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LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

PART I

THE RATIONAL METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

1. *Introduction*

EVENTS OF THIS century have raised an imposing array of searching questions which, not submissive to the ready answer, mercilessly demand a thorough review of the basic presuppositions of human existence. This pressing fact, together with the new and continuing inquiry which has induced man to refocus his attention on many of the same questions that have dogged his historical footsteps for centuries, have led him to a forthright recognition, though often a reluctant one, of the deep human need for and the full justification of a science of being. Without being man cannot live, for only in the climate of being is life meaningful.

Yet the old antinomies persist, and today, as in the past, philosophers sharply disagree regarding the nature as well as

the method of metaphysics. For all, metaphysics is, if ultimates are admitted, an inquiry into ultimates; but the ultimate is different things for different philosophers, and there are different philosophies because of different ultimates with correspondingly different ways of realizing them.

The single minded aim of the present inquiry will be an attempt at a further clarification of the method of metaphysics. That some clarification is welcome is witnesesd to by the opposing directions of development sometimes noted even within the Thomist school and by an almost systematic ambiguity often surrounding the metaphysical enterprise itself.

That our inquiry might satisfactorily be contained within determined limits, we shall presume a common ground of agreement regarding the nature of metaphysics, assuming that it is the science of being as such, and shall concentrate our principal effort toward pin-pointing and elucidating the notion of its method.

Working out the methodology of any science contains more than its share of problems, as the philosophical literature particularly of the past decade reveals. Yet, when we approach the question of the methodology of the metaphysician, we appear to have released the lid from a pandora's box of antinomies and seemingly insoluble paradoxes. For, as the most fundamental and universal of sciences, metaphysics must have a method which matches it stride for stride both in its fundamentality and its universality, and this means that neither this science nor its method can rest on presuppositions for which it itself is not accountable.

The method of a science is nothing more than a ' way of proceeding' intellectually. As we know, etymologically it derives from the two Greek words, *meta* (with, along), and *hodos* (way), which together mean 'along a certain way or path.' Consequently, method is the name given to the manner in which a scientist pursues a more perfect and more complete knowledge of the subject of his inquiry. Referring this to metaphysics we can then say that in general the method of the metaphysician is the special manner in which he pursues

his more perfect and complete understanding of being. The question which we propose to consider in this study is the method of metaphysics *in particular.* Hence we wish to know *how it is that the science of metaphysics unfolds and evolves; what procedures the metaphysician employs in seeking out a fuller knowledge of his proper subject, being.*

That the orientation of this study might appear from the outset, we shall here indicate in summary form its fundamental tenet and conclusion. We seek to establish, and, to some extent, clarify how it is so, that the method of metaphysics is as unique as the science itself, and that it is for that reason most properly termed a ' rational method.'

Owing to the pejorative overtones which the phrase ' rational method ' currently conveys, such a claim is likely to cause some dismay, for to assert that the metaphysician employs a *mtional method* seems clearly to amount to saying that, despite all the clarifications of the past century in neo-Thomist circles relating to the nature of metaphysics, one is dangerously approaching the reactionary position of the rationalists who saw no need to distinguish between metaphysics and logic. Yet it is our conviction that the method of metaphysics is fundamentally and genuinely ' rational,' and that such is indeed the unequivocal position of St. Thomas. The principal intent then of this paper envisages the substantiation and explicitation of the above claim.

Our inquiry into the method of metaphysics as St. Thomas understood it begins with the consideration of a difficult text which occurs in his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius.[1] Here, in the first article of the sixth question

[1] Although this text has been the subject of much comment, the key point, in our opinion, and to our knowledge, has never been sufficiently explained nor exploited. We would consider this text to contain in germ St. Thomas' definitive view regarding the method of metaphysics. The following is a partial list of those who have, in recent years, commented upon this text: Sheila O'Flynn, " The First Meaning of ' Rational Process ' According to the Exposition in Boethium De Trinitate," *Laval Theologique et Philosophique,* X, 1954, pp. 167-188; Germain Grisez, *Thomist,* XXIII, 3, 1960, pp. 469 ff.; Jean Isaac, O. P., "La Notion de dialectique chez Saint Thomas, *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques,* XXXIV,

entitled," *Utrum oporteat versari in naturalibus rationabiliter, in mathematics disciplinabiliter, in divinis inteUectualiter,"* St. Thomas begins his response by attending exclusively to the first part of the question, namely, whether in natural philosophy one ought to proceed *rationally.* He replies by stating that in the pursuit of scientific or demonstrative knowledge one can be said to proceed rationally in one of three ways.[2]

2. *The Second Way of Proceeding Rationally*

Although it is the *first* of these ways which concerns us directly, we will, in the interest of clarity, anticipate this consideration by examining beforehand the *second* and *third* alternate ways of rational procedure before we turn our attention to the first. Though the passage is lengthy, it is decidedly relevant to our inquiry:

> Another way in which a process is said to be *rational* is from the term toward which it tends. The last term toward which a *rational inquiry* ought to lead is the understanding of principles *(intellectus principiorum),* for it is by a resolution into these principles that we judge. When, however, such a resolution is had, the process or proof is not said to be *rational* but *demonstrative.* Yet, occasionally our inquiry cannot be terminated at an understanding of principles, but rather terminates in the act of inquiry itself as, for example, when we are unable to decide between two alternatives; and this happens when we proceed according to probable arguments which are capable of generating opinion or faith but not certain knowledge. Thus such a procedure is termed *rational* to distinguish it from a *demonstrative* procedure, and it is possible that one proceed *rationally* in this manner *in any science whatsoever,* in order that through probable arguments one might prepare the way for trne demonstration. This, then, is the second manner in which we employ logic in demonstrative sciences, not indeed inasmuch as it is doctrinal, but to the extent that it is applied. Thus, according to both of the above mentioned ways, a process is termed *rational* be-

1950; Ralph Mcinerny, "Some Notes on Being and Predication," *Thomist,* XXII, 1959, pp. 323 fl'.; Charles De Koninck, " Metaphysics and the Interpretation of Words," *Laval Theologique et Philosophique,* XVII, I, 1961, pp. 32 fl'.

[2] " Dicendum ad primam questionem quod processus aliquis, quo proceditur in scientiis, dicitur rationabilis tripliciter - - - - "

cause of its dependence on the *rational science,* for in this manner, logic, which is called the *rational science,* is employed by the demonstrative sciences, as the Commentator remarks in commenting on the first book of the Physics. [3]

It is clear, then, that in this passage St. Thomas is pointing out that the term or *finis* of an intellectual inquiry can be used to determine whether or not the procedure employed. is a *rational procedure.* In short, if the term of an intellective process is truly certain or demonstrative knowledge, then the procedure is not *rational* according to this second meaning of *rational.* If, however, the inquiry can do no better than produce probable knowledge or opinion, then the process is rightfully termed *rational.* Thus *rational process,* according to its second meaning, is divided against a *demonstrative* process. The latter affords scientific knowledge through true demonstration; the former, the *rational process,* can produce nothing beyond probability or opinion.

The *rational* process to which St. Thomas here refers is indistinguishable from a purely dialectical process.[4] Dialectics, which is a branch of logic, can truly be termed a science, although it can never conclude with certainty, owing to the intrinsically unstable condition of the premises from which it begins. Nonetheless, there is a real certainty to the probability of its conclusions,[5] and hence, to this extent, it does partake of the nature of a science.

Further, any intellective inquiry whatsoever can be considered to proceed *rationally* in this manner, since arriving at probable conclusions is often but a preparatory step toward the

[8] All citations taken from St. Thomas' Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius are from the critical edition of Bruno Decker, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate,* E. J. Brill, Leiden, *1955;* author's translation.

• Not infrequently the distinction between logic and dialectics is overlooked. This leads to unnecessary obscurity of thought and, occasionally, even to a serious misinterpretation of texts. Cf. e. g., Jean Isaac, 0. P., "La Notion de dialectique chez Saint Thomas,' *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques,* XXXIV, 1950, pp. *500* ff.; and James C. Doic, C. S.C., "Aquinas on Metaphysics and Method," *Philosophical Studies,* XIII, 1964, pp. 27-28.

• Cf. *In IV Meta.,* 1. 4, [576].

realization of a true demonstrative process m which a **full** resolution into first principles is had.

In concluding his remarks, St. Thomas incisively distinguishes the *rational* process, understood as a dialectical one, from the other two forms of rational procedure by referring to the fundamental Aristotelian division of logic into *doctrinal* and *applied* logic.[6] To proceed dialectically is to employ logic inasmuch as it is *applied* only and not as *doctrinal.* We shall not delay longer on this distinction for the present, for it **will** suffice here merely to bear in mind that when St. Thomas speaks of the *rational* process according to this second sense of *rational,* he has in mind that type of inquiry after truth in which logic is employed not as doctrinal but as applied only.

3. *The Third Way of Proceeding Rationally*

In the last section of the body of the article we have been examining, St. Thomas explains the third manner in which an intellectual process can be termed *rational;*

> The third way in which a process is termed *rational* is when the procedure respects the proper mode of the rational soul in knowing. In this sense a *rational* procedure is proper to natural science, for natural science in its manner of proceeding respects the proper mode of the rational soul in a twofold way.
>
> First, because, just as the rational soul receives its knowledge of intelligibilities, which are more knowable by nature, from sensible things, which are more knowable with respect to us, so natural science proceeds from those things which are more knowable to us and less knowable according to nature, as is clear from the first book of the *Physics.* Further, demonstration which proceeds from a sign or an effect is the type mainly employed in natural philosophy.
>
> Second, because, since it is the function of reason to proceed from one thing to another, this is especially observed in natural science, where from the knowledge of one thing one comes to a knowledge

[6] Henceforth we shall translate the expression *logica docens* as doctrinal logic, and *logica utens* as applied logic. We agree with Father Doic that doctrinal logic corresponds to the more modern term, *formal* logic, and that applied logic is equivalent to what is now called *material* logic. Cf. " Aquinas on Metaphysical Method," *Philosophical Studies,* XIII, 1964, pp. 29-30.

of another, as from the knowledge of an effect one comes to the knowledge of the cause. And not only does one proceed from one thing to another according to reason, where there is no real distinction between things, as when from *animal* one proceeds to man. . . . But in natural science, in which demonstration occurs through extrinsic causes, something is proved about one thing through another thing altogether extrinsic to it. And thus the mode of reason is especially observed in natural science; wherefore natural science is the science most conformed to the intellect of man.[7]

Thus the manner in which the natural philosopher proceeds is *rational* because it imitates the mode of knowing of the rational soul. It does this in two respects:

(1) Just as the rational soul takes its knowledge directly from sensible things, which, although less knowable in themselves, are more knowable with regard to us, and then proceeds to a knowledge of that which is more knowable in itself, so likewise the natural philosopher begins his inquiry with that which is more knowable relative to us and less knowable according to nature. Thus the demonstration employed by the natural philosopher resembles the mode of knowing of the rational soul inasmuch as it proceeds for the most part from sign and effect.

(2) The mode of procedure of the natural philosopher is in close harmony with the mode of procedure of the rational soul inasmuch as it, like the latter, often proceeds from the knowledge of some thing to the knowledge of another thing entirely distinct from it. It does this through the employment of extrinsic causes, and, since this manner of proceeding is singularly appropriate to the natural philosopher, his method of inquiry is very properly *rational* in the third sense in which St. Thomas understands that term. Hence the method of the natural philosopher is, as most perfectly conformed to the intellect of man which is rational, the most human.

In this passage, then, St. Thomas wishes to emphasize what he has said elsewhere regarding the method of the natural

[7] *In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1, ad lam quaestionem.

philosopher, namely, that the latter makes use of all four causes in pursuing a more penetrating knowledge of the subject matter of his science.[8] Though it is proper to the procedure of all of the sciences to proceed from one *ratio* or intelligibility to another, with the lone exception of the metaphysician it pertains exclusively to the natural philosopher to proceed from the consideration of one thing to another.[9] This then is the second manner according to which the methodological procedure of the natural philosopher is imitative of the rational soul, and hence is properly designated rationaU [0]

St. Thomas then remarks that this manner of proceeding is not proper to the mathematician, whose investigation always takes its point of departure from the form or the essence of the thing, since it employs only the formal cause, and never the efficient, final or material causes. Thus, although the mathematician may be able to arrive demonstrably at the definition of a circle by beginning with a triangle, this he can do simply because the triangle is potentially a circle and vice versa.[11]

St. Thomas concludes his remarks regarding the third manner according to which an intellectual procedure might be termed *rational* by emphasizing that, although a rational procedure of this type is most fittingly made use of by the natural philosopher, it is not a manner of proceeding which is exclusively his.;l[2] He has stated elsewhere, for example, that the metaphysician also employs efficient causality in his inquiry, although he makes considerably more sparing use of it than does the philosopher of nature.[13]

4. *The First Way of Proceeding Rationally*

Having thus considered the last two of three distinct ways in which a scientific methodology might be termed *rational*, we

[8] *In I Phys.*, l. l. [12].
• *In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad primam quaest., ad 3.
[10] *Ibid.*
llibid.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *In Phys.*, 1. 1, [12].

can now return to a consideration of the first presented by St. Thomas. Here *we* shall see how metaphysics is, with. reference to the method it employs, the *rational* science *par excellence.*

In beginning his response St. Thomas has said, as already noted, that the manner in which one proceeds in the sciences can be termed *rational* in a threefold sense. He then proceeds to a consideration of the first of this tripartite division of *rational* procedure, stating that a method of inquiry can be termed *rational* with reference to the *principles* from which it proceeds. Thus, if one's inquiry stems from and involves the operations of reason and their products, such as genus, species, opposition and similar beings of reason, which the logician properly considers, the inquiry can be termed *rational.* [14]

St. Thomas then proceeds to explicitate further the manner and the extent to which a truly scientific investigation, which is not strictly a logical investigation, can be termed *rational.* The subsequent three statements in the body of the article are crucial regarding St. Thomas' definitive position regarding the method of metaphysics. [15] It will be helpful to read them first as a piece, before submitting them to analysis.

> Thus a manner of procedure is termed *rational* whenever in any science one uses propositions which are set forth in logic; that is, whenever we employ logic in other sciences inasmuch as it [logic] is *doctrinal.* However, this manner of proceeding is not a prerogative of any particular science, in which error results unless it proceed according to its own proper principles. Yet this method of procedure can properly and aptly be followed in both logic and metaphysics, since each of these is a common science and, in a certain sense, is concerned with the same subject. [16]

The thought expressed in the opening sentence is deceptively subtle, for, at first reading, it seems merely to say that an

[14] "Uno modo ex parte principiorum, ex quibus proceditur, ut cum aliquis procedit ad aliquid probandum ex operibus rationis, cuiusmodi sunt genus et species et oppositum et huiusmodi intentiones, quas logici considerant." *Ibid.*

[15] There are other complimentary passages occurring in other treatises which we shall have occasion to consider subsequently.

[16] *In Boetii De Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad primam quaest.

intellectual investigation is *rational* if it employs propositions and logical intentions in any way whatsoever providing it applies them to the real order; i.e., the subject of its own science. Such an interpretation, however, is promptly overturned by what is set forth in the remainder of the passage. For, if what we have just supposed were the correct interpretation, then it would immediately follow that all real sciences could properly be termed *rational,* since it is clear that all make some use at least of propositions and other logical intentions which properly fall under the legitimate consideration of the logician. However, St. Thomas expressly underlines the fact that not all real sciences can be called *rational* in the sense in which he is presently using that term. In fact, he expressly states that there is but *one* real science which is privileged to employ logic in this manner, and it is *metaphysics.* We must, then, return to the beginning of this passage and initiate a fresh start.

5. Doctrinal and Applied Logic

Upon closer scrutiny we note that the process in question is only then *rational* when it employs logical intentions, not in any way whatsoever, but only when it employs them *as the logician does,* that is, " to the extent that we use logic as it is doctrinal in the other sciences." The term ' doctrinal logic' *(logica docens)* is juxtaposed to 'applied logic' *(logica utens)* which is clearly implied in the full context of the statement.

We met with this same distinction in considering the *second* way in which a scientific process can be said to be *rational.* This distinction has singular importance relative to an adequate understanding of the special relationship obtaining between the sciences of logic and metaphysics. Hence, there is need for a more detailed consideration of the distinction between doctrinal and applied logic, for the passage we are presently striving to interpret will yield no meaning whatever unless these notions are carefully distinguished and clearly understood. [17]

[17] As indicated above, we translate *logica docens* as doctrinal logic, and *logica utenl1* as applied logic.

Doctrinal logic is in effect the same as speculative logic. As such it comprises the consideration of definitions, propositions and other beings of reason exclusively from the viewpoint of their intentional existence, and thus attends to the various relationships existing between them.[18]

On the other hand, applied logic, as the term indicates, involves an application of *doctrinal* logic to *real* being.[19] In this connection it should be borne in mind that logic is both an art and a science which has as its proper subject beings of reason, and that it is made possible by the very fact that the human mind is capable of reflecting upon its own act, upon itself.[20]

Further, it is important not to view logic as an end in itself, for it is esssentially an instrument of the mind directed toward facilitating and rendering possible a scientific and ordered grasp of the world of singular existents.[21] This it accomplishes by presenting to reason for its use all of the intentional instruments which the logician has fashioned through his consideration of its own proper subject, beings of reason, such as definitions,

[18] The distinction between doctrinal and applied logic comes in for particular attention in Prof. Ralph M. Mcinerny's recent work, *The Logic of Analogy*, Martinus Nijhofl', The Hague, 1961, pp. 181-121; and in Prof. Edward D. Simmons' article, "The Nature and Limits of Logic," *The Thomist*, XXIV, 1961, pp. 67-70.

[19] " Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de istis intentionibus, instituens modum, quod per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis probabiliter instituendas; et hoc demonstrative facit et secundum hoc est scientia. Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam et ad alias particulares scientias quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus logicis. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae habent ipsam scientiam et doctrinam et usum, sicut dialectica tentativa et sophistica; quaedam autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa. *In IV Meta.*, 1. 4, [576-77].

•• *In Post. Analy.*, Proem. [1-2]; *In IV Meta.*, !. 4 [574].

[21] " --- scientiae speculative, ut patet in principia Metaphys. sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa. Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias." *In Boetii De Trinit.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2.

propositions, the modes of predication, and syllogistic argumentation; all of which are indispensable to the scientist in his quest for a more perfect knowledge.[22] Since logic is the science of reason which must always be employed by man as he seeks more perfect knowledge both of himself and of the world which surrounds him, it is not merely the method of this or that speculative science, but is indeed, in a fundamentally true sense, the method of all the real sciences.[23] The canons of logic which are formulated by the mind through a consideration of things, as known, are what are referred to by the expression, doctrinal logic; while the application of these same canons to real being is what is meant by *applied logic.*

In regard now to the interpretation of the passage from the commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, it will help to bear in mind that, while logic is the common method of all the sciences, it is not, however, employed by all of them in the very same manner. As one science differs from another because of its proper subject, (that concerning which it is seeking more perfect knowledge), so it will make use of logic in accordance with the nature and dimensions of its own proper subject matter.

The natural philosopher will not use logic in the same way as the mathematician, nor will the mathematician avail himself of logic in the same manner as does the metaphysician. This is a key principle underlying the whole argument of St. Thomas, for the major premise of that argument is that " a process is *rational* when, in any science, one uses propositions set forth in

•• " Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad earn, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis scientiis indigemus. Unde secundum Boetium in Comment. super Porphyrium non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum." *Ibid.*

[23] " Et hoc etiam consonat verbis Philosophi, qui dicit in II Metaph., quod modus scientiae debet quaeri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod logica, quae docet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis ante omnes alias scientias addiscere .... ' *Ibid.,* ad 8. " Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis." *In II Meta.,* 1. *5,* [885].

logic; that is, whenever we use logic in other sciences precisely inasmuch as it is doctrinal."

We can note then that the special meaning attributed to the term, *rational,* in this part of the text is extremely restricted. Although he admits that all sciences do and must make use of logic, the rational science, St. Thomas does not grant that thereby these speculative and real sciences pursue their object by employing a *rational* method. In other words, in order for the method of a science to be termed *rational,* as that term is presently understood, it does not suffice that somehow it simply makes use of logic. It must indeed make use of it in order for its method to be called *rational,* but it must also employ logic in a most extraordinary manner. How? If the manner of proceeding of a speculative science is *rational,* in the present context of that term, then it must employ logic precisely inasmuch as it is doctrinal *and not* inasmuch as it is applied. However, before continuing with our analysis of this passage there is yet another precision which must be made and which has to bear on the distinction between doctrinal and applied logic.

Generally speaking, when logic is employed as an instrument by the real sciences, it formally ceases to be logic, and is automatically integrated into the real science which employs it. This is because logic as such is not a science of real being, but of intentional being or beings of reason only.[24]

Yet there is a branch of logic, commonly termed 'dialectics,' which can be applied to real being without losing the essential characteristics of a *rational* or logical science. The reason for this is that dialectics begins from propositions which are merely probable, and consequently, since they never fully attain to real being, they are beings of reason. Dialectics, therefore, is the science not of demonstration in the strict sense but rather of probable argumentation,[25] and as such can be, as a *branch of*

•• Prof. Simmons has expressed this notion well: "However, no logician, as logician, can ever say that this or that proposition (in a scientific area other than logic) is certainly true. Logic is related to the other sciences simply as an instrument to be used by each one of them, without doing the work precisely of any one of them." *Op. cit.,* p. 64.

•• Cf. *In Post. Analy.,* Proem., [6].

logic, both doctrinal and applied.[26] This feature of dialectics is altogether unique and is not true of judicative or demonstrative logic which, as logic, is *exclusively doctrinal.*[21]

Demonstrative logic is doctrinal only and can never be applied as such, for the reason that demonstration, which deals with necessary and universal principles, concludes not probably but necessarily and certainly. Consequently, whenever the principles of demonstration are applied to real being, as they would be in the context of the passage under consideration, the certain conclusions which follow pertain not to logic, since they are not mere beings of reason, but rather real beings. The result of this is that such conclusions form a part of the body of a real science, and do not belong to the science of logic, which has, as its proper subject, beings of reason only. Thus it should be carefully noted that the real scientist who, in the pursuance of the object of his own science, employs logic, (as indeed he always must), is not on that account a logician in the *formal* sense, but rather a mathematician, a physicist, a philosopher, etc., as the case may be.

On the other hand, though he is not formally acting the part of a logician in exploring the unknown in the realm of the real, he must, however, have some implicit knowledge at least of logical principles and procedures which, as forming the common method of all the sciences, are indispensable to all progress in the realm of knowledge.[28]

[2] *"In IV Meta.,* l. 4, [576], cf. note 17.

[27] " Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam, et ad alias particulares scientias quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus logicis. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae habent ipsam scientiam et doctrinam et usum, sicut dialectica tentativa et sophistica; quaedam autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa." *Ibid.,* [577].

[28] *In 11 Meta.,* l. *5,* [335]. We feel that this is an important feature of the nature of logic and its relation to the real sciences which is gradually being lost sight of even by some contemporary Thomists. Witness, for example, the remark of Joseph Owens: " But why cannot these beginnings, in the case of Thomistic metaphysics, be taught the student independently of an approach either through logic or through natural philosophy?" "A Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," *The*

At the same time, however, it is not the function of the logician but of the individual scientist to determine the method of the particular sciences, although obviously this does not imply that the real scientist is free to use or not to use logic in implementing his scientific investigation. His only ' freedom ' consists in his determining *how* he will employ logic in his particular science, and surely he is to be encouraged, as Prof. Simmons has remarked, ". . . to introduce his proper investigation with a proemium in which he determines the contraction of logic which constitutes his own method." [29]

An explicit understanding of the methodology of each of the particular sciences would go a long way towards resolving the countless discussions which ensue regarding the relationship between the various sciences, and is really essential if the true nature and function of logic as a common science is to be understood and appreciated. [30]

We have seen, then, that demonstrative logic is doctrinal only, and that dialectical logic is both doctrinal and applied. These considerations will now permit us to penetrate further into the relationship between the method of metaphysics and logic. As seen, St. Thomas has stated that a scientific process is ' rational' when one uses logical intentions precisely as they are set forth in logic. Viewed in the background of the preceding considerations, the meaning of this enigmatic statement now seems sufficiently clear. He is saying that a scientific process is *rational,* according to the first meaning of that term, when a real science is capable of assimilating the doctrinal canons of logic whole

New Schol., XXVIII, 4, 1954, p. 473. For a well reasoned defense of logic cf. Henry B. Veatch, *Intentional Logic,* Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1952, Ch. II. esp., also: Veatch, "In Defense of the Syllogism," *The Modern Schoolman,* XXVII, March, 1950, pp. 184-202, and Edward D. Simmons, "The Nature and Limits of Logic," *The Thomist,* XXIV, 1961, pp. 47-71.

[29] *Op. cit.,* p. 67, n. 20. " Modus autem proprius singularium scientiarum, in scientiis singulis circa principium tradi debet." Cf. *In II Meta.,* 1. 5, [355].

[30] " The distinction between logic as a common mode and its contractions in the various scientific methodologies must be recognized, understood, and respected for the sake of logic itself, and especially for the sake of the sciences for which logic serves as a tool." Edward D. Simmons, *op. cit.,* p. 67.

and entire, and of thus employing them integrally in the pursuit of a fuller knowledge of its own proper subject.

Were we to entertain any doubt that this be the correct interpretation of St. Thomas' thought on this point, a careful perusal of the remaining two statements of this passage would amply reassure us of its basic accurateness. Yet before moving on to a consideration of these further remarks let us recapitulate briefly what our interpretation has been. We have concluded that not every real science which employs logic can be said to proceed *rationally,* but only that science or those sciences which can make use of doctrinal logic without altering it in the least, and without conditioning it to the specific exigencies of its own proper subject of inquiry.

6. *The Affinity of Logio and Metaphysics*

The next question, then, which naturally arises is whether there is such a science at all, and, if so, whether it be one or many. St. Thomas gives direct and definitive answers to both of these questions. There is indeed a science that proceeds in the above described fashion; it is one and one only; it is metaphysics.

> But this manner of proceeding does not, properly speaking, pertain to any of the particular sciences, in which error is had unless they proceed according to what is proper to them. [31]

By this remark St. Thomas does not intend, assuredly, to contradict what we have heard him say elsewhere regarding the common method of the sciences. That is, by now stating that none of the particular sciences pursue a *rational* method in the sense just described, he does not envisage denying that logic is the common method of all the sciences. This is clearly brought out by the added condition expressed by the word ' properly ' *(proprie).* Thus he says that' properly speaking,' no *particular* science proceeds *rationally,* for no particular science, although it uses logic, employs logical propositions exactly as the logician

[31] " Sed hie modus proeedeudi non potest proprie eompetere alieni partieulari seientiae, in quibus, peeeatum aeeidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur." *In Boetii De Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad primam quaest.

employs them, but must further modify them to fit its own proper subject matter.

Thus, as St. Thomas points out, a particular science which would attempt to employ logical propositions, in the manner in which he has described, would inevitably incur error in some form or another, for such propositions have not yet been tailored, as it were, to fit the limited and determinate subject matter of that particular science. Hence, although the particular real sciences do make use of logic, and unavoidably so, they do not, however, use it in such wise that their manner of proceeding might be termed *rational* in the first sense.

Finally, in the last sentence of this passage St. Thomas identifies by name the real science that does proceed according to a *rational* method in this restricted sense, and at the same time he provides the reason underlying his claim. The real science that proceeds strictly according to a *rational* method is metaphysics. The reason this is so is because metaphysics, together with logic, is a ' common ' science, possessing as it does a subject that includes all things. Hence, as sciences, logic and metaphysics are intimately related, for both share in a certain sense a common subject. There is no other science that can claim a similar prerogative. In St. Thomas' own words: "This properly and suitably occurs, however, in logic and metaphysics, inasmuch as each of these two sciences is common and is, in a certain sense, concerned with the same subject." [32]

St. Thomas is restating here what he has said in some detail in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,* and it is quite a simple matter to perceive how profound his thought is and how far reaching are its implications. There is a genuine affinity between logic and metaphysics, an affinity that is altogether unique amongst the sciences, because they alone have 'being' for their subject. Metaphysics investigates real being as such, while logic investigates beings of reason as such. [33]

[32] " Contingit autem hoc proprie et convenienter fieri in logica et metaphysica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subiectum quoddammodo." *Ibid.*

[33] " Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus quas ratio adinvenit

7. *The Unlimited Horizon of Logic and Metaphysics*

Because, therefore, the human intellect can know all being, all being can be known as known, and it can be known according to the manner in which it is known, that is, universally as a second intention.[34] Though the true, direct object of the human intellect is the material, singular existent,[35] such knowledge is necessarily mediated through some universal grasp of the nature of that singular.[36]

By reflecting upon the universal form inhering within itself, the intellect is led to a secure knowledge of the singular thing, and is capable of ascertaining the non-individual status of that form as well as the possibility of its being predicated or referred to numerous singular existents.[37] Such explicit reflective aware-

in rebus consideratis; *sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura,* sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, et est proprium subiectum logicae." *In IV Meta.,* 1. 4, [574].

[34] "*Prima* enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. *Secunda* autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit *in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum,* intelligens se intelligere et *modum quo* intelligit." *De Potentia,* q. 7, a. 9, resp.; cf. also: *In I Sent.,* d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 11; *In I Sent.,* d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

[35] " Unde ilium quod est obiectum intellectus nostri non est aliquid extra res sensibiles existens, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed aliquid in rebus sensibilibus existens; licet intellectus apprehendat alio modo quidditates rerum, quam sint in rebus sensibilibus. Non enim apprehendit eas cum conditionibus individuantibus, quae eis in rebus sensibilibus adiunguntur." *In II De Anima,* 1. 8, [717]; cf. also: *De Potentia,* q. 7, a. 9, resp.

[36] *Ibid.,* also: " - - - intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter per modum intellectus, non autem materialiter per modum rei materialis." *Sum. Th. I,* q. 85, a. 1, ad 1.

[37] " - - - idest dictum est solum in universali, quod substantia est illud, quod non dicitur de subiecto, sed de quo dicuntur alia; sed oportet non solum ita cognoscere substantiam et alias res, *scilicet per definitionem universalem et logicam;* hoc enim non est sufficiens ad cognoscendum naturam rei, quia hoc ipsum quod assignatur pro definitione tali, est manifestum. Non enim huiusmodi definitione tanguntur *principia rei,* ex quibus cognitio rei dependet; sed tangitur aliqua communis conditio rei per quam talis notificatio datur." *In VIII Meta.,* 1. 2, [1280]. Van Roo formulates the genesis of the being of reason succinctly as follows: " To the nature, existing as one and undivided by reason of its abstraction from matter and the conditions

ness on the part of intellect of the immaterial and universal status of the very intelligibility enlivening its own act of understanding generates a second intention, or a being of reason,[38] and such beings of reason, which receive their very actuality from created intellect, and hence exist as such only in intellect,[39] constitute the exclusive and unique field of investigation of the logician.[40]

At this point it can be remarked that, although the second intention is the result of a reflective act of intellect, and although it exists nowhere as such save within intellect itself, all *entia rationis* are indirectly though necessarily dependent upon the form or similitude received by intellect through the intellective illumination of the phantasm. The presence of this form within intellect permits it first to understand and then reflectively to grasp that presence as *intentional,* and it is, as indicated, this reflective grasping of the intelligible species which generates the being of reason or second intention.[41]

of matter, are added the intentions of universality or predicability, which are a kind of relation which the nature has to the many subjects in which it exists (or can exist) outside the intellect, as one nature common to all and predicable of all." William A. Van Roo, S. J., "The Study of Genus," *The Modern Schoolman,* XX, 1943, p. 241.

[88] " Nee tamen intellectus est falsus: quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, *scilicet gemts et species,* non attribuit rebus *secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in inteUectu.* Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in se ipsum reflectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas: et sic sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio, cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam; *ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio, cui respondet res inteUecta secundum quod huiusmodi;* sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis respondet res extra animam; *rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei respondet solum res intellecta." De Potentia,* q. 7, a. 6, resp.

[89] " --- inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super opus reflectitur; unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus et aliae de intentionibus intellectus. Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod *esse intentionis intellectae etiam in ipso intellectu consist,it,* non autem esse intellectus nostri, cuius esse non est suum intelligere." *Sum. Contra Gentiles,* IV, c. 11.

•• *Ibid.*

[41] Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod *aliud est inteUigere rem et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus rej!ectitur." Ibid.*

Since, therefore, there is nothing to prevent intellect from achieving, in the manner just described, a reflective grasp of all intentions or forms inhering within it, i. e., from the aspect of their inherent universality and hence predicability, it follows that the subject of the science of logic is as wide as the horizon of metaphysics itself.[44] Whatever metaphysics considers it

[44] "Et hujusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subjectum logicae. Hujusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subjectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit quod subjectum logicae aequiparatur subjecto philosophiae quod est ens naturae." *In IV Meta.*, 1. 4, [574], cf. also: *Ibid.*, A parallel passage is found in the opusculum, *De Natura Generis*, whose authenticity is accepted by some; rejected by others; Cap. 4, [486], *Opuscula Philosophica*, Spiazzi, O. P., ed., Marietti, I954, p. ISO.

Since we will have occasion to refer to this *Opusculum* again, a word about its authenticity seems in order. Cajetan rejected the opusculum on the grounds that it contained some points in open contradiction with the teaching of St. Thomas. For a critique of Cajetan's theory of the formal constitutive of the created person, cf. J. Reichmann, " St. Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan and the Created Person," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXIII, I959, I, pp. I-33; pp.

The authenticity of *De Natura Generis* is also rejected by Perrier *(Opuscula omnia, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis*, Vol. I, Paris, Lethiellieux, I949, p. Perier's position is unequivocal: "... prorsus non S. Thomae; cum vehementer discrepet ab eius doctrina." Similarly, Mandonnet, according to Msgr. Grabmann, rejects the work as spurius because it is not mentioned in the official catalogues of St. Thomas' works.

On the other hand, Grabmann's own study of the ancient catalogues and manuscripts led him to conclude that the *De Natura Generis* is indeed an authentic work of St. Thomas (Die *Echten Schriften des Heiligen Thomas von Aquin*, Aschendorfl'schen Verlagsbuchhandlung. MUnster, pp. and More recently the studies of C. F. Rossi, C. M., have led him to the same conclusion as that of Msgr. Grabmann. Cf. Rossi, "Gli Opuscoli di S. Tommaso d' Aquino: Criteri per cognoscerne l'authenticita," *Divius Thomas*, (PI), I953, p. 388. The same conclusion has been reached more recently still by F. Pelster, S. J., "Die Thomas von Aquin ausgeschriebenen Opuscula, De instantibus, De Natura Verbi intellectus, De principio individuationis, De genere, De natura accidentis, De natura materiae, De quattuor oppositis, und ihr Verfasser," *Gregorianum*, XXXVI, I955, pp. Adrian Pattin also accepts the authenticity of the *De Natura Generis*, cf. "Bijdrage tot de Kronologie van St. Thomas' Werken," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, XIX. I957, pp. Finally, it is interesting to note that Capreolus himself expressly considers St. Thomas to have been the real author of the *De Natura Generis.* Cf. *In Ill Sent.*, d. 5, 3, 3, ad I arg. Scoti, Vol. V, p. I05, col. *Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomas Aquinatis*, ed., Pabanet Reques, Paris, I904. The contrary view is supported by H. F. Dondaine, *O. P., Bulletin Thomiste*, IX, I954, p. 94, who agrees with Mandonnet.

regards from the aspect of being, and logic, because of its *common nature,* is competent to keep pace.

Yet there remains a very important difference in both the *material and formal* subject of their considerations, for the metaphysician considers *real being* from the aspect of real being; while the logician considers *rational being* or second intentions from the aspect of its rationality or their intentionality.43

The metaphysician considers the forms of things not absolutely, as does the logician, but concretely as they subsist in an act of existence intrinsic to the singular thing and extrinsic to and independent of the activity of created intellect.[44] Conversely, the logician considers forms *absolutely,* that is as they exist in intellect apart from all material conditions.[45] This is why the logician considers whatever he considers as a logician from the vantage point of its intentional existence. He is concerned with the signification of intentions or ideas, but only as they signify as existing in intellect itself.

Although the metaphysician is concerned with forms only to the extent that they delimit and determine the act of being of a singular thing independently of the activity of intellect, yet he does concern himself with intentional or rational being in a certain sense. This he does, not strictly inasmuch as they are *intentional,* but only to the extent that such intentions represent *real* modifications of operative intellect.

Expressed somewhat differently, the metaphysician considers

•• "Unde logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit hoc nomen, corpus, de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicare: sed esse hujus naturae non est ejusdem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde *quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, quia considerant res secundum suum esse,* nee hoc nomen, corpus, nee aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus .... " *In I Sent.,* d. 19, q. *5,* a. 1, ad 1; "Logicus enim considerat *modum prae®candi et non existentiam rei." In Vll Meta.,* 1, 17, [1658].

«'' Logicus enim considerat absolute intentiones .... ", *In Boetii De Trin.,* q. 6, a. 3, resp., " Logicus enim considerat aliqua secundum quod sumuntur in ratione, *et ideo considerat substantiam secundum quod per actionem inteUectus subest rati01ni universalitatis* . ... " *De Natura Generis,* c. 4, [503]; cf. also, *Sum. Contra Gentiles,* IV, c. 11, cf. footnote 39.

•• *Ibid.*

beings of reason just as he does prime matter, material forms, whether substantial or accidental, and whatever else he considers, namely, simply inasmuch as these are ordered and related to the act of being itself of the singular thing in which they inhere and of which they are principles, and *not* inasmuch as they are related to an intentional or mental act of existence which has been supplied the form inhering within intellect by that power itself, of whose act of understanding the form is a determining principle.

It is for this reason that both logic and metaphysics have unlimited horizons. Neither science considers any particular or formal determination of being as such, for neither *esse intentionale* nor *esse reale* contains determination in and through itself.[46] Whatever determination it possesses it has received from the form which it actuates. Each of these sciences views its respective subject matter, common being, from an existential vantage point which, in the case of logic, is *intentional,* and, in the case of metaphysics, is *real.*

The metaphysician attends to how things exist in the rt>al order and why; i. e., he considers them independently of the effect of the activity of created intellect, while the logician attends to the manner in which ' things,' i. e., beings of reason, or second intentions, exist in created intellect. There is a striking similarity between these two sciences, but all the same this likeness is solidly permeated by a profound difference.

Because, then, of the unique manner in which the logician considers and analyses his subject matter, logical propositions are universal, not only in the sense that concepts of material things are universal because they are abstracted from matter, and are thus immaterial, but also in the sense that they contain, as they are viewed by the logician, no formal determination whatever. The logician considers them from the exclusive viewpoint of their being ordered to an intentional act of existence.

Were the matter otherwise, the logician's inquiry would be

•• *De Ver.,* q. 1, a. 1, resp.; *S. C. G.* III, c. 66; *S. T.,* I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3; *S. C. G.,* I, c. 43; *S.C. G.,* II, c. *52; Quaest. Un. de Anima,* a. 1, ad 17.

limited to a specific or generic class of intentional beings, and would not be open to *all* beings of reason, with the resulting necessary denial of its special status as a 'common' science, as well as of its truly remarkable and singular affinity to metaphysics. Were logic burdened by such a supposition, it would simply be incapable of keeping pace with the dynamic and ubiquitously searching inquiry of the metaphysician, who, in his inquiry, is free of even the most rudimentary inhibitions.

Wherefore, since the metaphysician considers all being from the standpoint of its very being, and shows no direct concern for the being's formal or essential determination save as a determination of being/ [7] he is in a position to apply the propositions of the logician to real being directly. As seen, St. Thomas has expressly ruled out the possibility of such an exchange between logic and the other real sciences on the exclusive ground that none of the 'particular' sciences could make this transfer without first readapting the proposition to the limited subject of each respective science.[48] To employ logic in this way, however, is not to employ it precisely as logic, i. e., as doctrinal.

Since, therefore, the subject of metaphysics is not thus

[47] Whatever science directs conscious attention to a *particular aspect* of being, is, by that very act, a particular science. Metaphysics and logic are, however, as St. Thomas has remarked, 'common' sciences. *In IV Meta.*, 1. 1, [530].

[48] " Sed hie modus procedendi non potest proprie competere alieni particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur." *In Boetii De Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1, ad primam. "When propositions that have been established in this rational science serve to elucidate the subject of another science, the process involved is called rational, and constitutes a particular use of logic. Inasmuch as this use consists in providing scientific knowledge, logic is said to be used according as it teaches in another science. However, although any particular science can use logical propositions in this way, - - - they are not appropriate to the more limited subject, for what is logically common does not actually contain what is really distinct and particular. The process which starts from second intentions is of course proper to logic, but it is also appropriate to metaphysics, for metaphysics and logic are both common and deal with common things, the logical communia being founded on the real communia-and thus they somehow have the same subject." Sheila O'Flynn, " The First Meaning of 'Rational Process' According to the Exposition in Boetii De Trinitate," *Laval Theologique et Philosophique,* X, 2, 1954, p. 181.

limited, for being does not of itself bespeak limitation, the metaphysician is in a position to employ a 'purely' logical method; something which is forbidden to any other science. It is for this reason that St. Thomas maintains that the *rational* method, in the sense of a strictly logical method, is proper to metaphysics alone.[49]

PART II

THE RATIONAL METHOD OF METAPHYSICS AND PREDICATION

Our foregoing study of the method of metaphysics has led us to conclude that its method is *rational* in a unique and exclusive sense. Although logic is not a science of the real, and metaphysics is the science of the real *par excellence,* considering whatever it considers from the viewpoint of its being real,[50] these two sciences have much in common, for both are 'common' sciences having being as their proper subject.

As seen, this singular fact enables the metaphysician to employ logic in a manner that no other science can-to make use of logical intentions as though they were not logical intentions at all, i. e., by employing them just as the logician does. The sole 'difference' lies in the fact that the metaphysician directs them toward real being, being that is not dependent for its being on an act of a created intellect.

Because, therefore, the logician employs not only what are commonly termed second intentions, (e. g., genus, species, difference, opposite, etc.) , but also entire propositions and forms of argument in meeting the requirements of his own science, it will follow that the metaphysician, who is entitled to borrow from the logician whatever intentional instruments he may

•• In addition to emphasizing this point in the corpus of the article, as seen, St. Thomas also returns to it in his response to the first objection. The objector had contested that it was wrong to attribute a 'rational' process to the philosophy of nature since it seems to be totally diverse from the rational science, logic. St. Thomas grants the force of the objection when applied to 'rational' process taken in the first sense; denies it relative to 'rational' process taken in the second sense. *Ibid.*

[50] *In IV Meta.,* l. 1, [530].

have fashioned, and to exploit their utility in investigating the subject of his own science of the real, is fully within his rights in employing logical propositions as well as second intention concepts, just as the logician has employed them, to advance the cause of his own metaphysical inquiry. [51]

Consequently it is to the metaphysician's own special manner of handling ' logical ' propositions that we now wish to direct our attention, hoping thereby to throw some additional light on the *rational* method of metaphysics. It follows, then, that we intend to explore at least some of the metaphysical implications of predication.

I. *An Instance of the Application of the Logical Method*

The third lesson of the seventh book of St. Thomas' commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle provides us with a passage very much to our purpose. This passage refers expressly to the important text in the commentary recently considered, [52] and repeats in condensed fashion the main features of the argument in the commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate.* It does more, however, than merely repeat what has been set *down* in these other passages, for it expressly indicates the relation existing between the *rational* method of metaphysics and *predication,* canonizing this teaching both with a concrete example and express approbation.

Beginning with the third lesson of his commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, St. Thomas observes that Aristotle divides his consideration into two parts. In the first he will consider the essence of sensible substances through logical and common arguments, *(per rationes logicas et communes)* .[53] In

[51] *In Boetii Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad lam quest.

[52] *In IV Meta.,* l. 4,

[53] " Postquam determinavit Philosophus ordinem procedendi circa substantias, hie incipit determinare de substantiis sensibilibus, sicut praedixerat; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima determinat de essentia substantiarum sensibilium per rationes logicas et communes, [578]. In secunda per principia substantiarum sensibilium in octavo libro, ibi [691], 'Ex his itaque dictis syllogizare oportet.'" *In VII Meta.,* 1. 3, [1306].

the second part he will consider the essence of sensible substances through the principles themselves of sensible substances.[54]

Aristotle begins his analysis by determining what essence is, and this he does through the application of the logical method.[55] St. Thomas then defends the legitimacy of employing this method in a metaphysical treatise by underlining the fact that metaphysics has a special affinity to logic, since both are common sciences.[56] Consequently, he argues, the logical method is proper to the science of metaphysics, and hence it is fitting that the metaphysician begin with it.[57]

St. Thomas' next comment is truly significant with regard to the correlation obtaining between the method of metaphysics and predication. Aristotle had remarked that he would begin his investigation of the essence of sensible being by instituting a ' logical ' consideration of them. St. Thomas now explains the meaning of the term ' logic ' (7r€p£ *avrov* A.oy(KW>) as Aristotle here understands it, pointing out that he employs the term in this context because his investigation of sensible being commences with an application to it of the *way of predication,* and this approach, St. Thomas adds, properly pertains to logic.[58]

St. Thomas' comment, therefore, removes all doubt as to the legitimacy of the metaphysician's use of predication as a means to obtain a true knowledge of being. He thus carefully underlines the fact that, although Aristotle says that he will first proceed according to the ' logical ' method, he does so only inasmuch as he recognizes that the ' logical ' method is a method altogether consonant with and appropriate to metaphysical inquiry. It is clear, then, that, when Aristotle speaks of pro-

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *Ibid.,* [1398].

[56] " Sicut enim supra dictum est, haec scientia habet quandam affinitatem cum logica propter utriusque communitatem." *Ibid.*

[57] " Et ideo modus Iogicus huic scientiae proprius est et ab eo convenienter incipit." *Ibid.*

[58] " Magis autem logice dicit se de eo quod quid est dicturum, inquantum investigat quid sit quod quid erat esse *ex modo praedicandi.* Hoc enim ad logicum *proprie* pertinet." *Ibid.*

ceeding logically in this text as well as in others, he does not intend that such an investigation be considered as pertaining to the science of logic, for, though the method is *rational,* the investigation is metaphysical. This is because demonstrative logic is *doctrinal* only, and, when applied to real being, becomes one with the science applying it. Demonstrative logic, is, as logic, doctrinal only.[59]

Since, then, there is no such thing as a demonstrative procedure which pertains to the science of logic, it follows that whenever St. Thomas speaks of investigating real being demonstratively according to the logical method his words are not to be interpreted to mean that he considers the investigation a logical one. He merely means that the metaphysician is at work investigating real being according to the logical method, which is the method proper to the science of metaphysics, since it, like logic, is a common or transcendental science.

Clearly, then, the teaching contained in this passage from the commentary on the *Metaphysic8* is in every way consonant with the teaching previously considered in the article from St. Thomas' commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, where it is stated that the *rational* method pertains, among the real sciences, only to the science of metaphysics.[60]

To return now to St. Thomas' statement that Aristotle will investigate the nature of sensible being by analyzing it through predication, we note that he immediately undertakes to accomplish just that. " When we inquire about the essence of anything," he says, " we are unable to give a suitable answer by naming those things which pertain to it only accidentally."[61] For example, when one asks, ' what is man? ' one cannot reply

[59] That the metaphysician does proceed ' rationally ' is a rather central point in Thomistic and Aristotelian metaphysics which does not seem to have been properly emphasized nor indeed, in some instances, fully realized by some very competent and widely respected contemporary Thomists. We shall return to this observation later after having concluded our analysis of the relation between metaphysics and predication.

[60] Cf. *In Boetii de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad lam quaest.

[61] *In VII Meta.,* l. 3, [1309].

that he is white or that he is seated, or that he is
From this it follows that none of those things that are predicated ' accidentally ' of a being pertain to its essence so as to be constituitive of it.[63] On the other hand, when *per se* predication is had, something at least (if, for the sake of argument, we prescind from proper accidents) of the essence of the subject is expressed even though the predicate may not express the entire essence.[64]

Thus an analysis of predication is a perfectly legitimate method for determining what pertains to the essence of an individual, determinate being, and what does not; and this analysis is conducted not on the logical but on the metaphysical level.

It might, of course, be thought that to place so much reliance on predication is to lean dangerously in the direction of the development of a thoroughly subjective metaphysics. Such anxiety, however, is ill-founded, for predication, while it does represent an act of reason, is not on that account subjective. If, for example, we return for a moment to the proposition St. Thomas proposed as an instance of *per accidens* predication, viz. that ' This man is white,' we might justifiably ask how we know that this is in fact an instance of *per accidens* predication. Is it not because we have at some time observed that, though there are men who are white, there are also others who are not? From this we were led to conclude negatively that ' white ' does not pertain to the essence of man. The act of predicating follows upon man's experience of being in its limited and determinate forms, and hence primarily and directly reflects things as they *are,* not as they are *thought.*

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] "Et ideo nihil eorum, quae praedicantur per accidens de aliquo, pertinent ad quod quid erat esse illius rei: non enim musicum esse, est tibi esse." *Ibid.*

[64] " Et ideo sequitur quod musicum esse non est tibi esse; quia, ea quae pertinent ad quidditatem musici, sunt extra quidditatem tuam, licet musicus de te praedicetur. Et hoc ideo, quia ' tu non secundum teipsum es musicus,' idest quia musicum non praedicatur de te per se, sed per accidens. lllud ergo pertinet ad quod quid est tui, quod tu es ' secundum teipsum,' idest quia de te praedicatur per se et non per accidens; sicut de te praedicatur per se homo, animal, substantia, rationale, sensibile, et alia hujusmodi, quae omina pertinent ad quid est tui." *Ibid.,* {1310].

2. *Predication and the Real*

Indeed the act itself of composing and dividing is the human intellect's way of consciously knowing the other, and it is grounded on the real.[65] Though it may and will employ terms having logical and universal overtones, such as 'substance,' 'body,' 'animal,' etc., the intellect does not directly and naturally avert to the logical aspect of these terms or concepts, but rather employs them as an inner expression of that which is extrinsic to intellect and which is the determining and formal cause of its knowing.[66]

All logical intentions are consciously and reflectively acquired, since they depend upon the intellect's turning back upon its own act and upon the product of its own act and attaching to that product a relation which is derived through having made a comparison of concepts; as, for example, that 'animal' is the genus of 'man,' since it indeterminately includes man.[67]

[65] "Uncle qui putat dividi quod est divisum in rebus, verus est in sua opinione; ut putat hominem non esse asinum: et similiter qui putat componi quod est compositum in rebus, ut qui putat hominem esse situm in rebus, ut qui putat hominem esse animal. . . . Quod sic considerandum est, non enim ideo tu es albus, quia nos vere existimamus te esse album; sed quia tu es albus. Uncle manifestum est, quod *rei est causa veritatis in opinione et oratione.* . . . Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam aut eius quod se habet per modum formae et materiae, vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subiectum respondeat *quasi fundamootum et causa veritatis*, compositioni, quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce. Sicut cum dico Socrates est homo, veritas huius enunciationis causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hie homo . . . . " *In IX Meta.,* 1. 11, [1896-98].

[66] "Praedicatio enim est quoddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re, ipsam unitatem eorum quorum unum de altero dicitur. Uncle ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis quae est genus, quae similiter per actionem intellectus completur. Nihilominus tamen id cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit, componens id cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius id cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine 'animal.'" *De Ente et Essentia,* c. 3, [20], Spiazzi, ed., Marietti, Romae, 1954.

[67] " In conclusion, then, it is the relations of reason which the intellect finds among its concepts, and only these (contrary to the opinion of most contemporaries), that constitute *the intentions* which form the subject of the science of

The fact that the human intellect is capable of spawning an almost unlimited number of beings of reason merely by explicitly recognizing the various relations which exist between the concepts contained within it, accounts for the very possibility of the existence of the science of logic. Ultimately, the reason why such a network of relations of reason is possible at all is because all the natural concepts of intellect which directly refer to some aspect of real being, exist immaterially in the intellect, and because, owing to the abstractive manner of the human intellect's knowing the real material existent, there can be many concepts in intellect which owe their origin to one single individual being.[68]

It is clear, therefore, that a suitable understanding of the origin and nature of these second intentions is of paramount importance to the metaphysician, if he is to avoid falling into the same state of utter confusion as those who have failed to distinguish between metaphysics and logic. Thus a failure to attend to the origin of second intentions and their relation to real being, brings in its train a serious oversight with regard to the function of predication in metaphysics, which in turn leads to an insidious undermining of the science of being, which so heavily depends upon predication for the exercise of its own unique and singularly effective rational method.[69]

logic. For it is by the establishment of these relations that the concepts are ordered and the rational work formed by the art of logic.' O'Flynn, Sheila, *op. cit.*, p. 181. "Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis." *In VII Meta.*, 1. 13, [1576]. For a detailed study of the nature of genus, cf. "A Study of Genus," by Wm. A. Van Roo, S. J., *The Modem Schoolman*, XX, 1943, pp. 89-104; 165-181; 230-244.

[68] *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 7. Cf. also: *Sum. Th.* I, q. 58, a. *5* and q. 85, a. *5.*

[69] St. Thomas emphatically underlines this point in the introduction to his treatise, *De Ente et Essentia:* "Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, secundum Philosophum, primo Caeli et :Mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in primo libro suae Metaphysicae; ideo, ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam, dicendum est, quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur, et quomodo in diversis inveniantur, et *quomodo se habeant ad intentiones logicas*, scilicet genus, speciem, et differentiam." The Opusculum, *De Natura Generis*, also emphasizes the relation between logical intentions, predication and the real order: "Ex dictis patet quod,

Since the logician considers things inasmuch as they exist in the mind [70] and the metaphysician or philosopher considers them inasmuch as they exist' apart' from their being known, [71] it follows that the logician, when he makes use of predication, considers merely the mode of predication without averting to what is ultimately signified, [72] whereas the metaphysician considers not merely the mode of predication, but at the same time considers the significative determination of the mode as it refers to the real order of things. [73]

It is, then, because predication is first and foremost an expression of real being [74] that the different ways in which the

considerando entitatem rerum in se sicut facit Philosophus primus, in substantia nulla foret praedicatio unius de altero, quae tamen in substantia reperitur secundum logicum, secundum quem substantia quodammodo induit similitudinem inhaerentiae accidentalis, ubi est proprie dici de altero etiam secundum primum Philosophum. Ex quo facile deprehenditur error volentium in natura rei multiplicare formas substantiales, unde sumuntur praedicta substantialia, sicut et formae accidentales multiplicantur in re, de qua multa praedicantur accidentalia realiter; cum tamen in substantia non sit praedicatio aliqua secundum veram naturam rei, sed per actum intellectus, ut dictum est. Unde ponentes plures formas substantiales in re una, *ignorant naturam et originem propositionum* in quibus aliquid de aliquo praedicatur, et differentiam etiam inter substantiam et accidens." c. *5,* [513].

[70] " Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis." *In VII Meta.,* 1. 13, [1576]; cf. also: *De Nat. Generis,* c. 4, [503]; "Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Pars autem logicae, quae demonstrativa est, etsi circa communes intentiones versetur docendo, tamen usus demonstrativus scientiae non est in procedendo ex his communibus intentionibus ad aliquid ostendendum de rebus, quae sunt subiecta aliarum scientiarum." *In I Analy. Post.,* 1. 20, [171].

[71] " Sed philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia; et ideo apud eius considerationem non differt esse in subiecto et de subiecto." *In VII Meta.,* 1. 13, [1576].

[72] Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei. Unde quidquid respondetur ad quid est, dicit pertinere ad quod quid est; sive illud sit intrinsecum, ut materia et forma; sive sit extrinsecum, ut agens vel finis." *In VII Meta.,* 1. 17, [1658].

[73] " Sed philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum sint extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse." *Ibid.*

[70] " Cum autem in re sit quidditas eius et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis." *In I Sent.,* d. 19, q. *5,* a. **I**.

intellect executes the act of predicating accurately reflect the diverse ways in which real being is.[75] The copula, 'est,' although it signifies the composition of subject and predicate, does this secondarily. What it first signifies is the actual inherence of the form expressed by the predicate in the singular existing things represented and signified by the subject of the enunciation,[76] and hence the copula primarily signifies the limited actuality of being as determining and experienced by the knower.[77]

Because this actuality of being, which is known directly, i.e., in man's present condition, is both determined and actualizing, it is composite;[78] and this very composition is what the composition of enunciation reflects as it announces the mind's conformity with its object.[79]

[75] " Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus." *Ibid.* ". . . si consideretur ipsum esse rei, quod est ipsa ratio veritatis, sicut dicitur in II Meta. (com. 4) eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate; unde quae sunt magis entia, sunt magis vera . . . . " *Quaest. Un. De Caritate*, a. 9, ad I.

[76] " Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter." *In Peri Hermeneias*, L. I. 8, [98]. " . . . compositio autem intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur." *Sum. Th.* I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 8; " . . . enunciatio est judicanda una non ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate significati." *In Peri Hermen.*, L. I. I. 8; cf. also: *In IX Meta.*, 1. 11, [1898].

[77] " Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum *est*, est communiter *actualitas omnis formae*, vel actus substantialis vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum, 'est,' significat compositionem." *In Peri Hermen.* I, I. 5, [78]; cf. also: *Sum. Th.* I, q. 14, a. 14, ad 2.

[78] " Esse autem, in quo consistit compositio intellectus, ut affirmatio, compositionem quamdam et unionem indicat . . . . " *In IX Meta.*, 1. 11, [1900].

[79] " Sicut cum dico Socrates est homo, veritas huius enunciationis causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hie homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa veritatis est compositio albedinis ad subiectum: et similiter est in aliis." *In IX Meta.*, 1. 11, [1898].

As is clear, the concepts employed by intellect in the enunciation to express its oneness with the complex object known are initially obtained through the first act of the mind; for, St. Thomas says, " The enunciation follows upon apprehension, and thus we necessarily express things as they have been understood." [80] Thus, although the enunciation is many materially, [81] it signifies as one,[82] so that what the intellect understands and expresses through its act of judging is a singular subject in which is found a particular form or perfection. [83]

Because, then, the intellect gives expression to the material thing known according to its own mode, that is, immaterially, there is, despite this difference of hierarchic levels of being, a genuine isomorphism or conformity between the intellect knowing and the material thing from which the intellect's act of knowing has received its formal determination, viz. the object known.

Stemming from this isomorphic structure which exists between the intellect knowing and the thing known, which is unequivocally and irreversibly announced in any affirmative judgment, is found the absolute validation of the employment of predication as an unerring tool of *metaphysical* method. Through predication one is placed in contact with the real, for the mode of the act of predication reflects the mode of the

[80] " ---- enuntiatio sequitur apprehensionem. Unde secundum quod intelligimus aliqua, oportet quod enuntiemus ilia." *In I Sent.,* d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, sol.; 'Unde secundum diversitatem rationum format praedicatum et subjectum, et secundum identitatem componit." *Ibid.,* ad 1.

[81] " Sed ilia compositio vel divisio, qua intellectus coniungit vel dividit sua concepta, est tantum in intellectu, non in rebus. Consistit enim in quadam duorum comparatione conceptorum; sive ilia duo sint idem secundum rem, sive diversa." *In VI Meta.,* 1. 4, [1241].

[82] "Et sic etiam intellectus quando considerat propositionem, considerat multa ut unum; et ideo inquantum sunt unum, simul intelliguntur, dum intelligitur una propositio quae ex eis constat ---- " *De Ver.,* q. 8, a. 14; *Sum. Th.* I, q. 14, a. 14; *In I Peri. Hermen.,* 1. 3.

[83] "Compositio autem est quaedam imitatio unitatis." *DeVer.,* q. 2, a. 7, ad 3; "Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicata praedicantur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subiecto de quo praedicantur, et unicuique eorum quae de 'ipso praedicantur' id est diversa quidditas et essentia." *In VII Meta.,* 1. 2, [U87].

being of the thing known. In St. Thomas' words: ". . . the manner of predicating is proportioned to the things themselves about which predication is made." [84]

3. *Predication, the Predicaments, and the Modes of Being*

The subject of metaphysics is *ens commune,* (common being) ,[85] and, because common being contains within it no express determination whatsoever, it is exclusively through predication that it is diversified.[86] The most general, all inclusive diversification of common being by means of predication is represented by the ten predicaments, each of which represents a mode of being found by the intellect in the existing thing which is known.[87] Thus the predicament, substance, does not add a

[84] " . . . modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio . . "; *In 1 Sent.,* d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1. " . . . quot modis aliquid praedicatur, ' toties esse significatur ' idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse." *In V Meta.,* 1. 9, [890]; " . . . diversus tamen modus existendi impedit univocam praedicationem "; *De Bot.,* q. 7, a. 7; "Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi." *In Ill Phys.,* 1. 5, [322].

[85] " Cum enim haec scientia metaphysica consideret ens commune sicut proprium subjectum quod quidem dividitur per substantiam et novem genera accidentium . . . ." *In III Meta.,* 1. 1, [1682]; " . . . quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subjectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune." *In Meta.,* Proem.

[86] " Ens enim non est genus . . . quia in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum . . . . " *In 1 Sent.,* d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2; " . . . hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hac vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi . . . . " *In IV Meta.,* 1. 2, [553]; " Uncle oportet quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera *secundum diversum modum praedicandi,* qui consequitur *diversum modum essendi;* quia ' quoties ens dicitur ' idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, 'toties esse significatur,' idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi." *In V Meta.,* 1. 9, [890].

[87] "Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum accidentale, quia compositio fit per intellectum secundum determinatum tempus. Esse autem in hoc tempore vel in illo, est accidentale praedicatum. Sed ens quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, significat ipsas naturas decem generum secundum quod sunt actu vel potentia." *In X Meta.,* 1. 3, [1982]. "In nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta ut patet in V Meta., (com. 13, 14). *De Pot.,*

new dimension to being, for this new dimension or new nature would itself belong to being. Rather, "... by the name of substance is expressed a certain mode of existing, namely, of *per se* existence; and so similarly in the other predicaments *(genera)*." [88]

Thus the predicaments are distinguished according to the diverse manner of predicating, and this latter is directly dependent upon and proportionate to the diverse modes of being found in the singular existent. [89] Consequently, although the predicaments are classifications of the most basic modes of predication, the differences found in the modes of predication themselves are not the sole work of intellect, but are caused by the really different modes of real being. The predicaments are not, therefore, *mere subjective classifications of being* having no counterpart in the world of real being, but rather reflect and mirror the actual ways in which being *is* participated by things *independently* of the mind's knowing it. [90]

It is this proportion between the modes of predicating and the modes of being which permits the philosopher to make use of predication in seeking out a further knowledge of his own proper subject, and it is this, plus the fact that metaphysics and logic are both *'common' sciences*, that permits and justifies the metaphysician's employing the modes of predication in precisely the same way the logician does, funneling its activity now toward real beings rather than toward beings of reason.

q. 7. a. 9, resp., "... nihil quod est ens tantum in anima, in genere determinato collocatur." *In I Sent.*, d. q. a. 1, sol., "... quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non aliquod accidens, vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum essendi, *qui fundatur in ipsa essentia rei." De Ver.*, q. a. 1, resp.

88 - Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit supra ens aliquam differentiam, quae significet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur *quidam specialis modus essendi scilicet per se ens;* et ita in aliis generibus." *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 1, resp.

89 - Unde oportet quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi . . . qui consequitur diversum modum essendi. . . ." *In V Meta.*, 1. 9, [890].

90 - ... modum praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio . . . ." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 4, a. ad 1.

Ultimately, this is what grounds the legitimacy of the *via praedicationis* as a thoroughly metaphysical method and procedure, so that, through a consideration and comparative analysis of predication, the metaphysician is quite able to reach truly scientific conclusions regarding the metaphysical and transcendental aspects of the real.

4. *Predication and Prime Matter*

We have already witnessed an instance where St. Thomas fully approved of Aristotle's use of the' way of predication' to begin his inquiry into the nature of sensible being.[91] The consideration of other noteworthy instances of this same procedure will prove rewarding. One is found in the same seventh book of the Metaphysics where it is a question of the metaphysician's establishing, as a metaphysician, the reality of an indeterminate essential principle of sensible being.[92]

The validity of the proof of prime matter from motion as employed by the philosopher of nature is not called into question. Yet St. Thomas, approving of the procedure which Aristotle has followed, will affirm that this is not the only possible way in which the reality of primary matter can be demonstrated. The metaphysician, he points out, establishes the distinction of matter from all determinate forms *per viam praedicationis,* which, he immediately adds, " is proper to Logic, and which in the fourth book of this treatise he [Aristotle] has declared to be closely related to metaphysics." [93]

The fact that the nature of matter can be established by different sciences employing different methods of procedure ought to present no real problem, for there is here an overlapping of their material subjects, and, though both the natural philosopher, arguing from motion, and the metaphysician, argu-

[91] Cf. *In VII Meta.,* 1. 8, [1808].

[92] *In VII Meta.,* 1. 2, [127-89].

[93] "Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis Philosophiae, sed *per viam praedicationis,* quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae." *Ibid.,* [1287].

ing from ' the way of predication,' arrive at the same or a similar conclusion,[94] they do so through an entirely different medium. Hence the basic methodological canon that each science must conduct the investigation of its own subject matter with a method specifically proper and proportionate to it, remains inviolate and unchallenged.

Though it may appear to be an unwarranted assumption that the metaphysician should consider primary matter at all, for this seems to be the exclusive preserve of the philosopher of nature, whose proper subject formally includes matter, it can be pointed out that the metaphysician does not consider matter precisely inasmuch as it is a co-principle of the essence of sensible being, but exclusively from the viewpoint of its participation in common being.[95] Though it is perfectly true that the metaphysician is primarily concerned with the formal and final causes of being, his total interest also extends to the efficient and even at times to its material cause.[96]

[94] Relative to the overlapping of the material subjects of the sciences the following passage is instructive, and seems quite applicable in the present context: "... scientiae mediae, de quibus dictum est, communicant cum naturali, secundum id quod est materiale in earum consideratione, differunt autem secundum id quod in earum consideratione est formale, et ideo nihil prohibet has scientias interdum cum naturali *easdem habere conclusiones. Non tamen per eadem demonstrant*. ..." *In Boetii De Trin.,* q. *5,* a. 3, ad 7.

[95] ". . . metaphysicus considerat etiam de singularibus entibus non secundum proprias rationes, per quas sunt tale vel tale ens, sed secundum quod participant communem rationem entis, et sic etiam pertinet ad eius considerationem materia et motus." *In Boetii de Trin.,* q. *5,* a. 4, ad 6.

[96] " Omnis autem substantia vel ens per seipsam, si sit forma tantum; vel si sit composita ex materia et forma, est ens per suam formam; unde inquantum haec scientia est considerativa entis, considerat maxime causam formalem. Primae autem substantiae non cognoscuntur a nobis ut sciamus de eis quod quid est, ut potest aliqualiter haberi ex his quae in nono determinatur: et sic in earum cognitione non habet locum causa formalis. Sed quamvis ipsae sint immobiles secundum seipsas sunt tamen causa motus aliorum per modum finis; et ideo ad hanc scientiam, inquantum est considerativa primarum substantiarum, praecipue pertinet considerare causam finalem, et etiam aliqualiter causam moventem. Causam autem materialem secundum seipsam nullo modo, quia materia non convenienter causa est entis, sed alicujus determinati generis, scilicet substantiae mobilis. Tales autem causae pertinent ad considerationem particularium scientiarum, *nisi forte considerentur ab hac scientia inquantum continentur sub ente. Sic enim ad omnia suam considerationem extendit." In Ill, Meta.,* 1. 4, [384).

For this reason the metaphysician can establish the existence of a purely material and indeterminate principle of sensible being through his own logical method which, precisely because it is a 'common,' indeterminate method, is capable of being applied to all things without qualification, provided only that they be considered from the aspect of their existential indeterminacy, i.e., as participating common being. The metaphysician, then, considers matter, not as related to sensible form, for this pertains to the investigation of the philosopher of nature, but simply as matter; that is, as an indeterminate essential principle of being.

Similarly, the metaphysician is permitted to extend his inquiry to the material forms of sensible beings, although he does not consider them as material, but strictly as forms, that is, as principles of being.[97]

The argument for the existence of an indeterminate essential principle of sensible being from predication can be briefly presented as follows: From the nature of denominative predication it follows that there must be a subject which is formally and essentially distinct from whatever is predicated of it, and hence we must *ultimately* arrive at a subject which is *de se* indeterminate. This subject is primary matter. Let us attempt to explicitate and clarify the argument.

First of all, in denominative or *concrete* predication we note that the essence of the subject is distinct from the essence of the predicate.[98] Thus, e. g., while it is true that *this man is white,* it is not true that *man is whiteness,* or that *humanity is*

[97] " Et ideo dicit quod de principio formali, utrum sit unum vel plura, et quot et quae sint, pertinet determinare ad Philosophiam primam, et usque ad illud tempus reservetur; quia forma est principium essendi, et ens inquantum huiusmodi est subiectum primae philosophiae." *In I Phys.,* 1, 15, [283].

[98] " Sciendum autem est quod id, quod hie dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo, sed oportet hoc intelligi *de denominativa praedicatione,* sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis, unde subjungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative." *In VII Meta.,* l. 2, [1288].

whiteness, because the forms signified by the subject, ' man,' and the predicate,' whiteness,' are simply diverse. Similarly, it is true that this material thing is a man, although it is not true that *matter is man,* or that *matter is humanity .*[99] A comparative analysis of the truth and falsity of propositions such as these leads St. Thomas to conclude that matter is essentially distinct from *all* substantial forms. "Concrete or denominative predication itself shows that, just as substance is essentially distinct from its accidents, so matter is essentially distinct from substantial forms." [100]

The reason underlying this conclusion is that there must be an absolutely first subject grounding each act of denominative predication, if such predication is to be at all possible. As seen, in denominative predication the ' essence ' of the predicate differs from the ' essence ' signified by the subject, and this is why denominative predication must always be concrete. Its subject and predicate must connote complete supposits and cannot merely signify an abstract form, such as *humanity* or *whiteness,* considered independently of the singular subject in which it inheres, for the only possibility of predicating two different forms of each other is that both forms be found inhering in the same subject or supposit. Thus, when I say that *this man is white,* I am not identifying his humanity with whiteness, but am merely affirming that both forms are found in the same identical subject or supposit.

Hence, the *ratio* itself of denominative predication demands an absolutely first subject/ [101] for the very condition of the possibility of such predication rests on the assumption that the form signified by the predicate and the subject are distinct. From this it follows that in denominative predication the subject is related to the predicate as potency is related to act.[102] If,

•• *Ibid.,* [1289].

[100] Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut substantia est aliud per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam aliud est materia a formis substantialibus." *Ibid.*

[101] Our discussion is concerned only with material supposits in which the essence itself is composite.

[102] " Ita tamen fiat talis praedicatio, quod semper id quod est in potentia secun-

therefore, there were no absolutely first subject of predication, it would mean that there could then be an instance of denominative predication wherein the subject and predicate were related as equals, as act to act, i. e., as simply the *same* in essential signification, a condition which contradicts the prior condition of the very possibility of denominative predication, viz., that the subject be related to the predicate as *potency* is related to *act.*

From this then it follows that the ultimate or primordial subject of denominative predication must be free from all formal determination, for, if it possessed such determination, it in turn could be predicated of some other subject less determined than itself, and so on *ad infinitum,* until a formless subject were reached. This is why St. Thomas concludes that the ultimate subject of denominative predication must be fully indeterminate in the order of essence. " Whence it follows that, strictly speaking, the ultimate subject is neither a quiddity (that is, a substance), nor a quantity nor any other thing that pertains to any of the genera of being." [103]

Such then is the way in which the metaphysician, by using the logical method, can establish the existence of a purely indeterminate, essential principle in material being.[104] It is not the only way in which the indeterminate nature of matter can be scientifically explicitated, for the natural philosopher also arrives at a similar conclusion by beginning his analysis from *motion.* However, this is a sound and legitimate metaphysical proof of primary matter, and the *only one* available to the metaphysician. Hence it is not to be relegated unceremoniously

dum modum determinatum, praedicatur de eo, quod est immediate posterius." *In IX Meta.,* l. 6, [1840].

[103] "Quare sequetur quod illud quod est ultimum subjectum per se loquendo, 'neque est quid,' idest substantia, neque quantitas, neque aliquid aliud quod sit in aliquo genere entium." *In VII Meta.,* l. 2, [1289].

[10]. Note that the argument is not circular. It is not the existence of material being which the metaphysician is proving or attempting to prove, nor the existence of a material principle which he already grasps confusedly, but rather the precise nature of that material principle. His analysis of the modes of predication reveals to him the completely indeterminate nature of matter.

to the humble status of a mere exercise in logic. On the contrary, both the inquiry and the conclusion are genuinely metaphysical in character .[105]

5. *The Logic-al Method and the Unic-ity of Substantial Form*

Another striking instance of the metaphysican's use of the ' logical ' or ' rational ' method to establish a metaphysical conclusion is found with regard to the *unic-ity* of substantial form. We observe that St. Thomas repeatedly employs the *via praedic-ationis* (way of predication) to prove that in man there is but one substantial form; that by this single form or soul he is living, sentient, and intelligent.

It is impossible, he argues, that in man there be three substantial forms, and this impossibility becomes manifest from an analysis of the very manner of predicating.1.oa For whatever terms derive from diverse forms are predicated of each other either *per ac-cidens* (when, i.e., neither of the two forms are necessarily ordered one to the other), as, e. g., *'sweet'* is predicated of ' *white,'* or *per se* according to the second mode, as when the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate.[107] Thus, in the proposition: ' a plane body is colored,' since the subject will inevitably enter into the definition of the predicate, the predication is *per se,* but according to the second mode only.1.os

[105] " Attamen diversitatem materiae *ab omnibus formis* non probat Philosophus per v!am motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis Philosophiae, sed *per viam praedicationis,* quae est propria logicae, quam in quarto hujus dicit affinem esse huic scientiae. Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicata praedicentur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subjecto de quo praedicantur, et unicuique eorum quae de 'ipso praedicantur,' idest diversa quidditas et essentia." *In VII Meta.,* l,

[106] " Sed si ponamus animam corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossible videtur plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. . . . Secundo, hoc apparet impossible ex modo praedicationis." *Sum. Th. I,* q. 76, a. 3, resp.

[107] " Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta, cum dicimus quod album est dulce; vel, si formae s!nt ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se in secundo modo dicendi per se, quia subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati." *Ibid.*

[108] " Sicut superficies praeambula est ad colorem, si ergo dicamus quod corpus superficiatum est coloratum, er!t *secundus modus praedicationis* per se." *Ibid.*

Before continuing with this analysis it will help first to clarify somewhat the meaning of *per se* predication according to the *second mode.* What St. Thomas understands by such predication is simply that the subject and predicate are so ordered to each other that the subject could not exist without containing the perfection of the predicate, and, similarly, the predicate could not exist without existing in the subject. In the proposition, therefore, ' a plane body is colored,' we note that there can not be an instance where there might be a plane body which is not colored, and, at the same time, it is also obvious that there cannot be a colored thing or color which is not found in a plane body as in a subject. This type of predication is called *per se* because it is *necessary* predication. It is called *per se* predication according to the *second mode* because the predicate does not express the *substance* or nature of the subject. Only when this last condition is fulfilled is *per se* predication according to the *first mode* actually had, and whenever one does find *per se* predication according to the first mode, which looks directly to the form and not to the matter, it is impossible that the subject be predicated of the predicate. Thus, e. g., the proposition, 'man is an animal,' is erroneously converted to 'animal is man.' [109]

Wherefore, St. Thomas argues, if it be true that man is said to be an ' animal ' by reason of one form, and ' man ' by reason of another, it follows that neither of these two forms could be predicated of each other save *per accidens,* unless they be somehow necessarily ordered one to the other. [110] Granting, however,

[109] " Si igitur iste ordo facit praedicationes esse per se, hoc non erit secundum ilium modum dicendi per se qui accipitur secundum formam, sed secundum ilium qui accipitur secundum rnateriam, et subiectum, sicut dicitur superficies colorata. *Hoc autem est impossible,* quia in isto modo dicendi per se, id quod est formale, praedicatur per se de subiecto, ut, cum dicimus, superficies est alba, vel numerus est par. Et iterum in hoc modo dicendi per se subiectum ponitur in diffinitione praedicati, sicut numerus in diffinitione paris. Ibi autem e contrario accidit. Non enim homo per se praedicatur de animali, sed e converso. Et iterum non ponitur subiectum in diffinitione praedicati, sed e converso." *S.C.* G. II, c. 58.

[110] " Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo; sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi per

that they were so ordered, they could only be predicated one of the other according to the *second mode* of *pre se* predication inasmuch as one form would be a *necessary condition* for the existence of the other.m

However, neither of these alternatives is acceptable. The reason they are not itself rests upon the mode of predication, for ' animal ' is predicated *per se* of 'man ' and not *per accidens;* and, furthermore, it is impossible that ' animal ' be predicated of man according to the second mode of *per se* predication, since ' man ' is never placed in the definition of ' animal.' [112] Hence there can ultimately be but *one substantial form* in man simply because we are able to say: man is an animal; while we are unable to say that ' an animal is a man.' [113]

Thus, one of the most basic tenets both of the philosophies of nature and of being, namely, *the unicity of substantial form,* either in material substances or in immaterial beings, is at bottom a metaphysical problem, [114] and it can be established by the metaphysician through the ' logical ' method, that is, through an analysis of *the modes of predication.* [15]

accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent . . . . " *Sum,, Th.* I, q. 76, a. 8, resp.

[111] ". . . vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula." *Ibid.*

[112] " Utrumque autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal de se de homine praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis. sed e converso. Ergo oportet eamdem formam esse per quam aliquid est homo; alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur." *Ibid.*

[113] *Ibid.*

[114] " Utrum [principium formale] sit unum vel plura, et quod et quae sunt, pertinet determinare ad philosophiam primam . . . quia forma est principium essendi, et ens inquantum hujusmodi, est subjectum primae philosophiae," *In I Phys.,* l. 15, [283]. The proposition, ' man is an animal ' has experience itself as its irreducible and infallible source, for every proposition such as this which is *per se nota* is infallibly known to be true once the terms of the proposition are understood. Cf. *De Ver.,* q. 10, a. 12, resp.; and *In IV Meta.,* l. 6. We know that animal is predicated *per se* of ' man ' because we understand that this is the nature of man, Cf. also: *In VII Meta.,* l. 8, [1825-26].

[115] For parallel instances where St. Thomas has analysed the modes of predication to establish the unicity of substantial form, cf. *S.C. G.,* II, c. 58; *Quaest. Un. de Anima,* a. 11; *De Spirit. Creaturis,* a. 8.

6. *The Logical Method and the Distinction Between Essence and Existence*

Another instance, perhaps more celebrated than any of the foregoing, in which St. Thomas employs the *via praedicationis* to reach a conclusion in the order of metaphysics is found in the fourth chapter of his opusculum, *De Ente et Essentia.* Here St. Thomas makes use of the 'logical' method to show that the essence and existence of material beings are distinct. His argument can be summarized as follows: Whatever does not pertain to the intelligibility of an essence, comes to it from without, forming a composition with it, for no essence can be understood without whatever constitutes a 'part' of the essence.[116] However, every material essence can be thought of without considering whether or not it actually exists.[117] Therefore, it is manifest that its "existence is distinct from its essence or quiddity." [118]

Since, by reflecting on *the modes of predication,* I come to realize that I do not predicate necessary existence of any of the quiddities I directly experience, I can conclude that the essence or quiddity is of itself indifferent to an existence apart from the intentional or mental existence it has in my own mind. Because the modes of predication follow upon and reflect the modes of the being of things, I know that the essence of things is truly distinct from its existence.

Although this argument occurs with some regularity in various works of St. Thomas,[119] and is never expressly qualified

[116] "Quidquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quidditatis, hoc est adveniens extra, et faciens compositionem cum essentia; quia nulla essentia sine his quae sunt partes essentiae intelligi potest." *De Ente et Essentia,* c. 4.

[117] *Ibid.*

[118] *Ibid.*

[119] "Invenitur enim in omnibus rebus natura entitatis, in quibusdam magis nobilis, et in quibusdam minus; ita tamen quod ipsarum rerum naturae non sunt hoc ipsum esse quod habent: *alias esse esset de intellectu cujuslibet quidditatis,* quod falsum est, cum quidditas cujuslibet rei possit intelligi etiam non intelligendo de ea an sit. Ergo oportet quod ab aliquo esse habeant, et oportet devenire ad aliquid cujus natura sit ipsum suum esse, alias in infinitum procederetur." *In II Sent.,* d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; "Esse autem secundum quod dicitur res esse in actu, iuvenitur ad diversas

as being of dialectical value only, but, rather, is always presented in a 'scientific' context, there are, nonetheless, those who wish to interpret it as a *merely dialectical* or *logical* argument, and who see in it no grounds for justifying a metaphysical conclusion. Thus, for example, Father Joseph Owens seriously questions its validity/ [20] as does Pere Jean Isaac. [121]

In plain truth, neither seems to have appreciated the true nature of this argument, nor the reason for its validity, for

naturas vel quidditates diversimode se habere. Quaedam enim natura est de cujus intellectu non est suum esse, *quod patet ex hoc* quod intelligi potest esse cum hoc quod ignoretur an sit, sicut phoenicem vel eclipsim, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Alia autem natura invenitur de cujus ratione est ipsum suum esse, immo ipsum esse est sua natura." *In II Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1; a. 1; "... si illud esse [scil. divinum] potest intelligi sine ilia essentia, sequitur quod ilia essentia accidentaliter se habere ad illud esse...." *S.C. G.* I, c. 22; "Essentia enim uniuscuiusque rei est illud quod significat definitio eius." *Compend. Theol.*, c. 10; "In quocumque enim aiiud est essentia, et aliud esse eius, oportet quod aliud sit quid sit, et aliud quod aliquid sit: nam per esse suum de quolibet dicitur quod est, per essentiam vero suam de quolibet dicitur quid sit: unde et diffinitio significans essentiam, demonstrat quid est res." *Ibid.*, c. 11; "... esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae; non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus earn esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam." *Sum. Th.*, I, q. 8, a. 4, resp.; "... quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse; non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nee huius hominis et illius hominis. Et sic oportet quod quaecumque sunt in genere, differant in eis esse et quod quid est, idest essentia." *Sum Th.* I, q. 3, a. 5, resp.

[120] For example, Fr. Owens writes: "Because one can know what a man or a phoenix is without knowing that any such thing exists in reality, one is supposed to see that the being is in reality other than the essence. Such an understanding of the argument would seem to take for granted that one has a direct and immediate perception of the essence as a reality complete and rounded-off in itself as though it prescinded from being, and a similar perception of existence as a distinct reality. This has been called the 'logical' proof of the real distinction. But as found in St. Thomas, it does not enter the logical order at all. It starts from the nature considered absolutely, and so as common to both the logical and real orders, and proper to neither." *St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics*, Marquette University Press, 1957, p. 95.

[121] "Nous crayons que Ia preuve du *de Ente et Essentia* est purement dialectique; on ne demontre pas !'existence de Dieu par Ia distinction reelle de !'essence et de !'existence, mais vice versa." *Bulletin Thomiste*, VIII, 1951-52, p. 58. As indicated earlier, Pere Isaac does not seem to have distinguished adequately between logic and dialectics, but tends to identify every 'logical' method with a dialectical one. Cf., note 4.

neither seems aware of the special manner in which the metaphysician is qualified to employ *the logical method* and apply it to real being.[122] In none of the instances in which we note that St. Thomas employs this argument does there appear the slightest justification to assume that he is arguing dialectically only. The argument is presented in full seriousness and apodictically; from it he immediately concludes to the existence of subsistent being. Moreover, oftentimes this is the *only* argument employed in a context that is calculated to establish the real distinction between created essence and its existence. On the other hand, if one has not clearly realized the peculiar relevancy of logic to metaphysics, and the *spee;ial manner* in which the metaphysician is privileged to employ logic in developing his own science, it is understandable that one should be skeptical of St. Thomas' procedure, and should seek to neutralize its significance.[123]

7. *Logw and Metaphysics*

If the foregoing interpretation of the 'logical' method of metaphysics is correct, then it seems time that one seek to restore logic to its rightful place of dignity and importance in the academic world. The current tendency often to associate logic with idealism and to ease it out of the philosophical curriculum cannot but have profound repercussions for metaphysics and for the whole of philosophy. It is inevitable that, by losing sight of the method of metaphysics, one will eventually lose sight of metaphysics itself, or, what would prove

[122] One author who does not seek to minimize the 'logical' argument and is not embarrassed by it is Germain G. Grisez. In a review article of M. Gilson's book, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy*, p. 14, he writes: " Further, although this argument is in a way very similar to dialetical argumentation, I do not think it is dialectical; rather, it is an example of the metaphysical method which Aquinas himself explicitly describes and distinguishes from dialectic, *(In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1) ." *The Thomist, XXIII*, 3, 1960, p. 469.

[123] For an outstanding example of a recent, sympathetic evalution of the science of logic, cf. *Intentional Logic*, Henry B. Veatch, Yale University Press,

equally as disastrous, confuse metaphysics with the science of logic.

Further, the foregoing analysis heavily underlines not only the easy availability of the 'rational' or 'logical' method in furthering a metaphysical investigation, but it indicates at the same time the metaphysician's need for an understanding and appreciation of that method, and, consequently, of *the nature and the function of the science of logic.* Though these two sciences are indeed distinct as sciences, they are, nonetheless, in a very real sense more closely related to each other than to any other of the sciences, for logic and metaphysics are the only ' common ' sciences sharing in a certain way a ' common ' subject, being.[124]

Thus, although logic is the method of all the sciences, yet in the fullest and most proper sense it is the method of the science of metaphysics. Therefore, precisely because the *rational method* consists in the application of the " modes of predication " to real being, just as the logician analyses the modes of predication in order to exploit the subject of his own investigation, beings of reason, it follows that the metaphysician must have a thorough grasp of at least the fundamentals of logic, and of the various modes of predication themselves, if he is to honor the demands made upon him by his own science.[125]

This, then., can be ranked as a classic instance of the applicability of St. Thomas' opening remark in his opusculum, *De Ente et Essentia,* that a small error in the beginning becomes a large one in the end. If indeed the metaphysician has an imperfect understanding of the meaning of predication and the significance of its various modes, surely he cannot long avoid erring in applying these modes to the subject of his own science, real being.

[12]. We do not intend to imply, however, that the study of logic, as such, is exclusively a logical inquiry, for, as E. Coreth points out, it is also a metaphysical one. " Die begriindung der Logik kann aber nicht Aufgabe der Logik selbst, sondem nur Aufgabe der Metaphysik als Grundwissenschaft sein." *Metaphysik: Eine Methodisch-Systematische Grundlegung,* Tyrolia-Verlag, Innsbruck, 1961, p. 85.

[125] Cf., note 82.

In his opusculum, *De Natura Generis,* St. Thomas has dramatized this point very effectively by indicating how a confused understanding of the nature of predication, through a failure to distinguish adequately between *per se* and *per accidens* predication, has led some into the error of supposing that a single being can contain a plurality of substantial forms.[126]

Further, in his *Summa Theologiae,* St. Thomas warns against a wooden and mathematical application of logical intentions to the real order, which can easily lead to an arbitrary and artificial multiplication and division of the real.[127] Besides, as already seen, in his proemium to the *De Ente et Essentia* he expressly mentions the philosopher's need to recognize the manner in which 'essence' and 'being' are related to logical intentions, if, in the carrying out of his investigation, he is to avoid error.[128]

[126] " Ex dictis patet quod, considerando entitatem rerum in se sicut Philosophus Primus, in substantia nulla foret praedicatio unius de altero, quae tamen in substantia reperitur secundum logicum, secundum quem substantia quodammodo induit similitudinem inhaerentiae accidentalis, ubi est proprie dici de altero etiam secundum primum philosophum. Ex quo facile deprehenditur error volentium in natura rei multiplicare formas substantiales, unde sumuntur praedicta substantialia, sicut et formae accidentales multiplicantur in re, de qua multa praedicantur accidentalia realiter cum tamen in substantia non sit praedicatio aliqua secundum veram naturam rei, sed per actum intellectus, ut dictum est. Unde ponentes plures formas substantiales in re una, *ignorant naturam et originem propositionum, in quibus aliquid de aliquo praedicatur, et diffierentiam etiam inter substantiam et accidens."* Caput *5,* [513]; "Ponit enim [scil. Avicebron] omnes formas secundum se consideratas accidentia esse; dicit tamen substantiales esse per comparationem ad aliquas res in quarum definitionibus cadunt, sicut albedo est de ratione hominis albi. Sed haec positio tollit quidem veritatem materiae primae. . . . Tollit etiam logicae principia, auferens veram rationem generis et speeiei et substantialis differentiae, *dum mnnia in modum accidentalis praedicationis convertit." De Substantiis Separatis,* c. 6, [69-70], *Divi Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Philosophica,* M. Spiazzi, O. P., ed., Marietti, Taurini, 1954.

[127] " --- non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere; quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest." *Sum. Th.* I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4; Cf. also, *De Natura Generis,* cap. *5,* [513], cited in the preceding footnote.

[128] " --- ideo, ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem

Lastly, in his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, in reply to an objection, St. Thomas returns to this point while expressly intent upon emphasizing another. He concedes that for the most part a scientific inquiry should begin with what is simpler and easier in itself and then proceed to what is by nature more difficult, unless necessity demands otherwise.[129] For, on occasion, there is need to begin one's inquiry not with what is easier for us, but with that upon which the understanding of what is to follow depends.[130] This, he maintains, is the situation with regard to logic, for it is by no means an easier discipline than the other sciences; on the contrary, it is one of the most difficult. Logic is difficult precisely because it deals with second intentions *(secunda intellectis)* .[131]

Nonetheless, a study of logic should precede a consideration of the other sciences, because their unfolding depends upon it, inasmuch as logic provides the method of proceeding in all of the sciences. Clearly some knowledge of the method of a science is a prior condition for the acquisition of the science itself.[132]

aperiendam, dicendum est, quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur, et quomodo in diversis inveniantur, et quomodo se habeant ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et differentiam." *De Ente et Essentia,* Proem., [1].

[129] " --- in addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud requirat." Q. 6, a. 1, ad 2 am quaestionem, ad 3 obj.

[130] " Quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est facilius, sed ab eo, a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet." *Ibid.*

[131] " Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere *non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maximum difficultatem,* cum sit de secundo intellectis - - - - " *Ibid.* In an article in which the role of logic and its relation to metaphysics is expressly discussed, Sheila O'Flynn seems to argue against St. Thomas on this point, for she states that logic should be studied first simply because it is easier than metaphysics, and that, were this not so, the natural order of learning would be inverted. " There is another point to be considered, so important that, if it were lacking, the logical approach would be in vain. Not only can the second intentions be distinctly known independently of a distinct knowledge of the reality upon which they are remotely founded, they can, besides, *be known more easily than the objects of metaphysical inquiry.* If this were not so, the logical introduction to a metaphysical study would be contrary to the order of learning." *Op. cit.,* p. 186. Italics mine.

[132] " --- sed quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis. Oportet autem primo scire modum scientiae quam

There is a latent paradox in the remark that the knowledge of the method of a science must precede its actual appropriation. What is more, the paradox is particularly disconcerting with regard to the first of the human sciences, metaphysics. On the one hand it appears that one must first know the science before he can determine the method appropriate to it, and, on the other, it seems impossible that he have actually appropriated the science to any degree without first having employed the method proper to it. As indicated, the problem is especially acute in establishing the method of metaphysics, for, as a universal and common science, it excludes nothing from its consideration. [138]

Yet, the conclusions at which we have arrived regarding the unique method of metaphysics permit one to escape the horns of this dilemma, for it has been pointed out that the method of metaphysics is the ' other ' common science, logic, which the metaphysician employs precisely inasmuch as it is doctrinal. This fact, then, permits the ' future metaphysician ' to develop the method which he will later be able to employ as the method of metaphysics, before he need have any express notion of a science of metaphysics, or indeed of its method as such.

In acquiring a knowledge of logic he is unconsciously preparing and rendering possible the great intellectual adventure of seeking out a deeper understanding of being, and it seems likely that he will have begun to metaphysicize implicitly long before he has an express understanding of the nature of his inquiry, and, perhaps, even much less of the manner in which it is being conducted. Yet, if his performance is truly that of a meta-

scientiam ipsam, ut dicitur in II Metaphysicae." *In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1, ad quaest., ad Sam obj.

[183] "A method can direct activity to a goal only by anticipating the general nature of the goal. But the only question to be settled in metaphysics is the general nature of the goal of knowledge, for all questions of detail have to be met by the science and by common sense. Accordingly, it would seem that every method in metaphysics must be involved in the fallacy of begging the question. By the mere fact of settling upon a method, one presupposes as settled the very issue that metaphysics proposes to resolve." Bernard J. Lonergan, S. J., *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, Longmans, London, 1958, rev. ed., p. 401.

physician, he is using the method of metaphysics, i. e., the rational method, and this necessitates his having gained some explicit mastery at least over the mysterious workings of his own mind, for logic, as the science of second intentions, involves just this.

In this manner the apparent circularity of the 'method-science' process is broken, for, in exploring the structure of his intellectual operations and reasoning processes, one is indeed shaping and forging for use the very instrument he will have need of to carry on all manner of scientific endeavor, and especially that of seeking out the diversification as well as the causes of common being. Indeed, were it otherwise, and were the method of metaphysics anything other than logic itself, in the sense already outlined, the objection would be unanswerable. Then one would have to understand the nature of metaphysics before he could devise a method proper to it, and he would, on the other hand, require a consciously possessed metaphysical method before determining upon the nature of the science of metaphysics. [134]

8. *Logic and Contemporary Thomism*

The precise and nuanced manner in which logic constitutes the method of metaphysics has, to the detriment of the working out of a systematized development of St. Thomas' metaphysics, often been neglected by some of the more prominent expositors of Thomism, and, in some instances, views concern-

[134] Father Lonergan replies to this dilemma with a distintion between latent and explicit metaphysics. However, because his notion of a latent metaphysics does not seem to involve a partially explicit logic which will serve as the method of metaphysics, we would suggest that the analysis presented above adds a needed complementary dimension for a fuller explanation of the possibility of the priority of metaphysical method over the science of metaphysics. At the same time, however, Lonergan does insist that the method of metaphysics is grounded on explicit anticipations of consciousness, and by this, perhaps, he understands very much the same thing we feel St. Thomas does by *doctrinal logic.* ". . . there is only one method that is not arbitrary, and it grounds its explicit anticipations on the anticipations that, though latent, are p1·esent and operative in consciousness." Lonergan, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-02.

ing logic seem to have been entertained which run counter to the foregoing interpretation of logic as uniquely constituting a metaphysical method.

One notes, for example, that M. Gilson tends to consider logic as a genuine philosophical liability. Indeed, he does not hesitate to suggest that rather than being a valuable instrument of inquiry for the metaphysician, tends rather to lead him astray. As a consequence the more we "... rid it of logic, the closer we are to metaphysics." [135] In the place of logic he would substitute a rejuvenated grammar which he apparently conceives of as a kind of ' existential ' logic. He will even suggest that logic has been at the root of most, if not all, of man's metaphysical troubles, and proposes as a workable remedy ridding grammar of logic altogether, that grammar might serve as an unmixed and pure instrument available to the metaphysician as he seeks to deepen his knowledge of being.[136]

While this indictment is directed toward Aristotelian logic principally, its tenor seems to indicate that its author somehow considers logic an unqualified metaphysical liability which should, as far as possible, be kept at a discreet distance from the science of being lest it contaminate it.[137]

[135] *Being and Some Philosophers,* Toronto, 1947, p. 198.

[136] " We might have better luck with contemporary grammarians, for whom the logic of Aristotle is but a thing of the past. True enough, such scholars feel in no way concerned with philosophical problems. Language is for them a fact to be objectively studied, such as it is. But this is precisely what we need, and it may well appear, on closer investigation, that grammar is nearer metaphysics than formal logic itself is. The more we rid it of logic, the closer we are to metaphysics." *Ibid.* With all their emphasis on the importance of logic, both Aristotle and St. Thomas always display a great respect for the art of grammar and the meaning of words, a point which M. Gilson seems to overlook, but of which Prof. De Koninck is keenly aware. " The modest objective of this paper was simply to draw attention to the truth that no explanation in metaphysics will be adequate-that none indeed will be soundly grounded-unless the need for this simple but thoroughly fundamental investigation of the meaning of words is acknowledged. In this respect Aristotle, and St. Thomas after him, are *abreast of the most urgent problems of philosophy in our own time."* " Metaphysics and the Interpretation of Words," *Laval Theologique et Philosophique,* XVII, I, 1961, p. 84.

[137] *Op. cit.,* p. 196.

Clearly, such an attitude has very little in common with St. Thomas' view that there is a special affinity between logic and metaphysics, since both sciences share in a certain way the same subject, common being, and that this permits the metaphysician to employ logic in his own investigations of real being in precisely the same manner the logician uses his own science in investigating beings of reason.us

All of which leaves us little choice but to conclude, despite our profound respect for M. Gilson as a philosopher, that St. Thomas himself would hear the views he expresses on the nature of logic, and its overall place in the philosophical enterprise, with frank astonishment. It is doubtlessly undeniable that the science of logic has been abused, and that the ' logicism,' which Gilson himself so masterfully dissects in his work, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, has played an important role in the history of modern philosophy.[139]

Yet, let us not hastily condemn logic for the abusive way in which it has been handled by undiscerning philosophers. Today it is still the metaphysical instrument *par excellence*,[140] just as it was for St. Thomas and for Aristotle, and it finds its nobility precisely in this, that it is mediately ordered to assist, in an unique and singular fashion, in man's greatest merely' human' undertaking, the quest for the causes of what is.[141]

[138] For a critique of Gilson's conception of the function of logic in metaphysics similar to our own, cf. Germain G. Grisez's review of Gilson's *of Christian Philosophy*, *The Thomist*, XXIII, 8, 1960, pp. 467 fl'.

[139] (lfl4) Chapter I.

[140] In the proemium to his commentary of the *Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, St. Thomas summarizes the nature and function of logic with his accustomed penetration and clarity: " Si igitur ex hoc, quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur, adinventa est ars aedificatoria vel fabrilis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate huiusmodi actus exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quaedam necessaria est, quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat. Et haec ars est logica, idest rationalis scientia. Quae non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem (quod est omnibus artibus commune); sed etiam ex hoc, *quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam.* Et ideo videtur esse ars artium, quia in actu rationis, nos dirigit, a quo omnes artes procedunt."

[141] " Sed quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio

As for grammar, necessary and important as its function is, it does not attend to a consideration of the immediate signification of words as signs of concepts, and as employed in propositions and reasoning, but rather to the remote and abitrary meaning of words as employed in individual and particular languages.[142] Hence grammar could not possibly take over the function of logic. Accordingly, it is surely with unfeigned wonderment that St. Thomas would entertain the suggestion that the metaphysician be perennially on his guard against the incursion of logic into his science, and even that he would do well to alienate himself from logic as much as possible. Rather his conception of logic and its function is such as to permit and to encourage a far more amicable relationship between logic and its sister science, metaphysics.[143]

Metaphysics is not logic, yet neither can the metaphysician carry out his sacred assignment to investigate the real without logic. Although logic deals with beings of reason, it is not on this account entirely unrelated to the real; it is this factor, gigantic in its implications for philosophy, which, as Pere Philippe, O. P., has pointed out, distinguishes Thomist from Nominalist logic.[144] The logic, therefore, of St. Thomas and Aristotle essentially faces toward the real, and loses its very identity if understood in any other context.[145] Unfortunately,

vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptiorribus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius. *In Peri Hermen.*, I, 1. 2, [13].

[142] " --- significatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius [sci!. logici] considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici." *Ibid.*

[143] On the importance of logic to metaphysics cf. "Aquinas on Metaphysical Method," by James C. Doig, C. S.C., *Philosophical Studies*, XIII, 1964, pp. 81 ff.

[144] "Analyser Ia logique de S. Thomas sous Ia lumiere de Ia logique formelle mathematique, c'est Iaisser echapper !'essential de Ia logique thomiste, qui presuppose une philosophie de l'etre et de Ia substance et ne peut se comprendre qu'en fonction de cette philosophie. Certes, Ia logique de S. Thomas a bien un subjet qui lui est propre, l'etre de raison, analogue au sujet de Ia metaphysique *(In Meta.*, IV, 1. 4, [574]) mais cet etre de raison se fonde sur Ia nature en tant que connue et ne peut s'isoler de cette nature. C'est ce qui distingue Ia logique thomiste de Ia logique nominaliste." M.-D. Philippe, O. P., *BuUetin Thomiste*, Tome X, 1957-59, Fascicule I, p. 271. Cf. also, note 141.

[145] *In Peri Hermenias*, I, 1. 2, [13].

once the real nature and function of logic is lost from view, the possibilities of metaphysics' itself permanently slipping over the precipice of the human horizon are frighteningly real.[146]

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[146] Witness, for example, Henry D. Aiken's remark concerning logic and a subsequent comment on the nature and function of philosophy. "Logic, by general consent, is no longer a philosophical subject, and all logicians are, or wish they were, members of the departments of mathematics .... The 'fate' of philosophy then is now, as ever, to be neither a science, an art, or even a discipline. It has no principles; nor as philosophy can it ever acquire any. It is always and forever a personal 'activity' of the human soul." *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, Vol. I, William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, editors, Random House, New York, 1962, pp. 17-18. Yet one could hardly wish for a harsher critique of logic than that supplied us by Heidegger: ". . . to invoke logic for purposes of delimiting the essence of thinking is a questionable approach, if only because logic as such, and not merely some of its doctrines and theories, is questionable. . . . Logic arose in the curriculum of the Platonic-Aristotelian schools. Logic is an invention of schoolteachers, not of philosophers." Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim (trans.), Yale University, 1959, pp. 120-21.

MORALITY AND REAL RELATIONS

BACKED AS he is by the experience of his predecessors, each philosopher simultaneously faces the problem of stating his insights in a manner meaningful to his contemporaries. This article suggests a way for the moral philosopher to catch the attention of men living in this age of sensitivity to time's irreversibility, this era of field-theory psychology and of increased awareness both of inner tensions and of community. A relational, not relativistic, view seems suitable for today and suggests that the ethician look around carefully before he looks upward or forward.

Attempting to explain the nature of moral reasoning, philosophers who wish to take account both of the invariant features about man as well as his gradual approximation to goals or a goal are, like all humans, liable to err. Karl Rahner portrays the results of overplaying the heavy hand of the law-giver or of overstressing the fixity of natures.

> The situation [in reigning deductive moral theologies], as it were, gives the cue for the choice of the universal norms to be considered here and now. What is carried out and applied, are the universal norms and they alone. The situation is conceived tacitly and as a matter of course as *simply pre-existent* to the finding of the norm and the making of one's decision.[1]

Situation and norms, in such cases, are the only factors required to find the concrete imperative. The pure objectivity of the deductive approach in theology which Rahner is decrying has also been caricatured whenever ivory towers are taken to be the natural habitat of philosophers.

A similar accent on objectivity is apparent in any moral

[1] *Theological Investigations*, vol. II: Man in the Church, tr. Karl-H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 221.

For a discussion of two basic ways to view natural law, see V. J. Bourke, "Two Approaches to Natural Law," *Natural Law Forum*, I, 1 (1956), 93-4.

philosopher who considers man's ultimate end as some rather static extrinsic object. At least a suggestion of this mentality peeps out in the following passage.

> Our actions are always directed at a limited set of circumstances apart from which the distant goals remain vague and ineffectual. And the future reference of present action does not make the present a means to the future; on the contrary, it makes the present more an end in itself than otherwise could be.[2]

The circumstances and future goals of the moral act cannot be overlooked by the ethician, of course, but if their connection with the very being of the agent is not recognized, necessary lawfulness again is replaced by such severe objectivity that it may become difficult to elucidate personal moral responsibility.

The " relational morality " explicated below is frankly an effort to span a frequently encountered subjective-objective dichotomy which does not seem to hold up under intense scrutiny.[3] The science of ethics must take into account not only the commoness of human nature but also the rich variety of human tendencies to ends. In its efforts to acknowledge these systematically, ethics need not fall into extremes like the ones just mentioned. Taking all relevant reality into account, the ethician can admit that man is a tendential being really related to others and really ordered within himself. What activities suit such a being can then be determined. Of course, the tendencies themselves are known through a study of activities.

To admit the reality of relations without falling into relativism, or wandering forever in a Bradleyan world in which all contingent things are merely adjectival of the Absolute, is not an easy task.[4] If relation is viewed solely as a categorical

• Otis Lee, "Value and the Situation," *Journal of Philosophy,* XLI, 13 (June *illl,* 1944)' 360.

[3] See V. J. Bourke, "Natural Law and the Contemporary Mind," in *Teaching Thomism Today,* ed. G. F. McLean, O.M.I. (Catholic University Press, 1963), 31-0.

• Gestalt psychology seems to have a similar problem in bounding its " fields " without excluding relevant structures. See M. Wertheimer, "Some Problems in the Theory of Ethics," in *Documents of Gestalt Psychology,* ed. Mary Henle (University of California Press, 1961), 36-37.

accident conveniently mediating between beings without entering into their very existence in a real though accidental way, the failure of any relational ethics is inevitable. But if the experience of various kinds of human relations is carefully surveyed, the conviction that man is actually marked by them may emerge. The metaphysical basis for these important relations can then be uncovered, and a logical way to express the findings can be decided on. This article attempts such a survey, indication of foundations, and expression of the results.

I. EXPERIENTIAL EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONS

When one attempts to state fully all the important relations of man, several approaches suggest themselves. To avoid excessive complexity in this admittedly involved survey, we will first look briefly at man as a part of various kinds of wider wholes[5] and then glance at him as a whole with intrinsic parts. The procedure can be described as a gradual narrowing of focus on the field of relations.

A. *Wholes of Which Man is a Part*

Because they do not bring themselves into existence, all creatures are necessarily connected in a relation of dependency for their very being on God, the source of their existence.[6] An obligation to acknowledge this dependency follows if the creature becomes aware of it. This order of creatures to Creator is inescapable, and the built-in tendencies man finds in himself as well as in other creatures pose their own demands. Not the least of these tendencies is man's lingering dissatisfaction with anything less than the very source of all being. He has no choice about the fact that he is made the way he is, a tending being.[7]

[5] See Helmut Kuhn, "Le concept de l'ordre," *Gregorianum*, XLIII, *fl* (196fl), fl57, for a discussion of order as togetherness.

[6] *Summa Theologiae*, I, fll, 1 ad 3; Ottawa vol. I, 1491. See also *ibid.*, 13, 5c; Ottawa vol. I, 81.

[7] See Thomas Davitt, S. J., "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law," in *Origins of the Natural Law Tradition*, ed. Arthur L. Harding (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954), 33.

It is by an examination of activities which indicate these inclinations, however, rather than by a direct vision of their Source that man can discover what actions are most appropriate for him. Even someone who doubts the ultimate ordination of all things to God can learn much from a study of experienced inclinations which seem universal.

The widest whole of which man finds himself a part seems to be the cosmos. That there is give and take on all levels within the system is attested to by abundant scientific data. Looking at his relations to non-human things, man finds himself dependent on them for necessary shelter and food, for his very continued living. They in turn depend on man, the only culture-producing animal, for their full actualization. Communication and expression are dependent on material media, and in these processes there arise new relations which bind individuals together. It seems correct to say that the average man of 1965 is involved in a melange of real relations with his environment more diverse than that of his counterpart living in the year *965.* The intelligibility of these environmental influences is part of the ethician's concern.[8]

Relations with other persons rather than with inanimate things or irrational animals seem more clearly, however, to influence the being of man and enter into his moral activity. He finds himself to be a member of many groups besides the organizations he may form or join voluntarily. That man is by nature sociable is argued to not only from his gregarious tendencies but also from the evidence that group life is necessary for the fulfillment of human capacities on all levels and at all ages.[9] Hermits are remarkable exceptions, but even they

[8] See V. J. Bourke, "Freedom as a Moral Value," *Proceedings of the XIIth International Congress of Philosophy,* vol. III (Firenze: Sansoni, 1960), 63-64 and also Jacques Leclercq, *La vie en ordre,* vol. IV in *Essais de morale Catholique* (Paris: Casterman, 1947), 67.

[9] "Yet although the person is a substance and as such can sustain relations, he does not possess the gift of aseity; he exists not in isolation but in a particular situation and hence ill relation to other things. Indeed he cannot exist without these relations, because it is through them that he attains self-awareness and self-fulfillment. He is continually being made and unmade and remade again by them,

cannot be said to be islands. They cannot shake off their real dependence on their Creator. Recluses are often cited as supreme examples of the exercise of human freedom, but persons who live in free societies provide the moral philosopher with examples of more complex interplays of relations both necessary and free.[10]

It is interesting to observe how psychiatrists and psychologists, who purport to have individuals as their chief concern, insist that they must take into consideration the social milieu of their clients. Kurt Goldstein, to take one, contends that " a true insight into the condition of the individual is to be gained only if the individual is considered as part of the whole of nature, particularly of the human society to which it belongs." [11] Man considered apart from the society of his fellows is a useful but in a sense a false abstraction.

The group needs man, for without him there is no group. Man needs the group, for his fullest actuality as man cannot be achieved

so that at times he may seem to be no more than a cluster, a criss-cross of relations. The relational being of society has the effect, therefore, of making the person other than he would be if, by an impossible supposition, he remained unrelated, or if, more plausibly, he were part of a different relational pattern." Joseph Folliet, *Man in his Environment,* tr. Martin Murray (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963), 16.

[10] " In its most general sense, personal freedom is a certain relation: the free agent stands in a definite reference to his surroundings and to the various components of his consciousness.

"Social freedom introduces greater complexity into this relation. The free society adds to the consituent freedoms of its members a new complexus of inter-personal relations. A well organized group of persons presupposes self-determination within the group and some non-restriction from outside the group. The moral value of societal freedom is analogous to that of the person but is constituted of additional facts, ideals and relations." Bourke, "Freedom as a Moral Value," *op. cit.,* 66.

[11] *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 6.

See Wertheimer, *op. cit.,* 38, 40, for similar statements by a psychologist.

Abraham Maslow asserts, " I would now add to my former statement which stressed the pursuit of identity as a major preoccupation of existential psychology, the additional problem of the need for community, of self-realization via community, and of the real, deep, and possibly insoluble problems of the relationship between identity and community." "Further Notes on the Psychology of Being," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology,* III, 1 (Spring, 1963), 128.

except by those autonomous acts of voluntary action involved in social living. Reason, the hallmark of man, employed in the understanding of one's self, leads one toward the actualizing of multiform relationships. Intentional human action in accordance with the natural law of one's being *cannot* be in natural conflict with the same in any other being living under reason.[12]

If man deliberately tries to live *in* a group without being *of* a group, tensions may develop to the point of endangering his own healthy equilibrium.

The family, the smallest social unit, can provide myriad examples of many types of influential inter-personal relations. Although the biological element certainly figures in family relations, it is not the constitutive element which distinguishes the human from the animal organism. Person goes with sociaJ.[13] Human need of a group seems most obvious in the case of human infants, who are more helpless than any animal young. Their dependence on their parents is a very real relation with evident moral implications for father and mother. Conversely, an experiential basis for oughtness lies in the child's awareness of owing something to his parents that he does not owe to other men.

Children themselves not only would behave differently but would have different "personalities" if they had different parents. Thus within the family all sorts of superior-inferior, mutual, or symmetrical-asymmetrical relations obtain. An indication of this two-way interplay is the effect which creative education of children has on the parents themselves. Even a cursory survey of relations of man as a part of a family and of other social units can serve as convincing proof that every man is different intrinsically because of his group memberships.

The inter-personal ties just discussed may be regarded as extrinsic relationships in the sense that man is the subject

[12] R. C. Baldwin, "A Note on Obligation," *Proceedings of the Xlith International Congress of Philosophy,* vol. VII (Firenze: Sansoni, 1961), 43-44.

[13] J. Messner, *,Ethics and Facts* (St. Louis: Herder, 30-31, lists the determinants of precisely human existence belonging to the world of values as: personality, family, and society.

and something outside him is the term. There are other more intrinsic relations which can be called " reflexive " because man is both their subject and term. These are orderings found or made within himself. Not even a Robinson Crusoe is without such relationships, for he surely would experience some inner tensions which many philosophers would attribute to the conflict of sense appetites and reason. " Reflexive " here does not mean to imply that a man must be aware of them. They are real whether or not they are reflected on. Of course, to be or become aware of them is an important component of moral activity.

B. *Man as a Whole of Parts*

When a man is ordered within himself, order in his relations with others is often spontaneously engendered or recovered.[14] This is not true only of recent or contemporary men. Yet it seems that systematic investigation of the individual psyche has been a characteristic of modern thought since the Renaissance. The scrutiny of subjectivity and reflection on conscious activity are aspects of many modern philosophies. Instead of examining such philosophical systems, however, this section will pay more attention to what a few present-day psychologists are discovering and concluding with regard to human internal harmony. They seem to provide data of interest to the moral philosopher.

1. *Psychological Integration*

Herbert Fingarette, a practicing psychiatrist reflecting on his findings, concludes that all insight therapy has a moral dimension. He thinks that neurotic and ontic guilt are inseparable and that guilt feelings are associated with unconscious, unintegrated sub-selves. Sub-selves which a person cannot accept are repressed, and guilt feelings become associated with such repressions.[15] Are such statements significant for an ethician? He

[14] See *S. T.* I-II, 36, Sc; Ottawa vol. II, 914.

[15] Herbert Fingarette, "Real Guilt and Neurotic Guilt," *Journal of Existential Psychiatry,* III, 10 (Fall, 1962), 156-7.

might speak of virtues and vices instead of " sub-selves," but the ethician would probably agree that integration is indeed a sign of moral maturity. Every moral act seems to be a product of veritable constellations of virtues in dynamic interplay and with shifting patterns.

Abraham Maslow, another existential psychologist, holds that

> ... ultimately, the best way for a person to discover what he ought to do is to find out who and what he is, because the path to ethical and value decisions, to wiser choices, to oughtness, is via isness, via the discovery of facts, truth, reality, the nature of the particular person.[16]

What a man is doing is thus to be distinguished both from what he could do and what he ought to do. All three aspects are viewed by Maslow as some function of what kind of being man is. He continues,

> The more he knows about his own nature, his deep wishes, his temperament, his constitution, what he seeks and yearns for and what really satisfies him, the more effortless, automatic and epiphenomenal become his value choices. . . . Many problems simply disappear; many others are easily solved by knowing what is in conformity with one's nature, what is suitable and right.[17]

The vocabulary, again, is different from that of many philosophers; but Maslow shares their conviction that there is some community in human nature. He thinks that through therapy a person comes to find out what he is, and this description is found to be almost the same as the description of what he ought to be. Part of what he now is, he himself has constructed. Some dissatisfaction with the edifice has led him to therapy in the first place.

Realizing Ideals

The end for which the patient is striving is not extrinsic but rather the existing self. One way to fuse what he is and what

[16] "Fusions of Facts and Values," *American Journal of Psychoanalysis,* XXIII, (1963),

[17] *Ibid.*

he ought to be is to redefine his expectations so as to make them come closer to actuality and attainability. This may lead to a kind of Spinozistic learning to love the inevitable. On the other hand, it may be that the patient's ideals are unrealistic. Not only is there the problem of actualizing dormant possibilities, there is also the task of distinguishing truly human capacities and freeing the patient from arbitrary "neurotic shoulds," his distorted notions of what is fitting to his deepest needs. The psychical illnesses consequent upon not fulfilling true potentialities or upon trying to actualize idealistic nonfulfillable ones are just as symptomatic as sickness resulting from choosing food unsuitable to one's digestive system.[18]

The importance of knowing human nature in all its ramifications is stressed by Maslow.

> . . . if one becomes disillusioned with humanness as one gets to see it more deeply, then this is the same as saying that one had illusions or expectations which could not be realized or could not stand the light of day, i. e., which were false and unreal.[19]

Here we see Maslow widening his perspectives to make observations about humanness as such. In the following excerpt, a priest-psychologist tries to narrow his view so as to give an intelligible account of moral individuality.

> It is impossible for the virtue of prudence to play its integrative and dynamic role in the normal moral development without mature and well differentiated psychological equipment. This equipment consists of adequate reality perception and testing, of correct estimation of past events and precise anticipation of future possibilities, of elaborate experience and logical reasoning, of sound sensitivity to guilt and efficacious inhibitive powers.[20]

The recognition by both these authors of man's interior complexity is noteworthy.

[18] See Karen Horney's discussions of these inner conflicts of the neurotic in *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1945).

[19] Fusions . . . " *op. cit.,* 19!3.

[20] Noel Mailloux, O. P., "Morality and Contemporary Psychology," *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,* IX (1954), 54. See Rahner, *op. cit.,* 227.

3. *Reflection*

Recognition of inner conflicts certainly points to the fact that the " parts " within man are not automatically ordered. His precise task as a rational being seems to be to reflect on himself, a task he cannot accomplish by some simple intuition but rather by laborious observation of his own behavior in relational complexes. Reasoning itself is an example of relating or measuring, a bringing together of objects in order to see whether they fit. Maslow says that

> if we wish the facts to tell us their oughtness, we must learn to listen to them in a very specific way which can be called Taoistic. . . . the facts themselves carry, within their own nature, suggestions about what *ought* to be done with them.[21]

"Listening" calmly to genuine but usually unexpressed reactions and being attentive to surroundings are prerequisites for the reflection needed to reach moral decisions whether in prudential judgments or more general moral maxims. The moral scientist must admit the importance of reflecting on one's own will acts.[22] To determine what he should do, one must know as thoroughly as possible what he is equipped to do. A man usually reflects on a certain object which he is willing unless he is swayed by passion or circumstances or hobbled by Ignorance or error.

This moment of reflection is also the moment of freedom, for it reveals at least that he need not continue to think about that object, and in the case of most objects it may show some deficiency; in some cases it may completely change the object from good to bad or vice versa.[23]

[21] Maslow, "Fusions . . . " *op. cit.*, 129-130.

The " structure " of these inner relations must not be misunderstood. Goldstein, it seems, sets up a false dichotomy and leaves the impression that one cannot both be a rational animal and have drives, by which he probably means something like "sense appetites." *Op. cit.*, 7.

[22] See Bernard Lonergan, S. J., *Insight: A Study of Human Understandt'ng* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 601-602.

[23] G. P. Klubertanz, S. J., "The Root of Freedom in St. Thomas's Later Works," *Gregorianum*, XLII, 4 (1961), 716.

Moral virtues ensure the reflectivity of choices. The virtuous person performs better human acts more humanly than the person customarily led by passion and sugggestions received through his senses. This is not to deny the importance of sensory observation for moral decision, of course.

Maslow explains that his " B-cognition " is the " perception of the Being, the otherness, or the intrinsic nature of the person or thing." [24] Healthy people perceive the deeper facticity as well as the oughtiness of the object. By " oughtiness " Maslow means "an intrinsic aspect of the deeply perceived facticity," a "demand character, or requiredness or built-in request-for-action." [25] His insistence on the importance of reflection for better acceptance of responsibility is worthy of attention. [26]

Mailloux also observes:

> The leading of a life of freedom, that is to say, of a genuine virtuous and moral life, necessarily implies, besides its intrinsic difficulties which too readily monopolize all our attention, the initial risk of making one's own decisions and of accepting one's full responsibility for them and their possible consequences. [27]

Relinquishing the security of conformity to ready-made standard moral judgments and taking the initiative and full responsibility of one's own destiny often appears equivalent to facing complete indeterminacy. One less painful substitute is to get lost in a group. It is possible to assimilate the value-orientations of one's culture in a unique and personal way, however. On the one hand, if men had no access to the accumulated experience of their ancestors, there would be no moral science because life would be too busy and short to permit this type of reflection. If the embodiment in concrete styles of life of the

[24] "Fusions ..." *op. cit.,* HlS-129.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Maslow could be criticized, however, for tending to treat " value" as a quality among others which can be isolated by the methods of empirical science. Moral goodness does not seem to be such a simple quality.

[27] Mailloux, *op. cit.,* 57.

wisdom of one's forebears is at odds with what one fundamentally is, however, conflicts ensue.[28]

0. H. Mowrer contends that

> once one has made a choice and committed himself to a given moral order or system, then he is *not* free to cheat on that system, no matter what it is.... No one can play "fast and loose" with the rules of his reference group without being in trouble with his conscience (if he has one) and fearful, "shy," and "insecure" with respect to the group itself.[29]

Because he and the other psychologists just mentioned arrive by different routes at similar conclusions about reflection and responsibility, ethicians should be interested in their findings. Verified conclusions of present day psychology and psychiatry may provide stimulus for moral reasoning which does not stay in the law-duty pattern.

To summarize, man finds order to some extent within himself as well as in the world. But depending both on his clear vision of what already is as well as his prevision-paradoxical1y possible only upon reflection-of what really can be, he may and in many cases must further make order. He may even destroy order if he acts contrary to what really suits his tendencies and the proper inclinations of the beings with which or with whom he interacts. Actions are unsuitable not only if they frustrate the development of others but also if they hamper the satisfaction of the agent's true needs or lead to his destruction.[30]

[28] See Adrian van Kaam, C. S. Sp., "Sex and Existence," *Insight,* II, 3 (Winter, 1964)' 6.

[29] " Science, Sex, and Value," *Personnel and Guidance Journal,* XLII, 8 (April, 1964), Mowrer thinks that the " details of different social systems naturally vary; and at this level of analysis, morality is, to be sure, relativistic, ' pluralistic.' But the fact of one's sociality, of one's 'belonging' and being committed to some social system is undeniable, universal; and it is from this circumstance that we reach a kind of moral bedrock, or ' absolute.' If one is functioning in a given social system, then one is honor-bound to ' play the game ' as prescribed in the system. Or, if one *must* deviate from it, to do so openly, honorably, and take the stipulated consequences of such disobedience, or else leave the system." *Ibid.,* 751.

[8]° Charles Fay notes that recent scientific discoveries indicate that the "really revolutionary change in human knowledge and power centers on man's altered relation to himself. . . . From now on, evolutionary progress will not occur in

Man can, by a laborious reasoning process, come to recognize what his tendencies are. He can also discover what fits them by considering his relations with others as well as the inter-relations of various capabilities he discovers within himself. Recognizing that one exists in a relational context can stimulate reflection on what would be appropriate to a being who becomes truly whole, well-rounded and developed (rather than straight-laced or unfulfilled) only as a partner with others. The toil of taking into account all these relevant imbrications appears to be the ethician's very vocation.

II. SOME ATTEMPTS TO CONSIDER RELATIONS IN ETHICS

This section surveys a few ethical systems which seem inadequate because they consider relations as some kind of exterior " betweenness " or else overlook the aspects common to some moral situations. This contrast may enhance the viability of the relational viewpoint being proposed in this article.

Kurt Baier does not seem to recognize the moral significance of what we have called reflexive relations. He holds that

> morality arises out of the relations between individuals, that there would be no need for and no point in having a morality if people had no sort of contact with others, that the solitary individual could employ his reason in practical matters only from the point of view of self-interest, never from the moral point of view.[31]

This would mean that persons living alone cannot affect one another, so, morally speaking, there is nothing that they may not do or refrain from doing. A world of Robinson Crusoes, he holds, has no need or use for a morality. The fact is, however,

humans without their awareness but is initiated and controlled by them. Man is now on the verge of exercising human dominion over the bio-cultural modification of human existence. It belongs to man that he complete, in the light of finalities or evolutionary tendencies of his nature, his imperfect bio-psychological structures, his largely potential principles of action." " Human Evolution: a Challenge to Thomistic Ethics," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* II, 1 (February, 1962), 77.

[31] *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 215.

that no one person is ever utterly unrelated to others. In Baier's system, nothing could be said about the moral fittingness of an anchorite's activity.

The following statements by an instrumentalist rightly indicate that an ethician must consider circumstances and relations.

> We are always acting within a limited setting which includes various circumstances, and probably other actors in addition to ourselves. In this sense the situation, including both agent or agents and the circumstances confronting him or them, is the unit of experience.[32]

This real unit is said to contain the basis of the ideal, the resolution of unsatisfactory aspects, and to be always relative to a specific state of affairs. Actions strive for the good which completes the situation, making it determinate and actualizing value potentialities. When a problematic situation is thus taken as a unit and its completion is taken as a goal, value seems to become utterly objective.

The incompleteness of the situation is said to call out the agent's desire for completeness, and it is admitted that not all situations are social. But does the action in any way complete the agent himself? Or is he just a kind of Kantian "*dator formarum*"? It seems easy, in such a theory, to consider the agent a mere cog in a big machine and to regard relations as more important than the things related.

Lewis Hahn, a contextualist, is similarly concerned with the situation and its completion, saying that

> any given situation sets up some order among the activities involved. If a goal is demanded, the means necessary to achieve that goal are also demanded. Though not just any means will fit into a demanded pattern, certain alternatives are usually possible.[33]

He also tries to allow for some subjective ground of value by insisting that the "felt quality of an experience" affords a ground for prizing.

[32] Lee, *op. cit.*, 889.

[88] "A Contextualist Looks at Values," in *Value: a Cooperative Inquiry*, ed. Ray Lepley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 118.

Individuals of the sort contextualism finds are not isolated, independent centers of desire or introspection. A large part of what they are is due to their environment. The culture of an era or epoch is a very significant factor in the prizings of an individual.[34]

This stress on non-atomicity seems correct, but whatever the admitted "individual quality" of an activity may mean, contextualism does not seem to take sufficient account of the variety and intrinsic order or disorder of human powers as well as of their affinity to extrinsic goals. Even before he enters a situation, a man is already related to whatever in the context could answer some genuine need or realize some capacity of his.

The unrepeatability of situations is also stressed in another theory, relativistic ethics.

Norms are universal, but man as an existent is the individual and unique in each case, and hence he cannot be regulated in his actions by material norms of a universal kind.... There remains then as "norm" of action only the call of each particular unique situation through which man must pass successfully.[35]

There is no point in trying to find similarities between men who are so unique. This position does not overlook the real relations of the agent but rather exaggerates their singularity. [36]

•• *Loc. cit.*, 123-4; see 470.

[35] Rahner, *op. cit.*, 218. Furthermore, Bahner states that insofar as "the same man subsists in his own spirituality, his actions are also always more than mere applications of the universal law to the *casus* in space and time; they have a substantial positive property and uniqueness which can no longer be translated into a universal idea and norm expressible in propositions constructed of universal notions." *Ibid.*, 226.

•• David Bidney indicates two presuppositions underlying such an ethics: 1) all moral evaluations are culturally conditioned or determined and hence their validity is limited to the social and cutural context in which they originated, fl) it is impossible in practice to establish universally acceptable criteria for measuring and comparing moral values, so each moral system has equal validity. "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism," Chapter IV in *Ethics and the Social Sciences*, ed. Leo Ward, C. S.C. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University Press, 1959), 59-60.

III. METAPHYSICAL BAsis FOR REAL MoRAL RELATIONS

In contrast to the ethical systems just sketched, this article maintains that relatedness is a characteristic intimately modifying the actual being of the moral agent. F. H. Bradley's insights into the relational context could serve as correctives for such excessive empiricisms.

If you wish to remove one part from a whole, and maintain it away from its original context, you must find what elements constitute that whole, and you must find exactly what each contributes. For you cannot tell otherwise what it is you are taking, and how much is left. Your cutting may not merely loose the string of the bundle. It may have utterly destroyed the connection which maintains the parts in existence. And the result of this is that correct abstraction is guaranteed by nothing save actual experiment.[37]

Note, however, that Bradley is in danger of a return to isolated parts if he maintains that a connection (which might be construed as an extrinsic " betweenness ") is constitutive of existence. This would be exaggerating relations almost to the point of substantializing them.

A. *Reality of Relations*

Although relations can be *regarded* as rather uninfiuential, in reality a consideration of them can even be a genuine starting point of metaphysics, as James Collins asserts.

Metaphysics makes its proper start with the integral human experience of the community of existing natural beings. It is here that we obtain the foundational meaning for .the concretely real. Our act of acknowledging natural existents in their active relations is more basic for metaphysics than the contrasts which we draw in relatively abstract and limitative ways for purposes of analysis and inference concerning the concrete natural beings.[38]

The universe can truly be viewed as a huge whole of tendential

[87] *The Principles of Logic,* vol. II (London: Oxford University Press,]958), *560-561.*

[88] *Three Paths in Philosophy* (Chicago: Regnery, 875.

beings mutually acting and reacting in numerous kinds of relationships.

1. *Tendencies of Man*

On the basis of the outline of various human relations in section I above, perhaps one could make a list of the basic tendencies which cause a man spontaneously to take a position with regard to many things and events. Because these inclinations can be satisfied only if he contacts and uses resources beyond himself, they might be considered as ties binding man to others. Such tendencies are dynamic and ongoing reachings, however, because appropriate actions alleviate but do not terminate these fundamental desires. St. Thomas tried to draw up such a list centuries ago. As Thomas Davitt explains, man

> *connaturally-that* is, without any reasoning-judges that all those things to which he has a natural inclination are good and ought to be sought after and that their contraries are bad and should be avoided. Therefore his elementary judgments as to what is good and bad follow from the knowledge of his inclinations. [39]

All men judge that self-preservation, sexual union, life in society, and use of intellectual and volitional powers are good. Not to do these things is judged bad. These are not names for simple appetities but more like generic terms for groups of tendencies. Their demands vary, and judgments with regard to them are influenced by environment, education, or personal habits. The inclinations themselves may even demand that the judgment that it is good to preserve one's life, for example, give way to the judgment that it is better to give one's life. Such a judgment is made in spite of the persistent and continuing drive to self-preservation. [40]

The foregoing has viewed man's basic needs, as it were, irom within. Because of man's way of knowing, considerations must be thus piece-meal, even though in actuality they are united in one agent. The reciprocity of appetite and whatever satisfies

[39] Davitt, *op. cit.,* 34. See *S. T.,* I-II, 94, £c.
[40] *Ibid.,* 37-38.

it may, nevertheless, also be viewed from the outside m, as Maslow seems to suggest, for

> when anything is clear enough or certain enough, true enough, real enough, beyond the point of doubt, then that something raises within itself its own requiredness, its own demand-character, its own suitabilities.[41]

Facts call for definite kinds of action. The lure is from outside, but only because of its affinity with something inside. Some notion of relatedness seems to be the only way to deal adequately and intelligibly with a being who finds himself necessarily oriented to something other than himself for his own completion, not only on the biological or physical level but on all the " levels " as well as " parts " into which he may be divided for convenient consideration.

Even without explicit admission of a Creator as the ultimate cause and end of striving, it seems that the reflective man can recognize that he is obliged to try to satisfy his wants/[2] Tendency, relation, finalization-these are inextricably intertwined. If anyone denies that a basic drive of human nature is to do all possible to preserve and enhance existence, the only way to argue with him seems to be to urge that he is not acknowledging things as they really are. By yielding to this kind of drive to continue in being, each creature also makes for the continuance of all creatures. [43]

2. *Suitability*

Whatever satisfies the basic needs just discussed is apt for the subject of those needs. The ethician must, of course, go on to consider the pertinent circumstances and ends of various species of activity, but the basic fittingness to tendency remains the root consideration for whoever would judge moral activity.

[41] " Fusions . . . " *op. cit.,* 127.

[40] See Jacques Leclercq, *La philosophie morale de saint Thomas devant la pensee contemporaine* (Paris: Vrin, 1955), 404.

[43] See Linus Thro, S. J., "Moral Values and Obligation in the Light of Tendency," *Proceedings of the XIIth International Congress of Philosophy,* vol. VII (Firenze: Sansoni, 1961), 437.

Lee, as already noted, refers to the situation as resolving an incompleteness.[44] This article has stressed, rather, that for the development of his various kinds of capacities, man requires objects of various sorts which he attains by a variety of activities. Not what suits the rational appetite taken in isolation but what will result in the completion of human nature adequately and fully considered-this is what is suitable for man. An adequate account of human nature must consider man's essential intrinsic and extrinsic relations as well. What man should do, then, would seem to be whatever he can maximally do given not only his physique but also his degree of interior balance of sense appetites, his status, his circumstances, and the whole meaningful situation in which he acts. To find out what is really conducive to full human well-being, one must study experienced tendencies and their objects. Such a study of finality is necessarily a study of relations, or vice versa.

B. *Community of Essence*

Stressing the complexity of human drives and the panoply of relations which affect man intrinsically could, possibly, lead to insufficient acknowledgment of the universality of human nature and of general norms which can be found when investigating real similarities. For that reason, this article would be unbalanced without a brief look at what is meant by human nature or essence.

Louis Dupre states: " Man does not belong to the world of things but is the meaning-giving principle of this world, he has no fixed essence but is essentially free development."[45] He says that man's nature is

" *Op. cit.*, 338.

[45] " The Philosophical Stages of Man's Self-Discovery," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (1963), 224.

St. Thomas speaks of the mutability of human nature in several places. "Natura autem hominis est mutabilis." *S. T.* II-II, 57, 2 ad 1; Ottawa vol. III, 1715 b. " Et hoc contingit pJ:Iopter mutabilitatem naturae humanae et diversas conditiones hominum et rerum, secundum diversitatem locorum et temporurn." *De Malo*, ques. II, a. IV, ad 13.

not entirely given once and for all; in man " nature" is never allowed to follow a course independent of a " person." . . . To talk about human nature as if it were an immutable entity given in its entirety is to ignore the most essential characteristic of *human* nature.[46]

What Dupre has in mind when he uses the word " person " seems similar to Robert Johann's meaning. Man, he holds,

is radically and fundamentally a person. It is not an intellect or a mind that thinks; it is a person who thinks. But a person can fulfill himself-indeed, a person can really be himself-only in dialogue and communion with other persons.[47]

Such dialogue cannot take place in private soliloquies. Other persons are available only in the everyday round of experience.

The notion of a changing human nature may seem shocking at first. If nature is not taken as a concept of bare substantial form and if it is admitted that knowledge of nature grows as men witness more activities which display it, then the idea that a thing's nature admits of some change (at least in the sense that there may still be undiscovered human capacities) is not so absurd. Perhaps in truly new future situations man's abilities will find expression in fresh ways of acting.

The discovery of unsuspected potencies would certainly affect the moralist's notion of human nature. As Charles Fay suggests:

The fact that alterations introduced by evolution are accidental modifications of human nature does not mean that they are simply accidental moral determinants .... St. Thomas compares circumstances in the moral order to " accidents," but this does not simply

[46] " Toward a Re-examination of the Catholic Position on Birth Control," *Cross Currents,* XIV, 1 (Winter, 1964), 69. Lest Dupre be made out to be a complete relativist, it should be added that he is fighting a conception of natural law as entirely unvarying and static, somewhat like the usual view of the laws of physical nature.

See Emil Fackenheim, *Metaphysics and Historicity* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), 15.

[47] " The Return to Experience," *Review of Metaphysics,* XVII, 3 (March, 1964), 321.

mean that what is accidental in the physical order is accidental in relation to right reason.[48]

Rapidly changing conditions in today's world do indeed support the contention that man is a being essentially conditioned in that he is really and sometimes radically changed by intercourse with others. He is also essentially conditional in his basic dependency on God for existence. An ethician blind to biological advances such as artifical selection of genes may be cut off from discussion with his contemporaries and even untrue to his calling to take account of all relevant factors of moral activity.[49]

IV. Lome OF INQUIRY INTO MoRAL RELATIONS

Can the relational ethics being advocated here be expressed logically? How can oughtness[50] be derived from isness? If it can, then it appears that " ought " and " being " are very closely related, if not even identified, i. e., that a person is obliged to do what he is equipped to do. Do facts not only indicate but even generate values?

One way to express logically the theme of this article is to say that a judgment of a moral scientist on a type of activity, such as " Sharing food is good," or " Masturbation is bad," can be considered as the conclusion of a conditional rather than a categorical syllogism. The major would be: " If such a type of activity is suitable (or unsuitable) to human nature, then such a type of activity is good (or bad) ." " Good " and "bad " mean suitable and unsuitable, it is true; but perhaps they may be taken to have a wider meaning when not followed by the phrase " for men." The major means to say that if man's true

•• *Op. cit., 65.* See *S. T.* I, *5,* 1, where St. Thomas speaks of relative perfection. Bidney speaks of nature as absolute and of cultural constructs as relative means to conquer reality. *Op. cit.,* 67. This polarity could prove misleading if the contention that there are accidental but real modifications of human nature is valid.

•• See Fay, op. *cit.,* 78.

[50] We do not intend to equate oughtness with formal obligation or personal conscience felt as binding, but rather with acknowledged appropriateness.

ends (and, of course, his ultimate end) are to be attained, then certain means are to be used or not used.

The minor of such a syllogism would be: " But the given action is suitable (or unsuitable) for human nature." This would require demonstration. It seems the only way to show fittingness or unifittingness is to examine whether the results of the activity do or do not further the full development of the agent without injury to others.[51] Such an examination must, we have been arguing, view man in his context of real relations. Thus an immutable statement nevertheless includes variables.

The way man is and the way things are with regard to him dictate what is of value for his more complete realization. Maslow's non-atomistic approach in psychology is similar to the one being urged for ethics. He holds that

> facts are dynamic and not just static; that they are not scalar (magnitude only) but rather vectorial (having both magnitude and direction) . . . many of these dynamic characteristics of facts, these vectorial qualities, fall well within the semantic jurisdiction of the word " value." At the very least, they bridge the dichotomy between fact and value which is conventionally and unthinkingly held by most scientists and philosophers to be a defining characteristic of science itself.[52]

Man himself is a kind of vector in that he is certainly directed and directional. Tendency is a thing's direction or real relation to an end. The notion of real relation includes capacity and also a goal wider than the tending being itself. Whatever

[51] Of course, one need not wait to have personal experience of appropriateness or inappropriateness before taking a stand. Mowrer mentions, for example, that the Soviet experiment with relaxed divorce laws in the 1920's should be taken by everybody as an instructive example of the consequences of thwarting basic human tendencies. "Here is an instance of ' vicarious feedback ' that is a report of what happened in *another* contemporary society which also thought it could eliminate the restraints and sacrifices which sexual morality presupposes." *Op. cit.,* 750.

[52] " Fusions . . . " *op. cit.,* 126. " Blindness to future possibilities, change, development, or potentialities leads inevitably to a kind of status quo philosophy in which 'what is' (being all there is or can be) must then be taken as the norm. Pure description merely is . . . an invitation to join the conservative party. ' Pure ' value-free description is, among other things, simply *sloppy* description." *Ibid.,* 129.

completes a genuine human tendency is already related to man, is already valuable for him even before he may come to admit its convenience. It remains valuable even though he never acknowledges its value. It has moral worth if it is in any way involved in an agent's moral activity.

Viewing " values" relationally, it seems difficult to say whether they are subjective attitudes or objective facts. Is not a valuable thing an extrinsic (usually, but not always) object which suits an intrinsic tendency? Is not value real suitability to real need? If so, it is not conferred by the agent. There does not seem to be a gap to span here except when one tries to imagine a link instead of admitting the connection is intelligible, although it is sensible in some cases, as in biological or dietetic suitablity. And the intelligible is not unreal.

There are *facts* and there are *values,* but it is a mistake to conclude that ontologically these compose two disparate universes. Nor is it necessary to say that every proposition is a value judgment, or ev.ery " fact " an "idea." Realism is anti-reductionist, in any direction. That is to say, it is empirical; things, including selves, have essential structures which reason can investigate and know. But things are never merely essences. And selves are never merely essences either, but are coming-to-be through the fulfillment of potencies which are *natural* to the sort of thing they are.[53]

Human selves are by nature in relation. Man's being-for-himself essentially or constitutively includes being-for-others. There is in reality no barrier here which moral philosophy must try to surmount.

A non-atomistic realism also overcomes any artificial is-ought distinction. Myriad relations permanently establish and underlie an act's suitability for a human agent. What ought to be done expresses not merely a relationship of suitableness, but an existential situation which subjects the moral agent to a certain claim. Neither autonomous self-determination nor the ideal of self-realization adequately covers the existential situation.

[58] Baldwin, *op. cit.,* 43.

But now view the perfection of oneself as the object of the tendency of man as man, together with the added consideration that no finite agent is simply good in himself, but rather through the possession of the good which is not himself, the perfectly fulfilling goal. . . . In this context " ought " means obligated to fit oneself freely into the designs of the supreme Legislator, whose will for man is expressed in his nature and its tendencies.[54]

Becoming aware of this larger context, man is obliged to acknowledge the claim, make his own personal commitment, and act accordingly.

V. CONCLUSION

Because the study of the human relational-but very real-context is complicated, on-going, and not productive of exact scales of values, it probably is not very appealing as a suggested way to develop an ethics. The recognition of the great number of relevant real relations which need to be investigated may prove dismaying even to one who admits that a lack of fixity need not imply an utter relativism.

The relational viewpoint would also be rejected, it seems, by anyone who regards man as autonomous and basically self-sufficient. Although this article was not intended as an exhortation to atomists, its conclusions would certainly be unpalatable to them.

If the circumspect way of moral reasoning advocated here is admitted to be fruitful, however, the habit itself of right reasoning in moral matters could be defined as a habit of deliberate openness to and recognition of real and enduring-but dynamic and complicated-extrinsic and intrinsic relations. An ethician with this habit would also be open to the Creator of tending beings which have community of nature. He would not, however, leap to law and God in the *initial* steps of ethical mqmry.

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•• Thro, *op. cit.,* 439, 441.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

PART III

CRITIQUE oF THE CALVINIST DocTRINE

SECTION 1: *Calvin's Negative Arguments*

THE OBJECT of this concluding critique is the doctrine of the Interior Testimony and its foundation. One part will deal with the doctrine expressed by Calvin and his immediate followers; another with the doctrine of Karl Barth and his attempt to return to the fonts of the Reformation in a modern way. Finally, the fact that, aside from the manifest distinction in their expressions of the doctrine, they are both susceptible of one common critique will be shown.

If the theological system of John Calvin is viewed as an edifice and the place where the doctrine of the Interior Testimony finds entree is sought, beyond doubt, the portal will be found in his position concerning the single font of revelation. En bloc it is precisely in this respect that the two structures, Calvinism (and *servatis servandis* the Protestant schools that adhere to his general principles) and Catholicism differ. At this point it is just to ask, what was the basis for this modification of the Catholic system.

The answer is evident in the fourth book of the *Institutes* which deals with the constitution and power of the Church (and in a subsidiary fashion of the state also, insofar as Calvin considered it as an adjunct of the Church) , and in the ninth chapter in which Calvin discusses the ecumenical council. This is the occasion of returning to the theme we have seen proposed in the beginning of the *Institutes,* but in a way that reveals another aspect of Calvin's thought.

To subject the oracles of God to the authority of men, so as to make their validity dependent on human approbation, is a blasphe-

my unworthy of being mentioned. . . . If the authority of the Scripture be founded on the approbation of the Church, what decree of any council can be alleged to this point? I believe none at all. . . . They alledge an ancient catalogue, which is called the Canon of Scripture, and which they say proceeded from the decision of the Church. I ask them again, in what council that canon was composed. To this they can make no reply. Yet I wish to be further informed, what kind of canon they suppose it to be. For I see that ancient writers were not fully agreed respecting it. And if any weight be attached to the testimony of Jerome, the two books of Maccabees, the history of Tobit, Ecclesiasticus, and other books will be considered as apocryphal; to which our opponents will by no means consent,[1]

This passage can be made the occasion, first, of general remarks with regard to Calvin's attitude toward Tradition, and, second, of a more detailed reply to the questions he asks regarding the tradition of the Canon of Scripture. In general, then, it seems evident from Calvin's use of the term "decree of the Church," here and elsewhere/ that he did not grasp sufficiently well the distinction between Tradition, strictly so-called, and the ecclesiastical magisterium. It is to be wondered, therefore, if even today this same misunderstanding is not propagated to some extent among Protestants who follow Calvin's footsteps. This is not a denial that the "decree of the Church," of which Calvin speaks, if conditioned by those things which are required of an infallible pronouncement, possesses a quality which is a guarantee for the faithful that it is free from error. Nevertheless, we do maintain that there is a real distinction between a font of revelation, which from a positive point of view contains the word of God; and a proposition of the truth contained therein, which proposition is negatively protected from a false presentation of the divine revelation. The former characterizes Tradition; the latter, the "decree of the Church."

Granted, therefore, that Calvin did make this unwarranted composition, it becomes somewhat easier to perceive the root

[1] Inst., IV, 9, 14; *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 447 (CR, XXX, 867).

• E. g., *Inst.*, IV, 8, 16; *ibid.*, p. 432 (CR, XXX, 857-858).

of his indignation when he exclaims that subjecting God's word to human approbation is a" blasphemy unworthy of being mentioned." Catholic theology by no means grants that an authentic dogmatic decree of the Church is tantamount to " human approbation," because such a decree is possessed of the negative quality of infallibility. But the same theology does recognize that this decree is but a re-expression of a truth the immediate source of which is the mouth of God, speaking either in the Scripture or in Tradition.

In the history of the Church's magisterium we can point to some relatively ancient witnesses to her care in preserving and proposing integrally what was committed to her by an apostolic tradition, the Canon of the Scriptures. The " ancient catalogue . . . called the Canon of Scripture " is not a document that comes from apostolic times. Of this tradition we have no proper ecclesiastical pronouncement earlier than that of the provincial council of Rome the acts of which were subject to the approval of Pope St. Damasus I. In this decree the Canon as it is now comprised in the Latin Vulgate is proposed as that which the " whole Catholic Church receives."3 The third provincial council of Carthage, fifteen years later, reproduces the same list.[4] In the fifth century the decrees of Pope St. Innocent I and Pope Gelasius witnessed to the same Tradition.[5] Finally, in the century previous to that of Calvin, the seventeenth ecumenical council of Florence (1449l) recapitulated the identical canon.[6] These examples might be considered as a partial answer to Calvin's query. "If the authority of the Scripture be founded on the approbation of the Church, what decree of any council can be alleged to. this point? I believe none at all."[7]

The last portion of the paragraph cited from the *Institutes* at first sight does seem to present a difficulty for the Catholic view. If the establishment of the Canon of the Scripture really

[3] D. 84. [4] D. [5] D. 96, [6] D. 706.

[7] The question here is not what authority Calvin would concede to this or that particular Council, provincial or ecumenical, but rather the fact that within the Church such witness is to be found.

is based upon an apostolic tradition, what is the significance of the position of a doctor of the Church of such authority as Jerome, who, as Calvin affirms, rejected some of the so-called deutero-canonical books? In reality this historical truth serves well to show the manner in which the magisterium of the Church functions to clarify doubts which may arise from time to time even with regard to the deposit of revelation. In this particular case it seems that St. Jerome had come under the influence of the Jewish rabbis during his sojourn in Palestine. These doctors of the Jewish community had come to reject some of the books of the so-called Alexandrine Canon of the Old Testament (the canon as it is exemplified by the LXX) , and their arguments seemed conclusive to St. Jerome. Fr. Zarb observes, however, that the "Apostles, who in their very ministry had made ample use of the Alexandrine Greek version, by their example left a clear doctrine with regard to the number of the sacred books, i. e., that they are not only those of the Palestinian canon, but also those contained in the Alexandrine version." [8] It is precisely for this reason that "three African councils immediately replied to Jerome's contention, and prescribed the complete Canon of the Sacred books.[9] From that time though one or another individual may have wavered in the acceptance of this canon, mostly because of St. Jerome's ancient opinion, nevertheless the teaching of the universal Church is constant and clear. This bit of history does point out the corrective function of the Church in the proposition of divine revelation.

In Calvin's particular defense of the doctrine of the Interior Testimony the first three arguments are negative, by which he excludes the basis which the Church offers for establishing the authority of Scripture. The first of these is, logically speaking, a *reductio ad absurdum.* If the establishment of the Scriptures is to depend "on the determination of the Church," if the Church is to decide " both what reverence is due to the Scrip-

[8] Zarb, S., O. P., *op. cit.,* pp. 194-195.
• *Ibid.,* p. 196.

ture, and what books are to be comprised in its canon," [10] then it follows that, objectively, the truth of God is limited by the will of man, and, subjectively, faith has no more firm a foundation than merely human favor. These consequences, however, destroy the very foundation of religion. Therefore, the condition is to be rejected.

It can be seen from the previous discussion of the Catholic position in itself that it is precisely the sense of that condition, namely, "the determination of the Church," which is at stake. Considered in a critical fashion, " the determination of the Church " might conceivably be taken in two different senses. From one point of view it is the inquiry which the Church made in the early centuries of her existence in examining the credentials which might be adduced as indicative of the canonicity of one book or another. It must be admitted that the entire Church was not always explicitly aware of the full content of the Tradition concerning the canon, delivered to her by the Apostles. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct an investigation with regard to this Tradition. The criteria for this investigation were such things as, for example, prophetic or apostolic authenticity and, notably, the use of a book in the liturgical services of the early Church. It does not matter here which of these was considered as definitive. That this inquiry took place is evident from the discrepancies which appear in the list of books comprising the canon of various early Christian authors. Evident too is the fact that this investigation on the part of the Church was a determination in a historical sense. The Church, as an historical institution, made use of ordinary historical apparatus, viz., external testimony and internal coherence, to set the limits of the canon.

The process involved, if analysed today, takes on the appearance of the construction of a syllogism:

Whatever books, guaranteed by one or another quality, were delivered to the Church by the Apostles as divinely inspired and the rule of faith must be accepted on faith as canonical. The following

[10] *Inst.,* I, 7, I; *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 86 (CR, XXX, 56).

books, moreover, meet the requirements. Therefore they must be accepted on faith as canonical.

So far we see no need for special divine intervention. The process of fashioning the syllogism, therefore, is not the determination which is the basis of the note of canonicity making these books a rule of faith. The investigation proceeded on a natural level, by the sifting out of evidence, by the balancing of one authority against another. The rule of faith, however, cannot be of this natural level, because faith transcends the natural. In this sense, then, the determination of the Church cannot possibly be the criterion of canonicity.

If we consider the act by which this " syllogism" is brought to a conclusion, namely: " These *are* the canonical books of Scripture"; then the determination of the Church takes on an entirely new sense. The teaching Church, aside from any previous historical investigation and controversy which may have attended it, comes to a definitive decision. Since by divine institution it belongs to the teaching Church to fix conclusively and with authority the boundaries of the list of canonical books, when she comes to this decision it is no longer merely in light of historical evidence that she judges, but in virtue of a divine commission, which she exercises with God's guarantee of infallibility.

The significance of this decision is explained by the Church herself, in a statement made by the Vatican Council:

> The Church recognizes these books as canonical, not because they have been subsequently approved on her authority, after once having been put together by merely human ingenuity, nor again solely because they contain revelation without error, but for the reason that, written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God as their author, and as such have been delivered to the Church.[11]

In other words, the Church herself declares that she gives no validity to the Scriptures which they do not themselves have. It is not a matter of the subsequent ecclesiastical approval of

[11] Session III, "Dogmatic Constitution of the Catholic Faith," D. 1787.

merely human works. The Church's decision does not look God-ward, as it were, and dictate to the Author of the supernatural order what instruments He must use to make His revelation known. Rather the decision is all for the benefit of the members of the Church, indeed, for all mankind, the men who receive the revelation as from God. The Church vouches to them for the Bible's supernatural character, giving their supernatural faith the objective criterion that the faith of men in God requires.

Where, then, it may be asked, is the dependence of God's truth on man's will? It is certain, first of all, that no man forces God to reveal Himself to others. There is no dependence here. Neither can the dependence be said to consist in the transmission of the spoken or written word. Thoughout the process of transmission God remains the Master, with full control over the means He employs to accomplish His designs. What power has a pope or a college of bishops sitting in plenary council to declare (" to determine," in the words of Calvin) that these books contain truths proposed with divine inerrancy for the foundation and growth of faith? Considered in themselves they are but men, and their powers are human. They live in a particular era and their judgments take on the historical coloring of their time and environment. They are little fit to serve as a criterion, in any sense, of the supernatural faith of men. Yet, not by divine dependence, but rather by divine condescension and largesse they are endowed with the dignity of possessing the prerogative of separating that which has intrinsic divine worth from material which, though it may recommend itself for beauty, composition, and lofty doctrine, simply has not been delivered to the Church as divinely inspired.

In the same vein we may reply to Calvin's second conclusion, namely, that such a system results in faith's being founded on human favor. This is the subjective aspect of the problem, and it is to be solved on the bases of the principles expressed above regarding the act of faith. It is incontestable that the mind and will of man are, in their innermost reality, an in-

violable sanctuary that no one enters, but God alone.[12] " What man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of a man, that is in him" (I 11). It is in this sanctuary of the mind and will that faith comes to be. However rationally sound may be the system of proposing or declaring the truths to be believed, the act of faith needs an inner impetus, which can only come from God. Faith is an interior light, and the light is divine. The mind of man, in its very enlightenment, needs also to be moved to assent to the truths of faith, for they " appear not," and this movement, in the will, is a divine movement. All this is necessary, and it is doctrine that is integral to the Catholic theology of faith. No claim is made for the Church in the sense that she, as an instrument, penetrates into the soul of man and there produces faith in divine revelation, by enlightening and moving the mind and heart to assent to divine truth.

The role of the Church is precisely that of a teacher. God is the Supreme Master, and the Church receives from Him an objective deposit of truth which, if men give assent, can be subjected to an act of faith. The Church is the proximate criterion of the revelation of God. Her proposition of truth is objective, i.e., she is committed by God to lay before men an object which may be grasped, to lay it before them in such a way that it is easy to grasp. To grasp this object requires, however, more than mere proposition. It requires an efficient or moving cause, enlightening and inclining a man to believe.

In the Catholic tradition the motion and the light which have their origin in God are comprised in the generic term, *grace.* This grace, the result of which is living faith, must be carefully distinguished from Calvin's "inner testimony of the Holy Spirit." According to the Catholic view, when God has revealed Himself and transmitted this revelation to the Church, and the Church fulfills her function of teaching all nations, all is accomplished that needs to be done in the objective order. Grace intervenes, interiorly, to make this revelation effective.

[12] The foundation of this inviolability is the immediate ordination of the rational creature to God, an ordination which is unique. cf. *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 2, a. 8, c.

On the other hand, according to Calvin, something is still lacking to revelation, as set forth in the manner described above. The "testimony of the Holy Spirit," then, although taking place in the soul of man, that is, interiorly, would have a twofold role. First of all, it gives that last objective approbation or determination to the revelation in Scripture, which, in the Catholic view, is the Church's proper function. Second, this testimony brings about the subjective assent as Calvin would conceive it.

Our criticism is that no further objective approbation is required, once the Church has declared what the true canon is. We must emphasize that this present discussion is not concerned with possibilities. The Church is not an instrument that God needs, from which, therefore, He could not dispense. She is an instrument He has devised for the benefit of man, and so the need is rather on man's part to fit into the plan of God. The Church's determination of the canonicity of the Sacred Sciptures, in the sense now evolved, is not more nor less than a divinely given opportunity to verify, in the objective order a divine truth in a manner which accords perfectly with the needs of human nature. Man is a creature who assimilates truth proposed in a concrete dynamic fashion. This is the manner in which this divine truth is delivered to man by God.

Passing now from Calvin's mistaken view of the Catholic position in this matter, let us examine his own use of Scripture to refute what he supposed to be false doctrine. The passage which he adduces, it will be remembered, consists in words of encouragement addressed by the Apostle Paul to the Ephesians. As far as textual criticism is concerned there is no difficulty here. This verse comes to us with no variation that would alter in any way the sense. Both the Douay and King James versions translate the verse: "[Ye are] built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief cornerstone."

In the context the Sacred Writer is speaking to non-Jewish converts to the Christian faith and telling them of the reconciliation which has been accomplished by Jesus Christ, not

only between themselves and God, but also between the heretofore separated segments of the human race, namely, Jew and Gentile. The Apostle, speaking as a Jew, says that whereas in previous times the Jews obtained a special favored position, now all belong to the Church, Gentile and Jew alike. " This," says Father Voste, "is the object of the entire second chapter of the epistle, wherein the status of the Gentile as regards both sin and origin is vividly set in opposition to their present state of sharing in the benefits of Christ." [13] By abrogating the Mosaic Law Christ has made Israel and the Gentile nations to be a single people, one in its access to God through Him who has effected this reconciliation. Thus the Sacred Writer concludes: "You [Gentiles] are no longer strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and the domestics of God, built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief cornerstone."

The unity achieved among men through Christ was an object aptly described by the Apostle through the figure he uses, namely, that of a building. This is not the only occasion in which St. Paul spoke of the Church in this way. He used the same manner of expression, and even more explicitly, when writing to the Corinthians: " You are God's building. According to the grace of God that is given to me, as a wise architect I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereupon. But let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon. For other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus" (I Cor. 3: 9-11). There are striking similarities between these two texts. In both cases the Church is likened to a building. The foundation of the building is brought into both metaphors. Christ's role in constituting the foundation is equally evident in each. Yet, because of the richness of the figure, there is not complete correspondence, the most striking difference being the variant designation of Christ, merely as the foundation in I Corinthians, and, more specifically, as the chief cornerstone, in the epistle to the Ephesians. This is a crucial difference too, because the meaning of the

[13] Voste, J., O. P., *Commentarium in Epistulam ad Ephesios,* p. 35.

phrase, " built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets," is precisely what is in question when Calvin adduces the text as proof that the Church is validated by the Scriptures, and that the Sacred Writings in no wise depend upon the Church's determinations.

Modern exegetes, Protestant and Catholic alike, concede three possible meanings to the phrase, " the foundation of the apostles and the prophets." The first, which is dismissed universally, is that the foundation is Christ Himself. The sense would be: " You are built upon Christ, who is the foundation of the apostles." This seems to be ruled out reasonably by the subsequent redundant reference to Christ as the chief cornerstone.

The second meaning proposed, the one adopted by Calvin in the *Institutes,* is that the word *foundation* is to be interpreted as the doctrine set forth by the Apostles. Thus Calvin says, " **If** the *doctrine* of the prophets and apostles be the foundation of the Church, it must have been certain, antecedently to the existence of the Church." [14] The *International Critical Commentary* adduces Bengel to the same effect. " The testimony of the apostles and the prophets is the foundation of all believers." [15] The parallel passage of I Corinthians, already cited, is brought to bear in support of this interpretation. This same commentary indicates the inherent difficulties to such an interpretation:

> Nowhere is the gospel or any doctrine called the foundation of the Church. Moreover, it would be rather incongruous to assume as the foundation the system of teaching about Christ, and as the cornerstone Christ's person. . . . Moreover, the building consists of persons. In I Cor. 3:10 the figure is different, the building there is doctrine and the foundation naturally doctrinal, " Christ," i. e., teaching about Christ. Still further, if this view be adopted, the point that is brought in is an incidental one, quite unessential to the connection. [16]

"Inst., I, 7, *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 86 (CR, XXX, 57).

[15] Abbott, T. K., *International Critical Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians,* p. 70.

[16] *Ibid.*

The difficulty with this interpretation can be summed up as two-fold: one, contextual, the other, the incongruity of the text itself. The Apostle's whole argument deals not with a unifying doctrinal system, but rather with a unifying personal relation, in which every Christian is made an integral part of the building which is the Church, by incorporation in the person of Christ. Textually, the assumption of this position makes for the difficulty of conceiving of a foundation which is doctrinal, while the cornerstone is clearly the person of Christ.

The last possible meaning of the phrase is that the " foundation of the apostles and prophets " is none other than the apostles and prophets themselves. Grammatically, the construction is conceived of as a genitive of apposition, so that in the English version the preposition, *of,* stands for the sign of equality. This interpretation is supported by the ancient and weighty authority of St. John Chrysostom, and is adopted by all present day exegetes. Aside from authority, the chief argument which makes this view appear most acceptable is that of the resulting parallelism of the passage. The Church, or rather, its members, constitute a building. The apostles are this building's foundation, i.e., the stones upon which the whole edifice rests, for in Him " all the building, being framed together, groweth up into an holy temple in the Lord " (Eph.

This position is also strengthened by a consideration of *who* is designated by the terms, " apostles and prophets." There is little doubt but that the former term refers to the Twelve (including St. Paul) , and also to those pillars of the primitive Church, who are given this name in the Acts of the Apostles. Now although an older opinion with regard to the "prophets" was that the reference is to the seers of the Old Testament; today exegetes commonly hold that St. Paul is speaking rather of that college of privileged members of the primitive Church, subjects of the charisms according to which they spoke in the assembly of the faithful for the edification of the Christian

community.[17] The locutions of these prophets did not as such pertain to the doctrine which is the core of Christian belief and practice, but had to do presumably with the vicissitudes, etc., of the Church of that day and age. If this be the true sense of the phrase, " apostles and prophets," (a view confirmed by the very order in which the terms are placed, for if it were a question of the Old Testament prophets, the natural order would seem to demand the precedence of " prophets," whereas this construction seems to indicate some subordination of the prophets to the apostles) it is quite impossible that the foundation of which St. Paul speaks is evangelical doctrine.

Adopting this latter interpretation, therefore, as the authentic meaning of the passage, we cannot concede that Calvin used it aptly in support of the doctrine of the Interior Testimony. St. Paul in this place is not making even passing reference to the relation between the Sciptures and the Church. He is merely giving a full picture of the make-up of the Church, with a special emphasis upon its apostolicity.

Even granted the possibility that the inspired writer has the doctrine of the apostles in mind when speaking of the foundation, neither does it follow that the passage constitutes a patent contradiction of the Catholic position. Several elements need to be considered here, which Calvin does not bring into focus. The first is the fact that the writer himself is an apostle. He speaks of himself as such in the prologue to nearly all the his epistles. In the present one he begins, "Paul, an *apostle* of Jesus Christ, by the will of God" (Eph. 1: 1). Moreover, he writes at a time (about 63 A. D., according to the common estimate) when the Church, if not entirely, at least for a great part, was in the hands of the apostolic college as to its regimen. It was this group of men which had been commissioned immediately by Christ to rule the infant Church, and to give to its members the doctrine Christ Himself had delivered to time. In other words, this is the primitive Church.

[17] Ceuppens, F., 0. P., *Quaestiones Selectae ex Epistulis S. Pauli.* Rome: Marietti, 1951, pp. 173-174. See also the places to which Father Ceuppens refers.

Several consequences follow, bearing directly upon these facts. The first, and perhaps the most evident, is that no certainty can be had as to whether the *doctrine* to which St. Paul allegedly refers is oral tradition or the canonical scriptures. It *is* certain that not all the Scriptures are involved, because this is not the Apostle's last epistle. It is beyond question that the New Testament of canonical writings, as we know it, was non-existent at this time. Perhaps all that the Ephesians had learned of the Gospel was from the lips of St. Paul and his companions.

The second consequence to be noted has to do with the relation which existed between the Apostle Paul and the people to whom he was writing. We may characterize this relationship as that of master to disciple, and it is precisely that connection, which, according to the Catholic position, obtains between the present day teaching Church, i.e., those authorized to deliver Christian doctrine intact to all believers, and the members of the Church with whom such power is not vested. Obviously the cases are not exactly equivalent because today the Church does not add new revelation to that delivered in the authentic fonts of revelation. Neither is the infallibility, which is the Church's endowment, of the same nature as biblical inspiration. The Church's function is merely to accredit the objective validity of the doctrine which is received in tradition and the Scripture.

To solve, therefore, Calvin's objection that " this doctrine must have been certain, antecedently to the existence of the Church," [18] we should make the distinction implicitly contained in the foregoing paragraph, viz., between the teaching Church, as just explained; and the believing or learning Church, i. e., the entire body of the faithful of Christ, to whom the divinely revealed data proposed by the teaching Church is the key to a share in eternal life. The teaching Church performs an active function in setting forth the revealed data, not by giving intrinsic divine certainty to something that is in the

[18] *Inst.,* I, 7, 2, *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 86 (CR, XXX. 57).

first instance merely human, but by accepting it as divine from God and as such validating this acceptance for the benefit of men generally. The believing or learning Church actively receives the doctrine of faith. In this sense alone does Calvin's statement have truth, the major difficulty being that this is not precisely the sense in which he proposed the argument.

Having seen that it is impossible to find a refutation of the Catholic doctrine in the Epistle to the Ephesians, let us re-examine Calvin's position with regard to St. Augustine. We may assume that the occasion of Calvin's discussion with regard to the text, " I would not believe the Gospel, were it not that the Catholic authority moved me to do so," was its use by Pope Leo X in the Bull, *Exsurge Domine,* composed in 1520, the burden of which was the condemnation of the theses which Martin Luther had defended in Wittenburg. Calvin takes this occasion to explain that in reality for St. Augustine the Church is a witness to an unbelieving world, a witness that ceases to be necessary for a believer.

This assertion of Calvin is not merely of historical interest. Whether or not St. Augustine can be adduced in support of the Catholic doctrine is an important point for the theologians of the Calvinist school; first, because of the very intrinsic authority of St. Augustine, and, second, because, granted his support, the Protestant movement can point to a fore-runner of its point of view. In fact Pannier, writing in France at the turn of the century, speaks of the relation between Calvin and Augustine on the doctrine of the Interior Testimony in this vem:

> There is certainly not yet [in St. Augustine] the *whole* of the witness of the Holy Spirit. . . . But St. Augustine has the intuition of a mysterious work which is wrought in the soul of the Christian, of an understanding of the Bible which does not come from man but from a power external to him and superior to him; he urges the role which the *direct* correspondence between the Book and the reader must play in the foundation of Christian certitude. In this as in many other points Augustine was the precursor of the Reformation and a precursor without immediate continuers.[19]

[19] Pannier, J., *Le Temoignage du Saint Esprit,* Paris, Fischbacher, 1893, pp. 67-68.

In America Benjamin Warfield took up this same theme with a degree of enthusiasm: "In point of fact Augustine is just as clear as the Reformers that earthly voices assail only the ears . . . and he differs from them only in the place he gives the Church in communicating that grace out of which comes the preparation of the mind to understand as well as of the heart to believe, and of the will to do." [20]

In light of these tendencies to see in St. Augustine an incipient Reformer, a tendency that is but a reflection of four centuries of discussion with regard to the text which occasioned the controversy/ [1] the admission of Karl Barth is striking and important. The theologian of Basle is willing to grant that St. Augustine is speaking from a Catholic point of view:

> The saying [of]Augustine-which the Reformers attempted in vain to interpret . . . *in meliorem partem-now* became possible: in answer to the question what we are to tell those who still do not believe in the Gospel, Augustine has to confess, obviously on the basis of his personal experience: *Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas.* That I have the Gospel and can believe in it is obviously, as Augustine sees it

[20] Warfield, *op. cit.,* p. 47£.

[21] Warfield gives a history of the various arguments which have been adduced to support Calvin's view by theologians of his school. If this text were the only place in Augustine's writings where he touches the problem being considered, it would be worthwhile to relate them in detail. For the present, it appears sufficient to summarize. Thus a contemporary of Calvin, P. Melancthon, states: "Augustine means that he is moved by the consentient testimony of the *primitive* Church" (Warfield, p. 458). Another contemporary, Peter Martyr: "Augustine wishes to signify . . . that much is to be attributed to the ministry of the Church. . . . It cannot be inferred from this, however, that the authority of the Gospel hangs on the Church *in the minds* of the auditors" (p. 459). Later the Protestant scholastics were to propose the so-called "philological argument," according to which St. Augustine, by the use of a peculiar tense (the imperfect, where the pluperfect was called for), inferred that this experience was his own, *as an individual;* so that nothing can be deduced from his statement with regard to others. In the nineteenth century, however, there were not lacking Calvinists, such as W. G. T. Shedd, who admitted that Augustine actually accorded to the Church at least more authority than to any one member on this particular point. Warfield himself seems to recognize this when he grants that St. Augustine "differs" from the Reformers in the "place he gives the Church, etc." (p. 47£). For this entire historical consideration see pp. 449-470.

and as he was rightly understood in later Catholic polemics, itself a gift of Church tradition. Therefore the saying foreshadows that inclusion of Scripture itself into the tradition which was expressly accomplished at a much later date.[22]

Here Barth departs completely from the traditional Calvinist view, and the reason for his departure is his unique theory of how external authority in the Church tends to petrify the vitality of religion, and how this hardening of the core of Christian doctrine began, by an unconscious movement even in the first centuries of the Church, so that the Reformation was a glorious moment in the battle, which must constantly be waged, to keep the word of God absolutely free to do its work.

The difficulty of establishing with precision the true position of St. Augustine in this regard is manifest. In the first place, neither the passage which Calvin takes into consideration or any whole work of Augustine deals *ex professo* with the relation between the Church, the Scriptures, and the act of faith. It has been observed often enough that St. Augustine's writings are, for the greater part, of an occasional character. Therefore, we must always try to view them as a whole. This in itself is a formidable task. We will attempt, however, to offer some evidence which indicates that, had he written a tract on the establishment of the divine authority of the Scripture, his doctrine would coincide in its lines with that exposed in the Catholic Church today.[23]

Four points will be considered here: 1) What did St. Augustine think with regard to the immediate activity of God in the act of faith? 2) What was his doctrine as to the intrinsic worth of Sacred Scripture? 3) What does he have to say about Tradition as a font of revelation? 4) What was his attitude toward the magisterium of the Church? It will be readily seen that, if a reasonable degree of certitude can be found regarding

•• Barth, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 549.

[23] The work of P. Batiffol, *La Catholicisme de S. Augustin*, treats in a definitive way of this entire question, and the following portion is written in close dependence upon the references he adduces.

these points, the judgment with regard to the text, "I would not believe the Gospel, etc.," should be made more easily.

There is no doubt about St. Augustine's doctrine on the part that God must have in the conceiving of faith.

> The sound of our words strikes the ear; the Master is within. We may admonish by the sound of our voice; if He who teaches is not within, our speaking is idle. . . . Have you not all heard these words? Yet how many will leave not having grasped the truth? Whomever the Holy Spirit has not taught retires as ignorant as before.[24]

This is merely St. Augustine's rhetorical way of expressing the truth which is part of the doctrinal patrimony of the Catholic Church, namely, that in the subjective order, that is, within the soul, only God is able to work.

Neither is there any question but that, according to St. Augustine, to the inner voice of God corresponds an objective revelation which carries with it its own authority of validity. So constantly does St. Augustine return to the theme of the intrinsic value of the Scriptures and the quality of inerrancy which they possess, that it seems useless to quote any one text. One must notice, however, that for Augustine the inner voice and the authority of Scripture complement one another.

We have already noted with what force the Fathers of the Church assert the existence of an authority whose source is apostolic (and, therefore, divine, since in the minds of the Fathers the mission of the Apostles was but the final term of the visible mission of the Son of God), which is distinct from the Scriptures. St. Augustine's witness with regard to apostolic tradition is just as strong as that of any of the Fathers. We may note that the lack of explicit controversy on this question prevented St. Augustine from writing to the point as much as we might now appreciate; but the following texts are an indication of his mind.

> I believe that the custom [of receiving Christians baptized in heretical sects] comes from apostolic authority-just as many things

•• *Ep. Joan. ad Parthos,* tract. III, 13 (ML *35,* !2004).

which are not found in their writings, nor even in the councils of their successors; which, nevertheless, because they are kept by the universal Church, are believed to be handed on and commended by these very Apostles.[25]

In another place, where the discussion is not merely about a practice which presupposes a dogma, but about a dogma, properly speaking (namely, the meaning of Christ's "descent into Hell"), St. Augustine writes thus:

Practically the entire Church agrees that [He freed Adam from Limbo at that time]. . . . And it is to be held that she has not believed this in vain, from wherever it may be handed down, even though the expressed authority of the canonical scriptures cannot be adduced on this point.[26]

Since it is impossible to find in the writings of St. Augustine a comparison of the Scriptures and Tradition, and in light of these texts, the interpretation by Warfield of St. Augustine's thought seems to lack sufficient basis.

A *presumptive* apostolicity may lend to the immemorial customs of the universal Church an authority which only arrogance can resist; and to the Church, which was founded by the Apostles and made by them a depository of the tradition of truth, a high deference is due in all its deliverances; but to the Scriptures alone belong supreme authority because to them alone belongs an apostolicity which coalesces with their entire fabric.[27]

Actually the apostolicity of tradition is no more " presumptive " than is the divine authority of the Scriptures. In fact if we make use of the figure afforded by the term " font " of revelation, the doctrine of St. Augustine and the other Fathers appears to amount to this, namely, that the content of Scripture and Tradition coalesce to form a single stream. Scripture and Tradition are the source of dogmas which are the elements in the body of the doctrine of Christianity. When Tradition is the source of a dogma, the case is evident from a comparison

[25] *De Bapt. contra Donat.,* II, 12 (ML 43, 133).
[26] *Epist.* 164, 6 (ML 33, 711).
[27] *Op. cit.,* p. 442.

of the Scriptures with Tradition, as crystallized in some authentic organ of the transmission of revelation. The dogmas that are founded in the Scriptures themselves are evident from an examination of the text and authentic exegesis. When these two sources do coalesce into a single stream, its contents are kept within its banks, so to speak, by the infallible Church.

This last point brings us to the consideration of St. Augustine and infallibility. Aside from the evident fact that he depended from the very beginning of his conversion on the Church's magisterium, can we infer from his own writing that his thought on the infallibility of this teaching authority coincides perfectly with the doctrine as it is presented today? We must keep in mind that a span of almost sixteen centuries makes a difference in the manner of explicitness of expression; and in this light the following texts are remarkable for the clarity with which they set forth the doctrine of the Magisterium.

Truth abides in the bosom of the Church. Whoever is separated from this bosom of the Church is bound to speak falsely.... From the mouth of truth I acknowledge Christ, Truth personified; from the mouth of truth I acknowledge the Church, who shares in this Truth. [28]

Then with regard to the stability of the Church's magisterium in the setting forth of the true meaning of tradition:

Thus, even though a certain example ... cannot be adduced from the canonical Scriptures; in this matter we still hold to the truth of those same Scriptures, as long as we do what the universal Church has determined-the Church which is herself commended by a scriptural authority. And so, since the Scriptures cannot be wrong [in their commendation] let whoever fears to be mistaken by the obscurity of this question consult the Church on it. [29]

The considered judgment of Fr. Batiffol with reference to St. Augustine's thought on the authority of the Church, as exemplified in the plenary council seems, therefore, to be correct: " The soverign authority of a plenary council does not *make*

[28] *Enarratio in Pso* 57, 6 (ML 36, 678-679).
[29] *Contra Crescono* I, 38 (ML 43, 465).

the truth, but only *disengages* it from controversy and *confirms* the traditional Catholic faith." [80] Thus we see that all the elements of the doctrine of the Catholic Church are to be found in the writings of St. Augustine; and it is within this remote context that one should view his assertion with regard to faith in the divine authority of the gospels. The immediate context of this passage has its own proper significance. The paragraph runs as follows:

You might be about to read to me from the Gospel, and try to show from your reading that it speaks of the person of Manichaeus. But if you would meet with someone who did not yet believe the gospel, how would you answer his, "I do not believe?" But I would not believe the Gospel, were it not that the authority of the Catholic Church moved me to do so. Therefore, since I obey them when they say, "Believe the Gospel," why ought I not to obey their "Do not believe Manichaeus?" Take your choice: If you say, "Believe the Catholics," the difficulty is that they warn me to accord you no belief; and so if I believe them I can do nothing else but withhold faith in you. If you say, "Do not believe the Catholics," you do not act fairly by inducing me to believe in Manichaeus through the Gospel, because I have come to believe the Gospel itself because of Catholic preaching. [81]

The background against which St. Augustine constructed his argument was the peculiar doctrine which the Manichaeans held in regard to the authority of the Sacred Scriptures. In order to lure converts, they asserted that their system offered something to which the Catholic Church made no claim. They guaranteed the members of their sect a conviction of truth more perfect than faith. Rational demonstration, they

[80] *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 36.

[81] Evangelium mihi fortasse lecturus es, et inde Manichaei personam tentabis asserere. Si ergo invenires aliquem qui Evangelio nondum credit, quid faceres dicenti tibi Non credo? Ego vero Evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicae Ecclesiae oommoveret auctoritas. Quibus ergo obtemperavi dicentibus mihi, Crede Evangelio; cur eis non obtemperem dicentibus mihi, Noli credere Manichaeis? Elige quid velis. Si dixeris, Crede Catholicis; ipsi me monent ut nullam fidem accomodem vobis; quapropter non possum illis credens, nisi tibi non credere. Si dixeris, Noli Catholicis credere; non recte facies per Evangelium me cogere ad Manichaei fidem, quia ipsi Evangelio Catholicis praedicantibus credidi. *Contra Epist. Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti* (ML 34, 176) .

affirmed, was to be had of the apostleship of their prophet, Manichaeus. In establishing this demonstration, however, they claimed the use of the gospels. Their contention was that the gospels demonstrated Manichaeus to be a true prophet. St. Augustine, in turn, demonstrates the fallacy of the Manichaean position by setting up the dilemma which it presents. Granted the authority of the Catholic Church to transmit the Word of God, the Manichaeans must be rejected; for the Church herself spurns their doctrine as false. On the other hand, with the fall of the Catholic Church's authority, the Scriptures lose their power to form a finn basis for any system which claims them as a foundation. Why is this so? Evidently St. Augustine does not mean to say that the Scriptures take their intrinsic worth from the Church's subsequent approval, so that the Church would " create " the Scriptures. Again, it is a question of an objective criterion which God provides for the benefit of mankind, according to a pre-established order. Cardinal Cajetan, a contemporary of Calvin, interprets the thought of Augustine in this vein:

> Thus does Augustine speak in regard to the proposition and explication of the things to be believed by us who hold the second place as far as faith is concerned. He says that he would not believe the Gospel save that the Church proposes it to be believed; for we accord faith to these books rather than to others for the reason that the Church proposes these as worthy of belief. It is otherwise with the prophets, who hold the first place as far as faith is concerned; for they were taught by God Himself and wrote the very books.[32]

Cajetan here takes occasion to distinguish the faith of those who either receive revelation immediately from God, or at least are inspired by Him to transmit that which He wants written for the common good of the Church, from the faith of

[32] Et similiter auctoritas Augustini quoad proponendum et explicandum credenda nobis, qui secundum locum in credendo tenemus, loquitur. Uncle dicit quod non crederet Evangelio nisi Ecclesia proponeret illud credendum: propterea enim credimus magis his libris quam aliis, quia Ecclesia hos proponit credendos. Secus autem est de Patribus qui primum locum in credendo tenent: qui scilicet a Deo instructi sunt et libros ipsos scripserunt. *Comm. in Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

those who receive the revelation of God or His inspired Word mediately, i. e., through the instrumentality of the Church. It is this latter faith of which Augustine speaks, says Cajetan; and he goes on to point out, in concert with St. Thomas, that the mediate position of the Church in no way destroys the divine motive for faith. The Church receives the commission from her Founder to be the condition without which faith is not conceived, at least in the ordinary working out of God's plan.

Thus we are left to choose between this explanation of St. Augustine's thought and the explanation of Calvin, namely, that the Church's confirmation of the Scriptures is merely an "act of piety," not the transmission of a divine tradition of apostolic origin. Taking into consideration Augustine's general doctrine regarding divine revelation, we are much inclined to take the part of Cajetan.

This view is confirmed by an examination of the work of St. Augustine, which Calvin recommends as providing conclusive proof of his interpretation. [33] In this very work St. Augustine speaks of the Scriptures and the Church in the same breath, as it were: "Nothing appears more prudent, chaste, and advantageous to religion than all those Scriptures which the Catholic Church holds fast." [34] He also emphasizes the necessity of the Church in her magisterial function as an interpreter of divine revelation. [35] In fact, throughout this treatise the writer links faith and the Catholic Church as if one could not be spoken of without the other. " Follow the road of Catholic teaching which comes to us through the Apostles from Christ Himself, and thence will proceed to those who follow." [36]

To sum up, therefore, the criticism of Calvin's supposed

[33] *De Utilitate Credendi;* cf. *Inst.* I, 7, 3; *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 88 (CR, XXX, 58).

[34] *De Utilitate Credenti;* (ML 4!<!, 74).

[35] Nulla imbutus poetica disciplina Terentianum Maurum sine magistro attingere non auderes; Asper, Cornutus, Donatus et alii innumerabiles requiruntur, ut quilibet poeta possit intelligi, cujus carmina et theatri plausus videntur captare: tu in eos Libl'os, qui quoquo modo se habeant, sancti tamen divinarumque rerum pleni, prope totius generis humani confessione diffamantur, *sine duce irruis. Ibid.,* (col. 77).

[36] *Ibid.,* (col. 79) .

refutation of the Catholic doctrine, or, perhaps better, his refutation of the supposed Catholic doctrine, we offer the following statements:

1) Because he misconceived the true nature of that font of revelation which is divine tradition, Calvin drew false conclusions with regard to the consequences of the Church's position.

2) His argument from the authority of St. Paul lacks foundation in the biblical text.

S) In view of St. Augustine's whole body of writings, and with particular regard for the text which is adduced by Catholic authors in support of the Church's doctrine, it appears that the Bishop of Hippo can in no wise be considered as a " precursor of the Reformation, but a precursor without immediate followers." It might better be stated that in his thought is the germ of the Catholic synthesis which is the common heritage of Catholic theology today.

SECTION 2: *The Unique Position of Karl Barth*

Apparently the next step in this criticism should be the consideration of Calvin's positive defense of the doctrine of the Interior Testimony. This will be postponed briefly, however, to give place to a few remarks about what is specific to the doctrine of the Interior Testimony in Karl Barth. The reason for this arrangement is that the criticism which is common to all expressions of this doctrine necessarily takes into account what Calvin has to say about its foundations.

It is already evident that the doctrine of the Interior Testitnony in Karl Barth is modified radically by his beliefs regarding revelation. In fact we may say truly that the change in point of view is so fundamental that the doctrine of the Interior Testimony in Barth would be unrecognizable to John Calvin. It is no longer a divine light which illuminates the mind to see a permanent quality about the Scriptures, a quality, in other words, that is really *the1·e;* rather it is an intermittent divine activity which places man in immediate contact with God, of

which the Scriptures are merely the *occasion.*[37] Actually, in this respect Barth is much further from the truth than was Calvin. The Catholic doctrine includes a Bible endowed with a permanent quality (summed up by the word, canonicity), to which there corresponds a permanent conviction on man's part, conditioned by a permanent commission of the Church to administer the transmission of God's Word. Calvin
the commission of the Church; Barth takes away the real canonicity from the Bible.[38]

Barth's most fundamental error, however, seems to be not his acceptance of the unwarranted conclusions of some modern biblical criticism, to the effect that since the Bible contains many imperfections and even errors, the old theory of divine inspiration is no longer tenable. His whole methodology is rather based on an even more radical subtraction from the truth, " an agnosticism, from which he attempts to escape by fideism."[39] It is, therefore, a criteriological error, insofar as it is a denial of the value of the thought processes of the rational creature, at least when the object of thought is God; but it is theological to the degree that this denial is based ostensibly upon a misconception of the effects of original sin. Father Hamer's labelling of the basic attitudes gives us the occasion of designating the element in Barth's doctrine in which this " fideism " reaches its final term. That element is, of course, the doctrine of the Interior Testimony. This means that since Barth chooses to limit himself in this instance to the terminology of the primitive Reformation, at the same time categorically affirming that he adheres strictly to the principle, *sola Scriptura,* his fideism, which on the part of God is but a

[37] Fr. Hamer has shown with sufficient clarity that this Occasionalism is a characteristic note of the whole Barthian system.

[38] It might be noted that there is an intermediate step in this process, namely, a retention of a Bible to which may be attributed at least some degree of intrinsic divine value, along with a denial that the Testimony of the Holy Spirit results in a *permanent* attitude of faith. This latter is the doctrine of J. Pannier, whose work is cited above, and who conceived the Interior Testimony as intermittent with regard to its subject, man. Cf. *op.* cit., p. 200.

[39] Hamer, *op. cit.,* p. 171.

sudden thrust which pierces momentarily the opaque cloud of agnosticism, consists in the *illapsus divinus* which is the Interior Testimony of the Holy Spirit.

SECTION 3: *The Foundations of the Doctrine of the Interior Testimony of the Holy Spirit*

Finally, let us take this doctrine and see if it cannot be subjected to some common criticism, even though its proponents differ widely in their orientation. In so doing we shall be attempting to take a truly theological viewpoint, trying to perceive the causes or motives which have inclined Protestants of the Calvinist tradition to found their system upon this rock, the Interior Testimony of the Holy Spirit.

One analysis which is commonly adduced is summed up by the familiar phrase "private judgment vs. authority." The Protestants are presented as children of the Renaissance, participating in that general tendency to emancipate human reason from what were considered the bonds of medievalism. In rejecting the authority of the Church, they would merely have substituted the authority of the individual. It should be evident that this criticism does not meet squarely the problem which is posed by the Calvinist doctrine of the Interior Testimony. Calvin, in fact, begins with the axiom that only God can bear witness to His own Word; and in our own day Barth considers as a datum of Christian dogmatics that without the testimony of God, man can make *no* judgments about divine things. The Interior Testimony, except in the case of the sentimentalists who reduce all religion to a merely natural " religious experience," is an authority which stands outside man. A contemporary Calvinist theologian, writing on the Interior Testimony, states: "Let us say at the outset that [this] Holy Spirit is in no way immanent to my spirit; that He belongs just as properly to God as my spirit belongs to me." [40]

To institute a criticism that is more telling, we should begin

•• Preiss, Theo., *Le Temoignage du Saint Esprit.* Paris, Delachaux et Niestle, 1946, p. 16.

by indicating the extent of agreement between Calvinists (even Karl Barth) and the Church in this matter. Then we can proceed to expose the foundations of the Protestant doctrine, first, by explaining the Catholic viewpoint on what is legitimate, though over-emphasized, in the Protestant system; and second, by showing exactly where the Catholic and Protestant doctrines stand opposed as contraries.

The points of agreement are important ones. In the first place, it is common to the various Calvinist and the Catholic systems of theology to consider revelation as something that is wholly supernatural in its origin. In whatever form it is proposed the theology which is Calvinist in its origins is faithful to that truth expressed by Christ: "No one knows the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him" (Matt. 11: and repeated by St. Paul: "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him" (I Cor. 9). We are well aware that investigation of the precise sense of the word " supernatural " in all itS' applications will also reveal striking dissimilarities; but this much is certain, namely, that if God be viewed as the efficient cause of revelation, Catholic, orthodox Calvinist, and neo-Calvinist theologians are in basic agreement. For all, this cause operates in a manner that exceeds all the powers of this world. No man ascends to heaven to draw God down.

The doctrine of predestination, which is rightly considered as characteristic of the system built by John Calvin, is in one way a corollary of this initial supernaturalist orientation. Since there is agreement regarding the first; there will be a certain concord upon the second matter. Again, we are familiar enough with the departures of Calvin from orthodox Catholicism in the lengths to which he carried the doctrine of positive reprobation, as a part of predestination. The point of agreement, however, should not be overlooked. Just as in the consideration of God as the source of revelation; here again in the consideration of the various effects of predestination, there is common agreement that the movement toward God (particularly, voca-

tion and justification; cf. Rom. 8: 80) is based upon a divine determination or choice. Catholics and Calvinists are at one, therefore, in affirming the font of religious truth to be out of reach of man, and the contact between God and man in the order of religious truth and personal engagement to be based upon a divine choice.

The distance from these basic assumptions to the doctrine of the Interior Testimony in the Protestant system is not great. The question for the Catholic theologian should be: Are there legitimate elements in the traversing of this distance? That is to say, when in the positing of the Holy Scripture as the sole means through which God accomplishes a *vocation* (one of the principal effects of predestination) , Calvin and his disciples close their system with the doctrine of the Interior Testimony. Can the Catholic theologian also agree that here is an element of truth?

Again the answer is in the affirmative; but since by the principle of *sola Scriptura* the Protestants have introduced an element that is entirely foreign to Christian orthodoxy, the agreement must be much more restricted. This is the place to note a certain over-emphasis in that system. We have already seen that in the Catholic doctrine of the establishment of faith in the truth: "The Scriptures are the Word of God," the testimony of God proposed in Tradition through the infallible Church is complemented by divine grace, a motion and a light-an *interior testimony,* but certainly not of the character which the Calvinists attribute to their Witness. In the Catholic system there is even another point which shows the legitimacy of Calvin's *tendency,* without confirming in any way the form that it took. According to the doctrine of St. Thomas once faith has been conceived the believer is able to judge by a certain connaturality concerning those things which pertain to the object of faith.[41] Now the divine character of

"See *Summa Tkeol.,* II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad Sum. Sicut enim per alios habitus virtutum homo videt illud quod est sibi oonveniens secundum habitum ilium, ita etiam per habitum fidei inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his quae conveniunt rectae fidei et non aliis.

the Scriptures is of this genus, and so by the instinct of faith the believer is able to perceive, with a marvelous certitude (less in degree, however, than the certitude of Calvin's "fiducial " faith) , that this is truly the Word of God.

In this explanation we assume, of course, as a necessary condition of faith the transmission of the testimony of God through the proposition of the Church; but, with this understood, it must be admitted that the Protestants are in contact with a profound truth. Unfortunately their expression of it is not contained within an orthodox context. Were it framed in this background, we should marvel at the beauty, and accuracy, of their insight.

> The [Testimony of the Holy Spirit] makes the phrases of the Bible written in the third person to speak in the second person. It makes of the Bible a personal letter. From Adam to Jesus Christ the believer discovers a history which embraces his own destiny. He sees himself as perverted and condemned with Adam, and saved in Jesus Christ. [The Spirit] is able to accomplish really that which can and ought truly to be called a " religious experience." [42]

The Testimony of the Holy Spirit in this Catholic sense is an effect of that elevation of human nature and the faculties of man to participate in the life of God, to the end that more and more it is the Holy Spirit who is, in virtue of His gifts, the moving force of the Christian's activity. It is not strange that the Author of the Scriptures should call the attention, as it were, of the Christian to the divine character of the Word of God.

In the presence of the present day exposition of the doctrine of the Interior Testimony by Protestant authors more or less faithful to all of Calvin's principles, the exact manner in which this activity is attributed to the Holy Spirit, as the **Third** Person of the Blessed Trinity, should be kept well in mind. We have no reason to attribute other but an orthodox sense to Calvin's statement-the sense, namely, whereby this divine work *ad extra* would be appropriated to the Holy Spirit as being particularly consonant to what is distinctive of His

[42] Preiss, *op. cit.,* p. 29.

personality, i.e., to proceed from the Father and the Son in an ecstasy of love. In modem authors, however, such as Barth and Preiss, the doctrine of the Trinity is clouded by the tendency to distinguish the Persons of the Trinity on the basis of their very activity regarding man (e. g., the Word, *because* He reveals God to man; the Holy Ghost, *because* He witnesses of God's love to us in Jesus Christ). Catholics can benefit from this Calvinist doctrine only if these distinctions and restrictions are used to keep the doctrine in its proper perspective.

To point out what seems to be the most basic contrary opposition between Catholicism and Calvinism, ancient or modem, on this point, we must return to the Calvinist theme of predestination, and see what relation it has to this particular question. First of all, the order of the theological synthesis of St. Thomas calls our attention to the truth that predestination is really a " part " of divine providence, distinguished from ordinary providence by the end toward which those who are ruled by each tend-the attainment of which, in the case of the rational creature, is of an exceptional order. St. Thomas makes a second point too in this tract, which is of primary importance here. He points out that between the order of divine providence (or predestination) and the execution of this order, called the *government* of the universe, natural and supernatural, there is a striking difference. In his own words the difference consists in this: "[As far as the order of providence is concerned) God oversees all things *immediately* . . . [But with regard to the execution of this order] there are certain *means* of divine providence. For He governs the inferior by means of the superior." [43] The predestination of those God has foreknown and elected " to be made conformable to the image of His Son," means that God comprehends, immediately and perfectly, the place each of His elect is to have in the heavenly Jerusalem, as well as every inch of the path each will take to reach that goal. It does not mean, however, that God is

[43] " Quantum igitur ad primum horum, Deus immediate omnia provideto . . . Quantum ad secundum sunt aliqua media divinae providentiae. Quia inferiora gubernat per superiorao . . .. *Summa Theolo,* I, q. a. 3, in corp.

constrained to furnish *immediately* all the means that each of His elect will employ, according to His comprehensive foreknowledge. On the contary, the perfection of this latter aspect of predestination, the government of the elect in leading them to eternal life, is enhanced by the employment of means, secondary causes, to accomplish God's plan. Such management of the execution of God's predestination of the elect is not, indeed, "on account of any defect in His power, but because of the abundance of His goodness, so that He communicates to creatures the dignity of causality." [44]

The "dignity of causality " communicated to creatures **in** the supernatural order of the execution of the predestination of the elect is really the point where the Catholic position is sharply distinguished from that of Calvin and his school, right down to the present day. **It** is a point that extends itself to form a line that marks the separation of the two syntheses. Before seeing exactly how this separation is effected in the matter of the establishment of the canonicity of the Scriptures, we may carry the exposition of the Catholic doctrine one step further. The causality, shared by God with creatures in the execution of predestination, takes place in two distinct ways. The most commonly discussed created cause in this order is the *instrument.* This is not the place to evolve the precise

[44] *Ibid.* St. Thomas discussed this same question later in the same part of the *Summa,* p. 103, a. 6. Here he assigns the root of the difference in the order of providence and its execution:

Cujus ratio est quia, cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel ratione vel cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc consistit, quod particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus; sicut optimus medicus est, non qui considerat sola universalia, sed qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium; et idem patet in ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum particularium rationem gubernationis habeat.

Sed cum per gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernationem, quanto maior perfectio a gubernante rebus gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat; sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores.

notion of instrumental causality. As examples of the employment of divine instruments we cite the sacraments; and we note in this example a characteristic common to all instruments, namely, that of itself instrumental causality is a phenomenon that is transient. We note, secondly, that according to common Catholic doctrine, the instruments which God employs are dignified to the extent that they are not merely the occasions but real efficient causes of internal grace.

The second type of created cause in the supernatural order is the *minister.* Since this notion is not quite so common, and also because it is more to our point, it may be helpful to note several characteristics of the ministerial cause.[45] First, to which of the genera of causes does it belong? It is clear that the minister is not an efficient cause. For example, the ambassadors of a government, who function as ministers, do not act as moving causes in the strict sense in the accomplishment of this or that mission. They are, rather, dispositive, and operate in the order of material causality. From the same example of the ambassador we may derive other notions. First, there is a certain permanency about the office of a minister, although its duration is dependent entirely upon the will of the authority in whom the minister's mission originates. Second, the degree of dignity with which the minister is endowed is also to be determined by the supreme authority for whom the minister acts.

The point at issue here is, of course, that in the present economy of the execution of predestination the Church founded by Jesus Christ, the Minister of the New Testament (who is more than this too) , is the minister through which the elect are disposed to receive the graces according to which they are to be made conformable to the image of the Son of God. If it must be admitted that there has been neglect on the part of Catholics to emphasize the function of the testimony of the Holy Spirit (as explained above) in the verification of the

[45] The ministerial cause which is spoken of here is not to be confused with the sacramental minister, who is truly an instrumental cause. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa,* 11-11, 188, 4, ad 1.

Scriptures; we may ask the Protestants of today if in their synthesis they have not overlooked this last point.

The answer to this question must be in the affirmative, and it must also be amplified, because it is not merely a question of neglect, but rather of a gross misunderstanding. The neglect consists in not taking into account the ministerial role of the Church in the accrediting of the Scriptures. We have seen that the minister does not work in the same intimate way as the instrument. The Church administers, in the certification of the Scriptures, an external grace; while in the sacrament of Baptism, for example, internal grace is really conferred. But this is not to diminish the function of the Church to nothing, to a mere " act of piety," because in the exercise of her ministry of preserving, proposing and explaining the contents of divine revelation she exercises a *permanent* ministry according to a commission of her Divine Founder, which charter includes the guarantee of infallibility.

How this aspect of the execution of predestination escaped Calvin can be seen from his writings. In the very discussion of the Interior Testimony he observes:

> That alone is true faith which the Spirit of God seals in our hearts. And with this one reason every reader of modesty and docility will be satisfied: Isaiah predicts that " all the children " of the renovated Church " shall be taught of God." Herein God deigns to confer a singular privilege on his elect whom he distinguishes from the rest of mankind. [46]

Another remarkable passage is that in his commentary upon the second epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (1: 22): "It is necessary that the spirit who has spoken through the mouth of the Prophets enter into our hearts and touch them to the quick to persuade them that the Prophets have faithfully set before them that which was committed to them from on high." [47] Preiss correctly interprets these passages: " This is to say that the Church and each Christian today recognizes the Bible as the word of God by a testimony and with a certitude

[46] *Inst.,* I, 7, 5; *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 91 (CR, XXX. 60).
[47] Cited by Preiss, *op. cit.,* p. 13.

both of which are *direct."* [48] Finally, Karl Barth states the identical doctrine in his own way:

> We cannot speak of the inspiration of the Bible ... without that other royal act-which is only a continuation of the first-in which the inspiration is imparted to us, in which here and now we are forced out of our position as spectators of the word and work of the biblical writers, in which the calling of the prophet and apostles becomes an event to us by the ministry of their word and work.[49]

These statements taken together show that in the Calvinist tradition the secondary cause is not considered in the execution of predestination. Contact between God and the elect must be immediate, or, according to this view, there is no contact at all. It is significant that Calvin and Barth both speak explicitly of the *prophetic vocation* in this connection and liken the Christian vocation to it. In reality the prophets enter into the plan of predestination in an utterly unique manner. The gift according to which they serve God and the elect is a charism, not pertaining directly to their own salvation, but given primarily for the benefit of the Church. Also because of this unique character of the prophetic gift, these specially chosen ones "hold the first place in believing," as Cajetan observes in the place cited. Holding this position they are among the superiors through whom the elect are governed. From the point of view of their having received divine revelation immediately and having been enlightened and moved to transmit the word of God to writing by the gift of biblical inspiration, the prophets were truly instruments of God. From the point of view of the witness that they bear toward the elect of all ages they are ministers of the covenant between God and His Chosen People-" Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ and the dispensers of the mysteries of God " (I Cor. 4: 1).

The truth that the ministry of the prophets, based upon a charism, was not connected necessarily with the effects of their own predestination, notably vocation and justification, is of great moment here. It is this very formal separation between

[48] Preiss, *ibid.,* p. U.

[49] Barth, *op. cit.,* I, 2, p. *522.*

holiness and the ministry that seems to have been a scandal to Calvin, and remains so to the Protestants of today. We say " formal separation " because the evidently preferable situation is the joining of the two, as it is exemplified in the prophets such as Isaiah and Jeremiah, and the Apostles. It is this formal separation too which gives the teaching Church its special character as a minister in the execution of God's plan for the recapitulation of all things in Christ, and, in particular, the administrator of the revelation of God in Tradition and the Scriptures, to which she bears witness by giving an infallible guarantee to their divine origin. In other words, the public exercise of this gift of infallibility pertains to the order of charisms.

In light of all this we wonder if the following presentation of the Church's position is justified (a presentation that is current, having been published within the last decade):

> Who has written the Bible, who has made the collection of the books contained therein and put them in a single volume, declared them to be normative and canonical? The Church of the first centuries, without any doubt. Therefore, the Church of Rome concludes triumphantly, it is the Church who has *created* the Scriptures. [50]

The Church's claims are certainly more modest than this! She only stands firm in the precise position she holds in the execution of predestination and this not because of any defect either in the power of God, or the efficacy of His revelation in the Bible-" for the Word of God is living and effectual, and more piercing than any two edged sword, reaching unto the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Hebr. 4: 12) -but because of the superabundance of God's goodness, who even shares with creatures the dignity of causality.

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•• Preiss, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Church and the Liturgy: Liturgy Vol. *Concilium.* Edited by JoHANNES WAGNER. Paulist Press, Glen Rock, N. J., 1965. Pp. 191. Cloth, $4.50.

What strikes one most forcibly in reading the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy is its determination that the renewed liturgy shall be the means by which the People of God are sanctified and enabled to worship their Creator in spirit and truth. The principal concern of the Constitution is to make the Church's worship meaningful to modern man, but if the intention of the Council is to be realized, not only will there be need for specific reform measures on the part of the post-conciliar liturgical commission but there will also be need for proper instruction, or more precisely, a genuine education, in the sense of the Church which is both constituted and expressed through the liturgy. The way to a thorough renewal has already been partially prepared by theoretical specialists, but their thought must filter down to the practical administrative levels of the parish, religious house, and school.

In a way, then, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy is both a beginning and an end. It is the beginning of a new phase in the life of the Church's liturgy, but it is also the culmination of years of historical research, theological development and pastoral experimentation. The second volume of *Concilium,* edited by the distinguished German liturgist, Johannes Wagner, is devoted to the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, but the editors and the contributors have attempted above all to see the document in terms of the Church and its growth in recent years. As Wagner points out in his preface to the volume, " The liturgical movement . . . is ultimately but a part, the specific expression and an important interpretation of a much greater and more comprehensive process that has been going on in the Church irresistibly for a long time: the image of the Church is seen in a new light; it is seen and made a reality in a new and profound manner."

Since the liturgy is the mystery of the Church's own life, it is the greatest treasure which the Church possesses and therefore the object of heavy responsibility for the bishops who possess authority in the Church. As the Constitution points out, it is first of all in his celebration of the Eucharist that the bishop manifests the true nature of his episcopal office as a successor of the apostles. It is in and through the liturgy that he continues the apostolic work of building the Church as the Body of Christ through the proclamation and celebration of the Paschal Mystery so that men might be made one in Christ's Body, dead to sin and risen in glory. The Church

is built where the apostolic ministry gathers men together in the name of Christ by proclaiming the gospel to them and by breaking for them the Bread of Life. In view of the vital role which the bishop plays in the liturgical life of the Church, the first four articles of *The Church and the Liturgy* delineate various aspects of this topic. Dom Cyprian Vagaggini illustrates the theological bases upon which rests the full range of bishop-liturgy relationships, Joseph Pascher outlines the relation between bishop and priests according to the liturgy Constitution, Frederick McManus discusses the juridical power which the Constitution has vested in the episcopal conferences with regard to the liturgy, and Joseph Jungmann discusses the bishop's role in the development of the devotional life of the Church.

But since it is impossible for the bishop always and everywhere to preside over the whole flock in his Church, " he must establish smaller groupings of the faithful. Among these the parishes, set up locally under a pastor who takes the place of the bishop, are the most important, for in some manner they represent the visible Church constituted throughout the world" (Constitution, paragraph Because each parish celebrates the Eucharist in union with the local bishop and because every bishop is in union with the Pope as the Bishop of Rome, the Church is visibly manifested to the world above all though the celebration of the mystery of Christ. In this sense, the liturgy is always a public and communal action. Hence to minimize in practice this character of the liturgy is to oppose its very essence. By the very fact that there can be no liturgical celebration which is not public in principle, every celebration should be carried out in the most public way. This especially applies to the celebration of the Eucharist. Likewise it is opposed to the essence of the Eucharist, which is above all the sacrament of the Church's unity, that more than one Mass be offered at the same time and in the same place. Hence whenever distinct Masses are not required for distinct assemblies of the faithful, the only normal way to celebrate the Eucharist is concelebration.

The background to the conciliar teaching on this matter contained in paragraphs 57 and 58 of the liturgy Constitution is concisely presented in the survey of the recent literature on concelebration given by the Dutch Redemptorist, Hendrik Manders. The present writer feels that this is the most important contribution appearing in *The Church and the Liturgy.*

As Manders points out, the contemporary interest in concelebration is not really new but is rather the result of fifty years of movement leading up to the stage which the decisions of the Council have taken as a starting point. During the period from the medieval theologians to the beginnings of the modern liturgical movement, any interest paid to concelebration was not very favorable. At best, theologians were interested only in the validity of consecration, since they lived in a spiritual climate where con-

celebration could not really be theologically understood. In the nineteen-twenties there was a change in attitude limited to a small circle of theologians. Manders attributes this change to a more profound contact with the life and liturgy of the Eastern Churches-a development spurred on by Pius XI-and also to the development of a pastoral orientation given to the liturgical movement through the efforts of Dom Lambert Beauduin. It was an address given by another Belgian, Dom Placidus De Meester in 1923 which clarified the basic theological principle behind concelebration: " Its function," he said, is " to express, first, the communal character of the Church's prayer; secondly, the principle of the hierarchic nature of the Church, and thirdly, the close bond of unity which the Church received from her Founder " (p. 138).

In 1927 the Belgian Jesuit, J. M. Hanssens published an historical study of concelebration which greatly influenced later investigations. It was Hanssens who first introduced the distinction between sacramental and ceremonial concelebration, a distinction which complicated later discussions of the problem and which tended to obscure the theology of the rite.

Following Hanssens' work, the problem of concelebration in the-West lay quiet. Although several isolated articles on the subject appeared during World War II, the topic did not come to life until 1949. By that time the liturgical movement had succeeded in reviving a consciousness of the social aspect of the Mass: however, the communal character, which Hanssens had stressed, was not equally appreciated. Opposition to individualistic forms of celebration naturally provoked resistance from those who were inclined to an individualistic piety. Among these were certain ecclesiastical authorities who often made decisions which hindered the development of concelebration but which nevertheless fostered theological research on the problem. In general the Holy See seemed reluctant to open the door to the establishment of concelebration as a general practice in the West. In this regard, Father J. Loew wrote to Father Manders in 1953: "Rome, today, and especially the Congregation of Rites, which has competence in the matter, is strongly against any attempt to introduce concelebration."

However, following World War II the phenomenon of large conferences of priests emphasized the inconvenience and often the incongruity of a multitude of private Masses. Since concelebration was canonically excluded as a possible solution to the problem, a remedy was often found in a *messe communautaire* at which one priest celebrated while the others participated and received Communion. This type of celebration implied a tendency toward concelebration, but it also brought up new problems, especially concerning the value of many Masses as compared with one Mass celebrated collectively by a number of priests. Influenced by Father F. Hiirth, a Jesuit from the Holy Office, Pius XII discussed the problem of the *messe communautaire* in two major addresses that are still misunder-

stood and misinterpreted today. However it should be emphasized here that in the allocution, *Magnificate Dominum,* delivered in 1954, and again in his address to the Assisi Congress in 1956, Pius XII did not reprobate the *messe communautaire* but rather said it could continue provided it was approved by the bishop and did not scandalize the faithful.

But as Manders notes, behind the *messe communautaire* lay the more searching question that is vital for the spirituality of the priest: How much is individual priestly celebration a positive element in the spiritual life of the priest? In the discussion as to whether daily celebration is a genuine spiritual value, the meaning of concelebration was re-evaluated. Soon the question of concelebration became a question of co-celebration or collective celebration so that all participating priests could renew Christ's sacrificial act individually by pronouncing collectively the words of consecration. The situation threatened in which concelebration becomes a synchronized Mass in disguise.

Since the *messe communautaire* was experienced as a communal celebration that manifested the solidarity of the priesthood, concelebration was looked upon as the ideal expression of this communal bond. However, concelebration came to be thought of as a celebration only of priests and not as a celebration of the whole Christian community. Thus while the liturgical movement was seeking to de-clericalize the celebration of the liturgy there developed a tendency toward a clericalization of concelebration. As Manders states, " the principle of concelebration as manifestation of the hierarchical unity of the Church, so strongly emphasized by the older authors in conformity with tradition, found itself in competition with the idea of co-celebration in which all participants collectively express their unity in the priesthood on an equal level" (p. 143).

Recent studies by G. Danneels, P. Fransen, P. Weber, M. C. Vanhengel and P. Tihon have analyzed the rite of concelebration in the light of contemporary sacramental theology and have thus laid the theological foundation for the statements on concelebration made by Vatican II. These authors seem to agree that a genuine concelebration presupposes a principal celebrant and a college of priests who celebrate the Eucharist together with the principal celebrant but under his hierarchical guidance-all in the midst of a participating community. Other authors apply the term concelebration also to the more recent form in which all the priests celebrate the Eucharist on the same level, with or without a participating community. Both H. Schmidt, who introduced the term "co-celebration" for this latter form, and Danneels wonder just to what extent this type of celebration realizes the full meaning of concelebration.

Actually the form of concelebration has not been constant in the Church, either in the East or the West. In general the basic distinction in the forms is between a spoken and silent concelebration or, to use Hanssens' term-

inology, between sacramental and ceremonial concelebration. Authors did not agree in what sense these forms of concelebration did in fact consecrate the Eucharist; in practice, however, the problem was settled by a declaration of the Holy Office on May 23, 1957, which stated that the silent form of concelebration is not in fact co-consecratory today in the Western Church. It should be noted here that the silent form of concelebration by one principal priest and participated in by others is essentially the same as the *messe communautaire.*

Following the Holy Office decree, various authors drew the conclusion that the silent form of concelebration and also the *messe communautaire* were forbidden; however, both Hiirth and Nicolau stressed that this conclusion was incorrect. As Hiirth pointed out, the intention of the Holy Office was simply to make it clear that at a silent concelebration and hence also at a *messe communautaire* only the principal celebrant actually consecrates. Following the 1957 decree, there was no doubt about the discipline for the Latin Church-the recitation of the formula of consecration by all concelebrants is considered to be essential to the sacramental sign. The Church's power to formulate such a decree arises from her authority over the matter and form of the sacraments, save for their substance, as stated by the Council of Trent (D. 931). The Holy Office decree also affirmed that what it decreed is so *ex institutione Christi.* In this regard the decree went beyond Pius XII's previous allocutions. Although it would seem that something more than sacramental discipline is involved here, most authors agree that the Holy Office did not intend to give a dogmatic definition to the effect that the recitation of the consecratory formula is of divine institution.

It is with this background that Manders approaches the real problem of the true theological meaning of concelebration. The real problem is not the scholastic question of whether a number of priests can jointly pronounce the words of consecration validly, nor is it the question of whether only the spoken word effects the consecration. The latter question was prompted by a very narrow view of both the nature of the Eucharist and the function of the priesthood. It found its origin in the idea that the only strictly priestly action in the Eucharist consists in performing Christ's sacrificial act by pronouncing the consecratory formulae. However one must not limit the theology of concelebration to the collective rite by which the Eucharist is confected or to the collective renewal of Christ's sacrifice by a group of priests. The first sense of concelebration is that "it is the manifestation of the hierarchical unity of the Church" (p. 148).

All of the sacraments are celebrations of the Church in which the Church herself comes to a true realization of her own nature as the sacrament of Christ Himself. It is the whole community of the Church which celebrates the mystery of Christ, but each member functions according to the status which he has in the hierarchical community as a whole. As Manders points

out, the sacramental rite of concelebration " makes real the unity of the college of priests in the one Spirit of the ministry in the midst of the community for which their function was given. Each functionary, performing the sacramental task for which the Church ordained him, cooperates sacramentally with the bishop or his delegate as the center of this unity. And thus the unity of Christ's Body becomes manifest, as it must be manifested in the world" (p. 149).

Precisely because the unity of priests and their bishop becomes a sacramental reality in the rite of concelebration, the practice of having but one principal celebrant is the norm for any eucharistic celebration which should reflect the nature of the Eucharist itself. In this regard Manders quotes the following significant passage from Danneels:

> ... Christ is the chief celebrant who offers his sacrifices only within the unity of his Church, and here supreme power resides in the entire *Ordo sacerdotalis* as in her womb. The concelebrating presbyterium is then the manifestation within a definite ecclesiastical community of that *Ordo,* and the actualization, here and now, of this sacrificial power. For even when the priest functions alone . . . he can only perform an ecclesiastical symbolic action, doing this in virtue of Christ's priesthood insofar as this is present on earth in the entire *Ordo sacerdotalis.* Even as an isolated celebrant, the priest still functions as a member of a sacerdotal hierarchy and in virtue of powers possessed by that *Ordo* as a college. In concelebration, that which is always implied becomes implicit by signs: a collegium of priests enters into the very sign of the eucharistic celebration, in order to support the activity of the chief celebrant" (p. 149-150).

The unity of the priesthood is especially implied when priests concelebrate with their own bishop, above all when newly ordained priests concelebrate with the bishop at the moment when they are admitted to the priestly college and receive their mission from him. The bond between various local churches that make up the universal Church is shown forth when bishops of various dioceses concelebrate together or in union with the Pope in the presence of a community.

In concluding his survey, Father Manders points out that articles 57 and 58 of the liturgy Constitution deal only with concelebration including a collective consecration. The practice of ceremonial concelebration or the *messe communautaire* still remains licit, and it continues to give a suitable manifestation of the unity of the priesthood and the hierarchical structure of the Church.

Another important detail concerning the eucharistic celebration as the achievement of the Church's unity is the re-establishment by the Council of Communion under both species for all the Christian people. The high level of scholarship which Father Manders manifests in his survey of the literature on concelebration is also manifested by Father Godfried Danneels

in his brief but thorough bibliographical survey of "Communion under Both Kinds."

Although the other articles in *The Church and the Liturgy* are not so significant, the volume as a whole is a representative survey of contemporary Catholic theological thought concerning the ecclesial aspects of the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy. Hence it fulfills the aim which the editors had in mind when they inaugurated *Concilium.*

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The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism, by HEIKO AuGUSTINUs OBERMAN. Cambridge, (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. xv + 495, with bibliography and index.

Harvard awarded its Robert Trout Paine Prize for to this work. The University's judgment has never seemed better. Prof. Oberman has produced a model of historico-theological investigation. Well organized, impressively documented in both primary and secondary sources, lucid and tranquil in style, it is a pleasure to read. Even when he feels himself obliged to dissent from the views of earlier scholars in the late medieval field, names such as Seeberg, Vignaux, Hagglund, Feckes, Lortz and others, Oberman is unfailingly courteous and amiable about it. This reviewer will find it necessary to question several of Oberman's ultimate evaluations of Riel- and of Ockham as well; but there can be no question about his command of the field. With this treatise, Oberman has obviously established himself as the leading contemporary student of Biel; it is difficult to see how his work could be surpassed. Reference to this volume will be a *sine qua non* for ttny future treatment of Nominalist theology.

Oberman intends, fundamentally, "to come to a reassessment of the impact of Nominalism on 16th century thought, especially of the elusive relationship-both negative and positive-between Gabriel Biel and Martin Luther" (p. 3). In entering into the thicket of 14th and 15th century dogmatics, Oberman realizes that he is dealing with "emotionally and denominationally colored presuppositions" (p. He finds three "Schools" of interpreters already long at work there: the "Background of the Reformation" school which "stresses contrasts" between Nominalism and Luther's thought; the "Thomistic" school which views Aquinas' doctrine as the "apex" of the Middle Ages and hence Nominalism as a "disintegration" and "collapse" which led to the Reformation; and the

" Franciscan " school which, following in the spirit of the late Ockham scholar, Philotheus Boehner, is "willing to defend the orthodoxy of Nominalism" and considers Luther's teaching "an erroneous interpretation of the theology of such a Nominalist as Gabriel Biel."

In the midst of conflicting perspectives, Oberman desires to study Biel for himself, to "take with utmost seriousness" the *Rex Theologorum* who taught at Tiibingen from 1484 into the early 1490s and instructed two of Luther's teachers, Bartholmaeus von Usingen and Johann Nathin. By placing Biel " within the context of the Tradition which he himself acknowledges to be authoritative," Oberman hopes to demonstrate that the thought of this 15th century Doctor and, indeed, Nominalism in general, is neither simply " the aftermath of High Scholasticism " nor merely " the background of the Reformation." For Oberman, "Nominalism" has **a** theological position and even a certain religious value of its own. Besides employing Biel's *Collectorium* on the *Sentences* and his *Expositio* of the Mass, Oberman breaks relatively new ground by having frequent recourse to Biel's pastoral works, his *Lectures* and, above all, his *Sermons.* Oberman insists that Biel's *Sermons* "must be taken seriously as documenting his thought "-a point well made. Up to now, on the basis of the *Collectorium* alone, *Divus Gabrielis* has usually been judged-and more or less dismissed -as but a verbose echo of Ockham. This still common impression Oberman corrects, in large part, a least.

Oberman projects the full spectrum of Biel's dogmatic and moral theology as it appears in both his academic and pastoral writings. He finds that Biel accepted but toned down, in a suitably pious manner, the Ockhamist concept of an *Absoluta Dei Potentia.* Biel stressed, far more than did Ockham, the " wisdom " of God's use of His Power; the " congruity " and reliability of the moral-soteriological order " established " *de facto* by God; and the absolute changelessness of the Divine *Misericordia* as expressing the Divine *Voluntas.* In successive chapters of this rich and complex study -whose high points can only be indicated here-Oberman analyzes Biel's "anti-manichean" anthropology in which human freedom of will vis-a-vis God is absolutely central, in which the damage wrought by Original Sin may vex but cannot destroy the natural human liberty of moral-religious choice, in which sin is caused more by ignorance, really, than by malice; Biel's Scotist-Ockhamist conception of naturally acquired (and fundamentally important) virtues of Faith and Charity, and their relationships to the extra Gifts of infused Faith and Charity, to "historical" belief, to apologetics and the several planes of theological reasoning; Biel's twofold but unified view of the decrees of Justification and Predestination-one an eternally gratuitous *Acceptatio* decreed " ante merita praevisa "; the other an equally free Divine arrangement decreed for rewards "post merita." Oberman sums up Biel's Ockhamist doctrine here: "God has

graciously committed Himself to accept good deeds that are only in order of priority related to Acceptation as ' causes ' of His Acceptation," though " strictly speaking, even virtuous works performed in a state of grace do not cause Acceptation " (p. 192). Oberman notes-not without a trace of wonderment at the verbal-conceptual cleverness of the Ockhamist school- that "Biel has a remarkable doctrine of Justification: seen from different vantage points, Justification is at once *sola gratia* and *solis operibus!* " (p. 176) . Oberman analyzes Biel's moderately contritionist view of Penance as virtue and as sacrament. Biel's Ockhamist Christology Oberman defends against the common charge of quasi-nestorianism; he sees it, instead, as an attempt to avoid a semi-monophysite position; he does note, however, that, in conceiving the Atonement, Biel has a strong tendency to an Abelardian, man-ward moral exemplarism, rather than to the Anselmian idea of a God-ward satisfaction. As to Biel's Eucharistic theology, Oberman finds that it does more to " distinguish " than to " unite " the Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Sacrifice of Calvary, and hence tends to make the daily celebration of Mass a separate, if admittedly secondary, effort " ad provocandam Dei misericordiam." As an Evangelical, Oberman is, naturally enough, cooler to Beil's Mariology than to any other aspect of his thought; in its popular form, as seen in the copious *Sermons*, Biel's intercessory-mediatorial concept of Mary seems to Oberman to " undermine " the Chalcedonian faith in the real Humanity of Christ, and even to encroach partially on the traditional offices of the Holy Spirit. Yet Oberman concedes that in comparison with the reigning style of 15th century Marian speculation, Biel's utterances are "restrained." He is rather more impressed with Beil's ability to combine Nominalism with an "affective" and " non-speculative " popular mysticism-which he terms a kind of "democratization of mysticism "-i.e., a life of penitential devotion well within the reach of the ordinary, mediocre but well-intentioned Christian in the world. This combination appears to Oberman to belie the common claim that Nominalism and "mysticism "-in a broader sense of that term -were incompatible. Finally, Oberman sees Biel as, in effect, a proponent of the theory of not one but *two separate* fonts of Revelation, and hence as foreshadowing the " *partim-partim* " mentality of the Fathers at Trent- or at the least that mentality as Oberman intuits it. It is in this area of Scripture and Tradition especially, and in the domain of Mariology as well, that Oberman sees Biel as a clear forerunner of much Post- Tridentine thought.

Oberman presents this " Gabrielistic " synthesis, in both its strong and weak points, against a panorama of the dogmatic thought of the time. In addition to the excellent textual footnotes, there are several long comparative excursuses into various parallel doctrines taught by other doctors: not only Anselm, Lombard, Albert, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus and

Ockham, but major secondary figures like Gregory of Rimini, Robert Holkot, Jean Gerson and others less well known. The excursus on Scripture and Tradition traces the problem of what is meant by " Tradition" back as far as Basil the Great and Augustine. For the benefit of those who might be confused by the proliferation of Nominalist terms, Oberman helpfully supplies a glossary; and for still others who might need some help wandering through Biel's nomenclature, Oberman has drawn several large schematic charts in a style not unlike that to which M. Maritain was once addicted.

The general picture which Oberman wants his reader to have of Biel is that of a substantial theological thinker and a religious man in his own right: " Biel's pastoral works provide us with the evidence that the Ockhamistic system, preserved in its full integrity, is perfectly suited for explicitly theological and pastoral application" (p. . Here, this reviewer finds himself unable to agree with the author. It seems, rather, that Prof. Oberman's superb textual documentation-and his own recurrent, penetrating judgments-tend to damage this flattering picture. When *Divus Gabrielis'* theological profile is sketched in completely, what we discern is a thoughtful and industrious divine, yes. But by no means a profoundly searching one. Working within Ockham's system, Biel was led, by his own deep personal piety, to mitigate its worst tendencies to amoralism and to a frivolous playing with the themes of Revelation. Unfortunately, he could not, while remaining an Ockhamist, also extricate himself from the influence of his master's very thinly veiled pelagianism. An all-pervading exaltation of nature and a corresponding trivialization of Original Sin combine to impoverish Biel's well-intentioned theology of Grace, Faith and Charity. Oberman has to a certain degree brightened up Biel's image, but the previous severe judgment on Ockhamist or "Nominalist" theology must continue to stand unchanged. As a dogmatic meditation on the Mystery of the New Testament, the soteriology of Ockham and Biel remains not only defective, but beyond any remedying.

Oberman himself appears to reveal a curious ambivalence within his own view of Biel's theological value and his relationship to the Latin Church. On one hand, doubtless in abreaction to the violent language of Bouyer, Iserloh, Vander Pol and others, Oberman is led to judge that Biel and the Nominalists in general are "orthodox" Catholics: "We are altogether willing to defend the thesis that late medieval Nominalism should be viewed as a basically Catholic movement" (p. However, by the "orthodoxy" of Nominalism Oberman seems to mean only those aspects of it which are " forerunners " of Trent on " Mariology " and the " relation of Scripture to Tradition." But these are not the central aspects of Nominalist thought which its modern Catholic critics single out for such bitter condemnation. They are principally concerned with its metaphysically loose and over-humanized soteriology and its shallowing-out of sacramental theory.

It seems, in a word, somewhat beside the point to defend the "orthodoxy " of Biel and Ockham on the grounds that, for the modern Catholic, there is nothing *fundamentally* wrong with their attitude towards Scripture and Tradition or with their Marian speculation (though Biel's could stand some vigorous pruning) . The real problems lie within the doctrines of sin, Grace, Faith, Charity and Beatitude. And concerning these themes, Oberman himself has many a shrewd observation: For Biel "the tragedy of man" consists "in a lack of knowledge which is not primarily explained as a result of his Fall and loss of Original Justice, but as a natural consequence of his status as a creature" (p. 68); " Acquired faith seems to be Biel's real and main concept of faith . . . as always when there is an option between a naturally acquired or an infused habit, one senses his suspicion of all heteronomy, all that may imperil the freedom of the will" (p. Biel, in misreading Augustine's *De Libero Arbitrio,* III, *5,* 15, shows "a striking lack of sensitivity for the important distinction between metaphysical and psychological freedom of the will" (p. 104); "Doubtless for Biel sin has not made it impossible for men to act rightly without the aid of Grace .... Not absence of Grace, but improper cognition prevents men from acting rightly" *(ibid.);* an infused *habitus* of Grace is "required for acceptation " but " only ... within the context of the Eternal Decree and not [by] a metaphysical necessity" (p. 168). It is hardly surprising, then, that Oberman should conclude that " at least comparatively there is an explicit tendency towards naturalism, as acts performed under the general influence of God are said to be more completely in man's own power than those performed under the influence of created Grace" (p. 50).

As an Evangelical, Oberman could find Biel's soteriological views no more congenial than Luther himself could. However, Biel's thinking is no less repugnant to Thomists than to Evangelicals. Following the mature doctrine of Aquinas, Thomists view created " actual " Grace as a *special* and *ontologically necessary* aid given by God beyond His " concursus generalis"; and without that special help, no human being can perform a good moral act or even " prepare himself " for Grace by " doing what lies within himself." Oberman hints broadly that it is because of their predilection for Aquinas that modern Thomists judge Scotus, Ockham and Biel as perpetrators of the theological " collapse " of the Middle Ages. A certain continuing rivalry among the Orders cannot be entirely discounted, of course, but it is more probable that Thomists see the Pauline-Augustinian insight into Grace first endangered and then all but destroyed by late Franciscan Nominalist dogmatics.

Heinrich Denifle accused Biel of being an incompetent " halbwisser " who misreported Aquinas' teaching on special Grace and the " concursus generalis." Oberman manages to acquit Biel of this charge. Biel did take the early teaching of Aquinas *(liS,* D. for his definitive view; and

Oberman believes that Aquinas entirely reverses himself later on in the *Summa* (I-II, Q. 109); but Oberman then points out rightly enough that in Biel's day most theologians still esteemed the *Commentary on the Sentences* the more authoritative of Aquinas' works.

Since no review is quite complete without at least one carping at a typographical error, we might note that on page *256,* note 21, referring to a passage in Aquinas' *Sentences,* directs us, rather puzzlingly, to *Ox. IllS,* **D. 2, Q. 1, Art. 1.**

However, these judgmental reservations are more or less peripheral. In its expository substance, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology* can be recommended most cordially to all who are interested in medieval and reformation dogmatics, and in the history of dogma as well. Oberman has produced an exhaustive, a detailed and, at times, a brilliant account of Tiibingen's "King of Theologians "-that piously pelagianizing German divine whose work the young Luther admired so much as to memorize whole portions of it; and for whom, but a decade or so later, a disillusioned and more mature Luther would reserve some of his most acrid language.

This is the first of a projected two-volume study of Biel and Luther promised by Prof. Oberman. The second volume is to deal with Luther, and we await its appearance with much interest.

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