THE GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE IN NICOLAI HARTMANN'S METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION

INTRODUCTION

I T IS STILL too early to evaluate justly Nicolai Hart-
mann's work and significance. The inclinations and in-
terests of a generation usually are directed towards the
seasonable, that is, towards whatever is said or written for
and in the present time. The problems of the *philosophia
perennis,* the recurring problems of the centuries, are not as
attractive as contemporary interests, but Hartmann devoted
himself inexorably to those profound, perennial problems.
However, where the progress of knowledge ramified into new
directions, Hartmann pointed them out and called for team-
work in researching them.

Hartmann's own work comprises many branches of philoso-
phy. His early works [1] show him deeply anchored in the be-

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[1] *Platons Logik des Seins* (Plato's Logic of Being), ed. by H. Cohen and P.

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gmnmgs of classical Western Philosophy.   These early works surprise the student with Hartmann's mental capacity and dimensions.   Joseph Klein said the first work, *Platons Logik des Seins,* is

a *hymnus demonstrativus* to Cohen's philosophy of the origin. The methodical Idealism is presented there in a manner which was not even displayed in the works of the heads of the [Marburg] School.[2]

In the works of young Hartmann, who, at that time, was a fervent adherer to the Marburg school, are found propositions which foreshadow his later thinking.   They indicate already the philosophical *metanoia* of Nicolai Hartmann, who was intensively occupied by the search for his own philosophical standpoint.   He admits that from 1922 the theory of cognition was the main object of his thought which earlier (in 1915) had brought him into conflict with the position of the School of Marburg.   He states:

One of the most responsible questions of a system **...** [is] the position regarding the much debated correlation: Subject-object. . . .   On its inner disposition depends the problem of the systematic holding especially of idealism and realism with all their subspecies.[3]

And then he announces his own conviction:

The classical solution to this question was given by Kant. According to him cognition is only possible when there is something identical in thought and being.   But this identical something is not the full object with its infinite determinations.   This lies forever as entity beyond what is recognized **...** [and] in that datum consists the necessary non-identity of thought and being.[4]

Natorp in the collection *Philosophische Arbeiten* (Philosophical Works), Vol. III, p. x, 512, Berlin, Topelmann, 1909, and *Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgruende der Mathematik* (Proclus Diadochus' Philosophical Beginnings of Mathematics), in the same collection, Vol. IV, 1909.

[2] Joseph Klein, *op. cit.,* p. 109-110.

[3] Nicolai Hartmann, " Systembildung und Idealismus " (Systematic Structure and Idealism), in *Kleinere Schriften* (Shorter Essays), Vol. III, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958, p. *65.*

• Nicolai Hartmann, " Systembildung und Idealismus," *loc cit.,* p. 67: " Die klassische Loesung dieser Frage hat Kant gegeben.   Erkenntnis ist nach ihm freilich

This non-identity of idea and being became Hartmann's motto in his philosophical strife " against the Marburg Logical Idealism and Neo-Kantianism on the whole." [5] Due to this insight Aristotle, Kant and Hegel appeared in a different light. Hartmann devoted to them special treatises. At the same time, however, Hartmann remained alert to and receptive of novel contemporary positions as, for instance, those of Husserl and Scheler. Heidegger's subjective existentialism, however, never received Hartmann's applause.

Hartmann's philosophical development can be passed along with his writings. In 1919 "the breakthrough to a new ontology was completed." [6] Its first document is *Grundzuege einer Metaphymk der Erkenntnis/* This book is considered the basic and pioneering work of Hartmann's entire teaching.

Hartmann's philosophical interest turned further to ethical [8] and ontological problems, which he documented in the following inqumes: *Zur Grundlegnng der Ontologie,* [9] considered a prolegomena to Hartmann's ontological positions; *Moeglichkeit und Wirklichkeit/* [0] Hartmann's study of potentiality and actuality; *Der Aufbau der realen Welt,* [11] a compendium of a

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nur dann moeglich, wenn etwas ldentisches in Denken und Sein ist. Aber dieses Identische ist nicht der voile Gegenstand mit seinen unendlichen Bestimmtheiten. Dieser liegt vielmehr als Totalitaet immer jenseits des Erkannten. . . . Das ist die notwendige Nichtidentitaet von Denken und Sein."

[5] Werner Ziegenfuss, *Philosophen Lexilcon* (Lexicon of Philosophers), Vol. I, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1949, p. 454.

[6] Werner Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.,* p. 454.

[7] (Foundation of a Metaphysics of Cognition), Berlin-Leipzig, Verein wiss. Veri., first ed. xii, 389 p.; Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., second revised ed., 1925, xiv, 551 p.; third ed., 1941; fourth ed., 1949.

[8] *Ethik* (Ethics), Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1935, 1949. Also translated by S. Coit, London, Allen & Unswin, Three volumes in English: *Moral Phenomena,* 343 p.; *Moral Values,* 476 p.; *Moral Freedom,* p. Also translated *Etica,* Traducion R. Kaiser-Lenoir, Paris, 1945.

[9] (On the Foundation of Ontology), Berlin, W. de Gruyter & Co., 1935, 1941; Meisenheim/Glan, Westkulturverlag, 1948.

[10] (Potentiality and Actuality), Meisenheim/Glan, Westkultnrverlag, 1938, 1949, 1950.

[11] (The Structure of the Real World), Berlin, W. de Gruyter & Co., 1940; Meisenheim/Glan, Westkulturverlag, 1949.

general theory on the real categories, which prepared for the
Philosophic der Natur/ [2] a compendium on the special cate-
gories.   Hartmann   wrote   also   an   inquiry   on   immaterial   or
spiritual reality and its historic-philosophical consequences.
This work he called *Das Problem des geistigen Seins.* [13]

To these comprehensive writings Hartmann added numer-
ous smaller studies and essays on systematic and historical
problems of philosophy.   These were collected and posthu-
mously edited by Frida Hartmann under the title *Kleinere
Schriften.* [14] Some of these essays are evaluated and cited as
classical contributions to Western thought.

The progress of Hartmann's philosophy and its condensation
in these writings was accomplished in a continuous dialogue
with the great forerunners and those contemporaries who left
their imprints on the history of ideas.

Hartmann's own philosophy is unchangeably coined by his
ontological orientation,   that means, by his grasp of reality
and his understanding of the cognition of reality.   Similar to
Aristotle, St. Thomas, Kant, etc., unlike Plato, Augustine and
especially the existential philosophers, Hartmann was an abso-
lutely objectively alined thinker.   A mentioning of himself
scarcely occurs in any of his writings.   Hartmann put every
philosophical idea into the current of a *philosophia perennis* of
problems, and related it to the already available results of
Western Philosophy. [15]   His writings show a clear and noble
style of which J. Bochenski said : "His works are real models
of dispassionate exactitude and scientific comprehensiveness," [16]
and which J. Klein praised:

In the works of Ernst Cassirer, the artist among the thinkers of
the Marburg School, we find similar achievemc:-tts of perfect style;

[12] (Philosophy of Nature), Berlin, W. de Gruyter & Co., 1950.
[13] (The Problem of Non-Material Being), Berlin, W. de Pruyter & Co., 1933,
1949.
" (Shorter Essays), *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, 1955; Vol. 2, 1957; Vol. 3, 1958.
[15] Cf. Joseph Klein, *op. cit.,* p. 120.
[16] J. M. Bochenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy,* Berkeley, University oi
California Press, 1957, p. 212.

but his elegance lacks the same depth, clarity and penetration of thought. [17]

This study is limited to a problem which has been recognized as central in cognition. Hartmann explored it in his basic and pioneering book, in *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis.* **It** is the question of the union of the cognizing subject with the recognized object, or the problem of the gnoseological transcendence. **It** is rooted in the fact that things themselves, when recognized, always remain outside the subject. The intellect never "has " the things, but only impressions, notions, images of things. Hartmann presents this factual condition in an antinomy.

The intellect must transcend itself inasmuch as it grasps something outside itself, that is, inasmuch as it is the *recognizing* consciousness. But, the intellect cannot transcend itself, inasmuch as it can grasp only its own contents, that is, inasmuch as it is recognizing *consciousness.* [18]

In order to find a solution to this difficulty Hartmann approaches it by a phenomenological analysis of the cognitive act, in which he discovers the gnoseological transcendence.

The term " transcendence " means here the reaching out of the subject beyond itself through its *act* of cognition [19] and the reaching out of the object beyond itself through its *effect* on the subject.

The term " gnoseological " modifies the term transcendence, because it is essentially a transcendence in the order of cognition, not a transcendence in the order of being, in contrast to the teaching of those Greeks who held an ontological transcendence of ideas.

The problem of transcendence occurs in many transformations in the history of philosophy. Hartmann had to come to terms with these historical positions. In this study, however,

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[17] Joseph Klein, *op. cit.,* p. no.

[18] Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *op. cit.,* ed. *1925,* p. 60.

[19] Note the contrast to the immanent acts of the intellect, such as thinking, judging, knowing, imagining.

these positions will be mentioned only inasmuch as it seems
necessary.   No attempt is made to adjust Hartmann's   posi-
tion to any historical school.   The intention of this work is to
avoid any bending of Hartmann's   philosophy towards tradi-
tional systems or principles of being and/or of principles of
knowing.   Where Hartmann's   theory does coincide with them
it does not seem necessary to point this out; where Hartmann
deviates, a bending in favor of traditional   principles would be a
falsification of Hartmann's   teaching.

This study does not claim any other privilege than to pre-
sent Hartmann as Hartmann from the point of view of the
theme.   It is expected to draw more attention to a philoso-
pher who, due to contemporary trends, becomes overlooked,
but who certainly will survive some of these trends and fer-
tilize the dialogue of future thinkers.   This conviction is based
upon the fact that Hartmann opens up again the entire wealth
of being, its real structures, categories, principles and relations,
in objective consideration of their history as well as by think-
ing, measuring, anticipating within the noetic affluence of the
twentieth century.

I.   HARTMANN's   NOTION   oF   METAPHYSICS   IN   GENERAL

" Philosophy does not begin with
itself.   It presupposes the accu-
mulated knowledge and methodi-
cal experience of all sciences as
well as the two-edged experience
of the philosophical systems of
the centuries.   From all that phi-
losophy has to learn."

NICOLAI   HARTMANN.

One of the most eminent students in the Hartmann   circle
depicts the philosophical situation during the twenties of this
century in terms of his own personal experience:

In order to hear Hartmann I had come to Marburg for a semes-
ter. I came with definite expectations.   For us younger ones the
name Hartmann was a notion characterized perhaps most distinctly

by the title of his book *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis.* We had experienced Kant as the great master of philosophical thought, but at the same time also as the great critic. Kant's idea that metaphysics is impossible on the basis of pure reason was for our generation, as for many previous ones, an intransgressible position. One was used to consider distrustfully everything called metaphysics, and to look at all metaphysical movements rather suspiciously. Although Kant had written the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics,* and some of us knew that in the *opus postumum* were even found beginnings and pieces of this metaphysics, nevertheless, the large region of philosophical thought, the metaphysical thinking of all kinds, was orphanized. The theory of knowledge stood before it as a kind of safeguard.

Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition was a theory of knowledge. But this thinker, who was in no way inferior to Kant in critical keenness, and who gave now a coherent theory of knowledge, called his resulting theory metaphysics. Supported by the Kantian inquiry into the foundations of knowledge, Hartmann, in carrying on, proved that there are metaphysical foundations in knowledge itself.

Therefore, with this work now we re-experienced what Hartmann certainly had realized by and for himself when he wrote it. It was a dispute with Kant, most of all with the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, from which Hartmann had come. Indeed, the metaphysics of cognition was a work of eruption. Formerly, Kant's teaching had put itself as a bulwark in front of all philosophical efforts dealing with metaphysical issues. With Hartmann's theory a practicable path into the open reappeared. [1]

Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition had made the young thinkers listen attentively. Indeed, one came to Marburg in order to hear Hartmann. This thinker had gone through years of profound study and a controversy with the Marburg logical Idealism. An essential philosophical discussion had taken place in Hartmann's mind with the most important thinkers via Husser! and Scheler back through the centuries, and in reverse again from Plato to the present time. But it was mostly on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel that his own philosophy had matured. From this experience results the statement:

[1] Robert Heiss, "Nicolai Hartmann," in *Nicolai Hartmann Der Denker und sein Werk,* Goettingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952, p. 16. Idem, transl. C. E. Schuetzinger in *The Personalist.* Autumn 1961, pp. 471-472.

Nobody begins with his own thinking. Everyone finds in his time a gnoseological and problematic situation into which he grows, and out of which he himself begins to search. He accepts the great content of the problems from the historical stage which they have reached. For these problems go through the centuries without changing essentially. They are the same metaphysical problems about which Kant said, they were the fate of reason, because reason can neither reject nor solve them. However, there are many more of them than Kant assumed. [2]

Here we find Hartmann strongly impressed. Through this *status quo* his own philosophic mission became clear to him. He accepted it with all its difficulties. The philosophic idea occupied him constantly. From the historical data he had found, he groped back into the very origin of systems and problems. Clearly he distinguishes both:

In most of its representations philosophy had started from pre-conceived world-views, into which it subsequently had to fit what-ever the contemporary horizon ... assigned to master. The mental constructs which developed this way are then the so-called philosophical systems. They form a whole before they master the pertinent problems and determine the latter from the consequences of the whole. [3]

Then Hartmann adds sagaciously:

Philosophy does not consist merely of those constructs. Another kind of mental work moves along with the systems, shrouded by them, namely the efforts advancing along the problems by ana-lyzing them, investigating them, penetrating them. Such work has the tendency to accept nothing but verified proofs. It is the healthy tendency philosophy shares with all the other sciences. It

[2] Werner Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.,* p. 454-455.

[3] Nicolai Hartmann, " Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte " (The Philosophic Idea and its History), in *Kleinetre Schriften,* Vol. 2, p. 2: "In den meisten ihrer Repraesentanten ist die Philosophic von vorgefassten "\Veltbildern ausgegangen, *in* die sie dann nachtraeglich hineinzwaengen musste, was der jeweilige Horizont ihrer Gegenstaende ihr zu bewaeltigen aufgab. Die so entstehenden Gedankenbauten sind die sogenannten philosophischen Systeme: sie konstruieren ein Ganzes vor Bewaeltigung der einschlaegigen Probleme und entscheiden diese dann aus den Konsequenzen des Ganzen."

is clear, besides a philosophy of systems there advances a philosophy of problems. [4]

Accordingly we have to classify Hartmann himself within the established dichotomy. Viewing his *opera omnia* one is inclined to see in Hartmann a systematic thinker. He mastered the traditional branches of philosophy, presented his studies translucently and in excellent organization, so that the term " systematic thinker " seems well justified. But system was not Hartmann's starting ground. System was to Hartmann a result achieved, an end, a goal. It was Hartmann's great desideratum, the completion of which seemed never reached, for philosophical knowledge is never finished. System meant to Hartmann the totality and perfection of philosophical knowledge. This idea of " system " had resulted from Hartmann's own philosophical genesis. He strode through reality seeingly, thinkingly, reflectingly, and the more he saw, the more he thought, reflected, and knew. But the more he knew, reflected and thought, the more he perceived. It was Goethe who had stated: "One sees as much as one knows." Hartmann verified this statement especially in regard to his penetration, evaluation and criticism of the history of ideas. For this reason it is so difficult to separate Hartmann's noetic development and philosophical speculation from the development of his works. Both advance step by step and grow organically towards their completion. H. Huelsmann, too, has this impression. He remarks in a footnote of his *Methode in der Philosophic Nicolai Hartmanns:*

In Hartmann's philosophy as well as in his philosophical development there is no flaw, there is only now and then an accomplished correction.

• Nicolai Hartmann, "Der philosophische Gedanke ... ," *loc. cit.,* p. 2-3: "Die Philosophie besteht nicht in jenen Konstruktionen allein; es geht stets neben diesen und von diesen gleichsam verhuellt eine andere Art gedanklicher Arbeit einher, die an den Problemen fortschreitet, die analysiert, nntersucht, eindringt und die Tendenz hat, nichts als das Erweisbare gelten zu lassen. Es ist die Seite der Philosophie, die sie mit den gesunden Tendenzen aller Wissenschaft gemein hat. Neben dem Systemdenken schreitet das Problemenken."

It seems to me that the turning away from Marburg is such a correction.   It is not an inner change. Everything here has the way of correction. [5]

Such considerations aid to classify Hartmann among the problematic thinkers.   This is in accord with his own convic- tion.   He stated about the present era that the time of the preestablished systems is past.

In history Hartmann had discovered that the system thinkers are in the majority.   There were the systems of Plotinus and Proclus.   The Scholastics of the Middle Ages were almost without exception systematics.   A counter-move- ment occurred only in the late Nominalism.   The Modern era produced new systems: Bruno, Spinoza, Wolff, Fichte, Schel- ling and Hegel bent reality according to their systems, that is, they pre-constructed and attempted to solve the problems by complying with the principles of their preconceived systems.

In the minority group Hartmann counts foremost Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant.   Thereby he used as criterion

that their thinking either does not submit to a system at all, or that it constantly transgresses it or breaks through it. [6]

Such a criterion enables us to recognize in Hartmann himself a problem-thinker, and this criterion becomes for him the cri- terion of true philosophy on the whole:

[Philosophy] does not predetermine.   It does not presuppose a world-view to which everything has to adjust, or at least it remains ever ready to revise it.   It does not accept prescribed principles. It first searches for them. It begins with the problems which it finds ... in advancing. It is concerned with the solution of prob- lems, but when it cannot solve them, it perseveres with them in exploration and uncertainty.   Problems which do not coincide with its calculation, are never rejected.   Philosophy remains with them,

[5] Heinz Huelsman, *Die Methode* ... (The Method in the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann), Duesseldorf, Schwann, 1959, p. 115, note 1.

[6] Nicolai Hartmann, " Der philosophische Gedanke . . . ," in *op. cit.,* p. 3: " .... class sich ihr Denken entwerder ueberhaupt nicht in ein System fuegt oder doch es staendig ueberschreitet und durchbricht. . . .."

follows their paths in any direction. Again and again the conse-
quences stemming from the problems may force philosophy to
break through established mental constructions. Therefore, it may
often appear inconsequent when viewed from the side of the sys-
tems. On account of this the two ways separate unequivocally:
whether thinking is concerned with the harmony of mental con-
structs or with cognition. [7]

It appears then that all systematic thinking results in some-
thing conditioned by time, whereas problem-thinking achieves
something supra-temporal, namely, the progress of cognition.
Because it starts from the problem, it can advance from prob-
lem to problem through the centuries.

Hartmann took an empathic stand regarding this problem
development. His works bear witness to the fact that the
problems led him to his analysis of the categories, a gigantic
intellectual achievement, overdue since Kant's *Critique.* The
problems taught Hartmann also to treasure the Aristotelian
aporetics and to revive it in contemporary thought since the
philosophical demands of the twentieth century urged him.
The problems with their inextricable remainders transmitted
from generation to generation were challenging Hartmann also
to become the philosopher of the trans-intelligible, of the irra-
tional, that is of what transcends here, now, and perhaps for
ever, the human intellectual capacity. But the problems made
Hartmann also search for his own position which he finally
found as ontologist and metaphysician.

But what did Hartmann actually mean by" metaphysics?"

[7] Nicolai Hartmann, " Der philosophische Gedanke ... ," in *op. cit.,* p. 3: " Sie
entscheidet nicht vor, setzt kein Weltbild voraus, auf das alles hinauslaufen muss,
oder ist doch bereit, es jederzeit zu revidieren. Sie laesst sich ihre Prinzipien nicht
geben, sie sucht erst nach ihnen. Sie geht von den Problemen aus, die sie vorfindet,
oder auf die sie im Vordringen stoesst; urn Loesung der Probleme ist es ihr zu tun,
und wenn sie sie nicht loesen kann, so verharrt sie im Suchen und in der Unge-
wissheit. Sie weist keine Probleme ab wei! sie in ihrer Rechnung nicht aufgehen;
sie harrt bei ihnen aus, geht jeden Weg mit ihnen, wohin immer sie fuehren
moegen. Die Problemkonsequenz zwingt sie, den aufgefuehrten Gedankenbau
immer wieder zu durchbrechen. Darum erscheint sie, vom System aus gesehen,
meist als "inkonsequent." Daran scheiden sich eindeutig die heiden Wege, ob
es dem Denken urn Einheit des Gedankenbaus geht oder urn Erkenntnis."

Did he take the term in its traditional meaning?   In the first
part of his metaphysics   of cognition Hartmann explains his
own position.   He speaks here of three kinds of metaphysics:
The subject-matter   metaphysics, restricted to special fields; the
speculative metaphysics;   and the metaphysics   of problems.
The first and the last withstand criticism.   But the second
kind is contestable.

   On the whole specialized metaphysics is not more traditional
than metaphysics of problems.   Both kinds have been trans-
mitted from generation to generation of thinkers through the
centuries and have become more developed.   But subject-
matter metaphysics is predominantly   the province of the
system-thinkers,   who understand metaphysics as a field with
restricted subject-matter circumference.   To many of these
thinkers ontology was the fundamental science from which
cosmology, psychology and natural theology forked off as spe-
cialized fields.

   Such specialized metaphysics could indeed preserve its meaning
even after the specialized domains themselves became either partly
very questionable, or partly independent and non-speculative. But
once the tradition thereof had been torn down, and other philo-
sophic basic sciences had pushed themselves in the foreground, it
would be necessary to set their foundations anew.   However, this
assignment, even if it were possible to fulfill it, seems not to be
ours.[8]

Hartmann refutes the traditional view by saying,

it is erroneous to think metaphysics   begins first of all with a specu-
lation about God and the soul, or about the whole universe. . . .
The metaphysical questions indicate themselves rather closely
behind the given and the grasped facts.   This is valid also for all
the non-speculative disciplines.[9]

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[8] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik* ... , p. 11-12: "Solche
Gebietsmetaphysik koennte zwar ihren Sinn behalten, auch nachdem die "Gebiete"
selbst zum Teil sehr fragwuerdig, zum Teil selbstaendig und unspekulativ geworden
sind.   Aber nachdem die Tradition hierin einmal abgerissen ist, andere philo-
sophische Grundwissenschaften sich vorgedraengt haben, waere es erforderlich,
ihre Fundamente erst neu anzulegen.   Diese Aufgabe, selbst, wenn sie moeglich
sein sollte, ist nicht die unssre."

[9] Nicolai Hartmann, " Systematische Selbstdarstellung" (Systematic Self-presen-

The second kind of metaphysics according to Hartmann is the metaphysics which serves more or less as " battlefield of speculative systems, of their doctrinal constructs and world-views." [10]   Hartmann points out that the specialized meta-physics speculates, too, but it strives for a solution of the prob-lems.   In the purely speculative metaphysics, however, the problems "remain basically unsolved, while the speculative hypotheses enjoy greatest freedom." [11] This results in a steady fluctuation of contradictory solutions of the problems.

The problematic areas remained within their own rights; only the theories, which had dared to approach them, became objects of criticism.   Metaphysics as speculation is rightly considered out-dated.[12]

Finally Hartmann asks, what kind of metaphysics remains [13] since the mutual chasing of the systems seems at the end.   In answering this question, Hartmann points to the perennial problems which require further development.   It follows, that modern metaphysics can be only a metaphysics of problems with "slow progress of research" [14] because of the always urging but unsoluble remainders of problems.   Hartmann explains:

The strange phenomenon, however, is that almost in all fields the philosophical basic and central questions are of such a nature.

tation), in *Kleinere Schriften,* Vol. 1, p. 13: "Es ist ein Irrtum zu meinen, die Metaphysik beginne erst mit der Spekulation ueber Gott und Seele oder ueber den Kosmos als Gauzes. . . . Die metaphysischen Fragen melden sich vielmehr auf allen Gebieten dich hinter dem Gegebenen und Erfassten.   Das gilt durchaus auch von den ganz unspekulativen Disziplinen."

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 11.

[11] Ibid.: " [Probleme im Grunde) **...** ungeloest bleiben, waehrend die spekula-tiven Voraussetzungen in groesster Freiheit variieren **...** [im Gewoge) **...** wider-sprechender Loesungen von Problemen."

[12] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* **...** , p. 12: "**...** die Problemgebiete blieben in ihren Gerechtsamen; die Theorien nur, die sich an sie gewagt hatten, verfielen der Kritik.   Metaphysik als Spekulation ist es, was **...** mit Recht fuer lahmgelegt gilt."

[13] *Idem,* "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in *op. cit.,* p. 11.

[14] *Ibid.*

They are metaphysical questions inasmuch as they are finally unsoluble questions. Consequently systematic thinking is necessarily metaphysical thinking, systematic philosophical research is necessarily metaphysical research. Man sees himself continuously confronted with the ancient, eternal aporias with their irrational woof. And this situation is the decisive one. It constitutes the unchanging basic condition of philosophy. [15]

Hence, metaphysics of cognition, too, is understood by Hartmann in this sense. This will become clear from the following mqmry.

II. HARTMANN's METAPHYSICS OF CoGNITION

It is clear that Hartmann belongs to the problem thinkers. What were his relations to other prominent individual representatives of his own group and which problems occupied his mind especially? It is evident that no thinker can be concerned with the entire cosmos of problems. What Hartmann had stated in regard to the plethora of the categories applies also to the multitude of problems:

. . . to outline these . . . is the desideratum of philosophy which is not only beyond the power of the individual thinker to fulfill but transgresses the boundaries of an era. Generations will have to work on it. But they, too, will achieve only what has become mellow in their time. [16]

This study is geared towards the gnoseological problems.

[15] Nicolai Hartmann, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in *op. cit.,* p. 11: " Das Eigentuemliche aber ist, dass fast auf allen Gebieten die philosophischen Grund und Kernfragen von dieser Art sind. Es sind metaphysiche Fragen im Sinne nicht endgueltig loesbarer Fragen. Die Folge dieses Umstandes ist, dass systematisches Denken notwendig metaphysisches Denken, und systematisch-philosophische Forschung notwendig metaphysische Forschung ist. Es sind die alten, ewigen Aporien mit irrationalem Einschlag, vor die sich dauernd der Mensch gestellt sieht. . . . Diese Sachlage ist die ausschlaggebende. Sie macht die dauernde Grundsituation der Philosophie aus."

[16] Nicolai Hartmann, *Philosophie der Natur* (Philosophy of Nature), p. v: " Diese **...** zu entwerfen, ist ein Desiderat der Philosophie, das zu erfuellen nicht nur ueber die Kraft eines Einzelnen, sondern auch wohl ueber die eines Zeitalters hinausgeht. Daran werden Generationen zu arbeiten haben, und bewaeltigen werden sie offenbar auch stets nur das, was in ihrer Zeit spruchreif geworden ist."

Therefore, it is necessary to approach only that sector of Hartmann's problem thinking which deals precisely with cognition. Two possibilities exist for research in order to receive answers to the above questions: one begins either with the thinker or with the problems. In both cases one has again an alternative, namely, either one traces the problem from the beginnings to their contemporary state, or one regresses from the present time to the origin of the history of Western philosophy. Hartmann often did the latter. It seems therefore inviting to follow his procedure.

The problems were Nicolai Hartmann's primary concern. Since he had disclosed again the ontological realm with his *Meta physik der Erkenntnis* he had to screen those problems which were related to cognition and had been registered in the history of ideas. His attitude was the one he pictures in the description of a problem thinker:

The theory of cognition . . . has to proceed critically. Critical procedure, however, is not selection of problems, indeed, such can take place only from the point of view of solubility, but critical procedure is . . . selection of a position. The inquiry has to be critical not in regard to the problem but in regard to the system and theory.H

The conviction that the problem of cognition is a metaphysical problem is rooted in Hartmann's theory that cognition deals with the " grasping of the given, that is, cognition is concerned with the objectification of an existent, or, that an existent becomes an object." [18] Approaching cognition under such an aspect, a nexus of problems presents itself. Hartmann lists the following as the fundamental questions of cognition:

I) The problem of the subject-object union, which is the problem of gnoseological transcendence;

[17] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik* ... , p. 125: "Erkenntnistheorie ... muss kritisch vorgehen. Kritisches Vorgehen ist aber nicht Auslese der Probleme, eine solche koennte ja nur vom Gesichtspunkt der Loesbarkeit stattfinden, sondern gerade die Auslese des Standpunktes. Nicht zum Problem, sondern zum System und zur Theorie soli sich die Untersuchung kritisch verhalten."

[18] Cf. Werner Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.,* p. 466.

2) the problem of apriori and aposteriori knowledge;
3) the problem of the criterion of truth;
4) the question of problem awareness;
5) the problem of the progress of cognition.

All these problems are metaphysical problems in Hartmann's view. But they are aporias, problems which resist a perfect solution, "because they contain an irrational remainder." Therefore, Hartmann seeks to separate within these problems the "transintelligible   or the irrational from the intelligible, in order to find for the intelligible part the starting point." [19] Through this method the propositions   become gnoseological aporias the ontological foundation of which Hartmann strives to discover.   He turns his attention to the metaphysical data of the subject-object relation, which obviously is anchored in the existential sphere .

. . . At any given time only a part of our surrounding world is known, a circle of objects renders itself prominent through the actual limit of objectification which is based relatively upon the noetic condition of the subject.   However, beyond this there lies an unlimited zone of the transobjective, that is of the unknown. Since the limit of objectification is moving during the noetic process, the question arises, whether it is capable of boundless shifting. This has to be denied, for the phenomenon of the unintelligible-for-us is demonstrable. It follows, that there must exist a second boundary, the boundary of objectification or recognizability (intelligibility). Obviously this border must be fixed for it is established by the kind and disposition of our apparatus of cognition. [20]

This condensed ontological account of Hartmann's theory of cognition points then to the " transintelligible " beyond the limits of objectification, for there is a difference whether some-thing is unknown or unknowable.   Hartmann deals then with the " affirmative notion of the thing-as-such," with the removal of its aporias, and, finally he demonstrates the irrational given in the object of cognition and in the categories.

All this shows that Hartmann has learned from his philo-

[19] Cf. *ibid.*
[20] Werner Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.,* p. 466.-.-.-

sophical ancestors, but that he accepts critically and care-
fully only what withstands his re-measuring on reality. We
follow him now in his passing along the history of philosophy.
Thereby we do not stop at trivialities for Hartmann truly was
concerned with the great problems of the great thinkers, these
he pursues into their origins.

This study will deal in detail with the first problem, the prob-
lem of the gnoseological transcendence. Since there can be
no genuine understanding of the work of Hartmann on this
problem without an appreciation of his methodology, the gen-
eral lines of his notion of method must first be outlined.

III. HARTMANN's CoNCEPT OF METHOD

Approaches into such a depth of problems require a suitable
means, a method by which success can be expected. What was
Hartmann's attitude in regard to method and which method
did he choose for his philosophical inquiries? In continuous
mental dialogue with the centuries of thought and in view of
the various means used by the thinkers he says:

... Cognition does not stop. It does not only .advance in its
content by enlarging and deepening its world-view, it moves in
another sense, too. Cognition changes its own procedure. It learns
to work with other methods, it even creates and invents such tools
and improves and polishes them. [21]

In the historical advancement of philosophy not only the transi-
toriness of projected world-views and systems are found, but
also lasting achievements of cognition and with them arises
the question how to grasp, how to preserve and advance them.
An answer is possible if, in all these achievements, a coherence
can be discovered which outlasts the opposition of systems
and historical eras and which points beyond all these limita-

[21] Nicolai Hartmann, " Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.,* I,
p. 160: "... Erkenntnis steht nicht still. Sie bewegt sich auch nicht nur in
dem Sinne fort, dass sie inhaltlich vorwaertskommt, das Bild der Welt erweitert
und vertieft, sondern auch in dem anderen Sinne, dass ihr eigenes Tun sich aendert,
mit anderm Werkzeug arbeiten lernt, ja dieses Werkzeug erst erschafft, erfindet,
an ihm verbessert und feilt."

tions.   In such a coherence, then, lies the possibility and over-
ture for the epigone [22] to distinguish between truth and error
within the transmitted ideas and systems.   In order to aug-
ment the efficiency of the thinker it becomes necessary that a
methodical procedure be acquired which helps the epigone not
only to escape the relativity of his own time-conditioned views
and interpretations,   but also in order to overcome these views,
if they are untenable.   Hence the assignment of the individual
thinker is to recognize the content of the problems provided
by the millenia.   He must rediscover these problems.   He must
grasp their meaning and importance in order to be able to
evaluate the work achieved by his predecessors, and to make
use of valuable achievements.   Therefore, the serious philoso-
pher faces the task to continue the inquiry where the trans-
mitted problems and propositions demand it.   Of course, such
a work challenges mental efforts.   The philosopher must truly
be a researcher, one who probes and wrestles with tradition
and the given reality.   He must be a systematic thinker, that
is, one whose problem-thinking discovers the continuity of
thought, of questions and of problems and who works with it,
hence, prolongs it and passes it on to the coming generations.
Hartmann   believed that

the important thing is not the variety of attitudes and interpreta-
tions, but the methodical basis, that is, a forcing power of cogni-

•• Cf. Heinz Huelsmann, *Die Methode in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns,*
p. 21: "Hartmann often used the word epigone in order to express his own re-
lation and the relation of his contemporaries to the great thinkers in history."
Cf. also note 2, *ibid.:* " The word epigone is not an arbitrary term.   It means a
very exact relationship.   First of all it signifies the descendant and the late-hom.
In it is also a point of modesty and humility, of respect for the greatness of the
past.   However, epigone means also to be the older in the objective spirit, for the
epigone is enabled without own merits but through his historical place where he
stands to harvest fruits ripened in history.   Thus the epigone has possibilities, pro-
vided by the historical development, by the progress of the sciences, which put
him in a more advantageous situation than the thinkers of the past. It is informa-
tive, too, that this term occurs especially in connection with the method.   It allows
us to presume that Hartmann by using this term intended to determine his own
place in the history of ideas."

tion, a consequential attitude determined by its relationship to the object and to the labor already achieved by the past. [23]

Thus method is not an arbitrary matter dependent only on the choice of the thinker who uses the method.

It is prescribed by the species of the object. For its own procedure there is only one alternative given: to meet or to fail the object. The object is met only by a proper method. And to be sure, the object can be failed (missed) in many ways. It is truly comprehended by the correct way. [24]

Here Hartmann refers to Aristotle who explained in regard to his own philosophical predecessors: " In proceeding . . . the object itself pointed the way for the researchers and forced them to continue the inquiry." [25]

From this it is clear that method has to adjust to the object. If one approaches an object with a heterogeneous method, the object keeps itself closed up, or becomes complicated and appears unconquerable.   But as soon as the homogeneous method is found and applied, the object itself opens up, appears simple, lucid, and soluble. This insight caused Hartmann to define method as

the manner by which an object is approached.   The method is practical when it commences where the object shows its open assailable sides. Whoever proceeds otherwise will experience that the object escapes. It is wrong to think that one can approach one and the same object by so and so many different methods. Certainly one can, but one does not get hold of the object. [26]

[23] Nicolai Hartmann, " Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte," in *op. cit.,* II, p. 18: "{Es kommt] nicht auf die mannigfachen Unterschiede der Einstellung und Auffassung an, sondern einzig auf das methodische Grundmoment ... das heisst, class es eine zwingende Macht der Erkenntnis gibt, eine Konsequenz, die aus dem Verhaeltnis zum Gegenstande heraus bestimmt ist."

[24] Nicolai Hartmann, " Der philosophische Gedanke . . ." in *op. cit.,* II, p. 48: " Sie ist durch die Artung des Gegenstandes vorgezeichnet; man kann sie im eigenen Vorgehen nur entweder treffen oder verfehlen.   Und zwar verfehlen auf vielerlei Art, treffen nur auf eine."

[25] *Metaphysics,* I, 3/984 a 18 f.

[26] Nicolai Hartmann, "Der philosophische Gedanke ... ," in *op. cit.,* II, p. 18: " Methode ist die Art, einen Gegenstand anzupacken; sachgerecht ist eine

Hartmann admits that there are various methods, but he cautions the user, for the choice of the method is determined by the object.

Another surprising aspect of the theory of Hartmann [27] is that methods themselves do not result from mere pondering about method. Methods originate rather through "the full devotion to the object." [28]

In his earlier work " Systematische Methode," [29] Hartmann distinguishes three principal methods: the transcendental method, the descriptive method, and the dialectical method. Later Hartmann speaks of "method-momenta" which are continuously interrelated. [30] Some of these interlacing moments are the phenomenological-descriptive, the analytic-retro-conclusive, the dialectic-synthetic points. Other methodical elements follow from these, complement these and allow a synopsis of the different levels of methodical procedures. This synthesis leads to a theory of methods which can be detected and proved in most of the teachings of outstanding philosophers. However, since there are many thinkers and many problems, the methods applied at any given time must vary.

Method and content are not neutral to one another. A special content demands a special method. How should one be able to prescribe a methodical type if all the philosophical potential of the method lies in its elasticity and adaptability? This fact becomes especially important when one tries to tailor such a method for a definite type of system. A systematic method obtained that way is then nothing else but an instance of censorship which prevents the admission of what had not been curtailed previously by the system. [31]

Methode, die ihn dort anpackt, wo er seine freiliegenden Angriffsflaechen hat. Wer ihn anders anpackt, dem gleitet er durch die Finger durch. Es ist ein lrrtum zu meinen, man koenne dieselbe Sache so oder auch anders in Angriff nehmen; man "kann " freilich, aber man bekommt sie nicht zu fassen."

[27] Cf. W. Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.,* p. 468.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Nicolai Hartmann, " Die systematische Methode," in *Kleinere Schriften,* III, p. 92.5.

[30] W. Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.,* p. 468.

[31] Nicolai Hartmann, "Die systematische Methode," in *op. cit.,* III, p. 'i!'i!-23:

The viewpoint o£ Hartmann, that the system is considered the result, the end, the goal o£ philosophical reasoning, has been explained.   Hartmann sees the method working towards such an end.   However, method, unlike system, is not the end but the beginning o£ a philosophy.   It has to serve as guide in all actual philosophizing.   This does not mean that-before using any method-the philosopher has to penetrate method fully beforehand.   Often such penetration comes aposteriori through reflection upon the £unction and achievement o£ the method. And with the aposteriori insight there develops the method awareness.   For instance,

the final methods of Formal logic are present in practically every thinking. But not every thinking knows about their presence ... and if it does know about the methods, thinking does not become more methodical by knowing about them.[32]

From this statement o£ a phenomenon it follows that a certain methodological apriority is generally given. Already in the pre-Socratic philosophy a method was used.   But a " reflection upon its own procedure " was completely absent. Plato and Aristotle illuminate later the immanent methical moments.   They show that knowledge o£ content must precede knowledge o£ methods, £or

without the preceding of a philosophy of nature geared . . . towards a content, that is, without the application of method (at first naive and unconscious) posterity would not have been able to find the method. Research of method presupposes experience of method.[33]

"Denn Methode und Inhalt sind nicht indifferent zu einander. Jeder besondere Inhalt verlangt eine Besonderung der Methode. Wie also kann man einen Methodentypus vorzeichnen wollen, waehrend doch aile philosophische Leistungsfaehigkeit der Methode in ihrer Dehnbarkeit und Anpassungskraft liegen muss? Besonders schwer aber faellt solch ein Vorwurf ins Gewicht, wo man diesen Methodentypus noch dazu auf einen bestimmten Systemtypus zuschneiden will, so dass systematische Methode dann nichts anderes ist als eine Zensurinstanz, die ins System nicht einlaesst, was nicht vorher " systematisch " zugestutzt ist."

[32] Nicolai Hartmann,   " Die systematische Methode," in *op. cit.,* III, p. 23: "... die Schlussmethoden der formalen Logik (sind) schlechthin in allem Denkeu vorhanden.   Aber nicht alles Denken weiss urn dieses Vorhandensein; und wenn es darum weiss, so wird es dadurch im allgemeinen urn nichts methodischer."

[83] Nicolai Hartmann,   " Die systematische Methode," in *op. cit.,* III, p. 24:

In other words, method, too, can become object of study, but before it can be analyzed it has to be. Method becomes lucent by applying it and becomes objectified only after its application by the methodologist.   Thus the apriority of method conditions its application.

The method of cognition is the very first of all conditions; but the recognition of the method which comprehends the method of cognition is the very last of all insights. [34]

Based on these insights Hartmann himself uses the methods in a skillful manner in his philosophy.   He approaches the problem of method by formulating the aporia of method as follows:

How can method exist in a vital subject-matter research, and, what is more, how can it function if there is no guiding methodical awareness *in* the intellect? [35]

In this formulation of the aporia the determining factors of the method are given: the object, the subject-matter, and the intellect.

The method is prescribed by the assailable surface which the object shows. But it is not determined by the object alone, for it is just as much influenced by the structure of the cognitive apparatus. [36]

In the method then two categories meet which Hartmann considers given and necessary in every process of cognition: the category of being in the object, " which can be taken from

"... ohne den Vorgang rein inhaltlich gesinnter Naturphilosophie, d. h. ohne die zunaechst naive und unbewusste Anwendung der Methode haetten die Spaeteren eben garnicht auf sie kommen koennen. Methodenforschung setzt Methodenerfahrung voraus."

[34] *Ibid.:* " Die Erkenntnismethode ist die erste aller Bedingungen; die sie begreifende Methodenerkenntnis aber ist die spaeteste aller Erkenntnisse."

[35] Nicolai Hartmann, *Aufbau der realen Welt,* p. 577: " Wie kann in der lebendigen Sachforschung die Methode bestehen und folgerichtig arbeiten ohne ein leitendes Methodenbewusstsein?"

[86] *Ibid.,* p. 578: " Die Methode ist bestimmt durch die Angriffsflaechen, welche der Gegenstand ihr darbietet; aber das " Darbieten " ... ist nicht vom Gegenstand her allein bestimmt, sondern ebensosehr von der Struktur des Erkenntnisapparates her."

any level of the hierarchy of being," [37] and the spiritual cate-
gory of cognition or knowledge in the subject, which constitutes
the counterpart of the first. The existential realm and the
gnoseological realm indeed affect the method also. Hence,
method too, becomes relationally determined by "the coordi-
nation ... which connects cognition with the content of its
object." [38]

In philosophy this coordination is the point of departure for
the selection of a method, for philosophy has to ask either *for*
a problem or *because of* a problem. The content of the un-
known area in an object is expressed in the problem. This
unknown area has to become disclosed through the chosen
method. Therefore, by its very nature the method is the path
on which the objects of the real categories or the problems of
reality move into the noetic sphere. In the noetic sphere then
the real categories are represented by their corresponding
cognitive equivalents obtained by a suitable method. Hence, in
the entire process of cognition method is needed, for the prob-
lem awareness in the subject does not remain static. Problem
awareness urges towards problem solution by investigation of
possible answers. In this phenomenon Hartmann recognizes
an essential methodical element:

Such an investigation reflects the finding of a method, although
it is not yet an explicit method awareness. But it is an object
awareness stemming from an awareness of a prevailing problem
situation whereby the chance of possible advancement is subjected
to deliberations because of the data. [39]

In such deliberations the methodical design develops and
becomes seen for

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 577.

[38] Nicolai Hartmann, *Aufbau der realen Welt,* p. 577: " [Methode wird bestimmt]
.. durch die Zuordnung . . . welche die Erkenntnis mit ihrem Gegenstande
inhaltlich verbindet."

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 579-580: "Die Umschau ist Reflexion der Methodenfindung. Sie ist
... freilich noch kein explizites Methodenbewusstsein. Aber sie ist ein Sach-
bewusstsein aus der Problemsituation heraus, wobei die Chance moeglichen Vor-
waertskommens auf Grund des Gegebenen der Erwaegung unterliegt."

one needs the total apparatus of methods, **...** the direct analyti-
cal ascent from the concrete **...** , the dialectical synthesis **...** ,
and the hierarchic perspectives of the strata.   And whatever the
method may be that is first used one of the other methods must
join it for the sake of complement and controJ.4°

Among all the possible methods Hartmann considers the
transcendental   method   (also called the critical method by
Kant, because it involves an analysis of the conditions and
limits of knowledge) the proper philosophical method. It
searches for the ultimate principles and connects in the process
of knowledge the object with the subject, real categories with
the categories of cognition. By means of the transcendental
method the philosopher proceeds from the actual real to the
conditions of the possibilities of the given. Therefore, Hart-
mann evaluates this method as the fundamental step towards
the finding of universal principles and, therefore, a necessary
requirement of objective cognition and of philosophic problem
awareness.

In the gnoseological situation the apriori or universal prin-
ciples are not the first, but the last recognized elements, or pre-
cisely the unkown and, therefore, searched for factors of a
problem.   The problematic character of this situation intensi-
fies in philosophy because philosophy has to find out the laws
of these universal principles.   Therefore, it must be understood
that

this kind of method obviously rests upon a retro-conclusion (Rueck-
schluss): the ontological *prius* becomes simultaneously in the
gnoseological order the *posterius. 41*

The transcendental   method then consists actually in this

'"Nicolai   Hartmann, *Aufbau dur realen Welt,* p. 616: " **...** man [bedarf] **...**
des ganzen Methodenapparates,   . . . den direkten analytischen Aufstieg vom *Con-*
cretum her **...** , die dialektische Zusammenschau **...** und Schichtenperspektive.
. . . Und je nachdem die eine oder andere Methode vorangegangen ist, muessen
die anderen zur Ergaenzung und Kontrolle nachfolgen."

01 Nicolai Hartmann, "Die systematische Methode," in *op. cit.,* p. 29: "[wird]
diese ganze Methodik ofl'enbar ein Rueckschluss.   Das in seinslogischer Hinsicht
fruehere ist eben zugleich das fuer den Erkenntnisweg Spaetere."

kind of procedure. The usual order becomes reversed for the general direction of inference is normally a descending motion deductively proceeding from general principles to the given particulars. In the transcendental method, however, there is an ascent from the object to the conditioning principles.

In this opposition of the directions and in the simultaneous penetration of both, the idea of a system of methods becomes clearly apparent. In such a system, however, the hypothetical method, the one which provides the conclusion aposteriori in the research of principles is the proper philosophical method. The principles of philosophy lie in another sphere than the principles of mathematics and physics. They lie on a higher level and form, as it were, an upper floor in the division of the sciences. They in turn are again conditions of scientific principles. For the latter become in philosophy a problem, an object, the ultimate principles of which philosophy has to search for. Therefore, the sphere of the philosophical objects, too, is transferred to a higher level. . . . Only the upper link of the concatenation, the inference of the philosophical categories, is a transcendental conclusion in the strict sense. The problem of the principles appears here in a more condensed, more powerful form; we deal with the highest, first principles. Conclusions leading beyond this level are not possible. For on the level of first principles (*archai* in the strict sense) the inference depends methodically on itself alone and is the only entrance to the principles. In this uniqueness of the philosophical conclusion (aposteriori) there lies the special characteristic of the transcendental method as an exclusively philosophical procedure. [42]

[42] Nicolai Hartmann, "Die systematische Methode," in *op. cit.,* p. 29-31: "In dieser Entgegengesetztheit der Richtungen und dieser gleichzeitigen Durchdringung beider findet sich deutlich der Gedanke eines Systems der Methoden angelegt, innerhalb dessen aber die hypothetische, als die der rueckschliessenden Prinzipien-forschung, die eigentlich philosophische Methode bildet. . . . Die Prinzipien, mit denen es Philosophie zu tun hat, liegen in einer anderen Sphaere als die mathe-matisch-naturwissenschaftlichen. Sie liegen eine Stufe hoeher, bildengleichsam ein oberes Stockwerk zu ihnen. Sie sind selbst wiederum Bedingungen fuer die Wis-senschaftsprinzipien. Denn diese werden auf philosophischem Gebiet selbst wie-derum zum Problem, das heisst zum Gegenstand, dessen Prinzipien es zu finden gilt. Auch die Gegenstandssphaere ist also hier eine Stufe hoeher hinauf verlegt. . . . Ein transzendentaler Schluss im strengen Sinne ist nur das obere Glied der Schlusskette, der Schluss auf die philosophischen Kategorien. Die Prinzipienfrage erscheint hier in verdichteter, potenzierter Form; es handelt sich urn die obersten, ersten Prinzipien, ueber die hinaus kein Rueckschluss mehr fuehren kann . . . ."

Another procedure which provides an object and outlines the
content of the object is used by the natural sciences.   This
procedure is the descriptive method.   The descriptive method
does not predicate anything about the cognitive validity, cor-
rectness, necessity of the object, and it does not inquire into
its principles.   Nevertheless,   this method is useful for all
the empirical sciences and it aids the transcendental   method
too.   In this study reference to this method will be made
when we deal with Hartmann's   method in his *Metaphysik der
Erkenntni8.*

In one point we may hope to advance further than the old
fronts the philosophical   object or problem.   In description,
however, the object is outlined, observed, limited, described.

In a third method, the dialectical method, the principles of
the objects or problems become interwoven.   Hence the vertical
direction of the transcendental   method becomes horizontalized.
The static concept-resulting   from the transcendental   method
-becomes through the dialectical method a dynamic one, for
through this method's synthesis the conceptual identification,
stabilization and determination   become related to other con-
cepts, objects and problems.   Therewith the functional char-
acter of both of these methods becomes evident.   This then is
the foundation   for the coherence, coordination, categorization
of a system:

. . . by ascending with the transcendental method to the highest
principles, it seems at first as if each category were something
isolated and for itself inasmuch as its relativity consists in the
relation to the object only.   . .. the system would be nothing but
the sum of these single fundamental concepts-as   valid as they
may be. Dialectics teaches the reverse. A single category is noth-
ing without its relation to other categories. Without any other
categories a single category cannot even be defined. Hence, there

Denn nur dort, wo es sich urn "erste Prinzipien"   *(archai* im strengen Sinne)
handelt, ist der Rueckschluss methodisch ganz auf sich selbst gestellt, ist er der
einzige Zugang zu den Prinzipien.   Und in dieser Einzigkeit des Rueckschlusses
liegt das Eigentuemliche der transzendenten Methode als eines bloss philosophischen
Verfahrens."

ɪs still something that is superior to the principles without being their genus: the relation between the principles, their reciprocity, their dependence on one another. That means, each category is conditioned through all the others, is determined by the others, but at the same time, it is co-conditioning and co-determining all the other categories. It is then clear: this universal, reciprocal relationship is the idea of a system, or the system of the categories is the logical *prius* of the single categories. However, a system cannot be defined as the sum of the categories which the system comprises. The system is more than their sum total, for it is the unity and the essence of their relations. Thus it is a dynamic system of relations and not a static system of concepts. [43]

This study is not intended to be a detailed analysis of methods. .Method is viewed only within the limitation given by Hartmann's general theory of method. Therefore, the above sketch of the principal methods occurring in Hartmann's thought seems sufficient, especially since method plays a part in the analysis of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition . .More insight into the problem of method within Hartmann's philosophy can be obtained from H. Huelsmann's excellent work, *Die Methode in der Philosophic Nicolai Hartmanns.*ᴴ

We have now to investigate how Hartmann used his methodical insights in his theory of cognition.

[43] Nicolai Hartmann, "Die systematische Methode," in *op. cit.,* p. 45-46: " Steigt man mit der transzendentalen Methode rueckschliessend zu den Prinzipien auf, so scheint es zunaechst class jede Kategorie fuer sich etwas ist und ihre Relativitaet nur in dem Verhaeltnis zum Gegenstande hat. Das System ist dann nichts als die Summe dieser einzelnen, fuer sich vollgueltigen Grundbegriffe. Dialektik lehrt das Umgekehrte. Die einzelne Kategorie ist nichts ausserhalb der Beziehung zu den anderen Kategorien. Sie ist ohne diese nicht einmal begriffiich fixierbar.-Es gibt also hier noch etwas, was den einzelnen Prinzipien uebergeordnet ist, ohne doch ihr Oberbegriff zu sein; das ist die Beziehung zwischen ihnen, ihre Gegenseitigkeit, ihre Gebundenheit aneinander, welche besagt, class jede durch die anderen aile bedingt und bestimmt ist, und dennoch zugleich Bedingung und Bestimmungsgrund aller anderen ist. Diese allseitige Beziehung, diese Wechselbeziehung, ist aber nichts anderes als die Systemidee. Das System der Kategorien ist also das logische *prius* gegenueber der einzelnen Kategorie. Das System ist nicht definierbar als Summe der Kategorien; es ist mehr als ihre Summe, es ist die Einheit und der Inbegriff ihrer Beziehungen. Es ist dynamisches Beziehungssystem, nicht statisches Begriffssystem."

« *Op. cit.* (cf. note 5).

Hartmann comes from the Marburg School. The goal of this Neo-Kantian school was to investigate the nature of knowledge and to provide the theory with new philosophical foundations. Hartmann made this goal his own, only his intention transcended the Marburg aim, for he gave to the theory of cognition a realistic level in proving its metaphysical anchorage.

In regard to the gnoseological problem on the whole Hartmann's method led him to three major approaches. First, Hartmann attempted to refute positions opposed to the phenomena of cognition. This showed him the limitation and determination of the proper gnoseological problem areas. Having found these he was able to uncover the roots of cognition in the antic realm. [45]

On this path the question of the scientific *locus* of cognition occupied the thinker. Is cognition, properly speaking, a probblem and/or object of psychology or of logic? Hartmann found that none of these disciplines can explain the phenomenon of cognition. Therefore,

the study of the entire field must be divided into theoretical problem spheres in accordance with the areas of the data. First, the subject in itself presents a closed psychological sphere. Another one is the ideal logical sphere that corresponds to the given field of the logical structures. Finally there is the total antic sphere of reality .... [46]

In Hartmann's philosophy these spheres exist for themselves, that means they are distinct and independent from the subject. There is, for instance, the logical sphere as such with its ideas, judgments and conclusions, which show " even a certain independence from the various levels of cognition." [47] Then, confronting this sphere, there is the sphere of the psychic acts

•• H. Huelsmann, *op. cit.,* p. 116.

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik,* p. £13: " ... die Gesamtbetrachtung ... in Problemsphaeren der Theorie spalten, entsprechend den Gebieten der Gegebenheit. Das Subjekt bildet hier in sich selbst eine geschlossene psychologische Sphaere der Theorie; dem Gebiet der logischen Strukturen muss eine Sphaere der logisch idealen Theorie entsprechen; die ontisch reale Gesamtsphaere erfordert ein Gebiet ontologischer Betrachtung."

"Nicolai Hartmann, *Aufbau der realen Welt,* ed. 1949 p. 175.

within the cognitive process.   These acts function in accord
with the content of cognition as acts of perception, ideation,
intuition.   Hence, these acts constitute a sphere of their own,
namely, "the sphere that supports spiritual being, for spiritual
being depends on psychic being." 48

Consequently, the psychic sphere is the primary, the logical
sphere is the secondary sphere, the specific phenomena of which
integrate unnoticeably,

therefore the tendency of the theory of cognition to display prefer-
ence either for the one or for the other and turn either into a kind
of logism or of psychologism. The proper orientation is obtained
only by strict consideration of the transcendental nature of the
gnoseological relation. 49

This required " proper orientation on the transcendence of
cognition" was observed by Hartmann himself in the methodi-
cal reduction of cognition to being (" methodische Selbstueber-
fuerhrung der Erkenntnis ") by means of the phenomenological
method.   The procedure of Hartmann, however, applies a
methodical correction to the approach of recent philosophical
theory.

The phenomenon of cognition must be described in such a manner
that the coherence of its essential characteristics as a whole be-
comes seen and that through this coherence a guarantee is given
for its completeness. We possess the method of such an essential
description today in the procedure of phenomenology. This recent
philosophical theory has already brought forth a multitude of im-
portant analyses of essences. However, in the field of cognition,
. . . it adhered almost exclusively to the logical sphere and to
parts of the psychological sphere of the phenomena. A phenomen-
ology of cognition as essential analysis of the metaphysical aspects
in the phenomenon of cognition as such is not yet made. It needs
to be newly outlined from its very origin. . . . It can be antici-

48 *Ibid.*
•• *Ibid.,* p. 176: "Daher die Tendenz der Erkenntnistheorie entweder nach der
einen oder nach der anderen Seite zu entgleisen, entweder einem Logismus oder
einem Psychologismus zu verfallen.   Die eigene Linie in ihr ist ueberhaupt nur im
strengen Sichhalten an den Transzendenzcharakter der Erkenntnisrelation durch-
fuehrbar."

pated that the phenomenology of cognition has to become an inde-
pendent science." 50

Obviously, this correction makes Hartmann's approach radi-
cally different from Husserl's method. Huelsmann wisely allows
Hartmann to speak for himself about the kind and degree of
difference:

It seems here preferable not to speak in general of "essential dif-
ference or deviation" but to consider Hartmann's own judgment
on this matter: He says, " Our analysis of the phenomenon of
cognition deviates in one aspect from the phenomenologists.   They
exclusively adhere to the immanent elements of the phenomenon
and do not grant to the transcendent element its own way. This is
not a mere consequence of their method, but rather a partiality of
their interest in the phenomenon ... or a remnant of a fixed
prejudice. Phenomenology today sees itself handicapped in its own
development by the limitations of a philosophy of immanence which
in last analysis rests upon an idealistic prejudice.   This restriction
is avoided by our analysis of the phenomenon of cognition.   The
transcendence of the object of cognition definitely belongs to the
phenomenon and must be described." 51

50 Cf. N. Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 37-38: "Das Erkenntnisphaenomen
muss so beschrieben werden, class der Zusammenhang seiner Wesenszuege als Ganzes
uebersichtlich wird und dadurch zugleich eine Gewaehr fuer die Vollzaehligkeit
derselben bietet.   Die Methode einer solchen Wesensbeschreibung besitzen wir
heute im Verfahren der Phaenomenologie.   Diese noch junge philosophische Wissen-
schaft hat bereits eine Fuelle wichtiger Wesensanalysen gebracht, hat sich aber
bisher im Erkenntnisgebiet fast ausschliesslich an die logische und Teile der psy-
chologischen Seite der Phaenomene gehalten.   Eine Phaenomenologie der Erkennt-
nis als Wesensanalyse des Metaphysischen im Erkenntnisphaenomen steht bis heute
noch aus.   Sie muss erst von Grund aus neu entworfen werden. . . . Es ist Ieicht
vorauszusehen, class die Phaenomenologie der Erkenntnis von rechts wegen eine
gauze Wissenschaft fuer sich bilden muss."

51 H. Huelsmann, *op. cit.,* p. 77: " In einer Beziehung aber weicht unsere
Analyse des Erkenntnisphaenomens von derjenigen der Phaenomenologen ab. Diese
halten sich ausschliesslich an das Immanente im Phaenomen und lassen das Trans-
zendente in seiner Eigenart nicht zu Worte kommen.   Das ist nicht sowohl eine
Inkonsequenz der Methode, als vielmehr eine Einseitigkeit des Interesses fuer das
Phaenomen, resp. ein Rest standpunktlicher Voreingenommenheit.   Die bisherige
Phaenomenologie sieht sich in ihrer eigenen Entfaltung gehemmt durch den Bann-
kreis der Immanenzphilosophie, der letzten Endes auf einem idealistischen Vorur-
teil beruht.   Dieser Bannkreis ist in unserer Analyse des Erkenntnisphaenomens
durchbrochen.   Die Transzendenz des Erkenntnisgegenstandes gehoert mit zum
Phaenomen und muss mit ihm beschrieben werden."

Even the corrected phenomenological method was only the beginning of the process of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition. From Aristotle he acquired an appreciation and mastery of aporetics, or of the pure science of problems. In Aristotle, Hartmann discovered also the method

to investigate the problems as such before treating them theoretically and to see them independently from possible attempts of solutions, that is, to distinguish the unknown from that which is comprehended and to elaborate the difficulties and contradictions of the given phenomena for their own sake. [52]

This Aristotelian   procedure   served   Hartmann   immediately as a model, but Hartmann remained independent in his approach, for in Aristotle's   method, too, Hartmann discovered deficiencies:

In one point we may hope to advance further than the old aporetics. The latter is not based on an analysis of the phenomenon. It is not supported by descriptive preparation which clearly is distinguished from the analysis. Therefore, the old aporetics suffers a certain lack of organization. Observing more critically, one finds in Aristotle some phenomenological motives in the midst of aporetics. The very limiting of the problem requires a start from the facts. If these facts are not determined beforehand, then it becomes necessary to assure them step by step. [53]

However,   through   such a procedure   the coherence of the method suffers from many excursions and, certainly, the understanding is rendered more difficult. For this reason Hartmann

[52] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 39: " ... die Probleme vor ihrer theoretischen Behandlung und unabhaengig von moeglichen Loesungsversuchen rein in sich selbst zu untersuchen, das Unbegriffene vom Begriffenen zu scheiden, Schwierigkeiten und Widersprueche der vorliegenden Phaenomene urn ihrer selbst willen herauszuarbeiten."

[53] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 39: "In einem Punkt ... duerfen wir hoffen weiter zu kommen als die alte Aporetik. Diese ist nicht auf Analyse des Phaenomens basiert, stuetzt sich auf keine beschreibende Vorarbeit, die deutlich von ihr abgehoben waere und leidet daher an einer gewissen Planlosigkeit. Sieht man genauer zu, so findet man bei Aristoteles phaenomenologische Motive mitten in die Aporetik hineinverarbeitet; Problemfixierung bedarf eben des Auggangs von einem Tatsachenbefund, und wo dieser nicht vorher festgelegt ist, muss sie sich seiner von Schritt zu Schritt versichern."

aims at a synthesis of aporetics and a phenomenology in which the analysis of the phenomenon is the basic step. After this is accomplished, aporetics is enabled to follow freely its own laws or its " inner logic."

The latter consists not in the coherence of the data, but in connections between the data and the unknown, the searched for elements.[54]

Hartmann deliberated, planned, and accomplished his methodological procedures in his *Grundzuege einer Metaphy8ik der Erkenntnis.* This is shown in the fifth chapter of the above mentioned work, in which Hartmann's methodical principles and insights are presented.

In the first passages of that chapter, Hartmann abolishes the immanence of orthodox phenomenology. He departs from it by making the gnoseological transcendence the basis of all of his deliberations. The gnoseological transcendence is the fundamental separation of subject and object. It is that momentum of the basic phenomenon of cognition which is fully supported by the data. Hence, Hartmann departs unmistakably from the logical idealism and roots cognition in reality. Therewith, Hartmann also corrects the phenomenological method for

the transcendent character of the determination of the subject through the object is valid not only in the cognition of concrete things but in any cognition of objects. A confrontation remains even then when the object is not a space-temporal one. For the ideal object, too (for instance a mathematical proposition, or a specific subjective element, such as an attitude, a feeling) becomes an object. For it is without abrogation face to face with the recognizing subject, and therefore, transcendent. The recognized object does not surpass the cognitive construct, but it remains what it was when unrecognized. . . . A mathematical proposition does not become more true or less true by being known. A mental attitude does not become changed by being recognized. Hence, only in the object's independence lies the universal gnoseo-

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[54] *Ibid.:* "Diese besteht nicht in Zusammenhaengen des Gegebenen in sich selbst, sondern in solchen zwischen Gegebenem und und Gesuchtem."

logical meaning of transcendence, not in a psychological *outer* or *inner* of the subject.[55]

Hartmann advances here from the subjective element to the objective element, from the ideal to the real, from the purely psychological functional phenomenon to the ontic phenomenon. His intention is to show the pure basis of knowledge in which his theory of cognition is rooted.

Thus the general movement of Hartmann's methodological procedure can be summarized in three steps:

1. The phenomenological description of the gnoseological data is presented.
2. The problem of cognition in general is focused and analyzed into its aporias.
3. It concludes in a theory or a treatment of the problems.

The first step presupposes a very important principle in Hartmann's approach to cognition which must be considered in more detail: the principle of maximum data.

IV. HARTMANN's PRINCIPLE
OF THE " HIGHEST PossiBLE MAXIMUM oF DATA "

Hartmann, a phenomenologist *sui generis,* begins the approach to all the problems he deals with in the gnoseological realm by a descriptive, practical disclosure of the phenomena. He is aware of his own criticism of the motto of Scienticism:

[55] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 48-49: "der transzendierende Charakter der Bestimmung des Subjekts durch das Objekt gilt nicht nur fuer konkrete Dingerkenntnis, sondern schlechthin fuer aile Gegenstandserkenntnis. Das Gegenueber bleibt unaufhebbar, auch wenn es kein raumzeitliches ist. Auch der ideale Gegenstand (etwa ein mathematischer Satz), ja selbst ein spezifisch subjektives Gebilde (eine Gesinnung, ein Gefuehl), ist, sofem es Gegenstand des erkennenden Subjekts wird, diesem unaufhebbar gegenueber und insofem transzendent. Der erkannte Gegenstand geht auch hier nicht ueber in das Erkenntnisgebilde, sondem bleibt, was er unerkannt war. . . . Ein mathematischer Satz wird nicht wahrer oder unwahrer dadurch, class er erfasst wird, eine Gesinnung nicht anders dadurch, class sie durchschaut wird. In dieser Unabhaengigkeit allein und nicht in einem psychologischen Aussen gegenueber dem lnnen des Subjekts, !iegt der allgemein gnoseologische Sinn der Transzendenz."

Orientation on mathematics and on the mathematized sciences
of nature. [56] The last consequence of this motto necessarily
results in " a caricature of the phenomenon of cognition." [57]
Hartmann decides that if any orientation   on science should
be considered for the theory of cognition, then " it ought to be
obtained in equal proportion from all these sciences." [58] But
that, too, seems insufficient for in doing so the entire domain
of scientific cognition becomes eliminated.   Besides,   " the
factum of cognition is not only inexhaustible by the *factum* of
the sciences but becomes also distorted by it." [59] Therefore,
Hartmann   demands   that scienticism is confronted   with a
healthy anti-scienticism   which again is not allowed to domi-
nate.   The confrontation must be regulated: "A certain dis-
trust in both of these positions is fruitful. Their suspension
gives security to completion." [60]

    But is such a widening of the realm of orientation   a non-
philosophical attitude?   The methodical scientific doubt takes
as little as possible for granted. The scientific method is ruled
by "the device of the minimum of data." [61] Descartes, for
example, accepted as given only one point, the "cogito."   Fichte
accepted as jumping-board the "active Ego ('I') " only. But

if it were possible to deduct from one point or from one proposition
the plethora of the content of cognition, those thinkers would be
justified. However, this hope has long proved delusive. It rested
upon the most monstrous self-illusion of philosophy since each one
of these deductions showed a surreptitious obtainment of the mani-
fold content which previously had been excluded by the elimination
of data.   In reality the plenty of the content does not flow from the

[56] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis,* p. 40.
    [57] *Ibid.*
    [58] *Ibid.:* ". . . gleichmaessig an allen Wissenschaften stattfinden."   Cf. also
idem, Einfuehrung in die Philosophie, p. 67.
    [59] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege ...* , p. 41: "Das Faktum der Erkenntnis
ist mit dem Faktum der Wissenschaften nicht nur nicht erschoepft, es ist durch
dasselbe auch entstellt."
    [60] *Ibid.:* "Ein gewisses Misstrauen beider Richlungen ist hier gerade fruchtbar
... , ihr Spannungsverhaeltnis verbuergt am ehesten die Vollstaendigkeit."
    [61] *Ibid.:* " die Devise des Minimums an Gegebenheit."

erroneous denial of the quantity of data which *nolens volens* is at the disposal of the deducting consciousness.[62]

As is well known, the " device of the minimum of data " led the logical idealists to the extreme position which finally refuses to admit that anything is given. They considered everything a question or problem. Such attitude urges us to ask whether at least the question is given. For if the question is given, then a determination of the content is given. If that were denied, the problems would no longer be distinguishable among themselves.

The intuitivistic camp of Positivism offered the antithesis to the idealistic thesis, namely "everything (all) is given." If this antithesis were true, then all theory, all speculation and thinking of philosophy would become unnecessary for this antithesis indirectly declares the natural ratiocination of human reason superfluous. Both of these extremes

blur the meaning of the concept of givenness (data). This meaning is rooted in the fact that in all the mental activities is found something which is a clearly distinct basis in contrast to that which has to be discovered.[63]

" Given" is only a part of the whole. Therefore, the "too much " and the " too little " of data demand a balance. Hartmann ponders:

In the "too-much-of-givenness," at least, the possibility exists that the error becomes balanced; an erroneous assumption is con-

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[62] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 41: "Waere es moeglich aus dem einen Satz die Mannigfaltigkeit des Erkenntnisinhalts zu "deduzieren," so behielten diese Denker recht. Diese Hoffnung hat sich Iaengst als truegerisch erwiesen. Sie beruhte auf der ungeheuerlichsten Selbsttaeuschung der Philosophie, indem aile solche "Deduktion" auf die Erschleichung eben jenes mannigfaltigen Inhalts hinauslaeuft, der durch die Beschraenkung der Gegebenheit ausgeschlossen war. Die Inhaltsfuelle fliesst eben in Wirklichkeit nicht aus der faelschlich verleugneten Masse alles uebrigen Gegebenen, die gewollt oder ungewollt dem deduzierenden Bewusstsein eben doch zur Verfuegung steht."

[63] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 42: "Verwischen den Sinn des Gegebenheitsbegriffs. Denn dieser wurzelt eben darin, dass es in aller Gedankenarbeit etwas gibt, was sich als Ausgangsbasis vom Gesuchten und Aufgegebenen deutlich unterscheidet. Das Gegebene ist ... gerade nicht das Aufgegebene, sondern ein anderes."

fronted with other data which correct the assumption.   The con-
tinuous revision of the premises by looking back step by step is the
only criterion available in the question of givenness.

   But in the " too-little-of-givenness," the danger of the embezzle-
ment of problems exists. . . .   A problem once refuted does not re-
turn by itself.   For unnoticed, but simultaneously with the selec-
tion, the bias of the position occurs and excludes forever the once
excluded.   The " petitio principii " of the position, the most ordi-
nary of all errors of philosophical systems is fundamentally   an
error in regard to the data, the one of the elimination of data.   To
approach the problems with a prejudice equals a predetermination
of their solution. [64]

Such thoughts led Hartmann to the " device of the largest pos-
sible maximum of data," for it suits the critical attitude of the
thinker and the approach to the phenomenological analysis of
the problem. [65]

   This chosen device permits

firstly to return again and again, and to go beyond, the held and
the possible positions; secondly, to accept the data for the time
being without screening.   The phenomena as such ought to be
taken as equally valid by the phenomenological analysis that fol-
lows from the fact that phenomenology is concerned neither with
the theory nor with the formulation of any problem. [66]

   •• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 42: " Bei einem " Zuviel an Gege-
benheit " besteht wenigstens die Moeglichkeit, dass sich der Fehler wieder aus-
gleicht; einer falschen Annahme treten andere Gegebenheiten gegenueber, au denen
sie sich aufheben kann.   Die bestaendige, von Schritt zu Schritt zurueckblickende
Revision der Praemissen ist ohnehin das einzige Kriterium, das es in der Gegeben-
heitsfrage gibt.   Bei einem " Zuwenig an Gegebenheit" aber besteht die Gefahr
der Problemunterschlagung. . . .   Ein abgewiesenes Problem kehrt von selbst nicht
wieder.   Denn unbemerkt schleicht sich zugleich mit der Auslese die Vorentschei-
dung ueber den Standpunkt ein, und der Standpunkt schliesst das einmal Ausge-
schaltete aus.   Die *petitio principii* des Standpunkteo, rler gewoehnlichste aller
philosophischen Systemfehler, ist im Grunde ein Gegebenheitsfehler, und zwar ein
solcher der zu eng gefassten Gegebenheit. . . .   Mit einem fertigen Standpunkt an
die Probleme herantreten, heisst ihre Losung vorentscheiden •••• "

   [65] Cf. Werner Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.,* p. 573-574; p. 487-489; also Hartmann, *Ein-
fuehrung* . . . , p. 94.

   •• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ••• , p. 43: " erstens, je und je zurueckzu-
greifen hinter moegliche und gewonnene Standpunkte, Zweitens, Gegebenes vorerst
ohne Auslese anzunehmen, da fuer die Phaenomenanalyse die Phaenomene an sich
gleichwertig sein muessen, steht " die Phaenomenologie . . . ja nicht nur diesseits
der Theorie, sondem auch, diesseits aller Problemstellung."

It is the assignment of phenomenology to arrange the data and to collect them under the genus of descriptive notions. However,

the data collected by phenomenology do not claim to be the given of objective reality. But they claim validity as phenomenon. And it is, indeed, the phenomenon which the theory has to interpret. [67]

For the theory, however, the phenomena have not the same value.

Now Hartmann's approach becomes seen. The prospect of this way indicates:

1. Hartmann takes " the optimal maximum of data " as basis of his orientation. [68]
2. Hartmann discloses the data phenomenologically. Therefore, he remains at least for the beginning unconcerned with possible consequences. " Phenomenology can deal with the metaphysical elements of the problem of cognition inasmuch as such elements are found in the accessible realm of data." [69]
3. Hartmann investigates the phenomenological result critically in his aporetics.
4. Hartmann clarifies when possible-through his theoretical solutions-the aporetic results. [70]

Up to this point in the study we have considered only those elements of Hartmann's thought which will bear on the problem of gnoseological transcendence to be taken up in Part Two.

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(To be continued)

[67] Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 43: "... was sie als gegeben zusammenstellt, erhebt nicht den Anspruch auf objektive Realitaet, sondern nur auf Geltung als Phaenomen. Und eben das Phaenomen ist es, was die Theorie zu deuten hat."

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] *Ibid.,* p. 44: "Phaenomenologie darf das Metaphysische im Erkenntnisproblem herausarbeiten, sofern sie es als metaphysische Tatsache im Umkreis des ihr zugaenglichen Gegebenheitsbereiches vorfindet."

[70] Idem, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.,* I, p. 1!'!5: "... the experience of science teaches us to return again and again to the given in order to penetrate it, for the first grasps with which we embrace it are usually quite incomplete and inexact."

AN EVALUATION OF AVERROES' PARAPHRASE ON ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

Introduction

T SEEMS THAT Aristotle's *Poetics* is a work which looms in the consciousness of critics of every age, and notably from the latter half of the sixteenth century onwards/ As critics become better practiced in their profession, they either consult this work or start to discover Aristotle's poetic principles by their own analyses, and notably the principle of poetic coherence, from which they start to deduce that type of logic which should regulate artistic production in this domain.

As St. Thomas Aquinas and Averroes have said, [2] poetics is the last part of logic. It is not easy, however, to distinguish poetic logic from rhetorical logic, inasmuch as rhetoric uses poetic logic. This is why Aristotle gives poetic imitation as the first principle in the scientific analysis of poetics. [3] Although the rhetorician can speak epically, tragically, or comicly, and he can even use the metres of dithyrambic poetry, [4] the Stagirite clearly distinguishes the poetic arts from the realm of rhetoric. At the same time, he suggests a hierarchy among the poetic arts-a hierarchy which is readily recognized by anyone who knows that communication through words is better than communication through wordless sounds. Aristotle clarifies this hierarchy in the course of his treatise.

As we shall see in the course of this study, Averroes seems to have failed to grasp the clear distinction between the scopes proper to poetics and to rhetoric. Whether his misunderstand-

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[1] Namely, from the time of Jules-Cesar Scaliger, whose analysis of the Stagirite's *Poetics* occasioned the famous disputes of the seventeenth century.

[2] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Proemium in Commentarium Super Analytica Posteriora;* Averroes, *Paraphrases in Librum Poeticae Aristotelis,* chap. 7.

[3] *Poetics* 1447a 9-ll.

[4] Aristotle, *Rhetoric,* III, 10-12.

ing was peculiar to him or common among Arabians is a ques-
tion which can be resolved satisfactorily only by a complete
study of the Arabian tradition in this matter, notably from
Avicenna onwards. This study exceeds the scope of our
present investigation. However, since the text of the *Poetics*
as used by Averroes is obviously corrupt, [5] we should briefly
summarize three principles of textual corruption which can
be discerned in his treatise, namely, *fragmentation, corruption,*
and *correction.* By *fragmentation* we mean that a text is
culled from many incomplete sources. For example, after
the death of a famous teacher, his students may seek to
publish one of his tracts which was never fully typed. In
the search for other sources containing the missing parts of
this tract, they may come across scraps of paper on which
he wrote some of these parts or at least outlines of these por-
tions; and noting that even these sources do not yield all the
missing parts, they may look for notes which various students
took down in the course of classroom lectures, as well as for
those which other persons culled from other pertinent lectures.
If all these sources fail to afford a complete text, the students
may decide to use the notes or portions of published texts of
the teacher's successor to fill out the text. Many proposed
Aristotelian texts have been compiled from fragments as just
described and have been expurgated by the removal of ex-
traneous sources. By *corruption* [e] we mean that words of a
text have been changed *accidentally* inasmuch as, in copying
the text, a scribe has taken a word to be another word because
of ignorance concerning the language of the text, weariness, or
one of the many other sources of human fallibility. By *cor-*

[5] This corruption is testified also by Balmes, who made a sixteenth-century
translation of Averroes' *Paraphrase:* "ea quae praeter rationem conficta sunt: simi-
liter pernitiosa Averrois [sic!] non retulit, quare videtur diminutum, vel ut potius
corruptum textum videtur habuisse." (Cf. *Opera omnia Averrois,* Venice: 1560,
III, 16Sr.)

[6] Obviously the term "corruption" can be taken in two senses, namely, as
generally referring to the poor condition of a text, or as specifically referring to
the condition we describe here.

reotion we mean that the words of a text have been changed
purposely, either because a scribe, not understanding   these
words, substitutes other terms, or because, deeming the text
to be obscure as it stands, he takes words from a latter portion
of the text and substitutes them for the terms in an earlier
portion, or vice versa; or again the scribe may rearrange the
parts of the text. [7] We shall see that the text of the *Poetws*
as used by Averroes suffers from at least fragmentation   and
correction.

*   *   *   *

Establishment of an Aristotelian Text

   The prime purpose of textual criticism is to free a text from
all faults.   In addition to the foregoing three types of flaws,
we should mention also that defect which consists in produc-
ing a copy wherein marginal *soholia* added to a previous manu-
script or printed edition are incorporated into a text because
deemed to be a part thereof.   Although this flaw is not per-
ceptible in the copies of the Averroes text we shall use for this
study, it is a flaw which the critic must deem possible in the
texts he consults.

   Besides the common principles of textual criticism, however,
there is a doctrinal principle which is proper to the examina-
tion of Aristotelian texts, namely, the principle that a subject
matter must be considered in a manner which is proper to it,
that is, by the appropriate application of the general scientific
method of starting with common principles of that matter and
proceeding to its proper principles, so that, at the end of the
investigation, a definition of the subject matter is at hand. [8]
The practical application of this doctrinal principle in the
establishment of an Aristotelian text encounters rather insur-
mountable difficulties at times, as, for example, in the problem
of establishing the proper order of the eight books of the

   [7] As used here, the term *correction* is used abusively, that is, not in the sense
of what is necessarily a genuine emendation, but in the sense of what a scribe
deems to be a genuine emendation.

   [8] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics,* I, 33 (88b 15-!29); II, 8 (93a 1-93b 17).

Politics or the proper succession of the fourteen books con-
stituting the extant text of Aristotle's treatise on metaphysics. [9]
At other times, as, for example, in establishing the order of the
parts of the *Poetics,* the problem is far less difficult, as long as
one understands the general principle and the special applica-
tion of this principle as Aristotle delineates this application in
the first statement of the *Poetics.*[10]

An objection can be raised against the last statement inas-
much as the cited general principle pertains especially to trea-
tises in which demonstrative argumentation is involved. [11] Yet
logical analysis does not prove by demonstrative argumenta-
tion, it only reports what actually happens in logical proce-
dures. This objection would be valid if the general principle
could not be applied analogically to logical treatises. In fact,
such analogical application is valid since, although logical trea-
tises do not demonstrate by argumentation, they do present
the evidence of what happens in logical procedures; and this
evidence suffices for a valid application of the general principle.

As regards this application, it should be noted that the sub-

• While recognizing the strictly textual difficulties cited by the textual critics,
the doctrinal critic need not put his own conclusions into complete conformity with
those of the textual critic. For example, the textual critic may deny that the
extant "text" of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is a text, his denial being based upon
grammatical and stylistic discrepancies. The doctrinal critic, who is more con-
cerned about the requisites for the proper analysis of subject matter than about
literary coherence, may hold that this extant "text" is a genuine text. The
textual critic is especially concerned about grammatical coherence, the doctrinal
critic about logical coherence. On the basis of this difference, there is a distinc-
tion between the questions: "What is Aristotle's complete text on metaphysics?"
and "What is the complete text on metaphysics as Aristotle planned it and as he
fulfilled his plan either by producing a succession of tracts or by producing vari-
ous tracts, each tract fulfilling some part of his plan?" The former question would
concern the textual critic, the latter question the doctrinal critic. Both critics
should recognize the principles of each type of criticism and the limitations of
each set of principles, as well as that the textual critic frequently needs the help
of the doctrinal critic, and vice versa. For example, the doctrinal critic can tell
the textual critic that the successive parts of a planned text need not be fulfilled
in chronological order or in one coherent literary style; the textual critic can help
the doctrinal critic by indicating the problems anent the history of various texts.

[10] 1447a 4-8.

[11] Cf. note no. 8.

ject matter for a logical treatise is a second-intention logical
whole, whereas the subject matter for a scientific treatise, in
the strict sense of the expression " scientific treatise," is a first-
intention logical whole, a generic subject the species of which
really exist.   As we have seen, the verification of the subject
matter for poetics, namely, poetic imitation, is not easy, since
poetic imitation seems to be a part of rhetorical imitation.   Yet
Aristotle shows that poetic imitation is only an accidental part
of rhetorical imitation by introducing arts which have a closer
and direct formal relation with those arts which are used in
rhetorical imitation   (namely, musical arts, which are more
directly related with tragic and comic speech than the latter
are with rhetorical imitation) .

Our foregoing consideration enables us to appreciate another
doctrinal principle relative to the establishment of an Aris-
totelian text, namely, that fragments which are clearly not a
part of one text (since they have no formal relation with the
subject matter of that text) can be the parts of other texts.
At times what is contained in these fragments may indicate
the subject matter or matters which would serve as the spring-
board for another treatise (or other treatises).   The establish-
ment of order within a text, of course, is by the formal con-
tinuity (grammatical   or logical, or both grammatical   and
logical) of the textual parts.

Now for many centuries before the time of Averroes, scholars
working on Greek texts had been using these principles for
establishing Aristotelian texts, [12] and it is probable that St.

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[12] Possibly the most famous example of this work is the extant text of Aris-
totle's *Metaphysics.*   As St. Thomas Aquinas shows *(Super Metaphysica Aris-*
totelis) , this text has a *logical* coherence befitting the demands for the scientific
analysis of the subject of metaphysics.   Alexander *(515,* !'l0) and Asclepius (4, 9)
suggest that Eudemus was the contemporary of Aristotle who combined what are
at least apparently many tracts of the Stagirite (at least one of which seems to
comprise notes which Pasicles, a nephew of Eudemus, took on a lecture or series
of lectures presented by Aristotle), to form the cited extant text, which may have
received the philosopher's own approval.   Whether the compiler was Eudemus or
someone else, the result indicates an outstanding grasp of the Stagirite's method,
as well as of the subject matter of metaphysics-and   this despite the problems

Thomas Aquinas was applying these norms when he discovered the faults in the extant Latin translations of these texts and asked William of Moerbeke to provide new translations. [13] It can even be said that one of the gauges for excellence in Aristotelian scholarship is the ability to apply these doctrinal norms, along with the principles common to every critical study of texts. In this context, the following praise which Balmes lavishes upon Averroes is faint praise indeed: "Hence, as I judge the matter, the authority, rather than any ignominy, of Averroes shines forth. Not understanding the mind of Aristotle, he adds to the art other matters which Aristotle did not consider, as though, being another Aristotle, Averroes himself becomes an authority when he stops imitating" the Stagirite. [14] If Averroes did not understand what the text reported Aristotle as saying, he should have investigated whether the text he had at hand really represented the Stagirite's teaching. If this investigation yielded a positive verification, he should have restudied the principles and previous sections of the *Poetics.* In any event, we can already see that Averroes' paraphrase falls short of the demands for a genuine commentary.

Status of Aristotle's Text on the Poetics in Medieval Europe

Inasmuch as Averroes produced his *Paraphrase* during the latter half of the twelfth century, and it underwent its first Latin translation in the year 1256, we do well to study the status of Aristotle's text in Western Europe up to the time when this translation first appeared, as well as during the subsequent centuries, up to the time when another Latin translation, namely, that of Abraham de Balmes, was published at Venice (1560).

about grammatical coherence. (Cf. *Aristotle: The Metaphysics,* with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick, M.A. [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961], Introduction, xxxi-xxxiii.)

[13] Cf. Grabmann, M., *Guglielmo di Moerbeke, 0. P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele. Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae,* XI. Rome: Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1946, 68-72.

u Cf. *Opera omnia Averrois,* Venice: 1560, III, 168r.

The *Poetics* is not found among the translations of Aris-
totelian texts which had been attributed to Boethius, nor has
any pre-Moerbeke   Greek-to-Latin   version been unearthed.
Furthermore,   Greek versions of this text were at best uncom-
mon in university circles. So, until March 17,   when
Herman the German completed his Latin translation   of an
Arabic version as cited by Averroes in his *Paraphrase,* Aris-
totle's work on this subject was not commonly known in
Europe.   The widespread influence of the Averroes *Paraphrase,*
however, is testified by the number and dates of extant manu-
scripts of Herman's

Herman says that he turned away from the work of trans-
lating a complete Arabic version of the Stagirite's text because
of difficulties relevant to " the differences between the Greek
system of metres and the Arabian," the obscurity of Aristotle's
terms, and other causes. After mentioning that he found it
easier to translate Averroes' account of the Aristotelian text,
he compares Averroes with Cicero and says that, just as a grasp

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[15] The fact that Herman completed his translation in Toledo on March 17,
1256 is verified at the end of the Paris National Library manuscript lat. 16709,
fl'. 2r-28v, as well as at the end of the Vatican Chisiani manuscript E. VIII, 254,
fl'. 58r-67V.

[16] The Paris National Library manuscript lat. 16678 (fl'. 15F-172r) and the
Vatican Chisiani manuscript E. VIII, 254 (fl'. 58r-67V) are surely of the thirteenth
century.   The Saint-Omer Municipal Library manuscript 598 (fl'. 142v-186r), the
Paris National Library manuscript lat. 16709 (fl'. 2r-28v), and the Erfurt Civic
Library manuscript Ampl., Octavo 16 (fl'. 1-16) have been traced to the late-thir-
teenth or early-fourteenth century.   Established as having been produced during
the fourteenth century are the Vatican Urbinates manuscript lat. 221 (fl'. 178r-184v),
the Erfurt Civic Library manuscript Ampl., Fol. 85 (fl'. 22r-29r) , the Leipzig Uni-
versity Library manuscript 1388 (fl'. 156'-168r), the Wolfenbiittel Ducal Library
manuscripts 488. Helmst (fl'. 170V-176V) and 598. Helmst (fl'. 150r-159v), the
Madrid Palace Library manuscript 259 (or 2055) (fl'. 68r-77V), and the Madrid
National Library manuscript 1418 (fl'. 114r-124v).   The following are manuscripts
the dating of which has been traced to the late-fourteenth   or early-fifteenth cen-
tury: Paris University Library 1032 (fl'. 167r-17F); Valencia Chapter Library 82
(or 70) (fl'. 83lr-347r); Naples National Library, Vindob. 8160 (or Martini 57)
(fl'. 252r-254V); and Krakow Jagellonian Library, 502 (fl'. 315r-325r).   Of the
twenty-four available manuscript copies of Herman's translation, the Leningrad
Public Library manuscript Class. lat. Q. 8 (fl'. F-28r) is an Italian copy produced
in the year 1480, and therefore seems to be the most recent.

of Cicero\; *Rhetoric* helps one grasp Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* so Averroes helps one understand the Stagirite's *Poetics.* [17] Both parts of the comparison, of course, are highly questionable, as also is the placing of Averroes on the same level as Cicero. [18]

Among the excuses Herman offers for not translating a full Arabic text of the *Poetics,* the one based upon the obscurity of the Stagirite's terms seems the most plausible. Yet this very excuse calls into question the validity of the Aristotelian text as cited in the *Paraphrase.* If Averroes' citations were easier to translate than was the Arabic version Herman had at hand, were the citations taken from the Arabic version? Possibly Averroes made his citations from another Arabic version? Or possibly Averroes revised an Arabic version to conform to his understanding of the Aristotelian text, so that this revision would embrace also a change in the Stagirite's terms? If these alternatives are excluded, why it is that, apparently at least, Herman did not take up the work of translating a complete Arabic version after completing his work on the *Paraphrase?* The answer to this last question may lie in the rather obscure phrase " and other causes." At the time he wrote the introduction to his translation, he seems to have been satisfied with the portions of the *Poetic.'?*upon which Averroes comments. [19]

Some day specialists in the field of *Aristoteles arabwus* may be able to provide answers for the textual difficulties we have raised, as well as for the problems about the Arabian manu-

[17] "Postquam cum non modico Iabore consummaveram translationem rethorice Aristotelis, volens manum mittere ad eius poetriam, tantam inveni difficultatem propter disconvenientiam modi metrificandi in greco cum modo metrificandi in arabico, et propter vocabulorum obscuritatem et propter alias causas, quod non sum confisus me posse sane et integre i!lius operis translationem studiis tradere latinorum. Assumpsi ergo editionem Averrois determinativam dicti operis Aristotelis, secundum quod ipse aliquid intelligibile eliceret ab ipso, et modo quo potui in eloquium redegi latinum. Et nonnullum conferet intelligendi adiutorium ea que in hoc libro sunt intellectus poetrie oratii [sic!] sicut intellectus rethoricarum Tullii Ciceronis adlimans est ad intelligendum negocium Aristotilicale rethorice."

[18] Apparently Herman generally deemed that at least these two Aristotelian tracts are not directly approachable.

[19] "Assumpsi ergo editionem Averrois determinativam dicti operis Aristotelis, secundum quod ipse aliquid intelligible eliceret ab ipso."

script tradition concerning the *Paraphrase.* Surely the con-
formity of doctrine and order between the Latin translations
made respectively by Herman and Balmes indicates a common
source for the Arabic text used by the former and the Hebrew
version used by the latter.   Apparently, however, the Hebrew
version used by Balmes has some corruptions.   For example,
whereas Herman's translation has the clear indication of the
citation of Aristotle's words by an introductory *"Aristoteles
dixit,"* Balmes' version has no indication whatsoever, or, at
best, merely the term " *Dixit."* [20] There is no doubt that the
Stagirite's text, *as Averroes cites it,* is corrupt. [21] But, again,
whether he accurately cites the Arabic text upon which he
bases his paraphrase, or selects and combines phrases from this
text in keeping with his plan, is a problem which can be re-
solved only by the discovery and analysis of the Arabic text
in question.   At any rate, a comparison between Averroes' cita-
tions and a critically established Greek text of the *Poetics*
readily manifests the distortions in the former.

  As we have previously noted, the most valid argument in
favor of Herman's avoiding the work of translating the Arabic

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[20] For example, in the first chapter, Herman's translation reads: "Dixit Aris-
toteles. Propositum quidem nostrum nunc est loqui in arte poetica, et in modis
poematum, etc.," whereas, without any indication of citation, Balmes' version
reads: "Nostra intentio in presenti, est loqui de arte poetica, et de speciebus
poematum."   Later, in the same chapter of the *Paraphrase,* Balmes' translation
reads: "Dixit.   Et sicut homines naturaliter, etc."

[21] This fact will become very clear in the course of our study.   For the present,
let us compare the first part of this text as it is found in the *Paraphrase* and as it
is found in the Greek-to-Latin translation made by William of Moerbeke.   "Propo-
situm quidem nostrum nunc est loqui in arte poetica, et in modis poematum.   Et
quia eum qui vult ut canones qui dantur in hanc artem procedant processu debito,
dicendum primitus quid agat unaqueque maneries poetica. Et ex quibus con-
stituuntur sermones poetici. Et quot sunt modi intentionum intentarum per
sermones poeticos et quod ut ponat sermonem suum in toto isto incipiendo a primis
que nobis naturaliter sunt in hac intentione: dixit. Omne itaque poema et omnis
oratio poetica aut est vituperatio, aut est laudatio. Et hoc patet per inductionem
poematum" *(Paraphrase).*   "De poetica ipsaque et speciebus ipsius, quam vir-
tutem habet, et quomodo oportet constituere fabulas si debeat bene habere poesis,
adhuc autem ex quot et qualibus est partibus, similiter autem et de aliis quecumque
sunt eiusdem methodi, dicamus incipientes secundum naturam primo a primis.-
Epopoiia itaque et que tragodie poesis, etc."   (Moerbeke translation.)

text he had at hand seems to have been the difficulty he
encountered in the terminology-not necessarily Aristotle's own
terminology, but *this terminology as translated into Arabic.* [22]
Witelo, a close friend of William of Moerbeke, contrasts the
difficulty of Arabic verbosity with what he calls *implicatio
Graeca,* that is, the subtlety of thought which the Greek
thinkers implied in their verbal paucity. [23] Indeed, one can
safely say that any person lacking an intimate knowledge of
Greek (that is, a knowledge far exceeding the limitations of
classroom training) is apt to miss this subtlety. In this con-
text, the Greek-to-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Poetics* which
William completed in Viterbo on March 1, 1278 [24] takes on
special importance. Having spent some years in the Dominican
convents located respectively in Nicea and Thebes, [25] William
gained that knowledge of Greek which results from daily usage;
and although the Greek of the Middle Ages differed consider-
ably from that used by the Stagirite, the recognition of the
subtleties in medieval Greek was of inestimable help towards
accurate translation of Aristotle's terms. In fact, his recogni-
tion of the subtleties in the text is of considerable help towards
our own reading of the critically established text, despite the
lacunae in his translation and the occasional inaccuracies re-
sulting from these *lacunae.* [26] The style William achieved has

[22] This problem is suggested by the contrast between *poema* (as found in Her-
man's translation) and *poesis* (as found in Moerbeke's translation).

[23] Cf. Witelo's letter to William, in which the former makes this observation:
"Libros itaque veterum tibi super hoc negotio perquirenti occurrit taedium verbosi-
tatis Arabicae, implicationis Graecae, paucitas quoque exarationis Latinae" (cited
by Grabmann, *op. cit.,* 59).

[24] Since William's translation was completed almost four years after the death
of St. Thomas Aquinas, we can readily understand why there is no indication of
any project the saint may have had concerning a commentary on this Aristotelian
tract.

[25] Cf. Grabmann, M., *op. cit.,* 36-41.

[26] An example of such an inaccuracy occurs in the first chapter, where William
translates *;Jv nva. ovva.p,w i!lCa.crTov* as "quam virtutem habet" (with an
apparent reference to " poetica ") instead of " quam virtutem habet unaquaeque
species [poetical," possibly because the term *i!Ka.<rTov* may have been missing from
the Greek manuscript he was using.

the facility and piquancy of Aquinian Latin.   The Greek text
he used seems not to conform completely with the critical
editions established in modern times, but it seems to have been
derived, rather closely, from the Aristotelian prototype. [27]

The presence of only two manuscripts of the Moerbeke trans-
lation [28] seems to indicate that it was not sufficiently diffused
to help avoid the Renaissance divorce of the poetic arts from
one another and from their respective order to the whole scope
of poetic imitation-a divorce apparently justified by Averroes'
misrepresentation of Aristotle's teaching on this subject. The
Greek-to-Latin translations achieved respectively by George
Valla of Piacenza on September 30, 1498, and Alexander Paccio
of Florence during the following half-century (and published
in the third volume of the Venetian *Opera omnia Averrois* in
1560), came too late to stem this rift and its ensuing conflict.

*   *   *   *   *

Evaluation of Averroes' Paraphrase

Our investigation about the status of Aristotle's *Poetics* in
medieval Europe has provided some of the sources needed for
an accurate evaluation of the *Paraphrase.* Inasmuch as the
Arabic text translated by Herman seems to have been more
reliable than the Hebrew version translated by Balmes (and
Mantini [29]), we shall use Herman's translation as a more basic

[27] Cf. *Aristoteles Latinus* XXXIII: *De arte poetica,* Guillelmo de Moerbeke
interprete.   Edidit Erse Valgimigli; reviserunt praefatione indicibusque instruxerunt
Aetius Franceschini et Laurentius Minio-Paluello.   Bruges-Paris: Desclee de Brou-
wer, 1953, xii-xviii. As regards the internal evidence of William's authorship of
this translation, cf. also Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Guglielmo di Moerbeke tradut-
tore della *Poetica* di Aristotele (1!l78)," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica,* XXXIX
(1947), 1-17.

[28] Toledo Chapter Library 47.10 (fl'. 75r-9ov), written about the year 1!l80; and
Eton College Library 1!l9 (ff. 194v-eo6v), the better of the two texts, which was
produced by an Italian scribe about the year 1300.

[29] Antonio Poso, the editor of Balmes' translation of the *Paraphrase,* cites
variants from Mantini in the cited Venetian *Opera omnia Averrois.* Franceschini
and Minio-Paluello *(Aristoteles Latinus,* XXXIII, xv) list Mantini's translation as
correlative with that by Balmes (both from a Hebrew text) in their table of

source, [30] the Balmes and Mantini versions as secondary. Because of its fidelity to the Greek text of the *Poetics,* we shall use the Moerbeke translation as a basic referential version, with consultation of modern critical editions of the Greek text as required. [31]

Here we do well to recall the logical context of the *Poetics.* Being not only the last part of the whole of logic, but more accurately the last part of material logic, in the order of analysis, [32] the *Poetics* shares with the *Posterior Analytics,* the *Topics,* and *Rhetoric* the characteristic of being a treatise on a special type of argumentation. Thus, just as we speak of demonstrative argumentation, dialectical argumentation, and rhetorical argumentation, so we can speak about poetic argumentation, or what Aristotle calls "poiesis." [33]

Like the other types of argumentation, poetics has its own general procedure, or what is analogous to procedure as found in the superior types of argumentation. In this regard, there is a subtle, but very important difference between the phrases " *how* stories must be constructed if poetic argumentation is to thrive " (Moerbeke) and " *on what basis* stories must be con-

stemmas of manuscript traditions anent the *Poetics.* Otherwise, little seems to be known about Mantini.

[80] The manuscript copies of Herman's translation are distinguished as they offer the *editio longior* or the *editio brevior.* Since the two Paris National Library manuscripts (lat. 1663 and 16709) are very good copies offering the *editio longior,* we shall rely especially upon these copies.

[81] Although the modern critical editions of the Greek text are not necessarily superior to the text Wiiliam used, they serve to corroborate William's translation and are of considerable help towards filling the *lacunae* in this translation.

[82] Although poetics is the first type of material logic to be used, it is the last type to be analyzed, since the intelligibility of poetic logic is derived primarily from demonstrative logic.

[88] Moerbeke and Paccio preserve the Greek term in translation: " quomodo oportet constituere fabulas si debeat bene habere *poesis,* adhuc autem ex quot et qualibus est partibus" (Moerbeke); "quo pacto, ut recte *poesis* se habeat, componi fabulas oporteat" (Paccio). The corrupt citation made by Averroes has substituted terms which, in this case, make the argumentative character of poetics more explicit: "Et quot sunt modi *intentionum* intentarum per sermones poeticos" (Herman) ; " et quot sint species *intentionum* quas orationes poeticae intendunt " (Balmes); "et quot sint species *rationum* quas orationes poeticae intendunt" (Mantini).

structed so that poetic argumentation may be correctly estab-
lished" (Paccio) on the one hand, and, on the other, "And
since he who wants the *canons* given for this art to proceed in
a proper way" (Herman) and" Now he who wants the *rules*
which [Aristotle] will present, to have an appropriate measure
in their application" (Balmes) . The difference lies in the dis-
tinction of emphasis upon the investigative character of the
Poetics ("how " and " *on what basis")* or a quasi-preceptive
characteristic. It is true that the Herman and Balmes transla-
tions preserve the investigative character by going on to say
that the person seeking the proper application of the canons or
rules must learn such fundamentals as the action and elements
of each poetic type. [84] But, whereas the Greek texts used by
Moerbeke and Paccio represent Aristotle's aim under the aspect
of argumentation itself (" bene habere poesis " and " ut recte
poesis se habeat ") , Averroes' citation in his *Paraphrase,* as
translated by Herman and Balmes, seems to emphasize a regu-
lative aspect which may conceptually pertain to this aim
 (" procedant processu debito" and" observent rectum modum
usus ") , but which, as we shall see, actually limits it.

   This difference has an important bearing upon the question
of whether Aristotle deems the Greek types of poetics to be
exhaustive types of valid poetic argumentation or whether the
considerations he offers in the *Poetics* are applicable to judg-
ments about the validity or invalidity of poetic types dis-
covered after his time (e. g. the plays of T. S. Eliot, Claudel,
and Fry; the operas of Wagner and Puccini). If Aristotle's aim
directly concerns the validity of the poetic argument, then his

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[34] "Et quia eum qui vult ut canones qui dantur in hanc artem procedant
processu debito, dicendum primitus quid agat unaqueque maneries poetica, et ex
quibus constituuntur sermones poetici, et quot sunt modi intentionum intentarum
per sermones poeticos " (Herman); " lam autem expedit illi, qui vult ut regulae,
quas traditurus est [Aristoteles], observent rectum modum usus, quod primo
aedi[s]cat quam actionem habeat unaquaeque species fabularum, et ex quibus
constent poeticae orationes; et ex quot rebus constituantur, et quae sunt ipsarum
partes quibus constant et communes et propriae; et quot sine species intentionum
quas orationes poeticae intendunt, et quod totum suum sermonem de his instituat
ex principiis, quae nobis naturaliter insunt circa hoc negocium" (Balmes).

treatise has a universality of truth which exceeds the precise scopes of the Greek poets he cites and is, therefore, applicable to types discovered after his time. 1£, however, his aim directly concerns the application of the canons or laws selected by Averroes, then his treatise takes on the restriction imposed by this selection. [35]

Actually this problem arises because Averroes chooses to explain Aristotle's doctrine on the basis of what he terms "universal rules which are pertinent to all peoples, or the greater number of them," and this because, according to him, " very much of what is contained in this book consists of canons which are proper to the poems [of the Greeks] and their expertise in them." [36] Averroes, then, chooses to comment only on those segments of the *Poetics* which seem to offer what he calls " universal rules . . . pertinent to all peoples " *in keeping with his own verification of these "rules" in Arabic usage.* We may well inquire as to how he arrives at the conclusion that only the Greeks were cognizant of many of the matters he excludes from his paraphrase. At any rate, by deciding to judge the *Poetics* in the light of what he deems to be the " universal rules " contained therein, Averroes already substitutes another investigative principle for the principle offered by the Stagirite. As we shall see, this substitution is only one of the elements whereby he reduces the full scope of Aristotle's treatise.

<p align="center">*   *   *   *</p>

[35] Taken out of context, Balmes' reading "he who wants the rules ... to have an appropriate measure in their application " can be interpreted as meaning that one should not apply the rules beyond the precise scopes of the poetic types mentioned by Aristotle.

[36] As regards the second part of this introduction, the respective translations of Herman and Balmes vary considerably, although it is not necessary here to determine which, if either, is the correct translation: "Cum plurimum eius quod est in hoc libro aut sunt canones proprii poematibus ipsorum et consuetudini ipsorum in ipsis, aut non sunt reperta in sermone Arabum, aut sunt reperta in aliis ydiomatibus " (Herman); " cum multae earum que sunt ibi: sunt regulae non propriae poematibus Arabum, cum tamen utantur illis" (Balmes). Herman's version seems more in keeping with what Witelo terms "Arabian verbosity." (Cf. note

Having studied the differentiation of aim as presented re-
spectively by the Greek text of the *Poetics* and the Herman and
Balmes translations of the *Paraphrase,* let us now examine an
important differentiation in *the list of matters to be investi-
gated.*   The Greek text lists the following as matters to be
studied: (1) the poetic art itself and its species; (2) the
cogency of each species [37]; (8) the requisites for the composi-
tion of a plot; (4) the number and quality of the parts of this
art; and (5) whatever else pertains to the same method or
discipline. [38]

As regards the translations of the *Paraphrase,* Herman,
Balmes, and Mantini list (1) and (2) as distinct. Herman
combines (8) and (4), whereas Balmes and Mantini mention
them in a rather confused manner. [39]   All three translators
represent the text of the *Paraphrase* as making a substitution
for (5). The doctrinal concordance on this substitution [40]
seems to indicate that Averroes lacked a text mentioning that
other matters beside.<; the foregoing pertain to this investiga-
tion, or that he purposely put aside Aristotle's method and
substituted a method of his own. At any rate, his presenta-
tion is a considerable reduction of the scope of the *Poetics.* [41]

This reduction is testified also in Averroes' redactions of the

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[87] In this regard, Moerbeke most accurately translates the term *Mva.p.tv* as
" *virtutem,"* whereas Paccio's version has " *facultatem."*   Herman's text has *"quid
agat,"* and both Balmes and Mantini translate the Hebrew-substituted word as
"actionem."

[88] *ITep! 'II"Ot'}TtKfjs a.vrfis re Ka.l TWV el6wv avrfis, ijv Ttva Mva.p.tv   lx;et, Ka.!
7rws 6ei <Tvvl<Tra.<T0a.t rovs p.Movs el p.lX"Aet Ka"Aws   lJ 'II'Ol'J<Tts,   6e tK 7l"6<Twv Ka.!
'll"olwv t<Tr! p.oplwv, op.olws |Je Kal 7rep! TWV lL"A"Awv lS<Ta; rfis   a;vrfis t<TTt p.e066ov* •••
(1447a 1) (Text based upon Vahlen's third edition Leipzig, 1885 and presented by
W. Hamilton Fyfe in *Aristotle: The Poetics.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1960, p. 4).

[39] " et ex quibus constituuntur sermones poetici " (Herman); "et ex quibus
constent poeticae orationes; et ex quot rebus constituantur, et quae sunt ipsarum
partes quibus constent et communes et propriae " (Balmes, Mantini) .

[40] "et quot sunt modi intentionum intentarum per sermones poeticos " (Herman);
"et quot sint species intentionum quas orationes poeticae intendunt" (Balmes);
"et quot sint species rationum quas orationes poeticae intendunt" (Mantini).

•• The reduction of this scope precludes any consideration of the *Paraphrase* as
being a summary of the *Poetics.*

previous segments in the aforementioned list. As regards the first segment (I), the Greek text speaks *of the poetic art;* Averroes represents the Stagirite as speaking of the species (or modes) *of poems.* [42] Averroes, however, uses the term" poem" in its strictest sense, as meaning the extensive or short work of versification; this is evidenced in the fact that, in his declaration of the first natural principle o£ this investigation, he couples " poem " with " poetic phrase." [43] Anent the second segment (2), the difference between Herman's reading, "what is accomplished in each poetic *manner,"* and the Balmes-Mantini translation, "and what action is possessed by each *species of stories,"* is important, not because o£ the grammatical distinction between "manner" and "species" (since *"maneries"* can be taken in the sense whereby we refer to a manner or type of speech, and therefore to be identical with " *species")* , but because o£ the distinction between the more universal term "poetic" and the less universal word "stories." Inasmuch as Herman's translation seems to be the more faithful representation o£ Averroes' thought, we should prefer his reading; and on this basis we cannot argue to any restriction of Aristotle's teaching here.

Despite the confused status o£ the translations o£ Averroes' citations anent segments (3) and (4), we can note the £act that the expressions *"sermones poetici* " (Herman) and *"poeticae orationes* " (Balmes, Mantini) must be counterbalanced to the Greek-text distinction between "plot" and the reference to parts of *the whole poetic art.* Whereas the expressions

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[42] · Propositum quidem nostrum nunc est loqui in arte poetica, et in *modis poernatum"* (Herman); "Nostra intentio in presenti, est loqui de arte poetica, et de *8peciebus poematum* " (Balmes, Mantini) .

[43] Thus the contrast between the term " *carmen* " in Balmes' translation and the use of the word *"poesis"* in the Mantini version does not alter the fact that by "poem" Averroes means "the whole of which a poetic phrase is an integral part," whether the whole in question is represented by "poem," *"carmen,"* or *"poesis"* " Omne itaque poema et onmis oratio poetica aut est vituperatio aut est laudatio " (Herman) ; " Omne itaque carmen et omnis poetica oratio, est circa vituperationem, aut laudem" (Balmes); "Omnis itaque poesis et omnis poetica oratio, est circa vituperationem, aut laudem " (Mantini) .

traceable to Averroes' text refer to the integral parts of a poem, the term " plot " refers to the chief guiding element in a poetic work as the expression " poetic work " embraces drama, music, and the other arts Aristotle mentions later; and the universality indicated in the reference to " the whole poetic art " exceeds the somewhat limited universality signified in the Arabian-derived expressions.

By way of summary, we may say that, up to this point in our study, we have discovered two principles whereby Averroes seems to limit the scope of the *Poetics,* namely, the substitution of a quasi-preceptive aim for the Stagirite's investigative aim, and the substitution of the poem (taken as indicated) and the poetic phrase for Aristotle's more universal indications of subject matter.

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *   *</p>

The Discipline (or Method) of the Poetics Replaced by Another Discipline (or Method)?

The verbal changes connoting a limitation of Aristotle's scope have suggested that Averroes may have changed the very discipline (or method) of the *Poetics.* This suggestion is corroborated especially by the fact that *Averroes substitutes another first principle of investigation for the p1inciple cited by the Stagirite.* Aristotle states the following as his principle: "The epic and tragic poetry, as well as comedy and dithyrambic poetry, and, for the most part, flute and zither playing, are all, taken as a whole, imitations." [44] Averroes states his principle in this way: " Every poem and every poetic phrase is either vituperation or praise." [45]

[••] *Poetics* 1447a 9-11.

[45] "dixit. Omne itaque poema et omnis oratio poetica aut est vituperatio aut est laudatio " (Herman): "Omne itaque carmen et omnis poetica oratio, est circa vituperationem, aut laudem" (Balmes). That Averroes is actually substituting another principle for Aristotle's principle is evident from Herman's introductory *"dixit"* (which sets off Averroes' statements from the foregoing citation), as well as from what immediately follows in the *Paraphrase* upon the statement of principle: " And this is manifested through the induction of poems, and properly of

Here the question arises as to whether there are at least two natural first principles £or the investigation o£ poetics, so that the principle proposed by Averroes would be as valid as, more valid than, or less valid than the principle proposed by the Stagirite, yet, also as regards the last alternative, directly in line with the investigation in question. Or does Averroes, in £act, submit as a principle something which directly falls within the scope o£ another discipline, as, £or example, the logical discipline represented by Aristotle's *Rhetoric?* If this last possibility is verified, then there is no need £or trying to verify the alternatives concerning a possible direct relation with the scope o£ the *Poetics,* since one and the same proper principle cannot pertain directly to two disciplines.

The last possibility is, in £act, verified in the course o£ the *Rhetoric,* since, properly considered, vituperation and praise are rhetorical functions. [46] It is true that a poet may compose vituperative or laudatory verses, but he does this within a scope which exceeds his own scope as a poet, namely, the scope o£ the persuader or rhetorician. As a poet he represents human actions which the audience *may* and, i£ they have attained the capacity £or rhetorical reasoning, *should* vituperate or praise; but vituperation and praise themselves are beyond the precise scope o£ poetic argumentation. Aristotle preserves this fine distinction between the respective scopes o£ rhetoric and poetics when he says: "Now since those producing an imitation imitate persons in action, the latter must be either good or depraved (£or morals always differ in this way, inasmuch as all persons are morally distinguished according to malice or virtue) , or better or worse than us, or just as we are." [47] Averroes clearly transfers this consideration to the context o£ rhetoric when he says:

their poems [i. e. of the Greeks], which concern voluntary matters, that is, the good and the shameful." (Translation made from Herman's Arabic-to-Latin version.)

•• Aristotle, *Rhetoric,* I. 9.
"*Poetics* 1448a 1-4.

Moreover, from the fact that, through this art, those who repre-
sent and assimilate aim at instigating (persons) to certain actions
which are voluntary, and at discouraging them from performing
certain actions, what they intend through representations are neces-
sarily either virtues or vices; for every action and every practice
concerns only one of these, namely, virtue or vice. Necessarily, then,
good and virtuous producers of representations must represent only
virtues and virtuous persons, evil producers of representations must
imitate evil persons. And since every assimilation and representa-
tion occurs only with a view to illustrating what is becoming or
what is unbecoming, evidently the aim of these representations is
only the pursuit of what is suitable and the refutation of what is
shameful. For, to represent virtues, the former, namely, those who
have a like inclination towards that which they produce in their
representations, must be more virtuous and better; and those who
represent moral evils, must be worse than the former and closer
to moral evils. And from these moral differences between men
there result praise and vituperation, that is, the praise of the good
and the vituperation of the evil. And for this reason some poets
are good in praising, but not in vituperating, whereas others are
good in vituperating, but not in praising. Finally, these two dif-
ferences, namely, the approval of what is becoming and the detesta-
tion of the shameful, must be present in every assimilation. How-
ever, these two differences are found only in assimilation and repre-
sentation achieved through words, not in representation attained
through metre or in harmonic representation. 48

Averroes' transfer of the whole of poetics to the realm of
rhetoric is more evident when he claims that the *sole* aim of
poetics is moral doctrine, than when he refers to praise and
vituperation as *resulting from* poetic representation. The latter
remark can be taken in the proper Aristotelian perspective
whereby poetics, as a lesser material logic, has an order to
rhetoric as to a greater material logic. As regards the former
point, however, poetic representation involves much more than
human acts as praiseworthy or blameworthy, notably in the

•s *Paraphrase,* chap. 2. The English translation offered here is derived from
Herman's Arabic-to-Latin translation. The Balmes and Mantini versions differ
from the foregoing only in the substitution of synonyms (such as " *probos"* for
" *bonos,"* " *improbos* " for *"malos,"* " *commendatio* " for " *laudatio* ") and in speak-
ing of the poet's *natural* inclination to virtue or vice.

case of drama, which represents human acts not only as acts of an individual, but also as acts having social consequences; and, within the scope of the order to moral science, there is the presentation of circumstances which may augment or diminish the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the individual human act. Inasmuch as the circumstances represented involve also natural truths, poetic has an order also to the natural sciences, as well as an accidental order to mathematics, inasmuch as the metres and harmonies entailed promote perfection in the knowledge of mathematics.

Now Averroes seems to have been conscious of the fact that poetic works can represent the truths of the natural sciences, inasmuch as he goes on to speak about three differences he discerns in representation through words: (I) an assimilation through which only the similarity between two things (namely, the representation and the object it represents) is attained, without any indication of what is morally good or evil; the clear representation of what is morally good; and (3) the strong representation of evil. He takes the first type of representation to be, as it were, the matter which is adaptable to the second and third types. After citing Homer and unnamed Arabian poets as examples of producers of the latter types, he speaks of other Arabian poets who represent only natural truths. [49]

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[49] " Et in assimilatione que fit per sermonem inveniuntur tres differentie. Et est assimilatio per quam intenditur convenientia assimilati cum suo assimilabili, preter ostensionem aliquam decentis, aut turpis, sed solum intenditur ipsamet convenientia: Et hec assimilationis species est quasi materia apta ad hoc ut alteretur, seu permutetur ad utramque duarum extremitatum, scilicet, assimilantur interdum ad ostensionem decentie, valde experimendo ipsam. Et interdum permutatur ad ostensionem alicuius turpitudinis, similiter valde experimendo ipsam. dixit. Et ista fuit via Homeri. Videtur quod ipse procedebat in suis assimilationibus per convenientiam experimens decentiam et turpitudinem. Et quorundam poetarum bona opera consistit penes convenientiam tantum. Et quorundam penes ostensionem decentie et turpitudinis. Et quorundam penes coniunctionem utrorumque fit, ut Homeri. Et ipse scilicet Aristoteles ponit exempla de quali manerie morum per poetas, qui fuerint in tempore ipsorum famosi seu notorii, et in legibus ipsorum. Et per usum cuiusque maneriei istarum trium manerierum assimilationum. Et tibi non erit difficile invenire exempla in poematibus Arabum, licet plura ipsorum

The reference to the representation of a mere similarity as
being, as it were, the material substratum for moral representa-
tion is important since it seems to indicate that, when Averroes
says that " every assimilation and representation occurs only
with a view to illustrating what is becoming or what is unbe-
coming," he means that this is the sole *principal* aim.   In
this context, his implied teaching that the first type of repre-
sentation is ordered to the latter types as matter to form (and,
therefore, as matter to its end) seems to be in keeping with
what Aristotle implies when he says: " **...** those producing
an imitation represent persons in action, and the latter must
be either good or depraved," namely, that persons in action
which is moral, or human acts, constitute the prime object of
poetic representation.   This consideration enables us to see the
status of Averroes' grasp of poetics with greater precision.
Having the contents of the whole of the *Paraphrase* in view,
we can say that, although the Arabian philosopher seems to
have tried to grasp the precise character and scope of poetics,
he seems not to have sufficiently disengaged poetics from its re-
lation to rhetoric to have been able to appreciate the precise
and full scope of poetics in itself, and, therefore, could not
understand that the principle of investigation enunciated by
Aristotle is the principle which clearly distinguishes poetics
from rhetoric.

That he knew that poetics should be considered as inde-
pendent of rhetoric in some way, is evidenced when he ex-
amines the second cause for poetic invention, [50] as well as when

poemata non sint, ut ait Abunazrin Alfarabius, nisi circa voluptatum genera.
Species vero poetrie quam elegiam nominant non est nisi incitatio ad actus coituales,
quos amoris nomine obtegunt et decorant.   Ideoque oportet ut a talium carminum
lectione abstrahantur filii, et instruantur et exerceantur in carminibus que ad actus
fortitudinis et largitatis sive liberalitatis incitant et inclinant.   Non enim instigant
Arabes in carminibus suis nisi ad has duas virtutes e numero virtutum.   Neque
simpliciter ad has in quibus virtutes sunt; sed in quibus per eas aquiritur altitudo
honoris et glorie. Modus autem poematum in quo intenditur tantum convenientia:
reperitur pluries in eorum carminibus in quibus multociens inducunt proprietates
et accidentia corporum metallicorum, et consimilium mineralium.   Et etiam terre
nascentium et animalium " *(Paraphrase,* chap. 2; Herman version).

   [50] *Paraphrase,* chap. 8.

he speaks about "six en·ors with regard to the composition of poems." 51 As regards the first mistake, he says that a poet could erroneously represent what can occur " for the most part, not rarely or equally," whereas this type of representation " pertains more to rhetoric than to poetics." 52 Yet even in this context he fails to have a sufficient grasp of the difference between persuasion (which is proper to rhetoric) and capture of interest (which is proper to poetics) .53

That he failed to make a sufficient disengagement in this regard is manifested in two points made in his text about the aim of poetics, and in his distinction of the species of imitation. The two points in question are that Averroes (1) claims a moral identification of the poet with moral good or evil, and (2) denies that the arts using metre or harmony or both metre and harmony (e. g. dancing and music) can represent virtue or vice.

As regards the first point, Aristotle does say that " the poetic art was developed according to the morals found in " each poet: " those who were more reverent imitated good actions and those which were characteristic of them, whereas those who were rather contemptible imitated the actions of depraved persons," and that the latter *first* produced vituperations, just as the former produced hymns and praises. 54 However, he goes on to say, later on, that the writers of comedy reached that stage of disengagement from the scope of rhetoric whereby they produced, "not vituperations, but what provoked laughter," 55 and then speaks about the inclination of poets to produce tragedy or comedy as they had a natural bent to serious or comic repre-

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51 *Ibid.,* chap. 7.

52 *Ibid.* It should be noted that Averroes' claim that this is an error is far from accurate.

53 Thus he says that the sixth error of a poet is " to depart from poetic composition and pass over to persuasion and truthful statements, and especially if the statement is silly and has little persuasion. Sometimes, however, this type is valid, namely, if it has a suitable or truthful persuasiveness " (Ibid.).

54 *Poetics* 1448b 19-22.

55 *Ibid.,* 1448b 30-31.

sentation. [56] In other words, *at first* the scope of poetics was
not clearly disengaged from the scope of rhetoric, and, during
these early stages, there was a moral identification between the
poet and what he produced in his imitations.   Later, however,
when the poetic scope was clearly discerned, each poet made
the *judgment* as to whether he was better suited to represent
moral actions seriously or by way of comedy.   Whether Aver-
roes was led to his teaching on this point because the Aris-
totelian text he consulted was corrupt anent this section of the
Poetics, or because the serious Arabian poets up to his time
seem not to have become totally disengaged from the scope of
rhetoric is hard to decide.[57]

As regards the second point, namely, the denial that the arts
using metre or harmony or both can represent virtue or vice,
it seems that Averroes failed to note the significance of the
bodily movements of the interpreter of a poem (metre) or his
tone of voice (harmony) . Thus, although, as seems to be the
case, Averroes may never have been present at a drama (at
least at the time he was reading the *Poetics)* , acuteness in ob-
servation would have enabled him to perceive the moral sig-
nificance of the arts in question,[58] even if the circumstances for
this observation would be only those pertinent to a private use
of rhetoric.   At any rate, his position implies a divorce between
the metrical and harmonic arts and their exclusion from the
true scope of the poetic arts. [59]

[56] *Ibid.,* 1449a 5-9.

[57] It is quite obvious that this section of the *Paraphrase* is impregnated with
conscious or unconscious references to matters treated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric.* How-
ever, the fact that Averroes more or less constantly judges matters treated in the
authentic text of the *Poetics* in the light of the rhetorical use of poetics does not
necessarily indicate that portions of the text of the *Rhetoric* had been inserted
into the text of the *Poetics* Averroes was using.   He could have been led to make
his own insertion of these rhetorical matters on the basis that the only poets whose
works he knew had been writing within the scope of rhetoric.

[58] This significance is possibly most apparent in the operas composed notably
from the time of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart onwards, wherein the composer aims
at abetting the moral significance of the phrases in the libretto by deliberate
choices of metre and harmony, and wherein this moral significance is promoted by
the visible actions of the singers.

[59] Having consciously or unconsciously set about to understand the contents of

Concerning the species of imitation, Averroes has the following to say:

Poetic stories, however, are made up of imitative phrases. [60] Now the species of imitation, and imitation itself, are of three kinds, two of which are simple, the third comprising both of these. Of the two simple kinds, one is the imitation of the likeness of some thing and the assimilation of it with another thing. This occurs in each language through the dictions proper to it; the Arabs have assimilative letters. [61] The second kind is the association of what are similar by reason of place, and this is called commutation in this art. And you should know that in this division are contained those species which the men of our time call accommodation [62] and cognomination, the difference being that cognominations most frequently concern practices connected with a thing, whereas accommodation concerns a practice related with proportions, that is, the proportion of a first thing to a second is the proportion of a third thing to a fourth, and there is the commutation of the third to the first or vice versa. Now the book on Rhetoric has already mentioned the number of things from which commutations arise. The third species of poetic phrases is composed of the foregoing two species.[63]

It should be noted that the species of imitation discussed here are *not* species of *poetic* imitation as such, *but common* species of imitation. The first species is common for all the

the *Poetics* in the context of the *Rhetoric,* Averroes seems to have been embarrassed by most of what he encountered in the *Poetics.* For example, in the first chapter of the *Paraphrase,* he says that music and dancing, which, according to him, imitate poetry, "are naturally fitted to these two intentions," namely, vituperation and praise: **"Et** hoc modo se habet in artibus representativis que imitatrices sunt poetrie, ut est percussio cithare vel psalterii, vel insuffiatio tybie vel fistule, vel santandi artificium, scilicet quod ipse sunt apte naturaliter his duabus intentionibus " (Herman version). Why does he predicate this capacity of these arts taken as a whole, and deny it of them as they are taken according to the media through which they have this capacity?

[60] Balmes' version reads: " Fabulae autem poeticae sunt orationes imitantes." We can aptly translate this as "Now poetic stories are imitating phrases" if we strictly take the subject materially, the predicate formally.

[61] The term "letters " here seems to refer to the letters of the Arabic alphabet as representing sounds.

[62] Mantini's translation has *"metaphoram"* instead of *"accommodationem."*

[63] *Paraphrase,* chap. 1; translation made from the Balmes version.

parts of material logic, the second species is common to rhetoric and poetics. Hence far from analyzing what is properly poetic, the Commentator only confuses the procedure. Instead of investigating the species of the *whole* poetic art, he analyzes an integral part of this art (namely, plot, or, in his terms, " poetic stories ") , and this, not according to genuine principles for the specification of plot (whereby, for example, tragic plot is distinguished from comic plot), but according to general elements of plot (words and phrases) and these, in turn, according to language, and what he calls " commutation."   In his further division of "commutation" into "cognomination" and metaphor, he fails to distinguish metaphor from analogy of proper proportionality other than by a reference to Aristotle's *Rhetoric.* Furthermore, unlike the Stagirite, Averroes fails to mention the basis for his distinction of species. Having a view of the poetic art as a whole, Aristotle discovers a threefold basis for differentiating the poetic arts, namely, medium, object, and manner. [64] This is why, having established the parts of the poetic art according to these principles, he produces the rest of his treatise in keeping with the requisites for genuine scientific analysis, whereas, having introduced his distinction of the " species of imitation," Averroes can hardly do more than continue to fluctuate between poetics-in-itself and poetics-in-rhetoric, as well as between greater and lesser universals.

Averroes could have avoided his predicament, too, by examining the two generative causes of the poetic art *as Aristotle designates them.* The Stagirite states the first cause in this way: "Learning is most delightful, not only for philosophers, but also for all other persons engaging in it no matter how slightly. For they rejoice as they look at images because it happens that, in seeing images, they learn *and syllogize* as to what each thing is, as, for example, who that man is. If, however, a looker has not previously seen the person represented, the delight is produced, not by the image as such, but by its elabora-

•• *Poetics* 1447a H!-1448a 17.

tion or coloration or some like cause." ⁶⁵ Omitting any special comment on the role of poetics in promoting reasoning itself (, Averroes makes the following remarks sug- gesting that, in a sense, the poetic artist (and specifically, m this context, the painter or sculptor) is a teacher:

And for this reason we use examples in the process of teaching so that the students may have an easy grasp of what is said, and this because of the function of the imaginative faculty in them. The soul, then, will receive proposed matters more perfectly, in keeping with the delight it finds in examples. Teaching, then, pertains, not only to philosophers, but also to other persons who share this func- tion with the philosophers to some small degree. For doctrine is found to proceed naturally from person to person in conformity with the comparison between teacher and disciple. And since exem- plary imitations are only certain similarities of things which have been previously sensed, they are used only with a view to having statements be more quickly and easily understood. However, a statement is more easily understood through them because of the delight of the imaginable thing they represent. This is the first generative cause of poetry. ⁶⁶

The Stagirite states the second generative cause of the poetic arts in a dependent phrase (or clause): "Since it is natural for us to imitate by both harmony and rhythm (for it is evident that metres are parts of rhythms)." ⁶⁷ Averroes offers this redaction: "Now the second cause is man's natural delight, too, in metre, harmony, and rhythms," and then adds, " for it seems that, according to the very significance of rhythms, they should be proportionate to metre, for persons who naturally understand rhythms and metres." ⁶⁸ The trou-

⁶⁵ *p.a.vO&.vetv oV p.6vov rois ¢nAou6¢ms 7]0r.urov &.A/\Ct Kat rois CfAAor.s 0f.lolws, d.AA.' €7rl. {3paxV Kotvwvoiiutv a{J7·oV. Br.Ct 'YaP roiiro xalpovat T<i.s elK6vas OpWvres, 5rr. UVf-tf3alveL BewpoVvras p.avO&.vetv KaL   rl fKaurov, orov c>rr. oVros €Keivos . . . .
(Ibid., 1448b 8-14; italics and underscore mine).*

⁶⁶ *Paraphrase,* chap. 3; translation based upon Herman's version.

⁶⁷ *KarCt ¢Utnv 0€ Ovros   roU f.UtJ-eiuOar. Ked rfjs dpf.i-ovlas Kal. roV jJV0p,oV (rCt 'YttP pirpa. 5rt p.op[a. TWV pv8p.wv eUTL cpa.vep6v)* (1448{3 15-16).

⁶⁸ *Paraphrase,* chap. 3; translation made from the Balmes version (Instead of "harmony," Herman uses the term "symphony"). It should be noted that Aver- roes seems to imply that the natural inclination to imitate by harmony and rhythm

ble here is especially that, whereas Aristotle's statement empha-
sizes the aspect of *communication* through harmony and
rhythm   (that is, the intellect aspect) , Averroes emphasizes
the *pleasure* involved, and hence misses another occasion for
recognizing the poetic art as primarily " syllogistic " and " argu-
mentative," as these two terms are understood analogously.

   We could hardly expect the Commentator to produce, within
the limits of a paraphrase, an extensive commentary on the
character and role of poetic reasoning, or on the function of
elaboration and coloration in relation to the whole scope of
poetics; but we should expect that *what he says should truly fit
within the context of the Aristotelian tract.*   In other words,
Averroes' fault lies, not in failing to produce an extensive com-
mentary on the doctrine of the *Poetics* (which, at least appar-
ently, he did not intend) ,[69] but *in paraphrasing in such a way
as to change and impose falsifying restrictions upon this doc-
trine, without any evident reason for such treatment.*   This is
precisely the defect whereby his *Paraphrase* has little doctrinal
value other than serving to indicate, indirectly, the need for
discerning the realm of poetics in itself. We could go on to
further evaluations of other sections of the *Paraphrase,* but
these evaluations would be reducible to evidence concerning
Averroes' failure to grasp the importance of Aristotle's investi-
gative principle, as well as of the method which flows from this
principle and which the Stagirite outlines at the beginning of
his tract.

   Although the precise scope of our study has not permitted us
to give much in the way of direct evidence concerning the im-
portance of Aristotle's principle and method, it has enabled us
to take note of the confusions arising from departure from this
principle and method.   And, in fact, many of the confusions

is true only of a human minority: " for persons who naturally understand rhythms
and metres" (" apud illos qui naturaliter compraehendunt rithmos et metra").
Possibly the Arabian children he encountered did not feel free to produce this
type of imitation.

   [69] Sometimes, as in the case of discussing the moral aspects of Arabian poetry,
Averroes goes far beyond the limits of a paraphrase and enters the area of com-
mentary in the strict sense of the word.

represented in comments made in reference to the Stagirite's text from the Renaissance to our own time can be easily traced to this departure as the principal source of the confusions extant in the Latin versions of the *Paraphrase.* [70]

For our own investigation of the poetic arts, we should recast this principle in view of the arts which are readily accessible to us and state it, for example, in this way: " The opera, the theatre, the novel, the short story, the ballet, the symphony and the tone poem, as well as abstract painting and are all, taken as a whole, imitations." It is true that, in following the method of analysis which conforms to this statement of the principle, we should have to make many changes *within* the method as pursued by the Stagirite himself, but our very capacity to recast the principle indicates that we grasp its genuine universality, and our ability to pursue the method relies upon a grasp of the universality, not only of the method as a whole, but also of the particular analytic procedures contained therein. Furthermore, the universal value of the principle and the method gives us an assurance that we can advance in our analyses without notable error and within a much shorter period of time than if we were to interrupt our work by such excursions as trying to find, for example, perfect examples of dithyrambic poetry.

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[70] Although the investigation of these derived misrepresentations of the Aristotelian text exceeds the scope of our present study, it seems feasible to suggest that even John Calvin's position on the poetic arts may have been derived, to some degree, from presentations of the *Paraphrase* in the schools of his time. Calvin seems to have accepted poetics in a rhetorical context and rejected it in itself.

REASON AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY
OF PAUL TILLICH

P AUL TILLICH'S name or a discussion of his opinions in
a philosophical paper hardly needs justification. Al-
though professedly a theologian, the late Dr. Tillich
has equal right to be called a philosopher. He received the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Breslau
in 1911; in 1933, when he was dismissed by the Nazis, he
was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt;
and, when he came to Union Theological Seminary, he be-
came Professor of Philosophical Theology. But, more impor-
tantly, his very theological method-the method of correla-
tion-demands that he be a philosopher, since the theologian
must answer the problems presented by the philosopher and
must investigate the philosopher's analyses.

It is precisely by this procedure that Dr. Tillich established
his epistemology. The theologian's "answer" of revelation is
correlated to the philosophical problems and analyses of rea-
son.[1] He must establish in what sense theology is a rational
endeavor and how religious knowledge is true knowledge. The
present paper, however, does not undertake to pursue Dr. Til-
lich's theological correlation; it does not even attempt to dis-
cuss his entire epistemology, but only seeks to clarify two
notions basic to every epistemology: reason and knowledge.

Reason as the Structure of the Human

I£ we say man is rational, or theology is a rational enter-
prise, we imply a connection with reason. But what is reason?
This must be our first consideration, as it is for Tillich. Rea-
son, he finds, is too often understood in our day in the re-

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[1] This is done primarily in " Reason and Revelation," Part I of his *Systematic
Theology.* This will be our principal source for the discussion in this paper; other
works by Dr. Tillich will be used to confirm and clarify the ideas therein presented.

duced sense of the mere capacity for "reasoning"; it is under-
stood " in the sense of scientific method, logical strictness and
technical calculation." [2] Thus limited, it can be called "tech-
nical reason." This notion, "though always present in pre-
philosophical and philosophical thought, has become predomi-
nent since the breakdown of German classical idealism and in
the wake of English empiricism." [3] " Only the cognitive side
of the classical concept of reason remains, and within the cogni-
tive realm only those cognitive acts which deal with the dis-
covery of means for ends." [4] This "reason" is functioning
when a physicist works out laws to determine the path neces-
sary to send a multi-ton rocket toward the moon; it functions
when a lawyer searches for arguments and arranges them; it
functions when a teacher adopts a new procedure for pre-
senting the *Bellum Gallicum.* Technical reason works from
the known to the unknown, in order to achieve some end; but
it accepts these ends from " somewhere else," and this is dan-
gerous if technical reason is our only notion of reason. Ends
are then determined by non-rational forces-traditions or arbi-
trary decisions-and man is dehumanized. " Technical reason
always has an important function. . . . But technical reason
is adequate and meaningful only as an expression of ontological
reason and as its companion." [5]

What, then, is "ontological reason? " First: it is not a divi-
sion of reason parallel to technical reason; rather it is the whole,
of which technical reason is a part or an aspect. Ontological
reason is " the structure of the mind which enables the mind to
grasp and to transform reality." [6] It is "the source of meaning,
of structure, of norms and principles." [7] So, Tillich concludes
that "reason is identical with the humanity of man in contrast

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[2] Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York, 1957), p. 75.

[3] Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago, 1951, 1957, 1963), I, 72. This
work will be cited simply as *S. T.*

• *Ibid.,* 73.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.,* 72; cf. also p. 75, where the mind is said to "grasp and shape reality."

[7] Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith,* p. 75.

to all other beings." [8] Reason is not a *power* by which man knows, but a *structure* through which he knows. We might try to give a diagram or picture of this: Man, defined as " finite freedom," [9] is a power, or force, that flows into activity; but- as in any being-this happens only through essential struc- tures. The essential structure proper to man is reason. [10]

When Salvador Dali creates his "Crucifixion of St. John of the Cross," he acts through reason; when Martin Luther King chafes at the social injustice to Negroes in the United States, he acts through reason; when Albert Einstein formulates the theory of relativity, he acts through reason. Reason thus "is effective in the cognitive, aesthetic, practical, and technical functions of the human mind." [11] And, as Tillich says else- where, reason includes all meaningful functions of the human mind, " the ethical and aesthetic as well as the cognitive, not because ethics and aesthetics have also a cognitive element (which they certainly have), but because they create mean- ingful expressions of the ground of being." [12] Thus we can call every human act a rational act; man can be irrational, but not non-rational. [13]

This has been the traditional view of reason from Parmenides to Hegel. It is found in Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza. " Classical reason is *logos,* whether it is understood m a more

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Paul Tillich, "Human Nature Can Change: a Symposium," in *The Nature of Man in Theological and Psychological Perspective,* ed. Simon Doniger (New York, 1962), p. 179.

[10] Perhaps a more " homey " analogy will be helpful. Man is like icing in a spreader with force behind it; as it flows through the top, the design will be deter- mined by the form (the structure) of the top.

[11] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 72.

[12] Paul Tillich, "Reply to Interpretation and Critieinn," in *The Theology of Paul Tillich,* eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York, 1952), p. 333.

[13] Tillich says: " In theology one must distinguish not only ontological from technical reason but also ontological reason in its essential perfection from its predicament in different stages of its actualization in existence, life, and history " (8. *T.,* p. 75). Since we, however, are undertaking a philosophical investigation, we will limit ourselves to the essential nature of reason, and, in the following section, to the essential nature of knowledge.

intuitive or a more critical way. Its cognitive nature is one element in addition to others; it is cognitive and aesthetic, theoretical and practical, detached and passionate, subjective and objective." [14] This broader notion of reason, in the judgment of Walter Leibrecht, is a " concept of reason which tends to break the traditional compartments of naturalism and supernaturalism, idealism and materialism." [15]

But ontological reason itself must be distinguished. It is primarily the structure of the mind, as indicated above. As such it can be called " subjective reason." But nearly all philosophers have assumed that the functioning of the mind is possible because there is a corresponding structure in reality according to which the mind can grasp and shape it. " From the time of Parmenides it has been the common assumption of all philosophers that the *logos,* the word which grasps and shapes reality, can do so only because reality itself has a *logos* character." [16] This can be called "objective reason." The relation between the objective and subjective reason" is the basic epistemological problem"; [17] and it has been given various explanations, of which there are four main types: the realistic, the idealistic, the dualistic, the monistic. As a theologian, Tillich does not feel obliged to make a decision about the interpretations, but he does consider the " common presuppositions " of alP [8]

It is also necessary to note the close connection Tillich makes between reason and emotion. He seems to think of emotional life as something distinct, for he says, " Even emotional life is not irrational in itself." [19] But " an emotional element is present in every rational act." [20] And, "In its essential structure reason unites formal and emotional elements." [21] He does not say emotion is rational, but in any one rational act there is an

[14] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 72.

[15] Walter Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," in *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich,* ed. Walter Leibrecht (London, 1959), p. 6.

[16] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 75.   [19] *Ibid.,* 72.

[17] Tillich, "Reply," p. 333.   [20] *Ibid.,* 77.

[18] Tillich, *S. T.,* pp. 75-76.   [21] *Ibid.,* 89.

interplay between emotion and reason.   This observation will
be important for our next section.

   We might conclude this section, however, with the criticism
of J. H. Randall, Jr. He says," That the mind has the power-
or, more precisely, *is* the power [22]–to do what he assigns to
' ontological reason,' as well as what he calls ' technical reason,'
is undoubtedly true.   Tillich himself is inclined to stop short
with these facts, rather than to pursue the analysis of what is
a more complex process than he often suggests." [23] A reader is
left with precisely this feeling: Tillich has not gone far enough
in his explanation; but the fact remains, he has not gone fur-
ther, he has committed himself only to this point, and we must
agree with Randall's added comment: "Perhaps this is suffi-
cient for his purpose as a theologian." [24]

   Knowledge   as the Unity of Participation   and Separation

   " Knowledge " as an every-day word has many meanings,
and we must specify in what sense it will be the subject of our
discussion.   It is not the store of accumulated learning and
experience; nor is it the act of knowing.   For our discussion it is
the state of knowledge, the situation in which one knows.
Rather easily, we can point to the experience of knowledge,
the situation in which I say: "I know." But what is going
on? What is my state in this moment?   The present section
will present Tillich's explanation of this state.

   We might locate ourselves with regard to the previous sec-
tion by saying that we are merely narrowing the field of inquiry.
In reason, we saw," its cognitive nature is one element in addi-
tion to others .... " [25] We center, now, on this one function;
and knowledge is the operation of this function.   It is the state
of man operating through the cognitive function of subjective,

[22] This does not contradict what we said when we denied that *Reason* was a
power.

[23] John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in *The Theology
of Paul Tillich,* p. 148.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 72.

ontological reason.   But, in order to determine and describe
the state of man when he knows, we must begin on a much
broader scale. We must begin with the ontological considera-
tions which are found in all reality and all being, and then
place the reality of knowing into this context.

The basic and all-embracing structure of reality is self and
world. Since man is the being " in whom all levels of being are
united and approachable," [26] and since he is the unique being
"who asks the ontological question and in whose self-aware-
ness the ontological answer can be found," [27] Tillich begins
with man, to derive the basic structure of reality. "Man ex-
periences himself as having a world to which he belongs." [28]
This is the primary experience: man-in-a-world.   From this
complex dialectical relationship, this experience of self-related-
ness, is derived-by analysis-the self-world structure.   This is
then attributed to living beings and by analogy to all indi-
vidual *Gestalten.* [29]

Within this basic structure there are other polar elements,
of which individualization   and participation   are one pair. [30]
" Individualization   is not characteristic o£ a special sphere o£
beings; it is an ontological element and therefore a *quality* o£
everything." [31] It is implied in and constitutive of the notion
of the self, and is true o£ every being. However, only man is
completely a self and completely an individual; and in man
alone is individuality truly significant. In non-human being
the individual is £or the species and £or man; but even in col-
lectivistic societies the individual man is ultimately what is
important.   When individuality is perfect we have a" person." [32]

[26] *Ibid.,* 168.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.,* 169.

•• *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.,* 174-178. The other two elemental polarities are dynamics and form,
freedom and destiny.

[81] *Ibid.,* 175-176.

[32] Cf. Paul Tillich, *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality* (Chi-
cago, 1955), p. 17; where Tillich answers empiricism: "Being, according to this
vision of reality, is characterized by individualization and not by participation.

Polar to this is participation, which means " taking part."
It can mean a " sharing," as participation in the duties of a
sheriff; or "having in common," as participation in human
nature; or "becoming a part," as participation in a political
movement.0 ³ ⁗ In all three cases participation points to an ele-
ment of identity in that which is different or of a togetherness
of that which is separated." ³⁴ The individual participates   in
the rational structure of the universe, in the universal *logos;* ³⁵
he participates in his environment and is part of the total web,
part of the *totum,* ³⁶ of the universe.

Man participates in this totum in various ways. He par-
ticipates in all levels of life, but only man can reach the perfec-
tion of participation which is " communion "-the mutual par-
ticipation of completely centered and completely individual
selves, the participation of persons. Between the absolute
individual and persons in communion there is a complete spec-
trum of varying proportions of individualization and participa-
tion. " Individualization and participation are interdependent
on all levels of being." ³⁷

All individual things, including men and their minds, stand alongside each other,
looking at each other and at the whole of reality, trying to penetrate step by step
from the periphery toward the center, but having no immediate approach to it,
no direct participation in other individuals and in the universal power of being
which makes for individualization."

³³ Paul Tillich, "Participation   and Knowledge: Problems of an Ontology of
Cognition," *Sociologica,* Vol. I of *Frankfurter Beitrage zur Soziologie,* eds. Theodor
W. Adorno and Walter Dirks (Stuttgart,   1955), p.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 176.

³⁶ Cf. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man,* trans. Bernard Wall
(New York, 1959), especially pp. 44-45. On first reading Volumes I & II of the
Systematic Theology, I felt Tillich and Teilhard were very close on many points
and observed that " Tillich and Teilhard would combine to give man a clearer
picture of his origins."   Imagine,   then, my gratification when I read Tillich's
statement   in the Introduction   to the recently published third volume: "... I
happened to read Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's book *The Phenomenon of Man.*
It encouraged me greatly to know that an acknowledged scientist had developed
ideas about the dimensions and processes of life so similar to my own" (S. *T.,*
III, *5).*

³⁷ Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 177.

Let us turn, at last, to knowledge, which is founded in the basic ontological structure. [38]   "The primary phenomenon is the understanding of the situation of encounter in which both oneself and others participate, but not as separated subject and object." [39] Encounter is the basic experience, and from it we derive the subject-object relation, which is the polarity of self and world in a cognitional context. [40] There is a relation of two centered selves, participating in a common situation. [41] Thus Randall's objection seems to be inaccurate.   He says: "The analysis [of the subject-object distinction] makes no attempt to explore the emergence of that distinction from the larger context of organic and social life, and of their natural condi- tions." [42]   But a discussion of the primacy of encounter does seem to do this.

What, then, is knowledge, or knowing? "Knowing is a form of union. In every act of knowledge the knower and that which is known are united; the gap between subject and object is overcome. The subject 'grasps ' the object, adapts it to itself, and, at the same time, adapts itself to the object." [43] Or, as Tillich says later, "The knower participates in the known . . . . ." [44]   The state of knowledge is the participation in an- other, union with another. "But to be able to encounter cogni- tively subject and object must be open for each other.   The knower and the known must receive each other." [45]

But what is this participation?   Can it be merely biological,

[38] The process, however, is circular, since Tillich admits that the universal struc- ture, at least in part, is analysed from the phenomenon of knowing. Cf. *S. T.,* p. 176; also "Participation   and Knowledge," p.

[39] Tillich, "Participation   and Knowledge," p.

•• *Ibid.,*

u Cf. Tillich, *Biblical Religion,* pp.   where *religious* encounter is discussed, and where Tillich says the person " is established in the encounter of an ego-self with another self, often called the '1-thou' relationship, and it exists only in com- munity with other persons " (p.   .

•• Randall, p. 153.

•• Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 94.

"*Ibid.,* 177.

•• Tillich, "Participation   and Knowledge," p.   Cf. also *S. T.,* p. *95.*

man participating in the totum? Tillich says, "Man partici-
pates in the universe through the rational structure of mind
and reality." [46]   He can participate in the reality because he
knows it and, vice versa, he can know it because he partici-
pates. But this is precisely the point to be explained. One
feels, however, that Tillich has given a good phenomenological
description of the fact and has demonstrated a necessity for
his point. Knowledge is participation.

  " But the union of knowledge is a peculiar one; it is a union,
through separation. Detachment is the condition of cognitive
union. In order to know, one must 'look' at a thing, and, in
order to look at a thing, one must be ' at a distance.'" [47] The
subject must be "over against" what is known. **"If** this were
not the case, the structure of that which is known would be
invaded and destroyed by the dynamics of the knower. There
is no knowledge where there is no separation. Man can have
knowledge because he has a world and is, in this respect, sepa-
rated from his environment." [48] Cognition is a relation of cen-
tered selves.[49]

  " The unity of distance and union is the ontological problem
of knowledge." [50] Tillich admits that most philosophers have
seen both sides, both poles; but they have erred in clinging
to one or the other. Indeed, "cognitive reason is subject to
the conflict between union and detachment in every act of
knowledge." [51] Really knowledge is had in a unity of these two
elements of participation and separation. However, in respect
to the most essential note of knowledge, "participation seems
to be absolutely predominant over separation." [52] In various
examples, Tillich trys to demonstrate the interplay of these

  •• Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 176.
  [47] *Ibid.,* 94.
  [48] Tillich, " Participation and Knowledge," p.
  •• *Ibid.,*
  [50] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 94.
  [51] *Ibid.,* 97.
  [52] Til!ich, "Participation and Knowledge," p.

two: knowledge fulfills; it heals; it transforms.   But in all these he seems to emphasize the element of participation. [53]

"The element of union and the element of detachment appear in different proportions in the different realms of knowledge.   But there is no knowledge without the presence of both elements." [54]   So, Tillich sets up a scale of their relations: at one end is " controlling knowledge," at the other is " receiving knowledge." [55]   He recognizes his indebtedness for this distinction to Max Scheler's division of cognition into *Heilwissen, Bildungwissen, Herrschaftswissen.* [56]   Of these he accepts the first, " saving knowledge," but extends the concept to include all " existential knowledge."   He rejects the second, "educational knowledge," as not being really distinct; and he accepts the third, "controlling knowledge."   Thus he establishes " a scale on the one pole of which we have controlling knowledge, on the other pole existential knowledge.   Between these poles which correspond to the elements of separation and participation lie different combinations of controlling and existential knowledge of reality." [57]

Controlling knowledge is characterized by the predominance of the element of detachment.   Tillich calls it " the outstanding, though not the only, example of technical reason." [58] This does not mean that it is a subdivision of technical reason; rather, the procedure of controlling knowledge is an instance of technical reason being used. [59]

Controlling knowledge transforms the object into a completely calculable " thing," to control it.   But there is also

[58] Tillich, *S. 1'.,* pp. *95-96;* cf. also *Biblical Religion,* pp. 11-1'2, on knowledge as fulfilling.

•• *Ibid.,* 97.

[55] *Ibid.,* 97-98.

[56] Tillich, " Participation and Knowledge," p. '204; Scheler's division was proposed in his book *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissoos* (Munich, 19'24).

""Ibid.

[58] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 97.

[59] We must question Randall's remark that controlling knowledge is "the product of technicaL instrumental reason."   Randall, *op cit.,* p. 145.

participation   at two points.   First, since the object shares the
categorical structure of all being, it has elements of self-related-
ness-what might loosely be called subjectivity.   Because of
this, it can meet the subject in an encounter.   Second, the
object of knowledge is "taken in thoroughly,"   as is indicated
by the "per-" in perception.   So, even here we have union,
though detachment is the characteristic.   " Controlling knowl-
edge is one side of cognitive reason and an essential element
in every cognitive act." [60]

But when we encounter man, we may not use technical,
controlling reason; to do so destroys the human reality .[61] Cer-
tainly there are physical and psychic levels where controlling
knowledge can be used to learn about man; but this is not the
way to know a human person.   For this, there must be greater
stress on the element of union, which is characteristic   of "re-
ceiving knowledge."   This gives us knowledge of the person in
the moment of communion.   This is what must prevail in the
knowledge of life processes.

These are the two poles, and Tillich explains every act of
knowledge as a relation of these in a different proportion.   This,
he says, is the meaning of the word "understanding."   "Its
literal meaning, to stand under the place where the object of
knowledge stands, implies intimate participation.   . . . Under-
standing . . . involves an amalgamation   of controlling   and
receiving knowledge, of union and detachment,   of participation
and analysis." [62]

An excellent example of the interplay   between the two ex-
tremes is had in historical knowledge.   It is objective and de-
tached in the consideration of the evidence, the documents and
records.   But, in order to interpret this as significant history,
the historian must participate in the event, he must " recon-
struct" and "re-live " the event. [63]

[60] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 89.

[61] *Ibid.,*   73.

[62] *Ibid.,* 98; cf. also *"Participation   and Knowledge,"* p. *205.*

[63] *Ibid.,* 103-104; cf. also "Participation   and Knowledge," p. 207; *Dynamics of
Faith,* pp. 85-85.   Also Gerald A. McCool, "The Primacy of Intuition," *Thought,*

We are now pointed in the direction of religious knowledge, Tillich's goal in undertaking this whole discussion of knowledge. Here, we can merely indicate what religious knowledge is. It is committed knowledge, existential knowledge; it is Faith. It is on the pole of participation, and it is received in the most intense participation-ecstasy. "It means rather the participation of the whole personality in that which transcends objectivity as well as subjectivity." [64]

We have seen participation and separation in their various relations in different kinds of knowledge; but what conclusions can we draw? Certainly we must agree with Randall when he observes that for Tillich "the object of knowledge and the object of love are one and the same, and *knowledge* is ultimately a "participation" in true being." [65] But still we have an uneasy feeling. As noted above, [66] Tillich does not seem to have explained what this " participation " really means. He has only emphasized that participation is necessary for all knowledge. " I believe," he has said, " that in every cognitive relation an element of participation is involved. But it is less obvious in controlling knowledge than in what I have called uniting or receiving knowledge. . . . The way of participation shapes the character of the knowledge itself, and is not only an external precondition of it." [67]

As we saw, [68] "an emotional element is present in every rational act." Participation, thus, seems to be precisely this emotional element. Fr. McLean has drawn this conclusion.

XXXVII (Spring   He is explaining the position of Carlos Cirne-Lima; and, on the role of the historian, he says his methodology must be that " of comprehension rather than the methodology of discursive scientific knowledge .... " The historian must strive for " a comprehension of an historical personage; he must try within the limits of his evidence, to place himself within the consciousness of the historical character whom he is trying to understand and endeavor to grasp the world of that personage as it appeared to him."

•• Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p.   cf. also *S. T.,* pp. 117, *153-155; Biblical Religion,* p. *55; Dynamics of Faith,* p. 76.

[65] Randall, p. 134.

[66] See ftn. 46.

[67] Tillich, "Reply," p.

[68] See ftn.

Tillich, he thinks, is dissatisfied with the existential irrelevance
of controlling   knowledge.

For this reason receiving knowledge is added to provide the ele-
ment of union or participation in reality. Unfortunately the vehicle
for this type of knowledge is emotion, though Tillich attempts to
retain the rational by referring to it as " a criticizing and accepting
agape which is detached and involved at the same time." [69] With-
out wishing to give in to complete subjectivism he would seem to
hold that objective rationality by itself is incapable of grasping the
real with its basic self-world content.   This implies the necessity
of a subjective element of participation by emotion which alter-
nates with the moments of objectivity which are insufficient in
themselves.   In this way an element of subjectivity is introduced
into every meaningful encounter with reality and is placed at the
focal point of union and participation. [70]

   McLean's conclusion seems substantiated   by Tillich's own
words:

It is the time difference between the moment of uniting participa-
tion and separating objectivation which makes ... –in some de-
gree-all knowledge possible. This does not mean that a former
participation is remembered and made an object of cognition. But
it does mean that the moment is present in the cognitive moment
and vice versa. Participation still persists in the moment of cogni-
tive separation; the cognitive encounter includes moments of pre-
dominant participation, which I have called the perceptive mo-
ments, as well as moments of predominant separation, which I have
called the cognitive moments. They alternate and establish in their
totality a cognitive encounter. [11]

   Thus, we seem forced to conclude that participation is sub-
jective, emotional (and not rational) involvement, and that
the real moment of knowledge lies in the moment of separation.
   However, have we noticed that Tillich distinguishes   emo-

   •• Tillich, " Participation and Knowledge," p. 206.
   •• George F. McLean, 0. M. 1., "Man's Knowledge of God According to Paul
Tillich: a Thomistic Critique," *The Catholic University of America Philosophical
Studies,* CLXXX (1958), 14-15. In passing, it might be mentioned that hints in
the passage quoted indicate McLean has an inaccurate understanding of Tillich's
notion of subjective and objective reason.
   [71] Tillich, "Participation   and Knowledge," p. 209.

tional participation from the participation, or union, involved in knowledge? He says: "No union of subject and object is possible without emotional participation." [72] Though emotional participation is simultaneously present with cognitive union, it precedes cognitive union; and Tillich calls it the *vehicle* of the cognitive. [73] The participation of knowledge is not mere emotion; contrary to McLean, it is truly rational. It is an intuition; and, if Tillich cannot get better hold on it, it is because this kind of knowledge is vague and unformed, unconceptualized. Tillich can only restate his opinion: Knowledge is rational; it is the union of two rational elements-participation and separation.

This study has attempted to summarize Paul Tillich's understanding of reason and knowledge-two concepts basic to any epistemology. At times his vocabulary is strange and his thought is very complicated; but no penetration is possible without a sympathetic effort to grasp him in his own terms. [74] This brief presentation does not pretend to be adequate to Dr. Tillich's thought; but, if the reader now has a sympathetic appreciation of reason as structure and knowledge as participation, this study will have achieved its purpose.

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[72] Cf. again the article by McCool; Tillich's ideas seems very close to those of Cirne-Lima.

[73] Tillich, *S. T.,* p. 98.

... Here we might mention David Hugh Freeman, *Rece;nt Studies in Philosophy and Theology* (Philadelphia, 1962) as a violation of this procedure. Of the sources available, this included one of the more extensive treatments of Tillich; but the unsympathetic interpretation from a basis of logical positivism made it unuseable for this paper.

WHITEHEAD: CHALLENGING A CHALLENGE

I N A RECENT article Walter E. Stokes, S. J., stated his aim in the first sentence: "Whitehead's insight into the unity of order in the universe presents a unique challenge to theistic realists in the Catholic tradition, who may in the broadest sense be called followers of Aquinas." [1] Although the author of this assertion admits that he will "deal with Thomism dialectically and characterize it by certain tendencies and modes of thought," [2] the tendencies and modes of thought which he appears to expose are hardly Thomistic at all. Is this perhaps the reason Fr. Stokes rather arbitrarily restricts" theistic realism" to "Thomism "? More germanely, the error is in placing Alfred North Whitehead in the general stream of Greek philosophy. This is the small mistake at the beginning which is a great one in the end. [3] Ignoring post-Kantian German philosophy, the article seems rather to depict all philosophers as either Platonic or Aristotelian: into this Procrustean bed must be placed all subsequent philosophers. [4] Nevertheless, the author *should* have recognized the tremendous Hegelian influence upon Whitehead; Fr. Stokes does recognize the deep inspiration of Wordsworth upon Whitehead. [5] Yet, what can the appellation " romantic poet " mean? Does it imply that Wordsworth was a Platonist? an Aristotelian? On the contrary, no one attributes the romantic label to either of these Greek philoso-

[1] The Rev. Walter E. Stokes, S. J., "Whitehead's Challenge to Theistic Realism," THE NEw ScHOLASTICISM, XXXVIII (1964) 1-21. This same challenge appeared in the *Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association,* XXXVI (1962) 134-142, and in the *Papers for Discussion at the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association* (Woodstock, 1963) 18-38.

• " Whitehead's Challenge to Theistic Realism," p. 1.

[3] Aristotle, *De Coelo,* I, *5,* 271 b 13.

• Because Thomists are likewise " heirs to the wisdom of Plato and Aristotle, they essentially agree with Whitehead's approach to philosophy." Stokes, *art. cit.,* p. *5.*

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

phers.[6] It is, in fact, only because of the strong idealistic [7] cocktails of which Whitehead imbibed that the latter's notion of " solidarity " is rendered intelligible-that notion which is at the very basis of Fr. Stokes' article.[8] Also indicative of this idealistic element in Whitehead's metaphysics is the interminable emphasis on relations: Unlike Plato and Aristotle, both Hegel and Whitehead unambiguously inculcate a doctrine of internal relations. Here, also, Fr. Stokes manifestly approaches the Hegelian archway [9] but fails to make contact with the nineteenth century. Is this idealistic entry-like the palatial gates of the Lion of Judah-guarded by two hungry lions named Plato and Aristotle? [10]

Obviously overlooking Whitehead's indebtedness to Hegel, the article proposes that, when Whitehead concerned himself with "the central problem of philosophy," he placed himself "in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle." [11] This assigning of Whitehead to the Greek tradition may be acceptable only if we

[6] This romantic influence upon Whitehead is discernible throughout his works. Thus, for example, in summarizing his philosophical views ("Immortality," *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* ed. P. Schilpp [New York, 1951], Whitehead unambiguously accentuates the notion of *value,* and in *Science and The Modem World* (New York, 1948), p. 96, he explicitly declares: "The romantic reaction was a protest on behalf of value." Cf. *ibid.,* pp. *95,* 199. *Religion in The Making* (New York, 1957), p. 144.

[7] In his "Autobiographical Notes," *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, op. cit.,* p. 7, Whitehead confesses that he "nearly knew by heart parts of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason."* Reference to Friedrich Schelling can be found in *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge, Eng., 1955), p. 47. And pervading at least his major works is the constant reference to Francis Bradley; see, for instance, *Adventures of Ideas* (Middlesex, Eng., 1948), pp. 269-270. Cf. also *Process and Reality* (New York, 1929), pp. 304-305. Now, can we seriously believe that Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Bradley are Platonists? Aristotelians?

[8] "Let us explore the possibility of assimilating Whitehead's notion of the solidarity of the universe into a living Thomism." Stokes, *art. cit.,* p. 2.

[9] Thus Fr. Stokes asserts: "In Whitehead's metaphysics 'solidarity' means that the universe is an organic whole. There is a plurality of individual entities in the universe which produce the one single, common result which is the complete fact. . . . . For the universe is unity constituted by the interaction of a plurality of interrelated individual entities" (pp. 2-3). Cf. pp. 4, 14, 15, 17-20.

[10] *Art. cit.,* p. 2.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 4.

assume that Plato and Aristotle were Hegelians. On the other hand, when called upon to write his most profound philosophical work, Whitehead acknowledged that his " final interpretation " was but " a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism." [12]

It is this fundamental misinterpretation of Whitehead which clearly is reflected in the remainder of Fr. Stokes' article. Thus, in the area of natural theology, he declares, " There is a circular movement from the world to God, from God to the world . . . this process has no end." [13] However, this is but half the story, for in Whitehead's philosophy the universe likewise has no beginning.H This, of course, is decidedly anti-Platonic; [15] in addition, the immanence of God is emphatically un-Aristotelian; [16] but the eternal immanence of God is not un-Hegelian! [17]

By rejecting Aristotle's notion of God as a Prime Mover, Whitehead, as alleged by Fr. Stokes, "presents a challenge to traditional natural theology." [18] But what can Fr. Stokes possibly understand by " traditional natural theology"? Certainly St. Thomas did not think it necessary to await a twentieth-century philosopher to insist upon God's immanence to things. [19] In a word, Whitehead's philosophy presents a challenge to Thomists only if Thomists reject divine immanence. And this could possibly be done, again, only by forcing Aquinas into a

[12] *Process and Reality,* p. viii.

[13] *Art. cit.,* p. 6.

[14] *Process and Reality,* p. 519; *Science and The Modern World,* p. 88; "Mathematics and the Good," *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, (Y(J. cit.,* p. 674.

[15] *Timaeus,* 48. Cf. *Rep.,* VII, 530A; *Statesman,* 269B-270A; 273A-C. Cf. also Aristotle, *Physics,* VIII, 1, £51 b 16-17; *Meta.,* XII, 6, 1071 b 32-107£ a 2; *De Coelo,* II, £, 300 b 15-19.

[16] *Meta.,* XII, 6 and 7.

[17] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind,* trans. J. Baillie (New York, 1949), p. 84; *Science of Logic,* trans. W. Johnston and L. Struters (New York, 1951), pp. 135-141, 401-415, 466 ff. *The Logic of Hegel (The Minor Logic),* trns. W. Wallace (Oxford, 1959), p. 97; *The Philosophy of History,* ed. C. Friedrich (New York, 1956), pp. 16 ff.

[18] Stokes, *art. cit.,* p. 6.

[19] "God is in all things, and innermostly." *Summa Theol.,* I, 8, 1.

Greek mold while ignoring his originality. [20] Thus we read in Fr. Stokes' article: "Must Thomists choose between an eminently real, transcendent, unmoved mover, totally devoid of life and love, and an immanent, changing, finite God of love? Why must Thomists fashion God after the image of a Greek philosopher? " [21]

As an historical parenthesis, it may be observed that the denial of God's immanence which Fr. Stokes attributes to " theistic realists " is certainly not discoverable in either the Augustianian or Greek Christian traditions. Yet, in the final analysis, much of this discussion hinges on how one interprets the term" traditional natural theology." At any rate, Thomistic natural theology has inculcated the doctrines of creation, conservation, and concurrence, none of which is explicable if we equate Aquinas with Aristotle. In short, Fr. Stokes accepts Whitehead's misinterpretation of "theistic realism," and then finds in this misinterpretation a challenge to the Thomistic notion of God. That is, he employs Whitehead as both prosecutor and judge-a technique that cannot but be successful. Yet all along, Fr. Stokes completely overlooks the recognized fact that Whitehead's historical accuracy is far from unquestionable.22

Within the context of liberty, it is once again maintained, "Whitehead's notion of God challenges the Thomistic position on God's freedom." [23] Far from constituting a challenge, White-

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[20] For a beautifully cogent yet succinct summary explaining the principal differences between St. Thomas as an Aristotelian and St. Thomas as an original thinker, cf. E. Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York, 1960), p. QSQ, n. 6.

[21] *Art. cit.,* p. 7. Incidentally, to depict the unmoved mover as "devoid of life" is historically inaccurate, inasmuch as Aristotle explicitly attributes eternal life to God *(Meta.,* XII, 7, 107Q b 14-Q9). Again, the notion that love was absent in Greek philosophy is extirpated by Plato's insistence on love as an intermediary between the human and the divine *(Symposium,* QOQ-Q03) and that goodness itself was what motivated the demiurge to produce the universe *(Timaeus,* Q9E).

[22] Whitehead acquired his knowledge of philosophers from conversations and secondary sources. Thus, his knowledge of Plato stems, not from Plato, but from A. E. Taylor. This, once more, underscores the Hegelian influence on Whitehead.

[28] *Art. cit.,* p. 8.

head's teachings on freedom seem more of a scandal. For in
the first place, Whitehead " transcendentalizes " freedom: a
dog, plant, rock-even an electron, muon, baryon, or lepton-
is free. In Fr. Stokes' own select terminology, "To be is to be
free." [24] But what kind of liberty is this? Thomistic? Obvi-
ously not. Moreover, as Fr. Stokes himself indicates, for White-
head "To be is to be finite." [25] God, of course, is no exception;
in fact, God is, for Whitehead, only a creature. [26] To interpret
this doctrine as a " challenge " to scholasticism is to send the
proverbial boy to do a man's job. Any maximal liberty in
Whitehead's God is purely abstract or possible, but never con-
cretized.[27] Still, God can be called free only because He depends
on sensible things: without the world, there would be no
God. [28] One seriously wonders how such a un-Christian view
could have motivated this assertion: "And *tAe question is an
urgent one* because Whitehead believes that *his notion of God
is very much in accord with 'the Galilean origins of Chris-
tianity.'* " [29]

One further point concerns Fr. Stokes' identification of
Whitehead's creativity with Plato's receptacle [30] or St. Thomas'
prime matter. [31] Why this should be St. Thomas' prime matter
rather than Aristotle's is not explained by the author. None-
theless, from this identification, he proceeds to consider crea-
tivity as a type of non-being, an irrational or surd element
which he believes Plato expounded upon in his *Sophist.* [32] Such

[24] *Ibid. Cf. Modes of Thought* (New York, 1957), pp. 9-10. Yet Fr. Stokes
seems to subscribe to Whitehead's opinion: " ... by their interactions the forces
of the universe gradually create new environments for themselves. In their totality
these forces participate in God's absolute freedom " (p. 12). Cf. also p. 14.

[25] Stokes, *art. cit.,* p. 9.

[26] *Process and Reality,* pp. 46-47, 134-135.

[27] *Religion in the Making,* pp. 153-154; *Modes of Thought,* pp. *95;* 136.

[28] *Process and Reality,* pp. 521-522.

[29] *Art. cit.,* p. 6. (Emphasis added.)

[30] *Ibid.,* pp. 8-9. Cf. *Proceedings,* p. 136: "The Counterpart of the Receptacle
is Creativity."

[31] Stokes, *art. cit.,* p. *5.*

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 9.

oversimplified identifications, however, are exceedingly dubious. For in the first place, the Platonic receptacle is nowhere identified with non-being. On the contrary, Plato, in the *Timaeus,* a cosmogonic dialogue, insists that the receptacle shares in being.[33] The non-being o£ which Plato speaks in the *Sophist,* a metaphysical dialogue, is in no way prime matter or the receptacle, but a Separated Form o£ the same supramaterial nature as the Forms o£ Being, Rest, or Motion.[34] Fr. Stokes' misinterpretation o£ Plato accordingly led him to the misconstruing o£ Whitehead.

Moreover, i£ we equate Whitehead's creativity with Plato's receptacle, it becomes impossible to understand Whitehead's own views, inasmuch as, while Plato identified his receptacle with space,[35] Whitehead's creativity is the ultimate o£ ultimates;[36] and space £or him, is not an ultimate at all: "Any assimilation o£ time and space cannot proceed along the traditional line o£ taking matter as a fundamental element in space-formation."[37] In the *Principles of Natural Knowledge,*[38] Whitehead emphatically asserts that matter, like space and time" are adjuncts to events." Again, in *Adventures of ldeas,*[39] Whitehead explicitly declares that " the space-time o£ modern mathematical physics ... is almost exactly Plato's Receptacle."

Unlike creativity-which in its very intelligibility signifies movement, dynamism, and life-Plato's receptacle, as explicitly described by Whitehead himsel£/[0] is an actuality " in

[33] *Timaeus, 51.*

[34] *Sophist, !'l55-!'l59.*

[35] *Timaeus,* 49-50.

[36] *Process and Reality,* p. 47; *Science and The Modern World,* pp. 107, 177; *Adventures of Ideas,* pp. fl08-fl09. Whitehead entitles his discussion of creativity "The Category of The Ultimate" *(Process and Reality,* pp. 31-3fl).

[37] *The Concept of Nature,* p. fl4. Cf. "Space, Time, and Relativity," *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (New York, 1929).

[38] *The Principles of Natural Knowledge* (Cambridge, Eng., 1955), pp. 25-26. Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 171-182; *Science and the Modern World,* pp. 68, 103-104. Cf. also " Space, Time, and Matter: Are they, And If So in What Sense, The IDtimate Data of Science?" *Aristotelian Society,* Supplementary Volume II, 44-57.

[39] *Adventure.s of Ideas,* p. 178.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 316. Cf. *ibid.,* p. 234.

abstraction from the ' life and motion ' in which all activities
must partake."   Also in *Adventures of Ideas,* Whitehead un-
equivocally identifies Plato's receptacle, not with any dynamic
metaphysical principle, but solely with a *"locus."* [41] Far from
identifying his creativity with Plato's receptacle, Whitehead
rather insisted that this receptacle and the void of Lucretius
"play the same role." [42] In fact, such dynamic notions as
"adventure,"   "zest," and "eros" give rise to a feeling which is
" the complement to Plato's receptacle, *its exact opposite."* [43]

With respect to the identification of Whitehead's creativity
with the prime matter of Aquinas, it should simply be observed
that Whitehead's entire philosophy can, from one point of view,
be visualized as an open attack upon materialism; [44] and if this
be true, it is indeed most unintelligible to identify the abso-
lutely supreme principle of reality with matter.

Moreover, how the notion could be seriously entertained that
creativity is identified with the purely passive potency of prime
matter completely transcends the imagination.   That the most
active principle of the universe is equated with its most passive
principle is incomprehensible and reminds one of St. Thomas'
anger with David of Dinant. [45]

One final word: While it is true that Whitehead posits the
reality of non-being, [46] the non-being of which he refers is due
to a negative prehension whereby that which is excluded by
an actual occasion is constitutive of what it is.[47] Clearly, the
inspiration here is not the Platonic receptacle, nor his Form of

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[41] *Ibid.,* pp. 218-219. Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 177-178; 182.

[42] *Ibid.,* p. 160. On p. 159 of this work, Whitehead likens the receptacle to the
Epicurean void.   Cf. *ibid.,* p. 145.

[43] *Ibid.,* p. 339. (Emphasis added.)

.. See, for example, *Science and the Modern World,* ch. 3 and 4 where materialists
are accused of confusing the abstract with concrete reality. Materialism Whitehead
opposes with his philosophy of organism.

[45] *Summa Theol.,* I, 3, 8; *Sum. Cont. Gent.,* I, 17. *De Ver.,* XXI, 4. Even for
Plato the receptacle plays the role of a passive potency *(Timaeus,* 50).

[46] E. g., *Adventures of Ideas,* pp. 257, *259; Process and Reality,* p. 531; *Science
and the Modern World,* p. 163.

[47] *Process and Reality,* p. 66.

non-being, but Hegel's doctrine that negation is determina-
tion: [48] " This doctrine extends, or distorts, the meaning of
another saying of Plato, when he says that non-being is a form
of being. Here, I am saying that rejection is a form of pre-
hension." [49]

In the foregoing remarks, the present writer is not so naive
as to believe that Thomistic philosophy cannot be challenged.
Indeed, the very expression " perennial philosophy " implies
that Thomism is able successfully to assimilate novel insights
without losing its fundamental identity.   However, only a con-
glomeration of irrelevant texts could produce a patchwork
which resembles any allegedly urgent or immediate threat to
Thomism by Whitehead's philosophy. It is only by misrepre-
senting Plato's receptacle, Aquinas' prime matter, and White-
head's creativity that Whitehead can be depicted as constitut-
ing a menace to the principles of the Angelic Doctor.

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[48] See, for example, *The Logic of Hegel (The Minor Logic)* §§ 89-92 (pp. 169-
173); *ibid.,* §§ 116-119 (pp. 215-222); *The Science of Logic,* pp. 36, 121-169; *The
Phenomenology of Mind,* pp. 140-143; *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* §§ 72, 73,
144. (In these selections, Hegel acknowledges his Spinozistic debt.)   For White-
head's views, cf. "Process and Reality," *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (Lon-
don, 1948), p. 90: "Plato's doctrine must go the way of the one possible geometry.
The universe is more various, more Hegelian."   Cf. also *Process and Reality,*
p. 254: " It is now evident that the final analogy to the philosophies of the
Hegelian school, noted in the Preface, is not accidental."   Cf. *supra,* foot. 12.

•• "Analysis of Meaning," *Essays in Science and Philosophy,* p. 99. Cf. *Process
and Reality,* pp. 66, 354, *355,* 362.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Ethics in a Christian Context. By PAULK. LEHMANN. New York, Harper
and Row, 1963, pp. 384, with selected bibliography and index. *$5.00.*

T!Wologie Morale du Nouveau Testament. By CESLAUS SPICQ, 0. P. vols.
Paris: Gabalda, 1965, pp. 897, with tables and indices.

Original Sin, trans. T. C. O'BRIEN, 0. P., Volume qq. 81-85)
Summa Theologiae, edited by Thomas Gilby 0. P. and T. C. O'Brien,
0. P. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, pp. 178, with Latin text, English
translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries. $7.50.

Hardly any doubt exists about the gap between Christian morals and
contemporary culture. Dr. Lehmann's book seeks, if not to close the gap,
at least to bring the two within shouting distance of one another. The
ethical message of the Christian faith should be intelligible enough, and
important enough, to be relevant today. Dr. Lehmann hopes that his
book will make *some* contribution towards that end. It does.

"We have been urging," writes Lehmann in his own summary of the first
part of his book," that Christian thinking about ethics starts with and from
within the Christian *koinonia.* In the *koinonia* it makes sense to talk about
the will of God as the answer to the question: What am I, as a believer in
Jesus Christ and as a member of his church, to do? For it is in the *koinonia*
that one comes in sight and finds oneself involved in what God is doing
in the world. What God is doing in the world is setting up and carrying
out the conditions for what it takes to keep human life human. The fruit
of this divine activity is human maturity, the wholeness of every man and
of all men in the new humanity inaugurated and being fulfilled by Jesus
Christ in the world. The description of this activity of God provides a
koinonia ethic with its biblical and theological foundations " (p.   .

The *koinonia,* a New Testament word variously translated as "fellow-
ship," " participation," " congregation," " association," is seen in its central
focus in Paul's use of it in 1 Cor. 1:9: "God is trustworthy, by him you
have been called into *fellowship* with his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord."
Lehmann, after collating the texts, defines the *koinonia* as " the *fellowship-
creating reality* of Christ's presence in the world" (p. 49, italics his).
Neither identical with nor separable from the visible church, the *koinonia*
is rather the little church in the big church, the community where authentic
witness to revelation and response to the Spirit are the dynamic elements;
the *koinonia* is " the leaven in the lump, the remnant in the midst of the
covenant people " (p.   . It is wrong to call it the invisible church or to

make too many distinctions between it and the structural church. Its business in many cases is precisely to be visible and the more visible the better, since witness does not make sense unless it is visible.

In the context of this *koinonia,* then, one asks the ethical question. Not, what must I do to obtain the supreme good? nor, what must I do to live a moral life? The Christian ethics is not concerned directly with either the one or the other, it is concerned directly with what a believer in Jesus Christ and a member of his church, acting precisely in that capacity, would do. The purpose of such action is the maturity described in Ephesians 4:15-16 "Rather are we to practice the truth in love and so grow up in all things in him who is the head, Christ. For from him the whole body (being closely joined and knit together through every joint of the system according to the functioning in due measure of each single part) derives its increase to the building up of itself in love." Maturity in Christ, then, is the aim of *koinonia* ethics " the full development in a human being of the power to be truly and fully himself in being related to others who also have the power to be truly and fully themselves" (p. 101).

And this is what God is doing in the world, i. e., establishing this kind of mature Christian society. In a stroke of analogous thinking Lehmann uses the insight of Aristotle that while ethics is the science of the Good, politics is the science of the highest or supreme Good. Aristotle even uses the word *koinonia* (H52 b 27) to describe this society and to indicate the basic relatedness between people. Thus God is a ' politician ' who is ' making or doing politics ' in the world. Lehmann can conclude in a remarkable canonization of Aristotle's thought that " it is the Aristotelian *definition* and the biblical *description* of what is going on " (p. *85,* italics his) that gives his own thought its basis. "According to the *definition,* we may say that politics is activity, and reflection upon activity, which aims at and analyzes what it takes to make and to keep human life *human* in the world. According to the *description,* what it takes to make and to keep human life human in the world is the ' unsearchable riches of Christ ' " *(ibid.* italics his). Lehmann refers to Ephesians 3:8-10 where Paul tells us that to him was given the grace " to announce among the Gentiles the good tidings of the unfathomable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men as to what is the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from eternity in God, who created all things; in order that through the Church there be made known . . . the manifold wisdom of God." That wisdom is, of course, to establish the " whole body " in Christ closely joined and knit together, as Paul says further on in the quotation already cited.

Since Lehmann thinks that Christian dogmatic theology must be ori-entated to this ethical reality of the *koinonia,* he turns to the theology of Messianism as his central dogmatic key. In its light three Christological affirmations acquire special meaning. In the Trinity the Spirit must proceed

from the Father and the Son *(filioque)* since the Spirit sanctifies us as
part of the general messianic work *of the Son,* which would not be so if
the Spirit did not proceed from the Son. Similarly the *omousion* (the Son
is of one substance with the Father) must be correct since the messianic
work does not proceed from two gods, one who creates, the other who
redeems. Christ's messianic mission is seen, secondly, to bear special signi-
ficance to his triple role of prophet, king, and priest. Lehmann takes
special care to show that Christ's kingship is not an esoteric title having
nothing to do with the world at large. God is concerned with all men. The
world, as well as the church, make up the realm over which Christ is king.
Thirdly, Christian eschatology is enriched by keeping it in the context of
Christ's messianic mission. "It makes no sense to talk about the 'last
things' apart from what is going on here and now. And what is going on
here and now is not primarily a matter of setting out the punishment of
sin and setting up the triumph of the saints; it is primarily a matter of
behavior, of what God is doing in the world and of what in consequence
man is involved in, of what man is to do and can do" (p. 118). The
presuppositions for Christian ethics, then, have to do not with the natural
man, Adam, whom grace heals and perfects, but rather with Christ and
with the new humanity in Christ.

From these various considerations Lehmann turns finally to some practi-
cal application of Christian ethics. He does not see any room for " absolutist
ethics" in the *koinonia.* The "absolute" to Lehmann, is "a standard of
conduct which can and must be applied to all people in all situations in
exactly the same way " (p.   . In answering questions about lying or
sexual conduct, or modem war, Lehmann formulates a principle based on
Bonhoeffer: that the " living word is the verbal expression of the full
complexity and totality of the existing, concrete situation" (p. 130). One
cannot lay down an absolute standard to follow, one must simply play
every situation by his Christian ear, so to speak, always taking into
account that " a Christian ethic seeks to show that the *human* in us all
can be rightly discerned and adhered to only in and through the reality of
a climate of trust established by the divine humanity of Jesus Christ and
the new humanity, however incipient, of all men in Christ" *(ibid.).*
Similarly, the sexual act must be understood "in the context of human
reality of encounter between male and female under conditions of trust
and fulfillment, . . ." (p. 137) and a Christian sexual ethic seeks to
" exhibit the intimate relation of sexuality in all its forms to the freedom
and the integrity of human wholeness in the most concrete human
encounter of belonging. Such an ethic can offer no sexual guidance accord-
ing to a blueprint designed to apply to all sexual behavior in the same way "
(ibid.) Of modem war Lehmann does not take the "absolutist view" that
it is an inadmissable violation of Christian conscience. The complexity of

the human situation simply will not allow a *koinonia* ethic to accept such a conclusion. War may never be a Christian possibility, it still is in our world a possibility which a Christian may not be able ultimately to avoid. Lehmann develops that thought from the Federal Council of Churches and shows how in the context of the *koinonia* ethic each Christian must decide whether his participation or abstention from modern war is part of God's work in the world. Membership in the *koinonia* means that the Christian " is related to what God is doing in the world and that in the light of God's characteristic behavior there is never any one way as against all others for dealing with any human situation. God is not really as devoid of imagination as that" (p. 141). The decision each makes is a risk but it is a risk of trust.

These conditions make up only the first third of the book. We have reviewed them in some detail for the purpose of honest dialogue to which we shall proceed shortly. In the next third, called "Christian and Philosophical Thinking About Ethics," Lehmann evaluates and criticizes the ethical theories of Aristotle, Kant, William James, Paul Weiss, Eric Fromm, the analytic philosophies; he discusses the value of the thrust of Christian ethics toward philosophical ethics as seen in the works of Augustine, Aquinas, Schleiermacher, and concludes with his own reflecting on the insufficiency of philosophical ethics. The last third of the book, called " The Question of Conscience," contains first a critique of moral theology, then a brief history of the decline and fall of conscience. A final chapter on the ethical reality of conscience concludes the book. Many valuable insights are scattered throughout these pages, as well as many opinions we quite strongly disagree with. To some of these we shall return, but let us first offer our own evaluation and criticism of Lehmann's *koinonia* ethics.

We accept, first of all, the *need* for a new statement of Christian ethics for our day, or at least the need for restating the old one in more relevant terms. Lehmann has taken a valuable step in fulfilling that need. Karl Jaspers as long ago as 1941 said that the intensely personal Kantian ethics must be rethought and restated in terms of communication. The loneliness of each man before his God was too terrible. Men need other men to help them towards a fruitful ethical life. Lehmann's *koinonia* ethics is a beautiful expression of what Jaspers was looking for.

Also, Lehmann's relating of what God is doing in the world to what Christians are doing in the *koinonia* is marvelous. It changes the view of a static *koinonia,* the company of the saved, to a dynamic bridgehead of God's action in the world-at-large. It gives a new or at least freshly stated importance to the vocation of every member of the *koinonia* who must now read not only the Bible but the newspapers (as Karl Barth said) to find out what God is doing; and who must make ethical decisions about his role in God's "worldly " work, whether it be for helping his neighborhood in urban renewal, or for racial justice, or for world peace.

Again, the insight of Aristotle about the superiority of the political good to the ethical good is well used in this book. In answering the objection that Christ exalted the individual not the *koinonia,* Lehmann is especially good. Going after the one lost sheep? It was returned to the *flock.* The prodigal son? He came back to the *family.* All the biblical images of God's dealing with men are political: as " people," " land," " kingdom," and so on. Christ never exalted the " rugged individualist "; He was concerned, however, with the "redeemed individual whose individuality is the by-product and the fruit of the fellowship of Christ's body " (p. 58) .

A third cause of our admiration is Lehmann's great scholarship. In his preface Lehmann says he has been writing this book since 1954. The thoroughness of its work and the felicity of its style show it. Eminently readable, deep in its sources, and judicious in its final selected bibliography, the book is a model of creative scholarship.

Our dialogue must begin with some of Lehmann's premises. " What God is doing in the world is setting up and carrying out the conditions for what it takes to keep human life human" (p. 124) . Isn't that rather diminishing God's work? "The fruit of this divine activity is human maturity, the wholeness of every man and of all men in the new humanity inaugurated and being fulfilled by Jesus Christ in the world" *(ibid.).* Is *maturity* the fruit of God's activity? Isn't it perfectly reasonable to ask, maturity for what?

If we agree that the emphasis on Christian ethical thinking has wrongly been placed on the individual (" Am *I* saved? ") and on the ultimate reward in heaven, (the pie-in-the-sky) we still cannot go all the way with Lehmann in his conception of a *koinonia* ethics as an instrument for God's work here on earth. If eschatology has been too exclusively concerned with " last things," it should not, on that account, be too exclusively concerned with present things. Lehmann, in his effort to be relevant, has taken the tension out of the Christian position so well described by Cullmann as the tension between "the already with the not-yet," and which we could further describe as the tension between the divine and the human, between heaven and earth.

He passes over some of the most poignant texts in scripture which state this tension, as example, the famous 15th chapter of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, " and if Christ has not risen, vain is your faith, for you are still in your sins. Hence they also who have fallen asleep in Christ, have perished. If with this life only in view we have had hope in Christ, we are of all men the most to be pitied" (17-19). Having recently completed a study on the problems of evil in our world, and what ghastly evils we have seen, I have come to the conclusion that the Christian doctrine of eternal beatitude with God cannot be ignored. We must also make *that* relevant otherwise we simply have no answer for the atrociously unjust

slaughter of the masses that went on during World War II and that may
continue to go on. We have no answer for the sick and the dying.

Again, St. Paul tells us what maturity is for in his Epistle to the
Ephesians, a text cited by Lehmann, but which he does not use very clearly;
" Being rooted and grounded in love, you may be able to comprehend with
all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to
know Christ's love which surpasses knowledge, in order that you may be
filled unto all the fullness of God" (3:17-19). Lehmann's vision is too
land-locked to give much validity to these stirring words of St. Paul.
Maturity is for love, maturity in Christ gives us the stability and inde-
pendence to love one another purely, and to love God with our whole mind,
our whole soul, and all our strength, for all eternity.

Lehmann cites Paul Weiss' criticism of Aristotle's eudemonism, that it
universalized a supreme good that was really the good of well-born Greeks
who had reached middle age. When St. Thomas accepted that doctrine he
did something tremendous with it, something that Lehmann failed to do
with Aristotle's "koinonia" doctrine. The supreme good, to Saint Thomas,
is the contemplation of God, but God is never regarded as some kind of
private good of the individual. *God is the common good.* God is the good
of the *koinonia.* To Lehmann, Aristotle's *koinonia* is the good of God.
There at least is where his *koinonia* ethics would take us if we carried it.
out to his final conclusions. And there we are not willing to go.

In his eagerness to establish his theology of Messianism as his key,
Lehmann says that it " exposes the speculative and irrelevant character of
all eschatological thinking apart from ethics" (p. 118); apart, that is, from
what God is doing in the world. Again, it is his emphasis that bothers. Note
his coupling of " speculative " and " irrelevant." To speculate on the vision
of God, or eternal beatitude, as St. Paul does, as St. John does, and not
always in terms of " politics," is certainly not irrelevant even though
some of the theological constructions about it have been irrelevant and far
removed from our problems. Lehmann throws out the baby with the bath.

His brief allusion to the liturgy is another case in point. " As the politics
of God give to the eucharistic liturgy its occasion and significance, so the
ethical reality of the *koinonia* gives to the celebration of the Eucharist its
integrity " (p. 103). Vatican II would surely agree with Lehmann's state-
ment. The liturgy does celebrate the deeds of God among men, especially
the Redemptive act of Christ, so that its occasion and significance does
come from the politics of God. Secondly, the ethical reality of the *koinonia*
-that the church must be missionary, must be concerned with carrying out
God's work in His world-gives to the liturgy its integrity.

But the politics of God and the ethical reality of the *koinonia* do not
exhaust the significance or the integrity of the liturgy. God can be regarded
sometimes as " above politics," and beloved in himself because he is God;

the *koinonia* has not only an ethical, it has a contemplative reality also. Let us put it this way. As a believer in Jesus Christ I receive in the liturgy strength to get involved in and carry out God's work in the world. But his will in the world is to bring all peoples to the liturgy. The liturgy is not just the beginning of life in the *koinonia,* it is the end; and it is more the end than the beginning. In other words the worshipping community is not for social justice, though it should help us towards such action; social justice is for the worshipping community, that is, we are just in order to worship, and to love God with pure consciences that " you may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know Christ's love which surpasses knowledge, in order that you may be filled unto all the fullness of God" (Eph. 3: 18-19). In short, Lehmann has confused the penultimate end-what God is doing in the world, i. e., making human life human, maturity in Christ-for the ultimate end, the vision and the love of God. " Thou hast made us for yourself, 0 Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You."

Lehmann reacts against sterile metaphysical systems of maturity which are "all doctrine" one might say, "and no action." But time and time again, and in spite of his acknowledgment that it should not be so (p. 104), his ethics devours doctrine. His doctrine comes much more from moral than his moral from doctrine.

Of his practical applications we think that Lehmann inadvertently distorts the absolutist position by some of the examples he chooses. The absolutist point about telling the truth should not be interpreted to mean that one must reveal the total truth to everyone, everywhere, always. Absolutist ethics in this matter recognizes that at times it is imperative to hide the truth from those who have no right to know it. Lehmann does not make this clear. Surely no one of us would want to say anything different than Lehmann did to the woman who was dying of cancer, but in relating that incident he himself falls back on an absolute. He asks: Granted that this patient has a right to the truth, what is the truth to which the patient has a right? " (p. . It is not *koinonia* ethics that directed Lehmann to recognize the right the patient had to the truth; it is simply a recognition of an objective right in justice that he had to respect, whether in or outside of the *koinonia.* The woman had a right to the truth not because she was a member of the *koinonia* but because she was a member of the human race. The *koinonia* ethics presupposes the absolute character of the rights due to people as they are people. Then, in the context of the *koinonia,* some kind of communication is called for which will be honest, tactful, and Christian. Lehmann's words to the woman are an admirable and touching example of " ethics in a Christian context," but to leave the impression that the absolutist ethics would exclude the possibility of saying those words is unfortunate.

The absolutist position on modem war is another example. To say tnat it makes all modem war inadmissable is to identify absolutist ethics with the pacifist view. Actually those who subscribe to absolute standards of morality have no monolithic position about modem war. Some are pacifists, some not. " It is much easier, ethically speaking, to be a Roman Catholic ... than to be an evangelical Christian" (p. 1M2). Lehmann says we can make precise distinctions about just and unjust wars, etc. He hasn't been in recent touch with Roman Catholic thinking! All those " precise distinc-tions " were certainly clouded by World War II and Hiroshima. Catholic theologians have no pat answers about nuclear war, although most have come to pretty much the same conclusion arrived at by the World Council.

And I think Lehmann should have at least mentioned the *bonum prolis,* the good of the child, in his discussion of the sexual act. Surely one cannot solve the whole problem without looking at the procreative aspects. The sexual act must indeed be understood in the context of a trusting encounter between man and woman; it must also be understood in the larger context of family and society, even in the context of Lehmann's guiding view, i.e. what *God* is doing in the world. Extramarital intercourse may, in some cases, be an expression of subjective trust between a man and a woman; it is not, however, an expression of trust in the larger, more objective design of God who is bringing about through marriage and the family the " political good," the good of society.

The obscurity of these arguments underline the necessity of a voice in the world capable of telling us just how God, by establishing and blessing human sexual relations, *is* working in the world. Perhaps it is precisely in recognition of the need of such a voice that brings Lehmann at the end of his book to the subject of conscience.

The best meaning of conscience to Lehmann in Calvin's: " the inward integrity of the heart " (p. 866) . By it a man can rise above the law to yield a voluntary obedience to the will of God. Lehmann follows the "aIl things are lawful " of St. Paul in 1 Cor. 10:28, and interprets him to mean the ' all things ' in the context of God's politics on earth. But St. Paul is giving advice to Christians about eating food offered to idols. He is saying there is nothing intrinsically wrong with food since " the earth is the Lord's and everything in it." So a Christian is free in his conscience to eat or not. But surely this is not a universal principle. Why doesn't Lehmann consider actions like murder, adultery, etc.? Is it because they threaten his denial of an absolutist ethics? Is it because they threaten his denial of an absolute, objective norm for conscience? Is it because they would introduce the possibility of someone's conscience being instructed, the possibility for teachers, for *a* teacher? We readily admit an area of human, of Christian choice today that is ambiguous, delicate, an area where a man can be guided only by the voice of the Spirit within. Lehmann is so

sensitive to that area that he seems to have forgotten the other clear area, marked out, let us say, by the Commandments.

The criticism Lehmann has, finally, of moral theology, is this: it prevents a discernment of the full depth and urgency of the ethical situation. It does not answer J. D. Salinger's moving question: "But where does by far the bulk, the whole ambulance load, of pain really come from? Where *must* it come from?" (cited p. 320). Moral theology, i.e. Roman Catholic and Anglican moral theology, never answers that question, never enters into the total impotence of man to get himself up from his ambulance load of pain, never appreciates the doctrine of total depravity, and never really understands that God makes, or has already made " the next move." Moral theology obscures God's move by showing man to be ethically potent to make his own move.

We would have to admit that some types of Roman Catholic moral theology have moved too far away from the individual and, if you will, existential ethical situation. But recent studies on the scriptural sources of moral theology are remedying that kind of wrong abstraction. Even so, we think Lehmann is asking something of moral theology that it can never give. I do not go to dentistry to be cured of a toothache, I go to a dentist. I do not go to moral theology to be cured of sin, I go to God, or rather, God brings me to himself. Lehmann's criticism is not just that the principles of moral theology are wrong, he is upset with the whole approach as his strong remarks on p. 321 certainly bring out. But the approach of moral theology is valid since moral theology is not a priest who is himself a sinner. Lehmann wants it to be that. Moral theology is one thing; the priest hearing confessions, his heart breaking over the weakness of man, and his own weakness, is another. Moral theology can tell, but not in the same way a priest can tell, where the ambulance load of pain comes from. Perhaps Lehmann's whole criticism can be traced back to his instinctive coupling of the words, "speculative" and "irrelevant."

It is impossible to take up each point. Besides, we do not want by these observations to take back one iota of what we said in praise of the book. For the Catholic moralist it will certainly act as an antidote to all arid, irrelevant speculation and it will challenge him to make much more relevanb his speculation on the traditional moral tracts, to rethink them in terms of the need today, in terms of the whole ambulance load of pain that this world is.

The book should also act as a stimulus to bring moral theology back to scripture, and for such a task Father Spicq's book is immensely valuable. His use of the word " theology " in the title would lead one to expect a highly organized synthesis of the New Testament moral teaching. The book is not that. " Theology " connotes only the authenticity of the text- it is truly *God's* word-and the general unity of the divine teaching. Spicq

was tempted to unify the whole moral message of scripture around the idea of charity, "the response of gratitude and adoration to the epiphany of the divine agape in the Christ" (p. 10, n. 1), but such a procedure seemed to go beyond the revealed data. In the light of Spicq's own three volumes on agape, that remark reveals a great deal about his passion for accepting the message as it is.

His idea of biblical theology is helpful in understanding the plan of his book. Spicq describes it as a kind of philological-historical research of a rational, objective character, presupposing exegetical and literary criticism; it is authentic theology, giving to the science of God a profound understanding of revelation and, in this way, exercising a sapiential function, i.e., dealing with the knowledge of principles. Such a study presupposes faith in the biblical theologian, for only under the light of faith could he discern the profound message of the New Testament. Biblical theology, while recognizing an evolution of thought in the New Testament, nevertheless seeks and finds an inner harmony in the varied presentations of individual themes. Yet it presents these themes with complete respect to their own orientations and with the nuances of the various authors. Total synthesis is impossible. "We are persuaded that the literary *genres* which specify the gospel accounts, the apostolic letters (the theological treatment of *Romans* or the note to *Philomen),* the apocalyptic visions, the homily *to the Hebrews,* stand in too great a contrast, the axis of thought of each author too different, to tie them all together without falsifying their historical perspectives and consequently the signification of each text" (p. 15). It would be as if an American were to write a book on the meaning of contemporary American life, basing himself on Presidential addresses, decisions of the Supreme Court, the novels of Faulkner, Hemingway, Bellow, Baldwin, the plays of Albee and Williams, the reports of the news media, etc. He would take individual themes like freedom, human dignity, and show how each express it. He would not, however, formulate a "teaching" that would disregard the nuances of each "teacher." This of course does not deny the validity of systematic theology; it is simply to say that systematic theology is not, properly speaking, biblical theology.

Spicq's moral theology, then, is a collection of major themes common to almost all the authors of the New Testament. To these he puts annexed themes which receive their illumination and proportion from the major themes. Spicq insists that his work is an essay. Other conceptions are legitimate, perhaps even more fecund. Following Augustine, Spicq hopes he will have our approval for having dared and, if it comes to that, our pardon for having failed.

The book is not quite the loose collection of themes these remarks would suggest. In the first Chapter, "Evolution of Moral from the Old to the New Covenant," Spicq shows how the old law is fulfilled first in Christ

himself, and secondly in the authentic moral life of charity. "For me to live is Christ " (Phil. 1:QQ) • Christ is our law; we are to enter into the very life of Christ, be assimilated to him. This is achieved especially through the Eucharist. " The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not the sharing of the blood of Christ? And the bread that we break, is it not the partaking of the body of the Lord? Because the bread is one, we though many, are one body, all of us who partake of the one bread" (1 Cor. 10:16). The Greek word translated as "sharing" is *koinonia,* which brings out the truth in Lehmann's idea. But Spicq notes that this sharing is to help us attain the end, "the union of charity with God" (p. 40).

Every response to Christ, whether of trust or fidelity or service, will be guided by the deepest and most pervasive response of all, which is charity. From Christ and from our response to Christ will flow (I) a deeper rectitude of conscience, (Q) a much more interior and positive moral life, and (3) a new freedom, ease and joy.

These five truths are the massive blocks on which Spicq rests his book. Chapter Q is on the new being and the new life, i. e. we belong to Christ. Chapter 3, on grace and glory, delineates the interior aspects of the belonging. The next four Chapters emphasize the positive aspects: of holiness in Chapter 4; of faith in Chapter 5; of hope in Chapter 6; of charity in Chapter 7, which is the whole law and the prophets. Chapter 8 discusses the rectitude of conscience; Chapter 9 the freedom, ease and joy of the children of God. Chapter 10 catches the entire moral life as a passage from the image of God in which man was created to the eschatological transformation, according to which he will be finally and fully "re-created" in Christ. In the 11th and last Chapter Spicq offers his thoughts on the characteristic traits of New Testament moral: it is unified, religious, baptismal (related to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), and full of encouragement.

We can only say that Spicq has our complete approval and gratitude for having dared, and he has no need of our pardon. The book is magnificent. All of us know men with great ideas but who are so much hemmed in by a desire for perfection they can never get them down on paper. Spicq's book is a sprawling and wonderful example of a mind with great ideas willing to risk "spoiling" their purity by getting them down. Just before he sets out his ideas on what biblical theology should be he admits that the final solution will come only in the execution, *solvuntur ambulando.* Spicq walks like a giant.

The book has the mark of incredible scholarship. The footnotes seem to refer to every book written in every language, not just by way of offering an erudite nod in their direction. Spicq has read them and knows what is in them. If there is a flaw in the book it would have to be this vacuum-cleaner approach. Not only every book but every text in scripture that has some relevance, however remote, to the author's point, is quoted. The reader feels himself to be in a kind of blizzard.

That flaw, however, is a virtue for the moral theologian who is willing to equip himself for winter weather and spend hours out in the Spicqian snowstorm. Great treasures are there, enormous trees, mountain flanks of research on individual themes. Spicq so illuminates many of the traditional moral tracts, beatitude, conscience, freedom, the theological virtues, etc. that a patient and judicious reading cannot help but enrich and give deep scriptural resonance to these tracts.

The lack of synthesis is a virtue, too. It leaves room for, rather, it demands, a system of some sort. Order is still something the human mind desires; still indispensable in teaching and learning. For that reason alone the systematic theologian will never go out of busines. But the business he is in simply requires deep familiarity with the scriptures and with what modern scholarship is saying about the scriptures. Spicq represents the best.

Regarding his deliberate avoidance of synthesis and his blizzard of scriptural texts we may introduce the remarks on our third book by askinj!;: if Spicq comes, can Aquinas be far behind? Father O'Brien's book is an excellent example of the kind of Thomistic scholarship needed to come after Spicq. Indeed, if we may keep our shaky metaphor alive for a few more lines, in the new Gilby-O'Brien edition of the *Summa,* and especially in the volume at hand, the winter is over and done, the spring has appeared in our land.

"Thomism," said Paul VI recently, "like every system in the tradition of the Schools, has experienced the danger of dryness and trifling subleties, as well as the inconvenience of scholastic formalism. But he went on to say that "far from being a system sterilely closed upon itself, (it) is capable of successfully applying its principles, its methods, and its spirit to the new tasks that the problems of our time propose to the reflection of Christian thinkers" (Address to the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Sept 11, 1965). The words are at once recognition of the legitimate complaints being made these days about Thomism and stirring challenge to Thomists to do something about them.

Original sin is one of the " problems of our time," and it is very much in "the reflection of Christian thinkers." "But where does by far the bulk, the whole ambulance load, of pain really come from? Where *must* it come from?" Lehmann, in this connection, quotes also Mitya Karamazov: "It's terrible what mysteries there are! I can't endure the thought that a man of lofty mind and heart begins with the ideal of the Madonna and ends with the ideal of Sodom. What's still more awful is that a man with the ideal of Sodom in his soul does not renounce the ideal of the Madonna. . .. God and the devil are fighting there, and the battlefield is the heart of man" (p. 320). Surely there is no subject more in the minds and hearts of modern men than this.

In his first Appendix O'Brien sets the tone of his work. He discusses in

a general way the attitudes towards original sin, including along the way some enlightening remarks about Luther, part of whose "formation must be understood as a reaction against a nominalist optimism which he mistook for the classical position of scholastic theology" (p. 106). O'Brien shows this rather convincingly. In his section on contemporary attitudes he cites Teilhard de Chardin, Berdyaev, Kafka, W. H. Auden, Adamov. The last named wrote: " What is this? I know first of all that I am. But why am I? All I know of myself is that I suffer. And if I suffer it is because at the origin of myself there is mutilation, separation. What am I separated from-1 cannot name it. But I am separated " (p. 108) . O'Brien accepts Martin Esslin's opinion that these words of Adamov reflect and are the basis of existential literature and of the theatre of the absurd. To men like Sartre, Becket, lonesco, original sin appears precisely as the meaninglessness of our lot.

With such an approach we have every confidence that O'Brien will not fall into the sterile Thomism of dry and trifling subtleties but will spend his energies in continuing the living tradition of St. Thomas who, in his tract on original sin, offers insights, O'Brien says, " that keep our thinking about this mystery worthy of a faith that is an assent to divine truth, not the acceptance of cruel divine whim to be justified by invented devices, or of a myth before which reason must remain mutely agnostic" (p. xxiii).

A second appendix, an historical outline, is important and valuable; and a third, a thematic conspectus of Catholic teaching, cites the pertinent modern texts. This reviewer does not understand clearly what O'Brien is saying about monogenism. He clearly states that we should observe the caution of Pius XII. "Had monogenism been *de fide* he (Pius) would have said so; he did not " (p. 117) . But on the next page O'Brien seems to say that *de facto* monogenism is practically *de fide.* It is my understanding of the famous *Humani Generis* text that Pius XII was leaving the door open precisely on this question. If Pius had meant polygenism as O'Brien seems to mean it-the appearance of many men who were not really men-there would be no problem about original sin, and Pius' words surely indicate that there is.

O'Brien's treatment of original sin in Scripture-the next two appendices –is a good example of the systematic theologian accepting his data from the biblical theologian. He depends quite openly on Dubarle's thoroughly modern study, *Le Peche Originel dans l'Ecriture,* as well as on studies by Rencken and Lyonnet. And again we see Paul VI's plea for an open Thomism come to fruition in O'Brien's scholarship. Four other appendices, " The Summa and Earlier Teaching," " Sin Caused by Origin," " Original Justice," and "Fallen Nature" are helpful.

The translation is sprightly and modern. It avoids all the Victorian mannerisms and Latinisms of the older translation and it makes marvelous

English of those phrases that everyone said had to be left in Latin. The rendering of the first part of the important text, q. 81, a. 1, is a good example. The Latin goes " *Et ideo alia via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam possunt considerari ut unu/1' homo, in quantum conveniunt in natura quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus omnes qui sunt unius communitatw reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota communitas quasi unus homo.* O'Brien translates: "Another approach, therefore, should be made. **It** is this. All who are born of Adam can be considered as one man by reason of sharing the one nature inherited from the first parent, even as in political matters all belonging to one community are reckoned to be like one body, and the whole community like one person." By dropping the *dicendo quod* completely and substituting, *It is thw,* O'Brien makes clean English out of Latin. The *in quantum* was always rendered *ina.ymuch as;* O'Brien's *by reason of* is better; so also is his *even as* for *secundum quod,* which used to be rendered *according to which.* Finally, *person* for *homo* is a creative touch, probably inspired by the use of the term " moral person " in our literature today. The rest of the translation is like that.

If the other volumes in this series stay to current problems and to the new work being done in scripture, if they are as deft in the handling of the Latin and as thorough with the historical data, if in a word they use Father O'Brien's text as a kind of working model, then we shall have in the Gilby-O'Brien *Summa* the chief instrument for the handing on of the solid doctrine of St. Thomas to our generation. **It** shall prove as nothing else can prove the resilience and youth of Thomism to skeptical and critical men. A final word of praise to McGraw-Hill Book Company: their taste has been impeccable.

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Dominican House of Studies
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Comparative Miracles. By RoBERT **D.** SMITH. St. Louis, **B.** Herder Book Co., 1965. pp. 184. *$5.95.*

Are Christian miracles unique, or is there, in fact, no gulf between Christian miracles and the prodigies of other faiths? The author, operating within the sphere of comparative religion, attempts an answer to this question by comparing the prodigies of history to see if any pre-eminence need be granted to the Christian miracles. Hence he does not attempt to prove the possibility of miracles, nor that God exists from the fact of miracles, but rather undertakes an historical survey of sigm meant to signify the favor of some ' superhuman ' intervention.

In order to pass judgment upon these signs, or better, prodigies, the author begins with the principle that any prodigy can be valid as long as it is worked in the light of some truth. This openminded approach must be tempered, however, by the inclusion of a number of critical measures which assist in judging both the historical veracity of the accounts of the prodigies and the ' superhumannesss ' of the event. With competence, the author uses these measures, such as the instantaneity of a cure, the visibility of a mystical event relative to cures, the doctor's diagnosis, evidence of an organic disease, and a cure surpassing the medical science of the time. With such stringent demands upon the prodigies of history by the author, very few come out as complete signs, that is, as signs of a superhuman intervention beyond any reasonable doubt. These few are the miracles of Christ.

The work is divided into three broad categories, the first being those signs contained under the general title of ' mystical ' phenomena, the second being cures, and the third, wonder-workers themselves. The conclusion of the investigation of mystical phenomena, such as ecstasy, occultists' tricks, visions, stigmata, inedia, levitation, bilocation, and the like, is that they all leave room for reasonable doubt and therefore do not constitute a complete sign. After examining pagan cures, Christian-Science cures, the cures of other more Christian bodies, and the Catholic cures as at Lourdes, again the author, by exposing some obvious frauds and some uncertain cases in the light of his critical apparatus, concludes that there is reasonable doubt found in each case except for the miracles at Lourdes. These latter seem to be unique, since they are often ·*instantaneous* cures of organic diseases which have been testified to by Doctors.

The first wonder-worker to be considered in the last section of the book is Mohammed. The author does an excellent job in criticizing the three miracles claimed by his followers (he himself only claimed one miracle or sign, and that was the Koran) . The detail of this critique will be welcome to those who know little about the Islam faith. Buddha, the pagan philosopher, Apollonius of Tyana, and the Christian saints also fall under the doubtful eye of the critical apparatus the author has assembled against their wonders.

The last chapter of the book is devoted to Christ, as we might have suspected. Of the wonder-workers, his miracles are the only ones which qualify as complete signs. We are lead to this conclusion, not only from comparison with the dubitable signs of the others previously examined, but also from the facts that Christ fulfilled the Old Testament prophecies very well, that witnesses of the miracle wrote them down during their lifetime (not the case with Mohammed, Budda, and the others, whose works sometimes had to wait for centuries to be recorded), and that all the Christians unanimously accepted Christ's miracles as signs confirming his message.

Finally, in spite of the great controversies against the Christians during their first years, non-Christians "raised no outcry against miraculous facts recorded in the Gospels." Christ's signs were unique then, in the history of miracles, as being complete signs.

On the whole, *Comparative Miracles* is well thought-out and constructed. However, precisely in its most important section, namely, the signs of Christ, it lets the reader down by neglecting much of the modern scriptural emphasis upon Christ's miracles as encounters with God. Would it not be in this very aspect that his miracles were really unique? Christ's proof-deeds were not only meant to *prove* the veracity of his message, but also to point the way to the Father as appearances, creative and living epiphanies of the love and justice of God now acting among men. This is how the semites reacted to Christ's deeds as well. Christ, in fact, seems to be the ultimate miracle, if miracle is to be taken, as the author himself says, as a "sign of [God's] special favor."

However, the author does establish the uniqueness of Christ's signs, taken in the traditional sense of motives of credibility, and as such, his work constitutes a fine offering in the field of comparative religion.

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BRIEF NOTICE

The De Grammatico of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy. By D. P. HENRY. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1964. Pp. 169. $4.95.

For his essay in interpretation of a medieval treatise on semantics the author has chosen a text that is both rich in difficulties and courageous in recognising them. In the eleventh century there were none of the accepted solutions which later became standard for many sophismata. The schematic format of that later-developed tradition is replaced for St. Anselm by the more tractable device of a dialogue between tutor and student, in which the obscurities and demands of a natural language can be brought to the surface in considerable detail. Professor Henry uses a good deal of historical knowledge, ancient and modern, to elucidate what is going on in this complex dialogue. His personal mirror for speculation is the Ontology of S. Lesniewski, a formalized system of logic sufficiently rich in means of expression not to impose its own solutions, which, while surely not essential to the task, very well pictorializes the needed distinctions. It seems that an approach through the theory of syntactical categories as handled by combinatorial logic might also have been useful, perhaps with less need of technical introduction. As a work of scholarship the book is to be especially commended for including the Latin text, and not appealing merely to the translation which is also provided.

<div align="right">Ivo THoMAs, 0. P.</div>

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Browning, Douglas, (editor), *Philosophers of Process.* New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. xv., 346. *$5.95.*

Concilium. Glen Rock: Paulist Press, 1965. Vol. 7. Roger Aubert, (ed.), *Historical Problems of Chttrch Renewal.* Pp. x., 179. $4.50.
    Vol. 8. Teodoro Jimenez-Urresti and Neophytos Edelby, (eds.), *Pastoral Reform in Church Government.* Pp. viii., 184. $4.50.
    Vol. 9. Christian Duquoc, 0. P., (ed.), *Spirituality in Church and World.* Pp. 166. $4.50.
    Vol. 10. Pierre Benoit, 0. P., (ed.), *The Human Reality of Sacred Scripture.* Pp.   with subject index to Vols. 1-10. $4.50.

Dillenschneider, Clement, C. Ss. R., *Christ the One Priest and We His Priests,* Vol.   Tr. Sister M. Ranelle, S. S. N.D.   St. Louis: B. Herder, 1965. Pp. $5.75.

Endres, Joseph, C. Ss. R., *Man as the Ontological Mean.*   Tr. E. H. Ziegelmeyer, S. J.   New York: Desclee, 1965. Pp. $4.50.

Fuchs, Josef, S. J. *Natural Law.* Tr. Helmut Reckter, S. J. and John A. Dowling. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965. Pp. 193. $4.50.

Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., *The Theological Virtues,* Vol. I *Faith.* Tr. T. K. Reilly, 0. P. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1964. Pp. 473 with index. $8.50.

Goerner, E. A., *Peter and Caesar.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1965. Pp.   with index. *$5.95.*

Harling, Nikolaus, *Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras.* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1965. Pp.   and glossary.

Harrington, Wilfrid, 0. P., *Introduction to Scripture.* Chicago: The Priory Press, 1965.
    Vol. 1 *Record of Revelation: the Bible.* Pp.   with index. $3.95.
    Vol.   *Record of the Promise: the Old Testament.* Pp. 396 with indices. $7.50.

Kiernan, Thomas, *Who's Who in the History of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1965. Pp. vii., 185. $6.00.

Luyten, N. A., O.P. (ed.), *Recherche et Culture: Taches d'Une Universite Catholique.* Switzerland: Fribourg, 1965. Pp. 328.   fr.

McMullen, Ernan (ed.), *The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy.* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963. Paperback. Pp. 325. $3.00.

Tresmontant, Claude, *Christian Metaphysics.* Tr. Gerald Slevin. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965. Pp. 148 with index. *$3.50.*

Rahner, Karl, S. J., *Spiritual Exercises.* Tr. Kenneth Baker, S. J. New York: Herder and Herder, 1965. Pp. 285 with glossary. $5.50.

Sikora, Joseph, *Inquiry into Being.* Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1965. Pp. 288 with index. Paperback. $3.25.

Smith, Robert D., *Comparative Miracles.* St. Louis: B. Herder, 1965. Pp. 180. Paperback. $2.75.

St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-
Vol. 21 (Ia Ilae, 40-48) *Fear and Anger.* Tr. John P. Reid, 0. P. Pp. 189 with appendices. $7.50.
Vol. 54 (Ilia, 46-52) *The Passion of Christ.* Tr. Richard T. A. Murphy, 0. P. Pp. 222 with appendices. $7.50.

Woelfl, Paul, S. J., *Politics and Jurisprudence.* Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1966. Pp. 310 with index. $3.25.