THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C.

VoL. XXXIV APRIL, 1970 No.2

GOD: HOW NEAR A RELATION?

IF THE ABOVE title suggests anything to the reader, the danger is that too much might be implied. I do not propose to treat of all the aspects of the " nearness " of God to man, nor attempt to investigate all th; Pl)plications of the category of " relation " commonly used in our effort to give an adequate theological account of the links that exist between the creature and the Creator. There are, however, a number of questions that have been placed insistently before the Catholic theologian recently that demand from him a more adequate interpretation of God's involvement in our world and in our history. This statement implies a position that the standard position is not strong enough. Though, as will appear, I have no intention of reversing the classic Thomistic position in this fundamental area, I do think that a concerted effort is needed to explicitate the richness, the flexibility and the relevance of this tradition of thought, and to see that in the long run the reality we attempt to express is more important

than the words we use in that attempt. Further, I do not hope to give final answers, but I do hope that it will not pass as presumptuous to open some areas of our standard theology to more close scrutiny for the sake of the continuance of a balanced development.

It can be reasonably admitted that the Thomistic arrangement and presentation of the theology dealing with the Mystery of God have not been easily understandable. [1] One soon gets used to the predictable labels attached to the traditional "De Unitate Dei- De Trinitate Dei" schema: it is said to be too static, philosophical, too little in line with the basic patterns of Salvation History, etc. To anyone understanding the basic approach of St. Thomas, this causes little concern; he finds many of the current questions on God hopelessly naive, e. g., the "Honest to God debate," and feels that at the same time they can be speedily and neatly dealt with by an appeal to the best of traditional Thomism. Recent suggestions in theories of a "developing Deity" would be smartly dismissed as nonsense. But here we must be careful: it is possible to evade a responsibility. Are the Thomistic answers really available to modern thought? Are they too concealed within a system of thought that can appear overly rigid and exclusive? Have we spoken sufficiently with the proponents of the newer Theisms in an effort tore-actualize the context of the Thomistic doctrine dealing with man's affirmation of God? The answer to be given must be carefully qualified in view of the excellent work that has already been done. [2]

Those outside the Thomistic tradition seem to have considerable difficulty in understanding precisely what Thomists (and for that matter, all Catholic theology) are getting at when it

[1] Cf. K. Rahner, "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate,'" *Theological Investigations* IV (London, 1966), 77-104; G. Martelet, "Theologie und Heilsoeconomie in der Christologie der 'Tertia,'" *Gott in Welt* IT (Freiburg, 1964),

• Apart from the basic and well-known work of Rahner and Schillebeeckx, articles, such as C. Kiesling," A Translation of Tillich's Idea of God," *Journal of Ecumenical Studiea* 4 (Winter, 1967), 700-715, are of great value.

comes to discussing the *reality* of God's relationship with man. Some recent developments in Catholic theology admit, implicitly at least, that we have fallen short in giving an adequate account of the God-Man relationship, as we shall soon see.[3] It seems that traditional Catholic theology, from the Middle Ages on, has left the reality of God too "abstract," not sufficiently involved as an actual, free Presence in human affairs. Perhaps the very richness of the notion of being and the utter existential fulness of the divine Reality as understood in Thomism has given the impression that nothing more can be said. One source of constant questioning is the degree in which the whole Being of God is really engaged in man's destiny and, consequently, the degree in which God's actions really reveal what He actually is. This seems to have been in Fr. Y. Cougar's mind when he wrote:

> Sooner or later, speculative theology, drawing upon revelation attested to in Scripture, will have to pose the problem which occupies us in a much more personal way: if there is such a deep bond between theology and economy, if God discloses the *en-soi* of his Mystery in the *pour-now;* of the alliance, of grace and the incarnation, all that has been and is done for us, including the incarnation, has been required, has it not, in spite of his absolute liberty, by what God is *in himself?* Is there not in the mystery of his *en-soi,* a presence, a call for the *pour-now;,* including hominization? [4]

In a recent work Schubert Ogden has given intelligent and clear expression to a new theism, called "neo-classical," which attempts essentially to establish the intrinsic relatedness of the divine Reality to man and his world.[5] Ogden relies on the basic work done by Whitehead and Hartshorne in this field.[6]

[3] Cf. Magnus Loehrer, "Dogrnatische Bemerkungen zur Frage der Eigenschaften und Verhaltensweisen Gottes," *Mysterium Salutis* II (Einsiedeln-Ziirich-Kiiln, 1967)'

[4] "Christ in the Economy of Salvation and in our dogmatic Tracts," *Ccmcilium* I (Jan., 1966), 4-15.

[5] *The Reality of God and other Essays* (London: SCM Press, 1967).

[6] Cf. especially C. Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1948); *Reality as Social Process* (Glencoe, TIL: The Free Press, 1953).

I will note the main points of this neo-classical approach, not so much as an effort to identify the adversary as to have a talking point for the furtherance of our announced intention to explicitate the latent riches within the Thomistic tradition.

Ogden's preoccupation with giving us a new brand of theism begins with his perception of the increasingly atheistic assumptions of our contemporaries. Much of the classic theism seems contradictory to the modem mind (and to Ogden). One point singled out is the impossibility of harmonizing the free character of creation with the immutable essence of God as Pure Act/ Whatever the case, the classic theism (and Thomism is included explicitly in this) lacks existential allure for men of our time.[8] God is just not sufficiently involved with man and his world. The traditional idea of God as Pure Act, static, impassive, immutable, must be supplanted by an idea of the Divine Reality that is more viable for the modem mind. Now one's conception of God must not only be logically consistent but also intelligible, if God is going to be accepted as our ground of confidence in the ultimate worth of life. God must be conceived of as genuinely related to the world and as really affected by our actions.[9] A purely external relation of

[1] *The Reality of God,* p. 17 f: "Theologians usually tell us that God creates the world freely, as the contingent and non-necessary world our experience discloses it to be. This assertion is also made necessary because it offers the only really credible construction of the account of creation in Holy Scripture. At the same time, because of their fixed commitment to the assumptions of classical metaphysics, theologians also tell us that God's act of creation is one with his own eternal essence, which is in every respect necessary, exclusive of all contingency. Hence, if we take them at their word, giving full weight to both of their assertions, we at once find ourselves in the hopeless contradiction of a wholly necessary creation of a wholly contingent world. . . . As *Actus Purus,* and thus a statically complete perfection incapable in any respect of further self-realization, God can neither be increased or diminished by what we do, and our action, like our suffering, must be in the strictest sense wholly indifferent to him."

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 18.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 47: "... We have seen that the only God whose reality is implied by a secular affirmation is the God who is the ground of confidence in the ultimate worth or significance of our life in the world. Given this affirmation, God must be so conceived that his being this ground of confidence is rendered as intelligible as possible ... , God must be conceived as a reality which is genuinely related to our life in the world, and to which, therefore, both we ourselves and our various actions all make a difference as to its actual being."

reason cannot be sufficient; God must be related to the world with a real internal relatedness. [10]

This relatedness that is referred to here is parallelled to the relation of the human subject to an historical event which profoundly affects him. [11] The distinction between" existence" and "actuality" is introduced in this context. "Existence" is the non-variable in God, the abstract constant, which strictly speaking is not relative; " actuality " is the variable insofar as the existent is verified in a variety of concrete ways. [12] Hence, the way is open to a dipolar affirmation of God through which God is said to be at once supremely absolute and supremely relative. [13]

Ogden sees this in favourable contrast to traditional theism's monopolar affirmation of God who, in the doctrine of St. Thomas, is related to the world in a purely nominal way. [14] He attributes in this perspective a merely unqualified negation of real relatedness to the world. The traditional interpretation of the Scriptural names, "King," "Judge," etc., succeeds merely in eliminating any real element of relatedness of God to the

[10] *Ibid.:* "God must enjoy real internal relations to all our actions, and so be afl'ected by them in his own actual being."

[11] *Ibid.:* " A person or thing may properly said to ' exist,' provided the essential characteristics by which he or it is defined are somehow actualized. Thus, I exist, for example, so long as the complex of traits designated by my proper name as all the stages of my life history is realized in some state or other of actual relations with my fellow human beings and to the larger natural environment. This is to say that my existence as such has to be distinguished from any of these actual states, taken simply by itself. I exist as the person I essentially am, whether as actually young or old, sick or well, in relation to these persons or those. ' Existence ' in short, properly functions as *an* abstract constant, always implying ' actuality ' as an abstract variable. Hence to say that anything ' exists ' requires that the variable ' actuality ' have *some* specific value."

[12] *Ibid.,* see also pp. 58 ff.

[13] *Ibid.,* pp. 48 ll'.

" *Ibid.,* p. 48: " The whole character of traditional theism is defined by *an* essential one-sidedness or monopolarity. As it conceives God, he is so far from being the eminently relative One, that he is denied to be related to our life at all. He is said to be a reality which is in every respect absolute *and* whose only relations with the world are purely nominal, or external relations of the world to him."

world.[15] So, in the traditional theism, God is literally not related to the world at all.

There may be a hint of bipolarity in the ordinary account of theism, but this is in fact deceptive.[16] Mystery is appealed to, but this is less a sense of the Mystery of God than a maze of inconsistencies and logical confusion."[17] Throughout all this there remains the existential repugnance of a statically indifferent Deity.

In the process of offering this neo-classical alternative to the traditional theism, Ogden introduces" the reformed subjectivist principle" of Whitehead, which in this instance means that the paradigmatic case of reality consists in the " self."[18] To exist, as such, means to be related to one's body, one's society, one's world.[19] The self develops through this interaction through relatedness. The temporality of the human self displaces the old ideas of substance and being, and replaces them with newer concepts of creative becoming and of being in process.[20]

In the light of this basic analogy God is seen as the supreme instance of this creative becoming.[21] He is eminently social and temporal, related to the world as the self is related to the body. He is, in fact, absolute in this relativity.[22] God in this sense can

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 49.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 50.

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 51: "... the so called 'mystery' has been unmasked as a logical confusion, which makes supernaturalism all the more incredible as a reflective account of our experience."

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 57: "... According to this principle we can give an adequate answer to the metaphysical question of the meaning of ' reality ' only by imaginatively generalizing ' elements disclosed in the analysis of the experience of subjects.' "

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 58.

[20] *Ibid.:* " If we begin by taking the self as thus experienced as the paradigmatic case for reality as such, the result is a complete revolution of classical metaphysics. It thereupon becomes clear that real internal relations to others and intrinsic temporality are not 'mixed perfections' peculiar to finite beings such as ourselves, but ' simple perfections ' inherent in the meaning of ' reality ' in the most fundamental use of the word. In consequence, the chief category for finally interpreting anything real can no longer be ' substance ' or ' being,' ... but must be process or creative becoming, construed as that which is in principle social and temporal. ..."

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 59: "This implies, naturally, that God is by analogy a living and even growing God and that he is related to the universe of other beings somewhat as the human self is related to its body."

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 60.

never be without an actual world.[23] As so involved in the worldly process, God appears as a worthy ground for our confidence about the future, because our future is actually God's future too.[24]

Hence this newer dipolar approach to the affirmation of God will appear as an acceptable form of theism that works through accessible analogies and intelligible categories.

These rather skeletal indications of the neo-classical position can be further fleshed out by reference to another article by Ogden.[25] The starting point is a brief note in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* which Ogden develops.[26] The basic question is, should the eternity of God be interpreted more as a primal and infinite temporality than as an eternal constant "Nunc Stans "?[27] Ogden attempts to get into the general swing of Heidegger's thought as he analyses the instance of *Dasein* in the effort to come to a general unveiling of Being. When God is recognized as a Being, he must necessarily be understood as being-in-the-world through *care.*[28] Further, since the present is seized only in relation to the past realization and future possibility, so God's present must be similarly conceived.[29] God's experience

•• *ldid.,* p. 6fl.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 64: " ... the only God . . . is the dipolar ground of the ultimate significance of our life in the world. It is just such a God that the premises of neoclassical metaphysics enable and even require us to conceive. . . . God . . . must be thought of as the eminently relative One who makes possible ' a general confidence about the future,' an assurance of the final worth of our life which will not be disappointed."

[25] "The Temporality of God," *The Reality of God,* pp. 144-163.

[26] *Sein Und Zeit* (Halle, 19fl7), English trans., *Being and Time* (New York, 196fl), p. 4fl7, n. I (in original German); p. 499, n. xiii in English trans.: "It requires no extensive discussion to show that the traditional concept of eternity, in the sense of the ' stationary now' *(nunc stans),* is drawn from the vulgar understanding of time and is limited by an orientation to the idea of the ' constant' presence-on-hand. If the eternity of God would admit of being ' construed ' philosophically, it could be understood only as a more primal and 'infinite' temporality. Whether the *via negationis et eminentiae* could offer a possible way to this goal would remain uncertain."

[27] Ogden, *op. cit.,* pp. 145 ff.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. *150.*

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 15fl: "... he (God) is an experiencing self who anticipates the future and remembers the past and whose successive occasions of present experience are themselves temporal occurences."

of himself is necessarily in a kind of divine temporality, in his possession of himself in memory of the past, and as open to the divine scope of future possibility.[30] In fact, God is absolute temporality, because his relatedness to the world is total. He is not restricted in this relatedness as man is.[31] The only norm of God's relatedness to the world is himself.

Thus, Ogden, in instancing the primal and absolute temporality of God, considers that he has arrived at a theism that is in favourable contrast with the classic tradition.

The above indications are not put forward as a complete expression of a position that has been intelligently and roundly worked out in the works referred to. My intention is merely to rough out the general lines of this current approach for the sake of the comment to follow.

Now the danger here for the doughty Scholastic is to weigh in and thoroughly refute this theory point for point but, in so doing, to overlook completely the acute theological and philosophical perception that is evinced throughout. In that way, one could fail completely to see the openings that are provided for a presentation of the classic and Thomistic theism more in accordance with contemporary thought and values. This, of course, would take more time and space than is at the moment available, but it is worth our while to begin what others may well complete in a more competent and comprehensive manner.

On the Catholic side there is considerable evidence of an attempt to appreciate in a more vital manner the existential relevance of the divine Reality to man. *K.* Rahner's bold attempt to " economize " the Mystery of the Trinity is well known.[32] Over and over again he states that the Trinity is a Mystery of Salvation; that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity; that the salvific function reveals precisely the immanent personality of the Divine Three.[33] Hence, it would

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.*, up. 154 fl.

[32] Cf. "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise, 'de Trinitate,'" *Theol. Investigations* IV, pp. 87-102.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 87. See also his latest approach to Trinitarian theology in "Der Dreifaltige Gott als Transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte," *Mysterium Salutis* II, pp. 317-398. For this point see especially pp. 381 fl.

be theologically unacceptable for him to conceive of the Father or the Holy Spirit becoming man: only the Logos, the Word of the Father, is the revealer.[34] No one can deny that this is in general a laudable attempt, though Rahner's most recent and profound elaboration of the theology of the Trinity needs a thorough and critical examination. This, however, cannot concern us here.[35]

The problem, and the attempt to answer it, is better expressed in that section of theology usually called " de Deo Uno." Partially through the influence of Rahner [36] a distinction is being made between the "Attributes" (Eigenschaften Gottes) and the salvation-historical "Behavior" of God (Verhaltensweisen Gottes) .[37] Dom Magnus Loehrer notes in his article that, through the influence of the history of Apologetics, the attributes of God have been rather philosophically set out and construed, with a consequent loss of meaning when it comes to interpreting the biblical metaphors.[38] Likewise, the Magisterium has elaborated its doctrine on the attributes of God only as the occasion arose and usually in the context of correcting an error: hence the reaction against the Gnostics, Dualists, Gilbert Porrecta, and so on.[39] He goes on to suggest a much more positive approach in which the influence of Barth and Brunner is felt.[40] The above distinction between the" attributes" and the "behavior" of God is accepted as a way of affirming more completely the total Mystery of the Revealed God in his saving Reality.

A philosophy of religion can realistically affirm the various attributes of God; but when those attributes are transposed

[34] Pp. 88, 91, *Theol. Investig.* IV; pp. 378 ff. of *Mysterium Salutis* II.

[35] *Op. cit.,* "Der Dreifalitige Gott - - - - " Ralmer's analysis and suggestions concerning the meaning and the use of the idea of personality as applied to God are very interesting.

[36] Cf. K. Rahner, "Gott," *LThK* IV (1960), 1083-1086.

[37] " Dogmatische Bemerkungen zur Frage der Eigenschaften und Verhaltensweisen Gottes," *Myste:rium Salutis* II, pp.

[38] *Op. cit.,* pp. fi.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 300.

[40] *Ibid.,* pp. 807 fi.

onto the theological plane, they too often conceal the decisive free actions of God in his saving design for the world. They can obscure the fact that God takes a determined attitude toward man.[41] The knowledge of God's free "attitudes" or "behavior," known only in Revelation, fills out, in a sense, the knowledge we have of God through the attributes that are basically affirmed of the Deity through creation.[42] These revealed *Verhaltensweisen* (ways of behavior) are not subject to conceptual synthesis. We are left with a fruitful sense of God's Mystery and the ineffable inner unity of the divine Reality.[43] God's revealed behavior cannot be deduced from the attributes, yet these are, in retrospect, presupposed as the foundation of God's free action.[44]

These ways of behavior through Salvation-History are not disincarnate gestures on God's part. They are given definitive expression in the event of Christ.[45] Here God is finally revealed as Love in his free saving relations with man.[46] What may have seemed anthropomorphisms in the Old Testament are now given truly human expression in Christ.[47] Thus, God's inner Self is really revealed in the " economia " of his salvific activity.[48]

" *Ibid.,* p. " Dies ist z. B. der Fall, wenn die Exodusassage ' lch bin da, der ich bin ' (Ex. 3: 14) ohne weiteres als Aussage der goettlichen Aseitaet gedeutet wird, oder wenn die biblischen Aussagen ueber Gottes Heiligkeit und Liebe einfach als Aussagen ueber Gott als 'Esse Subsistens' bzw. als absolute Guete gelesen werden. Wenn es wahr ist, dass Gottes freie Verhaltensweisen seine Eigenschaften ... voraussetzen, dann braucht nicht bestritten zu werden, dass in diesem Sinn auch die verschiedenen Shriftaussagen ueber das freie Verhalten Gottes einen solchen letzten metaphysischen Hintergrund implizieren, wei dies im klassischen Traktat " De Deo Uno " immer gesehen wurde."

'" *Ibid.,* p. 303 f.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 304.

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 304 f.

[45] *Ibid.,* pp. 305 ff.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 306: "... in Christus werde endgueltig offenbar, dass Gott Liebe ist (I Jn. 4: 8). Diese Satz muss freilich richtig verstanden werden. Zunaechst ist zu beachten, dass er nicht als Aussage ueber das metaphysiche Wesen Gottes gelesen werden darf, sondern als Aussage ueber das letztefreie Verhalten Gottes zum Menschen in der Heilsgeschichte zu verstehen ist,"

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 807.

'"Ibid,

Conversely, this demands of man that he regard God not as a neutral, metaphysical Deity, but as the God of Redemption, one who merits his trust more than provokes his fear.[49] Thus the actual "behavior" of God calls forth a determined attitude from man in the presence of God. There is implied the reality of intersubjectivity, with all its free spontaneity, enabling God to be a real Presence in man's life. This is born out in the various situations of Salvation History in that God communicates his Narne to man, not merely as a token to be treasured but as a kind of symbol indicating the personal character of God's Self Gift to man.[50] God reveals Himself as eminently *God-with-us* and thus calls man to intimate communion with himself.[51] In this context the divine names are not seen as mere confirmations of what has already been attributed to God through the processes of Natural Theology but as a progressive revelation of the actual saving character of God.[52]

The Christian theologian, then, sees within the divine attributes, as it were, a free zone of God's actual activity made known to us only through revelation, thereby giving us a deeper knowledge of the divine Reality.[53]

This interesting approach does not deny the traditional theological method of affirming the God of revelation, but it does explicitate some valuable points in its alertness to the contributions made by Lutheran theology above all. Deep questions nonetheless remain: what is really added? If one replies, the concrete recognition of the saving freedom of God, the further question arises: has it received its ultimate theological ex-

•• *Ibid.,* p. 808.

[60] *Ibid.,* pp. 808 fl.

[61] *Ibid.,* p. 810.

•• *Ibid.*

[63] Here the examples of God's immutability and omnipresence are given. A complete statement on the divine immutability is not possible unless it is realized that God remains unchangeable in himself but actually becomes in the other ... in the incarnation (.. wirklich im andern *wird)* (emphasis original). Also, the true character of the divine omnipresence is not revealed to us save in the fulfilment given by God's dwelling in Christ. Cf. p. 311 f.

pression? Does it resort all too easily to dialectic instead of seeking a solution by deepening the categories already present in the classic Thomistic scheme? In other words, is the above approach, essentially, merely a more striking and appealing statement of the problem rather than an attempt to give a complete solution? For this, at least, we should be grateful. As will be seen, my own approach will be developed more in the direction of a deeper understanding of the available categories, and, to that degree, I have no intention of passing final judgment on this theological development. I instance it for the moment as a Catholic attempt to come to grips with a problem more and more clearly perceived, and consequently I must leave it at that for the time being, while I shall attempt to develop some points in another direction.

* * * * *

It must be rather forthrightly stated as a first point that Catholic theology, in the general tradition of St. Thomas, has not felt the " remoteness " of God as much as its critics might suppose. This is undoubtedly due in large part to the strong account it gives of itself in the doctrine of the Missions.[54] In the same breath, St. Thomas and his followers can state that God is related to man only by a relationship of reason *and* that the three Divine Persons are really communicated to the soul in grace.[55] The "mission-schema" deeply affects the theology of creation as wel1.[56] As it lies there unexplained in the *Summa,* St. Thomas's theology of the Trinity can indeed appear quite

•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 43. For profound commentaries on the whole doctrine, see L. Chambat, *Presence et Union. Les Missions des Personnes de la Sainte Trinite selon St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Abbaye Saint Wandrille, 1945); F. Cunningham, *The Indwelling of the Trinity. A Historico-doctrinal Study of the theory of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Dubuque, 1955).

[55] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 43, a. 2: "... Unde missio et datio in divinis dicuntur temporaliter tantum. Generatio et spiratio solum ab aeterno. Processio autem et exitus dicuntur in divinis et aeternaliter et temporaliter: nam Filius ab aetemo processit ut sit Deus; temporaliter autem ut etiam sit homo . . . vel ut sit in homine secundum invisibilem missionem."

•• *Ibid.,* q. 45, a. 5: "... divinae personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum."

abstract and removed from the *economia* of Redemption. The same goes for the" de Unitate Dei" which precedes the theology of the Trinity.[57] Provided, however, that the schema is approached with synthetic intent and with a sympathy for what Aquinas is actually getting at in his attempt to give an ordered and intelligent introduction into the totality of revealed Truth, it is not difficult to appreciate this classic approach as a remarkable piece of constructive theology. Whatever the case, it must be admitted that, even if the above remarks partially explain the lack of sensitivity on the part of Thomists to the theistic problems felt by the neo-classical approach, they do not offer a solution. We might address ourselves more fundamentally to the problem by making the following points: I. The problem of the different perspectives; II. The field of analogy; III. The" relatio rationis ";IV. The Being of God.

I. THE PRoBLEM OF THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

It is worth stressing again that my intent is wholly positive: I do not wish to attempt to directly refute the " neo-classical " approach as Ogden has described it to us but only to accept his implicit challenge to reactualize some of the true riches of the classic and Thomistic affirmation of God. In a question of this type different perspectives are to be expected. One point of view can so impress itself on the objective account of a particular theologian's affirmation of God that the result is at best misunderstanding and at worst complete unacceptability. This is brought out especially in the present case where Ogden has above all in mind to establish some point of contact with the contemporary mind through the use of the categories and analogies that implicitly or explicitly it seemingly finds appealing. If this is a dominant motive with him, it could hardly be expected that he is in a position to be struck with the full depth and extent of the classic Thomistic approach. His concern is not the immediate concern of the Thomist, with

•• See F. Bourassa, "Sur le Traite de Ia Trinite," *GregOTianum* 47 (1966), !l85.

the latter's employment of the formal metaphysical categories of substance, relation, etc. Does this mean, then, that the confrontation of these two approaches devolves around only semantic considerations? One instinctively feels that it is much more, for, along with the motive affecting our *style* of presentation, there is the deep question of the whole personal stance of each theologian approaching this question. This may not find expression in his particular account of the divine Reality. One must be alert to both a pre-understanding of what we wish to give formal expression to and a pre-valuation of the reality concerned. Let us consider briefly each of the components of the perspectives in which we approach this question of God: 1) the motive that affects the theologian; 2) the pre-understanding that he enjoys of the divine Reality; 3) the pre-valuation that axiologically orientates him one way or the other.

1. *The Motive.*

The Thomistic approach has for its immediate motive understanding. The intellectual penetration of the divine Reality, which is the "subiectum theologiae," [58] is the characteristic action of the theologian. This radical intellectualism in theological procedure is based on the conviction that authentic understanding is the surest road to affective progress and makes for a ready and flexible expression of the object of theological thought in accordance with the demands of a variety of circumstances. As it stands, however, the whole Thomistic system is geared to intelligence, as act of the theologian in his contemplation of the revealed Mysteries, not to affective piety or communication. [59] If it appears cold or abstract, and therefore hyper-rational and inhuman, this is only because someone has not yet realized that we must first affirm what really is the

[58] Cf. R. Gagnebet, "Dieu, Sujet de la Theologie selon St. Thomas," *Analecta Gregoriana,* 1954, pp. 41-55; also, M. D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 196; 301-!:110.

•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 2 (prologue); *In I Sent.,* dist. 2, div. text.; *In II Sent.,* prol.;

case, *what actually is,* rather than express the divine Reality in terms which happen to be the most compatible here and now with our affective inclinations or most adapted to instant communication. It refuses to allow the divine Reality to be measured by the subjective capacity of our affections or our capabilities in communication. This is not to say that the Thomistic method has no time for nourishment of faith and charity, with its icy intellectuality, or that it is not interested in pastoral relevance. The reverse is true: because it wishes to know the real God, to love the real Good, because it wishes to have a real content in its communications, it adopts from the beginning an intellectual standpoint which can certainly appear overly detached and disinterested; but it suffers the danger of giving such an impression out of respect for its motive, which is to give an objective account of the divine Reality.

Is the object of the newer theism similar? There is undoubtedly a stress on intelligibility for the modem mind, intelligible relevance, on presenting God as a credible ground for hope, etc. It is too early to state, and certainly too rash to suggest, that the neo-classical theory has sacrificed an ontic statement for the sake of an affective and subjective stimulus and easier communicability. Ogden most certainly does wish to give a metaphysical account of what God is really like.[60] Nonetheless, perhaps a distracting element has entered into the neo-classical position. Proponents of this theory wish to use categories with which modern man is more familiar or that he finds more appealing. This is, of course, laudable; but if a rigorous critique has not been made on the objective grounds of this topical appeal, confusion concerning the ultimately real character of divine Reality must, seemingly, follow. Just because the contemporary mind is more at home with an existential account of reality interpreted in a broad evolutionary and dynamic sweep, it does not necessarily follow that God is actually like that. Because categories happen to be at this moment more intelligible, it does not follow that they are more

•• *Op. cit.,* especially pp. 44-70.

apt. The only norm that governs our use of language and all manner of conceptual tools for the affirmation of God must surely be the divine Reality itself, what God *really* must be like. Once we are on the road to affirming that, the language of interpersonal involvement and symbol can be adapted for affective expression and communication in our attempt to bring out the personal relevance of such an objectively affirmed Reality.

In brief, I suggest that, when the ontic stress of the Thomistic method of affirming God is not fully appreciated, one cannot expect that it is going to be credited with full marks. Further, -though here I do wish to avoid too sweeping a statement- because the neo-classical approach, as presented to us by Ogden, tends to span the levels of ontic affirmation, affective relevance, and intelligible communication, there is the appearance of a weakness built into this approach. These next two points will partially clarify what has been said up till now.

2. *Pre-understanding.*

Obviously any hermeneutic of various systems of thought must be at pains to come to grips with the pre-understanding present in a given instance. This is especially important when the issue in hand is one of considerable depth and complexity and necessarily profoundly affects the subjectivity of those involved. Often Thomism is analysed in its affirmation of God merely on the merits of its objectively expressed concepts, e.g., when it happens that someone opens the *Sumrrw.* and naively begins to expatiate on the contents without taking into account the whole theological life that it comes from. New, the pre-understanding for the theologian of the classic Christian tradition is surely that there is One God and that he is revealed to us in Christ Jesus. At no juncture is God actually regarded as an aloof Deity, even if the metaphysical moment in our affirmation of the divine Reality does give rise to the employment of highly abstract conceptual tools drawn from philosophical systems that attempt to state the objectivity of the real. The concepts that are used by the theologian in his effort to affirm correctly

the Reality of God make no pretence of encapsulating the Divinity. In the dynamism of our affirmation of God the mind must yield to the darkness of the *Res Divina,* the One, Simple Infinite Reality that God is.[61] The very darkness and obscurity into which the mind is drawn leads us to appreciate more fully the concreteness of the historical facts in which God is revealed to us: they stand before us in an historical originality and spontaneity within the field of Absolute Ineffable Being that has been affirmed of God through the formal metaphysical categories. I have called this interplay of abstract and concrete the *formal* and *mysteric* moments in our affirmation of the Living God.[62] This double moment arises from the special pre-understanding we have of God as the Lord of Creation and Salvation History. An influential Protestant theologian, W. Pannenberg, stresses the concrete historical actuality of the event of God's revelation of Himsel£.[63] Though I cannot endorse his position completely, I do feel that he exercises a salutary influence in drawing attention to the event of Salvation History that our conceptual knowledge must return to if it is to attain to its most true affirmation of God. What we are stressing here is, I feel, the noetic expression of what those theologians already mentioned in more ontic terms with their distinction between the *"Eigenschaften Gottes"* (Attributes) and the " *Verhaltensweisen Gottes"* (Actual Behavior) .[64]

This being the case, I would think that the Thomistic approach is not given sufficient credit for its pre-understanding. To sum up with regard to the second component of the perspective and, at the same time, acknowledging the danger of oversimplification, it could be stated that the pre-understand-

[61] Cf. *De Div. Nom.,* c. Q, lect. 4; c. 7, lect. 4.

•• Cf. A. J. Kelly, "To know the Mystery: The Theologian in the Presence of the Revealed God," *The Thomist* XXXII (1968), 40-47; *55-59.*

•• Cf. *Theology as History,* ed. J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb (New York, 1967) . Special reference could be made to the opening essay by Robinson, " Revelation as Word and as History" (13-4Q), in which Pannenberg's approach is sketched; and to Pannenberg's own essay. "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth" (101-133).

•• Cf. M. Loehrer, *op. cit., Mysterium Balutis* II, pp. Q91-314.

ing that should be taken for granted and accounted for is that God is an Ineffable Personal Mystery. For the Christian theologian he is a Mystery of Love and, despite the absolute intimacy of his communication, remains known as *God,* i. e., as the One who is accepted as being incomprehensible. No word or concept will ever be adequate to express what God truly is. The pre-understanding that is in operation behind the structured affirmation of God in the classic and Thomistic tradition teaches the theologian to regard God as an *abiding* Mystery, dwelling in a darkness that is always beyond our conceptual determinations. [65]

This is a far cry from the neo-classical approach which sees in human subjectivity, through *the reformed subjectivist principle* of Whitehead, [66] the paradigm case in the process of affirming the divine Reality. The Thomistic pre-understanding of this whole problem would tilt the theologian in quite the opposite direction: God is not immediately to be affirmed as the image of man; rather, man must first assert the absolute transcendance of God, and only then, with his eyes open to the full scope of reality, is he in a position to qualify this basic affirmation of the divine Transcendence by availing himself of analogies, above all, those supplied by the being and life of the human person. This point will be treated in a more detailed fashion later. Suffice it to say that a conviction of the divine Transcendence precedes the application of the various analogies; the reverse procedure, working through " self-contained " analogies of the subjectivity of the human spirit, etc., is in danger of aprioristically constricting the absolute character of the divine Reality within the imagined limits of the analogy that is first employed. So much, for the moment, with regard to the pre-understanding that can be assumed in the Thomistic aproach to the affirmation of God.

[65] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 12, a. 13, ad 1um: "licet per revelationen gratiae in hac vita non cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et *sic ei quasi ignoto coniungamur.* . . . "

[66] As cited and employed by Ogden, *op. eit.,* p. 57.

3. *Pre-valuation.*

This third component of the general perspective is possibly the most important in our attempt briefly to indicate the generally accepted Thomistic style of approach to this central theological issue. It comes to this: my formal theological approach to God does not demand of me an abdication of my personal relationship with the divine Mystery, known and lived through faith. On this level, God for me can only be the Father revealing himself in Christ. This remains, in that radical, transrational mysticism of faith, an experience that axiologically conditions the whole conceptual structure of my theological affirmation. The Living God, accepted in faith, is a *Presence* for the Christian theologian which, obscurely experienced and unobjectifiable as it is, gives a non-conceptual depth and dynamism to formal theological expression. Our concepts live from this depth of personal presence. They have an objective formal signification, but in the total meaning of any theological statement a non-conceptual *plus value* must be allowed for, arising from that personal communion that faith brings about between God and the believing mind. A convenient way of saying this is to say that there is a personal *significance* completing the formal *signification* of our theological statements and concepts. [67]

Thus, my formal theological expression will presumably indicate a drive toward objectivity in any assertions about the divine Reality, a refusal to let God be measured by my own subjective experience; but always present in such assertions there is the consciousness (which I hesitate to call pre-theological) of the fact that God is personally related to me in the community of believers in a way that engages the divine Personal Freedom and elicits an authentic response from me as an individual believer in the here and now of this instant of the History of Salvation.

* * * * *

•• Cf. A. J. Kelly, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 173-181.

There, then, is a broad indication of what I consider the general perspective of the Thomistic approach. To what extent can I presume that this is shared by the neo-classical school? With regard to the motive, some divergence has been noted: regarding the pre-understanding, the primary conviction of the utter transcendence of the divine Reality is not as strong, and the pre-valuation may well be accepted as the same, depending on one's theology of faith, and the place that that faith and the life of grace plays in the processes of theological thought. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to stress the perspective of the Thomistic approach, above all, to make theologians of this tradition realize, on the one hand, the intellectuality of the Thomistic approach, and on the other, the non-conceptual depth that accompanies the thought of the Christian theologian.

II. THE FIELD OF ANALOGY

I have no intention of giving here an exhaustive treatment of the principles guiding the use of analogy. It will be of some use at this juncture, however, to indicate the major features of the dynamic field in which our analogies, as applied to God, operate. I would suggest that the determining features of this field can be reduced to two mutally conditioning points: 1) God is anticipated as a personal *subject* by theological thought; 2) the divine Reality is anticipated as an *absolute* Reality.

1. When the mind seeks the ultimate explanation of the universe in its total intelligibility, it is right for it to anticipate that this ultimate intelligible ground of reality will be a *subject.* This is so if only for the simple reason that in every act of knowledge and willing we " come to ourselves " as a persistent, unified consciousness implied in all our acts. It would hardly make sense to such enquiring intelligences, enjoying such an all-pervasive presence of self in all activities and related in intersubjective communion with other such consciousnesses, if the total intelligibility of reality could reside in anything else but a transcendent subject, personal in its knowledge and love. This intimate experience of self as an intelligent source of all

enquiry, experiencing, understanding, reflecting, and finally, of committing oneself to reality through the act of judgment, makes one anticipate a transcendent personal presence as the deepest and most coherent source of the intelligibility of the universe. One can put this another way in a more objective idiom: the proofs for the existence of God, declaring the presence of a transcending cause, necessarily include the recognition of the personal character of God because of the personal "perfections" which the universe contains and which demand explanation.

Such an anticipation of the Reality of the divine Subject is more strikingly experienced by the theologian precisely in his Christian capacity, for his whole theological thought has originated from the fruitful tension of his faith toward the God who has revealed himself in Christ. God, as the object of faith and as working that faith through the Spirit in the believer, is, in a sense, experienced as the divine "Thou," a living, Personal presence in one's life. Theology, springing from this faith which alone puts the theologian in contact with the divine revealed Reality, injects a vivid awareness of the Personhood and subjectivity of the divine Reality which, in fact, may not be objectivized until the very end of the theological process. There are, nonetheless, clear grounds for seeing this anticipation of the divine "relatedness" to us in the fact that theology is "fides quaerens intellectum."

Hence God is anticipated as a uniquely personal Reality. This anticipation gives shape and specification to our knowledge. Despite the abstract conceptualities that might necessarily be employed, and despite the ontic and even impersonal character of some of the analogies that might be applied, our theological thought and affirmations are polarized, in a very definite way, by this anticipation of God as a Personal Reality. Obviously, the neo-classical School has seen this very clearly.[68]

2. The second feature of this dynamic noetic field in which

[68] In its interpretation of the divine Reality directly in terms of the existence and actually of the human subject.

our analogies operate is the anticipation of the divine Reality as an *absolute* Reality. This demands from the beginning of the theological process a consciousness of the surpassing plenitude of the divine Reality necessarily eluding categorization within the limits of our experience. Our minds must necessarily be given over to the process of negation, of judging " This is not God " where *this* means the conceptual construct that is employed by the mind to affirm the transcendent Reality of God. There results, indeed_, a darkness of thought before the divine Reality, and a silence of word-there comes a point when we can say no more about it. This is not necessarily some profoundly mystical experience. It is rather a down-to-earth recognition that we are truly endeavoring to affirm an *absolute* Reality. While we speak of *negation, darkness, silen<:e,* etc., it must be noted that the whole *direction* of our thinking about God, or better, our knowledge of him, remains wholly positive. It is a directed darkness. It results in a great knowledge of the Reality that God is.

Merely to call attention to this point is not enough. A question arises in many forms as to *why* we should feel justified in going beyond this or that attempt at conceptualizing the Divinity. Basic reasons can be given: if God is absolute, then the process of our knowledge must subject its performance to this recognition. We might come to this theological conviction by an ontic concentration on the proofs for the existence of God, or through a transcendental analysis of our knowing and willing which points to the implicit acceptance of an unlimited absolute in our spirit-activity, and this remains to be adequately thematized. However we affirm the absolute character of the divine Reality, we must take the word *absolute* literally: this divine Reality is *not limited* in the manner of the realities directly accessible to our experience. By definition, what is absolute evades limitation and restriction and hence all adequate thematization by the human mind. This affirmation of the absoluteness of the divine Reality is accompanied by the experience of the self-transcending power of our knowing and willing. These spirit-activities constantly surpass their own

objective attainments. Thus, they are existentially indicating a Reality which is beyond the present scope of our attainment of reality. Though the Reality thus indicated is not attainable in thematizable form at the present time and in the present conditions of our spirit-activity, the presence of this *fully-:,-ufficient* Reality is obscurely intimated to the mind through the thematizations of finite reality that it has arrived at. Hence, there is that *Known-Unknown* character of the Absolute in its relationship to our minds. This springs from the affirmation of the necessary absoluteness of God coupled with the experience of the self-transcendence of our spirit-activity in the direction of the Absolute, which continually eludes objectification in terms of adequate conceptualization. The conjunction, then, of the objective affirmation of the Absolute character of the divine Reality and our subjective experience of self-transcendence towards it explains why the mind of the theologian is necessarily *restless* in his knowledge and feels continually compelled to go beyond the conceptualizations already arrived at, however valid these might be.[69]

In this way, what we have called the anticipation of the absolute character of the divine Reality is borne out. We must anticipate that God is not like *this* or *that,* not even like *me* or *it,* since the absolute character of the divine Reality must surpass the subjective-objective formulation we use in the normal finite case. Rather, God is the supreme actualization of all perfection, uniquely and concretely personalized in the Being of God. He has everything that points in our experience to the possibility of absolute concretization and nothing that cannot be thus absolutely and unrestrictedly possessed.

Here is a sensitive point. On the one hand, we have God anticipated as an eminent *subject.* On the other, we have this anticipation of the absoluteness of the divine Reality. This does not stop us from affirming consciousness of the divine Reality as pertaining to the perfection of *Being,* but it does prevent us from affirming that consciousness of God solely in

[09] Cf. A. Kelly, *op. cit.,* pp. *50-55* and *passim.*

the tenns in which we experience it. We can objectively state that God is the supreme Subject and as such is consciously related to us. What we are not justified in doing is reading into the divine Consciousness, in the sheer actuality of the divine Existence, that subjective-objective polarity that characterizes our human experience of subjectivity. God is quite simply above this distinction and contains, consequently, whatever of the actuality of existence we imply in making this distinction. To turn the matter around the other way, we are not justified in affirming the Reality of God merely in the tenns of the subjectivity that we experience. Since we need both polarizations to express our experience of reality, we need both to express our affinnation of the fulness of the divine Reality. We must avail ourselves of the whole scope of our knowledge of reality if we are going to affinn God in the most real way.

Hence, I would feel that even such authors as Novak tend to read too easily their own experience of subjectivity into the divine Reality/ [0] even though he does valuable service to the classic theistic approach in expressing it in such a relevant and attractive manner. It is true that we experience the totality of what is affinnable of God only within the polarities of subject and object. Object in general tenns is a thematization of the universe of what really is, as "ob-jected," as *up against* the knowing mind. The subject, the knower, let us say, experiences an unrestricted openness to the whole scope and span of what is, yet the attainment is necessarily so limited. There _is not a complete correlation. It is as though the totality of what is is broken by these two polarities. In the divine Reality this is not the case. God simply is, not as subject and object as we experience this division but in the one act of being that includes what each member of this division has to include. Since, however, we must talk of God in human tenns, we will naturally avail ourselves of this division in the hope of bringing out in the best possible way the fulness of the divine Actuality.

To sum up, the divine subjectivity is the specifically *divine*

[7] °Cf. M. Novak, *Beliq and Unbelief. A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge* (London, 1966), pp. 115-188 especially.

act of conscious Being, transcending our limited, human experience of subjectivity. Spontaneous religious language (that which often passes for "mere metaphor") has a good deal to teach the theologian. It exhausts the whole of reality, delighting in inter-subjectivity of communion, yet speaking of God in language which most properly applies in inanimate objects on occasion. God is said to be a rock, etc. Of course, this points to a special type of divine subjectivity exercised in man's regard, but it also hints at an instinct in the human spirit that senses the special character of the divine subjectivity, transcending all our finite experiences of it.

The peculiarities of the special noetic field in which our various analogies operate are these two features: the anticipation of God as an eminent subject, and the anticipation of God as the genuine absolute. They do not cancel one another out, as might be thought, but rather complement one another in a unique fashion: the anticipation and objectivization of the divine subjectivity is corrected by the anticipation and eventual thematization of the general terms of the absolute character of the divine Reality, and the anticipation of the divine absoluteness is complemented by the anticipation of the divine subjectivity, so that the mind will not be lead into a state of noetic atrophy, before an infinite void, but be directed through the obscurity of this knowledge to the darkness where the living God truly dwells: *Deo quasi ignoto coniungamur.*[71]

I have no doubt that Ogden and the tendency that he so ably represents will (perhaps unwittingly) do the traditional classic approach good service in stressing the anticipation of the divine Reality as a unique subject. I feel that he has not adequately taken account of the full noetic field and recognized the determining feature of anticipation of the divine absoluteness. The next two sections will make this more clear, since they will take us closer to the heart of the matter. It might be remarked in passing that even *the contemporary mind* might find within itself the resources to affirm the divine Reality if contemporary

[71] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. a. 18 ad 1um.

theologians stressed more the necessity of really anticipating the absolute character of God instead of anticipating for the contemporary mind the kind of God it feels most comfortable with.

III. THE " RELATIO RATIONIS " BETWEEN GOD AND MAN

We must now attempt to deepen more adequately the notion of God's relatedness to man and his world in the context of the *relatio rationis* which Ogden has taken exception to. Here, above all, it is necessary to be alive to the values that classic Thomistic tradition wishes to stress.

It cannot be denied that classic theism, and Thomism in particular, sees no possibility at all in there being any other relation between God and the world than that of *reason alone.* The pith of the argument lies in the absolute *Is-ness* of God, the sheerly existent One. God cannot be said to acquire a new real relationship to anyone or anything without thereby denying the ontic absoluteness of the divinity. This would mean a further increment of actuality or perfection. By the same token, the Deity cannot be thought of as totally relative to reality " outside " itself as though God were some form of subsisting transcendental relation in regard to the world. This would mean that God was intrinsically constituted as an absolute Being by an essential relation to *what-is-not-God.* [72] To the Thomistic theologian this would be nonsense.

Before going on with the discussion, two points can be conveniently made: 1) In this classical approach, we can readily concede an ontic, objective concentration which has hitherto left much that is of interpersonal and existential value unsaid. There are many reasons why this might have been the case, and we cannot go into them here. Suffice it to state the fact of the matter. In this whole discussion the category of *relation* is not so easy to pin down.[73] Admittedly St. Thomas and his

•• See this argument as summarized by W. Kern, "God-World Relationship," *Sacramentum Mundi* II (London-New York, 1968), pp. 403-406.

•• Cf. J. De Finance, *Connaissance de L'Etre* (Paris, 1966), pp. 464-475.

followers have used this category in a very objective sense, describing it from the instances of the reference of one object to another by reason of quantity or cause-effect proportion. [74] Clearly the antic consideration has been primary, as the basic analogue was isolated for the understanding of this " tenuissima entitas." Hence, even at this early stage it is worth asking the question: have the real possibilities of this category been fully exploited; is the nature of relation exactly the same when existing between two things as when existing between two persons? If not, then already there is room for seeing a different complexion on the question of the relationship of God to man. Straight away, the term *relationship of reason* seems to be open to a more realistic interpretation in terms of intersubjectivity. This is a point which must be looked into more closely since it promises to open the way to a broader sympathy with the neo-classical approach.

Let *us,* then, examine more deeply the meaning of the *relationship of reason* that God has in regard to man and the world. We can begin by asking just what are the real elements in it.

1. *The Real Relationship of Man to God.*

Although it is clear enough that God does not actually change and cannot, there is another side to the question that is equally clear: the creature does change, viz., in its coming into existence, in the development of its potential in life, in the vital unfolding of its natural capacities. There is a further radical transformation in the creature when man, the intelligent and free agent, receives the free Self-Communication of God, so that man becomes a new being in Christ. Thus, there is that radical relationship of the creature to God as the sustenance of its being whereby the creature is related to God as the proper source of existence. (In this context it is sufficient to draw attention to the completeness of the relationship of the

[74] This is not to deny the role that Trinitarian theology had in developing the philosophy of the relation.

creature to the Creator, leaving aside the more technical questions of just what kind of real relationship this is, predicamental or transcendental, etc.). Also, the created person as a recipient of God's free grace is related to God in a new way. Man's specifically *human* existence is elevated by the gracious activity of God, so that man really does share in the infinite eternal life of the Trinity, thus coming into the possession of a unique, freely-given fulfilment of creaturely existence. Through the transformation of his psychology, man can now commune through faith and love with the divine Persons in the knowledge that the present obscurity and limitation will pass in an eschatological consummation when he shall see God as he is, in vision full and immediate.

This much, then, is obviously real *in* God's relationship to man: he is related to us as Creator and Redeemer. This implies that we are *really* related to him as the created and the redeemed. In this relationship God penetrated the whole fabric of our human existence as the creative sustenance of our being; he freely intervenes in man's history, personal and public, as a Saving Presence. Yet he remains related to us only by a relationship *of reason.* It must, however, be stressed that we would not speak of the relatedness of God to man in this way unless first we recognized that God had freely related man to himself. The mind sees this relatedness because God has made the first move. It is not a figment or equivocation. God really brings about the creatures relatedness to himself, and this is a real relationship. The difficulty of the whole matter resides in this, that God remains God throughout the whole process of his communications. If he changed in communicating himself, it would simply not be God who was giving himself-or existence--to creatures.

The real element in this interrelatedness existing between God and man finds conscious expression in man, especially when he has received Grace.[75] Man so graced, conscious of his communion with the divine Persons, does not regard God

•• See W. Kern, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

as related to him in a purely figmentative way, externally or non-literally.[76] God is a living Presence for man, a Mystery in which his life and fulfilment are involved. This Presence of God to man is included in man's presence to himself and an intelligent and free consciousness. God is, in this sense, apprehended as man's Mystery, a Presence in man's life and action, the goal and Master of man's destiny. God is" related" to man as total love, a love which calls, exacts, redeems, consoles and judges, in the depths of man's conscious self. Man sees God as eminently *his God.*

It could be objected that this apprehension of God's relatedness to man, based on man's real relatedness to God, is nothing more than a mystical flight, a projection onto God of the spontaneity and conditions of our own freedom whereas, *in fact,* traditional theism holds that God does not change and is not "involved." In answer it can be admitted that anthropological utterance is used quite freely of God in the language of myth and religious symbol. There is a basic reality that must not be forgotten, however. This is the real freedom of God. It is certain that there is no real relation of God to man; it is sure that the only relation we can admit is that of reason alone. Notwithstanding, there is in God Himself a real divine liberty which will be seen as another real dimension to this " relatio rationis."

2. *The Divine Freedom.*

Included in our affirmation of God as the absolute Unconditioned is his freedom. He would not be God if he were determined by necessity. God could not be made God by any reality outside himself. Anything that exists apart from God need not have been; God caused it to be. Man need not have

•• We can say God is *literally* related to the world, even if this does not mean in exactly the same way as we are related to it. God is related to the world in the way it is proper for him alone to be related to the universe. Hence I must take exception with Ogden's use of this word: "... The fully justified assertion that God is not literally related to the world (if by "literal" is meant in the same way as we are related to it) proves on examination to mean that he is literally not related to it." (p. 50)

been redeemed and restored; God exercised a gracious and compassionate freedom in thus *re-creating* man. Admittedly, our recognition of the freedom of God must necessarily be qualified by an equally strong assertion about his immutability which follows necessarily from the absolute character of his existence. We say: God does not change, yet he is free. Logically we are led to say that God did not suddenly get a new idea with regard to the creation or the redemption of man; he must have eternally intended it. Yet, conversely, he could have eternally not intended it.

Now this brings us to a striking and relevant aspect of God's freedom. As a freedom actually exercised in this concrete " economia," it is backed by the absolute immutability of God. We might be tempted to jump in immediately and say," There, you see, God is eternally unchangeable, he is not really involved after all." There is another view to the matter. *God has eternally chosen to be our God.* Implied in God's loving and wise intention that *we* should exist and commune with him is the recognition that he is the God of *our* world and *our* history, of *this* economy, despite the infinite number of possibilities that were open to him. This is a process of thinking back into God the value of these " contingent " events of our creation and redemption, only to find oneself in the presence of a divine liberty that has truly eternally committed itself to man, to these men, to us sinners. God has eternally chosen to be *our kind of God;* he has qualified himself in this way. In this perspective it is hardly a daring statement to say that God is freely and *totally related* to man, even though the term " relation of reason " remains valid on its own level.

3. *God's Relatedness to Man.*

The qualification that must be added here is at once a restriction and an intensification of God's relatedness to his creatures. It is a restriction, because God is not related in a new, real way to anything outside himself, because of the sheer, all-exhausting act of existence that properly belongs to him. God can in no way acquire a new foundation of relatedness in

himself nor be specified by a reality outside himself, as has already been said. That would destroy the very notion of the absolute. At the same time, our qualification of the way God is related to man results in our seeing it as a more intense form of relatedness. If God is not really related to things outside himself, and if he has freely committed himself from eternity to this temporal scheme of creation and grace, does it not follow that his relatedness to the creature is present in the very relatedness of his own divine consciousness to his own divine Reality? In short, God is related to the creature because he is " related " to himself. This does indeed sound like a casuistic conundrum, but a small amount of reflection will reveal the startling reality of the situation. Usually, we express this divine knowledge and love of God for the creature as being performed "through himself," "in the divine Essence," or other such phrases. Whatever be the words chosen to mediate this Mystery, the message is constant: the creature is present to the Creator in the Creator's own presence to himself. God is related to the creature in experiencing his own relatedness to himself, in his act of Existence. Thus the bond of God's relatedness to man, in his concrete personality, life and development, is nothing less than the totality of the divine Reality itself.[77]

Still, it is only a " relation of reason." This can be recognized as the expression of the mind's activity when it attempts to designate the close, communal relatedness of God to man, and vice versa, at the same time allowing for the absolute character

[77] This naturally means that the universe has its full reality only " in God," a reality it can only fully possess in eschatological hope when its deepest and definitive actuality will be attained . . . though even then, it would seem, the universe (and man) will have its deepest reality only " in God." This is a challenging problem for a truly Christian eschatology. W. Kern *(op. cit.,* p. 404) has some extremely concise remarks on the point of the God-world relationship. If I understand him correctly, I find myself in agreement with his general point stressing the special character of this relationship, but I am loath to follow him in his suggestion that God could be in a sense really related to the world, but in a way excluding the world being the foundation of that relationship, since the whole propriety of our philosophical language in this context would be threatened. His stress on the freedom of God seems to support the line that has been taken here.

of God as a member in this interrelatedness. All this points to a reality latent in this expression, signifying God's real nearness to man. Perhaps our treatment of this special relationship has not been sufficiently theological. It might be that theology has been too easily influenced by the original philosophical models in understanding the application of this category of relation, e. g., spatial or qualitative proportions, interactions, etc. Perhaps our consideration should swing more to the properly theological model that dominates all theological reflection, the Incarnation itself. God, the Eternal Word, is "*subjected* " to human life and history. Though he remains changeless and absolute" within" the divine Reality, he makes his own a thoroughly human history, in time, "outside" of God.[78] This unique case shows the palpable historical actualization of something that has eternally happened within the divine Reality where one all-embracing and all-exhausting Act, in which God claims and possesses all that is, has been and will be in the universe.

Admittedly, the Incarnation, as that transformative claiming of the sacred humanity by the Eternal Word, is the extreme case. For all that, it seems to accord with the Pauline sweep of theology to see it as the paradigm from which we can understand the extent of God's relatedness to man. More than anything else, it dramatically presents the theologian with the deep reality of God's concern for man and his world. The weak designation, *relatio rationis*, unable to convey the personal involvement of God in man's fate, must be used in its right place as an accurate designation. But it must not be

[78] Theologians, such as K. Raimer, W. Brugger, F. Malmberg, have been working on this important question. To what extent God *changes* in the other, in being subject to human history and the modes of operation of an individual humanity, is surely one of the biggest Christological questions at the moment. The greater or lesser reality that one sees in " God changing in the other " will influence the whole of the present question. At present I must be content with stressing the divine Actuality as inclusive of the reality of creation in the divine freedom to such an extent that God is really indicating his actual reality when he " subjects " himself to humanity in the Incarnation. The question of the degree of type of change must be left open for the moment.

allowed to weaken our grasp of the utterly total and personal relationship that God enjoys with regard to man.

After attempting to give some indication of the real meaning hidden in the weak and possible misleading term, " relation of reason," we are now in a position to give a more positive statement about the Reality of God as it is known by us.

IV. THE BEING OF GOD

The impression that the traditional affirmation of God as *Esse Subsistens* makes on much of the contemporary theological and philosophical mind is easy enough to ascertain. So often it is characterized as impersonal, abstract, and, of course, all too static. It is hard enough, however, to counteract this impression, should one wish to do so. Naturally we would be expected to say that it has been misunderstood, or that it must be reinterpreted along more *dynamic* lines. One finds it difficult to make any blanket assertion of how the theologians of a past age actually interpreted, for themselves, this formula. The existential depths of their language will, in the main, probably have to be their own secret, since they were not concerned to express the values that appeal to us of a later age. It is, therefore, of greater importance for us to interrogate ourselves on the meaning we see in this simple phrase, *Esse Subsistens.* This in turn depends largely on what we mean by is: Is it just a logical figment? An empirical recognition that such and such is the case? Or does the word "is" indicate what we understand by an intuition into the deepest actuality of reality? These are big questions. Let us content ourselves with just noting a few points in this vital area.

I. Following the indications of St. Thomas [79] we are lead to see for ourselves that the *"is-ness"* of a being is the radical actualization of all its reality. It is the fundamental *en-actment* of all the formal components of the being in question. The recognition of this leads us to see our activity of stating in

[70] *Summa Thool.,* I, q. 8, a. 1: "Esse est illud quod magis intimum cuilibet et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt."

word and mind the existence of a being as staking out the claim of this concrete existent in the universe of what really is. In affirming that *this is,* we recognize the originality of the existent as something which occupies a unique place in the whole span of reality. This recognition of the existence of something is an appreciation of the quite special character of individual things as they are confronting us, uniquely themselves, possessing in themselves through their act of existence a unique enactment of perfection. [80]

When we affirm God as *lpsum Esse,* what, then, are we doing? It appears that the theologian is affirming of God, in a shorthand way, all the radical energy, originality, spontaneity and charm that he has encountered in existence on the level of creation. It is not as though we are assigning God to a characterless void, for we look to a supremely perfect concretization of existence, the radical perfection that has been grasped in reality. It is not as though an addition sum is being done of all the perfections, in their various grades, and then designating God as the possessor of the whole lot as we have come to know them. What we are doing is more akin to "allowing for," within the divine Reality, a transcendent totalization of the perfection of existence as we have come to know it. Further, this formal, metaphysical "making allowance for " a perfect totalization of existence is in the concrete, because of the actuality of God known in the history of salvation, given an even more personal, free, and determined dimension. In other words, the ideas we might form of the positive plenitude of the divine existence in its sheer actuality must be completed by that specially concrete revealed knowledge we have of God as the Trinity and of God as an eternal, free Self-communicating Mystery. The theologian must allow for all this in the ultimate act of existence that is God. Salvation History, presenting us with the personal presence of God in our midst, brings us ultimately to a more concrete, if more mysteri-

[80] Cf. C. Fabro, *La Notione metafisica de Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Milan, 1989), pp. 185-188.

ous, affirmation of the divine Act. Thus, the divine Act of existence is recognized as not merely the source and sustenance of human and worldly existence but as the originating source of salvation itself. There is no need, then, for this term, *Ipsurn Esse Subsistens,* to be in any wise an untheological, abstract, or static expression. There are still some considerations that might make this more clear.

3. A remark on the terminology of *rnixed* and *pure perfections* might be helpful. It is very easy to isolate these two types of perfections too much. *Mixed* perfections as applied to God, e. g., God " hearing," experiencing some emotion, etc., are so designated in a convenient enough manner to indicate a special effect in the range of the divine activity which, it is assumed, can eventually be reduced to more objective and dispassionate language. For instance, God " hearing " man's plea for redemption is translated into the more objectively theological language of God's election and foreknowledge implementing the design of salvation. Be that as it may, we should not fail to notice that the attribution to the Divinity of these mixed perfections, even though we might know that, in fact, God does not possess them, is an expression of a richly symbolic knowledge of the divine Reality. It indicates a non-conceptual and concrete attainment of the meaning of the Divinity which cannot be adequately objectivized. There is a splendor or radiance about the divine Actuality as it comes into our knowledge which a purely conceptual designation cannot express. All this goes to stress that it is *rnan,* not a detached mind, that is grappling with the knowledge of God. There is a charm and appeal about the divine Being that is too concrete for the necessarily abstract, formal processes of objectivization. Hence, the theologian must be ready to recognize a real, concrete *sense* of God in the use of symbol and metaphor which are able to bring home to man as a totality the reality of the absolute Being of God in his concern for man.

In this context, a brief remark about the *temporality* of God might be made. If the traditional theistic approach ever attributed temporality to God, it would be surely on the plea of

its being a " mixed " perfection and, therefore, could fit into metaphorical language about God in the sense of the above paragraph. We certainly do speak of time in God in an anthropomorphic manner. The point at issue here is: *is* there any sense in which temporality could be attributed to God absolutely, as something akin to the "pure perfections "? Every orthodox theist must certainly fail to see how there can be succession or development in the sheer actuality of the divine Being. There is room for closer study on this point. If temporality can really be expressed in terms of pure perfection, as not essentially implying limitation, progress, transition from not having perfection to having it, then there is nothing to stop anyone from attributing this kind of temporality to God. If the existential concept of temporality, drawn from a reflection on the actuality of human existence, is, as applied to God, nothing but an attempt to point to the ever complete actuality and the continuous self-originating and self-possession of the divine existence in which God is always *actually* appropriating his Being and his Selfhood, then it could be said that the divine existence might fittingly enough be expressed in terms of absolute or primal time. Eternity would meaningfully appear, not so much as a static" Now" but as a divine time in which God is ever actually possessing himself and all else in himself. Human time would then appear as a weak sharing in the abounding originality of the " divine " time.

On the other hand, if temporality means subjecting God in his absolute actuality to some form of development in our theological affirmations, I cannot see how real temporality could be attributed to the divine Reality. So much for this brief remark.

To return to the main point: the designation of God as " lpsum Esse " can be understood to be a supremely vital and complete affirmation. No one presumably is under the delusion that he can express fully what God is but through this expression we say that God is the infinite Actuality, in a sense, "situated" by man's experience of this actuality within the limits of corporeal and historical existence. No one is saying

that God is abstract because our concepts are abstract, but it is affirmed that the realities that these concepts seek to express are now actually in God. To appreciate this as fully as possible, the mind must recollect itself in an experience of its own actuality, in its attainment of being. In the experience of this attainment, and of presence to self necessarily involved, the human person comes to recognize that *what is,* being, is not a vague abstraction but reality intuited in all its personal warmth, with all its subtle colorations and textures, in the special charm of spontaneity and in the singular originality of existence. Such a " notion " of being, as the actualization of " omnia quae in re sunt," [81] is used in our affirmation of God as the all-perfect act of Being. In speaking of God in this way we are not contracting the divine Reality to the limits of our own attainment of reality, rather, we are pointing to the concretization of an infinite Actuality which remains merely situated for us by our experience of reality through our natural and supernatural capacities. Revelation does not add new thoughts to this kind of knowledge but gives us a deeper and more concrete insight into the implications of our basic affirmation that *God is,* perfectly and infinitely.

* * * * *

SuMMARY:

In indicating these few points of just how concrete our affirmation of the Being of God is, the question can be asked, do we to a large extent transcend the problematic of the God-world relationship? One is inclined to answer in the affirmative. Since God is affirmed from "within " our existence, the Reality of God is asserted from the fact that our existence is " given "-by God in its concrete historical form. God so affirmed is *our God,* freely though eternally committing himself. To realize the reality and the concreteness of our affirmation of God as *lpsum Esse* is to realize his complete relatedness to us.

[81] *Summa Tkeol., loc. cit.*

We arrived at this point by taking up, first of all, two noetic considerations: I. the Perspective, and II. the Field of Analogy. In these two points we stressed the interrelatedness that was assumed at the beginning of the theological quest, yet showed how the anticipation of the divine subjectivity was necessarily corrected by a correlative anticipation of the divine absoluteness. We then took up the *reality* implied in the *relatio rationis*, the God-universe relationship, and the inspection of this led us to make the final remarks on the actual Being of God. Indeed, God as we know him, is *for-us,* though we have no need to lessen his absoluteness nor his freedom in stating that.

CoNcLusioN:

I must admit that this has not been so much dialogue as self-examination induced by the stimulating work of the neoclassical school as brought to my attention, above all, by Schubert Ogden. Much remains to be said in the line of fruitful dialogue since here our treatment is rather lopsided. My main conclusion would be that the " relatio rationis " as applied to God in his relationship with the universe is not as extrinsic or existentially unappealing as it might seem. I have given my reasons at some length, but they reduce to the real relatedness that God brings about in the creature through the free but eternal exercise of his freedom. By this he makes himself eminently the God of our Universe, " our kind of God." For this reason, the name " relatio rationis " might well be replaced by the term "relationship of intersubjectivity" in certain contexts, once the basic metaphysical contours of the question are established. (One might hazard, "relatio conscientiae personalis ") . Whatever words one uses, one must attempt bring out the reality that is implied here without destroying one term of the relationship, namely God, in his absolute fulness of Being.

Such are the general lines of the approach. There are many points that need clarification. I am grateful *ior* the stimulus

that the neo-classical theologians offer in their application of "Process Theology" to the Being of God; but in the end, I feel we must for no matter how intelligently this theocy has been put forward, or how sensitive it is to the values of contemporary theology, it remains an anthropomorphism, however finely drawn.

ANTHONY J. KELLY, C.SS.R.

St. Mary's Seminary
Wendouree, Victoria
Australia

THOMAS AQUINAS AND ANALOGY: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

WHATEVER PARTICULAR claims or assertions a philosopher or philosophical tradition may wish to make, what is unqualifiedly affirmed in the very endeavor of philosophy is inward or mental experience; and " spoken words are the symbols of mental experience." [1] Speech and mental experience or understanding would seem to be inseparable. The philosopher's inquiry into the whole invariably leads, then, to an inquiry into language.

> By looking directly at whatever presents itself in our familiar world, at things and their properties, at human affairs and actions, we run the risk of being blinded, as do people who observe the sun during an eclipse if they do not look at its image on some watery surface .... To avoid being " blinded " Socrates thought he had to " take refuge in spoken words " . . . in exchanging questions and answers with himself and with others and in *them* search for the truth of things. [2]

Philosophers whose conceptions of human speech and understanding are as divergent as Heidegger's and Aristotle's still concur in the centrality of language for man. Aristotle defines man as a living being possessing speech, and Heidegger asserts that:

> To be a man is to speak . . . in his profound essence he is a speaker, *the* speaker. That is his distinction and at the same time his burden. It distinguishes him from stones, plants, animals, but also from gods.[3]

[1] Aristotle, *On Interpretation,* I. 16"8, tr. E. M. Edghill, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

• Jacob Klein, "Aristotle, An Introduction," in *Ancients and Modems,* ed. Joseph Cropsey (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. *56.*

[8] Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* p. 69.

For Aristotle and Aquinas, to " take refuge in spoken words " is to take refuge in the power of human language to translate the language of the things themselves and thus to symbolize the mind's experience of the whole. This power of language is, in part, the power of analogous signification. Analogy, briefly, is the dilation of the focus of our meanings and words beyond their original concrete matrix. Without analogy, names would be but serial numbers stamped upon the objects of our experience and designating no more than the sequence in which we encountered them. Embedded so deeply in the fabric of man, analogy, it seems, is a" mystery" in the sense of an inexhaustible source of concrete problems. This is to say that analogy itself is analogous, i. e., subject to a variety of formulations all of which bear upon the mysterious issue involved, none of which, however, fully embody it. Our discussion, then, in focusing upon the Thomistic doctrine of analogy, necessarily lays no claim to an explanation of analogy as such but rather seeks only an accurate explication of but one traditional (i.e., the Thomistic) formulation of the problem, or " mystery " as we have defined it, of analogy.

The Thomistic doctrine of analogy has been handed across the centuries nestled for the most part in the largely unquestioned categories of Thomas's commentator, Cardinal Cajetan, Thomas De Vio (1468-1584). Recently, however, the accuracy and authority of Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas on this point have been as widely disputed as they were once accepted. Therefore it seems that we must initiate our discussion either by validating the position of Cajetan or by prying the Thomistic doctrine free from a regrettable distortion of long standing. In either case we must see what it is that Cajetan maintains Thomas to be saying.

Cajetan constructs his interpretation of St. Thomas around an early text in the *Commentary· on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* (1254-56), which text reads as follows:

> Something is predicated analogously in three ways. First, it may be predicated according to intention alone and not according to its being (secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse).

This happens when one intention is referred to several things according to a priority and posteriority, and yet this single intention really exists only in one thing. Thus, the intention of health is referred to animal, urine, and diet in different ways, according to a priority and posteriority, but not according to a different being, because health exists only in an animal. The second of these is analogy according to being but not according to intention (secundum esse et non secundum intentionem) .

This occurs when several things are equally matched in the intention of some common note even though that note does not have a being of one and the same sort (esse unius rationis) in each of them. An instance of this is that all bodies are made equal in the intention of "body." As a result the logician, who considers only intentions, says that this term " body " is predicated univocally of all bodies. In reality, however, this nature exists with a being of a different sort in corruptible and incorruptible bodies. Thus, in the eyes of a metaphysician or a philosopher of nature, who consider things according to the being they have, neither body nor any other term is predicated univocally of corruptible and of incorruptible things, as is clear from words of the Philosopher and of the Commentator in the fifth text of the tenth book of the *Metaphysics.* The third of these is analogy according to intention and according to being (secundum intentionem et secundum esse). And this is when they are equally matched neither in a common intention nor in being. Thus being is predicated of substance and of accident. Of such things the common nature will have some being in each one of the things of which it is predicated, but it will differ because they are of greater or lesser perfection. Similarly, I maintain that truth and goodness and the like are predicated analogically of God and of creatures. This means that according to their being (esse) all these things exist in God and in creatures according to their greater or lesser perfection. From this it follows that, since they cannot exist according to the same being iii both, they are diverse truths (diversae veritates) .[4]

Thomas's threefold division stated above (secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; secundum intentionem et secundum esse) forms the structure of Cajetan's treatise *De nominum analogia* (1498) and these become Cajetan's analogy of attri-

[4] Thomas Aquinas, I *Sent.*, d. 19, q. *5,* a. 2, ad 1.

bution, analogy of inequality, and analogy of proportionality, respectively.

'Cajetan's analogy of inequality, intended to parallel Thomas's analogy *secundum esse et non secundum intentionem,* finds the following definition in Cajetan's treatise:

> Things are said to be analogous by analogy of inequality if they have a common name, and the notion indicated by this name is exactly the same but unequally participated in.[5]

According to Cajetan, analogy of inequality, the predication of a generic (or specific) concept of its inferiors, is not analogy at all, except by an abusive extension of that term.

Cajetan defines analogy of attribution, paralleling analogy *secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse,* as follows:

> Analogous by attribution are those things which have a common name, and the notion signified by this name is the same with respect to the term but different as regards the relationship to this term.[6]

While Cajetan recognizes the logical usage and validity of analogy of attribution, he denies that it can have any metaphysical or religious application whatsoever. Consequently, analogy of attribution is not analogy properly so-called; for analogy, as Cajetan interprets it, is a metaphysical doctrine. That is to say that what is common to or shared by the diverse analogues is intrinsic to their existence. When formally considered, analogy of attribution is for Cajetan always extrinsic, as is clear from the first of his four criteria of analogy of attribution: " so that only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination." [7] Cajetan rejects altogether intrinsic attribution; for it implies necessarily some intrinsic common formal causes.[8] Thomas's bifurcation of analogy into *analogia multor-*

• Cajetan, *DtJ nominum analogia,* n. 4.
• *Ibid.,* n. 8.
[7] *Ibid.,* n. 10.
[8] *Ibid.,* n. 11.

um ad unum and *analogia unius ad alterum,* to be found throughout Thomas's writings,[9] appears in *De nominum analogia* as *analogia duorum ad tertium* and *analogia unius ad alterum,* both subdivisions of analogy of attribution.[10]

Finally, concerning analogy of proper proportionality, corresponding to analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse.* Cajetan says:

> We say that analogous by proportionality are called those things which have a common name, and the notion expressed by this name is proportionally the same. Or to say the same in a different way, analogous by proportionality are called those things which have a common name, and the notion expressed by this name is similar according to a proportion.[11]

Cajetan identifies this third division of analogy, i.e., *secundum intentionem et secundum esse,* with the analogy of proportionality presented by Thomas in his *De veritate* (H256-59):

> Consequently it must be said that knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely equivocally of God's knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated analogously, or in other words according to a proportion. Now an agreement according to proportion can be of two kinds. According to this, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy ... The first kind of agreement is one of proportion; the second of proportionality ....[12]

The example cited in both texts (i.e., *I Sent.,* d. 19, q. a. ad 1 and *De v'erit.,* q. a. 11) is that of "sight" said analogously of both corporeal and intellectual vision. " Proportionality " is chosen over and against " proportion " since the latter entails a determinate relationship between the analogue, which simply does not obtain outside of the category of quantity. Further, in discerning between proper proportionality and improper proportionality (metaphor), Cajetan explains how proper proportionality is had: " For instance, principle can be predicated of the heart with respect to an animal and of a

• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. *5; De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 7; *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 34.
[1°] Cajetan, *op. cit.,* n. 17.
[11] *Ibid.,* n. 23.
[10] *De Verit.,* q. 2, a. llc.

foundation with respect to a house." [13] Proper proportionality entails a real perfection intrinsic to each analogue, whereas improper proportionality or metaphor requires no such intrinsic reality. Finally, Cajetan considers proper proportionality to be the only valid form of analogy for metaphysical and religious discourse. [14]

> (1) because it arises from the genus of inherent formal causality, for it predicates perfections that are inherent to each analogate, [14a] [and] (2) because only terms which are analogous by this type of analogy are called analogous by the Greeks, from whom we have borrowed the term. [15]

So far as Cajetan is concerned, then, proportionality alone is truly and properly analogy "as we have learned from the Greeks," [16] and the movement from analogy of inequality to analogy of attribution and finally to analogy of proper proportionality is a movement from the "less properly analogous to those which are truly analogous." [17]

Although the tri-partite division of analogy cited and discussed above is to be found but once in the entire corpus of Thomas's writings, Cajetan and his numerous adherents attempt to correlate and reconcile every other analogy text with it (i.e., *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1). For example of how Cajetan deals with other and seemingly discrepant texts, we may cite one of the many texts in which Thomas divides analogy two ways into *multorum ad unum* and *unius ad alterum:*

> Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, that is, according to proportion. Now names are so used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, for example *healthy* is predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of

[13] Cajetan, *op. cit.*, n. 26.
[14] *Ibid.*, n. 27.
[14a] *Ibid.*, n. 26.
[15] *Ibid.*, n. 28; cf. n. 2 and cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 7.
[16] Cajetan, *op. cit.*, n. 2.
[17] *Ibid.*

a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus *healthy* is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures, as was said above. Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures, is said .according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently.[18]

Cajetan reads this entire passage as an explication of his own category of analogy of attribution, of which " multa . . . ad unum " and " unum ... ad alterum " are subdivisions; [19] and it is in this fashion that this passage has been read for centuries. Further, in his commentary on the above passage, Cajetan distinguishes names said of God and creatures from instances of analogy of attribution:

But there is similarity in the fact that analogy belongs to either thing by reason of an order obtaining between two things, although differently in each case. For between God and the creature there is a formal imitative similarity (similitudo formalis imitativa) (which is touched upon in the text when creatures are said to be ordered to God as to their cause, in which all perfections pre-exist): between a healthy animal and urine, however, there is not similarity but a relationship of signification (relatio significationis). Thus in the former there is an analogical community according to formal predication, while in the latter there is a community of attribution to one thing according to whatever predication, either extrinsic or intrinsic. [20]

The distinction drawn between " similitudo formalis " and " relatio signi:ficationis " underscores the point made earlier-that for Cajetan analogy is properly metaphysical rather than semantic or logical. Cajetan finds the following article of the same question congenial as well to his own insistence that all analogates are to possess intrinsically and " formaliter" the perfection predicated analogously of each.

[18] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. *5c.*
[19] Cf. *ibid.,* nn. 9, 18.
[20] Cajetan, *Commentaria in Summam theologiae,* I, q. 13, a. *5,* n. xiv.

However, as was shown above, names of this sort are predicated of God not only as cause but also properly. For when God is called good or wise, this signifies not only that he is the cause of wisdom and goodness but also that these perfections exist in him in a higher way. In light of these considerations, then, it must be maintained that, as far as the reality signified is concerned (ad rem significatam), these predications are made antecedently of God rather than of creatures because perfections of this sort flow from God to creatures. As far as the imposition of the name is concerned (ad impositionem nominis), however, creatures are named first, because we know them first. Therefore they have a way of signifying which befits creatures as has been said above. [21]

With respect to the above distinction between " ad rem significatam " and " ad impositionem nominis," the whole weight of Cajetan's interpretation comes down upon the " res significata," the common or participated intrinsic perfection threading each of the analogates to each other, rather than upon the "modus significandi," a logical or semantic question.

Summarily, then, at the structural center of Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas on analogy is the tripartite division of analogy in the *Sentences*, the third member of which is identified with the analogy of proportionality treated in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 11. Central as well is the focus upon the " res significata," i. e., the assumption that analogy is properly metaphysical.

Cajetan's position has not been without its critics, notably Sylvester of Ferrara and Francis Suarez; but until recently, his adherents have easily out-numbered and out-published his opponents. Although our full criticism of Cajetan's position will take the form of a positive counter-proposal, several brief points might well be raised and levelled against Cajetan here.

First, Cajetan's acceptance of the tri-partite division of analogy in the *Sentences* as normative seems hardly tenable textually. This division occurs only once in Thomas's writings [22] and can hardly be taken as a formal division of an:tlogy.

n *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 6.

•• Cf. Ralph Mcinerny, *The Logiv of Analogy* (The Hague, 1961), p. 96.

This is Mcinerny's conclusion in what is an impressively thorough and careful analysis of Thomas's analogy texts. Concerning this tri-partite division, Mcinerny comments:

We are reading the present text as presenting, not a division of the analogy of names, but as pointing out that the foundation of analogous names is not always the same. In such .an example as 'healthy,' that from which the name is imposed has existence in only one of the things named by it. Various references or propositions to that in which *sanitas* exists are the foundation for the extension of the word *sanum.* In the second division we were apprised of a remote and proper way of looking at things. These different vantage points give rise to the univocity and analogy with respect to the same name and the same thing named by it. In the third division, we are told of analogous names which are so founded that that from which the name is imposed exists in each of the things named analogously but ' secundum rationem maioris et minoris perfectionis.' [28]

Second, Cajetan's reduction of all proper analogy to analogy of proportionality as discussed in *De veritate,* q. 2, a. 11 has been widely and variously criticized. Cajetan himself, as noted earlier, points to Greek usage and to the possession of intrinsic perfection " formaliter " in accounting for his position. Cajetan fails to recognize that Thomas used the term " analogia " differently than the Greeks used *ava'Aoy£a* and that thus no one-to-one correspondence is possible between the two terms. [24] " St. Thomas makes the phrase ' secundum analogiam ' common to every nonchance equivocation, something Aristotle does not do with the phrase *Kar' ava'Aoytav."* [25] Also, while both Klubertanz and Montagnes conclude that proportionality as proposed in the *De veritate* was for Thomas a temporary and isolated position to which he never again returned, [26] Mcinerny maintains that there is no conflict between the proportion of the *Summa*

•• *Ibid.,* pp. 122-3.

•• Cf. *ibid.,* p. 35.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 94.

•• Cf. George P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy* (Chicago, 1960), pp. 86, 94, 97; and Bernard Montagnes, *La Doctrine De L'Analogie De L'etre D'ap1'es St. Thomas D'Aquin* (Lorwain, 1963), pp. 65-66.

theologiae and the proportionality of the *De veritate.*[27] In *De veritate,* Thomas distinguishes between proportion and proportionality only after stating: "Consequently it must be said that knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely equivocally of God's knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated analogously, or in other words according to a proportion."[28] This appears to be in perfect harmony with the *Summa* where Thomas speaks of names common to God and creatures in terms of a proportion of one to the other.[29] In either instance God's knowledge is known and named from ours. "Proportion" in the *Summa,* it seems, extends to both determinate and indeterminate proportions, whereas the point of the distinction drawn in the *De veritate* seems to be to state explicitly that between some things named analogously there is a determinate relation, while between others not; and yet that in both cases the one is known and named from the other. Thus, contrary to Cajetan's interpretation, the text of the *De veritate* does not deny that there is a proportion "unius ad alterum" in the names common to God and creatures. In fact, the two-fold division (unius ad alterum / multorum ad unum) is reiterated in the reply to the sixth objection of the same article. Thus Mcinerny's conclusion appears sound:

> What St. Thomas is stressing in the *De veritate* is that this proportion or relation is indeterminate; it is not determinate as if by moving from our knowing we could know *what* God's knowledge is.[30]
>
> What St. Thomas is after in the *De veritate* is the recognition that such a proportion does not put us in possession of determinate knowledge about God.[31]

Regardless of whether one accepts the conclusion of Klubertanz and Montagnes, or that of Mcinerny, Cajetan's position is

[27] Cf. Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 85.
[28] *De Verit.,* q. a. llc.
[29] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. 5c.
[30] Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 88.
[31] *Ibid.,* p. 90.

rendered untenable. It seems rather clear that Cajetan's own independent thought and writing intrudes itself between exegete and text so that "Cajetan becomes, on the matter of analogy, not so much a commentator who wants to understand the text before him, as an author who sees the text in the light of his own independent work." [32]

Third, the cardinal presupposition of Cajetan-that the analogy of names is a metaphysical doctrine-is the most fundamental focus of recent criticism. While Cajetan clearly creates the impression that possession of the analogous perfection " formaliter " is constitutive of the analogy of names, Thomas leaves no doubt that a name could be analogously common to God and creature even if it were intended to signify only "causaliter." [33] Cajetan's position seems irreconcilable with what appears to be a formal statement of Thomas on analogy: " when something is analogously predicated of many things, that from which the others are named is found properly only in one thing." [34] Thus it would seem that intrinsic versus extrinsic denomination would be accidental to the analogy of names as such.[35] In fact, to be named analogously would always be an extrinsic denomination. Mcinerny concludes that:

> The phrase ' illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum ' has nothing to do with possessing the perfection intrinsically. To say that among things called healthy, only animal can be so denominated from a perfection intrinsic to it, is to say more than is said when we are told that animal, urine and food are called healthy analogically. Whether this ontological situation holds or not, all the rules given for the analogy of names are valid and unchanged. We cannot argue from the fact that things are named analogically to one ontological situation or the other, for what they have in common is to be named analogically-not *to be* this way or that but *to be named* in this way.[36]

•• *Ibid.,* p. 13.
•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13; Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 17.
•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 16, a. 6c.
•• Cf. Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* pp. 91, 93.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 98.

The point here is simply that the analogy of names is a logical rather than a metaphysical question, a point which Cajetan missed altogether; and "the division of analogy resulting from such confusion can only be regarded as a gross identification of the logical and real orders." [31]

* * * * *

Prior to any attempt at presenting a clear and cohesive doctrine of analogy in the writings of Aquinas, it is well to note the bewildering variety of texts from which any such doctrine must be gleaned. Nowhere in the writings of Thomas is there to be fond a thematic, ex professo treatment of analogy; rather, Thomas simply employs analogy, presupposing prior instruction and familiarity. Analogy is one element in the " philosophy " of Thomas; and " he does not expound this philosophy systematically for its own sake but only partially and for the solution of particular problems, usually theological ones." [38] **But** this raises fundamental questions of methodology to which we will later return briefly, the scope of which, however, lies beyond the reach of this study. The textual point to be made here concerning analogy is simply that " the diversity of problems and viewpoints rather than doctrinal development is the principal background for the variety of terminology." [39] Concerning chronological development in Thomas's conception of analogy, Klubertanz concludes that the results ofchronological investigations are meager, [40] and Mcinerny sees no evidence of any evolution or significant shift in Thomas's mind on these points. [41] Consequently, while no doubt at the cost of some oversimplification, though hopefully without any risk of significant distortion, we will in our treatment trace no chronological development of the doctrine of analogy through Thomas's writings.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 35.

[88] G. Klubertanz, *op. cit.,* p. 22; cf. p. 105.

[••] *Ibid.,* p. 22. Klubertanz proposes six general areas of usage of analogy in the writings of Thomas-d. *ibid.,* pp. 106-107.

[••] Cf. *ibid.,* p. 104.

["] Cf. Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. vi.

Once what it means to be named analogically is pared from one or other concrete application of analogous appellation, it seems apparent that the analogy of names itself is a logical or semantic question, belonging to the logic of signification and quite distinct from the ontological doctrines of the analogy of being, participation, and analogous causation. To be named happens to things as they are known and is not intrinsic to them as they exist " in rerum natura." [42] In Thomas, analogical signification is nearly always compared with univocation and equivocation; and in every such instance, things *are said* (" dicuntur ") rather than *are* (" sunt ") analogues, univocals, or eqm-vocals (" analoga," " um-voca," " eqm-voca ") . " The emphasis is always on *dicuntur* as opposed to *sunt,* on *ratio* as opposed to the mode of existence which things enjoy apart from being known and named." [43]

St. Thomas could not be clearer on the status of the analogy of names: it is a logical doctrine to be discussed in terms of what is formal to logical discussions and, above all, to be divided by properly logical criteria. By attaching nearly every statement on the analogy of names to equivocation, St. Thomas makes it difficult for us to treat the analogy of names .as something other than a logical intention. [44]

By logical or second intentions are meant ideas about first intentions, i. e., ideas derived from or verified in first intentions. First intentions, in turn, are ideas about real things, i.e., ideas derived from or verified in things in the real world. First intentions, then, belong to things as they are in the real world, i. e., to things as extramentally existent, whereas second, or logical, intentions belong to things as they are in the intellect, i.e., to things as intramentally known. Examples of first intentions would be: " bread," " white," " animal," " man," " rational," etc., while corresponding second intentions would be: " substance," " accident," " genus," "species," "specific difference," etc. Logic, then, becomes the science of second

[42] Cf. *ibid.,* p. Hl5.
[43] *Ibid.,* p. 77.
[44] *Ibid.,* p. 84.

intentions, whose task it is to explicate the properties of or relations between *things as known.* Even though logic entails knowledge of real entities which are themselves the remote foundations of logical intentions, and even though logic aims at ordering such knowledge of real entities, the logical and real orders must nevertheless be held distinct.

Analogous, univocal, and equivocal signification are concerned with the relationship between word, concept, and referent.[45] Words are conventional or arbitrary signs of concepts, which, in tum, are natural signs of things as known. Given the situation that one word is applied to a plurality of concrete referents, univocal, equivocal, and analogous signification refer to whether the concepts signified by the single word are in the case of each concrete referent virtually identical, virtually diverse, or systematically ambiguous, respectively. We will return to the relation between analogy, univocation, and equivocation. The point to be made here is that *analogy* is a second intention, a logical relation, obtaining between the three constitutive elements in verbal signification: word, concept, thing. To demonstrate the logical or second-intentional character of analogous, univocal, and equivocal signification, we may note that the very same concrete referents may be analogues, univocals or equivocals, depending upon the names given them. For instance, a shrieking infant and an enthusiastic student are analogues when they are said to be " concerned," univocals when said to be " alive," and equivocals when said to be" trying." Although logical intentions are remotely grounded in things as they really exist, their proximate foundations are always things as known. Thus, " whatever be the foundation in reality for their similarity-and it need not be cause/effect-it is unimportant for the statement of what it means for things to be named analogically."[46] We have focused already upon what it means to *be named* in contrast with simply *to be;* now we must focus upon what it means to be named analogously, in contrast with to be named univocally or equivocally.

[45] Cf. John A. Oesterle, *Logic* (Englewood Cliffs, chapters I and 8.
[46] Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 188.

Thomas frequently presents analogy as a kind of equivocation, as in the following text:

The term " animal " which is predicated of the living animal and of the drawing of that animal is not used purely equivocally; for the philosopher broadly speaking takes equivocal names in a broad sense according to which they include analogous terms, because being, which is an analogical term, is sometimes said to be equivocally predicated of different predicamentsY

With pure or chance equivocals the same name signifies totally diverse concepts, whereas with analogues or equivocals by design the same name signifies concepts which, while diverse, are not totally divergent or unrelated but are instead " partim diversae et partim non diversae," and " in aliquo uno convenientes ":

Something can be predicated of diverse things in multiple fashion. First of all, when the concept is absolutely identical so that it may be used of several things univocally, such as the term animal of both a horse and a cow. Second, when the concepts are simply diverse so that they are predicated of various things equivocally, as the term dog of the stellar constellation and of an animal. Third, when the concepts are partly diverse and partly not diverse (partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae); they are diverse insofar as they imply diverse relations; they are one, however, insofar as these same diverse relations are referred to one single thing. Such things are said to be predicated analogously, that is proportionately, insofar as each thing in relationship to its relation is referred to that one thing. [48]

Something can be predicated of several because of different concepts in two ways. The first way because of completely different concepts which have no relation to one common thing. And these are called accidentally equivocal terms because it happens, as it were, by chance that one man gives a name to one thing and another man gives the same name to another thing. As, for example, happens most conspicuously in the case where two men are called by the same name. The second way, one name is used of several according to concepts which are not totally different but which agree in some respect. (In a:liquo uno convenientes) ,[49]

•• *Summa Thevl.,* I, q. IS, a. 10, ad. 4.
'"IV Metaphys., lect. I, n. 585.
•• *I Ethic.,* lect. 7, nn. 95-96; cf. *I Sent.,* d. 81, q. 2, a. 1, ad. 2.

The examples following upon the latter citation above are quite illustrative: " military " is said of sword, quirass, and horse in that" they have reference to one principle"; "healthy" is said of medicine, food., and wine in that "they have reference to one end"; "being" is said of substance, quantity, and quality " according to the different relationships to the same subject "; " sight " is said of body and mind " according to a relationship to different subjects"; "good" is said of many things" according to analogy, or the same proportion, inasmuch as all good things depend upon one first principle of goodness or inasmuch as they are ordered to one end." [50] What distinguishes these examples from each other is not that some are with real foundation and others without but rather the variety of foundations upon which they rest. The point may again be made here that:

' To be named analogically ' is always an extrinsic denomination of things, not something which belongs to them as they exist *in rerum natura.* This is something which attaches to things as known, and on this level, the reason is always the same: many things receive a common name insofar as they are denominated from what the name principally signifies.[51]

There is, then, in analogous signification, an element of community in the midst of diversity. "There is diversity because the name signifies different proportions or relations or references; there is unity because these proportions or relations or references are to one and the same thing. . .. The analogous name is one of multiple signification but· that multiplicity is reduced to a certain unity because the name signifies many relations to one and the same thing." [52]

In like manner it should be known that that one thing to which diverse relations are referred in analogous predication is one in number and not only one in concept (ratio)' just as in the case of that one thing designated by a univocal name. [53]

•• *Ibid.*

[61] Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 125.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 74.

•• *IV Metaphys.,* lect. I, n. *535-6.*

In the case of all names which are predicated analogously of several things, it is necessary that all be predicated with respect to one, and therefore that that one be placed in the definition of all. Because " the intelligibility which a name means is its definition," as is said in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics,* a name must be antecedently predicated of that which is put in the definitions of the others, and consequently of the others, according to the order in which .they approach, more or less, that first analogate .... [54]

Something is said to be predicated analogously which is predicated of several things whose intelligibilities are different but which are attributed to one and the same thing. [55]

The " one " to which the various analogues have diverse proportions or relations or references, the " one " to which the diverse " rationes " and definitions are attributed, is the " ratio propria " of the analogous name: " When something is said analogously of many things, that thing is found according to its proper concept (ratio) in only one of those things from which the others receive the name." [56] The "ratio propria" is saved by only one of the analogues, while the others refer to it, proportion themselves to it " per prius et posterius." For example, " animal " alone saves the " ratio propria " of "healthy" which is "id quod habet sanitatem "; and "substantia" alone saves the "ratio propria" of "ens" which is "id quod habet esse."

This community of reference to or participation in the "ratio propria" does not, however, cause analogy to shade off into univocation.

Things named univocally participate equally in the common notion signified by their common name. The notion signified by ' animal ' is' animate sensitive substance' and it is participated in equally by man and horse. In things named analogically, on the other hand, the common notion signified by the name is not shared equally by all the things which receive the name; only one of the analogates is signified perfectly by the name. The others are signified imper-

•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 18, a. 6c.
•• *De principiia naturae,* c. 6, n. 866.
•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 16, a. 6c.

fectly and in a certain respect, that is, insofar as they refer in some way to what is perfectly signified,[57]

Analogy, then, in Janus-like fashion, stands between and faces both equivocation and univocation. Thus Thomas frequently describes it as midway between them.

This type of community is midway between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in things which are predicated analogously there is neither a single intelligibility (as in univocation) nor simply different intelligibilities (as in equivocation). Rather, a name which is predicated in several ways signifies different proportions to some one thing .... [58]

The distinction between analogy and equivocation and univocation may be brought out as well by considering the distinct manner in which each of them is divided.

It should be said that equivocal, analogous, and univocal names are distinguished differently. For equivocal names are distinguished according to the things signified; univocal names are distinguished according to diverse differences; but analogous names are distinguished according to diverse modes.[59]

The division of analogy which Thomas intends to be formal and exhaustive [60] is not the tri-partite division adopted by Cajetan [61] but rather the bifurcation of analogy into "multorum ad unum " and " unius ad alterum."

Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an *analogous* sense, that is, according to proportion. This can happen in two ways: either according as many things are proportioned to one (thus, for example, healthy is *predicated* of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of body, of which the latter is the sign and the former the cause), or according as one thing is proportioned to another (thus, healthy

[57] Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 76. In his more recent study of analogy, *Studies m Analogy* (The Hague, 1968), Mcinerny focuses upon the problem of whether or not there is a *ratio communis* in an analogous name and how it may differ from the *ratio communis* of a univocal name.

•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. *5c.*

•• *I Sent.,* d. ii!ii!, q. 1, a. 3, ad. ii!.

•• Cf. Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 82.

[11] Cf. *I Sent.,* d. 19, q. *5,* a. 2, ad 1, and our discussion of this text.

is said of medicine and an animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body). And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures. Hence, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some relation of the creature to God as to its principle and cause, wherein all the perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same; yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but the name which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing: e. g., *healthy,* applied to urine, signifies the sign of animal health; but applied to medicine, it signifies the cause of the same health. [62]

The mode of this predication is twofold. In the first way something is predicated of two things by being referred to a third thing, as. the term " being " of quality and quantity in respect to substance. The other way is when something is predicated of two others referring one to the other, as the term being (ens) is of substance and quantity. [63]

It has already been pointed out at some length that a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic attribution on ontological grounds is simply accidental to the analogy of names formally as such, which is to say that: " the intrinsic possession of the perfection is irrelevant to the intent of the phrase that something said analogically of many is found in only one of them with respect to its proper notion." [64] Every instance of analogy involves extrinsic denomination, understood in logical rather than ontological categories: " When something is said analogically of many things, it is found according to its own essence in only one of them, and the others are denominated from it." [65] Summarily, things are said to be named analogically when they have a common name which signifies one of them principally, "secundam rationem propriam," and the other (s) secondarily, "secundum proportionem."

•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. *5c.*
•• *De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 7; cf. *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 34.
'"Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 93.
•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 16, a. 6c.

The final distinction we wish to draw is that between analogy and metaphor. " What distinguishes the analogous name from metaphor is this: those things which do not verify the proper notion of the common name are nonetheless properly, if less so, signified by it and consequently it can properly suppose for them." [66] The discussion in *II Sent.* d. 13, q. 1, a. 2 under the title "utrum lux proprie invenitur in spiritualibus? " may perhaps prove illustrative of the point to be made here. Ambrose and Denis argue that "light " said of spiritual things is said improperly and is but a metaphor. They recognize only the " ratio propria " of " light " (i. e., principle of corporeal visibility), whereas Augustine recognizes a common notion, a " ratio communis," (i.e., principle of manifestation) as well. Consequently, it is Augustine's view that "light" is said properly of spiritual things and even more properly thereof than of corporeal things. The "more" pertains, however, to an ontological judgment having to do with the "res significata " rather than the " modus significandi." Thomas concurs with Augustine in concluding: " light exists more truly in spiritual things than in corporeal things. Not so much by reason of the proper concept of light but by reason of its manifestation." [67] What is immediately significant here for the purposes of our discussion is the extension or radiation of meaning from the " ratio propria " to form a " ratio communis," a community of meaning. This is simply not the case with metaphor where the name has only its " ratio propria " which is transferred to an alien context and usage.

What distinguishes the analogy of names from metaphorical usage is this: the former have been given an extended meaning and are no longer univocal terms having only a 'ratio propria.' Thanks to their 'ratio communis' they have become analogous. The metaphor, on the other hand, is a univocal term, used in a proposition to suppose for something which does not fall under its signification. Thus the term is used improperly ,[68]

•• Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* p. 147.

[67] *II Sent.,* d. 13, q. 1, a.

[08] Mcinerny, *op. cit.,* pp. 149-150. This question of the relationship of an;uogy to metaphor in Thomas Aquinas is discussed thematically at some length in *St"udies in Analogy.*

Our attempt so far has been to point out and explicate the logical character of the analogy of names. Within this schema the question of divine names, i. e., names common to both God and creatures, arises as a special instance or application rather than as a subdivision of the analogy of names.[69] Such names are clearly neither equivocal nor univocal but are rather either analogous or metaphorical. Things are named as they are known; thus a thing can be named precisely to the degree to which and according as it is known. Formally, analogy presupposes concepts, presupposes knowledge of what is named, presupposes an epistemological foundation. Consequently, the problem of how we name God with creature-names leads to the prior and more fundamental problem of how we know God with creature-knowledge.

Yet, if we focus first upon the problem of naming God, it is clear that God is named from creatures and that creatures are " secundum modum significationis " or " secundum ordinem nominis " the " per prius," the " id a quo " of such names. In creatures alone is the "ratio propria" of such names saved. Yet, " secundum rem significatam " or " secundum rem nominis " God is the " per prius," the " id a quo " of names common to God and creatures.

We cannot give any names to God except those which we derive from creatures.[70]

The name of anything which is named by us can be taken in a twofold way. It is either the expression or signification of an intellectual concept ... and thus the name exists in creatures first rather than in God; or insofar as it manifests the essence (quidditas) of the thing which is named and this time the name exists first of all in God.[71]

Thus the perfections found among creatures which serve as the matrix of names said of God now appear to be only quite imperfectly found or verified in creatures. God *is* essentially

•• Cf. *ibid.,* p. 158.
•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 18, a. 5c.
11 *Ad Ephesioa,* c. 8, lect., 4.

each of the perfections which man in some sense and to some degree *has.* God is pure act whereas man in some respects is, to a degree, actualized.

> Being is predicated *essentially* only of God, since the divine esse is subsistent and absolute. Being is predicated of all creatures *by participation:* no creature is its own existence, but rather is a being which has existence. In the same way, God is essentially good, because he *is* goodness itself; creatures are called good by participation, because they *have* goodness. [72]

Thomas describes the extrapolation involved in naming God and creatures in terms of the three steps found in the writings and tradition of pseudo-Dionysius: (1) affirmation; (2) negation; (3) supereminent affirmation. [73] For example, **(1)** God is said to be 'good'- (2) not in the sense that creatures are said to be' good'- (3) but with a supereminent goodness that altogether transcends human goodness.

The underlying problem throughout this discussion, however, is the epistemological one. A logical analysis such as the above is simply descriptive and seemingly explains nothing. The critical question seems to be: how does one attain the perspective or standpoint from which **(1)** creature-concepts become applicable to God and (2) the ultimate ground of such creature-concepts shifts from created reality to uncreated reality? Actually, these are but two aspects of a single insight-an insight which is apparently without foundation. With respect to our previous discussion, the problem is that of forming a "ratio communis" that will include God and creature alike, i.e., the problem of extending man's meanings and concepts to infinite or transcendent proportions without their becoming inapplicable to the finite and the concrete. Needless to say, the scope of this question is immense and well beyond the focus of this study. We will only hint at the lines which a thorough analysis of this question might take.

•• *Quodl.,* IT, q. 2, a. 1c.

[73] Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Divine Names,* in Rolt, *Dionyaius the Areopagite* (New York, 1920).

It seems that, in names common to God and creature, the underlying reference of effect to cause accounts for the common name and grounds its *ratio communis*, without which such a name would be said not properly but metaphorically of God.

Whatever is said of God and creatures is said by virtue of a certain ordering of the creature to God, as its principle and cause, wherein all the perfections of things pre-exist excellently. [74]

Every agent is found to produce effects which resemble it. Hence if the first goodness is the efficient cause of all good things, it must imprint its likeness upon the things which it produces. Thus, each thing is called good because of an intrinsic perfection, through a likeness of the divine goodness impressed upon it, and yet is further denominated good because of the first goodness which is the exemplar and efficient cause of all created goodness. [75]

The analogy of divine names, then, is rooted in the analogous causation of God as creator.

We find that there are three modes of agent causality. There is an agent causality which acts equivocally ... and one that acts univocally .... The mode of God's causality is neither of these ... not univocal ... not equivocal. . . . Thus the third mode of agent causality is analogous causation. Hence it is clear that the divine being (esse) produces creaturely being (esse) in its own but imperfect likeness. Therefore, divine being is said to be in its own but imperfect likeness. Therefore, divine being is said to be the being of all things from which all created being flows as from its efficient and exemplary cause. [76]

Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed because of communication in form according to the same concept of genus and species, but solely according to analogy, *viz.*, inasmuch as God is being by virtue of his essence, things are being by virtue of participation. [77]

* * * * *

Thomas's doctrine of the analogy of divine names is, like nearly all of his teaching, a hybrid of theology or faith and

•• *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 5c.
•• *De Verit.*, q. 21, a. 4c.
•• *II Sent.*, d. 8, q. I, a. 2c.
•• *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 4, a. 3, ad. 3.

philosophy or reason. That the world is created by God is a datum of divine revelation alone, whereas the principle that " omne agens agit sibi simile," as well as the notions of participation and exemplarity, are products of philosophical reasoning. Maritain has described the teaching of Thomas as an immense movement of thought between two intuitions: the intuition of Being and the intuition of God/[8] The analogy of divine names is an extremely significant expression of that movement. Similarly, Josef Pieper likens Thomas's task of reconciling revelation and reason to the bending of Achilles' bow-the two tips of the bow representing the Bible and Aristotelian philosophy/[9] For Thomas, the reception of Aristotelianism was a theological act, the work of theology in full possession of its faith, a theology not yet separated from the world, its conditions, its perspectives, its procedures, its culture.80 For Thomas, theology exists only if revelation exists and only if man accepts this revelation.[81] Thus it seems that there is no fully satisfying solution in Thomas to our contemporary probings into the naming and knowledge of God; for St. Thomas's point of departure, i.e., the acceptance of divine revelation, represents for many modern men a destination which hardly seems itself attainable. His philosophical categories as well may seem to be outflanked by our questions. Yet it seems that philosophy takes different forms indigenous to each age; and perhaps faith, too, may assume a modern form hopefully giving rise to a " synthesis " that will allow us to know, to interpret, and to name ourselves and our world in terms of a relationship to what lies at the ground of our existence.

ROBERT E. MEAGHER

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

[78] Cf. Jacques Maritain, *St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1958), p. 100.
[7°] Cf. Josef Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1964), p. 107.
[8°] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49.
[81] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 129.

KNOWLEDGE OF CAUSALITY IN HUME AND AQUINAS

THERE ARE MANY reasons why a re-examination of Hume's analysis of knowledge, especially insofar as this analysis bears upon the causal relation, is important. First of all, Hume's influence on contemporary thinkers, scientists as well as philosophers, is tremendous. His thought, to large extent, arms the logical positivists with the basic arguments which they employ to show that metaphysical statements are meaningless.[1] His view, moreover, that all necessary propositions are nonexistential and that all existential propositions are contingent and nondemonstrative-to which his teaching on the causal bond is closely linked-is one of the reasons why the analytic philosophers are prevented beforehand from inquiring into inferences concerning God's existence.[2]

[1] On this point, cf. Julius R. Weinberg, *An Examination of Logical Positivism* (Paterson, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1960), p. 3. Hume's position on the philosophical significance of the causal proposition is frequently reflected in contemporary philosophers, in particular, logical positivists and analysts. Moritz Schlick, for instance, writes: "Necessity means nothing more than universal validity: the sentence: 'A follows necessarily from B,' so far as content in concerned, is completely identical with the sentence: ' *In every case* where the state A occurs, the state B follows," and nothing more whatsoever" *(The Philosophy of Nature* [New York: Philosophical Library, 1949], p. 89). Wittgenstein puts it more succinctly: " A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only logical necessity" *(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949], 6.37, p. 181). For an example of Hume's pervasive influence on contemporary sciences, see 'Villiam S. Beck, *Modern Science and the Nature of Life* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), *passim,* but especially pp. 174-175. An excellent survey of Hume's influence on the elimination of causality as a philosophically valid notion is provided by Gerald F. Kreyche in his article, " Some Causes of the Elimination of Causality in Contemporary Science," *The Thomist* XXIX, No. 1 (1965), 60-78.

[2] That Hume's criticism of the philosophical viability of the causal proposition bas profoundly influenced both logical positivism and analytic philosophy on this

Thus, to understand some of the major trends in contemporary thought, an understanding of their Humean basis is essential.

For a realist, an even deeper reason motivates a study of Hume. With Hume, the realist maintains that human knowledge is derived from experience, that it begins with the deliverances of the senses. Yet the realist, unlike Hume, holds that we can, through experience, come to know things as they actually are, that we can grasp at least some of the relations which really exist among the sensible beings of experience. Obviously " experience " leads Hume and the realist to opposing positions. Thus it is incumbent upon the realist to examine Hume's analysis of experience, to confront it with his own, and to show why Hume's inquiry fails to account for some fundamental data of experience.

The present study, which falls into two parts, takes the form of a hypothetical meeting of the Edinburgh branch of the Scottish Philosophical Association in December, 1774. There David Hume, former Under-Secretary of State, presented a paper summarizing the chief points of his speculative philosophy. Thomas Davingwood, professor of antiquities in the University of Edinburgh, then replied to Mr. Hume's paper. Professor Davingwood's studies of the ancients had led him to examine the writings of some obscure medievalists, whose views, he discovered, had been " grossly and grotesquely distorted."

* * * * *

It is a pleasant honor to be invited to summarize for you

question is abundantly clear from the literature. For instance, Diogenes Allen observes: " Logical Positivism and Linguistic Analysis have greatly altered the condition of the field of the philosophy of religion. Exponents of these philosophies would, for the most part, endorse the criticisms of Hume. . . . The upshot of Hume's criticism is that the grounds for the claim that there is a God are inadequate" *(The Reasonableness of Faith* [Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), pp. xv, xiv. Cf. also the debate between Eugene Fontinell ("Faith and Metaphysics") and Joseph Owens (" This Sublime Truth ") in *Speaking of God,* ed. Denis Dirscherl (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1967) and the colloquy between J. N. Findlay and G. E. Hughes, "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" in *Nmv Essays in Philosophical Theology,* ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1955), pp. 47-67.

the chief elements of my philosophy insofar as it bears on the nature and scope of human understanding, particularly with respect to the meaning of the causal relation. While I pretend not to unlock the deepest mysteries of human knowing/ I am confident that the principles disclosed by my analysis of experience and the conclusions to which these principles lead are of the greatest significance in helping human kind attain to that truth properly befitting it and in avoiding the fruitless and disputatious reasonings so oft employed by those overvain and quarrelsome spirits who are forever searching after occult powers, forms, substances and accidents, and other abstruse entities. For I believe that, by applying the experimental method, whose value has been illumined so brilliantly by the incomparable Newton and other luminaries in the realm of mechanics, to questions bearing on man and human knowing, we shall discover those truths conformable to man's nature and lay bare the authority of that abstruse philosophy which in times past has posed in the dress of wisdom, yet in truth cloaked the most foolish superstition. [4]

• Cf. *Treatise of Hu7rULn Nature* (henceforth cited as T) (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961), Introduction, p. xiv: "The essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments. . . . And though we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical."

• Cf. *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (henceforth cited as E) (Garden City: Doubleday, n. d.), Sect. I, p. 312: "Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these entangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. . . . The only means of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects."

On the truth conformable to man, cf. *E.*, Sect. I, pp. 318-314: "It cannot be

In making this application of the experimental method to human understanding I first direct attention to those appearances or phenomena disclosed to us in our immediate experience of being conscious of something. Today I propose to analyze this experience, applying the results of this analysis to the relation between the event that we call cause and the event that we call effect.

The generic term covering the immediate data of conscious experience is perceptions. For it will be allowed that" nothing is ever really present to the mind, besides its own perceptions," [5] and these are the only existent things of which we are certain, being directly present to our minds, drawing from us our most firm assent, and serving as the unshakeable basis for all our conclusions. [6] Perceptions admit of two classes. Of these, the first are what I term *impressions,* which, as it were, force their entry into the mind; under these I include all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they first appear in consciousness. The second class of perceptions are called *ideas,* being less lively and vigorous than the preceding, of which they are copies or images. [7]

Both impressions and ideas may, as more acute scrutiny of

doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection; and consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding." Cf. *Ibid.,* p. 815, on rejection of abstruse metaphysics, as well as *Ibid.,* Sect. XII, Part III, p. 480.

[5] *T.,* I. iv, II, p. 180.

[6] *T.,* I, iv, II, p. 193: "The only existences of which we are certain, are perceptions, which, being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions." Cf. *T.,* I, ii, VI, p. *6Z; E.,* Sect. XII, I, pp. 4Z0-4Zl.

[7] *T.,* I, i, I, p. Z: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call *impressions* and *ideas.* The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name *impressions;* and, under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas,* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." Cf. also *E.,* Sect. II, pp. 816-317.

experience shows, be either *simple* or *complex.* The former are irreducible to more elemental constituents, admitting no distinction or separation, whereas the latter can be broken down into composing parts, viz., into simple impressions and ideas.[8] Although complex ideas, owing to the freedom and arbitrariness of our fancy, need not have any exact impressions corresponding to them, I make bold to declare " that all our simple ideas, in their first appearance, are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent." [9] As to our impressions, those resulting from our thinking or reflecting upon the ideas present to the mind are derived from those ideas, which, in tum, are derived from antecedent impressions.[10] Impressions of sensation or feeling, on the other hand, are simply given to us in experience. Doubtlessly they derive from things external to us, but as I believe that nothing is of greater harm to genuine philosophy than an oversearching into causes/ [1] it is sufficient to note that they arise from " unknown causes." [12]

The maxim stated above with respect to the derivation of all our simple ideas from antecedent impressions may appear of little moment. Yet its discovery is most fortunate, indeed a happy event for true philosophy. For by means of this principle we have an infallible guide, a test that can be applied to any idea, even the most abstruse, that occurs in human discourse. Thus, whenever we suspect that an idea bandied about by philosophers may be chimerical and, in truth, no genuine or meaningful notion, we can quickly determine the issue by

[8] *T.,* I, i, I, p. 3: "There is another division of our perceptions --- which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. This division is into *simple* and *complex.* Simple perceptions, or impressions and ideas, are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts."

• *T.,* I, i, I, p. 4.

[10] *T.,* I, i, II, p. 7: "Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of *sensation,* and those of *reflection.* The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived, in a great measure, from our ideas."

[11] Cf. *T.,* I, i, IV, p. 7: "Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes."

[10] *T.,* I, i, II, p. 7, text cited in note 10.

demanding from those who advance the idea in question that impression whence it is derived. Should they be unable to furnish us with this impression, we can at once conclude that they have been arguing over a mere word to which no meaningful idea can be assigned. [13]

Impressions once present to the mind reappear in it as ideas after two different fashions, according as either the memory or the imagination is the faculty at work. If the idea retains a considerable part of that liveliness and vigor characteristic of the impression, then it is the result of memory. If not, the imagination or fancy is the faculty responsible. [14] Ideas of memory also differ from those of imagination in that they preserve the original order of the impressions, at least to some degree, whereas there is nothing freer and more arbitrary than the fancy. Yet the latter difference, being not always observable, serves not to distinguish infallibly ideas of memory from those of imagination, whence I conclude that the essential feature allowing us to discern the ideas of memory from those of imagination is the superior force and vivacity of the former. [15]

[13] *E.*, Sect. II, pp. 319-320: "All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure; the mind has but a slender hold of them. . . . On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid. . . . When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea . . . , we need but inquire, *from what impression is that supposed idea derived?* And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality." Cf. also *T.*, I, ii, III, p. 31; *E.*, Sect. VII, Pt. I, p. 351, Pt. II, p. 363.

[14] *T.*, I, i, III, p. 8: "We find, by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when, in its new appearance, it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner. is called the *memory*, and the other the *iJrUigination."*

[15] *T.*, I, i, III, p. 9: "There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident, namely, that though neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas, can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrained to the same order and form with the original impressions; 'while the memory is in a manner tied down in that respect,

Because memory does, on most occasions and to large extent, preserve the original order of impressions, there is a connection among the ideas it provides. Yet there is nothing discernible within any of our ideas inseparably and infallibly linking it to any other. Basically this results from the derivation of our ideas from impressions, since " there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable," whence it naturally follows that there are no two ideas perfectly inseparable. [16] Nor is there any separate idea of existence which the mind needs to add to any of its conceptions to render it real. Whatever we conceive, we conceive as existent, or, what comes to the same, nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. [17] Thus there is no essential connection among our various ideas flowing from qualities observable in them. Yet, as experience also shows, our ideas are definitely connected in the mind. Despite the complete freedom of the imagination in disposing of those

without any power of variation." But compare this passage with *T.,* I, iii, V, p. 77: "When we search for the characteristic, which distinguishes the *memory* from the imagination, we must immediately perceive, that ... these faculties are *as* little distinguished from each other by the arrangement of their complex ideas. For, though it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them *as* it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their operaton, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recall the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. Since therefore the memory is known, neither by the order of its *complex* ideas, nor the nature of its *simple* ones; it follows, that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity."

[16] *T.,* I, i, III, p. 9.

[17] *T.,* I, ii, VI, p. 61: "There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceived *as* existent. . . . The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. . . . That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. "\Vhatever we concei,·e, we conceive to be existent." Cf. also *T.,* Appendix, pp. *554, 555,* and esp. p. *558:* "·whatever is distinct is distinguishable, and whatever is distinguishable is separable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are, tl1erefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceived as separately existant, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity." Cf. *T.,* I, ii, II, p. 30: *"Whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or, in other words ... nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible."*

ideas which it fashions, it appears as though the imagination is carried, as it were by Nature herself, from one idea to another. This proclivity to join ideas can scarce be the result of chance, for we observe that certain ideas regularly unite with others. There is, then, some uniting principle which, while not providing an inseparable link between ideas, supplies a kind of attraction in the mental universe comparable to the attraction of gravity in the physical and forming, as it were, the cement of the mind, binding idea to idea.[18] The ultimate causes of this mental attraction I pretend not to explain,[19] but the more proximate causes are qualities naturally leading the imagination to pass from one idea to another. These qualities are those of *resemblance*, *contiguity* in time and place, and *cause and effect.*[20] The natural relations or principles of association imply not, as already noted, any inseparable, necessary bond among our ideas. They are, as it were, endowments of nature, providing men-and animals as well-for carrying on the affairs of

[18] *T.,* I, i, IV, p. 10: "\Vere ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them; and it is impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do), without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connection; for that has been already excluded from the imagination . . . we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; Nature, in a manner, pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one." Cf. *E.,* Sect. III, p. 320.

[19] *T.,* I, i, IV, p. 12: "Here is a kind of *attraction,* which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; but, as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved into *original* qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain."

[20] *T.,* I, i, IV, p. 10: " The qualities, from which this association arises, and by which the mind is, after this manner, conveyed from one idea to another, are three, viz., *resemblance, contiguity* in time or place, and *cause and effect."* Cf. *E.,* Sect. III, p. 321. An unusually good critique of Hume's approach to causation is given by Matthew O'Donnell in " Hume's Approach to Causation " *Philosophical Studies* X (1960), 64-99. Provocative essays on Hume's definitions of cause are provided by J. A. Robinson and Thomas J. Richards in their articles, both given the same title-" Hume's Two Definitions of Cause "-in *Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. V. C. Chappel (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 129-161.

life. This is evident above all in the relation of cause and effect, which alone allows us to go beyond the evidence of memory and sense, whenever we are dealing with matters of fact or existence. But neither animals nor children, nor the common run of men, nor, for that matter, even philosophers in their daily activities, are guided by reasoning in making those inferences from cause to effect. An activity of such important consequences for life cannot be trusted to the uncertainty of reasoning. Thus Nature has given us a more ready principle, that, namely, of cause and effect as an associative bond in the imagination, at once available to all for ready use in meeting the contingencies of life.[21]

The relation of cause and effect may also be regarded as a species of philosophical relation. The latter is any comparison we may choose to make among ideas upon their arbitrary union in the imagination.[22] The kinds of philosophical relation I reduce to the following seven: resemblance, degrees of quality, contrariety, quantity or number, identity, space and time, and cause and effect.[23] Of these, the first four are what may be termed invariable relations, depending exclusively on the ideas related, whereas the final three may be changed without any change in the ideas related. By this I mean that the relations of

[21] *E.,* Sect. IX, pp. 383-385: "It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the same causes .... / But / It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning. . . . Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning; neither are children; neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions; neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar. . . . Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready, and more general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation." Cf. *T.,* I, iii, XVI, pp. 161-164.

[22] *T.,* I, i. V, p. 13: "The word *relation* is commonly used in two senses considerably different from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces another . . . or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them."

[23] *T.,* I, i, V, pp. 13-14; *T.,* I, iii, I, p. 63.

resemblance, degrees of quality, contrariety, quantity and number are discovered simply by inspecting and reflecting upon the ideas they unite. Those of identity, space and time, and cause and effect can never arise from the simple viewing of ideas but require experience for their disclosure.[24]

This excursus into the several species of philosophical relations may perchance appear an instance of abstruse metaphysic. Thus I hasten to show the relevance of these distinctions to true philosophy. For all the objects of human inquiry may, I gather from the writings of philosophers and experience in human discourse, be divided into two types, viz., *relations of ideas* and *matters of fact.*[25] The truth of propositions involving objects of the first species is intuitively evident or demonstratively certain, being discoverable merely by exercising thought. And it is in investigating objects of this kind that the invariable philosophical relations disclose to us their use.[26] Matters of fact or of existence, on the contrary, can never be discovered by the manipulation of ideas. No proposition concerning existence or matters of fact can be the subject of demonstrative reasoning, inasmuch as the denial of any matter of fact or of existence does not involve any contradiction or absurdity.[27] The truth of propositions dealing with matters of fact,

[23] *T.,* I, iii, I, p. 63: "These relations may be divided into two classes; into such *as* depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together, and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas. . . . It appears therefore that of these seven philosophical relations, there remain only four, which depending solely upon ideas, can be the objects of knowledge and certainty. These four are *resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number.* Three of these relations are discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration." On the need for experience to discover the relations of identity, situations in time and place, and causation, cf. *T.,* I, iii, II, pp. 66-67, where the necessity for the sensible presence of at least one of the objects related is stressed.

[24] *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. I, p. 322: "All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *relations of ideas,* and *matters of fact."*

[25] *T.,* I, iii, I, pp. 64-65; *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. I, p. 322: " Of the first kind/i.e., relations of ideas / are the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic; and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain."

[26] *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. I, p. 322: "Matters of fact ... are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with

as a consequence, can in no wise be determined by the invariable philosophical relations, which are valid whether any objects corresponding to the ideas related exist or not. If we tum to the three variable philosophical relations, we immediately note that two of these, those, namely, of identity and of space and time, cannot advance us beyond our immediate experience, inasmuch as they necessarily entail the immediate presence of the objects related in idea to the mind. They are rather perceptions than reasonings.[28] Thus, if any of the philosophical relations can assist us in going beyond present experience to infer, from the existence of one object given in an immediate perception to another object not given in such a way, this can only be the relation of cause and effect. The inference founded on this relation is unique. It does not deal with ideal connections, as do the invariable relations, for it bears upon actual existents and matters of fact. Yet this relation, unlike those of identity and of space and time, does not arise betwixt objects both of which are intuitively given in an immediate impression.[29] This causal relation has already been numbered among those natural principles of the imagina-

the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; hecause it can never imply a contradiction." For a synthetic passage, cf. *E.*, Sect. IV, Pt. II, p. 330: " All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence."

[28] *T.*, I, iii, II, p. 67: "AU kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a *comparison,* and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other. This comparison we may make, either when both the objects are present to the senses, or when neither of them is present, or when only one. When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call *this* perception rather than reasoning. . . . According to this way of thinking, we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning *identity* and the *relations* of *time* and *place;* since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses."

[29] *T.*, I, iii, II, p. 67: " It is only *causation,* which produces such a connection, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that it was followed or preceded by any other existence or action ... this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connection of *cause and effect."* Cf. *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. I, p. 3f!3: "All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *cause and effect.* By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence Qf QUr memory and senses."

tion whereby it is led to find connecting links between the ideas at its disposal. As such, it is a relation native to man and a relation whose ultimate causes lie beyond discovery. What remains is to investigate the nature of this relation as a principle of philosophical reasoning and to determine whether or not it is founded on properties within things discoverable by human understanding.

Various authors have attempted to show that the causal relation can be determined exclusively on rational grounds. They formulate this relation in propositions somewhat like the following: " Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence," and they then assert that this proposition is either intuitively evident or demonstratively certain. It is, some argue, intuitively evident by reason of the nature of the ideas related, it being impossible for men to deny the truth of the above proposition once they understand the terms involved.[30] Yet the idea of effect or of " whatever has a beginning " is distinct from and thus separable from that of cause. There is thus no contradiction in conceiving any object as first non-existent and then existent without referring it to any distinct idea of cause.[31] Still others argue that this relation is demonstrably certain, inasmuch as anyone who denies the necessity

[30] Cf. *T.,* I, iii, III, pp. 71-72.

[31] *T.,* I, iii, III, p. 72: " But here is an argument, which proves at once that the foregoing proposition is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of existence, without showing at the same time the impossibility there is, that anything can ever begin to exist without some productive principle and where the latter proposition cannot be proved, we must despair of ever being able to prove the former. Now that the latter proposition is utterly incapable of a demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves by considering, that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, it will be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The separation therefore of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas, without which it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a **cause."**

of a cause for any contingent or produced being surreptitiously reintroduces the very thing he denies, since he must then attribute the existence of the object in question either to nothing or to the object itself. If this is so, then how can we regard "nothing" or the "object itself" if not as the very cause in question? In replying to such specious reasonings, we need but observe that, in excluding all causes, we really mean just that, supposing neither nothing nor the object itself as the cause of its existence. Naturally, if everything must have a cause, then it is obvious that the object itself or nothing must be accepted as the cause if all other causes are excluded. But our point is just this, must everything have a cause? A need of this kind cannot be taken for granted, for this would be begging the question. [32] Nor can reason discover to us any such necessity, since the ideas which it must employ in any endeavor to do so are all of them, as has been shown already, distinct and separable. Thus it follows that the causal relation can be derived only from experience, to which we shall now turn. [33]

What does experience disclose to us concerning any objects said to be joined as cause and effect? It is obvious that it can discover in the sensible qualities of objects no impression sufficient to give rise to an idea of such magnitude, for no matter what quality I seize, I soon find some object not having it, yet falling under the name of cause or effect. [34] The idea, then, of causation, must be derived from some relation among objects. In determining these relations I observe that objects regarded as being related as cause and effect are *contiguous* in space and time, and that the object denominated cause has a

[32] *T.,* I, iii, III, p. 74: "It is sufficient only to observe, that when we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the cause of the existence; and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion."

[33] Cf. *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. I, pp. 324-325; *T.,* I, iii, II, p. 68.

[34] *T.,* I, iii, II, p. 68: "Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects, which we call cause and effect, and turn them on all sides, in order to find that impression, which produces an idea of such prodigious consequence. At first sight I perceive, that I must not search for it in any of the particular *qualities* of the objects; since, whichever of these qualities I pitch on, I find some object that is not possessed of it, and yet falls under the denomination of cause or effect."

priority in time over the object denominated effect.[35] Yet these relations are insufficient to convey to us the idea of causation, for there are many objects so related which we yet do not regard as instances of cause and effect. For example, night regularly follows day, but for all that we do not regard day as the cause of night. On the other hand, I observe that heat follows from flame and I am led to infer that flame is the cause of heat.[36] On each separate encounter with these two objects in experience, all that is given is a distinct and separate impression. Yet, when this experience is repeated several times, it is no longer necessary for both of these objects to impress themselves upon our senses or memory. On the presentation of one of them in an impression of the senses or memory, our understanding immediately arises to a consideration of the other. Then, "without any further ceremony, we call the one *cause* and the other *effect,"* inferring from the existence of one of these objects present to us in an impression the existence of the other. Experience, it appears, has shown us a third relation involved between cause and effect, that, namely, of constant or frequent conjunction or connection.[37] Yet the addition of this new relation to those of contiguity and temporary priority serves not to explain sufficiently our idea of causation. For we believe that the relation between cause and effect is necessary and infallible. And from the bare fact that certain objects are

[35] *T.,* I, iii, II, pp. 68-69: " The idea of causation must be derived from some *relation* among objects. . . . I find in the first place, that whatever objects are considered as causes or effects, are *contiguous.* . . . 'Ve may therefore consider the relation of *contiguity* as essential to that of causation. . . . The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects ... is that of *priority* in time in the cause before the effect." Cf. *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. I, pp. 324-325.

[36] Cf. *T.,* I, iii, II, p. 70: "An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause."

[37] *T.,* I, iii, VI, pp. 80-81: "It is ... by *experience* only that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another. The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them .... In advancing, we have insensibly discovered a new relation betwixt cause and effect when we least expected it. . . . This relation is their *constant conjunction."*

constantly conjoined in time and space, we can discover no compelling motive for affirming that such objects must necessarily be so united. All that experience shows us is that the mind, after a frequent repetition of like objects similarly related in space and time, is determined by custom to infer from the existence of the one to the existence of the other.[38] Whence, however, comes the idea of necessary connection, an element regarded as essential to the causal relation?

As must all our ideas, so too that of necessary connection or causal efficacy must be traced to some antecedent impression.[39] But there is no impression of sensation capable of giving rise to an idea of such magnitude, since impressions of sensation arise exclusively from externally observable qualities or phenomena, and these are incapable of giving us the key to unlock the inner being or nature of the objects whence they derive.[40]

•• Cf. *T.,* I, iii, VI, pp. 80-81, 85-86; I, iii, XIV, pp. 142-143, 151; *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. II, pp. 330-331; V, Pt. I, p. 336. For a synthetic statement, see, for instance, *E.,* Sect. VII, Pt. II, p. 363: "Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connection. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection. ·we then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connection in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant." Cf. *An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature 1740,* ed. J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1938), p. 12: "Here therefore is a *third* circumstance, *viz.,* that of a *constant conjunction* betwixt the cause and effect. Every object like the cause, produces always some object like the effect. Beyond these three circumstances of continguity, priority, and constant conjunction, I can discover nothing in this case," and p. 22: " But, beside these circumstances, 'tis commonly suppos'd, that there is a necessary connexion betwixt the cause and effect, and that the cause possesses something, which we call a *power,* or *force,* or *energy."*

•• *T.,* I, iii, XIV, p. 142: "As we have no idea that is not derived from an impression, we must find some impression that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea."

•• Cf. *E.,* Sect. IV, II, pp. 328-329: "Nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the color, weight, and consistence of bread. . . . It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers." Cf. *Ibid.,* Sect. VII, Pt. I, pl. 351: Sect. Vlll, Pt. I, pp. 373-374.

The idea of necessity, then, must stem from an impression of reflection, whose nature can be explained as follows. The repeated observation of similar objects regularly united in spatial continguity and temporal succession gives, it is true, no insight into any new quality belonging to the objects so united. Yet the act of observing these resembling instances does make a new impression upon the mind, and it is this impression which serves as the model for our idea of necessity or power or efficacy, the element universally regarded as essential to the relation betwixt cause and efl'ect.[41]

In sum, there is no necessary connection among objects discoverable by human reason, even after repeated experience, that can account for our idea of causation. The necessity implicated in this idea arises exclusively from a determination of the mind by custom to infer like effects from like causes and the observation of this determination by the mind. Necessity is thus "something that exists in the mind, not in objects." [42] Why, then, do we universally attribute this necessity to things? The reply to this question, it appears, can only be that our mind is naturally inclined to " spread itself on external objects," leading us to presume that the necessity existing in the mind actually resides in things. [43]

While I deny that the idea of causation, as a philosophical relation, can afford us any grounds for advancing beyond pre-

" *T.,* I, iii, XIV, pp. *151-152:* " There is ... nothing new either discovered or produced in any objects by their constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of succession and contiguity. But it is from this resemblance that the ideas of necessity, of power, and of efficacy, are derived. These ideas, therefore, represent not anything that does or can belong to the objects which are constantly conjoined. . . . Though the several resembling instances, which give rise to the idea of power, have no influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality *in the object,* which can be the model of that idea, yet the *observation* o£ this resemblance produces a new impression *in the mind,* which is its real model. . . . This determination is the only effect of the resemblance; and, therefore, must be the same with power or efficacy.... Necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another." Cf. also *E.,* Sect. V, Pt. I, p. 336; VII, Pt. II, p. 363.

•• *T.,* I, iii, XIV, p. *152.*

'" *T.,* I, iii, XIV, p. 153.

sent experience and the testimony of senses and memory, I mean not to deny the value of this idea as a natural relation or principle of association. We are constrained, as it were by Nature herself, to place a necessary bond between cause and effect. We *believe* that events called by these names are actually joined, that the relation between them is infallible and necessary. We believe that we can justly infer, from the existence of an object present to our senses or memory, the existence of another object with which the object whose impression we presently feel has been united in past experience. Thus, in drawing to a close my account of causation, I must now trace the nature of this belief and its place in human life. As to belief itself, it is either some new idea, such as that of reality or existence, which we add to the simple conception of an object, or it is but a special feeling or sentiment of some of our ideas, distinguishing them from the fictions of the fancy.[44] That it is not a new idea is clear from what was said previously respecting the idea of existence and also from the fact that, were there a separate idea of existence, our fancy could add that idea to any of its conceptions, thus rendering the most fictitious as vivid and worthy of our assent as the most real. We may thus conclude that belief is simply a certain feeling or sentiment, characterizing certain of our ideas and serving to distinguish them from fictions. This feeling makes us take a firmer hold of our ideas, rendering them more lively and thus more similar to our impressions.[45] It arises only when there is present to the senses or memory some impression to which we relate the idea in which we believe.[46] Because a

" *T.,* Appendix, p. 554: " Either the belief is some new idea, such as that of *reality* or *existence,* which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar *feeling* or *sentiment."* Cf. *E.,* Sect. V, Pt. II, pp. 840-841.

•• *T.,* Appendix, p. *555:* "We may ... conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters ..• *belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception."* Cf. *E.,* Sect. V, Pt. IT, p. 841.

[46] *E.,* Sect. V, Pt. I, p. 889: "All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object."

present impression is associated with an idea, we have the feeling or sentiment that this idea is real. Belief, therefore, is "nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object," and is an act of the sensitive part of our nature, involving not our cognitive or knowing powers.[47]

Why is the nature of belief so important to the idea of cause? The reason lies in the fact that all our arguments involving the idea of cause consist both of an impression of the memory or senses and of the idea of that object producing or produced by the object of the impression.[48] This idea is, thus, related to an impression actually present to the senses or memory. It follows that this idea takes on the force and vivacity of that impression,[49] so that we conceive it in a manner different from that in which we conceive the fictitious ideas of the imagination. Nor does there enter into our belief in this relation any so-called judgment, as many advance. For the distinction betwixt judgment and the simple conception of an object is in no wise one of nature but merely of the manner whereby the same object is conceived.[50] In fine, "all belief of matter of fact or real existence," a belief to which the idea of causation is linked, " is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. . . . All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the

n *E.*, Sect. V, Pt. II, p. 341 for quote cited in text. Cf. *T.*, I, iii, VII, pp. 88-89 on belief as act of man's affective nature. A good study of Hume's use of the causal inference as a psychological and not philosophical explanation of our belief in real objects and real relations among objects is provided by John W. Lenz, "Hume's Defense of Causal Inference," in *llume: A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. V. C. Chappel (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 169-186.

•• *T.,* I, iii, V, pp. 76-77: "All our arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of au impression of the memory or senses, and of the idea of that existence, which produces the object of the impression, or is produced by it."

•• *T.,* I, iii, VIII, p. 90: " *When any impression becomes present to us, it not only transpOTts the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity."*

[50] *T.,* I, iii, VII, note 20, pp. 564-565: " What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding / conception, judgment, and reasoning / is, that taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects."

thought and understanding is able to produce or to prevent." [51] The necessity in our causal inferences is based on the inference itself, not vice versa. [52] Thus I conclude that our belie£ in real causes results not from the discovery o£ any necessary connection betwixt objects o£ our experience but exclusively and solely from their customary conjunction in past experience and from the liveliness and vigor imparted to our idea o£ one event by another presently impressing itself either on our senses or on our memory. [53]

* * * * *

Truth, as Mr. Hume observes, is difficult to attain; and the validity o£ his remark is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the inquiry into human knowledge. Thus I am confident that he, o£ all those present, will be especially receptive to the comments I should like to make concerning human knowledge and our understanding o£ the causal relation. Mr. Hume and I have much in common. First, we agree in denying to man a store o£ inborn ideas whereby he might be able to grasp the nature o£ things anterior to his experience o£ them and in affirming that all our ideas in some way derive from sensory experience. [54] Again, we agree in holding that an abstract analysis o£ ideas or concepts can never enable us to grasp, through knowledge, those relationships objectively binding one being to another. [55] Nevertheless, as shall be seen, our analyses o£ experience lead us to quite different conclusions concerning the nature and extent o£ human knowledge. Consequently, I

[51] *E.,* Sect. V, Pt. I, p. 339.

[""] *T.,* I, iii, VI, p. 81.

[••] For this teaching cf. *T.,* I, iii, VI, pp. 85-86; I, iii, XIV, pp. 142-143; *E.,* Sect. IV, Pt. II, pp. 328-329; Sect. V, Pt. I, p. 336; Sect. V, Pt. II, p. 342; Sect. VII, Pt. II, pp. 360-361, 363.

[5·] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 84, a. 3.

[55] That an abstract analysis of concepts cannot give us an understanding of relationships actually existing among real existents is indicated in *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 44, a. 2, ad 1: "Licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea quae sunt de eius ratione. . . . Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum."

turn to my task with the confidence that Mr. Hume will be among my most attentive auditors, for it is a common desire to secure the truth proportionate to human understanding that motivates us both.

There are several areas wherein Mr. Hume's analysis is open to criticism. I like, for example, the way he is able first to claim that all we know are our own perceptions, be they impressions or ideas, and then to speak of "objects" present to the senses or memory *in* an impression.[56] Obviously Mr. Hume agrees with the maxim, " consistency is the hobgloblin of small minds." We are not here, however, to quibble. Thus I shall concentrate on what I believe to be the cardinal deficiencies in Mr. Hume's philosophy. In brief, I intend to show that Mr. Hume has failed to take into account or has misinterpreted certain fundamental data of experience and that this failure or misinterpretation is the root source of the erroneous conclusions to which his analysis leads. First, I shall briefly summarize his views on the nature of knowledge in general and on the primary, direct object of human understanding. I shall then turn to experience itself, to see whether or not a more careful scrutiny of it will disclose to us the evidence required for allowing human knowing a greater scope than that granted to it by Mr. Hume.

The notion of knowledge that emerges from Mr. Hume's analysis is the following: Outside the knower are unknown (and unknowable) "objects" or "things" or "realities." These in some way or another act upon our senses, causing affective states to arise within us and giving rise to vivid images which are called impressions. These impression-images, lively and vigorous in their initial impact upon the mind, can

[56] For evidence of inconsistency in Hume on this matter, cf. the texts cited above in notes 6, 10, £8, 46, 48. Other points of Hume's teaching that can be criticized are: (I) his unhesitating acceptance of the rationalistic restriction of demonstrative arguments to those capable of resolution through the use of abstract principles of thought, in particular the principle of contradiction, thus failing to allow for the distinction between explanatory demonstrations *(demonstratio propter quid)* and factual demonstrations *(demonstratio quia);* (£) his refusal to admit more than a difference of degree between ideas and sense images.

be reproduced m fainter images called ideas, and the latter can be combined at will by the fancy. In short, knowledge consists in the production within the knower of impressions by external, unknown causes, and in the reproduction by the imagination or memory of these impressions in fainter images called ideas.[57] Knowledge is thus essentially a matter of mechanical action and production or reproduction of images. In addition, these impressions (lively images) and ideas (faint copies of lively images) are the immediate, direct objects of human knowledge. Beyond them we cannot go, at least by way of knowledge.[58] We can *believe* that there are "things" corresponding to these impressions or ideas, " things " external to us and existing independently of our consciousness, but we can never know these "things." [59] This, in brief, is Mr. Hume's position on the two chief points we intend to examine. Moreover, if Mr. Hume is right here, he is absolutely correct in concluding that we can never attain through knowledge to an understanding of the bond necessarily and objectively linking cause to effect among the beings of the universe. How could we know a relationship of this kind if, from the very start, we are limited to a knowledge of our own subjective states of awareness, to our own perceptions, be they impressions or ideas? Let us, then, inquire of experience to see if it discloses to us any features that may have escaped the acute Mr. Hume in his analysis.

Knowing or knowledge is itself an experience. Indeed it is that experience whereby we have experience. This experience of knowing discloses two fundamental poles, a knower and a known; for knowledge is an act of someone we call a knower concerning something we call a known. As an activity of a knower, it is a vital, living act, perfecting the knower in one way or another, proceeding from, taking place in, and terminating within him. Knowing can thus be called an immanent activity in order to distinguish it from physical or transient

[57] Cf. texts cited above, notes 7, 8, 10, 14.
[58] Cf. above, notes 6, 10.
[59] *T.*, I, ii, VI, p. 62; I, iv, II, pp. 171-199.

activity. The latter proceeds from an agent but advances beyond that agent to another being in which it terminates and which it perfects. In knowing flame, for example, I neither change the flame nor do I become hot, whereas the activity whereby a flame changes the temperature of a body proceeds from the flame only to terminate in the body which it heats. Knowing perfects the agent, in other words, whereas transient activities perfect the patient. And knowing perfects the agent because through knowledge the knower enlarges his horizons and, as it were, completes his being. For while remaining himself, the knower becomes what is other than himself, namely, the known, whose perfections the knower shares through knowledge. Knowers, consequently, differ from nonknowers in being able to perfect themselves through an act immanent to themselves, an act through which they can draw into themselves what is *other* than themselves, causing this other to exist in a new way. This capacity argues to the existence within knowers of a nature in some way freer, less limited than that of nonknowers. It means that a knower is less limited to the here and now, less restricted in being than a nonknower. In brief, this capacity means that knowers are in some way free from matter and the conditions of matter; it means that knowledge implies some level of immateriality in knowers. [60]

It further follows that knowers differ among themselves according to their level of immateriality. For there are, as experience also shows, knowers *and* knowers. A worm knows an apple from an acorn; a dog knows his master; the dog's master, a man, knows his dog plus arithmetic, physics, himself. The openness to what is other than self manifestly differs in these three examples of knowers, thus arguing to a progressively more immaterial principle within each to account for the diversity we discover in their knowledge acts. Reflection upon this experience and the endeavor to account for it is the reason for distinguishing two great divisions of knowledge, sense knowledge or sensation and intellectual knowledge or understanding.

[60] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 1.

Furthermore, experience also shows that both these divergent types of knowledge are united in the one knowing agent, man. [61]

Thus far we have regarded knowledge from one of its poles, the knower. But what of the other pole of knowledge, the known or the other? How does this stand with regard to the knower and to the types of knowing acts he exercises within himself? Again looking to experience, the experience called knowledge, we observe that it is an activity immanent indeed to the knowing agent but controlled, governed, and determined by the other, by the *object* known. This object measures knowledge and is the final criterion whereby knowledge is judged to be true or false. [62] It is obvious that "things," precisely insofar as they are realities or beings existing in nature, " outside of knowledge," are not within the order either of sense or intellectual existence. [63] Evidently, for a thing to be known, it must somehow be *in* the knower, exist within him. The knower, the agent, must be united to the known, to the object toward which his act of knowing is directed. [64] The notion of thing differs thus from the notion of object, for an object is a thing-as-related-to-a-knower, whereas a thing, precisely as thing, is not thus related. But this does not mean that "thing" and "object" are two different "things." Nothing real is added to a thing when it is related to a knower; no change is brought about in the thing. It is rather the knower who receives an augment to his being, for in knowing he becomes, is identified in some way or another with what is other than himself, namely, the thing-object. [65] The object, in other

[61] Cf. *ibid.* Cf. also *De Verit.,* q. 1!, a. 2. On man as the *knowing subject or agent* for all acts of human knowledge, cf., for instance, *De Verit.,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 3: "non enim, proprie loquendo, sensus aut intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque."

•• Cf. *De Verit.,* q. 14, a. 8, ad 5; also q. 1, a. 2.

•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. 7: "Sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis."

•• Cf., for instance, *ibid.,* q. 78, a. 1.

•• *In V Met.,* 1. 17, nn. 1003-1004, 1026-1029, esp. n. 1026: "Sed videre et

words, is the thing as vicariously present to the knower. Moreover, the same individual thing can be related in various ways both to various knowers and to the same knower. For instance, a cat can be related to the knower we call man either as a colored object, an emitter of meows, a furry, agile, slant-eyed animal with sharp claws. In addition, a multitude of different things can be related as one unique object to a knower, so that *an* object can refer to many distinct individual things. For instance, all cows can be related to a knower under the aspect, that is, as object-things, of milk-producing animals. We might term things as things the material object of knowledge, namely, that which is grasped in a knowing act, whereas we might term the precise aspect under which they are ordered to a knower as an object the formal object of knowledge or that aspect or formality of things by which they are known.[66] But in any event, object means thing as ordered to related to knower in some determinate way; object points to something in things that is now in the knower making things present to the knower. The object, in other words, is the thing, but the thing as existing now not according to its own being in the world of nature but according to the being of the knower in the world of knowledge. If knowledge means anything, it means that the knower, in the act of knowing, and the thing, as object known, exist as one; there is a community of being between knower and known.[67]

For knowing to take place, then, the knower and the known must be existentially united in the knower. Yet the existence or superexistence of the known in the knower is not itself knowledge. It is rather the necessary prerequisite for the act of knowing, for in order to know the knower must first be

intelligere et hujusmodi actiones ... manent in agentibus, et non transeunt in res passas; unde visibile et scibile non patitur aliquid, ex hoc quod intelligitur vel videtur. Et propter hoc non ipsamet referuntur ad alia, sed alia ad ipsa." Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, 13, 7; *Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia Dei*, q. 7, aa. 9-11.

•• Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 22. a. 10. Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 77, a. 3 and ad 4; q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

07 Cf. text cited in note 64.

united to the known. But as yet we have not seen how this superexistence of things, as objects, in knowers takes place. How explain a presence of this kind? Obviously what is required is a medium or presentative form or intentional likeness existing within the knower making the known present to it. The medium in question, moreover, must be by nature a pure sign, a totally vicarious presence directly and immediately linking knower and known. Its presence, indispensable to account for the knowing act, must be so unobstrusive that it must not stand *between* the knower and the known, that is, it must be of such a nature that it is itself not directly known but is grasped only in an activity such as that in which we are now engaged, namely, a reflective search and scrutiny of our acts of knowing to discover what it is that makes knowledge possible. Were it to get in the way, to stand between knower and known, this medium would itself be the immediate, direct object known, and I see not how we could ever go beyond an analysis of our own subjective states to attain real objects.

Yet how is this medium brought into being? The explanation, if we hearken to experience, seems to be as follows. The various bodies that make up the things of the universe we experience through knowledge have two kinds of action.[68] One follows from what is proper to them as bodies, being an action through movement and proceeding from one body to another, affecting the latter in some physical, material way. Thus one billiard ball strikes another, imparting motion to it. Thus light strikes our eye, causing certain physiological and neurological changes within our sense organs and brain. Thus flame heats our hand. Yet this can hardly explain knowledge, for we can know flame without becoming hot. Knowledge is possible only if bodies have another type of action, one that is not for the purpose of changing or modifying matter but is directed to a diffusion of a likeness, a likeness received from the thing in the knower and existing in the latter according to his own mode of being. In other words, the physical things or bodies

[68] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 3.

that constitute the universe of our immediate experience can be known because they are meant to be known, because they are orderable to knowers. But they could not be so ordered did they not have, of themselves, the ability to communicate themselves in some way to knowers. This ability is rooted ultimately in their natures but proximately in the actions whereby they disclose themselves to knowers. Actually sensible, relatable to sensory powers because of properties or qualities dynamically issuing from :their inner wealth, the physical things of the universe are proportioned to sensory powers within knowers. [69]

The proper, immediate object of any given sense is a determinate aspect of the sensible thing. And, in the case of our outer, external senses, the act of sensing opens out upon the thing itself precisely as that thing is, here and now, exercising some action upon the sense organ involved. [70] Here there is no need for an additional presentative or objectifying form or likeness, produced this time by the knower, *in which* to grasp, to know in act, the object. In the case of the knowing acts a knower performs through his outer senses, the actual presence of the thing to the sense through the thing's own proper activity is sufficient. The sense act is thus immediately terminated in the thing-object as effectively present to it. Yet we have sense knowledge of sensible things even when the things in question are not present to our outer senses, as imaginative and memoritive experiences testify. To explain knowledge of this kind, the presence of the thing-object to the sense power through a form or likeness whereby the known is made to exist in the knower according to the knower's mode of being is not alone sufficient. Here a further presentative form or likeness is necessary, one which the knower, who has already become one

[69] Cf. *ibid.,* ad 1: "Non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum se; sed solae qualitates tertiae speciei, secundum quas contingit alteratio. Et ideo solae huiusmodi qualitates sunt obiecta sensuum, quia, ut dicitur in VII *Physic., secundum eadem alteratur sensus, secundum quae altemntur corpora inanimata."* Cf. also *In 11 de An.,* l. 14, n. 425; *De Verit.,* q. 8, a. 7, ad 2.

[70] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1.

with the object through a first form or likeness which the ancients called an impressed species, expresses in order to contemplate an object not physically present to him.[71] Yet in every instance, the object known is *not* these presentative, objectifying forms or likenesses or species but the thing-object existing now within the knower through the medium of these likenesses.

Even on the level of sensory knowledge, experience bears witness, the knower grasps not only those sensible aspects of the thing which form the proper objects of specialized outer senses-colors, sounds, etc.-but their union in the one sensible thing, a being sensed moreover as something affecting in some way the life of the knower. A mouse, for instance, not only sees grey and hears sounds coming from a cat but realizes that the cat is the source of these sounds and this color and, moreover, that the cat whose jaws open before it is certainly not about to do it a favor. These sensible properties are the proper objects of what are called the internal senses of common sense and estimation, and these properties are seen to be emanating from the thing which at this instant is actively confronting the knower. And the total ensemble of these sensible aspects of things is stored in the inner senses of imagination and memory, which are the powers capable of bringing into being the second kind of forms or likenesses of which we spoke. These forms or likenesses are what the ancients referred to as expressed species or phantasms.[72]

We also claim to understand the sensible things of the universe. We claim to know what they are; we claim to possess some kind of knowledge of their essences or natures, the principles intrinsic to sensible things making them to be what they are. We claim, in other words, that sensible things are also intelligible, that they are ordered to a higher knowing power within man, his intellect or understanding. But unlike the sensible aspect or object in things, the intelligible aspect does not,

[71] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 78, a. 4, entire article.
[70] *Ibid.* Cf. also *Quaestio disputata de Anima,* 13.

purely of itself, disclose itself to us.[73] For instance, no men whose hearing is unimpaired will fail to hear a thunderclap if they are properly situated. Yet they may differ markedly in their explanations of what a thunderclap is, although all of them are impelled, as it were by an inner necessity, to inquire into the matter. This indicates that understanding or intellection requires something on the part of the knower not required for sensation or sense knowledge. It indicates that there is a need for the knower to discover, within the data delivered to him by his senses, the intelligible source of those data. It means that the human mind is impelled to find out why this particular sensible thing actually affecting his sensory powers is what it is, why it is characterized by such and such sensible qualities, how it is related to other individual sensible things possessing similar qualities. The reason for such qualities lies *within* the things, for it is they that possess these qualities, and the latter can even be regarded as signs or clues pointing to the dynamic, intrinsic principle explanatory of them. It is to this principle that the human mind or intellect or understanding is ordered. Yet to know this principle, man must first render or make it actually intelligible. That is, he must flood it with light, he must extricate it from phenomenal, surface conditions in which it is immersed. He must liberate it from conditions keeping it from actually disclosing itself to the mind. This principle is

[73] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 84, aa. 2-4. Note that in these articles St. Thomas stresses the nature of human intellectual knowledge as an act of an agent whose being is composed of matter and spirit, body and soul. The principle governing the thought expressed in all these articles is the following: Were intellectual knowledge innate, were it derived from the nature of the human soul itself, were it derived from " separated forms " flowing in some mysterious way into the soul, then the concrete union of soul and body in man would be senseless. "Non enim potest dici quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus; quia nec forma est propter materiam, nec motor propter mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxime autem videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellectivae, ad eius propriam operationem, quae est mtelligere, quia secundum esse suum a corpore non dependet. Si autem anima species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam apta nata esset recipere per influentiam aliquorum separatorum principiorum tantum, et non acciperet eas ex sensibus, non indigeret corpore ad intelligendum: *unde frustra corpori uniretur* " (art. 4, emphasis added) .

present to man, for it lies at the heart of the phantasms or forms or likenesses already present in the human knower as explanatory principles of his sense knowledge. For these forms derive their efficacy from the inner dynamism of the thing-object. What is necessary is for man's mind, his intelligence, to make this principle actually intelligible, to render it alive for himself. This is the work of what Aristotle called the agent or active intellect, a power native to man that takes over the deliverances of sense experience and disengages from them that aspect of real things ultimately accountable for their properties and sensible qualities, an aspect we term nature or essence.[74] Once disengaged by the agent intellect working on the phantasms or expressed species of the memory and imagination, this intrinsic principle of things becomes present to man's mind as a new likeness or species or form of the thing. United to this nature through this likeness, existing in him according to his own intellectual mode of being, man can then grasp it intelligibly through an act generative of ideas, that is, vicarious forms of the natures of things, through which those natures are themselves directly attained. The idea through which the nature or essence of the thing is known is not itself the immediate object of intellect. For it, like the species or likenesses of the sensible order which we have already examined, is a pure means, an unobstrusive presence of the thing-object within the knower, brought into being by him as a means *in which* to contemplate the thing-object itself. The idea, in fact, *is* the thing-object existing according to the mode of intellect, uniting knower to known. As an entity of the psychical realm, the idea is itself an object of knowledge, yet it is never known directly, immediately, but only secondarily, through a reflection on the very act whereby knowledge of things is achieved.[75]

How does this analysis bear upon the causal relation? Remarkably enough, none of the ideas of our intellect, or rather, the thing-objects known through these ideas, necessarily implies

•• Cf. *ibid.,* q. 79, a. 8.
•• *Ibid.,* q. 85, a. !ll.

any other thing-object or idea. Here I agree with Mr. Hume's analysis. In addition, the very first idea of the intellect, the idea of being in the vague sense of something or whatever is or can be, includes the notion of existence as an intelligible content.[76] And since every genuine idea is necessarily that of something either actual or possible, there is agreement between Mr. Hume and me on the score that the idea of existence or possible being is not a distinct idea added to other ideas.[77] Nevertheless, as noted previously, the notion of an object or of a thing-as-related-to-a-knower means that things can be viewed under various aspects, formalities, points of view. They can be viewed in this way because all these different aspects actually are rooted in the thing attained under the aspect in question. This suggests, and experience confirms, that human knowledge is piecemeal. We just do not enjoy an intuitive grasp of a given being in its totality, in all its wealth. We first know it in an indeterminate, vague way under the universal aspect of "something." In addition, in conceiving things, in grasping them through ideas, our knowing acts contain nothing that is truly proper to the human knower himself. There is, to be sure, a conformity or likeness between knower and known, for the known exists in the human knower through a likeness we call an idea. But no affirmation of this conformity has been made. Thus I hold that knowledge requires completion

[76] St. Thomas frequently asserts that the first concept of the mind is that of being or "that which is or can be" (cf. *S. T.*, I, q. 5, a. 2; I-II, q. 94, a. 2; *De Verit.*, 1, 1; *Contra Gentiles*, c. 98; *De ente et essentia*, proeemium). For being is the "first intelligible," in the light of which all else is intelligible. Yet it is essential, in order to understand St. Thomas's teaching on this point, to distinguish being *as* the first intelligible from being as the subject of the science of metaphysics. The same materially, they differ formally, as thing-objects of intelligence. For the being that is first known is known by all men, because *all* men are knowers, whereas the being that is the subject of the science of metaphysics is known only by metaphysicians, and it is obvious that not *all* men are metaphysicians. Moreover, the being that is first known is grasped in an act of simple conception or apprehension (cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2), whereas the being that is the subject of metaphysics is attained only through a judgment of separation (cf. *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3).

[77] For Hume's position here, consult notes 17, 44.

through a further act, one distinct from the simple conception or apprehension of a given aspect of real things. This act is that of judging or judgment; it consists in affirming or denying one concept, called predicate, of another concept, called subject. In judging, the mind does not affirm that its concept or idea is conformed to the thing (for this conformity is given in the act of conceiving; the mind, through the idea, is like to, conformed to the thing) . Rather, judgment affirms or denies that the human knower, in the very act of giving judgment, knows that he has the truth, that his intellect is actually conformed to things. In other words, a judgment means that the human knower affirms that he possesses within himself the likeness of the thing known.[78] Moreover, what is judgment if not an act by which the human knower asserts that a predicate and a subject, which differ in notion or idea, are identical in the thing? For in every true judgment the two terms that are identified differ in notion. They are the same in the thing or the subject of whom the predicate is affirmed, but they differ as intelligible units of thought.[79] The proper function of judgment consists in making the mind pass from the level of simple essence or simple object signified to the level of thing or subject possessing existence, a thing of which the object of thought (predicate) and the subject of thought (subject) are intelligible aspects.[80] Mind puts together in judging what it has torn apart or distinguished in conception; it synthesizes what it has analyzed.

In addition, the notion of existence given in the vague concept of being that is the first object-thing known through an idea in the act of conceiving is a purely abstract, noetical object, a unit of intelligibility; it is existence as *signified.* In judgment, on the other hand, existence is reached as something concrete, as an act *exercised,* lived in real things. In affirming, through a judgment, that the sensible beings of our immediate

[78] *De Verit.,* q. 1, a. 3. Again, as we find in *Summa Theol.,* I-ll, q. 173, a. " Judicium est completivum cognitionis."

[79] Cr. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a.

[80] Cr. *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 5, a. 3.

experience exist, we grasp, in some degree, the act within things ultimately responsible for all that they are, the root source, intrinsic to them, of their natures and properties, the act making the qualities we have perceived in a sensory way real.[81]

The importance of judgment in human knowing can be seen in the growth of human knowledge and plays an essential role in grasping the necessary connection between cause and effect. As noted previously, the first concept or idea, the first thing-object attained in intellectual knowledge, is that of being in the vague sense of" something." Human knowledge progresses by making more and more determinate the elements potentially contained in the notion of something, in proceeding from common, indeterminate knowledge of things in their most general aspect as " something " to what is precise, determinate, within them.[82] This vague knowledge becomes more distinct as the intellect advances to an understanding of things in their proper natures. This it does by grasping in things their characteristic or proper accidents or phenomenal appearances, viewed as signs or indications of their inner natures or essences.[83] And because the proper, immediate object of human intellect is the being of sensible things, which exist only as individuals,

[81] The human intellect is primarily ordered to know being as found in sensible things (cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 84, a. 7). These are all concrete, composite realities. Through simple apprehension, special formalities really existing *within* these composites are grasped, but grasped in an abstract, universal way (cf. *ibid.,* q. 85, a. 1). The role of judgment is to reunite these distinct intelligible aspects of real things, to put them back together as they are in things (cf. text cited in note 80). Moreover, the being or existential act (esse) *within* the things is the source for all that they are: " esse est actualitas omnis forrnae vel naturae " *(ibid.,* q. 3, a. 3).

[8-] Here texts of capital importance are *S. T.,* I, q. 85, a. 3 and *In I Phys.,* l. I, nn. 6-8. The latter reads: "innatum est nobis ut procedamus cognoscendo ab iis quae sunt nobis magis nota, in ea quae sunt magis nota naturae; sed ea quae sunt nobis magis nota, sunt confusa, qualia sunt universalia; ergo oportet nos ab universalibus ad singularia procedere ... non sunt eadem magis nota nobis et secundum naturam; sed ilia quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam, sunt minus nota secundum nos. Et quia iste est naturalis modus sive ordo addiscendi, nos debemus devenire ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturae ... nos procedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia, et intelligibilia in potentia. . • ."

[88] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. IS, a. 2. Cf. also *De Verit.,* q. IO, a. I, ad 6.

throughout this entire process of making our vague awareness of things as " somethings " distinct, we must constantly refer our intellectual grasp of things in their common aspects to the phantasms or expressed species of imagination and memory in order to see the univeral nature as it actually exists in the individual, concrete being that is the thing-object known.[84] There is, in other words, a necessity for bringing judgments to bear upon sensible existents actually experienced.[85] Through judgments of this kind, we gradually come to see the bifurcation of being into substance and accidents; into the being which exists in itself and being whose existence is an in-existence.86 This, in turn, discloses to us the dynamic character of the beings of our environment, for we come to understand that the accidental features of things, through which their inner essence is disclosed, are in reality complements to that essence, perfections or acts flowing from their inner being or essence, perfecting it and giving it more "being."[87]

We judge, in other words, that the beings of immediate experience, the sensible existents given to us in consciousness, can in some way be regarded as hungering for more being, as dynamic centers of existence reaching out for more, clamoring

[84] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 84, a. 7.

[85] Thus the need, in Thomistic metaphysics, for resolving *all* judgments in the senses: "sensus sunt extremi sicut intellectus principiorum, extrema appelans ilia in quae fit resolutio judicantis" *(De Verit.,* q. 2, a. 3); "quia principium primum cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodamodo resolvere omnia de quibus judicamus" *(ibid.,* ad 2).

[86] *In V Met.,* l. 9, nn. 890 ff: "oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi. . . . Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis. . . "

[87] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 5, a. I, ad I: "cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse *secundum quid,* sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid . . . . "

for fulfillment. We discover levels of being among the existents delivered to us through We find that they are more or less good,, true, beautiful. But none of those sensible existents given to us in our immediate experience is totally, perfectly good, true, beautiful; none is totally being. This argues to a lack in them, a lack which in final analysis is the reason why they hunger for more being, for fulfillment, a lack or appetite explanatory of the dynamism they disclose. All this is inexplicable, utterly absurd, unless we are willing to admit that all of these sensible beings of immediate experience are of themselves incomplete beings. Since they are not being itself, they cannot even explain of themselves the being we actually discover in them. They are, in other words, caused beings.[88] That these beings are caused is a judgment forced upon the mind by an appreciation of what they are, and this appreciation, in turn, is the result of a long process of judgmental acts bearing upon the sensible existents present to us in sense knowledge. Certainly the idea of cause is not a part of the idea of any of these sensible existents as natures or essences of such or such a kind. But, and here is the point which Mr. Hume has failed to see, we cannot understand these sensible existents as beings until we have judged that they are, in their being, non-self-explanatory, demanding *an other* from whom their being is derived and from whom is derived the thirst or appetite they display for more and more being.[89] In other words, through judgments we grasp that the beings of our immediate experience demand a cause for their being. Mr. Hume is right in holding that the causal relation can never be discovered through an abstract analysis of ideas. But by eradicating the judgment act from human intelligence, he cut himself off from the only way possible for attaining this relation in a knowledge act. For it is precisely through judgments concerning the sensible beings

[88] Cf. *ibid.,* q. 2, a. 3, quarta via.

[89] The dynamism, the movement characterizing the sensible beings of the world of our experience is an indication of their unfulfillment, of their need to acquire what is not theirs by nature, that is, more being. On this, cf. *ibid.,* q. 44, a. 4, and ad 1.

present to us in experience that we see that they are caused, that they are effects, which would not even be were there not a cause distinct from them responsible for their being.[90]

WILLIAM E. MAY

0CYI'p1U lnatrumentorum
Washington, D. C.

•• One of the major values of Hume's critique of the causal proposition is, perhaps, its value in showing that the causal proposition is not a first principle, not a rationalistic apriori "given." On this cf. Joseph Owens, "The Causal Proposition-Principle or Conclusion? " *The Modem Schoolman* XXXII (1955), 159-171, 257-270, 3(t3-339, and "The Causal Proposition Revisited," *Ibid.,* XLIV (1967). 143-151.

THE SUAREZIAN POSITION ON BEING AND THE REAL DISTINCTION: AN ANALYTIC AND COMPARATIVE STUDY

IF IT IS TRUE, as St. Thomas says in his introduction to the *De Ente et Essentia,* that being and essence are the first things conceived in the intellect; and that everything else is conceived under the " auspices," so to speak, of these primary notions, might we not safely conclude that this first and fundamental monocular to all knowledge would have very far-reaching effects indeed? Just as a person facing the west will necessarily have a different perspective of the lights and shadows and all the passing parade of reality than one facing the east, so also it might make a difference whether one takes his fundamental intuition of being from the top or bottom, or from somewhere on the circumference, to speak metaphorically.

In fact-to reduce the situation to extremes--the question of whether one views being from the bedrock of essence or the heights of existence might be the deciding factor in a myriad of other orientations which characterize his life: the orientation towards conservatism or progressivism; individualism or personalism; naturalism or mysticism; determinism or freedom; self-expressionism or altruism; passivity or activity; provincialism or universalism; humanism, or covert or overt theocentricity; multiplicity or unity, etc.

On his voyage to China in reflecting on the fundamental differences which emerged in his discussions with some of the ship's passengers, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin concluded that

> In all thought there is . . . a fundamental option, a postulate which is not demonstrable, but from which everything else is deduced. If one admits that esse *(l'etre)* is better than its opposite,

it is difficult to stop short of God. If one does not admit it, no further discussion is possible.[1]

Both essentialists and orthodox Thomists hold that "esse is better than its opposite." (If, as Suarez points out, essentialists sometimes hold that "essence is most perfect," this is only because they conceive essence as substantially subsisting in itself, which subsistence must presuppose existence, in Suarez's estimation).[2] This is what allows them to be on "speaking terms." However, since the essentialists hold that esse is really identical with essence, we might expect they mean something else by "esse" than the Thomists, who hold that it is really distinct from essence. If their perspective is not from the pole opposite to existence, it seems to be somewhere along the line. One of the purposes of this study will be to determine the *locus* of their metaphysical orientation with some measure of accuracy.

I. SoME CHARACTERISTics OF SuAREZ

In the construction of this study I concentrated especially on *Disputation* XXXI, Sects. 1-14, in which Suarez considers the nature of essence and existence, and the distinction between the two; *Disp.* XXVIII, Sect. 1, on the major divisions of being; and *Disp.* XXX, Sects. 4 and 6, on God's essence.[8]

In the reading of Suarez I have been struck especially by three things, which I think may have a bearing on the texture of his thought: namely, his conceptualism, polemic attitude, and individualism.

1. *Conceptualism:* When one returns to St. Thomas after

[1] Corte, *La vie et l'ame de Teilhard de Chardin* (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1957), p. 58: "Je crois bien en fait, qu'il se place Ia, dans toute pensee, un option fondamental, un postulat qui n'est pas demontrable, mais dont tout derive. Si !'on admet que l'etre est mieux que son contraire, il est difficile de s'arreter sans aller jusqu'a Dieu. Si on ne l'admet pas, il n'est plus possible, de discuter.

[2] *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* Charles Burton, Ed. (Paris: Vives, 1961), t. 26 (this edition is used for all further references to the *Disputations);* Disp. XXXI, Sect. 18, med.

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 1-20, p. 74 ff., p. 89 ff., and pp. 224-812.

reading Suarez for some time, St. Thomas appears to have an almost " chatty " style in comparison. Suarez is the strict logician, the rigid dialectician, all the way through. He rarely resorts to examples or comparisons, rarely departs from an unflinching argumentative mold. There can be no doubt that he is concerned primarily with concepts and particularly with the analysis and mutual comparison of these concepts. This is not to say that he is unrealistic but only that he emphasizes the conceptual, the essential.

fl. *Polemicism:* Suarez in the *Disputations* does not ordinarily declare himself at odds with St. Thomas on specific points. It seems that he has too much respect for *Divus Thomas* to openly differ with him. Quite frequently, however, he states his diametrical opposition to impressive barrages of Thomists and then adds that " they base their assertions on such-and-such texts of St. Thomas."

One cannot help but notice in Suarez's disputations a kind of zest for combat. After two or three pages of closely-knit arguments he will conclude that his adversary's position is *ridiculosum.* Not that he is swayed by passion or emotionalism, rather just the opposite; he is the epitome of a cooly logical, bilious metaphysician. But, whereas it was a *notable* thing in the St. Thomas legend that he once brought his fist down on the table and exclaimed " that takes care of the Manichaeans! ", this type of behavior is rather a commonplace in Suarez.

3. *Individualism:* Unlike St. Thomas, who has the facility for making his reader almost forget about the author and attend wholly to the subject matter, Suarez reminds you continually of his presence. " *Ego* " is a much-used pronoun with Suarez. And he is continually giving " personal attention " to those arguments which impugn " *nostra sententia* " or " *nostra positio."* Suarez automatically gives the unmistakable stamp of his own character to his writings.

II. SuAREZ ON BEING AND THE DIVISIONs oF BEING

The main criterion that Suarez uses to distinguish real beirig from potential being and nothingness is the state of "standing

outside causes," of escaping, as it were, from indeterminacy and nothingness.

The " being " which he seems to have in mind is that bare minimal being which is common to both rocks and men, i. e., the lowest and most general type of existence. And it is this bare, minimal being that is made into a genus containing in a confused and indistinct way all the various categories of being of which this one transcendental concept can be predicated according to the analogy of intrinsic proportionality, in much the same way that the genus of animality contains indefinitely all the specific differences and can be predicated of all higher species (univocally in this latter case, not analogously).

The main divisions in the category of being are, according to Suarez, the divisions of infinite and finite being. These divisions, although not *per se notae,* gain their value from the fact that they are most useful in the order of demonstration.

" Infinite," as applied to God, is not a privative notion, (which would imply that he was ordered to some termination, which he did not actually have) but rather a negative notion, in that the notion of being, as applied to God, does *not* prescind from any perfection of finite being. Any finite being, on the other hand, is cut off from the perfections of others, *intrinsicaUy* by the particular differences of its nature and *extrinsically* by respect to those beings which contain its own perfection eminently as well as from those beings whose perfections *it* contains eminently itself.

The division of being into *ens a se* and *ens ab alio* can be reduced to the previous division, says Suarez, since " aseity " does not imply sui-causality but is merely another negative notion implying that God is *not* subject to change or emanation and hence is completely actual, perfect, infinite. And to *thiS latter* division we can reduce the categories of necessary and contingent being, uncreated and created being, actual and potential being, and *ens per essentiam* and *ens per pa'rticipaticmem.*

III. THE BEING oF Goo

According to Suarez/ God's esse is not *compounded* with his essence but *is* his essence in the most simple, complete, and absolute manner. This is why, in God's appearance to Moses, God, in answering Moses' question as to his identity, indicated that in actual fact he was the *only* existent, so that, in a very real sense, creatures may be said not to exist. And thus, in God's essence, there can in no wise be any passive potentiality, an'd in his existence there can be no receptivity or participation.

The main difference between the esse of God and that of creatures is, says Suarez,[5] that God's esse is both really identical *with* his essence and also *of* (or *from)* his essence:

> · I aver unconditionally that to be "really identical *with* an essence," and to be "*of* an essence," are not convertible predications: for, it suffices for the former that there be no distinction in the thing, but, for the latter, it is necessary that the essence of the thing should not be able to be totally constituted, in lieu of that quality or property which is said to be "of the essence." [6]

And so, this is the main distinction between the essence of God and that of creatures, namely, that we cannot even adequately *think* of God's essence, except as existing, whereas, with created essences, we can make a precision of reason from existence as the final actuality of a being.

And this leads us to the question of whether, besides this distinction of *reason* which we can discern in created essences, there is any more *radical* distinction.

IV. THE TYPE OF DISTINCTION WHICH OBTAINS BETWEEN CREATED EssENCE AND CREATED ExiSTENCE

1. *The Thornist Position.*

Suarez himself expounds the Thomist position in Sect. 1 of *Disp.* XXXI, where he states that they posit a distinction *in re* for the following five reasons:

[5] *Disp. XXX,* Sect. 4. [6] *Disp. XXX,* Sect. 6, p. 91.

[6] Fateor ... in universum non converti--esse in re idem cum essentia, et esse. de essentia; nam ad illud prius sufficit quod in re non sit distinctio, ad hoc vero posterius necesse est ut non possit rei essentia esse plene constituta, praeciso eo quod dicitur esse de essentia.

(i) It is an *eternal truth* that man is a rational animal; but his *actual existence* is a contingent fact, depending entirely on the action of some efficient cause, so that something real must indeed be added to the essence.

(ii) Creatures do not have esse of their essence and hence must *receive* it, which implies potency, or essence. in lieu of which they would have to be unreceived act, i.e., God, pure Act.

(iii) There must be some kind of real composition in creatures; otherwise, they would have that simplicity which is the prerogative of God alone.

(iv) Esse is either something distinct from the composite of matter and form or the result of the union of partial existences. If the latter obtains, then we have to face the problem of an incomplete potency having an existence of itself. But this seems impossible, because we know that the only incomplete component principle that can exist separately is the human soul.

(v) Theology affirms the distinction of Christ's human nature., or essence, from the esse of the Divine Word. So, at least here there must be a real distinction.

2. *The Scotist Position.*

The Scotist school proposes a " modal " distinction, which it justifies in this way:

"Distinctions are not to be multiplied unnecessarily." There certainly must be some type of distinction between created esse and essence, for the reasons proposed by the Thomists. However, a modal distinction is sufficient adequately to describe the composition in created beings. And so, why should we rush into the innumerable difficulties that will arise if we try to maintain a real distinction in each created being?

The nature of a " modal distinction is such that one extreme is separable, by the divine power, from the other extreme," although this divine power could not extend to a mutual, or convertible, separation, i. e., so that not only would created

[1] *Diat. XXXI,* Sect. I, #II, p. iiS.

essence be separable from its own proper esse (which is a necessity for explaining the hyposatic union), but also the *esse* itself could be separable from the essence of a creature.

3. *Suarez's Own Position.*

Suarez prepares the way for his "distinction of reason" by his doctrine on distinction itself:

> Distinction, since it is just a negation, or a kind of relation, is not a condition *sine qua non* for the existence of a thing, but, rather, is a characteristic resulting from the existence of something *in such-and-such a way.*[8]

It is only through the *determination* of being that negations and relationships are set up. In being itself, however, we can find no *a priori* reason why there must be a real distinction of esse from essence.

He therefore holds with Alexander of Hales, [Peter] Aureolus, and others, in positing the complete sufficiency of a distinction of reason for establishing the distance between finite and infinite being.

However, it must first be made clear, he says, that the essence he is referring to is *not* the essence as *purely potential,* for the essence as potential is nothing else but the objective potency existing in the mind and jurisdiction of God, i.e., pure nothingness. For, if such an essence had any reality of itself, there would be something outside of God which did not depend on him for existence.

The essence which is under consideration, is, therefore, the actual essence which has received the *esse essentiae* and thus becomes a subjective potency capable of receiving further perfection.

Essences, according to Suarez, are concrete, finite *existences.* There is no actuality which we could add to them which would add anything to that which they already have. The *quod est* is really a particular, determinate, fully constituted *esse.* If

[8] *Ibid.*, Sect. 4, # 5, p. 286: Distinctio, cum sit negatio vel relatio quaedam, non est conditio per se requisita ad esse rei, sed quid resultans ex *tali* esse rei.

we distinguish an actual existence *realiter,* then we must distinguish the *esse* of the actual essence from the *esse* of the .actual existence, and so on *ad infinitum,* multiplying entities without end.[9]

4. *Refutation of the Thomist and Scotist Reasonings.*

(i) *"Eternal" essential definitions* are neither so eternal as to require their production *in re, ab aeterno,* nor so necessary as to prescind from divine liberty; and, in fact, the copula, "is," by which, e. g., "rational animal" is predicated of" man," is itself implicitly hypothetical, i. e., conditioned by whether or .not any man actually exists *in rerum natura.*[10]

(ii) *Essence as a potency* is not an objective potency (i.e., nothingness) but a subjective potency actuated and capable of further actuation, i.e., actuated of its very nature. Nothing need be added to such a potency *ab extra.*

(iii) *Composition in creatures* is sufficiently accounted for by the compositions of matter-form, substance-accident, nature-subsistence, etc., and in angels by a composition .of esse and suppositum, in the following manner:

> The esse of the nature [of an angel] is received in a supposite distinct from this esse itself, and from this point of view is limited, because it is united in a composition and is limited and determined through such a mode of subsistence.U

The composition which Suarez speaks of here seems to differ from the potency-act composition which St. Thomas discerns In angels, mainly in that the receptacle, for Suarez, has some

• *Dist. XXXI,* Sect. 4, # 5, p. 236.

[10] *Ibid.,* Sect. 2; also, Sect. 12, *ad fin.*

[11] *Ibid.,* Sect. 6, init.

[12] *Ibid.,* Sect. 13, # 15, p. 303: Esse naturae (angeli) recipitur in supposito ex natura rei distincto ab ipsa, et ex hac parte limitatur quia in trahitur, et per talem subsistendi modum limitatur ac determinatur.

Since, a few lines earlier, Suarez says: " dici potest illud esse receptum in supposito ex natura rei distincto ab ipso esse essentiae," and since in this place he seems to be making a reaffirmation of this same fundamental principle, it would seem that " ipso " should be read instead of " ipsa." I have translated the passage with this presupposition.

actuality (being the suppositum) whereas, for St. Thomas, the receptacle, being pure potency, would not seem to have any actl.lality of itself.

(iv) *Partial existences* present no metaphysical impossibility,. as the Thomist would lead us to believe. Rather, every being, precisely insofar as it is composed, is replete with partial existences. There is the partial existence of the matter, of the form, of the accidents, of the subsistence, etc. And although we must admit that prime matter is " *prope nihil,"* still the very fact that it is not *absolutely* nothing gives it something of existence.[13]

· (v) *The distinction of Christ's human nature from the esse ofthe Word.*

The humanity of Christ truly has its own proper existence (otherwise it could not be an *actual* essence); nor was it just the *esse essentiae* that was subsumed by the Divine Word in the Incarnation (which theory, indeed, would make it almost impossible to comprehend how Mary could be the Mother of God) but rather the *esse existentiae,* of the humanity, which was united to the Word., in Mary's womb, so that the very action of conception terminated in the production of the God-man (by which Mary truly became the Mother of God) . And probably, says Suarez, this conception took place in such a way that both body and soul, being united to each other, were united in a " naturally prior " way (prius natura) to the. Divine Word, making it Mary's privilege to bring about the union which terminated in the actual suppositum of the God-man.14

There are, therefore, two natures and two *existences* in Chirst formed into one composite person. And in this way, Suarez declares, we escape many of the difficulties of the Thomists, who are hard-pressed to explain just how a real hypostatic *union,* rather than just a "fiction," [sic] takes place in the Incarnation; why Christ's human nature is not eternal;

[13] *Ibid.,* Sect. 11, *passim.*

[14] *Ibid.,* Sect. 12, # 24, p. 290.

how the esse of the Word can be proportioned to a finite and merely objective essence, etc.

(vi) *The modal distinction of the Scotists* is just as unsatisfactory as the Thomists' distinction, because a mode is only intelligible on the supposition that it is added to an *already existing* entity.

V. THE CAUSE OF EXISTENCE

One of the most obvious advantages of maintaining a *real identity* of essence and existence (and hence a lack of any real composition in the order of being itself), says Suarez, is that it frees one from the necessity of recognizing any *intrinsic* principles or causality in being, except for the natural composition of matter and form in material being.[15]

Strictly speaking, those who admit only a distinction of reason within being can ascribe causality in the production of a new "esse" only to *extrinsic principles.*[16] That is, in the sphere of transient "becoming," they recognize creatures themselves to be principal and proximate causes of existence. And this for three reasons: 1) they truly effect a whole, existent composition; 2) their action is a real action with a real terminus; and 3) the very eduction of the form is a reduction of potency to act, i. e., to *existence.*

Thomists, quite congruently with the mind of St. Thomas, usually relegate the action of creatures to the mere "preparation" of supposita to receive existence, i. e., by various "dispositive" actions in which they act as instrumental, or at least secondary, causes in the transmission of existence. They say that creatures produce the *hoc* esse, while it is God that produces the *esse.* But, by these very "dispositions" which creatures bring about are they not *ipso facto* causing a new existence? Do not creatures, in producing the "hoc," also produce the esse?

"Sicut res, ita et actiones, frustra multiplicentur." Why should it be necessary to posit any separate action on the part

[15] *Ibid.,* Sect. 8, *init.*

[16] *Ibid., ad fin.*

of God to bring about an existence which is already sufficiently accounted for? Creatures do not just dispose the matter and educe the form but they actually bring about a finished product, *standing " outside its causes,"* which is nothing else but existence. Once a thing has been "reduced to act," we cannot even *imagine* anything which is still needful and which only God, working alone, could add.

The action of generation certainly must have some kind of existence itself and thus terminate in some type of existence; otherwise, *we are left with an action terminating in real nothingness.*

Indeed, if existence required a separate action on God's part, then there would be need to posit not two but *three* substantial actions, e. g., in the creation of man: the creation of the soul, the disposition of the matter, *and* the *union* of the two, which definitely seems to be a purposeless " multiplication of actions."

And so, says Suarez, we ought to conclude that creatures, in producing the " hoc," also produce the esse and therefore the essence too (since these principles are really identical) and that they do this as principle and proximate causes.[17]

What then, is the part of God in producing existence? God, answers Suarez, is the First Cause of existence. **It** is only God who specifically and *per se primo* brings about existence itself, since it is only God who is able to create being from nothing; to supply the very foundation of existence, which, in spiritual creatures, is their substance (called by Cajetan their "necessity ") and, in material creatures, is prime matter; and to produce, in the strictest sense, the totality of the particular and determined existent thing.[18]

VI. Gon As THE DETERMINER OF EssE

The determination of esse must be ascribed to the action of God: not that he actually intends the determinations or pro-

[17] *Ibid.,* Sect. 9, *passim.*

[18] Suarez is willing to admit a *quasi* formal and material causality on the part of form and matter respectively in the production of material things but observes that these could not really be termed principles intrinsic to being itself.

duces esse under the *ratio* of any certain detenninations but rather that, as the key speaker in the assemblage of creation, he communicates through the language in vogue in the realm of contingency, which" language" happens to be detennination and specification itself:

> God confers esse, *qua* esse, *per se primo;* creatures, on the other hand, effect only this or that esse. Which is not to say that God does not bring about in every esse its entire specific determination, or that a creature, in effecting some esse, does not at the same time effect in this esse all that content of *ens commune* which is subject to abstraction by us. . . . But God, in effecting these determinations, does so in that mode which is proper and adequated to his infinite power, namely, through the production of esse itself, *qua* esse, whereas the mode (ratio) which properly obtains on the part of the creature is this or that particular esse.[19]

We must note, that God's determination of esse is not in the spheres of principal and proximate causality (since this, in Suarez's mind, is the proper realm of creatures alone) but rather in the sphere of first causality, which belongs to God alone.

VII. PoTENCY: PERHAPs THE CRux oF THE WHOLE PRoBLEM

One can scarcely fail to notice, in reading Suarez, that he speaks of " subjective potency " in a different sense than that which was applied to it by St. Thomas and is applied to it by most Thomists.

Suarez refers to many different types of "esse's": the *esse essentiae, esse existentiae, esse materiae,* etc. It is obvious that he views the natural, subsistent composite as an accretion of many different types of esse's. Even the most potential principles have some type of proportionate esse.

[19] *Dist. XXXI,* Sect. 9, # 21, p. 265: Deus per se primo oonfert esse, ut sic, creatura vero solum facit hoc vel illud esse. Non quod vel Deus non efficiat in omne esse omnem determinatam rationem ejus, vel quod, cum creatura efficit aliquod esse, non efficiat in ilia omnem communem rationem essendi, quae a nobis abstrahi potest . . . sed quod ratio, sub qua Deus attingit ilium effectum, et adaequata virtuti ejus . . . , sit ipsum esse ut sic; respectu vero creaturae sit tale vel tale esse.

The essence, seen by Suarez as having its own intrinsic esse; seems to be something like the seed which contains in its own *actuality* all the potentialities of the full flowering of existence, which " flowering " is really just the logical conclusion of this *esse essentiae.* This view of the actuated essential potency is indeed a very valid and very natural view. For its esse exerts a type of efficiency, causing the full actuation (the *esse existentiae)* through the becoming process and through the final determinations given to accidents.

But note that the esse in this case imitates an *active* potency, with quasi-efficient causality in the production of the fullness of existence. It is *not* that passive potency which St. Thomas speaks of as being one of the two correlative principles in the constitution of finite being.

St. Thomas, in referring to the essence as *potential* to the reception of esse, is not using " potency " in its first and most common sense. Potency in the first meaning of the word, as St. Thomas says in the first article of his *De Potentia,* is the power which must be presupposed as the principle of *operations.* And it is only in a derived sense that we apply the term to the potential principle for the " *first act,"* or form, of a composite being. Potency in this derived sense is applied properly to prime matter, which is *pure passive potency,* and passive for this reason, namely, that by its very definition it cannot presuppose any act or actuation (since such an actuation would render it incapable of receiving the very *first* act) .

Why does St. Thomas, in speaking of essence, often refer to it as *sicut* potentia or *quasi* potentia? Does he mean by this that it is not a real potency, just as existence is not really a form but can be called a "quasi-form"? This is certainly not his intention, for he states quite explicitly in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and other places that all creatures must be composed from potency and act and that the potency is one thing (aliud) and the act is another. [20] Unless we want to take " *aliud* " here as synonymous with " *idem,"* we are impelled tO

""II Coot. *Gent., 6!l.*

say that he is not calling essence a potency in an equivocal sense.

The reference, then, to essence as a " quasi-" potency is explained by the fact that it is one of the *furthest* extensions of the meaning of potency from the primary meaning of the word. But this extension is by no means invalid, any more than it is invalid to extend the term " act " to form and ultimately to existence, though in its first sense it refers to overt, accidental operations. For this is merely an instance of the abstraction process itself in which both universal and transcendental must be derived from, and traced back to, their original sensuous expressions.

Essence, then, is a real potency and is precisely that potency which corresponds to existence itself, to the first and ultimate act of the whole being, the " form of the form." And it is here that Suarez is quick to point out what seems to be a glaring difficulty: water is poured into a pre-existing container; accidents are received into a pre-existing substance; form is received in " barely existing " matter; therefore existence must be received into an essence or potency which has at least some kind of at least seminal existence, i.e., the *esse essentiae.* For, how could it be received into the furthest extreme of potency, i.e., pure nothingness?

St. Thomas would no doubt answer that potency, *qua* potency, cannot possess even the most seminal semblance of act. To ascribe act to potency in this way would be like ascribing whiteness to blackness, *qua* blackness, or up to down, *qua* down. Besides the obvious and endless semantic difficulties such liberties would bring on, there would be an inevitable blunting of the precision which metaphysics, as a science, should have.

But this is not to minimize the problem. For the problem which Suarez is pointing out here is nothing else but the verj problem, or better, the mystery of *creation.* For creation, just as it took place at that very beginning of time which was in: reality outside of time, cannot even now be relegated to any point of time, or even be said to have ceased. Existence,. as an

immovable *center* of things, is in this sense removed from the fringes of the gyrations and fluxations of temporal motion. (And this is perhaps one meaning that can be inferred from St. Thomas's statement that existence is "that which is *most* intrinsic and formal" in a thing.) There is no presupposable principle in the temporal movements of the processes of generation and corruption that could serve as a foundation, a fulcrum, a for existence itself. Rather, existence as the truly first act *is* the foundation, the center, for all such progressions. *We are faced here with the dilemma of choosing, as the potential "substratum" of existence, either nothingness it-.yelf or the very existence itself.* Suarez chooses the latter alternative. For he makes this foundation for the "*esse existentiae*" to be nothing else than the existent essence; and since this latter is really identical and synonymous with the existence itself, he is in reality making existence to be its own foundation. St. Thomas, on the other hand, takes the other course; for the potency which he allows as a recipient of esse can have in itself not the least bit of act and must, for this reason, be a type of nothingness.

The problem becomes most acute, and transparent, when referred to the angels in whom, as St. Thomas says in the *De Ente et Essentia,*[21] there is the most of act, and the least of potency, among all creatures. Here we have a case where there is no matter to serve as a receptacle for form and esse, and no temporal progression of existential change, to account for a gradual accretion of perfections. Rather, angels have complete actuality and *semper eodem modo se habent,* as Dionysius says.[22] Suarez posits as the "receptacle" for the angelic esse the vecy suppositum of the angel itself. But we are led to wonder whether such an answer is really a clarification of the problem. For is not the suppositum the whole existent essence without any precision being made? He seems to be stating, for all practical purposes here, that the whole is being received into the whole.

[21] Ch. IV.

[22] Quoted by St. Thomas, *De Substantiis Separatis,* Ch. XVII, 94, *ad fin.*

It would seem that the more meaningful answer to the prot>:. lem, especially as applied to the angels, is given by St. Thomas in stating that their esse is received into a potency which of itself has nothing o£ act but is rather a relative non-being. Nor is" relative non-being" to be taken here as a kind of existence (as Suarez takes it in the case o£ the relative non-being of prime matter); rather, it is the result of the transcendental ordering o£ existence to this or that specific determination. Indeed, existence is the transcendental ordering itself, the termination o£ which *is* the potency, which potency is much like the point which must necessarily terminate the line but which has no meaning itself except in reference to the line. Only potency is more o£ a non-entity than even a point, just as esse has more o£ being than a line.

But what is it that constitutes subjective potency as *"relative"* non-being? It could be nothing but the determination of the esse to this or that mode of expressing, extending, exteriorizing, the divine essence in an intrinsic nothingness which *becomes* relative; the particular act and the particular potency have an irrevocable and irreducible relationship for one another and neither the determined esse nor the determined essence could have any intelligibility or reality except in terms of this relationship: in much the same way that, if the end house in a block of houses is removed, the house would be no longer the *end* house, and the end of the block would no longer be the *locus* o£ that end house.

As St. Thomas says in one place/[3] nothingness in each particular thing is properly said to be prior by nature (but not by duration) as that which arises solely from the creature itself and not *ab alia.* This is that natural and ultimate " progression " which is found in every creature and is most fundamental to it, *so* that potency, as relative non-being, is in this sense naturally prior to act in any particular creature, for the very reason that the potency " supplies " the only prerequisite needed by God " before " he can create, which

[23] *In II Sent.,* I, I, *5, sed contra,* ad *i2um.*

is pure nothingness. And the esse, in taking on the determinations of a specific essence, gives " form " and essential denomination to the potency, just as a globule of oil in falling on water " forms " the surface of the water in the very act of revising its own shape to fit the new environment.

In smnmary, we might observe that the essential position of Suarez is very understandable: It is the only position by which one can effectively avoid the use of "nothingness" as a principle. But then again, we might ask, is nothingness really that much of a threat to metaphysics? The answer to this question will perhaps be indicative of a fundamental option continually open to metaphysicians. [24]

HowARD P. KAINZ

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

•• Hegel, for example, in his own dialectical fashion, and in the epistemological context supplied for him by his immediate philosophical predecessors (Kant, Fichte, and Schelling), faces up to such an option in the beginning of his *Lagic* (cf. "The Doctrine of Being" in the "minor Logic"): If we explore the meaning of "Being," we find that, in a very real sense, it is equivalent to, and paradoxically grounded in, Nothingness. Being is identical with Nothing, in the sphere of our concepts. This "identity," however, must not be understood in the sense of traditional formal logic but in the context of Hegel's dialectical logic. It is an identity-in-distinction, just as Hegel's "Reason" or *Vernunft* (which is often misinterpreted in a Kantian or pre-Kantian sense) is the unity-in-distinction of being and thought, ego and otherness. In other words, the fundamental " reality" which " Reason " discerns in the beginning of the *Logic* is not Being but the transcendental dialectical relationship between Being and Nothingness, that very fundamental distinction which is at one and the same time a fundamental unity.

We might go one step further here to draw up a parallel between Hegel and St. Tqomas: Just as the dialectical reciprocity between the two opposites, Being and Nothing, leads immediately in Hegel's *Logic* to the synthetic comprehension of "Becoming," so also a transcendental relationsip (=unity) between two distinct principles, esse and pure potency (essence) leads in St. Thomas's formulation to the comprehension of the ontological constitution of "contingent being."

EXISTENTIALISM: GREEK ETHICS AND THE WAY BACK TO THE FUTURE: A NOTE

FOR ANY READER of Kierkegaard, it is a well-known fact that existentialism considers Socrates as its model. It is true that, in the *Philosophical ragments*, Kierkegaard goes " beyond Socrates " in developing a more radical view of truth and of learning, but still it is Socrates who is taken as the source of inspiration. We can observe this same phenomenon of the return to Greek ethics in the use which both Sartre and Camus make of classical tragedy. Again, their existential rendering of the ancient tragedies makes each one more radical than its earlier Greek version. Yet, the amazing thing to note is the sympathy which the existentialists feel for Greek ethical themes in spite of the intervening centuries and all of their polemic against " historical understanding." Existentialism is anti-evolutionary where man is concerned and thus can feel itself immediately contemporary with classical man. All men share the same human condition regardless of time, although the Greeks seem to have caught the tragical flavor better than many other eras of the past.

However, my interest now is neither to explore this relationship between Greek ethics and existentialism nor to comment on the views of man which they share in common. Since existentialism is future oriented and anti-historical in its outlook, it would be more true to its spirit to turn this brief exploration toward the future and not the past. In any strict sense, existentialism's interest in classical ethics was not historical; it was simply inspirational. That is, existentialism drew from these ancient figures both its inspiration and the basis upon which it could extend its own analysis. Thus, what we want to ask now is how the combination of both existentialism

arid Greek ethics might point out for us " the way to the future." Existentialism, no less than ancient philosophy, now belongs to another age, but both still can provide a ground for the " way back to the future."

Specifically, what I want to try to do is to extend a very brief parallel to an argument which I have developed more fully in another connection.[1] That is, if existentialism can and has provided a basis upon which metaphysics may be built, and if it has done this by establishing the empirical foundation for metaphysics which Kant demanded, what can existentialism provide for the revival of a classical ethical perspective?

To suggest this may seem strange, since modem ethics is perhaps most closely associated with " subjectivism" and " relativism," and these themes seem both opposed to classical "objective" ethics and also actually to be what existentialism endorses. Again, what I want to ask is not so much whether existentialism was or is itself " subjective " but whether in fact its explorations in psychology and literature can actually provide *us* with a ground for a return to something like a classical ethical perspective. Do we once again have available a common model for all men and a universal standard for judgment?

Perhaps the best way to approach this problem is to consider the distinction which is often drawn and which is so fundamental to existentialism: that is, we do not have a universal human nature given to us as an essence in advance, but we do all exist as men in a common human condition. Classical ethics would seem to depend for its objectivity on our ability to discover a universally shared human nature. Therefore, to deny this would put Athens ethically at a great distance from Copenhagen and Paris and also doom existentialism to some form of subjectivism in ethics. However, let us explore a little what kind of common human condition existentialism thinks we share and then see whether in fact this can enable us, not to go back to Greek ethics but to move forward to revive a

[1] See my *The Exi:Jtentialist Prolegomena: To A Future Metaphyaic8,* University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1969.

siillilar ethical perspective in the future. *If our human cr:mdition is the same, although our essence develops differently and oontingently, can this 3erve as the basis for an objective norm?*

" Fate " is a common theme stressed in Greek ethics, and, it is also characteristic of existentialism; If in .fact this notion i:qvolves a of essence in classical thought, on the; other hand" fate" is strong in existentialism as the unyielding. context of events which surround men and against which they must act to define their essence and to achieve their freedom. Men can be free, but not unless they can overcome their fate and maintain their individual freedom. Sometimes, of course, tliis freedom is more internally directed than concerned with control over external everi.ts; but, nevertheless, there is a common goal which all men are striving to attain and against which they can be measured. Our freedom flows from ourselves;· it is not connected with any specific form of external behavior. Sartre's waiter can be as free as Aristotle's virtuous man. In this sense, existentialism involves a little bit more democracy than does classical ethics which tends toward aristocracy.

To say this, of course, does not mean that the existentialist either ignores or would pull down all social and class distinctions. Far from it. He takes these for granted as the given structure of society within which men live. Our actions will be judged by this society according to the various sets of objective norms which are in force at that time; however, whether any given individual is " free " or not, this is an evaluation which can only be made internally. Existentialism W.ke,s man's setting in society for granted, just as Greek ethics does. It. is far from revolutionary in its social theory; in fact, the major problem for men does not lie on the external or on the social level. Regardless of external events and our response to. them, the crucial battle for freedom always is within, and. achieving this has little to do with altering social arrangements.· To place the oruy locus of the human battle externally is to: falsify the problem. Man does what he can to improve social but he must never confuse this with securing iri.-dividuality and freedom for himself.

All this having been said, it probably is over the meaning and the place of" contingency" that Greek ethics and existentialism differ most, but perhaps it is also precisely this difference which gives us a clue to the future. "Necessity" is the core of Being upon which metaphysics has usually been based; now, for the existentialists, metaphysics must center on contingency and the accidental. Metaphysics is possible on an existential base, but it turns out to be of a different kind. And so it is with ethics. All men share the same norms, and they are to be judged by them. The problem is that these are only accessible to the individual if he adopts them as an internal condition, and they rest on a contingent base. That is, no man is determined to be free, although he may live in a context which condemns him to face freedom. He can reject freedom, but at least it is offered to every man. Of course, what determines this are not his circumstances but only his response to them. "The way to the future " lies in the recognition of our common circumstances, in the fact that our freedom does not depend on social change (although nothing prevents this if conditions can really be improved) , and that our own internal response will be successful if it learns to accept contingency as an ultimate fact of life and to act on that basis.

If we accept existentialism, we leave behind all evolutionary schemes where human ethics is concerned, and our moral behavior will in no way depend on our historical understanding. Existentialism also enables us to break away from the concept of a necessary God whose fixed nature once controlled human action even before the rise of evolutionary theories. God, too, must be conceived of on a contingent basis, and this frees his action just as it does man's. Our future is no different from the Greeks; we all face contingency and the necessity to decide in the face of uncertainty, no matter how different the facts are. We both stand in the same place; all of us are future oriented, although now we have discovered both the essential internal locus of freedom and its basis in external contingency. A new metaphysics of contingency vs. necessity, that is, one which is

made possible by an existentialist prolegomena, can open the way to a common moral basis in the future. It will be one based on freedom and contingency as universal human conditions, not on any demand for identity of principle between all moral codes.

FREDERICK SONTAG

PCJ11Wfla Colleg6
Claremont, Califomia

BOOK REVIEWS

The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth. By COLM O'GRADY. Washington-Cleveland: Corpus Books, 1969. Pp. 866. $10.00.

Any appreciation of this book by Colm O'Grady on the ecclesiology of the late Karl Barth must take into consideration the express intention of the author as presented in the Introduction. The book under consideration is merely the first volume of a two-part study of Barth's ecclesiology. The second volume, although announced for Spring, 1969, has not, to my knowledge, appeared to date. In this first volume the author wishes to present a faithful exposition of Barth's ecclesiology and thus make some contribution towards the Catholic understanding of our separated brethren. It is only in a second volume that he will present the reflections of a Catholic in relation to Karl Barth's doctrine on the Church.

Colm O'Grady has remained faithful to his purpose. Except for a few pages of interim reflections, the book consists of an exact presentation, in a summary form, of the teaching of Karl Barth on the Church and directly related matter. The latter includes almost the whole of dogmatics, as a cursory glance at the table of contents will soon confirm: Section One. "The Church of God: The Eternal Basis of the Church in God's Election of Grace." Section Two. " The Church in the Son: The Objective Realization of Reconciliation." Section Three. " The Church Through the Holy Spirit: The Fundamental Form of the Subjective Realization of Reconciliation." These three sections follow an analysis of Barth's teaching on the Church as found in the first edition of his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,* the basic text where his Theology of Crisis, less properly known as his Dialectical Theology, is to be found.

O'Grady is very careful to point out the development which took place in the· theological thinking of Karl Barth. His treatment of the Theology of Crisis is objective since he allows, for the most part, Barth to speak for himself-a procedure which the author follows throughout this first volume. O'Grady gives a brief outline of the genesis of the Theology of Crisis, listing the names of those who influenced the thought of Barth both positively and negatively, i.e., Plato, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, W. Herrmann, the two Blumhardts, Overbeck, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, not to mention Luther and Calvin and St. Paul as read by the Reformers and Barth himself. Plato and Kant Barth knew through his brother, Heinrich, and Dostoevsky through his friend, E. Thurneysen. Barth's attitude towards the representatives of neo-Protestantism was critical. He was primarily an original theologian and exegete whose principle source

was Paul. However, there is no denying the influence of Luther's "sola gratia" interpreted according to an "soli Deo gloria" on Barth's basic and persistent affirmation of the absolute Sovereignty of God and his gracious activity. Barth will eventually nuance his Theology of Crisis, hut he will. remain faithful to his fundamental insight on, the absolute Sovereignty of God and his separation from man or " diastasis." . Karl Barth's evolution from a Theology of Crisis to a Theology of the Word of God to that of the Word of God made Flesh, Jesus Christ, is. well presented by O'Grady. The fundamental role of Jesus Christ in the· election, justification and sanctification of man is a recurring theme· throughout. All is realized and proclaimed in Jesus Christ. The Father elects, justifies and sanctifies man in the Elect, the Just and the Holy &e, and man participates in this gracious activity of God insofar as he is a member of the Whole Christ. Jesus Christ is the concrete realization of God's gracious activity while, at the same time, revealing the total· Otherness of God. It is through the Spirit of the Lord that man is saved in the Community, and yet man remains at once just and sinner. The Word of God is found in the Scriptures alone, and yet the Scriptures, in their materiality, are not Revelation, which remains basically the work of the Holy Spirit. Man is called to become a member of the Community, and yet the Community has no control whatsoever over the Spirit of the Lord. The Sacraments are merely signs of God's gracious activity and in no way instruments of justification, not even baptism and the eucharist. There are " services " in the Community but no " officials." The Church has authority but does not enjoy infallibility in her teaching. She is, at one and the same time, the Communion of Saints and the Communion of Sinners. The world was created good by God. It is primal pre-history which already comes from grace and is related to the Church, since the God who is active in creation is the same God who is later active in reconciliation and in the Church. But, man, through his pride, is basically sin.

These and other points of Barth's teaching are exposed at some length by O'Grady with all the striking and paradoxical power of Karl Barth himself. Their importance and interrelation in the teaching of Barth on. the Church become more and more evident as we advance in the book: This is hardly a novelty since any study which pretends to present a oomplete picture of the nature and being of the Church must take into oonsideration the whole of Revelation and especially Christology and Soteriology. In the case of Karl Barth, his conception of God's absolute Sovereignty and gracious activity realized and revealed in Jesus Christ has profound repercussions on his nofion of justification and, consequently, on his notion of the Church. O'Grady is fully justified .in dwelling at· length on these points.

However, the purpose of Colm O'Grady's book is to help Catholics better

linderstand .the teaching of Xarl Barth. An objective presentation of Barth's Dogmatics is, without doubt, essential in this respect. Yet, is it sufficient? There are two parties in the dialogue which the author wishes to foster: Karl Barth and Catholics. True, the second volume promises to present the points of ecclesiological agreements and disagreements between Barth and the Catholic Church as well as the basic theological reasons for these agreements and disagreements. Nevertheless, and this even on the level of an objective presentation of the teaching of Karl Barth, I do not feel that we are given a sufficient introduction into the basic insights which goveni or at least guide the thought of Barth. For a Catholic to " stand " Barth, he would need a thorough grounding in the theology of the :Reformers and in subsequent Protestant theology. This, of course, is no simple task and can hardly be demanded of one man, and still less of One book. O'Grady does furnish the basic outline of such a background, but it should be completed, I feel, by further readings, many of which he himself mentions in footnotes.

To be more specific, it is mentioned as a fact admitted by almost all students of Karl Barth that Luther's " sola fide, sola gratia " and Calvin's " soli Deo gloria, diastasis " had a lasting influence on the thought of Karl Barth. Yet, we do not find a comprehensive view of the genesis, context, and meaning of these key concepts. Then again, Barth's reaction against liberal neo-Protestantism and the Historical School is affirmed and somewhat documented, but further readings are a must. In other words, the genesis of Barth's thought, its immediate and mediate context, must be filled in by the reader. All of which leads us to conclude that this book is addressed more to the initiated than to the beginner. In which case it rertainly can be considered as an important contribution to the ecumenical .dialogue.

This dialogue would be further advanced if certain points were elaborated in greater detail. There is, for instance, Barth's notion of the Whole Christ. It is expounded at length by O'Grady, but no mention is made as to its possible sources other than the Pauline epistles. Is it not possible that Augustine had an influence on the actual interpretation of these texts by Barth? And what role, if any, did Primaeval Man of the History of Religions School have on Barth? His treatment of the preexistent Christ would lead one to believe that there might have been some form .of influence. Then again, there is the notion and the role of the Community which have such a prominent place in ecclesiology today. It is evident that much of what Barth has to say is merely a repetition of the doctrine of the Reformers, but this doctrine itself would have to be elucidated especially as concerns the Protestant fear of the Community " controlling " the Spirit; their notion of the Community giving itself leaders; their teaching on the primacy of the Word of God over the tradition of the Church in which tradition; nevertheless, has a role to play; etc. In all fairness, it must be

admitted that O'Grady treats of these subjects in some detail, but their background does not seem to be fully developed.

A basic question which a Catholic cannot help but ask, and whose answer would greatly help him to understand Karl Barth better, is: what is the part of rhetoric and what is the part of actual dogmatics in the dialectical aspect which is so characteristic of Barth's writings? True, this same style is found in parts of the writings of Paul and Augustine. Admitting that Revelation deals with the Mystery of God and of Jesus Christ, is dialectics the only literary style suitable for a correct presentation and interpretation of the Mystery? Is this Barth's way of expressing Luther's rejection of the "Theology of Glory," i.e., ontological considerations? Is this a declaration that Revelation deals merely with the " for me " and not with the "in itself," with the " functional" and not with the " ontological "? If so, what are the religious and philosophical presuppositions behind this position, and what is their value? Is it ordained to making Theology ultimately "Pastoral"? What influence did Nominalism, and subsequently Descartes and Kant, have on this way of thinking? When it is question of God's relation to mankind in Jesus Christ and of man's relation to his fellow man, is it purely and simply a matter of relations implying that relation and reality are identical? Finally, when it is stated that God's ways are not man's ways, does this mean that God's plan transcends man's logic, or that it contradicts it in the strict sense of the word?

O'Grady's book certainly helps us to understand better Karl Barth's actualist thought-form which excludes all "staticism." Yet, I should think that more consideration must be given to this matter. Catholic theology and Protestant theology definitely present Christians with two different thought-forms. The use of analogy of being by the former is, no doubt, already a source of difference. But more basically, there is also the question of the Theology of Creation and especially that of the transcendence and immanence of God.

It is all to the credit of Colm O'Grady that he has brought to the attention of English-speaking Catholics the specific thought-form of Karl Barth with all its dynamism and appeal, as well as all the questions which, by its very existence, it puts to the Catholic theologian. We are forewarned. We are introduced into another manner of interpreting our common heritage in faith. Even when we cannot agree with the conclusions of Barth, we must take them into consideration. We are invited, in particular, to wonder at the gratuitousness of God's love for us revealed and realized in the person, works and words of Jesus Christ and granted to us in the Holy Spirit. From this admiration should flow praise, prayer and a life in conformity with what has been revealed to us.

The second volume of Colm O'Grady's work will, no doubt, further our understanding of Karl Barth, and, hopefully, bring with it at least some

elements of a solution to the questions enumerated above. All the more reason to look forward to its publication in the profound hope that our dialogue with our brothers may progress towards that ultimate unity which Christ desired for his Church, and for which the late Karl Barth devoted his life.

THOMAS R. PoTviN, 0. P.

Dvminican Faculty of Theology
Ottawa, Canada

A History of Theology. By YvEs M.-J. CoNGAR, 0. P. Translated and edited by Hunter Guthrie, S. J. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1968. Pp. 312. $5.95.

A new History of Theology by Father Yves Cougar, 0. P.! This would indeed be welcomed by all theologians, students of theology, or people interested in the deeper understanding of their faith. For nobody can deny that there is a real need for a good History of Theology, especially in English, and that Father Cougar is undoubtedly one of the very few scholars who would be competent to write such a book.

Unfortunately, for several reasons to be explained below, this is not such a book. And this is doubly said, for it could have become it: and thus one constantly feels frustrated while reading it and realizing that it did not.

First of all, the book is really far from being new. It "substantially reproduces "-as one reads (p. 7) with some surprise and disappointment in the first lines of the "Preface" (signed by Fr. Cougar)-" the article entitled 'Theologie' which appeared in the *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique* published at Paris in 1938-39." [1] One may wonder whether It is really worthwhile to translate and publish today, in the form of a ·hardbound book, a thirty-year old article from a theological encyclopedia. In order to answer this question, we must examine both the original article (1) and the present book (2), the latter first in those points in which it claims to surpass the original (a, b) and then as translation (c).

1. *The original article in D. T.C.: its values and limits.*

The original article, of which the present book is a translation, was composed by Fr. Cougar in 1938-39 and is entitled " Theologie." Its

[1] As a matter of fact, the article was composed in 1938-39 but published in 1943. Cf. P. Quattrocchi, "Bibliographie generale du Pere Yves Congar," in J.-P. Jossua, *Le Pere Congar: La theologie au service du peuple de Dieu* (Paris: Cerf, 1967, p. item 150). An English translation of this book was published by the Priory Press, Dubuque, Iowa.

aim is to explain the notion of Catholic theology, its nature and methods. The article consists of three parts of unequal length. The first, cols. 841-46, gives a short but very valuable survey on the emergence and meanings of the term " theology " (or rather *theologia* in Greek and Latin) , a survey which is not only of philological interest but already reveals a great deal concerning the discipline itself. The second and longest part, cols. 846-447, presents a rather detailed history of the notion and methods of theology from the patristic beginnings to the century. It is not, and was not intended to be, a " History of Theology " in the sense of a history of theological literature (as patrologies are for the patristic period, or Grabmann's *Geschichte der katholischen Theologie* is for the medieval and modem periods) nor a history of dogmas or Christian doctrines (as, e. g., the classical Protestant works of Adolf von Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg, or, more recently, of Alfred Adam). The third part, cols. 447-501, entitled " La notion de theologie. Partie speculative," contains a systematic description of the nature and method of theology.

This original article had, for its times, very great merits. It was really the first full-sized treatise of such proportions and quality in Catholic theological literature, encompassing both historically and speculatively the nature and method of theology. It was carefully written, reliably and richly documented, with numerous references to both the original sources and the best available literature. Moreover, it was truly forward-looking and, as did Fr. Cougar's work in general, in many points it anticipated and, as a matter of fact, effected or strengthened that theological renewal which prepared Vatican II.

Particular merits of Fr. Cougar's article include: a generally excellent knowledge and sense of history; a much more positive evaluation of patristic theology than what was customary at the time for Thomists, who often considered real theology to be a creation of the Schoolmen. The exposition of the theological methodology of the " Golden Age of Scholasticism," and in particular that of St. Thomas Aquinas, was especially outstanding; in the judgment of many it was in fact the best brief presentation available. Modem theology was viewed in a more positive light than was usual in that epoch; there are even a few pages on Luther's notion of theology.

The speculative part is, as a whole, an excellent piece, outstanding especially in its acknowledgment of the full theological and scientific status of positive theology (biblical, historical) , while not neglecting theology's truly speculative functions. In fact, the insistence on the intrinsic unity of theology, without suppressing the diversity and complexity of its " integral " and " potential " parts, is perhaps the most valuable characteristic of this section.

The article, however, has also, quite understandably and even fully excusably for its circumstances, its definite limits. The modem period and

its positive contributions are, from an objective point of view, relatively neglected. Non-Catholic Christian theology is generally ignored, with the above mentioned exception of Luther and a few passing remarks. Non-Scholastic medieval theology (" monastic theology ") is hardly mentioned, its exegesis superficially presented and harshly criticized (cf. cols. 367-68). In the speculative part, there seems to be no real awareness of what more recent methods of thought (e. g., phenomenology, existentialism, transcendental analysis-all already operative during the thirties in German Protestant and, to a lesser degree, Catholic theology) may contribute to the *intellectus fidei.* The contribution of other sciences, besides history (including philology) and philosophy, to the theological enterprise is judged with skeptical reservations (cf. cols. 499-500).

In all fairness it should be said that these shortcomings are not of Fr. Congar but rather of that epoch of Catholic theology, and Fr. Congar is among those who have done the most to overcome them. In this repect it is most instructive to compare Fr. Congar's much later work, *La foi et la theologie,*[2] composed in 1958-59[3] and treating essentially the same topics, with his article in *D. T. C.;* one can see there how he truly assimilated and embodied many of the results of more recent investigations, even though, naturally, that work also would be today in need of serious updating.

2. *The present book.*

What are the implications of all this for the present book?

First of all, the title of the work, *"A History of Theology,"* and the description of its content both on its cover and in the table of contents (p. 21) are misleading. As explained above, the work is really both more and less than that: it is a study, both historical *and systematic,* of the *nature and method* of theology. Strangely enough, the whole original third part (65 cols. of the original article and pp. 198-288 of the Book) is entirely suppressed in the table of contents, which gives the (wrong) impression that all this is part of the last (6th) chapter, "From the Seventeenth Century to the Present" (which thus includes almost half of the book!) .

Second, the book, " substantially reproducing" an article of thirty years ago, without any serious updating, reproduces not only its values but also all its shortcomings. The values remain values, though much of what was pioneering insight in those days is left behind today by the progress of both historical and speculative research. The shortcomings however, understandable and excusable as they were thirty years ago, are much less so today.

[2] Tournai: Desclee et Co., 1962, in the series *Le Mystere Chretien.*

[3] Cf. *op. cit.,* p. ill.

The "Preface," anticipating, *as* it seems, these objections, affirms that the present edition surpasses the original article in two respects: first, it restores parts of the original manuscript suppressed by the editors of *D. T. C.,* and, second, it has been updated.

In the next two sections of my review I shall examine these two points.

a. *Restoration of suppressed passages from the original manuscript.*

A comparison with the original text in *D. T. C.* (the book itself gives no indications!) has shown several passages in which the text of the original manuscript seems to have been restored. As for quantity, even allowing for some texts which may have escaped my attention, these passages do not add up to more than 10-15 pages.[4] The additions I have found are generally good, although, since the translation is far from being fully reliable and the original text is not available, one can use them only with great caution.

There are, however, many cases of omissions from the original text *as* found in *D. T. C.,* a fact about which both the foreword and the preface say nothing. The very rich documentation of the original article, one of its great values, was systematically omitted or drastically curtailed in the present edition." In some cases whole sections of the text itself were dropped, again without any indication (cf., e. g., p. 176, where there are only a few lines for col. 431, or p. 276 f., where one looks in vain

[4] Such passages seem to be relatively more frequent in the first chapters of the book. Some examples I have found: on p. 26: a few lines in the section dealing with Aristotle; p. 29: 4 lines on Origen; pp. 34-35: Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on St. Thomas's terminology; on p. 37: quotations from Tertullian and Pontius; p. 40: a quote from Adolf von Harnack; pp. 44-45: 14 lines which, however, were inserted in a very confused manner (cf. below under c.); p. 52: a paragraph commenting on more positive aspects of medieval exegesis; pp. 67-68: a page on St. Anselm; p. 71: 7 lines on Abelard; p. 75: 9 lines on monastic theology (this passage may be a more recent addition; there are, however, no references to recent studies on the subject); p. 76: two lines in the section on Peter Lombard. etc.

Since examples of references and bibliographical indications omitted could be adduced from practically every column of the *D. T. C.* article, I am going to give only a *few examples* of *substantial* omissions of documentation: col. 342 on the term *theologia;* cols. 347-49: about 15 lines of bib!. references on patristic theology before St. Augustine; col. 350-51: from the extremely rich documentation on St. Augustine and his influence (occupying, counted together, almost an entire column) the translation retained only a few items (cf. pp. 45-46, notes); col. 358: 15 lines of bibliography, listing mostly items which are still very valuable, are entirely omitted in the English text (cf. pp. 57-58); col. 359: bib!. on the medieval of sciences omitted (cf. p. 59); col. 363-64: an entire column of bibliography on the debate concerning the use of dialectics in theology and on St. Anselm, of which no trace can be found in the English edition, *and so forth throughout the entire wOTk!*

for the comparison of the different systematizations presented on cols. 49!l-95 of the original article) . Even if in some cases omissions of older literature may have been justified, the reader should have been warned! In most cases the original documentation, esp. bibliography, should have been expanded and updated; in the next section we shall see that almost nothing was done in this direction. Thus to claim without qualifications that " the present text is more complete than that published in the *Dictionnaire*" (Preface, p. 7) is misleading.

b. *The updating.*

In the Preface we are told that the present text "has, moreover, another claim to relative perfection. I have tried to update the present work, particularly in its historical section. Since 1939 there have been many books devoted to the object and method of theology. On these topics it was certainly my duty to provide a well-documented summary for my readers. I acknowledge the fact that the result is somewhat short of what I envisaged .... I have, however, introduced rectifications and sufficient and necessary additions ..." (p. 7) .

To what extent has the work really been updated? Except for the " Preface," very little indeed!

The "Preface" of the book (pp. is entirely new and gives a brief summary of the development of Catholic theology since 1939 to the present. One cannot say that it is a "well-documented" summary, for here, too, Fr. Congar's valuable bibliographical references were omitted or drestically reduced. The translation, moreover, of the Preface is such that this whole section becomes practically worthless (cf. below).

As for the rest of the book, a careful study revealed the following efforts to update it:

P. 31, n. 9 contains some references not found in the original (it contains, however, also several mistakes). On p. 43, inn. 8 some references to more recent works on Origen's theology were added, though their content was not worked into the text, which remained unchanged. On p. 189, in n. 9 *two* relatively new books (published respectively in 1950 and 1957) are indicated on the conception of dogmatic development in the 19th century: little compensation for omitting the much richer references of Fr. Congar (col. 439) and for ignoring the numerous more recent studies on the subject. On p. 197 four lines on the encyclical *Humani generis* (Pius XII) were added; on p. a couple of paragraphs on some interventions of Pius XII and John XXIII; on p. 218 one paragraph on Vatican Il's *Dei Verbum;* on p. a quote from Schillebeeckx; on p. 274 another reference to *Humani generis.* Finally, pp. give a brief presentation and criticism of the so-called "kerygmatic theology," and pp. 281-83 contain some good comments on modern (phenomenological) philosophy of religion, but in both cases without documentation or bibliographical references.

Again, even if a few short passages escaped my attention, these would not change the picture substantially.

To summarize: the historical section, contrary to what the Preface says, remained almost entirely un-updated; all the important investigations since 1939 on the history of the notion and method of theology (with the very few exceptions mentioned above) are ignored.[6] A comparison with *La foi et la theologie* by the same Fr. Congar can show what this means for the period between 1939-58-and the output of the last decade was not less rich![1]

As for the systematic section, though it received somewhat more additions, it remained substantially in a pre-Vatican II stage.[8]

In the light of all this it is almost cruel to quote the back flap of the book: "This *completely up-to-date study* (emphasis mine) is an indispensable guide to the theological trends and insights, both past and present."

c. *The Translation.*

In the case of a theological work of such high quality and preciSIOn as Fr. Congar's original article in *D. T. C.,* an accurate and precise translation is essential. Unfortunately, the present translation is such that no one using it without a constant checking of the original French texts could be sure of reading truly what Fr. Congar wrote.

The Preface.

The preface of the book (pp. 7-20), signed by Fr. Congar (p. 20), is an addition in respect to the original article. Fr. Congar, however, published its French text in the collection *Situation et taches presentes de la theologie*

• E. g., the latest work of Fr. Chenu referred to is from 1935 (p. 80, n. 18); the name of **J.** Leclercq, the leading historian of medieval monastic theology, does not even occur!

[7] As for the " General Bibliography and Reading List " at the end of the book (pp. it contains many good works on recent Catholic theology, selected, however, in an arbitrary fashion and mostly without any perceivable relationship to the content and aims of the book.

[8] I have found altogether four references to Vatican II (outside of the Preface): p. 187: five lines of the "Translator's Note"; p. five lines of a very general content; p. the passage on *Dei Verbum* mentioned above; p. two lines which I quote: "Vatican II says of faith that 'it instructs reason by multiple knowledge.'" The reference given in the corresponding note (n. 80) is not to the documents of Vatican II but to" *Denz.* 1799," which-according to the" Editor's Note" on p. the *"Enchiridion Symbolorum* . . . , ed. Denzinger-Schonmetzer." In Denzinger-Schonmetzer, however, n. 1799 is a text of the Council of Trent on the sacrament of marriage! The quotation is really from n. 1799 of the "old" Denzinger, and *from Vatican I, not II!*

(Paris: Cerf, 1967), pp. 11-23: "La theologie depuis 1939." A comparison of the translation with this French text leads to shocking results.

Thus, e. g., on p. 10, lines 2-12, one reads with surprise (in connection with the so-called "nouvelle theologie" and the controversies it elicited):

> The authors, and even more forcefully the Jesuit collaborators of *Sources chretiennes* and *Theologie,* defended their position and explained it. They maintained that even *though their position was basically modernistic, it was not necessarily destructive* (emphasis mine). *It centered* (emphasis mine) on two key points: (1) a distinction which was really a disjunction between *faith* and *belief,* the latter being the ideological structure in which faith finds expression; (Z) the conception of the relation between dogmatic pronouncements and religious realities as a relation of symbol to reality, not as an expression *proper* (however inadequate) to reality.

The French original, on the contrary, says (p. 13, line 17-p. 14, line **1):**

> Les auteurs pris a partie, exactement les collaborateurs jesuites de *Sources chritiennes,* et de *Theologie* se sont defendus et expliques.
>
> Ces auteurs *ne professaient pas la philosophie ruineuse qui caracterisait tJSsentiellement les positions modemistes et que l'on peut resumer* (emphasis mine) en ces deux points: 1° une distinction, voire une disjonction, entre *joi* et *CT01Jance,* celle-ci etant Ia structure ideologique dans laquelle s'exprime celle-la; Ia conception du rapport entre les enonces dogmatiques et les realites religieuses comme un rapport de symbole a realite, non d'expression *propre* (meme si elle demeurait inadequate) ả reaiite.

Neglecting minor inaccuracies let me point out that where Fr. Congar wrote (translation mine): "These authors did not profess the destructive philosophy which essentially characterized the Modernistic positions and which can be summarized in these two points: `---` ," the translation presents him saying that these authors acknowledged that their position is basically Modernistic, and then attributes the key points of Modernistic philosophy to them. Here the " translation " does not only simplify **or** obscure the meaning of the original; it simply contradicts Fr. Congar, and makes out of the Jesuits involved (i.e., Fr. de Lubac, Fr.-now Cardinal-Danielou, Fr. von Balthasar-at that time a Jesuit, etc.) • representatives of an heretical position!

On pp. 13-14, speaking on the tasks of today's theologian, one finds the strange sentence:

> In the theology of the Incarnation of the Son, for example, he must find room for the sacraments and eschatology, and even in the mystery of the Three Divine Persons he must examine the questions about human beings and propose solutions.

The corresponding French text says (p. 17) :

• Cf. Y. Congar, *Situation et taches presentes de la Theologie* (Paris: Cerf, 1967), p. 13, n. 6.

Il faut developper dans Ia theologie, celle par example de !'Incarnation du Fils, des sacrements, de l'eschatologie, mais meme celle du mystere des Trois Personnes, ce qui, en elle, peut assumer les questions des hommes et leur apporter une reponse."

In English (my translation):

One has to develop in theology, e. g., in the theology of the Incarnation of the Son, of the sacraments, of eschatology, even in that (i.e., theology) of the mystery of the Three Persons, that which can take up the questions of men *(scil.* of today) and furnish an answer to them.

On p. 15, lines 20-24, one reads (concerning recent trends and their results):

Thirdly, the historicity of the human condition has finally been brought to light in a new fashion, under the aspect of the condition of a being of the world and of a being with the other characteristics of the human person.

The French (p. 18) has:

8° On a enfin mis en lumiere d'une facon nouvelle I'historicite de Ia condition humaine, de I'etre au monde et de l'etre aux autres caracteristiques de Ia personne humaine.

Besides giving" finally" (through its position in the sentence) a different sense from what " enfin " had in the original, the above translation entirely misses the meaning of the last two lines, where " to be to the world " and " to be to others " are well-known technical expressions of contemporary philosophy.

On p. 17 in the last paragraph one reads:

In short, today we find differing manners of theologizing. Scholasticism: conceptual, argumentative, or deductive, *exhausts the datum of tradition* (emphasis mine), not only of an *intellectus fidei,* rationally established, but of an application to different times and cultures.

French (p. 20) :

Bref, nous rencontrons aujourd'hui plusieurs de theologiser: Ia conceptuelle, argumentative, deductive, issue de Ia basse-scolastique; Ia recherche, a partir du donne de Ia Tradition, non seulment d'un *intellectus fidei* rationellement elabore, mais d'une reponse aux questions du temps et des hommes. . . .

The English sentence, beginning with " Scholasticism ... ," amalgamates into a nonsensical mess two distinct ways of theologizing, i.e. (translation mine): "the conceptual, argumentative, deductive way, stemming from late Scholasticism," and " the search, starting with the data of Tradition, not only for an *intellectus fidei* but also for an answer to the questions of (our) times and (contemporary) men.

Further passages where the meaning of the original was altered or confused include: p. 9, lines 6-10 (cf. p. 12 of the French text), line 16 (cf. p. 12); p. 10, last 4 lines (cf. p. 14); p. 11, lines 1-5 (cf. p. 14), line 23 ("as is very evident today" is not found in the French); line 27 (cf. p. 15: the French, as the encyclical *Humani generis*, does not speak of *"a failure to return* [emphasis mine] to scriptural and patristic sources " but of " un abus dans le retour ..."; what was criticized by the encyclical was not at all that these authors failed to return to the sources, but the way in which they did!)'; p. 14, line 10 ("a fifth dimension probably" is a "funny" remark, entirely out of place, and not found in the French: cf. p. 17); p. 16, line 2 (cf. p. 19: "before" is a mistranslation of "devant" which is not a preposition but the participle of "devoir"!); p. 18, lines 1-2 (cf. p. 21), line 13 (cf. p. 21: "un enrichissement grace au dialogue avec les Autres" is simply" translated": "some embellishment"!), lines 16-17 (cf. p. 21); p. 19, lines 15-17 (cf. p. 22), lines 22-26 (cf. p. 22) .-All this on the first 14 pages of the translation!

The rest of the book.

Even though for the rest of the book the translation is not as bad as for the preface, it still contains many mistakes. For the benefit of readers I am going to point out *some* of the major errors.

On p. 25: the provisory definition of theology given in the first paragraph simplifies Fr. Congar's careful definition (cf. col. 341) to the extent of a mutilation.

On p. 26 Fr. Guthrie writes: "Plato was the first to use the term *8£oAoy{a,* to point out the profound educational value of mythology. For this reason the Neoplatonists and some of the early Fathers of the Church classified him as a *theologian."* Now, that Plato was the first to use the term *8w>..oyla* would be difficult to prove (even though it is true that the word is not attested earlier in Greek texts of indubitable authenticity); [10] surely, what the French said was that he used the term *once* (" une foi "-col. 342). Nor is it true to say (and the French did not say it) that this was the reason why he was considered later a theologian.

On p. 32, lines 7 ff., one reads with surprise concerning the Latin term *theologia:* "Several Fathers apparently do not even know the term; v. g., Minucius Felix, St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, Arnobius, Boethius, and St. Gregory." What the French said (col. 345) was: "Plusieurs Peres ne *le* connaitront meme pas: ..." where "le" referred to the specific ecclesiastical sense of the term.

Same p., n. 12 last line and its continuation on p. 33: where the French had (col. 345): ". . . est une monographie sur le dogme trinitaire ou

[10] Cf., e. g., G. Ebeling, "Theologie," in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* Srd ed., vol. VI, col. 754.

theologia n'aurait que le sens admis par plusieurs Peres grecs " the English translation reads: "... is a monograph on the Trinity dogma in which *theologia* would not have the only meaning admitted by several Greek Fathers." This is just the opposite of what the original text said. As a result Fr. Guthrie begins the next sentence with "For ..." whereas the French has " par contre. . . ." (In the same note the name Langraf became " Sandgraf ") .

The pages 44-45 present a real confusion. Lines 1-7 of p. 44 contain a fairly good translation of the French text (col. *350)* :

If the student studies this *Epistola* XXXVIII, just cited, he will be impressed by the sureness and exactitude with which Basil distingushes the terms " essence " and "hypostasis" ....

Then follow six lines comparing Basil with Athanasius, which are not found in *D. T. C.,* and are presumably restored from the original manuscript. Then, however, we read again:

For example in *Epistola* XXXVIII of St. Basil,[11] note the firmness and subtlety with which he distinguishes the notions of essence and hypostasis.

This is obviously but a slightly different version of the text given above (lines 1-7) .

Now comes a passage which continues the translation of the French (interrupted by the insertion) but contains several errors: thus " concordisme apologetique" becomes "apologetic concordat" (sic!)," au service d'une perception et d'une expression plus precises du donne chretien" is translated: *"serviced by a most precise* (emphasis mine) perception and expression of the Christian data," i.e., the relationship has been inverted and the comparative became superlative. What follows (lines on St. Jerome and his influence on the Latin Middle Ages is fairly faithful to the French. But then (lines 30 ff. continued on p. 45) we have a cryptic sentence not found in the French (and presumably taken from the original manuscript) :

For Gregory Nazianzen theology is a spiritual function reserved to the priests and practically identical with the theory (sic!). This, of course, is not a pure theory but it is sufficient to engage a total spiritual life and any spiritual experience.

Since the original French text is not available, one can only guess what Fr. Congar may have written,[12] but certainly he must have thought of

[11] It may be noted that, in the light of patristic research since 1939, this *"Epistola* XXXVIII of St. Basil" is not considered authentic today but attributed generally to Gregory of Nyssa; cf., e. g., A. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition* (London: A. R. Mowbray and Co., 1965), p. 285, n. 3.

[12] I would suspect, in particular, that the affirmation: . theology is a spiritual function reserved to the priests," is the result of some misunderstanding.

theoria, the Greek term for contemplation, which is then misleadingly rendered by " theory " without sufficient explanation.

The English text then continues without interruption (p. 45, lines " with regard to the previous text we need to cite only two typical references ... " (and there follow references to Abelard and St. Thomas). The reader may wonder to what previous text he is referred to, since in the preceding two sentences no particular text was mentioned. Only by looking up the French (col. 350) can one see that, the passage on Gregory Nazianzen being a later insertion, the "previous text" is St. Jerome's letter to Magnus!

P. 46, lines 5-6: "That those steps were taken in nature *(sic!)* is sufficient condemnation of any who thought that Augustine belittled nature." The corresponding French sentence (col. 351): "St. Augustin lui donne une grande importance et cela suffit a montrer le simplisme de tout jugement attribuant a Augustin une meconnaissance de Ia nature; ... "

On the same page, line "probably from the stains of original sin," is an addition to the French text. The "Translator's Note," however, is only a slightly abbreviated version of a text found in *D. T. C.* col. 350-351.

On p. 48, lines we read: "Of course, these analogies are not proofs. They have value only for the intelligent ears of the believers." The French has (col. 353): "Bien entendu, ces analogies ne sont pas des preuves, mais des moyens de tendre a !'intelligence, qui ne valent que pour le croyant: ... " Thus the important reference to the Augustinian *intellectus fidei* is lost through a flattening simplification. (On the same page, last line " Church bells can ring over this decision " is one of the " funny " additions to the French text).

On p. 57, lines 5-4 from the bottom: the French phrase "Ia patristique proprement dite" (col. 357) is very misleading "translated": "the patristic *Platonism* (emphasis mine) properly so-called."

On p. *65* the quotation, beginning in line 16, contains several mistakes (cf. the Latin text in *D. T. C.* col. Thus, e. g., in the Latin" humiliter quantum potest quaerere " depends on " debet " and thus the right translation would be: " he *should humbly* seek " and not, as the English text has, "he *may patiently* seek" (emphasis mine). Also the rest of the text as well as the subsequent quotation (" 0 Lord ... ") are " translated " so freely that the precise meaning of Anselm's careful sentences is lost.

On p. 116, lines 13-14 we read the strange sentence, attributed to Alexander of Hales (concerning theology as science): "For it is a science which reaches intelligence *only after it leaves faith"* (emphasis mine). The same expression (" Only after it leaves a living faith, ... ") is repeated in the next line. In the French (col. 393) we have in both cases "a partir de la foi ": i.e., theology does not "leave faith" but starts with (and bases itself upon) faith!

On p. lines 18 *H.,* we find:

Obviously, it will always be a temptation for Scholasticism to conceive the work of speculative theology as an application to a special datum preserved by tht philosophical categories.

The French has (col. 421):

. . . ce sera toujours nne tentation, pour cette scholastique, de ne concevoir le travail de Ia theologie speculative que comme une application a un donne special, tenu par ailleurs, de categories philosophiques.

Thus the meaning of the original, which spoke precisely of the application *of* philosophical categories to a datum received from elsewhere (i.e., from revelation and faith) is entirely lost; furthermore, where the French spoke of " this Scholasticism," i.e., of that of the 16th and 17th centuries, the English has Scholasticism in general; " ne ... que " is not translated.

Even though the systematic part, beginning with p. 199 (" The Speculative Notion of Theology"), seems to have been somewhat better translated, there too one finds passages where the meaning of the original is altered. Thus, e. g., on p. 246, line 6 from bottom, and ff., we read:

From the standpoint of objective content, it is faith which dominates theology from one end to the other. It is uniquely to develop in a human intelligence according to the mode connatural to that intelligence, that it annexes and *subordinatesitself to* (emphasis mine) philosophical notions.

The French text which corresponds to the second sentence runs as follows (col. 474): "C'est uniquement pour prendre son developpement dans une intelligence humaine selon le mode connaturel a cette intelligence qu'elle s'annexe et se subordonne des notions philosophiques." Thus, according to Fr. Cougar, it is faith which associates and *subordinates to itself* philosophical notions, whereas the translation reverses the relationship and makes faith *subordinate itself to* philosophical notions, which is something quite different!

Time and space do not permit *us* to analyze here the whole translation line by line-and it would be tedious reading. The examples adduced (and many others could be added) have shown sufficiently, I am afraid, that the translation is not reliable.

If Father Cougar had given us a new History of Theology, it would have been a major event for the annals of theological publishing Even if we had received a well translated and reasonably updated version of his old article, it would have been a very valuable book, eminently worth reading. I cannot help stating, however, that *"A History of Theology"* –'' translated and amicably edited " by Father Hunter Guthrie, S. J.– is a disappointment.

DAVID L. BALA.s, 0. CisT.

University of Dallas, Tt'JXIUI
Anselmianum, Rome

10 " Foreword," p. 5.

Dogmenentwicklung a1s Problem der Geschichtlichkeit der Wahrheitserkenntnis: Eine Erkenntnistheoretisch-theologische Studie zum Problemkreis der Dogmenentwicklung. By WINFRIED ScHULZ. Rome, Libreria Editrice dell'Universita Gregoriana, 1969. *Analecta Gregoriana* 173. Pp. 387.

Hardly any other question receives as much attention in theological circles today as that concerning the relation between history and revealed truth. Such is the contention of Winfried Schulz in his carefully researched and perceptive study of dogmatic development as analyzed and theorized by Roman Catholics of the past and present. He begins with acknowledgements of gratitude to Sisto Cartechini, Johannes Lotz, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan. This gives the reader reason to hope that something genuinely worthwhile is to be found in the rest of the book, and that expectation is not disappointed.

The treatment is in terms of themes rather than a purely chronological ordering of positions. The first of the book's three major sections involves a consideration of dogmatic development in its possibility, origin, limits, and relation to the historicity of human truth. This is followed by a survey of certain attempts to deal with development against a horizon on which the distinction between the formally and virtually revealed loomed large (Schultes, Tuyaerts, and Marin Sola). Von Drey, Mohler, Kuhn, Newman, and Blonde! are then introduced with their concern for historical tradition as conducive to the clarification of dogmatic development. They are presented as a transition to contemporary theological attempts to come to grips with the problem. The final section deals with cognitional theory and historically mediated truth, the antinomies posed by dogmatic development in this context, and finally the theological structure of revealed truth.

For one interested in a scholarly study of Catholic attempts to understand changes in faith experienced and reflected, this book should prove quite valuable. Although another preceded it by some years (Herbert Hammans, *Die Neueren Katholischen Erkliirungen der Dogmenentwicklung,* Essen, 1965), they do not cancel each other out. Hammans made only one reference to the work of a theologian of the stature of Bernard Lonergan, an omission Schulz has attempted to remedy, though some may wonder why among the secondary sources no mention is made of the extremely useful article written by the late Robert Richard in *Continuum* of 1964. What is more, Schulz makes an effort to indicate where he agrees and disagrees with Harnmans (e. g., on Newman, p. 160).

There are a number of sections in which a more detailed treatment seemed to be desirable. One of the first has to do with the historical studies of the usage of the words *Faith* and *Heresy* in western theological literature and conciliar documents of the past. The names of Lang, Umberg, Lennerz, Favre, Fransen, De Letter, Lawlor, Salaverri, and Garcia Martinez

suggest themselves in the context of a discussion on the part of Catholic scholars concerned with the meaning of *anathema sit* and *fides* in the decrees of Trent. I have tried to show the importance of this research for a renewal of the Sacrament of Penance in terms of some type of general absolution without a preceding confession of serious sin in species and number (cf. "Auricular Confession and the Council of Trent," in *The Jurist* 28 [1968], 280-97; "Renewal of Penance and the Problem of God," in *Theological Studies* 30 [1969], 489-97). Schulz considers Lang but of the latter's significant contributions in this area he seems to take less account than they deserve. To be more specific, there may be a commonly accepted opinion that a conciliar canon concluding with *anathema sit* rejects heresy in the strict sense and implicitly proposes the contradictory as divinely revealed truth. If that opinion does not stand the test of historical investigation into conciliar hermeneutics, then a definite factor in the development of dogma for many Catholics would involve unlearning mistaken interpretations of teaching from the past. Given Schulz's concern with historicity, it is strange that more attention was not given to the implications of this line of thought.

In an understandable effort to show that Newman distanced himself from the Catholics who sought to find a paradigm for dogmatic development in the process of deductive reasoning, a false impression may have been given. Newman listed logical sequence as one of the notes of authentic development. He denied that development either ante or post factum was necessarily reducible to the thought process expressed in an apodictical syllogism. But for him quite clearly the guarantee that a subsequent expression was not a falsification of the faith expressed in a prior one involved the fulfilment of a condition; namely, if the rules of deduction were not followed, those of logic in a broader sense were not violated either (cf. *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,* London 1888, ed. 6, P. II, c. 5, 189 ss.).

An attempt is made to show that charges of biologism leveled against Newman are not grounded. (p. 160) It might be noted that the search for analogues that led Newman to living organisms deserves to be pondered more today than at times it is. One often hears it said that the dogmatic development that has taken place might not have or might have been notably different. There is a truth in this, but unqualified it makes past development look more than a little arbitrary. Here the analogy with the growth of living organisms is limited as well but may prove helpful. In particular, after a certain period a life process under way often seems to preclude certain changes of direction that were antecedently possible. A point of application might be that of church order in the New Testament. A number of notably different types are to be seen there. It appears that the growth of a gradually developing number of Christian communities is in focus. But what was realized at one stage of development is not for

that fact alone shown to be a viable form at a subsequent period of development. The application of biological analogues may be useful here, though, to be sure, it merely labels the problem of irreversibility rather than solves it.

It would not be surprising if some criticize Schulz for not alluding sufficiently to the importance Newman attributes to implicit faith, especially in his *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.* There is a problem on the level of faith-reflective as distinct from faith-experienced. How is one to determine which of all the articulations of Christian faith is normative for the believer? Newman recurs in the case of Catholic and Protestant to the fact that faith is a real rather than notional assent. As a result of this, both are related in their believing itself to realities and not simply to propositions; the Catholic to the word of revelation in the word of the Church and the Protestant to the content of the Scriptures. Whatever one may think of this position, it is significant in terms of Newman's notion of dogmatic development.

What is more, it may well have implications for at least one problem facing Christians today. Notwithstanding important ecclesial differences acknowledged by Catholic ecumenists and their Protestant counterparts, one sees signs of an emerging consensus on the part of many in both groups. Intercommunion is coming to be viewed not merely as something factually occurring but as a justifiable type of conduct in view of a common faith in Christ, his presence in the Eucharist, and perhaps even the ministry of those who preside at the rite. It is in this context that I think a question inspired by Newman should be asked. What is the nature of the believing that is celebrated in the Eucharist? Is it primarily the acceptance of a formula of consensus uniting celebrants with Christ? Or is it a ritual association of the individual with the living reality of faith on the part of a concrete local church (preexistent or then realized) and so with Christ? If the latter is the case, then Newman's notion of faith as real assent may be applicable today to a problem in which carefully worded and elaborated formulae have been constructed to express a common faith regarding Eucharist and perhaps ministry. This reviewer is at present involved in the process of formulating just such a consensus-statement but does not think a common faith regarding Eucharist and ministry suffices of itself to justify a common celebration of the Lord's Supper. Historically conditioned but real ecclesial differences of the first order are found in communities otherwise united in such belief. Now, what is professed when men gather to recall the death and resurrection of Jesus? It is a faith that unites even those who cannot articulate it adequately-a condition affecting all in varying degrees. In this context its implicit character is most important. The union is not above all in terms of agreed-on formulae (however important) but by way of association with a concrete local church and its leaders. If this is so, it seems to raise very serious questions about joint

celebration by those whose communities are divided in their conviction regarding God's will for the structuring of Christ's Church. In this context Newman's notion of implicit faith as real assent should, I think, be considered.

With good reason Schulz devotes considerable attention to the works oi Karl Rahner. In this he has an advantage over Hammans in that he is able to draw on ideas expressed in " Kerygma und Dogma." the section Rahner and Lehmann did for the first volume of *Mysterium Salutis.* The expertise Schulz has acquired puts him in a good position to do further work on Rahner's more recent endeavors.

In August of 1969 the latter published a noteworthy essay containing among other things a reply to a position expressed by Jean Cardinal Danielou (cf. " Die Freiheit theologischer Forschung in der Kirche " in *Stimmen der Zeit* 184 [1969). 73-82). In it a practical rationale is at least implicitly proposed for future policy regarding differences that exist within the Catholic Church. It is Rahner's contention that further determinations of faith like those of the past are probably not going to be forthcoming at least, one assumes, for some time. Such definitions seem unlikely because their precondition is not realized, namely, a more unified theology. (p. 81) This should not be overlooked when it comes to expressing Rahner's theory regarding the development of dogmatic expressions of Christian faith. But it does raise a question. Have dogmatic definitions been the result of theological consensus? An affirmative answer without qualification would seem strange coming from the one who wrote " Chalkedon-Ende oder Anfang? " Or is theology rather to be furthered or at least stimulated by dogmatic definitions? If the tension is real, the relation is probably reciprocal. At any rate the latter deserves a great deal more attention from systematic theologians. Schulz seems to be the very kind from whom we could expect fruitful research in just this area.

CARL J. PETER

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

St. Augustine on Nature, Sex and Marriage. By JoHN J. HuGO. Chicago-Dublin-London: Scepter, 1969. Pp. 249. *$5.95.*

In 1965 a voluminous work on the Catholic Church's attitude toward contraception appeared. In a special way the Church's attitude toward sexuality in general and toward sexual pleasure and love in marriage is set forth. Not only the official teaching of the Church but also the varying (and sometimes even contradictory) opinions of theologians and canonists

down the centuries come in for detailed examination and discussion. The author, Prof. John T. Noonan Jr., is attached to the Law Department of Notre Dame University. The book he has produced is at one and the same time an astounding display of compilatory erudition (and as such of considerable utility to the serious theologian, above all to the moral theologian) and a very clear case of special pleading, that is, of special pleading for a loosening of the traditional Catholic teaching on the subjects examined. An ever-recurring refrain in the book (taken up by innumerable other writers) is this: the cause of the Church's harsh and negative and even pessimistic attitude toward sexuality and sexual pleasure in general is none other than St. Augustine who, it is maintained over and over again, held that all sexual pleasure even in marriage is sinful! This augustinian teaching, it is further asserted, influenced the whole of Western theological thought for well over a thousand years. Even St. Thomas, who for a moment seemed on the point of emancipating himself from it through the sound teaching of Aristotle on the notion and structure of pleasure, fell under its spell. Ever after, insists the author, this augustinian-scholastic (= thomistic) approach dominated the theological field and very effectively queered the pitch for any further truly realistic and objective thinking in the matter. Under this baneful double influence Catholic theologians were unable to adjust principle to human behavior, as Noonan pointedly asserts in his criticism of the hidebound moral teaching of Billuart. In that bald assertion one may be permitted to think that the author lets the cat out of the moral theological bag! Referring to the encyclical *Casti Connubii* of Pius XI, he concedes that, as a synthesis of past doctrinal statements, the document is a masterpiece, but he maintains that it is completely devoid of all historical sense. In point of fact, when the matter is examined carefully, it will be seen that it is Prof. Noonan and not Pius XI who is lacking in authentic historical sense. For instance, his exposition of St. Thomas's (one of the knaves of the piece) teaching is on the one side most inadequate and on the other, as far as it goes, a complete distortion of Aquinas's thought in the question of pleasure in general, and in particular in the question of sexual love and pleasure and their place in marriage. This should perhaps not be altogether too surprising, for Prof. Noonan is neither a trained medievalist nor a trained moral theologian. *Ne supra crepidam sutor!*

Now, Father John J. Hugo offers us in the present study a thorough examination of the mind of Augustine (the second and perhaps prime villain of the piece) on the same matters. Basing himself on a close examination of texts and contexts (doctrinal and historical), he is able to show that the contention, repeated *ad nauseam* by modern theological writers, that for Augustine all sexual pleasure, even within the limits of marriage, is always sinful, is without foundation and amounts to a grave maligning of the Bishop of Hippo. In a special way he brings out Augustine's penetrating and most realistic conception of the interrelation

between *function, finality* and *pleasure* (see pp. 86-88, 114-117, 216-217, note 29). This same teaching was taken up later by Aquinas, and it constitutes the basis of his teaching on the morality of pleasure in general (and in this, be it said, St. Thomas was anything but a pessimistic kill-joy!}, and on the morality of sexual pleasure in particular. This teaching has been either completely ignored or gravely distorted by modern theological writers. Were it fully grasped and applied, it could well supply the key to many burning problems of the day.

The study of Hugo is by and large complete and satisfying, and in view of the actuality of the subject treated it must be regarded as a most timely and important contribution to modern theological discussion. The work would have benefited very much had the author shown himself to be aware of modern discussions on very important and closely connected problems-on the origin of man, for instance, and on original sin. All indication of pertinent literature on these matters is unfortunately lacking. Moreover, the production of the book leaves very much to be desired. This, however, cannot be laid at the door of the author. Why must the notes (that are so important in a study of this kind) be all relegated to the end of the book? And why, to make matters worse and much more aggravating for the serious reader and student, must they be numbered chapterwise and not consecutively? And why must they be printed in the same size of typeface as the body of the study? All the important texts (references for control purposes at back!) of Augustine are given *in extenso* in the text itself, indented and italicized. What is the sense of calling attention to the italicized phrases in a text adduced in italics? (see, for instance, p. 178}. These are blemishes that could well have been avoided. Had they been elimated the book would have gained considerably in attractiveness and the price in reasonableness into the bargain. And that would make itself felt on the Catholic book market!

CoRNELIUs WILLIAMS, O. **P.**

895 KaufbtJUren
Germany

La Dimensione trinitaria del carattere sacramentale. By CRESCENZO SEPE. Rome: Lateran University, 1969. Pp. 176.

In this work the author intends to offer a complement to the contemporary theology of the sacramental character, which principally centers around the christological, ecclesiological, and anthropological aspects of the character. The first part (pp. 11-78) is historical. Here the author examines the trinitarian dimension of the sacramental character in Scripture, in the writings of the Fathers, and in medieval and modern theology. The larger portion (40 pp.) is devoted to medieval authors, such as Alexander

of Hales (21 pp.) and Albert the Great (12 pp.), although the modem authors, M. J. Scheeben and H. Mlihlen, are treated.

The second part (pp. 79-112) is theological and discusses the mediate relationship of the sacramental character to the Trinity. The author attempts to highlight this relationship successively in the christological, ecclesiological, and anthropological dimensions of the character. The third part (pp. 113-169) is both theological and speculative. After showing the essential relationship of the sacraments in general to the Trinity, the author proceeds to expose the particularly intimate bond of the character. The latter is shown to be a consecration of the soul whereby is realized a real, supernatural, static, *efficientiva* and *durativa* presence of the Trinity, a presence qualitatively different from that accompanying sanctifying grace. Moreover, this presence is cultic-sacramental and personal; it has an intimate connection with the presence of Christ in the Church.

This work, a doctoral dissertation from the Lateran University in Rome, is well composed and much of the material skillfully arranged. The mystery of the Trinity is the principal mystery of the faith, so that there can be no theology at all without at least indirect reference to this mystery. Thus we wish to congratulate the author for taking up a theme which, to our knowledge, has not yet been so extensively treated. The clear exposition of the sacramental character as an entitative habit of the soul, caused by a special presence of the Trinity in the soul (real and supernatural but qualitatively differing from the presence received in sanctifying grace), is, in the present state of sacramental theology, still quite valuable.

On the slightly negative side, the arguments of the author seem here and there to be over-simplified. Granted that the efficient cause is also the exemplary cause *(omne agens agit sibi simile!),* his argument for the presence of the Trinity in the sacraments in general (to which he devotes a whole chapter, pp. 117-123) is too facile. He says that the sacraments are the activity of Christ and so of the Trinity *ad extra,* and he consequently assimilates the effect to the efficient cause. But what is expected is a convincing argument for the *special* Trinitarian aspect of the sacraments or the *special* sacramental aspect of the Trinitarian *operatio ad extra.* Moreover, the absence of some fundamental questions concerning the sacramental character should be noted, e. g., why do only three out of the seven sacraments have this special Trintarian effect; whether these sacraments form a special group distinct from the others, and, if so, whether this has some Trinitarian reason; why does such a Trinitarian reality as the sacramental need exist in the present sacramental economy?

TosHIYUKI MrrAKAwA

Oura-tenshudo
Nagasaki, Japan

Eucharist. By Loms BoUYER. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968. Pp. 496. $14.00.

This book which bears the subtitle, *Theology and Spirituality of The Eucharistic Prayer,* is really an historical study of the origin and development of the Canon from its Jewish cradle to the post-Vatican II liturgical renewal and the return of Protestantism to traditional Eucharistic forms. We have come to expect from Bouyer sound scholarship and brilliant, original insights. This monumental study, the fruit of twenty years of painstaking research, does not disappoint that expectation.

The Eucharistic Prayer is, Bouyer insists, original and profoundly Christian; but it is not a *creatio ex nihilo.* Its roots lie deep in the liturgical soil of Judaism. The first Christians, all converts from Judaism, regarded themselves as the Israel of God, the people of the new and everlasting covenant. Just as the Christologies of Paul and John are unintelligible without continual reference to the authors' Jewishness, so also the unique Christian community act of worship, the Eucharist, cannot be understood without immediate reference to the Jewish worship from which it sprang and of which it is the fulfillment. Western theology would have been spared the bizarre theories on the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist which cluttered the post-Tridentine manuals had the Jewish concept of " memorial " been clearly grasped.

Bouyer sees the Eucharistic Prayer (the Canon) holding in primitive Christian worship the place occupied by the *Berakoth* in the Synagogue worship. The Eucharist, like the *Berakoth,* is the response of God's people to the reading of his word. Gregory Dix *(The Shape of the Liturgy)* pointed out the similarity of the dialogue which introduces the Canon with the dialogue between the President and the members of the *Chaburah* which preceeded the *Berakah* of their fraternal meal. J. P. Audet, O. P., *(Revue biblique, 65* [1958], 871-899) argued convincingly that the primitive *eucharistia,* like the *Berakah* of synagogue worship, was essentially a proclamation of the *mirabilia Dei.* C£. I Cor. 11:26. Bouyer agrees with Audet, but he insists that the *Berakah* expresses the people's dedication to the divine will as well as proclaiming the *mirabilia Dei.* The *Berakah,* as the people's response to the word of God, replaced in the Synagogue worship the sacrifice which could not be offered outside the Temple of Jerusalem. The essential element of the sacrifice, the people's dedication to God, is found in the *Berakoth.*

Scholars dispute the exact nature of the prayers of Chapters IX and X of the Didache, but there is general agreement that they are Christian adaptations of the *Berakoth.* Bouyer, like many others, regards them as Eucharistic prayers. What is disputable in Bouyer's presentation is his acceptance of the collection of prayers of Book Seven of the Apostolic Constitutions as evidence that the primitive Eucharistic prayer was a

christianization of the *Berakoth,* the *Qedushah,* and the *Keter* which are found in the ninth-century collection *Seder Amram Gaon.* The parallels are striking. The prayers of Book Seven of the Apostolic Constitutions are unquestionably Jewish prayer formulas. But a problem still remains, and Bouyer has not faced it squarely. Are the prayers of Book Seven of the Apostolic Constitutions liturgical prayers used in the Christian Eucharist, or, are they a collection of Jewish prayers made by a Christian convert from Judaism? Some Patrologists of note, e. g., Quasten, regard these prayers as "a very interesting collection of Jewish prayers." When we remember that the author of the *Didascalia* which comprise the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions was, in all probablity, a convert from Judaism, the suspicion is strong that the prayers of Book Seven were taken from a Jewish prayer collection and not from a Christian Eucharistic liturgy.

This English translation of Bouyer's book contains a supplementary chapter on the reform of the Roman Canon and the three new Canons recently added to the Roman liturgy. The author remarks in his Foreword: " this reform has fulfilled some of the most important *desiderata* of this book, a fulfillment which could never have been hoped for at the time that I undertook to write it." Indexes of biblical texts, rabbinical texts, of the synagogue liturgy, of ancient Christian writers, of Christian liturgies, and of modern authors round off what is one of the most important studies on the history of the Eucharist produced by modern scholarship.

RICHARD KuGELMAN, C. P.

St. John's
Jamaica, N. Y.

Incontro con Cristo. Credibilita della Religione Cristiana. By VLADIMm BouBLIK. Rome: Lateran University, 1968. Pp. 802.

In the preface the author admits that to some his enterprise may seem presumptuous today when fundamental theology is hedged around with difficulties. But he is modest and does not propose to solve all these difficulties but to present a modernized version of the old manuals on *De Revelatione,* such as Father Garrigou-Lagrange published many years ago. Regardless of the Western world, in the East one feels continuously the need for clear ideas on basic things like revelation, the supernatural, pain and death, the Risen Lord. The author is well acquainted with the manuals, a list of which appears on p. ix. But at the end of each chapter there is an ample bibliography of special treatises and articles. For the ordinary student these lists are far too long. It would be better to give two lists, one for specialists and one for seminarists.

The whole book bears the stamp of thoroughness, and if the author begins by saying that he cannot solve all the problems, the student will be pleased with the way in which most difficulties are presented and answered. One of the unfortunate side effects of ecumenism is the modem contempt for apologetics. The faith is to be proposed but not defended. Yet the fact is that today the faith has to be defended from the old errors that more or less survive and from new ones that hide behind the assumed title of theology.

In this book the author deals with modem errors. The chapters on Revelation itself, his treatment of myth and demythologization are excellent. He analyses the various exegetical positions of Bultmann. However, with regard to Christ and his miracles, a confrontation with living, hostile forces would have been more beneficial than a fresh charge versus Loisy, Von Harnack and Renan. From the missionary point of view, a defence of Christian mysticism, of the Church's power to make saints, of the excellence of her worship, of the Church's right and duty to evangelize, would make excellent appendices to some future edition of this book. Indeed, an apologetic of the Christian priesthood is one of our pressing needs, especially in the "tiers monde " where so many are losing awarenses of the priest's supernatural role. The absence of this kind of apologetic is due, I think, to following too closely the order of the old manuals. Nevertheless, a professor's manual is limited by the time available for lectures and the course, and that necessarily restricts the scope of his published work. In these days, one should be grateful that the author has covered so much ground and with such excellence.

JEROME TONER, O. P.

St. Charles' Seminary
Nagpur, India

The Crisis of Faith. By FREDERICK SoNTAG. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1969. Pp. 285. *$5.95.*

" This Roman Catholic Church which was built on the assumption of authority is in crisis today over where to locate and how to interpret authority .... This is not because the pronouncements of the Councils do not make it clear; they do. However, there are movements toward decentralization ... which give each person an increasing sense of individual norms against which he feels the Church's teaching authority must be measured. . . .More and more, it would appear, Roman Catholics are developing standards that are external to the authority of the Church."

The author, a Protestant scholar on the philosophy faculty at Pomona College, bases his observations on his experiences during a precedent-setting year of teaching philosophy at a Catholic seminary in Rome, the

first non-Catholic (his term) to be invited to teach regular courses in a Roman seminary. Dr. Sontag hails as the work of the Holy Spirit this trend among Catholics to look less to papal authority for guidance and more to Scripture and individual conscience. However, he is concerned lest the trend continue into religious anarchy. "Strict unity has been abandoned as a way proceeding in the Roman Church, but can this tendency toward an indefinite multiplicity of authorities be halted now that the line is broken?"

The purpose of his book is to contribute to halting that multiplication of authorities at some " halfway house " between papal authority and religious anarchy and thus to establish some stable position for the reconciliation of divided brethren of all Christian denominations. As a partial answer he opts for the " authority of Paul " in preference to the " authority of Peter." " Some take the route via Peter and accept an ' authorized spokesman and guardian' who preserves the tradition and hands it down. The other route is to follow Paul, which means to search for the immediate presence of God and, in that converting encounter, to let the transforming experience of the Divine be the definitive test for all claims to authority .... All Christians who come later must somehow find exactly the same authority that Paul did opposing Peter."

But how can the Christian have confidence that he is guided by " the immediate presence of God " and not by his own ego? To the extent that he departs from self-concern to concern himself with the needs of others, Dr. Sontag suggests.

The author maintains that the search for a usable concept of authority to resolve the conflicts of our day and effect reconciliation of divided brethren demands new definitions of traditional religious concepts. Especially we must redefine the nature of God, of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit. " Surely the eternal God of St. Thomas appears inadequate to our task." He does not offer new definitions but suggests that they be defined in terms of selflessness and concern for others. He urges a third Vatican Council for the implementation of new definitions.

The book is written with a brotherly spirit and no trace of rancor despite its strong disagreement with traditional Catholic teaching. The traditional Catholic, conservative Catholic-how does one come up with an equivalent term that does not have pejorative connotations today?-will find this book with its search for a new source of authority and new definitions of God to be an exercise in futility. Avantgarde Catholics will find the book congenial in intent but perhaps slightly quaint and outmoded by the writings of militant Catholic reformers, who are certainly more daring in their departure from tradition and harsher in their denunciation of it than is the sweet-tempered Sontag.

ROBERT CAMPBELL, O. P.

De Paul
Chicago, IUinoia

Esegesi Tomistica. By P. CORNELIO FABRO, C. S. S. Rome: Libreria Editrice della Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1969. Pp. 478.

This most recent publication by a renowned Italian Thomist is the first of two new volumes containing a collection of selected philosophical essays authored by Father Fabro over the past thirty-four years. As the author states in the forward, the collection of articles represented in this, the first volume, both antedates and synthesizes the analysis made in his now famous work, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tomaso,* which first appeared in 1939 and whose third edition appeared in 1963. The second volume which, to this reviewer's knowledge, has yet to appear, will consist of a further collection of previously published articles which principally contrast the Thomistic with the Hegelian-Heideggerian notions of Being and which, again according to the author, closely parallel the content of his book, *Participation et causalite,* which first appeared in 1960. The title chosen by the author, *Esegesi Tomistica,* is indeed apt, since all of the essays deal with some aspect or other of St. Thomas's philosophy.

While the essays are of varying length and range over a rather wide spectrum of philosophical problems, the basic themes underlying these studies come through with unmistakeable clarity. For Fabro, Aquinas's distinction between essence and existence *(esse),* which permits him to view *esse* as the act of acts and the form of forms, and his concomitant teaching on analogy and participation by which the unconditioned " nature " of *esse* is philosophically revealed, provide the unique and essential core and methodology of Thomistic metaphysics.

Since there are fourteen separate essays comprising this first volume, it will scarcely be feasible to attempt a detailed treatment of each one. Instead, an effort will be made to point out several interesting claims contained in the essays and then briefly to summarize the author's views regarding the " nature " of *esse* and transcendental participation.

The first five chapters of the volume all appeared in various philosophical periodicals before 1940. These essays treat of four separate problems: (a) an analysis of how the principle of causality is known; (b) the Thomistic notion of contingency; (c) the distinction between "quod est" and" quo est"; (d) the path St. Thomas followed in developing his theory of *esse* as the act of essence. The last of these articles appeared in the *Revue de Philosophie* in 1938 and is the first of two essays appearing in the volume which are in French. In it the author attempts to reconstruct the path Aquinas followed in arriving at his conviction that the essence of finite being is not its own actuality. It is Fabro's conclusion, and one to which this reviewer is sympathetic, that Aquinas came to recognize the need for a real composition within the very heart of contingent being through the demands placed upon him by the otherwise insoluble problem

of participation. Fabro sees Aquinas's solution to this problem as charting a middle course between Platonism and Aristotelianism, Avicennianism and Averroism. At the same time Fabro feels that the Thomist position regarding essence and existence is in accord with the authentic spirit of Aristotelianism.

The next two chapters, five and six, constitute one-third of the total book and are highly polemical in nature. Written in 1939 and 1941 and published in the Italian periodical, *Divus Thomas*, they present a detailed and rather personal critique of the French Jesuit, Pere Descoqs' interpretation of Aquinas's metaphysics of being. These pages will perhaps interest only those desirous of a first-hand account of one side of one of the Thomist-Suarezian basic encounters which took place during this period.

Chapter VII consists of an article entitled " Logic and Metaphysics " which appeared in the *Acta Pont. Acad. S. Thomae Aquinatis* in 1946. Here the author attempts to clarify the important role logic plays in the development of Thomistic metaphysics, while at the same time defending Thomism from the charge of " exaggerated realism." The author contrasts Thomas's understanding of logic with that of Hegel, whose views he feels are firmly in line with those of Spinoza. For Fabro, authentic Thomism does not conceive of logic as " an enclave where one might cultivate sterile concepts which have no rapport with reality." (p. 95) Rather, he argues, metaphysics and logic intimately compenetrate one another, and this intimate relationship preserves for being both their dialectical character and that tension of opposites which constitute the very foundation of metaphysics as a human science. (p. 294) Fabro insists that the Augustinian, Scotist and Suarezian metaphysics are radically and irreducible diverse from Thomistic metaphysics, (p. 94) and intimates that it is this diversity which explains the different understanding each has of the role logic and the dialectic of participation play in its development.

Chapter VII, which contains one of the shorter essays, makes an interesting historical observation regarding the development of the Suarezian notion of contingency and the concomitant Suarezian analogy of intrinsic attribution. The author has sleuthed out the curious fact that the Alexander of Hales, whom Suarez quotes in support of his own position on contingent being, was not that celebrated personage at all but rather a one-hundred-year-later 14th century Italian Franciscan, one Alexander Bonini, hailing from a small town in southern Piedmont, Alexandria della Paglia. Fabro carefully documents his claim that this " unknown " Alexander of Alexandria anticipated in remarkable detail Suarez's teaching on contingency and analogy and shows that Alexander's views were unquestionably an indirect source of Suarez's own position. Fabro concludes: " If Suarez had been familiar with the original texts, he would have been able to discover, we think, that ' his ' Alexander of Hales had formulated ' *expresse et optime'* not only his own solution regarding the distinction between essence

and *esse*, but also his theory of act and potency, and its corollary of the analogy of intrinsic attribution." (p. 310)

The last five chapters discuss the related themes of (a) the determination of act by potency; (b) the foundation and (c) development of the fourth way; (d) analogy and (e) the notion of participation. All of these articles have appeared since 1960. They total 120 pages, comprising roughly one quarter of the entire work, and constitute the sole portion of the book written after the completion of Fabro's *Participation et causalite* which appeared in 1958.

In his discussion of St. Thomas's fourth proof for the existence of God the author makes the claim that: " of all the proofs for the existence of God [it is] the one which is theoretically the most basic and the most formal." (p. 382) In his opinion all other proofs ultimately rest on Aquinas's doctrine of participation, which doctrine in turn constitutes the very core of the fourth way. He views the common scholastic tendency to identify the fundamental characteristic of limited being with the *notion of contingency* to have been an outright import from Avicennianism and Leibnizianism and to have been incubated in the Augustinian, Nominalist and Suarezian schools, owing to the failure of their adherents to have grasped and/or accepted what Fabro calls the "intensive Thomist notion of *esse."* (pp. 370-1) It is Fabro's contention that Aquinas himself came, in his maturer writings, to place more and more emphasis on the notion of participation as the most efficacious means of demonstrating God's existence.

Fabro also sees an intimate connection between Aquinas's teaching on the three related problems of participation, causality and analogy and attempts in Chapter 13 to develop the rudiments of the latter in an article written in French and originally published in *Bulletin Thomiste* (1964). He is strongly critical of the influence Cajetan has allegedly exercised with regard to analogy among a long line of Thomists, and he locates Aquinas's own doctrine as midway between Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality and *extrinsic* attribution and Suarez' analogy of *intrinsic* attribution.

The concluding chapter is, fittingly for Fabro, on the subject of participation, and appeared in *Divinitll.Y* in 1967. The author again underscores the theoretical inseparability of the teaching of Aquinas on essence-existence and on participation. He also insists that the authentic Thomistic notion of participation requires not only the distinguishing of *esse* as act from the *essence* that is its potency but also from that *existence* which is the *fact of being* and is consequently merely an effect and not a metaphysical principle. According to Fabro, it has been the failure by some Thomists (he names Marechal, Lotz, Rahner) to note the distinction between *intensive* and *factual esse* which has led them to attempt to ground the experience of *esse* in mere judgment and hence to speak

equivocally of a "Thomist existentialism." Finally, Fabro concludes his study with an insistence that analogy has both a vertical *(intrinsic* attribution) and a horizontal *(intrinsic* proportionality) dimension, both of which are essential to the authentic Thomistic notion of participated being. However, he is very desirous of emphasizing that the Thomist notion of intrinsic attribution is very different from that of Suarez, since it rests firmly on the foundation of the distinction between *esse* and essence.

While the present reviewer is in full agreement with the fundamental themes the author has developed in this his latest work, he does find it difficult to give the book his unqualified recommendation. The reason for his hesitation is simply that there is little in this new book of selected articles which is not already contained in the author's major works alluded to above, viz. *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione* and *Participation et causalite.* Thus the main value this reviewer sees in the publication of this newest volume is that it serves as a useful source book for one interested in pursuing the development of Aquinas's notion of existence during the early and late Middle Ages and of tuning in on some of the essence-existence disputes which occurred during the first half of this century. However, unfortunate as it may be, even the professional scholar will find himself hampered here by the total lack of any kind of name or subject index. Such an omission seems inexcusable in a work at once so diverse in subject matter and otherwise so distinguished for its scholarship.

A singular if unexpected bonus is rendered the reader, however, by the inclusion of a bibliographical listing of all of Father Fabro's writings which has been prepared by his students at the University of Perugia. The list of his major works of philosophy alone totals nineteen volumes which collectively comprise a massive 6000 pages plus. The list of philosophical articles, covering a period of thirty-four years. is equally as impressive containing 272 separate titles. This complete list of the published works of Fr. Fabro should prove a great boon to future students who will wish to delve into the thought of a philosopher who surely must be among the most eminent and prolific of Thomist scholars in this century.

JAMES B. REICHMANN, S. J.

Seattle University
Seattle, Washington

Issues zn Religion. A Book of Readings. By ALLIE M. FRAZIER. New York: American Book Company, 1969. Pp. 373.

The Gospel of Irreligious Religion. Insights for Uprooted Man from Major World Faiths. By LowELL D. STREIKER. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969. Pp. 169. $4.95.

Issues in Religion is a successful presentation of readings on religious philosophy which clearly illustrates the connection between critical and speculative thought, and the basic structures of human existence in which religious questions and responses originate. Beginning with selections from literature (Dostoevsky, Nietzche, Tolstoy, and Rilke) concerning the human condition, it proceeds to consider the origins of religious life with texts from Freud, Feuerbach, Durkheim, Campbell, R. Otto, and Suzuki. The last half of the book deals theologically and philosophically with the modes of religious life and, finally, with the doctrine of God. Ample introductions to the sections and the various selections given both a scholarly and evocative context to the reading. This book views religious thought *a8* a religious phenomenon, and this is precisely what any academic study of religion should accomplish. It would serve as an excellent text in an introductory course for religious studies.

Professor Streiker's book picks up where *Issues in Religion* seems to end. It is current, germane, and so clearly written that one immediately grasps the vision of this new and interesting writer. Here is an exciting essay emerging from the " irreligious " ferment within traditional religions which is closely intertwined with the unprecedented encounter of the world's religions and the secularists' rejection of all religion. He dramatically argues that " knowledge of one manifestation of the Spirit is knowledge of none." (p. xvi) Issuing a call for the living religions of today to meet on a truly dialogical level, he urges men to learn not necessarily from the religions encountered but from the men who live by them. He sees the meeting of the higher religions as an opportunity and a challenge for growth in faith and in the mystical life of modern man. Possessing a sensitivity to both the Indian traditions and the contemporary sub-culture, *The Gospel of Irreligious Religion* grapples with the problems of structureless religion and the need to recapture and reproduce living religious experience. An outstanding chapter considers the religious " irreligion " of Rabindranath Tagore, the Bengali poet spearheading the Indian renaissance of this century, who saw that only " by transforming the mundane and habitual can man participate in the divine creativity." (p. 153) Although Streiker's essay is at times simplistic, it faces the most acute problems of religion today and offers provocative and creative direction.

WILLIAM CENKNER, 0. P.

The Catholic University of America
Waahmgtcm, D. C.

La Verita Dell' Uorrw. By LuiGI BoaLIOLO. Roma: Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1969. Pp. 316.

This " Truth about Man " represents the first volume of a " new course of philosophy elaborated in accordance with Vatican Council II " to be offered and published by the Lateran University in Rome. Prof. Bogliolo, who was entrusted with the preparation of the new course, is introduced by the Rector of the University as best qualified for his task, not only because of his " generous attempts to meet the demands and the mentality of young people " but especially because of his ability to combine the treasures of tradition with the interesting and sound views of modem times. (5 f.)

In his Introduction, the author finds the anthropological orientation of modern philosophy as the most characteristic feature of the mentality of our age. Even Vatican Council II made " the anthropological inspiration of modem thought its own." (10) And since in a most courageous, yet all too forgotten and obscured conception also St. Thomas has seen in " man, in a certain sense, the totality of being," Prof. Bogliolo believes himself justified in endorsing this modem trend, in attempting " the centralization of all philosophy in man," and realizing a metamorphosis of the entire ontology into anthropology in his textbook. (!'l!'lf.)

His " anthropological and personalistic ontology " constructed " in conformity with the modern mentality" (35) and characterized as a" study of the human spirit " (45) is divided into seven sections. In the first section entitled: "The Truth of His Being," (15 ff.) the author is concerned with a " recovery of the integral human experience " and with a preliminary view of " man as synthesis of ontology." He rightly recognizes that the possibility of a realistic philosophy depends upon a possible cognitive contact with reality as such. " The heterogeneity of thought and experience " maintained by Kant must and can be overcome; for " thought also is an experience ... capable of serving as the foundation of the first, most radical and concrete of all human sciences," of metaphysics. It is intellectual, not sensory experience that characterizes man, having as its object the act of existence of sensible beings, and consequently of everything that is. Existence of being is the act of all acts, the perfection of all perfections, "proper to every thing and common to all things." (!'l12) " To experience the existence of any being means the experience of something which *is* in everything existing and real. It is impossible to experience the *existence* of one *existent* without experiencing, in a certain sense, *all that exists."* (28) In this authentic, integral intellectual experience of the act of existence the philosophy or ontology centered in man has its solid existential foundation. (45)

This intellectual perception or experience also explains the unique nature and position of man in the universe as it is visualized in " man as synthesis

of ontology." (35) Of course, man--or rather" the human form" or" the human spirit" (44 f.)-is not seen as the combination of a science, as the title seems to indicate, but as the transcendence and immanence of all cosmic perfections, as the author wishes to interpret these traditional terms. Because of his intuition of the act of existence, man or the human spirit is the totality of being, the substantial culmination of the cosmos, the peak of the interiority of cosmic life and structures; in one word, he is the immanence, i.e., the intrinsic possession of all cosmic perfections and the transcendence or the " existential-substantial superiority " of this possession. (37 ff.)

In the second section: "The Truth of His Knowledge," (49 ff.) the author first attempts to determine the nature of human cognition. Knowledge is defined as an identifying and subjectifying activity. It demands that "the subject . . . subjectifies the object, transforms it into itself, giving it a new mode of being, i.e., its own mode of being," (53) so that the object becomes the soul itself. (118) Intellectual knowledge is always the seeing of the being of that which is, an intuition, an immediate contact. (56) In the case of the human intellect, however, it is a conceptual intuition, and man's primordial intellectual vision is identical with the primordial concept of being. (57) "Human intelligence is abstracting intuition or intuiting abstraction." (58) Abstract and universal knowledge thus in no way involves an impoverishment of reality. According to St. Thomas, abstraction signifies an identifying and spiritualizing activity, " elevating things to the level of the knowing subject " and enlivening and enriching their interior fulness. (54) As a result of this humanizing operation, the abstract idea is the universal in the sense of the universality of the nature and causality ascribed to " spiritual beings in relation to the material existent." The universal means the whole or totality of all its inferior perfections. Human intellectual vision is thus an operation transforming, elevating, intensifying, totalizing, and spiritualizing its objects. (60 f.)

His understanding of human knowledge and of its object, then, offers the author the solution of the traditional problems concerning the origin of our ideas and concerning the value of the universals. " As identifying activity, cognition effects that the same forms or ideas which are in things and inform things are in the mind and inform our mind." (62) Combined with this simple explanation of the origin of our ideas is the author's "coherent doctrine about the universals." (64) The identifying operation of cognition reveals that " every single substance has something of the universal in itself"; relatively, "inasmuch as it is an existent and as such has a relation with all the existents," and absolutely, inasmuch as "every single substance is an universal insofar as, in itself and through itself, it is a whole, a universe, a fulness, a totality." (65) The identification of the universal with the ontic whole finally allows us to end the related

philosophical debate by simply declaring that " everything real is universal, and every universal is real." (67}

The determination of the nature of cognition is followed by a discussion of its characteristics in " the components of human knowledge." (70 ff.) Human knowledge is sensory-intellectual. " There is no intellectual knowledge whatever, which would not have its origin from the senses." (71) However, the intellect enjoys the same primacy over the senses that the soul enjoys over the body. Human knowledge is objective-subjective. This " duality stands at the beginning of cognition, conditioning its formation and origin " in order then to turn into an identity of object and subject in actual knowing. (73} Human cognition is passive-active in a way that " the intuitive and the abstractive activity represent two inseparable aspects of human knowledge. Human intellectual intuition abstracts and, while abstracting, intuits." (75) Intuition is served and completed by reasoning. Human cognition is thus intellectual-discursive. As intellectual experience, human knowledge is, then, characterized by the duality of apriority-aposteriority. Dependent upon the pre-existence of its object, human cognition is " radically conditioned by the aposteriori," while " permeated by being and its laws of absolute, necessary, and universal validity," the spirit's identifying experience necessarily has its apriori. (77 f.)

In connection with his investigation of the apriori-aposteriori aspects of knowledge, the author proposes " in a brief, but sufficiently clear way the fundamental principles concerning possibility." (80) What he reveals is usually explained as intrinsic and extrinsic possibility in ontology.

Epistemological problems are touched in " the essential attributes of knowledge." (89 ff.) The objective validity of knowledge is seen to depend upon the anthropological structure of cognition. Gnoseology finds its answers in the ontology of man. (89) Human cognition is primarily "the intellectual vision of the act of existence." (94} As an identifying operation, it has truth, certitude, and evidence as " attributes that pertain to it *naturally* and thus *necessarily;* without them there is no knowledge at all." (89} The problem of error and doubt does not represent an objection against this clear and distinct idea of human knowledge. Errors are simply " partial truth," (92} and a doubt is merely an imperfect certitude, " a parasite of certitude." (97} With regard to the critical problem of knowledge and of philosophy as a whole, the author sees no reason to share the interiority complex that " many followers of the classical philosophy " experience in the face of modern and contemporary philosophy. As " the immediate vision of the existence of the existents." (105) human cognition is always critical, since it is always accompanied by a judgment of existence. (100) The solution of the problem of knowledge has its foundation in this *intellectus entis et primorum principiorum.* (102)

These epistemological convictions serve as a basis for the refutation of skepticism, relativism, phenomenalism, positivism, idealism, existentialism,

and of Cardinal Mercier's mediatism. (107 ff.) " Before one questions whether the subject is able to know the object, one ought to ask what 'to know ' does mean. If the investigation reveals that cognition is essentially an identification of subject and object, the problem of mediatism becomes senseless." (114)

In a further section of this ontology of man " The Truth of His Spirit," (115 ff.) i.e., " an ontological doctrine of the structure of the human spirit," is to be developed. First, origin, nature, and characteristics of the will are studied. " The will has its birth in knowledge," the author believes. The identity of subject and object of cognition is genuine, but it presupposes this duality. " The soul having become the thing known feels itself divided from itself to the extent to which the known object remains separated and divided from it. Knowledge thus creates an intrinsic split in the soul which suffers, in a certain way, a painful laceration in its being. Hence a tension to recover the entire being of the thing known originates. . . . The merely intentional possession necessarily is followed by the interior tension directed to the full possession of the known object. The origin of this interior tension . . . signifies the birth of the will, . . . of the appetite for the total and exhaustive possession of the object." (118) Born out of the all-comprehensive cognition of the act of being, the will by nature is omnidetermination, a tendency to the total good. As faculty of the totality of good, it is free in the face of a particular good.

The structure of the spirit is thus revealed as necessarily intellectual, willing, free, and personal, its personality proceeding from its liberty. (131)

Aquinas's assertion that the intellectual soul is known by way of its understanding serves as the principle of a philosophical view of the nature of the human soul. The denial of man's transcendence over the world, as defended by materialism, sensism, and certain forms of existentialism, does not demand an explicit refutation; such philosophies are not held "worthy of a consideration." The knowledge of the substantiality, the independent and subsistent being of the human soul becomes manifest in an investigation of the nature of the intellect, will, and freedom. "All the characteristics and attributes of intellectual cognition imply the independence of the knowing soul." For instance, " intellectual knowledge is by definition cognition of the *existent as such. Existence* is the perfection, upon which all the perfections depend and which itself does not depend upon any .... The cognition of such perfection is the knowledge of all knowledge; from it all other knowledge originates and it does not depend upon any other knowledge. The *independence* of the *cognitive activity* demands the *independence* of the knower. Hence the knowing soul is independent." (134)

The idea of the independence of the soul immediately " raises the question concerning the soul's dependence upon the body." It cannot be denied that the body conditions the operation of the human intellect; but

"it is clear that the soul can exist when separated from the body, because its acting is totally independent of the limitations of the body and of the senses. . . . The soul transcends corporality not by way of an antagonism or opposition, but because it offers being to the body and contains the ontological perfections in a superior, non-corporeal way." It immanently contains and transcends corporality, "without allowing itself to be blocked by its limits." (135) " It is a superior substance which assumes the body into itself . . . elevating it and communicating its spiritual and personal dignity to it." (136)

From a consideration of the properties of the perception of existence, which has "evident characteristics of spirituality," and of the intellectual knowledge in general, we arrive at a knowledge of the supermaterial simplicity and spirituality of the soul. And an accurate analysis of our first experience of existence also allows us " in an irrefutable way to conclude to the immortality of the soul. . . . By way of the perception of being we know, in a confused and imperfect way, all things at once *(omnia simul)* . It is thus a primary characteristic of this perception to be *tota simul:* in one stroke to know the totality of known things, without any before or after; it is the intrinsic *simultaneous and total* fulness of cognitive possession." This fulness of the intellectual activity has its correspondence in the interior *total and simultaneous* fulness of the soul's being, which existential fulness represents immortality in its positive aspect. For immortality is not just a denial of mortality but essentially a participation of God's eternity. (141 f.)

After his demonstration of the soul's substantiality, spirituality, and immortality, the author considers "the attributes of the human spirit." (144 ff.) Besides being intelligent, willing, free, and personal, the human spirit is described as possessing all the cosmic, i.e., spatial, temporal, dynamic attributes in a non-cosmic way. The inferior grade of material reality finds itself more truly in the superior grade of the spirit than in itself, and it is only this conception of the transcendence of the spirit which is able to overcome " once and for all the incredibly widespread dualistic mentality." (154)

The following fourth section of the book is dedicated to a consideration of certain logical doctrines concerning " the correctness of human discourse and the validity of the method." (157 ff.) Porphyry's tree is to be improved by the addition of the act of existence. " The hierarchy of things and the corresponding hierarchy of the ideas " thus has its peak in " being: radical perfection and notion," and its primary disjunction in" being by essence: God, and being by participation: the created existent." (162) The distinction of the predicaments and of the predicables is explained and extended to include the more general modes of the realization of existence just mentioned.

These remarks about the concept are followed by some ideas about

judgment, definition, and reasoning. Notions of logic concerned with these operations of the mind are to be grounded in the ontology of the intellect. The first and basic act of human cognition is " the intellectual vision of the act of being " and thus the comprehension of everything that exists. Hence judgment and reason are totally at the service of intellectual intuition. (173 f.) The traditional doctrine which denies truth and falsity of the first operation of the mind, reserving it only for the judgment, does obviously not hold true of the apprehension of existence; " for this comprises, in a superior way, every truth, every apprehension, and every judgment." (176) All other cognitive operations are only processes of development of this primary intuition of being, " in virtue of which all is already present and immanent in our mind from the beginning in the same way as the entire future of the animal or of the plant is present in the tiny germ." (185) The logical theories of concept and judgment are to take account of this basic truth, and consequently of the ideas concerning " being and the transcendental judgments, the first judgments and the principles of being." (179)

In his treatment of the nature and figures of the syllogism the author finds that inductive reasoning, proceeding "from the particular to the universal " (188) is of no less probative force than deduction. As examples of such induction he lists the argumentation from finite effects to the Absolute and from the nature of intelligence to the nature of the soul. The foundation of the incontestable validity of this inductive reasoning is said to be the relation between part and whole. (190)

All the preceding insights of this new modem anthropological ontology are repeated and summarized in a eulogy of St. Thomas's philosophical method and thought as " a typical example of a realistic method." (194 fi.) The required renewal of teaching and studying philosophy can find its model in the dialectical force of Aquinas's philosophizing. "His Christian thought endowed with the strongest realistic, open, profound, and dialectically proceeding sense can fill young men with enthusiasm also today." (194)

Man "thomistically understood as the totality of being *(totum ens)"* (250) is presented as the basis of subjective and objective morality in "the correctness of his individual and social behavior." (247 fi.) As norm of human existence, human nature has to be seen in all its dimensions and in its relations to the hierarchical order of immutable, absolute, and necessary values. " To act according to this order of things and of values means to act in a human way, i.e., morally." (251)

" A perfect parallelism " between the speculative and practical reason is discovered in the correspondence of the intuition of the first theoretical and practical principles. However, the superiority of the human soul, so enthusiastically exalted in the ontology of the human spirit, seems suddenly to give way to " the weakness and frailty of the human mind "

(256) in this abridgment of the traditional course of ethics. Indeed, the condition of our mind and will is found to be so miserable that it is said to render the revelation of God a moral necessity. (256)

As a social being, the human person naturally stands in interpersonal relationships which "always constitute an enhancement of the ontological space of the person." Social life has Christian charity as its dynamic principle and is always to serve as an instrument for the ends of the person. An imposition of social structures and political positions from above against the free will of all is repugnant to man's personal dignity. "The society of human persons can be conceived only as a democratic society." (259)

In "The Truth of His History," (265 ff.) the author offers some ideas about the philosophy of history which is explained as having the concept of man as its constitutive principle (268) and as finding its meaning and fulfillment only as *historia salutis.* (270)

And "Aesthetic Truth" (273 ff.) finally gives a short "introduction to the philosophy of art." As merely transfigurative and transformative activity, human creativity is distinguished from God's creativity which is *productio ex nihilo sui et subjecti.* It has its foundation in the human spirit and manifests itself as creativity of intellectual cognition, creative imagination, and of the will.

A bibliography, an index of authors, and a table of contents conclude the work.

The preceding short characterization of the main ideas of this first volume of the new course of philosophy according to the norms of Vatican IT certainly proves beyond any doubt that Prof. Bogliolo's " Truth about Man " does not fulfill the expectations one ought to set for a modem treatise of the philosophy of man. His thought is as post-conciliar as his exclusive authority, St. Thomas, and his anthropological ontology is as up-to-date as the selections from the traditional scholastic courses of ontology, epistemology, logic, psychology, ethics and aesthetics, which represent the constitutive parts of his ontology of the spirit. A realistic and critical confrontation with modem scientific and philosophical questions about human existence and nature is not offered, either because such problems do not seem to be " worthy of consideration," or because their solution is simply considered to be " clear."

This general evaluation of the present philosophical production, however, is not intended to deny its originality and its reflection of certain trends of modem thought. The author is obviously fascinated by " recent studies " (17) of certain nco-scholastics who, under the influence of Marechal and Heidegger, have finally " discovered " the authentic meaning of the thomanic *esse,* understood to be the totality of all perfection and the flood of being out of which all essences emerge. While fully endorsing this platonic interpretation of the *esse* in St. Thomas's writings, as it is defended in neo-

thomistic *esse-ism,* the author preserves his independence with regard to the understanding of the cognition of this act of existence and with regard to the use he makes of this idea in his presentation of traditional doctrines. He keeps himself free of every influence of the so-called transcendental thomism and refuses to see the *esse* as the horizon of every question or its cognition as a positing of the judgment or as the result of an intensive abstraction. Intending to propose a realistic philosophy, he is aware of the need of a certain cognitive contact with reality, and seeing such a contact only in experience, he declares thought to be an experience also, and he identifies the primordial and basic act of thought with the perception of being, conceived as the existence of all existents and as the idea of all ideas. This experience of being is then used as the basis not only of his ontology of the human spirit but also of his conception of traditional scholastic doctrines. However, this so-called intuition of being represents a rather questionable foundation for philosophical explanations and its one-sided use seems to be greatly responsible for the shortcomings of this philosophy of man.

It simply is not true that the primary and basic intellectual act is the experience or perception of this act of existence and that human knowledge is the natural and necessary development of this primordial intuition. The mere fact that the *esse-istic* understanding of St. Thomas's *esse* was, according to its modem discoverers, unknown for 700 years, should be sufficient proof that this intuition does not represent a common human experience. A critical examination of one's adult consciousness, not to speak of the development of human cognition, should convince every *esse-ist* that his notion of being is as empty or as complete as that of any other normal human being, that is, that his so-called intuition of being, as the perfection of all actual and possible perfections, in no way surpasses the possibilities corresponding to his actual experience and knowledge of existing reality. It will further reveal that the presentation of the entire human knowledge and of all cognitive operations as a necessary development of this vision of existence is no less a merely dogmatic statement than the belief that Ciceronian Latin is the natural development of the understanding of the noun *mensa* to be memorized by a beginner student of Latin. Human learning is an ad-discere, as the author rightly mentions in another context, not a biological development of a " radically synthetic and simultaneous perception of all that exists." {191) However, even granted its psychological realization, the alleged intuition could not serve the epistemological purpose for which it primarily was introduced. It cannot offer the desired contact with reality, since being as act of all acts, common to all possible finite being and especially as comprehending both God and creature, as the author conceives it, is obviously a mere *ens rationis* and not an existent's real component, the experience of which would be identical with a grasp of reality. The critical problem of human knowledge is thus

not abolished by an appeal to the vision of existence nor by lhe author's identification of intellectual knowledge with this intuition. He does not overcome the traditional dualism of thought and experience, as he hopes to do, but merely replaces it by one of his own, opposing perception of existence and experience of the sensible existent without being able to bridge their difference. And by his psychological interpretation of intellectual cognition be renders the solution of the epistemological problem simply impossible. If knowledge means an actual identification of the object with the subject in a way that the object known becomes the soul itself, a differentiation of various objects and of the soul from the object, and thus knowledge itself becomes inconceivable.

The questionable character of the author's understanding of the intuition of being, then, affects also the value of its use in philosophical psychology. It is true that an elaboration of the nature of this notion of *esse* could be as useful for the demonstration of the spirituality of the human intellect as that of any other act of abstract knowledge. However, the mere recognition of the alleged independence of this act of existence from other perfections does not by itself prove the independence of the cognition and of the soul. The independence of an object of knowledge from another object does not as such establish the independence of the cognitive act of perception and of the subject, in whatever sense this ambiguous term " independence of cognition " may be understood. The author seems to relate it to the substantiality as well as to the subsistence of the soul. Since he identifies the " truth about man " with an ontology of the spirit and completely disregards the vegetative and sensitive life of man, the difference of the soul as the substantial principle of life from the body does not find its logically consistent explanation, and " the independent being " of the soul is thus expected to be seen as a result of the experience of the independent act of existence.

Equally unsatisfactory is the relationship established between the notion of the intuition of being and the immortality of the soul. Since we do not possess the *tota simul et perfecta visio* of all that is, the author's conclusion to our total and simultaneous possession of our being as a participation of God's eternity cannot be valid either. Moreover, experience constantly reminds us that we do *not* possess our being wholly and simultaneously; as incarnate spirits we are subject to the laws of psycho-somatic life and thus open to growth, development, and personal maturation. However, insistence upon experience, so important for a realistic philosophical study of man, is there reserved for the alleged intellectual perception of the act of existence. The unrealistic spiritualistic view of human nature, which results from this neglect of a critical evaluation of human existence, could be easily corrected by an occasional look at reality, especially in a hospital or in a mental institution.

The hook's frequent merely metaphorical expressions and question-

able statements, for instance, ascribing ontological personality to the soul and its origin to freedom, seeking the foundation of the author's inductive reasoning from the existence of the creature to the existence of God in the relationship of part and whole, confusing operation and power while unsuccessfully attempting to see the origin of the will in cognition, etc., seem to deserve a rethinking and more precise formulations.

The young people, to whose demands and mentality this " Truth about Man " is said to be so well adapted, must certainly enjoy a life well protected from the influence of modern civilization. Our students are not so unexperienced and unproblematic that they could be satisfied with the philosophical answers of this ontology of the human spirit.

MARIUS ScHNEIDER, O. F. M.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Del Principia di Crcazione o del Signifieato. By Au.ESSANDRO
Padova: Liviana Editrice, 1967. Pp. 168.

Whether systematization of the presumed points of confluence between philosophy and theology is at all efficacious remains an issue that readily invites and engenders controversy. Alessandro Cortese's *Del Principia di Creazione o Del Significato* is best appraised as a work which evidences the fact that &uch issues are perhaps more plaguing among Italian and European philosophers than certain members of either constituency care to admit. Thus, it is important to understand how such systematization accommodates a new kind of philosophy, and that the endeavor to elucidate this philosophy is an explicitly proclaimed objective of Cortese.

Concerned to emancipate philosophy from its apparent restricted dependency on the contingent empirical world, Cortese attends with some care to the formal dieresis between the conception of " experience " (= becoming) and the conception of " logos " (= immutability) . Reminiscent of Hegel, Cortese explicates this new philosophy in terms of a traditional account of the relation between experience and logos, a synthesis which obliges one to read logos in terms of experience and experience in terms of logos. Entailed in the notion of synthesis, and in fact apparently indistinguishable from synthesis itself, is what Cortese calls " The Principle of Creation."

The Principle of Creation seems to be what might be called " a pregnant concept," that is, there are certain outward visible signs that something is going on inside, but a description of internal affairs is rather speculative and cannot be teased out as one might like, at least until birth, assuming

birth is really a possibility for such concepts. Nevertheless, Cortese speculates at great length concerning the Principle, and it is difficult to deny that his speculation is theologically interesting. In his attempt to structure the Principle of Creation as an Absolute Principle Cortese claims that relativity is untenable since it commits one to a position of ultimate non-determinability which *prima-facie* makes the epistemological enterprise incoherent and nugatory. It is not enough, however, to claim or even to demonstrate that the implications of a relativistic conceptual scheme are devastating for epistemology, and thus Cortese introduces the notion of " Protologia " as the absolutizing force of the Principle of Creation.

Endeavoring to unpack the sense of Protologia, the formal dieresis between immutability and mutability is carefully given an account by appealing to a particular usage of " Christianity " and " future." Christianity presents itself as a mode of " absolute-act " in the sense that it proclaims that God has become man in Christ and affirms his Death and Resurrection. Future presents itself as pure potential which has significance only insofar as it is, in the Aristotelian sense, actualized and become " fact " and therefore manifested as on the spacial-temporal designation, " present." There is a constant turning over, Cortese claims, a movement or process in which the sense of future becomes fact and out of this fact derives the sense of a new future, a new potential, the feasibility of a new fact. Yet, the formulation itself appears to commit one to certain intractable problems of stability. That is to say, the characteristic instability of the future throws one back unmistakably to the instability of the present whose relation to the past exemplifies the philosophically tenuous nature of the historical process itself. Attempting to make the reader feel the force of this argument, Cortese presents the notion of Protologia which turns out to be a concept theologically grounded in and in some sense identical with the *concetto* of God. Thus, Cortese argues, there is a point at which the underlying structure of temporality is rooted in the absolute concept of God. More explicitly, Cortese argues that the Principle of Creation is the philosophical dimension through which such a concept, absolute by virtue of logical necessity, can be reasonably expressed and is itself a requisite for further reasonable discourse. The Principle of Creation is ultimately independent of the philosophical spacial-temporal categories, yet *everything,* particularly such philosophical categories, are only meaningful insofar as they are rooted in the Principle of Creation.

With the exorcism, so to speak, of the duplicitous superficial structure of temporality, the stage is set for a new kind of philosophy. In the Principle of Creation future emerges with authentic content, and thus, philosophy itself becomes maximally relevant as the Emergent. Yet, precisely at the moment of its inception, authentic future is again absorbed into the Principle of Creation, and it is here that ethics, an emergent philosophy, is seen by Cortese as the central category of temporality.

The Principle is an absolute, and in its synthesis of mutability and immutability, not-being and being, finitude and eternality, it is the incontrovertible condition, the context in which all possibilities become possible and all fact becomes fact. Philosophy, which concerns itself with either ontology or logic, is spurious, since it neglects the fundamental absolute condition in which both endeavors derive significance. Outside of the Principle of Creation, there is no significance, and thus philosophy is obliged, if its goal entails significance, to treat the foundation of all epistemic considerations, the Principle of Creation. Philosophy becomes for Cortese sacred philosophy, that is, *Dio filosofico,* and its search is for the absolute ground of the formal dieresis made articulate in theology.

Philosophy accomplishes its task only by appeal to the Principle of Creation which synthesizes experience (which Cortese refines by reference to recent developments in phenomenology) and reason (which draws on what Cortese calls analysis of language structure and common sense). A prerequisite for significant epistemology is knowledge of the Principle of Creation, and historical knowledge thus presupposes that condition of process in which the events or moments of history converge with the absolute Principle which undergirds the feasibility of such events.

This is not the place to attempt a definitive philosophical assessment of Cortese's work or even to sketch the major outlines of its difficulties. However, a brief excursus of such topics is surely not imprudent and in fact may be of more than heuristic interest to the reader. For, despite Cortese's generally rather tidy arguments, his analysis accommodates several deficiencies, one of which is essential to the logical structure of his exposition and therefore should be treated.

Attempts at grounding the philosophical enterprise in what Cortese calls the " Absolute " are indeed attractive, and there is little doubt that many philosophers have countenanced such views of one sort or another. However attractive such a position may be, one must be philosophically circumspect about certain inherent difficulties in the language itself which militate against entertaining the position without palpable absurdity.

Language, Wittgenstein opined, is " a form of life," and thus it is a human reality or construct which inherits many of the same logical limitations possessed by the human entities that use it. To hold that language about God, that is, the Principle of Creation, the Absolute, can itself be Absolute, clearly obfuscates the possibility of philosophy as a human linguistic mode. It is more frequently than not an excessive burden for the philosopher and theologian alike to be cognizant of the fact that "God-talk" is by its very nature never anything more than man's talk about God and thus not itself Absolute. Language is, by its very nature as a human reality, incapable of expressing the Absolute. That is to say, how can one expect the language to express absolutely that which, as Cortese holds, is the source and most fundamental condition of language itself?

Perhaps one might respond that Cortese intends that philosophy is not just language about the Absolute but language derived from and undergirded by the Absolute. Thus it follows that language transcends its normal limitations as a human reality and itself becomes divine, *Dio filosofico.* What sense one might make of this claim, however, is perhaps a conundrum best left for the perceptive reader.

RONALD S. LAURA

Harvard Divinity School
Cambridge, Mass.

The Idea of God. Philosophical Perspectives. Edited by EDWARD H. MADDEN, ROLLO HANDY, MARVIN FARBER. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1968. Pp. 182. $8.50.

This is a handsome volume, and the title promises a central matter of general philosophical interest. Apart from the first essay by Fr. Clarke, S. J., however, there is not a great deal in this book to recommend it. It is edited from the offerings of a symposium on the Idea of God held at the State University of New York for two days in October, 1967. Essentially, the book is made up of four lectures, on each of which two comments are made. The announcement on the dustcover runs as follows: "The aim of this symposium is to consider in detail and from a variety of viewpoints, the fundamental problems and potentialities of contemporary religious thought." Between the aim and the achievement there lies a great gulf: the rather free-wheeling style of many of the contributors, personal references that might be charming in their place, and, presumably, "off the cuff" observations on a number of things, do not seem to assist the purpose of a technical and serious publication. The "detail" that is promised is hardly in evidence; the circle of reference is very limited and even quite insular, though, be it noted, amongst the lists of metaphysical celebrities in the Index are to found the names of A. A. Milne, Cassius Clay and God! The variety of viewpoints is there; the most unified group seem to be the atheists brought together by a certain amount of mutual adulation and a fine triumphalism in expression. The " Theists " are rather timid and seem to be the " odd men out " in the symposium. Perhaps the increasing popularity of a " finite God " does tend to undermine one's religious assurance. Admittedly, some of the " fundamental problems " are touched upon, but there is little effort at interrelation. The general tone of the treatment does not say a great deal for " the potentialities of contemporary religious thought," though it does say a lot for its " fundamental problems."

The single bright spot is the opening lecture by Fr. W. Norris Clarke,

S. J. He presents us with a clear, highly polished and scholarly little essay which shows deference to the large and delicate question " How the Philosopher can give Meaning to Language about God." (pp. He shows alertness to the exigencies of trends in current linguistic analysis and clears the ground rather deftly by pointing to the special character of the problem: there can be no meaning-analysis of the term "God," unless one is prepared to go through the process of discovery which relates to the finding of the significance of the term. He faces all the big issues well, the role of the principle of intelligibility, the meaning of "casuality," the total personal nature of our knowledge of God with its inherent limitations. Perhaps the best point is when he shows that the animating element in our affirmation of God is a fundamental option to respect the exigence of intelligibility. Lonergan, of course, has made this point before, but Fr. Clarke makes it again for his purposes and makes it well. (pp. 7-11) A lot more could be said about this lecture, but we cannot delay. The worst thing that can be said is that it more or less ruins the rest of the book. Would that the subsequent lectures had faced even some of the points that were raised so early. Perhaps it was all discussed, and the best part of the symposium was not printed. (There are the two brief comments, and they elicit an unfortunately brief comment in reply from Fr. Clarke).

The other essays are as follows: "Difficulties in the Idea of God," by Paul Edwards. (pp. 43-77) This author's convinced atheism seems passionately off the mark: it is wearisome to hear a repeat, especially in overconfident tones, of difficulties that have already been answered. If space allowed it would an interesting exercise to work quietly through Mr. Edward's lecture and show him that believers understood him better than he is inclined to think. Meanwhile, those whose intelligence and faith have taken them into the presence of God will, in nice irony, be praying for Mr. Edwards as he greatly "welcomes the disintegration of Christianity . . . ." (p. 74) John Cobb Jr. in" The Possibility of Theism Today" shows control over his subject. (pp. He well indicates the cultural shift that makes the theologian's reasons of other days lack a conclusive power in the present. (pp. 106-111) Possibly in his care not to overstate his case, Cobb appears overly timid and hesitant in his own conclusions. He follows Whitehead's doctrine of the finite evolving kind of God. Perhaps that is the reason. The last essay," God and the Philosophers," by Joseph Blau, is a great effort in irenicism. (pp. 139-163) Does he have his tongue in his cheek when he tries to reconcile everyone, theists and atheists alike, behind God as the one symbol of the future? Will he please anyone? He does not seem to understand very clearly the standard positions with regard to the relationship between faith and reason nor the point of the traditional proofs for God's existence. (pp. *145* ff.) Philosophers and believers are not that silly, as Fr. Clarke's essay shows.

No doubt dialogue on this level is in its infancy. It is true, too, that

Christians, and especially Catholics, have a duty to enter into it. From the published results of a symposium like this we can learn at least one thing: it is no time to lose one's nerve in the face of more general atheistic positions. It will be a long time before the present modern phase of thought will even begin to approach, in rigor and depth, the most ordinary and common positions of the great Scholastics. There is *something* to start from, and a lot we owe to the future to preserve.

A. J. KELLY, C.SS.R.

St. Mary's Monastery
Wendouree, Vic.
Australia

Reflective Naturalism: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. By VINCENT PUNZO. New York: The Macmillan Co.: London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969. Pp. 387. $7.50.

Vincent Punzo, a member of the philosophy department of St. Louis University, has made a commendable effort to provide a better textbook. His work deserves consideration by anyone who teaches a required college or seminary course in the subject. The ethics presented in the book is essentially a personally rethought and reformulated version of thomistic theory, but Punzo does not present his textbook as a thomistic manual. Instead, the problems of ethical theory are extricated from contemporary philosophical debate, and the more or less thomistic solutions are reached by criticism of some alternative positions. Punzo refers to his method as "expository-critical "; it is an application of Aristotelian dialectical method.

The book is divided into two parts, almost equal in length. The first part deals with a number of central issues of ethical theory, while the second part takes up a few moral problems. The book might be considered for use in a one-semester course. If an instructor feels there is too much material for such a course, either half of the book could be used by itself. The arguments developed in the treatment of moral problems in the latter half of the book do not depend on the theory outlined in the earlier chapters.

In the first chapter, Punzo argues against forms of metaethics-particularly emotivism-which would render normative ethics impossible. Chapter two defends freedom of self-determination against various arguments drawn from recent British and American philosophy. Chapter three argues against reductionistic naturalism and also against rationalistic theories, such as Kant's formalism, and in favor of a version of natural law theory (although Punzo avoids the expression "natural law").

According to Punzo, practical reason discerns moral value by comparing the possibilities of human satisfaction and frustration-which belong to the objective facts of nature-with an ideal conception of human community. Possibilities that can be realized by human action and that are suitable to the human community are morally good; those unsuited to it are morally evil.

Chapter four clarifies the theory proposed in chapter three, particularly in regard to the ideal of human community involved in the definition of morality. Punzo uses Kant's ideal of human community, the kingdom of ends, to limit utilitarian consequentialism, and he simultaneously uses Mill's concrete humanism to limit Kant's formalistic conception of duty. The resulting position is plausible, but not completely clear; the limitations of Punzo's theory as a useful normative criterion appear clearly enough in the second half of the book, which treats moral problems with dialectical arguments for the most part independent of the theoretical part of the book.

Chapter five treats the cardinal virtues. Punzo does not tightly integrate this treatment with the moral theory outlined in the previous chapters. The treatment is mainly traditional, the presentation less dialectical than most of the chapters. An analysis and critique of Joseph Fletcher's position is provided in connection with the treatise on practical wisdom.

Chapter six, the first chapter of the second part of the book, deals with premarital intercourse and abortion under the title: ":Morality and Human Sexuality." Chapter seven argues against Hayek's classical liberalism for a welfare conception of social-economic justice. Chapter eight deals with some problems of the political order, including capital punishment and warfare. Chapter nine, arguing against Dewey's "closed naturalism," offers the alternative of an " open naturalism "-that is, one compatible with a religious commitment to a personal and transcendent God.

Most of Punzo's conclusions are compatible with the views of most thomists, and most of Punzo's arguments are plausible. Yet the position as a whole is not profoundly thought out; the argumentation is not theoretically cogent; the critiques of alternative positions include few brilliant insights. Judged as an essay in creative philosophy, therefore, this work is poor.

But judgment by such standards is not altogether fair, since Punzo's declared intent was to provide a useful introduction for students of ethics. If the students are not particularly interested in philosophy but are somewhat interested in the subject matter of ethics, the dialectical argumentation of this volume might be considerably more effective than a logically tighter treatise would be. At the present time, when each class of students seems less able and less willing than the previous one to follow any sort of argument, perhaps argumentation like Punzo's is the most philosophical approach to ethics worth attempting in an undergraduate or seminary course.

However, one considering this book as a text should notice the range and limitations of the materials Punzo uses. John Dewey is dealt with explicitly more fully than any other philosopher. Punzo's dialectic also makes extensive use of Kant, Mill, Moore, and Whitehead. Aquinas and Aristotle are mentioned less often; they shape Punzo's line of argument rather than providing material for his dialectical mill.

Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and the existentialists are practically omitted; Scheler, von Hildebrand, and Hartmann are not mentioned. The contemporary form of British analytic ethics is not strongly represented; figures such as Hare and Toulmin do not appear. The forms of psychological and sociological naturalistic reduction that are strongest today are not treated; Freud and Levi-Strauss do not appear in the index, and Fromm is only mentioned once in the book. Apart from Joseph Fletcher, recent Christian ethics is hardly treated; Brunner, Barth, and Tillich are unmentioned, and Catholic moral theology is studiously avoided.

There is no need, of course, for a systematic treatise to make a comprehensive survey of contemporary positions in ethical theory. Indeed, to make such a survey ;vould lead to a history of ethics rather than to an introduction to its problems. However, in view of the fact that Punzo has chosen to use a dialectical method to present his position, his choice of materials becomes very important. If students come to the ethics course ignorant of the authors Punzo uses and having read much in the indicated areas which he omits, the book might not be very useful. On the other hand, if previous courses in the curriculum have provided an introduction to Dewey, Mill, and Kant the book might work quite well.

Punzo's treatment of moral problems in the second half of the book is generally sound and well informed. However, I would not wish to use this part of the book as a text for a number of reasons.

In the first place, one can hardly do justice to a single complex problem-such as abortion-in less than two hundred pages. Punzo treats abortion in twenty-four pages; the entire problems section of the book is less than two hundred. Hence there is inevitable superficiality. Many objections are ignored that would occur to anyone who is intelligent, interested in the problem, and not sympathetic to the conclusions reached. The conclusions would therefore remain unconvincing to many students. In matters of morals as in matters of faith, no argument is perhaps better than an inadequate one.

In the second place, the list of problems treated includes warfare but does not include the nuclear deterrent already in being; it includes abortion but does not include the popubtion problem; it includes social-economic justice but does not include poverty and colonialism. Of course, a book like this must stop somewhere, but many students may feel that Punzo has abstracted aspects of problems that are more easily treated and ignored the wider and thornier issues.

In the third place, the treatments of problems are not linked by reference to common, underlying principles. Abortion is treated in a chapter with premarital intercourse, as if abortion had something to do with sexual morality. Capital punishment and warfare are treated in a different chapter. The principles of organization are material, not formal; therefore, the close relationship between problems of justice bearing on the dignity of life in the abortion issue and in the problems of capital punishment and warfare is concealed.

The bibliographies provided for the problem areas are not ample; many important items are omitted. For example, the bibliography on abortion includes some useful material-more favorable to abortion than against **it–** but omits Eugene Quay's *Justifiable Abortion,* Russell Shaw's *Abortion on Trial,* David Granfield's *The Abortion Decision,* Glanville Williams' *Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law* (an important pro-abortion work), and the useful paperback based on the 1967 Harvard-Kennedy Conference: *The Terrible Clwice.*

The book has a rather brief index. **It** does not have study guides, suggested assignments, or other teaching aids. Those not familiar with Aristotle and Aquinas often will have difficulty locating the sources of Punzo's positions in the classic texts. But Punzo generally writes clearly. As usual, Macmillan has done a good job of editing and production, and, considering the present inflation, the price of the volume is not excessive.

GERMAIN G. GrusEZ

GeorgefJown University
Washington, D. C.

La philosophie dans la cite technique (Essai sur la philosophie bergsonienne des techniques). By RoGER EBACHER. Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1968. Pp. 242. *$5.25.*

In his Introduction to Roger Ebacher's work Pierre Colin sounds the basic theme of this volume: "Has philosophy a role in technological society *(la cite technique)* , and if so, what? " Much of Bergson's very limited consideration of technology revolves about *mecanique,* the hardware of the paleotechnic and mestotechnic era in which he lived. He posits a contrast between *mystique* and *mecanique,* and M. Ebacher conceives of the latter under Bergson's formula" *supplement d'ame."* He quotes Albert Thibaudet's comment of 1923: "Bergson's philosophy of intelligence is a philosophy of *technique* and the intelligence of *lwmo faber* defines itself as a means of operating upon matter through manmade instruments."

M. Ebacher's analysis begins with the precise meaning of *techniques* as a

transmittable assembly of methods oriented toward activities judged useful or practical. In his view man possesses an inherent technological bent and social evolution moves toward a technological civilization, that is, toward ever increasing rationality and control of the environment. The author continues: " The philosophy of Bergson is essentially a philosophy of life, of the evolution of life, of man inserted in this evolution."

Having thus defined the linkage between Bergson's thought and technology, M. Ebacher devotes the remainder of the volume to an analysis in depth of four aspects of his subject: (I) Bergson's contacts with technology, (2) a doctrinal analysis of the last chapter of the *Deux sources* where the subject is most specifically touched upon, (3) locating the doctrine in the context of Bergson's overall thought, and (4) showing the role of philosophy in the technological society, employing a parallel between Bergson and Marx.

M. Ebacher :finds that the key likeness through which Bergson interprets the situation of a technicized world is that of spirit and body; that the *mal du siecle* had its source in the constructive intelligence that had fabricated a social body whose animating principle had not grown along with it. Bergson's solution would be an enlargement of the " soul of humanity," an expansion of the ideal of fraternity and respect for the person, an enhanced subtlety of intelligence. Philosophy would have an educative role as regards the citizen and a prophetic role as regards a technological civilization "seeking its profound sources of energy."

In his analysis of the *Deux sources* **H.** Ebacher points out that philosophies of automatic progress are obsolete. While the Bergson of *L'Evolution creatrice* optimistically tends to associate human progress with technical progress, toward the end of his life he affirms that, even among the most confident, hope and optimism are but a violence done to anguish. For Bergson, the middle way between his early optimism and a facile pessimism lay in revealing the evils of technical civilization and seeking remedies.

Technology as a whole *(techniques)* can only be understood in the context of the general march of evolution in the world. In some sense every new machine and method is a new organ of mankind. Bergson objected to the use of the machine to satisfy the egoism of a privileged class and asked a return to a more simple life in which the machine is placed at the service of all mankind's fundamental needs. He conceived the role of philosophy as directing the use of the machine in terms of value preferences; the conquest of darkness and fear, the movement toward a more open society, enlightenment and greater self-awareness *(conscience).*

If *technique* belongs to the material side of mankind, M. Ebacher maintains that in Bergson's thought it must be informed by spirit (l'ame)- conceived on the model of artistic grace, eternal mobility, lightness, vitality on the move, dynamism on the alert-and hence as creative, spirit (l'ame) seen through the logic of imagination as life, duration (la *duree),* spirit *(l'esprit)* •

Technique may be the instrument of barbarism and mediocrity. In 1914 Bergson could view Germany, militarized by Prussia, as a mechanism carried to the extreme of materialization, without the ennobling and spiritualizing ideals of France's 18th century: the inviolability of law, the eminent dignity of the person, the obligation of peoples to respect one another. For Bergson, the true mission of man lies in introducing into the world the greatest possible charge of freedom. The object of human life is not the fabrication of tools but the "creation of himself by himself"- and *technique* is but an instrument of freedom.

In comparing Marx and Bergson, J\1. Ebacher finds them in accord that inherent in man is a " will to power imposing itself on nature making it enter into human plans. Both recognize that the primary role of *technique* is to transform nature into an object for man and place it under his dominion." *(p.* 213) He adds that while "for Marx Man-as- Technician is a result, for Bergson he is a point of departure for the superhuman *(sur-humain)* -the conversion of *technique* into the philosophical and mystical." It belongs to technology to create a " new form of existence; open, personalized, creative, in a word, *divine.* The technician goes beyond himself toward that intuition where praxis and contemplation, action and being fuse together."

Bergson remarked in another place: "In the great work of creation which is at the origin [of things] and which carries itself out under our eyes we feel that we, ourselves participate, creators of ourselves." :rhus men put themselves to service in creating humanity, planetary man, as" masters associated with a greater J\iaster." This secular gnostic vision of a process tmiverse divinizing itself in man has a particular appeal to the contemporary mind. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener in *The Year 2000,* for example, foresee an era in which man makes his own nature, a *hybris* dominated future.

Certainly a major reason for continuing interest in Bergson lies in his influence on the thought of more recent thinkers like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin whose vision of evolution and of the eschaton certainly owes much to this master. Chardin, at the end of *L'Avenir de l'lwmme,* foresees the formation of a noi:isphere and the eventual separation of mankind into two realms. One of these, true to nature, transcends nature by participating in a gratuitously bestowed divine grace that opens man to God and the universe. Another part of mankind self-divinized, moves itself and is moved to an endless process of disgregation and dissolution. Some of the notions inspired by Bergson may be leading, fruitful, and amenable to inclusion in a synthesis that complements and expands *fides quaerens intellectum.* The role of technology is a case at point, for technology is reason applied to making and doing things-not " right " reason necessarily, for technology is notoriously blind to both means and ends. Norbert Wiener in one of his last books, *God and Golem Inc.,* recalls the

Golem myth to point up the fearsome potential of blind technology. Technology is the vehicle by which men's goals, men's loves, are realized-and " Two loves built two cities." The secular city is a conceivable product of technology. Yet to one living in the latter third of the 20th century, it might appear that "man making himself " tends to botch the job. The philosophic base and values of the technical society in its secular version seem infirm, and the anguish that Bergson once suggested seems not unjustified. Only a technology informed by right reason, art, and prudence, bears promise for the future.

M. Ebacher does not raise these latter issues but seeks to understand and elucidate his subject on its own terms. His work is scholarly, clear and firm in its conclusions. It seems somewhat overwritten in the sense that a great weight of analysis is often directed at minor points. It is often redundant as the same matter is brought out at successive stages of the author's development. Perhaps the essential argument could have been treated almost as well in a substantial article.

Nevertheless, this book is of considerable value in clarifying a specific aspect of the thought of Bergson and illuminating the conceptual origins, the metaphysical, psychological, and value premises of much contemporary evolutionary thought.

CHARLES R. DECHERT

The Catholic Univi!Tsity of America
Washington, D. C.

Philosophy and Contemporary Man, 1968, and *Current Issues in Modern Philosophy,* 1969. Edited by GEoRGE F. McLEAN, O. M. I. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press. Pp. 193 each. $7.95 each.

Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Vol. 4. 1969. Edited by JoHN K. RYAN. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1969. Pp. 232. $7.50.

The workshops in philosophy held at Catholic University early each summer have come to serve as a barometer for the changing atmosphere of the profession among one segment of Americans practicing this art. There may be a tendency to identify this group as Catholic by religious persuasion and therefore scholastic in orientation. The reasoning here would be true on the whole, yet there have always been notable violators of the pact: one thinks of Brownson and W. M. Urban. The volumes under review harbinger an opening to thought structures and approaches which bring to mind men such as these two.

The two volumes of papers issuing from the 1966 Workshop are not reduced in relevance by the passage of time alone; the philosophical world lives with a lower pulse rate than do other areas of knowledge. Indeed, if there is a pervasive spirit in these Proceedings, it is precisely that such a gap exists, and that there is considerable wherewithal within the writers' tradition to bridge it, if it can be but utilized.

Philosophy and Contemporary Man divides its attention between the problems of relating philosophy, located primarily within the liberal arts curriculum, with the ever-evolving methodologies of the " hard " and " soft " sciences. Five papers range over the physical and social sciences, culture, art, and psychoanalysis. Taken together, these presentations offer considerable material for explicating the current clash between scientific and " philosophic " methods, on the one hand, and the person-oriented stress on the intuitive which is seen developing today in counterpoint to technology.

Another section of this study offers four papers on specifically Christian thought and its ramifications, or lack of such, on the contemporary mind. Here we are suplied with *reportata* from an incisive panel discussion of the interaction of person and society from historical, epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Still another section of this volume takes up the question of theism in American culture. Three essays are given over to the pragmatists' view of religion and the originality of this native product. Consequences are seen in the recent " death of God " furor which will affect the future of American religious thought in directions yet undetermined.

The second volume produced from the 1966 Workshop attempts to relate the changing philosophical temper in this country with the education of the Catholic clergy. *The Current Issues in Modern Philosophy,* then, is to be understood in this framework. Today's seminarian will encounter a society vastly different from that of the recent past, and effort must be employed to realign his education in accomodation. It may be said that this volume in its commentaries and analyses of Church discipline and the current condition of philosophy compares well with the best of European speculation. Especially praiseworthy are the several contributions of William T. Magee.

In addition to this series of Workshop Proceedings, and those resulting from ACPA conventions, the Catholic University Press irregularly issues a series entitled *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy,* under the editorship of John K. Ryan. We are now presented with Volume 4 of this series, featuring papers of some length by faculty and alumni of the Graduate School. The articles range over a variety interests, from an analysis of the logic found in the Confucian dialogues by A. S. Cua, to the implications of Ortega y Gasset's "radical reality," or the object of first philosophy. Dr. Caroline Putnam examines the profile of the philo-

sopher-monk presented in the writings of Denis, Pseudo-Areopagite, while Dr. Jude Dougherty critizes the once-current view that medieval philosophy and theology proved an obstacle to the advent of modem scientific methodology. Although now laid to rest, it is not yet clear exactly why this interpretation of the period between ancient and modem thought did not act as a preventative to modem methodology, however clear the fact itself may be.

Problems indigenous to the scholastic field are represented in the contributions of John Quinn and Bernardino Bonansea who discuss time in Augustine and Scotus's interpretation of Anselm, respectively. An intriguing view of the doctrine on universals which is possible to extract from Aquinas forms the basis of Ryosuke lnagaki's survey of this subject. The author stresses that knowledge of being is intrinsic to an appreciation of Aquinas's position on the nature of universal concepts. It is being which gives reality to the universal, and only in relation to being can it be understood. Standing in the way of this realization by Thomistic commentators, says lnagaki, has been an attitude limiting knowledge to that of nature and a demand that the analogy of being first be reduced to univocity. Paradoxically, the univocity of the so-called universal concept is conjectured by the author to require being's equivocity as its first context. On the whole, this latest volume in the series commands respect and reflects the cosmopolitan interests of scholars operating within the Christian ambit of Western thought, but by no means therefore parochial in vision.

JOHN B. DAVIS, O. P.

The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pa.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Alba House: *Theology: Science of Salvation,* by Rene Latourelle, S. J. (Pp. *$5.95).*

Archie J. Bahm: *Directory of American Philosophers* V 1970-1971 (Pp. 436, $14.95).

Beauchesne et Ses Fils: *L'Activite Artistique,* by M.-D. Philippe (Tome I, pp. 448, F 45,00).

Bruce Publishing Co.: *Contemporary Protestant Thought,* by C. J. Curtis (Pp. *$6.95); New Morality or No Morality,* ed. by Robert Campbell (Pp. *$6.95); Contemporary Pastoral Counseling,* ed. by Eugene J. Weitzel (Pp.

Catholic University of America Press: *Tommaso Campanella.* Renaissance Pioneer of Modem Thought, by Bernardino M. Bonansea (Pp. $14.50).

Congregation of the Marian Fathers: *Lord Have Mercy on Us* (Pp. 79; *Domine, Miserere Nobis* (Pp. 86).

Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Scientificas: *Bartolome de las Casas. De Regia Potestate o Derecho de Autodeterminacion,* critical bi-ligual edition by Luciano Perefia, J. M. Perez, Prendes Vidal Abril, Joaquin Azcarraga (Pp. 473, 450 pesetas).

East-West Center Press: *Advaita Vcdanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction,* by Eliot Deutsch (Pp. 119, $6.00).

Fides Publishers, Inc.: *The Making of the Christian Church,* by Richard Zehnle (Pp. 180, *$2.50); Theology Today Series (95¢* each) : No. 4 *The Theology of the Trinity,* by Laurence Cantwell, S. J. (Pp. 94); No. *5 The Theology of Creation,* by Robert Butterworth, S. J. (Pp. 91); No. 7 *The Theology of History,* by Osmund Lewry, 0. P. (Pp. 96); No. 8 *The Theology of the Church,* by Peter Hebblethwaite, S. J. (Pp. 93); No. 9 *Theology of Ecumenism,* by Michael Hurley, S.J.

B. Herder Book Co.: *The Continuous Flame: Teilhard in the Great Traditions,* ed. by Harry J. Cargas (Pp. 138, $1.85).

Holt, Rinehart & Winston: *The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense,* by Mortimer Adler (Pp. 374, $7.95); *The God of Space and Time,* by Bernard J. Cooke (Pp. 217, $4.95); *Between Earth and Heaven.* Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, and the Meaning of Christian Tragedy, by Roger L. Cox (Pp. 271, *$5.95); The Seminarian.* A Novel, by Michel Del Castillo (Pp. 135, $4.96).

Humanities Press, Inc.: *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science.* Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1966/1968, ed by Robert S. Cohen & Marx W. Wartofsky (vol. IV: pp. *555,* $20.00; vol. V: pp. 490, $16.75); *Evolution, Marxism and Christianity,* by Claude Cuenot (Pp. llO, $3.00); *Science and Faith in Teilhard de Chardin,* by Claude Cuenot (Pp. 109, $3.00).

Martinus Nijhoff, Publisher: *Language and Illumination,* by S. Morris Engel (Pp. 150, 19.80 guilders).

Oxford University Press: *A Short History of Western Liturgy,* by Theodor Klauser (Pp. 244, $8.00); *The New English Bible* with the Apocrypha, (Pp. 1815, $9.95).

Philosophical Library: *Spinoza: A Life of Reason,* by Abraham Wolfson (Pp. 363, $6.00); *Book of Onias,* by R. C. Crossfield (Pp. 69, $3.50); *Jesus Alias Christ.* A Theological Detection, by Simon S. Levin (Pp. 136, $5.50); *In God's Image,* by Jacob Rosin (Pp. 81, $4.00); *The Beginning Spring,* by Robert Louis Nathan (Pp. 138, $4.95).

Random House: *The Visages of Adam.* Readings Philosophical on the Nature of Man, by H. A. Nielsen (Pp. 385, $3.75).

Charles Scribner's Sons: *Religion in Ancient History.* Studies in Ideas, Men and Events, by S. G. F. Brandon (Pp. 426, $12.50).

Sheed & Ward: *Dissent In and For the Church. Theologians and Humanae Vitae,* by Charles E. Curran, Robert E. Hunt, and the " Subject Professors " (Pp. 249, $3.93) ; *The Responsibility of Dissent: The Church and Academic Freedom,* by John F. Hunt and Terrence Connolly (Pp. 240, $3.95) .

Tulane University: *Tulane Studies in Philosophy.* Epistemology II Vol. XVIII/1969 (Pp. 130, $2.50).

University of Notre Dame Press: *The Spirit and Power of Christian Secularity,* ed. by Albert L. Schlitzer, C. S.C. (Pp. 230, $10.00).