THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press. Washington 17, D. C.

VoL. XXXI JULY, 1967 No.8

GEORGE EDWARD MOORE'S CRITICISM OF SOME ETIDCAL THEORIES

IN HIS *Logic and Language,* Second Series, A. G. N. Flew termed George Edward Moore the *doyen* of British philosophy.[1] Although he failed to attract popular attention as did certain of his contemporaries such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell, recognition of his stature as a " philosopher's philosopher" has been widespread and enduring. The time-spread of his activity is in itself nothing short of phenomenal: his first published work appeared in 1897, and the last lectures he published came from the press in 1957, the year before his death.[2] As a professor at Cambridge and long-time editor of *Mind,* he had ample opportunity to leave his mark on two generations of philosophers in the English-speaking world.[3]

[1] *Logic and Language,* Second Series (Oxford, 1958), p. 2.

• His *Commonplace Book 1919-1953* was published posthumously in 1964.

• Moore's autobiography may be found in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,* a colleciion of essays by various authors edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, !!nd ed. (New York, 1952), pp. 8-89. An account of Moore's final days appears in "George

Moore has often been compared to Franz Brentano as a pivotal figure in the history of contemporary philosophy. Just as Brentano, by his rejection of the post-Kantian idealism of nineteenth century German philosophy, fostered and inspired such diverse movements as existentialism and the neo-empiricism of the Vienna Circle, so did Moore change the course of British philosophy by his rejection of the Hegelianism which flourished in Great Britain at the turn of the century.[4] It was he who led his fellow-student at Cambridge, Bertrand Russell, to abandon idealism in 1898, and together they embarked upon a crusade which led far beyond the goals which either had envisioned or intended. Not only do the milder forms of logical and linguistic analysis which dominate British philosophy today derive from the orientation and method which was Moore's legacy to his followers. The more radical philosophy of the early Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus,* and of the logical positivism of A. J. Ayer and his disciples, are also generally regarded as having their origin in Moore's rejection of Hegelianism.[5]

The fact that Moore never became well known beyond the comparatively narrow circle of professional philosophers in spite

Edward Moore 1878-1958," by R. B. Braithwaite, in *Proceedings of the British Academy,* Vol. XLVII, pp. 298-809.

• J. Laird, *Recent Philosophy* (London, 1986), pp. 188 and 129 fl'. Cf. also F. Copleston, S.J., "Contemporary British Philosophy," in *Gregorianum* XXXIV (1958); also Moore's " Preface " to his *Principia Ethica,* pp. x-xi.

• For the relationship between Moore and the Logical Postivists, see A. Stroll, *The Emotive Theory of Ethics* (Berkeley, Calif., 1954); for L. Wittgenstein's dependence on Moore see the " Introduzione critica" to the Italian translation by G, C. M. Colombo, S.J., of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* pp. 18 fl'. See also M. White, *The Age of Analysis* (New York, 1955), pp. 21-26. In his" A Reply to My Critics" in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore.* Moore wavered toward acceptance of the emotive theory of ethics of the Logical Positivists, but in a personal conversation I had with him on September 7, 1955, he told ine that he had definitely rejected such a view. This rejection is confirmed by A. C. Ewing, who has recently reported that at some date after 1958, Moore said that "he still held to his old view [that ethical statements have cognitive meaning], and further that he could not imagine whatever in the world had induced him to say that he was almost equally inclined to hold the other view." *(Mmd,* LXXI [196!!], p. 251.)

of his great importance is partly due to the fact that his relatively conservative views about strictly philosophical problems were not the sort of thing of which headlines are made-something which cannot be said, for instance, about some of Bertrand Russell's propositions concerning morality. G. E. Moore's lack of popular appeal was also due to the coldly serious manner in which he wrote. His books and articles are closely reasoned and seemingly repetitious. Professor Ferrucio Rossi-Landi has noted that

> In that tedious and pedantic manner of his, Moore examined a restricted number of particular questions, holding them under his nose like a myopic who reads without his glasses, without ever distracting his gaze from the tiny sector about which he has decided to busy himself.[6]

But if Moore's writings did not appeal to the general public, his work did attain some notoriety through the fact that his ethical system was studied and esposed by the Bloomsbury Group, a loosely organized society of avant-garde artists and writers which revolved around Virginia Woolf in the London of the twenties and thirties. Moore had no direct contact with the members of the Bloomsbury Group apart from the fact that several of its members had studied with him at Cambridge in the early years of the century. But although he himself deplored the manner in which his name had become associated with the group, it became inseparably linked with the activities and ideals of Virginia Woolf and her associates.[7] Moore's ethics appealed to this group, which constituted one of the most highly cultivated intellectual societies in the history of the Western world, largely because of the emphasis which he

[8] F. Rossi-LDJldi, " L'eredita di Moore e la filosofia delle quatrro parole," in *Rivista di Filoaojia,* XLVI, n. 8 (1955), p. 807.

[1] J. K. Johnstone, *The Bloomburg Group* (London, 1954), Chap. II. See also J. M. Keynes, *Two Memoirs* lLondon, 1949] pp. 8Jld the two volumes of the autobiography of Leonard \Voolf [Virginia's husband], *Sowing* [New York, 1960], pp. 44-164, and 169-171, 8Jld *Beginning Again* [New York, 1968], pp. 21, 24-!M, 40-42, 52, 187-189, 8Jld 148. It was Mrs. Dorothy Moore and various acquaintDJlces of Moore who infQrmed me that he was not entirely happy about the way in which his name had become so closely linked with Bloomsbury.

placed on aesthetic values as ultimate ends. But it cannot be denied that its members were also fascinated by Moore's implicit invitation to cast off certain aspects of Victorian mores.

Although Moore wrote at least as much about problems which may be roughly summarized as being of an epistemological nature as he did about ethics, it is only with the latter that we will be concerned here. As to his epistemology, we must be content to point out here that he believed in a correspondence theory of truth and that the objects of reality consist principally of combinations of sense-data, though what may be the exact relationship which sense-data bear to the objects which they constitute and to knowing subjects is a problem which continued to puzzle him to the end of his days.[8] Though basically an empiricist, he was willing to admit the reality and existence of objects and qualities which do not appear to the senses. This latter fact is of the greatest importance to his ethical theory.

Moore was neither a notably prolific writer nor one given to developing a system for system's sake. He himself has confessed that he would never have been roused to interest in philosophical problems had he not felt the need to refute what he considered the outrageous statements and propositions of various philosophers.[9]

Nearly half of Moore's *Principia Ethica* (first published in 1903; reprinted 1922, 1929, 1948, *1951,* 1954, *1956,* 1959), the work we shall consider here in greatest detail, consists of the

[8] A synthesis of Moore's epistemology is to be found in A. White, *G. E. Moore--A Critical &cposition* (Oxford, 1958), Chap. VITI. Cf. J. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London, 1957), pp. 208-215, and D. Cleary "An Essay on G. E Moore" in *The DCYl.lYnside Review,* Vol. LXXXVI (1968), pp. 216-219. I should confess that I find the summary of Moore's epistemology as given in the text to be woefully inadequate, especially in view of Moore's constant shifts in position. Certainly he was not a mere phenomenalist except for a brief period around 1918 when he wrote " Some Objects of Perception " *(Philosophical Studies,* pp. 220-282), and, possibly, when he wrote *Principia Etkica* (see, e. g., p. 41). His final published pronouncement on the status of sense-data was a firm rejection of what he termed the Mill-Russell view *(The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,* pp. 581-82).

• G. E. Moore, "An Autobiography," in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,* p. 14.

refutation of various ethical systems. His later volume, titled *Ethics* (London, took the form of an exposition of the general tenets of utilitarianism, together with a correction of this doctrine. Moore's several other essays and articles which appeared in learned journals and which have reference to his ethical theory also evidence a more or less polemical character. I refer to the two essays, " The Conception of Intrinsic Value " and" The Nature of Moral Philosophy," which were published in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XI,* (reprinted as Chapters VIII and X respectively of *Philosophical Studies* [London, the article" The Value of Religion," which appeared in the *International Journal of Ethics,* XII (1901); "Is Goodness a Quality?" which appeared in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XII,* 1988 (reprinted as Chapter III of *Philosophical Papers* [London 1959]); his essay "A Reply to My Critics," which concludes the volume titled *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (1st ed. Evanston, ed. New York, and numerous book reviews, in particular his review of Franz Brentano's *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong,* which appeared in the *International Journal of Ethics,* XV (1905).

In this paper concerning Moore's criticism of various ethical systems I shall follow the method of exposition used by Moore in his *Principia Ethica,* since this was his most complete treatment of the subject, but reference will be made to other works in those cases in which Moore later modified his theory.

Moore begins his *Principia Ethica* with a general criticism of all ethicians of the past, and in his Preface he makes the ambitious statement, paraphrasing Kant, that he intends to write "Prolegomena to any future Ethics which can possibly pretend to be scientific." [10] He takes many philosophers to task first of all for failing to define the province of ethics/ [1] the scope of which he proposes to be not only human conduct,

[10] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, 1908), p. ix.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 1.

but human conduct insofar as it is good or bad. He maintains that " That which is meant by ' good ' is, in fact, except its converse ' bad,' the only simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics." [12]

This leads to his next great criticism of the great majority of his predecessors in ethical investigation, namely that they have generally failed to distinguish between the two principle meanings of the word " good," which can signify either what is " good in itself " (or " intrinsic good ") or what is " good as a means." Although Ethics is concerned with good as a means (for all human conduct, according to Moore, is good only as a means for the attainment of intrinsic good), it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of " intrinsic good," upon which all good as a means is dependent.

Moore spent a lifetime trying to state clearly what he meant by " intrinsic good," [13] a process whicht was rendered particularly difficult by the fact that he maintained that it is an indefinable concept, and that the intrinsic goodness of things can be only known by intuition. [14] It is a non-relational quality [15]

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 2.

[13] Moore refined his notion of " intrinsic good " especially in " The Conception of Intrinsic Value" (Chap. VIII of *Philosophical Studies* [London, 1922]) and in his" A Reply to My Critics." *(The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,* esp. pp. 554-611.)

"Moore states that when he calls propositions about good " intuitions," he merely means to assert that they are incapable of proof; he implies nothing whatever as to the manner or origin of our cognition of them *(Principia,* p. x). He compares the manner in which we know " good " to the manner in which we know " yellow " *(Ibid.,* pp. 7 and 10).

In order to test the goodness of things by intuition, they are to be considered in isolation. The following text from *Principia* (pp. 83-84) will illustrate how the test is to be applied: " Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire-mountains, rivers, the sea; trees, and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine these *all* combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that on one thing jars against another, but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason, and on the whole, as far as may be, without one redeeming feature. . . . The only thing we are not entitled to imagine is that any human being ever has or ever, by any possibility, *can,* live in either, can ever see and enjoy the beauty of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so, supposing them quite apart

which he describes as " non-natural," [16] which is dependent on, or derived from, the various good-making " natural " qualities of objects or states of affairs which Moore's described as " organic wholes." [17] Furthermore, intrinsic goodness is an " ought-implying characteristic," [18] or, in other words, to say that a thing is intrinsically good must entail that it ought to exist.[19] Or, to be still more precise, " A statement about obligation follows from the very nature of a statement about intrinsic value." [20]

It is Moore's characterization of intrinsic good as being a non-natural quality which led him to make his principal criticism of many ethical systems, that is, that they commit what he termed the " naturalistic fallacy." This fallacy consists in the attempt to identify intrinsic good, a " non-natural " quality with some other " natural " quality or object. Although Moore had at least as much difficulty in :fixing the precise distinction between what he meant by a" natural" and a "non-natural" quality as he did in making clear the meaning of intrinsic good, what he means by the " naturalistic fallacy " is clear enough: it is the identification of intrinsic goodness with any other quality, characteristic, or object whatsoever. He made it clear even at the beginning of *Principia Ethica* that even if good were a natural quality, and the attempt were made to identify it with some other natural quality (whatever may be meant

from any possible contemplation by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it would; and I hope that some may agree with me in this extreme instance."

It is interesting to note that Moore later rejected the conclusions of this intuition. (See note 47 below.)

[16] G. E. Moore, "Is Goodness a Quality?" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Vol. XI, p. *(Philosophical Studies,* p.

[16] Moore *Principia,* p. 13 fl.

[17] *Ibid.,* pp. It was suggested by H. J. Paton in his contribution to *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (p. 115) that Moore "would agree with the Provost of Oriel [Sir W. David Rossl that goodness is a 'totiresultant property.'"

[18] Moore, "A Reply to My Critics," p. 605.

[19] Moore, *Principia,* pp. 17 and 67 .

•• Moore, " A Reply to My Critics," p. 575.

by the term), he would still call such an. identification an instance of the naturailstic fallacy.[21]

The naturalistic fallacy can occur under many forms. Moore reduces them to two groups, the first of which he terms metaphysical theories, the second of which he calls naturalistic theories. Naturalistic theories are then suddivided into theories which declare some natural object, other than pleasure, to be the sole good; and hedonism, the doctrine that pleasure is the only good-that good and pleasure are identicaP[2]

Moore chose to discuss the naturalistic theories before taking up the metaphysical theories, and of the naturalistic theories he elected to examine the non-hedonistic varieties before taking up the question of hedonism itself. The philosophers who are hailed into court include J. S. Mill, W. K. Clifford, the Stoics, Rousseau, Herbert Spencer, and M. Guyau.

Moore termed the first group of theories naturalistic because they identify good with some particular quality or object which exists in space and time-in the realm of nature. And the first of such theories is that which equates goodness with 'life according to nature.' Such a view he attributes to the Stoics (though he is of the opinion that in their case the theory is of a metaphysical rather than naturalistic nature) and Jean Jacques Rousseau.[23]

In its most general form, this theory holds that whatever is natural is good. Moore points out that taken at its face value this proposition is obviously false, since there are many things in the world of nature (which he identifies with the visible universe) which are, in themselves, bad, for example, pain. He next suggests that such a theory may maintain that whatever Nature (with a capital" N ") has decreed must be good. This is rejected for two reasons: a) as an agnostic, Moore cannot identify Nature with an all-wise God, and hence can see no rea-

[21] Moore, *Principia,* p. 14. Mary Warnock has pointed out in *Ethics Since 1900* (London, 1960), p. 19, that while the name "naturalistic fallacy" may be misleading, for Moore " the true fallacy is the attempt to define the indefinable."

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 39.

[23] *Ibid.,* p.

son why whatever Nature has ordained must necessarily be good, and b) if what Nature has decreed is taken to mean that that which is good is that which is normal, then this view must be rejected by reason of the fact that many abnormal things are better than normal things. For instance, the genius of Socrates or Shakespeare must be admitted to be better than the mediocre intelligence of the average man.[24] He suggests that the identification of what is normal with what is good came about through the observation of the fact that what is normal is *usually* better than that which is abnormal, but he maintains that it is clear that this is not universally true. A third suggestion he makes as to the meaning of " nature " in the phrase " life according to nature," is that it means the minimum of what is necessary for life. Apparently, he is in this case equating the natural with the primitive. By way of refutation he cites a dialogue of Lucian, in which it is pointed out how silly it is to hold that the life of lions and bears and pigs and wild Sythians is a greater good than that of civilized man.[25]

The second sort of naturalistic ethics he undertakes to refute is cine which systematizes the appeal to nature by holding that whatever is more evolved in nature is the more perfect. Its champions would seem to hold that nQt only does evolution (especially in the Darwinian sense) show us the direction in which we are developing, but also shows us the direction in which we ought to develop. Moore cites Guyau and Herbert Spencer as partisans of this view. He notes that at one point in his *Data of Ethics* Spencer seems to indicate that his evolutionist ethics is based on hedonism, that the generalized conclusion may be drawn, in virtue of numerous individual observations, that what is more evolved always brings more pleasure into the world. As a matter of fact such a generalization would not show any strict causal relatonship between evolution and pleasure, but only that the progress of evolution and increase of pleasure have gone hand in hand in the past. Moore at-

•• *Ibid.,* p. 48. •• *Ibid.,* p. 45.

tempts to show that Spencer actually held an evolutionistic and hedonistic ethic simultaneously, a position which would lead to contraditions. For example, Spencer seems to recognize in the increased production of life a mark of progress in evolution. Moore points out that it is quite possible that a small quantity of life should give a greater quantity of pleasure than the greatest possible quantity of life that is only just " worth living." !!6 And judging evolutionistic ethics on its own merits, that is, not as related to hedonism, Moore points out that while it may be true that the actual evolution of the universe has favored an increase in intrinsically good things, we have no assurance that it will so continue. Darwin's law of natural selection, for instance, might, under changed conditions, favor the evolution of lower forms of life which might be better only in the sense that they were more suited to those new conditions.[27]

We now tum to the refutation of hedonism, to which Moore devotes a whole chapter in *Principia Ethics.*[28] By hedonism, Moore understands the doctrine that pleasure is the sole good, a· " vulgar mistake " which is quite widespread because " it is the first conclusion at which any one who begins to reflect upon Ethics naturally arrives. It is very easy to notice the fact that we are pleased with things. The things we enjoy and the things we do not form two unmistakable classes, to which our attention is constantly directed. But it is comparatively difficult to distinguish the fact that we approve a thing from the fact that we are pleased with it "[29] Among the philosophers whom Moore considers to be hedonists are listed Aristippus, the disciple of Socrates, and the Cyrenaic school he founded; Epicurus and the Epicureans; the utilitarians such as Mill and Bentham; Herbert Spencer in his non-evolutionistic moments; and Moore's own predecessor in the chair of moral philosophy at Cambridge, Henry Sidgwick.

We can here do not more than summarize very briefly the

•• *Ibid.,* pp.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. S7.

•• *Ibid.,* Chap. III.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 60.

s<alient features of Moore's complex and often excellent arguments against the principle that pleasure is the sole good, and hence we can hardly do justice to them. His arguments in general may be said to take two principal forms: 1) demonstrations that the writers in question were not consistent in their hedonism, and 2) an appeal to intuition. The first argument is used against Mill, who, as Moore points out, does not make pleasure simply the sole and highest good, but distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures, a distinction which obviously involves some principle of evalution beyond that of mere pleasure. The appeal to intuition is also brought to bear against Mill's psychological hedonism, against the proposition that the good is that which we desire. To this contention Moore retorts that if it is true, then it is nonsense to speak of bad desires.[30]

In his criticism of Sidgwick, Moore calls intuition into play on two levels.[31] First he cites the arguments of Socrates against Protarchus which show that if pleasure is the sole good, then the life of an oyster (presumably a contented one) is as desirable as that of a man. But Moore recognizes that this argument is unfair, that what most hedonists really wished to defend was not that pleasure is the sole good, but rather consciousness of pleasure. He admits, for instance, that this is what Sidgwick really meant to hold. But it is no use: "It seems to me that a pleasurable Contemplation of Beauty has certainly an immeasurably greater value than mere Consciousness of Pleasure. In favor of this conclusion I can appeal with confidence to the sober judgment of reflective persons."[32]

so *Ibid.,* pp. 61-81.

81 *Ibid.,* pp. 81-96.

82 *Ibid.,* p. 94. This is another instance of the test by intuition. To my mind the best example of the application of the method of intuition to the refutation of hedonism appears in his *Ethics* (p. 147): "It [hedonism] involves our saying that, for instance, the state of mind of a drunkard, when he is: intensely pleased with breaking crockery, is just as valuable, in itself-just as well worth having, as that of a man who is fully realizing all that is exquisite in the tragedy of King Lear, provided only the mere quantity of pleasure in both cases is the same. Such instances might be multiplied indefinitely, and it seems to me that they constitute

In addition to hedonism in general, Moore also considers two subforms of it, egoism and utilitarianism.

Egoism, in the form in which Moore is most interested in refuting it, holds that *each* man's happiness is the sole good. Of this view Moore says, " what Egoism holds . . . that a number of different things are *each* of them the only good thing ... is an absolute contradiction. No more complete and thorough refutation of any theory could be desired." [88]

Moore's refutation of utilitarianism can be summarized in an equally succinct manner. He accuses the utilitarians of a double error: "1) The best possible results were assumed to consist only in a limited class of goods, roughly coinciding with those which were popularly distinguished as the results of merely ' useful ' or ' interested " actions; and these again were hastily assumed to be good only as means to pleasure. (And hence utilitarianism falls with the hedonism on which it is based.) 2) The utilitarians tend to regard everything as a mere means, neglecting the fact that there are some things which are good as means which are also good as ends." [84] He points out that if every good is only good as a means, it must be justified by some future consequence which must itself be only good as a means to some other good, and so on *ad infinitum.* [85]

Turning now to Moore's criticism of metaphysical ethics, we must note that for Moore the realm of metaphysics is the realm of abstract essences. The principal notion considered by meta-

a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure."

•• *Ibid.,* p. 99.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 106.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 106. It should he noted, however, that if " utilitarian " is understood in its .etymological sense instead of as a designation for the peculiar forms of hedonism of Bentham and Mill respectively, then Moore can himself be called a utilitarian. Indeed, although Moore never gave a name to his ethical theory, it has often been referred to as ideal utilitarianism (See W. David Ross, *The Right and the Good* [Oxford, 1980], pp. 9 and 19). Moore told me he approved of this designation and preferred it to all others (interview of Sept. 7, 1955). Sir W. David Ross has suggested the name " agathistic utilitarianism " as being more appropriate (*op. cit.,* p. 9 note).

physics in the scholastic use of the word, i.e., being as being, is not taken into consideration at all by Moore in his ethical theory. Numbers, for instance, are given by Moore as an example of what he means by metaphysical entities, which, he maintains, are real, but do not exist.[36] If the material object of metaphysical is understood to include the objects of universal predication as actually existing or possible things, then Moore's own theory is a metaphysical one, as was recognized by L. Vigone, who wrote: " When he wishes to define the object of ethics he moves decisively to a metaphysical plane, that of classic metaphysics, which is quite a different thing from what Moore thinks it is. The most evident proof of this rests precisely on the fact that he rejects utilitarianism and pragmatism and says that the object of ethics is the ' good in itself.' "[37]

Moreover, even though Moore condemns what he is pleased to term metaphysical ethics, he praises metaphysicians for " insisting that our knowledge is not confined to what we can touch and see and feel."[38]

Among the " metaphysical " ethicians criticized by Moore are the Stoics (as we have already had reason to note), Spinoza, and Kant. His principal argument against them is that their theories hold that human actions are good to the extent that they conform to some suprasensible thing which is either real, but does not exist, or, if it does exist, is eternal and unchangable. If that reality is real, but not existent, then it can indeed suggest some good which can be brought about in the world of actual existence, but the mere fact that it is *real* has no bearing of itself on what ought to be done.[39] If the suprasensible reality is the only reality, as seemed to be true of Spinoza's concept of the Absolute Substance, then nothing that can be done in the world of nature can have any ethical value, be-

•• *Ibid.,* p. Ill.

[37] L. Vigone, " L'etica di Giorgio Eduardo Moore," in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica,* XLV (1953), p. 363.

[88] Moore, *Principia,* p. 110.

•• *Ibid.,* 114.

cause the world of nature is unreal.[40] Or ifthe suprasensible reality is existent but eternal and immutable, then too it can give us no information about what is to be done, since no action of ours can possibly have any effect on the suprasensible reality. The latter argument Moore uses against Kant's view that ethics is based on a Kingdom of Ends.[41]

Another criticism brought against Kant rejects the notion that to be good means that a thing is willed in a certain way. Moore holds that a thing is not good because it is willed, though it may be true that it may be willed because it is good. He can see no direct relationship between good and will, because, he says, it is possible to will some things which are evil.[42]

Before going on to an evaluation of Moore's criticisms, it would be well to raise the question as to which general school of ethical thought Moore's system is to be ascribed. Denis Cleary, I. C., has pointed out that Cambridge philosophy in general, and Moore as a representative of it, are notably deficient with respect to a profound historical sense/[3] and in a way I think this is quite true. Furthermore, A. N. Prior has maintained that Moore is doing nothing more nor less than carry on the tradition of Locke and Hume.[44] But I think that there is a sense in which Moore can be said to be firmly rooted in Aristotle. Moore first went up to Cambridge as a student of the classics, and began to read Aristotle and Plato for their literary value before he became intrigued by their philosophical content. He records specifically that he became familiar with Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* at this time.[45] So far as I

•• *Ibid.,* p. 116.

01 *Ibid.,* p. 118. I do not intend to defend Moore's *interpretation* of Kant. Moore has been frequently accused of refuting an author by attributing to him ideas which that author would hardly recognize. The argument cited here probably has more cogency against ethicians of the phenomenological school such as Dietrich van Hildebrand.

•• *Ibid.,* p. U9 ff.

•• D. Cleary, "An Essay on G. E. Moore," *The Downside Revimo,* LXXXI (1958)' p.

"In *Logic and the Basis of Ethics,* quoted by C. B. Daly, "G. E. Moore and Non-Naturalism in Ethics," *Philosophical Studies,* XII (1961), p. 61.

•• See "An Autobiography" in *The Philosophy of G. E. MoOTe,* p.

know, Moore has nowhere, in his published works, discussed his dependence on the *Nichomachean Ethics* in writing *Principia Ethica,* nor has anyone else raised the question. In all probability, it never even occurred to Moore. To read and absorb Aristotle's *Ethics* was the normal thing for the undergraduate of Cambridge or Oxford in his day, and to ask whether he was influenced by Aristotle would be something like asking whether the average American is influenced in his political thought by the Declaration of Independence.

And yet the point is well worth making. Once the comparison has been suggested, it is easy to see a remarkable parallel between the *Principia Ethica* and the *Nichomachean EthiC$,* especially Book I. Both Aristotle and Moore start off with a discussion of the good in general (which Aristotle, like Moore, distinguishes into good as means and the " good which we desire for its own sake ") 4<6 followed by a discussion of what is the good for man. Both reject sheer hedonism, and although Moore does not describe the end of man as " happiness," the goods which Moore thinks the highest and the chief components of happiness according to Aristotle closely coincide. If the cultured Athenian gentleman was Aristotle's ideal, the life of the proper Edwardian gentleman would seem to embody for Moore all that was best in the universe. For Aristotle, the highest good is contemplation of the truth. This is not far from those high esthetic states of mind so valued by Moore.[47] Moore was quite conscious of this close relationship.[48] Moore differs

•• *Nichomachean Ethics,* Book I, Chapter 11,1 1094".

01 See *Principia Ethica,* p. 188: " By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects." However, varied his view slightly over the course of years. At the time he wrote he believed that there are some purely material things which are good in themselves (p. 8!i!-83). He later changed this view when he wrote " Is Goodness a Quality? " in which he maintained (p. 1!i!3) that only experiences can be good. He again changed his mind in his " A Reply to My Critics" in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (p. 618), where he held that not only are experiences good, but also the sum total of experiences-a view which he did not consider incompatible with maintaining that " no state of affairs can be good, unless its existence entails the proposition that somebody is having some experience."

•• G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica,* p. 199.

notably from Aristotle in giving short shrift to virtue, which he thinks is good mainly as a means [49] and hence should be relegated to Casuistry rather than Ethics. [50]

I mention all this by way of bringing up the question whether the "intrinsic good" which forms the cornerstone of Moore's system is the same good " at which all men aim," which Aristotle speaks of in the opening lines of the *Nicomaohean Ethics.* In at least one of his obiter dicta, Moore clearly makes this identification. He states in his essay, "The Nature of Moral Philosophy," written in 1921:

> One thing, I think, is clear about intrinsic value-goodness in Aristotle's sense-namely that it is only actual occurrences, actual states over a period of time- ... that can have any intrinsic value at all.[51]

This in turn raises the question whether the good which forms the basis of the moral order in the mainstream of the Aristotelian tradition as represented by a) St. Thomas Aquinas, and b) the contemporary neo-Thomists, is to be identified with intrinsic good in Moore's sense.

This is a quite difficult question to answer, partially because of difficulties in terminology, partially because the question at hand is seldom raised. That the question is seldom asked is quite surprising because it is a crucial one.

Perhaps the simplest way of formulating the question is to ask whether the *Bonum in Communi* spoken of in Part One Question Five of the *Summa Theologica* is the same as the *bonum* which *faciendum est et prosequendum* in the First Part of the Second Part, Question 94, Article 2, which is Aquinas' formulation of the fundamental principle of the natural law.

At least one Thomist commentator on Moore has asked the question this way: is Moore's "intrinsic good " to be identified with " transcendental good," and does St. Thomas

•• Ibid., pp. 176-177.

•o *Ibid.,* p. 4.

01 Printed in *Philosophical Studies* (London, 1922), p. 827.

struct his ethics on a metaphysics of good.[52] I feel that this is not a very good way of stating the question because moral good is itself good in a transcendental sense. I would prefer the following way of putting the problem (following a terminology suggested by Sertillanges) : is the moral good based on the ontological good? [53]

As I mentioned above, this question is seldom raised by Thomists, especially in the English-speaking countries, but most textbook writers seem to implicitly answer in the negative by making such a clear-cut distinction between physical and moral evil that there is no way left to relate them. One wonders, after all is said and done, what possible relation moral good can have to the *bonum commune.* One American textbook on ethics, *Right and Reason,* by Austin Fagothey, pp. *56-65,* devotes a whole chapter to " The Good as Value," and then separates moral values from all other values so that one wonders why he raised the question in the first place.[54]

It should by now be apparent in which direction the sympathies of the present author lie. But let us consider what sort of case can be made for the view that, for Thomas, moral good is *not* based on what I have been pleased to term ontological good. One Thomist who has written about Moore and who has rejected the view that Thomas' *bonum in communi* (which he terms " transcendental good ") is the basis of ethics is Carl W. Grindel, C. M.[55]

Although Grindel admits that some Thomists would deny

•• C. Grinde!, C. M., "Ethics Without a Subject: The Good in G. E. Moore," in *Thomiatica Morum Principia* (Rome, 1960), pp. 78 fl'.

58 A. D. Sertillanges, *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy,* p. !!49.

•• Actually Fagothey seems to contradict himself in this chapter. Thus on p. 57 he states that "Values, though not wholly realizable, clamor for realization. They should exist, they deserve to be, even if we have no way of bringing them into existence." To say they should exist seems to give them a moral reference. But on p. 60 he states that " The common estimate of mankind separates moral values from other values," and goes on to develop this thought in such a way that being a good man apparently has nothing to do with actualizing values. Nevertheless, the fact that Fagothey does devote Chapter 5 (and possibly Chapters 6 and 7) to what seems to be " intrinsic good " in Moore's sense, indicates that he at least senses that it should have some relation to natural law. For this reason I consider Fagothey's text better than any other currently available.

•• C. Grinde!, *op. cit.,* p. •79.

his interpretation, he holds that his view is a valid inference from several texts of St. Thomas.[56] According to Grindel, St. Thomas, in his commentary on the Sixth Book of the *Ethics* of Aristotle (Lect. 7, n. 1211), says that ethics should be taught after natural philosophy and *before* metaphysics. This is true, but I think Grindel tries to make much too much capital out of this observation. In the first place, the reason given by St. Thomas for this ordering of things is not that metaphysics is irrelevant to ethics, but that it is too difficult to master at an earlier age, because, although the principles of nature are not separated from sensible objects, and although the nature of mathematics is not obscure to young men because mathematical proofs concern sensibly conceivable objects, things pertaining to wisdom are purely rational.

As a matter of fact, what is probably the best argument possible for the contention that St. Thomas thought that the good studied in metaphysics is the basis of ethics is to be found in this same commentary. We have already noted that in the First Book of the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle begins with a discussion of good in general as the basis of ethics. As a matter of fact he devotes a goodly part of the first five chapters to this question. But then, in the sixth chapter, Aristotle abruptly (in true Aristotelian fashion) decides: " But perhaps we should now leave these subjects, for a precise determination of them belongs to another branch of philosophy." Aristotle does not tell us what that branch is, but St. Thomas confidently volunteers the information: it is metaphysics![57]

From this point on, Aristotle abandons the consideration of the nature of intrinsic good, and like Moore, turns his attention to *what things* are good. And by a process which Moore would call " intuition," and St. Thomas (and Aristotle himself) would term an exercise of practical reason, he gives his conclusion: it is happiness.

Grindel's second text is similar to the first. It is a quotation from Aquinas' *Commentary on the Liber de Causis*.[58] In it

[56] *Ibid.,* p. 79.
[57] In *I Ethic,* Lect. 8, n. 97.
[58] Lect. 1 (ed. Mandonnet, Opuscula Omnia I, p. 195).

Thomas merely states as a fact that the ancients studied logic, mathematics, philosophy of nature, moral philosophy, and metaphysics in just that order. Apart from the inversion of the order of learning mathematics and philosophy of nature, and the fact that it mirrors what Aquinas thought was done, rather than what he thought Aristotle thought should be done, this quotation proves no more than did the first. Even if it is true that Thomas thought that metaphysics is to be formally studied after ethics, this would hardly exclude a sufficient, though rudimentary, knowledge of good in general. One might just as well argue that the God spoken of as the *finis ultimus* in the First Part of the Second Part of the *Summa* is not the God of the Five Ways-which are presumably a metaphysical treatment.

Grindel goes on to develop his view of Thomistic ethics as being grounded in an empirical study of human nature. He seems to proceed in the spirit of the sort of biologism which many Thomists have come to reject of late as being more Suarezian than Thomist.[59]

There is a growing movement to see human good as the basis of Thomist ethics. Germain Grisez has developed this view both in his book, *Contraception and the Natural Law* [60] and in a recent article on the first principle of practical reason as treated of in the *Summa Theologica.*[61] Certainly there is good reason for holding that human good is the basis of ethics.[52] The point is interesting because, although Grinde! recognizes that Moore bases his ethic on those intrinsic goods which are human goods,[68] another Thomist critic of Moore, C. B. Daly,

•• Cf. G. Grisez, *Contraception and the Natural Law* (Milwaukee, 1965), p. 46.

[60] *Ibid.,* p. 107 ff.

[61] G. Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, Question 94, Article *Natural Law Forum,* X (1965), p. 184.

[62] Cf. *Summa Theologica,* I-II, q. 94 a. 2: "The order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. . . . There is in man an inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him."

[68] C. Grinde!, *op. cit.,* p. 82. Grinde! hardly does Moore justice by commenting

writing in the Irish journal, *Philosophical Studies,* condemns Moore for failing to take human good into account.[64] Moore recognized that human goods might be only a part of the sum total of intrinsically good things, but that they are of great importance to ethics since by definition they are the only goods which we human beings can know.[65] Grisez sees some sort of conflict between transcendental good and human good-a conflict which would render Thomistic and Moorean ethics incompatible if it does exist.[66] I think therefore that it is worthwhile to show that at least one eminent commentator on I-II q. 94 a. 6 of the *Summa* has seen no such conflict. What is more, this passage is not unknown to Grisez, who cites it on p. 168 of his study. Since Schuster presents his case with great precision, I think it will be well to quote the passage in full:

> The question has been raised whether *bonum* is to be understood here as *bonum honestum* or only in the most general sense as *bonum transcendentale.* If the concept of value is to be the very first in the *apprehensio* practica, this is possible only if it is conceived as unconditional value, as *bonum transcendentale.* Moreover, St. Thomas teaches (I, *5,* 6) that the division of *bonum* into *honestum, utile,* and *delectabile,* fundamentally has reference only to human good, but that more profound consideration reveals that it is anchored in bonum as such, insofar as it is *appetible* and the *terminus motus*

that Moore mentions the human good only " in passing," since the greater part of pages 188, 184, and 186 of *Principia Ethica* are devoted to the subject, as Grindel himself notes.

•• C. B. Daly, "G. E. Moore and Non-Naturalism in Ethics," *Philotrophical Studietr,* XII (1968), p. 64.

•• G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica,* p. 184.

•• Despite my criticism of this point in Grisez' article, I consider it all in all to be of considerable value, especially in that he has recognized that the *bonum* which *faciendum etrt et prosequendum* is not to be restricted to moral actions (p. 168).

Grisez has restated his position in a less formal way in a more recent article in *The Thomist* (Vol. XXX, 4, Oct. 1966). At first sight he seems to have modified his view of a year earlier. There he states (p. 847) that " I would suggest that the only adequate ultimate standard for right and wrong in human acts is the total possible good that man can in any way attain." Such a formulation would be in perfect accord with Moore's views. But then he t·everts to the position (p. 848 ft.) that there are privileged values which may never be slighted even though their actualization may be in conflict with the total welfare of man and the universe.

appetitus. But in our article, an ultimate, and therefore universal foundation of principles is being sought, the concept of *bonum* should not be restricted to an ethical meaning. On the other hand, St. Thomas is most concerned with the *bonum humanum. A praeceptum legis* is only thinkable in its proper sense with regard to rational creatures. This is most especially true with regard to the more special laws, *quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana.* These are ethical goods in the strict sense of the term. But it is still true that for the foundation of the ethical principles and fundamental precepts a more universal theory of value and a metaphysical relationship are called into play. Even for irrational beings, certain modes of action are right-they correspond to nature-and are therefore intended in the natural law of the divine will. And thus the formula, *bonum faciendum,* binds men in the strict ethical sense.[67]

•• J. Schuster, S. J., "Von den ethischen Principien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. Th. I• II••, q. 94, a. 2" in *Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie* LXXV (1988), pp. *54-55:* " Es wurde die Frage aufgeworfen, ob das *bonum* hier im streng ethischen Sinne als *bonum* oder nur im allgemeinsten Sinne des *bonum transcendentale* zu fassen sei. Wenn der Wertbegriff der allererste in der *apprehensio practica* sein soil, so kann doch, wie es scheint, nur an die unbestimmte Werthaftigkeit oder das *bonum transcendentale* gedacht sein. Ausserdem lehrt der heilige Thomas (P. I, q. *5,* a. 6.) dass die Einteilung des *bonum* in *honestum, utile* und *delectabile* zwar urspriinglich nur vom menschlichen Gute gelte, dass sie aber bei tieferer Betrachtung schon im *bonum* als solchen verankert sei, insofem es *appetibile* und *terminus motus appetitus* sei. Weil nun in unserem Artikel doch eine letzte, metaphysische und damm allgemeine Fundierung der Prinzipien erstrebt wird, sei der Begriff des *bonum* nicht auf die ethische Bedeutung eingeschriinkt. lndes ist es dem heiligen Thomas zu allermeist urn das *humanum* zu tun. Ein *praeceptum legis* ist doch nur fiir verniinftige GeschOpfe im eigentlichen Sinne denkbar. Erst recht gilt das fiir die spezielleren Gesetze, *quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana.* Diese sind aber im strengen Sinn ethische Giiter. Dabei bleibt es wahr, dass zur Begriindung der ethischen Prinzipien und auch des hOchsten Grundsatzes ein allgemeineres werttheoretisches und metaphysisches Verhiiltnis herangezogen wird. Auch fiir die unverniinftigen Wesen sind gewisse Handlungen richtig, naturentsprechend und darum im Naturgesetz des Schopferwillens intendiert. Der Satz: *bonum faciendum,* gilt also fiir den Menschen im streng ethischen Sinn."

A similar development is given by Gregory Stevens, 0. S. B., in " The Relations of Law and Obligation." *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* Vol. XXIX (1955), p. 198. Grisez comes close to admitting the thesis in question on p. 199 of his *Natural Law Forum* article, where he states, "Of course, ' good ' in the primary precept is not a transcendental expression denoting all things. Nevertheless, it is like a transcendental in its reference to all human goods, for the pursuit of no one of them is the unique condition for human operation, just as no particular essence is the unique condition for being."

In the course of attempting to refute Grindel's thesis, I have given, in effect, a certain amount of proof that Thomas (and Aristotle before him) held that ontological good (or transcendental good, or *bonum in communi)* is the basis of the moral order. To give a detailed proof citing a concatenation of Thomist texts is beyond the scope of the present article. I shall rest my case therefore, with an appeal to the authority of various Thomist writers in addition to that of Schuster: A. D. Sertillanges, O. P., *Les grandes theses de la philosophic thomiste,* p. 282, also *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy,* p. 249; E. Elter, S. J., *Compendium philosophiae moralis,* ed. Sa, p. 8J; B. H. Merkelbach, O. P., *Summa theologiae moralis,* Vol. I, #246; Odon Lottin, O. S. B., *Morale fondamentale,* p. 207-08; *Jacques Leclercq, La philosophic morale de Saint Thomas devant la pensee contemporaine,* p. 227 ff. and 267. To these we may add, although some would deny that they (especially the latter of the two) are in any sense Thomists: Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* pp. *596-605;* Teilhard de Chardin, *The Divine Milieu* (Harper Torchbooks edition), pp. 58-62.

The same Father Cleary who questioned Moore's historical sense had to admit that " Once the nature of good [in Moore's theory] has been clearly established on a metaphysical plane, it will be seen that much of Moore's thought will fit more than adequately into traditional ethics." [68] In this judgment I concur, especially in view of the fact that, as pointed out above (p. 11), Moore's theory really can be considered a metaphysical one, despite his disclaimer to the contrary.

In evaluating Moore's criticism of various ethical systems, I would say that the most valuable criticism which philosophers of the Aristotelico-Thomistic tradition could take to heart would be that which calls to task those ethicians who fail to distinguish between good as means (which is, in general, in his view, moral good) and good as end (intrinsic good). I have noted above the infrequency with which English-speaking Thomists have busied themselves with the relation of *bonum*

[68] D. Cleary, *typ. cit.,* p. 220.

in communi to the *bonum* which is the object of the first principle of the natural law.

The second most valuable criticism made by Moore I would say to be his rejection of hedonism. I have found that the arguments of *Principia Ethica* have been helpful allies in many a formal or informal confrontation.

The third valuable criticism which Moore has to make concerns his refusal to identify the natural with the primitive. Some Thomists have of late made similar observations.[69] I have often wondered if they in any way derive from Moore's observation of 1903. If Moore's ethic is, in the last analysis, in the line of traditional ethics, and if his system can hang together without identifying the natural with the primitive, then there is good reason to hope that the tradition as a whole may be so favored.

GABRIEL FRANKS, O. S. B.

Immaculate Conception Seminary,
Conception, Missouri

[69] E. g., Louis Dupre, *Contraception and Ca.thoUcs,* p. 41 n.; Germain Grisez, *Contraception and the Natural Law,* p. 28.

JUNG'S IDEAS ON RELIGION

FREUD, considered a genius by scientists, is generally rejected in religious circles because of his materialistic view of man. The popularity of Jung among religious people on the other hand, cannot be denied. Jung is the modem psychologist who has restored the religious factor in man, thus setting up the long awaited bridge between psychology and religion.

Not everybody shares such an optimistic viewpoint: "I am alarmed," says Cyril Connelly, "at the popularity of Jung's ideas on the Catholic Church." [1] And Glover: "Jung's system is fundamentally irreligious. Nobody is to care whether God exists, Jung the least of all." [2] H. L. Philp says: "After many years of psychological study . . . I find too much sectarianism and often too much dogmatism ... I have been disappointed in my search." [3]

Are the opinions of these psychologists objective? Are Jung's ideas on religion dogmatic and dangerous? A synthetic study of Jung's own writings shall help us to elucidate the problem.

Philosophical Background

Jung's ideas on religion and God cannot be understood without the knowledge of some of his philosophical principles. The most important principle for understanding Jung's conception of analytical psychology is the principle of opposites. According to Jung, the root of psychological drives lies in a double polarity which constitutes the quintessence of life. " Old Heraclitus, who was indeed a very great sage, discovered the most marvellous of all psychological laws: the regulative function of opposites. He called it *enantiodromia,* a running contrariwise,

[1] Edward Glover, *Freud or lung?* (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 7.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 168.

[3] H. L. Philp, *lung and the Problem of Evil* (New York: Robert M. 1959)' p. xi.

by which he meant that sooner or later everything runs into its opposite."[4] The tension between the two opposites is the source of energy and the greater the tension of opposites the greater the energy that comes from them. Energy is crucial in Jung's system and there is no energy without the tension of the opposites. The opposites are the key to the dynamics of human personality.

If polarity and opposition are universal laws, then, nothing can exist without its opposite and, therefore, "every psychological extreme secretly contains its own opposite or stands in some sort of intimate and essential relation to it."[5] As a consequence of this polarity everything in nature is found in natural pairs, a prerequisite for polarity and opposition. For instance, good and evil, masculine and feminine, death and life, conscious and unconscious, anima and animus, persona and shadow, and so forth.

The opposites are compensatory of each other, that is to say, one opposite compensates the deficiencies of the other opposite, thus balancing the complex elements of human personality. The compensatory function of the opposite is an expression of the self-defense mechanism; for example, extroversion compensates introversion, the unconscious compensates the conscious mind, the ego compensates the anima, and vice-versa. Compensation also exists in the realm of ethics where evil compensates the good and vice versa. The compensatory function of the opposites is automatic, free from the arbitrary control of our will.

Opposition and duality play an important role in the development of human personality. Duality is not a luxury but a prerequisite of growth, and needs to be preserved by all means. In the last stage of the process of development, however, duality and opposition are harmonized and integrated into a higher synthesis. It is unity and wholeness, says Jung, the

• C. G. Jung, *The Collective Works of C. G. Jung* (New York: Pantheon Books), hereafter referred to as *C. W.,* 1, p. 71.

[6] *Ibid.,* 5, p. S75; 9, 1 p. 96.

goal of man, which is symbolically expressed by the most important archetype of man, the archetype of the self. The process of man towards his goal, namely, wholeness, which is intimately connected with religious content, is called by Jung the process of individuation.

The law of evolution is also a universal law of nature. The origin of man has to be found in animality; and animals, in their turn, proceed from other inferior beings. The whole cosmos is evolving towards consciousness, which is the remote goal of everything existing.

Existence of religious factors

Does a religious factor exist in man? (Jung's views on religion differ radically from those of Freud). For Jung the existence of a religous factor in man is not an a priori principle. It is rather an empirical conclusion derived from the examination of countless numbers of patients who came to him for help: " The soul," he says, " possesses by nature a religious function. . . . But were it not a fact of experience that supreme values reside in the soul, psychology would not interest me in the least, for the soul would then be nothing but miserable vapour. I know, however, from hundredfold experience that it is nothing of the sort, but on the contrary contains the equivalents of everything that has been formulated in dogma and a good deal more, ... I did not attribute religious function to the soul. I merely produced the facts which prove that the soul is *naturaliter religiosa,* i. e., possesses a religious function." [6]

The manifestations of the religious function in man are so extraordinary and unusual, and its properties are so different from those of other human functions, that there is no possibility of reducing religion to any other human activity. The spiritual, Jung says, appears in the psyche as a drive, indeed a true passion. It is not derivative from another drive but a principle *sui generis,* namely the indispensable primitive power in the world of drives. " Since religion is incontestably one of the

[8] *Ibid.,* 1!!, p. 1!!-lS.

earliest and most universal expressions of the human mind, it is obvious that any psychology which touches upon the psychological structure of human personality cannot avoid taking note of the fact that religion is . . . something of considerable personal concern to a great number of individuals." [7]

Nature of religion

Religion is directly connected with the contents of the collective unconscious. But, how is it possible to know these contents? These contents are known through revelation. This is not the Christian revelation, which presupposes the manifestation of a transcendent God, existing outside man and outside the universe. No, the Jungian revelation is a personal and unique phenomenon which everybody can experience if properly disposed. This unique experience manifests the secrets hidden in the unconscious, because " revelation is an unveiling of the depths of the human soul, a ' laying bare '; hence it is an essentially psychological event." [8] In other words, " religion is a careful and scrupulous observation of what R. Otto aptly termed the *numinosum,* that is, a dynamic agency or effect not caused by an arbitrary act of the will, . . . it seizes and controls the human subject who is always rather its victim than its creator." [9] Religious experience is so powerful that it produces deep psychological effects, even transformations of human personalities, and alteration of consciousness. [10]

The root of religion is revelation, so the nature of religion-and, as a consequence, of God-will depend, psychologically speaking, on the nature of the experience of the numinous. It will depend also on the nature of the contents of the collective unconscious which erupts into consciousness as revelation opens the treasures stored in the depths of the human psyche. The collective unconscious reveals itself as full of power, with a sense of mystery and strong feelings. This kind of human experience Jung calls religious experience. The factors pro-

[7] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 5.
s *Ibid.,* 11, p. 74.
• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 7.
[10] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 8; 11, p. 7; 11, p.

clueing this experience are the archetypes of the collective unconscious. The contents and ideas appearing in consciousness are Gods: "Gods are personifications of the collective unconscious, for they reveal themselves to us through the unconscious activity of the psyche." [11]

Causes of religious experience

Which are the religious factors producing that special state of mind called the numinous? To answer this question, pure empirical observations are insufficient. We have to cross the threshold of Jung's working hypotheses: the factors producing the experience of the numinous are the archetypes of the collective unconscious.

There is a personal unconscious which stores memories and repressed material, and a collective unconscious made up of archetypes. The archetypes of the collective unconscious are the most important elements composing Jung's structure of human personality. They are also the most original and problematic. The archetypes are the elements composing the inner part of our objective psyche. They are forms and images of collective nature, universal human dispositions of our mind, invested with power, which bring us protection and salvation. Because they are not personal but collective, they contain the treasures and secular experiences of the whole human race transmitted through heredity. As such, they are the most valuable and, at the same time, the most dangerous potentialities of the human personality. [12]

Religion has always been an important factor in human behavior. Therefore the archetypes, which store ancestral experiences, have to contain " the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution born anew in the brain structure of every individual." [13] And since religion is universal and underlies all events, the history of religion, in its wide sense, is a treasure

[11] *Ibiil.,* 11, p. 168.
[12] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 50; 11, p. 517; 9, 1, pp. 44; *5,* p. 66; 9, 1, p. 156.
[13] *Ibid.,* 8, p. 158.

house of archetypal forms. Especially important is the archetype of the self.[14]

Religious experience follows the general rules governing the activities of the unconscious. The contents of the unconscious erupt into consciousness generally in the second half of life, that is to say, over thirty-five. At that time the unconscious spontaneously invades consciousness, and since consciousness and unconsciousness are the extreme of a dual polarity, religion appears as compensatory of consciousness. The great religions, says Jung, confirm the existence of a compensatory ordering factor which is independent of the ego, and whose nature transcends consciousness.[15]

The contents of the collective unconscious appear in the beginning as autonomous complexes, independent of the control of the ego, and of the arbitrary power of the will. They are dangerous because, in addition to being autonomous, they are charged with tremendous energy. These contents, and consequently those of religion, are automatically projected upon external objects which absorb part of their energy. The process and techniques leading to the differentiation and assimilation of these contents by the conscious mind constitute the most important steps towards individuation. And since the archetypes of religion are the most important archetypes, religion and individuation are intimately interwoven. Throughout these pages the analysis of dogmas and Gods is always simultaneously parallel with the steps of the process of individuation.

Contents of Religion

Psychologically speaking, Jung identifies God with the contents of the collective unconscious. And since man is in continuous evolution, these contents, though essentially always the same-because they are collective-appear, however, in different ways, according to the degree of consciousness of man, and the concrete circumstances in which man finds himself. Since these contents are collective they have little to do with

[14] *Ibid.,* 12, p. 82.

[15] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 294; 11, p. 488.

the ego and much to do with the archetypes. Since they are experienced, they have little connection with an external God and are strongly related to our feelings and passions.

In primitive man the contents of the archetypes appear as myths; myth is a process of the unconscious. Consequently, since the contents of religion are identified with the contents of the unconscious, myth is no more than a living religion; its ritual is magic.[16] Although myth is archaic, it is nevertheless connected with the process of individuation of primitive man, and the ritualistic performances carried out for the purpose of producing the effect of the numinous were the prerogative of the medicine man, such as invocation, taboos, sacrifices, and incantation. Therefore, myth is the religion of primitive man, and since man's evolution towards consciousness is a slow process, the contents of religion in modern man are underlined by mythical contents. Myth is therefore the crux for understanding religion. For instance, Jung calls Christ the living myth of our culture, asserting that the myths of Near and Middle East underline Christian dogmas,[17] and that the history of dogmas goes back into the grey mist of neolithic prehistory. They were ancient mysteries protecting man against the uncanny things that live in the depths of the psyche. From myth to religion, says Jung, there is only one step.[18]

Since the collective unconscious contains the whole heritage of mankind's evolution born anew in the brain of every individual, as man evolves dogma appears as the substitute of myth. Dogma stems from myths and a slow evolution of them. In dogmas the contents of myth are replaced by Gods who appear as the expression of the psyche, as the hero appears in myth. The ritual of dogmas is not, as in myth, the prerogative of the medicine man, but " of physicians, prophets and priests; finally at the civilized age, of philosophy and religion." [19]

Dogma, says Jung, expresses an irrational whole by means of

[16] *Ibid.*, 9, 1, p. 154.
[17] *Ibid.*, 9, !i!, p. 179.
[18] *Ibid.*, 11, p. 800; 9, 1, p. 1!i!.
[19] *Ibid.*, 11, p. !i!94.

imagery and reflects the spontaneous and autonomous activity of the objective psyche, the unconscious. Dogmas are not only expressions of the contents of the archetypes, but also of their dynamic autonomous activity; they symbolize the motions of the libido. Dogmas are imbued with emotional values and express the soul more completely than scientific theories because they last for centuries, as against the dialectical nature of scientific theories.[20]

Since the existence of the collective unconscious is a psychological hypothesis and dogmas are symbolic expressions of the contents of the unconscious, dogmas are intimately related to psychology. Hence, for Jung, the Catholic way of life is completely a psychological problem, and Catholic dogmas are psychological expressions of Catholic man: " almost the entire life of the collective unconscious has been channelled into dogmatic archetypal ideas and flows alone like a well-controlled stream in the symbolism of creed and ritual. It manifests the inwardness of the Catholic psyche."[21] Therefore, since the archetypes of the collective unconscious can be shown empirically to be equivalents of religious dogmas, the better these dogmas express the unconscious, the better they are, the longer they last, and the greater the possibility of success. In conclusion we may say that Christianity has come to stay because it fits in with the existing archetypal pattern.[22]

Moreover, dogmas are healing systems for the ills of the soul because they control the terrific emotional values of the unconscious. In this sense dogmas " protect man against the uncanny things that live in the depths of the soul. . . . This was the purpose of rite and dogma; they were dams and walls to keep back the dangers of the unconscious."[23] Dogmas, therefore, canalise the libido, the energy of the unconscious, protecting man from the perils of the soul.

What happens, then, in a religion without dogmas? Jung warns of the dangers of this kind of religion, referring especially

•• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 46; 11, p. 45-46.
•• *Ibid.,* 9, 1, p. 12.
•• *Ibid.,* 9, 1, p. 14; 12, p. 17.
•• *Ibid.,* 9, 1, p. 22.

to Protestants. Protestantism, having no dogmas, lacked the protecting walls, and therefore the energy liberated went into the channels of curiosity and science. Many Protestants abandoned dogmas to embrace science but, says Jung, in this way Europe became the mother of dragons that devoured the greater part of the earth.[24] Jung, the psychologist, sees in history the influence of the healing factor of dogmas when he says: " Christianity was accepted as a means to escape from the brutality and unconsciousness of the ancient world. As soon as we discarded it, the old brutality returns in force as has been made clear by contemporary events . . . a long step backwards into the past."[25] The energy of the unconscious free of the protective walls of dogmas finds its outlet in communism, Hitlerism, fascism, etc., the modern dragons that threaten to devour the earth. Whoever throws Christianity overboard, he adds, is bound to be confronted with the old problem of brutality.

Why are religions invested with therapeutic power? Because religion is an important factor in human personality and, consequently, its absence produces natural psychic disturbances. The conscious mind may ignore its presence, but the factors are there, in the unconscious, and the more the ego tries to repress them, the greater the disturbances, and the greater the autonomy and power of the complexes of the collective unconscious. Religion is, in this sense, a form of psychic therapy, and one of the greatest helps in the psychological process of adaptation.[26]

Even more, Jung asserts that neurosis is never cured unless the religious factor is restored: " During the past 30 years, people from all civilized countries have passed through my hands, . . . among all my patients in the second half of life there has not been one whose problems in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to

•• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 47; 9, 1, p. 22.

•• *Ibid.,* 5, p. 280.

•• *Ibid.,* 4, p. 155; 16, p. 121; 16, p. 16.

say that everyone of them fell ill because he had lost what the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook." [27] Furthermore, he asserts that " side by side with the decline of religious life, the neuroses grow noticeably more frequent . . . the mental state of European man shows an alarming lack of balance." [28] Jung sees in psychic sufferings the symptoms of a wrong attitude coming from the total personality. Even the moral attitude is a real factor with which psychology must reckon. General conceptions of spiritual nature are indispensable constituents of psychic life.[29]

Dogmas are valuable insofar as they are rooted in religious experience. Experience, and not faith, is their starting point. This experience is irrational, and if dogmas become too external and void of experience, then they are completely obsolete, no more than relics of the past. The rational mind has to keep in touch with the unconscious, and according to the nature of the unconscious, so the experience and formulation of dogmas has to be. Here Jung departs from Christianity because, according to the theory of opposites, evil is a factor as' important as good, and since the uniconscious contains both good and evil, dogmas cannot dispense with evil.[30] Therefore a formulation of dogmas which is rooted only in good is incomplete and does not do justice to the whole nature of the archetypes. In consequence, the Gods who appear in consciousness cannot only be good since " evil needs to be pondered just as much as good . . . in the last resort there is no good that cannot produce evil and evil that cannot produce good." [31] The Gods of the collective unconscious are dualistic, and the Church has become detached from the world of nature, because Christianity has dispensed with the dark part of God, Satan.

To attain full individuation in the Jungian sense it is necessary to withdraw the external projection which dogmas pre-

•• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 884.
•• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 885-886.
•• *Ibid.,* 8, p. 885-886.
[30] *Ibid.,* H!, p. !lO; 12, p. 15.
•• *Ibid.,* 12, p. 81; 12, p. 85.

suppose: "It [individuation] can only happen when you withdraw your projection from an outward historical or metaphysical Christ and thus wake up Christ within. The self cannot become conscious and real without the withdrawal of external projections." [82] Faith, in the Christian sense, entails both the existence of a transcendent God and of a historical Christ. But since an exclusively religious projection may rob the soul of its values, and since dogmas express the contents of the collective unconscious, in the last resort, the contents belong to the unconscious, not to external Gods in which they are projected. The withdrawal of the projection is a natural consequence of his views: "Jung rescues religion from dogma," says Joseph L. Henderson," he shows me how to withdraw the mistaken projection." [sa] At the end Jung gets rid of dogma altogether.

Myths and dogmas are not only expressions of the contents of the unconscious, but of what, perhaps, is more important: its motions and life. "Myths and dogmas are self portraits of the movement of the libido. Thus the sun, the snake, the fire, the horse are its symbols." [84] For instance, the course of the sun in myth is an expression of the movement of the libido; the sun's nocturnal journey means the repression of libido; the sun's journey across the heavens means progression of the libido.

Therefore, on the Christian level dogmas are symbolic expressions of the life of the unconscious of the Christian man. For instance, the mystery of the Eucharist, says Jung, transforms the soul of the empirical man into his totality, symbolically expressed by Christ. The Mass is, in this sense, the rite of individuation process. The humanity of Christ symbolizes the ego; his divinity, the unconscious. The Mass expresses therefore symbolically the union of the conscious and the

[••] C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, *Jung and the Problem of Evil,* p. 288.

[33] Joseph L. Henderson, "C. G. Jung: A Personal Evaluation" in *Contact with Jung* (London: Tavistock, 1968), p. 222.

[••] Hans Schaer, *Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 71.

unconscious in the process of individuation. In archaic man the numinous experience of the individuation process was the prerogative of shamnans, the medicine men. They experienced sickness, torture and regeneration. These experiences in the Christian man, at a higher level, " imply the idea of being made whole through the sacrifice, of being changed by transubstantiation, and exhalted to the pneumatic man." [35] For Jung, the Mass is a symbolic expression of the motion of the unconscious in order to obtain full individuation and consciousness. He describes the life of the unconscious in the language of dogmas. He says that though his writings sound as if they were a sort of theological speculation, it is in reality modern man's perplexity expressed in symbolic terms. For instance, when using the term " crucifixion " or " sacrifice of the cross," one should understand " realization of the four functions " or of " wholeness." [36]

Jung finds in the writings of the alchemists the best manifestation of his ideas. The alchemists did not actually try to find the philosophical stone. They were not pioneer chemists, but rather mystics who through the unconscious projection into matter of the contents of the archetypes were expressing in that way the motions of their psyche towards individuation. [37]

Gods

Jung is agnostic with respect to the existence of a transcendent God. To me, he says, the question whether God exists at all or not is futile. It is futile because his metaphysical attitude is essentially Kantian: " Epistemological criticism proves the impossibility of knowing God but the psyche comes forward with the assertion of the experience of God. God is a psychic fact of immediate experience." [38] This is a cornerstone for the understanding of Jung. The whole idea of God is based on experience, not on the hypothesis of the existence of a transcendent and personal Deity, which he considers unattainable .

•• *C. W.,* 11, p. 294; 11, p. 278.
•• C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, *Jung and the Problem of Evil,* p. 245.
37 *C. W.,* 12, p. 462.
•• *Ibid.,* 8, p. 828.

Jung does not totally exclude metaphysical truths, although in practice he rejects them as useless and even as "actual impediments on the road under development," [39] especially if these truths have lost touch with personal experiences. Existence for him is synonymous with experience; existence of God is therefore experience of God; God is an object of personal expenence.

The God of Jung is inside and he calls a systematic blindness the prejudice that God is outside man. God is inside, because, psychologically speaking, the God-image is a complex of ideas of an archetypal nature representing a certain sum of energy which appears in projection. [40] The soul, says Jung, must contain in itself the faculty of relation to God, i. e., a correspondence, and this correspondence is, in psychological terms, the archetypes of the God-image. What is therefore God? The soul's deepest and closest intimacies is precisely what God is.

If God lies in the deepest and closest intimacies of the soul, his properties will reflect-at least psychologically speaking-the properties of the unconscious where he lies. The properties of God have to be imbued with anthropomorphic traits, the qualities of the unconscious. For instance, since man is continuously evolving, God is also evolving and appears in different ways.[41] As Jolande Jacobi says: "the metamorphosis of the Gods in our outward and inward worlds is inexhaustible, and never ceases."

The evolution of God and man follow parallel lines. His creation has also to manifest this characteristic of God, " since all creation *ex nihilo* is God's and consists in nothing but God, with the result that man, like the rest of the creation, is simply God become concrete. It was only quite late that we realized that God is Reality itself and therefore-last but not the least-man. This realization is a millennia! process." [43]

•• *Ibid.,* 9, p. 84; *5,* p.

•• *Ibid., 5,* p. *56;* 11, p. 58; 11, p. 10-11.

"*Ibid.,* 11, 84.

•• Jolande Jacobi, *Complex, Archetype, Symbol in the Psychology of C. G. lung* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959), p. 118.

•• *O. W.,* 11, p.

Jung's conception of creation has nothing in common with that of Christians. Creation implies the acquisition of consciousness of the universe, especially of man. Why? Because the purpose of creation is connected with the transformation of God; the encounter with the creature changes the creator. The purpose of creation is the necessity of a greater consciousness in God. This is clear in the Book of Job.

Yahweh is the God of the Jews, but a God without consciousness. How is this to be proved? Because of his encounter with Job. Job sees through the injustice done to him the duality and imperfections of Yahweh. Job possesses a superior knowledge of God which God himself does not possess. He realizes God's inner antinomy and to his horror he discovers that Yahweh is in a certain respect less than human. This explains the behavior of Yahweh, the behavior of an unconscious being who cannot be judged morally. Yahweh is amoral, jealous, irritable, good and evil, but he is not responsible for his actions because he is too unconscious to be moral; morality presupposes consciousness.[44]

What happened after God's encounter with Job? Here are Jung's own words: "The victory of the vanquished and oppressed is obvious; Job stands morally higher than Yahweh ... Joh superiority cannot be shrugged off. Hence a situation arises in which real reflection is needed. That is why Sophia steps in. She reinforces the much needed self-reflection and thus makes possible Yahweh's decision to become man ... Job is morally superior to him and therefore he has to catch up and become human himself ... Yahweh must become man precisely because he has done man· a wrong . . . he must regenerate himself." [45] Job possesses greater consciousness than Yahweh and, therefore, psychologically speaking, the incarnation of God is a necessity in order to obtain, through suffering in his human nature, a greater consciousness. The Gods of Jung evolve from unconsciousness to consciousness. The in-

[44] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 872; 11, pp. 867-888; 11, p. 428.

[45] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 405.

carnation of God is the crux for his understanding and, therefore, the Book of Job is for Jung what Genesis and the fall of Adam is for Christians: " Christ did not come to deliver mankind from evil . . . when God becomes man it means nothing less than a world-shaking transformation of God." [46] Therein lies the Copernican revolution of Jung's ideas on God.

Trinity

Jung's ideas on the Trinity are not intellectual explanations of the dogma. On the contrary, Jung says that as a metaphysical truth the Trinity remains inaccessible to him, and has never contributed in the slightest to his belief or to his understanding. Jung, always cautious, however, does not deny the possibility of metaphysical truths that may possibly underlie archetypal statements.

Jung explores the New Testament and says that there is not a single passage where the Trinity is formulated in an intellectually comprehensible manner. Even more, he adds, "the New Testament contains no Trinitarian formulae," that is to say, no intellectual formulation which makes the Trinitarian formulae understandable. How, then, does Jung explain the Trinity? As usual, by resorting to the unconscious: "They nevertheless occur and are clear indications of an active archetype operating beneath the surface and throwing up triadic formulations." [47] So, the existence of the Trinity is proved through the numinous revelation of the archetypes of the collective unconscious which project their contents in triads. In other words, " the development of the Christian idea of the Trinity unconsciously reproduces the archetype of the *homoousia* of Father, Son, and Ka-mutef which first appeared in Egyptian theology ... that is to say, man's conceptions of God are organized into triads and trinities." [48]

Following the theory of evolution Jung relates the apparition

[46] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 401.
[47] *Ibid.,* 11, pp. 138-139; 11, p. £00.
[48] *Ibid.,* 11, pp. 148-149.

of the Trinity with a gradual development of consciousness in man. On an archaic level there is not Trinity, but unity, so the Trinity entails a gradual unfolding of the archetype in man's consciousness, and its absorption into the pattern of ideas transmitted by the culture of antiquity. [49] This culture is not merely Christian culture, but goes back four thousand years. Thus the archetypes of the unconscious follow a slow process of transformation. Their objective content, expressed in projection, depend both on the state of evolution o£ the collective unconscious and on the ideas and culture in which the contents of the unconscious appear. Jung points out that nobody can doubt the manifest superiority of the Christian revelation over its pagan precursors. [50]

How then is the appearance of the symbol of the Trinity explained psychologically by Jung? Although his reasoning is obscure, nevertheless it is possible to synthesize his ideas. The Father represents the state of culture lacking self reflection; this kind of consciousness sees everything as one, the Father. To prove it, Jung tells how he had the occasion of observing this phenomenon in a tribe of negroes in Mount Elgin, in Africa; they believe that the creator had made everything good and beautiful. For primitive people, man, the world, and God, form a whole (oneness), a unity unclouded by criticism. It is the world of the Father. [51]

But a reflective consciousness, like that of Job, realizes the duality of God, his lack of self-reflection, the imperfection of his creation, and the necessity of the incarnation of God. Then the Son appears. " Hence the " One " has to be supplemented by the " Other " ... the world of the Father is fundamentally altered and is superseded by the world of the Son." In this way, " the One becomes a Father by incarnating in the Son, and by so doing becomes definable. By becoming a Father and a man he revealed to ma.n the secrets of his divinity." [52] Once again we see the struggle of God on his road to consciousness..

[49] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 140.
[50] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 187.
[51] *Ibid.,* 11, pp. 188-184.
[52] *Ibid.,* 11, pp. 184-185.

But the world of the Father and the Son is incomplete because the incarnation of the Son is not continuous. Here lies the necessity of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit appears as a continuation of the incarnation of God. God is indwelling in the empirical man through the Holy Spirit. As man gains consciousness, making the unconscious contents conscious, God, who dwells in man, gains also consciousness, with the help of empirical man. The Holy Spirit represents the final and complete stage in the evolution of God and the divine drama.[53]

To summarize, the collective unconscious evolves both through centuries and individually in man in order to obtain consciousness. But in the Christian man the unconscious obtains consciousness in a way symbolically represented by the Trinitarian formula. The Trinity, says Jung, is a revelation not only of God but also of man.

Quaternity

The Trinity is not a complete expression of the process of the unconscious. "Whereas the Christian symbolism is a Trinity, the formula presented by the unconscious is a quaternity ." Which is the element missing in the Christian formula? The missing factor is the devil, " the dogmatic aspect of the evil is absent from Trinity and leads to a more or less awkward existence of his own as the devil." [54]

In terms of creation Jung explains the necessity of the evil factor as it appears in the poisonous quality of the *prima materia.* Matter, he says, is not included in the Trinity formula, but, since the material world is real and is an intrinsic part of the divine *"actus purus,"* then the devil is there.[55] In other words, if everything real is part of God and matter is real, it has to be included in God. Consequently, this situation gives rise to a quaternity, because the devil cannot be destroyed; he is eternal, he is the fourth. There is no total creation without the dark side, the devil; there is no principle of individuation without the dark side, the shadow. Once again we

•• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 186. u *Ibid.,* 11, p. 59. •• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 195.

see the working power of opposites, the tension of opposites that makes energy possible.

The quaternity formula includes Lucifer as the dark side of God. But on different occasions Jung speaks of a quaternity as including a feminine factor. The symbol of the Trinity is exclusively masculine in character. The fourth element was the earth or the body, and they were symbolized by the Virgin. In this way the feminine element is added to the Trinity, thereby producing the quaternity.[56]

The number four is, for Jung, a magic number. He sees quaternities everywhere. The quaternity is the religious symbol, not only of Catholicism, but of many other religions. In Catholicism, however, the fourth element is Mary: "The Three are the Summum Bonum and the devil is the principle and personification of evil. In a Catholic quaternity, the fourth would be the Mother to 99 per cent divine. The devil does not count, being an empty shadow owing to the *privatio boni.*"[57] Catholics dispense with the devil because evil according to Saint Augustine has no positive entity, and Mary is almost divine. Hence, a Catholic quaternity includes the feminine element.

Jung gives a special importance to the dogma of the Assumption. He sees the force of nature behind the pontifical definition, and in God and Mary a cautious approach to the solution of opposites. But he warns Catholics, who say that the quaternity is without a shadow that the devil is there. Psychologically speaking the feminine part of the quaternity is the symbol of the archetype of the anima, a feminine figure, our feminine element of the unconscious; the anima is "the matrix of the quaternity, a *Mater Dei.*"[58]

If the psychological quaternity appears sometimes as the devil, the dark element, and at other times as the feminine element, namely, Mary or Sophia, then it seems that the

[56] *Ibid.,* 11, pp. 62-68; 11, pp. 196-198.
[57] C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, *Jung and the Problem of Evil,* p. 216.
[58] *C. W.,* 11, p. 68; *and the Problem of Evil,* p. 219.

quaternity would make a quinary. To this obvious objection Jung answers: "The quaternity is a hypothetical structure, depicting a wholeness. It is not a logical concept, but an empirical fact. The quinarius or quinio (e. g., in the form of 4 + 1, i.e., quincunx) does occur as a symbol of wholeness (e. g., in China and occasionally in alchemy) but relatively rarely. Otherwise the quinio is not a symbol of wholeness, quite the contrary (e. g., the five-rayed star of the Soviets or of the U.S. A.). The latter is rather the chaotic prima materia." [59] We are unable to interpret this mysterious answer.

Christ

The history, nature, and concrete life of Christ is for Jung of very little importance. Why? Because Jung's approach to Christ is psychological, neither theological nor metaphysical. Jung sees in the person of the Redeemer a "collective" figure fulfilling the expectations of the unconscious of the people who lived at that time. So, the question of who Christ really was is irrelevant. Christ personifies the collective expectations of the unconscious because he lived the concrete, personal life which, in all essential features, had at the same time archetypal character. Since the archetypes of the collective unconscious are not personal, but universal, the life of Christ symbolizes the eternal life of the species, and thus what happens in the life of Christ happens always and everywhere. [60] Here lies the central idea of Jung's approach to Christ: the life of Christ is a perfect expression of the needs of the archetypes of the unconscious.

Consequently, in the Gospels myth, legends, and factual reports are interwoven into a whole: the archetypal and the individual. Hence, says Jung, the Gospels would immediately lose their character of wholeness if one tried to separate the individual from the archetypal. Christ, as an expression of the unconscious, is a myth, " the living myth of our culture

[59] C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, *Jung and the Problem of Evil,* p. 216.
[60] *C. W.,* 11, pp. 88-89.

and regardless of his historical existence embodies the myth of the Divine Primordial man, the mystic Adam." [61]

Jung asks two questions: 1) what was in man that was stirred up by the Christian message? 2) What was the answer Christ gave?

1) What the Christian message stirred up was the archetype of the self in the soul of every man, with the result that the concrete Rabbi Jesus was rapidly assimilated by the archetype, because Christ realized the idea of the self. The archetype of the self represents the psychic totality of the individual, and symbolizes the union of consciousness and unconsciousness; the opposites are united in the self. Historically, says Jung, the self is identified with the God-image and, consequently, with Christ, because Christ represents a totality of a divine or heavenly king, a glorified man, a son of God, and unspotted by sin.[62] The connection between Christ and the self, the self and the God-image, and the myths which symbolize this God-image, is summarized in this important text: "Since he [the hero of more than human stature] is psychologically an archetype of the self his divinity only confirms that the self is numinous, a sort of God, or having some share in the divine nature. In this mythologem may lie the root of the argument in favor of '*homoousia.*' For psychologically it makes a vast difference whether the self is to be considered 'of the same nature' as the Father, or merely 'of a similar nature.' The decision in favor of *homoousia* was of great psychological importance, for it asserted that Christ is of the same nature as God. But Christ, from the point of view of psychology and comparative religion, is a typical manifestation of the self. For psychology, the self is an imago Dei and cannot be distinguished from it empirically; the two ideas are therefore of the same nature. The hero is the protagonist of God's transformation in man; he corresponds to what I call mana personality." [63]

[61] *Ibid.,* 9, 2, p. 38; 11 p. 89.
[62] *Ibid.,* 9, 2, p. 37; 11, p. 156.
[63] *Ibid., 5,* pp. 391-392.

Hence, psychologically speaking, the " more than human properties " of the mythological hero confirm the divine nature of the self. But Christ is a perfect symbol of the archetype of the self because Christ symbolizes the hero's attributes: a divine father, hazardous birth, precocious development, miracles, death, choir of angels, shepherds, etc. Therefore, it was Christ's attributes which make him an embodiment of the self. He stirred up the archetype of the self because Christ expresses better than anything else the contents of this archetype: "He became the collective figure whom the unconscious of his contemporaries expected to appear." [64] The self of man responded to the Christian message.

2) What was the answer Christ gave to that which was stirred up by the Christian message? The answer is individuation in man; incarnation in Christ. Since in psychological terms Christ and the self are identical, everything that happens to Christ is happening to man. The process of individuation presupposes a long and painful road towards wholeness and rebirth. At the end the archetype of the self unites all pairs of opposites. Individuation involves suffering, a passion of the ego, from the violence done to one by the self. The sufferings of Christ, who is man and God at the same time, symbolize the sufferings of the ego towards wholeness, torn apart by the violence of the self. The humanity of Christ represents the ego; his divinity, the self; thus, as a consequence of the integration of consciousness and unconsciousness, the ego enters the "divine realm" where it participates in God's sufferings. The cause of suffering is the same in both; for man means individuation and wholeness; for God means incarnation and consciousness.

Jung sees in the life of Christ projections of the inner life of the unconscious. For instance, he says: " The three days descent into hell during death describes the sinking of the vanished value into the unconscious, where, by conquering the power of darkness, it establishes a new order, and then rises

[64] *Ibid.,* 11, pp. 154-155.

up to heaven again, that is, attains supreme clarity of consciousness." [65] But if the life of Cluist does not represent perfectly the inner life of the unconscious, then the answer given by the Christian message is good, but not perfect. This is Jung's contention, and his ideas are connected with two things: the process of individuation, and the necessity of evil for duality.

1) The process of individuation. Jung is careful to make a sharp distinction between wholeness and perfection. The goal of individuation is not perfection but wholeness: " Nat ural as it is to seek perfection in one way or another, the archetype fulfills itself in completeness ... the individual may strive after perfection, but must suffer from the opposite of his intentions for the sake of his completeness. I find then a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me." [66] This is an unusual idea; the ego may look for perfection, as in the Christian attitude, but the self looks for completeness. Completeness and not perfection is the supreme human goal.

2) The necessity of evil for duality. This is in a sense a consequence of the first, because without the integration of the evil there is no totality, and the figure of Christ is not a totality, for he lacks the nocturnal side of the psyche's nature, the darkness of the spirit, and is also without sin.[67] Therefore, although the attributes of Christ make him out as an embodiment of the self, looked at from the psychological angle, says Jung, he corresponds to only one half of the archetype. According to the metaphysical doctrine of *privatio boni* wholeness seems guaranteed in Christ. But in the plan of empirical psychology, "one must take evil rather more substantially, there it is simply the opposite of good." Jung is amazed when a Protestant theologian had even the temerity to assert that God can only be good. Thus, Christ can only lead to perfection, not to wholeness.

Jung finds the psychic complement of Christ in the doctrine of the two sons of God, Satan and Christ. In consequence, the

•• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 90. •• *Ibid.,* 9, 2, p. 69. •• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 156.

coming of the Antichrist is not just a prophetic prediction, but an inexorable psychological law. Hence if Christ is half the archetype of the self, namely, the light side, "the other half appears in the Antichrist, which is just as much a manifestation of the self, except that he consists of its dark aspect." [68] Psychologically the Antichrist corresponds to the shadow of the self, the dark side of human personality.

The coming of the Antichrist is related to the conception of Yahweh. Yahweh was a totality including both good and evil, that is, Satan and Christ as his two sons. In the Book of Job, the devil was still on good terms with Yahweh and Christ. At the time of Christ's incarnation, however, Satan became detached from Yahweh, fell from heaven and was hidden not in hell, but in matter. Since the incarnation presupposes a world-shaking transformation of God, the incarnation of the dark side is logical, and " nothing less than the counterstroke of the devil provoked by God's incarnation; for the devil attains his true stature as the adversary of Christ . . . only after the rise of Christianity." [69]

Taking into account Jung's ideas on God as a duality his views are logical. The primitive God, Yahweh, lacked consciousness; the incarnation is the solution to acquire it. But since Christ and Satan are both parts of God it is natural to expect a double incarnation, the incarnation of the light side represented by Christ, and the incarnation of the dark side represented by Satan, who is to become the Antichrist.

For Jung, the solution of individuation lies not in the Gospels but in the Apocalypse. St. John's consciousness was Christian, his unconscious collective. His ego was identified ·with the Gospel of love and, consequently, the imitation of Christ creates a shadow in St. John's unconscious. His consciousness sees only the light side of God and, as expected, a tremendous *enantiodrO'Jny* takes place that John himself could not understand and failed to see. The unconscious compensates for the one-

•• *Ibid.,* 9, p. 44; 9, p. 41; 9, p. 46.
•• *Ibid.,* 9, p. 11, p. 401.

sided attitude of consciousness, and the opposites collide in his visions. His visions are not personal, but collective, and a consequence of an unusual tension between consciousness and unconsciousness.[70] What St. John sees is "the power of destruction and vengeance"; his visions are, therefore, the visions of the dark side of God missing in the Christian message and symbolized as " monsters with horns, the sun-moon child," etc. Like Job he saw the fierce and terrible side of Yahweh. The missing quaternity is restored, and the God of St. John is both perfect and imperfect, a duality: " God has a terrible double aspect; a sea of grace is met by a seething lake of fire, and the light of love glows with a fierce dark heat of which it is said-it burns but gives no light. That is the eternal, as distinct from the temporal Gospel: *one must love God but must fear him."* [11]

Critique of Jung's Ideas on Religion

Jung's methodology

Jung has steadily insisted that his views on religion are not theological or metaphysical, but simply empirical. He relies on empirical observation rather than on abstract theories which he humbly confesses he is unable to comprehend. However, no modern science is merely a collection of facts, and though Jung says that he finds access to religion only through the psychological understanding of inner experiences, he also points out that his psychology, like every empirical science, cannot go along without auxiliary concepts, hypotheses and models.[72] His method is descriptive, but he is also aware that nowhere does the observer interfere more drastically with experiment than in psychology. Psychic experience, he says, is very difficult.[73] Likewise, he sees that in dealing with the numinous factors his feelings are challenged as much as his intellect, and that he cannot write in a coolly objective manner, but must allow his emotional subjectivity to speak.[74]

10 *Ibid.,* 11, p. 444; 11, p. 488.
7' *Ibid.,* 11, pp. 450-451.
'" *Ibid.,* 11, p. 306.
""*Ibid.,* 17, p. 86.
•• *Ibid.,* 11, p. 868.

In " Two essays of Analytic Psychology " he says that his work is a pioneer work, and often a bitter one, " hence not everything I bring forth is written out of my head, but much of it comes from the heart also, a fact I would beg the gracious reader not to overlook." [75] In " Religion and Psychology " Jung realizes that he is beyond the territory of psychology. Furthermore, he asserts that " he can throw light on theology and Sacred Scripture more than theologians." [76] He also points out that the great mistake of Freud was to tum his back on philosophy and, finally, he writes: "I fancied I was working along the best scientific lines, establishing facts, observing, classifying, describing causal and functional relations, only to discover in the end that I had involved myself in a net of reflections which extend far beyond natural science and ramify into the fields of philosophy, theology, comparative religion, and the human sciences in general. This transgression, as inevitably as it was to suspect, has caused me no little worry." [77] In other words, the work of Jung is basically empirical, sometimes partially empirical, and, on occasions, theoretical rather than empirical. It is important to bear in mind this distinction in order to give a fair evaluation to Jung's work.

But whether the work is empirical or not, we must be aware of the different approaches to religion of Jung, the theologian, and philosopher. Jung's ideas on religion are rooted in the facts observed in the experience of the numinous. With these observations in hand he speculates psychologically in order to discover the auxiliary hypotheses, explanations of the empirical facts. But it is relevant to point out that Jung not only relies on the facts of immediate experience, but also on a more or less world religious literature ranging from myth, astrology, alchemy, gnosticism, and oriental mysticism to Sacred Scripture and the dogmas of Christianity. He uses everything available to support his psychological views. Jung considers doctrines and objects

[75] *Ibid.,* 7, p. 116.

[76] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 458.

[77] C. G. JWlg, "The Spirit of Psychology" in *Spirit and Nature* (London: Ed. J. Campbell, 1955), p. 426.

which strictly belong to theology or metaphysics from another point of view: the psychological one. For instance, Christ, for theology, is God; for Jung, Christ is a symbol of the archetype of the self. Psychology and man are the pillars of Jung's approach to religion; all the rest revolves around them and is subordinated to them. He attempts to build a science of religious functions rooted and ending in man, a closed human system.

A close look at the work of Jung shows also a manifest connection between psychology and history. The nature of the psyche is fully evaluated when viewed from the historical point of view, because history is contained in each individual, especially in the archetypes of the unconscious. Jung studies history observing the behavior of the psyche, and studies the psyche analyzing its continuous manifestations through the centuries.

Scientists and philosophers accustomed to the analytic and detailed empirical approach find difficulty in reading his works, and even more difficulty in understanding them. Moreover, clarity is not Jung's special gift. As Ira Progoff remarks, Jung often gives up the reductive study of man in terms of efficient causes to adopt a teleological point of view. Jung also stresses the social approach in psychology, " whereas the psyche had previously been biological, it now becomes inherently social, and for Jung, it meant that the psyche now had to be understood in historical terms. Jung took this step and asked the question: What are the historical roots from which the contents of the psyche are derived? " '[8]

Furthermore, different points of view on God usually pose serious semantic problems. The same words may entail totally different significations. This is the case here. Jung himself is aware of its implication, as the source of bitter misunderstanding between his views and those of theology and metaphysics. " One of the main difficulties lies in the fact that both appear

[18] Ira Progofl', *lung's Psychology and its Social Meaning* (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 267.

to speak the same language, but this language calls upon their mind two totally different fields of association ... take, for instance, the word God. The theologian will naturally assume that the metaphysical *ens absolutum* is meant. For the empiricist, on the contrary, God is a mere statement, or at most an archetype." [79] For the theologian trained in traditional ways, and for the layman, the semantic problem encountered in the reading of Jung is almost insurmountable.

Is Jung's method with regard to religion totally justified? Although Jung's initial attitude claims to be neutral, it is not; it is philosophical and as old as philosophy itself. The initial rejection of a transcendent God, of the possibility of metaphysics, and of a relativistic morality, is common in the history of thought. Jung's initial attitude, although essentially Kantian, is at times more radical than that of Kant himself. Both Kant and Jung deny the possibility of the science of metaphysics. But the German philosopher compensates for this denial by means of the postulates of the practical reason. The existence of God, and the spirituality of the soul, are the starting points of Kant's ethics. Not for Jung, who sometimes maintains a relativistic idea of morality without any reference to anything but man. God and man are intimately related; but not for him, who seeing religion only from man's point of view fails to transcend the limits of human nature. There lies the incompleteness of Jung's conception. A closed system is only possible in the Creator, not in the creature; in God, not in man.

Sources and inte1·pretation of sources

Christian revelation is founded on an unusual manifestation of a transcendent God, who reveals himself to man by means of the prophets, apostles, and Christ himself. It presupposes a special intellectual illumination called "inspiration." Jung's ideas on revelation are legitimate, according to his point of view; revelation is a manifestation of the collective unconscious which manifests itself in the experience of the numinous. The starting

•• *C. W.,* 11, p. SOS.

point of his psychology is therefore empirical; the numinous experience of his patients is empirical. But to support his ideas on revelation and religious functions he uses sources which for centuries have been considered not necessarily as projections of the unconscious, but rather as conscious manifestations of man, and even as objects existing independently of human consideration. Furthermore, these sources, from myth to Sacred Scripture, are of such a variety of origin and nature that the first and most urgent need is the empirical critical evaluation of them, as well as of their applicability to the psychological problems which religion poses. The selection of the material that Jung uses is not always based on the intrinsic value of these manifold sources, but sometimes on their usefulness for supporting his ideas on religion and man.

Moreover, Jung's interpretation of these sources, although psychological, is not without difficulties. For instance, he considers Yahweh as a symbol expressing the motion of the libido of the objective psyche, according to his psychological point of view. But the theologian cannot help having misgivings concerning the plausibility of his approach because, (i) Jung's conception of how some of the books of Sacred Scripture were written, e. g., St. John's Apocalypse, differs from the Christian interpretation. (ii) Because Jung's interpretation of their contents, although claiming to be psychological is sometimes opposed to the interpretation of theologians. Consequently, he has been accused of holding heretical doctrines. Jung, sensitive to criticism, was infuriated by the imputation, and reassured the reader by saying that he asserted nothing positive or negative about the existence and nature of a transcendent God. On the contrary, he adds, " Psychology thus does the opposite of which it is aceused ... it opens people's eyes to the real meaning of dogmas, and far from destroying them, it throws open an empty house to new inhabitants." [80] His answer is partially true, but not totally convincing, because, although in theory his views and those of theologians belong to different

[80] *Ibid.,* 12, p. 15.

realms, in practice it is not always easy to keep thetn independent, or to harmonize them. For instance, theologians consider God as a Trinity; Jung's psychological approach demands a quatemity.

lung's positive philosophical attitude

Jung calls himself an empiricist, but he also says that it is impossible to write psychology without models, auxiliary concepts, and hypotheses. Hypotheses, concepts, and models are tentative principles set up by the scientist to explain facts and laws. With them scientists try to explain their respective .fields; with them Jung tries to explain man. His hypotheses are dialectical principles established to make the complex facts of human behavior understandable. Jung holds for a structure of personality based on the theory of opposites; a dynamic of personality based on the concepts of psychic energy, the law of conservation of energy, and psychic entropy. He also professes a philosophy of individuation. Jung's initial attitude, as explained before, is not neutral but philosophical. His views on the unconscious of man, on the four functions and two attitudes are philosophical. His ideas on duality and opposition, on morality and evil, on evolution, etc., are philosophical ideas that influence every one of Jung's voluminous writings.

And we do not blame him, because there is no possibility of being a psychologist without being a philosopher: " Insofar as it was purely a question of method," says Baynes, " Freud and Jung found themselves in harmony, but the study of psychological processes can never remain a mere question of method; sooner or later it must challenge the investigator to produce a philosophical standpoint. And here a basic psychological difference began to make itself felt . . . a psychology that excludes the most vital problems of life from its sphere of responsibility requires no further criticism. It is already moribund." [81] Psychology challenges the investigator, and poses the perennial and most important problems of philosophy, like morality, religion, immortality, death, suffering, passions, knowledge, and love.

[81] H. G. Baynes, in *C. W.,* 6, pp. iii-iv.

·There is something more. As Jung honestly professes, he writes with his heart as much as with his mind. Every single page of his work manifests not only facts, but also the unequivocal imprint of the man, of Jung. His erudition is phenomenal, perhaps without a par in Western tradition. But this erudition sometimes betrays him because, leaving aside any material which jeopardizes him, he selects other materials which enhance his views. The work of Jung is a mixture of facts, marvelous intuitions, philosophical concepts, amazing erudition, and the continual projection of his unusual and extraordinary personality.

Religious functions

Is it possible to investigate the religious function of man? Yes, there exists a psychology of religion simply because the phenomenon of religion is a human manifestation which psychology cannot overlook. Jung studies the religious psychological manifestation characterized by the numinous. The amount of empirical material he has gathered as a psychotherapist is so important that it is simply impossible to evaluate; perhaps it is unique in modern research in this field. He describes the properties of the numinous; the contribution of the rational and irrational factors in religious experience; the relation between the numinous and the collective unconscious; the connection between dreams and religious factors; the meaning of myth and its religious implications; the manifestation of religion according to different cultures, in the Western, world, in primitive and Oriental people&; the connection between types and their religious characterizations; the relation between ministers, priests, and the needs of the faithful; the meaning of the symbols appearing in contemplation, in addition to many other things.

Jung is indeed a pioneer in the field of religious phenomenology, but his research on the therapeutic value of religion is itself unique. Jung knows the weaknesses, passions, sufferings and problems of modern man perhaps better than any psychologist of the present century, and as a psychiatrist he was

especially interested in the connection between mental health and religion. Through the practical knowledge of thousands of patients who passed through his hands he saw the absolute necessity of religion as a factor in the integration of man. He also investigated the relationship between neurosis and religion, the function of religion in the development of human personality, and the abnormal manifestations of religion.

Scientists should consider very carefully Jung's priceless contribution to the phenomenology of religion, his best empirical work in a field which until recent years has been untouched. Neither scientists nor those engaged in pastoral theology and religious psychology can afford to ignore the material and the observations gathered by him in sixty-five years of pioneer work.

Man's ideas of God

The psychology of religion, Jung points out, is not a question of God at all, but of man's ideas of God. There are people who do have such ideas and who form such conceptions, and these things are the proper study of psychology.[82] However, we must be cautious in respect to this truth. Man's ideas of God are one thing and Jung's ideas about man's ideas of God are another. The interpretation he gives to the contents of man's ideas of God is sometimes strange to those who had such ideas. Jung, the philosopher-psychologist, interprets man's ideas of God within the framework of his own ideas of God. In this area of research his position, although very valuable, is open to doubt and requires further investigation. This occurs mainly in Jung's psychological interpretation of the content of Christian dogmas, namely, God, the Trinity, Christ, and the Holy Spirit.

Dogmas

The formulation of Christian dogmas does not entail the unveiling of the depths of our unconscious. They are expressions concerning an infinite and transcendent God, and not the archetypes of our psyche. But it is also true that our ideas of

Ao *(1. W.,* 11, p. 168, footnote.

God usually bear anthropomorphic traits of both a rational and an irrational character. The common man, even the educated one, knows a little about a spiritual God, much about a picture of him framed somewhat by his mind but more so by his senses, as well as by the irrational needs of our appetite. Jung sees only the human projection, which is not necessarily nor exclusively unconscious, and he investigates the psychological characteristic of its contents in the light of the religious literature over the centuries.

It is the relationship between dogmas and the needs of the human psyche, discovered empirically, which makes Jung's ideas of dogmas valuable. There is in man a religious instinct, endowed with energy, which finds it natural object in dogmas, especially Christian dogmas. In other words, aside from the truths about God that dogmas contain, dogmas fulfill a collective and individual psychological function related to the unconscious needs of our psyche. There is a true psychological affinity between the needs of the unconscious and the Gods formulated in dogmas. Moreover, dogmas absorb the perilous energy of the unconscious; they are like dams or walls storing and keeping its energy under control. Without the protecting walls of dogmas the energy released by the unconscious erupts into consciousness overpowering the ego of man and thus disposing the individual soul for neurosis, and even psychosis. The nations without the protecting shields of dogmas are easy prey to collective destructive ideas which in modem times have appeared exemplified as " isms," communism, Hitlerism, fascism, etc. Repression of religion, he says, presupposes mass murder on an unparalleled scale.[83]

Dogmas are the objects of faith, but the pure and exclusive intellectual surrender to an object, which, by definition, is obscure and transcends the possibility of our understanding-as are all Christian dogmas-finds no room in Jung's approach, unless it goes together with experience. St. Paul defines faith as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of

•• *Ibid.,* 7, p. 104.

things that appear not," (Reb. 11: I). Faith inclines man to assent to truths which are not apparent to the mind: the Trinity is the object of Christian faith. Thus there is always an obscurity in the act of faith which, because its object lacks evidence, needs the impulse of the will in order to give assent. For Jung the object of faith lies not in the existence of an infinite God, outside man, but rather in the contents of the collective unconscious, as they reveal themselves in consciousness: "The religious point of view, understandable enough, puts the accent on the imprinter, whereas scientific.psychology emphasizes the *typos,* the imprint-the only thing it can understand. The religious point of view understands the imprint as the working of an imprinter; the scientific point of view understands it as the symbol of an unknown and incomprehensible content." [84] Jung stresses experience, as against Christianity which stresses the intellectual surrender, even against our own feelings, as in periods of aridity, and especially in the mystic purification of faith, the dark night of the soul. But, although faith in itself depends essentially on the intellect and will-the two spiritual potencies, it is also true that it is man who believes, the whole man, and feelings and human experiences undoubtedly help the assent of the act of faith, especially in the first stages of Christian life.

God

The God of Jung is not transcendent, but it "includes the idea of the ultimate, of the first or last, of the highest or lowest." [85] Hence God is reduced to a human factor, very important, indeed, but human.

Does Jung make any distinction between God and man? It is difficult to say, since he asserts that the God-image in man is *homoouma,* namely, of the same nature as God; and not *homoiouma,* which is of similar nature. But, especially in his last years, he leaves open the possibility of the existence of a transcendent God. Jung defends himself against the critics who accuse him of deifying man saying: "I have been accused of

"'*Ibid.,* U, p. 17. [65] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 455, footnote,

"deifying' the soul. Not I but God himself has deified it ..·. I merely produce the facts which prove the soul is *naturaliter religiosa."* [86] We are in sympathy with him; he is not deifying the soul, but perhaps humanizing God, because religious ex-' perience, religious factors, and Gods themselves, do not transcend the human domain. They are considered as human psychological factors, leaving unsolved their relationship to a personal God. It is more difficult to follow Jung when he invests God with the properties of omniscence, eternity, and other attributes of this kind, unless we strip these words of their traditional meaning. These attributes belong exclusively to a transcendent and infinite God.

The psyche is evolving, consequently, God, the expression of its contents, is evolving also. Yahweh is an unconscious God of dual nature, evil and good, just and unjust, light and dark. The starting point of the redemption is not sin but the confrontation of an unjust God, Yahweh, with a just man, Job. Man is more just and conscious than God, therefore God must incarnate both in order to obtain a greater consciousness and redress the wrong done to Job.

Are these ideas then a symbolic expression of the process of individuation? For Jung, yes; but are they also the conception of the author of the Book of Job? Certainly not; the Book of Job confronts a just man with the mysteries of the Providence of God, which are beyond human understanding. Jung prefers his own to the traditional interpretation. But it is not sufficient to resort to psychology in order to justify his views, because that would imply that this Book symbolizes the motions of the collective unconscious of the writer, a principle impossible to prove empirically. Jung himself is aware of the implications of his views. He says: " The idea of a God has become burningly topical. It is no longer a problem of experts in theology seminaries, but a universal religious nightmare . . . the layman in theology like myself-must make a contribution." [87]

Again, interpreting the Book of Revelation Jung asserts that

[88] *Ibid.,* U, pp. [87] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 458.

the psychotherapist has more to say on these matters (the visions of St. John) than the theologian. Consequently, the irritation of theologians who accuse Jung of intruding into their field is understandable, although their interpretation of Jung's ideas is usually wrong. Reading Jung's "Answer to Job," we do not know much about Yahweh or Job, but we certainly know a great deal about Jung's ideas and personality. What Jung actually attempts is to pose and to solve the thorny problem of evil. He chooses the Book of Job simply because this book affords him the opportunity to expand his ideas. His interpretation is unique, astonishing to the neutral reader unaware of the problem of the unconscious.

Jung's attitude is human, understandable; he sees and touches evil; he witnesses wars, proverty, injustice, murder, tragedy, suffering, neurosis and death. No wonder, if driven by his feelings, he rejects St. Augustine's formula of evil as *"privatio boni."* His approach is not metaphysical and abstract, but rather psychological and concrete; he speaks from his heart, even from his passions. The Augustinian solution teaches him nothing.

The belief of Jung in the existence of evil is natural, even logical. But less natural and logical is the solution he proposes through duality and opposition. Evil is a positive factor and as essential for man as is good; without evil there is no opposition nor tension and consequently no psychic energy. Therefore we have to assimilate evil as we assimilate good. Here Jung is a tentative philosopher groping in the dark. As he humbly confesses, he lacks the power of abstraction, so important in philosophical thought.

Trinity

The dogma of the Trinity, psychologically speaking, is a symbol representing the process of the collective unconscious towards consciousness. The projection of the Trinity presupposes a developed consciousness which is non-existent in archaic man, whose unconscious projections are myths. The Trinity is the outcome of the natural evolution stemming from myth in

the same way as modern man is the natural evolution of archaic man.

The study of myth and its relationship to religion is very important in Jung's writings. His contribution in the study of this factor is original and important. But insofar as dogmas go, Christians look with skepticism at the idea that the mystery of the Trinity symbolizes the process of assimilation of the unconscious by the ego. It is true that Jung is always coming up against the misunderstanding "that a psychological treatment reduces God to 'nothing but' psychology." [88] But is it possible to harmonize the two viewpoints, namely, the psychological and the theological? The theologian considers the Trinity as existent outside man and the universe and only known by external revelation. Jung considers the Trinity, however, as the projection of a psychological unconscious process, and known by internal revelation; as if a little Trinity were hidden in the inner recesses of our psyche. Jung's treatment is essentially an unconscious process, as against St. Augustine's interpretation which finds in knowledge and love the analogy of the Trinitarian formula. Are both points of view harmonious? Perhaps, if we remember that Jung sees in the Trinity not a dogmatic formula expressing the nature of God, but rather a psychological symbol which expresses the needs of the Christian psyche.

But the theologian rejects as false the idea of a quaternity, which Jung claims to be the voice of nature. The Trinity should be a quaternity, he says, because Satan—the dark part of God—or Mary—the feminine partner—are missing. The proof that Jung provides, in spite of the amount of material ranging from literature to alchemy and gnosticism, bears no conviction. Why? Because Jung rejects as invalid a much more important wealth of material supporting the Trinity, namely, all the writings of the Fathers and almost twenty centuries of Christian theology. Jung, moreover, adduces gnosticism and alchemy, plus his own personal interpretation, to prove his

[88] *Ibid.,* 11, p. 163, footnote.

point. But both E. J. Homyard and H. E. Stapleton, the former a specialist in alchemy, the latter in magic circles, deny the importance of the number four.[89] The operations of the unconscious do not prove the inadequacy of the Trinity. The visions of the mystics were always Trinitarian, and the presence of the Trinity in the soul of Christians not only is a dogmatic truth, but also a mystery experienced experimentally by a multitude of souls.

Christ

The historical Christ is irrelevant for Jung. But Christ as a symbol of the archetype of the self is the living myth of our culture. His miraculous life expresses faithfully the needs and motions of the collective psyche. The life of Christ is, consequently, collective, embodying myth as constituting the quintessence of the Gospels.

What can be said about this unusual conception of Christ? Reading " Psychology and Religion," and especially " Aion," one cannot help admiring Jung's tremendous erudition. But his style is so obscure and the materials he chooses so diverse that the reader ends up quite perplexed. We subscribe, however, to his conclusion, that the life of Christ is in perfect harmony with the needs of the unconscious, and even that there are probably mythical elements in the Gospels. But to identify, for instance, the mythical death of the hero with Christ's death is, in Jungian terms, equivalent to saying that Christ's death symbolizes the regression of the libido into the unconscious. His resurrection, likewise, is a symbol of the coming into consciousness of the contents of the collective unconscious. Jung's psychological treatment, if partially true, is relevant to psychology, but of little bearing for the believer. It is chiefly the reflective and conscious consideration of the life of Christ which attracts Christians to the Redeemer: his doctrines, his wisdom, his evangelic life, his miracles, his compassion and love, his mercy, his poverty, his self denial, and the panorama of the beatitudes,

[89] E. J. Holmyard & H. E. Stapleton, Cited by H. L. Philp, *op. cit.,* p. 74-75.

The message of Christ appeals to the unconscious, but chiefly to the ego, as a symbol of everything good and worthy in life.

Christians are surprised by Jung's ideas on the incarnation. The purpose of the coming of Christ is not the redemption of mankind from sin. Rather, he comes to beg the help of man in order to acquire a greater consciousness, arid to redress the injustice done to Job by an unconscious God. Where is the root of the psychological interpretation to be found here? In individuation, because the unconscious-which represents the divinity of Christ-and the ego-which represents his humanity -have to endure struggles and sufferings in order to acquire wholeness. The sufferings of Christ symbolize these sufferings; his humanity (the ego) is suffering the tension and the opposition of his divinity (the unconscious).

But Jung's own words seem sometimes to be a dire_ct denial of the traditional interpretation, as, for instance, in this passage taken from" Psychology and Alchemy": "whereas Catholicism emphasizes the effectual presence of Christ, alchemy is interested in the fate and manifest redemption of substances, for in them the divine soul lies captive and waits redemption . . . the captive soul appears in the form of the ' Son of God.' For the alchemist, the one primarily in need of redemption is not man, but the deity who is sleeping in matter .... His attention is not directed to his own salvation through God's grace, but to the liberation of God from the darkness of matter." [90]

Moreover, since in the practical realm the process of individuation entails the necessity of withdrawing the projection from the figure of the Redeemer, Jungians and Christians in the end follow different roads leading them to their goals. For Christians, Christ is the way, the truth, and life, hence his imitation is their goal. Jungians treat dogmas as projections of the contents of the objective psyche; their goal, therefore, is not an external Redeemer, but wholeness.[91] The withdrawal of

[90] *C. W.,* 12, 299.

[91] Cary F. Baynes, in C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (New York: Harvest Books, 1988), p. viii.

the external projection, however, is only possible to a few exceptional individuals.

Individuation

Jung offers his ideas on individuation as the solution to the problems puzzling modern man. Current religions are good, but incomplete. Atheism is not the answer; man is his own healer and his own goal. And to develop the human personality the religious factor is the most important factor leading toward's individuation. But his presentation of individuation is obscure, and it is difficult to express his views, and to do justice to them. The root of the obscurity resides in Jung himself and in the difficulty of the subject. The goal he tries to offer lies beyond the sphere of empirical psychology and religious phenomenology.

Many have violently attacked Jung's ideas on individuation, especially Glover, who says that it is impossible to convey to the reader the immense wordiness, confusion, contradictions, and nebulosity in Jung's ideas on individuation. These words are unfair, although there is a certain obscurity and nebulosity in some of Jung's ideas, especially in the last stages of the process. For instance, Jolande Jacobi says that the archetypes of the" old wise man" and "magna mater" are: "primordial images representing in man materialized spirit, in woman matter impregnated with spirit. . . ." [92] What is that?

Jung divinizes man in the sense that he finds not in God, but in man himself, in the self, the solution for the problems haunting modern man. His religion is in this sense too human; he leaves unsolved the burning question of the relationship between religious experience and the existence of a transcendent God. He teaches us the necessity and importance of religion in our lives, but he refuses to go beyond man himself.

ANTONIO MORENO, O.P.

St. Albert's College,
Oakland, California

•• Jolande Jacobi, *The Psychology of C. G. Jung* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 165.

ECUMENISM IN LOGIC

THAT THERE exists today not a little opposition, bordering on hostility, between two major schools of Logic, the Traditional and Non-Traditional, is no big secret in the academic world.[1] In other domains of erudition similar situations are prevalent. It is an experiential fact that opposition can at times be a healthy sign; at other times it is a phenomenon that is quite understandable. Yet, whenever opponents' views are frequently dismissed as puerile or subjected to ridicule, the chasm between camps only widens. This is one of the major problems today in the field of Logic.[2] But it is not an insoluble one, for polemics is never a good substitute for genuine proof.

In our view the animosity between the major schools of Logic is triggered and fostered by those who neglect or refuse to ·praise others for their contributions to the development of the " art of arts." There are some logicians who are of the opinion that Logic reached its apogee with Aristotle and the medieval Scholastics; others believe that Logic did not start until a century ago with the insights and writings of Boole, Frege, and Peano. By viewing Modern Logic as only a sophisticated amalgam of higher Mathematics, as many members of the Traditional school are wont to do, these latter tend to avoid any serious acquaintance with its general principles, techniques, and alleged benefits. On the other hand, not a few members of the Non-Traditional school are altogether too willing to scrap Traditional logic without any sort of personal investigation into the matter. In light of its many contributions to the evolution of Logic, it is unfair to dismiss Traditional logic as

[1] Cf. *An Introduction to Logic,* by M. Cohen and E. Nagel, especially page v of the Preface and Chapter IX (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.-London, 1968) .

[2] Cf. *A History of Formal Logic,* by Fr. I. M. Bochenski, O. P. Trans!. by Fr. lvo Thomas, O. P. (Notre Dame Press, 1961), pp. 5-18.

monolithic or as a system of mere historical value. In either milieu not much listening to the " other side " goes on; yet listening to the " other side " is often the first step to the solution of a problem of this scope. Because of this communications gap, the Traditional school will not be made aware that it probably is, as is alleged, *too philosophically-oriented;* and the Non-Traditional school will continue to claim naively that it is *philosophically neutral,* which it is not, as Fr. Bochenski observes: ", .. for never before have formal logicians been *so* divided by mutually opposed philosophies as here. We need only instance Frege's outspoken Platonism, and Boole's nominalism and even psychologism . . . . " R The truth of other charges would probably escape both schools.

Positive measures, then, are necessary if a solution is to be had soon. Perhaps logicians of both major schools of Logic should make it their business to learn something from the ecumenical efforts being mutually carried on today by leaders of Christian and Non-Christian sects. They are seriously trying to understand and appreciate each other's views in many areas of religion. Actually, in the last fifteen years some appeals for ecumenism in Logic have been made by stalwart logicians of both schools:

... The exaggerated notion of the cleavage between the old and new logic fosters the very ignorance which engenders it. Scholars engrossed in the logical tradition tend to be unaware of the degree to which old results with which they are familiar have come to be integrated into the modern science of logic; ...

. . . But if it is deplorable to exaggerate the cleavage between the old and the new logic, it would be yet more deplorable to underestimate the novelty and importance of the new . . . . It behooves scholars interested in any phase of logic to acquaint themselves with the fully scientific stage of their subject; and it behooves the elaborators of this growing structure to acquaint themselves with the long tradition whose hither end they are helping to fashion.[4]

• Bochenski, *op. cit.,* pp.

• W. V. Quine's Preface to *Conventional Logic and Modern Logic,* by Fr. J. T. Clark, S. J., Ph. D. (Publ. Woodstock Coli. Press).

> ... The decision as to which group's theory will prevail, depends ultimately on the truth of the matter. However, the possibility of a rapprochement between the two rests as much on the Aristotelian iogician as it does on the Mathematical logician. If both sides decide upon a sniping campaign which will consist solely in exposing genuine flaws or feigned short-comings in each system, then the ugly gap that has separated philosophy and modern science will open between the old logic and the new.... [5]

These words imply both a warning and a challenge to all responsible logicians. The warning should no longer go unheeded. To this important challenge we hope to offer a modest response. We shall try to show quite simply that it is not impossible for the logicians of the " opposed camps " to gain a better understanding of and appreciation for each other's brand of Logic. In initiating such a *dialogue* we have designedly chosen the area of the *Non-Categorical Syllogism* for two reasons: (1) because it is so central a topic in both schools of Logic; (2) because it is a subject that lends itself to a worthwhile comparative study much more easily than many others. As a consequence, it will be more likely that our chief purpose here will be more perfectly realizable. It is also hoped that others may be stimulated to face up to this ecumenical challenge m even more difficult areas in the universe of discourse.

* * * * *

Because they are *extremes* in the same logical genus, the Categorical and Non-Categorical syllogistic forms have a polarity of major differences. Yet they do have very much in common: e. g., their inferential character, their logical purposes, their partial composition. Because the Non-Categorical syllogism is usually composed of some Categorical propositions, and because in Traditional Logic the treatise on the Non-Categorical syllogistic pedagogically follows the treatise on the Categorical syllogistic, it would seem feasible here to present

• *Whitehead's Concupt of Logic,* by Fr. Raymond Smith, O. P. (Thomistic Studies #6, The Newman Press), pp. 1, 175-177.

the reader in capsule form some of the salient features of the Categorical type of argumentation. With such an orientation it is hoped that the treatise on the Non-Categorical syllogistic will be more understandable.

Historians of Logic are almost unanimous in crediting Aristotle as the *inventor* of the syllogism. However, like most inventors, he was not totally original. There is strong historical basis for the opinion currently in vogue that in no small way his theory of the syllogism reflects a dual influence: (1) the propositional technique so well worked out by Eudoxus (400-347 B. C.) ; and (2) the methodology employed so often throughout the dialogues of his teacher, Plato. For such pioneering efforts in the development of the syllogistic the Stagirite has been highly praised by many internationally-recognized contemporary scholars in the field of Logic, and even hailed as the " originator of formal logic." [6] Over the centuries Aristotle's theory of the syllogism has also had its share of critics-some of whom were more bitter than constructive.[7]

His formal presentation of the syllogistic can be found in the early chapters of his *Prio1·Analytios* I, which in the course of history has been subjected to interpretations with many shades of difference.[8] Like every genuine syllogism, the Categorical syllogism is a perfect composite expression (because it generates a complete meaning) in which, certain things being

[6] Cf. *Aristotle's Pri01· and Posterio1· Analytics* (Greek text, with introd. and commentary), by Sir W. D. Ross (Oxford University Press: London, 1957), pp. !l4, !l9; also *ibid.* (Bochenski) , pp. 70-71.

[7] Cf. the *writings* of the Stoics, Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, I. Kant, A. de Morgan, John of St. Thomas, Peter of Spain, C. S. Peirce, Ivo Thomas, J. Lukasiewicz, A. N. Prior, and H. Veatch, and many others. But these authors will give a good cross section of the criticism.

[8] Cf. *Formal Logic,* by A. N. Prior (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1955), p. 116, in which he strongly disagrees with the statements expressed by Jan Lukasiewicz in his monumental work, *Aristotle's Syllogistic* (2nd edit.) : ". . . the implicative forms which Aristotle uses are a perfectly natural way of talking about syllogisms (asserting their validity), but a statement *about* a syllogism is not itself a syllogism; and on the few occasions when Aristotle gives actual examples which he calls syllogisms, they are *not* implications, but inferences."

given, other things will tend to follow necessarily.[9] Such a form of discourse is generally to be constructed of three simple propositions or "truth-value" statements, which are to be mutually related as to the content-matter signified by the concrete terms or as to the supposition involved in the term-variables employed as the *extremes* in the propositional formulae.[10] An example of the former employing concrete terms would be: All Logicians Are Not Geniuses; an example of the latter employing term variables would be: Some A Are Not B. In Non-Traditional Logic it is stylish to call the Categorical proposition an *atomic* proposition, insofar as it does not contain any kind of " sentential connective," i. e., a propositional copula, e. g., " if . . . then. . . ."[11] However, unlike the Categorical syllogism, in which the propositional-Terms are so intimately interrelated (i.e., the Major and Minor extremes with the Middle term), the Non-Categorical syllogism is characterized by the *formal connection* between the propositions in the Antecedent and the Consequent. This is a radical difference. This difference, in turn, is the basic reason for the two sets of proximate logical norms employed in Traditional Logic for determining the probative value of arguments cast in these different syllogistic forms.

The Non-Categorical syllogism has, more or less, a standardized form: i.e., the Major premiss will usually be a Non-Categorical proposition, the Minor premiss and the Consequent (Conclusion) will usually be Categorical propositions. These will be its most common notes of identification. Since this is the logical framework in which the Non-Categorical syllogism is commonly cast, any differences in structure would be merely accidental, in the sense of being more complex. The *type* of Non-Categorical syllogism will be ordinarily determined by the kind of Non-Categorical proposition found m its Major premiss.

[9] Cf. Aristotle's *Prior Analytics,* I, chap. 1.

[10] Cf. *ibid.,* chaps. 1-4; also *Posterior Analytics,* IT, chap. 16 where he writes: " All vines are deciduous," etc.

[11] *Introduction to Logic,* by PatriCk Suppes, p. 12.

Non-Categorical propositions, known also in Traditional Logic as Hypothetical propositions, can take many different forms.[12] Yet they all are similar insofar as each is a perfect composite meaningful statement signifying more than one mental judgment and declaring something to be either True or False. In its normal shape the Non-Categorical proposition openly appears to be nothing else than two or more *atomic* statements concatenated by a sentential copula, as " if . . . then": e. g.," If (you ask the Father anything in My name), then (He will give it to you)." These types of complex statements have, according to Aristotle, a very definite *unity,* but not as perfect a unity as that possessed by the Categorical proposition itsel£.[18]

For the most part, Non-Categorical statements are easily recognizable as their sentential connectives are usually quite manifest; however, those called *exponibles* do not appear at first to be Non-Categorical.[14] Traditionally, Non-Categorical propositions fall into three distinct classes because of their different logical forms: (1) the Conjunction, (fl) the Disjunction, (3) the Conditional. The Conjunctive proposition is indicated always by such sentential-connectives as: *and, 1TW'!'e-over, but,* etc.: e. g., "God hates sin, *but* He loves the sinner." The Disjunctive proposition (sometimes called Alternation) is generally discernible because it contains some version of the

[12] *Summulae Logicales,* Tract 1, pp. 7-8 (Marietti; author's translation), by Peter of Spain, (Pope John XXI) : "... this follows concerning the hypothetical proposition. It is that type of proposition which has two categorical statements as its own subordinate principal parts, as " if man runs, man is moved." And it is called " hypothetical " from the word *hypos* which means " under " and *thesis* which means "position," as if *suppositive,* because one part is placed under the other. Of hypothetical propositions one is conditional, another is copulative, still another is disjunctive. . . ."

[18] Cf. Aristotle's *Perihermeneia* (On Interpretation), chap. *5.*

[u] *Exponibles* are really disguised Compound or Non-Categorical prop<isitions, containing such words as *only, except, insofar as,* e. g., *"Only* men have a sense of humor "; " No college students, *except* the vegetarians, are obese"; " Men, *insofar as* they can perceive relationships, exhibit the power of ratiocinating." These statements can ultimately be reduced to some conventional form of the normal Non-Categorical propositional-form, and, therefore, need no special consideration.

sentential-connective, *"either ... or ..."* : e. g., *"Either* you will hate the one, *or* love the other." The Conditional proposition (not infrequently called Material Implication in Modern Logic) usually employs some form of the sentential-connective, " *if . . . then . . .*": e. g., " *If* anyone is deaf, *then* a hearing aid might prove helpful." It might be well to mention here that, despite the difficulties occasioned by the *truth-tables* of Modern Logic, the views of the Traditional and Non-Traditional schools concerning the "truth-values" of these classes of Non-Categorical propositions are very similar, as is evident in the following passage:

. . . For the *truth of the Conditional* it is exigent that the Antecedent not be able to be true without the Consequent, as " if man is, then animal is"; whence every *true* Conditional is necessary, and every *false* Conditional is impossible. However, for *its falsity,* it suffices that the Antecedent can be true without a true Consequent, as " if man is, then he is white." For the *truth of the Copulative* it it necessary that both parts be true, as " God exists, and, Man is an animal." For *its falsity* it is enough that one part be false, as " Man is an animal, and, a horse is a stone." For the *truth of the Disjunctive* it is sufficient that one part be true, as " Man is an animal, or, a raven is a stone." It is also permissible that both parts of it be true, but not so properly, as " Man is an animal, or, a horse is capable of whinnying." For *its falsity* it suffices that both parts be false, as " Man is not an animal, or, a horse is a stone." [15]

In every genuine Non-Categorical syllogism, then, one can expect to find that the Major premiss will have some one form (or combination of such forms)' of these manifestly Non-Categorical propositions. Regardless of their distinctive structure and functional differences, all Non-Categorical syllogisms will have this common element. Another likeness in this kind of syllogistic-form will be that, both in the minor premiss and in the Conclusion, there will appear an atomic or categorical proposition which in some way will be related *operationally* to, (i. e., positing or destroying) its Major premiss: e. g., " *If* Communists are deceivers, *then* they are immoral; *bu,t,*

[15] *Summulae Loaicales.* Tract 1, p. 8 (Marietti Edit.), by Peter of Spain.

Communists are deceivers; *thm·efore,* they are not immoral." In this example the Minor premiss (Communists are deceivers) is said to have *posited* (i.e., affirmed) one part of the Major premiss, namely, the Antecedent, by restating it as it is written; at the same time, the other part of the Major premiss, namely, the Consequent, is being *destroyed* (i.e., denied) in the Conclusion. It is obvious that there is a logical blunder in the above example because of an operational infraction of a logical law of validity. Logical laws forbid indiscriminate positings and denyings; valid procedures in Logic are far from being arbitrary. For Non-Categorical syllogisms to be of any worthwhile logical value, special logical norms governing operational procedures for each kind of Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms must be rigorously observed. Since the most common forms of Non-Categorical arguments are the Conditional and the Disjunctive, or are reducible to these, they will receive a more detailed treatment than the Conjunctive syllogistic. The Conjunctive syllogism also deserves only a minimal consideration because of its real and/or apparent lack of implicational being.

Of all the compound or hypothetical forms of the syllogism, the *Conditional* is generally considered by logicians to be the most commonly used in everyday social discourse. Perhaps the basis for such a judgment is the undeniable fact that the human mind has such a natural proclivity to draw out implications or inferences from most statements. Since the Conditional Syllogism must contain a Conditional proposition in its Major premiss, such a propositional-form is essentially composed of two parts, technically known as the *Antecedent* and the *Consequent.* That the Antecedent be first in place in a compound statement is not absolutely necessary, though most frequently that will be its position. It can easily be detected in a statement, for it will be the proposition containing the *condition* and be ordinarily preceded by the particle, " if " : e. g., "*If* the Congo's deeply-rooted political problems are solved, *then* African unity will soon be a reality." Sometimes, however, the particle, " if," is merely implied in conditional statements. In such instance it may be less easy to identify:

e. g., *"Had I known you wanted to go to* MY FAIR LADY, I would have bought you a ticket." The Consequent, on the other hand, will generally signify what results or does not result from the fulfillment or the non-fulfillment of the earlier condition, and will be preceded usually by the particle " then," as was seen above.

Besides having some sort of a Conditional propositional-form as its Major premiss, the Conditional syllogism will necessarily have its Minor premiss and its Conclusions structured from Categorical statements *logically operating* on the parts of the Major premiss-i.e., by affirming or denying. Though some syllogistic arguments may appear to be Non-Categorical, they are not strictly speaking considered to be so, unless the above conditions are satisfied. Ordinarily, such synthetic hypothetical syllogisms are easily reducible to the normal Categorical syllogistic-form: e. g.,

> *If* M is, *then* N is;
> @ If 0 is, then M is;
> *Therefore:* If 0 is, then N is.

This is *reducible* to:

> (If) All M is N;
> (and if) All 0 is M;
> (Then- Therefore) : All 0 is N.

Prior to actually exposing the canons of validity, proper to the Conditional syllogism, it might be feasible to inform the Non-Traditionally oriented logician that a normal Conditional statement for the Traditional school of Logic is not formed merely from any two or more causally unrelated atomic propositions haphazardly joined together by the sentential-connective," i£ ... then .... " Rather, the Traditional logician tends to look for some necessary and/ or causal dependence of the Consequent on the Antecedent: e. g., "If you fool with fire, then you will be burned." In other words, the Traditional school of Logic tends to view *implications* to be quite *formal*

in character. From such a frame of reference very many of the Material Implications of Non-Traditional Logic are considered by the Traditional logician only in a *per accidens* mode. Subsequently it will be shown why the Non-Traditional school of Logic is inclined to give such emphasis to *material implication* and simultaneously to minimize the importance of the *causal nexus* between the Consequent and the Antecedent in the standard propositional and syllogistic forms involving Conditionals. Its close affinity with Mathematics is one of the basic reasons, because physical causality is not the natural concern of sciences in that degree of abstraction. This type of implication is not a creation of Modern Logic, as so many erroneously think, but is really as old as the ancient Stoic logicians.[16] Material implication may be typically exemplified by this proposition: "If Judas had not betrayed Christ, then it is snowing out." As to an appraisal of the validity of syllogistic arguments involving any kind of *material implicational* statements, the " informed " Traditional logician is not less capable of appreciating their logical shape or structure than is the Non-Traditional logician. However, in so doing, the Traditional logician is in no way agreeing that statements are *true* merely because someone arbitrarily assigns such a " truth-value " to them. Truth is a relationship with much deeper roots!

Experience has frequently made us aware that not every Conditional syllogistic argument is logically valid. This defect is usually brought about by some logically wrong operational procedure involving the Minor premiss and/or the Consequent as related to the Major premiss of the syllogism. Though each of these atomic propositions can posit or each can destroy either part, or both parts, of the syllogism's Major premiss, still the choice of proceeding validly is very limited for both the Minor premiss and the Conclusion. Even the *seqnerwe* of these logical functions performed in by each of

[16] Cf. *Method8 of Logic* (Henry Holt & Co.: New York, 1955), by W. V. Quine; pp. 12, 17.

these Categorical propositions is extremely important. The key to every valid operation in the Conditional syllogistic is primarily with the Minor premiss, for the Conclusion should follow its direction. To function validly, the Minor premiss must *posit* (i.e., affirm) in a standardized way, and must *destroy* (i.e., deny) in a standardized way. Otherwise, the syllogistic-form will inevitably be logically defective for it will have violated a basic rule of logical reasoning, as happens when anyone commits the *fallacy of affirming the consequent* [17]: " When two things are so related to each other, that if the one is, the other by necessity is, then if the latter is not, the former will not be either; but if the latter is, it is not necessary that the former should be." The two simple rules every valid Conditional syllogism must satisfy may be formally stated in this manner:

a) *If the Minar premiss" posits" (affirms),* it must *affirm the Antecedent of the Major premiss,* and then the Conclusion must affirm the Consequent of the Major premiss: e. g.,

If M is N, *then* 0 is P;
(anteced.) (conseqt.)
@ M is N (the Antecedent is identically restated) ; *then-therefore:* 0 is P (the Conseqt. is identically restated).

and

If M is not N, *then* 0 is not P;
(anteced.) (conseqt.)
@ M *is not* N (the Anteced. is identically repeated); *then-therefore:* 0 *is not* P (the Conseqt. is identically repeated).

b) *If the Minor premiss "destroys" (denies),* it must *deny the Consequent of the Major premiss,* and then the Conclusion must deny the Antecedent of the Major premiss: e.g.,

If M is N, *then* 0 is P;
(anteced.) (conseqt.)

[17] Cf. Aristotle's *Prior Analytica,* chap. 4; also his *De SCYph. Elen.,* chap. 5.

@ 0 *is not* P (the Conseqt. is negated, contradicted) ; *then-therefore:* M *is not* N (the Anteced. is also negated).

and

If M is not N, *then* 0 is not P;
(anteced.) (conseqt.)

@ 0 *i.'l* P (the Conseqt. is negated, contradicted); *then-therefore:* M *is* N (the Anteced. is negated, contradicted) .

In the concrete these rules are not difficult to understand. (a) asserts simply that it would be a logically invalid procedure to infer conversely the fulfillment of any of the many possible or specific conditions in the Antecedent, for there would be no real or logical assurance that one depended on the other: e. g., "*If* I fall asleep (go to the cinema; watch T-V, etc.), *then* I will flunk the semester examination; but, I did flunk the semester examination; therefore, I fell asleep." Both the Traditional and Non-Traditional schools of Logic are in substantial agreement with the soundness of the logical law *invalidating* such an argument-form. This law is traditionally known as the *modus ponens.* (b) states that the non-fulfillment of the Consequent of the Major premiss reasonably allows for the inference of any one or even of all of its possible conditions in the Antecedent, insofar as the Consequent *did not de facto occur* and none of the alleged conditions which would induce the Consequent were fulfilled: e. g., "*If* I overeat, *then* I shall get sick; but, *(de facto)* I *did not get sick;* therefore, I *did not overeat."* Both the Traditional and Non-Traditional schools of Logic are also in complete accord as regards the soundness of the logical law *validating* this argument-form. It is traditionally known as the *modus tollens.* Further on these two logical laws will be shown to be valid or tautologous by means of a rather modern logical device used often as a decisional procedure and known as the *truth-table method.*

Like all Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms, the Disjunctive syllogism also has a genuine Non-Categorical proposition as its Major premiss and both its Minor premiss and its Conclusion will be a Categorical proposition. The Non-Categorical

proposition in the Major premiss will always be Disjunctive in its structure, insofar as it will be made up of two or more atomic statements joined together by the special sentential-connective, "either ... or ... ": e. g., *"Either* Russian ships approaching Cuba will submit to being searched, *or* they will be sunk." In order that there might be unity in this syllogistic form, as was also necessary in the Conditional, its Minor premiss and its Conclusion must be operationally related to the constituent parts of the Major premiss. The Disjunctive syllogistic, taken strictly, always contains a Major premiss which asserts that *one and only one* of the two or more disjuncts is *true.* This is so because of the mutual incompatibility that exists really between the disjuncts, i. e., *at least one of them is true and only one of them is true:* e. g., *"Either* you will pass this final examination, *or* you will flunk for the semester." However, there is no orderly sequence that has to be followed for validity by the Minor premiss and the Conclusion as regards their proper functions of positing and destroying in relation to the Major premiss. Because the disjuncts are usually so fundamentally opposed, the rule for proceeding validly is quite simply expressed in this manner: *If one part of the Major premiss is affirmed in the Minor premiss, the other part must be denied in the Conclusion;* and, *If one part of the Major premiss is denied in the Minor premiss, the other part must be affirmed or posited in the Conclusion:* e.g.,

(i) *Either* John passes the final exam, *or* he flunks for the the semester;
@ John does *pass* the final exam;
Therefore; he *does not flunk* for the semester.

(ii) *Either* John passes the final exam, *or* he flunks for the the semester;
@ John *does not pass* the final exam;
Therefore; he *does flunk* for the semester.

That there are two vastly different types of Disjunction is not a discovery of modern logicians, as some logicians mis-

takenly think. The history .of Logic shows unequivocally that even in Megarian-Stoic Logic this logical phenomenon was recognized/ [8] The strict or pure Disjunctive syllogism is often referred to as the Exclusive Disjunctive and even in Non-Traditional Logic it is often given a separate consideration as a *tmth-function.* However, by far the more popular type of Disjunction is called *weak* or *Non-Exclusive.* Usually the Non-Exclusive Disjunctive syllogistic will contain a Major premiss that has an *incomplete* list of alternatives, *one of which at least* will be *tme.* Not infrequently it happens that two or more of the alternatives may be *tme;* e. g., *"Either* you can have lobster, *or* some southern-fried chicken, *or,* a full course steak dinner"; again," *Either* one can fly from Chicago to New York, *or* walk, *or* take a train, *or* even drive over the new highways." Sometimes this type of syllogistic-form is called Alternation; historically it was known as the *quasi-Disjunctive* syllogism.[19]

Unlike the Exclusive Disjunctive syllogistic-form, in its valid formulation the Non-Exclusive Disjunctive syllogism is quite standardized as to its *sequence* of positing and destroying. In this *weak* kind of Disjunction, because an *alternate* is affirmed (i. e., posited) , it does not lead one validly to conclude to an outright denial (i.e., destroying) of the other alternate or even alternates: e. g., *"Either* the cross-country varsity won, *or* it lost the race; *but,* it did not win; therefore, it lost the race." Such a conclusion is factually unwarranted and logically invalid, for the possibilities (i.e., the alternates) of the outcome were insufficiently stated, since the varsity team could have *tied.* Thus, the proper sequence of logical operations (i. e., positing and destroying), if the Alternative syllogistic is to be valid, is for the *Minor premiss first to deny or destroy one part of the Major premiss, and then for the Conclusion to affirm or posit the other part* (s) : e. g.,

> Lloyd is *either* in the Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, *0'1'* Air Force;

[18] Cf. Bochenski, *op. cit.,* pp. 119-1!W. [19] Cf. W. V. Quine, *op. cit.,* pp. 11-18;

@ Lloyd *is not* a Marine;
Therefore: He is either in the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, *or* Air Force.

Only a brief treatment is to be given to the Conjunctive syllogistic-form, for it is the least common of the Non-Categorical syllogisms. Like all the other Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms, the Conjunctive syllogism (some times called the Copulative) will ordinarily have a Major premiss composed of two or more atomic statements joined together in a unit by a special sentential-connective: *and, moreover, but,* etc.: e. g., "John Kennedy was assassinated *and* Johnson took the oath of the Presidency in the airplane a few hours later." Generally, its Minor premiss and its Conclusion will be atomic or categorical propositions, related to the Major premiss both in content-matter and by some type of logical operation, i. e., either positing or destroying, or both. However, in this syllogistic-form, ifit is to be valid, only the *positing* (i.e., affirming) of the parts constituting the Major premiss is permissible, for *in every conjunctive proposition all the parts must be true if the proposition as a whole is to have the value of truth.* The Traditional and Non-Traditional schools of Logic are quite unanimous in their agreement on this point; the latter school customarily shows this most clearly in its definition of the conjunctive *functor* by the *truth-table* method. This will be exhibited later.

The *implicational* features of Conjunctive syllogisms become most apparent when they are re-cast into the more common types of the Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms already treated. After such reconstructions, however, their validity is then regulated by the norms proper to that syllogistic-form: e. g.,

"John Kennedy was assassinated, *and*
Johnson took the oath of theJ Presidency in the airplane."
N. B. Both conjuncts are *true* (de facto) .

Reccmstructed: "It is false that *either* John Kennedy *was not* assassinated, *or* that Johnson *did not take the oath* of the Presidency in the airplane."

N. B. It is false that either disjunct is *false.* The rest of argument would be subject to the rules of validity governing the Disjunctive syllogistic.

Thus we conclude the Traditional presentation of the Compound or the Non-Categorical syllogistic. That such a presentation can be definitely complemented and perfected by some formal features studied by the Non-Traditional school of Logic will be shown in the remainder of this comparison.

* * * * *

Before presenting some of the more common techniques employed by Non-Traditional logicians in appraising the logical value of very many Compound arguments, some form of introduction to the Non-Traditional school of Logic seems to be both feasible and necessary. This orientation is chiefly for those who are not too well-acquainted with thiS' relatively new kind of Logic. This introduction will consist of a somewhat brief and simple exposition of this New Logic, as it is sometimes called, in the following areas: (1) its distinctive features, (2) its salient purposes, (8) its historical genesis and evolution, and (4) its basic elements.

The Non-Traditional school of Logic has, since the turn of the century, outstripped by far all other schools of Logic both in popularity and prestige. This is a fact that in fairness cannot be denied by the " informed " members of the Traditional school of Logic. In some ways it is quite a departure from Traditional Logic, and for many reasons it is rightly labeled THE NEW LOGIC. It is also known as *theoretical logic, mathematical logic, exact logic, symbolic logic,* and *modem logic.* Each of these labels reflects some facet of this novel brand of Logic. Like so many others, the writer tends to prefer *mathematical logic* as its most fitting name. This choice of name is based on the fact that Non-Traditional Logic has *four* features which really distinguish it from all other kinds of Logic, i. e., Ancient, Medieval, and Indian: (1) it is built normally along the lines of a *calculus* in which *formalism* is the general principle employed in a logical methodology; (2) it is deeply concerned

with the project of devising the most perfect formal systems of reasoning in order that more exact interpretations of arguments and more rigorous proofs can be effected; (3) it has the natural proclivity to formulate its own basic logical laws, axioms, and theorems in a thoroughly artificial language; (4) its *object* language, which comprises variables, functors or constants, quantifiers, etc., is made up almost exclusively of arbitrarily-designated symbols which are *ideographic* in character, (e. g., p rather than the conventional *phonographic* symbols (e. g., words).

This mathematically-oriented Logic offers many solid reasons for its existence, but only those directly pertinent to the scope of Logic itself are of immediate interest to this discussion. Since the validity of discourse is the chief preoccupation of the logician, he will be much more concerned with the *fO'rm* or *structure* of arguments and argument-forms than with their Content-matter. The Non-Traditional school alleges that this detachment from the *matter of arguments* is quite characteristic of genuine *formal* logicians and is the paramount reason for their creating a new kind of *scientific language.* With such a technical medium that is not unlike the equations and other formulae so often found in the sciences of Mathematics and Chemistry, more arguments would have greater *probative value* and most of the dangers to rigorous deduction would be noticeably minimized. Some of the common fallacies anticipated are solecisms, equivocations, and other errors of discourse rooted in the ambiguity of everyday language. Even deceptions springing from rhetoric and emotionalism, which are so inherent in *natural* languages, would also be more frequently avoided. Like musical notes, such a technical language would have both an universal intelligibility and an operational flexibility which would far surpass that of any *natural* language. In other words, it would be functionally more efficient in evaluating arguments than is the popular version of Arabic numerals (compared to the ancient Roman) in performing calculations: e. g., compare 20 x 20, and XX x XX. Thus, programming the arguments of everyday intercourse into this exact kind of

communication would become an easy task and assure greater' accuracy in testing their logical validity. Leibniz expresses this purpose of the New Logic with a great deal of confidence:

Then, in case of a difference of opinion, no discussion between two philosophers will be any longer necessary, as (it is not) between two calculators. It will rather be enough for them to take pen in hand, set themselves to the abacus and (if it so pleases, at the invitation of a friend) say to one another: *calcule'"""ua!*

Ordinary languages, though mostly helpful for the inferences of thought, are yet subject to countless ambiguities and cannot do the task of a *calculus,* which is to expose mistakes in inference owing to the forms and structures of words, as solecisms and barbarisms. This remarkable advantage is afforded up to date only by the symbols *(notae)* of arithmeticians and algebraists, for whom inference consists only in the use of characters, and a mistake in thought and in the calculus is *identical.* [20]

Peirce and Frege have expressed similar views about the goals which the New Logic can accomplish in the domain of discourse.

Exact logic will be that doctrine of the conditions of establishment of stable belief which rests upon perfectly undoubted observations and upon *mathematical,* that is, upon diagrammatical, or iconic, thought. We, who are sectaries of *exact* logic, and of *exact philosophy,* in general, maintain that those who follow such methods will, so far as they follow them, escape all error except such as will be speedily corrected after it is once suspected. [21]

Inference is conducted in *my symbolic system* (Begriffsschrift) according to a kind of *calculation.* I do not mean this in the narrow sense, as though an algorithm was in control, the same as or similar to that of ordinary addition and multiplication, but in the sense that the whole is *algorithmic,* with a complex of rules which so regulate the passage from one proposition or from two such to another, that nothing takes place but what is in accordance with these rules. My aim, therefore, is directed to continuous *strictness of proof* and utmost *logical accuracy,* along with perspicuity and brevity. [22]

•• Cf. G. Leibniz, *Abhdlg. ohne Uberschr.* I, 200, as found in Bochenski, *op. cit.,* p. 457.

[21] Cf. Charles S. Peirce, *The regener. Logic* (CPlll), 268. (Noted in Bochenski, *op. cit.,* p. 280.

•• Cf. G. Frege, *Grundgesetzen der Arithmetik* (1893), p. 316 (Noted in Bochenski, *op. cit.,* p. 284.

Non-Traditional logicians are in almost total agreement that all these primary objectives can be fulfilled by this New J..ogic. It is an undeniable fact that actually the majority of these purposes have been already to some extent achieved.

Although Modem Logic tends to the almost total use of *ideographic* symbols in its myriad systems, in no way is this to be looked upon as an original creation in the domain of Logic. This type of symbolization was not unknown either to the ancient Hellenic logicians or to many of the logicians in the Middle Ages. Yet, the historians of Logic unanimously agree that the use of ideographic symbols was quite limited in the sphere of Logic up until the year 1666 when Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) wrote his scholarly work on Mathematical Logic, *De Arte Combinatoria.* Regardless of the fact that this highly original masterpiece, and others like it, remained unpublished until the end of the nineteenth century when it was *discovered* by Bertrand Russell, Leibniz is almost universally acclaimed by contemporary logicians as the *founder and originator* of the New Logic. Many other factors, too, were important over the centuries in conditioning the growth of Non-Traditional Logic, e. g., the prolonged and chronic dissatisfaction with the perfection of the Euclidean system. This disenchantment amongst mathematicians was to crystallize in the middle of the nineteenth century with the innovation of non-Euclidean geometries created by Nicolai Lobachevsky, a Russian mathematician, and Bernhard Riemann, a German mathematician. [28] About the same time, this new *approach* to Logic was to come of age and was really put on a most solid footing by the publication of two famous works of George Boole (1815-64): *Mathematical Analysis of Logic* (1847) and *The Investigation of the Laws of Thought* (1854). To record the contributions and their authors in Modem Logic would fill volumes. However, some of the greatest contributions to the constant and inexorable evolution of Non-Traditional Logic

•• Cf. W. M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford University Press, pp. 878-888.

have since been made by such scholarly and mathematically-oriented logicians as De Morgan, Peirce, Frege, Peano, Hilbert, Russell, Whitehead, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Bochenski, Carnap, Thomas, GDdel, and Church.[24]

Of the *ideographic* symbols employed in the many systems of Logic in the Non-Traditional school, the most common and most fundamental are called *variables* and *constants (functors).* Like numerals in Arithmetic (e. g., *2* cats; *4* goats), *variables* are nothing more than conventionally-approved signs used by logicians to represent: (a) things, classes, and ideas in propositions; (b) both categorical and compound statements. Those in (a) are designated as Term Variables; those in (b) are known as Propositional Variables. In some systems of Logic, even in the Traditional school, the notations for Term Variables are arbitrarily established as *capital letters,* such as *A, B, C.* In such systems the atomic statement, *all hyenas are odorous,* would be written symbolically as, *all* A *are* B. This in no small way enables the logician to concentrate on the *form* of statements and arguments. Aristotle was not unaware of this advantage and was inclined to use Term Variables in most of his theoretical expositions of the Syllogism. However, from a cursory study of his logical treatises it seems quite fair to admit that he did seem to be unaware of extending the notion of the *variable* to the propositional-level.

This contribution was to be first made by the Stoic logicians soon after the demise of the Stagirite. In the development of Logic, especially the Non-Traditional brand, this stretching of the *variable* to symbolize almost any kind of propositional-formula was to prove invaluable. In not a few systems of Non-Traditional Logic the small letters *(p, q, r,* s,) are arbitrarily employed as symbols representing propositions, especially the atomic kind, in very many logical operations in the universe

•• This listing is not intended to be an exhaustive or a graded enumeration. Rather, its aim is merely to show the scholarship that has been going on quite noiselessly in the development of both Mathematics and Logic. Yet, it is an anomaly that so few logicians of the Traditional school, until recently, have been keenly aware of this activity. 1

of discourse. Using such Propositional Variables in place of the Antecedent and Consequent of the Conditional statement, "If (Kenya is a new Republic), then (more Africans are free)," it would be written: " If (p) then (q) ." Further on it will be shown that even the sentential-connective will also have its own distinctive operational symbol. Thus, discourse for the logicians can be symbolized completely in what is called the *object language,* a medium most suitable for efficiency in logical operations. In most systems of Logic, sentential-connectives (traditionally called *propositional copu..lae)* are referred to as Constants or Functors. These logical *constants* or *functors* are in many ways quite similar in their purposes to the operational symbols in the field of Arithmetic: e. g., +, -, +, X. None of these *constants,* however, can be properly used except in some connection with a propositional-variable; but, unlike the commonly-used arithmetical operational-symbols, in Non-Traditional logic there is a variety of symbols for the same logical function. [25] As a result, to many logicians the symbols in the *object language* of a system other than their own are often as strange and devoid of meaning as the words of a foreign language with which they are unacquainted. [26] This is undeniably one of the major imperfections in the New Logic.

In Non-Traditional logic *functors* are necessary instruments for all logical operations involving propositional variables. As will be shown immediately, some symbol in every system must represent negation or contradiction. It is a functor indispensable in all systems. This is why it is generally considered to be *prirnitive.* It is generally unilateral in *scope* too, for it exercises its operational influence on a propositional- variable (or more than one) in only one direction, i.e., it affects everything that follows it: e. g.,- p;- (p v q). Most other functors or constants are

•• This radical disagreement in symbolization among the schools of Non-Traditional logic is clearly illustrated in the famous *stroke-function* of Sheffer, e. g., pjp; in the unique notations of Lukasiewicz, e. g., Cppp; in the use of the arrow or the horseshoe, etc., to signify material implication.

•• Here, because of their simplicity, we will employ the notations of Peano-Russell-Whitehead as found in the second tome of the *Form.ulaire de Mathem.atiques* (1895-1908) of Peano, and in the famous *Pricipia j\!Jathem.atica* (1910) by Lord Russell and A. N. Whitehead.

said to be *binary* or *dyadic* their ·scope is two-directional, for they express a relational operation between at least two propositional-variables and are always placed *between* the propositions or arguments they are meant to affect: e. g., (p v q) ; (p == q) . The functors used in the above examples will now be properly identified, and each will be defined by what is known as the *truth-table method.*[27] Then will be shown the important role each plays in the domain of discourse as viewed by the Non-Traditional school of Logic. This tabular method is regarded by logicians as a very convenient device for many logical purposes, especially for the defining and interdefining of logical functors. Somewhat mathematical in appearance, this simply constructed schema clearly manifests how the truth-values of all non-categorical propositional-forms are determined formally and functionally by the Constant or Functor with which statements are logically related. In such logical relationships, propositional-variables are known as *truth-functional* expressions, and *truth-values* (which every proposition possesses) are said to be either *true* or *false.*

1) *The Contradictory Function.:* The constant symbolizing this function usually appears like a rippled minus sign and is not infrequently called the *Tilde* " –." It simply indicates that negation is to be applied to a statement or a group of statements taken as a whole, e. g.," –p ", "– (p. q) ." It can take the place of such everyday expressions as, " it is not the case that," or, "it is false that," or just simply "not" with a verb: e. g., *It is false that* (John Kennedy is President of the USA) ; *It is not the case that* (all saints are negroes). Substituting the propositional-variable, "p ", for each statement in parentheses, each of these propositions would be correctly symbolized in the same way by Modern logicians: "– p ".[28] In drawing up the " truth-table " by which this *constant* is logically defined, it will become clear that the *negation of any true*

[27] Historically, it is a fact that Frege, Peirce, and Wittgenstein perfected the Megarians' notion of *Truth-Tables.*

[28] Sometimes logicians prefer to superimpose the negation symbol on the propositional-variable itself, e. g., " p"; either system of notation is permissible.

statement becomes false, and the negation of any false statement becomes true:

p	-p
T	F
F	T

2) *The Conjunctive Function:* The constant representing this rather common operation in logic is written by many Modern logicians simply as a point or period and is called the "dot" " . ";being a binary functor, it is always flanked by one or more propositional-variables, e. *g.,* "p. q ". It signifies that common relationship implied by such words in everyday conversation as: " and," " but," " however," " although," and so forth. In the compound conjunctive proposition, " all dogs are animals, *and* all angels are spirits," if the propositional-variables, " p " and " q ", were used to symbolize each of these categorical propositions, then the whole proposition would be correctly symbolized in this manner: "p. q ".[29] In constructing the "truth-table" by which this *constant* is logically defined, it will become clear that the only conditions in which such compound propositional-forms have a " truth value" of T are when all the constituent propositions have a *true* "truth-value." Otherwise, compound conjunctive propositional-forms, taken as a unit, will have a "truth value" ofF:

p	q	:::	p.q
T	T		T
T	F		F
F	T		F
F	F		F

3) *The Disjunctive Function:* The constant employed by most Mathematical logicians to signify this function is ordin-

•• Many logicians do not follow this form of notation. They prefer to omit this symbol altogether and just place the propositional-variables in juxtaposition, e. g., "pqr ". Quine and Lukasiewicz are representatives of this notation.

arily called the " wedge " and appears like the letter " v ". Derived from the Latin word, " vel," it is a symbol used to represent the *weak* or type of compound disjunctive proposition. In " natural " language the tive function is usually when the nectives, " either . . . or," are used between propositions and propositional-forms: e. g., *"Either* (the students will ride downtown), *or* (they will go for a long walk)." In such instances there exists a number of possibilities, as in the example above, for the students could do *both--by* walking back from downtown! Substituting the propositional-variables, "p" and "q ", respectively for the above statements, the whole proposition would be correctly symbolized in this manner: " p v q ". In setting up the " truth-table " by which this *constant* is logically defuied, it will be evident that any compound disjunctive propositional-form of this type will have, as a unit, a " truth-value " of F *only when none of the constituent propositions has a "truth-value" of T.* Otherwise, such compound disjunctive forms will always have a *"truth-value" of T because at least one of the disjuncts is true or possible of realization:*

p	q	∴	pvq
T	T		T
T	F		T
F	T		T
F	F		F

4) *The Alternative Function:* The constant employed by many Modem logicians to stand for the *strong* or *exclU8ive* type of disjunction appears as an " inverted wedge," " A ". Based on the exact meaning of the Latin word, "aut," it signifies the strict " either . . . or " relationship between propositions and It represents the dichotomy that either one course of action or thing can be chosen, or its opposite to a greater or lesser degree, but *not both simultaneously:* e. g., *"Either* (this semester exam will be passed), *or*

(our football hero will not graduate) ." Substituting the propositional-variables," p" and' q ",respectively for those propositions in the parentheses, this compound proposition would be validly symbolized in this manner: " $p \wedge q$ ". From an examination of the "truth-table" definition of this functor it will be rather obvious that a compound alternative propositional-form, as a unit, will have a "truth-value" of T only under those conditions *when only at least one and at most one of its alternates has a" truth-value" of T,* i.e., the joint or combined *truth* of its propositions or propositional-forms is definitely excluded:

p	q	:::	$p \wedge q$
T	T		F
T	F		T
F	T		T
F	F		F

5) *The Material Implicative Function:* The exact meaning of this logical function is the subject of not a little controversy in Modern Logic. However, the *constant* used to express this conditionally inferential relationship between propositions and propositional-forms has the appearance of, and is aptly called, the " horseshoe," " $\supset$ ". Being a binary or dyadic constant, it logically affects both what precedes and what follows it. In everyday intercourse this symbol takes the place of the sentential-connectives, "if ... then," or, "if ... therefore" e. g., "*If* (the majority of voters in the USA want Johnson as their President), *then,* (he will be President in the years to come)"; or, "*If* (there are seven sacraments), *then,* (it is snowing)." Substituting the propositional-variable, "p ", for the Antecedent of each of these statements and the propositional-variable, "q ",for the Consequent of each of these statements, each of these compound conditional propositions would be properly symbolized in this manner: " $p \supset q$ ". From the tabular definition of this *constant,* it will be evident that, regardless of the content-relevance or non-relevance of the Antecedent

and Consequent in this propositional-fonn, the compound propositional-fonn involving *material implication* will have, as a unit, a *false* " truth-value " only in that instance *when the antecedent has a true " truth-value " and the consequent has a false "truth-value."* Otherwise, such compound propositional-fonns, as a whole, will have a *true* "truth-value":

p	q	:·.	p:::Jq
T	**T**		T
T	**F**		**F**
F	**T**		**T**
F	**F**		**T**

6) *The Material Equivalence. Function:* This logical operation is generally represented in Mathematical Logic by the binary *constant* which appears as three horizontal bars placed parallel to each other," e:= ". This functor is used to symbolize a kind of " bi-conditional " statement and is usually interpreted to translate the " *if and only if* " relationship in everyday discourse: e. g., " *If and only if* (he remains a Democrat) , will he receive that important Federal office." Replacing with logical supposition the statements in parentheses with the propositional-variables, "p" and "q ", the compound proposition indicating *material equivalence* would be correctly written in this manner: "p e:= q ". By the common" truth-table" method it will be manifest that this truth-functional expression is the truncated fonnula of the statement," (p :::J q). (q :::J p) ," and that two or more propositional-fonns are *materially equivalent* only in those conditions in which *both the constituent propositions have the very same " truth-values "*: i. e., either *both* are *true,* or, *both* are *false:*

p	q	:·.	pe==q
T	**T**		**T**
T	**F**		**F**
F	**T**		**F**
F	**F**		**T**

All these constants' definitions oon be summarized in this schema:

p q	-q	p.q	pvq	p /\ q	p:)q	p==q
TT:	F	T	T	F	T	T
TF:	T	F	T	T	F	F
FT:	x	F	T	T	T	F
FF:	x	F	F	F	T	T

Before concluding this section, there are two phases of Modern Logic that must be explained, (1) the need for punctuation, and (2) the pattern for constructing any " truth-table."

In natural languages and in mathematical formulae not infrequently the meaning of a statement is ambiguous. This common situation is occasioned usually by the lack of proper " grouping " of words and phrases; sometimes it even arises from a syntactical mistake. In the famous Rule of Saint Augustine for Religious living in common a rather humorous misunderstanding could spring from such improper grouping of words: e. g.," Fast from food and drink as much as your health will ailow," if one were to pause after the word "food"! In Mathematics, too, formulae can occasionally be ambiguous and even meaningless: e. g., 10-2 x 8 can equal either 4 or 24, depending upon what " grouping " of numerals and operations is followed. It ought to be apparent, then, why some simple form of punctuation is necessary, for vagueness is undesirable in both science and conversation.

Logic, too, has to come to grips with the problem of punctuation for it is not totally immune from meaningless and ambiguous expressions either. Consisting mostly of parentheses and brackets of divers shape and size, logical punctuation ensures logicians that their formulae will be" well-formed," i.e., meaningful and non-ambiguous. However, not every system of Modern Logic employs the very same symbols for the same purposes. Some systems use a method made up of " dots " (e. g., :, .) in lieu of parentheses and brackets; other systems, as in that of Lukasiewicz, have a built-in notation so tailored

that any other bracketing, etc., would be unnecessary: e. g., Cppp *(If* p and p *then* p) . Despite their tendency in very complex arguments to create a nuisance factor, parentheses and brackets usually have been the method of punctuation a-dopted in this treatment. Thus, any bracketed or parenthesized propositional-form is to be treated as a unit in itself before any operation is to be effected: e. g., (p v q) = (-p => q); or in the "truth-functional" expression "– (-p. -q) ," the conjunctive function is first understood, and then what is bracketed is *wholly negated.*

Finally, it remains for us to show the reader the easiest procedure for the constructing of a" truth-table" under ordinary circumstances. After more than five propositional-variables appear in any argument or proof, the "truth-table" method becomes rather awkward operationally. For such circumstances Modern Logic has many less cumbersome, but not less efficient, methods of deciding on the value of arguments: e. g., the" reductio ad absurdum," the indirect proof, etc. The procedure for determining the number of horizontal columns in any " truth-table " will be determined by the number of propositional-variables employed with the same signification in the argument. In a mathematical manner this determination is symbolized as 2°, in which the " nth " power represents the number of propositional-variables, either expressed affirmatively or negatively: e. g.,

2^1 (prop.-var.>will have *two* horizontal columns in its truth-table;
2^2 (prop.-var.>will have *four* horizontal columns in its truth-table;
2^8 (prop.-var.)will have *eight* horizontal " " " "
2^4 (Prop.-var.>will have *sixteen* " " " " "
2^5 (prop.-var.)will have *thirty-two* " " " " "

In the construction of any *truth-table,* regardless of the number of propositional-variables, the easiest and safest procedure to follow is *to halve successively* the *truth-values* directly under each propositional-variable according to the number of horizontal columns. This suggested method can be perhaps better understood by an illustration:

p	q	r
T	T	*T*
T	*T*	F
T	F	*T*
T	*F*	F
F	T	T
F	T	F
F	F	T
F	F	F

The *truth-table* method is not only useful for the defining and interdefining of *constants* or *functors,* but is also a very common procedure for making definitive decisions on the logical value of moderately complex arguments. Employing this *tabular* method, as simple as it is practical, arguments up to *five* propositional-variables can be lineally arranged in such a way that their logical value can be easily and effectively determined. By this logically-approved " decisional procedure ' complex arguments can be classified with certainty into two major types: (1) *tautologous,* i.e., logically true; (2) *non-tautologous,* i.e., logically false or invalid.

Any argument-form is said to be *tautologous,* i. e., valid, if and only if all the "truth-values" in the *main column* of its "truth-table" appear as *true.* The *main column* of any" truth-table " is normally recognized to be the column immediately under the *constant* with the widest *scope.* Any argument or argument-form that proves to be *tautologous* is formally or reflectively a "logical law." The *law of contraposition,* which asserts that the Antecedent and the Consequent of any Implication or Conditional can be validly interchanged provided they both are negated, aptly illustrates this logical fact in the following "truth-table":

-p	p	q	-q	[p	q] ≡ [-q	-p]
F	T	T	F	T	T*	T
F	T	F	T	F	T	F

*indicates the main column.

TFT	F	T	T	T
TFF	T	T	T	T

On the other hand, all arguments, which for some reason or other do not satisfy the rigorous demands of logical validity, are said to be *non-tautologous* or invalid. *Non-tautologous* arguments are further sub-divided into those that are *contingent* and those that are *contradictory.* Any argument-form is considered to be *contingent,* if not all, but at least one of the "truth-values" in the *main column* of its "truth-table" is *false.* Whereas, if all the " truth-values" in the *main column* of any "truth-table " are *false,* then that argument or argument-form is said to be *contradictory* or totally invalid. These points about the *non-tautologous* types of argument are clearly exhibited in the following " truth-tables ":

(1) *Contingent:* (i.e., not un-conditionally invalid)

-p p q -q	[p	q] v	[-p]
FTT F	T	T*	F
FTF T	F	F	F
TFT F	T	T	T
TFF T	T	T	T

* indicates the main column.

(2) *Contradictory:* (i.e., under *no* conditions valid)

-p p q -q	:::: [p v -p]	- [q v -q]	
FTT F	T	F*F	(t)
FTF T	T	F F	(t)
TFT F	T	F F	(t)
TFF T	T	F F	(t)

* indicates the main column.

* * * * *

The remainder of this presentation will be concerned with illustrating some of the more common techniques, especially the " truth-table " method, by which the value of arguments is ordinarily appraised in a systematic way by very many of

those schooled formally in Non-Traditional Logic. Now, having been sufficiently oriented, it is hoped that the reader will be able to appreciate these techniques peculiar to Mathematical Logic. These arguments will be clothed in everyday language, then translated into symbolic notation for operational purposes by the logician. Arguments involving from two to five propositional-variables will be shown.

a) *Two Propositional-Variables:* (i.e., $2^n = 2^2$: *four* horizontal columns)

(1) *"If* I fall asleep, then I will miss the train. But, strangely enough I fall asleep. *As a result,* I will miss the train."

Substituting the propositional-variables "p" in place of the statement (I fall asleep), and "q" for the statement (I will miss the train), this argument symbolically would read as indicated below in this " truth-table ":

~p	p	q	~q	::::::	[(p ⊃ q)	.	(p)]	⊃	[q]
F	T	T	F		(t)	T	(t)	T *	T
F	T	F	T		(f)	F	(t)	T	F
T	F	T	F		(t)	F	(f)	T	T
T	F	F	T		(t)	F	(f)	T	F

* indicates the main column.

The methodology of Traditional Logic as regards the " rules for determining valid arguments " is also confirmed in this " truth-table " showing this argument to be tautologous, for this argument-form is nothing else than the " logical law" known for centuries as the " modus ponens." It is now known in Modern Logic as a *Rule of Detachment.* [30]

(2) *"If* I do not fall asleep, *then* I will not miss the train. *Moreover,* I just will not miss the train. *Therefore,* I am not going to fall asleep." Employing the same propositional-variables in their substitutive role as in the above example, the

[30] Cf. *ibid.* (Bochenski, *op.* cit.), pp. 887-888.

invalidity of this argument will be most apparent in the following " truth-table." Besides, this argument-form is a manifest violation of an approved" logical law," traditionally known as the "modus tollens." By some logicians this non-tautologous argument-form would be easily recognized as the *fallacy of affirming the consequent:*

-p p q	-q	::::::	[(-p ::J -q)	.	(-q)	J::J	[-p]
FTT	F		(t)	F	(f)	T*	F
F.T F	T		(t)	T	(t)	F	F
TFT	F	..	(f)	F	(f)	T	T
TFF	T	∴	(t)	T	(t)	T	T

* indicates the main column in which a *false* truth-value appears.

b) *Three Propositional-Variables:* (i. e., 2n = 2[3]: *eight* horizontal columns)

"If all men have immortal souls, *then* all men have special inalienable rights. *Beside8, if* all men have special inalienable rights, *then* all men are essentially equal. *Therefore,* since all men have immortal souls, all men are essentially equal."

Substituting the propositional-variables "p" for the statement (all men have immortal souls), "q" for the statement (all men have special inalienable rights), and" r" for the statement (all men are essentially equal), this argument would be registered on a "truth-table" in the following manner:

p q r	::::::	[(p ::J q)	.	(q ::J r)]	::J	[p ::J r]
TTT		(t)	T	(t)	T*	T
TTF		(t)	F	(f)	T	F
TFT		(f)	F	(t)	T	T
TFF		(f)	F	(t)	T	F
FTT		(t)	T	(t)	T	T
FTF		(t)	F	(f)	T	T
FFT		(t)	T	(t)	T	T
FFF		(t)	T	(t)	T	T

* indicates the main column.

Since in the main column of this " truth-table " all the " truth-values" appear as *true,* this argument by this" decisional procedure " is said to be *tautologous,* i.e., logically true. As a matter of fact, this logical schema illustrates the validity of an argument-form, which is a "logical law" known as the *law of transitivity of implication.*[31] It might interest theologians to know that the Angelic Doctor employed this and many other logical laws throughout the hundreds of articles in his famous *Summa Theologiae.*[82] In our examples of *four* and *five* propositional-variables, arguments from this famous work will be used.

c) *Four Propositional-Variables:* (i. e., $2^n = 2^4$: *sixteen* horizontal columns)

I answer that, there is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things' have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His will.[88]

Substituting the propositional-variables, "p" for the statement (every non-cognitive thing tends to desire or rest in its own natural form), "q" for the statement (such things have a natural appetite), "r" for the statement (every intellectual being has a similar tendency proportionate to its own intelligible form), and" s" for the statement (such beings have an

[81] Cf. *Fundamentals of Symbolic Logic,* by A. Ambrose and M. pp. 185-187.

•• Cf. e. g., III, q. *5,* a. 4: [(-p ::> (-q. -r)). (q. r)) ::> [p). This is a valid instance of the Modus Tollens.

•• *Summa Theel.,* I, q. 19, a. 1 (Benziger edition).

intellectual appetite), then the argument of Aquinas would be tested on a *truth-table* in the following manner:

	p q r s ::::::::::	[(p :::J q)	. (r :::J s)	. (r1)] :::J	[s1]
(1)	TTTT	(t)	(t)	(t)TT	* T
(2)	TTTF	(t)	(f)	(t) F 'l'	F
(3)	TTFT	(t)	(t)	(f)FT	T
(4)	TTFF	(t)	(t)	(f)FT	F
(5)	TFTT	(f)	(t)	(t)FT	T
(6)	TFTF	(£)	(£)	(t)FT	F
(7)	TFFT	(f)	(t)	(f)FT	T
(8)	TFFF	(£)	(t)	(f)FT	F
(9)	FTTT	(t)	(t)	(t)TT	T
(10)	FTTF	(t)	(f)	(t)FT	F
(11)	FTFT	(t)	(t)	(f)FT	T
(12)	FTFF	(t)	(t)	(f)FT	F
(13)	FFTT	(t)	(t)	(t)TT	T
(14)	FFTF	(t)	(f)	(t)FT	F
(15)	FFFT	(t)	(t)	(f)FT	T
(16)	FFFF	(t)	(t)	(f)FT	F

N. B. *indicates the main column.

Because all the *truth-values* appearing in the main column of this truth-table are *true,* this theological argument is said to be *tautologous,* i. e., it is cast in a logically true or logically valid argument-form. Notice, too, that the Antecedent of the argument calls for only one major operation as regards its " parts " because all the major functors within it are the same. Only for the sake of the content of the argument have the iota subscripts been used with the singular categorical propositions, "God's intellect is His own Existence" represented by "r;" and "There is a will in God-His very Essence" represented by "Si ".

d) *Five PrCYpositionalVariable.'l:* (i.e., $2^n = 2^5$: *thirty-two* columns)

I answer that. as is said *(De Eccles. Dogm.* ii) : *The Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body;*

but His body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from tbe essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as already proved (q. 4, a. I), that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke 24: 37, 39), when the disciples, *troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit,* and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: *Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.* [34]

Substituting the propositional-variables "p" for the statement (Christ fittingly assumed a genuine human nature)," q" for the statement (He must have assumed a real body), "r" for the statement (He did *not* assume an imaginary body) , " s " for the statement (the salvation of mankind would not have really taken place), and "t" for the statement (the Gospel narratives about Christ would be in error), then the theological argument of the Angelic Doctor would be programmed on and tested by the *truth-table* method, as on page *856.*

Since all the *truth-values* appearing in the main column (asterisked) of this table are *true,* this theological argument is *tautologous.* It should be evident, too, that this tabular-method would be cumbersome in dealing with an argument involving six propositional-variables, thus necessitating sixty-four horizontal columns.

Whenever an efficient decision about the logical value of a rather complex argument is desired, especially if the truth-table inethod is deemed impractical, Non-Traditional logic has access to a tried and common technique. It is a vulcanized version of

•• *Ibid.,* III, q. *5,* a. 1 (Benziger edition).

	p q 5 t r −r	::::::	[(p ::> q)	. (q ::> r)	. [(−r) ::> (s. t)]]	::>	[p ::> r]
(1)	TTTTTF		(t)	(t)	[t]	T T*	T
(2)	TTTTFT	...	(t)	(f)	t	FT	F
(8}	TTTFTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(4)	TTTFFT	...	(t)	(f)	f	FT	F
(5)	TTFTTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(6)	TTFTFT	...	(t)	(f)	f	FT	F
(7)	TTFFTF		(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(8)	TTFFFT	...	(t)	(f)	f	FT	F
(9)	TFTTTF	...	(f)	(t)	t	FT	T
{10)	TFTTFT		f	t	[t]	FT	F
(11)	TFTFTF	...	(f)	(t)	t	FT	T
(12)	TFTFFT	...	(f)	(t)	f	FT	F
(18)	TFFTTF		(f)	(t)	t	FT	T
(14)	TFFTFT	...	(f)	(t)	f	FT	F
(15)	TFFFTF	...	(f)	(t)	t	FT	T
(16}	TFFFFT		(f)	(t)	f	FT	F
(17)	FTTTTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(18)	FTTTFT	...	(t)	(f)	t	FT	T
(19)	FTTFTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(20)	FTTFFT	...	t	f	[f]	FT	T
(21)	FTFTTF		(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(22)	FTFTFT	...	(t)	(f)	f	FT	T
(28}	FTFFTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(24)	FTFFFT		(t)	(f)	f	FT	T
(25)	FFTTTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
{26)	FFTTFT	...	(t)	{t)	t	TT	T
(27)	FFTFTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(28)	FFTFFT		(t)	(t)	f	FT	T
(29)	FFFTTF		(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(80)	FFFTFT		t	t	[f]	FT	T
{81)	FFFFTF	...	(t)	(t)	t	TT	T
(82)	FFFFFT		(t)	(t)	f	FT	T

* indicates the main column.

the *reductio* ad *absurdum* well-known to the Traditional school of Logic since the time of Aristotle. Of most methods accept.. able to the devotees of the New Logic for evaluating arguments, this technique is highly ranked, even to being " superior to any other." [85] It is easy and efficient to operate. Simply, it endeavors to show that in every *valid* argument, regardless of its complexity, a truth-value *inconsistency* will occur amongst the

•• Cf. *Symbolic Logic,* by I. Copi (New York: Macmillian, 1954), pp. 40-65; also his book, *Introduction to Logic,* pp. 274-801.

propositions *whenever eac-h of the premisses in an. argument is assigned a truth-value of T and its conclusion is assigned a truth-value of F.* This would happen only if a propositional-variable is assigned a *dual* truth-value simultaneously in the very same argument: e. g.,

$$\overset{T}{(G \vee H) \supset (I \cdot J)} \quad \overset{T}{(J \vee L) \supset M} \quad \overset{F}{(-G \vee M)}$$

t

Explanation of this example: In this *decisional procedure,* the Conclusion will have a truth-value ofF logically, if and only if both "-G " and " M " are assigned simultaneously a truth-value of F. That should be the first step in this technique. Then, many avenues of analysis and assignation are possible. In the first premiss the antecedent, (G v H), will have a truth-value ofT, since already in the Conclusion" -G" has a truth-value of F; and if that first premiss, as a unified truth-function, is now validly to have a truth-value of T, then both propositional-variables in its consequent must be assigned truth-values ofT. Moreover, the propositional-variable, "J "; appears also in the second premiss, (J v L), and retaining its former truth-value of T will simultaneously render that antecedent *true.* However, if the second premiss, taken as a unified truth-function, is to be properly assigned an overall truth-value ofT, then its consequent, "M ", must also have assigned to it a truth-value ofT. In such a maneuver, a truth-value *inconsistency* would arise in relation to the propositional-variable, "M ". Such a truth-value inconsistency in an argument-form through this technique is a guarantee that it is logically *valid.* In other words, if such logical assignations of truth-values could be made without such a truth-value inconsistency arising in the argument-form, it would be *non-tctutologous.* This logical device in many ways reflects the sound doctrine of the Traditional school of Logic on the nature of a *Good Consequence* so fundamental to any kind of validity in the universe of discourse: "... in regulating the goodness of any sort of consequence one most universal principle is offered, from which the rest are derived,

and to which they are reduced, namely: *in a good consequence the antecedent cannot be given as true and the consequent false; but if the antecedent w true, so too the consequent.* "[86]

* * * * *

The purpose of this study of the Non-Categorical syllogism was to show that actually the members of the Traditional and Non-Traditional schools are more *alien* than *hostile* to each other's teachings. Mutual appreciation is generated only from mutual understanding. In other words, logicians of the two major schools are related to each other more as *foreigners* than as *foes.* After all, one can hardly expect to learn to like Japan and the Japanese without knowing their language, customs, and culture. Logicians must face up to this fact. If any worthwhile progress in solving this problem is to be achieved, then all concerned logicians must admit (1) that a knotty problem exists between the major schools, but is not insoluble, and (2) that insularity and self-righteousness are the two biggest enemies of any ecumenical movement-even in the field of Logic. Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* offers all of us helpful guidelines in this project:

> . . . The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the *union of all* [italics mine] a considerable amount is amassed . . . ;
>
> . . . We must with a view to the science which we are seeking, first recount the subjects that should be first discussed. These include both the *other opinions* that some have held on the first principles, and any point besides these that happens to have been overlooked. For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous *to discuss the difficulties well;* for the subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of the previous diffculties, and it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know. But

[36] Cf. John of St. Thomas, *Logica* (Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus), Tome 1, Book 8, chap. 11, p. 67 (Author's translation).

the difficulty of our thinking points to a " knot " in the object; for insofar as our thought is in difficulties, it is in like case with those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward. Hence one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand, both for the purposes we have stated and because people who inquire without first stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to go.... [37]

DENNIS C. KANE, O.P.

Providence College,
Providence, R. I.

[37] *Metaphysics,* Book II, chav. 1, and Book Ill, ehap. 1 (from *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* McKeon edit.) .

BOOK REVIEWS

Man as Man and Believer: Concilium, Dogma Vol. 21. Edited by EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX, O. P. and BONIFACE WILLEMS, O. P. Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1967. Pp. 178. $4.50.

When Modernism was threatening to corrupt the very core of Christianity around the turn of the century, the magisterimn of the Church exposed its erroneous extremes but did not yet possess the theological tools for a positive response to the difficulties involved. This volume of *Concilium, theology in the age of renewal,* is one sign that the Church is in the process of confronting the real crux of the Modernist crisis. It represents the relevant progress that has taken place in this regard during the past half century, culminating in the conciliar documents of Vatican II, particularly the *Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation.* This, however, marks only the beginning of future development necessary in this post-conciliar age. Anthropological and epistemological problems must be solved and added to the advances in historical and scriptural studies in order to meet the challenge of contemporary thought to Christianity and of the questions which have lingered on after the crisis of Modernism. As the editors of this volume put it in the preface: "Every branch of theology has already felt the far-reaching changes that are taking place, particularly in the fields of anthropology and epistemology. For all the faithful, the basic issue arising from all this is the question: What is the relation between man as man and man as believer? And this obviously leads to questions about revelation, faith, dogma and the magisterium or the teaching function of the Church." The central question always appears to be: How do we give adequate consideration to the complete context of human history and still attribute a unique moment in that history to Christ?

Continuing the same characteristic format of the *Concilium* series, Part I of this volume contains a number of articles on various aspects of the general theme. The introductory article, by Peter van Leeuwen, traces the development of the *Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation* from the original plan of the preparatory theological commission in 1960 through the schemas of 1962-68 to the final text of 1964 that was the basis of the conciliar document as ultimately approved. During this long and laborious process some very significant changes were made. Principal among these were the definition of revelation and the principle of its transmission. The earlier schemata had proposed a concept of revelation as exclusively propositional and identical with revealed teaching. But the Constitution adopted a definition of revelation as salvation history with Christ at its

very center (p. II). Likewise, concerning the principle of transmitting revelation the magisterium was not considered as identical with tradition, but rather as having the " special function of authoritative judging and guiding in the truth in an authentic way-i. e., with official authority, in union with the whole People of God, and not standing above the Word of God, but rather serving it " (p. 15). Fr. van Leeuwen concludes by commenting that the Constitution has provided the context for the fruitful posing of such ecumenical questions as the" dominion of God's Word over the Church, the distinction between tradition, traditions and the function of the magisterium, and particularly the pope's pastoral function within the function of the episcopal college and the whole community of the faithful " (p. 19).

In light of the general orientation given by the first article the subsequent essays treat of the more specialized aspects of the problems revolving around the relationship between nature and grace in man. Leo Bakker, in his article, "What Is Man's Place in Divine Revelation?" starts off by showing how the problem, as it stands today, has come down to us from the Age of Enlightenment through the Modernist crisis. The fundamental question asks whether divine revelation is a supernatural speaking by God completely from outside man, or do faith and revelation have some necessary connection with man's self-understanding, his experience, his projects, etc. Because the Constitution rejected a purely intellectualist approach to revelation as a communication of truths, it opened the way to overcome the dilemma of " God " *or* " man," and the opposition between "from without" and" from within." As Bakker expresses it: "Christianity, however, lives by the mystery of the incarnation: not *either* God *or* man, but *both* God *and* man, in an indissoluble unity of grace. We now begin to see the truly human aspect of divine revelation and of our faith. We also begin to understand scripture, i. e., the book through which God's Word can reach us, as a genuinely human book. We begin to better realize how a Man from within our history is proclaimed as embodying the fullness of God's revelation. This fully human dimension of revelation reduces the intellectual aspect; it also prevents revelation from being regarded as a communication of truths that God would speak to us, as it were, apart from man, even though by means of man " (p. 34). At the same time, we must avoid the extreme theories of Modernists like Tyrrel and Loisy who completely divorced the experience of faith from its dogmatic formulation and denied the divine uniqueness of Jesus Christ in our history.

The next article, "Revelation and History in the New Testament: Biblical Hermeneutics," by Anton Vogtle, pursues further some of the implications of the *Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation* in the context of interpreting the Gospel account of Christ. He points out that one must be open to the possibility that God could manifest himself in the

form of an historical Person before he can understand Christ's claim to be the final revealer and mediator of eschatological redemption. Then it is necessary to have an adequate conception of the genuinely progressive historical character of revelation in Christ. Referring to the Constitution's teaching that the Apostles enjoyed a fuller insight into the words· and deeds of Christ after the resurrection, he proceeds to show how unfounded it is to interpret the New Testament accounts of Christ as though they were a story told in retrospect. For in the primitive Church Jesus was primarily a present living personality rather than a figure of the past, so that the kerygmatizing of his earthly life was not seen as a distortion of its historical character, but as a developed understanding of its significance in light of the revelatory events of the death, resurrection and sending of the Spirit. This is especially evident in St. John's Gospel wherein the activities of the earthly Christ and the exalted Christ interprenetrate one another. And this is a testimony to the conviction of the early Church about the unity of the divine plan beginning with the Incarnation, culminating in Pentecost and moving toward final fullfillment in the Parousia. New Testament exegesis, therefore, must start out anew from the experience of our risen Lord.

Juan Alfaro, in his article, "The Dual Aspect of Faith: Entrusting Oneself to God and Acceptance of the Christian Message," develops a theology that balances well the divine and human elements of belief. After a brief summary of the biblical concept of faith as man's total response to God, he analyses the two-fold aspect of faith. Acceptance of the Christian message is necessary because without this intellectual aspect the mystery of Christ would cease to be real, and without a definite doctrine there could be no visible community of believers. But faith, in the final analysis, is the acceptance of the reality expressed in the doctrine, the giving of himself by God as our Father in Christ. And so faith essentially includes the entrusting of oneself to God, and the desire to love him. God calls man from within by grace, and from without through the message of salvation. Man responds freely in a true choice of faith by either accepting or rejecting God. The act of faith is constituted by the dynamic fusion of both the personal-inner and doctrinal-outer aspects. The difficult question remains, however, whether faith can exist apart from the acceptance of the Christian message. On the basis of a series of statements in various documents of Vatican II the author concludes that such an act of faith, as a genuine response to the primary aspect of God's grace, would be true but incomplete and embryonic. Since only in light of God's revelation in Christ can man come to a full understanding of himself, the choice of faith cannot achieve a completely human expression without knowing the Christian message, to which it is inherently orientated.

Consequent to these concepts of revelation and faith is the continuous

challenge to the Church that her preaching and teaching strive to render the unique revelation of God in Christ relevant at all times. This seems to be especially true in contemporary society where the process of secularization is separating the religious more and more from the structures of this world. Today, therefore, persons have a particular need for assistance to find God's revealing presence in their lives. The other articles in this volume of *Concilium* are concerned with certain dimensions of this crucial problem. Gregory Baum's " The Magisterium in a Changing Church" makes some clarifications that can contribute to current theological discussions of the difficult question about how to reconcile the indefectibility and infallibility of the ecclesiastical teaching authority with the doctrinal changes that have been taking place. He distinguishes the *continuous magisterium* from the *intermittent magisterium.* The former is exercised in the liturgy and its preparation and is the ministry of the Word by which Christ teaches continually the local Churches through his ordained ministers. The latter is exercised by ecclesiastical decrees which strengthen the continuous magisterium, and which must be viewed in the wider context of the teaching of the whole Gospel. He suggests that Catholic theologians seriously consider whether " the Church may find herself in a situation where she must change the formulation of her doctrine in order to announce the unchanging Gospel infallibly and defend the immutable character of divine truth" (p. 81). Baum proposes that the universal magisterium, for the sake of exercising its supreme function, should always be in dialogue with the whole Church, and cites *Ecclesiam suam* as an excellent example of the way to search out a relevant presentation of the GospeL

In the article, *Truth and Life,* Hans Urs von Balthsar brings out the special existential character of a truth of faith in summoning man toward a total commitment in life. Consequently a dogmatic formulation can never be interpreted as though it were concerned with a purely theoretical truth. The concluding article, "Theology as an Ecclesial Science" by M.-D. Chenu, offers a brief but brilliant reflection upon the work of the theologians at Vatican II. He finds this experience an excellent illustration of the necessity of theology, which must be of continuous service to a community of faith. His own words express the idea quite forcefully: "As opposed to a purely empirica,l pastoral attitude, a summary supernaturalism, a short-winded exegetical positivism or a false dogmatism, theological learning with its own laws is a vital necessity for the Church as the People of God, enabling it to breathe in the world" (p. 104).

Since the whole problem of doctrinal development is essentially connected with the theme of this volume, Part II provides a bibliographical survey in two studies on the question. Herbert Hamman's " Recent Catholic Views on the Development of Dogma " is a fine summary of current opinions considered in the context of older theories. In "The Problem of Doctrinal Development and Contemporary Protestant Theology " George

A. Lindbeck, a teacher of the history of doctrine at Yale University Divinity School, and Lutheran observer at Vatican II, indicates that doctrinal development is not a major theological problem for Protestants who do not think of it as resulting in infallible dogmas as Roman Catholics do. Although they are chiefly concerned with the problem of development within the New Testament period, there are questions about the attitude of the Reformers regarding the relation of scripture to creeds and confessional formulas. The sixteenth century view is no longer tenable since historical studies and awareness have shown that the Church's doctrines do " go beyond " scripture. After giving the points of agreement and disagreement among contemporary Protestant theologians about such problems of development, he concludes: " the present hermeneutical debates may perhaps produce a deeper and more ecumenical understanding that the biblical witness should operate as that supreme norm of all later developments which God uses to keep his Church faithful to the Lord who has come and is coming again" (p. 149).

Part III, *DO-C Documentation Concilium,* provides an essay on an historical approach to the problem of the relationship between Gospel and Dogma by Walter Casper in which he emphasizes the need for " an interpretation of dogma which is dynamic, related to man and his problems, and spiritual and biblical in character" (p. 167). Finally M. C. Vanhengel and J. Peters make a brief report on the international theological Congress held in Rome, October, 1966, which covers very the ten categories considered there.

This twenty-first volume of *Concilium* has achieved its general purpose of providing the perceptive reader with an understanding of the problems regarding the relationship between man as man and man as believer. Also the proposed solutions or, at least the approaches that might be pursued in searching for answers to the questions, are worth careful consideration. As much as one might have hoped that here and there the writers would have developed their ideas more fully, this seems to be beyond the scope of such an undertaking as *Concilium.* However, it is hoped that the volumes in this series will soon be made available at more popular prices for the many who can benefit by reading them.

FREDERICK M. JELLY, O. P.

Dommican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Philosophical Anthropology. By J. F. DoNCEEL, S. J. New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1967. Pp. 477 with bibliography and index. $5.00.

Philosophical Anthropology is the title chosen by },r. J. F. Donceel, S. J. for the third and revised edition of his earlier work *Philosophical Psy-*

chology. The change in the title is indicative of more than the enlarged and enriched scope of the present edition; it is reflective also of the perennial problem of writers of textbooks on psychology, namely, how to present a systematic account of the human mind which is at once clear, terse and substantiated by hard facts, and, at the same time, expressive of the rich and elusive qualities which characterize and distinguish the human spirit, the qualities which, well described, elicit from the reader the happy recognition of himself as he truly is. As one recent book states the case: " As one lives life or observes it around him (or within himself) or finds it in a work of art, he sees a richness that somehow has fallen through the present screen of the behavioral sciences" (Berelson and Steiner, Human Behavior, p. 666) Fr. Donceel aims at avoiding this regret, and indicates his purpose by giving his work the broader and at the same time more penetrating title of ' anthropology.'

In a work which intends to capture the full range of human behavior as it is peculiarly human, and along with its context and meaning, an author is obliged to appeal to more than one methodological approach, and this the present author does. He draws first o:f all on the perennial philosophy in the Ai-istotelian-Thomistic-Marechalian vein for many of his fundamental insights. He complements this approach with extensive contributions from contemporary phenomenological and existential psychologies. He employs experimental and descriptive data wherever apt, and, insofar as he incorporates, for example, conclusions from Freudian psychoanalysis and from the phenomenology of Teilhard de Chardin, he can be said to depend on their somewhat specialized approaches. He appeals moreover to scholastic metaphysics for support of many discussions and arguments and, in fact, leans in some cases on Catholic theology. The approach of the book is wholeheartedly eclectic.

With such disparateness of approach, one of the major problems of the book is to find an intrinsic unity, a theme to hold together the insights, conclusions and contributions from so many points of view. The author succeeds very well in setting up a central or core idea on which to frame his development of the philosophy of man. Starting with the subjective " I " as expressed in phenomenological analysis, which tells us WHOM we are studying, he proceeds by way of the objective psychologies to describe WHAT man is, in himself and in relation to the universe he is in, beginning with the " lower " and " outer " aspects and gradually penetrating deeper into the spirit, until he arrives at the center of man again, where he finds the " I " with whom he began. As a framework, the theme is simple and effective.

Enlarging on this framework, Fr. Donceel succeeds in touching on almost all of the major psychological (or anthropological) questions of interest to contemporary scholastic philosophy. A brief listing of the topics discussed

will serve to jndicate the scope of the book: the concept and nature of life, the origin of life, evolution of life and of man (Teilhardian) , sensations and learning in animals, the differences between animals and men, and the future of man (also Teilhardian), perception and affect in man, Gestalt psychology, intelligence and intelligence testing, will power and its development, drives and man's deepest urges, personality, temperament (Sheldon's system) , Freud's psychoanalysis and derivative depth psychologies, characterology, the nature of knowledge, the scholastic division of sense faculties, interpersonal knowledge, the nature of love, the immateriality of the intellect and the universality of ideas, the origin of ideas, the act of affirmation and its metaphysical implications, freedom of will and determinism, the immortality of the soul, the relation between soul and body, the origin of the human soul, and man as a person, plus two appendices: Evolution and Theology, and Christology and Anthropology.

This list of major topics illustrates the comprehensiveness of the author's treatment and its relevance to the questions being asked presently in Catholic colleges. Moreover, the specific topics are generally handled in excellent brief and clear statements of position; the phenomenological contributions are especially good. If there is anything to criticize in the text, it is the defect which almost inevitably dogs the trial of the eclectic, and especially in a field as knotty as psychology, and most especially in a book which draws on so many and such disparate sources. The criticism is of lack of penetration-the contributions from the various sources have not been presented at a depth and with a delicacy profound and accurate enough to yield a consistent and thoroughly satisfying (intellectually) philosophical anthropology. There are many approaches, but no integration. This is most apparent in the repetition of topics: the senses, perception, emotion or appetites, intellect, will and person are each given two separate treatments, one empirical or descriptive and one scholastic, and the challenge of uniting the insights from both points of view into one coherent statement is not met. Again, one can legitimately question the validity of presenting some of these authors in a seemingly homogeneous text, without careful explanation of the sometimes deep diversity of fundamental point of view. For instance, Teilhard does not simply complement and extend scholastic conceptions-his dictum that all that is always was, and his strictures against distinguishing and dividing reality into compartments, do not fit in comfortably with scholastic categories and principles.

Although the major inspiration of the text is, as Fr. Donceel points out, Aristotelian-Thomistic-Marechalian, the key thesis of Thomistic psychology and anthropology is passed over and practically disavowed. This is the definition of the act of knowledge. The author, in fact, claims that the act of knowledge cannot and must not be defined (p. 284). The reason given for this, and it seems astonishing, is that, since definition is an act of

knowledge, defining knowledge puts the defined into the definition (p. 280)! By the same token, then, one could not define understanding (since it certainly enters into the grasping of a definition) nor predication, nor subject and predicate and copula (they are all in definitions} and so on. In fact, unless one accepts the dictum that the defined shall not enter into the definition as referring to the term defined and its synonyms, one rules out the possibility of defining any number of easily definable items. Actually, the author uses the classical Thomistic definition of knowledge in terms of immateriality to elucidate the nature of knowledge (pp. 285-286}, but without the *ex profesao* analysis of the act of knowledge, this exposition does not enjoy its wonted force.

Perhaps lying at the root of this diffidence about defining the act of knowledge, and extending even to the failure to thoroughly penetrate and relate the contributions of the disparate sources used in the book, is the author's concept of the philosophy of nature itself. For Fr. Donceel, natural philosophy is the data of experience (enlarged and confirmed by experiment) plus metaphysical principles, that is, empirical fact illumined by the most abstract and universal principles. He does not allow place for a genuine philosophical approach grounded in fact and yet looking for proximate and proper causal relationships, within a limited area of reality and in terms of the principles of this limited area. For instance, he would apparently not admit a philosophy of living things which does not depend for its principles on metaphysics. He would rule out what are now being called metapsychologies and metabiologies, and the like. And yet it is within these spectra of reality and at these levels of abstraction that most approaches to the study of man make their more significant general statements, and engage in controversy and discussion. And it is therefore at this level of analysis that a comprehensive and consistent theory of human nature, or philosophical anthropology, must locate its principles, draw its conclusions and judge the claims of competing theories.

MicHAEL STocK, O. P.

St. Stephen's Priory,
Dover, Mass.

Le Thomiame et la penaee italienne de la renaissance. By PAUL OsKAR KRISTELLER. Conference Albert-le-Grand 1965. Montreal: Institut d'etudes medievales, 1967. Pp. 292, with index of names. $6.00.

This study is a pioneer attempt to fill a lacuna in Thomistic and Renaissance scholarship. In it Professor Kristeller traces skillfully the mutual influences between Thomism and Italian thought from the 13th to the 16th

centuries, with particular emphasis on the relationships of Italian Dominicans to secular Aristotelians such as Pistro Pomponazzi, to humanists such as Lorenzo Val_l,a, Ermolao Barbaro, and Baptista Mantuanus, and to Platonists such as Pico de la Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino. In each instance Kristeller takes cognizance of the uses of St. Thomas and the evaluations of his thought provided by these scholars, as well as of the references (and replies) of Thomists to their Averroist, humanist, and Platonist contemporaries. To support his thesis he further supplies, in an appendix, edited texts of two opuscula that are extremely valuable for understanding the interchanges described in the study. The first is the *Opus aureum in Tlwmistas,* composed by the Carmelite Baptista Mantuanus, and the second is the *Opusculum ad Laurentium M.edicem quod beatitudo hominis in actu intellectus et non voluntatis essentialiter consistit* of Vicenzo Bandello (de Castronovo), a Dominican Master General celebrated for his work on the Immaculate Conception, who engaged in controversy with Lorenzo de Medici on the subject of man's final beatitude. Kristeller's account of the background of the latter controversy and his analysis of the arguments of both protagonists will be illuminating to present-day Thomists, who will find that their attempts at dialogue with partisans of other schools (and the attendant disagreements and terminological misunderstanding) are far from being without precedent in the history of thought.

This essay is magisterial in its competence, if not in its tone. The author provides references to innumerable little-known texts and articles that are indispensable for serious work on his subject. Especially noteworthy are the animadversions on the history of Thomism with which he prefaces his study (pp. 14-41); these take on special value at a time when so many scholastics have confused ideas as to what the term " Thomism " means and are generally ignorant of the historical conditioning to which its synthesis has been subjected.

By way more of emendation than of criticism, the reviewer suggests that a perusal of the physical treatises of such Italian Dominicans as Giovanni Graziadei (de Ascoli) and lsolano de lsolanis, neither of whom is mentioned by Kristeller, as well as of the physical works of Capreolus, Cajetan, Javelli and other better-known Thomists, might prove helpful for tracing further relationships with the Italian Renaissance. The concepts discussed by these writers had bearing on the evolving science that was soon to be transformed by Galileo, and they also show awareness of the nominalist tradition that formed a part, albeit not prominent, of the intellectual ambience of the period. The reviewer has been engaged in a similar study of Domingo de Soto and the Salamancan school, and has found a parallel situation existing in Spain during the 16th century. Soto, for example, was broadly acquainted with the secular scholarship of his contemporaries (Italian and French, as well as Spanish) , and even came under attack

from his countrymen, the Averroist Diego Hurtado de Mendoza and the classical Aristotelians Francisco Valles and Gaspar Cardillo de Villalpando. Whatever one might think of Soto's Thomism, it was cognizant of the complex currents that characterized early 16th century thought, and quickly came to be regarded as a significant (if arguable) contribution to the learning of the period.

W. A. WALLACE, O. P.

Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.

Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning. By JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S. J. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 199t. $4.95.

War, Poverty, Freedom, Concilium Vol. 15, New York: Paulist Press, 1966. Pp. 168; *Religious Freedom,* Vol. 18. Pp. 188. $4.50 ea.

Two months after Vatican II's *Declaration on Religious Freedom* was promulgated, Loyola University's Bellarmine School of Theology organized an Institute on Religious Freedom in which theologians, lawyers, and political scientists of different faiths participated. The papers read at this conference have been published by Macmillan under the editorship of John Courtney Murray, S. J., who himself contributed the first of the essays.

Murray relates the genesis of the conciliar declaration itself, of which he is the acknowledged architect. He points out the change from the earlier drafts, which were rather abstractly theological, to the later and final versions which took more adequate account of the historical and political dimensions. Particularly stressed is the shift in the central premise from freedom of conscience (which has always been fraught with theological difficulties) to the richer concept of the dignity of the human person.

Dean Jerald Bauer of the University of Chicago School of Theology then discusses the philosophy behind the traditional American notion of religious freedom, perhaps overdrawing somewhat the influence of the Enlightenment at the expense of other independent factors such as the English common law and the unique American experience itself; he then argues that modern person-oriented philosophies are needed to give adequate basis for a contemporary understanding of religious freedom. Francis Canavan, S. J., of *America,* shows the coherence between the Vatican II document and traditional natural law doctrine, while criticizing the conciliar declaration for insufficient attention to the political aspects. Scriptural dimensions are explored by David Noel Freedman of the San Francisco Theological Seminary, who focuses on the Old Testament which was bypassed in the declaration, and by John L. McKenzie, S. J., who uses the opportunity mainly for a statement of his own highly controversial views on the freedom of Christians within the Church.

The next two papers turn to. legal and political elements of the issue. Victor Rosenblum, political scientist at Northwestern University, has considerable praise for the Council's declaration as a statement of constitutional principles, precisely because of its general and vague language about which others have expressed such keen disappointment and suspicion. On the other hand, a negative appraisal is given by Philip Denenfeld of Western Michigan University (active in the American Civil Liberties Union), who sees the declaration as concerned more with religion than with freedom and is especially distressed at its implications for the American controversy over whether parochial schools should be included in government aid to education. The final two essays, respectively by J. V. Langmead Casserley of Seabury-Western Theological Seminary and George van Massenhove, S. J., of Belgium, reintroduce theological perspectives into the discussion. Appended to the published essays is the text of the Vatican Council's declaration.

Two recent volumes in the *Concilium* series also deal extensively with religious freedom. Volume 15 opens with an article by John Courtney Murray discussing the development of doctrine (particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) which culminated in the work of Vatican II. Roland Bainton offers a Protestant's view on " Truth, Tolerance, and Freedom," arguing for religious freedom on the basis that scientific certitude is not possible in religious matters and then offering tentative opinions on a variety of practical questions such as whether there should be paid chaplains in the Congress and Armed Forces (negative answer), national holidays with religious overtones (all right if the national and religious aspects merely coincide and are not identified) , prayer at Presidential inaugurations and the like (perhaps merely a period of silence if there is objection to prayer) , etc. Other articles in this volume, not directly related to the present subject, include Yves Cougar's "Poverty in Christian Life amidst an Affluent Society," and Alois Muller's "Authority and Obedience in the Church " (based on his book published in translation by Newman Press, 1966).

Volume 18 is devoted entirely to " Religious Freedom," and included somewhat curiously under the general category "Canon Law." The opening historical survey by Joseph Lecler, S. J., is especially valuable for its insights on the intolerance of heretics in medieval Christendom. Rabbi Arthur Gilbert contributes the essay," Religious Freedom in Jewish Tradition and Experience." Teodoro Jimenez-Urresti discusses "the case of Spain " with considerable understanding for both the Spanish national and religious heritage and the new attitudes reflected in Vatican II. Other articles deal with the problem from the viewpoints of the World Council of Churches, Islam, and Hinduism.

A. B. WILLIAMS, O. P.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Loring, L. M. *Two Kinds of Values.* Forword by KARL R. PoPPER. New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. 199. $5.00.

Although it would be untrue to assert that Miss Loring's judgments about recent ethical theory are optimistic, *Two Kinds of Values* is a hybrid of strengths and weaknesses. There are several reasons for saying that it is a work deserving of the designation "useful." By its survey of opinions on several major axiological questions in the light of certain established thinkers, i. e., Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, Moore and Hare, it contributes to a deeper understanding of recent ethical discussion. The author is fearless in addressing herself to the views of these men as she expresses her disagreements, criticisms and distinctions with directness and clarity. It is regrettable that her affirmations, on the other hand, are somewhat concealed. She does offer several significant conceptions as she takes part in the ongoing discourse on value. Among these must be included " non-ethical values," " basic evaluation," and " moralism," expressions which are at the center of her argumentation. Her presentation of them deserves to be taken seriously, since they serve to point the direction toward a truly adequate axiology, a need which Miss Loring appreciates correctly and sensitively.

Certain limitations appear to be present in this work, if one views it from the vantage point of comprehensive axiological inquiry. The work is inclined to ·slight the total system of the major authors analysed. In particular, it considers the ideas of Aristotle reported in the *Ethics,* while deftly skirting the metaphysical conceptions either of the *De Anima* or of the *Metaphysics,* as these propose an interpretation of human nature. It builds its notion of the Ethical Good upon the Kant of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment* but becomes shy before the influence of the *Critique of Pure Reason* where the Kantian epistemology sets the groundwork for his Ethical Good. In my opinion, the ontological dimension is essentially required for dealing with Miss Loring's " non-ethical evaluation " concept or with her " basic values " concept. This point is consequential because the author strives for to questions which are broader than the strictly ethical. Karl Popper asserted this judgment explicitly and correctly in the foreword. Miss Loring seeks an axiology, but is reluctant to admit the ontological dimension in it, which has occasioned an inadequacy in her estimation and treatment of the authors with whom she has found so much dissent.

It ·should be admitted, however, that *Two Kinds of Values* as well as the author's suppositions in it concerning the ontological dimension spring from an emphasis on the psychological phenomena in human action. Her term " basic evalution " is the. major hint for this judgment. It is undeniable that non-ethical experiences and evaluations must be comprehensively analyzed in order to understand, as well as to integrate, the ethical in. the

human situation. Nevertheless, psychology provides one exclusive set of categories. To set the stage for an adequate axiology other disciplines must be listened to and assimilated into the body of the analysis. Precisely speaking, anthropology, sociology, economics, epistemology. history of philosophy as well as psychology have a right to be heard in axiological inquiry. *Two Kinds of Values* overlooks the comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach at a time in the history of axiology when such an approach seems to have won the day.

G. L. CoNCORDIA, 0. P.

Providence CoUege,
Providence, R.I.

The Dynamism of Biblical Tradition. Concilium, Vol. 20. New York: Paulist Press, 1967. Pp. !Wl. $4.50.

When we view the bible primarily as the revelation of the Godhead, we have a tendency to limit our perspective merely to the content of scripture. We tend to forget that the bible is also a witness to man's 8truggle for truth, to man's struggle to see God in history. Once we broaden our gaze to encompass not only the content of God's word but also the manner of its transmission, we begin to appreciate the human dimensions of scripture and the dynamism of biblical tradition. This aroused awareness and appreciation will in turn help us to better understand the role which tradition must play in the life of the Church. It is to this concern that a distinguished group of biblical scholars address themselves in this volume of Concilium. Each in his turn points up and explores the dynamic aspects of biblical tradition.

The opening essay by Pierre Grelot emphasizes the fact that the Old and New Testaments are the products of a living tradition-not merely a handing down of words but the result of a continual development that constantly goes on. Joseph Schreiner explores the development of the ancient Israelite *credo.* Orginally a liturgical proclamation of Yahweh as the God of Israel, it always remained open to the ongoing development of their faith. Joseph Blenkinsopp also investigates the Israelite creed in order to show the enriching influence the exodus had on the old confession of faith. Raymond Tournaly shows us how the sages of the post-exilic period formed a theological synthesis with new perspectives. ,

The New Testament is also the result of the development of living tradition in the early church. Basic to this development are the sayings of Jesus and the preaching of the apostles. Frans Neirynck takes Mark 9: *33-50* and develops an interesting theory based on key word association. With regard to the kerygma, David Stanley optsl for the position that the kerygma is the key to the unity of the New Testament. Jules Cambier

analyzes Paul and illustrates both the perduring and dynamic aspects of tradition. The concluding article of this volume by M. C. Vanhengel and J. Peters concerns itself with the problem of the historicity of the gospels.

Also contained in this volume are six bibliographical surveys on the homily which, besides discussing the nature of the homily, give a very useful and enlightening resume of the literature now available in the various languages discussed.

The subject of this Concilium volume is of very great importance and an understanding of its content will help all of us in our endeavor to make the Word of God revelant to twentieth-century man.

WILLIAM F. HEALY, O. P.

CoUege of St. Mary of the Springs,
Columbus, Ohio.

Spirituality in the Secular City. By CHRISTIAN DuQuoc, O. P. Concilium, Vol. 19. New York: Paulist Press, 1966. Pp. $4.50.

This volume contains some useful insights on secularity, desacralization, the theology of earthly realities, modern asceticism. The line of thought pursued throughout is that secular realities have an integrity of their own which must be respected and in which we can find God. Chardin is mentioned frequently and his basic vision is accepted by most of the writers. Among them are two Americans, Bernard Cooke and Ernest Larkin, and one Canadian, Elmer O'Brien. The rest are Europeans, mostly French.

The translations are good, except for the first essay, which is awkward. David Reisman's 'inner-directed' comes into English from whatever it was in the French as ' introdetermined ' (p. 8). Christian Duquoc, the editor, has a very strong essay on the role of the theologian today, somewhat overstated but nonetheless provocative. The best essay, probably, is Claude Geffre's on the process of desacralization. The most interesting is the brief report at the end of the volume on ' The Brothers of the Virgin of the Poor,' a new group founded in 1956 who desire to be at the same time children of the ancient monks of the East as well as disciples of the message of the hermit of Tamanrasset.

The volume is not the last word on secular spirituality but it is a good first word, a good introduction.

THOMAS R. HEATH, O. p.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Information and Prediction in Science, Proceedings of a Symposium ·of the Academie Internationale de Philosophic des Sciences (1962). Edited by S. Dockx and P. Bernays. New York: Academic Press, 1965. Pp. 272. $9.50.

Science is technology. Science is scientists-theoreticians and experimentalists and administrators and science teachers. Science is a body of knowledge, but it is also M. I. T. and Cal Tech. Science is the history of science: it is Newton and Darwin and Einstein, and your local lab technician as well. Science is sociologists, is city-planners and computers. It is also a method, or a set of methods, or a way of looking at things, even a way of life. And, of course, science is physics, natural history, cryogenics, entomology, psychology, and theoretical medicine.

Science is, simply, too complex to be captured in any one description. All attempts to say what science " really is " amount to a description of an aspect of science that has caught the fancy of the interpreter. Must one, then, despair of describing science at all? Or, if someone makes the attempt, must he simply hope that his perspective will turn out to be an important one?

Today the case is less bleak than all this would make it sound. For a *sociology of science* is in the making that may offer a theoretical structure of science complex enough to manage at least a great number of aspects, perspectives, and descriptive data. And to complement this theoretical structure III number of exciting new views on the nature and epistemology of science, and on discovery or creativity in science, have come into being.

In this atmosphere a concept that has been proposed as a key to the understanding of this complex structure is *information theory.* In such a view the exchange or communication of information becomes the operative concept. *Information and Prediction in Science,* the proceedings of a symposium held in 1962, is an attempt to explore this concept. The meeting centered very largely around the contribution of Leon Brillouin, an eminent theoretician in the field of information theory, discussing " how the human mind establishes a law of science from experimental information " (Preface).

Other contributors were Satosi Watanabe: "Une Explication Mathematique de Classement d'Objects," Andre Mercier: " La Physique et !'Information," and D. M. MacKay: " Information and Prediction in Human Sciences "-a fascinating amalgam, to say the least, of high-level mathematical theory and concrete application.

Needless to say, as with all such symposia the results are uneven. A favorable reviewer can find plenty to commend, a critic can come down hard on a weak article or two. (For instance, I found the article by van Duiju rather insubstantial, and, at the opposite extreme, I would question the pertinence of the long and thorough article by Alonzo Church.) How-

ever, it seems more to the point to question (a) the extent to which the volume as a whole fulfills the promise of its basic theme, and (b) the relative importance of that theme.

On the first point it seems fair to say that the volume throws a good deal of light on the problems information theory must face if it is to serve as a key to the analysis of scientific practice. The second point is more complex: Is the time ripe, at this stage in the history of science and its new interpretations, to look for a key to the complex structure of science? If by " looking " is meant a detailed, careful, theoretical or experimental search for pieces to be fitted into a slowly-developing construct-then the time is always ripe. If, however, looking means a speculative search for a grand scheme, then I would guess that the time is not yet ripe-the theory of information is still too young, new approaches to science are only beginning, even the sociology of science, which might offer an undergirding, is yet in its infancy.

In sum, *Information and Prediction in Science* is an interesting volume. It brings together in congress representatives of many specialties in many countries in interdisciplinary dialogue, and it presents some tentative beginnings in the extension of information theory into larger fields. But information theory is not yet the key to a grand description that will do justice to the complexity of science.

PAUL R. DURBIN, O.P.

St. Stephtm's College
Dover, Mass.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Belaval, Yvon. *Philosophers and Their Language.* Transl. by Norbert Guterman. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. Pp. 147. $4.00.

Benoit, Pierre, Murphy, Roland E. (Ed.) Concilium. Vol. 20. *The Dynamism of Biblical Tradition.* New York: Paulist Press, 1967. Pp. 218. $4.50.

Blandio, Giovanni, S. J. *Peccato Originale E Poligenismo.* Forli: Edizioni di Ethica, 1967. Pp. 48. L. 450.

Bourke, Vernon J. *Ethics.* New York: Macmillan, 1966. Pp. 497.

Copi, Irving M. and Gould, James A. *Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory.* New York: Macmillan, 1967. Pp. 842. $4.50.

Cowan, Wayne H. (Ed.) *Witness to Generation.* New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. Pp. 272. $1.75.

D'Arcy, Martin, S. J. *Of God and Man.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 178. *$1.25.*

De Chardin, Pierre Teilhard. *The Vision of the Past.* Transl. by J. M. Cohen. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. 285. *$5.00.*

——— and Blondel, Maurice. *Correspondence.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 174. $4.95.

de Lubac, Henri. *The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin.* New York: Desclee, 1967. Pp. 880. *$5.95.*

Donceel, J. F., S.J. *Philosophical Anthropology.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967. Pp. 496. *$5.00.*

Donovan, John F. M. M. *The Pagoda and the Cross-The Life of Bishop Ford of Maryknoll.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. 228. *$5.95.*

Dubuois, Jacques Marcel. *Le temps et ['instant selon Aristote.* Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1967. Pp. 478. 420 FB.

Emery, J. K. (Ed.) *The Concept of Morality.* University of Colorado Studies Series in Philosophy. No. 8. Boulder, Colo.: University of Colorado Press, 1967. Pp. 94. *$2.50.*

Ferre, Frederick. *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. 465. $7.50.

Gaboury, Placide. *Matiere et Structure-Rejlexions sur l'Oeuvre d'art.* Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1967. Pp. 184. $8.60.

Gallagher, Donald and Idella. *The Education of Man.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 191. $2.25.

Gardeil, H. D. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas IV. Metaphysics.* St. Louis: Herder, 1967. Pp. 829. *$5.25.*

Garner, RichardT. and Rosen, Bernard. *Moral Philosophy-A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 867. $6.95.

Grunbaum, Adolf. *Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes.* Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1967. Pp. 148. $6.50.

Hanley, Katharine Rose and Monan, J. Donald, S. J. *A Prelude to Metaphysics.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. Pp. 177.

Hayen, Andre. *San Tommaso D'Aquino e La Vita Della. Chiesa Oggi.* Milano: Ente Editoriale Dell'Universita, 1967. Pp. 151. L. 1900.

Hospers, J. *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis.* (second edition). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. Pp. $7.95.

Kennedy, Robert F. *Just Friends and Brave Enemies.* New York: Benn Hall Associates, Popular Library, Pp. 174. $.60.

Kim, Arthur G. (Ed.) *G. B. Phelan Selected Papers.* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967. Pp.

Laistner, M. L. W. *Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Empire.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. 145. $1.95.

Lawrence, Nathaniel and O'Connor, Daniel (Ed.) *Readings in Existential Phenomenology.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. Pp. 411. $8.50.

Lee, Edward N. and Mandelbaum, Maurice. *Phenomenology and Existentialism.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 268. $8.00.

Lehmeir, Ludvig, S. V. D. *The Ecclesial Dimension of the Sacrament of Penance from a Catechetical Point of View.* Cebu City, Phillipines: University of San Carlos, 1967. Pp.

Loew, Cornelius. *Myth, Sacred History and Philosophy.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967. Pp. $2.95.

McCaffrey, Patrick J. *Films for Religioull Education.* Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1967. Pp. 106. $1.00.

McDonagh, Enda. *Freedom or Tolerance? The Declaration on Religious Freedom of Vatican II.* Albany, New York: Magi Books Inc., 1967. Pp. 155. $8.95.

lVIaly, Eugene H. and McNeill, Rt. Rev. Msgr. Leon A. *New Horizons for the Word of God.* Wichita, Kansas: Confraternity Bookstore, 1967. Pp. 96.

Mackey, J. P. *The Grace of God, The Response of Man.* Albany, New · York: Magi Books Inc., 1967. Pp. $8.95.

Manier, Edward and Houck, John (Ed.) *Academic Freedom and the Catholic University.* Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Inc., 1967. Pp. $4.95.

Marcel, Gabriel. *Problematic Man.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 144. $8.95.

Marou, Henri !renee, Russell, R. P., 0. S. A., and Paparella, B. A. (Ed.) *The Resurrection a;nd Saint AugUBtine's Theology of Human Values.* Villanova, Pa.: Villanova Press, 1966. Pp. 5!!. $!!.25.

Mauriac, *Anguish and Joy of the Christian Life.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 110. $1.!!5.

Melden, A. I. (Ed.) *Ethical Theories. A Book of Readings* (second edition with revisions). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. Pp. *550.* $7.95.

Muckenhirn, Sister Charles Borromeo, C. S. C. *The Implications of Re- . newal.* Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Inc., 1967. Pp. !!!!9. $5.95.

Nishida, Kitaro. *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness.* Trans!. by Robert Schinzinger. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1958. Pp. !!51. *$5.50.*

O'Flaherty, James. *Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia.* Translation and Commentary. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 229. $7.50.

Olafson, Frederick A. *Principles and Persons.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 258. $7.50.

Osborne, William. *The Segregated Covenant.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. !!5!!. $5.95.

Parker, Francis H. *The Story of Western Philosophy.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967. Pp. 388.

Pereiia, L. and Perez Prendes, J. M. (Ed.) *Francisco De Vitoria. Relectio De India.* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1967. !!39. *450* pesetas.

Prall, D. W. *Aesthetic Judgment.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967. Pp. 878. $1.95.

——, *Aesthetic Analysis.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967. Pp. !!11. $1.95.

Rahner, Hugo, S. J. *Man At Play.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 105. *$.50.*

Rawski, Conrad H. (Ed. and Transl.) *Petrarch: Four Dialogues for Scholars.* Cleveland: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1967. Pp. !!09. $7.45.

Regan, Richard J., S. J. *Conflict a;nd Consensus.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 21!!. $5.95.

Ricoeur, Paul. *The Symbolism of Evil.* New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. 357. $8.50.

Robinson, James M. and Cobb, John B., Jr. (Ed.) *Theology as History.* New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. !!76. $6.00.

Roth, Robert J., S. J. *American Religious Philosophy.'* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967. l.>p. 211. $!!.95.

Rubenstein, Richard L. *After A.U8chwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism.* New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966. Pp. 287. $1.75.

Schlegel, Richard. *Completeness in Science.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967. Pp. 280. $7.50.

Sheets, John R., S.J. *The Theology of the Atonement-Readings in Soteriology.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. Pp. 288. $8.50.

Skolimowski, Henryk. *Polish Analytical Philosophy.* New York: Humanities Press, 1967. Pp. 276. $7.50.

Smith, Marvin W. *Philosophic Dicta.* Seattle, Wash.: Craftsman Press, 1967. Pp. 71. $8.95.

Struve, Nikita. *Christians in Contemporary RU8sia.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. 464. $7.50.

Sullivan, Sister Bede, 0. S. B. *Movies: Universal Language.* Film Study in High School. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Inc., 1967. Pp. 160. *$2.45.*

Sullivan, Mark W. *Apuleian Logic: The Nature, Sources and Influence of ApuleiU8's Peri Hermeneias.* Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 266. $12.00.

Thils, Gustave. *Theologica et Miscellaneis.* Louvain: E. Warny, 1960. Pp. 484.

Trese, Leo J. *Orw Step Enough.* Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Inc., 1966. Pp. 191. $8.95.

Ullrich, Lothar. *Fragen der Schopfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz, 0. P.* Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1966. Pp. 888.

Utz, Arthur. *Ethique Sociale.* Tome III. *Philosophie du droit.* Fribourg: Editions UniversitairelljFribourg Suisse, 1967. Pp. 868. Fr. 86.

Wagner, Johannes (Ed.) Concilium. Vol. 22. *Adult Baptism anul the Catechumenate.* New York: Paulist Press, 1967. Pp. 189. *$4.50.*

Watzlawik, Joseph, S. V. D. *Leo XIII and the New Scholasticism.* Cebu City, Phillipines: University of San Carlos, 1966. Pp. 226.