THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017

VOL. XXXII JANUARY, 1968 No. 1

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY: THE THEOLOGIAN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REVEALED GOD

PART I

THE CHURCH lives and contemplates the Mystery of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit communicated to her. Even though a certain knowledge of the revealed God is possible (Denz.-Schon. 3016), there will remain necessarily an overall darkness, because it is the real God who is known: thus one who is infinite sheer Act and, therefore, incomprehensible. (Denz. 167; 367; 525; 616; 2669; 3016). God, in being known, must at the same time remain unknown; otherwise, it would not be God who was known at all.

The problem of the transcendence and the immanence of God examined in the noetic sphere presents a bewildering number of issues and aspects which will always exact rather delicate treatment. This is so especially today when one finds all varieties of opinions steadily gaining acceptance, ranging from the hyper-immanence of Teilhard to the extreme tran-

scendent accentuation of J. B. Metz.[1] The aim of this study is to consider our theological knowledge of the Mystery of the revealed God precisely as affected in its modalities and dynamism by the divine transcendence. In this way we hope to make a contribution to the theory of our theological knowledge and so help to clear away false problems, to alert the theologian to the dignity and the mystery of his task, and finally to throw light on some principles of theological pedagogy which will form the student in a true sense of the transcendent God. A general Thomistic standpoint recommends itself as a flexible viewpoint from which to assess and interpret the multiple problems that confront theology in this area.

A good deal of work has been done on allied topics, and certain problems have arisen in the general area which will determine, each in its own way, our precise problematic. These points of difficulty and discussion can be isolated under three headings:

1. Here we isolate, as a special point of recent discussion, the Thomistic approach to the Mystery of the revealed God and the modem criticism of this approach. This comes from those who would favor a more radical salvation-historical method in theology. This latter, though it appreciates the orthodoxy of the Thomistic schema of approach, finds it also strangely removed and cut off from the concrete terms of revelation.[2] It is felt that, when too large a stress is laid on the Unity of the divine essence, the saving Mystery of the Trinity is excessively underplayed in theology and life.

[1] Cf. H. Urs Von Balthasar, "Die Gottvergessenheit und die Christen,"Hochland 57 (1964-5), 1-11. Also J. B. Metz, "Die Zukunft des Glaubens in einer Hominisierter Welt," *Weltverstandniss im Glauben,* edited by Metz himself (Mainz, 1965),

• G. Martelet, "Theologie und Heilsiiconomie in der Christologie der 'Tertia,'" *Gott in Welt II* (Freiburg, 1964), 3-43; K. Rahner, "Dreifaltige Gott als Transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte," *Mysterium Salutis* II (Einsiedeln, 1967),

Whereas this study does not intend to "' solve " this problem, it cannot but be influenced by it, as will be seen.

2. In recent years, there has arisen quite an intense debate on the personalism of St. Thomas's trinitarian theology. If the problem is accepted as it has been expressed, it seems that A. Malet in his much-quoted work, *Personne et Amour dans la Theologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1956), had decisively vindicated the theology of St. Thomas in this respect.[3] However, at this later date, when one reflects back on the issue, it can be suspected that the problematic in the framework of which the discussion took shape may not have been in every way genuine.[4] Consequently it can be asked whether a clearer understanding of the special character of our theological knowledge would not have precluded the possibility of such a problem arising in the first place, or at least would have allowed it to be approached correctly. After all, God is *these three divine Persons;* hence any theological problematic that implicitly allows that God could primarily be something else is necessarily suspect in its formulation and in its implied noetic theory. This present discussion will proceed with an eye to this problem and with the intention of making a contribution to the answering of it.

S. Finally, the question may be asked, as it has been asked by scores of theologians and philosophers before this: what is the role of the concept in our theological knowledge? There is, as is well known, a variety of answers; but if this present study intends to give anything like an adequate contribution to the theory of our theological knowledge of God, especially in those aspects touching on God's transcendence over our knowledge, we must at least make mention of the main streams of opinions and try to discern the contribution of each.

[3] The criticism of the classic Thomistic approach had been extreme: cf. S. Boulgakof, *Le Paraclet* (Paris, 1944), 117 f; V. Lossky, *Essai sur la theologie d'Orient* (Paris, 1944).

• The most searching appraisal of the problem and of Malet's attempt to answer it is F. Von Gunten, "La primaute de Ia Personne et Amour dans Ia theologie trinitaire de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Angelicum* 35 (1958), 73-90.

There is the widely accepted classic Thomistic opm10n of Penido which stresses above all the abstract nature of the concept.[5] Then, in reaction to this, we have great stress put on the role of judgment in our knowledge of God.[6] Finally, there is the recent theory of E. Schillebeeckx, who sketches for us the objective dynamism of the concept in our philosophical and theological knowledge of God, which remains in the long run non-conceptual, but the direction of which is determined by the concept, though the concept in no way expresses the divine Reality/

All these theories are claimed to be found " literaliter " in the doctrine of St. Thomas. Whereas it does not fall to us to give an exegesis of the texts of St. Thomas on this whole subject, we must try to bring the worthwhile elements of a very rich Thomistic tradition together into a coherent theory, at least in regard to the precise point of the present discussion.

Such, then, is the general framework within which the discussion will be conducted. By considering the whole range and dynamism of our knowledge of God in its subjective and objective implications in the manner in which it is affected by the continual beyondness of divine Reality, even given the fact of revelation, we hope to delineate the vital structure of theological knowledge in relation to the revealed God. Thus principles may be reached that could have a deep influence on our understanding of the nature of theology, of its basic method, and of the pedagogy necessary for the communication of this unique type of knowledge.

• M. Penido, *Le Role de l'Analogie en Theologie dogmatique* (Paris, 1931), 189 lf. and *passim.*

• E. Gilson, *Le Thomisrne* (Paris, 1948), 150-155; H. Rouillard, *Karl Barth* II (Paris, 1957), 197-9!04; C. de More-Pontigibaud, *du Fini a l'lnfini* (Paris, 1957), *35* lf; H. de Lubac, *Sur les Chemins de Dieu* (Paris, 1956), 144 lf; 9!47 lf; F. Genuyt, *Le Mystere de Dieu* (Tournai, 1969!), 85; B. Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'Analogie de l'Etre d'apres S. Thomas* (Louvain, 1963).

• E. Schillebeeckx, *Revelation et TMologie* (Brussels, 1965), 9!35 f; 105-109, etc. This author presents his theory with a careful textual analysis of the works of St. Thomas; he finds that we do not apply the content of the concept as such to God, according to St. Thomas, "bien qu'il n'a pas pousse Ia chose a fond.-.. " P. !i135.

I. THE HIDDEN GoD

This general section will serve as an introduction to the meaning, relevance and extension of the special aspect under consideration of the divine transcendence with regard to our theological knowledge.

1. *Theology in the presence of God*

In the act of faith man affirms the reality of the revealed God, not in the clarity of intellectual vision but in the dark, personal yielding of oneself to the Word of God through an inner obedience to His mysterious call. There results a kind of tension in the believing mind. There indeed exists that tranquillity of mind in the possession of the Supreme Truth, the fulfilment of everything the human spirit anticipates; [8] however, man remains in the full conscious possession of his powers of reflection, and this continues to take place within the very structure of the act of faith. The believer is confronted with the Mystery of the divine Three calling him into communion with themselves. [9] This is, then, an all-meaningful Mystery, not merely an intellectual puzzle or a series of propositions which have to be taken "on faith." The believer is in the presence of the supreme Reality of his life, which in the natural thrust of his mind, he seeks to know ever more deeply.

Thus, because this mystery of life and grace is so ultimately meaningful and because the mind can reflect, theology arises: " word about God," the understanding, even the conceptualization of the revealed Mystery within the limits of man's capabilities. The conceptual schemata and expressions that result, the systematization of thought and proposition, are all living from the presence of the Ineffable God personally given to man in the depths of his being.

[8] " Omnia cognoscentia implicite cognoscunt Deum in quolibet cognito," *de Verit.*, q. a. ad 1; "omnia ... in quantum desiderant esse, desiderant Dei similitudinem et Deum implicite," *ibid.*, ad Cf. J. Mouroux, "Presence de la Raison dans la Foi," *Sciences Ecclesiastiques* 17 (1965), 181 f.

• Cf. Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Paragraph

Theology, consequently, is nothing more than faith seeking to understand itself; faith prolonging itself into reflection. The more ordered and precise this reflection is, the more scientific and systematic theology becomes.[10] This reflection of faith will vary from person to person, and indeed, as experience has shown, from age to age, as it is influenced by what is currently considered to be the paradigm case of knowledge or systematic reflection. In the theology of St. Thomas we see this reflection on the Mystery of God embodied in the intellectual life of his age and taking to itself the methods and patterns of scientific procedure then employed.

For St. Thomas, God was the " subiectum theologiae," which means, in Aristotelian language, that God was the Reality which the scientific mind sought to penetrate.[11] This penetration of the " subiectum " was the whole aim of the scientific procedure. To this purpose the data was marshaled, its various aspects classified, hypotheses advanced, principles isolated, conclusions drawn. These conclusions were the "obiectum" in Aristotelian terminology. As such, the "objectum" provided the medium through which the mind possessed the " subiectum " and appropriated its perfection.[12] Through the confusion of the object with the subject in theological science there resulted the long barren years of "Konklusionstheologie." Clearly it would be quite unjust to characterize the theology of St. Thomas in this way, as has sometimes been done.[13]

As God is the " subiectum " of theology in the Thomistic approach, it is implied that everything that theology considers is directed to the manifestation of the divine Reality," ad manifestationem subiecti ";[14] thus creation, the Church, the sacra-

[10] *Summa Theol.*, II-IT, q. a. 10: "Cum enim homo habet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, diligit veritatem creditam, et super earn excogitat et amplectitur, si quas rationes ad hoc invenire potest."

[11] Cf. Cajetan, *In Post. Analyt.* (Lyons, 1957), John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theol.*, in I, I, 9 (Rome, 1934).

[12] R. Gagnebet, " Dieu, Sujet de la Theologie selon S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Analecta Gregoriana* 68 (195·1), *41-55.*

[13] For example, G. SOhngen, "Theologie als Konklusionstheologie," *Mysterium Balutis* I, 967

[14] *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. *5*, a. 4, ad 3.

ments, above all the Incarnation are to be considered as " quid Dei," each in its own way contributing to a deeper understanding of the divine Mystery. Theology, then, is entirely taken up in the contemplation of the " ratio Dei," the Mystery of the inner life of God, known only to Himself, and to others through revelation. [15]

This concentration on the divine Reality in the theology of St. Thomas and the tradition after him determines the character of this theology in a marked eschatological perspective. Theology is a share in God's knowledge of Himself and a foretaste of the vision that the blessed enjoy; all this contributes to marking Thomistic theology with a supra-temporal view of things, whereas at the same time it is confident of itself as the highest form of wisdom, enabling the possessor to judge of all reality according to its deepest explanation,-God, in His trinitarian life.[16]

Notwithstanding the obvious and universal vadidity of this approach, some questions must remain open, especially in view of certain contemporary theological developments. There are points of difficulty. From the beginning this "scientia theologica " was in danger of absorbing from Aristotle an inclination to an idealistic metaphysics (which, paradoxically, was quite against the original intention of the Greek philosopher), in which the validity and the value of the singular, as such, was compromised by the excessive dominance of the conceptual universaJ.l[7] We can see this element in the approach of St. Thomas, though just how much the actual performance of this theological synthesis overcome this initial shortcoming is another question. [18]

An unavoidable aspect of the classic synthesis of St. Thomas

[15] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, aa. 6-7.

[16] *Ibid.,* a. 7.

[17] J. de Finance, *Etre et Agir dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Rome, 1960)' 13-28.

[18] Account would necessarily have to be takeu of the profoundly historical treatment that St. Thomas accorded to Law and the Mysteries of our Lord's life, to give two obvious instances. Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, qq. 99-108; III, qq. 36-39, 41-46, etc.

is its built-in tendency to prescind from the singular events of history, to become unhistorical in this sense. It can easily be forgotten that it is only through the "economia" that God reveals Himself at all, and " when theology forgets the singular things of God's Love, it tends to become pure deduction." [19] This tendency we see expressed in the whole scholastic tradition; in its gradual veering away from the Scriptures, it became, to some extent, imprisoned in its own abstract structure. [20] The notion of a systematic Aristotelian " scientia " in theology does encounter a difficulty. God, who is the "subiectum scientiae," is not an impersonal abstract Deity but the Living God, the Mystery of *these three* divine Persons actively engaged in intimate dialogue with man. To this extent detached scientific enquiry is not possible, as it is in other sciences.

Whereas the value of St. Thomas's synthesis is so obvious that it need not be stressed here, one cannot but feel sympathy for those modem theologians who do not feel at home in the rigid scientific procedure of the " ordo doctrinae" when treating of God. This hardly takes away from the accomplishment of the " Doctor Communis "; but it does bring out that the Living God of revelation radically transcends any one scientific approach. This we shall bring out more and more as the study proceeds. For non-Catholic theology, the generalization seems adequately substantiated, " that the scientific point of view is that which abstracts from true theology." [21]

To anyone at all sensitive to the question, one thing must be clear: any extreme view must be avoided, if one intends to build on the riches of the past and be open to the insights of the present. Certainly, theology is a unique science, having, as it does, a unique scope of inquiry. It is like: the nomothetic

[19] M. Chenu, *Introduction a l'Etude deS. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1960) „ 270 ff.

[20] This was, of course, in great contrast to the approach and practice of St. Thomas himself; his magnificent Scriptural commentaries assure us of his immersion in the sacred text itself.

[21] M. Dupuy, "Experience spirituelle, et Theologie comme science," *Nouvelle Revue Theologique* 86 (1964), 1137.

sciences in that it does deal in abstract laws that are verified in the divine Reality, whereas, at the same time, it has affinities with the idiographic sciences which deal with a uniquely given reality, such as history, for instance.[22] The point to stress is that the revealed God,, as presented to the mind of the theologian, is beyond the confines of any one approach; the divine Reality demands that we make both approaches to it, and yet it exhausts both approaches, as we shall see more clearly later.

St. Thomas serenely admits the limitations of all theology with regard to the knowledge of its "subiectum ": "non possumus scire de Deo, quid est "[23]-even though it would appear that he starts out to do precisely that. However, the analogy of science is saved, because God can be known through His effects, and these can take the place of a definition of the divine Reality.[24] We must be on our guard against taking this statement too rigidly, because it must be remembered that in the first place no effect of God is adequate to express Him to the mind of man; and second, the effects of God, above all those in the history of His saving dealings with men, in themselves preclude scientific classification in the strict sense, because of their uniquely inter-subjective character; and third,, the highly analogical character of the science of theology becomes plain when the peculiar character of its subaltemation is registered.[25] In the ordinary case of subaltemation the higher science, whose principles the lower science uses, is at least in the range of the intellect in its present state. This is not the case in theology; the knowledge of the principles, of God seen in Himself, is necessarily restricted to the next life, in the beatific vision.

So, on the one hand, we must naturally respect and profit from the special approach of St. Thomas to the revealed God; on the other, it seems furthest from his intentions to take the categories of science too rigidly or formally, for in the notion

[22] *Ibid.,* 1159.

[23] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 7, ad I.

[24] *Ibid.:* " sicut in aliquibus scientiis philosophicis demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum,. accipiendo effectum loco definitionis causae."

[25] *Ibid.,* a. !l.

of science itself applied to God, of the subject of that science, of the method in that science, of the aim and the subalternation within it., the revealed God stands out in His living presence as a transcendent Reality, always necessarily beyond the scientific penetration and abstract analysis. Hence our knowledge of the revealed God, though it may indeed follow the path that St. Thomas has laid down, will profit from knowing the limits of this and every approach, and eventually come to a deeper consciousness of the divine Reality.

fl. God and man's present manner of knowing

Since the theologian does his work within the framework of a specifically human existence, it will be well to note the limitations of our knowledge of God which are inherent in the present state of affairs. As spirit, man is radically open to the infinite scope of being; but in the space and time of his embodied existence this fundamental openness is characterized by the terms of the present condition.

There is a radical contrast between God's manner of knowing and our own; God's knowledge of Himself, in the infinite act of sheer existence, is immediate and all embracing. Within the all-actual Reality of God there is a supreme consciousness; within this, there is a sublime act of Self-identification which exhausts all that God is. Thus, God is Self-evident to Himself, in perfect simplicity, actuality and immediacy.[26]

Our manner of knowing God is obviously quite different in this life. It is the same whether we speak of that knowledge of God accessible to us through the intelligibility of creation, or whether it comes to us through faith in the God of grace, living and acting in the history of man. Our knowledge is fragmented into many different concepts, propositions, images and symbols, for the human intelligence in this life cannot attain the simplicity of God in Himself. However, man does grasp and name the divine Reality in accordance with the present manner of his existence, namely, that of an embodied spirit,

•• *Ibid.,* q. 14, aa. 1-4.

in that the divine Reality is represented to him in sensible realities from which his knowledge takes its rise.[27] Only in this world is our knowledge now at home; the things of this world are connatural to us. Since man is spirit-in-matter, he is naturally ordained to know a spiritual object; but since his existence is that of an embodied spirit-person, this object is attained precisely in that it exists in matter. Hence being shines forth for man only in the " essences of material things," [28] and we are forced to consider the towering Mystery of the Trinity in terms of the lowly realities of this world.[29]

The human mind, then, is bound inextricably to the realities of this world., even when going beyond it.[30] Man knows m terms of the realities of this world, and this is the state of man's knowing that revelation has respected: "the ray of divine revelation comes to us according to our manner of knowing." [31]

Through revelation God engages the human mind through the realities which are actual for man. The vitality and completeness of our engagement with the divine Mystery is thus assured, even though a basic inevidence must remain, for we do not behold God as "He-is-in-Himself" but insofar as He manifests Himself to us through the communications of nature and grace. St. Thomas states that the natural knowledge we have of God through the intelligibility of creation is completed by "plures et excellentiores effectus," and "aliqua attribuimus ex divina revelatione ad quae ratio naturalis non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum." [32]

Note the severely ontic and objective approach of St. Thomas

[27] *Ibid.,* q. 84, a. 7.

[••] *Ibid.*

[••] *Ibid.,* q. a. "Intellectus noster non potest pertingere ad ipsam simplicitatem divinam secundum quod in se est consideranda. Et ideo secundum modum suum, divina apprehendit et nominat, id est secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis."

[30] *Ibid.,* q. 84, a. 7: "per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum ... in invisibilium rerum aliqualem oognitionem ascendit."

[31] *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 1, a.

[32] *Summa Theol.,.* I, q. a. 13.

to revelation. His theology stresses the objectively real character of the divine Truth, as distinct from the personal, intersubjective bearing of that Truth, which of course, it denies in no way. It brings out the real advance in our knowledge of God through revelation, " aliqua attribuimus ad quae ratio naturalis non pertingit." [33] Also, it must be stated, although St. Thomas does speak about our knowledge of God with a great stress on the " effects " of God, the Incarnation must be taken as the "potissimus effectus" expressing God.[34] Given the general validity of this ontic approach with its strong objective accent, the question arises: is this approach completely adequate? Does it not demand, to be ultimately true to itself, an explication of historical and immediately personal intersubjective elements that it has hitherto left too little expressed? This question will occupy us further and more exhaustively later on in the study we are making.

St. Thomas usually sketches the marks of our knowledge of God by making use of the "an est." and "quid est" distinction.[35] He consistently states that we know the "an est" of the divine Reality under various aspects, but not the " quid est." [36] The general basis for the use of this distinction is the conviction that there is indeed something truly positive in our knowledge of God, yet it is *God* whom we are attempting to know positively, and therefore God who cannot be known in the infinite simplicity of Himself in this life.

This " an est " seemingly does not mean knowing the existence of God in general, but it does imply that we know that certain attributes and the Trinity of Persons are in the divine Reality. Thus it implies that it is only through a multiplicity and fragmentation of concepts and judgments that our minds

"" *Ibid.*

•• *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; ad 4: "... (Philosophi) non cognoverunt bonitatem quantum ad potissimum effectum ipsius, scilicet incarnationem et redemptionem."

[35] *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 1, a. q. 6, a. 3: q. 1, a. 4, ad 10; *ad Rom.*, c. 1, lect. 6. For a note on the position of St. Thomas compared with St. Albert and predecessors, see H. Dondaine, " Cognoscere de Deo quid est," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* (1955)'

•• *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 1, a. 4, ad 10.

are directed toward the fulness of the Mystery of God. This multiplicity of judgments in our qualification of the divine Reality is the thematized expression of the state of our knowledge before the infinite and hence ineffable Reality of what God is in Himself.[87]

The quality of each of these affirmations is, first, that we know that each is true; and second, that there is expressed in each, formally, some reality which is to be found in the Mystery of God. There is no question, however, of expressing this as it is "in Reality," in God; the manner of our knowing the reality and the mode of its existence in God are infinitely apart. Notwithstanding this powerlessmess of the human mind before Gad-in-Himself, there is implied some confused knowledge, in a way analogous to the ordinary case when we question the existence of something; a confused knowledge is implied, otherwise the very question would be impossible.[38] While this general observation is valid, we must be careful not to take it too literally. In the ordinary case of systematico-scientific procedure the object of the study is roughly designated by knowing the general type of the thing in question; " genus proximum vel remotum." [39] But with God, there is no question of genus in this sense; He cannot be a species contained within the larger classification of a genus, one of the differentiations of which would be God. He exhausts the totality of all the perfection of being. Nor are there any accidental qualities (as in the usual case) whose appearance might serve to provide the prior identification of the object of the scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, in place of the generic or accidental knowledge there can be present a corresponding confused knowledge through God's own activity, "per modum causae et doctrinae." [40] In this way we are enabled to make formal affirmations about the divine Reality, either because the ontological perfections pre-

[87] *De Divinis Nominibus,* c. 2, lect. 14: "opportet quod Deum intelligamus esst> supra omne id quod intellectu apprehendere possumus."

•• *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 8.

•• *Ibid.*

•• *I Sent.,* d. 16, q. 1, a. 8.

sent in the effects must belong to the Cause in a higher way, or because through sensible realities He has suggested to us the hidden and exalted Mystery of His inner trinitarian life.

Once more, let us call attention to the thoroughly objective and ontic expression of the Thomistic distinction we have attempted to outline. Again, from another point of view [41] this distinction does seem a little rigid and closed to the full richness and complexity of the situation. Does the fact of God being for us a Self-disclosing personal Mystery emerge sufficiently? Since God has initiated a dialogue with man, the knowledge of Him cannot be reduced to the number of conceptual propositions we can make about Him; He is not merely an object, but a subject, a supremely personal one, acting towards us. What can be said is that the value of St. Thomas's terminology consists in bringing out that God, considered as the supreme Reality, does surpass our adequate conceptualization, in that we can never know the " quid est " of the divine Reality in this life. Thus the way is left open to explicate, within the objective framework provided by the Thomistic synthesis, the intersubjective elements and the subjective bearing of the objective reality, which the classic theological viewpoint of St. Thomas did not require.

To summarize, we can say that, in the valid antic framework of St. Thomas's approach to God, there is a mediacy, a multiplicity, and a fragmentation of concepts in our affirmations, because our knowledge is necessarily linked with the realities of this world. What God is in Himself is left unknown. For this reason the type of knowledge accessible to us in this life can be called knowledge of the " an est " of God, known through the proportioning of the realities of this world to the Reality which founds them. This antic stress of the Thomistic approach leaves room for the explication of the interpersonal aspects, and in a sense, demands this explication; for, after all, God is a " Thou " in our regard, known intimately in faith as

[41] K. Rahner, " Bemerkungen zur Gotteslehre in der Katholischen Dogmatik," *Catholica* 20 (1966), 1-18.

communicating with us through the whole span of the history of salvation.

3. *The general negative character of our knowledge of God*

As an explication of what has been said up to now, and as an indication of what we will add in the next few paragraphs, it can be said that in our knowledge of God there is a certain predominance of the " via negativa." The qualification is necessary, because it has been remarked that nothing is easier than collecting series of texts, one group of which would favor the positive, almost anthropomorphic quality of our knowledge of God, the other showing just as clearly from the writings of St. Thomas a startling negative tendency.[42] Obviously, a more nuanced view of the matter is desirable.

When we consider the Mystery of the revealed God we are under the necessity of taking the divine Reality both as an ontic Reality, one "reality" among many (even though "the many " in this case are the creation of God) , and also as a Personal Subject in whose Mystery the believer is intimately involved. The ontic aspect of our knowledge demands from us a keen realization of the presence of negation in our knowledge, because God, the Creator of all, is infinitely removed from the finite instances of His creation. The self-disclosure of God, effected through His saving intervention in the history of man, demands in our noetic attitude just as keen a realization of the extraordinary positive quality of our knowledge afforded us by Revelation. From the outset we cannot speak about our knowledge of the revealed God without being aware, at least to some extent, of the two points of reference in that knowledge; in the interplay of the two, and in their reciprocal complementarity we must look for that special modality of our theological knowledge of God as it is affected by His continual transcendence.

In passing, it can be noted in reference to the structure of the *Prima Pars* that, though St. Thomas is conscious of salva-

•• M. Penido, *op. cit.*, f.

tion history as the locus of our theological knowledge of the God of Revelation, he expresses it as arising from the " effectus naturae vel gratiae." [43] This is, as we pointed out before, an objective and antic expression leading to the knowledge of the divine Mystery behind the orders of nature and grace; any quality, e. g., goodness, that we can detect in the effects of God " ad extra," we attribute to God by whom it is possessed in an eminent and infinite fulness., although the divine manner of its existence in God can be known only negatively and proportionately; the whole movement of the first twenty-six questions is in this direction. There are ample indications that this approach is theological, and not merely philosophical; [44] even though the divine Persons in their specifically personal roles do not yet come into the picture. The " effectus naturae vel gratiae " in these early questions are taken as the common product of the Three together in the unity of the one nature which is known obscurely in the negative and proportionate manner that we have already made mention of.

When the Mystery of the Trinity comes in for specific attention, the divine Persons are mentioned in their personalities in a positive manner. [45] However, first of all, they are considered in this positive way, "ad intra," and only later" ad extra." [46] When the missions " ad extra," are considered, we begin to see that the effects of God " ad extra " are in fact the foundation for the dynamic of Self-communication of the three divine Persons. An intersubjective relationship begins to appear within the effects in general. [47]

[43] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1.

« Cf. C. Strater, " Le Point du Depart du Traite Thomiste sur Ia Trinite, *Sciences Ecclesiastiques* 14 71-87. This auther brings out very well how the first questions of the *Prima Pars* consider, in fact, the one Mystery of the revealed God, which is the Trinity, though not yet considered precisely in the respective intelligibility of the three divine Persons in their relative distinction.

[45] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. et seq.

[46] *Ibid.,* q. 43, aa. 1-8.

[47] *Ibid.,* a. 4, ad 1; a. *5,* ad 3: "quantum *ad effectum gratiaf!!* sic communicant duae missiones in radice gratiae; sed distinguuntur in effectibus gratiae qui sunt illurninatio intellectus et inflarnmatio affectus . . . . "

Though a number of theologians have sympathetically pointed out that the Incarnation does not get maximum appreciation in the schema of the *Summa/* [8] nonetheless, it is quite clear that there is a depth of personal communication present in all the ontic effects, above all, of grace. Thus, in general, we can see that the broad movement of the *Summa* in treating of God is from the ontic and objective to the inter-subjective, from the transcendent Reality of God affirmed in negation, to the " Thou " of each of the divine Persons as known in the missions.

To take up the thread once more, let us look a little more closely at the dialectic of positive and negative in our knowledge of God. When we say that our knowledge is negative, or employs a negative process in affirming God, we do not mean to say that the affirmation itself is of a weak or conditional kind; nor do we deny that we are affirming the divine Reality in its existential fulness. Every negation about God presupposes a prior affirmation, otherwise there would be nothing to deny.[49] The affirmation is always latent in the negation; what is affirmed is something that we know, through reason or revelation, must be attributed to God; what we deny is something that just as clearly cannot be in the *real* God. This is the finite manner of the existence of those realities which we attributed to God (e. g., fatherhood, sonship, love, wisdom, knowledge, etc.), although it must be granted that our experience of these entities on the finite level, primarily in their creaturely mode of existence, enabled our minds eventually to be orientated toward the divine Mystery.

In the affirmation, then, positive and negative aspects are involved; there is not a reciprocal cancellation; the negative element, purifying the affirmation from the finite manner of

[48] G. Martelet, "Theologie und Heilsiiconomie in der Christologie der 'Tertia,'" *Gott in Welt* II, 3-43; Y. Congar, "Christ in the economy of salvation and in our dogmatic tracts," *Concilium* XI, n. (1966), K. Rahner, "Bemerkungen zum Dogmatischen Traktat 'de Trinitate,'" *Schriften* IV (Einsiedeln, 103-136.

•• *I Sent.,* d. 34, q. 3, a. *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. 3, ad 7; *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. I-II, q. a. 6; *de Div. Nom.,* c. 1, lect. 3; *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 14.

its original signification, makes the statement truly positive. The affirmation always triumphs. [50]

St. Thomas himself came to see more and more clearly the transcendence of God over our knowledge; in his later works he denied absolutely that God can be categorized in any this-worldly genus, not even in a reductive manner. [51] This he had admitted before. [52] Conversely, what immediately confronts our intelligences is the finite instances of Being, participations of divine Being, to be sure, but inadequate to express the infinite simplicity and actuality of the divine Reality: " only created and finite being falls within the vision of our intellects, which altogether fails before the Uncreated and Infinite Being; and therefore, we understand God to be above everything that our intellects can ap1;>rehend." [53]

The negative element must always play a vital role in a true theology, not to lead the mind to a void of infinite nothingness, but as directing our knowing to the supreme Personal Reality in the majesty of its transcendence.

Starting then from these :few general comments, we can conclude that the mind, engaged in the knowing of God, must, in a special sense., ever be in motion. Since God can never be adequately expressed at any stage in man's knowledge, and if this knowledge already arrived at is to maintain its authenticity, the intelligence must always be moving :forward into a deeper darkness, leaving behind the finite expressions of the Godhead it has already reached, as it " intends " the divine Reality in Itself. The mind seeking to know God must always thrust itself in the direction of the divine Reality, where it exists in Itself, and not merely in the representations that the mind has made of It. In this dynamism the formal indication of what is " in God " is not renounced, but the way in which these realities are expressed is successively left behind. God

[50] Cf. H. de Lubac, *Sur les Chemins de Dieu* ... , 146 f.

[51] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 3, a. *5.*

[52] *I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 4, a. *!'l,* ad 3; *de Pot.,* q. 7, a.), ad 7 (Cf. Capreolus, *In I Sent.,* d. 8, q. *!'l,* quinta conclusio).

[53] *De Div. Nom.,* c. *!'l,* lect. 4.

cannot be adequately expressed save by the divine Word Himself, and He will not be given immediately to our minds until we enjoy the beatific vision.

A genuine theology can keep its authenticity only in a conscious "docta ignorantia" in the presence of the divine transcendence. This does not mean mere ignorance but a conscious "unknowing" as the intellect "intends" the divine Reality in its incomprehensible Self. "We know God through ignorance, in that in knowing God we know that we do not know what God is." [54]

A refinement of this principle of the ever deeper darkness is that the whole movement of our knowledge is toward a more personal realization of the revealed God; the deeper the darkness, the more clearly God in Person is known by the mind. This negation is the condition of His Self-disclosure. The self despoilment of the mind enables it to receive the divine Mystery as a Reality to be known; it is a paschal act of the intelligence by which the highest achievement of the mind is realized in the moment of its death,-an aspect that J. Mouroux was quick to point out. [55] This principle of the darkness of our knowledge, as it were, directed toward the Personal Mystery of God, highlights the fact of the divine transcendence, not merely in a philosophical sense but also in a theological sense, the transcendence of the revealed God. God, in His revelation, is a "Known-Unknown" in a special sense; for God calls us into the sense of His transcendence, in order that the human mind might realize not only *what* He is but *who* He is. As the study proceeds, this point will be further elaborated.

It is a matter, then, of retaining two seemingly contradictory points: God must not be placed in some kind of detached transcendence through failure to realize that He has revealed Himself in this transcendence; and yet our knowledge is becoming more perfect the more negative and dark it becomes. Thus, to anticipate what will receive fuller treatment later, we can

[54] *Ibid.*, c. 7, lect. 4.

[55] J. Mouroux, "Presence de la Raison dans la Foi," *Sciences Ecclesiastiques* 17 (1965)' 190 ff.

draw attention to two "elements" (to use the most general word for the present) which are clearly discernible in our knowledge of the revealed God: i) what we might call the *formal* element indicating our knowledge of the divine Reality as a *That,* an objective Reality, which demands that the mind enter an ever deeper darkness before the Beyond-ness of God in regard to all this world's categories; ii) we shall call this element *mysteric,* as it refers to the given, personal subjective aspect of our knowledge, arising from the revelation-faith dialogue, in which God is more and more recognized as a loving" Thou" in relation to man.[56]

To summarize this section, let it be noted that God is presented to the believing mind, not merely as one objective reality among many but as *the* Reality, in whose Mystery the believer is personally involved, as subject to Subject; hence, theological thought about God leads to and from a depth of personal presence of God to the believing thinker; hence it tends for this reason to escape from an overly univocal classification into a science with God as the " subiectum," because God is too personal, too present, too historically given, and too transcendent for this (although all the time it must be realized that, in a correctly understood analogical sense, St. Thomas's terminology is valid) .

This inability of the straight scientific structure to approach adequately the Mystery of God is one specific instance of the transcendence of God over all human categories.

All that remains to be said on this point is that our knowledge of God is essentially negative in its procedure, if it is going to be positive in its performance, if it is going to lead to a deeper and more real affirmation of the real God who has made Himself known to us.

[56] When we say that God is a " That," this also implies that He is a Personal reality, but we do not directly think of His free, personal action towards us; it is objective, an ontic affirmation, of necessity abstracting from the concrete instances of God's concrete historical involvement with man, (His "For-Usness ") in favor of affirming Him in His objective "In-Se." We will be continually returning to this point.

II. THE KNOWING OF GOD IN THE CONCEPT OF OUR CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

We have sketched the general character of the transcendence of the revealed God with respect to our knowledge, and indicated some of the elements involved in the dynamism of human knowing when confronted by the divine Mystery. We can now take up special aspects of the role of the concept in this knowledge.

1. *The "concept of God"*

Our conceptual [57] knowledge is necessarily linked with the realities of this world. Even the great secret of God's inner life is made known through analogies drawn from our connatural field of knowledge.

The divine Realities are expressed in a way proportionate to the realities which lie in the natural scope of our experience. At the center of this proportionate expression is our concept of the finite instance of these realities which, by proportionate application, are made part of our affirmation of the divine. The question then is: how truly is the concept, abstracted as it is from the field of our immediate experience, expressive of the eternal, infinite Reality which is the Mystery of God?

In posing this question now, the" an est"" quid est" discussion of the whole last part opens out into a more specific phase. The conclusion was that some confused formal knowledge of the divine Reality was implied by reference to the terms of our present immediate knowledge. Now we must extend this conclusion into the specifically conceptual order and context.

Do we have a "concept of God"? This question is asked, not in the sense that there could be any possibility of abstracting an idea from a divine Reality immediately, but whether the

[57] Here the word " conceptual " means that order of human knowledge which grasps reality through, and in, universal, abstract ideas, and as such, is distinguished from immediate experiential knowledge of the singular thing and from a direct intuition of it. Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2; *de Potl*, q. 7, a. 6; *in Joan.*, c. 1, lect. 1; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 2; *de Verit.*, q. 4, a. 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 86, aa. 1-5; also P. Siwek, *Psychologia Metaphysica* (Rome, 1962), 376-378; 388; 408.

concept can be sufficiently dissociated from the field of its finite verifications to be rendered applicable to the divine order through our affirmations.

The answer must be negative, if our concepts are necessarily linked with the finite manner in which the realities we wish to affirm of God are manifested in the present limited range of our connatural knowledge; if, say, our idea of "wisdom" can formally be grasped only as realized in our connatural range of experience, that is, as an accidental perfection, a developing and defectible power of the human mind. Some kind of positive answer would be possible if the intellect could form a concept of the " essence," the pure meaning of wisdom, and not see it as essentially bound up with its present finite verification. To the extent that this concept could express a perfection not limited in its meaning, as meaning, there could be nothing preventing this concept from playing a formal signifying role in the affirmation of the divine Reality.

Such is the case. As already shown, we know God only through the "contuitio" of Him,[58] together with the realities of this world. Some of these perfections imply a limitation, not only existentially, but also essentially, in their pure meaning: e. g., sensation. Perfections of this type do not immediately concern us, being as they are only" virtualiter" in God (though it must be admitted, as the terms of revelation so strikingly show, that they have a vital part in engaging the fulness of our attention with regard to the divine Reality by a metaphorical function). Our interest goes for the moment to the other perfections in which no limitation in their essential notion (ratio)[59] is implied.[60] These are above all the transcendentals -being, unity, truth, goodness, (beauty), perfections pervading all reality .[61] Together with these are the specific perfections

[58] H. de Lubac, *CYJJ· cit.,* llO ff.

[59] For the meaning of "ratio," see especially *I Sent.,* d. q. 1, a. 3: "ratio nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alieuius nominis et hoc in his quae habent definitionem est ipsa rei definitio (... non refert utrum ilia quae dicuntur habere rationem, habeant vel non habeant definitionem.)"

[6°] For this division of perfections, cf. *I Sent.,* d. q. I, a. 2.

[61] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. 1; a. S, ad 3; *I Sent.,* d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad

of love, life, intelligence, power, etc., in whose pure meaning there is no built-in demand for limitation, though in their existential verification they are experienced only as limited.[62]

Though this observation draws its force from the basic metaphysical principle that the essence of a finite reality is distinct from its existence, we do not wish to create an unnatural rupture in our knowing between the essential and existential orders; it is the whole experience of reality that can direct our knowledge to the divine.[63] Our experience not only provides a concept, but also symbolic and metaphorical elements that will never bear complete conceptualization. Thus, the total reality offers its essential core to be substantially affirmed of God, purified as this must be of what is proper to its finite verifications. These finite instances, however, have their role in engaging the totality of the knowing subject's consciousness in such a way that the conceptual affirmation of the divine Reality will at the same be rooted in experience and be interpreted as a prolongation of it, not merely an exercise in metaphysical abstraction. In this context the formation of the concept must be seen as the abstractive process within the total experiential consciousness, not as something which is altogether divorced from it.

Thus, abstract conceptual knowledge lives, as it were, from an ever present non-conceptualizable substratum of metaphor and symbol. We might, in accordance with the content of the faith, affirm of God " fatherhood " and " wisdom," etc., and apply our purified concepts to Him under these aspects. There remains in our consciousness our concrete experience of these realities, of human fatherhood and human wisdom. The critical intelligence must abstract the pure meaning of these formalities, if the affirmation is really going to be substantially of *God;* and this process must be seen as truly the situation of divine Realities in the direction pointed to by our experience, if the affirmation is to be made by *man.* It can be said that the

•• *I Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad ad 5.
[68] E. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, 356 f.

analogies of proper and improper proportionality, though distinct in the formal affirmative power of each, are not so divorced in the actual exercise of our knowing; they appear rather as two aspects of the one human affirmation of God. The negative side of this observation is that the " modus significandi " must be denied of the " ratio significata " of the concept-familiar thomist doctrine.[64] What has just been noted indicates that the "modi significandi" do have a vital role in our knowing, in surrounding the concept with an existential field of reference.

It is through the concept critically disengaging the pure meaning of a reality from its finite instances that we apply the names of " wisdom," " goodness," etc., to the divine Reality and designate it as substantially signified in this way. But this by no means indicates that the concept expresses the infinite manner of being in which the reality, notionally expressed by the concept, exists in God. Certain expressions of some Thomists are found wanting in this respect.[65] Concepts do not express the concrete reality; they are abstract universal quiddities in the mind by which the mind can know all singular verifications of this quiddity now abstractly and universally expressed. The mind cannot find the existential fulness of reality in the concept but beyond the conceptual order in reality. Thus, the perfection as it exists in God cannot be known as it exists in God; the role of the concept is such that it enables us to make a formal affirmation of what is in God. In the concretive synthesis of judgment, the concept enables the mind to grasp tendentially a formal aspect of the divine Reality. Through the act of judgment the mind compounds the formal conceptual content with the affirmation of existence-and is thus noetically and validly orientated to-

[64] *Summa Theel.*, I, q. 13, a. 3.

[65] E. g., M. Penido, *op. cit.*, 189 f.: " . . . pour concevoir Ia bonte divine nous devons abstraire de Ia bonte creee une idee transcendante qui n'est pas formellement . . . mais seulement proportionnellement le concept de bonte creee, et c'est cette idee universelle que nous proportionnons a Dieu, c'est par et dans cette idee universelle que nous connaissons Ia bonte subsistante." (Quoted also by E. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, 244, note 2; and B. Montagnes, *op. cit.*, 164.)

wards the mysterious depths of the divine Being.[66] There the quiddity expressed of God is one with the divine unlimited act of existence, and in that way is infinitely, ineffably and incomprehensibly realized.

The affirmation in its existential import dynamically orientates our minds to the hidden depths of God. In its formal content it is an affirmation of a formal aspect of the divine Reality. It is valid, though at the same time inadequate, not expressing the reality as it is in God. This it does only proportionately and above all negatively. In this sense it is truer to say that the divine Reality is affirmed or " signified," rather than " expressed." [67] However, we must retain the formal signifying aspect intrinsic to the concept achieved in its state of abstraction from finite verifications, in its formal signifying power; if this is not kept, our affirmation would be a straight out anthropomorphic utterance or lack any intrinsic specification and thus affirm nothing. [68]

* * * * *

Before adding some clarifying points, it will be necessary to pause over the truly personal character of the theological affirmation and its fully existential quality. This can best be expressed by bringing out two elements, or better, "moments," facets pertaining to the inner structure of our affirmations alluded to before.

First, the formal; we know through faith the supernatural interventions of God in salvation history. And in this knowledge our conceptual affirmations about the divine Reality are rendered supremely meaningful in their formal content, whereas the concept is subject to continual enrichment from the mind's contemplation of the "effectus naturae vel gratiae" which include the Incarnation, [69] etc., the basis of our affirmation. God

[66] Cf. H. Bouillard, *op. cit.,* 198 ff.; also D. Burrell, "Aquinas on Naming God," *Theological Studies* !l4 (1963), 183-212; C. de More-Pontgibaud, *duJ Fini a l'lnfini* (Aubier, 1957), *35* f; E. Gilson, *op. cit.,* 124-357.

[61] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. !l.

[68] M. Corvez, "L'idee et !'affirmation de Dieu," *Revue Thomiste* 57 (1957), 314.

[69] As well as all the effects in the Church through history, cf. *ud Ephes.,* c. I, lect. 8; *ud Hebr.* c. 11, lect. I; fo.r good comment on this, see A. Motte, "Theodicee et

in Himself will always be beyond these conceptualizations, as has been explained, even though they will be more meaningfully affirmed of Him.

Second, there is what we will continue to call the " mysteric " moment; it arises from the fact that there is a givenness about the divine Mystery that the formal element in our affirmations does not obviously express. It is one thing to consider our affirmations as signifying God as good, wise, etc., in a general way little different, except by origin, from the formal signification of philosophical affirmations. However, it is another thing to realize that the theological affirmation must be considered as a response to the givenness of God's Self-manifestation in a *most special manner,* as the divine Mystery of Self-communication concretized in the actual role of the three divine Persons in salvation history; for here each is a uniquely personal term of our knowledge, the "Thou" of God in our regard.[70] Our theological affirmations are the answer in a dialogue first initiated in the salvific roles of the three divine Persons in their saving work. Such affirmations arise from considering God as the supreme objective Reality known through the variety and excellence of His effects, and as a response to the Reality manifested concretely in this dialogal, divinely subjective manner of the Mystery of God-in-Se-pro-nobis, of salvation history, which is not exhausted by the formal analyses of concepts.

Thus, our affirmations, despite their abstract form, have a context, origin and purpose very much bound up with salvation history. The realization of this double moment in our affirma-

theologie chez S. Thomas," *Revue des sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques* 25 (1987)' 5-27.

•• Here we must stress the full realism of the Incarnation, as modern theology has attempted to express it: Christ's humanity is not simply an apparition, or human appearance, or simply an instrument which Christ uses to manifest His presence, yet being still disguised in Himself. Rather, Christ's human nature is the expression of Got\ Himself, the "inhumanization of God," (H. U. Von Balthasar, *Dieu a parte un langage d'homme: Parole de Dieu et Liturgie* [Paris, 1958], 78), the self expression of God outside Himself (K. Rahner, " Reflexions theologiques sur L'Incarnation," *Sciences Ecclesiastiques* 12 [1960], 14 f.); Christ is God the revealer and also God revealed (R. Latourelle, *Theology of revelation* [New York, 1966], 868 f.). Thus in the fullest sense we have the " Thou " of God addressed to man.

tions makes them more personal and existential in the sense of having their most concrete reference point in the given Mystery of God as revealing Himself. Furthermore, by bringing out this double moment in our affirmations it is hoped that a fruitful principle will be provided for later questions which depend on harmonizing the revealed concrete Reality and the abstract content of our concepts.

* * * * *

a) *Negation and the concept.* If God is to be validly qualified by these conceptual affirmations, the concepts themselves in their limitation must be submitted to a double negation, in order that the affirmation might achieve its formal validity. The concept, as a finite, inadequate element in the formal signification of the divine Reality, is not negated; there is a positive conceptual content which must remain in the affirmation, otherwise the affirmation will have no formal " direction." However, the negative element does come into play; first, in that the concept must be purified with regard to its finite field of reference, if it is to be applied to God. That is, the elements which do not formally belong to the pure meaning which the concept expresses but to the existential verification of the concept from which the concept was originally taken; this is the first and most elementary negation.

There is a second zone of darkness[1] surrounding the concept. We must deny the concept the capacity to express the reality it formally signifies, as it is *in God.* That is the object of God's knowledge. The positive content of the concept yields to a state of willed ignorance of the divine Reality, because no concept can express what God is. As soon as we have a conceptual notion of a reality which must be in God, as identified with the divine Reality, it must be immediately submitted to a process of negation, not in its limited validity but in its capacity to adequately express the transcendent Mystery toward which the mind of the Christian theologian is orientated. The way of theological knowledge must ever take him into a deeper dark-

ness, "where God is said to dwell": "Illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat se Deum nescire." [71]

b) *Mysteric concreteness.* There are two ways of conceiving reality; the one concrete, the other abstract. One can think of a good thing, or goodness in general, indetermined to any particular object. The abstract idea enables the mind to prescind from any actual immediate experience of goodness, etc., in its predications and renders possible the proportionate predication of it (etc.) to God.[72] This does not mean that God is good in the way we understand the realities of our connatural world to be good, but, in a way we do not understand, that He is the *Good One* in a way surpassing the expressive power of our human categories and concepts.[73] Thus the ultimate realization of this abstract idea is affirmed in the dark proportionate manner that has been sufficiently explained.

This point can be more developed with regard to the notional predication of the three divine Persons: God is not merely " Fatherhood " or " Sonship " in general but *the* Father as a *mysterically* given Reality, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, acting and revealing Himself through the course of salvation history. There must always be the concrete identification of the formal content of our affirmations with the actual divine Person in salvation history.

This Father, etc., concretely identified in salvation history as a unique " Thou " in His mysteric givenness, must not be substituted for by a concretization of "fatherhood" in general laboriously elaborated in its essential formality through the psychological image, etc., (the value of which is not denied). Rather, the two moments must remain in our knowledge, the formal more abstract one directed toward ontological " Res Divina," and the mysteric directed toward the ineffable, personal givenness which eludes our formal concepts.

[71] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. *5*, ad 14; cf. also *de Verit.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 8; *de Div. Nom.*, c. 7, lect. 4: " Est alia Dei perfectissima cognitio per remotionem, scilicet qua cognoscimus Deum per ignorantiam."

[72] *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1; *I Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 32, a. 2.

[73] M. Corvez, *op. cit.*, 315; and by the same author, "De la connaissance de Dieu," *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948), 511-524.

c) *A theology of affirmation.* Theological knowledge has indeed its precise conceptual content; but it does not consist in mere conceptual analysis in an effort to :find a greater notional evidence. It perfects itself in affirmation, in a proclamation that God IS so, in the sense that He is a supremely personal and ineffable Reality behind all His communications. At a great depth theology is kerygmatic, much more so than the favorers of "kerygmatic theology" would seem to realize, for it teaches us to proclaim of God, in the deepest and most meaningful manner, the realities, i.e., the attributes, etc., of which, according to revelation, He is the possessor. This affirmative character of theology is in keeping with the notion of God as the " subjectum theologiae " treated at the beginning, for it is a response to a unique " Thou " Who has manifested Himself and not a mere logical effort to draw as many conclusions as possible from or about a series of propositions.

* * * * *

In view of what has been outlined, it seems that each apparently different approach has some positive contribution to make if one sets the question in a more integrated perspective.

The classic Thomistic opinion of Cajetan and his followers, such as Penido, despite some exaggerated expressions and a too abstract and notional approach, does lay due stress on the abstractive power of the mind to disengage a pure meaning, independent in its formal content of the :finite realizations from which it originates. To that extent there must be what is often called an " analogical concept," not in the sense that the concept changes or that it contains within itself the full range of its existential realization, but simply because it is not inextricably wedded to the :finite in its formal content. This is a necessary :first stage in our affirmation of the divine Reality. I would consider that the classic Thomist view has not fully been aware of this, being content to place our knowledge of God in what is merely its abstractive phase. It falls short in not appreciating the vital role of judgment and is therefore too abstract and static.

Those who lay stress on the role of judgment make a contribution along different lines. As well as a prejudgmental abstractive phase in our knowledge, there is the perfection of our knowledge in affirmation.[74] In this affirmative phase the mind is actually orientated toward the divine Reality in its existential fulness, as it is "in reality," even though the affirmation does not have within its formal conceptual content an adequate expression of the Reality affirmed; for in our affirmations of the *Res Divina* the formal conceptual content is expressive of a pure abstract meaning-a quiddity known originally in finite verifications and now reflexively grasped as not essentially linked with them-which is predicated of God as a valid, though inadequate expression of the divine Reality. In this way our minds are darkly orientated toward the mysterious depths where the finitely signified perfections exist in an infinite manner.

Analogy, then., is not merely the possession of a concept which can prescind from finite realizations in its formal content; it means, fundamentally, that there is a way we can affirm realities of God in a valid manner. This is not an anthropomorphic exercise on the one hand, for the content of the affirmation is not bound up with the finite world in its formal signification. Nor, on the other hand, is it a lapse into agnosticism, for we are affirming something of God which is really God; there is a positive predication and a truly existential judgment but with this difference, that the manner of existence in God is not represented. The names we predicate of God are immediately representative of our concepts.[75] Hence St. Thomas can say, "huiusmodi nomina *significant* divinam substantiam, et predicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a *representatione* eius."[76]

E. Schillebeeckx's theory of objective dynamism offers more room for reflection. Its value is that it situates the conceptual

[74] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 16, a. 2: "Quando intellectus iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum."

[75] *Ibid.*, q. 13, a. 1.

[76] *Ibid.*, a. 2.

elements of our knowledge of God in a dynamic noetic. It brings out the abstract nature of the concept [77] and how it arises from the finite world.[78] Finally, it highlights an existential and experiential aspect too often neglected in our discussions of the character of knowledge of God.[79] It is my opinion that this theory is exaggerated to the extent that it makes all our knowledge *properly* of God to consist in a non-conceptual order.[80] For Fr. Schillebeeckx the non-conceptual is not a complement to the conceptual in our knowledge of God but rather a subsitute for it. The whole theory is developed with a keen realization of the transcendence of the divine Reality,

[77] E. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, 842 f.: "Les concepts de la foi possedent un contenu qui nous oriente positivement vers la realite du salut: ils ont une valeur de connaissance mais n'impliquent aucune saisie conceptuelle de cette realite. La paternit.e de la premiere Personne, par exemple se trouve reellement dans la perspective objective de notre concept humain de ' pere,' mais nous ne saississon pas conceptuellement le mode de realisation et la paternite en Dieu: comme contenu conceptuel nous n'avons que le concept de paternite humaine. C'est dans la ligne, dans la perspective objec· tive de cette paternite que Dieu *se* situe, mais nous ne pouvons pas le situer exactement dans cette perspective .... "

[78] *Ibid.*, 284 f.: "Quoique les concepts soient inadequats et meme, en taut que abstraits, ne possedent en elles-memes, et par eux-memes aucune valeur de (ce que·le concept abstrait fait connaitre se situe dans la realite concrete et est done realise autrement que dans le concept-) ils possedent en liaison avec !'aspect non conceptuel, une valeur de realite,-inadequate sans doute, mais cependant reelle,- car ils donnent (et eux seuls) une direction et un sens a l'elan, qui a partir des concepts, nous porte vers la realite ... ," etc. The philosophy of knowledge of which Fr. Schillebeeckx avails himself is that of D. de Petter, 'who stresses an implicit intuition in all our knowledge, which is not directly accessible to reflexive analysis; at no moment does the mind give adequate expression to its full existential grasp of reality, though it is capable of a certain confused abstract expression through our concepts, which are, on the one hand, consciously grasped as not being determined to this existential reality, yet, on the other, are actively referred to it as abstract inadequate expressions. Cf. " Begrip en werkelijkheid aan de overzijde van het conceptualisme: Impliciete Intuitie," *Tidjschrijt voor Philosophie* 1 (1989), 25-48; and "L'Intuitif implicite dans l'acte de connaissance," *Actes du Xwme Congres international de philosophie* (Amsterdam, 1948); for review cf. J. Isaac, *Bulletin Thomiste* 8/i (1947-58), 465-68.

[79] E. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, 108 f; 842 fl'.

[80] E. g. *ibid.*, 108: "nous n'appliquons proprement a Dieu comme tel les contenus purement conceptuels de 'pere' et 'fils' mais dans Ia ligne de ces contenus, a !'exclusion de tons autres (ce sont ceux qu'utilise Ia revelation) nons 'tendons' reellement vers Ia realite divine .... "

which thus demands the presence of non-conceptual elements in our knowledge. Nonetheless, we cannot accept it completely, for we are forced to recognize the lowly role of the concept itself as a limited formal expression of the reality which is in God, even though the divine manner of its existence therein is not expressible.

I am conscious of the danger of merely verbal differences in this area, for when different theologians talk of the " concept of the divine Reality," etc., two different things can be meant. No one can justifiably say that our conceptions of God really express the reality in the infinite manner of the divine where essence and existence are one in unlimited act. To that extent our knowledge can be called non-conceptual, in that our minds are oriented to the existential fulness of the divine Reality only by going beyond the concept and by entering into the darkness which belongs to the human mind before the eminence of the divine order. Hence there is no question of" seizing" the divine Reality or grasping it adequately and conceptually.[81] But, to repeat, the concept remains in itself a necessary positive element in our knowledge of the divine and, indeed, a formal element expressive of what is " in God " but not in the infinite manner in which it is contained in the divine Reality; it enables us to affirm God validly without pretending to any adequate formal knowledge of Him. Perhaps it is more truthful to say that our concepts yield us, not so much knowledge " of God " but " about God."

In the final part of this study I propose to take up the non-conceptual element in our knowledge, presenting it as a complement to our properly conceptual knowledge. In this my debt to Fr. Schillebeeckx will be obvious. Up to the present one point has not been sufficiently brought to the fore, viz., the reason why we postulate a dynamism in our knowledge with

[81] Fr. Schillebeeckx occasionally gives the impression that those who would allow the positive conceptual element in our knowledge of God, in the sense explained, somehow conceive the divine Reality as adequately grasped or " saisie," e. g., *op. cit.*, 244; 848.

its vital inclusion of conceptual and non-conceptual elements. We must try to answer this question in a later context.

Briefly, then, the special transcendence of the revealed God affects our theological knowledge in the conceptual order, i) by making it less a process of abstract expression but one of existential affirmation in which the concept has a validly formal directive role in the determination of the precise aspect of the divine Reality to be affirmed; thus we know concerning it" an est," with a necessary element of the " quid est sub quadam confusione." [82] ii) The personal mysteric givenness remains in some way a non-expressed "plus" in all our affirmations. iii) Both these points indicate that our theological knowledge, even in its conceptual elements., lives from the experience of faith, so that it is caught up as an element in the dialogue with the divine " Thou."

2. *The real dimension of the affirmation*

Since we have been concentrating here more on the positive moment in the dialectic of our knowledge before the divine transcendence, we must now complement what has just been said by clarifying how the concept is a formal expression of what is in God. The discussion must be briefly directed to more ontological considerations following upon our previous concern with the content of the concept; now we are concerned with the actual verification of that concept in the divine Reality. What is at stake is this: is our knowledge purely functional, or is God, as He is in Himself, truly qualified by our affirmations? Do our affirmations, made as they are through the medium of conceptualizations arising from reflection on the history of salvation, truly provide us with a *real* theology?

Two extremes are to be avoided: first, an exaggerated realism which would spring from a too univocal application of our concepts of God without the accompanying realization that God is revealing Himself in human language and categories which are made to signify Him but not represent Him. This

[82] *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 3.

error would prevent us from sufficiently intellectualizing our experience of the realities through which God has revealed Himself, by not disengaging the relevant intellectual content and submitting it to the necessary negations. Unless there is this critical effort on the part of the human mind, the fact of God's revelation can never be appreciated; to hear God's word, as *God's,* it must be stripped of what is intelligibly irrelevant, so that the "proportion " can be verified.

The second extreme consists in negating the conceptual content of the affirmations of faith and theology too much. Such an exaggeration would no doubt arise from the realization that God has revealed Himself in an " economia," not in His " immediately eschatological" Reality. Such a tendency would allow a certain pragmatic purpose in our concepts but deny of them a truly real verification., in that they do not tell us of God " in Himself " but only in the " quoad nos " of the " economia."

Although from the biblical angle this point must continue to be discussed,[83] the contribution of St. Thomas is very relevant for the healthy development of modern theology; his own doctrine is the fruit of manifest development on his part. He becomes more and more severe on the overly negative teaching of Maimonides; [84] by the time of his writing the *de Potentia* he seems to have definitively clarified hiSi doctrine on the verification of our ideas in God.[85]

[83] Cf. L. Malevez, "Nouveau Testament et theologie fonctionnelle," *Revue de Science Religieuse* 48 (I960), 284 f.; Y. Cougar, "Christ in the economy of salvation and in our dogmatic tracts," *Concilium* XI n. 2 (I966), 4-I5.

[84] In *I Sent.,* d. 2, q. I, a. 3, he sees only a superficial difference between the opinions of Maimonides and Avicenna as contrasted 'with those of Denis and Anselm: "in superficie diversae videantur." But in the *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. 5, the opinion of Rabbi Moyses is said to be " insufficiens et inconveniens "; and irn the *Summa Theol.,* I, q. I3, a. 2, we find the same "inconvenientia" attached to the opinion of Moses Maimonides.

[85] Cf. the very difficult passage in the *I Sent.,* d. 2, q. I, a. 3, compared to a clearly and strongly defined position in the *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. 6. A tendency can be detected to objectivize in a more real manner the " ratio " in question, in order to preclude any impression that the ratio i!! God as understood by us, not as He is in Himself. The *Responsio ad Joannem Vercell. de artie. 108* clarifies the position

To appreciate his doctrine to the full, the distinction must be clearly maintained between the logical and ontological orders, between the order of our knowledge of the *Res divina* and the *Res divina* in its actual existence. In the logical order, each conceptual expression of the divine Reality exists in our minds as in a subject, that is, as the logical intentional likeness of the ontological reality. In the mind, it resides as a meaning which can be applied to God. Thus the divine Reality is present to the mind, not in the immediacy of what it is but as understood. But, God is not our ideas about Him; outside the mind these divine attributes and notions exist, not as conceptualized but as existentially realized in the infinite Act of the divine Reality.

The link between these two orders is not merely that of efficient causality, as though the formal quality of the effect was only "virtualiter" in God.[86] The correspondence must be a formal one.[87] The reality as it is in God and this same reality as conceived by the mind look to one another as what is signified to what signifies (in the imperfect, inadequate manner already explained) ... " sicut significatum in signo." [88]

Hence, between the concept and the divine Reality there is a strict, though extremely limited, formal correspondence. But despite the limitation of the formal likeness, the divine Reality can be analogically affirmed as truly qualified by our concepts, yet not fully expressed by them because of its infinite realization of God.

And so the quality of our knowledge is not merely functional or subjective but objective, real in that it deals with the divine Reality as it is in itself, in the eternal, infinite plenitude of what God IS. St. Thomas sums this up neatly, using as his example the attribute of goodness:

after the doctrine of the *Sentences;* on this point see F. Von Gunten, "La primaute de Ia personne et de l'amour dans Ia theologie trinitaire de S. Thomas," *Angelicum* 35 (1958)' 81 fl'.

[86] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. 2.

[87] *Respoosio ad Joan. VerceU.; de Pot.,* q. i. a. 6.

[88] *I Sent.,* d. 2, q. I. a. 3.

Thus it follows that the intellect in conceiving goodness is like that which is in God and is God: so that something that is in God and is God corresponds to the notion or conception of goodness.[89]

* * * *

It could be remarked that the subtlety of this type of scholastic consideration runs the danger of making the God of such a theology as abstract and impersonal as the concepts we use about Him. In this context I would make four remarks:

I) This consideration is only a partial aspect of our theological knowledge of God, indeed its most abstract phase. God in His concrete living relationship to us is altogether too ineffable to allow our theology to confine itself to abstract conceptual affirmations or to regard these affirmations purely in their abstract formal signification without taking into account the mysteric moment that must be present in them. This type of theological consideration does not necessarily consider God as merely a" Nuda Essentia." [90]

2) This objective "eschatological" view of our knowledge of God does lay a healthy stress on the fact that salvation history is the presence of Eternity in time, and that every finite communication of God made in the temporal historical order bears with it the infinite eternal Reality of what God is in Himself and stems from it.[91] It enables us to set the" for us" or" economic" aspect of the divine Mystery in eternity, in the " In Himself " of God; and thus theology becomes truly a theology of God, not an " economia " or a theology of history.

3) By stressing the fact that the formal meaning of the concept applied to God achieves its formal meaning not in

[89] *De Pot.,* a. 7, a. 6.

[9°] Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 11/1 (Zollikon-Zi.irich, 1932), 18.

[91] This is one element in the whole series of answers that must be sought for anew by modern theology; for as Y. Cougar, "Christ in the economy - - - ," *op. cit.,* 11, remarks: " Sooner or later speculative theology . . . will have to pose the problem which occupies us so much in a much more personal way: . . . all that has been done for us, including the incarnation has been required, has it not, in spite of the absolute liberty of God, by what God is in Himself? Is there not, in the mystery of His ' en Soi,' a presence, a call for the ' pour nous ' . . . ? "

itself but in the divine Reality, the doctrine of Thomas causes the whole tendency of our theological knowledge to be directed away from a purely conceptual approach that would regard analysis and the drawing of dogmatic conclusions as the aim of the theologian. Rather, it causes a concentration of theological attention on the reality of the divine Mystery existing beyond our conceptualizations, affirmed but not expressed, signified but not represented in its ineffable fulness. Thus, theology has an inherent demand for a sense of the divine transcendence, which, in its turn, will cause the unique character of our theological knowledge, as it is affected by the special transcendence of the revealed God.

4) This point of the concept being verified within the divine Reality ensures a contemplative dimension for theology that should not be underplayed. This abstract conceptual knowledge does formally affirm the Reality of God as it will appear in final evidence. Thus, there is present in a mature theology a concentration on God in Himself over and above the immediate consideration of the " economia."

In bringing out a positive element in our conceptual theological knowledge by the assertion that there is a formal correspondence between the divine Reality and the formal meaning of our concepts, we have succeeded in stressing more the transcendence of God. Theology is directed to go beyond its own conceptualizations in the consciousness that they are all actually but ineffably realized in the divine Reality; and this would demand that the abstractly formal affirmation of " God-in-Himself" be appreciated as vitally linked with the mysteric givenness of God-in-Himself in salvation history. Our knowledge is presented with a positive fulness of Mystery; its reaction to this expresses itself in a multiplicity of concepts in the humble effort to understand what we already believe.

3. *Conceptual multiplicity and the fulness of the Mystery*

As a matter of fact, in the present procedures of theology we are confronted with a multiplicity of divine names and con-

cepts. It should be remarked at the outset that this plurality does not result merely from the reasoning processes of the scientific investigator into divine things but from the living historical experience of God in Israel and the Church.[92] Hence, these names, along with their obvious propositional value, have a rich dialogal role in the verbal response to, and the conceptual realization of, the given divine Mystery; for these names do not signify abstract quiddities, though this impression can easily be had from the overly philosophical treatment these properly theological names have largely received. Theology must explicate more the salvational historical origin of these names and the significance of possessing the name of God, implying as it does a Personal Self-commitment on God's part regarding man.[93]

Even though the treatment of the divine names has not been as " theological " as desirable, nevertheless the speculative effort involved in elaborating the proper concepts and finding names for all the intelligible aspects of the Mystery of God can be seen as the fecundity of the believing mind in the presence of the Fulness of revelation where God has " named " Himself "Emmanuel," " God-with-us," yet remains in His "inapproachable light" (I Tim. 6: 16), the Ineffable One immeasurably beyond all our concepts and images by which our minds are nonetheless validly directed toward the divine Reality in this life of faith.

First of all, and most necessarily, a plurality of distinct names and concepts is required because of the Self-communication of the three divine Persons. Faith prolongs itself into reflection on this central mystery of the Holy Trinity, and thus ideas must be multiplied to express the meaning of the distinct divine Personalities, the relationship of the divine Persons to One another and to us. Thus there arises a theological vocabulary signifying a corresponding set of concepts, the " Theologia Discreta."[94]

•• R. Latourelle, " Revelation, Histoire et Incarnation," *Gregorianum* 44 (1963), 237. E. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, 338.

•• Cf. E. Brunner, *Dogmatik* (Zurich, 1960), 124.

•• *I Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 4; *de Div Nom.*, c. 2, lect. 2.

Then again, because theology has the duty to integrate the rational demonstration of the one essential divine Being and because of the lived confession of the One God in Israel and the Church, there is demanded another series of " essential " names and concepts designating the various qualities of the Deity which each of the Three possesses in common, hence giving us the "Theologia Unita." [95]

What God is in His essential perfection is refracted and reflected throughout all the universe of nature and grace, through the "effectus naturae et gratiae." If God should be adequately seen, one name would suffice because of the simplicity of the vision coupled with the simplicity of what God is in Himself; but because we do not see God in this way, and only through what He has done, and because these effects are many, and because He cannot be adequately qualified by any one of them, we must attribute to Him all the perfections we can find in our limited range of knowledge [96] along with the process of conceptually identifying the divine Three.

A great multiplicity of names and concepts arises in the theological response to the fact of God's saving interventions in man's history. It is the recognition of the ineffable transcendence of the revealed God that, at root, demands this theological plurality; for the divine Persons would not be sufficiently represented as divine, unless qualified by the totality of the essential names. Each of the Three could not be confessed as divine save as distinctly named and distinctly understood, whereas any one name applied to God signifies a limited conceptual meaning, being determined to one formality, and cannot be applied to God, save in the consciousness that all other separately understood perfections be affirmed of the divine Reality as well. The multiplicity of our conceptual affirmations is a confession of the transcendence of God in His unique ineffable Reality. Thus this conceptual multiplicity is at once a response to the Fulness of the divine Mystery revealed to us and a recognition of it as a transcendently divine intervention.

[95] *I Sent.*, d. fffl, a. 4. [96] *Ibid.*

III. THE MYSTERY OF THE REVEALED GoD AND THE MoMENTS OF oUR AFFIRMATION

We must now see, in the synthetic phase of our study, how these various elements in our knowledge converge in the affirmation of the one divine Mystery in its formal transcendence and in its given personal concreteness with regard to us. We will prescind here from the subjective element in this affirmation, [97] and concentrate on its objective content. [98]

1. *The formal and mysteric affirmation of the divine Simplicity.*

The names we use in our speech about the divine Mystery cannot be synonyms; if they were, the whole fabric of our knowledge, and more specifically, our dogmatic formulations would collapse in an agnostic muddle. At the most, they would retain a merely symbolic value. St. Thomas realized quite clearly that there was the apparent contradiction, if one asserts i) that the names we use for God do enjoy a substantial verification in the divine Reality, and ii) that the divine Reality is one, a single, simple " Perfection " in the concrete sense. The solution to this antinomy must respect both issues: saving the validity of our knowledge and the simplicity of God. [99]

The answer to this precise question need not long delay us; our names do not signify the divine Reality immediately but through the mediation of concepts drawn from this world and the experience of God's saving presence in it. Our ideas have different intelligible contents and are grasped as distinct meanings: person, nature, goodness, mercy. Now, because these

[97] " Subjective" in this context indicates an affective, connatural type of knowledge proper to the experience of the knowing subject and as such not fully communicable or conceptualizable.

[98] " Objective " here, in opposition to the above mentioned " subjective " type of knowledge, indicates what is conceptualizable about the Reality we know, whether it be referred to us merely as an " Object," a " That," or a " subject," a " Thou ": hence, a limitation of language, these words are used in two different senses.

[99] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 6; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 4.

names signify the divine Reality under aspects distinct in our mind, the names we use of God are not synonyms, which would express the same reality under the same formal aspect.[100]

Logically, the question should be asked, how are these formalities different in God? In the connatural world of our knowledge, person and nature, power, love are formalities really distinct. The experience of God in His dealings with man forces us to apply these meanings to the divine Reality through a series of distinct concepts. Since this distinction is so much part of our understanding, and so much part of reality, how can the divine Reality be said to possess these qualities and really *be* what we affirm it to be, without there resulting a distinction in that Reality?

Before outlining the answer to this question, I would like to point out that this is not such an abstract and irrelevant question to modern theology as our less metaphysical times might think.[101] One's attitude to this question indicates whether or not one has realized the mystery of the fact of revelation, as well as the inherent difficulty of our speech about God, and the crisis our thought faces in pondering divine things. In more recent times, A. Malet, working in the framework of speculative Thomistic theology, has brought out the necessity of clarifying the issues involved.[102]

To substantiate his thesis regarding the primacy of person in the trinitarian theology of St. Thomas, Malet has inter-

[100] *Summa Theol., loc. cit.,* a. 1: "variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus noster respondet unum omnino simplex secundum huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo attributa licet significant unam rem, tamen, quia significant earn sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonoma."

[101] K. Rahner (" Der dreifaltige Gott als Transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte," *Mysterium Salutis II)* makes the point that there is a relative lack of interest in this type of more subtle question, and one cannot but agree that today there are more important points to be presented, though these subtle abstract points will probably be in the long run of great help to the newer salvation-historical type of theology when difficulties may appear under a different guise. In the present context, this point about the distinction in God demands close attention in that our theological knowledge must be seen to affirm the *One* divine Reality over its conceptual multiplicity.

[102] A. Malet, *Personne et Amour,* 99-103.

preted the " distinctio rationis " within the divine simplicity in a way not justified in the texts of St. Thomas, as a number of Thomists have pointed out in an irrefutable way.[103] He is accused of making the distinction too real. Certainly for him, the distinction of nature and person in God is no merely subjective one, on the level of our ideas, but something that has an objective as well as an ideal sense: " On voit que la distinction 'in ratione' n'est pas une distinction subjective. Elle n'existe pas seulement dans !'esprit humain qui parle de Dieu." [104]

He goes on to say that all the " rationes " that have been used, viz., nature and person, habens and habitum, id quo and id quod, are realized in God and" saved" in the divine Reality. (Especially *I Sent.,* d. 2, q. 1, aa. *2-5* is used for textual evidence) .[105] And thus, "Toutes les analyses que nous avons consacrees a montrer la primaute de la personne sur !'essence, tout ... n'est vrai, dans la Trinite, quei sur le plan des 'ratio' ... !'absence de la distinction in re en Dieu, n'est pas une imperfection, mais une perfection. La distinction en Dieu n'est pas ' moindre,' elle est ' autre.' " [106]

For the author, any neglect of the realism of the distinction "in ratione" (as he prefers to call it, as different from "rationis" in St. Thomas) [107] in failing to appreciate its objective sense can have serious consequences for all our thought on the Trinity and the Incarnation. The underplaying of this distinction would eventually force us to conceive, for instance, the " potentia generandi " as belonging to each of the three divine Persons, so that it would have to be said that each of the Three generated, and similarly through the common possession of the " potentia spirandi " that each of the Three breathed

[103] F. Von Gunten, "Personne et Amour dans Ia theologie trinitaire deS. Thomas d'Aquin," *Angelicum* 35 (1958), 80-85; J. H. Nicholas, "Chronique de theologie dogmatique," *Revue Thomiste* 57 (1957), 367 ff., A. Malet, *op. cit.*

[10]. *Ibid.*

[105] *Ibid.*

[1oo] *Ibid.*

[107] Cf. J. H. Nicolas, *op. cit.*

the Holy Spirit. Likewise, the result in Christology would be dire. If there is no objective distinction between nature and person, how is the admission avoided that the divine nature is incarnate or that the three divine Persons are all incamate? [108] The patent falsehood of all this makes Malet suppose a "difference veritable" between person and nature in God.[109] In the measure that this objective distinction is not appreciated, theology is bound to an essentialist view of things and at the worst exposed to Sabellianism. [110]

No one can deny that there is a difficulty here, and perhaps one that cannot be answered in this type of theology, for we are dealing with the Mystery of God. Notwithstanding, it seems hardly to be a step in the right direction for the solution of the problem to undermine the utter simplicity of the divine Reality by introducing any distinction other than that existing between the divine Persons themselves, and the distinction that from our point of view is purely subjective. [111] An appreciation of the special character of our knowledge as affected by the transcendence of God will enable us to keep intact both aspects of the mystery this knowledge confronts. Now let us return to a positive discussion of the supra-conceptual simplicity of the divine Reality.

[108] A. Malet, *op. cit.* " Si sur le plan trinitaire, en effet, suppot et essence se distinguaient seulement dans !'esprit humain, et non comme le dit Saint Thomas, 'etiam extra' (N. B. this is a misused text, as F. Von Gunten has pointed out, *op. cit.*, 82; this phrase refers to the real distinction between the Persons), c'est a dire en Dieu lui-meme, tout ce que nons avons dit sur Ia primaute de Ia personne, n'aurait aucun sens. D'abord, !'essence engendrait. Ensuite Ia puissance d'engendrer devenant identique a !'essence, les trois Personnes engendreraient enfin Ia puissance de spirer le devenant egalement, les trois personnes spireraient. . . . Sur le plan Christologique, si Ia personne ne distinguait pas vraiment de !'essence, !'union de Dieu et l'homme se serait fait in natura. Comme Ia nature divine est numeriquernent Ia meme dans les suppots divins ce serait trois suppots qui se seraient **incarnes."**

[109] *Ibid.*

[110] *Ibid.*

[111] At this juncture it is worth noting how abstract the point of view of Malet is. He is looking at the given Mystery of God in His Self-communication through a pre-elaborated trinitarian theology, without realizing that it was only in the experience of the Self-gift of God in *these Three*, in the divine " Thou," that we have our knowledge of the Trinity.

* * * * *

At the outset it must be remarked that, if St. Thomas is going to be cited in favor of any opinion on this point, it is not desirable to confine oneself to the first book of the *Sentences.* Malet has tended to do this; consequently he has overlooked the more authoritative places where Thomas has treated the question.[112] As has already been shown, the content of our concepts is verified in God in a formal analogical manner. God *is* good, etc. On our part, these " rationes " or intelligible aspects are distinct, for the meaning of " nature " is not that of " person," " wisdom " is not " goodness," and so on; the intelligible content of each of these notions is distinct. Originatively, these distinct notions are predicated of God as distinct meanings. Each of these independent notions has its own distinctive role to play. To that extent, at the origin of the formulation of our knowledge of God these different conceptualizations of what God is, are, we might say, ranged side by side, one added to the other., each contributing something that must be predicated of the divine Reality. All imperfection must be removed from the formal signification of each of these distinct notions. But here we encounter a paradox: even though our concepts do express a pure meaning, and need imply no limitation in their essential content, yet applied to God, precisely as God, each concept on its own, in its own distinct and distinctive role, does imply a limitation from our point of view.

For us, goodness is not wisdom, the formality of essence is not the formality of person. There is a necessary limitation implied in the formality we intelligibly represent to ourselves, because it expresses only one formality, one perfection. This arises because all our knowledge of the divine is formally expressed in categories which are" not-God," drawn from realities which can only partially represent His fulness of infinite

[112] It is necessary to read especially *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. 4; *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. 6; *Resp. ad Joan. Vercell.,* qq. 1-3; though, as both Von Gunten and Nicolas remark, the substantial doctrine can be found in the *I Sentences,* e. g., *I Sent.,* d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; cf. also B. Lemaigre, "Perfections de Dieu, et multiplicite des attributs de Dieu," *Revue des Sciences Phil. et Theol.* 50 (1966), 198-227.

Act. God verifies in the depths of His being each of these attributions and affirmations. But the consequence of this plurality of affirmations about God is that each of them, though made originally in articulated distinctness, must yield to the fact that God *is* God, an all simple and infinite Reality. In this one infinite Reality goodness is wisdom, knowledge is love, nature is person, not because our ideas imply this identification but because these ideas are applied to God by that dynamic reference to the divine which is the very soul of our affirmations. The divine order is one of utter simplicity and infinity, and the finite distinct idea must yield to the infinite simple Reality.

The impact of the Mystery of God's infinite simplicity on the finite distinct concepts of the mind is not to leave them ranged side by side, like numerals in an addition, the sum being God; rather it is to see in a positive, though dark manner that God is not the sum of them. Each formality must be affected by the infinity of the Divine and look to a terminal transformation where it loses its capacity to exist as a distinct thing in the all exhaustive act of God's Existence. We can now gain a deeper insight into the negative process of our knowledge.

When our knowledge is confronted precisely by the infinite simplicity of God and when we consider the one divine Reality affirmed by this multiplicity of conceptual operations "per modum unius," a more radical negative process is necessary than when we considered each affirmation of God under some determined formal aspect by itself. First, each intelligible content is applied to God by that fundamental positive-negative process by which the mind comes to the authentic signification of God without adequately representing Him. In the concept of " goodness," for instance, the mind does not know the divine goodness as it is in itself; however, with its conceptual formal reference point it can make meaningful affirmations of the divine Reality. The essential content of the concept is said to be " in God," though God is not said to be " in the concept " as though seized or adequately expressed by it. In this inadequacy, coupled with the basic validity of using this particular concept as applied to God, the mind can know God in a truly

authentic manner, by surpassing its clear knowledge in the consciousness that God's infinity is not expressed.

The process of negation is achieved when each single affirmation is considered in its organic correlation with the totality of our affirmations made about God. This whole body of knowledge, existing perhaps in some systematic sequence in the mind, must be affected by the realization that what is at stake is the lmowledge of God, of God who is the all-Simple and Infinite One. This transcendent Oneness draws each of our concepts into a further negation, that of its distinctness. In our minds, one thing is not the other; in God, one thing is the other. This is so, because our finite "rationes" are found in God, not as distinct formalities but in the infinite, one Reality, which in its supereminence expresses all these formalities in itself, and expresses them in their utmost perfection, and all of them together in the one simple infinite Act.[113]

Hence there is a zone of darkness above the multiplicity of our affirmations which establishes the mind in an attitude of unknowing before the one divine Reality. At this stage it would be more telling to say that it is not so much that these formalities are " in God," even as contained in the divine simplicity, but, to use a bolder expression, the Reality which

[113] Cf. *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. 6: "omnes istae multae rationes et diversae habent aliquid correspondens in ipso Deo, cuius omnes ipsae conceptiones sunt similitudines." And also *de Div. Ncnn.,* c. 1, lect. 3: "qui cum singula nomina determinate aliquid significant distinctum ab aliis, venientia in divinam predicationem, non significant illam finite, sed infinite; sicut nomen sapientiae prout in rebus creatis accipitur, significat aliquid distinctum a justitia, sed cum in divinis accipitur, non significat aliquid determinatum ad genus, et ad speciem seu distinctionem ab aliis perfectionibus, sed aliquid infinitum ...": in this way our conceptual knowledge is of necessity polarized beyond its distinct formal expressions toward the divine Reality, in its simple Reality, known only in the darkness of the tendency' of our affirmations. This is a point which would establish a contact with K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II i, 375. Hera he stresses that God is not contained in our ideas drawn from this world, as just an univocal extension of our idea of perfections, but has His *o·wn* proper essence, uncontained and inexpressible by human\ thought and language. What we have said about the *properly* divine order of Reality negatively designated by our limited and multiple concepts seems quite close to what Barth holds on this matter, or at least would provide a point of dialogue in a comparative study of the two views.

is God expresses in one single all perfect *Ratio* all the perfection which is in each of the formalities affirmed of Him. It is a higher Reality and consequently a higher simplicity than that known in the connatural world of our knowledge. Before this divine order of ineffable simplicity the mind remains in the darkness of the consciousness that God is not known as He-is-in-Himself.

* * * * *

Up to the present our attention has been turned to the formal transcendence of the divine Reality over our speech and concepts demanding a dark and negative character in our knowledge. This has been on a formal abstractly metaphysical level where the data of salvation history and natural revelation have been conceptualized and treated in an extremely static manner. The result arrived at was that the divine order, so abstractly affirmed, cannot be known save by negation, so that the mind, positively directed by the concept on the one hand, and on the other yielding to the complete darkness of our knowledge regarding the divine Reality as It-is-in-Itself, "in-tends," or noetically tends toward the divine Reality in its real existence.

This abstract formal type of knowledge does not enable us to synthesize our conceptual data; in fact the burden of all that has been said is that God as the " divine Synthesis " of all the attributes, etc., which He possesses, is beyond us in His utter simplicity. The formal content of our knowledge does not express God in the simple fashion in which He exists in Himself. Now, if this is so and we realize this fully, some consequences must result.

Just as the formal affirmation of God was made through conceptualizations of the experiences of salvation history, God is good, loving, just, wise, etc., in order that God might be objectivized in our knowledge as truly God, in His transcendent Reality, this affirmation arising out of man's concrete experience with the God of Salvation. This formal type of knowledge in its metaphysical objectivity needs to be brought

into dialectic once more with the experience of salvation history from which it arose.

This formal static type of knowledge ended in establishing the mind in a darkness before the divine Reality; now, it is this very darkness that demands a return to the existential starting point of our knowledge and exacts from the theologian the realization that he is not affirming merely a static object but a divine Subject freely acting in relationship to sinful man. This divine" Thou" has revealed Himself, not as the ontological possessor of divine attributes [114] but in the concrete, as the God of Love, of Trinitarian Agape manifesting itself in mercy and in a way far outweighing the divine justice. The formal abstract knowledge cannot express this.

The idea of a free, loving, historical intervention of God eludes that formal aspect of our knowledge with its abstract metaphysical character; but the very force of the tension present within it toward the divine Reality-in-Itself demands as a complement the mysteric givenness of the divine Reality in which God is encountered as revealing Himself. Thus the darkness of our formal objective knowledge looks to the concrete self-disclosure of the divine Subject to achieve its completeness.[115]

Thus the affirmation of the divine simplicity must be considered to be the product of a dialectic between its formal and mysteric moment, each completing and living from the other. Just as each single affirmation, e. g., of the attributes in particular, has these two moments, as has been pointed out, and is centered above all in the givenness of the divine " Thou " of the Logos of God, so also this eventual affirmation of the divine simplicity, which is the completion, in a sense, of all the previous affirmations, pointing as it does to the fact that God as He is in His infinite eternal Self-simplicity cannot be known in this life.

[114] That is, an Object indifferent to man by not entering, in the concrete, into a free personal relationship to Him.

[115] The " That " content of our knowledge must revert to the " Thou " content of the experience of God from which it arose.

The mysteric givenness of the divine presence in history demands that we objectivize this presence and do our utmost to conceptualize it for the purpose of affirming it as an objective Reality, a truly divine infinite Reality. This moment in our knowledge directs the mind to God in His metaphysical, meta-historical Reality, to the God Who need not have spoken nor acted to be what He concretely is in Himsel£.[116] Now, the darkness brought about by the formal moment of our affirmation before what God-is-in-Himself demands the return to how God concretely reveals Himself who has spoken and as such is a given Reality in the experience of the believer and the Christian theologian; thus the darkness of the formal objective moment opens into the mysteric moment in which the givenness of the divine " Thou " concretely revealing Himself is perceived.u7

In this manner, our affirmation of the simple Reality of God in its achieved totality affirms the real God, both as mysterically given in His dominant character of " Agape " and yet as regards our formal understanding " dwelling in light inapproachable." He has revealed Himself, yet He has not appeared as He is.[118]

Thus, from the consciousness of God's transcendence over our knowledge and His beyondness in relationship to all human categories, our theological knowledge is so affected as to

[116] This " formal " moment in our knowledge brings to our reflexive grasp of revelation and the history of salvation an articulated awareness of i) His transcendence-in-Himself over His communications (Denz. 432), and ii) the *fact* of His free action, in that it need not have been so for Him to be what He is in Himself. This is where we must not lose the opportunity of pointing out a similarity between what is said here and the doctrine of K. Barth, *op. cit.*, 372 ff.; our stressing the two moments in theological thought before the transcendent Mystery of God enables us to appreciate God in His total ineffable Reality as the eternal, all simple subsistent One, and as " Der Liebende in der Freiheit." Thus a too static, Platonic view of the divine simplicity\ is avoidable. Here again I feel a comparative study would have much to offer.

[117] Cf. K. Rahner, "Bermerkungen zur Gotteslehre in der Katholischen Dogmatik," *Catholica Jahrbuclv fur Kontroverstheologie* 20 (1966), 1-19.

[us] Cf. K. Rahner, "HI. Schrift und theologie," *Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe* II, 524.

demand a dialectic between the two moments as we have attempted to describe them.

2. *The supracategorical nature of the divine Reality*

In conceiving the Mystery of the revealed God, concepts expressing two types of reality are used: the absolute and the relative. The absolute considerations arise from the formal objectivization of the One God as infinitely above and beyond His finite considerations. The category of relation is invoked because it is found necessary to objectivize in some intelligible way the inter-subjective life of the three divine Persons between One Another and in relationship to man in the history of salvation. These two categories enable us in some way to express the Mystery of the revealed God in its totality, i.e., as the One God who is these three divine Persons.

The previous explanations made clear that we do have valid knowledge of God. The concepts of person and nature, of habens and habitum, of the attributes, of the absolute and relative, are really verified in God. By using what-is-not God these concepts do tell us something that is truly verified of the God of creation and salvation, inadequate as it is.[119]

However, let us remember that the principle of negation, pointing as it does to the divine simplicity, still stands. In a superior order that which is expressed distinctly by our concepts of the absolute and relative is one Reality; neither set of concepts by itself, the absolute or the relative, can validly express the fulness of the divine Mystery as revealed to us. The absolute category cannot lead us to the mystery of the three divine Persons, while the relative cannot of itself establish the three divine Persons in a transcendence which is properly divine; they do not express the absolute transcendence of God.

As St. Thomas remarks, if in the divine perfection nothing more were present than that which is signified by a relative name, it would mean that the divine Reality was something

[119] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 6: "omnes rationes sunt in intellectu quidem nostro sicut in subiecto, sed in Deo sunt sicut in radice verificante has conceptiones."

imperfect, that it was something existing solely in reference to something else. Similarly, if it were nothing more than what is signified in the name " wisdom," it would not be subsisting, etc. But, because the divine perfection is greater than what can be signified by any one name, it does not follow, if any of these names have an imperfect signification when applied to God, that the divine Reality is imperfect, because the divine Perfection has within itself the perfection of all types of reality. [120]

In another classic passage we see that it is precisely because of the established mystery of the transcendent simplicity of God that we can appreciate more fully the reality of the three divine Persons in their mutual distinction. [121] The divine Reality contains all perfections both of the absolute and relative order; each of these perfections is the divine essence, is God. The Fatherhood really is God, so also the Sonship, in the supreme simplicity of the divine Form. Because of this sheer identification within the divine Reality, all that belongs to Fatherhood, all that belongs to Sonship must be found really in God, as all the notes of everything else we attribute to the divine Reality can be found there in a supremely real way. Now, because each of these relationships is found really in God, each must be distinct from the other; for, in the meaning of a relation being really in God there is here implied a term to which the reference is had, since a real relationship cannot exist save between two distinct realities and really distinct realities; Fatherhood must then be "Sonwardness." This personal reference cannot be really saved except in the positing of a really distinct correlative, the Son. Sonship cannot be " Fatherwardness " in all its reality unless there is the reality of the really distinct Father. Thus, in the dark affirmation of the divine Simplicity the way is opened to a powerful realization of the reality of three divine Persons in their inter-subjective life.

The significance of this point is that our mind remains con-

[120] *Summa Thool.,* I, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3.
[121] *IV Cont. Gent.,* c. 14.

fronted with the one mystery. [122] Noetically there is no retreat from this single point of reference, i. e., the one Reality in which everything affirmed of God is verified. When Thomas stated that the divine Reality was not in any genus of created reality, even reductively/ [23] he opened the way for predicating substance and relation of God without giving the impression that the mystery of the Trinity was something added to the divine essence. From the first, the theologian in his affirmation of the transcendent simplicity of the revealed God is noetically disposed to appreciate the mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of the Three Who *are* God, and in so being are distinct from One Another.

* * * * *

Cajetan expresses profoundly the transcendence of the divine Reality attainable only in the darkness of negation. This splendid passage, so often quoted by Thomistic writers, represents one of the profoundest insights in the whole scholastic tradition. [124] The divine Reality is described as transcending all the categories we use to express it in a supremely mysterious order which is proper to God alone:

... know that in God, in reality or in the real order, there is one Reality which is not purely absolute nor purely relative, nor is it mixed or composed of or resulting from both; but in a most eminent manner it formally contains that which is relative (indeed, many relative entities) and that which is absolute. Thus, in the formal order or in the order of formal *realities* (rationum), that is to say, in itself, not in regard to us, there is in God a unique formal

[122] Similarly we can say that the structure of our affirmation is such that we are in a position to realize, in a telling way, the analogical character of the three divine Persons in God and not to consider them as " persons " in the modern sense of the word, as distinct conscious subjects. On this point, cf. K. Rahner, "Der Driefaltige Gott als Transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte," *Mysterium Salutis* II,

[128] *I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 4, a. 2; d. 19, q. 4, a. 2; *de Ente et Essentia,* c. 6; *I Cont. Gent.,* cc. 24, *25; de Pot.,* q. 7, a. 3; *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 3, a. 5; *Compendium. Theogiae,,* cc. 14, 15, 16.

[12]. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *le Sens du mystere* (Paris, 1934), 220; H. Dondaine, La Trinite (Editions des Jeunes, Paris, 1945), 337; J. H. Nicolas," Chronique ... ," *Revue Thomiste* 57 (1957), 369.

Reality which is neither purely absolute nor purely relative, not purely communicable nor purely incommunicable, but most eminently it formally contains whatever absolute perfection there is and whatever the relations of the Trinity demand. It must be so, because there belongs to every most simple reality, which of itself is maximally one, one adequate formal meaning; otherwise this reality would not be primarily and of itself intelligible as one thing by any intellect. And this is confirmed, because the Word of God is only one, for a word if it is perfect is adequate to that which it expresses.

We are wrong in approaching God through the categories of absolute and relative, imagining that the distinction between the absolute and the relative is prior to the divine Reality itself. Consequently, we think that the one has to be subordinated to the other. However, the complete opposite is the case; because the divine Reality comes before being and all its differences, it is super-Being and super-One, etc .... (Comment. in I, q. 39, a. 1).

There is a point here to be made of some importance to the essentialist-personalist problem in trinitarian theology previously referred to. Cajetan indicates in his explication of the doctrine of St. Thomas that the divine Reality is above all being and its differences; it is above the distinction of absolute and relative, of communicable and incommunicable, above our ideas of what is essential in God, and what is personal in God (this later in the sense that we consider the absolute to be the essence and the relative to be constitutive of the divine personalities). Here, however, we must be careful; though the divine Reality transcends the distinction we make between the absolute and relative and, therefore, the distinction of essential and personal insofar as it is implied in this first division, it must not be thought that the divine Reality is neither purely personal nor purely essential, in the sense that it is neither purely absolute nor purely relative. It is the divine *Person* precisely as *Person* that transcends all these distinct categories. The personal in God does not yield to a higher order that is not completely personal. God in the communion of His inner life remains the supremely personal Reality. [125]

[125] And above all, in the modem sense of the word, as a " Thou " in free relationship to us. Here again we must not lose the opportunity to point out: though we

As St. Thomas explains, the notion of the divine Person implies both the absolute and the relative considerations.[126] To this extent the divine Person is implied in the affirmation of the transcendent simplicity of God; for everything in God is the unique subsistence of God, the unique divine Subject, a divinely personal reality. It can be said that the mystery of the divine simplicity does not place the divine Personality on the same footing as the other divine perfections; because it is the term of attribution to which all that is said of God is referred, and the ultimate term of attribution, it must be preeminent amongst all the eminent perfections of God.[127] There is nothing more ultimate in the divine Reality than to be personal.

The darkness of negation so necessary for our authentic knowledge of God highlights what is personal in God. What we attribute to Him is denied of Him in its finiteness and multiplicity, with the result that our minds are left in a" docta ignorantia " before the transcendent Reality of God. But this darkness is not a static state but a state of tendency, a "directed darkness," through which the obscure expression of our conceptual knowledge is indicating an inexpressible divine ultimate Subject which is the focal point of all this attribution and in which all the formalities are one. Thus this darkness positively directs our minds to the subsisting perfection of not only something but Someone. Thus the experience of the divine " Thou " in salvation history is translated into our most formal and abstract affirmation.[128]

assert that God is a supremely personal Reality in the sense of " subsistens distinctum in natura rationali " and in the sense of being a " Thou " toward other personal beings and the three divine Persons a "Thou" to One another, we must be careful to note that there are not three " " in God, three distinct, subjective freedoms; that would be a tritheistic conception of the Trinity. Cf. B. Lonergan, De *Deo Trino* II (Rome, 1964), 186-193.

[126] *Summa Theol.*, I, q, 29, a. 4: "significat relationem in recto et essentiam in obliquo . . . . "

[127] *Ibid.*, a. 3: " persona est quod est perfectissima in tota natura . . . " ; ad 2: "hoc nomen persona maxime Deo convenit . . . . "

[128] We might say that theological thought on God sees God in a completely personal dimension, as a Persona-in-se, i. e., the infinite subsisting subject of all

In the light of what has just been said, the essence-person controversy seems rather unnecessary and irrelevant, because of the uniquely personal Reality above all our categories. It cannot be doubted i) that the sole subject of any divine action is personal; ii) that there are only three divine Persons and that God IS these three divine Persons; and iii) that all our categories and concepts in their distinctness are not finalized in themselves but look to a higher order of simplicity in which the distinction of notions yields to an ineffable Unity. These notions direct our knowledge to the divine order, enabling us to meaningfully affirm it; they do not in their distinctness and limitation express this divine order as it is. This problematic arises, partially at least, from the failure to realise this, that God transcends our categories and concepts in an infinite simplicity, to which our minds are directed only in the darkness of negation, by affirming in this dark manner this divine Reality as surpassmg our conceptualizations, not as contained within them. [129]

3. *The formal and mysteric; affirmation of the Trinity*

At this juncture, I would like to point out a contrast: Despite the true depth of Cajetan's insight into the divine transcendence, there remains a strange rift, at least at first sight, between the " Res Divina," this Deitas or " Ratio Dei," and these three divine Persons, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

The " Res divina " expressed as a single " ratio " is an

our personal affirmations and as " haec Persona-quoad-nos " as the freely acting divine Thou with regard to us.

[129] In this way we can see one danger in a static representationist type of theology. Once .it is admitted that our concepts somehow represent the divine Reality in themselves, and we forget, on the one hand, that these concepts are expressive of realities which are verified in the Infinite Subsistence of the divine subject in an altogether simple fashion; and on the other, that our theological thought is within the context of a given Mystery, of the divine "Thou" communicating Himself to man in salvation history and perceived as " our Mystery " in faith, it is little wonder that various pseudo-problems will arise in that our knowledge is not duly polarized by the divine Reality.

anonymous entity in a certain sense. It is obviously a truly powerful affirmation of what God must be, surpassing all our concepts and categories, all being and its differences. Nonetheless, in its very achievement it endangers or distracts from the full realization that God has actually and historically intervened in our history, revealing Himself and disclosing Himself to us as the divine "Thou" of the Father, speaking to us in the Logos, His only begotten Son, and communing with us in the Holy Spirit. Theology must not be distracted out of this positive historical consciousness of God by confining itself to an abstract, static mode of thought.

It need not be stressed that the common manualistic stream of theology has tended to regard God as adequately affirmed in a series of abstract notions which were, no doubt, adequate for the formal expression of our knowledge of God but failed to realize the given truth that the three divine Persons have communicated themselves. This lack of due emphasis is especially apparent in the doctrine of grace; this was considered more as the possession of something than a relationship with Someone, to the Father, in Christ, with the Holy Spirit.[130] Thus there came about a radical depersonalization in theology, to some extent due to one of its most profound insights. The directly personal element was at times designated as a mere manner of speech, as appropriation was at times regarded.[131]

It is difficult to conceal a sympathy for Malet in his attempt to bring out and to save the personal element in Thomistic trinitarian theology, above all in spite of the inaccuracy of his solution when certain cases of the divine activity "ad intra" and "ad extra" are considered. J. H. Nicolas assures us that Malet's fears of Sabellianism and essentialism in theology will be allayed if the above cited comment of Cajetan is taken into consideration.[132] Cajetan himself has in mind an objection of

[130] Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Le Sens du Mystere* ..., 224-43: "La Deite et l'essence de la grace" ... such a treatment, while it stresses the intrinsic supernaturality of grace, completely lacks the trinitarian perspective. Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, *Rev. et Theol.*, 368.

[131] H. Barre, *Trinite que j'adore* (Paris, 1965), 81-89.

[132] "Chronique," *Revue Thomiste 57* (1957), 369.

Scotus who, like Malet, tried to objectivize the distinction of these formalities in the divine Reality, in order to preserve the given Mystery of the Trinity (the Father communicates in the act of generation His divine nature only, and not His distinctive personality) /[33] Not only does the Father not communicate His divine personality, but also the "potentia generandi" is not communicated, even though the divine nature is. H. Dondaine, confronted with this objection posed by S. Boulgakof (one of the theologians to whom Malet's work was directed) , candidly admits that the Thomist explanation can give no further understanding of the mystery at this point.[134]

At this juncture, we can begin to reflect on our process of knowing and affirming the revealed Reality of the Trinity. The very transcendence of the Mystery demands two facets in our thought, or two "moments," as we have previously called them, in our theological affirmations: one can be designated "formal " in that it regards the objective ontology of the divine Reality; by this, the mind is darkly orientated toward the "Ratio Deitatis "; other moment called "mysteric " looks to *these three divine Persons* in their concretely personal reference to man in salvation history as the New Testament describes them. These two moments in our affirmation are demanded by the supra-categorical, supra-conceptual nature of the divine Reality. They are demanded in order that our affirmations might respect the full Reality of the Trinity as A Mystery, and ouR Mystery, in its formal transcendence and its mysteric givenness.

The formal moment serves to explicate the quidditative ontological aspect of the divine Reality as one intelligible Reality in itself, surpassing as it does all our concepts and categories as a unique formal Perfection, as "A Mystery." Thus, in the

[133] Cajetan, in I, q. 89, a. 1, n. 8: "ex hoc enim quod est unius rationis in se non sequitur, ' ergo tantum communicabilis vel incommunicabilis ' sed stat quod sit et communicabilis et incommunicabilis et hoc propter infinitatem illius rationis formalis."

[134] H. Dondaine, "Bulletin de theologie," *Revue des Sciences Philos. et Thiol.* %1 (1947)' 441.

way of negation above all, the ineffable personal Reality of the revealed God is affirmed. However, in this precise achievement, there is a noetic veering away, to a necessary extent, from the given truth of the Mystery as it comes to us, namely, in these three divine Persons who are before us, not as abstract notions but in themselves, directly and immediately and actually identified as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the personal communion they have instigated with man. The formal moment directly regards the transcendent objective Reality of the revealed God without directly regarding these Three as the Scriptures present them; and so the presence of another moment in our theological affirmations is necessary for their full theological truth.

It is imperative, then in order that our theological progress might be more fully assured and past dangers of abstractionism in theology avoided, that we realize that present in a truly theological affirmation of the divine Reality is a dialectic between two moments.

The formal moment is the necessary counterpoint to the mysteric moment; we cannot have the one without the other, for if theology contents itself with affirming merely the " Three " in salvation history, known in the immediacy of faith, God would not be apprehended in a theological manner as sufficiently removed from our categories and surpassing our concepts. The divine Mystery as an ontological Reality would not be adequately objectivized. Conversely, if we regard merely the formal content of our affirmations, the risk is present of engulfing the concretely personal character of the given divine Mystery in an abstract and anonymous "Deitas "; and this would draw our attention far away from the fact that the Trinity was a Mystery of salvation, in fact, THE Mystery of salvation.[135] Theology could easily substitute for the immediate personal revelation of the three divine Persons an abstractly elaborated "Immanent Trinity" which in the long run can

[135] K. Rahner, "Ueber den Begriff des Geheimnisses in der Katholischen Theologie, *Schriften* IV, 82-89.

take much of the personal realism out of the history of vation and Revelation. [136] Both moments must be present in reciprocal completion, in a role of mutual direction toward the fulness of divine Reality which neither, of itself, can adequately affirm.

* * * * *

If we might briefly return to the aforementioned problematic of Malet, it will be remembered that he demanded a rather too objective " distinctio rationis " in God, in order that revelation might be respected in its concrete givenness, where only *The* Father is Father, and only the Son is incarnate, ... etc. Malet is right in perceiving that theology must at all costs respect the concrete given fact of the mysteries it seeks to penetrate; however, his solution to the problem as he saw it was unsatisfactory, since he interpreted the divine Reality too much in terms of our distinct limited concepts.

Now, in the light of the reflections that have been made about the two moments in our affirmation of the divine Reality, this problem, the solution of which can never logically be seen, for it would imply an immediate apprehension of the divine Reality in itself, may be grasped to some extent and a properly theological solution found. This is suggested because we postulate these two moments, one of which directs the attention to

[186] G. Martelet, "Theologie und Heilsi:iconomie in der Christologie der 'Tertia,'" *Gott in Welt* II, 3-43: here we see how a prior elaborated " theology " of God as the one divine Essence and Trinity of Persons (understood through the psychological image) blunted the realization that the Incarnation of the Logos was the real locus of our knowledge of the Trinity, not merely because He instructs us with words about God in Himself, but because He, together with the Holy Spirit, was God's Self-communication to the world in the sense that the immanent Trinity was manifested in the " economia " of salvation. Thus, the humanity of Christ would be really expressive of the Person of the Word, as Son of God,. and altogether inconceivable as the incarnation of some other divine Person. This failure to recognize the Incarnation as the precise expression of the Person of the Son caused the tendency to see Christ as " God made man " with Christ's character as the Son of God underplayed in grace (15) in the humanity of Christ as an "Instrumentum coniunctum" (14), in the priesthood of Christ (17-18), in the prayer of Christ (19f), in the relationship of the whole Trinity to the Incarnation (21-7), etc. (all this is not to undermine the magnificent achievement of St. Thomas but merely to point out how all values cannot be saved in the particular schema he adopted.)

the given personal Reality of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in salvation history, the other to the objective transcendent Reality therein implied, and the total effect of this living dialectic is that our theology in its abstract phase takes place within the given Mystery, as it were, and is a response to it. Abstract formal thought does not result in being distracted from the divine Personal Mystery at hand; or rather, there results "formal" abstraction, but it is always polarized by a deeper grasp of the given Reality of the Mystery. [137]

This dialectic does not offer the solution to " problems " in this field, but it does establish us in a correct theological attitude with regard to the divine Mystery; God ever remains the revealer, revealing more than theological thought can formulate. Further, tills theological thought is the response to a given Reality, but a response wbich can never be as great as the Reality it seeks to affirm.

In this light it would seem possible to see a greater existential bearing in our thought about the Trinity; for instance,

[137] Thus the " Psychological Image " can be appreciated as a theological hypothesis by which the given Personal Mystery is affirmed in a meaningful way accessible to our formal categories: " Trinitate posita, congruunt huiusmodi rationes." *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 32, a. I, ad 2). This metaphysical reflection takes place, as it were, "within" the given Mystery, "Trinitate posita," which remains ineffable in itself and is not placed " within " the psychological image in the sense that the Mystery is expounded in terms of our human psychism. Rather, this hypothesis purifies the directly scriptural data of any anthropomorphic interpretation and leads us into a validly spiritual way of speaking of procession and of the distinct personality of the Three we encounter in the concrete " economia" in a way which harmonizes with (without fully exhausting) the biblical notions of proceeding Word and Love. In purifying our notions, this image is leading us to a more real understanding and appreciation of the divine " Thou " before our faith in the given Mystery. It is not a theological fabrication of the Mystery in our terms but a true exercise of the *via nl!gativa* in which our notions are purified! before being affirmed of God, and which enables us to theologically affirm " these Three," related to us in the intersubjective relationship of faith, in a way meaningfully adapted to the Mystery but not exhaustive of it ... " ad recte sentiendum de salute generis humani quae perficitur per Filium incarnatum, et per donurn Spiritus sancti" *(ibid.,* ad 3). For the purifying role of the psychological image, cf. *de Pot.,* q. 9, a. *5* ... , " modeste tamen et reverenter absque comprehendendi praesumptione ... nee talis inquisitio est inutilis cum per earn elevetur animus ad aliquid veritatis capiendum quod sufficiat ad excludendos errores .... " See also *IV Cont. GMt.,* c. I (at end).

the notion of Person applied to God as equally designating the Three meets with an admission of darkness before the ineffable divine order of Reality; but when the mind returns from this noetic darkness to the Scriptures where *these Three* are described, our affirmation concludes to the differing verification of our human notion of Person in the One God in a way not only analogical to our human notion but analogical in reference to the Three in themselves. There is that "plus" when the mind passes through the darkness of its formal categories and returns with its formal limited accomplishment to revelation as concretely expressed in the Scriptures. Likewise, to use another example, the notion of relation, used necessarily in our formal ontological affirmation of the divine Mystery, is darkly affirmed of God and then seen as concretely instanced in the " ad Patrem " life of the Son as presented to us in the Gospels (and similarly with regard to the" ad Filium" of the Father, etc.). Thus, the peculiarity of our theological noetic is to lead us back to revelation, from the consciousness of God's ineffability-in-Himself to the given revealed Mystery of God-in-Himself.

* * * * *

It will now be useful to compare these two moments in our affirmation with other distinctions that occur in our knowledge of God.

i) It is not the same as "clear" and "mysterious," for both moments share in the same clarity and experience the same obscurity before the transcendence of the revealed God. However, the dialectic of these two moments in our theological thought can be considered in this division. For example, the formal abstract moment of our thought results in the consciousness of its own inadequacy and thus intrinsically demands the mysteric moment, in which God is the given Reality, in those three divine Persons in communion with man in which God manifests Himself in a positive attitude of love toward sinful man, and in which God is a divine Subject rather than an Object with regard to our knowledge. Likewise the clarity of

the formal moment, in the clarity of its positive direction, demands the darkness inherent in the mysteric moment, a darkness which results from directing our attention toward " The Three " Who are the One God.

Similarly, the clarity of the mysteric moment looks to the obscurity inherent in the achievement of the formal moment, in that the divine " Thou " which the mysteric moment directly looks to must be affirmed as a truly transcendent Reality, transcending our concepts, categories, and its own finite communications. Likewise, the mysteric moment of our thought demands the clarity of the formal moment so that our affirmations will be made of God as of an " eschatological " Reality, of Him as He will appear in His eternity and infinity as not measured by the present " economia."

ii) More obviously, this distinction of moments is not equivalent to essentialist and personalist types of knowledge, for in the problematic in which we have worked this distinction looks to the theological knowledge of the Trinity " ad intra." In fact, both of these moments look to the affirmation of the divine Reality as an " essentia " and as a " Persona," without implying any contradiction.

The formal moment indicates an " essentia" by directing our theological attention towards an abstract "Ratio Deitatis "; the mysteric moment directly indicates what God concretely IS in salvation history and in this way points to a mysterious "essentia Dei"; [138] for the "In Se" of the divine Reality is shown in the "pro nobis," for God in acting toward us is disclosing Himself. Both moments of our theological thought are "personalist" too, each bringing out "personal" values in making its contribution to the total truth of our theological affirmations; the mysteric moment looks directly to the divine "Thou" in salvation history, whereas the formal moment, in directing the mind to the divine simplicity, highlights the supremely personal character of the divine Reality in a more objective and metaphysical sense.

[138] In the sense of showing us WHAT God is: Three, Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

iii) These two moments are not distinct, insofar as one looks to the Unity of God and the other to the Trinity of persons; rather, these two sides to the central mystery of our faith are implied in each of the moments of our theological thought. The formal moment, whilst directing our attention to a transcendent simplicity, does nonetheless imply that this is the simplicity of a Reality which is the Trinity, for it makes explicit that the absolute and relative formalities are formally and eminently present in the one single perfection where the relative remains relative and thus demands its correlative real opposite.

The mysteric moment, as well as directing our attention to " These Three " in salvation history, in its own way indicates the Unity of God, because each of the Three implies, by very force of His role in the act of redemption, a communion with the other Two; so that one divine Mystery is communicated to us.

iv) This distinction is not the equivalent of the truth of faith and the truth of theology, as though the mysteric moment was some pre-reflective stage in our knowledge and the formal moment represented theological reflection " as far as theology could go." Rather, this mysteric moment must find its place at the very heart of our theological reflection, so that the formal abstraction which will be necessary will not result in unnecessary *distraction* from the given fact that the history of salvation and the revelation therein implied *gives us God* and the three divine Persons in themselves. In this way we will not need to interpret the Incarnation according to a previously elaborated trinitarian theology which fails in some measure to appreciate the actual personal "Self" of the divine Person in His role "pro nobis." The Incarnation is properly the function of the divine " Logos," the revealer, and it is inconceivable that the other divine Persons could become man, for, being revealed in themselves in this" economia" by very force of their personalities, they have another function. They are given in salvation history as they are and could not be conceived of in another way. If this mysteric moment enters right into our theological reflection, a number of quasi-difficulties will be excluded from

theology, e. g., the primacy of the person in trinitarian theology, and there will be a more fruitful realization that God has actually revealed HIMSELF.

On the other hand, the formal abstract moment of our thought must itself look to revelation, not merely as that from which it begins but as that which it seeks to penetrate; it must result as a response to the given Mystery, a response prolonged into an effort to appreciate it in its objective ontology.

v) Further, this mysteric formal distinction is not tantamount to concrete and abstract. This will be seen on reflecting that the formal moment is aimed at the concrete affirmation of not " Gad-in-abstracto " but this God, who is Father, Son and Spirit, considered in His objective ontology. The mysteric moment achieves a different form of concretization for our theology in that it directs our attention to the divine " Thou " of salvation history, to a divine Subject with regard to us, in His free spontaneous action and in Himself.

vi) To take the matter further again, the "mysteric-formal " division is not the same as economic-immanent with regard to the Trinity; both moments aim at expressing the One God, whose immanent Self is manifested in the " economia." The formal moment, in expressing the objective ontological aspect of the divine Reality, directs our attention to this Reality as the radical principle of salvation history. Similarly, the mysteric moment, though it implies immediately the " economia," is really directed at the Reality of God-in-Se in the conviction that the God of the" economia" is the immanent Deity.

The dialectic between these two moments makes us conceive the Trinity, not merely as an "economic" mystery, nor for that matter as an intellectual puzzle abstractly divorced from salvific Reality. The formal moment enables us to break out o£ a " God-for-us " type of theology with its recurrent danger of Sabellianism, at least in expression.[139] The mysteric moment enables us to see the Trinity as the Mystery of salvation, as truly OUR MYSTERY; and the result of bringing out these two

[139] B. Lonergan, *de Deo Trino* II (Rome, 1964), 193 ff.

moments in our knowledge of the Trinity as affected by God's transcendence is to see our theological noetic as leading us to a unique type of affirmation because of the special uniqueness of the divine Subject that is referred to our knowledge.

Thus our total affirmation of the Mystery of God contains these two moments; they are present as demanded by the consciousness of God's transcendence over all our categories. An inter-subjective relationship can establish us in the presence of the " Great Other " through revelation and hence calls forth an objective ontological statement of the transcendence of God over all finite realities and conceptualizations. The formal moment in which this objective statement is achieved looks, in the precise darkness and abstractness of its achievement, to the mysteric givenness of the divine "Thou" in salvation history. The darkness of one moment achieves itself in the clarity of the other; and the abstractness of the one is perfected in the concreteness of the other.

The supraconceptual and supracategorical nature of the divine Reality demands this double moment in our knowledge; thus the transcendence of the revealed God affects our theological thought with this modality and establishes it in a unique noetic. It is a personal knowledge, yet conditioned by the darkness of our affirmation of the divine Reality as It-is-in-Itself. It is a dark and negative knowledge, yet entirely directed to the divine "Thou" who is related to man's experience in salvation history and mediated to man now through faith and the Scriptures as a given reality.

The unique character of our theological knowledge should be realized before we address ourselves, in systematic theology, to the divine Mystery. Our whole approach should be conditioned by the recognition of the special transcendence of the divine Reality and the unique character of the theological noetic. Already we can see that the recognition of these two moments in our theological thought will lessen the rift between the older, more formal speculative type of theology and that of the more modern salvation-historical approach.

I have approached this whole question from a Thomistic

standpoint, though with the necessary freedom of the speculative method. I have so far shown how the Thomistic type of negative knowledge is best regarded, not in a static abstract manner but as directed to and conditioning our affirmation of the given divine Reality: God in His " in Se " communicated to us in the "pro nobis" of salvation history. We must now set our theological knowledge, in its full noetic range, above all with regard to its non-conceptual depth.

(to be concluded)

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THOMISM AND MODERN SCIENCE: RELATIONSHIPS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

THE IMPORTANCE of science and technology in the modern world is generally recognized by the Christian community. The Second Vatican Council, in fact, singled them out as dominant factors in our civilization, factors that are most responsible for the changing thought patterns of the twentieth century. The Council Fathers pointed to " the mathematical and natural sciences " as having a profound impact " in the cultural sphere and on modes of thought." [1] The life sciences and the social sciences, they acknowledged, are contributing also to the intellectual revolution that characterizes our age. Just as the Council of Trent over four centuries ago warned Catholics of theological innovations that could undermine their faith, so, in a more positive spirit, the Second Vatican Council directs attention to secular transformations to which the Church must adjust if she is to carry out her mission in the modern world.

As a consequence of the Council's teaching, those charged with fostering the intellectual life within the Church are encouraged to take a positive attitude toward scientific disciplines. And, since so much of the Church's intellectual life is associated with scholasticism, and with Thomism in particular, the opportunity is thereby provided to examine anew the relationships between Thomism and modern science. The aim of such an examination, of course, is to chart a program for the future. Such a charting presupposes a knowledge of the present situation, but even more it presupposes a correct understanding of what has happened in the past. Thomism has existed for close to seven hundred years, and modern science has a history of about half that span. If it is difficult to back

[1] The Pastoral Constitution, *Gaudium et Spes*, on the Church in the Modern World, Preface, No. 5.

off and study the present situation, it is relatively simple to view the past, to see there what has been good and what bad in the relationships between Thomism and science, and from this to make plans for the future.

THE MEDIEVAL PAST

The early history of this relationship, that before the rise of modern science in the early seventeenth century, does not require lengthy exposition. Because of the Aristotelian thought context in which medieval science was located, both St. Thomas and his teacher, St. Albert the Great, took an active interest in, and wrote competently on, topics that were to interest the precursors of modern science. For example, they discussed motion and the conceptual foundations of what was later to become the science of mechanics; [2] they evaluated the astronomical theories of their time; [3] they had distinctive views on the structure of matter that went far beyond those of their contemporaries.[4] Thomistic science, as practiced by St. Thomas and

[2] St. Albert, for example, is usually cited for his use of terms *f!uxus formae* and *forma f!uens* to characterize the diverse ways of viewing the entitative status of motion in general, and of local motion in particular. This distinction, taken up in the fourteenth century by nominalists and realists, became a fruitful source of discussion from which the new science of mechanics, in both its kinematical and dynamical aspects, was to emerge. See Anneliese Maier, *Die Vorliiufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert* (Roma: 1949), pp. 11-16. Similarly, St. Thomas is singled out for attention, because of his teaching, contrary to Aristotle and Averroes, that motion through a void would not be instantaneous, thus indirectly influencing the development of a concept of inertial resistance to motion among later thinkers such as Nicole Oresme. See A. Maier, *Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik* (Roma: 1958)' pp. 226, 246, 257, 266-279.

[3] For St. Thomas's critical evaluation of medieval astronomical theories, see Thomas Litt, O.C.S.O., *Les Corps Celestes dans l'univers de saint Thomas d'Aquin.* Philosophes Medievaux, Tome VII (Louvain/Paris: 1963); also W. A. Wallace, O. P., *Cosmogony.* Vol. X of St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (New York/London: 1967), English translation, with notes and appendices on Thomas's science.

[4] St. Albert, with unusual foresight, endorsed the atoms of Democritus as providing an insight into the structure of material substance, provided they be interpreted as physical parts of bodies in the sense of *minima naturalia.* St. Thomas, in his tum, made a considerable advance beyond the teaching of Avicenna and Averroes with his theory of the virtual presence of elements in compounds. For details, see

his early followers, was not divorced from philosophy and theology. It entered into the very fabric of the Thomistic synthesis and was responsible, in large part, for the value of that synthesis as an integration of all of knowledge, both human and divine.

Until very recently, little has been known about the role of Thomists and other scholastic thinkers in laying the foundations for modern science during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. One of the pioneer historians of this period, Pierre Duhem, however, attempted some fifty years ago to verify the thesis that Leonardo da Vinci was the key figure in effecting the transition from scholastic patterns of thought to those of Galileo.[5] Duhem's researches led him in an unexpected direction. Rather than confirming his conjecture about Leonardo da Vinci, they brought him to a hitherto unknown personality in the history of science, the Spanish Dominican and Thomist, Domingo de Soto.[6] Duhem was able to point out that Soto had equivalently formulated what was later to become Galileo's law of falling bodies some eighty years before this was published by the great Italian physicist.[7] In fact, since Soto's writings were known to Galileo in his youth, the Spanish Dominican may have had a direct influence on the evolution of the science of mechanics as it is now known.[8]

It is not necessary to verify such an influence, however, to

A. Maier, *An der Grenze van Scholastik und Naturwissenchaft,* 2. Auflage (Roma: 1952)' pp. 81-88.

[5] *Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci.* Ceux qu'il a Ius et ceux qui l'ont lu. 8 Vols. (Paris: 1906-18).

[6] *Ibid.,* Vol. III, pp. 268-582, section entitled "Dominique Soto et Ia scolastique parisienne." For a critical study of Soto's life and works, see Vicente Beltran de Heredia, *Domingo de Soto.* Estudio Biografico Documentado. (Salamanca: 1860).

[7] For verification of Duhem's thesis in considerable detail see my article entitled " The Enigma of Domingo de Soto: *Uniformiter Difformis* and Falling Bodies in Late Medieval Physics," to be published in *Isis.*

[8] An edition of Soto's *Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis,* which contains the discovery relating to falling bodies, was published at Venice in and dedicated to the Italian Dominican, Domenico Bolano. Galileo studied at Pisa and Padua shortly after this date, and, in his *Juvenilia* (commonly regarded as his student notebooks), makes reference to one of Soto's *Quaestiones,* thereby indicating that these were available either to himself or to his teachers.

show that the Thomists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were actively interested in the velocities of falling bodies, projectiles, motion in a vacuum, and similar problems whose discussion led to the new science of mechanics. Their various opuscula, as well as their commentaries and "questionaries" on the *Physics* of Aristotle,[9] show them taking part in the controversies between the nominalists and the realists that were so important for this development.[10] They knew the science and the mathematics of their day, and they contributed intelligently to its development, as well as to its integration within the broader framework of their philosophy and theology.

THE MoDERN PAST

By the end of the sixteenth century, however, a changed attitude on the part of Thomistic writers becomes detectable. The change, unfortunately, was to the detriment of scientific and mathematical interests, although it seems to have come about without any prejudice against these disciplines. The fact that most Dominicans in this period seem to have been engaged in teaching seminarians goes far to explain what happened. :Few, if any, were professionally interested in science. Faced with a pedagogical problem of communicating the more metaphysical theses that are necessary for sacred theology, and possibly teaching students who had insufficient knowledge of

[9] Among the works of Dominicans, apart from Soto, who discussed topics relating to physics or astronomy, we may mention: Giovanni Graziadei (di Ascoli), *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (Venice: 1484); Crisostomo Javelli, *In libros Phy8icorum Quaestines* (Lyons: 1568); Isidoro !solano, *De velodtate motuum* (Pavia: 15!Z!Z); Petrus Crokart de Bruxellis, *Argutis8ime, subtiles et fecun<U Questiones Phy8icales ...* (Paris: 1521); Amadeus Meygretus, *Questiones in libros De Celo et Mundo Aristotelis ...* (Paris: 1514); Diego de Astudillo, *Quaestionu super octo libros Phy8icorum et mper duos libros De Generatione Aristotelis ...* (Valladolid: 1532); and Domingo Banez, *Commentaria et Quaestiones in duos De Generatione et Corruptione libros* (Salamanca: 1585).

[10] Soto, in fact, attempted to show how the nominalists and the realists both " sin through excess " in discussing such matters as the entitative status of local motion. For a brief statement of his resolution, see my paper, " The Concept of Motion in the Sixteenth Century," to be published in the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* for 1967.

mathematics, they gradually abandoned the tradition in which technical problems relating to Aristotle's *Physics* were given full treatment. Instead, they began what was to become known as the " manual tradition " in scholastic philosophy. In place of questions on the velocities of motion, for example, they introduced sections on creation, subsistence, and problems related to the Eucharist into natural philosophy .[11] By the time Galileo and Newton were writing the revolutionary treatises that would shape modem thought for the next three centuries, such treatises were no longer of immediate interest to Thomists.

Entering, then, on the second phase of the history of the relationships between Thomism and modem science, a phase in which science has already emerged in its present-day form and in which Thomism has already taken on the characteristics of a system (and a closed system at that), one can only be disappointed with what is seen. In the post-Tridentine period, the teaching Church had already assumed an authoritarian air that extended to all areas of knowledge, modern science included. At the same time, those who were charged with advancing the intellectual life within the Church, who might have been expected to benefit from contact with the new disciplines, were not themselves prepared to read and evaluate critically the works in which they were contained. As a consequence, the scene was set for a disastrous encounter between

[11] This is particularly noticeable when one traces the development of the text-books of the Spanish Thomists who came after Soto, viz., Diego Mas, 0. P., *Commentaria in universam philosophiam Aristotelis una cum quaebtionibus quae a gravissimis viris disputari solent.* (Valencia: 1599); Juan Martinez de Prado. 0. P.. *Quaestiones philosophiae naturalis in tres partes distribttiae.* (Alcala: 1651-5!l); Cosme de Lerma, 0. P., *Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum,* ed. 2a (Burgos: 1655); Diego Ortiz, 0. P., *Philosophiae brevis explicatio, cum gravioribus questionibus a philosophis disputari solitis* (Seville: 1678); and Frolan Diaz, 0. P., *Philosophia naturalis per questiones et articulos divisa iuxta mentem D. Thomae* (Valladolid: 1695). Many, such as Lerma and Ortiz, believed that they were following Soto's doctrines, although actually they departed from him, particularly in their metaphysical emphases. For a sketch of the more favorable aspects of this development, see Santiago Ramirez, 0. P., "Hacia una renovacion de nuestros estudios filos6ficos. (Un indice de Ia producci6n filos6fica de los Dominicos espafioles)." *Estudios Filos6ficos,* I (195!l), pp. 8-28.

Thomism and modern science that has had unfortunate consequences, reaching all the way to the present day.

One aspect of this confrontation, valuable for the lesson it affords, may be examined in the impact on Thomistic manuals of natural philosophy of the two most important works in the history of mechanics and astronomy, Galileo's *Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences* (1638) and Newton's *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1687; 2nd edition 1713). Since this examination, by reason of space, cannot be exhaustive, it will concentrate on three of the most representative manuals in the period from the end of the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, namely, those of Gaudin, Roselli, and Lepidi.

Antoine Gaudin's *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque D. Thomae dogmata* first appeared in 1671 and went through many revisions and editions to the end of the nineteenth century. [12] The edition of 1726 is of interest for its treatment of the laws of motion. [13] Gaudin exposes the traditional teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas., but nowhere mentions the works of Galileo or of Newton. He does have a section on the laws of motion and impetus, which is devoted exclusively, however, to a consideration of laws proposed by Descartes. In fact, one would gain the impression that Descartes alone had made innovations in the science of mechanics, so extensive are Gaudin's references to the French thinker. [14] Gaudin still speaks of heavy and light bodies, apparently not having learned from Galileo that this distinction was no longer viable; [15] he mentions

[12] For details of Gaudin's life and writings, see J. Quetif, O. P., and J. Echard, O. P., *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Paris: 1721), Tom. II, p. 740.

[13] Volume 2 of the Cologne 1726 edition is devoted to the first part of the *Physic8,* dealing with *ens mobile in communi.* The third disputation, which treats of motion as a property of changeable being, has a section entitled *"De legibus motus et impetus localis,"* pp. 280-282.

[a] This seems to be characteristic of the Thomistic manualists of the period; they generally concentrated on Descartes and such thinkers as Mersenne, Maignan, and Gassendi, and paid little attention to the more mathematical treatises of writers like Galileo and Newton.

[16] Galileo's teacher, G. B. Benedetti, had already rejected the existence of levity *(levitas),* maintaining that all bodies in the universe are heavy, and

Galileo, along with William Gilbert, in discussing magnetism; [16] and he grants that the acceleration of falling objects is proportional to the series of odd numbers, [17] but disclaims any intention of going into details on such matters. There is not even a mention of Newton in the section on laws of motion, even though the *Principia* had appeared almost forty years before. In an 1854 edition/ [18] Newton's laws are discussed in an extended footnote, where they are pointed out as being completely false; the footnote is undoubtedly the work of an editor/ [19] however, and seems to have been borrowed from another manualist, viz., Roselli.

The *Summa Philosophica* of Salvator Maria Roselli is a monumental treatise in that it not only attempts to expose Thomistic thought thoroughly, but also tries to take account of innovations among the moderns. [20] Roselli devotes considerable attention to Newton and his commentators and is willing to accord to Newton's synthesis some mathematical validity, although in general he is opposed to all of its physical doctrines.

Galileo followed him in this. The first convincing proof, however, came from Newton, with the evidence he adduced for the law of universal gravitation. Goudin mentions none of these thinkers, restricting his attention to Descartes and Gassendi; his own opinion is expressed in the words, " itaque dico, sicut corpus grave innato impetu tendit deorsum, ita !eve sursum" *(op. cit.,* p.

[16] "Quantum ad res quibus ea vis [sci!., vis magnetica] inest, primo ac praecipue interioribus terreni globi partibus ac eius veluti nucleo inesse docent, qui de vi magnetica diligentius scripsere, Gilbertus, Galilaeus, Cartesius et alii" *ibid.,* p.

[17] " Porro qua proportione acceleretur motus gravium, viri solertes cum variis experimentis quaesiverint, reperiere accelerari juxta progressum numerorum imparium - - - " *ibid.,* p. This teaching is contained in Galileo's *Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences;* it was known from the fourteenth century onward, however, that this mathematical relationship is verified in all uniformly accelerated motions.

[18] Both this edition and that of are cited because they are the only early editions of Goudin available to me.

[19] Goudin himself died on October 1695; the tenth edition of the work, the last under his care, appeared in 1692. See Quetif-Echard, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 740.

[20] For a full description of this work and the background against which it was written, see E. I. Narciso, 0. P., *La Summa Philosophica di Salvatore RoseUi e la Rinascita del Tomismo.* Studi e Ricerche sulla Rinascita del Tomismo, n. 2 (Roma: 1966). References to Roselli that appear below are from the Madrid edition of 1788.

Roselli denies the existence of universal attraction, however this is to be understood, and holds that the element fire is absolutely light.[21] The heavenly bodies, in his estimation, are neither heavy nor light, because he still is convinced that they move in circular paths according to Aristotelian teaching.[22] He examines with some care Newton's laws of motion, but finds all of them false, and substitutes in their place his own laws of motion.[23] These, unfortunately, miss the point behind Newton's "mathematical principles of natural philosophy," and are sterile for providing any insight into the structure of the system of the world. Considering that Roselli prepared his second edition almost a hundred years after Newton's classic,[24] this failure to grasp the physical import of Newton's reasoning is almost incomprehensible.[25]

When Roselli comes to discuss the system of the world, moreover, there can be no doubt that he is still defending a geocentric universe. He rejects the Ptolemaic system, and also that of Tycho Brahe, on the grounds that the physical principles on which they are based are false.[26] He is willing to admit the Copernican system as a hypothesis, but teaches that it can be in no way defended when holding that the sun is at rest and that the earth moves.[27] Discussing the cause of the

[21] *Summa philosophica,* Vol. II, pp. 861-872.

[22] *Ibid.,* pp. 455-466.

[23] *Ibid.,* pp. *455-566.*

[24] The first edition of the *Summa philosophica* appeared in 1777, and the second edition in 1788. A third edition was printed at Bologna between 1857 and 1859; this was requested by the 1838 General Chapter of the Dominicans, with the proviso that the parts dealing with physics be reduced(to a few questions.

[25] As Newton himself maintained, he attempted to argue from the properties of celestial motion that can be analyzed mathematically to a knowledge of the physical cause of such motion, and thus reasoned to the presence of gravity in all bodies of the solar system whose motions were observable. He disclaimed any knowledge of the cause of gravity, and did not wish to frame any hypotheses *(hypotheses non fingo)* on this subject, since it was not directly related to hiSI argument. Once he had proved a posteriori that celestial bodies obey the law of gravitation, he could argue forcefully for the heliocentric system on the basis of physical principles, and not as a mere mathematical hypothesis.

[26] *Summa philosophica,* Vol. III, pp. 172-203.

[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 204-207.

motion of the stars, Roselli rejects Kepler's thesis, together with the systems of Decartes and Leibniz.[28] He also examines and rejects Newton's analysis of the system of the world, and concludes with his own thesis, namely, that the heavenly bodies have no active principle of motion within them, that they are not moved directly by God, but that they are moved by the angels.[30]

Roselli's manual had a great influence on the subsequent development of scholasticism. Not only was some of his material excerpted and inserted in subsequent editions of other manuals, such as Goudin's, but as late as 1875 a five-volume *lnstitutiones Philosophicae ad mentem angelici DoGtoris S. Thomae Aquinatis ordinatae* was issued at the Abbey of Monte Casino containing substantially all his teachings, including his evaluations of Newton's mechanics.[31] Although the Dominicans had rejected this part of Roselli's manual as early as 1838,[32] this shows that teachers who regarded themselves as authentic Thomists were still using Roselli's analyses almost two hundred years after the first appearance of Newton's *Principia.*

Of less interest and importance is the treatment of Alberto Lepidi in his *Elementa philosophiae christianae,* published at

[28] *Ibid.,* pp. 402-426.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 426-445.

[30] *Ibid.,* pp. 445-452. This seems to reveal a misunderstanding, on Roselli's part, of the orders of causality involved. There would seem to be no repugnance in allowing for gravity as a passive principle of motion within the heavenly body, as St. Thomas taught was the case for earthly bodies, and at the same time allowing for immaterial movers (such as angels) as active principles of the motion.

[31] The author (anonymous) evidently compiled this text from other works, as he himself states in the introduction to Vol. II: " Institutiones physicas ita concinnare curabimus, materiam a probatissirnis Auctoribus sive antiquis, sive recentioribus excerpendo, quae magis scitu necessaria viris ecclesiasticis videtur. Quaedam enim res, licet physicae sint, sacrae tamen doctrinae inserviunt, quas diligenter persequitur P. Salvator Maria Roselli, 0. P., ideoque eius opere praecipue utemur" (p. 2). The writer's analysis of the forces involved in maintaining equilibrium in the solar system, however, reveals a complete misunderstanding of Newtonian mechanics (pp. 233-234).

[32] See E. I. Narciso, *op. cit.,* p. 139, fn. 13.

Paris and Louvain in 1879.[33] Discussing the properties of corporeal substance, Lepidi treats of the concept of inertia, which he acknowledges as deriving from the "Principles of Philosophy" of Sir Isaac Newton.[34] By this time, Thomists seem willing to concede that there is possibly some truth in Newton's teaching. Lepidi, at any rate, shows himself an opportunist in wishing to use the Newtonian concept of inertia for arguing against materialists.[35] He accepts inertia as a fact, although he does not think its nature is correctly understood by the moderns, and regards it as a conclusive proof that the motion or rest of any physical body can only be explained by some external cause.[36]

Other cases could be adduced, but these are sufficient to characterize the attitude of Thomists toward Newtonian science during the period when the thought of Newton had already gained acceptance in the great university centers of western Europe and in the U. S.[37] In all fairness to the Dominicans we have mentioned, they were not completely arbitrary in their rejection of certain aspects of Newton's teaching. As only recent work in the philosophy of science has shown, Newton's laws of motion are not without their logical and their extra-logical difficulties.[38] It is to the credit

[33] Lepidi was born on February 1839, and died on July 31, 1925. His *Cosmologia* was the third and last volume of his *Elememta philosophiae christianae;* the first volume of the series appeared in 1875.

[34] Vol. III, pp. 143-145. The title, *Principia philosophiae,* actually refers to the work of Descartes, not Newton; some editions of Newton's classic, however, were printed with these words of the title in bold type, e. g., PRINCIPIA *mathematica* PHILOSOPHIAEl *naturalis,* thus suggesting an affinity to the title of Descartes' work.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 144.

[36] *Ibid.,* p. *145.*

[37] Perhaps this unsympathetic treatment of Newton is explainable by the fact that most scholastic manualists were of Italian, Spanish, and French nationality. Their knowledge of Newton seems to have been gleaned from the writings of French partisans of Descartes and Leibniz, who were themselves strongly anti-Newtonian. The manualists, of course, rejected both Descartes and Leibniz, and, along with them, Newton as representing a more extreme position to which even they were opposed.

[38] For a contemporary evaluation of these difficulties, see W. A. Wallace, O. P., "Newtonian Antinomies Against the *Prima Via," The Thomi.st* 19 (1956), pp. 151-

of these Thomists that they were more alert than many of their contemporaries in detecting flaws in Newtonian reasoning. At the same time, however, one should not overlook the fact that their attitude toward the science of mechanics, and the new astronomy, was essentially negative. They were convinced, to a man, that they already possessed the whole truth about the structure of the universe, and their minds were not open to the possibility of any new knowledge coming from modern science.

To recapitulate, then, the history of the relationships between Thomism and modern science is partly good and partly bad. From the time of St. Thomas all the way to the sixteenth century, there is a sincere interest in science and its problems, and a definite contribution is made to its progress. From the beginning of the sevententh century to the end of the nineteenth, however, the attitude is reversed. Thomists subordinate all of their philosophical teachings to theology; they are already convinced that they possess the absolute truth and they attack any new proposal as undermining the very foundations of the Catholic faith. Finally, by the end of the nineteenth century, they grow increasingly aware that much of their rejection of modern science is arbitrary, and gradually they delete all references to science from their manuals of philosophy. They make a hurried retreat from natural philosophy, and place emphasis instead on metaphysics. Thus begins Thomism's uneasy rapprochement with contemporary thought: Thomistic cosmology, now recognized as "without a cosmos," is restricted to a few generalities, and Thomism itself is seen as a magnificent synthesis, erected on simple sense observation alone, and standing in complete independence of modern science.

THE PRESENT

This brings up the present situation, where science has become one of the most influential factors in contemporary

192. Others outside the scholastic tradition have made similar criticisms, e. g., Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science.* Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. (New York: 1961), pp. 153-l¡l!O¦il.

civilization. While no longer attacked from without, or at least not with the vehemence of the previous centuries, science now has problems that have arisen largely within itself. Some of these are associated with the extremely rapid growth of scientific activity during the twentieth century; others come from a concern over the very foundations of science and mathematics themselves, occasioned by new theories such as relativity and quantum theory, that cast doubt on the Newtonian world view so long accepted by the scientific community.

An example of the first type of difficulty is the present "information explosion." The methods in which Galileo and Newton pioneered have been brought to fruition in the early part of this century, and science, particularly in the U. S., has become a "big business." Vast amounts of money, from government and private sources, are poured annually into all types of research activity. Data are accumulated at a much faster rate than human beings can organize and assimilate them. Lagging only slightly behind this accumulation of data is a rapid proliferation of theories, which themselves require evaluation. Scientists now have so much information they do not know what to do with it. The pressing problem, felt everywhere, is a lack of integration in knowledge, and this not only within science-for the physicist can no longer speak with the chemist or the biologist on the details of his science, and even finds few physicists with whom he can converse over his specialty-but also in science's relation to other disciplines. The problem of the "two cultures," so much discussed in Britain and the U.S., is symptomatic of the lack of integration in all areas of knowledge. [39]

Examples of the second type of difficulty besetting scientists are provided by the relativity theory, with its concern over the structure of the very large, and the quantum theory, at the other extreme, with its concern over the structure of the very small. Both of these theories raise perplexing problems of in-

[39] Attention was focused on this problem by the work of C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: 1961).

terpretation that have caused scientists, at least, to seek help from philosophers in an attempt to extricate themselves from their own antinomies. In fact, as a result of this type of problem arising within science, there has been a growth of disciplines that are closely related to science and its problems, such as the history of science, the philosophy of science, the sociology of science, etc.

Disciplines such as these offer some promise of bridging the gap that has been developing between the " two cultures," and also of offering help in coping with the " information explosion." Quite unexpectedly, they also offer some promise for a renewal of cooperation between Thomism and modern science. Those scientists, for example, whd have been studying the historical foundations of their disciplines, in their attempts to understand the intellectual milieu in which science originated, have become more open to philosophies other than mechanism and positivism, which so long dominated their thinking. The great interest in the medieval precursors of Galileo has led some to reexamine the conflicts between the nominalists and the realists, and to see advantages in Thomism that have generally been overlooked by secular scholars. Even the criticisms of Cartesian and Newtonian thought mentioned in the early part of this study can now be examined impartially, and there is a growing recognition that the failure of Thomists to go along with an accepted Newtonian world view in the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries was not simply a matter of religious prejudice. There was also a valid philosophical content to their critique, from which scientists themselves could have learned, had they too been patient with those who were apparently their adversaries.

Similarly, the study of the philosophy of science, particularly as practiced in the U.S., has produced an atmosphere in which a Thomistic philosopher once again is able to breathe. It is true that the origins of the philosophy-of-science movement in the Vienna Circle showed a remarkably positivist and empiricist bias. Many members of the Vienna Circle emigrated to the United States, where they contributed heavily to the growth

of logical positivism as a prevailing philosophy in American universities. Within the past decade, however, ther.e has been a disenchantment with the type of philosophy of science proposed by .logical positivists, and this on the part of scientists themselves. There is increasing awareness that the methods actually used by practicing scientists have little or nothing to do with the complex formalistic analyses of logical positivism. In reaction, there has been a gradual shift toward realism on the part of scientists generally, and of a few influential philosophers of science in particular. [40] The brand of realism that is presently favored is materialistic and ultra-realist, by Thomistic standards, but it nonetheless introduces a polarization within the philosophy of science that can make Thomism of interest to practitioners of this discipline. The situation is analogous to the one that prevailed from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, when nominalism and realism were in direct opposition, and Thomism could appear as a " middle of the road " philosophy capable of assimilating the values in both extremes. [41]

Thus it is that the growth of the history and philosophy of science offers promise for a rapprochement between Thomism and the scientific culture of the late twentieth century. Apart from this, there is cause for optimism when Thomism is considered vis-a-vis the "information explosion" and the integration of knowledge required in the present day. Thomism is sufficiently analytical to be acceptable to the scientific mind. Apart from providing an analysis, however, it is also a *synthesis,* and one that is capable of tying together the most diverse strands of knowledge in a meaningful way. Its basic insights into the structure of matter, into the living organism,

•• Among these philosophers of science may be enumerated David Bohm, Mario Bunge, P. K. Feyerabend, and R. S. Cohen, some of whom are Marxist in their philosophical sympathies.

[41] See fn. 10 above. There are marked affinities between sixteenth-century nominalism and realism and twentieth-century neoempiricism and materialism as diametrically opposed philosophical viewpoints; Thomists, as moderate realists, recognize all four as extreme positions.

into man and society, etc., provide a broad foundation on which rapidly multiplying scientific disciplines may find a unified intelligibility.

This new relevance of Thomism to twentieth-century culture carries with it an important message for Catholic philosophers and theologians in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council. To some extent in Western Europe, and to a lesser extent in the U.S., Catholic philosophers have been cultivating personalist, existentialist, and phenomenological philosophies as one way of updating Catholic thought and making it more relevant to the concerns of man and society. Such philosophies are not without their value, but for the most part they are incapable of dealing with modern science and its problems. Catholics understandably feel at home with them because they speak about person, and existence, and the transcendent concerns that have been always those of Christianity. But the more Catholic thinkers endorse existentialism, phenomenology, and personalism, and the more they divorce themselves from the hard thinking that characterizes a scientific culture, the more divisive they become, and as a consequence the less they do to promote the integration of knowledge. At the worst, they openly combat the modern scientist, and at the best, they patronizingly attempt to supplement what he is saying, while speaking in a language that is utterly different from his own. The end result can only be an alienation from Catholic thought of a major component of twentieth-century culture, a component that the Second Vatican Council was most concerned not to alienate.[42]

Thomism, on the other hand, is an open-ended synthesis that is capable of assimilating the good to be found in modern science and its methods, as well as the good to be found in existentialism, phenomenology, and personalism. As such it offers the greatest hope for solving the problems of modern

•• Father Ernan McMullin, in his Presidential Address to the American Catholic Philosophical Association at Notre Dame, Indiana, on March fl8, 1967, forcefully called attention to other harmful consequences, in the U. S., of this general situation. The address is to be printed in the *Proceedings* for 1967.

man, for unifying all areas of knowledge, and for revitalizing Catholic thought along the lines suggested by the Second Vatican Council.

THE FUTURE

Thus a final concern suggests itself, viz., the relationship between Thomism and modern science that should be the goal of efforts in the future. Here one can be very brief. All that need be done is to avoid the mistakes of the past and apply well the lessons learned from history. What are the mistakes of the past? First, the long time period required for the assimilation of new knowledge, particularly when this involved a revolutionary viewpoint. As has been seen, it took from one to two hundred years before Thomists assimilated the essential content of Newtonian physics, and realized to what extent it applies to the physical universe. The point is not being made that Newtonian physics was true and accurate in all its specific details. Whether Newton and his followers were right or wrong is not at issue here; the simple fact is that far too long a time elapsed before their arguments were being evaluated constructively by scholastic thinkers generally, and by Thomists in particular.

Second, a point closely related to the first, the past history of Thomism has witnessed too facile a rejection of the good with the bad. The general principles that form the backbone of the Thomistic synthesis provide powerful standards against which to verify a new proposal; in the past, however, on the basis of these principles alone, Thomists have been too quick to reject an entire system immediately, without bothering to look at the good points it might contain. This has impeded the growth of Thomism, and particularly its assimilation of data from the positive sciences.

Third, a point not unrelated to the first and the second, in the past there has been too strong a commitment to authority (whether of St. Thomas or of the Church in endorsing him), and, as a consequence, a rigid adherence to prevailing views in all areas of thought. Thomists, in principle, state that

one should not rest on authority in matters philosophical, and yet *de facto* they have been doing precisely this.

Fourth, and this is particularly true of the latter period in Thomism's history, Thomists have been content to remain at a very general level, concentrating on metaphysics, and neglecting the specialized disciplines that have developed because of the needs of modern man. Without intending to do so, they have promoted a divorce between philosophy and science, and as a result, they have allowed their theology to be completely untouched by scientific progress.

One usually benefits from the mistakes of the past by conscientiously attempting to avoid them in the future. A simple way of doing this, and a most important way at that, is to return to a concept of the relationship between Thomism and science that existed at the time of St. Albert and St. Thomas. The pragmatic program of confining Thomism to a simplistic system of thought well adapted to the education of seminarians must be relinquished as quickly as possible. Instead, Thomists must be encouraged to become increasingly concerned with, and enlivened from. their contact with, the specific problems of the physical, biological, psychological, social and political sciences. Such a renewal will benefit not only Thomism but also the sciences it can serve to integrate. In so doing it will meet the needs of modern man and his society so strikingly pointed out by the Second Vatican Council.

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REVERENTISSIME EXPONENS FRATER THOMAS

THE EXACT value of the *auctoritates* in the theology of St. Thomas has been studied more than once by renowned scholars, historians or philologists.[1] But ordinarily it has been considered only too partially and externally, in rather material inquiries which do not extend to a methodological reflection on the whole. In the present discussion we do not pretend to complete this study but to prepare the direction which must be followed in order to determine, once and for all, the true value of an element of the thought of St. Thomas.

It is a question of grasping in its very accomplishment (in *actu exercito)* the manner in which St. Thomas, theologian,

EDITOR's NoTE: This article, which appeared in French in the *Freiburger Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic und Theologie* 12 (1965), nn. 2-3, pp. 240-258, is printed in English with the permission of the Director, Father H. 0. Luthi.

[1] M. D. Chenu, "Authentica et Magistralia, Deux lieux theologiques aux Xlle et Xille siecles," *Divus Thomas* (Piac.), II (1925), pp. 257-285; *BuUetin Thomiste* I (-8, n° p. 86; M. Riquet, "Thomas et les 'auctoritates' en philosophie," *Archives de Philosophie* III, pp. 117-155; *B. T.* I (-3, n° 633, pp. 86-87; M. D. Chenu, "Maitre Thomas est-il une 'autorite '? Note sur deux lieux theologiques au XIVe siecle," *Revue thomiste* VII pp. 187-194; *B. T.* I (-3, n° 997, p. K. Balic, "Sv. Toma Akvinski i drugi nauctelju," *Bogoslovska Smotra* XXV (1937), p. 47 fl'., 133 fl'., fl'., 373-388; *B. T.* VI n• p. 149; G. Geenen, "L'usage des 'auctoritates' dans la doctrine du Bapteme chez S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Ephem. theol. Lovan.* XV (1938), pp. I. Backes, "Thomas von Aquin und die Tradition der Vaterzeit," *Pastor Bonus* XLIX (1938), p. 94-99; *Id.* " De opvatting en de houding van den h. Thomas van Aquino bij het gebruiken der bronnen zijner theologie," *Bijdragen van de phil. en theol. fac.* (Nijmegen, 1941), pp. 3); *B. T.* VI n• 148, 149, p. G. Geenen, "De opvatting en de houding van den h. Thomas buj het gebruiken der bronnen zijner theologie," *Bijdragen ... der Nederlandsche Jezuiten* IV (1941), pp. *B. T.* VI n• 173, p. 140; *Id.,* "Thomas d'Aquin et les Peres," *DTC* XV (139), 1946, col. 738-761; *B. T.* VII (1943-46), n• p. M. D. Chenu, *Introduction a l'etude de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (1950), pp. R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism* (1956); *B. T.* X (1957), n° pp. M. D. Chenu, *La thevlogie au Xlie siecle* (1957), ch. XVII. *Authentica et Magistralia,* pp. 351-361; *B. T.* X (1957), n• 389, p.

uses the authorities on which he bases his procedures. The analysis of an article chosen from the *Summa* and selected not for the importance of its conclusion but for its complexity, by presenting us straightaway with a concrete case, will preserve us from an error of method: projecting prefabricated categories on the subject (citations of exegetical necessity, of tradition, of argument from authority, etc ...). This article, which is characteristic in its analytical procedure and in the questions it raises, allows us to operate as upon an anatomical slice of " theological tissue." Thus placed at the heart of the problem, we will next be able to inquire how St. Thomas formulated, explained and criticized his own manner of cooperating with the authorities. For, thanks to an extravagant understanding of the nature of authority, St. Thomas states that theology can arrive at a scientific law in the Aristotelian manner. By way of conclusion we will outline how such an intelligent use of authority, once it is no longer understood, becomes materialized and the source of the greatest intellectual tyranny. Then, in order to escape from the iron collar of intellectual authoritarianism, a lively reaction of liberation sets in and the primacy of criticism is proclaimed.

I. *Analysis of I, q. 5, a. 5.*

In the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas undertakes to investigate the manner of God's existence. He first shows that God is perfect *(maxime perfectus, universaliter perfectus),* possessing in himself the perfections of all realities. Then he asks the question whether goodness belongs to God. Before concluding that God is *summum bonum simpliciter,* it is necessary to analyze what good *in communi* is. Question *5,* entitled *de bono in communi,* has, therefore, a rather particular law. It appears as a metaphysical reflection inserted and integrated into a theological sequence and in view of a theological inquiry. There must be no misunderstanding here: the six articles of this question remain part of a theological reflection, but an eminently metaphysical part.

Question *5* first situates the relationship of good in regard to

being; good and being are the same in reality but have distinct *rationes.* We do not make the same judgment when we say "Peter exists" as "Peter is good." The second article expresses something new in relation to the first, for Peter is good only if he has attained his proper end, that of his nature; his existence precedes his reaching this end. If then the *ratione.'!* of good and being are distinct, one must ask what order exists among them. St. Thomas replies that reason for being is first *secundum rationem,* according to the A.Oyo<>-accordingto the order of the formal cause-" *prima in conceptione intellectus cadit ens."* But, according to the order of causality, good is first, for it possesses the *ratio* of desirability on which the final causality is based. In other words, one cannot affirm in an absolute manner that the *ratio entis* is first and the *ratio bani* is second. There must be a distinction: from a certain viewpoint being is first, from another good. This distinction avoids a rationalism (or an intellectualism) limited to the order of science alone and shows the exigencies of realistic metaphysics: in the order of causality good is first. This touches again the Augustinian position and reveals what is legitimate in it. Finally, although being is first according to its *ratio,* there is a convertibility of the *rationes* of being and of good; all being as such is good.

Following the confrontation between being and good, St. Thomas arrives at good in itself. The *ratio* of good goes back to its final cause (art. 4) and consists *in modo, specie et ordine* (art. 5) . This article brings us to the place chosen for an analysis of the use St. Thomas makes of the *auctoritates.*

In the first objection St. Thomas emphasises that *ratio bani* cannot consist *in modo, specie et ordine;* the authority of the Scriptures and of St. Augustine seems opposed to it. The Book of Wisdom proclaims that "all things have been disposed *in numero, pondere et mensura"* (Wisdom 11: 21). And St. Augustine commenting on this passage specifies that *numerus, pondus, mensura* are the basis for the trilogy *species, m.odus et ordo: " Mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et*

stabilitatem trahit." (Gen. ad Litt. IV, 8). Now the Scripture text is not speaking of the good but of all beings. This trilogy therefore concerns the *ratio entis,* not the *ratio boni.* Here then are two *auctoritates* from different contexts being used with the very definite purpose of distinguishing between the *ratio entis* and the *ratio boni,* a viewpoint which assuredly was that of neither the one nor the other of these authorities.

In order to specify what the *ratio boni* consists of, insofar as it is distinguished from the *ratio entis,-which* has meaning only in a metaphysical analysis of Aristotelian inspiration-, St. Thomas uses the authority of the Scriptures interpreted by St. Augustine to reject the Augustinian conclusion so perfectly expressed in the *Sed contra:* the good consists in mode, species, order.[2]

In the body of the article he reasons as follows: " Everything is said to be good insofar as it is perfect: in this way it is *appetibile."* Now he is perfect to whom nothing is lacking according to the mode of his perfection. And each one is what he is through his form, which presupposes certain determinations and is necessarily followed by others. Therefore, for a person to be perfect and good it is necessary that he have a form with all that is prerequisite to it and all that follows it. The determination (or the commensuration) of material or efficient principles is prerequisite to this form; and this is signified by *"modus."* In this sense it is said that measure determines in advance the mode: *modum praefigit.* The form itself is signified by *species* for, through form, everyone is constituted in his species. It is therefore said that number determines

[2] *" Haec tria, modus, species et ordo, tanquam generalia bona, sunt in rebus a Deo factis; et ita haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est. Quod non esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret" (De Notura boni,* c. 3). We should also consider the fifth objection in which St. Thomas opposes to the authority of St. Augustine, for whom *modus, ordo* are caused *ex pondere, numero et mensura,* the authority of St. Ambrose who affirms that *"Lucis natura est, ut non in numero, non in pondere, non in mensura creata sit" (Hexameron,* lib. I, c. 9). Therefore the *ratio* of the good does not consist *in modo, specie, et ordine* . . . since light which is good is not created *in numero, in pondere, in mensura.*

the species, " for definitions," which signify the species, " are like numbers," according to the Philosopher *(Met.* VIII) . Indeed, as an added or substracted unit varies the species of number, so in definitions an added or substracted difference varies the species. Finally, from form there flows the inclination to the end, or to action, or towards something of this kind; for each one, insofar as he is in act, acts and tends towards that which befits him according to his form; and this pertains to *pondus* and to *ordo.* This is why the *ratio boni,* insofar as it expresses a perfect being, truly consists in mode, species and order.

Thus, through an Aristotelian analysis St. Thomas takes up the trilogy of St. Augustine which itself pretended to interpret the text of the Book of Wisdom. This gives us the following equivalences:



From a purely historical point of view it is scandalous to unite in this way such diverse studies made under such varied viewpoints and preoccupations. Can we say that authority is respected as it should be, respected honestly for what it is? It is inclined towards something which in fact is no longer its proper and immediate meaning.

For St. Augustine *modus, species, ordo* are constant dimensions which constitute things as good and manifest their richness; they are like the *generalia bona,* and St. Thomas wants to fashion from them the essential structure of the *ratio bani!*

A quick judgment would describe this manner of operating as poor theological " concordism," even imply a lack of intel-

lectual integrity. St. Thomas uses St. Augustine to make him confirm what he has not explicitly said. His thought is transformed. Briefly, authority is no longer really used; it is no longer respected; it is abused.

If such a judgment were correct, it would be serious! For either St. Thomas is aware of the foregoing and intellectually dishonest, or he is unaware and his procedures are superficial. Whoever has studied St. Thomas at close hand finds difficulty in believing that the theologian and saint would deal so lightly with the authorities of the greatest of the doctors of the West. It is just as difficult to admit that St. Thomas does so unknowingly and that he is satisfied with vague rapprochements. Is it not possible to find a different interpretation for his manner of procedure?

Are we not in the presence of an act of freedom, that freedom of heart and spirit which is proper to one who pursues only truth? Is this not the freedom which he can allow himself precisely because it considers "the Philosopher," St. Augustine and St. Ambrose as *auctoritates* to the extent that they are witnesses to truth, and in addition because each one has *auctoritas* only to this extent? The theologian then, who is essentially the servant of truth and can seek only the truth, has the right to use them to the same extent.

Beginning with faith, the theologian seeks truth by adhering to the Revelation of God. In its own manner and at its own level theology cooperates with this Revelation. By this very fact its research shares in what is absolute about this Revelation, which communicates to it the divine and eternal Truth which is joined neither to time nor to place, even though it was communicated in a certain place and at a certain moment; divine truth which is not conditioned by such or such system of thought, even though it was expressed with all the resources and the limitations of a certain kind of human mentality. By this very fact the theologian, in the name of this Revelation of which he is the servant, can consider all truth as his property, every particle of truth discovered by men of all times and all places (and especially by his fathers in the faith), and he

has the right and the duty to make use of this property in order to make all the riches of divine Revelation better known. By the authority of divine Revelation, to which he submits himself in faith and to which he consecrates his research and the powers of his intellect, the theologian uses the *auctoritates* (of the Fathers of the Church and of the philosophers) with great freedom, while remaining respectful towards them; for he uses them in order to penetrate further into revealed truth. In this way he explains these diverse authorities, having recourse to the ultimate intentions of their authors, themselves seekers only of truth. [3]

He therefore no longer regards these authors as strangers, distant persons whom he can reach only in a purely external manner (historical or scientific) . Before all they are *avv8ovAot* [4] to him in the service of truth, they are friends who cooperate in the same work. Thus, to reveal in a more perfect manner all the riches of revealed divine truth in the case of the Fathers, to seek truth in a more penetrating and exact manner in the case of the philosophers, is to engage in "teamwork" with them, to that degree of friendship which brings the incompleted attempt of the friend to its completion. Thus we assist at a true dialogue between the theologian and other minds in search of truth: the authorities he uses. To him the authorities are living words-somewhat in the manner of the word of God in which they participate more or less directly through their content of truth; they are no longer purely fixed and judicial authorities, amenable to a simple philological-historical com-

[8] But evidently the theologian has the right to use the *auctoritates* in this manner only if, by so doing, he does not contradict, does not go against the intention of the author as expressed by the context, and finally,. if he does not mutilate the text for the needs of his case. It would be interesting to state that the freedom St. Thomas takes in regard to the *auctoritates* always presupposes these conditions. St. Thomas himself, in commenting on the Gospel of St. Matthew, notes the three ways in which someone can falsify the authority of the Scriptures: I) *cum dicitur de uno et exponitur de alia; ... quando inducit quis auctoritatem ad aliquid, ad quod non est auctoritas . . . quando illud quod est pro se, de auctoritate accipit, et aliud quod est oontra se dimittit, quod est mos haeretici ...*" *(In Matth.,* c. 4, lect. 1, ed. Cai [Marietti] n°

[4] II Col. 1:7; 4:7; Apoc. 6:11; 19:10;

mentary. We assist at a dialogue, one of those rare dialogues between intelligent people where communion is established beyond the feebleness of expressions and the limits of intuitions, because mutual goodwill knows how to recognize the direction of the truth which each pursues with equal fervor, in a real self-detachment; a dialogue which surpasses individual limitations until each at his own level perceives with joy the point of convergence of the common effort.

In the light of this research hypothesis, let us turn again to article 5. The authority of St. Augustine in his various texts on the good can be viewed in an external manner: these are the words of a thinker, the views of the bishop of Hippo, a man of the fifth century whose thought was conditioned by neoplatonist philosophy. Thus for him, good is that which is ultimate in the metaphysical order; *modus, species* and *ordo* manifest the presence of realities which are good like their general attributes. Thus, where the good exists these three attributes appear; to the extent that these attributes are realized, the good itself is realized. According to such a method, it is primarily a question of respecting a particular way of understanding the goodness of realities such as it is, conditioned by a historical milieu and philosophical influences.

But the theologian can also consider the authority of St. Augustine insofar as he is witness to truth, namely, a pioneer by his research, a step in its discovery, a "Father" who has understood and expressed something of the truth. When a mind, which is primarily in search of what goodness is and aims to penetrate in the most profound manner possible into the *ratio boni,* encounters St. Augustine, it is very pleased to make use of his researches and to confront them, in a certain sense, with the researches of the Philosopher. At this moment the efforts of Aristotle and of Augustine can truly cooperate in the same task, the discovery of truth. Is not the theologian who proceeds in this way respectful in the highest degree of the authority of Augustine and of Aristotle, since he prolongs their efforts by placing himself in their school and by using them in the most intelligent manner possible? The greatest homage

from a disciple is to surpass his teacher in the very thing he received from him.

To bring together the *modus* of St. Augustine and the *dispositio* of Aristotle, *species* and *forma, ordo* and *inclinatio ad finem,* certainly gives this trilogy a new meaning which it does not allow historically. But its deepest purpose is not to force it, far from it, but to make it more precise and to enrich it. Instead of understanding these notions uniquely as referring to the wisdom of God who does everything in measure, number and weight, St. Thomas also makes explicit the internal relationships of finality which bind together *modus, species* and *ordo.* This philosophical analysis of Aristotle according to the different causalities is in no way opposed to the Christian wisdom of Augustine. Instead of stopping exclusively at the material and literal expressions, conditioned by this or that historical milieu or philosophical system, the mind tries to grasp the profound meaning of these expressions insofar as they manifest the reality known and contain a part of the truth. There is need to go that far, we believe, if we wish to grasp the supple penetration with which St. Thomas as theologian makes use of the " auctoritates."

St. Thomas does not offer undue homage to authorities, nor does he proceed to a historical inventory of his predecessors with the intention of pointing out the value and originality of his personal contribution; he does not delay over a philological analysis which by its method excludes all concern to emerge beyond a " formal," that is, very material analysis; he appeals to all collaborators and teachers of repute, whose support, insights and intuitions will help him to progress, to grasp better the ineffable truth.

The eminent situation of the theologian is not unique: the philosopher already can proceed in a fairly similar manner in regard to other philosophers, to the extent at least that the " friend of wisdom " is primarily in pursuit of truth. In the name of the quest for truth, the common good of all philosophers and of all men, the philosopher may make use of the authority of other philosophers in order to deepen his own

search for truth. He then considers them as friends, cooperators, rather than as adversaries or rivals. When St. Thomas, as commentator of Aristotle, examines the manner in which the philosopher questions his predecessors in order to find out how they understood the principles and first causes of reality, his attitude is indeed the same as the one we are outlining here. In regard to Anaxagoras does he not clearly emphasize:

> Here he deals with Anaxagoras' opinion; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in general in what respect Anaxagoras' opinion should be accepted as true, and in what respect not? [5]

He even specifies, not without humor:

> Therefore, with reference to what he has not expressly stated his opinion is true; but with reference to what he has expressly stated his opinion is false .... " [6] " --- If his opinion is taken in its entirety according to a superficial understanding of his statements, a greater absurdity will appear for four reasons. . . . These absurdities appear then, if Anaxagoras' opinion is considered in a superficial way. Yet if anyone were to follow him up "and articulate," i.e., investigate clearly and distinctly, the things which Anaxagoras "means," i.e., what he intended, although he did not know how to express this, his statement would appear to be more astonishing and subtler than those of the preceding philosophers .... [7]

And St. Thomas concludes:

> It is clear, then, that, in regard to the things which he stated expressly, Anaxagoras neither spoke correctly nor clearly. Yet he would seem to say something directly which comes closer to the opinions o fthe later philosophers, which are truer, namely, to those of Plato and Aristotle .... [8]

It seems, therefore, that to St. Thomas, theologian and commentator on Aristotle, there is a twofold manner of considering and utilizing documents and *auctoritates:* either the document is considered in itself as a fact and made use of in accordance

[5] *I Metaphys.,* lect. 12, ed. Cathala, par. 194.
[6] *Loc. cit.,* n° 194 fin.
[7] *Loc. cit.,* no 195-196.
[8] *Loc. cit.,* n° 199.

with its own expressions, such as the document is presented to us; or in the document, which becomes an authority, there is perceived a sign, a testimony which allows us to reach for something else: the thought, the underlying and poorly expressed intuition, the direction of the research of its author. We can then interpret the document according to the ultimate intention of the author. If the author is a philosopher, he is primarily pursuing truth. From then on the interpreter of the sense of the truth is no longer a stranger to this authority. And the method only continues and enlarges upon the method Aristotle put into practice in the passage commented on by St. Thomas. [9]

II. *The auctoritates the theological method according to St. Thomas.*

The interpretation which we have proposed is the fruit neither of a personal impression nor of a speculative extrapolation; it is confirmed by our Common Doctor himself, not only when he comments on Aristotle but in his own work.

In the first question of the *Summa,* analyzing what theology is, St. Thomas states that *Sacra Doctrina* is a science, but a science of a very particular type, for there are two kinds of sciences: some proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, such as arithmetic and geometry; others proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science, as the science of perspective proceeds from geometry and music from arithmetic. *Sacra Doctrina* is a science in the second sense: it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science. which is the science of God, the science enjoyed in its fullness by the blessed. This is why, as music believes the principles communicated to it by arithmetic, so *Sacra Doctrina* believes the principles revealed to it by God. [10]

This much is clear: the scientific law of theology is that of one science subordinated to another science. It is a science which receives its principles from Revelation. It therefore does

[9] *Met.* A, 8, 989a 30, fl'.

[10] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 2.

not know its own principles immediately and with evidence, but it adheres to them by believing in them without having evidence. Therefore the theology of St. Thomas sees itself in a state of total dependency. Although capable of reaching scientific perfection, it always remains imperfect and unsatisfactory to the intellect; a genuine science awaiting the beatific VISIOn.

Yet theology possesses a unique certitude, for it is founded on supernatural faith, on divine authority /[11] " This science possesses a certitude which is derived *ex lumine divinae scientiae quae decipi nan potest."* It also has a unique dignity since, because of its attitude, it considers that which transcends reason. And, moreover, the good of this doctrine, insofar as it is practical, is eternal happiness; [12] it therefore finalizes all other sciences.

Let us be more specific. This science receives its immediate principles from the science of God. As a matter of fact, through faith the revealed truths are accepted as the proper principles of theological scientific research. Revealed truths received in faith are directly based on the authority of God. Authority is thus considered not as extrinsic to theological science but as that which founds it and allows it to exist by providing it with its proper principles. Divine authority can fulfill this role precisely because it is not purely external to the intelligence of the theologian, an intelligence lifted up by faith. Through faith, divine authority is truly introduced into the life of the intelligence of the believer, without being confused with the natural requirements of his intellectual life, but by raising up this life. It is the most internal and most intimate aspect of the theologian's faith; it is his light and, at the same time, that which is imposed in the greatest transcendency; it is the norm of all his research, the principle of every point of departure and arrival. Far from remaining foreign to the life of the intelligence of the believer, divine authority offers him new possibilities of development and a new fruitfulness. It can

[11] *Loc. cit.,* a. 5.

[12] *Ibid.*

thus be said that theological research even in its scientific requirements is born of divine Revelation received by faith; its point of departure is divine authority. Normally, all knowledge which is based on human authority can produce only an opinion, a " dialectical " knowledge, so that, depending on the value of this authority, the opinion will be more or less perfect.[13] In contrast, divine authority can be the basis of a truly scientific knowledge. Precisely because this divine authority is completely different from the others, it is not only external, it is also the principle of a spiritual life and intellectual determination. It produces a definite adherence of faith which, although obscure, is capable of assuming the philosophical sciences into its service.

Consequently, adherence to the articles of faith is more certain than our most certain metaphysical knowledge, since it is capable of assuming the latter and putting it at its service. St. Thomas emphasizes: " Though weakest when based on what human beings have disclosed, the argument from authority is most forcible when based on what God has disclosed." [14]

Truly we are in the presence of a form of ultimate authority which allows the human intellect, lifted up by faith, to enter immediately into the school of God. For all this it does not suppress our research and our labors. On the contrary, it gives rise to them and demands them. "Since grace does not scrap nature but brings it to perfection, so also natural reason should assist faith." [15]

Nor does being in the school of God in any way suppress the need for lucidity. The theologian knows the various ways in which he must use the different authorities. He uses the authority of canonical Scriptures " *proprie et ex necessitate argumentando,"* [16] as the scholar uses the proper principles of

[13] Cf. *Quodl.* III, a. 31, ad I: *"Probare autem per auctoritatem non est demonstrative probare, sed fide rei opinionem facere."*

[14] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Ibid.*

his science. The authority of the Doctors of the Church is used *"quasi arguendo ex propriis sed probabiliter."* And as far as the authority of the philosopher is concerned, it is used " *quasi extraneis argumentis et probabilibus."* In this we see how the theologian relates the use of the authority of the Fathers of the Church to the use of the authority of the Scriptures revealed by God. The authority of the Fathers interests the theologian only to the extent that what they affirm conforms to what is affirmed by canonical Scriptures. His use of the authority of the Fathers is relative to the light of the Scriptures. Finally, the authority of the philosophers interests him only to the extent that what they say expresses the truth or leads to it. Then he uses it to manifest revealed truths. [17]

Thus authority is not considered for its own sake but primarily in relation to another reality: the authority of the Fathers in relation to that of the Scriptures and that of the philosophers in relation to the truth which the human intellect is capable of reaching by itself. The authority of Scripture alone possesses what is absolute, precisely insofar as it communicates to us the divine Truth which is the first Truth. Nevertheless this authority itself is entirely directed to the beatific vision. If God speaks to us and if He asks us to believe in his word, it is in order to communicate to us his life, his light, his truth, and to communicate it to us some day in the clarity of the beatific vision. The ultimate intention of God in speaking to us is to communicate to us his truth in order to lead us to the beatific vision.

The twofold use of authority which we have presupposed earlier is therefore methodologically legitimate. At the same time it appeals to the authority of the author in question. The fact is very clear when it is a question of the Fathers of the Church or the philosophers, since their authorities can be considered either as a punctual fact in a synchronic or " diachronic " study of the history of human thought, in other words, in themselves or for themselves, or as a stage, a step,

[17] In *Boot. de Trin.,* q fl, a. S, ad 8.

a force in the collective march towards the true, namely, insofar as these authorities have value in relation to Sacred Scripture or to the truth which the intellect is capable of discovering by itself. Even when it is a question of divine authority expressed in the Scriptures a twofold usage is imposed.[18] We can indeed make use of this authority by considering it in itself in a pure adherence of faith: " God has said so, Amen." We give our approval exclusively to the word of God as to the revealed truth guaranteed by divine authority itself. We can also make use of this authority according to its proper finality. If God speaks, it is in order to communicate his truth, to lead to the beatific vision. From then on, we adhere to revealed truth as to a divine source of light, capable of fecundating an entire new search for truth. The believer-theologian makes revealed truth his own as a proper principle in his theological research, and he cooperates with this revealed truth by developing his theological knowledge.

Is not the pretense of rejecting the second way of using divine authority in order to exalt the first to transpose the attitude of nominalism and of positivism to the level of faith? If we formalize divine authority and want to consider it exclusively in itself outside its whole proper finality, we materialize it in spite of the pretense of proclaiming its absolute transcendence. On the other hand, by exalting the second way of using the authority of Scripture to the detriment of the first, are we not forgetting the proper character of divine Revelation which is imposed on the believer? Pure adherence of faith to the Word of God possesses in itself something absolute (the believer is not necessarily a theologian). Therefore we must avoid confusing the divine authority of Scripture and the

[18] Note well that the use of the divine authority of the Scriptures considered in themselves implies for the Catholic that they must be considered through the *magisterium* of the Church and Tradition, since the Scriptures are entrusted to the Church who must watch over them. The distinction which could be made between the use of the authority of the Scriptures considered in themselves and their use through the *magisterium* of the Church and Tradition is therefore a theoretical distinction which cannot properly imply two uses of Scripture for the believer. For the theologian, before being a theologian, is a believer.

authority of men; we must not transpose the conduct of our human reason to the level of the adherence of supernatural faith. Supernatural faith is one thing, human faith another. In itself revealed truth remains independent of our intellectual conduct, and through the adherence of faith it raises up our intellectual life. Certainly God, in revealing his truth to us, mercifully adapts himself to the conditions of our intelligence. He uses human words and human discourse. Mercifully he demands from the believer his cooperation as theologian, but his truth does not become relative because of this cooperation. The use which the believer makes of divine authority to elaborate theology is a superabundance of mercy. This is why it is a fact of Christian grace and truly speaking does not occur in the Old Testament. [19]

Finally, this twofold use of authority is based on the very nature of authority as conceived by St. Thomas. To him authority is joined to the person and inseparable from him. It is truly the property of the perfect person. To the extent that the person has reached his end, to the same extent he is capable of strengthening a less perfect person who has not yet reached his end. Authority therefore supposes a real superiority: it is the endowment of him who, by reason of his superiority, is capable of helping those who are inferior to him by assuming their responsibility. This is exercised in various ways, always ordaining the inferior towards his proper good and efficaciously helping him to reach it. In fact, authority can be exercised either in the domain of practical life (that of family life: education; political life: the exercise of laws), or in the domain of scientific and philosophical knowledge (teaching). In the latter instance one is in the presence of the authority of the teacher, one who knows perfectly and who by

[19] Do not those who reject the scientific theology of St. Th'omas have a; secret, unCQnscious desire to return to the Old Testment and to replace the theologian by the prophet? But in contrast with the prophets of the Old Testment who received their mission from the Holy Spirit, would they not often prefer to raise themselves up as prophets? A well-known phenomenon of regression: it always materializes, for it substitutes the exigencies of origin for the light of the final cause.

that very fact is capable of communicating his knowledge to those who do not possess it. The authority of the teacher is thus at the same time relative to the perfection of his knowledge-he has authority to the extent that his knowledge is perfect-and relative to those who are capable of receiving his instruction. The disciple who receives instruction from a teacher adheres to this instruction, oral or written, by having confidence in him, and he makes use of it to acquire truth. He uses the words or the writings of the teacher as one who can supply for his own ignorance and who will allow him more rapidly to overcome this state of ignorance. The disciple who recognizes the authority of the words or the writings of a teacher can thus use them in two ways: either he adheres purely and simply to these words or these writings of authority by considering them in themselves, receiving them as a quasi-definitive expression; or he can, while adhering to them, use them to obtain truth in an untiringly pursued research. While this is true of all authority, it is eminently true of divine authority. God, being the only true Teacher who knows all perfectly, is alone in having sovereign authority. This is why only his teaching demands a full adherence of faith. Likewise, there are some who think that there is nothing greater than to remain in such adherence, excluding from it everything which could remove it from its initial purity. Such an attitude forgets that the teaching of God, by the very fact of his perfection, is ordained to the communication of the full truth more than is any other teaching. This is why God demands from us recipients of it not only a very pure adherence of faith but also the most loving and the most intelligent possible effort of cooperation in view of the beatific vision. The *Sacra Doctrina* of St. Thomas can be understood only in this perspective.

III. *From authority to authoritarianism, from authoritarianism to the primacy of rebellion.*

This understanding of authority, especially of divine authority, which allowed St. Thomas to erect his *Sacra Doctrina*, is something very great and simultaneously shows the gene-

rosity of the mercy of the God-who-reveals and the vitality of our intellect elevated by faith. In teaching us God wants us to be docile and intelligent disciples, disciple-friends who co-operate efficaciously with their teacher, knowing that all the knowledge of their Master is theirs, that one day they will know with clarity all he knows. But by reason of this very penetrating understanding of authority, the *Sacra Doctrina* masterpiece erected by St. Thomas remains vulnerable and fragile. In the human order masterpieces are not only rare but also fragile realities, realities which are most prone to disintegration and deterioration.

Does not respect for human authors become greater when it reveals the profound, the modest and disinterested intention which gave force and tenacity to their research? Did not these human teachers seek to lead their disciples, readers or listeners, to the truth which they had perceived over and beyond an expression which they were the first to realize was limited and imperfect? Would not the most perfect, the most faithful way of listening to them, the most respectful use of their authority consist in surpassing the letter, form and mode of their thought in order to reach the object which they wanted to reveal, as long as an extensive investigation has permitted their words and thoughts to be exactly located?

Shortly after this general and very bold conception of *Sacra Doctrina* according to St. Thomas, there appeared the teachings of William of Ockham and his disciple Gabriel Biel, who exercised such great influence over the whole development of theology. Certainly William of Ockham does not reject the *auctoritates.* Apparently he seems to recognize the same nuances as St. Thomas. He states in his *De Sacramento altaris:*

"If by doctors is understood modern doctors who publicly and privately and even in writing reject one another . . . it is not improper to deny them. For nothing that they say is to be accepted except what they can prove by evident reason or by the authority of sacred scripture or by doctors approved by the Church." [20]

•• *De Sacramento altaris,* q. 3; see *Quaestio prima principalis PrologHn primum librum Sententiarum,* ed. P. P. Bonner (B. Goetschmann, Ziirich) in which he

Nevertheless, if we try to state what he understands by authority, we soon realize that the word no longer has the same meaning: it is practically reduced to a power. He who has authority is he who has the power to command effectively. Authority no longer is considered on the one hand with respect to a perfect nature which has reached its end, and on the other hand with respect to inferior natures which must be aided to reach their own ends. The concepts of nature and end no longer have any real meaning in such a doctrine. In fact, to William of Ockham only the individual reality, the supposit, is real. Nature is a construct of the mind, something fictitious. To him the life of the intellect is reduced on the one hand to an experimental quasi-intuitive knowledge of existing particulars and on the other hand to a knowledge of the universal, fruit of the intellect, which allows him to classify and order individual realities. There remains room only for a description of the existing realities and a rational logic. There no longer exists a real and profound cooperation between intellect and reality; no dialogue remains possible, there remains only the monologue. We can describe and classify, but no longer can we truly know by *intentionally* becoming the other. Reality can no longer be considered except in a purely external manner.

It is easy to grasp the immediate consequences of this attitude for our discussion. No longer can we envision a twofold use of authority, since it has become something imposed on the inferior who must suffer it. It forces him to submit, it constrains him to obey. It does this, not in view of its achievement or its own perfection but as a fact which imposes itself. Formalized and as it were hypostatized, authority becomes demanding.

Henceforth there is no longer any possibility of conceiving of a cooperation, a common pursuit of truth between the teacher who instructs and the disciple who receives his instruction. The authority of the teacher demands that it be accepted

often cites the authority of St. Augustine, of the Philosopher aud the Commentator: *"ad auctoritates Philosophi et Commemtatoris dico ... sicut patet ad primam auctoritatem Philosophi et Commentatoris . . ."* (*ad Jum dubium* p. 47).

for its own sake without being immediately directed towards the acquisition of truth; it is imposed in a tyrannical manner, truly alienating the intellect of the disciple. This is all the more true in theology where the authority considered is the supreme authority. The latter is imposed in an absolute manner, without any recourse. The believer then finds himself in the presence of the omnipotence of God who realizes all that He wants according to the good pleasure of his sovereign freedom. The intellect of the believer has only to give himself up to this good pleasure and simply try to grasp all that God can do. The adherence of faith is reduced to a pure act of obedience which recognizes the sovereign authority of God, and theology is reduced to the study of the extent of the power of God, the inquiring into the possibles (all that which God wants to realize *de potentia absoluta)* . This false exaltation of the authority of God, identified with his omnipotence, tends to reduce the life of the intellect to nothing. One is tempted to say that the exaltation of the authority of God demands an annihilation of the intelligence of the believer.

It is in this theological climate, which proclaims such greatness for the authority of God and prevents the intellect of the believer from being itself in accordance with its most natural needs, that certain philosophical reactions must be located. In order to recover its vital spontaneity and that which is most natural to it, the intellect then experiences the need to free itself from all authority and from everything that might prevent it from being fully itself. This tyranny, born of the false exaltation of authority, has given the human intellect a rather acute feeling for its autonomy, for what is proper to it. Thus it is not surprising that its first reaction is the rejection of everything which comes from outside, of everything which is not immediately the consciousness of its own activity. It adopts a hypercritical defensive attitude rather than first accepting and then criticizing; it starts out by being opposed through criticizing, in order to rediscover in its most intimate self, in its consciousness, the certitude of which it has such need, but not without having rejected what until then constituted its

first source of all certitude and of all security: the authority of God. A false exaltation of authority must inevitably result in a false exaltation of autonomy.

Is this not the basic attitude of Descartes? In the presence of a certain budding nm;ninalism which had penetrated into Scholasticism, he experiences the imperative need to rediscover in the innermost recess of his consciousness this vital source of knowledge and certitude. By opposing nominalism, the tyranny of authority, he reveals the vital needS/of his intellect. Such a reaction is healthy, but is it sufficient? Does it not remain too dependent on the very thing which it rejects? Is it not primarily a defensive, critical attitude? He who defends himself remains in a real relationship to his adversary, very often he is preserving the latter's conduct! Descartes reacts against the iron collar of theological authoritarianism-he wants a *tabula rasa-,* but from then on he imprisons himself in the certitude of his own thought. Did Descartes have sufficient audacity and enough strength in his reaction? Did he not remain halfway, at the level of opposites in the same genus? For the " exteriority " of authority he substituted the interiority of his *cogito.*

In order to free himself completely from the formation of the nominalist doctrine, it would have been necessary to rediscover the realism of nature and especially of the final cause. For authority in itself is not opposed to the development of our intellect but a certain manner of understanding and using authority. First of all, we must reject the cause of this formalization of authority which, oblivious to why authority exists, erects it into an absolute.

At the end of this discussion it would seem, therefore, that the misgivings of some, the severity of others in their appreciations of the use St. Thomas makes of the *auctoritates* find their ultimate cause, not in the limitations of the method or the scientific immaturity of the Common Doctor but in the vigor and purity of his thought which most men have not been able to approach or to persist in. His error, if error there be, is in surpassing in insight his *auctoritates* in the very same direction in which they labored towards the discovery and expression of

the truth. Because, over and beyond a good understanding of the text cited (for he has a wonderful knowledge of the context) ,[21] St. Thomas recovers the spirit at work of the *auctor* to whom he refers, he rises above the materiality of the sign and, better than the author, clearly brings out the fullness of what is meant. One would be tempted to say that it is not only the most charitable but the most faithful of expositions, since it is themost loving and the most penetrating exposition of the truth sought and found in the common dialogue of the authorised writer with his commentator. [22]

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[21] The excellent research which Father Le Guillou has just undertaken on St. Thomas's knowledge of oriental theology is striking proof of this. (See "La sacra doctrina, theologie du Mystere," *Le Christ et l'Eglise, Theologie du Mystere* [Centurion 1963]). To grasp the value of every citation of the Angelic Doctor, we must go to its immediate and to its larger context.

[22] It remains that this freedom of the Angelic Doctor is a difficult example to follow. Many will confuse it with a false "freedom of the children of God" often claimed by anarchists, by the self-taught and by false scholars. The path of scientific ascetism, spiritual privation, love of truth, without which this true freedom cannot be born and bear fruit, will thus have to be constantly recalled to mind. With St. Thomas it is the fruit of a contemplative life, matured at length by the active practice of the primitive observances of the Preachers. Already a philosopher, as philosopher he also must practice the long ascetical exercises of scientific inquiries (linguistic, exegetical, historical) in order to divest himself of facile intuitions and not to accept as correct his own opinions about an author. This ascetical way is necessary in order to acquire a little self-detachment without which all dialogue with the *auctoritates* would be a lure, for want of this exclusive love of the truth.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Secularization Theology. By RoBERT L. RicHARD, S. J. Foreword by Martin E. Marty. Pp. 200. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. $4.95.

To review this book adequately is a difficult, if not indeed an impossible task. Dr. Martin E. Marty, who contributes the foreword, describes it as a " protestant " book which demands from its author a " catholic" sequel. That sequel however will, alas, never be written, for Fr. Richard, who was clearly a young theologian of great promise, died suddenly almost immediately after his book was published. Dr. Marty asserts that "Father Richard makes clear that he agrees in the main with the secularizing theologians," but this judgment seems to me to be doubtful. What is evident is that he had considerable sympathy for their angle of approach, which he took to be more relevant to the twentieth-century situation than that of traditional Roman Catholic apologetics. Nevertheless, the defects which he discerned in them are glaring and lethal, and this leads us to regret all the more that this ultimately destructive work must lack the " catholic " and constructive sequel for which it so obviously calls. In the first part, "The Genealogy and the Message," he is primarily concerned with Dr. John A. T. Robinson and Dr. Harvey Cox; in the second, "The Break from Tradition," with Dr. Paul van Buren; and in the third, "The Creative Insights," with Cox and Robinson again, concluding with a short section, " The Future of Secularization," which is largely devoted to Cardinal Cushing's pastoral letter "The Servant Church." Other writers, such as Schubert Ogden, Thomas Altizer, William Hamilton and Leslie Dewart (and even Teilhard de Chardin and Lonergan) receive incidental and briefer mention, and, of course, the shade of Bonhoeffer hovers over all.

Perhaps the most useful thing I can do in the present review will be to list some of the reflections which I find in my mind after reading Richard's book.

First, then, although the " radical " or " secularizing " theologians have a common dissatisfaction with practically everything that

Christian theologians earlier than Bonhoeffer have ever written, and a common conviction that they themselves have found the way to make Christianity both intelligible and attractive to people of the twentieth century, it is extremely difficult to find any positive and constructive feature that unites them. For some of them, God does not exist and never has existed; this is certainly van Buren's position. For some of them, God, they assure us, is dead, though Robinson would not say so. For Vahanian, Altizer and Hamilton, the death of God is the very heart of the Gospel. However, even those who preach the death of God understand it in such a variety of ways that it is astonishing to find them apparently under the impression that they are in substantial agreement and differ only on minor and unimportant details. For some of them (as for Vahanian), God does exist but has withdrawn himself from the vision of modern man. For some (as apparently for Cox), God does exist, but it is hopeless to attempt to get modern man to see this, though perhaps it may again become possible in the future. But, in that *ultima Thule* of secularized Christianity, Thomas Altizer's *Gospel of Christian Atheism*, with which Hamilton in his latest phase seems to agree, God (who is identical with Satan) used once to exist but destroyed himself on Calvary, in order than man might be free from the obligation of serving him, although the Christian Church throughout the ages mistakenly supposed that he still existed. There is, of course, a common concern with Jesus; the label " Christian " could hardly be claimed without this, but there is little agreement as to who and what Jesus is. For Altizer he certainly was God, though he presumably ceased to exist when God did. For van Buren he certainly was not God, though, like everyone else, he ceased to exist when he died. A certain ambiguity arises through a tendency to re-define God in terms of perfect humanity. When this is done (as it is by Dr. John Knox, though he would not, I think, associate himself with the " radicals ") , God, although his metaphysical status has vanished, reappears as identical with Jesus. It is perhaps to the credit of many radicals that they do not take this way out. While reinterpreting the perfection of Jesus simply in terms of his orientation to other people ("the man for others"), they are content to let deity disappear altogether, though the cost of this is that the uniqueness of Jesus, while it is postulated dogmatically, becomes quite unintelligible and inexplicable. But, once again, there is so little uniformity of belief, that the more

conservative radicals, such as Robinson, cling on to God even at the expense of defining him, somewhat ambiguously, as the" ground of being." One might well be tempted to suppose that the common feature of the radicals was their determination to attract attention somehow, even if it meant scandalizing their fellow-Christians; *epater les bourgeois* is, in any case, good fun. To suggest this would not, however, be entirely just, though if a Christian theologian did want to attract attention, it would be difficult to think of a more promising way than to proclaim oneself a Christian atheist and announce the death of God. There is, I believe, another explanation which is morally, though not intellectually, less discreditable. It is connected with the particular type of existentialist philosophy to which most of the radicals adhere. (Van Buren is an exception; for him the philosophical savior is not existentialism but linguistic analysis.) This type of subjectivism finds it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between beings and our ideas of them. God is simply our idea of him, and if the idea dies, God dies with it. Thus, although Altizer appears to be telling the story of a literal suicide on the part of God, one cannot be quite sure that he is not describing a process taking place in the minds of human beings or even that he recognises any difference between the two. After all, one of his venerated masters is Hegel (the others being Blake and Nietzsche), and for Hegel reality was identical with the Idea. It is, I think, very significant that Dr. John Macquarrie, who of all existentialist theologians is most firmly rooted in Catholic tradition, has in his recent writings insisted that a sound theology must keep the balance between existentialism and ontology and must synthesize subjectivity and objectivity in worship and theology alike. I suspect that a great deal of the difficulty that one experiences when one attempts to pass a critical judgment on the writings of the radical theologians arises from a subjectivist metaphysic and epistemology, which is nonetheless potent for being unexpressed, and which is unexpressed because it is unrecognised, and which is unrecognised because its employers, not being professional philosophers, have failed to observe how tendencious and questionable it is.

There is, however, one of the party who is a professional philosopher, namely, Dr. Leslie Dewart, and in his book, *The Future of Belief,* the issue becomes quite explicit. I have discussed his work at length in an article in the *Downside Review* for October 1967,

and I shall refer here only to the points that are immediately relevant.

Dewart interestingly observes that, although Christian doctrine has always been in a process of development, we have only recently come to recognise this. "Why," he then asks, "should the Church at a certain point in the history of dogma have become aware that its dogma had a history?" (p. 78) His answer is that human experience in general has become aware of its own historicity and evolutionary nature and that the Church is sharing in this contemporary experience, though it is lamentably lagging behind owing to its attachments to the past. Now this observation might be the starting point of a valuable investigation of the nature of doctrinal development, and indeed something of the kind has been initiated by Professor Maurice Wiles in his book *The Making of Christian Doctrine.* Dewart, however, uses it as the springboard for a wholesale onslaught on the traditional view of the nature of truth itself. He denounces, under the somewhat misleading label of " Hellenism," the view that truth consists in the correspondence between thought and objective reality and insists that it is a purely subjective condition of the mind itself. "Truth," he writes, "is not the adequacy of our representative operations, but the adequacy of our conscious existence" (p. And again: "The nature of truth does not merely permit truth to develop, but indeed requires that it do so. For truth itself consists in a certain intensive development of man's original relation to reality given by the fact that, being a reality, he participates in being" (p. 111). He is emphatic that it is truth itself, and not merely our apprehension of it, that changes, that is historically and socially conditioned, so that what is true at one time may be false at another.

Now the fatal objection to this doctrine of truth, as to all forms of radical scepticism, is that it is inherently self-destructive and suicidal. As Dr. Armand Maurer wrote, in a review of Dewart's book in *The Ecumenist* (Jan. Feb. 1967):

> The doctrine of the historicity of truth espoused by [Dewart's) book faces the further difficulty that, if it is true, it must have come into existence as a part of man's process of self-awareness and self-making, and hence it is relative to his situation in a certain moment of history. Like all truths, it must be historically relative, not timeless and supracultural. And yet the doctrine says more than this; it pretends to be a philosophical truth valid for all times and cultures. In short, total historisation is not tenable, for the doctrine of historicity cannot be formulated without denying itself.

Indeed, in order to refute the doctrine, we need not say anything; we need only to wait in silence while it cuts its own throat. It is only because time is precious that we need to argue against it. And I think we shall find that this doctrine of Dewart is endemic to the existentialist radicals as a group. (Van Buren is an exception, but his philosophy is not existentialism but logical analysis.) Unless we go right to the epistemological root of the radical theologians, we are almost certain to find ourselves at cross-purposes with them. We shall in particular be unable to understand their apparent inability to distinguish between our idea of God and God himself.

I wish, however, to go further than this and to argue that this radically existentialist theology is neither specially congenial to people of our day nor in harmony with what modern science has to tell us about man. The first point has been made quite clearly by Richard. While affirming that the movement has given a distinctly Anglo-Saxon turn to its borrowings from Europe and especially from Germany, he writes:

> Without that final turn, theology, no theology, can discourse successfully with the American secular city-not even with its Roman Catholics. The existentialist categories that have so largely overtaken American Catholic theology may have become very useful and meaningful for those who have had long experience of them, in the original or at least in American translation. But by and large they are not the categories in which America's scientific technological and secular humanist will ever learn to talk comfortably about God [p. 291.

This needs heavy underlining, and it is as true of England as of America. One of the more naive characteristics of the radical theology is its belief that it has found the idiom in which to speak to the ordinary man and woman of the present day. It has, of course, invented a few sensational slogans which can startle some and puzzle others. But there is no reliable evidence that it makes any appeal except to a rather sophisticated coterie.

My second assertion is that the existentialist theology is out of harmony with what modern science tells us about man. It does indeed affirm that man finds himself projected *(geworfen)* into an alien environment, in which he feels himself anxious and alienated and estranged. All this is no doubt true, though it should perhaps be pointed out that ordinary non-neurotic people do not find the world such a place of unrelieved horror as existentialists depict it. Where, however, existentialism parts company both with science and with common experience is in its failure to recognize that man

is not merely *in* the world but is, on the material side of his being, actually *part* of it. Both biological evolution and the elementary facts of nutrition make this plain. It is, of course, in the avowedly irreligious existentialists that this is most clear, for example, in Sartre and Camus. And the attitude of revolt against their environment which characterizes such figures as Roquentin and Rieux, while it has its elements of genuine nobility, is basically a repudiation of man's involvement in materiality as such. Nor do the Christian existentialists avoid it. Even in its Christian interpretation, the authentic existence to which they call us is more a matter of living *in spite of* the world than as *part of* it. There is little sense of the Pauline assertion that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth awaiting redemption; rather it is man who groans and travails awaiting redemption from the world. It is significant that for existentialist theology there are no problems about the relation between science and religion, for it ignores those facts about man from which the problems arise. It is at this point that, in spite of the attempts of some existentialists to claim him as one of themselves, an impassable gulf yawns between them and Teilhard de Chardin.

One glaring defect in the secularizing theologians is their failure to take acount of death, which is after all, together with birth, the most universal and inescapable fact of human existence. After commenting on van Buren's demand for absolute silence as to whether God exists or not, Richard writes as follows:

> Still another condition that would have to be met [in van Buren] is the final removal from man's serious concern of the problem posed by the quite empirical fact of human death: extinction or immortality? For unless modem man confronts at least the possibility of immortality, it seems that his only realistic alternative is to accept the absurdity of human existence, human spirit, human creativity. And this is where van Buren could perhaps learn much from Bultmann and the existentialists [p. 117].

However, neither Robinson nor Cox satisfies the need:

> The Robinson-Cox Secularization is without a theology of death. It is a very excellent thing to insist, as both do, that the Christian must not live in this world as though he really lived elsewhere all the time. But it is a very mistaken thing to give the impression, as both seem to do, that the Christian must live in this world as though he were to live here for ever .... To be sure, both Robinson and Cox believe in an afterlife. . . . But in neither of the two authors is the affirmation of immortality, or bette11 of the specifically Christian resurrection from the dead, a truly operative religious or theological principle [p. 169].

If we wish to find a serious discussion of death which takes full account of modern thought while holding firmly to the Christian tradition, we could not do better than refer to the writings of either of the two Jesuit Fathers, Karl Rahner and Ladislaus Boros; [1] while writing in a largely existentialist idiom, both are free from the secularist and anti-intellectualist assumptions which are common to most of the writers to whom I have referred. It is interesting to note that, in Macquarrie's opinion, Rahner is the outstanding example of the group of Roman Catholic thinkers to whom the leadership of theology has passed from its former Protestant holders. [2]

In spite of their concern with man, it is precisely in their view of man that the chief defect of the secularizing theologians lies. Not only, as we have seen, have they nothing of importance to say about the universal human experience of death but, surprisingly enough, they find themselves committed, as regards the basic nature of man, to a view which is to all intents and purposes pre-Christian and Hellenic. This appears most clearly in Cox, who interprets the biblical doctrine of creation as meaning that the created universe is not only not divine but is also unconnected with God and totally autonomous. This view, although it rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of real species, sees man as self-sufficient and altogether shut off from any real contact with his Creator; he has to " go it alone." It is sharply contrasted with the classical Catholic doctrine, for which man, while having a relatively stable and determinate nature, is altogether unfinished and open to God, from whom, without his own human nature in any way suppressed but rather enhanced, liberated and transformed, he can receive ever fresh influxes of creative power. The secularizers constantly appeal to the famous sentence of Bonhoeffer, " We must live in the world as if God did not exist," [3] and in doing this they virtually deny that a mature and authentically living Christian ought to take any conscious account whatever of God. And this means that prayer, as anything other thau a psychological technique for self-improvement, is a flight from reality and a sheer waste of time that might

[1] *K.* Rahner, *Theological Investigations,* I, pp. ff; IV, pp. 347 ff; L. Boros, *The Moment of Truth, passim.*

[2] J. Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology,* p. ix.

[3] On the various possible (and impossible) ways in which this sentence has been understood, cf. Richard, pp. 117 ff.

be better spent in other ways. For the secularizing theologian, no less than for the Marxist, religion is an opiate, and a harmful opiate at that. If any argument were needed for the thesis that the ultimate source of the secularized theology is to be found in that fallen being who deceives the very elect by changing himself into an angel of light, it could be found in the fact that one of its most immediate effects is to stop people from praying. It leaves man nothing but his own power with which to fight the colossal forces of evil which are rampant in the world today. A popular hymn of an earlier epoch informed us that Satan trembles when he sees the weakest Christian on his knees. Today *nous avons change tout cela;* and the enemy of mankind, when he contemplates the spirituality of the utterly mature secularized Christian, will be delivered from at least that cause for trepidation.

In thus casting overboard the whole tradition of Christian spirituality throughout the ages the secularizing theologians are only being true to their general attitude. One of their most marked characteristics is the cavalier way in which they brush aside the accumulated wisdom of the ages. Thus, for example, Dr. Ronald Gregor Smith rejects the whole tradition of natural theology from Augustine and Aquinas to William Temple and A. E. Taylor with the brief remark, unsupported by any argument, "If you begin from this world you cannot go beyond it. Thus the logical consequence of an enquiry into the nature of the cosmos, or of the moral demand, is pantheism, or humanism, or nihilism." [4] Similarly Dr. John Knox, whose sympathy with the secularizers is evident even if he is not professedly one of them, writes in regard to Christology: "We can have the humanity without the pre-existence and we can have the pre-existence without the humanity. There is absolutely no way of having both." [5] In other words, Athanasius, the Cappadocian Fathers, Cyril, Augustine and Aquinas were dunderheads who could not see a logical contradiction when it stared them in the face. The widespread dismissal of both the prayer and the thought of the Christian past as mistaken and irrelevant to the present day is, I suggest, a mark not of width of mind or depth of intellect but rather of narrowness and provincialism. As Mr. Harry Blamires once remarked, there is no reason whatever why I should

[4] R. Gregor Smith, *Sermlar Christianity,* p. 59.
[5] John Knox, *The Humanity and the Divinity of Christ,* p. 106.

attribute special value to a person's views simply because he is alive. When we are tempted to adhere to certain views simply because they are contemporary, it is well to remember that a hundred years hence they will be as uncontemporary as the thought of the eighteen-sixties is today. Secularizers might well meditate on the tombstone inscription:

Es quod fui; eris quod sum.

To return to Fr. Richard's book. Dr. Marty is, I think, going rather too far when he writes in his foreword: "Father Richard makes clear that he agrees in the main with the secularizing theologians." What is clear is that he felt a great deal of sympathy with them and was anxious to go with them as far as he could. Nevertheless, the criticisms which he offers of their conclusions, while worded with great restraint and respect, amount time after time to a virtual refutation. We have seen his criticism of Robinson and Cox for their insufficient attention to the fact of death. (Incidentally, the same strange omission characterises the volume of essays edited by William Nicholls under the title *Conflicting Images of Man,* which was concerned to rebut the position of the extreme secularizers.) Again, he denies that Robinson has contributed anything to the solution of the transcendence problem: "It is Robinson himself who raises the metaphysical question of transcendence and immanence, not some challenger. And he raises it only to walk away from it" (p. 36). He avows himself to be in disagreement with van Buren on the basic issue of epistemology (p. 109). He rejects Dewart's judgment of "Hellenism" (p. 171). He asserts that "van Buren's ultimately apodictic exclusion of God ... is neither critically justified in itself, nor actually representative of either Bonhoeffer's own thought or" of those who have tried to develop it. . . . "Van Buren has not really contributed in our judgment to the positive development of the Bonhoeffer Secularized Christianity" (pp. 119, In fact, on page after page we find Richard, after expressing great respect for a thinker's astuteness in raising a problem, drastically criticising his attempt at solving it. While again expressing regret that the desired sequel to Richard's book will never be written, we must register our gratitude for the clarity with which he has raised the questions which still remain to be answered by the secularizers.

One final point. It is the constant contention of the secularizers

that Christianity in anything like its traditional form is quite unacceptable, and indeed unintelligible, to mature twentieth-century men. This is simply not true. Admittedly the great majority of people, whether mature or immature, show little interest in the Christian religion. There are, nevertheless, vast numbers of highly intelligent, sincere and mature men and women, thoroughly acquainted with the modern world and its problems, who, so far from finding traditional Christianity unintelligible or irrelevant, find in it the one key to the problems of human existence. These are not ecclesiastical obscurantists. They see plainly that, in the words of Pope John, the substance of the ancient doctrine, contained in the deposit of faith, is one thing and its formulation quite another. They do not profess to give an answer to all the questions. While gladly recognising all that is true and good in the secularized civilisation in which they live, they exercise a balanced and critical judgment on it and refuse to capitulate to its basic assumptions. And by prayer and the living of the Church's sacramental life they become the channels through which the grace of God, with its healing and illuminating power, can cure the ills of a perplexed and anxious world. There is every reason to suppose after reading his book that Fr. Robert Richards was one of them.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

God-Talk. By JoHN MAcQuARRIE. New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. *255.* $6.00.

In an age of advanced technology there are signs that man has suddenly lost interest in the world he has learned to manipulate and has given over all his attention to the mystery of himself, of human life and existence. A significant focal point of this anthropological concern is the phenomenon of language, man's "linguisticality." This provides, for instance, a point of convergence for two contemporary schools of philosophical thought that were quite disparate in origin, namely, existentialism and a movement that began as logical positivism but has since become linguistic philosophy. For theology, one of the consequences has been a representation of the problem of God in critical and largely empirical terms, amounting to a tendency to reexamine with some distrust the traditional modes of speech and of discourse about the divine. Surely this is by no means unfamiliar to: theology, but the problematic is being urged with new earnestness and within the perspective of a new self-understanding of man that deepens the problem somewhat and challenges the hitherto available solutions.

It is language then that offers the precise " locus " of the problem of God as pursued by John MacQuarrie in this characteristically lucid study; "God-talk," as an Anglo-Saxon equivalent for theology, makes the terms of the investigation abundantly clear. Any raising of the linguistic problem in theology is going to suggest rather quickly the prior and deeper epistemological problem. It has become somewhat of a commonplace in Catholic theological circles to acknowledge that the underlying difficulty in the Modernist crisis lay here and that Catholic theology lacked at the time the resources to deal with the crisis on its own level; and indeed what advancements have been made up to the present are still far from yielding any satisfying solution to the problem. At times, this present book calls for some sort of underlying gnoseology, but the absence of any explicit theory of knowledge is not in the present case, I think, necessarily a defect. However closely allied, the

epistemological question is a distinct and far vaster one and tends to obscure the purely linguistic problems; thus there is a decided advantage in a study conducted, somewhat empirically, within the narrow confines of language itself. Also, Dr. MacQuarrie's concern is not mere linguistics but language as it is grounded in and emerges from thinking; the area of attention is the nebulous one of the relationship, at once derivative and reciprocal, of language to understanding and conception. MacQuarrie dismisses as inadequate attempts by linguistic philosophers to rehabilitate religious language by considering it as purely emotive and subjective in kind, meaningful under the assumption that it does not purport to assert anything about reality. On the contrary, he insists on searching for the objective cognitive content of such speech; in a word, since such speech is at once unique and varied in kind, he is seeking the basic logic underlying all "God-talk."

MacQuarrie is clearly convinced that the theologian cannot seek to fathom the mysterious role of the believer's language without attending to the highly specialized studies done within linguistic or analytic philosophy. This represents the first of the influences on his own theological stance-a lesser one in the final analysis than the Heiddegerian, but a formative one all the same. His own Scottish background happily provides him with a rich acquaintanceship with such qualified thinkers as Ian Ramsey, Antony Flew, Karl Popper, P. F. Strawson, and a host of others. All of this provides him with a starting point and a methodology that is and remains dialectical and strongly empirical; the constant touchstone is the need for verification-a healthy sign if the search after God is to be, in James Collins's words, "something more than a domestic clarification of intended meaning on the part of theistic believers." [1] Still, the empiricism that functions here is not the narrow sort relied upon by Bertrand Russell and the early Wittgenstein; indeed some of MacQuarrie's most telling criticisms are directed against the " picture theory " of knowledge associated with logical positivism and the " physicalism " of Carnap. It is an empiricism, however, that refuses any a priori theory of language and begins instead with a phenomenological analysis of what living language reveals about itself.

[1] James Collins, " God and Contemporary Philosophy," *God: Commonweal Papers, l,* Feb. 10, 1967, p. 534.

Among the yields of such an analysis is the indispensable distinction between *discourse* and *language:* the first is living talk, akin to the Greek " logos," within a personal, communal, and situational context, whereas the second can be mere words and sentences. In the latter, the content of the word is a mere signification *(Bedeutung);* in the former, it acquires genuine meaning *(Sinn).* The consequence of this is the ability to view words not as mere labels but as vehicles of communication (p. 90), less a set of signs than the language of being. Considerably less intelligible are MacQuarrie's "obiter dicta" that seemingly would allow for the possibility of a computer being constructed that would be capable of spontaneous activity and of ultimately being endowed with consciousness and personhood. His statement that, "For all we know, if we could get ' inside ' the machine, so to speak, we might find that it does think, in the sense of having conscious processes similar to ours " reaching a point at which " conscious thought ' emerges' " and "a critical stage at which spontaneity and freedom come along" (p. 96), is a rare instance in which MacQuarrie's empiricism goes undisciplined. Of more consequence is the observation of Viscount Samuel that occasions such remarks, namely, that the true meaning of most words cannot be satisfactorily explained merely in terms of overt behavior.

It is, however, in the perspective of the contrast offered by Barth and Bultmann in their respective treatments of theological language that MacQuarrie sets his initial problematic. (He does not, apart from occasional references, pursue the debate into the attempted development of the " new hermeneutic " among the so-called post-Bultmannians.) Barth's revelational theology allows only for an initiative of God towards man, so much so that communication is possible only on the assumption of God's " requisitioning" human language; Bultmann builds rather from the side of human language itself, discerning within such speech an inner possibility for expansion to the point where it can articulate the divine. In both cases a breakdown results in the lack of any satisfactory explanation as to how the leap to the other side is effected. How is God enabled to use human words to embody a revelation that transcends the human without violating the structure of such speech? Or vice versa, how can biblical speech, which when purged of its mythological *vetement* is found to be expressive of man's self-understanding, suddenly gain the power to express the

Transcendent? Even granting that such a transition be somehow possible, there remains in either case the further question as to how the content of such language could be open to objective and public verification. Barth wants to deny to speech any capacity whatsoever to express the divine and then to fall back upon a " secret " language whose meaning is in no way yielded up in the objective signification of the words, which serve merely as a non-cognitive vehicle. Bultmann wishes to stay with words whose meaning is clear and significative for man, because they are directly expressive of his own existence, and yet ultimately to allow these very expressions to give non-mythological utterance to what is transcendent to that existence. Dr. MacQuarrie contends that what is missing in the thought of both theologians is the "bridge," and he feels some affinity with Tillich in his search for what is lacking.

For Tillich, the symbolic character of all religious talk enables it to " point to " the " symbolizandum." But obviously there has to be some fundament that makes this possible, and this is what Tillich uncovers in his doctrine of " participation." Man as maker of symbols participates in what he is enabled to symbolise; in this way he finds access to structures which are so fundamental that they cannot be objectified, but they can at least be brought to expression in the language of symbol. But participation, no matter how conceived, demands something in common, and Tillich is finally brought by the logic of this to acknowledge that it is "being" that provides a basis on which to talk about God. Bultmannian existential language has now found an anchor in a language of being; God is symbolised as the Ground of our being because he is Being Itself. But this is verging close to a traditional metaphysics, and at this point MacQuarrie feels compelled to part company with Tillich, whose contribution turns out to be only " a slender and shaky bridge " (p. 52) after all. It is his notion of being with its "many obscurities" (p. 54) that dictates MacQuarrie's sceptical reaction; he is unwilling to grant that the assertion, " God is Being Itself," is not also symbolic in kind. Others, of course, have discerned this same ambiguity in Tillich's thinking: he has been interpreted as everything from a metaphysician to a mere humanist like Martin Buber. I must confess, however, to finding some ambiguity in MacQuarrie's statement that Being (in Tillich's assertion, "God is Being Itself") does not "stand for some being or for something that is" (p. 51) and at

the same time his rejection, as a nominalist prejudice, of a reading which sees it as referring " to some highly abstract universal, at which we arrive by abstracting every determinate characteristic from the sum total of whatever is ... " (p. 52).

MacQuarrie, then, is forced to reach for his own solution, electing to build from the side of language and seeking to locate there the precise factor that will endow human language with the capacity to express what belongs to the realm of God. The linguistic expressions themselves function in a variety of ways: 1) the mythological, myth being the primordial language at the base of all religious experience; 2) the eventual conscious recognition that the myth refers to something beyond itself, and this marks the refinement of myth into symbol; 3) the culminating literal expressions of analogy, each instance of which " corrects " itself with a correlative and negating analogy, the use of analogy thus being paradoxical. But we are still left with the basic dilemma: how does the original mythological language gain the power to designate the transcendent in the first place? MacQuarrie is clearly sceptical, with Ronald Hepburn, of any "self-authenticating encounter" (p. 110), which, while it might inaugurate the entire religious response, would necessarily remain non-objective. Indeed, he has shown very incisively that the Bultmannian position wherein God-talk " is talk about a real Other that stands over against the self in encounter" leads ultimately to an impasse, because " in order to prove that there is an encounter with a real Other, one would need somehow to get behind the experience, or find a second route to that which we know in the experience, and this is not possible " (p. 244).

Dr. MacQuarrie does, of course, believe himself to have escaped the bind, and the way out is found in the later speculations of Martin Heidegger,[2] i.e., in Heidegger after his acknowledged "reversal," when the transition was made from a pure philosophy of *existenz* in *Sein und Zeit* to a genuine ontology in the writings after 1937,[3] from *Dasein's* projection of Being to Being's mittence

• The English speaking world is indebted to John MacQuarrie for his translation with Edward Robinson of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit, (Being and Time,* New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

[3] Heidegger's first mention of his "reversal" was in his *Letter on Humanism* in 1947; he has explained, however, tha1l "the matter thought in the term 'reversal' was already at work in my thinking ten years prior to 1947"; cf. the Preface by

of itself to *Dasein,* what William Richardson has called the transition from phenomenology to thought. Bultmann expressly did not follow Heidegger into the later phase of his thought; Henrich Ott did but in a far less radical way than MacQuarrie does here. MacQuarrie's Christian use of Heidegger focuses on perhaps two points: 1) Heidegger's "ontological difference" between Being *(Sein)* and being *(Seiendes)* can be interpreted as a philosophic rendering of the difference between God and creation; because Being only " comes to pass " *within* the beings, there is for man (as *Dasein)* the possibility of a reach to God; 2) *Geschichte,* or the mittence of *Sein* to *Dasein* who, as openness merely " lets be " and allows Being to unconceal itself *(a-letheia),* offers obvious parallels to the Christian mystery of revelation; man encounters Being as holy and is thereby called to authentic existence, i. e., to the committment of faith.

Such a Christian use of Heidegger might be objected to on the basis of the latter's own insistence that *Sein,* while transcending the ontic order, is totally immanent to the world; something clearly attested to in Heidegger's phrase that Being is nothing apart from the beings. Nonetheless, this does not alter the fact that the thought itself, *mutatis mutandis,* may be *logically* open to such a theological adaptation. MacQuarrie does not infer that Heidegger is a crypto-theist, though he quotes approvingly Laszlo Versenyi's observation on the "quasi-biblical tone of Heidegger's pronouncements" (p. 166). Yet, the question needs to be asked: *is* the Being known phenomenologically by Heidegger so necessarily immanent to the world that any identification of it with God would involve a denial of the Christian understanding of God's utter transcendence? William Richardson has suggested an alternate Christian approach vis a vis Heidegger, one in which " the voice of a radically transcendent God comes not out of Being-a phenomenologist's Being-but breaks into this kingdom from without." [4] But this puts the thought itself at a further distance from Christian theology. For one thing, it opens the way to seeing its deepest affinities as lying with idealism; an interpretation in which Being is " a pre-

Heidegger to William Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenommology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofi, 1963), p. xvi.

[4] William J. Richardson S. J., "Heidgger and God-and Professor Jonas" *Thought* (Spring, 1965), p. 40.

jacent transcendental area of knowledge prior to the categories," i. e., what a Thomist understands by " esse intentionale " or being-as-it-is-our-intellect.[5] The strong point of MacQuarrie's insight is that it locates Heidegger in the camp of realism, which presumably is more congenial to the Gospel. Even more to the point, it offers some approach to the mystery of the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of God; for Being *is* God and yet " comes to pass " for man (i.e., is present to him) only *within* the ontic order of beings, as *in* the world though not *of* the world. This in-existence of God in a world of which He does not form part, seen in Heideggerian categories of the Being-process, is somewhat suggestive of St. Thomas's classic position on the universality and unconditioned freedom of God's prime motivation of all created activity, including the human will's eliciting of its own inviolably free act. The parallel, of course, would take considerable and cautious working out, but the inherent difficulties do not appear insurmountable. One might well ask if St. Thomas's thought does not safeguard better the freedom and autonomy of the human person, but it would be less debatable that Heidegger has disclosed the fact and meaning of man's historicity, i.e., his temporality as something more than mere successiveness, in a way that the system of Thomas is not capable of, in and by itself. This introduces another objection to the Christianization of Heidegger, one that Hans Jonas has already called attention to,[6] namely, its climate of fatalism. *Dasein* is "fate-laden" *(geschicklich),* thinking's lot is cast by Being which is not at *Dasein's* disposal, the mittences of Being as constituting the epochs of thought do bear undertones of determinism. The implication for Christianity is of a continual reoccurrence of revelation without any reference to once-and-for-all acts of God in the historical past. There seems no reason, however, why such

[5] C£. Ralph Powell, 0. P.: ., Has Heidegger Destroyed Metaphysics"; this paper is as yet unpublished, but similar observations by the same author can be found in *Truth or Absolute Nothing* (River Forest, Ill.: The Aquinas Library, 1952); cf. also John Deely, "Heidegger in the Tradition of Christian Philosophy," *The Thomist* (April, 1967). What is meant here is man's primitive concept of *ens* as the *primum cognitum;* a primordial intuition of undifferentiated being that occurs at the very dawn of intelligence, prior to the positive abstractive activity (formal and total) that later yields the " first intentions " and " second intentions " of Scholasticism.

[6] Quoted by Richardson in " Heidegger and God-and Professor Jonas " cited above, p. 19 ff.

Geschichte cannot be recast in terms of God's free initiative and sovereignty as Lord of history.

All in all, however, MacQuarrie's use of Heidegger manages to be very convincing; it readily brings to mind, as a historical parallel, what St. Thomas did with the pagan thought of Aristotle.

Yet what is ultimately being sought from Heidegger is some clue as to the basic logic of God-talk. One step towards the clue's discovery lies in the realization that the later thought of Heidegger is no repudiation of his earlier existentialism; the transition from the language of existence to that of being is a subtle one in which the latter affords the ground for the former. God-talk is thus existential-ontological; the mythological language of the Bible is open to interpretation in the existential terms of self-understanding (demythologization), but this is possible only because of a real encounter with the Holy wherein Being has the initiative in the disclosure of itself. It is this latter ontological event that summons man to authentic self-understanding. It is in this way that MacQuarrie thinks it possible to break out of the subjective circle; as myth and symbol are anchored in a language of existence, so the latter is grounded in turn in a language of being.

But this is still only a partial solution to the problem of theological discourse. It is only the mittence of *Sein* into *des Seiende* (things in being, rather than the process whereby they are) that enables the particular beings to appear, i.e., to be present to *Dasein* as the place where the Being-process occurs; this MacQuarrie takes from Heidegger. From his own Christian faith, and with some indebtedness to Barth, he understands its religious analogue to be concretized in the Incarnation. Here is where God as Being and man as the privileged existent are brought together, and here is furnished the " likeness " that will allow analogy to function as the instrument of theological discourse. It is analogy, then, that is the key to God-talk, and such discourse" is by no means empty and does indeed relate to the reality of divine Being" (p.

But is analogy so conceived, i. e., as confined within an ontology such as Heidegger offers, broad enough in scope to do service for the Christian faith? Its role here seems largely linguistic in kind, a matter of an open texture to words that is frequently inventive, always dialectical, and with the corrective supplied by paradox. While admitting of extension to something other than what is designated directly, it is not expressive of any structure within

finite reality itself that opens out onto God. What is lacking is any sort of metaphysical substratum to analogy. MacQuarrie would apparently believe Heidegger to have been successful in his avowed attempt to " overcome " metaphysics, and while taking exception to some of the teachings of the linguistic philosophers, he seemingly applauds their stand against the reinstatement of metaphysics (pp. 109-110); elsewhere he appears to relegate metaphysics to the same status in theology as myth (p. 142). This would seem to be so not only in the case of classical metaphysics but even for the metaphysics of process philosophy, e. g., that developed by Charles Hartshorne, of which John Cobb and Schubert Ogden have made theological use.[7]

This perhaps explains why Dr. MacQuarrie, apart from a few references to St. Thomas, bypasses the traditional Catholic solution to the problem he raises. This explanation postulates (or rather establishes-philosophically in one way and theologically in quite another) a radical continuity between the creaturely and transcendent orders, so that God, breaking into history on his own initiative, is enabled to utter his revelatory Word in such fashion that this Word finds genuine though inadequate expression in 1) events of history, and 2) the human speech of prophets interpretative of such mystery-events. (Obviously, the believing response to this is not possible through any empirical investigation of the " facts " but only through the anointing of the Holy Spirit.) The linchpin is " analogia entis," and it remains alien to l\1acQuarrie's religious thinking, partly because of those who set the problematic for him and partly because of what appears to be a commitment of his own (however qualified by his intellectualism and a hard core of empiricism that he shares with other British writers, such as Ian Ramsey) to Barthian Revelation Theology.

It is true that MacQuarrie does make room for some sort of natural theology, "not to establish a religious faith but to support one" (p. 234), and for the usual reason: "because God has set his stamp on his own creation, we must hold that there is a sufficient measure of resemblance to make analogical discourse possible " (pp. 222-223) . However, the resemblance apparently breaks

[7] Cf. John Cobb Jr., *A Christian Natural Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965) and Schubert Ogden, *The Reality of God* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

through only in the Incarnation, and even then its religious intelligibility can only be grasped in the analogy available within an existential ontology. MacQuarrie is surely allowing much more to our faith-understanding than does Barth with his "analogia gratiae," or perhaps even Emil Brunner. What he does not allow, however, even where God's revelatory act in Christ is concerned, is any touchstone in man's natural experience (in spontaneous consciousness rather than in thematic reflection) of the analogical character of finite being that is open-ended towards Uncreated Being. MacQuarrie would not be inclined to say-as does one of the Fathers-that the Incarnate Logos walks in his own footprints already discernible in creation.

Analogy in an existentialist climate is something quite different. Since the encounter with Being is by way of *Geschichte,* and since the very structure of *Dasein* is temporality, human experience has no other horizons. Any assertions about God as timeless are out of the question or at least meaningless. Analogy means conceiving God as taking time within himself; otherwise he is indistinguishable from nothingness. Only a philosophy of being rather than one of existence can liberate the concept of pure actuality that is *toto caelo* removed from that of nothingness, one that can express the perfection of process without its intrinsic limit of succession, even as pure becoming. That God "extends himself in time ... needs time to create, to act, to make history," that he" goes into the risk of creation and history " (p. *225),* can be understood in two quite distinct senses, according as time is viewed as a necessary constitutive element of the creaturely or of the non-creaturely. The difference is not slight where an understanding of the genuine otherness of God is concerned, and it lies in the employment of analogy allowable respectively to a Thomist and to a Heideggerian.

Perhaps what provokes these somewhat critical remarks can be seen, at bottom, as nothing more than the tension inherent in the Protestant and Catholic approach to the task of theology. If so, Dr. MacQuarrie offers us a most balanced presentation of the Protestant stance, in the perspective of a true theological effort and with emphasis on the cognitive dimension to faith-knowledge. This is welcome and cannot but be helpful; it is a far cry from the reductionism we have been led to expect from the immanentists and the secularizers. His articulation of Protestant Christianity in the concepts supplied by Heidegger offers much hope for a new

rapprochement. Such a hope rests on two convictions: **1)** first, that the existential-ontology represented by so profoundly original a thinker as Heidegger is a call to traditional metaphysics to surpass its present limitations; second, that newness of understanding in man's quest for the truth cannot break continuity with the achievements of the past. The general truthfulness of these attitudes is intensified within the context of Christianity. Whether Christian existentialism can be implanted in the soil of traditional theological thought, whether it can find there its roots and be nourished, this is yet to be seen. But there are reasons for believing with Fergus Kerr that the basic interpretative concepts with which the faith must work will be deepened and resituated, that " nothing is being abandoned, nothing is being destroyed [while] everything is being deepened and enlarged." [8]

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[8] Fergus Kerr, 0. P., "Heidegger Among the Theologians," *New Blackfriars* (April, 1965), p. 403.

BOOK REVIEWS

Toward An American Theology. By HERBERT W. RrcHARDSON. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. Pp. $3.95.

It is rather refreshing these days to be told by a theologian that the notion of a personal God is not necessarily opposed to a concern for science, to the individual and his freedom or to a new metaphysics. In his first essay on the sociotechnic age Dr. Richardson rejects most of the assumptions of the theologians of the secular age or of the death of God. In his opinion they are asking antiquated or false questions. They are criticizing a notion of God which is itself a modern invention or they are confusing problems of principle with problems of practice. Atheism is the sign of a period of transition and crisis not only in religion but in the whole culture. If we have already entered a sociotechnic age in which the methodology of science is fully accepted and the organization of society is governed by technology, the positive task is not to criticize the past but to discover God as the unity of that particular, highly differentiated type of social structure. It seems, therefore, that Dr. Richardson is not accepting secularization as the inevitable outcome of modern history but, on the contrary, is advocating the integration and the sanctification of sociotechnics in and by Christian tradition. This vocation is particularly given to American theology because it understands the sociotechnic culture and has in its tradition the right answers to the new needs (Chapter 5). One of the answers is the emphasis on faith as the power of reconciliation going beyond the relativism of fragmented perspectives and striving toward unity. To discover this, it is necessary to distinguish five forms of secularism: gnosticism, rationalism, naturalism, skepticism, relativism, correlated to five kinds of faith: *crucificiens, quaerens, perficiens, formans, reconcilians?* This categorizing seems a little artificial in view of the complexity of history and the unity of biblical faith. What is more interesting is the effort to go beyond relativism. The scientific culture is highly differentiated and specialized and is in danger of advocating a variety of disciplines and points of view unrelated and purely relativistic. The gain of modern culture is the differentiation of many approaches to reality, but it may become a sheer multiplicity without unity. The author's intent is to keep the differentiation but to find a principle of unity. He is therefore using as instruments of the faith *reconcilians* what he calls a metacritical knowledge and a philosophy of unity. The metacritical point of view is a philosophy which does not deny the critical approach of science but uses it without by-passing or absolutizing it. In Dr. Richardson's view this metacriticism requires a metaphysic of unity. Relativism

cannot be overcome by a universal sociology of knowledge but by an implicit or explicit ontology. Plotinus and Thomas Aquinas *(ens et unum convertuntur)* appear on the horizon. But Dr. Richardson begs to differ with them. His unity is not formal and is somehow above being. (The difference with Thomas Aquinas is not clear.) There are three hypostases of unity: wholeness, individuality and relationality allowing a plurality of category-systems but leading or implying, finally, a unity of unities. The actual argument for the existence of God is henological. Dr. Richardson's argument is less developed than Henry Dumery's phenomenological approach to the same problem. He does not seem aware of the difficulty that henology presents for the doctrine of creation.

The last part of the book is devoted to the outline of an American theology. Three questions are raised concerning the reasons of creation, incarnation and the sending of the Holy Spirit. The author stresses the meaning of the puritan and theocratic Sabbath as the sanctification of the world, the glory of God in the Incarnation instead of the need for redemption in man and the real indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The main points are not sin and redemption but the glorification of God and the sanctification of man. One wonders if it is with tongue in cheek that Dr. Richardson is finding a Christological, trinitarian, Mariological and spiritual theology typically American? But he wants his theology to be also ecumenical,- and it is. Every ecumenical Christian can find large areas of agreement in such a theology, even if one disagrees with its interpretation of Chalcedon, with the way it conceptualizes *(perichoresis)* the union, assuredly real, between the Holy Spirit and man as one person in two persons (man and Christ) or with items of its metaphysic. One could wish also that many assertions would be more developed. It is far from self-evident that henology is leading to a trinitarian theology. The philosophical and theological arguments seem sometimes more stated than demonstrated. But it is encouraging to see a theologian interested in doctrinal theology and thinking that " a man, even a Christian man, should not affirm one thing and deny the things it presupposes and implies."

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Eucharistic Theology. By JosEPH M. PowERS, S. J. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. $4.95.

New Approaches to the Eucharist. By CoLMAN O'NEILL, 0. P. New York: Alba House, 1967. Pp. U6. *$3.95.*

" To inform " is the principal aim set for himself by Father Joseph Powers. He informs us easily and with unostentatious scholarship of the Church's understanding of the Eucharistic mystery. His tools for this are survey and summary, and these are applied to the existing body of literature on his subject. His work is thus a handbook which correlates the conclusions of specialists in their own areas.

After outlining the history of Eucharistic theology and ritual celebration, he summarizes the eucharistic faith recorded in Scripture; he analyzes a more refined theological reflection on the biblical data; and then he summarizes the contemporary theological approaches to reinterpreting the dogma of real presence and transubstantiation. He concludes his work by synthesizing the principal elements raised in his survey.

The basic contrast which emerges from the preliminary historical survey is between the patristic view of the Eucharist as the image and source of the unity of the Christian community and the medieval view of the Eucharist as the property of priests and something to be gazed on rather than eaten. Our own times are recapturing the validity of the patristic concept.

" The Biblical Faith " is the second chapter's burden and is presented with remarkable clarity and simplicity. In this chapter (and in the whole book) one wishes that the author had provided more documentation of his sources, but one suspects that the lack is due to financial considerations. Inclusion of sources and cross-references would have enhanced the value of the present study immensely. As it stands, the work is thoroughly sound and scholarly but is lacking in critical apparatus.

The transformation of Israelite cult and history emerges clearly. Just as Jesus is the transformation in his own person of the total meaning and significance of Israel, so in his actions does he transform the meaning, power, and significance of the institutions of Israel, and, in our context, of the paschal celebration. This transformation is the biblical root of the contemporary explanation of the Eucharistic mystery in terms of transignification and transfinalization.

Turning to theological elaborations of the Church's faith, the author informs us of the new concepts of grace and of sign. Grace is no longer viewed as the adornment of the soul, but as the whole history of God's action accomplished in Christ and continued in the sacramental action of the Church. Sign is no longer restricted to a gnoseological pointer. Rather, it is now seen as incarnating and, in a sense, being what it signifies. Human bodiliness is thus the sign of personal reality, and sacraments are

signs which embody the grace they signify. Meaning is not something "extrinsically assigned" to things and situations; rather, it is the basic mutual relationship between man and the world in which he exists. Things, or the world, apart from the human mind, have only a capacity for meaning. The capacity is actualized only when man or a person functions in the world. Consequently, the *full* "meaning" of the Eucharist will be seen to depend on the active response of the believer and on his openness to the communication of the person of God through the signs of bread and wine. It also depends on a total change of the " reality " of the bread and wine, so that their meaning is genuinely and radically affected (they are not simply affected by some " extrinsically assigned " new meaning) .

In considering the one Body of Jesus which is involved in Eucharistic theology, the author is forced to review some developments in the theology of Christ. He contrasts the older conception of hypostatic union with the newer hypostatic unity. This is aimed at transcending the impression of duality in the personality of Christ and at stressing the one human subjectivity of Christ. He notes also the suggestions of Father Schoonenberg relative to the body of the Risen Jesus. These suggestions attempt a middle course between the mere psychological evoking of Jesus by faith (Bultmannian) and the reduction of the glorified Jesus to a tangible or perceptible reality which would be the " object " of our knowledge. The Scriptural accounts will not support such " objectifying " on our part. Thus, according to Schoonenberg, the Risen Jesus is objective but not objectifiable.

The fourth and final chapter of the book is a survey of the contemporary Eucharistic debate, especially as proposed by the Dutch theologians. The author digests the major writings from 1955 through 1966, and he appends to the chapter a selected bibliography of current eucharistic studies arranged chronologically. He reports the major theses of F. Leenhardt (1955), of Jean de Baciocchi (1955), and of A. Vanneste {1956). All of these deal with the problem of substance and transubstantiation. The 1958 ecumenical conference at Chevetogne also discussed the eucharistic problems, and the contents of these papers are summarized. Such topics as the language of dogmatic definitions and its relation to philosophical schools {J. Dupont and G. Ghysens), substance and transubstantiation {Leenhardt and de Baciocchi), and the memorial character of the Eucharist {Thurian) were discussed. H. Verbeek {1959), utilizing more contemporary thought-forms, presented the Eucharist in terms of noumenon (the gift of Christ to the Church) and phenomenon (the eucharistic species). 1960 saw the beginning of criticism and reaction within Catholic circles. 0. Schelfhout replied to Vanneste's 1956 article, and J. Lescrauwaet replied to Thurian. In 1962, S. Trooster surveyed all the development, both Protestant and Catholic, in Eucharistic theology.

Edward Schillebeeckx, commenting on Trooster's paper, stressed that transubstantiation takes place within the symbolic reality of the sacra-

mental act. He thus recalled the discussion to the realm of the sacramental or sign. Further, Schilleebeeckx wrote a major article in two parts in which he studied carefully Trent's decree on the Eucharist, its canons on real presence and transubstantiation, the present state of the question, and then offered his own views on the problems. Powers is in rather obvious admiration of the contributions of Schillebeeckx to the discussion and and particularly of the soundness of his theological method. (It is interesting to note that in almost every significant point the author's own conclusions are in clear agreement with the writings of Schillebeeckx.)

After reviewing the literature of our contemporary controversy, Powers launches his own summary of Eucharistic theology. This incorporates the best thought available, and provides an excellent and brief presentation of very knotty areas. For example, his pithy remarks on transignification are clear: " Transignification basically means the divine (not human!) act in which the substance (that is, the meaning and power) of a religious sign is transformed in the personal revelation of God." Eucharistic transignification demands the true and, real conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus. But transubstantiation takes place only in a transignification, a transfinalization (pp. 171-173).

Colman O'Neill raises several questions in his approach to "new approaches." Whereas Powers sets out to inform, O'Neill intends to correct new approaches by applying the doctrine of *Mysterium Fidei* as a measure. He is more concerned to point out dangers and inadequacies than he is to give a balanced exposition. One suspects that this volume is more a juxtaposition of essays than an organically constructed unity. For a volume directed to the general public, *$3.95* is a high price to pay for 105 pages of text and no index.

The "new approaches" elicit from O'Neill chapters on the relation of word and sacrament; communitary and private celebration of Mass; the presence of Christ; transubstantiation; and a phenomenology of the Eucharist.

Sacraments are a part of the ministry of the word. They transcend this ministry because they are a fuller and more integrally human meeting with Christ than the word is. The chapter on " Communitary and Private Celebration" is directed principally against Karl Rahner's 1949 essay on the many Masses and the one sacrifice of Christ, and his restated *1955* argument on the many Masses as the many sacrifices of Christ. The value of private celebration is dependent on the fact that every Mass is essentially the action and prayer of Christ. It is, even if no other participants be present, a pleading for grace by Christ the Priest made present to the Church in the liturgical celebration. The problem of Real Presence reduces to explaining how Christ can be present in a symbol and how, simultaneously, there is more than a. merely symbolic presence.

O'Neill's thought on transubstantiation and phenomenology of the

Eucharist is unsatisfactory. The treatment of transubstantiation is restricted and dated, particularly in view of the work done by Schillebeeckx and summarized in Powers's study. O'Neill restricts his confrontation with phenomenological approaches to "radical phenomenology," and in particular to the work of Luchesius Smits. This is, in effect, to ignore the writings of such major theologians as Rahner, Schillebeeckx, and Schoonenberg, among others. Rather than reducing all phenomenological approaches to radical phenomenology (espoused by very few Christians), the critic of such approaches ought to address himself to representatives of more commonly held positions.

Were O'Neill's book read by itself, it might well be judged a significant contribution. But when it is read in conjunction and comparison with Powers's work, it suffers by the connection. The good points made by O'Neill are made better by Powers, and the limitations of O'Neill's work are made more evident by the breadth of Powers's. Nevertheless, all in all, we are fortunate in having two good Eucharistic studies available to us.

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The Evolving World and Theology. Edited by JoHANNES METZ. Concilium, Vol. 26. New York: Paulist Press, 1967.

Any brief essay inevitably raises more questions than it answers. A dozen such essays can compound that provocative effect. This is the case with *The Evolving World and Theology.* Taking evolution as their theme, an international group of Christian scholars examines the interaction between theology and the world of growing scientific knowledge and power. With one or two exceptions, they succeed in offering precise, carefully-nuanced statements of the question. It is a tribute to the caliber of the authors that their ten-page essays generally quicken the reader's enthusiasm for asking questions rather than quench that enthusiasm.

The preface places theology squarely in the evolving world, not in any safe, neutral zone all to itself but immersed in the ambiguity and partial, hard-won clarities of human inquiry. Metz finds a healthy tension between theology and science that expresses the creaturely situation of Faith in this world.

Werner Broker, a young priest-scientist, sketches without detail evolutionary phenomena on the biological, cosmic and historical levels. (The English text has several examples of the inappropriate use of scientific terms.) The mood of the article is not pessimistic, but Broker doubts that

human freedom has increased in the course of human history. Z. Alszeghy, a recognized authority in this area, surveys the statements on evolution by the *magisterium* since 1860, pointing out that even the most recent have continued to allow freedom. He argnes, therefore, that the theological arguments thus far adduced to show that evolution is irreconcilable with faith are evidently unconvincing. Karl Rahner, in a similar approach to the question of monogenism, concludes that there is no reason for the *magisterium* to intervene in the matter of polygenism in order to protect the doctrine of original sin.

Harvey Cox examines the future with three sets of optics: apocalyptical, teleological and prophetic. He urges Christian theologians to purge and purify their eschatology so as to offer *universal* hope to mankind. The general secretariat of *Concilium* uses the same device to examine death as a) the destruction of the present order, b) a continuation of this life into the next, and c) something completely new and mysterious to man. Andreas van Melsen, a Dutch philosopher of science, examines a natural law that changes because nature changes and because man changes. He draws an analogy between natural sciences and ethics. In science, experimentation adds both to the content and to the method of science. In ethics, new experiences contribute in some way to the first principles of natural law. H. Dolch, a philosopher-theologian, proposes that, in an evolutive world, the real sin is a refusal to cooperate in God's dynamic plan.

The two most positive and realistic chapters are those of Emmanuel Mesthene and Eric Mascall. Mesthene, in particular, offers a balanced analysis of the impact of technology upon man and the aims a Christian must have in a technological world.

In the bibliographical survey section, Ben van Onna, a doctoral candidate at the University of Tiibingen, considers both the older and the more recent theories to explain paradise and original sin. He then offers as his own the suggestion that the garden of Eden is not yet an historically realized situation for man. Rather, man, coming to be as an evolving creature, had in evolution itself the promise of grace. In the beginning, then, paradise was the promise of a final state that did not yet exist.

Corresponding to the physicists' goal of a unified conception of physical reality, theologian Norbert Schiffers points out, is the Church's aim to be the sign of unity and hope for all mankind. Abundant cause is given in this volume to motivate the evolving Christian to keep pace with his evolving Faith and so make his mark in an evolving world.

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The Grace of God, the Response of Man. By **J. P.** MAcKEY. Albany, New York: Magi Books, Inc., 1967. Pp. 19!il. $3.95.

James P. Mackey, a professor of dogmatic theology in Ireland, is known to many from his frequent articles, especially in the *Irish Theological Quarterly,* and from his recent book *The Modern Theology of Tradition.* His present work, *The Grace of God, the Response of Man,* which appeared in Ireland in 1966 under the title *Life and Grace,* treats, in a series of connected essays, four central theological themes: Grace, Morality, Tradition, the Fall. The first two are concerned with Christianity's relation to the individual; the last two deal with the communal element in Christianity. A rather lengthy introduction and concluding remarks help give the book a greater unity.

The essays are not concerned primarily with replacing traditional formulas but with giving a new and more profound understanding of truths frequently presented in an unsatisfactory way. Modern insights into the human condition, the contributions of personalism and existentialism, an evolutionary world view-all of these are incorporated into Father Mackey's wide ranging essays. They hint at an extensive knowledge of contemporary thought: literary, philosophical and theological.

A consideration of one of these studies may give a better indication of the nature of the work. The chapter entitled " Grace " begins with a criticism of the view of grace as a tripartite structure superimposed on a "three storied" human nature; substance, powers, and activity. The conception seems to make grace foreign to man, with no meaning for his nature. He agrees with Rahner's insistence on an intimate connection of nature and grace but warns about compromising the uniqueness and gratuity of God's gift. Mackey considers that Rahner's own view has not sufficiently avoided the superstructure way of thinking. He turns instead to Emil Brunner's stress on the theology of the Word of God and describes grace in terms of an interpersonal relation of God and man. Grace, then, is God's self-revelation to man in word and action. On man's part it is the knowledge or faith that results from this self-revelation, the love and hope that grow from this knowledge.

No one can doubt the value of using the most perfect human reality-interpersonal union in knowledge and love-as the analogue of man's graceful relation to God, but this reviewer has several reservations about Fr. Mackey's essay. Can we define sanctifying grace in terms of the activity of faith, hope, and charity? Does not this activity presuppose some reality in us that makes this loving encounter-dialogue possible? A second reservation: without attempting a defense of the manuals and monographs on grace, I find Fr. Mackey's strictures a bit severe. Is their description of grace quite the dessicated skeleton that he proposes? For instance, he criticizes Van Noort and others for giving an inadequate

definition-grace is a quality of the soul-although this statement is not intended as a definition but only as a generic notion, as one author explicitly notes (Van Noort, *De Gratia Christi,* p. 145). He chides these authors for affirming a position with no attempt to explain *how* the statement is verified; yet in the application of his own views to the grace of Baptism and the Eucharist he attempts no solution of the problems advanced but merely indicates the need for further theological research. The uneven and sometimes difficult style provides another obstacle. The sentence structure can be quite involved: a ninety-eight word sentence can be difficult to follow.

A provocative book in the questions that it raises and the insights that it provides; and in another sense, in the questions that it glosses over and the positions which it oversimplifies.

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Hamann's *Socratic Memorabilia.* A Translation and Commentary by JAMES C. O'FLAHERTY. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. Pp. $7.50.

Some of the more outstanding individuals influenced by Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), religious thinker of the Age of Goethe, were Herder, Goethe, F. H. Jacobi, Jean Paul Richter, Soren Kierkegaard, and Ernst JUnger. In terms of literary movements his influence has been noted in cultural development from the *Sturm und Drang,* through the romanticism and religious revival of the eighteenth century, to expressionism, existentialism, and dialectical theology of the twentieth. Yet it was not until the middle of this century that a German scholar, Josef Nadler, published a definitive edition of Hamann's collected works. In the last three decades, however, an increasing number of journal articles and other types of studies suggests a trend that might be considered the beginning of a " Hamann renaissance." The present volume attempts to fill a genuine need, since no translation of the entire *Socratic Memorabilia* has previously appeared in English or in any other language.

Professor O'Flaherty has divided, his study into two parts. Part I is an analysis of the concept of form in the *Socratic Memorabilia;* Part II consists of an annotated translation of the work with the German text on facing pages. The author approaches the essay through the study of literary form, because he believes that content and form are so fused in Hamann's writings that such a method will be useful to shed light in a

special way on the work and to provide the basis for an analysis of its philosophical and theological implications. The genesis of the essay is 1raced to Hamann's conversion to an evangelical version of Christianity in London in 1758 and to the later unsuccessful attempt of two friends to persuade him to renounce his new faith. One of the friends was to become the celebrated philosopher Emmanuel Kant; the other was an ardent rationalist, Johann Christoph Berens. The *Socratic Memorabilia* was an answer to the friendly remonstrations of Kant and Berens and a clear rejection of the Enlightenment version of Socrates as a rationalistic hero. Hamann presents the sage as a forerunner of Christ and to some extent of the Christian believer. Professor O'Flaherty points out that Hamann, finding it impossible to speak directly of the Christian message in an age of rationalism, attempts to interpret Socrates within the Christian frame of reference. One of the most original features of the discussion of form is an analysis of the intrinsic dramatic qualities of Hamann's little work in Chapter 4 of Part I. Here as elsewhere the translator and commentator reveals considerable breadth and depth of scholarship.

The analysis of Part I and the translator's notes contribute immeasurably to a reader's total comprehension of the content of the *Memorabilia.* The appendix contains a tabulation of typological themes, biblical references, and a graphic representation of the essential unity of the work. An extensive bibliography is followed by a very serviceable index. In the present volume Professor O'Flaherty makes accessible to a wide circle of readers a classic of the Age of Goethe which should merit the interest of philosophers as well as students of literature. In this reviewer's opinion, he has made through careful and rewarding scholarship a distinguished contribution to the current revival of interest in Hamann interpretation.

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Ethique Sociale. Tome II Philosophic Du Droit. By ARTHER UTZ. Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1967. Pp. 868. Price 85 Suisse Francs.

Writing philosophy has always been a luxury in which only a few could indulge. Yet it is in the nature and to the advantage of all men to conduct their lives and affairs by some ultimate reasons of their existence. Social and political relaitions are an example point. It is only from the vantage of some values which transcend the immediate private interest that we can-as inevitably we have to-harmonize our personal interests

in view of a common good, and it is only by reference to a superior norm that we can reasonably submit ourselves to a particular law which other persons make for us or the sovereign for the people. But while the concept of a superior reason in life is something that we generally live by, the concept of an unchangeable ultimate reason of things is not so generally accepted. Contemporary morals and jurisprudence, in particular, show many signs of a positivistic and even pragmatic orientation. Although, even today, few jurists would favor a law completely neutral ethically, the tendency is, nonetheless, to separate law from morality, mainly, perhaps, because of the latter's frequent association with a particular religion. But whatever position we take in regard to the relationship between law and morals, there always remains the question of what precisely constitutes the normative nature of the law itself. Politics and sociology may attempt but only philosophy can give an adequate answer. This is the theme and the thesis of Fr. Utz's present treatise.

Philosophy of Right, which, in translation, is the subtitle of this work, is the second of five volumes intended to cover the main areas of social philosophy under a general heading of *Ethique Sociale.* Volume One, on the principles of social doctrine, appeared in 1960; three other volumes to be devoted to the social, economic and political orders respectively, are in preparation. All are originally in German, but the French translation has so far been very successful. The author, a Dominican and professor at the University of Fribourg, has been engaged in social studies for many years. His published works include four volumes of *Bibliographie Der Sozialethik,* an international bibliography which is a very useful source of information for students of moral and social philosophy. This explains why *Ethique Sociale* also devotes half of its space to bibliographical notes.

It is the author's assumption and his point of departure that contemporary jurisprudence is overwhelmingly positivistic. Modern social and political thought has been characterized by gradual departure from a philosophical, or more precisely, from a metaphysical view of life. "Positivism has taken over the leadership from metaphysics." But positivism based exclusively on experimental and sociological data cannot solve the problems arising in the actual human conditions, such, for example, as the conflict between the individual conscience and an existing unjust law, or between social demands of the underprivileged and an existing law protecting private property. Only a philosophy of law based on man's reason and a vertical subordination of every law to the eternal law of God, as the ultimate norm, can become the foundation of an authentic science of law as a norm. However, a return to a pure philosophy of law is not what we actually need or what Fr. Utz has in mind. He separates himself from those who maintain the pure theory of values "even if they adhere to the natural law theory." Law is a concrete norm whose efficacy depends not only on its metaphysical foundation but also on authority, sanction and other historico-sociologi-

cal conditions. But it is only by a return to a metaphysical foundation of jurisprudence that a " compromise " may be found between the axiological absolutes and a sociologically conditioned existence.

St. Thomas's treatise on Law underlies most of Fr. Utz's thinking, but the references are not excessive. One would occasionally expect in a work like this a more substantial treatment of such controversial issues as capital punishment and even of St. Thomas's view on it. A number of other similar topics are passed over rather too summarily. The reader may also be surprised that, unlike many current and especially Catholic publications on social questions, *Ethique Sociale* makes no explicit use of or reference to the issues raised by the Second Vatican Council or even by previously published encyclicals. The reason for such absence, at least in the present -volume, lies in the nature of the work itself which is primarily a philosophical treatise addressed to a specific audience on a specific subject. It would be wrong, nonetheless, to conclude that *Philosophy of Right* is irrelevant to practical problems. Our political constitutions, judicial procedures and our concept of law and obedience to it have always been greatly influenced by theoretical thinking. A critical analysis of such thinking as well as the thinking itself must, therefore, go on.

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Belief and Unbelief, a Philosophy of Self-knowledge. By MICHAEL NOVAK. New York: New American Library, Mentor-Omega Books, 1967. Pp.

This paperback reprint of the book published in 1965 will give college students an opportunity to be introduced to a renewed, if somewhat summarized, version of a theme of classical Catholic thinking. The main purpose of the book is to present an argument for the existence of God. Belief here means belief in the existence of God, not faith in revelation, so the discussion is instituted between philosophical theism and atheism rather than between faith and unbelief. The author thinks, and rightly so in my opinion, that the question of philosophical theism, and metaphysical enquiry in general, cannot be ignored if there is to be any kind of reasonable conversation between a theistic and an atheistic philosopher. The relationship between philosophy, belief and faith is left undertermined, as is the integration between existential decision and intellectual enquiry, if the existence of God is not simply known but believed. Nevertheless, the book's basic argument is the dynamism of understanding. " The choice of belief springs from confidence in the centrality of the phenomena of aware-

ness, the drive to understand, insight, and critical reflection in this universe." This starting point might answer some of the difficulties which have accumulated concerning the problem of the existence of God.

A philosophy of self-knowledge begins with a more human, personal, critical point of view than the existence or the order of the physical universe, as they are taken in naive realism. But in order to be valid and convincing the argument of the capacity and dynamism of the intellect supposes a whole metaphysics of knowledge and reality. Here the metaphysical depth of the argument is always presupposed but never completely elaborated. Michael Novak refers the reader to the movement initiated by Joseph Marechal and followed by Bernard Lonergan which tries to integrate the Kantian critique of knowledge into a metaphysic of being. In popularizing this very important trend of Catholic philosophy, Michael Novak makes excellent remarks about the silly presuppositions, the false images or representations of God which in believers or unbelievers hinder the authentic search, in truth and spirit, for God. But Michael Novak's essay, like so many books published today in American theology and philosophy, brings to mind the wise prediction of Bernard Lonergan: "What will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait." (Bernard Lonergan, *Collection,* p. 267).

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Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S. J. Edited by F. E. CROWE, S. J. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 315. $8.50.

Father Bernard Lonergan, S. J. occupies a unique position in contemporary Catholic thought. Admired and accepted as the architect of a new intellectual era by a small but intensely loyal following, rejected by a larger group on the charge of being an Aristotelian, an anti-Aristotelian, a Kantian, a Hegelian, a Thomist, and even a Nestorian, he is respectfully ignored by the multitude, including professional philosophers and theologians, who find his technical examples baffling, his theoretical perspective labyrinthine, and his literary style disconcerting. The present collection of articles and addresses written over a period of twenty-two years illustrate the surprising breadth of his interest and technical competence and indirectly reveal the development of his thought.

Collection includes articles on formal logic, the foundations of geometry,

comtemporary scientific thought, metaphysics, semantics, marriage, education, and various theological problems. Underlying this heterogeneity is a unifying thread, the central importance of a reflective understanding of what it is to know. His earliest article, "The Form of Inference," sounds the theme that is later elaborated and transformed. Lonergan uses the forms of inference found in Aristotelian logic as empirical data from which he may infer the basic pattern of human thought, hypothetical inference based on connotation. Though his later studies transcended this one-sided and rather simplistic use of logic, his search for invariant patterns or cognitional structures grew into an explanation of knowing based on the distinction and interrelation of experience, understanding, and judgment.

Two articles, written since *Insight,* reveal further developments in Lonergan's reflective analysis and relate his thought more closely to contemporary philosophical concerns. " Metaphysics as Horizon " incorporates an idea stemming from the phenomenologists' "I-world" polarity. A horizon, the maximum field of vision from a determinate standpoint, grounds the possibility of meaningful questions, a grounding that is revealed more by performance than by content. The title " Dimensions of Meaning " suggests a rapprochement with contemporary analytic philosophy, but this suggestion, unfortunately, lies outside Lonergan's intentional horizon. What the article does treat is the mediating role of meaning in cultural evolution, a topic of intense interest to biblical theologians.

Lonergan's theological articles, chronologically arranged, reflect his growing concern with the problem of the evolution of theological understanding. Here his reflective analysis of cognitional structures leads to an emphasis of *metlwd,* a term whose meaning grows in depth and complexity as Lonergan's later thought develops. With a proper theological method one can interrelate different theological epochs and their characteristic emphases, uncover the inner dynamism of dogmatic development, and work more effectively and self-consciously towards a new non-static theological synthesis.

Lonergan, the reflective recluse, lacks the popular acclaim of more topical theologians. Yet he is grappling with the most difficult and overarching theological problems and doing so in a more methodic and integrated way than any other contemporary theologian, with the possible exception of Karl Rahner. He is surely one of the seminal Catholic thinkers of our era. The present Collection of essays, supplemented by Crowe's introduction, constitutes the best and most readable introduction to the sometimes frustrating, often irritating, but ever enlightening thing that is the thought of Bernard Lonergan.

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Leo XIII and the New Scholasticism. By JOSEPH WATZLAWIK, S. V. D. Cebu City: The University of San Carlos, 1966. Pp. 238.

This study, the first of a special series of monographs published by the Graduate School of this Philippine university, proposed to give answers to three questions: I) what is Neo-Scholasticism, 2) is it really a Neo-Scholasticism or a mere revival of medieval Scholasticism, 3) did Leo XIII favor the revival of Scholasticism in general or did he desire the revival of Thomism in the strict sense?

The author understands Neo-Scholasticism to be the adaptation of the principles of medieval Scholasticism to modern problems and conditions. What are being renewed are the timeless contributions of Scholasticism, stripped of their medieval condition, a "Neo-Scholasticism to indicate that it is an adaptation to modern intellectual needs and conditions." This is what Leo XIII so vigorously promoted by force of his personal talent and the influence of his office as Supreme Pontiff.

In seven chapters an account is given of the misunderstandings regarding Scholasticism old and new, of the causes of the decline of Scholasticism and its modern revival, the nature of Neo-Scholasticism, and finally in two chapters the role of Leo XIII. It is the author's contention that the Pontiff was approving and fostering Scholasticism in the broad sense, with particular emphasis on St. Thomas.

There can be no doubt that Leo XIII and his successors have placed St. Thomas at the head of a pure Scholasticism and have been convinced of St. Thomas's perennial value for providing elements of adaptation and solution to the problems of every age. St. Thomas is indeed constantly singled out as the safest and most complete of the Scholastics, but certainly this is not in the sense that his paramount contribution is relative to students or initiates in philosophy. This latter point, so briefly and rapidly stated, is the weakest part of this study.

The title of this monograph is somewhat misleading. Most of the work deals with the history of the rise of Neo-Scholasticism in the manner of the familiar histories of philosophy. Leo XIII played a very important role in this revival; however, this study devotes its major attention to the movement itself.

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1'he Seventh Solitude: Metaphysical Homelessness in Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. By RALPH HARPER. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Paperback Edition, 1967. Pp. 153. $1.95.

This is a paperback edition of a book first published in 1965. But in the present format it has enough merit tq be considered anew, both from the point of view of the philosophical content and from the modest cost which now would make this volume available for use in a philosophy class.

Dr. Harper's contribution to philosophical discussions of nihilism is a meditative consideration of several features of nihilism, for example, facing the absoluteness of nothingness, the choice to be a loner, the destruction of God, and the difficulties of forming a philosophy of love from this context. Out of the context of these absolutes of solitude, the " dead ends of nihilism," the author hopes to point to a few exists. I don't know if he succeeds.

Philosophically speaking, the only " exit " that appears from this study is a nostalgia for a metaphysical home in which earth, man, and justice were ıı unity. But can we justify a metaphysics only on this basis? How is it possible to break out of isolation back into community? Neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche succeeded. And it was up to existentialism and phenomenology in our century to put man back into his communal environment. Dr. Harper appends to his book an essay on Augustine and Proust to draw a sharp contrast between a passion for God and' a passion for the earth. These are the two paths open to us (and I agree). But it is difficult to see how they follow from the nihilism of the thinkers represented in this volume. The author contends that this is possible because we are the images of God. A retreat from community to solitude will still lead to a recognition of this fact. From the recognition of God's footsteps in us a path back to the love of earth and a passion for God can be found. This is the Augustinian thesis that truth is within us, that the proper search for truth is introspection. As true as this may be, it remains a difficulty in seeing how Nietzsche's words and life could possibly be interpreted in this way. Kierkegaard too. For, though the latter did in fact find God, he was never able to move back into a " passion " for the world.

Stylistically speaking, the author fails to point to a " few exits " as well. Not that his writing style is bad. It is not. But there are so many quotations from diverse authors, even in one sentence, that the thought patterns are broken up.

Amazingly enough, these negative aspects of the book serve a positive purpose. And in this purpose the author does succeed. The total effect of reading this volume is one of arresting our attention. Insights leap out at the reader, and he is forced to put the book down and 'think. And although I do not feel any valid " exits " are revealed out of the nihilistic

strain of thought, nevertheless a number of paths are suggested which stimulate our own thinking on these all-important tenets. For this reason Dr. Harper's book would function best as a class-study volume from which student views could be evoked.

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