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JUSTIFICATION IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY TODAY

GOD'S revelation is a Prophetic Word interpretative of events within history; moreover it is addressed to men living in a world bounded by time and space and so subject to constant change. This suffices to explain that theology born out of this revelation is of itself always relevant to the human situation. The Divine Word has inexhaustible intelligibilities, and man's discovery of these is qualified somewhat by the situation out of which he lays hold of that Word. Man's angle of approach determines which of its intelligibilities will come into focus for him. This polarity of objective truth and subjective situation is a tension indigenous to theology.

Recent theological endeavors within Catholicism-at least since 1958-have evidenced a definite newness of situation. At least where justification is concerned, this present stance, while amounting to an abrupt reaction against the immediate past on one hand, is on the other a harkening back to a more

ancient era of Christian theology, one that antecedes the Reformation and offers correctives to its dislocation of theological endeavor. These new directions in thought can be viewed as a liberation of certain virtualities of truth that have lain dormant within the faith; they are not emerging clothed in identical categories of thought and language, but they do reveal that their roots lie in past achievements within tradition. This serves two purposes: it gives substance to thinking that otherwise might appear ephemeral; and it supplies cautions to those exaggerations which the spirit of this age lends itself to.

The following reflections are intended not as a survey but rather as an attempted systematization [1] (necessarily tentative) of certain basic tendencies that manifest this continuity. Any such attempt must originate from and be dominated by certain basic intuitions, which serve as principles of unity and order in intelligibility. Those operative here derive from the theology of St. Thomas; for the rest it has been necessary, where the suggestiveness of contemporary theological writing is concerned, to exercise some personal options in selecting what harmonizes and rejecting what does not. As for procedure-first, an objection to the very possibility of doing this must be met; secondly, the synthesis itself ranged on three points: I) man's radical justification in creation and predestination, 2) his formal justification in the transformation by grace, and 3) some brief references to the ecclesial dimensions of this latter.

[1] The somewhat limited nature of this attempt is explained in part by the fact of the present paper being presented originally as one part of a symposium held at La Salle College in Philadelphia in December, 1965, where it was preceded by a study of Justification from a Biblical standpoint presented by Rev. Aelred Lacomara, C. P., (St. Michael's Monastery, Union City, New Jersey) and complemented by studies of the problem in Lutheran theology by Rev. Clarence Lee, (Lutheran Theological Seminary, Germantown, Pennsylvania) and from an ecumenical viewpoint by Rev. Arthur Crabtree, (Eastern Baptist Seminary, Philadelphia, Pennsylvannia) .

I. AN OBJECTION: THE THEOLOGY CONSOLIDATED AROUND THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

1. *Conciliar Pronouncements and Evolution of Dogma*

Undeniably, Catholic discussion of justification for the past four centuries has been dominated by the pronouncements of the Council of Trent. This is as it should be, yet it has resulted in the peculiar phenomenon of theology in its very distinctness from faith losing its nerve and suffering a dis-location from at least one of its proper tasks, that of a continuing and creative re-thinking of the intelligibilities inherent in God's Word infallibly attested to by the Church. This may be understandable in the light of the dangers which then threatened the life of the Church, and in a limited understanding of what theological endeavor was supposed to be, but for all of that it was an infelicitous turn of events. Doctrinal pronouncements should be seen not as an end but as a beginning; not as closing off speculation but precisely as providing the norms for authentic deepening of the understanding that lies at the heart of faith. Conciliar teachings are always *true;* they are *irrevocable; no discontinuity* is discernible between earlier and later definitions. At the same time they are not and do not pretend to be *exhaustive* or *integral;* their truthfulness is not absolute but relative, yet without any trace of relativism.

Contemporary Catholic theology is nearly unanimous not only in affirming a true development of dogma, but further in construing such evolution as more than the mere logical explicitation of what is already implicit in existing formulations and definitions. The historicity of all human existence, and therefore of Christian existence, demands acknowledging the temporally conditioned nature of dogma; it enables us to understand that the Church's utterances even when infallible are still spoken out of a limited horizon of knowledge. The object of faith after all is uncreated; the human conception and propositional formulation of it is always a hold on such truth at one historical moment and from a finite perspective. All such

formulae of faith transcend themselves, not because they are untrue, but precisely because they are true.[2] This includes even the divinely inspired expressions of sacred Scripture. The very commitment to language gives rise to a problem that is not simply semantic but truly hermaneutical. However, it is an over-simplification to dismiss the difficulty (as do some present day Catholic thinkers) by merely separating doctrine from formulation, and saying that faith lays hold of the former, reaching through the expressions which can always be rejected. This amounts to theological relativism and leads to thinking that all formulae are merely approximations, equally expressive of truth. More radically, it is to deny the humanness of faith by supposing that there can be faith without intelligible content. More helpful in this area is the three-fold distinction used by Karl Rahner between the *Unchangeable Object* of faith; the *truth* expressed in doctrinal formulae; and the *mode of expression* in which such are presented.[3] Unsurprisingly, no developed theory of such doctrinal evolution can be found in St. Thomas; and the evidence does not favor Marin-Sola's opinion that the proximate principles for such a theory are there.[4] At the same time, that the fact of authentic evolution

[2] Cf. Karl Rahner: *Theological Investigations,* Vol. I, Essay on "The Development of Dogma," p. 44, Baltimore and London, 1961.

[8] *Schriften zur Theologie,* Vol. IV, 1960, "Theol. Prinzipien der Hermeneutik eschatologischer Aussagen "; this volume has not yet appeared in english but Rahner suggests the distinction in Vol. I (translated as *Theological Investigations)* in the essay "Development of Dogma," p. 44 ff; in a footnote he equates the first two members of the distinction with St. Thomas' " res intellecta " and the "intellectum."

• Cf. F. Marin-Sola, 0. P.: *L'Evolution homogene du Dogme catholique,* Fribourg, vols.). The theory for which Marin-Sola finds a basis in St. Thomas amounts to a doctrinal development only "quoad nos" and necessitates positing a *virtual* Revelation which reason under the light of faith attains to by a process of logical inference from the propositions of *fornLal* Revelation. St. Thomas however seems little concerned with " theological conclusions" in this precise sense, and more given to discerning new and deepening intelligibilities within formal Revelation, through an exercise of "ratio illustrata a fide" but in ways other than the logical or strictly demonstrative; this latter is more suggestive of the type of doctrinal evolution now coming into focus. In fairness to Marin-Sola he does allow for other processes in the course of development, e. g. one through

was at least not alien to the thought of St. Thomas is suggested by these words from the Secunda Secundae: "... among men, the knowledge of faith has to proceed from imperfection to perfection." [5]

In brief, this is to say that though conciliar definitions are truly normative for theology, there remains the prior theological task of studying these within the context of history to discern their genuine meaning.[6] They need not always represent a unique line of progression over past definitions. On the other hand, it hardly needs to be said that as genuine confessions of the Church they are not to be dismissed as mere projections of ecclesiastical anthropology.

2. *The Historical Conditionedness of the Decisions of Trent*

Recent historical scholarship has tended practically without exception to point out an orientation in Trent that was unsystematic and fragmentary. An instance in case is the perhaps definitive though still incomplete work of Hubert Jedin.[7] The intent of the Conciliar fathers was largely polemical and defensive, occasioned by the disruption of ecclesiastical order during the Reformation. Various necessities had to be provided for and there was no pretense at offering any integral solutions to problems. Very much in evidence was an avowed lack of any clear understanding as to the nature of the church; emphasis was thrown almost exclusively upon the visible face, the hierarchial structure of the church; the role of Sacred Scripture

affective or experiential knowledge (cf. Vol. I, Chap. 4), but these for the most part sub-serve the speculative way. Even so, his work is the best fruit of the ninteenth century controversies, and remains historically an indispensable counterpart to the studies of Newman.

• *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 3um.

[6] The inestimable value, for instance, of reading the earlier, rejected drafts of schemas that are finally accepted within a Council has been graphically shown by recent studies on Trent as well as by the experiences of Vatican II; for example the drafts on religious liberty from the latter are considerably instructive.

[7] Hubert Jedin: *Das Konzil von Trient*, Freiburg in Breisgau, Vol. 1 (1949), Vol. £ (1957); These two volumes are available in an english translation; *History of the Council of Trent*, Herder and Herder, N. Y.

was left obscure; and much to our point here, the division within Christianity, both institutional and spiritual, was accepted as fact.

Beyond this, however, is the phenomenon of the decrees of Trent gaining long after the Council had adjourned a status seemingly unique in all of Christian tradition. [8] They became the norm for *all* of Christian belief and conduct, so that Trent stands isolated from the tradition that preceded it, indeed the earlier tradition becomes as it were funneled through Trent. A definitely Tridentine epoch comes into being, during which certain institutional factors and even organizational practices are engrafted onto the Conciliar teachings. The First Vatican Council was absorbed completely into this system consolidated around Trent, but with the summoning of Vatican II the tide began clearly and irreversibly to change. To speak of the end of the Counter Reform may be somewhat histrionic, but it is also close to the truth.

In 1546 the Council laid down its decisions on Justification; their conditionedness, both historical and polemical, needs to be taken into consideration. *"Sola fide"* was condemned as a vain and presumptuous confidence, but in the Council's own understanding of this phrase, without any indication that this is indeed what Luther understood by these words, and without any attempt to indicate the orthodox meaning that can be given to the phrase. Recent Lutheran studies [9] insist that "imputation" is used by Luther in an exclusively forensic sense (patterned upon the language of St. Paul in *Romans)* so that it does not exclude in any contradictory sense an intrinsic renovation of the creature by grace. The decisions of Trent were certainly not intended as either a denial or an affirmation of this; indeed it is historically true that the insistence upon an intrinsically inhering quality as the "*causa unica juBtificatiords"* was directed against the "two-fold righteousness"

[8] Cf. Giuseppe Alberigo: "The Council of Trent," in *Concilium,* Vol. 7, 1965, p. 83.

[9] E. g., R Kosters: "Luther's These: Gerecht und Siinder Zugleich," *Catholica,* 1964, No. 18; C. Berkouwer: "Verdienste der Gnade? ", Kamper, 1958.

theory of its own papal legate, the Augustinian Seripando. Finally there are the repercussions resulting from the long dominance of late Medieval theology by Nominalism and Voluntarism (these have always been, perhaps unsurprisingly, bedfellows); and a long line can be traced from Scotus to Occam to the theologians immediately preceding the Council such as Gabriel Biel, Gregory of Rimini, and Von Usingen who was the teacher of Luther at the University of Urfurt_l[10] It was the insistence of the Augustinian theologians at the Council that resulted in the exclusion of *only* merits " *de condigno* " from man's preparation for grace. Nothing is said of merits " *de congruo* "-but this can hardly be interpreted as a positive defense by the Council of the Scotistic position on congruous merits; a position unacceptable to Reformation theology and actually opposed by the Thomistic theologians at the Council. Thus it is an erroneous procedure to seek to find in the decisions of Trent a solution ready-made to the questions posed in contemporary theological research.[11]

II. AN ATTEMPTED SYNTHESIS

1. *Radical Ju8tification in Creation and Prede8tination*

Brought into being out of nothingness and standing in conscious self-awareness, man poses to himself a primal question. He seeks in effect to *ju8tify* himself, the fact that he "is." And in fact his being is justified, in the relationship he bears to the prototype of himself existent eternally in the creative depths of God; he is justified in the mystery that he is the *Imago Dei*, "Let us make man to our image and Likeness" *(Gen.* 1 :26) . The infra-rational creature is without such justification.

[10] Cf. the illuminating study of H. A. Oberman: *The Harvest of Medieval Theology,* Harvard U. Press, 1963.

[11] On the Scripture-Tradition question, for instance, the Anglican William Palmer has pointed out that an earlier, rejected draft of "in Sacred Scripture and in traditions " read " partly in Sacred Scripture and partly in traditions"; thus the approved text can hardly be interpreted as favoring the "two-source theory."

However, this imaging of God needs to be taken seriously; it demands the acknowledgment that such imitation is impossible on the level of nature itself, and so is a primordial transformation within man's nature, having as its consequence that man now transcends the rest of the universe, and is a true counterpart to God from within the creaturely sphere. This is to say that the creation of man out of nothingness was at the very same time, by a pure contingency of God's love, a totally unexacted elevation to where his being opens out onto the Divine. It would not appear to over-state the truth to add that God would not have created man had he not intended to re-generate him-for all his non-deity-into adoptive but genuine sonship. It is this which legitimatizes man, which justifies his existence.

This uniqueness of man's being, existentially supernatural, trans-finalized towards the Divine Object, means that he is unable to be defined *integrally,* in his very humaness, apart from this elevation. In the realm of freedom the object or end is formally determinative; [12] it makes the free reality (the decision and the person so disposing himself) to be what it is morally and humanly.

True enough, beneath all this is a natural substratum or substructure, man's natural endowment of spirit. But even this, his pure nature, precisely because it is openess to and capacity for the Divine, cannot be easily strictured within the Aristotelian category of " physis "; by his essence man is above " nature," he transcends the cosmological universe; to define him as a rational animal is to characterize him in only one, and a vastly inferior, dimension of his being. St. Thomas speaks explicitly of the soul's natural capacity for grace; [13] as in the birth-pangs of Christian theology Tertullian had written of" *homo naturaliter Christianus."* Cajetan notes that

[12] *Summa Theol.,* I-11, q. 1, a. 3: "... actus morales proprie speciem sortiuntur ex fine: nam idem sunt actus morales et actus humani."

[13] *Op. cit.,* I-11, q. 113, a. 10: "... justificatio impii non est miraculosa: quia naturaliter anima est gratiae capax; *eo* enim *ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam,* ut Augustinus dicit."

it is inexact to refer to grace as created,[14] and John of St. Thomas while concurring suggests a certain impropriety even in the word "infused," preferring to speak of grace being *educed* from an obediential potency that is none other than the very nature of the soul.[15] Cajetan even writes of grace as "in some sense natural, in some sense not natural," since the soil into which alone it can be implanted is the free act educed from the natural potency of the soul, such free activity being a necessary disposition to the achievement of grace.[16]

It is misleading to characterize this in excessively negative terms as a mere non-repugnance. Theologically this capacity for grace rests upon man's being in his very nature the *Imago Dei.* On the purely natural level, however, this imaging is only *representational,* i. e., man in knowing and loving his human values merely represents, on a scale of being infinitely lower qualitatively, God's knowledge and love of self. The superior image of *conformity,* which is achieved in an intentional identity with the object of knowledge and love, is impossible

[14] *Comm. in I-II,* q. 112, a. 1: "... non proprie fit, et consequenter nee creatur; sed dicitur creari, quia non educitur de potentia subjecti, nee datur ex **meritis."**

[15] *Cursus Theologicus,* Disp. XXV, art. I, no. 3: "... gratia non creatur, cum producatur tamquam accidens inhaerens; ergo producitur in subjecto et ex subjecto, non ex nihilo...." *Ibid.,* no. 8: "... gratia non creatur physice (moraliter enim dicitur in Scriptura creari quia datur sine meritis) sed per actionem eductivam producitur, quia producitur ut inhaerens in subjecto, et sic non infunditur sicut anima quae creatur in corpore . . . gratia autem producitur ut accidens inhaerens subjecto et pendens ab illo, et sic non creatur. Dicitur autem contineri in subjecto a quo educitur secundum potentialem obedientialem, non naturalem; quia entitative non est aliud quam ipsa natura animae, respective autem dicit ipsum entitatem ut subjectam supernaturali agenti. . . ."

[16] *Op. cit.,* q. 113, a. 10, no. IV and V: "Alio modo, sic quod propria dispositio educatur de potentia subjecti, sed non per agens naturale, claudendo sub naturali agente totum ordinem naturae. Et tunc est potentia quodammodo naturalis, et quodammodo non naturalis .... ex eo autem quod ilia dispositio educibilis est de potentia propria, quandam naturalitatem habet.

Et hoc modo potentia animae ad gratiam est quodammodo naturalis, pro quanto actus liberi arbitrii quo praeparatur ad gratiam, educitur de potentia naturali liberi arbitrii. . . . Et quia medium nunc hoc, nunc illud inducit extremum; ideo potentia animae ad gratiam quandoque naturalis, quandoque non naturalis, sed obedientialis aut supernaturalis vocatur."

where God is concerned apart from the re-creation and elevation of grace. Nonetheless, St. Thomas describes the image of representation as an aptitude for the image of conformity. [17] An aptitude for something is more than mere non-repugnance; at the same time it is not necessarily an exigence for the higher order of which it is somehow capable. The actual implementation of the aptitude for grace is no wise within the capacities of man's nature; this remains utterly gratuitous and does effect a real elevation of that nature. [18] This orientation to grace from within nature can then accurately be described as *positive* yet purely *passive*. Irrespective of how one nuances theologically this order to grace, there remains the all important fact for the believer that man's nature was *"de facto"* so elevated in its very creation, and actually ordered to the vision of God. [19]

What does all this mean where justification is concerned? Only this, that as an inseparable element within the eternal creative decrees calling man out of nothingness, there occurs a primordial justification and this is: first of all, *exclusively God's act;* how could it be in any fashion man's since it occurs before man is, anteceding even that act which would be man's free consent to the elevation of his nature-and secondly is characterized by *universality;* its extension to all men without exception. Every re-achievement of justification will take place against the background of this initial and unqualified gratuity

[17] *Op.* cit., I, q. 93, a. 4.

[18] Thus the natural desire for the vision of God of which St. Thomas speaks *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1£, a. 1; *I-II,* q. 3, a. 8; ***III*** *Contra Gentes,* 50), which betrays this aptitude for elevation to the supernatural, remains itself conditional and inefficacious.

[10] Perhaps this is what is meant to be conveyed by the " existenz " of German existential thought and the authentic existence of " Dasein " in Heideggerian terms, i.e., the natural openess of spirit to the Divine. More probably, however, as Rahner and others have suggested, it could amount to an implicit awareness of the supernatural dimension (not recognized as such, of course) which characterizes existentially all human existence. To some extent contemporary Catholic theology is being influenced by these tendencies of thought (e. g., the influence of Heidegger upon Max Muller and J. B. Lotz, as well as Rahner), but for the most part it appears to be simply a case of a common historical situation giving similar directions to both Catholic and non-Catholic thought.

and universality. Though this occurs outside of history it does not occur outside of nature. The supernatural order is structured within nature; nature and grace can never be confused, they stand over against one another, yet "*de facto*" creation exists only within an order that is existentially supernatural. Grace is not so much something added on to nature (a superstructure above or alongside of nature) as a transformation within nature itself. The loss of this divinization does not leave nature intact; man's fallen state in original sin is that of a deprived but still somehow supernaturalized being; its privation being not the return to a natural condition, but a negative qualification of man's very quiddity, accidental and existential, yet ontic and real. Original sin thus amounts to a dis-jointedness, an alienation within a nature that retains an order to the Beatific Vision.[20] In this way, Catholic theology tends today to envision a radical "de-secularization" of this world; salvation is seen as really offered to all men; and the possibility is open to anonymous revelation and an implicit faith truly salvific (implicit, not so much cognitionally and logically as in a moral or existential sense).[21]

Obviously, however, justification has in Biblical language a narrower sense, one involving God's foreknowledge and permission of the Fall, and implying the rectification of a condition of un-righteousness. The alienation resulting from man's primal sin is such that justification can now only be in virtue of a *new* bestowal of salvation, the initiative of which is once again solely God's. There is however a major difference, for now salvation is offered entirely *in a human mode,* offered by God but as He breaks into man's history and assumes a human existence. Justification thus takes upon itself a dimension of

[20] This order is first of all something negative, explained by original sin as a privation within a once elevated nature (analogous perhaps to the negative qualification of a blind man's being, in the light of the naturalness of sight), and secondly is based on the actual graces offered, anonymously or otherwise, which while not justifying nature at least "sur-fmm" it in some fashion. The gratuity of grace is no argument for its rarity.

[21] Cf. W. J. Hill, 0. P.: "Salvation of the Contemporary Non-Believer," *Proceedings: Catholic Theological Society of America,* 1963.

temporality, and in each man involves either looking forward to the Incarnation that is to come or back toward the Incarnation that has occurred. There is now a sense in which man is involved in his own justification, and here the question of *merit* arises. First of all, the " merits " of Christ are really not merits in the ordinary sense of the term. Justice in God is only distributive and never commutative; and so no humanity, even that of the Word, stands before God in equality. The justification achieved in Christ remains God's free gift to man; it is not merited either condignly or congruously. When the merits of Christ are said to be condign all that is meant is that there is a proportion of objective adequacy between the love inherent in Christ's obedience and the hatred inherent in man's rebellion; and that God does not merely condone the latter but rectifies it, and does so from within human history.

What is true of Christ's universal merits is far more radically true of what are called the " merits " of the righteous man; these do not mean that man " earns " the reward of eternal life so much as that he accepts eternal life within an historical process. The very grace itself as implanted within the soul that is human is thereby subject to a law of organic growth; a process of intensification within the subject achieved by God's appropriating through created grace man's free activities. What occurs takes place in this universe of freedom, not in the cosmological universe, since a meritorious act is necessarily a free one.

Finite freedom, however, has no causal influence whatsoever upon Uncreated Freedom; it is improper then to speak of God" committing" Himself to reward certain acts. Uncreated Freedom simply chooses to realise itself creatively *in a human mode,* i. e., within human freedom, and thus there is " no distinction between what is from the second cause and what is from the first cause." [22] In this way of looking at things,

[22] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 23, a. 5: "Non est autem distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et ex praedestinatione; sicut nee est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda, et causa prima: divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes caus11XU!Il secundarum. . . ."

there is simply no place for so-called congruous merits where first grace is concerned. All preparation for grace is itself a grace.

This can, I believe, be confirmed within the context of predestination, and once again the gratuity and universality of salvific grace shown. Christs' redemptive act means the offer of salvation for all without exception. If the eternal decree of God here implemented be real, then it must be creative, i. e., productive in every man of grace truly sufficient for salvation. Occurring within the depths of the free human personality this initial unmerited graciousness of God may meet with resistence and thus be rendered inefficacious, or not resisted and then the grace fructifies of itsel£.[23] In the latter case the will's free consent does not *cause* the fructification of the grace, rather the grace fructifies into the free act. The non-justification of those who resist God's love is thus accountable to themselves; the justification of others remains God's free gift.

Four new emphases mark this contemporary Catholic picture of justification: (I) it is utterly gratuitous; (2) it is structured within rather than alongside human freedom; (3) it is extended to all men (allowing however for rejection); (4) it is in strong reaction to any overtones of a semi-Pelagianistic nature. On this latter point, the controversy between Thomists and Molinists would seem to be no longer an issue.

2. *Transformation of Man by Justification into a "New Creation"*

Only Christ is our righteousness-but still He is *our* righteousness. If justification be God's gift, it is nonetheless to be found in man; the very notion of " gift " demanding not only a

[23] The possibility of refusing and thus "frustrating" God's graces rests upon His free decision that these initial graces be fallible or frustratible. This gives rise to an ultimate question, one which as St. Augustine notes man cannot presume to answer lest he wish to err, as to why the ontological disposition of soul, prior to all activity, is in some men " openess " to grace and in others resistence thereto. Nevertheless, to understand that the very first "moment" in the economy of salvation is a grace given to all men that is truly efficacious *in its own order* (i.e., as *summoning* to justification) does help to explain how the lack of justification is finally due to a refusal on man's part for which he alone is responsible.

donor but also a beneficiary. The very fact of "being made just " implies a transformation, a renewal of some sort within man. " If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation," writes St. Paul (I *Cor. 5* : 17). Further expressions of Sacred Scripture leave little doubt as to the sublimity of what takes place: there is a " giving " to us of the Spirit, with whom we are " anointed " and " sealed "; man is now " with God " and " of God." The emphasis is decidedly on Uncreated Grace, and recent Catholic thinking tends strongly in this direction, yet without thereby excluding a created effect within man. Justification is thus an appropriation, a possession of the soul by the Holy Spirit, not solely as He is within the Trinity but precisely as inexisting man. If it be established exegetically that *"pneuma"* in St. Paul many times refers to a created spirit (i. e., " the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by *a* holy spirit, *which* is given to us "; *Rom. 5* : 5) , nevertheless it remains true that the primary signification from which the others are derived is that of the personal Spirit of the Father and of Christ; Who is at once the " earnest" of what is to come and the very accomplishment of our present righteousness. The Uncreated Spirit is sent by the glorified Christ ("I will not leave you orphans"; *John* 14 : 17) , thus only after His ascension (" If I do not go, the Advocate will not come to you"; *John* 16: 7), and so once again within the context of an economy that is human and historical, within the strictures of time and place. Contact with the " *Pneuma* " issues in conforming union with the Son who brings us before the Father; the justified soul is caught up into the inner-Trinitarian life and enters upon familiar and proper relations with the Divine Subsistences; man is conformed to the humanity of Christ and thus to the eternal Word, and so he imitates in his own grace-life the relationships, both eternal and temporal, of the Son to the Father whence he proceeds, and to the Spirit issuing from them both.

A re-examination of these Biblical notions is occasioning new emphases, or perhaps more accurately new conceptions, where the theology of justification is concerned. Several of them deserve mention.

Hypostatic Union. It is conceivable that only the Second Person of the Trinity as a Son, an all perfect Image of the Father, could express "ad extra" that perfect imaging of the Father to which mankind is called; and thus that only he could have become Incarnate within the chosen economy.[24] St. Thomas' clear teaching that each or all of the Divine Persons could have become flesh is thus only an indication of abstract possibilities intended to throw light on what the Hypostatic Union is ontologically.[25] What follows from this is that man can be understood in an integral sense only in the light of the Incarnation, and thus remotely in the revelation of the Trinity; Christian anthropology thus finding its roots in Christology. It is the doctrine of the Trinity which ultimately delivers to us the answer to the question " what is salvation," and the underlying question " what is man."

Uncreated Grace. However true this may be, recent Catholic thinking has evidenced to a considerable extent an explanation of Uncreated grace that simply does not appear to stand the test of theological analysis. The union or conjunction of God and soul in justification is seen as immediate, resulting from an initiative of God's that antecedes any production by Him of created graces. This has been variously described, most notably as a "created actuation by uncreated Grace" (De la Taille) or as a "quasi-formal causality" (K. Rahner) . It is difficult to see how this is not a dangerous anthropomorphizing, which if it does not slight the transcendence of God, does at least forget the consequences of man's creatureliness, his "alterity" before God. It has not been explained how the "having" of God by the justified can be other than *terminative,*[26] supposing a logically prior elevation that is a genuine trans-

[2]. This suggestion has been advanced by Aloys Grillmeier in the article "Christologie" in *Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche,* Vol. II, 1160, as well as by Karl Rahner: " Reflections theologiques sur !'Incarnation," *Sciences Ecclesiastiques,* 1960, p. 5 ff.

[26] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 3, a. *5;* that this is all St. Thomas intends becomes clear when article 5 is read in the light of the previous four articles of the same question.

[26] This is the clear teaching of St. Thomas, cf. *Summa Theol., I,* q. 43, a. 3.

formation, thus something ontic; an elevation that is demanded if the gratuity of God's gift is to be preserved. To suppose otherwise is to conceive of the resulting relation between God and man as something autonomous and absolute, a pure medium which (unable to have a fundament in a changeless God) does not demand any foundation in man, and so is not an accident of his being.

Created Grace. Important too, is a reaction against a misconception of sanctifying grace, a gross mis-construing of it as a "thing," as something cosmic, deriving from an overly univocal understanding of terms such as " quality " and *"habitus."* When grace is called a created accident this does not mean that the just man now has a new accident distinct from his substance in the categories of physical nature; that grace is put into him automatically-but only that he is now accidentally divinized through an operation of the Holy Spirit that truly recreates him. The implications of St. Thomas' phrase here are too often overlooked: " It is men who are created according to it (i.e., grace), that is, constituted thereby in newness of being." [27] What needs stressing is the dynamic character of grace; its occurence within freedom as a state of consciousness, a restoration of the human personality now energized to where it can enter the sphere and life of God; rendering possible the "having" of God in the only way possible, i. e., as term in acts of knowledge and love. It is true that sanctifying grace is conceived of as lying below the threshold of consciousness, but it is there precisely as the root of conscious activity, and if, logically speaking, dispositions (entitative or operative) enjoy a *subjective* priority over activity; essentially and formally the case is the inverse. Thus God makes donation of Himself in the perduring " habitus " of grace; much as spouses are given to each other in the *state* of marriage and not only in the consummating *acts* of that state. And, in fact, the very habitualness of grace alone makes possible the co-existence of sin (acts of venial sin, that is) and

[27] *Op. cit., I-ll,* q. llO, a. 2, ad 3um.

the state of justification. This may be the closest Catholic approximation to Luther's *"simul justus et peccator."* [28]

Faith. Along these same lines is the renewed emphasis being given today to the personal nature of faith, representing a return to St. Thomas' understanding when he writes in the *Secunda Secundae:* " In any form of belief, it seems that it is the *person* to whose words the assent is given, who is of principal importance, and as it were the end; while the individual truths through which one assents to that person are secondary." [29] This is further clarified in the affectivity that is involved in the act of belief, in the awareness that the intellect's assent is made under pressure from the will. What occurs is less an act of objective understanding than a subjective and existential awareness of Christ as "my salvation," of the forgiveness of sins he offers as an answer in experience to my inner longing for salvation. Moreover this initial experience originates from a divine initiative (" *ex instinctu divino* ") ; "God's self-revelation in the believer remains His own wholly original and proper deed " in which there is " an actual mediation of salvation by God at the present moment." [30] Thus a somewhat new notion of time seems to characterize the grace-experience (not replacing but complementing the Aristotelian " measure of motion ") in which man is summoned by God to

[28] This is not what Luther intended; he does seem to mean that sin unto death remains somehow in the baptised person, though it may be one more instance of the typically Lutheran tolerance for what is at least paradoxical if not contradictory; cf. *Justification Today,* Studies and Reports on the Fourth Assembly of the Lutheran World Federation in Helsinki, 1963, published by Lutheran World, New York, p. 23 ff.; also helpful is Gordon Rupp: *The Righteousness of God:* A reconsideration of the character and works of Martin Luther, London, 1953. The Helsinki report mentioned above takes exception to Hans Kung's suggestion *(Justification,* The Doctrine of Karl Barth and a Catholic Reflection, London, New York and Toronto, 1964) that the Catholic practice of confession amounts to an acceptance of Luther's position, seeing in this a misunderstanding of Luther's true meaning, p. 42.

[29] *Summa Theol., II-II,* q. 11, a. I.

[30] S. Pfiirtner, O. P.: *Luther and Aquinas: A Conversation,* London, 1964, pp. *56* and 57.

his own personal time and to decision in which events of the past are given a new kind of presentiality.

Theological Virtues. Allied with this is a new endeavor to view faith, hope, and charity not as three different endowments of the soul but as three formalities distinguishable within one total religious response. The assent of faith which demands some intelligible content also involves of itself a trust that may be called, when abstractly isolated from the formality of assent, hope. At least the compartmentalizing of the Christian response to Christ does tend to distort somewhat its personal, unified nature.

Infusion. Where the term " infusion" is concerned, there is need to remember that the unity of first and second causes is such that what man does, God does. So that infusion is less accurately presented as a quasi-miraculous working of God than a human action under a divine initiative opening up the self to God under three distinct formalities. This is to approach the notion of infusion from the side of formal object rather than from that of agent.

Certitude of Salvation. Also, it might be noted in passing that the elaboration of faith by hope introduces into the response of the justified man a new element of certitude. This is not now the *cognitional* certitude of faith (with which alone Trent dealt in affirming an objective certitude of this kind while eliminating any subjective certitude as a "vain confidence ") but an *affective* certitude of personal aspiration towards eternal life; an unswerving movement whose certitude is not conditional but absolute since the power which implements this inclination is the merciful saving will of God-not man's present grace, much less his merits. Surely this is a Catholic formulation of Luther's fiduciary faith!

3. *The Ecclesial Dimension to Justification*

Lastly, in the event of justification there has been a sharp focusing upon elements that are ecclesial and sacramental.

The starting point here is an anthropological one, making rich use of the concept of " encounter " borrowed from Phenomenological thought. Human existence is radically different from that which places infra-rational things outside of nothingness; it presupposes a " logos " structure to all of reality as it comes to pass in man as consciousness, therein assuming meaning. If this meaning fundamentally derives from things as they exist in consciousness, in a more formal sense it is extended to things in a human appropriation of them. It carries the implication that in every event there is discoverable something of mystery, that beyond all facticity there lies authenticity. This "logos" character is first of all, then, the structure of all reality as it is brought onto the level of human existence; but secondly it becomes the scaffolding, as it were, within which the Uttered Word addressed to faith can occur. The contact between God and man thus takes upon itself a specifically human quality; God's act is not so much a breaking into history from without as it is a case of God's love assuming human form in visibility and historicity. The difference between the two modes of expression is that in the former God's intervention is thought of as frequently set over against man's endeavors, in the latter the entire process of humanization (with the one exception of sin) is itself the effect of one harmonious divine causality. [31] This is obvious enough in the instance of the Incarnation where " God addresses man as a man, among men," [32] but is now being extended to the entirety of religious experience.

Two consequences of this deserve mentioning. First, it tends to give to the contact with God and Christ a meta-historical character. The Word of God read in the Church is itself the event of God's self-disclosure, assuming a dialectical aspect, a

[31] On the natural level this harmonizes well with the teaching of St. Thomas on the universality and exclusivity of God's causality in the production of being as such, including that of action; the resulting ubiquity of God *(Summa Theol., I,* q. 8); the immediacy of his providence (op. *cit.,* q. 22), etc. On the supernatural level it emphasizes the continuity of grace with the order of created spirit without, of course, any lessening of the total gratuity of the former.

[32] E. Schillebeeckx, O. P.: *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter tvith God,* New York, 1963, p, xvi.

note of contemporaneity. In Heideggerian terms this is the *historic* as opposed to the *historical* order; or in the Bultmannian use of Heidegger, the sphere of the Christ of faith rather than that of the Jesus of history. This *is* a present Catholic emphasis, but a very tempered one. On one hand is the fear of illuminism or theological occasionalism; such fear leading to an insistence that the contemporaneity of the Word be measured against an authentic historical meaning attested to in Tradition. On the other hand is the recognition that man's bodiliness roots him first of all in an historical order out of which alone does his " historic " being emerge; the personal " moment " does come, but only out of the past, and the present decision is the summation of many past decisions.

When the contact is a sacramental one, however, there appears to be less reluctance on the part of Catholics to stress its "historic" character. Thus the sacramental encounter is seen as a time-transcending advent of God in His humanity involving a rendering present of the very mysteries of His earthly life. Father Schillebeeckx writes: "all the mysteries of the human life of Christ endure forever in the mode of glory"; [33] and these he sees as rendered present in the Sacraments. Here too a caution is needed. There is indeed a genuine encounter with Christ, and one achieved in presentiality, but is not this with the glorified Christ as he is today at the right hand of his Father; is it not a *new* advent of Christ who now comes to be present in the faith-signs of the believer, and so in a mode proper to faith, i. e., in a world of symbols, in realities of the intentional order? [34] The power of Christ conforms the

•• *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

•• In six of the sacraments the presence of Christ, while a true and genuine presence, would not seem to be more than a symbolic presence, i. e., it is real only by way of an exercise and influx of his *power* in and through the sacramental symbols; the Eucharistic presence is different and more than this, being a real presence not merely of Christ's power but of his very human *substance.* But even in the Eucharist, this presence of the whole Christ "truly, really, and substantially" (in the words of Trent) is sacramental in mode, i.e., not a natural presence in flesh (in this way Christ is only in heaven) , but a sacramental presence in the symbols of bread and wine. Vatican II, mentioning multiple other

believer to his risen humanity by appropriating the believer's act of symbolizing Christ's past saving deeds. The Church is not the Incarnation, but its prolongation in a sacramental mode; it is Christ with us not in natural flesh but in symboJ.[3]

A second consequence to " encounter " is a new emphasis upon the subjective role of the recipient of a sacrament. Apart from the intention demanded for validity, more stess is being laid upon the religious intents of the recipient, his genuine longing for deeper union with Christ, not merely as increasing accidentally the fruitfulness of the reception, but as essential to the sacramental communication of grace. This is what is meant by calling the sacraments "sign"; they are not mere objective symbols of past deeds of Christ and present impersonal effects from God, but symbolic attestings to personal grace, i.e., to an authentic and loving involvement of the self with God in Christ. Unless the act amount to genuine personal prayer it cannot really be encounter with Christ and bring with it increase of grace. There are obvious consequences here for the reviviscence of the sacraments. Also, the initial priority of grace to all human cooperation means that such desire for union with God is itself a grace which (apart from rejection) may or may not fructify into sacramental visibility, thus amounting to either an explicit or an implicit encounter with Christ, a sacramental or an extra-sacramental mediation of salvation.

Deriving from this is a quite different perspective on infant baptism-while certainly valid and a genuine sacrament, it can-

presences (in his Scriptural word, in the midst of the Church at prayer, etc.) characterizes his presence in the sacraments in general as one "by his power," and merely states that he is present "especially under the Eucharistic species"; *Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy,* Chap. I, 7.

[85] A more detailed exception to, or at least caution on, Fr. Schillebeeckx's conception of the presence, in the sacramental encounter, of Christ and all the saving events of his earthly life can be found in W. J. Hill: "The Encounter v<rith Go.!," *Proceedings, C.T.S.A.,* 1964, p. 173, a review seminar on *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God;* for a more detailed criticism of the same point see C. O'Neil, 0. P.: "The Mysteries of Christ and the Sacraments," *The Thomist,* January, Apart from this demurral, the observations which follow above are in substance the suggestions of Fr. Schillebeeckx.

not involve, before the dawn of intelligence, the communication and possession of grace in this personal way, and so its sacramentality would appear to be radically different from that operative in the adult. The impossibility of any response suggests a similar bestowal of grace outside of baptism to infants not destined to reach the age of reason. At least in the light of the universality of God's will to save and Christ's Redemptive act, there appears no compelling reason against this possibility. It is possible then that the whole question as to the salvation of unbaptised children may thus far have been posed in misleading terms. In this same spirit is the growing reluctance to use the phrase "*exopere opemto*" where sacramental efficacy is concerned, and to substitute in its stead the more traditional phrase "*in virtute Christi.*"[36]

Growing out of all of this is an increasing awareness of the societal context to the event of justification. If Christ is our "God with us" this occurs only by a translation of the individual into the "Saved Community," which mediates salvation to him as he stands in inter-relatedness to other members and to Christ. The sociological nature of this "newness of being" (with its undertones of *"metanoia"* and *"diaconia"*); this being engrafted onto the Body of Christ, is no denial of its ontic character. Justification occurs here within the community, which is "in the midst of the world and for the world, the sign and as it were the sacrament of salvation offered to all men," and is "the beneficiary of God's pardoning and saving act."[37]

And when this ecclesial dimension is understood in terms of the Church as the "Holy People of God," a necessary complement to "Body of Christ," then it is understood how the Event of Justification occurs within failure and sin; how the Church is a Church of sinners who do penance and walk the path of

[36] Fr. Schillebeeckx points out that St. Thomas does not use the phrase "ex opere operato" once in the *Summa Theol.* in a sacramental context, and concludes that this is deliberate. *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

[37] Y. Cougar, O. P.: "The Church: People of God," *Concilium*, Vol. I, 1965, pp. 21 and 23.

conversion; a People of the Way who, already justified, stiii " work out their salvation in fear and trembling."

In summary conclusion: contemporary Catholic theology on justification is two-directed, emphasizing: (I) its genuine universality (2) its utter gratuity. In the latter there are two truths preserved: a) the sovereignty of God and primacy of grace b) the human and historical mode in which this grace realizes itself.

WILLIAM J. HILL, 0. P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

CONCUPISCENCE

WHEN a mind of the stature of Saint Thomas Aquinas slightly shifts the metaphysical foundation of a traditional theological teaching, its implications to the rest of theology and spirituality may take centuries to become apparent. Aquinas started such a gigantic shift of position from the center-line of Augustine's theology of concupiscence, when by a simple *distinction* he assigned to concupiscence a *material* and not a *formal* role in original sin.[1]

The rich implications of this theological insight should have flowed from it gradually and continuously in the course of theological reflection. But this organic process was hindered by the theological reversal of the Reformation. The relation of sin and concupiscence became a burning issue. In response to the teaching of the Reformers the Council of Trent gave certain dogmatic definitions to preserve the Catholic tradition. The mechanism of challenge and defense had clouded the issue. Only today, as the dust of the Reformation is settling, are Catholic theologians coming to recognize that the theology of concupiscence still needs readjustment to make it consistant with the definite requirements of dogmatic definition and a long theological development.

The first of these recent theologians to point out the serious difficulties of the traditional manuals' presentation of concupiscence is Franz Lakner.[2] After studying the various definitions of concupiscence in recent textbooks, he observes that concupiscence is frequently conceived as an evil and disordered inclination, and integrity takes on the connotation of being freedom from *evil* concupiscence. Lakner points out that this distortion

[1] M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963) 175 citing St. Thomas, I-II, q. 82, art. 3.

[2] *ZKT* LXI (1937) 437-41.

arises from a failure to distinguish precisely the dogmatic and the ascetico-moral concepts of concupiscence.

L. Lercher [3] follows up Lakner's lead. He carefully distinguishes between concupiscence in the moral sense (*concupiscentia prava)* and in the dogmatic sense (appetite whose motion anticipates the judgment of reason and perdures against the command of the will) .

Karl Rahner takes up the same problem in greater detail in his study on the " Theological Concept of Concupiscentia " in *Theological Investigations.* [4] He agrees with the difficulties pointed out by Lakner and Lercher. He shows the additional difficulty of treating concupiscence as purely a sensitive power}; This, he says, is inconsistant with the Thomistic metaphysics of human knowledge and the relationship between the sensitive and spiritual cognitive powers.

> Every human cognitive and conative act is necessarily, in virtue of man's very nature, sensitive-spiritual or spiritual-sensitive. . . . Thus where there exists a concupiscence in the theological sense as an involuntary concupiscence anticipating free decision and resisting it, this is spiritual too. [6]

Why, then, asks Raimer, should concupiscence be conceived as a "rebellion " of the ontologically lower against the higher? St. Augustine's interpretation of St. Paul's concept of" flesh" and "spirit" as an opposition of man's sensibility (in the metaphysical sense) to his intellectuality Rahner sees to be the influence of Gnostic and Neoplatonic tendencies. [7]

The question is: have we today freed ourselves completely from such tendencies?

The second service K. Rahner renders is to carefully point out the limits placed on theological speculation by the demands of doctrinal definition. The process of theological development through history has revealed two sides to this complex question which are not easily brought together. Rahner deliniates these demands.

[3] *Institutiones theol. dogm.* 113 (Innsbruck, 1940) nn. 608-10.

• Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigation,* I (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961) 345-89l.

• *Ibid.,* 352. • *Ibid.,* 353. [7] *Ibid.,* 354-57.

The Council of Trent (Denz. 792) to some extent confirms the notion that concupiscence be called sin at least improperly speaking *(quia ex peccato est, ad peccatum inclinat)* . But theology, while being faithful to this universal teaching, must be consistant with the defined doctrine stating that integrity or freedom from concupiscence of the first creation was an undeserved exaltation of human nature and not its natural condition (Denz. 1026, 1078, 1516) .

Rahner, after pointing out the difficulties that face modern theology in attempting to make precise the notion of concupiscence within the area delimited by the demands of doctrinal definition, draws in broad outline a solution prompted by modern philosophy that apparently satisfies the demands of dogmatic theology. In this paper we would like to pursue a similar course of analysis, showing that the psychology of Saint Thomas is adequate to meet and explain satisfactorily the demands of this problem. More than this, we believe that Thomistic metaphysics is the most adequate tool to date to unify the theological doctrine of concupiscence with the necessarily related parts of theology, e. g., the hereditary character of original sin and the relation of concupiscence to justification and grace.

CoNCUPISCENCE-NOTIONALLY CoNSIDERED

The question of concupiscence, a difficult problem in itself, is made even more complicated by the fact that the subject of our examination (the nature of man) is always qualified to some degree. Since our examination must begin in the existential order and work back to the essential order, the order of essence or nature, it is imperative that we strip away any modification the nature has received through personal activity. This is necessary since we can only arrive at the nature itself, considered as second substance, through an examination of the individual existing nature, namely, first substance, which, in our case, is a human person. The nature as possessed by a person is able to be individually modified by the activity of

the person. To see the nature as it is *in se* we must, then, eliminate from it any qualification or modification it has received by being individualized or personalized.

The individual nature is capable of being modified by personal activity and habit. Personal activity leaves a residual effect in the nature both by reason of the impact of the act itself and because of the habits it induces in the various faculties. It is only when we succeed in isolating the nature by removing the effects of personal activity and habit that we are able to study it in its ontological constitution.

Unfortunately, the individual nature cannot be completely isolated since it can never be viewed totally stripped of all qualification. This is so since the individual nature is the existential subsistent. As such we are dealing with a *suppositum* capable of, and actually exercising, responsible acts. These responsible acts have a necessa.ry impact on the nature of the individual both by reason of the activity itself and, even more determinately, by the habits either induced or strengthened by the activity engaged in. The individual substance, inasmuch as it exists and acts in this concrete, existential and historic moment of being, never stands stripped to its ontological constitution. It is *always* qualified to some degree.

Because of this qualification, which is ever present, it is necessary to distinguish continually to the degree possible, concupiscence, pure and simple, from the reaction of the sensitive faculty which has already received some qualification, which now adds a vigor and insistence not found in concupiscence considered in itsel£.[8]

It is quite obvious that this distinction has not always been made. This is clearly so in those theories of concupiscence

[8] *De Malo,* q. 4, art. 2, ad 4: ". . . concupiscentia habitualis potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo aliqua dispositio vel habitus inclinans ad concupiscendum: sicut si in aliquo ex frequenti actuali consupiscentia causaretur concupiscentiae habitus; et sic concupiscentia non dicitur originale peccatum. Alio modo potest intelligi habitualis concupiscentia ipsa pronitas vel habilitas ad concupiscendum, quae est ex hoc quod vis concupiscibilis non perfecte subditur rationi, sublato freno originalis justitiae; et hoc modo peccatum originale materialiter loquendo est ha6itualis concupiscentia."

which maintain that concupiscence is always to be considered as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite contrary to reason. Along with a definition such as the one just stated there is usually appended a note about the vehemence of the passion of concupiscence which immediately causes one to suspect that the author has not properly distinguished between the nature in its concrete, existential situation and the nature conceptually conceived. The final conclusion that flows from the failure to draw this distinction is the assertion that concupiscence is unnatural to man.[9]

St. Thomas' conception of the nature of concupiscence is quite different. For Saint Thomas concupiscence is something very natural to man. He states that the basic reason £or concupiscence in man is his matter-form composition.[10] The basic polarity discoverable in the matter-form construct is ultimately to be attributed to the character of matter, possessing, as it does, intrinsic defects.[11] The naturalness of concupiscence is

[9] For a list of authors who hold a view similar to the one described cf. Karl Rahner, *op. cit., 350,* n. !i!. Cf. Robert W. Gleason, *Grace* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 196!2). Describing concupiscence Father Gleason uses such expressions as: " the indeliberate non-free inclination for sin " (p. 94); "non-free preference for evil " (p. 95).

[10] *De Anima,* VIII, corp.: " Sic igitur et in corpore humano contingit; quod enim taliter sit commixtum et secundum partes dispositum, ut sit convenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est eJectum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptible, fatigabile et hujusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessesitate materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic mixtum ex contrariis subjacere talibus defectibus. Nee potest obviari per hoc quod Deus potuit aliter facere; quia in institutione naturae non quaeritur quid Deus facere potuit, sed quid rerum natura patitur ut fiat, secundum Augustinum super Genes. ad litter. (lib. II par. a princ.) . Sciendum tamen est, quod in remedium horum defectuum Deus homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium justitiae originalis, perquam corpus esset omnino subditum animae, quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nee mors nee aliqua passio vel defectus homini accideret, nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficio; et subjacet defectibus secundum quod natura materiae requirit."

[11] *Ibid.,* ad 7: "... pugna quae est in homine ex contrariis concupiscentiis, etiam ex necessitate materiae provenit; necesse enim fuit, si homo haberet sensum, quod sentiret delectabilia, et quod eum sequeretur concupiscentia delectabilium, quae plerumque repugnat rationi. Sed contra hoc etiam homini fuit datum remedium per gratiam in statu innocentiae, ut scilicet inferiores vires in nullo contra rationem moverentur; sed hoc homo perdidit per peccatum."

further seen in that the natural tendency of each power is to tend to its proper object.

Keeping these assertions in mind and using the original state of Adam as our control, it is possible to formulate St. Thomas' teaching on concupiscence in this wise: concupiscence is the habitual [12] ability of the sensitive appetite to move into act *independently* of the control of reason. Or, to put it another way, concupiscence is the ability of the sense appetite to act in the situation in which the appetite is under the political control of reason rather than under its despotic control.

That such a formulation is valid will be obvious from the following considerations. The Common Doctor holds it as basic that the original state of Adam found him perfectly harmonized in his nature so that the lower faculties of the soul were always in perfect accord with the intellect and will.[13] This does not mean that the sensitive appetite of Adam remained in a state of habitual inactivity or that it only moved to act after being so commanded to by reason and will. Original justice did not make Adam a controlled automaton but perfected him precisely as a man.

The perfection of the nature of Adam was: a gift.[14] It was something undue to Adam. It was not a demand of the basic structure of his humanity. When this gift was lost through sin, Adam did not lose any of the goods which were a demand of

[12] *De Malo,* q. 4, art. 2, ad 4: "... concupiscentia secundum quod pertinet ad originale peccatum, non est concupiscentia actualis, sed habitualis. Sed intelligendum est quod ex habitu efficimur habiles ad aliquid. Dupliciter autem aliquod agens potest esse habile ad aliquid agendum. Uno modo ex aliqua forma inclinante ad hoc ... Alio modo ex subtractione ejus quod impediebat . . . Sic ergo concupiscentia habitualis potest dici dupliciter."

[13] *De Anima,* VIII, corp.: "... Deus homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium justitiae originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae, quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nee mors nee aliqua passio vel defectus homini accideret, nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficio; et subjecet defectibus secundum quod natura materiae requirit."

[14] *De Malo,* q. 4, art. 1, ad 11: "... originalis justitia fuit superaddita primo homini ex liberalitate divina; sed quod huic animae non detur a Deo, non est ex parte ejus, sed ex parte humanae naturae, in qua invenitur contrarium prohibens."

his nature.[15] The fact that Adam, after sin, was subject to concupiscence, shows that this is a demand of his nature-it is something natural to human nature. This is the way nature operates when left to itself.[16]

The lack of concupiscence consists in this: " That the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passion of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason."[17] This harmony of the nature was so perfect that the sensitive appetite was not able to escape the control of reason. Rebellion, in any form, of the passions against reason could not occur in the state of innocence.[18] The passions of Adam were perfectly regulated.[19]

Yet Adam was still a human being. In fact, the gratuitous addition of rectitude or integrity to the nature made him a more perfect human person. The gift of his nature perfected him in his totality. Adam's sensitive reactions were not eliminated; rather, by special gift, they were finely attuned to the control of reason. Not only would Adam experience the

[15] *I-II,* q. 85, art. I, corp.: "... bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici: primo ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus ipsa natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae, et alia hujusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad virtutem, ut supra habitum est (q. 63, art. I). Ipsa autem inclinatio ad virtutem est quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae, donum originalis justitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nee tollitur, nee diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum totaliter est ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae, scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes actus, ut supra dictum est (q. 6I, art. !2). Oportet autem quod ex hoc quod aliquid inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, diminuatur inclinatio ejus ad aliud. Unde cum peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae, quod est inclinatio ad virtutem."

[16] *I-II,* q. 85, art. 5, ad I: "... remota originali justitia, natura corporis humani relicta est sibi; et secundum hoc, secundum diversitatem naturalis complexionis, quorumdam corpora pluribus defectibus subjacent; quarumdam vero paucioribus, quamvis existente originali peccato aequali." Cf. also: *I-II,* q. I7, art. 9, ad 3.

[17] *I,* q. 95, art. !2, corp.

[18] *Ibid.,* ad 1: ". . . caro concupiscit adversus spiritum per hoc quod passiones rationi repugnant; quod in statu innocentiae non erat."

[19] *Ibid.,* ad 3: ". . . perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas. Temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet, et quae oportet. .

ment of the sense appetitive power but he would also experience pleasure resulting from the activity of these faculties. He was very much a human being, but, it must be added, a perfected human being. He was a person possessing, as his formal and determining part, a nature which was perfected (by gift) to the ultimate limits of its perfectibility. Rationality was now so fitted to animality, matter so permeated by spirit, that the basic polarity or tension was no longer felt as uppermost in the nature or in the person. Harmony resulted.

St. Thomas does not bother to state explicitly how this is accomplished within the nature of man. He merely says that this is so. However, an explanation can be constructed from his overall teaching on original justice with its impact on the nature as well as from his explicit teaching on the nature of concupiscence.

If man is conceived in a natural condition it can be said that any time a sensible good would be presented to him, his sense appetite would be aroused (quite naturally) because every natural power has a natural appetite or inclination for its good.[20] This first reaction, which is spontaneous, is not to be considered concupiscence. Concupiscence would consist only in the actual movement of the sensitive faculty to possess the good which had been proferred. It is to be further noted that concupiscence consists in a positive and elicited act and thereby one which is based on sense knowledge and necessarily involves a judgment of the particular reason *(vis cogitativa)* as to the suitableness of the good presented. The judgment of the particular reason, however, does not deal with man in his totality but only with the suitability of the object (or good) for the faculty in question. It is for this reason that the faculty is able to swing into act once this "judgment" has been made and thereby go into act independently of the judgment of reason itself (universal reason). Whether the elicited movement of the faculty is in accordance with reason or opposed to it does not,

[20] *I-II*, q. 10, art. I, corp.: "Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum objectum ...."

then, have any bearing on the nature of concupiscence. Concupiscence consists in the movement of the faculty independently of the judgment of reason (universal) whether this movement be in accord with or opposed to reason.

St. Thomas says that the act of sensuality is not completely in our power because it *precedes* the judgment of reason.[21] Reason comes into play only consequent to the actual elicited movement of the faculty to its proper good. When the movement of the faculty is against the universal judgment of reason there is then experienced resistance of the sensitive appetite to reason. This is what Aquinas calls the *fomes* of sin.[22] It is the result of the sin of Adam, since in Adam there could be no resistance to reason inasmuch as the faculty would never go into act without the agreement of reason.

It is important to distinguish the *fomes peccati* from concupiscence. The idea of the *fomes peccati* is necessarily connected with the movement of concupiscence but it is still conceptually and really distinct from it. Concupiscence consists in *every* movement of the sensitive appetite inasmuch as the sensitive appetite is both able to be aroused and to move into action independently of the control of reason. The *fomes peccati* is to be conceived as the movement of the sensitive appetite which persists in pursuit of its proper object after (universal) reason has judged that this object is not suitable for the person considered in the totality of his relationships (to God, to man, to himself) . The *fomes peccati* essentially consists, then, in the actual resistance of the sensitive appetite to reason.[23]

When it is stated that concupiscence consists in the habitual ability of the sensitive appetite to move into act independently of the control of reason we do not mean that reason is not able

[21] *De Verit.,* q. art. *5,* corp.: "Actus autem sensualitatis non est perfecte in potestate nostra, eo quod praevenit judicium rationis . . . . "

[22] ***III,*** q. 15, art. !il, ad 1: "Et ideo perfectio virtutis, quae est secundum rationem rectam, non excludit passibilitatem corporis; excludit autem fomitem peccati, cujus ratio consistit in resistentia sensualis appetitus ad rationem."

[23] *Ibid.*

to control the lower faculties. The lower faculties have an inborn aptitude to obey reason.[24] What must be realized is this: man (the person) is the responsible, determining agent of his action but since he is now affected by consupiscence he has only political and not despotic control over his sensuality. Besides this, he now at times actually experiences resistance of his affective nature to the control of reason. This resistance, however, as previously stated, is not concupiscence but a necessary result of the loss of reason's despotic control.

The fact that man has only political control over the lower part of his soul is natural to man. Despotic control can be had only by a gift to the nature in the strict sense. Historically this was accomplished in Adam by original justice which induced harmony and integrity into his nature.

The naturalness of political control can be seen from an examination of the workings of the appetites, both lower and higher, and the interaction between them. What must be realized first is that the sense appetite is an elicited appetite and as such demands some knowledge before it is able to issue into act. This knowledge is furnished ultimately by the internal senses. Prior to this elicited act, however, there is a natural inclination of all the sense faculties towards their proper objects. This is only the *appetitus naturalis* of the faculties. Now through the spontaneous and indeliberate movement of man's conative nature the sense appetite is moved from a state of potency to act so that it now can act. This first movement then is not concupiscence. It is a spontaneous and indeliberate act of the sensitive appetite upon the presentation of its proper good. Since the sense appetite is an elicited appetite, a second movement of the appetite will follow. The movement is dependent upon an actual awareness of the proper object *and* the suitableness of this object for the appetite involved. What

•• *I-II,* q. *50,* art. 3, ad 3: " . . . 'appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu rationali.'" *(Anima,* lib. III, text. 57). Cf. also: *III,* q. 18, art. 2, corp.: " Sciendum est etiam quod sensualitas sive sensualis appetitus, inquantum est natus obedire rationi, dicitur rationale per participationem . . . . "

actually happens is this: once the appetite is moved from potency to act, so that it is able to act, it must "wait for" (not in a temporal sense) the same object to be pronounced or judged a good by the particular reason *(vis cogitativa).* Dependent upon this pronouncement, then, the faculty will act or will not act. However, it must be noted that the particular reason only compares individual awareness *(intentiones)* .[25] Thus the judgment of the particular reason is necessarily limited to the suitableness of the object for the appetite in question and it makes no pronouncement on its suitablity for the person.

Once this judgment is made concerning the suitableness of the object the appetite moves into second act, that is, it positively elicits an act of desire for the object. Now all this is done independently of the control of reason. Man's *natural* basic structure makes it impossible for reason to control perfectly the movements of the sense appetite.

Much different, however, was the condition of man in the state of integrity of nature. In this state the sense appetite would "wait for" (not in a temporal sense) the regulating influence of reason. The reason's regulated image is what would move the sense appetite to act. In this condition the judgment of the particular reason would always be penetrated by the judgment of the universal reason and the appetite would never move into act unless both judgments were in agreement. It is in this way that reason was able perfectly to control the sense appetite. The sense appetite was not able to act independently of the judgment of reason (universal) any more than, in the natural state of man, the sense appetite could move to act independently of the judgment of the particular reason *(vis cogitativa)* judging the suitableness of the object presented.

[25] *I,* q. 78, art. 4, corp.: "Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur *aestimaflva naturalis,* in homine dicitur *cogitativa,* quae per collationem quamdam hujusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Uncle etiam dicitur *ratio particularis,* cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediem partem capitis. Est enim collativa intentionurn individualium, sicut *ratio inteUectiva* est collativa intentionum universalium."

CoNcuPISCENCE- ExisTENTIALLY CoNSIDERED

The preceding treatment is only one aspect of the nature of concupiscence and original justice. The above dealt with the nature of concupiscence and original justice in themselves in an effort to discover their essential nature or fundamental notional elements. We approached the subject from a metaphysical point of view leaving aside, therefore, any actual modifications that would accrue to a man by reason of his actually existing condition. In order to discover the essential meaning of concupiscence we endeavored to isolate man conceptually and to consider only his natural abilities, without any reference to gift, in order to estimate how he would act if viewed as reduced to his ontological constitution.

We must now consider man as he was, and is presently, affected by reason of the states in which he did, and now does, exist. We must study man in his existential situation. First we will consider Adam in his original supernatural state. In this state Adam possessed both perfect integrity [26] and sanctifying grace. All are agreed on this point. Thus all are agreed that Adam was established in a supernatural economy. The introduction of the fact of the supernatural economy, in which Adam was established, forces us to come to grips with the difficult problem of the relation of nature and grace. In our approach to this problem we will use as our basic working principle the teaching of Saint Thomas that "*gratuita praesupponunt naturalia.*" We will now work this out in some detail.

Considering the supernaturality of Adam's original condition we can describe the state of original justice in its material aspect as composed of a twofold element. This would comprise a sort of primordial immortality and an integrity. Consequent upon the fall of Adam, these preternatural gifts or material elements of the state of original justice were lost to man. He

[26] Perfect integrity entails immortality in St. Thomas' view for he always describes integrity in terms of the triple subjections *(I,* q. 95 art. 1, corp.). The third of these subjections was the perfect subjection of the body to the soul, accounted for by a special power given to the soul. Because of this the soul was so able to permeate the body that it preserved it from corruption *(I,* q. 97, art. 1, corp.).

now naturally suffers death and the lack of his original integrity. The lack of integrity describes the state of concupiscence. Thus it is taught that concupiscence is the result of original sin. However, it is natural to man because it is the lack of a non-extraneous accident perfecting the nature of man. (The nature of man, of course, is a body-spirit *unit.)* [27]

[27] We conceive of original integrity in terms of a non-extraneous accident perfecting the nature of man. It must be remembered that no nature, essence or form can receive the addition of something extraneous. But at the same time that which has a nature, essence or form can receive something extraneous thereto. Thus humanity contains nothing but what belongs intrinsically to humanity. This is clear, says St. Thomas, from the fact that if anything is added to or subtracted from definitions which indicate the essence of a thing, the species is changed, as is the case with numbers. But man, on the other hand, who has humanity, can have something else which is not contained in the notion of humanity, such as whiteness and the like, which are not humanity but are in the man. These things are contingent adjuncts which are extraneous to the nature (such as whiteness) and as such belong solely and properly to the *mppositum* or person. For subsistence adds a positive quality to the nature which renders the resultant composite the subject of these contingent adjuncts. Thus man is man whether he is white or non-white since this is a personal property and non-communicable; it is a quality which logically follows suppositality. But if whiteness was added to the nature (essence or form), man would always have to be white since whatever belongs to the nature itself is universally communicated through natural generation *(De Potentia,* q. 7, art. *5,* ad. 18). But the basic reason why whiteness cannot be added to the nature is that it is extraneous to the notion of humanity.

Although St. Thomas rules out the possibility of an *extraneous* accident inhering in the nature this should not lead us to the conclusion that nature is not patient of every type of accident. Nature is capable of receiving a quality or disposition which perfects it precisely as nature. That quality which would perfect nature as nature would not be extraneous to the nature as would be the notion of whiteness and such like accidents. A quality which would perfect humanity as such could not be said to be extraneous to the notion of humanity. A non-extraneous accident is one which achieves intelligibility in terms of nature, though like every other action and passion it, along with the nature in whose intelligibility it participates, is referred to the person. Nor would its addition or subtraction entail a change of species since it leaves the definition, which indicates the essence of the thing, intact. And only those additions which would change the definition would entail a change of essence of species.

A quality of this type would not be individuating because it would enjoy a logical priority to subsistence and would, therefore, be antecedent to suppositality. As an accident of the nature as such it would reside in one of the essential principles of the species, either in the soul or in the body, the combination of which two elements produces a unity of nature. Rather than being extraneous to these elements and to the nature which results from them it would pertain to the natural

The material elements of man in the state of original justice (immortality and integrity, i.e., the preternatural gifts), in the conceptual order, are those which are presupposed and " preformed " in readiness for the reception of the supernatural form of grace which (presupposing a natural rectitude as its proximate disposition) lifts the whole man to a supernatural state of existence, where he now exists not only as essentially *homo* but also (by way of accidental modification) as *homo supernaturalis.* This it seems to us is the Thomistic concept of man in the state of original justice, according to the theory of those who hold for an adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace and under the aegis of St. Thomas'

perfectibility of these two principles of nature and, consequently, to the nature itself. And as long as nature possessed such a perfective quality this quality would be shared by every other being of the same species. For whatever belongs to the nature as such is transmitted with the nature through natural generation.

It should be clear, then, that only one type of accident can be added to the nature (essence or form): that accident, namely, which perfects the nature in its own order-an accident which actuates the perfectible potentiality of the nature in its own right. And because it perfects nature as such within the limits of its natural perfectibility, it is not extraneous to the nature and, therefore, would not entail a change of species. The essence remains the same, namely, rational animality.

Further, an extraneous accident would differ from the nature by a difference in kind. A non-extraneous accident, however, would represent a difference in degree only since its sole purpose would be to produce an intensification of the inherent powers of the nature and thereby perfect the nature itself. And it is because it differs only in degree that it can reside in the nature prior to subsistence and still not entail a change in the species.

We may summarize this implicit teaching of the *De Potentia* (q. 7, art. 4, corpus) quite accurately by stating it in terms of a condition, namely, "an accidental quality can be introduced into the nature, with a logical priority to subsistence only if it perfects the nature (essence or form) as such within the limits of its natural perfectibility."

It may be argued against the second part of our condition that nature is able to receive a perfection by being assumed by a higher order of being. Thus in the Incarnation the human nature was assumed by the Person of the Word and was thereby deprived of its connatural personality and transposed to the hypostatic order. But this is not an argument against our condition because the perfection which flowed into the human nature, by reason of the grace of union, resulted from the fact that the nature was substantially united to the Person of the Word. And it is only in the *union* with the Person that the nature was so perfected. Even in this case the nature is not perfected *qua sic* since the perfection flowed from the personal union which took place. The nature as such is not perfected but only this one individual nature in which the Word subsists. The nature so assumed, it

principle that *"gratuita praesupponunt naturalia."* This way of thinking, too, makes much more meaningful the analogous use of the "matter /form " terminology which is proper to the cosmological, hylomorphic theory. Especially is this true of the typical working of this theory in terms of " higher integrations " after the manner described by Lonergan. [28]

The concupiscence which is of the very nature of man and which appeared as an actuality consequent upon the original sin of Adam does not consist merely in a human nature bereft of sanctifying grace. As we can see in the present economy of salvation, it is possible (and actual) for concupiscence and sanctifying grace to be present in the same subject at the same

is true, is transcendently more perfect than a nature not assumed but the perfection it now has was received solely from its union with the Person.

This becomes clearer if we consider that even on the natural plane nature receives a perfection from the fact that it is the nature of a person, of this individual person. But this perfection which flows from person to nature in the existential order is an individual non-communicable perfection. As such it is proper to this individual nature but not to the generic or specific nature. If we were to maintain otherwise we would have to include the idea of individual existence in the notion of the generic nature which is clearly an impossibility. Whatever perfection flows from the person to the nature is, then, the perfection of that individual nature which the person possesses as its formal part. This perfection does not have an influence on the generic nature and, therefore, it not communicated through the process of natural generation.

It is of the utmost importance to realize that a reciprocal influence obtains between person and nature in the existential order, the order of actual existence. St. Thomas expressed this in a negative way when he stated that in Adam person infected nature and now, in the present historical situation, nature infects person *(De Malo,* q. 4, art. 4, ad. 5). He also stated that other sins (actual, personal sins) do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only the nature of this individual person *(1-Il,* q. 81, art. 2, corp.). Thus in our present state personal acts can and do influence the individual subsisting nature, that is, the nature of this person.

Looked at from a positive viewpoint we can say that the personalized nature, in the present historical situation, is also able to receive a *perfection* from the person. In fact, this is a law of asceticism. Each person is obliged to work towards producing harmony in his composite being by introducing rectitude into his individual nature by *personal* acts. The acquisition of virtue, for example, though properly a personal attainment, perfects the nature in such a way that the higher faculties of the soul are able to contain, with varying degrees of success, the lower faculties of the soul. The act of actual containment, however, is a personal act but it does have a residual effect in the nature itself.

[28] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: a study of human understanding.* Student ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), 723-725.

time. Rather, concupiscence is something which attaches to the nature of man-a nature whose rectitude is presupposed (conceptually as a proximate disposition for sanctifying grace.

The rectitude of human nature in the state of original justice (which, *conceptually,* was effected by way of the extrinsic formal causality of grace-an accidental form to be acquired by the whole man) consisted in such a heightening and perfecting of the nature of man, by way of a" preternaturally given," non-extraneous, perfecting accident *in linea naturae,* that the really distinguishable spiritual and material phases of man (essential human features) were so intertwined and interpenetrating and *one* that the natural *suppositum,* in view of grace to be conferred, could be correctly described as immortal and perfectly integral. That man was immortal simply meant that he could not die *(posse non mori)* . There was to be no dissociation of his spiritual and material phases (by reason of preternatural gift in view of grace). That man was integral (by reason of preternatural gift in view of the grace of the state of original justice) meant that he was capable of directing his life with a singleness and effectiveness of purpose which is not a natural phenomenon, although many may approach that status asymptotically by natural endeavour. [29] A more comprehensive definition of the integrity we are speaking of here has been given by J. B. Metz:

> The innermost meaning of the preternatural condition of man in the original state is integrity which as such has far different effects than sanctifying grace. This condition, although constituted by God completely free and undue, should have given inner perfection to man in the dimensions of his nature, was lost by man through original sin: .. ,[30]

[29] J. P. Mackey, "Original Sin: Concept of Concupiscence" *ITQ* XXX (1963), 34.

[30] " der Inbegriff der tiber die Heiligmachende Gnade streng als solche hinausreichenden aussernatiirlichen Ausstattung des *paradiesischen* Menschen, die, obwohl von Gott vollig frei und ungeschuldet zugieeignet, diesen in den Dimensionen seiner Geistnatur innerlich vervollkommnen sollte und die er durch die Erbsiinde verlor: ..." LThK [2], V, 718.

Nor does the concupiscence which fallen man receives in his very nature as part of the punishment of original sin, consist essentially in a struggle between the natural (i.e. essential) phases of man, between his materiality and his spirituality. For, even in the state of original justice, when man was gifted with all sorts of preternatural endowments as " fitting " proximate dispositions for the sanctifying grace with which he was *de facto* graced, even then man retained his dual nature. Nor did his gifts so integrate the whole man that it was possible for the " tensions " of the integration to be totally unfelt. Because man's duality is his nature, it is true to say that it is the actual basis of anything which modifies the nature of man-be that modification a perfecting accident or the lack thereof. Thus, the dual nature of man makes it impossible for his materiality to be completely absorbed into his spirituality or for the " limitations " of his materiality to be completely exhausted by his spirituality. On the other hand, in a non-graced, non-gifted state, it is equally impossible for man's materiality to completely swamp and remove any active influence of his spirituality-though man is then more likely to be seduced by his materiality. In short, man is by nature a spiritual/material being and no state of his existence is sufficient to phase out one aspect of his essence. Therefore, the concupiscience which man naturally has as a result of and as a punishment for original sin, a concupiscence that consists in a lack of integrity, cannot consist in that which is already presupposed for either the gifted or non-gifted state, i.e., the dual nature of man. This of course does not say that there is no difference to be seen in the tensions between materiality and spirituality as these are verified in the gifted and non-gifted states.

It remains true to say, however, that the basic duality of matter and spirit in man is responsible for his ability to sin and to repent, even in a highly gifted and graced state. *Homo viator* simply cannot be exhaustively confirmed in either good

or evil. We know this from the revelation of sin and its possibility and the possibility of repenting. [31]

In the light of such considerations as the above, more and more theologians are coming to the awareness that the treatment of concupiscence as presented in many of the manuals does less than justice to man's ontological reality,[32] not to mention the consequent violence to the theology of original justice and original sin. This reaction has shown itself especially in the current realization that one cannot, without a terrible Manicheanism, identify man's "sinful tendencies" with his so called "lower powers." Such a position would result in a "Platonic" man whose dual nature consisted of two warring "parts." Then too, it would render almost fruitless St. Thomas' stroke of genius whereby God's saving grace is at least the extrinsic formal cause *(radix)* [33] of the well ordered and disposed human nature (via preternatural gifts) which was originally presupposed to grace's elevation of the person.

Those Thomists who were able to perceive the synthetic quality of St. Thomas' thought, especially its ability to view formally realities in terms of their highest integrations have reacted against the tendency to represent the "lower powers"

[31] "In fact, though we shall not attempt it here, if one were to try to explain in the terms of a theological and metaphysical anthropology the possibility of repentence for Adam (as opposed to the absence of such a possibility in the free decision of the angels), in the last resort one would only be able to do this by insisting that integrity was for Adam a preternatural gift, and that its loss, as a consequence of the loss [1] of sanctifying grace in general, was only possible for *this* reason ... [1] This loss is insufficiently explained in terms of sin as such, for the angel who has sinned retains the metaphysical essence of his integrity (the relative identity of 'nature' and 'person') even after his sin. Thus he is 'impenitent' precisely because he was in a position exhaustively to shape his entire nature through his personal decision; hence too, no remainder is left over in him, either psychologically or ontologically, which might have escaped this personal decision and from which the reshaping of the person could begin." *Theological Investigations,* I, 372-373.

[32] L. Lercher, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae.* Vol. II. (Innsbruck: Rauch, *1951),* 428-435; J. P. Mackey. "Original Sin: concept of concupiscence," *ITQ* XXX (1963), 23-35; *idem,* "Original sin: nature and grace," *ITQ* XXX (1963), 191-203; J. B. Metz, "Begierde (Begierlichkeit)" LThK[2], II, 108-112.

[33] *I,* q. 100, a. 1, corp.

of man as practically non-human. In terms of this "manualized " view, man in the state of integrity didn't really look much like a man. On the other hand, practically everything bodily came to be viewed as sinful or resulting in sin, or driving toward sin, or tugging the spirit away from God whenever they considered postlapsarian man. This led men such as K. Rahner to make remarks like the following:

"In the concrete experience of man's exposure to temptation, his moral weakness and sinfulness, elements are to be found which do *not* belong to the theological concept of *concupiscentia.* And this for the simple reason that we must necessarily presuppose their presence in Adam even before the Fall, because Adam too, in his preternatural state of integrity, could be tempted and could sin. Now it is only what was lacking in Adam in virtue of his gift of integrity that belongs to the theological concept of *concupiscentia."* [34]

In light of St. Thomas' principle which was mentioned earlier (viz. *gratuita praesupponunt naturalia)* theologians have been able or at least are able to re-integrate their view of man-and this on two fronts (which might even be able to be distinguished as material and formal elements):

1. They have realized that in man the body/spirit acts as a unit, be he graced and gifted or not. Thus, in the state of original justice, the whole man was, as perfectly as possible for a human, aligned with God. Here then is the perfect setting for St. Thomas' distinction of formal and material elements in original justice. The whole of man's being (as material cause) is funneled and integrated into the goal of the formally highest integrating factor in a rational creature, viz. the intellect and will of man as in contact with (not, however, confirmed in) his ultimate end. And this is on a supernatural level by reason of the presence of sanctifying grace which presupposes, and which is extrinsically and formally causative of, a preternatural rectitude which it (i.e. grace) elevates.

In this context, (viz. that of the realization that the "lower powers " belong to the whole man and reach their perfection

[3] *K.* Rahner, *Theological Investigations,* I, 849-350.

when they are aligned with a truly aligned reasoning power) one speaks of a gift of integrity whereby all the natural spontaneity of man's appetite is freely subsumed into his intellectual ordering and receives its actuation in accordance with this ordering. Concupiscence is that aspect of a man's ungifted nature (unmodified by a non-extraneous perfecting accident) wherein the spontaneity of his appetitive powers is operative without immediate or controlling reference to the intellectual ordination of his being. This is the realm of tension, struggle and political control as opposed to the despotic control possible in the gifted state.

This is a true insight. Its need is clearly seen and indicated by both J.P. Mackey and K. Rahner.[35] Yet they do not go into the minute examinations of the workings of human nature as is provided, according to a Thomistic view (i.e. a metaphysical view), in the present study. In their study of man they employ a different terminology than that which is traditionally used by philosophers and theologians. It calls to mind the terminology and mode of expression common to a modern philosophy, namely that associated with the name of Martin Heidegger. Especially is this true in the use of such time-honored terms as person and nature. One's first impression is that Rahner is completely departing from Thomistic teaching. But after careful consideration it is our conviction that Rahner's treatment of man is really helping us get a more Thomistic view of the Thomist teaching. So much so is this the case that the detailed examination by St. Thomas of the nature of man and his appetites and their integration or dissociation (as the case may be) would seem to form the perfect material basis ("nature " in Rahner's terminology) which calls out for a higher integration into an actually existent, human situation (be it graced or not) which is characterized in a grace context by the concept of the " supernatural existential."

9l. The " supernatural existential " is the formal atmosphere in which concupiscence must be seen in the fallen state of man, and in reference to which the integrity of original justice must

[35] J. P. Mackey, *art. cit.; K.* Rahner, *op. cit.*

be viewed if it is to have its proper existential (and therefore Thomistic) meaning.

The supernatural existential seems to us to be vitally connected with yet another insight into the ontology of man. Like the notion of unity which was achieved when thinkers called to mind the fact that man's essence is both spiritual and material, this new insight is also granted in man's spiritual/material duality. It too is unifying, but beyond this and more specifically it emphasizes the" bodily "aspects of man's metaphysical, ontological being. In a sense man" bodily" strives after *whatever* he strives after, inasmuch as his body is not part of him but that he is his spiritualized body. The" bodily" character of man's being is1 emphasized by the Thomistic psychology of man.

> Certainly in a metaphysical psychology we must distinguish between sensitive and spiritual appetites as between two really distinct powers of man. Yet this distinction must be conceived of with the utmost caution. For a human power must not be conceived of as " thing "; it is never more than that through which the one man acts. And a plurality of powers are and remain always powers of one and the same man, from whose substantial ground these powers, on St. Thomas's view, arise, are supported by it and held together by it in a unity. Consequently the objects of the sensitive and the spiritual appetites are present to the awareness of one and the same subject, related to one and the same subject. In a properly understood Thomist metaphysics of human knowledge, the relationship between the sensitive and the spiritual cognitive powers must be so conceived of as to fulfill two conditions. On the one hand the sensitive cognitive faculty will have to be seen as itself arising from the spiritual ground as a continuation of the information of matter by the spiritual soul and thus as completely mastered by the spirit right from the start. On the other hand the spiritual cognitive faculty, because it must allow sensibility to arise from itself as the presupposition of its own realization, will itself have to be seen right from the start as a " sensitized " spirituality. Thus in virtue of man's metaphysical structure it will be fundamentally impossible from the start for there ever to be an act of sensitive cognition which is not also *eo ipso* an act of spiritual congnition. And the converse holds good too.[36]

"'K. Rahner, *op. cit.,* This is also the special point of Rahner's Thomistic commentary: *Geist in Welt; zur MeJtaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin.*

Another important point to be brought into consideration at this juncture is the following: " The free act does indeed dispose of the whole subject, in so far as it is as a free act an act of man's personal centre, and so by the root as it were, draws the whole subject in sympathy with it." [37] The whole subject which is drawn in sympathy with the personal free decision of the personal centre is, of course, to be understood as including the " bodily " aspect of man with all its natural spontaneity, including all tendencies and drives etc. Of course too, all of this will be manifested in different ways according to the different states of the supernatural existential in which man exists.

One reason why the " bodily " must now be emphasized is simply because it has suffered some neglect in earlier thought, even though it is absolutely part of the essential conception of man in whatever state he exists, be it good or evil, turned to or away from his God. Consequently, because St. Thomas' thought is decidedly existential, i.e., he thinks essentially about actually existent realities, if one would understand his theology of man, be he graced or ungraced, just or unjust, he must look squarely at what exists. This is the importance of the" bodily" insight for a fruitful concept of supernatural existential.

THE SuPERNATURAL ExiSTENTIAL IN THE STATE OF ORIGINAL JusTICE

De facto, it is held that the first man, with his state of original justice, was created in a state of grace. This was the thought of St. Thomas, at least in his later writing. [38]

That Adam, then, existed in a state of grace is a fact. This grace elevated him to a supernatural level of being. Thus it can be said that he actually existed as supernaturalized by way of a qualitative, accidental, formal modification of his essentially human, substantial being.

[37] *Ibid.,* 869.

[38] Cf. the brief sketch of William A. VanRoo, *Grace and Original Justice* (Rome: Analexta Gregoriana Vol. LXXV, 1955), *55-61.*

Rectitude of all his human powers and faculties is presupposed for his state of grace. In fact, their rectitude toward God is what is supernaturalized by grace. Of course, grace is the root cause of their rectitude in the existential situation, because it is true to say that the normative, extrinsic cause of the *actual* existent, in the realm of formal causality (i.e. " whatness ") , is that form which ultimately integrates into a higher unity all the aspects of the actual existent being as it actually exists as integrated. Thus that form which makes *homo supernaturalis* precisely *supernaturalis* is the form which gathers an already presupposed rectitude of *homo naturalis* into its supernatural ambit. Moreover, like any form, it controls the development of the previous and proper dispositions for its infusion by way of specification even though the development which it " governs" is in a realm which is conceptually distinct from itself. In the present case, for example, grace is not substantial to man, though it presupposes a " righted " substantial nature for its infusion. Thus, conceptually, one may say that in the existent situation, wherein grace is a fact, the accidental form of grace is the root cause of the rectitude of the substantial nature of man precisely in view of its own (i.e. grace's) infusion. This amounts to saying no more than that *homo supernaturalis* presupposes and is normative (formally) for the rectitude of a *homo naturalis* in the existential or actual situation. This is an analogous use of the formal/material insight and terminology of Scholastic cosmological thought, which usage is common in theology.

Thus, Adam in his supernatural state, studied from the point of view of a philosophical (metaphysical, ontological) specification of his being, is seen as an actually existent and autonomous human nature (person) whose essential elements are material and spiritual, and who, moreover, is in contact with his fulfillment as a human being (God). He is in contact with his ultimate end inasmuch as his powers as a man are ordered to this end and therefore rectitude is present. But Adam is in contact with this end not merely on his own human level of

being. By a gratuitous gift, God has graced him in such a way that he is supernaturally in contact with his supernatural ultimate end. He has never been in contact with his God in any way other than by supernatural contact. The grace which effected this contact is not of the essence of Adam's being. Essentially he is simply matter / spirit called ' rational animal.' Ontologically, however, i.e., actually and existentially, such a being has only existed with a reference to the supernatural mode of existence. Sanctifying grace as a supernaturalizing accident presupposes Adam's essential nature (by way of metaphysical conceptualization) as its proper subject of inherence. Inasmuch as it modifies an actual subject as a form, on the analogy of the cosmological principle, it is responsible (by way of extrinsic, formal causality-root cause) for the facts that are presupposed. And all that which is presupposed to the reception of the form actually exists only in light of the form's inherence. Thus in an actually existent Adam, the accidental form of grace is the root cause of the rectitude of his human nature. This is true, however, only with reference to the supernatural existential, that is, for the supernatural quality of the rectitude by reason of the grace inhering in Adam. Sanctifying grace is not responsible for Adam's rectitude as it is formally and essentially considered in a substantial human context. This formal rectitude is what is presupposed by the supernatural accident and is thus conceptually extrinsic to the supernatural perfecting or elevating accident. In fact, essentially speaking, it is not only distinct from the supernatural, elevating accident but is adequately distinct from it. Thus sanctifying grace, via extrinsic formal causality (root causality), is normative of the natural rectitude which is presupposed for the actual, existential, supernatural state of being.

It is an axiom in Thomistic theology that *actiones sunt suppositorum.* This means that the whole *suppositum* (person) is expressed by the actions and, hence, the right ordering of its powers. Thus St. Thomas has no hesitation in maintaining that the triple subjections are expressive of a person in a state

of original justice (as distinct from grace) who is now in readiness for the reception of grace.

In the state of original justice, however, Adam was not left merely to the personal decision of the moment. He did not constantly have to reaffirm the right ordering of his in view of grace. By way of special gift, by way of a non-extraneous and perfecting accident *in linea naturae,* God so modified and so attuned the natural powers of Adam, that in their very nature, by way of gifted inclination, they yielded to and perfectly grounded and "fed" Adam's personal decision to be *de facto* rooted in supernatural contact with God. All the spontaneity of his powers was in the service of his free communication and fulfilling interpersonal relationship with his God. This was by way of preternatural (not supernatural) gift *in linea naturae* (and not *in linea personae)* . We know this to be true first of all because God revealed that the gift (or its lack) was to pass among humans by way of generation (specified by nature). Secondly we know that this gift could not have been personal because the person is the arbiter of free decision. Otherwise Adam would have been prevented from freely sinning. He did sin, says revelation. Therefore, any perfecting gifts must have modified his nature whose spontaneity was geared towards his personal reaffirmation of his rectitude to God, which rectitude was supernaturalized, along with the person, by grace.

The spontaneity which is being mentioned here includes all the powers and faculties and appetites and all their inclinations which go to make up a man and whose structure and function (on a philosophical frame of reference) have already been worked out in detail by St. Thomas. [39]

Presupposing the gift of integrity (understanding it in the sense in which it has already been treated) we are simply saying that by its force all the inclinations of man, acting in their natural (preternatural) way, are now in service of the actually right ordered personal choice of the man and will not be contrary to it unless it should happen that this same free personal choice (now graced) should choose to reverse itself.

[39] Cf. *I-II,* q. f'lf'l-40 dealing with the passions.

When we say that original justice (as delineated earlier) is of the nature and not of the person we do not mean that original justice is independent of the personal choice. Rather this choice is according to the nature of man, and according to the free disposition of the man to his ultimate end or fulfillment as this is specified by his nature as geared to such an end. Thus the nature, as gifted, controls the type of choices, the quality of acts and their direction. Freedom refers only to the existent nature, viz., person.

Thus asK. Rahner so well observes:

A man who possesses the gift of integrity is no less ' sensitive,' he is no more 'spiritual' in a Neoplatonic rather than a Christian sense, involving the lack of an intense vitality. Rather he is free really to dispose of himself through a personal decision in so sovereign a way that within the area of his being there is no longer anything to resist this sovereign self-determination by a sort of passive sluggishness.[40]

The " sluggishness " mentioned in the quote refers to the material, (or more materialized) aspects of man's natare which are not quite so readily in the service of man's free choice except by way of a preternatural gift of integrity.

THE SuPERNATURAL ExiSTENTIAL IN THE STATE OF ORIGINAL SIN

When Adam sinned by making a free choice against God he lost sanctifying grace. He also lost that which depended on the grace as on its extrinsic formal cause, viz., the right ordering of his nature to God through his personal choice as indicated and strengthened by the gifted spontaneity of his nature in serving the ends of his free act of choice. In fact, by choosing a good other than that towards which his being is naturally directed he acted against the gifted leaning of his nature and threw the nature into disorder by his free decision. Thus in the order in which it actually happened he removed the disposition which grace, by way of extrinsic formal causality, specified as required for its presence. Thus he lost grace.

•• K. Rahner, *ip. cit.*, 372.

There is only one way in: which the nature of man can reach its true fulfillment and satiation and that is by personally exercising its free choice towards an intellectual possession of and willful love of God. However, because of his terrifying power of free choice and lack of intrinsic physical determination *ad unum,* a man must seek to know and love and thus come into contact with his God. As a matter of fact man, in the person of Adam, had been created as already in contact with God with a view toward fulfillment an.d this was not only on a natural but on a supernatural plane as well. His gifted powers were all in service of his free choice by reason of the natural control (preternatural) of the lower powers by the higher. Man somehow freely chose against God. He sinned. He fell. He lost gifts both for himself and for his descendents. [41]

Now we have a man desperately in search of, in agony for his meaning, struggling to discover what fulfills his being. By decree of God his supernatural ultimate end is still there, *de facto.* He is not in contact with it. He cannot of his own power come into contact with it. (Only in view of a redemption can he come into contact with it) . Even to come into contact with the redemption he must search for and believe in a revelation of it. He has to recognize the revelation. He has to search for it. Meanwhile, myriads of other influences are impinging upon his consciousness. His natural appetites can experience delight. They recognize and seek delight. This distracts his mind. Sometimes it hinders his thinking completely if he follows his sensitive or matter-involved appetites more than his spiritual but matter-focused appetites.

By the actual grace of God such a man can come to a knowledge of the truth. Yet he is enticed in many directions, some more material, some more spiritual. It takes a gift of supernatural Faith to give him any assurance of contact with God. Even this doesn't remove contrary enticements. It only removes them to a greater or lesser distance according to a more

[41] Cf. the excellent treatment of the organic and social nature of original justice as this has bearing on Adam's offspring in the article of P. DeLetter, "Original Justice and Adam's Sin," *CM* XXIV (1960), U-20.

or less effective or intense ascetical effort or mystical action of God-their final absence never being completely effected in this life.

Though by reason of Redemption's grace men can retrieve supernatural contact with God, he is no longer the recipient of God's help in effecting the rectitude of nature which grace presupposes-at least not in the heightening and perfecting sense of this help which he had enjoyed by way of preternatural gifts of non-extraneous accidents to his nature. Now he needs an ascetical program which never, even though helped by God, brings all the powers of his being so much into the service of his free decision as did the preternatural gifts. His spontaneity does not so much help his decision as hold it back. His appetites now seek their own satisfaction.

De facto, however, the satisfaction soon will disappear if the proper order is not present. The supernatural, actual, existential ultimate end still beckons. A man will " feel " no peace until he "feels" it in God (St. Augustine). But even then, because God no longer grants the gifts of non-extraneous perfecting accidents, there will still be grave danger, more or less removed ascetically, of another loss of contact with God.

This tension-filled" lostness" which precedes a man's choices for good or evil makes it impossible for the man to exhaust his being in either good or evil. This situation came about as a punishment for the original sin. The descendants of Adam receive a nature that lacks the perfecting, non-extraneous accident which Adam had. They still, however, must freely, knowingly and lovingly achieve the same goal as Adam because they have the same essential nature and are morally obliged as he was by the same *de facto* decree of God to achieve this end in a supernatural way. This is the only existing way in which it can be achieved. All this can be accomplished by the Redemption. But still, no preternatural gifts are given as fitting perfections or sharpenings of the still presupposed natural rectitude required for the presence of grace in the soul.

Speaking, "essentially," i.e., leaving aside for a moment how a man actually exists (in a supernatural existential, as a matter

of fact) and speaking only metaphysically (i.e., by way of prescinding from certain *de facto* modification for the sake of taking a look at fundamenal notional elements) one can say that man's appetites (be they material or spiritual predominantly) are in a concupiscent state. Man's free personal choice is consequent upon the actuation of many of his appetites and therefore because of his multi-directedness, or manysided "seducibility," these acts and appetites may or may not be in accord with what he actually knows or will know to be in accord with what *de facto* is the only fulfillment possible to his nature. On the present level of speaking there are two definitions of this concupiscence which amount to the same thing:

1. Concupiscentia . . . is the act of the appetite in regard to a determinate good or a determinate value, in so far as this act takes shape spontaneously in the consciousness on the basis of man's natural dynamism, and as such forms the necessary presupposition of man's personal free decision.[42]

2. . . . concupiscence is the habitual ability of the sensitized appetite to move into act *independently* of, and previous to, the control of free decision. Or, to put it another way, concupiscence is the ability of the sensitized appetite to act in the situation in which the appetite is under the political control of free decision rather than under its despotic control.[43]

It is important to notice the difference of perspective that is evident in the two definitions of concupiscence just quoted. Rahner is speaking of concupiscence in terms of act. We have defined concupiscence in terms of capacity for act. Needless to say, however, both definitions are affirming the same insight, since acts presuppose capacity and capacity itself is meaningless without reference to act. Nevertheless, they are really distinct from one another in the philosophy of St. Thomas. They agree in specification, though, and that is the point at issue here.[44]

We believe that the essential nature of concupiscence has

[42] K. Rahner, *op. cit.,* 359.

[43] Our definition.

[44] Because act perfects capacity on the act/potency scale we can maintain that the two philosophical views we are considering are complimentary to each other.

thus been treated in both its potential and actual aspects according to the two definitions. Concupiscence has been subjected to an exacting intellectual biopsy and its essential or central structural and functional reality has been revealed. According to St. Thomas's theology, however, we have still only revealed the material aspect of concupiscence i.e., the lack of the proper subjections which meant integrity, which was a disposition for' grace. We must now consider the formal notion of concupiscence, i. e., concupiscence as it now exists in the state of fallen but redeemed human nature. This means concupiscence in relation to the present state of the: supernatural existential.

SuPERNATURAL ExiSTENTIAL IN THE STATE OF REDEEMED NATURE

Man's supernatural existential is his ". . . ordination to a supernatural end, which is binding on all men in the present order of reality and salvation, as a real ontological existential of man, which qualifies him really and intrinsically." [45]

Thus, man actually exists *as* called to a supernatural ultimate end. By the aid of grace he must dispose himself for an elevation to a supernatural level of being. Thus by the aid of actual graces, he must, as specified by the grace to be obtained (after the manner of extrinsic formal accidental causality) make a free decision or disposal of his being towards God, and thereby establish the rectitude which is conceptually prerequisite for grace's inherence.

[45] K. Rahner, *op. cit.,* 376. "Existential, iibernatiirliches.-Dem Begriff ii. E. liegt sachlich folgender Verhalt zugrunde: imvoraus zur Rechtfertigung durch die sakramental oder aussersakramental empfangene Gnade steht der Mensch schon immer unter dem allgemeinen Heilswillen Gottes, *ist* er schon immer erlost u. absolut verpflichtet auf das iibernatlirlicke Ziel. Diese " Situation " ist eine real-ontologische Bestimmung des Menschen, die zwar guadenhaft zuseiner Natur hinzutritt (darum: i.ibernatiirlich), in der realen Ordnung faktisch aber niemals fehlt. Damit ist gegeben, class ein Mensch auch in Ablehnung der Gnade u. in Verlorenheit nie ontologisch u. subjektiv gleichgiiltig sein kann gegeniiber seiner iibernatiirlichen Bestimmung." Karl Rahner & Herbert Vorgrimlcr, Kleines theologisches worterbuch. (Freiburg im B.: Herder, 1961), 107.

Now, however, man not only does not have the preternatural gifts with which God had enabled him to maintain the rectitude in which he was created (with grace), but its penal lack in his present state has left him in a state of concupiscence whose more fundamental elements we have already considered. Moreover, man's multi-directional and many-sided spontaneous dynamism or appetite is such that its very independence, as mentioned earlier, prevents it from ever fully serving any one free decision of a man. His appetite always (perhaps more and more weakly with asceticism) spontaneously tends to, and does dynamically act as a "presupposition of man's personal free decision." Thus, in the existential, actual, and hence formal state of the matter, concupiscence actually resists man's being finally rooted in any one free choice, be it good or evil, including even the free choice demanded by the supernatural existential.

In this " existential " or actual state of affairs, concupiscence is formally defined as follows:

1. "Concupiscence is man's spontaneous desire, in so far as it precedes his free decision *and resists it"* (K. Rahner) .[46]

9l. Concupiscence is the habitual ability of the sensitized appetite to move into act *independently* of and in resistance to the (fully determined) control of free decision. Or, to put it another way, concupiscence is that verified modification of a man's being whereby his appetite is under the political control of free decision and cannot be under his despotic free control, because it resists and is unresponsive to despotic control.

This is the evil concupiscence we customarily speak of. It is not hard to discover the reasons for this. If man's very being (appetites) resists his being firmly rooted in a personal and free choice of God, then this resistance is exerted by man's being drawn to other goods as perceived by his body/spirit being. Whatever these goods are (sensitive or intellectual) they are against man's true supernatural good inasmuch as they draw man away from the latter. Thus they are the roots of sin. That is why J. B. Metz says that" evil concupiscence" is

·[6] K. Rahner, *Theological Investigation,* I, 360.

that which presses a man's freedom towards choosing a good, which if affirmed as a good, freely, results in a man's conviction of sin.[47]

In this context, it is easy to see how all the sensitive evils that we are wont to fear from our bodily being and which were wont to be set over against our spirit came to be called concupiscence. As a matter of fact our more predominately material aspects often mirror the work of concupiscence much more readily than do our more predominately spiritual aspects. In fact such a state (i.e. concupiscence) is only possible in a matter/spirit being wherein neither element exhausts the other, and wherein both elements are constantly present in some sense to the other. Thus it is true to say that material aspects of our being are, at base, (conceptually and essentially speaking) responsible for the possibility of such a state as concupiscence. (Matter limits spirit, it can never be exhausted in one object as the pure spirit can be, though by a gift of integrity it can be held in the power of the spirit by way of right ordering to God, but even there the basis for a choice of sin, and later of repentence, remains). Thus Rahner, "The specifically *human* form of the distinction between person and nature (as distinguished, for example, from a like dualism which has to be supposed for the angels as well) is explained by the dualism of matter and form in man, regarded as each possessing its own consistency *(insichstandig)* ."[48]

CoNAN GALLAGHER, M.S.SS.T.

Holy Trinity Mission Seminary
Winchester, Virginia

[47] " --- die Freiheit auf sas eigene begehrte Gut hinlenkt u. (als "bose Begierlichkeit ") auf ein Gut hindriingt, das als bejahter Gegenstand sittlich verantwortlicher Freiheit Siinde ware." J. B. Metz, "Begierde (Begielichkeit) ," LThK", II, 108.

[48] K. Rahner, *Theological Investigations,* I, 364.

PREDICATION: A STUDY BASED IN THE *ARS LOGICA* OF JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

Introduction

This is a study of predication based upon the *Ars Logica* of John of St. Thomas. The importance of a study of predication depends in part on the present-day philosophical revival. On every side there are signs demonstrating a renewed interest in philosophy: attempts of scientists to establish contact with a philosophy of nature, as at the notable Darwin Centennial at the University of Chicago; and even more striking, the revival of metaphysics, vague but strong enough to bring about changes in the curriculum of such institutions as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The United States Military Academy. In this revival, logic is important because it has never been abandoned to a serious extent and has remained a respectable tool for science, so much so that the very revival of philosophy often is under the guise of a logic. Logic remains today what it has ever been: a tool of reason, and as such it is indispensable to the advance of science, to the struggle to give certitude to science, and even to the re-emergence of metaphysics.

Predication, however, is the key-stone of logic, affecting every important logical problem, for predication is the fundamental tool of reason.

The *Ars Logica* of John of St. Thomas has been selected as the central source, not, however, as the principal source. Our aim is not to give an historical sketch of the teachings of John of St. Thomas on predication, but to get at the truth of the matter. This truth is best expressed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who is our principal source. Nevertheless, it is convenient to centralize our topic around the *Ars Logica* for three reasons. First, John of St. Thomas is faithful to the

teachings of his master, St. Thomas, to an exceptional degree.[1] Second, he summarizes a great deal of the Scholastic tradition.[2] Third, his writings are exercising considerable influence among modern logicians.[3] A better basis is hard to find.

SECTION ONE

THE GENERAL NOTION OF PREDICATION

The Definition

The word " predication "[1] has enjoyed a variety of meanings. In a very loose sense, it has been used to signify the attribution of one thing to another, no matter how such an attribution came about. It is common to read of the predication of a major term of a minor term in a syllogism;[2] and among the Greeks it meant a legal charge;[3] for the Romans, predica-

[1] So much so that it is the opinion of Klubertanz that John of St. Thomas is a founder of Thomism. Cf. Klubertanz, George, S. J., *Being and God According to Contemporary Scholastics* (Modern Schoolman, 1954, p. 4). For the absurdity of this position, cf. O'Brien, Thomas C., 0. P., *Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics* (The Thomist, 1960), pp. 17-18, and 85, note 349. Historians such as Copleston make no suggestion of it. Cf. *A History of Philosophy* (London, 1953).

[2] This is especially true of the Scholastic tradition after the time of St. Thomas.

[2] The logic section of *Elements Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* by J. Gredt (Herder, 1937) is merely a summary of the *Ars Logica.* R. Schmidt, S. J., in his review of *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas* (New Scholasticism, April, 1956) writes: "The importance of John of St. Thomas (1589-1644) in modern Thomistic thought can hardly be exaggerated. The dominant tradition of Thomism comes from him, and through him from Cajetan. And the part of his philosophy in which his influence has been greatest is logic" (p. Cf. also M. Adler: *Solution to the Problem of Species* (The Thomist, April 1941), p. note 16; p. note and Simon's *Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences* (The Thomist, January 1943), p. 88. Among non-Scholastics, cf. *Intentional Logic* by H. B. Veatch (New Haven, p. ix.

[1] The gr. *Kanryopla,* latin *praedicatio.* The verb forms are *Kanrtop€w* and *praedicare.* In latin, *dicere, dictum,* etc. often are used as synonyms, frequently together with the preposition *de.*

[2] Aristotle's *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics,* as well as the commentaries upon them, have many examples of this use.

[3] Cf. Berry, George, *The Classic Greek Dictionary,* Chicago, 1949, p. 367.

tion was used to signify a public announcement; [4] in Christian times it has been modified to mean the sermon.[5] But there is a stricter meaning of the word: the attribution of one to another within the area of the second act of the mind, the judgment. Even here one finds variety. Predication in this stricter sense has three meanings in the works of Aristotle: the simple attribution of one to another, the qualified attribution of one to another, and the attribution of two to a third.[6] St. Thomas, too, writes of inhering predication, informative predication and identical predication.[7] Thus a clear definition of predication must be found as the first point of this discussion.

The first note of predication is that it is an intellectual activity, and, more precisely, pertaining to the second act of the mind.[8]

Secondly, predication is said to be an act of the universal.[9] The human intellect, before it can know, must abstract the universal from the phantasm in the imagination; universals form the proper field of the human intellect, a situation which has given rise to the scholastic adage that science is of the universaP[0] But two kinds of universal can be distinguished in the intellect: the metaphysical and the logical.[11] The former

[4] Cf. Marchant, J. and Charles, J., *Cassell's Latin Dictionary*, New York, p. 431.

[5] The accepted meaning in the Romance Languages.

[6] Cf. Bochenski, I., 0. P., *Ancient Formal Logic*, Amsterdam, 1951, p. 22 Fr. Bochenski goes further and says that there is an evolution of the notion here, but that is beside the point.

[7] Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. I.

[8] Praedicatio pertinet ad secundam operationem, in qua enuntiatur unum de alio ... *Ars Log.*, 357, a 33.

[9] *Ars Log.*, 354 b 20 fl'. The universal can be such in signification (the noun), in representation (the concept) and in being (the nature), cf. St. Thomas, *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2 ad I. Here it is a question of the universal in being.

[10] Nulla scientia agit de singularibus ... *Ars Log.*, 314 b 32.

[11] *Ars Log.*, 314 b 18 to 315 a 3. Cf. also *ibid.*, 333 a1 42 fl'.; 345 a 2; 352 a 35. Here John of St. Thomas blends two traditions in terminology, the older one referred to in note (9) which emphasizes the relation between reality, its mental representation and its oral expression, and a newer one which emphasizes the mental structure. John of St. Thomas also speaks of a third terminology, that of *intentions. Ars Log.*, 259-293. This synthesis of terminology often is confusing to the beginner in scholastic logic.

is the nature in a universal state, a real being; the latter is the relation whereby the universal refers to inferiors, a being of reason. With these brief preliminary notions in mind, the full relation of predication to the universal can be discovered.

First of all, predication is a quasi-property of the universal:

> Predicability, or the relation to many under the formality of predication, is as a passion of universality which is the relation of being in many. [12]
> Hence this predicability is as a passion of universality; for from the fact that the universal is in many by identification it follows it can be truly predicated of them. [13]

Yet the use of such phrases as "quasi-property," " as a passion " calls for more clarification:

> And if you ask how such a contraction, inclusion, being in many, differs from that which is to be predicated of many, the answer is that being in many is explained by an identification with many, which can come about even through simple representation. . . . But predication comes about by the application of one to another in the second operation. [14]
> Although universality and predicability are distinct aspects (indeed predicability is the passion of universality ...), yet the capacity or non-repugnance to be in many and to be predicated of many is the same, because these two are so essentially coordinated that, given one, the other follows.[15]

It is important to match these texts with others:

[12] Praedicabilitas sen relatio ad plura in ratione praedicandi est quasi passio universalitatis, quae est relatio ad essendum in pluribus ... *Ars Log.,* 836 b i'l8-82.

[13] Unde ista praedicabilitas se habet ut passio universalitatis; ex eo enim, quod universale est in multis per identificationem, sequitur, quod possit de illis vere praedicari ... *ibid., 856* b 43-48. Cf. also *265* a 11; 351 a 18; *355* a 17.

[14] Et si quaeras, quomodo differat talis contractio sen inclusio sive esse in multis ab hoc, quod est praedicari de multis, respondetur, quod esse in multis explicatur per identificationem cum multis, qualis fieri potest etiam per simplicem repraesentationem ... Praedicatio autem fit per applicationem unius ad alterum in secunda operatione componente et praedicante ... *ibid., 356* b 31-42.

[15] Licet sint distincti respectus universalitatis et praedicabilitatis (siquidem praedicabilitas est passio universalitatis ...), tamen capacitas sen non repugnantia eadem est ad essendum in multis et ad praedicandum de multis; quia ista duo, scilicet esse et praedicari, ita essentialiter coordinantur, ut posito uno sequatur aliud ... *ibid.,* 329 b 12-21.

There is the aspect of aptitude to many before actual predication, and this is the universal.[16]

It is said to be of many by predication; for nothing is predicated of another unless it be one with it, not diverse.[17]

From a reflection on these texts, several conclusions can be drawn about the nature of predication. The act that is predication presupposes the universal, or, to say the same thing in other words, potential predication is the universal. Yet, if this be so, how account for the passages quoted which clearly say that predication is a quasi passion of the universal? There seems to be a difficulty in reconciling the unity of the two on the one hand, and the distinction on the other.

But upon closer study of these texts, three stages or moments can be distinguished: first the universal as apt to be in many, second the universal as apt to be predicated of many, and third the actual predication. The first is the universal in being, the second is the universal as predicable, and the third is the universal in predication. The first and second are always found together, for whatever is in many, can by that very fact be said of many. But that one is *actually* said of another requires a new act of the intellect.

Relating all this to the fact that predication is an act of the intellect, the universal in being and the universal in predication pertain to the first act of the mind, simple apprehension, whereas the actual predication pertains to the second act, the judgment. It is the actualization of the universal in predication, which in turn presupposes the universal in being. Seen in this way, the apparent dissociability of the texts quoted above is resolved, and the order of the tract on universals in the *Ars Logica* becomes clear.[18]

[16] Datur respectus aptitudinis ad multa ante actualem praedicationem, et hie est universalis ... *ibid.*, 336 a 6-8. Cf. also 332 b 24; 351 a 25-43; *355* a 42.

[17] Et dicitur esse "de multis" per praedicationem; nihil autem praedicatur de alia nisi sit idem cum illo, non diversum ... *ibid.*, 314 b 12.

[18] John of St. Thomas first treats of the universal both as in being and as in predication, then the cause of the universal, and finally the act which is predication. Cf. *op. cit.*, 313-375.

It is to be noted that the universal in question is the logical one.

The metaphysical {universal) considers natures as stripped of individual notes, and it does not pertain to it to consider their reference to these natures that it be predicated of them, but {this pertains to) the logical {universal) .[19]

Another point to be made about predication in order to establish a clear definition is that it is distinguished both from definition itself and from appellation.

This application (of the definition to the defined thing) does not pertain to the actual constitution of a definition, but to the actual exercise of its predication. [20]

Thus the definition is a thing apart from predication, although the application of the definition is a predication. Furthermore, definition is not exclusively of the second act of the mind, [21] whereas predication is.

Predication can be confused with appellation insofar as both are applications. [22] John of St. Thomas brings this up in refuting an opinion:

But this opinion confuses the general application of a predicate to a subject with the special property of logic which is called appellation. [23]

While it is true that often predication contains appellation

[19] Metaphysicum considerat naturas denudatas a conditionibus individualibus, non vero pertinet ad ipsum considerare respectum earum ad easdem naturas, ut praedicetur de illis, sed ad logicum ... *ibid.*, 333 a 50-333 b 5.

[20] Haec applicatio non pertinet ad constitutionem actualem definitionis, sed ad exercitium actuale praedicationis ejus ... *ibid.*, 135 a 34-37; cf. also 134 b 41 where St. Thomas is cited: In definitione non praedicatur aliquid de aliquo ... *II Post. An.*, lect. £, in the Marietti edition, no. 4£8. All quotes from the *Post. An.* are taken from this edition.

[21] Cf. *Ars Log.*, 18 b 45; 134 a 40; 137 b 17; £06 b 31; £34 b 39.

[22] Appellatio is defined: applicatio significati formalis unius termini ad significatum formale alterius ... *ibid.*, 39 b 43-45. In the sentence "Peter is a great logician," " great " by appellation is said of, or applied to, "Peter."

[23] Sed haec sententia confundit generalem applicationem praedicati ab subjectum cum speciali proprietate logica, quae vocatur appellatio ... *ibid.*, 180 a 6-10. Cf. also Maritain, J., *Petite Logique*, Paris, 19£3, p. 9£.

virtually and equivalently for purposes of verification,[24] there can be predication with no reference to appellation at all.[25]

Thus the definition of predication strictly taken must take in the following notes: a general application of one to another, exclusively in the second act of the mind, the actualization of a logical universal in predication, based upon the universal in being.

John of St. Thomas gives as his definition: the attribution of one to another by affirming or denying.[26] The phrase "by affirming or denying " places predication firmly in the second act of the mind, while the phrase " attribution of one to another " is equivalent to a general application. According to the scholastic custom of the times, the basis is treated separately, and so not included in the definition, but it must be confessed that the addition of the adjective " actual " to " attribution " is necessary to define predication in the strict sense.

However, in the same passage John of St. Thomas cites a definition of predication taken from St. Thomas which contains all the above-mentioned notes. St. Thomas writes:

> Predication is something brought about by the action of the intellect as it is joining or dividing, having as a basis in reality the unity of those things, one of which is said of the other.[27]

Here predication is plainly taken as an act of the intellect, there is a general application of one to another, unquestionably in the second act of the mind, and based upon the universal in being. That John of St. Thomas recognized this as the stricter definition is evident from the fact that this is the one he explains at length,[28] in practice taking his own definition only

[24] *Ibid.*, 181 a 13 ff.; esp. *25.*

[25] *Ibid.*, 367 b 36 ff.

[26] Praedicatio est attributio unius ad alterum negando vel affirmando ... *ibid.*, 357 a 35-37.

[2-] Praedicatio enim est quoddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens tamen fnndamentum in re, ipsam unitatem eorum quorum unum de altero dicitur ... *De Ente et Essentia,* c. 3 in fine, Marietti, n. 20.

[28] *Ars Log., 357* a 44- b 36.

as a general one. It is unfortunate that many modern followers of John of St. Thomas have elected this more general definition of predication [29] with a subsequent confusion in the minds of their readers.

Thus predication as it is of the second act of the mind is defined in a general way as the attribution of one to another by affirming or denying. A more precise definition is: the act of the intellect as it is joining or dividing based on the unity or division *in re* of the elements joined or divided. At this point this definition is a working one only, arrived at from an analysis of texts from John of St. Thomas and St. Thomas himself. It is only when the problems brought up by an acceptance of such a definition are solved that the true nature of predication can be said to be expressed by these words.

The Formal Note

Of all the notes listed in the preceding section as pertaining to predication, one stands as more formal than all the others: the actual application of one to another.

> The formal note of predication, which is the attribution itself, or the conjunction of the extremes after the manner of attribution .... [30]
> The formal note of predication consists in the identity and connection of one extreme with another. [31]

In other words it is the attribution of one extreme to another that is the most important part of the definition of predication. This, however, should not be confused with the definition itself. Although for an act to be identified as predication it must fulfill the complete definition, the precision of the formal note

[29] To mention but two examples, Gredt and Maritain. Gredt goes so far as to define predication as an enunciation. Maritain keeps referring to predication as an attribution, although he is much clearer than Gredt. Cf. Gredt, J., O.S.B., *Elemenfu Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae,* Friburg, 1937, no. 136 (Vol. I, p. 114); Maritain, J., *Petite Logique,* Paris, pp.

[30] Formalem rationem praedicationis, quae est ipsa attributio seu coniunctio extremorum per modum attributionis ... *Ars Log.,* 357 a 44-47.

[31] Ipsa formalis ratio praedicationis consistit in identitate et connexione unius extremi cum alio ... *ibid.,* 379 a Cf. also 360 a

within this definition does help to point out the true nature of predication.

However, a question immediately presents itself. If the formal note is the attribution of the extremes, how can the definition of predication include the notion of division? One seems to exclude the other; there can be no such thing as negative predication. The answer is given by a close reading of the definition. The " joining and dividing " of the definition modify the " intellect," not the " act." In other words, predication is an act of the intellect precisely as that intellect is in the second operation of the mind. Thus predication takes place only when two extremes are attributed to each other; the separation of one extreme from the other is the opposite of predication. Yet, since contraries belong to the same genus,[32] the positive and negative acts have something in common. This higher genus must be carefully distinguished from the more particularized predication which is our subject. In confirmation of this, note the universal tendency to formulate the rules of predication in terms of affirmative predications, and the preference for affirmative example.[33]

The Foundation

In discussing the general notion of predication, one obscure point remains: the basis or foundation of predication. Already both the universal and the unity of the thing in reality have been mentioned as bases for predication. Others can be listed, as, for example, the individual things themselves. Consider the following texts:

> The aptitude to being and to be predicated of many follows upon nature by reason of its abstract state and unity.[34]

[32] Common scholastic teaching. Cf., e. g., St. Thomas, *In X Meta.,* 1. 5.

[33] The examples from the *Ars Logica* and the works of St. Thomas will appear throughout the dissertation. Even the mathematical logicians show this tendency. Cf., e. g., Lewis, C. and Langford, C., *Symbolic Logic,* New York, 1959, as typical.

[34] Aptitudo ad essendum et praedicandum de multis consequitur naturam ratione status et unitatis abstractae ... *Ars Log.,* 33!2 a 9-11.

The existence of many individuals alone can be the basis for the abstraction of the universal unity and the giving of the aptitude for predication. [35]

Before the relation of actual predication there is found this relation of the one to the many.s6

The root of predicability is universality. [37]

The basis and root of predicability is the identity of the extreme of the predicables. [38]

The foundation, however, of this relation or attribution is the identity or the convenience of the extremes if the predication be affirmative, or their disconvenience if it be negative. [39]

In all, four bases are listed here. First, the existing things as individuals; second, the nature of individuals as abstracted (this is the universal in being); third, the universal in predication, or the nature as apt to be predicated of many; and fourth, the identity of the extremes. The existing individuals are not so much the basis of predication as of the universal in predication, and need not be considered further here. The universal in being, the universal in predication and the identity of the extremes are all the same in that each is one thing which has or contains various aspects. These aspects are distinguished by the human mind. Thus, e. g., the universal " man " insofar as it is apt to be in many stands for one nature; " man " taken as a universal in predication also stands for one nature, now as it is apt to be predicated of many; but one of this " many " and " man " are identified by actual predication. Thus the more proximate basis of prediction is expressed best by the phrase " identity of the extremes " since

[35] Existentia autem plurium individuorum solurn potest esse fundamentum, ut abstrahatur unitas universalis et reddatur apta ad istam praedicationem ... *ibid.,* 332 b 24-28. Cf. 366 a 37-b 39, for details.

[36] Ante relationem actualis praedicationis invenitur ista relatio unius ad multa ... *ibid.,* 335 b 37-39.

[37] Radix autem praedicabilitatis universalitas est ... *ibid.,* 391 b 15-16. Cf. 351 a 7-25.

[38] Fundamentum et radix praedicabilitatis est identitas extremorum praedicabilium ... *ibid.,* 336 b 35-37. Cf. 359 b 11-16.

[39] Fundamentum autem hujus relationis seu attributionis est identitas seu convenientia extremorum, si praedicatio sit affirmativa, vel disconvenientia, si sit negativa ... *ibid.,* 357 b l-6.

in this case alone the note of actuality comes forth. But this identity is found in the very universal, or the relation of the universal to its inferiors.

If, then, by the basis or foundation of predication is meant the potential predication, the basis is undoubtedly the universal in predication. But if the basis or foundation be taken strictly to mean the starting point of predication, then the basis is the identity in reality of the extremes.

Summary

Predication in the strict sense is defined as the act of the intellect as it is joining or dividing based upon the unity in reality of the elements joined or divided. Within this definition, the formal note is the attribution of one to other. This is possible because of the unity in reality, and in the abstracted nature, of these elements.

SECTION Two

THE PROPOSITION

The Expression of Predication

Within the range of man's speech are many word forms and combinations of words; furthermore, there are many languages that have evolved through the centuries.[1] Whatever may have been the origins of language, there is no doubt that man in small and isolated communities uses a language which is geared to his cultural development, but as the human communities grew and contacted other groups, culture and language became mixed.[2] The Greek philosophers, especially the Eleatic Zeno and Aristotle, developed a fairly complete theory of language[3] but one closely identified with Greek culture and logic. Wherever Aristotle's logic was accepted, his linguistic ideas were also

[1] Cf. Pei, *The Story of Language* (L. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1949).

[2] A striking example in the present is the importation of American "culture" into Europe with the adoption of American words.

[3] For details, cf. Bochenski, *Formale Logik,* pp. 31-58.

adopted. [4] When, however, the great scientific movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought to light many new facts about languages, when the positivists of the nineteenth century studied these facts independently of Aristotelianism, then Aristotle's neat systematization was found wanting. Indeed, modern language scholars challenge almost every statement made by Aristotle except that words are signs, man communicates by means of words, and that words and ideas are related. [5]

There is no point to repeating Aristotle's notion of the proposition, therefore, unless the validity of his aprpoach to language is established. This can be done by a distinction of the proposition as it is in ordinary speech and as it is a tool of reason, that is to say as the proposition is a medium of communication and as it is an instrument of science. This distinction is based upon the findings of language scholars such as Pei [6] and of anthropologists such as Taylor. [7]

In ordinary speech, a word or group of words expressing a complete thought is called a sentence. This is the most frequent way of communicating with others. There is an extraordinary variety of sentences: the simple one word sentence and the long periodic one, with verb and without verb, direct and inverted word-order, etc. Grammarians have, in the more advanced cultures, expressed the rules implicit in common speech, or have attemped to impose rules drawn from other sources. [8] It is important to note that: first, ordinary and grammatical speech are always distinct; second, ordinary speech clearly communicates ideas even in defiance of grammar; and third, the grammatical rules of one language rarely apply to another. Thus side by side with the fixed grammatical language is the colloquial, living language; this ungrammatical language can

[4] Climaxing in the adaptation made by St. Thomas to the doctrine of the Trinity. Cf., e. g., *Summa Theologica,* I, q. 39.

[5] A typical example is F. Bodmer, who ridicules scholastics rather than Aristotle himself. Cf. *The Loom of Language,* New York, 944.

[6] *Op. cit.*

[7] Primitive Culture, London, 1903.

[8] Cf. Bodmer, *op. cit.,* p. 119 (middle) ff.

be used to convey clear ideas, as in advertising; and one learns a foreign tongue the better when one forgets the grammar of his own language.

Yet can it be said that grammar is useless? The fact that grammar develops when a people achieve a higher level of civilization argues that it is an artificial device meant to bring greater clarity into speech. Whether or not a grammar achieves this is another question. Certainly if all the members of a language group follow the same rules of grammar, a greater simplicity in communication would follow. But the language would also lose its richness and variety; further, the less cultured members of the society would be at a disadvantage.

Just as grammar developed later than the language, among a smaller group within the society, for the purpose of fixed clarity of expression, and later, elegance of expression; so did logical rules of language develop still later, among a smaller group for the purpose of scientific reasoning. This obviously is what Aristotle did for the Greeks: establish logical rules for language to serve in the quest for science. That such rules should be built on commonly accepted or grammatical notions was natural. Also, since science is the same for all, and the means of obtaining science are equally valid for all, the logical rules of language would also be equally applicable to all, since logic is *par excellence* the tool of science.

In this section, then, the proposition is considered not as it is in ordinary speech, not as constructed by rules of grammar, but as a logical device. The other two considerations, however, cannot be completely disregarded.

Historical and linguistic studies now give enough evidence to make such an explanation of the development of the logical aspect of language plausible.[9] In any case, it is evident that

[9] Cf. Bodmer, *op. cit.;* the proceedings of the Week of Synthesis held in 1956 and published as *Notion de Structure,* Paris, 1957, esp. the art. *Structure de la Logique;* and the art. *Language,* by G. L. Trager, in the *Encyclopedi(ij Britannica,* 1959, vol. 13, pp. 696-703.

Note Aristotle's statement: Other types of orations are here omitted for their examination pertains rather to rhetoric and the theory of poetics-but the

language logically considered is other than language as regulated by grammarians or as used commonly.

The Logical Proposition in General

A proposition is defined as: an oration signifying truth or falsity indicatively. [10] This definition was imposed, or at least recorded, by Aristotle, [11] and until the nineteenth century commonly accepted by logicians/ [12] although the term itself gradually assumed a new usage. Aristotle frequently wrote of an "enunciative oration" [13] reserving the term "proposition" for the premise of a syllogism. The distinction is merely a functional one, and in the course of time has disappeared: by St. Thomas' time, the two terms were frequently, but not always, used interchangeably; by the time of John of St. Thomas the two were completely synonymous. [14] Today, the term" enunciation " is rarely used, although there are signs of its revival

enunciative oration pertains to this science ... *Peri Hermenias* 4, 17 a 1. The science in question is logic.

St. Thomas interprets this passage: Ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum constructio ... *In Peri Hermenias* I, lect. 7 in fine, Marietti no. 87. Citations from this work are from the Marietti edition.

[10] *Peri Hermenias* I, c. 4; St. Thomas, *In Peri Herm.,* lect. 7, no. 83; *Ars Log.,* 23 b 29-30, also 145 b 41-42. The common latin text is: oratio verum vel falsum significans indicando. The word used in greek is *1rp6rarns,* in latin *propositio.* For a history of the use of the word in the latin tradition, cf. art. *Propositions and Sentences* by A. Church in *The Problem of Universals,* Notre Dame, 1956, p. 3 ff.

[11] *Loc. cit.,* as to how original this was with Aristotle, cf. Bochenski, *op. cit.,* p. but cf. also Taylor, A., *Socrates,* New York, 1954, pp. 153 ff., esp. p. 153, note fl.

A different version is given in *Prior Analytics,* fl4 a 16: A proposition is an oration affirming or denying something of something. This, however, is a secondary and derived definition.

[12] I. e., by those in contact with Aristotelian tradition. Indian logic, for example, developed independently, and although the same problems developed, Indian terminology remained incomplete. Cf. Bochenski, *op. cit.,* p. *516;* pp. 481-517.

[13] Gr. *6.7ro¢avr!ldJs* A6')'os; latin *enunciatio.*

[14] Thus, e. g., "God exists" is called a proposition in the Summa Theologica I, q. fl. The term "enunciation " is found frequently, however, in the Commentaries. Cf. also *Ars Log.,* fl3 b 7-fl7; 144 a 45-b 4; 239 a 41-46.

due to the new meaning attached by some to the term " proposition." [15] Throughout this discussion the term "proposition " will be used as synonymous with enunciation.

Proposition, then, as a logical tool, is defined as an oration signifying truth or falsity indicatively. That the proposition is an oration is an understatement: it is the principal type of oration. [16] An oration is defined as an emission of sound signifying something by agreement and whose parts taken separately signify only as terms. [17] A perfect oration is one that generates perfect sense in the hearer .[18] Thus the general notion of proposition is that it is a collection of sounds which mean what they do by agreement and which convey a completeness. It is precisely this conveyance of completeness that distinguishes propositions from other types of orations, since for man completeness is found in truth and falsity. Science seeks truth, and the proposition as the tool of science must indicate that truth or its absence. This manifestation of truth or falsity takes place through the indicative mood of the verb which is clear and unequivocaJ.[19]

Besides an analysis of the traditional definition, other aspects of the logical proposition are indicated in the *Ars Logica.*[20] Thus propositions are second intentions:

[15] :Mathematical logicians tend to use the term " proposition " m an abstract sense, signifying the meaning rather than the expression of the meaning. In this case, the term " sentence" is being introduced into logic to cover the former meaning of "proposition." Cf. Church, *op. cit.,* pp. 3-6; Veatch, H. B., *Intentional Logic,* New Haven, 1952, pp. 213 ff. In manuals of mathematical logic, the common definition is: any expression that can be called true or false. Cf. Bochenski, I., *Nove Lezioni di Logica Simbolica,* Rome, 1938, p. 11; Lewis and Langford, *op. cit.,* p. 79. Note here the distinction between "proposition" and "propositional function."

[16] *Ars Log.,* 23 b 7-8; b 32; 144 a 25-36; 239 a 32-40.

[17] *Ibid.,* 17 a 7-11; cf. also 128 a 30 ff.; 230 b 1 ff.

[18] *Ibid.,* 17 b 24-27. Note that imperfect orations also are tools of science; but the perfect oration is the better tool. *Ibid.,* 18 a 21-32; b 20 ff.

[19] *Ibid.,* 23 b 38-24 a 12. This is not to say that the indicative mood is found in all propositions, but that the verb must be assertive. This, however, is best done by the indicative; other moods must be at least reduceable to the indicative.

[20] These texts are cited here not only to clarify the notion of the logical proposition, but also to introduce the problems with which the rest of the paper shall concern itself.

In the second operation, moreover, there is found the intention of oration, which is divided into the various types of perfect and imperfect orations .... And in turn, the proposition founds other second intentions which are the properties of a proposition. [21]

Yet not all propositions are second intentions:

When a proposition is formed; the second intention of the proposition is not as yet present formally, but only fundamentally and proximately; as when a universal nature is abstracted from singulars, there is as yet no intention of universality, but the fundament. Yet it is called a proposition and a syllogism from the fact that it is formed in exercise. [22]

Further, propositions have a relation to judgment, and through judgment to truth and falsity:

The definition or essence of enunciation taken commonly is this: it is a perfect oration ... expressing a complex object about which a judgment can be made ... from which it follows that it signifies truth or falsity. [23]
Since, therefore, the enunciation is perfected by its meaning, by which a complex object is signified on which the assertion and affirmation of the judgment can fall, it follows that truth and falsity are accidents of such a signification, not the substance of the enunciation. [24]
It pertains to judgment to assent and dissent, it pertains to enunciation to join the extremes upon which judgment falls as on matter. [25]

[21] In secunda autem operatione invenitur intentio orationis, quae dividitur per varios modos orationis perfectae et imperfectae .... Et rursus propositio fundat alias secundas intentiones quae sunt proprietates propositionis ... *ibid.,* 293 b *QQ-25* & 30-32.

[22] Quando formatur propositio, non est adhuc formaliter secunda intentio propositionis, sed fundamentaliter proxime; sicut quando abstrahitur natura universalis a singularibus, nondum est intentio universalitatis, sed fundamentum ejus. Denominatur tamen propositio et syllogismus hoc ipso quod formatur iu exercitio ... *ibid.,* 306 a 41 - b *5.*

[23] Ratio seu essentia enuntiationis in communi consistit in hoc, quod sit oratio perfecta ... exprimens objectum complexum circa quod potest ferri judicium ... ex quo consequitur quod significat verum vel falsum ... *ibid.,* 240 a 29-39.

[24] Cum ergo enuntiatio perficiatur significatione, qua objectum complexum significatur super quod potest cadere assertio et affirmatio iudicii, consequenter veritas et falsitas sunt accidentia talis significationis, non substantia enuntiationis . . . *ibid.,* 146 b 40-46. Cf. 240 b 34; 24 b 30. It is true that in one passage, 158 a 44-b 2, the essence of the enunciation is said to consist in the signifying truth or falsity, but in view of the number and clarity of the other texts it seems certain this particular passage is to be interpreted benignly.

[25] Judicium autem pertinet ad a.ssensum et dissensum, enuntiatio ad copulationem extremorum, super quam cadit indicium assensus tamquam supra materiam . . . *ibid., 25* a 25-30. Cf. 239 b 27 ff.

Enunciation can represent the very assent of judgment, and not only the joining of the extremes, and by reason of this the enunciation is capable of falsity if the assent be false.[00]

Yet the most important point about a proposition is its signification:

The enunciation is perfected by its meaning.[27]
Truth and falsity do not change the signification of the enunciation, which is the constitutive of the proposition.[2s]

This is because the proposition receives its unity from its signification:

A proposition is said to be formally composed not by the formality of many entities and by the composition which is the ordering of the concepts, but by the formation of one from a plurality already had, from whose presence and comparison a third species or concept is formed and results.[29]
We say that from such a gathering and formation there is produced one word or concept which is the term of the second operation.so

Yet this unity is not the essence of the proposition:

Union is a form and act of things potentially one precisely as potentially one, but it is not the form essentially constitutive of the whole, but (it is a form) applicative and unitive of the essential form to its matter of subject.[81]

•• Enuntiatio potest etiam ipsum assensum iudicii repraesentare et non solam copulationem extremorum, et ratione hujus est capax falsitatis si assensus ipse falsus sit ... *ibid.,* 149 b 4!l-46. Cf. 145 a 1!l; 150 b 87-151 a 12.

[27] Enuntiatio perficiatur significatione ... *ibid.,* 146 b 40-41.

•• Veritas et falsitas non mutat significationem enuntiativam, quod est constitutivum propositionis ... *ibid.,* 197 a 29-81.

•• Propositio dicitur formaliter composita non formalitate plurium entitatum et compositione ordinationis conceptuum, sed formatione unius ex pluribus praesuppositis ex quorum collatione et comparatione formatur et resultat una tertia species seu conceptus ... *ibid.,* 155 a 26-84. The expression " formalitate plurium entitatum " refers only to the categorical proposition, 155 b 82 fl'. Cf. also 152 a 27 fl'., his preferred opinion.

•• Dicimus ex tali formatione et collatione produci unum verbum seu conceptum qui est terminus per secundam operationem procedens ... *ibid.,* 155 b 2-6. Cf. 156 b 49- 157 a 10.

[31] Unio est quidem forma et actus unibilium ut unibilia sunt, non tamen est ipsa forma essentialiter constitutiva totius, sed applicativa et unitiva formae essentialis ad suam msteriam seu subjectum ... *ibid.,* 180 b 85-41. Cf. 227 a 20-85.

From these texts, several important conclusions can be drawn. First, a proposition as such is not necessarily a second intention. But every proposition fulfilling the definition given above is capable of being a second intention. Propositions, moreover, correspond to the second act of the mind. Secondly, the proposition as such is not the judgment, but is antecedent to the judgment. However, at times the proposition does at the same time express both the union of the extremes and the act of judgment. Third, the essence of the proposition is the joining or separating of the extremes; yet the import of the proposition is taken from its single signification.

A third aspect of importance is a consideration of the proposition's subjects of inhesion. Obviously, propositions can be subjected in the spoken word; they can be written or recorded orally, they can be in the ear of the hearer, the eye of the reader, etc.; propositions can be imagined and remembered; and since all these are expressions of intellectual activity, propositions are found in some way in the intellect. But only the proposition as spoken and recorded fully lives up to the definition and characteristics listed above. Certainly as found in the ear of the hearer or eye of the reader, the proposition is merely a collection of sounds or colors, and so can be dismissed from the present consideration. In the imagination and memory, a proposition is a collection of images,S2 a potential for propositions rather than actual propositions. Further, what is in the intellect is not the proposition as such, but something that in turn is expressed by the proposition. Thus, formally, the spoken and recorded proposition alone seems to fulfill Aristotle's definition. [33]

Considering all these aspects, the logical proposition can be defined as the tool of science which is the expression of truth and falsity by assertion.

[33] This is in harmony with St. Thomas' teaching that enunciations are formed *after* cognition. Cf. *In I Sent.,* dist. 8, q. 2, a. *5* and dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad *5.*

The Categorical Proposition

Logic allows for a considerable variety of propositions, all of which are tools for science.[34] The principal division is that into categorical and hypothetical propositions, a division based upon the type of copula used in connecting the extremes.[35] We will consider only the categorical because it is the most simple and direct expression of the composition and division that takes place in the intellect. Furthermore, the hypothetical proposition is a concatenation of categorical propositions, and so depends on them as words depend upon the letters of the alphabet.[36]

However more useful the hypothetical has proven to be in the development of science, the categorical remains the more fundamental and the clearer expression of predication.

Truth is found more principally in the categorical than in the hypothetical.[37] For the categorical is that which the second operation of our intellect primarily forms.ss

In the hypothetical, moreover, and even less in the syllogism, there does not take place the predication of one of another, nor the identification of the extremes.[39]

The categorical proposition is defined as that which indicates a predicate of a subject.[40] The categorical has three principal parts: a subject, a verbal copula and a predicate, whereas the hypothetical has a conjunctive copula uniting two categori-

[34] The scholastics admitted four principal divisions: categorical and hypothetical; universal, particular, indefinite and singular; negative and affirmative; modal and non-modal. Some of the moderns retain these expressly, as Joseph and Stebbing, others implicitly, as Lewis. cr. bibliography.

[35] *Ars Log.*, £5 a 36 ff. Cf. also 157 a 20 ff.

[36] *Ibid.*, 95 a 9-£4; 144 b 9; 156 a 32-37; 159 b 18-19; 160 b 33-37; 165 a 1-5; b 39-44 gives a brief summary.

[37] Per prius invenitur veritas in categorica quam in hypothetica . . . *Ibid.*, 159 b Q0-£1.

[38] Nam *categorica* est illud, quod per se primo format secunda operatio nostri intellectus ... *Ibid.*, *155* b 36-39. Cf. 157 b 39-44.

[39] In *hypothetica* autem et multo minus in *syllogismo* non intercredit praedicatio unius de altero neque identitas extremorum ... *Ibid.*, *156* a 32-36.

[40] *Ibid.*, 144 b 7-8.

cals.[41] St. Thomas merely uses the term "simple" to describe the categorical.[42]

There are some peculiar characteristics of the categorical proposition. It closely resembles both predication and judgment, for all three have an application of one to another. Further, it most perfectly fulfills the definition of proposition, and clearly shows the correlation of proposition to intellect. For to the categorical proposition there corresponds but one concept in the intellect/[3] yet the categorical itself is composite.[44] In other words, the categorical proposition affords one a key to predication that is fairly simple. For this reason, the study of the categorical proposition is preferred to the others, and will form the framework for the remainder of the discussion. ·For in analysing the elements of the categorical proposition, it is possible to arrive at an analysis of predication itself. By penetrating the expression, the substance of predication will gradually come to light.

SECTION THREE

THE LOGICAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSITION

The Elements

Nouns and verbs are the building blocks of the categorical proposition. When actually part of a proposition, these terms are subject to a new formality: for in the proposition each term must be either a subject, a predicate or a copula. Terms under this new formality are never found outside the proposition; subject, predicate and copula participate so closely in the logical intention which is the proposition that removal from the proposition immediately reduces them to terms. In treating of subject, predicate and copula, we are touching upon the very essence of the proposition.

The proposition has been defined as: an oration signifying

[41] *Ibid., 25* a 41-44, b 17-19.
[42] *In Pe:ri Herm.,* I, lect. 8.
[49] *Ars Log., 155* b 32 ff.
[44] *Ibid.,* 156 a 41- b 13.

truth or falsity by indicating: [1] It follows from this definition that no single term can be a proposition in this logical sense. For every oration is made up of parts which themselves are terms/ Besides, the only terms that would qualify are categorematic. But there are only two types of categorematic: the noun and the verb. Neither can of itself constitute a proposition: the noun, because of itself it is the expression of the first act of the mind, whereas the proposition is an expression of the second act; the verb, because it consignifies a subject. Therefore at least two terms must be joined in a proposition. Further, one of these must be a noun, and the other a verb.[2] It is universally agreed that the noun functions as the subject in a proposition; but the role of the verb is the center of controversy.

The difficulty is twofold: first whether the verb is the copula, in which case a third term would be required; or the predicate, in which case no copula is needed; or, secondly, whether the verb can be both depending on the kind of proposition. For propositions can be either of two terms or three, it seems. One can say" Man is white" and" Man exists";" Man is running" or " Man runs." First, therefore, the true nature of the distinction between two-term and three-term propositions must be investigated, and second the role of the verb in each must be determined.

A proposition such as " Man is white " is traditionally called a proposition *of the third adjacent,* while a proposition such as "Man is" is traditionally called *of the second adjacent.*[3] The distinction was already recognized by Aristotle, who treated both as true propositions.[4] The distinction became well estab-

[1] Aristotle defines oration: a word which signifies arbitrarily and whose parts separated signify something as term not as an affirmation or negation . . . *Peri Herm., ch.* 4.

[2] Potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex enunciatio fieri ... St. Thomas, *In I Peri Herm.,* lect. 1, no. 6.

[3] This rather mysterious terminology comes from the latin *propositio de secundo adiacente* and *propositio de tertio adiacente* which seem to have been first used by Albert of Saxony, cf. Bochenski, *Formale Logik,* p. 208. The latin expression becomes clearer when one supplies a word like *termino.*

[4] Cf., e. g., *Peri Herm.,* I, sh. 10.

lished in scholastic philosophy, again with the recognition that both kinds of propositions are true propositions:

A proposition is formed in two ways: in one way from a noun and a verb without any addition, as when one says " Man is "; another way when a third is present, as when one says " Man is white." [5]

But today there is a movement away from propositions of the second adjacent, especially if the verb involved is "is." These are now called existential propositions and they are considered to be outside the field of logic:

Existence is not and cannot be a predicate. [6]
Logic and deductive system are never concerned with existence except in a hypothetical sense-the sense in which " A exists " means " There is a definable entity, A, such that .... " Thus 'existence' has to do with the possibility of intellectual construction .... [7]

It has already been stated that the proposition is a logical tool for the aid of science. The end of logic is truth. The solution to the problem of propositions of the second and third adjacent follows upon a realization of what science is. If one maintains that science treats *only* of the essences of things, then propositions of the second adjacent have no place as a tool for that science, since they do not help to state the answer to the scientific question; What is it? On the other hand, if science is restricted to the field of existence, then propositions of the third adjacent must be abandoned. The traditional

[5] Enunciatio dupliciter formatur. Uno quidem modo ex nomine et verbo absque aliquo apposito, ut cum dicitur " homo est "; alio modo quando aliquid tertium adiacet, ut cum dicatur "homo est albus" ... St. Thomas, *In II Post An.*, lect. 1, no. 3. Cf. also *In II Peri Herm.*, lect. 2, no. 212. Nowhere is there a suggestion that either type is not a true proposition, e. g. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2 raises no such objection to the celebrated *Deus est.* St. Thomas also uses as an example *Socrates sedet*, as *Summa Theol.*, I. q. 16, a. 8 ad 3 & 4. The opinion that the "tripartite theory" is "degenerate" (cf. MacCabe, H., *The Structure of the Judgment--A Reply to Fr. Wall*, The Thomist, April 1956, pp. 23.5-6) confuses predication with proposition, and is easily refuted from St. Thomas' own writings.

[6] Ogden and Veatch, *Putting the Square Back into Opposition*, New Scholasticism, October 1956, p. 415. In note 6 the authors cite Gilson.

[7] Lewis and Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 182, note 10. Modern logicians are undoubtably influenced by such movements as phenomenology and existentialism.

position, however, is that science asks two questions: What is it? and Does it exist? [8] Logic, then, must be ready to assist reasoning in the quest for either answer, and to do so must include propositions of the second as well as the third adjacent. In fact, the question: Does it exist? precedes the question: What is it? [9]

Both the proposition of the second and the proposition of the third adjacent, then, belong to logic, and do so because of the nature of science. But since a knowledge of the existence of a thing is only the initial step for science, propositions of the second adjacent play only a small role in logic.

Thus a proposition of the second adjacent is one that states that a thing is. A proposition of the third adjacent, on the other hand, is one that states what a thing is. From this it follows that such propositions as " Man runs " and " Man is running" taken in opposition are not examples of this division,' [0] for they do not express a difference in meaning. [11] Both answer the same scientific question. In other words, while materially propositions of the second adjacent have two terms, formally they are constituted such by the fact that they state *that* a thing is. So too propositions of the third adjacent are constituted formally not by the fact that they have three terms, but by that fact that they state *what* a thing is. But such a proposition as " Man runs " taken by itself can be a proposition of the second adjacent if it is taken as merely stating the fact that man runs. If, however, it is taken as meaning a quality belonging to man, then it is a proposition of the third adjacent, and should be expressed "Man is running."

To get back now to the problem of the role of the verb, it is

[8] *An sit* and *Quid sit.* The answer to the first is *Quia sit.*, cf. St. Thomas, *In II Post. An.*, lect. 1. Cf. also Veatch, *Intentional Logic*, pp. 161 ff.

• St. Thomas, *In I Post. An.*, lect. Q.

[10] The manualists are somewhat confusing on this point. Cf. Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 65-68.

[11] Dicere "homo ambulant" aut "homo est ambulans" nihil differt . . . Aristotle, *Peri Herm.* ch. 1Q. Currere est currentem esse ... St. Thomas, *In I Peri Herm.*, lect. 5, no. 18. Both maintain there is a difference between propositions of the second and third adjacent, as we have seen.

evident at once that in a proposition of the second adjacent, the verb is the predicate. Such propositions have no copula since there is nothing to join to the' subject. Should one seek a copula here, one becomes involved in an infinite series, since that copula too would need a copula, etc. This is clearly true especially of the verb " is."

In a proposition of the third adjacent, however, a further difficulty presents itself. For some, such a proposition is also composed solely of a subject and predicate. [12] In this case, the predicate of a proposition such as " Man is white " is " is white." Such a position is based upon the definition of the verb, part of which states that it is " always denoting those things which are predicated"; [13] and on certain texts from St. Thomas, such as:

" A proposition is made up of a subject and a predicate." [14] This position, however, does not take into account the complete doctrine as presented by St. Thomas. Consider the following texts:

> The verb then is said to be always denoting those things which are predicated: both because the verb always signifies that which is predicated, and because in every predication there must be a verb from the fact that the verb implies composition by which the predicate is joined to the subject. [15] The enunciation is formed in two ways: one way from a noun and a verb without any addition ... ; another way when a third is present .... [16]

Here St. Thomas seems to hold for a twofold function of the verb: in one case the verb is the predicate, but in the other the verb is distinguished from the predicate. In fact, a verb cannot be a complex term, for part of its definition is that

[12] E. g., H. McCabe. Cf. *op. cit.,* pp. 235-6.

[13] Et eorum quae praedicantur semper est nota. Cf. above, pp. 280-281.

[14] Enunciatio constitutitur ex subjecto et praedicato ... *In I Peri Herm.,* lect. 9, no. 8. Note the omission of any mention of a copula. Cf. also *ibid.,* lect. 5, no. 60.

[15] Dicitur ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero; tum quia verbum semper significat id quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet esse verbum, eo quod verbum importat compositionem qua praedicatum componitur subjecto ... *In I Pe:ri Herm.,* lect. 5, no. 8.

[16] Cf. above, note 5, p. 281.

"its parts separated do not signify." [17] In a proposition of the third adjacent, the verb is a copula uniting the predicate to the subject. [18] But it must be remembered that within a proposition the subject can be considered as related to the rest; [19] or it can be, together with the predicate, considered as the matter for the copula. [20] In other words, if the material element in the proposition is restricted only to the subject, then since the verb is as form to the noun, the remainder of the proposition can be called the predicate. There is then no need to distinguish the copula from the predicate. But this consideration is of value only when comparing one proposition with another. This, I think, explains St. Thomas' teaching in the latter part of the *Peri Hermenias,* where he is concerned with the types of opposition. On the other hand, if the proposition is taken in itself, then the material element is not merely the subject, but includes the predicate, and the copula emerges as the form. Nothing can be matter and form for itself, and so the predicate must be distinguished from the copula.

In the proposition, the subject is as matter, partial as it were, in respect to the predicate, because the predicate is said of the subject and received in it, as it were. Further, the subject and the predicate are called the matter, as it were, of the copula, because according to the relation and convenience of the predicate to the subject the very union between predicate and subject is or is not done in the correct way. [21]

The proposition then, if of the second adjacent, must have a subject and a predicate; if of the third adjacent, it must have a subject, a predicate and a copula.

[17] Cujus nulla pars significat separata ...

[18] *Ars Log.,* 16 b 20-24.

[19] *Ibid., 25* b 33-37.

[20] *Ibid.,* 28 a 18 ff.; 211 a 35-39.

[21] In propositione subjectum habet rationem materiae quasi partialis respectu praedicati, quia praedicatum de subjecto dicitur et quasi in eo recipitur. Rursus subjectum et praedicatum dicuntur quasi materia copulae, quia secundum habitudinem et convenientiam praedicati ad subjectum fit vel non fit debito modo unio, ipsa inter praedicatum et subjectum ... *Ibid.,* 28 a 14-23. Another explanation of the texts of St. Thomas would be through the distinction of propositions into the second and third adjacent.

The Subject

The term "subject" has many meanings in philosophy: there is the subject of inhesion treated in Physics, substance treated in Metaphysics, the virtuous person in Ethics, etc. " Subject " as taken in this discussion is distinct from all of these: it is the logical subject.

The subject of a proposition is defined as: that about which something is said.[22] It is a term which stands for something about which something else is said. In the proposition "Man is white," "Man" is the logical subject, for "white" is said of it.

It is evident from this definition that the subject must be the extreme of the proposition. This is not to be confused with the grammatical subject or even the first term of the proposition. The logical subject does not depend upon its place in the proposition, but upon its role as a base for something else. For this reason, the subject must always be a logical noun, although grammatically the term may be an adjective or even a verb. For the logical noun is the stable extreme of the proposition, as distinguished from the verb.

A second point evident from the definition is that the subject, since it refers to the predicate in its very definition, must be found in a proposition alone. There cannot be a subject, unless there is also a predicate simultaneous with it.[23]

The final point is that the subject, being under the influence of something else, is as potential, or as matter, in reference to the rest of the proposition.[24]

Thus the logical subject is a second intention constituting the universal as subject to another. This intention of subjectivity formally is not the same as physical subjectivity, although in some cases the same thing is the basis of a physical form and a logical predication:

[22] lllud de quo aliquid dicitur ... *Ibid., 25* b 3-4. Aristotle gives as a general definition: Subjectum autem est id de quo alia, quod quidem ipsum de nullo attribuitur ... *VII Meta.,* ch. 3. I am indebted to Fr. De Vos, 0. P. for the use of his own translation from the greek.

[23] *Ars Log.,* 87 b 23 fl'.

[24] *Ibid., 25* b 36 fl'.; 28 a 14 fl'.

For some things are said of a subject, but are not in a subject, as universal substances which are predicated of inferiors but do not inhere. Other things, on the opposite extreme, are in a subject but are not said of a subject, as singular accidents which inhere, as this whiteness, but are not predicated because they are not superior. Other things neither are said of nor are in a subject, as singular substances, e. g. this man. Finally, other things are said of and are in a subject, as universal accidents, e. g. white. [25]

Nevertheless, it is true that the intention of subjectivity has its origin in the physical subject:

The intention of subjectivity to predicates is an intention of first substance only in so far as it is founded on the very formality of sustaining other things. Therefore this formality or mode of substanding is substanding in the highest sense and is under all others, as also, e. g., founding subjectivity itself .... [211]

In other words, the logical subject is far from being a substance, although were it not for the fact of physical substance the logical subject would be meaningless.

Despite its potential and material aspect to the rest of the proposition, the subject has its own influence over it, especially on the point of quantity, which always follows the material part. Nevertheless, because the predicate and the copula are more perfect than the subject, the subject in comparison is considered as imperfect, so much so that the qualifications of the subject follow upon the predicates. [27]

[25] Nam quidam dicuntur de subjecto, sed non sunt in subjecto, ut substantiae universales, quae praedicantur de inferioribus, sed non inhaerent. Alia per aliud extremum sunt in subjecto, sed non dicuntur de subjecto, sicut accidentia singularia, quae inhaerent, ut haec albedo, sed non praedicantur, quia non sunt superiora. Alia nee dicuntur nee sunt in subjecto, ut singulares substantiae, v. g., hie homo. Alia denique dicuntur et sunt in subjecto, ut accidentia universalia, v. g., album *Ibid.,* 476 b Ql-34.

[26] Ilia enim intentio subicibilitatis ad praedicata ·in tantum est intentio primae substantiae in quantum fundatur super ipsam rationem sustentandi alia. Ergo ista ratio seu modus substandi est maxime substans et sub omnibus aliis, utpote etiam ipsam subicibilitatem fundans ... *ibid.,* 534 a Ql-28. Cf. also 530 b *QQ-Q9;* St. Thomas, *In VII Meta.,* lect. *Q.* The truth of this last passage is not vitiated by the fact that Aristotle was not writing of this here.

[27] *Ibid.,* 39 b Ql-QQ; 481 a *Q5* ff.

The Predicate

The predicate of a proposition is defined as: that which is said of something.[28] It is, as it were, a form of the logical subject. For this reason it is customary to apply the notions of physical forms to the predicate.

Like physical forms, the predicate can be essential or accidental,[29] quidditative or non-quidditative.[30] But in all such cases, the predicate must be more perfect than the subject, that is to say, the predicate must express a perfection of the subject. But unlike physical forms, the predicate can express a part, even a material part, of the subject, as e. g. a genus. Hence it is not that the actual predicate must represent a perfection higher than the subject, but that it must represent a perfection *of* the subject. In expressing this perfection of the subject, the predicate does express a form, but not necessarily a higher perfection.[31] Nor can it be overlooked that the predicate, itself, in propositions of the third adjacent, is a matter in reference to the copula.[32] The predicate, then, always acts as a form, but it does not necessarily express a form.[33]

For this reason, the predicate can be a logical verb, as in propositions of the second adjacent, or a noun or adjective. The latter, however, must represent a perfection of the subject, if the proposition is affirmative, or at least be able to be thought of as a perfection of the subject, if the proposition is negative.

The Copula

The copula is the term which joins the extremes of a proposition.34 In the categorical proposition, the copula is always a verb. But it should be noted at the beginning that the copula is not restricted to the verb " is," but is any verb that joins the extremes of a proposition. If a proposition should be compli-

[28] Id quod de aliquo dicitur ... *Ibid.,* 25 b 4-5.
[29] *Ibid.,* 360 a 18 fl'.
[30] *Ibid.,* 315 a 44.
[31] *Ibid.,* 131 a 7 fl'.
[32] *Ibid.,* 211 a 32-39.
[33] *Ibid.,* 470 a 39 fl'.
[34] *Ibid.,* 24 a 41 fl'.

cated, as e. g. with a relative clause, then the copula of the whole proposition is called principal in contrast to the secondary copula of the clause. The copula, again, can be simple or single, and complex or plural.[35] Since this study is restricted to the simple categorical proposition, only the simple or single copula is pertinent here. Nevertheless, the division points out that the copula is not as simple a notion as it seems.

The verb which is a copula is so only secondarily, for every verb has its own meaning signifying an activity. To this meaning is added the function of joining the extremes of the proposition.[36] Thus the verb which is the copula has its own concept in the intellect, and has various meanings.[37] This nuance of meaning can be added to any verb that allows an object.

The verb as it is a copula is not to be confused, then, with the verb as a predicate, nor is it to be considered as part of the predicate. It is the very nature of a logical verb that it be said of a noun, but that the verb should join the noun to another term is accidentaJ.3[8] It is a diffierent intention of the verb.

The copula is the very form of the proposition, for it signifies nothing less than the union of the extremes.[39] Without such a union, there would not be a proposition. Both the subject and the predicate are as matter for the copula.[4°] From another point of view, however, the copula is dependent upon the extremes, for without extremes there is nothing to unite.[41] In other words, subject, predicate and copula are in such mutual relationship that no term is a copula unless there be simultaneously terms as subject and predicate.

Since the copula is a verb, it must signify in time. But this does not mean that the copula must unit t"Le extremes as dependent upon time:

[35] *Ibid.*, *fl6* b *fl5* ff.
[36] *Ibid.*, 1fl1 b 39 ff.; *fl25* a 30 ff.
[37] *Ibid.*, 225 a 30 ff.
[38] *Ibid.*, 122 a 1 ff.
[39] *Ibid.*, 357 b fl4 ff.
[40] *Ibid.*, 28 a 18 ff.
[41] *Ibid.*, 124 b a 3 ff.

That a verb absolves from time is to signify truth not dependent upon time. For if the truth signified by the verb does not depend upon time, neither will the union of the extremes depend upon time. . . . But it always signifies with time, because it must signify after the manner of action, flow or change, even for propositions of eternal truth, because those things which are eternal and independent of time are understood by us after the manner of time.[42]

The manner of signification of the copula, which is in time, does not restrict the extremes to the temporal order, nor is the truth of a proposition necessarily transient.

In summary it can be said that the copula of the categorical proposition is a logical verb to which has been added the intention of uniting the extremes of the proposition. The copula, therefore, is the perfection of both subject and predicate, and is the very essence of the proposition. While it is a verb and so must signify after the manner of time, the copula need not signify time itself.

Traditional logicians have favored the verb "is" before all others as the best copula, so much so that sometimes the impression is given that " is " is the only possible copula. Certainly " is " is very convenient as a copula: it is an ideal connective, it allows the nominative case both before and after, it is a short word, and, above all, it covers a multitude of meanings and so can be used almost as a symbol. But precisely because "is" has such an ambiguity about it, the mathematical logicians have little use for it.[43] What is disputed here is not the notion of the copula, but the use of this particular " is " as the best copula.

That " is " is a legitimate copula is evident, and there is a basis for its universal use in the fact that every other verb

[42] Verbum ergo absolvi a tempore est significare veritatem non dependentem a tempore. Si enim veritas significata per verbum a tempore non dependet, neque enim unio extremorum a tempore dependebit . . . Semper tamen cum tempore significant, quia per modum actionis, fluxus seu motus significare debet, etiam propositionibus aeternae veritatis quia ea quae sunt aeterna et independentia a tempore, per modum temporis intelliguntur a nobis ... *Ibid.*, 2!W a 33-51.

[43] The verbal copula, in fact, is often changed to a hypothetical copula. Cf., e. g., Bochenski, *Nove Lezioni*, p. 117.

includes " is." [44] Furthermore, since the function of the verb " is " as a copula does not change its meaning, it follows that there is always an existential import to the proposition. [45] This is certainly best expressed by "is." As for the objection that " is " is ambiguous since it stands for many relationships between the subject and predicate, it should first be noted that such ambiguity is removed when one understands the subject and predicate of a particular proposition. But since many of the mathematical logicians are in no position to analyze the subject and predicate because of their break with metaphysics, it is necessary for them to adopt a. variety of symbols to represent these diverse relationships. Each of these, however, is really added to the fundamental meaning of " is," [46] so that the many copula. of the mathematical logician added together do not have a greater extension than the classical "is."

On the other hand, the copula " is " must be admitted to be less clear as a pedagogical device or in an involved argument. In these cases it is better to make the relationship expressed. It is also true that the traditionalists place an undue historical value on "is": Aristotle used other verbs, especially "belongs to," [47] and even demands other copula.e.[48]

It seems that the problem can be resolved in the following manner: within the context of traditional philosophy, "is " can legitimately be used as a. copula. to express any relation of the subject and predicate since " is " is implicit in every verb, and since the exact nature of the particular relationship is evident

[44] *Ars Log.,* a 4-19.

[45] Conventional logicians ... maintain that every proposition, universal or particular, has an existential import, although not necessarily an import of actual existence ... Regan, R., S. J., *Venn Diagrams and Conventional Logic,* New Scholasticism, July 1959, p. 292. This is rejected by many mathematical logicians. Cf., e. g., Ogden and Veatch, *op. cit.,* pp. 410 ff.

[46] Cf. Greenwood, T., *The Unity of Logic,* The Thomist, October 1945, p. 468.

[47] Gr. *i!7rapxetr0;* latin *pertinet ad* or *convenit.*

[48] Cf. Bochenski, *Ancient Formal Logic,* pp. 28-9. Fr. Bochenski sees an evolution in Aristotle's teaching: first a use of "is" in the *De lnterpretatione,* then the use of "belongs to" in the *An. Pr.,* and finally the use of other copulae in ch. 36 of the *An. Pr.* At the moment I do not see the validity of the evolutionary interpretation.

from an analysis of the subject and predicate as universals. With a philosophical framework which does not admit the notions of universal and predicables, it is better to make the relationship clear by use of different copulae. The expression " belongs to " is, strictly speaking, more accurate, since the predicate is *said of* the subject, always with some foundation in reality.

CONCLUSION

The nature of predication can be studied directly through an analysis of the mind's operations, or indirectly through a study of the proposition which is the expression of the mind's operation.

Predication Directly Analyzed

Just as an accident can be studied as it is a perfection or form of the body and as it is in itself, so predication can be considered as it is an act of the universal, and as it is in itself. Both considerations involve a direct analysis of predication.

Predication as it is a perfection or act of the universal retains universality; predication is not the reverse, so to speak, of abstraction: it is not the singularization of the universal. Predication is rather an identification of the universal with its inferiors. In this way, predication is a perfection of the universal, not its destruction, for being said of many follows upon being apt to be in many.

Predication in itself is defined as the attribution of one to another by affirming or denying. It follows from this that predication has a twofold aspect: union on the one hand, and composition on the other. Of these, the more important is the union of the extremes, which is the very act of identification or separation. But it is the composition which affords the greater difficulty, for since the intellect is a spiritual faculty, it is simple. How, then, can predication, an act of the intellect, be composed? That some sort of composition must be involved follows from the very definition of predication. The fact is clear; the explanation is postponed.

Thus a direct analysis of predication leads to the conclusion that predication is at once a perfecion of the universal and an intellectual act identifying or separating two extremes.

Predication Indirectly Analyzed

Predication is indirectly analyzed through the categorical proposition; hence it is important to distinguish those elements of the proposition which are proper to it precisely as proposition, and those elements proper to it as expressive of predication.

The proposition is made up of terms which have the formality of subject and predicate. Predication, on the other hand, does not have terms since these are defined as extra-mental. But predication does have a subject and predicate, for these are mental intentions which can be added to concepts as to terms. Terms, then, are proper to the proposition as such; subject and predicate are held in common, or rather pertain to the proposition as it is expressive of predication. But where the proposition has the copula uniting subject and predicate, predication itself is the union or separation of the extremes. The attribution of one to another is predication. And just as the copula has many meanings included in the function of joining the extremes, so too the act of predication has many meanings, depending on the type of union involved. The act of predication when an accident is predicated of its subject is different from the act of predication when a genus is predicated of a species. Yet both are true predications.

It might be objected that since the copula has a corresponding concept, it is this concept that takes the place of the copula in predication. But it should be recalled that the concept in question corresponds to the copula not as it is a copula, but as it is a verb. Predication, a union of subject and predicate in the mind, does not involve a third concept as uniting the subject and predicate, but predication itself unites the two. The attribution of predicate to subject is an act of the intellect comparing concepts, and it is to this act that the copula of the proposition corresponds.

Just as the proposition is true or false according as the separation or union signified by the proposition is also found in reality, so predication is said to be true or false as the attribution of predicate to subject corresponds to reality. Predication is neither true nor false by definition, since predication takes place in the intellect and so can deviate from extramental reality.

Predication is a unity, combining subject and predicate in such a way that one mental act is involved. This is not to deny that there are several preparatory acts, but predication itself properly is a single act. The act of predication, like all intellectual activity in man, is rooted in abstraction. [1] But abstraction can be of the form from the composite, as the abstraction of humanity from man, or the total essence of a thing, as man is abstracted from Peter. [2] Thus predication is of two basic kinds: the predication of the whole nature of the individual, expressed by such propositions as " Peter is a man," or the predication of a formal aspect of the nature, as " Man is rational." But in both cases, predication is a unit, for the elements joined form one whole. The fundamental aspect of the unity of predication is not denied by the presence of subject and predicate, but rather strengthened, since the division here is by abstraction from a single whole.

But predication is not always affirmative. In the case of the negative predication, its unity may seem to be nullified by the fact of the copula signifying separation. For a negative predication is expressed through a negative copula, such as " is not," " does not belong to," etc. Since the predicate is here denied of the subject, it seems that unity itself is denied. But after all, the negative predication asserts that the predicate does not belong to the subject. In other words, subject and predicate are conceived of as parts of a whole, and then denied of each other. This is due to the abstractive nature of the intellect in

[1] Cf., e. g., St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. *85,* a. 1.

[2] Cf. *Ars Log.,* 358 b 6 ff. Also Gredt, *op. cit.,* no. 138; and Simmons, E., *In Defense of Total and Formal Abstraction,* New Scholasticism, October *1955.*

man; universals must always be involved.[3] Thus even in negative predication, one is attributed to another, but not as ing, but as disagreeing. Attribution is not to be identified with affirmation, but is a type of genus in which affirmation and negation are both found.[4]

The division of predication parallels that of proposition except in one case. Thus there are affirmative and negative predications, essential and accidental, etc. The exception is that of disparate and identical predication.[5] Identical predication is found when the subject and predicate have a relation of convenience, such as "Man is man." Disparate predication is found when subject and predicate are not convenient to each other, such as" Man is not a stone." This is not to be confused with the distinction of true and false predication. For identical predications can be false, as in " Man is not man," and disparate predications can be true, as in " Man is not a stone."

Predication is found not only in the intellect as in a subject, but also outside the intellect, in the written and spoken word as these are grouped into propositions under the influence of the intellect. In all these cases predication is the act of the intellect attributing one to another by affirming or denying.

But predication as found in the intellect, the written and the spoken word, is a term of proper proportionality, for all these have true predication, although it is found primarily in the intellect. Predication, however, can also be said by an analogy of attribution of the imagination as it is a source for the materials of predication, and of the recorded word as an effect and a sign of predication. Unless the intellect actually informs terms with its second intentions, terms only materially and potentially are propositions, and so only signify predication, rather than actually contain it.

EUGENE BONDI, O.P.

St. Stephen's College
Dover, Massachusetts

[3] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 86.

[4] Cf., e. g., St. Thomas' phrasing of affirmative and negative predications in *In I Peri Herm.,* lect. 10, no. 13.

[5] *Ars Log.,* 360 a 31 ff.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS

WILLIAM **J.** HILL, **0. P., S. T. D.,** Vice-Regent of Studies of the Dominican Province of St. Joseph, Professor of Dogma and Director of the Graduate Theology Program at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C., is editor of the volume on Hope for *The New English Summa of St. Thomas* being published by McGraw-Hill, Inc.

CoNAN GALLAGHER, M.S. Ss. **T., S. T. D.,** Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Holy Trinity Mission Seminary, Winchester, Virginia, contributor to several scholarly journals, is Chaplain of the Middle Atlantic Province of the Newman Apostolate.

EuGENE BoNDI, 0. **P., S. T. L.,** Ph. **L.,** having completed his studies for the Doctorate in Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in Rome and received approval of his dissertation (a summary of which is presented here) is now Professor of Logic at St. Stephen's College, Dover, Massachusetts.

AQUINAs **B.** WILLIAMS, 0. **P., S. T. B.,** Ph. **D.,** author of *Maimonides and the Existence of God,* having taught a course in Ethics in the Summer Session at St. John's University, Jamaica, New York, has returned to the Dominican House of Studies to pursue his studies in theology.

THOMAs **R.** HEATH, 0. **P.,** S. T. **L.,** Ph. **D.,** Professor of Moral Theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, **D.** C., whose publishing credits include scholarly studies in renowned journals and poetry in popular magazines, has a volume of his verse and a book on *The Problem of Evil* scheduled for publication.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Trinity, trans. CEsLAUs VELECKY, 0. **P.,** Volume 6 (Ia, Q7-3Q) *Summa Theologiae,* edited by Thomas Gilby, 0. **P.** and Ceslaus Velecky, **0. P.** New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965. Pp. 170, with Latin text, English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossary. $5.75.

The high level of scholarship generally characteristic of the new English *Summa* is amply verified in this volume which covers the first section of the treatise on the Trinity. Fr. Velecky's competence in this most awesome subject is evident from the very start, beginning with the Introduction where he admirably expresses the pivotal role of the doctrine of the Trinity in St. Thomas' conception of theology. In vivid terms he points out: "The chief truth that the Word of God tells us about God is that he is not one Self but three ... who live one life. And to think about this is not to become involved in barren metaphysical speculation, but to look at the mystery of Christian life, the salvation brought by the Word made flesh who brings us to the Father by the grace of the Holy Ghost " (p. xix). In fact the treatise reaches its climax in the last question, "the discussion of the divine missions (Ia. 43), where the story begins of man's sharing in the life of the three divine Selves." The treatise on the Trinity, concludes Fr. Velecky, is no less than "the cornerstone which locks together the 51Q Questions of the *Summa."* Without it, no other section of the *Summa* can really be understood in its full context.

St. Thomas' theology of the Trinity is shown in still greater perspective through Fr. Velecky's discussion of its scriptural, patristic, and scholastic elements. The whole enterprise of theologizing about the Trinity is persuasively defended against the charges of rationalization and fruitless speculation. Aside from exigencies arising from erroneous interpretations of revelation, theological reasoning about the Trinity is also demanded because a thinking Christian will always want to penetrate the revealed message as well as possible-" not to make it comprehensible, but to give some meaning to certain puzzling statements taken from or based on the Scriptures " (Appendix **1,** p. 1Q7). St. Thomas' doctrine in fact " has only one source-the Scriptures " (Appendix Q, p. 130). It is also ba5ed on Tradition, of course, but Scripture and Tradition are " a single source rather than two " since St. Thomas understands the Scriptures " as something meant to be read and interpreted with the living tradition of the Church" *(ibid.).* Finally, by explaining the relation of the Thomistic teaching to that of the Fathers (Introduction and Appendix 3) and to later discussions in the medieval schools (Appendix 4), Fr. Velecky shows how sensitive St. Thomas was to theological problems both in the history of the Church and in his own day.

The last six appendices are explicitly intended to be read as introductions to the six questions translated in the volume, although all of the appendices can really be used in this way with great advantage. Appendices 5, 6, and 7-" Divine Processions," "Divine Relations," and " Divine Persons "- discuss the central concepts of questions 27, 28, and 29 respectively. Appendix 8, "Logic in the Theology of the Trinity,'" has an especially pointed message for modern readers who might be inclined to see questions 30 and 31 as evident justification for the caricature of scholasticism as an idle word game: although, " as St. Ambrose says, it is not God's good pleasure to save his people by means of dialectical skill, mistaken logic can lead men into paths that lead away from salvation" (p. 150). Appendices 9 and 10, "Characteristics or 'Notions'" and "Reason and the Trinity," are connected with question 32. For all of the questions, finally, much additional clarification is furnished in the copious footnotes to the text itself. One erroneous footnote of some importance does deserve mention. On p. 85 the XI Council of Toledo's rejection of the formula, " Trinity is in the one God," is quoted as evidence that the term ' Trinity ' was not always accepted in the Church. From the text cited (DB 278) it appears that the objectionable word was 'in,' not 'Trinity': *Haec est sanctae Trinitatis relata narratio: quae non triplex, sed Trinitas et dici et credi debet. Nee recte dici potest, ut in uno Deo sit Trinitas, sed unus Deus Trinitas.*

The actual translation, while reasonably faithful to St. Thomas' thought, appears to warrant a somewhat more reserved praise. Any scholar, no matter how well he may have understood St. Thomas' doctrine, would encounter difficulty in translating unless he were also proficient in linguistic arts; the risks are even greater when (as is the case with the entire undertaking of the new *Summa)* a relatively free, idiomatic translation is proposed, and they are multiplied still further when the original material is as difficult and technical as the present treatise. On top of all this, Fr. Velecky was especially handicapped by the fact that English is not his mother tongue; we are informed of this on p. xvii, where responsibility is in fact assigned to Fr. Gilby for several passages as they appear in their final form. The total product suffers not so much from the choice of questionable English equivalents for various Latin expressions as from the fairly frequent appearance of ineffective, awkward constructions which obscure the essential thought. The following instances are illustrative:

1) Q. 27, a. 1 c, fourth paragraph. *Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum quod est conceptio rei intellectae ex ejus notitia procedens.* "Whenever anyone understands because of his very act of understanding, something comes forth from within him, which is the concept of the known thing proceeding from his awareness of it." Since the " because of" clause is followed by punctuation but preceded by none, it wrongly seems to modify the previous phrase rather than the remainder of the sentence which comes after it.

2) 27, 4 ad 1. *Hujusmodi autem ordo attenditur secundum rationern voluntatis et intellectus.* " Now they are related as one the specific meanings of will and of intellect." Unless we assume that " one " is a misprint for " are " we have something that does not even make grammatical sense.

3) 28, I ad 4. . .. *relationes quae consequuntur solam operationern intellectus in ipsis rebus intellectis sunt relationes rationis tantum, quia scilicet eas ratio adinvenit inter duas res intellectas. Sed relationes quae consequuntur operationem intellectus, quae sunt inter verbum intellectualiter procedens et illud a quo procedit, non sunt relationes rationis tantum sed rei.* "Relations in things understood which result from mental activity alone are merely logical, for the reason devises them as existing between two objects of its understanding. Those, however, which result from the mind's activity, such as the relation between the idea springing forth and its source, are not merely logical relations, but real." The Latin is quite clearly distinguishing relations between mental constructs themselves from relations between the mind and its constructs; but the English obscures this because, in the first sentence, *ipsis* is not translated at all and the phrase " in things understood " appears to modify " relations " rather than " mental activity."

4) 28, 2 c, fourth paragraph. *Sic igitur' ex ea parte qua relatio in rebus creatis habet esse accidentale in subjecto, relatio realiter existens in Deo habet esse essentiae divinae idem ornnino ei existens. In hoc vera quod ad aliquid dicitur non significatur aliqua habitudo ad essentiarn sed magis ad suum oppositum.* "Consequently from this point of view, while relation in created things exists as an accident in a subject, in God a really existing relation has the existence of the divine nature and is completely identical with it. When we think of relation as a ' being to something ' we signify a bearing, not on the nature, but rather on an opposite term." In Latin the distinction between the two aspects of relation is set up clearly by the balancing of the phrase *ex ea parte qua* in the first sentence against *in hoc vero quod* in the second; in English, the clumsy rendering of the former phrase and the absence of an equivalent for *vero* in the second leave us hardly aware that any distinction has been made at all.

5) *.Jbid.* ad 1. *Et propter hoc dicuntur duo tantum esse praedicamenta in divinis. Quia alia praedicamenta important habitudinern ad id de quo dicuntur, tarn secundum suum esse quam secundum proprii generis rationern. Nihil autem quod est in Deo potest habere habitudinern ad id in quo est vel de quo dicitur nisi habitudinem identitatis, propter summam Dei simplicitatem.* " This is why only two categories are supposed to apply to God, for the others connote relationship to the subject of attribution from the point of view both of existence and of the specific concept of the category. Nothing in God can be attributed to him in any other way than as being identical with him, since he is absolutely simple." Of the three

Latin sentences the first refers to the preceding part of the paragraph (an explanation of a text from Augustine) while the last two are connected with each other (as *autem* in the final sentence suggests); in English the point is obscured by undoing this order and combining the first two sentences while isolating the third (without translating *autem).*

6) *Ibid.* ad 2. . .. *sicut in rebus creatis in illo quod dicitur relative non solum est invenire respectum ad alterum sed etiam aliquid absolutum, ita et in Deo; sed tamen aliter et aliter. Nam id quod invenitur in creatura praeter id quod continetur sub significatione nominis relativi est alia res; in Deo autem non est alia res sed una et eadem, quae non perfecte exprimitur nomine quasi sub signi.ficatione talis nominis comprehensa. Dictum est supra, cum de divinis nominibus agebatur, quod plus continetur in perfectione divinae essentiae quam aliquo nomine significari possit. Unde non sequitur quod in Deo praeter relationern sit aliquid aliud secundum rem, sed solum considerata nominum relatione.* " When we apply the category of relation to creatures and to God, we should think not only of the reference to another but also of something absolute; but this is different in the two cases. For in a creature we find another reality besides what is signified by the relative term. In God, however, there are not two realities but one and the same which is not expressed perfectly by the term, since the meaning cannot cover it. For as we have said already when the divine names were discussed, by ' perfection of the divine nature ' more is meant than can be conveyed by any word. Therefore one cannot conclude that there is in God yet another reality besides relation, unless we consider our words purely semantically." Here, through a combination of faults already exemplified in previous citations-ambiguous ordering of phrases (first sentence), poor connective devices (second), and bad punctuation (third) -plus injudicious departures from the literal Latin (fourth and fifth), we tend to lose the essential point which is a distinction between the way relation is predicated of creatures and of God.

7) Among other questionable liberties with the literal text we may note the following: (a) "changing and being changed" for *actionem et passionem* in 28, 3 ad 1, and even more incongruously in 28, 4 where the master-slave example causes trouble (it is not clear how the master " changes " the slave; in fact the literal translation of *actionem* is forced to make an appearance halfway through the first paragraph of the corpus); (b) " his relations to creatures do not affect his reality " for *relationes Dei ad creatures non sunt realiter in ipso* in 28, 4 (the English is hardly clear and could even be misleading); (c) "contrasting relations" for *relationes oppositas* in 30, 2 (the literal "opposite relations" would have been equally clear, whereas the suggestion of "contrast "-contrariety-in God could give the wrong impression) .

A list of examples such as these risks giving an exaggeratedly unfavorable

impression of the entire work. It would not be fair to charge that the translation as a whole is inadequate; and besides, even the defects are mitigated to some extent by the presence of the Latin text alongside the English. The real criticism intended by the foregoing bill of particulars is that Fr. Velecky's undeniably sound grasp of the treatise on the Trinity does not come across as well in the translation as it does in the remainder of the contents. But the overall evaluation of his effort must remain an enthusiastically favorable one: it represents a welcome contribution to theological scholarship and deserves to be recognized as one of the superior volumes of the new *Summa* thus far published.

AQUINAS BRUCE WILLIAMS, O. P.

Dominican HoustJ of Studies
Washington, D. C.

They Call us Dead Men. By DANIEL BERRIGAN, S. J. Introduction by William Stringfellow. New York, Macmillan, 1966, pp. 19Q. $4.95.

Father Berringan writes in turn on poverty, marriage, the eternal youth of the Church, the priesthood of the laity, sacred art, the renewal, St. Paul as a figure of crisis, technology, and new forms of faith. The sub-title of his book, " Reflections on Life and Conscience," reveals the focus of these various subjects, i. e., as they touch on life and especially conscience today.

About poverty he observes that many religious groups in the Church have over the years lost their first great vision in favor of security and stability. The dissociation of their pattern of life from " the realities that first breathed energy and purpose on its members, dissociation of the vows, prayer, and works from the deepest needs of man and from a sense that the Church must serve those needs-this puts our problem in its simplest terms " (p. QO). Poverty was practiced in the early Church community not merely for detachment's sake, but to help the poorer brethren. Poverty of spirit went deep into consciences and emerged in various forms of humility and compassion.

Today the Charles de Foucauld groups seem to grasp this significance of poverty. Living at the side of deprived men and women, helping in various humble ways without propaganda or direct social reform, these groups give extraordinary witness to Christ's poverty. In the older religious orders, especially in America, this deep sense of the apostolic power in true proverty is blunted. Immersed in affluence, even the church itself finds it extremely difficult "to admit change, unwilling to abandon reliance on material power, prestige and honor in favor of a more dramatic and fundamental gospel spirit" (p. 31). But the challenge is there and with imagination it can be met.

The same kind of spirit is found in many Catholics entering marriage today. They have lost much of their apostolic witness in being too much concerned with affiuence, have turned not outward to their suffering brethren but inward towards security. Catholic couples ought to bear their sacramental energies into the world at large to ask painful and public questions and, in so far as in them lies, to risk their talents and graces in the larger life of the real world.

A world wide secular hope for more equal distribution of wealth and for peace certainly exists today, but almost as certainly all religious vision is excluded from that hope. Berrigan urges the Church to find her way into this hope, to reveal her youth again through breadth of vision, invincible love for men, and by carrying the pain of the world in her own heart. The layman must become more conscious of his priesthood to be an instrument for reconciliation through suffering and defeat. The great Christian longs for human unity, is marked by a sense of his times, and is aware of the critical nature of community effort. He must be encouraged by a Church willing to forgive his mistakes, since all his mistakes will never equal the error of inaction.

In the world of entertainment and art giant dream machines are taking over, and Catholic art extends this dream world into religion. The images of Christ stress the childish, comforting, soft, inviting the Christian " to no real Christ, to no real neighbor, to no real sense of time or of this world. They allow no suspicion that Christianity is a matter of deeds, even of one's blood " (p. 95) .

Renewal begins with the awareness of others as *here* not *there;* it leads slowly to facing up to the plight of others, and a willingness to change in order to help. The renewed Christian is not over jealous of his Christian identity in the work so long as the work is done. "Nuclear warfare, population explosion, world proverty, adaptation of missionary efforts, conversation with men of all faiths, a new openness with Marxists, world-wide recial conflicts-these are a few of the moral questions that must shortly win unequivocal response from the Church" (p. 110).

The author sees St. Paul as representing the crisis of renewal. A Hellenist, a Pharisee, a cosmopolite, converted at the world's crossroads, he bewildered the Apostles but won them in the end by his incredible sense of mission and service. " A profound consciousness of the Spirit at work in ali-in himself, in the community, in local leadership-marks Paul's greatness" (p. 131). The presence of the Spirit did not, however, assure human success. Paul was set aside by the powers of this world yet all the while he went ahead, convinced that human evidence of defeat hides the profound mystery of victory in the cross. He established liturgy as a source of daily teaching and nourishment so that the mystical body of Christ, feeding on the Eucharistic Body of Christ and on His word, could go and nourish the world.

Berrigan wants the apostle today to be like Paul, but very much of modern problems. We live in a unique crisis. Never before did man have the power" to end man, end history, to bring down the world" (p. 160). Every prior crisis left room for the unborn; this one threatens even that. Man is tempted today to overstep his human limits, to play God. This is where technology has brought us. But the spirit of man will never be destroyed. It must reassert itself now especially in efforts towards peace, for that is the profound and first issue of modern times. Nor should we leave peace making to the few diplomats, leaders, military experts. A consensus of enlightened men, including the voice of Christians, is desperately needed. " The world's need of Christians could perhaps be defined as a need for spiritual presence and a need for prophecy" (p. 169).

The beast of the Apocalypse was the Roman state. Berrigan notes that while we must avoid all crude fundamentalism in applying John's vision of the beast to our day, we can nevertheless sense a panhistorical message behind it. Salvation lies not in man, in progress, in technology, in the " overflowing cornucopia " of man's triumphs, nor in the state's absolute control over man's life. Salvation lies in Christ. " When the state would seize on mysterious areas of life that belong to God the believer can never yield " (p. 183). But things are not that simple. Forms of faith today can indeed be in cooperation with the state seeking the common good, but the believer must not be enticed into helping the state at the expense of violating his covenant with God by fostering racism, war, or vicious use of power. And he may even be called to that deeper vocation, described by Isaiah, of the servant-disciple who restored justice through gentleness and defeat; a victim of distrust and humiliation, he nevertheless accepted all without discouragement, for Yahweh was his support.

That, in sum, is the Berrigan vision. It is the message of Vatican II's " Church in the Modern World " as received and translated by a priest and poet for the modern world he sees. It disturbs complacency and shocks consciences, but mostly for the good. The style of the book, surprisingly, is turgid, the thought difficult to follow, the tone grim, though here and there one finds some singing passages. The various considerations of the lonely, tragic hero (cf. pp. *25,* 122, 188) bespeak, at least to this reviewer, a wrong preoccupation. They can too easily be read as the definitive role for the Christian today, excluding the possibility of other roles, other forms of sanctity and of love. The author frequently cites John XXIII but his message lacks John's open and captivating charity. For all that the book is important, and cannot be ignored.

THOMAS R. HEATH, O. P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

BRIEF NOTICES

Heaven or Hell. By GEORGE PANNETON. Trans. Ann M. C. Forster. Westminister, Md.: Newman, 1965, pp. 360, with bibliography and analytic index. *$6.95.*

Drawing on scripture, tradition, the teaching of theologians, especially Aquinas, the saints and mystics, Canon Panneton has written a book intended as a sort of Guide to the Future Life. It is not a highly technical book, more of a moralistic treatment for the purpose of reminding the general reader of the facts about his ultimate destiny. The book makes no attempt to integrate the work that has been done in eschatology over the past ten or fifteen years, but is content to state the traditional theology on the last things. Thus, it is disappointing. It does contain, however, many quotations from the saints and mystics about heaven and hell which, regardless of the development in understanding the scriptures, are interesting and useful.

Treatise on the Virtues. Trans. JoHN A. OESTERLE. (la2ae, qq. 49-67) *Summa Theologiae.* Englewood Clifs, N. J.: Printice-Hall, 1966, pp. 171, with Introduction and notes. Paperback.

This is a very fine translation of an important tract in the *Summa* by a competent scholar. It makes available for use by itself or as supplement to biblical studies a text containing the classical theological treatment of the virtues. Servais Pinckaers in an important article about this tract *(Cross Currents,* Winter, 1962) shows that the teaching of St. Thomas has amazing freshness and validity for our day. Virtue, according to the Angelic Doctor, is really a capacity to create works that are humanly perfect on the moral plane; it gives a man the strength to do his best. With the help of insights from Pinckaers, from Dr. Oesterle's good Introduction, the deep truth of Aquinas will sparkle with life. Virtue will no longer be seen as temperance, or the great moderator, but as strength, as power, as the ultimate, the maximum to which we are called by Christ.

THOMAS R. HEATH, O. P.

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