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METAPHYSICS AS CREATIVITY

THE QUESTION to which the author addresses himself is the following: is there an analogical sense in which metaphysics is creative? The answer given to the question is orchestrated by the conviction that metaphysical conclusions are truly synthetic and not analytic; novel and not tautological.

To make out of nothing is an act finding no analogue within the created order. Creation, properly speaking, is the effect of God whose divine *fiat* makes things to be out of nothing. Secondary causes determine being in the order of specification. They do not cause to be where before there was nothing at all. The analogy between God's creative act and what we shall call here human creativity emerges when we take account of creation as existential novelty. God's creative act is so novel that paradoxically enough it adds nothing new. God plus creation does not make "two." "Before" God creates there are no beings *(entia):* there is only *lpsum Esse Subsistens.* " After " God creates there is no new *esse* but only an order

of *entia* which " previously " had not been at alP This strikingly Christian metaphysics of creation does away with every classical dualism. There is only one world, not two.[2] Analogically, novelty within the immanent order of being is the contrary to the analytic order. As an intellectual operation, analytic reasoning is Aristotle's" resolution back to the causes" of a reality given the mind for scientific penetration or critical evaluation. The mind takes the given, the object, and reduces it or breaks it down to its constituent causal principles. In so doing, the intelligence traces backward that which unfolds " forward" dynamically within the real.[3] This dynamic thrust must rigorously hold in check all of those contingent factors that disturb the ordered finality of the cosmos. Wherever contingency significantly alters the actualizing of finalities potentially present within a nature, that nature escapes-to the degree to which it is subject to finality-a perfect analytical resolution within the mind. In a word, the classical Aristotelian ideal of science insists upon the necessity of its object. The analytic order, therefore, is ultimately tautological, but *only* ultimately so. Novelty here belongs to the understanding which comes to penetrate that which is given whole and complete to itself. But there is no true novelty in the reality subsequently understood. There is only the fulfillment of ontological expectations. For these reasons predictable reality is capable of being dominated by demiurgical science. Technical power over the real is identified with the predictability of future univocal instances of a type which has *already* been penetrated analytically, resolved to its causes and-especially-to its final cause. Scientific mastery over the cosmos proceeds through understanding models or types of realities whose individual instances

[1] The issue is argued cogently in Gerald Phelan, " The Being of Creatures," *Selected Papers,* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies), pp. 83-94.

[2] The classic study on pagan dualism Yersus Christian creationism is *Christianity and Classical Culture,* by Charles Norris Cochrane (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), esp. pp. 399-456.

[a] Cf. my *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence* (Dallas: University of Dallas Press, 1969).

can be expected, all things being equal, to conform to their norm. Although every being is novel *as being*, natures which merely unfold their potentialities analytically are not novel *as natures.*

By novelty in this essay we mean existential creativity, that which is not reducible analytically to a pre-existent given or type and which, therefore, cannot be predicated " before " the event nor reduced to formal necessities already given " after " the event. At the risk of pre-judging our conclusions before we have marshalled the evidence, we maintain that novelty is synthesis, synthesis taken in the Thomistic sense of the term and not in the Hegelian. [4]

The metaphysical problem in this context bifurcates: 1) in what sense is metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline, a habit, synthetic? in what sense is the subject of First Philosophy synthetic? Metaphysical methodology, as Father Robert Henle pointed out a number of years ago,[5] never adds content to its point of departure. Whereas other sciences develop extensively by adding intelligibility to intelligibility, metaphysics cannot proceed in this fashion because outside of being there is nothing at all.[6] Metaphysics is an intensive rather than extensive performance. This does not suggest, however, that metaphysics merely renders explicit what is implicit in its point of departure. Were metaphysics merely a science of explicitation, a Voegelinian " articulation " of an archaically given " compactness " [7] or experience, metaphysics would ultimately be reducible to the analytic order which is capable of being expressed logically in the proposition of tautological identity," *A* is *A."* The analytic

• Briefly: Helgelian synthesis consists in the resolution of tensions through the dialectic; Thomistic synthesis consists in unifying in existence diverse aspects of the essential order which are not analytically implicated in one another. The subject is explored in my book (cf. note 3), esp. Chapter IV.

[5] Robert L. Henle, *Method in Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1951) .

[6] This is the constant teaching of St. Thomas; a classic text is *De Potentia Dei*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

[7] Eric Voegelin, *Ordlff and History, Israel and Revelation*, Vol. 1 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), esp. x-xvi.

bends backwards upon a subject given to the mind and bombards that subject with predicates whose intelligibilities were initially abstracted from the sensorial order by the agent intellect co-operating with the order of phantasms, symobls. This method is impossible for metaphysics because it supposes that the subject of First Philosophy, *ens commune,* is a given, a datum, a determined whole present to the intelligence. Were *ipsum esse* a given, it would *be.* But the act of existing does not exist, even as an intentional object.[8] Metaphysics never encounters an " object " as the intentional term of its conclusions.9 Metaphysics does not articulate the meaning of an intelligible content present to itself. Metaphysical judgments terminate in the "being-true" *(esse verum)* of propositions bearing upon the act oℓ existing/[0] The metaphysical habit, therefore, does not express conceptually the non-conceptualizable act of existing which can only be affirmed or denied in judgment, never conceived in acts of simple understanding. The issue is worthy oℓ further elucidation because of the emergence in recent years of the Thomistic school which insists upon the transcendental method as the proper point of departure for metaphysical speculation.

Fathers Coreth, Rahner, and Lonergan, in the tradition of Marechal, find the metaphysical structure of being as being in the inbuilt dynamism of the intelligence.[11] The unrestricted

[8] Thomas Aquinas, *In de Divinis Nominibns,* cap. VIII, lect. I, "... non sic proprie dicitur quod *esse* sit, sed quod per *esse* aliquid sit." The issue is explored in my *El problema de la trascendencia en la metafisica actual,* Coleccion filosofica de Ia Universidad de Navarra (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S. A., 1963), esp. pp. 75-89.

• Cf. my "The *Triplex Via," The New Scholasticism,* XLIV, 2 (Spring, 1970), 223-235.

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2; *De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 2, ad I. St. Thomas's insistence that the demonstration for God's existence does not terminate in God's *Esse* but in the truth of the proposition is paradigmatic for *all* metaphysical demonstrations. Concerning the *esse verum* itself, cf. Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "The 'To Be' Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* Vol. XVI (1940), esp. pp. 234-245; cf. my *Man's Knowledge of Reality* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 5th printing), pp. 134-156.

[11] E. Coreth, *Metaphysik.* Eine Methodish-Systematische Grundlegung (Inns-

and potentially infinite reach of the mind bespeaks its corresponding answer in being. (It is not without interest in this context that Father Lonergan opts for John of St. Thomas's designation of *lpsum lntelligere* rather than *lpsum Esse Subsistens* as the ultimate Name of God).[12] This author is convinced that a thorough study of the transcendental method would reveal a metaphysics in which " to be " would emerge as a function of" to know"; being, a function of meaning; existence, a derivation of essence, somewhat the way in which answers depend on questions. The economy of this study prohibits our exploring these possibilities, but that economy does not absolve us from our duty to point out the following:

I) If the transcendental richness of being can be discovered simply by reflecting upon the dynamic exigencies of any act of understanding, it follows that metaphysics is implicitly present within the mind of any intelligent man capable merely of reflecting upon the conditions of his own understanding; 2) if this were true, metaphysics would not be an intellectual discipline that proceeded by way of separation and negation, which last is St. Thomas's own understanding of metaphysical methodology; this last does not argue against the validity of the transcendental method but, as Father James B. Reichmann has indicated, it does render dubious that method when advanced by philosophers who claim to be Thomists; [13] 3) with the same Father Reichmann we fail to see how the transcendental being conditioning every act of understanding, itself unconditioned, could be anything other than essence. With Father Lonergan

bruck, 1961); K. Rahner, *Geist in Welt* (Innsbruck, 1939); J. B. Lonergan, *Insight,* A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library. revised students' edition, 1967); "Metaphysics as Horizon," *Collection.,* ed. by F. E. Crowe, S. J. (Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 202-221; J. B. Lotz, *Das Urteil und das Sein,* Eine Grundlegund der Metaphysik (Pullach bei Mi.inchen, 1957).

[19] Lonergan, *Insight,* pp. 657-677. My basic disagreement with Father Lonergan centers around what he calls " The Idea of Being." I deny that there is any " idea " of Being in the sense of actual existence; any other " idea of Being " would be irrelevant to metaphysics in my understanding of the discipline.

[13] James B. Reichmann, S. J., " The Transcendental Method and The Psychogenesis of Being," *The Thomist,* XXXII, 4 (October, 1968), 449-508.

himself we insist upon the difference between understanding and judgment.[14] With St. Thomas we hold that the act of understanding reiterates intelligible structures, realities, essences.[15] Judgment affirms these structures or realities to exist. The task of disengaging being from mere meaning, existence from essence, is exactly what the word itself suggests: a *task,* a work of reasoning! The reasoning in question follows St. Thomas's insistence that the metaphysician distinguishes not by abstracting but by separating *esse* from its modes.[16] No act of intellectual reflection, altogether apart from reasoning about the mystery of the unity of all being within community,[17] can lead us to the conclusion that " to be " is not identically to be any essence. True metaphysical transcendence is one with the mind's judgment that existence transcends essence. In no sense is this conclusion implicitly contained within any act of understanding, nor is it deducible from intelligibilities intrinsic to data discovered within any series of acts of understanding.

Although no essence englobes *esse* as constitutive, all essences are englobed within *esse.* This conclusion is thoroughly synthetic because it is not deduced or " unpacked " in the felicitous term of Father Joseph OwenS.[18] The reasoned conclusion falls altogether outside of data found in the immanent structure of the world. That *esse* be related to essence as act is to potency is a synthetic judgment orchestrated by a structurally *negative*

[14] This difference constitutes the core of Father Lonergan's critique of Leslie Dewart's *The Future of Belief,* cf. Lonergan, "The Dehellenization of Dogma," *The Future of Belief Debate,* ed. by Gregory Baum (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp.

[15] Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Questiones Quinta et Sexta,* Hach dem Autograph Cod. Vat. lat. 9850 mit Einleitung herausgegeben von Paul Wyser, 0. P. (Fribourg: Societe Philosophique, 1948), q. *5.* a. 3, responsio, pp. 38-41; E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers,* second ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, esp. pp.

[16] Thomas Aquinas, *ibid.,* pp. 38-9.

[17] I have borrowed the term "community" from Father Reichmann's study, *op. cit.,* pp. 498-503.

[18] Joseph Owens, *An Interpretation of Existence* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 80-84.

reasoning process. The widespread conviction that every possibility must be actualized one day or another is a conclusion profoundly embedded not only within the Cartesian raationalist tradition but within the pagan Greek world as well: being, actual existence, exercise, is somehow a formal effect already structured within the objectively given, essence. This analytic reduction of existence to essence was attacked by St. Thomas in that work of his youth, the *De Ente et Essentia.*[19] Were a nature to cause its own being (or to cause its being as if the latter were a property), the nature would have to be before it was. The only being of the possible is that of an existing mind capable of conceiving the possible and of an existing cause capable of producing it. To borrow a most apt term coined by Father Lonergan/[0] "performance" is an ultimate. And it is precisely performance, exercised act, be-ing, that is never given analytically. We can conclude, therefore, to the following paradox: although it is true that metaphysics never adds anything to its point of departure which is being as being, it is also true that metaphysics does not discover this point of departure *in anything* at all given the mind as a real object intentionally present to spirit.

The issue is almost banefully obvious. Were the act of existing discoverable *in* the cosmos as part and parcel thereof, we could presume that the scientific masters of the cosmos would be master metaphysicians! It takes no sociological statistic to inform us that the very elucidation of the proposition is sufficient to render it ridiculous. In a word: metaphysical conclusions are synthetic, they are novel. They point towards the following conclusion which shall be argued in due course: metaphysical conclusions are truly creative. Before moving to this further issue, we reiterate once again: metaphysical conclusions, doctrines, are one with the " being-true " of meta-

[19] Thomas Aquinas, *Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de s. Tlwmas D'Aquin,* Texte etabli d'apres les manuscrits parisiens. Introduction, Notes et Etudes historiques par M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, 0. P., Chapter IV.

[go] Lonergan, *op. eit.,* "Metaphysics as Horizon," *passim.*

physical propositions; nonetheless, these truths are known thanks only to the method of separation and negation.

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The existential character of *all* syllogistic reasoning, be it metaphysical or not, was explored brilliantly by Joseph Owens in his *An Interpretation of Existence.* [21] Whereas analytic inference moves from an already given to conclusions formally, albeit implicitly, contained therein, strict syllogistic reasoning-be it deductive or inductive-does not infer from a given which is explicated subsequently but from the linking together of two premises which engender the conclusion. The conclusion is not contained even implicitly in *either* preinise, major or minor, argues Father Owens. The reasoning in question is not formal but is one with an act transcending both premises. This act of the intelligence is thoroughly synthetic, we might add, in that it consists in concluding to new knowledge in the performance of joining together in the mind two premises that do not have to be joined by any formal necessity whatsoever! An objector might cavil by insisting that the conclusion is truly present implicitly in a formal sense once the premises have been brought together. This objection, however, is invalid because the distinction between synthesizing major and minor premises and then concluding is virtual, not real. No formal necessity forces the intellect to join two knowns in order to conclude to the hitherto unknown! (This is the genuine advance, we do believe, made by Owens.) To "see" intellectually the premises as synthesized *is to conclude.* "\Ve are touching here the mystery of efficient causality which so troubled Hume. Hume was aware that being, including-of course-the being of rational discourse, its " going-on," simply escapes the order of formal intelligibility. [22] Again the paradoxical structure of existence

[21] Owens, *op. cit.,* pp. 80-85.

[22] Cf. David Hume, *The Letters of David Hume,* I, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), 187; *An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, 171;0, by David Hume,* with an introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. Srafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), esp. pp. 13-23.

eludes the essential order: whereas I must conclude as I do in strict demonstration, the very exercise or performance of my reasoning and concluding by-passes every essential exigency found within the data about which I am reasoning.

Synthetic reasoning is trans-evolutionary, whereas analytic thinking is evolutionary. Conclusions in the analytic order are already latently present within the data from which they are deduced. It follows that analytic thinking is always theoretically predictable: given the proper data, conclusions concerning such-and-such predictably follow. The computer can merely simulate synthetic reasoning because electronic simultaneity removes from us the enormous task of thinking-through a situation within non-electronic time. Computerized conclusions are new to us, *quoad nos,* but they are not new in themselves. Already programmed into the computer, these conclusions are there-to-be-known before being known formally. They are "unpacked," as Owens would put it, or, in the slang of the trade, "garbage in, garbage out." The content of knowledge in the analytic order is already *present* as content before it is known as such. The act of syllogistic reasoning, however, is not previously there as intentional presence, even "stored" intentional presence. *Esse* is in every sense act and in no sense potency. This commonplace of Thomistic metaphysics takes on new significance if focused upon an order of knowledge-metaphysics itself-that always concludes " indirectly " and that terminates, not in natures given to consciousness but in truths about Being.

Synthetic reasoning is not, of course, anti-evolutionary but rather trans-evolutionary. Were this reasoning anti-evolutionary no philosopher or scientist or creative artist could look back on labor done in the past and see in it the seeds of the present development of his work. But hindsight is never foresight. Had present development been present in the past, it would have" been." Therefore we would not be dealing with development but with already actualized achievement-possibly explicated more fully but nonetheless already *there.* Efficient causality exercised in the mind posits or sets up *in being* formal

structures *which can then be analyzed backwards.*[23] Thus we set students to work tracing the progress of the thought of Kant or Aquinas, for example. Tracing spiritual progress, critical exegesis, involves beginning with *omega* and working back to *alpha.* Were these students commencing with *alpha* they would not be students of philosophy but philosophers. The history of ideas is fairly rational and comprehensive when read backwards. **It** makes a moderately intelligible pattern. This history, however, could never have been predicted. Today I know that Kant and Hegel demanded Descartes as background, but from the vantage point of the sixteenth century I could never have deduced either Kantianism or Hegelianism from exigencies supposedly latent in Cartesian rationalism. Had I done so I would have been Kant or Hegel rather than a commentator on Descartes. True intellectual insight or breakthrough has no strict relationship with the normal progress or evolution of a discipline whose practicioners draw out implications formally present in knowledge already accumulated. "Discovery" is not what its semantics suggest, the uncovering of the given; discovery is rather the intentional being *(esse verum)* and expression *(verbum, dictio)* of the *new.* This consideration heightens the annoying experience all original thinkers have with their gifted pupils; what takes thinkers who are pioneers years to come up with is often grasped immediately by bright learners. The spontaneous reaction, " of course," " it's obvious," " why can't everybody see that! " was not at all so evident or obvious to the man who first made the discovery *before he made it!* In physics, for instance, scientific advance rarely depends on historical residue, and the trailblazer largely depends on his own wits. Genius heightens the synthetic structure found in all syllogistic reasoning, whereas more moderately endowed intelligence contents itself with analyzing hypotheses or theories already eleborated or with commenting upon artistic creation produced

[23] Synthesis always precedes analysis and engloves it. I have argued elsewhere that the act of synthesizing is *esse,* whereas essence is the analytic of being. (cf. Wilhelmsen, *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence,* esp. Chapter IV).

by other men. One man's synthesis either becomes the occupation of other men-scholars, for instance-or an analytic moment within their own syntheses. These last are never reducible simply to what goes into them.[24] Is this not the very meaning of originality?

Father Owens points out the peculiarly heightened way in which metaphysical conclusions bearing on existence fall totally outside the horizon or ambient of the premises engendering them. He compares the mathematical conclusion that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles with the metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God. In the mathematical example, the conclusion is contained neither in the definition of triangle nor in the notion of a parallel line drawn through the apex. "But these two notions when taken together result in the new knowledge contained in the conclusion . . . [but] the equality of the angles to two right angles does not get away from the triangle itself."[25] This is not true of the reasoning concluding to God's existence as Cause of Being. The being-true of the proposition "God exists" not only is contained in no nature whatsoever but it is nowhere in any of the information from which the metaphysician concludes as he does. The impossibility of analytically inferring existence from essence or meaning, as either a constituent or as following formally as would a property, moves the mind to conclude that essence is dependent on its own *esse* and is therefore posterior to *esse* within the complexity of the sensibly perceived and affirmed existent. Given that the "to be" of the existent does not exist or " subsist," the metaphysician is confronted with the weird situation of a nature dependent upon its own existence which existence, in turn, does not exist. But whatever does not exist in itself is dependent on what does exist in itself. A

•• This conclusion was first suggested to the author in his work on the metaphysics of love. No act of love is ever explicable in terms of the reasons *why* we love. Grounded in *esse,* love always escapes any attempt at analytic reductionism. It follows that there is no answer to the famous question: why did God create the world? Love is not a reason.

•• Owens, *op. cit.,* p. 83.

double dependence emerges, nature upon its *esse* and *esse* upon -what? The ultimate conclusion, that the " to be " of any *res* depends upon a Being whose Nature is To Be, totally escapes the data. Nonetheless, this conclusion is inevitable once the philosophical habit has pushed itself across the frontier of nature into the order of being as being. The issue was expressed trenchantly by St. Thomas when he wrote that, " the First Cause who is God does not enter into the essence of created things; nonetheless, the *esse* which is in things cannot be understood except as' deduced' from the Divine *Esse."* [26] The act of affirming God to exist is possibly the supreme instance of efficient causality within the intentional order reiterating efficient causality in the extramental order. The absolute novelty of being is answered by the relative novelty of metaphysical knowledge. Analogously to the way in which the synthetic function of *esse* is never reducible to the substantial and accidental modes of reality that *esse* posits, the synthetic character of metaphysical conclusions escapes the data engendering them. Human intellectual creativity thus imitates Divine Creation.

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The creativity of metaphysical doctrine is illustrated further and radicalized by both its negative and " separative " structures. Typical metaphysical method involves an exercise of reason which constantly separates (relatively) the act of being from the order of nature and which subsequently denies that being *(esse)* is the way in which the human mind is constrained to conceive being. The diverse *rationes* entis-existence as act, perfection, synthesis, the good, the true, etc.-are so many *verba* of the intelligence that escape univocal conceptualization and symbolization. Even more: given that *all* conceptual-

•• *De Pot.,* q. 3, a. *5,* ad 1. The demonstration of God's existence from what I have called "the double dependence " is the nerve center of the *De Ente et Essentia.* This demonstration depends upon the *prior* distinction between existence and essence. In opposition to Father Owens I hold that this distinction is known to be real and not merely notional *anterior* to the proof for God's existence.

ization and symbolization are formally univocal, if only reductively so in many instances, it follows that not only God but even created *esse* falls outside every intentional act in the sense of not being terms present to the mind in understanding. [27] These *verba* are not conceptual terms *within* the essential order. They are simply truths (with a small " t ") about the principle with which nature is *not* identified, nature's own being. Any other conception of metaphysical knowledge would see it as a kind of super-physics or crowning of all other intellectual activity through a prolongation or reflection upon exigencies already discovered within the diverse scientific, humanistic, and philosophical although non-metaphysical, disciplines. Were this the case, metaphysics would be ultimately analytic and theoretically predictable in its development. Existence would fall back into essence. Creationism would fade away into legend and late twentieth-century man would have returned to the closed universe of his pagan forefathers. Norbert Del Prado's

[27] Thomas Aquinas, *In de Divinis Nominibus,* c. *5,* lect. 2 (Torino: Marietti, 1950), n. 660, p. 245: " Deinde, cum dicit Dionysius . . *Et ipsum* . . . ostendit quomodo *esse* se habeat ad Deum; et dicit quod ipsum *esse commune est ex* primo Ente, quod est Deus, et ex hoc sequitur quod esse commune aliter se habeat ad Deum quam alia existentia, quantum ad tria: primo quidem, quantum ad hoc quod alia existentia dependet ab esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune dependet a Deo; et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius quod ipsum *esse commune est ipsiU8 Dei,* tamquam ab Ipso dependet, *et non ipse* Deus *est esse,* idest ipsius esse communis, tamquam ab ipso dependens. Secundo, quantum ab hoc, quod omnia existentia continenter sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub eius virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam ipsum esse creatum: et hoc est quod dicit, quod *esse* commune *est in ipso* Deo sicut contentum in continente *et non* e converso *ipse* Deus est *in eo quod est esse.* Tertio: quantum ad hoc quod omnia alia existentia participant eo quod est esse, non autem Deus, sed magis ipsum esse creatum est quaedam participatio Dei et similitudo lpsius; et hoc est quod dicit quod *esse* commune *habet lpsum* scilicet Deum, ut participans similitudinem Eius, *non* autem *ipse* Deus *habet esse* quasi participans ipso esse." This text must be linked with the insistence in the *De Ente et Essentia,* c. 4, that the demonstration for God's existence involves the double dependence spoken of in the text of this study, "alia existentia dependent ab esse communi " but " esse commune dependet a Deo." These considerations reveal the impossibility of talking metaphysical good sense about the act of existing in isolation from either God or the nature whose very be-ing *esse* " is." They point up the synthetic structure of the existential order as well as the synthetic structure of the intentional order of metaphysics as an intellectual discipline.

insistence, made in 1911, that the "real distinction" is the *Veritas Fundamentalis Philosophiae Christianae* is as true today as it was then.[28] The fact that contemporary Thomism has moved far beyond Del Prado without contradicting him is an illustration of the thesis being advanced in this essay.

The non-identity of *esse* and essence is deducible from *neithe1·* existence *nor* essence for the following reasons: 1) *esse* (unlike the existent) is never a given from which anything could be deduced (from the bare consideration of *ipsum esse* nothing follows because quite literally there is no *ipsum esse* as either real or intentional object), 2) essence is existentially neutral and therefore yields no truths whatsoever about being; conversely, no examination of essence can yield falsehoods about being. From an analysis, *a la* Hegel, of either *esse* or essence we would have to conclude to the nonsense that nothing exists at all. *lpsum esse* or *ens commune* in abstraction from *ens* or from *lpsum Esse Subsistens* is Non-Being, Hegel's famous antithesis to Being; essence prescinded (not abstracted) from *esse* is equally Non-Being.[29] One overarching conclusion emerges from these considerations. An analytic *demarche* in metaphysics would have to commence with either existence as given or essence as given, but the point of departure from existence is blocked because *esse* is no object, and the point of departure from essence is useless because existentially neutral. Metaphysics lodges itself as a nascent habit in the mind when a man compares the diverse modes of existing of a common essence (existential diversity within essential community) or the relative unity and absolute diversity of everything in being. The exercise of this comparison of The One and The Many engenders the conclusion that existence transcends, while englobing, essence. The very performance of this act is synthetic, novel, creative. Every subsequent metaphysical per-

[28] Norbert Del Prado, *De Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae* (Friburgi Helvetiorum, 1911).

[29] Thomas Aquiuas, *De Ente et Essentia:* "Ergo patet quod natura . . . absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum." C. ill, ed. Roland-Gosseliu, p. 26.

formance manifests a similar structure without being thereby a simple articulation of the already known. In a profound sense there are no " alreadys " in metaphysics.

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We can no more demonstrate the structure of metaphysical knowledge from formal necessities, from " systematic " considerations, than we can dig *esse* out of essence. The immense difficulty in discussing the structure of metaphysical truths-and, *a fortiori,* their novelty and creativity-is rooted within the very mystery of existence as probed by Thomistic wisdom. Msgr. Gerald Phelan was a pioneer in pointing out the inadequacy of Aristotelian terminology for expressing St. Thomas's deeper insights into Being.[30] The fourfold nexus of causes that Aquinas inherited from Aristotle included, of course, the efficient cause-that existing agent which contributes to the generation of a substance or accident by actualizing a previously existent potency, a *real* potency in the classical language of the Schoolmen. Only that which exists can cause efficiently. **But** Aristotle's efficient cause forms part of nature. Within Thomism the Aristotelian insistence that only things that exist can produce existing effects was carried over in its entirety. The very meaning of efficient causation was simultaneously both deepened and obscured due to the Thomistic non-identity between existence and essence: deepened, because *esse* was affirmed as the very act of being which rendered efficiency possible, obscured, because *esse* simply cannot be fitted into Aristotle's list of causes. Phelan wanted to jettison the whole vocabularly of causality, at least in the crucial instance of creation.[31]

Is *esse* a cause? If by cause we mean a principle contributing

[80] Gerald B. Phelan, "The Being of Creatures," *Selected Pape:rs,* p. 87. "Consequently, discussion of the being of creatures in terms of causality, participation, composition of act and potency, *esse* and *quod est,* and all the familiar vocabulary of the production and reception of *being (esse)* used in reference to creation . . . all this still enveloped the thought of St. Thomas in an aura of essentialism."

[81] Phelan, *ibid.*

to the production of being, then *esse* is both cause *and effect:* cause in the sense of being the act of all acts, that without which no other cause acts; effect, in the sense that the" to be" of any thing whatsoever results from the " aggregation " of aU four Aristotelian causes at work: i.e., without an agent acting (sexual activity of man and woman), upon properly disposed matter (ovum, seed, etc.), according to their natures (humanity) , for an end (propagation of the race, etc.), the child does not come into being. *Esse* as an ultimate act fascinated Cajetan and opened him to a furious attack by Bafiez.[32] St. Thomas's statement that *esse* " results from the principles of nature" permitted Siger de Brabant to treat the Common Doctor roughly.[33] The ambiguities simply point up the puzzling characteristics of radical existential activity when expressed in terms proper to Aristotelian meta-physics. If we wished to exploit the Aristotelian terminology, we might designate *esse* as an " internal efficient-formal cause." *Esse* is "most formal," the act even of forms. But *esse* could be called, by a stretch of language, an internal efficient cause because *esse* is ultimate radical activity of all that is, that which is most intimate to any being whatsoever.[34] But an "internal formal-efficient cause" requires such a degree of refinement in order to escape a nest of contradictions that it is dubious that the term could ever receive widespread acceptance. An act which is determined by

[32] Domingo Bafiez, *The Primacy of Existence in Thomas Aquinas,* translation with an introduction and notes by Benjamin S. Llamzon (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966); E. Gilson, "Cajetan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophic, 15,* pp. 54-72; F. Wilhelmsen, "History and Existence," *Thought,* XXXVI, no. 141 (Summer, 1961), pp. 207-214.

[33] The controversy is detailed by Gilson in his *Being and Some Philosophers,* pp. 64-73.

[34] *Summa Theologiae,* I, ad 8, 1: "Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ipsius ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quamdiu in esse conservantur , .. quamdiu igitur res habet esse, tamdiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt . . . Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime"; Cf. *In I Sent.,* d. 37, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa Contra Gentiles,* III, c. 67.

that which it makes be rather than determining its own proper effect escapes the nature of Aristotle's efficient cause. In truth, we encounter here, once again, the incapacity of the human mind to express *esse* in a *verbum* of simple understanding. The metaphysician can only orchestrate and deepen his insights about being by taking account of the univocal structure of every meaning when applied analogically to *esse.* This truth prohibits metaphysics from ever halting in any " vision of Being," and it spurs the philosopher to further reasoning issuing into subsequent judgments which are never reducible to his point of departure. The *scientia* of metaphysics concludes by separation and negation to truths about being which are simply as novel as is being.

The heart of creation, existence, is forbidden any direct access to the intellect through the intelligible species. Never given in concepts, existence is never given at all. In a deep and mysterious sense, First Philosophy " creates " within the intentional order a world of *truths* about Being. These truths are not frozen into a univocist Platonic Truth capitalized and thus contemplated in terminal intellectual vision. The creation of a New Order of Knowledge concerning the Order of Being is itself being, the very being of reasoned judgments. These considerations, if substantially valid, constrain us to conclude that metaphysics is not only thoroughly synthetic and therefore creative but it also enables us to give Kant his due even while transcending him. Kant's complaint about metaphysics was lodged in his insistence that metaphysics was an absolutely universal and necessary science about absolutely Nothing at all. Kant was right. Metaphysics bears on no "object" in the strict Aristotelian sense of the term, nor do metaphysical insights play over formal intelligibilities interiorized intentionally in the mind. Kant was wrong only in supposing that knowledge is reducible to intelligible content, be that content synthetic or analytic. *(Esse,* after all, is not the content of the synthesized but synthesizing as an act.) Because the mode of conceiving-the" meaning "-of metaphysical judgments must be denied of the truths affirmed,[35] the metaphysician is always

constrained to transcend his own conclusions. Being is *never* the way in which I am constrained to conceive it. The metaphysician's transcending negations catapult him out of any plateau of understanding and move him to use every conclusion as a point of departure for further reasoning about Being. These transcending negations generate new truths. Metaphysics is the only human science which is defined by its future. Were the First Philosopher to halt at any point, his conclusions would be debased into univocal falsifications of existence. Originality and creativity are not happy coincidences in the life of a genuine metaphysician; they are conditions for the very exercise of his profession.

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[35] The proposition must be taken formally as written: given that modes of conception function as predicates said of subjects; given that these predicates are intelligibilities finding their principles in intelligible species; given that intelligible species are the product of *determined* action by existing natures on the intelligence, it follows that *esse* is never expressable, even correctly but partially, by formal intelligibilities. God is true but not as I conceive truth; existence is perfection and act and synthesizing but not as I conceive these attributes. The *triplex via* functions within all metaphysical discourse and is not limited to man's judgments about God. (Cf. my "The *Triplex Via," loc.* cit.). I do not understand the *esse* of God which is " omnino ignotum" *(In Epistolam ad Romanos,* I, 6) and "penitus - - - ignotum" *(Summa Contra Gentiles,* III, c. 49). But even the *esse* of the most trivial creature is " entirely unknown " and " utterly unknown " if knowledge means *understanding,* rather than judgment. My " understanding," in this regard, is by analogy with the univocal order; unless this be understood and corrected constantly, metaphysics opens itself to the very critique launched against it by Kant in his *Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics,* edited in English by Dr. Paul Carns, reprinted edition (La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1945) .

ANALOGY AND THE DISREPUTE OF METAPHYSICS

THE INABILITY of metaphysicians to reach common and lasting agreement on any of their propositions is notorious. Furthermore, metaphysical philosophizing regularly produces statements which strike many as being strange or even meaningless. If the metaphysician's words are given the meanings they have in ordinary language, his statements may appear to be either internally inconsistent or to contradict contingently given matters of fact.

Modern philosophy has responded to this situation in two ways. Descartes felt that all a metaphysician had to do was to find a foolproof way to distinguish the certain from the doubtful and then apply this method to our philosophic problems. His method was modeled on that of mathematics; more recently we have been advised that the guarantee of success is the construction of our metaphysics on the basis of logic, or of biology, or of phenomenology, etc. The other way, made classic by Hume and Kant, holds that there is no such thing as a sound method for metaphysics because it is by nature an enterprise undertaken only as the result of some mistake. One contemporary version of this approach has it that metaphysical statements presuppose confusion about the logic of terms in everyday language.

This essay proposes a different kind of approach to metaphysics' difficulties. Drawing out implications of a familiar doctrine which is itself metaphysical, the doctrine that *being* is not a generic concept, it will argue that paradoxical formulas and great problems in achieving common agreement are to be expected in metaphysics without its necessarily being an illegitimate pursuit and without there being a still undiscovered royal road to answers for its questions. In other words, it will be argued that metaphysics has difficulties unique among human

intellectual endeavors because it is by its nature uniquely difficult. Not all the reasons that could be put forward for this claim will be examined here. The one I will focus on is important both because it involves previously unseen consequences of a classic discovery about the logic of many metaphysical concepts and because it is relevant to the attempt to deal with philosophical problems linguistically.

As metaphysical, the presuppositions of this account will be highly controversial if not thoroughly disreputable, and of necessity this will appear to the reader as a major weakness. But if the argument that there is no foolproof method to rid us of problems of the kind to which metaphysics gives rise is correct, then reliance on disputed assumptions must in fact be unavoidable. Actually, arguments have been offered many times in support of the assumptions made here; this essay will add nothing to them. What it hopes to contribute is an explanation of why arguments of precisely that kind have such difficulty winning common agreement, an explanation, however, which does not render these arguments null and void.

But of what benefit can it be to learn that, included in metaphysics' bag of tricks, are ways of accounting for its own peculiarities? Unless one shares its metaphysical assumptions, what could one learn from this study other than that metaphysicians are sometimes capable of cleverness, a point which is probably not in doubt. There is more to it than that. What is involved here is a choice between naive and non-naive approaches to these problems. Metaphysics is considered disreputable because of its embarrassing queerness and scandalous lack of agreement. But all attempts to rid us of these, whether of the Cartesian or the Humean-Kantian kinds, have generated as much controversy and paradox as they were trying to eliminate. So, a theory which can explain the existence of a type of problem that it can be subject to itself and which does not at the same time claim to be a way of avoiding that type of problem will have the advantage, unlike these other theories, of being consistent with the facts of our philosophical experience. That experience suggests that, whether we are pro- or

anti-metaphysics, when we humans begin to philosophize, we are not going to avoid difficulties of the kind metaphysicians get into. A significant, though partial, reason for this is found in the logic of concepts like that of *being.*

I

Against Parmenides, Aristotle pointed out that *being* is not related to particular classes of beings, and the characteristics which distinguish these classes from one another as a genus are related to its species and their specific differences. When it is said that a generic concept abstracts from differences which attach to the genus in its various species, "abstract" is used in a sense which is perfectly intelligible according to the standard of ordinary usage. Etymologically, " to abstract" means to draw from or separate from; and unless our language has meanings which are complex in such a way that some parts can be at least cognitively distinguished from others and referred to without referring to the others, the relations of genus to species to specific difference would not hold between any of our concepts. The same is true of the species-individual relation. We can refer to blue, for instance, because we have experienced it; but, whenever we refer to blue, we fail to refer to any number of things that were present with blue in any given experience of it. This is not to say that there are no philosophic difficulties associated with the use of the word" abstraction"; indeed there are. It is simply to say that the assertion that a genus abstracts from differences between species, or that a species abstracts from differences between individuals, does not by itself commit one to any philosophic theory of abstraction; it does not, for instance, commit one to the view that, in order to have a language with universal terms, we must first of all perform self-conscious and directed acts of focusing on some aspects of experience and distinguishing them from others.

Unfortunately, when one says that a generic concept does and *being* does not abstract, he is not only using the term "abstract " consistently with an ordinary usage, he is also employing the only terminology available in which to express

what it is that generic concepts do which concepts like *being* do not. This terminology is unfortunate because of Peter Geach's attack, in *Mental Acts,* on "abstractionism" as a theory of how we acquire generic and specific concepts; so, a few words relating my views to Geach's are necessary.

Although we are not in complete agreement, his central argument against abstractionism is one which is of equal importance to the case I am making. He points out (pp. 33-38) that to the genus-species relation between the concepts *chromatic color* and *red* there does not correspond a distinction between features really given in experience. There cannot be one feature of a thing by which it is colored and an additional feature by which it is red. There is no color in a red sense-object over and above the redness; otherwise it would not be true that red *is* a color. With this I am in agreement. But while being able to say that red is a color implies no real distinction between what is expressed by these concepts, it does imply a logical distinction. We can refer to one and the same " real " feature of our experience by means of the concept *red,* which concept will not refer to blue, or by means of the concept *chromatic color,* which will also refer to blue but not to white. These two concepts, in other words, refer to the same reality in logically distinct ways. And by the abstraction true of generic concepts but not true of concepts like *being* I mean the logical feature of generic concepts which distinguishes the way we refer to experience by means of them from the way we refer to experience by means of specific concepts. (Certainly, what is referred to by a specific concept was experienced by us together with many features really distinct from it, but the relevant comparison of *being* is with generic concepts.) So, by attacking under the name of abstractionism a view demanding that generic and specific concepts express really distinct features, Geach is not attacking the view of abstraction which I am making use of. All this can be made clearer by examining why *being* cannot be abstract the way a genus is.

When we define the criteria for the use of generic and specific terms, we find that the definition for a specific term is richer in

content than that of the generic term, that the meaning of the specific term includes but adds to the meaning of the generic term. A specific term has a *logically* complex meaning a part of which is the meaning of the generic term; so the concept of the species involves in addition to the concept of the genus concepts which refer to what falls logically outside of what is referred to in the concept of the genus. This difference between the criteria for generic and specific terms constitutes the difference between the ways these terms refer to experience, the difference being that the meaning of the generic term is a component of the meaning of a specific term which can be cognitively separated from or pulled out from the other parts of that whole.

Can *being* express a feature common to all beings as *triangular* expresses features common to the isosceles and the scalene? Can we cognitively separate some component or components of meaning which might be common to all beings from other components which would differentiate beings from one another? No, if the differentiating components are real, they are referred to by the concept *being* just as much as are the components of similarity. For there to be a scalene triangle, there must be a figure possessing the features defining triangularity and in addition features defining the scalene. But what can be added to what is referred to by *being?* To put it one more way, what is expressed in the notion of a specific difference falls outside of and is logically extraneous to what is expressed in the notion of the genus; what falls outside or is logically extraneous to the notion of being is nothing. Therefore, *being* does not abstract from differences as does a genus.

The concept *being,* however, is taken by many metaphysicians to be a transcendental, that is, to refer to absolutely all aspects and categories of reality. But there is also a commonly held view that no concepts can be transcendental in this sense, since it is essential to their function to distinguish different features of our experience from one another. This objection is irrelevant to my purposes for three reasons. First, all it could prove is that transcendentals do not have the same

kind of use as the great majority of our concepts. Like the logical positivist criticism of metaphysics, it succeeds in expressing a way in which metaphysical thinking differs from other kinds but not in showing that these other kinds are the only valid ones. Second, most defenders of transcendentals that I know of recognize the need for a plurality of transcendental terms with logically distinct uses; each of them refers to being in general, but no one of them says all there is to say about being in general.

But it is not the transcendental character of *being* that is important here. On the hypothesis that a notion refers to absolutely everything, it follows that the notion does not abstract from any differences between things; but examples appearing below will show that a notion may be nonabstract in the way *being* is yet not be transcendental. It is this way of being nonabstract or nongeneric which accounts for the embarrassing features of metaphysics that we are studying. Convenience demands that terms be introduced for the connotation and denotation of words nongeneric as "being" is. For these uses previous philosophy has left us the terms " analogue " and " analogate." I will adopt this terminology because asserting that two things are analogous does not have the same emphasis as simply asserting that they are similar. All similarity implies difference. But asserting that a given similarity is only an analogy goes beyond merely implying that the likeness is accompanied by difference. In speaking of analogues, analogical terms, etc., I am not, of course, committing myself to all the liabilities acquired by these terms during their somewhat checkered history.

Taking *being* as an analogue, however, is only one way of attempting to avoid dilemmas of the Parmenidean kind. One other is to conclude that the concept *being* is nonexistent, that is, that the word " being " is used in totally equivocal senses. Another way is to interpret the concept (s) of being as nondescriptive or nonattributive, as having the meaning, for instance, of an empty logical or phenomenological form such as " subject of predication " in general or " object " in general.

Both positions can be associated with the view that *existence* is not a predicate. I find myself unable to accept the view that the multiplicity of uses for " being " can be explained as complete equivocations. And it is hard to see how interpreting *being* as nondescriptive would solve the problem dealt with here. For the fact that a concept is logical or phenomenological does not imply that its relation to other concepts is not that of genus to species. So, if a concept such as *object* in Husserl cannot be related to its subordinate concepts as genus to species, it remains to be determined how it is related to them.

If we hypothesize that " being " is not totally equivocal and, therefore, that there is some community of meaning in its various uses, do we not imply that an abstraction in some way characterizes our acquisition of this meaning? Although abstraction, in the sense in which we have been speaking of it, may not be a sufficient condition for our possession of common meanings, it appears to be a necessary condition. That abstraction is somehow necessary for our acquisition of the meaning of " being " also follows if we only acquire this meaning concomitantly with our acquiring generic and specific meanings such as " red," " tree," " laughing," " sharp," " speed," etc. And it does seem to be the case that we would not have our notion of being had we not experienced what we can refer to as "something red," "something moving swiftly," etc.

But would not the family resemblance theory provide a means of avoiding abstraction as an element in our account of the community of meaning for various uses of "being"? Unfortunately, it would not. The family resemblance theory obviously will not account for any transcendental term, since such a term is predicated of something not simply because of the eyes which it shares with some members of the family or the ears which it shares with others but because of any feature it possesses whatsoever. And as we shall see, there are nontranscendentals which share *being's* way being nonabstract.

More fundamentally, however, the existence of family resemblance relations presupposes abstraction. In Wittgenstein's

words, " We see a complex network of similarities, overlapping, criss-crossing" *(Philosophical Investigations,* 66) . But we cannot see a complex network of similarities unless we see cases of similarity. To imply that we can see complex networks of similarities without seeing particular ways in which some things are similar would not be an advance in the theory of meaning, as Wittgenstein's analysis definitely is; it would be a return to Platonism in a disguised form. And " abstraction " in our sense need signify no more than a grasp of some way in which otherwise distinct things are similar; for seeing a similarity means seeing a similarity in a certain respect and, to that extent, performing a cognition which leaves out of consideration other features which are also given in experience. So, recognizing that two members have the family nose involves an abstraction in the ordinary sense.

Likewise, although there may be no feature possessed in common by card games, board games, and ball games, card games certainly do have features in common; they have a common feature by reason of which they are called "card" games. And it might be that they share a feature by reason of which they are called " games." This is no more impossible than there being similarities between certain social processes by reason of which we can say this is a game of bridge and that also is a game of bridge. Thus, an abstraction could be involved in our acquisition of a family resemblance term such as " game " in a manner similar to the way the abstraction corresponding to a term such as " speed" was seen to be involved in the acquisition of our meaning for" being." But there is a decisive difference between the two cases. On the family resemblance hypothesis an abstractable common feature that might earn the name " game " for two activities using cards would not be a common featu're earning them the name " game " along with both board games and ball games. Some feature might earn them that name in common with board games, but some other feature would earn them that name in common with ball games. In other words, family resemblance relations between various uses of a word begin where ab-

stractions end. On the contrary, we acquire our meaning for " being," which by our hypothesis is somehow similar in various uses of the word, only in the process of acquiring meanings for such terms as " ball," " board," and " card." Therefore, being a card does entitle a thing to be called a being in a sense similar to that in which a ball is called a being, a board is called a being, etc. So it appears that "being's" community of meaning does not begin to function only after abstraction's function has been terminated; rather this nonabstract community of meaning is bound up with abstraction.

In other words, arguing on the basis of an allegedly ordinary meaning of" abstraction," we have arrived at the philosophical paradox of a nonabstract meaning acquired by abstraction. I will argue that this is just one example of the kind of result which is to be expected from standard metaphysical procedures, procedures which are entirely valid. The abstraction associated with *being* and concepts like it has been called, not very helpfully, imperfect or incomplete abstraction and analogical abstraction. In a moment I will present a model in terms of which analogical abstraction can be made intelligible. But now the result of this discussion can be expressed by saying that an analogue, such as *being,* does not abstract perfectly or completely from the differences with which it is associated in its various analogates. In what follows I will show two consequences which result if there are concepts which are imperfectly abstracted in this way: the first is the necessarily paradoxical character of propositions using such concepts; and the second is the corresponding difficulty in discovering and agreeing on the truth or falsity of these propositions.

II

Etymology suggests that to aid our understanding of analogical abstraction we examine proportionality as a logical form. A proportion such as 4:2::6:3 expresses a similarity between two ratios, but it expresses the differences along with the similarity. What it expresses is a form of seeing-as, of seeing that 4 is to 2 as 6 is to 3; and in this seeing-as the differences

are seen along with the likeness. But seeing 4:2 as similar to 6:3 implies seeing each of these ratios as an instance of the abstractable value, double. Since the ground of similarity is abstractable from the differences, we have a logical means of expressing the similarity which, unlike proportionality, does not express the differences at the same time. Thus we can predicate " double " of both ratios.

The similarities signified by proportions, therefore, are not necessarily analogically abstracted similarities. But about analogical similarities it can be said that, unlike generic and specific similarities, they can only be expressed" proportionally," which does not mean that a proportion must always be used but that what must be used is some logical form which, like proportionality, expresses difference at the same time as likeness. Assume that we can see substance as similar to accident in a manner analogous to our seeing 4:2 as similar to 6:3. Just as we must be capable of seeing 4:2 as double if we can see it as similar to 6:3, we must be capable of seeing substance as being if we can see it as similar to accident. Seeing substance not as substance but as being, however, cannot involve the nonconsideration of features peculiar to substance, as there is a nonconsideration of specific differences in the genus. Rather, it involves seeing everything about substance as being. And, since the concept *being* does not abstract from the differences, it must be capable of expressing both similarity and difference between substance and accident.

The upshot of this is that the difference between two subjects of which an analogue has been affirmed must be expressed by means of an affirmation and negation of the analogue itself. Therefore, in the case of one analogate there will be a double affirmation regarding the analogue, but in the case of the other analogate there will be simultaneous affirmation and negation regarding the analogue which, regardless of appearances, will not be contradictory. Why can the differences between things of which an analogue has been predicated be expressed only by means of an additional affirmation in one case, and negation in the other, involving the same analogue? When we have as-

serted a nonequivocal term of two things we have expressed a similarity between them, for the similarity in the affirmations signifies similarities in things. To express dissimilarity between two things, we must affirm something of one of the things and deny it of the other. To say that *A* is a man and *B* is a man is to express a similarity between them. To express dissimilarity, we must add that *A* is, for instance, a Lutheran while *B* is not a Lutheran.

But, in the case of generic or specific predication, what is affirmed and denied in the second instance is related to what is affirmed in the first instance as something logically extraneous, as something falling outside of what is signified. Again, to say that " triangle " abstracts from " scalene " or " isosceles " is to say that the latter signify something which is not signified by the former or that the former signifies something capable of being added to by, but something indifferent to what is signified by, the latter. Thus, if the analogue which is affirmed in the first instance were not involved in and essential to what is both affirmed and denied in the second instance, there would be no difference between an analogical and a generic predicate. The same analogue, therefore, must be essentially involved in the affirmations which express the similarity of the subjects and in the opposition of affirmation and negation by which dissimilarity of the subjects is expressed. Of course, the analogue cannot be involved in the original affirmations and the subsequent opposition of affirmation and negation in exactly the same ways; otherwise, redundancy would result in one case and contradiction in the other. But that is simply to restate the fact that an analogue, unlike a generic concept, can, while remaining itself, be involved in affirmation and negation in diverse manners.

To help make this point clearer, let me put it in a slightly different way. When a concept is attributed to two things, what is attributed expresses *at least* a way in which the two things are similar. However, when what is attributed to two things is an analogue and, hence, not only expresses a way in which the things are similar but also a way in which they are dissimilar,

the attributions themselves fail to bring out the fact that the analogue expresses a way in which the things are dissimilar. Still, the things do differ with respect to the analogue. For, if an analogue does not abstract from differences, the differences do not fall outside of what is signified by the analogue. So, among the affirmations and negations which express the differences between two analogates must be affirmation and negation regarding the analogue itself. If among what can be asserted and denied of two analogates to express their difference were not the same predicate which is asserted of both to express their similarity, the predicate with reference to which the things are similar would be abstracted from its differences and would not be analogical. And even though the exact way in which an analogue is used to express similarity will not be the same as the way it is used to express dissimilarity, still it is the analogue itself that will be twice affirmed of one analogate while being both affirmed and denied of the other; for the difference between the ways it is used in these cases cannot add to the analogue as a specific difference adds to the genus.

As unfamiliar as this may sound, it is only an attempt to express in a methodical way something which has examples with which we are all acquainted. There is a history of philosophic puzzles concerning the division of being, that which exists, into substance and accident. Substance is supposed to be what exists but does not exist in another while accident is that which exists but exists in another. Another what? Another being. So, *existence* is the concept relied on to formulate both what substance and accident have in common and what distinguishes them. Relations provide another example. For some, there are both internal and external relations. But external relations have been described by means of a double affirmation of the concept of relation and internal relations by means of affirmation and negation. The relations signified by " larger than " and " near to " merely refer their subject to other things. " Knowing " and " loving " signify qualities affecting their subjects intrinsically in addition to referring

them to others. Thus there are relations which are merely relations, purely relative; and there are relations which are not merely relations, not exhausted by what is signified by "relative."

Many paradoxes concerning the Deity involve analogues. Both God and creatures are said to exist. Often, however, it is added that God is his own existence while no creature is its own existence. In the first case, two affirmations concern existence. In the second case, both the affirmation and the negation concern existence. Now, think of the contradiction that some mystics and/or pantheists see in asserting existence of anything other than God. And, on the other hand, think of the contradiction the atheist sees in the idea that, instead of simply possessing the feature signified by an abstract term such as "existence," some individual thing can be identified with it. From the viewpoint of the theistic metaphysics mentioned above, the mystic is guilty of identifying existence with the difference with which it is associated in God and the atheist of identifying existence with the difference affecting it in creatures. If existence cannot be completely abstracted from its differences, it runs the risk of being absorbed into them.

Again, those who interpret moral evil as an offense against God can sometimes be found to refer to it as an evil relative to a good which is goodness itself, whereas physical evil is relative to a good which is not goodness itself.

Many metaphysical problems concern knowledge or consciousness, and the logic of analogical concepts has had its effect in this area also. Some metaphysicians hold that consciousness must be analyzed as a genuine mode of existence other than- and defined by its correlative opposition to-ordinary existence, the existence things have in themselves. But there is a division in the ways this view has been defended. Some have held that knowledge must possess existence of the ordinary kind at the same time that it has the nature of a correlative opposite to that kind of existence. In other words, consciousness is a thing at the same time that it is consciousness. For this position, according to our terminology, existence in the ordinary sense

is an analogue involved in its differences in such a way that one kind of thing of which this existence can be affirmed must be distinguished from others of which it can be affirmed by a simultaneous denial regarding existence of this kind.

The other way of defending this view would have it that consciousness, being defined in opposition to ordinary existence, precludes its existing in that way and still being what it is. Therefore, the features characterizing ordinary existence would constitute specific differences under the genus *mode of existence*. (This view is recognizable as Sartre's radical division of the *pour soi* and *en soi* from one another as modes of reality.)

The reason why a metaphysician would oppose Sartre's position would probably be that he takes what is referred to as existence in itself as necessary for any reality whatsoever. This necessity would explain why Sartre's disassociation of the two modes of reality forces him to describe one of them as nothingness. But it is precisely belief in this necessity that is supposed to justify the extreme opposite view that any mode of existence defined in opposition to ordinary existence is contradictory and that, therefore, consciousness is not a distinct mode of existence. This opposite view, however, agrees with Sartrean view that something could not be defined against existence in itself and still possess it. In other words, this view also implies that existence of this kind is not an analogue.

Perhaps the view that consciousness should not be analyzed as a mode of existence is correct. Still, the proneness of metaphysicians to so analyze it would have to be explained. For it is not only the theories just looked at that do so but also the Idealist theory. What is Idealism, after all, if not the conviction that consciousness actually is an existence for its objects, together with the unwillingness to admit the paradox that there is for its objects some other state of which it can be simultaneously asserted that it, too, is an existence but denied that it is an existence for a knower.

More examples will follow. They are all, of course, cases in which analogical concepts can be *alleged* to be present in order to account for a paradox. That analogy is capable of doing

so does not rely for its proof on examples but on logical necessities involved in expressing the difference between things possessing a common feature when those differences do not add to the common feature as a specific difference adds to a genus. The problem of deciding whether or not one is actually dealing with an analogue is discussed in what follows. But, on the hypothesis that we are predicating an analogue of a subject, it follows that we are predicating it of something having features contradicting features which are essential to, intrinsic to, and not abstractable from, the analogue as predicated of some other subject; and this must be expressed by the simultaneous affirmation and negation of the analogue in ways which are different but do not differ by characteristics logically added to the analogue from without.

III

It is important to distinguish the kind of apparent contradiction being explained here from the kind which arises between philosophers who are unaware that they are using a word in two different senses. Nor is it the kind that results from the fact that our language is much less varied than is the reality which is to be conveyed by means of it. Because of this, a philosophic use of a word which is appropriate from the standpoint of one of the word's ordinary uses will be inappropriate from the standpoint of others. Any confusion having this kind of source can be cleared up by substituting a complex phrase or clause which explains that use of the original word on which the philosopher \Vas relying. But, whenever the meaning of the original word was analogical, whatever phrase or clause we substitute for the word will necessarily be capable of double affirmation regarding one thing and simultaneous affirmation and negation regarding another.

Further, if we possessed as widely varied a language as we could possibly use, it would necessarily continue to contain words subject to this kind of paradoxical use if it is true that there are aspects of things which are not capable of being the foundation for or object of generic or specific abstraction. If,

for instance, *potency* is an analogue and if we had completely different words for active and passive potencies, the fact would not be destroyed that what we were referring to by these words would possess aspects so related that they could be expressed by asserting a term common to both, which common term, while not being used equivocally, must in a different way be asserted of one and denied of another. If such common terms were lacking, there would be a deficiency in our language; for not only would we then be incapable of expressing some ways in which things are similar, we would also be incapable of expressing some ways in which they differ, the same terms (or synonymous terms) being needed to express both.

'Vittgenstein, of course, was aware that our language is less varied than are the uses that we have for it, and he sought to explain the existence of philosophic problems and strange philosophic statements by this fact. Here is a well-known passage from the *Bluebook:*

> A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who doesn't see what everybody sees; nor on the other hand is his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street. That is, his disagreement is not founded on a more subtle knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look around for the *source* of his puzzlement. . . . Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one place, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notations which fulfill these needs.

I hope to have shown, on the contrary, that if the philosophic puzzle, the strange statement, or the apparent contradiction involves the predication of an analogue of its analogates, the difficulty cannot be removed by finding another form of expression for what we are saying about one of the analogates, either a form that does not convey similarity with the other analogate

or a form that does not convey difference. Granted that both the limited forms of our language and the logic of analogues can lead us to vacillate philosophically between neglecting the differences for the sake of the similarities or the similarities for the sake of the differences, still there is a distinction between these two cases which is crucial. In the case of an analogue dissimilarity must be expressed by the use of the same or a synonymous word as is the similarity. So, if a newly introduced form of expression for one of the analogates really has the same meaning as the replaced form of expression, necessarily both similarities and differences between the analogates will be capable of being expressed by means of affirmation and negation employing the new form of expression. And if the new form of expression does not have the same meaning as the old, then, contrary to Wittgenstein's hypothesis, the new form is not being used to express the same facts as the old.

The peculiar logic of analogical concepts we have described here was first pointed out by Yves Simon.[1] Earlier Simon had worked out a theory that thinking was both immaterial and an activity in the sense similar to that in which walking, laughing, and other physical processes are called activities.[2] As an example of this peculiar logic which will lead directly to the question of determining the truth of propositions about analogues I will contrast Simon's theory with the views expressed by Ryle in *The Concept of Mind.* Here is part of the criticism of " the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine ":

> It maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that there occur physical processes and mental processes, that there are mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of corporeal movements. I shall argue that these and other analogous conjunctions are absurd; but, it must be noticed, the argument will not show that either of the illegitimately conjoined propositions is absurd in itself. I am not, for example, denying that there occur mental processes. Doing long division is a mental process and so

[1] "On Order in Analogical Sets," *The New Scholasticiwn,* XXXIV (1960), 1-42.

[2] *Introduction a l'ontologie du connaitre* (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown), pp. 57-95.

is making a joke. But I am saying that the phrase "there occur mental processes" does not mean the same sort of thing as "there occur physical processes," and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two.

So, for Ryle, the meaning of " process " when said of physical events has nothing in common with the meaning of "process" when said of mental events. Simon, on the other hand, does not find the meaning of " action " when predicated of mental events totally dissimilar to its meaning when predicated of change in the physical order. Perhaps Ryle was taking" process" as said of physical events to refer to an aspect of these events that mental events really do not share, while Simon was taking " action " to refer to a different aspect of physical events, one which they do have in common with mental events. As a result, there could have been no contradiction between these views since what Simon asserts of both thinking and, for instance, walking is not the same as what Ryle asserts of one and denies of the other.

Unfortunately, opposition between these two views could not be so easily eliminated if Simon is correct. For he argues that *action* as predicated of cognition and of change is an analogue. (He takes action to be productivity. Physical acts produce results distinct from themselves; this productivity he denies of thinking. Physical acts, however, also incorporate as being indistinct from themselves the productivity by which their agent brings them into existence; otherwise an infinite regress of actions required for the production of further actions develops. And, in the same way, thinking can envelop as indistinct from itself the productivity by which the thinker brings it into existence. Thus the difference is between a productive productivity and an unproductive productivity.)

If *action* is an analogue, one cannot refer to the differential of change in abstraction from the common ground linking change and thinking. And the answer to the question whether what Simon meant by " action " in the case of change could have been the same as what Ryle meant by "process" must be yes and no. No, insofar as what Simon meant by" action"

in the case of change can also be said of thinking; this is not true of " process " for Ryle. Yes, insofar as what " action" meant in the case of change can in another way be affirmed of change while being denied of thinking; this is true of the meaning Ryle had for " process " in the case of physical events. But, for Simon, the difference attaching to action in the case of change cannot be understood apart from a similarity between change and thinking not recognized as such by Ryle. And similarity between analogates is expressed by the same concept as is difference; so, if Ryle really was referring to what Simon considered to be the difference of action in the case of change, he was referring to something common to change and thinking without knowing it.

Since Simon admitted both samenesses and differences between mental and physical events, if he were to have had a dispute with Ryle, it would have been over the elements of sameness; neither side would have been denying the existence of differences. And because analogy would have been involved, the dispute could not have been settled by Simon's simply pointing to a zone of sameness between thinking and change unqualifiedly abstracted from all differences. The lack of unqualified abstraction means that the difference is given along with the likeness. As a result, when one grasps what " action " refers to in the case of change, the possibility is always there that he may fail to focus on the similarity between action in the case of change and action in the case of thinking. And, having missed the similarity while recognizing that a similar form of language is used in both cases, a philosopher may feel that others have been misled into thinking there is a likeness by the similar ways in which these disparate areas of experience are referred to in language. Recall what Wittgenstein said in the *Bluebook* about the " analogy " between mental and physical activities:

> Perhaps the main reason why we are so strongly inclined to talk of the head as the locality of our thoughts is this: the existence of the words " thinking " and " thought " alongside of the words denoting (bodily) activities, such as writing, speaking, etc., makes

us look for an activity, different from these but analogous to them, corresponding to the word "thinking." When words in our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars, we are inclined to interpret them analogously; i. e., we try to make the analogy hold throughout.- We say, " The thought is not the same as the sentence; for an English and a French sentence, which are utterly different, can express the same thought." And so, as the sentences are *somewhere,* we look for a place for the thought.

Do we see analogies between things because there are similar forms for referring to them in our language? Or do similar linguistic forms sometimes exist because we have grasped analogies between things in the sense of meanings which express both the points of similarity and the points of dissimilarity between things? It has been argued that metaphysical paradox .is a necessary and legitimate occurrence if philosophy ever deals with such meanings. But are things actually characterized by aspects which, when known, are seen to be both points of similarity and points of dissimilarity between the same things? Are there, in other words, analogues of the kind we have described, and if so, are there any which philosophy deals with so that its paradoxes can be accounted for by them?

On the one hand, such questions can be answered only by reference to particular examples. If thinking and walking are both actions as Simon says they are, then there is an analogue of the kind we are interested in; if not, perhaps there is some other example. When, on the other hand, because of the imperfect abstractability of the analogue, someone has failed to grasp a similarity which is there for the grasping, we must employ argument to establish the similarity. And it is my contention that the same condition, imperfect abstraction, which renders a kind of simultaneous affirmation and negation a necessary result of metaphysical thinking, also explains the extreme difficulty metaphysics has in finding arguments which compel common agreement. As a result, any argument necessary to show that an actual philosophic paradox can be accounted for by the presence of analogues will be of impaired communicability by the very fact that it concerns analogues.

This is what remains to be established.

IV

If abstraction is a prerequisite for the human grasp of truth, when the mind is dealing with aspects of things which can be only imperfectly abstracted, it is operating under conditions of special difficulty, that is, conditions which make its discovery of the truths in question more difficult for it than is the discovery of other truths. For, to the extent to which abstraction would be held in check, a necessity for our grasp of truth would be absent. And a case can be made that abstraction has such a role. The propositional forms we use to express and communicate what we consider to be the truth do nothing if they do not reflect the fact that our faculties of conceptual knowledge are not capable of expressing the whole of any of our experiences at once, that we must express what we have experienced bit by bit, putting together the results of diverse mental acts. (Even a transcendental, again, does not say all there is to be said about anything.) Any theory of the nontautological use of our propositional forms which would exclude the piecemeal character of our thinking would not only be false, it would be ridiculously so. And the logically piecemeal character of our thinking, that is, the failure of any one of our concepts to express all there is to be expressed in a species, an experience, an event, or a thing, is what our notion of abstraction principally refers to.

Although I have a fondness for this argument, I recognize that it is insufficient as an explanation of how lack of complete abstractability affects the discovery and communication of philosophic truths. The only way I have found to accomplish this expeditiously is by analysis of specific examples of metaphysical thinking. So I will briefly develop two such lines of thought in order to point out how analogical concepts can create obstacles to this thinking, obstacles of a kind that will occur in any case of metaphysical reasoning about analogues.

On his way to establishing that thinking is indeed an action on the part of the thinker Simon first tried to show that the

thinker is active in thinking, that is, that thinking is caused by the thinker and not by something else. And to show this, he began by asserting the necessity of thinking's having some efficient cause. Elsewhere he tried to point out the reason why we know that some things need an efficient cause in order to exist.[3] According to him, it is when we recognize that what is known as the material cause is insufficient to account for something that we know the causality of some other being is also necessary. Thus we recognize that a statue needs a sculptor when we recognize that the clay's being what it is is not a complete explanation of the statue. The clay was clay before it became a statue; therefore, it is not through being itself that the clay became a statue. How could this argument for efficient causality avoid the traditional problem that it is not necessarily true that a thing either exists through itself or through another, for " through itself " is not the contradictory opposite of "through another" but merely of "not through itself"? Recognizing the insufficiency of the material cause would license us to posit some other being on which the thing depends, because implied in this recognition is the recognition that the thing is caused somehow, namely, materially. And to see this is to see that the thing, for example, the shape by which the clay is a statue, is a dependent thing. But such a dependent thing is either dependent on the material cause alone or on the material cause together with other causes; so the insufficiency of the material cause shows dependence on some other being.

For Simon as for many others, the notions *material oause* and *efficient cause* are analogues. Bodies are material in relation to properties such as shape and motion, and essence is material in relation to existence. Does a particular case of something materially caused have a necessary relation to an efficient cause because of the differential factors peculiar to this case? Yes and no. No, insofar as the analogue is in some way

[3] *Prevoir et savoir* (Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, 1044). pp. 36-39; *Freedom of Choice*, ed. Peter Wolff (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969), pp. 129-135; *Traite du libre arbitre* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 94-98,

abstractable from the differences; otherwise, only this analogate of *something materially caused* would be dependent on an efficient cause. But insofar as these differences cannot be abstracted from, the answer is yes; these differences are not extraneous to that by reason of which there is a necessary relation to an efficient cause.

But, in order to see these analogues as the grounds of a necessary relation between their analogates, the analogues themselves must be made our objects, not just the analogates. In other words, the analogues must be seen insofar as they are points of similarity, not of difference, between their analogates; and this is what the incomplete abstraction of the analogue is. Assume that it is being argued that if an analogate of *A* exists, then an analogate of *B* must exist. To recognize the relation between analogues *A* and *B* we must have experienced an analogate of *A,* for instance, and performed the incomplete abstraction necessary to grasp this analogue, *A,* by reason of which this thing is analogously similar to other analoga tes of *A.* For, to say the existence of something which is an analogate of *A ipso facto* implies the existence of something which is an analogate of *B,* is to say that the relation of the analogate of *A* to the analogate of *B* is not caused merely by the differentiating factors associated with analogue *A* in this thing; it is to say that *A's* necessarily imply *B's* regardless of the differences affecting *A* in various analogates.

(On the other hand, since *A* and *B* are analogues, the relations between their analogates, while remaining genuine, are subject to the same kind of internal differentiation as are the analogues themselves. As one instance of *A* differs from another, so its relation to an instance of *B* will differ from that of the other; but this will remain just as much a genuine relation to an instance of *B* as the thing is a genuine instance of *A.* So the model of proportionality is still applicable; for implied in the assertion that whatever is materially caused has an efficient cause is the proportion that as one thing differs from another in being materially caused, it will differ from another in being efficiently caused. To be the efficient cause

of existence absolutely considered would be one thing; to be the efficient cause of an already existing body's acquisition of a new physical modification would be another.)

Failure to achieve the incomplete abstraction of an analogue from its analogates means failure to grasp an analogue insofar as it is a point of similarity rather than of difference between the analogates; and this will always result in features peculiar to one analogate being substituted for features which attach to the analogue in its generality. The experiential source of the analogue *materially caused* is the sense-observable change that bodies undergo. Thus a consequence of failure to achieve incomplete abstraction of this analogue would be to consider being the effect of an efficient cause to be identical with being a physical process or the result of such a process. And the history of philosophy offers many examples of theories identifying efficient causality with physical efficient causality; Hume, for instance, included spatial and temporal relations among the defining features of causal relations. In such theories the relation to an efficient cause is restricted to one analogate of the materially caused so as to be incapable of being asserted of other analogates. It is possible for such a view to be held by someone who, not failing to achieve the partial abstraction required, would grasp the analogue which expresses the reason why physical changes necessarily have efficient causes but who simply does not know that there are other analogates. But when the required abstraction has not been accomplished, someone like Simon would not find surprising a position, such as Hume's, that there is no analogue which expresses the reason why physical changes have efficient causes since there is no discoverable reason why they have them.

It was asserted above that, since abstraction is required for the grasp of propositional truth, where abstraction is impeded the grasp of truth will be made more difficult. We are now a little closer to seeing what meaning that admittedly vague assertion has for the problem of deciding where truth lies in a philosophic dispute. The argument we have examined concerns an alleged necessary connection between certain kinds of things.

Grasping that necessity would involve grasping the reason for the connection, the aspect of one thing which grounds its necessary relation to the other thing. But that would require abstraction, and, in the case of analogues, one cannot abstract perfectly from features which do not attach essentially to the analogue insofar as the analogue grounds the common necessary connection but which do attach essentially to the analogue in any particular case from which we acquire our knowledge of it. This explanation of the problematic character of philosophic disputes, therefore, will apply to arguments concerning necessary connections between certain things or certain aspects of things. Does this so severely limit its value as an explanation that it is rendered uninteresting?

To answer this objection it would be enough to recall that the troubles we are trying to give a partial account of are those of metaphysics. But one does not have to be doing philosophy in the grand manner to rely on a proposition-especially a hypothetical one-which asserts some necessary connection, being true. And not only is it a fact that many philosophers have believed in some necessary connections holding between diverse aspects of our experience, it is difficult to think of philosophers who have not. Although a purely therapeutic type of philosophy, one which occupied itself with making statements to the effect that such and such a conclusion does not follow or such and such a problem does not impose itself, might not rely on a belief in any such necessary connection, it could be argued that any philosophy wishing to reach some positive conclusion cannot avoid them. This is even true for a philosopher who sees his task as purely descriptive as long as the evidence he would put forward for his description could be expressed in the form of *reductio ad abmrdum,* proceeding from some givens, of the contradictory opposite. Thus paradigm case arguments are good examples of what I mean by the reliance of a philosophic argument on a belief in a necessary connection. So is the argument against transcendentals from the need of an intelligible opposite. Most philosophers have

believed in some necessary connection between sense knowledge and propositional knowledge. And so on.

V

There is still more to see, however, about the causing of metaphysical dispute by the logic of analogues and analogical terms. Of all the paradoxes involving that logic, my favorite may be the famous theory of prime matter (which let us arbitrarily stipulate to mean the subject of substantial change) as a pure potency, a totally featureless, propertyless being. Everyone will admit that philosophizing about dispositions and capacities has proven a risky undertaking; but someone who is willing to admit to a reality which is a total capacity, a total disposition and nothing else, is hardly one to be afraid of an over-adventuresome use of a concept. I will briefly work out a fairly standard way of reaching that conclusion.

The analogates of *nonbeing* constitute an analogical set of the kind we are considering. On the one hand, *nonbeing* is a logical construct; we can arrive at this construct in the process of observing that among the things true of our pet collie, for instance, is not his being a philosopher. On the other hand, our two-day old child is no more a philosopher than is the collie; of both it is purely and simply true that they are not philosophers. But we have hopes that the child, unlike the collie, has the potentiality to receive that knowledge we call philosophical. If such a potency is something real, still to be something in potency alone is absolutely speaking not to be it; so being in potency would be an existing way of not being.

But is potency something real? Perhaps the paradox of an existing form of relative nonbeing can be avoided by recognizing *potency* as itself a logical construct, a species of logical construct under the genus *nonbeing.* Unfortunately, this is the way out that was attempted in the theory that for a thing to be something in potency meant that some contrary to fact conditional about it was true. But in that case a child would have the ability to become a philosopher only as a result of

becoming the object of some other human's thought, for only as such does he become referred to by a contrary to fact conditional or by any logical construct.

Now, as far as I know, no believer in prime matter claims that it can be known by experience; whatever we can learn about it we must learn by reasoning. We are supposed to be able to learn about it that it is a pure potency. But if *potency* is itself an analogue, then grasping the truth of any necessary proposition which is used to show why prime matter is a pure potency and which employs an experientially acquired concept of potency will be subject to the kind of difficulty we are describing. Assume that the reasoning invokes as necessarily true a statement such as "Every change requires a subject which undergoes the change and which itself is only potentially what will come into existence as the result of the change." In order for us to grasp the truth of that proposition, experience must have provided us with uses for the words "change," "potentially," " subject of change," etc.; and the first locus of uses for these terms which is given in our experience would be what is conceptualized by the philosopher of substance as accidental change. The concept of potency which is employed in his proof of the nature of prime matter, therefore, will be acquired through his understanding of the relation between the subject and term of an accidental change.

But a major difference will distinguish potency at the level of accidental change from potency at the level of substantial change, if there is such a thing as substantial change. The subject remaining throughout an accidental change is not only something which is potential with respect *to* some accidental modification. it is at the same time and by its identity with itself something which is actual in other respects. A child, as opposed to a collie, deserves to be considered a potential philosopher because of the actual qualities that are found in the being of the child. But, unlike the subject of accidental chan!'"e from which the concept of potency is acquired, the subject of a substantial change could not be, by its identity with itself, anything actual at all. The subject of a change

bringing into existence a substance could not possess in itself the characteristics of substance since to be the subject of this change it must be only potential in this respect. And it could not be an accident or a group of accidents which was the subject of a substantial change; where an accident, that which exists in another, exists, substance already exists. So prime matter is neither something which exists in another nor something which does not exist in another. Since by hypothesis it is a potency, prime matter must be purely potential.

But just as it can seem contradictory to assert existence of something while denying it any actual characteristics, it can also seem contradictory to assert potency of something and deny it any actual characteristics. The metaphysician must acquire his knowledge of whatever proposition he uses to deduce the status of prime matter as a potency from his experience of accidental change. And because the potency relative to accidental change is by identity with itself something actual -note the simultaneous affirmations of potency and its opposite here-it is impossible to abstract completely the analogue *potency* from the difference affecting it in this case, namely, its *being not only a potentiality but also an actuality.* And since the difference, *being something actual,* cannot be completely left out of our consideration by means of the abstractive process through which we become aware of the analogue *potency,* the possibility is created of our coming to think that it is really the actuality of the analogate, subject of accidental change, which is the precise reason for its being the subject of a change.

Perhaps no one would deny that the actual existence of the potency prior to a change is at least a remote reason, a necessary if not sufficient condition, for there being a subject of change. Still the prime matter theorist will hold that it is not actual existence as such, nor the possession of certain actual characteristics as such, which proximately and sufficiently qualifies something to be the subject of a change. It is conceivable for both these things to be true of something without its being eligible to be the subject of a change. The actual features of a child's being cause him to be potentially a phi-

losopher. But these actual features are linked to the change by which the child becomes a philosopher, not insofar as they are actualities but insofar as they ground potentiality. And it is conceivable that there be a change in which all the actual features belonging to the subject before the change continue to exist after the change; what cannot continue is the subject's being only potentially what it became as a result of the change.

A sufficient reason for this being difficult to grasp is that the aspect of a thing which makes it eligible to be the subject of a change, potency, cannot be distinguished from the difference affecting it in the experienced instance by an abstraction which would satisfy whatever standards would express in full the contribution to the human discovery of truth which it is abstraction's role to make. But, against this analysis, an objection can be raised, and the answer to it will allow a much more precise description of the way imperfect abstraction creates an obstacle to the knowledge of metaphysical truth.

Any philosophy relying on alleged necessary propositions must in the final analysis claim that some of these propositions are self-evident in the traditional sense, that is, are capable of being known from the mere fact that the meanings of their terms are known. Some such propositions are needed as starting points for the philosopher's arguments. Therefore, the meanings on the basis of which the truth of these propositions is evident must have been acquired before he began to philosophize; in other words, the propositions playing the role of principles for such a philosophy must assert necessary relations between things, relations whose grounds are already expressed in meanings of ordinary language. For example, the philosopher would know the meanings of " change," " something undergoing a change," "capability," and "what exists after a change" previous to recognizing that whatever undergoes a change must have the capability of being what will exist at the end of the change; he would have the uses of "existing," " existing in another," and " not " before discovering that substance and accident divide being.

Because these meanings must be possessed prior to any philosophic use of them, it can be objected that the reason for

disagreement over alleged necessary relations involving analogues cannot be that philosophers fail to achieve the incomplete abstraction from differences that is required for an analogue to be understood as the ground of a necessary relation common to many of its analogates. For, if we already have such meanings, whatever mode of abstraction they entail must have already come into logical existence.

In reply to this objection I direct your attention to a kind of abstraction other than that characterizing the signification of general concepts. Philosophers-and others who are engaged in argument-frequently announce that they are abstracting, at least temporarily, from this or that aspect of the subject under consideration while concentrating on some other aspect. Although in some respects similar to the abstraction (hereafter, abstraction1) characterizing general concepts, this kind of abstraction (abstractionz) differs from the first in being a characteristic of a conscious, intended, thought process. Abstractionz is necessary for arguing about complex subjects just as abstraction1 is necessary for propositional truth; our thinking can only come at things step by step, putting together the results of diverse insights and diverse lines of investigation.

Likewise, inquiring into the truth of an alleged necessary connection between different aspects of our experience involves this second kind of abstraction. For it involves considering an aspect of things as the possible locus of a necessary relation to another aspect; therefore, whatever else might be associated with our experience of our first aspect but is not relevant to this necessary connection will be left out of consideration. (For instance, my using *being* as an example of a concept imperfectly abstracted1 required my asking you to abstractz from its transcendental character as not relevant to whatever is necessarily true of *being* insofar as it is imperfectly abstracted1.) To put it another way, asking what other aspects of experience a given aspect may have *necessary* relations with implies our ability to distinguish this aspect from, and to leave out of consideration, all features attaching to it *ccmtingently* in the existence where we have experienced it.

Propositions used to assert such necessary connections are

the kind we are discussing. And since abstractionz is required for the knowledge of them, it is required for the knowledge of the self-evident truths from which this kind of philosophizing must begin. But knowing a self-evident necessary truth means seeing relations between meanings already present in ordinary language. Therefore, the abstractionz involved in the search for necessary philosophic truths presupposes and relies on the abstraction! associated with those ordinary meanings. And this dependence of abstractione on abstraction1 allows us to respond to our objection. In order for our language to possess the terms of the self-evident proposition, the relevant abstractions1 must have been achieved; but the corresponding processes we are calling abstractions2 need not have taken place. That is, necessary relations between the aspects of things exprt.,;sed in ordinary language need not have been discovered nor even inquired into.

But, when the preceding abstractions1 have been of the kind we are calling incomplete and imperfect, the subsequent abstractions2 (which can likewise be called imperfect abstractions inasmuch as they deal with analogues) will be made under conditions creating the maximum possibility for error in the resulting judgment. For, when we are wondering whether an analogue does or does not have necessary connections with other elements of our experience, the possibility of focusing on what is known abstractively1 so as to be prevented from seeing it as having the necessary relations exists in a way in which it simply does not exist in the case of things generically and specifically abstracted1. In the case of analogues, differential factors peculiar to only some instances are present and able to solicit the attention of abstractione where they cannot be present in the case of genera or species, namely, at the term of the process which provides the abstracted1 meaning for abstraction2 to focus on. Again, understanding the analogue as ground of a necessary relation common to all analogates means seeing the analogue as a point of similarity capable of predication of all the analogates, not just as a point of dissimilarity predicable of some but not of others. And seeing it as a point

of similarity is to achieve the imperfect abstractionz, But when it is imperfect, abstraction1 gives difference along with likeness, the same concept expressing both, for the differences affecting the analogue in each of its *real* existences are not even *logically* extraneous to the analogue as a specific difference is to a genus. As a result, it will be particularly difficult to discover by means of abstraction2 the necessary propositions needed to show, as in the case of *action,* that the community between two experienced instances of the analogue is more than verbal, or, as in the case of *potency,* that there is an instance of the analogue other than the kind we have experienced. In fact, at the end of our investigation, such conclusions may appear purely and simply contradictory.

Let us apply the distinction between abstraction1 and abstractionz to the argument for pure potency. By abstraction1 we have a meaning for "subject of change." This phrase is predicable of a number of individuals, and each of these individuals possesses a great number of features. Suppose we ask, "What feature possessed by these things, if any, caused them to be such that they existed one way at one time and another way at another time?" This question is not like" What makes all men men?" to which a reasonable answer might be that they are men. On the contrary, our question assumes that all the individuals concerned are called "subjects of change" because they are known to be subjects of change. What the question does is to express verbally our focusing on things insofar as they are subjects of change in order to find out what causal factors, if any, are relevant to the existence of subjects of change as such, that is, in abstractionz from whatever else these things may be. It happens that we have " potency " and similar terms in our language; we use them with reference to subjects of change, and they do seem to express a condition without which a thing would not be a subject of change. Assume that through this line of thought we come to believe that every subject of change must have the potency to be what will exist at the end of the change. Would our knowledge of this proposition provide us with the

illumination needed to recognize the totally nonactual character of the subject of a substantial change? If the meanings of the terms of this proposition are analogues, not necessarily.

If knowledge of this proposition is to yield knowledge of pure potency, it must express two abstractions2, not only that of "subject of change" but also that of "potency to be what will exist at the end of the change." And it would be entirely possible for one who had achieved the incomplete abstraction1 necessary to have the word "potency" in his language to make the following mistake while attempting to accomplish the corresponding abstraction2: in examining the concept *something potentially something else* he focuses on that feature of his object which is its "*being something actual* which is suited to becoming something else" and fails to recognize that it is not because of its actual being *qua* actual that anything is suited to became something else, that it is because a form of relative nonbeing is true of it that something is eligible to become what it is not. Consequently, his reflection leads him to think "potency" connotes a kind of actuality. And although he seems to assent to the principle of the prime matter theorist's argument, what he means by "potency" can only be called a point of dissimilarity with what the prime matter theorist wants "potency" to mean in the case of substantial change.

Such an error would be a correctable one, for nothing in our argument supports the view that genuine metaphysical knowledge is impossible. But a process of correction would be subject to the same obstacles we have been describing for the process of discovery. For example, one could try to eliminate the apparent contradiction in pure potency by pointing out that prime matter will always be actual in some way but not actual in and of itself as is the subject of accidental change; it would still be unproven, however, that it is not *qua* actual that a thing is eligible for accidental change. And the communication of this would be hampered by the paradoxical ways of speaking that the logic of analogical concepts forces on us, for instance, the paradox that, even though a child is potentially a philosopher only because of some actual characteristics present in his being

and not in the collie's, still he is more properly said to be eligible to become a philosopher because of the way of not being a philosopher that is true of him.

It has always been thought that the only ways to be ignorant of a self-evident proposition were either to be ignorant of the meaning of its terms or to have never had one's attention directed to the necessary connection these meanings imply. When these terms are analogous, however, and we do have the ability to use them, even conscious consideration of their meanings does not guarantee a grasp of the truth, since there is more than one way of being ignorant of the meaning of an analogical term. Nor is there anything other than knowledge of a self-evident proposition which can guarantee knowledge of it, for, by definition, a proposition does not become self-evident to us through our viewing it in the light of something else which is a criterion for its truth. If an opponent has failed to grasp the self-evidence of a given truth, its *necessity* can still be shown him by indirect means, that is, by showing him that denying it leads to a denial of something else that is evident to him. But this process would presuppose his correct understanding of other truths involving analogues and his ability to see through any apparent contradictions, resulting from the logic of analogy, in our statements.

VI

To summarize and conclude:

Developing the idea that *being* is not a genus I have presented a reason for metaphysics' having the troubles it does, which does not render metaphysics invalid but does necessitate its being prone to confusion and error. To say a concept can express a difference between two things is to say it can be affirmed of one and denied of the other. So a concept capable of expressing a similarity between things but which does not abstract from differences between them will be involved in simultaneous affirmation and denial of one of the things. This is what is meant by a concept's being imperfectly abstracted from differences; and when we must signify aspects of our

experience by means of such concepts there cannot have been fully achieved what it is the role of abstraction, a necessary precondition for our grasping of truth, to achieve. So, when metaphysics must deal with things by means of analogical concepts, the discovery of the necessary connections it relies on as its inference-tickets must be accomplished under the most disadvantageous conditions. For, if the ground of a necessary connection between things is what is signified by an analogical concept, it is signified by a concept that also expresses features which constitute points of difference between the things having the necessary relation as a common property and which are inextricably bound with the analogue in all the analogates from which we can draw our knowledge of it.

I feel that there are other factors contributing to metaphysics' troubles; but if I am correct, the factor studied here is important. One kind of evidence for its importance is supplied by the number of paradoxes and disputes susceptible to analysis in this manner. (In the places cited above Simon has worked out similar analyses for " duration" as said of time and eternity, various uses of "life," and "having a preceding cause " as said of free and unfree acts.) But another kind of evidence is supplied by the number of metaphysicians who have described the concepts they were using in terms similar to those from which we have tried to work out this theory of the effects of analogical concepts on metaphysical thinking. And hitherto those noting the analogical character of metaphysical concepts have in doing so been innocent of the purpose for which we have pointed to it here, namely, to apologize for paradox and dispute in metaphysics. (To my knowledge, it has not been until recently that analogical concepts have been invoked to prove-which they do not do-that God-talk is meaningful. They are at most a necessary condition for God-talk, not a sufficient condition.)

If the achievement of consensus on the truth or falsity of propositions is any criterion, then philosophy has always been the most difficult kind of human thinking; but if the testimony of philosophers themselves carries any weight, then metaphysics is philosophy's most troublesome branch. And this explanation

of metaphysics' plight does not claim to be any less troublesome than what it is explaining. In fact, it can be accused of explaining the strangeness and the controversial character of metaphysics by means of something which itself seems very strange and is highly debatable. But after so many explanations claiming to save us from these things, the present account should not be held suspect for not claiming it; and there is no way of proving this account which is not subject to the same kind of problem. For, if my argument is correct, then *abstraction* is itself an analogue capable of being both affirmed and denied of certain concepts (and this is to say that *logical similarity* or *community in meaning* are, in our sense of the word, " analogous " concepts) . And should a particular example such as *being* not be sufficient to convince an opponent that my statements about imperfect abstraction are cases of the logic of analogy and not of contradiction, then there would be nothing to do but to try to get him to admit as necessary propositions from which an analogous affirmation and denial would follow. And the difficulty of that undertaking should by now be clear, that is, obscure.

Where does this leave us? Right where we have been all along. Philosophic arguments, both metaphysical and anti-metaphysical, will continue. I have tried to show one reason why we should expect this to be the case. For those who will disagree-if my analysis has been correct, they should be legion-and think that we should look forward to eliminating some day metaphysics' state of confusion through some foolproof method of answering its questions or exposing its errors, it at least may be helpful to realize that a permanent state of paradox in metaphysics and of controversy among metaphysicians does not *ipso facto* render all metaphysics null and void, that there are hypotheses favorable to metaphysics that account for this situation. For, in order to be possible, success in metaphysics need not be probable.

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THE INADEQUACY OF SITUATION ETHICS

FOR SOME TIME one was tempted to think that the expression, "the new morality," was merely a catch phrase invented by writers of popular articles for use as a respectable cover in recounting various tales actually designed for the mild erotic stimulation of their readers. One did not, of course, intend to deny that there is a growing tendency to withhold from Victorian and fundamentalistic sexual prudery even the adherence in profession which many had continued to accord it long after having abandoned it in practice. The new morality did not, however, seem to be anything of significance for the professional philosopher concerned with ethical theory. This initial attitude had to be changed when " the new morality " was adopted as a slogan by various theologians and religious personages who claimed to hold something new and who attempted to give a reasoned defense of their position. One of the foremost of these theologians is Professor Joseph Fletcher of the Episcopal Theological School who calls his view situation ethics and gladly takes for it the rubric, " the new morality." [1] Given the currency of Fletcher's views (and others like them), it is important that his ethical theory be subjected to rigorous critical evaluation.

Fletcher holds that there are at bottom only three possible approaches to ethical decision making. (p. 17 ff.) Legalism he describes as approaching the moral decision with a codified set of directive rules. Apparently he is thinking of one's consulting a list like the Decalogue, finding that bearing false witness is forbidden and, therefore, holding that any act of bearing false

[1] Fletcher's most complete statement of his views is contained in his book, *Situation .Ethics: The New 2'domlity* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966). I shall depend on this book in referring to his work. For convenience, I shall insert page numbers in parentheses in the text to cite references to this book.

witness is wrong no matter what the circumstances. Antinomianism, he says, approaches moral decisions with no principles whatever, and it remains unclear how its decisions are to be made.

Situation ethics does approach the moral decision with rules and principles, but these are not to be taken as directives- rather, they are merely guidelines and illuminators for making a decision in the present case. (p. 26 ff.) A particular situation may be such that the situationist sets aside a principle, such as extra-marital sexual relations are wrong, in the belief that such relations are in this situation right.

Fletcher urges situation ethics on us by arguing the implausibility of the other two approaches. I shall have more to say about his supposed trichotomy later, but for now I wish to continue the account of his position.

As Fletcher realizes, more than one particular theory of right might be developed within the bounds of what he calls situationism. His own position might better be called Christian Situation Ethics (or as we shall see, Agapic Situation Ethics). His theory of right is expressed in one principle: *"The situationist holds that whatever is the most loving thing in the situation is the right and good thing."* (pp. 61, 65) He makes it clear that this principle follows from his first principle of value which is, "Only one thing is intrinsically good; namely, love: nothing else at all." (p. 57) Further, he makes it clear that " love " *is* to be understood as *agape* (Christian love of fellow man or general good will), not as *philos* or *eros.* (p. 79) It will occur to anyone familiar with the British tradition in moral philosophy that Fletcher's position is very closely related to act-utilitarian views, such as those of Bentham and G. E. Moore (in *Principia Ethica).* Indeed, he quotes on the motto page _Moore's well-known and much criticized assertion that "right" does and can mean nothing but "cause of a good result." Since so much critical thought has been devoted to various forms of utilitarianism, it will be instructive to draw clearly the comparison between Fletcher's view and utilitariamsm.

The characteristic feature of utilitarian theories of right is the claim (whether made as a meaning claim or otherwise supported) that the criterion of rightness is maximization of value or goodness. Thus, the utilitarian must first present a theory of value or goodness. He then presents a criterion of rightness in terms of value produced. Obviously, by adopting differing theories of value persons could arrive at different specific theories of right, although still agreeing on the basic utilitarian claim that the right is what maximizes the good. In its best-known classical form utilitarianism was conjoined to a hedonistic theory of value. Thus, classical utilitarians held that an action is right if, and only if, it produces at least as much pleasure as any other action possible under the circumstances.

Further, for Bentham at least (though probably not for Mill) , this was *the* principle of rightness. Any other moral principles, such as, " Bearing false witness is wrong," were conceived as mere rules of thumb for convenience sake. In principle, one could always appeal directly to the first principle of rightness and only such appeals had any binding force. Other rules merely gave a summary of past experience. They had no binding force. Obligations come only from the first principle. Such a view is now usually called act-utilitarianism.

It is clear that Fletcher agrees with Bentham that rightness is maximization of goodness and that rules of rightness other than this first principle are to be taken as mere rules of thumb or illuminators. [Thus, in a generic sense, Fletcher's situationism is more or less the same view as act-utilitarianism.] But, of course, Fletcher differs with Bentham in regard to value. Bentham holds that only pleasure is intrinsically good, whereas Fletcher holds that only agapic love is intrinsically good. If Bentham is a hedonistic act-utilitarian, Fletcher is an agapic act-utilitarian; and if Fletcher is an agapic situationist, Bentham is a hedonistic situationist.

One possible variation is important to note. Having said that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, the hedonistic situationist (act-utilitarian) can say simply that the action which

produces the most pleasure is right. It is doubtful, however, that Fletcher wants to say that the action which *produces* the most *agape* is right but rather that the action which *expresses* the most *agape* is right. Since *agape* is (as we shall see) an attitude which favors the neighbor's interest and is expressed in attempts to further the neighbor's interest, it seems clear that he will want to say that the expression of *agape* is the criterion of rightness.

One might ask, but is it then *agape* or its expression which is intrinsically good? This might be taken as a problem for the interpretation of Fletcher I have presented. He does not seem to me to state his position precisely enough for us to say exactly which he intends. His answers to particular problems using his criterion are clearly given in terms of the expression of *agape,* not in terms of producing more *agape* in the self or in the neighbor (although this would be an activity of which his theory of right would usually approve) . Perhaps he really thinks it is the expression of *agape* that is intrinsically good, but it seems more likely to me that he might want to say that the two are not separable, i.e., that expression in action is a criterion for having *agape.* Further, he says that our task is to seek an optimum of loving-kindness. (p. 61) I take it that loving-kindness is *agape* expressed. Fletcher also says that love is something we *do. (ibid.)* This seems to me to support my conjecture. Thus, Fletcher understands the maximization of goodness to be the expression of what is good rather than the production of what is good as a hedonist would have it. The important features of the two positions remain parallel. The difficulties I suggest later apply to either view. It seems clear, however, that even further difficulties would arise for the production view. On that view, for example, one would be instructed to view his neighbor always as a possible agapic lover, not as a possible beneficiary of one's own love. Love's task would be to increase itself, but that would leave no time for furthering the interests of others, which is surely supposed to be the point of Christian love.

Since hedonistic act-utilitarianism is generally regarded as

open to over-powering objections, it is important to decide whether Fletcher's agapic theory of value enables him to avoid these common objections. In most standard works on ethics one finds at least the following kinds of objections to hedonistic act-utilitarianism. (These objections are so familiar that I shall state them only sketchily and shall say only enough to show what line seems the most promising for Fletcher to use if they are turned against him.)

(A) If we suppose that a young man whose wealthy father refuses him money could truly say that (knowing he would not be caught) more pleasure would result in total, considering all concerned, if he killed the old man, then hedonistic act-utilitarianism must say that it is right for him to do so (or even that it is his duty to do so). To this example it would seem natural that the agapic situationist would say; " Well, that is what the hedonist gets by worrying only about pleasure, but it poses no problem for me. Love would never behave in such a way."

(B) Suppose that one must choose between two actions, let us say, spending the evening reading by a fire with a bottle of brandy or attending a party which one has promised to attend. Now, if the total pleasure produced by these actions for all concerned is equal, then the hedonistic act-utilitarian must say that it is morally permissible to do either. Many philosophers have argued, however, that it seems clear that we really think that one is obligated to go to the party (keep the promise), the equality of pleasure produced in the two cases notwithstanding. To this objection one can again imagine the agapic situationist saying, " This is the hedonist's problem. Love keeps its promises. Loving concern for the promised friend would indicate that one ought to keep the promise, other things being equal. Love is concerned with the feelings of our neighbors, not with the cold summing of pleasures."

(C) The best known and most often cited objection to act-utilitarianism is that it fails to account for duties of justice (or that it often indicates that certain actions are permissible when they seem clearly to conflict with the principles of

justice). The point is made with many examples. Basically, they repeat this situation. Suppose that one can, in given circumstances, perform either of two actions. One can distribute a given amount of pleasure equally between three different individuals or one can provide for one individual the same total amount of pleasure while providing none for the other two. The hedonistic act-utilitarian must say that either course of action is morally permissible. Many philosophers have argued, however, that the second course of action is clearly unjust (more clearly, no doubt, when the example is given in greater detail) ; that it is therefore wrong; and that the first course is, accordingly, one's duty. In regard to this objection one can imagine the agapic situationist saying, "But, of course, love could never be expressed in this arbitrary fashion." Indeed, Fletcher goes further and says baldly that love and justice are one and the same. (p. 87) Justice is love distributed or love working out its problems. From this he concludes unjust actions can never be loving actions and loving actions can never be unjust.

These answers to traditional objections against act-utilitarianism in its hedonistic form do have enough plausibility to warrant further examination of agapic situationism. It is clear that the question as to the nature of agapic love now becomes crucial. Unfortunately, Fletcher does not tell us precisely what he means by " love " (or" *agape* ") , but he does sav a good deal about it, and I propose to examine what he does say.

We should, however, be clear from the outset as to the kind of account of the nature of *agape* Fletcher's view requires. The crucial point is just this: he must not, in explicating the nature of agapic love, in any way appeal to judgments of goodness or rightness or to any judgments containing terms themselves to be explicated using the concepts of goodness or rightness. Given the use he wishes to make of agapic love, the violation of this requirement would lead his theory into a vicious circle.

One suspects, of course, that this requirement is likely to be violated by any plausible account of Christian love. Further,

the ways in which it seemed likely that the agapic situationist would respond to the traditional objections to hedonistic act-utilitarianism arouse the same suspicion. When we ask why love would never do this or that, do we not expect to be told (even if indirectly) , " Because it would not be right." Indeed, some would take Fletcher's identification of love and justice as the only evidence required that he is guilty on this score. I shall have more to say about his view of love and justice later, but for now I would like to try to make the case for his argument's being circular on a broader base, i.e., to try to show that the circularity is probably irreparable.

Fletcher makes clear that *agape* is not sentimental and is not based on liking of, or desire for, its object. (pp. 79, 117) Rather, love is " an attitude, a disposition, a leaning, a preference, a purpose." (p. 61) He tells us further that, pinned down to its precise meaning, agapic love is benevolence or good will (in strong senses of these now somewhat watered-down terms) . (p. 105) Moreover, he insists that this love extends to all, even to our enemies. (p. 101 f.) In light of these and other things he says, it seems most plausible to suppose that he views agapic love as an attitude which leads one to favor and seek the well-being of all other people. While Fletcher never gives a precise statement of this position, what he does say indicates various ways in which he might try to state it.

At one point in describing love he says that love seeks the neighbor's good. (p. 103) This suggests the claim that " *x* has agapic love for *y* " means " *x* is disposed to seek what is good for *y* ." But this way of putting it will not do. He cannot say that *agape* is an attitude which leads to the seeking of the neighbor's good, because *agape* has already been offered as a criterion of goodness. Thus, to seek a man's good would be either to increase his love or to act lovingly toward him. But this is circular. In short, if love is the criterion of goodness, then seeking the neighbor's good cannot be a satisfactory account of the nature of love.

But rather than a disposition to seek the neighbor's good, love is perhaps an attitude which leads us to favor and seek

what is in the neighbor's interest. Thus, we might say that" *x* has agapic love for *y"* means *"x* favors and seeks to promote the interest of *y."* Again difficulties arise. If we say that favoring and promoting the neighbor's interest is trying to satisfy *all* his desires, then love will lead us to beat the masochist, give heroin to the addict, help the murderer to find his victim, etc. But Fletcher insists that *agape* is not gratification and does not necessarily please. He says specifically that love does not give heroin to the addict just because he wants it (love might do so as part of a cure). (p. 117)

But having admitted that love does not favor and promote the satisfaction of all desires, the agapic situationist must now try to specify the sense in which love favors and seeks the neighbor's interest. He has said that love is prudent (and so apparently rational). One might, therefore, take the neighbor's own long-range goals and preference-order as given and say that love will seek what is in the neighbor's interest in that it will seek to satisfy those desires compatible with fullest achievement of the neighbor's long-range goals. Thus, one would suggest that *"x* has agapic love for *y"* means *"x* favors and seeks to satisfy those desires of *y* which are compatible with *y's* fullest achievement of his own long-range plans and goals." But clearly the same difficulty arises again. Some persons may have adopted long-range life plans which would lead us to say that love must then support outrageous schemes. Consider, for example, the young son of a Mafia leader who tries to surpass his father by deliberately setting out t,o become the world's greatest criminal. According to this account, love would then try to aid him in his quest. Yet, this is surely not the role of Christian love.

Thus, the agapic situationist is driven to say that agapic love is an attitude which favors and seeks to satisfy desires compatible with some restricted group of long-range interests. The problem is how these interests are to be identified. For obvious reasons they cannot be identified using considerations of rightness or goodness. But rightness and goodness would otherwise be the obvious candidates, and no other plausible

way of identifying the kind of interests love would try to promote suggests itself. After all, one would have thought that Christian love was trying to do what was good for the neighbor or trying to help him become what he ought to be.

Fletcher does speak of love as ministering to the neighbor's needs, and this might suggest using needs as opposed to desires in an account of what love favors and tries to promote. (p. 104) But this seems unpromising, since needs would have to be specified either in terms of the long-range goals of the neighbor or in terms of what it would be good or right for him to have. Thus, the same problem would arise on this account as well. One might try to avoid the difficulty by saying that "*x* has agapic love for *y*" means "*x* favors and seeks to promote the happiness of *y*." But if one takes happiness to be measured by degree of satisfaction of long-term goals, then the difficulties concerning the promotion of outrageous schemes appear again. If, on the other hand, one takes happiness to be satisfaction of only certain goals and desires, it seems clear that these would have to be specified using judgments of what men ought to be or what is good for them.

In summary, my argument is this: the agapic situationist appears to avoid the difficulties of hedonistic act-utilitarianism only because he has built principles of goodness and/or rightness into his account of love. But this process begs the question. A close examination reveals that, when one attempts to characterize agapic love as an attitude which favors and leads to the promotion of the neighbor's interest, one is unable to say what will count as favoring or promoting the neighbor's interest within the bounds the agapic situationist must observe. If promoting the neighbor's interest is explicated in some way using all the neighbor's actual desires and goals as a basis, then agapic love should favor and promote various outrageous schemes which Fletcher says specifically it does not promote. But the only plausible way to adjudicate among the neighbor's desires is through the use of judgments of right and/or good. To use agapic love as Fletcher uses it in his agapic situation ethic would, therefore, either lead to results he admits would

be wrong or else involve a *petitio.* [2]

In connection with this point it may help to consider Fletcher's contention that love and justice are the same, since justice is love distributed, nothing else. (p. 85 ff) I would suppose that the natural way to take what he says is as the claim that the terms "love" and "justice" have the same meaning. He says, for example, that love and justice are one and the same and can never vary. (p. 89) Further, he writes quite explicitly, " Love =justice; justice= love." (p. 95) On the other hand, he also says such things as : "Justice is Christian love using its head .... Justice is love coping with situations where distribution is called for"; (p. 95) "Prudence, careful calculation, gives love the care-fulness it needs; with proper care love does more than take justice into account, it *becomes* justice." (p. 88) These statements and others like them indicate that Fletcher does not really intend to say that "love " and " justice " have the same meaning but that justice is love with qualification or in one aspect. But one must admit that it is simply not clear how precisely Fletcher intends us to take his identification of love and justice. I suspect, however, that his concern is with a supposedly possible difference between courses of action indicated by love and by justice. He wants to emphasize that justice and love will yield the same decision in each given case. This is presumably due to the fact that (according to him) what is just in a given case is the course which love would dictate. If we take " justice " as a term from the theory of right, then what he is doing here is simply spelling out his theory of right more fully by applying it to the specific case of justice. What he intends to do, I think, is to give us a criterion for justice in terms of love expressed so that the two cannot then be in conflict.

Thus, if we take Fletcher to be suggesting an actual identity of meaning between " love " and " justice," he is at odds with

[2] Fletcher suggests on page *105* that *agape* is an attitude held because of God or because of His command or wish. Depending on how it is developed, this move could involve another circle, since it is tempting to think that it may mask an appeal to a previous principle such as obligation to do God's will.

himself, since he says things which make sense only if the two terms have some difference in meaning. But if we take him to be giving a criterion for justice, then the same objections already entered against his view on rightness in general arise again in connection with this particular case.

This is clearly indicated by an example Fletcher discusses:

> Nathaniel Micklem relates a story of Cannon Quick's about an Indian deeply in debt who inherited a fortune and gave it away to the poor, leaving his creditors unpaid. The "moral" drawn was that something is wrong with charity (love) when it is at variance with justice, . . . This is, of course, a very badly drawn lesson. It is true, yes, that love and justice should not be at variance. The reason, however, is not that one would excel the other but, rather, that they are one and the same thing and *cannot* vary! The Indian failed in *agape,* and was therefore unjust. (p. 89)

But how are we to determine that the Indian failed in *agape?* He certainly attempted to serve the interests of his neighbor. Given that the poor probably had greater need for money than the creditors, it is not at all clear that he has failed to promote as much as possible the interests of as many of his neighbors as possible. But note that Fletcher is quite sure that he failed in *agape.* Is this not because *agape* is promoting the *proper* inte!ests of those neighbors whose lone *ought* to promote or, put another way, promoting first the interests of those who have a *just* claim on one? In short, is it not necessary to use considerations of rightness (in this case, justice) in explicating agapic love itself, so that the whole theory is involved in a vicious circle?

In spite of the circularity of his central claim, one cannot help feeling considerable sympathy for one aspect of Fletcher's view. He is anxious to remove ethics from the hold of those who check a list of prohibited actions (such as lying or adultery) and then reject as wrong any action on the list *no matter what the circumstances.* But, sympathy for any opponent of such moral primitivism notwithstanding, it is necessary to point out that Fletcher makes a serious mistake when he takes the only alternatives for principled ethics to be rigid

codified pharisaism, on the one hand, and situationism (act-utilitarianism), on the other. He apparently believes that anyone who does hold any moral principles, but who also draws into his moral decisions considerations of the exact circumstances of particular cases, must be a situationist if he is to be consistent. He admits that a non-Christian situationist may replace *agape* with some other value-Aristotle he takes to have substituted self-realization as the value. (p. 31) But even so, a philosopher who, like Aristotle, wants to consider the facts of particular cases remains in Fletcher's view a situationist.

Notice, however, what he says in introducing the idea of a situation ethic:

> The situationist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same he is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set them aside *in the situation* if love seems better served by doing so. (p. 26)

Here moral rules and principles are regarded as mere summaries of past experience. When in a particular case we believe that the rule will not lead to the best result, we are to *set the rule aside,* to act contrary to the rule. Since there is always the situationist (or act-utilitarian) first principle to which appeal may be made directly, this view of principles and rules is not surprising. It is, however, doubtful whether such summaries should be called moral principles at all.

What Fletcher has overlooked is the possibility of another kind of approach which also takes full account of the peculiarities or particular situations but which also retains moral principles which are directive and which are not to be simply set aside whenever we think it would be well to do so.

One must, of course, distinguish between making an exception to a principle or rule and a principle or rule containing an excepting clause or being conditional. This is an obvious and fairly familiar distinction. If I subscribe to a certain rule such as, " Do not steal," in simple, categorical form, then if I

decide on whatever grounds to make an exception to the rule, i.e., to steal, then I have broken the rule. But if the rule is "Do not steal unless it is necessary to save life," then if I steal in circumstances in which to do otherwise would cost a life, I have *not* broken or made an exception to the rule against stealing. Thus, anyone whose moral principles and rules go beyond simple injunction or prohibition to the inclusion of conditions under which the action is enjoined or prohibited must be as interested in the circumstances of the particular case as is Fletcher's situationist.

Further, with a complex set of principles and rules (and surely any plausible theory of right will be complex if it uses principles and secondary rules) it will be necessary to include ordering principles to say which duties, rights, etc., imposed by the rules are to take precedence in cases of conflict. But this need not be taken (as Fletcher appears to do) as giving rules for breaking the rules. So long as all the principles include in full statement (or simply have understood) a clause like "provided that the ordering principles do not override," no exception has been made, and no rule has been broken.

It is extremely important that we realize that the kind of approach I have been describing is possible (whatever the content of the principles adopted by various persons), since Fletcher is, of course, able to score very easily against the two kinds of position he represents as the only possible alternatives to his situationism. One of his most persuasive devices is the citing of cases in which ridiculous decisions are indicated (or, alas, have been made), when someone clings to hard and fast application of a simple unconditional principle. He is then able to contrast this approach with the benign sensibleness of his situational approach. But the kind of position I have described can join whole-heartedly in the rejection of the pharisaism which Fletcher calls legalism. It could also easily be held by someone who, like Fletcher, rejects the hypocritical ethics of the American middle class. (p. 137) But this should make it clear that one can be as reasonable and as contemporary in outlook as Fletcher tries to be without having to be a situationist.

At this point it might be well to say something about Fletcher's stipulation that this ethic is relativistic. (p. 43 f.) Most of the time his relativism seems to involve nothing more than the claim that in differing situations differing courses of action may be right. In other words, simply another denial of simple-minded, simple-rule legalism. Understood in this way, relativism is surely a characteristic of any plausible moral theory including the kind of complex principle view I have described above. But this means that the complex principle view may lead to as much agonizing over applying or adopting principles as does Fletcher's situationism. Simple-minded legalism may, as he intimates, attempt to avoid agonizing decision, but this need not be true of a plausible moral theory of complex principles.

It is possible that Fletcher intends to be a relativist in a stronger sense, but this is never made entirely clear. He does say that love decides situationally, not prescriptively. (p. 134) But his discussion seems to indicate that what he would count as prescriptive would be decisions which somehow committed one to simple unconditional rules.

When Fletcher says that we must be concrete and consider well-defined cases, naturally there is merit to his suggestion. Cases show how complex principles must be. They help us decide what principles to adopt. But it is in trying to formulate and test principles (complex though they be) that we assure ourselves that we have considered situations morally and not merely from the standpoint of personal taste, personal interest, or temporary emotion. By abstracting from particular interests and temporary involvements, the process of adopting principles helps us to achieve objectivity. This is the point of the universality of moral judgments. No matter how conditional thev may be, moral judgments must be universal in that they must be applicable to all similar situations.

Now Fletcher might leap on the term " similar "here, arguing that no situations are ever sufficiently similar to allow for a formulation of principles, no matter how complex. Yet the danger of his insistence on making a fresh decision for every

case is just the kind of personal involvement in the case which may rob even the best-intentioned of objectivity. Further, there are at least two replies to the possible objection about similarity. First, one need not be committed to saying that the set of principles he embraces at any one time is eternally final. If a particular situation does genuinely contain elements not covered in any principle we already hold, then we may have to make a decision of principle-to commit ourselves to a new principle. But it is important that we make a decision of principle, not just a decision in this case, for it is by considering the case from the standpoint of possible principles that we may hope to achieve objectivity. Second, the principles we adopt are not imposed on us from above. Therefore, if there does occur a set of circumstances which calls to our attention a difficulty in our principles, nothing keeps us from adjusting them provided we make our decision as an adjustment of principle, not as a mere one case judgment. The point remains, however, that it is important to adopt principles, since this is one way in which one may hope to attain the objectivity which is an important aspect of the distinction between mere judgments of personal preference and moral judgments.

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FAITH IN OTHER PEOPLE: THREE VIEWS

THE " CREDIBILITY GAP" which was once considered the affiiction of a political administration has now become a general feature of our society. Economic and ethnic groups now meet one another in principle with skepticism. A deep-seated mistrust governs relationships among nations and between individuals. In view of this, the question concerning the conditions necessary for people to trust each other seems to be an urgent one. The problem seems acute enough to warrant an essay which has as its concern precisely the question of what it means to have faith in another person, and this article will endeavor to explore this issue by analyzing and evaluating three contrasting notions of what is involved in believing other people. The division of the essay is threefold: Part One will consider the contribution of the empiricism of David Hume, while the emphasis on reason of some scholastic writers will provide the framework for discussion in Part Two. Lastly, Part Three will propose the personalist approach of the nineteenth-century neo-scholastic thinker Matthias Joseph Scheeben.

I

DAviD HuME

Perhaps the most influential philosopher in the English-speaking world at the present time is still David Hume. Certainly, the general principles which he laid down concerning human knowledge are in many ways the outstanding expression of the empirical outlook which has in general characterized the Anglo-Saxon mentality, and these principles also form the foundations of the analytic philosophy which prevails in much of the English-speaking world.

For Hume, a wise man will proportion his expectation of

future events in general to the degree of regularity with which he has experienced them in the past. For example, I have had a certain experience of this particular individual, and I have found that his statements proved perhaps rarely true, or perhaps frequently so, or perhaps almost always so. If I am sensible, I will proportion my confidence in his future statements to my past experience of his reliability.

Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am surrounded by my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leave it in order to rob me of my silver standish.- *But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy*.- So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake and tumble my house about my ears.[1]

The more extensive my experience of a person, the better position I am in to know how to expect him to act. H I know him very well, not even the irregularities in his manner of acting will surprise me.

The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. A person of obliging disposition gives a peevish answer: but he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: but he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others, we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the constant character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy.

However, for me to form a judgment as to a person's reliability, it is not essential that I have had personal experience of him. There is, in general,

> a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages. . . . The same motives always produce the same

[1] *Enquiry,* Section 8, Part I, source of the subsequent passages cited.

actions: the same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former *most* of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter .... Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies .... A man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather, as that he will find it untouched an hour later.

With regard to people that I do not know personally, then, I proportion my expectations to my experience of mankind in general.

Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations.

Hume intends this notion of proportion literally, even mathematically.

Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence. . . . A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full *proof* of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he

proceeds with more caution: he weighs the opposite experiments: he considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability*. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to over-balance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably begets a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.

The same applies to the credence we give human testimony.

The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not derived from any *connexion* which we perceive *a priori* between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. . . . As the evidence derived from witnesses and human testimony is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as *proof* or as *probability*, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and observation.

If then there is any evidence contrary to something someone says, we balance the strength of the evidence against our experience of his reliability. The result will always be a lessening of our confidence in what is said.

We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on one side, we incline to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.

The picture which Hume gives us of what happens when *we* put faith in someone has a great deal to recommend it. In

point, of fact, this is largely how we act. If I am faced with the task of hiring someone to do a job, how do I decide whom to hire? If at all possible, I go on my own experience of him; if not, I go by the testimony of others whose judgment I know by experience to be reliable. It is this principle which governs the creation of any establishment, whether in civil life or in the churches: it is the basis on which bishops are appointed and the Roman Curia perpetuates itself, for instance.

The key factor in this empiricist conception of faith is the presumption that a person is not to be trusted until he has proved himself reliable. There are no *a priori* grounds on which a person might be trusted simply because he is a person. As a guide to the choice of safe employees, it is eminently practical. But it cannot be accused of being a creative faith: it is essentially static. It does not help the other person to become more of a person, more fully himself. It leaves him the way it finds him. It has little to do with love. The child who experiences solely (if that were possible) or mainly this form of faith from his parents, and who has to prove himself constantly before obtaining their support, is likely to suffer enduring psychological damage.

II

Some Scholastics and Neo-Scholastics

Another possible understanding of what it means to have faith in human beings was developed by Catholic theologians of the post-tridentine period in response to the problems concerning faith and tradition raised by the Reformers; it was subsequently taken up again by large numbers of neo-scholastics in the nineteeth and twentieth centuries. This is a logical or syllogistic conception of faith. Credence given to something someone says is the product of three factors: the speaker's knowledge, his truthfulness, and the fact that he said it.

The act of belief then takes the form, at least implicitly, of a syllogism or polysyllogism:

Whatever a truthful person says on a subject he has sufficient knowledge of will be true.

But A has sufficient knowledge about this matter, and he is truthful.

Therefore whatever A says on this matter will be true.

But A has said such and such;

Therefore such and such is true.

If faith in A is to be reasonable, then each of these factors must be *known* and not merely believed; then the conclusion is logically justifiable.

Sylvester Maurus, for example, argued:

Faith in a human being is resolvable into premisses, and it is because of these that we believe that what he says is true: the premisses because of which we believe what a person says are: This man is truthful, and so what he says is for the most part true; but he says, for example, Peter is dead. Therefore Peter is dead. Faith in a human being, then, is resolvable proximately into his truthfulness and the fact of his making the statement. [2]

De Lugo held the same view:

If we consider the matter sufficiently, we will see that the assent of faith is arrived at by means of this syllogism, either explicitly or implicitly .[3]

Likewise Heinrich Denzinger, author of the well-known Enchiridion:

The act of faith is, either implicitly or explicitly, the conclusion of a syllogism, in which the authority of the speaker forms the major premiss, and the fact of his witness the minor premiss. [4]

He analyzes the matter somewhat further:

There are two syllogistic processes to be distinguished in the act of believing someone; one which prepares the grounds and concludes that it is possible and even necessary to believe, and a second

• *Opus Theologicum* (Rome, 1687). Book VII, q. 112, n. 4.
[8] *Disputationes de Fide* (Lyons, 1656). *DiS'p. I,* s. 6 (n. 77).
• *Vier Bucher von der religwsen Erkenntnis,* p. 489.

which leads to the actual act of belief itself and is contained at least implicitly in it.[5]

The whole force of this view is to make faith in a person predominantly, in some cases exclusively, a matter of the intellect. Where Hume and empiricist philosophy would base it on our past experience of a person, this view bases it on an intellectual deduction. Not only the conclusion needs to be deduced from the premisses but the premisses themselves must be *known* to be true and not merely believed. Thus Kleutgen, one of the founders of the neo-scholastic movement, says: " In order to be accepted, both premisses . . . need to be demonstratively proven (Beweisfiihrung) and not simply correctly understood." [6]

However, there is the dilemma that in a syllogism the certainty of the conclusion cannot be greater than that of the weakest premiss, and in theology there has traditionally been difficulty in " proving " the fact of revelation. In an attempt to get around this, it is held that our assent in faith rests directly on the " authority " of the other rather than on a process of reasoning.[7] But, as long as that " authority " is understood to consist in the other's knowledge and truthfulness, the problem remains as it was before, since the motive is considered to be an exclusively intellectual one.

Given the sharp scholastic distinction between intellect and will, the question then arises whether the will has any part to play in the act of giving faith to someone. A number of late scholastic and post-tridentine writers considered that in general it does not but only in the case of faith in a divine revelation. In the view of Marsilius of Inghen (1330-96) the will has only a negative role, not to resist where the logic is compelling. Sylvester Maurus considered a positive participation of the will only " more probable." [8] In general, however, most of those

[5] P. 491.

• *Theologie der Vorzeit* (Miinster, 1st ed. 1853-1860), p. *522.*

[7] Cf., for example, W. Moran, *Faith, Its Birth in Us* (Dublin, 1948), 3 ff.

[8] *Op. cit.,* Book VII, q. 135, nn. 11, 12.

who have understood faith syllogistically have held that the will does have a positive role to play: I do not see directly the truth of the statement that is made, and so the logic of the syllogism does not compel me to assent. For assent to take place then, in scholastic language, my will must command my intellect to assent.

> The intellect of itself is not sufficiently compelled by the force of the motives to exclude all doubt: therefore for this to take place it must be commanded by the will. The minor premiss (this latter statement) is proved by the fact that the motives do not all make the truth of the statement evident, and so they do not compel the intellect to exclude all doubt. [9]

It is an unquestioned axiom for the scholastic and nco-scholastic conception of faith that faith cannot co-exist with doubt (a view which has since come under some heavy fire).

Curiously, however, this act of the will which steps in to exclude doubt does not have to be free. It can in certain circumstances be a forced will.

> Not even ... freedom can be maintained to be a characteristic of faith in general. ... It should be noted that [Aquinas] denies ... freedom to the faith of a man who was present when a prophet, to confirm his statements, raised someone from the dead. [10] It is not essential to faith in general that it proceed from free will, and it is not a necessary characteristic of it even to be able to proceed from free will.[11]
>
> The act of faith is constrained when the believer is constrained by the force or evidence of the proofs to accept this inevident truth as an object of his assentY Even in relation to a particular object, faith need not be free. Evident proofs of credibility can necessitate the mind's assent. That does not by any means make the object itself of faith something evident, but it removes from the act of faith its libertyY

Even when it is admitted, then, that the will has a role to play in faith (and, of course, especially when it is not free will),

[9] De Lugo, *op. cit.,* Disp. 10, s. 1 (n. 6).

[10] Kleutgen, *op. cit., Beilage* 3, p. *56.*

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 57.

[10] A. Lefebvre, *L'acte de foi d'apres la doctrine de St. Thomas* (Paris, 1904), p. 18.

[13] *Ibid.,* p.

its role is secondary to the intellect. It is the act of the intellect, the act of mental assent, which actually constitutes faith in a person or a statement, and so the action of the will is something extrinsic to faith as such.

A distinction must be made between those characteristics which faith possesses because of the constitution of the intellect, and those which it possesses because of the constitution of the will. The former are intrinsic and in part essential, the latter are external and inessentiaP [4]

The ultimate basis on which faith rests then is something which belongs to the theoretical order.

Faith is rooted in a principle which is theoreticaJ.l [5] An act of faith is an act of knowledge, ... because by its very nature it is an act which pertains to the intellect *(Vernunft)* .[16]

And so any vitality that faith might have, any quality of being alive, will be the sort of vitality which characterizes the operations of the intellect. " The act of faith is vital ... insofar as it comes from the intellect." [17]

[11] De Lugo, *op. cit.,* Disp. 9, s. 3, n. 48.

One last point may be made in sketching this view of the nature of faith in human beings: if it is logical, it is discursive, that is, an indirect or mediate act, not one which sets up a direct relationship between the person of the believer and the person or matter he believes in. Sylvester Maurus and Franzelin make this point with particular clarity:

Any mediate assent, that is, one by which we do not assent to a proposition because of itself, is resolvable into those premisses from which we infer the proposition by a syllogism, whether explicit or implicit. [18]

Every assent of our intellect is either immediate, where the objective truth is manifested to the intellect by itself and not by means of some other truth known beforehand; or else it is

[u] Kleutgen, *op. cit., Beilage* 3, p. 62.

[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 86-87.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 54.

[18] Sylvester Maurus, *op. cit.,* Book VII, q. 111, n. 3.

mediate assent, where the truth is manifested not by itself, but through some other truth known beforehand. . . . Every assent of faith properly so called is necessarily mediate.[19]

Again, it can be seen that in this view of things there can be no presumption that what a person says is true. His credentials have to be established first. There is in fact, as Kleutgen makes clear, a presumption that he is not to be believed until he has *proven* that his knowledge is sufficient and that he is truthful.

The same basic objection seems to apply to this view as to that of Hume, namely, that it is not creative but passive, and that it cannot serve to found a genuinely personal relationship of the type which is of such decisive significance for human life.

III

JosEPH ScHEEBEN

In contrast with these views Joseph Scheeben suggests the thesis that genuine faith in a human being is directly based neither on past experience of his reliability nor on logical demonstration of it but on respect for his person, a respect to which he has a right as a human being. That is to say, by the very fact that he is a human being, he is entitled to my respect. He has a dignity and a worth equal to my own. If I take his life, I have forfeited my right to my own life. If I despise him, I have implicitly condemned myself. Part of the respect to which he is entitled is a presumption that what he says is true, unless there is good reason to believe the contrary.

It lies in the nature of the case that we are not moved to give a person this recognition on the grounds of logical proof: normally in the case of human beings such a thing is impossible. We give him this recognition because of our *respect for his person.* This respect not only urges us but makes it justifiable for us . . . to presume his reliability, as long as there are not well-founded grounds

[19] J. B. Franzelin, *De divina traditione et seriptura* (Rome, 1870), pp. 559-60.

to the contrary. [20] Such a presumption is the distinguishing element, or rather the very root of faith; so much so that without it we cannot speak of faith in any valid sense.[21]

The respect which Scheeben is speaking of is not the sort of thing which we give to people because of any particular virtues we may know they have, much less because of an office which they hold in society. He means the respect which we owe to a person simply by the fact that he is a person. It is not something, then, which we give to a privileged few and not to others. It applies to every member of the human race without distinction. The same is true of the presumption of veracity of which he speaks. Every human being, by the simple fact that he is a human being, is entitled to receive from me a presumption that he is telling the truth.

There is, however, a restriction which must be placed on this, namely, that the person be claiming to describe his own personal experience and not information obtained at second hand. The reasons for this restriction will be discussed shortly.

It will be clear even from this much that Scheeben's understanding of faith is strongly personalist, although it is widely assumed today that " personalism " is a recent development. But his personalism is of a special kind. Faith does not presuppose a personal relationship with the other: it creates one. More, it is, in his view, that which makes any truly personal relationship possible.

From the beginning this conception of faith is a creative one. It does not first demand that the other person produce his credentials. It goes out to him, assures him of his own value and worth, and so creates the possibility for him to become himself. In this sense it might well be called a religious or at least humanist faith. It would seem in any event that only a faith which acts in this way, which starts by presuming the reliability of the other, is capable of fulfilling the demands which crucial human situations place on us, where the development of a human person is in the balance.

[90] Scheeben, *Dogmatik,* I (Freiburg i.Br., 1875,' 1959[2]). 643.
[••] *Ibid.*

The act of believing another person then, in Scheeben's view, is not by any means simply a matter of cognition; it is a question of morality, of my ethical attitude towards my neighbor in general as a person, of whether I am prepared to treat him as a human being ought to be treated. What is at stake is not primarily my knowledge but my ethical status.

> Faith is by no means simply a logical act of knowledge; in its totality it is an ethical *(sittlicher)* act.[22] The root of faith [namely, my respect for the personal dignity of the other] is ethical in nature, and as the act itself develops to completion its character remains always ethicaJ.[23]

What does it mean, that an act be "personal"? For Scheeben, it means on the one hand, as we have seen, that it is directed primarily not towards an object, such as a truth or a proposition, but towards the person of the other and specifically, in this case, to his person as being worthy of respect by the fact that he is a person. It also means that it arises out of the depths of the person acting. Here we encounter a question of decisive importance. If faith is to be a genuinely personal act, there is one essential pre-condition which must be fulfilled: it must be given freely. A majority of Catholic writers on this subject in the past have seen so little of the personal element in faith, even as given to human beings, that they have considered it quite compatible with a compelled assent: compelled at least by the obviousness of the other's knowledge and veracity. The basis of the view was a literal interpretation of James 19: "The devils believe and tremble." Scheeben points out that such belief can be called faith only in an equivocal sense.[24] The heart of true faith is lacking. Did James really consider that the devils were believing Christians?

For Scheeben, faith by its nature is not something to which we can be compelled either by experience or by logic. We believe a person because we want to, freely and willingly,

[22] *Ibid.,* 816, 632.
[23] *Ibid.,* 633.
[24] *Ibid.,* 649.

That does not mean we will necessarily like what he says but, if we accept his word only because we have no other choice, then we cannot be said to have faith in him. Genuine faith is present only when the other "offers us his own insight as the ground and norm of our conviction, and we willingly accept it as such." [25] "An unwilling acceptance of testimony, resting on the fact that denial would be too foolish or useless ... does not deserve the name of faith." [26] Either faith is given freely, or it is not faith. "Faith is essentially and intrinsically ... an act of *free* will." [27]

Yet we must go further. Even this is not enough, in Scheeben's view, for an act to be truly personal. The things that distinguish a person from an object, that constitute him a person, are mind and will, and the depth of the unity of these, which is his " heart." An act that is merely an act of the mind, such as an exercise in mathematics, is not a personal act. Nor is one that would be solely an act of the will, even free will, for that would be simply an assertion of blind force. For an act to be personal it must bring both a person's mind and will into play in a unity. But this unity has a depth, the "heart," and a person is really acting as a person only when what he does rises out of his heart. All these elements are present in faith if it is genuine, and so faith is an exceptionally good example of a personal act; it is an act of the whole person.

> Man is involved in the act of believing with his whole interior being, and with the whole spiritual side of his being, with mind and will and heart. [28] [And so] faith is an act of the whole person, in a way that scarcely any other act is; it is an act of the person as such, and he acts in it with all those powers which are most characteristically his.[29]

It was natural enough for Scheeben, like the Romantics before him and such a man as John Dewey subsequently, to turn

[25] *Ibid.,* 617. Cf. also his article" Glaube" in Wetzer !Uld Welte's *Kirchenlexikcm* (Freiburg, 1881), cols. 619-620.

[26] *Ibid.,* 631.

[27] *Ibid.,* 813, Scheeben's emphasis.

[28] *Ibid.,* 812.

[29] *Ibid.,* 809. Cf. also 812 !Uld " Glaube," 659, 660.

to the notion of the " organic " to describe a reality which is thus complex yet simple because alive. The opposite of an organism is a machine. The unity of a machine is built up by adding parts one to another from the outside: it is an extrinsic unity. By itself it is inert. It is a juxtaposition of things to perform a certain function repeatedly. The unity of an organism, on the other hand, is built up from within; it has a variety of parts, but they form an inner whole, because it is living.

Faith is certainly susceptible of analysis regarding its constituent elements, but we must not lose sight of the fact that what we are analyzing is really something simple and straightforward, and the elements which we consider one by one form an inner unity which is alive: faith is a " living organism." (Scheeben)

Any conception of faith in terms either of experience, in the sense outlined above, or of logic Scheeben rejects as mechanical. A syllogism is the mental equivalent of a machine. It produces its results automatically. Its unity comes from the addition of premiss to premiss. It is not alive and concrete: it is abstract. This is a forceful charge against the typical scholastic concept of faith. " It conceives of faith in too abstract and mechanical a fashion, its living organism is overlooked or attenuated." [30] The same applies to Hume's concept of experience. From beginning to end faith is a " living development," [31] and so this logical-mechanical concept of faith as a process of reasoning is quite unable to do justice to it.

It goes together with this that he rejects the neo-scholastic view, forcefully defended by Kleutgen, that faith is based on theoretical insight. If the ultimate basis of faith is cognitive or theoretical, the knowledge that the other person possesses the required information and is truthful, then the one who gives him belief is rather like a detached spectator observing certain phenomena and concluding from them. But if faith is to be a genuinely personal act, a living and organic whole, then its

[30] *Ibid.,* 630.
[31] *Ibid.,* 648.

root must be on the level not of the theoretical but of what Scheeben terms the " practical," that is, an action or attitude which commits the person of the believer. It takes its origin from something which involves the one believing existentially. " Belief has its foundation not in a theoretical principle but in respect for the dignity of other intelligent beings." [32] " Genuine faith is a *practical* recognition of the personal dignity (of the other) ." [33] Another way of putting this is to say that the motive of faith acts first not on the mind but on the will, and only through the will does it influence the mind. If the motive of faith, the reason why we believe a person, were our experience of his reliability in the past, or our reasoned conclusion to that effect, then it would influence our mind in the first place; we would conclude it was reasonable to believe him, and because we thought it was reasonable we would do so. Although Scheeben is far from denying that faith in a person ought to be reasonable, it is not reasonableness which he considers to be the motive which really leads us to believe someone but the person's simple dignity as a human being. This is something which appeals to the voluntary or affective side of our nature. No doubt the act of accepting what he says as true is an act of the mind, an act of assent, but this follows after. " The motive of faith ... acts first on the will, engendering respect, esteem and trust; only through the will does it have influence on the assent of the mind." [34] Interestingly, Thomas Aquinas holds also that this is where faith does not simply receive help but *begins:* " The beginning of faith lies in the affective part of man (in *affectione),* in that the will leads the intellect to give assent." [35]

Faith is a personal act, then, not simply because it involves the commitment of one person to another. It is personal, first in the radical sense that every person is entitled to receive it by the fact that he is a person. By the fact that he is a human being like myself he has a right to my respect on pain of my

•• *Ibid.*
•• *Ibid.,* 626.
•• *Ibid.,* 633.
[85] *Do Veriwte,* q. 14, art. 2, ad 10.

denying my own human dignity, and therefore he has a right to my presumption that what he says is true. In a given case there may be good reason to go against the presumption. The fact remains that it and not its contrary is the starting point in dealing with another person and with what he says.

From the side of the one giving credence, faith is a personal act because it is specifically an activity of those powers which constitute a person as such, and its root is freely given respect which, to be genuine, can only come from the heart. Faith in a human being is therefore an act of the whole person. It is personal especially in the sense that, as a result of these facts, it is creative of the other person. It presupposes in him nothing but the potentiality to become himself, and in going out to him it makes it possible for him to do that, and it expresses confidence that he can.

However, there is more to faith in a person than the general character of a personal act. There is also the question of believing what he says, of being convinced of something. What is it that justifies me intellectually in doing this? If what we have seen of Scheeben's views is true, is he not in effect denying that faith needs to be a reasonable act? Such denial has not been uncommon. A number of those who have recently laid emphasis on the personal character of faith have suggested, in praise of it, that it is at bottom an unreasonable act. Even where it is not explicitly stated, such a view has come to be implicitly assumed in some quarters as a result of an only half-comprehended existential philosophy and of the theology of Karl Barth. It is, of course, understandable that philosophers who consider, in the tradition of Hume, that "religion is founded on faith, not on reason," that is, that religious faith and reason are unrelated, find it easiest to speak with theologians of like mind. But, for many people, both are evading the crucial issue. If the question of reasonableness is not of ultimate importance for faith, then I may believe anything.

With Scheeben this is not the case. It is important that faith should always be a reasonable act: we must be intellectually justified in giving credence to what the other says. Faith must

"be reasonable and lead to truly reasonable knowledge." [36] How then do we go about securing this?

In the first place, it is obvious that, if our acceptance of what someone says is not to be sheer credulity and if it is to result in a genuine addition to our knowledge, then the other person must actually possess the knowledge which he claims to have, and he must be truthfully communicating it; further, we must know with surety that he possesses it and is communicating it truthfully.

It is these two qualities which the other possesses, then, truthfulness and knowledge--or insight, as Scheeben prefers to call it, because he wishes to restrict consideration to the case where a person is claiming to speak about his direct experience -which ensure that our belief will be an act of genuine cognition. They are not the motive of faith as such, the reason why we believe him: they are " specific attributes " of the motive, that is, they specify the way the motive acts. The motive is his dignity as a human being. Of itself this simply leads us to respect him. For our respect to be able legitimately to take the specific form of belief these other two things are required as preconditions. They do not by themselves act as the motivating force which brings us to believe him, but they mean that our resulting conviction will be accurate and not a delusion. The difference may be subtle, but it is important.

If they do not of themselves constitute the motive which leads us to believe a person, however, they are also not entirely separate from the motive. They are aspects, qualities or " attributes" of his dignity as a person, namely, those which make it possible for our respect for him to take the specific form of belief in what he says. On the other hand, these two factors, the knowledge of the person we give credence to and his truthfulness, are not on the same level of significance; they have different types of roles. Scheeben's ideas on this subject represent one of his most distinctive contributions to the theory of faith.

[36] Scheeben, *loc. cit.*, 649.

To believe a person means at least this much, that I adopt his insight or knowledge as my own. I " take his word for it." It is an act of mental substitution. I did not witness a particular incident: X claims to have witnessed it; I accept his account of it. " In point of fact, faith is at bottom nothing but the substitution of someone else's insight, and as a rule only direct insight or intuition, for one's own," [37] given, as we have seen, out of respect for his person. Somehow or other I must come to consider this justifiable. But my final act of assent, e. g., such and such is what happened in that case, does not rest on *my* knowledge that the adoption of his insight is justifiable. It rests directly on *his* insight because that is what I am adopting. This is a point of basic importance in Scheeben's conception of faith. The assent of belief is not discursive (in contrast to common neo-scholastic theory), it is direct and immediate, the other person's insight simply taking the place of my own. Also, it is not as if I were to reason from his insight to mine: in the past I have found his insights in this matter to be correct, therefore I will accept that such and such is the case now. My final act of assent is not-if it is to be genuine faith-in any sense the conclusion of a process of reasoning, whether from his insight or my knowledge that his insight is reliable. It is the direct and immediate adoption of his insight in place of my own. The immediate intellectual basis of my assent, then, is *his insight.*

However, the only access I have to his insight is through his words or some external sign, and these signs do not necessarily express accurately what he knows or does not know. So I rely on his truthfulness to be assured of this, that his words correspond to his knowledge. Of itself his truthfulness does not assure me that what he says is true. But to the extent that he is truthful, he will see to it that his words accurately represent *his own conscious awareness* of having knowledge of the matter in question. His truthfulness assures me that he *thinks* that what he says is true. Not, once again, that I draw

[37] *Ibid.,* 650.

a logical conclusion from his truthfulness to the fact that his words correspond to what he thinks. I can do this, but it is not faith. Faith is present when I view his truthfulness as part (a "specific attribute") of his personal dignity, which I respect, and so out of respect for his person I *trust* that his words correspond to his thoughts. [38]

But there is still a gap. How do I know that what he thinks is true is really true? There is one type of case where we normally recognize a special assurance about this, namely, when he is speaking of his own direct personal experience. This is the restriction Scheeben makes, mentioned earlier, and, of course, it is a large one. There is a big difference between the case where a person is describing something he has witnessed or seen in some way himself and where he is passing on second-hand information obtained from another source as if it were true. In the second case he may be easily mistaken. In the first, so long as he sticks strictly to what he has experienced, he cannot be in error. But how do I know that, when he claims to be describing an experience, he really experienced it? This depends on his truthfulness; a genuinely truthful man will not claim to have witnessed something when he did not.

Ultimately, then, everything rests on the question of his truthfulness. But how do I know that he is truthful? It is prescisely to this question that the initial observations on respect for his person apply. Because he is a human being he has a right not to be judged to be morally evil unless there are grounds to do so. His dignity as a human person, equal to my own, gives him the right that I should presume his truthfulness until there are solid reasons to the contrary. From the point of view of its intellectual justification, then, his truthfulness is sufficient to assure me of the validity of his knowledge when he is claiming to describe his own personal experience. Where a person is passing on second-hand information or hearsay, Scheeben considers that genuine belief in the sense of a personal act is often excluded. In such case, ratification may well have to be sought from other sources.

•• Cf. *ibid.,* 640.

A further point may be inserted here. Neo-scholastic philosophy has usually drawn a distinction between the motive of an act and the act itself. The motive of faith was generally held to be the combination of the speaker's knowledge and truthfulness; lengthy debates were carried on in the seventeenth century whether the fact of the statement should be counted as part of the motive for believing as well. For Scheeben, as we have seen, the motive of faith as such lies in none of these but in the personal dignity of the other human being. From the point of view of its intellectual justification, the whole weight lies on the validity of the other's insight. This, and nothing else, is the basis on which our belief rests as an act of the mind, and it rests on it, in Scheeben's view, directly and immediately. But, in every statement that a person makes there is included a formal claim that his insight regarding the matter in question is valid. Even if faith is understood in the strict sense as the acceptance of a statement on the word of another, then acceptance of the basis of faith-the validity of the person's insight-is already a formal act of faith in the person concerned. The presumption of his truthfulness is a similar procedure, except that it is not the acceptance of an explicit testimony: in every statement that a person makes there is normally included a claim that he is truthful, but it is included only implicitly, not expressly, like the validity of his insight. As a result, Scheeben terms this presumption of the person's truthfulness not a formal act of faith but "an act analogous to faith." Its structure is the same as that of faith, except that it is not a response to an explicit statement.

The distinction may seem pedantic. The question at issue is, is it meaningful to speak of faith other than as a response to a testimony? In reference to religious faith the question becomes: is it meaningful to speak of faith other than as a response to a divine revelation? In its own way this question sums up one of the major dilemmas of Christian theology in our time. One final conclusion may be drawn from this part of the inquiry. We have already seen some of the ways in which faith is a personal act in Scheeben's view. We are now in

a position to add another. By its nature faith involves a direct and immediate union of mind with the other person. My act of faith rests directly on the insight of the other person, so that it is an " immediate assent." I adopt the other person's insight as my own; I base mine immediately on his. The result is a particularly intimate form of personal union. In fact, Scheeben maintains that it is really in order to achieve this union of mind with the other person that we give credence to what he says, in the case of real faith.

> Faith has its root ... in the desire ... to ,enter into a union of mind *(geistige)* with him.[39] The assent of the mind to the truth attested to takes place only insofar as the will, led by respect for the person of the one speaking, seeks agreement with his judgment, participation in his knowledge, and community of knowledge with him, that is, desires a spiritual or mental union *(geistige Vereinigung)* with him.[40] An unwilling acceptance ... which brings about no union *(Anschluss)* with the other person but simply regards him as a channel by which a truth we have not ourselves experienced happens to become accessible to us, does not deserve the name of faith, and it is a misuse of words to call it such.[41]

From this point of view also, as Scheeben sees it, faith is personal in a creative sense; it does not presuppose a personal relationship, it creates one.

Our awareness of hidden, subconscious forces at work in people and our alertness to social, economic and psychological pressures among individuals and groups has made us wary of others, suspicious of their motives, and cautious in affirming faith in them. At a time like this there is much to be said in favor of a theory which calls for neither verification of truthfulness nor proof of the sufficiency of one's knowledge before commanding our faith. Scheeben's personalistic approach circumvents the limitations inherent in the empiricist theory of Hume and the rational systems of the scholastics by calling our attention back to the dignity of the human person. It is

" *Ibid.,* 631.
•• *Ibid.,* 638.
•• *Ibid.,* 648.

there that man, because of his human dignity, has a right to be met with a positive and affirmative attitude and not with mistrust and disbelief except insofar as there is evidence to warrant it.

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DEWART'S *THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF:* A REVIEW ARTICLE

LESLIE DEWART in his *The Foundations of Belief* [1] has both a negative and a positive purpose. Negatively, he criticizes epistemological, metaphysical, and natural theological positions called thomistic. Positively, his efforts are directed toward a total refashioning of epistemology, ontology, and theodicy. While recognizing the dangers of extreme brevity, we may attempt to summarize his position under the rubrics of *Being, Consciousness,* the *Knowing Process, Truth, Reality,* and *God.*

Being is that which exists. It is that "sort of reality which is revealed in experience." (p. 431) As such, being is absolutely contingent. Moreover, it is simply a fact that confronts us. Like Mount Everest, being is simply there. Objects that are beings have no innate intelligibility. "Anything that is, is essentially, and as such, a fact. It need not be, it has no meaning that constitutes it as reality." (p. 294) This does not mean that being is unintelligible or absurd; rather, beings may be said to be extra-intelligible; for "there is no reason *intrinsic to them* and *to their constitution* why they should be *as* they are." (p. 294) It is only the extrinsic world situation in history that accounts for the form beings take. The only sense in which we can say that being is intelligible is in the sense that *"1oe* can understand it." We cannot say " that it is *in itself* subject to being-understood; for its being understood is not done, as it were, in consultation with it." (p. 296) Being contributes nothing to our understanding of it for " our understanding of being requires only that *we* relate ourselves to it." (pp. 296-7)

Consciousness is the starting point of the knowing process,

[1] New York: Herder & Herder, 1969. Pp. $9.50.

the undeniable empirical fact common to us all. It is the condition of the possibility of the opposition of subject and object because the subject in the subject-object relationship is constituted as such by consciousness. Consciousness or subjectivity is the presence of the self to itself. Consciousness takes place "in and through the self's self-differentiation from the known self . . . and through the presence of the self to the non-self." (p. Q64) It "emerges as it differentiates, abstracts, separates and opposes *things* to each other-that is, as it objectifies the world of being-and as it differentiates itself from that which is not itself." (p. 264) In short, growth in consciousness is a growth in self-differentiation and a consequent creation of the self that is accomplished in and through the self's presence to the self and the non-self.

The *Knowing Process* is an aspect of the process of emerging self-consciousness. The knowing process is not one in which the mind bridges a gap between itself and the supposed intelligibility of the object and thereby incorporates that intelligibility into itself. Rather, instead of the mind making the world present to itself in knowledge, it makes itself present to the world by opposing itself to the world.

> . . . knowledge does not actually combine subjective conditions with objective content. If consciousness creates itself only in and through the differentiation of subject from object, it follows that the creation of the self is made possible only in and through the objectification of being. Hence, human understanding attains to a meaning which ... is not of its own making but which, on the other hand, was not precontained in the reality of the world prior to knowledge. The meaning of reality does transcend the subjectivity of mind; but reality does not *have* within itself a transcendent meaning which the mind merely transfers onto itself when certain conditions are satisfied. The meaning of reality emerges within the mind's relation to reality which consciousness achieves.
>
> Therefore human knowledge is truly operative, not only in the self-creative sense previously outlined, but also in the sense that consciousness is responsible for establishing *the meaning of* that which is known . . . knowledge is not the transposition of an objective content from reality into the subjective reality of the

mind. Least of all is it the transposition of an objective content from the mind into reality. The mind's creation of meaning takes place only in and through the establishment of the self's presence to reality. Therefore, quite as in the case of the self-creation of consciousness, meaning is created by consciousness, but not arbitrarily. The meaning created by consciousness is the meaning *of* reality-it is indeed the meaning of the *objective* reality that is known. And we need not hesitate to speak in this context of " objective reality " in the full import of the word. For the point is indeed that only objects properly so called *have* meaning. But ... the reality of being is not identical with its objectivity. Objects have meaning precisely because they are relative to the self, a self whose subjectivity results from its differentiation from them. (pp. 269-70)

Hence, the knowing process is one in which the self creates meaning in becoming present to itself in and through its presence to the world.

Truth is the quality that the knowing process confers upon the mind.

Truth is ... the meaningfulness of the facts. We might say that truth is the meaning of the facts, provided this were not construed as if the meaning were within the facts. Truth is the mind's " making out " the meaning of the facts; it is making the facts to have meaning. Truth is not the meaning found within the facts; truth is the meaning which is put upon the facts because they are understood. (p. 299)

In short, truth is the meaning the mind imparts to the brute facts it relates itself to, and that meaning is commensurate with the growth of consciousness through the mind's self-differentiation from that which is not itself. It follows from this that truth varies with the achievement of self. Hence, truth always grows as the subject grows in consciousness. In this context error is simply " that form of consciousness which should be surpassed," (p. 314) and one may speak of truth as " that value or quality of knowledge which increases as knowledge grows and perfects itself." (p. 314)

Truth, in the last analysis, is that aspect of man's being that drives him forward.

> Truth is that property of consciousness which renders man transcendent; it is that quality of knowledge which impels consciousness beyond itself. Truth is, therefore, that which makes human understanding dynamic and creative, searching and self-critical, restless and progressive, and ambitious to the literally ultimate degree. (p. 326)

Reality is that which transcends consciousness, that which is other than the self. Reality and being are not identical concepts. "The essential characteristic of reality is its aptitude for being related .... Reality is whatever the self can have relations towards. Being, on the other hand, is the object of thought: it is that which is empirically given." (p. 399) Hence, those beings that are related to us are real precisely because of their being related; they are not real because they are beings (i.e., empirically given) . Therefore, there is nothing intrinsically incoherent about a reality that would not be a being. There may be reality that is not a brute fact, not empirically given. In this context non-being does not refer to nothing but to a reality that is not a being.

God is that reality which is non-being. Man's starting point in the quest for God begins with the " empirical observation that we do experience what primitive religions call God, although evidently we do not experience him as being at all." (pp. 387-8) It begins with that aspect of ordinary experience that we call religious experience. Man finds himself confronted with the brute facticity of being that has no meaning in itself. Yet he is driven to seek meaning by the very dynamism of his being. However," the meaning of existence cannot ... be found in being, because it does not exist in being" (p. 438) ; for being is, as we have seen, non-intelligible. So the meaning of existence may and must be found elsewhere, in non-being.

> That it (the meaning of existence) is, in fact, found elsewhere is borne out by experience....
> The consciousness of being, though revealing only being as the object of experience, places man in a position to question the ultimacy and exclusiveness of being. (p. 439)

We have only to ask why there is something rather than

nothing and we are forced to reply that this is only because a sufficient reason for being exists. And yet there is nothing given in being, that is, in empirical reality, that is this sufficient reason.

> But to give this reply is to transcend the assumption that being exhausts reality, that existence marks the totality beyond which only nothing is found. Is not the point, if we reflect upon it, fairly evident: that the absoluteness of the contingencY. of being reveals, (at least by indirection), that being is not, as it were, the most important, the most significant, the noblest thing in the world? ... For all its value and dignity, all being and all existence, including human existence itself, can be counted for nothing and given up--without regret. . . . If we understand this, and are able thus to subtract ourselves from any bondage or debt in which we might he held by being on account of our having been born into being, and if we can, thus, thereafter exist freely, as the result of conscious choice, the reason is that we can understand ourselves in the light of that which transcends being in every way. (p. 440)

Hence, in religious experience and in a religious mode of action that implies a judgment on being and a commitment to a meaning that cannot be found in being, there is already implied an acceptance of a reality beyond being that we may call God. It should be noted, however, that God is not the object of our experience.

> . . . being is and remains always the *object* of conscious experience. That which transcends being is revealed only *in* being, and *within* the experience of being, in the sense that our experience of being, and only our experience of being, reveals in us the capacity to judge being (whether rightly or not) and to dispose of it (whether for good or for ill). Though conscious being is conscious of being, and though it is conscious of no object but being, in the consciousness of its object, namely, being, it can become conscious of that which is not an object, namely, that which transcends being. (p. 441)

In short, religious experience reveals that the meaning of human existence is not to be found within the realm of being, Rather, it is to be found in a reality that is beyond being, a non-being. "And when human experience reveals this, human experience has become *religious* belief." (p. 442)

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I cannot but admire the daring of a man who would undertake to rewrite so many of the fundamental areas of philosophy and, indeed, within the compass of a single volume. Further, I find myself in agreement with a number of his aims and specific points. That past philosophical positions need *to* be transcended, that empirical evidence needs to be studiously consulted, that the differentiation of human consciousness must be taken into account, that we must cease to make God a being like ourselves, only infinitely bigger-all these points and many others deserve commendation. However, there are many grave reservations that I would make with regard to Professor Dewart's work. For the purposes of brevity and clarity I will limit myself to three: a critique of the notion of being as non-intelligible; a questioning of the adequacy of the description of the knowing process as self-creative through the mind's self-differentiation in and through its presence to itself and to the world; and, finally, some critical remarks about the historical judgments that are liberally scattered throughout this large work.

Being, according to Dewart, is simply there. It is brute facticity; it is non-intelligible intrinsically. In order to assess this notion I will attempt to indicate some of the data Dewart believes must be accounted for by a notion of being, the inadequacies he sees in the classical view of being as intrinsically intelligible, the manner in which his view purports to account for the necessary data, the difficulty I find with Dewart's account, and finally, what I believe is a more adequate way to account for the data.

The data that most impresses Dewart in the matter of man's approach to understanding being is the changeability and variability in that understanding. The same man at various stages of his life looks upon the same data in varying ways. Thus, the adult views his childhood quite differently than he viewed it when he was living it as a child. Further, different people living in the same world develop different views of being in accordance with their backgrounds. Not only do attitudes of people differ with regard to specific beings, but often there are

vast cultural differences between peoples that manifest a different view of the whole world of being. These differences, many of them good and fitting, must be accounted for by one's view of being.

Now the classical view of being fails completely to do justice to this state of affairs. According to the classical view " every real being is a self-contained object." (p. 258) There is in things a "Thalesian divinity ... which the mind extricates and appropriates for its own use...." (p. 300) Every being has its own fixed essence that determines what the being is to be and how it is to act. Quite simply, "a being's essence accounts for what it is necessarily as intelligible." (p. 378) Such a view of the intelligibility of being fails completely to accord with the facts of changing and varying understanding. For, those with such a view see the intellect of man as the infallible capacity to ferret out the fixed intelligibility of being. Once that intelligibility is grasped, as it must be grasped, there is no room for a different view of things

> ... except on the grounds of either intellectual or else moral fault. If truth is but the outcome of looking at what-is and grasping it, those who disagree with one's understanding of the truth cannot be in the same good faith that one knows oneself to be in, unless they lack intelligence or opportunity. (p. 36)

Hence, if one accepts the classical view of the fixed essences and fixed intelligibility of things, one simply cannot account for the intellectual pluralism and intellectual progress that is so evident today.

In order to correct this deficiency Dewart opts for the non-intelligibility of being coupled with the creation of intelligibility by the mind in its self-differentiation from other beings. Once one concedes that the mind creates truth in its self-relation to being, then one is in a position to recognize the validity of views other than one's own. For such other views simply refer to different more or less adequate developments of individual self-consciousness that lead to the creation of different degrees and variations of truth. Further, one is able to see that there is no position that is totally true or totally false but

that each position is true to the degree that it represents an adequate development of consciousness and is false to the degree that it is a development that can and must be surpassed. Hence, the way is open to the development of truth and to the variation in truth, something that was impossible with a view that saw being as intrinsically intelligible.

While I must admit the ingenuity of Dewart's view, I find that Dewart does not manage to live up to it. Throughout his book one finds rather harsh judgments on the stands of other men. The views of the Greeks and the Thomists are labelled " totally incredible," (p. 186) " nothing short of fantastic," (p. 256) "preposterous and fantastic," (p. 300) and they are judged to be so inadequate that no alert modern man could be content with them. Now, in these judgments Dewart is assuming that there is a state of affairs in the world of being, a human process that continually goes on not only in Professor Dewart but in other men. Insofar as this process goes on in other men, it is going on in what are objects opposed to Professor Dewart. Hence, on his view of being, what is going on in these men is simply brute facticity. It is non-intelligible because the whole world of being is non-intelligible. Further, the views that these men have of the processes they describe in their books are present to Dewart only in black markings on pieces of paper. Since these black markings are also beings external to Dewart, they are also non-intelligible. Therefore, on his view of being, Professor Dewart is confronted with two sets of non-intelligible data. On his view, he can not say that either set is intrinsically true or false. Both sets are simply there. Hence, it makes no sense for Dewart to make judgments that compare the intelligibility in the print of the books he is criticizing with the processes that this print purports to describe. As far as Dewart is concerned, for him intelligibility and meaning derive from him alone as subject. The "truth is not the meaning found within the facts; truth is the meaning which is put upon the facts because they are understood." (p. 299) Hence, instead of criticizing others for their errors, Dewart should, if he were faithful to his own principle of the

non-intelligibility of being, be criticizing his own failure to develop and differentiate his own self-consciousness. In short, it is contradictory for a man who claims that all beings are extra-intelligible or non-intelligible to make a habit of criticizing the expressions of some personal beings (note that the expressions, too, are beings) as " fantastic," " incredible," that is, unintelligible. If being is simply there, if it has no intrinsic intelligibility, how can it be condemned in any case for not being intelligible? As soon as one begins to make judgments about another's views, one either implicitly admits that there is an intelligibility that exists apart from one's own mind that is the standard of one's judgments or one assumes that oneself is the standard of judgment. Does Professor Dewart subscribe to the second assumption, at least in his own case?

Actually, Dewart is correct in disowning the view of beings as having only fixed intelligible essences that determine what they are and how they act. This view of the intelligibility of being when coupled with the notion of the natural infallibility of the intellect (an infallibility that I do not intend to deny though I cannot clarify it within the limits of these pages) does tend to lead to a static and intolerant notion of truth. However, the corrective that needs to be applied is not the denial of the intelligibility of being but almost the exact opposite. What is inadequate in the view of fixed intelligible essences is not that it sees intelligibility where there is no intelligibility but that it sees intelligibility as fixed and limited whereas it is *changing* and *practically unlimited.*

In the first place, the intelligibility of beings is not always fixed. Intelligibility is that quality of order and relationship in material things that the mind can grasp and appreciate. That the movements of my hand have a relationship to my brain, that my past affects what I am at present, that the type of person I am is largely dependent upon my environment-these and a host of other relationships and explanations that the mind can grasp constitute the intelligibility of myself. But I am changing. My relationships are changing. I am becoming a more complex and differentiated being. By these very

facts of growth, the intelligibility that is associated with me also grows. I have no fixed and permanent intelligibility that is established once for all time.

Moreover, this intelligibility of changing being is not the comparatively limited intelligibility implied in the view that Dewart is opposed to. For the universe is not an heterogeneous collection of disparate items all with their own limited intelligibility in isolation. The fact is that the web of interrelations that characterize our sphere of existence is incredibly vast. Scientists have been working for centuries attempting to unlock the immensity of these relationships, and no one would claim that they have gone beyond the beginning of the beginning. In fact, the inquiring activity of science presupposes that everything is interrelated, that there is a cause for each thing and every aspect of each thing, that nothing just happens in a way that is totally unrelated to any other happening, that if one had the gift of omniscience one could even know how the dice would fall each time, given height, spin, and all the other factors involved.

Now it is this changeability and vastness of the intelligibility of being that accounts for the existence of differing and yet relatively true viewpoints. For no one man grasps anything like the total intelligibility of the universe. Each of us sees only a portion of the world and each of us is conditioned and limited by his past to realize the import of only a fraction of what he sees. Hence, it is that each of us can have different yet legitimate developments in and through the development of consciousness that takes place through our respective encounters with intelligible being. Hence, too, there is to be expected a continuous advance in the truth. As long as there is still more intelligibility to be grasped, there is the further possibility of a personal development in the truth. Finally, (and we cannot develop this point here) there is revealed in this view the possibility of error; for it is the failure to grasp the data pertinent to the question one asks that leads one to postulate an explanation, an hypothesis, that does not accord with the real world of objects.

My second reservation regarding Dewart's position has to do with his description of the knowing process. Obviously, from what I have just stated, I cannot agree that the knowing process involves the creation of *all* intelligibility. However, I think that it is quite true to speak of this process as a growing self-differentiation from the known self accomplished through the presence of the self to the non-self. Certainly this is an aspect of what takes place when we know. My objection here is not so much that Dewart's account is incorrect but that it is inadequate and incomplete. Because space limitations prevent a full catalog of the shortcomings of his views I will limit myself to discussing only three of them. First of all, if it is true that knowing does involve a differentiation of self, this is only the first step of the process. If one pays more attention to the introspective empirical evidence, as Professor Dewart so often urges us to do, one realizes that an end of true knowledge is to unite oneself to what is known. We can understand this more clearly if we think not of some nameless object but of that object we call a person. When we know nothing about another individual we are not conscious of any division between us. The moment we become conscious of him is the moment of our realization of the gulf between him and ourselves. However, if we begin to understand him, if we begin to attempt to share in the way he experiences things and to appreciate how he understands his experiences, if, in a word, we approximate in our own development and self-differentiation the development and self-differentiation that characterizes him, we become like him. And if we love ourselves and what we have become in the process of reaching up to the development of another being, we will love him also. Real understanding of another is ultimately unifying, even if it does entail self-differentiation. Hence I do not find, as Dewart claims, that " the idea that through knowledge reality ' comes into ' the mind, in however analogical a sense, appears fantastic to, and is usually resisted by, the newcomer to philosophy." (p. 69)

Further, the self-differentiation that takes place as one grows in knowledge is also self-unifying. The man who really has a

developed consciousness and a self-differentiation with regard to a given area of being is the man who sees the meaning of even complex things at a glance, even though the process by which he arrived at the condition of seeing things in this way was a process of self-differentiation. Hence, the expert in physics understands in one simple view Einstein's relativity equation, a mother understands in a flash the wealth of meaning involved in her love for her child, a theologian of the stature of St. Thomas grasps the unity of the universe and himself as a part of it in a grasp that could never be articulated for another. Yet, in each case there was necessary a prior process of self-differentiation. Hence, although it is true that self-differentiation from self and from the other is an aspect of the process of knowing, self-unification and unification with the universe is a goal of that process.

Perhaps the greatest inadequacy in Dewart's description of knowledge is its failure to pass beyond the common sense level. For Dewart, knowledge always remains at the initial stage in which the knower becomes conscious in varying degrees of his self-relation to reality. It never rises to the stage in which the knower transcends himself and arrives at the grasp of the relationships that exist between things outside of the knower. In other words, knowledge in his system never reaches the scientific level.

Now, as a matter of fact, all our knowledge does begin with our consciousness of a relationship and a distance between ourselves and some beings. Thus, my knowledge of the place of the earth and the sun in the scheme of things necessarily begins with my consciousness of the relationship of these two bodies to me. Hence, I realize immediately with all the assurance of common sense that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. However, when human inquiry is prolonged it seeks for more than just what appears in consciousness. It seeks for the relationships that exist within things even apart from consciousness. Thus, it arrives at the notions of the revolution of the earth about the sun and of the movement of the sun and its planets in relationship to the stars of this galaxy, etc. It

becomes able to predict what will happen in the heavens in the future and to describe accurately what happened at some celestial moment of the past when it was not present as conscious. In short, the process of knowledge proceeds from initial consciousness of how things are related to me to how they are interrelated among themselves. And it is precisely because the mind can do this that it is capable of bearing judgments on the opinions of other men as Dewart so frequently does. Such a judgment is simply the mind's assessment of the relationship or lack of relationship that exists between the intelligibility in reality and its representation in written or spoken words of another human being. It is an evaluation of conditions that exist entirely outside the knower, although that evaluation begins necessarily with the knower's relationship in consciousness to the realities in question.

Finally, I believe that some remarks must be made about the rather large number of historical judgments made by Dewart throughout his work. Judging what the thought of another is or was is an immensely complicated task. It is not enough to quote a few texts in which the author expressly treats the subject in question. The mark of a great thinker, especially a philosopher or theologian, is integration of thought. The great mind develops continuously, not by accumulating new data that is pigeonholed according to subject matter but by a progressive expansion of its understanding that consistently incorporates into its overall view and each of its subsidiary views every new piece of data. Hence, if one hopes to grasp the viewpoint of a great thinker, one cannot simply read what he has written on a subject. One must go through, at least in an approximate fashion, the same kind of integrated development that he went through to arrive at his terminal position-a development that included a host of elements not specifically labelled as the subject we are interested in. In short, in order to grasp the meaning represented by a great man's words, one must become like him, become his intellectual equal. It is for this reason that the tyro who demands that

the teacher briefly and clearly explain to him what relativity means is asking what the teacher cannot give. For he is asking that the teacher short-cut the necessary process by which he (the student) must grow so as to approximate in a limited way that understanding that once was Einstein's.

Now I find in Dewart's book a readiness to interpret others that appears to indicate he has little idea of the enormity of the task involved in deciding what another man held. Thus, the incredibly complex view of Bernard Lonergan on knowing, a view that can be grasped only after an intense study of the whole thought of the man, is misunderstood so that in Lonergan "the assumption appears to have been explicitly made that besides consciousness there is another datum, ' knowing,' and even 'looking,' which, presumably, unites one being (the conscious knower) with another (the known) ." (p. 514) Anyone conversant with the whole of Lonergan's thought would know that he would not and could not hold that besides consciousness there is another datum, knowing. This may not emerge from the single text that Dewart cites; it emerges from the whole corpus of Lonergan. For Lonergan, consciousness is an aspect of the knowing process that goes through every aspect of that process.

Similarly, Dewart assumes that in the classical concept of knowledge " language has no role in the process of human consciousness, but is wholly *subsequent* to consciousness and the mere externalization of it." (p. 121) Now Dewart is undoubtedly correct in claiming that language is an essential and distinct and intrinsic aspect of man's thought process. But it simply is not true that the classical concept of language, especially as that concept was expressed in St. Thomas, was unaware of this fact. It is true that one may have difficulty in finding a treatise on the function of language in St. Thomas. However, one can find a quite nuanced view of human understanding and the palce of *verbum* in that understanding. In fact, I would suggest that the view of language gleaned from St. Thomas's treatment of *verbum* is in many ways superior to the view Dewart now propounds as overcoming a fallacious

notion of the past. Nor is this a recent discovery. One has only to read the series of articles written over twenty years ago by Bernard Lonergan and now printed in book form as *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967). For St. Thomas, the language that is essential to human understanding is the inner word. That inner word is the product of the act of understanding; and that inner word is not always of some immutable essence but of the intelligibility to be found in sensible data. The outer or spoken word or external action refers to and means this inner word. When one recognizes that for St. Thomas knowledge means a modification of the being of the knower, when one further realizes that the intelligibility of that which the knower assimilates is assimilated according to the being of the knower (and hence, according to the manner in which the knower has been changed by prior knowledge and differentiation of consciousness), one can begin to see how inner words that are the product of successive acts of understanding can be quite different in different people and can lead eventually to the differences in outer language and culture that are familiar to us all.

Dewart's failure to grasp the meaning of others is nowhere more apparent than in his tendency to ridicule the notion that one can know essence before existence .

> . . . It is barely credible that generation after generation of philosophers have accepted without murmur the assertion of St. Thomas ... that "every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being known of its existing." . . . For this assertion is nothing short of fantastic: it is precisely the opposite of what any legally sane, adult citizen can verify for himself .... (p.

Far from being " fantastic," this assertion of St. Thomas makes eminent sense in the context of his whole thought. For St. Thomas, nothing is in the intellect unless it is first in the senses. But once one has had sense experiences and once one has grasped the intelligibility in his sense experiences, one is capable of combining in his own mind elements of prior

experience and understanding and conceiving other beings that might exist. Hence, I know of the existence of birds and of the existence of men. Because of that past knowledge, I can conceive of a flying rational creature, though I have no evidence that such a being exists. Nor is this kind of thought worthless. For this process of conceiving what might be is the very basis of modern science. It goes by the name of hypothesis. Out of all his past knowledge and out of the few clues presently available regarding the problem before him, the scientist constructs a theory about what might be. That theory is only thinking, only hypothesis. It approaches being a grasp of the real insofar as it is verified by empirical testing.

What is truly ironic is that Dewart himself is forced to acknowledge in another context that man can conceive of a world that does not yet exist-approximately what St. Thomas means when he says that one can know the essence of something without knowing it exists.

> His (man's) awareness of the world as that in which his consciousness comes into being opens up a possibility from which affective, appetitive experience takes its origin, namely, the possibility of conjuring up a different human situation. That is, the *prospect* of defining himself otherwise than as he *now* is, the *prospect* of making his situation be other than it *now* is, opens up for man the possibility of being *beyond* what he *now* is.... Hence, to become aware that one exists in situation is to become aware that one could exist differently, since awareness of being in situation is awareness of the contingency and limitation of a reality which consciousness transcends. Thus, to grasp the world as the locale of man's situation is to grasp the contingency of man's situation; but to be aware of this contingency is to be aware of the possibility of conceiving another world (or, rather, of conceiving a rearrangement of this world) which would constitute an *alternative* to one's present situation. (pp. 272-73)

Finally, to limit myself to one of the many criticisms that could be made against Dewart's judgments regarding the history of theology, let me say that his account of the origin of the notion of created grace (p. 381-82) is hardly in accord with the evidence gathered by the historians of grace. (Com-

pare Dewart's account with that found in Charles Moeller and Gustav Philips, *The Theology of Grace and the Ecumenical Movement* [London, 1961] pp. 11-23).

In summary, I admire Dewart's attempt to criticize the old philosophical foundations of belief and to erect newer and more solid foundations. But I believe that he has not paid enough attention to the data. He has not effectively grasped what the old data were; and he has not attended sufficiently to experience to be able to erect a more coherent account of how man understands and how he reaches up to God. When the foundations of belief are said to include the non-intelligibility of being, the building that is constructed on those foundations is bound to be incoherent and unintelligible. When the mind of man is said to be creative of the meaning of being, it will be no great step to declare that it is also creative of the meaning of that reality Dewart calls God.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Time of Our Lives. The Ethics of Common Sense. By MORTIMER J. ADLER. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. Pp. 361. $7.95.

It says something for the vitality of philosophical thought, and for a philosopher who can formulate it, to argue that, while this century in no sense seems utopian in realization, it is still nonetheless a better century than any preceding one. The thirteenth century has been eloquently argued for as the "greatest of centuries." Mortimer Adler proposes the twentieth instead in his latest book, the third one developed from the annual series of Encyclopaedia Britannica Lectures delivered at the University of Chicago and designed, like the earlier two books, to stimulate the revival of traditional philosophical inquiry in this century.

Adler's books are always models of organization, and the present one is no exception to well-planned development, philosophical exposition, and persuasion. I stress "persuasion," in the sense that Adler, to use a fruitful distinction of his own, concentrates on "first order" problems, which is to say, he argues about the basic issues that matter for man and not primarily about whether man can successfully transcend the use of his tools of communication (Adler solves this by doing it); and to develop philosophical exposition about first order problems is to argue persuasively in the philosophical sense of the term.

The book has four major parts. Part One presents the commonsense answer to the question of how one can make a good life for one's self. Part Two states philosophical objections to the commonsense answer; the defense of this answer entails meeting philosophical critics of common sense on their own ground. Part Three, by expanding and deepening the commonsense answer, transforms the answer into moral philosophy. Part Four confronts the difficult social, economic, political, and educational problems-along with the critics-<Jf the twentieth century. The major question becomes whether "our time is out of joint," and our society sick, or whether this is "a good time to be alive," and our society a good one to be alive in. In arguing for the second alternative, Adler underlines the need for a moral and educational revolution. The rationale for this ordering is clear. Adler wishes initially to come to terms with the normal, literate person by means of common human experience, which even twentieth-century philosophers share, and lead such a person to a sound moral philosophy which, on the one hand, can withstand various philosophical critics and, on the other hand, can serve as a viable guide for realizing, proportionately, the good human life. The book merits serious consideration by both the normal, literate person and the contemporary

philosopher. In this review, let us confine ourselves to the philosophical dimension.

How, in Part Two, does Adler deal with the philosophical objections and criticism that can be raised against the commonsense view elaborated in Part One? He distinguishes two types of objections: substantive and formal. Formal criticisms are embodied in what is now called " meta-ethics." After noting (perhaps a bit cavalierly, but certainly with a good deal of justification) that such formal objections have been answered already in past centuries of philosophizing, Adler considers two theses behind formal objections to the commonsense view: 1) all evaluations are reducible to describable facts (a sort of ethical reductionism); 2) the good is indefinable (the ineptly phrased "naturalistic fallacy" issue stemming from G. E. Moore).

With respect to the first, Adler maintains that there is one good (the "good " said of the whole human life) that is sought wholly for its own sake, and consequently there is one categorical ought that is self-evident. If so, and he argues this point strongly and effectively in Chapter 9, then not all judgments of value can be reduced to statements of fact. (I would be inclined to argue that other statements of value, e. g., those pertaining to the good of basic virtues, are also not reducible to statements of fact, but Adler's instance is sufficient for his immediate purpose.)

Concerning the second thesis, Adler summarizes Moore's " open-question argument," which in effect maintains that, if good is defined by X, then whatever has the property X is good; this proposition should be an analytical one; yet we can always ask whether this particular instance of X is *really* good, and with such a question always open, a definition of good cannot be constructed. Adler responds by showing how Moore did not recognize the difference between an analytic proposition in the modern, Kantian sense, and a self-evident proposition or axiom in the ancient sense (the per se nota). Adler is thus inclined to accept that the good is indefinable in the latter sense but not the former. This clarification does indicate where Moore's mistake lies, but in speaking about the indefinability of good as acceptable in the sense of a per se nota proposition, Adler does not appear to distinguish between the transcendental good (which is thus indefinable) and the moral good (which is not *thus* indefinable). More satisfactory-or better, more relevant-for the problem in Moore is the distinction between the real and apparent good and the use to which Adler puts this distinction, particularly in terms of "needs " for real goods and " wants " for apparent goods.

This basic distinction between real and apparent good also serves as the crucial substantive critique that can be made of the notion of happiness developed (among others) in Locke, Kant, and Mill, as well as the primary substantive defense of the commonsense view of moral philosophy. The distinction permits Adler to formulate a related basic distinction, the *tatum*

bonum-the sum total of real goods which all men ought to strive for- and the *summum bonum-the* highest good in an order of real goods. It is the *totum bonum* that is an end which is never a means, and yet, though an ultimate end, cannot *be* a *terminal* end in the sense that one can arrive at and wholly realize at any moment in a temporal life *(see* especially pp. 118-20). It is not too much to say that the heart of Adler's substantive defense of commonsense moral philosophy lies in the comprehensive and articulate development he makes of those basic distinctions; it forms the core of the critical Part Two of his book.

Part Three lays out the dimensions of the ethics of common sense as it can be developed philosophically, namely, a teleological ethics which, however, includes also certain truths emphasized in deontological ethics and utilitarianism. Adler argues that only such a moral philosophy is " sound, practical, and undogmatic." Some readers, especially *some* moral philosophers, may smile indulgently at Adler's claim that this moral philosophy, as he presents it, is " undogmatic," since Adler's style will seem " dogmatic." Attentive reading, however, will dispel this superficial impression. Adler carefully defines what he means by "dogmatism" (p. 191); furthermore, his " strong style " of writing springs from a " tough " analysis of relevant philosophical distinctions, and to mistake this for " dogmatism " can arise only from insensitivity to the serious business of philosophizing.

One difficulty, nevertheless, can be cited in his philosophical elaboration. In this book, and others, Adler has always run into difficulty in analyzing the relation of the individual good and the common good-a problem, to be sure, that is thorny for any concerned moral philosopher. Part of the snarl here lies in the ambiguity of " common good " and Adler complicates the problem by associating that phrase with a good common to men sharing the same human nature rather than with the common moral and political good, for which he uses the phrase "good of the community," which can easily become imprecise. Such terminology also tends to put the individual good and the " good of the community " into opposition. Add to this the treatment of war as "social pathology" (which modern warfare may well be) and one gets (as on p. 179) the obligation of an individual to preserve the genuine common good reduced to " no more than take risks or suffer temporary inconveniences." The long footnote 6 (pp. 311-15) wrestles at great length with this problem and recognizes, as the body of the text does not, that "individual subsistence and society's endurance" are " co-implicated in reciprocal causality." Still, what Adler cannot bring himself to say is that man's individual good can, in a given situation, consist in the very preservation of the common moral and political good. This is the road Socrates teaches and takes throughout his life; and at the end of his trial, he recognizes that even physical death may have to be endured for the preservation of the moral good, both individual and common. There are worse things than death but, in Adler's account, it would be hard to see how and why this is possible.

Another matter Adler discusses which raises some difficulty, and which may be of special interest to readers of this journal, concerns an issue in sexual morality. (pp. 326-27) There are two points of interest to note. First, Adler over-simplifies to a danger of misrepresentation in stating that the " official position of the Vatican rests on the factually false proposition that human sexuality is intended by nature to serve only one end-procreation." Actually, in the much publicized *Humanae vitae,* Pope Paul, in reiterating that artificial contraception is contrary to natural law, says in paragraph 11 that " the Church ... teaches that each and every marital act must remain *open* to the transmission of life " (italics added) , and in the following paragraph he acknowledges the *two* meanings of the conjugal act, the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning. The " official position of the Vatican " is not captured in the narrow presentation Adler makes of it; to cite only one precision not allowed in the Adlerian presentation: if one end, procreation, is not attainable, there is nothing immoral in attaining the other end, the expression of mutual love.

Second, Adler has no qualms in maintaining that there is nothing morally wrong in simple fornication. That is a matter which can be debated on its own merits. Adler's manner of using St. Thomas Aquinas to support the view is something else. Adler quotes the first three paragraphs of Book III, Chapter 122 of the *Summa Cont. Gent.* These three paragraphs present arguments that simple fornication is not a sin. Adler introduces the quoting of the paragraphs with this remark: "... the correct view of simple fornication is the one that Aquinas states in the following manner." St. Thomas has the following sentence preceding the same paragraphs: "From the foregoing we can see the futility of the argument of certain people who say that simple fornication is not a sin." Now let me make it clear about the objection I am raising here. The paragraphs in question are being put as " objections " to the view that simple fornication is a sin; Adler, of course, is aware of this, and I am not suggesting that he is presenting these paragraphs out of context. Still, his use is misleading. Adler notes that St. Thomas replies to these paragraphs on the ground that sexual congress should be entered into only for the purpose of generating offspring-even here, as in interpreting the " official Vatican position," Adler is narrowly restrictive in a way Aquinas is not, e. g., Aquinas notes that sexual congress between a man and a sterile woman is not a sin. But the point is that Adler concludes this long footnote 9 (p. 327) by saying: "If we reject this " (i.e., Adler's restrictive view of Aquinas' "sufficient answer ") " then, according to Aquinas' own reasoning, there is nothing morally wrong in simple fornication." It is this way of using Aquinas I object to. First, it is not Aquinas' " own reasoning," since the arguments he was using in the three paragraphs were current objections or positions of the day. Second, to suggest that, if somehow the generation

of offspring could be diminished or eliminated as the purpose of sexual congress, then the remark that St. Thomas would find nothing morally wrong in simple fornication does not follow. There are arguments against simple fornication other than those St. Thomas finds cogent in the particular, given context. In any event, it is misleading to suggest that, even under the given qualification, Aquinas could be construed as reasoning that there is nothing morally wrong with simple fornication.

But let us turn away from any more negative criticisms which might be made about this book to positive assessments, which far outweigh difficulties or disagreements. Within the space limits allotted for this review, I should like to make one general point concerning Part Four and a comment on the Postscript.

Adler's general conclusion that this is a good time to be alive and that ours is a good society to be alive in is by no means an uncritical one on his part. One will find that he is acutely aware of all the adverse criticisms which can be made about our century and in particular about American society as it presently exists. Because, I think, Adler has such an extensive grasp of philosophy from ancient to modern times, allied with a penetrating acquaintance of historical and cultural developments throughout the same period, he has the necessary perspective to discern the sense in which his affirmative answer can be sustained while also pin-pointing where improvement has to be made. The chapter entitled " The Moral and Educational Revolution that is Needed" documents at once what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. With regard to the moral revolution, the central thesis is that the right understanding and ordering of human goods needs to be implemented: the practice of a teleological ethics and the categorical obligation to seek the genuinely good human life by making right choices in regard to the means of achieving it. The educational revolution consists in reforming the educational system so as to reverse the present emphasis which displaces genuinely liberal and humanistic education by forms of specialized technical and vocational training. I take it that the latter remains important; but what it cannot do, and what must be done, is what humanistic education can do: prepare the young for the business of making good human lives for themselves. To achieve this, " faculties must once again consist of teachers rather than professors, of men interested in liberal and humanistic learning, for themselves as well as for others, more than in research or in advancement of knowledge in some specialized or technical field." Again, I take it, this does not mean the simple downgrading of research and specialization but the re-ordering of educational values. More than this needs to be done, but without this not enough can be done. And it is about such basic human concerns that much of current student agitation is directed to.

A quick postscript to Adler's *Postscript.* He "reveals " what he recognizes is " a poorly kept secret," that the book rests basically on

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, which he regards as a philosophical refinement of commonsense wisdom. He goes on to say that the " most accurate description of what I have done, it seems to me, would be to say that certain things to be found in Aristotle's *Ethics* constitute my point of departure and control the general direction of my thought, but that I have gone further along the line of thinking about moral problems laid down by Aristotle--adding innovations to his theory, as well as extending and modifying it." (p. 237)

I should like to suggest two points in this connection. The first is that, overall, Adler has magnificently achieved what the quoted sentence says he sought to do. The second point is that the primary reason why the book so successfully achieves its objective is precisely because it carries out what a philosophical venture ought to do: it relies on the accumulated wisdom of past philosophers while making its own original contribution. To play a bit on " original," Alder is original on two scores. He has made use of the origins of philosophical wisdom found in Aristotle and others from the past; he is also an origin himself in developing, modifying, and applying such wisdom to the present while also adding his own insights. To be "original" without knowing and benefitting from the past is inevitably a thin contribution and quite liable to errors already made. To repeat the past without regarding what is novel in the present is to invite the tedium of the twice-told tale. This book of Adler's in avoiding both extremes, is an original contribution to the important philosophical, and practical, issues that confront us now.

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Philosophy of History. By ROBERT PAUL MOHAN. New York: Bruce Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 191. $3.50.

The author adduces ample justification for this admirable and useful little work when he writes: " The philosophy of history is not only a significant chapter in the history of ideas, but it is particularly reflective of the contemporary crisis of a generation which seeks increasingly to understand itself and the long-term significance of the events of our time." (p. 171) This understanding will come from no source more securely than from history " because every voyage into the past begins in a present whose concerns influence both inquiry and inquirer."

What the author has sought to do-and succeeded admirably in doing-in this rich and compact little volume is twofold: to place the reader in possession of the general patterns which the quest for meaning in history has

taken heretofore, and to open out to him the patterns of inquiry which that quest may hope to take in the present and the immediate future with some hope of a rewarding increase in understanding. The book itself thus possesses the form which every speculatively historical work spontaneously takes on: through the concerns of the present it links both past and future.

The historical account of what the philosophy of history has been in the past is rich, compact, and well-ordered. The author immediately satisfies the question which must inevitably present itself to a culture so sophisticated by written history as the modern age: the relation between philosophy of history and the writing of history. It is well-known with what suspicion the practicing historian has, in the past, come to look upon the constructions and lucubrations of the philosopher of history; how much emphasis, by contrast, he has placed upon the austerity of his method by which he understood precisely its freedom from any speculative presuppositions. The author relaxes this tension by pointing out simply and succinctly that the two enterprises go quite naturally hand in hand. The history which the practicing historian seeks to compose is the criterion which the philosophy of history naturally accepts as the measure of its own achievement; the meaning which is the overt concern of the philosophy of history is also the concern of the historian once he passes, as Croce has noted, beyond the point of mere chronicler and has begun to reflect upon his matter.

In like manner, the author tries to relax the tension which has existed between philosophy and the philosophy of history. The austere philosopher, of the Cartesian type for example, has frequently felt that such interpretative-speculative structures as the philosophers of history have elaborated violate the strict cannons of philosophical method. Beginning with Vico, at least, Professor Mohan points out, the philosopher of history has consistently accepted as his own the ideal of methodological rigor which philosophy has elaborated, though, quite rightly, he has demanded that in their development the particular character of his matter be taken into account. The kind of questions which the philosophy of history raises are not only germane but follow quite inevitably from the normal thrust of philosophical inquiry.

In his exposition of what the philosophy of history has been and has sought to accomplish in the past Professor Mohan accepts the basic distinction between cyclical and linear theories. Upon this basis he groups the various candidates for inclusion in his treatment. Thus classical Greek reflection upon history is identified as the original example of the cyclical type, while the thought of Augustine is noted as formulating the linear concept of historical movement which is implicit in Christian soterism. This scheme cannot be seriously questioned so far as it goes. It soon becomes apparent, however, that it is of limited validity. This is made clear when later and more sophisticated theories are considered. For example, Vico's

theory of history cannot be brought under either alternative offered by this rubric. The doctrine of " ricorsi " presents all the problems of both the cyclical and the linear theories while possessing nothing of the rewarding simplicity of either. The author in his treatment of Vico does try to place the specific quality of that philosopher's approach in evidence, however, and succeeds at least in suggesting that there are differences here which, adequately explored, would involve a reevaluation of that earlier division.

The emphasis given to Kant as a representative of the theory of historical progress is gratifying. Kant, in contrast to other writers in this line, reflected acutely on the really speculative problems underlying the concept of progress. His treatment of this idea, consequently, though still in accord with the spirit of the enlightenment, is more sober and a little less sanguine than those others, like Turgot and Condorcet, who pushed on more rapidly to substantive adumbrations of what they considered constitute progress. The treatment accorded to Comte and St. Simon is ample for a work of this intent, but the inclusion of Marx under the rubic of progress is at least dubious. Here again, in the presence of Marx, the division into tendencies breaks down; the number of elements present, the complexity of their combination and the novel pattern which issues from it imposes new problems of interpretation and eventually demands the modification, if not the abandonment, of those earlier schemes. The really difficult, however, lie elsewhere, though the present author cannot be held culpable for not attending to them; these are the problems of historical time, etc., which most schemes have brushed only lightly.

The grouping under the rubic "The New Cyclicism ": Nietzche, Danielevski, Spengler, Sorokin, is satisfactory, especially as efforts are made to indicate the qualifications with which the appellation is to be received in each case. The inclusion of three such important thinkers as Hegel, Dilthey, and Croce under the flaccid rubric of " Idealism and Hegelianism " is of another order, more an evasion than a confrontation. The problems which this rubric conceals arc immense. By no stretch of the imagination can the profound differences which distinguish these men be treated in this manner. True enough, the author, in the space of this work could not be taxed for failing to treat them adequately. It is just, however, to expect that the presence of these differences and their irreducibility would be more emphatically underlined.

This concern with what philosophy of history has been should not distract us from the author's very]audible concern with the present state of this inquiry and the future which might be prognosticated for it. The chapter on contemporary theology of history is one of the most rewarding. Although the shift from philosophy of history to theology of history is abrupt, it is justified. What would lend greater value to the treatment would be some suggestion of why this shift has come about and why the

step that speculation on history in the philosophical vein had to take on its own premises appeared. The selection of the individual authors for direct consideration is perhaps too narrow; but the treatment of each, in his own right, is unexceptionable. The concluding chapter is simply too rich; it deserves to be expanded, even at the cost of increasing the book by a third. But if this were done the manner of treatment would have to be altered considerably. Thus the notion of historicity in the existential vein is only brushed over lightly; based as it is on a very profound treatment of the underlying concepts such as time, it merits much more.

The exceptions taken in the above paragraphs serve not to denigrate but rather to place in greater relief, the solid qualities of this book. Within its compass it accomplishes more than one would have the right to expect. It is well planned, simply and lucidly written, reasonably well-informed, and carefully documented. It must with facility accomplish with any motivated reader what the subtitle declares to be its intention: to introduce him to a region of philosophy which has held Western man fascinated for many thousands of years.

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The Existentialist Prolegomena to a Future Metaphysics. By FREDERICK SoNTAG. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 231.

In this book Professor Sontag seeks to reconstruct a ground or prolegomena for metaphysics in the personal and internal experiences of decision described in existential literature. After Kant's destructive analysis the only acceptable method for metaphysics is to investigate the source of metaphysical questioning concerning being and nonbeing. The precise area chosen is man's direct knowledge of nonbeing in anxiety and dread, or more succinctly, in the psychological immediacy of experienced uncertainty. Metaphysics cannot be scientific, abstract, certain, and necessary anymore, but it results in concrete, individual, confused and unresolved knowledge.

Such an approach is not purely subjective nor is the data independent of common experience. Existential literature describes the most basic experiences of moral decision which force a man to raise questions concerning the meaning and structure of his existence. The attempt to meet the problems of human existence is, for Sontag, the fountainhead of metaphysics. For, if one can describe what in man's existential experience forces him to raise such questions, the validity, meaning, and application of metaphysics would be vindicated as a matter of course. Metaphysics IS defined from its origin in the inner psychological experience of man.

However, not just any psychological experience is sufficient. A distinction must be drawn between introspective psychology, which simply attempts to describe and characterize man's inner states phenomenologically, and philosophical psychology, which uses these descriptions as a prolegomena upon which to reopen and examine traditional metaphysical and theological questions. But the philosophical psychology which serves as the prolegomena must be pure, that is, it must eliminate reference to any particular individual and treat the experience as a general condition applicable to all men. Insights of this type of psychology are either analytical, that is, explicative, resulting in no addition of knowledge, or synthetical, that is, expansive, which increase knowledge beyond a simple description. One single intense experience can provide such revelatory, synthetical insights provided it possess impact of depth penetration. Since existential literature incontestably has given proof of such experiences, the task is merely to show how these synthetical insights, certain personal and crucial psychological, boundary limit situations, can have metaphysical validity.

This task is accomplished first by establishing that individual insights have relevatory significance if something of the essential structure of being is exposed. Two such insights are basic, anxiety and dread. By providing insights into being and nonbeing anxiety and dread prove that they must be fundamental to all human experience of existence. They present the fundamental insecurity of man and the possibility of nonbeing and, as such, force man to raise metaphysical questions regarding the irrevocable limits and precariousness of his existence. These insights do not require a complete uniformity of overt behavior but simply a universally applicable inner experience. The universality, the second part of the task, is based upon the experience that in moments of ethical crisis men are joined together and become conscious of their membership in the community of being. As Sontag remarks, "Inner suffering unites man as nothing else **can."**

The criticism of pure subjectivity in this theory is avoided on the grounds that these psychological crisis situations produce subjective insights which cause certain objective and concrete states of suffering which affect man's power to grasp human existence. These states of suffering are perfectly objective while the insight remains subjective. Insecurity, inferiority, lonliness, fear, lack of confidence, and the general accompaniments of anxiety and dread, as states of suffering, produce overt symptoms which depend for their understanding on a penetrating internal insight into human existence. They are fundamental to the new metaphysics based on a grasp of being via the inner life.

Sontag terms his theory *existential empiricism*, an empiricism of concrete inner states. It is concerned with pure philosophical psychological insights derived from the inner states that anxiety and dread synthetically illustrate. By " existential " is meant the inner grasp of existence by which

internal universality is found, and by " empiricism " is meant that the basic experience must be explored critically.

The inner life of man is revealed through interrelationship with other men. Such an essential kinship is first discovered in literature and drama. From these two forms of communication is discerned a concrete picture of internal existence placed in verbal, and in the case of drama, visual terms. :For a new metaphysics based on the inner life, existential literature and drama once again provide central and irreplaceable data.

Moral problems are the root of the knowledge of existence and arise only as relations develop between individuals. Literature and drama not only make inner structure overt but extend the experience beyond individual limits. This extension is caused through self-reflection. It takes place when the reader or viewer himself becomes involved in the inner structure made visible. Once this involvement is established, the experience receives universality as a structure of common moral interaction. The literary produced internal penetration reaches the individual's ethical consciousness and procures valid structure for understanding human moral action and a means to clarify human existence. A situation of this profundity and individual involvement give a metaphysical significance to self-reflection. Hence, for literature and drama to be philosophical or to possess philosophical content, it must reveal a certain situation in which the self may be revealed to itself through one or more real or fictional characters. The essence of great literature, competent of immortality, is that it reveals such universally applicable moral situations. The task of an author is to make an insight forcible enough to mold specific dramatic situations which will yield the same insight and be a principle capable of universal application whether it be grasped as such or not.

Through self-reflection on these situations the involved individual can anticipate universal human moods yet unexperienced by means of ethical structures which are uncovered. These situations now provide ethical directives manifesting life's inherent possibilities by their potential embodiment in any individual self-consciousness. This constitutes the awakening of an internal dramatic form of life in each individual resulting in a sensitivity to being's possible structures still concealed in self and experience. In relation to these ethical directives the individual constructs a meaningful inner life. This is the metaphysical basis of ethics. But these situations, now synthetically structured for dramatic self-revelation, also constitute a possible metaphysical basis. Ethics and metaphysics are brought into a close relationship.

What is internal may at least be universal, but what is externally observed certainly is not. Only a penetrative insight into inner life is. Artistic insight now becomes a metaphysical conscious structure and assures its basis in the immediately real. Existential literature and drama become the new prolegomena for metaphysics.

Kant's *Prolegomena* allow for a metaphysics of experience but not one of things in themselves. Metaphysics is restricted to universal but subjective application and remains a science which requires the construction *oi* a single necessary structure. But the existentialists reveal in their psychological explorations a basic uncertainty, chance, and possibility as the heart of being. Nonbeing is the means to understand being, and nonbeing produces psychological states upon which their writings dwell. Variety of possibility, uncertainty, freedom, choice, are really characteristics of being and result in a new, radical, and flexible metaphysics.

No one single metaphysics can possibly emerge as universally valid and exclusive of other theories of being, except perhaps a meta-metaphysics which reflects on all possible systems of metaphysics. ::VIetaphysics can remain abstract and speculative and be comprised of universal statements, but no theoretical analysis is necessarily authoritative. If metaphysics can be conceived as partial truth, trustworthy but inexhaustive, acceptable but flexible, existentialism can give rise to metaphysics.

Yet the existential prolegomena cannot allow all theories to be equally true. There are no final rules governing the metaphysical questions which are raised or their responses. Each person must judge for himself if the theory has an existential empirical base. The prolegomena present concrete grounds to decide, accept, reject, or modify some given abstract formulation.

Classical metaphysics has always been closely associated with theology. Any change in the approach to metaphysics will have a wide implication for contemporary theology. Few concepts are more crucial to the history of both than nothingness and time. As new views are presented on these notions, being is reconstructed and the concepts of metaphysics and theology are revised. Sontag attempts such a revision by proposing as a sounding device Wittgenstein's *Tractatus.* By applying the existentialist concrete data to the abstract structure of the *Tractatus,* he seeks to conclude what elements form a useful and new metaphysics in reaction to it. The reader is asked to judge whether the new views are proper and whether a correct revision has begun. The judgment on the whole process of revision, Sontag himself suggests, is best rendered against the testing grounds of theology and ethics.

The concept of being in the new metaphysics must be that of an absolute infinite set of possibilities actualized by decisions of either God or man. Questioning is its basic structure since actual structure must depend on decision. Questioning, uncertainty, and the demand for decision raise metaphysical questions as probable, and probability uncovers a basis for decision in the precariousness of existence. Since decision is fundamental to the world's actual structure, and questioning is man's reflection of it emotion can be accepted as empirical data revealing being's structure, the emotional force of an existential situation alone gives meaning to the questions.

The questioner is aware of the permanent objective possibility of a negative reply to his question. This fact gives basic meaning to any question. So questioning reveals itself as a bridge between two nonbeings, that of the lack of knowledge in the questioner and that of the possibility of nonbeing in the object of the question. Questions reveal interior and exterior nonbeing and hence uncover the uncertainty of being's structure. Questioning is essential to man's being. It reveals nonbeing as part of the most real.

The recognition of negativity and nothingness as permanent features of being itself causes anxiety and dread, for now man must bear responsibility for being's structure. In the encounter with nothingness man transcends the immediate and discovers freedom. Questioning, negativity, anxiety, dread, decision, characterize human behavior as a rational response to being's structure. Hence being must contain nothingness to explain behavior, and this is what bases the new metaphysics on experience.

Freedom separates man from the future which can be lost or modified, since nothingness lies between the present and some desired future. The prospect of the loss of a desired future self, with nothingness to replace it, causes anxiety. Anxiety is thus the source of freedom because nothing can compel a man to become his future. The possibility of nothingness which induces dread is the condition for the possibility of becoming one's future freely, of the transcendence of the present state toward future being. Metaphysics actually provides the only basis upon which a man understands.

Time is of importance since, in the consideration of past and future and in the precariousness of the passage between them, the problem of nothingness arises. Time necessitates a movement away from the present and an extension into the past and future. Nothingness is discovered in time and time uncovers the nothingness which the pure present cannot know. Nothingness and time are the keys to interpret being. They are the basis for freedom in action and thought which force man to transcend himself and to attempt to understand his finite nature and the structure of being in which he operates. Hence crisis and human finitude involve an encounter with nothingness and provide an insight into the structure of being.

This new metaphysics should cause certain conclusions regarding God. In what sense is nothingness and time, as keys to interpret being, applicable to God? Nothingness is applicable to God in that God's Being involves all the possible modes of being, of which only a portion are actualized; hence any experience of the divine nature must feel and be impressed by the nonbeing of all the nonactualized possibilities. God cannot be approached temporally. Time is God's creation. God knows time in the objects of the world but only within his nature in the act of creation and cessation. However, God knows the rules which govern the actualization

of any combination of possibles but not their existence in such a way. This factor time adds. This is not radically new knowledge for God inasmuch as no new concept is added; what is new is the awareness of a possible eternally understood as now actually existing. Although God did not know of this existence with certainty, he knew it as possible from eternity before man actualized it.

Since God can receive the knowledge of actualization passively, his mode of communication can be silence. His silence leaves man the maximum freedom for self-directed change. Silence is God's answer to man's questions which is indicative how different God's nature is from man's.

This new metaphysics is objectively verified as universal, not in terms of an objective demonstration or in one theoretical structure that excludes others, which is now impossible given the flexibility and freedom within being. The only verification consists in showing a consistency in offering an explanation of the world's structure. The proof offered is one of ethical impact. Beginning with the immediacy of psychological insight and the literary analysis of human nature, insights are drawn from these to define and characterize being itself. To check this construction, ethical implications are considered to determine how practical such advised conduct seems to be. Proof is by means of concrete life, medical, ethical, religious. It may not prove that all subjectivity has been eliminated, but an account of being without subjective reference can be given. Since this is but a prolegomena, full proof awaits the attempt to construct on this basis a solution to all traditional ethical, religious, and theological problems.

What has been proved is that it is now possible to ask certain metaphysical questions in a new way by an approach to being via nonbeing. Nothingness and time, whose foundation is tinged with emotion, now can give a rational account of human life. Sontag now turns his attention to his views on metaphysics and theology in counterpart to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus.*

Language stops at clarity, but thought ends when finally forced into silence on any question. Metaphysics and theology are really metalanguages. They think beyond basic language structure. Since being is an absolute set of possibilities, the world is what has been and is being formed out of this totality of all possible states by decision. This totality of possibles is continuously present in logical space and is a combination of every entity or object which could conceivably come into factual existence without internal contradiction. Since the move from potential to actual existence is dependent on some actualizing agency, actualization as well as its object may be necessary or contingent depending upon the degree of steadiness inherent in the actualizing power. Hence the world lies in a relationship between actuality and possibility, and so likewise do those disciplines concerned with it.

Logic treats every possible as such and considers each as a fact in logical space without regard for the possibility or impossibility of their actualization within the world. The potential actualization of any entity depends on its relation to other possibles, the framework of the present world with its rules which govern inclusion and exclusion, and the degree of power and steadiness (contingent or necessary) in its proposed actualizing force. The totality of the possibles which attain actual existence, their causes of actualization, together with the possibles which are related to them, are expressed by metaphysics. Theology gives an account of its origin out of other possible sets by exposing the rules governing the possibles as a whole, which is God, and by attempting to grasp the entity in its setting among the abstract infinity of possibles, which is the divine nature, and the powers which establish laws, namely, the divine nature and will. Religion meditates on its future and its outcome and considers how the introduction of new possibles might alter the structure radically.

Language itself is in an unending process precisely because no actuality is necessarily ultimate. A new possibility can always be found which changes the context in which that actuality is grasped and begins the linguistic reformation over again. Even language arises in the area between the possible and the actual.

Theory presents possible entities in some logical structure by determining the existence of compossibles and the nonexistence of noncompossibles. Any such theory is itself only one possible mode of reality and the function of language may be described as presenting possible models, as more or less actual. A theory is distinguished from a mere statement of fact in that its sets of possibles are combined in a definite way so that from it further statement of fact can be deduced and predictions made. It is difficult to decide if any theory applies merely to possibles or also to actuals. Theory reaches up to actuality from possibles in that theory is like developing a scale which is graduated from possible reality to actualized existence. To represent reality theory must have the same connections between sets of possibilities that actualized reality has. Since an infinite number of theoretical viewpoints of being are possible, all the sciences which treat of an aspect of being tend never to be finalized or complete.

All any theory needs, then, is a basic form which embraces all the absolutely infinite sets of possibles beyond which it may vary from actualized reality by degree. The task is to determine how closely in fact the theory conforms to the actualized world by existential immediacy. In the new existential metaphysics each theory must consider in its own framework the degree of probability it represents, and it must reflect this in its own theory about itself. Hence a theory is factually true to the degree it represents the actualized world and logically true when it represents some possible world which could have been actualized. Since any sufficient theory possesses both, the problem is to determine the degree of

actuality versus the degree of logical possibility. This requires existential empiricism.

Language cannot express nonlogical sets of possibilities without considerable difficulty and caution, since it derives its logic more from an actualized set of possibles from which contradiction and inconsistency were 1cmovcd. But, since language is far from parelleling the actual world, symbolism is important in that through it other possible worlds can be explored. The perfect proposition presents the exact relation of existence and nonexistence within the possibles which it describes and indicates their position within the absolute set of possibles.

The tasks, then, of theology and metaphysics are manifestly different. Theology seeks to reconstruct the norms operative at the moment of creation to render the best account of the process of actualization, tracing the flow of power as it etches a causal change among the possibles. Metaphysics describes the various possibilities but adds clarity by relating these to the actual order of things and constructing priorities by the manner in which it orders am! structures the possibilities. Hence philosophical language is clearer than theological which deals more in the realm *of* the possible.

Value, the object of ethics, likewise exists between possibility and actuality. Unless man comprehends the cause of a possible becoming actual and its relationship to what might have been, he cannot value what is. Contrast induces value. Hence every ethical proposition cannot be finalized. The number of ethical norms is actually finite and stable, but the possibilities to which they apply are not. Due to the fact that actualization demands decision, the will as a phenomenon of the exercise of power and decision becomes the primary concern of existential empiricism. Acts of divine and human will have structured the actual world. From the will's action, man grasps actuality. He can formulate theories on being, about how it is, came to be, might yet be, or might have been. Using these theories on every level of being in each discipline, man can grasp the structure of being without the aid of necessary and certain propositions. One possible theory leads to an attempt to formulate a more possible theory, never settling on one. Due to the lack of finality, asking the precise question is necessary. Dogmatism is the most inappropriate method.

The new metaphysics demands a new type of metaphysician, human and divine. Man needs objects to know, but God is not dependent on outside presentation. So metaphysics requires man to transcend himself to know, but not God. Time pervades every new metaphysical analysis and presentation. God's knowledge is limited by and subjected to time's outcome for its completion, a limitation God freely subjected himself to. Hence God transcends his eternal nature in knowing time as man does his temporal nature in knowing objects. If man can discover the divine activity in creation he can grasp whether he knows the actual structure or simply

a possible, but for some reason, rejected plan. God's unknown is the detail of actual events, while man's unknown is the future and the totality of all that is possible which lies behind the present structure. Thus man needs metaphysics because he is finite, and God needs metaphysics because the details of the actual order were created with certain indeterminate factors involved. J\-fan can err about the actual structure of being, but God is never mistaken even when temporally he is uncertain about some specific outcome. To complete his metaphysics God needs that knowledge of actuals, and man needs to trace the grounds for God's creative selection of one structure over the others which were equally possibly but differently attractive, for, though he is a metaphysician of the present and future, the solution requires the constitution of the past and its original alternatives. But, in fact, metaphysics is an on-going task never to be completed or established as certain, for the very structure of being is possibility.

Professor Sontag, by establishing a new prolegomena to metaphysics and in the process-or as a result-having changed the essential characteristic of being's structure from actuality to possibility, has presented a new prolegomena to all philosophical and theological disciplines. We are faced in fact with a new logic, ethics, metaphysics, psychology, theology, and even a new God. The presentation oftimcs is clouded by excessive repetition and the attempt to universalize inner experience on the statement that crisis unites all men, and the application later on of nothingness and time as interpretive of being to God are definitely the weak areas in the theory. The restructuring of all disciplines on the relationship between actuality and possibility, eliminating from them any finality of thought or expression, may prove unacceptable, as well as their new subject matter as assigned in this new view. The comments of others on this fundamental revision and its implications will be intriguing and most interesting. However, Professor Sontag suggested that the best judgment on his work and the prolegomena should come from the testing ground of theology. I presume that entails not only those conclusions about God drawn from his theory but likewise, or at least, that knowledge of God which He has revealed of Himself. The conclusion that God's knowledge of actuals is uncertain and that God further requires man's decision to actualize His knowledge is contrary to revelation and theological reflection thereon. Since this criterion is the best to judge the prolegomena, it may indicate that the revision has not been entirely correct in this respect and possibly others. Should the prolegomena, through criticism, testing, and modification resulting therefrom, open all inquiry in the direction Professor Sontag indicates, and the complete revision of metaphysics is fully attempted, only then can anything near a personal definitive judgment be made. In the meanwhile, one can only assume the attitude of wait and see.

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Bertrand RusseU's Theory of Knowledge. By ELIZABETH RAMSDEN EAMES. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1969. Pp. 240. $6.00.

The aim of this book is to establish that Bertrand Russell's philosophy embodies a presuppositional and methodological unity as well as a consistency in development. Toward this end the author studies four key areas of Russell's thought: 1) his conception of philosophy; 2) his method of analysis; 3) his empiricism; 4) his realism. The basic philosophical questions to which Russell returns again and again are epistemological; hence, if there is any unity to be found in his philosophy, it will center around his theory of knowledge. The title of the volume, therefore, should not mislead; Mrs. Eames really purports to supplement eariler studies by men such as Fritz, Gotlind and Weitz, by presenting a comprehensive survey of Russell's entire philosophy.

In Chapter One the author notes that Russell is a philosopher who has frequently been subject to misinterpretation. This is due partly to his conception of philosophical method as hypothetical in the fashion of natural science. There must be constant testing, revision, and rejection. Thus, according to the author, Russell's philosophy must be viewed in its entirety for an accurate appraisal of his thought. Yet many interpreters, such as W. T. Stace, A. W. Levi, and W. V. Quine, tend to view Russell as a museum piece, a thinker seminal for logical empiricists and language analysts, without noting that his own thought has developed so that he can be identified with neither of these positions.

In Chapter Two Mrs. Eames discusses her first major theme: Russell's conception of the nature of philosophy. Several distinctions aid the exposition. First, one must note the context of Russell's statements on the subject. Thus when he says that philosophy is " an unusually ingenious attempt to think fallaciously," he means to criticize what philosophy *has been;* whereas when he says, " philosophy arises from an unusually obstinate attempt to arrive at real knowledge," he is referring to what, in his mind, philosophy *ought to be.* What it ought to be will surprise those not familiar with his later thought. For, although he argues for the use of logic in philosophy, philosophy should not be a purely formal discipline. Rather, his empiricism puts him on the "other side " of the philosophical revolution he began; that is, his concerns are the traditional ones: the nature of the world, the nature and possibility of knowledge, etc. Philosophy should be analytical but based on experience of the real world: in Mrs. Eames' words, philosophy

> should provide an analysis of the experiential basis of our common sense and scientific knowledge in the tradition of Hume, and it should provide a systematic ordering of our beliefs and inferences governed by logical economy in the tradition of rationalism but with new logical methods. (p. 52)

Russell's rebuttal of traditional philosophy lies in his abhorrence of the excesses of idealism and of the use of philosophy to justify ethical or religious preconceptions.

The next three chapters discuss in detail the analytical, empirical, and realistic components of this conception of philosophy. The author concludes by noting the leading criticisms of Russell's thought by his contemporaries, with rejoinders by Russell.

The volume is a highly competent and lucidly written expose of the thought of Bertrand Russell. Mrs. Eames' sympathetic reading of Russell does not blind her to the difficulties in his position. Some of these difficulties would seem to point to the failure of empiricism and hence to invite a critique of empiricism itself. For example, when Russell's shrinking empirical base becomes so small that he must introduce non-empirical postulates to keep himself afloat, one wonders why he does not simply scuttle the ship. To stay aboard is a Pyrrhic kind of consistency. Yet Mrs. Eames' intent has not been to evaluate empiricism but to present a comprehensive survey of a major exponent of that position. What emerges is a picture of a philosopher *in via*, whose failures are as constructive as his successes. Thus Mrs. Eames' study could well become the basis for a comprehensive evaluation of empiricism itself.

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William Jarmes and Phenomenology: A Study of the" Principles of Psychology." By BRUCE WILSHIRE. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1968. Pp. $10.50.

William Barrett In his foreword to this book quotes Wittgenstein as saying that psychology, for all its experimental techniques, cannot advance without a clarification of its "conceptual confusion." He cites this as the reason for studies such as that of Wilshire. In the author's own introduction he contends that James, precisely because he was a radical empiricist, was not a functionalist, a behaviorist, or an introspectionist, but a phenomenologist.

> Functionalism eschews the point of view of the conscious organism itself; behaviorism avoids reference to consciousness and *intentional* behavior; introspectionism does not ground itself on the intentional mind-world relation. (p. 8)

Phenomenology, however, does so ground itself, and hence begins with the most thorough empiricism, since it is this mind-world relation which is first in our experience.

> The value of phenomenology, then, is that it prompts us to reconsider the scientific and cultural value of what has seemed to be the core of our consciousness: that relational and referential opening onto the world-that peryading sense of *what the u·orld means to us.* (p. 9)

The author quotes John Dewey as writing:

> There is a double strain in the *Principles of Psychology* of William James. One strain is official acceptance of epistemological dualism. . . . According to the (other) strain, subject and object do not stand for separate orders or kinds of existence but at most for certain di<;tinctions made for a definite purpose within experience. (quoted on p. 177)

He believes that Dewey was quite correct in detecting this double strand in the *Principles,* and he interprets this as a struggle on James' part to break through to a non-dualistic phenomenology, a struggle which was never completely successful but which had an important influence on Husser!, in whose work phenomenology clearly emerged. The author's thesis is well summed up in the following paragraph:

> *The Principles of Psychology* is an important work at odds with itself. As we look back over it we discern the lines of internal struggle. On the one hand, we see the manifest thesis which attempts to treat thought as a psychical existent specifiable in its own terms, that is, independently of its Object, and which attempts to correlate this straightway with a psychical state of the brain. On the other hand, we see the latent strand: James' growing realization that he cannot correlate until he has specified, and his efforts at specification which land him in an involved and incompletely carried out analysis of thought's Object; the upshot of this is to throw him out into the lived-world and to cast doubt on the very notion of thought as a psychical existent. The traditional psychophysical dualism, whether it takes the interactionist or parallelistic form, is imperiled; no correlation of existents seems possible. We face the prosped of a wholly different dualism----<Jf analyses not of existents-a conceptual dualism. What must be correlated-in whatever sense of the world "correlation " is applicable--are two different analyses: the cognitive analysis of being-in-the-world and the causal analysis or the organism." (p. 211 ff.)

The result is that James by a torturous route eventually anives at the three basic elements of phenomenology: the (I) intentionality, (2) world-liness, and (3) teleology of thought. Our concepts are not the object of our thought but *intend* the object. This object is not an isolated thing but a *lebenswelt,* things in relation to each other and to us. Finally, we know this total Object in its meaning, and hence its *value* for us. We know it as meeting our need for meaning.

The author believes that James did not arrive at the *transcendental* viewpoint of Husserl's phenomenology because he never " brackets " existence in order to grasp the *a priori* necessity of essences as the conditions of knowledge. However, he does believe that James, on this point, anticipates the existential phenomenologists, especially Heidegger, in his insistence on the teleological aspect of meaning. Furthermore, he shows that this is linked by James with his pragmatism, because he defines the *real* and the *practical,* i. e., as that realm of the phenomenal which appears to us as that which concerns our purposes in life, the things with which we have to deal in order to live. Thus pragmatism in its earlier and more profound form (quite different from the popularized version found in some of James' later writings) was rooted in his conviction that whatever is true and real must matter to us.

Furthermore, James anticipated J\ferleau-Ponty and others in his insistence that the self is bodily, and that for something to be real for us it must somehow enter into bodily experience. On the other hand, the author criticizes James' famous theory of emotions as basically confused and dualistic.

In my opinion the author has established his case quite convincingly. It is an important point to make because it shows that James has played a key role in the development of what for the most part seems a continental European mode of philosophizing but which turns out to have contacts both with American pragmatism and (curiously) even with British analytical philosophy through Wittgenstein. Certainly the task of liquidating Cartesian dualism must be carried through to a satisfactory resolution.

In his concluding chapter, however, it seems to me that the author himself exhibits a good deal of confusion on the mind-body problem. He seems to be saying that, after all, thought and brain-state are identical.

> What I am suggesting, with James' help, is that spirit *is* the meaning of matter at the level of human existence. (p. 224)

He is insistent that thought as *meaning* must be given priority to a study of brain-states, but he does not adequately explore the ontological character of a body which can think. Why can the human body think when the animal body cannot?

I found this book very difficult to read because of the author's patient pursuit of the thread of phenomenological thought through what he says is James' "valuable confusions." It seems to me that the argument could have been considerably simpler and briefer. It is valuable, however, as supplying an important historic link in the development of the phenomenological method.

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Examen critico de la enseiianza superior de la filosoffa en America. Col. "La Filosofia y la Universidad," # 4. By DIEGO DoMINGUEZ CABALLERO. Washington D. C.: Union Panamericana. Secretaria General, Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos, 1969. Pp. *53.*

The collection to which this volume belongs attempts to examine and appraise the present situation with regard to the teaching of philosophy in the universities of the Americas. This work makes a comparison with three preceding publications in the same series devoted to the three sections of American culture: the Anglo-, Spanish-, and Portuguese-American. The author is a Panamanian teacher.

The first section is an analysis of what the previous studies state about the history of philosophy in the different regions of North and South America. It consists mostly of quotations from the above-mentioned essays. The over-all impression is that the author had much to say and that he somehow did not manage to say all he wanted. The author notes the emphasis on the existence of originality in American thought related in the previous essays, which feel certain of the quality of the philosophical productions and confident about the future. The author quotes Prof. Jose Echeverria as saying that the teaching of philosophy has so improved that today in many university centers it is possible to study philosophy in a very rigorous way and within an atmosphere of academic responsibility. However, as far as Latin America is concerned, in most cases philosophy teachers almost to the present have merely adopted European systems without developing their own thinking. The reason seems to be that Spain, during the colonial period, followed an educational approach based on authority and dogmatism, attitudes totally opposed to philosophy. The positivistic tendencies of the 19th century did not produce philosophers, either. Only after 1916 with Ortega y Gasset a new philosophical climate begins to predominate in Spanish-speaking countries, when a group of philosophers begins to develop a more original thought, and their work can be rightly considered as strictly philosophical and highly valuable. In North America philosophers have been more free and more willing to produce original thought.

The second section is a detailed consideration of the relationship between university and philosophy. Though the need for a " theory of the university " is pointed out, the fact is that throughout the whole section " university " is taken in so broad a sense and so ideal a fashion that many relationships between university and philosophy as here proposed give the impression of being artificial and unrealistic. Perhaps too much responsibility is placed on the shoulders of an institution which has begun to show its limitations everywhere in a pathetic way. It might be that the way to achieve the same goals should be more varied. To identify philosophy

with what is done in the departments of philosophy of the universities is another mistake. Unless such a connection is understood in a rather loose sense, we would again face a concept of university quite remote from reality. In a section devoted to the departments of philosophy, however, some very sensible considerations are made concerning the relation between science and philosophy. A large part of this section is devoted to the problems of the organization of university studies.

In a section devoted to the teaching of philosophy the author quotes the conclusions arrived at in the previous studies he is analyzing; such conclusions are not very encouraging. He finds that philosophy has not received the importance it should have in university life, that it usually is not studied in an adequate fashion, and that there is a lack of communication between the teachers of philosophy of different universities.

The last section takes up again the problem of teaching philosophy. A strong emphasis is put on the distinction between the philosopher as such and the instructor in philosophy, a distinction which in practice is often forgotten. One of the main problems the author is concerned with is the possible effect that the lack of a notion of philosophy could have on the teaching of the discipline. Do we need to know what philosophy is before attempting to teach it? The fact is that in three areas of the globe three different tendencies provide a ready-made answer: philosophy of man in Europe, linguistic analysis in Anglo-Saxon countries, and philosophy of society in Communist countries. This last section is perhaps the most interesting. The author tries to solve the difficulty by using his personal experience as a philosophy professor; his conclusions are both sound and helpful.

It is difficult to appraise a book that is meant to be a comparative summary, but, insofar as the author's purpose is to give us a comprehensive and critical view of the teaching of philosophy in the Americas, he has certainly succeeded.

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Tomismo e pensiero moderno. By CoRNELIO FABRO, C. S. S. Rome: Lateran University, 1969. Pp. 469.

This volume is a collection of articles and papers which for the most part have already appeared in philosophical journals. They reflect Fabro's teaching as found in such major works as *La nozione metafisica di parteci-*

pazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino (3d ed., 1964), *Dall'essere all'esistente* (1957), *Partecipazione e causalita* (1961), *lntroduzione all'ateismo moderno* (1964), published in English under the title *God in Exile* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968), and *L'uomo e il rischio di Dio* (1967). Twelve of the sixteen articles that make up the book are in Italian, two in French, and the following two in English: " The Problem of Being and the Destiny of Man " (pp. 135-64) and " The Transcendentality of *Ens-Esse* and the Ground of Metaphysics " (pp. 319-57). The book has a cumulative index of authors covering both this volume and *Esegesi tomistica* (1969), which is Vol. I of this two-volume work.

Although it is not easy to classify under a single heading studies covering a large variety of subjects, the title of this book seems to be appropriate. It reflects a theme that runs through the entire work but most especially through the paper " S. Tommaso e il pensiero moderno " (St. Thomas and Modern Thought) which the author delivered at the Lateran University in 1963 in the presence of Pope Paul VI.

It is Fabro's contention that Thomism, far from being an outmoded philosophy, has much to offer to twentieth-century man. At a time when " philosophical speculation meets almost insurmountable difficulties and the very concept of philosophy is in a crisis " (p. 5) a need is felt for a return to " an essential Thomism." By this the author means a philosophy that "transcends all closed systems and individual historical figures, including St. Thomas himself insofar as he was necessarily bound by the cultural limitations of his own time." (p. 16) An essential Thomism must be able to meet the problematic of modern culture and examine carefully the problem of the relationship between thought and being, that is, of subject and object, that can only be solved in a metaphysics of the *esse* as the act of being. (p. 17)

In Fabro's view, the originality of Aquinas's speculation as compared to Greek thought, both Platonic and Aristotelian, as well as to the thought of the Church Fathers and the other medieval schoolmen, consists precisely in its understanding of the *esse* as meaning primarily act, the act of being. This new approach to philosophy marked the transition from the functional *esse (esse in actu)* of traditional metaphysics of the "form" to the actual *esse (esse ut actns)*, which is always and exclusively act. This transition, in turn, involves a radical change in our concept of both the creature and God, inasmuch as a creature becomes a metaphysical composite of essence and the act of being participated in the *lpsum esse subsistens.* (pp. 103-105)

In an attempt to compare the Thomistic concept of being with Heidegger's concept of being in *Sein und Zeit* and his later works Fabro shows the inadequacy of the latter. In fact, for Heidegger, being is neither God nor the ground of the world *(Weltgrund);* it is rather every existent. Being is that which is most intimate, nearest to us. Yet what is truly meant by

it is always the particular existent and never, properly speaking, Being as such. (p. 137) Thus Heidegger's perspective is opposed to Aquinas's metaphysics where causality becomes the reason and foundation of God's presence in the world. (p. 153)

A predominant theme in Fabro's work is the problem of the foundation of Thomistic metaphysics. He traces this back to the notion of being as a transcendental composite of essence and existence as two really distinct principles related to each other as act and potency, in contrast with the *Ipsum esse subsistens* which is Pure Act. "So understood, the distinction of essence and *esse* must be recognized as an ' absolute novelty ' with regard to [Aquinas's] predecessors and hence also with regard to those sources which inspired the Thomistic position." (p. 166) In a detailed analysis of texts from three of these sources, namely, Aristotle, Boethius, and Avicenna, the author shows that in none of them does the distinction between essence and existence have the metaphysical impact found in Aquinas.

In the paper that provides the title for his book Fabro points out that the main difference between Thomism and modern thought consists in their different approach to truth. Whereas Thomism stresses the principle of transcendence, modern philosophy stresses the principle of immanence. This conflict is evident in R. Eucken's essay occasioned by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* and carrying the title: "Thomas Aquinas and Kant: A Battle Between Two Worlds" (Quoted by Fabro, p. 415).

In his attempt to justify the position of a Christian philosophy, such as that of Aquinas, in the modern world Fabro makes two important observations. First, it is necessary to assert in clear and unequivocal terms the distinction between philosophy and physical science in order to avoid the misunderstanding that scientific achievements tend to confirm the teaching of modern philosophy. The two areas of study are independent of one another and achievements in the scientific field have no direct bearing on philosophical speculation whose concern is the ultimate explanation of truth and reality. Whereas science is in a continuous progress and evolution, the understanding of truth and the fundamental relationship between man and being cannot change. It is in this sense that Aquinas's notion of truth is as valid today as it was in the past.

Secondly, because of their distinct areas of study, there is no real conflict between science and classic philosophy; the conflict is rather between classic and modern philosophy. Specifically, there is a conflict between two different perspectives, one corresponding to the principle of immanence (modern philosophy) and the other to the principle of transcendence (classic philosophy). This goes to support Eucken's statement that between classic and modern philosophy there is " a battle between two worlds." (pp. 418-20)

Fabro's work aims at establishing certain positions for which he is well-

known m scholastic circles. His interpretation of the notion of being as participated *esse* has opened new insights into Thomistic metaphysics, which appears to be an original synthesis of Platonic, Neo-Platonic, and Aristotelian elements inspired and enlivened by a Christian spirit. Perhaps not everyone will agree with Fabro's interpretation of Aquinas's thought, and many no doubt will resent his manifest disregard for the contributions of other schools within the framework of classic philosophy. Yet it must be admitted that Fabro's work raises many interesting and challenging issues and tends to reassure the reader that the perennial values of scholastic philosophy, as reflected in Aquinas's approach to truth and reality, have much to offer even to the twentieth-century man.

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The Vanishing Right to Live. By CHARLES E. RICE. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1969. Pp. 200. $4.95.

New Morality or No Morality. Edited by RoBERT CAMPBELL. New York: Bruce Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 248. $6.95.

Realistically aware that people are less often persuaded by " general and theoretical " considerations than by " concrete arguments directed to specific situations," yet convinced that the former are of fundamental importance, Charles Rice has skillfully combined both approaches in his very readable treatise on contemporary moral problems. A professor at Fordham Law School when his book was published, and now at Notre Dame, Rice shows the expertise of a legal background along with a keen sensitivity to moral principles in his discussion of eight major areas: artificial insemination, abortion, euthanasia, suicide, capital punishment, contraception, sterilization, and homosexuality. His thesis is that the present trend toward liberalization in these areas reflects a declining reverence for human life, and, more basically, an erosion of men's sense of responsibility both for their own actions and for the rights of others.

In each specific problem he discusses, Rice offers a quite adequate presentation of the relevant traditional arguments concerning respect for human life and for the processes that generate life; he is perhaps most effective in his reprobation of abortion and euthanasia, least so in his defense of capital punishment. At the same time, as would be expected from an author in his profession, he does not explore every aspect of each

problem with the systematic precision of a moral philosopher or theologian but concentrates on those aspects that contain discernible social and political dimensions. As regards artificial insemination, for example, he is concerned not with the case of the husband-donor (AIH) but with the more common and socially complicated case of the anonymous donor (AID). Similarly, his concern in the chapter on contraception is not with the moral character of each instance of contraceptive intercourse between married people but with the generally expanding contraceptive mentality which signifies and promotes irresponsible sexual behavior in married and unmarried people alike. Other issues are similarly treated with heavy reference to their implications for social policy.

Some readers, even if they applaud the author's traditional stand on the moral issues, wiil object to his views on the political handling of these problems. Rice stands unapologetically with those who are often accused of trying to "legislate private morality." He favors legal prohibitions against not only abortion, euthanasia, and attempting or abetting suicide, but also fornication, adultery, AID, homosexuality, and most cases of sterilization. Moreover, he advocates legal " discouragement " of contraception through such measures as banning their sale to unmarried minors. In particular, Rice will no doubt be charged with offering an "alarmist" argument for his position: one of his major apprehensions about AID, abortion, euthanasia, contraception and sterilization is that these practices, once condoned in principle and permitted legally, may be adopted as coercive instruments of a government increasingly preoccupied with population control and human engineering.

However, I think the author makes a good case. He is not at all unaware that questions of moral principle are not the same as questions of political prudence, in fact he is often at pains to emphasize the distinction; but he is also aware-as some of his opponents may not always be-that it is a distinction often easier to draw in theory than in practice. Just how often are we sure that the dimensions of a given immoral practice are entirely " private " and thus to be exempted from legal interference? As for Rice's " alarmism," it is not based on a naive fallacy that the legal toleration of an immoral practice logically necessitates the legal coercion of that practice; it is based on a perceptive analysis of the immoral attitudes toward human life which underlie much of the actual propaganda for both the toleration and the coercion. His concrete references to contemporary as well as historical occurrences are impressive, particularly the discussion of abortion, where his predictions on the direction of the liberalization campaign have been amply borne out in the sweeping law just passed in New York and in the movement already under way to impose the " opportunities " of this new law on weHare recipients.

There is one possible criticism of Rice's work which I would share in a qualified way. In various places one finds attacks on civil disobedience and

on the Warren Court, expressions of a militant anti-Communism, and other rhetoric indicative of a " conservative " political bent. My objection is not to the substance of his views (which, frankly, I find to be not uncongenial to my own) but to their unnecessary intrusion in a way which does not contribute to the author's central message, and which may tend to antagonize readers of other political persuasions who would otherwise receive his message sympathetically. This, however, is a very minor defect in a work which presents a more sound and judicious analysis of pressing moral problems than many works even from the pens of some professional moralists.

New Morality or No Morality is a collection of popular magazine and newspaper articles which its editor, a professor of ethics at DePaul University, intends as an aid to classroom discussion of current moral issues. There are " pro " and " con " articles on race relations, campus revolts, the biological revolution, abortion, drugs, sex, contraception, and sensitivity sessions; these topics are somewhat arbitrarily separated into categories of "Public Morality" (the first four) and "Private Morality" (the remainder).

Two of the topics receive excellent treatment: the biological revolution, whose prospects are debated by Harvard Professor Donald Fleming and his peers; and abortion, which is ably attacked by Eunice Kennedy Shriver and Dr. Herbert Ratner, and defended, with admirable and frightening candor, by Dr. Alan Guttmacher. Daniel Moynihan's introductory essay (" Has This Country Gone Mad? ") and the articles on drugs, contraception, and sensitivity sessions are mildly interesting; the debates on the other topics involve too much rhetoric and too little reasoning to be very worthwhile. Most college students, I suspect, would rather be referred to the valuable articles in their original sources instead of being required to purchase the entire anthology.

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Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union. By WALTER H. PRINCIPE, C. S. B. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967. Pp.

In at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, Walter Principe defended a thesis entitled: *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century: the Doctrine of William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, Hugh of Saint Cher and Philip the Chancellor.*

The first volume on *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* was published in 1963; the present volume is the second in the series to be completed. In the opinion of the author the theology of Alexander marks an advance over that of William by its range of interest, its theological method, and its profundity of thought.

We do not have to review again the importance of the early thirteenth century in the history of theology. It was during this period that new philosophical currents were beginning to influence theologians and significant changes in theological methodology were taking place. The study of the development of the theology of the Hypostatic Union, while important in itself, takes on added weight when seen against the background of the total philosophical and theological ferment of the time. In all of the authors studied, but particularly in Alexander, we see the conscious use of concepts borrowed from Aristotle and the Arabians. Alexander used the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle systematically, but it cannot be said that he had rethought his own philosophical background according to these new ideas. Perhaps what we have within his works is an agglomeration of Aristotelian ideas alongside the Aristotelian-Boethian notions that were the heritage of that period.

In his Introduction the author presents a short biographical sketch of Alexander. After this, briefly but adequately, he explains his use of sources. The principle source for this work in Book III of Alexander's *Glossa;* an important but secondary source is the *Questiones disputatae.*

The first two chapters are also introductory: the first to Alexander's philosophy, the second to his theology. Within the lengthy first chapter which is devoted to the philosophical background we find the key to the understanding of his theology of the Hypostatic Union. More particularly this key is found in Alexander's distinction of a threefold order of being: *esse naturale, esse rationale,* and *esse morale.* It is within the *esse morale* that Alexander includes the concept of a person. The *esse naturale* corresponds to the subject; the *esse rationale* includes the *essentia* and the *hypostasis;* and the *esse morale* includes the concept of a person. In many cases Alexander is content to define person as a hypostasis that is distinct by a property or properties, in others he adds that dignity is implied. He would distinguish a person from a hypotasis by the "property of dignity."

The first chapter is an introduction to the thought of Alexander on the Hypostatic Union through an analysis of the necessary philosophical background. From this the author goes on to introduce us to its theology by dealing with the Incarnation as a doctrine of faith. The supernatural character of the Hypostatic Union is shown in Alexander's teaching on its transcendence in respect to human reason and in his presentation of Catholic belief in this mystery as well as in his descriptions of heresies opposed to this belief.

As we have stated, Alexander was well aware of the inaccessibility of the mystery of the Incarnation to human reason, yet he proposes certain arguments to tend to prove the union of the divine and human natures in the person of the Word. Within his own frame of reference he probably saw this as carrying on the tradition of Saint Anselm and Richard of Saint-Victor. He did not call them *argumenta convenientiae,* but significantly the founder of the Franciscan school at Paris presented arguments from philosophy and other truths of faith to show the fittingness and propriety of the Incarnation even apart from the sufferings of Christ.

In one argument he saw a concatenation of beings from the lowest to the highest which would be imperfect without a union of the Deity with the creature; further, this union should take place most fittingly with the human creature. A second argument maintained that it is proper to the highest goodness to declare itself in the highest way by means of the highest good the creature can have. Since no pure creature attains so high a good as can a creature united to the Diety, the highest good should effect the Incarnation.

A third argument is based on the teaching of faith on the perfect happiness of heaven. If the soul is to have glory in its sensitive part the object of its glory must be sensible as well as intelligible; such a sensible object is provided by the humanity of Christ. So, even without the passion, the Incarnation would be of value. In his explanation of the sacrament of Matrimony Alexander found many reasons to assert that Matrimony was instituted to show the highest love of God for the Church and also the union in nature of Christ and the Church; even if Adam had not sinned this sign would have been present.

These first two chapters give us an introduction to the philosophical background and the theology of the Hypostatic Union and from this point of departure the author goes on to examine Alexander's doctrine of the "Mode of Union." In the early thirteenth century there were three positions of the " Mode of Union" called by later theologians: " the assumptus theory," "the subsistence theory," and "the habitus theory." Alexander rejected " the habitus theory " as condemned by Pope Alexander III and seeming to admit only an accidental union. He also dismissed " the assumptus theory" as a threat to the unity of Christ. Only " the subsistence theory" met his approval. Nevertheless, in developing his own theology of the unity of Christ Alexander seemed to be constantly at grips with "assumptus theory."

Alexander clearly demonstrated that the human nature is not absorbed by the divine nature, nor is it compounded with the divine nature to form a new common nature, but rather it is united in the personal being of the Word. Alexander's use of the term "hypostasis" may be difficult for us to understand. Here we must refer to the author's explanation of the philosophical background wherein he places the word in context. When

Alexander spoke of a human hypostasis in Christ he understood an entity of the logical order. Moreover, when he used the term *hypostasis composita,* he meant to state that after the union the hypostasis of the Word is said to be composed because it possesses two natures without any change in the Person.

Another significant development in the theology of Alexander is seen in the clear distinction he made between the grace of union and sanctifying grace. He eliminated the idea that the grace of union is the grace of adoption and also the notion that the grace of union is an entity standing between the human nature and the Divine Person. Within this theology, too, the teaching of Alexander on the " communication of properties " contributed a great deal to the doctrine of the " communication of idioms." His use, however, limits the attribution of human predicates to the Son of God.

In his conclusion the author pays tribute to the originality, the theological method, and the profundity of Alexander's doctrine of the Hypostatic Union. As we look back on the history of theology it is difficult for us to weigh the precise value of the contribution made by individual theologians to the development of doctrine. The author makes clear that Alexander came at a critical point in the history of theology when new ideas and new methods were being introduced. His use of these ideas contributed to the work of his more illustrious successors.

We are grateful to the author for his own considerable contribution made in this important study. No theologian who hopes to understand what happened in the early years of the thirteenth century, an extremely important period in the history of the growth of Christian ideas, can afford to neglect this work.

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Standing and Understanding: A Re-appraisal of the Christian Faith. By STANLEY BRICE FROST. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1969. Pp. 187. $4.50.

This volume offers us the contents of a lecture which the trustees of the Arthur S. Peake Memorial Trust invited the author to give in 1968. In it he attempts to harmonize his Christian faith and the modern human situation. The work falls into three parts: **1)** his place of standing; 2) his place of understanding; 3) the practice of religion. I shall take up each part in turn.

The Christian presents to his contemporaries a definite attitude, a specific stance toward the developments which have taken place in the physical, the social, and the historical sciences. They can discover it in his speech, detect it in his manner, and observe it in his religious practices. This is not surprising; it would be puzzling were it not so. All this is not less true of the hebrew, the islamic, the buddhist or the pagan man. Each possesses a weltanschauung, each reaches out to an interpretation of life which guides his actions and governs his relations. It indicates his place of standing.

A brief description of the Christian's place of standing might be this. God has revealed himself to men in the person of Jesus of Nazareth who as a man lived in the condition of other men on this shrinking planet, earth. This Jesus being truly man is also truly God. Being truly man means that he " can have full sympathy with our moral and mental struggles, full understanding of what it means to be human, because he literally became one of us." (p. 115) Being truly God indicates that he is something new in human history, that he is God breaking into human existence. Since he is God, the Christian accepts " the new understanding of God and the new knowledge of his intentions with respect to the human race " as fully authoritative revelation. Christ's stance in the world becomes the Christian's stance.

But is this Christian stance intelligible to the modern world? Does the Christian tradition inherited by so many provide a coherent, a consistent, a rational way of living in this age of technological progress and rapid change? The author undertakes to reply by a description of man's own understanding of himself as presently reached in various sciences, particularly the biological, the physical, the social, and the historical sciences. His concern is to take man in his present existential situation and by employing human reason as a dependable guide in assessing the present state of knowledge to show the reasonableness of the Christian faith. Here are his words: "that is the faith which I want to re-appraise in the setting of the human situation and in the light of the considerations which the present state of human knowledge, as far as I am in a position to apprehend them, may bring to bear upon it." (p. QS)

This re-appraisal contains a number of observations. The concept of evolution, far from banishing man's sense of wonder, has replenished it. The question, "Who am I? " still remains. The search for an answer is more pressing than ever before. Psychology and physiology for all their advances in the knowledge of mind and nervous system still leave man convinced of his exercising a real freedom of choice, of his being a true center of self-awareness, and of his possessing a sound notion of values. However small we discover our earth to be in this expanding universe, we know that we are not things but persons. Upon this affirmation I live out life's commitments.

The author begins his quest for an understanding of God by asking not " Is there a God? " but " Am I alone? " l\1odem man, he thinks, is not impressed by the image of a transcendent God who acts as a need-fulfiller or a problem-solver. He has come of age. What impresses him is the personal response which he receives from life, a response which enables him to grow in his own person and to satisfy the unrest in his heart for him who is the full answer to his loneliness. To judge that he is not alone and to live in the assumption that this judgment is correct is an enrichment not an impoverishment of life.

However, if I am not alone but seek God who is "the personal response of the universe, of life, to my sense of personhood," where do I find him? (p. 68) One source is in the findings of the natural scientists. For they speak of the unity of their universe, of their complete acceptance of the idea of evolution, and of their readiness to explore the concept of ecology. (p. 69) If the environment of man is a "universe not a multiverse, and if the universe is one, then God who is the personal of the universe is One and as such known, recognized and responded to by the reason which is in man." (p. 70) If the evolutionary process, sustained as it progresses in a complex ecological system, manifests a directedness to an end, it is reasonable to conclude that this end-directedness is guided to its term "by a logos or reason, the personal quality of the universe, God." (p. 80)

History, too, has its part to play in the re-appraisal of the Christian faith, for Christianity claims to be founded upon the sure facts of history. The author briefly reviews various interpretations of history to conclude that the historian's task is to indicate the meaning of the data before him in the light of his own principle of interpretation. (p. 101) The Old Testament writers interpret their past as the gallant attempt of a people to shape itself into a community bonded together under God. (p. 103) They offer us the insight that history has a direction and a meaning. We may employ it to survey from the beginning to the present the whole story of man in search of his true significance.

The New Testament also presents us with a view of history. In a chapter entitled "Jesus of Nazareth" the author presents a conception of the Incarnation in terms consonant with present-day understanding of world order, of personality, and of history. He prefers to speak of God as "arising out of human history" rather than as "breaking into history." Present theories of personality suggest that he explain the phrase, " God became man," as the identification of God with Jesus experiencing what is to be a man much in the way a father may identify with the feelings of his son facing a challenge for the first time. To dissolve the Christ of history into the Christ of faith is so radical as to be destructive, for the Christian bases his faith upon the historical person who is Jesus of Nazareth and submits to his demands. Upon this he stands and to this he commits himself.

Previous attempts to explain the events of Christ's death and resur-

rection do not, in the author's opinion, meet the present conditions and attitudes of men. Less stress upon the notion that the death of Jesus is a work of satisfaction, an act of sacrifice, or the price of a ransom, is more in keeping with present emphasis upon personality and personal responsibility. To view it as an outstanding example of one who is prepared to die for his vision of the truth does inspire our contemporaries. Yet the author protests against reducing it to a mere example. For, in addition, it reveals to us a great deal about God himself and teaches us that " when we love ... according to the teaching of Jesus and in the spirit of Jesus, we know that we are one with all the purposes of the universe." (p. 157)

The death of Christ is an historical fact beyond all cavil. But Christ was restored to life again. The New Testament declares that God raised him from the dead and made him who was crucified both Lord and Christ. (Acts, :36) The first Christians accepted this truth on the authority of the apostolic witness. Such witness is, in the author's opinion, no longer quite convincing. The only faith he can have is one gained for himself from the teaching of Jesus, from the record of his life, from his manner of dying, and from the impact of his personality upon him. The modern mood finds comfort in this approach.

I have tried to present briefly, but I hope fairly, the author's Christian interpretation of the human situation in its present state. Its acceptance opens the way to an experience of the personal awareness of God with whom the Christian can enter into communion through the Son in the Holy Spirit. Growth in this experience surely involves the exercise of private prayer and of communal service. Basic, too, is the need for some form of self-discipline, not necessarily imposed but freely chosen and directed to keep order and to preserve control under the pressures of daily living. We require these if we are to express in our daily engagements sincere commitment to the Christian meaning of human existence. Without them Christian practice lacks incisiveness.

The effort of the author to present an integral and coherent interpretation of Christianity in terms comprehensible and acceptable to men of this century is timely and commendable. He has endeavored to supply for a real need. How far has he been successful? The answer will vary among the various readers. If they wholly accept his interpretation of the Christian message they will find complete satisfaction in the work; if they partly accept it, then qualified satisfaction. A question which does arise for the Christian reader, a question of fundamental and enduring importance is, " Has Jesus committed to each man the power to interpret his message as he thinks best or has he committed this task to a chosen body?" This vital question is not explicitly raised in the book. Its answer is perhaps supposed in its pages.

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Humiliation and Celebration: Post-Radical Themes in Doctrine, Morals and Mission. By GABRIEL FACKRE. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969. Pp. 307. $6.95.

Professor Fackre believes that the radical theologies need a decent burial. Not that they should be revived-the themes are post-radical-but their passing demands commentary upon their own importance and upon the relationship between the " death of God " and developments in ethics and ecclesiology. This "settling of accounts with radical thought" is undertaken "within ... and for the Christian community." (p. 2) Its perspective takes " the Christian drama as a fundamental point for our reflection." (p. 3)

Part I offers sympathetic summaries of the radical theologians (Altizer, Hamilton, Van Buren) , a radical moralist (Fletcher) , and radical missioners (from W. C. C. sources). The remaining three parts develop post-radical perspectives on each of these three areas respectively, with by far the most emphasis being given to doctrinal matters (Part II) . The term " radical " is likely to be initially misleading. It should not be thought that the views of the " radicals " in morals and mission are predicated upon the theological assumptions of the " death of God " group. Rather, what gives unity to these various radicals is that they all represent reactions to the cultural phenomenon of secularization. Secularization is a process which occasions celebration in virtue of its constructive possibilities, and humiliation because of its potentialities for evil. This much, then, should clarify the title and sub-title.

The "radical " movement as a response to secularization is, thus, the theme running through the book. Secularization is defined as an historical process having two aspects: (I) Man has" come of age." In earlier periods men depended upon God, religious moral laws, and the Church to meet their various needs as befits children before maturity. Now man has grown up, and has taken control of his own destiny. (2) "This-worldliness " means the fading of any sense of transcendence, and the thoroughgoing adoption of the empirical attitudes of science-technology. Fackre thus shows how these two features characterize the various radicals. The radicals have been the missionaries, the pioneers, on this secular frontier. The fundamental problem of the book is how the Christian community, in its doctrine, morals, and mission, can learn to be at home in this secularized land without losing its own soul, that is, without departing from the basic features of the Christian Story.

The doctrinal section is a discussion of a variety of " images " in terms of which the divine-human relationship may be made intelligible and meaningful to the believer in a secular age. Some traditional images, like fatherhood, must be restated so that its interpretation does not carry the

kind of authoritarianism incompatible with our maturity, and the senses of transcendence ruled out by this-worldliness. Fackre also offers some new images, such as the tutor, explicitly borrowed from secular analogues. About this section as a whole, I did not find it easy to disentangle theology and sociology. That is, Fackre sometimes writes as if the process of secularization has actually altered the ontological relationship between God and man; at other times, it seems that the secular age only makes it necessary to find new ways of expressing a relationship which in itself is unaltered. In other words, it is not clear whether the community confronts a new reality or merely a new vocabulary expressive of the same reality.

Radicalism in morals is a protest against the tyranny and dependency embodied in the traditional conception of the moral law. Fackre argues, *contra* Fletcher, that the concept of law should be restated in order to account for the important role which law plays in mature moral reflection as well as in the Christian Story. In addition, Fackre suggests that Fletcher's excessive individualism fails to appreciate the function of the community in the moral enterprise. Secularization in morals also means that the moral perspectives of the community must be scrutinized by all the tools of modem enquiry, but, in the last analysis, secular rationale is lacking for the selfless love which is the culmination of Christian morality. " Selfless love is part of the fabric of Christian morality ... because it is a faithful report of the style of God, and the schoolmaster of faith." (pp. 236-237) This comment is characteristic of Fackre's consistency in adhering to his avowed perspective; tension between the Story and our secular attitudes are typically resolved in favor of the former.

The same themes are treated in the discussion of the radical conception of the Church. Dependence on the " Mother Church," the ecclesiastical claims to define the destinies of men by its institutional framework must all be repudiated. The Church is to define itself in terms of the secular mission, the commitment to the "worldly work of Christ."

This discussion of secularization contains considerably more celebration than humiliation. That is, Fackre's attitudes toward the possibilities of science-technology are predominantly positive, even enthusiastic. Though the " coming of age " theme is introduced as being valuationally neutral, the whole treatment of it in the book is affirmative. Man has reached maturity; he is responsible, independent, adult. It is enough to remark many people have lost the social optimism once so widely associated with technological progress, and there is similar doubt, I believe, about the proposition that man has " come of age." Perhaps Fackre should have devoted more than "one small footnote" (p. 301) to those other radicals, the young, who rather than embodying the secularism of our age are repudiating it.

Any general assessment of this work must reflect the fact that it is written from and for the Christian community. This book is to be

recommended for the Christian who from that perspective wants to understand and interpret these radical developments. For one who has doubts about that perspective or wants to see bold new interpretations of it, this work has little to say.

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Le Dynamisme de la Morale Chretienne, By P. ANCIAUX, J. GRoos, F. D'HoOGH. Gembloux, Belgique. Editions J. Duculot, S. A., 1969. Vol. I, pp. 174; Vol. II, pp. 200. FB 120 each.

At the outset, it is somewhat disconcerting to discover that these volumes were collected and published for the explicit purpose of instructing priests in the two dioceses of Antwerp and Mechelen-Brussels. Although the authors do refer on occasion to French and German theologians who have made the points which they reiterate, all three rely consistently upon the formulations by fellow Northern Europeans as normative in the documentation of their arguments. They neither quote, nor do they indicate a serious grappling with any English sources, with the possible exception of J. A. T. Robinson's popular work, *Honest To God.*

A third reason for discouragement, and by far a more important problem, arises from the fact that these ten essays first appeared in *Collectanea Mechliniensia* in 1964-1965. Most were evidently composed well before that time; and the idiom of the early sixties sometimes poses difficulties for readers in a new decade. All three of the writers, for example, express a trust in the even progression of history as unveiling the constant providence of God. Thus they speak of the anguish of man in the midst of evolution and of social evolution from the legalism of the primitive peoples (I, pp. 31, *59,* etc.). That God is the Lord of revolution as well as of evolution nowhere grasps their attention.

All three men imply a confidence in man's general ability to master the forces of nature. J. Ghoos, for example, seeks to emphasize the broader implications of the Genesis command to man (1 : 28-30; 2 : 15) . He sees God calling man to "humanize" the world. In 1970, however, man is discovering problems enough in the simpler and more modest attempt merely to maintain the balance of nature in the world. Again, the focal interest of the authors remains in the theological virtue of love. A solitary reliance on love, even when profoundly stated, ignores its co-implicates, namely,

faith and hope. In short, elements in the presentation appear now to be unnecessarily " dated," and the reader is forced at several points to consider the work as a " period production."

To concede the shortcomings of the collection, however, is not to dismiss the work as entirely unedifying. It is like the layman who, when asked by his priest, " How is your wife? " replied: " In comparison to what?"

The articles do focus reflection upon some universal and crucial problems in the church and in the world: What is the relationship of Christian morality to the modern world? Upon what norms, if any, can the twentieth-century Christian depend? What tasks are essential, what commandments irreducible for the believer? How are collegiality, co-responsibility, and primacy related? What place does love occupy in daily life?

Not only do the authors present readable meditations on these and other questions, they also stress the complementarity of traditions, the positive interaction of Catholic belief and humanism, agnosticism, and even with professed atheism. They offer a sound expression of human solidarity. They afford a glimpse at the meaning of " embodied " religion. And they look continually at the dynamic movement of Christian ethics, at the very core of a living faith. Throughout, all three writers retain an openness to other points of view, a measure of modesty concerning their own formulations.

Compared with several of the recent, vigorous discussions of Christian morality and Christian ethics, then, the present volumes appear to be of limited value. But in comparison with the dry dogmatism repeated in many efforts at Christian instruction, *Le Dynamisme de la Morale Chretienne* contains expressions of the faith which are refreshing, useful, and engaging.

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Caritas est in ratione. Die Lehre des HZ. Thomas iiber die Einheit der Intellectiven und Affectiven Begnadung des Menschen. By TmoR HoRVATH, S. J. MUnster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1966. Pp. 304.

This book is based on the following text of the *Summa Theologiae* **(11-11,** q. 24, aa. 1-2): " . . . charity is . . . in the reason . . . by a certain kinship of the will to the reason." The text indicates the contemporaneity of St. Thomas in that his work serves as a launching pad for new and challenging ideas which speak to man's searchings today: the basic

unity of the human person, the mutual relationship between natural and supernatural happiness, the influence of Scripture on scholastic theology, the experience of God's transcendent love for men, the synthesis of physical and ecstatic love, the role of Christ as the reflection and foundation of the union between grace and salvation. The present work examines all of the foregoing notions and relates them to the theological vantage point of St. Thomas.

Fr. Horvath replies to the difficulties posed by Pere Rousselot in his *Pour l'HU!toire du probleme de l'amour au moyen age* and by A. Nygren in his *Eros and Agape.* The latter, in the preface to his 1953 edition (republished as a Harper Torchbook in 1969) found no reason to modify his original position or to make changes. However, further scholarly editions of *Eros and Agape* will have to take account of the contributions of Fr. Horvath in *Caritas est in ratione.*

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Theology Today Series: 4. *The Theology of the Trinity.* By LAURENCE CANTWELL, S. J. Pp. 94; 5. *The Theology of Creation.* By RoBERT BuTTERWORTH, S. J. Pp. 91; 7. *The Theology of History.* By OsMUND LEWRY, O. P. Pp. 96; 8. *The Theology of the Church.* By PETER HEBBLETHWAITE, S. J. Pp. 93. *$.95* each. Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1969.

The mystery of the Trinity has in many ways become the neglected mystery of the Christian Faith. It is the most mysterious of all the mysteries. This mystery has always been regarded as too complicated for the ordinary Christian and as something which is best left to the theologians. And this has had a detrimental effect in the spiritual life and the devotion of the Christian. This little book by Father Cantwell is an attempt to dispel the excessive mysteriousness, and this he does very successfully. It will be welcomed and can be read with profit by any educated Christian who is sincerely trying to deepen his faith. The earlier chapters will be of use to the student of theology also. The author expounds the teaching of the New Testament in a very clear and concise manner. Though simple in style, the contents of these chapters show the author's competence in the theology of the New Testament. Likewise, in the chapters (4 & 5) on the historical development of the doctrine this preciseness of thought is again evident. The doctrine of the Fathers is set forth, the trinitarian heresies are examined clearly yet without allowing

the reader to be lost in a maze of terminology and conflicting opinions which is the usual hazard of a student of this period of Trinitarian history. Unfortunately, when it comes to the speculative examination of the doctrine, the treatment is somewhat deficient. It is easy for the author to dismiss as speculative the "traditional" or "Neo-Thomistic" approach. But, by its very nature the human intellect "seeks" and "speculates." And surely we have something to learn from those minds, much greater than ours. It is a mistake to underestimate the capability of the educated Christian mind. True, it may not appreciate all the finer points of the traditional speculative arguments, but these do present a real challenge to the mind. And a mind challenged is a mind alive. A mind seeking and thinking is preferable to a mind satisfied with trite explanations.

The Theology of Creation is both satisfying and irritating-satisfying because of what it does, irritating because of what it professes to be doing. In the space of about seventy short pages it presents us with a fine summary of the Biblical doctrine on creation, showing how faith is the covenant (God developed into explicit faith in the creator-God), how the influence of the Wisdom tradition made itself felt in this field, and finally how the doctrine of creation by word and wisdom reaches its culminating point in the doctrine of creation in and through Christ, the Word and Wisdom of God. It also emphasizes the dynamic nature of the Biblical doctrine on creation-creation is not merely the static positing of things in existence but a work of God that is orientated towards fulfillment in Christ and the new creation. The booklet irritates insofar as it is presented not as a Biblical theology of creation but as a theology of creation *tout court.* One will look here in vain for a discussion of the fruits of long centuries of Christian reflection on this fundamental mystery of our faith. It is true that many of the questions treated in classical theology-questions like the liberty of creation, participated being, the relationship between time and eternity, and between the glory of God and the good of the creature-may seem to be of little immediate relevance to a modern Western audience, but theology and immediate relevancy do not always coincide, nor is the West the Church Universal. As a Biblical theology of creation Father Butterworth's booklet is satisfying and answers a real need, but the title "The Theology of Creation" is a little ambitious.

The Theology of History is history considered by the Christian theologian. It is a field which received scant attention by Catholic theologians until Vatican II. Protestant theologians, on the other hand, have treated it as a serious subject for many years. Barth, Cullman, Bultmann have all written on it. Father Lewry's slim volume is a brief but competent introduction to this subject and the research being undertaken in it. He makes the general distinction between salvation-history and secular-history. We can well see the point of a theology of salvation-history. This he deals with in the early chapters. But where the book has something to teach is

in showing that all history-secular as well as sacred-is study for the theologian. God is the beginning and end of all things-history included. His principal thesis is that Christ is the center of all history, secular as well as sacred. The Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (No. 10) says as much: "She (the Church) holds that in her most benign Lord and Master can be found the key, the focal point and the goal of men, as well as all human history." In the latter part of the book Father Lewry deals with Christ as Lord of history, the fulfillment of all previous history and the norm of all future history. We recommend this book to the student of theology.

Pope Paul in his allocution at the opening of the Second Session of the Council put among the main objectives of the Council the Church's desire and need to give a more thorough definition of herself. The sixteen documents of the Council contain the answer. Much, by way of commentary, has been written on the Church since. The last booklet under review is a further contribution to the vast literature. Taking the local Church as the starting point, chapters are devoted to the unity of the Church, its essential structures, the diversity of tasks in the Church, and a final chapter to the mission of the Church. What is the particular merit of the booklet? To my mind, Father Hebblethwaite sets out to give a study of the Church from the documents of Vatican II. He has no axe to grind, no chip on his shoulder; he does not find the Church irrelevant nor the Pope insincere. There is a tone of hope and confident optimism about the whole of the booklet. He makes the basic distinction in the very first pages: the Church is both human and divine. On the one hand, it is made up of very ordinary people with failings, inadequacies and sins. And so the Council could speak of the Church as being in constant need of purification. But the Church is also divine, founded by Christ and given the guarantee that his Spirit would be with the Church until the end. And the author has this to say: it is prayer, patience, and a basic conviction that one should not separate oneself from the bishop, and not any ill-tempered assertion of rights, that in the Church wins through in the end. Old ideas perhaps, but worth thinking about in these hectic days.

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Giustizia e Carita. By REGINALDO M. PrzzoRNI, 0. P. Rome; Lateran University Press, 1969. Pp. 151.

If there are two words which are used quite synonymously today, and two realities which are confused when they need not be, they are " love "

and "social justice." There is a certain urgency that these notions of justice and charity, as understood in the Christian tradition, be more clearly sorted out through a deeper understanding of their respective formalities (meaning, function, limits, interrelationship) so that the realities expressed might be more fruitfully lived in our own developing society. Fr. Pizzorni, professor of philosophy at both the Lateran University and the University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Rome, has attempted such a clarification in this monograph. He notes that charity " e in crisi," since it has been rejected in the name of social justice; thus there is the risk of losing both the one and the other. "Love in most men will grow cold" (Mt. 24 : 12); this is the source of much of current society's maladies. The author then poses the question whether there can be a justice without charity, a social consciousness without love. Nations and peoples have been driven apart and even devastated in wars in the name of justice; something more is needed to unite and to bind together, and this is charity understood in the Christian sense.

In the first chapter the author establishes the Christian notion of charity and its implications: charity surpasses and must integrate justice. Two fundamental and indispensable moral attitudes should prevail in order to live as befits *man:* a respect for the dignity and the rights of others, and the benevolence, love, and charity which sees in another an "alter ego." Without the operation of the Christian law of charity, the law of the Gospel, there is little chance of the human fraternity practically succeeding in establishing the rule of justice. In the Christian economy, respect for the rights of others is the minimum and lowest measure of charity. True social peace is the fruit of *evangelical* justice. Christian love is a command that pervades all human activity, justice included; it is an attitude and an activity which, without possibility of division, embraces the love of men in God and of God in men.

The second chapter details the distinctiveness of these virtues, which, however important, does not imply two divergent but rather convergent forces. Charity toward others in God obliges to what is beyond justice, all the while providing what is strictly due. Charity is a duty, a debt, but, unlike justice, it is not exactable because not rigorously determinable in its extension or in its term; it is an " obligatio" and not a " debitum " (my neighbor has no true right to my love nor can my love be forced); its omission constitutes a violation of the divine and natural law for which we must render an account to God and not to man. The measure of justice's obligation is another's *right,* regardless of one's feelings toward or relationship to the other person. The measure of charity is the *need* of one's neighbor (whose need is felt as the need of one's own self) and the available resources.

From this the author goes on to examine in Chapter III the relationship between the two virtues. Charity presupposes and does not substitute

for justice but rather adds to it; justice presupposes charity, which alone can adequately bring justice into play and nourish it, since justice by itself will often be applied only imperfectly; it must be calmly and objectively precised and recognized, which is done only with difficulty; it often demands privations and sacrifices, which only charity can sustain. Since man needs a sense of belonging more than he needs bread, this is the function of charity.

Obviously then, charity holds first place (Chapter IV). Justice alone cannot succeed in abolishing the distances existing between men (something dramatically felt by the now generation) , because it must by definition maintain otherness, the rights of another as such. Only charity truly unites because it considers another as oneself; it addresses itself without pre-ordained measure to the needs of another, over and above the requirements of justice and right, as though to one's own needs. Justice may create order, but only charity creates life and peace; Christian justice is a fraternal justice, a justice of love.

Tracing this teaching through the Fathers (Chapter V), the popes (Chapter VI), and Vatican II (Chapter VII), Fr. Pizzorni synthesizes the whole in a concluding chapter "Necessity of Charity in Social Life." Very appropriately he notes that in this life the rule of charity will not effect a uniformity in all human endeavors, quoting St. Thomas: " Friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely counted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united to peace." *(Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 29, a. 8, ad 2) But diversity, the author reminds us, must remain at the service of unity and of peace.

This short treatise is written in a simple and uncomplicated style. Despite some repetitions, it points up the functions, goals, and indispensable complementarity of justice and charity. Their interrelationship is seldom given the space and attention, especially in the English language, it deserves. It would be of benefit to many if a translation of this monograph could be included on our paperback theology racks.

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The Spirit and Origins of American Protestantism. A Source Book in its Creeds. By JoHN A. IIARDON, S. J. Dayton: Pflaum Press, 1968. Pp. 516. $9.75.

Father Rardon has gathered useful documents, creeds, confessions of faith, declarations, platforms of the churches of Reformation origin and of the churches of American origin. The anthology, of course, is not complete and is not meant to be. But it gives good and representative samples of doctrines held by many diverse Protestant churches based or born in the U. S. A. The choice is very ecumenical. It goes from classical texts, like the Augsburg Confession and the Thirty-Nine Articles, to Adventism, Ethical Culture, and New Thought, recording in passing a quaint letter of Thomas Jefferson against the Calvinist *"deliria* of crazy imagination," defending Unitarian Principles and sound moral principles which are rather puritanical. He writes to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse: "I have received and read with thankfulness and pleasure your denunciation of the abuses of tobacco and wine. Yet, however sound in its principles, I expect it will be but a sermon to the wind." Perceptive politician!

According to one's taste, one will prefer more classical texts or, on the contrary, some coverage of the non-established underground churches. Though the sampling is really quite wide, it is a useful book of reference with two indexes confessional and analytic. It is also exclusively a book of reference. The historical introductions to confessions or documents are very short indeed and I would have liked them a little more substantial.

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Thessalonians. By D. E. H. WHITELEY. (The New Clarendon Bible Series). London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 115. $4.00.

New Testament scholars are already familiar with the work of D. E. H. Whiteley, especially his studies in the *Theology of St. Paul* (1964). Quite possibly it was his knowledge of Pauline thought that prompted him to undertake this exposition of the Apostle's writings to the Christian community at Thessalonica. Many of Ius insights into the thought of St. Paul have appeared here in a more concise form. *Thessalonians* is a short volume, yet one which surveys the entire question posed by these epistles. There are maps, illustrations, and a selected bibliography to assist the reader. The Introduction to this study is proportionately long (31 out

of 112 pages), but necessary if the thought of St. Paul is to be clarified.

Whiteley offers a general revue of the historical and critical problems concerning the foundation, development, and life of the Church at Thessalonica. Then he adds a discussion of the major theological, Christological, and eschatological themes which are so important in these two documents. Indeed, he wisely indicates that much of St. Paul's ethical teaching and moral guidance for the Church can only be understood from an eschatological perspective. Whiteley accepts the traditional order of these two epistles (I-II Thess.), though he takes note of recent viewpoints which might suggest some other arrangement of the material. He also accepts the Pauline authenticity of both documents. Nevertheless, he is well aware of the tension existing between them, and he is prepared to admit that Silvanus or Timothy might have written II Thess. under the direction of St. Paul. This might have some bearing on Whiteley's exposition of particular passages, as when he finds certain contradictions in these epistles (e. g., I Thess. 5:1-11 and II Thess. 2:1-12. cf. p. 14). His discussion of the meaning and importance of the apocalyptic element in Thessalonians is sober and clear. No attempt is made to engage in apocalyptic symbol identification. Whiteley's approach to the text of St. Paul is analytical. The *Revised Standard Version* is used as a basis for the commentary, which appears page by page underneath. Generally, the thought of St. Paul receives primary emphasis. But when necessary, specific words are treated and occasionally Greek is introduced. Some scholarly opinions are mentioned, but for the most part the author avoids disputed issues. His commentary is clear; his style is precise. It is only inevitable that some of his positions are open to discussion, but they are always well presented and argued.

Given the aim of the New Clarendon Bible series, D. E. H. Whiteley has written a worthwhile and contemporary study on Thessalonians. This book is not directed to an audience of professional biblical scholars. It makes no attempt to rival the outstanding work of B. Rigaux in his *Epltres aux Thessaloniciens* (1956). It is not an original study; it is not an exhaustive or controversial investigation of these epistles of St. Paul. Rather, it is written for the educated reader who seeks to deepen his knowledge of the documents of the New Testament and their religious content. The result is a very readable work.

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The Yahwist. The Bible's First Theologian. By PETER F. ELLIS, C. SS. R. Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1968. Pp. 319. $8.95.

How assess the history and the theology of a genius who wrote of a period which antedated him by centuries? This task has exercised many. The question is complicated by the subtlety of the terms involved (revelation, inspiration, history, theology). Defining theology as a deliberate, methodical, systematic reflection on the data of faith, Father Ellis sees the Yahwist as the first and possibly the greatest of the inspired Old Testament theologians.

The "Yahwist " is the name given to the Hebrew Homer who, around 950 B. C., reflected upon Israel's rich tradition and then remolded it in a fascinating tale in which he consistently refers to the Lord under the title of Yahweh. His saga (printed in full in the back of the book) makes up a large part of Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers; it thus deals with primeval, patriarchal, and national history. Literary and psychological affinities bind the Yahwist to his contemporaries who composed the history of the ark, of David's rise to kingship, and of Solomon's succession (cf. Samuel 1-11). These authors do not view God as intervening in Israel's history only at rare intervals but as working through the ordinary, purely secular and human events of life, which he guides from within. In other words, the Yahwist's is a demythologized but not a detheologized world; beneath the ordinary and above the secular he discerns the guiding hand of the Lord of history (p. 83 f.).

It is difficult for moderns to appreciate the value of the history which the Bible offers. The information it supplies is found in tradition alone. Moreover, the biblical approach to history is didactic and theological, and only secondarily historical. Quoting E. Jacob, Father Ellis points out that "to speak of history and revelation through history, two realities must be brought together: raw facts, and their interpretation. The latter is even more important than the facts. . . . The OT is a clear example of the priority of the interpretation of history over its presentation . . . . " (p. 89) And in fact, one of Israel's greatest contributions is the tremandous conviction that history is the epiphany of God.

It is one thing, however, to say that the Bible does not contain modern history, or History with a capital H, and quite another to state that it therefore contains no history at all. Although theological and didactic, the Bible is also baldly objective and devoid of myth and rests on traditions faithfully preserved in Israel's living memory. Recent extrabiblical evidence testifies to the accuracy of the names, customs, travels and mode of life which is found in the patriarchal narratives, and Albright speaks confidently of " data supporting the substantial historicity of the patriarchal tradition." (p. 96)

To the unintitiated, Father Ellis' listing of the literary techniques used

by biblical historians (including the Yahwist) may prove to be disturbing. He concedes, for instance, that whole speeches have been put into the mouths of historical characters, and he cites S. Driver as his (1907} authority (Lagrange in 1898 had noted how the Greek historian Thucydides had done the same thing} . But this does not render the accounts worthless, provided the speeches fit the situation and are consistent with the thrust of the biblical message. There is also the technique of foreshadowing, essential to any good storyteller. Divine soliloquies and dialogues, theological comments, genealogies, obstacle stories-these are categories which the Yahwist used with consummate skill and mastery. What is truly remarkable is that, even when he touched upon myths, he injected them with life and meaning; not content with demythologizing, e. g., the Flood story, he rethought it and gave it its theological meaning: God will not tolerate sin.

Nor is the Yahwist lacking in profound theology. His God is one who chooses and makes promises, one who loves. (p. fl'.) He is the Lord of history who forgives readily. (158 fl'.) Lord of life and of fertility, he is covenant-minded and deeply concerned with the kingdom of God. (165 fl'.) In his view of salvation history the Yahwist was led almost forcibly to the exciting vision of God's plan for all men (i.e., the universality of salvation) .

The Yahwist is, then, for an advanced reader interested in the scholarly advances of the past fifty years. There is, alas, a notable lag between the scholars and the believing multitude; this book should help build a bridge between the two.

On the debit side, one might point out one important title that is twice misspelled (pp. 95 and should be *Aram Naharaim); Finnegan* should be *Finegan* (p. 216); the reference on p. 102 is confusing. There are also several omissions from the bibliography: Dentan, Chaine, and Robert-Tricot.

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Anatomy of the New Testament. By RoBERT A. SPIVEY and D. MooDY SMITH, Ja. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969. Pp. 510. $8.95.

By way of justifying the publication of another New Testament manual, two recognized Protestant biblical scholars have attempted what they consider to be a fresh approach: they have set out to isolate key passages

in the text and to offer a commentary on them. What they have actually succeeded in doing, however, is to dissect the New Testament into a series of pivotal *themes* illustrated by quotatings from the text. This is accomplished mainly by asking key questions at the beginning of each section and then proceeding to answer them through the exegesis of pertinent passages.

A comprehensive review of late Old Testament history provides material for the first chapter in which the authors show themselves sensitively aware of the aspirations and ideals of Judaism, the "matrix" of Christianity. Included is a fine treatment of Gnosticism, the Greco-Roman mystery rites, and the canon of Scripture. With regard to the text itself, Mark's Gospel is treated first, then Matthew's and Luke's. The primacy of Mark is assumed, together with the existence of " Q." Traditions (Eusebius, Papias) on the origin of Mark and Matthew are handled as second century ·· guesses." The authors are aware of the conclusions of both form and redaction criticism, as also the principal Protestant positions on controverted issues.

In chapter 5 the authors attempt a "portrait " of Jesus. Here they gather together several loose threads which the reader might have assumed had been omitted, e. g., the parables in Matt. 13. Conclusions regarding Christ's self-knowledge are guarded; after citing his unique exercise of authority during the public ministry, Spivey and Smith offer the following lame observation:

> How could Jesus assume such authority? The probable explanation proceeds from the central proclamation of Jesus concerning the irruption of the kingdom of God. This emergent rule of God rendered all other authority provisional and transitory. The preaching of the inaugurated kingdom gave to Jesus' message a fresh, almost revolutionary, quality that inevitably offended those who respected traditional authority. (p.

The Acts of the Apostles are treated next, followed by the epistles of St. Paul. The latter are covered in thematic order corresponding roughly to their actual sequence of composition. Spivey and Smith generally manage to capture the key concepts involved, give a tidy summary, and present the latest scholarly positions. In the case of justification in Romans 3, however, they are content simply to reproduce the classical Protestant notion of a purely forensic act of God. (p. 334) The post-Pauline letters conclude the second part of the book.

The Johannine corpus is covered in the "Conclusion" of the text beginning with the statement: "... it is by no means probable that any of the Johannine books were written by the apostle John." (p. Treatment of the fourth Gospel is brief but well-done. The final paragraph is typical of the helpful summaries found throughout the book. (p. 436) After a lengthy commentary on the letters to the seven churches in the

Book of Revelation the authors give us only a sketchy treatise on the rest of the book.

Illustrations abound throughout this text, as also a number of maps and a few charts. Although one of the maps shows the cities of Asia Minor, the journeys of St. Paul are not traced. A few Catholic sources are cited (the *Jerusalem Bible,* the *Anchor Bible* on John, Robert & Feuillet's *Introduction to the New Testament);* however, the majority of Catholic scholars go unnoticed: Benoit, Leon-Dufour, Cerfaux, Ahern, Stanley, etc. Had this emerging segment of scholarship been more widely represented, certain lacunae in the text might have been avoided, e. g., M. E. Boismard's probable theory *as* to the liturgical origin of I Peter; also, the analysis of the Book of Revelation into an historical (chaps. I-ll) and apocalyptic (chaps. 12-22) perspective popularized by Feuillet and other Catholic scholars. In spite of this shortcoming, however, the "Anatomy of the New Testament" can be used profitably as an aid to understanding that portion of Sacred Scripture.

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A Short History of the Western Liturgy: An Account and Some Reflections. By THEODOR KLAUSER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 246. $8.00.

This book has a long and varied history. It began in 1943 when Theodore Klauser wrote a short history of the Western liturgy. Various translations appeared (including an English one), and the book in time was enlarged and revised. It is the 1965 revised German edition that now appears in English translation.

The book is excellent. The author presents a brief survey of liturgical history, drawing upon liturgical sources and expert opinion of modern liturgical scholarship. The chief difficulty with the book lies in the enormity of the task. Any attempt to summarize briefly the vast field of Western liturgical history is bound to contain certain limitations. At times one feels that only those who have done extensive reading in liturgical history could appreciate Klauser's efforts; yet, from another point of view, the work can serve as a most helpful introduction to the field and as an incentive for further investigation and study.

The author divides the liturgical history of the West into four periods, which give us the four chapters of the book: the first to Gregory the Great; the second to Gregory VII; the third to the Council of Trent; and

the fourth to the Second Vatican Council. In each case he first gives a brief survey of the period and then discusses and analyzes certain liturgical phenomena of the period which give it its characteristic marks-this the book's sub-title.

The first period is described as the "period of creative beginnings." A delineation is made as to what was of Jewish origin, what of Hellenistic, and what early Christianity added of its own. Attention is paid to the contribution of Hippolytus and the " mystery " element of early worship.

The second period embraces the " expansion under Franco-German leadership." This chapter is most helpful. The reader may find much information here that could be gleaned only by consulting rather difficult technical works; this is true particularly as to the provenance, date, etc., of the liturgical books. Among other things, an interesting detailed description of a papal mass (c. 700) according to Ordo I is given. The Franco-German contribution is evaluated, and the reader understands why " we ought to be grateful to the Franco-German Church not only for having salvaged the Roman liturgy, but also for having enriched it." (p. 77)

The third period is " the era of luxuriant growth in which the liturgy was both re-interpreted and also misinterpreted." It is during this period that the popes, beginning with Gregory VII, took into their own hands once more the task of leadership in the realm of the Roman liturgy. The practice of priests saying private masses spread-a symptom of the dissolution of the liturgical community; the liturgy comes to be viewed as exclusively a priestly duty.

The final period extends to the Second Vatican Council and is characterized as " the age of a rigid unified liturgy and of rubricism." The Council of Trent, reacting to pressures both within and without the Church, ushered in a new period of absolute control and centralization by the Holy See. During the twentieth century the movement for liturgical renewal began, sowing the seeds for the *Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy* of Vatican II.

The bibliography at the end of the book is most extensive: 56 pages. There is a general section (which is itself subdivided) followed by a bibliographical section corresponding to each section of the book. One regrets the fact that the bibliography was not brought up to date (nothing later than 1965 is given) , that more non-German references were not given, that translations were not indicated when such were available.

In conclusion it might be said that Klauser's comments as to his treatment of the historical development of the Roman sacramentaries could well be predicated of the knowledge of liturgical history engendered by his entire book:

> This information moreover should serve to comfort all those who are shocked by the fact that as a result of the Second Vatican Council the centuries-old, cast-iron uniformity of liturgical books and prayers has been abandoned in favour of an

attempt to make the liturgy correspond more closely to the needs of different people and different countries. For surely, if the Church was able to tolerate variations in the liturgy even within the one city of Rome and moreover was not ashamed of this, then in the same way she will also be able to tolerate the fact that in the future the liturgy will only be universally the same in respect of its fundamental principles, but will differ widely as to the manner in which it is put into practice. pp. *58, 59)*

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Between Earth and Heaven. By RoGER **L.** Cox. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969. Pp. *252. $5.95.*

Roger **L.** Cox, an Associate Professor of English at DePauw University, takes issue with such formidable adversaries as Karl Jaspers and Reinhold Niebuhr to argue that there is such a thing as " Christian tragedy." In support of his case, he presents six works: *Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth, Crime and Punishment, The Idiot,* and *The Brothers Karamazov.* Those who, following Aristotle, continue to regard tragedy as a dramatic genre might be disposed to take issue with the author's right to derive half of his evidence from the novels of Dostoevsky. However, much has happened to the theory of tragedy since Aristotle delivered his lecture on *Poetics;* and the discussion of the subject has been a meeting ground for philosophers, anthropologists, clinical psychologists, theologians, sociologists, and literary critics. Indeed, as F. **L.** Lucas suggests, it has sometimes seemed that all definitions of tragic drama would have to be reduced to a tautology: " Serious drama is a serious representation by speech and action of some phase of human life." And Richard Sewall in *The Vision of Tragedy* (1952) is quite representative of the willingness of modern criticism to consider the possibility of writing tragedy either in drama or in fiction. In fact, Sewall devoted considerable attention to Dostoevsky's tragic outlook, and it is possible that Professor Cox may be slightly in his debt.

Whether or not one can accept the thesis that " Christian tragedy " is a legitimate critical term, depends, in part, upon what one's definition of tragedy is. Recognizing this need for such a definition in the development of his thesis, Cox proposes the following: " A *tragedy* is a literary work, predominantly somber in tone, in which the main character encounters some significant misfortune for which he himself is partly, though not wholly, responsible." In Cox's view, tragedy deals with "the timeless problem of necessary injustice," and the tragic hero is seen to be involved in a situation in which he makes, or is forced to make, a decision that leads directly to suffering. He is responsible for what he does, but he is not to blame for it.

In the light of this definition, it is possible for Cox to argue that the gospel narratives are tragic. He sees the crucifixion as the "central event" in these narratives and Christ as making a decision that results in his being "partly though not fully responsible for the significant misfortune which he encounters." Yet Cox never really answers his own question as to "whether the resurrection destroys or even significantly diminishes the tragic meaning of Christ's suffering and death." If the central event of the gospel narratives is not the crucifixion by itself but an event with three parts-the last supper, the death on the cross, the resurrection-Cox's argument that the gospels are tragic would seem to be in some difficulty.

In any event, Cox feels that the main sources of "Christian tragedy" are not the synoptics but what he calls the Pauline and the Johannine writings. His specific examples of writers of "Christian tragedy"-and one wonders how many others he might have found-are Shakespeare and Dostoevsky. The former is said to be greatly influenced by the "Western" Pauline tradition, while the latter reflects the "Eastern" Johannine outlook.

The essence of Cox's thesis is clearly stated in his final chapter, "The Meaning of Christian Tragedy":

> Let us proceed now to more positive statements about the Christian tragedy. It is, first of all, based solidly upon the New Testament, which served these writers not merely as the source of a few images or some philosophical commonplaces set forth in biblical style, but as the matrix of thought which finds expression in *Hamlet, King Lear,* and *Macbeth, Crime and Punishment, The Idiot,* and *The Brothers Karamazov.* The attitude toward human action in *Hamlet-the* futility of works without faith-reflects in detail the analysis which St. Paul sets forth in the book of Romans; in *King Lear* the treatment of love, as well as that of the relation between wisdom and foolishness, between sight and blindness, mirrors conceptions embodied in the Corinthian letters; and the thematic material in *Macbeth* is straight out of Luke's gospel. The vision graven on Myshkin's heart in *The Idiot* comes directly from the book of Revelation; and much that is central in *Crime and Punishment* and *The Brothers Karamazov* is taken from two chapters in the gospel of John. These are not casual borrowings but the very substance of the works in question.

Cox finds that "Christian tragedy" is not only distinguished by this use of New Testament sources as the matrix of its thought but also by its measuring of character by the "standards of Christian thought" and by its replacing of the "law of retaliation" with the "law of love." Moreover, in "Christian tragedy" there is a symbolic use of the familial relationship that is profoundly different from that found in Greek tragedy, e. g., the father image is that of one who fosters, nourishes, and provides, and there is much concern for the broader implications of the concept of brotherhood. Similarly, "Christian tragedy" presents life in terms of reciprocal concepts that are religious, e. g., heaven and hell, rather than in terms of the Greek

moral concepts of good and evil. In *Lear,* for example, the apocalyptic instant in which one who suffers with Christ is both judged and forgiven may be seen as the source of both the psychology and the ethics of the play.

There are many ingenious passages in Cox's efforts to demonstrate his theory about the three Shakespearean plays he treats. One wonders what he might do with *Antony and Cleopatra, Romeo and Juliet,* and *Richard II.* And it is really not too difficult to recognize the marked influence of Orthodoxy in Dostoevsky. Certainly in the case of Shakespeare, it has been unfortunate that more attention has not been given to the possibilities which Cox explores. But not all Shakespeare criticism has been without religious sensibility, *as* any reader of G. B. Harrison knows. A. C. Bradley's favorite theory that the essence of Shakespearean tragedy lies in the mystery of evil, and in the necessary sacrifice of the good, is less obviously " Christian " than Cox would have it, but it may account for more of Shakespeare's work.

In the last analysis, one is not sure whether Cox's book really belongs to the genre of literary criticism, which it may well be thought to represent, or to the world of apologetics where it is more likely to be quoted.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Alba House: *The Origin and Evolution of the Priesthood,* by James A. Mohler, S. J. (Pp. *$3.95).*

American Catholic Philosophical Association: *Truth and the Historicity of Man.* 1969 Proceedings. (Pp.

Appleton-Century-Crofts: *Readings in Ancient Western Philosophy,* ed. by George F. McLean, O. M. I. & Patrick J. Aspell, O. M. I. (Pp. $3.50).

Barnes & Noble: *Avatar and Incarnation,* by Geoffrey Parrinder. (Pp. $9.50); *A History of the Medieval Church 590-1500,* by Margaret Deanesly. (Pp. $3.00 paper); *Vasco DaGama and His Successors,* by K. G. Jayne. (Pp. 344, $11.50).

Bruce Publishing Co.: *Answer Me, Answer Me. What's the Church Coming To?* by Jeanne Davis Glynn. (Pp. 151, $44.95); *Philosophy of History,* by Robert Paul Mohan. (Pp. 191, $3.50).

Craig Press: *Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century,* by Arthur F. Holmes. (Pp. $4.94).

Fides Publishers, Inc.: *Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology,* by Charles E. Curran. (Pp. $6.50); *It Is the Lord: Sin and Confession Revisited,* by William J. Bausch. (Pp. 157, $5.00).

Fordham University Press: *Freedom of Choice,* by Yves R. Simon. (Pp. 184, *$5.95).*

Fortress Press: *Sacra Doctrina. Reason and Revelation in Aquinas,* by Per Erick Persson. (Pp. $9.75).

Francke Verlag: *Bernardi de Trillia Quaestiones Disputatae de Cognitione Animae Separatae,* ed. by Pius Kunzle, O. P. (Pp. Fr. 80, DM

Harper & Row: *My Travel Diary: Between Two Worlds,* by Paul Tillich. (Pp. *$5.95); To A Dancing God,* by Sam Keen. (Pp. 160, *$5.95).*

Herder & Herder: *A Marechal Reader,* ed. Joseph Donceel. (Pp. $8.50); *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan,* by David Tracy. (Pp. 317, $9.50); *The Trinity,* by Karl Rahner. (Pp. $4.95).

Holt, Rinehart and Winston: *The Freedom Seder. A New Haggadah for Passover,* by Arthur I. Waskow. (Pp. 64, $1.50 paper); *S. O. S. For Catholic Schools,* by C. Albert Koob & Russell Shaw. (Pp. 150, $4.95); *Sad Nun at Synanon,* by Barbara Leslie Austin. (Pp. 186, *$5.95).*

Humanities Press: *Ernst Mach Physicist and Philosopher.* Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. VI. (Pp. 303, $11.50).

Magi Books, Inc.: *Twentieth Century Philosophy,* by Bernard Delfgaauw. (Pp. 180, $4.95); *Why God Became Man* and *The Virgin Conception and Original Sin,* by Anselm of Canterbury. (Pp. *253,* $6.00); *Commentary on St. Paul's First Letter to the Thessalonians* and the *Letter to the Philippians,* by St. Thomas Aquinas. (Pp. 122, $4.50); *Overview Studies: The Theology of Karl Rahner,* by Gerard A. McCool. (Pp. 40, 50¢); *The Philosophy of Karl Rahner,* by Joseph Donceel. (Pp. 29, 50¢); *The Art and Technique of Prayer,* by Ferdinand Valentinc. (Pp. 48, 50¢).

Memphis State University Press: *Persons, Privacy, and Feeling. Essays in the Philosophy of the Mind,* ed. by Dwight Van de Vate, Jr. (Pp. 142).

Oxford University Press: *The Bible as Literature,* by T. R. Henn. (Pp. 270, $7.00); *The Victorian Church.* Part II, by Owen Chadwick. (Pp. 518, $12.50).

Schocken Books: *Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion,* by James Luther Adams. (Pp. 318, $2.95); *Understanding Genesis,* by Nahum M. Sarna. (Pp. 297, *$2.45* paper).

Societi:tEditrice Vitae Pensiero: *La Nozione di Legge Naturale,* by Joseph de Finance, S. J. (Pp. 27, L 200).

University of California Press: *The Rhetoric of Religion. Studies in Logology,* by Kenneth Burke. (Pp. 327, $2.95); *Augustine of Hippo,* by Peter Brown. (Pp. 463, $2.95 paper).

Vallagarina-Arti Grafiche R. Manfrini: *Esperienza e Pregiudizio,* by Antonio Schiavo. (Pp. 205).

Weisenbeck: *Alfred North Whitehead's Philosophy of Values,* by Jude D. Weisenbeck. (Pp. 214).

Westminster Press: *Spirit, Faith and Church,* by Wolhart Pannenberg, Avery Dulles, S. J., Carl E. Braaten. (Pp. 123, $4.50).