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THE COMPOSITION OF THE PEOPLE OF GOD

THE PEOPLE of God is a salvific reality which originates from the divine plan for the salvation of men. It incarnates this plan in history and tends to the fulfilment of all the forms of historical change by the final return to God, when men, " regenerated in Christ through the Holy Spirit and beholding together the glory of God will be able to say 'Our Father.'" [1] Accordingly, the constitution of the People of God passes through three great stages. The first embraces the whole period of its preparation, which lasted until the coming of Jesus. The second stage extends from the coming of Christ until the end of time; and, finally, the third is established above all time, because men saved through God's grace will have achieved in God himself that fullness of perfection which is possible for them.

In each of these stages the People of God manifests special characteristics which it is necessary to consider in order to determine its configuration or physiognomy. As these great

[1] Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity *(Ad gentes divinitus),* n. 7 fin.

stages are differing manifestations of one sole plan of salvation, no one of them can be correctly understood except in relation to the last and definitive stage; this one alone fully incarnates God's plan. Even during its life here on earth the People of God " is marked with a genuine though imperfect holiness:' [2] that is, imperfect as compared with the definitive holiness of the life to come.

Presupposing the essential ordination of each stage to the next and of all of them to the last and definitive stage, it is possible, however, to examine specifically the characteristics of one of these stages in order to determine what the composition or constitution of the People of God is at a given moment, without losing sight of the fact that its full constitution will be achieved at the end of time. [8]

The Present Stage of the People of God

For evident reasons which need no explanation, everything that relates to the composition or constitution of the People of God during the present stage holds special interest for us, since this stage is situated between the preparation and the ultimate consummation. This situation makes clear to us that the People of God among whom we live should display characteristics of the transitoriness linking it with the earlier phase, as well as anticipations of the permanence which lead it to the threshold of full union with Christ in the glory of the Father.

The present stage of the People of God can be defined as that of fullness in the faith, [4] of historical fullness, of sacra-

[2] Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *(Lumen gentium),* n. 48.

[3] This typically eschatological view of the Church or People of God was habitual among the great masters of theology, as can be seen in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 8, a. 3. Full incorporation into the Church or People of God or Body of Christ is achieved in glory, where the essence of the will be fully manifested. When the eschatological view was lost, there arose the error of regarding this way of speaking among the great masters to be inexact, if not dangerous. The renewed ecclesiology which we have today rectifies the preceding· deviation and is situated along the line of those masters whose doctrine fits in with the great riches afforded especially through Vatican II.

• Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation *(Dei Verbum),* nos. 4 and 8.

mental fullness.[5] All these formulas, and others like them which could be proposed, express one and the same fundamental idea. A stage of faith can be had only in this life; yet, by speaking of a full faith, any new public revelation in this world is excluded, so that the stage which follows must consist in the clear vision of God. Similarly, historical fullness, on the one hand, includes history, that is, anything that touches the People of God in its earthly condition; and, on the other hand, since it is the fullness of this same history, it implies that there can be no expectation of a later historical stage but only the victory over all mutability by entrance into the unchangeable repose of God, " resting " from the works of this world " as God rested from his works." [6]

If one speaks of sacramental fullness, the same ideas are expressed in a more concrete and compact form. The sacraments really imply transitoriness and a state of pilgrimage, since in them is reflected " the appearance of this passing world," [7] that is, the image of a " world " which needs symbols to go towards God and to be united with him. Yet, at the same time, the sacraments orient us directly towards the definitive term of our salvation; the sacraments prefigure eternal life,[8] since they unite us fully with Jesus Christ as author of our salvation. This is realized most especially in the Eucharist, which, if we may be allowed the paradox, can be defined as bliss in darkness, since in it Jesus Christ is present really and substantially as object of our blessedness, though under symbols which call forth from us the exercise of faith. The Eucharist expresses in the highest way imaginable the proper condition of the People of God in its present phase, which is a state of faith, of history, and of symbols, under which is contained the selfsame reality which will be manifested in its fullness in the life to come.

[5] *Lumen gentium,* nos. 1 and 48.

[6] Hebrews 4: 10.

[7] *Lumen gentium,* n. 48.

[8] St. Thomas indicates this relation to eternal life as one of the elements included in the very notion of sacrament (cf. *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 60, a. 3).

We are used to speaking of the beginning of the life of heaven; but in reality there is much more involved than a mere beginning. We are not "foreign visitors" but "part of God's household,"[9] that is, his sons regenerated "through water and the Spirit."[10] This closeness to the final state is precisely what causes the movement of the People of God towards blessedness to be much stronger at this time than in pre-Christian times. St. Paul's words, "I want to be gone and be with Christ, which would be very much the better,"[11] expresses very vividly the force and sureness with which the People of God seek for fulfilment in the world beyond.

However, despite the perfection of the present state and its immediate nearness to final glory, one can never ignore the basic fact that, in this world, the People of God are subject to limitations, arising from various causes which we need not treat here.[12] All these limitations introduce into the prefection of the Church or the People of God an element of relativity which has manifold repercussions, above all when we consider that the Church is not merely an exterior reality capable of being understood and explained by human resources alone but a mystery that calls for the exercise of faith. The content of faith, though always the same for all men, can be understood in varying degrees of penetration according to the differences of each man's condition. All this enlarges the complexity of the problem of the constitution of the People of God in this world and demands nuances which we shall try to establish in a general way in the following pages.

"To Belong" and "To Be Related"

Both the complexity of the problem and the need fo:r fine shades of meaning come strikingly to mind in a paragraph very characteristic of Vatican II:

• Eph. 2:19.

[10] Jn. 3:5.

[11] Phil. 1:23.

[12] To gTasp this fact in its deepest source, it is enough to recall what Vatican II says about the limitations of the kingdom of Christ in this world (cf. Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity, *Apostolicam actuositatem,* n. 5).

All men are called to be part of this catholic unity of the People of God, a unity which is harbinger of the universal peace it promotes. And there belong *[pertinent]* to it or are related *[ordinantur]* to it in various ways the Catholic faithful as well as all who believe in Christ, and indeed the whole of mankind. For all men are called to salvation by the grace of God.[13]

The complexity of the paragraph is as evident as its compactness. The position of men in relation to the Church is defined by two basic concepts: *to belong* and *to be related,* that is, some persons belong to the Church whereas others are related to it. Obviously the first supposes a greater perfection, since there can be no doubt that to belong to the Church is much more than to be related to it.

These two fundamental concepts of *belonging* and *being related* can be realized or become incarnate among men " in various ways." For belonging to the Church does indeed take place in different modes, depending on whether the members are children or adults, just or sinners; and even within these categories conditions can differ enormously, since not all sinners are attached to sin with the same intensity of will, nor do all the just possess the grace of justification in the same degree. In an analogous way, being related to the Church can take the most diverse forms. Within this " relationship " are included all the men who do not yet belong to the Church and who, on the other hand, live in such different religious conditions that it is not possible to consider them to be related to the Church in an equal manner.

To make this argument concrete it is enough to cite the example of two extreme cases. Let us consider, on the one side, a good Jew who believes in God, loves him, hopes for immortal life and has good relations with his neighbor, in all this following God's word as revealed in the Old Testament. On the other side, let us take a militant atheist, who not only rejects faith from his own soul but does everything possible also to uproot it from all other men. Both are related to the Church. But the relation of the first contains very great salvific richness, while

[13] *Lumen gentium,* n. IS fin.

that of the second man is extremely weak and is counteracted by a personal posture consciously hostile to everything that comes from God as Savior and implies a share in goods leading to salvation. Men of this type, says Vatican II: "deceived by the Evil One . . ., living and dying in a world without God, are subject to utter hopelessness." [14] This implies definitive loss of the goods of salvation, as well as a complete rupture with the mystery of the Church. Between these two extremes there exists an immense variety in the actual manner in which each man or groups of men are related to the Church. [15] Yet it is always necessary to maintain that during the present life every man is really related to the Church and, as he subjects himself to the power of this relation in greater or lesser degree, he will receive in a greater or lesser measure goods leading to salvation.

Man does not establish his relation to the Church by his own initiative. This is a grace which God gives and which remains obscure for the person who receives it, so much so that, allowing for exceptional cases, men who are related to the Church only through this orientation do not come to have an explicit awareness of it. The Moslem and the Hindu are related to the Church, but they are not conscious of this ordination. If they accept the preaching of the Gospel when this is effectively proposed to them, their situation changes. This, however, brings up another subject, that is, the means whereby God grants men the grace of conversion and incorporates them into the Church, so that they are no longer merely related to her but truly belong to her. We are not going to enter into so great a problem now. Our aim in the foregoing arguments has been to clarify a little the state of the person related to the Church while the situation continues.

All of this serves to show the complexity and compactness of the ideas which Vatican II expressed in the paragraph quoted

[14] *Ibid.,* n. 16. Cf. also Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *(Gaudium et spes),* nos. 13 and 37.

[15] In this regard it is enough to concentrate on the categories or forms of ordination indicated by *Lumen gentium,* n. 16 and *Ad gentes divinitus,* n. 10.

above. As yet we have not given our attention to a detail which is very important. The Council, on the one hand, reduces the immense number of conditions in which men can be found with regard to the Church to two basic situations, namely, either *belonging* or *being related* to the Church. But the same Council, on the other hand, having reduced the situations to two, distinguishes three groups of men: "the Catholic faithful," "the others who believe in Christ," and the rest of men. At first sight it would seem obvious that, if there are two situations, there would be two groups; yet the Council points out three.

This anomaly is due neither to a flaw in logic nor much less to carelessness. The expression here was the subject of much study and was chosen deliberately. On the one hand, it is clear that Catholics *belong* to the Church; on the other, it is clear that those who have not received the Gospel as yet "are related ... to the People of God." [16] However, in the Constitution on the Church the Council did not wish to state precisely what is the exact situation of "the others who believe in Christ," that is, non-Catholic Christians; these men find themselves neither in the situation of the Catholic nor in that of the person who is still ignorant of the Gospel. Speaking in general terms, we could say that they are in an *intermediate* situation, although the word "intermediate" is inadequate, since it conveys the idea of equidistance from the extremes; such is not found in this concrete case, since the distance between a man who knows Christ and another who never heard of him is always much greater than that which can exist among those who hold differing opinions about the teachings and work of Christ.

Non-Catholic Christians, that is, all those we commonly designate by the expression *separated brethren,* are closer to belonging to the Church than merely being related, if their situation is taken collectively. Within this very great mass of persons there are also extremely varied conditions, so that

[16] *Lumen gentium,* n. 16.

some are not very different from those who have only a relation to the Church. Nevertheless, their corporate situation is one of greater closeness. At any rate, Vatican II in its Constitution on the Church does not place such persons definitely in either of the two great categories or gTOups, that is, neither among those who belong to the Church nor among those who are simply related to her. In other documents the Council is more precise with regard to the concrete situation in which the separated brethern are actually found. But of this we shall treat later. Nevertheless, we must say now that the Council was unable afterwards to find a simple formula to describe the situation of all these men, since the situation in itself is complex. That is to say, since it is characterized by such contrasted features as, for example, nearness and distance, it cannot be expressed by a simple formula, which would necessarily have to be partial, one-sided, and incomplete. One cannot dream of a magic power in formulas which changes the real situation, nor did Vatican II ever intend this. Nevertheless, the Council, despite the fact that it was facing a problem which would place necessary limitations on it, did achieve considerable progress in comparison with the earlier papal teaching which, on this particular subject, is represented principally by the Encyclical Letter *Mystici Corporis* of Pius XII.

Pius XII settled upon two groups, namely, Catholics and separated brethren. The former fully belong to the Church as its members, the latter are only " related to her by desire and wish." [17] The relation of which the pope speaks has a greater scope than *relation* as understood by Vatican II. Yet the very fact that the Council does not use this concept to define the situation of this class of believers opens the road to a search for a terminology which would be better suited to the reality, since it is beyond doubt that the concept of relation leads one to think only of weak and very distant ties with the Church, when the fact is that numerous groups of separated brethren are very close to the fullness of the Church.

[17] Pius XII, *Mystici corporis (AAS,* 35 [1943], 243).

Pius XII does not speak of the relation of the rest of mankind with the Church except implicitly, when he affirmed with all Christian tradition that all mankind is called to belong to the Church, or, inversely, that the Church was founded for all men without distinction. But the pope makes an important point which does not appear in the passage from Vatican II we have just explained. It is the idea of the mediation of the Church to all mankind who are still ignorant of the Gospel. Pius XII expresses this by saying that Christ *embraces* the human race, that is, he bestows on men the goods of salvation through his spouse the Church.[18] As a result of this action of Christ upon humanity through the Church, the entire human race returns or is related to Christ through the mediation of the Church. This cannot be effected without a relation to the Church itself.

The personal teachings of Pius XII and those of Vatican II are identical in content. Nevertheless, the Council, by the very act of considering the problem in its full complexity and by avoiding the term *relation* to express the aggregate of !'elations between the separated brethren and the Catholic Church, opem; up great possibilities of doctrinal progress in this matter and expedites the practical progress of ecumenism. From the time of the Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* of Pius XII to the promulgation of the Council's Constitution on the Church twenty years went by during which the greatest effort in the whole history of theology took place in ecclesiology. It is natural that a labor of this nature should have produced fruit.

Recapitulating all that has been said, we can affirm some clear conclusions, which it suffices here to state: Catholics *belong* to the People of God; those who have not yet received the Gospel are only *related* to this People; the separated brethren, taken collectively, are much closer to *belonging* than to *being related.* We intend to determine the degree of this belonging on the basis of the Decree on Ecumenism, which, although it is a document of a lower rank than the Constitution

''' *Ibid.,* pp. £39-240.

on the Church, stands out clearly, nevertheless, among those most representative of the new theological mentality produced by Vatican II. Looking back at the we have just proposed, we see at once the extreme cases of mere relation to the Church are represented by the Jew and the militant atheist. The maximum degree is found in the former, the minimum in the latter.

"Subsistence" of the People of God in this World

The above explanation has familiarized us with some fundamental concepts of Vatican II regarding the constitution or composition of the People of God in this world. To penetrate the depth of these concepts we must now consider further each of the large groups of men indicated by the Council: Catholics, separated brethren, and the rest of mankind. Following the order of the Council itself, we begin with the Catholics.

The chief statement of Vatican II on this point is contained in the following words: The People of God in this world " *subsists* in the Catholic Church, which is governed by the successor of Peter and by the bishops in union with that successor." [19] In this way the general teaching of the Council concerning the People of God acquires a concrete determination. The People of God *subsists* [*subsistit]* in the Catholic Church. A little later on we shall see how this word " subsists," which was not used in the vocabulary of ecclesiology before the Council, has a very full and precise meaning, which would be difficult to express by any other word.

The foregoing statement of the Council has various parallel places which we are going to repeat in order to obtain a concilar perspective wide enough to allow us an exact overall idea. According to the Council, the Church " is a kind of sacrament or sign" and "instrument" of salvation. [20] Now this concept, attributed to the Church without further clarification, is made concrete in the Catholic Church. According to the Council,

[19] *Lumen gentium,* n. 8.

[20] *Ibid.,* n. I. Cf. also nos, 9 and 48.

the Catholic Church is effectively " the all-embracing means of salvation," and it is only through her " that the fullness of the means of salvation can be obtained." [21] The only difference which can be noted between these passages is merely verbal and involves the substitution of the word *sacrament* for the composite expression *all-embracing means [generale auxilium* J which was more in use in the theological vocabulary immediately prior to the Council. The doctrine contained in both expressions is totally identical.

This idea of the concrete realization of the Church or the People of God in the Catholic Church is set forth by the Council under another form, which consists in identifying the hierarchical structure, willed by Christ for the community of his faithful, with the college of bishops presided over by the pope. Let us examine the texts.

In order to establish this holy Church of his everywhere in the world until the end of time, Christ entrusted to the College of the Twelve the task of teaching, ruling, and sanctifying. Among their number he chose Peter. After Peter's profession of faith, he decreed that on him he would buiid his Church; to Peter he promised the keys of the kingdom of heaven. After Peter's profession of love, Christ entrusted all his sheep to him to be confirmed in faith and shepherded in perfect unity. Meanwhile, Christ Jesus himself forever remains the chief cornerstone and shepherd of our souls.[22]

Yet, on the other hand, we know that this organization established by Christ is definitively found in the Catholic Church " governed by the successor of Peter and the bishops who are in communion with him." [23]

Finally, we can add an argument of a general nature which, in one form or another, is present in almost all the conciliar documents. In fact, when we read these documents we see

[21] Decree on Ecumenism *(Unitatis redintegratio),* n. 8.

•• *Ibid.,* n. Cf. also nos. 9 and 48.

•• *Lumen gentium,* n. 8. A fuller development of this point would demand II. delineation of the relations existing between the episcopal college, presided over by the pope, and the apostolic college, presided over by Peter. Naturally we shall not go into this theme, which Vatican II treated especially in *Lumen gentium,* nos. and

without any possible doubt that Christians not integrated into the Catholic Church are, on the one hand, *brethren* but, on the other hand, *separated;* that is, in their situation there are positive values which make them truly brethren; but there is also something negative, there is separation, there is rupture, and therefore the lack o£ some or many means o£ salvation given by Christ. Since the People instituted by Christ cannot be lacking in anything that leads to salvation, it is obvious that where this lack exists, one cannot find the People o£ God with the fullness proper to it. This fullness, on the contrary, is found in the Catholic Church, which is the all-embracing means of salvation and "has been endowed with all divinely revealed truth and with all means o£ grace." [24]

Now we have before our eyes a broad view o£ conciliar teaching which allows us to contemplate £rom different angles a truth o£ capital importance to us, that is, that the People o£ God *subsists* in the Catholic Church. For this reason everything Vatican II says in the other documents about the Church or the People o£ God in general must be understood in the concrete o£ the Catholic Church. By this we are not trying to take away the value and importance that other Christian confessions possess £or the Christian disposition o£ the things o£ this world and the attainment o£ salvation. All o£ this we grant, o£ course, and we shall explain it at greater length later on. What concerns us now is to establish solidly one o£ the extremes, namely, the clear affirmation made by Vatican II that the People o£ God *subsists* in the Catholic Church. In the Council's teaching we shall encounter many other complementary statements which give to this first one its own precise meaning o£ this basic truth within an overall synthesis. But before reaching tile synthesis, it is necessary to analyze the themes. Like every other analysis, this one demands the treatment o£ one thing after another, so that we reserve £or each matter the place that belongs to it.

•• *Unitatia redintegratio,* n. 4.

"To Subsist" and "To Be"

We have indicated earlier that the verb *to subsist* was introduced into the vocabulary of ecclesiology by Vatican II to express the relation of identity between the People of God and the Catholic Church. Ecclesiology before the Council made use of the verb *to be* for this purpose. Whereas preconciliar ecclesiology said that *the People of God is the Catholic Church,* the Council says that *the People of God subsists in the Catholic Church.* At first sight, the preconciliar statement seems simpler and clearer, since the verb *to subsist* used by the Council gives the impression o£ being overly academic. We shall see, however, that the Council's term is not only exact but that it contains besides an enormous advance as regards the recognition of the ecclesial values of other Christian confessions. To do this, we shall begin by locating the Council's expression *to subsist* in its proper context.

History and Context of a Council Term

The introduction of the verb *to subsist* was the result of a debate which focused on the appropriateness of using *to subsist* or *to be.* Only during the final stages of the elaboration of the Constitution on the Church was the verb *to be* set aside. This historical circumstance clearly shows us that Vatican II made the change in full awareness of the reason and with a precise purpose of which we shall speak later.

Once the term was chosen to be inserted into the Constitution on the Church, the Council introduced it also into other documents to express concepts which have an intimate relation with the theme that now concerns us. So, for example, treating of unity, the Council manifests its desire that all Christians will be gathered "into that unity ... which Christ bestowed on his Church .... This unity, we believe, *subsists* in the Catholic Church as something she can never lose, and we hope that it will continue to increase until the end of time." [25] What is affirmed at first of the Church in general is later applied to one

[26] *Ibid.,* n. 4.

of her essential properties, unity. The same could be said also of holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity, since these, too, are properties of the Church of Christ which *subsist* in the Catholic Church. The Council, however, makes this application explicit only when it treats of unity.

Again, the verb *to subsist* appears in regard to the relation between the Catholic religion and other religions. God, says the Council, " has made known to mankind the way in which men are to serve him, and thus be saved in Christ and come to blessedness. We believe that this one true religion *subsists* in the catholic and apostolic Church, to which the Lord Jesus committed the duty of spreading it abroad among all men." [26] Keeping in mind that the term *religion,* according to the vocabulary of the Council, means not just a catalogue of truths or external practices but embraces also the totality of the human person in his relations with God and neighbor, the statement that the one religion willed by God *subsists* in the Catholic Church acquires a singular value and is equivalent to saying that in the Catholic Church are found or subsist the whole of revelation and all the means of salvation given by God to men. This is a new way of proclaiming, in less customary terms, that the Church is the universal "sacrament" of salvation though which grace comes to men, since Christ, who founded the new People "as a fellowship of life, charity, and truth, uses it also as an instrument for the redemption of all, and sends it forth into the whole world as the light of the world and the salt of the earth." [27]

We now have a view of a selection of passages from Vatican II which, despite the diversity of subjects to which they refer, echo an identical concern. One verbal feature of this concern is the use of the verb *to subsist* instead of the verb *to be,* a practice which takes on special significance if we recall that it does not come from a spontaneous choice of words based on earlier usage but the outcome of a debate and of an effort to clarify ideas.

•• Declaration on Religious Freedom *(D-ignitatis humanae),* n. 1.

[27] *Lumen gentium,* n. g.

The Intention and Thought of the Council

On this solid foundation it is easy for us to take the next step to explain the profound intention of Vatican II. As everyone knows, one of the great preoccupations of the Council was to show that in the Catholic Church are concentrated or integrated all the goods leading to salvation, affirming at the same time the value of these goods when any one of them or many are found outside the Catholic Church.[28] Certainly, the circumstance of being found outside the Catholic Church lessens the salvific efficacy of these goods, but just as surely this efficacy, although diminished, remains and plays an important role in the history of salvation/[9] until the day of the Lord comes.

Affirming the superior excellence of the Catholic Church and safeguarding the goods of salvation existing outside of her necessitate the use of a finely nuanced vocabulary. If, for example, Vatican II had said that the Church of Christ *is* the Catholic Church, that the unity intended by Christ *is* Catholic unity, that the religion willed by Christ *is* the Catholic religion, we would have a collections of statements susceptible, no doubt, of a correct explanation but open also to erroneous interpretations. Hence, to say that the Church of Christ *is* the Catholic Church runs the risk of implying that other Christian confessions are *in no way* communities endowed with ecclesial reality. Then the comparison between the Catholic Church and the other confessions would amount to a comparison between one community in which the whole ecclesial reality willed by Christ is concentrated and other communities which possess nothing of this reality. Such a way of understanding the matter is radically false, not for what it attributes to the Catholic Church but for what is denied to the other confessions.

[28] *Unitatis redintegratio,* n. 3; *Lumen gentium,* n. 15.

[29] *Unitatis redintegratio,* n. 3; *Lumen gentium,* n. 16; *Ad gentes divinitu8',* n. 10; Declaration on the Relationship of the Chnrch to Non-Christian Religions *(NoB'tras aetate),* nos. 2-4.

As regards unity and religion an analogous argument can be used, that is, it is possible to think that unity and religion exist in the Catholic Church in such a way that nowhere else are found either the elements of unity proceeding from Christ or any religious value capable of putting man in contact with God. In these cases, as in the preceding one, one cannot object to the fullness attributed to the Catholic Church; yet one cannot concede the totally negative assertion about other Christian confessions or about non-Christian religions.

To avoid any possibility of understanding the matter in this way, Vatican II abandoned the use of the verb *to be* and adopted instead the verb *to subsist.* When the Council says that the Church, the unity, and the religion willed by Christ *subsist* in the Catholic Church, it states that this Church possesses the fulness of the goods and means of salvation instituted by Christ in such a way that in her is reflected fully the plan of salvation and that the image of Christ himself shines there inasmuch as he is the author of this salvation. The subsisting of the plan of salvation in the Catholic Church causes her to be effectively the image of Christ analogous to the way Christ is the image of the Father. [30]

Yet this manner of affirming the fullness which belongs to the Catholic Church does not afford any basis for a negative judgment concerning other confessions or religions. On the contrary, the very fact of attributing to the Catholic Church the embodiment of the subsistence or fullness of the salvific plan presupposes the acknowledgment that there are diverse participations *of this same plan* which, without attaining the fullness which would enable them to subsist, have a true salvific content which proceeds from God and which, therefore, can lead men to God.

The degrees of participation in the goods and means of salvation, as well as the salvific efficacy derived from this participation, differ enormously. Yet, wherever there is some

[30] The theme of the Church as the image of Christ was fully developed by Paul VI in his Allocution at the opening of the second session of Vatican IT. Cf. *AAS, 55* (1963)' 845-852.

form of participation there must be a principle which acts upon men in a positive way to orient them towards God and enable them to find salvation in him. Since these are always limited participations, they cannot subsist or be efficacious of themselves. We can say that, as regards their salvific purposes, they exist only inasmuch as they *adhere* to the Catholic Church in some way and in proportion to the measure of this adherence. In the Catholic Church is the subsisting fullness of salvation; outside of her there are participations which, on the one hand, must rest upon this fullness and, on the other, must tend towards it. We believe that this is exactly the thought of Vatican II. In its documents we read that the salvific efficacy of separated Christian confessions " is derived from the very fullness of grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church," [31] and that the elements of sanctification and truth existing in these confessions " possess an inner dynamism toward Catholic unity." [32]

Full and Participated Member ship

Having recourse to an analogy from the physical order we can argue in the following way. Just as the fullness of being exists only in the subsisting Being, from which proceed and towards which are ordered all other beings, so too, in all due proportion, the fullness of the plan of salvation subsists in the Catholic Church in which all those religious expressions which have a true salvific content share and to which they are ordered. Thus, just as the limited being which creatures share is true being, so, too, the limited participations of the salvific plan existing outside of Catholic fullness are true participations of one true salvation. On the basis of these explanations it is now possible to express in a concrete and simple way the relation existing between the Catholic Church and the separated Christian confessions. The Catholic Church is the total, full, *subsistent* realization of the People of God as Christ founded it; the other confessions are partial or incomplete

[31] *Unitatis redintegratio,* n. 3.
•• *Lumen gentium,* n. 8.

realizations *of this same People.* For this reason, the truth found in its fullness in the Catholic Church is found also, in a partial and incomplete manner, in the other Christian confessions.

From this follows a conclusion of major importance in the practical order. If, for example, a confession actually separated becomes united to the Catholic Church, it does not disappear nor is it destroyed; rather it is brought to perfection and attains the fullness to which it tends by a dynamism inherent in the goods of salvation which it already possessed. Thus, just as the end of a journey is not the destruction of the voyage but its natural completion, so too, making due allowance for the analogy, union with the Catholic Church is not the extinction of the other confessions but represents the attainment of their fullness.

If the separated confessions are partial realizations of the People of God, of the Church of Christ, they possess also in a partial way an ecclesial reality, that is, they are communities organized and sanctified by virtue of one element or many that, by the will of Christ, pertain to the constitution of his Church. The partial realization of Christ's will for the Church in separated confessions is a basic principle for judging everything related to these confessions. Although they do not have the fullness of the salvific means given by Christ, yet those means which they do preserve are authentically Christian and identical with those used in the Catholic Church. Thus, for example, Baptism, if valid, is the same everywhere; and this can be said of any sacrament, as long as it is a true sacrament instituted by Christ.

Any community formed by these means of salvation possesses a true ecclesial reality, even though it has it only in part. And this reality, insofar as it is true and ecclesial, is not merely similar to but strictly identical with that which is found in the Catholic Church. The fullness of the Catholic Church does not consist in her baptism being better or more efficacious that that of the other confessions but rather in possessing, along with baptism. all the other means of salvation, while the

other confessions always lack something and are precisely for that reason separated. One must always return to the principle that the Catholic Church fully incarnates a reality which the other confessions incarnate only partially. The Catholic Church is the fullness of the Church, the other confessions are participations in the Church in unequal degrees which depend on the concrete situation of each confession.

According to Vatican II the ecumenical apostolate is directed to confessions as such, not immediately to persons.[33] However, although the apostolate directed towards individual persons is distinct from the ecumenical, it cannot be properly exercised except within an ecumenical atmosphere. This demands that the situation of the non-Catholic be acknowledged in all its values and that the step towards Catholicism appear to be not a disapproval of what went before but the culmination or fullness towards which the previous status was ordered by its very nature .. This psychological atmosphere which this type of apostolate should involve was very well defined by Paul VI when he said: "The door is open ... ; the step to clear it can be given honorably."[34] It is a step which does not mean a break but rather complete consistency with truths already accepted. As the Council says: "Baptism is thus oriented toward a complete profession of faith, a complete incorporation into the system of salvation such as Christ himself willed it to be, and finally, toward a complete participation in Eucharistic communion."[35] The step that leads to all these forms of fullness can surely be taken *honorably.*

The Vocabulary of Vatican II and of Pius XII

In Pius XII there is the culmination of a literary tradition which we can now consider as antiquated and surpassed. This is the tradition which used to express the relations between the Church or People of God and the Catholic Church by the verb

[33] *Unitatis redintegratio,* n. 4.

[34] Paul VI, "Message to the World from Bethlehem," Jan. 1, 1964 *(AAS, 56,* 175).

[35] *Unitatis redintegratio,* n. 22.

to be, with the consequent affirmation that the People of God is the Catholic Church and vice versa. The most explicit and clearcut statement in this direction was made by Pius XII when he said that " the Mystical Body of Christ and the Roman Catholic Church *are* one and the same thing: *unum idemque esse."* [36] Taken in the precise sense intended by the pope and confirmed by the whole preceding tradition, this statement expresses an indubitable truth which must always be maintained and which, of itself, does not imply lack of esteem, and even less not any denial, of the ecclesial goods possessed by the separated confessions. The popes, especially from the time of Leo XIII and notably as regards the separated Oriental confessions, repeatedly called attention to the close bonds between them and the Catholic Church. All of this remains intact in the statement of Pius XII. However, it must be recognized that, objectively considered, such a statement is not the best and that it can afford a pretext for wrong interpretations, as we have already mentioned. For this reason, the development of ecumenical studies and the greater sensitivity which these studies awaken have given an urgency to the task of seeking a vocabulary completely adjusted to the objective situation and capable of excluding every possibility of false interpretation in this very delicate matter. Progress in this regard was achieved by the Council, progress which has its more visible manifestation in the wording of the new formula and yet, at the same time, opens great possibilities for doctrinal progress.

If we take all of this into account, we can explain, on the one hand, the resistance of some theologians to the vocabulary of Pius XII and, on the other hand, the full objective coherence between the teaching of this pope, which represents the whole preceding tradition, and the teaching of Vatican II, while at the same time recognizing the great verbal and doctrinal progresg achieved by the Council. We think that in this way each matter is put in its proper place. Nor can one fall into the huge error

[86] Pius XII, *Humani generis (AAS,* 42 [1950], 571).

of thinking that Vatican II limited itself to sanctioning things already accepted and perceived by all, nor is there even the slightest basis for saying that the Council liquidated the ecumenical teaching prevalent during the previous period. The Council summarized and enriched the common heritage and gave it a more precise expression as the result of examining the problem under all of its aspects and in relation to the totality of the doctrine professed by the Church. We can say that the Council made ecumenism pass from an initial phase, in which it is necessary above all to see to the consolidation of what is primary, to another stage of development and expansion.

Vatican II achieved a similar advance in the question of the relations between the Catholic Church and non-Christian religions. The distance between these religions and the separated Christian confessions is so great that one may not argue on the basis of the same criterion in both cases. However, working from the principle of safeguarding all good existing outside the Catholic Church, the Council made an important advance also in the subject. In these religions are found "rays " of that Truth which enlightens men and "subsists" in fullness in the Catholic Church. [37]

Variety within the Catholic Church

We have just seen that the full or" subsistent" embodiment of the People of God during its earthly stage is the Catholic Church. Separated Christian confessions approach this fullness to a greater or lesser degree and non-Christian religions possess, or at least can possess, some of its " rays." This basic problem resolved, we can now turn to the inner life of the Catholic Church in order to study its constitution, which is precisely what God has willed for His People, since, as we have already said, this People is realized or embodied with subsistent fullness in the Catholic Church. In keeping with the principle of analyzing before trying to synthesize, we shall first study the elements of diversification existing within the Catholic Church.

[37] *Nostrae aetate,* n.

Then we shall see how all her elements are mutually coordinated.

"Not only, then, is the People of God made up of different peoples but even in its inner structure it is composed of various ranks." [38] By these words the Council expresses two different categories of diversity, namely, that which affects persons by reason of their ethnic origin and that which comes forth from the ecclesial organism itself in which, as in every organism, there is a "variety from the members and functions." [39] The first category of diversity is somewhat external to the Church as such; the second, on the other hand, is inherent and intrinsically constitutive.

Diversity of Origin

The diversity derived from ethnic orgin could appear to be strange in itself, in view of the concept we sometimes have regarding the Church, but also expressly contrary to another statement of Vatican II. The Council says that " there is in Christ and in the Church no inequality on the basis of race or nationality, social condition or sex." [40] If none of these introduces inequality, its seems that diversity of origin should have no reverberation in the Church and consequently should not be taken into account to explain variety within the Church itself.

If we examine the problem more closely, however, we see that one cannot come to this conclusion, nor is there any opposition among the various statements of the Council. When the Council rejects any type of inequality which has its origin in race or nationality, social condition or sex, it is referring tacitly to one of the world's most serious problems, namely, discrimination, by which certain rights, which are of themselves common to all, are unjustly limited to citizens of a determinate race, nationality, social condition, or sex. The Church completely excludes from her inmost being any type of *discrimina-*

[88] *Lumen gentium,* n. 13.

•• *Ibid.,* n. 7.

·0 *Ibid.,* n.

tion in favor of some members and against others. However, it does not follow, not even remotely, from this that qualities inherent in race, nationality, social condition, or sex are in no way present in the Church. It is enough to consider marriage, for example, which, on the one hand, is a sacrament belonging to the unchangeable constitution of the Church, and, on the other hand, can only be contracted between a man and a woman; that is, marriage presupposes difference of sex and is established upon this differentiation. Nevertheless, this difference implied in the sacrament has nothing to do with discriminatory theories or practices which attempt to reserve the right to contract marriage to certain groups or which limit the possibilities of the choice of mate.

Within the Church discrimination is rejected.[41] At the same time, however, there is room for every legitimate diversity no matter where it comes from. The number of the Constitution on the Church where the Council rejects every type of discrimination begins clearly with these words: "By divine institution Holy Church is structured and governed with wonderful diversity."[42] The problem lies in determining how the diversity inherent in qualities of the natural order, such as race, nationality, social condition, or sex, can be present within the Church and modify its proper life, that is, the life of salvation. The same Council provides sufficient instruction on this important problem. The principle from which everything else flows is stated by the Council in these words: "This characteristic of universality which adorns the People of God is a gift from the Lord himself. By reason of it, the Catholic Church strives energetically and constantly to bring all humanity with all its riches back to Christ its Head in the unity of his Spirit."[43] In virtue of this principle everything that is genuinely human has its place within the Church. Furthermore, moved by the Holy Spirit, the Church is conscious of the obligation to work to integrate this within her own life by preserving the proper

[41] Concerning this theme cf. *Gaudium et spes,* n. 29; *Nostrae aetate,* n. 5.
[42] *Lumen gentium,* n. 32.
[43] *Ibid.,* n. 13.

characteristic of this human reality and making it serve, by the gift of God, the work of salvation. The Council goes on to say that, in bringing the kingdom of God to humanity, the Church" takes nothing away from the temporal welfare of any people by establishing that kingdom. Rather does she foster and take to herself, insofar as they are good, the ability, resources, and customs of each people." [44]

This way of expressing the consciousness of the Church concerning the bonds uniting it with the genuinely human patrimony of various peoples demands, as a necessary consequence, that the various goods of that patrimony and all of them together survive within the Church; with this they acquire a new value, that is, the value which results from their insertion into the Church in virtue of which they are apt to lead man to salvation whose only author and finisher is Christ. The Church welcomes to her bosom any form of healthy pluralism, since everything that is healthy comes from God, and it not only does not impede salvation but contributes to the more effective attainment of it. In this postconciliar period attention has been focused on pluralism especially in the liturgical field. If we compare the present situation with the uniformity of the previous period, we become immediately aware of the magnitude of the change; nevertheless, we have not, as yet, reached the end of the progress which can be made in this direction.

The acceptance of racial and ethnic differences, as well as any other type, together with their incorporation into the Church, should be regarded as one of the basic points of the teaching on the missions developed within Vatican II. The principle passage on this point follows:

Theological investigation must necessarily be stirred up in each major socio-cultural area, as it is called. In this way, under the light of the tradition of the universal Church, a fresh scrutiny will be brought to bear on the deeds and words which God has made known, which have been consigned to Sacred Scripture, and which have been unfolded by the Church Fathers and the teaching

u *Ibid.*

authority of the Church. Thus it will be more clearly seen in what ways faith can seek for understanding in the philosophy and wisdom of these peoples. A better view will be gained of how their customs, outlook on life, and social order can be reconciled with the manner of living taught by divine revelation. As a result, avenues will be opened for a more profound adaptation in the whole area of Christian life. Thanks to such a procedure, every appearance of syncretism and of false particularism can be excluded, and Christian life can be accommodated to the' genius and dispositions of each culture. Particular traditions, together with the individual patrimony of each family of nations, can be illumined by the light of the gospeU [5]

The possibilities contained in this program are unlimited. For its effective realization and adequate guidance there is required the presence of an " authority " which plans and directs. This is the task which the Council entrusts to the Conferences of Bishops in each great socio-cultural territory. [46]

All these types of diversity directly affecting the style of Christian life partially germinate from pluralism already existing and partially stimulate it. At the same time, because of the ease of communication among the various parts of the world, a new phenomenon is realized which tends to produce bonds of higher unity among distinct cultures. Hence one cannot consider that the contact of one culture with another terminates in a simple juxtaposition of the two. Cultures cross-fertilize and enrich one another and impel the human mind to ever higher goals. To be able to foretell where the diversities with a higher unity will be manifested in the life of the Church as a result of the encounter and compenetration of cultures, it would be necessary to make a specialized study of the whole second chapter in the second part of the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. We shall not go into that matter here. For our purpose we think that the explanation of the principle which we have just given is sufficient.

'" *Ad gentes divinitus,* n. 22.

•• *Ibid.* Some further determinations on the way to put this order of the Council into practice can be seen in the third part of the Motu Proprio, *Ecclesiae Sanctae,* n. 18 *(AAS,* 58 [1966], 786).

Diversity of Origin and Organic Diversity

As explained, diversity proceeding from origin is always somewhat external to the Church in the sense that the goods of salvation, which are the things that properly constitute the Church, do not demand of themselves such a diversity; this proceeds rather from *below,* that is, from the earthly situation of the man who received the message of salvation. However, it is not a question either of a diversity which can be described as merely external, since salvation builds upon it, takes it and makes it effectively serve its own purposes. Salvation is of such a nature as to embrace man in his totality, and nothing that is genuinely human by nature, by custom, or by any other title, is excluded from its transforming influence. Just as, on the other hand, salvation during the present stage " subsists " in the Church or People of God, so it is obvious that human goods as well, including diversity, belong to this People and contribute to its constitution.

Admitting all this, however, we must recognize also that diversity of origin does not flow from salvation as such, nor, for the same reason, is it necessary for attaining final consummation in the bliss of heaven. Even if the whole human race formed only one country, had only one culture and accepted the same customs, the goods of salvation would still not lose their efficacy, since their power is equally effective whether it acts on men who are all alike or who are different from one another. Considered in itself, salvation is "indifferent" to merely human diversities; it takes them and incorporates them when they exist, but it does not cause them.

The People of God, which incarnates salvation, can exist perfectly without these human differences. If the constant progress of the media of social communication and all the other causes which condition the life of mankind should arrive at the total removal of existing diversities,-supposing that such an elimination could be the term of a genuine progress,-nothing essential would change in the People of God. *Certain modes* of expressing its life would disappear, but *its life* would be kept

intact; since, if it is true that the People of God is embodied in the persons and things of this world, considered in itself, however, it is not of this world but *of God.* Just as the Word assumed human nature, not to depend upon it but to exalt and transform it into a universal instrument of salvation, so, analogously, the People of God incorporates human diversities in such a way that it is never subordinated to them but directs them to the transcendental goal of the salvation which it brings.[47]

With the People of God there is another kind of diversity which, in contrast to the one due to origin, we can call *organic.* [t arises from within this People, flows from the very goods which constitute it, which are ordered among themselves in such a way that they demand a variety of offices and functions. It is impossible to make all of them uniform or gather all of them together in a single person without causing them to disappear. This sort of diversity is inherent in the People of God and belongs intrinsically to its constitution.

Whatever may be its concrete realization, the general idea of a people always involves a relation to a diversity, not merely numerical because it includes a large number of persons but also, and principally, qualitative. For a people's life is impossible without a distinction and distribution of functions, all of which are contained within a hierarchical organization which orientates all of this to the common good of the people. The Church or People of God is truly a people and as such is " organically structured." [48] The criteria and means for structuring this people are original and belong to it exclusively, that is, they are not derived from copying the structures of the various peoples in the human race. According to Vatican II, the structure of the People of God is based on " the sacraments and the virtues." [49]

Among the virtues charity holds the first place, since it is the "law" of the People of God.[50] For this reason the basic destiny of this people is " to make a simultaneous manifestation and

[47] *Lumen gentium,* n. 8.

[48] *Ibid.,* n. 11.

•• *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.,* n. 9.

exercise of the mystery of God's love for man." [51] Among the sacraments it is the Eucharist which best manifests the organically structured character of the People of God. On the one hand, the celebration of the Eucharist is " the fount and apex of the whole Christian life," [52] and, on the other, the faithful participate in this celebration " not, indeed, all in the same way but each in that way which is appropriate to himself." [53]

These principles organization and diversification are completely unknown in the constitutional law of any country in the world. They are principles given by Jesus Christ himself when he instituted his Church or his People. It is true that this People can and should give attention to the structures of the various nations in order to gain a deeper knowledge of its own structure. However, basically this structure will always remain a mystery, a reality which does not flow from the essential social nature of man and which is not demanded by this nature but proceeds directly from Christ. Like every structure, the Church, too, introduces diversification, hierarchy, order among persons in such a way that it is impossible to think of a Church whose members would be completely uniform and undiversified. By its very being the Church or People of God implies a diversity of elements and persons. However, one must always keep in mind that this diversity is always hierarchical and ordered to the end that " the new commandment of charity may be fulfilled by all." [54]

This elemental analysis of the concept of the People of God has been sufficient to show that there exists in it a diversity which is so intimately connected with its nature that it cannot be suppressed or changed without attacking what is deepest in

[51] *Gaudium et spes,* n. 45.

[52] *Lumen gentium,* n. 11.

[53] *Ibid.* The idea that the hierarchical structure of the People of God is manifested in the liturgy and especially in the eucharistic celebration is found frequently in Vatican II, as for example, in the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy *(Sacrosanctum Concilium)* nos. 41. Cf. also the Instruction, dated May 1967, given by the " Consilium " for applying the aforementioned Constitution to *The Cult of the Eucharist,* n. 16 *(AAS, 59, 551).*

[54] *Lumen gentium,* n. 32.

the very being of this people. We shall arrive at the identical conclusion if we take as our point of departure other symbols expressing the People of God, as, for example, the body and the family. St. Paul often uses the idea of body and applies it directly to explain the difference of members, gifts, and functions which cannot be lacking in the Church, just as they cannot be lacking in the human body.[55] Revelation likewise abounds in concepts drawn from family life to express the relations of men with God and among themselves. Using this basis the Council frequently speaks about the Church as the family of God.[56] The family demands a diversity of persons and functions and, at the same time, stamps on the exercise of these functions a well-defined "style," which consists in love holding predominance. Analogously, in the Church there is a diversity, much more complex than that of a natural family, from which flows a multitude of functions which should be performed with that spirit of love which is in the concrete the love of charity. The Council says: "Thus it is evident to everyone that all the faithful of Christ of whatever rank or status are called to the fullness of the Christian life and to the perfection of charity."[57]

Concrete Forms of Diversification

The forms of diversification proceeding from origin cannot be classified. They can increase, decrease and even disappear without the intimate life of the Church being thereby affected. By extending a little the concept of diversification bound up with origin we can include within this category the differences which characterize the various local churches. As Vatican II says: " Within the Church particular Churches hold a rightful place. These Churches retain their own traditions without in

[55] A synthesis of St. Paul's ideas, including diversity and the bases upon which it depends, can be seen in *Lumen gentium,* n. 7.

[56] Concerning this theme cf. E. Marino-G. di Agresti, O. P., "Processo evolutivo nelle imagini della Chiesa. Popolo di Dio o famiglia di Dio? ", *Vita Sociale,* n. 3 (Pistoia, 1967).

[57] *Lumen genthtm,* n. 40.

any way lessening the primacy of the Chair of Peter. This Chair presides over the whole assembly of charity and protects legitimate differences, while at the same time it sees that such differences do not hinder unity but rather contribute toward it." [58] The traditions of the particular Churches, insofar as they are *proper* to these Churches and not directly bound up with the universal Church, can disappear without detriment to what is essential. Often they represent a way of understanding and expressing the Christian life, a way marked by the differences of origin which prevail in the region and give it its own physiognomy distinct from that of other places. If the differences based upon origin are not essential to the Church, neither are any other differences which are founded upon them or which necessarily presuppose them.

In saying this we do not intend to assert or even vaguely to suggest that the existence of particular Churches is an accidental phenomenon in the Church or People of God. We are only saying that the local differences or peculiarities or traditions as local can vary endlessly without affecting in the least the universal Church in its constitutive elements. Hence it is impossible to make a list of the legal characteristics or traditions of the Church. Vatican II states that these local traditions correspond to the gentle form whereby divine Providence governs the Church [59] and are concerned chiefly with discipline, liturgical rites, and the theological and spiritual heritage of the various regions. [60] Among all these particular traditions those are of special importance which are found in the ancient Patriarchal Churches, which the Council calls " parent-stocks of the faith *[matrices fidei]."* [61]

All these forms of diversification are subject, of themselves, to great variability, inasmuch as they differ not only from one

[58] *Ibid.,* n. 13.

[59] *Ibid.,* n. 23.

[60] *Ibid.* Cf. also *Vnitatis redintegratio,* nos. 15-17.

[62] *Lumen gentium,* n. 23. A fuller development of everything referring to the traditions of these Churches and their insertion into the universal Church can be seen in the Decree on Eastern Catholic Churches *(Orientalium Ecclesiarum),* nos. 1-6.

region to another but also within the same region where the Church or Rite undergoes notable changes in the course of time. The ritual forms everywhere usually have a greater permanence, especially in what we call the "oriental rites." Yet in itself this does not prevent this kind of diversity from being very changeable, if it be compared with the permanent constitution of the Church as such. Besides all these variable forms of diversity there are others which are permanent. The Constitution on the Church implies certain diversities which we call *organic,* which are as permanent and definite as the Church from whose nature they come forth as an inner demand.

According to Vatican II the concrete forms of organic diversification within the Church have one of these two bases, namely, office, condition and state of life.[62]

a) *Clergy and Laity.* There is diversity, first of all, by reason of office. By this the Council means that within the People of God there are some members consecrated especially to exercise " the sacred ministry for the good of their brethren." [63] It is a ministry which comes from Christ, is exercised among men, and has as its aim that the whole People of God be oriented freely and efficaciously to Christ.

> For the nuturing and constant growth of the People of God, Christ the Lord instituted in his Church a variety of ministries, which work for the good of the whole body. For these ministers who are endowed with sacred power are servants of their brethren, so that all who are of the People of God, and therefore enjoy a true Christian dignity, can work toward a common goal freely and in an orderly way, and arrive at salvation. [64]

This diversity by reason of office proceeds from the sacrament of Orders instituted by Christ for the precise purpose of providing pastors or ministers for his Church. [65] Therefore, it is Jesus Christ himself who by instituting the sacrament of Orders has introduced into his Church the distinction between

[62] *Lumen gentium,* nos. 13 and 44.
[63] *Ibid.,* n. 13.
[64] *Ibid.,* n. 18.
[65] *Ibid.,* nn. II,

those who receive this sacrament and all other persons. This distinction is commonly expressed by the terms *clergy* and laity."[66] "By reason of their particular vocation" the clerics " are chiefly and professedly ordained to the sacred ministry . . . . But the laity, by their very vocation, seeks the kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by ordering them according to the plan of God." [67]

The distinction between clergy and laity is essential within the Church and cannot disappear or even be diminished as far as its basic truth is concerned. However, the juridical and social forms in which the distinction is expressed can vary for many reasons. It is obvious that, although through the whole history of the Church clerics have been clerics and lay persons have been lay persons, the concrete manner of establishing the relation between these two ranks of the faithful presents quite different aspects from one age to another. Exactly the same thing will happen in the future.

To appreciate the full scope of this distinction, we must take account of an important fact. Christ not only instituted the sacrament of Orders but also reserved to himself the choice of the persons who are to receive it by giving the grace of vocation to whom he wills. Christ is the author of the institution, that is, of both the sacrament and the interior call to receive it. For this reason we can say that the sacrament of Orders is hierarchical in the twofold sense that this sacrament gives rise to the hierarchy constituted by sacred ministers and is reserved by the will of Christ to some men within the Church. The latter is a characteristic of the sacrament of Orders which distinguishes it from all the rest.

The sacred ministry is of divine institution [68] and requires a divine vocation or calling which Christ alone gives. The necessity of this vocation for the sacred ministry is frequently

[66] In the strictly canonical sense *clerics* are all those persons who have received the *tonsure.* We prescind now from this rite, as well as from *minor orders* and the *subdeaconate,* and take the word *cleric* in its rigorous theological meaning, which implies having received at least the *deaconate.*

[67] *Lumen gentium,* n. 31.

[68] *Ibid.,* n. 28.

affirmed by the Council. For building up the Christian community, the Council says, there must be various ministries which "are raised up by divine vocation in the midst of the faithful." [69] Like every other grace, this divine vocation demands personal cultivation not only on the part of the person who is called but also on the part of the whole community wherein the vocation is born and developed. [70] Inasmuch as the vocation transforms the person called into a servant of the community, it is natural that both this person and the community have very clear obligations to foster this outstanding gift of God.

One of the most delicate duties of the Church's authorities is precisely that of discerning who are called by God. As in every other human work, one must reckon with the sad reality of mistakes, to which are exposed not only the person concerned but also those who must make a judgment about the genuineness of his vocation. The vocation is a gift of God; nevertheless, allowing for exceptional cases, it " is never to be looked for as something which will be heard by the ears of future priests in any extraordinary manner. It is rather to be detected and weighed in the signs by which the will of God is customarily made known to prudent Christians." [71]

The grades divinely established for the ministry of the Church are three, namely, episcopate, priesthood, and deaconate.72 The supreme authority over the universal Church is definitely linked with the first of these, not in the sense that only one who is already a bishop can be elected pope but inasmuch as the acceptance of the election as supreme pontiff obligates the one elected to receive episcopal ordination, if he is not already a bishop.

[69] *Ad gentes divinitus,* n. *15* (last paragraph).

[70] Vatican II strongly inists upon the obligations of the whole Christian community in order that the divine calling may be awakened and strengthened in suitable pet·sons. Cf. Decree on Priestly Formation *(Optatam totius),* n. !?.

[71] Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests *(Presbyterorum ordinis),* n. II.

[72] The development of this great theme fills the whole third chapter in *Lumen gentium.*

b) *Religious.* We begin by stating that we understand the term " religious " not in the juridical or canonical sense but in the purely theological meaning of consecration to perfect charity towards God and neighbor through the practice of the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, within a form of life approved by the Church. As far as we are concerned, it makes no difference whether this form of life constitutes a state canonically distinct from that of the laity or not. In this way we locate the term and the concept of *religious* on the same ground as the dogmatic Constitution on the Church places it.[73] The organic diversification willed by Christ is not completely achieved with a hierarchy whose members possess, in quite distinct degrees, an office in which the laity does not share. Undoubtedly this is the most im. portant and most visible diversification connected, as it is, with the sacrament of Orders. It is not, however, the only one.

Christ is the author of the family, and he consecrates it through the institution of marriage. The same Christ, however, calls some Christians determinately and asks them to renounce the formation of a family, so that they might follow him in a special way and devote themselves only to building up the kingdom of heaven. According to Vatican II, the relation exist· ing between religious or consecrated believers and lay persons is analogous to the relation between builders and those who prepare the building materials.[74]

It is not possible to develop here and now the theology of the religious life or special consecration to God. We are interested

[73] This approach to the problem by Vatican II raises certain difficulties on the part of Secular Institutes, which are basically only psychological difficulties. In· eluding the members of these Institutes in the term and concept of *religious,* the Council does not even remotely wish to say that they are *religious* in the canonical sense but only that they are Christians *consecrated* to God in a special way, within a form of life approved by the Church and which, like every particular form, requires its own organization to which these who are commonly called *lay persons* cr " Christians of the street " neither are nor can be made subject. On this matter cf. J. M. F. Castano, 0. P., "Naturaleza de los Institutos Seculares a la luz del Vaticano II," *Revista Espanola de Derecho Canonico,* 21 (1966), 217-239; " Gli Istituti Secolari nel nuovo Codice della Chiesa," *Angelicum* 45 (1968), 44-47.

[74] *Gaudium et spes,* n. 38.

only in placing the problem in the general setting of organic diversification within the Church. The substance of revealed teaching on this point was summarized and expressed by the Constitution on the Church in the following words: "Although the religious state constituted by the profession of the evangelical counsels does not belong to the hierarchical structure of the Church, nevertheless it belongs inseparably to her life and holiness."[75] If, then, this special form of life which we call the religious life is contained within the universal life of the Church as one of its typical expressions, obviously this form can never fail despite the variety of social and canonical forms in which it is embodied. Religious life, then, is not a circumstantial or superficial phenomenon in the Church but a vital element involved in its very substance. On the other hand, as it is a type of life to which not all persons are obligated or called but which of its very nature is reserved for some persons, it follows ultimately that religious life is a permamant principle of diversification within the Church.

To grasp the value of diversification inherent in the religious life we should reason in a way analogous to that which we used when we examined the ministry. In fact, just as Christ is the author of the ministry inasmuch as he instituted the sacrament of Orders and gives the vocation to receive it, so too, with all due proportion, it is true to say that religious life is derived from Christ by a twofold title, namely, inasmuch as it is contained in his example and his explicit teaching, and inasmuch as he gives the vocation to embrace this type of life. Christ is the author of the religious life.[76] Here is a statement of capital importance which is not always noticed as it should be. Vatican II explicitly teaches that " the evangelical counsels of chastity dedicated to God, poverty, and obedience ... are a divine gift, which the Church has received from her Lord

[75] *Lumen gentium,* n. 44 fin.

[76] It would be puerile to argue against this statement by saying that it is not found in Sacred Scripture. We have already said that we understand *religious life* in the sense of a life especially consecrated to God through the practice of the evangelical counsels, of which Revelation speaks very clearly.

and which she ever preserves with the help of his grace." [77] It is impossible to state with greater clarity that this life of special dedication to God has Christ as its author and that the Church knows that she is committed to preserve this way of life always. But we shall not go on to develop these matters, which would draw us away from our present purpose.

In addition to being the author of the religious life, Christ is also the one who gives to certain believers the grace of a special call to embrace this life. The need for this special vocation is a fact evidenced in the whole of revealed teaching and in the whole tradition of the Church. As regards revelation, it suffices to cite a gospel text which has always been justly considered as typical. When Jesus, arguing with the Pharisees, proclaimed the indissolubility of marriage, he heard this remark from his own disciples: " If the case of a man with his wife is so, it is not expedient to marry." [78] This comment gave Jesus the opportunity to explain the idea which concerns us here: "Not all can accept this teaching; but those to whom it has been given," [79] that is, to some it is given but to others it is not. Christ chooses, that is, makes a selection based on motives which he alone knows. The consequence is that some "understand" and others "do not understand." It we take into account the special characteristics of biblical language, this means that some receive the grace to embrace virginity "for the sake of the kingdom of heaven," [80] whereas others do not receive it. Gathering together all the biblical and traditional teachings, the Council insists frequently upon *divine vocation* as the original and primary basis of all religious life. The first thing of which members of any religious Institute must take into account is that " by their profession of the evangelical counsels they have given answer to a divine call " [81]

[77] *Lumoo gootium,* n. 48.

[78] Matt. 19:10.

[79] *Ibid.,* 11.

[80] *Ibid.,* 12.

[81] Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious Life *(Perfectae Caritatia),* n. *5.*

which entrusts to them a function proper to them " in the Church at the present time." [82]

Christ wills the religious life, and it is a perennial reality in the Church. The diversifications derived from it in the inner life of the Christian community are consubstantial with the People of God and will remain forever. By pointing out the ministry and the religious life as bases of organic diversification Vatican II penetrates to the very depths of the essential mystery of the People of God. Whatever can be said about the relation among ministry, structure, organization, and hierarchy on the one hand, and life on the other, is already virtually contained in the great conciliar principle which takes ministry and life together as the point of reference for every organic diversity inherent in the Church as such. The concrete forms in which the religious life is embodied can vary almost without limit. It is enough to cast a glance at the number and variety of existing Institutes to gain an approximate idea. And yet, for a complete view of the problem, one must take into account the fact that some old forms have disappeared and that other new ones will appear in the future.

If one reflects a bit upon the relation that exists between the development of human society and religipus life, one observes an interesting fact, namely, that to the extent that new kinds of life and new technical professions or specialties are introduced, the Church endeavors to have believers especially dedicated to God through the practice of the evangelical counsels to live in each one of these new conditions. This is the best way to show that the Church not only accepts these new situations but also considers them apt to serve as a human setting in which are found lives of total consecration to God. Thus there arose forms of religious life devoted to the teaching of the young; thus the secular institutes came into being; and thus there will continue to come about other "styles" whose configuration no one can predict at this time.

Ultimately all of this is a simple consequence of the fact that human progress helps the Church to penetrate more profoundly

[82] *Ibid.*, n. *25;* cf. also n. 1.

into the content of revelation and to express it not only by her doctrinal statements but also by the concrete styles of life which have taken deep root in the human stituation of the various ages.[83] Just as, on the one hand, the forms of consecration to God, characteristic of one era, subsist in those that follow (at least the principal forms and what is substantial in them) , the history of religious life can be legitimately regarded as a mirror which reflects the consciousness of the Church through the course of time, and like an organ in which lives and through which is exercised her rich experience of human affairs. It is impossible to judge today's man without knowing yesterday's man. The forms of religious life which arose in the past are organs of the " memory " in which the Church preserves her " experiences " of an earlier age, which at the same times makes it easier for her to act upon men of any later period. From this point of view there is no human institution which is in conditions so favorable for obtaining an exact overall view of the history of all mankind.

The " memory " of the past is preserved in the Church not only though the " adult " forms of religious life but also through the whole being of the Church herself. It has not been our intention to suggest prerogatives exclusively found in the religious life but only to show that in everything we have been speaking of it fulfills a special function. Since religious life in the same way makes manifest especially the eschatological direction and characteristics of the People of God[84] by intensifying their desire to be united with the Lord,[85] so, too, it has a special mission in the preservation of the " traditional " characteristics of the Church whereby she lives in perennial contact with her origin and continues ever in harmony and consistency with hcrsel£.[86] In the Church the projection toward the future

[83] Cf. *Gaudium et spes,* nos. 44, 57, 58, *Dei Verbum,* nos. 8, 10, 12.

[84] *Lumen gentium,* n. 44.

[85] *Ibid.,* n. *5.*

[86] Vatican II expressly speaks of *rick spiritual traditions* inherent in Eastem monasticism when it treats of the bonds which unite the separated Christian communities of the East with the Catholic Church. Cf. *Unitatis redintegratio,* n. 15.

springs from her being rooted in a source which develops an ever stronger propulsive as it pierces to profounder depth.

The Forms of Diversification Compared

We have indicated three types of diversification: one which proceeds from ethnic origin and other human circumstances which can affect the person; another which is based upon the reception of the sacrament of Orders; and a third which has its origin in the profession of the evangelical counsels according to some form approved by the Church. The first does not arise from the inner life of the Church nor is it an essential clement among the goods constituting the plan of salvation. Absolutely considered, this diversification could be absent, not in the sense that the person ceases to be affected by his ethnic origin and the other circumstances which surround his life but in the sense that salvation and the Church's existence would be equally possible on the hypothesis that all men belonged to only one country having the same ethnic traits and identical social customs. In contrast, the diversification derived from the sacrament of Orders and religious profession is essential to the Church, so much so that she would lose her identity if forms of diversification such as these were to disappear. This is precisely the reason why we call these forms *organic.* They flow from the very nature of the ccclesial organism and express functions which cannot be lacking to her in any hypothesis.

a) *Order of Importance.* If we compare these types of diversification according to the degree of their importance in the Church, the lowest place belongs to the diversification based upon origin and the highest belongs to the sacrament of Orders. What could be absent without loss to the Church is always less important than what emerges from the inner life of the Church herself and cannot be eliminated without directly undermining the constitution which Christ gave her.

The diversification based upon the sacrament of Orders is also more important than the one derived from religious profession. By the sacrament of Orders the ministers of the

Church are appointed to be the judges who must decide about the genuineness of religious life and its conformity with the Gospel.[87] It is not the religious who judges the minister of the Church as such but vice versa. Ultimately, the supreme reason is that Christ placed all the goods of the New Testament and, therefore, the religious life "in the hands of the apostolic college, over which Peter is the head," [88] that is, in the hands of the episcopal college presided over by the pope, since it is in this college where " the apostolic body continually perdures." [89] The college of bishops not only succeeds the apostolic college but has become, as it were, its perennial incarnation through the ages. It succeeds chronologically but by inheriting the powers which the apostolic college received " in order to establish on earth the one Body of Christ." [90] On its part, the episcopal college is built upon the sacrament of Orders in its highest grade. As Vatican II says: " Episcopal consecration, together with the office of sanctifying, also confers the offices of teaching and of governing. These, however, of their very nature, can be exercised only in hierarchical communion with the head and the members of the college." [91]

Religious life is " in the hands " of the college of bishops. If anyone tried" to liberate it" from this dependency, he would destroy it. When the Council says that, " in fulfilling their duty toward the Church " religious " should show toward bishops . . . reverence and obedience," [92] it is not merely proposing a " pious consideration " but expressing a dogmatic truth, namely, the intrinsic dependence of the religious life upon the episcopal college. The exemption some Institutes enjoy is not contrary to this dependence but organizes this dependence *in a determined manner* and with the purpose of

[87] *Lumen gentium,* nos. 48 and 45.

[88] *Vnitatis redintegratio,* n. 8.

•• *Lumen gentium,* n. 22.

[90] *Vnitatis redintegratio,* n. 8.

[91] *Lumen gentium,* n. 21. Concerning the relation to one another of these three *duties* conferred by episcopal consecration, cf. J. M. Ramirez, O. P., *De episcopatu ut sacramento deque episcoporum collegia* (Salamanca, BAC, 1966), pp. 48-57.

•• *Lumen gentium,* n. 45.

"providing more adequately for the necessities of the entire flock of the Lord." [93] Exemption can be and is granted with regard to the local bishop, but it can never be granted with regard to the episcopal college as a whole or as regards the Roman Pontiff. Furthermore, exemption with regard to the local bishop is, in practice, very limited; [94] although influenced by the tendencies of various eras in the area of canonical regulation, the progressive reductions which it has undergone basically obey the original and dogmatic fact that religious life is subject to bishops by a will of Christ which no one can change, not even the college of bishops.

b) *Compatibility.* The various sorts of diversification we have indicated are not mutually exclusive but can be present together. It is evident that a particular person finds himself marked by some well-defined ethnic, social, or other characteristics, and no one can be simultaneously in differing conditions. Yet, granting this, there is no incompatibility between differences by reason of origin and organic diversifications. A Christian, no matter what his human situation may be, can follow a religious life and receive the sacrament of Orders if he has the necessary qualifications demanded by the very nature of religious profession and the sacrament. The constitution of the Church stands above all discrimination. The religious can be a minister of the Church, and one who is already a minister can become a religious. Finally, neither the religious nor the minister should be chosen solely from a specified race, country, social class or profession. To dedicate oneself to God by the profession of the evangelical counsels or to receive the sacrament of Orders or both of these, the color of the skin and other circumstances which define the human situation of the person are utterly indifferent. If, in practice, it is fitting to make some choice, it is not based upon any discriminatory principle but on the "law of incarnation" or

•• *Ibid.*

•• Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church *(Christus Dominus),* nos. 33-35.

adaptation which presides over the life of the Church; [95] that is, the Church should try to bring salvation to men by presenting it in forms of expression, persons, and institutions which have a human attraction for the peoples to be evangelized.

A man, especially when he does not as yet know the Church very well, tends to judge her by her mode of presentation. [96] Hence there is the exceptional importance that, for " planting " the Church and the growth of the Christian community, the evangelization of peoples must be accomplished by natives, men who have a good knowledge of national traditions and can make these traditions serve the more effective spread of the Gospel. [97] For this reason the Church makes a great effort to recruit natives from each country to be the ministers needed on each level of the hierarchy, and she asks that religious Institutes make the due adaptations whereby they can express consecration to God " according to the nature and the genius of each nation " [98] by incorporating " into the Christian religious life the ascetic and contemplative traditions whose seeds were sometimes already planted by God in ancient cultures prior to the preaching of the Gospel." [99] No one can see in this a discrimination deserving criticism. Rather, it is the empirical and concrete proof of the esteem the Church has for every one of the various cultures in relation to the spread of the GospeP [00]

From the foregoing reflections it can be understood that the sacred ministry and religious life are not only compatible with differences founded on origin; rather, one must say that, granted such diversities, they tend to become incarnate in the latter to express more brilliantly the characteristics and constitution of Christ's Church. For it will always be true that the Church " strives energetically and constantly to bring all humanity *with all its riches* back to Christ its Head in the unity of His Spirit." [101]

[95] *Ad gentes divinitus,* n. 10.

•• *Gaudium et spes,* n. 43.

[97] *Ad gentes divinitus,* nos. 15 fin. and

[98] *Ibid.,* n. 18.

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] *Gaudium et spes,* n. 58,

[101] *Lumen gentium,* n. 13.

Coordination of the Diversities

In the preceding pages we have analyzed the immediate principles of diversification within the Church. Each of these principles is nothing more than the realization of some particular aspect of God's plan from which every legitimate form of diversity proceeds and to which it returns. However, these immediate principles of diversification, by the very fact that they proceed from God, cannot bring anarchy into the Church. Today, as in the time of St. Paul, it is necessary to affirm that Christ is not divided.[102] Where there is division, there we encounter an evident consequence of the sin whereby "man is split within himself."[103] Ecclesial diversification excludes uniformity but not order. It is a coordinated diversification in which functions are distributed so that the whole organism may be better served and be endowed with greater vitality.

The same analogies of people, body, and family, which served us to establish a basis for diversity, serve us equally to understand that this diversity must be subject to coOI·dination, since, on the contrary, the Church would not be *one* body, *one* people, or *one* family but a conglomerate of things and persons in which the incarnation of Christ's will concerning the community of salvation could not be recognized. Christ founded the Church by enriching it " with an admirable variety."[104] Yet, at the same time he wants the faithful to " wipe out every kind of division, so that the whole human race may be brought into the *unity* of the family of God."[105]

We cannot now make a study of the unity of the Church in its fullness. We shall limit ourselves to reproducing an extremely compact paragraph from Vatican II on this point:

> They are fully incorporated into the society of the Church who, possessing the Spirit of Christ, accept her entire system and all the means of salvation given to her, and through union with her visible structure are joined to Christ, who rules her through the

[102] I Cor. 1:18.
[103] *Gaudium et spes,* n. IS.
[104] *Lumen gentium,* n. S!i!.
[105] *Ibid.,* n. !i!S fin. Cf. also *Gaudium et spes,* n. 48.

Supreme Pontiff and the bishops. This joining is effected by the bonds of professed faith, of the sacraments, of ecclesiastical government, and of communion. [106]

This paragraph must be examined closely, if an understanding of its meaning is not to become singularly difficult for those who are not familiar with the subject. Here, however, we cannot digress to engage in this task. [107]

What concerns us at the moment is to offer some brief reflections on the way the diversities within the Church are coordinated among themselves for the greater good of the whole.

a) *Ministers and Lay Persons.* The ministers or pastors " know that they themselves were not meant by Christ to shoulder alone the entire saving mission of the Church toward the world. On the contrary, they unde1·stand that it is their noble duty so to shepherd the faithful and recognize their services and charismatic gifts that all according to their proper roles may cooperate in this common undertaking with one heart." [108] The pastors have a high-ranking function, but it is not all-embracing. "The laity are called in a special way to make the Church present and operative in those places and circumstances where only through them can she become the salt of the earth." [109] The sanctification of the human professions from within, that is, by living them, forms one great task which pertains properly and specifically to the laity. Just as the Church does not find herself truly established in a country as long as there is not a number of natives in whom her ministries are embodied and realized, so also, in all due proportion, human professions are not effectively incorporated into the Church if there are not persons who, on the one hand, fulfil their genuine requirements and, on the other, practice them in accordance with the salvific will of Christ. Only in

[106] *Lumen gentium,* n. 14.

[101] In *Unitatis redintegmtio,* n. £, can be seen a clearer and easily available explanation of the principle bonds which constitute the unity of the Church.

[108] *Lumen gentium,* n. 30.

[100] *Ibid.,* n. 33.

this way can Christ make himself effectively present in each of these human professions. Now it is obvious that the practice of these professions pertains specifically to laymen.[110] It happens also that in many regions sacred ministers are either very few in number or deprived of the necessary freedom of action. In these cases the Church could not be present or function without the collaboration of laymen.[111]

In the Church there is a diversity of ministries, since the role of the consecrated " minister " is different from the function of the lay person practicing his worldly profession. Yet the mission of the Church is but one and the same,[112] in such a way that each person contributes from his own place to its realization.

The distinction which the Lord made between sacred ministers and the rest of the People of God entails a unifying purpose, since pastors and the other faithful are bound to each other by a mutual need. Pastors of the Church, following the example of the Lord, should minister to one another and to the other faithful. The faithful in their turn should enthusiastically lend their cooperative assistance to their pastors and teachers. Thus in their diversity all bear witness to the admirable unity of the Body of Christ. This very diversity of graces, ministries, and works gathers the children of God into one.[113]

Actually, with all belonging to the one same body, each of the parts benefits from the gifts and ministries of the rest and finds in all this an effective help for reaching its own fullness, while, at the same time, it helps others to gain the fullness proper to them.[1H]

These considerations already give us an idea of the dogmatic foundations of the problem. Undoubtedly, to get a complete picture of the coordination between pastors and lay persons within the Church, it would be necessary to explain how the priestly, prophetic and royal powers which laymen possess in

[110] *Ibid.,* n. 31.

[111] *ApostoUcam actuositatem,* n. 1.

[112] *Ibid.,* n. !2.

[118] *Lumen gentium,* n. 32.

[1"] *Ibid.,* n. 13.

virtue of baptism and confirmation are attached to the analogous powers which the sacred ministers receive through the sacrament of Orders. We hope to say something about this at another time. For the present we shall not launch into greater depths, since this would lead us too far afield.[115]

Obviously the dogmatic aspects have repercussions in practical conduct. If we examine the problem from the standpoint of priests, we find in Vatican II a paragraph which simultaneously expresses the way their life differs from that of the laity and the need for coordination with them.

By their vocation and ordination, priests of the New Testament are indeed set apart in a certain sense within the midst of God's People. But this is so, not that they may be separated from this people or from any man, but that they may be totally dedicated to the work for which the Lord has raised them up. They cannot be ministers of Christ unless they are witnesses and dispensers of a life other than this earthly one. But they cannot be of service to men if they remain strangers to the life and conditions of men. Their ministry itself by a special title forbids them to be conformed to the world. Yet at the same time this ministry requires that they live in this world among men, and that as good shepherds they know their sheep. It requires that they seek to lead those who are not of this sheepfold so that they too may hear the voice of Christ and that there may be one fold and one shepherd. [116]

The interior disposition with which sacred ministers should practice this living together with the faithful is the disposition of brotherhood. They are "brothers among their brothers" [117] and in union with them should be considered " disciples of the Lord," [118] that is, summoned by one and the same voice, which

[115] Vatican II explains sufficiently what relationships are especially involved in the insertion of the priesthood common to all the faithful into the hierarchical priesthood of consecrated ministers. Cf. especially *Lumen gentium,* n. 10 and *Presbyterorum ordinis,* n. In n. 9 of the latter document the Council makes a general study of the relations between priests and believing laymen, those who belong to the separated Christian confessions, and those who do not even believe in Christ.

[116] *Presbyterorum ordinis,* n. 3.

[117] *Ibid.,* n. 9.

[118] *Ibid.*

makes known to each one the special function that pertains to him in one common task.

b) *Religious.* Repeatedly in history ways of thinking have appeared which seem to build up a kind of isolation between religious [119] and the rest of the faithful. The consequence of these false emphases is lack of esteem for consecration to God in the religious life. Surely some of the ills which presently affect the religious life come from this; hence we see that the religious vocation is encountering on all sides serious difficulties.

However, despite the fact that the religious follows a special way of life and that the profession of the evangelical counsels constitutes a permanent principle of diversification within the Church, it can never be said that the religious is an isolated being, inhibited in the presence of the conditions and concerns of men. It is evident that, given the human condition, there can be religious who are indifferent toward their brethren, the rest of men; unfortunately, however, such faults are found in every state of life. We cannot enter here into the casuistic analysis of the way each individual religious lives his vocation; this would be an endless and foolish effort. The only thing that interests us here is to offer some reflections about the way religious life, objectively viewed, is coordinated with the other states in which Christians live.

At this time we cannot even attempt an explanation of the rich teaching which the Council provides concerning the religious life and its insertion into the whole of the Church. [120] For the general view which interests us now it is enough to take account of what the Council says when it speaks precisely about the relation of the religious life to other states of life. The concept used by the Council to set forth this relation is exemplarity. [121] Those who embrace the religious state "tend-

[119] We continue to use the term *religious* in the same sense explained above in note 73.

[120] The theme is developed by the Council especially in the sixth chapter of *Lumen gentium* and in the whole of *PerfectaeJ Caritatis.*

[121] This does not mean that the Council considers exemplarity to be the concept which primarily defines religious life considered in itself; under this aspect religious life is especially a consecration to God, as the Council itself clearly says

ing toward holiness by a narrow path, stimulate their brethren by their example." [122] I£ the religious life is an example because it sets out courageously " to that perfect holiness to whi2h all the faithful . . . are called by the Lord," [123] it can never be deemed an evasion of the obligations towards men or a cause of isolation contrary to the demands of collaboration in the work of salvation. The example or model is always close and intimately present to those who allow themselves to be molded by it. But for this it is necessary first to recognize one's own need and to know how to welcome the exemplar.

Exemplarity always implies a certain superiority or excellence which obviously does not come from the person who enters the religious life but from the grace of God. It is he who freely distributed his gifts in accordance with norms and hierarchical gradations, which no one can impose upon him. As we have said earlier, the religious life is the fruit of a special call from God. Whoever accepts it contracts, in the presence of God who gives it and of the Christian community wherein it is developed, the responsibility to make it serve the purpose intended by God. He continues, in fact, pledged to lead a life so fixed upon God that it stimulates others to the full perfection of charity. And this is no easy task. Whoever pays attention solely to its excellence and does not attend to the responsibility can easily fall into a more or less conscious state of pride. Whoever, on the contrary, sets his eyes only on the responsibility and forgets that the greatness of the vocation contains the graces needed to live it worthily suffers discouragement and develops a psychological state in which the religious life is smothered. It is necessary to balance the two extremes by taking both with absoluteness. Then the religious life follows the path traced by Christ himself and enters without difficulty

(cf. *Lumen gentium,* n. 44). What is treated here is not religious life in itself but its integration or coordination with the other states of Christian life; that is, we fix our attention not on the vertical line or with reference to God, which is primary, but on the horizontal line, that is, with relation to men, and this is what we have aimed to clarify.

[122] *Lumen gentium,* n. 13.

[123] *Ibid.,* n. 11 fin.

into coordination with the other types of life also willed by Christ.

Without departing from the order of most general principles concerning the religious life, we can indicate the nature of its exemplarity a bit more precisely. In this regard Vatican II says that" by a more inward consecration made to God in the Church " religious life " also luminously manifests and signifies the inner nature of the Christian calling." [124] This very important statement of the Council, on the one hand, determines exactly the nature of the exemplarity which belongs to the religious life and, on the other hand, expresses with wonderful precision the intrinsic coordination and compenetration which exist between this life and the other types of Christian living. The religious life is not an addition juxtaposed to the Christian life from the outside; it is simply the purer and more genuine expression of this Christian life, or, as the Council says, *it luminously expresses its inner nature.* With this understanding of the religious life it is impossible even to think that religious life implies indifference, isolation, or remoteness from any true form of Christian life. The Council expressed this same idea in a distinct mode which offers us a new perspective for penetrating into the connection between religious life and Christian life in general. As the Council says, religious consecration " is deeply rooted in their baptismal consecration and ... provides an ampler manifestation of it." [125] Every Christian is consecrated to God through baptism; the religious does not invent a new consecration but binds himself to deepening his baptismal consecration. It is precisely for this reason that religious life becomes an example and model for every Christian who seriously strives to carry the possibilities and obligations of his own baptism to their ultimate consequences. The exemplarity of the religious life passes beyond the frontiers of the Church and radiates over the world. As the Council says, religious " give splendid and striking testimony that the world cannot be

[124] *Ad gentes divinitus,* n. 18.
[125] *Perfectae caritatia,* n. *5.*

transfigured and offered to God without the spirit of the beatitudes." [126]

After all these theoretical considerations it will be well to indicate, although in a very brief summary, some of the practical ways whereby the religious is inserted into the life of Christians and of men in general. We limit ourselves to transcribing the following conciliar passage:

> This sacred Synod encourages and praises the men and women, brothers and sisters, who in monasteries, or in schools and hospitals, or on the missions, adorn the Bride of Christ. They do so by their unswerving and humble loyalty to their chosen consecration, while rendering to all men generous services of every variety. [127]

In the Church we find diversity and coordination. There pastors who by virtue of their ordination must devote themselves to the exercise of the sacred ministry. There are religious called by a special vocation to make manifest the profounder demands of baptism to the whole Christian community. There are laymen who ought to be active in all human professions and order them according to God's will. The types of life are distinct but not separated from one another. Each of them enters into a connection with the others through the exercise of its proper function. Ultimately, this leads to the following very important conclusion: the Christian, no matter what his concrete vocation may be, does not live for himself alone, nor even solely for the " group " to which he belongs, but for the whole Christian and human community; and if he considers himself indifferent to the lot of even one man, he will be unfaithful to his calling. [128] With this we shall return to a well-known idea, namely, the communitarian character of salvation and of the Church or People of God which incarnates it. In any reality which is essentially communal, no vocation, no matter how special it may be, can be isolated from the rest; the day this would happen, the person would have radically

[126] *Lumen gentium,* n. 31; cf. also *Gaudium et spes,* n. 38.
[127] *Lumen gentium,* n. 46 fin.
[128] *Gaudium et spes,* n. 1.

brought his vocation to nothing and would have " excommunicated " himself.

Above the communitarian character of salvation and of the Church the supreme reason for the intrinsic coordination among the different Christian vocations must be sought in Christ himself and in the action of his Spirit, since the Church tends to recapitulate everything " under Christ its Head, in the unity of his Spirit" [129] entering in this way into the most profound communion with the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, which is the key, the center, and the summit of the unity of the Church.

This is the sacred mystery of the unity of the Church, in Christ and through Christ, with the Holy Spirit energizing a variety of functions. The highest exemplar and source of this mystery is the unity, in the Trinity of Persons, of one God, the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit. [130]

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[129] *Lumen gentium,* n. 13.
[180] *Unitatis redintegratio,* n. fin.

DARWIN ON EVOLUTION: ARE-ESTIMATION

I

IN THE edition of his *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of FavoTed Races in the StTuggle joT Life,* Darwin states: " I formerly spoke to very many naturalists on the subject of evolution, and never once met with any sympathetic agreement. It is probable that some did then believe in evolution, but they were either silent, or expressed themselves so ambiguously that it was not easy to understand their meaning. Now things are wholly changed, and almost every naturalist admits the great principle of evolution." [1] Fifty years later however, W. E. Ritter, of the University of California, writing in the April 14, issue of *Science,* the weekly periodical of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, said that anyone who thinks about evolution " can hardly fail to see signs that the whole battleground of evolution will have to be fought over again, this time not so much between scientists and theologians as between scientists themselves." [2] Today, almost fifty years later still, the issue is still being debated.

It should be pointed out that, whatever the present status of evolutionary theory may be, there is no conflict between evolution and monotheistic religion. That is to say, the theory of evolution is not a religious issue. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are all compatible with some sort of evolutionary doctrine. Speaking specifically of Christianity, and especially of Roman Catholicism, we find that, rather than being antagonistic toward evolutionary theories the Christian intellectual had actually been prepared for them. In the last century, even while

[1] C. Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (6th ed., 1872, Modern Library eel.), p. 369.
[2] As quoted by A. S. Zerbe, *Evolution in a Nutshell* (Chicago, 1926), p. 112.

evolutionary theories were being developed, Cardinal Newman was defending evolutionary theories with respect to Church doctrine and practice. More recently, Father E. C. Messenger edited two books with similar titles documenting the fact that evolutionary theories have been in vogue among Catholic intellectuals since the beginning of the Church.[3] In addition, recent papal pronouncements, although cautious, have never condemned outright evolutionary theories. Pope Pius IX's 1864 *Syllabus of Errors* did not mention Darwinism specifically. Darwin's works were never put on the Index of Forbidden Books. And in 1950 Pius XII's *Humani Generis* actually recommended that Catholics actively pursue research projects concerned with evolutionary theories. Our approach, then, in this monograph, will be in terms of science and philosophy rather than theology.

First of all, we must contrast an evolutionary doctrine with a non-evolutionary doctrine. In a non-evolutionary theory everything that exists presently has always existed in this present fashion. There are no gradual transformations. According to the "fixism" or "constancy" view, any innovations that have taken place in the universe have come about as the direct result of divine intervention. The supreme being must have some how directly created anything new, which then continues in existence until altered by another divine act. These interventions may be called revolutions: sudden changes.

On the other hand, evolutionary theories maintain gradual transformations. There is no constancy but only constant activity and gradual change which produce, in time, some innovation. These gradual changes are usually thought of as being progressive, i. e., productive of more and more perfect (usually meaning complicated) beings.

The contrast between the constancy view and the evolutionary view can be seen from two variations on the constancy theory. One is the Noachian theory and the other is the

• See his *Evolution and Theology* (New York, 1989l) and *Theology and Evolution* (London, 1950).

Catastrophic theory. The earlier Noachian theory maintained that fossils were not really the remains of living creatures but merely odd configurations of rock. A later version held that these remains were once alive but had now been made extinct. The cause of their extinction was the flood in the time of Noah.

As more evidence was accumulated, however, it became clear that many specimens existed long before the great flood. To explain the new evidence, many catastrophies were postulated rather than simply the one flood. After each catastrophy, it was claimed, new organisms were produced by God. The most. prominent proponent of this widely popular theory was the French naturalist George Cuvier (1769-1832) . As can be seen, the constancy view does not deny change. It differs from the evolutionary view concerning the way these changes have occurred.

We must commence our discussion of evolution by noting first that this term has several meanings. In its widest sense, including both common sense or unreflective knowledge as well as scientific knowledge other than biological, evolution refers to any gradual change or development. Thus, the ea1th is said to have evolved from a molten mass; social institutions have evolved from more primitive forms to complicated bureaucracies; mathematical logic is supposed to have evolved from Aristotelian logic, etc. Given this sense of the word, only someone who would deny all change would deny evolution.

Secondly, in its presently generally accepted biological sense, evolution means that all living things have been derived from a few, or only one, living ancestor through a long series of usually minute changes. In addition, in its biological context, evolution usually brings to mind the notions of struggle and progress as well as the unity of the biosphere. Evolution in biology offers a principle of unification. From a few primordial creatures there has developed all living things. There was struggling, the overcoming of obstacles, advancement. Rather than a preordained constant hierarchy there was a procession, a primeval protoplasm or protophyte or protozoon conquering the world. The ultimate development so far, of course, is man

himself. This is the *general* biological view of evolution. In this vague, general biological sense the evolutionary outlook, in Western thought at least, dates back to the ancient Greeks. Thales (c. 624-565 B. C.), Anaximander (c. 611-547 B. C.), Anaximcnes (c. 588-524 B. C.), Heraclitus (c. 540-475 B. C.), Empedocles (c. 495-485 B. C.), Democritus (c. 470-400 B. C.), and Anaxagoras (c. 488-429 B. C.) all held some kind of evolutionary theory in its general and vague biological sense. And, although it is not generally assented to by scholars, some authors even believe Aristotle (884-822 B. C.), the "father of biology," to be an evolutionist.[4]

The general theory of evolution, then, is as old as the hills. But what is relatively new is the emergence of various special theories of evolution, the most famous of which is Darwin's. It must be emphasized that Darwin's theory was designed to explain an already known theory. Darwin did not discover or invent evolution. He did attempt, as have others, to make the general theory more precise. Let us quickly review the pre-Darwinian intellectual atmosphere with respect to special theories of evolution.

Modem special theories of evolution were inaugurated by Jean Baptiste Chevalier de Lamarck (1744-1829).[5] Lamarck attacked the constancy views, declaring instead that present organisms are closely related to the extinct fossil remains. Life, he claimed, originated from inanimate matter via an evolutionary process in accordance with a pre-established divine plan. All present living creatures then developed from the first living beings. Present species were achieved in the following manner. First, there is a change in the creature's environment. Birds, for example, used to living on the mainland, fly out to sea and cannot find their way back. They must now adjust to an island way of life. Or, to take another example, due to some natural

• See, for instance, E. Nordenskiold, *The History of Biology* (tr. by E. B. Eyre, London, 1929), H. H. Newman, *Evolution, Genetics and Eugenics* (2nd ed., Chicago, 1935), and C. Singer, *The Story of Living Things* (New York, 1931).

• His main work is *Philosophie Zoologique* published in 1809. It has been translated by H. Elliott (London, 1914).

geographical upheaval, vegetative growth on the ground becomes scarce and creatures must turn to leaves and other vegetative growth above ground. In the effort to adjust to the new environment, the creature must change its structure. Thus, sea birds develop webbed feet and the giraffe's neck becomes elongated. According to Lamarck's principle of use and disuse, the use of the organ strengthens it, while it will eventually die due to disuse. This change in structure is then transmitted by the parents to their offspring.

Lamarck's theory never achieved wide acceptance. There were two main objections to his view. First, there is the question of origin. Habit might conceivably explain why a neck is long but it cannot be used to explain why a giraffe has a neck at all. Second, biologists failed to discover any transmission of acquired characteristics. The problem of inheritance stopped Democritus and Darwin as well as Lamarck. Democritus thought that representative particles, coming from all parts of the father's body, entered first his semen, then the mother, and then the offspring. Darwin, desperate to explain inheritance, revived the ancient view.[6]

The evidence against such a view, however, is strong. An armless man can father a child with arms. Rats' tails have been chopped off for years, yet their offspring are always born with tails. The lips, heads, etc., in certain tribes, although forced out of shape for years, always appear normal in the new-born.

It should also be pointed out, with respect to Lamarckism, that Darwin had another major objection to his theory. Darwin accused Lamarck of anthropomorphism. According to Lamarck, creatures actually strive to change. There is a kind of willing on the part of creatures in Lamarckism which Darwin found scientifically unthinkable.

Between Lamarck and Darwin there are four main figures to be mentioned: James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848), Robert

[6] See G. G. Simpson and W. S. Beck, *Life* (2nd ed., New York, 1965), pp. 164-165. Darwin may have had some knowledge of Mendel's work. See P. J. Vorzimmer, "Darwin and Mendel," *Isis,* Vol. 59 (1968), pp. 77-82.

Chambers (1802-1871), Richard Owen (1804-1892), and Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913).[7]

Prichard published his *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind* in 1826 in three volumes. Prichard, a medical doctor, realized that acquired characteristics cannot be transmitted to one's offspring. He also discussed how, by a process of selection and breeding, domesticated species of plants and animals can be altered. This process is then extended to living things as a whole. Why cannot species come from a genus as varieties come from a species, he asked. Prichard regarded climate as the key factor in the production of changes. If individuals or groups fail to adapt to changes in climate, with the other changes such a change would entail, they die out. He came close to the notion of natural selection but never actually stated it. He was also never very well-known.

A more flamboyant figure was Chambers. In 1844 he anonymously published his *Vestiges of the Naturalllistmy of Creation.* Although the book was not taken seriously by scientists, it was popular and ran through twelve editions. In his work Chambers attacks the notion of immutable species and special creations. Rather, everything is constantly changing. The change is not, however, erratic but under very strict laws o.f nature established by God as Newton and Laplace had shown. What was true for inorganic things was also true for the biosphere. Chambers' special theory of evolution, argued with force and vigor, was that everything changes according to a divine plan.

Owen, a comparative anatomist, also expressed himself on evolution. Owen, whose main, three-volume work is the *Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of Vertebrates* (London, 1866-1868), had published in 1843 a series of *Lectures on Invertebrate Animals.* He later (1846, 1847, 1855) produced other works concerned primarily with the anatomy of birds. It was Owen's belief that there was a basic archetype underlying

[7] For more details see Philip G. Fothergill, *Historical Aspects of Organic Evolution* (London, ch. 4 and J. Loewenberg, *Darwin, Wallace and The Theory of Natural Selection* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).

the structures of various species of animals. There were also many common structural elements among different species. He also interpreted the fossil remains as indicating that the older they are, the more vague and general (i.e., common to more presently existing species) are the structures of the remains. This in turn indicated a development or transmutation of species, toward more diversified and complicated types, over the centuries. How does this occur? By the agency of an Intelligent Directing Power acting through secondary causes. By a synchronization of climatic and geographical changes with species changes, the Creator, according to a pre-established plan, allows the basic type to alter and adjust. Owen rejected both Lamarckism and Darwinism, choosing to take a middle course. He admitted a struggle for existence leading to the dying out of some species. But extinction is not an explanation of origin. Lamarck was rejected because he attributed volitional powers to all living things. Owen's middle course was an innate tendency, implanted by God, for creatures to deviate from parental types.

Next we must mention a person who is of equal importance with Darwin with respect to the theory of natural selection, namely, Wallace. Wallace grew up in southern England. He was never well-off financially and the closest he ever came to being regularly employed was when, in his teens, he worked as a surveyor with his brother. Wallace's interest in evolution came about through his friendship with Henry W. Bates, whom he met in 1844. Bates was well-off and spent his free time as an amateur naturalist. In 1848 the two men went on an expedition to the Amazon. Wallace returned to England in 1852, after many hardships at sea. After a relatively brief stay in England, Wallace left for the Malayan Archipelago to study the plant and animal life there. He remained there for eight years (1854-1862). While there he wrote two essays: "The Law which has regulated the Introduction of New Species" (1855) and "On the Tendency of Varieties to depart indefinitely from the Original Type" (1858). In these essays Wallace states conclusions the same as those of Darwin.

Wallace had come upon his conclusions independently of Darwin. Nevertheless, Darwin was embarrassed by the timing of Wallace's second paper, for he was then right in the middle of writing his *Origin of Species.* Ironically, Wallace had sent his second essay to Darwin in order to obtain Darwin's opinion on its merits. Darwin immediately recognized it as his own work in miniature but was at a loss in deciding how both Wallace's and his rights to priority were to be simultaneously protected. The problem was finally solved by having both Wallace's paper and an abstract of his *Origin* read at the same meeting of the Linnean Society on July 1, 1858.

Before passing on to Darwin himself, two other figures, both of whom had a strong influence on both Wallace and Darwin, should be mentioned. One was Thomas Malthus (1766-1884), an Anglican clergyman, and the other was Charles Lyell (1797-1875), a highly influential geologist. In 1798 Malthus published a pamphlet entitled *Essay on the Principles of PopUlation.* **It** was his answer to several contemporaries who believed that human evils and poverty were due to an uneven distribution of property which resulted from abuses perpetrated by the various social institutions. Malthus argued instead that the evils were due to overpopulation. While the population increases geometrically (1, 4, 8, 16, etc.), he argued, the food supply increases only arithmetically (1, 3, 4, *5,* etc.) . The fact that the world has not felt the full burden of this
cal increase of population was due to the existence of wars, disease, etc., which constantly reduce the population. Malthus himself did not sanction such means of population reduction. Rather, he recommended moral restraint in the forms of celibacy and late marriages. Malthus's little essay went through many editions and his views were well-known.

Sir Charles Lyell made his reputation as a geologist. He published his main work, *The Principles of Geology,* which quickly became a standard in its field, in 1880. Lyell's book was taken by Darwin on his famous *Beagle* voyage (1831-1886) and carefully read. In his work Lyell presented a basically uniformitarian point of view. The history of the earth

is not a series of castastrophies but is instead one continuous whole with each age leading gradually into the next. What is going on today was going on millions of years ago.[8] Lyell noted how land masses are being built up by sedimentation while rocks are weathering down; how areas once under water are now high above sea level and *vice versa.* By extrapolating into the past what we know of geology today, he maintained, we can understand how it is that present minute changes can and do, in time, produce great changes. LyeWs views were also well-known and even fashionable. He lectured to thousands, and having a geological specimen in one's home was considered very up-to-date.[9]

Perhaps the general atmosphere during the first half of the nineteenth century with respect to evolution can be no better summarized than in a paragraph from Loren Eiseley' s review of Gertrude Himmelfarb's book *Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution* (New York, 1959) appearing in the *New York Times* book review section April 26, 1959, pp. 5, 28. Eiseley states that

Darwin once protested that he had never encountered another naturalist who expressed evolutionary views, but the great man must have been singularly restricted in his contacts. A contemporary diary reveals that in 1852. discussions about the origin of animal species, the antiquity of the earth and related evolutionary topics occurred among students at University College. In the light of all this surrounding bustle of activity, it becomes easier to understand why Darwin's intellectual development was so immediately quickened after his return from the voyage of the *Beagle.* Our fascination with the romance of the Darwinian voyage, our yearning to share vicariously in a great adventure, has tended to obscure the fact that it was not until Darwin reached home and began to participate in the intellectual ferment of the Eighteen Thirties and Forties, that he came upon the principle of natural selection.

[8] Throughout the nineteenth century it was generally thought that the earth could not be more than a billion years old.

[9] Besides those mentioned, Darwin's theory was anticipated by several others. For example, W. C. Wells in an article in the *Philosophical Transactions* for 1813 and Patrick Matthew in a book *Naval Timber and Arbori Culture,* 1831. For more details see *Darwin and Modern Science* (ed. by A. C. Seward, Cambridge, England, 1909), pp. 13-17. Darwin himself, in his *Origin,* lists about two dozen precursors.

We must now consider Darwin's special theory of evolution. Born in Shrewsbury, England in 1809, Darwin spent his early years studying under Samuel Butler in the Shrewsbury school. In his father, a successful medical doctor, sent Charles to Edinburgh to study medicine. Charles, however, had no interest in that profession. Realizing his mistake, his father, in sent his son to Cambridge to take holy orders in the State Church. He graduated in 1831 without honors. While there, however, he was befriended by two outstanding naturalists, John Henslow and Adam Sedgwick. Through their influence, Darwin changed from being an aimless rich man's son to being an avid naturalist.

In August of 1831 Henslow urged Darwin to accept the position of naturalist on the English surveying ship *Beagle,* about to leave on a world cruise. After settling a dispute over the trip with his father, he left England in December of 1831 on a five-year trip which took him across the Atlantic, around South America, across the Pacific, around New Zealand and Australia, around the tip of Africa, and back up the Atlantic to England. Throughout his trip he was collecting specimens and making notes. Upon his return he published various narratives of his work. Darwin tells us that in October of 1838 he read Malthus and began to formulate the theory of natural selection. By June of he had worked out the basic outline of his theory and put it down in the form of a brief sketch which was later to be much expanded. He did not publish his views because they were not yet perfected, and the necessary evidence had not been completely marshalled. Under constant urging by his friends Sir Joseph Hooker and Lyell, he finally began to write his *Origin of Species* in 1856. Stimulated by the arrival of Wallace's paper in 1858, Darwin rushed his work to completion. The work was finally published in November of 1859. Its 1,250 first edition copies were quickly sold out.

The *Origin of Species* brought Darwin much notoriety and made him financially independent for life. Lyell, at first sceptical, finally came around to Darwin's way of thinking in 1864. All over England debates broke out over the merits and de-

merits, and its implications for science and religion, of the theory of natural selection. Theists found Darwin's views a powerful argument for theism and Christianity. Atheists used it to show that God was an unnecessary hypothesis. Dnrwin himself claimed to find no contradiction between his theory and traditional religious beliefs. Undoubtedly, the stir caused by Darwin's views was due mainly to their supposed effects upon the religious life of the country. Those inclined to take the books of Genesis literally condemned Darwin as a devil. Those supporting antireligious doctrines regarded Darwin's book as the epitomy of absolute scientific perfection. Darwin's later work *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871), really two books in one, only added more fuel to the fire. The latter part attempted to show how various colors peculiar to one sex were developed because of a preference for that color by the other sex. The former part was an attempt, straining what little evidence there was available at the time, to apply his special theory of evolution to the origin and history of man. Before his death in 1882 Darwin authored several other works, including a brief autobiography, but these were of little significance when compared with his *Origin of Species.*

But what did Darwin say that called forth so much argument and dissension? The fifteen chapters comprising the sixth edition (1872) of the *Origin of Species* discuss the use of artifical selection by man and the occurrence of natural selection via a struggle for existence, the various causes of alterations in species other than by natural selection, difficulties with respect to accepting his theory, the evidence for his theory (which is drawn almost exclusively from the fossil record), and end with a recapitulation. In Darwin's approach, then, the theory is presented first to be followed by his evidence for it. This was good rhetoric on his part. In an atmosphere heavy with prejudice against such a theory, it was wise to "soften up" his audience before presenting the evidence.

II

The Darwinian theory itself is simple enough to understand. The breeding of various animals (horses, cattle, etc.) for various purposes (speed, milk, etc.) was a well-established occupation in Darwin's time. The same kind of thing was also being done with plants. This breeding, cross-breeding, etc., under the aegis of human control, is artifical selection. Could it be possible that there was another kind of selective process going on in nature without human control? If there was such a "natural " selection, perhaps it could account for the :!_;30 varieties of pigeons, varieties of grape vines, etc., found in nature. In addition, such a process might explain how, assuming the general theory of evolution, more perfect creatures were formed just as human breeders produce, in time, more perfect specimens of plants and animals.

The precise mechanism proposed by Darwin for natural selection is the following. First, there is the universal tendency for all offspring to vary slightly in many little ways from both their parents and each other. No two plants or animals, even of the same type and born in the same locale, are exactly alike. Second, the propagation of new offspring is so rapid and prolific that there is never enough food and other means of survival to go around. Many must die. Take this fact in conjunction with the innate instinct of self-preservation and there results the familiar struggle for life. Although there are symbiotic relationships in nature, the general rule is constant warfare among offspring within the same species and among different species for survival. Third, there is, as a result of the above two steps, the survival of the fitter, or, as is usually said, somewhat erroneously, of the fittest. This accurs because some minute variations possessed by some offspring are more advantageous erroneously, of the fittest. This occurs because some minute variations possessed by other offspring. The creature with the favorable variation, within its total environmental situation, thus lives on while its fellow offspring die. These stronger, healthier, better suited to survive, survivors can then repro-

duce, thus carrying on the process toward greater and greater perfection. The advantageous characteristics of the surviving parents are, of course, inherited by the new offspring.

Several features of Darwin's explanation should be noted here. The first concerns his purpose in proposing his thesis. Darwin truly attempted an explanation and not merely a description of what he found. If he had simply described the birds, plants, animals, fossils, etc., which he had found in different geographical locations and in different rock stata, he would have been just another naturalist. Descriptions and mere summations of data do not explain anything. Facts do not explain themselves. To state a fact is not to state a cause. When the problem is to explain the data, one cannot simply restate the data.[10]

For evolutionary theory this meant that Darwin had to give some definite mechanism explaining the many facts indicating that species were mutable. The theory of natural selection presented itself to Darwin's mind as a means of escaping the two scientifically undesirable extremes of Lamarckism and special creation. Concerning Lamarck, Darwin could agree with Wallace's succint criticism. "The powerful retractile talons," he states," of the falcon and cat-tribes have not been produced or increased by the volition of those animals; but among the different varieties which occurred in the earlier and less highly organized forms of these groups, *those always survived longest which had the greatest facilities for seizing their prey."*[11] Concerning special creation, we read in Darwin's *Descent of Man* that his purposes in writing *The Origin of Species* were" firstly, to show that species had not been separately created, and

[10] See G. Smith, *Natural Theology* (New York, 1951), pp.

[11] From Wallace's paper read to the Linnean Society July 1, 1858. We should note here a deep inconsistency in Darwin's views. He was not willing to allow all creatures will power but he was willing to allow all creatures (at least all animals) intellectual powers. He states in Chapter 3 of *The Descent of Man:* "My object in this chapter is to show that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties." Moreocver, all the way down the scale of animals the differences are only in degree.

secondly, that natural selection had been the chief agent of change, though largely aided by the inherited effects of habit, and slightly by the direct action of the surrounding conditions." [12]

We note also that Darwin did not rule out an over-all direction given to the development of species by God. That is to say, he allowed for teleology, i. e., actions, changes, etc., taking place with a definite end or purpose in Mind. At the very end of his *Origin* he declares " There is grandeur in this view of life, with its special powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved." As Ernst Cassirer has so aptly said, purposeful activity has a secure place in Darwin's theory. It is, in fact, not only there but absolutely indispensable to his reasoning. It is safe, records Cassirer, to "assert that no earlier biological theory ascribed quite so much significance to the idea of purpose, or advocated it so emphatically, since not only individual but absolutely all the phenomena of life are regarded from the standpoint of their survival value. All other questions retreat into the background before this one." [13] Darwinism chooses from among all the possible relationships among living creatures one and only one group on which to concentrate, namely, relative survival values of slight variations. The purely morphological study of creatures, so important to the systematist, is ignored. Darwin himself, being less dogmatic than many of his followers, admitted his dependence upon teleological reasoning. [14]

What the above indicates, philosophically speaking, is that Darwinism *per se* does not entail a doctrine of absolute chance. There is rather a concatenation of events, lines of causality,

[12] Modern Library edition, p. 441!.

[13] E. Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (tr. by W. H. Woglom and C. W. Hendel, New Haven, Conn., 1950), p. 166.

[14] See *The Descent of Man,* Part I, ch. 1!.

which cross everywhere, thus bringing about sets of circumstances in which there is competition for survival. For instance, a series of environmental changes might coincide, at just the right time, with a series of inherited changes so as to produce individuals with slightly stronger talons than other individuals in the species. These then would have a better chance to survive than the others. It is like a man going to the store to buy something and meeting someone who owed him money who was also at the store. Each man went through a series of changes with a purpose in mind. The crossing of the two series of events resulted in an unexpected, chance meeting. The first man now has a chance to collect his money. We see that there is no absolute chance involved. The so-called chance event is dependent upon, and definitely secondary to, the purposeful non-chance series of occurrences.

This aspect of Darwin's theory must be emphasized because of the tendency on the part of many to hail his theory as the final elimination of causality and order in the world. Causality and order have traditionally been thought to lead ultimately to God. Some thought that by eliminating the former they could also finally eliminate the latter. They tried to make a case for either religion or evolution but not both. This, however, was never the case. As Miss Himmelfarb has documented in her book, previously mentioned, the situation following 1860 was not a case of religion vs. evolution but rather a case of the two extremes in each group vs. the middle. The strictly Biblical, fundamentalist-type religious person attacked his coreligious for allowing Darwin into the church by the back door. On the other hand, the diehard materialist attacked his fellow scientists and philosophers for allowing religion a pew in his scientific church. Darwin himself tried to remain aloof from such debates claiming that, since he was unversed in theology, he was unfit to discuss the issues involved.[15]

[15] See F. Darwin (ed.), *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwi:n* (New York, 1898), Vol. I, p. 805.

III

But how critical was Darwin himself of his own position? In the last chapter of the *Origin of Species* Darwin lists five major objections. One concerns the belief that members of two species cross-breeded to produce an offspring will always produce a sterile offspring; that is, the offspring will not be able to reproduce. This would seem to indicate that species are really absolutely distinct and so cannot transmute into one another. This objection is answered by arguing that such does not actually occur; that is, it is possible, given the right conditions, for cross-breeded offspring to reproduce. The facts, therefore, render the first objection impotent.

The second objection asks how it is possible to have such a widespread distribution of species throughout the world if they all came from one or two parents originally. Darwin's answer is migration over long periods of time fostered by climatic and geographical changes.

Third, according to his theory innumerable intermediate forms among presently existing species should be observed, but they are not. Where are all the links among the presently existing species? In other words, how is it possible for a systematist to classify flora and fauna at all? Should there not be an infinite number of intermediate steps between and among particular creatures picked out at random? He answers: " For we have reason to believe that only a few species of a genus ever undergo change; the other species becoming utterly extinct and leaving no modified progeny. Of the species which do change, only a few within the same country change at the same time; and all modifications are slowly affected." In effect, Darwin is saying that such intermediaries did and do exist. The ones that did exist, however, have died out while the ones presently forming are so far separated and are forming so slowly that we do not notice them.

As a variation on the above objection, notes Darwin, it might be asked why is not the geological record filled with these extinct intermediate specimens, if his answer to the third ob-

jection is true. He considers this the most obvious of the many objections which might be urged against his theory. Also, as two corollary objections, it can be asked why do whole groups of allied species appear suddenly in successive geological strata (a fact that would seem to support the Catastrophic theory), and, why do we not find numerous fossil remains below the Cambrian level since " we know that organic beings appeared on this globe, at a period incalculably remote, long before the lowest bed of the Cambrian system was deposited." Darwin':;: reply is two-fold. One is the hope that such problems will be removed by future discoveries. And second, "I can answer these questions and objections," he states, " only on the supposition that the geological record is far more imperfect than most geologists believe." [16]

Finally, he notes the objection raised by Sir William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) , the famous physicist, to the effect that the world is not old enough to have allowed all the proposed mutations to have taken place. This is probably " one of the gravest " objections yet advanced. In reply he gives two possibilities. One is that evolution proceeds more quiddy than even he himself believes. The other is that the world is much older than Lord Kelvin believes. Modern dating techniques have borne out the second possibility. The world is now thought to be about 4.5 billion years old, about four times as old as Kelvin would admit to. However, this is counteracted by the fact that the process of evolution now seems to be much slower than Darwin believed.

A little later, after recapitulating the half-dozen main arguments which he considered to favor his views,[17] he states, as a general, psychological objection to his theory, that "the chief cause of our natural unwillingness to admit that one species has

[16] Several precambrian fossils do exist. Several alga-like microfossils have been found in Ontario, Australia, and South Africa. See "Alga-Like Fossils from the Early Precambrian of South Africa," *Science,* Vol. 156 (April 1967), pp. 508-511.

[17] The evidence for evolution in general and for Darwin's theory in particular, drawn from individual differences within species, the warfare of nature, plant and animal breeding, paleontology, homology, embryology, and rudimentary organs, is to be found in any elementary science book and need not be repeated here.

given birth to clear and distinct species, is that we are always slow in admitting great changes of which we do not see the steps." Scientifically speaking, this objection is minor.

When reflecting upon Darwin's self criticism, it is strange that he did not raise what is considered by some to be a major criticism of his special theory of evolution. As Fothergill comments, while discussing Richard Owen:

> His criticism here still stands today, although it is to a large extent ignored (this being the trend of the times). "Assuming, then that *Palaeotherium* did ultimately become *Equus,* I gain no conception of the operation of the effective force by personifying as ' Nature ' the aggregate of beings which comprise the universe, or the laws which govern these things, by giving to my personification an attribute which can properly be predicated only of intelligence, and by saying' Nature has selected the mid-hoof and rejected the others'." Owen recognizes that there is a struggle for existence among species which leads to the extinction of some of them. But extinction is not creation. [18]

Natural selection, it is argued, may be adequate to explain some cases of survival, but it does not explain arrival. If someone were to ask " Why does this tree produce this one kind of fruit? " and if the answer given were " Because the farmer didn't pick them," the answer would hardly be a scientific explanation of the origin of the particular kind of fruit in question. Likewise, for Darwin to say that a particular species exists the way it does presently exist because its parents possessed characteristics which gave them relatively greater survival value and which characteristics were passed on to the offspring, does not explain the origin of these characteristics. Where did they come from originally? They were passed on to the parents from the grandparents. How did the grandparents acquire them? From their parents, and so on *ad infinitum.*

Now, as Owen remarks, it might be said that Nature gave the ancestors of the presently existing species in question the favorable characteristics somewhere along the line. But what

[18] P. G. Fothergill, *op. cit.,* p. 96.

is Nature if not a label used to cover the aggregate of everything in the universe and perhaps its laws of operation also? Did everything give the one species its edge over others? Did some part do so? Which part? And how? Isn't saying that Nature, either in whole or in part, such as the ancestors' immediate environmental situation, bestowed upon the ancestors slight variations conducive to winning the fight for life the same as simply affirming that such characteristics are there because they are there? And isn't this, in effect, the same as saying that the presently existing species exist because Nature in its selective process did not eliminate them just as the fruit is there because the farmer did not pick it?

Darwin, however, certainly did think of his work as explicative of origins and not merely survivals. Not origins absolutely speaking for, in the beginning, the initial wherewithal to commence the evolutionary process came from God, but in a relative sense insofar as new varieties of living things are to be explained by natural selection. When he speaks about the survival of individuals and species, he means to say that the slight changes inducing survival will in time accumulate to the point where the resulting organism will differ to such a great extent from its ancestors that it must be classified as a new species/ [9] As an example of origination, Darwin presented to the Linnean Society the imaginary case of island-bound canine creatures feeding on relatively slow-moving rabbits and relatively fast-moving hares. Due to environmental changes, the rabbit supply begins to decrease while the hare supply increases. As a result, the lighter, faster dogs with better eyesight will be favored even if the differences be ever so small. They would survive during periods of food scarcity, would rear more young, and pass on their slight peculiarities to their offspring. " I can see no more reason to doubt that these causes in a thousand generations would produce a marked effect, and adapt the form of the fox or dog to the catching of hares instead

[19] Darwin was not aware of " mutations." Even if he were, however, it would not have helped his case much since, by and large, mutations are unfavorable to the well-being and survival of the organism.

of rabbits, than that greyhounds can be improved by selection and careful breeding." [20] After a thousand generations, then, Nature will have affected a new species. We see, therefore, that Darwin's whole theory is his answer to the objection that he does not really explain origins.

It must be noted, however, that in doing so Darwin commits himself to at least two presuppositions, both of which are open to severe criticism, and which he himself never attempted to completely justify. We do not include here his belief in God as the ultimate cause of the organisms and the environment which, through various physical and chemical interactions, produces the initial slight variations in individuals. Rather, we have reference to his postulating an interminable progress wherein the simpler creatures produce in time the more perfect, more complex organisms and also to his nominalism with respect to the status of species. Let us discuss the first postulate.

IV

At the end of his *Origin,* Darwin declares that he cannot doubt that his theory embraces all the members of the plant and animal kingdoms. All animals descended from four or five progenitors and likewise for all plants. He then offers a further speculation. "Analogy would lead me one step farther," he continues, " namely, to the belie£ that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide." Deceitful or not, Darwin seems to have favored his analogy. [21] He did favor the notion of a continuous progressive line of development ultimately culminating in man. Such a postulate cannot be simply assumed, for it has a legitimate alternative. To some, time is the great destroyer, not creator. All things degenerate, become less perfect, in time.

[20] From his paper read to the Linnean Society 1 July 1858.

[21] Wallace, although a strong adherent of natural selection, could not see. how Darwin or anyone else could claim that all plants, animals, and men carne from a few cells. The differences among them were too great to allow for such a theory. Wallace advocated instead special creations for inorganic matter, plants, animals, and men.

Darwin realized this and did attempt to document his claim by reference to the fossil record. The geological record appeared *to Darwin* to indicate this perfect ascent from very simple to very complex organisms.[22]

It does not appear this way to others. Simpson, for instance, the Harvard paleontologist, admits that the course of evolution seems to differ radically for different animals. Some appear to have gone through comparatively rapid changes, while others have changed very little, while still others have apparently not changed at all, since the earliest days of life on our planet.[23] William Thompson, of the Entomology Research Institute in Ottawa, Canada, is even more critical of the continuous progress aspect of Darwin's theory. Even assuming that the dates assigned to various fossil remains are accurate, he states, it still appears that the picture presented to us of these ancient times is very much like that of the world today.[24] Many genera and species are inseparable from those existing today even though found in deposits of great antiquity. This is especially true of insect fauna. The majority of the various preserved species of termites, ants, flies, etc., are still in existence today even though their fossil remains go back fifty million years. Professor Thompson, an avid student of paleontology, claims to possess a fly trapped in Baltic amber which is of the same genotype as the present-day *Drosophila.* Other examples are also available. The Crossopterygian fish (thought to have become extinct seventy million years ago), a species of deep sea mollusc (once thought to have disappeared 280 million years ago), the conifer *Metasequoia* (once believed to have become extinct fifty million years ago), the articulate Brachiopod *Lingula* (going back *500* million years), are all still with us today.[25]

[29] See F. F. Centore, *Life, Atoms, Chance* (New York, 1966) for a discussion of the scientific merits of the hypothesis that living organisms came from nonliving matter.

[23] See G. G. Simpson, *Tempo and Mode in Evolution* (Columbia U. Press, 1944).

•• See W. R. Thompson, "The Status of Species," *Philosophical Problems in Biology* (ed. by V. E. Smith, New York, 1966), pp. 85 ff.

[25] The following is a condensed geological time chart taken from G. S. Carter,

Thompson also wishes to take into account the fact that the dating of fossil remains is more guesswork than science. He states that

> the paleontological record is not by any means the simply convincing story that neophytes in biology are led to accept. Most students receive without hesitation the idea that the seriation of the fossils, on which the reconstruction of phylogenies depends, is a basic fact, yet, as is well known, the order of the fossils is based on the rocks containing them, while the order of the rocks is based on the fossils they contain. This statement, though it was received with protest when I made it in a symposium some years ago, is not seriously contested by paleontologists.[26]

To escape this circular reasoning, the Darwinian must assume that organic evolution proceeded from the simple to the complex. In other words, instead of building a theory on the .facts, he is using the theory to decide what the facts are, charges Thompson.

At present there is no sure way of determining the ages o}. rocks. The usual estimates depend upon three relatively well-established dates which in turn are based upon rates of atomic disintegration. Any other dates given are interpolations based

A Hundred Years of Evolution (London, 1957), p. 197. The figures to the right are in mi!Hons of years and are, of course, very, very approximate.

Quaternary		Secondary	
Pleistocene	1	Cretaceous	120
Tertiary		Jurassic	150
Pliocene	12	Triassic	185
Miocene	30	Primary	
Oligocene	50	Permian	220
Eocene	60	Carboniferous	280
Paleocene	70	Devonian	325
		Silurian	350
		Ordovician	400
		Cambrian	500

[26] W. R. Thompson, *art. cit.,* p. 87. The criticism could also be expanded in other directions. For example, the human eye is said to have the remains of an extra eyelid. This would make it less complicated now than it was eons ago. But, if the development was from the more to the less complicated, what becomes of the geological timetable? Perhaps rock strata containing less complicated organisms are *newer* than those containing the more complicated ones.

upon the three. Also, there is no essential connection between the thickness of the rock stratum and its age.[27]

Moreover, the various rock strata often do not lie with the supposed newer upon the supposed older. The Cambrian rocks, for instance, which are thought to contain the oldest fossils and therefore to be the oldest rocks, do not always rest upon the usually non-fossil bearing precambrian rock formations. In general, any rock stratum may be found to rest on any other rock stratum in the series supposed to be older than itself, while, in some cases, the supposedly older rock is found on top of the supposedly newer rock. Darwin himself was aware of this situation. He explained it away by calling upon Lyell and others who showed that the earth's surface has undergone many upheavals and shiftings thus disturbing the neatness of the geological strata. The mixed-up stratifications, then, are abnormalities. This answer does not really solve the problem posed by Thompson, however. For, in order to know what is abnormal, one must know what is normal, and this is precisely the issue to be decided. Obviously, it cannot be decided by geology. Hence the importance of the progressive development theory: the simpler the forms, the older the rocks. But what if the present order of stratification is the normal one rather than the abnormal one? In that case, simpler species will be found in newer rocks and the constant progression theory must be re-evaluated.

The question now to be raised, assuming the correctness of the presently accepted geological stratification, is why some species apparently developed into others while some other species did not. Simpson believes that the reason some species have remained constant is that they lived in stable environments and have reached a state of equilibrium with their

[27] Even atomic disintegration methods have their limits. According to an article in *Time* (August 17, 1962, p. 65), "By measuring the amount of potassium 40 and its decay product, argon 40, in a digger's find, scientists conceivably can fix an object's age at *50* million years, with a probable error of less than 2%. The radio-uctive carbon dating system, for which Dr. Willard Libby won a Nobel Prize in 1960, reaches back for only *50,000* to 60,000 years."

enviromnents so that any change would destroy rather than advance them. But do not the long-lived species live among the short-lived species (i.e., species that have supposedly evolved) in the same environment? Also, according to geologists, no part of the world has had a stable environment. Environmental instability is, in fact, one of the two keys (the other is mutations) to the modern theory of adaptation.

This points to a further difficulty with the assumption of a continuous progressive development. Carter, referring to Darwin's day, says that "Another criticism against the gradual evolution of complex organs was that small changes in their parts in the course of evolution must destroy their efficiency. This is the same criticism as that concerned with co-ordination everywhere in the body." [28] He considers the answers to both to be the same. The variations occurred in such small steps that they could not have upset the over-all coordination of the organism or caused it a loss of efficiency. However, the slight variations could have given the creature some advantage over its fellow creatures.

In the same place he also gives another objection against Darwin's theory. "The objection was made that in development many organs reach complex structure before they begin to function. The vertebrate heart is an example." This objection, he continues, " is removed when it is realized that it is the whole life-history of an animal that evolves. Complex structure in these organs is very necessary when they begin to function, and any failure to develop their structure at earlier stages would undoubtedly have negative selective value."

It is hard to see how the answers given by Carter in the above two paragraphs can be reconciled. He seems to want to have the same facet of the same theory explain two contrary occurrences. To Darwin's way of thinking, some slight variations give their possessors the edge in the fight for life. Since they survive, they can reproduce. The offspring inherit the favorable variations. The sole criterion of favorableness is

•• G. S. Carter, *op. cit.,* p. 76.

survival value at the time and at the place of variation. How, then, can a natural selection type of evolutionist claim both that the eye, for example, developed because each minute step was favorable and that the vertebrate heart developed because each minute step along the way was not favorable: it was only the over-all, complex organ that was favorable. To say that minute variations are passed on because right *now,* at the time of variation, the parents have the edge over other creatures and that minute variations are passed on because they will be of value *later* seems to be stretching one theory a bit too far. Darwin himself, later in life, again being less obstinate than many of his followers, was willing to admit that perhaps too much emphasis was given to natural selection. Other factors, covered by other special theories of change (he did not say exactly what they were), might also be at work. He justified his earlier overemphasis by pointing out that, in order to counteract one extreme (special creation of each species), it is sometimes necessary to go to the other extreme.[29]

Besides the problem of reconciling the two answers given by Carter to the two objections stated above, there is also a problem with respect to the first answer taken alone. If survival value is the sole criterion of favorableness in variations, why would anything other than bacteria or some simpler form of life exist in our world? Carter claims that each variation was so small that it could in no way harm the efficiency of the organism. But, on the one hand, if they are *that* small, how could they in any way help the organism in its struggle for existence? And, on the other hand, if such variations were more than just above non-existence, how could they not hinder the stability of a perfectly well-adjusted organism? If survival is the end or purpose of natural selection, then this end has been preeminently fulfilled eons ago with the advent of bacteria. Compared to the ease with which so-called higher forms of life can be killed, it is practically impossible to destroy these things. The slightest variation in climate, ecology, atmosphere,

•• See *The Descent of Man* (2nd ed., 1874, Modern Library ed.), p. 442.

etc., can terminate the life of that highly complex organism, man, while the various bacteria, by and large, can undergo all sorts of extreme change and still survive to reproduce again a million-fold.

V

Consider now the second assumption needed by Darwin in order to explain not merely the survival of species but their origin, namely, his nominalism. By nominalism we mean Darwin's view that species are only strongly marked varieties which exhibit relative permanence and stability over a given period of time. When beginning the summary of the evidence for natural selection, the acceptance of the truth of this position is given as the first presupposition that must be assented to.[30] For Darwin, this meant that there are no essential differences among living things. No individual existing creature is, *in any way, identical* with any other living thing. There are no true classes of creatures. There are only "populations" of creatures. What is called a class is merely a collection of individuals. Put positively, every individual existing creature Is umque.

Darwin believed that the acceptance of this position would be a great help to science. Of immediate benefit would be the termination of the constant arguing among systematists over what is and what is not a true species. In the future " Systematists will have only to decide (not that this will be easy) whether any form be sufficiently constant and distinct from other forms, to be capable of definition; and if definable, whether the differences be sufficiently important to deserve a specific name." Hereafter, systematists will be compelled to say that the only difference between a species and a variety is that varieties are presently seen to be connected by intermediate gradations, whereas the intermediate steps among species are now missing. No longer must one search for the essence of a creature so as to identify it with another creature of the same

[30] See *The Origin of Species* (Modern Library ed.) , p. 360.

essence, for there are not now, nor have there ever been, such essences.[31]

In stating his position, Darwin was declaring himself on one of the most ancient and important of philosophical issues, namely, the problem of universal concepts. It does not appear, however, that he realized what he was getting into. His manner of presentation and his failure to elaborate and defend his view reveals a philosophical naivete that one would not expect from a great mind. If one were to consistently follow out the consequences of this nominalistic position, the effects upon science, and human life in general, would be profound.

The first difficulty posed by Darwin's nominalism is whether or not the taxonomist has a right to exist at all. Rather than aiding the systematist, it may well be that he and his profession are rendered impossible. According to Darwin's "analogy," which is generally accepted by Darwinians today, there is one long flowing continuum from the first living thing to man. How then can anyone systematize a collection of millions of individual creatures when there is no system? A taxonomist cannot *di8cover* the genus and species of a specimen because all such classes have been ruled out by the theory of gradual ascent. The most he can do is arbitrarily to name groups of creatures which appear *to him* to be similar. He *invent8* his own species and genera.[32]

Consider the problem with respect to man. We say "John is a human being," " Mary is a human being," " Sam is a human being," "Sally is a human being," etc. But how is this possible, if they are not identical with respect to being human? Given the nominalistic position, no such identity is possible. The most a systematist could say is that John, Mary, Sam,

[31] Sec *ibid.,* p. 371. Cf. D. L. Hull, ., The Metaphysics of Evolution," *The British Journal for the History of Science,* Vol. 3 (1967), pp. 309-337. Hull claims that Darwin was not definite in deciding the status of species, but instead took a position somewhere between the " essentialists " and nominalists. However, regardless of what Darwin himself may have thought, his position was nominalistic at least in the tradition of either Roscelinus or Occam.

[32] See G. G. Simpson, *Principles of Animal Taxonomy* (New York, 1961), *passim.*

Sally, etc., are *like* human beings. They are similar in this respect, not identical. What and where, then, is this " human being" that they are *like?* If John, Mary, Sam, Sally, etc., are not essentially the same but only similar to one another, in what does the similarity reside? If they are like "human beings " and there is no " humanbeingness," they resemble nothing. Similarity is not identity. To say something is like something else implies that it is also different. New York is is not London. Yet there is identity here also. New York and London *are* cities. They are not *like* cities.[83]

To escape this problem one o£ two courses has usually been taken. One method is to ignore the implications o£ Darwin's nominalism. It is not unusual to find biologists claiming to be adherents of Darwin's special theory of evolution while they simultaneously go on describing and naming species. It is sometimes difficult to tell which half of the split personality dominates. When giving a popular lecture, for instance, he may sound like an orthodox neo-Darwinian in claiming that it does not make much difference whether man is thought of as a well-developed protozoon or whether a protozoon is thought of as an underdeveloped man. In his actual work, however, he proceeds to arrange individual specimens into various classes as if there were something identical about them and as if he had never heard of Darwin.

A second escape route is that proposed by such outstanding biologists as Ernst Mayr, Simpson, and W. S. Beck.[84] Evolutionary taxonomy, they state, replaces the notion of an essence, identical in each species, with the notion of a collection of physical characteristics (similarities) inherited by all the members of the same group. Instead of types, there are now only populations. Due to the passing on of certain characteristics through genes, the offspring are similar to their parents. in physical traits. The anatomy and physiology of a group of

[33] On the history of this problem see W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy* (tr. by J. H. Tufts, New York, 1960), pp. 107 fi', 188 fi', 287 fi', 860 ff.

•• See G. G. Simpson and W. S. Beck, *op. cit.,* pp. 487-506. For more detail see S. Wright, *Evolution and the Genetics of Population* (Vol. I, Chicago, 1968).

offspring is therefore the sum of the characteristics of those individuals constituting the population.

Another way of looking at the second escape would be to take a statistical approach. The pattern of characteristics is a frequency distribution of the many variants on each characteristic present at any given time. Typology is thereby eliminated, it is alleged. Instead of looking for species, we now look to the frequency with which certain characteristics and variations on those characteristics show up in a group of specimens. A high frequency of a certain group of characteristics indicates an area within the flowing continuum of creatures that is to be marked off as a "species." In other words, the search for similarities is now to be aided by mathematical techniques, essences having been replaced by gene structures.

One wonders, though, if this really removes the difficulty. If no two individuals in the universe are identical *in any way,* why worry about classification at all? To claim that "John is a man" and "Sam is a man" merely means that John and Sam have similar genes (note that the concept gene is itself a universal), manifesting themselves in similar physical traits, is still to deny that " man " applies equally well to both. We are still left with the question " What does it take to be a man?" If John has one arm and Sam has two, is John less a man than Sam? How is it that we can classify both John and Mary as humans despite all the many obvious and not so obvious differences? In other words, statistical means are fine for noting the frequency with which various traits occur within a group of specimens, but how are we to know that a certain thing belongs in a particular group in the first place? How far must an individual depart from the statistical average before it is no longer in the species? To answer these questions one must know what constitutes a species before, not after, the measurements are made. It makes sense to say that men's brain sizes vary between X and Y. It does not make sense to say that because your brain size is between X and Y you are a human. If this were the way things were done, then human babies would not be human while adult dolphins and

porpoises would be. The status of a corpse is also instructive. Although the brain sizes are the same, a corpse is not a human being but only the *remains* of a human being.

This problem of determining species is not peculiar to modern Darwinians but affiicted Darwin himself. We read in his *Origin of Species* the following brief paragraph. " Hence, in determining whether a form should be ranked as a species or a variety, the opinion of naturalists having sound judgment and wide experience seems the only guide to follow. We must, however, in many cases, decide by a majority of naturalists, for few well-marked and well-known varieties can be named which have not been ranked as species by at least some competent judges." [35] Darwin's intention here is to indicate the subjectivity and arbitrariness of species selection. In a later paragraph, after giving examples of confusions in deciding what is and is not a species, he states: " Nevertheless, no certain criterion can possibly be given by which variable forms, local forms, sub-species, and representative species can be recognized." [36] One wonders, of course, how he can accuse some naturalists of confusing varieties with species when there is no sure way of telling them apart in the first place.

VI

Before going on to a discussion of the paleontological evidence surrounding Darwin's nominalism, we should pause a moment to reflect upon the social consequences of such a nominalism. Recall that there are no ontological breaks in the scale of being from the first primal cell to the most intelligent of men. This means that even at the upper end of the scale there is a gradation of perfections. "In a series of forms,"

[35] C. Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (Modem Library ed.), p. 41.

[36] *Ibid.,* p. 42. We might at this point remind ourselves of a compromise position stated by Wallace and restated by others. For instance M. J. Adler, in answer to his own book *Problems for Thomists: The Problem of Species* (New York, 1940), published a long article entitled " Solution to the Problem of Species" *(Thomist,* Vol. 3, 1941, pp. 279-379) in which he argued that to be true to St. Thomas Aquinas one must hold for the existence of only four species (mineral, plant, animal, man), all other divisions being merely varieties or races.

thought Darwin, "graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite point when the term 'man' ought to be used. But this is a matter of very little importance. So again, it is almost a matter of indifference whether the so-called races of man are thus designated, or are ranked as species or sub-species; but the latter term appears the more appropriate." [37] Darwin is again showing his naivete, this time in social and political matters.

It did not take long for Darwin's "survival of the fittest" and "all the world's a jungle" approach to evolution to find its way into literature and politics. Perhaps the two figures who best epitomize the full consequences of this approach to life are Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). Who can say that the white race, which has produced Newtons, Shakespeares, Einsteins, etc., does not have the right to use the inferior black and yellow races, just as they in turn use creatures inferior to themselves? In fact, why cannot some groups within the white race, if they can out-survive their fellow whites, assume the title and honor of supermen? As Randall has said with respect to Nietzsche, "What was good in the world in which Providence ruled for the salvation of every human soul, can, to the emancipated mind that sees the bitter travail of evolution, the fierce struggle to bring about higher types of life, no longer appeal as good at all." [38] And, as he said with respect to the relationship between the United States and Hitler before our entry into the second World War, "Secretary Hull is crying in the jungle to those who follow the jungle's law." [39]

It is strange that at a time when various movements were afoot to eliminate slavery and imperialism, a new doctrine should have arisen which could be used as a powerful tool to support slavery and imperialism. Equally ironic is the fact that

[37] C. Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (Modern Library ed.), p. 541.

[38] J. H. Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind* (revised ed., New York, 1940)' p. 608.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 674.

Darwin, himself a kindly and charitable man, should have provided a doctrine which could be and was used as the ultimate justification for the most hideous of tortures.

VII

Turning now to the paleontological evidence for Darwin's nominalism, one finds that the geological record of fossils has not changed a great deal since 1872. In 1872 Darwin asked himself why naturalists could not find innumerable intermediary specimens among presently existing population types and why the geological record did not retain the remains of these intermediaries. His answer to the first query was that the whole process is proceeding so slowly that the lifespan of one human is not long enough to notice such mutations. His answer to the second problem, however, has been the occasion of much disbelief. He said, in effect, that the remains are not there now as far as we know, they may be discovered in the future, but if they are not we have no right to *expect* that they will be. For various reasons, such as the perishableness of the dead creatures, he would be giving us false hopes if he were to promise that they would certainly be unearthed some day.

To someone just coming from a class in scientific methodology such an answer must appear a bit strange, to say the least. According to the usual presentation of scientific procedure, the scientist must be able to test his theories. Scientists must sit at the feet of facts. The theologian may accept on faith, the philosopher is allowed to build castles in the air, but the scientist must prove and demonstrate his propositions, ultimately by reference to intersubjective, concrete experience. So, when it is heard that a theory depends in large part upon evidence that does not exist and that cannot be found, it is understandable that scientists will hesitate before rushing in to embrace the theory.

Darwin's explanation of why one does not have the right to expect to find such evidence is plausible. Most organic beings are highly fragile and quickly decompose after death without leaving a trace. This is an observable fact. The trouble with

this fact of experience is that it can also be used to support some theory diametrically opposed to Darwin's.[40] Someone in favor of a special creation theory, to take an example, could claim that God had created millions of very special species before the great flood. If these creatures could be found, they would *prove* the theory of special creature because they would contain special marks put upon them by God. Unfortunately, however, all these creatures were very perishable and now cannot possibly be found. It is like the story that tells that St. Patrick drove the sea serpents away from the Irish coast. How do you know that? Well, you don't find any sea serpents there, do you? Or, why do elephants have red eyes? I don't know, why? So they can hide in cherry trees. Don't be silly! Well, you've never *seen* an elephant in a cherry tree, have you! It is simply not scientifically acceptable to base a theory on non-existent evidence.

Just what is the status of the paleontological record as it stands today? The geological record exhibits two general characteristics, both of which were admitted by Darwin and both of which are unfavorable to his particular theory. One fact is that the paleontological record does not converge toward fewer and fewer species, and ultimately to one creature, as we dig further and further back into time. Secondly, the various large divisions of creatures seem to come upon the scene suddenly (by geological standards) rather than showing a gradual transformation from the simpler to the more complex. The first state of affairs is more significant for the Darwinian than the second. Perhaps most of the chains between and among the supposedly sudden manifestations of new creatures are missing. Nevertheless, what fossils we do find, even if their number is relatively small, should show the general tendency to converge upon the postulated primal cell from which all subsequent variety and

[40] The same holds for the argument based upon vestigial organs. Also, if chains of fossils are missing for the lower forms, maybe they are also missing for the higher forms. Did man exist in Cambrian times? Yes, but the remains are lost. In a similar vein, having salt in our blood no more proves that we came from the sea than having iron in our blood proves we came from the Great Mesabi Range.

differentiation has flowed. Instead o£ a gradually increasing organization and definition o£ species, however, one finds that the remains o£ past creatures are as well defined and ordered as are those in existence today.

Darwin, at the beginning o£ Chapter 6 o£ *The Origin of Species,* attempted to give various reasons, other than the imperfection o£ the geological record, £or the lack o£ intermediaries among well-defined species. His reasons were meant to apply to both the present and the past, i. e., we should be able to see the intermediaries around us today *and* preserved in the fossil record. He asks "why, i£ species have descended £rom other species by fine gradation, do we not everywhere see innumerable transitional forms? Why is not all nature in confusion, instead of the species being, as we see them, well-defined? " He gives three reasons why the situation exists today and, by extrapolation, why it existed in the past, therefore explaining the lack o£ fossil evidence. As a further reason £or the missing chains o£ evidence, he gives the £act that he believes the geological record to be highly imperfect.

The first reason is that new varieties form very slowly, "So that, in any one region and at any one time, we ought to see only a £ew species presenting slight modifications o£ structure in some degree permanent; and this assuredly we do see." Second, by the constant rising and sinking o£ land masses, surface areas o£ the earth are constantly being isolated £rom each other, thus cutting off intermediary specimens. Third, "when two or more varieties have been formed in different portions o£ a strictly continuous area, intermediate varieties will, it is probable, at first have been formed in the intermediate zones, but they will generally have had a short duration." The main reason £or their short lives is that " the range o£ the inhabitants o£ any country by no means exclusively depends on insensibly changing physical conditions, but in a large part on the presence o£ other species, on which it lives, or by which it is destroyed, or with which it comes into competition; and as these species are already defined objects, not blending one into another by insensible gradations, the range o£ any one species,

depending as it does on the range of others, will tend to be sharply defined." Also, due to their smaller numbers, intermediate varieties will be more quickly exterminated.

Darwin's first reason is observationally verifiable to some extent. We can and do observe various changes in the outward appearances of some creatures. This is especially true with respect to color variations. One type of animal preys upon another type. But in order to be caught, the victim must first be seen. Gradually, the more easily seen offspring are eaten, while the less easily seen offspring survive to reproduce. In time, the less easily seen variety comes to dominate the species.[41] However, no one as yet has claimed to witness a certain type of bird, moth, snake, mouse, etc., change into something other than what it started out as. As a result, evolution by natural selection has not be established by direct observation. Even in the case of the famous fruit fly, which differs from the others in that it has been subjected to all sorts of artificial conditions since 1909, the basic genotype has remained the same. So it happened that, after many years of research hinging upon Darwin's first reason, Robson and Richards could write, " We do not believe that natural selection can be disregarded as a possible factor in evolution. Nevertheless, there is so little positive evidence in its favor, so much that appears to tell against it, and so much that is as yet inconclusive that we have no right to assign to it the main causative role in evolution." [42] Such titles, then, as " Darwin's Missing Evidence " or the like which appear from time to time in the popular press, and which report upon some slight variation or other, are misleading for two reasons. First, Darwin himself was aware of such variations. Also, such variations are not changes in species.

The second reason for the lack of intermediaries is much more highly speculative than the others. Darwin himself ad-

[41] See J. Huxley, *Evolution: The Modern Synthesis* (London, 1942) and P. G. Fothergill, *op. cit.*, pp. 319 ff.

[42] G. C. Robson and O. W. Richards, *The Variation of Animals in Nature* (London, 1936), p. 316.

mitted this and chose but to mention it and then pass on to his other reasons. We will do the same.

His third reason again shows Darwin to be somewhat less critical of himself than he claimed to be. Darwin is ou.t to explain why there is a sharp differentiation among species (both past and present) . His answer here is that the intermediaries are destroyed in the process of having to live among other, sharply defined, species. Because their neighbors are sharply defined, and because they are quickly destroyed, the intermediary species cannot be found. One wonders how Darwin can account for the sharp definition of species by calling upon the sharp definition of other species. This merely assumes what is to be explained.

The fact that the fossil record does not converge has led some modern advocates of natural selection literally to invent the missing chains of evidence. This practice has become so commonplace that it can be found in any elementary science text, on educational TV, and, of course, on popular programs of all sorts. Most of the genealogies or " trees " have a tendency to be highly orthogenetic, i.e., to be set up in such a way that the organisms seem to be inwardly directed to develop in just a certain fashion and in no other. The practice of constructing family trees usually involves picking out some fossil sample as the great ancestor of many present forms and then drawing in lines, to which are attached drawings of other fossils or existing creatures, which all converge on the ancient ancestor. When carefully scrutinized, however, such phylogenies do not represent the actually existing fossil records. They are rather imaginative constructions, arbitrarily arranging a few actual fossil remains with many assumed intermediaries. As Thompson has said, somewhat facetiously, with respect to the ease with which an ancestor can be dreamed up,

> It is, in fact, a *construct,* which represents a hypothetical reality, but whose role, as I have said, is simply that of the generator of an imaginary phylogeny. It is thus comparable to the constructs in mathematical physics, such as the representations of the universe

in the cosmologies of Ptolemy, Tycho Brahe, and Copernicus. But while the constructs of the astronomers can be checked by quantitative measurement, those of the phylogeneticists cannot. This is obviously a great advantage to them.[43]

At this point we might interject another element posing a problem for a more or less strict Darwinian with respect to Darwin's nominalism. The gradual transmutation of one population group into another is said to be so slow as to be largely imperceptible. This may be true at one time and one place, but why could not one see the various stages in the evolution of some creature at one time but in different places? That is to say, it seems to be assumed that evolutionary development transpires at a fixed rate all over the world. The validity of this assumption is questioned by Arnold Lunn. "There is one point," he states, "which so far as I know has never been made, but which seems to be worth making. Darwinists seem to believe in what may be described as the *synchronisation of evolution.* They assume that the different phases of evolution were synchronised throughout the world."[44]

Lunn takes as an example the development of the wing. If Darwinians are right, he claims, there was a time when scales on reptiles were becoming feathery. Later, feathers, incapable of flight, were fully developed. Still later, *archaeopteryx,* the first true bird, lifted itself into the air. Now, if evolution is still continuing today, and we have no reason to turn off the theory just now, why do we not see examples of the various stages of wing development existing simultaneously throughout the world today. In other words, unless all evolutionary phases were and are synchronized throughout the world, there must have been a time (which should show up in the fossil record), and the present must now be a time, when some reptiles had and have feathery scales, some feathers, and some efficient wings. In fact, however, no modern form possesses any of

[43] W. R. Trompson, *art. cit.,* p. 70.

[44] A. Lunn, *The Revolt Against Reason* (London, 1950), p. 124. Darwin himself accepted synchronization as a fact. See *The Origin of Species* (Modern Library ed.), pp. 262-265.

the many such nascent organs which innumerable millions of creatures must have had somewhere along the line.

This consideration leads us into the next unfavorable aspect of the paleontological evidence with respect to Darwin's nominalism. Darwin was also cognizant of this second problem and attempted to explain its occurrence in the same manner as he explained the first. Why is it that whole groups of creatures appear rather suddenly and fully formed in various geological strata? Because, for various reasons, the connecting chains of slowly developing creatures have not been preserved. This is inconvenient for the theory of natural selection. But such a lack does not disprove the theory. But then neither does it prove it.

Such ardent students of the subject, as W. Thompson, Austin Clark, Paul Lemoine, and James Gray have found the lack of sufficient paleontological evidence sufficient reason to seriously question whether natural selection is true at all. Among contemporary insects, for example, the *Ephemeroptera, Odonata, Orthoptera, Blattids, Coleoptera, Hymenoptera, Diptera, Lepidoptera, Hemiptera,* and *Mecoptera* each appear rather suddenly in some one particular time. This is also true of oysters, Hippurites, frogs, whales, seals, etc. Sudden appearance is the rule and not the exception.

The well-known cases in which it appears that there may have been a slow development can be explained in some other way or there is evidence to show the contrary. The different forms of the Paludine Mollusc shells, for instance, appear in different parts of the world, under different ecological conditions, at the same time. This indicates that there is only a difference in phenotype (accidental difference) rather than a change in genotype (essential difference). In the case of the Ammonites, genealogies have been set up going both from straight to loosely coiled to tightly coiled cones *and vice versa.* Mere shape or size cannot be used to decide antiquity. In the case of the Foraminifera, the various forms exist simultaneously, and there seems to be no evidence of a struggle for existence. Even in the famous cases of the horse and the elephant, the

apparent changes can be explained phenotypically rather than genotypically.[45]

Returning now for a moment to what was previously mentioned concerning the incompatibility of a doctrine which teaches that variations are preserved because immediately useful for survival with a doctrine that says such variations are preserved because they will be useful later, we can see a close connection between the problems posed by the sudden appearances of species and the problems posed by the radical transformations of organs. Some organs are not useful at all until they have reached a certain high degree of organization and completion. Carter mentioned the vertebrate heart as an example. A survey of nature, however, reveals many more cases of the same type. The cases of creatures that emerge from eggs compared to those that emerge from wombs, the suckling of offspring on land and in the sea, and the water spider will suffice to show the problem.[46]

In the first example, it is biologically impossible for a shelled egg *gradually* to give up its shell, its food supply, and *gradually* to develop a placental connection, with all the various blood vessel connections, etc., that are needed. It is an all or nothing situation. If such a change-over did occur at some time in the past, it must have occurred suddenly, that is, there must have been a radical transformation. Until the whole new method of reproduction is completely coordinated in all its complicated precision, it is useless for survival.

Consider also the case of the whale suckling its young under water. The mother has a receptacle into which milk is secreted. It has muscles which contract in order to force the milk into the baby against the surrounding water pressure. There is also a cap around the nipple (into which the baby's snout fits) which prevents the mixing of salt water with the milk. Also, the baby has an elongated windpipe, that projects beyond the

[45] See W. R. Thompson, *art. cit.,* pp. 90 ff.

[46] This type of objection has been especially emphasized by Douglas Dewar as an argument against any kind of evolution. See his *Difficulties of Evolutionary Theory* (London, 1931) and *More Difficulties of the Evolutionary Theory* (London, 1938).

gullet opening, to prevent milk from getting into the lungs. Again there can be no *gradual* transformation. The apparatus is useless if not fully developed. All modifications must be complete before the child can be suckled under water.

In the case of the water spider, the home which it builds ior its young is useless until completed. This creature builds a little inverted cup-like structure, moored by threads to stones or plants, under water. Air is brought into the cup by being attached to the fine hairs on the spider's body. The trip to the surface and back must be made many times. The same process is used periodically to replace the nest's air. This, also, could not have developed gradually. There is no half-way position between rearing offspring above water and doing so under water. Ordinary spiders quickly die under water. According to Darwin's theory, then, the original spider must have developed all the prerequisites for underwater life while above water (where they would be of no use to it) and then haphazardly fell into the water one day. How can evolutionary theory of any stripe explain such a thing, one might ask. Similar difficulties can be raised in the cases of eyes, wings, and any other highly complex organ.

Darwin argues that, impossible as it sounds, such intermediate steps must exist because his theory is true. And his theory is true because it is the only scientific alternative to the obnoxious theory of special creation. Dewar argues that a scientist (Dewar himself was a trained zoologist) should not espouse an explanation for which there is insufficient or contradictory evidence regardless of what his *a priori* " feelings " on the subject may be.[47] No reputable scientist who supported, say, the wave theory of light would call someone crazy for supporting the corpuscular theory of light. Nor would the reverse happen. There are solid reasons on both sides. Why should not the same openness of mind obtain in regard to evolutionary theory? It appears that Darwin did sincerely believe that there was sufficient evidence to support his special

[47] It might also be asked why one must use only natural causes to explain It phenomenon in order to be " scientific." This would be the case only if scientific were defined that way. But this is an assumption which need not be granted.

theory of evolution. But it also appears that his desire to destroy the special creation view caused him to overrate the supporting evidence and underrate the objections. His attitude is understandable. After all, how many different special theories can there be? He knew of Lamarckism and of others that were either the same as, or similar to, his own. And his own theory was not that radical. He was merely extending the use of "secondary causes." Previously, secondary causes, i.e., natural causes as opposed to the calling upon God as a direct cause in each case, had been used to explain new varieties. Now secondary causes would also explain new species. One could even look at his theory from another point of view which would also make it appear, he naively believed, as not so very radical. Secondary causes are still used to explain varieties; but now all species are to be considered as varieties. One need not even consider the particular secondary cause mechanism he chose to do the explaining, namely, natural selection, to be the only one operating in nature.

It is interesting to observe that in our own century, after so many years of heated debate in the last, no thinker of note is willing to commit himself one hundred percent to Darwin's position. In 1932, J. B. S. Haldane expressed the view that, after observing the way all living things are so closely related in so many different ways, any kind of revolutionary hypothesis becomes fantastic. However, as far as the exact causes of evolution are concerned, there is room for much critical caution. Selection is a factor, but it is perhaps not even the major one. Also, the dogmatic notion of a necessary progress in development, so dear to Haeckel and other early Darwinians, must be abandoned.[48] And Carter, at the end of his consideration of a hundred years of evolution, could say that evolution rather than revolution is the order of the day, and that neo-Darwinian theory is probably true, but that there is "certainly much work still to be done before the theory approaches completeness."[49]

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[48] See his *The Causes of Evolution* (London, 1932), pp. 152 ff.
[49] G. S. Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

THE ANALOGY OF INDIVIDUALITY AND "TOGETHERNESS"

IN EVERY person's life and in every philosophy of man there is the constant tension between honorable individuality and community. Excessive individuality can destroy one's necessary membership in community. Over preoccupation with community can check one's growth in individuality. Occasionally some persons choose exclusively either individuality or community. It seems that, although the tension will never be fully resolved, one must be both an individual and a member of community. In the paragraphs which follow we wish to bring out this point, namely, that one must be, necessarily, both an individual and a member of community, but particularly we wish to expand the thought. that neither individuality nor community is a univocal concept or reality. Rather, in man there are various levels of individuality. Likewise there are various levels of community. We have used the word" togetherness" as a generic term because, as will appear later, community, at least in our future use of the word, will be limited to a particular level of togetherness. We wish, immediately, to acknowledge our indebtedness to Karl Rahner and to Gabriel Marcel for many of the ideas which appear below and, in some instances, for their terminology.

NOUMENAL EGO-PHENOMENAL EGO

By these terms " noumenal " and " phenomenal ego " we wish to give a name to two aspects of man which, although they cannot be separated, yet must be distinguished. Man is spirit in matter, or, if you will, spirit in the world. By the " noumenal ego " we mean man as spirit. It is common doctrine with the Scholastics that the human soul is a self-subsistent form. By this they mean, at least the Thomists, that certainly

after death the human soul is capable of existing on its own apart from the body. But also it must be emphasized that the human spirit, even in its conjunction with the body, is self-subsistent. If it is self-subsistent after death, it must be self-subsistent before death. By the term "phenomenal ego" we mean the same human soul which informs matter. Donceel [1] has brought out this distinction rather felicitously. He points out that the human soul must be considered both as a formal principle and as a substance, as a spirit. The soul is said to be a spirit which *acts* like a substantial form. The soul as spirit is rightly said, as self-subsistent, to be a complete *substance* but not a complete *nature.* This understanding of the soul as a spirit which informs matter is a synthesis of a thesis which derives from Plato and an antithesis which comes from Aristotle. Plato insisted that the human soul was a spiritual being -and this we grant. Aristotle insisted that the human soul was the form of matter-and this, too, we must grant. The synthesis is found in the fact that the human soul is a spirit which informs matter.

It would take us too far afield to give a deeper explanation here of how the unity of man is thus preserved and how, simultaneously, the soul can be spirit which is materialized by its intrinsic dependence upon matter. It is our opinion that a solution of this antimony can be suggested by a recourse to Karl Rahner's theory of quasi-formal causality [2] and likewise to De la Taille's theory of Act and Actuation. [3]

INTELLECT- UNDERSTANDING

If man is a spirit (noumenal ego) and spirit in matter (phenomenal ego) on the substantial level, it will be necessary that these two aspects of man appear in his levels of activity.

[1] J. F. Donceel, S. J., *Philosophical Anthropology* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), pp. 435-436.

[2] Karl Rahner, S. J. "Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace," *Theological Investigations,* trans. Cornelius Ernst, O. P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press), I, pp. 319-346; cf. footnote p. 340.

[3] Maurice de la Taille, S. J., *The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act* (West Baden Springs, Ind.: West Baden College,

We wish here to point out how this will become manifest in the operations of man's intelligence. Before we recall this distinction, we must immediately point out that there is only one intellect, one intelligence, in man. Just as there is only one soul in man which is a spirit which informs matter and thus we truly have two aspects to the one human soul, so likewise in man there is but one intelligence with these two aspects, intellect and understanding. As it is always the total man (the noumenal ego and phenomenal ego) which exists and operates, so, too, whenever man's intelligence operates both aspects must be present, namely, intellect and understanding. Man, in intelligizing, must necessarily and *simultaneously* know the other, a material reality and himself, be conscious of the other and of himself. In the first aspect of this one operation we have the intentionality of knowledge, identity *with* opposition, and in the second aspect we have only the pure identity of knowledge, identity *without* opposition, or simply being-present-to-itself. In the human intellect as understanding there is present the quiddity of material things or the *proper* formal object of the human mind attained by the abstraction of the intelligible species. In the intellect aspect of the human intelligence, we have being as *common* formal object of the mind. This is intellectual consciousness. Understanding is the spiritual, cognitive faculty of the substantial *j01·m* of a material body. Intellect is the spiritual, cognitive faculty of *spirit* in matter. Understanding has been commonly well-developed by scholastic philosophers. We would wish, therefore, to underline the aspect of intelligence which we have called intellect, namely, that aspect of intelligence whereby the human soul as *spirit,* as self-subsistent spiritual substance, is capable, by reflection, of returning to its essence, of being present-to-itself-as-subject, of taking possession of itself as being and thus achieving the identity of the real and the intelligible.[4]

• D. J. Shine, S. J., *An Interior Metaphysics: The Philosophical Synthesis of Pierre Scheuer, S.* J. (Weston, Mass.: Weston College Press, 1966), pp. 78-81 and footnote. Cf. also, footnote of pp.

INTELLECTUAL WILL-RATIONAL WILL

Just as there is only one soul in man which is spirit and yet informs matter; just as there is only one intelligence in man which yet has two aspects, intellect and understanding, so too in man there is but one will, but it has two aspects. These we have called intellectual will and rational will. Intellectual will parallels human intelligence as intellect. It is spirit taking possession of itself, necessarily loving itself simultaneously with the other. Rational will parallels the understanding aspect of the intelligence. It is concerned with the will's appetite for the material quiddities which have been presented to it by the understanding. Just as the intelligence in its every act as intellect will necessarily also act as understanding and thus be involved with materiality (the "tuming to the phantasms" of the Scholastics), so likewise the intellectual will must operate simultaneously with the rational will which both seeks the material quiddities presented to it by the understanding and " informs " affective movements on the sensitive level. This we have elsewhere called a "turning of the will to the sensitive appetites." [5]

AN INDIVIDUAL-ANALOGY OF BEING-BEING AND THE ONE ARE CoNVERTIBLE-ANALOGY OF INDIVIDUALITY

What is an individual? An individual would be a natural unit which is undivided in itself and separated from all others. It is in the system of St. Thomas-Capreolus-Karl Rahner-De la Taille an individual substance of a particular nature which has its own commensurate act of existence. Thus we can draw up a schema of the strata of being; beginning from the lowest to the highest there would be inanimate units (perhaps atoms and/or molecules), vegetative beings, animals, men, angels, and God in whom the particular individual substance or essence is identical with his act of existence.

Analogy of being. The principle of analogy or proportion-

• D. J. Shine, S. J., "Spiritual Direction and the Spiritual Exercises," *Review for Religious,* vol. 25, no. *5* (September 1966), p. 891.

ality is stated thus. The transcendental perfections and the ontological perfections of being are common to all beings, to each according to its degree. The transcendental perfections would be oneness, trueness, and goodness. Some of the ontological perfections would be life, consciousness, knowledge, love.[6] We would also include "togetherness."

Being and the one are convertible. The unity of a being is going to be in direct proportion to its being itself. Hence, as its perfection of being increases in the strata of being, its unity and individuality are going to become more perfect. For the present we are concerned with but the transcendental property of the unity of a being. Later we shall briefly make an application to the ontological properties of being and their analogy within the strata of being.

Analogy of individuality. It is apparent that we simply cannot speak now in a univocal way about the individuality of being for, by the principle of proportionality which we have just recalled, the unity of a being is going to be in direct proportion to its being. So the unity of a vegetative being is going to have something in common with, and something different from, the unity of the inanimate unit. The being and unity of a man will be superior to that of an animal, etc. Hence we must say of the analogy of individuality that, as truly as being is analogous in its various manifestations, so there must be an analogy of the at-oneness-with-itself of every being. Shortly we shall see that man is in the unique position of having within himself, even as an individual, a stratified unity of individuality.

w·e would like to insert here a parenthesis drawn from Karl Rahner. [7] Within a particular being the degree of its ability for presence to itself through consciousness and self-possession in love is the indication of its degree of being. This would be true of all beings. We are speaking here of analogy. This "being-present-to-itself" is simply a mode of describing the actuality, the intrinsic self-realization of the being. Beings, that is, all

[6] Scheuer-Shiue, *op. cit.,* pp. 58-54.

• *Theological* IV, " The Theology of the Symbol," pp. 229-230.

beings, express themselves because they realize themselves through a plurality in unity. Self-realization as plurality and as possession of sel£ are not disparate elements simply juxtaposed in a being, since possession of self in knowledge and love is not just an element but *the* content of that which we call being. Briefly, being expresses itself, because it must realize itself through a plurality in unity. We know from Revelation that in God where we have the highest being and hence the greatest degree of at-oneness-with-oneself, we have simultaneously plurality in the supreme being, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This is without detriment to the divine unity. Hence plurality, although in the composition of creatures it is really an indication of finiteness, must also be considered as having a positive aspect. I£ there is plurality in the supreme divine unity, plurality must also be considered as a positive perfection found in the finiteness of a being. We mention this plurality in the unity of a being here because Rahner's emphasis of plurality as a positive perfection strikes us as a valid insight into the metaphysics of being. We know from Revelation that there is a community of persons in the one supreme being. This seems one instance where a Christian philosopher can and should profit from his knowledge of Revelation. Perhaps it could be said that in all of philosophy, particularly in metaphysics and psychology, the Christian philosophers have not adequately worked downward from Revelation to enlighten their own philosophy of being and of man. For example, Christian philosophers might be able to get a deeper understanding of human fatherhood if they studied the data of Revelation about God the Father " from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named." [8]

THE GREATER THE INDIVIDUALITY, THE GREATER IS THE COMMUNICABILITY AND NEED FOR COMMUNICATION

We would like to establish eventually the fact that, as the individuality of a being on the various levels of beings increases,

[8] Eph. 3: 14-15.

there is in direct proportion a greater possibility of communication and simultaneously a greater need for communication. Hence, as unity is a transcendental property of being, communicability is necessarily an ontological perfection. As background for this statement we wish to establish first the two following propositions: a) the greater the transcendence of form over matter, the greater is the interiority of the activity of the being; b) the greater the interiority of the activity of the being, the greater is its individuality; then we shall come to our primary point, c) the greater the individuality of the being, the greater is the communicability and the need for communication.

a) *The greater the transcendence of form over matter, the greater is the inteTiority of the activity of the being.* In the hylomorphic theory the form of the corporeal being is understood to be less dependent on matter the higher its level in the strata of being. Although we will speak in terms of the transcendence of form over matter, the basic outlook applies simply to act and potency as such. In all beings, as we ascend from the lower to the higher, act progressively predominates over potency. This is but to assert in another way the superiority of act over potency. On the level of inanimate being there is almost an equality between the characteristics of form and matter. Qualities which are due to the form, such as taste, color, sound, etc., and activity which springs from form, are almost totally realized in and through matter. So quantity, the source of extension and mensurability in the corporeal being, can be equated with qualities, and the qualities of the being are thus measureable. The passivity of matter is conjoined with spontaneity of form and there is an equality, that is, there is a constancy in the realized balance of spontaneity and passivity in the immaterial body. Hence, there is relatively little interiority of the inanimate being in its activity. Its spontaneity is, as it were, exhausted in its self-realization in matter. However, on the second level of corporeal being, vegetative beings, action now tends to become more immanent. This is said to be due to the transcendence of the form over matter. There is a depend-

ence of the form upon matter; nevertheless, there is a superority of activity precisely due to the higher form and also a greater interiority of activity. Hence the three attributes commonly ascribed to vegetative beings, namely, growth, nutrition and reproduction, although exteriorized, yet show greater interiority than is found in the lower level of being. Animals have sensitive knowledge. Their images and memories as such are completely interior. In man there is the highest interiority found in corporeal beings, for man is capable of being present-to-himself in knowledge and love. In the angels there is still greater interiority because they do not, as does man, depend on matter for their knowledge of material realities. Nevertheless, there is a degree of exteriority because, although they truly know themselves as creatures or created knowers, they simultaneously know other things from the " outside " and thus simultaneously know the other and themselves. Finally, in God we have perfection of interiority, for in his knowledge and self love he is dependent on nothing outside of himself.

b) *The greater the interiority of the activity of the being, the greateT is the individuality of the being.* Although stones and inanimate things truly have an individuality, it is not in most instances of particular importance. It makes little difference to a stonemason which of thousands of bricks of a particular type he will next place into that section of the wall. Individuality increases on the level of vegetative being. A rose bush put in favorable circumstances of sun, water, chemical food, is going to be noticeably different, noticeably individualized in comparison with another rose bush of the same species which is planted in an unfavorable milieu. Animals will have yet a greater individuality. Consider the individuality of two dogs of the same litter, of the one who has to find his way in life by searching the garbage pails of back alleys and of the other who is cared for by a dowager. When we come to the level of man we need not stress the individuality, for we shall develop this point at some length later. Yet even here, the individuality of the substantial nature is enhanced much more intensely precisely because of the intellectual and volitional activities

which man realizes throughout his lifetime. Angels possess yet greater individuality because, whereas man has a common nature, each angel is a unique species and hence totally different from any other angel. In God again we reach the perfection of individuality, because God is infinitely unique.

c) *The greateT the individuality of the being, the greater is the communicability and need for communication.* Rahner has stated that "the true law of things is not: the more special and distinct in character, the more separated, isolated and discontinuous from everything else, but the reverse: the more really special a thing is, the more abundance of being it has in itself, the more intimate unity and mutual participation there will be between it and what is other than itself." [9] Non-living material beings have the lowest level of communication although they truly communicate. Hence hydrogen and oxygen communicate and water results, but in their communication of self their individuality is destroyed. Communication for them frequently means self-destruction. The contrary is going to be true on the higher levels of being. Precisely through communication the individuality of a being will not be destroyed but necessarily enriched. In plants there is a slight rise in this ability and necessity for communication. Plants, as against inanimate things, need not destroy their own nature in their self communication. They communicate by the propagation of others of the same species. Animals have yet greater communication. They communicate with one another through knowledge, e. g., hens clucking as grain is being tossed to them, horses neighing in a barn when a fire breaks out. In man, obviously, there is yet higher communication. He is capable of language, he communicates through books, art, literature, political life. In angels a higher level of knowledge and will activity necessarily implies greater means for communication and greater need for communication. For the angels in their communication do not have, as does man, the" symbol" of the

[9] Karl Rahner, " The Significance in Redemptive History of the Individual Member of the Church," *The Christian Commitment,* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp. 77-78.

body which is a necessary means whereby man communicates. Hence the body is for man both a means of self-revelation and at the same time a veil which hinders and frequently blocks his ability to communicate with another person.[10] Through Revelation we know that in God we have the supreme example of communication. By divine necessity the Son proceeds from the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Here is the infinite exemplar of interior communication. By and in his freedom God communicates outside himself, and we have creation, conservation, concurrence, the communication of divine goodness through sanctifying grace and the uncreated gift of the Three Persons to intellectual beings. De Finance has attributed this apparent paradox-of greater individuality implying greater communicability-to the *act of existence.*

> It [the act of existence] is a principle of communion, yes, but at the same time a principle of uniqueness. It is the act by which each being affirms itself in its incommunicable singularity, but affirms itself *within being,* as *sharing in being,* as linked in its very singularity with all other singulars. . . . And the more each one strives to be itself and to advance towards perfect authenticity, the more also it enters into profound communion with all the others, since it is the same Act which is acting in all and communicating itself to all. It is not, therefore, by some illusory renunciation of being oneself that would bring about the meeting with another, but in a deepening of one's own self. Nevertheless we must distinguish here between simple individuality, which belongs to the order of nature or essence, and ' ipseity ' or selfward, which belongs to the order of act, of existing, while at the same time being conditioned by the former. To cling stubbornly to the former is to imprison one's self in one's poverty. To descend more deeply into the latter is to make one's self ever more open to others.[11]

ANALOGY OF "TOGETHERNESS"

Speaking above of the principle of proportionality or of analogy we have said that we must attribute to being not only

[10] Jean Mourroux, *The Meaning of Man,* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948), pp. 41-78.

[11] Joseph de Finance, S. J., "Being and Subjectivity," *Cross Currents,* vol. 6, no. (1966)' p. 174.

the transcendental properties of oneness, trueness and goodness but also ontological perfections. We have given examples of these previously, such as life, consciousness and love. These will be found in all beings, to each according to its degree of being. We state now that, in addition to life, consciousness, knowledge and love, "togetherness " is also an ontological perfection common to all beings. We have chosen this word "togetherness " because it seems to cover the different levels of beings. A "togetherness" of atoms may be called a molecule; a "togetherness" of vegetative beings could be called a grove, a forest; a " togetherness " of animals would be a flock, a fold, a bevy or a clutch. In man, as we shall see at greater length shortly, we may distinguish" togetherness" of community and of communion, in the State and in the Church. Revelation tells us of choirs of angels and likewise of the interpersonal communion of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. On the level of human individuals and of angels and of God the notion of " togetherness" has always been accepted, but on the analogy of being it would seem to us that the notion of " togetherness " for sub-human individuals has been underdeveloped in the past. Karl Rahner writes:

The sub-human individual is CJ::stituted in the way which needs to be precisely and clearly seen if anything is to be understood of the problem involved in this question: namely, its difference from and its bond with what is other than itself increase and decrease together. This seems at first to be a contradiction. At first sight one is inclined to say that anything that exists possesses its own peculiarity (and difference) in inverse ratio to its unity with, its bond with, what is other than itself; that, in other words, it decreases in selfhood the more it becomes bound up with something else, while any growth in distinguishing selfhood involves a decrease in its unity with and relationship to anything other than itself. It is no exaggeration to say that this error, seemingly such a self-evident truth, the apparent contradiction between all embracing unity and individual uniqueness, lies at the root of all the errors and heresies that have arisen in the study of relationships, of " social being." And yet even at the lowest sub-human level, if we look at it properly, we see that it is not so. Something that is merely separated spatially and temporally from something else is

neither really anything for itself (does not really possess anything for itself) nor really one with anything else[12]

Teilhard de Chardin brilliantly saw this "togetherness" in all reality and particularly the horizontal " togetherness " of a particular level of being. For, as he saw it, there was a constant convergence in the evolutionary process. After the initial opposition in the dispersion of atoms there was a higher composition in convergence due to a thrust for vertical "togetherness" and a concomitant transformation in this convergence with the result that there was an emergence of a higher level of being. Hence by involution in the evolutionary process a " togetherness " on a particular level of being was realized, and this in turn had an inner thrust for ascent to a higher level of " togetherness." However, the present writer does not think that it is an excessively harsh judgment of de Chardin's work to suggest that he perhaps conceived this " togetherness " in too univocal a sense and did not sufficiently, if not in his own mind at least in his written expression of convergence, emphasize its *analogous* nature.[13] Thus some of his critics have accused him of error in finding consciousness in the lower levels of being. I believe that in good part this is due to the fact that de Chardin did not emphasize sufficiently that he was speaking *analogously* of consciousness. Our observations about consciousness in lower forms of being gives us the opportunity to explain a bit more about the principle of proportionality or of analogy as we have applied it to "togetherness." :For example, the present author would be willing to speak *analogously* of consciousness in atoms, molecules and plants. Allow me to quote at some length the words of Scheuer:

The principle of proportionality seems, at first sight, paradoxical and opposed to common sense. Does it not entail pan-psychism? Shall we say that a mineral possesses life, intelligence, etc.? We must first remark that words should keep the meaning that they

[12] Karl Rahner, "The Significance in Redemptive History of the Individual Member of the Church," *op. cit.,* pp. 77-78.

[13] C. Armagnac, "Philosophie de la Nature et Methode chez le Pierre Teilhard de Chardin," *Archives de Philosophie,* :W (1957), pp. 5-41.

have in everyday usage. We shall not say that a mineral possesses life, because life means the perfection of immanence at least in that degree which is found only from plants upward. Likewise the use of the word *knowledge* starts only with the animal, and that of the term intellect only with the human soul, etc. We only say that, since all beings are only being, and since being is common to all of them, there is in none of them an ontological perfection which is totally heterogeneous to the other beings. Aside from all terminological discussions, we must affirm that there is in the atom something which is to the intellect what the being of the atom is to the being of a spirit. This formula is above reproach and contains nothing paradoxical. God is only life, spirit, intellect and love, yet He sees in Himself, as a very imperfect participation of Himself, the being of an atom. Would that be possible if the atom were heterogeneous, entirely *alterius rationis* [of another sort] than life, intellect and love? The principle of analogy destroys the basis of agnosticism and provides us with the only means of escaping it. It opens the way to that real intelligence of beings which understands the lower ones by means of the higher. The most material determinations are, in their intimate core, nothing but participations of thought and love.[14]

It should be apparent now why we have spoken of the analogy of " togetherness " rather than of community or communion, for we would run the risk of being misunderstood if we spoke of the community of atoms, molecules, flowers or animals. "... words should keep the meaning that they have in everyday usage." But we do affirm with Scheuer that there must be something in the atom, molecule, flower and animal world which is analogous to the community and communion of beings that is found in the being, man, and in the supreme being, God.

MAN-STRATIFIED UNITY OF INDIVIDUALITY AND "TOGETHERNESS"

Man is a microcosm which mirrors the macrocosm. In man there is found something proper to the nature of the angel, something proper to the nature of animal, plant and mineral. But man is not an angel, nor is he a plant or mere matter. He

[14] Pierre Scheuer, *op. cit.,* p.

is none of these, yet he is all of these. In the foregoing sections we have attempted to point out that there is an analogy of individuality on the various strata of being all the way from the atom to God. Likewise, too, there is found an analogy of " togetherness." In this present section we will endeavor to show that even within man there are various levels of individuality and of "togetherness."

A. *Analogy of individuality in a man.* In the individual man there must be considered four levels of individuality. He is a biological unit, a rational person, an intellectual person, and he can be a pneumatic person. We shall immediately consider each of these.

a. *Biological unit.* For years scientists have been aware of the total individuality of a person's fingerprints. The evidence seems to increase day by day to show that not only is this biological individuality of the configuration of fingerprints present in man as manifestative of his uniqueness but that throughout his whole body there is an individuality which marks him apart from all others. Already this uniqueness of man as a biological unit has been discovered in the composition of his blood cells and saliva. It does not seem unlikely, in time, that an absolute uniqueness will be found in every single cell of man. Yet, granted this unique1less, there is at the same time a remarkable degree of lack of individuality in man at this level. The surgeon's operating table brings out this fact: this is the standard, universal way to set a broken collar bone, to remove an appendix.

b. *Rational person.* Earlier we have distinguished the human intelligence as intellect and understanding. We noted that by the word " understanding " the human intelligence was meant insofar as it has a spiritual knowledge of material reality or, in other words, insofar as it has the quiddities of material things for its proper formal object. Likewise too, we distinguished rational will from intellectual will. Rational will was the human will insofar as it sought the material realities presented to it by the understanding and insofar as it also neC'es-

sarily had a" turning to the sense appetites." It is the human soul insofar as it is a spirit which *informs* matter. It is quite clear that our two aspects of individuality thus far presented cannot be separated. Our so-called phenomenal ego, therefore, necessarily includes both the rational person and man as a biological unit.

In this aspect of man's individuality he can and must be considered as a member of the human species, that is, he is an individual example of the universal which has been identified as " man." Our understanding of the phenomenal ego seems to be the same as Maritain's explanation of the human *individual* as opposed to the human *person.*

> Man, insofar as he is material individuality, has but a precarious unity, which wishes only to slip back into multiplicity; for matter as such tends to decompose itself. Insofar as we are individuals, each of us is a fragment of a species, a part of this universe, a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we obey. We are subject to the determinism of the physical world. But each man is also a person and, insofar as he is a person, he is not subject to the stars and atoms; for he subsists entirely with the very subsistence of his spiritual soul, and the latter is in him a principle of creative unity, of independence and of freedom. [15]

c. *Intellectual person.* Previously we explained the human intelligence as intellect with being as its common formal object. We have pointed out, too, the parallel aspect of the human will to which we gave the name intellectual will. These are the aspects of intelligence and will as they are in man insofar as he is a spirit. The intellectual person is identical with what we have previously called a noumenal ego. On the human *person,* Maritain remarks:

> The notion of personality does not refer to matter, as does the notion of individuality apply to corporeal things. It refers to the highest and deepest dimensions of being; personality is rooted in the spirit, in so far as the latter stands by itself in existence and

[10] Jacques l\1aritain, "The Human Person and Society," *Challenges and Renewals,* Selected readings-edited by J. W. Evans and W. R. Ward. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p.

super-abounds in it. Metaphysically considered, personality, being in one's substance a signature or a seal enabling one freely to perfect and freely to give this substance, evidences in each of us that expansiveness of being which, in a corporeal-spiritual being, is linked to the spirit, and which constitutes, in the secret depths of our ontological structure, a source of dynamic unity and inner unification.[16]

Maritain has a comment about individuality and personality which we repeat here and apply to our own explanations of phenomenal ego and noumenal ego.

Such are, if I have succeeded in describing them correctly, the two metaphysical aspects of a human being: individuality and personality, each with its own ontological physiognomy. Let us note that we do not represent two separate things. There is not in me one reality called my individuality and another called my personality. It is the same entire being which, in one sense, is an individual and, in another sense, a person. I am wholly an individual, by reason of what I receive from matter, and I am wholly a person, by reason of what I receive from spirit ... .U

Man as noumenal ego is not one example of the universal called " man." As noumenal ego man is absolutely unique. We have risen to a yet higher level of individuality. Just as in the Thomistic synthesis Gabriel is a unique angelic species and totally exhausts the extension of that species-there cannot be another Gabriel-so, in an *analogous* manner, the individual human soul *as spirit* exhausts the extension of this type o£ noumenal ego.

Karl Rahner has written well of this aspect of the human soul as spirit which we have called noumenal ego.

Now we must, however (even for ontological reasons), hold fast absolutely to the fact-even if this is not obvious to everyone at first sight-that something which is merely a case and a circumscription of something universal, something which *as* an individual and concrete something is just sheer negation, also cannot have-*as* something individual-any real, eternally valid significance. Man with his mental and moral acts, therefore, cannot be merely

[16] *Op. cit.,* p.
u *Op. cit.,* p.

the appearance of the universal and of what is-in this universality alone-" eternal " and ever-valid in the negative expansion of space and time. In him, the individual, there must rather be a given, a positive reality; expressed differently: his spiritual individuality cannot be (at least not in his acts) merely the circumscription of an in itself universal nature through the negativity of the *materia prima,* understood as the mere repetition of the same thing at different points in space-time. We must realize that a contrary view would be profoundly unchristian, and that anyone who does not see this, really has no right to protest against a medieval Averroism or against a modern Idealism. The assertion of something positively individual, at least in man's spiritual personal acts, does not moreover need to appear unscholastic, indeed not even really unthomistic. Of course, anyone who cannot rise to the metaphysical thought that (in good scholastic language) God cannot even *de potentia absoluta* create a second Gabriel-in other words, anyone who cannot rise *at all* to the notion of something individual which is not the instance of some universal idea, of something repeatable-cannot follow our thought here from the very start. Anyone, however, who can grasp this thomistic thought of something real which cannot be subsumed unequivocally under a universal idea or under a law, cannot reject the idea from the very start that something like this is conceivable-indeed, must be postulated-also in man as a spiritual person, as the existent who does not resolve himself completely into *forma-materiae-esse* . . . . At least in his actions, man *is* really also (not only) *individuum ineffabile,* whom God has called by his name, a name which is and can only be unique, so that it really is worthwhile for this unique being as such to exist for all eternity. [18]

d. *Grace-given supernatural individuality.* The highest level of individuality is found in the supernatural order when sanctifying grace is given indeed to the whole man, but basically and formally to man as spirit, as noumenal ego. Karl Rahner notes:

Furthermore, man is the *son of God.* That is, if we may bring theology into this examination of the analogy of individuality, God his creator values him so highly as a unique individual, that he has given him the power to enter the community of the most perfect individuality; by grace he can become the beloved child

[18] Karl Rahner, " On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics," *Theological Investigations,* II, pp. 225-227.

of the Father together with his only-begotten Son, and with the Son call the Father *his* Father; and with the Holy Ghost he can lovingly embrace both Father and Son, and thus receive an individuality in grace and glory which is a supernatural sharing in the individuality of the Trinity. In other words, individuality (the *unum* of scholasticism) is a transcendental concept, and goes together with the concept of "existing being" and, like this concept, has analogical meanings. If, then, an existing being's measure of individuality is determined by its analogical degree of being, the degree of being of a man in grace and glory can only be determined by uncreated grace, that is, by the communication to him, by grace but really, of God himself in his own reality; and so this is man's highest and finally determining individuality, and it is itself determined from within by the individuality of the three divine persons in the Trinity. [19]

As a conclusion to the treatment of the analogy of individuality we must again assert that man is a unity. Necessarily one must, in order to discuss these levels at all, speak almost as if these were independent realities in man, and then one must strain to get man back together again as a unity. Finally, we note that there is a definite ordination of the lower level to the higher. The biological individuality is ordered to the rational person, and the totality which is the phenomenal ego is ordained to the noumenal ego. The noumenal ego in turn, granted the supernatural order, finds its true finality as a grace-given, supernatural individual.

B. *Analogy of "togetherness" in a man.*

a. *Analogy of natural "togetherness."*

Civil community. Civil community is composed of many phenomenal egos. At the risk of tiring by repetition we say

[19] Karl Rahner, "The Individual in the Church," *Nature and Grace.* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), pp. 15-16. Cf. Rahner also in *The Christian Commitment,* p. 83: "For if the concept of individuality is an analogical concept, a transcendental characteristic of an existent thing, itself varying according to the level of that thing's being, then it follows that individuality as such will attain a higher degree and more radical intensity if the thing to which it belongs is raised to a higher ontological order. But this is what happens when man, while keeping his spiritual nature as such, by which he is and remains 'man,' is raised *to* the supernatural order."

that this would be men insofar as they are spirit in matter whose intelligence operates on the plane of understanding and whose will acts as *rational* will. Civil community is made up of men insofar as they are members of the species " man." On this level, it seems to us, there is a close to ideal parallel between our mode of expression about civil community and what Gabriel Marcel has to say about *community* and *communication.*[20] We would encourage the interested reader to recall the richness of Marcel's thought on these two notions.

Communion. Communion is found among *spirits* in matter. It involves " togetherness " in which others as " thous," as non-objectifiable presences or as *subjects,* meet one another. It is the encounter of noumenal egos. It is the meeting of persons on the level of intellect and intellectual will as we previously defined these terms. Need we state here that this presence can only come about through the materiality of man? Although man is spirit, he is spirit in matter. He cannot become present even to himself as spirit except through matter. Necessarily, too, although there is really a meeting on the level of spirit between an " I " and " thous," this can only come about through matter, through man's corporeity. It is necessarily through their bodies as quasi-objects that subjects can become present to themselves and to " thous." Teilhard de Chardin seems to us correct when he claims that we are still in an evolutionary process whereby in the noosphere we are advancing to higher levels of consciousness. Just as the *rational* person as individual was oriented to the *intellectual* person, in a parallel fashion civil community has a further ordination to communion. It is quite clear, since man is spirit in matter, that we will always need civil communities, despite their further orientation to the level of communion. Or again, with Marcel, we can never get along without the" functional" man, but this is not the highest level of the human person.

b. *Analogy of supernatural "togetherness."* Earlier in our

[20] Kenneth T. Gallagher, *The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), pp. 22 *et seq.*

article we acknowledged our indebtedness to Karl Rahner for much of our thought. In this section we acknowledge our total indebtedness to It is hoped that at least one advantage of our previous presentation will have been to spread out many of the ideas of Rahner which are, perhaps, too succinctly presented by him or which, perhaps, are not too clear to a person not familiar with Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge and of man. We wish to deal now with the Church as pneumatic *society* or community and the Church as pneumatic "cell." It is apparent that we have now left the natural level of man and are concerned with men meeting socially as members of a divinely founded and divinely sustained social reality.

The Church as pneumatic society. Here on the supernatural level we have the Church as the equivalent of civil community. It is the Church on the level of phenomenal egos, the Church as an organization, as a true society with all the powers, liberties, and restrictions proper to such a pneumatic society.

The Church as pneumatic "cell." This is th(" Church on the level of noumenal egos. Its equivalent on the natural level is communion as presented above. Just as true communion is impossible without civil community at the lower level (community is truly oriented to civil communion) , so in a parallel way the Church does and must exist as an organized society, but its higher ordination is to pneumatic social communion. Rahner has given the name "Christian cell" to such a grouping of pneumatic individuals on the level of *spirits* in matter. [22]

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing essay we have been almost exclusively concerned with principles and not with applications. For the interested reader who would wish to pursue further and see some of the consequences which flow from such a point of view, we can but refer him to the references given above to Maritain and Rahner. Throughout the writings of Gabriel Marcel there is likewise, for example, abundant amplification of the differ-

[21] *The Christian Commitment,* pp. 75 *et seq., Nature and Grace,* pp. 9 *et seq.*
•• *Th'e Cliristian Ci!mmitm:ent,* pp.

ences between " communication " on the level of community as opposed to the level of "communion." We suggest that we have perhaps given a more or less traditional scholastic framework which would help to integrate Marcel's valuable insights. Our effort, we hope, may give some further " systemization " to Marcel's ideas by working them into the Scholastics' metaphysics of man.

Finally, we can only encourage the interested reader to follow the applications which in particular Rahner himself makes, e. g.: "On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics," [23] wherein Rahner argues for a unique moral imperative for the person as spirit which is above but not contrary to the individual as a member of the human species and thus subject to universal law. His book, *The Dynamic Element in the Church,* [24] claims that there are individual moral prescriptive norms which are totally unique. In this same book he spells out different modalities of charisms within the Church, received by "pneumatic " individuals as such, by the Church as " pneumatic " society or community and the Christian "cells" within the Church. Thirdly, he analyzes the unique moral imperative which is to be discovered in the pneumatic individual's life as he makes the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. Throughout his writings the consequences of one of his fundamental views of the individual are constantly apparent. We would particularly underline in Rahner's view of the individual the aspects of intelligence which we have called: intellect and understanding. This is the source of so many of his profound observations consequent on the notions of unthematic and thematic knowledge. One instance of this is his "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ." [25]

It is the present writer's opinion, perhaps not too humbly expressed, that in the above presentation of the analogy of individuality and " togetherness " we have a matrix pregnant

[23] *Op. cit.,* footnote 18.

[24] New York: Herder and Herder, 1964.

[25] *Theological Investigations,* V, pp. 193-215.

with vast potentialities for developing truths about the individual alone and as a social being, both in the natural and supernatural order. Likewise too, it can serve to correct errors or apparent tensions or contradictions which may exist between man as an individual and man as a social being on the various strata of man's being. We have previously quoted Rahner [26] to the effect that individuality and sociability increase and decrease together. The opposite view, he claimed, "lies at the root of all the errors and heresies that have arisen in the study of relationships, of social being." Hence an understanding of the analogy of individuality and " togetherness " is not only a source of truth but a corrective of error.

Note. After this article was submitted for publication, the author devised phrases which perhaps would have made for simplicity and unity in terminology. The new terms would be the following. Those actually used in the article are in parentheses. Transcendental person (noumenal Ego), categorical person (phenomenal Ego); transcendental intelligence (intellect), categorical intelligence (understanding); transcendental will (intellectual will), categorical will (rational will); transcendental person (intellectual person), categorical person (rational person); pneumatic transcendental and categorical person (pneumatic intellectual and rational person); transcendental community (communion), categorical community (civil community); pneumatic transcendental community (pneumatic " cell "), pneumatic categorical community (pneumatic society).

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[26] Cf. text given for footnote 12.

THE QUEST FOR METAPHYSICS

PART I.

"THE OLDEST as well as the most recent ontological claim is that the truths ontology gives us are about Being-about Being *as such."* [1] Professor Hook in disputing the existence of metaphysics here refers to the traditional concept, which originated in the works of Aristotle. [2] The term itself, " metaphysics," was apparently first applied by the disciples of Aristotle to a group of books which were to be studied after the Physics. The metaphysical books explained the "science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature." [3]

The study of being as being was intended to attain a knowledge of the first principles and highest causes of things. This knowledge, wisdom or philosophy in the fullest sense, was called first philosophy since it was highest in dignity, although it came after physics in the order of learning. The study of first philosophy was united by Aristotle with the study of theology. [4] For him theology was the study of immaterial and immovable substances and so an extension of first philosophy, which dealt with being as being in relation to substance in general. The adequacy of the unification of first philosophy with theology has been widely discussed and disputed. [5] How-

[1] Sidney Hook, *The Quest for Being* (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1963)' p. 147.

• Takatura Ando, *Metaphysics: A Critical Survey of Its Meaning* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofi, 1963), pp. 3-16.

• *Metaphysics,* IV, 1, 1003a20.

'Ibid., VI, 1, 1026a30.

• Cf. Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951); J. D. Beach, " Separate Entity as the Subject of Aristotle's Metaphysics," *The Thomiat,* XX, (January, 1957), *75-95;* Augustin Mansion, " Philosophie premiere, philosophie seconde et metaphysique chez Aristotle," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain,* XVI (Mai, 1958), 165-221.

ever, there is no doubt that Aristotle himself made this unification and that it entered the common tradition of metaphysics.

Conforming to the thought of Aristotle the ancients divided philosophy into practical and speculative branches. The latter was subdivided into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics or theology. This division was taken over by the Arabian philosophers, notably both Avicenna and Averroes, and it was passed on to the Scholastics by them. It was Avicenna who made the distinction between the subject of metaphysics and its goal (id *quod quaeritur)* . The subject of metaphysics was being as being but its goal was the knowledge of immaterial being. In this way the unity of metaphysics and theology was maintained. [6] Modern thought tends to be shy of being, and metaphysics has been in difficult straights since Kant. [7] However, to defend the existence of metaphysics as originally and traditionally understood we must claim that the truths it gives are about being as being.

" Yet despite the enormous literature which has been written about Being, it is extremely difficult to find anything clear or intelligible in writings which contain that expression," Professor Hook rightly remarks. [8] Certainly "being" is hard to define. It does not refer to a species. Being cannot be contrasted to its opposite, non-being, because non-being is nothing. Nor is being a genus. The limitless variety of things in being defies the discovery of any common trait. Everything from a glorious being to just being funny is "being." The use of analogy hardly improves matters if God be taken as primary in being. Introduction of the Infinite into" being" only makes the notion more foggy and burdens the discussion with theological overtones.

Must we then agree with Professor Hook that " there is no such thing as 'Being,' i.e., it is a word that neither designates nor refers to anything observable or discernible in the world,

[6] Takatura Ando, *op. cit.,* pp. 17-39.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 40-70.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 147.

and has neither a substantive nor attributive character? " This study will answer this question in the negative. We shall show that traditional metaphysics does have a subject, being as such, sufficiently definite to be worthy of scientific study. We shall not attempt to define being in terms of the really real or of its ultimate causes or of any of the other ways in which metaphysics has been developed. This study will be confined solely to the question of whether traditional metaphysics has enough internal consistency to give hope of an orderly growth toward solutions of the more ultimate questions.

The Subject of Metaphysics. The general opinion today accords with the Aristotelian position in regarding science as a process of research rather than as a static body of doctrine.[9] The purpose of scientific inquiry is to produce a special kind of knowledge. Scientists differ on what exactly constitutes the special character of their knowledge, but most would agree that more is required of science than simply collecting and cataloguing the data observed. Most scientists attempt to give some sort of explanation for the data acquired from experience and experiment. However, few today would insist on the strict demands made by Aristotle for scientific knowledge.[10] For him scientific knowledge meant finding a reason for the data so cogent that it would show both why the facts are as they are and why they could not be otherwise. Today scientists are usually satisfied with the simpler relevant explanation for the data. In any case science is regarded as research into the facts in pursuit of reasons of some sort.

For fruitful research a clearly defined subject is required at the outset. No one can delve at random into the sea of facts with which he is surrounded with any reasonable hope of coming up with a meaningful explanation. Astronomy, for instance, takes the celestial bodies for its subject. Early observations of their movements led to some hypotheses as to their causes. Fuller observations by telescope destroyed the early

[9] Cf. Reginald Breton, *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1966 ed.), XX, 114, and the *Posterior Analytica,* I, 1, 71a1-10.

[10] *Posterior Analytica,* I, 2, 71b8-12.

hypotheses, which were supplanted by better explanations. These explanations in turn will have to be modified or abandoned in the light of the new data of radio astronomy. Throughout these changes the subject of the science remains. No matter how revolutionary the developments in a science, a researcher can always refer back to the subject to begin anew.[11]

A fully satisfactory explanation in any science has to account for each of the attributes known to pertain to the subject. At this point the subject of the science ceases to be merely the starting point of the investigation. The movements of the celestial bodies are seen in a new light when they are placed under the principle that all local motions are relative. Here the subject of the science becomes a principle of explanation and should be called its object. The material object of a science is to reach a conclusion which will be a reasoned fact, to explain the movements observed in astronomy, for instance. The reason for the fact is found in the formal object, motion as relative, which is the subject so understood and defined as to function as the middle term in a syllogism having the reasoned fact as a conclusion.[12] A science in this strict, Aristotelian sense begins with its subject and attains its objects.

The methods used in a science are consequent on a decision regarding its subject. An oceanographer and an astronomer can hardly use the same methods to investigate their differing subjects. Nor does a mathematician resemble either of them in his procedure. Moreover, the abstractions and generalizations of mathematics and natural science do not contain the only truth, and science need not be confined to subjects from which truth can be extracted.[13] Any discipline which has a subject with sufficient consistency to allow orderly development toward reasoned conclusions may be called a science. The first question in metaphysics is whether being as being is such a subject.

[11] *Ibid.,* I, 87a37-87b4; cf. *In Post. Anal.,* I, xli, (7).

[19] *Post. Anal.,* I, 9, 75b36-76a4.

[13] Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being,* I. *Reflection and Mystery* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), p. 23.

The difficulty of this question lies in the excess of information on being. No subject could be more abundantly available for study. We are inundated by being to such an extent that great difficulty arises in finding a central point on which to unify the discussion. Yet the natural grouping of experience does indicate that some beings are more fundamental than others. The qualities of a man or his quantity is more basic to his being than his relations. His very substance as a man is the most fundamental predicament of all. I£ being were unified by a reference to substance, the metaphysician could approach the ultimate by beginning with common experience. " The *goal* of metaphysics is the knowledge of the *cause* of being-common-to-the predicaments, but its subject is that common being itself," as Maritain said as early as 1948.[14] This view of metaphysics is at least as old as Dominic of Flanders, who taught it in the fifteenth century, as Thomas C. O'Brien, O. P., has shown in his important study.[15] However, this view runs counter to a highly respectable tradition possibly traceable to John of St. Thomas and still alive. This position would try to include both God and creatures in the subject of metaphysics.[16]

Some of the authors who would agree with Maritain that the subject of metaphysics is only common being still begin with the existence of God. Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., for instance, views the act of existing as the formal object of the science. Since the proper principle of existence is God, he holds that metaphysics " may *commence* its main work of dealing with

[14] Jacques Maritain, *Existence and the Existent* (New York: Image Books, 1956), p. 41, n. 15; cf. H. Renard, "What is St. Thomas' Approach to Metaphysics?" *The New Scholasticism,* XXX (January, 1956), 64-83.

[15] Dominicus de Flandria, O. P., *Perutilis atque praeclarae Quaestiones Dominici Flandrensis ... In Duodecim Metaphysicae Libros Aristotelis* (Venice, 1499), I, q. 1, a. 8, cited by Thomas C. O'Brien, O. P., *Metaphysics and the Existence of God* (Washington: The Thomist Press, 1960), p. 23.

[16] John of St. Thomas, *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas,* trans. Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), q. 27, a. 1, p. *562;* cf. George M. Buckley, M. M., *The Nature and Unity of Metaphysics* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1946), p. 130; Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs·: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 10-11.

its subject in terms of creation, conservation, and concurrence " only in the light of the divine existence.[17] William A. Wallace, O. P., has attacked this view rather vigorously/ [8]

Another complication was introduced by Vincent E. Smith at the national convention of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1954.[19] Dr. Smith held that the opening to metaphysics was made by St. Thomas through the demonstration of the existence of a Prime Mover on strictly physical grounds. This position was opposed by Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., and by George P. Klubertanz, S. J., who thought that metaphysics can open with a reflexion on the existential judgment.[20] On the other hand, Dr. Smith was supported by William H. Kane, O. P., and by Melvin A. Glutz, C. P.[21] Fr. Kane mentioned the immaterial soul as additional evidence for opening a metaphysical inquiry.[22]

The idea that metaphysics could be based on an affirmative, existential judgment had previously been developed by Robert J. Henle, S. J.[23] He was subsequently supported by Frs. Owens and Klubertanz in thinking that metaphysics could be derived

[17] Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., Review of Thomas C. O'Brien, O. P., *Metaphysics and the Existence of God, The New Scholasticism,* XXXVI (April, 1962), *250-*53; cf. Etienne Gilson, *Le Thomism* (cinquieme edition; Paris: Vrin, 1948), p. 28, et "L'Etre et Dieu," *Revue Thomiste,* XLII (Avril-Juin, 1962), 181-202.

[18] William A. Wallace, O. P., "Metaphysics and the Existence of God," *The New Scholasticism,* XXXVI (October, 1962), 529-31; cf. Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., "Existential Act, Divine Being, and the Subject of Metaphysics," *ibid.,* XXXVII (July, 1963), 359-63; John L. Yarden, C. S.C., "Some Remarks on Metaphysics and the Existence of God," *ibid.,* XXXVI (April, 1963), 213-19.

[19] Vincent E. Smith, "Prime Mover: Physical and Metaphysical Considerations," *Pmceedin(fs of the American Catholic PhilMophical Association,* XXVIII (1954), 78-94.

[20] Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., "Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism,* XXVIII (October, 1954), 454-76; George P. Klubertanz, S. J., "Being and God According to Contemporary Scholastics," *The Modern Schoolman,* XXXII (November, 1954), 1-17.

[21] William H. Kane, O. P., "Abstraction and the Distinction of the Sciences," *The Thomist,* XVII (1954), 43-68; Melvin A. Glutz, C. P., "The Formal Subject of Metaphysics," *ibid.,* XIX (January, 1956), 59-74.

[22] William H. Kane, O. P., *op. cit.,* p. 62.

[23] Rob'ert J. Henle, S. J., *Method in MetaphySics* (Aquinas Lecture, 1950; Milwaukee: Marquettll University Press, 1!)51).

from the experience of being as we find it.[24] At the same time Frs. Kane and Glutz had strengthened their own position.[25] The latter position also seems to be supported and developed by Antonio Moreno, O. P.[26]

The remarks cited above do not exhaust the diversity of opinion, but we cannot here do justice even to the authors mentioned. Each of these distinguished scholars is a follower of St. Thomas, a " Thomist " in some sense. Yet they obviously do not agree among themselves regarding the subject of metaphysics. The existence of such diversity, although a sign of vitality for the Thomists, may be a cause of some uneasiness for metaphysicians generally. If distinguished scholars and skilled researchers cannot reach agreement even when they follow a common master, perhaps the fault lies not in themselves but in their topic. Metaphysics does not lack opponents, such as Professor Hook, who claim that it has no subject to study. But if the diversity of opinion among the Thomists could be reduced to a degree that would permit a clear statement of the subject of metaphysics, a great medieval thinker could with greater confidence be ranked among those who have effectively supported metaphysics.

For one who appreciates the charm of the medieval worldview the temptation is strong to attempt an adaptation which will retain the positions of St. Thomas in the face of contemporary views. However, the medievals hold their charm only when they are seen in their own setting. The fresh vigor with which the Western tradition was animated when the joys of the intellectual life were first discovered cannot last in more

•• George P. Klubertanz, S. J., "St. Thomas on Learning Metaphysics," *Gregorianum,* XXXV (1954), 3-17, and "The Teaching of Thomistic Metaphysics," *ibid.,* 187-Q05; Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., "The Intelligibility of Being," *ibid.,* XXXVI (1955), 169-93; cf. George P. Klubertanz, S. J., " Comment on 'The Intelligibility of Being,' " *ibid.,* p.

•• William H. Kane, O. P., " The Subject of Metaphysics," *The Thomist,* XVIII (October, 1955), 503-Ql; Melvin A. Glutz, C. P., "Being and Metaphysics," *The Modern Schoolman,* XXXV (May, 1958), Q71-85.

•• Antonio Moreno, O. P., "The Nature of Metaphysics," *The Thomist,* XXX (April, 1966), 109-35.

mature times. Human truth is not absolute, though partisanship may try to make it so. A strained and distorted philosophy results when the great medieval thinkers are lifted from their own times and required to respond to questions which they did not ask. We shall rather seek to evaluate the truth and relevance of the Thomistic positions in the light of present knowledge and contemporary needs.

This study will concentrate on the texts themselves of St. Thomas. Its principal aim is not historical or literary, which are values in the higher criticism. Ours is the task of simple textual study in the hope of laying a more adequate foundation for the current discussion of the subject of metaphysics. The more important texts are quoted directly; the English version is given and the Latin original placed in footnote. Through this method the texts will speak for themselves as clearly as may be. Every effort will be made to determine the meaning of a text only by what it actually says. Further determinations belong to higher criticism and doctrinal development and not to a simple textual study. This approach has already been used with regard to analogy, but no such work has been done on the subject of metaphysics. [27]

The search for the texts used in this study has ranged over the entire body of the works of St. Thomas. It has been facilitated by the use of many articles each citing a number of texts on the subject of metaphysics. The *Catena Aurea* of Peter of Bergamo was of some help since it is an index of the entire body. The indices of the Leonine and Marietti editions of the individual works proved invaluable. These indices, along with *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas,* [28] were consulted under the following headings: *metaphysica, philosophia prima, scientia divina, subiectum, obiectum, ens, ens commune,* and *substantia.* The number of texts brought forth gives a good cross section of the statements of St. Thomas on the subject of metaphysics.

•• George P. Klubertanz, S. J., *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960).

•• Roy J. Deferrari, Sr. M. Inviolata Barry, C. D.P., and Ignatius McGuiness, O. P., eds. (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948).

In this brief presentation the texts will be grouped in a topical order designed to explain the teaching of St. Thomas. This organization requires the work of a responsible scholar. Philological systems are too mechanical to substitute for intelligence and judgment. [29] In Part I we deal with the notions of common being, substance, and divine being in connection with the subject of metaphyiscs. In Part II we shall evaluate this teaching on three critical points: faith and reason, matter and spirit, and mind and matter. A longer study would permit treatment of each text in its original literary and historical context before placing it into this doctrinal context. [30] Here we must take the responsibility of a more summary treatment.

Common Being. The prooemium of Aristotle to his Metaphysics makes a number of interesting points regarding the pursuit of wisdom, the dignity and order of the science, and its concern with the causes of things. Finally it shows that wisdom is sought in first causes and principles. However, this treatment does not explore the subject of metaphysics directly. The matter is summed up in the statement that this science is speculative not practical, liberal not servile, and more divine than human in character. It intends to seek out the firat and universal causes of things so that ignorant wonderment may give way to knowledge.

From the foregong, therefore, it is clear
  what the nature of this science is,
    that it is speculative, liberal,
      and not human but divine
  and what the aim is
    about which it raises questions
      and employs its entire skill and method.
    This science aims
      at the first and universal causes of things
        concerning which it both inquires and decides.

[29] See Ralph M. Mcinerny, Review of *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy* by George P. Klubertanz, S. J., *The New Scholasticism,* XXXVI (January, 1962), 128-34.

[30] Cf. James Counahan, O. P., *The Quest for Metaphysics: A Study of the Subject of Metaphysics in the Texts of St. Thomas Aquinas* (unpublished dissertation, Aquinas Institute of Philosophy, River Forest, TIL, 1967), 151 pp.

Through the knowledge of these causes
it comes to its stated term,
that wonder be eased.[30]

Thus Aristotle establishes that there is a universal science having all being for its subject. This consideration leads to the distinction of metaphysics from any of the particular or special sciences. No particular science considers universal being as such. Special sciences only consider some part of being cut off from the rest, and they study only what properly belongs to their own part.[31] The practical sciences are obviously not universal, so they may be set aside. However, if there is anything immobile in actual existence and consequently sempiternal and separable from matter when existing, it will be studied by a speculative science, since the practical disciplines deal with change. The study of this immaterial being is not physics, for physics deals only with certain beings, those with motion. Similarly, the study of this being is not mathematics because mathematics does not study anything separate from matter in actual existence; the mathematicals are separate only in definition. The study of actual immaterial being must belong to another science, which is prior to both mathematics and physics.

He next points out the way to this science.
He says that if there is anything immobile in being
and so sempiternal
and separate in being from matter,
obviously its consideration
belongs to a speculative science
and not to the sciences of doing or making,
whose studies concern some change.
But physics does not study such being.

[30] Patet igitur ex praedictis quae 8it natura huius scientiae, quia est speculativa, Iibera, non humana sed divina: et quae est eius intentio qua oportet habere quaestionem et totam methodum et totam hanc artem. Intendit enim circa primas et universales rerum causas, de quibus etiam inquirit et determinat. Et propter harum cognitionem ad praedictum terminum pervenit, ut scilicet non admiretur cog1₁itis causis. *In Metaphysicorum,* I, iii, 68.

[31] *Ibid.,* IV, i, 532.

Physics considers some being only,
those which are mobile.
Similarly the study of such being
does not belong to mathematics.
Mathematics does not consider
things which are separate in being from matter.
It only considers things
which are separable in the mind,
as has been said.
So the consideration of such being
must belong to another science
prior to both physics and mathematics.[31]

Physics is concerned with inseparable and mobile things. At least some mathematics deal with immobile things, which, however, are not separate from matter in existence but only in idea. In actual existence the mathematicals are in sense matter, and in astronomy or modem, mathematical physics some mathematicals are actually applied to moving things. The first science studies things which are separable from matter in actual existence and altogether immobile. Since the immaterial and immobile things are greatest in being, they are the causes of the sense objects, which are more manifest to us.[32] So the same science treats of the separate beings and of being as being.

The universal science is metaphysics and not natural science or mathematics. The subjects of both the latter sciences are limited to material being.[33] Some material things depend in being upon matter and can neither be nor be defined without it. Other things cannot exist without matter, although sensible matter does not come into their definitions. This distinction is

[31] Ostendit modum proprium scientiae huius; dicens quod, si est aliquid immobile secundum esse, et per consequens sempiternum et separabile a materia secundum esse, palam est, quod eius consideratio est theoricae scientiae, non activae vel factivae, quorum consideratio est circa aliquos motus. Et tamen consideratio talis entis non est physica. Nam physica considerat de quibusdam entibus, scilicet de mobilibus. Et similiter consideratio huius entis non est mathematica; quia mathematica non oonsiderat separabilia secundum esse, sed secundum rationem, ut dictum est. Sed oportet quod consideratio huius entis sit alterius scientiae prioris amabus praedictis, scilicet physica et mathematica. *Ibid.,* VI, i,

[32] *Ibid.,* VI, i, 1163-64; 1169-70.

[33] *Ibid.,* XI, vii,

illustrated by the difference between " curve " and " snub." Snub can only be defined as curvature of a nose. The notion of curve, however, can be defined without regard to whether it is a nose or a noose which is curved.[34] There may also be some things which do not depend upon matter either in being or in definition. Some of such immaterial things are never in matter, for instance, God and the other separated substances. Others, substance, potency and act, or being itself, are sometimes found in matter and sometimes not.

Keep in mind therefore
that there are some things
whose being depends on matter
and which cannot be defined without matter
and that there are also some things
into whose definitions no sensible matter falls
although they cannot have being
except in sensible matter.
These differ as do the curve and the snub-nose ...
There are also some things
which depend on matter
neither in being nor in the mind
either because they are never in matter,
like God and the other separated substances,
or because they are not always in matter,
like substance, potency and act, and being itself.[34a]

Metaphysics studies the completely immaterial class of things[35] Mathematics studies those things which depend upon sensible matter in being but which retain only " intelligible matter," substance supporting quantity, in definition. In the mathematical order the unity which is the principle of number

[34] Cf., *ibid.,* VI, i, 1157; *ibid.,* XI, vii, 2256-57.

[34a] Sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a materia, nee sine materia definiri possunt: quaedam vero sunt quae licet esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili, in eorum tam definitione materia sensibilis non cadit. Et haec difl'erunt ad invicem sicut curvum et sinum ... Quaedam vero sunt quae non dependent a materia nee secundum esse nee secundum rationem; vel quia nunquam sunt in materia ut Deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non universaliter sunt in materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum ens. *In Physicorum,* I, i, 2.

[35] Cf. *Ibid.,* II, xi, for a different division.

has being only in matter. The one which is convertible with being is metaphysical and does not depend on matter in any way.[36] Natural science or physics studies things which retain sense matter both in being and in definition.[37]

> Metaphysics therefore concerns the latter.
> Mathematics concerns things
> which depend on sensible matter
> in being but not in the mind.
> Natural science, which is called physics,
> concerns things
> which depend on matter
> not only in being but also in the mind.[37"]

Each of the special, limited sciences uses its own principles, observations, and postulates to reach its own conclusions. The investigation of the special principles of each science belongs to no other. However, some principles of demonstration are used in more than one science. The principle of contradiction, for instance, runs throughout all scientific thought. These principles derive from common conceptions which everyone has. Every demonstration works from these principles to the extent that the conclusions in any particular science are strengthened by the common principles. The question is whether the study of the common principles belongs to one science or to many, and if to one, whether it belongs to the one which studies being and substance, metaphysics, or to another.[38]

The question of where to locate the study of the common principles of demonstration is decided in terms of being in common, the subject of metaphysics.[39] This science inquires into the principles of being as being just as every science must

•• Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam metaphysic11m, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 11, a. 3, ad cf. *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. *5,* a. 1, c, par. 3; a. 3, c, par.

81 Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad

81" De huiusmodi igitur est metaphysica: de his vero quae dependent a materia sensibili secundum esse sed non secundum rationem, est mathematica: de his vero quae dependent a materia non solum secundum esse sed etiam secundum rationem, est naturalis, quae physica dicitur, *In Physicorum,* I, i, 3.

•• *In Meta.,* III, v, 387-91.

•• *Ibid.,*

seek the proper principles and cases of its own subject. For instance, health and the recovery from illness have certain causes, which the medic seeks. Likewise the mathematicals have principles and elements and causes such as figure and number, and the mathematician seeks them.[40] The common principles pertain to being as being. Metaphysics treats them as directly connected to its own subject. The other sciences can then take them for granted just as they take being

Although the subjects of the particular sciences are parts of being, those sciences are not parts of metaphysics. Their subjects are not parts of being according to the notion under which metaphysics takes being. Each of the other sciences takes only a part of being and considers it in a particular way.[42] Metaphysics takes all of being together with a variety of considerations on potency and act, the _one and the many, and substance and accidents. Metaphysics deals with all of these matters in the same way as it treats being.

As to the sixth say
that although the subjects of the other sciences
are parts of being,
which is the subject of metaphysics,
it does not follow that the other sciences
are parts of metaphysics.
Each science takes one part of being
according to a special consideration
different from the way
in which being is studied in metaphysics.
Hence properly speaking the subject of each science
is not a part of the subject of metaphysics
since it is not part of being under that aspect
according to which being
is the subject of metaphysics.
Seen under this aspect metaphysics
is a special science divided from the others.
Thus the study of potency, of act, of the one,

[40] *Ibid.,* IV, v, 588-9rt; VI, i, 1145 et 1147.

[41] *Ibid.,* XI, iii, rtft04-10;cf. *ibid.,* vii, ft248; *In II Sent.,* d. 8, q. 8, a. rt; *In I Sent.,* Prol., a. ft, c.

•• Cf. *In Meta.,* IV, i, 531.

or of others of the sort
can be called part of metaphysics
since they all are considered in the same way
as is being when treated in metaphysics.[42]"

All the parts of being as being come under metaphysics since they require the same handling as common being itsel£.[48] Singular things also and even matter and motion are considered in metaphysics in so far as they share in the common notion of being.[44] Metaphysics does not leave anything out because a science has to treat of all the parts and properties of its subject.[45]

Various questions are ruled out of physics and into metaphysics on the grounds that they do not pertain to moving being but simply to being.[46] Questions about the very existence of motion[47] or the nature of form[48] belong to the study of being as being. One might also ask whether "Socrates" and " Socrates seated " are the same. Since the different are properties of being as such, this question belongs to metaphysics.[49] For the same reason the notion of unity is discussed in the tenth book of the Metaphysics.[50]

The problems of space and place make interesting test cases.[51]

••• Ad sextum dicendum quod quamvis subiecta aliarum scientiarum sint partes entis, quod est subiectum metaphysicae, non tamen oportet quod aliae scientiae sint partes ipsius. Accipit enim unaquaeque scientiarum unam partem entis secundum specialem modum considerandi alium a modo, quo oonsideratur ens in metaphysica. Unde proprie loquendo subiectum illius non est pars subiecti metaphysicae, non enim est pars entis secundum illam rationem, qua ens est subiectum metaphysicae, sed hac ratone considerata ipsa est specialis scientia aliis oondivisa. Sic autem posset dici pars ipsius scicntia, quae est de potentia vel est de actu, de uno, vel de aliquo huiusmodi, quia ista habent eundum modum considerandi cum ente de quo tractatur in metaphysica. *In Boet. de Trinitate,* q. *5,* a. I, ad 6.

•• *Ibid.,* ad 7.

[44] *Ibid.,* a. 4, ad 6.

[45] *Ibid.,* a. 4, obj. 6 citans *I Post. Anal.,* 28, 87a38.

•• *In Physicorum,* I, i, *5.*

[41] *Ibid.,* VIII, v, 3.

•• *Ibid.,* I, xv, 12.

•• *In Meta.,* IV, iv, 570-71.

[50] *Ibid.,* X, i, 1920.

[51] *In Physicorum,* IV, i, 2; cf. *ibid.,* III, vi, 2.

On the Newtonian supposition that space extends to all being, this problem is both physical and metaphysical. On the alternative supposition that immaterial beings do exist, metaphysics would not consider space and place as such. They would not belong to being as such since immaterial beings do not have space and place. They would be studied directly in physics, and metaphysics would take them only under the aspect of being. In contrast to the other sciences the subject of metaphysics is simply being.[52]

Substance. We must agree with Professor Hook that when " we are told that 'Being is affirmed of the finite (being) by its dependence on infinite being,' that infinite being is the ground or cause of finite being so that the primary analogue for the proportion is not the Being of finite Being but the Being of Infinite Being . . . the fogginess of the term Being does not disappear when it is lifted from the dimension of the Finite to the Infinite." [53] Since infinite being is outside of common being, the prime analogate for common being cannot be infinite. But we must differ when Hook says that being " has neither a substantive nor attributive character." [54] It would be more accurate to say that being has both a substantive and an attributive character, but not equally.

Substantive beings such as wax and cabbages are obviously prior to attributive beings like the colors, sizes and shapes in which wax and cabbages may come. In the commentary of Aquinas on the Metaphysics the priority of substance over attribute or accident is taken as the basic priority in common being. "Being" is an analogous term like" health" or" medicine." [55] " Being " is used partly in the same sense and partly in a different sense in its various applications. The various usages of an analogous term, however, are unified by reference to some one which is the principle of the others.

[52] *In Meta.,* IV, i, 583.

[53] Sidney Hook, *op. cit.,* p. 158, quoting P. Coffey, *Ontology* (New York: P. Smith, 1988), p. 38.

[54] See above, p.

[55] *In Meta.,* IV, i, 584-88; XI, iii,

St. Thomas emphasizes that the unit to which the various members are referred in analogical usage is numerically one. When unity is achieved by mentally grasping a single aspect *(ratio)* of things, the resulting term is univocal. "Being" is not a univocal term since it is used in many different ways. Neither is it equivocal since its various applications have a reference to some one, and this unit is not merely mental. The reference is to a unit which is some single nature.

> Also keep in mind
> that in analogical matters the one
> to which different possessions are related
> is one in number and not merely in the mind
> as is the one designated by a univocal name.
> So he says that although being is used in many ways,
> it is not used equivocally
> but with reference to a one
> not referring to a one only in the mind
> but to one as to some one nature.[55]

In the examples of health and medicine an efficient or a final cause provides the unit to which the other analogates were referred. The unit to which beings are referred is substance, the subject in which they exist or to which they apply mentally.[56] The weakest kind of being is one like privations or

[56] *Ibid.,* IV, i, *539.*

negations, which exist only in the mind (in *ratione).* These objects are called beings because the mind treats them as such when it affirms or denies equality, inequality, or other characteristics. The next weakest kind is the one in which processes of growth and decline are called beings. Since change is an imperfect act, it always has somthing of privation and negation mixed with it. A third kind of being has no non-being mixed with it, yet it remains weak. Quantities, qualities,

[55] Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter. non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura. *In Meta.,* IV, i, *536.*

relations and the other properties of substance do not have enough solid being to stand by themselves. They can only exist in substances. So there is a fourth kind of being, which is the most perfect. It has being outside the mind without admixture of non-being, and it has a firm and solid being existing by itself. Such being are the substances. [57]

Each of the first three kinds of being are referred to substances, which is the first and principal being. Qualities and quantities are beings insofar as they belong to substances. Changes and processes tend to produce substances or its accidents. Privations and negations are called beings to the extent that they remove some of the other three kinds. So it appears that the variety of usages of " being " has some one, substance, to which each may be referred. [58]

> The fourth kind is the one
> which is most perfect,
> which exists in nature
> without any admixture of privation
> and with a firm and solid being
> almost of itself;
> these are the substances.
> All the others are referred to this
> as to their chief and principal.
> Qualities and quantities are called beings
> in that they are in substances,
> motions and generations
> in that they tend toward substance
> or toward qualities and quantities,
> privations and negations
> in that they take away
> one of the three preceeding. [58a]

[57] *Ibid.,* IV, i, 540-43; IX, i, 1768, XI, i, *£155;* cf. *In De divinis nominibus,* V, ii, n. *655* for a fivefold division.

[58] *In Meta.,* IV, i, 534; XI, iii, £197.

[58a] Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per se existens, sicut sunt substantiae. Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur. Nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur esse, inquantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes, inquantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum; privationes autem et negationes, inquantum removent aliquid trium praedictorum. *In Meta.,* IV, i, 543.

Evidently St. Thomas has first substance in mind here. First substance is not predicable of any lesser class although other things are predicable of it. Whiteness or humanity exist in and may be said of Peter or John, but Peter is not John nor is John Peter. The name of each can be said only of himself because there is no smaller class than one, and each first substance is some one individual existing by himself. Universal substance on the other hand is applied to lesser classes; animal applies to man and man to Peter and John. Universal substance is derived from the singulars since it is abstracted mentally from them. It does not subsist except by virtue of the first substances, in which universal substance is found.[59] First substance is primary, and it is the principal subject of metaphysics.[60]

The pre-Socratic naturalist would agree with many modern scientists and philosophers that first substance really means sensible, material substance only. Consequently the study of these material beings would be equivalent to the study of being itself, and natural science would assume the rank and functions of metaphysics. Questions about material substance would be the only useful and valid inquiries. Metaphysical questions either would be treated in terms of natural substance or would be entirely pointless. Unless there is some being beyond the physical, metaphysics ceases to be the first philosophy and physics becomes the first and most universal. The actual existence of immaterial being is necessary to establish a metaphysics.[61]

The ancient naturalists may be proven wrong by a full development of their own science. The eighth book of Aristotle's Physics proves that not all being is of a material sort, and natural things, which havetheprinciple of their movements within themselves, are only one kind of being. Immobile being is superior to and more noble than mobile being, which the

•• *Ibid.,* V, x, 908.

•• *Ibid.,* IV, i, 546; VITI, i, cf. *In Post. Anal.,* I, ii, 17 (5); xviii, (4); vii, (7) .

[61] In *Meta.,* 111, vi, 898; XI, ii, vii, cf. *I Oootra Gentiles,* c. 12.

naturalist studies. The same science which studies the first beings should also study common being. Hence the study of common being will belong to a different discipline than natural science.[61a]

The pre-Socratics did not think
that there was any substance
besides the mobile, corporeal substance
of which the naturalists treat.
Therefore it was held that they alone
decide about all nature and consequently about being
and the first principles also
since they are to be considered along with being.
But this is false because
there is still another science above the natural.
Nature itself, the natural thing
having a principle of motion in itself,
is but one kind of general being.
Not all beings are of this sort.
It was proven in the eighth book of the Physics
that there is an immobile being.
This immobile being is higher and more noble
than the mobile being which the naturalist studies.
Since the study of common being
belongs to that science
to which the study of the first being belongs,
the study of common being
belongs to another science
than to the natural,
and the other science will also consider
this sort of common principles.[61b]

[61a] II *Cont. Gent.,* c. 37.

[61b] Antiqui enim non opinabantur aliquam substantiam esse praeter substantiam corpoream mobilem, de qua physicus tractat. Et ideo creditum est quod soli determinent de tota natura, et per consequens de ente; et ita etiam de prinlis principiis quae sunt simul consideranda cum ente. Hoc autem falsum est; quia adhuc est quaedam scientia superior naturali: ipsa enim natura, idest res naturalis habens in se principium motus, in se ipsa est unum aliquod genus entis universalis. Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi: cum probatum sit in octavo *Physicorum,* esse aliquod ens immobile. Hoc autem ens immobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo considerat naturalis. Et quia ad illam scientiam pertinet consideratio entis communis, ad quam pertinet consideratio entis primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam quam ad naturalem pertinet consideratio entis communis; et eius etiam erit considerare huiusmodi principia communia. *In Meta.,* IV, v, *593.*

Metaphysics treats of sensible substances as well as of separate, immaterial substances. Any of the things which fall in one group can be touched by one power or studied in one science. For instance, the single habit of charity comprises many things under one formal aspect, divine goodness, as metaphysics studies many things under the aspect of being.[62] To the extent that all beings fall into the group of substances, they should be studied by the one, universal science. To the extent that they are varied by diverse species, they are treated by one of the special sciences.[63] However, metaphysics discusses sensible substances mainly for the sake of knowing immaterial beings since sensible substances belong in a way to physics.[64] Metaphysics deals with sensible substances simply as beings.[65]

There are as many parts of metaphysics as there are parts of substance. Immaterial substances are naturally prior to the material ones, and so the parts of metaphysics take on a natural order. The part of the science concerning sensible substance is first in the order of teaching because instruction should begin with what is better known. The part of metaphysics dealing with immaterial substance, however, is first in dignity and intention as these substances are naturally prior to the sensible ones. In the seventh and eighth books of the Metaphysics Aristotle discusses material substances. After that he goes on to the treatment of immaterial beings in the twelfth book.[65].

The number of the parts of philosophy
is equal to the number of the parts of substance,
to which being ,and the one mainly apply
and from which this science
gets its main study and purpose.
The parts of substance are ordered among themselves
since immaterial substances are naturally prior
to sensible substances.
Therefore among the parts of philosophy
some one must be first.

[62] *In III Sent.*, d. q. a. 4, qn. c. et ad 1.
[63] *In Meta.*, IV, i, 457.
"'*Ibid.*, VII, xi, cf. *ibid.*, XI, i,
[65] *Ibid.*, VI, i, 1165; XII, ii,
[65]. *Ibid.*, VII, i, xvii, 1648; XI, i, 2146,

The part concerning sensible substances
is first in the order of teaching
because we ought to start learning
from the more known ...
The part concerning immaterial substances
is first in dignity and purpose in this science,

Even though the different parts of metaphysics deal with different parts of substance, each part of the science unites with the others in the study o£ common aspects of substances. All have being and the one for their subject.[66] So the subject of metaphysics can be taken in two ways. Generally throughout the science the discussion concerns the notions of being and the one, but the main intention governing the discussion is substance.

The subject of this science can be taken
either generally as studied in the entire science;
in this way being and the one are studied:
or as the main thing intended,
substance.[66a]

Divine Being. Despite some reference to God as a separate substance[66b] no text of St. Thomas clearly indicates that the subject of metaphysics, common being, includes or applies to divine being. Common being is identical with the essence of every being and does not exceed the measure of any intellect.[67] No one can avoid knowing that things in general *(ens in*

[65b] Tot sunt partes philosophiae, quot sunt partes substantiae de qua dicitur principaliter ens et unum et de qua principalis est huius scientiae consideratio et intentio. Et, quia partes substantiae sunt ordinatae ad invicem, nam substantia immaterialis est prior substantia sensibili naturaliter; ideo necesse est inter partes philosophiae esse quamdam primam. Ilia tamen, quae est de substantia sensibili, est prima ordine doctrinae, quia a notioribus nobis oportet incipere disciplinam: . . . Ilia vero, quae est de substantia immateriali est prior dignitate et intentione huius scientiae. *In Meta.,* IV, ii, *563.*

[66] *Ibid.,* IV, ii, *563; In Boet. De Trin*... q. *5,* a. 4, c., par. 3; q. 6, a. 1, c., ql. 3, par. 2.

[66a] Subiectum autem huius scientiae potest accipi, vel sicut communiter in tota scientia considerandum, cuiusmodi est ens et unum: vel sicut id de quo est principalis intentio, ut substantia. *In Meta.,* V, vii, 842.

[66b] See above, p. *530,* and below, pp. *545* and 546.

[67] *De Veritate,* q. 10, a. 11, ad 10.

communi) are. Such being is known of itsel£.[68] I£ common being were to extend to both God and creatures, the essence of God would be knowable in this life.[69] But the first being in the order of causality exceeds the measure of any human intellect/ [0] Clearly common being is distinct from the first being, God.

In the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* a widely used distinction between divine and common being is explained. Common being is indeterminate and undifferentiated. Divine being is fully determined and so entirely diverse from any other. Common being is understood as open to additions, which modify it into one or another distinct kind of being. Divine being is so complete and perfect in itself that it is closed to any addition. Both notions are without additions, common being by its generality and divine being by its perfection.

> There is a double sense
> in which something may be without additions.
> Its very notion may be such
> that nothing can be added to it;
> thus God is without additions.
> He has to be perfect in himself;
> hence he receives no additions,
> nor can he be common
> since everything common is fulfilled
> in something proper,
> where it adds to itself.
> Or a notion may be such
> that it neither adds to itself
> nor it does not,
> and this is the way common being
> is without additions. [71].

[68] *Ibid.,* a. 12, ad 3.

•• *Ibid.,* a. 11, obj. 10.

[70] *Ibid.,* ad 10.

[71] Cf. *De Ente et Essentia,* c. *5; Summa Theol.,* I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 1; *De Potentia,* q. 7, a. 2, ad 6; *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 26.

na Aliquid esse sine additione dicitur dupliciter: aut de cuius ratione est ut nihil sibi addatur: et sic dicitur de Deo: hoc enim oportet perfectum esse in se ex quo additionem non recipit; nee potest esse commune, quia omne commune salvatur in proprio, ubi sibi fit additio. Aut ita quod non sit de ratione eius quod sibi fit

The distinction of divine from common being is more than a question of the definition of terms. Divine being excludes common being outside the mind.[72] Common being always has some addition over and above being alone. Its addition modifies the being into a table, a tree, or a man. The perfection of God, however, is too great to be confined to any category. Anything in a genus must have another principle in its besides its act of being. The other principle renders it similar to some other beings while its act of being renders it unique. But God is simply a unique and unlimited act of being, and there is no composition whatever in him. Hence he cannot be collated with anything else into a genus, even into the genus of substance.[73] He may be called a substance only in a broad sense.[74] Thus the transcendence of God surpasses common being.

The unity of common being is based upon substance as the prime analogate. If God is excluded from the category of substance, he has no place in common being except as a cause is in its effect. In fact, common being is the proper effect of God. As the builder builds, God creates common being.[75] Substance exists " by itself " only in relation to the accidents. Absolutely speaking, substance is dependent upon God an dwith substance all of common being.[76]

The most striking text to present the distinction of divine from common being is found in the commentary of the *De divinis nominibus* of pseudo-Denis. Plato had suggested that the ultimate principle of being was beyond being. "The sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation ... In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but

additio, neque quod non fiat, et hoc modo ens commune est sine additione. *In I Sent.,* q. 4, a. 1, ad 1.

[72] *De Pot.,* q. 7, a. !il, ad 4.

[73] *In I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 4, a. !il, et a. 3; *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 3, a. *5,* corp. et ad 1.

[74] *In I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 4, a. !il, ad 1.

[75] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 66, a. *5,* ad 4.

[76] *Ibid.,* I, q. 105, a, I, qbj. 3.

far exceeds essence in dignity and power." [77] Denis follows Plato as well as Plotinus and Proclus in giving the same idea the following expression: " If, as is indeed the case, the Good is above all being, then we are bound to say that what itself is without form gives form; that he who remains in himself without essence is the acme of essence; that, being a lifeless reality, he is supreme life; that, being a reality without intelligence, he is supreme wisdom, and so on, since any form denied to the Good points out his informing power." [78] As a cause is not its effect, God is not any of the perfections which he produces. Paradoxically " God himself is not being, but he is the being of being" as that by which beings are. [79]

The task of a medieval commentator faced with texts like those above was to find the doctrinal context which would render them true in some sense. In what sense of the term, " being," can it be denied God? St. Thomas responded that God is not common being *(ens commune)* . Where Denis says, " He is not being," Aquinas adds, " This is understood of *common* being as if depending upon it." [80]

St. Thomas fully developed the contrast between God and common being in a text of exact parallelism. Common being proceeds from the first being, God. From this fact three differences follow in the relationship between God and common being compared to the relationship between other existences and common being. Other things depend upon common being. God does not depend on common being; rather common being depends upon him. Other things are contained under common being. God is not contained under common being; rather it is contained under his creative power, which extends to more things than are actually created. Finally, other things participate in the notion of being, but God does not participate.

[77] *Republic,* Book VI, *509b.*

[78] *De divinis nominibus,* IV, 3, cited by Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 34.

[79] *Ibid.,* V, 4.

[80] *"Non ipse* Deus *est esse,* idest ipsius esse communis, tamquam ab ipso dependens," *In De divinis nominibus,* V, ii, 660; italics a.re the words of Denis.

Created beings participate in God and are his image. God does not *have* being because he *is* being.

Then where he says, " And itself ... "
he shows how being relates to God.
He says that common "being itself
is from " the first being, which is God.
From this it follows that common being
relates to God differently than other existences
in regard to three:
First, in regard to the fact that other existences
depend on common being.
God, however, does not,
but rather common being
depends on God, ...
Second, in regard to the fact that all existences
are contained under common being.
God, however, is not,
but rather common being
is contained under his power,
since the divine power extends to more beings
than the ones actually created. . . .
Third, in regard to the fact that all other existences
share in this, that they are.
God, however, does not,
but rather created being itself
is a certain share in God
and an imitation of him... ,[80]"

Common being is a technical term denoting the actually created substances with all that depends on them. **It** excludes the infinite actuality o£ the divine being as well as the non-

[80] " Deinde cum dicit: *Et ipsurn* ... ostendit, quomodo esse se habeat ad Deum; et dicit quod *ipsurn esse* commune *est ex* primo Ente, quod est Deus, et ex hoc sequitur quod esse commune aliter se habeat ad Deum quam alia existentia, quantum ad tria:

Primo quidem quantum ad hoc quod alia existentia dependent ab esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune dependet a Deo, . . .

Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub eius virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam ipsum esse creatum; ...

Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod omnia alia existentia participant eo quod est esse, non autem Deus, sed magis ipsum esse creatum est quaedam participatio Dei et similitudo lpsius; ... *In De divinis norninibus,* V, ii, n. 660.

actuality of merely possible beings, which have not, do not, and will never exist. With common being for a subject metaphysics is saved from arid speculation about non-existing essences at the same time as it is rescued from theology. Whoever the authorities may be who may be cited in favor of a notion of common being which could be divided into created and uncreated, St. Thomas Aquinas is not one of them. [81]

St. Thomas's mundane understanding of common being works also in the *prooemium* to his commentary on the :Metaphysics, although this science is presented there as the most intellectual. First, from the standpoint of certitude the science which studies the highest causes is the most intellectual since certitude comes from the knowledge of causes. Second, from the characteristics of intellect as compared to the senses it appears that the most universal science will be the most intellectual. The intellect grasps the universal whereas the senses know only the individual. Third, from the standpoint of intellectual knowledge itself the greatest science is the one having an object most separated from matter. Everything has intelligibility insofar as it is free of matter. Since God and the intelligences are free of matter in their actual being as well as in definition, the science which treats of them is the most intellectual and the chief of all the sciences.

The three intellectual considerations belong to a single science since the separated substances are the primary and universal causes of beings. The same science has a right to consider the causes of its subject genus as well as the genus itself. For instance, natural science considers the principles of natural bodies even when the principles are not bodies. So the same science can consider the separated substances as well as common being, which is the genus of which the separated substances are the common and universal causes.

> This triple study ought to be given
> to a single science not to different ones.
> These separated substances
> are the universal and first causes of being.

[81] See above, p.

The same science has to study
the proper causes of any thing
and the thing its.elf,
as the naturalist studies
the principles of the natural body.
Hence it follows
that to study the separated substances
and to study common being,
which is the thing of which these substances
are the common and universal causes,
belong to the same science.[81]"

Metaphysics seeks to rise above the multiple and variable beings of sense experience to find the unified and permanent realm of intelligible beings separate from matter. How then can the being of common experience be the subject of such a science? The response to the difficulty is to insist that, although *(quamvis)* common being is the subject of this science, still it speaks entirely of things which are separate from matter both in their mental conception and in actual being. Things like common being, which can exist either with or without matter, may be said to be separate in conception and in existence as well as things like God and the intelligences, which can never exist in matter.

Even though the subject of this science
is common being
the entire discussion concerns things
separate from matter in being and in the mind.
Not only those things which can never be in matter
(God and the intellectual substances)
but also those things which may be without matter
(common being)
are separate in being and in the mind.[81b]

[81]. Haec autem triplex consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias aliciuius generis et genus ipsum, sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem seientiam pertinet considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae. *In Meta., Proeemium.*

[81b] Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens co=une, dicitur tamen tota

The insistence on the scientific character of metaphysics may repel many contemporary thinkers from the thought of Aquinas. Today many think of science in terms of purely objective knowledge in the service of an impersonal technology. Contemporary existentialists and phenomenologists especially tend to place a distance between the personal, subjective knowledge valued as wisdom and the values of modern science. However, in these pages science simply means a methodical approach to a given subject, not an objective system.

Must we abandon clear thought and logical development in pursuit of subjectivity? To handle subjective terms like "being" and "good," which have different meanings for different people, we need a flexible technique. Analogy seems to be the device to use when the unity of the term is founded subjectively. Only the divine mind has within itself an objective standard by which to unify all being. As far as we are concerned *(quoad nos),* the unity of being will have to be founded on something which appears important to us. For those who appreciate the value of a concrete existent, especially their own person, first substance will retain the primacy which Aquinas accorded to it.

To relate being to a human person may tend to ally philosophy more with the humanists than with the scientists in modern culture. History concentrates on what man has been and done in the manifold of past circumstances. In literature and humane letters the poets and their critics magnify the past, symmetrize the present and project into the future an image of what a man may yet become. In both literature and history the thought of a humanist bears upon concrete events. In the face of the present cultural dichotomy a metaphysician may well find that his advantage lies with the humanists.

In Part II of this article we shall further evaluate the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas in contemporary terms.

de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum ilia quae nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam ilia quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune. *Ibid.*

PART II

Common being is a topic with sufficient unity and consistency to be the subject of scientific discourse. It originates at the point where being transcends the material and can be separated from it. Yet common being does not transcend experience to such an extent that it would be identified primarily with the infinite. Rather, common being should be related to the concrete existing substances of experience. The workability of the notion of common being will appear more fully as we here examine some of the critical points in its derivation from our experience.

Three distinctions are vital to the quest for the subject of metaphysics. The sphere of reason has to be distinguished from that of faith in order to open the way for genuine philosophy. Within the range of reason the spiritual order of things has to be distinguished from the material so that the transcendence of metaphysics over physics can be established. Finally, physical beings have to be distinct from their conceptualizations in the mind in order to ground metaphysics outside the knowing subject. What the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas have to contribute on these points needs to be evaluated critically from a contemporary point of view.

Faith and Reason. St. Thomas afforded ample place in his thought for philosophy as well as theology. Both early and late he assigned the study of creatures to philosophy and the study of God to theology. The first problem solved by this distinction concerns the contemplation of God. "All who have thought rightly have placed the contemplation of God as the purpose of human life," is set down in the prologue to the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences.*[82] The commentary then distinguishes two kinds of knowledge of God, one imperfect through creatures and the other perfect and immediate. Aristotle placed the felicity of human life in the first of these and the entire knowledge of philosophy is ordered to it.[83] Philosophy, which included much of what is now called

[82] *In I Sent.,* Prol., q. 1, a. 1, c.; cf. *IV Cont. Gent.,* c. 1.
[83] Cf. *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 4; *Iii,* c. 25.

science, remains distinct from theology because it proceeds "from the intelligibilities of creatures," whereas heavenly contemplation, which presupposes faith, sees God in his essence. In seeking this knowledge of God faith uses philosophy somewhat as first philosophy uses the reports of the other sciences.[84]

> There is a double contemplation of God.
> One, which is imperfect for the reasons already given,
> is through creatures.
> The Philosopher in the Ethics, X, ix,
> placed contemplative happiness in this one,
> which is also the happiness of this life.
> All philosophical knowledge,
> which proceeds from the aspects of creatures,
> is ordered to this contemplation.
> There is another contemplation of God
> where he is seen immediately through his essence.
> This one is perfect.
> It is possible for man supposing he has faith,
> and it will be achieved in Heaven. [84a]

A second problem solved by the distinction of philosophy and theology concerns the scientific knowledge of creatures. St. Thomas opens his prologue to the commentary on the second book of the *Sentences* with some remarks explaining how the study of creatures in theology compares to that in philosophy. The philosophers study creatures " as they stand in their own natures." Hence they are concerned with the causes and properties of creatures. The theologians study creatures as they come forth from God and return to him as their final purpose.[85]

[84] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. I, a. *5,* ad *fl; In Isaiam,* c. 3, (Opera Omnia Parmae, XIV, p. 441, col. fl).

[84a] Contemplatio autem Dei est duplex. Una per creaturas, quae imperfecta est, ratione jam dicta, qua contemplatione Philosophus, in X *Ethic,* cap. ix, felicitatem contemplativam posuit quae tamen est felicitas viae: et ad hanc ordinatur tota cognitio philosophica, quae ex rationibus creaturarum procedit. Est alia Dei contemplatio, qua videtur immediate per suam essentiam; et haec perfecta est, qua':l erit in Patria et est homini possibilis secundum fidei suppositionem. *In I Sent.,* Prol., q. 1, a. 1.

[85] Cf. *In Ethicorum,* I, i, 1-2.

The study of creatures belongs
both to philosophers and to theologians
but in different ways.
The philosophers study creatures
as they stand in their qwn natures,
so they seek the proper causes
and characteristics of things.
The theologians study creatures
as they come forth from the first principle
and as they are directed to the ultimate goal,
which is God.[85].

The general distinction between philosophy and theology is entirely objective. It is based on the objects known in the two sciences and not on the way by which they are known. Philosophy is possible because existing natures have causes and properties which can be examined. Theology is possible because God can be known in himself. Philosophy is about creatures and theology about God. A difficulty arises in applying this distinction to metaphysics. Like theology metaphysics also considers the highest causes of things. How can these two wisdoms be distinguished? In response the basis of distinction is shifted over from the object known to the knower, and metaphysics is distinguished from theology by the mode or way of knowing.[86]

Philosophers proceed by the light of reason to lift themselves to a knowledge of God through the study of creatures. Theologians proceed by the light of faith and descend from God to creatures. The philosophers place the knowledge of natural things before the knowledge of divine things, physics before metaphysics. The theologians place the study of the Creator before the study of creatures and so proceed opposite to the philosophers.[87]

••• Creaturaru:ni consideratio pertinet ad theologos et ad philosophos, sed diversimode. Philosophi enim creaturas considerant, secundum quod in propria natura consistunt: uncle proprias causas et passiones rerum inquirunt; sed theologus considerat creaturas, secundum quod a primo principio exierunt, et in finem ultimum ordinantur qui Deus est. *In 11 Sent.,* Prol.

[86] *In I Sent.,* Prol., q. 1, a. 3, qn. 1.

[87] 11 *Cont. Gent.,* c. 4; cf. IV, c. I.

Just as the beginning of natural knowledge
is the awareness from the senses of creatures,
so the beginning of the knowledge given from above
is the awareness infused by faith of the first truth.
Hence each of them
proceeds in a different order from the other.
The philosophers,
who follow the order of natural knowledge,
place knowledge of creatures before divine knowledge,
natural science before metaphysics.
Among the theologians the process is reversed,
and the study of the Creator
comes before the study of creatures.[87]

In the theocentric culture of medieval times the work of metaphysics was to mediate between philosophy in general and theology. It was to gather up the findings of all the other sciences and to dedicate them to the knowledge of God. Even Aristotle said that metaphysics was not concerned with every truth but only with that Truth which is the origin of all truths and which belongs to the first principle of the being of all things. This Truth, God, is the principle of all being because the disposition of things in the order of truth is the same as that in the order of being.

Now the Philosopher decides
that first philosophy is the science of truth,
not just of any truth
but of that which is the source of all truth,
and which is the source of being for all
so that his truth is the principle of all truth.
The disposition of things in truth
is just the same as in being.[87b]

[87]. Sicut ergo naturalis cognitionis principium est creaturae notitia a sensu accepta, ita cognitionis desuper datae principium est primae veritatis notitia per fidem infusa. Et hinc est quod diverso ordine hinc inde proceditur. Philosophi enim qui naturalis cognitionis ordinem sequuntur, praeordinant scientiam de creaturis scientiae divinae scilicet naturalem metaphysicae. Sed apud theologos proceditur e converso, ut Creatoris consideratio considerationem praeveniat creaturis. *In Boet. De Trin.,* Prol. 9, par. 1.

[87b] Sed et primam philosophiam Philosophus determinat esse scientiam veritatis, non cuiuslibet, sed eius veritatis, quae est origo omnis veritatis, scilicet quae pertinet

The mediating work of metaphysics was shown especially by the inclusiveness of its concerns. All beings, both the highest and the lowest, fall under its consideration. It extends from the first and supreme being to being in potentiality, which is the least of all. Thus God is included with creatures in the work of metaphysics.

> Not only the highest things but also the lowest
> fall under the science which among us is noblest.
> First philosophy extends its study
> from the first being clear to being in potency,
> which is the ultimate in being.[88]

Although philosophical theology or metaphysics touches divine things, the method used is distinct from that of scriptural theology. All of the objects for "theology" in a broad sense are separate from matter and motion. But there are two ways in which a thing may be independent of matter. Beings like God and the angels are separate from matter because their very definitions exclude it. Things like being and substance neither require nor exclude matter and motion according to their definitions. Philosophic theology judges of things separate from matter in the second way as of its subjects, and it judges of things separate in the first way as of the principles of its subject. Scriptural theology is just the opposite. It judges of things separate in the first way as of its subject, and of things separate in the second way only as they manifest divine things.

> Therefore philosophical theology decides
> about things separate in the second sense
> as about its subject
> and about things separate in the first sense
> as about the principles of its subject.

ad primum principium essendi omnibus; unde et sua veritas est omnis veritatis principium. Sic enim est dispositio rerum in veritate, sicut in esse. *1 Cont. Gent.,* c. I.

[88] sub nobilissima enim scientiarum, apud nos, cadunt non solum suprema in entibus, sed etia:m infima; nam Philosophia prima considerationem suam extendit a primo ente usque ad ens in potentia, quod est ultimum in entibus. *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 70.

The theology of sacred Scripture treats
about things separate in the first sense
as about its subject
although some things in matter and motion
are treated in it
to the extent required to explain divine things.[89]

Science is achieved when the principles of a subject are grasped, but there are two kinds of principles. Some are complete natures in themselves, the celestial bodies for example. They not only explain certain effects taking place on earth, but they also exist in themselves. The moon is studied in oceanography as the cause of the tides, and in astronomy as a nature in itself. Thus one can speak of two lunar sciences. Other principles do not have complete natures apart from the things which they explain. Unity, for instance, does not have a nature apart from number nor the point apart from the line; matter and form do not exist outside of physical bodies. This kind of principle can not be studied outside of the science which treats of the things in which it is.

The common principles of being are of both kinds. Aristotle says that all beings have the same principles by way of analogy, act and potency, for instance. Such principles are not complete natures in themselves and are said to be common " by predication." But being is also explained by " certain things, numerically the same, existing as principles of all things." Accidents are accounted for by substance, the corruptible substances are explained by the incorruptible, and so forth. Each higher stage of these principles is more in act than the one below. The ultimate stage will be most in act, least in potency, and completely removed from matter and motion. This kind of principle is called common " by causality."

If anything is divine, it is the causal principle of being. So divine beings can be treated in two different ways. They can

[89] Theologia ergo philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subiectis, de separatis primo modo sicut de principiis subiecti. Theologia vero sacrae Scripturae tractat de separatis primo modo sicut de subiectis, quamvis in ea tractentur aliqua quae sunt in materia et motu, secundum quod requirit rerum divinarum manifestatio. *In Boet. De Trin.,* q. 5, a. 4, c., par. 4.

be studied as they are in themselves. As the principles of being, as the invisible causes of visible effects, they pertain to the science which has being for its subject and which the philosophers called divine. As divine beings reveal themselves, they are studied "as they subsist in themselves and not merely as they are principles of things."

"Therefore theology, or divine science, is twofold. In one theology divine things are studied, not as the subject of the science, but just as the principles of the subject. The philosophers sought such a theology, and by another name it is called 'metaphysics.' The other theology considers divine things on their own account as the subject of the science. This theology is handed down in sacred Scripture."

> Thus there is a double theology or divine science.
> In one divine things are not studied as the subject;
> they are studied as the principles of the subject.
> Such is the theology which the philosophers seek;
> by another name it is called metaphysics.
> The other studies divine things
> for themselves as the subject of the science.
> This is the theology handed down in Scripture. [90]

One of the divine sciences, metaphysics, is proportioned to a purely human way of knowing. It proceeds from sensible being to a knowledge of the divine. The subject of metaphysics is being in general, and God is considered only as the principle of the subject. God in himself is studied in the theology which is based on Scripture. Only by revelation, which is transmitted in the Bible, can men know divine things according to a divine measure.

> From this one gets a double science of divine things.
> One following our ways
> takes its principles from the sensible
> to get notice of the divine.

[90] Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae, et haec est theologia, quae in sacra Scriptura traditur. *Ibid.,* q. *5;* a. 4, c., par. 4.

This is the way the philosophers
hand down a science of the divine
calling first philosophy a divine science.
The other following the ways of the divine things .... [91]

The subject of metaphysics is proportioned to human reason. Although divine things are most knowable in themselves, they are too bright for us " for our intellect is related to them as the eye of the owl is to the light of the sun." Even Scriptural theology does not gaze upon its subject directly but argues from the authority of God revealing. [92] Thus metaphysics is limited extrinsically by the fact that divine things are the proper subject of another science, scriptural theology, and it is limited intrinsically by the fact that its subject is proportioned to human knowing powers.

The medieval supposition that all right-minded men want knowledge of God more than anything sounds rather thin today. "Peace and Prosperity" come much closer to indicating our paramount values than any God-talk. The hope for peace is not founded on religion and the knowledge of God. Today it seems impossible that all men will ever have the same religion, and the religious wars at the end of the Middle Ages have convinced us that we must overcome religion to have peace. Similarly the hope for prosperity lies in science, technology and an improved organization of the economy, not in religion. Even when religion attains some relevance by reminding men of their moral obligations to share their wealth in social justice, the aim of general prosperity remains secular. The secular city seems to be growing day by day. Although God is not entirely dead, the paramount values of life today are not religious.

Some people think that philosophy can best be revitalized by recovering the theological concerns of the past. Certainly St. Thomas Aquinas was not a secular man nor did he live in

[91] Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur. Una secundum modum nostrum qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam divinam scientiam dicentes. Alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ... *Ibid.*, q. c.,

•• *Ibid.*, q. *5,* a. 4, c., par. 3.

a secular society. The main intention behind his pursuit of learning was to know divine things. But he does say that philosophy studies creatures as they stand in their own natures and that the subject of metaphysics is common being. Here he speaks for the simple truth of the matter and not out of any cultural determination. For metaphysicians this truth shows clearly that their discipline is not essentially dependent on the concerns of past ages. The being of common experience is built around the concrete, existential being of first substance, and it is fully secular. Not until we have delved to the ground of common being will the time come to recover theological pursuits.

Of course, common being still has to transcend material things. St. Thomas drew his evidence that there is being beyond the physical from the theological milieu in which he lived. We shall see that secular evidence can be adduced on this point also.

Matter and spirit. The second critical point in the development of the subject of metaphysics gives rise to a rather paradoxical evaluation. Bringing the mental act of separation to bear on metaphysics produced a brilliant success for St. Thomas. At the same time this success is mixed with some of the most archaic and medieval ideas in the entire body of his thought. Angels, intelligences and separated substances are hardly central to modern thought. Fortunately a critical evaluation of these aspects of the thought of St. Thomas can purify them of medievalism and perhaps render them congenial to our present outlook.

The problem was to distinguish the two divine sciences **from** the profane pursuits of mathematics and physics. The foundation of the distinction is the now famous doctrine of separation. The term and probably the idea of separation enter the works of St. Thomas through a cryptic remark of Boethius, " Theology is without motion, abstract, and separate since the substance of God lacks both matter and motion." [93]

[93] " Theologia est sine motu, abstracta atque separabilis. Nam Dei substantia et materia et motu caret," *De trinitate,* c. II; v. Bruno Decker (ed.), *Expositio librum Boethii De trinitate* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), p. lineae

St. Thomas expounded a text which seems to have said that theology is "not separate" *(inseparabilis)*.[94] He explains his reading by the fact that divine things never exist in matter. They cannot be separated from it because nothing can be separated except what was formerly conjoined. Mathematical entities do exist in matter and must be separated from it by an act of the mind. Divine things already exist in " abstraction " from matter before the mind considers them. Boethius proves this fact with a reference to the divine substance from which divine science takes its name and main concern.

> Divine things are already abstract in being
> from matter and motion.
> The mathematicals are not abstract,
> but are separable in thought.
> Divine things are inseparable from matter
> because nothing can be separated
> unless it was first conjoined.
> Hence divine things are not separable in thought
> but are abstract in being.
> With the mathematicals
> it is just the opposite.
> He proves all this by the substance of God
> about which divine science is mainly concerned
> and from which it is named.[95]

The various objects of the sciences as grasped by the different acts of the intellect offer the distinctions needed to explain the doctrine of separation. Not every difference among objects defines a new power or habit. They are distinguished only by differences in their objects taken precisely as objects. Both animals and plants, for instance, are objects of the same power of sight without dividing it. Hence the speculable, object of a

[94] Bruno Decker (ed.), *op. cit.,* p. 160, l. 9.

[95] Res enim divinae sunt secundum esse abstractae a materia et motu; sed mathematicae inabstractae, sunt autem consideratione separabiles; sed res divinae inseparabiles, quia nihil est separabile nisi quod est coniunctum. Uncle res divinae non sunt secundum oonsiderationem separabiles a materia, sed secundum esse abstractae; res vero mathematicae e contrario. Et hac probat per Dei substantiam de qua divina scientia considerat principaliter uncle et inde nominatur. *In Boet. De Trin.,* c. expositio, par. *5.*

speculative science, is divided only by differences in it precisely as knowable.

The immaterial nature of the intellect requires that the speculable as such be immaterial. Furthermore, the habit of science requires that the speculable be necessary since science is concerned with what cannot be otherwise. The mobile by definition could be other than it is, so anything mobile is not necessary. Immobility is achieved only by removal of matter and motion. Hence the speculables and the speculative sciences are divided according to their order of removal from matter and motion. [96]

The intellect has two acts by which it can remove objects from matter. By one act the intellect grasps indivisibles and knows the essence of a thing, what it is. This act looks to the nature of a thing understood according to its degree of being. The natures grasped by this act may belong either to some complete individual or to something incomplete, a part or an accident. The other act of the intellect composes and divides, forming affirmative or negative judgments. This second act looks to the being itself of a thing (*ipsum esse rei)*. The being grasped in judgment may be the result of a conjunction of principles, as the being of a man arises from the union of body and soul, or the being may be concomitant with the nature itself as in simple substances like the angels.

> There is a double operation of the intellect,
> one by which it knows of anything, what it is,
> called the " understanding of indivisibles," and
> another by which it composes and divides
> forming affirmative or negative statements.
> These two operations correspond
> to two aspects of things.
> The first operation looks to the nature of the thing
> according to which the thing understood
> obtains a certain grade of being
> whether it is a complete thing
> like a solid,

[98] *Ibid.,* q. *5,* a. I, c. par. !'l; cf. *In De sensu et sensato,* i, I; *In Physicorum,* I, i, 1.

or an incomplete thing
like a part or an accident.
The second operation looks to the being itself
which results from the union of principles
in a composite thing
or is the concomitant of the simple nature
in simple substances. [97]

Some speculables, the objects for the second act of the intellect, can exist without matter and so do not depend upon it either to be or to be understood. Some things of this sort, such as God and the angels, never exist in matter. Others, such as substance, quality, being, potency, act, the one and the many, and so forth, sometimes exist in material things and sometimes do not. Divine science or theology is concerned with all of these things, but it is principally concerned with God. Another name for this science is " metaphysics."

There are some speculables
which do not depend in being on matter
since they can be without matter.
Either they are never in matter
like God and an angel,
or they are sometimes in matter and sometimes not
like substance, quality, being, potency, act,
the one and the many, and others of the sort.
Concerning all of these
there is a theology or divine science
(God being the main thing known in it),
which by another name is called " metaphysics." [98]

[97] duplex est operatio intellectus. Una, quae dicitur "intelligentia indivisibilium," qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vel'o, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et hae quidem duae operatione duobus, quae sunt in rebus, respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus. *In Boet. De Trin.*, q. *5,* a. 3, c., par. I.

•• Quaedam vero speculabilia suut, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive nunquam sunt in materia, sicut Deus et angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens,

The fully immaterial objects are first grasped when the mind judges that they are not material. The act of judgment differs sharply from abstraction. Abstraction can consider one thing without another even if the two are united in actual being. A man can be considered without considering his Negro, Caucasian, or Mongoloid race. Circles can be considered in abstraction from whether they are dollars or doughnuts. The unity of the things abstracted from each other is not denied; it is simply ignored. Judgment, however, can tmly separate in the mind only what is also separate in actual being. The acts of affirming and denying bear upon being and distinguish two things by asserting that one of them is actually not in the other. Hence judgment and not the abstractions is properly called " separation." [99]

Thus the intellect in its different operations
makes different kinds of distinctions
of one thing from another.
In the operation by which it composes and divides
it distinguishes one thing from another
when it understands
that one of them is not in the other.
In the operation by which it understands what something is
it distinguishes one thing from another
when it understands
what this is without saying anything about the other
neither that the one thing is with it
nor that it is separate from it.
This distinction does not rightly have the name,
"separation," but the first only.[99]

potentia, actus, unum et multa, et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est thoologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica. *Ibid.,* a. 1, c., par. 3.

•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. *85,* a. 1, ad 1, for a different usage.

••• Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum diversas operationes; quia secundum operationem, qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse. In operatione vero qua intelligit, quid est unumquodque, distingnit unum ab alio dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Uncle ista distinctio non proprie habet nomen separationis, sed prima tantum. *In Boet. De Trin.,* q. *5,* a. 3, c., par. 2.

The judgment that being is not material requires some objective evidence. The simple consideration of being apart from matter would produce only an abstract science reducible to mathematics. The truth of the judgment that not all beings are material was established for the medievals by the admitted fact that immaterial substances existed. In the commentaries on the natural science of Aristotle the separated substances were ruled out of natural science by St. Thomas because all of physics was concerned with mobile beings.[100] Metaphysics would begin with the existence of separated substances and continue to seek knowledge of them in its pursuit of the first and highest principles of being.[101]

For instance, the following argument is in support of the existence and primacy of metaphysics. This argument proceeds on the grounds that one truth can be proven, not from something false but only from another truth. Anything which is the cause of a given characteristic of the members of a group will take the name of that characteristic mainly to itself, as fire is the cause of heat and is mainly hot. This principle can be applied to the name, " truth." Truth is not the property of any particular species. It belongs commonly to all beings. Whatever causes the truth of things is the most true being. It is the source of the truth of the others and agrees with them in the common name and notion.[102]

The medievals thought that the physical changes on earth were governed by the changes in the stars and planets, which were thought to be changeless except as to place. Whatever substances would be the causes of the permanent being and truth of the heavenly bodies would be even more stable and true than they. The higher substances would have no causes themselves, and they would be the causes both of the heavenly bodies and of other material beings.[108] Truth is the act of the

[100] *In De caela,* ill, ii, 814 *In De generatione et corruptione,* vii, 58
[101] In *Meta.,* IT, ii,
[109] *Ibid.,*
[108] *Ibid.*.' cf. *ibid.,* VI, i, 1164.

mind conforming to being, so the cause of the being of a thing is the cause of its truth.[104]

Every material thing, even the supposed celestial bodies, must have an immaterial cause. Everything which is composite u.nd participated is reduced to something which is by essence as to its cause. All bodies are beings in act insofar as they participate in some form. A pure substance, separate from matter, is by essence form. Hence pure substances must be the principles of bodily substances. If we add that first philosophy considers first causes, it follows that it studies those things which are most true. Metaphysics not only exists; it is the main science of truth.

> This is necessary in that it is necessary
> that everything composite and participated
> be reduced to what is by .essence as to a cause.
> All corporeal things are being in act
> insofar as they participate in some form.
> Hence it is necessary that separate substance,
> which is form by essence,
> be the principle of corporeal substance.
> If we add to this deduction the fact that
> first philosophy considers first causes,
> it follows that
> it considers the things which are most true,
> as was said before.
> Hence it is the main science of truth.[104a]

Metaphysics holds its primacy among the sciences because it is directly concerned with pure substances existing apart from matter. Material things are dependent on an immaterial order in which the changing world participates. The Platonic overtones of this argument are apparent. However, the pure sub-

[104] *Ibid.,* II, ii,

[104a] Et hoc est necessarium: quia necesse est ut omnia composita et participantia, reducantur in ea quae sunt per essentiam, sicut in causas. Omnia autem corporalia sunt entia in actu, inquantum participant aliquas formas. Unde necesse est substantiam separatam, quae est forma per suam essentiam, corporalis substantiae principium *esse.* Si ergo huic deductioni adiugamus, quod philosophia prima considerat primas causas, sequitur ut prius habitum est, quod ipsa considerat ea quae sunt maxime vera. Unde ipsa est maxime scientia veritatis. *Ibid.,*

stances to which St. Thomas refers are not the ideas of Plato. They are concrete existing beings linked to the changes in this world through the existence and movement of the heavenly bodies/ 05 The first principles of metaphysics are not grounded merely in the mind. Truth is a function of existing being. Consequently, i£ there exist any immaterial substance, a third part, theology or metaphysics, must be added to physics and mathematics to make up the speculative sciences.[106]

St. Thomas Aquinas could easily refer to immaterial substances as justification for metaphysics since the spiritual order of beings was much closer to medieval men than it is to modems. In religion the existence of angels and saints was a matter of common belief, and their constant intervention in human affairs found ready credence. In science most of the experts held that the earth was at the inmost point of a series of concentric spheres constituted of material superior to earthly matter. Each sphere was thought to have its own motion imparted to it by an immaterial mover. Taken together the motions of the spheres controlled the changes of material things on earth.[107]

St. Thomas attempted to mobilize scientific opinion of both the philosophical and theological traditions in support of the real existence of separated and immaterial substances. In the commentary on the *De trinitate* he identified the intelligences of Aristotle with the angels of popular, theological teaching.[108] He accepted the consequence in holding that the angels must be the causes of the motions of the celestial spheres and the governors of terrestrial motions. The intelligences or angels would thus be treated in metaphysics as principles and causes of its subject, common being. Throughout his life St. Thomas

105 " --- est aliqua substautia separata a sensibilibus; non quidem species rerum sensibilium, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed primi motores," *ibid.,* XI, ii, 2179.

106 *Ibid.,* VI, i, 1166-67; XI, vii, *2262-65; In De generatione et corruptione,* Prooem., 2 (2).

107 *III Cont. Gent.,* c. 28; cf. Thomas Litt, O.C.S.O., *Les Corps Celestes dans l'Universe de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1968), pp. 100-01.

108 *In Boet. De trin.,* q. *5,* a. 4, ad 3.

held for the identity of the intelligences with the angels even though many theologians including Robert Kilwardby, O.P., and St. Albert the Great disputed him.[109]

The immaterial movers today are obsolete. Universal laws of motion account for the movements of the heavens, and space travel has eliminated the celestial spheres. All of the matter in the universe is essentially the same. The physical and chemical laws discovered on earth apply to the planets and the most distant stars. The extension of the laws of natural science has led men to greater confidence in themselves and their technology. The psychological need for saints and angels is greatly reduced. Today the difficulties preventing the justification of metaphysics by virtue of the existence of immaterial substances are more formidable than ever before.

Since cosmic motions no longer establish the existence of immaterial substances, perhaps an appeal to the general principles of all change is still possible.[110] Once the principles of matter, form and privation are understood, one can see the necessity for a transcendent first mover. In this way the full development of general natural science achieved in the eighth book of the Physics leads readily to metaphysics. Unfortunately most natural scientists today find matter, form and privation completely alien ideas, and their elucidation is frequently entangled in metaphysical difficulties. Metaphysical speculation will likely proceed concomitant with the development of natural science. Thus the contempor:try metaphysician will need a starting point which does not presuppose a complete natural science.

Once in commenting on the Physics[111] and again in commenting on the Metaphysics [112] Aquinas touches on the connection between the subject of metaphysics and the human soul as

[109] Vernon J. Bourke, *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 147-55.

[110] *In Meta.,* IV, v, 593.

[111] In *Physicorum,* II, iv, 10.

[119] " --- in rebus non solum sunt corporea, sed etiam quaedam incorporea, ut patet in libro de anima." *In Meta.,* I, xii, 181; cf. *ibid.,* VI, i, 1155 et 1159.

an incorporeal substance. In the Physics man is viewed as a mobile being like many others. Most of the actions of man are accounted for by the same biological principles which explain the operations of other living bodies. Yet man has a few acts, mainly understanding and willing, which cannot be explained completely by material organs.

The human senses like those of the other animals operate through material organs. The sensation generated in the sense organ under the stimulus of a physical agent, light, sound, or pressure, is not itself conscious. Nor can the percepts accumulated in the internal senses such as memory and imagination know themselves. Sensations and sense percepts cannot reflect back upon themselves because the act of a material organ is extended. If the sense percept produces an emotional response, it is strictly determined and not free.

Human understanding can reflect upon itself and can know itself in the act of knowing some material object presented by the senses. Through conscious knowledge a human mind can see the common aspects of diverse individuals and can produce abstract concepts to cover them. It is the intellect which knows humanity where the senses know individual men. The attitudes taken on the basis of conscious, abstract knowledge are free and self determining.

Abstract science and human liberty show that man is not limited to the direct and determinate operations of the senses. If understanding and willing are immaterial, they must operate through immaterial powers. The existence of immaterial powers argues to an immaterial substance in which intellect and will are situated. Nothing can be more intimate to man than his immaterial substance, the human soul.

Unfortunately for the subject of metaphysics a rather sophisticated development of philosophical psychology is needed to establish the existence of the soul firmly. The problems of abstract science and human liberty are bound to be difficult. Often they defy solution for lack of the metaphysical foundation needed for an adequate approach. Consequently, some thinkers have suggested bypassing the psychological problem

altogether. The immateriality of being can be proven directly from the same evidence which proves the immateriality of the soul.[113]

A conceptualization is itself an immaterial being. When passively impressed with the likeness of a known object, the mind has the capacity actively to form within itself an intention of that object. This reflex intention is the notion signified by the definition.[114] The notion is formed when the mind reflects upon itself and knows both its own act of knowing and the notion by which it knows. The notion known is a secondary object of understanding because the primary object is the being whose likeness was impressed on the mind originally.

> Since the intellect reflects upon itself,
> through the same reflection it understands
> both its knowing and the notion by which it knows.
> Thus the notion understood
> is secondarily
> that which is understood.
> That which is understood primarily is the thing
> of which the intelligible notion is the likeness.[1140]

Conceptualized being offers an obvious example of immaterial being. Conceptualization results from the act of self knowing, which is impossible for a material thing. In the course of human history mental probing into the experience of being has produced a vast literature in science and in the humanities. The poet's song and the critic's judgment as well as the coordinates of the mathematician and the schemata of the naturalist represent but a fraction of the world of conceptual being.

[113] L.-B. Geiger, O. P., "Abstraction et separation d'apres S. Thomas: *In De Trinitate,* q. *5,* a. 3," *Revue de Science Philosophique et Theologique,* XXXI (1947), 3-40; cf. M.-V. Leroy, O. P., "Abstractio et separatio d'apres un texte controverse de saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste,* XLVIII (1948), 328-39; P. Isaac, O. P., *Bulletin Thomiste,* VIII (1947-52), *558,* n. 884.

[114] *I Cont. Gent.,* c. *53.*

[114a] " Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum refiectitur, secundum eandem refiexionem intelligit et suum intelligere et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secondario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. *Summa Theol.,* I, 85, 2, c.

A student familiar with some of the sciences or the humanities can be induced to reflect on the contents of his mind through the study of logic. Then he has only to be convinced that material beings lack the reflexive kowledge, the "subjectivity," needed for conceptualization to see the need for a study beyond the physical. The phenomenon of culture offers ample, secular evidence for the reality of immaterial being.

Clearly the fact that the mind can conceive of immaterial beings would not prove that being is immaterial. One can think of triangles without steel or of humanity without men, but such forms merely grasp immaterial aspects of material things. They are studied in one of the sciences dealing with material beings. Metaphysics is founded on a solid existing reality. It is the existence of conceptual being which proves the immateriality and immortality of the human soul. The existence of conceptual being also shows the some being is not rnaterial. [115]

Mind and matter. The final critical point in our evaluation of the teaching of St. Thomas on the subject of metaphysics discloses the gulf which separates him from modern thought. Far from doubting the reality of conceptualized being, philosophers since Descartes have generally been determined to begin metaphysics with thought alone. They have sought to encounter being as such in the elaboration of the forms and conditions of clear thinking. I am first a thinking thing, and in virtue of my thought I am. Material beings are thus an appendage on the mind. The approach of St. Thomas is just the opposite. For him existing being is prior to and in control o£ thought. No matter how elaborate conceptual beings may grow, they are always reducible in their elements to the concrete reality of first substance, the basic subject of metaphysics.

The history of philosophy belies the apparent simplicity of

[115] " --- ce n'est pas parce que je con<;ois immateriellement l'etre que je conclus a l'immaterialite de l'etre mais parce que rna conception de !'etre est elle-meme de l'etre et de l'etre immateriel, meme si elle conc;oit l'etre de chose materielle qui n'est pas immateriel," L.-B. Geiger, O. P., *op. cit.,* p. 26.

the distinction between physical being and conceptualized, mental being. Metaphysics has constantly been confused with logic or dialectics and not without reason. The dialectician considers all things. He could not do so without seeing them all under some one aspect since one discipline has to deal with one subject. All things have no common aspect except being. Consequently, the material of dialectic is being, which is what the metaphysician also studies. The sophist similarly imitates the philosopher in breadth of knowledge if not in depth. A sophist can speak freely on anything and give the impression of wisdom. He could not manage his glib speech without something on which to base the appearance of true philosophy.[116]

The difference between the philosopher and the dialectician is that the philosopher works more powerfully on the common aspects of being. As a result of his demonstrations he develops genuine science and has complete certitude. The dialectician works only from probabilities and does not achieve science about being in general but only opinion. The reason is that mental being *(ens rationis)* is different from natural being *(ens naturae).* "Mental being" applies properly to the intentions, such as genus, species and the like, at which the mind arrives in considering things. These intentions are not found in physical being *(rerum natura)* but follow upon the activity of the mind. Mental being is the subject of logic, and the logician sees beings only as reflected in the mind.[117] The philosopher and the metaphysician take beings in their capacity fully to be.[118]

The intentions of the mind pair off evenly with natural beings so that all natural beings can fall under the consideration of the mind. Thus the subject of logic extends to everything of which natural being may be predicated, and logic pairs off with metaphysics. Regarding the common properties of being the philosopher attempts to work from his own principles to prove what can be known about them. The dialec-

[116] *In Meta.,* IV, iv, 573.
[117] *Ibid.,* VII, xiii, 1576; xvii, 1658.
[118] *Ibid.,* XI, iii, 2204 ad calcem.

tician studies them by working from his mental intentions, which are extrinsic to nature. The conclusions of the dialectician are tentative since he is not working with intrinsic principles.[119]

And the reason for this
  is that there is a double being,
    mental and physical.
Mental being correctly applies to those intentions
  which the mind finds in things as studied
    (genus, species, and the like)
  and which are not found in physical being
    but follow upon consideration by the mind.
  This sort of thing, mental being,
    is rightly the subject of logic.
These intelligible intentions
  pair off evenly with physical being
    in that all physical beings
      fall under the consideration of the mind.
  Thus the subject of logic extends to everything
    of which physical being is predicated.
So he concludes that the subject of logic
  pairs off with the subject of philosophy
    which is physical being.[120]

In modern metaphysics the attempt to minimize presuppositions has led to the requirement that the distinction between mental and physical being be proven. If it cannot be proven, logic and Mind consume all of metaphysics and being. In ancient and medieval metaphysics there were many presuppositions. In the Aristotelian method any science presupposes the acceptance of one's personal experience as well as the ex-

[119] *In Post. Ana.,* I, xx, 171 *(5);* cf. *In Meta.,* IV, iv, 576-77.

[120] Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae. Huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit, quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae, quod est ens naturae. *In Meta.,* IV, iv, 574.

perience o£ others and the data o£ any experiments which may be devised. Experiences which come with some consistency and regularity call for an explanation. [121]

Experience does not explain itself. In addition to a subject o£ study a science must presuppose some principles. The basic principles on which every explanation in a science will be constructed are called " axioms " by Aristotle. The axioms cannot be proven in the science itself. That equals added to equals are equal is the basis for explanations in arithmetic and cannot be proven arithmetically. Besides the axioms certain theses, which are not so fundamental, are laid down in the course o£ a science. In physiology the definition o£ the heart as an organ for pumping blood is a thesis. Some progress was possible before its discovery since it does not apply to the entire subject. A thesis which asserts an existing £act is called an "hypothesis " by Aristotle. The hypothesis that blood circulates is necessary once the definition o£ the heart has been established. When the axioms, theses, and hypotheses are applied in a demonstration to the subject o£ a science, they show why the subject must be as it is and cannot be otherwise. [122]

The critical problem for Aristotle did not consist in enumerating the preconditions o£ scientific knowledge. In Aristotle the principles o£ a science are not limited in number by being brought forth by the mind out o£ itself as Kant postulated. Rather they are brought forth by the creative reflection o£ the mind upon a certain part o£ experience, the subject o£ the science. The number of principles needed for a science is unknown until, if ever, the science is completed. Thus the critical problem arises anew at the outset o£ each demonstration.

Once launched into a science a mind frequently cannot follow the argument because o£ some special difficulty or *aporia.* Every teacher is familiar with the unexamined preconceptions which hinder the free flow o£ a student's thought. A difficulty

[121] *Post. Anal.,* I, 1, 7lal-7lb8.

[122] *Ibid.,* see Herbert Ratner M.D., "William Harvey, M.D.: Modern or Ancient Scientist?" *The Dignity of Science* (Washington: The Thomist Press, (1961), pp.

is a knot in the line of reasoning which has to be untangled before further progress is possible.[123] Human experience is so tangled that difficulties are sure to be encountered at every point.

By patiently untangling difficulties the Aristotelian method, which was accepted by St. Thomas, makes gradual progress toward certainty. Each of the axioms, theses and hypotheses proposed for a science has to be tested against experience. Where the Cartesian method of general doubt would withhold assent from any statement not clearly proven, the Aristotelian method tries to make an assent proportioned to the state of the science on the point under discussion. A given point may be held under difficulties without being doubted.

The distinction of mind and matter involves many difficulties especially for the modern mind, but it cannot be doubted if metaphysics is to proceed. Without this distinction the question of the meaning of being becomes senseless. To question is to push off into the unknown, to push the self off as a rocket leaves the pad. The center of power and activity goes into motion through the surrounding being. Of what use is the most powerful rocket with no space through which to travel, no guidance system to seek an orbit, no planet or star around which to define a place in being? A questor is carried along by the dynamism of his own thought, but he cannot move at all without some element through which to guide his path. The quest for the meaning of being is guided by past experience of existing things, the self and the world. The metaphysical quest carries the self into the world in search of some grounding point in being. If being is not grounded outside the self, the mind turns to itself and ends by elucidating its own laws. Metaphysics is then absorbed into logic as Hegel clearly saw. The distinction of mind and matter, self and world is axiomatic to metaphysics in the sense that no progress is possible in the science without it.

The texts of St. Thomas have little to contribute on this

[123] *Meta.,* III, 1, 995a23-995b4.

point beyond remarking that the distinction of mind from independent beings is vital to the distinction of logic, dialectics, and sophistry from metaphysics. But once this distinction is accepted, previous distinction of matter and spirit is readily established since mind is immaterial. Thus the existence of separated substances, intelligences, and angels need not be relevant to the pursuit of metaphysics. We need only to reflect that minds themselves are immaterial existences. In our experience, however, they are not self existent. Our minds are subjected in a primary being, personal substance, over which we exercise free dominion. For us being is found here primarily. This flesh has to penetrate the mystery of the existing material world outside the mind in quest for the meaning of being. At the outset the quest is secular; it does not presuppose religion or the existence of God. However, some may hope to find a God at the source of being, and there find rest for the soul.

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WHITEHEAD IN FRENCH PERSPECTIVE: A REVIEW ARTICLE

THERE ARE now a good many books in English on Whitehead's philosophy. All but one of these were written by authors now living in the U. S. A. But important non-English studies are scarce. Indeed the new French work is the only one I know.[1] By the timing of her interpretation Dr. Parmentier had the advantage o£ access to many others. Johnson, Lowe, Hammerschmidt, Shahan, Palter, Christian, Leclerc, Mays, Sherburne, Cobb, and several others form a substantial appreciative and critical literature. Alix Parmentier has diligently and judiciously combed this literature (perhaps making too little use o£ Cobb, whose book became available rather late in her inquiry), besides going through all of Whitehead's writings. Some French and non-French continental studies are also taken into account. If, in addition, she has paid special attention to my own comments on Whitehead, I do not find that this prejudices me against her! And I feel honored indeed to stand between Aristotle and Plato as the most often-cited authors.

Dr. Parmentier has a deep interest in metaphysics and philosophy of religion and shows intensive knowledge of their history. She is less iconoclastic than Whitehead, sees more wisdom in the great traditions of Western philosophy of religion than he did (or than I do) , but this has some advantage in a writer so subtly appreciative of the genius of the man she is studying. It gives her more detachment and objectivity toward the system she is explaining than might otherwise be possible. But she is determined to give the Anglo-American thinker every chance to make his way with French readers. It is exhilarating and encouraging to read her very numerous and extensive translations and to see how readily Whitehead

[1] Alix Parmentier, *La Philosophie de Whitehead et le probleme de Dieu.* Beauchesne, Paris, 1968.

translates into lucid French. Other non-French authors cited are also always (with one odd exception) translated.

The title is appropriate enough. True, the book deals only with Whitehead's metaphysical system (and not-she tells us this at the beginning--with his views on history, politics, and the like) and treats above all the conception of God in which the system culminates. The discussion of this conception is preceded by over fWO pages on the basic categories, prefaced by a rather extensive sketch-less technical than Lowe's masterly one-of Whitehead's intellectual Odyssey, his development from mathematician to logician to theoretical physicist to metaphysician. The presuppositions, the background, for his thought about God are thus adequately given. The exposition of the systematic philosophy is rather largely through translation of passages from all the later works and is on the whole one of the best we have in any language.

A French philosopher who wants to understand Whitehead but does not read English readily now needs only patience and some capacity for metaphysical speculation to reach the goal. Whitehead is now available in French, as he was not hitherto in any European language. The linguistic barrier is to that extent removed. This is a welcome change, which I hope will have considerable influence upon the future of European philosophy. The great skill and immense effort which alone made this book possible should not be allowed to go in vain. But those at home in English should also take this book into account. It is mature, deeply meditated, scholarly. There is an index of names and a valuable bibliography, the most complete now in print. The 100 pages given to the early writings and those of the middle years help to dispose of some absurd views about the changes in Whitehead's thinking, such as that he became a metaphysician and philosopher of religion because his son was killed, or that there is grotesque discontinuity between the nonmetaphysical and the metaphysical works. Whitehead was always aware of philosophical issues. But the chronological account also sheds positive light upon the basic intuitions.

Concerning the "philosophy of organism" I have at least one apparent disagreement with the author. Like most students, she seems to construe the " perishing " of actual entities, or unit events, rather literally. This metaphor, taken from Locke, seems to me misleading, and I have never employed it. To perish seems to imply becoming lifeless. But Whitehead says that, thanks to objective immortality in God, occasions, though "they perish, yet live forevermore." *This* metaphor I take more, and the other less, literally than some do. After all, we are told that actualities become but "do not change." Perishing as *diminution* of life would surely be a change! So I hold that perishing is not, taking God into account, a loss, something negative, and is wholly positive, an addition. This, too, we are on occasion told. An entity in perishing " acquires " additional functions. But this acquisition is no change in the entity itself; nothing is added to it, any more than something is substracted; but the entity itself with all the reality or life it ever had, no more and no less, is added to the de facto sum of entities as prehended in subsequent phases of the divine life. The saying that " subjectivity is lost" as the entity becomes object for its successors seems misle.ading-within the system. True, we are told that " indeterminacy has evaporated." But note that indeterminacy is a negation, a privation. The process of becoming removes, or rather transcends, this privation, yet by the principle of process (that an entity includes within itself how it became) even the indeterminacy is present in the living act of transcending it which *is* the entity.

For *us,* as succeeding actualities, much of the subjective life, the vividness of past occasions, is indeed lost, our prehensions being " abstract," " under a limitation," or partly " negative." But to take this abstractness as holding even for divine prehensions is to make nonsense of the affirmation that " the truth itself " is only the way all things are embraced in the Consequent Nature of God. If so, how can it be true that a certain subjectivity occurred, yet is not contained in God? So I hold that it spoils Whitehead's system to regard past entities

as inactual. Actuality, definite reality *is* pastness. This was also Bergson's doctrine. The present is only nascent actuality. I do not say that Whitehead is wholly clear about this. But some of his commentators seem to me less clear, not more. I feel this especially of Christian's interpretation of perishing.

Dr. Parmentier sees serious difficulty in the apparent succession of " genetic phases " within the becoming of a single actuality. Here I agree and incline to cut the knot by denying that there is any such succession. An entity (a single experience) becomes in a single act, which has aspects of grasping data and aspects of thinking about them (physical and mental prehensions), but the data are not "first grasped and "then" thought about-unless in subsequent actual entities. Rather, an entity grasps its data thinkingly, in a single act. Perhaps part of what Whitehead ascribes to a single entity is really effected by a short sequence of entities, rather than a sequence of phases within one entity. (Memory, in the broad sense of intuition of previous actualities, is essential to intellection; but then, according to Whitehead, it is essential to any actuality or experience at all.) That a single actuality corresponds to a finite time rather than an instant is not incompatible with this view, since time is measured only by comparison, involving relations to other actualities. Time and space are relational, a.nd that we experience in units of tenths or twentieths of a second means that a single experience of ours can be contemporary with millions of successive atomic or subatomic actualities, and probably with a number of actualities of bird experiences. Simply empty time or space have no measure. Thus, in spite of Chappell, we need not believe that the temporal finitude of an entity implies *internal* succession. Rather, it implies the possibility of external but contemporary succession. This may be a difficult doctrine; but one of the lessons we can learn from Bergson, Peirce, Einstein, and Whitehead is that it is time, even more than eternity, which our intellects tend to distort and find hard to grasp.

The author notes the range of opinions concerning the utility of " eternal objects" in the system, and makes a modest

suggestion as to the need for them. The suggestion is perhaps sufficiently qualified to meet certain objections which have caused me to ignore the doctrine in my modified Whiteheadianism. But I still wonder if there is not a confusion between universals with a relative independence of time and universals with absolute independence. I suspect that "red," with the meaning we can give to the term, is relevant only to our and subsequent "cosmic epochs" but not to becoming as such, no matter how far in the past. Definite forms, I hold with Peirce, are created, not pigeonholed in eternity. Here I am closer to Bergson and Dewey, and to many "nominalists," than to Whitehead. Metaphysical principles, including God in his essential nature in contrast to his contingent qualities, are, I hold, eternal, but not specific qualities of sensing or feeling.

Dr. Parmentier rightly sees "religious intuition of a complex kind" as pervasively influential in Whitehead's thinking. Whitehead himself has indicated this. But she holds that the physical theory of relativity (and of vectors) and the biological idea of organism were also basic. No doubt, but I think it of some importance that the Buddhists long ago adopted quite a bit of what, according to this author, Whitehead got from physics. They not only took events as basic terms rather than substances but also insisted-and sometimes even more strongly or onesidedly than Whitehead-upon the internal relatedness of events to other events and the falsity of the idea that an event is anything in abstraction from the universe out of which it has emerged. Dr. Parmentier rightly remarks that for Whitehead concrete unit-events have external, or non-constitutive, as well as internal relationships. Such an event can without distortion be considered in abstraction from its contemporaries and successors, even though not from its predecessors. Also, as she notes, eternal objects, and God as primordial, are independent of all particular events (though not of the general necessary truth that events occur, some events or other).

Miss Parmentier is deliberately sparing of critical comments until her final chapter. Here she brilliantly sums up the basic

intuitions embodied in the system and then asks how far the results agree with what she views as the religious or Christian truth. The discussion here is admirably done, with learning and finesse. She wonders if the ultimacy of love and the ultimacy of relativity and creativity (which, as she points out, integrally includes relativity) are not subtly in conflict. Without sharing all her convictions on this question, I think they could hardly be better expressed or more reasonably argued for. She is troubled by the consideration that God is said to be an actual entity and not a *person.* Here I take Whitehead to have erred. He should have conceived God as analogous to a society of actual entities not a single entity. If the divine society is " personally ordered," then it is a person on the eminent plane; or perhaps, as I now incline to think, a society of societies, a multiplicity of persons-somewhat, but not by any means wholly, analogous to classical trinitarian views. God is the eminent, primordial, everlasting Person, or Society of Persons. I believe this makes better Whiteheadian sense than what Whitehead actually says.

Dr. Parmentier takes religious truth to require that God be eminently Creator in a sense not allowed by Whitehead. Here I side with Whitehead, except that he might have emphasized some aspects of his doctrine more. God must, in the system, be eminently creative, and *the* Creator in the only sense which has meaning for Whitehead (or for me). Other actualities or societies are noneminently creative; they are self-creative creatures of deity, as Lequier said long ago. That God is not the same as creativity is not, as the author sees clearly, at times at least, any subjection of God to something else: for creativity is only our ultimate perspective upon eminent and noneminent forms of actuality. There is nothing but the self-creative, other-creative, actualities of God and creatures. Nothing "limits" divine freedom-as though God would be greater *solus.* That God needs noneminent or free creatures (some such creatures, not necessarily the ones that are actual) does not seem to me any derogation to the majesty of God. What is the use of an ability to choose *not* to have something

which it is better to have than not to have? And if it is not better for God to have noneminent creatures than not to have them, our lives are meaningless. This Whiteheadian conviction I owe to my reading and experience at a time when Whitehead was not even a name to me.

Dr. Parmentier suggests that love does not entail relativity and that it was physics which led Whitehead to stress the latter principle. But not only did the Buddhists arrive at a re-btivistic view of reality (not specifically of space measurements, simultaneity etc.), but they saw ethical and spiritual value in the doctrine. So, and in no lesser degree, did Whitehead. To him it was of prime ethical importance, entirely regardless of any theory of physics, that the unity of a person Yvith his own past and future be upon the same ultimate principle as his unity with the past and future of other "societies "-the principle of causality or prehension (inheritance from antecedent actualities) plus concern for subsequent actualities. " Objectification is sympathy," and self-interest is but one strand of this sympathy, with no metaphysical priority. This is the old Buddhist insight. The ethical point of view is only the conscious and wholehearted recognition and acting out of the metaphysical truth. A Buddhist, but not so many others, would easily understand Whitehead's only half humorous saying, " I sometimes think that modern immorality is a consequence of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance." Similarly, a Buddhist document classifies egocentric attitudes as "writhing in delusion." The self-identical ego is not an absolute term of reference, and its importance is secondary. A South African writer, Whiteman, holds that the Christian (Judaic) principle of loving your neighbor *as* yourself is a point of agreement between Christianity (adequately understood) and Buddhism. It seems subtly contradicted by the standard Western doctrine of substances as the final units of reality. For then self-love would be identity and love for another just nonidentity, and loving another "as oneself" would be nonsense. Only if self-identity is but relative can nonidentity with others be also relative and love in both cases the same in principle and ideal.

True, one man's successive experiences are m every successive unit distinct from another man's, but the contents, the sets of data which alone give value to the experiences, largely overlap. There is no sense whatever in which one must or should justify the future good one seeks to promote for others by pointing to probable or certain contributions thereby made to the future states of that individual which one is. The only fully rational aim we can have for the future is to have served God, in whom alone our present reality can have permanent status. Egoism is the unwitting denial of death, and still more, of the radical abstractness and only provisional importance of self-identity in its nondivine forms. There is indeed something ultimate, for me as for Whitehead, and not merely abstract, about the unity of the divine life. Whitehead trie_d to safeguard this by terming God *an* actual entity rather than a society. Here I think he deserted the tracks of his own systematic scheme, as well as got farther from trinitarianism than he needed to.

Does love conflict in principle with relativity? This I cannot see at all! Love of A for B seems clearly to render A in some genuine sense relative to B. And since what we love in others is above all their own forms of love, in loving them we are relativized both to them and to those they love. In the eminent form we have universal or divine relativity which, conceived analogically, is divine love. I honestly don't see what the author's point is here. But, of course, she is in venerable company in her conviction. An expositor of Hinduism recently said, " for the disciple the Guru is there, for the Guru the disciple is not there." Similarly, for Brahman even the Guru is not there, as distinguishable in any way from Brahman. This may be Hinduism (in one form?) but it is not what Dr. Parmentier or I mean by the divine love. So what is the point she wants to make?

As the author says, there must be some ambiguity or tension in Whitehead's thought, or such widely diverse interpretations as those of Hartshorne and Mays (whom she treats more kindly and, I admit, more intelligently than I did some years

ago) would not occur. But, as she is also aware, this sort of thing has happened to all the great philosophers. Ours is too difficult a subject for there to be simple agreement even as to what a man means to say, let alone as to what he should say.

I heartily recommend this book. It does honor to Whitehead, its author, and Anglo-American as well as French scholarship.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Jerome Biblical Commentary. Edited by RAYMOND E. BROWN, S. S., JOSEPH A. FITZMYER, S. J., ROLAND E. MURPHY, O. CARM. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp.

Even a first glance can hardly fail to indicate the astounding array of scholarship which has gone into this impressive collection. As one begins to probe more deeply into particular sections of the book, this initial reaction is pleasantly corroborated. What we have in this two-volumes-in-one is a verse-by-verse commentary on the whole of Sacred Scripture. In many ways, it is a " modern " American counterpart of the mammoth *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture* compiled by British scholars fifteen years earlier. The structure and format of the two works are similar, but their contents are notably diverse. In this diversity lies perhaps the most telling evidence to date of the progress of Catholic biblical scholars in America during the interim. The earlier commentary employed only three U. S. and two Canadian scholars; the *Jerome Biblical Commentary* has been written entirely by representatives of these two countries. A pertinent sub-title might well read, "North American Catholic Biblical Scholarship Comes of Age."

The format is tidy and attractive, although the print is not as dark and clear as the British work. The articles and commentaries are numbered consecutively and divided into sections headed by large, boldface arabic numerals. This is, in fact, the only consecutive enumeration in the entire volume, as the pagination begins afresh with the New Testament portion. This system of numbered articles is a valuable aid to cross-references; however, this reviewer was disappointed that scriptural chapter-and-verse notations are not included at the top of each page to expedite the rapid finding of comments on specific passages. The Revised Standard Version has been followed for the titles of the books and the spelling of proper names. In the matter of titles, however, two exceptions occur to mar the consistency: *Canticle of Canticles* is retained for the *Song of Solomon,* and *Apocalypse* is retained for *Revelation.* The numbering of the Psalms is consistent with the RSV.

Both scholars and serious students will find an amazing wealth of up-to-date information in the assortment of introductory and auxiliary articles, which would of themselves make the book salable. In these articles, as also in the commentaries on individual passages, the reader will find the most recent literary and scientific data available. For example, the article on *Inspiration and Inerrancy* includes the opinions of Levesque, McKenzie,

Benoit, K. Rahner and other modern scholars-as well as a timely warning not to cling too tenaciously to the erstwhile rigid distinction between revelation and inspiration but rather to consider the latter term as containing the total influence of God upon the sacred authors. One is not surprised to find insights from the Qumran Community reflected in a variety of ways in the competent treatment of the Dead Sea Scrolls. If more examples of modernity are needed, the reader may consult the fine article of Robert North, S. J., on *Biblical Archeology,* which is accompanied by an excellent chart of key excavations in the Holy Land and elsewhere. The use of similar charts is typical throughout the volume.

When the monumental *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Bible* appeared in the United States in 1963, this translation of a Dutch work was hailed as a significant sign of the high standards of those American scholars who did the translating and adaptation. At the time, this reviewer noted a slight unevenness of quality in the treatment of the Old and New Testaments: the treatment of the latter seemed inferior to the quality of the handling of the Old Testament. This observation is not true of the *Jerome Biblical Commentary;* New Testament scholarship in Catholic circles in the United States has finally caught up with Old Testament advances. One verification of this remark is provided by the series of articles under the general heading *Aspects of New Testament Thought* by David M. Stanley, S. J., and Raymond E. Brown, S. S., covering such topics as: " The Titles of Christ"; "New Testament Eschatology"; "The Kingdom of God"; "Gospel Miracles"; "Parables of Jesus"; "The Resurrection of Jesus", and "The Twelve and the Apostolate." None of the "sticky" issues are avoided. In the article on the resurrection, for example, the question of whether or not the tomb of Jesus was empty is adequately considered. Yet-and here is one of the glories of this volume-radical conclusions are scrupulously avoided in favor of authentic scholarship; facts backed up by clear evidence is the order of the day. After giving various opinions on the topic Fr. Brown concludes with this parenthetical note: " In this light, we think it biblically irresponsible to claim that Christian faith in the resurrection is independent of the question of whether or not Jesus lies buried in Palestine-Christian faith in the resurrection is in continuity with apostolic faith in the resurrection, and there is no evidence that the first witnesses took such a stance of indifference toward the body in the tomb." (78: 151).

It would be a mistake to conclude from this quotation, however, that the *Jerome Biblical Commentary* represents a reactionary or merely approach to exegesis, albeit a modern approach. This charge was leveled-not without reason-against *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture.* In the latter's handling of the question of miracles, the Book of Jonah, etc., the lid was still on; editorship was cautious and not markedly venturesome. Now, with the strictures removed via Pope Pius XII's Encyclical *Divino*

Afflante Spiritu of 1943 and, more recently, via the Pontifical Biblical Commission's decree *Instruction on the Historical Tndh of the Gospels* and the Vatican II document, *Constitution on Divine Revelation,* Catholic scholars have rapidly been bridging the gap between them and their Protestant brethren. In the introduction to Peter (67: for example, the *Jerome Biblical Commentary* accepts as the probable range for its composition the period A. D. This is a far cry from the conservative dating of the book (in the middle 60's) of a decade ago (cf. *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture,*

In reviewing a tome as broad in scope as the *Jerome Biblical Commentary* it is simply impossible to analyze every section. The best one can hope to do is to hit the high spots-and the low spots, if any. What strikes this reviewer is the remarkable consistency of the disparate sections of the book; consequently, my remarks will be largely an encomium.

Under the editorship of Roland Murphy, O. Carm., the books of the Old Testament have been assigned to a squad of capable scholars, most of whom are also experienced teachers. The introduction to the Pentateuch provides expert background material on the four Mosaic traditions and the question of authorship; it likewise approaches the meaning of these five books in terms of promise, election, covenant and law. The exegesis of Genesis 1-11 reflects the character of these chapters as an historical parable. Careful attention has been given to harmonize the treatment of the other four pentateuchal books with this modern thrust. The historical and prophetical books are handled by men who have, for the most part, previously done specialized work in the area assigned them. An example in point is the fine work on Deutero-Isaiah by Carroll Stuhlmueller, C. P. Fr. Murphy himself undertook the introduction to the wisdom literature and the exegesis of three of these seven books: *Canticle of Canticles, Ecclesiastes* and *Psalms.* It is evident that the author of *The Seven Books of Wisdom* has poured his wisdom into the effort. The Rector of the Pontifical Biblical Institute R. A. F. MacKenzie, S. J., has managed to find time to contribute his rare insights to the *Book of Job.*

The New Testament section, prefaced by an oversize folding map of Palestine, has been edited by Joseph Fitzmyer, S. J., and Raymond Brown S. S. Here some surprises are immediately noticed: John L. McKenzie, S. J., has done *Matthew,* whereas the name of David Stanley, S. J., would have been expected in this area. (Fr. Stanley did the New Testament Reading Guide Series commentary on *Matthew).* And whereas Raymond Brown, S. S., would have been expected to handle *St. John's Gospel* and the *Johannine Epistles,* this assignment has been carried out by Bruce Vawter, C. M. (Fr. Brown did both the New Testament Reading Guide Series and the Anchor Bible Series commentaries on *St. John's Gospel)*. In both of these instances we get another aspect of American Catholic biblical scholarship: the versatility of these men, who are at home in

either Old or New Testament fields. Carroll Stuhlmueller, C. P., handles his New Testament specialty, the *Gospel of St. Luke,* while Fr. Fitzmyer's Pauline expertise is put to work on four of that Apostle's epistles. His skill in synthesizing St. Paul's thought is illustrated in the section on *Pauline Anthropology* (79: 117-123) where he distinguishes the concepts *soma, pneuma* and *psyche.* Throughout both Old and New Testament areas, copious, up-to-date bibliographies are provided, and the overall index to the volume seems adequate.

Though the consistency of the tome is (as noted already) admirable, this reviewer did detect minor weaknesses not at all typical of the whole work. In Article 11, *Excursus: Israel and Her Neighbors,* the section on the *Arameans* is little more than a rehash (often word-for-word) of the corresponding article in the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Bible.* The article on the *Amorites* strangely fails to mention either Mari or Hammurabi (though these terms are treated in later articles). In the New Testament section, the exegesis of the *Apocalypse* was somewhat of a disappointment. While the scholar deputed to handle this difficult book has dealt knowledgeably with the symbolism involved, I do not think that he has given sufficient attention to the sound theory of Andre Feuillet regarding the historical perspective of the *Apocalypse.* Fr. Feuillet sees chapters 4-11 as depicting God's judgment on the Jews for their rejection of Christ and persecution of Christianity. Having gained the confidence of his Christian audience by means of this pseudo-prophecy, St. John proceeds to launch into an apocalyptic judgment against the new enemy of God's people, the Roman Empire, whose destruction he foresees as imminent. An increasing number of American scholars are adopting this division of the *Apocalypse.*

It is a source of great pleasure to me to introduce the *Jerome Biblical Commentary* to readers of THE TnoMIST. Not only teachers of Scripture but more advanced students of the Bible will want to own their personal copy of this auspicious token of the flowing of American Catholic biblical scholarship. Although the rapid rate of progress in this field precludes the possibility of any accurate projection of the continued contemporaneousness of the contents of this volume, this reviewer is willing to conjecture that it will be relevant for at least a generation.

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The First Christian Century in Judaism and Christianity. Certainties and Uncertainties. By SAMUEL SANDMEL. New York: Oxford Press, 1969. Pp. 241. $6.00.

This book contains three lectures given originally at the Dubuque Theological Seminary, February 1967. The book format itself presents four lectures, amplification of the originals, together with previously unpublished notes. However, the book, according to Sandmel, is substantially the same as the lectures.

Dr. Sandmel does not aim at a definitive work synthesizing the Judaic and the Christian religio-cultural 5ituations of the first century of our common era. He considers such a task impossible for one scholar in one lifetime. Sandmel sets for himself a more modest goal: the delineation of what can be called certain knowledge and of what must be realized as presently uncertain, to the end of helping scholars avoid the fruitless search for more than can be found, as well as the scholarly horrifying prospect of seeming to find more than is in the sources.

The first lecture considers the significance of the first century C. E. for the emergence of Judaism into what can be called its modern situation of being Rabbinic in character. There are many references to Christian frame work which Sandmd deems relevant or parallel to Jewish development, but the emphasis is on Judaic religio-cultural growth. Overall, the stress is upon the limitations on their precise knowledge which the scholars must find. The result is more uncertainty than certainty about the first century C. E.

Lecture two develops in detail the growth and change evident in first-century Palestinian Judaism. Treated briefly are key elements of a changing milieu: the rise of Rabbinism, Rabbinic literature as reflective of first-century Judaic thought, Rabbinism as normative Judaism, the emergence of the Book as religiously central in late post-exilic Judaism, the reality and function of the Sanhedrin, the same for the Synagogue, Judaic universalism and particularism, the meaning and importance of Jewish sectarian influences (including Qumran) . Thoughout there occur many references to Christian and Judaic mutualities both of understanding and misunderstanding.

Lecture three concerns itself with Hellenistic Judaism in the first century. Much of this deals with Philo and the possibility of a true adapted Judaism among the Dispersion. Sandmel considers whether Paul, the Apostle, is a Rabbinic or a Hellenistic Jew and compares him with Philo.

Lecture four is simply titled "Christianity." This is noticeably the longest and most intricate of the lectures. One might try to summarize the vast amount of material presented under the generic heading of "search for precise history." The author's philosophy of history becomes evident in the exercise of his critical powers and apparatus. He calls for

a moratorium on history in the search for understanding of Christian origins. Then he continues the presentation of his own scholarly, sometimes evidenced, sometimes personal, sometimes intuitional, sometimes " bunchy " insights into the reality of Christianity through brief estimations of the Christian canonical literature. He works backward from the youngest book, II Peter, to the eldest, Mark. He considers the possibility of bridging the gap between Gospel and Jesus so as to ascertain some truth with security about Jesus, his milieu, and their interaction. Sandmel rejects the possibility, reasoning thus: the Gospel pericopes are *midrashim* (p. 189); there is no historic reliability in the "developing midrashic tradition" (p. 214, note # 35; cf. p. 188}; *midrash* is meditative piety, not history (p. 189}; therefore he is troubled " by this personal inability to go beyond the Gospels back to Jesus." (p. 191)

Dr. Sandmel is a Reform Jew. (p. 146) He defends in his" Preface and Apologia " the firm possibility that an objective, scholarly non-Christian can justly understand Christianity. He believes that in himself that possibility is actuated. Wherever in his work he consciously believes himself to be subjective, opinionated, or concluding on a " hunch," he honestly indicates this. His book is extremely controversial. Time and again he fires deprecatory critical blasts at scholars he thinks are proceeding illicitly or subjectively (e. g., p. 101, note # 15 on M. Black's article, "Pharisees," in *Interpreters' Dictionary of the Bible;* p. 215, note # 37, regarding Bomkamm and his *Jesus of Nazareth;* p. 217, note # 39, he accuses J. Jeremias of "cultivated fuzziness.") Wherever he finds what he considers good scholarly work he takes time out to offer his praise. The notes appended to each lecture (chapter) are informative and important for the perception of the author's intent, procedure, and conclusion.

The book as a whole seems to be more of an essay than a scholarly treatise because it is so personal. The personal flavor stems from the apparently calculated avoidance of extended quotations and detailed references. One must not conclude that the assertions of Dr. Sandmel are not evidenced. Many are. But there is much use of the first person and a good amount of indication that many intellectual stances and conclusions are more personal and "hunchy" (" hunch" is used many times) , backed by an overall coloration derived from wide scholarship rather than by any particular substantiating source.

In the selective bibliography many Catholic works are listed. But in the course of the book very few Catholic critical sources are referred to. This is undoubtedly due to Sandmel's N. T. education under Protestant tutelage (p. 147} and to his opinion (as of 1964, see p. 198, note # 3) that Catholic N. T. scholarship was not very much, an opinion that in recent years has improved.

For Catholics the books of the N. T. are inspired by God in such a way that they have taken on a character which makes them the rule of faith

(which rs true of many other Christian confessions). Faith itself is a supernatural gift of God to be preserved by active fidelity. The entire rationalistic presupposition of Sandmel (cf. p. 196) militates against the Catholic laudatory and grateful acceptance of the author's integral work. There are many items, insights, conclusions in this work which Catholics will receive with joy and thanks. But scholarship is not enough to perceive, or to understand, or to express the integrity of the whole N. T. as the work of the Spirit operating in the Church and in the churchmen who wrote the Books. For us to say or think that "Mark ... openly repudiates and disowns them [the disciples of Christ]" (p. note # is ridiculous, unfaithful. For us to perceive that Luke argues against Matthew and John argues against both Matthew and Luke (p. 185) is an act of blindness. For us to conceive of Luke and Matthew envisioning the Church as an entity directed by purely human leadership, while only John sees divine guidance in the Church, (p. 186) would be the contradiction of the bases (all of them) on which our faith is founded. Scholarship which reaches such conclusions is really not scholarship, or it is suffering from a malaise. Dr. Sandmel is honest, learned, and as open as he can be; all will admit this description. But that Dr. Sandmel is correct is something else again.

The bibliography is only of those books and articles read by the author, very extensive indeed. There are subject and author indices. A few editoral imperfections are present: p. appears to omit an "is "; p. Dibelius is spelled Dibelious; p. Apollos is spelled Apollass.

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Heresy in the Later Middle Ages. The Relation of Heterodoxy to Dissent, c. 1250-c. 14/50. By GoRDON LEFF. vols. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967. Pp. 800. $15.00.

Dr. Leff, who has already written good studies of Thomas Bradwardine, Gregory of Rimini and Richard Fitzralph, as well as a best seller on Medieval Thought, has now produced a very lengthy survey of heresy in the latter Middle Ages that is as important as it is impartial. His real mterests, of course, lie in the fourteenth century, but he is all too aware that many of the " heresies " in vogue then have their roots in the thirteenth. Hence his first volume is devoted to the thirteenth century (and in particular to Joachism, to internal disputes of the Franciscans and to the heresy of the Free Spirit), while his second is largely occupied with Wyclif, the Lollards and the Hussite reformation.

The great strength of Leff's book is that the author is thoroughly familiar with the vast literature, whether primary or secondary, of his subject. On some points, of course, he is content, perhaps too content, to repeat uncritically the conclusions of the many scholars who have worked on individual topics of his area-a rather obvious instance occurs in the chapter on Wyclif where, without any recourse to St. Thomas himself, Leff takes over Workman's rather simplistic presentation of St. Thomas'il expression of Transubstantiation. Almost on every page, however, there is evidence that Leff has read and re-read original sources. From this point of view his pages on Olivi are the most original, especially pp. 100-139, where he uses the unpublished *Postilla in Apocalypsim* to telling effect when showing that it was with Olivi that the problem of poverty first turned into a dispute over the *usus pauper* introduced by St. Bonaventure. However, the lengthy treatment (pp. *52-255)* of the disputes within the Franciscan Order is somewhat overburdened with data and tends to sag H little towards the end.

Perhaps the most interesting pages in this first volume are those on " The Heresy of the Free Spirit." The origins of the movement are still uncertain, as Herbert Grundmann, whose *Religiose Bewg1mgen im Mittelalter* (Hildesheim 1961) is the best study of unorthodoxy before 1300, has forcefully pointed out. Yet it was one of the most pervasive as well as subtle of the heretical movements between 1250 and 1450. Generally it was to be found among, though it is not to be identified with, the Beguines and Beghards, particularly in Germany where they were less organized than in the Low Countries and France. The central idea of the Free Spirit was that of a free intellect incapable of any wrong and occupied by an all-pervading deity. Margaret Porete of Hainault, who was tried and condemned at Paris in 1311, is a good example of the movement. Her *Mirror of Simple Souls,* written in French, survives in numerous versions (English included) of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, and an exhaustive edition and study of it has recently been published by Romana Guarnieri in *Archivio Italiano per la storia della Pieta* 4 (Rome 1965), pp. 353-708. This, as Guarnieri points out, became the " bible " of the Liberty of the Spirit movement. The dominant theme of the *Mirror* is that, when a soul is granted in this present life a full and abiding vision of the divine nature and becomes one with that nature, it is thereby set free to enjoy this union and this vision and to do nothing else. Total passivity was what Margaret taught; the existing hierarchical structures as well as Scripture and Revelation have no place in her scheme.

Dr. Leff thinks that Margaret's teaching did not go beyond " a mystical pantheism " which simply despised the distractions of the created world. But surely it is not the soundness or unsoundness of l\fargaret's teaching that is of prime importance but rather the fact that her trial and her own stubborn persistence (ending in a hideous death) led to the persecution of

the Beghards and Beguines and to the stifling of every aspiration for the laity and the unlearned in general to emerge as a potent spiritual force in the Church. Without doubt, the adherents of the Free Spirit were heretical, and generally they were crafty enough to hide themselves among the largely unlettered Beghards and Beguines; but it was a tragic mistake of the Church to root them out at the expense of the latter. Behind the Beghards and Beguines there lay that genuine desire for spiritual renewal by a return to evangelical principles that is the basis of any real reform. The plain truth, however, is that there was not, in fact, any room in the Church of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries for evangelical movements such as these. For if the lay and monastic movements of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries (those of Francis and Dominic, for example) had found an outlet for their zeal in the foundation of new religious orders, that outlet, as Leff rightly points out, was no longer possible after 1215, when the Fourth Lateran Council banned new religious orders.

A large part of Leff's second volume is taken up with more than a hundred pages (498-605) on Wyclif and the Lollards. Leff's obvious mastery of Wyclif's works makes this the most absorbing part of his work. Clearly Wyclif did not hold for *scriptura sola* in the ordinary meaning of the phrase any more then he rejected tradition: for him the Scriptures plus the *sensus apostolicus* (more or less the apostolic tradition) were the norms of the true church. What Wyclif meant by the true church is another matter. Certainly he did not mean the visible church; indeed Wyclif's single and most revolutionary step was the rejection of the ecclesiastical hierarchy-a step that in effect mounted an attack on the very existence of the Church in this world. In place of the hierarchy, Wyclif put God's Word as fittingly interpreted. The true church in the long run is the early church which, pledged to poverty, humility and charity, continued unbroken the life of Christ and the Apostles. Inasmuch as the Church of Wyclif's day (in fact the Church from Constantine onwards) had abandoned that ideal, it could no longer be considered the true church. Nor could it now have any part in interpreting the Word, since in fact it had not conformed to the Scriptures for over a thousand years.

If Wyclif's position on the Church has often been misunderstood (notably by De Vooght, *Les sources de la doctrine chretienne,* Louvain-Bruges 1954, and other writings), his teaching on the Eucharist (in *De eucharistia, De apostasia* and the *Trialogus)* is more often than not misrepresented. As Leff well shows, the change of the bread and wine into Christ's real presence remained as axiomatic for Wyclif as for his predecessors and opponents. On that point he was never heretical: his challenge was not to the accepted truth of Transubstantiation but rather to the current explanations, whether Thomist or Scotist, of how it

occurred. Wyclif's teaching, in fact, was simply a corollary of his consistent position in metaphysics. Holding that it was metaphysically impossible to have accidents without substance, he concluded that, if the bread and wine stood for Christ sacramentally, then they must continue to exist as natural bread and wine. Transubstantiation for Wyclif therefore meant the coexistence of the substance of the bread and wine elements with the sacramental presence of Christ. It is a spiritual transformation which can only be perceived as a spiritual and not as a physical presence. Of course, Wyclif never explains or suggests just how this change takes place or how this coexistence is possible, other than by postulating a miracle. Christ's presence was, he insisted, independent of human agency and physical change; the words of the priest were simply the " efficacious signs " of Christ's hidden, " figurative," sacramental presence. And it was precisely this that shocked Wyclif's contemporaries. The reaction to it was immediate. His teaching, indeed, cost him the backing of the Friars, many of whom were in agreement with him in his attacks on clerical abuses. It lost him also the support of Oxford where he was then living and where his teaching on the Eucharist was condemned (albeit narrowly) by a twelve-man commission in 1381 (a condemnation repeated at the Blackfriars Synod in London the following year).

Curiously, Wyclif saw himself as saving the Church from heresy. He was, he believed, protecting the Church both from the Scotist and Ockamist teaching that the substance of the bread and wine was annihilated to become Christ, the accidents remaining through God's omnipotence, and from the blasphemy (*abominatio desolationis)* inherent in the Thomist claim that only the accidents of bread and wine remained after the consecration. On this matter, as indeed in all his other teaching, Wyclif was convinced that it was he, and not the Church of his day, who was on the side of orthodoxy and of apostolic tradition.

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The Judgment of the Dead: The Idea of Life After Death in the Major Religions. By S. G. F. BRANDON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. 312. $6.95.

The comparative studies of Professor Brandon, more popularly known ior his controversial *Jesus and the* have multiplied considerably in recent years. In this work he examines the judgment of the dead and its obvious corollary, *post-mortem* existence, in ten world traditions. From the outset he tells us that he is a historian of religion who employs " the

same methods and techniques of research as are used by his colleagues in other fields of historical inquiry." (p. ix) His focus, therefore, is two-edged: historical and comparative.

It is in Egypt where he first identifies a sophisticated concept of *post-mortem* judgment, and this is probably the most thorough and satisfying chapter. The selection of texts, the historical development of the concept, and the interpretation is executed with perception and care. However, the thoroughness evidenced in this single chapter is not found again in the book. With Mesopotamia, the Graeco-Roman traditions, the Hebrew religion, Christianity, and Islam, there is no attempt to consider the cumulative tradition adequately. The texts are not comprehensive and seem to be selected frequently at random; most importantly, the historical perspective is lost as he rapidly generalizes in order to compare the concept with other traditions. The final chapters dealing with the judgment of the dead in India, China, and Japan are mere sketches. Indian Buddhism is covered in three pages and the tradition of Japan in four pages! There is little effort to trace the concept through the historical and philosophical stages with the subtle transitions in meaning and significance so necessary in Eastern thought.

The real concern of Brandon is to show that judgment of the dead presupposes an established judicial process in the various religious traditions. In the *Epilogue* this is one of the primary conclusions. (p. 193) But it does not seem that he clearly proves it in many of the traditions considered and certainly not in the Eastern world. Nonetheless, the general conclusions are credible: for example, belief in judgment after death depends on the conception of what part of the human personality survives after death. (p. 194) Also, in the theistic traditions judgment is linked to the concept of the deity to such a degree that it follows from almost a theological necessity. (p. 195) In those cultures where metempsychosis or reincarnation dominate, judgment of the dead is not a theological necessity but the termination of a natural process. (p. 194-5)

Brandon has an excellent grasp of the *Weltanschauung* of the traditions and, whether consiously or not, uses this as a principle of interpretation. However, in the process he is unable to retain the historical context of the material. This book reflects a major problem in the study of the history of religions: namely, methodology. Brandon quickly loses the historical methodology with which he began. Since the concept of *post mortem* judgment is seen as the result of a world-view, this study is more concerned with the morphology- the forms, structure, patterns- of the belief and, consequently, is a systematic and not an historical work.

Is Brandon really *doing* what the historian of religion does? It depends first on the validity of his data, and in this case, considering the vast range of the study, his data is only as good as his sources. Since textual criticism, moreover, is limited and even absent with some of the major

religious texts of the world traditions, a comparative study at this stage seems premature. To determine what is common/different is an arduous task because *lil£e* must be compared with *like.* Ohm has long ago warned historians of religion that reality must be compared with reality, doctrine with doctrine, and ideal with ideal. When this is not realized, the comparisons become generalizations and in many cases highly suspect and possibly misleading and erroneous.

The major problem with Brandon's work is the lack of a hermeneutical principle by which the data that he has drawn upon from scnpture, philology, philosophy, history, etc., can be harmonized without destroying the value of the disciplines' conclusions. In short, this study is too comprehensive to be definitive. It would be more profitable for Brandon and for many other historians of religion to limit themselves- if they think they are ready for comparison- to two tmditions at the most .

. .*The Judgment of the Dead* is not without merit. The few generalizations that Brandon makes are stated with great caution, which shows that he is keenly aware that the historian of religion at this stage of comparative study can only conclude to approximations. Even in comparing common data, one only approximates the other. Over one hundred pages of notes permit the reader to delve more seriously into source material and central ideas. The plates (12) and line drawings (9) enhance the book considerably. Although the bibliography is weak at some points (Christianity and especially the Eastern traditions), the indices are exceptionally well done. Above all, Professor Brandon has given us another interesting and attractive book.

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La Trinite et le Mystere de l'existence. By JEAN DANnnwu. Meditations 'fheologiques. No. 3. Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1968. Pp. 120. 75 FB.

This paperback contains a number of lectures on the Trinity given during a retreat by the now Cardinal Danielou. The author's purpose is to show how the Trinity is at the center not only of our creeds and theology but of our very existence and spiritual life. In the first four chapters he discusses the common life of the Trinity, its manifestation in creation, its presence within man, as revealed through Christ, the perfection of personality. Then he analyses the mystery of the communication of God's life to man, taking each divine person singularly in the last three chapters. This review of the contents of the book cannot express the skill with which the author introduces theology and then draws out the moral relevance

for the Christian. His thought is simple, and he avoids overloading the meditations with modern controversies about the divine indwelling.

Danielou's book is timely for more than one reason. When theology is being so greatly influenced by what one may call "historicity," Christians may need to be reminded that Jesus of Nazareth is also the Eternal Word of God. Moreover, when the Church is initiating dialogue with men of other faiths, a common ground may be found with Hindus and Buddhists in this aspect of the Christian faith rather than in presenting the historical incarnation of Christ. I do not know if this book will be part of the English edition of the "Theological Meditations." It would be a pity if it were omitted, for it is an excellent example of theology and meditation.

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Theologia Moralis. By ALPHONSUS VAN KoL, S. J. Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1968. Vol. I, pp. 8£4, $17.14; Vol. II, pp. 716, $19.£8.

These compendious volumes represent the first appearance since Vatican II of a complete moral theology manual. In view of the literature that has been written on the necessity of a renewal of moral theology, seconded by the Council itself, the present work will not satisfy those who are looking for a radically new approach in content or in format. This is no such rewrite or eye-catching presentation. Vol. I treats of General Moral Theology: *de vita theologali-the* theological virtues and the virtue of Christian humanity (a special virtue for the author, distinct from theological charity, natural in substance and supernatural in mode, whose object is the proper natural goodness of man) ; *de vita cultuali-the* virtue of religion; *de vita morali-the* cardinal virtues. Vol. II is entirely devoted to the sacraments, in which the author had the collaboration of his fellow Dutchman, P. Huizing, S. J., in the tracts on Holy Order and Matrimony.

The use of the Latin language is explained by Fr. Van Kol's intent to make his text universally usable. Moreover, it has been left to the reader to apply the moral doctrine to the circumstances and positive law of his own country, especially in matters of justice. Casuistic considerations have been reduced to a necessary minimum. Highly technical words have been also translated into the seven major vernacular tongues. The bibliographies amply diffused throughout the volumes give a sampling of the pertinent literature up through the early sixties. They contain some British and American works but more Dutch and European references. The passages of Vatican II and the recent documents of the Holy See,

including *Pastorale Munus* and *De Episcoporum Muneribus,* are appropriately employed throughout.

Some further improvements over previous manuals of this type may be listed. An interesting change is the exclusive location of the tract on marilal and extra-marital chastity in Vol. I under temperance rather than in connection with Matrimony. A more extensive treatment is given to the pathological impediments to the freedom of the human act, to situation ethics, to the Christological aspect of the virtues, to religious liberty, to cooperation *in sacris,* to sex education. Following Pius XII the author rejects the opinion which in principle absolves youths who commit masturbatory acts from all sin or from grave sin. He supports the view that a woman who is in danger of being raped may take the anti-conception pill. Written before the publication of *Humanae Vitae,* the text strictly adheres to the norms of Paul VI. The author opts for a middle position on periodic abstinence, justifying it in its relationship to the finality of marriage and for matrimonial motives. The special question of overpopulation is also considered. A chapter of some fourteen pages is devoted to the question of war, with notes on the lawfulness of a preventive war and on the justice of universal conscription and of conscientious objection.

In the second volume we can note the evaluation of the special intention of the Mass celebrant, e. g., that the intention of a stipend is no more efficacious than other accompanying special intentions, and that, in lieu of any other, the celebrant himself is in a way a special intention. Fr. Van Krol holds that the eucharistic fast cannot be considered to bind gravely in conscience and that devotion is a sufficient reason to celebrate Mass without a server. The bibliography of Marriage hardly cites a work appearing in the 1960's.

These volumes provide a helpful post-Conciliar source book for the moral professor and useful auxiliary reading for students.

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Religious Trends in English Poetry. Volume VI: 1920-1965, Valley of Dry Bones. By HOXIE NEALE FAIRCHILD. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 535. $12.50.

This volume marks the conclusion of a massive work of literary scholarship. Its author, who is Professor of English Emeritus of Hunter College and who was for many years a distinguished member of the faculty of Columbia University here concludes the work of more than thirty years. It is the fruit not only of mature scholarship but also of what still may

be thought of as Christian wisdom. Professor Fairchild is not simply a learned critic and literary historian; he is a man who deeply understands both the distinctions and the close relationships between religion and poetry, lo say nothing of the same distinctions and relationships that exist between poetry and theology. It is not a book that will afford much satisfaction to those who follow fads of either the literary or the theological variety. Nor does it provide easy comfort for any who may be in search of assurances that in writers like Auden or Eliot there is evidence that " Christian poetry " can and will survive in a very non-Christian world.

The book deals with English and American poets who, in the period between and 1965, have established some claim to a place in the history of poetry. The treatment, however, is topical rather than chronological. It begins with an analysis of what its author, who is professedly an Anglo-Catholic Christian, calls "the Situation": "The modern temper. Hollow men eating their naked lunches in the Waste Land while awaiting Godot. ... " The Situation shows itself as widely pervading the thinking not only of aesthetic nihilists like Allen Ginsberg but the " cool " academic poets as well.

Fairchild makes a blunt distinction between what he describes as the antithetical Christian and romantic attitudes towards the Situation: " The Christian will see it as the inevitable collapse of a *false* faith in man. The romantic will see it as the cowardly and perverse abnegation of a *true* faith in man, and he will hold the Christian largely responsible for this apostasy." This latter viewpoint is, for example, represented by Kathleen Nott in *The Emperor's Clothes* (1958)-a work which attacks Eliot, C. S. Lewis, Dorothy Sayers, Graham Greene and others in the name of science, liberalism, and human progress.

The book, employing this distinction between the Christian and romantic attitudes towards the Situation, is primarily concerned not with technical problems of literary criticism but with what " poets think and feel about the world in which they, and we, are living." And Fairchild is well aware that this is an approach which will not commend itself to those who still hold to the outworn fad of " the autonomous poem," which exists as an artifact in total detachment from all other considerations. He traces the rise and fall of this curious theory and notes its continued survival in the graduate schools of some American universities: "No self-respecting graduate student would dare ascribe a statement by Yeats to Yeats: the words were uttered by a mysterious Speaker, or better, the Persona. In my opinion this is nonsense. Yeats wore many masks, but through each of them he meant to express some aspect of his multiplex nature."

Literature, in Fairchild's view, is very much a part of the history of ideas; it reflects, and helps to form, the spirit of its age. But poetry in this century has become "a diminished thing." Fairchild traces the sense

of alienation and the loss of an audience which is felt in Shapiro, Roethke, Aiken, and Barker. But he also notes that few of those who see their art as a diminshed force in the modern world will also regard it as something which is vanishing. On the contrary, some, like Wallace Stevens, see poetry as the true surrogate for a vanished religion, while others have sought to employ the image of the poet as magician and medicine man, as did Hart Crane or Dylan Thomas. But the experimentation and the autonomy theories of the twenties, the social consciousness of the thirties, and the cool academic verse of more recent times have left little fertile soil for the l'omantic vision of the poet as prophetic genius.

Fairchild explores the socially conscious poetry of the thirties as seen in such writers as Day Lewis, Hugh MacDiarmid (Christopher Murray Grieve) and the earlier Auden. This social consciousness, some of which survives, he finds also in the difficult religious allegories of Charles Williams and other Christian writers, who grope for a vision of a world in which men serve one another because they would first serve God. And in individual chapters he carefully traces the effects of war, science, technology, and the machinery of urban life upon the poets of the last forty years. And he finds much to commend in the work of David Jones in *The Anathemata* (1952) . Jones, he finds, is one writer who has made a fruitful attempt to "harmonize the sacramental symbol and the poetic image and to show that this harmony cannot long survive the art of a technocratic culture, where there is no real escape for the poet in McLuhan's philosophy of mass-media communications." As Fairchild's perceptive observation has it: " It will be difficult for poets to derive much satisfaction from a philosophy so hostile to the written and spoken word, so obviously fabricated by a professor of English who has grown sick of books."

Fairchild concludes that in the modern poets who do not share the Christian outlook there is no salvation from the Situation in either nature or love. The end for them is nihilism, and it is left to the Christian writers to affirm life and the redemption of time. He sees much modern poetry as nothing less-or more-than a late phase of the Romantic Movement. Its fountainhead was the tradition of the nineteenth century which finally blended with the symbolism of the dying years of the *fin de siecle* and was followed by the eccentricities of surrealism. In turn came the movement called " Apocalyse," of which Henry Treece is an example. This prophetic development preceded the Second World War and was followed by the " neoromanticism " of people like Francis Scarfe, who displayed a deep faith in the power of poetry to make a better world.

In his final chapter, Fairchild notes that the list of modern poets who have become converts to Christianity is impressive: Eliot, Auden, David Jones, Edith Sitwell, Alfred Noyes, Roy Campbell, Robe1t Lowell, Thomas Merton, Siegfried Sassoon, C. D. Lewis, Allen Tate, Cleanth

Brooks, and Elizabeth Jennings. He also observes that Mark Van Doren, Elder Olson and Yvor Winters seem to believe everything that a Christian should believe "except the Christian Faith itself."

But the problem of religious poets is greater now than ever before, for, as Auden says, there is a lack of belief in the endurance of the physical, the reality of the evidence of the senses, the perdurance of human nature, and the loss of the public realm as the sphere in which personal deeds are actually revealed. Nor does the traditional shoptalk of Catholicism engage with modern life and the " unbaptized raw material of our time."

After examining the work of professedly Christian poets, most of whom are either Roman Catholic or Anglican, Fairchild asks what the future may hold for a Christian poetry that appears to be " often submerged in the Situation which it seeks to amend." And his conclusion is scarcely comforting in tone: " Quantitatively it is almost negligible in comparison with the output of writers who ignore or oppose supernatural religion. Qualitatively, it is torn between the dread of pious triteness and the dread of heresy; the desire to edify and the desire to make works of art; the desire to communicate and the desire to be modishly inexplicit. These conflicts can be exhausting."

To those who may share Professor Fairchild's devotion to classical Christian orthodoxy, but not his use of labels and his delight in the abusing of the various shades of " romanticism," this book will prove at times irritatingly simplistic in its judgments. But it is nonetheless an imposing enterprise in apologetics supported by an equally imposing array of literary historical scholarship in a tradition of which this volume may be the last example ever to appear.

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A Trilogy on Wisdom and Celibacy. By J. MASSINGBERT FoRD. Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 256. $7.95.

This attractively-produced book sets out to challenge four common assumptions:

1) " that the words bethulah, parthenos and virgo denote *virginitas intacta"* (they have, in fact, the author says, wider connotations than is generally believed, and the contexts in which they appear must be scrutinized to discover whether they should bear the meaning of " youthfulness " or " celibacy ") .

2) "that from the earliest times these terms in the Latin and Greek

tongue were used as frequently, or more frequently, in reference to women than to men" (in fact, linguistic evidence suggests that the word *parthenos* was used as frequently for men as for women, and that the word *eunuchos* was the most common word for a celibate man).

3) "that the earliest written record of Christian teaching on celibacy is found in I Cor. 7, and that the recipients of this epistle included a group of women (and possible men) celibates who had already established themselves in the newly founded Christian community at Corinth " (in reality I Cor. 7 is speaking of young widows and widowers living in a Jewish-Christian community which clings rather tenaciously to traditional social patterns, class distinctions and questions that exercised Jewish teachers both before and after Paul).
4) "that numerous Christians contemporary with Jesus (for example, Paul and some of the disciples) and also those of the sub-apostolic age embraced lives of consecrated celibacy" (in fact, these do not appear to have embraced any form of absolute celibacy).

Mrs. Ford's conclusions are based on a striking familiarity with exegetical writings and techniques and with rabbinical sources. There is not, she states, any clear reference to the practice of celibacy among peoples of the Jewish faith in the pre-Christian era. (pp. 23-58) As for the Christian era, celibacy became practical and popular only in the mid-third century, which is much later than the time usually assigned to it. Chapters on celibacy in the New Testament (pp. 59-128), in the writings of the sub-apostolic Fathers and of the Apologists (pp. 129-145), in those of Clement of Alexandria and Origen (pp. 146-164) and of Tertullian (pp. 165-215), serve amply to document her point. For Dr. Ford, indeed, the origins of celibacy are not to be found in any Gnostic aberrations or misogamic tendencies of these sources. Rather, she finds its beginnings in the attitude of Jewish teachers of the first and second century to continence. These teachers, it is clear, adopted temporary continence in order to enable themselves to be free to study and to spread the love of the Torah. This link between continence and the pursuit of wisdom also appears among the early Christians, probably under the influence of the rabbinical approach. Just as the rabbis sacrificed the greater part of their conjugal life for the love of Torah-Wisdom, so Christian men were prepared, for the love of the living and new Torah, Jesus, to imitate to the full their Master who had never married (and Christian women, later, to follow that of Mary). Thus, Dr. Ford claims, celibacy evolved " not from the influence of pagan superstitions concerning marriage, coition and women, or from heretical Gnostic teaching, but rather from a love and pursuit after Wisdom that now was hypostatized in Jesus Christ, the Living Torah."

Mrs. Ford's book is as stimulating as it is tranquil. Here and there,

however, it is marred by some sloppy proof-reading as well as by one or two hasty sentences or translations. Thus Tertullian's statement, "Et cum haec etiam de primis et unis nuptiis praetendi ad causam continentiae possint, quanto magis secundo matrimonio recusando praeiudicabunt," is made nonsense of in the translation " Furthermore, since arguments of this kind can be used to urge abstention from even a first and second marriage, how much more valid are they against contracting a second." (p. 109) With respect to Tertullian, indeed, the author also states *(ibid.)* that Tertullian does not " admit celibacy as a general practice," citing *De monogamia* 3.1, where in fact what Tertullian says is that "complete and absolute virginity or continence" is not obligatory, but that even if it were, " such legislation would not be an innovation, since the Lord himself opened the Kingdom of Heaven to eunuchs and indeed lived as a eunuch himself." It is curious, too, that there is no discussion of the famous " Quanti igitur et quantae " in Tertullian's *De exhortatione castitatis* 13.4: " How many men, and how many women, among the orders of the Church, have preferred, in the name of continence, to marry only God.... " Perhaps celibacy was present in the Church a shade earlier than Dr. Ford so repeatedly maintains.

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Kierkegaard. The Difficulty of Being Christian. Texts edited and introduced by JACQUES CoLETTE, O. P. English version by RALPH McINERNY and LEo TuRcOTTE. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968. Pp. 3fl6. $5.95.

Another Kierkegaard anthology seemed hardly needed. Several are available which bring out various aspects of Kierkegaard's thought. Yet Fr. Colette hit upon a new idea, and a very good one. Instead of covering a variety of topics or surveying the chronological stages of Kierkegaard's oeuvre, he decided to retrace in Kierkegaard's words the intrinsic dialectic which is the moving force of his entire work and which no single work can convey. Upon completing a study on Kierkegaard's dialectic of Christian existence some years ago, this reviewer felt how much stronger the impression would be if it could be communicated in the philosopher's own words. So, naturally, he was happy to see the idea finally realized. Yet a strange thing strikes the reader immediately. Instead of one development the author presents two: an intellectual one, from ignorance to revelation, and an emotive-voluntary one, from anguish to love. Why did he prefer this dualistic presentation when Kierkegaard's own thought is marvelously united? The an!lwer is found in Colette's ninety-page introduction which

demonstrates the editor's inability or unwillingness to grasp the unifying dialectic of Kierkegaard's work. He restricts himself to haphazard remarks on themes essential to this dialectic, often appropriate but mostly extrinsic to Kierkegaard's own development. He states, by way of conclusion, that Kierkegaard's thought can be of help to a believer in an a-religious intellectual climate. But he never quite decided whether he wanted to pursue the religious problematic of the modern Christian or the dialectic of Kierkegaard (as he promised). The initiated reader will find his way through these texts without profiting much from presentation or introduction. The beginner will receive an equally small amount of enlightenment from the editor, if he ever attempts to reach, beyond mere" reading," an understanding of Kierkegaard's inner dialectic.

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Moral Knowledge and its Methodology in Aristotle. By J. DoNALD MoNAN. New York: The University of Oxford Press, 1968. Pp. 163. *$5.50.*

The general aim of the book is to focus upon the methodology of moral knowledge as Aristotle presents it in the *Protrepticus,* the *Nicomachean Ethics,* and the *Eudemian Ethics.* Dr. Monan abstracts a dual focus in the three works: on the one side, there is what Aristotle explicitly states moral knowledge to be; on the other, there is an implicit doctrine of moral knowledge in the argumentation actually employed.

In the *Protrepticus* we are confronted with two life-ideals: the intellectualistic (contemplation or thought) and the activistic (civics, politics, and/or conduct). Each ideal has its basis in a different psychology: thE' former identifies man with *nous;* the latter views man as an honorable animal. The attempt to unify these two teleologically is unsuccessful. When this work is viewed implicitly, we find that the "justification of a life-ideal consists in a reflection upon common opinion and upon pre-philosophic, affective experiences of value." (p. 34)

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* moral k:10wledge is based upon praxis and phronesis (practical wisdom) which is grounded in demonstration, induction, and intellectual intuition. The general result is that the teleological unification of action and value is only partially successful. The implicit doctrine illustrates that an experimental base is employed for value analysis; it is conveyed through the ordinary use of value-language and its rationalization.

The same duality of method is encountered in his analysis of happiness.

Aristotle says that it can be based on the common opmwn of the many or it can be psychologically deduced from the proper function of man. In effect, he explicitly bases his argumentation on the former and implicitly grounds it in the latter.

Since the *Eudemian Ethics* closely parallels the *Nicomachean Ethics,* attention now is given only to the implicit doctrine used in the treatise. The basic difference is that while the NE defines man in terms of *nons,* the EE is less rationalistic, conceiving man in terms of *psyche.* EE's analysis of happiness, then, looks towards integrating the intellectual and moral virtues in a concrete vein.

The style of the book is difficult; the general thesis seems plausible and should spark some serious discussion.

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Foundations of Theory. By WILLIAM YouNG. Nutley. N.J.: Craig Press, 1967. Pp. 13!i!. $3.75.

Many a professional philosopher has had the experience, in the reading of countless articles in philosophical journals, of saying to himself: yes, you are correct, but only if I grant you your suppressed premises. These are required by your argument but are questionable. You assume what is most debatable and beg the question.

Professor Young wants to avoid this, and hence he poses for himself the problem of the ultimate justification of Theoretical Thought. " This study envisages the question of logical rather than factual presuppositions of Theoretical Thought, the warrant for assurance that Theoretical Thought is valid rather than the *de facto* conditions of the existence of Theoretical Thought." (p. VIII)

The book is small, but the quality is excellent. The author always gets down to fundamentals. He does not use the term " theory " to cover up problems. He devotes one chapter to the analysis of this term, giving a careful consideration to the distinction between theories, hypotheses, and laws, and also to the confusion in contemporary thought, because they are not recognized. In answering the question as to what is a " Theoretical " in contradistinction to a "non-Theoretical" language, the author gives one of the best analyses I have seen of the distinctions which should (but often are not) made between the "analytic" and the "a priori." (pp. 51, 5!i!)

All philosophers-and who is not guilty?-use the notion of "presupposition," often without regard to what *it* presupposes. Professor Young gives an analysis of this idea. His distinction between " presuppose " and " premise," although not new, is most interesting.

The most important part of the author's analysis, and that to which all his work converges, is in the last two chapters, especially the last, the title of which is " Theory and Theism." There is an ingenious argument that the agnostic's position is coherent only on the supposition of atheism. And he adds: "If the claim of radical theism is discredited on the ground that it is open to question, the ground by which it is discredited is itself discredited." (p. VI)

The author's conclusion, the last sentence in the book, as to the justification of Theoretical Thought is: " If meaning depends on God and the original awareness of God is non-Theoretical, the presupposition of God as the Origin of meaning may be reckoned to be the ultimate non-Theoretical factor in the foundations of Theoretical Thought." (p. 117)

Now this conclusion is certainly compatible with the author's "radical theism," which of necessity denies the " autonomy of Theoretical Thought." But, it is not clear to the writer how all this is compatible with the task the author sets for himself, which is (I) to justify Theoretical Thought only " logically," avoiding all " factual presuppositions " (p. VIII) , and (2) to limit the argument therefore to the matter of validity rather than truth.

Is the contradiction here apparent or real? Professor Young, in one place, seems to be sensitive to this question and lays down the " claim " that " God is the Origin of all meaning " can be translated into " God is the Creator of the world." He admits that this is an "odd formulation." Such a translation is possible in terms of Hegelianism, which the author obviously wishes to avoid. But otherwise, is it possible?

The chapter notes and comments are both interesting and informative and also reflect the author's linguistic ability in many languages. It is unfortunate that the publishers did not add an Index.

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The Freedom of Man in Myth. By KEES W. BoLLE. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968. Pp. 213. *$5.00.*

Biographical references on the cover introduce Dr. Bolle as an author who " spends his leisure playing the piano and clarinet, doing woodcarving, and teaching Latin to his children." The table of contents mentions as key topics: myth, humor and mysticism. This is rather a strange combination. Therefore, one can get the impression that the book may be more amateurism than real scholarly work.

The first chapters discuss the great publications on myth and religion:

van der Leeuw, Wach, de Vries, Jockel, Esnoul, Eliade, Long. Further in the book the author refers to the less well-known philosophical work: "Mythe et Foe," which is the result of one of the yearly conferences directed by Enrico Castelli at Rome. This convinces one of the solid scholarly effort put in the book, although it is still a shame that the philosophical work on myths by P. Ricoeur, "The Symbolism of Evil," is not mentioned.

Part I (pp. 3-93) discusses the myth; Part II (pp. 97-185) discusses the relation between myth and mysticism. In an appendix (pp. 187-192) we find a translation of parts of the Ramiiyana, often referred to by the author. Finally there is an index (pp. 193-199).

In the part on myth the author discusses the classical publications on myth and argues that philosophical presuppositions are present in the study of myths. "Establishing their structure means necessarily attributing more weight to some myths than to others" (p. 19) or ". . . no single factor is enough to account fully for the myth." The author himself tends to follow here the basic ideas of Eliade by emphasizing the primacy of the cosmogenic myth (pp. 14-15) and by accepting some special characteristics of it. (p. 34)

The originality of the author is that he has seen that the interest in myths must have something to do with the problems of our own civilization. The link between the world of the myth and our world Professor Bolle finds in the characteristics of humor. Humor is the capacity to abolish extremes or untolerable situations in life. Since the romantic period humor and irony have suddenly been very successful. The same romantic period revived the interest in ancient religions and in myths. (p. 36) It is the fundamental thesis of Professor Bolle that the myths are also abolishing extremes and intolerable situations. It is this capability of the myths, says the author, which allows the myth to perform its function, i. e., "to liberate man from the exhausting and deadening order of things in his common experience." (p. 86)

As such, myths are general orientations for the life of a culture. (p. 178) Mysticism is the capacity to experience life as presented in the basic myth, but thereby also interpreting and changing the myth. If the interpretation is felt by the culture to be what everybody intuitively felt himself, then we have a popular mystic: Augustine, Francis of Assisi, Ignatius of Loyola. (p. 98) If the interpretation of the mystic is clearly a change of the basic myth, the mystic may frighten the culture and provoke his condemnation, e. g., Jacob Boehme.

At the end the author analyses one particular myth, our myth of scientism, and refers to one of its most popular mystics, Einstein. Aware of his limitations as a historian of religion Dr. Bolle ends his book by appealing to the philosopher "to spell out ... where our mythology should go...." (p. 185) Ricoeur has attempted to give us a guideline, but the

philosophical choice made by P. Ricoeur is fundamentally different from the one made by K. W. Bolle. Professor Bolle has chosen humor to explain the myth. Professor Ricoeur has taken the seriousness of the quest for truth as his guideline.

Having been a student of Professor Ricoeur myself, the reading of Professor Bolle's book has had a disturbing influence on our vision of the problem of myth. We find the disturbance, however, very promising and strangely enough profoundly liberating. The book *The Freedom of Man in Myth* has itself a capacity of making free!

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Sancti Thomae Aq1tinatis Vitae Fontes Praecipuae. Edited by ANGELICO FERRUA, O. P., with an introduction by ANTOINE DoNDAINE, O. P. Alba: Edizioni Domenicane, 1968. Pp. 411. L.2.500.

The present volume makes conveniently accessible the chief sources for the life of Thomas Aquinas. Such a volume has long been needed, since the earlier edition of D. Priimmer and M. H. Laurent (Toulouse, s. d.), whose texts this volume reproduces, has long been out print and is not found on the shelves of most libraries. The texts are not critical but will satisfy all but the professional historian until a critical text can be produced.

As the title indicates, this volume does not present the full dossier of early documents for the life of Thomas; nevertheless, it publishes the two major primary sources that have value: the *Historia beati Thomae de Aquino* of William of Tocco, and the *Processus canonizationis sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Neapoli.* It also includes one other major work, the *Legenda sancti Thomae Aquinatis* of Bernard Gui, which adds nothing to Tocco's work except better organization and a finer style. Concluding the volume are four short selections concerning Thomas: a) from the *Historia Ecclesiastica Nova* and b) the *Annales* of Ptolomey of Lucca, c) from the *Vitae Fmtrum* of Gerard of Frachet, and d) from the *Bonum Universale* of Thomas of Cantimpre. Of these only Ptolomey's passages, coming from an eyewitness who was a historian, have historical value. These early sources are preceded by the text of Pius V's bull: *Mirabilis Deus,* declaring Thomas a doctor of the Church, 1567. The editor introduces each selection with a short biographico-historical study, numbers the paragraphs of all the selections consecutively, and provides several indices and a select bibliography. The sources omitted are the *Life* of Thomas (1340) by Peter Calo (a reworking of Tocco) and the canonization process at

Fossanova which dealt solely with posthumous miracles of Thomas.

The documents here published have not only a hagiographical interest (the major pieces were produced in connection with the canonization of Thomas, 1323) but also record many passages of great human quality. The *Historia* of Tocco and the Naples Process have independent value and complement each other, despite a few contradictions in minor details, e. g., the venue of a cure. The canonization process took place in Naples in September, 1319, forty-five years after the death of Thomas. Despite this distance in time, the depositions have an exceptional value by reason of the quality and character of the forty-two lay and clerical witnesses. Some of them were men eminent in their professions: the Abbot of Fossanova; William of Tocco, Dominican prior of Benevento; John of Naples, master of theology at Paris; John di Blasio, judge and friend of the Queen of Sicily; John of Gaeta, doctor of laws; Bartholomew, logethete and protonotary of the kingdom of Sicily. Furthermore, seventeen of the witnesses had either lived with Thomas or heard him preach or teach. Judge John di Blasio had known him for ten years and conversed with him frequently during half that time. The Dominican Conrad of Suessa had known him at Rome and Orvieto. The remaining witnesses relate information they had received from people who had been close to Thomas. Bartholomew of Capua got the substance of his testimony from John of St. Julien, the prior who gave Thomas the habit and was captured with him by the brothers of Thomas when he joined the Dominicans. Reginald of Piperno, the friend and faithful assistant of Thomas, stood behind the testimony of Leonard of Gaeta and John di Buiano.

Reginald was also the chief gurarantor of the *llistoria* of Tocco. Many of the details there recorded had been entrusted to Reginald by Thomas and were known to him alone. The *llistoria* supplies considerable information not found in the Naples Process. It is punctuated by lengthy pious reflections that mar the simplicity that otherwise characterizes it. Tocco had been collecting information about Thomas for about twenty years before he composed the *Historia* in 1318. The second part, containing miracle-accounts, was added between 1318 and 1320. Tocco presented the first part of the *llistoria* and a collection of miracles he had made to John XXII at Avignon, about 1318, in view of the canonization of Thomas.

Father Dondaine enriches the edition with his fine introduction. Drawing on his own critical sense, he effectively removes the doubt, based on an unperceptive study of, or failure to study, the documents, that has shrouded the " Bene-dixisti-de-me Thoma" incident since the 17th century. Dondaine shows that it is solidly reliable.

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Paul Tillich's Appraisal of St. Thomas' Teaching on the Act of Faith. By THEODORE HALL, O. P. Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1968. Pp. 104.

This work is part of a doctoral dissertation from the pontifical faculty of theology of the University of St. Thomas Aquinas at Rome, better known as" The Angelicum." The first two sections summarize the teaching on faith of Paul Tillich and St. Thomas respectively. In the third section the author gives an evaluation of the teaching of St. Thomas within the appraisal of Paul Tillich who charges the Angelic Doctor with a voluntaristic distortion of the meaning of faith. Such a charge implies an intellectualistic distortion which is the basis of the voluntaristic. And so Father Hall replies to both charges before giving his thomistic critique of Tillich's teaching on faith. The concluding section is his own reply to the responses made by Paul Tillich to several critics of his theological notions. The author concludes that the teaching of St. Thomas on the act of faith must be upheld before Tillich's appraisal for several reasons; for example, the alleged distortions disappear when the Common Doctor's doctrine is considered adequately in the fuller context of his theology, and Tillich's teaching itself is subjectivistic.

The expository and evaluatory sections are concise and orderly. Within the confines of this brief review it is impossible to be detailed in our comments. As a general observation, however, greater clarity would have been added by a more extensive consideration of certain points, particularly in regards to Tillich's thoughts and arguments. The reader who is interested in pursuing these might find them in the complete dissertation as the table of contents would seem to indicate.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Barnes & Noble, Inc.: *Reason, Truth and God,* by Renford Bambrough (pp. 164, $5.00); *Greek Thought and the Rise of Christianity,* ed. by Hugh F. Kearney (pp. 161, paperback).

Beauchesne: *Les Profondeurs de la Grace,* by J.-H. Nicolas, O. P. (pp. 43,50 F.).

Bruce Publishing Co.: *An Interpretation of Existence,* by Joseph Owens (pp. 153).

Corpus Books: *The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth,* by Colm O'Grady (pp. 376, $10.00); *I Saw a New Earth.* An Introduction to the Visions of the Apocalypse, by Paul S. Minear (pp. 411, $10.00).

Desclee de Brouwer: *Consultation Internationale sur le Non-Etre.* Dialogue philosophique, by Roger Lapointe (pp. 159, 150 FB) .

Duns Scotus College, Southfield, Mich.: *Scotus Speaks Today.* Seventh Centenary Symposium (pp. $4.00 paper) .

Fides Publishers Inc.: *The Jahwist.* The Bible's First Theologian, by Peter Ellis, C. SS. R. (pp. 319, $8.95); *Teaching High School Religion Through Literature.* II (Teachers Manual), by Jane Syburg (pp. 61, paperback); *Principles.* An Anthology of Readings, selected by Jane Syburg (pp. paperback).

Harper & Row: *Letters to Leontine Zanta,* by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (pp. $4.00).

Harvard University Press: *Concepts of Space.* The History of Theories of Space in Physics, by Max Jammer (pp. *$5.50).*

B. Herder Book Co.: *As I Loved You,* by M. J. Andre (pp. 149, *$5.50).*

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.: *Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times,* by Nathan Rotenstreich (pp. $6.50); *Leo Baeck: Teacher of Theresienstadt,* by Albert H. Friedlander (pp. $8.95); *The Bhagavad Gita,* tr. with Introd. & Critical Essays by Eliot Deutsch (pp. $4.95).

Lateran University: *Dalla Fenomenologia Pura alla Trascendenza Assoluta,* by Mario Valentino Ferrari, O. P. (pp. 95); *La Verita dell'Uomo,* by Luigi Bogliolo (pp. 313); *Filosofia e Cristianesimo.* Discussioni Recenti, by Duilio Bonifazi (pp. 154) ; *La Base del Realismo e la Critica Neokantiana,* by Mons. Luigi Chiesa (pp. 163); *La Dimensione Trinitaria del Carattere Sacramentale,* by Crescenso Sepe (pp. 175) ; *Incontro con Cristo.* Credibilita della Religione Cristiana, by Vladimir Boublik (pp. 3U); *La Recezione del Diritto Civile nel Diritto Canonico,* by Mons. Ovidio Cassola (pp. 163); *De Ieiunio et*

Abstinentia in Ecclesia Byzantina ab Initiis usque ad Saec. XI, by Joachim Herbut (pp. 143); *Vallepietra dalle Origini alla Fine del Saecolo XIX,* by Filippo Carafl'a (pp. 309); *La Pontificia Universita Lateranense nel 1968* (pp.

Liberia Editrice Salesiana: *Per Un Nuovo Spi1-itualismo Cristiano.* Saggi di Pluralismo Filosofico-Teologico Ispirato alla Dottrina Essenziale dei Padri e Dottori, by Giuseppe Muzio (pp. 80).

Liviana Editrice: *Del Principia di Creazione* o *del Significato,* by Allessandro Cortese (pp. 168).

McGill University Press: *Standing and Understanding.* A Re-appraisal of the Christian Faith, by Stanley Brice Frost (pp. 187, $4.50).

McGraw-Hill: *St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae.* Vol. 51 (Sa *Our Lady,* by Thomas R. Heath, 0. P. (pp. 144, $7.00).

Macmillan Co.: *A Church Without Priests?* by Jacques Duquesne (pp. $4.95) .

Marquette University Press: *Saint Thomas Aquinas. On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists,* Tr. & Intr. by Beatrice H. Zeller (pp. 96, $3.00); *Beyond Trinity,* by Bernard Cooke, S. J. (pp. 84, *The Apple or Aristotle's Death,* Tr. & Intr. by Mary F. Rousseau (pp. 96, $3.00).

Martinus Nijhofl': *Studies in Analogy,* by Ralph Mcinerny (pp. 147, 19.80 guilders).

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