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THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

FEW CONCEPTS in modern philosophy are invested with such a variety of meanings as the concept of metaphysics. To many, metaphysics has no meaning at all because it does not even exist. To others, metaphysics is that part of philosophy dealing with mysterious and occult things that lie beyond the scope of our senses. For the majority of philosophers and scientists the term 'metaphysics' is synonymous with philosophy, as opposed to contemporary science. Among scholastics, there is a variety of opinions on its nature. Even Thomists disagree among themselves on both the nature of this science and on Saint Thomas' own metaphysics.

Saint Thomas explicitly analysed the nature of science and, consequently, of metaphysics in his Commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*. In his Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* his thought, though perhaps not so explicit, seems more complete and mature. When he wrote this Commentary nothing was known about the historical difficulties concerning the composition and unity of Aristotle's work. In spite of this, Saint

Thomas' thought in both books is always the same regardless of whether there is or is not a gradual evolution in Aristotle's own philosophical thought.

What is the nature of metaphysics? Are physics and metaphysics specifically distinct? What is the proper mode of abstraction to which metaphysics corresponds? The answer to these questions is closely related to the general methodology of sciences. Since science is primarily an intellectual knowledge, its division and specifications depend on that element which makes knowledge possible, namely, immateriality: "It is clear," says Aquinas, "that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge."¹ In the immateriality, and therefore in abstraction, lies the solution of our riddles.

Scientific abstraction presupposes a harmonious relationship between the object, upon which science falls, and the cognitive power that operates in order to acquire knowledge. Fundamentally, abstraction depends on the object; but formally, abstraction is an activity of the mind for it is only in the mind that the habit of science can exist. To understand the nature of metaphysics we have to bear in mind this double abstractive consideration. First, it is necessary to investigate the nature of the second operation of the mind, the judgment, for the purpose of applying the results to metaphysics. Secondly, and not less important, we shall investigate the nature of the objects upon which the judgment of metaphysics falls.

I. METAPHYSICS IS BORN

Nature of judgment.

"The intellect," says Aquinas, "has two operations, one called 'the understanding of indivisibles' by which it knows 'what' a thing is; and another by which it composes and divides, that is to say, by forming affirmative and negative enunciations. Now these two operations correspond to two prin-

¹ *Summa Theo.*, I, 14, 1.

ciples in things, the first operation regards the nature of a thing itself ... the second regards a thing's act of existing." ²

The second operation—the judgment—formally contains the truth, which is defined as: "the equation of thought and thing." ³ Accordingly, the judgment signifies the equation of the thing outside the mind with the concept of the thing in the mind, that is to say, the thing as known and expressed in the intellect by means of the enunciative word of the judgment. In other words, truth is the equation between what is said and enunciated *inside* the intellect, and the thing itself as it is *outside* the mind; the equation of reality and its enunciative word.⁴

The primary feature of a judgment may, therefore, be summarized by saying that it simply expresses reality as it is, without changes and subjective interpretations. This concept is of vital importance to our inquiry.

The judgment of separation in metaphysics.

Saint Thomas relates abstraction and two operations of the mind. The abstraction proper to physics and mathematics corresponds to simple apprehension.⁵ The judgment, however, bears upon metaphysics: "one with respect to the operation of the intellect composing and dividing which is properly called separation; and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics."⁶ So, the judgment proper to metaphysics is 'separation.'

If what was explained above is applied, now, to the judgment of separation it follows that if the judgment of metaphysics is truthful, that which the judgment separates *inside* the mind must be separated in reality, *outside* the mind. In Saint Thomas' words: "Since the truth of the intellect results from its conformity with the thing, clearly in this operation the intellect cannot truthfully abstract what is united in reality ...

² In *Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

³ *Summa Theol.*, I, 16, 1.

• Santiago Ramirez, O. P., *La Filo{lofia de Ortega y Gasset* (Barcelona, 1958),

p.

• In *Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

• *Ibid.*

the intellect can truthfully abstract things which are separated in reality, as when we say 'man is not an ass.'" ⁷

The first conclusion is therefore clear: the object of metaphysics exists in reality, outside the mind, separately.

The judgment of separation does not fall upon the act of existence as such.

Some believe that the judgment of separation falls upon the act of existence. This opinion, however, is totally foreign to Saint Thomas. The judgment of separation, it is true, falls upon existing beings, but not upon the existence of these beings as such. Existence is identical in all beings. Essence is the principle of distinction of existing beings, as Aquinas clearly says: "The distinction of beings is not due to their existence: since they agree in it ... hence things are distinguished because they have different natures, by which existence is acquired in different ways." ⁸

Does the judgment separate existence and essence? Then essence would not be part of the subject of metaphysics, which is absolutely false. Does the judgment separate existent beings from beings without existence? That makes even less sense. A certain wish to adapt to the contemporary philosophical trend of existentialism has prompted some scholars to direct their efforts in that direction, when in truth, it is essence that is the main concern of metaphysics. As Saint Thomas says: "Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ - Res ad invicem non distinguuntur secundum quod habent esse: quia in hoc conveniunt . . . relinquuntur ergo quod res propter hoc differant quod habent diversas naturas, quibus acquiratur esse diversimode." *Summa Contra Gentiles*, CI, "... Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum, hoc esse distinguitur ab illo esse, in quantum est talis vel talis naturae. Et per hoc dicit Dionisius quod licet viventia sint nobiliora quam existentia, tamen esse est nobilior quam vivere: viventia enim non tantum habent vitam, sed etiam cum vita simul habent et esse."-*De Potentia*, 7, 8; *De Verit.*, 1 ad 3; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, 1 ad 1.

definition of substance is not 'a being of itself without a subject,' nor is the definition of accident 'a being in a subject'; but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance to have existence not in a subject; while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident to have existence in a subject" ⁹

The explanation of the judgment of separation lies not in existence, but elsewhere.

The judgment of separation refers to separation from matter.

The judgment separates the concept of being as being from the concept of matter and mobility. As we say 'man is not an ass' because the concept of man and the concept of ass are different, we say in like manner that 'being as being is not material' on the ground that the concept of being and the concept of matter are different for, according to Aquinas: "There are still other objects of speculation which do not depend on matter with respect to their existence because they can exist without matter." ¹⁰

The judgment of separation expresses an ontological reality. Accordingly, the independence of being from matter presupposes the existence of immaterial beings. Metaphysics comes after physics or psychology which demonstrate the existence of these beings.¹¹ The new science is aptly named metaphysics, that is to say, post-physics; "for in the order of analysis it comes after physics." ¹²

Is the existence of immaterial beings an absolute necessity for metaphysics? If by metaphysics we mean a science specifically different from physics, then, their existence is absolutely necessary. Let us examine this necessity.

a) Aristotle and Aquinas say that if material beings were the only existing beings, then physics would be the first philosophy. Why? Because if all beings are material and mobile

• *Summa Theol.*, III, 77, 1 ad 2; "Sed naturalis et philosophus primus considerat essentias, secundum quod habent esse in rebus . . . et per hoc diversum modum essendi, dicunt esse diversa genera."-In *Boethii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 3.

¹⁰ In *Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1.

¹¹ In *IV Meta.*, l. 5, n. 593.

¹² In *Boethii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 2 ad 3; *Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 1.

the part of philosophy treating them would study and give explanation of 'all' beings, assuming thus the role of first philosophy.¹³

b) The demonstration of the existence of immobile beings constitutes the goal of the study of motion. The fact of motion, it is shown, implies the existence of an immobile motor. This motor is not part of the subject of physics, only its end,¹⁴ and since that 'motor-being' lies beyond the scope of physics, it needs to be considered by another science which embraces all beings: "But if there is a different nature and substance over and above natural substances, which is separable and immovable, there must be a science which differs from the philosophy of nature and is prior to it ... and universal."¹⁵

The demonstration of the spirituality of the human soul is also sufficient; anything immaterial or immobile implies the necessity of metaphysics: "in the world there are not only bodies but also certain incorporeal things, as is clear from 'The Soul.'"¹⁶

In a universe composed exclusively of material beings, it is clear that physics assumes the role of first philosophy, explaining all beings. But our universe is not so; the demonstration of the existence of immaterial beings has proved it. Therefore, the separation of the concept of being as being from materiality follows consequently upon the discovery of immaterial beings: "There are still other objects of speculation which do not depend on matter with respect to their existence because they can exist without matter."¹⁷ Physics is unable to deal with the problem of being so a new science is born, and it will delve

¹³ " --- that if there is no substance other than those which exist in the way that natural substances do, with which the philosophy of nature deals, the philosophy of nature will be the first science. But if there is some immobile substance, this will be prior to natural substance; and therefore the philosophy which considers this kind of substance, will be the first philosophy. And since it is first, it will be universal; and it will be its first function to study being as being.... " *In VI Meta.*, l. 1, n. 1170; *Ibid.*, III, l. 6, n. 398; IV, l. 5, n. 593.

^u *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 2 ad 3.

¹⁵ *In XI Meta.*, l. 7, n. 2267; *Ibid.*, IV, l. 5, n. 593.

¹⁶ *In I Meta.*, l. 12, n. 181.

¹⁷ *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1.

into the problem of being as such which now appears under a new light and a new formality: its immateriality.¹⁸

So, the first and most important judgment of metaphysics expresses the first and most important feature of reality: "The being as being is not material, it is immaterial."

II. NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

The whole of metaphysics is immaterial.

The judgment of separation seems to impair rather than to enhance the intelligibility of beings. On one hand we assert the independence of being from materiality. On the other, we are puzzled by the countless multitude of beings manifesting themselves as material and mobile. Are these material beings not beings? It seems that we face two kinds of beings, material and immaterial. How then is the science of metaphysics possible?

Here is an easy solution to the dilemma: metaphysics deals with immaterial beings such as the soul and God, leaving to physics the modest investigation of matter and motion. Those who are happy with this position fail to see its implication, namely, the death of metaphysics as first philosophy. The sphere of metaphysics would be restricted to a few spiritual beings, leaving totally untouched the thorny enigma of '*ens commune*.'

For others, metaphysics embraces all beings, material and immaterial, but in different ways. Treating spiritual substances it leaves behind all matter. But when metaphysics considers material beings, then, it does not separate from matter, but treats these beings as they are, material and mobile. This attitude is common, even sensible, but it presupposes a distressing confusion of the material and formal object of metaphysics.

In truth, metaphysics always does without matter, and not

¹⁸ - --- But if there is some immobile substance, this will be prior to substance; and therefore the philosophy which considers this kind of substance, will be first philosophy. And since it is first, it will be universal; and it will be its function to study being as being, both what being is and what the attributes are which belong to being as being."-In *VI Meta.*, l. I, n. II 70.

only in treating spiritual beings, but all kind of beings, material and immaterial. It seems puzzling, but there lies the solution which baffles the philosopher and confuses the scientist.

1. This position is explicitly asserted by Aquinas in the Proemium of *Metaphysics* and in many other places: "... Now although the subject of this science is being in general, the 'whole of it' is predicated of those things which are separated from matter both in their intelligible constitution and in being (esse) ... not only ... God and the intellectual substance, but also ... being in general. This could not be the case, however, if their being depended on matter." ¹⁹

2. The unity of science depends on the unity of its subject, formally considered, not materially. And this formality depends in its turn on the mode of immateriality. So if there is one science of metaphysics and not two, its immateriality has to be the same in all its parts. If metaphysics does without matter in dealing with spiritual substances, and uses matter in dealing with material substances, then, evidently, there are two immaterialities and two metaphysics, because as Aquinas says: "The different genera of knowable things are distinguished according to the different modes of knowing just as those things which are defined with matter are known in one way, and those things which are defined without matter in another." ²⁰

Those who ascribe two immaterialities to metaphysics do violence to the Aristotelian methodology of sciences.

3. "The terminus of knowledge, in natural sciences," says Aquinas, "must be in the sense ... ; and knowledge in mathematics must terminate in the imagination On the other hand, there are some things which transcend both what falls under the sense and what falls under the imagination, as those that are entirely independent of matter Therefore in divine science we should go neither to the imagination nor to the

¹⁹ *In Proemium Meta.; Ibid.*, XI, l. 7, n. VI, l. 1, n. 1163; "Philosophia prima est specialis scientia, quamvis considerat ens secundum quod est omnibus commune, quia specialem rationem entis considerat secundum quod non dependet a materia et motu."-*In II Sent.*, d. a. sol. *In I Phys.*, I, 1, nn. 1-3.

²⁰ *In I Post., Anal.*, l. 41, n. 11.

senses." ²¹ The metaphysical judgment always terminates in the intellect, beyond the external and internal senses. This is a further confirmation of the total immateriality of its subject.

4. Matter and motion as such do not come directly under metaphysical consideration: "But to say that a heaven should be both separated and mobile is impossible, because nothing separated from matter can be mobile." ²² Mobility implies necessarily the existence of matter, because prime matter is the first principle of motion. ²³

In addition, St. Thomas asks in the commentary of Boethius: "Does divine science treat of what exists without matter and motion?" He answers: "The philosopher says ... that first philosophy deals with things which can exist separately, that is, from matter and with immobile things ... so divine science abstracts from matter and motion." ²⁴ He does not say that 'part of metaphysics' abstracts from motion and matter, but simply 'metaphysics.'

So, metaphysics considers all being under the same immateriality and the same abstraction. Metaphysics is one, and always does without matter.

The immateriality of metaphysics is 'precisive.'

1. The judgment of separation does not positively preclude matter. This occurs with spiritual substances, and their science is theology: "First in the sense that it is not of the nature of the thing called separated to be able in no way to exist in matter and motion, as God and the angels ... the theology of Sacred Scripture treats of beings separated in the first sense as its subject." ²⁵

2. The judgment of separation is 'precisive'; namely, it does without matter in the sense that matter is not positively precluded nor is it positively included. Matter is not positively

²¹ *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 2.

²² *In III Meta.*, l. 7, n. 411.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, V, l. 15, n. 987.

². *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

precluded because then metaphysics would be the science of spiritual substance only, which it is not. On the other hand, matter is not included either, for this would transform metaphysics into a physics dealing with mobile beings. The concept of being is not opposed to the concept of materiality; materiality simply is not included, and consequently, its '*ratio*' or formal concept is not material: "in the sense that it is not of the nature of that which is separated to exist in matter and motion."²⁶

This is so because being and its attributes do not universally exist in matter, for example, substance, potency, act, and being itself and this could not be the case if their being depended on matter: "we say they are separated because it is not of their nature to be in matter and motion, although sometimes they are in matter and motion, as animal abstracts from reason, although some animals are rational."²⁷

The concept 'animal,' neither includes nor excludes both rationality and irrationality; neither attribute is of its essence. In like manner, the concept of being as such does without matter because matter is not of the essence of its formal concept, though it is not necessarily part of this concept not to possess matter either, since there are material beings.

Even in material beings, the concept of being does not include matter. Material beings are not material as beings, but as they are 'such beings,' namely, material. Aquinas, foreseeing the difficulties which baffle so many, raises the question whether matter and motion are objects of metaphysics. After all, they are also beings and metaphysics cannot dispense with them. He solves the difficulty with his usual clarity: "the metaphysician deals with individual beings too, not with regard to their special natures in virtue of which they are special kinds of being, but insofar as they share the common character of being. And in this way matter and motion also fall under his consideration."²⁸

Metaphysics regards matter and motion as sharing the common notion of being. Physics studies a special kind of being,

•• *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, ad 5; *Summa Theol.*, I, 3, 4 ad 1; *De Pot.*, 7, 12 ad 6; *Ibid.*, 3, 16 ad 4.

²⁸ *In Jq(1th),# Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4 ad 6.

namely, mobile being. **It** is a principle of metaphysics to leave to particular sciences the role of investigating particular beings. And it is worth noticing, as Cajetan says, that metaphysical beings are not compared to physical beings as universal wholes to their subjective parts, but rather as formal is related to material.²⁹ The material object of metaphysics embraces all beings-material, immaterial, substances, and accidents, even individuals. But metaphysics considers these objects under the same formality: being as being. And it considers all these objects in the light of total immateriality.

The subject of metaphysics.

The subject of a science is that "whose proper passions and *per se* accidents demonstration shows."³⁰ Science investigates the principles, causes, elements, properties, and proper accidents of its subject.

The subject of metaphysics is "being," "common being," "being as being and the quiddity of being." These are expressions of a unique reality. What kind of reality is "common being"?

1. **It** is real, as opposed to the being of reason whose existence is only in the mind. So, logic and metaphysics do not share the same subject, though both are universal sciences.⁸¹

It is created, because only created things belong to the ten categories. God is not part of the subject of this science.

3. The being of metaphysics is primarily considered as essence, divided in the ten predicaments: "But being as divided by the ten categories signifies the very nature of the ten categories insofar as they are actual or potential."³² So, although it is true that this being, as opposed to the object

²⁹ Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, *Commentaria in De Ente et Essentia* (Taurini, 1934), p. 7.

⁸⁰ *In I Post. Anal.*, 1. 15, n.3.

⁸¹ *In I Sent.*, d. 19, 5, 1 ad 1.

⁸² *In X Meta.*, 1. 3, n. 1982; *Aliam entis extra animam sive prout ens in rerum natura, et tunc significat rei essentiam extra animam existentis.*"-*In I Sent.*, d. 19, 5, 1 ad 1; "significat naturam decem generum."-*De Malo*, 1, 1 ad 19; "Significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem praedicamenta."-*Summa contra Gentiles*,

of logic, is real and existent, existence as such is not the primary concern of metaphysical investigation.

4. Substance is the principal object of metaphysics because substance is "the first and principal being."³³ This science considers the principles, causes, elements, properties, and proper accidents of substance. Metaphysics embraces all substances insofar as they share the common genus, that is to say, *entia per se*,³⁴ but not insofar as they are 'such substances,' unless they are spiritual, as in the case of the human soul whose investigation properly belongs to metaphysics. The investigation of the soul belongs to psychology only insofar as the soul is considered as the form and principle of motion of the body.

Metaphysics also studies the accidents proper to all substances because every science considers both the subject and the proper accidents and passions of the subject as well.³⁵ Metaphysics, however, does not investigate the particular accidents of being that pertain to particular sciences, e. g., motion to physics, and measurement to mathematics.

Demonstration in metaphysics.

Insofar as metaphysics investigates the essence of the ten predicaments it demonstrates chiefly through the formal cause: "Hence inasmuch as this science considers being, it considers the formal cause before all the rest."³⁶ In this sense the consideration of metaphysics is analytic, not synthetic as in physics.

Metaphysics also demonstrates through the efficient and final causes. On the other hand, since its object is always abstracted from matter, the material cause, in the strict sense, is precluded: "To consider the material cause in itself does not belong to it in any way, because matter is not properly a cause of being

III, 9; "Hoc nomen ens, secundum quod importat rem . . . significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem genera."-*Quodlib.* Q, 3; Nomen rei exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis."-*De Verit.*, 1, 1.

³³ *In II Met-a.*, I, 5, n. 391.

•• *Ibid.*, XI, I, 1, n. 2153.

•• *Ibid.*, II, I, 4, n. 318; *In II Phys.*, 3, n. 1.

³⁶ *In II Meta.*, I, 4, n. 384.

but of some definite kind of being, namely, mobile substance." ³⁷ Wherefore St. Thomas summing up the diverse ways of demonstration due to the sciences says: "Not every science demonstrates through all the causes. For mathematics demonstrates only through the formal causes. Metaphysics through the formal and final causes principally but also through the agent. Natural science, however, demonstrates through all the causes." ³⁸

The way of demonstration of metaphysics is a further proof of the total immateriality of its subject.

God is not part of the subject of metaphysics.

God does not enter into this science as its subject, but as the principle and cause of being. To every scientific discipline belongs not only the study of its subject, but also that of the cause of its subject. The purpose of a science is the knowledge of its subject, and this is achieved when we know the subject's properties, causes, and principles. ³⁹ Sometimes these causes and principles are not complete and independent beings, but essential elements of the subject, as, for instance, matter and form in natural science. In this case the principles are parts of the subject, and the consideration of them belongs to the science of the subject whose principles they are. ⁴⁰ On the other hand, when the causes are complete and independent in themselves, they are not integral parts of the subject, but external to it. The study of these causes and principles in themselves will belong to another distinct science. ⁴¹ This is the case with metaphysics, which is concerned with: (a) the properties of being as being, and (b) the causes of this being (final and efficient), namely, God. Since God is the proper cause of being, metaphysics considers God not in Himself, but in His effect, being.

It is impossible, therefore, to have a philosophical science whose subject is God. From the knowledge of being as such,

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *In I Phys.*, 1, n. 5.

³⁹ *In Proem. Meta.*; *In I Post. Anal.*, l. 15; *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4.

⁴⁰ *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

we can demonstrate no more than God's existence, and some of His attributes: Creation, conservation, providence, goodness, and love. But even this little bit is the most valuable part of metaphysics.⁴²

Metaphysics and the " primum cognitum."

It is important to distinguish between the concept of 'being-as-such' and the concept of being which we acquired in our first cognitive notions. The first concept which falls under our apprehension is being, and this concept contains in act, although confusedly, all beings, because outside this concept literally nothing exists. One must avoid the danger of identifying this concept of being and that of 'being-as-such.' The former is superficial and confused knowledge; it is easily grasped and is common. The latter abstracts from all matter and is acquired only after a protracted intellectual analysis: " and so the ultimate end of this kind of analysis is the consideration of being and the properties of being as being . . . it is learned after physics and the other sciences inasmuch as intellectual consideration is the end of rational consideration" ⁴³ Metaphysics comes at the end of a long road and presupposes a profound meditative and reflective judgment on the concept of being. Materially, not formally, the first cognitive notions and the subject of metaphysics are identical.⁴⁴ Cajetan observes that the being of metaphysics is known formally only by a few.⁴⁵

III. THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICS

The unity of metaphysics depends on the unity of the concept of being, its subject. And since the idea of being varies accord-

•• *In I Meta.*, 1. 8, n. 60.

⁴³ *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 6, 1 ad 3.

.. "Propter quod haec duo sunt simul cera, et quod huiusmodi termini sunt primi cogniti ab homine cognitione intellectuali confusa atque imperfecta per simplicem apprehensionem, et quod sunt ultimo ab eo cogniti cognitione intellectuali distincta et perfecta per viam iudicii reflexivi atque resolutionis."-Santiago Ramirez, O. P., *De Ordine* (Salamanca 1968), p. 96.

⁴⁵ - Secundo modo ens est terminus metaphysicalis; et forte adhuc viris doctissimis non innotuit."-Cajetanus, *Commentaria in De Ente Essentia*, p. 6.

ing to different philosophical schools, so, also, does its unity.

If the essence of substance is numbers, as seems to be Pythagoras' and Plato's thought, then the unity corresponding to metaphysics comes to the unity proper to numbers, that is to say, quantitative and absolute.⁴⁶

For Parmenides, the concept of being shares the quality of a genus, imparting the same signification to all the inferiors. So the unity of metaphysics is again absolute and perfect, unity proper to a nature which is the same in all its parts.⁴⁷

Aristotle fought bitterly the univocist conception of being. Being is not univocal and uniform but, at the same time, one and diverse, equal and different. The unity of being, consequently, cannot be the numerical unity of Pythagoras, nor Parmenides's generic unity. Its unity is analogous.⁴⁸

St. Thomas, following the Greek philosopher, rejects the static and univocal conception of Parmenides in both the book of physics and metaphysics.⁴⁹ Being is analogous,⁵⁰ not univocal and so metaphysics in its search for unity has to find it in the unity proper to analogy-not univocity. What kind of analogy corresponds to being? The concept of being is analogous with the analogy of intrinsic attribution, and this analogy presupposes a common perfection which is partaken by all its inferiors according to different degrees. In addition, it implies causality from which the analogy stems.⁵¹

The unity corresponding to attribution is not perfect inasmuch as its formal concept applies to its inferiors with a certain

•• *In IV Meta.*, l. fl, nn. 556-560.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, I, l. 9, n. 139.

•• *Aristotle, IX Meta.*, II 1, 1053b 10-15.

•• *In I Phys.*, 7, n. 11; *In I Meta.*, l. 9, n. 139.

•• *In IV Meta.*, l. 1, n. 534.

⁵¹ "Analogum analogia attributionis intrinsecae dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius, et dividitur in partes vel modos suos sicut totum potentiate in partes potentias. Quinque condiciones huiusmodi analogi: a.) quod habeat unum primum et maximum ad quod cetera referantur vel a quo cetera dependeant, b.) quod illud primum sit, qua tale, principium et causa ceterorum secundum aliquod genus causae, c.) quod ideo illudmet participetur a ceteris secundum prius et posterius, d.) quod det eis formam et perfectionem, e.) quod ponatur in definitione eorumdem inferiorum analogatorum qua talium." Santiago Ramirez, O. P., *De Ordine*, p. fl71.

unity mixed with diversity. The unity is due to the first analogue to which all the inferiors refer; its diversity, to the different relations with which these inferiors refer to the common term.⁵² These references are not based on abstraction like those of a universal whole with respect to its subjective parts. The analogous references stem from causality, imply subordination, and presuppose a single term.⁵³ For instance, in the concept 'healthy,' the first analogue, and consequently the giver of unity, resides in the 'health of man.' But this term is also applied to food, air, color, etc., inasmuch as these things refer to the health of man following a cause-effect relationship. The unity lies in human health because human health is the only term to which all the things are referred. The multiplicity resides in the different relationships to man's health. Thus the unity in the diversity.

Unity of substance and accidents.

To being as being corresponds a double intrinsic analogy of attribution: the first unifies substances and accidents; the second unifies God and creatures: "and so, in a certain hierarchical order all beings are reduced to certain principles."⁵⁴

The unity of being, of course, cannot be the unity proper to a genus. Being-as-such transcends these ten supreme categories and is common to all of them.⁵⁵ So, its unity is analogous because the concept of being is endowed with all properties characteristic of the analogy of intrinsic attribution.

1. Substance is the first analogue to which all accidents refer in one way or in another: "Others are called beings because they are affections or properties of substances . . .

⁵² - The same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and same thing . . . different inasmuch as they simply imply different relationships . . . according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing." *In IV Meta.*, l. I, n. 536.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, n. 536.

⁵⁴ *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4.

⁵⁵ - --- et ideo ens dicitur per prius de substantiis et per posterius de aliis; et ideo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis, quia nullum genus praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis speciebus."-*De Principiis Naturae*, Chapter 6.

others because they are processes toward substance, as generation and motion . . . others because they are corruptions of substances . . . again, certain qualities or accidents are called being because they are productive or generative principles of substances." ⁵⁶

2. Substance is the cause and principle of all accidents: "The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause of its proper accidents. **It** is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accidents." ⁵⁷ That is to say, the accidents refer to substance as one and the same thing, reference being based in a triple causality, efficient, final, and material.

3. Substance and accidents partake the concept of being in a certain hierarchical order. First is substance, then accidents, and among these there is also a subordination: "Accidents, however, befall substance in a definite order. Quantity comes first, then quality, then passions and motion," ⁵⁸ and finally relation.

4. The accidents partake the perfection of being due to substance: "even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being." ⁵⁹

Since the unity of metaphysics depends upon that of being, its unity is analogous. The unity emerges from substance to which all accidents refer. The diversity arises from the variety of relations with which the accidents are related to substance. **It** is the imperfect unity, mixed with diversity, proper to analogy.

Unity of God and creatures.

The distance between God and creatures is infinite. Nevertheless, there is a relation which gives unity to Creator and creatures. The unity is analogous and based in causality; God is the proper and adequate cause of all beings. The reduction

⁵⁶ *In IV Meta.*, I, 1, n. 539; "... omnia dicuntur ens ex eo quod attribuuntur substantiae, quae est subjectum aliorum."-*De Principiis Naturae*, Chapter 6.

⁵⁷ *Summa Thea.*, I, 77, 6 ad 2.

⁵⁸ *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3; *In IV Meta.*, I, 1, nn. 539-543.

⁵⁹ *Summa Thea.*, I-II, 88, 1 ad 1.

to unity, though similar, is not identical to the case of substance and accidents, as Aquinas demonstrates: "Creator and creatures are reduced to one, not with the unity proper to univocity, but proper to analogy. And such ... can be twofold: first, inasmuch as some beings share one perfection according to different degrees ... as substance and accidents. Secondly, inasmuch as one receives existence and nature from another, such is the analogy corresponding to creature and Creator. Creatures do not have existence unless they receive it from First being, and cannot be called beings unless they imitate Him." ⁶⁰

Metaphysics does not consider God directly, but indirectly, as the ultimate explanation and proper cause of the created being. And it is noteworthy that for metaphysics, the first analogate is not God but substance. God's causality refers to substance, the principal subject of this science.⁶¹

The hierarchy of beings and the primacy of substance are cornerstones for the understanding of metaphysics. If the subordination is overlooked, then, the formality of this science is lost, reducing metaphysics to a motley variety of disconnected material objects. Metaphysics refers everything to substance, its principle subject. The more other beings resemble substance, the more they fall under the consideration of metaphysics. And since, as has been shown, substance is immaterial, the rest of beings through their reference to it partake of the immateriality, ⁶² and the formality of substance in the same way as in theology all objects, material and immaterial, share the immateriality of God to Whom they refer: "about creatures insofar as they are referred to God either as a principle or an end." ⁶³

Although Thomists unanimously agree, in theory, with regard to immateriality as the formality of sciences, they forget the

⁶⁰ *In I Sent.*, prolog., q. 1, 2 ad 2.

⁶¹ "Deum vero sive ens increatum, indirecte et propter ens creatum, veluti causam propriam et primam eius." Santiago Ramirez, O.P., *De Ordine*, p. SSO.

⁶² "... non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa nisi in ordine ad unum, ex quo habet unitatem."-*Summa Theol.*, I-II, 54, 4.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, I, 1, S ad 1.

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

principle in practice, especially in metaphysics. And no wonder, because our intellects are not metaphysical like God's and the angels', but rather physical, as long as we are pilgrims on earth. So, metaphysics: "is not a human possession . . . nor again is it subject to man's command, because man cannot acquire it perfectly." ⁶⁴

After all, Saint Thomas himself explains our limitations, and justifies our failures.

IV. METAPHYSICS AS A POTENTIAL WHOLE

Metaphysics as a science is also a whole because all the sciences partake of the nature of a whole. There are three kinds of whole, explained by Saint Thomas in this way:

It must be observed that there are three types of whole. One is universal, which is present to each part in its complete essence and power; hence it is properly predicated of its parts, as when we say: man is an animal. A second type is an integral whole, which is found in any one of its parts neither in its full essence nor by virtue of its total power; in no way, then, is it predicated of a part, for example: a wall is not a house. A third type of whole is a potential whole, which is a mean between the other two; for it is present to each of its parts in its complete essence, but not in all its power. Consequently, it is predicated in a manner which is midway between that of other two types: for it is sometimes predicated of its parts, but not properly. ⁶⁵

The potential whole bears upon metaphysics, and its properties are as follows: 1. All its parts share the essence of the whole. The parts do not share the total virtuality of the whole, and among them some partake of this virtuality more than others. 3. As a consequence of the two first conditions, a potential whole implies order and subordination: the inferior parts are subordinated to the superior according to the degree of participation of the power of the whole.

For example, the human soul is a potential whole in respect to its three different functions, intellective, sensitive, and vegetative. These three functions partake of the essence of the soul

•• *In I Meta.*, I, 3, n. 60.

•• *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 2 ad 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, 77, I ad 1.

but not the totality of its power. In addition, the vegetative soul is subordinated to the sensitive, and both to the intellectual to which they are ordained. The supreme function of the soul is intellectual, but even this function does not share the complete virtuality of the soul, illustrating thus the nature of a potential whole.

Metaphysics, because of its material object, is an integral whole. It contains many different parts upon which its consideration falls, such as substance, quantity, quality, act, potency, essence, existence, and so forth. Integral parts are common to all the sciences. All of them have material parts, brought together by the unitive power of the habit.⁶⁶

In addition, metaphysics makes a potential whole: "The same is to be observed in potential whole, wherein one part is more perfect than another; . . . For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of a higher degree; and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based."⁶⁷

Metaphysics is a sort of potential whole in possession of a variety of functions: it is wisdom, science, and understanding. As science, it derives conclusions from principles. As understanding, it uses the first principle of knowledge. Metaphysics is also wisdom, containing virtually and in a high degree the qualities of science and understanding. As wisdom it is superior to understanding because: "wisdom makes uses of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding."⁶⁸

Metaphysics as wisdom also contains in a superior way the habit of science, because metaphysics considers the objects in a deeper way than particular sciences, judging their conclu-

⁶⁶ Santiago Ramirez, O. P., *De Ordine*, p. 32.

⁶⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, 57, 2 ad 2; *In II Post. Anal.*, 20, n. 15.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, I-II, 66, 5 ad 4.

sions and resolving them with the first principles of knowledge and not only with their own proper principles as particular sciences do.

Let us see, therefore, how metaphysics, as a potential whole, exercises these functions.

The functions of metaphysics with respect to its proper object.

a) *Scientific functions.*

1. Metaphysics considers both the common concepts, and proper properties of being as being. These concepts and properties are found in all the sciences. But, precisely as they are common to all sciences, in no way can they be proper to any of them, because what is proper in one science cannot be proper in another. They are proper to being as being which all the sciences share: "Whatever principle pertains to all beings, and not just to one class of beings distinct from the others, belongs to the consideration of the philosopher."⁶⁹ And so, metaphysics considers these concepts, common possession of all sciences and all men-oneness, goodness, truth, beauty, analogy, identity, distinction, similitude, equality, act, potency, finity, infinity, necessity, contingency, essence, existence, cause, effect and so forth.

The analysis of these common concepts and properties is through the formal cause. It is a consideration proper to metaphysics in its scientific function.

2. Metaphysics treats also the ten supreme categories. It studies their essences, principles, properties, causes, and the relation among them. Again, metaphysics is here a science, and derives conclusion through the formal and final causes chiefly, and also through the efficient cause and material cause *in qua*, not the strict material cause.

b) *Sapiential functions of metaphysics with respect to its object.*

1. Metaphysics considers first principles, chiefly the principles of contradiction, identity, and exclusive medium. These

•• *In XI Meta.*, l. 4, n.

principles are the foundation and root of all knowledge and as such they are indemonstrable. Metaphysics does not attempt the foolish task of trying to demonstrate them. But since the formulation of these principles depends upon the apprehension of the first concepts, metaphysics, as wisdom, grasps and penetrates them with a better insight than does understanding, and consequently, knows better the principles which depend upon them: "Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom." ⁷⁰

The defense of these principles is also an important function of metaphysics, especially now that criteriology is a relevant part of philosophy. Criteriology belongs to metaphysics, not to logic, nor to psychology as many believe: "The inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them; but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz., metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concedes nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objection." ⁷¹

The defensive function of metaphysics goes beyond the defense of the first principles and is exercised also against those who deny the possibility of knowledge, the existence of motion, the reality of the external world, etc. How metaphysics defends the principles and conclusions of particular sciences we will treat later.

Metaphysics is wisdom with respect to the first causes and principles of its object. Metaphysics shows the essential dependence of the whole universe on God, an important sapiential function that presupposes the investigation of the ultimate causes of being as being: "Although the first cause, namely, God, is not part of the essence of created beings, existence, which is inherent in created beings, cannot be understood unless

⁷⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, 66, 5 ad 4; *In I Meta.*, I, n. 46; *Ibid.*, IV, I, 5, nn. 588-598.

ⁿ *Summa Theol.*, I, 1, 8.

it is derived from divine existence, in the same way as a proper effect cannot be understood unless it is derived from its proper cause." ⁷²

Metaphysics as wisdom delves deeply into reality and searches the root and causes of being, its subject. It finds the essential dependence of being from God, who is, as well, the final cause of the universe and motion: "But even though they are immobile in themselves, they are nevertheless the cause of motion in other things after the manner of an end." ⁷³ Hence it especially pertains to metaphysics to consider the final cause.

8. The supreme sapiential function of metaphysics is the contemplation of the order of the universe: "As the philosopher says ... it is the business of the wise man to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the most powerful perfection of reason whose characteristic is to know order." ⁷⁴

The good of the universe is *bonum ordinis* ⁷⁵ which manifests itself in a two-fold way, first, in the order of the different parts of the universe among themselves, and secondly, in the order of the whole universe with respect to its end which is God. It belongs to metaphysics to contemplate both orders but specially to contemplate the latter because: "This is the principle order, for the sake of which the first exists." ⁷⁶

Metaphysics considers the order of beings, their hierarchy, the subordination of accidents to substance, the diversity of the different kingdoms of animals, plants, and minerals as well as their relations and dependence. But even more important is the contemplation of the subordination of the whole universe with respect to man. Metaphysics finds in man the purpose and end of the whole material *cosmos*,⁷⁷ reaching, thus, the following conclusion: "... subsistent intelligences are guided by divine providence for their own sakes, and other things for their sake, in this sense, that the good things which

⁷² *DIJ Pot.*, 3, 5 ad 1; *Ibid.*, ad 2.

⁷³ *In III Meta.*, l. 4, n. 384.

⁷⁴ *In I Ethic.*, l. 1, n. 1.

⁷⁵ *In III Sent.*, d. 6, 3, 1 arg. sed contra.; *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, 49.

⁷⁶ *Irt I Smt.*, d. 44, 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, 103, 2 ad 3.

are given them by divine providence are not given them for the profit of any other creature: while the gifts given to other creatures by divine ordinance make for the use of intellectual creatures ... The final end of the universe being God, the intellectual nature alone attains Him in Himself by knowing Him and loving Him." ⁷⁸

Even more, metaphysics does not stop in man and, ultimately, finds in the love of God the final explanation of the universe and man: "The love of God infuses and creates goodness." ⁷⁹ Creation, conservation, motion, and providence are but manifestations of this love. No wonder that metaphysics is so important for: "however small the amount of divine knowledge that the intellect may be able to grasp, that will be for the intellect, in regard to its ultimate end, much more than the perfect knowledge of lower objects of understanding." ⁸⁰ Therefore, metaphysics must consider the highest and universal end of all things, and in this way all the other sciences are subordinated to it as an end.⁸¹

And so, the natural beatitude of man, as man, consists in the description of the order of the whole universe.

Functions of metaphysics with respect to other sciences.

a) All the particular sciences borrow from first philosophy the concepts common to all the sciences, such as cause, effect, similitude, substance, accident, relation, essence, existence, etc. The particular sciences use these concepts analogously and adapted to their proper subjects. But since these common notions properly belong to metaphysics, it is to metaphysics that the explanation and defense of them belong, and not to the particular sciences which do not use them in their whole domain but rather contracted to their particular subjects. ⁸²

⁷⁷ "Omnes creaturas corporales ordinantur ad spirituales, et totus motus deserviens generationi et corruptioni ordinatur ad generationem hominis."-In Heb., 1, lect. 5, n. 75.

⁷⁸ *Summa contra Gentiles*, III,

⁷⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I, *Ibid.*, 44, 4.

⁸⁰ *Summa contra Gentiles*, III,

⁸¹ *In I Meta.*, l. 8, n. 59.

⁸² *In IV Meta.*, l. 15, nn. 590-595; *Ibid.*, XI, l. 4, n. *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 17.

b) The particular sciences also borrow from metaphysics the general principles of knowledge: the principle of contradiction, identity, etc., as explained above. The sciences utilize them with analogy, adapted to their particular subject. First philosophy assumes the role of defending and explaining them, even when contracted to a particular subject.⁸³

c) The definition of the subject of sciences is the principle of demonstration of properties of this subject. From their subjects the sciences derive conclusions. But it is a well known principle of methodology that the particular sciences neither prove the existence of their subjects, nor are capable of discovering their natures. **It** is the task of metaphysics to do it, and so, the particular disciplines are subordinated to first philosophy, in a certain way: "Therefore the other particular sciences make 'no mention of,' i.e., they do not investigate the 'whatness' or quiddity of a thing and the definition signifying it. But they proceed 'from this,' i.e., from the 'whatness' itself of a thing, to other things, using this as an already established principle for the purpose of proving other things."⁸⁴

It is obvious that particular sciences cannot defend their principles. Such would imply a vicious circle, that is to say, the defense of the principle by the same principle, or by means of the conclusion which in its turn presupposes the principle. Metaphysics, as supreme wisdom, comes to their defense: "**It** is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz., metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles ..."⁸⁵

d) The task of metaphysics is not to derive conclusions proper to other sciences. **It** must, however, judge the conclusions of the particular disciplines, and should reject them when they are opposite to its own.⁸⁶ For example, if physics teaches

⁸³ *In IV Meta.*, 1, 5, n. 591.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, VI, l. 1, n. 1148.

⁸⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I, 1, 8; *Summa contra Gentile!*, III, 25.

⁸⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I, 1, 6 ad 2.

that motion is possible without a motor, then, metaphysics denies the validity of this conclusion as opposite to a more general principle, and one which is absolutely certain, namely, everything that goes from potency to act requires a being in act.

e) Metaphysics, as wisdom, directs all other sciences to its own proper end. The different functions of a potential whole are subordinated to each other, and therefore the inferior sciences are ordered to the superior, and all of them to metaphysics: " So, the practical arts are ordered to the speculative ones, and likewise every human operation to intellectual speculation, as an end. Now, among all the sciences and arts which are thus subordinated, the ultimate end seems to belong to the one that is preceptive and architectonic in relation to the others In fact, this is the way first philosophy is related to the other speculative sciences."⁸⁷

Metaphysics with respect to philosophy and itself.

Metaphysics is the only discipline capable of speculating on the nature, division, properties, and methods of philosophy as such, in itself. Logic is impotent because it deals with the being of reason, while philosophy deals with the real. Physics treats only mobile beings, and, obviously, philosophy is not mobile being. Mathematics studies quantity as measurable and the nature of philosophy is not that of quantity.

Speculation about this thorny problem belongs to metaphysics as wisdom. And it entails great difficulty because it implies reflection upon our own thought, which is even more difficult than the reflection proper to logic, and sometimes to psychology. The more immaterial the knowledge, the more it is capable of reflection.⁸⁸ And since metaphysics is the most immaterial of the sciences, the speculation which implies the maximum reflection should belong to it. Why is this reflection so difficult to achieve? Because the reflection proper to psychology falls upon the act of the intellect as vital; the reflection proper to logic upon the intentions made by our mind;

⁸⁷ *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, 4.

•• *De Verit.*, 1, 9; *Summa Theol.*, I, 14, 2 ad 1.

but the reflection required to speculate the concept of philosophy does not fall upon the act or the intention of the mind, but upon the consideration with which it deals with the concept of philosophy in the abstract. From that maximum reflection comes, as a consequence, the philosophy of philosophy in itself.⁸⁹

In addition, to metaphysics, as wisdom, belongs not only the contemplation of the admirable order of the universe and its Creator, but also the contemplation of the order among the sciences, the consideration of their natures, properties, and methods. The speculation about this order 'as a whole,' is exclusive to metaphysics. To the particular sciences corresponds the inference of conclusions, the division of their subjects, and so forth.

Since philosophy in itself is an analogous and complex whole, its consideration presupposes knowledge of the different sciences -their properties, elements, and causes. Then metaphysics, in possession of this complex totality, reflects upon its own nature, making the philosophy of philosophy. This speculation due to its difficulty and complexity should be undertaken at the end of metaphysics.

A good metaphysics is like the symbol of a healthy philosophy. Philosophy without metaphysics is crippled and seriously incomplete. So, and to sum up, let us recall Hegel's words: "It is a remarkable thing when a nation finds that its Constitutional Theory, its customary ways of thinking and feeling, its ethical habits and traditional virtues, have become inapplicable; it is certainly not less remarkable when a nation loses its Metaphysics, when the intellect occupying itself with its own pure essence has no longer any real existence in the thought of the nation."⁹⁰

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⁸⁹ Santiago Ramirez, O. P., *El Concepto de Filosofía* (Madrid, 1958), pp. 18-80.

⁹⁰ Hegel, *Science of Logic* (New York, 1945), p. 93.

THE GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE IN NICOLAI HARTMANN'S METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION: PART TWO

INTRODUCTION

IN PART ONE of this study certain notions preliminary to a consideration of gnoseological transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition were considered: his notion of metaphysics in general; his concept of the metaphysics of cognition; a general outline of his theory of methodology; and finally, his use of the principle of the maximum of data. Hartmann's approach to the central problem of this study depends upon these basic notions. A summary of them affords a prospectus of the remainder of the study: using the optimal maximum of data as a basis of his orientation, Hartmann will collect the data phenomenologically; he will investigate the phenomenological result critically in his aporetics; and form his own theory regarding the solution of the problems.

Part Two of this study will be divided, accordingly, into a study of his phenomenology, his aporetics, and his theory of gnoseological transcendence. At the conclusion of the exposition of Hartmann's thought, a critical evaluation of his position will be presented.

1. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE

Hartmann starts his collection of characteristics of the phenomenon of cognition with the statement:

Cognition is an act, which transcends consciousness. That is fundamental. The subject is confronting the object. The object presents itself in space, is empirical, is something.¹

¹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Einfuehrung* . . . , p. 68: "Erkenntnis ist-das ist hier grundlegend-ein Akt, welcher das Bewusstsein ueberchreitet. Das Subjekt steht dem Gegenstand, der sich raeumlich, empirisch, dinglich darstellt, gegenueber."

Thus, cognition is not recognized as simple conscious act, as, for example, thinking, recalling, imagining, dreaming. These acts originate in the subjective realm, function in it, and their orientation is immanent. That means they urge the subject to an expression in the subject or by the subject. In Hartmann's statement cognition is recognized from the very beginning as an act which transcends ² the subject's consciousness. ³ A grouping of cognitions with the immanent conscious acts leads to error. Therefore, it must be understood that the cognitive act transcends. Neither the subject as such, nor the object as such are transcending. The objects remain always "without" (extramental) ; the subject remains always "within" (in itself) in the entire cognitive process. **It** is the act of cognition-accomplished by the subject-which transcends the subject's limit. As a rule every transcendent act

is connected with the subject from one side only. Its other end transcends the subject. The latter connects with the real which becomes through it the object-4

Actually man is in connection or relation with his environment through numerous such acts. Every action, for example, is a transcendent act. But in contrast to cognition-which leaves the object unchanged, although the effect of the object becomes "registered" in the subject-action seeks to alter the object. The act of willing always nourishes the inclination to seize the

² Nicolai Hartmann, *Einfuehrung* . . . , p. 68.

³ Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, p. 15: " Kant . . . reduced everything to an affection of the senses through the *Ding-an-sich* (the-thing-as-such). He failed to trace the aporias which are contained in this position. The transcendental aesthetics, too, touches only on the *apriori* element of sensuality, Nevertheless, so much is clear that Kant recognized very well the transcendental relation in the sense data and took it seriously.-Younger theories ignore this relation and therewith begins the distortion of the problem of cognition. This decline has led on the one hand to psychologism, on the other hand to logicism. To the latter belong all those interpretations which identify cognition with judgment-regardless of how these theories may differ otherwise. Thinkers such as Natorp, Cassirer, Rickert, Husserl, and Heidegger succumbed in this regard to the same error. They opposed the same psychologism which shared with their logical theories the misjudging of the transcendence in the phenomenon of cognition."

• Nicolai Hartmann, " Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in *op. cit.*, I, p. 21.

extramental world in order to accomplish something in it. The direction of these acts flows from within, that is, from the subject to the world of the objects. But there are other acts, too, which move in the opposite direction, and are nevertheless transcendent acts. The source of these acts is an extramental (extrasubjective) object, as is the case, for instance, with the act of experience, suffering (*Erleiden*), sympathy, empathy, compassion, and with all the acts of cognition. In all of these cases an object with its determining effect is received. In the phenomenon of cognition, too, there is always a relation between an object and a subject: a being which is recognized and a being which recognizes. Both are beings, both anchor in being. The something which is recognized becomes first of all through cognition something that stands opposite (=object) which means the something becomes objectified for a subject by the cognitive relation and within this relation.

This fact causes Hartmann to ask whether anything in the existential mode of the objectified thing becomes changed through such a relation of cognition, or whether the existential mode of the object turns into a pure objective mode.

The answer is clear: Cognition cannot and does not change the existential mode of the object. The existential mode of every recognized object remains a "being-in-itself" (*Ansichsein*).

However, in regard to the transcendent character of the phenomenon of cognition one has to understand that "cognition is the objection (=objectification) of an existent to a subject, the turning-into-object of being." ⁵

In such a context, "transcendent" always means, according to Hartmann, *transcendere* or "crossing over." But it is significant that "transcendent" is predicated of the act: it is not predicated of the objects of the act. "Transcendent" is predicated of the functional mode of cognition but not of the cognitive object.

• Nicolai Hartmann, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in *op. cit.*, p. 110.

DIAGRAM OF THE PHENOMENA OF TRANSCENDENCE

Empirical
Awareness

Concept

Idea.

Empirical
Object

Subject

Object

The subject stands opposite of the object (confronts the object). Cognition is nothing else but the coherence, the relation between subject and object. Consciousness and the object, only the two together amount to the total real world. **If** one takes as basic phenomenon the direction of intention from consciousness to the object then the essential character (of cognition) is seen, namely, that the limit of the consciousness is transcended. Therefore, cognition is a "transcendent act." "Transcendent" in this sense (or application) does not contradict the meaning of *transcendence* (stepping across), but it differs in regard to the usual application to transcendent objects distinguished from immanent objects, for the objects do not transcend a borderline, but the acts transcend.⁶


Hartmann recognizes therewith as the fundamental phenomenon of cognition: "the grasping of something." This basic phenomenon, however, must still be analyzed into its elements which are so essential **that-if** they remain unnoticed-the errors of the philosophical schools/ as proved by history, may

⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, *Einfuehrung in die Philosophie*, p. 68.

• Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in *op. cit.*, p. 17: "One had been accustomed to understand cognition either as a conscious act, or as a logical construct (judgment). The proper meaning of "grasping" (comprehending) of something had submerged in oblivion. In regard to this fact logicism was in no way safer than psychologism.

reappear. Hartmann begins his analysis of the phenomenon of cognition with an investigation of these elements:

1. "Being-subject (*Subjektsein*) of an object is different from being-object (*Objektsein*) for a subject." ⁸ The function of both of these elements is essentially different, for
 - a) the subject (=a being endowed with intellect or consciousness) actualizes the transcendent act of cognition;
 - b) the object affects the subject:



2. These two functional roles in the relation are not interchangeable, for
 - a) the subject comprehends (grasps) the object:
 - b) the object is comprehensible and is comprehended, or the object is intelligible and is understood.
 Hartmann describes the "grasping" as:

"the subject's reaching beyond its sphere, a reaching into the sphere of the object-which is a transcendent and heterogeneous sphere in regard to the subject-a seizure of the determinations of the object within the sphere of the object ... , a bringing-in and an inclusion of the comprehended determinations within the sphere of the subject." ⁹
3. The subject, by accomplishing the act of cognition, has necessarily to transcend by its act, that is, it must "leave itself." But in order to become aware of the determinations of the object, the subject must function within its own sphere. Therefore, according to Hartmann, the function of cognition presents itself as
 - a threefold act of the subject:
 - a transcending,
 - a being-without-itself,
 - a returning to itself.¹⁰
4. The object remains untouched by this subjective act. **It** does not become immanent through this act but remains the some-

• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 44.

• *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

thing in the homogeneous existential sphere. The object's determinations through which the object affects the subject do not become shifted

through "being-comprehended" and "being-included" in the sphere of the subject.¹¹

The bringing-in to the subject (collecting) of the determinations of the object is not an inclusion of the object itself, but "only the repetition of the determinations of the object re-occurring in a construct which becomes the content of the subject's consciousness, namely, in the cognitive construct or the image of the object."¹²

5. Accordingly, change takes place
 - a) not on or in the object: the object remains (and behaves) indifferent towards its recognition;
 - b) but in the subject through the function of cognition.

"On the object no novel phenomenon occurs; in the subject, however, there originates the object-awareness with its content, the image of the object."¹³

Thus, Hartmann sees the "something of comprehension" as one of the pillars of the phenomenon of cognition. He fixes its limit through what is proper to this "something of comprehension": the characteristic "being-in-itself." Prior to any presentation of a being as an object is the object's "being-in-itself," for

All cognition aims according to its nature at something in existence inasmuch as this being exists prior to cognition and independent from it.¹⁴

If the object were not a being-in-itself, it would be possible to recognize whatever one wishes, just as one can think, or will what one wants to think, or to will. The in-itself-existence of the object is clear through the act of perception.

Nobody believes that the thing perceived comes into existence

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 44.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 44: "Aile Erkenntnis geht ihrem Wesen nach auf Seiendes, sofern es auch vor ihr und uuabhaengig vor ihr besteht." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 51.

with the act of perception, for example, by a looking at it, or by a glance. The general knowledge is that the thing is and is before it is perceived. **It** is independent of perception.¹⁵

Otherwise any relation of cognition to a given, that is to existents, would be untenable, and "every difference between comprehending and failing the object, or the difference between truth and error, would perish."¹⁶ The natural awareness of reality needs no proof when facing the real. **It** can be demonstrated on the phenomenon, that the object has a being-in-itself:

Cognition is the grasping (comprehending) of a being-in-itself; that is a relation between subject and existing object, or, more exactly a relation between the notion (concept) which the subject attains of something and the very something itself, inasmuch as the latter exists independently from the first.¹⁷

Therefore, cognition is not a mere "phenomenon of consciousness," for the cognitive act crosses over, transcends consciousness. Cognition has its antic roots in the object, and in the subject. Thus, it is evident that the problem of cognition is not only a gnoseological problem. **It** is a metaphysical problem too. This finding is now investigated under the aspects of the object and of the subject.

A. The Object

The previous inquiry showed that the being-in-itself (*Ansiehsein*) of the object is an essential factor of the object. Hartmann stresses:

Any being (without exception) when becoming the object of cognition becomes an object *posterior* to its existence. There is no being whose essence is so constituted that it is necessarily object of a subject or of a consciousness. The "being-in-object" originates only when a subject appears on the plane of the world which recognizes the object and establishes a relationship of confrontation.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Idem.*, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁸ Nicolai Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, p. 17.

According to Hartmann, the notion of the "being-in-itself" of an object is at first

in no way an ontological concept, that is, this notion is not the same as the concept of "being-as-such," for it originates entirely from the gnoseological considerations. Hence, it is from the sphere-or-formed in view-of the *intentio obliqua*.¹⁹

But if the notion "object" stems from the aspect of the *intentio obliqua* or from reflection, then it is a gnoseological concept. Since some thinkers and schools disagree on that point, Hartmann devotes some deliberations to the distinctions of gnoseological being-in-itself²⁰ and ontological being-in-itself.²¹ In his *Grundzuege einer Meta physik der Erkenntnis*, he says:

the gnoseological being-in-itself signifies only the essential independence from the degree of cognition and therewith also from the subject on the whole.²²

But this being-in-itself is essential for the gnoseological relation because all object cognition necessarily means some being independent from cognition. In this, Hartmann sees the reason why cognition distinguishes its object from the conceptual image of the object. "The latter has the index of objectivity. The object shows the index of being-in-itself."²³ It is clear that the notion of "being-in-itself" -as Hartmann sees it- is "an expedient of reflection, a counter-concept to the notion of appearance or of the phenomenon of the object."²⁴ Such a counter-concept occurs in the gnoseological relationship alone. The subsequent reflection or the *intentio obliqua* conditions the emergence or the development of the notion of being-in-itself in

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung* . . . , pp. 51-53.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-60.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 51: "nur die prinzipielle Unabhaengigkeit vom Grade des Erkenntnisses und dadurch auch ueberhaupt vom Subjekt."

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 52: "Die letztere traegt den Index der "Objektivitaet," das Objekt den des "Ansichseins." Cf. also "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung* . . . , p. 152.

order to signify existence gnoseologically. Hence, the notion of being-in-itself designates independence within the gnoseological correlation.

This independence, however, is unessential for the ontological being-in-itself, for

if something is "in-itself" -that is, if something is subsistent in the ontological sphere-then it does not matter whether its existence is related to any other being such as, perhaps, to a real subject.²⁵

With this neutrality or indifference, the ontological being-in-itself actually absorbs the gnoseological being-in-itself

whereby it is directed not towards the subject, but towards being as being. Seen from the point of view of the subject, all being-in-itself becomes or is a being-for-me (Fürmichseiendes) or something that confronts me. Seen from the point of view of being as being both are identical, namely being. Hence, the ontological concept of being-in-itself returns here from the *intentio obliqua* to the *intentio recta*.²⁶

On this point, however, gnoseology turns to ontology, therefore Hartmann's phenomenology of cognition has only to indicate the facts.

As a result of such an inquiry, Hartmann considers neither the subject the center of gravity in the phenomenon of cognition nor the gnoseological relation, for

the real center of gravity lies neither between subject and object, nor beyond the subject, but it is found beyond the object: in the transobjective (sphere),²⁷

Hartmann expresses phenomenologically the emergence of the deeper ontic relation which is found beyond the gnoseological relation. The latter is embedded in the ontic relation for the ontic sphere not only encompasses gnoseological elements: subject, object, gnoseological relation-it transcends all of them, stretches beyond all of them. For all of these cognitive factors

²⁵ Nicolai Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung* ... , p. 153.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.

⁰¹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 58.

have not only their own existence, that is their own ontological gravity, but are embedded in the sphere of being on the whole. Hartmann describes this arrangement of the data and he sketches them accordingly in his diagram. In his scheme the gnoseological and the ontological spheres are not the same. The ontological sphere encompasses the gnoseological sphere. In reality, the sphere of being is not only prior to, but also deeper than the sphere of cognition. In Hartmann' diagram, the relation between both of these spheres is obvious.

DIAGRAM OF THE SPHERES OF COGNITION AND OF BEING ²⁸

The limits of cognition are found within being. The limits of being stretch far beyond cognition. The radius of cognition reaches only from the subject to the being objectified at any given time. Only in the realm of cognition being becomes objectified. The subject, however, is an existent. **It** follows that through cognition and through objectification a gnoseological zone is cut out of being, and the things which are taken into

²⁸ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . o, pp 1105o

that zone of cognition, form the "circle of objects" around the subject. Theoretically and potentially the circle of objects is unlimited. However, being remains indifferent towards cognition. As being, it does not resist recognition.²⁹ In actual cognition, however, the sector of the existential sphere which becomes known, or which becomes the gnoseological sphere, is relatively limited, for it becomes the zone of objectified being, surrounded or framed by the zone of transobjective being.

Through such a synopsis, the way is opened to correctly arrange cognition within the total coherence of life and being. There was a time when man thought the world was nothing else but the opposite pole of the knower, namely mere object. Now it is seen differently, cognition itself is a sector, a piece of the whole world, a link and truly a link of a chain of many other pieces, which are prior to and independent from cognition.³⁰

At the same time, this arrangement causes another insight, namely, that cognition is not static but dynamic and "a different one in content for every new level of position."³¹ This level changes and changes in one and the same subject, therefore, the sector of the objectified is

another one for the naive position, another for the scientific one, and for the scientific view it is again another one than for the philosophical position.³²

The quality of cognition, however, does not alter the general validity of the fundamental relationship between the objectified and the transobjective. Hartmann calls this range of the cognitive relation of the subject to its surrounding in its total circumference the "circle of objects." The circle of objects or the limited zone of the objectified existents is, however, on its part again surrounded or enclosed by the unlimited sphere of being.³³

²⁹ Naturally there is a resistance against" being recognized." For instance, certain plants and animals close themselves when touched. Animals escape when approached. A child "hides" something when detected in doing wrong. But such resistance does not occur by reason of being, for what is can be recognized as being.

⁸⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte ...," in *op. cit.*, p. ISS.

⁸¹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 204.

•• *Ibid.*

•• *t&id.*

This latter sphere is the not yet disclosed or the still sealed sphere of knowledge. **It** is the truly transobjective sphere. The transobjective sphere is not sealed off forever to cognition, but it is the necessary precondition on the side of the objects for the progress of cognition.

This second limit, too, does not exist as such. **It** is given for the subject only. **It** functions as a limit in regard to the subject's ability to move the limit of objectification.³⁴

Thus, the relatively limited circle of objects emerges from the unlimited ocean of being which in itself remains indifferent or neutral to cognition. The circle of objects, as part of this ocean of being, is recognized, hence, objectified and related to the subject. Hartmann summarizes: "Obviously, the *ratio cognoscendi* ... presupposes a *ratio essendi*, an existential relation between the subject and its objects."³⁵

Although both the object and the subject belong to the identical sphere of being, nevertheless, they constitute within it the counterpoles of an identical sphere of cognition. The object and the circle of objects have been presented so far from various aspects. Now we have to turn to the subject in order to render the other of the two poles of cognition intelligible and demonstrate the metaphysical grounding of both.

B. The Subject

The subject, too, is an existent. As an existent and as an independent being, it is situated in the homogeneous existential sphere in which the objects are. Therefore, what has been found in regard to the object applies also to the subject. **If** the subject would be nothing else but the counterpole of the objects within the gnoseological relation, we would have to assume that it becomes totally merged or absorbed in this relation. In regard to the objects, we saw that the objects transcend this relation, that they are prior to this relation, and that they are more than objects within this relation for they are in themselves.

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p.

•• *Ibid.*

They root existentially and essentially in being, display their various functions, and they have many relations to other existents beyond and without the gnoseological relation to a subject. Can that be said also in regard to the subject?

The subject, too, stretches beyond the gnoseological relation to its object. **It** is not exhausted by this relation. The subject—just as well as the object—is existentially and essentially rooted in being. **It** is not only a cognizant being, a knower; it is prior to cognition an existent, a being who wills, desires, loves, acts, feels, thinks and reflects. The subject is a person capable of many other acts and functions than to cognize and to know. **It** is clear: the subject as well as its objects is interwoven in numerous primary connections of being, of life, and of the cosmos. **It** is interlaced in many relations which precede cognition. The subject does not merge totally in the gnoseological relation.³⁶ In restricting the subject's being to a mere knowing, that is, in making it a mere gnoseological subject, it becomes uprooted from its original existential ground. The theories developing from this are numerous and shown in the history of philosophy.

Therefore, the problem and its roots must be investigated and it must be asked in how far the gnoseological relation is possible between a subject which is not only a knower, and an object, which is not only a known, and which are the requirements of such a relation.³⁷

Hartmann's scheme of the spheres of being and cognition³⁸ shows that these spheres can neither become identified, nor separated, that the sphere of being lies before, above, beneath the sphere of cognition, and that the latter is embedded in the first. **It** is equally impossible to clarify the problem of the subject without consideration of these data, as it is impossible to explain the problem of the object without seeing it rooted in these connections. Consequently, the entire problem of transcendence depends on these data.

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , pp.

³⁷ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p.

³⁸ Cf. Hartmann's "Diagram" reproduced on p. 145.

In regard to the object, these data become comprehensible through the object's interlacing with the circle of objects and the transobjective,

but in reference to the subject these existential relations become comprehensible through the fact that the subject itself contains principles, whose functions and mode of being the subject does not penetrate, that is, principles whose being evidently is other than the being of consciousness.³⁹

The existential sphere of the subject "seen from the point of view of the consciousness toward within" ⁴⁰ transcends the subject itself. Besides it furnishes transsubjective conditions which keep the subject rooted in a "sphere of transsubjective existential relations." ⁴¹ Thus, the homogeneity of the subjective and the objective sphere of being is at once recognizable, since "the subject understands itself as being existent in the same way as the object is." ⁴² Therefore, it is clear that both the cognizing subject and the recognized object are "embedded in a common sphere of being in which they are perfectly embraced . . . and conditioned by multilateral relations." ⁴³ According to Hartmann:

The relation of cognition which we know . . . as a one-sided determination of the subject by the object . . . , must be understood as one which is capturing the multiple connection of being, or, exactly, as the relation which appears in the phenomenon of cognition.⁴⁴

Such statements show Hartmann as an ontologist who brings his theory of cognition with the given, who weighs and measures reality and the cognition of reality. Hartmann himself declares:

What at first appears to be of great disadvantage proves, in closer analysis, an invaluable advantage, and appears to be the naturally given practicable way of gnoseological research. . . .

³⁹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 231.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

.. *Ibid.*

•• *Ibid.*

.. Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 321.

The independent existential character of subject and object is that which takes both of them away from isolation and shows them joined in the nexus of relations. Isolation exists only for the most restricted horizon of subjection. The independence of isolation is a relative one, that is one which is insuperable for *ratio* only.⁴⁵

In these data, Hartmann also anchors his theory of irrationality:

As long as one maintains the impossibility of irrational relations, naturally one is cut off from the insight into this ontological situation. In the moment, however, when one grasps that relations have not to be more rational than substrates and that they ... are as neutral towards intelligibility as all the other existents, then the ontological condition becomes clearly seen.⁴⁶

Therefore, Hartmann considers also

the ontological understanding of the irrational in its principles a necessary condition for the understanding of the basic gnoseological relation⁴⁷

of subject and object within the sphere of being. Evaluating the theories of knowledge, he points out:

this sphere is not a constructed, clear-cut unity, as is the one of speculative monism, but it is a relationally restricted and divided multiplicity. Theory cannot judge about the sphere's principle of unity. All the inconsistencies of monistic attempts to derive multiplicity from unity are insufficient. It is likewise with the open systems of dualism (for instance, the Cartesian dualism) which rest upon a similar mistaking of the sphere, namely upon the purely subjectivistic isolation of subject and object, which, to be sure, cannot be avoided on a certain level of speculation but which is easily removed ontologically. Through a removal of that isolation all these speculative theories, and those idealistic and realistic theories, too, which try to overcome the subject-object dualism by constructed means, become superfluous. Constructed means are not necessary ... because the problem for the solution of which they had been constructed does not exist. Subject and object are originally joined in the sphere of being.⁴⁸

"Ibid.

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p.

Hartmann's theory then is based on the fact that "the subject is an existent among other existents,"⁴⁹ and that the other being (=object) affects the subject by conditioning and determining it. For

where everything is joined, and mutually conditioned and determined, it would be unintelligible if the subject would not be precisely included in the net of these relations and if the subject would be exempt from being determined by the other beings.⁵⁰

Such deliberations concerning the subject led Hartmann to his definition of cognition: cognition consists in the process that an "in-and-for-itself existent," a subject, becomes "determined by another existent, the object"⁵¹ on the intentional, that is, on the gnoseological level. The determining element remains thereby unchanged in its own being-in-itself. The object does not become totally objectified, it rather remains in a certain sense supra-objective. The subject, however, becomes gnoseologically enriched and intentionally determined by the object, more exactly, by the content of the object. Hence, the relation of cognition means ontologically the unilateral modification of a subject by an object which for itself remains totally untouched by or indifferent in regard to the entire event. One is tempted to say that cognition is a one way street, for it is "a unilateral, irreversible determination of the subject by the object."⁵² The latter does not become determined through the subject and its cognition-it remains before and after cognition the same-but the agent itself becomes "impressed"; the subject becomes modified through what is recognized. Therefore, it is justified to speak here with Hartmann of a "sphere of content of the subject itself."⁵³ As a matter of fact, on the side of the subject, a "sphere of images is facing the circle of objects."⁵⁴ These images are formally subjective images or

•• *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 322-323.

⁵¹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 323.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁵³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 208.

•• *Ibid.*

constructs, that is, they originate and exist in the subject. They are with the subject and wither away with the subject in spite of their transcendent (non-immanent) origin. But truly they result from the object-reality, or from the object-effect upon the subject through the subject's act of cognition.

Materially, they stem from the object's sphere. Hence, they are not subjective in content. Their content is the cognized object, therefore, the content is materially objective. Consequently, it is clear, cognition happens in the subject; through this a gnoseological counter-sphere of object-images in the subject originates. But since the subject itself is an existent, this gnoseological counter-sphere of object-images in the subject is also rooted in the ontological sphere. It follows that through cognition an entrance is opened for the subject into the being of the object. Therefore, the subject, or

the knower is to be defined ontologically as that being in which this relation which connects the subject with the other beings, produces a modification which is typical for such a relation, that is, a sphere in which the homologous links of this unilaterally determined relation join, a sphere of modifications which resemble their counterlinks scattered in all directions of reality.⁵⁵

It appears, then, that the sphere of the subject is not one of psychological limitations. Empirical psychology deals more or less with the functional only, with factors and phenomena of the stimulus-response relation. Rational psychology, however, deals with the mode and being of the psychic; it asks for essence and existence of the soul as such, which is a concern with the ontic sphere, a sphere prior to all the stimulus-response relations, prior even to the modi. It is the existential sphere of the objects and the existential sphere of the subject with its cognition by which being becomes ennobled. In this situation, therefore, the subject becomes visible as "that summit of integer being where being reflects itself."⁵⁶

Summing up, we find the subject embedded in the same sphere of being in which its own objects are found, so much so

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p.

•• *Ibid.*

that this or that subject even can become an object of cognition of other subjects.

Therefore, in this very sphere of being which comprises everything, the subject excels by its very nature. It is the "highest, the most individualized, the most different,"⁵⁷ and the most complex being. Through cognition, the subject receives a unique superiority which is found in no other sensible being. Cognition, namely, expands the sphere of the subject according to the measure of the known objects within the subject to "a multifarious world of representations of being as such."⁵⁸ This closed sphere of the subjective gnoseological content,

which develops in universal relation, reflection, and representation, and forms in itself a counter-world to the existing real world, is the sphere of objective content in the cognizing consciousness. Its inner aspect is the consciousness itself.⁵⁹

The uniqueness of the subject in the midst of other beings is clear, for the other existents are the subject's objects; being-an-object, however, means (in the original sense) to-become-reflected. "Objection" (objectification) in this sense is the strict correlate to the representation in a subject. The arrangement of the spheres depends on the relation of the objects to the subject (according to the measure of the subject's understanding) and it exists in this order only for the subject within the ontic sphere. The circle of objects "is nothing else but that fraction of being which comes to a representation in the subject, that is the fraction of being which is reflected."⁶⁰ Therewith the subject itself becomes a gnoseological cosmos depending at any given time on its own noetic potential and activity, -a "modulus of reflection"⁶¹ of those objects which transcend the subjective sphere by their effect on the subject. Therefore, whatever is known of being is attained by cognition.

Hartmann anticipates⁶² that such an interpretation will find

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 109.

•• *Ibid.*

•• *Ibid.*, p. 151; cf. also, pp. 109-210.

⁶⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 110.

•• *Ibid.*

•• *Ibid.*, p. 828.

a certain opposition because it assumes a transcendental relation of causality between object and knower, for the image, resulting in the subject, is understood as effect of the object on the subject. Object and subject, however, are heterogeneous poles, thus it would follow that they are also heterogeneous as cause and effect.

Besides, it is difficult to see how "a mental construct should be the effect of something that is extramental."⁶³

In meeting these objections, Hartmann explains two misunderstandings which obscure the facts.

First: A causal relationship cannot be refuted on the basis of mere transintelligibility. In the realm of nature the cause-effect relation remains unintelligible, that is, the function, the "how" of the generation of the effect, the structure of the causal nexus, and the proper essence of this dependence remain irrational. The law of efficient causality as universal formula, however, is generally accepted by the natural sciences, at least hypothetically.

By the same privilege then, one may consider valid-at least the ontological hypothesis of the theory of cognition-a determination which transcends the object and becomes an object-image in a subject, regardless of whether this determination of the subject by the object is understandable or not.⁶⁴

Secondly, this noetic determination is not one which is totally merged in the causal relation. Such "is the case with the dependence of space-temporal phases of certain processes from which its formulation originated."⁶⁵ But in regard to the noetic image in the consciousness, this object-image is-apart from its psychological genesis-an adimensional one. Therefore, it cannot be the effect of a four-dimensional object or cause.

Furthermore, we may remember that there are other determining relations, too, besides efficient causality. For instance, there is the relation of reason and logical consequence as demonstrated in mathematical theorems. There is also the relation of

⁶³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 323.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 323-324.

⁶⁵ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 324.

means and purpose (finality). But, these relations do not provide a solution regarding the gnoseological subject-object relation. How then have we to deal with this problem?

In cognition the situation is that subject and object-although heterogeneous as such-belong nevertheless to the ontological sphere. Due to this homogeneous sphere of being then, and in it, the phenomenon of the gnoseological relation is possible.

In the ontological realm many different beings are connected with and related to one another by reason of the all-embracing *ens*. The type of determination which prevails in this realm, of course, can be much more universal than the type of determination within the causal nexus.⁶⁶

In seeing that the object and the subject exist prenoetically and ontologically in a homogeneous realm, to Hartmann one of the gnoseological difficulties becomes transparent. This is not so, however, in a philosophy of immanence, inasmuch as such a philosophy operates simply immanently. Hartmann's theory that an extra-mental object can determine a recognizing subject in such a way that this determination becomes the representation of the extramental object in the subject must appear to representatives of any philosophy of immanence as a theory of "extreme absurdity." Realistically seen, however, it is clear that

a mere ontological relation, which conditions and connects object and subject, suffices to impress the object's traits upon the structure formed in the subject (=object image); and to make this image "objective."⁶⁷

Summing up Hartmann's inquiry of the gnoseological condition, we find in cognition:

Firstly: The transcendent subject faces the object.

Secondly: The transcendent object faces the subject.

Thirdly: Cognition as such is transcendent.

This particularity of confrontation or transcendence (= ob-

⁶⁶Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 325.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 326.

jectivity in the original sense) is shown by every object determination. The knower knows of this transcendence, for normally the knower does not consider these determinations his own. He distinguishes them as those of the object. Indeed, the entire cognitive structure in the subject is objective, for "objective is not the object as such but the image of the object in the intellect inasmuch as it shows the traits of the object."⁶⁸ In being conscious the subject knows of both data: of the object *and* of the object-image, for the subject discriminates the objective image in itself from the extramental object. Furthermore, the subject is aware of itself and of its relationship to the object. In this then, properly speaking, the object awareness consists.

Under such conditions, the object and the object-image, therefore, are not understood as one although they are identical in their content.⁶⁹

In describing the phenomenon of cognition, Hartmann states four distinct notes or concepts of cognition of which each one expresses a complex of essential characteristics of the gnoseological problem. These concepts, although they overlap, are not identical as the enumeration shows. They are:

- First: The relation of cognition (or the essential subject-object relation).
- Second: Cognitive structure or object-image (object representation) in the subject.
- Third: Truth, or concord, of the object-image and the object.
- Fourth: Progress of cognition, or the tendency of development of the image in order to absorb or represent more and more the total content of the object.

The description of these gnoseological phenomena forms the basis for Hartmann's advancement to the whole problem of the gnoseological transcendence. Again Hartmann's pioneering attitude leads him now only to a deviation from the usual analytic method of the phenomenologists/^o his attitude towards

⁶⁸ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 48.

⁶⁹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 48.

⁷⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* • . . , p. 77: " [The phenomenologists] keep

the "dogmatic attempts for a solution,"⁷¹ too, determines Hartmann's original approach to the problems of transcendence. By accepting the transcendence as the original phenomenon in cognition, Hartmann opens for his phenomenology the way to metaphysics, for metaphysics of cognition is his great concern. Of course, it is a metaphysics according to his own understanding. As previously shown/² this is neither the traditional subject-matter metaphysics, nor the speculative systematic metaphysics, but a metaphysics of problems. Consequently, Hartmann's phenomenology, which is his analysis of the phenomenon of cognition, proceeds further to the aporetics of cognition or to the inquiry of the problematic elements of cognition.

II. THE APORETICS OF GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE

The *phenomena* of the gnoseological transcendence, namely: subject, object, cognitive relation, were presented in the light of Hartmann's interpretation. Hartmann approaches now *the enigmatic nature of the gnoseological transcendence*. In other words, we have to deal now with the perennial problematic character of cognition which was indicated by the phenomena but has not become completely translucent by their analysis. Therefore, the aporias of the gnoseological transcendence have to be explored. Hartmann stresses that

... the mark of its metaphysical nature lies ... in the perennial problematic character which reaches beyond solubility.⁷³

Hartmann explains:

exclusively to the immanent elements in the phenomenon and ignore the original transcendent elements. Such a procedure is not so much an inconsequence of their method as a bias of their interest for the phenomenon or a remnant of their predetermined position. Phenomenology today finds itself restricted in its own development by the boundary of immanence which-in its last analysis-is based upon an idealistic prejudice. This boundary is ignored by our analysis of the phenomenon of cognition. The transcendence of the object of cognition definitely belongs to the phenomenon and has to be described."

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁷³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 38.

Aporetics has to follow without restriction its own laws, its own inner logic, . . . the latter does not consist in a coherence of the data . . . , but in a coherence between the given and what is searched for. This liberty can be secured for aporetics only through the broadest possible survey of the total results of the phenomenological findings.⁷⁴

Therefore, aporetics (or the science of philosophical insoluble problems) must follow the phenomenological description. **It** can never precede phenomenology. This requirement has been fulfilled in the previous inquiry. According to Hartmann, phenomenology as well as aporetics precede "principally all theory, all positions and their metaphysics."⁷⁵ Nevertheless, phenomenology and aporetics are different. The latter no longer describes, it compares, examines, arranges the given, states the discrepancies contained in the given. **It** formulates the acuteness of the paradox which is characteristic of all opposition in actuality. "Aporetics has not to concern itself with the overcoming of the opposition. This is the concern of the theory."⁷⁶ But the perfection or completion of aporetics depends on the question whether and how it approaches and masters its assignment. The more aporetics can point out "the intellectual pathlessness of the opposition,"⁷⁷ and the more it succeeds in establishing the boundary of the intelligibility of the problem, the more it is what it ought to be: "The meaning of the word 'aporia' . . . is the stopping of the method in the face of the actual."⁷⁸ In this sense it was used by the Greeks and the literal translation "pathlessness" stresses the original meaning.

The further elaboration of a problem consists in the re-opening of the way; all theory is a finding of a path, a creation of a new method.⁷⁹

Thus Hartmann marks out the methodical span of aporetics. **It** leads from the accomplished phenomenological description to the "threshold of the theory without ever crossing its

.. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁷⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 40.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

limits." ⁸⁰ Aporetics has to lead from the given to the assignment.⁸¹ The assignment is nothing other than the development of the problems.

In the preceding pages the "given" of the gnoseological transcendence has been presented. These given elements pointed beyond themselves towards the problem. The problem then in Hartmann's formulation is "the union between subject and object in the cognitive relation and the transcendence of the object in the direction of the subject," ⁸² in its enigmatic complexity. It originates from the confrontation of two propositions, the proposition of consciousness or interiority and the proposition of the exteriorization of the subject or the subject's reach beyond itself.

In his presentation of the general aporia of cognition, Hartmann distinguishes three elements:

1. The subject-object relation.
2. The standpoint of the subject.
3. The standpoint of the object.

The result of Hartmann's phenomenological study was that "in every cognition ... a knower and a recognized object confront one another." ⁸³ With this the problem begins, for this very fact presses towards the question:

How can an actual relation consist between these two (subject, object), since their levels or spheres are definitely separated and transcend each other so that each of them exists also outside or independent of this relation.⁸⁴

Some alternatives seem likely: either the relation levels out the transcendence of subject and object: then they form a unit; or the relation is "neither essential nor actual" ⁸⁵ for one of the two.

⁸⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 40.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁸³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 44.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁸⁵ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 61.

These alternatives are incorrect: subject and object are not a unit, they are not identical. Subject and object are ontologically as well as gnoseologically separated.⁸⁶ If they were identical, it would mean that each would be present in the other, or "with the subject, the object would be necessarily given,"⁸⁷ and, in reverse, with the object the subject would be given. This is not the case, and, although this erroneous position is held in "every philosophy of identity,"⁸⁸ the evidence of the phenomena, the evidence of reality, refute it.

The second of the two alternatives is also incorrect, for the cognitive relation is not at all "unessential and inactual" to the subject and for the object. For it is through this intellectual relation-and, to be sure, within this relation only-that the subject is a knower and the object is a recognized or known something.

From where does this unity stem which is given in the cognitive relation of the positively separated beings? How is such a relation possible?⁸⁹

Here it becomes obvious that the cognition of cognition has arrived in a pathlessness or at an aporia. Hartmann remarks:

In its most external and most schematic part already the problem of cognition presents its metaphysical nature.⁹⁰

The problem becomes even more obscure when dealt with separately under the aspect of the one or the other, because from "the standpoint of the subject, cognition is the comprehension of an object."⁹¹ Hence, the object is precisely, through this relation, through the object-image, placed in the subject. However,

It is essential to consciousness that it can obtain only its own content, for it never can leave its own sphere ... When the intel-

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 61.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 61.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

lect aims at an extramental something, the something in truth is put in the intellect, it is thought about, it is conceived, it is sensed. The intellect transforms the independent object about which it thinks-precisely by doing so-into a dependent object, namely into the object-thought-of. The immanence of intellection is, so to say, more powerful than the intention of the transcendent subject. The intellect (or the consciousness) cannot break through this restricted ring, the "circle of thinking," in spite of all the objectivity of the resulting idea. The consciousness remains forever enclosed in itself and dependent on the world of its own determinations and ideas.⁹²

Unequivocally, we deal here with the theorem of consciousness or of the content of the subject. The cognizant subject's world is a closed one, a world in the subject only. This natural "seclusion" of the intellect or of the consciousness in the subject-in spite of all the transcendent elements-belongs, therefore, essentially to the notion of the subject.⁹³ The subject claims, as has been demonstrated, not only to be a being-in-itself, but also a being-for-itself and is capable of accomplishing many other functions besides cognitive acts.

Hartmann studies also the historical origin of the theorem of consciousness and reports his findings:

The theorem that the consciousness can comprise nothing else but its own content, and that it is therefore irretrievably imprisoned in itself had not to wait for modern subjectivism. It was used by skepticism of antiquity, but its origin seems to date as early as the sophists. If the witnesses of posterity are trustworthy, the first formulation is found in the teaching of the Cyrenaics. By declaring their inner states and concepts insufficient, they locked themselves up, as it were, in "a state of siege" [*hogper en poliorkia*] in their own subjective state of mind, cut themselves off from any exterior influence in order to get some information about the things.

This picture of the state of siege is the exact phenomenological description of the condition in which the intellect (or the consciousness) finds itself when it begins to reflect (or to think) about its relationship to its comprehensible own content. This picture characterizes an a priori intelligible trait of the intellect which-once

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 61-6fl.

⁹⁸ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 6fl.

recognized-leaves no doubt about the nature of the intellect. It is only astonishing that in the history of philosophy so many keen gnosologists failed to see that.⁹⁴

After such considerations it appears the more complicated to understand that nevertheless "from the point of view of the subject ... cognition is the grasping of an object."⁹⁵

Hence, the subject must be able somehow to reach beyond its own sphere for the object. Consequently, it must "protrude and be without itself in order to be able to comprehend."⁹⁶

How could the subject otherwise reproduce in itself the object-image, showing the determinations of this or that object of the concrete order? The determinations of the object-image must be the replica of the determinations of the extra-mental real object. Since the object is neutral to cognition, its neutrality testifies for its non-participation in the act of comprehension. Consequently, comprehension must be accomplished solely by the act of the subject, which means that the subject must reach outside itself, in spite of its immanence of consciousness, for only by doing so can it attain the determinations of the object. "This getting outside of itself of the subject in the cognitive function is the enigma."⁹⁷ For this externalization of the subject in the cognitive process is clearly contradicting the subject's characteristic seclusion-in-itself. In this contradiction the "antinomy of consciousness," as Hartmann calls it, becomes evident. Hartmann formulates it as follows:

Thesis:

The consciousness must exteriorize itself inasmuch as it has to grasp something outside itself, that is, inasmuch as it is *cognizing* consciousness.

Antithesis:

The consciousness cannot exteriorize itself inasmuch as it can grasp its contents only, that is, inasmuch as it is cognizing *consciousness*.⁹⁸

•• Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , pp. 93-94.

⁰⁵ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 61.

•• *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 61.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.

Obviously, transcendence and immanence of the noetic function are in contradiction, or the nature of cognition seems to be opposed to the nature of the intellect.

But this opposition is

unavoidable because only the intellect or the consciousness can have cognition. It follows that either the nature of cognition dissolves or neutralizes through the antinomy of consciousness, or the antinomy of consciousness becomes dissolved by the phenomenon of cognition.⁹⁹

Hence, an aporia presents itself again. Hartmann divides this aporia. He says:

In the antinomy of consciousness phenomenon stands against phenomenon. This did not become clear in the development of the first aporia because the phenomenal character of the theorem of consciousness was not seen yet. This character could not be dealt with in the analysis of the phenomenon because the analysis had to adhere to the natural point of view, that is to the naive as well as to the scientific one. The knowledge of the self-seclusion of the intellect belongs to the philosophical reflection already.

The antinomy of consciousness is indeed a gnoseological antinomy. But this does not make it necessarily a proposition of the theory. It can very well be a mere expression of a phenomenon, but of course, of a phenomenon which becomes seen only when the philosophical deliberation has departed from the natural position which is always directed towards the object, which is clearly expressed in the skeptic character of the antinomy.¹⁰⁰

We deal here then with two propositions which are equally significant as expression of the phenomenon, but which are at the same time contradictory to each other.

The antinomy does not admit a solution as long as the thesis and the antithesis share the same degree of apriori certainty. If it should be dissolved, one of the two propositions is supposedly false. Concerning the consciousness only one of the alternatives can be true: either the subject is secluded in itself, or it is capable of exteriorization. But both cannot be true at the same time. There is another alternative, however: if it were possible to demonstrate that the two propositions have to be interpreted in a different

⁹⁹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

sense. The latter requests the highest and most difficult speculation. **It** was, therefore, long overlooked and perhaps only Leibniz used this interpretation in his theory of the "windowless monad," which, in its own representations, can indirectly grasp a transcendent. This way out of the difficulty, however, is a purely aprioristic way and can be used only at the expense of the independence of the sensual data. **It** comes into conflict with the phenomenon of the empirical givenness.¹⁰¹

The third consideration begins with the aspect of the object. Descriptive phenomenology has shown that from this point of view

cognition ... reaches for the determinations of the object in order to bring them to the subject. **It** is the indirect determination of the image in the subject, through the real determinations of the object.¹⁰²

As has been previously shown, the object of cognition proves indifferent, neutral towards cognition. **It** does not transfer to or into the subject. **It** remains unconcerned before and after its cognition and it remains outside, not being secluded or locked up in the consciousness, for it does not at all become the "image" in the subject. The act of cognition, as well as the consciousness or intellect itself, distinguish clearly between object and object-image. The object stays transcendent when confronting the subject. **It** never inhabits the subject. But,

this aporia has been ignored in every philosophy of immanence because in it the awareness of the being-in-itself has been overlooked which accompanies every object consciousness.¹⁰³

From the point of view of the object then, a new antinomy results. **It** is, so to say, the counterpart, or the reverse side of the antinomy of the subject or the antinomy of consciousness. Again, Hartmann offers his formulation:

Thesis:

The determinations of the object must in some way become transmitted to the subject inasmuch as cognition takes place; the

¹⁰¹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , ppo 94-95o

¹⁰² Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* o o o , Po 95o

¹⁰³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . o • , Po 63o

image in the subject can be "objective" (that is, shows the traits of the object) only if the object can convey the traits in some way to the subject. However, in this conveyance, the transcendence of the object for the subject is broken through.

Antithesis:

The determinations of the object cannot become conveyed to the image in the subject. They remain transcendent to the sphere of the subject, for in the object awareness the transcendence of the object for the subject is not violated. It remains intact. The object awareness means precisely the object as a being-in-itself which is indifferent to its being recognized.¹⁰⁴

The difficulty from the point of view of the subject consists in the contradiction between the nature of cognition and the nature of the intellect or consciousness. The difficulty from the point of view of the object consists again in a contradiction; this time, however, it is a contradiction between the nature of cognition and, in difference to the first, the nature of its object. Here, too, the contradiction" is unavoidable, for only an *object* can be recognized, or, because cognition always deals with an object."¹⁰⁵ Hartmann finds again an alternative:

Either the phenomenon of cognition neutralizes itself on the transcendence of the object—a transcendence which belongs to the phenomenon; or the transcendence of the object dissolves itself on the phenomenon of cognition.¹⁰⁶

Here, too, all thinking winds up in wondering. For an aporia presents itself again. Hartmann says:

The alternative: either the *given* is an illusion, or the *transcendence* is an illusion is basically the same as: Either the grasping of the object as such is an illusion, or the enclosure of the consciousness is an illusion. A solution of the aporia can result only from a synthesis which reconciles the approved phenomena.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the antinomy of the object which in its content is the direct reverse of the antinomy of consciousness, or of the subject, in no way coincides with the latter. Here we deal solely with a breaking or a not-breaking of

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 63.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

the relation or transcendence between subject and object; a being-without-itself, as in the case of the subject, is not the question here. Therefore, it would be very well thinkable ... that a solution of the object antinomy would draw along with itself the solution of the antinomy of consciousness so that the latter could be treated indirectly from the side of its objective counterpart. But for such a solution it would be necessary to find a unifying synthesis bridging the opposites.¹⁰⁷

Related to the aporia of the object is the problem of perception, the nuclear phenomenon of every aposteriori cognition. This problem emerges automatically in such a philosophizing. **It** seems that perception makes graspable the transcendent¹⁰⁸ (that is here, according to Hartmann, the totally other, or, from the subject's station, the object).

In perception, the perceived is to the intellect the part allotted directly from the object to the subject. Therefore, an aporia originates again:

How can a subject receive (or perceive) the object if the object is not given to the subject? But how can the object be given to the subject when the object is transcendent (totally other, totally separated) to the subject in the relation of cognition, that is, when the object remains indifferent to the subject?¹⁰⁹

The dilemma is obvious: Is the transcendence or is the given an illusion? As is known, idealism denies the transcendence of the object (the total otherness, the total separation). Skepticism denies the givenness (*Gegebenheit*). But,

If the giving act is an act of the object, then it cannot be understood how it can reach into the sphere of the subject. **If** the act, however, is an act of the subject, then it cannot give to the subject any determinations of the transcendent object; it can transmit only the determinations of immanent object awareness.¹¹⁰

The intellect, in dealing with this problem experiences a kind of confusion because aporetics proves to be a "pathlessness."

¹⁰⁷ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 95.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 44 and 47.

¹⁰⁹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 64.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

Therefore, the intellect turns to the gnoseological relation in order to grope its way back to the actuality of the thing and of the knower. In other words, reason seeks the ground of the gnoseological transcendence. Therefore, the intellect turns naturally to the close ally of cognition: to being. All the gnoseological problems lead, when rightly considered, to the ontological condition. This is documented, for example, in the history of Monism and Dualism, in the history of Idealism and of Realism and in their variations. Hartmann has pointed out some of the important theories in regard to this phenomenon found in the history of ideas. He grew on these theories and he purged his own views by learning from the mistakes and their consequences.

At the beginning of Western thought Parmenides presented a theory of identity: thinking and being are one; they are the same, they are simply being. Heraclites, too, offered an identity philosophy, differing from the first only by its dynamic *pantarrhe-view* of the world. The *logoi* of Heraclites, however, are found in two very differentiated spheres: in the cosmos and in the soul.¹¹¹ Hartmann comments:

In this teaching the *logos* is at once the subjective and the objective law ... which leaves untouched the differentiation of the sphere of consciousness and the sphere of being, as well as their mutual independence.¹¹²

In Plato's theory of the ideas, human questioning reaches its classical peak. Plato has

discovered the logical sphere in the realm of ideas, but the main insight, thereby, was that the ideal sphere was also a metaphysical sphere of principles of being. That means, the basic thought was an explicitly ontological one: the essence of the ideal forms (for instance, of the mathematical proportions) is also the nature of the real being; thus, one can fairly summarize the transcendent as identity of the principles as presented in the theory of ideas.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 356.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 356-357.

¹¹³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 357.

The dualism of Aristotle deviates from Plato's theory. Matter becomes the attribute of real being and distinguishes it from thinking and from the *eide* of the logical sphere. Form, identical with the *eide*, is in both. Hence, the Aristotelian "essence" appears as having a dual nature, namely, as being in the logical and in the ontological sphere. "The idea is the substantial form of the existent, but the things are actualizations of the idea in matter."¹¹⁴ In this twofold occurrence of essence Hartmann sees the centre of truth of the Aristotelian system. He thinks that

a certain and universally valid cognition of being is possible only when logical essences exist which simultaneously are the essences of things.¹¹⁵

This was also the teaching of the medieval scholastics up to Christian Wolff (Wolf; Hartmann uses one "f"). Erroneous theories, too, developed in the course of history through identification of the logical with the ontological. However, this erroneous identification usually appears as a relapsus in the "Eleatic identity theory of thinking and being,"¹¹⁶ a ground from which grew, for instance, the ontological proof of the existence of God in which the boundary between essence and existence is effaced. But "the logical and the real cannot be taken identically, however, their essences or principles are the same,"¹¹⁷ in the logical and in the ontological sphere.

In the modern era by means of the methodical doubt a philosophical catharsis is noticeable.

The thought which is the strongest antithesis to the thesis of identity stands as pioneering accomplishment on the threshold of this development; it is the open dualism of *extensio* and *cogitatio*, or Descartes' theory of the two substances.¹¹⁸

In Descartes' system, a categorical separation of consciousness and the extramental world is accomplished. Each confronts

¹¹⁴Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundruege* ... , p. 857.

••• *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 859.

¹¹⁷ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 857.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

the other. Each opposes the other. Each is essentially separated or transcendent-so much so that the *hiatus* remains unbridged even by Descartes' theory of the Pineal gland.

In Kant's philosophy, the key concept is synthesis. Applying it to the problem of cognition, Kant came to the conviction that in the sphere of the empirical human subject there develop gradually the notions, judgments and finally the theories. On the one hand, they are constructed of the material provided by empirical cognition which stems from the affection on our senses caused by the Ding-an-sich (thing-as-such), on the other hand, however, they originate apriori in the sphere of the categories. The objects can only result from a synthesis of both. The intellect has to provide the unity.¹¹⁹

Hartmann shows here very distinctly the extreme point of Kant's error. Although he himself had been a Neo-Kantian in the beginning of his philosophical development, he no longer agrees with Kant that "the objects ... can result from a synthesis only" and that "the unity must be given by or stem from reason."

The discovery of this error served Hartmann as weapon against the Marburg School. He criticized the Neo-Kantians:

the idea of the synthesis is also the root of Neo-Kantianism. The essence of the object develops for the Neo-Kantians in the course of the historical process which presents itself as a great process of cognition. The historical process consists in the fact-as this strange Idealism assumed-that the world becomes more and more perfected in its ideas. Kant still found the Ding-an-sich hidden behind the empirical thing; the objects of the Neo-Kantians, however, result from the synthesis only. There is no other world behind the ideas. Therefore, it appears that the progress of cognition is nothing else but a steady inner construction of ideas.

We do not believe that the world is nothing but such a cognitive progress. We distinguish precisely the ideas from nature. Nature remains always the same. Only our notions of nature have changed and have become more correct.¹²⁰

Hartmann does here neither deny the sphere of the ideas, nor the steady expanse of this sphere through the progress of cogni-

¹¹⁹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Einfuehrung in die Philosophie*, p. 106.

¹²⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Einfuehrung* ... , p. 106.

tion,¹²¹ but he opposes the one-sided interpretation of the idealistic and rationalistic philosophies by pointing strongly to the primary given in reality which precedes any gnoseological experience and without which the latter would not at all be possible. In this criticism Hartmann's own philosophical position becomes demonstrated. He stresses that

the ideal solution ... has to search for an original unity of subject and object which lies beyond their non-identity, hence, a unity which embraces subject and object.¹²²

Here Hartmann points to the rooting of the gnoseological problem in the ontological sphere and in being itself. Thus Hartmann not only confronts cognition with being, he actually puts cognition into the sphere of being because it not only stems from the thinking subject, it is also founded in the object, although the latter is essentially separated (*urgeschiedenen*) from the subject. Hartmann sees in the problem of cognition "certain points ... in which the gnoseological problem runs in a straight direction into the ontological problem."¹²³ He is convinced of the metabasis (Plato), because, "behind the 'object' there emerges the existing thing, behind the relation of cognition there appears the relation of being,"¹²⁴ and both confront one another as "being and being instead of as knower and the known."¹²⁵

As mentioned earlier in this work, being by becoming an object may remain totally indifferent or neutral to its objectification. It also may react as it is, for instance, in the case of objects which are other humans. But it is clear that the establishment of cognitive relations does not change the being

¹²¹ Hartmann continues in the quoted paragraph: "Such a continuous construction of ideas actually takes place. Therefore, the transcendental question and the total transcendental method are so highly actual. They survived Idealism and are today still of significance. This is clearly seen on the *status quo* of the sciences, for example, of the science of nature if one compares today's insights with the previous levels of development."

¹²² Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , pp. 173-174.

¹²³ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 174.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

of the objectified existent. The noetic relation as such also does not change the ontic relation. However, when a being becomes a knower, when an intellectual being recognizes an object, in such a case being does not remain indifferent in regard to the other pole because of the act of cognition which is necessary in this relation. Therefore, the recognizing being "tends to embrace the existent thing in the relation (of cognition) more and more intensively."¹²⁶ From this angle Hartmann sees all the gnoseological problems and relations grounded in the ontological sphere. He says:

To the degree to which the transobjective is still understandable ... that means inasmuch as it belongs to its nature to be intelligible, to such a degree it still fits in the gnoseological relation, at least one would be justified to presume that it exists only in and for the gnoseological relation. However, to the degree to which the transobjective contains elements of the irrational, or better, of the transintelligible, to such a degree it will not be absorbed by the gnoseological relation, regardless of how extended the latter may become. In this condition its relation to the subject is no longer one of real or possible cognition but it is simply a confrontation of two existents, the relational structure of which although it cannot be questionable, may nevertheless be intelligible. Therefore, it is clear that this relation is an ontological one.¹²⁷

Such firm footing on the ontological basis prevents Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition from deviating into relativistic positions, such as, for example, those shown in Greek philosophy,¹²⁸ and those perceptible in contemporary trends, for instance, Heidegger's existentialism.¹²⁹ Hartmann proved the

¹²⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 174.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹²⁸ Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Einfuehrung in die Philosophie*, p. 94.

¹²⁹ Cf. idem, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, p. 43: "Martin Heidegger instead of asking for being as being, asks being for its meaning. An ontology which does not clarify this question is blind. This was the reason why the ancient ontology had to decline. A new beginning must be found. It is to be discovered in existence (Dasein), which on its part becomes restricted to the existence of man. This existent is superior to the other being because it is being which understands itself in existence. All existential understanding is rooted in it. Therefore, ontology must be based upon the existential analysis of this 'Dasein.' From this position it follows that all being must be interpreted relative to man ... : the world in

untenableness of such positions. The object, the subject and the gnoseological relation of both of them are truly encompassed by being. Therefore, contrary to relativistic theories, Hartmann teaches that finally all gnoseological problems must turn into ontological questions, for behind all cognition, there is waiting the question for being.

By pointing to the emergence of the ontological problems behind or beyond the gnoseological questions a methodical way is visible which leads from the aporetics of cognition to the theory. Theory, in Hartmann's philosophy, does not mean an even solution of problems. Theory is the treatment of problems described by phenomenology, and explored in aporetics. Hartmann confesses in all theory: *Igrwramus et ignorabimus*, that is, he admits the insolubility of the perennial problems, and the limitation of consciousness which is experienced when confronted with the transintelligible sphere.

III. THE THEORY OF GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE

Aporetics of cognition, in the last analysis, must arrive at the sphere of being for "the nature of the thing is not exhausted by an objectification for a subject."¹³⁰ Consequently, for the subject, too, the object is an existent, a Ding-an-sich. This condition challenges human cognition to search.¹³¹

But the searching subject itself is an existent. Hence, the relation between these two real beings which becomes established by cognition is, so to say, in the foreground only a

which I am is at any given time my world (je meinige), but can very well be another for any other man. Similarly is the truth my truth (je meinige). (Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Halle, 1927, especially the introduction and the first part.) Therewith, the question for being as being is eliminated. What is asked for is only being as it is for me, given to me, understood by myself. This is a predetermination of the basic ontological question throughout and, to be sure, through the formulation of the question . . ."

¹³⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p. 182.

¹³¹ Hartmann who analyzed the problem of cognition thoroughly, is, of course, aware of reflection. But in his investigation, he limits cognition to its primary givenness in the ontological realm in order to explore unhindered the primary condition of all cognition.

gnoseological one. Its background or its basis is an ontological one, namely being.

Hartmann uses these findings in his theory in order to illuminate thegnoseological aporetics. He says:

A theoretical treatment ... has to attempt to see thegnoseological nature of the subject-object relation against the background of its ontological nature.¹³²

Therefore, Hartmann divides his theory or treatment of the aporetics of cognition into an ontological and agnoseological part.

In the ontological part, Hartmann treats the problem of the object as being the introduction to the problem of being. He says that

when at all, then only from this point can the ontological relation be seen, a relation which is hidden in thegnoseological nature of the relation of cognition.¹³³

Hence, the problem of the object is the recognized *exemplum crucis* in the noetic problem.

In the approach to Hartmann's theory of cognition, it seems advisable to secure the premise that the object is confronting the consciousness of the subject. Therefore, we must ask what Hartmann means by consciousness? Hartmann criticizes the "widely spread view which identifies spirit, mind, with consciousness."¹³⁴ This would allow the equation spirit=consciousness. However, although consciousness falls within the range of spirit, nevertheless, not all spiritual being is consciousness. Besides, there is

also a very unspiritual consciousness. One cannot deny that it possesses practical shrewdness and a certain amount of intelligence, but all this remains tightly bound to the service of vital needs. It shows in no way an autonomous intention.¹³⁵

¹³² Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege ...*, p. 182.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

... Nicolai Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*, p. 48. This view is, according to Hartmann, "not only found in Psychologism; the idealistic theories too, suggest it." But Hartmann objects to it for this view does not aspire high enough.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* He continues: "We know this from the higher animals. ••• Perhaps

The actual genesis of spirit from unspiritual consciousness, which during the last decades has become a controversial issue in the academic world of the natural sciences and philosophy, is not the question here. Hartmann thinks that "from the aspect of consciousness alone spirit cannot be understood."¹³⁶ It is clear to him that the consciousness of man is of another kind than the consciousness of even the highest developed animals. Hartmann points out the factor which differentiates the spiritual consciousness from the lower. It is the severance or detachment from the tension of the drives, the freeing from the vital urges, the distance of spiritual consciousness from the matter with which it has to deal. Therefore, spiritual consciousness is not restricted to the vital level of the individual. The individual's environment is not limited to needs,

it is widened in its content, and, strictly speaking, it is without determinable limits. It can expand as far as experience and conjecture will lead it.... Therewith it shows an essentially different relationship to the real world in which the individual lives, than other beings, namely, an objective relation coined by penetration and comprehension.¹³⁷

For that reason, consciousness is truly "an existent, a being, a species of being,"¹³⁸ which has a very definite univocal meaning. The latter becomes clear

if a privation of consciousness is spoken of, the tacit supposition of any non-ontological theory of cognition is that there is consciousness, which means that consciousness is something.¹³⁹

one can at least say, that where sense organs are found, there may well be a beginning of consciousness."

¹³⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*, p. 48. Hartmann had pondered deeply in these themes. He even wrote on "Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie," in *Kleinere Schriften*, III, pp. 78-187. Within the hierarchy of being, the spiritual consciousness means to Hartmann "a *novum*, which is added, but which is not another *continuum* of the successive levels. With spiritual consciousness it is the same as it is with the organic life which is added to the inorganic nature. Nobody doubts the coherence, but the organic cannot be explained by mechanics, not even by the most advanced forms of the latter."

¹³⁷ Nicolai Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*, p. 109.

¹³⁸ Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, p. 18.
¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

Therewith, the ontological supposition supports all the cases. Futhermore, it becomes evident that all cognition and all the theories of cognition are based on this presupposition.

The cognizable elements of being can only be determined gnoseologically. But the being of cognition and of its object can only be understood ontologically. One cannot treat these problems separately; only *in abstracto* can one isolate them.¹⁴⁰

In the following presentation of Hartmann's *theory*, only those parts of his ontology and gnoseology are referred to which stand directly in relation to the gnoseological transcendence.

Hartmann's inquiry centralizes at first-as previously seen-on the object by viewing its ontological and its gnoseological aspects. From the object, the theory proceeds to the subject and finally to the noetic relation in which both become intentionally united.

Ontologically seen, the object is in itself. It is completely indifferent towards recognition and towards intellectual comprehension and penetration. "From the natural and from the philosophical point of view of cognition the object is the transcendent,"¹⁴¹ for cognition is never outside the subject, or, cognition is *in* the subject, and "the mode of cognizing an object is always the mode of a subject."¹⁴² Hence, any artificial orientation of cognition towards its object in the existential sphere is unnecessary, for the orientation or the direction of the subject-even in reflection-is towards an object. Therefore, Hartmann considers it necessary to clarify the problems first from the point of view "of ontology before treating them gnoseologically-hence, this is not a theoretical arrangement but it is the natural order."¹⁴³ Naturally the realistic tendency of cognition reaches deep into the ontological realm, because it not only advances to the object and to the transobjective, but in comprehending the nature of being, it recognizes itself,

¹⁴⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 318.
m *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁴² Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 183.
HB/*ibid.*

the subject, and with it the transsubjective also. Hartmann adds that the sphere of ontology has to be thought of " as the homogeneous unifying sphere of the transcendent and of the immanent." ¹⁴⁴ This is due to the object, for being is one in spite of being shared by the many." ¹⁴⁵

The object of cognition at any given time is, therefore, always a " sector of the sphere of being " ¹⁴⁶ woven into the nexus of reality, exposed by it for cognition and yet never severed from it. This sector is, to be sure,

potentially unlimited for the existent on its part does not resist any further objectification. **It** is indifferent towards it. Cognition can explore it in every direction—at least principally. ¹⁴⁷

Gnoseologically seen, this sector of reality, however, is precisely an existential *sector* and therefore, a limited something, determined and enclosed for the subject. What lies beyond it is excluded from the momentary cognition. **It** is the trans-objective which lies beyond the momentary comprehension. Through this condition the existential spheres of objection ¹⁴⁸ at any given time become distinguishable. No further demonstration is necessary to make clear that the *ratio essendi*, which is searched for by cognition, precedes the *ratio cognoscendi*.

The uniqueness of the intellectual being in the midst of being puts the noetic object which emerges from the plane of being at any given time in position to itself (= subject) and transforms the relation therewith into a gnoseological one. **It** is in the subject that through the cognitive process there originates the *ratio cognoscendi* or the object-image, which stems from the *ratio essendi*. Therewith is shown that the subject is

the very point in reality in which being is reflected-and, since this re: flexion causes a multitude of representing images—the point in

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹⁴⁵ This position reminds us of the Aristotelian problem of the one and the many, but it is not dealt with here by Hartmann. However, as is seen, it is presupposed.

¹⁴⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* .•• , p. 204.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ Cf. diagram *The Spheres of Cognition and of Being*, p. 145.

which this reflexion takes place widens to a cosmos of multiform representations of being,¹⁴⁹

which, on the other hand, are the subject's own representations, because they exist in the subject and through its act, or briefly, because they are subjective representations of objective images. In regard to their content, these subjective representations are object-determined, wherefore they are rightly called object-images. These images are the obtained aspects of the extra-mental object in the noetic cosmos of consciousness. This sphere of the subject is, therefore, not simply a psychological sphere, but it is the inner sphere, or the countersphere of the objects, that is, it must be understood as gnoseological sphere.

Hartmann does not claim that the determinations of cognition presented here are an "explanation or even a theory of consciousness."¹⁵⁰ They may, however, be used as an outline towards the progress of the theory. In any case, they seem necessary in order to arrange the spheres of the problems of the theory according to its areas. Hartmann distinguishes three such areas:

1. A limited psychological sphere.
2. A logical (ideal) sphere.
3. An ontological sphere.

In this three fold confrontation of psychology, logic and ontology the field of the proper (narrower) problem of cognition takes a special middle position through which it connects the other problem areas with one another, but it does not level them out.¹⁵¹

Whatever sphere may be considered, according to Hartmann, each one is based on the antic sphere, on being. A philosophical analysis, therefore, cannot ignore the import of the ontological moments upon the problems.

Hartmann's demonstration of the ontological roots of the gnoseological aporias is not an artificial speculation. It begins with the empirical natural cognition which always presupposes being. The relation, too, between subject and object is a

¹⁴⁹ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, p. 104.

¹⁶⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege ...*, p. 109.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

natural phenomenon. The seclusion of the conscious subject in its sphere does not make it isolated from other beings. But a certain "subjection to a definite kind of relation" ¹⁵² takes place in which the noetic appropriation of the determinations of the object result as object-images in the subject. This result, however, belongs to the sphere of knowledge already. It is no longer purely gnoseological or object of cognition. As object-image, the result of cognition has become the intentional content of the intellect or of the consciousness and therewith leaves the sphere of the gnoseological transcendent. Hence, now it can be seen that the gnoseological transcendence in Hartmann's theory is a comprehending of a being-in-itself; this is the clear restriction or the boundary of the genuine act of cognition compared to all the other intellectual acts.

Cognitive intention transcends simply not only the sphere of the subjective states but also the sphere of the mere intentional objects, or, of the for-me-existents; it penetrates to the being-in-itself. ¹⁵³

In regard to a solution of this basic aporia, Hartmann holds that it is sufficient to have

a mere ontologically conditioned relationship between object and subject ... in order to transmit the determinations of the object upon a subjective construct; thereby the latter is made objective. ¹⁵⁴

Such a position, however, does not claim to have found a final solution for-as Hartmann explicitly states-the "how of the transmission of the object-image into the subject, the genesis of the images in the consciousness remains irrational" ¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 318.

¹⁶⁸ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 118. Hartmann still remarks: "Of course, there are many kinds of transcendence, just as there are many peculiar borderline relations. For instance, the transobjective remainder of the momentary objection is transcendent; furthermore there is the realm of the transintelligible to reason; values transcend being; God (as extra-mundum) transcends the world, etc. But all these kinds are not the gnoseological transcendence, with which we are concerned here."

¹⁵⁵ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 326.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 238: Hartmann, as is known, distinguishes also between the gnoseological and the ontological irrational: "the meaning of the first is irrational in the sense of the unfathomable which, in the ontological order, would mean

(= transintelligible) at least for today's understanding. Nicolai Hartmann then accepts as a solution of the basic gnoseological aporia the summary of his findings:

In the determination of the subject through the object the mutual transcendence fully remains. This transcendence causes no contradiction to the phenomenon of object-awareness. The object is independent from the latter. It stands indifferent towards its cognition. The relation of cognition ... is a transcendent relation; it is an ontological relationship which cannot resolve in any inner aspect of the subject.¹⁵⁶

Hartmann checked this result of his theory by comparing it with other theories. He measures on them again and again his own position. In general, he criticizes many contemporary thinkers who display a kind of "atavism," that is they cling to a theory which teaches that

cognition is a production within the consciousness, a forming of notions and ideas, or at least a transforming, hence, a process which is characteristic of the synthetic judgment.¹⁵⁷

Not only the idealistic schools are based on such a theory. From them it is to be expected. But the correlativism of the theory of knowledge, too, is not free from it, because this correlativism "assumes the insolubility of the mutual connection

chance; in the gnoseological order it means the incomprehensible, the unknowable, that which is inaccessible to reason and lies beyond the limits of cognition, or which is the transintelligible." In the latter sense it is used here.

¹⁵⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , p. 362. In the same passage Hartmann adds about the admitted irrationality or transintelligibility that it "is not in need of a special justification. It is naturally ontological. However, for that reason, it is not less certain than in the case of a clear understanding of its structure and function. It possesses a degree of hypothetical certainty which marks the unavoidable minimum of metaphysical assumptions."

¹⁵⁷ Idem, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *Kleinere Schriften*, I, p. 123. "This interpretation is taken as Kantian with reference to the authority of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by its representatives In Kant there are indications which seem to support such an assumption—most distinctly so in the "transcendental deduction of pure reason." (2nd ed.) There Kant taught that the objects originate directly through intellectual action in a synthesis only. Of course, one seems to forget that many a contrary statement from the same *Critique of Pure Reason* can be quoted."

between subject and object." ¹⁵⁸ In the "as-if-philosophy" (*Als-Ob-Philosophie*) of Hans Vaihinger ¹⁵⁸ this erroneous idea is found. The historical relativism, too, is firmly convinced "that man cannot advance to the objects ... as they are, and retains nothing of them but changing opinions." ¹⁶⁰ Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, too, as presented in the *Ideen* does not advance further. Husserl supplements the intuition of the ideas (*eide, Wesensformen*) with reflective studies of the spiritual (mental) acts which lead finally to the level of the essences.

But where do such theories finally lead, theories which make it impossible to arrive at the truth either because of erroneous premises, or because of a lack of distinction between the true and the false? Such theories actually deny to cognition its proper object, therefore, in their last consequence, these theories arrive at a denial of being. Thus, any genuine knowledge and any true science disappears. Cognition divorced from its object-as is the case in the above mentioned theories-can no longer be called cognition. The tendency of such systems towards total scepticism becomes considerable for they succumb to the circle "into which all such procedures usually run. They come under their own law of the suspension of univocal truth, whereby they extinguish themselves." ¹⁶¹ All these theories

¹⁵⁸ Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* . . . , p.

¹⁵⁹ Werner Ziegenfuss, *op. cit.*, II, p. 767. "According to Vaihinger thinking and willing are originally only media in the service of the will. Thinking is not able through pure theoretical cognition to comprehend the given, the immediately experienced reality. Such a cognition cannot obtain truth in the sense of an accordance with reality. Cognition must be taken *as if* it were true, that means as fiction. Fictions are inadequate and subjective; they are imaginary modes of notions, the conclusiveness of which in reality is barred from the very beginning." (*Die Philosophie des Als-Ob*, p. 606.)

¹⁶⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.*, p.

¹⁶¹ Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.*, p. 128. See there also Hartmann's evaluation of the natural sciences, especially of physical theory, of the micro-mechanics of the atomic processes, etc. He states that any positivism "which makes the empirical data subjective because they are rooted in sense-data" is unable to provide a final answer and therefore, needs a conversion to ontology.

fail because they do not have the proper basis. They begin with the supposition that

cognition consists in a mental forming (constructing), and because the forming starts from a given, it must be a transforming. If one identifies the *content* of the data with the variety of perception, the *mode* of being of the data, however, with reality-as the unwise Neo-Kantian understood it-then the outcome must show that the intellect by its scientific procedure does change (or transform) the given real into a more or less unreal something and that the intellect issues as true cognition what it does change.¹⁶²

Therefore, the real is not recognized but it is mistaken, for "the real is never given as such, either through the senses, or in any other elementary form of cognition."¹⁶³ It lies always "outside" the subject (=intellect or consciousness) and, therefore, must necessarily be searched for. "Real, in the strict sense of the word, is simply the real existent only."¹⁶⁴ But the gnoseological transcendence stretches-although in varying degrees-from the lowest to the highest levels of human intellection. "The scientific experience teaches us that we have again and again to return to the data in order to exhaust them."¹⁶⁵

Hence, the object is the important factor which makes the gnoseological theory a true or false theory of cognition. For naturally with the object, the essence of cognition either stands or falls. If the object is seen erroneously as being in the subject, better, as being in the consciousness (as is the case when sense perception, conception, ideation or any other performed functions of the consciousness or any results of such functions are taken as the starting point of cognition) then, indeed, an object as being-in-itself and existing in the extramental sphere cannot be found. Such "cognition" (erroneously so called in this case) does not need to search for objects in the sphere of being,

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. HM.

¹⁶³ Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. the work by Karl Rahner, *Geist in Welt*, Muenchen, Koesel-Verlag, 1957, in which the author analyzes the *Conversio inteUectu11 ad phantasmata* of Thomas Aquinas.

and, consequently, does not need to seize an object in order to appropriate it. Such a function, however, ceases to be a cognitive one. Such operations of the intellect belong to the immanent sphere of thought. Naturally, the gnoseological transcendence is ignored, for it is not needed to reach the extra-mental being or a being-in-itself. The realm of reality and the realm of consciousness, however, are bridged or connected only through this transcendence, hence, they can come to each other solely through this transcendence, and this transcendence is the basic phenomenon of real cognition. Theories, systems, speculations, etc., which do not take account of this phenomenon, necessarily are doomed to failure.

Hartmann wonders how the notion of the object-in-itself was ever put in opacity, or how it could be so totally ignored, "since the normal consciousness (or intellect) -when it becomes attentive to that notion (which happens in the conflict of opinions)-never mixes the notion up with the real object." ¹⁶⁶

The ponderability of this question led Hartmann to the disputed discovery of the "circle of thinking" (*Zirkel des Denkens*) by tracing the errors and demanding from the erroneous theories an answer to the question of the real object. Thereby, he comes across a position which abolishes the confrontation of object and subject, in other words, a position which ignores the heterogeneity of object and concept. This theory asks:

What-if anything-do we know of the object which is not contained in our concept (idea) of it? The concept and the judgment, both of them are on the level of the concept and are transformations of the concept. Hence, what then does confront the concept (or what is opposite of the concept)? In last analysis, it seems that this confrontation itself consists merely in our mode of conception, the independence of the object from thought (*Meinung*) is itself only an object-we-think-of, a thought. If we suppose in our judgment the object as being-in-itself, this being-in-itself is a supposed one only. If one thinks of the object as an independent structure

¹⁶⁶ Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.*, p. U7,

in the extramental sphere, the independence and with it the extramental sphere too are spheres of thought.¹⁶⁷

This circular current of thought is truly a vicious circle which returns to its starting point within the sphere of consciousness. **It** presents the argument of the "circle of thinking," which in such an illusory manner acquits itself of the real in-itself-existing object. **If** the objects were accepted, this deception would fall back into the ancient error of the duplicity of the world, which is criticized in Plato's philosophy. According to Hartmann, it would be more exact, however, not to speak of a doubling but of a multiplication of the world, for "in every consciousness the concept is different, whereas the object remains identical with itself."¹⁶⁸ The criterion of all cognition versus thinking remains positively bound to the gnoseological transcendence which is not only conditioned by, but necessary for the object-subject relation, for

in the cognizing consciousness an object-image originates which is adequate to the external object, but the latter remains forever a transcendent object-in-itself, which is not identical or one with the image.¹⁶⁹

Therefore, cognition neither is, nor can be a mental construct. **It** is an act, "which is in continuous progress by dealing with the enigmatic nature of being. The transcendent cognitive relation progresses with cognition, and it, too, increases its range within the surrounding world."¹⁷⁰

IV. EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE

The detailed presentation of Hartmann's gnoseological transcendence is now open to an evaluation and a critique. A critique proves itself justified if it can show its point of de-

¹⁶⁷ Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

¹⁶⁹ Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in *op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

parture, or its basis. The critique offered here views the problem of the gnoseological transcendence from two perspectives, namely,

- 1) from the immanent point of view of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition, and
- 2) from a realistic (orthodox realistic or traditional scholastic) perspective.

Seen from the immanent point of view, the gnoseological transcendence is the cardinal point from which the logical Idealism and Neo-Kantianism can be attacked and overcome. For the non-identity of object and subject, or their gnoseological heterogeneity, established with the proven gnoseological transcendence, points unequivocally to and shows the object's foundation in being, i.e., the object's pre-gnoseological existence. Therefore, it is proven that the object of cognition is being-in-itself and is, therefore, causally independent of and prior in time to cognition by a subject. When the production of an object through a subject is either assumed or actually taking place, then it is no longer real cognition but thinking, imagining, or phantasy. For-as Hartmann shows-the object of cognition is not produced or generated by a cognizing subject. The object which at any given time is recognized is extramentally given-according to Hartmann's view of the hierarchy of being-on a certain existential level or in a sphere of being and is a being-in-itself whether it is ever recognized by a subject or not. Such a given real object when recognized influences through its effect the subject and challenges, so to say, the subject to accomplish an act of cognition. Thus the original givenness of the object is the first prerequisite of any possible cognition. Therefore, the cognitive intention of a subject is not aiming at an "intentional" but at a real object. This fact is indicated also in the original meaning of the word "object," signifying the "standing against" of two given beings. Through such a direction or alignment of the intention, cognition penetrates the "brazen ring" of consciousness and causes it to transcend or to step over itself by aiming at an object which

is being-in-itself and therefore is a transcendent object, i.e., a being of another kind than the subject. Accordingly, in real cognition always real subjects face real objects and both become the poles of a genuine gnoseological relation.

The object of cognition is a being-in-itself and is therefore never in the cognizing subject, it remains neutral to its being recognized, unaltered by it, may even outlast the subject and its own recognition. But the result in the subject is an image of the recognized, external object through the effect of the object and the cognitive act of the subject. The more exact in the subject is the generated and existing image of the object, the more perfect is the cognition. And the more perfect the cognition is, the more justifiably is it called a truth in view of its relation to the object, which it pictures. Hence, in Hartmann's theory we meet again a notion of truth which equals the *adaequatio intellectus et rei* of the Scholastics. However, Hartmann's truth is subject-immanent, i.e., resulting and existing in the subject and therefore the logical or gnoseological truth only. His concept of truth therefore is neither the one of Antiquity, nor the one of the Middle Ages, for the ancient and the medieval notion of truth was unequivocally based upon the truth of reality, or the ontic truth. Cognition was considered a more or less perfect grasping of the essence of beings through which the recognizing intellect participated in the *intellectus archetypus*. In Hartmann's philosophy this is not accepted. The admitted apriori elements of cognition, occurring on all levels of cognition, have hypothetical character, i.e., they are subject-produced assumptions for the phenomenology of cognition shows that a recognizing subject does set up, first of all, certain assumptions or hypotheses stimulated by experience, in order to prove them by re-checking the given reality with them, and, when proven, to apply them to reality. Here, too, Hartmann's method or criterion of "several instances" becomes applied. It follows, that Hartmann's apriori elements of cognition are of a hypothetical nature and subject-conditioned, but they are not founded upon the unchangeableness and eternity of essences. However, they meet the real, given

object from the subject's side with certain notions of categories and of being. This is the case, not only on the scientific, but on any noetic level. Hartmann stresses, however, that such identical elements in object and subject" are not the categories themselves," as Hegel and other idealists assumed, and that they are not "even definitions of them; they are the hypothetical representations of the undefinable and in their nucleus actually never graspable categorical essences only."¹⁷¹

Within Hartmann's theory of cognition such a forming of hypothetical apriori notions and principles or laws becomes a necessity for any objective cognition, because the progress of knowledge is based upon an awareness of an insufficient cognition of beings or upon the knowledge or cognition of not-knowing. Only the cognition of a lack of knowledge, of an imperfection of insight or grasp, stimulates the mind to conquer more and more the realm of the trans-objective reality. And truly, the "circle of (recognized) objects "is always surrounded by the immeasurable ocean of the unknown, and perhaps, for human grasp, even unobtainable, impenetrable given. In other words, according to Nicolai Hartmann the real object remains transcendent, and the subject is ever newly challenged to transcend its own consciousness because reality remains to a certain degree supra-rational, irrational. It seems then that this is the new formulation, the new admission of the ancient confession "*Ignoramus et ignorabimus.*"

Built upon such insights Hartmann's theory of cognition becomes, therefore, an aporetic metaphysics of cognition. He expresses that already in the restrained, prognostic title of *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, i.e. basic characteristics of a metaphysics of cognition, for it, too, cannot determine and predicate the ultimate and the last of human cognition in spite of the advanced information of the twentieth century. In the preceding study Hartmann's theory was therefore presented as an aporetic metaphysics, precisely in reference to Nicolai Hartmann's distinctions between ontology and metaphysics, between problematic and systematic thinking. Within

¹⁷¹ Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, ed., p.

this frame, the gnoseological aporias were introduced, and with the gnoseological transcendence the breakthrough and a breaking-away from idealism of any form was possible. This was Hartmann's great concern: to deliver cognition from the logico-idealistic bondage. Therefore, this is considered Hartmann's proper merit: the in-itself-being object of cognition can no longer be an illusion for a generating mind does not produce it. Whoever will follow Hartmann's thought will be led to a cognition of the real object in its own existence, for Hartmann's philosophy points to the real world with its proper hierarchy of being, its own structures, categories, principles and laws, with its relations and its dependence. Hartmann's advancement to the gnoseological transcendence then-intended and shown by Hartmann as the necessary basis for realism-can be considered by realistic thinkers at least a highly valuable attempt, a beginning or even a road to cross over the idealistic border and to refute logical Idealism.

What then can be said about Nicolai Hartmann's gnoseological transcendence from a realistic (Aristotelian-Scholastic) point of view?

First of all the basis of such a criticism is to be shown. The orthodox realist knows about and acknowledges the gnoseological transcendence. Without such a transcendence, truth (a true cognition of the world, of essences of beings, even partial cognition) would not be possible. But the truths, the essences are not only recognized or known. They cannot be recognized or known if they are not first in themselves and before any cognition. The orthodox realist, therefore, holds that there is an antic, an ontological truth, or in this context, a pre-gnoseological truth in the things.

Whenever such a realistic thinker gets acquainted with Hartmann's aporetic metaphysics of cognition, he will be at first surprised at Hartmann's thought, which in many points is in concord with Aristotle, Aquinas and Scholasticism. This impression may have caused Gottlieb Soehngen to admit: "Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition has many essential starting points in common with the Aristotelian Scholastic

thinking." ¹⁷² This is not astonishing. Hartmann himself says that " it needs a total revolution of the world view through which the phenomenon of the natural object-awareness becomes changed (*auf den Kopf gestellt wird*) " in order to be able to agree with the idealistic thinkers. "For regardless how much one may attempt to interpret transcendence into its reverse (immanence), one cannot ignore it in the phenomenon." ¹⁷³ Nevertheless, the realistic thinker has to get down to the individual problems and the differences of the positions.

The greatness of a philosopher may be measured, at least partially, on the attitude the thinker displays in regard to the real problems and especially to those urgent and pertinent in his own era. Hartmann states that no thinker begins in philosophy with a blank. To everyone a certain level of problems, of knowledge and of principles is transmitted. Indeed, even Aristotle found a certain problem-situation given, i.e., he found the Sophistic, the Platonic and other theories in which the epigone could detect inevitable provocations and valuable premises. Aristotle saw and responded to the pre-Aristotelian positions with critique, corrections and agreements. What made Aristotle immortal was the fact that he bent the pre-Aristotelian thinking to realism by measuring the theorems of his fore-runners on reality.

During the Middle Ages the phrase was coined of the " waxen nose of the authority " which could be shaped or reshaped. Thomas Aquinas acted accordingly when he, in the wealth of thought characterizing the thirteenth century and in the wealth of Christian tradition, accomplished his great philosophical synthesis by adjusting transmitted ideas to the " modern " level of his own times.

Immanuel Kant was, according to his own report, " aroused from slumber" by the bias of the English empiricists. Hence, to this problematic situation of the eighteenth century the world owes the three Kantian " Critiques."

¹⁷² Gottlieb Soehngen, *Sein und Gegenstand*, Muenster, Aschendorff'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1930, p. 103.

¹⁷³ Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , 1925, p. 76.

In the post-Kantian, post-Hegelian era Nicolai Hartmann found himself philosophically challenged by the gnoseological situation and therefore, he dealt with the idealistically imbalanced problem of cognition. Nothing had made philosophy more disrespected than the theories of the neo-Kantian rationalists and of the logical idealists. These systems preconstructed their theories in order to explain and interpret reality and truth according to their immanently generated ideas.

Besides, Hartmann recognized early that the error of a system of thought does not remain limited to an ideology. It spreads contagiously to other large and significant regions of human existence. For instance, during his own life time, Hartmann had experienced in Russia the effects of Dialectical Materialism and later in Germany those of the superman ideology. Therefore, it seems, Hartmann felt obliged to break away from any form of Idealism and to turn radically to Realism. He devoted himself strongly, courageously and completely to this task. His separation from the Marburg School was taken as a necessary consequence of this decision. Hartmann began to follow up the "idea" and to pursue it into its origin in reality. He searched back on the phenomena of the given to the object of cognition and found it a being-in-itself. From there he took his gnoseological orientation and completed his philosophical synthesis. He did it with inexorable logical accuracy and in a brilliant style. From then on he considered himself no longer an idealist, but an ontologist, for his philosophy had become realistic and independent as he stated in the first sentence of his fundamental and important early work *Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*:

The ... enquiries are based on the understanding that cognition is not a creating, a generating or producing of the object as the Idealism of the old and of the new version wants to teach us, but it is a grasping of something which exists already before any cognition and which is independent of it.

This basic orientation and attitude of Hartmann cannot be ignored by realistic thinkers.

For the criticism here it is now especially important to see

what Hartmann actually means by cognition. He described it: "Cognition always is a grasping of an object which is in itself, and therefore, it is not a having of an objectivity, of a mere intentional object." ¹⁷⁴ In this statement lies *in nuce* also the thesis of the gnoseological transcendence. Three issues are here especially important for a critique of Hartmann's thought:

1. The object.
The truth.
3. The progress of cognition.

On all three issues, depending more or less on a transcendence, the critique must measure Nicolai Hartmann's realism.

1. As shown in the previous exploration Hartmann's concept of the object is in concord with the one of the orthodox realist. Both hold that cognition does not aim at the image of the object in the intellect but at the real, extramental thing-in-itself. This was expressed by the Scholastics in the statement that cognition does not aim at the object's *esse intentionale* but at the object's *esse reale*. The Scholastics called this intellectual alignment or direction the *intentio prima*. Hartmann introduces in his theory the term *intentio recta* as equivalent to *intentio prima*; the term *intentio obliqua* for the Scholastic *intentio secunda*, which reflects on the image. Hartmann wants these fundamental differences clearly distinguished in his gnoseological theory. So did the Scholastics. For the *intentio obliqua* deals with the picture of the extramental object in the intellect and can therefore be influenced by the receiver. **It** is indeed more or less perfect according to its degree of similarity with the thing-in-itself and the mode of the knower. **But** this image is never the object of the *intentio recta*. Hartmann's theory harmonizes here with the traditional realistic notion of the object. Gottlieb Soehngen even asks, "whether the notion of transcendence was formulated as radically by Thomas as it is done in Hartmann's *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*." ¹⁷⁵

The second issue is the problem of truth. The transcend-

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzuege* ... , pp.

¹⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

ent concept of cognition necessarily comprises the transcendent concept of truth. Gnoseological (logical) truth or error, is always respectively either the agreement or the disagreement of the obtained cognitive image with the thing-in-itself. This is strongly underlined in Hartmann's theory.¹⁷⁶ Such a concept of truth harmonizes with the Scholastic *Veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem*. However, this is the gnoseological (logical) notion of truth only. The orthodox realist knows also the ontological truth which is found in the essence of the thing and which is considered the measure of all logical, or gnoseological, truth.

Hartmann now takes strictly the gnoseological truth as truth proper. He was certainly influenced by his Aristotelian study and by the phenomenological method (*sui generis*) according to which truth in the proper sense of the word can be spoken of only in regard to cognition and knowledge but not in regard to the thing. Truth as property of the thing presupposes the agreement of the thing with its idea, its original design, or, Thomistically speaking, with its "eternal exemplar." Hartmann does not accept this concept of truth. He limits his notion of truth to a subject-immanent (consciousness), human truth. In his philosophy he neither presupposes nor accepts a personal creative, divine intelligence. As a hypothesis it would not be helpful, and the possibility to prove or demonstrate it is not seen by Hartmann. Such a divine intelligence would be to Hartmann a trans-metaphysical mystery, with which he would refuse to deal, for it would be beyond philosophical reasoning. Here then the critical questions must be asked. Does not Hartmann's concept of truth overburden the gnoseological transcendence from the side of the subject? Is not Hartmann's own realism weakened or even endangered by idealism? Followed to its ultimate consequences, such a concept of truth-and finally, also, of certainty-seems to open the door to an encroachment of the immanent idealistic view. Hence, from this point of view, the immunity of Hartmann's realism seems in danger.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *Grundzuege* ... , pp. 54-56.

An excursus appears helpful here. Thomas Aquinas himself accepted the Aristotelian concept of truth. Through the Christian tradition—which, although it was known to Hartmann, was not Hartmann's background—the Augustinian *verum est id quod est* was assigned to Thomas, and the *rationes aeternae* pointed the way to the roots of the truth of things in the Divine Intelligence. To Thomas Aquinas and to Nicolai Hartmann truth is and remains relational, i.e., it is subjectively objective. In the philosophies of these thinkers truth means not an object of, but the objectivity of, cognition in the subject.

Naturally, Thomas had the invaluable adventure which Hartmann did not accept, that he understood noetic subjectivity within the human realm as a determined, partly passive and limiting subjectivity. In the divine order, however, truth was to Thomas a determining, measuring, creative, personal intelligence. Consequently, there was no difficulty in maintaining the relational character of his concept of truth. His concept of truth was not only not endangered but deepened, safeguarded and elevated in the Divine Spirit. Therefore, Thomas can say, convinced and convincingly:

The Divine Ideas are certain principles or forms or the stable and incommunicable reasons of the things which have no other causal forms and which are therefore eternal, immutable and dwell in the Divine Intelligence. But although they themselves neither develop nor vanish, it is assumed that all the other things which may develop and vanish, or which actually develop and vanish, are formed according to them.¹⁷⁷

And again Thomas explains:

What the Greek called "ideas," is called by the Latinist "form." Therefore, with ideas are meant forms which are valid for other things and which exist for themselves outside the things. Such a form can serve a twofold purpose: either it is the original reason of the thing of which it is the form, or, it is the intelligibility in which sense it is spoken of when referred to the forms of intelligible things that they are in the knowing intellect. In both cases the supposition of ideas is necessary.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 15, a. fl.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 1.

On such grounds Saint Thomas comes to the conclusion:

Hence, the things of nature are constituted between two intellects and are said to be true according to their similarity with the one or the other of the two. Namely, the things are said to be true according to their similarity with the Divine Intellect inasmuch as they fulfill the end towards which the Divine Intellect has ordered them . . . A thing is said to be true according to its similarity with the human intellect, inasmuch as nature aims to produce a true opinion of itself. The first relation of truth spoken of is prior to the other. For the relation to the Divine Intellect precedes the relation to the human intellect. Even if there were never such a thing as a human mind, nevertheless the things would be called true because of their relation to the Divine Intelligence.¹⁷⁹

Hartmann never arrived at such a conclusion bridging with it the gnoseo-ontological hiatus. The gnoseological transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's theory of cognition shows no such final anchorage of cognition either in a theory of participation or in an *analogia entis*. Hartmann's transcendence remains in the horizontal dimension of cognition, i.e. inner-worldly, inner-cosmic. It is not secured through a connection with the vertical line of cognition which ascends and transcends to the meta-cosmic realm of the Divine. This then is the reason for not having a final solution either for cognition or for truth. If Hartmann's excellent and clear dealing with cognition-although it is throughout inner-worldly oriented-could find and incorporate the vertical dimension of the idea, it would no longer remain a mere aporetic metaphysics, for it could view the summit of transcendence and from there it could find a still more satisfactory answer and its last and ultimate transcendence.

3. The third point for measuring Hartmann's theory of the gnoseological transcendence is the progress of cognition. Through the knowledge of the unknown or through the cognition of the inadequacy, of the incorrectness, of the lack of cognition the human intellect is urged again and again to strive for greater similarity, for more exact adequacy, which is for

¹⁷⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. fl.

truth. Therefore, the intellect strives for deeper comprehension of the real, of the world, of the universe and its cause.

In the progress of cognition there again appears a transcendence which is, according to Hartmann, a transsubjective and a transobjective one. For in progressing cognition aims at an element of the thing which is not yet known, which is not yet objectified. Hence, the consciousness transcends not only the subjective sphere but also the objectified region. This phenomenon gives new strength to Hartmann's proof of the transcendent, i.e., in respect to the argument against the production or generation of the idea in the subject as it was taught by the logical idealists of Marburg. Precisely through the progress of cognition it becomes obvious that the thing remains in itself, remains neutral, indifferent towards cognition. The phenomena show that the object of cognition in its existence and essence remains untouched by any changes and variations which do, however, occur in the cognition of the individual as well as in the general knowledge of mankind and in the sciences.¹⁸⁰

Here another moment of agreement with Scholasticism can be seen. In his *Summa* Saint Thomas distinguishes: "*Alius est modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo.*"¹⁸¹ The existing thing in itself, which is recognized and acknowledged in Thomas' and Hartman's philosophy, however, is in the Thomistic theory firstly an idea embedded in a created being, as shown in the previous excursus, secondly, an idea ordered toward a created intellect. Hartmann sees the human intellect ordered towards a cognition of things (cf. his a-teleological concept of the universe) which are never completely exhaustible. They retain always a mysterious, impenetrable remnant, a particle of trans-intelligibility or irrationality. Hartmann, greatly influenced by modern phenomenology and the findings of scientific psychology¹⁸² takes the limitations of

¹⁸⁰ Cf. *Grundzuege* . . . , pp. 52-54, 67-71, 99-102 and others

¹⁸¹ *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1.

¹⁸² Modern Ganzheits- and Gestalt-psychology have shown, for instance, that the "naked" perception of an isolated fact or being or thing proves to be an illusory abstraction in every regard.

the human intellect as the borderline of possible objectification. Consequently, he diverges again from the Scholastic viewpoint according to which all things are ordered to man, but man is ordered to God. Here too, Hartmann remains consciously inner-worldly and sees the progress of cognition, in spite of its obvious transcendence, within the anthropological sphere. Hartmann measures the phenomena and the dimensions of currently achieved human knowledge and draws the line between the objectified and the transobjective. The transobjective region, be it in a single thing, be it in the universe, becomes the basis for Hartmann's theory of irrationality or of trans-intelligibility. Apparently impressed by Hegel's notion "The truth is the whole," Hartmann concludes that only when the whole of being could be grasped, penetrated and known, can the single thing, which is a cosmic momentum, a mesh of the whole, be truly recognized and known. Thus, the full meaning of being-in-itself can be applied only to the world as a whole. The whole world is the "proper object" of a cognizing subject, although the subject itself is a part of the whole. In this sense then, too, all transcendence, all progress of cognition leads to the ontic sphere.

But the human intellect cognizes the determinations of the whole and of a single being-as the phenomena show. These determinations which are known by the individual and/or by mankind are given always within and through the basic ontic relation. They are proportioned to the pre-gnoseological existential relation: man-world; they determine only that "part of the universe" which is so far objectified and they therefore can be the assignment of an individual, of many, or of the specialized sciences. Whatever man objectifies anew of the trans-objective sphere can be obtained only through thegnoseological transcendence which enlarges the "circle of objects." But human cognition will never exhaust the trans-objective realm.

This summary and critique then shows that through Hartmann's philosophy in general, through his metaphysics of cognition and his theory of thegnoseological transcendence in

particular, a philosophical progress was achieved. **It** may be pointed out that Hartmann's contributions appear as a broad basis for a continuation of the domestic dialogue and as a challenge especially for Neo-Scholasticism. **It** offers a promising possibility to advance, and this not only because of the concord of certain positions found in both philosophical systems (certainly many more may be found than those discovered and elaborated so far), and which doubtlessly will result in surprising affirmations of traditional views, but especially also because of the diverging positions. The latter seem a suitable starting ground for reciprocal corrections and complementations and may therefore contribute to a new transcendence as is to be hoped for in any progress of human knowledge.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Naturordnung als Quelle der Gotteserkenntnis: Neubegründung des teleologischen Gottesbeweises. By GEORG SIEGMUND. Fulda, Germany: Verlag Parzeller and Co., 3rd Edition, 1965, pp.

This study is based on extensive biological research, undertaken by the author in the twenties. The book witnesses indeed to solid biological knowledge. It may conveniently be divided into three parts. In a first historical section, which runs from p. top. 169, the importance attached by the main philosophers to the teleological argument (and to teleology in nature) is discussed. A second section is a study on teleology as found in living beings. A third section (pp. is purely philosophical in nature: it presents the teleological argument as well as some inferences from it and a refutation of some contrary positions.

It follows from the above that the book is extremely wide in scope :and covers much material: the author shows an enviable acquaintance with the history of philosophy, biology and ontology. Generally speaking he seems to this reviewer to have succeeded in establishing his point, viz. the teleological argument of the existence of God. The book is well written, very clear and stimulating. As one would expect, on points of detail some criticisms must be voiced.

It is certainly not true that Homeric man did not reach the level of self-decision (p. Athena repeatedly suggests a course of action to Odysseus," if he wishes himself."-' Kosmos' may originally have signified 'frame,' 'battle array,' rather than decoration (p. In the pages consecrated to Aristotle one misses a study of the place of chance and failure in Aristotle's physics.

The mentality which led to cosmic religion is hardly discussed. The author should have mentioned (and quoted) the very important book by Festugiere *La revelation d'Hermès trismégiste: Le Dieu cosmique*, where the history of the cosmological argument is traced. (The author almost exclusively used German works; he does not mention Simpson nor R. Ruyer's *Neo-finalisme*.)

We read on p. 53 a quotation from J. Hirschberger to the effect that the empirical world lies wholly outside St. Thomas Aquinas' interest. In its obvious sense this statement is sheer nonsense as every student of St. Thomas knows. The author remains unaware of a certain contradiction on these pages: with Steinblichel he assumes that Thomas should have

verified that there is finality on every level of being in nature, but shortly afterwards he quotes Hirschberger to the effect that finality is a metaphysical principle. **If** so, verification in all instances is clearly unnecessary.

What Siegmund writes on p. 55 (the mutual connection of things and their sharing in a common order is outside their nature) , is true in one sense, but one may also maintain that the mutual connection of things is because of their natural capacity and desire of such an order.

We read on p. 57 that the fourth argument of St. Thomas for the existence of God has no validity insofar as it is based upon the transcendentia. The author writes this because he did not understand that by 'verum' St. Thomas here means the so-called 'veritas ontologica causalis,' i.e., the intelligibility of things. Siegmund overlooks the fact that we do find varying degrees of intelligibility in the world, which ask for an explanation. He unduly constructs an opposition between the teleological argument of the *Summa contra gentes* and the *Summa theologica*.

The author is rather pessimistic on pp. 91 ff. concerning the future of the cosmos which would go towards "grosstmöglichen, vollstündigen Unordnung." This insight becomes the basis for a following assertion, viz. that a teleological argument is only possible starting from living organisms. The present reviewer is ready to concede that teleology appears most clearly in living beings, yet he feels that there is a much greater unity and cooperation between the anorganic world and life than Siegmund is prepared to admit.

Siegmund is right with his assertion insofar as finality appears to require a certain duality of things at different levels, as, for instance, of different functions in the same animal, of an organ and its object, an animal and its environment. **If** there would be no living beings, the anorganical world would be so uniform and such a unity that we could no longer speak of finality. On pp. 96-100 the author makes the important observation that Kant's criticism against the traditional demonstrations of God's existence was directed against the formulation in which he knew these, i. e., the version of Leibniz.

The second section of the book is the most valuable one. **It** appears to be an attempt to mobilize the results of biological research as available in the thirties to form the basis of a teleological proof. The present reviewer is not in a position to say whether later biological research has brought many new facts to light, but the thesis of Siegmund seems to have been well established: in order to explain life and the formation of the different organs, finality is necessary; a psychovitalistic force is not sufficient (individual plants or animals would not have the time to gather the necessary experience); likewise instinct is not a sufficient explanation.

The last section of the book presents a formulation of the teleological

BOOK REVIEWS

proof and makes some inferences. On these pages the author remains close to the generally admitted scholastic pattern of questions and answers concerning the relationship between God and the world.

In spite of quite a few over hasty statements, on the whole the book is solid, scholarly, interesting and well worth reading with sympathy and interest.

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Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis. By WILLIAM T. BLUHM. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. 488 pp. † index. \$7.95.

Considerable ferment and little consensus exist in political theory today. The classics have an unsure status, and contemporary work is diversely fragmented. Scant attention is given to political values and much emphasis is placed on various political facts; seldom do the two realms face each other, rarely do they meet. Most students of politics recognize these problems, but few have attempted their solution. Bluhm has broken ground. He makes a significant beginning in addressing them.

Bluhm argues very convincingly that the relevance of the classics need not be doubted; their relevance is evident from their influence on, or thematic recurrence in, contemporary theory. He spends most of the book pointing out, by heuristic comparisons, the affinity of a number of the more significant contemporary positions to classical systems. Examples of his pairings are Plato with Leo Strauss, St. Augustine with Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, St. Thomas with Jacques Maritain (Bluhm gives the latter pair a fair hearing, along with *some* penetrating and significant questions and criticisms), Rousseau with Carl Friedrich, and John Stuart Mill with Christian Bay. Bluhm's expositions and comparisons are well done, though not always with maximum profundity and not always without some strain to make a case.

In order to deal adequately with the diverse theories that he presents, Bluhm coins two categories that account for two broad positions on the real, the good, and the knowable. He calls them noumenalism and naturalism, assigning special meaning to each term. Noumenalism is the position that identifies the good political order, known by teleological reason, with a divinely ordained set of values taken to have the fullest reality. Within noumenalism, however, transcendentalism sees the good order as radically apart from the empirical world, whereas immanentism finds the good order inherent in the empirical world. Naturalism is the position that assumes

reality, insofar as it is knowable, to be coextensive with the empirical world; this reality and its purposes are essentially unintelligible.

Bluhm's noumenalism-naturalism categories closely parallel the common ought-is, value-fact distinctions. Although Bluhm does not side with noumenalist philosophy as opposed to naturalistic science or with science as opposed to philosophical inquiry into the political good, he lays the ground for and calls for bridge building between the two positions for the sake of a unified discipline, in both its ethical and factual dimensions. This problem is vital. Bluhm's major contribution is his bringing the issue to the surface, establishing a historical perspective, and indicating some possible approaches to a solution. It remains for students of politics and of philosophy as well-most of all, Christian students-to take up the issue in earnest.

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