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RELIGION AS ILLUSION IN THE THOUGHT OF SANTAYANA

MOST OF THE critics of Santayana consider his early series of five books entitled *The Life of Reason* to be his finest work, and of these certainly the most beautifully written and most poetically persuasive is *Reason in Religion,* first published in 1905.[1] This book is an expansion and elaboration of some of the ideas in his earlier book entitled *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900).[2] Although Santayana later claimed to have outgrown some of the ideas in these early books-for example, his conviction that the classical Greek civilization was the model for all times-still his fundamental ideas on religion never changed, even in his last book (hailed by some as revealing a more nearly orthodox view) entitled *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels or God in Man* (1946).[3] These views are basically very similar to those

[1] (New York: Scribner's, 1936, first published in 190.5).
[2] (New York: Harper, 1957, first published in 1900).
[3] *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels or God in l'rlan* (New York: Scribner's, 1946).

of Vaihinger in his *The Philosophy of 'As If'* [4] and of Arnold in his books on religion,[5] although Santayana never mentions either of his predecessors, and his "pious scepticism" (a phrase applied by him to recent Protestantism but equally characteristic of his own view) is elaborated in a more rhetorically eloquent fashion than that of either the dry philosophical argument of Vaihinger or the literary presentation of Arnold.

I

Like Arnold, Santayana would preserve the essence of true religion, which is the highest expression of the Life of Reason and which in no way depends on a consideration of religious language as having an objective referent. In fact, he usually considers such a " factual " attitude toward religious language as an "abuse" of truly spiritual religion.[5a] The suprarational

[4] Hans Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of 'As If'* (London: Routledge & Kcgan Paul, 1924, first published in 1R75 in Germany). His thesis (p. II *et passim)* is that "hypotheses which are Lnown to be false " such as, in religion, the ideas of God, immortality, and all dogma may and should be " employed because of their utility."

[5] See especially *St. Paul and Protestantism* (London: Macmillan, 1903-1904, first published in 1870); *Literature and Dogma* (New York: Macmillan, 1906, first published in 1873); and *God and the Bible* (New York: Macmillan, 1903, first published in 1875). See also my article entitled "Arnold's Religion and the Theory of Fictions," *Religion in Life,* XXXVI (Summer, 1967), 21?3-231?.

[5a] In my argument against the fictional religion of Santayana, as in my arguments against the similar views of Vaihinger and Arnold, I am not upholding the literalism of the Fundamentalists but rather the " analogous literalism " first formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas, which is, as Gustave Weigel has said, neither the " univocal literalism " of the Fundamentalists nor the " unliteral symbolism " of Bultmann and his follows. This latter reduces !he truth of the Scriptures to " existential " or subjective experience. Of " analogous lileralism " Weigel adds that the symbolist need not fear

> that the "utter otherness " of God is denied by an analogous understanding of the formulas which speak to us of God. In a proportion we do not say that the half of an orange is in any way equal to the half of a melon. We only say that in the ratio of whole and half they are equivalent. When the Scriptures call God our King, they are not saying that God is our Nero. It is only affirmed that proper power in his limited field of direction is relatively equivalent on his side of the equation to the absolute dominion of God over us on the other side. There is no univocity; no equality. . . . Nor does this give us only formal knowledge. When I am told that the boy before me looks like his father, I know some-

tenets of traditional religion, he says, like the Christian " vision of heaven" which " pretended to be an antidote to our natural death," [6] are beneficial when considered as only poetic fictions but harmful, at least potentially harmful, when considered as truth.

Some of the terms running through Santayana's argument are similar to those used by Arnold, and Santayana, as we shall see, is, like Arnold, not consistent in deciding how they are to be applied to early Christianity. First, Santayana refers to the metaphysical language of Christianity as " myth" whose content is poetic and fictional, whether or not it was or is so recognized by its makers and users. Second, sometimes, a little confusingly, he uses " gratuitous fictions " to refer to fictional myths mistaken for fact and warns that such a mistake will bring " regrettable reactions " because the victim will soon discover his own error. Third, Santayana, like Emerson, uses the term "prayer" confusingly because in the same passage it can mean the " rational prayer " of a fictionalist, which is only "contemplation, ideality, poetry," and the petition of a believer to a transcendent God. Fourth, Santayana, like Arnold, usually uses the word " spiritual " to refer to a fictional attitude toward any metaphysical realm or transcendent God; the implied argument is that, if one really believed in such a God, he would be acting morally through fear or prudence and thus would be materialistically interested in his bodily welfare. Fifth, Santayana, uses the phrase "realm of essence " to refer to beautiful imagistic creations of his own imagination which refer to nothing beyond themselves but which are pleasant to contemplate and offer a refuge from the sordid realities of our mundane existence. I have a number of serious objections to Santayana's philosophy of religion and shall mention most of them as this essay progresses, but I shall reserve the connected presentation of my counterarguments until I have traced the

thing about the father I have never seen. "Myth, Symbol, and Analogy " in *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich,* ed. by Walter Leibrecht (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 128-129.

[6] *Reason in Religion,* p. 9.

rather tangled development of his views on this subject. In presenting his views I have felt it necessary to quote from them rather frequently to establish the accuracy of my interpretation. Footnote references to the sources of these quotations will enable the reader to ascertain for himself whether I have taken them out of context.

The first point to be noted is that, in his emphasis on the " initial advantage " and the " original fineness " of the myths which constitute the poetry of religion, Santayana is leaning toward Arnold's contention that the original makers u£ the myths considered them as poetic rather than factual, and later he specifically so argues:

> . . . if the myth was originally accepted it could not be for this falsity plainly written on its face; it was accepted because it was understood, because it was seen to express reality in an eloquent metaphor. . . . Had these S?mbols for a moment descended to the plane of reality they would have lost their meaning and d:gPity . . . . Such an error, if carried through to the end, would nul;ify all experience and arrest all life.[7]

But, he continues, the corruption of Christianity occurred when it " was paganised by the early Church." " The Christianity which the pagans adopted," he says, became "a rdigion that had passed through civilization and despair, and had been reduced to translating the eclipsed value of life into supernatural symbols." [8]

This interpretation would seem to imply that before its " reduction" by the pagans the dogma of Christianity was considered as poetic fiction, at least by the more intelligent of its adherents, including Christ himself. Arnold had argued variously on this point saying in some places that the original writers of the Bible were writing in a "tentative, poetic way," with " no pretensions to metaphysics," [9] and in other places attributing this superior and truly spiritual understanding only

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 53-54.
[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 106, 107.
[9] *Literature and Dogma,* p. 37 *et passim.*

to Christ.[10] It is curious, however, that in his early books Santayana does not refer specifically to the views of Christ. Not until his last book, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* (1946), does he consider this problem, over forty years later, by which time he had completely abandoned his usual early attempt to impose his own sceptical interpretation of Christian dogma on the early Christians and by implication on Christ himself. In fact, he had by no means been consistent even in his early books in maintaining that the "myth" was "originally accepted"[11] as unreal. In *Poetry and Religion* (1900) he had said:

> Had Christianity or any other religion had its basis in literary or philosophical allegories, it would never have become a religion, because the poetry of it would never have been interwoven with figures and events of real life. No tomb, no relic, no material miracle, no personal derivation of authority, would have existed to serve as the nucleus of devotion and the point of junction between this world and the other. The origin of Christian dogma lay in historical facts and in doctrines literally meant by their authors.[12]

And in *Reason in Religion* he admits that

> there were ... two things in Apostolic teaching which rendered it capable of converting the world. One was the later Jewish morality and mysticism, beautifully expressed in Christ's parables and maxims, aml illustrated by his miracles, those cures and absolutions which he was ready to dispense, whatever their sins, to such as called upon his nameY [The other was] the tenderness and tragedy [of the life and death of Jesus], relieved by the story of his miraculous death, his glorious resurrection, and his restored divinity.[14]

1£ the spread of Christianity depended on these miraculous elements, then is it undesirable and even dangerous to believe in them? On the answer to this question Santayana's argument

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 79 *et passim.*
[11] *Reason in Religion,* p. 53.
[12] *Interpretations of Poetry and Rcligiun,* pp. 106-107.
[13] *Reason in Religion,* pp. *85-86.*
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 86.

again vacillates between yes and a reluctant no in his early books on religion. His main argument is that a consideration of metaphysical Christian language as having an objective referent is psychologically and morally dangerous: " To confuse intelligence and dislocate sentiment by gratuitous fictions is a short-sighted way of pursuing happiness. Nature is soon avenged. An unhealthy exaltation and a one-sided morality have to be followed by regrettable reactions." [15] Santayana is assuming here (as is clear from the context) that a believer in an objective referent for religious language will soon discover it to be only " gratuitous fictions " and will then suffer " regrettable reactions" from his disillusionment. The moral danger he had already explained more fully in *Poetry and Religion.* The imagination which makes us believe religious dogma to be more than a poetic fiction, he says,

> i:. an irresponsible principle; its rightness is an inward rightness, and everything in the real world may turn out to be disposed otherwise than as it would wish. Our imaginative preconceptions are then obstacles to the perception of fad and of rational duty; the faith that stimulated our efforts and increased our momentum, multiplies our wanderings. The too hasty organization of our thoughts becomes the cause of their more prolonged disorganization. . . . And as we our hopes, and detest the experience that seems to contradict them, we add fanaticism to our confusion. [16]

But in spite of Santayana's assurance that "Nature is soon avenged" on orthodox believers, he cannot avoid the fact that many such believers have never lost their faith even under the most disappointing circumstances. According to his psychological criterion, should not such a condition of faith be desirable? Santayana's problem here in part is that he bas a dual, if not a self-contradictory, attitude toward truth. He has been arguing that metaphysical religious language is best considered as a poetic fiction. One should look only for psychological (emotional) satisfaction by disregarding truth either literal or (though he does not say so) analogical. In other words, like Vaihinger, he " knows " that the idea (even m

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 10.

[16] *Poetry and Religion,* p. 10.

analogical language) of a transcendent realm and God is "false." But, paradoxically, this knowledge of falsity for Santayana is a truth. " The feeling of reverence should itself be treated with reverence, although not at a sacrifice of truth. . . ." [17] His argument for the fictional approach to religion, furthermore, has been that the opposite would soon lead to disillusionment and " regrettable reactions " because the believer would lose his faith. But what if one does not lose his faith? He admits that many orthodox sages have never lost their faith and still "have lived steadfastly in the spirit." But his regard for truth forces him to maintain that such naive satisfaction is intrinsically " spurious," whether or not it is followed by disillusionment. Such literal interpretation of the myth, he says, is crudely materialistic because it reveals a concern for the present welfare of the body and its perpetuation beyond this life. How then can all these sages have "lived steadfastly in the spirit " ?

Besides the above, we have already noticed some other logical self-contradictions in Santayana's argument. Unfortunately, there are others. For example, he defines " rational prayer " as only" contemplation, ideality, poetry, in the sense in which poetry includes all imaginative moral life." [18] He says, furthermore, that "Prayer is a soliloquy," which, of course, would be consistent with his definition in the preceding sentence and like Emerson's definition of prayer as " the soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul," with a very important exception: the rest of Santayana's sentence reads as follows: "but being a soliloquy expressing need, and being furthermore, like sacrifice, a desperate expedient which men fly to in their impotence, it looks for an effect . . . . " [19] Obviously Santayana has merged here, without distinguishing between, two kinds of prayer as he himself has defined them. He has made no distinctions between the "rational prayer," which he has defined as a soliloquy, and what he elsewhere calls " magical prayer," the appeal for assistance to a higher being in whose existence one

[17] *Reason in Religion,* p. 13. [18] *Ibid.,* p. 43. [19] *Ibid.,* pp. 39-40.

really believes. From the standpoint of his own logic he should have said that the prayer which at its best is a soliloquy-" contemplation, ideality, poetry "-too often becomes instead "a desperate expedient which men fly to in their impotence . . . ." Of course, even when he does not confuse it with his so-called" magical prayer," why does he insist on calling poetic, soliloquizing contemplation prayer? Santayana had a great admiration for Christianity, especially Roman Catholic Christianity. In fact, in his essay entitled " Modernism and Christianity" in *Winds of Doctrine* (first published in 1913) he condemned modernistic varieties of Christianity because, as he said:

> The modernist view, the view of a sympathetic rationalism, revokes the whole Jewish tradition on which Christianity is grafted; it takes the seriousness out of religion; it sweetens the pang of sin, which becomes misfortune; it removes the urgency of salvation; it steals empirical reality away from the last judgment, from hell, and from heaven; it steals historical reality away from the Christ of religious tradition and personal devotion. The moral summons and the prophecy about destiny which were the soul of the gospel have lost all force for it and become fables.[20]

Why, then, does Santayana insist on calling his sophisticated soliloquy prayer even when he does not contradict himself in the same sentence? The answer is somewhat complex, but part of it lies in the same kind of reasoning that prompted his condemnation of modernism when, from one point of view, he is a prime example of it. In the above, we notice that he condemns modernism for " stealing historical reality away from the Christ of religious tradition and personal devotion " and also for " reducing the soul of the gospel " to "fables." Yet, in the sentence preceding the extended quotation he says: " Such a moral fable is what Christianity is in fact; but it is far from what it is in intention," and a few sentences before that he says, " Christianity is indeed a fable, yet full of meaning if you take it as such." [21] Why, then, condemn the modernists for calling Christian doctrine a collection of fables? The point that

•• *Winds of Doctrine* (New York: Scribner's, 1940), p. *50,*
"'Ibid.

Santayana, not very successfully, is trying to make is that the modernists are not respectful enough in their attitude toward the ancient language. Let us, says Santayana in effect, keep the traditional language for its emotive force and interpret it as beautiful fictions or illusions. Therefore Santayana's poetic soliloquy can retain the name of prayer. It is perfectly permissible for the modernists to have the new wine provided they put it in the old linguistic bottles.

But this is not the complete answer. Santayana not only admired traditional Christianity, but, sophisticated modern that he was, he longed for the old faith. This attitude is not so evident in the early books as in the later, and it is most noticeable in the wistful melancholy appearing here and there in *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* (1946) written only a few years before his death.

Returning to the logical self-contradictions that appear in his early books, we notice that in the chapter on mythology in *Reason in Religion* Santayana contradicts what he said earlier about the harmfulness of " gratuitous fictions " when they are considered to be true. In the later chapter he says: "Illusions incident to mythology are not dangerous in the end, because illusion finds in experience a natural though painful cure .... In taking fable for fact, good sense and practice seldom keep pace with dogma." [22] In fact, as he says later, the consideration of myths as true is even necessary for man's moral life, since " Man is still in his childhood "-all of mankind, he means, except the philosophical elite. "Nor should we wonder," he says generously, " at this enduring illusion. Man is still in his childhood; for he cannot respect an ideal which is not imposed on him against his will. . . . His moral life, to take shape at all, must appear to him in fantastic symbols." [23] This statement appears in the chapter entitled" The Christian Epic," by the end of which, however, he has dropped this view of myth as a moulder of morals for a less enthusiastic but still tolerant opinion of it as a harmless eccentricity. " Matters

[22] *Reason in Religion,* pp. 51-52. [23] *Ibid.,* pp. 91-92.

of religion should never be matters of controversy. \Ve neither argue with a lover about his taste, nor condemn him, if we are just, for knowing so human a passion. That he harbours it is no indication of a want of sanity on his part in other matters." [24] But on the next page, referring to the third century, he once more returns to regret for the spread of the " sea of superstition and dialectic which had submerged Christianity" [25]. a regret almost but not quite so strong as the one expressed twenty pages before for " the failure of Christianity, with its prolonged discipline and opportunities, to establish a serious moral education." [26] In this mood, which prevails in spite of contradictions in his early books on religion, Santayana considers that Christianity had borrowed the less desirable aspects of other religions:

> ... being a doctrine of redemption, like neo-Platonism, it tended to deny the natural values of this life; but, being a doctrine of creation and providential government, comparable in a way to the Stoic, it had an ineradicable imvard tendency toward pantheism. and toward a consequmt acceptance of both the goods and evils of this world as sanctioned and required by providence. [27]

In attempting to account for the conflicting views that appear especially in Santayana's early books, the answer may well be, not that he is simply careless in following the sequence of hi& argument, but that his position, like that of Emerson, is an ambivalent one vacillating between a consideration of man as truly subordinate to a power greater than he and a consideration of man as not thus subordinate but as his own divinity. As Santayana and Emerson present these views, they cannot be reconciled as either the Christian Incarnation in which God becomes man as God-man, or the reverse process, described by Berdyaev as made possible by the Christian Incarnation, namely, the possibility of the human-divine. [28] Both Santayana and Emerson rejected the Christian Incarnation as pure myth be-

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[28] With one important difference there is a parallel in the philosophy of Nicholas Berdyaev to the human-diYine argument of Santayana and Emerson. Berdyaev

cause, for one thing, they did not believe in the idea of sin, which made the Incarnation necessary. Of course, they rejected as fictional all the dogma of Christianity, except the idea of some kind of a God-for Emerson a kind of vaguely pantheistic Over-Soul, of which man at his best was "part and parcel"; for Santayana (in certain moods) a kind of vague pantheism which (perhaps mistakenly) he considered to be like the religion of Spinoza. But Santayana usually rejected (except poetically or fictionally) the idea of any kind of God beyond man; he called himself the only real materialist of his day. I submit some passages from Emerson and Santayana which indicate that they vacillate between a humble attitude toward a power greater than man and the self-confident attitude of considering man as his own god. (I) From Santayana's "Ultimate Religion," first presented as a paper at The Hague during the commemoration of the tercentenary of the birth of Spinoza:

My destiny is single, tragically single, no matter how multifarious may be the causes of my destiny. As I stand amazed, I am not called upon to say whether, if I could penetrate into the inner workings of things, I should discover omnificent power to be simple or compound, continuous or spasmodic, intentional or blind. I stand before it simply receptive, somewhat as, in Rome, I might stand before the great fountain of Trevi. [29]

argues that Christ's Incarnation as the Divine-human made it possible for man to become divine. "Christianity," says Berdyaev,

> has always taught of the weakness and fall of man, of the sinfulness and weakness of human nature. At the same time, Christian anthropology recognizes the absolute and royal significance of man, since it teaches of the incarnation of God and divine possibilities in man, the mutual interpenetration of divine and human natures . . . in Christian revelation the truth about man's divine nature is really only the reverse side of the medal of the truth about Christ's human nature. The Christology of man is inseparable from that of Son of God. . . . (Donald A. Lowrie [ed.], *Christian Existentialism: A Berdyaev Anthology* [London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965], p. 57.)

The important difference, of course, between the position of Berdyaev and that of Emerson and Santayana is that Berdyaev believes in the objective reality of the Christian Incarnation as necessitated by the sinfulness of man. For Santayana and Emerson the fall of man was simply his failure to understand his potential divinity, and the Christian type of Incamation was a superstitious myth.

•• In Irwin Edman (ed.), *The Philosophy of Santayana: Selections from All the Works* (New York: Scribner's, 1958), p. 576.

And this from Emerson's "The Over-Soul":

As with events, so is it with thoughts. When I watch that flowing river, which, out of regions I see not, pours for a season its streams into me, I see that I am a pensioner; not a cause but a surprised spectator of this ethereal water; that I desire and look up and put myself in the attitude of reception, but from some alien energy the visions comc.[30]

But Emerson says in " Nature " that " l\1:an is a god in ruin," [31] because he does not recognize his divinity, and in " SeH-Reliance " that man's prayer "is the soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul." [32] Many other similar passages may be found in Emerson. 'Ve have already seen a number of the same type in Santayana, to which may now be added the following: 1\Ian, says Santayana, " adores, and the object of his adoration may be discovered within him and elicited from his own soul." [33]

But, although he agrees with Emerson fundamentally that Everyman is always potentially, sometimes actually, divine, Santayana balances this exuberance on the next page by a sobering reflection concerning the nature of the universe and man's relation to it. "The universe," he says, " so far as we can observe it, is a wonderful and immense engine; its extent, its order, its beauty, its cruelty, makes it alike impressive," [31] and he adds that not only what we call our follies but also our spirituality come from this universe, "our real ancestor." [35] The " follies " are " the ignorant crimes of the universe which have passed into our own blood," and the " spirituality " of this Janus-faced ancestor also transmitted to man appears in the following passage:

It [spirituality] threads its way through the landscape with so little temptation to distraction that it can salute every irrelevant thing, as Saint Francis did the sun and moon, with courtesy and a certain affectionate detachment.

[30] *Complete Essays and Other Writings* of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 262.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 39.

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 163.

[33] *Reason in Religion,* p. 190.

[34] *Ibid.,* p. 191.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 192.

> Spirituality likes to say, Behold the lilies of the field! For its secret has the same simplicity as their vegetative art; only spirituality has succeeded in adding consciousness without confusing instinct. . . . The spiritual man should be quite at home in a world made to be used; the firmament is spread over him like a tent for habitation, and sublunary furniture is even more obviously to be taken as a convenience. [36]

If this passage had already been written when Emerson wrote his first essay entitled "Nature," he would have been happy to quote it in the section on "Commodity." Indeed, Santayana's sinuous poetic rhythm is quite as felicitous as that of Emerson's best passages and the exaltation of man as part of Nature is quite as emotionally appealing, if not so buoyant, as Emerson's. And Santayana repeats Emerson's further exaltation of man as always potentially, and at times actually, divine, the actualization depending on man's recognition of his latent powers. "The heart," says Santayana in the "Conclusion" to *Reason in Religion,* "utters its own oracles." [37] Here again while attempting to summarize his views, he makes a series of statements which illustrate most strikingly the defects of his philosophy in compact form:

> Mythology, in excogitating hidden dramatic causes for natural phenomena ... has profoundly perverted and confused the intellect; it has delayed and embarrassed the discovery of natural forces, at the same time fostering presumptions which, on being exploded, tended to plunge men, by revulsion, into an artificial despair. At the same time this experiment in mythology involved wonderful creations which have a poetic value of their own .... In imagining human agents behind every appearance fancy has given appearances some kinship to human life. . . . While objects and events were capriciously moralised, the mind's own plasticity has been developed by its great exercise in self-projection. To imagine himself a thunder-cloud or a river, the dispenser of silent benefits and the contriver of deep-seated universal harmonies, has actually Etimulated man's moral nature: he has grown larger by thinking himself so large .... Without misunderstanding, there might have been no understanding at all; without confidence in supernatural support, the heart might never have uttered its own oracles. [38]

[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 194-195. [37] *Ibid.,* p. 276. [18] *Ibid.,* pp. 275-276.

From whatever standpoint-" operationally," [39] ontologically, or morally-one wishes to consider this passage, its graceful style cannot conceal its serious errors.

In the first place, many great thinkers of the past and present have found solid arguments in the form of" converging probabilities" (to use Cardinal Newman's phrase) which have concinced them of the existence of a transcendent God. Santayana presents no argument against the existence of the "excogitated" deity except to say (without any proof or without any qualification) that such a belief has had (and he implies always had) two bad effects: it " has perverted and confused the intellect " and has " tended to plunge men, by revulsion, into an artificial despair." Why does he not show these ill effects in all the great theistic thinkers from Aristotle on to the present? The answer, of course, is that such effects exist only in Santayana's imagination.

Santayana then says that the wonderful fictitious creations of the myth-maker (a mere self-projection, whether or not they are recognized as such) have a poetic value; the mythologist would be like Vaihinger if he were aware that his creations were fictitious. But Santayana would have the myth-maker imagining himself as god, "the contriver of deep-seated universal harmonies." This outdoes Vaihinger in egotism, because

[39] I borrow this word from the following sentence by Santayana *(Reason in Religion,* p. 31): " God's majesty lies in his operation, not in his definition or his image." It is not surprising that here and elsewhere Santayana reveals a tendency to pragmatism, since he studied under, and admits that he was considerably influenced by, William James. In his "A General Confession" (P. A. Schilpp [ed.], *The Philosophy of George Santayana,* Evamton and Chicago, 1940, pp. 14-17) Santayana admils that "in taking eYerything good-humouredly, with a grain of salt" (that is, in taking from it \\hat is useful), he is following "a sort of pragmatism" (p. 14), but whal the mature James called pragmatism Santayana "could not stomach" (p. 16). In Santayana's opinion, James's pragmatism involYed "arguments which assumed that consciousness was a material engine absorbing and transmitting energy: so that it was no wonder that presently he doubted whether consciousness existed at all . . . this pictorial cosmology had the advantage of abolishing the human imagination, with all the pathos and poetry of its animal status" (p. 16). At any rate, both James and Santayana emphasize the priority of "operation." For the connection of pragmatism with Vaihinger's 'As If' system, see Vaihinger, p. viii.

Vaihinger limits the :fiction to one's acting *as if* he were commanded by a God in whose existence he does not believe. Apparently for Santayana the moral benefit does not demand action: " he has grown larger by thinking himself so large." Imagination will perform the magic trick-a substitution of esthetics for morally responsible action-a perversion of ethics as well as religion which is characteristic of Santayana's philosophy, as we shall have opportunity to observe further.

The last sentence of the lengthy quotation above goes even further in egotism, because it says self-projection in the way of imagining oneself to be God is not, after all, necessary, because the human really is his own God. For that reason, then, it was good for primitive man to believe in the real existence of God, because without this preliminary " confidence in supernatural support, the heart might never have uttered its own oracles." Santayana would not have been, and the many modems who believe that man is his own God today will not be, impressed by references to the tyranny of rulers from Nero to Hitler who have held this view. Sanatayana, of course, was a shy recluse, and Emerson, who held the same view about man's potential (often actual) divinity, never oppressed anybody, but the record is quite different for those with political power who believe thus.

II

In the chapter on " Ideal Immortality " in *Reason in Religion,* Santayana turns to another quality in man besides the contemplation of his own greatness that enables him "to participate at once in humanity and in divinity." His celebration of memory has all the poetic beauty and gentle melancholy (while professing comfort in " the serenity and balm of truth ") that were to characterize the philosophical portions of Proust's *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu:*

> As it is memory [says Santayana] that enables us to feel that we are dying and to know that everything actual is in flux, so it is memory that opens tn us an ideal immortality .... When the meaning of successive perceptions is recovered with the last of them,

when a survey is made of objects whose constitutive sensations first arose independently, this synthetic moment contains an object raised above time on a pedestal of reflection, a thought indefeasibly true in its ideal deliverance, though of course fleeting in its psychic existence. [40]

In his last full book, *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* (1946), this combination of assurance and gentle melancholy may still be found, though by this time the assurance is less, and the melancholy more, pronounced than in the early books. Though not accepting it for himself, he is not only far more tolerant of the interpretation of dogma as having an objective referent but has found this approach to be " an inspiration " expressing" some inborn predicament of the spirit." [41] Though, of course, he is too sophisticated to admit it, there is some indication in both the tone and the content of this book that he himself, in spite of his confident scepticism, would, if he only could, accept the " impetuous " view of " a refined spirit " like that of Cardinal Newman.

As was mentioned above, Santayana by this time has completely abandoned his usual early view that the authors of the Bible and Jesus considered religious dogma as poetic rather than factual. Here he intends to " study and clarify " this factual view which " hypostasises the idea of Christ into a divine power at work in the hearts of men" and which has been and is " so idolised by sensitive and noble minds " [42] such as Newman and all other believers. In speaking of Christ's Passion, he says:

... and here especially, in a scene so characteristic of *John,* what is recorded as a fact and by believers must be accepted as a fact, is surely a symbol also, and who knows in how many senses, rising to who knows what angelical removes? Could we divine them all, we should understand why Christ's Passion was necessary, and how, by undergoing and transcending it, he overcame the world.[43]

Even the symbol, rising to its " angelical removes," is here clearly to be interpreted as pointing to a reality which is

•• *Reason in Religion,* pp. 260, 262.
" *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels,* p. 19.
•• *Ibid.,* pp. 18, 19.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 150.

objective truth and not poetic fiction. How different is this Santayana from the early dispenser of " rational " wisdom who warned of " regrettable reactions," even " artificial despair," which would result from considering dogma as objectively valid! Of course, he cannot completely surrender his feeling of superiority to believers, and he returns at the end to say, apparently even here with considerable modification of his old assurance:

> As in poetry, so in religion, the question whether the event described here [in the Gospelsj actually occurred is trivial and irrelevant. Anything may occur in infinite time. The question is what light it would kindle within us, if it happened to happen. [44]

There is a wistfulness here which Santayana did not intend to reveal. The light is not kindled now within us, but would be if " it happened to happen." But presumably for believers the light is aglow and has been " kindled " by their belief that these events actually occurred. How, then, can the question whether they occurred be "trivial and irrelevant"? In the next sentence Santayana is once more ambiguous, perhaps as a deliberate device to check the emotion apparent, even if restrained, in the last sentence quoted above. " Facts," he says, " matter little for the spirit except for what they mean to the heart." [45] But, unless the " spirit " is to be almost all intellect (and even Santayana's melancholy, however restrained, indicates that emotion is important here), the exception is far more significant than he intended to indicate. This restrained melancholy continues in the final sentence of this passage on the relative unimportance of whether the events recorded in the Gospels did or did not occur: " Lucifer might admit that a divine Christ had existed, yet might disdain to imitate him; and a disillusioned philosopher might aspire to imitate him without believing in his existence." [46] This would clearly be aspiration in spite of, and not because of, disillusionment, and what has caused this obstacle which the philosopher might attempt so nobly to overcome? It is obviously his decision that

[44] *Ibid.,* pp. 173-174. [45] *Ibid.,* p. 174. [46] *Ibid.*

dogma is not fact, and this decision would indicate that Santayana, in spite of his cultivated detachment, is a victim of the "inborn predicament of the spirit" that prompted him to write this book.

But the lonely and gallant knight of rationalism fights his sophisticated battle nobly and returns briefly in his final chapter to a denunciation of dogma considered as fact:

> For if idealism is turned into a psychological physics or cosmology it becomes merely naturalism disguised in romantic or dialectical myths. Idealism then inspires the same religious sentiments as pantheism and the same morality.[47]

In the very next sentence, however, he feels obliged to qualify, and apparently to contradict, what he has just said: "The idea of Christ, however, is not that of an ordinary man who has been more or less inspired by the spirit of God. . . . He was *really* [italics mine] God become man; and that is a very different idea from that of a man living, so far as his nature permits, in an ideal union with God."[48] Although he probably does not intend *really* here to mean ontologically valid, the second clause shows that he must mean more than *poetically* (in the sense of *fictitiously)*; therefore, to some extent at least, the contradiction still remains, unless we assume that Santayana is expressing not his own opinion but that of believers in the Catholic dogma. This model of Christ as "really God become man," he says,

> is what forced Catholic theology to adopt the doctrine of a supernatural human soul: so that only a sacrificial human life and a sanctified human body should be truly natural to man and compatible with his perfect happiness. This implies the sacrifice of almost everything that a man ordinarily cares for, including his animal will and his animal self.[49]

This idea of Christianity as morbidly ascetic seems at first sight to be contradicted on the next page by this observation:

> It is indeed one of the beauties of the idea of Christ that in spite of his absolute holiness, or because of it, he shows a spontaneous

[47] *Ibid.,* p. *250.* [48] *Ibid.* [49] *Ibid.*

sympathy, shocking to the Pharisee, with many non-religious sides of life, with little children, with birds and flowers, with common people, with beggars, with sinners, with sufferers of all sorts .... [50]

However, the adjective "non-religious" shows the logical connection with the previous passage: the essence of religion, the doctrine of the Incarnation, had " forced Catholic theology to adopt the doctrine of a supernatural human soul," which, in Santayana's opinion, inevitably involves a morbid asceticism. Thus Christ's avoidance of such asceticism could only mean that he was showing " spontaneous sympathy with many non-religious sides of life." After all, Santayana's most important point was his rejection of what he considered to be an ontological absurdity, the " supernatural human soul."

Thus Santayana ends where he began-a " religious " materialist, who does exclude transcendental logic, as he said in his "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," but who considers this logic valid only " to render articulate certain special perspectives necessarily confined to the subjective or poetic sphere." [51] Such transcendental logic, including religious dogma, would belong in what he called "the realm of essence," essence for him being distinguished from existence. [52] Essence for Santayana was not a reality like Plato's noumenal realm or world of Ideas above the phenomenal realm or world of appearances. Santayana denied that he was a Platonist because, as he said, Plato attributed substance to his universals and believed in their active and beneficent influence on the phenomenal world. For Santayana essences are simply creations of the mind beautiful to contemplate with no pretensions to any kind of ontological validity. [53] Santayana summarizes his philosophy well in the following passage from the *Apologia:*

Mine [he says] was indeed a modest Epicurean humanism, that invited mankind to profit as much as possible by the course of

•• *Ibid.,* p. 251.

[01] Santayana in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of George Santayana,* p. *506.*

•• *Ibid.,* p. *500 et passim,* and *The Realm of Essence* in *Realms of Being* (New York: Scribner's, 1942), *passim.*

•• *The Realm of Essence, passim.*

natural events without pretending to subject them to any secretly moral principle. [54]

And how is this similar to Vaihinger? Both men (I) obviously consider reference to any Being greater than man, indeed all reference to " transcendental logic " of any kind, to be a creation of man's psyche and therefore devoid of objective reality. (Q) Such reference to a transcendent reality is pure illusion or fiction but very useful in ordering our lives. (3) Santayana's " realm of essence," which has no existence except in the imagination but is beautiful to contemplate, is precisely the same as Vaihinger's "fictitious mental constructs." There is a difference, however, in the results claimed for these constructs of the two men. Santayana claims only that one can escape from the sordid world and enjoy contemplating these illusions; Vaihinger claims that they result in idealistic behavior. But since Vaihinger approves fully of Schiller's illusory and brief flights into the poetic " Realm of Shadows," it would seem that Vaihinger's idealistic behavior is perhaps, after all, similar to Santayana's estheticism. (4) Both men are fundamentally materialists, but they insist on referring to the fictional approach to religion as really more " spiritual" than the attitude of the believer.

I shall now summarize my objections (first strictly logical and then logical and moral) to Santayana's philosophy: (1) Santayana's style is graceful and often illuminating on individual points, but, like Emerson, he usually operates by a kind of poetic inspiration and loses the thread of his argument in multiple inconsistencies. (2) A belief in God may be prompted by prudence rather than by true spirituality or by emotional needs rather than by sound reasoning, but there are many believers who were first persuaded intellectually that such a belief is true. In fact, many of us for a long time resisted compelling intellectual arguments because of our fear that they might be predominantly emotional. (3) Sidney Hook has accused all intelligent believers of being motivated by a" failure

•• Santayana in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of George Santayana,* p. 503.

of nerve." This attack, of course, is not argument but a simple debater's trick familiarly known as "name calling." Such an accusation might more logically be made against fictionalists like Santayana, who admittedly are unbelievers but use religious language as fictions for the sake of emotional therapy. (4) In spite of Santayana's sweeping assertion that belief in a transcendent God is a sign of intellectual confusion, there are, even in this age of widespread unbelief, many sound intellectual arguments for such a belief. This is a reinforcement of (2) above, which is concerned with the question of the priority of intellectual and emotional persuasion. There is not space here to discuss the intellectual arguments; they are presented clearly and cogently in the works of Dr. John Hick, especially his *Faith and Knowledge* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957) and *Philosophy of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs. N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). There are, of course, many other good books on this subject; these are mentioned as examples which are intellectually valid without being too technical. (5) Any honest and intelligent man, it seems, would try to find the truth wherever it leads him, but for Santayana and the other fictionalists illusion is more important than truth. (6) Such dependence on illusion is a moral defect because it depends on beauty, and a very evanescent beauty at that, to act as a substitute rather than supplement for truth and goodness. Such estheticism, however refined, is a form of hedonism, which at its best depends on pleasure rather than happiness, and refined hedonism can easily degenerate into crude hedonism, as was evident in the nineteenth century in the movement from Pater to Wilde, Dowson, Lionel Johnson, and others in the Yellow Nineties. (7) Santayana, of course, was not degenerate, but he withdrew into his ivory tower and used his whole philosophy to justify his unwillingness to face a "world of perpetual change, defeat, and imperfection," as the following characteristic quotation indicates. He speaks of " truth " along with beauty, but he really subordinates truth to beauty, and he is not interested in improving but in escaping from the workaday world. The passage is from " Society and Solitude ":

To substitute the society of ideas for that of things is simply to live in the mind; it is to survey the world of existences in its truth and beauty rather than in its personal perspectives, or with practical urgency. It is the sole path to happiness for the intellectual man, because the intellectual man cannot be satisfied with a world of perpetual change, defeat, and imperfection. . . . For beneath natural society, in the heart of each of its members, there is always an intense and jealous solitude, the sleep of elemental life which can never be broken; and above natural society there is always another solitude-a placid ethereal wilderness, the heaven of ideas-beckoning the mind. [55]

Santayana's attitude is also well illustrated in the Epilogue to *The Last Puritan,* in which Mario, one of the characters, says to the author:

In this novel ... the argument is dramatised, the views become human persuasions, and the presentation is all the truer for not professing to be true. You have said it somewhere yourself, though I may misquote the words: After life is over and the world has gone up in smoke, what realities might the spirit in us still call its own without illusion save the form of those very illusions which have made up our story? [56]

Since this passage may well be considered as at least an important part of what Santayana would have been willing to call his spiritual last will and testament, we may appropriately leave him at this point, with regret that so great a talent was able to find nothing more substantial in the realm of spirit than illusion.

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[55] In Edman (ed.), *The Philosophy of Santayana,* pp. 345, 347.
[56] (New York: Scribner's, 1936), p. 602.

BERGSON'S CONCEPT OF MOTION

THE TWOFOLD PURPOSE of this article is to give an original exposition of Bergson's notion of motion and to point out many of the similarities between the thought of the Angelic Doctor and that of Henri Bergson in regard to their notion of motion and the significance that their concepts of motion played in the inception of their philosophies. Although I am well aware that Bergon's notion of motion is usually treated solely in regard to his concept of duration, it is my view that Bergson's notion of motion may be accurately described as a concept distinct, if not separate from, that of duration. In addition, it is clear that Bergson held this concept to be applicable to the real world similar to a moderate realist view of true knowledge.

Bergson's lnteUectual Milieu

In order to appreciate Bergson's contribution to philosophy one must recognize the intellectual milieu in which he philosophized.

In early modern philosophy and science one finds the strange phenomena of a material universe subject to locomotion but not to any kind of substantial change. In addition, locomotion itself was held to be something extrinsic to matter, something added to it from without. In other words, matter is essentially immobile, static and inert. Matter is considered to be either bare extension or composed of a number of unchangeable atoms which are moved locally, being packed together in clusters of various densities entering into combinations which produced nothing really new.

In this mechanistic universe, subject to strict determinations, time had really no significance. If the universe had a history, this history would not have any scientific or philosophical significance at all.

This universe, where there is a total absence of generation and corruption, was the universe of Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Descartes, etc. For these and many subsequent thinkers, bodily substance was marked by its unchanging pem1anence in existence and potency to receive only locomotion. Substance ultimately became reduced to an inert " I know not what " for Locke or an idea imposed upon the manifold of sense data by the knowing subject for Kant.

Two Aspects of Bergson's Singular Intuition

Bergson believed that " a philosopher worthy of the name has never said more than a single thing . . . because he has seen only one point." [1] If this statement does not apply to anyone else, it is definitely applicable to Bergson himself. For, in all his writings he attempts to convey only one single message that "reality is mobility itself." [2] Only process is real and all reality is process.

An immediate corollary follows from the above when it is taken in conjunction with the following two propositions: that in man process or development is found in its most perfect form and that the production of the processes found in man (consciousness) is the product of all other processes in nature-via evolution. According to the corollary, through knowing human process or development absolutely one can know, by an act of sympathy or empathy (intuition) , all the processes in nature via their participation in human development. Thus mathematical physics must abdicate its reign over the sciences in favor of psychology and biology. This intuition for Bergson is one whereby the mind is adequated with the real in nature, and it can in no way be reduced to what knowledge might mean in idealism or psychologism.

Dissolution of Mobility by the Intellect

According to Bergson, the natural bent of the intellect is towards "manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to

[1] *The Creative Mind,* trans. by M. L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), p.

[1] *Ibid.,* p. 177.

make tools." [3] "All the elementary focus of the intellect tends to transform matter into an instrument of action that is ... an organ." [4] This activity of construction [5] "is exercised exclusively on inert matter" [6] or matter conceived or reduced to the inert. For the intellect is only entirely at home " when it is working upon inert matter, more particularly upon solids." [7] What enables the intellect to deal with matter successfully in this way is its " unlimited power of decomposing according to any law and recomposing into any system." [8] Through analysis the intellect reduces reality to immobile elements [9] which become the tools we use to manipulate matter. Through synthesis the intellect attempts to reconstruct mobility "out of immobilities put together," [10] which is impossible. The intellect is concerned only with the " actual or future positions and not the progress by which it passes from one position to another, progress which is the movement itself." [11] We fix our mind upon the path " the immobile plan of its execution," [12] which is extrinsic to the motion itself.

From mobility itself our intellect turns aside because it has nothing gained in dealing with it. If the intellect were meant for pure theorizing, it would take its place within movement, for movement is reality itself, and immobility is always only apparent or relativeY

Explanation for the intellect "consists in resolving" [14] the problem. The intellect can only" represent becoming as a series of states, each of which is homogeneous with itself and consequently does not change." [15]

[3] *Creative Evolution,* trans. by A. Mitchell (London: Macmillan, 1911), p. 146.
• *Ibid.,* p. 170.
[5] " the intellect aims first of all, at constructing . . . our intelligence . . . has for its chief object the unorganized solid." *Ibid.,* pp. 161-2.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 161.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 162.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 165.
[9] Precisely what this means will be made clear below.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 163.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *!bid.*
[11] *Ibid.*
H *Ibid.,* p. 173.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 171.

Cinematographical Nature of the Human Intellect

" The function of the intellect is to preside over actions " [16] and these actions themselves are only thought of in terms of "ends to attain, that is to say, points of rest." [17]

From one end attained to another end attained, from one rest to another rest, our activity is carried by a series of leaps, during which our consciousness is turned away as much as possible from the movement going on, to regard only the anticipated image of the movement accomplished. . . . In order that our activity may leap from an act to an act, it is necessary that matter should pass from a state to a state, for it is only into a state of the material world that action can fit a result, so as to be accomplished.[18]

"Apriori we may presume that our perception manages to apprehend matter with this bias." [19] Further, Bergson believes that we have evidence for this in the coordination of our sensory and motor organs. The first symbolizes " our faculty of perceiving, the second our faculty of acting." [20] Here we have organic evidence of " the perfect accord of perception and action." [21]

Our activity always aims at a *result* into which it is momentarily fitted, our perception must retain of the material at every moment, only *a state* in which it is provisionally placed. [22]

Thus, according to Bergson, the natural activity of the intellect does not permit it to experience process; what we know and are concerned to know via our intellect is the result of process. Thus we know the products of motion and not motion itself. We considered the path and the various possible points of rest along that path both of which are extrinsic to the motion. The beginning point of rest or the terminal point of rest and all those intermediate possible points of rest are what we retain of motion; all of these are extrinsic to the actual

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 315.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.,* p. 317.

motion. The intellect must reduce the mobile into immobile states if it is to deal with it successfully. Therefore:

> The primal function of perception is precisely to grasp a series of elementary changes under the form of a quality or a simple state, by a work of condensation. The greater the power of acting bestowed upon an animal species, the more numerous, probably are the elementary changes that its faculty of perceiving concentrates into one of its instants. [23]

Whereas the mobile and that which is in process are constantly changing, so is our sensation of it. Our intellect through this act of condensation reduces the mobile to immobile states. It then attempts to reconstruct the mobile by stringing the states together in a series.

What the intellect knows, as we have said, is the various positions of the moving object along its path which is " only a snapshot view of a transition." [21] By running them together we believe we have reconstructed the motion. This is precisely what is achieved through the motion picture media. The important thing to realize is that there is *no real motion in a motion picture.* It is only the showing of a series of stills so rapidly that we forget that we are perceiving the immoble. Since the nature " of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind." [25] "Of the discontinuous alone does the intellect form a clear ideal." [26] " Of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea." [27]

Real Time as Opposed to Time Reduced to the Fourth Dimension of Space

Since the intellect is only concerned with the path of motion, it confuses the properties of the path-which can be represented by a line-with the motion itself. Concomitant to this is the identification of two radically different kinds of multiplicity, namely, numerical or spatial multiplicity and the multiplicity

[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 317-18.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 319.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 323.
[26] *Ibid.,* p. 163.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 164.

found m motion and time which is not capable of spatial representation.

Numerical multiplicity presupposes discontinuous homogeneous quantity capable of juxtaposition in space.[28] For, if one wishes to represent "number to ourselves and not merely figures or words, we are compelled to have recourse to an extended image. . . . Every clear idea of number implies a visual image in space."[29]

It is also possible to count moments of duration as " a succession which is nothing but a succession " and not an " addition, e. g., which culminates in a sum,"[30] but this is a tragic error as will become clear below.

By giving a greater attention to our experience we discover that another kind of multiplicity perfectly coincides with the reality of process, namely, multiplicity of our conciousness. Here we discover that one cannot reduce conciousness to either the homogeneous or the discontinuous because any moment of consciousness always contains within it the memory of its past. " Consciousness passes from one shade to another. The inner life is all this at once: variety of qualities, continuity of progTess and unity of direction."[31] Thus it is impossible for one to analyze the duration of consciousness into the homogeneous or the discontinuous.

What enables one to believe that consciousness can be analyzed into discontinuous homogeneous states is that " we create for them a fourth dimension of space which we call homogeneous time."[32] Duration is always expressed in terms of extension. . . . When we evoke time, it is space which answers our call."[33]

[28] Cf. *Time and Free Will,* trans. by F. L. Pogson, (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 76 ff.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 78-79.

[30] *Ibid.,* p. 79.

[31] *An Introduction To Metaphysics,* trans. by T. E. Hulme (Indianapolis: Hobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. "27.

[32] *Time And Free Will,* p. 109.

[33] *Creative Mind,* p. 13.

Now, because real process is neither discontinuous nor homogeneous, real time, which must relate to real motion or process, cannot be either discontinuous or homogeneous. "We may sympathize intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathize with our own selves." [34] Thus it is easily seen why Bergson said what he did about consciousness, but it is more difficult to see how it is always true of all other motion. "There is a reality that is external and yet given immediately to the mind; common sense is right on this point." [35] Therefore, Bergson is not caught in subjective idealism, although he takes process, as it is found in consciousness, as the prime analogate of all motion and process. [36]

Real Motion: Its Heterogeneity and Indivisibility

No man in the history of thought stressed the historical nature of every phenomenon in the universe in the same manner as Bergson. The history or duration of a reality is the totality of its being. Nevertheless, it is somewhat more difficult to see how what applies to process as it is manifested in human consciousness also applies to all other kinds of motion; still, this can be made clear by considering a few examples.

Our first example is that of a falling stone. If one drops a stone from the Empire State Building, the longer it falls the greater its velocity. When it hits the ground, one could say that the duration of the fall determined the velocity at which it hit the ground. Since from its very beginning there is a constant increase in the velocity once the falling begins, there are no two identical moments in its movement. Each accepts the motion of what is prior and manifests its own increase in velocity. This building-up of velocity is only possible because there is a continuous, indivisible duration of the motion occuning. In fact, any interruption of this duration destroys the motion itself. For example, if the stone is stopped and dropped again, I no longer have the same motion. If something retards

[34] *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* p. 25.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 49.
[36] See our remarks above on the second aspect of Bergson's single intuition.

the motion, the determinate of how much retardation will occur by the retardant is directly related to its velocity which is directly related to the duration of the fall or the time it has fallen. Here we find that the past of a motion is somewhat of a non-conscious analogate of what memory is for consciousness.

Our second example is a baseball pitcher throwing a curve. Anyone who has ever attempted to perfect the art of throwing a curve knows that the knack of throwing a successful curve is not merely the transference of the English to the ball by twisting one's wrist (which can be accomplished by all) but knowing the proper height and force with which to throw the ball so as to give the pitch its proper duration. In other words, the arc of the curve stands in direct proportion to the duration of the pitch: the shorter the duration the smaller the arc, the longer the duration the greater the arc. As in the process of creating a picture, the duration of creating the work of art " is not an interval that may be lengthened or shortened without the content being altered." [37]

The duration of his work is part and parcel of his work ... the time taken up by the invention is one with the invention itself.[38]

The third example is that of the movement of a hand. In the movement of my hand "my consciousness gives me the inward feeling of a single fact." [39] Between two points of rest there existed " an indivisible or at least an undivided act, the passage from rest to rest, which is movement itself; " [40] " nevertheless this movement takes a certain time." [41] For example, the hand movements of a ballet dancer must each be given its proper duration. Too quick and the movement will lack the grace and symmetry necessary to the art; too slow and the movement will lose the rhythm of the dance.

[37] *Creative Evolution,* p. 859.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Matter and Memory,* trans. by W. Scott Palmer (New York: Doubleday, 1959)' p. 182.
[40] *Ibid.,* pp. 182-8.
[41] *Ibid.,* p. 184.

In accord with our first two examples no moment within the motion can be said to be discontinuous with those prior or posterior to it; but neither is any moment homogeneous with those prior or posterior to it. Therefore motion presents us with a continuous heterogeneous reality, a reality in which every moment is both parasitical in respect to the past and productive in respect to the future, a reality which through the actualization of potentiality creates ever more wonderous potentiality.

lmposl!ibility of Measuring Motion

Is motion measurable? If not, what are men measuring when they claim to measure motion?

In answer to the first question Bergson gave an emphatic No because one can only measure the homogeneous and discontinuous. Since motion does not possess these characteristics, one cannot measure it. The answer to the second question, which is not as easily seen, is that what men measure when they claim to measure motion is the path, the trajectory of the motion, and not the motion itself.

What struck Bergson most was realizing that" real time ... eludes mathematical treatment "[42] since real time is heterogeneous. For example, in

> perceiving a shooting star ... there is a natural and instinctive separation between the space traversed ... and the indivisible sensation of motion or mobility. In a word, there are two elements to be distinguished in motion, the space traversed and the act by which we traverse it ... the first of these elements is homogeneous quantity, the second ... is quality or an intensity whichever you prefer.[43]

The error of those who claim to measure motion is precisely that some " attribute to the motion the divisibility of the space which it traverses, *forgetting that it is quite posl!ible to divide* an object but not an act."[44] It is only by" solidifying" motion, that is, by an " identification of this series of acts, each of

[42] *Creative Mind,* p. 10.
[43] *Time and Free WiU,* pp. 111-112 .
[44] *Ibid.*

which is *of a definite kind* and *indivisible,* with the homogeneous space which underlies them," [45] that motion can be made into an object-an object for the mathematician. " The space employed for this is just that which is called homogeneous time." [46] Thus in motion "we have multiplicity without quantity," [47] that is, homogeneous quantity.

From the above it is clear that from the attempt to measure motion has arisen "a pseudo problem born of a confusion of duration with extension." [48] It is the path that is at least potentially divisible [49] into discontinuous homogeneous units. Now, real space is the existence of parts outside of parts within a body. But discontinuous, homogeneous space is empty space, as Kant has demonstrated in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.* [50] Bergson clearly is pointing out that this empty space is irrevocably immobile.

" Of movement then he (the mathematician) only retains changes in length." [51] Nor should one be surprised to find Einstein, a mathematician, in search of world lines, geodesics or a map upon which cosmic events take place. The tragic flaw in all this is that these geodesics, if they exist, are extrinsic to the reality of motion.

For the geometer all movement is relative: which signifies only in our view, *that none of our mathematical symbols can express the fact that it is the m,oving body which is in motion rather than the axes or the points to which it* is referred. And this is very natural because these symbols, always meant for measurement, can only express distances. [52]

[45] *Ibid,,* p. 113.

[46] *Ibid.,* p. lZI.

[47] *Ibid.,* p. lZZ.

[48] *Creative Mind,* p. Z9.

[49] I might add that the real path cannot be divided without destroying its relationship to the real motion. Further the real path, the line which is the intersection of two planes of quantified being can only be divided in the imagination but never in fact. Of course, the representation of a line on the blackboard can be bisected, but to divide a symbol is not the same as to divide a reality. The above, I admit, would only be valid for those who hold that mathematics is more than gaming with symbols.

[5°] Cf. trans. by Ernest Belfort Bac in a volume entitled *Kant's Prolegomena and],fetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (London, 1909), pp. 137-Z45.

[51] *Matter and Memory,* p. 188.

[••] *Ibid.,* p. 189.

Thus it becomes clear why, in an age when the mathematician rules the other sciences, motion is said to be extrinsic to the material universe. The natural result of such a reign is confusion of the path of motion conceived of as a line with motion itself. Once the line of trajectory is confused with the motion, the properties of mathematicals are falsely attributed to motion with all its false consequences.

The tragedy of all this is the identification of motion with such a spurious a reality as empty space. This is counterfeit motion constructed by the best of counterfeiters. Such counterfeiters who claim that their product is genuine because it is a working hypothesis, because the engineer and technician finds it useful, are analogous to the counterfeiter of currency who claims that his currency was genuine because it can be passed to those not perceptive enough to recognize it as counterfeit and used by them as if it were real. For Bergson as quoted above, to do this is to tum away from what is absolute in motion, *motion itself,* and to reside with only an apparent relative, the path of the motion.

Impossibility of Defining Motion

For Bergson, to define something means to draw its limits, to determine it. In this sense " a perfect definition applies only to a *completed* reality." [53] Therefore motion or movement can only be perfect in retrospect. It was precisely the habit of viewing motion as a completed reality which, according to Bergson, causes one to solidify or diminish its reality.

However, motion as it is given to us is precisely as the incomplete, as the unfinished, as that which is tending towards completion but is not yet complete.

Bergson and Aquinas: Similarities in their Notions of Motion

In contrast to those who preceded him, Bergson once again recognized change as intrinsically permeating the real world, that which is first and primarily given to us by our act of knowing the world. Generation and corruption once again becomes that which the philosopher of nature must come to

•• *Creative Evolution,* p. 16.

grips with and that which, if properly understood, might lead the philosopher to a metaphysics. This is not to be confused with the notions of change or process one might find in the idealism and psychologism of his or our times.

This intuition of the mobility of reality as the beginning of a true philosophy in the sense that it is *ens mobile*, which is to be understood at the start, is to me a common point of departure for both Bergson and St. Thomas.

Admittedly, the absence of the notion of substance in Bergson's philosophy renders Bergson's thought radically different from the thought of the Angelic Doctor. However, when one realizes that Bergson had identified the concept of substance with the inert solidified matter of the mathematical physicist, it is no wonder that he did not include such a concept in his own philosophy. But, I wonder if the dynamus motion of substance in the philosophy of Aquinas, which is itself not simplistic or inert and is itself subject to change, is contradictory to the Bergsonian intuition.

Another point of possible comparison is their common belief in the continuity of man and nature. For both men viewed man as a microcosm, as the culmination of all which is displayed in the universe.

In Bergson's description of motion as a continuous heterogeneous reality, a reality in which every moment is both parasitical in respect to the past but productive in respect to the future, and the recognition of the single directionality of motion and time, etc., I believe we have a notion of motion which more properly approximates the notion of motion as the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency than anything which might be contrived by the mathemati:cal physicists.

It should be noted that this definition of motion by St. Thomas might not suffer from the same defects as other definitions of motion according to Bergson. For the definition of St. Thomas, as I understand it, was precisely a successful attempt to define the incomplete as incomplete. Further, this definition is not to be understood as a definition in the sense of merely limits, etc., but rather in the sense of that which lays bare the reality of that which is defined.

Bergson is noteworthy for having freed us from the relativism of modern thought without having to posit an absolute doctrine of natural place. By stating that what is absolute in motion is motion he can agree with the physicist in regard to the fact that any point of view taken for the purpose of measurement must be relative but that the relativity of our measurements of motion cannot be transferred to the motion, nor can the motion be reduced to the measurements we contrive for it.

By excluding the mathematician from treating of motion per se, it seems again that St. Thomas and Bergson have a common point of agreement, since both believed that mathematics abstracts from motion as motion, the mobile as mobile.

Critically it can be said that the pragmatism of the intellect is definitely overstated in Bergson's philosophy. Yet it can be said that he correctly displays the intellect as it appears in modern science wherein one appears to be more concerned with the developing of a working hypothesis that would enable one to manipulate nature rather than understanding nature. [54]

* * * * *

It was not our purpose to reduce the philosophy of Bergson to that of St. Thomas or the philosophy of St. Thomas to that of Bergson. The differences are many, and a discussion of them would not fall within the scope of this article. However, I believe that I have successfully pointed out that there are many points of contact in regard to their notions of motion, etc. Recognition should be given to a continuity in the thought of realistic thinkers with regard to what they view as the nature of the kind of realities that are presented to men.

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•• h not Maritain's statement about the modern intellect a reminder of this? " Three centuries of empirico-mathematicism haYe so warped the intellect that it is no longer interested in anything but the invention of apparatus to capture phenomena ... that is all Yery true. The slope of modern intelligence is slanted against us. Well, slopes are made to be climbed; the intellect has not changed its nature; it has acquired habits. Habits can be corrected." *Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. by G. B. Phelan (Xew York: Scribner's & Sons, 1959), p. 3.

BRADLEY'S l\IONISTIC IDEALISM

1. INTRODUCTION

FOR MOST OF ITS contemporary critics metaphysics is usually identified with some version of nineteenth-century idealism, and for most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers the metaphysics of F. H. Bradley represents the most prominent example of classical idealism. Hence, in much of the present discussion about the possibility of metaphysics in Britain and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in America there is a tendency to view the particular categories of Bradley's metaphysics as the adequate and essential expression of the metaphysical spirit and point of view.[1]

The two basic themes of Bradley's metaphysics are the experience-theorem and the consistency-theorem. The experience-theorem states that there is no reality independent of sentient experience. The consistency-theorem states that reality is one perfect individual and that any aspect or portion of that individual taken in isolation is self-contradictory. The first is a statement of idealism; the second of monism.[2]

The arguments on behalf of these two theses are quite complex. In this article I will simply attempt to describe the nature and outlook of monistic idealism. The basic issues seem to be these. 1) Such a metaphysics must undermine the prestigious reality-value that common sense gives to the world of spatial and temporal existence. Hence, the reality of the common sense world, to which we are accustomed to give our practical allegiance and in which we daily live, must

[1] This is especially true of those analysts who haYe been deeply influenced by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, both of whom were students at Cambridge when Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* was published (1893).

[2] Although these are sometimes interpreted as axioms of Bradley's metaphysics, he himself insists that they are the results of ideal experiment, and so it is better perhnps to call them theorems.

be trivialized. 2) This trivialization takes the form of degrading the world and its objects to the status of appearance by revealing evidence of their ideality and self-discrepancy. 3) Bradley then attempts to show that the self-discrepant and ideal presuppose a supra-relational, perfectly consistent individual of actual sentient experience. 4) Since the world as we experience and live it certainly does not seem to be perfectly one and throughout sentient, things cannot *really* be what they *seem* to be. Therefore, the character of things as they appear must be transmuted, when viewed from the perspective (or non-perspective) of the Absolute.

2. TRIVIALIZATION OF THE 'VORLD OF EXISTENCE

1.

Any speculative metaphysics that attempts to construct a theory of being will distinguish degrees or levels of reality. It will usually distinguish dependent and secondary being from independent and primary being. Traditionally, with the exception of materialism and naturalism, metaphysical systems have purported to show that the world of common sense is somehow dependent and secondary being. What distinguishes the monistic idealist here is the manner in which he holds that the world of space and time is only dependently real.

Bradley does not argue that the world we experience is causally dependent but that it proves to be ideal and, therefore, self-inconsistent. Its dependency is not manifested by an experiential insight that its existential actuation is contingent and received but by a metaphysical appraisal that reveals its lack of any proper substantiality.

Ordinarily we would assume that we directly experience this world and that nothing, save perhaps our own self, is more immediate to us. But Bradley denies that what is immediately experienced is the daily world in which we live and to which the practical man is accustomed to give the highest reality-value.

The question of reality-value and of the immediacy of experience are closely related. Although it is possible to hold that

what is ultimately real is reached through inference, the plausibility of the reality-claim of our common sense world of existence is directly proportioned to the directness of its being experienced. Once it loses its evidentiary priority, it would have to submit its metaphysical credentials in the same manner as any other realm of reality. For a metaphysician who accepts the immediacy of our experience of the temporal-spatial world, on the other hand, the problem arises of showing its contingency by distinguishing between its evidentiary primacy in the order of knowledge and its causal dependency in the order of being.

Bradley was well aware that the biggest psychological obstacle to acceptance of the monistic conclusion was its dissolution of the real order of our spatial-temporal world, which repelled even many of those who were willing to agree to its merely dependent and contingent mode of being. This is why Bradley makes such an effort to undermine our naive acceptance of the apparent immediacy of common sense. He wishes to show that it has not even dependent and contingent substantiality, but that it is throughout adjectival.

Something substantial must be able to be designated as an individual being in order that its *perseity* can be acknowledged by judgment. A particular existent can conceivably be causally dependent without losing all claim to dependent and contingent *per se* existence, but something that cannot be as such uniquely designated surely loses any claim to *per se* existence or contingent substantiality. A finite substance, however causally dependent, resists inclusion in a monistic whole, but if Bradley can show that the world of existence lacks all claim to *per se* existence, then he opens the way to his eventual conclusion that it is but an appearance of the Absolute. [3]

Hence, Bradley argues that none of the objects in our real world can be uniquely designated, that is, designated as substantially real. None, that is, can be the ultimate subject of

[3] I employ here and throughout the article terminology more scholastic than Bradley himself was wont to use.

an existential judgment. All the objects and the real world of space and time itself turn out to be ideal and, although real insofar as they fall within sentient experience, are not ultimately real. In Aristotelian terminology, our real world and its objects belong to the category of accident and not substance; their being is essentially adjectival.

2.

Our real world of common sense, according to Bradley, is an ideal construction that proceeds from a felt difference which is the source of its distinction from the imaginary or, in general, from those worlds we are wont to call unreal. But this felt difference must always be what is *at present* felt, whatever that happens to be.

> In madness or drunkenness ... even in dreams I may construct another world which is the environment of my dream-body, and may oppose to this reality a mere imaginary world. The basis of the opposition everywhere is, in a word, present feeling, and one present feeling, if you take reality so, stands as high as another. And the conclusion suggested is that the above opposition of real existence to 'mere imagination' is in the end invalid and breaks down ... Thus the gulf between imaginary and real existence, however necessary and useful it may be, is at once arbitrary and novel.[5]

If a merely felt quality seems but a precarious foundation for such an edifice, this is precisely what Bradley wants to suggest. This latent felt quality (latent because it is never made explicit or specified) differs for different present states of awareness. My present self in each case is what provides the basis for the construction of my real world, but my present self may fall in any state, some of which on reflection are called unreal.

• The basis for this is Bradley's logical doctrines of immediate feeling, ideality, and judgment, and cannot be evaluated or criticized without considering them.

[5] F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Tmth and Reality* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 46-7.

In each case my real world is the world continuous with my real body, and my real body is my waking body; but my waking body for Bradley is my present body. "It is simply the body which is for me here and now as I am asking myself this question." [6] Even my present body, moreover, is partly ideal construction. It is mine insofar as it is identified with my self, and my self is an ideal object, but one always continuous with my finite center and still partially felt.[7]

The felt quality varies with different present states of feeling, and hence my self and my body varies with these states. Merely from feeling as a basis my real body may be in one case my dream body, my waking body in another case, or my drunken stupor body, or even my psychotic body. Even thus far we have identity and construction, but when we make a selection among these bodies and the real worlds constructed on their basis, we must further transcend the merely felt quality. When I, in reflection, assign one of my bodies and its world to the unreal status of dream and accept another as real, I am judging and not merely accepting the diverse testament of different states of feeling.

In itself there seems no reason, Bradley argues, to assign to my real body any superior reality, since in dream, in mere imagination, and in states of hypnotism or madness, I find myself with other bodies. My real world is a construction made in reflection on a basis of a selection of my real body from the various candidates. The selection is not on the basis of any inherent superiority of existential actuation, but on the basis of the criterion of system. Whichever contributes to the most coherent and comprehensive of consistent interpretations, that is the one that is selected as the so-called real world of common sense.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 461.

[7] Bradley distinguishes the finite center from the self as a basis for avoiding the solipsistic dangers of the experience-theorem. Everyone views the universe from his own finite center, which, however, is continuous with ultimate reality. The private self is an ideal object that arises in contrast to the public world and is not given immediately in experience.

The world of spatial-temporal existence has indeed a special place for us, since it is the locus of our bodily behavior in which we must work out our destiny. What Bradley denies is that its pragmatic priority constitutes any metaphysical claim that prevents it from being included in the encompassing Absolute whole. Its superiority over the worlds of dream and hypnotism, and the other "unreal" realms, is a matter of degree and working success, and then only from a special point of view.[8] Hence, no more than these other worlds constructed from and within our experience does the world that common sense calls real possess any substantiality that would resist eventual inclusion and integration into the substantial reality of the Absolute.

3. DEGRADATION TO APPEARANCE

1.

Bradley uses the term " appearance " to denote the secondary and dependent mode of being. Although it does not grant to dependent being the finite substantiality that created being possesses in Thomistic metaphysics, for example, it is not equivalent to " illusion." Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as " *mere* appearance," and the phrase is used by Bradley only in a context that makes it clear that the term " mere " is intended to convey a sense of contrast to that which is ultimately real and not to refer to appearance isolated from ultimate reality.

"Appearance" is ambiguous, because it can refer to either 1) the common meaning according to which something is said to appear to someone, and 2) Bradley's technical usage, according to which the content of a finite thing is held to be self-discrepant and self-transcendent. Bradley recognizes the liabilities of the term, since it properly belongs to the perceptual side of things, which is but one side. But he appeals for a

[8] For some points of view Bradley insists that other organizations of our experience may be superior, for example, in mysticism.

certain license in usage, since, he observes, if everywhere we refrain from metaphor, we would finally have to remain silent.

Since, therefore, not everything called an appearance in the metaphysical sense (# 2) appears in the literal sense (# 1), we cannot insist that the finite thing itself need always be appearance in the strictly literal sense. When he calls a finite being an appearance, therefore, Bradley means that

> its character is such that it becomes one, as soon as we judge it. And this consists in the loosening of content from existence; and because of this self-estrangement, every finite aspect is called an appearance ... Hence, the finite is appearance because, on the one side, it is an adjective, of Reality, and because, on the other side, it is an adjective which itself in its limited character is not real. When the term is thus defined, its employment seems certainly harmless. [9]

Appearance is that which is ideal, that which is essentially other-referent rather than self-subsistent. It is content loosened from existence in the sense that it qualifies a subject other than itself; it is not identical with its own being. It is abstract and universal, abiding in diverse contexts without accounting for the diversity, in spite of the fact that it depends upon it. Insofar as it includes diversity without including the conditions which make the differences compatible, it is self-discrepant. It is abstract and not concrete. It is adjectival, but in its own limited character, even as an adjective, it cannot qualify reality without undergoing transmutation.

2.

In order to show that an object is appearance and therefore adjectival Bradley employs the axiom of non-contradiction as an instrument of metaphysical appraisal. According to Bradley judgment and thought are essentially existential. All judgment qualifies reality with ideal content, and therefore an essential law of thought must also be a principle of reality itself. The demand of thought for consistency as a condition of truth is

[9] Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 430.

at the same time a demand for consistency as a condition of reality. Ultimate reality is that which is perfectly consistent, and the degree of reality consists in the degree of consistency. The existential function of all judgment guarantees the metaphysical relevance of the axiom of non-contradiction. Hence, anything that shows evidence of self-discrepancy can and must be degraded to the level of appearance.

Although the existential function of thought gives metaphysical relevance to the axiom of non-contradiction, Bradley also requires some means that will enable him to reach a general theory of being. He cannot construct a metaphysics by examining each and every object separately. He requires that the axiom of non-contradiction be an instrument of global appraisal, so that he can generalize from a limited number of instances.

Bradley's explicit argumentation takes two forms. First, in *Appearance and Reality* he examines a select list of categories that have been employed by traditional metaphysics and finds them all self-inconsistent. Although this prepares the way for Bradley's own conclusion, it is not really coercive.

The essential basis for the global appraisal function of consistency, however, is Bradley's critique of relations. 1) Bradley argues that mere conjunction and bare difference are self-contradictory. In this way he establishes that everything in the universe is related to everything else in some way. External or negligible relations are themselves self-contradictory. Hence, all relations are relevant or intrinsic. All relations must make an essential difference to everything else. 3) Nevertheless, not even intrinsic relations are fully self-consistent. This means that the mutual relevance of all to all must be expressed in a form more intimate than the way of relations permits. Reality cannot be a system of distinct objects in relations but an individual from which distinct objects and relations are abstractions of a limited perspective. [10]

[10] See Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 227-8; *Appearance and Reality*, pp. *506* fl., 519-20; and *Collected Essays* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 628-676.

The result of this analysis is to establish that, in principle, any finite or isolated object is self-contradictory. Hence, anything short of the perfect individual, that whose content is at one with its existence, is self-contradictory and, therefore, appearance.

3.

The logical foundation of this analysis is Bradley's doctrines of ideality and immediate experience. Ideality is content loosened from existence, and, according to Bradley, any object that abides over a period of time or that is distinguished from any other object or the felt background is ideal. In other words, any object whatsoever is ideal; it is a universal. So, too, are the relations between objects.

Anything that stands out from the sheer immediacy of feeling is ideal, and this includes the objects of direct perception. As ideal they transcend immediate experience, no matter how directly they seem to be perceived. Nevertheless, they depend upon that felt immediacy from which they stand out, but which in their own proper character they are unable to include. Not only are they unable to appeal to immediate experience for their evidentiary foundation, but, because they are unable to take up into their ideal form the sentient background upon which they depend, they are throughout conditional in their being. This dependency on conditions which their own ideal definition and boundaries exclude-by-ignoring manifests itself in analysis as self-discrepancy. To be defined from without is to be distracted from within.

Hence, any evidence of ideality, ideal mediation, or intellectual structure, is evidence of self-discrepancy and a sign of appearance. This is why the world of existence, unable to be uniquely designated and therefore ideal, is but appearance. Bradley's analyses of the various aspects of the world is but an application of this fundamental insight. In this way, time, space, and change are found to be merely appearance and not ultimately real. All of nature is convicted of self-discrepancy and of being merely appearance. Indeed, so also is God.

Bradley does not identify God with the ultimate reality of the Absolute, nor does he have in mind a finite God. What he means is that the concept of God expresses some truth about the universe, a truth higher than those of science, and therefore God has some reality for Bradley. Although it has a reality higher and more real than our finite selves, nevertheless, because it involves relations and ideality, it is to some degree inconsistent and therefore appearance.

4. REALITY AS THE ABSOLLTTE EXPERIENCE

1.

Appearance is self-discrepant and ideal. Whatever is finite, isolated, or in relation is ideal, and, therefore, self-consistent and appearance. Reality, therefore, must be that which does not suffer from these defects. Reality must be the perfect individual, fully concrete and independent. It must suffer from neither ideality nor inconsistency.

But why must there be an ultimate reality? Why should the deficiencies of appearance require the reality of that which is not deficient?

Appearance is self-contradictory, and the self-contradictory cannot be real. But the content of appearance must belong to reality, for anything that falls within sentient experience is so far real. Contradiction is caused by the conjunction of differences without including the conditions that reconcile them. There are no natural contraries. Contraries occur with the bare conjunction of differences, and the occurrence of the contradiction is a sign of a restricted perspective that excludes implicitly or explicitly the reconciling conditions.

Hence, the contradictory appearance essentially depends upon conditions, which it fails explicitly to include in its proper character and within its proper limits. To assume that the contradictory cannot be real is tantamount to asserting that what reconciles the discrepancy is real. Since the reconciling conditions are intrinsically demanded by the nature of appearance, that which provides them is no merely extrinsic ideal

but the necessary condition of the being of the content of the appearance. Hence, the dependent mode of being that appearances possess presupposes the being of ultimate reality. [11]

Since any pluralism is self-contradictory, ultimate reality must be one seamless, perfect individual. Bradley views the Absolute as supra-relational, that is, as including all the content introduced into experience by relations and appearance but including it as perfectly harmonious. The Absolute does not swallow up the differences into a neutral unity, a night in which all cows are black. Differences in the Absolute, however, are the self-differentiations of the absolute unity. Whole and parts are mutually relevant to each other. Ultimate reality, then, is the perfectly consistent, individual identity-in-difference, of which an imperfect illustration would be that of an organism or, perhaps, of an aesthetic experience of a beautiful painting. [12]

2.

This perfect individual that is ultimate reality must be an individual of actual sentient experience. Perhaps we can best understand Bradley's assertion that reality is experience if we understand it to be, not a pretense at giving positive speculative insight into the nature of reality but rather a way of saying that in the end reality is none of the abstractions we customarily use to interpret it for limited purposes.

It is not matter, nor Hegel's Reason; neither fire nor water; not substance and not merely ideal. All of these would be instances of what Whitehead called misplaced concreteness, or what Bradley calls one-sided abstractions. Although it is none of these simply, neither is it vacuous. **It** is experience, the source from which all of these abstractions are taken.

[11] In other words, appearance qualifies reality, but on conditions outside of its own ideal limits. Even its limited truth-claim holds good (to whatever degree that it does hold good) only on the basis of those conditions. Hence, the conditions must be real.

[12] Idealists commonly appeal to the organism as an illustration of what they mean by the concrete universal, but almost all agree that it is quite inadequate as a representation of the Absolute's identity-in-difference.

According to Bradley, experience is the continuous source from which ideality arises and the continuous subject into which all our ideal activity must return as qualification. When we acknowledge that all our ideality fails to exhaust and can never express this experience from which it comes and to which it returns, what is there left to say but that it is unincluded experience that remains? What is there left to say, granting these assumptions, but that reality is experience?

Just as we commence in felt awareness, so we continue there throughout all our ideal activity. It is only in abstractions and ideal constructs that we reach anything non-sentient, and these fall back into their sentient source as the subject which they must inadequately qualify. At best they express partial truths about reality and experience. They offer experience to us from certain limited perspectives. "Matter," "the unconscious," " the merely ideal," for example, do not conduct us to different realms of being, they abstractly manifest experience in certain of its features and for certain limited purposes.

Bishop Berkeley suggested centuries earlier that we put to a test his own somewhat similar doctrine. Such ideal experimentation seems to have become the common legacy of idealists, and Bradley appeals to it in his own form.

> Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience ... When the experiment is strictly made, I myself can conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning ... [13]

The trouble with such *Gedankenexperimenten* is that they seem to derive their results from a failure to conceive of any alternative. This failure is attributed to the intrinsic impossibility of the case being otherwise, when, according to a less sympathetic observer, it might be attributed to a subjective or psychological deficiency on the part of the experimenter.

[13] *Appearance and Reality,* pp. 127-8.

Nevertheless, we find very little argumentation by Bradley on behalf of his thesis. His remarks are generally scattered and brief, and give the impression of something already settled in his mind rather than a topic of controversy. "We have here," Bradley insists, " a matter for observation and experiment and not for long trains of reasoning." [14] The very simplicity of his approach would seem to militate against the validity of a conclusion which has hardly been universally accepted by philosophers, were it not for the nagging persistence with which his thesis seems to resist clear and neat refutation. This leads to the suspicion that it is not the object clearly before the experimenter that regulates the results but the context of implicit assumptions. [15]

5. TRANSMUTATION

1.

All appearance qualifies reality. Reality is not something behind the appearances but the perfect individual whole of which the appearances are but partial abstractions. Nevertheless, things are not really what they seem to be and as they appear cannot be predicatl:'d as such of reality. In order to be true of reality, appearances must suffer loss of private and proper character; they must undergo transmutation.

As self-contradictory, appearances cannot be true of reality. They can be ultimately true of reality only insofar as their discrepancy is reconciled by inclusion of the conditions upon which the conjoined qualities depend. But in order to be harmonized with all the other elements so as to have the contradiction removed, each must sacrifice those ideal limits which define its own proper being and set up the opposition of hostile elements.

"Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 316.

[15] On Bradley's assumptions the distinction between conditions of being and conditions of being-known is not ultimately valid. Hence, the common method of attacking the experience-theorem by citing such a distinction is not an adequate refutation of Bradley's employment of it, unless these assumptions are undermined or called in question.

All finite content qualifies reality only on the basis of conditions outside of its own proper being, and some of the conditions are unknown. Hence, not only is it conditioned, it is also conditional. In the light of fully known conditions it is *liable to* transmutation in character. Although the conditions can never be known in detail, it can be known, according to Bradley, that the full conditions cannot be found in ideal and relational schemes. Hence, all appearances, as ideal and relational, *must be* transmuted. Just as the apparent motion of the sun around the earth had to be transmuted and altered when fuller knowledge of the conditions of the solar system became available, so also in metaphysics interpretation of experience, whether by our own explicit intellectual systems or by the ideality implicit from the very beginning, is subject to alteration in the light of the full conditions of its being. Since ideality and relations by their essence cannot include these conditions, appearances are not only subject to transmutation but must be transmuted, in order to be true of a reality which is neither relational nor ideal.

2.

Apart from logical and purely theoretical problems, the doctrine of transmutation has its greatest significance in the fact that it alters our locus of deepest concern. In a sense this also occurs in a theism which inspires a religious, as well as a philosophical, response. To assert the reality of something transcending the spatial-temporal world is to encourage a devotion to something other than the perpetually perishing world of common sense.

In a monistic idealism, however, this re-location of deepest concern is inspired by a trivialization of the tragic and the personal. It is true that Bradley reminds us that we must till our own gardens on this earth, for they are the only ones we have, but it is also true that the transmuted values no longer acknowledge the intrinsic worth of each individual human person. It is now the balance of the universe that counts and which alone is made richer by all the suffering and all the discord.

Although we are assured by Bradley that in his metaphysics what counts most for us counts in the end for the universe as well, it is only true if we are willing and able to accept transmuted satisfaction of the needs for the Good, True, and Beautiful. For the individual as a separate entity all may turn out to be lost, and his only recourse is to identify himself with the universe at large, where the triumph of these values is assured.

This seems to be the necessary result in a metaphysics in which dependent being is interpreted as appearance. To deny any intrinsic substantiality to dependent being removes any obstacle to their inclusion in the monistic whole. But at the same time it devalues their intrinsic worth as dependent beings, and with their loss of any residual inseity their only abiding value can be as a transmuted qualification of the Absolute. [18]

6. CONCLUSION

Because of the necessity of transmutation Bradley has been accused of ultimately holding that there are simply no such things in the universe as space, time, etc. To call something an appearance often seems to mean the same as to say that there only appears to be something. In this sense the category *of* appearance has seemed to many, both metaphysicians and those hostile to metaphysics, to be highly objectionable. [17]

To those hostile to metaphysics it seemed a perfect example *of* tortured metaphysical logic, designed to distract our attention from the existential world in which we live and love, on

[10] This is perhaps the key objection that people like William James and Gabriel Marcel had to Bradley's metaphysics. Both accused Bradley of trivializing the tragic and the significance of the individual human being's response. See James, *Pragmatism* (N. Y.: Meridian, 19.55) and *A Pluralistic Universe* (N. Y.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909); and Marcel, *Philosophy of Existence* (London: Harvill Press, 1948) and *Philosophical Fragments, 1909-1914* (Xotre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1965).

[17] This objection was raised from the beginning. Its most famous advocacy was, however, by G. E. Moore. See Moore, *Some Main PTOblems of Philosophy* (N.Y.: Collier Books, 1962), p. 36. It was renewed by Morris Lazerowitz in *The Structure of Metaphysics* (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 1955).

behalf of some Absolute toward which we are supposed to direct our deepest concern and devotion. Dialectical slight of hand tries to convince us that this blooming, buzzing world is not there after all, that it only appears to be there.

Philosophers of alternative metaphysical persuasion, however, have called into question the right of the category of "appearance" to represent all metaphysical categories of dependent being. From their point of view it is quite possible to determine the secondary and dependent status of certain segments of reality without relegating them to the level of appearance.

To construct a metaphysical alternative to monistic idealism, however, one cannot concentrate merely on a contrast of conclusions. .Monistic idealism preempted the metaphysical outlook in the nineteenth and early twentieth century because it seemed to be the most rigorous of the philosophies attempting to engage in the activity of speculative metaphysics. Bradley's emphasis on logical foundations especially gained him an attentive hearing from all segments of British thought, and it continues to give him a relevance to contemporary scholarship even among those most unsympathetic to his metaphysical conclusion.

Contemporary metaphysical efforts, therefore, might do well to examine their own evidentiary and logical foundations in the light of the Bradleian experiment. In this way alone can they hope to claim from the majority of the Anglo-American public any recognition that they have opened alternatives to Bradley and nineteenth-century idealism other than the anti-metaphysical reaction.

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RECENT CHURCH TEACHING ON RELIGIOUS PROFESSION: TEMPORARY OR PERPETUAL?

THE PROCESS OF renewal of religious life has been vigorously promoted in the Church since the time of Pius XII, but it acquired a greater momentum with the celebration of Vatican Council II. However, this renewal has raised various kinds of problems, and so there is taking place what normally occurs in human affairs: some are disoriented when confronted with the problem, and they perhaps will never again be able to reorganize the different elements of their religious profession into a vital synthesis; others, faced with the same problem, are penetrating the depths of the contents of their profession and the grounds which sustain it. As a result, they are achieving a better knowledge and an increased appreciation of what religious life means for those who embrace it and also for the Church as a whole today.

The movement of renewal as promoted by the Church is adopting the latter attitude. It is a movement of interiorization, a deepening, a returning to the sources, above all to "a following of Christ *as proposed by the gospel,"* [1] so that by means of religious the world might receive a new manifestation of the same Christ adapted to the "changed conditions of the times." [2] Vatican II not only clearly points up this approach but also supplies the radical reason:

> Since the religious life is intended above all else to lead those who embrace it to an imitation of Christ and to union with God through the profession of the evangelical counsels, the fact must be honestly faced that even the most desirable changes made on behalf of contemporary needs will fail of their purpose unless a

[1] *Perfectae Caritatis* (Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious Life), n.

[2] *Ibid.*

renewal of spirit gives life to them. Indeed such an interior renewal must always be accorded the leading role even in the promotion of exterior works.[3]

The Chief Problem

Religious life rests entirely on the basis of *divine vocation;* if this foundation is lacking, the whole edifice comes down." The Council repeatedly confirmed the existence of this special divine vocation [5] whereby God calls certain Christians "so that they may enjoy this particular gift in the life of the Church." [6] If everything in religious life rests on the basis of *divine vocation,* then two things are easily understandable: 1) that everything concemed with this vocation is of paramount importance; that the movement of renewal of religious life must pay particular attention to the vocation which is its foundation.

Circumstances affecting religious life today have brought to the fore the problem of the duration of divine vocation. Many attempts are being made to establish a doctrine of religious vocation as a divine calling for a limited period of time. Such a vocation cannot beget in the person called more than a commitment of temporary duration. When the time for which God granted the vocation comes to an end, the individual is freed of the previous commitments and can choose another form of life.

Temporary duration of religious vocation starts off by being proposed as a *possibility.* But at times, in order to explain such a possibility, certain reasons are alleged that logically lead to a denial of perpetual vocation. The attempt to search out a possible way for temporary vocation is transformed into an undertaking to attack perpetual vocation. Controversy is understandably engendered. And, on the basis of polemics, it is not easy to reach calm conclusions which provide a new and more profound clarification of the problem we are con-

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Pius XII, Apostolic Constitution *Sedes Sapientiae (AAS* 48 [1956], 357).

[5] *Perjectae Caritatis,* nn. l, *5, 25.*

[6] *Lumen Gentium* (Dogmatic Constitution on the Church), n. 43.

cerned with or to approach in a fruitful manner the teachings on this question which the recent Magisterium of the Church, especially Vatican II, offers.

Our task here will be to present such a body of teaching, letting the texts themselves, with their calm and exciting objectivity, explain a point which is so important in the divine plan regarding religious life. We will limit ouselves to the doctrine of Vatican II and of Paul VI. At times we will also refer to the teaching of Pius XII, which was singularly profuse and in admirable harmony with recent documents. However, his teaching will not be the basis of our exposition but mainly corroborative, illustrating the unity and continuity of the Magisterium of the Church on perpetual vocation.

Starting Point

Centering our exposition on the Church's teaching, the starting point must be of necessity the way the Magisterium understands " the observance of the manifold counsels proposed in the gospel by our Lord to his disciples."' Among the counsels Vatican II singles out the "precious gift " of ·drginity which "has always been held in particular honor by the Church," [8] an honor manifested in many ways but especially by means of the cult rendered to those who in life " had imitated Christ's virginity ... more exactly." [9] But, how does the Council understand virginity or continence for the sake of the kingdom of heaven as it appears in the preaching of Christ? Is it a temporary virginity or continence? [10] Referring to Matthew 19:12 the Council answers:

> The Church has always held in especially high regard perfect and perpetual continence on behalf of the kingdom of heaven. Such

[7] *Ibid.,* n. 42. [8] *Ibid.* [9] *Ibid.,* n. *50.*

[10] In proposing the question in this way we do not presuppose that virginity is exactly the same as continence. We use both terms because this way of speaking in this concrete matter belongs to a fairly common usage and is found in Vatican II where we find, for instance: "virginity, *or* celibacy ... *this* total continence" *(Lumen Gentium,* n. 42). For further clarification we refer to our book *El aace;rdotio en la Iglesia* (Pamplona: OPE, 1968), pp. 221-252.

continence was recommended by Christ the Lord and has been gladly embraced and praiseworthily observed down through the years and in our day too by many Christians. [11]

The answer could not be clearer. What Christ commended was a perfect and *perpetual* continence.

Pius XII, referring to the same passage in Matthew, had given a similar but more sympathetic explanation, showing the equivalence between *perfect* and *perpetual,* thereby transcending any form of dualism in this matter.

> The divine Master (in speaking of eunuchs) is not referring to bodily impediments to marriage but to a resolution freely made to abstain *all one's life* from marriage and sexual pleasure. For in likening those who of their own free will have determined to renounce these pleasures to those who by nature or the violence of men are forced to do so, is not the divine Redeemer teaching us that chastity *to be really perfect must be perpetual?* [12]

Actually, all of this is a very elementary fact in the history of Christian thought. The Church has never considered as virginity (or continence or perfect chastity) a commitment of temporary duration. [13] Christ's invitation to renounce marriage in order to follow him makes no sense unless it is referred to the entire life of man. [14] This is why theology has always insisted, and insists today, on the necessity of the "propositum" or irrevocable decision to abstain from marriage for the sake of the Kingdom of God if the virtue of virginity or celibacy is to exist. Virginity which is presumed in the Church is rooted not only in the words or preaching of Christ but also and mainly in his behavior. When Christ speaks of virginity and recommends it," he is speaking of his own personal case and explaining his own conduct ... he is proposing himself as an example.

[11] *Presbyterorum Ordinis* (Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests), n. 16.

[12] Pius XII, encyclical *Sacra virginitas (AAS* 46 [1954], 164).

[13] This idea is constantly repeated in the above-mentioned encyclical of Pius XII, as well as in Paul VI's encyclical *Sacerdotalis Caelibatus (AAS 59* [1967], 657-697).

[14] Cf. L. Legrand, *La virginite dans la Bible* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1964), pp. 47-54.

He preserved his celibacy and he did this for the kingdom of heaven." [15]

If Jesus' words refer to perpetual virginity or continence, even more does his example call for a decision which would include the fulness of content possessed by " the words and example of the Lord" [16] in this matter. Hence, a practice of the evangelical counsels which, as Vatican II puts it, "draws its origin from the tea:::hing and example of the Divine l\faster," [17] tends of its own n:tture to stabilize itself or to perpetuate itself throughout ihe entire life of the person who embraces them.

With regard to the evanselical counsels of poverty and obedience entirely similar arguments could be produced. Both the words and the example of Christ call for a mode of imitation which would endure for the whole of life.

Christ also proposed to his disciples that forrn of life which he, as the Son of God, accepted in entering this world to do the will of the Father. In the Church this same state of life is imitated with particular accuracy and *]Jerpctually* exemplificd. [18]

We also believe that only when there is a perpetual commitment to imitate Christ's form of life is it possible to say in earnest and not mockingly what the Council says when speaking of religious life, namely, that

it reveals in an unique way that the kingdom of God and its overmastering necessities are superior to all earthly considerations . . . . to all men it shows wonderfully at work within the Church the *surpassing greatness* o£ the force of Christ the King and the *boundless power* o£ the Holy SpiritY

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 86.

[16] *Lume:n Ge:ntium,* n. 48. Paul VI, speaking of priests and directing attention precisely to their celibacy, says: "Your celibacy has been too much under discussion and the force of Christian asceticism is being too much weakened as well as *the irrevermble character of the commitme:nts consecrated before God and before the Church"* (Allocution in a General Audience, Sept. 19, 1969).

[17] *Petrjectae Caritatis,* n. 1.

[18] *Lume:n Gentium,* n. 44.

[19] *Ibid.*

The Council is proclaiming here that religious life is not just any imitation of Christ but an imitation which reproduces in the presence of the Church and before the world that very type of life in which Christ realized the redemption of all mankind and which, by the same token, has a redemptive value which is original and its own. The Church not only cannot rid herself of it but she considers it as " a divine gift, which the Church has received from the Lord and which she ever preserves with the help of his grace." [20]

The imitation of Christ, " as proposed by the gospel," [21] has consequences of great importance for our topic. For it is evident that, if the counsels, as they are proposed in the gospel, claim the entire life of those called by God to their practice, it cannot be said-not even insinuated-that the acceptance of perpetual commitments regarding these counsels is in certain disagreement with man's condition. God does not call us to live in violence. And if he calls to the life-time practice of the evangelical counsels, such a practice does not do violence to man but elevates him to a higher type of life. What really matters in all this is to view the evangelical counsels from the perspective of Christ and of the *divine vocation* which he himself grants to some Christians to be put into practice.

Perpetual Religious Vocation

Vatican II, when dealing with the problems concerning religious vocations, states that the best source of attraction for young people is the good example of those already professing this type of life.[22] It says somewhat the same thing regarding vocations to the priesthood. [23] Paul VI, leaning precisely on the force of example, makes explicit the character of the vocation which is awakened by its impulse. When priests and religious, says the Pope, live their own self-donation cheerfully and generously, new vocations to the priesthood and the religious life easily arise among young people who

[21] *Perjectae Caritatis,* n. 2. [22] *Ibid.,* n. 24. [20] *Ibid.,* n. 43.
[23] *Presbyterorum Ordinis,* n. 11; *Optatam Totius* (Decree on Priestly Formation), n. 2.

know how to nourish in their young hearts the desire one day to serve the Church and to give themselves to souls for the whole of life by reproducing in themselves the lineaments of the Good Shepherd and faithfully following in his steps. [24]

On the other hand, the number and quality of vocations provide a hint for judging the religious level of Christian communities. Addressing the bishops the Pope tells them:

the full gauge of the Christian life of the communities confided to you is in the number and in the quality of those who are consecrated to God *irrevocably.* [25]

Talking to Benedictine nuns he says:

You know, what is more you live, as in a unique act, prolonged *throughout the whole time of your earthly existence,* this species of spiritual acrobatics: *contemplatione suspensus,* suspended in contemplation. [26]

For many religious their religious vocation is expressly a missionary vocation. In respect to the perpetuity of this missionary vocation the Council said:

A man must so respond to God's call that, without consulting flesh and blood (cf. Gal. 1:16), he can devote himself wholly to the work of the gospel ... he who is sent upon the life and mission of him who "emptied himself, taking the nature of a slave" (Phil. 2:7). *Therefore, he must be ready to stand by his vocation f01' a lifetime,* and to renounce himself and all those whom he thus far considered as his own, and instead to become " all things to all men" (I Cor. 9:22) .[27]

Paul VI, in giving norms for compliance with this conciliar principle, noted:

In the promotion of vocations for the missions both the mission of the Church to all nations and the ways whereby the different

"'Paul VI, Message on the occasion of the World Day for Priestly and Religious Vocations *(AAS 56* [1964], 397).

[25] Paul VI, Message on the occasion of the World Day for Priestly and Religious Vocations *(AAS* 61 [1969], 332).

[26] Paul VI, Allocution to the Benedictine Superioresses of Italy *(AAS* 58 [1966], 1159).

[27] *Ad Gentes Divinitus* (Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church), n. 24.

participants (Institutes, priests, religious, and the laity of both sexes) try to make it effective should be carefully explained. *Especially should the special missionary vocation* " *for life* " be extolled and illustrated by examples. [28]

If perseverance in the missionary vocation, as proposed by the Council, ought to be prolonged throughout the whole of life, the same duration must be attributed to the perserverance the Council talks about in relation to religious when it says: " Let all who have been called to the profession of the vows take painstaking care *to persevere* and ever to grow in the vocation to which God has summoned them." [29]

The reasoning is perfectly legitimate, because, in the first place, when it is a matter of religious belonging to specifically missionary Institutes, their religious vocation and their missionary vocation have the same content and therefore the same duration. Besides, one of the reasons alleged by the Council as the basis of the perpetuity of the missionary vocation is that "the missionary enters into the life and mission of him who emptied himself." Now, according to the same Council's declaration, this is realized in all religious, in each one according to his own vocation, since all "share spiritually in Christ's self-surrender . . . they strive to associate themselves with the work of redemption and to spread the kingdom of God." [30] The other reason, namely, the total dedication to the work of the gospel, will be considered shortly. Thus there is no reason whatever why it should be necessary to assign a duration to the vocation of the missionary religious distinct from the rest of religious. It is always a duration that extends throughout the whole of life. Paul VI, addressing religious men from different Congregations, could tell them, without any distinction, that religious vocation is the beginning of a " total and *permanent* consecration to God and to the different works of the apostolate." [31]

[28] Paul VI, motu proprio *Ecclesiae Sanctae,* part III, n. 6 *(AAS* 58 [1966], 784). The third part of this motu proprio contains the norms for the application of the Council's decree.

[29] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 47.

[30] *Prefectae Caritatis,* n. *5.*

[31] Paul VI, Allocution of June 6, 1969 on his visit to the Regina Mundi Institute.

Perpetual Vocation and Total Consecration

In reading the documents of the Church's Magisterium one can notice that the *perpetuity* of the self-donation to God is included in the totality of that same surrender, which undoubtedly is the most characteristic element of divine vocation. Perpetuity is an integral part of the totality and helps to explain it. According to Vatican II the *total* dedication of the missionary to the work of the gospel implies that " he must be ready to stand by his vocation for a lifetime." [32] If the dedication does not last for the total duration of life, it cannot be a *total* dedication. And the Council states that " the total consecration" the makes of himself to God is characterized by its representation of the " unbreakable link between Christ and his Spouse, the Church," [33] because it represents a union that lasts forever. This presupposes that such a total consecration is perpetual, since otherwise it could not be a symbol of something which lasts forever. Paul VI defines *divine vocation* as:

> the manifest and firm will by which one desires to surrender himself wholly to the divine service. This is deduced from the prescription of the canon of Trent in which it is established that only those youths are to be received into the seminary whose disposition and will offer hope that they will serve in the ecclesiastical ministries *perpetually*.[34]

Total surrender is manifested in *perpetual* service.

Granted the inclusion of *perpetuity* in the *totality* of religious consecration, a very broad horizon is opened up regarding the teaching of Vatican II on the *perpetuity* of vocation. As a matter of fact, the Council frequently states that religious vocation "involves their entire lives," [35] that religious devote "their entire lives to God's service," [36] that by celibacy they

""*Ad Gentes Divinitus,* n. 24.

[33] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 44.

[34] Paul VI, Apostolic Letter *Summi Dei Verbum (AAS 55* [1963], 987-988).

[35] *Perfectae Caritatis,* n. 1.

[86] *Ibid.,* n. *5.*

fully consecrate themselves "to God alone with undivided heart," [37] that virginity implies " a complete gift of body and soul." [38]

This entire series of expressions, and others which could be added, definitively confirms the idea that vocation is a calling which God addresses to man and which, by informing all the manifestations of life, ought to last for an entire lifetime. Divine vocation is perpetual. On the other hand, the Council's multiplicity of expressions amounts to nothing more than the presentation from different viewpoints of what must be considered the substantial nucleus of any religious vocation, namely, "total self-dedication to God, one inspired by *perfect charity* " which is framed within " *a profes8ion of the evangelical counsels."* [39] Profession of these counsels implies that the Christian "is totally dedicated to God, *loved above all things,* and is committed to the honor and service of God under a new and special title ... he intends, by the profession of the evangelical counsels in the Church, to free himself from those obstacles which might draw him away from the *fervor of charity* and the perfection of divine worship." [40]

Two constitutive elements of this substantial notion of religious vocation claim, each one by itself, man's whole life. Charity is a permanent gift; it ought to endure throughout one's whole life in this world, but also, in addition, is destined to last for all eternity. The evangelical counsels, *as they are proposed in the gospel,* likewise claim man's entire life. These two elements--charity and the counsels-form the substantial content of religious vocation insofar as they are united or merged into each other. The mere calling to a life of charity does not suffice to constitute religious vocation, because charity is the law of all the people of God/ [1] whatever one's state in life. Nor does the mere calling to the evangelical counsels suffice, since they lack meaning unless they are informed by charity.

[37] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 42.
[38] *Optatam Totius,* n. 10.
[19] *Perfectae Caritatis,* n. 11.
[40] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 44.
[41] *Ibid.,* nn. 9, 32, 42.

We would say rather that in the Christian life a calling or vocation whose object or content is merely the evangelical counsels is unthinkable. Religious vocation is a calling to perfect charity toward God and toward neighbor, not, however, to a charity that could be called common or undifferentiated (however perfect it might be) but to a qualified charity, i.e., endowed or adorned with the evangelical counsels, which are precisely the qualities with which that concrete charity whereby Christ redeemed us was endowed.

It is, of course, possible to state this in reverse, that is, to define religious vocation by its ordination to the evangelical counsels considered expressly as qualities which spring from charity and which impel toward a full love of God and neighbor. We think, however, that the former is the better statement. If both charity and the counsels are stable or permanent values which claim man's entire life in the totality of his acts and of his duration, it is obvious that religious vocation, as constituted precisely by the union or merger of charity and the counsels, implies a more profound and more stable possession of the whole of the Christian's life. A religious vocation so established is by its very nature a perpetual vocation.

The firm and clear teaching of Vatican II on vocation should not lead us to consider vocation and the religious life which springs from it as something merely static that ought to be perpetuated in its own state from beginning to end. The perpetuity the Council speaks of is an on-going perpetuity that obliges religious to heed and to improve their own formation "*throughout their lives.*" [42] Religious vocation, constituted by the fusion of charity and the evangelical counsels, possesses the dynamism proper to each one of these elements and reinforced by their mutual union. [43] On the other hand, such dynamism,

•• *Perfectae Caritatis,* n. 18.

•• For the topic of charity as principle of sanctification and the apostolate, cf. *Lumen Gentium,* nn. 33 & 42; *Apostolicam Actuositatem* (Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity), nn. 3, 4, 8. The dynamic value of the evangelical counsels in all aspects of the Christian life is clearly outstanding in the sixth chapter of *Lumen Gentium,* as well as in *Perfectae Caritatis,* nn. 12-14.

inherent in the constitutive elements of vocation, ought always to be taken into consideration in order to gain a complete and balanced notion of the religious life.

Other Conciliar Perspectives on the Perpetuity of Religious Vocation

Besides the principal modes employed by the Council to explain its doctrine on the perpetuity of religious vocation, there are other concepts in which the idea of perpetuity is at least latent. To begin with, there is the idea of *cornplete profession* of the evangelical counsels, for example:

> The lay religious life, for both men and women, constitutes *a state which of itself is one of total dedication to the profession of the evangelical counsels.* [44] Secular institutes are not religious communities, but they carry with them in the world *a profession of the evangelical counsels which is genuine and complete.* [45]

Both these passages coincide in the main idea. There is, however, a difference: the Council, when talking about lay religious life, employs the notion of *state* which does not appear in relation *to* secular institutes. Given this difference, we can concentrate on the substantial content of the texts. The Council proclaims that the lay religious life and the life of the secular institutes is a *complete* profession of the evangelical counsels. According to an oft repeated statement, such profession is understood *to* be *cornplete* in relation to the counsels *as these are proposed in the gospel.* Now, the counsels, as they appear in the teaching and example or conduct of Christ, are realities which last *for life.* Therefore, it seems evident to us that only on the supposition of a *perpetual* vocation can one properly speak of a *complete* profession of the evangelical counsels. No other form of vocation can gather *completely* what belongs to the evangelical counsels or is able " to pattern the Christian man after that type of chaste and

[44] *"Perfectae Caritatis,* n. 10.
[45] *Ibid.,* n. 11.

detached life *which Christ the Lord elected for himself,* and which his Virgin Mother also embraced." [46]

The Council also speaks of religious life as a *stable* life or vocation, [47] which impels religious to a constant and humble fidelity [48] and in virtue of which " they thereby unite themselves *with greater steadiness and* security to the saving will of God." [49] Evidently a *constant stability* does not suggest the idea of temporariness but rather of perpetuity. And this impression which comes from a reading of the texts is confirmed by a simple argument. It is a question of a stability which symbolizes in the presence of the faithful and of the world the *indissolubility* of the union which exists between Christ and Church. [50] Since *stable* is defined in relation to *indissoluble,* religious vocation begets a *state of life* within the Church, i. e., a kind of life which has perpetual permanence in a way analogous to other ecclesiastical states.

Vatican II repeatedly applies to religious life the idea of *state.* [51] We think it would be a mistake to take *state* in a merely canonical sense. Sometimes, of course, the Council has this in mind, but it cannot be affirmed that this is always the case. A good proof lies in the fact that the Council speaks of the *religious state* when enumerating the different types of permanent life which, *by the will or institution of Christ,* must always exist in the Church. [5"] Finally, the Council treats of the relations between the evangelical counsels and the development of the human person. Moreover, the mode in which its expresses this problem presupposes that it refers to a *perpetual* practice of the counsels. This could be assumed a priori, since a merely temporary practice of the evangelical counsels does

[46] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 46. Cf. also *Perfectae Caritatis,* n. 25.

[41] *Lume:n Ge:ntium,* n. 43.

[48] *Ibid.,* n. 46.

[49] *Perfecate Caritatis,* n. 14.

[50] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 44; *Perfectae CaritatU!,* n. 12.

[51] Limiting ourselves only to *Lumen Gentium,* nn. 13, 31, 43, 44, 45 can be consulted.

[59] We think that this idea is sufficiently clear in nn. 13 & 31 of *Lume:n Ge:ntium.*

not seem to offer a basis for posing the problem. The Council says:

> The profession of the evangelical counsels, though *entailing the renunciation of certain values which undoubtedly merit high esteem,* does not detract from a genuine development of the human person. Rather by its very nature it is most beneficial to that development. [53] (Religious) as they strive to live their profession faithfully . . . will not be influenced by those erroneous claims which present *complete continence* as impossible or as harmful to human development ... they should not only be warned of the dangers confronting chastity but be trained to make *a celibate life consecrated to God* part of the richness of their whole personality. [51] Through the profession of obedience, religious offer to God *a total dedication of their own wills* as a sacrifice of themselves . . . religious obedience will not diminish the dignity of the human person but will rather lead it to maturity in consequence of that enlarged freedom which belongs to the sons of God. [55]

Evidently, all these passages refer to a religious vocation which lasts for a lifetime. The first text speaks of a *renouncement of wealth* in general, but it is clear that it is a perpetual renunciation. If the renunication of marriage, for instance, does not last for the whole of life, i.e., if it is not a definitive renunciation, it would not be a true renunciation. The renunciation implied in the other evangelical counsels ought to be likewise perpetual, since the Council attributes to the three counsels a renunciation with identical consequences. The sense of the second and third texts affords no doubt at all. In the second it is *perfect continence* which is identified with *celibacy.* This, however, never expresses a merely temporary commitment but one which last for a lifetime. Finally, it is clear that an obedience which consists in a *full* surrender of the will cannot be limited to a specified time, however long; its very *totality* or *fullness* lays claim to the whole of life, so that the Christian, through this form of obedience, remains "anchored in the absolute." [56] Obedience is the anchor whereby the Christian is irrevocably fixed in God.

[53] *Ibid.,* n. 46. [5·] *Perfectae Caritatis,* n. [55] *Ibid.,* n. 14.

[50] Paul VI, Allocution to the International Union of Superioresses General *(AAS* 59 [1967], 340).

Analogy between Religious Vocation and Priestly Vocation

This analogy has been explicitly stated by Paul VI in these terms:

> If in fact the priesthood has been associated with monasticism, this has come from the perception of the harmony between religious consecration and priestly consecration ... the union in the same person of the religious consecration, which offers itself totally to God, and of the priestly character configures him in a special way to Christ who is at the same time Priest and Victim. [57]

Vatican II never expressed itself in these terms. Nevertheless, it offers a clear basis for establishing this analogy. If the plan of life the Council proposes to priests [58] is compared with the one it marks out for religious, [59] the similarities immediately strike us. On the other hand, this plan only expresses the practical requirements of the vocation, granted that such a plan is well-drawn, as we are obliged to think in this concrete case.

The analogy is not based only or mainly on the common obligation which religious and priests in the Latin Rite have of keeping celibacy. It springs from the very root of religious vocation and priestly vocation, inasmuch as both imply, though in different ways, an "irrevocable," "for always," "total and irrevocable" [60] consecration to God and to the salvation of souls. Now, the priestly vocation cannot be thought of otherwise than as a perpetual vocation, since it is actualized and becomes effective in the Church by means of the sacrament of Orders which impresses an indelible character. On this basis of sacramental doctrine a vocation to the priesthood cannot exist or even be thought of which would last only for a specified time, since any vocation ought to be harmonious or coherent with the nature of the object to which it refers.

[57] Paul VI, Allocution to the Major Superioresses of Religious Institutes of Italy (*AAS* 58 [1966], 1181). Cf. also Pius XII, *Sedes Sapientiae* (*AAS* 48 [1956], 355).

[58] *Prebyterorum Ordinis*, nn. 15-19.

[59] *Perfectae Caritatis*, nn. 5-6, 12-15, 18.

[60] All these expressions which we have noted in explaining religious vocation are applied to the priesthood by Paul VI in his Allocution to the Pastors and Lenten Preachers of Rome (*AAS* 60 [1968], 217, 218). The same ideas repeatedly appear in *Presbyterorum Ordinis*, cf. nn. quoted in note 58 above.

The analogy, therefore, is established by virtue of that which is more radical in the priesthood and in religious vocation. Thus we think that the perpetuity of vocation to the priesthood offers an excellent demonstrative analogy for affirming the perpetuity of religious vocation. In either case it is a perpetuity which is not linked to a decision or precept of the Church but is inherent in the vocation itself. The Church, with its own ordinations, can and must help priests and religious better to embody and more easily to live out this perpetuity in their respective vocations. But perpetuity itself is presupposed as a constitutive note of *divine vocation* as God communicates it.

The preceding ideas are useful to clarify a problem in the practical life of the Church: the frequent coexistence in the same person of a religious and a sacerdotal vocation. In the Church as a whole a very high proportion of priests are at the same time religious. This fact shows better than any argument the coherence or harmony between priestly and religious vocations; even more, it leads us to the discovery of the ideal form in which both the priesthood and the religious life tend to be embodied.

The priesthood does not necessarily imply acceptance of the evangelical counsels, but it is clear that it leads very strongly toward them, especially the episcopal priesthood. The teachings of Vatican II leave no room for doubt in this respect, not only when it treats of celibacy but also in relation to the other counsels. A priesthood effectively enclosed within the framework of the evangelical counsels is the priesthood which is more identified with that of Jesus Christ, and therefore it is the one which finds itself, normally speaking, in the best condition to realize with the maximum efficacy the ministries which are proper to it.

Similarly, the practice of the evangelical counsels tends to find its consummation in the priesthood, always insofar as persons are capable of receiving the priesthood. By means of the counsels the Christian detaches himself entirely from earthly realities in order to give himself totally to Christ and

"to serve the mystery of redemption in subordination to him and along with him, by the grace of the Almighty God." [61] But any form of service to redemption is subordinated to the priestly service, aboYe all when this service is actualized in the celebration of the eucharistic sacrifice which is " the fount and apex of the whole Christian life," [6„] through which " the work of our redemption is exercised," [63] „ the source and apex of the whole work of preaching the gospel " [64] and the "chief duty" of priests. [65] The impulse for the ministry which is contained in the acceptance of the evangelical counsels reaches its consummation when it is united with the priesthood, especidly if it is the highest priesthood or the episcopal priesthood. This mutual connection between priesthood and religious life clarifies different phenomena in the Church and offers a supreme term of reference for understanding the perpetuity of reli:;ious vocation, since a vocation which tends to reach its consummation in the priesthood cannot be merely temporary.

Perpetual Stability and Human Life in General

After having attempted to clarify the perpetuity of religious vocation from within, i. e., from the stability inherent in the gifts of grace which constitute it, a glance directed at the whole of human life may perhaps help us better to understr..nd this problem.

Human life is characteristically manifested by mobility and stability as expressions of the inner nature of man. These two apparently antithetical notes very well express the' essential duality which constitutes man. Man is one, yet with a special unity which results from the unity of soul and *body*. [66] Mobility derives mainly from matter or body, whereas stability proceeds,

[61] *Lumen Gentium,* n. *56.* These words explicitly refer to the cooperation of the Virgin Mary with Christ in the salYation of mankind.

[60] *Ibid.,* n. 11.

[63] *Sacrosanctum Concilium* (Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy), n. 2.

[64] *P,·ebyterorll1n Ordinis,* n. *5.*

[65] *Ibid.,* n. 13.

[66] *Gaudium et Spes* (Constitution on the Church in the Modern World), n. 14.

also mainly, from the spirit or soul. This implies that mobility and stability do not affect man to the same extent or penetrate in the same profound manner into the interior of his own nature. What the Council says about human history in general can be applied with all propriety to man who both fashions and is fashioned by history: "Beneath all changes there are many realities which do not change." [67] Analogously, man's mobility is located rather on the " surface," whereas his stability springs from what is the most profound root of his being, i. e., " his interior qualities (whereby) he outstrips the whole sum of mere things." [68]

These considerations of a general character are socially verifiable. It is normal for man, when he has reached his full development or human maturity, to stabilize himself in a definite profession or type of life which allows him to realize himself fully. For, if man does not achieve stability in his life, he cannot avoid experiencing a certain interior violence which of itself is a sufficient sign that some of the values connaturally claimed by the human condition are missing. Looking more deeply into this, it is also a verifiable fact that the mature man, considered in the constitutive elements of his nature alone, tends normally to be situated in the state of marriage which expresses the fullest and more perfect mode of merely human stability in this life, being based on an " *irrevocable* personal consent." [69] l\1arriage, on the one hand, is the term toward which a long process of human maturity connaturally tends and in which it finds its consummation, and, on the other hand, it possesses an indestructible stability " qualified by his laws," [70] which places it above every whim of human wilfulness. Indissolubility and the " power and strength of the institution of marriage and family " is a good which overcomes " the profound changes in modern society " [71] because it is founded on

[67] *Ibid.,* n. 10. The temporal order, the Council also says, has its own proper laws, permanent and firm, which are Lhe basis of the legitimate autonomy which belongs to it (cf. *ibid.,* n. 36).

[68] *Ibid.,* n. 14.

[69] *Ibid.,* n. 48.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] *Ibid.,* n. 47.

a " mutual gift of two persons." [72] In this way it becomes the symbol expressing the act whereby man fully gives himself to God.

If human life, considered only in the values which flow from nature, is oriented toward an "irrevocable " stability and finds its consummation in it, it seems evident that Christian life, in any of its forms of realization, has to have a stability which is more firm as Christ's grace more exceeds simple human nature. For this reason Christian marriage possesses a special firmness which comes to it from its condition as a sacrament.

From these considerations the perpetuity of religious vocation and the perfect harmony it maintains with one of man's more characteristic tendencies, namely, to aspire to a stable type of life, appear in a new light. Human stability acquires the special consistency which is proper to Christian stability, because that which is permanent in man's life" has its ultimate founlation in Christ, wLo is the same yesterday, and today, yes and forever." [73] Christ himself is " the goal of human history, the focal point of the longings of history and of civilization, the center of the human race, the joy of every heart, and the answer to all its yearnings." [74] Christian stability is realized in different forms. One of the most important is that which is inherent in religious vocation, because those who embrace it "have a dist_inguished place in the house of the Lord" [75] since they make a special consecration of themselves to God " which is deeply rooted in their baptismal consecration and which provides an ampler manifestation of it." [76]

Characteristic Bonds of the Religious Life

Religious life is part of the global mystery of the Church; it constitutes one of its manifestations which, by the will of

[72] *Ibid.,* n. 48. Cf. A. Osuna, O. P.. "Doctrina moral del Concilio sobre el matrimonio," *Scriptorium Victoriense,* 15 (1968), 166.

[73] *Ibid.,* n. 10.

[74] *"Ibid.,* n. 45.

[75] *Presbyterorum Ordinis,* n. 6.

[76] *Perfectae Caritatis,* n. 5.

Christ, will never be absent: "it belongs inseparably to her life and holiness." [77] In virtue of the connection which exists between religious life and the universal Church "Church authority has the duty . . . of interpreting these evangelical counsels, of regulating their practice, and finally of establishing stable forms of living according to them." [78] For this purpose she dictates the laws which she considers fitting to each age and " endorses rules formulated by eminent men and women." [79] All of this means that religious life and the practice of the evangelical counsels are a life and a practice ruled, directed, regulated by the competent authority of the Church which introduces new elements that, according to the letter alone of the gospel, are not essential to religious life.

Eminent among the elements introduced by the Church to regulate the practice of the evangelical counsels is the taking of vows " or other sacred bonds which are like vows in their purpose." [80] These bonds of whatever type offer to those who accept them " the support of greater stability in their way of life." [81] The practice of the evangelical counsels could be considered in a *p-ure* state, i.e., insofar as it springs simply from a grace of Jesus Christ moving man's will to embrace them. But this will, which is always presupposed and without which religious life lacks any sense, is a less committed and, by itself, a less firm and less stable will than when the reinforcement of a vow or of another similar bond is added whereby the Christian "is totally dedicated to God by an act of supreme love." [82]

These brief considerations not only disclose to us the Church's intervention in religious life but also, in addition, one of the goals the Church pursues by such intervention: to give religious life firmness and stability. If we omit stability, we cannot seriously affirm that the religious state perpetually exemplifies "that form of life which he, as the Son of God, accepted in entering this world to do the will of the Father." [83]

[77] *Lumen Gentium,* n, 44,
[78] *Ibid.,* n. 43.
[79] *Ibid.,* n. *45.*
[80] *Ibid.,* n. 44.
[81] *Ibid.,* n. 43,
[82] *Ibid.,* n. 44.
[83] *Ibid.*

The idea of stability is so important that the Council takes it as a criterion for distinguishing the degrees of perfection of the consecration made to God in the religious life: "This consecration *gains in peTjection* since *by viTtue of jiTmeTand steadier* bonds it serves as a *betteT* symbol of the *unbTeakable* link between Christ and his Spouse, the Church." [84]

The different degrees of perfection of which the Council speaks do not refer to the subjective aspect of the consecration or the intensity of the self-surrender the Christian makes of himself but to the objective perfection of the consecration in itself. This perfection grows in the same measure as the firmness and objective stability on which it is based. Naturally, it is necessary to avoid any form of dualism which would end by separating in principle the objective and subjective aspects of the consecration. If the Christian makes his surrender with sufficient knowledge as is his duty, this requires that, when he commits himself to these bonds, objectively more perfect because of their greater firmness and stability, he also elicits a fuller subjective and personal act of self-donation, i.e., an act of surrender which is exactly equal to what the bonds contracted demand. However, since man does not always surrender or give everything he can, there is always the danger in the human condition that some bonds, objectively the best, will be accepted in a merely mediocre donation, just as it is possible to receive the greatest sacrament, the Eucharist, with a weak charity, far from what the Sacrament demands of itself.

On the level of doctrine with which we are now concerneJ, the fact of taking stability as a criterion in order to judge the perfection of the commitments, and therefore of the profession which rest on them, is of great importance. According to the teaching of Vatican II it must be affirmed that *peryetual* bonds are more perfect than *tempomTy* ones and that perpetual *solemn* bonds are more perfect than the corresponding *simple* ones; the more stability and firmness, the more perfection. What is said of the vows analogously applies to other forms of

•• *Ibid.*

commitment. The Council does nothing more than assemble and develop the traditional doctrine on this point. The ancient text of the *Consecration of Virgins* repeatedly insists on the idea of a full and irrevocable dedication to Christ through the " propositum " and practice of *perpetual* chastity; only this form of chastity permits aspiring to espousal with Christ who "just as he is Son is also Spouse of perpetual virginity." [85] Pius XII is filled with the same idea when he says that the best way to comply with the evangelical counsel of virginity is to commit onself to its practice " though a perpetual vow which leaves no door open to turn back." [86] The reason is because, as he explains at length, only this definite and irrevocable commitment can be the appropriate expression of a love for Christ which is so truly total, exclusive, and absorbing as to erase from man's heart any preoccupation other that of belonging to Christ alone. It is not a rnatter of " locking the doors " behind one so that man shall have to go forwards by force; Christ neither asks for nor desires forced surrenders. But the psychology of love has its " laws " which are helpful in appreciating its seriousness and intensity.

The possibility of turning back, sought in a calculating manner, reveals a certain insecurity or indeci»ion in the surrender and therefore in the love which inspires it. The inclination proper to love is to hold fast to the object loved as strongly as possible and for always. When the union is unbreakable, love is had in the state of joyful tranquility and is made present with the greatest intensity. Nothing urges as powerfully as love, and nothing at the same time leaves as live an impression of repose and well-being in the soul. The one who does not leave even one door open to turn back is the one, objectively speaking, who fully accepts the demands of love for him who invites him to follow him. To consider the vow as an impediment to spontaneity and love of

[85] Preface of the Consecration of Virgins. Cf. G. Esculero, C.M.F., *Virginidad y Liturgia* (Madrid: Coculsa, 1963), p. R3.

[86] Pius XII, *Sacra Virginitas (AAS* 46 [19.54], 165). Paul VI, in leaving Uganda, said " to the clergy, religious men and women: you have devoted ami consecrated yourselves to Christ without reservation and *without return"* (Allocution of Aug. 1969).

surrender is not to have understood either the vow or love. Nothing is given with such pure love as what is given irrevocably, and irrevocability is never so manifest as when it is confirmed by vow.[87]

Intervention of the Church and "Pure " Evangelical Counsel

The Church regulates the practice of the evangelical counsels in order to secure its firmness and stability. For this reason the Church asks that the Christian who wishes to practice them in the religious state commit himself to it by means of some kind of bond (vow or something similar) which by itself reinforces and consolidates the decision of the will. Perhaps at one time this ecclesial decision might have seemed arbitrary or even deforming, since it is not stated in the gospel that the practice of the counsels must be reinforced by any special bond, even less by a perpetual one. The gospel presents the counsels in a "pure state," i.e., as Christian values which are defined in relationship to a better and fuller following of Christ. This is quite true. But it is not less true that the counsels, *as they are proposed in the gospel,* shape all the manifestations of the life of the Christian and claim the entire duration of that life. In other words, they are counsels which can be accomplished only by means of a *total and perpetual* consecration to Jesus Christ, as we have already noted.

If this vision of the whole problem is taken into account, it can be quite well understood that the Church has the greatest concern to secure for the practice of the evangelical counsels those properties of totality and perpetuity that belong to it according to the gospel. All the actions of the Church directed toward the achievement of this goal are wholly consistent with the evangelical counsels and make easier the unfolding of the inner virtualities they possess. Since the vows or other similar commitments are meant to strengthen the firmness, stability, and wholeness characteristic of the evangelical counsels, it is evident that they do not represent a " corrupting" element of the "purity " of the gospel but, on the contrary,

[87] A. Bandera, O. P., *El sace:rdotio en la Iglesia,* p. 235.

are limited to drawing out one of the virtualities contained germinally in the counsels themselves.

All this leads us to a very important conclusion. The practice of the counsels is not perpetual because the Church enjoins the taking of perpetual vows or other similar bonds. The explanation is exactly the opposite, i. e., the Church introduces bonds because the counsels are in themselves perpetual, and therefore only perpetual bonds can serve as the adequate framework for their practice and their embodiment before the whole community of the faithful and before the world. Other inferior forms of commitment fall far below the perfection of the evangelical counsels, and by themselves they would never express it adequately; rather, they would partially hide them, since many faithful could get the impression that the demands of the counsels go no further than those of some temporary commitments.

Temporary and Perpetual Profession

The Church not only admits but also commands these two forms of profession in such a way that perpetual profession cannot be made unless some years of temporary profession have elapsed. Some institutions do not even have perpetual profession. However, there is always something which can be considered equivalent to a perpetual profession, as in certain cases the commitment to renew indefinitely until the end of life the temporary profession made for a shorter or longer span of time. In other cases there is the acceptance of a definitive commitment to the Institute to which one belongs, whether made explicitly or at least implicitly because of the fact that one continues in the Institute after finishing the formation period. Such a continuation makes sense only with reference to a permanence.

The Church's legislation is complex. Nevertheless, one thing is sufficiently clear, namely, that the Church commands all religious to make a temporary profession and that in many cases such temporary profession never culminates in a properly so-called perpetual profession. This obliges us to reflect upon

the two forms of profession and to compare them. Every comparison can have an annoying result for those who are assigned a secondary place. We regret this. Our intention is only to discover which form of profession, objectively considered, better responds to Christ's intention when he proposed to us the evangelical counsels. We shall be aided in our endeavor to remain as objective as possible by the use of the Church's documents, as we have done thus far.

Above all, a fundamental principle stated by Vatican II must be recalled: the different forms of perfection are not equally perfect. "This consecration will be *mOTe perfect* inasmuch as the *indissoluble bond* of the union of Christ and his Bride, the Church, is better expressed through firmer and more stable ties." [88] Thus, temporary profession is, as such, less perfect than perpetual; on this main point the Council leaves no room for doubt. The Sacred Congregation of Religious and Secular Institutes, basing itself on the preceding word of the Council, explicitly states the principle of the superiority of perpetual profession:

> Religious profession ... brings about *a total consecration* to God, who alone is worthy of such a sweeping gift on the part of a human person. It is *more in lceeping with the nature of such a gift* to find its culmination and its most eloquent expression in *perpetual profession,* whether simple or solemn. [89] The practice of this life is realized definitely at *perpetual profession* ... the one perpetual religious profession retains *its full significance.* [90]

This objective importance must have manifestations which affect the life of the religious, especially when he prepares himself to make perpetual profession. This is why the same Congregation asks that religious be given" a serious preparation for perpetual vows. It is in fact desirable that this *unique and essential act,* whereby a religious is consecrated to God *forever,* should be preceded by a sufficiently long preparation, spent in

[88] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 44.

[89] Instruction *Renm.·ationis causam,* n. 2 *(AAS* 61 [19691, 106). Immediately after it quotes the already known words of Vatican II in support of its point.

[90] *Ibid.,* n. 35 (Zoe. *cit.,* p. 119).

retreat and prayer, a preparation which could be like a second novitiate." [91]

From these passages there can be no doubt that the only profession in which the full content of religious life is expressed is *perpetual* profession. It alone can be considered as a symbol and adequate realization of a vocation and a life which imply wholeness and perpetuity of self-donation to God as essential notes. Temporary profession, as temporary, can never be either a symbol or a realization of such self-donation; it is a profession that, because of its very temporariness, cannot include or make present to the Church the full content of religious vocation. However, temporary profession is an evident fact in the life and practice of the Church, and thus it cannot be meaningless, as the Congregation explains: "While still retaining its probationary character by the fact that it is temporary, the profession of first vows makes the young religious share in the consecration proper to the religious state." [92]

Temporary profession is a period of trial. This statement is of major importance, since it indicates that such a profession has no reason to exist in itself but serves only as a means of verifying the genuineness of the vocation and of attaining the situation proper to such a vocation which is perpetual profession. From this we further conclude that temporary profession must last as long as is considered sufficient for the formation of the candidates, [93] i.e., until they are judged fit for definitive incorporation into the Institute. Naturally this takes place when the result of the trial inherent in temporary profession is positive; if it is negative, the candidate abandons the Institute and definitive incorporation does not take place.

The situation of trial which accompanies the whole period of temporary vows is distinct from the trial which takes place

[91] *Ibid.*, n. 9 (p. 1l2).

[92] *Ibid.*, n. 7 (p. 111). The idea of *trial* as one of the characteristic notes of temporary vows is repeated several times in the Instruction.

[93] *Ibid.*, n. 10 (p. 1l2). The Instruction sets the extreme limits for such duration: "This period shall last for not less than three nor more than nine continuous years." (n. 37; p. 1l9).

in the novitiate. The novice does not make a consecration of himself or acquire any sort of commitment. He approaches the religious life, but this approach, as it were, leaves him at the door. On the other hand, the professed religious of temporary vows undertakes a trial of the religious life from within, i. e., he contracts religious ties and subjects himself to their demands, though this takes place only temporarily and therefore with an inevitable character of provisionality.

The peculiar nature of the trial undertaken during the period of temporary profession causes it to be a *participation* of the full religious life as it is realized in perpetual profession. The idea of participation is to be found explicitly in the text of the Sacred Congregation quoted above and is fundamental for an understanding of the value of the profession of temporary vows, as well as its relationship to perpetual profession. Temporary profession is a beginning or a sharing in that which is realized in its fulness in perpetual profession. It is a dynamic and homogeneous participation, i. e., endowed with an internal vitality which tends to bear fruit in its fulness, granted, of course, that the vocation is genuine, since only such a vocation contains the seeds or virtualities which can mature and lead to fulness.

These arguments cause us to discover in its very root the essential dependence of temporary upon perpetual profession. Temporary profession is not self-justifying, because a beginning or a participation which has in itself the reason for its existence makes no sense at all. Temporary vows find their justification only in relation to perpetual vows for which they are a preparation and in which they inchoately share. The Instruction *Renovationis causam* never speaks of a temporary profession that could be considered the normal expression of a religious vocation which has reached maturity. According to this document there is a temporary profession, i.e., a period of trial and beginning of the religious life, and a perpetual profession that represents the normal term and expression of that same life.

The Institutes that do not have perpetual vows suffer a genuine maladjustment which does not permit them to give

adequate expression to what the evangelical counsels are in themselves. Since the counsels, as we have seen, are perpetual, they demand a perpetual profession or expression; if this does not take place, the counsels do not encounter as perfect a proclamation as befits them. The lack of perpetual profession is supplied by the commitment of renewing indefinitely temporary profession until the end of life or by other procedures. However, this is nothing but a theologically poor recourse, since it cannot be compared with formal perpetual profession. Sometimes the circumstances in which some Institutes have begun explain this kind of theological anomaly. But, if we wished to look at those Institutes now as models of modern institutionalization of the religious life, we would be genuinely mistaken. A total consecration to God through love in the practice of the evangelical counsels is an *irrevocable* consecration, because otherwise it would not be total, and it can only have an adequate expression in a profession which is likewise *irrevocable* and *perpetual.* The connection between mature religious life and perpetual profession springs from the very nature of things, and only adverse or anomalous circumstances can explain that, in some cases, it does not attain its formal realization.

Perpetual Vocation and Human Psychology

Occasionally there is a recurrence to human psychology in order to reject the doctrine of perpetual religious vocation. Human psychology is fickle, subject to a multitude of fluctuations, often unforeseeable, which either dissuade from or render practically impossible an irrevocable decision whereby the whole of life would remain oriented in a fixed direction. As a complement, those who argue in this fashion warn us that grace in its way of acting adapts itself to human nature and respects its "laws" which also proceed from God and which illustrate for us the paths his Providence follows regarding man. A grace of perpetual vocation would do violence to human psychology. Yet God does not call us to live in violence but in freedom and inner repose.

This form of argumentation contains valid elements as, for instance, the need for seeking as perfect a harmony as possible between divine vocation and human psychology in such a way that the person called by God might live his vocation with psychological spontaneity and free of interior violences which would necessarily be converted into disfiguring elements. Granted this, it is also necessary to recognize that human psychology is not the first criterion for judging God's gifts. When Jesus Christ instituted an indissoluble marriage bond and a sacrament of Orders which imprints an indelible character, he thought of everything except doing violence to man. His institution tends to facilitate the path of salvation. And yet, he demands on man's side an irrevocable decision which commits his whole life and marks out for him one direction alone. As a matter of fact, we know that more than once both married people and priests appeal to " psychological changes " in order to be declared freed from all commitment. But everyone knows that this is not a serious reason, since psychological variations cannot make marriage dissoluble or the sacrament of Orders to cease to imprint a sacramental character. Psychological reasons, if they exist, should have been taken into account before acquiring the irrevocable commitment that is inherent in the sacraments of matrimony and Orders.

This analogy with the sacraments of matrimony and Orders helps to locate the doctrine of perpetual religious vocation in an atmosphere of serenity which allows us adequately to reason about it, because serenity is necessary not only in order to live a perpetual religious vocation but also to talk about what it is in itself. Having said this, let us return to the starting point which is the need to find a harmonious and spontaneous coherence between divine vocation and human psychology.

First of all, it must be kept in mind that we are dealing here with a theological problem whose solution cannot be achieved by lowering the divine until we make it one more human element. An elementary rule of theological method obliges us to follow the inverse way, i. e., to look for those energies or

values in God's gifts which give strength to human psychology and which elevate it to a new mode of being and of activity that, being new and higher, not only does not lose any of the natural spontaneity connatural to man but increases and consolidates it with the new forces it introduces.

Nature and Grace

The functions of God's grace in relation to nature and the benefits which come from it is a theme which by far surpasses what we could say here. We will limit ourselves to recalling the fundamental notions proposed by Vatican II.

Nature and grace represent two orders that are coherent and harmonious," [4] because "the same God is Savior and Creator, Lord of human history as well as of salvation history." [95] This harmony is not only a simple parallel but a convergence, since human history tends to be completed in the history of salvation,96 and "the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine" [97] whereby all man's activity is, in itself, directed to the Paschal mystery of Christ in which it will find its definitive consummation. [98] 'Vhen both orders meet and merge, grace performs a series of acts of which the Council also speaks very often. [99] In the first place, grace does not take away from nature any of the good which is in it, does not impede or stop the development of its faculties and possibilities. But this act whose content is expressed by the Council in a negative way is nothing but the prerequisite for a long process which is described in these terms: " rather does she foster and take to herself, insofar as they are good, the ability, resources and customs of each people. Taking them to herself she purifies, strengthens and enobles them." [100]

Grace, or the Church which is its embodiment, *assumes* all good. *To assume* is the most proper term used in Christology

[94] *Gaudium. et Spes,* n. 59.

[95] *Ibid.,* n. 41.

[96] *Ibid.,* n. *45.*

[97] *Ibid.,* n. 22.

[98] *Ibid.,* nn. 38-39.

[99] The fundamental passage, on which the others depend, is n. 13 of *Lumen Gentium..*

[100] *Lumen Gentium.,* n. 13.

to express the action whereby the Word makes his own or takes on human nature in being incarnated. Now the grace which Christ grants us realizes a similar action toward the goods of nature: it *assumes* them. The assuming action of the Word produces in human nature definite effects. Excelling among them is the effect of making it impeccable and of raising it to the dignity of "instrument of salvation." [101] In an analogous way the assumption of natural goods by grace exercises an influence that consists mainly in *purifying* or cleansing them from the stains of sin [102] and in *elevating* them to a new mode of being and acting. [103] Because of all this the Church, which is the incarnation of grace or " the universal sacrament of salvation," [104] " strives energetically and constantly to bring all humanity with all its riches back to Christ its Head in the unity of his Spirit." [105]

Here we have in brief synthesis what we consider to be the fundamental core of the ideas that Vatican II proposes concerning the relationship between nature and grace. *To assume, to purify, to strengthen, to elevate* are verbs which express with great precision the profound and powerful influence which grace exerts on the totality of the "domains " of nature. It is necessary to keep them always in mind so as not to depart from the magnificent " path " traced by the Council.

The Grace of Vocation

The concepts explained above regulate the relationships between nature and grace in any of their manifestations. They are very universal concepts which range over the whole reality of both levels. Nevertheless, it is not our concern at this

[101] *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* n. 5.

[100] *Ad Gentes Divinitus,* n. 8.

[103] The idea of *elevation* informs the entire *Lumen Gentium.* The Council employs it to designate the profoundest aspect of God's salvific plan: " the Eternal Father created the whole world. His plan was to elevate men with a participation in his own divine life" (n. 2). Cf. also *Dei Verbum* (Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation), nn. 2, 3, 6.

[10·] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 48.

[105] *Ibid.,* n. 13.

time to insist on the universal aspects of the question but rather to make application to the concrete case of the relationships between religious vocation and human psychology.

Religious vocation is an expression of grace; it is itself a peculiar grace in a way similar to the way human psychology, on its part, is within this world the noblest expression of nature. Religious vocation, when it enters human psychology, realizes typical acts of grace in its encounter with nature: *it assumes, purifies, strengthens, elevates.* The immediate consequence of all this is that human psychology becomes singularly improved and strongly attracted toward the proper goal of the religious life. The force of attraction is perfectly expressed by saying that human psychology *is assumed* by vocation.

For the practical purposes we are proposing here, it is of great importance to stress that we are dealing with the attraction exerted by a specific grace which is that of a religious vocation. From the fact that grace has an attractive power it does not follow that any grace has an attractive power toward everything, i. e., toward all things belonging to the Christian life. This would mean that *any* grace could change in *any* Christian direction *any* psychological functioning, even when this would be absolutely not recommended from a human viewpoint. It is clear that such a grace does not exist. Besides, with this notion of grace we would end up in a radical denial of any specific vocation within Christianity, since any grace would work for everything.

We are dealing here with a specific grace which is a religious vocation, granted to some specified Christians and not to others. Of *this concrete grace* we affirm that it exercises an attraction on the psychology of those definite Christians to whom God concedes it. Accordingly, the psychology of such individuals becomes *assumed* by the religious vocation and is oriented by it to its own goal.

But, upon what does the *assumption* exerted by religious vocation on human psychology fall? On the totality of the psychology? On only some of its parts? These are questions we consider of paramount importance for an exact statement

and, consequently, for a good solution of the problem. The impression is gained from certain writings that vocation lies wholly in the purpose or decision of the will to consecrate oneself to Jesus Christ. Our personal opinion is that the decision of the will counts for much, and that it must be considered as one of the most important signs, but that in itself it does not suffice.

Looking at the history of the subject one becomes aware of a tendency to " spiritualize " vocation to excess, i. e., to "locate" it in man's superior faculties, leaving aside, at least in practice, the rest of human psychology. According to this tendency vocation does not assume human psychology in its totality but only in its most elevated parts or faculties. However, in our opinion, such an idea of vocation is mistaken and contains, at least virtually, the germs of numerous and grave problems which today are seriously preoccupying the Church.

Recent documents of the Church, and a rather elementary reasoning on data which we have already seen, lead us to a richer and more profound idea of vocation. The vocation more frequently considered by the Magisterium is the priestly vocation. However, we think that this fact by no means invalidates the explanation we are attempting because, first of all, there is a true analogy between religious vocation and priestly vocation, as we have already seen from explicit affirmations made by the same Magisterium. In addition, the documents concerning the nature of religious life already contain virtually everything that is found affirmed explicitly of priestly vocation.

The Council generically states that God "properly endows and aid with his grace " [100] those whom he chooses. To penetrate the contents of this principle, i.e., to precise what the Council understands as *appropriate qualities* on which the help of grace falls it would be necessary to gather together everything that the Council says or insinuates on the criteria of formation and selection of candidates to the priesthood. But this procedure would turn out to be exceedingly lengthy

[106] *Optatam Totius,* n. 2.

and, for the time being, impossible to go through. Paul VI in one of his personal documents exposes with absolute clarity the range of the grace of vocation in relation to human psychology: "The whole person must be equal to the harsh burdens of the ministry." [107] And in order to get rid of any shadow of doubt concerning the meaning of *the whole man* he adds:

> It is worth remembering that the acceptance of this call *involves more than the spiritual faculties* of the candidate-his intellect and free will. It *involves also his senses and his very body.* The whole person must be equal to the harsh burdens of the ministry and ready, if need be, to lay down his life as did the Good Shepherd. We must not think that God would call young men lacking the necessary qualities of mind and will, or suffering from some serious psychic or organic defect. For these men would be unable to *shoulder the varied duties and burdens of the ministry.* [108]

According to this, it is perfectly clear that the grace of vocation affects the totality of the person, in his spiritual faculties as well as in his sensitive powers, whether of an internal order as imagination, memory, etc., or on the level of the exterior senses; not even the body is left outside the influence of vocation.

The preceding notion of vocation is contained, according to Paul VI, in a very universal principle concerning divine Providence which was explicitly enunciated by St. Thomas and which the Pope makes his own, quoting the very words of Aquinas: "When God chooses someone for a certain task, he trains him so that he can carry it out worthily." [109] The Pope adds that this norm for God's action is for priests a basis for firm confidence, since God, together with vocation, grants also all the endowments needed to bring the vocation to a happy termination, [110] or, better still, these endowments are

[107] Paul VI, *Summi Dei Verbum (AAS 55* [1963], 987).

[108] *Ibid.*, pp. 986-987.

[109] *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 27, a. 4. St. Thomas states this principle in relation to the sanctity of the Virgin Mary, which is the holiness required by the sublime mission to which God called her.

[110] Paul VI, *Summi Dei Verbum*, p. 986.

as integrating parts of a total grace which is vocation. Hence, as he says: "One of the incomparable gifts characteristic of our vocation is this inner security .... Nothing seems to be more out of keeping with the psychology of a loyal priest than being oppressed by doubts." [111]

But let us return to the subject of the notion of vocation. The doctrine exposed by Paul VI in his apostolic letter *Summi Dei Verbum* reappears and is confined again in the encyclical *Sacerdotalis Caelibatus.* [112] Priestly vocation is a grace that affects the human person in the totality of his being and of his faculties. And this is perfectly understandable, since the exercise of the priestly ministry likewise commits the whole person and claims the availability of all his energies. The vocation which God gives as a capacitation for the priesthood must be adequate for the purpose for which it is granted. All of this facilitates the argument concerning religious vocation. The documents of the Magisterium concerning this type of vocation are not as explicit as those referring to priestly vocation. But the lack of explicitness can be supplied by fundamental argumentation.

In the preceding pages we have already perceived the insistence with which the Council affirms that religious life claims the human person whole and entire, because it is a *total* consecration to God, a *complete* surrender, *for life,* to the service of God and to the spreading of his kingdom, a *total* renunciation of all things which could impede the fervor of charity and the perfection of divine worship. [113] Apart from these and other similar expressions which could be multiplied, it is evident that each one of the vows, characteristic of religious life, affects preferably each one of the three layers or levels to be distinguished in human life: spirit, sensibility, and material goods. We say *preferably* because each religious vow, studied in all its virtualities, affects the whole of human life under the

[111] Paul VI, Allocution to the Pastors and Lenten Preachers of Rome *(AAS* 58 [1966], 226).

[112] Paul VI, *Sacerdotalis Caelibatus,* n. 62 fl. *(AAS* 59 [1967], 682-683).

[113] On all this cf. *Lumen Gentium,* n. 44.

modality which is proper to it. Obedience, for instance, informs not only the manifestations of the life of the spirit but also all of human activity. And something similar can be said of each one of the other vows. If we now consider not each one of them in isolation but the three together insofar as they constitute a global synthesis, it is evident that their coordinated and conjoined action ranges over the totality of human life in any of its layers or levels and in all of them at once, insofar as they are integrated into the unity of the person.

Our argument is based directly on the vows, because they are the more clearly perceptible *differential* element when one looks at religious life. But the vows are not the whole, not even the most important part. Consideration of other elements reinforces the idea of totality which is inherent in religious life.

From what has been said it can be easily understood that religious vocation must be adequate to what religious life is in itself, since God grants it in order to enable one to embrace this kind of life and *perpetually* to persevere in it. If life is " marked " by the note of totality, vocation also either is total or it is not vocation. In other words, either it devolves upon the whole of the psychology of the person, without leaving out of its influence any of its manifestations, or it is by no means *religious* vocation but at best the appearance or shadow of vocation. Priestly vocation and religious vocation have different contents, obviously, but, since both, to be duly actualized, claim the totality of the person, they preserve a similarity between them and mutually clarify each other. The comparative study of analogous truths has been and will always continue to be a legitimate method for providing theological clarification.

Human Psychology

Vocation is a grace which informs the whole human psychology for the entire duration of the life of the person. Hence an immediate conclusion follows: when human psychology is analyzed in its relation to vocation there is need to study all the psychological strata or levels, both in their " functioning "

and in their connection and coordination with each other, and this not only in a particular period of human life but in the totality of its duration. Such a study necessarily turns out to be too complex to be able to be done at a glance; it requires the use of appropriate methods which can only be carried out by an expert in the matter. [114]

This elementary verification traces out for us in all its crudeness the problem of finding out which psychologies are completely and perpetually suitable to receive the grace of religious vocation. God grants this type of vocation only to some, i.e., he makes a selection between persons and persons. Vocational selection, as any other belonging to the order of Christian life, has a prime and supreme basis in the freedom of God who distributes his gifts according to his will, and a secondary or derivative basis in the very persons whose qualities make them more suitable for one or other goal.

The salvific will of God implies that the grace needed for salvation can be incarnated in any human psychology, granted that the latter offers its necessary cooperation. But the specific grace of religious vocation, or any other which is reserved to some, cannot be necessary for salvation (as a general rule), because it is evident that those Christians who are not called to the religious life do not incur by this lack of calling any danger to their salvation. Arguing from principle, this implies that the existence of human psychologies contrary to religious vocation and at the same time compatible with Christian life is possible. Are there in fact such psychologies? Everyday experience and the explicit declarations of the Magisterium force us to answer in the affirmative.

Previously we have established an analogy between the mystery of the Incarnation and the grace of religious vocation; the Word *assumes* nature and, analogically, vocation *assumes* the psychology of the person to whom it is communicated by God. This analogy, which up to now we have employed only

[114] Paul VI rightly insists on this in *Sacerdotalis Caelibatus,* nn. 63-64 *(AAS* 59 [1967], 682-683) .

in its positive aspects, also has a negative side. "What (the Word) took up was our entire human nature such as it is found among us in our misery and poverty, though without our sin." [115] This means that sin is something that *cannot be assumed* by the Word, not only because it is radically opposed to God's sanctity but also because in itself it makes man's salvation, willed and wrought by the Word through his incarnation, impossible. Now, if in man there is something which cannot be assumed by the Word, a fortiori there can be things which are not assumable by the grace of vocation, since this grace is reserved for some specified Christians who, in the totality of the Church, are always a tiny minority. Whatever is opposed to the purpose of the Incarnation is not assumable by the Word; analogically, in relation to religious vocation, all those psychological types which are contrary to the practice of the religious life cannot be assumed by a religious vocation. On such psychological types a genuine religious vocation cannot settle, though, on the other hand, they might be suitable for a Christian life of a high level.

With this doctrinal background we are better prepared to understand the documents.

> Concretely, this divine calling manifests itself *in a given individual* with *his own definite personality structure* which is not at all overpowered by grace. . . . The life of the celibate priest, which engages the whole man so totally and so delicately, *excludes* in fact *those of insufficient physical, psychic and moral qualifications. Nor should anyone pretend that grace supplies for the defects of nature in such a man.*[116]

Paul VI speaks only about a *de facto* exclusion. But we think that the exclusion is *in principle,* leaving aside only cases of an exceptional intervention by God. Granted this exclusion in

[115] *Ad Gentes Divinitus,* n. 3. The impeccability of Jesus Christ is so clear in Sacred Scripture and in the whole tradition of the Church that there is no need to expatiate on it.

[116] *Sacerdotalis Caelibatus,* nn. 62 & 64. Another important passage from Paul VI is referred to in note 108 aboYe. Pius XII had said the same in *Sacra virginitas (AAS* 46 [1954], 180-182). Cf. Vatican II, *Optatam Totius,* n. 6.

principle, it can no longer be thought or pretended that " grace here supplies for nature," since the grace of vocation is not given to such natures, i.e., to persons of such psychological types. Vatican II says practically the same thing about religious life:

> Since the observance of total continence intimately involves the deeper inclinations of human nature, candidates should not undertake the profession of chastity nor be admitted to its profession except after a truly adequate testing period and only if they have the needed degree of psychological and emotional maturity. [117]

Something analogous could be said regarding the other vows. But the need of a definite psychology or " personal structure " is much more evident if one considers the three vows together as forming a unity and as integrated in the complexus of all the other elements which constitute religious life.

In order to judge whether a psychological type is assumable by the grace of vocation it seems that special attention should be given to the complex world of sensitivity, with all the personal factors, hereditary and environmental, which could affect it. Both on the cognitive and on the affective levels man's life is closely bound up with psychological stability, which is the basis of moral and religious stability. Religious vocation demands a definite psychological type or "personal structure." But it must not be thought that such a psychology is something already given or irreformable, which is either possessed totally from the outset or turns out to be unattainable. To promote healthy inclinations and to correct deviant ones belongs to the process of formation. However, it always presupposes a basis which is not acquired in the formation process and whose lack

[117] *Perfectae Caritatis,* n. The Sacred Congregation of Religious and Secular Institutes, in its Instruction of Aug. 1.5, 1969 on the contemplative life, affirms that this kind of life " must be the product of mature reflection and unfaltering decisiveness, which enable one to renounce certain social advantages which are known and esteemed at their true value. Such maturity is required in order that, with perfect spiritual freedom, a type of life can be chosen in which the religious consumes his entire eatthly existence clinging to Christ alone and occupied with the affairs of heaven."

provides a clear proof that psychological dispositions belong to the order of things which are assumable. Religious vocation requires a psychological disposition upon which a *total* and *perpetual* consecration can be established.

A Cause of Frequent Misunderstandings about the Religious Life

The insufficient attention often paid to the relationships between vocation and human psychology is the occasion of confusions which, because they affect so important a matter, have serious practical consequences. The cause to which we now refer is the idea which many have about the content of religious life. Reading some explanations one might think that religious life, in its proper sense, consists only of the practice of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Everything else to be found in the life of religious belongs to the *common* Christian life. The virtues, especially the theological virtues, and the sacraments are not religious but merely Christian realities given by Christ to all in order to achieve the perfection which consists primarily in union with God by charity. The vows are no more than means-and non-essential means-in the process of sanctification and union of man with God. Indeed, means of this kind can be absent from the work of sanctification without thereby endangering sanctification itself. On the other hand, it is possible that their presence might become in some persons a true obstacle which, far from facilitating sanctification and salvation, impedes them or opposes them with serious difficulties. In such cases the means ceased to be a means and must be done away with.

Granted these arguments, the conclusion is clear. The religious, when he takes vows, commits himself to the use of definite means of sanctification which for him are purely accidental means. It is possible that in certain cases these vows or accidental means become impediments for him. Once this phenomenon happens and its verification realized, the genuinely Christian thing to do is to get rid of the vows and to abandon

the religious life which has degenerated into a danger for the *common* Christian life within which is to be found that which can sanctify everybody. Consequently, the accidental character of the vows and of the religious life which is based on them to maintain a perpetual vocation would lead us to a contradictory situation which, on the one hand, would impel us to persevere in such a vocation and, on the other, would pile up obstacles to sanctification and salvation. It is obvious that God cannot call for perseverance in something which, in principle, turns out to be an impediment to union with him.

What can we say about all this? We cannot agree either with the preceding way of conceiving religious life and its relations with *common* Christian life or with the conclusions deriving from such a notion, especially the one referring to the temporariness of religious life.

Let us note, first of all, that, if the preceding arguments were valid, the temporariness of the vocation would be not a *possibility* but a *necessity,* i.e., something excelling the contingency of some concrete cases and converted into a law or inflexible norm, since it springs from the very nature of that in which religious life is said to consist. A perpetual religious vocation would be *impossible,* since it is affirmed as a principle that religious life is a purely accidental means which of itself can be transformed into an impediment to sanctification and salvation. And this conclusion is quite serious, since it implies that perpetual profession, introduced into the Church so many centuries ago, zealously maintained by her in our own day, and proposed by her as the best expression of a total consecration to Christ, is at bottom an immorality.

All of this is serious enough to demand a review of the starting point where the root of the evil is hidden. Previously, in the section *Perpetual Vocation and Total Consecration,* we offered a brief idea of the way we understand vocation and religious life and their relationship to *common* Christian life. Following Vatican II we have repeated many times that religious life is not limited to a plain compliance with the vows taken in profession but that it informs all the manifestations of

the life of the religious. A brief formula expressing our central idea could be the following : religious life is an original way of living the totality of the Christian life within the Church of Christ.[118] We think that only in this way does the repeated Conciliar affirmation of religious life as total surrender of the person and activity of religious to God make sense.

The Council states that the holiness professed by Christians in their different states of life is *one and the same.*[119] Sometimes these words are understood superficially as though they meant that the *differential* elements of each state, i.e., those which are not formally present in other states of life, were something merely accidental even for the state in which they are found. But such an understanding cannot be sustained. In order to be convinced of this, it will suffice to consider briefly in marriage and in the priesthood what are the elements differentiating the married and priests, elements which by no means could be labelled mere accidents in the lives of either married people or of priests. Why then does that which differentiates religious have to be considered without further qualification a pure accident which, in addition, can become an impediment to sanctification and salvation? Dismissing this, then, as lacking any basis, let us agree that the married state, the priestly state, and the religious state are all of them original modes of living the totality of the Christian life in the Church. The unity of holiness, as proclaimed by the Council, is not identified with *uniformity* but admits of a healthy pluralism, clearly witnessed to by the gospel. It is God, not man, who in the interior of Christianity produces and gives specific vocations whose content is different and which, therefore, qualifies with different modalities and styles that sanctity which leads us to the same goal. Plurality of vocations introduces into the one sanctity a pluralism which, because it comes from God, cannot but be perfectly legitimate, even entirely necessary for the Church.

[118] For further explanations we refer to our book *La Iglesia Imagen de Cristo* (Pamplona: OPE, 1969), ch. 7, pp. 326-334.

[119] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 41.

These considerations could be amply confirmed by the teaching of the Council, but we have already exposed much of this. Reading the sixth chapter of *Lumen Gentium* and the entire decree *Perfectae Caritatis* one never gets the idea that religious life consists in a mere practice of the vows or that it is a merely accidental thing. The reader will frequently come upon the word *charity* and other words which appear there as the expression of *realities* which *constitute* religious life. Religious life is *a whole* within which the vows are not more than *a part.* The judgment which such a whole merits from the Council is well expressed in the following words: "all religious, both men and women, *who have a distinguished place indeed in the house of the Lord,* deserve special care in their pursuit of spiritual progress for the good of the whole Church." [120] We wish to warn that the vows can be considered *part* when we pay attention only to the acts whereby what we could call their material fulfilment is concretized. But, if we take into account all their presuppositions, implications, motivations, and ramifications, it is clear that they range over the whole life of the religious, as we have often said.

Two passages from Paul VI conclude this section. The first shows the connection between charity and the religious life, which thus appears as a powerful proclamation of the *Absolute,* i. e., of something which does not suggest precisely the idea of accidentality. The second passage presents religious life as a *fullness which realizes the surrender of the Church to Christ.*

(Religious life) comprises a certain absolute-totalitas *quaedam*- a unique and total love. The soul must be given over to this love completely; it must return to this love unceasingly if it is to live the religious life in all its depth and authenticity. In a world that seeks to rid itself of absolute commands, that tends to regard all values as relative, the consecrated soul, focused unswervingly on God by its vows, is anchored in the absolute, as it were.[121]

Feel each time more persuaded that your life of love, of sacrifice, of

[120] *Presbyterorum Ordinis,* n. 6.

[121] Paul VI, Allocution to the Superioresses General gathered in Rome to study the application of the decree *Perfectae Caritatis (AAS 59* [1967], 340).

living crucifixion with Christ will redound to the benefit of the whole Church, because the members of secular and religious Institutes are a chosen portion of the Mystical Body, as a fullness which realizes the surrender of the Church to Christ as Spouse, as sign and as testimony .'[22]

Temporary Vocation

We have made innumerable references to this form of vocation, always taking an attitude that excludes it. Now we consider it necessary to qualify somewhat the extent of that exclusion.

It has always been admitted that in the Church there have existed genuine vocations but vocations frustrated because of lack of correspondence on the part of the person who received the grace. Any grace from God, and therefore also the grace of religious vocation, requires a cooperation which man has to give freely. If he who is called effectively complies with this requirement of grace, his vocation is strengthened; if he does not, his vocation " starves to death," i. e., is lost. And a genuine but lost vocation turns out to be, *in fact,* a temporary vocation. There can be no difficulty in this.

Thoughout the history of theology many more or less explicit affirmations of a temporary vocation can be found, though this precise expression is not found. In the literature on the controversy concerning the Mendicant Orders during the 13th century we can find ideas which can orientate toward a temporary vocation, especially when two themes are studied: 1) the *pueri oblati* and 2) the vow to enter religion, which is valid and binding, though it is not always followed by an effective perseverance till the end of life, since some Christians receive the grace of persevering and others only that of beginning.

It is impossible to delay now on the historical details of the controversy or on the precise sense which the ideas mentioned above have in it. But we can affirm with certitude that the modern problem whether religious vocation is in itself perpetual or only temporary falls totally outside the perspective of the

[122] Paul VI, Allocution of June 6, 1969 on his visit to the Regina Mundi Institute.

theologians participating in the controversy. Their clear and evident intention is to show the moral legitimacy of certain acts from which a religious life follows and which sometimes lasts only for a brief time in spite of which it can and must be considered to be a grace of God.

Leaving aside all these subjects, it is worthwhile reflecting a bit on temporary vocation in itself. The first thing we need is to clarify the vocabulary and to distinguish between *religious* vocation and vocation without any other specification. *Religious* vocation, as we have already said, must be suited to religious life, *as it is pTOposed in the gospel* in its fundamental outlines. The teaching of the gospel refers beyond possible doubt to a following of Christ through the practice of the counsels which lasts for the whole of life. Therefore it is obvious that *Teligious* vocation whereby someone is called to embody such a following of Christ cannot but be *perpetual;* only in this way does it respond to the object or goal toward which it moves. To talk about counsels which, *as they are proposed in the gospel,* demand perpetuity, and, on the other hand, to think that a merely temporary vocation is a grace adequate to embody them in life turns out to be a real contradiction.

Religious life, as it in fact existed and exists in the Church, is fittingly expressed in perpetual profession, i. e., in bonds which are exactly adjusted to the peculiar character of the evangelical counsels. This concrete form of institutionalization proposed by the Church for religious life is the best and most appropriate channel for the accomplishment of the full will of Christ regarding the evangelical counsels. And outside this channel the Church does not admit that any association of Christians may receive the name of *religious institute.* Therefore, iL is not possible to separate vocation to the communitarian and public realization of the evangelical counsels from vocation to the institutionalized religious life, i. e., the one which is based on perpetual vocation. [123] In other words, vocation to the religious

[123] In order lo solYc some problems wbicb could arise on the occasion of the affirmations made in the text, it would be convenient to keep in mind and

life is a perpetual and only a perpetual vocation. If in fact it is not realized, this is because of faults in human cooperation on the part of one or other of those who mediate in the long process of its perception, development, formation, and maintenance throughout the difficulties of life.[124]

A *temporary religious* vocation is something that makes no sense and turns out to be a real contradiction. It is possible that God grants graces which, because of different circumstances, are interpreted as a calling *to* religious life and that this apparent call guides the person toward a religious institute in which he would live for some time but from which he would end up by leaving, ordinarily during the formation years. Loyal interpretation of God's graces received at a definite moment and sincere incorporation into a religious institute subjectively justify the behavior of that person and of those who directed or confirmed his first steps; but *none* of this can *be* identified with a genuine *religious* vocation understood in its true nature of a grace whereby God calls one to the practice of the counsels *such as they are proposed in the gospel.* The appearance of *religious* vocation, though it may remain for years, is not a *religious* vocation. Let us say that the verification of lack of vocation is not the *loss* of vocation, though the verification might be realized much too late.

analogically to apply to religious vocation what Paul VI says about vocation to the priesthood: " The priestly vocation, although inspired by God, does not become definitive or operative without having been tested and accepted by those in the Church who hold power and bear responsibility for the ministry serving the ecclesial community. It is, therefore, the task of those who hold authority in the Church to determine, in accordance with the varying conditions of time and place, who in actual practice are to be considered suitable candidates for the religious and pastoral service of the Church, and \\·hat should be required of them " *Sacerdotalis Cadibatus,* n. 15 *(AAS 59* [1967], 663). "The priesthood is a ministry instituted by Christ for the service of his Mystical Body which is the Church. To her belongs the authority to admit to that priesthood those whom she judges qualified-that is, those to whom God has given, along with other signs of an ecclesiastical vocation, the gift of a consecrated celibacy " *(ibid.,* n. 962; p. 682).

[124] In this process not only those commit themselves who receive the grace of vocation but also those devoted to their formation and the whole Christian community. Cf. *Presbyterorum Ordinis,* n. II; *Optatam Totius,* n. 2; *Ad Gentes Divinitus,* n. 15 (circa finem). On the special responsibility of the parents, cf. *Lumen Gentium,* n. 11 (end of second paragraph); *Apostolicam Actuositatem,* n. Il.

What has been said thus far does not necessarily exclude all possibility of a temporary vocation. *Religious* vocation is perpetual, but nowhere is it said that every vocation to the practice of the evangelical counsels has to be a *religious* vocation. We have already said that the priestly vocation includes an invitation more or less direct, more or less pressing, to the practice of the counsels, especially in the matter of the episcopal priesthood. Let us try to explain briefly this possibility of a temporary vocation.

Religious life takes the evangelical counsels in all the fullness of content which belongs to them, i. e., *as they are proposed in the example and preaching of Jesus.* But this does not exclude forms of life in which the counsels are taken, so to speak, *a little reduced.* The "reduction" could affect the number of the counsels or the duration of the commitment.

Religious life includes the three counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience; they form a unitarian synthesis in which each counsel informs the others and is informed by them. But this does not mean that the three counsels have to be taken together always and necessarily. There are Christians who commit themselves to the practice of one specific counsel and not the others [125] with a commitment which cannot be acquired seriously without a special grace of God that we call *vocation* (though not *religious* vocation) .[126] This commitment can be not only hidden and merely private but also external and public, as the one which is acquired in the reception of Holy Orders. The priest, for instance, becomes obliged to celibacy not by virtue of a *religious* vocation (unless it is a case of religious priests) but of grace or vocation which comes from God though distinct from *religious* vocation.

Nothing impedes this reduction, whereby the " block " of evangelical counsels (characteristic of *religious* life) is broken, from being applied also to the order of duration. The counsels

[105] Pius XII, *Sacra virginitas (AAS* 46 [1954], 163).

[126] The Council, referring to virginity and celibacy, says that it is a "precious gift of divine grace which the Father gives to some men " *(Lumen Gentium,* n. 42).

are counsels. This apparent platitude has great importance, since it means that no Christian is obliged to comply with them personally [127] and that, if he wishes to comply with them, he can do so either by committing himself to the totality of their content as to matter and duration or by committing himself only to a part. The partial or temporary commitment is a means of imitating *in a reduced fashion* the type of life of Christ which cannot cease to be beneficial for the Christian who accepts it and for the whole Church. The fact that this is not enough to constitute *religious* life does not mean that it is not possible. In fact, just as there are Christians who commit themselves to the practice of one counsel and not the others, so are there also those who commit themselves only for a definite period of time and not for life. Actually, Christians who impose on themselves temporary commitments do not form communities. [128] But nothing seems *to* impede that in the future there will be communities based on these commitments, at least as regards the majority of the members. Rather, it is conceivable that the existence of such communities will be an efficacious means of approach to the practice of the evangelical counsels for a large number of Christians who otherwise would not have any serious contacts with these valuable instruments of sanctification and the apostolate. Besides, Vatican II actively urges all movements and initiatives directed to procure a progressive purification of Christian life by the use of a concrete program which is the effort to embody with increasing perfection the beatitudes [129] and the spirit of the evangelical counsels. [130] We consider that the communities we are referring

[127] The obligation of the evangelical counsels affects the Church as a whole, not particular Christians. It is a case analogous to the sacraments of matrimony and Holy Orders. Cf. our book *La Iglesia Imagen de Cristo,* ch. 7, pp. 350-355.

[128] As we have alreauy said previously, there are religious communities which never take perpetual vows, but their members at a given moment assume the commitment of indefinitely renewing temporary vows, or by some other means they commit themselves in a definitive manner with the Institute. Besides, as we have also saiu, this very fact is somewhat anomalous from a theological point of view.

[129] *Lumen Gentium,* nn. 8 & 38.

[130] *Ibid.,* n. 42 fin.

to could contribute considerably to the achievement of this goal.

The institutionalization of this type of community could begin by service to the missions. In the Church there is a specifically missionary vocation which last "for life." [131] But, at the same time, "the obligation of spreading the faith is imposed on every disciple of Christ, according to his ability." [132] In other words, every Christian vocation has a missionary project [133] and by the same token it shares to a great or lesser extent in what we call a specifically missionary vocation.

A practical way of actualizing the missionary spirit inherent in the Christian vocation is to devote oneself for some time (which can vary according to different cases) to the direct service of the missions. In fact, this already exists in the Church and tends to take on every day a greater increase. It could be notably favored by the formation of homogeneous groups and, if the case permits, of communities whose members mutually aid each other in the accomplishment of their missionary service. Nothing seems to be opposed to the idea that these communities, once formed, could practice the evangelical counsels during the time of their missionary commitment. The counsels encourage apostolic zeal and are excellent instruments for an effective missionary activity.

At times this temporary service to the missions is rendered by Christians already united in marriage. Naturally, it is not a case of proposing to them that they form communities to practice the evangelical counsels. But it seems clear to us that Vatican II proposes for laymen a series of missionary tasks to which they can commit themselves for a definite time and whose realization would be favored by the formation of communities within which the counsels could be practiced also temporarily .[134]

What is said here with regard to service of the missions could be applied analogically to many other forms of life and ministry

[131] *Ad Gentes Divinitus,* n. 23.
[132] *Lumen Gentium,* n. 17.
[133] *Ad Gentes Divinitus,* nn. 35-36.
[134] On such tasks cf. *ibid.,* nn. 17 & 41.

within the Church. Perhaps the family is one of the fields which could benefit greatly from the establishment of communities of the type to which we refer. The way the world is going and its progressive secularization gives the family an even greater importance in the maintenance of Christian life and in the very existence of the Church. That is why the different movements of family spirituality represent today one of the more promising manifestations of the life of the Church in preparing and consolidating its future.

If, as we have said, Christian life in general must be more and more improved and embody with increasing perfection the beatitudes and the spirit of the evangelical counsels, this seems necessary especially in the case of Christian families upon whom more and more a responsibility is going to fall which only they can face. This presupposed, we ask ourselves: would it not be possible for Christians willing to form a family, solidly based on the beatitudes and the spirit of the evangelical counsels, to prepare themselves for the goal with the effective practice of the counsels for a more or less extended period? If the idea can be realized, nothing seems to be opposed to this realization taking place within communities whose " functioning" is not easy to foresee at this time. The importance this would have for the Christian improvement and promotion of the family seems evident, although it is also clear that both can be achieved, with greater or lesser effectiveness, by other means.

The future of priestly and religious vocations is presented each time more bound up with the existence of families which embody the beatitudes and the spirit of the evangelical counsels, since only from within such families will it be possible to find children and young people with the human and Christian qualities which would make the priesthood and the religious life desirable for them and would make them sustain themselves in those vocations in the midst of a world increasingly more complex and secularized. It seems that we are approaching a time in which vocations will hardly prosper if they do not proceed from a family which had been " as a kind of

introductory seminary," [135] since only within a family will they be able to acquire the roots which allow them to keep themselves afloat for life. This is why every movement which consolidates within families a genuinely evangelical spirit is of capital importance not only for the family but also for the future of priestly and religious vocations. We consider that the existence of communities whose members practice the evangelical counsels temporally can be a good help for the achievement of such goals.

What ever might be said of temporary communities and of the services they might render, one thing is clear: that the forms which the manifestations of holiness can assume in the Church are inexhaustible and that nobody can set limits to them. Nobody will be able to demonstrate that the communitarian practice of the evangelical counsels has necessarily to be adjusted to the established pattern of religious life. In principle, nothing impedes such a practice from taking on reduced forms which will not be *religious* life but which will certainly constitute a new mode of proclaiming the sanctity of the Church and of rooting within the universal Christian family that esteem for some counsels in which the eschatological and pilgrim character of the Church singularly stands out. This means that, in principle, the existence of a temporary vocation is perfectly possible; indeed, it is presented as an authentic enrichment of the life of the Church.

Secular Institutes have been an enrichment of the doctrine and the traditional practice concerning a life consecrated to God by the following of the evangelical counsels. But they did not substract any value from the institutions with a longer history, the religious Orders and Congregations. Something similar can take place with the theme of temporary vocation, considered as presupposition for the establishment of communities of a new type whose shape one cannot foresee but which at any rate will suppose an effort and an achievement of the Church in its constant search to introduce the practice of the

[135] *Optatam Totius*, n. 2.

evangelical counsels within any new form of human life. It would be strange indeed if Vatican II could take place in the Church without provoking the appearance of new forms of surrender to God.

"\Ye will make a concluding observation which seems to us of great practical interest. Any healthy tradition is open to a homogeneous development with which it enriches itself, and all legitimate enrichment springs from a tradition with which it is coherent and whose validity it confirms. Applied to the case at hand, this means that the tradition of perpetual religious vocation leaves the door open to forms of temporary vocation and that, on the other hand, the possible forms of temporary vocation can be integrated in a coherent and spontaneous fashion with perpetual religious vocation. It would be a mistake with regrettable consequences to seek support in perpetual religious vocation in order to discard any form of temporary vocation or, on the contrary, to present a possible temporary vocation as a proof that *religious* vocation is not perpetual. To give each thing its own is the best guarantee of reaching a balanced-and what is more important-a true solution.

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ACADEMIC DISSENT: AN ORIGINAL ECCLESIOLOGY
A REVIEW ARTICLE

TWO VOLUMES [1] WHICH spell out a well-publicized position on dissent bear extensive critical evaluation. The first volume, purports to repeat substantially the theological rationale which Charles Curran and his associates submitted to the Inquiry Board at the Catholic University in justification of their public dissent to *Humanae Vitae.* The companion volume, *The Responsibility of Dissent: The Church and Academic Freedom,* is a development of the written testimony presented to the Inquiry Board by counsel on behalf of the " subject professors " in vindication " of the propriety and responsibility of their actions in the light of accepted academic norms." The first volume contains its own history of the case.

Within thirty hours of the encyclical's promulgation a neuresthenic telephonic harvesting of signatures was activated with zealous vigor by Charles Curran and twenty associates of the Department of Theology of The Catholic University of America for subscription to their *Statement* of July 30, 1968 in opposition to the doctrinal prescriptions of *Humanae Vitae.* Some of the subscribers did admit that they had not yet read the text of the encyclical or, if they had, that it was hardly with benefit of those schoarly and meditative reflections that a broader expansion of time would have encouraged. Time has the numbing effect of dimming the memory of the asperities of this contestation of a solemn and definitive papal teaching but the spiritual wounds inflicted upon the faithful may be long in mending. The raw aching fact is that scandal was given. These dissidents did interpose their pastoral counsel between the Supreme Pastor of the Universal Church and the faithful in a grave matter of morality touching intimately the conscience of spouses. None of the numerous statements of Pope Paul subsequent to the promulgation of *Humanae Vitae* in any way has substracted from the full original force of its doctrinal content, nor-more nearly to the nerve center of the sensitivities of academic freedom, its prerogatives and immunities in theological disciplines, as they are related to the grave responsibilities of

[1] *Dissent IN and FOR the Church: Theologians and Humanae Vitae,* by Charles E. Curran, Robert E. Hunt, Terence R. Connelly; *The Responsibility of Dissent: The Church and Academic Freedom,* by John F. Hunt and Terence R. Connelly with Charles E. Curran, Robert E. Hunt, Robert K. Webb. S<'arch Book paperbacks. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969.

Catholic theologians and priests to teach, preach, publish, and counsel in accordance with the authentic teaching of the Catholic Church-has there been any expression of disapproval from the Vatican on the correctness of Cardinal O'Boyle's stand on *Humanae Vitae,* both in his capacity as Chancellor of the University and as Ordinary of his priests.

My own religious and intellectual response to these two volumes is such that to dispense with them by the customary brief review would be less than fair to readers of the review. There is need for an article-length review in order that frequent referrals to the text may disclose the evidence for the critical appraisal.

The title, preface, and first chapter, *The Historical Context,* chronicle the events leading to the theological contestation of *Humanae Vitae* by the author and the " subject professors " with a faultless choice of words ami expressions. The title is *Dissent IN and FOR the Church,* (italics in the original). The Preface spells out the refreshing liberalization and independence of priests and layman " of ecclesiastical direction " and " from the institutional Church" and notes that "Pope Paul VI has spoken frequently in a *fearful, and even reactionary,* manner about the contemporary tumult in the Church." (italics supplied) . The defense of dissent is undertaken " with the hope that the Roman Catholic Church will thus be able to carry more faithfully its God-given mission in history." And the volume is dedicated " especially to those unjustly accused of disloyalty without benefit of due process." Their *Statement* did not constitute a " rebellion or revolution " but rather was inspired by a conscientious responsibility to do just what they did and in the very manner they did it.

Summarily, my own appraisal of the *Statement* is that it is a supercilious pastiche of highly questionable postulates, such as the crude charge that the Roman Pontiff does not correctly understand orthodox catholic ecclesiology, the referrals to past reversals of authoritative papal pronouncements on matters about which even onetime militant Protestant scholarship has long since become too embarassed to regurgitate, the position that *Humanae Vitae* is at variance with affirmations of Vatican II and demonstrates no advance upon *Casti Connubii,* etc.

The *Statement-and* the exposition of all that is implied therein in succeeding chapters-constitutes a bold and novel ccclesiology which, we respectfully submit, none of the Pontiffs, Councils, and Fathers of the Church have ever known, and surely one that might have drawn unusual interest had it been proposed to the Fathers of Vatican II as the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church.

Chapter Two, *Preliminary Consideration concerning the Nature of Theology and the Role of Theologians,* and Chapter Three, *Preliminary Consideration concerning the Nature and Function of the Magisterium,* represent the schema of the constitution of the Church which the authors are confident that the ever " ongoing" divine revelation will ratify and make

incontestably clear to the community of believers in unearthing the original and authentic divine intent of Our Divine Lord from the historical incrustations of usurpations of ecclesiastical power and from uncritical deference and obedience to an " aggrandized teaching authority residing in councils and Church officers."

In the face of this trend toward establishing an exclusive teaching prerogative ;n the hierarchy, recent historical studies have exercised a modifying influence by pointing out the presence of error by way of theological dissent. Dissent thus appears traditionally as one possible, responsible option in the theological task, and in its own way, is an intrinsic element in the total magisterial function of the Church. The entire Church, as truly magistral, can never be contained simply and exclusively in what has become known as the hierarchical magisterium. (pp. 86-87) .

The credibility of *Dissent IN and FOR the Church* then rests on the necessity of bringing the " theologians," dissenters as well as nondissenters, within the magisterial authority of the Church as, supposedly, established by Christ, Our Lord. This is done by the employment of a concatenation of terms excised from Vatican II and at variance with their original meaning in text and context. The argument proceeds as follows: The People of God-all, without exception, are called upon to the *aedificatio Corporis Christi* which St. Paul proclaims (Col. g: 7; Eph. 4: 16). Now surely within this all comprehensive sweep " theologians " are associated in a special way by a "coresponsibility," a notion that is in accordance with and is further reenforced by the full implications of " collegiality of bishops." Now, when we turn to *the* principal document of Vatican II, *Lumen Gentium,* the *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,* the very first chapter is an unambiguous reaffirmation of the doctrine of the *Mystical Body of Christ* with eighty-four scriptural references to attest to this, and of the supplementary notes five are *nominatim* to Pius XII's *Mystici Corporis* and *Humani Generis* and others to the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, Conciliar documents, and papal encyclicals in support of it. Let the reader compare Chapter One of *Lumen Gentium* on the *Mystical Body of Christ* with the only two scant considerations of it by Curran:

Pius XII, in *Mystici Corporis* (1943) and again with more emphasis in *Humani Generis* (1950), insisted that the mystical body of Jesus on earth was simply identical with the Roman Catholic Church. In *Humani Generis,* the Pope insisted that his teaching on the matter was to settle the discussion among theologians. Vatican II has produced a different teaching. (p. 80)

Has it?

In the twentieth century, the distinct and "official" recovery of a broader-based ecclesiology under one biblical image was brought about by the encyclical *Mystici Corporis* of Pius XII (1943). This encyclical marked an important stage in the development of ecclesiology-the end of one era (taking up the findings and

themes of over a century of minority theological works) and the beginnings of another era. Ecclesial life-style, howenr, was not significantly changed by the issuance of *Mystici Corporis.* However, almost immediately, it was recognized that the doctrine and limits of the 1943 encyclical and the use of solely the " mystical body" image were inadequate to articulate properly an authentic churchly self-awareness, both domestically in terms of the internal componency and life-dynamics of the Church, and especially in respect to other Christian communities outside the Roman communion. (p. 95)

Is this a valid reflection of Chapter One of the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church on the *Mystical Body of Christ?*

Chapter Two, *On the People of God,* follows upon, without abrogating, the preceding and first chapter on the *Mystical Body of Christ.* **It** affirms the universal salvific will of God, the redemptive merits of Christ's passion, death, and Resurrection, the removal of ethnic, racial, national, and geographic barriers among the People of God, etc. Within this all comprehensive catholicity all the people are the people of God, and they are diversely related to the Mystical Body of Christ, his Church on earth. The Catholic faithful are " fully incorporated "; the catechumens are incorporated into the Church by intention; the baptized non-Catholic Christians are " linked " with the Catholic Church to the degree that they " share " by baptism and other sacraments, the acceptance of Scripture, and participation in prayer in the life of God. All these are " prompted " by Christ's grace to that unity by " faith in its entirety " and " union of communion with the successor of Peter " for which " Mother Church never ceases to pray, hope and work that this may come about." (15) **If** there is a fuller and more radiant bloom to the doctrinal formulation of the People of God, its roots are deeply embedded in medieval theologizing.

Chapter Three of *Lumen Gentium-On the Hierarchical Structure of the Church and in Particular on the Episcopate-with* its firm reaffirmation of the Petrine commission, its unique and exclusive prerogatives, its independent, plenary, and unconditioned magisterial authority, and the formal explicitation of the doctrine of the collegiality of the bishops (and of the bishops alone, not a collegiality of any other ministry) as a constitutive part of ecclesial magisterium in its union with, agreement with, and by consent of the Vicar of Christ, stands out with the full radiance of divine revelation against the congregationalist ecclesiology of Curran; it stands out fully authoritarian and unabashedly hierarchical. All this in one of the only two dogmatic constitutions of Vatican **II.**

But the college or body of bishops has no authority unless it is simultaneously conceived in terms of its head, the Roman Pontiff, Peter's successor, and without any lessening of his power of primacy over all, pastors as well as the general faithful. For in virtue of his office, that is, as Vicar of Christ and pastor of the whole Church, the Roman Pontiff has full, supreme, and universal power over the

Church. And he can always exercise this power freely. The order of bishops is the successor to the college of the apostles in teaching authority and pastoral rule; or, rather, in the episcopal order the apostolic body continues without a break. Together with its head, the Roman Pontiff, and never without its head, the episcopal order is Lhe subject of supreme and full power over the universal Church. But this power can be exercised only with the consent of the Roman Pontiff. For Our Lord made Simon Peter alone the rock and keybearer of the Church (cf. Mt. 16: 18-19), and appointed him shepherd of the whole flock (cf. Jn. 21:15 ff.). *(Lumen Gentium),* n. 22.

As Oscar Cullman, the renowned Protestant theologian observer at the Council remarked, the formulation of the doctrine of the collegiality of the bishops left the full and plenary powers of the Roman Pontiff undiminished and unconditioned as before, and, if I may add, completely removed any lingering doubt to the contrary on the intent and meaning of the Vatican I definition. Square all this with the shabby historicism on p. 56 and following.

The insistence of the authors of *Dissent* that theologians are intrinsic to the ecclesial magisterium is the most rootless of all their protestations. There is no warrant for it in the mandate of Christ, neither explicitly, implicitly, or by any mamH'r of prolonged inferential ratiocination. There is no evidence of such a role for theologians in the writings of the Fathers of the Church nor in any of the official documents of the Church, papal and conciliar. And for all the dissidents' facile rhetorical references to Vatican II, the Council Fathers never graced them with a distinct classification or separate consideration as they did with the Roman Pontiff, the bishops, the religious, laity, and priests. Indeed, the word itself "theologians" appears *only once* among the 103,014 words of the sixteen official texts promulgated by the Ecumenical Council. Considering the centrality of the dissendents' concept of the role of theologians as an intrinsic element in the total magisterial function of the Church " (p. 87) to their ecclesiology, it seems that they have been slighted by a Council celebrated for its formulation of the collegiality of bishops and by those very bishops who were accompanied by *pcriti.*

Undaunted, the dissidents manage to overcome this formidable accumulation of traditional ecclesiological barriers by several ploys. First, the absolutes and certitudes of Christian doctrine are brought within the changing concept of valid knowledge and subjected to the historical and cultural limitations to which most human science is heir.

> The object of science has changed from the Aristotelian-Scholastic ideal (" certain knowledge of things through their causes ")-and the resultant concern for university, necessity and certainty-to the contemporary scientific ideal (complete explanation of all data in terms of their intelligible relationships) -and the resultant concern for development, probability and matter-of-factness. (p. 82)

In the light of an appreciation of historical growth and development, the theologian realizes he will never attain the older ideal of absolute certitude. (p. 32)

(What a field day Gilbert K. Chesterton would have had with these new ecclesiologists and a pity we have been denied so much amusement.) What shall we say of the absolutes of " whatever I have taught you " that Christ Our Lord commanded his Apostles to teach to every man everywhere to the end of time unconditionally for eternal salvation? At this juncture of theologizing, there must be a denial to any empowerment on earth to definitive teaching-including the last Council.

'Vith all reverence, theologians recog11ize that the documents of Vatican II were "dated " on the first day after solemn promulgation.

The *spirit* of Vatican II mighL be i!,'110red in favor of the letter and limitations of officially promulgated formulations. Reference in the future to the letter of the pronouncements of Vatican II as the final norm for e\·aluating theological data would effectively bring Roman Catholic ecclesiological *progress to a halt.* This is not because Vatican II formulations are unsuitable; rather, it is because they are intrinsically limited to what the Council :Fathers intended them to be-formulations which express, for the most part, the maximum capacity of that time but which do not preclude future, ongoing developments beyond the categories of Vatican II itself. (pp. 100, 101) (italics supplied)

And if this be true of Vatican II, then it is no less true of all the ecumenical councils since Nicaea. Whether they realize it or not, the dissidents have extinguished the blaze of their fiery zeal to gray ashes. For, if Vatican II is "dated" on the first day after their solemn promulgation in an "ongoing " process of religious knowledge and understanding, then there really never is any dissent. How could one distinguish an orthodox from a heterodox (Catholic) theologian?

A negative book review is generally not likely to encourage its readers to peruse the volume, much less to advertise its sales. I for one earnestly urge all who were interested or troubled by the *Statement* of the principal and the " subject professors " and by succeeding events which brought into their train among other considerations the question of the prerogatives and immunities of academic freedom to read *Dissent IN and FOR the Church* studiously together with a copy of the Documents of Vatican II. We have noted how far apart are *Dissent's* referrals to the Mystical Body of Christ, the People of God, the papacy, the collegiality of bishops, and the hierarchical Church, as well as the role the dissident " theologians " claim to be rightfully their own within the magisterium of the Church from the doctrinal teaching of the Fathers of the Council as solemnly set down in *Lumen Gentium.* The reader of *Dissent* ought also to observe whether its referrals to the Council's teaching on religious freedom is based on a correct understanding and application of the authentic meaning of the *Declaration*

On Religious Freedom, (Dignitatis Humanae). One such provocative reference reads as follows:

> Vatican II, with its declarations on collegiality and religious liberty, has made every contemporary theologian particularly familiar with doctrinal development and with the implications of that process for his interpretative endeavors. (p. 35) (see also p. 100).

Now, surely, it is not to the discredit of the Fathers of the Council nor is it a slight upon the Council's *Declaration On Religious Freedom* that neither their deliberations nor the document's content in anyway were concerned even remotely with " doctrinal development and the implications of that process for (every contemporary) theologian's interpretative endeavors."

Religious freedom, in turn, which men demand as

> necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society. Therefore, it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ. *(Dignitatis Humanae,* I.)

The reader of *Dissent* ought earnestly to search the Council's document to note whether the " subject Professors " and their principal have based their ecclesiological theologizing on the teaching of the Council Fathers and further, in broader context, whether, in fact, the main thesis of *The Responsibility of Dissent: the Church and Academic Freedom,* the companion volume, has been virtuously exercised. Of course, the reader must also bear in mind that they have written:

> With all reverence, theologians recognize that the documents of Vatican II were " dated " on the first day after solemn promulgation. (p. 100).

With such an escape hatch, it would be rather difficult to hold anyone of them to account.

The authors of *Dissent* exert much effort on distinguishing between infallible and noninfallible teachings of the magisterium. Their discussion, however, is inadequate and the emphasis misplaced. To begin with, the note of infallibility is attached to the solemn definitions of the Vicar of Christ, to the solemn definitions of an ecumenical council, not, however, without approbation and ratification of the Roman Pontiff, and to what has been traditionally recognized by the theologians themselves: *infallibilis ex ordinaria magisterio.* Of this last, *Dissent* is completely silent despite the fact that Vatican II first speaks of this infallibility before expounding thai of the Roman Pontiff, followed by the infallible pronouncements of a council acting together with the successor of Peter. *Dissent* does fix upon noninfallible teachings of the Church which are authentic but-as they will argue-not binding even if and when the Teaching Authority of the

Church says that it is binding in conscience, as it did in *Humanae Vitae.* This is as necessary to the argumentation of *Dissent* as the necessity of inserting the "theologians" within the magisterium. Summarily, this necessitous course of logic proceeds as follows: Infallibility absolutely precludes the possibility of error. Anything less than an infallible teaching does not foreclose absolutely such a possibility of error. And herein is grounded ultimately the possibility of dissent (p. 40) and the recourse to probabilism whereby an alternate course of conduct becomes justifiably permissible. A number of clarifications are here in order. An authentic noninfallible teaching of the magisterium is invested with certitude, that is, with moral, practical certitude. Such a certitude precludes and, in fact, is unrelated to any consideration of a contrary probable opinion. It is not the absolute possibility of error that an authentic noninfallible teaching of the Church speculatively does not foreclose that establishes the justifying grounds for recourse to the principle of probabilism. Nor is such recourse dependent upon the acknowledgement of a " doubtful law does not bind," a popular axiom which presumes what it denies. Probabilism does not rely on the absolute possibility of error but rather, given the absence of certitude (which an authentic noninfallible teaching of the Church does provide), it is an exercise of the virtue of prudence to choose between two solidly probable opinions. No such claim on the absence of certitude on the Church's absolute ban against artificial contraceptives may be made as existing within the Magisterium, whatever doubts some private theologians may have entertained within their own persuasion after 1963. (At this point we may appreciate more fully why it was necessary for the " subject professors " and their principal to bring the dissidents into the authority of the Church.)

Of the universality of commitment prior to the Council John T. Noonan wrote:

> No Catholic the<Jlogian has ever taught, "Contraception is a good act." The teaching on contraception is clear and apparently fixed forever. *(Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologiana and Canonists* [1966], p. 6)

> No Catholic writer before 1963 had asserted that the general prohibition of contraception was wrong. (p. 512)

And on *Casti Connubii:* whose validity and binding force the *Statement* called into question, Professor Noonan wrote:

> How great was its authority? By the ordinary tests used by the theologians to determine whether a doctrine is infallibly proclaimed, it may be argued that the specific condemnation of contraceptive interruption of the procreative act is infallibly set out. The encyclical is addressed to the universal Church. The Pope speaks in fulfillment of his apostolic office. He speaks for the Church. He speaks on moral doctrine that he says " has been transmitted from the beginning." He " promul-

gates " the teaching. If the Pope did mean to use the full authority to speak *ex cathedra* on morals, which Vatican I recognized as his, what further language could he have used? *(ibid.)*

In 1962, the year the Council opened, Cardinal Suenens declared:

What was condemned as intrinsically immoral yesterday will not become moral tomorrow. No one should entertain any confused doubt or false hope on the point. The Church has not decided that these (contraceptive) practices are immoral; she has merely confirmed what the moral law already said about them. *(Love and Control,* Eng. tr. Robinson. Burns Oates [1962], p. 103)

And at the Vatican Council Cardinal Suenens chose to conclude his speech of November 7, 1964 on the Schema on the Missions pointedly to reject and dispel the misconstruction he claimed the press had placed upon his speech on marriage of the 29th of October with these unambiguous affirmations:

Allow me to take thi.< opportunity and this method of replying very briefly to some reactions in public opinion which interpreted my speech on matrimonial ethics as if I had mid that the doctrine and discipline of the Church in this matter had ch&nged. So far as doctrine is concerned, my words made it quite clear that I wae asking only for research in this whole area, not with a view to changing anything in the Church's doctrine which has been already authentically and definiti,ely proc-laimed, but only with a view to elaborating a synthesis of all the principles which are relevant in this domain. So far as discipline is concerned, it is clear that the conclusions of the Commission to which I have referred have to be submitted to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff and adjudged by his supreme authority. I said this explicitly. It is obvious that any decisions regarding the of the Commission rest exclusively with that same authority. I say these lhin::;s now in order to remove all misunderstanding in public opinion.

There is nothing in the Encyclical itself nor in any of the numerom declarations about it since its promulgation by Pope Paul that dimly suggests any doubt about the absolute obligatory force of the doctrine which is propounded " by virtue of the mandate entrusted to us by Christ."

I have noted earlier that the stress which the authors of *Dissent* place upon the distinction between infallible and authentic noninfallible teaching is misplaced as far as the controverted issue is concerned. What matters is the deliberate, formal, calculated, purposeful intent of the Vicar of Christ teaching, as he undoubtedly did in *Humanae Vitae,* as Supreme Pastor of the Universal Church on a grave matter of faith and morals, a doctrine that is binding in conscience upon the spouses and the grave obligation of acceptance in teaching, preaching, and counselling " especially in the case of those who teach moral theology" *(H. V.* n. 28) and of the pastoral duty of the episcopate on this matter " as one of your most urgent responsibilities." *(H. V.* n. 29)

Two days after the promulgation of *Huma1Ule Vitae* His Holiness said·

We had no doubt about Our duty to give Our decision in the terms expressed in the present encyclical - - - We hoped that scholars especially would be able to discover in the document the genuine thread that connects it with the Christian concept of life and which permits Us to make our own the words of St. Paul: "But we have the mind of Christ" (1 Cor. 2: 16) (General Audience at Castel Gandolfo, July 31, 1968).

The pretext of a presumed doubt during the interlude of " study and reflection " was largely the confection of private theologians who actively engaged in teaching contrary to the repeated admonitions of Pope Paul not to ignore the traditional norms on marital relations which his predecessors, Pius XI and Pius XII, had authoritatively reaffirmed. Let there be no misunderstanding on the precise issue before us. If there was any doubt about the absolute ban on contraceptives in any private theologian, there was none in the Magisterium.

What, then, of a sincere doubt in a theologian? No one can be so presumptuous as to preclude such a subjective state of mind in a private theologian of piety, erudition, and good intentions. But such a supposition, we respectfully insist, is in the light of the historical testimonials unrelated to a *lex dubia* or the principle of probabilism. We simply posit it as a sincere and genuine intellectual difficulty in one who, while not denying the Teaching Authority of the Church to bind in conscience by an authentic noninfallible doctrine, would want to be more rationally satisfied intellectually. \Ve hope to have supposed the case of a doubting or even contesting private theologian with the best of human credentials. (Ultimately, it is the problem of the relationship of faith and reason, a matter to which we will dedicate our energies in a subsequent study).

In regard to personal external conduct, that is, preaching, teaching, publication, and counselling in the confessional, the obligation, to communicate the moral doctrine of the Church is no less absolute than in matters of dogma even if they arc of the authentic noninfallible description. This would preclude the presentation of alternate positions in good conscience on an *a pari* basis with the teaching of the papal and ecclesial Magisterium by some recourse to the principle of probabilism. Further, the obligation not to contest the Church's teaching in public, for example, via the communications media, is unconditional. This does not forbid private theologians to discourse together and raise all sorts of questions about the doctrine propounded if it is done discreetly, in places and in a manner and with such fellow discussants as not to give scandal. There is no incompatibility between the absolute obligation to teach in accordance with Church doctrine and, at the same time, to try to resolve sincere intellectual difficulties by collective discourse. Reconsiderations, restudies, repeated intellectual probings are of ancient vintage in the Church.

One need only recall the wild revelry in medieval *quaestiones, controversiae, disputationes, ego autem contra, sic et non* wherein every theological and philosophical verity was challenged in order to plumb the full dimensions of a question and to conclude to a richer knowledge of a truth that had already been professed. The *Statement* of the " subject professors " and their principal, the telephonic solicitation of signatures, the speed of their response to *Humanae Vitae,* the subsequent contestation shown in a variety of ways in order to organize and galvanize additional public opposition to the Encyclical, in effect, to interpose their pastoral counsel between the Supreme Pastor of the Universal Church and the Faithful, hardly comport with the exigencies of scholarly discourse.

Even within the internal sanctuary of his own mind there is a *per se* obligation for the private theologian to assent especially where the obligation of acceptance is stated so unambiguously as in *Humanae Vitae.* The obligation of acceptance as related to personal conduct remains absolute. The obligation to personal internal intellectual agreement with the doctrine propounded may become conditional in exceptional instances of an eminent theologian truly noted for his erudition and devotion to the Church. This extraordinary hypothesis will hardly cover the generality of priests and nuns who teach theology. All of us are accountable to God and not, as it is popularly said, to personal conscience, and, for Catholics at least, the Church's role in the formation of conscience is not diffused by private magisteria of theologians, prestigious and nonprestigious. It is not left to the conscience of the Catholic to subordinate the authentic and authoritative interpretation of the divine moral order to its own superior determination of the morality of an act. Conscience may speak with many tongues and not all of them are always reliable, nor are all the persuasions of conscience above the strongest urges of human passion, burdensome inconveniences, and rationally appealing self-interest.

The argument of the right to dissent, based on the possibility of error that an authentic noninfallible teaching by definition does not absolutely preclude, is finally given anchorage in the ominous " possibility of a

> pope becoming a heretic or a schismatic. Popes, canonists, and theologians have acknowledged the possibility of papal heresy or schism, and some nine centuries of theological and canonical discussion have included consideration of what the Church at large could do in such a case. (pp. 46-47)

Well, that ought to do it, if nothing else will!

Dissent abounds with casual teases, employment of words, expressions, and brief allusions, all calculated like psychedelic lights to induce a new consciousness of the Church. To "community of believers," "collegiality," and " religious liberty " harnessed to " coresponsibility of theologians," now add, " historically and culturally conditioned views of authority and truth," " the very notion of teaching is ambiguous," " post Vatican II self-aware-

ness," "post Vatican II mentality," "entire Church as magistral," "sensus fidelium," " charisms," the need for a " theology of compromise," etc. All of these are mentioned or stated in such a manner as to diffuse *The Hierarchical Structure of the Church, With Special Reference to the Episcopate,* c. 3, of *Lumen Gentium* and to suggest a latitudinarian magisterium (there is more than one way to insert the " theologians " into the magisterium. If they cannot make it on their own, then, surely, through an all inclusive congregationalist ecclesiology). Consider for example, *Dissent's* treatment of *sensus fidelium* (p. *56)* with what Vatican II says of it:

> The body of the faithful as a whole, anointed as they are by the Holy One, cannot err in matters of belief. Thanks to a supernatural sense of the faith which characterizes the People as a whole, it manifests this unerring quality when, " from the bishops down to the last member of the laity," (cf. St. Augustine, *De praed. sanct.)* it shows universal agreement in matters of faith and morals. *(Lumen Gentium,* n. 12).

The stress on complete unanimity of all the laity with the entire episcopacy is not so apparent in *Dissent.* The Council statement is tautological. Everyone is without error or everyone is in error. But God will not fail his Church in such unanimity. *Dissent* accustoms its readers by the sheer force of frequency to the employment of terms and expressions of the Council documents with a meaning at variance with their original source and context. The purpose is unmistakably clear. By appealing to a " post Vatican II mentality " and the inevitability of an " ongoing " process of doctrinal " development " the right of theological dissent becomes more than an exercise of academic freedom; it is a necessary beneficent catalyst in doctrinal adjustment and reformulation. In a word, there are no absolutes in creed and morality. The "subject professors" and their principal have wandered blithely into the \Yastelands of relativism simply by their insistence that orthodoxy be saved from itself. And all this is by the providence of a pneumatic imperial demiurge that moves the community of believers by graces and special charisms through a variety of ministries to the "theology of compromise." The ::\'Iontanists never exercised the Holy Spirit with such relentless vigor.

But surely it is bad grace when the authors of *Dissent* quote Pope Paul VI on conciliar decrees as a witness to their novel ecclesiology. On p. 101 we read:

> As Paul VI reminds us: The conciliar decrees are not so much a destination as a point of departure toward new goals. The renewing power and spirit of the council must continue to penetrate to the very depths of the church's life. The seeds of life planted by the council in the soil of the church must grow and achieve full maturity.

One is hard put not to wonder whether a deliberate, calculated deception is here intended or some intellectual incapacitation accounts for this unwarranted juxtaposition of the "dynamic interpretation" of *Lumen Gentium* which the authors espouse with the transitional developments through change initiated by decrees. *Constitution* is the general term for statements concerning the Church itself. Of the sixteen official texts promulgated by the Ecumenical Council four of them are constitutions, dogmatic, pastoral, and liturgical, each expressive of theological propositions. Three of the documents are Declarations (On Christian Education, Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, and On Religious Freedom) . *Declarations* are " policy statements " or statements of particular principles on relations with those who do not belong to the Church (Note that the declaration is on Christian, not just Catholic, education). *Decrees* are documents of practical significance. They are affirmations of the Council on modern problems and their solutions. They are essentially opportune, prudential directives to cope with contemporary problems in their wide diversity and to effectuate appropriate adjustments and progressive changes in accordance with the soteriological continuing mission of the Church. Thus, when the authors of *Dissent* quote Pope Paul VI on the intent of conciliar decrees-" not so much a destination as a point of departure towards new goals "-in approbation of their "dynamic interpretation" of the *Dogmatic Constitution On the Church* in accordance with their own novel ecclesiological prepossessions, they are being less than reverent with His Holiness and with the Fathers of the Council.

The authors of *Dissent* dust off some allegedly historical instances of papal doctrinal failings and reversibility of which Protestant scholars have long since been too embarassed to have cited against the validity of papal authority. There are the cases of Popes Liberius, Vigilius, and Honorius, and, of course, the popular referrals to Galileo and usury, and the more recent "reversals" of *Quanta Cura* and *Mirari Vos* by the Vatican II's *Declaration On Religious Freedom.* An occasion other than a lengthy book review should consider these allegedly doctrinal failings and reversals; thus it is understandable that we direct our limited comments to the following issues:

(1) The *Galileo* case illustrates what hazards are risked when the Roman Pontiff acquiesces in the findings and recommendations of an ecclesiastical commission. This aspect of the Galileo case and its relevance to Pope Paul's exercise of papal authority independent of the majority report of the papal commission has strangely been given the silent treatment by critics of *Humanae Vitae.* Further, the *Galileo* case becomes less intolerable, if not more understandable, when projected against the condemnation of Kepler by the Protestant theological faculty of Tiibingen in 1596 for affirming the identical scientific truth for which thirty-seven years later Galileo was condemned. The unanimous decision of the

Protestant divines was that Kepler's book, *Prodromus Dissertationum Cosmographicarum,* was heretical because it contradicted the Old Testament's story about Joshua's command to stay the sun in its cyclical course around the earth. Kepler's scientific thesis, his explanation and defense before the Academic Senate of Tilbingen, is substantially identical to that of Galileo before the Roman commission. It may not cast light upon the problem, but perhaps it may engender a sympathy for the times and their shortcomings to observe that Luther, Melancthon, and the generality of Protestant university professors and preachers strongly opposed the Copernican theory as contrary to the teaching of the Bible while, by contrast, the Copernican system was favorably considered and received by many of the Roman ecclesiastics even in high office. Further, what is generally overlooked is that the condemnation of Galileo was by virtue of a scriptural interpretation then prevalent among theologians who could not tolerate Galileo's challenge of their scriptural exegesis.

It seems to me that when the authors of *Dissent* fault the papal teaching authority in the Galileo case and pass over their favorite theme on the " coresponsibility of theologians " whose scriptural exegesis provided the major premiss for Galileo's condemnation by the Roman commissions, they are looking to theological self-interest rather narrowly.

(2) On usury we may consider some second thoughts and reflections by two scholars of the science of economy.

I was brought up to believe that the attitude of the Medieval Church to the rate of interest was inherently absurd, and that the subtle discussions aimed at distinguishing the return on money-loans from the return to active investment were merely jesuitical attempts to find a practical escape from a foolish theory. But I now see these discussions as an honest intellectual effort to keep separate what the classical theory has inextricably confused together, namely, the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital. For it now seems clear that the disquisitions of the schoolmen were directed towards the elucidation of a formula which should allow the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital to be high, whilst using rule and custom and moral law to keep do\yn the rate of interest. (Lord Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* [1946], p. 351)

The very simple formula in which eccksiastical authority expressed its attitude to the question of profit-making is this: Interest on pure money loan in any form is forbidden, profit on capital in any form is permitted, whether it flows from commercial business or from an industrial undertaking . . . or from insurance against transport risks, or from share-holding in an enterprise or however else.

This is at bottom by no means so astonishing when we consider more closely the men whom we are used to call Scholastics. We have been accustomed to do them a great injustice in regarding them as unpractical, abstruse-minded book-worms, treating of unreal topics, through endless repetitions and with intolerable prolixity . . . If one attentively pursues the writings of the Scholastics, especially the wonderful work of the very great Thomas Aquinas, the monumental quality of

which was equalled only by the creations of Dante and Michaelangelo, one gains the impression that the work of education which they had at heart was something different from our education in middle-class respectability; that it was the education of their contemporaries to be upright, intelligent, courageous and energetic men. (Werner Sombert, *The Bourgeois* [199W], p. 314)

(3) *Dissent* sees a reversal of doctrine of "freedom of conscience as stated in *Quanta Cura* of Pius IX and *Mirari Vos* of Gregory XVI by the *Declaration On Religious Freedom* of Vatican II. The simple fact is *Dignitatis Humanae* of Vatican II never discourses about "freedom of conscience." The expression itself does not even appear once in the entire document. The Declaration treats ,,-ith immunity from coercion in civil society on matters of belief and worship; not a word or even an oblique reference to "freedom of conscience." Further, there is nothing in any of the documents of Vatican II that diminishes the condemnations of the egalitarian value of aU beliefs and nonbeliefs which is the essence of the indifferentism proscribed by Pius IX and Grerrory XVI. On the contrary, the *Declaration on Freedo:n* identifies the Catholic Church as the one true religion which all men are hound in conscience to acknowledge but freely, with resronsihle freedom :md with immunity from coercion in civil society.

(4) There are endless occasions for critical comment; referrals to "auctores approbati" without saying approved by whom, "charisms" without noting the ancient Pauline doctrine on the sufficiency of grace for every vocation, and the gift of extraordinary charisms such as abounded in the early Church and the persecuted Church of martyrs but with no mention of the Council's repetition of St. Paul's admonition that only Church authorities may judge competently about the extraordinary graces.

(5) Even an article-length book review has its limits, and so we conclude with this last animadversion on *Dissent.* On p. 162, there is initiated a discussion of the *Failure to Admit Plurality of Natural Law Theories* (in *H. V.).* I must confess that after repeated study I still fail to appreciate the thrust of the authors' complaint. In the history of moral philosophy there have been a wide variety of natural law theories whose diversities extend from similarities to contraries and even to contradictories. There is the cosmological necessitarianism of the Stoics' naturalist monism and its variations by Cicero, Gaius, Ulpian, and Seneca. There is the Aristotelian natural law severed from its Platonic metaphysical moorings. The early Christian formulations of the natural moral law by Lactantius and St. Ambrose are followed by the natural law theories of medieval civilists, canonists, and theologians. Within the Protestant ethic, the range has extended from outright rejection to a modified acceptance of the scholastic basic doctrine to substantially identical concurrence with (Catholic) natural moral law teaching (especially among the Anglicans, as Bishop Gore, Dr.

Kirk, and Dr. Mortimer). Be it noted and reflected upon that all the Christian Churches held unanimously to the absolute ban on contraceptives until the first breach by the 1930 Lambeth Conference. The preceding Lambeth Conferences of 1908 and 1920 explicitly condemned contraception by appealing to the natural law. There is, too, the moral situationalism or contextualism which has gained wide acceptance among non-Catholics and even among some Catholics, and lately, love morality (Fletcher). Among some contemporary Catholics, there is evidence for revised versions of traditional natural moral law (Grisez, Bockle, Fuchs, and by such who are inspired by the evolutionary cosmology of Teilhard de Chardin, Monden), and lastly, the personalists. The generality of Catholic revisionists are, with some heterodox exceptions, really emphasizing one or other element of the traditional natural moral law which they are convinced would redress the balance of total perspective of the human act that they fear has not been maintained.

There are, too, theories of natural law of human conduct of realists (not excluding Marx) quite contrary or even contradictory to the above enumerated variations, that is, empiricist, mechanist, behaviorist, etc.

All referrals to the natural moral law in *Humanae Vitae* are, as in every Church document, not to a theory of natural law that is explicitly and exclusively identified with a particular system of philosophical speculation in the history of moral philosophy but pointedly to the existential natural law that is an integral constituent of evangelical morality, the *lex Christi,* by which man, through the redemptive merits of Christ and by the grace of God, may attain eternal life situated as he is from the moment of his being in the *de facto* supernatural status. That is why every mention of it is always in conjunction with the supernatural. It is *the* natural law (unlike that of the philosophers) which is within the scope of the commission of Christ to Peter and his successors to teach, interpret, and transmit to the faithful to the end of time without error. This may explain why in none of the Church official and authoritative documents, papal and conciliar, do we ever find a systematic corpus of natural law doctrine formulated, much less the development of argumentation as to its existence, the demonstration of its general and particular principles, and the rationale vindicating the application of the principle to a particular moral act. Put into perspective, *Humanae Vitae* propounds a doctrinal teaching which is of the natural moral law but whose certain discernment and unambiguous formulation derive principally from the abiding assistance of the Holy Spirit that has sustained the constant and universal teaching of the Church on the moral principles on marriage as they are existentially integral to the evangelical morality, the *lex Christi,* and subsequently on the unique charism of the papal magisterium which has applied those moral principles to specific acts of conjugal relations. It is as Vicar of Christ,- " by virtue of the mandate entrusted to Us by Christ "-as successor to

Peter and not as a venerated and world-renowned moralist, that Pope Paul VI teaches in *Humanae Vitae* (would it have mattered if he had?)

The companion volume, *The Responsibility of Dissent: The Church and Academic Freedom,* might not inappropriately be titled *The Primacy, Not of Peter, but of AAUP* in the teaching of Catholic faith and morals by Catholics at a Department of Catholic Theology in an American Pontifical University. Involved is a very serious issue, the question of academic freedom. Historical studies of academic freedom in universities in Europe and America do not disclose a firmly settlul and definite doctrine. l\iany affirmative admissions are made but tlwy arc in the uature of general libertarian aspirations and immunitities for the pursuit of truth and correspondingly severe negative declarations suppression and constraints placed upon freedom of expression. Academic freedom is a very complex and complicated problematic. To begin with, is it a univocal or analogous notion when applied to dinTse institutions of higher learning, state-owned, privately owned, church affiliated colleges and universities? Secondly, is the exercise of academic freedom and the conditions attendant upon it the same for all disciplines,-natural sciences, social sciences, aesthetics, l1istory, law, philosophy, theology, etc.? Thirdly, do challenges to or experimentation of received or established propositions of the various sciences relate equally to applied science and the speculative and under the same ur difi'ercnt conditions? But not every question will rt'ceive the same answer nor every answer resolve every question. In suggesting a new title for the second volume I was not being facetious. The question of teaching religious orthodoxy is, in judgment, a unique consideration and deserves a different approach and different standards of academic freedom than may apply to other studies. As for myself, I luvc no hesitar:ce in stating that the norm of orthodoxy in matters of Cathol;c faith and morals is the solemn definitive teachings of the papal magisterium whether *ex cathedra* or not and of the Councils approved and ratified by the Roman Pontiff.

As for the " subject professors " and their principal at the Catholic University, what really matters is what they did in the name of academic freedom and in invoking their rights of conscience. As a contemporary witness of the events *via* the various communications *media* I found them scandalous. They did do grave spiritual harm. They interposed their spiritual counsels between the faithful and the Supreme Pastor of the Universal Church and offered the faithful an *a pari* (they went beyond that, actually) alternative moral evaluatory judgment. And little to their credit they exercised themselves vigorously in galvanizing an opposition to the teaching authority of Pope Paul in *Humanae Vitae.* I found the incandescent indefectibility and radiant rectitude of *everything* that the dissidents said and did as detailed and " documented " in the companion volume a frightening example of edification.

John Henry Newman wrote while still a Protestant in

It is said that a man may go on sipping first white (wine) and then port, til he loses all perception which is which: and it is very great good fortune in this day if we manage to escape a parallel misery in theology. ("The Anglo-American Church, October 1839" in *Essays Critical and Historical,* vol. I, p.

When, after much spiritual searching and by the grace of God, John Henry Newman came to recognize what was the difference and how it is discerned, he choose to Consent Within and For the Church.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan. By DAVID TRACY. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970. Pp. 317. $9.50.

Since the publication of *Insight* Lonergan's later developments in theology and philosophy have generally been available only in the form of theology textbooks written in Latin or in privately circulated tapes and mimeographed notes stemming from seminars. Tracy's book, the first systematic overview of Lonergan's intellectual development, does much to fill an effective communication gap in making Lonergan's thought more accessible to a general public. It is based on a few years of study under and association with Lonergan, a thorough familiarity with all his works, and a strongly felt conviction that a general acceptance of Lonergan's views could provide a viable basis for a much-needed integration in theology and philosophy. The result is a work more concerned with exposing and defending Lonerganism than in analyzing or criticizing it. Since Lonerganism represents, at least for the fervent few, a major intellectual renaissance and since Tracy's book is already well on the way to becoming the guiding text for this new tradition, a critical discussion of the book and the tradition it represents would seem to be desirable.

The first three chapters play an and potentially misleading role in the overall structure. They seem to couple an introductory survey of Lonergan's method of horizon analysis with an exposition of his earlier works. But this is not quite what Tracy intends. Rather, he exposes Lonergan's later views on the nature of knowledge and the process of intellectual development and then uses this as a framework and source of standards for interpreting Lonergan's own intellectual development. Thus, his discussion of Lonergan's early articles, the "*Gratia*" and "*Verbum*" series, is not really concerned with the theological problems treated, the interpretations considered, and the positions defended but with the contribution these analyses made to Lonergan's intellectual formation as interpreted in the light of criteria Lonergan himself supplies.

Tracy's initial survey introduces "horizon" in a descriptive-historical way by a sketchy outline of periods and problems in which horizon-shifts have occurred, e. g., Aristotelian to Newtonian physics. This leads to a definition of "horizon" as a maximum field of vision from a determinate viewpoint. Its subjective pole refers to the intentionality-meaning possibilities of the subject's stage of development, while the objective pole refers to the worlds of meaning achieved by or open to the subject at the center of this horizon.

The problem being treated here is certainly a basic one in contemporary epistemology. Individual acts of knowledge depend on a general framework or horizon which is conditioned by the intellectual development of the individual, the culture in which he functions, and the specialties he pursues. Such a *Weltanschauung* is difficult to get at noetically. From within one finds it difficult to determine the boundaries; from without-to whatever degree one can be without--one easily misinterprets the significance of what transpires within. In recent years differing philosophical traditions have advanced various interpretative tools to treat this problem: analysis of conceptual frameworks considered as quasi-public objects; the hermeneutic circle; an interpretation of paradigm shifts; and the structuralist analysis of cultural covariance. Tracy, following Lonergan, simply presents horizon-analysis as *the* method of coming to grips with the problem. Since this plays a crucial role in Tracy's own interpretation and evaluation as well as in Lonergan's thought, a more critical treatment considering the difficulties and alternatives would have been desirable.

Lonergan's first substantial achievement was the series of four articles he wrote on the problem of grace and freedom. Here his primary concern was to distinguish the authentic position of St. Thomas from the later problematic of the " de auxiliis " controversy and the still later nco-scholastic interpretation of St. Thomas. In doing this Lonergan recovered the idea, developed but never really by the medieval theologians, of a world of theory mediating the meaning of faith. This recovery, rather than the theological problem treated, is the focus of Tracy's concern. The type of interpretation Lonergan attempted involved not only a mediation of faith through theory but also a mediation of the medieval theological mediation, making what they had done intelligible to a contemporary audience. This required both a methodology capable of yielding a correct interpretation of earlier speculative syntheses and also a way of assimilating and ordering the results obtained from such historical studies.

Lonergan's way of handling the first problem is explained through the operative metaphor of a scissors interpretation, where the upper blade is an *a priori* schema capable of handling any possible set of historical data and the lower blade is an *a posteriori* analysis of relevant texts. The blades should close on an authentic interpretation. The second task is interpreted as an explication and ordering of four key elements in the methodology of theological procedure: theorems, terms, dialectical positions, and techniques.

The discussion of the *Verbum* series, Lonergan's five long articles on Thomas's interpretation of Trinitarian theology, is somewhat closer to the texts of Lonergan's articles. St. Thomas, building on Patristic tradition, gave a detailed account of Trinitarian processions by analogy with the processions of an inner word and of love in man. Lonergan's attempt to interpret this encountered two formidable problems. First, he had **to**

recover the authentic doctrine of Aquinas rather than the systematically misleading interpretations given by theologians in the Thomistic tradition. Second, to make this intelligible to a contemporary audience he felt that he should transpose an account which Aquinas had given in metaphysical terms into an exposition phrased in cognitional terms-and then use the sources to show that this was a transposition rather than a misinterpretation.

Rather than present an account of Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas Tracy has a polemical contrast between Lonergan's intellectualism and the conceptualism and extrinsicism of the manualists. (These were pejorative terms in some Catholic seminaries during the period of the *nouvelle theologie* and the reaction centering around the Encyclical *Humani Generis.)* The great achievement of the *Verbum* series-from a philosophical point of view-was the clarification of St. Thomas's developed doctrine of mental acts and processes. This is not summarized here. In its place Tracy contents himself with a simplified non-technical account of insight, conceptualization, reflection, judgment, and abstraction. While this may be of some help to a beginner, it does not supply the interested scholar with any basis for distinguishing between Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas's doctrine, the use Lonergan made of this in his own development, and Lonergan's own doctrine. Tracy's book, however, was written to popularize rather than analyze Lonergan.

The tranbition from the *vetera* of interpreting Thomas Aquinas to the *nova* of *Insight* is mediated by a brief account of the transition from medieval to modern science and from pre- to post-critical philosophy. On both issues Tracy simply summarizes Lonergan's evaluation and conclusions and accepts them as defining the problems to be solved. In summarizing *Insight* Tracy's basic concern is to present and explain the elements of cognitional analysis that play a role in Lonergan's later ideas on theological method. Here, I believe, he is quite successful, particularly in his treatment of judgment, of the significance of the moving point of view, and in explaining the methodology by which Lonergan passes from cognitional analysis to a metaphysics of being. To achieve this Tracy must necessarily oversimplify, or in many cases simply omit, many of the points developed and problems discussed in the gargantuan work that is *Insight.* Only two aspects of this interpretative oversimplification presented a problem for the present reviewer.

Lonergan often develops his positions by a polemical contrast with counter-positions. In accord with his methodology these counterpositions are interpreted in the light of the systematic exigencies of Lonergan's own development rather than through an analysis of the sources and schools whose names supply labels for the counterpositions. Tracy preserves the rhetoric of this polemicism but further simplifies the doctrines presented as counterpositions. The net result is a defense of Lonergan by a contrast

with straw-dummies interpreted and judged by the niche accorded them in Lonergan's schematism. Thus, he can dismiss Hume, by claiming that his performance contradicts his doctrine, and Kant, by insisting that he misinterpreted the significance of judgment. What is operative in both evaluations is not an analysis of the authors in question but their assignment to the first and second levels of Lonergan's schematism.

The second closely related criticism is perhaps familiar by now. Tracy's method of exposition affords no foothold for a critical appraisal of Lonergan's thought. A descriptive summary of what Lonergan intends to accomplish, e. g., in developing metaphysics, is presented as a summary of what Lonergan has achieved. As indicated in a footnote (# 23 on p. 172) and in a paper delivered at the Florida Conference on Lonergan's thought, Tracy realizes that some of Lonergan's ideas are open to criticism. He may be justified in omitting such criticism from an introductory survey. But if he does, he should also forgo, or at least sharply curtail, a sustained defense of Lonergan that is only meaningful when adverse criticism is considered.

After finishing *!might* Lonergan returned to theology in a new way. Tracy's summary of this transition period again prescinds from the theological doctrine considered (Trinity and Christology) and focuses on the problems of methodology that marked the stages of Lonergan's own intellectual development. The basic contention is that Lonergan's transcendentally transformed viewpoint supplies a uniquely privileged position for developing theological method and for relating theology to other branches of knowledge. Here " method " is used in a broad sense to refer to reason's explicit consciousness of its own norms, structures, and procedures. The former methods of theological synthesis are deemed inadequate because they predate the rise of historical consciousness and the consequent realization of the role of meaning in mediating man's many worlds.

Tracy follows Lonergan in treating the problem of meaning by distinguishing different types of meaning and discussing their scope and interrelation. Though meaning has been and remains a central concern of contemporary philosophy, neither author averts to either the protracted and extensive discussion of the meaning of " meaning " on the part of the analysts or to the recent work of phenomenologists on the role of symbolism. However, there is another area where Lonergan's methodology does make a significant and novel contribution. This is the problem of interrelating functional specializations in theology. The development given is strongly reminiscent of Kant's deduction of the categories.

Kant saw knowledge in terms of three interrelated levels: a manifold of intuitions on the level of experience; a synthesis of reproduction in the imagination; and a synthesis of recognition in the understanding achieved by imposing concepts in judgment. From the classification of judgments

supplied by general logic Kant devised the table of twelve categories. But this derivation, based on the empirically given fact of different types of judgments, was not deemed adequate to explain how concepts can relate *a priori* to objects. Hence Kant's wrestling with the formidable problem of the transcendental deduction of the categories.

Lonergan accepts the functional specialization that has developed in theology but depores the divisiveness and lack of communication that has resulted from this. But a simple *a posteriori* acceptance of the specializations that have emerged affords no basis for interrelating these specializations in a meaningful way. What is needed is an *a priori* deduction of a table of functional specializations as something necessitated by man's way of knowing. Lonergan constructs such a table by distinguishing two phases in theology (a modernized version of the Aristotelian analysis-synthesis distinction) and correlating these with the four levels in the structure of consciousness.

Structures of Consciousness	Mediating Theology	Mediated Theology
deliberation	(4) dialectic	(5) foundations
judgment	(3) history	(6) doctrines
understanding	(2) interpretation	(7) systematics
experience	(1) research	(8) communications

Since the doctrine summarized in this table is the climax of Tracy's book, some explanation of it is in order. *Mediating* theology is primarily concerned with encountering the Judaeo-Christian tradition, *mediated* theology with speaking to the present and future from within a horizon transformed by that encounter. As with the earlier analytic and synthetic modes, the terminal point of the encounter phase supplies the starting point of the communications phase.

Each level of consciousness has its proper goal. Though common sense does not differentiate these levels and their related goals, scientific methodology must do so. Thus, as experience relates to data, so research determines what should be accepted as data. Interpretation, like understanding, presupposes the data established by textual criticism and uses the tools of exegesis, form criticism, etc., to understand the meaning of the texts supplied by level one. The historian accepts the established meanings of different texts and tries to determine the historic facts, or what really happened. Each of these levels leads to debates which should be arbitrated at the fourth level. Here, ideally, the encounter with the tradition culminates in a conversion commitment. Foundations defends and explains such a commitment, while doctrine is on the level of judgment because it

affirms the essential features of Christian belief, which one then tries to understand through the mediation of theories proper to systematics. Communications is not simply a call to experience but an attempt to interrelate theology to other disciplies.

By skipping complexities Tracy makes the basic schematism clear and then argues for the necessity of such a synthesis to end the feudalism of competing fiefdoms that divide and disfigure contemporary theology. What he does not do, because of the introductory nature of his work, is to probe the cogency of Lonergan's account. This is rather surprising considering the central role this schematism plays in Lonergan's current theological work and the climactic role it plays in Tracy's summary. What follows is not a critical probe but some suggestions for such a probe.

One could begin by comparing Lonergan's division of theological specializations with the Thomistic system it seeks to replace. In one of his earliest works (the *Gratia* series) Lonergan discussed what he called the "post-Thomistic fallacy," which consists in attempting to explain God rather than accepting God as the explanation of all there is. This was manifested in Thomas's methodology. In philosophy analysis began with the beings of ordinary experience and proceeded by way of resolution into causes until the ultimate intrinsic (essence and existence) and extrinsic (God as first and final cause) principles were reached. Synthesis pivots and explains beings in terms of the ultimate principles reached. When Thomas constructed a synthesis he was working as a theologian rather than as a philosopher and relied on faith and information about God supplied by revelation. Yet, within this framework he could define scientific theology in terms of its subject matter, God and all else as related to God. Further subdivisions were in accord with material objects (the Trinity, the Church) and formal objects (Christ as Savior, Christ as lawgiver). Lonergan's theological methodology centers not on God but on a thematization of human cognitional structures. For reasons which need not be discussed here I believe that a radical reinterpretation of the nature of theology is necessary. But the decisive change which Lonergan has introduced certainly calls for clarification and discussion rather than a simple defense along pragmatic lines.

Granted that a radical reinterpretation of theology is at least a desideratum, the crucial question is: Is Lonergan's schematic interrelation of theological specializations necessary or is it simply a tentative hypothesis? Lonergan insists that his methodological concerns are foundational rather than second-order questions and attempts to get at these foundations by finding the necessary interrelation of functional specializations. In this sense he is seeking a transcendental deduction of the specializations. As the conflicts between the pertinent passages of the first and second editions of Kant's *Critique* bear eloquent witness, transcendental deductions bridge a treacherous territory. If Lonergan's integration is to play the foundational

role he intends, then he must show that the isomorphism bet>veen structures of consciousness and theological specializations plays a constitutive rather than a merely suggestive role.

Perhaps Lonergan's long-projected work on theological method will show this, but the arguments Tracy summarizes give no indication of hov; it could be done. Each theological specialization obviously involves all four mental operations. The operative isomorphism is not between structures of consciousness and theological specializations but between the objective correlatives attributed to different mental operations and the goals prescribed for theological specializations. Thus, sense experience is correlated with data-and the textual critic established the data the exegete uses. But such a correspondence between the data of sense experience and communications is even more tenuous, for what the theologian wishes to communicate is certainly not simple experience, in Lonergan's technical sense of " experience," but the meaningful understanding requisite to ground critical acceptance.

Similar criticism of the other levels could easily be developed. The obvious retort is that the isomorphisms in question do not come from the levels individually considered but from the parallel roles these play in overall structures. Such a retort, however, is convincing only to one who has already accepted the idea of a :;tructural parallelism between the mental processes an individual goes through and functional specializations within a scholarly community. This is akin to the similar and rather unconvincing parallelism between individual and historical development that allows Lonergan to apply to primitive man the idea of undifferentiated consciousness which Piaget presents as characteristic of the child's mentality. Lonergan's work on method in theology may provide answers to such objections, provided the objections have been raised in a critical way prior to the completion of the book. It is rather surprising that in a work stressing the essential role of critical dialectic as a means of theological development none of the questions or criticisms that could contribute to such a development is introduced.

Tracy's book concludes with an exhaustive listing of primary sources and a sun-dial (only registering sunny hours) listing of secondary sources. In spite of the criticism presented here I believe that he has succeeded in his basic purpose of making Lonngan's thought intelligible to a general public. This inevitably raises the more basic question: what is one to make of the impressive intellectual achievement that is the developing thought of Bernard Lonergan? Is it, as many devoted disciples believe, the potential foundation for a revolutionary redevelopment of philosophy, theology and the intellectual integration of diverse disciplines? Or does it, as the present reviewer is inclined to believe, bring eight centuries of tradition to a graceful and stately conclusion? This is the way scholasticism ends-not with a blank but with a *summa.* Each reader,

of course, must form his own evaluation. But the process of judging will depend in a crucial way on three highly debatable points repeatedly emphasized by Tracy. These are the openness, the criticalness, and the contemporaneity of Lonergan's systematic development. Lonergan has not, Tracy insists, constructed a system in the classical sense. Rather, he builds on the innate dynamism of the human mind so that his system is necessarily open to, and in fact invites, further questioning, the formulation of new and differing hypotheses, a dialectic of such opposed views leading to warranted affirmation of the positions supported by the more cogent arguments. His development is also critical and contemporary in that it meets the critical exigencies of the day and provides a viable basis for integrating the theological achievements of the past and present.

Openness, criticalness, and contemporaneity-these are the *loci* of radically contradictory evaluations. Lonergan certainly intends, and Tracy insists, that the system is open in an unprecedented way. It invites a critical self-appropriation and guides a process of intellectual development, but it does not impose views. Yct the outsider inevitably sees Lonerganism in terms of a rather closed self-accrediting group. While this may be just a transitory phase, something inevitable in the promotion of any new system, the principle underlying the distinction between believers and outsiders presents more of a challenge to openness. This arises from the significance attached to Lonergan's cognitional analysis. The contention is that the invariant structure of human knowing which Lonergan has explicitated forms a fixed base for present and future intellectual developments. Anyone who appears to disagree with this implicitly affirms it by his very performance of questioning the system, coming to an understanding, and judging. Accordingly, it is felt, it is not really possible to disagree with Lonergan's cognitional analysis, the basis of his systematization. Anyone who thinks he disagrees with it thereby proves that he does not really understand it. The system, accordingly, is open to development but not to radical revision. 'Vhether or not this contention is correct depends on one's evaluation of the second point, the criticalness of Lonergan's system.

Criticalness, like openness, presents a superficial difficulty, stemming from the movement, and a more profound difficulty, stemming from the system. The superficial difficulty is an apparent clash between doctrine and practice. Knowing, Lonergan insists, is not simply a question of taking a look. It is a process which depends in a critical way on asking questions, criticizing suggested answers, investigating the consequences of alternative hypotheses, and committing oneself to an affirmation only when one has grasped evidence sufficient to warrant assent. Yet in the present work, as in other popularizations and seminars, Lonergan's doctrine is communicated by simply exposing it to view in a manner that poses no questions, considers no real alternatives-apart from straw dummies introduced for

expository purposes-and generally relies on judgments predetermined by an *a priori* schematism. This, too, may be a transitory phase. Lonergan's system must become known before it can be discussed and analyzed. But I believe that it can be communicated in a manner that exemplifies rather than grates against the criticalness it seeks to inculcate.

The more profound difficulty stems from the contention that Lonergan's cognitional analysis represents a resolute meeting of the critical exigencies of contemporary philosophy and is immune from any further revision. Critics with Heideggerian leanings would call this into question because of its implicit presuppositions concerning man's way of being in the world and the role that knowledge plays in relating man to reality. Lonergan's development is based on a resolute following of the intellectual pattern of operations. But, a Heideggerian would insist, this pattern is itself only intelligible as something emerging from *Dasein's* instrumental concern for the care and use of things.

Analysts would be critical of the linguistic presuppositions underlying Lonergan's cognitional analysis. If one rejects a denotational theory of meaning, as most analysts now do, then the meaningfulness of such terms as "experience," " insight," " concept," " reflection," and "judgment," is not determined by the mental states or acts to which they may refer. How they are to be explicated is a complex problem which we hope to treat in detail elsewhere. But the central point is that Lonergan's cognitional analysis actually builds on a *thematization* of mental acts. Any judgment as to whether or not this thematization is invariant to further revision and is an adequate platform for the elaborate extensions Lonergan builds will depend in a critical way on one's evaluation of the ontological and linguistic presuppositions underlying Lonergan's thematization. One who makes an adverse evaluation might understand and yet reject Lonergan's cognitional analysis. One who does not recognize the role that such presuppositions play might rest content with the view that Lonergan's presuppositionless analysis is either understood and accepted or simply not understood.

These remarks have a bearing on Lonergan's contemporaneity as a philosopher. His status as a contemporary theologian may seem to be beyond question. But even here there is room for a minority opinion. Lonergan's substantive work in theology, his articles on grace and the *Verbum,* his books on Christology and Trinitarian theory, were written in the period preceding Vatican II. Then, as now, Lonergan's cognitional analysis played a major role in structuring and interpreting his theological work. But there was one crucial difference. In his earlier days Lonergan argued that the role that judgment plays in the advancement of knowledge in *other* disciplines is in theology the prerogative of the Teaching Church rather than the individual theologian. The theologian's concern is understanding not judgment. In the analytic mode (the early version of

Lonergan's mediating theology) the theologian seeks to understand the sources of faith and the inner dynamics of development leading, for example, from the scriptural affirmation of Christ's mission to the Chalcedonian formulation of what Christ is. But the theologian did not evaluate the acceptability of such pronouncements. He simply accepted them as true. Similarly, in the synthetic mode the theologian might propose theories, but he left it to the Church to judge the truth and acceptability of the consequences flowing from his theories.

Such an approach effectively precluded any possibility of a radical revision in theology. In the last few years, when the problem of radical reinterpretation has become a paramount concern of theologians, Lonergan has devoted himself to the problem of method in theology. This surely is important. But, if this is to be a programming for the future rather than a systematization of the past, this methodology must be brought to bear on the pressing problems of current theology.

Such considerations bring us back to the question of the role that should be played by Lonergan's followers. If Lonerganism is to be a vital force on the current intellectual scene it must enter into the on-going dialogue. This, in turn, entails a re-examination of the foundations of Lonergan's philosophy and a critical coming to grips with the crucial theological problems that beset contemporary Christian theology. Tracy's book contributes to this by making Lonergan's thought accessible to a wider public. Though this work does not initiate the critical discussion of Lonergan's views necessary to insert Lonerganism into the on-going dialectic that is the philosophical enterprise, it may help to make such a discussion possible. This would be a significant and desirable achievement.

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VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas. By BERNARD J. LONERGAN, S. J., edited by David B. Burrell, C. S.C. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 318.

If an adequate history of scholasticism is ever written, the idea that modern scholastics were unresponsive to their own times may be due for some revision. The rationalism of the late and unlamented textbook Thomism came from somewhere. .Most likely it came from the Cartesian attempts to establish deductive certitude for all truth. The close study of the great scholastics indicates that the later tradition was more likely guilty of abandoning past riches in pursuit of modern accomodations than

of an excessive attachment to tradition. Certainly Bernard Lonergan in these textual studies us a welcome corrective to the conceptual rationalism of the late scholastics.

The chapters of this book were originally published between 1946 and 1949 as separate articles in *Theological Studies.* They constitute what has become known as the *Verbum* series which, with the *Gratia* series of articles, constitutes Lonergan's most fundamental research. As a result of their original publication these articles received wide attention and extensive criticism along with the author's other works. Readers of this review may recall the articles by Edward l\I. Mackinnon, S. **J.,** "Understanding According to Bernard Lonergan, S. **J.,"** in *The Thomist* 28 (1964), 97-132, 338-72, 475-522. This new edition gathers all the *Verbum* articles between one set of covers. Its most valuable feature is the eighty p::tgcs of indices prepared in substance by Frederick Crowe, S. **J.,** according to concepts and names and according to *loci* both Thomistic and Aristotelian. The original articles are presented unchanged with the addition of a brief introduction by the author. The editor assures us that the notes and references have been checked.

In response to a number of requests the purpose and method of these studies were indicated in an epilogue to the last of the series. (215-20) This passage may well be read as an introduction to the entire work. Under the Leonine motto, *vetera navis augere et perficere,* Father Lonergan makes it his business to discover what the old learning really was, especially in Aquinas. This task has been performed in this series of textual studies and in the series on grace. In the work, *Insight,* the author uses only as much of the ancient wisdom as accurately responds to his neeJs and methods. There he has undertaken the task of amplifying and perferting the traditional wisdom in the light of modern advances. The present series of articles on *Verbum* is, then, an historically accur<'!te reflection of the thought of Aquinas based upon an extensive examination of hi" texts.

The work as a whole is theological, since it aims at a better understanding of divine intelligence and the Trinity. The approach is psychological rather than metaphysical though " logic might favor the opposite procedure." (45-46) The first bvo chapters recover the profounrl. introspective analysis of human knowing in Aquinas with emphasis on t::e difference between concept and judgment. Lonergan has been criticized for not using the distinction between the *quo* and the *quod* to affirm that the phantasm is *id quo cognoscitur* and to deny that it is *id quod cognoscitur (Summa Theol.,* **I,** q. 84. a. 2, c.). However, the same diffe,·ence is captured in Chapter IV by the distinction between the *species qua* and the *species quae.* (163, n. 120, 166) Likely the delay in making this distinction will not bother those who are accustomed to the moving center of Lonerganian method. It must be admitted, however, that the rest of us will find it confusing.

The third chapter is a skillful analysis of the metaphysical language in which Aquinas speaks. This chapter refurbishes the mental and linguistic tools needed to conquer the mixed psychological and metaphysical problem of abstraction in Chapter IV. This difficult material may now be regarded as well digested in contemporary Thomism. Finally, the fifth chapter expounds the mystery of the Trinity in terms of divine intelligence generating the image of God and of love breathing the Spirit.

"It remains that *ipsum intelligere* is analogous to understanding, that God is an infinite and substantial act of understanding, that as the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, so also each is one and the same infinite and substantial act of understanding, finally that, though each is the pure act of understanding, still only the Father understands as uttering the \Yord." (191) Lonergan's emphasis on the primacy of understanding over conceptualization is not likely to trouble those who have gained an appreciation of the spirit of medieval philosophy from the sources. The machinery of theses, proofs, distinctions, and counterdistinctions erected by the late scholastics only disfigured the purity of understanding expressed in the largely dialectical discourse of the great masters, especially Aquinas.

The division of these chapters was dicated by the "different systematic contexts in which Thomistic statements about *verbum* are involved." (xiii) In a textual study close attention has to be paid to the context of each passage. A text lifted from context may take on a meaning quite different from that intended by the author. When placed together with other texts with which it was not originally connected a whole new system of thought may be evolved. With this technique St. Thomas could make it out that almost everything in Aristotle was conformable to and Christian faith. This method has had immense advantages for philosophy and theology, but it is not historical. Historical study places texts in a neutral context which does not distort them from the intent of their author.

The systematic contexts chosen by Lonergan are sound enough, given the psychological approach which he found manageable. (46) A metaphysical approach would, of course, also have its advantages. The degrees of being, especially the division of intelligent beings into human, angelic, and divine, would provide a workable frame. In this view the key notion of intelligence, identity of knower and known, would be seen realized analogically on the different levels.

Divine intelligence constitutes perfect identity between the act of understanding, the being who understands (who is being itself subsisting), and pure being understood. Angelic intellect maintains the perfect comprehension of the understanding subject in the act of understanding, but this act does not comprehend being, since the angelic subject has only a limited share in being. Human intellect does not comprehend being either objectively or subjectively. Our minds glean their understanding of it from

the passing impressions of sense. These limited insights are limited further by the history of the individual man. Our insights never add up to a comprehension of self, let alone to a comprehension of being.

Maritain has remarked on the resemblance between the Cartesian idea of intelligence and the angelic intelligence as seen by Aquinas. One may also remark that the sovereign, legislative power of Kantian mind makes it similar to the divine intelligence of Aquinas. A metaphysical context for the texts of Aquinas would bring out the radical gulf between human and divine understanding in his thought. Father Lonergan seems to leap this gulf too readily and so perhaps to seek for human understanding a comprehensiveness and power which belong to subsistent understanding only.

The following statement illustrates our difficulty: "Intelligibility is the ground of possibility, and possibility is the possibility of being; equally, unintelligibility is the ground of impossibility, and impossibility means impossibility of being." (44) These statements are true enough if we take " being " to refer to common being and " intelligibility " to refer to subsistent intelligence. The perfect self-identity of subsistent intelligence with pure being places all possible beings before the divine mind. If something were unintelligible to God, it would be entirely outside of being and so Consequently, Lhe intelligibility of cCJmmon being in the divi1:e mind is the ground of its possibility to be.

However, the statements are false if "iJ;telligibility" refers to human intelligence and " being " refers to that which is. For human intelligence actual being is self-justifying; being there it must be possible. From the actual beings of common experience we gather whatever limited intelligibilities we can discoyer. Our understanding derives from actual beings and is not the ground of their possibility.

The term, "common being," does not seem to enter Lonergan's vocabulary. His manner of speaking also assumes that *ens* is a concept. (43) This assumption is not necessary and, in fact, introduces unmanageable complications. Being is an actual essence understood by an act of judgment. It is a conception of the mind pertaining to the second act and not a concept at all.

But these remarks take us beyond the scope of this review. They pertain to a rather different metaphysics than the one which Bernard Lonergan has elaborated with such profound study. He has earned the gratitude of all philosophers and particularly of all Thomists.

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A Marechal Reader. Ed. and trans. by JosEPH DoNCEEL. New York: Herder & Herder, 1970. Pp. $8.50.

Joseph Donceel's edition-translation is a useful volume from one who is most qualified to produce it. In forty-three extracts from Joseph Marechal's five-volume *Le point de depart de la rnetaphysique* and two later articles Donceel manages to situate most important work and to offer a fairly detailed presentation of the advances which were contribution to the development of modern Catholic thought.

The thirteen extracts from the first three volumes situate the Kantian project between the options of idealism and radical empiricism. Marechal understood Kant's critique as an attempt to develop a third alternative. In this context the brilliance of Marechal's own development of Thomistic intellectual dynamism and completion of Kant's work is evident.

The twenty-eight selections from Cahier Five include about a third of this, the most important volume. principal theses, especially his development of the dynamism of the intellect through a study of the abstractive and objectifying processes, are set forth. The significance of the unity of sensitive and intellective faculties and the differences in their modes of attaining the object are exposed. Marechal's at times highly original intepretation of St. Thomas's theory of the operation of the agent intellect and the unity of the intellect and will does not distract from the development of the major thesis that understanding is a process of dynamic identification with the object rather than a passive observation.

Marechal's major insights into intellectual finality and exploitation of the transcendental method have been seminal for a major segment of contemporary Catholic thought. The problematic of Kantian and Thomistic interpretation in which Marechal worked is perhaps dated. But his insistence on knowledge through identification and his brilliant analysis, in extract XL, of subjective and objective evidence are as relevant as the day he wrote them. His critical insight, that the human mind is a part of reality and that the modes of its operation are indicative of the structure of being, finds its fitting place at the heart of the thought of both Rahner and Lonergan.

At one time, a translation of the full text of Marechal's major work, or at least of Cahier Five, would have been most welcome. But, since his ideas have entered the life-stream of contemporary thought, Donceel's volume admirably fits the need of the student for a means of grasping thB theses at their origin without becoming encumbered by the protracted analysis in which Marechal sets them forth. In a sense, Marechal's conclusions are greater than his premises. Donceel has retained enough of the original argument to make them intelligible without limiting their scope and significance.

The translation is smooth and readable. At times the transition from one excerpt to another is abrupt, leaving the reader dangling from the

first conclusion on the far side of an unbridged gap. Excerpt XLI which condenses the final book of Cahier Five should have been expanded or omitted. Some English-language bibliography and an index would have enhanced the value of this excellent book.

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Twentieth Century Philosophy. By BERNARD DELFGAAUW. Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, 1969. Pp. 172, $4.95.

Definitive critique or estimation of a study which claims so much territory for itself on the basis of so brief a treatment would be foolhardy. Delfgaauw's points are quickly made and, as one would hope, all judgments are pre-modified when offered. This is a well-done translation, by N. D. Smith of the fourth Dutch edition of *De Wijsbegeerte van de 20e Eeuw* written by a professor of philosophy at Groningen whose historical and scientific studies are gaining attention here. So far, this interest has resulted in translations of his profiles of Marx and de Chardin, his research on the problem of evolution, and a single volume survey of ancient and medieval philosophy. Delfgaauw's specialty, then, is synthesis. Rather than bicker over what he does not cover, let us attempt to render the tone and range of the present work best described as an essay on recent currents exclusive of the language-analysis strain.

Contemporary philosophy from the Delfgaauw viewpoint has moved away from that of the last century by its fresh encounters with science and theology. It is newly conscious of a responsibility towards the world and listens in respectful posture to art :md literature. It is no longer " a philosophy that believes it can understand everything " but rathel' " a speculation that attempts to penetrate as deeply as possible a reality which, in the last resort, it is incapable of grasping." (p. Q7) The reasons for this situation are outlined in Part I as stemming from a tension between modern man's notion that reality is always largely determined by the structures science gives it and by an awareness-paradoxically causing feelings of both freedom and fear-that he himself is not determined by such factors. Delfgaauw elaborates on this tension through consideration of biological and psychological advances and our deepening appreciation of religious consciousness.

Part II discusses four "answers " to this tension: neo-Thomism, twentieth-century Kantian and Hegelian thought, and l\farxism. The author does not underestimate the difficulty of isolating the actual responses to the contemporary problem within these tendencies. At bottom, the

delineation is hampered by the anterior question of what thinkers evidently working within these distinct traditions do in fact share with one another. This dilemma in demarcation is clearly observed among the nebulous grouping known as neo-Thomists. What, after all, is a neo-Thomist and how does he perceive his relationship first to Aquinas and second to contemporary thought? Does such a one attempt to speak or to listen, and if both, then in what proportion? The problematic is well presented, although Delfgaauw's own ...-iew surfaces in his observation that the movement " back " to Aquinas " is coming closer to achieving its original aim as it lends to disappear as a school." (p. 41)

With regard to the .Marburg and Baden schools of Kantian thought Delfgaauw sees Windelband's dictum: " Understanding Kant means going beyond him " as their shared conviction of how that thinker is to be brought into the present century. The two sub-schools differ in emphasis on the unity of thought as an objective. While Marburgers saw such logical unity behyccn mind and science that pure mathematics conjoined with natural science emerges as science *par excellence,* the Baden school placed central value on thought, harkening back to Lotze, and subjugated natural science to the humanities. The intricacies of what became of Hegel are well handled in this Part, too, and it is the British and Italian manifestations of his philosophy that receive chief attention. According to the author, the basic paradox of ·Marxist thought, the fourth of the tradition's responses to the modern tension, is the intrinsic opposition of politics to philosophy. When the philosopher convinces society to accept his view of social reality, then that society must restrain its creator from developing further or else sacrifice itself. This thought, not new in itself, is forcefully made by relating it to the idealistic underpinnings of Marx's world-view. Only an initial blurring of the distance between the theoretical ::.nd the practical, the abstract and the concrete, could have produced a philosophy which claims to be intrinsically political.

Part III presents answers to the crisis in man's knowledge of himself and his world experienced in this century from some dozen perspectives. Among these are philosophies of evolution, action and spirit, the phenomenological-existential directions, American pragmatism and personalism, and themes developed on a foundation of philosophy of history. The amount of information correlated here is secondary to Delfgaauw's talent for making succinct but incisive relationships. This reflects his initial observation: contemporary thought is characterized by a mutual stimulation process bet,Yeen philosophical movements.

As an alternative to extracting from his book these reflex influences and merely listing them out of context, it would be preferable to select one theme and one thinker to show Delfgaauw at work. Let us take neo-vitalism, and this in the version of Hans Driesch (1847-1941). The author interpets Driesch as "characteristic of the twentieth century." Driesch

conceived of thought as faced with Cartesian dualism, and his project was to overcome this in order to return to the reality which was its origin. This goal was coupled with one he had arrived at professionally, for Driesch was a marine biologist who had experimented with sea-urchins and had been impressed with the difference between living and non-living phenomena. Therefore-we are reminded of an earlier biologist, Aristotle- a special life-principle had to be acknowledged alsongside physical and chemical factors in the living being.

Driesch's relationship to both the Greek past and to the modern period's concern for certitude in knowledge is clear in his notion of philosophy. It had to be the " ordered systematic knowing of all that is knowable " and *therefore* had to have a starting point which was not open to doubt. This he felt had to be the fact of experience considered in itself. At this juncture there enter themes developed in both James and Husser!. Experience is on the level of consciousness; I experience something, with the emphasis on the experiencing rather than on the Husserlian something-intended-in consciousness. The point of departure which is indubitable, therefore, is the " I have something consciously " and, in turn, the awareness that the " having " is structured. Here he separates from Husserl's stress upon the " something had " as structured and therefore subjectable to phenomenological analysis. Driesch also departs from James's notion of consciousness as confusion, as teeming multiplicity. The project that emerges for philosophy, then, is the elaboration of the order displayed in conscious having. For Driesch, this is a logic which can reveal the structure of reality at empirical, psychic and social levels. If Descartes wanted to search out the implications of the *cogito,* Driesch went to work examining experienced reality. Only after this perspective had been thoroughly explored could the philosopher inquire about a reality beyond that which he experienced: whether such existed and what might be its nature.

Delfgaauw is at his best in perceiving the implications of a position such as that of Driesch. In trying to preserve the unity of experience and consciousness against both the idealistic tendency nineteenth-century thought and the Cartesian inheritance of modern philosophy as a whole, Driesch unified experience with thought on the one hand and with physical perception on the other. Neither sub-conscious experience nor rationalized consciousness is to be glorified. If we reflect on this, it does seem that Driesch is indeed as representative of contemporary thought, apart from the linguists, as Delfgaauw claims. What concerns the neo-Thomists, Kantians, and Hegelians, concerned the Cologne biologist. It is recognized by all that the only valid form of the Cartesian *cogito* is the *cogito aliquid;* the subject/ object dichotomy must be recognized but transcended. In speaking to their Kantian contemporaries, the neo-Thomists bring forth the root of the *aliquid* in both scholastic ontology (only Aquinas acknowledges *aliquid* as a transcendental attribute of *ens)* and in the theory of

intentionality which is the essence of Thomistic epistemology. Yet, with Driesch, many recent Thomists understoood that whoever starts with consciousness is destined to remain within it. Like him, they recognized that reality *did* transcend consciousness, but could this be maintained from a starting point within consciousness? The problematic for Driesch was: could consciousness be, from the very beginning, not only consciousness *of* the thing but also consciousness *with* the object known, and this before it was consciousness with itself, i.e., before it came to itself? His struggle reflected the extent to which he was thinking through Descartes.

With Mercier, J\farechal saw a need to incorporate into Thomism the Kantian perspective; yet, with Driesch, he was wary of the solipsism which might result. The task Noel and Gilson saw for themselves was to develop a theory of knowledge which would have man incipiently with the world. In this way a realist philosophy could not be critical in the Kantian sense but only immediately so, as in the former's case, or methodologically appropriate, as with the latter.

Under Driesch's hand nco-vitalism became a contemporary showcase for Kant's famous but unanswered " fourth question." \Vhat, indeed, could man be if he was both conscious of reality and in this very act transcended it? Reality could only be such for consciousness if it was itself primordial knowing; hence the further problem of the divine. Was reality God or the reflection of God? For himself Driesch could only posit the validity of the question. Dclfgaauw interprets his plight as that of philosophy struggling with science and religion. As a vitalist born of marine biology, Driesch had to think through the *entelecheia* evident in his research, a force that could only be qualitatively different from physical and chemical components. It was not only a part of the " totality causality " he described but somehow transformed the whole organism into what it could not be otherwise. Before the honesty of a thought such as Driesch's, the student of contemporary philosophy grows both silent and encouraged. Delfgaauw's presentation of what has come to pass through the intellectual efforts of our own century makes life within the *stoa* a bit more bearable.

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Science and Faith in Teilhard de Chardin. The Teilhard Study Library, vol. 1. New York: Humanities Press, 1967. Pp. 109. $3.00.

Evolution, Marxism and Chri.stianity. The Teilhard Study Library, vol. 2. New York: Humanities Press, 1967. Pp. llO. $3.00.

There have been at least three phases in tlle promulgation, study, and influence of the philosophical and religious writings of the Jesuit priest-paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Before the Second Vatican Council, Tcilhard was known through *The Phenomenon of Man* and *The Divine L"tfilieu,* and some of his unpublished essays were in the hands of European and Canadian theologians. During and immediately after the Council, in a second phase, there were two developments. :Most importantly, Teilhard's iJeas influenced several of the Council *periti* and are apparent in some of the Council documents, particularly in the *Pa.storal Constitution on the Church in the "\fodern World.* At the same time, Teilhard's name and some of his ideas, distorted and undistorted, became a rallying point for the renewd enthusiasm of many Catholics; Teilhard became a fad.

In a third phase, two more things happened. Serious general studies of Teilhard's thought began to appear, among them Henri de Lubac's *The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin* (i\cw York: Desclee, 1967) and *Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and His Meaning* (i\ew York: Hawthorne, 1965), Christopher Mooney's *Teilhard de Chm·din and The Jlystery of Christ* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), and Emile Rideau's *The Thought of Teilhard de Chardin* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). And the thought of Teilhard began to have a quite visible impact on Christian thought and especially on theology. Almost all contemporary Catholic theology of original sin is derivative of a fe,Y key ideas of Teilhard's, and almost every effort today to rethink the mystery of creation in terms of an evolutionary world view is heavily dependent on Teilhard's vision. To what degree new emphases in Karl Rahner's theology depend on Teilhard, to what extent Teilhard's influence has contributed to the " theology of hope" current and to the new strong stress on eschatology, how much Teilhardian thought is behind new directions in Catholic spiritual theology -all this can only be guessed at; but certainly Teilhard's influence has been great and widespread.

A fourth period is beginning in Teilhard studies. Most of Teilhard's philosophical and theological works are now in print, and there have been a number of general studies of Teilhard that have laid the groundwork for further work. What is beginning to take place is this: at the same time that Teilhard's impact on Christian thought, particularly Catholic theology, is becoming even greater, there are at present underway several studies of Teilhard's thought according to special areas. There are, for example, at

least five doctoral dissertations being written on different aspects of his ethical theory. One work that treats a special theme in Teilhard's thought has already appeared, *The One and the Many,* by Donald Gray (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969). There are sure to be many other studies that treat of special questions in Teilhard's writings-his idea of God, his ecclesiology, his theology of prayer-and that relate his ideas to present. philosophical and theological activity.

The two books reviewed here are properly situated between phases two and three; they are, in part, a product of the now passing fad for Teilhardiana, and they serve as an introduction to Teilhard's work and a guide to its implications. They arc made up of lectures given at the first annual conference of The Pierre Teilhard de Chardin Association of Great Britain and Ireland held in London in 1966.

The first volume consists of three essays by Claude Cuenot and a short piece by Roger Garaudy. Cuenot's three lectures-expanded-into-essays are eoncemcd with Teilhard's spirituality, his integration of science and religion, and the over-all structure of his thought. The first presents Teilhard's spiritual doctrine as an answer to the needs of young people who, in Cuenot's analysis, seek a Christian rationale for their will to effective action. The second article tries, with considerable success, to show that, for Teilhard and in reality, science and Christian faith are both convergent and mutually complementary. Cuenot's final study presents Teilhnrd's main themes and approaches under the subtitles of " cosmos and cosmogenesis," "anguish," "phenomenology," and "Christology." The style is somewhat light, and there is not much documentation. Together, the three make an adequate and interesting simple introduction to Teilhard de Chardin. One wonders why Garaudy's short article was included in the first volume; it is a comment on one of the studies in the second volume, and it shows gross misunderstanding of Teilhard's most basic purposes and ideas.

The second volume, *Evolution, Marxisrn and Christianity,* contains six more talks given at the 1966 Teilhard conference, together with a radio discussion, printed as recorded. The first three articles are in the field of the philosophy of science. F. Elliott, a biochemist and theologian, describes the origin of life biochemically in some detail, shows the significance of this for an understanding of evolution, and concludes with comments on the creative aspects of evolution. Barnard Towers briefly describes the findings of human embroyology and shows how they fulfill Teilhard's "law of complexity-consciousness." P. G. Fothergill, in an excellent study, presents and justifies Teilhard's views on orthogenesis.

Roger Garaudy gives his views on how Teilhard's thought can serve as a basis for dialogue between Christians and l\larxists; this article is longer than Garaudy's brief note in the first volume and is somewhat more convincing.

The last two articles are Christological. A. 0. Dyson responds to Garaudy and presents his version of Teilhard's Christology, a version which is unfortunately unlike Teilhard's own Christology. Dyson sees no possibility of immediate personal relation to Christ: " our relation to Christ is always mediate, not immediate, and is realized not in reflection, but ... in human deeds ..... " (p. This is, of course, to void Teilhard's mysticism of its heart and center, personal relationship with the risen Christ in whom the world holds together. F. Elliott, in "The Christology of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin," outlines the logical movement of Teilhard's Christology with depth, insight, and precision. The final item in volume two, "A Radio Discussion," is superficial and would have been better omitted.

The articles in these two books are, then, of mixed quality, as are most collections of this kind. Some, however, will be of interest to philosophers of science and to theologians.

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Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Science and Christ.* Trans. by RENE HAGUE. New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1969. Pp. *$5.00.*

This is the eleventh in the series of Harper and Row translations of the works of Teilhard, as they appear in the French version of Editions du Seuil. Teilhardian scholars will be delighted with the new translation, which makes available nineteen essays of varying length and one letter (to Emmanuel Mounier), written at different times between 1919 and 1955. Since the essays deal with topics in Christology and the theology of science that were approached again and again by Teilhard throughout his life, and some of which assumed definitive form in works such as *The Phenomenon of Man* (Kew York: 1959), they will be especially valuable to critical historians of theology. The total collection also makes interesting reading for anyone interested in the relations between science and religion, for they document the thought development of a scientist who was preoccupied throughout his life with the problems of these relations and who continued to commit his reflections on them to writing.

The longest essay, entitled "J\fy Universe," was written in Tientsin in In effect this is a 49-page summary of all of Teilhard's thought, ranging from his philosophy of creative union, through his Christology, to the evolution of the world. Two other essays of substantial length pages each) are "The Salvation of Mankind" and "Super-Humanity, Super-Christ, Super-Charity," written in Peking in 1936 and 1943 respectively. The essay from which the book gets its name, " Science and Christ

or Analysis and Synthesis," is a 16-page lecture delivered in Paris in 1921. The remaining items are fairly brief notes or jottings on various problems such as modem unbelief, Catholicism and science, degrees of scientific certainty in the idea of evolution, and the religious value of research. Practically all of the lectures have been published previously, but this is the first time they appear together and in English translation.

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Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion. By JAMES LUTHER ADAMS. New York: Schocken Books, 1970. Pp. 310. $2.95.

This first Schocken paperback of a book which was published initially in 1965 is a most welcome edition since it makes more available a work that has come to be considered the outstanding introduction to Paul Tillich. As a revision of Adams's 1945 doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, the book is restricted to Tillich's writings prior to 1945, most of which were in German. Forced to leave Germany because of his work with the Religious Socialist Movement and opposition to Naziism, Tillich and his family came to New York in 1933. There he taught at Union Theological Seminary until *1955* and wrote several works in English up to the time of his death in 1965. Many of these works deal with the same themes of his earlier writings in a developed form.

As the author points out, the contents of this book can be adequately appreciated only in relation to the broad spectrum of Tillich's writings. These include in his philosophy of culture such themes as social ethics, religious socialism, political theory, psychotherapy, and education, not to mention his writings on theology and Church life. Adams's work, however, does provide a most helpful background to the understanding of Tillich's total contribution to the development of Christian thought. The detailed bibliography of works by and about Tillich from 1910-1945 is invaluable to anyone who wishes to examine his ideas more thoroughly.

The contents of this book cover the fundamental areas of Tillich's quest for a new language to express the Christian message in the context of contemporary culture as well as the basic concepts by which he interprets that message in its religious relevance to the reality of a secular age. Dr. Adams considers in some detail Tillich's theology of art and culture, his philosophical classification of the sciences, and his philosophy of religion. In his introduction to the concluding chapter concerning Tillich's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology he observes: " According to Tillich, philosophy is a theory of the principles of meaning; philosophy of religion deals with these principles of meaning, relating them

to a theory of the essence of religion; and theology provides a normative system of religion based on the classical symbols of a particular confession." Such a summation is characteristic of the author's ability to expose clearly and succinctly the essential aspects of Tillich's thought. At the same time he offers the reader a firm foundation for studying his thought with a sound critical sense.

In his last lecture, delivered shortly before he died, Paul Tillich recalled his life-long quest for a new *theonomy*, i.e., the situation in which religion gives true depth and ultimate meaning to the existing culture and cultural forms provide the patterns for a meaningful expression of religious convictions. This quest especially identifies the apologetical task of his monumental *Systematic Theology* which he intended to be a dialogue with and against the individuals of our secularized society. In its paperback edition Dr. Adams's book promises to bring more readers toward a deeper understanding of Tillich's theological enterprise and to inspire contemporary theologians in their efforts at meeting the continual challenge of relating Christian revelation to the cultural conditions of our time.

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Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction. By ELIOT DEUTSCH. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969. Pp. 119. $6.00.

This is one of the most impressive books in Indian thought to appear in several years. Any work on Advaita Vedanta is significant because this school of Indian philosophy has been traditionally the most widely accepted system of thought and continues to be followed, in one form or another, by Indian philosophers today. Advaita Vedanta is a high philosophical moment in the history of Asian man. This particular study is impressive because it is a successful attempt at comparative philosophy, and it is articulated superbly by one in the forefront of his field, Professor Eliot Deutsch or the University of Hawaii. The importance of this work lies precisely in the fact that its author has set new goals for comparative philosophy with this single book: namely, "to bring comparative philosophy into the mainstream of *creative* thought-East and West." {p. 1) Professor Deutsch is convinced that Asian philosophy should be approached as " material for creative thought." {p. 2) His work in this short volume is evidence of this possibility.

Advaita Vedanta, which is a philosophical system established by Sankara {ca. 788-820), is more than a school of thought, for from its inception it has been a guide to spiritual experience. All of the classical philosophical

systems of India are called *darsanas,* a comprehensive Sanskrit word which literally means 'a point of view,' a point of view which has first been lived out and only then intellectually systematized in writing. The classical *Upanishads* speak of *darsana* in terms of spiritual perception. One must experientially achieve a spiritual level of perception; a mere rational conviction is not enough but an experiential grasp of knowledge is required. It is important to note that a philosopher does not speculate, does not express his thought, does not begin to systematize philosophically unless his 'point of view ' has been first experienced. In Advaita Vedanta, " one acquires knowledge only in an act of conscious being which is akin to what one knows and is the content of direct experience." (p. 4) Thus, Indian *darsanas* are paths of spiritual realization as well as philosophical systems of thought. The thought systems, nonetheless, were traditionally more akin to scriptural exegesis, for they were in the main an analysis of the classical Indian scriptures.

A comparative philosopher, however, neither accepts necessarily the scripture of the other as authoritative nor accepts even the experience of the other as authoritative. Professor Deutsch sub-titles his book "A Philosophical Reconstruction." This, he says, is the role of the comparative philosopher who determines what in that system of thought is consistent with universal human experience. To reconstruct a religious philosophy is to remove it considerably from its historical, cultural, and traditional context, and to search for that which has universal interest and meaning. Consequently, this study is neither a history nor an exposition of a particular school of Indian philosophy; it is the formulation of a philosophy which has been creatively restructured in order to be understood by any student of philosophy. Some may object to Deutsch's methodology and may insist that philosophy must be articulated in a historical and cultural context. Such studies of Indian philosophy already exist; Das Gupta, Radhakrishnan, Hiriyanna, and others have done this with varying degrees of success. However, their work has not placed Indian philosophy into the " mainstream of creative thought." Deutsch accomplishes precisely this, and his model highlights the challenging role of comparative philosophy today.

In eight chapters this book covers the essential metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical content of Advaita Vedanta. One of the finest chapters (Chapter Two: Levels of Being) considers the ontological levels affirmed by Advaita Vedanta and how each is arrived at and constituted. This is a highly creative chapter and evidences a philosophical reconstruction. Advaita Vedanta uses the Sanskrit term *badha* to make the necessary distinctions between the various orders /levels of being; it means literally ' contradiction ' but is translated in context as ' cancellation ' or ' sublation.' Deutsch reconstructs this concept as *subration* which he describes as " the mental process whereby one disvalues some previously appraised

object or content of consciousness because of its being contradicted by a new experience." (p. 15) To subrate means, therefore, to undergo an experience which radically changes one's judgment about something. This is then applied to the various levels of being. *"Reality* is that which cannot be subrated by any other experience. *Appearance* is that which can be subrated by other experience. *Unreality* is that which neither can nor cannot be subrated by other experiences." (p. 15) The more something is capable of being subrated, the less reality it has. Only the timeless, unconditioned, undifferentiated oneness of being is not subrated, i.e., *Brahman;* this is the content of Advaitic (non-dual) experience which is expressed in the *Atman* (self) -*Brahman* equation and identity. Such a philosophical reconstruction expresses the ontological levels affirmed by Sankara in more complex and contextual language and thinking.

Another exceptional chapter (Chapter Six: Aspects of Advaitic Epistemology) engages the popular critique of those who look to Indian thought and especially non-duality as a subjective idealism. Deutsch elaborates here on the ' soft ' realism of Advaita Vedanta by insisting that Sankara and his followers always saw the necessity of affirming the distinction between the subject and object within the phenomenal world and phenomenal experience. In Advaita non-duality between subject and object holds only on the level of the *Brahman-experience.* What makes this a very special kind of ' realistic ' epistemology is that it is philosophically necessary but ultimately false, for it is restricted to only a portion of man's experience. (p. 97) In short, the higher knowledge of spiritual experience which is non-dual holds only for the man who has attained this knowledge. What then is the role of reason in this epistemology? The main concern of Advaita is to describe and to lead the mind to the primary moments of spiritual experience. Reason enables one to function in this world, but its greatest value is when it enables one to transcend phenomenal reality and reach a higher knowledge and a higher reality.

This book is carefully written. The style and thought are clear, precise, and finely worked out; at times Deutsch reaches poetic moments. There is need, however, for an appendix of terms in which the more frequently used Sanskrit words are translated and placed in a philosophical context.

I would not hesitate to suggest this study to a student of philosophy. **It** can be recommended to anyone who is interested in creative philosophi*cal* thought in general and in the Eastern experience in particular. Finally, it should be in the hands of anyone interested in the intellectual history of man. Eliot Deutsch is one of the few Western scholars who could have written this type of book. **It** will be interesting to see if it will be used in the future as a model for comparative philosophy.

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Religion in Ancient History. By S. G. F. BRANDON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969. Pp. 412. $12.50.

Professor Brandon of the University of Manchester, England, wrote his new book, *Religion in Ancient History,* not only for specialists in the general or comparative science of religion or religiology, that is, for professors or students, but particularly for the intelligent lay people of the new middle classes in Great Britain, the United States, and other English-speaking countries. With his new study of the science of religion the author would like to reach the specialists in industry and commerce who provide the economic foundations upon which academic life is built. He wants to popularize the results of one hundred and fifty years of scientific exploration in the province of religion. He achieves this purpose by a simple and beautiful language, a clear diction, an acute pedagogical sense, many outstanding illustrations, and many well-chosen quotations from ancient religious texts. The latter two points alone justify the price of the book.

But Brandon does much more than merely popularize the results of the general science of religion. In his new book, *Religion in Ancient History,* Brandon sums up his whole scholarly life's work in the field of religion: his books on *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church, Time and Manlcind, Man and His Destiny in the Great Religions, Creation Legends of the Ancient Near East, History, Time, and Deity, Jesus and the Zealots, The Trial of Jesus of Nazareth, The Judgment of the Dead.* Brandon's new book is not only an excellent popularization of his previous works but is in itself a great scholarly contribution to the further progress of religiology. It stands at the very front of the evolution of this science. But that is not all. This recent book, as well as the author's previous works, is written in the spirit of a new humanism which today permeates the whole science of religion. It is an excellent guide for the layman through the vast and complicated province of religion. But certainly no specialist in the field of religion-religiologist or theologian-can afford to miss reading Brandon's summary of his life's work. His new book should be part of any library for the science of religion or theology, in fact, of any library.

It is the fundamental law of evolution of all sciences concerned with the functions of the human spirit that they go through a continual process of inner differentiation and through a process of mutual interdependence with the disciplines from which they originated and with their respective neighbor sciences. In the last one hundred and fifty years the science of religion differentiated itself into the history, sociology, psychology, phenomenology, and philosophy of religion. At the same time, religiology entered into a mutual exchange with philosophy, theology, history, and philology from which it had arrived and with the neighbor disciplines of sociology, psychology, literary science, and ethnography together with which it had come into existence in the last century.

In his latest book Brandon combines two of the branches of the science of religion: the history and the phenomenology of religion. In the chapters on the Jewish and Christian religion the historical method has somewhat priority over the phenomenological method. In the chapters on the pre-Judeo-Christian religions this relationship is reversed. The history of religion simply traces the evolution of a specific positive religion. The phenomenology of religion consists of a comparative analysis of religious phenomena or forms. Brandon is master in both methodological perspectives. He traces the evolution of religions-Chinese, Indian, }\l[esopotamian, Egyptian, Jewish, Greek, Roman, and particularly Christianity. At the same time he gives a comparative analysis of a variety of religious forms as they appear in different positive religions, for instance, the religious idea of soul, death, time, creation, space, devil, angel, providence, and saviour-god.

The history of religion will always remain the very fundament of religiology. But since the First World War the phenomenology of religion has gained supremacy over the other sub-disciplines of the general science of religion. Brandon participates fully in this ascendency of phenomenology. The phenomenologist inquires into the very essence of particular religious forms through the whole phenomenal world of religions and tries from there to arrive at a differentiated systematic of types and laws of religious data. He initiates a process of ideational reduction. The phenomenological study of religions presupposes a *sensus numinis* by which cult-processes or religious texts can be understood from inside on the basis of a general notion of religion. Such study should be-according to the religiologist--Dbjective, and it should be done without any " theological prejudice." In the perspective of the religiologist theology is the articulation of the self-understanding of *one* specific religious group. As such, theology may help to enter the self-understanding of *this* group. But it has thereby not yet fulfilled the epistomological requirements for understanding other religions. For the religiologist, Christianity is not the " absolute religion " which it still was for G. W. F. Hegel. The religiologist also does not agree with Adolf Harnack's statement, "He who does not know Christianity does not know any religion and he who knows Christianity with all its history knows all religions." If this statement were true, Christian theology would be sufficient to understand all religions and the science of religion would be superfluous, since the religiologist could find only phenomena in non-Christian religions very similar to those forms already discovered by theologians in Christianity. The religiologist Brandon finds it absolutely necessary to study Christianity *and* all other religions. He tries to do so objectively and without the slightest trace of his own theological past or perspective. He has a deep sense for the numinous which helps him to penetrate into the inner spirit of all religions including Christianity.

All religions of our earth planet belong to the subject matter of religi-

ology. The scope of this science is, therefore, much broader than that of any particular theology. Theologies themselves are religious forms to be studied by the religiologist. The specialist in the science of religion is concerned with dead as well as living religions. His field stretches from the sun cult of the Incas to the fertility rites of the Hindus. There are few religious forms in the now dead or still living positive religions of the Near East, the Far East, or the West with which Brandon is not familiar. But his main interest lies with the religions of the Near East: the religions of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Israel, Ancient Greece and Rome, and with Christianity in its Oriental origins and development up to the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A. D. Through his highly particularized historical and phenomenological studies of religious forms, their structure and historical context, Brandon has made a tremendous contribution to the continuously growing edifice of the world of religious phenomena, structures and life laws, systems of myth and theologies.

It is as typical for the Hegelian Right to abandon the present and the future to the past as it is for the Hegelian Left to sacrifice the past and the present to the future. Neither side has a real present. Brandon makes his middle class readers familiar with a large variety of religions which belong to the past. Even if they are still present with us today, such as Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity, they are nevertheless portrayed as phenomena belonging to the past. We are led through a huge museum. The reader learns about leaves which have grown on the tree of religion many Springs ago. Those leaves are still fascinating in their shape, but they have become somewhat dry. Brandon shows us to use a mythological image he himself thoroughly enjoys the skins out of which the snake of the human species has crawled many generations ago and which it has long since left behind. He tells the truth, which was the truth *for others* but which obviously is no longer *the truth for us.* Who can still kneel before 1\farduk or Zeus? From the viewpoint of Brandon, the discoveries of modern emprical sciences and the general historical experience of post-modern man have now rendered even the Christian view of life and history obsolete and untenable. Of course, Brandon is mainly concerned with certain historical objectivations of Christianity, for instance, the now-declining Constantinian folk church, the Victorian Christianity in England, or the fundamentalist Christianity in the United States. Those objectivations he tends to identify without qualification with the very spirit of Christianity. He seems not to be too familiar with the circles of reflective Christians on all continents for whom the Christian message of God as absolute future is still very much a viable option concerning the meaning of history and life for the present as well as the future. Of course, it need not particularly be mentioned that Brandon, like other religiologists, starts from the assumption that Christianity is a religion and as such underlies the laws, life forms, and categories of the history of religions.

In general, more observation of living religions in their daily activities could have helped Brandon to interpret the historical religions analogically, which otherwise can be reached only by historical-philological means.

The science of religion must not justify its existence by demonstrating its practical utility. But it may very well be that this science could become of gTeat importance in the unification process of our world in the second half of this century. Brandon is very much aware of this possibility. He wrote his new book in order to promote a better understanding between Eastern and Western cultures. In this sense his book is truly ecumenical not only in relation to the different Christian churches but also in terms of world religions. Religious forms belong to the determining variable of cultural change. The study of those religious variables of change may contribute to the mutual understanding of cultures. The present importance of the Near and the Far East for the West makes the energetic development of the science of religion a vital necessity. Brandon has devoted his life's work to the further development of the science of religion as an instrument for the understanding of Eastern cultures by Western man. Brandon is motivated by a world-wide new humanism which has found a special home in the science of religion.

Religiology is definitely not theology. In the last century the science of religion was developed against theology. Tensions still exist between those disciplines. But today it is very well possible that the same scholar works in the field of theology *and* religiology. Brandon is familiar with traditional theology. In earlier stages of his career he served as an army chaplain. Liberal Protestant theology has deeply influenced him. But his new book definitely does not fall within the traditional discipline of theology. The religiologist has no ambitions to replace theology, but he is very jeaious of the autonomy of his discipline versus theology. In the perspective of the religiologist, his science has lost its autonomy as soon as it becomes a theological discipline. In this case it becomes an *ancilla theologiae* as philosophy once was. In the perspective of the religiologist, it is against the universal purpose of the science of religion to be put in the service of one religious community and thereby become an instrument in the struggle of this one religious community with others. In the field of theology the science of religion may become part of missionary science. It may serve apologetic interests. The religiologist wants, rather, to uncover apologetical tendencies and ideological distortions produced by religious communities against one another. Brandon concentrates, for instance, much of his chapters about Christianity on the discovery of apologetically tendentious elements, particularly in the Gospel of Mark, but also in the other three gospels and in the writings of the early Church Fathers. The religiologist admit that also a science of religion as integral part of a theology may yield interesting scientific results. But, in his perspective, it would mean to break the backbone of the science of religiology if one

would make it into an integral part of a specific theology, since the purpose of this science is to explore the religions of the past and the present *for their own sake* and not for missionary and apologetical purposes of any particular religion. It is, of course, of greatest importance for young students of theology to acquire a thorough knowledge about the world religions. Brandon's book can certainly be most helpful in this direction. It would also be possible to reconcile theology and the science of religion with:n the framework of a liberal theology department on the basis of a general notion of religion to which also Christianity could be subsumed. Such reconciliation has taken place in Holland and Sweden. Such reconciliation is easier within the framework of Protestant theological departments--except those under Barthian influence-rather than in Catholic theology departments, since Protestant theologians-contrary at least to traditional Catholic theologians-share with the religiologist in the heritage of the great founders of the historical-philological school. In non-liberal theological departments-for instance, those promoting the dialectical theology or an integralist Catholic theology-a representative work of the science of religion like Brandon's new book will not easily find a home. But there can be no doubt that the study of such books would be of greatest value for orthodox and neo-orthodox theologians. The further effectiveness of the science of religion in general, and of Brandon's work in particular, will very much depend on the liberalization of Protestant and Catholic theology.

The science of religion has, like its modem neighbor sciences, philosophy for its immediate origin and its final goal. G. W. F. Hegel, whose 200th birthday the intellectual community celebrates this year, was not only the last great scholastic but also the father of the modem science of religion. Brandon's book is truly Hegelian in scope, analyzing and comparing all the positive religions contained in Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion.* Of course, the science of religion is no longer a normative science. Like its neighbor sciences, religiology has become a merely descriptive science. Brandon's study attempts to remain descriptive throughout. As a descriptive science, religiology is concerned with the survey, knowledge, and understanding of all religious data and phenomena, the origin and evolution of positive religions, and the causal and functional correlations of religious data. But the theoretical presupposition of the science of religion is, nevertheless, a general notion of religion, that is, a common standard of exploration underlying all religious forms. In the last one hundred and fifty years religiologists have developed a variety of such standards in the field of religion. This variety of methodological approaches makes the science of religion highly flexible and productive. But all those different methodological perspectives are subordinated under the presupposition that all positive religions are based on " religion " no matter how this fundamental notion of " religion " may be defined or interpreted, for instance,

as progressive unification of divine and human nature (Hegel), or as "feeling of dependence" (Schleiermacher), or as "hope for totality" (Bloch). For this fundamental notion of religion religiology depends on philosophy. The religiologist needs at least a provisional notion of religion at the beginning of his work as a working hypothesis. Otherwise, he could not differentiate between religious and other types of phenomena. Certainly at the end of the religiologist's work stands the question concerning the essence of religion, the historical value-scale of religiology, and the truth of religious knowledge. With those questions the history, phenomenology, sociology, and psychology of religion enter the field of the philosophy of religion. All branches of religiology are comparative in their method, and this comparative method has proven its tremendous productivity in the field of religion. Brandon's new work shows that once more. But that does not mean that the science of religion wants necessarily to relativize and equalize all religions in terms of a flat " nothing else than " bourgeoise or socialistic enlightenment. The science of religion can never entirely exclude the crucial question of religious truth without running the danger of becoming trivial and thereby forcing particularly the students to ask, after reading the most industrious, scholarly works on religious forms: "So what?"

Brandon's new work is based on a universal notion of religion. This notion stands as working hypothesis at the beginning of the book. It appears also as the result of the book, verified by each individual chapter. Brandon defines religion throughout his book as man's attempt to give meaning to his individual biography, as well as to the history of his group. Man is an animal which does not only want to survive but desires to survive meaningfully. Man creates religious forms in order to satisfy his need for meaning, his need for ultimate significance of his individual and collective existence. Brandon operates with an extremely humanistic and not-at-all theological notion of religion. This humanistic definition opens up tremendous vistas within the province of religion. It stimulates that deep sympathy without which positive religions cannot be understood from inside. Brandon has this humanistic sympathy for all religions to the highest degree. It is this sympathy which makes him the great master in his field.

But Brandon's humanistic notion of religion has its disadvantages. It is somewhat vague, and this vagueness has its consequences. Brandon's humanistic notion of religion does not help to differentiate sufficiently between religion and other functions of the human spirit, for instance, art or philosophy. Also, art and philosophy are definitely a human response to man's need for meaning. Another consequence of the vagueness of Brandon's notion of religion is that he cannot explain sufficiently the difference between magic and religion at the beginning of the religious evolution. In relation to the preliminary end of the evolution of religion

Brandon assumes as self-evident that Christianity can be subsumed under the same notion of religion together with, for inbtance, the Egyptian or Mesopotamian religions. Only a very clear, precise, and definite notion of religion could help to decide if Christianity can be called a religion or not. Brandon seems not to be aware in his new book of the fundamental problem raised by the still dominating dialectical theology of present Protestantism, whether Christianity can at all be subsumed under any general notion of religion. Karl Barth taught that Christianity was no religion but rather the crisis of all religions. According to Barth, religions are merely man's work. They are only the result of *hybris.* They are man's arrogant longing and attempt to penetrate by his own power the mystery of God while in Christ revelation has been given by God to the believer as a matter of grace. Brandon seems also unaware in his book of the post-modern Catholic theological position, that Christianity is no longer a religion but a trans-religious as well as a trans-cultural and trans-moral eschatological message of God as the absolute future, arriving in history and challenging human estrangement in all societies, particularly religious estrangement. Brandon, of course, does not want to relativize or equalize all religions, particularly not Christianity, despite his comparative method, comparing, for instance, the saviour-god Osiris with the savious-god, Jesus the Christ. According to Brandon's humanistic notion of religion, certainly all religions are the response of man's creative subjectivity to the problem of ultimate significance of this subjectivity. But not all religious answers to this problem of meaning are equally valuable in humanistic terms. There is progress in the evolution of the religious consciousness. During the religious evolution answers to the meaning problem of human existence become, for instance, less crude and bizarre.

The philosopher of religion, Hegel, is mentioned only once in Brandon's new work and then only in relation to the British anthropologist James G. Frazer, who took from Hegel the fundamental thesis that an "Age of Magic" preceded the "Age of Religion" in world history. But at least unconsciously and indirectly, Brandon is, nevertheless, as the most outstanding religiologist in the last one hundred and fifty years, still influenced by the great philosopher. Some elements in Brandon's book give explicit witness to Hegelian influence: the courageous scope of the study; the conception spirit of religion and the search for key ideas to penetrate the religious spirit; the conceptions *Weltanschauung,* logic of experience, of situations, or of religious forms; the conceptions irony of history or of fate understood as latent functions of human decisions and actions; preference for great personalities in the context of collective processes like Zarathustra or Akhenaton; the emphasis on the process of individuation in some religions of the Near East; preference for religious ideas and their artistic objectivations in cultic architecture, sculpture, painting, epic, and lyric, rather than for religious organization, attitudes towards the world, ethics

and social ethics, and the eufunctionality or dysfunctionality of religion for the structure of personality society and culture; the emphasis on Christianity as the last phase of the evolution of religion in which religious forms from older religions-ideas of soul, death, incarnation, saviour-god-are preserved and elevated.

Certainly Hegel's fundamental notion of religion was also humanistic. According to l\Iarxist philosophers, Hegel discovered the productivity of Man's consciousness in terms of a transcendental subjectivism in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit.* Also Hegel understood religious forms as the work of man in humanistic terms. But for Hegel, the Divine Spirit was working in the human spirit. Religious forms were not only the product of man but also the work of God. The evolution of religion was not only a process of progressive human self-knowledge but also of progressive God-understanding of men and self-understanding of God in the evolving religious consciousness of man as the partner of God. This latter theistic position of Hegel is no longer tenable for the humanistic science of religion. It is typical for the Hegelian Right and Left that both intellectual movements are unable to hold to Hegel's powerful syntheses. Brandon dissolves Hegel's synthesis of humanism and theism as does the whole Hegelian Left from Feuerbach to Bloch. He replaces Hegel's dialectical objective idealism by an undialectical subjective idealism a la Emmanuel Kant. He describes forms of religious consciousness, but the intentionality of those forms is not discussed. He analyzes God *hypostases* as they were projected throughout world history against the horizon of the "Holy," but the "thing itself"-the ultimate sacred reality in and for itself-remains out of considertion. The question of truth of religious knowledge is excluded from the new humanism in the science of religion. As the science of religion on the Hegelian Left is atheistic, so it remains at least agnostic on the Hegelian Right. One wonders how humanistic such an absolute humanism can really be, such as it is represented in Brandon's work? How much humanism is really left to post-modern man, walking alone through the museums of his abandoned *God-hypostases?* A reconsideration of Hegel's philosophy could probably help the humanistically inclined religiologist to arrive at a more balanced, fundamental notion of religion than has been produced so far in the science of religion and as presently represented in Brandon's otherwise excellent work.

It would be desirable that Brandon would have allowed the sociology of religion to influence his work more than it actually did. Sociological functionalism and nco-functionalism from Malinowski to O'Dea could have made the author somewhat more sceptical concerning our knowledge about the origins of religions, including the origin of Christianity. A greater emphasis on the sociology of religion could also have helped the author to understand more adequately the correlation between positive religions on one hand and the stratification and dynamics of societies on the other

hand. The analysis of this correlation is, at present, the strength of the Marxist science of religion with its philosophical-sociological orientation. It is the main thesis of Brandon's chapters on Christianity that the Christian religion was revolutionary in its origin and its evolution up to the fall of Jerusalem but that, after the year 70 A. D., Christianity adapted itself to the power structure of the Roman city empire and became a somewhat conservative law-and-order-religion. According to Brandon, it was .Mark's main concern to prove to the Roman society that Christianity was neither new nor revolutionary but had a positive relation to law and order in the Roman society. The other three gospel writers and the early teachers and Fathers of the Church pursued the same conservative apologetical tendency. It seems that Brandon overlooks somewhat how many revolutionary statements have not been censored in the four Gospels: ... I have come to bring fire and I wanted it to burn ... No rich man can enter the Kingdom of God . . . I have come to make all things new . . . He has pulled down princes from their thrones and exalted the lowly, the hungry He has filled with good things, the rich He sent empty away ... etc. Also, after the year 70 A. D. and the beginning of Catholic Christianity, did Christians continue to die for their faith as " atheists " and " traitors " in the Roman society. Religious orders continued the prophetic-revolutionary trend in Christianity the more the Constantinian folk church became conservative and a means of social control and integration for the Roman city empire, the European feudal societies, and finally the nation state. Today, amidst the decline of the Constantinian folk church, reflective Christians like Torres, King, the Berrigans, and Groppi have chosen to become prophetic-revolutionary agents of social change. No Marxist can any longer make the unqualified statement that religion is necessarily opium for the people. Marxist religiologists would certainly agree with Brandon that Christianity was originally a revolutionary movement and later on became, in the process of adaptation to different human action systems, conservative and even reactionary. But they would add that the revolutionary undercurrent never ceased completely in the history of Christianity. Modern martyrs like Torres and King, as well as the political theology, the theology of hope, and the theology of revolution in Protestantism and Catholicism, prove them right. It would have added to the value of Brandon's book if he would not have over-stressed the Christian's embarrassment concerning their revolutionary origin (according to Brandon, Jesus of Nazareth died as a revolutionary executed on a political sedition charge) and the element of newness in their Faith. It would have helped his book had he stressed more the element of revolutionary hope for the new, the eschatological "not-yet" in Christianity as it appears from Christian tradition. It is intrinsic to Brandon's main emphasis on the history and phenomenology of religion that neither sociology, psychology, nor philosophy of religion come sufficiently to the foreground. But it is

exactly one function of the law of differentiation and mutual interdependence, operative in the evolution of religiology, that it is impossible for one author to be master in all disciplines which constitute the science of religion or to be in contact with all the sciences from which religiology derived or with which it shares the same origin.

Religion constitutes an immense province of human life throughout man's social evolution. It is sufficient for the individual religiologist to gain his legitimation in one or two branches of his science. This legitimation gives the specialist in the field of religiology the right to make use of the work of other specialists in other branches of his science and of other either traditional or neighbor disciplines to the extent allowed for by his critical eye and his scientific intuition. It would be utopian to demand from the religiologist, at this time, a thorough knowledge of all societies and cultures in which religions have been formed or to know all the languages in which religious man has expressed himself in the course of social evolution. A religiologist cannot be judged as a dilettant because he is unable to live up to such demands. Such demands in themselves would be dilletantish.

Professor Brandon has fully gained his legitimation as an outstanding scholar in the history and phenomenology of religion. He has thereby earned the right to use other branches of the science of religion and other disciplines as auxiliary sciences. With the help of other specialists in other branches of religiology and in other traditional and new disciplines Brandon has established in his new book a fascinating historical synthesis of all knowledge presently available about the province of religion in terms of a new humanism. At the end of his book Brandon leaves us with the humanistic hope that man will not only survive but that he will also continue, despite all disappointments, to ask the fundamental question which all religions try to answer: What does the history of mankind mean? Postmodern Western man is supported in asking this question, according to Brandon, by his teleological instinct, by his deep grounding in the doctrines of progress, and by centuries of Christian tradition. It is up to the new generation of religiologists, philosophers and social scientists, as well as theologians to continue Professor Brandon's courageous seach for an inspiring purpose in history. A Christian theology of religions does not yet exist. Should it ever come into existence, it will need the help of the science of religion and of great scholars like Professor Brandon.

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God in Exile: Modern Atheism. By CoRNELIO FABRO. Translated and edited by Arthur Gibson. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968. Pp. *$35.00.*

Tlw subtitle of this *magnum opus* fixes the limits of the author's range of vision and suggests the terms of the thesis he attempts to establish. Fabro speaks of the roots of modern atheism in the Cartesian *cogito;* the line of inquiry he follows, after an initial analysis of what he takes to be the atheistic implications of Descartes' fundamental axiom, is more or less severely defined by his singular point of departure. Each subsequent chapter makes reference to this premise, which is also the source of what Fabro calls the internal dynamic of modern atheism. This continuing reference supplies focus and framework for Fabro's interpretations of post-Cartesian thought and provides the thread binding into some measure of unity a series of essays of uneven value and monumental proportions. *God in Exile* is an extended argument for the contention that immanentism is at the source of every expression of theism in modern philosophy. The work may be judged by the success of the argument and by the adequacy of this perspective as an insight on philosophical atheism.

On the face of it, the impression left by Fabro's exposition, that all of modem Western thought, at least in its philosophical dimension, is atheistic in its intrinsic logic and final thrust, is a vague one and irritates by its excessive generality and facile selectiveness. One would have to examine closely Fabro's treatment of each author or movement and determine whether the book's central thesis finds genuine application. More basically, it is a question of the authenticity of treating these several writers, whose work spans a period of three centuries, merely, or very largely, as vehicles for the transmission, elaboration, and refinement of a single proposition. One may assume that it is legitimate to consider the inherent logic of a philosopher's position independently of the latter's purpose or intent or even stated convictions which may ignore or defy that logic. It remains for an interpreter to bear the burden of proof in attributing to an author conclusions which he himself did not draw or which he may even have expressly repudiated. Fabro does not go so far as to call each and every thinker whose philosophy he studies an atheist, but he does something equivalently as sweeping and forceful in its impact. His ultimate contention is that there is no philosopher of any stature or any school entirely free either of the formative influence of Cartesian immanentism or of that theoretical atheism which, so he claims, is its inescapable derivative. More dramatically, Fabro wants to convict the whole of serious modern thought of the exile of God, the effective elimination of the God of biblical faith and ethical monotheism.

Fabro's method and principle of interpretation constitute the form of his inquiry and are imposed on the vast array of his materials with uncom-

promising consistency and unity of purpose. Although the approach follows a historical pattern, and although there is, indeed, abundant evidence drawn from a wealth of commentary and criticism contemporaneous with the authors studied, there is serious reason to question the work's overall historical accuracy. Fabro has chosen to emphasize precisely those aspects and elements in his subjects' thought which lend support to the thesis he is bent on verifying. His coverage is thorough; I can think of no philosopher of the first, or even the second, rank who is not included in Fabro's comprehensive survey of Western thought. His grasp of the essence of their teaching is stronger and surer in the case of Continental thinkers than that of English-language authors. In seven sections the atheistic core content of Western philosophy is laid bare, from the mid-17th to the mid-20th century, from Cartesian rationalism to dialectical theology and the " death-of-God " radicalism. His lengthy introduction is preceded by an excellent essay delimiting the notion of atheism and refining the terms and conditions of the author's proposed inquiry. In a concluding section Fabro reviews the course he has followed and questions the validity of his key principle. His own philosophical options are spelled out clearly and forcefully and a rather truncated brief is entered on behalf of a realist metaphysics.

Only the expert ought to venture a critique of any particular chapter, to register demurrers at the successive analyses of the most profound and intricate epistemologies and ontologies of the most powerful minds in our cultural history. I shall confine myself to a few observations on Fabro's handling of English Deists, most of which have not been reprinted since the early 18th century. Unfortunately, the section on the origins and historical background of Deism appears to be the weakest and least well documented in the book. Herbert of Cherbury's overriding concern, to banish the rising spectres of corrosive skepticism and furnish religious belief with a sound basis in reason and nature, is all but dismissed in Fabro's indictment. The tone of his appreciation of Deism is revealed in the forthright assertion that Deism prepared the way for the atheism of the 18th century and favored those who were denying all religion. Fabro's treatment of Hobbes respects the complexity and obscurity of the latter's religious philosophy, but it is strange to find Hobbes included with the Deists, with whom he had no connection.

Shaftesbury is regarded as in the Deist tradition, but as a very late and minor figure. Fabro fastens accurately on the issue which exercised Shaftesbury and proved of crucial significance in the long Enlightenment debate over God. Fabro fails, however, to examine carefully the succession of principal Deist writers after Toland, to uncover the nuances and complex directions taken in a series of works that emerged rather as a bulwark against outright unbelief than the invitation to atheism which Fabro discerns. Perhaps the major flaw in Fabro's actual reading of the philosophy

of the Deists is his linking of this movement with British empmcism. Toland, it is true, had connections with Locke, but of a personal and social nature, and the main inspiration of Deist thinking is neoplatonist and idealist in character. In any case, the Deist school is not fairly represented by the lone Toland and out of a possible forty or fifty important Deist works, over a period of fifty or sixty years, fewer than half a dozen are even mentioned by Fabro. The role played by the Deists in modern European religious history remains to be fixed and properly estimated; Fabro's sketch is neither adequate nor reliable.

It may be argued persuasively that atheism represents French Enlightenment thinking about God at its most historically authentic and logically consistent. Fabro's argumentation is far from persuasive, although this happens to be his interpretation, as one might have expected. He restricts himself to the four leading materialists in whose works he claims to find a full-blown atheism constructed from a number of disparate sources, unoriginal, intellectually inferior, but influential in the campaign to secularize French life and thinking. There is little of Fabro's own understanding in this section; he has followed quite uncritically standard Enlightenment authorities such as Verniere and Vartanian. One is puzzled by his repeated, and equally uncritical, citation of the commentaries of Soviet and other Marxist historians of philosophy. Fabro seems to rely on these Communist interpreters as guides to the at times an1biguous thinking of the *philosophes.* On the other hand, there are valuable references, in later sections, to Hegelian and Marxist texts on the part played by the French materialists in the warfare of modern reason with religious orthodoxy.

The later chapters, on 19th century European philosophy, display the author's historical sense and theoretical acumen at its best. The intricate convolutions of Kantian and Hegelian dialectics are traced patiently in an effort to pin down the inevitability of atheism for any position which precludes a viable realist metaphysics of being. The humanist underpinning of Marxism is wisely noted, as the positive counterpart to its antitheism and source of revolutionary ardor and vision. A chapter on Whitehead struggles heroically to disengage from a bewildering welter of insights and reflections on man's religious experience a coherent doctrine on the reality of God and the relationship to him of a world in process. The recurring affinities of pantheism and atheism are striking documented in this exercise. Throughout Fabro's volume there are appendices which present additional material and sometimes welcome elucidations of points raised in the text. The reader is advised not to neglect these pages or to overlook the staggering wealth of bibliographical references they providr.

In the concluding section Fabro doffs the historian's cap and assumes a role obviously more to his liking, that of philosophical critic and reconstructionist. More than any other aspect of thr "'ork. the forthright meta-

physical realism of this section impresses me as a healthy, invigorating contribution to an understanding of atheism *as* an intellectual phenomenon. The drive, the sheer energy, with which Fabro strives to nail down an extremely difficult and elusive thesis is exemplified superbly in the persistence with which he explores every avenue opened up by his research, going over the terrain painstakingly, to find at work that immanentism which, he is convinced, infects the whole of modern thought with an atheistic bias. Fabro has wrought a work of monumental proportions and performed a service of incalculable magnitude for the student of modern religious philosophy in general and of the problem of atheism in particular. That he has succeeded so admirably is a tribute to his speculative and scholarly competence; where he has been less successful he has laid down sound criteria and pointed the way for others. The translation is not smooth and is often infelicitous or misleading; one presumes, for example, what is invariably rendered "illuminism " to be "Enlightenment."

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The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge. By RoNALD H. NAsH. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1969. Pp. 147. $6.50.

Ronald Nash's short monograph has the obvious merit of being the first study in English dealing exclusively and comprehensively with Augustine's theory of knowledge. An accurate assessment of Augustine's views on this subject is all the more important in Nash's opinion as Augustine has not only allegedly stamped with his influence such giants as Descartes and Malebranche but has actually anticipated some of the most original insights of Berkeley and Kant. The topic is on the whole notoriously controversial, as the persistent divergences of interpretation among scholars, both past and present, abundantly testify. Nash has nevertheless faced the difficulties of his enterprise courageously. Pitting himself against Portalie, Boyer, Gilson, Copleston, and other established authorities, whom he accuses of having scholasticized Augustine, he presents an account of Augustine's thought which claims the double advantage of being more consonant with Augustine's own statements and more intelligible to the modern reader.

The opening chapters of the book deal in the main with a number of preliminary issues all intimately connected with Augustine's "epistemology," such as his repudiation of skepticism, his views on the role of faith

in human life and its relation to reason, and his theory of sense perception and cognition. Of particular interest is Chapter Two, which focuses on the *Contra Academicos* and traces the line of reasoning which led to the rejection of the materialistic or mechanistic cosmology on which skepticism was based in favor of Platonic teleology or the notion of an intelligible universe governed by a divine mind. The reviewer's sole regret is that Nash has not taken greater pains to indicate how Augustine not only used the Platonic theory to refute skepticism but reshaped the Platonic theory itself to suit the requirements of the Faith.

The remainder of the essay is devoted to an analysis of the doctrineH of divine illumination and of intellection, which, as the author rightly points out, form the core of Augustine's theory of knowledge. The competing interpretations advanced by contemporary scholars are reduced to four broad types, which Nash labels respectively the Thomistic, the Franciscan, the Formal, and the Ontological. The first and least acceptable of these, defended by Boyer, identifies the divine light of which Augustine speaks with the agent intellect and falsely ascribes to Augustine a theory of abstraction analogous to that of Aristotle. The second, to which the name of Portalie is attached, argues that the ideas are impressed on the human mind by God himself but leaves the mind with only a passive role to play in the act of knowing. The third, which finds its chief prononents in Gilson, DeWulf, Copleston, an"d Kaelin, sees the role of illumination as that of imparting a quality of certitude or necessity to the ideas but is unable to account for their content. There remains the ontological interpretation, hitherto shunned by most historians, which alone would do full justice to the complexity of Augustine's thought and which combines among other things the benefits of conceptualism and realism. In essence, it postulates an immediate awareness of the eternal truths on the part of the human mind. This statement is not to be taken to mean that man sees all things in God, as :Malebranche later contended, but that man's reason has been so structured by God as to be capable of knowing the ideas in the divine mind as well as the creation that is patterned on them. Only by having recourse to such an isomorphism, Nash suggests, is it possible to resolve what he calls the three great paradoxes with which any account of Augustine's views must come to grips and explain, namely, how the human intellect is both active and passive, how the archetypal forms are at once distinct and not distinct from the mind itself, and how the mind is and is not at the same time the light that makes knowledge possible. A brief synthesis of the most pertinent Augustinian texts accordingly reveals 1) that the ideas in the mind are *a priori,* that is to say, not derived from experience, 2) that they are *virtual* or not always actually thought, and 3) that they constitute the necessary *precondition of science.*

Nash shrewdly observes that the preference exhibited by scholars for

one or the other of these interpretations is by and large a function of the prior assumptions to which they are committed or with which they approach Augustine's works. Yet one does not see clearly how he is able to exempt himself from his own verdict. Although there is much to be said for his position, the terms in which it is expressed are often more redolent of modern thought than of Augustine and his models. It is misleading, if nothing else, to speak of the importance of " epistemology " for Augustine and to stress the kinship in this regard between his views and those of either Descartes or Kant, inasmuch as epistemology is predicated on the very denial of the teleology on which, by Nash's own admission, Augustine's final position rests. If the universe is teleological or, what amounts to the same thing, if there is a natural harmony between it and the human mind, one can dispense, as Augustine did, with the artificial intellectual tools to which philosophers were complelled to resort at the dawn of the modern period once that harmony had been rejected and once the intrinsic intelligibility of the universe had been questioned.

There are more subtle ways in which Nash's own bias occasionally comes to the surface. He is undoubtedly justified in taking issue with those contemporary theologians, such as Alan Richardson, who argue that faith as Augustine understands it is devoid of any propositional content (p. 31), but he in turn oversimplifies matters when he remarks that for Augustine " practical reason directs and guides the theoretical reason " (p. 34) , thus unwittingly making of him an advocate of moralism, which he most emphatically was not. Assuming the advisability of stating the problem in these non-Augustinian terms, the most that can be said from Augustine's point of view is that religious knowledge, as distinguished from purely philosophic knowledge, is in one and the same act both speculative and practical. This is not to deny that the will exercises a great influence on the intellect or that some kind of faith is presupposed on the part of the student especially during the early stages of the learning process.

The irony of the book, in this reviewer's judgment, is that Nash could have found much better support for his interpretation in a sound and penetrating analysis of Plato's theory of knowledge than in the parallels that he is so eager to draw between Augustine and the modern epistemological tradition. Unfortunately, he still clings to a textbook understanding of the separation between the physical and intellectual worlds in Plato and fails to see-in the celebrated analogy of the cave, for instance-an effort on Plato's part to show how the same world can be viewed in two radically different ways or a dramatic illustration of the fundamental distinction between mere opinion and true knowledge. He likewise takes at face value Plato's statements on reminiscence or recollection instead of discerning in them a figurative expression of the microcosmic nature of

the human soul or of the pre-established accord between the mind which knows and the universe which it knows *(cf.* p. 69, 81 ff.). The same mistake was, of course, made by Augustine, who nevertheless managed to capture with admirable profundity the true spirit of the Platonic argument and at least had the excuse of not having read most of Plato's dialogues, including the *Meno,* which he knew only at second hand.

Finally, the overall quality of the essay is marred at times by a number of minor but still annoying defects. The author sheds little light on the issues at hand when he defines a "word" *(verbum)* as a symbol, as opposed to a sign, in what may be one of the least satisfactory parts of the book (p. 85 ff.) , and his constant recourse to Latin words or phrases, presumably for the sake of clarity, is to say the least far from unimpeachable; witness, for example, the frequent use of the plural for the singular or of the genitive when the context obviously calls for the nominative form (pp. 63, 72, 75, 87, 89, *et pMsim).*

The preceding strictures are formulated for the sole purpose of furthering the dialogue which Nash has auspiciously reopened and which has yet to yield its choicest fruits. Whatever the merit of these strictures, there is no denying that the book assembles a wealth of profitable information which those philosophers and theologians whose interests reach back to the wellsprings of Western thought will plunder with delight.

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Why God Became Man and the Virgin Conception and Original Sin. By Anselm of Canterbury. Translation, introduction, and notes by JosEPH M. CoLLERAN. Albany, N. Y.: Magi Books, 1969. Pp. 253. $6.00.

This new translation has a distinct advantage over previous ones because it has been made from the very good edition of F. S. Schmitt, 0. S. B. The translator, J. M. Colleran, seems to indicate why he chose to translate the *Cur Deus Homo* and the *de Conceptu Virginali* when he says that "it is quite likely that Anselm's principal claim to fame is his authorship of the book *Cur Deus Homo"* and that "the virgin conception and original sin is a corollary to why God became man." (p. vii) Colleran lists the different works of St. Anselm in "the chronological order proposed by Fr. Schmitt, so that the reader may better appreciate the *Cur Deus Homo* and the *de Conceptu Virginali* in the light of St. Anselm's whole body of theological thought and devotional meditation." (p. 13) Colleran expresses " the hope that the understanding Anselm had of the truths of faith is

not obscured, but fairly communicated by the present English version, and that not too much of the fervor of the saint's utterance has been lost by being relayed through a colder tongue. The only liberty deliberately and frequently taken was to shorten many sentences in which Anselm not only states a proposition, but works in attestation from authority, and reference to a related truth, and an ascetical animadversion, all without stopping for breath." (pp. *54-5)*

Whatever may be the opinion of the reader about the relative importance of the works of St. Anselm, he will, I think, be generally satisfied with the work Colleran has done. Of course, no two translators would render a passage in exactly the same way; however, Colleran's renditions are, for the most part, defensible. Because translations have a limited usefulness, it is enough, I think, if the translator renders with defensible and reasonable accuracy the thought of the orir:;·inal language. Therefore, any criticisms \vhich I have to make are somewhat trivial. It is useless to attempt to solve the controversy about the advisability of translating into beautiful English a Latin text which is, in itself, stylistically pedestrian.

My main criticism of the present translator is that he sometimes puts into his translation more than the Latin will allow. This is done in one of two ways: First, he will often supply possible implications in the text, and second, he will use a stronger or more precise word than the Latin warrants. Often enough it is impossible to avoid this pitfall, especially in the case of rendering the so-called scholastic language into English or in leaving deliberate ambiguities in the original Latin. Here are a few examples of what I mean. Should *peregrinus* be translated "exile "? (p. 60) Again, (p. 176) "with the will in it" seems to add an emphasis that *in qua est voluntas* does not contain. Colleran translated *cum sit omnipotens* as "although he is omnipotent," (p. 60) whereas previous translators have either " since he is omnipotent " or " who is omnipotent." Most likely the clause is concessive, but I am not sure. Again, (p. 67) " that there is no opposition " translates *quomodo non obsistat;* surely St. Anselm intends to do more that merely show *that* there is no opposition. I wonder if *ratione* should be translated by " rational arguments." There may be some subtle reason for translating *natum de femina* "born of a female body," but why not simply "born of a woman "? (p. 67) St. Anselm insisted that copyists include the chapter-titles (p. 61); evidently he tl:ought they had some importance. Yet Colleran (p. 169) translates *quae sit originalis et quae personalis iustitia et iniustitia* as "What original justice or injustice and personal justice and injustice mean." St. Anselm wanted to know what they *were.* A complicated discussion of the meaning of meaning would not have been very familiar to him.

Probably the preface, introduction, and annotations to a translation are not the place to look for a clear doctrinal statement of an author's teaching. But there are a few points about Colleran's interpretations which I should

like to make. For the life of St. Anselm he has followed closely Eadmer and R. W. Southern, *St. Anselm and his Biographer;* it would have been helpful if Colleran had tried to distinguish a little more clearly between historical facts and literary commonplaces. For example, we should like to know how strongly the monks insisted that Anselm write down his treatises or reflections or musings. Again, was it true that Anselm was carried rather than led to the church for his investiture by the king? To such questions many will reply that, if we cannot believe what an author writes, then history-writing becomes impossible; yet we do know that rhetorical commonplaces were long in honor. Furthermore, it seems to me that any discussion of Anselm's methodology without a precise analysis of his teaching on faith, truth, and the rectitude of the mind is bound to miss the point of his "proofs." Did Anselm hope to convince his readers by persuasion or demonstration? There is a vast literature on St. Anselm in which we find many divergent interpretations. It is surprising, therefore, to find such unqualified statements as " father of scholastic theology " (p. *53)* and the implication of a " realism that is faithful to the philosophic tradition stemming from Plato." (p. *50)*

The notes (pp. *£15-£45)* are sometimes helpful, especially the cross-references. Some of the notes are to me ambiguous expecially where references are given to the Fathers; does this always imply that this was the source of St. Anselms speculation? Again, Colleran speaks of the ambiguity of Anselm's use of the word "Father," because it often refers to all three Persons of the Trinity. Yet the references (pp. 230-1, fnn. 33 & 79) do not seem to bear out what Colleran alleges.

All in all, Coleran's work is a contribution to Anselmian studies and is, I think, without serious errors. In these days of "little Latin" it will serve a useful purpose.

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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. *51* (3a, 27-30) *Our Lady,* with notes and appendices by THOMAS R. HEATH, O. P. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. Pp. 144. $7.00.

The reader who wishes to savor to the full the excellently translated and commented present volume of the Blackfriars *Summa* would do well to have at hand *Lumen gentium,* the dogmatic constitution on the Church, with its eighth chapter on "The Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God, in the Mystery of Christ and the Church."

Our Lady takes up qq. 27 through 30 of *pars tertia:* sanctification of the Blessed Virgin, virginity of the l\Iother of God, her betrothal, the announcement to l\1ary-four questions, editor-translator Heath says, that " have come from somewhere and are going somewhere," viz., come from the consideration of the meaning of the Incarnation and going towards the existential consideration of the meaning of Mary's Son who was born, lived, died and rose to save us from our sins. For St. Thomas as for Vatican II, Mary belongs to the divine plan from the beginning, and this carries through to the eschatological joy of her union with the Risen Christ and continuing concern for the brethren of her Son. However, neither predestination nor Assumption are the immediate concern of qq. Q7-30, and even the specific question, Mother of God, comes a little later (q. 35). In qq. 27-30 St. Thomas takes up the last preparatory steps to the entrance of Christ into the world: " let us first look at the mother conceiving him." What will we discover? The four questions provide the answer in a remarkable delineation of our Lady: holiness, innocence, human love for Joseph her husband, and humility before the great announcement. Mary is before us as the virgin mother who conceives Christ, not as the *Pieta.*

Appendix 3, " The Immaculate Conception," reflects further on Thomas's position, reproducing from the Shapcote 1926 English *Summa* a table on " The Law and Course of Original Sin." Heath shies away from discussing the possibility that Thomas finally accepted the privilege. Obviously he did not in q. 27, and the evidence of his sermon on the Hail Mary is hard to assess. Heath's further reflections on the ecclesial sense of the privilege in the thought of Vatican II are helpful. In a footnote Heath rewrites III, q. 27, a. 2, ad Q in the light of the defined truth of the Immaculate Conception, substituting for " did indeed contract original sin," the phrase, "was indeed subject to the common law of original sin, but in the very instant of animation she was preserved from contracting it. . . . " That the Immaculate Conception could only be in terms of the redeeming gTace is part of its very meaning; but why does Heath say "indeed subject to the common law " *(shades of old* DEBITUM PECCATI *controversies?)?*

The theology of original sin has shifted from a static to a dynamic, evolutionary view of reality. Heath explores the consequences of some current views with regard to the Immaculate Conception. He finds it hard to reconcile our Lady's initial holiness with Schoonenberg's "situatedness.'· He likes the personalistic approach of Alszeghy and Flick and finds value also in Hulbosch's evolutionary theory. They "have changed the emphasis of original justice from an actual datum once *given* to an actual reality once *offered* to men and refused, but offered again in another and better form through the redemption by Christ. . . . The 'need for redemption ' is another way of saying the lack of something that should be there, i.e., a privation of the grace of redemption." There is good bounce to Heath's

own example of a solid rubber ball: when a piece is lopped off, the ball rolls erratically ever after. " Original sin is not the erratic behavior of the ball ... it is simply the lack of an original perfection that should be there, it was the lop out of the ball. ... "

St. Thomas's discussion of Mary's freedom from actual sin gives him occasion to comment on her " marvelous intimacy " with Christ: " The Wisdom of God was present not only in her soul but in her womb as well." As for John Chrysostom's charges of vainglory at Cana, Thomas is brief: " Chrysostom exaggerates." The women's liberation movement in the Church is unlikely to invoke art. 5, ad 3-Mary indeed had the gift of wisdom, and the Magnificat shows her a good prophet, but " she did not use wisdom by teaching since this was not thought becoming to women," with a reference to I Tim 2:12.

On the question of Mary's virginity Thomas Aquinas lines up the traditional objections with his customary fairness. Among the reasons for the virginal conception Augustine is quoted to the effect that the Head was born physically of a virgin to signify that the members are born spiritually of the virgin Church. On the *in partu* virginity, which Thomas regarded as miraculous, Heath notes the disagreement among Catholic theologians today as to its exact meaning. It was delightful to reread Thomas on the question of Mary's vow of virginity. He considers soberly the arguments pro and con, both the moral dignity of vowed virginity and the Jewish sense of spreading their religion through their families, then opts for a conditional vow: " Perhaps she wanted to, but she also waited on God's good judgment. Afterwards, when she had taken a husband, the acceptable thing to do in those days, she with her husband took a vow of virginity."

On behalf of her betrothal and marriage Thomas brushes away the argument of St. Jerome that betrothal concealed from Satan the conception of Jesus, for " the devil is sharp enough to know what takes place within human bodies." One of the positive reasons for the conception of Christ occurring to a betrothed virgin is again ecclesial: " the betrothal symbolizes the whole Church. For the Church is a virgin betrothed to one man, Christ. Augustine says this." Characteristically, Aquinas adds a further reason of his own: to honor marriage as well as virginity.

Question 30 is the counterpart to the medieval *Marialia (Mariale super missus est)* and deals with the annunciation. The likenesses of chap. 8 of *Lumen gentium* (which has itself been called an extended commentary on Mary's *fiat)* are particularly close here: Mary conceived in faith before she conceived in flesh (from Augustine); her consent stood for all mankind's consent to the spiritual marriage taking place between the Son of God and human nature; as the evil angel tricked the woman, so it was fitting that God send an angel to the Virgin to announce the restoration of human nature in the divine birth. " The medium is the message " is

l'ticLuhan-borrowed reflection on Thomas's arguments for the appearance of the angel in bodily form. As to the plan of the Annunciation (de ordine annuntiationis, which comes out "was the announcement well planned? ") Thomas concludes with a benign interpretation of Mary's hesitation: "that kind of doubt was more one of wonder than of unbelief."

Appendix 1 is an historical survey of Thomas's writings on our Lady; the listing is preceded by two pages on the " temper of the times," with praise for Aquinas's restraint in a time of florid lives of Mary and the exaggerations of many *Marialia.* Seven writings on our Lady are listed, from the early commentary on the *Sentences* (1254-56) to the homily on the Hail Mary (1273). Within his limits Heath manages to give some good short examples from various writings, e. g., "A distinctive teaching" in the commentary on John "is that J\fary paved the way for Christ at Cana, assuring the people there that her ' religious ' son was not a hater of joy and festivity." The treatment of the *Summa* (pp. 96-97) is a good summary of the present volume. As for the Hail Mary, delivered during Lent in Naples, 1273, Heath summarizes well this short work, commenting on the difference between " a theologian quietly working out his distinctions" and a preacher "particularly if he is using the Neapolitan dialect."

There is an appendix also on "recent studies on our Lady in the New Testament," which is well-informed. It might help the reader to know here that Braun, *La mere des fideles,* is to be had in English as *Mother of God's People* (Alba, Staten Island, 1967); that Max Thurian's splendid book, though now out of print in its American edition, *Mary, Mother of All Christians* (Herder and Herder, New York, 1964) can still be had in its British edition (the same translation in fact), titled more correctly *Mary Mother of the Lord Figure of the Church* (Faith Press, 7 Tufton St., London, SW **1,** 1963); that the second half of R. Brown, *The Gospel According to John,* vol. 29A (Anchor Bible) is due for publication summer, 1970, and will cover John 19, 26.

Father Heath has handled his present task not only as a labor of love and loyalty but in a spirit of joy that shines through in his good humor right from the lively introduction, though I fear cryptologists may one day puzzle over the numbers 123 and 487 in the acknowledgements (p. xii) , and " a shot without a snooker " is a new addition to *thomistica!* Would all scholars wore their learning so lightly! Hopefully Fr. Heath will extend his editorial expertise to the other :Marian writings of St. Thomas. And now that Doubleday has beg·un to issue the Blackfriars *Summa* in Image paperbacks, it is good to look forward to having this book at popular prices. When E. L. Mascall reviewed this title for *New Blackfriars,* November, 1969 (as "an inspiring volume by an inspiring scholar"), he chose this passage to end with. I do the same, for it captures so well Thomas's views on our Lady and Thomas himself:

" The ' doubt of discussion ' is behind eYery article of the Summa, the ' doubt of wonder' is, of course, behind the whole vast enterprise of theology. Theology, as well as philosophy, begins in wonder " (p. 24, n. 22).

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St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Saint Paul's First Letter to the Thessalonians and the Letter to the Philipians,* (Aquinas Scripture Series Vol. 3; Revised Standard Version Text); tr. by F. R. LARCHER, O. P., and MICHAEL Dc:FFY, O. P.; Albany, N. Y.: Magi Books, 1969. Pp. 122. $4.50.

The first impression the modern biblical scholar has on reading the commentary of St. Thomas is that of a strange new world. It is, of course, an unfamiliar old world that was home to Christian exegetes for many hundreds of years before it was succeeded by the modern world of critical scholarship. And for that reason alone it is important that these commentaries be preserved; we should not forget the roots from which we have sprung or the rock from which we have been hewn.

As suggested above, the first thing the modern exegete notes is the almost total absence of critical or scientific analysis. There is no long introduction discussing the historical and doctrinal background of the letters, no philological discussions, no extended remarks on possible Hellenistic or Jewish influences at work, no literary analysis in the modern sense and no awareness of textual critical problems, minor as they may be in these letters.

To this reviewer's mind the importance of the commentary is three-fold. First of all, it reveals Thomas's thorough acquaintance with the text of Scripture. In one sense it can be said that this is a commentary of the Bible on these two letters. Throughout, the author adduces other texts of Scripture which might throw some light on the passage. Nor are they from what we would consider the better known or more important biblical books. One must conclude that St. Thomas really read and was thoroughly familiar with the Bible. As often as not the parallel passages are applied in a merely accommodated sense, but this is not to be despised in a meditative reading of the Scriptures.

The second point of importance is the hermeneutical stance of the author. Anyone acquainted with St. Thomas's other writings, above all his *Summa Theologiae,* will recognize immediately the tendency to analyse the text in a philosophical way. First of all, every verse is broken down into two or three points, each of which in turn is broken down into two or three

more points. :Moreover, his theological presuppositions frequently intrude in the explanation. For example, he writes: "Paul greets the Church ... *in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ*, that is, in the faith of the Trinity and of the divinity and humanity of Christ, because our beatitude will consist in knowing them. He mentions only the person of the Father and the incarnate Son, in which two is understood the Holy Spirit who is the bond between the Father and the Son." (p. 5) Again, in discussing 1 Th. 4:4 he distinguishes between venial sin, when concupiscence is present in relations with one's wife, and mortal sin, when adultery is committed. (pp. 30 f.) Modern scholars have not overcome this "hermeneutical circle," though they are more aware of its presence.

Thirdly, we occasionally find a theological insight that is of major significance in the development of ontological theology. Perhaps the most important of these in this commentary is Thomas's recognition, in 1 Th. 4:14, of the role of the resurrection of Christ in man's redemption, a role that has only recently been re-discovered by modern theologians. During the last several hundred years theologians commonly had reduced the resurrection to little more than epilogue in the theology of redemption, to an apologetic for Christ's divinity. Redemption was almost exclusively attached to Christ's passion and death. It is embarrassingly clear now that the Scriptures, and especially St. Paul, had already proclaimed the active, if not dominant role of Christ's resurrection in our justification. 1 Th. 4:14 is only one of several Pauline statements on the subject, and not the most forceful at that. Nevertheless, St. Thomas comments unequivocally that " Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection. . . . He is also the efficient cause of our resurrection, for the things done by Christ's humanity were done not only by the power of His human nature, but also by virtue of His divinty united in Him." (p. 35) This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the significance of this insight for a theology of redemption. We might say simply that it would almost justify by itself the publication of this translation of St. Thomas's commentary.

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The Origin and Evolution of the Priesthood. By JAMEs A. MoHLER, S. J. New York: Alba House, 1970. Pp. $3.95.

This book presents an account of the origin and evolution of the Christian priesthood from its beginnings, when it bore the marks of contemporary Jewish governing bodies, to its attainment, during the fourth century, of a degree of perfection rivalling that of the Jewish priesthood of Aaron. At this peak of development, the Christian priesthood, reflecting

the struggles of the Church with secular ruling powers, had come to symbolize the triumph of the Church. The functions of the episcopate, representing the fullness of the priesthood, had become surrounded with something like imperial dignity and splendor. The divine power of bishops and priests was stressed; their human capacities and responsibilities were viewed in their relationship of instrumentality to what God would accomplish within the Church.

The author sketches quite summarily the results of his scholarly research which could be expanded, as he must have pursued it, into a volume many times the size of this one. In the main part of the book the exposition is positive and factual, with little evidence of any kind of personal viewpoint. In the introduction, however, the author suggests his conviction that the Church may have reached today a turning point in history which will demand re-examination of the concept of the priesthood. The pastor of souls who, in the past, served as marriage counselor, psychologist, legal advisor, teacher and confessor, now finds many of these tasks taken over by professionally trained lay experts. Even the liturgical services, over which the priest continues to preside, have been opened up more and more to lay participation.

Does this mean that the priesthood itself is no longer relevant to the needs of contemporary man? Should the Church now be advancing toward a new kind of social structure in which the people themselves will predominate, selecting and empowering representatives from their own number who will govern the Church in accordance with their own wishes? Is the priest becoming more and more the presbyter who will serve for a time and then be replaced?

In his conclusion the author indicates clearly his conviction that there is need for a priesthood which will share the mediating function of the priesthood of Christ. A ceremonial priesthood, whose members were regarded as separated from the people whom they served, was found in pre-Christian times among the Jews, the Greeks and the Romans, seemingly in response to a basic human need. Within the Church this need has been supplied by bishops, priests and deacons, whose power of ministering to the people comes through sacramental ordination and not from the circumstances in which they have been humanly deputed. However strong the contemporary movement toward a simplified, socially oriented service, men will always seek a holy and sacred priesthood. Priests set aside from men will intercede for men, propitiating God for the sins of men and offering sacrifice for men at the altar of God in lieu of Christ the High Priest.

The author acknowledges that signs of the times point to a decreasing emphasis on the part to be played by ordained ministers in the functioning of the Church. He acknowledges, too, the abuses that have grown up within the Church as ordained ministers have turned their power and position toward personal advantage. w·e have reason, he suggests, for

looking hopefully to earlier forms of liturgy and ministry, as they are now being authorized, for a renewal of Christian life that will be comparable to that of the early Church. We should not be less mindful, he adds, of the early warnings against false prophets and teachers, and against schism and heresy. Today, as always, there is need of unity. The bishop is the center of unity around whom all the people of God should gather. He is the guardian of the tradition which began at the dawn of salvation history, and which took a new direction through the Apostles whose power each bishop receives through his sacramental ordination. This tradition, the author says, is meaured truly by the Roman Church of the West.

This book may be read with great benefit by those who, dissatisfied with the past, are seeking a new Church which will be in touch with the trends of the times. It may also be helpful to those who, loving the past and hesitating to break with it, need to distinguish more clearly in Christian tradition what is essential and divinely ordained from what is human and historical.

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De Doctrina Concilii Vaticani Primi. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1969. Pp. 583.

The Vatican Library is commemorating the centenary of Vatican I with this republication in an excellently printed volume of a number of doctrinal studies on the Dogmatic Constitutions *Dei Filius* and *Pastor Aeternus.* The editors, with the collaboration of R. Aubert, U. Betti, 0. F. M., and Msgr. Maccarone, offer six articles on *Dei Filius* and eleven on *Pastor Aeternus,* selections chosen for the research the authors made of the documents which prepared these Constitutions and for the witness they give to the theological effort which prepared for Vatican II in the light of Vatican I. Only four selections antedate the 1960's. The authors chosen indicate the quality of the choice: Kerrigan, Schlund, Aubert, Caudron, Nau, Paradis, Beaudoin, Betti, Dewan, Kasper, Hamer, Dominguez del Val, Torrell, Dejaifve, Thils, Chavasse.

The subject matter of most of the articles turns on one or other of two topics: the relation of the episcopal college to the Roman Pontiff and the various facets of the Conciliar teaching on infallibility. Vatican II developed the work of the previous Council regarding the episcopal college and the primacy; it reaffirmed the dogmatic teaching on infallibility but went on to state the proportionate response due to the exercise of the ordinary magisterium of the Roman Pontiff and of the bishops, that is, the form of proclamation of truth that does not engage all the conditions for infallibilty as noted by Vatican I.

M. Caudron *(Magistere Ordinaire et lnfallibilite Pontificale d'apres la Constitution "Dei Filius")* shows that, on the basis of Vatican I, it is impossible to draw a parallel between the ordinary magisterium of the Church and that of the Roman Pontiff. The term "ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church," a formula of Vatican I, had a long and tortuous Conciliar history. P. Nau *(Le Magistere Pontifical Ordinaire au Premier Concile du Vatican)* is constrained to correct Caudron's understanding, through his use of the distinction: *Ecclesia coadunata* and *dispersa*, of the nature and guarantee of this magisterium. The infallibility of the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church is the *consensio praedicationis praesentis totius magisterii Ecclesiae* united with its head. Nau does agree that the definition of papal infallibility in Vatican I is so restricted that it forbids a direct application of the formula to the ordinary magisterium of the pope. However, although the texts of the Constitutions furnish no positive argument in favor of the infallibility of the ordinary papal magisterium, they cannot be invoked to exclude it. The argument from silence of this Council does not prove that the personal magisterium of the pope could not be a rule of faith. The Conciliar Fathers were concerned to show only that, besides the solemn judgment, there is another mode of presentation of revealed truth: the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church.

These articles throw light on the discussions in the Council, especially the always valuable statements of the spokesmen for the Deputation on Faith concerning the "consensio ecclesiarum," with regard to the freedom of the Sovereign Pontiff in the selection of the means whereby he may ascertain that his teaching accords with revealed truth. Nau states that the representative of the Deputation showed that, along with the universal preaching of the magisterium united to its head, there is another criterion to which the Deputation attributed first rank-the ordinary teaching of the successor of Peter in the Church of Rome, whose sole tradition, just as the *consensio ecclesiarum*, is equally a guarantee of the truth of faith. Thus, the one source or privileged criterion always at the disposition of the Roman Pontiff is "the tradition of the Roman Church which has guarded with inviolable fidelity the deposit which Peter entrusted to it," the doctrine received and professed at Rome and actually handed down.

In his conclusion Nau makes the point that, while a solemn judgment of the Roman Pontiff, in the *ex cathedra* terms of the Council, is a single act which is necessarily infallible, it is not the only mode of doctrinal presentation in which the pope is assured of divine assistance in providing a rule of faith. In his teaching and preaching, by an ensemble of acts rather than by any single pontifical statement, i.e., by the constant teaching of the successor of St. Peter, the pope as doctor of the faith makes the faithful aware of the sense of revealed teaching. Thus, in the context of Vatican I, the ordinary magisterium of the pope cannot be termed infallible but rather *faithful* to the revelation it has the mission to make known. The

teaching m1sswn of the Roman Pontiff is to transmit and communicate faithfully the received deposit *(ut fideliter expOMret).* Thus the charism of fidelity attaches to this form of teaching, as infallibilty is involved in the solemn judgment. The ordinary pontifical magisterium is a rule which is imposed on faith and by the sole fact that its teaching is firmly held as revealed by the tradition of the Church of Rome which is constantly taught by the successor of Peter.

It is to be hoped that in the future the greatness of Vatican Council I and its work will emerge from behind the shadow of its successor. Continuing research and study of the caliber of many of the articles in the present commemorative collection will result in a more exact appreciation of that dramatic intervention of the Spirit in the Church a century ago.

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It is the Lord! Sin and Confession Revisited. By WILLIAM J. BAUSCH. Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1970. Pp. 157. *$5.00.*

This book was written for the " average Catholic " and to be judged as a piece of popular theology. Yet the work so skilfully incorporates some of the more widely accepted opinions of contemporary theology that it serves as an impressive summary of modern pastoral attitudes and practices.

The first six chapters are devoted to the concept of sin. "Friendship with God " is the figure under which the personalist approach to grace, the opposite of sin, is advanced. Consequently, sin is defined as" wounding that friendship" and is susceptible to varying degrees of hurt (avoiding the terminology of mortal and venial) . The objective standards of Christian morality are not rules to be kept but guidelines to be applied, norms to be concretized and interiorized. The " new morality " is a question of outlook and attitude. Formation of conscience, i. e., practical moral judgment, is traced to the influence of parents; to be truly human is to make one's Christian conscience an ever more perceptive and expansive faculty. The " fundamental option " or " over-all response " to the goodness of God is rather tentatively advanced as an explanation of the distinction between grave sin and mortal sin.

The final six chapters of the book deal with forgiveness of sin, which always requires an act of faith. The pagan, the devout Jew, the sincere Protestant, as well as the repentent Catholic, all have access to the forgiveness of the Father through sincere prayer and mortification. But the Sacrament of Penance offers a "special signalling" or ratification that

our sins are forgiven. The only limitation to sacramental forgiveness comes from the penitent's lack of sorrow.

An excellent chapter on the communal and ecclesial aspects of forgiveness fills in the lacunae left by the heavy emphasis on personalism in the first part of the work. The chapter on the history of penance, however, is too brief to do justice to the extensive historical research which has been done by Poschmann, Vogel and others. Deferral of first confession is advised on the strength of recent studies which claim that a child is incapable of mortal sin until the age of eleven or twelve and on the statement of Aquinas that one cannot commit venial sin until he is capable of committing mortal sin.

Examination of conscience for today's Christian, it is proposed, ought to embrace three broad areas: vocation, charity and omissions. The final chapter "It is the Lord!" could have been more effective if it had included reference to the central place of the Eucharist in the mystery of God's pardon.

Father Bausch displays an admirable talent for selecting key texts from incisive theologians and for translating scientific theological research into the language of the layman. The Sacrament of Penance could be saved from its present state of confusion through judicious application of the suggestions which this book has for both confessor and penitent.

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Persons, Privacy, and Feeling. Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Ed. by DWIGHT VAN DE VATE, JR. Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1970. Pp.

This book is a re-edition of seven essays on various aspects of the philosophy of mind which were published originally in "The Southern Journal of Philosophy." The authors are E. M. Adams, Douglas Browning, Charles Hartshorne, Donald Gustafson, Erwin W. Straus, Edward H. Madden and Dwight Van de Vate, Jr.

The good points of the collection are many: the general topic is of perennial interest not only because it seems forever to present problems almost too subtle and intricate to be solved but also because the solutions seem always to promise an insight into man "where he lives"-into the division of spirit and marrow, or, perhaps, where engram and percept intersect. These essays do not purport to solve all the problems, but they make their contribution. They are characterized, as is to be expected, by professional philosophical expertise. The analyses of many word-usages and

concepts, and the exposition of many varieties of opinions on different points, are handled very well and are instructive.

If any complaint is to be made it is that there is sometimes a little too much of philosophical gymnastics, too much of logical complexities and intricate verbalizings. Not too much for professional philosophers, in essays written by and for members of the guild, but too much for the average educated man without a major in philosophy. And when philosophy of mind is being discussed, could it not be argued that the average man is a potential listener and one who is eager to hear something revealing about himself? If philosophy is to be more than a game for philosophers, it has to gear its discussions to the idiom of common language as far as possible and, when common language cannot carry the message, to handle its technicalities in a way that will not confuse the non-professional. This would not only bring the work of philosophy to the ears of a wider audience but give the professional a test of his own ability. What is hard to explain to the average intelligent person is perhaps not too well understood yet by the expert.

One of the concepts I would have liked to see more fully explored is that of God as the ideal knower (in Professor Hartshorne's essay, p. 41), especially as this provides a limit in the epistemological problem. Some of the anguish generated by the epistemological problem could, it seems, be alleviated if the certitude required for human knowledge could be gauged somewhat lower than that appropriate to ideal knowledge.

Another concept worth considerably greater attention-it may be the key to the whole body-mind problem-is the concept presented in the introductory essay by Professor Adams. (pp. 12-13) His key remark is: " Therefore, the logical relationships in the mental must have something to do with the occurences of the neurological events which constitute the physical base of the new beliefs." This proposition is like a watershed in the philosophy of mind. If it is not accepted, the neurological becomes virtually the whole of the mind, mind becomes an epiphenomenon, and mental processes are rendered essentially meaningless, and that includes the mental process which makes and rejects the proposition. If it is accepted, it entails the assumption that mind is in some ways supra-ordinate to matter, that mind has its own laws and meaning, its own sources of energy and modes of transforming energies, and its appropriate modes of re-organizing the physical structures of the brain to subserve its own activities. It is these propositions that make the philosophy of mind an intriguing matter.

Nevertheless, there remains the problem of substantiating this kind of dualism, ontologically as well as phenomenologically. And for this purpose, it seems to me, with due regard for the history of philosophy from Descartes to the present, that the key concepts are still, and can only be, the Platonic-Aristotelian-Scholastic traditions of form and matter. However much the concepts might fail to provide the incisive tools for grappling with

the nature of the inanimate physical universe, they are not useless when it comes to dealing with the biological order, and they are virtually indispensable in the psychological order. It is only by the concept of the radical communicability of forms as opposed to the radical incommunicability of matters that a reasonable insight can be obtained into the ontological structure of intentionality-a phenomenon which either presents itself as a real transcendence of the physical individuality of bodies by way of an identification through forms, or only exists as an illusion.

By way of closing comments, although the philosophizing in these essays is excellent, the psychology is not always thoroughgoing. The whole question of being aware of one's own thoughts, memories, sensations and affects is complicated by the possibilities of internal limits on consciousness, as indicated, for instance, in phenomena like subliminal perceptions, repressions and inhibitions, and the whole psychology of internal consciousness as a function distinct if not separate from sensation. It is not simply true that sensation does not occur if a person is not aware of it; the facts are more complex.

Moreover, it is not simply true that sensations have no objects existing independently. (pp. 94-95, 98) Normal visual sensation is not a purely subjective experience, for, however the hue-aspect of the act is supplied by the subject, the existence of the surface of which it is a hue, and of surfaces of diverse characteristics which contribute to the diversity of hues, is objective, and the foundation of ali objectivity of visual perception. The distinction of primary and secondary qualities is not clean cut.

Again, the distinctions of feelings into stirrings, moods and emotions, and the assertion that stirrings do not regard objects and moods do not regard determinate objects, (pp. all seem arbitrary. The reminder of the loss of a previous high status may provoke a stirring of fleeting regret, and a mood of dread may be definitely connected to the possibility of being apprehended for a criminal act, and examples such as these could be multiplied.

And finally, it seems that Professor Van de Vate's concept of person, in the final essay, is not the person as he exists so much as it is the person as he conceives himself, the identity or self-image, or perhaps the person in the process of continually forming his self-image. If this is the case, something exists prior to the process of forming the self-image, and it is in this something that the " primitive " concept of person should be sought. I think the person, as Van de Vate conceives him, is necessarily a product of interpersonal reactions, and therefore " primitively " a social concept, but more " primitive " than this are the kinds of beings who are radically capable of forming societies.

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Freedom of Choice. By YvES R. SIMoN. New York: Fordham University Press, 1969. Pp. 167. Index. *$5.50.*

Peter Wolff, the editor and chief translator of this volume, while serving as Assistant Director of the Institute for Philosophical Research when that organization was preparing its volumes on freedom, was struck by the paucity of good books dealing with and solving some of the problems of human liberty. Among all the works of contemporary philosophers only one stood out, *Traite du librc arbitre* by Yves Simon. He wrote to the author about translating and publishing it and found that Simon was revising it himself to appear in a n:ulti-volumed Encyclopedia he was planning on important philosophical problems. Even then Simon, who was incurably ill and knew it, asked Wolff to finish the task if he were unable. This Wolff did with the assistance of Professor Simon's widow, Paule Simon, and Desmond FitzGerald.

Simon introduces his subject by analysing some popular notions of freedom: unihibited expression, disorderliness, exuberance, inventiveness, creativity. He shows how the Epicurean theory of "swerve" in the atoms of Democritus, reappearing in the Hcisenburg-Bohr principle of indeterminacy, satisfied many that the basis of human freedom lay in the indeterminacy of matter. The point of the book is to show that this is precisely where the root of freedom does *not* lie. **It** is found rather in the *superdeterminacy* of the will towards the comprehensive good *(bonum in communi).*

The comprehensive good is not an abstraction. A " money-minded " person is one who is interested in things only insofar as they procure money for him. Everything he wants he wants under the aspect of " being financially interesting." So the good all men seek by necessity is not an abstraction. **It** is embodied in the most fleeting particular objects of desire as well as long-range life projects. **It** is present in " rest and motion, in contemplation and action, in study ami business, in pleasure and austerity, in the gratifications of the senses as well as those of the spirit, in the ways of justice and those crime." (p. 23)

All men seek this. They seek it necessarily. And from this necessary thrust towards the universal good comes dominative power in the will over every particular good. Theories of freedom are basically confused over the difference between this active indifference of the will and the will's passive indifference. Active indifference comes from strength, power, force; it is the indifference of a hard substance cutting through soft, the indifference of the virtuous man to the kinds of trials thrust upon him. Passive indifference comes from weakness, inadequacy, deficiency; it is the indifference of a soft substance receiving a thousand impressions and distortions from a hard, of a weak man trembling before every wind.

Those who understand freedom through images of disorder have really confused the passive potentiality of the will with its active power, have

rooted freedom in the area of man's weakness rather than his strength. " By dominating indifference the will is an image of God, by passive indifference it rather is an image of prime matter. Aquinas mentions a philosopher who ' most foolishly ' thought God was the prime matter. Without going so far many people handle analogical intellection so clumsily that they confuse free choice with passive indifference of the will." (p. 120)

This is the main argument of the book. It is presented with extraordinary profundity and clarity mixed with that very attractive homely wisdom which made Professor Simon a marvellous teacher. The translation is very fine. In future editions perhaps another word for " indifference" could be found. The paragraph on page 100 beginning" But when there is a question of human action " is confusing, since it really shows a parallel between the practical and theoretical fields rather than the contrast Simon seems to have wanted to show. The word " nonvoluntary " in the last line of page 102 would better be rendered "nonfree" in keeping with what Simon rightly says on page 27 (at the bottom) about the voluntariness of the will's adherence to the comprehensive good.

Mortimer Adler in his forward says of the book that it is the only major essay on free choice written in this century that illuminates the controversy between the determinists and the free-willists. I agree with that judgment. In a word, a superb book.

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Spinoza: A Life of Reason. By ABRAHAM WOLFSON. New York City: Philosophical Library Inc., Second enlarged edition, 1969. Pp. 347. $6.00.

Dr. Wolfson's life of Spinoza has much to recommend it to devotees of Spinoza but relatively little that can be of value to the serious philosopher. Dr. Wolfson claims to have spent ten years in the preparation of this book, and the book certainly shows signs of painstaking research. Unfortunately, the book is devoid of footnotes, and the serious scholar is thus prevented from pursuing Dr. Wolfson's investigations.

From a strictly philosophical viewpoint, any life of Spinoza is bound to have meager rewards. Spinoza's philosophy perhaps more than any other shows scant signs of philosophical forebears; this was undoubtedly due to Spinoza's eremitical temperament and way of life. Dr. Wolfson attempts to provide some philosophical background by offering a catalog of medieval

Jewish thinkers who presumably had some small influence in predisposing Spinoza towards his pantheistic monism. He neglects to mention the possible influence on Spinoza's thought by Renaissance thinkers such as Bruno. Moreover, in his attempt to justify Spinoza in the face of Cartesian attacks, he fails to do justice to Descartes' influence regarding method, terminology, and the very questions he attempted to answer in his system.

Spinoza's life was his philosophy. Thus Wolfson's book is an apologia and defence of Spinoza's philosophy culled from his correspondence with various interlocutors, both friendly and otherwise. At every turn Spinoza is seen as one persecuted, betrayed or misunderstood, and in each instance Dr. Wolfson shows him to be patient, virtuous, kind, and supremely rational. But in many instances Spinoza's motives are derived from conjecture only.

The book is bare of any colorful anecdotal material simply because, one would gather, Spinoza led a supremely dull life. Even this is interpreted as virtue by Dr. Wolfson. The result is that the book reads more like hagiography of the worst kind than balanced biography. Spinoza is Wolfson's saint, and he baldly admits it in his introduction. There is much evidence that Spinoza was something of a misanthrope and cynic, but Doctor Wolfson always manages a benign interpretation. The supreme example is a small anecdote about Spinoza taking pleasure in torturing spiders and flies. Wolfson attributes this to scientific curiosity, and he interprets Spinoza's reported chuckles as rueful outbursts inspired by meditations on the likeness between mankind and savage spiders.

The author's style of writing is somewhat antiquated, full of quaint cliches. In spite of this, it reads easily. There is an adequate index and a skimpy and superficial bibliography. The book does place Spinoza's philosophy in its biographical, historical, and polemical context, but the content of the philosophy itself is nowhere even sketched. The book has little to recommend it unless one happens to venerate Spinoza as a saint.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Appleton-Century-Crofts: *Situationism and the New Morality,* ed. by Robert L. Cunningham. (Pp. 291, $3.50).

Beauchesne et Ses Fils, *L'Activite Artistique.* Tome II, by M.-D. Philippe, O. P. (Pp. 352, F 40,000).

Editions J. Duculot, S. A., *L'Eucharistie, Symbole et Realite,* by A. Vergote, Mgr. A. Descamps, A. Houssiau. (Pp. 179, 160 FB).

Edizioni Remo Sandron. *Appunti di Un Laico per Una Morale Teologica,* by Renato Rosselli. (Pp. 52).

Fides Publishers, Inc.: *Impact of History on Theology,* by Josef L. Hromadka. (Pp. 117, $1.95).

Harper & Row: *The God of Evil,* by Frederick Sontag. (Pp. 183, $5.95).

Harvard University Press: *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers. Faith · Trinity · Incarnation,* by Harry Austry Wolfson, 3rd ed., revised. (Pp. 663, $12.50).

Holt, Rinehart and Winston: *Prophets of the West,* by John Edward Sullivan. (Pp. 319); *Christian Community: Response to Reality,* by Bernard J. Cooke. (Pp. 195, $4.95); *Prison Journals of a Priest Revolutionary,* by Rev. Philip Berrigan. (Pp. 120, $5.59).

KTAV Publishing House, Inc.: *Judaism and Ethics,* ed. by Daniel Jeremy Silver. (Pp. 338, $10.00).

The Macmillan Company: *Early Christian Fathers,* ed. by Cyril C. Richardson. (Pp. 415, $2.95) .

Magi Books, Inc.: *The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space,* by Yves Simon. (Pp. 224, $3.75).

The Marquette University Press: *Ideas and Concepts,* by Julius R. Weinberg. (Pp. 60, $2.50).

Philosophical Library: *The Revelation of Baha'u'llah and the Bab,* by Ruhi Muhsen Afnan. (Pp. 235, $7.50) .

The University of Chicago Press: *"In Our Image and Likeness":. Humanity and Divinity in the Italian Humanist Thought,* 2 vols., by Charles Trinkaus. (Pp. 1020, $22.50 the set).

University of Florida Press: *The Kingdom of God in the Synoptic Tradition.* Univ. of Florida Humanities Monograph, no. 33. (Pp. 107, $2.00).

University of Notre Dame Press: *Discovery in the Physical Sciences,* by Richard J. Blackwell. (Pp. 252, $8.50); *Jean-Paul Sartre: His Philosophy,* by Rene Lafarge. (Pp. 208, $6.50); *The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry,* ed. by Joseph Bobik. (Pp. 312, $9.50); *Philosophy from St. Augustine to Ockham,* by Ralph M. Mcinerny. (Pp. 401, $12.00).

University of Washington Press: *Individuality and the New Society*, ed. by Abraham Kaplan. (Pp. 180, $5.95).

Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh: *Hervaeus Natalis OP and the Controversies over the Real Presence and Transubstantiation*, by Kenneth Plotnik. (Pp. 83, DM 9,80).