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THE TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD AND THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF BEING

I

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS who accept metaphysics as an authentic noumenal science and who do not restrict it to the merely phenomenal as Kant did, have been much concerned with the question of the explicitation of the nature and method of metaphysics.

The extraordinary progress made by the natural sciences has served to awaken philosophers to a much keener realization of the place of method in scientific inquiry of all kinds, as well as of a new awareness of the intimate relationship obtaining between a science and the method according to which it develops and evolves.

Yet, whatever the reason, the facts are there for all to see; the contemporary metaphysician is genuinely concerned with the method and nature of his own science. He is resolutely endeavoring to explain as concretely as possible what that method is. He very badly wants a profounder understanding of what the metaphysician does when he metaphysicizes, how

he does it, and how his procedure differs from the manner of inquiry of any other type of scientist.

Numbered among these is a group of highly distinguished philosophers, who, despite individual differences which mainly concern points of emphasis, employ a philosophical method which they term " transcendental." This group includes such eminent philosophers as Karl Rahner, J. B. Lonergan, J. B. Lotz, Emerich Coreth, and Andre Marc, to mention those who are perhaps better known.[1] All of these classify themselves in a rather general way as followers of St. Thomas Aquinas,[2] and in a yet more specific way locate themselves within the philosophical movement initiated by Joseph Marechal.[3]

The term, " transcendental method," which is used by these philosophers to describe the metaphysical method they employ, has been borrowed from Kant.[4] As they use the phrase it refers to the transcendental reflection employed by the intellect by which it comes to an explicit knowledge of its own nature.[5]

[1] The views of these philosophers are developed especially in the following works: K. Rahner, *Geist in Welt.* Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin, 2. Auf!. (Miinchen, 1957); J. B. Lonergan, *Insight.* A Study of Human Understanding, 2nd edition (London, 1958); J. B. Lotz, *Das D1·teil und das Sein.* Eine Grundlegung der Metaphysik (Pullacher Philos. Forshungen II) (Pullach bei Miinchcn, 1957); E. Coreth, *Metaphysik.* Eine Methodish-Systematische Grundlegung (Innsbruck, 1961); A. Marc, *La dialectique de ['affirmation.* Essai de metaphysique reflexive (Brussel-Paris, 1952).

[2] K. Rahner has this to say in the foreword of the second edition of his *Geist in Welt:* (Though the original edition appeared in 1939, the foreword to the 2nd edition was written in 1957.) "Wenn Pierre Rousselot und Joseph Marechal vor aHem angefiirt werden, so soli damit betont sein, dass diese arbeit sich dem Geist iluer Thomas interpretation vorziiglich verplichtet fiilt." p. 9. For E. Coreth's view cf. his *Metaphysilc,* p. 12; and for J. B. Lonergan's view cf. his article, "Metaphysics as Horizon," *Gregorianum,* XLIV, 1963, p. 318.

[3] Marechal develops his theory of the transcendental method of metaphysics in the fifth Cahier of his monumental study: *Le Point de Depart de la Metaphysique* (Bruxelles, 1949).

[4] Coreth states: " Die Reflexion auf vorgiingige Bedingungen der Moglichkeit eines Erkenntnisvollzugs heisst seit Kant transzendentale Methode: 'Ich nenne aile Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegenstiinden, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnishart von Gegenstiinden, insofern diese a priori moglich sein soli, beschaftigt'." (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* B 25), *Metaphysik,* p. 69.

[5] K. Rahner has this remark concerning his own position: "... the transcendental reflection upon the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, i. e., upon the

The purpose of this present study **will** be twofold: **1) to** inquire after the manner in which the transcendental method explains the origin and development of the science of metaphysics, i. e., the psychogenesis of being, and to offer a reasonably thorough critique of the transcendental method. Owing to the complexity of the question, our attention will be restricted almost entirely to but two contemporary exponents of the transcendental method, namely, Frs. Karl Rahner and Emerich Coreth. Finally, of these two, Coreth's views will receive the greater share of our attention.

The Position of Karl Rahner

Through his notion of transcendental reflection Rahner wishes to underline the strictly immaterial nature of the subject of metaphysics, common being, which, as common, is not found in the singular world of existents but which transcends all of the limitations of those objects empirically given to the intellect through the mediation of the senses.[6] By such a reflection the intellect can, according to Rahner, return fully to itself, and thus, transcending space and time, communicate interiorly with itself as spirit.

By its act of self-reflection, then, the intellect is freed from the conditions of the empirical " now," and the possibilities of the evolution of a transcendingly real science are revealed to it. In short, by reflecting upon itself in act, the intellect discovers the unlimited horizon of being, and with this dis-

natura intellectus, as St. Thomas expresses it, and of which we have been treating above, is precisely, according to our way of looking at it, what St. Thomas, in the place cited, calls the *supra seipsum refiecti* of the intellect." " Truth in Aquinas," *Continuum,* II, 1, 1964, p. 70.

[6] " Damit is auch die grundlegende Anweisung daflir gegeben, wie fiir Thomas Metaphysik vom Menschen betrieben werden kann. Sie ist weder im vulgiiren Sinn " realistisch " oder " inductiv ," wei! fiir ihre Moglichkeit das lumen intellectus agentis entscheident ist; sie besteht anderseits, wen dieses lumen die apriorische und nur formale Bedingung der Gegenstiindlichkeit der Welt ist, nicht in einer Schau eines metaphysischen Gegenstandes, etwa des Seins als solchen, sondern in der *transzendentalen Refiexion,* auf was 1n der Erkenntnis der Welt, in der Bejahung der physica mitbejaht wirt." *K.* Rahner, *Geist in Welt,* 2 Auf!., pp. 397-8.

covery the possibility of the science of metaphysics IS first grasped. [7]

It was Kant who first initiated the " transcendental reflection," but, we are told, because he did not carry his reflection beyond the finite knowing subject to its natural term, being as such, he failed to reach the unlimited horizon of metaphysics. His failure to carry the reflection to term forced him to forfeit the possibility of grounding metaphysics as a science.[8]

The Position of Emerich Coreth

Emerich Coreth also numbers himself among the contemporary philosophers following the lead of According to Coreth, the irreversible and absolute starting point for the critical establishing of the unlimited horizon of metaphysics is *the question.*[9] An elementary foreknowledge *(Grundwissen,*

[7] " Since the time of Kant reflection on the previous conditions of the possibility of knowledge had been called 'transcendental' reflection or the transcendental method in metaphysics. Unfortunately Kant stopped with the finite subject and therefore never reached an absolute horizon of knowledge and being. He remained forever enclosed within the boundaries of the finite. Therefore metaphysics remained for him impossible. Metaphysics is only possible if, going against and beyond Kant, we can show that our previous *a priori* knowledge is a knowledge of being as being within the unconditioned horizon of being. To prove this is the goal of the Marechal-Rahnerian philosophy." Kenneth Baker, S. J., "Rahner: The Transcendental Method," *Crmtinuum,* II, 1, 1964, p. *56.*

[8] " Erst von Kant stammt der Name und der methodische Einsatz transzentendtalen Denkens, das den empirischen Erkenntnisvollzug aus seinen apriorischen Bedingungen begreifen will. Doch geht Kant nur ziiruch auf das endliche Subject, ohne dieses noch zu iibersteigen. Er kann daher das Object nur bezogen auf die Relativitat des endlichen Subjects verstehen und keinen absoluten Geltungshorizont der Erkenntnis erreichen. Damit verschliesst sich ihm die Moglichkeit der Metaphysik. Nur wenn sich Gegen Kant and iiber Kant hinaus-zeigen liisst, class das apriorische Urwissen ein metaphysisches Wissen urn das Sein ist and den unbedingten Horizont des Seins iiberhaupt-eroffnet, kann die metaphysik kritisch and methodisch begrundet werden." E. Coreth, *Metaphysik: Eine Methodisch-systematische Grundlegung"* (Innsbruck: Tyroiia-Verlag, 1961), p. 71.

[9] " Der Anfang ist die Frage. Es ist ein Anfang, der jeden anderen, als moglich angenommenen Anfang iiberhalt; denn jeder Anfang muss erst befragt werden, ob er als Anfang moglich und berechtigt ist. Die Frage selbst aber ist uniiberholbar und voraussetzungslos." *Op. cit.,* p. 78. In establishing the question as the ground of a critical metaphysics Coreth differs from Marechal, Lotz, Marc and others who, as he says, begin their metaphysical analysis with judgment. *Ibid.,* note 11.

Vorwissen) must precede every question. I cannot question, Coreth says, unless I know something, however imperfectly. My question reveals to me that my knowledge is imperfect, and it indicates at the same time that further knowledge is possible; it reveals, therefore, that what I question is knowable.

Of course, one can, Coreth allows, question one's very act of questioning, but this only underlines the fact that the question is meaningfuU° Further, I note that my every question is an inquiry after being, which I already know in a confused, i. e., unthematic way. Since, however, I question after being, I realize that I do not know being in all its fullness. Metaphysics, then, is the science which flows from my thematic understanding *first* of the possibility, and *second* of the necessity of questioning or seeking after being. Hence, seeking after being becomes known to me as the very condition of self-fulfillment. **It** is the thematically conscious awareness of the nature of this primordial quest that sets the metaphysician apart from and above all other seekers.[11]

For Coreth, all other starting points of metaphysics presuppose the question. The metaphysician's horizon of being *(Seinshorizont)* is opened to him through the mediation of the question, and only the question, for every other starting point is subject to questioning.[12] The beginning of metaphysics is had

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] - Wenn ich etwa frage nach dern Sein, diese Frage aber nach den Bedingungen ihrer Moglichkeit befrage, so ergibt sich, dass ich nach dern Sein nur fragen kann, wenn das Sein fragbar und fraglich ist d. h. wenn ich urn das Sein schon weiss (sonst konnte ich noch gar nicht danach fragen), zugleich aber urn das Sein noch nicht voll und erschopfend weiss (sonst kiinnte ich nicht rnehr danach fragen). Wenn sich aber das Sein-als Bedingung der Moglichkeit des Fragens nach dern Sein-als fragbar und fraglich erweist, so folgt daraus deduktiv nicht nur die Moglichkeit, sondern die Notwendigkeit, nach dern Sein zu fragen." *Op. cit.*, pp. 83-4.

[12] - Als Anfang aber erweist sich die Frage nach dern Anfang selbst, die sich jedoch reflecktiert zur Frage nach der Frage and so den weiteren Fortgang vermittelt. Dieser offenbart das Sein als Bedingung der Frage; denn alles Fragen ist ein Fragen nach dern Sein, das wir irnrner schon wissen und doch irnrncr neu erfragen rniissen, olme es jernals in begriefendern '¥issen einholen zu konnen." *Op. cit.*, p. 95. Cf. also, p. 78.

with the very question as to its beginning.[13] This question is unquestionable and presuppositionless,[14] for, should an attempt be made to question it, I find that I am only reinforcing both the possibility as well as the necessity of questioning the beginning of metaphysics.[15] Hence it is, Coreth concludes, that the question is critically the most radical starting point at all possible.[16]

Although Heidegger had already raised anew "the question of Being" *(Seinsfrage)* in his principle work, *Sein und Zeit,*[11] Coreth traces his own present position regarding the systematic investigation of the question as the methodological starting point of metaphysics to the thought of Karl Rahner.[18] Yet, at the same time, Coreth believes that his own approach goes beyond Rahner's position on two counts: 1) While Rahner situates the beginning of the metaphysical encounter with the questioning of being *(Die Frage nach dem Sein),* he situates it with the questioning after the beginning itself *(Die Frage nach dem Anfang),* in order that the very question after Being might first be mediated. fl) Rahner did not derive the method of metaphysics from the questioning after the beginning itself *(aus der Anfangsfrage),* while he himself does.[19]

Moreover, Coreth distinguishes his own understanding of the transcendental method from the positions taken by Marechal,

[13] " Die Frage nach dem Anfang gibt aber sich selbst die Antwort, indem sie am Anfang nach dem Anfang fragt: Der Anfang ist die Frage nach dam Anfang." *Op. cit.,* p. 96.

[14] " Diese Frage ist fraglos und voraussetzungslos." *Ibid.*

[15] " Wird sie in Frage gestellt oder nach Voraussetzungen befragt, so ist dies eine neue Frage nach dem Anfang, die von neuem die Mi:iglichkeit und Notwendigkeit des Fragens nach dem Anfang setzt. Nach dem Anfang fragen kann und muss ich jedenfalls. So erweist sich diese Frage als ein Erstes, das nicht weiter in Frage gestellt werden kann und keines weiteren Aus\veises seiner Mi:iglichkeit und Notwendigkeit bedarf." *Ibid.*

[16] " Die Frage ist der kritisch radikalste Anfang, der uberhaupt mi:iglich ist." *Ibid.*

[17] The first chapter of *Sein und Zeit* is entitled: "Notwendigkeit, Struktur und Vorrang der Seinsfrage" ("The Necessity, Structure and Priority of the Being-question.")

[18] *Op. cit.,* p. 99, note # 7.

[19] *Ibid.*

Lotz, Marc and others,[20] who begin their methodical inquiry not with the question itself but rather with the act of judging. According to Coreth, the judgment is subject to mediation by other singular judgments, and hence it cannot constitute a presuppositionless starting point for metaphysics.[21]

A Preliminary Critique

Having examined the" transcendental method" as it is proposed and defended by two philosophers following in the Marechalian tradition, we are now faced with the somewhat formidable task of attempting to evaluate the transcendental method as an authentic metaphysical method.

We will recall that the " matter " or content of " the transcendental method" or "transcendental reflection" (the two expressions are synonymous), is, according to Coreth, the "question." What the transcendental reflection claims to accomplish is the thematization of the meaning of Being unthematically present in the very first acts of judging and of questioning. The unlimited horizon of Being *(Sein, esse)* is for Coreth virtually contained in any act of knowing, but a thematic or explicitized awareness of its unrestricted nature is necessarily mediated by the transcendental reflection. Thus " the transcendental method " is nothing more or less than the " mediating of the immediate." It is the thematically fully developed demonstration of the metaphysician's knowledge of Being *(Sein).* The transcendental reflection would make clear that the basic structure of Being is already, i.e., immediately, set forth in every complete intellective act as a preliminary condition of the very possibility of our questioning and judging whether or not something is.[22] Thus " the transcendentally grounded insight is a mediated immediateness."[23]

[20] *Op. cit.,* p. 78, note # 11. [21] *Ibid.*

[22] " Die transzendentale Methode ist nichts anderes als die 'Vermittlung der Unmittelbarkeit,' d. h. der thematisch vollzogene Aufweis, dass ein metaphysisches Wissen urn Sein und die Grundstrukturen des Seins immer schon-also unmittelbar-gesetzt ist und als vorgangige Bedingung der Moglichkeit unseres Fragens und Wissens in deren Vollzug eingeht." *Op. cit.,* p. Cf. alsop. 93.

[23] " So ist die transzendental begrundete Einsicht eine Vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit '." *Ibid.*

To the extent that the " transcendental method " rightfully emphasizes the supremely intellective nature of the science of metaphysics, we judge it to be beyond criticism.[24] Yet a lingering doubt remains as to whether the use of the term " method " in this context may not be ambiguous and hence questionable. Does what Coreth describes as the "transcendental method " truly correspond to " method " taken in the strict sense as "a way of proceeding"? Or, perhaps more accurately, is it not possible that he employs the term "method" in a fundamentally ambiguous manner?

That our first knowledge of being is not the being of the metaphysician is surely a point of common agreement. St. Thomas stated this as his position on many occasions.[25] Further, it is agreed that mediation is necessary if we are to arrive at a knowledge of being as being, of that common being which is the subject of metaphysics.[26] It is also clear that one will only embark on this undertaking after he has somewhat confusedly realized that there is something more for him to know. In brief, one's conscious quest after knowledge is the inevitable result of his already knowing something, however imperfectly. The realization of this quest will again somehow be formulated in a " question," so that the metaphysician does indeed begin his metaphysical investigation with a " question."[27]

[24] St. Thomas does not hesitate to underline the intellectual dimension of metaphysics. " Unde et ilia scientia maxime est intellectualis, quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus. . . . Unde restat quod in una commnni scientia huiusmodi tractentur; quae cum maxime intellectualis sit, est aliarum regulatrix." *In Metaphys., Proem.*

[25] Cf. e. g., *In IV Metaphys.,* l. 6, *# 605; Sum. Theol.* I, q. *5,* a. 2; *De Verit.,* q. 1, a. 1, resp.

[26] *In Metaphys., Proem.*

[27] In striving to thematize the grounding of metaphysics one is not really projecting an hypothesis which he will later attempt to verify. Rather, it seems that the presumption must be that metaphysics has in fact already been grounded. What one is attempting to do is to move from the primordial metaphysical performance to a clear unfolding of what " really took place." Hence in this sense a search for the starting point of metaphysics and its method is truly an "historical inquiry." One is really attempting to " explain " what has *already happened.* The metaphysical inquiry takes its beginning from a lived experience.

However, is this not true of all branches and levels of knowledge? Are not all scientists seeking, by reason of their profession as scientists, a more perfect and explicit knowledge of the proper subject matter of their own science? Do they not also proceed by questioning? Does not the question truly mediate the immediate for them also? We agree with Fr. Lonergan that Coreth's metaphysics is a brilliant achievement/ [8] even though we feel constrained to express reservation regarding his method of thematizing being. Nonetheless Coreth has brilliantly outlined the several problems relative to the starting point of metaphysics and has presented his own position with the greatest precision and clarity.

Yet, as regards the method to be employed, we are inclined to question whether he has given us a method which is singularly metaphysical, which is specifically proportioned to the nature of this transcendental science, and hence a method which is truly unique. It is called indeed a transcendental method, for its consists in a transcendental reflection, but why in truth is it " transcendental "? What does the metaphysician do methodologically that no one else does, and that no one else can do? And if it be said that the method of metaphysics is transcendental because it refers to the very horizon of being and serves to thematize our knowledge of that which of itself transcends all categorial limitation, may we not still ask how the transcendental reflection, i.e., the intellect's reflection on the conditions of its own operation, is a reflection wholly peculiar to metaphysics. May we not ask, for example, how the transcendental reflection, as a method of metaphysics, is related to logic? How it might differ from a merely logical inquiry?

It also seems that one would experience difficulty in explaining how metaphysics differs from other real sciences, particularly mathematics, if a thematic grasping of the nature of metaphysics is to be had through the type of a priori reflection which Coreth considers sufficient to uncover the unlimited and

[28] Bernard Lonergan, " Metaphysics as Horizon," *loc. cit.,* pp. 807 & 817.

unrestricted horizon of being. It would appear that for a thematic understanding of the differences obtaining between the methodologies of distinct sciences, one must go beyond the consideration of the point of departure of the sciences and of their proper subject, and also bring into consideration the method employed in developing the proper subject of each science. These notions are all, of course, intimately intertwined, but explicitating one does not necessarily involve an explicitation of the others.

Thus, as we sought to point out in a previous article,[29] St. Thomas indicates that the metaphysician proceeds according to a "rational method." Nor does Aquinas stop here, but he further clarifies the metaphysical method by explaining that the metaphysician, and he alone, is privileged, because of his subject matter, common being, to employ doctrinal logic and to refer it to real being in the very same manner that the logician employs it to refer to beings of reason.[30]

Here we have a statement which goes considerably beyond the plain remark that the transcendental method thematizes the unthematic, for it explains how this occurs and why. By providing these further qualifications, precious in each detail, St. Thomas permits us to grasp specifically how the metaphysician mediates the immediate and to understand how his manner of proceeding is distinct from the procedure of all other "real" scientists. In short, St. Thomas provides us with an anatomy of metaphysical procedure which is considerably more revealing than the assertion that the metaphysician employs the transcendental method, that is, that he reflects on the radical conditions of the possibility of his own knowing.[31]

[29] "Logic and the Method of Metaphysics," *The Thomist,* XXIX, 4, 1965, pp. 341-395.

[30] Cf. *art. cit.,* pp. *356-57.*

[31] It is interesting to note that, despite these delicate precisions given by Aristotle and St. Thomas on the method of metaphysics, Fr. Coreth is still able to remark: "Likewise the question of the method of metaphysics has arisen only in the modern era ... the question was never raised [by Aristotle] about the basic method of metaphysics, that method by which metaphysics, if possible at all, should validate and build itself up in conformity with its own nature. . . . But even

Thus the metaphysician is, according to St. Thomas, perfectly justified in formulating conclusions concerning the proper subject of his own science which are drawn exclusively from an analysis of the various modes of predication. [32]

The importance this remark has for the establishment of the doctrine of the analogy of being alone is sufficient to underline the central place of predication as regards metaphysical methodology, for the modes of predication simply follow the modes of being. [33] This it is possible to proceed to a further understanding of being by carefully attending to the modes of intentional being, i. e., to the modes of predication.

Although the " transcendental method " does bear some significant similarities to the " rational method " St. Thomas speaks of, nonetheless it appears to be overly concerned with the Kantian epistemological problem to be able to serve as an adequate and authentic metaphysical method. [34] The advocates of the transcendental method are clearly striving to bring to completion the task Fr. Joseph Marechal first undertook, namely, to answer Kant on his own grounds and in his own terms. Hence it is understandable that they should lay much emphasis on the grounding of a metaphysics and the establishing of its possibility before committing themselves to its evolution and development. One can also appreciate how the very grounding of metaphysics could possibly come to be identified with the use and application of the metaphysical method itself.

with the great systematizer, Thomas Aquinas, these systems are more of a practical and didactic nature, their aim being to present the subject matter in a meaningful way. They contain no critical methodology; they do not start by explaining and validating a method, nor do they advance by applying it in a strictly critical way." E. Coreth, " The Problem and Method of Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. III, 2 (1963), p. 403.

[32] Cf. the article quoted in note 29, pp. 364 ff.

[33] " Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi," *In III Physic.,* l. 5, # 322.

[34] " . . . the transcendental way of thinking of the modern age is here to stay. Henceforth it is impossible to study metaphysics in an uncritical ' objective ' way, impossible as well as inadvisable to ignore the modern period and to act as if the modern approach to philosophy had never existed." Coreth, *art. cit.,* p. 411.

Let us reemphasize, however, that there still remain striking similarities between the " transcendental " and the " rational " methods. Though he has not developed the point in any detail, Fr. Coreth is keenly aware of the close affinity existing between logic and metaphysics. He grants that this relationship between logic and metaphysics is a question of extreme importance and that it has received far less attention by contemporary philosophers than it rightfully deserves.[35]

Further, Coreth clearly states that the reductive-deductive thought process, which constitutes the very essence of the transcendental method, and through which metaphysics must transcendentally ground and perfect itself, is a logical thought process which occurs in accordance with the forms and laws of logic.[36] Coreth also grants that logic is co-grounded in the actual self-grounding of metaphysics.[37] Here we would disagree, therefore, with Lonergan's contention that various levels of critical evaluation must precede the grounding of metaphysics.[58] We believe that it is through the very grounding of metaphysics itself, and only then, that " Mythic Consciousness " and the counterpositions originating in bias are revealed in their true light and immediately dissipated. Thus we would contend that it is through the mediacy of the metaphysical insight that the knowing subject is first cleared of irrational conviction, and that, consequently, there can be no valid critique of the knowing subject prior to the primordial metaphysical insight which does not effectively beg the question, for no adequate norm would then be available for conducting the critique.

[35] " Damit ist schon der Ansatz zur LOsung eines Problems gegeben, das zwar gewohnlich wenig oder gar nicht beachtet wird, doch von grundsatzlichem Gewicht ist: die Frage nach dem Verhaltnis zwischen Logik und Metaphysik," *Metaphysik,* p. 85.

[36] " Die reduktive deductive Denkbewegung, in der sich die Metaphysik transcendental begrunden und Vollziehen muss, ist ein logisher Denk-process, der in der Formen und nach den Gesetzen der Logik geschieht." *Ibid.*

[37] " Diesem Zirkel ist nur durch die Einsicht zu entgehen, dass im Vollzug der Selbstbegrundung der Metaphysik zugleich auch die Logik-als das formale, in inhaltlichen Denkvollzug implizierte Element,-mitbegrundet wird." *Op. cit.,* p. 86.

[58] Cf. " Metaphysics as Horizon," *loc. cit.,* p. 818.

The foregoing considerations, therefore, indicate a fairly considerable area of agreement of viewpoint between the " transcendental " and " rational " methods of metaphysics. Still, significant differences remain, particularly, it seems to us, regarding the manner in which the science of metaphysics is grounded, and the way in which the method of metaphysics itself is employed. Indeed, the grave charge brought against the "transcendental method" by Gustav Siewerth seems, in the main, justified. [39]

According to Siewerth, Marechal has attempted to proceed from a logical, potential notion of being to a metaphysical, actual one.[4°] Further, the Marechalian transcendental method transforms the knowing subject into the ground of reality, and reality itself into the product of the judgmental affirmation. [41] Lastly, Siewerth maintains that the pure Marechalian concepts are indistinguishable from the capacity or potentiality of the receptive power, and that they have thus lost their analogical structure. They are, he says, more formalized than univocal being itself. [42] This leads him to conclude that "Fichte, Kierkegaard and Karl Barth are thus the travel companions of these nco-scholastic thinkers, brothers and heirs of the same history." [43]

These charges are grave indeed, and they appear to be aimed not at Marechal and Lotz alone but simply at all those endorsing the " transcendental reflexion " as the authentic metaphysical method. This seems borne out by the fact that Coreth expresses basic disagreement with Siewerth's critique " of

[39] Cf. G. Siewerth, *Das Schicksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu Heidegger* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1959), pp.

[40] *Op. cit.,* p.

[41] "Nimmt man diese 'akzidentelle Affektion ' nnd die rein begriffiiche 'apprehensio,' der ' Directe Konzep' von nnr ' allgemeinen Wesenstrnktnren ' an, so ist mnn allerdings gezwnngen, den Weg der ' Snbstanz ' oder der ' 'Virklichkeit' ans dem anffassenden Streben oder dem Subjecktakt zu erzeugen und das Subject zum ' Grunde der Wirklichkeit,' die Realitiit zum ' Produkt der Affirmation ' zu machen. Das aber ist genau die Position des Idealismus ...." *Op. cit.,* p.

[42] *Op. cit.,* p.

•• *Op. cit.,* p. 262.

recent scholasticism since Marechal," [44] as well as by his [Coreth's J reaffirmation that the transcendental method alone is capable of establishing in a critical, objective way the science of metaphysics. [45] A necessary corollary of this method is, Coreth argues, that one begin the metaphysical inquiry by questioning the possibility of a metaphysics and by reflecting upon the a priori of the finite subject. [46]

The Transcendental Method and an A Priori Notion of Being

The transcendental method rests on the sometimes rather hidden premise that there is an a priori notion of being prior to intellect's knowing any particular being as being. It is this very notion of being which makes possible the subsequent singular judgment by which I affirm that " this thing is." On this point Coreth is utterly explicit:

> . . . previous to all empirical knowledge about particular beings there is in me some basic knowledge of being. Whenever I know something, I know that it " is " so. My knowledge refers to something which is. And every time I inquire about something, I ask what it " is " and how it " is." My question refers to something which is. But how could I know that something is, how could I correctly affirm that it is so, if I did not know beforehand the meaning of " is," if I had no knowledge of being and of the meaning of being? And how could I even inquire at all about some existent as to whether it is or what it is, if I did not always previously know what being is and what it means.H

u Cf. " The Problem and Method of Metaphysics," p. 40.>;,

•• *Art. cit.,* p. 411.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 412.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 414. The similarity between Coreth's view and Martin Heidegger's is striking. Heidegger states in his *Introduction to Metaphysics:* "If we regard the question of being as the first question in order of rank, should we ask it without knowing how it stands with being and how being stands in its distinction to the essent? How shall we inquire into, not to say find, the ground for the being of the essent, if we have not adequately considered and understood being itself? . . . Thus it transpires that the question ' Why are there essents rather than nothing? ' compels us to ask the preliminary question: ' How does it stand with being?'" Ralph Manheim, trans., Doubleday Anchor Book, p. 27. In another place Heidegger states with equal insistence: " For the much-vaunted particular essent can only disclose itself as such insofar as we already understand

Yet the being that is known prior to any knowledge of particular things is not, for Coreth, thematically known as unlimited being, i. e., in its full sweep, for this fuller knowledge comes only in the wake of a transcendental reflection and deduction by which the mind becomes expressly aware of the conditions of the possibility of its knowing this particular thing.[48]

Now it must be granted that the intellect does have a kind of knowledge prior to its receiving any intelligibility through the illumination of the phantasm. As an immaterial faculty, intellect is primordially present to itself and thus possesses a truly innate knowledge of itself as existing.[49] However, this knowledge which the soul has of itself is not truly actual knowledge but rather habitual. It is like the habitual knowledge one might have of mathematics, for example, which at a given time one is not using,[50] though there is present a confused awareness that one can make use of it. Consequently, such habitual knowledge is extremely primitive and imperfect and could not under any circumstances provide one with a knowledge of " what being is and what it means," as Coreth would seem to claim.[51] The habitual knowledge of which St.

being in *its* essence." *Op. cit.,* p. 72. In this translation the German *Seiendes* has been rendered " essent " rather than being or a being.

•• Cf. *Metaphysik,* p. 84.

•• "... intellectus noster nihil actu potest intelligere antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat; nee etiam potest habere habitualem notitiam aliorum a se, quae scilicet in ipso non sunt, ante abstractionem praedictam, eo quod species aliorum intelligibilium non sunt ei innatae. Sed essentia sua sibi innata est, ut non earn necesse habeat a phantasmatibus acquirere; sicut nee materiae essentia acquiritur ab agente naturali, sed solum eius forma, quae ita comparatur ad materiam naturalem sicut forma intelligibilis ad materiam sensibilem ... Et ideo mens antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat, sui notitiam habitualem habet, qua possit percipere se esse." *(De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, ad 1).

[50] " ... anima per essentiam suam se videt, id est ex hoc ipso quod essentia sua est sibi praesens, est potens exire in actum cognitionis sui ipsius; sicut aliqnis ex hoc quod habet alicuius scientiae habitum, ex ipsa praesentia habitus, est potens percipere ilia quae subsunt illi habitui." *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, resp.; "... anima est sibi ipsi praesens ut intelligibilis, idest ut intelligi possit; *non autem ut per seipsam intelligatur, sed ea: obiecto suo.* ..." *Ibid.* ad 4um in contrarium.

[51] " And how could I even inquire at all about some existent as to whether it is or what it is, if I did not always previously know that being is and what it means."

Thomas speaks in the celebrated passages in the *Quaestio Disputata De Veritate,* (q. 10, a. 8), is totally impotent to fulfill the demands the transcendental method places on it as an a priori knowledge of being. In Coreth's view this primordial knowledge of being already *is* and must somehow *be* " *actual."*

This habitual, primordial knowledge provides the intellect with no actual awareness whatever of its own nature. Its appropriation of itself must yet be mediated by the other.[52] It is only through such a mediation that the intellect is capable of becoming aware even of its own immateriality.[53] The reason for this is that the human intellect, within the hierarchy of intellectual beings, occupies the last place and is related to all intelligible forms somewhat as primary matter is related to all sensible forms.[54] For precisely the same basic reason, the human intellect is incapable of giving expression to an intelligibility of itself alone. It is no more capable of this than primary matter would be of determining itself to any form whatever. Because intellect is incapable of forming an intelligibility of itself through which it might know its own nature and inner

"The Problem and Method of Metaphysics," p. 414. "... sicut non oportet ut semper intelligatur in actu, cuius notitia habitualiter habetur per aliquas species in intellectu existentes; ita etiam non oportet quod semper intelligatur actualiter ipsa mens, cuius cognitio inest nobis habitualiter, ex hoc quod ipsa eius essentia intellectui nostro est praesens." *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, ad 11.

[52] "Unde mens nostra non potest seipsam intelligere ita quod seipsam immediate apprehendat; sed ex hoc quod apprehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem; sicut et natura materiae primae cognoscitur ex hoc ipso quod est talium formarum receptiva." *Ibid.,* resp.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] "... sicut materia non est sensibilis nisi per formam supervenientem, ita intellectus possibilis non est intelligibilis nisi per speciem superinductam." *Ibid.* "... quamvis anima nostra sit sibi ipsi simillima, non tamen potest esse principium cognoscendi seipsam ut species intelligibilis, sicut nee materia prima; eo quod hoc modo se habet intellectus noster in ordine intelligibilium sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium...." *Ibid.,* ad 6um in contrarium; "... anima non cognoscitur per speciem a sensibus abstractam, *quasi inteUigatur species iUa esse animae similitudo;* sed quia naturam speciei considerando, quae a sensibilibus abstrahitur, invenitur natura animae in qua huiusmodi species recipitur, *sicut ex forma cognoscitur materia." Ibid.,* in 9um in contrarium. This is another way of saying that *subject* cannot know itself as *subject.*

structure, [55a] it is incapable of any self-knowledge prior to the abstraction of an intelligibility from the phantasm/ [55b] and this notwithstanding the fact that, as an immaterial cognoscitive power, it is already present to itself in a way which vastly transcends the self-presence of any sensible form. For just this reason the intellect's quest for self-appropriation is an extremely arduous one.[56]

The Notion of Being and Agent Intellect

To circumvent this obstacle to an a priori knowledge of the meaning of being the transcendentalists, [57] who are anxious to show that their understanding of the method of metaphysics is not only not contrary to St. Thomas's view but rather a completion and fulfillment of his position, seek justification for a genuine a priori knowledge of being in their interpretation of the nature and function of agent intellect. They readily admit the foregoing remarks and analysis inasmuch as they refer to the possible or passive intellect, but seek to point out that a yet deeper understanding of the role of the agent intellect in human knowing allows one a way out of the nearly total impasse. By emphasizing the pure act, dynamic aspect of the

[55a] "... cum mens intelligit seipsam, ipsa mens non est forma mentis, quia nihil est forma sui ipsius; sed se habet per modum formae, inquantum ad se sua actio terminatur qua seipsam cognoscit." *Ibid.,* ad 16um.

[55b] Cum enim intelligimus animam, non confingimus nobis aliquod animae simulacrum quod intueamur, sicut in visione imaginaria accidebat; sed ipsam essentiam animae consideramus. Non tamen ex hoc concluditur quod ista vis'io non sit per aliquam speciem." *Ibid.,* ad 2um in contrarium. "Sed qualis est natura ipsius mentis, mens non potest percipere nisi ex consideratione obiecti sui . . ." *Ibid.,* ad lum in contrarium.

[56] ". . . anima est sibi ipsi praesens ut intelligibilis, idest ut intelligi possit; non autem ut per seipsam intelligatur, sed ex obiecto suo, . . ." *ibid.,* ad 4um in contrarium; "... scientia de anima est certissima, quod unusquisque in seipso experitur se animam habere, et actus animae sibi inesse; sed cognoscere quid sit anima, difficillimum est...." *Ibid.,* ad Sum in contrarium.

[57] We use the term, "transcendentalist" to identify those adopting the transcendental reflection as the authentic metaphysical method. It is used without the slightest hint of a pejoratative connotation. It merely seems the most satisfactory way of identifying the philosophical movement set in motion by Fr. Joseph Marechal while avoiding withal clumsy and tiresome circumlocutions.

agent intellect the transcendentalists hope to present a plausible and perfectly consistent explanation of the source of the a priori in human knowing which is yet fully compatible with St. Thomas's teaching of intellect's universal dependence upon the phantasm for its knowledge.

While it is true that Coreth has laid little stress on the function of the agent intellect vis-a-vis the intellect's a priori grasp of being, this is not so true of his former mentor, Fr. Karl Rahner. According to Rahner, the unlimited horizon of being is available to the intellect through reflective deduction once the agent intellect *(active Geisteskraft)* has effectively illuminated a phantasm. Being is not known thematically at this point, yet, since the agent intellect exceeds in its illuminative power the form of any and all singular, sensible forms, it is against the expansive horizon of being, the agent intellect itself, that whatever is known is known. [58]

Hence, according to Rahner, by reflecting on its own act the intellect becomes aware thematically of the manner in which it transcends the very object known and grasps itself as the horizon within which all possible objects are to be known. [59] Finally, agent intellect reveals itself in its dynamic thrust *(Hinbewegung)* toward the totality of the objects themselves.60 In this fashion Rahner concludes that agent intellect possesses an a priori notion of being *(Sein)* which renders intellect intelligible without its having to imagine an object which transcends the object known, and without its having to have grasped the totality of possible objects in themselves. [61]

[68] "So kann das Worauf des Vorgriffs, nur in der Ge'wustheit des Vorgriffs als solchen selbst sich ofl'enbaren, obwohl der Vorgriff sich nur thematisch machen liisst in der Angabe eines Worauf. Das heist aber nichts anderes als: Der Vorgriff (und sein Worauf) wird gewusst, indem die Erkenntnis in der Erfassung ihreres einzelnen Gegenstandes sich selbst als sich schon immer tiber ihn hinausbewegend erfahrt, indem sie den Gegenstand so im Horizont ihrer moglichen Gegenstande erkennt, dass der Vorgriff sich in der Hinbewegung auf das Gauze der Gegenstande selbst ofl'enbart." *Geist in Welt,* auf!., p. 156.

[••] *Ibid.*

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] " So hat der Vorgriff ein Sein, das ihn erfassbar macht, ohne dass er eines vorgestellten Gegenstandes bedtirfte tiber den Gegenstand hinaus, zu dessen Ver-

Thus, if we have understood him correctly, Rahner maintains that it is impossible for one to grasp being as such without the simultaneous grasping of the form of a particular being. However, in this simultaneous grasping of the form of the material object and the unlimited horizon of the being of intellect, there appears for him to be a kind of mutual priority.

By means of the particular form of the being determining the intellect, the intellect is placed in act so that it can, by reflecting upon its own act, discover the unlimited horizon of its own possible field of activity. Nonetheless, according to a certain priority of nature, it would seem that for Rahner the unlimited horizon of being is realized before the particular form is grasped, for it is only, it seems, in and through the transcending, dynamic potentiality of intellect that the particular form can be referred to and known as being; not indeed as being as such but as this limited participation of being.

Whether or not Rahner might be said to accept this latter qualification expressly is perhaps questionable, but it does seem to be an accurate summary of Coreth's position, who, while making Rahner's analysis substantially his own,[61] seems to have articulated it somewhat more fully. Thus Coreth will say: " The intellect can know the limited form in its limitedness only if it first transcends these boundaries, thus reaching Being itself." [62] Further, we have already examined another passage in which Coreth states: " Thus some basic knowledge about being enters as a condition of its possibility, into every act of inquiring and of knowing, into every act of thinking." [63]

gegenstandlichung er geschieht, ohne dass das Gauze moglicher Gegenstiinde in seinem Selbst vom Vorgriff erfasst zu werden briiuchte." *Ibid.*

[61a] Cf. *Metaphysik,* p. 584.

[62] " Er [der Geist] erkennt die bestimmte Form in ihrer Begrenztheit; dies kann er erst, wenn er die Grenzen ubersteigt-auf das Sein." *Ibid.,* p. 580.

[63] *Art. cit.,* p. 414. A former student of Rahner, Father Kenneth Baker, has summed up his own understanding of Rahner's position regarding an a priori knowledge of being as follows: "We can only surpass the boundaries of experience if they are already surpassed. Thought can only know particular being if it already is open to being as such, and metaphysics is only possible if we already have an openness to being as such in our daily experience. Therefore, we affirm that a previous knowledge of existence is the condition of the possibility of any

The foregoing considerations lead us to the conclusion that the thematic clarification of being, which constitutes the very core of any metaphysical methodology, thus follows one course according to the transcendentalists and quite another according to St. Thomas Aquinas.[63] While avoiding the error of a dogmatic and naive ontologism such as that espoused by Fichte,[64] for clearly Coreth and the other transcendentalists vigorously oppose such a position,[65] the transcendental method does, nonetheless, strive quite openly to ground a realistic and critical metaphysics upon an a priori notion of being viewed as welling up spontaneously from the dynamically oriented faculty of the knowing subject, the active power of the human mind or spirit.

Yet, the basic point at issue is not whether or not the intellect may be considered as a "formal a priori principle of the spontaneous spirit,"[66] for this it indubitably is, but rather to what extent this spontaneously unconditioned principle can be and is recognized as such in those preliminary acts of knowing through a transcendental reflection on the conditions underlying the possibility of knowing itself.

Further, neither can there be any question but that the unlimited horizon of the intellective faculty is an essential condition underlying the possibility of any act of knowing a particular being. The question at issue, however, is *when* and *at what point* and *how* the mind actually grasps the reality of these conditions. It is here that, in our opinion, the transcendental method relies on an excessively intellectualist and

knowledge and that the denial of this previous knowledge really affirms it in the very denial." "Raimer: The transcendental Method," *Continuum* (Spring, 1964), p. *56.*

[63] We do not fault the transcendentalist position simply because it happens, as we feel, to disagree with the teaching of St. Thomas. Whatever our own views may be regarding St. Thomas, we draw attention to the fact of this doctrinal discrepancy precisely because the transcendentalists generally maintain their view to be at least a *legitimate development* of St. Thomas's thought.

[64] Cf. Coreth, *Metaphysik,* pp. 40 ff.

[65] Cf. Rahner, *art. cit.,* pp. *65-66.*

[66] *Ibid.,* p. 67.

optimistic interpretation of the knowing powers of the human spirit.

II

The Transcendentalist Position Revisited

While it may well already appear to the reader that the transcendentalist position is pursuing a course other than the one traced by St. Thomas, the very complexity of the problem and the radical consequences following upon the manner in which it is resolved convince us that a more detailed analysis will prove beneficial and perhaps even necessary, if the original intent of this exposition is to be attained. Hence we will now commence a more searching investigation of the transcendental and rational methods, hoping thereby to effect a more striking confrontation between the two approaches toward grounding an authentic metaphysical method.

The Mediating of Immediacy

A factor which complicates the issue at hand and renders our inquiry particularly difficult is the ambiguous manner in which Coreth employs the term "Being." This can be seen most clearly in those passages of his book where he gives a description of the transcendental method. This method, he says, consists in " a mediating of immediacy " (V*ermittlung der Unmittelbarkeit)* .[67] Coreth is quick to acknowledge that this expression has been borrowed from Hegel, although by it he understands something quite different than did the great German idealist.[68] In stating that his transcendental method is nothing more than the " mediating of immediacy " Coreth means that it is precisely in such mediation that the method of metaphysics essentially consists.[69] By "mediating the immediate " he means the thematizing or explicitation of the-already-given. It is, he says, "... the thematic, actuated proof

•• Cf. *Metaphysik,* p. 288.
ea *Op. cit.,* p. 88.
•• *Op. cit.,* p. 288.

that a metaphysical knowledge of Being *(Sein)* [70] and the underlying structure of Being is already, i.e., immediately, expressed and is present as a preliminary condition of the possibility of the fullness of our questioning and of our knowing." [71]

Yet, how is this thematization effected? What new knowledge does it afford? Somehow it must widen our vision of Being. Coreth grants that there is in our primordial knowing a knowledge of Being. Yet he insists that mediation is necessary in order to show forth the " pure positivity and actuality of Being, which is incapable of setting itself any boundaries." [72]

Coreth maintains that the " pure positivity and actuality of Being which can set no boundaries for itself is already primordially and immediately, even if unthematically, known." [73] He further adds that ". . . this knowledge grounds each question and judgment, rendering its performance possible, inasmuch as it activates itself within the unconditioned and unrestricted horizon of Being, grounding this horizon in the unconditionedness and the unrestrictedness of the act of Being. Nonetheless a mediating proof is required through which the unthematically known *(Bekannte)* first becomes thematically known *(Erkannte)* ." [74]

How does the thematic knowledge of Being differ from the primordial unthematic knowledge, and how is the mediation of the unthematic to the thematic accomplished? These two questions, which Coreth never seems to answer satisfactorily,

[70] To indicate the nuance between the German *Sein* (common being) and *Seiendes* (a being) we translate *Sein* as Being and *Seiendes* as being. It should be carefully noted, therefore, that the term " Being " alone never stands for God or subsistent being. This terminology is surprisingly faithful to that employed by Aquinas who never speaks of God as being merely *(lpsum esse)* but who always adds a modifier, such as subsistens, to indicate that he is not speaking of common being, the subject of metaphysics. Thus, e. g., " Deus est ipsum esse per se subsisteus" *(Summa Theol.* I, q. 4, a. resp.). For Aquinas *ipsum esse* alone is common being.

[71] *Op. cit.,* p.

[••] *Ibid.*

[••] *Ibid.*

"Ibid.

are the very questions the transcendental method must not fail to answer if it is to win our acceptance. Further, one can only have grave reservations as to whether these questions can be truly answered within the Marechalian context of an a priori notion of Being, where the metaphysical investigation begins with a clarification of the knowing subject dynamically reflecting on its own activity. [75]

Thus the claim is made that through the transcendental reflection the conditions of the possibility of knowing are made explicit to the knowing subject. Yet how precisely does reflexion mediate, and what are these conditions found to be? They are that no question can be asked [76] or that no affirmation can be made [77] save within the unlimited and unconditioned horizon of Being. Something about Being in a restricted sense is asked; something about Being in a restricted sense is affirmed, and the conditions underlying the possibility of the question or the affirmation are that the question or affirmation of Being must ultimately have unrestricted and unconditioned meaning. [78]

There can be no doubt, of course, but what it is true that every question and every affirmation do involve just such an unrestricted meaning of Being. However, the problem, we judge, is not here. Rather it lies in the explanation of how the immediate is mediated, in explaining how " the thematic mediating of the mediated immediacy actually occurs." [79] The mediation is said to be accomplished by and through the transcendental reflection (*transzendentalen Ruckgriff)* which merely consists in the knowing subject's becoming explicitly aware of its a priori knowing structure and its unique manner of

[75] " Since the real and dynamic activity of the subject precedes all objective contents of knowledge and mediates them as contents of knowledge, we must start our investigation from this activity. We must inquire into the conditions which make it possible, and constitute its being, insofar as they are co-affirmed and co-posited in the thinking activity, albeit implicity." E. Coreth, "The Problem and Method of Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. ill, p. 414.

[76] This is Coreth's view.

[77] *Viz.*, according to J. A. Marc, J. B. Lotz.

[78] Coreth, *Metaphysik,* pp. 93-4.

[79] *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

operating (*Gesetzlichkeit)* .[80] In effect, therefore, the thematization Coreth speaks of, which is the result of the mediating of the immediate, is identifiable with the intellect's grasping its own nature, with Self-fulfillment or actualization *(Selbstvollzug)* .[81]

How then does the intellect become aware of itself and of its nature? How does it come to realize that it is a faculty of Being? that its knowing occurs within the unrestricted horizon of Being? that Being is that which it intends? Our contention is that the intellect cannot come to an explicit knowledge of itself and of its function simply by transcendentally reflecting upon its own act of knowing some individual material object. Rather we contend that the intellect can come to a thematic knowledge of the unlimited and unrestricted nature of Being only through a reflection simultaneously mediated by the limited and restricted beings, which we progressively experience sensibly as well as intellectually, and ultimately widening out into the realization of the virtually unlimited actuality of each limited being it knows or can know.

Let it be said at once, however, that we do not advocate any form of " perceptionism " or " Super Look " which would entail our seeing Being in the sensible thing. Such a view would be nothing more than a crude caricature of the position advanced here.[82] There can be no question but that Being is grasped only in the intellect; outside of the intellect there is, clearly, no intellectual operation. What the intellect sees or

[80] *Op. cit.,* p. 93.

[81] *Metaphymk,* p. 93. Coreth's *SelbstvoUzug,* literally, fulfillment or actuation of the self, self-realization, would seem to be a quite close approximation to what Lonergan means by "self-appropriation." Regarding the latter, cf. Lonergan's *Insight,* p. 731.

[82] Lonergan has accused Gilson with advancing a " perceptionist " position, though he grants that Gilson has not consistently held to his initial premiss. Cf. " Metaphysics as Horizon," *loc. cit.,* p. 316. While we have some reservations as to the justness of Lonergan's charge, we are not concerned here with a defense of Gilson's position, and much less are we prepared to identify the latter's viewpoint with our own. Regarding a fundamental diversity of opinion on an allied question cf. our article: "Logic and the Method of Metaphysics," *loc. cit.,* pp. 39ft-93.

understands, it must see and understand within itself. Thus, in this sense we do not call for a perception of Being *in* the sense data of experience. At the same time, however, if any clarity in this matter is to be had, it must be recognized that, because of the very nature of human intellectual knowing, an underlying and persistent ambiguity accompanies every effort to speak of the " object " of the human intellect. This is a point which St. Thomas himself often adverts to, for, although intellection is an immanent operation, its primary object is not the intelligibility abiding within the intellect itself, to which the latter has given expression, but rather the things themselves which exist independently of the human mind.[83] Hence St. Thomas finds nothing odd in the remark that, in understanding, the intellect understands the material being outside itself, even though the intellective act as such is wholly confined to the intellect as the subject in which it inheres.[83a]

Thus, what we are presently calling for as a replacement for Coreth's transcendental reflection as a means of mediating the immediate and bringing the intellect to a thematic realization of the unlimited horizon of Being is an intellectual reflection continually mediated by a progressively more comprehensive grasp of the material existent as existing.

Although Coreth acknowledges the need for the " clarification " of Being on the ground that in its initial performance of questioning some fore-knowledge *(Vorwissen)* is always unthematically present as a necessary condition for the very possibility of the question,[84] he simultaneously contends that the intellect is capable of mediating itself through self-reflection.

[83] " Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima . . ." *Summa Theol.* I, q. 82, a. 2, resp. and ad 1. " . . . visio intellectualis non terminetur ad aliquam rei *similitudinem,* sed ad ipsam essentiam rei. *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, ad 2 in contrarium.

[83a] *Ibid.*

[84] " Das Vorwissen wird in der Frage niemals thematisch gesetzt; thematisch gesetzt wird das Nichtwissen und das Wissenwollen. Dennoch ist das Vorwissen in der Frage jederzeit unthematisch mitgesetzt; sonst ware die Frage-als Frage-nicht moglich." *Op. cit.,* p. 114.

It is this self-mediation, a built-in property of the transcendental method, that we find to be inconsistent with, and contradictory to, the initial supposition that the *Vorwissen* was in fact " unthematic." And here we return to our earlier claim that we find the position of Coreth to rest on a basic ambiguity concerning act and potency. If Being as unlimited and unrestricted is unthematically present in every question, then this is merely another way of saying that it is present (from the standpoint of knowing) only *potentially.*

The Ground of the Unthematic

Here a basic question must be raised which will at once pinpoint the problem and aid in dissipating the equivocation threatening to engulf the entire question. Namely, why is the knowledge of Being in the initial question known only potentially? It is precisely this query that Coreth, showing more concern for the fact of knowing than for the reason behind it, has failed to raise, with the result that one never quite knows why the intellect begins in this way.

It is here that the radically dual character of the human intellect is properly emphasized, for, unless the distinction between active and passive intellect and its significance is borne in mind, there is no reason for maintaining that there is anything unthematic whatever in the human intellective operation. One cannot admit, as St. Thomas does, that there is a distinction between active and passive intellect without committing oneself to a whole series of presuppositions and consequences which have a profound bearing on one's understanding of the entire intellective process and consequently of the very psychogenesis of Being.

One of those consequences, which would seem to have a direct bearing on the present question, is the delicate alignment of complementarity which characterizes the operations proper to both active and passive intellect. The agent and possible intellects do indeed, in their operations, complement each other in the most intimate and resourceful way and are hence mutually dependent, since each intellect contributes to the

intellective enterprise an operation wholly essential to a receptive actuation on the immaterial level, mediated by the corporeal world of beings which alone are immediately present in man's cognitive horizon.[85]

Indeed, so real is this mutual dependence that neither active nor passive intellect is capable of operating at any time independently of the other.[85a] Without receiving an intelligibility from the external world through the abstractive operation of the agent intellect, the possible intellect remains totally in potency and thus knows nothing actually.[86] On the other hand, the agent intellect, which is continuously in act in an indeterminate way with regard to the forms of all material beings, is, for its part, totally unreceptive of any determinate form or intelligibility, since such is the operation proper to possible intellect alone.[87] The consequences of the foregoing view with regard to the question of the thematization of Being are significant. First of all, it is clear that it is never owing to a lack of actuality on the part of the agent intellect that we do not know, for the latter is always in act. Rather the cause of our not knowing universal Being is to be traced solely to the potential condition of the possible intellect, which the agent intellect in turn is unable to actualize save through the mediating function of the illumination of the phantasm.

Further, that the unique mode of understanding of the human intellect might be fully appreciated, it is essential that one recognize that, although the agent intellect is ever present to the passive intellect, and although the agent intellect is

85 " *In omni enim actu* quo homo intelligit, concurrit operatio intellectus *agentis* et intellectus *possibilis." De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, ad 11. "lntellectus enim in actu comprehendit et intellectum possibilem et intellectum agentem." *Quaest. Un. De Anima,* a. 5, ad 4.

85a *Ibid.*

86 "lntellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis." *Summa Theol.* I, q. 79, a. ad 8. "lntellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est ' sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum,' ut Philosophus dicit in Til De Anima." *Ibid.,* resp.

87 " lntellectus autem agens *non recipit* aliquid ab extrinseco, sed solum intellectus possibi!is." *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, ad 11 in contrarium.

continually in act with regard to material being,s•• the same agent intellect is, nonetheless, never the direct object of the cognitive act of the possible intellect.[88] Indeed, were it so, we would have an immediate, i.e., non-mediated, knowledge of everything.[89] Such knowledge, it may be presumed, none of us is prepared to claim.

Now it is precisely because the agent intellect is not at any time the object of the possible intellect that there is no *pure intuition* of Being in human intellection. From this it follows that the possible intellect can never " reflect " on the agent intellect as it is in itself but can know it reflectively only to the extent that the agent intellect itself is made, through the medium of the intelligible forms of material beings, present to the possible intellect. We are faced here with a most profound paradox which, it seems, lies at the very bottom of the whole problem enveloping the psychogenesis of Being, namely, that the agent intellect, which is always in act and which alone is capable of rendering the forms of material beings actually intelligible to the possible intellect,[90] is itself actually unintelligible to the possible intellect save to the extent that it is actively engaged in impregnating the latter with the illuminated phantasm ultimately derived from sense experience.

87. The qualification of being by the term "material " is most important. Even though the impression may sometimes be given that the agent intellect is in act with regard to Being, there can be no question but that such an interpretation is contrary to the mind of Aquinas, who states expressly that the agent intellect does not encompass the entire horizon of Being " Cum non sint in eo omnes determinatae rationes omnium rerum." Cf. *Quaest. Un. De Anima, 5,* ad 9. For this reason the human intellect must somehow be united with God. *Ibid.*

88 " Unde quantum ad id quod requiritur ad nostram considerationem ex parte intellectus agentis, non deest quin semper intelligamus; sed quantum ad id quod requiritur ex parte intellectus possibilis; quod nunquam impletur nisi per species intelligibiles a sensibus abstractas." *Ibid.*

89 *Ibid.*

90 " Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia, formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu ... Oportet igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem." *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 79, a. S, resp.

Because this point is so crucial to our entire analysis of the psychogenesis of Being, let us examine briefly a uniquely illuminating passage from the *De Veritate* where St. Thomas focuses his attention on this aspect of the problem under consideration, viz., the relation between the agent and the possible intellect. Here St. Thomas is indicating the manner in which the passive intellect becomes aware of the nature of the light of the agent intellect. Since the remarks themselves constitute an answer to an objection, it will be helpful first to review the objection. The objector attempts to argue in a manner that will very likely remind us of the argument employed by the transcendentalists themselves, for he says: "Just as physical light renders all bodies actually visible, so the soul through its light renders all bodies actually intelligible. Yet corporeal light is seen through itself, and not through any similitude of itself. Wherefore, the soul does not understand itself through a similitude, but through its own essence." [91]

In replying, St. Thomas first distinguishes the manner in which light is known through its essence. He states that corporeal light is not seen through its essence save to the extent that it becomes the cause *(ratio)* of the visibility of those things that are visible, and to the extent that, as a kind of form, it renders them actually visible.[92] Just as, he says, the form *(species)* of a stone is not in the eye, but rather its likeness, so is it impossible that the form of the light which is in the sun is the same as the form of light in the eye.[93]

Applying this same distinction to the function proper to the agent intellect he concludes: " And in like manner the light of the agent intellect is understood by us through itself to the extent that it is the cause of the intelligible species by rendering them actually intelligible." [94] In this passage St. Thomas surely seems to state with all desirable clarity that the light of the agent intellect becomes known only to the extent that it is

[91] *De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, obj. 10 in contrarium.
[92] *Ibid.* ad 10 in contrarium.
[93] *Ibid.*
[94] *Ibid.*

" actually " engaged in illuminating phantasms, and that the depth and intensity of this illumination is directly proportional to the perfection of the form of the material thing which the agent intellect elevates to the level of actual intelligibility.

It can also be noted that this viewpoint alone fits in with St. Thomas's insistence, already examined elsewhere, that the agent intellect can never be an " object " of our knowing but must always be grasped obliquely through the intellect's knowing something other than itself.[95] Further, this account of the matter is also consistent with one's own psychological awareness that it is impossible, in any act of knowing, to experience actually the full sweep of one's intellective powers. It accounts for this experience because it explains why the intellect is never thematically in act according to the fullness of its powers in knowing any particular thing, and it recognizes that in its present state there is no other direct object of the human intellect save particular material things. Consequently, the way to Being is afforded only by following the tortuous route of negativity and separation. Thus the alleged shortcut to the world of pure, unrestricted Being and the thematic grasp of the nature of the intellect by way of the transcendental reflection is a route which merely leads to mythic consciousness.

This is why, then, if the intellect is to realize its own unlimited power to become the other and to illuminate all material beings, it must be led to this recognition through an antecedent or prior grasping of the virtually unlimited resources of the material things which it knows. Until the intellect thematically uncovers the virtually pure act principle contained in the singular things it knows, and grasps the latter's inner freedom from limitation and restriction when taken in itself, it is incapable of realizing the deepest meaning of Being, and hence it can have no adequate understanding of its own inner nature as the

[95] " --- ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus, et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium qualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt." *Summa Theol.* I, q. 85, a. 1, resp.

faculty of universal Being.[00] Thus, contrary to the claim of the transcendentalists, it was quite proper for Kant to reject on his own grounds the possibility of a science of metaphysics, for the presuppositions of his inquiry into the origin of synthetic a priori judgments did not allow him any possible access to the unlimited horizon of Being proportionately mediated by a noumenal reality distinct from the intellect itself. Any non-noumenal appropriation of Being would have demanded for Kant a critical apparatus by which mythic could have been differentiated from non-mythic consciousness. Yet no such critique could have been effected which would not simply overturn his previous distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal world and which would in effect already presuppose that which he was seeking to inquire after, namely, whether it was possible to distinguish between a mythic and an authentic

•• "lntellectus [humanus] autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis." *Summa Theol.* I, q. 79, a. ad 3. The position here outlined is in sharp contrast to that of Jean-Marc LaPorte, S. J., who would argue that, because the soul is of itself *actually intelligible,* " There is no need to pull an understanding of the positively immaterial out of an experience of the exclusively material. ..." Cf. "The Evidence for the Negative Judgment of Separation," *The Modern Schoolman,* XLI (Nov., 1963), p. note # Indeed, by looking upon the experience of material being as an experience which is " exclusively material " LaPorte would even seem to deny the possibility of arriving at a metaphysical awareness of Being by beginning with an analysis of limited material being. Because the *esse* of created being is "... intrinsically limited by the essence in which it is received" (ibid.) , he seems to feel that the only access to Being is through the intellect's reflecting on its own nature. At any rate, LaPorte looks upon any attempt to disengage Being from its limited, material conditions as a futile exercise in " terminological dialectic."

Yet, as indicated above, it is precisely for the reason that the *esse* of material things is only virtually unconditioned that an elaborate process (terminological dialectic?) must be patiently employed in order to disengage it from its *formal determination* as well as from its *material conditions.* However, even here the disengagement is only negatively achieved through separation, and this effectively prevents the intellect from ever having an " actual " concept of Being as such.

To our way of thinking, to suggest, as LaPorte does, that the *esse* of material things is beyond emancipation from material and determinate conditions leads one dangerously close to the edge of " essentialism," for it would seem to imply a denial that there is any principle at all within the material being that transcends limited and material conditions. If such a denial is justified, whatever can be the meaning of calling a material thing a being?

consciousness of Being. If one wishes to "save" the noumenal world of Kant, one has little choice but to move in the direction of Hume; if one prefers to authenticate the Kantian transcendental world of the mind and the understanding, one has little ultimate choice but to move in the direction of Fichte and Hegel.

It is only by emphasizing that the notion of Being itself is thematically clarified through the mind's knowing material beings precisely as beings that one can escape the radical conclusion of Heidegger that things are beings inasmuch as they fall under the illuminating powers of Dasein. If the *Seinsfrage* is answered "transcendentally" through Dasein's reflection on the conditions of the possibility of its own act of conferring Being *(Sein)* on things, then the Being it thematizes can never have any relevance apart from its own intellective act which is itself originative of Being. In this case the mind would know that something *is* because it is *known;* yet Dasein could never affirm that something *islcnown* because it *is.*

The Chthonic Element in Metaphysical Psychogenesis

The human intellect is an intellect because it faces toward Being. It is a human intellect because of the characteristically passive posture it assumes in facing toward Being. It is this difference in Being-posture which undergirds the threefold distinction among intellects, namely, divine, angelic and human. [97] While the divine intellect is in act with regard to all being,[98] and the angelic intellect is always in act with regard to its own proper intelligibilities, owing to its proximity to the first intellect, which is itself pure actuality,S [9] the human intellect, because it is maximally distant from the perfection of the divine intellect, is in potency with respect to all intelligibilities. [100] As a consequence, every act of the human intellect, even that of self-reflection, is of necessity mediated by an intelligibility derived

[97] Cf. *Summa Theol.* I, q. 79, a. 2, resp.
[••] *Ibid.*
[••] *Ibid.*
[loo] *Ibid.*

from the sensible **world** of singular existents. Wherefore, every human intellective act essentially entails an entire panoply of sense operations which, in their own way, amply mediate the intellect's grasp of common or universal being.[101]

It is this viewpoint alone which adequately accounts for all the pertinent data of the human condition of knowing and which gives a justifiable priority, in explaining the psychogenesis of Being in human intellection, to the body-soul relationship, and thus it does not compromise the unique psychic role played by the human body.[102] In effect, all attempts to explicitate Being without a mutually continuing body-soul relationship constrains one to adopt the neo-Platonic view that the body constitutes little more than an unwanted hindrance to the soul which of itself is oriented toward an ecstatic vision of pure Being.

What must constantly be borne in mind is precisely that which the philosopher is often so sorely tempted to overlook, viz., that on all levels of human knowing there is found the potency-act correlation wedded in one common performance. Just as possible intellect is related to agent intellect as the potential to the actual, so body is related to mind as potency to act. The unequivocal result of this correlation is a mutual, operative dependence so all inclusive and so delicately attuned that neither body nor soul is capable of expressing itself in act save in conjunction with its complementing act or potency. It is precisely the body-mind relationship, which specifies human knowing as human and which necessitates the illumination of the object of the intellect by the agent intellect[103] and

[101] " Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi opere, quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones." *Ibid.*, a. 4, ad 3.

[102] " Substantiae enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet animae, habent esse affine corpori, inquantum sunt corporum formae; et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus, et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur; alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur." *Ibid.*, q. *55*, a. £, resp.

[103] " Necessitas autem ponendi intellectum agentem fuit, quia naturae rerum materialium, quas nos intelligimus, non subsistunt extra animam immateriales et

which, consequently, requires us to designate the human intellect as a " ratio " as well as an " intellect." Only an intellect truly dependent upon a material world for its direct source of knowledge can meaningfully be designated " rational." [104]

It is for these reasons, then, and for no others, that the immediate object of the human intellect is not universal or common Being but rather the being of corporeal things revealed to the passive intellect through the illuminating power of the agent intellect. [105] Because the passive intellect is totally in potency to know prior to the reception of an intelligibility deriving from material beings, and because further, the agent intellect is never an object of knowledge of the passive intellect, it follows that it is impossible for the passive intellect to uncover the unlimited and unrestricted nature of Being simply by reflecting upon the naked conditions of the possibility of any single act either of questioning or of affirmation. In brief, the so-called transcendental reflection is incapable of thematizing the unlimited horizon of Being, even though that horizon is indeed unthematically present in every limited act of questioning and of affirming.

What the proponents of the transcendental reflection call for is an intellective intuition flowing from any actuation of the passive intellect by inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of that actuation. Thus an attempt is made, once the passive intellect has been put in act in a limited way by the

intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt solum intelligibiles in potentia extra animam existentes; et ideo oportuit esse aliquam virtutem, quae faceret illas naturas intelligibiles actu. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus agens in nobis." *Ibid.*, q. *54*, a. 4, resp.

[105] "Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam . . . Homines autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur; et ideo rationales dicuntur." *Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 8, resp.

[106] " Dicendum quod obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo; quia nee primum obiectum intellectus nostri secundum praesentem statum est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est, ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit." *Ibid.*, q. 87, ad 1.

intelligible form, to uncover the hidden foundation of that act of knowing without having further recourse to new acts of abstraction from the phantasm. The passive intellect is permitted to actualize itself by an act of self-exploration into the inner conditions of its knowing. What this means, as those advocating the transcendental method readily acknowledge, is that the passive intellect is enabled to obtain an imperfect, although authentic, grasp of the nature of the agent intellect, for it is the agent intellect which is seen to provide the unlimited and unrestricted ground or horizon against which every question or affirmation is set and viewed by the passive intellect. In short, through the transcendental method, the passive intellect is led to the threshold of an intellectual " intuition " which permits it to grasp the unlimited and unrestricted horizon of Being.

Where such a position fails radically is in its faulting the intellect's dependence on the material existent. **It** would afford the intellect an " intuition " into Being which in fact had not been mediated by the sense, i.e., which had not been truly mediated but rather merely occasioned by the object of human intellection, the material existent. Further, such a position allows for the passive intellect's passing from a state of potentially knowing to a state of knowing actually without assigning any source of this actuation other than the intellect itself, since the advocates of the transcendental method grant that the thematized knowledge of the unlimited and unrestricted horizon of Being arises from a reflection on the performance of the agent intellect's *(active Geisteskraft)* illuminating the intelligibility found in the phantasm.

106 " Denn die ' Intuition ' ist vermittelt durch die Sinnlichkeit; sie ist selbst nichts anderes als das geistig-im Horizont des Seins-Vollzogene 'sensibile.' Dies ist aber eine Vermittlung, die dem geistigen Vollzug als Dedingung vorausliegt, in diesen jedoch nicht konstitutiv als Begrundung eingeht; der geistige Akt wird nicht durch die Sinnlichkeit hervorgebracht. Daher kommt der Intuition eine gewisse Unmittelbarkeit zu, insofern sie weder durch anderes als den Geist selbst bewirkt, noch durch einen vorgiingigen Erkenntnisprozess des Geistes vermittelt ist; sie ist vielmehr der erste Akt geistiger Gegenstandserfassung, der rein dem spontanen Vollzug der aktiven Geisteskraft entspringt." Coreth, *op. cit.,* p. 5Sl.

That there is, however, an intellectualist aspect to the human dimension of knowing, no one would reasonably deny. Yet one could question the claim that the transcendental method represents an "intellectualism" consistent with all of the "human" aspects of man's knowing activity. As the foregoing analysis indicates, we do ascribe fully to the remark that there is the unlimited and unrestricted horizon of Being latent in every act of questioning and affirming. Where our view differs from the transcendental position is in the manner of explaining how this immediate presence of Being as unlimited is mediated by the human intellect and by the material existent. At this point we shall attempt to present a more thematized explicitation of this mediation.

That which the intellect first conceives is being.[107] On this there is complete agreement, nor do any of those supporting the transcendentalist position affirm that this first knowledge of being is identifiable with the unlimited and unrestricted Being of which the metaphysician speaks. Rather, they readily grant that unlimited Being is only unthematically present in this first act of knowing.

The being that is known in this first apprehension of the intellect and which is affirmed in the first judgment is a being that is restricted to the limited status and nature of the material thing from which the intelligibility has derived.[108] Therefore, in this first act being is known but not as Being in the unlimited and unrestricted sense. The actuality of the possible intellect is limited, in its act of knowing, to and by the actuality of the known, for the thing understood in act is the intellect in act. At this point the intellect's thematic knowing does not and cannot transcend its own state of actuation.

Now, since potencies are known only in their acts, it is not possible for the intellect to come to an understanding, even negatively, of its unlimited and unrestricted horizon simply by

[107] " --- in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nee aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens." *IV Metaphys.* Iect. 6, 605.

[108] Cf. Coreth, *op. cit.*, pp.

reflecting upon its present state of limited actualization by a limited material existent. It is impossible to uncover the existence of possibility save through act, and even the projection of some future effect rests precariously on an analogous extrapolation of act from one order to another. Though it is true that from various acts of a given agent the possibilities of that agent can be projected according to a moving scale of probability on the basis of those acts, yet such projection is ultimately made possible itself not merely by the acts of the agent in question but by the acts of other agents as well. Thus it only becomes possible to estimate what a particular agent is capable of doing by comparing its past performance with other similar agents who have exhibited in a more precise manner just what they can do. However, in these instances the conclusion arrived at will never surpass probability precisely because it is a case of projection and not of knowing actually.

Yet it is not this type of prediction that is involved in the case of the intellect's coming to a thematic knowledge or awareness of its unrestricted horizon. Here it must be a question of knowing with certainty; of knowing not what the intellect might be capable of doing but what in effect it *can* do. Thus, when one says that the horizon of the activity of the human intellect is unlimited and unrestricted, one is giving in effect a definition of the intellect, the only definition available to human knowing, which must operate within a horizon, but which is not itself actually the horizon, as in the case of the divine knowing.

Consequently, passive intellect itself cannot grasp its inner nature until it has somehow passed from a state of potency to one of act, and, if that nature is to know Being in an unlimited and unrestricted way, then somehow intellect must grasp itself as in act in an unlimited and unrestricted way. How does it arrive at this point where it will be able to declare that its nature is to know Being? How is it possible for the human intellect, which, as long as it is united to body, is ordered to grasp the limited, restricted being of material existents, to transcend the limited and restricted being of those beings it knows?

Being and CO'J'nmunity

The great paradox of human knowing is that the human intellect comes to know itself only through knowing others. It acquires knowledge of self only to the extent that it acquires knowledge of others. Thus self-knowledge is for the human intellect a desperately communal undertaking. The reality of community looms as decisively critical on the horizon of human knowing, for the mystery of Being reveals itself to the intellect as it immerses itself in, and is nourished by, the beings of the material world.

Although whatever the intellect knows, it knows as being and, even though the first act of knowing is an acknowledgment of being, yet this first knowledge is so primitive and so faint as to allow but a fleeting glimpse of the endless reaches of Being which the intellect will later discover to lie far beyond its primordial view. What the intellect knows at this stage it knows most obscurely, as one might only dimly make out the contours of a tall building enshrouded in a heavy fog. Just as the full height and characteristic design of the structure is only gradually revealed to the viewer as the fog begins to disperse, so, through continued concentration and effort and renewed acts of understanding, does the human intellect achieve to the full meaning of Being. Though the unlimited horizon of Being is immediately present in these first acts of knowing, it is in no wise consonant with human experience to affirm that the intellect is moved, at this premature, developmental stage, to inquire after and speculate on the vast horizon of its knowing. Rather, it is totally occupied at this time merely with comparing, contrasting and distinguishing the various beings which fall within its scope. The community of beings it experiences is first experienced as disparate entities, not as a community, and it will take much advance in the way of knowing before the intellect is able to discern the subtle patterns of interlocking relations and similarities which do indeed unify even the most individually diverse beings. In its preoccupation with widening its experience in order to share in the community of beings in which it moves, the human intellect names them all somehow

as beings, for it does not in a single instance say of them: " it is not," but rather: " it is." It is only later that the intellect, by reflecting on its own unique behavior in knowing beings, will begin to ask those questions which lead it to a deeper understanding of what it already very imperfectly knows. For the moment, the inquiry of the metaphysician is totally unknown to it. Consequently, it is unthinkable that the intellect should succeed in disengaging-or even desire to disengage-itself from its own individual acts of knowing and from the limited being of the beings it knows in these first groping stages of its development. In short, the intellect's first concerns are those of the common man, not those of the metaphysician.

As seen, questions always presuppose knowledge of some kind/ [09] and the more sophisticated the question the more profound and the more extensive must be the knowledge upon which the question is grounded. Since no question is more sophisticated than that arising from a metaphysical inquiry after Being, it is clear that such a question could not be raised at a time when the psychogenesis of Being is still very much in the embryonic stage and when massive obscurity is the very climate within which the human intellect moves and breathes. Though questions arise spontaneously, they do so only after a problem has been thematically grasped. Since the human intellect is fully occupied with the everyday problems of human knowing as it attempts to extricate itself and gradually to emerge from the dark night of unknowing, it is altogether out of the question that the problem of the transcendental nature of Being [110] or of the conditions of the possibility of its own knowing could occur to it at this time. [111]

[109] Coreth has a very fine treatment of the problem of the presuppositions of *the Question.* Cf. his *Metaphysik,* especially pp. 104-11, where he treats of "Die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Frage." Though Coreth places the beginning of metaphysics in the questioning of the question, it is obvious that such a question is highly sophisticated.

[110] " Die Frage als Anfang der Metaphysik erweist sich als der einzig mogliche Ansatz, aus dem die Methode des Vorgangs abgeleitet und begrundet werden kann." Coreth, *op. cit.,* p. 102.

[111] St. Thomas clearly distinguishes between ontological presence and psychological awareness in human knowing when he indicates that it is possible for the intellect

Eventually, however, as the acts of the intellect multiply and the intellect obtains knowledge of other material existents, all of which it recognizes as beings, and as it has the leisure and needed perspective to reflect on the ways these material things are, the comparative clarity of its knowing is disturbed and clouded by the genesis of an entirely new problem, the problem of community, for it is aware somehow that these things are both one and many. How is it possible for so many very different kinds of things to be in communion one with another? How is it that, although no two things are identifiable with each other, they are at the same time all recognized as beings? Let it be noted, however, that this primordial metaphysical question is primarily an existential and not a cognitional one. The intellect does not first ask " how is it possible for all things to be known as being," but rather, " how is it possible for all things to be beings?" The intellect is never first aware that things are because it is thinking of them, but rather it realizes that it is thinking of them because they are.[112]

Thus the intellect's knowledge of Being is continually mediated by its knowledge of beings. This knowledge is both progressive and radically unstable, since it depends on intellect's

to know being without knowing the true, even though it cannot know being that is not true, and that it can understand being without understanding the agent intellect, even though it cannot understand being without the agent intellect. ". . . sic ens non potest intelligi sine vero, quia ens non potest intelligi sine hoc quod correspondeat vel adaequetur intellectui. Sed tamen non oportet quod quicumque intelligit rationem entis intelligat rationem veri, sicut *nee quicumque intelligit ens, intelligit inteUectum agentem; et tamen sine intellectu agente homo nihil potest inteUigere." De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

[112] " Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam, nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram; et hoc sive in affirmando, sive in negando. In affirmando quidem, sicut dicimus quod Socrates est albus, *quia hoc verum est.* In negando vero, ut Socrates non est albus, quia hoc est verum, scilicet ipsum esse non album . . . Et hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum Est prout est verbalis copula." *V Meta.*, lect. 9, 895-96. "Non enim ideo tu es albus, *quia nos vere existimamus te esse album;* sed e converso, ideo existimamus te album, *quia tu est albus.* Unde manifestum est, quod *dispositio rei est causa veritatis* in opinione et oratione." *IX Metaphys.*, lect. 11, 1897. Cf. also *De Interpretatione*, L. I, l. 14.

continued actuation by diverse material beings for its own realization that these things are beings by reason of Being, i. e., a principle which simply transcends what they are. Therefore, this ascent to the transcendence of Being is, from the very beginning, continuously conjoined with negativity on a most profound metaphysical level. In order to have ascended to the realization that Being transcends the individual material beings which it experiences, the intellect had to learn to disassociate the limitedness of beings from the very principle intrinsic to them which gives them being.[112] It had to become aware that the individual, corporeal beings, merely inasmuch as they are individual, corporeal and quidditatively distinct from one another, are not beings; for individuality, corporeality, and whatness are all included within the broader scope of Being.

In short, the intellect's transition from its first, primordial grasp of being to its developed awareness of the unlimited and unrestricted nature of Being is an awareness that has been mediated by a thematic understanding of a community of beings sharing in an actuality that of itself neither positively includes nor positively excludes limitation of any kind.[113] Thus the actual experience of the community of beings is an essential condition for the possibility of the intellect's awareness of its own unlimited horizon, for it has discovered this horizon only to the extent that it was, through negative judgment, " actuated " by the acquired knowledge of every limited being it knows, as virtually unlimited and unrestricted as being.[118] Consequently, the intellect becomes aware of its own potentiality the only way it possibly can, through experiencing this

[110] " Omne autem aliud esse quod non est subsistens, oportet quod individuetur per naturam et substantiam quae in tali esse subsistit. Et in eis verum est quod esse huius est aliud ab esse illius, per hoc quod est alterius naturae ..." *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad *5.* "... non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nee *huius* hominis et *illius* hominis." *Summa Theol.* I, q. 8, a. *5,* resp.

[118] ". . . ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cuius tamen ratione non est ut ei additio fieri non possit ..." *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 6.

[118] " lntellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit esse quo modo *invenitur in rebus inferioribus,* a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse non est subsistens, sed inhaerens." *Ibid.,* ad 7.

potentiality as virtually actualized in knowing corporeal beings, and it acquires this experience through realizing that it knows whatever it knows as being.

Likewise, this view alone gives any meaningful explanation to the expressions, frequently employed by both Aristotle and St. Thomas, of "*ens inquantum ens*" and "*ens commune.*" The metaphysician does not consider Being in its isolated abstractness as a mere product of the mind, since metaphysics is truly a real and not a logical science.[113b] Rather he considers individual beings [114] inasmuch as they share in and participate common being.[114a] In short, the metaphysician considers a being as being *(ens inquantum ens)*.[115]

Now we do not consider it to be explainable merely by an incidental oversight that Coreth and other proponents of the transcendental method have laid no emphasis on the notion of community as a condition for the psychogenesis of Being. Though they speak of an unlimited and unrestricted Being they do not find occasion to refer to it as common Being, or at least very infrequently. This is quite understandable because the Being of which they speak has emerged in consciousness from the intellect's transcendentally reflecting on the conditions for the possibility of its very act of knowing some particular

uab "Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. . . . Sed philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt *entia*. . . ." *VII Metaphys.*, lect. I8, I576: "Logicus enim considerat *modum praedicandi*, et non existentiam rei." *Ibid.*, lect. I7, I658.

[114] *In Boeth. de Trin.*, L. II, q. I, a. 4, resp. Cf. also the preceding footnote.

[110a] "... metaphysicus considerat etiam de singularibus entibus, non secundum proprias rationes, per quas sunt tale vel tale ens, sed secundum quod participant *communem entis rationem*, et sic etiam pertinet ad eius considerationem materia et motus." *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. I, ad 6.

[115] Dicit autem 'secundum quod est ens' quia scientiae aliae, quae sunt de entibus particularibus, considerant quidem de ente, cum omnia subiecta scientiarum sint entia, *non tamen considerant ens secundum quod ens*, sed secundum quod est huiusmodi ens, scilicet vel numerus, vel linea, vel ignis, aut aliquid huiusmodi." *IV Metaphys.*, lect. I, 580. "... quia omnes philosophi elementa quaerentes secundum quod sunt entia, quaerebant huiusmodi principia, scilicet prima et altissima; ergo in hac scientia nos quaerimus principia entis inquantum est ens: ergo *ens est subiectum huius scientiae*, quia quaelibet scientia est quaerens causas proprias sui subiecti, *lOW.*, 588.

thing, and hence it cannot be meaningfully referred to as common Being. It is not known as common simply because it is not a necessary condition for Being's thematized emergence from consciousness that it be shared by a community of limited, restricted beings. It is only after it has been thematically referred to diverse existing things that the Being of the metaphysician can truly be recognized as common Being. Prior to that it could only be known, if at all, as the unrestricted and unlimited horizon within which the intellective act of knowing a particular thing is situated.

To fail to see the radical distinction here between the Being which constitutes the subject of Metaphysics for St. Thomas, common Being, and the Being which emerges from the transcendental reflection, unlimited Being, is surely possible only if one has already neglected to ask the question as to why both Aristotle and St. Thomas speak of common Being at all. If their position regarding the psychogenesis of Being were similar or identical to the transcendentalist position, there would have been no imaginable reason or justification for their referring to the subject of the science of metaphysics as " common Being." The expression itself, when carefully mulled over, indicates much more than has generally been recognized regarding the central question of the psychogenesis of Being. Thus the transcendental method is quite incapable of delivering on its claims that the human intellect can reach the unlimited horizon of Being by transcendentally reflecting on its first act of knowing.

Such a theory of the psychogenesis of Being is, further, inconsistent with the expressly stated views of St. Thomas.[116] Unless a family of diverse particular beings is known, Being can never be appropriated as "shared," that is, as common. This points up an entire series of problems extremely sensitive to the metaphysical undertaking, particularly that of the analogy of Being. The problem of analogy is really nothing more than

[116] We make no pretense here of attempting to evaluate the similarities or differences of the positions assumed by St. Thomas and Aristotle on this question. Whether or not St. Thomas has merely clarified and developed Aristotle's view or has indeed overturned it, is a question we leave for others to settle.

a problem of being shared, i.e., of community. Indeed, there are some quite serious reasons for questioning the possibility of being able to substantiate an analogous predication of Being, if the transcendentalist psychogenesis of Being is allowed. It would also seem not altogether impossible that the Being which emerges from the transcendental reflection would turn out to be identical with essence, for there seems no other valid way of arriving at a distinction between being and essence than by reflecting on Being as "shared" by things that *are* in a restricted way, i.e., by beings. To have arrived at a notion of Being prior to a thematic grasp of the distinction between the essence and existence of things would seem to preclude the possibility of transcending anything but a merely rational distinction through subsequent reflection on the multiple acts of human understanding, for the intellect would not be provided the needed dimensional leverage or perspective by which to effect a real distinction.[117] Briefly, it does not seem possible that Being can be viewed thematically as a horizon of unlimited dimension before it is shown to be distinct from the quiddity of limited beings. Indeed, it seems to us unlikely that the very question of Being as the unlimited horizon of knowing could ever arise apart from a prior realization that many things *are* differently and hence somehow constitute a community of diverse things. Only then will the question arise, because only then does the intellect gain its initial insight into the basic metaphysical problem, the problem of beings which are and which are not, i.e., which are in a limited way.

Finally, there is very substantial textual evidence that St. Thomas understood the notion of Being, of itself totally inde-

m It would seem that there is a real need for further indepth analysis of the psychogenesis of Being in the philosophies of Duns Scotus and Francis Suarez, particularly with regard to the questions of the univocity of Being and the distinction between essence and existence. Such a study would doubtless serve to clarify the entire question of the evolution of Being in the philosophy of St. Thomas and to bring into clearer perspective the relation between analogy and community and, of course, predication.

[118] Cf. notes Ill through 115.

terminate and free from all limitations and restrictions, [119] to have been acquired by the intellect by an abstractive process which is most properly termed " separation." [120] :l\-Ietaphysics, he affirms, is a distinct science, even though it considers Being according as the latter is common to all things, because it considers the special *ratio* of Being according to which it is not dependent on matter and motion. [121] He further insists that what is more simple and knowable in itself is less knowable to us and hence that the multiple and composite is known by us prior to that which by nature is more lmowable. [122] It is for this reason that the only avenue open to the human intellect of moving from the composite to the more simple and more intelligible, i.e., from the posterior to the prior, is that of negation. [123]

Nothing witnesses more eloquently to the extreme poverty of the intellect's primordial status of knowing than ordinary language usage. The only signs the mind employs somehow to express whatever transcends sensible things are negative signs. Thus we have no words to express what is beyond the visible, beyond the material, etc., save through the use of a negative prefix, as: invisible, incorporeal, immaterial, infinite, unlimited, unrestricted, etc. [124]

The importance of the foregoing considerations assumes even

[119] " Ipsum esse, absolute consideratum, infinitum est." *I Contra Gentiles,* c. 43. Cf. also *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. 2, ad 7.

[120] *In Boeth. de Trin.,* l. II, q. 1, a. 3, resp.

[121] " Philosophia prima est specialis scientia, quamvis consideret ens secundum quod est omnibus commune, quia specialem rationem entis considerat secundum quod non dependet a materia et motu." *III Sent.,* d. 37, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 2.

[122] " Simpliciora autem quae sunt priora et notiora secundum naturam, cadunt in cognitionem nostram per posterius." *X Metaphys.,* lect. 4, 1190. *Ibid.*

[123] " Inde est quod prima rerum principia non definimus nisi per negationes posteriorum; sicut dicimus quod punctum est, cuius pars non est; et Deum cognoseimus per negationes, inquantum dicimus Deum incorporeum esse, immobilem, infinitum." *Ibid.*

[124] Et inde est etiam quod omnia quae transcendunt haec sensibilia nota nobis non cognoscuntur a nobis nisi per negationem; sicuti de substantiis separatis cognoscimus, quod sunt immateriales et incorporeae, et alia huiusmodi." *III de Anima,* lect. 11, 758.

greater perspective when they are applied to the mind's understanding of Being. We have already noted the discrepancy obtaining between the intellect's first knowledge of being *(ens primum cognitum)* and that knowledge of Being which properly characterizes the metaphysician.[125] The first knowledge of being is confused and composite, since it includes everything within the sensible object, i.e., its singularity, its specific quiddity, properties, etc., since all of these somehow give expression and modality to the way the thing actually is.[126] In short, this first knowledge of Being does not as yet recognize that being as being *(ens commune)* is free of all such specifying limitations. Indeed, one comes to an understanding or realization of what it means " to be " only as one is progressively able through concrete, diversified experience to disassociate Being from matter and motion, from individuating characteristics and, lastly, from form.[121]

Now were it possible to know Being without employing the way of negation and separation, it would necessarily follow that the intellect would have straightaway, without any knowledge of material beings, an understanding of Being according to its total indeterminate sweep, for Being *(esse)*, to the extent that it is Being, is not distinct, though it can be diversified by something other than itself which shares and participates it.[128] Consequently, to know Being in an undiversified way would

[125] Cf. *Ill Sent.*, d. 37, q. 9!, a. 4, sol. 9!.

[126] " Si enim esse est subsistens, nihil praeter ipsum esse ei adjungitur, quia etiam in his quorum esse non est subsistens, quod inest exsistenti praeter esse ejus, est quidem exsistenti unitum, non autem est unum cum esse ejus, nisi per accidens, in quantum est unum subjectum habens esse, et id quod est praeter esse; sicut patet quod Socrati, praeter suum esse substantiale, inest album, quod quidem diversum est ab ejus esse substantiali: non enim idem est esse Socratem, et esse album, quod quidem diversum est ab ejus esse substantiali: non enim idem est esse Socratem, et esse album, nisi per accidens. Si igitur non sit esse in aliqua substantia, non remanebit aliquis modus in quo possit ei uniri illud quod est praeter esse." *II Cont. Gentiles*, c. 52.

[127] " Esse autem inquantum est esse, non potest esse diversum; potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse, sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis." *Ibid.* ". . . esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum." *de Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

[128] *Ibid.*

simply be to know Being absolutely,[129] and, were such knowledge possible, it would be altogether unnecessary to approach Being from the side of negativity, as both Aristotle and St. Thomas do.

However, it is essential to bear in mind that the Being which results from the way of negativity is not subsistent Being, for the latter cannot be shared or diversified/[130] but rather common Being which neither positively includes nor positively excludes determination of any kind.[131] There are indeed beings that are in motion, that are material, that are individual and that are in this or that way, yet it is not precisely because they are beings that they are in motion, that they are material, that they are in this or that way. It is the grasping *of* this indifference of Being to the different ways of being which the intellect has experienced through its appropriation of singular sensible things, which it in tum reaches by withdrawing Being from all the concrete forms and quiddities it actuates in the world of human experience, which first unveils to the intellect its thematically metaphysical vision of the world.

Further, it is precisely because the intellect must appropriate Being thematically in this way, and not first through an inner vision *of* its own potentiality as the faculty *of* Being, that St. Thomas expressly says that our intellect understands Being in the same manner that " it discovers it in corporeal being from which it draws its knowledge and in which being does not subsist but inheres."[182] Precisely then, because, the human intel-

[129] Cf. note 119.

[130] " --- esse divinum, quod est eius substantia, non est esse commune, sed est esse distinctum a quolibet alio esse." *de Pot., loc. cit.,* ad 4; " --- ipsum esse Dei distinguitur et individuatur a quolibet alio esse, per hoc ipsum quod est esse per se su:bsistens, et non adveniens alicui naturae quae sit aliud ab ipso esse." *Ibid.,* ad 5.

[181] ". . . ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cuius tamen ratione non est ut ei additio fieri non possit ---" *Ibid.,* ad 6. "Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non-ens quod non potest esse nee forma nee materia. Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam." *Ibid.,* ad 7. " lpsum autem esse alicuius rei secundum se consideratum non est quantum." *X De Coelo,* lect. 6,

[182] " Intellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit esse quo modo invenitur in

lect can only appropriate Being as that which is utterly perfect, the " actuality of all acts," [133] by disengaging it from the shifting world of material things where it is concretely measured and restricted by the potential principles within the subsisting entity, [134] and hence by way of negation and separation, is the metaphysical appropriation of Being so extremely difficult. It is a difficult and laborious undertaking, because it entails separating intellectually what is not sensibly experienced as separated and what cannot in any way be imagined as separate, for the very evidence justifying such an intellective act of separation, viz., that the actuality of this subsisting, corporeal thing is not of itself quantified, nor material nor otherwise limited or restricted, falls within the perceptive horizon of the intellect alone.[135] What the metaphysician means, therefore, when he affirms that the actuality of the material thing is of itself unlimited, is not at all that he is *capable of CO'nSideringit* in this way but that indeed *it is* so unlimited. The Being separated from the quiddity or the form of the material thing is the Being inhering not in the mind of the metaphysician but in the material thing the mind knows/ [86] although it does not exist in the mind in the same way as it exists in the thing. Indeed, Being is that actuality which penetrates most deeply into the very marrow of things. [187]

rebus inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse non est subsistens, sed inhaerens." *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. *!'l,* ad 7.

[188] *Ibid.,* ad 9.

[18,] " Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam." *Ibid.*

[186] " Si enim poneremus quod non viderentur sensibiliter aliqui circuli nisi ex aere, nihilominus tamen sic esset pars speciei circuli aes. Et licite tunc non separaretur circulus actu ab aere, separaretur tamen mente, quia species circuli posset intelligi sine aere, ex quo aes non esset pars speciei circuli, licet difficile sit mente auferre et separare ab invicem quae actu non separantur. Non enim est hoc nisi illorum qui per intellectum supra sensibilia elevari possunt." *VII Metaphys.,* lect. 11, 1505.

[186] " --- hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectior potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur." *de Pot.,* q. 7, a. *!'l,* ad 9.

[187] " inter omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus .... " *Quaest. Un. de Anima,* a. 9, resp. in initio.

As already indicated, it is because Being has been mediated by material things and has been found to be shared in by them that it is called common Being. Further, there is something of a close analogy between universal natures such as " man," "animal" and "common being." Just as "man" and "animal " do not exist anywhere apart from the individual men and animals which participate these natures, and from which intellect derives its knowledge of them, save in the intellect, so " common " Being, which is derived from the singular existents sharing in the actuality of Being, does not exist apart from the singular existents save in the human intellect. Though Being as common exists actually nowhere save in the human intellect, nonetheless the intellect has, as seen, derived this notion from its synthesizing appropriation of many corporeal beings sharing in Being, and it is because of this cognized communal sharing in Being that Being is designated as " common." [188] Indeed, not only is Being common but it is most common, for it includes all things potentially and is thus maximally communicable. [189]

Yet if one accepts the explanation of those employing the transcendental reflection to thematize Being as unlimited and unrestricted, there is simply no apparent reason why Being should be designated as" common," for, according to the transcendentalist interpretation, Being as first known is merely grasped as the unrestricted illuminating power of the intellect. Though it is claimed that Being is that which is affirmed of whatever is affirmed, still, as first known through the transcendental reduction, it has yet to be affirmed of more than one thing, and hence it cannot actually be known as " common "

[188] ". . . quo est commune multis non est aliquid praeter multa, nisi sola ratione; sicut animal non est aliud praeter Socratem et Platonem et alia animalia, nisi intellectu qui apprehendit formam animalis exspoliatam ab omnibus individuantibus et specificantibus; homo enim est quod vere est animal; alias sequeretur quod, in Socrate et Platone, essent plura animalia: animal scilicet ipsum commune, et homo communis, et ipse Plato. Multo ergo minus et ipsum esse commune *est aliquid praetm- omnes res ex:ristentes ni.si in intellectu solum." II Cont. Gentiles,* c. 26.

[189] " --- Iicet esse sit formalissimum inter omnia, tamen est etian1 maxime communicabile, Iicet non eodem modo inferioribus et superioribus communicetur." *Quaest; Un. De Anima,* a. 1, ad 17.

to many things. In fact, one cannot help but be struck by the complete absence of any attempt by the transcendentalists to show that Being is unrestricted and unlimited because it is shared and participated in by many things. Finally, what is perhaps no less significant, and as has already been indicated above, it is impossible for Being *to be known as potentially* " *common* " *to many* if, as the transcendentalist position affirms, Being is known as unlimited and unrestricted according to a transcendental reflection *before it is actually recognized as shared.*

Community and Analogy

It is this fact which raises some very serious objections to the transcendental method of thematizing Being on the momentously important score of analogy, the principal difficulty being that analogy is fundamentally a question of predication. That is, it is because of the judgmental cognitional structure of man that predication is necessitated, and through the predication structure the transcendental reality can only be expressed by analogy, i.e., by a sign that transcends the ordinary categories of predication wherein a predicate is univocally related to a subject either through negation or affirmation. Hence, speaking most properly, there are no such things as actually known analogous concepts, for analogy involves a diverse relation to many,[140] and hence the analogous term cannot become known save through multiple acts of predicating. The " so-called " analogous concept is uncovered through the recognition of a name that is similarly predicated.[141] Consequently,

uo" In his vero quae praedicto modo dicuntur, idem nomen de diversis praedicatur secundum rationem partim eamdem, partim diversam. Diversam quidem quantum ad diversos modos relationis. Eamdem vero quantum ad id ad quod fit relatio. Esse enim significativum, et esse effectivum, diversum est. Sed sanitas est una. Et propter hoc huiusmodi dicuntur analoga quia proportionantur ad unum." *XI Metaphys.,* lect. 3, *"Et iste modus communitatis* medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem." *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. *5,* resp.

m *Ibid.* Analogous predication is both made possible and necessitated by the human, abstractive mode of knowing material things, the only way they can be known directly in themselves. This is why God knows material things through his

the " analogous concept " or term is psychically mediated by predication itself, and it could not possibly be known as such prior to the actual performance of multiple acts of affirmation (or negation) somehow grasped as related to something common.[142] All of which, however, by no means prevents the first predicate employed from being an analogous predicate, for Being is just that.[143] Yet what it does preclude is that the first predicate could be thematically known as analogous before its diverse relationship to many has been articulated through several acts of predication. Discovering that Being is diversely related to many and hence common to many, though not univocally, is the very act in which the intellect becomes actually aware of the analogy of Being. Consequently, the unveiling o! Being as common and as analogous occur simultaneously, and it is this pervasive insight which rolls back the unlimited horizon of Being and grounds the science of metaphysics.[144]

own essence and the angels know them through intelligible species derived from God whether or not they may be mediated by other higher angels. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. *56*, a. 1, resp. Since, then, the names of things refer first to the intelligible species abstracted from things, it is only natural that the names of things do not follow the mode of being which is in things but rather the mode of being which the intelligible species themselves have within the intellect. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 13, a. 9, ad 2.

[142] Cf. *XI Metaphys.*, lect. 3, 2194-98.

[1] .. " Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum; sicut in praedicationibus *omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens." Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. *5,* ad lum.

[1] " " Et sicut est de mathematico, ita est de philosopho qui considerat ens, et praetermittit considerare omnia particularia entia, et considerat ea tantum quae pertinent ad ens commune; quae, licet sint multa, tamen de omnibus est una scientia, inquantum scilicet reducuntur omnia in unum . . . " *IX Meta.*, lect 3, 2203. To have a science there must be a subject of that science. Since the subject of the science of metaphysics is " common Being," metaphysics cannot be established before its subject, Being, is thematically clarified. Yet this does not mean that the common Being of the metaphysician is known posterior to the " common Being" of the logician. On the contrary, there is no possibility of a logical priority as regards the intellect's thematization of common Being, precisely because, as already indicated, such thematization must necessarily come from the intellect's grasp of material things *as they are.* Thus what we are categorically denying is that the intellect can rise to the level of thematized, universal Being merely by reflecting on itself as present to itself *in knowing a finite being finitely.*

Thus the only factor which prevents Being from being grasped univocally is precisely that it is experienced, through an analysis of predication, to be diversely related to different subjects. [145] Thus *what is* depends on the form that *esse* (Being) has actualized, and the *esse* of *this* being differs from the *esse* of another by reason of the singlar and quidditive differences of the actuated forms. [146] Now if common Being or *esse* could be known thematically prior to knowing a multitude of beings sharing unevenly in the actuality of Being, there would be no meaningful way of relating this a priori common Being to individual existents save *univooally.* What the univocal predication of Being would then seem to portend would be a merely feeble relation of extrinsic denomination between the Being of intellect and the being of the singular subsistent thing. [147] How much estranged such a view is from the mind of Aquinas is evidenced by the latter's insistence that the first principle of Being and of knowing, the principle of non-contradiction, finds its ground in the very fact that the material objects of intellect have acts of Being limited by their respective natures which serve to distinguish them from their negations. [148] It is this

[145] As seen, Being can be predicated similarly of diverse subjects simply because it is negatively indifferent to any determination whatever. As the actuality of all forms, it bestows the actuality of Being on each form without itself determining what that receptivity will be. Cf. *II Cont. Gent.,* c. 5!2.

[146] Quia vero natura materialis vel forma, non est suum esse, recipit esse per hoc quod in alio suscipitur; unde secundum quod in diversis est, *de necessitate habet diversum esse;* unde humanitas non est una in Socrate et Platone secundum esse, quamvis sit una secundum propriam rationem." *De Pot.,* q. !2, a. 1, resp.

[147] This analysis seems almost to coincide with that of G. Siewerth in his critique of the Marechalian position. Siewerth claims that Marechal has substituted potency for Being and suggests that there is a similarity between the Marechalian and Scotist notions of Being. "Dieser Widerspruch (die Umkerung und Vertaushung von Akt und Potenz) durchwaltet das Denken Marechals. Das ' Sein ' ist einerseits nur ein " Rahmen von moglichen Begriffen " . . . andererseits ist es dasjenige, durch das die Dynamis des Subjektes iiberhaupt iherer inneren Unbegrenztheit ermoglicht und offenbar wird." *Das Sckicksal der Metapkysik von Thomas zu Heidegger,* pp. !236-7. For Sie'werth's comment on the similarity between the Being of Scotus and Marechal cf. p. !242, note # 6.

[148] ". . . ex hoc enim quod res productae sunt in tali natura, in qua habent esse terminatum, *sunt distinctae a suis negationibus;* ex qua distinctione sequitur

latter distinction alone which then permits the intellect to grasp thematically that an affirmation and negation of the same thing cannot be simultaneously true.[148]. In effect, then, unless Being is discovered as limited, there is no possibility of controlling it, and everything affirmable would necessarily be affirmed in one act of affirmation, with the result that discourse, which is so indigenous to the condition of human intellection, would have neither place nor meaning.

Yet, in spite of all, it is for just this a priori correlation between common being *(Sein)* and the Being of beings *(Sein des Seiendes)* that Coreth is calling, for he claims that the being of restricted being can be thematically realized by the very fact that it appears within the horizon of Being which is the product of the transcendental reflection.[149] Yet, at the same time, the Being which constitutes the horizon in which the limited being is placed is nothing more than the fulfillment of spirit as spirit through which it discovers the infinity of Being.[150]

Further, a viewpoint seemingly common to those situating their own position regarding the psychogenesis of Being somewhere within the broad Marechalian horizon is that Being is that which is "intended by the thinking spiritual subject." From them Being is not that which is apprehended as existing in a limited nature through the actuality of a principle which is virtually unlimited and unrestricted, but rather it is a confused and indistinct awareness of the unlimited horizon of the intellect through an opaque awareness of the unlimited desire to know. Some followers of Marechal have referred to this

quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera; et ex hoc principia est necessitas in omnibus allis principiis ut dicitur in *IV MetaphysicOTUm." De Verit.,* q. *5,* ad 7.

usa *Ibid.*

uo " Wenn ich aber Seiendes unter der Form des Seins und im Horizont des Seins wissent vollziehe, so bin ich damit schon in die Moglichkeit gesetzt, auch Anderes-grundsiitzlich alles, was als Seiendes im Horizont des Seins iiberhaupt 'ist '-in seinem Sein zu vollziehen." *Op. cit.,* p. Sll.

110 " Das Wissen des Geistes im vollzug ist also, da es Wissen urn Sein als Sein ist, so weit wie das Sein selbst in seiner unbegrenzten Weite. Der Geist als Geist vollzieht sich demnach wesentlich in der Unendlichkeit des Seins." *Op. cit.,* p. 817.

awareness as a kind of" intuition." [151] Others, dissatisfied with the hyper-intellectualist overtones of this term, prefer to describe it as an" awareness of something absent whose presence is anticipated." [152] " It is not a saturating insight into being but an intending of being." [153]

Yet this "awareness," however anticipatory it may be, must be some form of knowledge, and it must be a knowledge of a potency, for it is a knowledge of the intellect as *ordered to knowing* and not precisely as knowing, which is anticipated. Despite the quite unmistakeably a priori nature of the subject's awareness of its own intellective potential, those advancing this view also admit that the knowing subject cannot become aware of its nature as " *omnia intendens"* without first having abstracted a determinate form from the corporeal world. The intelligible form, abstracted from the phantasm, is needed, it is claimed, in order that the spiritual subject may become aware of itself knowing and hence of its own unlimited horizon. [154]

What is especially puzzling here, however, and this point we have alluded to before, is that, although the intellect cannot know itself without first being informed by an intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm, it is capable of knowing thematically its unrestricted desire to know once it has been informed by an intelligible species. [155] If indeed it is true that the intellect is capable of appropriating its own nature in this manner, it is difficult to understand why one need insist, as the Marechalists do, on the knowledge of material being as a necessary condition for, and a kind of primer of, the intellect's coming to the fullness of self-knowledge. As seen, the agent intellect is no more in act in the act of abstracting an intelligible

[151] Cf. N. Balthasar, "Mon moi dans l'etre et mon moi dans le monde," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, XLVII (1949), p. 363.

[152] Jean-Marc Laporte, S.J., "The Evidence for the Negative Judgment of Separation," *loc. cit.*, p. 33.

[153] *Ibid.*

[154] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[155] Laporte concedes, however, that not even all *philosophers* possess the profound awareness of the intellect's pure desire to know of which he speaks. Yet he ventures no opinion as to why this may be so. Cf. *art. cit.*, p. 31.

form from the phantasm than it was before the act of illuminating occurred/ [56] and at this point the possible intellect is actuated in only the most limited way, since its very act of understanding is directly proportional to the intelligibility abstracted from the phantasm. Hence, it simply appears inconsistent to affirm that the intellect can know its own nature as unlimited and unrestricted and as the unlimited desire to know almost as soon as it has been actuated in a most limited and restricted way. There seems to be here a sizable leap from potentiality to actuality without the aid of any proportionate intervening act. What the transcendentalists claim at this point is a thematic knowledge of the nature of the spiritual knowing subject as an unlimited and unrestricted capacity for Being. Yet such knowledge can only proceed from act, and, if it be denied that the actuation can come from the side of limited material existents, then there seems no realistic alternative to maintaining that it comes wholly from the side of the intellect.

In short, the intellect's awareness of its unlimited horizon, of its dynamic thrust toward being, must, within the Marechalian context, be innate and actually present to it from the first moment of its existence, and there is thus no need for the intellect to wait upon an abstraction of intelligibility from the phantasm to thematize its full awareness of itself.

Conclumon

It is for this reason that we feel that the metaphysical methodology of the transcendentalists inevitably leads one to embrace an exaggerated intellectualist position which is radically incapable of offering a satisfactory synthesis of the complex totality of man's in-the-world-experience. The human intellect is not spirit in the unqualified sense as is the intellect of the angels. Rather it is a spirit necessarily ordered to a world [157] in which spirit is participated and shared, yet which

••• "... intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo patiens." *Summa Theol.*, I-IT, q. 50, a. 5, ad

[167] " Unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum intelligibilium, acquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus; et cum

is as truly material as it is spiritual. As a human intellect the intellect of man is united to a body, yet not in such a way that body totally contains it as it does other corporeal forms, for its power exceeds the capacity of body.[158] It is its basic body-orientation which permits us to distinguish the human spirit from the angelic[159] and define it as the form of a body.[160] Furthermore, this is the one and only reason why the angelic intellect is totally free of discourse, whereas the human intellect is dependent upon it,[161] for even its first principles of understanding become known to it through abstraction from the phantasm.[162] Ever united with the body in the closest union,

operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione suae naturae competit ei quod corpori uniatur, et quod sit pars speciei humanae, non habens in se speciem completam." *Quaest. Un. De Anima*, a. 7, resp., ad finem. Cf. also *ibid.*, a. 8, resp.

158 " Cum enim anima humana sit quaedam forma unita corpori, ita tamen quod non sit a corpore *totalite:r comprehemsa quasi ei immersa*, sicut aliae formae materiales, sed excedat capacitatem totius materiae corporalis, quantum ad hoc in quo excedit materiam corporalem, inest ei potentia ad intelligibilia, quod pertinet ad intellectum possibilem . . ." *Ibid.*, a. resp. ad finem.

159 " Species autem intelligibiles quibus animae intelligunt sunt a phantasmatibus abstractae; et ita non sunt eiusdem rationis cum speciebus intelligibilibus quibus angeli intelligunt, quae sunt eis innatae, secundum quod dicitur in libro de Causis quod omnis intelligentia est plena formis. Unde et intelligere hominis et angeli non est eiusdem speciei." *Ibid.*, a. 7, ad I.

160 *Ibid.*, ad 16.

161 "Unde et intelligere hominis et angeli non est eiusdem specie!. Ex hac differentia provenit quod angelus intelligit sine discursu, anima autem cum discursu; quae necesse habet ex sensibilibus efl'ectibus in virtutes causarum pervenire, et ab accidentibus sensibilibus in essentias rerum, quae non subiacent sensui." *Ibid.*, ad 1. For a like emphasis on the role played by the material thing in human cognition, cf. J. Pegaire, C. S. Sp., *Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Ottawa, 1936)' p.

162 ". . . Anima intellectualis principia et conclusiones intelligit per species a phantasmatibus abstractas . . ." *Quaest. Un. De Anima*, a. 7, ad It is also significant that St. Thomas employs the fact that the first principles of knowledge become thematically known only through the medium of abstraction from the phantasm as a basis for arguing that the first principles and the agent intellect cannot be identified. "Quidam vero crediderunt intellectum agentem non esse aliud quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia etiam ipsa principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus." *Ibid.*, a. 5, resp., prope finem; cf. also, a. 4, ad 6. For Aquinas, the mind knows even incorporeal things indirectly through a comparison with sensible beings, "- - - inoorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, oognoscuntur a nobis

every human act of understanding is the result of a cooperative effort between body and soul. As long as it is united with the body, the human intellect is altogether incapable of any act that is not somehow dependent on the body. The human intellect is thus both temporally and spacially circumscribed by its bodily instrument in its effort to appropriate itself.[163] Thus Montaigne was perhaps much closer to Aquinas's thought than he himself imagined when he said: " When I sit down, so do my thoughts." [164]

Hence, what needs calling for is a truly intellectualist metaphysics which respects the full and total sweep of *human* understanding. From the foregoing it would appear incontrovertible that such a methodology must be at once intellectual and *rational,* for, as a truly human science, metaphysics must grow and evolve from the intellect's contact and almost total immersion in the world. Metaphysics *must* be a web woven from the constant oscillating dialectic between matter and spirit, which transcends the world as the human spirit does the body, which cannot totally contain it, but whose very structure and method reflect the good earth from which it sprang. Though the highest of the sciences, metaphysics, if it be authentic, must remain profoundly human. Indeed, it is the human intellect alone which requires metaphysics for its fulfillment. It was this very chthonic dimension of metaphysics which the Kantian critique sought to discredit in order at last to discredit metaphysics as a truly human science, and it is this same chthonic element which must be jealously safeguarded if metaphysics is to endure.

As a corollary, it follows that metaphysics must have a

per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia quorum sunt phantasmata." *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 84, a. 7, ad 3.

[163] This thought is eloquently expressed by Jean Mouroux. "There is no thought without an immediate participation of the body in the very act of thinking. It is not the intelligence that thinks but ilie man; and the body is present to thought not solely as a remote instrument that remains a stranger to the activity it makes possible, but as an associate that provides the intelligence with the essential conditions of its action." *The Meaning of Man* (Doubleday, Image), p. 53.

[164] Quoted by Mouroux, *op. cit.,* p. 5!l.

method which is unique and which is rational as well as intellectual. Such a metaphysical method eliminates the need as well as the possibility of an a priori human knowing which is thematically appropriated by the knowing subject prior to the subject's having been proportionately actuated by the object of his knowing, the singular material existent. If metaphysics does employ a rational method, then it can rightfully be regarded as chthonic, as a from-and-in-this-world-science, which can be no more accurately described apart from its relation to the ground of this world than the human intellect or soul can be described without a reference to body.[165] Such a metaphysics will be mediated at every turn by predicative acts of the intellect necessitated in turn by the partial insights into the material existent which reluctantly reveals itself to the intellect through the fleeting, almost capricious glances of sense cognition. It is only a chthonic metaphysics of this kind that can authentically be said to have as its subject of inquiry common Being (which it has reached mainly by way of separation), the virtually unrestricted and unlimited dynamism of Being as present in every material being it knows as object.

Hence, the principle that man's primordial knowing is of the object first and only secondarily and reflectively of the subject co-knowing itself in the very act of communing with the other[166] must be carefully safeguarded as the most inviolable principle of all human knowledge.

Consequently, any claim to have reached an actual awareness of the unlimited and unrestricted horizon of Being by a transcendental reflection or inner intuition of the knowing subject is inescapably self-refuting, if one is speaking of the human

[165] Cf. notes 157-160.

[166] "Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud esse quod habet in cognoscente; oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet in oculo, sed per speciem lapidis quam habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum esse quod habet extra cognoscentem; sicut intellectus cognoscit lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu inquantum cognoscit se intelligere, sed nihilominus cognoscit esse lapidem in propria natura." *Summa Theol.* I, q. 14, a. 6, ad 1.

intellect, which, having as its proper object the quiddities of material things, must advance to the metaphysical domain of Being through the painstaking path of affirmation and negation, both of which constitute the radical human modes of self-alienation and self-fulfillment. The evolution of the human spirit is necessarily dependent upon and determined by the material things in the world which quietly and almost hiddenly commune in Being [167] and which comprise the cosmic community of conditioned beings.

The foregoing analysis of the psychogenesis of Being in the human spirit seems quite close to the profound truth so magisterially presented to the contemporary world by Martin Buber, namely, that man cannot find fulfillment or come to either a knowledge or a possession of his authentic self save in and through a community of persons.[168] While enthusiastically accepting this theme, our plea here is for a yet further widening of the notion of the metaphysical Thou to include not only persons but all individual material beings, so that the authentic appropriation of self as open to Being is positively aided by the spirit's every contact with each thing in the world that " is," regardless of whether or not it be a human person. Yet, at the same time, we do this with the full recognition that it is the human spirit's confrontation with person which plays the leading and even critical role in effecting the complete metaphysical form of autogenesis described above.

[167] While there are remarkable similarities here to the Hegelian notion of self-alienation, there are withal some vitally important differences. In this writer's opinion the Heideggerian notion of Being is much closer to Hegel's view of Being than it is to Aquinas's.

[168] " The primary word !-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration and fusion into the whole being can *never take place through my agency,* nor can it ever take place without me. I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. *All real living is meeting." The Writings of Martin Buber,* Will Herberg, ed. (Meridian Books, 1958), p. 46; italics added. In his book, *The Meaning of Love* (Newman, 1947), Robert 0. Johann, S. J. has laid similar stress on the importance of community for authentic self-development. More recently, Robert F. Harvanek has emphasized the place of community in the attainment of truth in an article entitled, " The Community of Truth," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. VII, 1 (1967), pp. 68-85.

In this context Heidegger's insistence that the human spirit *(Dasein)* is "the Shepherd of Being" [169] assumes a meaning highly acceptable to a metaphysician employing a genuinely rational methodology. As the Custodian and supreme Interpreter of common Being, which he has derived from his progressively more total immersion in the world of beings, man shares in a most unique way in the community of beings, for rising above them, he can serve as their protector, and as their interpreter to himself and to the world. In his exalted capacity as the mediator of Being, the metaphysician comes to realize ever more fully and more surely that he is a person precisely because, in his very act of understanding the Being of beings, he realizes that he communes and is meaningfully one with the universal community. In realizing the cosmic dimensions of his human activity the metaphysician is thus inexorably led to the intoxicating awareness that fully to be a person means "to be one with all others."

Finally, in reaching this breathtaking awareness, the truly communal metaphysician has simultaneously begun to realize in a still somewhat fumbling way that he is on the verge of a breakthrough regarding the massive problems of human and cosmic origins. His path has led him to the threshold of grasping the unrestricted and unlimited creative and unifying powers of a Person Who has had no need, as he has, to appropriate Being historically.

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ue " Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins," *Briey iiber den Humanismus* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1947).

LONERGAN'S METAPHYSICS OF PROPORTIONATE BEING

RECENT YEARS have witnessed an upsurge of interest in Thomistic thought. There have been not only deeper and more penetrating studies on St. Thomas himself but also efforts to update Scholastic philosophy, thus making it relevant to modem times. An outstanding contribution in this line is Fr. Bernard Lonergan's "Insight." [1] Basing himself on the nature of insight, Fr. Lonergan explores in this erudite work nearly every field that touches man: common sense, psychology, ethics, metaphysics. It is this last, a vigorous and novel restatement of Thomism, that we will expose.

Metaphysics for Lonergan, as for most other philosophers, is the science of being. In its full sweep, therefore, metaphysics includes all being. Transcendent Being thus also falls within its purview. In this essay, however, we shall concern ourselves only with the metaphysics of proportionate or experienced being. We note nonetheless that the transition from proportionate to transcendent Being is not neglected by Lonergan in his development.

WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

When we consider the breadth and depth of human knowledge, we are overwhelmed with admiration. There is hardly any field but has been invaded by man and forced to disclose its secrets. But if these myriad and highly diverse branches of learning are all branches of *human* learning, must there not be some point of reference common to all? Must not this prolific intellectual activity have some common denominator? At the root of this blossoming of science and mathematics, logic and

[1] *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ne\v York: Philosophical Library, 1957.) All further references to this volume will be indicated in the text itself.

literature, there is a single impelling force: the detached and disinterested drive of the pure desire to know. This desire within man urges him to break through the narrow confines of his self, to ask questions about anything and everything, and to set about finding the answers to them.

> The desire to know is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man. By moving him to seek understanding, it prevents him from being content with the mere flow of outer and inner experience. (348)

Metaphysics is concerned precisely with this detached and disinterested drive of the pure desire to know. It deals not with the concrete instances of the products of this desire, as do the other sciences, but tries to delve deeply into the desire itself. Since the other sciences spring from this desire and try to realize it in a hundred concrete instances, metaphysics may be described as the underpinning and unification of the various sciences. As Lonergan tells us,

> From the unfolding of that drive proceed all questions, all insights, all formulations, all judgments; and so metaphysics underlies logic and mathematics, the various sciences and the myriad instances of common sense. (390)

Metaphysics itself may be considered at three levels: latent, problematic, explicit. There is in the first place metaphysics insofar as it underlies the different branches of human learning. The desire to know is at the root of human intellectual activity. This desire unfolds itself through the empirical, intellectual and rational consciousness of man, fructifying in the diverse forms of knowledge. But though this drive is immanent and operative in all human knowing, it is not grasped as such. We are not aware that this desire is the mainspring of our intellectual dynamism. Hence this is dubbed" latent" metaphysics. This latent metaphysics fails to provide a unified view of the different sciences. It, accordingly, engenders a vague and general dissatisfaction in the one desirous of such a unified view. It prods the mind to inquire further into the nature of human knowing. The variety of conflicting theories presented by

philosophers only serves to add to the confusion. At this level metaphysics is said to be "problematic." Egged on by the problematic, latent metaphysics strives to manifest itself clearly. " It succeeds in conceiving itself, in working out its implications and techniques." (391) This bringing into the light of latent metaphysics is " explicit " metaphysics.

EXPLICIT METAPHYSICS

Since this study is primarily concerned with proportionate being, it would be helpful to define metaphysics in relation to proportionate being. Metaphysics would then be" the conception, affirmation and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being." (391) The terms of this definition warrant a brief explanation.

A heuristic structure is one which seeks to arrive at an unknown content by anticipating the type of act that will enable the mind to do so. Under the guidance of the properties of this act the mind moves forward to grasp the unknown content that lies as the end product of that insight. Or, as Lonergan has it,

> A heuristic notion is the notion of an unknown content and it is determined by anticipating the type of act through which the unknown would become known. A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions. Finally, an integral heuristic structure is the ordered set of all heuristic notions.

The other term, proportionate being, is a little more difficult to apprehend. This is due to the protean nature of the notion of being. Being, for Lonergan, is what is to be known through a totality of judgments. Hence we cannot define being in itself, as we have not attained that totality of judgments. We must, therefore, rest content with a heuristic conception of the notion of being. Consequently, being is " whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation." In short, being is the objective of the pure desire to know. Now human knowledge is dependent for its data on the senses. Being proportionate to human knowing must, therefore, be an object

of sense perception. Lonergan accordingly defines proportionate being as " whatever is to be known by human experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation."

To sum up then, the human intellect is tending towards being as towards the objective of the detached and disinterested drive of the pure desire to know. More immediately, it strains towards proportionate being. This striving is attempted through a heuristic structure. The study of this heuristic structure yields an explicit metaphysics of proportionate being.

CoGNITIONAL STRUCTURE As BAsis oF METAPHYSICs

Should we pause to reflect on this definition of metaphysics, a significant point catches our attention, viz., its dependence on our cognitional activity. We have actually defined metaphysics in terms of this cognitional structure, for " metaphysics can only begin in minds that exist and it can proceed only from their actual texture and complexion." (397) People cannot get rid of experience, nor can they help judging through understanding and reasonable affirmation. Of course, this is not to suggest that they are aware of this triple process; yet they exercise it all the same. The explicitation oȣ this ever present mode oȣ cognition begets metaphysics. For Lonergan then, " explicit and adequate metaphysics is a corollary to explicit and adequate self-knowledge." (535)

In any philosophy we can distinguish a cognitional theory and its metaphysical implications. For Lonergan, the cognitional theory is at the basis of the metaphysical aspects. This is not the traditional Scholastic mode oȣ viewing metaphysics. St. Thomas himself expresses his cognitional theory in metaphysical terms, hence his epistemology presupposes his metaphysics and does not ground it. But as Lonergan points out, even St. Thomas occasionally indicated the primacy of cognitional structure over metaphysical pronouncements. Thus in his *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 88, a. 2, ad 3 we find:

> The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power and nature.

St. Thomas here seems to affirm that one could demonstrate the power and nature of the human soul by a psychological act, i. e., *intelligere.* Lonergan avers,

> Now power and nature are metaphysical entities. To demonstrate them properly involves one in a long list of metaphysical theorems. Yet we have Aquinas' own word for it that a perfect demonstration of these metaphysical entities may be derived from a consideration of *intelligere,* the proper act of the human soul.[2]

Quite candidly Lonergan admits that " the most shocking aspect of the book 'Insight' is the primacy it accords knowledge." [3] While acknowledging the unorthodoxy of his approach, Lonergan clarifies his stand by referring to the Scholastic distinction between *quoad se* and *quoad nos.* If we consider the *quoad se* or ontological aspect, the metaphysical elements take precedence; if, however, the *quoad nos,* the metaphysical pronouncements must yield place to the cognitional theory. The two aspects are obviously interdependent. To consider them as separate or incompatible would be an error. In the present case the subject under study is the clarification of the metaphysical elements. In such a development one must begin with the cognitional structure, for we must first know and then seek to delve deeper into the nature of knower and known.

Finally, if we admit the dependence of metaphysical pronouncements on cognitional theories, we have at hand a ready explanation for the variety of diverse and conflicting metaphysical views propounded. These spring from a false or imperfect understanding of the structure of human knowing. Lonergan informs us that the cognitional structure is the touchstone for all sound metaphysics. A metaphysical system consistent with our knowing will be a basic position, for" bluntly, the starting point of metaphysics is people as they are." By parity of reasoning, what is out of harmony with the cognitional structure will be a counter position and, as such, will invite reversal.

[2] "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* XXXII (1958), pp. 71-72.

[3] *Ibid.*

This follows because the counter position precludes being intelligently understood and reasonably affirmed. The resulting incoherence pushes the mind on until the basic position is attained. Thus history itself confirms the conviction of Lonergan that " cognitional theory exercises a fundamental influence in metaphysical pronouncements." (889)

HuMAN CoGNITIONAL STRUCTURE

Since cognitional structure looms so large on the metaphysical horizon, a brief treatment of the subject seems essential. We shall study Lonergan's view of our cognitional structure in the light of the intellect's most complete and satisfying operation-the judgment. We can distinguish three levels in our act of cognition: the level of presentation, the level of intelligence, and the level of reflection. For a better understanding of the same it seems convenient to discuss the matter with the help of an example. We limit ourselves to the one proposed by Lonergan in his chapter on "Concrete Judgments of Fact."

> Suppose a man to return from work to his tidy home and to find the windows smashed, smoke in the air and water on the floor. Suppose him to make the extremely restrained judgment of fact, Something has happened. The question is not whether he was right, but how he reached his affirmation. (281)

The primary basis of this judgment or affirmation lies in two different sets of data. The man has a vivid recollection of the neat and well-kept house from which he set out for work that morning. He is now confronted by a scene of utter desolation. Thus far we have neither inquiry nor affirmation. We are at the level of presentation. But the man not only views the present data and recalls the previous, he unites the two separate sets of data by referring them to the same subject: there can be no doubt about it, the present derelict affair was once his spacious bungalow. We are now at the level of intelligence. By referring the different sets of data to the same house he *understands* that a change has taken place. "If the same thing exhibits different individual data at different times, it has

changed. If there occurs a change, something has happened." (282)

We have as yet no affirmation, only a set of statements. Finally, the intellect combines the level of presentation and the level of intelligence and posits the affirmation, something has happened. The second level presupposes and complements the first; the third presupposes and completes the second.

A further question immediately presents itself: on what grounds does the intellect combine the two levels and posit the affirmation? Lonergan tells us that " to grasp evidence as sufficient for a prospective judgment is to grasp a prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned." (280) Lonergan speaks of a formally unconditioned and a virtually unconditioned. The former has no conditions whatever; the sole example is God, the Absolutely Necessary Being. The virtually unconditioned has conditions, but these conditions are fulfilled.

> Accordingly, a virtually unconditioned involves three elements,
> 1. a conditioned
> 2. a link between conditioned and conditions
> 3. fulfillment of the conditions.
>
> Hence a prospective judgment will be a virtually unconditioned if
> 1. it is a conditioned
> 2. its conditions are known
> 3. its conditions are fulfilled. (280)

The prospective judgment is a conditioned, for it stands in need of evidence to be affirmed. Through an act of intelligence the data presented are understood. At this stage we form concepts, definitions, etc. Thus are conditions known. Then follows an act of reflective understanding whereby the mind through an insight realizes that the present case fits the definition or concept. By grasping the conditions as fulfilled the mind posits the prospective judgment by an affirmation or negation. This, in short, is our scheme of knowing.

But one can push the point further and demand, " How does one know that the conditions are fulfilled? " In answer to this Lonergan introduces the notions of vulnerable and invulnerable insights. When further questions are to be asked on a particular

issue, insights are said to be "vulnerable"; when there are no further pertinent questions, the insights are termed" invulnerable." When an insight meets the issue squarely, when it settles the matter, there are no further questions to be asked, and so there are no further insights to challenge the initial position. Thus each time we are faced with the question, is this so?, we have to consider whether or not further questions may be asked which will reveal the insight as insufficient. If the answer is no, we can ground an affirmation. Thus our knowledge progresses step by step as we pass from one judgment to another.

But what if there are further pertinent questions which do not occur to me? Fr. MacKinnon informs us,

> This inadequacy is to be met by increased intellectual development and by a more critical investigation of the given problem. It cannot be met by any solution which seeks to transcend the limitations of the human mind and compare the insight to reality .... The judgment of the mind is based on the evidence known by the mind. If the evidence seems sufficient to me, if I know of no further pertinent questions, the natural dynamism operative in my mind leads me to make a judgment and allows me to feel secure in the judgment once made.[4]

TRANSITION TO ExPLICIT METAPHYSICS

With Lonergan's cognitional theory examined we can now revert to the main theme of our essay: how is this metaphysics, dependent on cognitional structure, evolved? Just how the metaphysical elements are drawn out from our way of thinking will be discussed later. At this stage we shall try to unfold the nature of the transition from latent to explicit metaphysics. As the principle of the isomorphism of knowing and known plays a pivotal role in this explanation, a few pertinent remarks on this principle will be helpful.

Between our way of knowing and the things known there exists an isomorphism. Lonergan asserts,

• "Understanding according to Bernard F. Lonergan, S. J.," *The Thomist*, XXVIII (April, 1964), p.

> For knowing and known, if they are not an identity, at least stand in some correspondence and, as the known is reached only through knowing, structural features of the one are bound to be reflected in the other. (115)

On the strength of this principle it seems one could validly pass from the study of our cognitional structure to the affirmation of the structure of reality for " the simplest reason why our knowing has its peculiar structure would be that proportionate being has a parallel structure." (499)

With that brief digression we resume our explanation of the transition from latent to explicit metaphysics. This transition may be described as a deduction requiring a major premise, a set of primary minor premises and a set of secondary minor premises.

> The major premise is the isomorphism that obtains between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known. If the knowing consists of a related set of acts and the known is the related set of contents of these acts, then the pattern of the relations between the acts is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of these acts. This premise is analytic. (399)

The primary minor premises consist of a series of affirmations of the invariant structure present in our knowing. This invariant structure is the three-step process of experience, understanding and judging. Now, according to the principle of the isomorphism of knowing and known, it follows that a similar unification of these three elements must reside in the structure of the being known, namely, " a content of experience, a content of understanding and a content of judgment." The major and primary minor premise deal with the invariant structure or form of knowing. "The set of secondary minor premises is supplied by reorientated science and common sense." These supply the data or matter of cognition. Thus Lonergan can hold that "metaphysics . . . (is) the invariant form for which the sciences provide the variable matter." (733)

When the knower becomes aware of the structure operative in his cognitional acts, he passes from a latent to an explicit metaphysics.

For in any case, cognitional activity operates within heuristic structures towards goals that are isomorphic with the structures. If this basic fact is noted . . . if the principle of isomorphism is grasped, then the latent metaphysics, to which everyone subscribes without knowing he does so, ceases to be latent and becomes explicit. (400)

METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS

Potency, Form, Act

We are now in a position to discuss the elements that go to make up metaphysics as elaborated by Lonergan. These elements are central potency, form, act; conjugate potency, form, act; explanatory genera and species.

Lonergan argues to potency, form and act by pressing into service the principle of the isomorphism of knowing and known. Proportionate being is what is to be known by experience, intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. " A corresponding trilogy must obtain in the proportionate known, both the presently known and whatever would be known in a full explanation of the whole domain of proportionate being." [5] This trilogy Lonergan designates as potency, form and act.

Potency is that component of proportionate being which is to be known in explanatory knowledge by an " intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue." The empirical residue for Lonergan is the material element of reality having no immanent intelligibility of its own. Individuality, particularities of space and time .... The component to be fully known by " understanding things fully in their relations to one another," he calls form. Finally, what is to be known "by uttering the virtually unconditioned ' yes ' of reasonable judgment," is act. These three components constitute a single being. That which is experienced is understood; and what is understood is what is affi;rmed. Just as an act of cognition, though comprising three levels, yields a single knowledge, so also the contents of these three levels form a unity, constituting a single

• MacKinnon, *loc. cit.* (July 1964), p. 347.

proportionate being. It is not that we first experience a proportionate being, then understand it and finally affirm it. They :fuse into a single known. " Hence potency, :form and act, since they are known by experience, understanding and judgment, are not three proportionate beings but three components in a single proportionate being." (

Lonergan introduces a distinction in these metaphysical elements. There is central potency, :form, act and conjugate potency, :form, act. The necessity of this distinction arises because explanatory [6] knowledge is knowledge of a thing in relation to other things. But to know a thing as thing is to grasp and affirm it as a unity, identity, whole. We have, therefore, a central potency, form and act which are components of each thing and a :further conjugate potency, form and act which expresses the totality of its relations to other things.

Central form corresponds to the concrete and intelligible unity grasped in understanding a thing and is required to understand change. Central act, i.e., what is affirmed, is existence. Since central :form is the intelligible content, central potency will be identified with the individuality of the thing-its empirical residue.

> First then, in any plant, animal or man, there is to be affirmed an individually existing unity. By central potency it is individual; by central form it is a unity, identity, whole; by central act it is existent. (459)

If we consider now, not the thing as a unity but the being in its relation to others, we have a whole gamut of such relationships. These relations are verified and systematically expressed by the scientific method in abstract propositions. These empirically verified explanatory relations implicitly define terms which are grasped by understanding; they may be termed conjugate forms. Conjugate act is occurrence, for that is what is verified when we affirm relations defining a conjugate form. Finally "conjugate forms are verified in spatio-temporal continua, con-

[0] Description signifies beings as related to us; explanation, beings as related to one another.

junctions and successions." (437) These aspects of the empirical residue can be designated as conjugate potency.

Lonergan now asks a further question, what is the nature of these metaphysical elements? The answer, he tells us, is that they have no essence of their own. "They express the structure in which one knows what proportionate being is." When a proportionate being is understood, this is the mould in which an act of insight will take place. " They arise from the understanding and regard proportionate being, not as understood but only as to be understood." (497) Potency, form and act, therefore, seem to be a sort of general scheme by which we know proportionate being. More precise knowledge of what the form is must be obtained from science, Lonergan maintains.

Immediately we are faced with a poser. Are the metaphysical elements, then, mere logical entities? Have they no ontological value? The explanation given above sets potency, form and act in reference to cognitional activity. Are these elements only a structure of our knowing or are they also constituents of the known? Lonergan sees the force of the difficulty and answers:

> So, as far as these definitions go, the differences of the metaphysical elements are differences in the process of knowing and, unless further evidence is forthcoming, they are not differences in the being to be known. Still one may expect the further evidence to be available, for the simplest reason why our knowing has its peculiar structure would be that proportionate being has a parallel structure. (499)

What is this " further evidence " that helps tide us over this difficulty? The key is "intelligibility." We have defined being as the objective of the pure desire to know. Being is what is to be known when we correctly understand. It is the goal of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. Implied in such a definition is the intrinsic intelligibility of being. Since being is intrinsically intelligible the possibility of knowledge is also affirmed.

But this intrinsic intelligibility is not of the same type. There is the intelligibility corresponding to an act of understanding. This is formal intelligibility. But an act of understanding pre-

supposes something to be understood, some data into which inquiry is made. This is not the formal intelligibility attained when one understands. We may call it potential intelligibility. It is in potency to be understood by critical inquiry. Finally, there is the third type of intelligibility. It is the intelligibility resulting from the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. This we call factual intelligibility. " While the potentially intelligible is what can be understood, and the formally intelligible is what may or may not be understood, the actually intelligible is restricted to what in fact is." (501)

Intelligibility is intrinsic to being, hence the three types of intelligibility will also be intrinsic to being. Proportionate being is what is to be known by experience, intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. Neither of the three alone will yield knowledge of proportionate being. All three-experience, understanding and affirmation-are required corresponding to the three components of intelligibility intrinsic to proportionate being. Thus potency, form and act are not merely structural features of our cognitional activity but are immanent in the very constitution of the reality of being.

But there are other differentiations to be kept in mind. There are also other formal intelligibilities besides the one that constitutes the being's unity. The central form unites a variety of conjugate forms which are defined differently from it. Tagged on to the conjugate forms we have conjugate potency and act. These, too, form constitutents of the being. Thus "for every difference in intelligibility, there is a difference intrinsic to the reality of known proportionate being." (501)

Explanatory Genera and Species

By genus is meant that there are things with a different set of conjugates which render them different from one another. The terms and relations that go with one thing are distinct from the terms and relations of another. On logical grounds alone there can be no transition from one such thing to another. Thus the laws of chemistry form a genus which is not the genus

defined by the laws of biology. These genera are called explanatory because they regard things not as described but as explained, i.e., in their relations to one another.

How do these genera arise? Take the field of chemistry. Within this domain we have things which react with other things in accordance with fixed chemical laws. The totality of chemical activities can thus be explained according to these chemical laws. But, in the case of a plant, we find that, besides certain activities that can be explained by chemical laws, there are other activities which, if viewed in the light of chemical laws alone, are not quite explicable. Such would be acts of nutrition, reproduction, etc. In order to explain them we have to pass to a higher viewpoint, that of biology. This higher viewpoint, which renders the new set of activities explicable, gives rise to a new genus.

> The lower viewpoint is insufficient for it has to regard as merely coincidental what in fact is regular. This higher viewpoint is justified, for the conjugates and the schemes constitute a higher system that makes regular what otherwise would be merely coincidental. (256)

Each genus has its own set of conjugates. However, not all these conjugates will be applicable to all things within that genus. We have, for example, the domain of animals; this hinges on the genus of sensibility. Not all the conjugates of sensibility refer to all animals. In these differences of sensibility resides the basis for differences in organic structure. These differences in sensibility will thus bring about differences within the genus. Hence, within the genus we have various species. Thus "different combinations of forms from (a particular) set serve to define explanatorily the unities of things which differ specifically from one another but pertain to the same explanatory genus." (438)

Lonergan's conception of genera and species is not that of logical unifying entities. Autonomous sciences endowed with their distinct set of terms and concepts do not admit of a logical transition from one to another. Genera and species, rather, are

elements of unification in the order of being itself. To drive home this point, Lonergan sets forth his conception of genera and species in reference to potency, form and act.

> Different combinations of the verified correlations yield a range of schemes of occurrence, and in the measure such schemes are realized they make systematic the occurrence of (certain) conjugate acts. (438)

These conjugate acts usually occur systematically in virtue of the schemes. But some occurrences may be the result of random or chance. If there are such random occurrences, we could say that they lack intelligibility, i. e., lack an explanation. These would be instances of the merely empirical residue on the level of conjugate acts. " For a manifold of random occurrences offers a much larger range of merely coincidental conjunctions and successions, and such conjunctions and successions pertain to the empirical residue." (438) When we are confronted by certain regular occurrences that cannot be explained within the framework of the given set of conjugates, we move to a higher viewpoint and thus establish a higher genus with its own schemes and conjugate acts.

Now the manifold of conjugate acts which Lonergan calls the empirical residue stands as potency in regard to a higher set of conjugate forms that systematize it and constitute a new genus. Thus we can have an entire string of higher and higher genera, the lower acting as potency to the higher which may be designated as form. It must be pointed out that the lower conjugates survive in the higher genus for " without them there would be nothing for the higher set of conjugates to systematize." But the *things* made up by the lower conjugates do not survive. For things are an intelligible unity, identity, whole. The intelligible unity comprises the sum total of forms-central and conjugate. Now" the same data under the totality of their aspects cannot be the data for different things." (439) Thus, if a thing is an animal, it is not a plant or some lower genus. True the conjugates relating to the genus of biology will also be verified in the animal, but these con-

jugates have been systematized and subsumed under a higher viewpoint, i.e., sensibility. Hence the lower conjugates survive in the higher genus but not as things. Corresponding to each such independent genus we have autonomous sciences.

After this explanation of genera and species the obvious question is, is this conception of genera and species correct? is this de facto realized in our universe?

Lonergan honestly admits that there is no absolute certainty in this matter. But he insists that this view is" uniquely probable." If we are to give a coherent world view of this universe, if we are ever to unify the mass of logically unrelated sciences, then appeal must be made to higher viewpoints. This, moreover, is the only way one can explain how higher orders of reality can be immanent in lower orders without violating lower classical laws.

Finally, this conception of genera and species is based not merely on an analysis of empirical sciences but on the fundamental properties of insight. An act of insight takes place in imaginative representations. This leads to a certain accumulation of viewpoints. Imaginative representations of these accumulated viewpoints serve as data for higher insights. This process can go on and on. The lower order or genus yields images which enable insight to grasp clues to the laws of a higher order. Thus the images of the eye, the optic nerve and the cerebrum can lead to an insight whereby an occulist can study the properties of a psychic operation, i.e., seeing. "Potency corresponds to the imagined empirical residue; form corresponds to the insight." Grouping these various considerations we get a coherent account of what is meant by explanatory genera and species. This " resultant account has no competitors, for to the best of my knowledge, no one else has attempted to work out the pure theory of genera and species, where the genera and species are conceived not descriptively but explanatorily ." This conception, Lonergan assures us, is uniquely probable, for it meets the issue squarely, and there are no available alternative views.

But the issue of greatest moment is whether the universe

does in fact contain things that are differentiated by explanatory genera and species.

> If we appeal to the immemorial convictions of common sense or to the actual division of scientific departments, all evidence favors the affirmation of different explanatory genera. (441)

The contention that things are all of one kind is not based on concrete and substantial evidence but is the outcome of a mechanistic conception of reality.

JusTIFICATION OF METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM

We have analysed Lonergan's metaphysics of proportionate being in some detail. We can now pass on to a consideration of his metaphysical method and discuss its validity. Metaphysics is primarily a process of self-knowledge. It can, therefore, only take place within the consciousness of rational beings. Now, if we reflect on our cognitional acts, we realize that inquiry, insight, formulation, critical reflection, grasp of the virtually unconditioned and judgment are its necessary components. Their presence is incontrovertible, for without them man would be neither intelligent nor reasonable. Furthermore, at the heart of this cognitional activity lies the pure and unrestricted desire to know.

When the subject reflects on these inescapable elements of experience, intelligent inquiry and affirmation, he is forcibly made aware of his own " subjection to such inevitability to issue into his affirmation of himself as an individual existing unity differentiated by capacities to experience, to inquire, to reflect. Now this affirmation of oneself as a knower is also an affirmation of the general struCture of any proportionate object of knowledge." (528) Thus Lonergan's method is simply to analyze our cognitional activity and to pass from it to the domain of being. The question is, can one accept such a method? how does Lonergan justify it?

Every philosophy, he assures us, is based on cognitional structures correctly or incorrectly conceived. Therefore the

surest way to test a metaphysical system is to see if it squares with a true account of cognitional activity. Metaphysics, as developed by Lonergan, fulfils this requirement.

> For metaphysical structure of proportionate being as definitively explained, is an object of our knowledge, not through present scientific explanation of the universe, nor through any alleged inspection of the essence of the universe, but through its isomorphism with the utilized structure of our knowing. (525)

Another characteristic of a true philosophy is that it should ground a universal viewpoint. Based on cognitional structure, it should be able to sift the various elements that go to make this structure. It should be able " to construct any philosophic position by postulating appropriate and plausible omissions and confusion of elements " and be able to clarify its own stand by pointing out the flaws in the counterpositions and thus correcting them. Here, too, Lonergan's metaphysics fills the bill. This is not to suggest that Lonergan denies the possibility of any improvement on his effort. He fully realizes that such improvements will come about through a better grasp of the polymorphism inherent in our human knowing and a more accurate account of experience, insight and judgment. He rejects, however, a thorough and radical overthrow of his system.

> Rather, our meaning is that such improvements will not include any radical change in this philosophy, for the philosophy rests, not on the account of experience, insight, judgment and the polymorphic consciousness, but on the defining pattern of relations that bring these four into a single dynamic structure. (568)

To wind up this treatment of Lonergan's metaphysics of proportionate being, let us consider one final question posed by Lonergan himself. Can there be more than one true metaphysics or is a true metaphysics unique? Lonergan asserts that his conception gives unique results.

The argument is that

1. If a man is in the intellectual pattern of experience, and
2. If he is knowing an object within the domain of proportionate

being, then his knowing will consist in experiencing, understanding and judging and the known will be a compound of potency, form and act where potency, form and act are related as the experienced, the understood and the affirmed and where they have no meaning other than whatever has to be presupposed if there is inquiry, what is to be known in as much as there is understanding and what is known in as much as a judgment results from a grasp of the virtually unconditioned. (735)

This position is unassailable. The only way out would be to show that the supposition, namely, that cognition comprises experiencing, understanding and judgment, does not accord with reality. But any reflection on one's acts of cognition will reveal the absurdity of such a denial. Of course, if man were endowed with a different cognitional structure, there would perhaps be the possibility of some other metaphysics. But the point at issue is not the possibility of another metaphysics in a different universe but whether a different metaphysics is possible in this universe. There is no such possibility, Lonergan avers.

CoNCLUSION

Lonergan suggests that his metaphysics could be used as a yardstick to measure other systems. An ambitious claim for an "innovator." And yet, is it? Lonergan has set forth the characteristics of a unique and true metaphysics and has shown convincingly that his development corresponds to the demands made. Basically, it is a development of the pure desire to know, keeping close to our way of knowing. Once this position is accepted, the rest follows. Any system that is at variance with this position must be rejected as a counter position. Since the mind wants to get at the truth, this counter position will be corrected through keener reflection. We thus come back to the position, vindicating Lonergan's assertion.

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SPIRITUAL DYNAMISM IN MARECHAL

JOSEPH MARECHAL'S major philosophical contribution was his development in Thomism of the dynamism of the intellect. He attempted to confront the static idealism of Kant with the tendential nature of cognition as he found it in St. Thomas and hereby to release Kantianism from the knowing subject and bring it into the objective world.[1] Marechal was a convinced Thomist in the fervor of the revival, and he approached his chosen task from this peculiar metaphysical point of view. Thus, many who follow his general thought will use a different means of analysis and evidence for their conclusions. But Marechal's own analysis retains some value and has been fruitfully utilized in other fields. Gilleman's analysis of the dynamism of the moral subject and the role of the moral act are professedly Marechalian in inspiration.[2] The approach to the moral subject in terms of final option is at least indirectly rooted in Marechal's analysis of the nature of human dynamism.

Although German idealists constitute a major influence on Marechal's thought, he derived his theses of intellectual dynamism from the Thomism common to scholastic philosophers. In Marechal's presentation we can trace the scholastic origins of his theory. Our attempt here is to explicate Marechal's understanding of the spiritual dynamism of man as he finds it presented in St. Thomas. In a previous article we have sketched the discussion of the intellectual dynamism in the context of the problem of objectification and the proof of the existence of God.[3] At the present time we would like to approach this dynamism from another angle, through the discussion of the

[1] J. Marechal, *Le point de depart de la metaphysique,* Cahier V (Paris, 19ft6), pp. 4-5, !l91.

• G. Gilleman, *The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology,* trans!. W. Ryan and A. Vachon (Westminster, 1959), cf. Part II, Ch. II, note 4.

• P. Burns, "The Marechalian Approach to the Existence of God," *Tke New Scholasticism,* XLII (1968), pp.

relation of the intellect and will. These faculties were studied by Marechal in their mutual relations within the tendential spirituality of man.

Marechal finds evidence of a tendency to action innate in the intellect in the Thomistic analysis of two operations of the human intellect, assimilation of the specifications of the object of knowledge and the objectifying affirmation of these specifications in the relation of logical truth. Further investigation of the significance of these processes will reveal the relationship between intellect and will as they mediate the profound spiritual tendency of man.

Although the intellect must receive from the external object the matter of its knowing operation, it does not stand passive before the object and react to outside stimulation. Rather, the elaboration of the intelligible species is a process originated and completed by the intellect itself on the occasion of the presence of objective determinations in the phantasm. [4] The intellect, therefore, must move itself into action rather than receiving its operation from the object. A tendency toward the assimilation of sensible determinations which only awaits the conditions permitting its activity is innate in the human intellect. Man has an active tendency to knowing as a constitutive element of his intellectual nature, ontologically prior to all activity.

The process of objectification which immediately follows assimilation further reveals this dynamic tendency. The relation of logical truth established by the ontological affirmation asserts conformity of the contents of the intellect to the real object. [5] But the specifications of the object assimilated by the intellect represent only the dematerialized form of a sensible object. Because of a double indetermination-in individuation and in the order of being-the representative content of the species is not adequate to the real object. The affirmation establishing a relation of logical truth must complement the species' lack of individuation and supply for the debility of

• Marechal, *op. cit.,* pp. H!4 ff.

• *Ibid.,* pp. 78-77.

its being. Without such elaboration the representative content cannot be referred to objective existence. The individuation is provided by reflective conversion to the phantasm and through it to matter. [6] Such a conversion supposes and manifests the unity of human operation in a plurality of faculties.

Its supplementing of the species on the level of being reveals a more significant element of the dynamism of the intellect. The being of the object represented in the species is both finite and contingent. Such a reality is actually existent only through an intrinsic relation to Absolute Being. Hence the affirmation which relates the represented specifications to the existent object must, in order to attain the conformity of logical truth, relate the represented reality to Absolute Being. In both these references-to matter through the phantasm and to Absolute Being-the dynamism of the affirming intellect carries beyond its conceptual or representative power, beyond its functioning as a reflector of sensible reality. An existent sensible object is known, constituted in a lived relation of logical truth, only in the subsuming of the assimilated specifications by a dynamic tendency of the intellect to the existent and ultimately to Pure Being.[7]

The Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge implies an intellectual dynamism which is operative in its assimilative and affirmative functions. That this tendency is a natural one can be seen through a consideration of the temporally first intellectual activity of man. Every subsequent activity of the intellect and will might be accounted for by the drawing power of a good presented in the intellect or the residual power of a prior act of will. But the first exercise of human intellectual dynamism cannot be so specified or excited, since the intellect and will have not functioned previously. God is the only other " external " agent capable of moving the intellect and will to first activity. But his operation is in the nature itself, not added as a complement to it. Obviously, then, the first activity must proceed from an innate tendency. [8]

• *Ibid.,* pp. 208-9. [7] *Ibid.,* pp. US-52. • *Ibid.,* pp. !!95-96.

Since the tendential power is natural, it must be traced through the faculties to its roots in the ontological structure of human substantiality. The dynamism must now be examined as it is manifest in the two spiritual powers of man: intellect and will. This study proceeds by a consideration of the spiritual operations which should show the interrelation of the two faculties in their mediation of the substantial human dynamism.

* * *

The intellect and will are certainly closely related in their activity. Four activities of the intellect are under the direct influence of the will. In the first place, the direction of attention, the focusing on an aspect of the known object and its further investigation, is attributed to the will's direction of the intellect. Second, the actuation of habitual knowledge is in many cases under the direction of the will. A man can choose to think about one or another of the things present in intellectual memory. The formation of judgments of opinion in which the evidence of the known truth is inadequate to move the intellect to affirmation or negation is a third operation involving the will. Finally, the will is responsible for the assent of faith.[9] In addition to these activities, the role of the will in intellectual operations is used to account for the presence of error. The intellect in many cases is thus directed by the will rather than working from an independent inner dynamism and finality.

Moreover, the relation between intellect and will is reciprocal. For the will can desire freely only that which is presented to it by the intellect as good. The objective goals of the will are concretized in the intellect. In second act the intellect and will are related as specifying principle and dynamic principle: the twin sources of human intellectual life.[10]

Some general considerations of dynamism may now be introduced to direct the investigation of man's intellectual tendency. As dynamism emerges into activity, its operation must have a definite goal. Action is essentially the coming-to-be of an

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 288.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 289-91.

effect and as such an element of its being must be the specification of its tenn. Activity can be considered as the effect itself in its state of becoming. Hence the action must be a tendency to a definite tenn, the coming-to-be of some determinate reality. Obviously, when there is no patient or recipient of action, the action under all its aspects emanates from the active power and owes all the specifications of its being to that active power. Hence the end of the activity is communicated by the active power and pre-exists in its dynamic dispositions. Briefly, a tendency to action is a tendency to a goal, and this end is a constitutive element of the dynamic tendency itsel£.[11] A tendential nature is a tending to something definite, and that goal is contained as a dynamic disposition in the power itself.

In every activity, and by reduction in every tendential power, dual aspects are discernable: specification and exercise, direction and power/ [2] By an analogy with the relation of their operations, the hypothesis is advanced that within man's spiritual dynamism intellect and will stand as faculties in the relationship of specification and power. The will would originally be a natural power which is specified by the intellect.

Further analysis must be undertaken to strengthen the analogy based on the observed interrelation of the operations of the intellect and will. The investigation may be divided into two parts. The first is to show that the will is indeed the dynamic principle of the activity of the intellect. This is to be accomplished by showing that the Thomistic ontology of cognition implies that the intellect considered in distinction from the will does not possess a proper dynamism. The second part considers the intellect as it provides the specification of the will in both its natural and free operations.

Immateriality is the root of cognition, since it provides the possibility of interiority of an object and self-presence of the subject. To know is the property of a fonn which in its actuality rises above full communication to matter. Knowledge is an immediate consequence of an act's self-possession, as

[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 266-70.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 294.

opposed to its communication to potency. The formal act of knowledge is consciousness, the self-presence of an act which is self-possessed, the luminosity of a form which is unmixed with potency. Thus the formal act of the intellect is conscious presence. This state is attained only when the intellect has been actuated, is in exercise, through the specifications of an object. But the act of consciousness itself is independent of the tendency and repose which belong to the finalistic activity of assimilation and objectification. Knowing and consciousness are neither a doing nor a resting in an achieved end. Rather, to be conscious, to be intellectually" operative" in the strictest sense, is simply to be self-present, conscious of self and the specifications of the object which are interior to the self.[13]

Moreover, the species considered in its formal reality does not involve any consequent finality. The dynamism which objectifies it, like the dynamism which could assume it as the specification of an elicited act, originates in the will, not in the intellect and its formal complement.[14]

By this analysis of the nature of knowledge the conclusion is reached that the intellect as distinguished from the will possesses no intrinsic dynamism but is tendential through the influence of the will. As distinguished over against the will, the intellect is undynamic. The experienced dynamism of human intellectuality, in its first activity of assimilation and affirmative objectification, in its search for further knowledge, in the operations of belief and opinion and the formation of hypotheses, is the operation not of pure intellect but of intellect united with will.

The form specifying the dynamism originating in the human substance itself and participated in by the will would be found in the intellect. But only the nature of the intellect itself is present prior to the assimilation of the determinations of the sensible object.[15] This form of the intellect governs all its activity and can be expressed only in the most general norm of its operations, the transcendental concept of being. This

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 60-66, 808. *"Ibid.,* p. [16] *Ibid.,* pp. !!97-98.

form enters into every operation in a constitutive and regulative function. Man knows everything as being, as falling under the principles o£ being.[16] Moreover, man's intellect is subject to no intrinsic limitations, its representing and signifying embrace all the grades and levels o£ being. The .form specifying the original power and dynamism of an intellectual nature is expressed in the most general concept of being.[17] This form of being is present in the intellect prior to all activity as a dynamic disposition, not an innate idea. Thus not only does the will function as the dynamism of the activity of the intellect, but the intellect provides the specifications of the power of the will, as it functions as a natural power as well as an elicited or free one.

In their first actualities the intellect and will are the specification and power of man's spiritual dynamism. But the will's two modes of operation, natural and free, are in different relationships to the intellect and the profound tendency. The will functioning with the intellect in the activities of assimilation and affirmation is a *voluntas naturalis* and its operation is similar to the *appetitus naturalis* in each of the corporeal faculties of man.[18] But the activity of the will which follows the operation of the intellect, *voluntas libera,* differs from the natural appetites in its spontaneity and consequent freedom.

The natural will moves the intellect necessarily in the assimilation and objectification of the specifications of the sensible object. A double direction of activity then opens to the free will. It can center on the good perceived by the intellect in the known object, or, following a reflexive act of the intellect in which the act of knowledge with its objective content is itself perceived as an entitative completion and good of the intellect, the will can freely direct the acquisition of further acts o£ knowledge. This psychological mechanism accounts for the natural desire for knowledge and the freedom of man's fulfillment of this capacity. His intellect can perceive that

[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 151 ft.,
[17] *Ibid.,* pp. 278-80.
[18] *Ibid.,* pp.

knowledge is a good and so present it to the will so that the further quest can be a free act of the will.[19]

The natural dynamism of the will remains operative in at least two consequent intellectual operations, the assimilation of the specifications and the affirmation objectifying these determinations under the form of being. Certainly these are finalized operations, but they remain prior in their finality to the elicited acts of the will which are specified by objective knowledge. These operations are under the dominion of the natural finality of the will,2°

Moreover, the assent of the intellect, its firm adherence to a proposition, is given only in response to a clearly manifest object or under the direction of an elicited act of the will. The power of the objective assent, its motivation of the intellectual operation, is a function of the antecedent natural finality, a desire for the truth of the object. Every assent is in virtue of the dynamism operating from the will, functioning either naturally or through an elicited act.[21]

Intellectual dynamism is rooted in the capacity of the intellect for objective consciousness and the desire, natural or elicited, of the will for this good. This general tendency of human intellectuality towards objective knowledge originates in the human substantial principle itself. But the particular concrete forms which this dynamism assumes are achieved by the power of the free will with the acquired specifications of the intellect. A complex of habits is built up and serves as a second nature in the direction of intellectual dynamism.[22]

Each of the operations of the intellect and the elicited acts of the will are specified to some extent by the objective determinations which have been assimilated and brought into cognition. But the fundamental tendency of the natural will which originates the motion still holds sway over all its activity. Just as the a priori specification of the intellect, the form of being, is regulative of all the operations of the intellect, so the

[19] *Ibid.,* p. !t99.
[20] *Ibid.,* pp. !t24-30, 143-44.
[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 227-28.
[22] *Ibid.,* p. 300.

finality innate in the dynamism of the will is operative in each elicited act. The elicited act makes the general tendency of the natural will concrete in a particular set of circumstances, just as this or that being is subsumed by the intellect under the general form of being.

* * * *

Throughout this analysis the intellect and will have been treated as distinct but related powers or faculties of man, much as one might discuss the relation of the various internal or external sensory faculties. This is the common way of speaking and any deviation from it prior to this point would have needlessly complicated the discussion. But if Marechal's analysis is accurate, the intellect and will are not distinct principles of operation, each with its proper specification and exercise, determination and power. Rather, man has a spiritual ability to operate, and within the principle of this operation as within the principle of each of the sensory faculties we distinguish the specification and the power. The spiritual principle of operation considered under the aspect of formal specification or determination is the intellect; and considered under the aspect of power, the will.

Every aspect of intellectual activity pertains to the realm of "exercise" and finality. All becoming and assimilative activity directed through the acquired forms to the plentitude of truth is the operation of the rational appetite, the will. All dynamic elements of spiritual operation are the functioning of the will.[3]

On the other hand, everything in spiritual activity-whether we term the operation intellectual or volitional-which is specification or determination pertains to the order of formal causality; all this belongs not to the will but to the intellect. Appetite as such contributes no specification to an operation. Rather, the intellect enters into the activity of a dynamic subject as form, either natural or intentional.[4]

[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 800-01.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 801-M.

Every spiritual operation has the twin apects of specification and power. In the action is an orientation and thrust (power) to a definite term (specification). Prior analysis has shown the interpenetration of formal and final causality in an operation. In the first actuality whence the operation proceeds the double aspects are also found. Specification in the first act is the intellect as natural or intentional form. Power in first act is the will, with the possibility of functioning naturally or freely. Will is the dynamism of a form and intellect the specification of a power; twin-and distinct-aspects of an active potency. [25]

Consciousness or self-presence is the apex of the order of formality, the intellect. Possession crowns the order of finality, the will. In objective knowledge, consciousness is the blossoming of possession in a spiritual tendency. In the concrete the perfection of intellect and will in conscious possession of objective reality is one and the same.[26] The True is the Good, is Being.[27]

Attention is now directed to the finality innate in the profound spiritual tendency of man of which the intellect and will are aspects. Two points are to be established: first, that the dynamism of human intellectual life does have a definite term and goal; second, that this goal is the conscious possession of the Infinite Being.

That every activity must have inherent in it a definite term or goal has already been established. If the action follows an act of cognition, the specifying form originating the determination of the goal in the activity may be the act of knowledge functioning as an exemplary cause. But if the activity is a natural one, then the specifications of the term originate in the nature of the active principle itself.[28] Now the original determinations of the dynamism of human intellectuality are prior to the objective specifications which concretize the general tendency in its subsequent activity, for the first act of assimila-

•• *Ibid.,* p.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 808.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 805.
•• *Ibid.,* pp. 266-70.

tion proceeds entirely from the intellect-will. Human intellectual dynamism originates a finalized operation without the assistance of a distinct principle of exemplarity which would adequately account for the specification of its effect, an intelligible species with its peculiar unity.[29] Likewise, the objective affirmation of the species manifests a finality of the dynamic intellect which exceeds the specifying power of the representative content of the species.[30] Hence this dynamism has a definite term which pre-exists in its active dispositions and governs all its activity.

The nature of this final term is pre-figured in the innate specifications which direct the activity of the intellectual tendency. The form of the intellect is expressed only in the general notion of being. The power tends to conscious possession of all that is. Human spiritual power is subject to no limitations short of non-being; it reaches the entire realm of being. The only possible goal of an unlimited dynamic tendency to being is Infinite Being. No other being or series of beings is capable of bringing it to satiety by fully actuating the capacity and desire of the human tendency. Hence the final goal of man's profound spiritual tendency is God.[31]

In search of being in its fullness the spiritual power moves to the first assimilation and objectification of the specifications of the object present in sensation. And in search of this same goal the power engages its specifications in the entire series of activities and formal possessions, concretizations of the form of being and instances of the good. The elicited acts of the will are all in virtue of its fundamental orientation to the good in its fullness. Operating naturally and freely the will activates the form and specification of man's tendential nature. And the term, God, is sought in all operations of intellect-will.

Human intellectual activity is a gradual filling out of man's inborn capacity and desire. The psychological life of man, rather than a series of discrete acts, resembles a continuous growth whose term is written in the nature of the power itself

•• *Ibid.,* pp. 148-46. [80] *Ibid.,* pp. [81] *Ibid.,* pp. 806-H!.

prior to any objective specifications. The finite objects are brought into consciousness and known objectively, loved and chosen as goals in virtue of the fundamental determination which can be neither chosen nor denied, because it is the nature of the power of affirmation and love. Man can know a finite being and love a limited good only because of his capacity to know and love Infinite Being.[2]

In Marechal's metaphysical psychology man has a tendential spirituality. The profound spiritual tendency of man is open to the conscious possession of all being in virtue of its natural capacity and desire for Infinite Being. Intellect and will, man's spiritual faculties, are elements of his tendency and related as its specification and power. Every spiritual operation involves both formal and final causality, proceeds from both intellect and will together mediating the efficiency of the substantial principle. And each activity is an actuation of man's tendency to God, who is therefore sought and partially possessed in objective consciousness of participated being.

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•• *Ibid.,* pp. 319-!W,

BOOK REVIEWS

The Church. By HANs KuNG. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968. Pp. 529. $6.95.

To do a " fine-toothed comb review " of this volume is not my intention. Obviously others have combed its pages with a rather critical eye, as the possible mounting of a Roman process suggests. No doubt many questions are raised by the author which are quite apt to incite interest-if not the ire-of anyone on the defensive about the prerogatives of either the "official Church "or scholastic theology. This ought not to be a surprise to anyone, however, since it should have been well known (at least to the *sapientes)* that H. Kling, like a lot of other people, is fed up both with the formalism in the Church which tends to stymie renewal and the latent rationalism which tempts scholastic theologians.

For all its admirable comprehensiveness, *The Church* is a volume characterized by a few recurrent themes. One of these might be called *the humanity of the Church.* Indeed, I believe that Kling's ideas about what it means for the Church to be made up of sinful men are quite central to his entire ecclesiology. For the sake of simplification I shall concentrate on this single theme in the paragraphs which make up the remainder of this review.

To begin with, here are three rather telling passages from different sections of the volume, transcribed as specimens of Kling's thought on the humanity of the Church, for the purpose of analysis. The first of these is taken from the chapter in which the author discusses the meaning of the Church's being the "creation of the Spirit":

> To avoid confusing the Spirit and the Church it would be better not to speak of the Church as a ' divine ' reality. The individual believer, after all, does not become a divine reality because he is filled with and governed by the Spirit .... So it is we believe *in* the Holy Spirit ... ; by contrast we believe *the* Holy Church .... We do not believe *in* the Church, in the final analysis we never believe in ourselves (pp. 174-175).

Again we have the following paragraph from the chapter on the Church as the body of Christ:

> It is mistaken and misleading . . . to talk of the Church as a " divine-human " being, a " divine-human " reality, phrases which stress the unity, but overlook the difference between Christ and the Church, and suggest that Christ is simply a part of the Church rather than its Lord, the head of the body. Christ is not wholly contained in the Church. There is no hypostatic union between Christ and the Church any more than there is between Christ and the individual Chris-

tian .... To talk of the " mystical " body of Christ is misleading, since the word " mystical " is very often taken in the sense of what we nowadays understand by mysticism; this gives rise to a view of the Church as united with the divinity in a way that overlooks human creatureliness and sinfulness, and suggests a direct relationship with Christ, as identification with Christ, which is quite wrong (p. 287).

Finally, there is this passage, which deals directly with the question of sinfulness in the Church:

Various excuses [for the Church's sinfulness] have been attempted; they are understandable, but not acceptable: (1) Setting apart the "holy" members. . . . (2) Distinguishing between a "holy" *Church* and sinful *members*. ... (8) Distinguishing between the " holy " and the sinful parts of the Christian: again there have sometimes been attempts to split up the individual Christian himself. In as far as he is pure, he belongs to the Church; in as far as he is sinful, he does not. These are the sort of notions which can be played with intellectually. It would no doubt be highly convenient if a man could simply split off from his sinful self, and at least be pure within the Church. But man's wretchedness consists precisely in the fact that he cannot leave his evil, his sinful self, on one side; nothing is to be gained by this kind of quantitative separation (p. 828).

To take these passages as a kind of whole, but in order, we see that Kling's first plea is that we not confuse the Spirit and the Church. They are, he affirms, two distinct realities. The prima facie meaning of this is that, whereas the Spirit is the uncreated and limitless God, both the Church and the individual believer are created beings. Kling goes one step further, however, and lays down the requirement that we not refer to either the Church or the individual believer as " divine " realities. A question is immediately evoked by this requirement: whether or not a created reality {whether the Church or assembly of believers or the individual believer), which is not only created but defectible and actually sinful, can and ought under certain circumstances to called divine. In other words, are the Church and the individual believer, who is by supposition filled with and governed by the Spirit, in some sense, but *really*, divine? Can *the* attribute of God (namely, that he is divine) be attributed to the creature?

In the passage cited from the chapter on the Church as the body of Christ the issue is quite the same. When we say that the Church is a divine-human reality, the obvious meaning would appear to be simply that, at one and the same time (and this is quite mysterious from the outset), the Church is divine *and* human. Now, taken by itself, such a predication, notwithstanding its mysterious character which calls for some investigation (and perhaps in the end a modicum of understanding), need not necessarily stress unity and overlook difference, as Kling says it does. Again, as above, the terms, *human* and *divine*, obviously designate different or distinct realities (man and God). What appears to be said, therefore, is that, notwithstanding the presupposed difference between man and God (a

difference which can be neither fully comprehended by the mind nor overcome in reality), mysteriously in the Church and in the life of the individual believer the human and the divine are united. And the implication is that this union is somehow connected with and dependent upon the union between man and God which was and is effected in Christ, and which Tradition has designated by the term, *hypostatic*.

Now, perhaps, we come to the crux of the matter, for it is precisely at this juncture that the author refers to the term, *mystical*. He states that, as used in conjunction with the term, *body of Christ,* it is misleading. The reason he gives is that this word, *mystical,* is very often taken in the sense of what he nowadays understand by mysticism.

Here I should like to ask two question: (1) If the term, *mystical,* cannot be used to designate the union between man and God (either in the Church or in the life of the individual believer) what term *can* be employed? (2) Precisely how *is* mysticism understood nowadays? In other words, is there abroad no authentic understanding of mysticism? One might be ready to grant this to be the case (I, for one, should not think this too outlandish a position to take); but, in that case, the real task of the theologian who discourses concerning the Church would be precisely to set forth an authentic theory of the mystical union (true mysticism) between God and man in the Church. This union is, after all, the only real object of the term, *mysticism,* since we agree on the absolutely necessary ecclesial character of everything that goes on in the life of the individual believer. I am afraid, however, that we cannot look to H. Kling for this sort of discourse. He is too preoccupied with what turn out to be peripheral questions, however profound his mode of presentation.

I tend to think that, as it turns out, Kling has rather evaded or at least not faced the theological question most crucial to his thesis. And I use the term, *crucial,* here in reference not merely to the urgent necessity of there being a viable *theoretical* understanding of the mystical union between God and man in the Church but also to the more urgent *pastoral* necessity of men and women knowing and experiencing this kind of union-the mystical union-with Jesus Christ, in his Spirit. For it is mystical union for which man has been made (and, incidentally, that also for which the Church exists). Without it men will inevitably seek some other less perfect union. Without ful£llment in this mystical union, men will inevitably *give* themselves to some other union, in which we can see the very dynamics of idolatry. In other words, man is made to be united with another (or with others) in Christ. If, then, he fails to achieve this union, whatever he does will be tied up in self-justification, if indeed he does not abandon himself to plain sinful union (there is such a thing!) .

Is this not what " sin in the Church " is all about? Does not this term, *sin,* in reference to the Church, simply designate all those attempts on the

part of that segment of mankind which *we* call *Church* to attain human perfection andjor fulfillment without reference to the Savior, Jesus Christ, whom they profess to be their head and Lord? (The essence of sin, after all, is disorder) .

It turns out, therefore, that, on account of a defective understanding of the real (mystical) union of man and God in the Church, through the Spirit of Jesus Christ, Kiing has closed the door to the sort of radical understanding and presentation of the sinfulness of the Church for which he is really seeking. For this is the way I read his works (not just this book) . He is, no doubt, a theologian in good faith, a man who is seeking the truth about the Church. He is very serious about this search-perhaps too serious. And the paradox is that he is so serious about the element of sinfulness in the Church, that he does not see how serious it really is!

At this point we may turn for a few moments to the passage in which the author deals explicitly with this problem of sin. From the outset, let it be made clear (in concert with Kiing) that no excuse for the Church's sinfulness can be found. It is a *fact.* Since this is so, what we are seeking is two-fold: (1) some sort of understanding of the fact; why should there be sin in the Church, the communion of saints? some resolution of the problem constituted thereby; what if anything can we do about it? This latter aspect of the problem has to be brought to the fore at this time, because once having stated that the Church is, indeed, sinful, we cannot give in to the temptation to believe that this is the end of the line. If it were, of course, our message (and also our theology) would constitute a gospel of despair.

Perhaps the best answer to the question of why there is sin in the Church would be as follows: God permits sin in the Church, and out of it, in order to prove to man (or to me, if you prefer to keep the individual believer in focus) the vanity and stupidity of his seeking to please the Father outside of Jesus Christ. What I am saying, of course, is that sin must be understood as an attempt on man's part to *be* on his own, i.e., without reference to and dependence upon Jesus Christ. These efforts are vain; and God wants us to recognize their vanity. However, we do not learn very fast, because there is a certain pleasure involved in being on one's own. In any case, each individual failure in this regard is an instance in which the merciful Love of God can become operative. This, I would say, is the ultimate meaning of sin, its final cause, if you will.

In reference to Kling's remarks on this topic, however, I should like to ask whether or not we are close to another aspect of the truth (about sin in the Church) when we say that in Christian existence (or the life of the Church) there is indeed a kind of split (which Kiing seems to deny). Of course, this need not be understood in a quantitative way, as if so much of man were sinful and so much of him were pure. As a matter of fact, if you do understand it in this way, you have been trapped by

the so-called pelagian error, which would reserve for some part of man (or some area of human existence) an integrity which man can call his own. But is it not true that there is some division or distinction (the latter is the more proper word) in Christian man analogous to the distinction in Jesus Christ, even though the integrity of his divine nature is not prejudiced thereby (nor is the integrity of his human nature, by the way, however difficult it is for us to understand) .

May I go back, for a moment, therefore, to the statement Kling makes in this regard: "It would be highly convenient if a man could simply be split off from his sinful self, and at least be pure within the Church." I see this statement as focussing the entire question before us. Is it not a psychological fact that man *wants* to be split off from his sinful self? I, for one, should like to be free from that self (that nature) which seeks its own good outside of God and is thereby continually frustrated. It seems to me that, if you deny the truth of this situation, you are denying, at one and the same time, what the scholastics call the "natural inclination to virtue" and the very possibility of man's being visited by the grace of God and being host to his Spirit. To want not to *be* sinful is to want to *be* virtuous (I see no middle ground); and at the same time, no man who seeks that virtue outside of Christ attains it.

How, then, am I to " peel of," as it were, from this hell-bound formation in which I am locked. I would submit that this is precisely the question that Paul asks: "Miserable creature that I am, who is to deliver me out of this body doomed to death? " The answer follows immediately: " God alone, through Jesus Christ! Thanks be to God!" (Rom. 7: 24-25). And a little further on: "I am convinced that there is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in the heights or depths [and perhaps he might have added, *in my own sinful self]*- nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. 8: 38-39).

The question, therefore, is not whether or not man can be pure. The possibility of purity must be real, or, again, man can only despair. The question is, rather, where is this purity or freedom from sin to be found. Is the Church the locus, as it were, where the possibility of purity (freedom from sin) is realized? In my opinion to say this is not to "hypostasize" the Church. Kling, who studied Barth's doctrine on justification, should recognize this. Rather, this affirmative answer forms one element of a theory of authentic Christian mysticism, applicable both on the level of the individual Christian's life and on the level of the life of the Christian community, the Church.

To abide in Christ is to be invested with *his* purity, i.e., his sinlessness; and this is the super-fulfillment of every possible human desire in this regard. Almost incredibly, this is the reality which is available to man in

the Church, i.e., in Christ. Not to abide in Him, however, is ipso facto to return to the activity which proceeds from that other nature, which seeks exclusively its own good. This is the situation of the Church; this is my situation. One might even say that this is the healthy split which exists in the Christian life and the life of the Church, the split which is, as it were, the matter for the application of the healing balm of God's merciful Love, through Jesus Christ, in the unity of the Holy Spirit.

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Christ and Moral Theology. By Lours B. GILLON, O. P. Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967. Pp. 144.

The attempt to survey the present status of moral theology as it is being taught within the Roman Catholic tradition is an arduous task. The theologian who attempts it is immediately faced with the problem of integrating the many currents and influences which are making their appearances in books and articles. This small book by Father Gillon is an effort to evaluate one of the significant emphases in contemporary moral theology: the role of Christ.

The value of the author's work lies especially in the first half of the book in which he traces the development of a moral theology built around the person and following of Christ. This historical study is especially valuable to readers who are unacquainted with the writings of German authors who began this effort in the past century. The work of Steinbuchel, Tillmann, Sailer, Hirscher, Martin and Jocham is largely unknown, yet it is their work which gave a dimension to contemporary moral theology. The results of their work, as these appear in the writings of Bernard Haring, C. SS. R., should be seen in the light of the history from which they flow.

It is certainly true that the person of Christ received insufficient attention in many of the " moral theologies " of past centuries. Scholastic moral theology which followed the method and outline of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* often allowed for a divorce for moral theology from Christology. The synthetic theology of the Angelic Doctor was sundered into dogma and moral, with Christology cut off from moral.

Father Gillon rightly shows how far such a separation was from the original intention of Thomas Aquinas. In his effort to elaborate a scientific consideration of moral theology within the structure of the one science of theology, Aquinas used the *Ethics* of Aristotle both for content and method.

Yet his work remained a theology and was not that juxtaposition of scripture and philosophical ethics which marked the writings of his predecessors. When the moral sections are taken out of the entire structure of the *Summa* and studied independently, however, the genius of Aquinas is lost. It then appears that one has Aristotle's work with interpolated sections on the beatific vision, infused virtues, grace, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

It is possible to maintain the unity of Aquinas's moral teaching only by fidelity to his own methodological principles. And according to his own principles, the study of human conduct pertains to theology only insofar as man is considered as the image of God. It is in this image that he was originally created and it is into this image that he is recreated by his incorporation into Christ.

It is to the credit of Father Gillon that he stresses the Christological orientation of Aquinas's moral theology. The Christian is one who "imitates " Christ by his own living of those virtues which marked the life of Christ. Yet this is only the most obvious level of imitation. The Christian also " imitates " Christ by sharing in the very grace of Christ and by receiving those powers for acting which are participations in Christ's own priesthood. The truly Christological dimensions of Thomistic moral theology emerge only when the moralist takes seriously the questions on grace and sacramental character in the Third Part. Also of importance are Aquinas's explanations of how the actions of Christ, especially his passion and resurrection, are causes effective in the life of every Christian.

A further reason for the lack of emphasis on Christ in Roman Catholic moral teaching was the close connection which existed between moral theology and sacramental penance, as this came to be practiced. For the instruction of confessors the various " manuals " provided categories of sins. Recent study of the sacrament of penance has shown how inadequate this appreciation of the reality of penance is and how it must be completed by a profound study of the sacraments themselves and their role in Christian life.

It seems that in his final evaluation of the place of Christ in the moral theology of Saint Thomas, however, Father Gillon remains content with a rather extrinsic relationship. Christ is more than " the living model which should illumine our behavior and give us the strength and courage to strive after the sublime ideal of the Christian life." This statement is more or less true of the saints.

Christ is significant in moral theology because of his personal example; he is essential in moral theology because of what he makes the Christian to be. In Christ the Christian possesses that New Being which makes it possible for him to follow the example of Christ. The Christian acts like Christ because he is like Christ. Father Gillon appears to refuse to draw the conclusions towards which his premises point.

Several weaknesses are evident in certain portions of this book. One major weakness, especially in a work appearing after Vatican II, is the inadequate presentation of the Church. The Church is discussed only in terms of ministry, teaching and government. On this basis it is not true to say that the Church is the City of God, as this expression has entered theology via Augustine. Now an analysis of the participation of all Christians in Christ's priesthood should allow for a fuller and richer concept of the Church and of the relationship of Christ to his Church.

The examples which the author uses to describe the importance of Christological emphases in moral theology seem contrived and artificial. Precisely what "infused" justice changes in the relationships between persons or between employers and employees is not evident. What differences in justice arise because a person is considered as " a Christian person"? To suggest that there is some special variety of justice which exists among Christians is to create an ambiguous dichotomy between " natural " and " supernatural " morality.

Finally, the author discounts too lightly the major contributions which recent philosophies have made to moral theology. These contributions are too important to be considered as mere acceptance of whatever philosophy happens to be in vogue. The importance of Scheler, the role of the principle of personal exemplarity in moral theology, and a heightened sensitivity to the importance of persons and their interrelationships are, hopefully, now firmly at home within Roman Catholic moral theology. Important as are scholastic analyses in terms of the four causes, they are not exhaustive. The history of moral theology for the past five centuries should have demonstrated the weaknesses of scholastic moral theology and especially of the dehydrated scholasticism of the manuals. Yet one looks in vain in Gillon's book for any reference to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, for example, and his elaboration of *Nachfolge* as a pivotal concept in moral theology.

Father Gillon has contributed to moral theology by bringing to light how a consideration of the *imitatio Christi* is integral both to moral theology and to Aquinas's systematization of moral theology. His weakness lies in failing to realize the profound ramifications of that concept and of the key role which it must play both in the science and preaching of Christian morals today.

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Absolutes in Moral Theology? Edited by CHARLES CURRAN. Washington, D. C.: Corpus Books, 1968. Pp. 320. $6.95.

A renewal of moral theology has been called for for years. Books and essays and studies of all colors and kinds abound on the subject. Long before the Second Vatican Council theologians had been at pains to revitalize the moral teaching of Christianity. Since the Council of *aggiornamento* cries for a renewal of moral teaching have become even louder, and writers on the matter, whether lay or clerical, have become more vociferous. One of the most recent contributions toward a solution, in fact towards a radical solution, of the problem is this collection of essays edited by Charles Curran. Last year a similar attempt was made in Germany by Prof. J. Griindel in his very fine and penetrating study, *Wandelbares und Unwandelbares in der Moraltheologie,* which came out in the well-known Patmos paperbacks series. The scope of this present volume is somewhat more restricted than the work of Griindel. The editor is careful to point out the exact limits of the problem discussed by the various contributors when he tells us in his introduction that they" are addressing themselves to a comparatively minor, although still important question-the existence of negative, absolute norms of morality." (p. 16) Worried by the unbending intransigence of the Church's moral teaching up till now, a group of young ethicians decided to examine the question from every angle and perhaps push forward towards a new and up-dated solution to the problems that trouble and at times even torture the minds of many church members. Is it true to say that a lie is always sinful and bad in itself? Is it true that masturbation is always and in every case an abuse, a disruption of order, a disordered action, sinful? Is the practice of contraception through artificial means always and in every case evil? Is adultery always a sin or may it not at times be even demanded by Christian love and charity? In a word, it is a question of the absolute and universal binding character of the six negative commandments of the Decalogue as interpreted and applied down the centuries in and through the magisterium of the Church. Approaching the question from many different angles the contributors are of the opinion that, in view of the changed and changing situation of mankind, one may no longer maintain that negative moral norms have an absolute and universal binding force. Thus, the direct killing of the innocent is normally sinful, but in abnormal and circumstances as, for instance, in the case of incurable illness, when the dying person is prepared for death but may be doomed to lingering on for months in great pain and under heavy sedation, it is seriously suggested that the positive termination of this suffering must be envisaged. It is suggested, somewhat euphemistically one may be allowed to think, that the doctor may "positively assist and accelerate the process of dying." (p. 259) It

is also maintained that, in order to save the life of the mother, the child in her womb may legitimately and logically be considered as an aggressor, albeit innocent, against whom the mother has the right to defend herself, just as " in the case of a completely insane attacker who is killed by a person in an act of self-defence." (p. 193) In such a case, it is argued, it is from the moral viewpoint completely in order to terminate pregnancy. In the same way masturbation, adultery, fornication or suicide are no longer to be regarded as always and in every case disordered and sinful *(pMsim).* Artificial birth-control, which must be considered in the context of either the fifth (preservation of and reverence for the mystery of human life) or sixth (mutual masturbation) commandment, is, it is maintained, another obvious case where no absolute moral prohibitions can apply. With regard to marriage Christ said categorically and absolutely: "what God has united, man must not divide" (Mt 19: 6; also Mk 10: 9). The character of this prohibition is relativized by maintaining that marriage is not fully consummated in the human context until such time as the partners arrive at the certainty of mutual compatibility. Then, and not until then, it is contended, may a marriage be regarded as indissoluble.

These are the matters that receive the attention of the authors of this book, almost their exclusive attention. They are patently matters of supreme importance and of burning actuality. They have, indeed, been of burning actuality since the dawn of Christianity. They are, in a very literal sense of the term, matters of life and death. They may not be treated lightly, much less dare they ever be approached frivolously. The approach of the authors to these matters has been briefly indicated. It will be immediately apparent that a plea is being made not just for a *renewal* of moral theology and of Christian moral teaching and practice but rather for a *radical accommodation* of Christian practice to the practice of non-Christian society and consequently for a *complete change* and transformation of Christian moral teaching as handed down in the Catholic Church. That is to say, the authors' aim is to bring about a change in the Church's moral teaching *so* as to bring it into line with the practice of the modern changed and ever changing world.

Reading through these essays one gets a strange impression, and a certain unease sets in and takes hold of one. Going through these pages with an open and unbiased mind and conscious of the Church's unswerving and unbending position in the interpretation of the revealed moral message and its application to all the problems under discussion (for the Church is the unfailing custodian of the *depositum fidei,* which obviously includes matters of belief and practice, of faith and morals), one feels inescapably that one is in dialogue with men who are not sure of themselves, who are not sure of the positions they put forward, who are, as it were, floundering in a theological sea and do not know where they are going. At times one

just shudders at the naiveness of it all. Or again one winces at the patent absence of theological information which no theologian has a right to lack and which his readers have a right to know. Is it a question of lack of factual knowledge or of deliberate concealment of the facts with a view towards bolstering up preconceived notions and consolidating pretaken positions? It is hard to say. Examples of what I mean could be adduced in number. There is a very glaring one on the very first page of the book where we find this statement: "Less than a few decades ago, a more rationalistic approach argued that man could know and demonstrate the existence of God from reason." The obvious implication is that now we know better: God's existence cannot be demonstrated by reason! It is even explicitly insisted that " now theologians realize the embarrassing inadequacies of a one-sided rationalistic apologetics." One may be permitted to make the following observation right away: the fact any given ethicist or theologian is unable to carry through convincingly for himself and for others the proof for God's existence from reason does not justify him in maintaining that God's existence cannot be proved by reason. Admittedly, to carry through such a demonstration and really *see* its demonstrative force one must needs be a consummate metaphysician and have attained to the real meaning of being. And that is, I submit, normally quite beyond the range of an ethician's mind. Be that as it may, of greater theological importance is the following. The First Vatican Council, one of the main objectives of which was precisely to combat and call a halt to the pernicious influence of rationalism in the Church and in theology, solemnly declares in its dogmatic constitution *Dei Filius*, "that God, the beginning and the end of all things, can be known with certainty from created things through the natural light of human reason." *(DS* 8004) For the full authentic meaning of this solemn teaching one might consult with profit Vacant, *Etudes theologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican d'apres les actes du Concile,* vol. I, pp. 281-887. Why is this not mentioned? Have the readers of this book not a right to be told this? Or are we in fact dealing here with a piece of tendentious theological writing that is only all too common today? What right has a theologian to ignore the teaching of the First Vatican Council-or the teaching of the Council of Trent or of the second Council of Orange for that matter? This ignoring of past councils and their explicit and formal teaching would in itself be bad enough, sufficient indeed to cause one to question the theological method of such a theological writer. Worse still is the fact that we can detect here a most astounding ignoring of or ignorance of the documents of Vatican II!! For the Second Vatican Council makes its own explicitly and formally, this very teaching of the First Vatican Councii (see Const. Dogm. *Dei Verbum,* no 6, § 2) ! So much for this gratuitous assertion.

The book abounds in suchlike statements that make one shudder and wince. This one has been cited merely as a typical example of the theological style and method that runs right through the present book. It would obviously be quite beyond the scope of a review to go into each one in detail. The wary reader will without much ado find examples for himself on almost every page. However, I should like to take up a few fundamental attitudes that seem to be common to all the contributors to this volume and are, it would appear, the constituent elements of a theological approach that is quite widespread today when moral questions are under discussion.

The contributors to the present volume see quite clearly and correctly that, should the positions they uphold (artificial birth-control, euthanasia, termination of pregnancy, etc.) be in order, that is, in view of the changed and changing world, then it must of necessity be possible for the Church to change (not just renew!) her former teaching. To prove this possibility it is maintained here and in many other works of that ilk *(Contraception and Holiness,* for instance) that the Church has in fact changed, has in fact performed a *volte-face* in her pronouncements on some moral matters. Their argument is *ab esse ad posse.* Thus, against those who assert that the Church's teaching cannot change in matters of morals any more than in matters of faith, the rejoinder is made: but the Church has in fact changed her teaching in certain matters of Christian morality. For instance, it is said, lying may no longer be regarded as *always* sinful and bad in itself. There are cases when one may have the right and even the obligation to tell a lie. And that, we are told, is generally accepted teaching in the Church and among theologians. To the mind of the present reviewer such statements are completely misleading and even pernicious. If one examines the cases in mind with exactitude and theological precision it will be found, I submit, that there is no question of a lie there whatever. However, it is not a reviewer's business to carry out such an analysis. It should be said, nonetheless, in order to keep the records straight, that there is no need to have recourse to mental restrictions in the process. For a modern theologian to assert that to lie may at times be a right and a duty is not a sign that the Church's teaching has changed but quite simply that the theologian is misinformed. Another example that is frequently adduced (in this volume and elsewhere) is that of usury. In the matter of usury, it is said, the Church has completely changed her attitude. To this contention it must be said right away: what was wrong and disordered and sinful in the practice of usury in the Middle Ages is still today in the eyes of the Church sinful. From being a barren means of exchange money has become capital productive of wealth like other property, for the loan of which the Christian Church always tolerated a reasonable interest. I am not discussing the question of principle here, namely, as to whether the Church could or could not, should or should not change her moral teaching. That is being left open. It is only a question of fact.

Further, we are told, that the role of the theologian is not to be restricted to that of being a conciliar commentator. He is called " to develop and transcend the teaching of the Council." (p. 28) Then we are informed that there is a " conciliar mandate of accommodating theology to the times" (p. 35), and we are warned to expect disruption and dismay " unless the forces in the community favoring accommodation gain ascendancy." (34-35) "The first imperative for Christian conscience," it is categorically asserted, " is accommodation." (p. 39) On the face of it this is nothing more than downright theological and moral opportunism-and that in the name of a completely false notion of the supremacy and absoluteness of charity! (p. 248) Properly understood charity will be seen, on the contrary, to absolutize everything that has to do with the commandments and the will of God (see Jn 14: 21, 23-24; I Jn 2: 3 :ff.). The first duty and the fundamental obligation of a Catholic theologian is, in this post-conciliar era, not so much to become a mere commentator of the conciliar documents but rather to allow himself to become permeated by its teaching and spirit and in a spirit of gratitude and humility to accept loyally its sixteen documents, realizing all the while that, if the teaching authority of the Church, the *vivum magisterium,* the living teaching authority given to the Church by Christ himself, has any meaning at all, it is precisely this: to apply to the situation of the world according to the changed and changing conditions of every age and of every clime the saving teaching of Christ, so that thereby its ministers may become all the more effectively the salt of the earth. But it should be carefully noted: it is a question of *applying* the teaching of Christ, the Christian message of salvation, to the world of today in such a way that it will impinge upon the minds of all men of good will enabling them to comprehend its vital and saving important and, accepting it, to become transformed by it. It is not a question of *accommodating* it to the times. This the authors of the present volume have not seen or, if they have, they have not thought fit to put it in practice. Theologians and priests are, in a special way, called to be the salt of the earth, to be the ministers and the servants of the Word of God, of the divine message as propounded existentially by the Spouse of Christ, whose divinely given mission is to safeguard that Word and bring men to the Kingdom through its saving power. No, they rather set themselves the task of developing and transcending the teaching of the Council before it has had time as yet to be taught to all nations (see Mt 28: 19-20) and to reach the confines of the earth existentially, before they themselves have fully made it their own in thought and practice. And that is precisely the disturbing thing about it all. For if we ask where a " conciliar mandate of accommodating theology to the times " is to be found in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council we get no indication whatever from the authors. And if we look into' the

documents themselves, we fail to find a trace of such a commission, we fail to find even a vestige of what might be termed a "principle of theological accommodation." The only places that might possible be considered in this connection are the following: I) the pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, n° 7, 58, and 69; the Decree *Ad Gentes* on the missionary activity of the Church, n° and 26; 3) the Decree *Christus Dominus* on the pastoral office of the bishops in the Church, n° 13, 17; 4) the Decree *Presbyterorum Ordinis* on the life and office of priests in the Church, n° 22; 5) the Dogmatic Constitution *Dei Verbum* on divine revelation n° 13, where there is question of God's revealing Word becoming assimilated (or accommodated) to human thought and speech. To these conciliar documents might well be added certain large sections of Pope Paul VI's very important encyclical on the Church, *Ecclesiam Suam* n° 47-53, 60-123. Pope Paul insists very strongly that the *aggiornamento* in no way means conforming oneself to the mentality of the world (n° 51-52). And if one reads carefully and dispassionately the conciliar documents indicated above, one will find precisely this approach to things and not at all the principle of accommodation. The Council insists and repeats again and again: the Christian message is to be kept intact and unsullied, but every effort must be made to present it in such a way that men, wherever and whenever they live, will see its meaning and import (see Decree *Christus Dominus*, n° 13). It even insists that the life and living of peoples is to be brought in the most effective manner possible into conformity with the moral message of the gospel, with the revealed principles of moral living, and not the other way about, the message of Christ to be accommodated to the mentality of peoples! (see in particular the decree *Ad Gentes* n° . Above all, there is no question whatever of accommodating the moral teaching of the Church to the practice and customs of the times in the weighty matters of life and death already mentioned. So much for the teaching of the Second Vatican Council on the principle of accommodation. But this conciliar teaching will be seen to be nothing more than the message of the New Testament itself in modern garb. Suffice it to quote just one warning and exhortation of St. Paul in Rom 12: 2: "Do not model yourselves on the behavior of the world around you, but let your behavior change, modelled by your new mind. This is the only way to discover the will of God, and know what is good, what it is that God wants, what is the perfect thing to do." This principle of non-accommodation runs right through the New Testament: Mt 5: 17-48; Lk 12: 49-53; 1 Cor 6-8, 12; Eph Jas 4: 4; 1 Jn 4: I, 5; 5: 19. In view of all this, how can it possibly be asserted that the first imperative for Christian conscience is accommodation?!

Before bringing this already too lengthy review to a close I should like to make one last point. And that has to do with the use made of St.

Thomas and above all of his moral teaching in this volume in particular and by modern theological writers in general. St. Thomas has fallen on evil days. He is no longer a *persona grata* in theological circles. He is one of the benighted medievals with nothing really pertinent to contribute towards the solution of the burning problems that torture the minds of men today. And for all that he is held in esteem. Theologians still seem to have a kind of sneaking regard for the Dumb Ox of Aquino. The present volume contains a special study on moral absolutes in the theology of St. Thomas (pp. 154-185) But elsewhere in the book his teaching and authority is frequently enough appealed to. Unfortunately, however, a most lamentable misunderstanding, or better, a most pitiable lack of understanding or acquaintance with the monumental and truly masterly moral synthesis of Aquinas makes itself apparent. It is a well-known fact that of all St. Thomas's work the second part of his *Summa Theologiae* is the most subtle, the most intricate and demanding on the intelligence. For that very reason it would be advisable if all mention of St. Thomas were omitted from studies such as are contained in this volume. Then all danger of doing injustice to the Angel of the Schools would be avoided. In point of fact St. Thomas has some extremely pertinent things to say about the fundamental problems of human living, things that, if understood, could well contribute towards a truly existential solution of our modern problems. Thus he has a most penetrating analysis of voluntary action *(voluntarium),* of practical truth and of the structure of the moral object, distinguishing most carefully the theoretical level and the level of the vital involvement of the person in the situation and caught up in the *contingens singulare,* together with a most exhaustive and satisfying analysis of practical Christian wisdom, whose roots plunge deeply into the divine life of faith, hope and charity and whose business it is to guide the situational living of the Christian. Of all this not a trace is to be found in the present volume. On the contrary, it is insinuated-altogether without foundation, it must be said-that on the situational level of the *contingens singulare* St. Thomas's moral judgment would be as supple and flexible as that of modern ethicists. The principle of St. Thomas's moral teaching is a principle of application through practical wisdom (or prudence) , not a principle of accommodation! And this principle does not mean that an action which in itself and on the theoretical level is evil (adultery, for instance) may in a concrete singular case be completely in order and even be God's will here and now, inspired by the Spirit and instigated by charity. That would be straight-forward "situation ethics" of the kind proposed by Barth, Brunner, Thielicke, etc. But it does mean that on the plane of concrete singular activity every single circumstance surrounding the action must be taken into account, above all the quality and amount of personal subjective *engagement* or commitment on the

part of the agent, an element that may obviously vary not only from individual to individual but from action to action. In the concrete situation the involvement of the person may be so minimized that all question of full commitment is excluded, that is, as traditional moralists were wont to say, there is no question of mortal sin. That is quite a different thing from saying that such non-committed or not fully committed human activity is on the moral plane completely in order and God's will for the agent here and now. And here, too, one must be careful not to make generalizations that may be utterly unwarranted. For instance, it is easy to see how in the case of masturbation (and the attendant difficulties of the critical years of development) full personal (and moral) commitment may well be absent. It is much more difficult to see how this could be so in the case of adultery or fornication.

It is in this doctrinal context that we must understand the contention that the ultimate norm of human activity is the personal judgment of the individual, in other words, his own conscience, or as we read in this volume, " for moral science the given is the human experience of the good." (p. 32) It must, however, be carefully noted that it is not a question of any and every personal judgment, nor of any and every individual conscience, but uniquely of the judgment and of the conscience that is informed by the Spirit, by the spirit of Christ as concretized and applied in the ever actual and living teaching of the Church, especially when that teaching is to be found in its solemn *magisterium.* Even the pagan philosophers realized that it was only "the man of practical wisdom" (Aristotle 1107 a2) who could determine the mean of virtue. It was they, too, who realized that "to be virtuous is no easy task" (Aristotle 1109a23), foreshadowing thereby the teaching of Christ that "it is a narrow gate and a hard road that leads to life, and only a few find it." (Mt 7: 14) It would be to do St. Thomas an injustice to maintain that he held or would hold for the absolute autonomy of the individual conscience. It is to do him more than an injustice and at the same time betray a sad lack of historical and theological sense to insinuate that, were he alive today, St. Thomas, accommodating himself to the mind of his milieu, would see as something " immediately clear " that abortion and divorce are not always wrong!! (p. 184)

In the interests of truth and justice these serious strictures have had to be made. Within the limits of a short review it has been impossible to take up and analyze all the points that call for judgment and criticism in this book. "The essays are not intended to be definitive," we are told, "but only to express the theological convictions of the authors." (p. 18) Most assuredly they are not definitive, and it is gratifying to know that the authors themselves realize that. In reality they are neither the beginning nor the continuation of moral theology's rejuvenation and

revitalization. For the renewal of moral theology has long since begun, and immense work has been done by men like Haring, Carpentier, Gillemann, Pinckaers, etc. In spite of the work accomplished by these men the work of renewal must continue, for the message of the Gospel whilst being ever ancient must also ever be made fresh and new and life-giving. And that is the essential work of true moral theologians. The *donne revel£ moral*, the Christian moral message, ever calls for rethinking in every age and in every clime, so that it may ever be a message of life to the people of God. However, unless this work of rethinking the moral message of the New Testament is absolutely faithful to the moral ideal found in Sacred Scripture, unless it is carried through loyally under the guidance of the Church's moral teaching and inspired by the Church's interpretation and application of that ideal, then, far from being a renewal of moral theology, it is destined to become its corruption and its travesty, imprisoned within the limits of the theological convictions of the thinkers. In moral theology we have to do with the way of the Cross, with the following of Christ, with the image of God being brought to consummation along the narrow and hard road that alone leads to eternal life. That is the message that Christ gave the world of his time. That is the message we find in the apostolic catechesis of Christ's vicar on earth. But, sad to say, that is the message nowhere to be found in this book.

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The Situation Ethics Debate. Edited by HARVEY Cox. Philadelphia, Pa.: The Westminster Press, 1968. Pp. f.!85. $1.95.

My approach to this book will arise out of some preambulatory observations. It seems to me that contemporary culture can be characterized in four ways: (1) by a sense of historical evolution; (f.!) by an awareness of subjectivity growing out of developments in contemporary psychology; (8) by a scientific attitude which is suspicious of any position that is not empirically verifiable; (4) by an appreciation of the human situation as described in existential theology and existential phenomenology. In April, at Princeton, one theologian at the *Fourth Edward F. Gallahue Conference on Theology Today* put it this way: " It is true that theology is no longer happy with the earlier Christian belief that man lives in an unchanging cosmos, possesses an immutable nature and is subject to fixed moral laws. . . . Theology is now caught up in the alluring possibility that history and the future are" open," that moral demands can he understood *situatWnally,*

that God and reality may *both* be in process, that man and God may be together co-responsible for the future of man and nature, that truth is to be *created* more than *discovered* by man, that self-fulfillment rather than self-denial should be the mark of the Christian's relationship to his body and his world." A third way of characterizing contemporary culture is by the twin deflation-(!) the deflation of doctrinal absolutes and (2) the deflation of moral absolutes.

Contemporary situational morality has brought these points to the forefront--especially the fact that there is a deflation of strict moral absolutes, that is, in the sense of a specific act as intrinsically evil, always wrong. This is taking place even within the Roman Church, and I find this most healthy. Let me develop this briefly.

Max Weber in *"Politics As a Vocation"* discriminates between two ethics: (1) *an Ethic of Conviction* is that ethic whose ultimate concern is principle, with more or less indifference to empirical verifiable personal consequences; (2) *an Ethic of Responsibility* is that ethic whose ultimate concern is empirical, verifiable personal consequences that result from an act. It seems to me that to absolutize or to polarize the first, or the thrust towards absolutizing or polarizing the first, leads to juridicism, legalism and moralism. This is found in religious traditions, and the Roman tradition is certainly involved in the indictment. It seems to me that to absolutize or to polarize the second, or the thrust towards absolutizing or polarizing the second, leads to an extreme form of Situational Morality, a kind of relativistic utilitarianism, a type of antinomianism. My own position is that we cannot live consistently, constantly, uniformly, just on one of these ethics; we have to live on both, and it seems to me that the authentic genuine ethic is the resolution in conscience of the dialectical tension that exists constantly between these two ethics, the *ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility.* If this be plausible, then I find that the contribution of Situational Morality to ethics is the following: (1) it has pointed up the deflation of strict moral absolutes in the ethic of conviction, moral absolutes in the sense of specific acts as always wrong, as intrinsically evil; (2) it has pointed up the priority in contemporary moral thinking of the ethics of responsibility over the ethic of conviction; (3) it has sharpened the tension that exists between these two ethics, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, and made the personal resolution of this tension in personal moral decisions all the more necessary although very difficult. In all of this, conscience for the religious person is revealed as a response with evaluational knowledge and freedom of one person to the Person of God (Christ) incarnate in other persons. It is the resolution of the dialectical tension that exists between the two ethics, the *ethic of conviction* and the *ethic of responsibility.* The person is the communicating existent who stands at the convergence of a series of relationships arising from his encounter with another person or persons.

It should seem obvious that the morality of *every* man is situational- it all depends on how influential the impact of the principles, or now the cautious generalizations, are in the ethical situation. With the priority now more towards the ethic of responsibility rather than the ethic of conviction, how do we introduce someone, especially the adolescent, into this ethic of responsibility who had not been pedagogically trained in an ethic of conviction? Is it not at least discussible that the finest situationalist, the person who can exercise the best discretion and prudence is the person who has been trained in an ethic of conviction and possibly one of unquestioning obedience to principle and law? One of the arguments always given for the retention of an ROTC program in the colleges is that at the moment when colleges are asking parents what do the parents think that the role of the college is with regard to their college children, we have this institution of the ROTC that demands an exercise of obedience, if not of mind and will, at least of external execution. It reminds one of what Aristotle maintained, that no one should study theoretical moral philosophy, what we now like to call meta-ethics, until he has lived existentially, at least until he is about 40. The drama which represented the Professor writing an ethics-text after the chemistry had been somewhat altered is a case in point. In other words, to put the dilemma in sharpest focus- while it is true, it seems to me, that the priority in ethical decision-making is in the direction of responsibility rather than conviction, how can the adolescent come to terms with this ethic of responsibility when absolutes are eroding and he has not been disciplined to such searching awareness of all the concentric circles going out from his ethical behavior? My reference is to that marvelously inexpensive production " Sundays and Cybele "!! In other words, how do you introduce a genuine morality, a true morality to one who is unprepared for it? Again, to put it in another way-If situationalism has theoretical and practical respectability, how can it be taught when its demands are so great? Have not some situationalists given the impression that situationalism is an easy ethic when really it is a most difficult one?

Let me take another approach. There is no doubt that situationalism has pointed up the peripheral nature of much of the older morality. Dr. Fletcher likes to put it this way: " it is more moral to go to bed with the woman next door to whom you are not married but whom you really love, than to have coital exercise with your wife whom you hate." How true it is that the superficiality of the older morality is exposed when we put the hypothetical situation into this form: "If the only reason for the morality of the one is the presence of juridical words, and the only reason for the immorality of the other is the absence of the same, then how profound is the older morality? " Now this is appreciated by the young who refer to the phoneyness of so much of the older morality. But is there not some phoneyness in some of the trivialization of the New Morality? Canon

Streeter made this point when he was critical of the application of the New Morality towards the whole question of marriage. He put it this way: "When passion is the arbiter, my own case is always recognized to be exceptional. There never were in history lovers like 'we two,' never were any kept apart by a fate as hard as ours. When Aphrodite whispers in my ear, a principle which admits no exception may nerve me to resist; but if any exception is admitted, *my* case is certain to be the one." In other words, is it not true that there is no greater deception than in situations in which the erotic is in control and the philiac and agapaic are given a back seat? It seems to me that the best situationalists are those who have been disciplined on an ethic of conviction, and those who are most likely to trivialize the ethic of responsibility are the ones who have not been so disciplined. An ethic of conviction in the past structured the character for situationalism. Will there be such structured character entering the situation now?

Let me put this general uneasiness I have with Situational Morality this way. Situational Morality tends to place the emphasis on the ethic of responsibility, on agape, and on the empirical verifiable consequences upon persons. This is as it should be. But does it not tend, in the hands of many situationalists, to display not a neutrality towards principle and cautious generalization but possibly a minimization of principle in not recognizing that *not every* situation is a *crisis situation* for which principle and cautious generalization must be tailored? Dr. Graham B. Blaine seems to be saying this when he is critical of the role of the university with regard to a liberalization of the parietal regulations. In other words, is it not true that by minimizing principle, at least in the more complex ethical situations and contexts, we no longer have any means by which our selfishness (unrecognized, of course,) is challenged again and again? The ethic of responsibility by minimizing law in these complex situations loses a good measuring rod for one's own unselfishness. It is difficult, if not impossible, to be selfless, agapaic, kenotic when the control of our selfishness by the constant presence of the principle or the cautious generalization is not consistently being exercised. It seems to me that, without the presence of the principle and the likelihood that its application is relevant, without the floor of principle for my moral life but only the ceiling of agape open, the possibility for self-deception increases.

This has been pointed out by others. Peter Bertocci's *"Sex, Love and the Person"* (Sheed and Ward); Evelyn Millis Duvall's *"Why Wait Until Marriage"* (Methodist) and Wayne Anderson (Congregationalist) show how sexual intercourse out of context undermines the value system of human personality-values such as loyalty, service, and real love. Sexual intercourse is a totality of sharing, of persons, of value systems, etc. In addition, the value system of heterogeneous and socially outgoing sexuality according to Anderson is undermined by an overly permissive attitude

towards masturbation. In other words, does not principle and the cautious generalization provide us with the best instrument for non-deception?

One example that I would prefer to cite. It seems to me that it is unquestionable that someone convinced of the immorality of the Vietnam war should not participate in it. However, would it not be some indication of the selflessness of this position if the person so convinced began to consider the empirical verifiable consequences upon others who are not equipped with the same sophisticated conscience? In other words, does it not seem appropriate (and here I begin to show embarrassment) that if situationalism is a genuine ethic, if the ethic of responsibility is now to be accentuated over the ethic of conviction, should not the first responsibility of the conscientious objector be a willingness to show the ethically naive that conscience is elaborate and that prismatic analysis is the prerogative of all free men? I find this to be one of the most healthy results of contemporary breathing for the unsophisticated-no one can escape the situational nature of the ethical enterprise, and the discovery by some in my own church that conscience is not the simple imposition of law and principle from without but the agonization of the dialectical tension between the two ethics of conviction and responsibility, this discovery has been one of the most salutary results of the operation of ecclesiastical history.

All these several judgments are brought out in the many essays in the last portion of this book. This section is by far the most helpful for anyone who would want to study the criticisms coming from both Protestant and Catholic sources. This historical perspective that Harvey Cox provides at the beginning and the summary reflections of Dr. Fletcher at the very end are valuable for ethicians who cannot ignore the mode in which ethics is being done more and more by their students. The book will be indispensable for anyone considering that the genuine conscience decision is the resolution of the dialectical tension that exists between the two ethics, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility.

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Newman on Justification. By THOMAS L. SHERIDAN, S. J. Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967. Pp. $6.50.

Newman's relevancy on the contemporary theological scene is phenomenal and unquestioned; Lonergan and Schillebeeckx, to take two obvious examples, have acknowledged an indebtedness to him that is no

less real for being implicit. The intellectual temper of the man manifests rather clear affinities with the religious instincts of our own age: his eminently practical notion of faith, the disinclination towards metaphysical speculation, the sense of history, the place allowed to subjectivity and affectivity, etc. What comes through strongest, however, in this new study by T. L. Sheridan-literary " genre " of which is that of a theological biography focusing on Newman's early years from his conversion to Evangelicalism in 1816 to the *Lectures on Justification* of 1841 on the eve of his baptism by Father Dominic-is a kind of inverse relevancy. Newman's modernity is a two-edged sword, it cuts both ways.

Father Sheridan has allowed Newman to speak for himself in a multitude of excerpts from his journal, diary, personal papers, letters, etc., many of them hitherto unpublished. His own contribution is explanatory rather than interpretative, and Newman's thought comes through in detailed fashion, with clarity and exactitude, within the living tissue of its historical genesis and growth. Justification was the one passionate overriding concern during the pre-Catholic period, and it serves well here as a thematic principle. What come through in a study such as this are two lessons we desperately need to be reminded of today--one regarding man himself, the other respecting his religious thought.

(1) First, there are the Christian dispositions of man, the breath and the moderateness of his vision and impulses. These are factors that have always marked the Christian vision in its genuine manifestations, bearing witness that Christian truth is incomparably rich and many-faceted and that it does not suffer readily any Promethean constriction. In this sense, as Frederick Wilhelmsen has observed, Christianity is not one religion among others; nor, as Lonergan has maintained, can it be reduced to an ideology. Heresy (not in the canonical but in the theological sense) is indeed truth grown wild with loneliness. It is enthusiasm (in the sense in which the term is used by Ronald Knox, himself a modern-day replica of Newman, in his book that bears the one-work title) that threatens these Christian attitudes; and if enthusiasm was perhaps Newman's great temptation, it was one that he steadfastly refused.

The full dimensions of Newman's life appear more graphically if we see him, as one can so easily, as a sort of microcosm of the Church herself. As a man of his own times, it was understandable that he should suffer the limitations of the age and culture. He worked in relative isolation; he did not, for example, read German; he was perhaps less than fair to Luther in referring to the central doctrines of Evangelicalism as " Lutherism." (Fr. Sheridan points out that in spite of its designation as Arminianism, nineteenth-century English Evangelicalism had gone far beyond Luther and Calvin on some points, cf. p. !i!40).

Newman evidences that curious Christian Platonism so indigenous to the English religious mind: " What a veil and a curtain this world of sense

is" (from the *Letters and Correspondence,* cited on p. **141);** "... material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of real things unseen " (from the *Apologia,* cited on p. 14fl). Yet this Idealistic tendency is saved by an equally native empiricism, attested to above all by his constant insistence upon the practicality of faith. He does shy away from theological speculation, taking refuge too often in the term " mysterious," and he frequently demonstrates a need for the very theological tools he lacks. But this is only to say that in every epoch the Church has disabilities peculiar to the times.

Far more remarkable is the stamp of universality-the personal holiness, the refusal of personal or party loyalties in the face of what truth demanded. " *Veritas magna est et praevalebit,"* he wrote to his mother (p. 77), and much later in the *Apologia:* " I have changed in many things: in this I have not. From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion. . . ." (p. 137) The past could not be neglected, and so in 18fl8 he began devoting his summer vacations to a pursuit in chronological order of the Fathers. But this was no antiquarian interest; it was accompanied by an urgent sense of immediacy which enabled him to speak of ". . . two and two only supreme and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator." (p. 142)

(fl) In his work the real adversary of this period was the Liberalism that had begun to enervate the Church of England and with which Newman himself conducted a brief flirtation during 18fl7-fl8 largely under the influence of Richard Whately and Edward Hawkins. In his *Autobiographical Memoir* he writes by way of explanation: " There was great reason then to expect that on Newman's leaving the crags and precipices of Luther and Calvin, he would take refuge in the flats of Tillotson and Barrow, Jortin and Paley" (cited on p. 144). By contrast, his dedication to Evangelicalism was a perduring if radically qualified one. He considered his eventual acceptance of Catholicism not as a repudiation of that earlier conversion but as the consummation of it. From that earlier religious experience he retained an insight into the authentic import of *sola fides,* and what he sought to do now was to rescue it from the excesses to which it had been carried and reinsert it into the soil of genuine Apostolic and Christian Tradition. In effect, this was to see that this Lutheran intuition anteceded the Reformation and issued in fact from Catholic wellsprings. Louis Bouyer makes this observation in his Preface (p. 12) and elaborates somewhat on its obvious ecumenical implications.

But this achievement was to come only at the term of a long, taxing odyssey, one which was to exact its price in Newman's health and was no luxury of theological reflection. The needle of his theological compass was to flicker broadly, beginning with imputed righteousness inherited from Thomas Scott " to whom (humanly speaking) I almost owe my soul,"

which feared to designate any work of man " good " lest it rival the sovereignty of God, above all that work which is the Sacrament of Baptism. What Newman was never to lose sight of was the saving initiative of God; what he came eventually to realize was that man's righteous activity is no lessening of that sovereignty. "Alas! it is an opinion too widely spread, too perniciously held, to need formal statement, that if God be supposed to impart any intrinsic acceptableness to our services, this must diminish our debt to Him" (from the *Lectures on Justification,* cited on p. 248). At this point, Newman has come to see that justification is *in* us if not *of* us, or, in his own less familiar term, " adherent " if not inherent. It is a *declaring* righteous but, due to the efficacy of that Word, at the same time a *making* righteous-a rather exact approximation to Kung's thesis in his doctoral study of Barth.

With this the *sola fides* doctrine is purged of that excessive pessimism about man and his endeavors, even under God, that the Reformers gave to it. To wrest the initiative from God's hands in an exaggeration of man's works was unthinkable; it was no more true to fail to see that, if God's initiative were real, it demanded some alteration of the man summoned to "new being." The truth lay in an equilibrium, and Newman's way to this was the gradual elaboration of a theology of the Indwelling Spirit; the Spirit communicates to us the Presence of Christ and this is our justification. But this is to say that it is the Spirit, and not the Christian, who seizes the initiative in the building up of the Church and in the transformation of society. It is to offer a reservation in the face of what is being called, in an admittedly pejorative sense, the "New Pelagianism" that sees God " as edged out of the world " and urges the contemporary Christian to live *"etsi Deus non daretur"* (the two expressions are Bonhoeffer's).

True enough, the Spirit is operative only within the consciousness of the Christian, and the deep truth of Teilhard de Chardin's phrase that "God makes us to make the world" cannot be lost sight of. But is not Newman's caution needed in an age that continually prefers seeing the theological *status quaestionis* as an anthropological one?

In Newman himself we see the equilibrium: between, on the one hand, the universality of God's truth, and, on the other, its historical contraction to one focus on the revelation of Christ. It is an equilibrium to which the theological project on which we are now engaged-that of Christian Secularity-must attend. This is one of the things to which Fr. Sheridan's study of Newman serves to recall us, and it alone is ample justification for his painstaking workmanship.

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Freedom and Community. By YVEs SIMON. Edited by CHARLES P. O'DoNNELL. New York: Fordham University Press, 1968. Pp. *$5.50.*

Freedom. By MoRTIMER ADLER. Albany: Magi Books, Overview Studies, 1968. Pp. 47. $.50.

Freedom and Community, an anthology of several published articles, manuscripts and notes of Yves Simon, presents a synthesis of the late philosopher's views on the nature of freedom. As such it is a welcome complement to his numerous publications on authority and government, from his Marquette University lecture, *The Nature and Functions of Authority* (1940), to his posthumous work, *A General Theory of Authority* (Notre Dame, 1962) . In the preface to the latter work, A. Robert Caponigri wrote that Simon " is fascinated by authority precisely because he is so intensely devoted to freedom, to liberty." In that work and others Simon's concentration was on authority and its relation to freedom in a sound political community. In these newly published essays it is freedom which receives the primary emphasis.

The first essay, entitled "Freedom in Daily Life" (originally Chapter I of *Community of the Free,* 1947) , asks how so many ordinary people could have been seduced into forfeiting their own freedom in the pre-World War II decades. Simon finds the explanation in the general indifference to truth inherited from nineteenth-century European liberalism, and he sees the resulting tragedy as an object lesson that freedom radically depends on adherence to truth: "All of our real freedom is contained within the limits of our knowledge of truth. . . . The spirit of freedom has no worse enemy than falsehood." (p. 4) Simon then expands on the responsibility of citizens to search out the truth about current events amid the formidable propaganda of governments and communications media.

Toward the conclusion of the first essay Simon sets forth his central thesis on the true character of liberty, a thesis which thoroughly reflects the insights of Thomas Aquinas. The freedom of indetermination in choosing is only the fundamental presupposition to human liberty and not, as popularly misconceived, the essence or perfection of that liberty. The initial indetermination of man's will, involving the possibility of making wrong choices, is an imperfection which renders true freedom precarious. A man is really free when he so completely adheres to his true good that he can choose among a variety of acceptable means without the risk of choosing bad or illusory means that would make the attainment of his end impossible. This is the freedom for which Simon reserves the name "autonomy," a freedom wherein the moral law has become so interiorized that the human person's spontaneous inclinations coincide with it; and this interiorization involves " an ever better understanding of what it is

needful to know in order to act rightly, . . . [and] an ever-deepening, spontaneous, and voluntary adherence to the necessary ends of our activity." (p. 18) It is when a person is thus determined to the good that he is most completely the master of his activity and, hence, most free. Freedom, therefore, is not the antithesis of order but is itself " the most ordered thing in the world; it causes order to descend into the depths of the human will." (p. 19) This is why both despotism and anarchy are enemies of freedom, since each in its own way is characterized by arbitrariness as opposed to order.

The foregoing analysis reappears, with varieties in terminology and development, throughout the subsequent essays in *Freedom and Community*. The second article, "Liberty and Authority" (from the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 1940), applies Simon's concept of freedom more explicitly to political society: just as personal freedom is perfected by overcoming the will's potentiality for disorderly or illusory choices, " so the freedom of the group is exalted by the suppression of the disorderly forces that tend to make impossible a resolute course of common action." (p. 46) It is precisely the essential function of authority to secure order in a community by assuring " the unity of action of a plurality of men in the pursuit of their common good." (p. 51) Besides this essential role, Simon ascribes other functions to authority, some of which he describes as "substitutional" (the correction of deficiencies in men's minds and wills which hinder their capacity for self-government) and others as "perfective" (the guidance of the more ordinary men by those with superior qualities of mind and will for the betterment of the whole community).

The next three sections, edited from previously unpublished manuscripts and notes, expand on the relation between sound authority and true autonomy. The third essay contains an extensive discussion of servitude- of which Simon sees modern socialism as a form-based on St. Thomas's distinction between dominion which is exercised for the subjects' good and that which is exercised for a good alien to theirs. In the fourth article Simon suggests the limits within which authority must work (in both its essential and substitutional roles) if it is not to encroach on true autonomy; in particular, he points to the modern danger that a mechanical ideal of order and efficiency, born of a preoccupation with technology, may more easily tempt men to despise freedom and accept totalitarianism. The fifth section employs the previously developed concepts of authority and autonomy to interpret Aristotle's theory of the genesis of the State as well as Jefferson's guiding principle that "the best government is that which governs least." In the same essay Simon points out the constructive functions which the coercive power of authority does have, not only as a safeguard against disorderly forces but as a pedagogue to strengthen our

inclinations to right action. Finally, an essay entitled "Pessimism and the Philosophy of Progress" (originally from *Community of the Free)* seeks to separate the ideal of human progress from philosophies of naturalistic optimism which misconstrue and compromise the character of human freedom.

Whereas Simon's essays represent a systematic philosophical analysis of freedom, Mortimer Adler's article (originally published in the *Review of Metaphysics,* 1958) is primarily an historical discussion attempting to clarify the issues among different philosophical positions on the subject. In Adler's survey, freedom has been conceived in each of the three following ways: (a) as the intellectual and moral perfection of the human person; (b) as the ability to pursue one's interests and pleasures in congenial surroundings; (c) as self-determination or the psychological capacity to choose among alternatives (i.e., the freedom of the will). The first of these conceptions (a) characterized Platonism, Neoplatonism and Stoicism, and it has also been the prevailing conception in continental Europe even into modern times; (b) has been emphasized by British and American thinkers; (c) has predominated among the Epicureans, Aristotle, Descartes, Fichte and Sartre. Christian thinking has naturally emphasized (a), understood as presupposing (c); St. Thomas (followed by twentieth-century disciples such as Maritain and Simon) recognizes all three-subordinated as (a), (c), and (b)-and adds also a distinctive" political" liberty.

According to Adler, the attempt to fasten on one of these conceptions to the exclusion of others-e. g., Hobbes admitting only (b) or Sartre admitting only (c)-is the source of most of the past confusion in the philosophical dialogue. A consistent philosophy can be elaborated, he maintains, by either recognizing a variety of distinct meanings of freedom (as did Aquinas and Locke, each in his own way) or modifying each of the above conceptions and fusing them into one (as Rousseau, Hegel, and Dewey have all attempted). A precision among the various levels of meaning could, the author thinks, help to resolve not only the philosophical issues but also the ideological and political tensions in today's world.

Adler's essay is one of several incisive and readable studies now available in the Overview series. Other titles are: *Situational Morality,* by Robert Gleason; *What Is Existentialism?* by Roger Troisfontaines; *The Philosophy of Language* by Robert G. Miller; and *Five Oriental Philosophies* by Thomas Berry.

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The Church and the Second Sex. By MARY DALY. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. 187. $4.95.

The new self-awareness of the American woman who is both Catholic and professional is well illustrated in *The Church and the Second Sex.* Dr. Mary Daly, assistant professor of theology at Boston College, knows the past. But, far from becoming immobilized in the realm of fact, she is radically open to the possible in an area of *aggiornamento* which is often by-passed. A chief obstacle to the eradication of antifeminism is the lack of awareness of many women that such a problem exists. Dr. Daly uses the two volume work of Simone de Beauvoir as a point of departure for both the title and thesis of her book. She traces the denigration of woman that was easily accomplished by the approach to Scripture, particularly Genesis, which predated the recent biblical revival. In regard to the New Testament she carefully points out that the " statements which reflect the antifeminism of the times are never those of Christ .... What is very striking is his behavior toward them. In the passages describing the relationship of Jesus with various women, one characteristic stands out starkly: they emerge as persons, for they are treated as persons, often in such contrast with prevailing custom as to astonish onlookers." (p. 37) Elsewhere in the New Testament the social condition of woman at the time of Christ is reflected. That the influence of the *Weltanschauung* of the community at large rather than the personalist example of Christ dominated is quite evident in the writings of the Patristic era.

In Medieval times vitriolic statements were rare, but despite some notable exceptions woman fared poorly. Dr. Daly refers to Peter Lombard, St. Bonaventure and others, but she gives most attention to the stance of St. Thomas Aquinas who saw woman in her own nature as misbegotten, but not as regards human nature as such, for she is " included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation." (p. 49) The faulty scientific understanding that viewed woman as merely passive in the role of generation led St. Thomas to hold that, because the father is the active principle in generation, he is to be loved more. Thus Dr. Daly shows that an erroneous biology, the generally accepted exegesis of the texts of Genesis and the Pauline epistles as well as the prevailing sociological condition, that is, the subjection of woman-all can be detected in Aquinas's statements supporting the traditional view of women. The author notes, however, that St. Thomas supports this view of woman even though his theological understanding of the image of God in the human being and of man's last end as well as some of his philosophical positions form a basis on which the true equality of men and women could be established.

Dr. Daly stresses the importance of the industrial revolution in feminine emancipation. It must be remembered, however, that in its early stages the industrial revolution brought untold suffering to women who were

employed for long hours in factories and mines. It was through the democratic process that women were finally freed from this economic subjection. Ultimately, new opportunities were opened to women in the civic and economic spheres. Yet, papal statements for the most part, even in our own century, fail to appreciate the problems of women. Dr. Daly calls attention to the ambivalence of the statements of Pius XII. John XXIII and Vatican II mark a significant change in outlook. Dr. Daly believes that this horizon-shift leaves no room for retreat. This in spite of the fact that some are trying to revive an " eternal feminine " approach which makes of woman an immutable symbol, yet at the same time fail to accept individual women as persons in the true sense of the word. Ordination to the priesthood is seen not only as a distinct possibility but as the sign of genuine equality.

Dr. Daly sees the theological root of antifeminism in the problem of " conceptualizations, images, and attitudes concerning God." (p. 188) Her concern is particularly focused on the concept of God as male which persists and needs, as she maintains, to be exorcised.

To bring about an understanding of conditions she sees as " devastating," Dr. Daly uses broad, clear strokes, and herein lies both the strength and weakness of the book. This interestingly written polemic will be read by many who would never peruse a work that traced more meticulously the history of the question including the Church-society dialectic and the syntheses that emerged at various times, or one that contained a more thorough theological exploration of the problem. Perhaps this is not so much a criticism as a hope, for such a book is needed.

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Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America 1967. Yonkers, N.Y.: St. Joseph's Seminary, 1968. Pp.

The announced theme of these *Proceedings,* "The Church's Teaching Authority and Theology as a Science," purports " to offer a reevaluation of the teaching authority of the Church in the light of current theology." Two principal papers treat of the *magisterium:* " The Role of the Ordinary Magisterium of the Universal Episcopate" by Msgr. Austin B. Vaughan, and " Changeable and Unchangeable Elements in Conciliar Teaching" by Robert L. Richard, S. J. It is unfortunate indeed that the first paper delivered at this convention does not appear here, " The Role of the

Ordinary Papal Teaching in Contemporary Theology," by Eugene M. Burke, C. S. P. Its appearance in this volume would have been most timely, in view of some reactions to the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* of Paul VI which turned precisely on the impact of the ordinary teaching of the Roman Pontiff on the theological enterprise. One might also have liked to see printed the summary comments at the end of the convention by Rev. Robert E. Hunt entitled "The Theologian and the Magisterium: The Critical Issues of this Convention." Under the umbrella of the above theme three theological topics, original sin, the sacrament of penance, divorce, are discussed in eleven seminar papers. An addendum at the end of the volume is the article " Moral Implications of Business Pricing " by Thomas F. McMahon, C. S. V.

Msgr. Vaughan surveys his subject and raises most of the problems that have appeared in contemporary theology. He summarizes the teaching of pre-conciliar theology and of Vatican II itself on this topic; he offers enlightening remarks on the relationship of the Bishops' *magisterium* to that of the Pope and of the individual bishops, to the prophetic mission of the faithful, on the doctrinal contribution of the local church, on the relationship of non-infallible and infallible elements. He makes suggestions but offers no answer as to the criterion whereby the episcopal ordinary *magisterium* can be discerned in practice. In assessing the force and authority of non-infallible teaching of the ordinary *magisterium* he repeats the common interpretation and in a pastoral spirit sagely observes: "We will need more positive leadership on the part of bishops in proposing true doctrine (and not just denouncing what is questionable in terms that are vague); we will need a greater sense of responsibility on the part of theologians (in evaluating the impact of things they intend to say)."

As though anticipating certain theological reactions to unwanted episcopal statements and directives, Msgr. Vaughan remarks in his last section that the theologian, as other members of the faithful, must " respond in personal faith to the message of salvation " precisely as conveyed by " the teaching of the universal espiscopate as witnessed by the local bishop," and that as " organs of the bishops for a deeper penetration and more effective proposal of the truths of faith " the theologians " should be granted as much intellectual freedom as is possible, within the confines of their own commitment to the Catholic faith. This freedom is not an absolute value, but it should serve the salvation of mankind. If not, theologians will have become an independent non-committed research organization, which would have its own value, but which would not be serving the full purpose of facilitating the proclamation of the message of salvation, which is a great part of the role they have had assigned to them in the past."

The !ate Fr. Richard, in his brilliant study of the changing elements in conciliar teaching, offers a critical exposition of the positions of Bernard Lonergan and Edward Schillebeeck. His own suggestion is that " what

is unchangeable in conciliar teaching-changeless without qualification of any sort-is simply the *paradosis,* the *traditio,* of Irenaeus: in other words, the revealed essence of Christian Faith . . . the essence, therefore, as contained in the liturgical and catechetical recital of the basic mystery-events of salvation history. . . . What the councils have added to these and the other mystery-events of the basic Christian Gospel is, of course, authentically Christian, and true--as interpretation, as understanding, as uniquely consistent conclusion-but nevertheless not absolutely unchangeable, or changeless without *any* qualification .... " For Richard, infallibility extends *"without qualification* only to the essence of the Christian Gospel." This is an interesting viewpoint of the role of infallibility and bears further analysis. Do the *formulations* of dogmatic truths by the councils represent truths that are always so, even though the expressions themselves and their impact may undergo historical change; and if they are always true, what kind of infallibility do they enjoy? One suspects that, in the Richard view, the ordinary *magisterium* would be far more susceptible to the phenomenon of change.

Those interested in the difficult questions on original sin have the matter treated from the aspects of Scripture, the Councils, anthropology, ecumenism. The sacrament of penance is considered from its social aspect and includes also Trent's law on auricular confession (Fr. Carl J. Peter concludes that integrity is a requirement of the divine law, i.e., something revealed or insinuated by Christ), the age of first confession, and the theology of devotional confession. Divorce on its part is treated from the biblical, psychological and historical aspects.

Theologians today have a marketful of problems; these *Proceedings* show that they can be addressed in a calm, reasonable and informative manner.

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Guida alla rzcerca scientifica e allo studio di S. Tommaso. By LUIGI BoGLIOLO. Rome: Libreria Editrice della Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1967. Pp. 199, with Introduction, Bibliography, and General Index. L.

Professor Bogliolo has produced an excellent book concerning the requisites for scientific research, notably in the field of philosophy. Then he goes on to offer an introduction to the study of ecclesiastical disciplines and a special introduction to the study of Thomas Aquinas. He completes

this volume with a very extensive and manifold study of the basic characteristics of the Thomistic method.

In the first part of this work he offers splendid summaries on such matters as the relation between university studies and scientific research, auxiliary sciences, the search for books and bibliographical description, study and doctrinal documentation, external and internal textual criticism, synthesis or ideal construction, and redaction; and he appends a most useful consideration about mental labor and hygiene (including such matters as proper food, sleep, silence, and recreation) , as well as the currently widespread problem of psychic weariness, and the spirit of mental work. His presentation of the requisites for a good doctoral dissertation in philosophy could hardly be excelled. The value of his introduction to the study of ecclesiastical disciplines lies especially in the various bibliographies which are basic requisites in this field. Before we go on to examine the remainder of this work, we should like to correct a confusion of details in a report found on p. 124. The American section of the Leonine Commission is established at the Yale Memorial Library in New Haven, Conn. The English translation of the whole Leonine Critical Edition is not a project of this section of the Leonine Commission as such, although the English translation of the Leonine edition of the *Summa Theologiae* is being pursued by a special group in Washington.

In his introduction to the study of St. Thomas Professor Bogliolo says that Thomas preferred Aristotle to Plato with a view to expressing Biblical realism in technical language. (p. 117) This statement seems most apt, notably in view of the problem concerning Aquinas's use of the Latin language. Many Latin scholars have deemed his usage to be very poor. What is obvious to any Latin scholar is that Aquinas extends this language far beyond its capacity for *subtle* signification, much as Jerome does in his translation of the Greek text of the New Testament. Hence one discovers that, with these two Doctors of the Church, Latin takes on the philology of the corresponding Greek terms (as when Thomas has the Latin term *poenitentia* adopt the prime sense of *metanoia,* rather than that of penalty). In turn, by reason of its own legally-oriented philology, the Latin term gives a firm or fixed meaning to the context. This adoption of Greek philology, however, is accomplished by way of *logical supposition;* and this supposition seems to be the chief source of difficulty involved in reading the Jerome translation (the Vulgate) and the Aquinas texts, so much so that many, if not most, persons trying to plumb the depths contained in these texts must consult the Greek texts, wherein the philology is clearly indicated. The question at hand is even more astounding in view of the fact that, even at the late date of his composition of the commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* Thomas seems to have lacked a sufficient knowledge of Greek to note that the direct meaning of the term *metaphysics* is *after the Physics;* yet he seems to have had a good appreciation of Greek

philology even at the early date of his composition of his commentary on the Fourth Book of the *Sentences.* This grasp of Greek philology enabled Thomas to produce that harmony between Eastern and Western theologies which makes his writings the most perfect visible aid for ecumenism in our own time. Professor Bogliolo's table on historical events related to the life of Thomas Aquinas (this table being inserted between pages and of his text) is one of the best accomplishments in the book under review, inasmuch as it is a true reference table for discussion on problems related to the work of Thomas.

The preceding paragraph deals with one of the most important integral parts of Thomas's method. In the last portion of his book Professor Bogliolo examines the intrinsic character of this method according to many aspects, the first aspect being the motivation underlying the method, the love of God as the First Truth. The second aspect concerns the trust in the ability to reason, the third being a trust in the value of truth. The fourth aspect is its prime interest in the concreteness of truth. The fifth aspect concerns its integral disposibility, the sixth aspect being its historical sense. The seventh and eight aspects lie respectively in its universality and its openness to Christian values, the ninth aspect being its dynamism. The tenth aspect concerns its complete realism, the eleventh its complete intellectuality, the twelfth its complete humanism, the thirteenth its total inclusiveness. The fourteenth aspect lies in the fact that the Thomistic method begins with a complete human experience (or, in technical terminology, with such a totality of experience as enables the mind to abstract a whole from this experience). The fifteenth aspect lies in its capacity for full evaluation and reevaluation, in what Professor Bogliolo terms its *criticita integrale.* The sixteenth aspect concerns its complete organic unity. The seventeenth aspect is that it is both subjective and objective, the eighteenth being that it is both *a posteriori* and *a priori.* The nineteenth and last aspect presented by the author follows from the eighteenth, namely, that the Thomistic method is concerned with the primacy of what is real.

Whether the reader concedes all these aspects or not is not the question here. The author does not pretend that he offers an exhaustive account of the intrinsic character of the Thomistic method; but what he offers can be easily verified by those who are willing to study with him. Although his explanations include a special orientation to the existing European philosophical situation, they have an admirable consequence from the first aspect through the nineteenth and hence are of great value especially for those who possess only a very partial view of the excellent value of this method.

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Documentum de Modo et Arte Dictandi et Versificandi (Instruction in the Method and Art of Speaking and Versifying). By GEOFFREY OF VINSAUF. Tr. with Intro. by ROGER P. PARR. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968. Pp. 120. $3.00.

Little is known about the life of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, but there is not much doubt about the importance and influence of his writings. In 1967 Margaret F. Nims published a translation of Geoffrey's *Poetria Nova;* since then she has found a considerable amount of new material about him; the results of her investigations will soon appear in print.

Now, Robert Parr has given us a translation of the *Documentum* of Geoffrey, that is, the prose version of Geoffrey's teaching on literary composition in prose and verse. To do this Parr has depended entirely on the Latin text published by E. Faral in 1924. "It seems fairly safe to assume that for all practical purposes the text of Faral contains the essential doctrine." (p. 1) Inasmuch as Parr was content to present the essential doctrine, the reader will be prepared for the kind of translation before him. Certainly Parr's text does give us the essential doctrine. To make the text readable Parr has seen fit to neglect often the fine points of Latin syntax, especially with respect to the use of conjunctions, the tenses and moods of verbs, etc. For a careful study of the *Documentum* there is an urgent need of a new Latin edition which would be complete and well-annotated.

There are, unfortunately, some mistranslations in Parr's text. Here are a few examples. " To his sorrow he received counsel to consider craft rather than arms and the sword and thus did not end the war." (p. 39) The Latin text reads as follows: *potiore potitus consilio, potius artem quam arma consuluit et dolus, non gladius bellum consummavit.* The war did come to an end, but guile not the sword achieved this. The reader also will wonder about the translation of *dictandi* in the title as speaking. He will, perhaps, also wonder about the expression "the bodies of both she and her father." (p. 39) Again, (p. 40, n. 5) "This is what is meant by the natural beginning" is scarcely a translation of *Haec dicta sint de principia naturali;* the subjunctive here means, I think, let this suffice for the natural beginning. There are mistranslations of individual words. For example, *commessantes* as co-workers, *carum* as unpleasant (p. 67), *pullulant* as grow up, *expedit* as it is necessary (p. 78), *praerogativa* as previous selections. (p. 61) Perhaps, too, Parr should have used more traditional renderings of technical terms; for example, asyndeton is the regular expression for *dissolutum* and not dissolution. (p. *53)* Also, the names of places could easily have been translated; for example, rather than the bishop of *Cenomania,* it would have been more helpful to say the bishop of le Mans. Again, we are much more familiar with the name Benedict Biscop than with Benedict Bishop. (p. 25)

The annotations are not very informative. It would not have taken a great effort to improve this defect. Here are some examples: "Cicero's earlier work *de Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae."* (p. 9, n. Should this be Tacitus's work on Oratory? Again, with respect to the terms *via purgativa, via illuminativa, via unitiva,* a reference to the Pseudo-Derris as well as to St. Bonaventure would have been in order. The term "Yponasticon" (p. 51) is unknown to me as a Latin expression. Does it refer to the anonymous treatise *Hypomnesticon* in *PL* 45, coli. 1611-ff.? The reference to the Epitaph of Adam (p. 70, n. 45) is too vague. Why not a reference to *PL* 196, col. C? The reference *Ad Agricolae* (p. 71, n. 49) shocks the reader; *Agricolae* would have been enough.

The description of manuscripts given in the preface (p. I) is too meagre. of Saint Benoit needs further identification. Surely Galfridi Angelici (read Anglici?) and Galfridi Mnestisauf require a note.

To introduce the volume Parr gives us a short history of rhetoric. It is difficult to see what purpose this serves. It is, perhaps unfair to criticize an author for what he did not do; but here a history of the growth of handbooks, such as the *Documentum,* would have been useful, especially since the dates in which their influence first began to be felt is subject for debate. The introduction which we have is marred by too many misstatements, exaggerations and careless citations. Here are a few: " The state assumed the job of education during Roman times." (p. 9) The City only gradually took over education. It was not until the 3rd century A. D. that there was extensive imperial control and financing of education. Again, (p. 9) "Later it (rhetoric) came to form the basis of the trivium ... a tool to be mastered in undergraduate days." It is doubtful whether rhetoric ever was the basis of the trivium. The term " trivium " was a rather late-comer on the scene (probably 9th-10th century). It is also difficult to believe Parr's statement that " the loss of the philosophical view of literature caused the essential differences between rhetoric and poetic to disappear." (p. 10) On the contrary, perhaps the greatest levelling process of rhetoric and poetic was due to a philosophic outlook, namely, the sometime inclusion of both the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* within the *Organon.* Again, his statement (p. 11) that "this propensity toward allegory, in its early stages, resulted from methods of exegesis used in the interpretation of sacred writings " is probably defensible, but unclear. It would have been just as economical and much more clear had he said that allegory began ca. *500* B. C. when philosophers tried to understand more profoundly what they considered to be the philosophical implications of the Iliad and the Odyssey. I do not think these philosophers considered them to be sacred writings. Again, it is not entirely true that "Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* was lost during the Middle Ages and was not discovered until 1416." (p. 5) Certainly, Quintilian was not very important in the

Middle Ages; but there are two lOth century manuscripts which contain portions of the *Institutio.*

There is a great number of typographical errors in the text, especially in spellings, such as Bodlein, and in citing French works. None of these, however, obscures the sense.

Many times this reader would have been tempted to emend the Latin text, especially in the quotations from Horace. Surely Geoffrey would not have been so ignorant of Horatian metre! Or again, for example, (p. 73) "He is desirous of money, sparing of yours, extravagant of some one elses." The Latin text reads *parcus tuae,* when surely the sense requires sparing of his own.

The translation, despite the foregoing criticisms, will be of service to those who cannot read Latin, and does, indeed, contain Geoffrey's essential doctrine.

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Santiago Ramirez, 0. P. 1891-1967. In Memoriam. Salamanca: Convento de San Esteban, 1968. Pp. 95.

Near one of the corners of the Claustra de los Reyes, in the monastery of San Esteban in Salamanca, the door leading to a small backyard bears a rather shocking inscription: "Cemetery of the Theologians." As the visitor inquires for the reason of such a name he is told that a good number of great Spanish Dominican theologians are buried there. Some of them are well-known throughout the world, e. g., Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto. Ever since December 19, 1967 the name of another famous theologian, Santiago Ramirez, comes to the mind whenever the visitor or the passer-by notices the inscription on the lintel of the door. For on that date Fr. Ramirez was buried in the place reserved for the great theologians.

Fr. Ramirez's name is not unknown to readers of *The Thomist.* Two of his articles were published in this quarterly, *The Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas* (15 pp. 1-109) and *The Impact of Theology* (17 [1954] pp. 558-569). However, in spite of the fact that he was a well-known theologian and a highly praised one, especially by his disciples, an appraisal of his work is a rather difficult task. He was a Scholastic theologian who wrote most of his works in Latin, who clung tenaciously during his whole life to the solutions of traditional theology and who made no concessions whatsoever to what we would call " modern " approaches in theology and philosophy. According to the common standards of today he was not among the leading writers who determine the mood of the average reader,

and he did not write best-sellers, even though some of his books were widely controverted and went out of circulation soon after their publication. Although he traveled through several countries and taught in different places, he was not a lecturer of world-wide fame. And though his teaching was impressive in many ways, his statements were not of the sort that thrill audiences and deliberately shake the foundations of the traditional stands.

He was a calm, hard-working and demanding teacher and scholar. He was also somewhat shy, silent, absent-minded and rather difficult to talk to. Nonetheless, he found himself involved in some highly publicized controversies, especially that which concerned the philosophy of his compatriot, Ortega y Gasset, arguments which, to be sure, he did not look for. I remember the familiar figure of Fr. Ramirez working day and night in his poor room of San Esteban. Although already retired and very sick, it was marvellous the way he used to work. He looked so completely devoted to his work that nothing else could distract him. One could imagine how he hated the noisy controversies in which he was involved. He never liked any kind of publicity and always claimed for his work the freedom of a timeless silence. Yet, he was always ready to do his best for those who sought his help. In the summer of 1966 I happened to be working on the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset for one of the courses I was taking at the University of Madrid. Whenever I asked for his help, I witnessed the promptitude and generosity with which he always replied to any request. At that time I liked to think of him as a living summary of the history of that unique monastery in which we happened to meet. His appearance of a scholar worn out by the search of truth perfectly befitted the beautiful old cloisters of a religious house that has given the Church so many great men.

Santiago Ramirez was born in the small village of Samiano, state of Burgos, the heart of the old Castille, on July 1891. His parents were farmers. It is amazing to realize the extent to which his whole life was shaped after the characteristics of the land in which he first saw the light of day. The dry, half-desert Castille has always been the cradle for a hard-working, deeply religious and mystical people nourished in constant self-denial and ascetic renunciation. On the other hand, in the extraordinarily blue sky of this land the light is so clear that the contours of everything are perfectly differentiated. No wonder that this land has always been the background and the framework of a clear-cut and uncompromising vision of reality, such as Fr. Ramirez possessed.

He began his studies in the nearby town of Trevino and in 1908 he entered the diocesan seminary of Logrofio in order to become a priest. But in 1911 he left his seminary and joined the Dominican Order, for which he was ordained priest in Rome in 1916. In this same place he began his teaching career, concentrating on Logic, Ontology and History of

Modern Philosophy. From till1923 he taught Theology in Salamanca. For the next twenty-two years he was a teacher of Moral Theology at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. Some of his most important works were written in this period, especially his *De hominis beatitudine.* Back in Spain in 1945 he became director of the Institute of Philosophy Luis Vives, a branch of the official organism Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. Again in Salamanca in 1947, he was appointed Regent of San Esteban's Theological Faculty. A member of the Preparatory Commission for the Second Vatican Council, he later became a *peritus* of the Theological Commission. He died in Salamanca on Dec. 18, 1967.

Although his philosophico-theological publications cover so vast a field that they almost amount to a complete treatment on both, his major books can be gathered into loose groupings according to their subject matter. We do not include here his numerous articles.

On the notion of philosophy and theology as science: *De ipsa philosophia in universum secundum doctrinam aristotelico-thomisticam* (Madrid, *El Concepto de Filosofia* (Madrid, 1954); *Teologia Nueva y Teologia* (Madrid, 1958). Concerning man's destiny: *De hominis beatitudine* (3 vols. Salamanca-Madrid, This is the most important of his books and the one in which the high quality of Fr. Ramirez's scholarship is best shown. The introduction to the Moral Theology in the first volume is perhaps the best ever written from the Scholastic viewpoint. The stress on charity as the central reality of the Christian existence is one of the main features of the work.

On analogy, both in its philosophical and theological implications: *De analogia secundum doctrinam aristotelico-thomisticam* (Madrid, and some articles in different philosophical and theological magazines. In this field of analogy he particularly excelled. His teaching on this subject corrected the commonly accepted notions of the authors of his time, which were in several respects a misinterpretation and oversimplification of the thomistic statements.

On the common good, law and order: *Doctrina politica de Santo Tomas* (Madrid, 1951); *El Derecho de Gentes* (Madrid, 1955); *Pueblos y Gobernantes al Servicio del Bien Comun* (Madrid, 1956).

On the theological and moral virtues: *De certitudine spei christianae* (Salamanca, 1936); *De spei christianae fideique divinae mutua dependentia* (Fribourg, 1940); *La esencia de la esperanza cristiana* (Madrid, 1960); *Introducci6n al tratado de la prudencia de la Suma Teol6gica* (Madrid, BAC, 1956).

The last two books written by him are *De Ordine* (Salamanca, 1963) and *De Episcopatu* (Salamanca, 1966). The first one is an analysis of the notion of " order " and a development of the vision of reality as an perfectly ordered whole. The second is a timely account of St. Thomas's doctrine on episcopacy. In addition, an important part of his total lifetime pro-

duction still remains unpublished; fortunately, it is now in the process of being published.

A very special section of his books and articles, not mentioned above, refers to the noisy controversy regarding the philosophy of the late University of Madrid teacher Jose Ortega y Gasset. Fr. Ramirez's concern was to point out the difficulties of the main affirmations of Ortega y Gasset's doctrine from a Catholic viewpoint. Since the Spanish philosopher had by then become very popular through his disciples' teaching (he was already dead) , the controversy was pursued with passion and brought about a great deal of bitterness and resentment. It was a long time before tempers began to cool down.

As we look back at the impressive result of so much effort, we are certain that Fr. Ramirez's work will be fully appreciated for its real value when the scholars realize that it belongs to the long and ever-developing tradition of true Thomism. For his whole concern was to reflect upon the ever-recurring problems, and the product of such a reflection is so solid and profound that it will always find a place and be quoted among the authors who have surpassed their time by overcoming their contemporary myths.

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History of EMtern Christianity. By AziZ S. ATIYA. University of Notre Dame Press, 1968. Pp. 448. $13.50.

It is very widely assumed that the first great schism of Christianity occurred when Byzantium and Rome parted in the eleventh century. This view does not take into account the fact that major splits, whose consequences are still lasting, happened in the East during the Christological controversies from the fifth to the seventh centuries. In the book under review, the author, when he speaks of "Eastern Christianity," has in view not the Orthodox Church in communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople but the various groups which quarreled with both Byzantium and Rome on the Christological issue and remained for centuries isolated under the Moslem occupation: the so-called " Monophysite " group (Copts, Ethiopians, Syrian Jacobites, Armenians and "St. Thomas" Christians of India), the Nestorians and the Maronites. The latter group, formerly " Monothelite," is in communion with Rome since the time of the Crusades. Rather curiously, the author also adds a chapter on the " vanished Churches," where he includes Carthage. Thus, in his historical scheme, Tertullian and St. Augustine find themselves in the "East." In

fact, this example shows that the author writes of "non-Byzantine" and "non-Roman" Christianity, and not of the "East" as such.

A general study on the Eastern "Non-Chalcedonian" Churches was lacking in English. The participation of these Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, the conversations presently being held between their representatives and those of the Orthodox Church for eventual reunion, and the widespread interest in ecumenism, will assure to this book a well-deserved success.

Professor A. S. Atiya is Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Utah and is a member of the Coptic Church of Egypt. This explains the fact that Alexandrian Christianity receives quite a preferential treatment in his book (pp. 11-145), while the much larger Church of Ethiopia is covered in only twenty pages. (pp. 146-166)

The author's view of the early Church history suffers from his Coptic-centered historical perspective: Origen himself is described as " a true son of Egypt, Coptic to the core " (p. *35)*, and monasticism is viewed as " a purely Egyptian creation with world potential." (p. *59)* Not being a professional theologian, his description of the Christological debates of the fifth century is not always a model of clarity (" [Cyril's) almost indiscriminate use of words *physis* and *hypostasis* led to the Chalcedonian confusion which resulted in the establishment of the so-called ' Monophysite ' doctrine," p. 48). But the book (which is beautifully illustrated) will not be read as a handbook of Church history but for its precious description of the remarkable survival of the Eastern communities throughout the Middle Ages up to the modern times. In this respect it offers to the student a very competent collection of otherwise unavailable information.

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The Spiritual Journey of Saint Paul. By LuciEN CERFAUX. Translated by John C. Guiness. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968. Pp. 9l36. *$5.50.*

The author's long (he is *85* years old) and brilliant career as both theologian and biblical scholar automatically guarantees him a hearing. A defender of Father M. J. Lagrange's "La Methode Historique," Fr. Crefaux was a pioneer in the Catholic biblical revival. His distinguished writing career reached a climax in 1969l with the completion of a trilogy of Pauline studies: Christ in the Theology of St. Paul, The Church in the Theology of St. Paul, and The Christian in the Theology of St. Paul. The present volume is described on the dust jacket as " an extract of the spiritual doctrine contained in this trilogy." Actually, it is a summary of the main themes of St. Paul's epistles. But it more than this. Skillfully

woven into this doctrinal fabric is a spiritual biography of the great Apostle. Taking the epistles in chronological order (with an occasional assist from the Acts), Fr. Cerfaux has managed to construct a happy blend of St. Paul's life, doctrine and religious maturation. From the very beginning of the book the author's penetrating analyses are matched by his clarity and orthodoxy. The reader is treated to such succinct phrases as: "... Paul clearly affirms that God raised Jesus, not so that he might be his son, but because he was his son." (p. 21) All of the big themes are handled: the development of the key concept, " Body of Christ " in its various aspects; the growth of the concept of the " ecclesia " from local to universal scope (a favorite topic of Fr. Cerfaux) ; the emergence of Christ's diverse headships in the Captivity Epistles; the Eucharist and the resurrection.

Particularly commendable is the author's treatment of the theology of salvation in the Epistle to the Romans. His sweeping synthesis includes an up-to-date insight on the problem of original sin. (p. 120) And his exposition of the Pauline notion of freedom could well serve as a timely antidote to current misconceptions on the subject, especially his conclusion on p. 72: " Whenever one's freedom begins to harm the good of his neighbor which is the concern of every Christian, the right of the individual conscience must yield before the higher obligation of the love of Christ." In handling the classical comparison between Moses and Abraham (representing the works of the Law versus faith in Christ), Fr. Cerfaux scores his point with characteristic pungency: "... it was not Judaism that was born from Abraham, but Christianity." (p. 104)

The only criticism which this reviewer has with the book is that the author seems to make St. Paul's attitude toward the use of charismatic gifts in the Church more harsh that his epistles warrant. This is especially true on pp. *65,* 77-78. And one could wish that he had stated his case with more qualifications when he declares: " If St. Paul was a mystic, it does not follow that every Christian must be the same; and all Christians can be resurrected and created anew in Christ without becoming mystics as a result." (p. 94) The translation, for the most part, is satisfactory, although occasionally there is a flaw, such as "no otherwise" (p. 164) and "tempory" (for temporary, p. 180).

Fr. Cerfaux has given us a picture of a man who was as paradoxical as the doctrine he preached; Paul, the theological innovator and at the same time the " conservative " who meticulously upheld the continuity of apostolic authority in both discipline and doctrine. Although the work of a scholar, this book is not too difficult for the average layman. This reviewer recommends it highly as a comprehensive and very readable introduction to the life and thought of St. Paul.

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Writings in Time of War. By PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, S. J. Tr. by R. HAGUE. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. Pp. 315. $5.95.

It is difficult for the American reader of Teilhard to conceive of the pietistic religious background against which the French Jesuit can only be understood. In simplest terms, the piety of Teilhard's Catholic culture set up a dichotomy between love of God and love of the world. To love the world automatically meant that one must abandon belief in God. Simone de Beauvoir expressed her experience of this dichotomy very well: " I dipped my hands into the freshness of the cherry-laurel leaves, I listened to the gurgling of the water, and I knew then that nothing would make me give up earthly joys. 'I no longer believe in God.' I told myself, with no great surprise." *(Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter,* p. 144). Teilhard faced the same problem. He first loved the world. What then to do with his belief in God?

One reading these early writings of Teilhard is struck with amazement at the optimism breathing out on every page and the breadth of vision manifested so soon in his career. When one recalls that these essays were written as Teilhard was at the front in the Ambulance Corps during the First World War, then his optimism is even more incredible. Either he was totally removed from the events going on around him, or he had an astoundingly deep faith. But, however one ultimately passes judgment on Teilhard, no one could say that he was " removed " from the flow of daily events. Thus these writings become indeed an early testimony to a sound and secure faith, the pattern of which unfolds throughout the rest of his creative life. For only a deep faith in the presence of God in the world could have restrained despair, a despair which would naturally flow from a love of the world so torn with war and hate.

According to the thesis of C. Mooney, S. J. *(Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ),* Teilhard was a man of poetic insight who wrote all of his life in an effort to clarify this vision to himself and to others. I think these early writings bear out Mooney's contention. Here are found all of Teilhard's themes in germinal form. And Teilhard himself admits that nothing can be found in these early essays which was not elaborated upon at a later date: " They contain nothing that I have not said more clearly at a later date." (p. 11)

Among the selections introduced and well-annotated by Henri de Lubac, S. J., are "Cosmic Life" in which Teilhard develops the pressure of "life" and its call to men who find it through Christ, "Mastery of the World and the Kingdom of God, "Operative Faith," " The Universalist Element," and other jottings reflecting his constant concern for unifying the world and devotion to God.

In these essays is found this overriding purpose: "To make men see and make them feel-that is my first aim: to make an impassioned

profession of my faith in the richness and value of the world.... " (p. 15) Teilhard goes on to affirm also his faith in God as well. In this way he is able to transcend the pietistic cultural milieu in which he found himself. Where Simone de Beauvoir became an atheist, Teilhard became a mystic visionary who moves and influences our own culture today.

Unifying one's love of the world and love of God is not without danger, however. And Teilhard was well aware of this. That is why two prominent themes appear among these selections: the physical conjunction of Christ with the universe (" cosmic Christ ") and the problem of pantheism. The former idea is Teilhard's resolution of loving the world and God at the same time. The dichotomy is resolved through Christ who is simultaneously one with the universe through his body and one with God as the Word. But this insight opens the way for an objection. Is not Teilhard only a refined pantheist? Aware of this possible objection, the French Jesuit grapples with the problem of pantheism in an attempt to indicate how he differs from such a view. He does this by insisting upon a " union " which differentiates rather than conglomerates into an All.

What, then, is the value of this publication? First of all, it is an uplifting testament of faith and optimism for all who read it. Second, for Teilhard buffs and scholars it grants a glimpse into the early mind of this poet, the origins of his thought, and through the excellent footnotes of de Lubac contributes to an understanding of the development of his creative thinking throughout his life. Finally, many of the themes opened up by Teilhard can contribute towards theological renewal in an evolutionary perspective.

Teilhard's language was creative and new. All the more reason to be grateful to Hague for his excellent translation of the early attempts at expression found herein. However, the reviewer's copy was marred by a number of printing errors and missing letters (e. g., p. 10) which made reading the text difficult.

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The Idea of Happiness. V. J. McGILL. (Concepts in Western Thought Series; The Institute For Philosophical Research) New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 376. $6.95.

V. J. McGill's *The Idea of Happiness* revitalizes the traditional notion of happiness. Catholic philosophers and theologians might usefully investigate McGill's approach to happiness: dialectical clarification; impartial comparisons; and openness to the contributions of non-Scholastic philo-

sophical theories. More importantly, the author cogently demonstrates how every philosophical system has contributed to the overall idea of happiness. By pointing out the impact of the concept of happiness on economic policies, civil legislation, and social and political theories, McGill adds a practical dimension that most studies on happiness ignore.

Neither a history nor a thematic exposition of opinions, *The Idea of Happiness* describes theories (Part I), compares issues (Part IT), and reviews contributions of contemporary psychology in light of Aristotelian eudaemonism (Part III) . A review of the most important theories (Aristotelian, Stoic, Kantian, Utilitarianism) provides data for the dialectic of ness of this life require a delving into dogmatic arguments, which are into the human problem of happiness. Although McGill strongly favors Aristotelian theory, he does not set it as a standard for measuring other theories. He rather forces the reader to evaluate each position for its internal consistency and its ability to withstand objections.

McGill excludes transcendent theories of happiness from his dialectical development. Why? First of all, he feels that Christian theories of happines of this life require a delving into dogmatic arguments, which are beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, Christian imperfect happiness in the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas is, according to McGill (p. 89) , " really an understudy for happiness in heaven." Hence, it has little value in itself; additionally, the perfect happiness of heaven is entirely irrelevant to non-Christian philosophies of happiness. Finally, imperfect happiness in the non-Christian sense is attainable through human efforts, whereas Christian perfect happiness is ultimately a gift of God, involving the notion of grace and God's free will. McGill's position is regrettable. Could he not have compared non-Christian happiness of this life with Christian concepts apart from their eschatological aspects? The Scholastics (especially of Salamanca) clearly developed a theological happiness of this life that has the earmarks of a true end (albeit intermediate). By limiting Christian happiness of this life to its " inchoate " role, McGill unwittingly eliminates an important segment in the development of the idea of happiness. Moreover, claiming that the Angelic Doctor views external goods and fortune as " unnecessary and irrelevant," the author creates the false impression that Thomas had no concern for happiness of this life beyond the contemplation of mystics. Baiiez' distinction between *essentia beatitudinis* and *beatitudo essentialis et integralis* would have been useful in McGill's interpretation of Aquinas's view of happiness. From another viewpoint, St. Thomas's exposition on happiness *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, qq. 1-5) need not be interpreted only in the sense of perfect supernatural happiness and imperfect natural happiness. It could also include an imperfect supernatural happiness that ordinarily requires some degree of friendship, bodily integrity and other temporal necessities, especially in light of Thomas's statements later on *(ibid.,* I-II, q. 69; II-II, qq. 179-182).

The author provides a fascinating comparison of contemporary psychologists' self-actualization theories with Aristotle's eudaemonism and Spinoza's self-realization theory. He shows that psychologists and psychiatrists, by studying obstacles to human happiness and the means of removing them, have truly broadened man's understanding of happiness on the concrete level. Although some of the self-actualization authors (e. g., Mazlow, Fromm, Rogers) "really take the standard virtues for granted, and invoke them when needed in the concrete therapeutic situation," they actually (p. "reduce ethics to psychology," in spite of their desire to remain objective. Admitting significant differences, McGill nonetheless concludes that (p. 343) " the literature strongly suggests that what we have called 'self-actualization' theory is a continuation of eudaemonism and self-realization theory."

For McGill, Aristotle has contributed more to the idea of happiness than anyone else (p. 176 and similar remarks in passing) : " It is Aristotle's eudaemonism, however, that has the longer history and influence, that provides the fullest, most explicit theory of happiness, and is far more involved in the controversy over happiness." If McGill were to award Olympic medals to the winners, he would probably give the gold medal to Aristotle, the silver to Bentham and the bronze to Kant. Team standings, however, would place the Utilitarians (J. S. Mill, Bentham, Sidgwick, Hobbes) on top. And the self-realization theory of Aristotle and others would win the approval of the spectators.

Content rather than style makes this book difficult reading. But this should not discourage the serious student. *The Idea of Happiness* is a scholarly book. It is, I believe, one of the most important contributions to the literature of happiness in decades. I recommend it highly for its approach, content, and style. More importantly, I recommend it because it shows that the pursuit of happiness is so much a part of our human condition that we cannot easily eliminate it from our study of philosophy and theology.

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The Idea of Love. By RoBERT G. HAZo. (Concepts in Western Thought Series, General Editor: MoRTIMER J. ADLER), Institute for Philosophical Research; New York-Washington-London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 488. $7.95.

The aim of the series to which this volume belongs is " to transform what, in every case, at first appears to be a chaos of differing opinions

into an orderly set of clearly defined points of agreement and disagreement that give rise to real issues and make possible the kind of rational debate that constitutes genuine controversy " (p. ix). This end is fully attained by Mr. Hazo in his thorough survey of the notoriously rich and difficult literature on love by Western authors from Plato to Freud and C. S. Lewis. He draws mainly on writings in philosophy, psychology, and theology. His emphasis is on human love, and mainly human love for men, although other forms of love are considered, and a special chapter is devoted to the celebrated controversy on supernatural human love and, therefore, necessarily deals also with man's love for God.

The first part of the work is analytical and expository, beginning with a chapter in which the author succeeds in singling out seven critical notions as the minimum required for describing the different conceptions of love. Five of them refer to love insofar as it is said to be a tendency or inclination; they are: tendency in general, and then tendency in particular as acquisitive, as benevolent, as sexual, and as desire for union. Cross-mingling of these currents of thought gives rise to such conceptions as simple or mixed acquisitive tendency, or to self-interested benevolence and disinterested benevolence. Two critical notions refer to the judgmental aspect of love, namely, the judgment of esteem and the judgment of valuation. Very few writers reduce love totally to judgment or regard judgment as its primary element; there is general agreement that human love implies or presupposes judgment, but the relation between them is variously conceived.

There can be little doubt that these seven notions, patiently abstracted by the author from the vast literature on love, are basic to any discussion on this subject. They form a valuable critical instrument for interpreting and assessing any theory of love, as the author shows by classifying the principal theories of love according to these notions in the second part of his work which consists entirely of documentation. This gives the whole work a satisfying unity, and it enables one quickly to grasp the basic ideas of any given author, since in the list of contents the names of the authors considered are set out, in chronological order, under headings corresponding to these notions. One who has read the first chapter ("Critical and Terms ") can thus pass straight on to the section concerning any particular author in which he is interested.

Mr. Hazo prepares us for the documentation by three further chapters. One deals with the actual or possible controversies about natural human love (love as tendency, relation of judgment to tendency, the properties of love). In this chapter he arrives at a working definition of what is usually called love: four characteristics common to all conceptions of natural love among human beings are" that it implies interest, involves preference, inclines towards action, and is good or productive of good " (pp. 40-41). This simple formula is placed in nice contrast to the

bewildering complexity of opinions and of possible questions about love. The following chapter deals with the controversy about supernatural human love, hinging on the possibility of a love of God which does not involve self interest (as many Protestant theologians maintain, especially A. Nygren, in contrast to the view generally held by Catholic authors). This chapter is not meant to be exhaustive but representative, and perhaps the author wisely excluded reference to the mystics who wrote so extensively on love. It could have included a reference to *The Meaning of Love* by Fr. R. Johann, S. J. who, with his own personal solution, gives a good bibliography on the theological controversy. The last chapter of the first part treats of the unity and diversity of the literature on the idea of love. It shows that the same fundamental issues are raised whether it is a question of purely human love or of supernatural love.

The bulk of the book-about 800 pages-is devoted to documentation classified primarily by the pivotal notions of acquisitive and benevolent desire. The ideas of the most notable Western thinkers who have written on love are presented in summary form, with many quotations (usually to English translations when the original is in a foreign language). The selection is so wide, and so wisely made, that it would be niggardly to remark that some particular author might have been included. Yet, if Mr. Hazo wanted an example of utter and absolute egoism, he could have found it in the philosophy of Max Stirner, which is probably the most exaggerated-<>r undiluted-form of individualism proposed in the West. In dealing with the relation of judgment of love (c. 9) he might have referred to those philosophers, such as J. Maritain, and even more so G. Marcel, who hold that there is a form of knowledge mediated br love (for instance, knowledge by connaturality). He must have felt that this aspect of love-as a means of knowing-was not pertinent to his enquiry, for it is not mentioned even when he speaks of Pascal. He does, however, touch on this, both in general (v. g. p. 78) and in dealing with Scheler, Hartmann, and Fromm; and it could well be maintained that to provide a special insight with regard to the loved object is a property of love, at least in its higher forms.

One might describe this work as a history of the philosophy of love in the West. That history will continue, for men will always discuss and argue about love. Use of this volume will ensure that such discussion will not be aimless or one-sided but centred on the main themes of man's endless reflections on love.

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Tke Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture. Edited by CHARLES A. MooRE. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967. Pp. $9.50.

This is a collection of papers presented at the four East-West Philosophers' Conferences held in Honolulu between 1939 and 1964. The Editor gives a short introduction and a concluding survey. Between them are placed 14 chapters by Japanese scholars.

S. Miyamoto *(The relation of philosophical theory to practical affairs in Japan)* in treating this question takes examples from the historical cases of Prince Shotoku, State Buddhism and Shinran. S. Sakamaki *(Shinto: Japanese ethnocentrism)* gives a general explanation of Shinto, the way of gods. S. Hanayama *(Buddhism of the one great vehicle: Mahiiyiina)* expounds the fundamental ideas of Mahayana Buddhism. H. Yukawa *(Modern trend of Western civilization and cultural peculiarities in Japan)* emphasizes an irrationalism as one of the basic attitudes of the Japanese mind: "The Japanese mentality is unfit for abstract thinking!" (S. Miyamoto adds, however, to this paper a comment to the contrary). The long paper of D. T. Suzuki *(Reason and Intuition in Buddhist philosophy)* treats of the two fundamental and contrasted Buddhist methods of intuition and discursive understanding. (The paper is followed by a few pages by J. Takakusu on the method of Buddhist meditation) . According to H. Kishimoto *(Some Japanese cultural traits and religions)* "the peculiar nature of Japanese religions has brought forth two conspicuous cultural features. One is a distinct separation in the sphere of activities between the religious system and the ethical system. The other is the close relation between religious value and aesthetic value." D. T. Suzuki *(An interpretation of Zen experience)* tries to illustrate Zen experience through examples of several great Zen masters. According to H. Nakamura *(Basic features of the legal, political and economic thought of Japan)* the characteristics of the Japanese ways of thinking are above all the acceptance of actuality and the tendency to emphasize a particular social nexus. Y Ueda *(The status of tke individual in Mahiiyiina Buddhist philosophy)* talks first about the fundamental way of thinking of Buddhist philosophy in self-cognition, then discusses the problem of the relationship between the individual and the world as the one and the many. H. Nakamura *(Consciousness of tke individual and the universal among tke Japanese)* distinguishes two ways of approaching the problem, one the irrational way of the common Japanese people, the other the logical-philosophical way of thinkers. I. Hori *(The appearance of individual self-consciousness in Japanese religion and its historical transformation)* considers the first stage of individual self-consciousness in Japanese religion, and "the following stages of the historical transformations, which were brought about by the introduction into Japan of the Tendai sect, the Shingon sect, and the

Amidist movement of the Pure Land school." T. Furukawa *(The individual in Japanese ethics)* treats of the ethics of duty and loyalty and sees in Bushido the essence of the Japanese ethical tradition. M. Kosaka *(The status and the role of the individual in Japanese society)* treats the problem from a topographical point of view, dividing the history (700-ca. 1860) of Japanese culture and society into four periods. He defines the characteristics of these periods as aestheticism. T. Kawashima *(The status of the individual in the notion of law, right and social order in Japan)* describes first the characteristics of the Japanese notions of social obligation and of right, then points out that the Japanese attitude is, however, changing because of the loss of community owing to industrialization in more or less the same direction as the patterns of Western society.

Since these authors are scholars of top rank in Japan, their views on the Japanese thought tradition are surely of much value and worthy of being listened to seriously, although one may possibly hold a different interpretation on some points. The difficulty of understanding the Japanese mind for a Westerner is well known: many points are still controversial even among Japanese scholars. This volume throws light on many aspects of this " enigmatic, paradoxical and perplexing " thought tradition and has succeeded in bringing into relief the peculiar ways of Japanese thinking in contrast with the Western modes of thinking and also with those of Indian and Chinese philosophies.

Perhaps a list of the main sects of Japanese Buddhism and a little more detailed (than that given by an author) chronology of cultural main affairs at the end of the volume would have helped most Western readers. Since it is a collection of papers, one must overlook some disharmony: repetition of the same unquestionable matters; mixture of rather technical papers and papers for general readers; devotion of an excessive number of pages to relatively unimportant questions, sacrificing fruitful discussion on more important themes; moreover, a minimum {only one) contribution from the Japanese world of social science might impress one; also a treatment of Japanese Christianity in Muromachi-, Azuchi-Momoyama (and also Edo-) eras might be reasonably expected in such a work.

Since in such a volume of collected papers of diverse quality and of many authors a systematic clarification of the state of questions and an organized unification of the discussion materials are indispensable for a treatment of" *Essentials* of Japanese Philosophy and Culture," the concluding chapter by the Editor is still too short. Here he talks briefly of "the two most fundamental characteristics of the Japanese thought tradition," the general experiential point of view and its irrationalism, then of some other often attributed characteristics, like eclecticism, harmony, aestheticism and anti-individualistic attitudes, and then of problems of religion, ethics, social nexus, democracy and law in Japanese tradition. The shortness of this chapter is the more regrettable, because the late author,

an internationally known scholar for his contribution to the mutual understanding of the Oriental and Occidental philosophers, was doubtlessly one of the most competent for a fruitful treatment of the themes. What he has here really indicated will be very useful even for Japanese intellectuals.

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The Concept of the Prirnitive. AsHLEY MoNTAGU, Editor. New York: The Free Press, 1968. Pp. 283. *$6.95.*

This book is a collection of papers by Montagu, Berndt, Hseu, Tax, Diamond, George, Sahlius, Henry and Dozier on the value of the term "primitive" for the technical language of anthropology. It will have some interest for philosophers and theologians in their use of anthropological literature for research in their own fields.

Montague himself, and most of the contributors, argue for the elimination of the term. They argue that not only is it vague, but it is tainted with ethnocentrism and is incompatible with the value-free, objective, relativistic, and functionalistic methodology of anthropology. It originated in the assumption of European scientists that Western technological culture is superior to all others and a norm by which they can be judged. This prejudice was reinforced by the evolutionary approach which was simplisticly transferred from biology to the social sciences. If the term has any value, they believe, it can only be as a chronological designation for the culture of early man and cannot be applied to any existing cultures.

Most of the writers favor such a term as " non-literate," or other purely descriptive labels for those societies which today are popularly called " primitive." They show that non-literate cultures are not necessarily very ancient, nor particularly simple in structure, nor by any means crude in their art, their thought, their manners and morals, or in the functional adaptation of life to environment.

The only real dissentor in this discussion is Stanley Diamond in his essay " The Search for the Primitive." Diamond very vigorously argues for a new-Rousseauian position. He believes that many non-literate cultures are actually superior to modern civilization in the way they are designed to meet basic human needs. He argues, therefore, that there are certain aspects of man rightly labeled "primitive," which are seriously neglected in modern, rationalistic culture. He, therefore, proposes that the term be retained to characterize cultures in which these human traits receive their due.

In a brief essay Jules Henry indicates the importance of the idea of the

"primitive" for Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and suggests that their philosophical insights may be helpful to anthropologists, even if the term is not.

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Human Existence: Contradiction and Hope. By WALTER STROLZ. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 171. $5.95.

For more and more people today human existence seems either partly or wholly meaningless. The endeavor to overthrow traditional sexual and moral values; the attempt to make men assume sole responsibility for their actions and their destiny in a world which has witnessed the " death of God "; the " hippy " withdrawal from the "establishment "; all such phenomena are manifestations of this growing attitude. In part it is due to the discoveries of science and to the emergence of modern technology. Both have made men reject the myth-pictures of the past and replace them with a modern scientific or pseudo-scientific one. Man, seen in this new way, seems an entirely different creature. The meaning which his life had in the past is gone. That is the present meaninglessness of his existence for so many of our contemporaries.

Strolz's collection of existential essays is a reflection upon this. Without being technical and without entering into any problem in depth, it manages to convey a good sense of what one form of existential thinking makes of the situation. The author has little to say which is original. But he comes at the problem from many sides, and this gives his work a certain breadth and trueness to life which highly technical and penetrating treatises often lack. He sees the problem in the light of science, philosophy, religion, art and music. And each of these is an important dimension for the contemporary understanding of human existence.

In a brief essay on Pascal he tries to show how empirical science modified man's view of himself and history. But, he points out, it made the mistake of thinking that it could take a purely objective view of both. Pascal offered the corrective to this by showing that science, for all its pretended objectivity, is still the operation of man, the subject. There is no escape from this. Whatever else it may see, thought must also always see its own subjectivity.

From this some modern thinkers have concluded that there is nothing beyond the subject; others, that this world is the only real one. Both convictions lead to a special view of the human situation. Ernest Bloch, a Marxist, shares this view, he can preach a doctrine of hope. Hope, a subjective attitude of man, is not only a part of the human condition but

the most important and most crucial part. It gives man whatever promise and comfort he can have. This is all the salvation for which he can look.

The atheism of this position repeats the theme of many thinkers of the modern period. From Descartes to Kafka, it continually recurs. The " God is Dead " movement is only its most recent manifestation. In every such appearance it asks man again to assess his situation without recourse to the world-transcending God of the ancients. Whatever salvation is possible, it repeats, must be found without His intervention.

Where Bloch develops this theme in the context of hope as the crucial subjective attitude, Heidegger stresses fear. Man, he asserts, is the subject of fear, particularly the fear of death. But he should not shrink from this emotion. Rather he should use it as a means to articulate the question of being. Fear reveals to him what being is. And this elucidates his human condition and human existence.

Bultmann, Strolz goes on to say, took this as a point of departure to develop categories of being and existence into which the biblical message could be translated so as to make sense to modern man. To do this, he thought, he had to eliminate its " myth " content. When this disappears and the genuine metaphysics of human existence replaces it, the true message comes across.

But, for Heidegger's more developed thought this is unacceptable. " Myth " is not simply an expendable phenomenon of human reason. Rather, it is at root identical with language and with reason itself. Strolz uses this insight to rethink modern man's situation in terms of the Old Testament. Job and Ecclesiastes have something to say today and not through the expurgation of the myth presuppositions in which their message is couched.

At this point Strolz leaves the worlds of philosophy and biblical exegesis to pass to the world of music. Music, he theorizes, has something to say to us which nothing else can say. Perhaps a deeper understanding of the human condition can be had through it. At least, its understanding must round out any other.

The collection of essays closes with a consideration of childhood. Childhood, too, has a basic pattern of existence. And if one studies this and compares it with those patterns which seem successful or more admirable in adults, both are found to be at root the same. Strolz concludes that one who would transcend the conflicts of his human condition must face adult existence as a child faces his.

Strolz's work is a highly readable collection of essays. For anyone who wants a survey view of what modern man thinks of his condition, it is to be highly recommended.

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Evolution and the Reformation of Biology. By JIEBDEN TAYLOR. Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1967. Pp. $1.50.

This small volume in the University Series, Historical Studies, is more extensively subtitled: A Study of the Biological Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd of Amsterdam and J. J. Duyvene de Wit, late Professor of Zoology at the University of Bloemfontein, South Africa. As it turns out, it is even more elaborate than this: it is a book of religious piety and exhortation, an approach to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, a defence of Dooyeweerd's philosophy and a re-casting of biological facts in the light of Evangelical and Reformed Christian thought.

The author begins with the proposition that there can be no compromise between the scriptural account of the creation of the universe by Almighty God and the theory of mega-evolution, i.e., the theory that all living species are descended by a process of evolution from some original simple form of life, spontaneously generated by natural forces. The incompatibility of these views is not considered as a conflict between faith and science, but as a conflict between two faiths, each generating its own scientific interpretation of the facts of biology. One faith is faith in the truths revealed by God in the Scriptures, the other is faith in a self-generating universe in which everything can be explained by chance combinations of atoms. According to the first faith, God created all living things in their species, and evolution takes place within these specific limits. According to the second faith, all things that come to be have evolved. Against this second faith, the author marshalls the weaknesses in the evidences of paleontology, genetics, embryology and natural selection theory, and to the degree that the participants in the Darwin Centennial in Chicago in 1959 hesitated to espouse systematic or universal evolution as a fact, or even spoke out sharply against it, there is scientific respectability in this position. It is not clear, however, why this position is necessarily more scriptural than the other, unless contemporary scriptural learning is largely ignored.

Having dealt with the fairly limited question of evolution, the author proceeds to investigate the nature of man, and then the relation between religious faith and scientific knowledge, all according to the thinking of Dooyeweerd and de Wit. This leads him into a more general discussion of Dooyeweerd's philosophy, and to his major thesis that the philosophy of Dooyeweerd is the only philosophy really compatible with the Scriptures, and therefore the philosophy in terms of which contemporary biological thinking should be cast, in order to bring its understanding in harmony with revealed truths. Any other approach is apostate biology. Unfortunately, the exposition of Dooyeweerd's thinking is unsystematic and somewhat erratic, and the author's insistence on its scriptural relevance often seems forced. The book concludes with an exhortation to an Evangelical

and Reformed Christian thinking as the basis of true science, and a scriptural educational creed.

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The Student History of Philosophy. By BERNARD DELFGAAUW. Translated by N.D. SMITH. Albany: Magi Books, 1968. Pp. :t!!O. $4.95.

This one volume survey of Western philosophy is a translation of Fr. Delfgaauw's *Beknopte Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte.* The title selected for the English translation is a happy one; a " concise " history of Western thought is probably beyond hope. But to what avail another short history of philosophy? The proof must be in the classroom pudding. The study of philosophy's history appears to be losing ground in an increasingly crowded college and seminary curriculum. From the introductory survey course the student will take either some lasting appreciation of philosophy's search for ultimates or else the conviction that the past does not speak to his own present. Delfgaauw seems to be mindful of this and faces the challenge rather squarely. The work compares well with the author's previous studies of Marx and Teilhard de Chardin and is a good harbinger for his promised survey of twentieth-century philosophy.

Covering philosophy in the West down to the close of the nineteenth century, the present survey traces the essential trends of Greek, medieval and modern thought with clarity and direction. It is, of course, succinct, but expansion by the teacher in class would not be difficult. The opening section on ancient thought discusses Plato and Aristotle in a brisk fifteen pages, which allows room for a sorely needed analysis of Greek and Latin patristic philosophy, a topic often neglected in the seminary curriculum. Delfgaauw's treatment of medieval thought strives to correlate the historical factors in scholasticism's evolution with elements from the thought of chief figures. The author's talent for synthesis is best displayed in sections on the transitional periods, for example, the evolution of the *via moderna* from the *via antiqua.*

Fully half the survey is devoted to the formation of modern philosophy's worldview and the ramifications of this in the thought of the last century. Delfgaauw does not restrict himself to tracing the epistomological problem, as the emphasis he gives Spinoza testifies. For the author, Spinoza's thought is not extreme rationalism but rather reason in the service of an mystical vision, an *amor intellectualis Dei.* Those watching the recent attention given Spinoza's *Ethica* will be pleased with this appreciative position.

The study approaches the nineteenth century through "national " philosophies, and the discussion of German materialism handily recapitulates Delfgaauw's earlier work on Marxist thought. Perhaps the importance given de Biran is not proportionate to his influence in the French school, yet the author defends his case well. On the other hand, the contention that German philosophy had less influence on French thought of the last century than is usually supposed is not explicated as it should be. The significance of Darwin and Spencer on nineteenth-century British thought is rightly stressed, although some may resent their inclusion in a survey of philosophy.

The harried teacher of the introductory course is bound to recognize in Pelfgaauw's survey something of value: a swift yet competent look at our intellectual origins which keeps in mind today's students and their impatience with the past.

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Movies and Morals. By ANTHONY ScHILLACI, O. P. Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1968. Pp. 181. $2.45.

Sister Corita once remarked that if Christ were teaching the crowds today, He would be taking them to the movies. Father Schillaci's book, " Movies and Morals," is saying basically the same thing, Films, at least some of them, are in fact contemporary parables, offering the visually literate viewer emotional maturity, moral sensitivity and even religious experience.

However, not every Hollywood effort qualifies as modern man's morality play. This is true of even the so-called "religious" films. Father Schillaci contends that movies like "Going My Way," "Say One For Me," "The Bells of St. Mary '," through a cheap and sentimental presentation of their subject, often succeed in degrading the very values they seek to portray. He suggests that we look instead at the new cinema which " tells it like it is." Typical of the films in this category are: " The Trial," " Knife in the Water," "Alfie," "Georgie Girl," and "Sundays and Cybele." They tell us about life and what the book calls the four absurdities of our human condition: the loss of identity, the loss of vocation, the death of community and the death of love. But it is in the Bergman masterpieces: "The Seventh Seal," " The Virgin Spring," " Winter Light," " Through a Glass Darkly," and others, that cinematic theology finds its most fertile field. Here we have what the author defines as " a kind of devil's catechism for the theological virtues expressed, not in terms of theological abstraction

but of human suffering." Aptly enough, the book devotes an entire chapter to an analysis of the Swedish director's vision of good and evil.

To appreciate the film as art, it is important to know something about its " grammar." While this is not the purpose of the book, it does provide some interesting insights into the art of cinematography. For example, there is the matter of the director's use of a left to right camera or object movement to denote the usual, customary or peaceful action, but a right to left pattern to indicate difficulty, struggle, evil or disorder. This difference in movement is illustrated in Bergman's" The Virgin Spring": "the young maiden rides her pony to the church from left to right, along a peaceful lake and meadow which stress the horizontal lines of repose. But after her violent rape-murder, her family fights its way through a tangle of forest filled with diagonal and conflicting lines, going from right to left to find her body."

The appendices of a book are usually just that. But the fifty pages added at the end of " Movies and Morals " have a value comparable to any of the preceding chapters. This is the "how to" section of the book, providing not only the usual bibliography, but sample work shops, film series on various religious and moral topics, for teaching and preaching, as well as the addresses and telephone numbers of major film distributors.

Movies are coming into their own as a true art form. Many say it is *the* art of the age. Colleges and universities are increasing the number of courses on film appreciation and technique. The average young adult sees twenty films for every book he reads. There is great potential here and much to suggest that films can serve as a communications bridge between the Gospel and the contemporary world. Certainly it is an area that the theologian, the homilist, the educator should explore and " Movies and Morals " is a good way to begin.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Alba House: *Christ and Moral Theology,* by Louis B. Gillon, O. P. (Pp. 144, $2.95).

Barnes & Noble, Inc.: *The Refutation of Determinism,* by M. R. Ayers (Pp. 188, $6.00); *Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England* (Vol. I – Historical Problems) (Pp. 240, $5.75); *Chance, Love and Logic: Philosophical Essays,* by Charles S. Peirce, ed. by Morris R. Cohen (Pp. 318, $8.00); *Western Mysticism* (3rd ed.), by Cuthbert Butler (Pp. 242, $6.00).

Bruce Publishing Co.: *Spectrum of Protestant Beliefs,* ed. by Robert Campbell, O. P. (Pp. 106, $3.95).

Catechetical Guild: *Black Power: Value Revolution Toward Community and Peace* (Pp. 83, $0.75).

Convento de San Esteban: *Santiago Ramirez, O. P., In Memoriam* (Pp. 95).

Corpus Books: *Absolutes in Moral Theology,* ed. by Charles Curran (Pp. 320, $6.95).

Desclee de Brouwer: *La Trinite et le Mystere de l'Existence,* by Jean Danielou (Pp. 120, 75 FB); *Theologie, Science du Salut,* by Rene Latourelle, S. J. (Pp. 290, 210 FB, 21 FF, $5.55).

Verlag Hans Driewer: *Der Aggressionstrieb und das Bose,* by Winfried Czapiewski and Georg Scherer (Pp. 264).

Duke University Press: *Intellect and Hope,* Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi (Pp. 464, $9.50).

Fides Publishers, Inc.: *Movies & Morals,* by Anthony Schillaci, O. P. (Pp. 181, $2.45); *Fil1n8 for Religious Education II,* by Patrick J. McCaffrey (Pp. 108, $1.25).

Fordham University Press: *Freedom and Community,* by Yves Simon (Pp. 201, $5.50).

Harper & Row: *Writings in Time of War,* by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (Pp. 315, $5.95); *The Thought of Teilhard de Chardin,* by Emile Rideau (Pp. 672, $12.50); *The Church and the Second Sex,* by Mary Daly (Pp. 187, $4.95).

B. Herder Book Co.: *Equilibrium: Fidelity to Nature and Grace,* by M. J. Andre (Pp. 157, $4.95).

Herder & Herder: *Building the Human,* by Robert O. Johann (Pp. 192, $4.50); *Personalities and Powers,* by Robert E. Meagher (Pp. 142, $3.50).

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.: *Sex: Female; Religion: Catholic,* by Sally Cunneen (Pp. 171, $4.95).

lnstitutum Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Japonia: *Liber de Causis et Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Cauais Expoaitio* (Textus

Philosophici-2), ed. by Vincentius-Maria Pouliot, O. P. (Pp. 14.5, Yen 8,600, $10.00).

KTAV Publishing House, Inc.: *The Doctrine of Merits in Old Rabbinical Literature and the Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God,* by A. Marmorstein {Pp. 217 and pp. 168, $14.95).

Libreria Editrice della Pont. Universita Lateranense: *MisceUanea Andre Combes.* I (Pp. 896, L. 4000), II (Pp. 500, L. 5000), **ill** (Pp. 500, L. 5000); *Guida alla Ricerca Scientifica e allo Studio diS. Tornmaso,* by Luigi Bogliolo, S.D. B. (Pp. 199, L. 2000); *L'Azione Divina "Praeter Ordinem Naturae" secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino,* by Vladimiro Boublik {Pp. 150, L. 1500); *De Homine. I Structura Gnoseologicaet Ontologica,* by Aloisius Bogliolo, S.D. B. (Pp. 880). *L'Insegnamento Filosofico dei Preti deUa Missione alle Origine del Neotomismo in Italia,* by Giorgio Stella, C. M. (Pp. 251); *Il Fondamento Etico-Religioso del Diritto secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino,* by Reginaldo M. Pizzorni, O. P. (Pp. 282); *Ecclesia Sponsa apud S. Ambrosium,* by Joanes Josephus Marcelic, T. O. R. (Pp. 175, L. 2000). *Origini dell'Ordine dei Minimi,* by Alessandro Galuzzi, O. M. (Pp. 178, L. 2000).

McGill University Press: *Christian Ethics,* by Isma'il Ragi A. al Faruqi (Pp. 888, $12.00).

Macmillan Company: *Introduction to Logic* (8rd ed.), by Irving M. Copi (Pp. 482, $7.50).

Magi Books, Inc.: *The Student History of Philosophy,* by Bernard Delfgaauw (Pp. 225, $4.95); *Situation Morality,* by Robert W. Gleason (Pp. 40, $0.50); *What is Existentialism?* by Roger Troisfontaines (Pp. 81, $0.50); *Freedom,* by Mortimer Adler {Pp. 47, $0.50); *The Philosophy of Language,* by Robert G. Miller (Pp. 61, $0.60); *Five Oriental Philosophies,* by Thomas Berry (Pp. *55,* $0.60).

Marquette University Press: *Documentum de Modo et Arte Dictandi et Versificandi,* by Geoffrey of Vinsauf, tr. by Roger P. Parr (Pp. 120, $8.00).

Distribuzione Marzorati: *Gelassenheit di Martin Heidegger* (Heideggeriana I) , by Eduard Landolt {Pp. 819, L. 2800).

Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies: *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century. Vol. II. Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union,* by Walter H. Principe (Pp. 254).

Newman PressjPaulist Press: *God in Exile: Modern Atheism,* by Cornelio Fabro (Pp. 1280, $35.00); *Evolution and the Doctrine of Original Sin,* by Stephanus Trooster, S. J. (Pp. 138, $4.95); *Faith in the Face of Doubt,* ed. by John P. Keating, S.J. (Pp. 176, $1.45).

University of Notre Dame Press: *Kierkegaard: The Difficulty of Being Christian,* ed. by Jacques Colette, O. P. (Pp. 256, $5.96); *New*

Themes in Christian Philosophy, ed. by Ralph M.. Mcinerny {Pp. *336,* $7.95); *A Biblical Introduction to the Old Testament,* by Heinrich Gross {Pp. $1.45); *The Miracles of Jesus,* by Franz Mussner, tr. by Albert Wimmer {Pp. 105, *Understanding the Message of St. Paul,* by Nobert Brox, tr. by Joseph Blenkinsopp, ed. by Josef Goldbrunner (Pp. $1.45); *The Pope and the Press,* by Hugh Morely, 0. F. M. Cap. (Pp. 160, $M5); *Faith and Violence,* by Thomas Merton (Pp. $1.95).

Oxford University Press: *Saint Patrick: His Origins and Career,* by R. P. C. Hanson (Pp. $5.75).

Paulus Verlag: *Mensch und Person,* by Athanasius Kroger, 0. S. B. {Pp. 15,80 DM).

Philosophical Library: *The Beginning of Eternal Life,* by James A. Mohler, S. J. (Pp. 144, $4.95).

Plaum Press: *The Spirit and Origins of American Protestantism,* by John A. Rardon, S. J. (Pp. 516, $9.75).

Putnam's Sons: *The Great Thinkers on Plato,* ed. by Barry Gross (Pp. 348, $6.95); *The Spirit of Western Civilization:* I *The Spirit of the Classical World,* ed. by Wade G. Stephens (Pp. 383, II *The Rebirth of Learning,* ed. by William Bryar and George Stengren (Pp. 316, V *The Enlightenment,* ed. by Nicholas Capaldi (Pp. 316, , VI *Romanticism and Evolution,* ed. by Bruce Wilshire (Pp. $2.25) .

Sapienza: *L'Insegnamento Filosofico dei Seminari dopo il Vaticano II.* Atti del I Convegno Nazionale dei Docenti ltaliani di Filosofia nelle Facolta, Seminari e Studentati Religiosi d'ltalia {Pp. 304).

Shocken Books, Inc.: *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin,* by F. R. Tennant (Pp. 390, $7.50 cloth, paper); *The Prophet from Nazareth,* by Morton Scott Enslin (Pp. $5.00 cloth, $1.95 paper).

Charles Scribner's Sons: *A Christian Philosophy,* by Lawrence E. Lynch. (Pp. $3.95) .

Sheed & Ward: *The Eucharist,* by E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P. (Pp. 160, $3.95); *Is the Last Supper Finished,* by Arthur A. Vogel (Pp. 191, $4.50); *Paths to Unity: American Religion Today and Tomorrow,* by Ronald E. Modras (Pp. 309, $4.95); *The Future as the Presence of Shared Hope,* ed. by Maryellen Muckenhim (Pp. 181, $4.95).

State University of New York Press: *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States,* ed. by Marvin Farber (Pp. 813, $10.00).

Charles Thomas, Publisher: *Evil and the Concept of God,* by Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare (Pp. $6.75); *Aristotle's Syllogistic,* by Lynn E. Rose (Pp. 149); *Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment,* by Edward H. Madden, Rollo Handy, Marvin Farber {Pp. 150, $6.75) .

Frederick Ungar Publ. Co.: *Philosophy in the 20th Century: Catholic and Christian,* by George F. McLean, O. M. I., I *An Annotated Bibliography of Philosophy in Catholic Thought 1900-1964* (Pp. 871, $9.00), II *A. Bibliography of Christian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues* (Pp. 8Hl, $7.50).

D. Van Nostrand Company: *Deism: An Anthology,* by Peter Gay (Pp. 191, $1.75).

Villanova University Press: *St. Augustine and Christian Platonism,* by A. Hilary Armstrong, ed. by R. P. Russell, O. S. A. and B. A. Paparella (Pp. 67, *Augustine and the Greek Philosophers,* by John F. Callahan, ed. by Russell and Paparella (Pp. 181, $3.50).

Societa Editrice Vita e Pensiero: *Il Concetto di Filosofia Prima* (8rd ed.), by Giovanni Reale (Pp. 414, L. 6050).

Yale University Press: *The Mirror of Language: A. Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge,* by Marcia L. Colish (Pp. 404, $10.00); *The Geometric Spirit.* The Abbe de Condillac and the French Enlightenment (Pp. $10.00).

World Institute Council: *Fields Within Fields Within Fields.* I *MethoO,.. ology of the Creative Process.* II *Economic Fluctuations.*