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SCHILLEBEECKX AND THE ECCLESIAL FUNCTION OF CRITICAL NEGATIVITY

ONE OF THE theological issues which Edward Schillebeeckx, O. P., has treated most thoroughly in the past thirty years is that of the relationship between the Church and the world, an area in which he sees a primary task of the Church to be that of exercizing a function of " critical negativity " over against human society. By this term he means " a positive power which continues to exert constant pressure in order to bring about a better world, without humanity itself being sacrificed in the process." [1] It is the

[1] Schillebeeckx, "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man*, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 191. It was in this epilogue that Schillebeeckx first used the term " critical negativity," but the reality to which this term refers was already treated not only in some of the lectures which he gave in this country in late 1967 and which appear as the first five chapters of *God the Future of Man* but also in essays spanning the whole of his theological activity. The most important of these are to be found in the third and fourth volumes of his collected writings, entitled respectively *Wereld en kerk* (World and Church) and *De zending van de kerk* (The mission of the Church) .

purpose of this article first to situate this function within the larger context of Schillebeeckx's ecclesiology, next to present his understanding of the genesis, content, stages, and bearers of this function within the Church, and finally to offer some critical reflections on his position.

I. THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF SCHILLEBEECKX'S NOTION OF CRITICAL NEGATIVITY

The Church as Sacrament of the Risen Christ and Sacrament of the World

Schillebeeckx has not given to the nature and mission of the Church as systematic an analysis as that found, for example, in his work on marriage/ so it is necessary to draw this overview of his ecclesiology from a number of his writings. The most basic concept is that the Church is a sacrament and that in a twofold sense-the sacrament of the risen Christ and the sacrament of the world. The former sense is developed at some length in *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God.* In the first chapter of this work Schillebeeckx argues that" the man Jesus, as the personal visible realization of the divine grace of redemption, is *the* sacrament, the primordial sacrament, because this man, the Son of God himself, is intended by the Father to be in his humanity the only way to the actuality of redemption." [3] For Jesus' contemporaries, to be approached by him was to be invited to a personal encounter with the living God.

Those of us living after Christ's glorification cannot, of course, encounter him in his own flesh, but he does become present for us by taking up earthly realities into his saving activity: "This is precisely what the sacraments are: the face

[2] *Het huwelijk: aardse werkelijkheid en heilsmysterie* (Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1968). English trans. by N. D. Smith: *Marriage: Human Reality and Saving Mystery* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965).

[3] *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God*, trans. Paul Barrett, 0. P. *et al.* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 15. This is a translation of *Christus, sacrament van de Godsontmoeting* (Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1960).

of redemption turned visibly towards us." [4] This is true above all of the Church herself, the theme to which Schillebeeckx devotes his second chapter, "The Church, Sacrament of the Risen Christ," where he says that "in his messianic sacrifice, which the Father accepts, Christ in his glorified body is himself the eschatological redemptive community of the Church. . . . The earthly Church is the visible realization of this saving reality in history. The Church is a visible communion in grace." [5] The essence of the Church accordingly consists in the fact that in her the final goal of grace achieved by Christ becomes visibly present.

If the Church is in this respect *sacramentum Christi,* manifesting to all men the salvation wrought by" the one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus" (I Tim. 5), she is from another point of view *sacramentum mundi,* the sacrament of the world, making manifest what is in fact already present in the concrete reality of every human experience of existence in the world, namely, our being hidden in and our being made one by God's graciousness. [6] The Church is never the first "breakthrough" in man; rather, she brings to self-consciousness what is already present in human life inasmuch as she lives out in a historically visible way what is elsewhere still calling out for a concrete, explicit form-a true community of men united with one another and with God. This was the theme of Schillebeeckx's address to the International Congress of Theologians which met at Rome in the autumn of 1966/

' *Ibid.,* p. 43.

"Ibid., p. 47.

• Schillebeeckx, " Het leed der ervaring van Gods verborgenheid," *Wereld en kerk* (" Theologische Peilingen," Vol. III; Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1966), p. 131. This article is a lecture given before the congress of the " Verenigde Studentenverenigingen van de Theologische Faculteiten in het Nederlands taalgebied," (Jan. 13-15, 1966).

•" De Ecclesia ut sacramento mundi," *Acta Congressus lnternationalis de Theologia Concilii Vaticani II: Romae, diebus :26 septembris-1 octobris 1966 celebrati,* ed. Adolfus Schonmetzer, S. I. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1968), pp. 48-53. Dutch version: " De kerk, 'sacrament van de wereld,' " *De zending van de kerk* (" Theologische Peilingen," Vol. IV; Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1968)' pp. 40-45.

and to this theme he has since returned several times. In an essay first published in Holland in 1967 he wrote that in the *koinonia* or community of love which the Church is, there must become visible that which God intends for the whole world, and that is to bind men into a brotherhood on the basis of their communion with God in his representative, Christ Jesus.[8]

The way in which the Church manifests this divine intention is made more explicit in "Secularization and Christian Belief in God," where he argues that the Church is neither entirely separate from the world nor identified with it. Rather, "she is the '*sacrament* of the world,' the human community of believers which gives utterance to God and proclaims him in the secular world, thanks him in Christ Jesus and can say quite openly, in the name of all mankind: 'God is my song.'"[9] This he sees as the first humanizing task of the Church-to celebrate, to thank, and to commemorate, and this she does above all in the liturgy. Thus he says:

> The Church and her liturgy are the world ... at that profound level on which the world utters its own *mystery* in a conscious and mature confession, that mystery from which and in which it lives, thanks to Christ, and thus fulfills and realizes itself precisely as Christ's world; ... Hence we *celebrate* in the Church what is being accomplished outside our churches in human history, insofar as this can be called salvation history.[10]

The Church's Dialogue with the World

Schillebeeckx relates this concept of *sacramentum mundi* to the possibility and necessity of the Church's dialogue with the world, a dialogue which includes the Church's critical function vis-a-vis society. Quoting Vatican Il's *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes)* to the effect that the Church is "the sign of that spirit of brotherhood by which sincere dialogue is not only made possible but

[8] "Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachting," *De zending van de kerk*, p. 68.

[9] "Secularization and Christian Belief in God," *God the Future of Man*, p. 84.

[10] "Secular Worship and Church Liturgy," *ibid.*, p. 109.

strengthened" (n. 92), he goes on to ask whether the Church, as sacrament of this confraternity of all men, can in fact be so clearly separated from the world as to be its partner in dialogue.[11] After all, the Church is itself built up of men in the world. As the Council has said, " as formed of men, the Church is already present here on earth. She consists of members of the society of men on earth who are called to give to the family of the children of God in the history of mankind the form which must be further extended until the coming of the Lord" *(Gaudinm et spes,* n. 40). But this does not mean that dialogue between the Church and the world is impossible but only that in Christians the world itself is present in the Church and that this dialogue will therefore be, in the first place, an inter-Christian one, " a dialogue among Christians themselves both about their unique testimony of the faith and about the promotion of the well-being of the world and society."[12]

Further, Schillebeeckx notes a second form of dialogue. The whole of mankind does not belong concretely and actually to the sacramental communion of the Church in any of the Christian denominations. The Church thus encounters a community of men who have views different from hers about mankind and human society but who are nevertheless in the same worldly sphere as Christians. Here are other partners with whom dialogue is both possible and necessary, "not only with regard to the Church's witness and that of non-Christians, but also with regard to this shared work of building up the world and promoting the well-being of all peoples."[13]

Third, from a sociological point of view the Church is just one institution in society alongside many other groups. All of these participate in the task of working for the betterment of mankind, and because of this common sphere of work dialogue is possible among all these different bodies; " what is more, because of social interrelationships, this dialogue is very necessary."[14]

[11] " The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *ibid.,* p. 129.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 130. [13] *Ibid.,* p. 131. [14] *Ibid.*

Concerning the general nature of this dialogue Schillebeeckx writes that both the Church and the world talk about the same thing-man in the world and in society-but do so from different points of view.[15] The need of dialogue derives precisely from this fact that both the Church and the world have special contributions to make. To determine what the Church's special contribution is, he argues that we must see how it derives from the peculiar mission of the Church.

The Religious Mission of the Church

Schillebeeckx has always been quite clear that the Church's mission is properly religious. In conferences given to Dominican confreres in he complained that the Church signifies for many workers all kinds of social and political positions of power, which these men see as opposed to their own desires. Concretely they meet the Church not on her properly religious terrain but in non-essential temporal manifestations.[16] In an article written more than a decade later he again declared that the Church " has a religious mission, not a political or socio-economic one," [17] though, if circumstances call for it, she can help build structures to help men, above all the poor. And in one of the American lectures he supported this position by quoting *Gaudium et spes:*

> The sphere from which the Church has a special contribution to make to the dialogue with the world in view of building up the world and promoting man's well-being was very properly indicated by the council as follows: " thus the mission of the Church will show its religious, and by that very fact its supremely human character." In other words, the Church makes her contribution from the *religious* sphere.[18]

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 188.

[16] " Het kerkelijk apostolaat in verband met de situatie 1945-1954," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 95.

[17] " Christenlijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachting,' *De zending van de kerk,* p. 58.

[18] " The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *God the Future of Man,* p. 188, quoting in part *Gaudium et spes,* n. 11.

This religious character of the Church's mission, this concern with *Someone* and not only with man and his history, is so important that, if the Church should ever become simply identical with " the world " or with " improving the world," she would already have ceased to bring it a message.[19] All the same, there is a legitimate place for " improving the world " precisely *within* this religious mission, for this mission has, according to Schillebeeckx, a twofold aspect, one pole of which he terms " evangelization " and the other the " Christian leavening of life together on earth":

> Theologians bring forward raore clearly the fact that the Church, the *entire* People of God, has essentially a double mission: the first concerns the order of salvation, the second-intrinsically derived from the first-deals with the ordering of the temporal to salvation. Both aspects of the one mission of the Church (evangelization and Christian leavening of life together on earth) must be found in all active believers.[20]

In her evangelical or " exclusively religious " role, the Church stands forth as the place where what is really relevant to man and ultimately inexpressible can be brought to expression. She here serves "as humanity's representative, an interpreter for the whole of mankind, the prophetess who gives a name to the mystery from which all men are to live."[21]

The Christian Calling in the Temporal Order

If the Church has not always been fully conscious of the evangelical aspect of her mission, the derivative calling to

[19] "Secularization and Christian Belief in God," *God the Future of Man,* p. 79.

[20] " De typologische definitie van de christelijke leek volgens Vaticanum II," *De zending van de kerk,* p. *151.* Earlier in this essay Schillebeeckx writes that hesitations about the nature of the laity often arise because " one speaks of the total mission of the Church before stressing that precisely the primary and exclusively religious and transcendent mission of the Church has as a consequence a secondary but still specifically ecclesial mission *in the world,* namely, the ordering of the earthly process of humanization towards salvation" (p. 145). This essay first appeared in *De kerk van Vaticanum II: Commentaren op de concilieconstitutie over de kerk,* ed G. Barauna (Bilthoven, 1966), Vol. II, pp. 285-304.

[111] " Secularization and Christian Belief in God," *God the Future of Man,* p. 83.

minister to the needs of the temporal order has at times been even further from her consciousness, and yet, argues Schillebeeckx, this temporal involvement, no less than the call to evangelize, is demanded by the very nature of Christianity. He has developed this thesis in many places and in a number of interrelated ways, but the core of his argument is the following: Creation itself, including everything that has come to be through the cultural work of the human race, is the first expression of God's love for man.[22] It is, furthermore, a basic principle of Christian faith that creation and redemption form a single divine order: the same God who is Creator is also Savior, the same God is Lord of human history as well as of salvation history. The salvific love of this creating, redeeming God became manifest with special intensity in the death of Jesus Christ, which was an act of " radical love for man, in its radicality conceivable only from out of God's own personal love for man."[23] In the life and death of Jesus it became clear that the only adequate human answer to this love of God is a radical love for one's fellowman, a love so radical and absolute that it is intrinsically an absolute witnessing of God. Man's "yes" to his fellowman, as his response to God's own "yes" to him, is therefore an intrinsically religious act, something to which Catholic tradition has always borne witness by seeing in *agape* a love both of God and man and so calling this unconditional being for one's fellowman a theological or divine virtue.[24]

Now, the neighbor whom we are to love in this way is no abstract " human nature," just as our humanity is no mere communion among purely interiorized subjects. No, we are called to love the whole man and so must evidence not just "neighborliness" but a concern for the socio-economic, politi-

[22] " Grondslag van de wereldlijke plaats van de leek in de kerk," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 77. This article first appeared in *Tijdschrift voor Geestelijk Leven,* V (1949), pp. 146-66, under the title "Theologische grondslagen van de lekenspiritualiteit." See also "Nederig Hurnanisrne," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 77.

[23] " Christelijk geloof en aardse toekornstverwachting," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 68.

[24] " Het leed der ervaring van Gods verborgenheid," *Wereld en kerk,* pp. 123-24.

cal, and cultural well-being of others. Insofar as such concern is part of caring for one's neighbor as an expression of charity, "the striving for a better earthly future cannot be adequately differentiated from the striving for the one thing needful." [25] Membership in the Church *must* imply a hoping and striving impatience to change the appearance of the world out of love for man. This striving is not, to be sure, *identical* with the coming of the Kingdom of God but nevertheless forms a truly religious element in that coming, being " most intimately involved in the growth of the Kingdom of God." [w]

To substantiate this, Schillebeeckx notes that the final text of *Gaudium et spes* says that the form of this world *is already* passing away, whereas an earlier draft said only that it *will* pass away. This final text, he comments, expresses the fact that in the earthly movement toward the future the definitive presence of the Kingdom, the *eschaton,* is itself already at work/ [7] just as another text from *Gaudium et spes,* which asserts that " the Spirit of God ... is actively present in this development [of the social order]" (n. 26), makes it clear that the social dynamism which is passing through the world is to be seen as a moment of today's salvation history. [28]

Because of this intrinsic relation of the building up of human society to the mystery of the Kingdom of God, there will always be a certain residual "inconceivability" in the Christian's dedication to earthly tasks: the Christian does not know precisely where his radical devotion to his fellowmen is leading him, though he knows well that ultimately it is not meaningless. [29] The Kingdom of God

> is a Kingdom of justice, peace and love, a Kingdom where there will be no evil, nor mourning, nor crying, nor pain (II Peter 3: 13; Apoc. 21: 4). Christian hope knows that this possibility is given to man as a grace, and so the Christian lives in the conscious faith that his faithful commitment to a better temporal order is not in

[25] - Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachting," *De zending van de kerT:,* p. *56,* n. *5.*

[20] *Ibid.,* p. *56.* [27] *Ibid.* [28] *Ibid.,* p. 48. •• *Ibid.,* p. 70.

vain, although he does not see how this temporal order which is not yet the promised Kingdom can be the obscure beginning of the *eschaton.* [30]

This makes the Christian's devotion to earthly affairs thematically inconceivable. He himself is standing before a mystery and must confess this in all simplicity to those who ask him why he devotes himself to earthly tasks. This thematic inconceivability does not, however, lessen his devotion but radicalizes it, for it is the reverse side of God's own love for man. [31] The ultimate meaning of the building up of the earth thus passes over into mystery, accessible only to faith: "See here God's dwelling among men. He shall dwell with them. They shall be his people and he himself, God-with-them, shall be their God" (Apoc. 3). It is in this perspective of the eschatological fulfillment that believers must work for the temporal restoration of this world to make it a dwelling worthy of the children of God, the practical result of which will be that we so structure the world that men can live a life truly human and Christian and so more easily fulfill the will of God. [32]

Why This Temporal Mission Is So Emphasized Today

If this concern for a more human temporal order is an integral part of Christianity itself, there are, suggests Schillebeeckx, particular grounds for so much emphasis on this concern precisely today. Since faith, in its expression, never runs ahead of human experiences, the introduction of new temporal experiences will give rise to a faith-consciousness of tasks and obligations not grasped in earlier times. [33] Whenever for reasons of a new way of relating to earthly things the

[30] " Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 157.

[31] " Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachting," *De zending van de kerlc,* p. 70.

[32] " Kerk en wereld," *Wereld en kerk,* pp. 141-42. This article is based on a lecture given in Rome on Sept. 16, 1964, and was first published in *Tijdschrift voor ,Theologie,* IV (1964), pp. 386-99.

[33] " Terugblik en synthese," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 154. This article first appeared under the title "Un nouveau type de laic," *La nouvelle image de l'Egli8e,* ed. Bernard Lambert, 0. P. (Tours: Marne, 1967).

picture of man himself changes, the conclusions formerly drawn from Christianity should themselves change; they *must* be changed if they are to remain truly in accord with Christianity.34 Schillebeeckx goes on to argue that just such a new way of man's relating to earthly things has come about, with profound consequences. To corroborate this claim he relies heavily on the work of such men as the German sociologist Hans Freyer, who has analyzed this process in his book, *Theorie des gegenwartigen Zeitalters* (Theory of the Present Age) .s5

Freyer begins by noting that man has been touched in his depths by the " law of this epoch," changed even as regards his moral needs, his dreams, and his neuroses. 36 Man has become fascinated by the " makability " of the material world, by his power to transform raw materials into objects undreamt of a century ago, and has further learned so to organize his world of work with the help of machines that great quantities of objects can me manufactured in ever shorter periods of time. Nor is this manipulatory power of organization limited to the material world-it has been extended to society itself. Already in the forties of the last century, de Tocqueville, Lorenz von Stein, and others noted that revolutionaries no longer fought. for *certain* rights or advantages or against *single* oppressive situations but had plans for *an entirely new society.* 31 Today it is no longer a matter for surprise when plans for the total reconstruction of society are drawn up. Every year there appear books promising precisely this in their titles. The belief that one can organize society or the state in the way one organizes the mass production of a factory belongs to the "manager's" way of thinking, hence to one of the most influential truths of this epoch. 38 Ours is the first civilization to be

•• " De kerk op drift? " *De zending van de kerk,* p. 29. This article first appeared in *Tijdschrift voor Geestlijk Leven,* XXII (1966), pp. *533-54.*

85 Hans Freyer, *Theorie des gegenwiirtigen Zeitalters* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1955; 2nd ed. 1963); all quotations taken from this book are from the first edition.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 10. 87 *Ibid.,* pp. 69-70. •• *Ibid.,* p. 70.

conscious of the fact that it is really a worldwide civilization, and in this drawing together of the planet into the unity of a single field of action the apparent ability to grasp at a glance the task of ordering society on the entire planet and the consciousness of having at one's disposal powerful means to this end "raise the joys of planning to infinity." [39]

If this sociological analysis is correct, then the Christian's reaction to injustice in the world cannot but be affected. In the past, writes Schillebeeckx, experiences of injustice led conscientious people to the ethical imperative of charitable deeds in the private sphere of immediate interpersonal encounter. But today,

> in contrast with " medieval " man, we know that the social " establishment" is not a divine creation, but a cultural and man-made situation which can be dealt with and reformed. Historical imperatives that now emerge from such ... experiences immediately tackle the reform of the existing society itself.[40]

In other words, experiences of injustice now lead to involvement in the socio-economic and political fields. As an example of this phenomenon Schillebeeckx several times refers to the situation in post-war France where it became most obvious that a reorganization of temporal affairs was needed and that this was, among other things, a *Christian* duty. At this period a sensitive theologian like M. D. Chenu was writing, for instance, that " today grace is struggling to find its whole *terrestrial* dimension, in an economy where *matter* itself, *in* man, is also redeemed." [41] Schillebeeckx concludes that, while the theologian must be ever ready to point out all one-sidedness, it remains true that each age calls for its own proper emphases. Today it seems that the Christian must stand on

•• *Ibid.,* p. 77.

•• Schillebeeckx, "Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. *155.*

" M. D. Chenu, " L' 'homo oeconomicus' et le chretien," *Economie et Humanisme* (mai-juin 1945), p. 236, quoted by Schillebeeckx, "Cultuur en Godsdienst," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 17. Schillebeeckx's article first appeared in *Kultuurleven,* XIIi (1946)' pp. !l'i!0-82.

the side of the great economic and political revolutions occurring all around him; the modern expression of Matthew's last judgment scene would include references to help for developing countries. [42]

In embarking upon such work, "the Church's actual contribution can, of course, vary considerably-it may take the form of encouragement and confirmation, help, collaboration or the taking of initiatives. It may also consist of criticism and protest." [43] It is this last contribution, that of criticism and protest, which Schillebeeckx considers especially important. Thus it is necessary to discuss the genesis, content, and various phases of this ecclesial function, which he terms "critical negativity."

II. THE GENESIS, CONTENT AND VARIOUS PHASES OF CRITICAL NEGATIVITY

The Basic Meaning of Critical Negativity

As noted at the beginning of this article, Schillebeeckx understands by "critical negativity" a positive function of the Church by which it "continues to exert constant pressure [in the secular sphere] in order to bring about a better world, without humanity itself being sacrificed in the process." This is essentially a "negative" function inasmuch as the positive content of what is humanly desirable cannot be defined, although mankind clearly has some negative knowledge of it:

> In the long run, situations which are unworthy of man give rise to explicit protest, not in the name of a concept of what would here and now have been worthy of man which is already positively defined, but in the name of human values still being sought, and revealed in a negative manner in the ... experience of situations unworthy of man. [44]

•• Schillebeeckx, "Kerk en mensdom," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 156. This article first appeared in Holland in *Concilium.,* I (1965), pp. 63-83. Eng. trans.: "The Church and Mankind," *The Church and Mankind,* ed. E. Schillebeeckx ("Concilium," Vol. I; Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1965), pp. 69-101.

•• "The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *God the Future of Man,* p. 134.

""Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* p. 191.

Schillebeeckx acknowledges his dependence on T. W. Adorno's philosophical treatise, *Negative Dialektik*, [45] for the term " critical negativity " but adds that in a different perspective-and one that seems closer to Schillebeeckx's own-the expression had already been indirectly suggested to him by Paul Ricoeur, among others, especially by that French philosopher's article, "Taches de l'educateur politique." [46] Towards the end of this article Ricoeur writes that the health of any collectivity rests ultimately on the right relationship between what the German sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction *(Gesinnungsethik)* and that of responsibility *(Verantwortungsethik)* .[47] The former leads to unconditional devotion to an absolute, in which one does right without asking what the consequences of the action will be, while the latter leads to the taking of responsibility for one's action and also for its foreseeable consequences; the *Verantwortungsethik* is thus an ethic of force, of regulated balance, of calculated culpability.

Accepting Weber's distinction, Ricoeur goes on to say that the ethic of conviction is primarily carried forward by thinkers and culture and-what is especially significant for Schillebeeckx's postion-the confessing communities, including the churches, which find here rather than in politics properly so-called their point of insertion in the secular sphere. Unlike Weber's" men of politics," the bearers of the ethic of conviction act only indirectly in political matters, namely, by the constant pressure which they bring to bear on the ethic of responsibility and power. They are not bound to " the possible " and " the reasonable " but rather to " the humanly desirable," the

•• Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966.

•• Paul Ricoeur, "Taches de l'educateur politique," XXXIII (juillet-aout 1965)' pp. 78-93.

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 89. Weber developed the distinction between these two ethics in "Politik als Beruf," a speech at the University of Munich delivered in 1918 and later published in his *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Munich, 1921), pp. 396-450. English trans.: "Politics as a Vocation," *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-128.

optimum ethic. Ricoeur writes that " if we take this ethic at its highest point, as it is expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, it becomes clear that the problem is not to bring this ethic to immediate realization, but to express it indirectly by the whole range of pressures it exerts upon the ethic of responsibility." [48]

Critical Negativity as Derived from the Church's Religious Mission

Before treating in some detail the corrective action which the Church exercizes, one problem raised by Ricoeur's article should be considered. As he notes, *many* groups exercize critical functions toward society within the perspective of an ethic of conviction. What, if anything, specifies the Church's contribution? This is an important question, for, as Schillebeeckx writes, if in this or any other regard the Church " has no message *of her own* to bring, a promise which the world cannot articu-

[48] Ricoeur, p. 90. Ricoeur offers the utopia as an example of such indirect pressure of the ethic of conviction. The utopia does seem to have an historical function in the social order, for it alone can give to social, economic, or political action a human vision, in fact a double vision: to will that humanity become a single whole, and likewise to will the individual person as a whole. Regarding the former aspect, Ricoeur claims that it is this vision of humanity taken as a single suffering and aspiring being which lies at the horizon of all our debates about inequality in the world, about the atomic threat, about decolonialization, or about the issue of a "generalized economy." The second aspect of the utopian vision becomes particularly pressing in the face of the anonymity and dehumanization of relations among individuals in industrial society. The barbarian forms of urbanization into which we are plunged and the levelling of tastes and skills by the techniques of consumerism and the leisure industries make it clear to Ricoeur that man must fight on two fronts: to bring together humanity, ever threatened with truncation into rival groups, and to save each person from the anonymity in which he founders in modem civilization.

The utopian vision, as one example of the way the ethic of conviction can be formulated by the churches and other exponents of this ethic, does then, for Ricoeur, have a definite function in the social order. He cautions, however, that such a vision does not possess an efficacity of its own, but gains this only to the degree that it gradually transforms the experience which we have at the institutional level. This is why the utopia becomes a lie when it is not articulated on the possibilities open to each epoch. We know, for example, that equality is right, but we also know that an egalitarian society cannot be realized immediately but only by the corrective action of what both Ricoeur and Schillebeeckx see as the constant pressure of the ethic of conviction upon the ethic of responsibility.

late for us, then she indeed has no further reason for existing." [49] But in fact, he argues, the Church's critical role springs directly from her specifically religious mission, and that in both its aspects: the evangelical or directly religious aspect, and the derivative one of commitment to what Schillebeeckx, borrowing Paul Tillich's terminology, calls the world's "direct concerns," which the Church considers in the light of her message about the "ultimate concern" of human life.[50]

In considering the Church's critical function insofar as it is derived from the directly religious aspect of her mission, it should first be recalled that this aspect consists essentially of the Church's proclamation of the mystery of God and the consequent revelation to man of the mystery that he himself is. Schillebeeckx quotes approvingly the statement from *Gaudium et spes* that "since it has been entrusted to the Church to reveal the mystery of God, who is the ultimate goal of man, she opens up to man at the same time the meaning of his own existence, that is, the innermost truth about himself." [51] Or, as is stated elsewhere in this same conciliar document, the Church, relying on the inspiration of Christ, proposes to speak to all men in order to unfold the mystery that is man, to shed light on such fundamental questions as: "What is man? What is the meaning of suffering, evil and death which have not been eliminated by all this program? . . . What happens after this earthly life is ended?" [52]

Such questions about the meaning of existence are being

[49] Schillebeeckx, "Secularization and Christian Belief in God," *God the Future of Man*, p. 79.

[50] Schillebeeckx, "The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *ibid.*, p. 133.

[51] *Gaudium et spes*, n. 41, quoted *ibid.*, pp. 133-34.

[52] *Gaudium et spes*, n. 10, quoted *ibid.*, p. 135. It may be noted that Professor John E. Smith of Yale University, in his book *Experience and God* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), points out in several places this essential concern of religion with questions about the purpose and meaning of life: "This [religious] dimension marks man as the religious animal in the sense that he is the one being in whom the question of the purpose of existence as such becomes explicit both as a question and as a supreme interest" (p. 53). Or again: "The reality of God from the religious standpoint means the answering of the question about the ground and purpose of human life" (p. 64).

raised with great urgency and frequency today. In seeking the reasons for this, Schillebeeckx notes that Ricoeur, among others, has often pointed to the fact that our era's massive technical improvement, however useful and necessary it may be, remains on the level of the instrumental, the level of means and the subordinate meanings of human life. This whole process has accordingly been accompanied by an obscuring of ultimate meaning and values, with the result that " it is precisely this self-made, more and more manipulated world which causes [man's] anxiety." [53]

Furthermore, as writers like Freyer have observed, man has begun to plan not only the material world as a whole but himself as well, thereby increasing the danger of coming to regard himself as a being of no ultimate value, as merely a part in an overriding scheme of means ordered to purely calculable ends. Even assuming that all of men's material, psychic, and social needs have been met, Schillebeeckx writes, there would still remain the question: "And what now?" [54] This question derives from the mystery that is man himself and asks for the very *meaning* of his existence, a question which is implicit in every other need. The greatest danger for our Western civilization is that we think that through science we will clear up the mystery" man." To counter this danger, the Church must not only continue " bearing witness to, expressing, proclaiming and commemorating in grateful celebration the inexpressible mystery from which this world may live, unconsciously, thanks to Christ's life, death and resurrection," [55] but she must also- and here resides the *critical* side of this aspect of her mission-

protest against ideologies which underlie man's work for a better world on earth when she knows that these ideologies have an inadequate concept of man's deepest being. The Church is, after

[58] Schillebeeckx, " Secularization and Christian Belief in God," *God the Future of Man,* p. 63.

[5·] " Sociale structuren, maatschappelijk werk en charitas," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 213. This article was first reproduced by stencil in 1962 and was reworked in 1965 for the International Congress for Social Work, held in Santiago, Spain.

[55] " Secularization and Christian Belief in God, *God the Future of Man,* pp. 83-84.

all, convinced that whenever man (or society) gives himself over, with " ultimate concern " and therefore in an unconditional surrender, to objects which are not in fact capable of corresponding to his deepest desires, he will remain dissatisfied, unfulfilled and isolated, and the human person will suffer a loss of integrity. [56]

It is, then, in this prophetic protest against all false gods, against the idols to which man is tempted to give his ultimate allegiance, that the first aspect of the Church's function of critical negativity consists.

Critical Negativity as Emanating from the Derivative Aspect of the Church's Mission

Since, in her dialogue with the secular world, the Church not only elucidates the ultimate meaning of human life but also commits herself to the " direct concerns " of this world, she must exercize her critical function in this latter area as well. Here, for example in documents like *Gaudium et spes* and Pope Paul's encyclical on the development of peoples, *Populorum progressio,* the Church makes statements which must to a large extent be based on non-theological information, that is, on the analysis of secular situations. And because the Church as such has no special competence for such analyses, she must in fulfilling this task let herself be guided by the autonomous laws of this world's structures. [57] In other words,

> the Church cannot fulfill this prophetic [that is, this " critical and constructive "] task with regard to the secular problems of man and society purely in the light of revelation: she must also listen to the " foreign prophecy " addressed to her from the secular situation, urging her to take decisions which will help to shape the future. [58]

She must, for instance, be attuned to the writings of those who are trying to explain how changes in society have come and are still coming about. Among such works, Schillebeeckx more than once singles out Freyer's *Theorie des gegenwiirtigen*

[56] "The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *ibid.,* p. 134.
[57] *Ibid.,* p. 135.
[58] *Ibid.,* p. 136.

Zeitalters; The Sociological Imagination, by the late American sociologist, C. Wright Mills; *The Political Theory of Progressive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke,* by the English scholar C. B. Macpherson; *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society,* by Herbert Marcuse, professor of philosophy at the University of California at San Diego; "and, of course, *The New Sociology, Essays in Social Science and Social Theory* (in honor of C. W. Mills), edited by I. Horowitz." [59]

In discussing the manner in which these and other-by no means always written and published-" voices of worldly prophecy" influence the formation of the Church's own social imperatives, Schillebeeckx stresses that this is, in the first place, not a matter of theoretical formulation or theological expression on the part of the Church. Commenting upon the Second Vatican Council's declaration that the Church always has "the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel," [60] he writes that past experience shows that this cannot refer to a theoretical interpretation, for then the decisions which should shape the future would generally come too late: "Ethical imperatives have seldom been discovered by philosophers, theologians or the ecclesiastical magisterium. They arise spontaneously out of the concrete secular experiences of life; they impose themselves with the evidence of experience." [61]

In different terminology, the Church's social imperatives arise from what Schillebeeckx calls " contrast-experiences," those experiences which evoke the protest "No! It can't go on like this; we won't stand for it any longer! " [62] Examples of such experiences which he gives are those of the two World Wars, the concentration camps, the color-bar, the developing

[59] " Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* p. 204, n. S. See also "Church, Magisterium and Politics," *ibid.,* p. 165, n. 18.

[60] *Gaudium et spes,* n. 4.

[61] "The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *God the Future of Man,* p. 187.

[62] *Ibid.,* p. 186.

countries, the hungry, the homeless, the underprivileged, and the poor in countries where there is so much potential wealth.[63] In all these experiences he finds an implied awareness of values which is positive, though veiled and not yet articulate. The absence of "what ought to be" is what is experienced initially, and this leads first to protest and then to a perhaps vague, yet real, perception of "what should be done here and now."[64] He concludes an admittedly "terse and incomplete analysis" in the following way:

> What is called for is not only, nor even primarily, a reflexive dialogue, but rather the existential involvement of Christians in the world, a "presence au monde." This does not imply complicity with the world, but a saving Christian presence, the forerunner of that hope in a "new heaven and a new earth," a hope which *revolutionizes* our efforts for a better future on earth.[65]

In this passage's reference to the Christian hope for a "new heaven and a new earth" can be seen Schillebeeckx's conviction that the formulations of protest by which the Church responds to the voices of worldly prophecy are drawn up in the name of her utopian vision based on eschatological hope. As he said in one of his American lectures, it is the Church's "utopian" view which is the standard of her criticism, the "utopian" urge of the Gospel which provokes her prophetic protest against any curtailment of the possibilities of man's existence, while this urge is itself grounded "in her hope of that promised future which starts already modestly in the history of this world as salvation history."[66] The Christian is not simply *seeking* what is humanly desirable, something unknown; he *knows*, in his eschatological faith, that the God of the promise has bound himself to the realization of this in Christ, even though the Christian cannot formulate the content of this promise m a positive way.[67] In other words,

[63] "Church, Magisterium and Politics," *ibid.,* p. 154.
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] "The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *ibid.,* pp. 137-38.
[66] "Church, Magisterium and Politics," *ibid.,* p. 159.
[67] "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Jl.'lan's Future on Earth," *ibid.,* p. 191.

in opposition to everything which would diminish the possibilities of humanity, Christian faith in the *eschaton* continues to play a critically negative part and, with regard to the building up of a truly human future, the same eschatological hope still says that the humanly impossible is made really possible in Jesus the Christ. [68]

The Content of the Church's Social Protest

In this opposition of the Church " to everything which would diminish the possibilities of humanity," she is, according to Schillebeeckx, above all obliged never to allow man to rest content with any "establishment." As he explains it, the Christian hope for a " new world " relativizes every earthly result of man's work of humanization, for no result attained can yet be this " new world." In the past Christians often drew from this fact the false conclusion that they should stand opposed or indifferent to the building up of a better world, but in fact the only correct conclusion is that Christianity can never rest satisfied with any " established order " on earth. There is no definitively " Christian culture " or " Christian social order." The Christian element is precisely the continual transcending of the achieved result, the refusal to say: Now is the good finally attained. [69] As Schillebeeckx says elsewhere, "in a political society, the Christian expectation and the Sermon on the Mount play the part of an effective ' utopia ' which will keep on exercizing an ever-present pressure on all social and political matters." [70]

This " utopia " is thus the permanent source of criticism of

•• *Ibid.,* p. 193.

••" Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachting," *De zending van de kl'!T'k,* pp. 69-70. In the same vein, he said in one of the American lectures that "the Gospel message of Christian expectation offers the stimulating possibility constantly to overcome the limitations of any present 'establishment.' It contains a permanent criticism of the actual situation: secular institutions, social structures and their dominant mentality. It urges constant improvement, and above all, it brings the finn conviction that this building up of a more human world is genuinely possible " ("Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 157).

70 - Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 158. This is similar to Ricoeur's description, referred to above, of the Sermon on the Mount as one of the highest expressions of the ethic of conviction.

all structures of life on earth, allowing no existing situation to pretend to be already the realization of " the Christian order " or "the humanly desirable." The Christian's eschatological faith will condemn every left-wing political effort to give a positive and definitive name to what is worthy of man, just as, on the other hand, it will condemn all right-wing political tendencies which give an absolute value to the " established order " and rationalize it as a pattern of temporal society which has been sanctioned by the "eternal" God.[71] Finally, "eschatological faith also implies a criticism of every attempt which, purely on the basis of scientific and technological planning, claims to be able to realize a perfect future for the whole of mankind." [72]

In addition to this critique of every " establishment," a vigorous defense of human freedom is also demanded of the Church. She must protest against all threats to this freedom, which is not only a good in itself but also the human basis for Christianity. Those who, for example, live a colorless existence in a large city, in an atmosphere which again and again eliminates the higher desires, lack the fundamental condition for Christianity-genuine freedom, which must always contain the possibility of self-distancing over against one's situation. [73] In

[71] "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *ibid.*, p. 192.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 193. The contemporary German theologian Johannes B. Metz, to whose writings Schillebeeckx several times refers, has expressed similar thoughts on the relation of Christian eschatology to the Church's critique of society. He writes, for example, that Christianity's " eschatological proviso does not mean that the present condition of society is not valid. It *is* valid, but only in the ' eschatological meanwhile.' " This proviso brings about " a critical attitude to the societal present. Its promises are not an empty horizon of religious expectations; neither are they only a regulative idea. They are, rather, a critical liberating imperative for our present times. These promises stimulate and appeal to us to make them a reality in the present historical condition" ("The Church and the World in the Light of a 'Political Theology,'" *Theology of the World*, trans. William Glen-Doepel [New York: Herder and Herder, 1969], p. 114; original edition: *Zur Theologie der Welt* [Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald-Verlag, 1968]).

[73] " Op zoek naar Gods afwezigheid," *Wereld en kerk*, p. 56. This article first appeared in *Kultuurleven*, XXIV (1957), pp. 276-91. See also " Het kerkelijk apostolaat in verband met de situatie 1945-1954," *Wereld en kerk*, p. 92.

a milieu marked by misery and tumultuous labor, where all kinds of propaganda are at work, it becomes in the long run impossible to stand open to the sacramental preaching of the Church. For her own sake as well as for the sake of man himself, the Church must accordingly speak out against the threats to man's freedom and personhood posed by the increasing "rationalization" of modem society.[74]

[71] Here again the Church must first listen to the " voices of worldly prophecy " in order properly to grasp the threat of " rationalization." As understood by Max Weber, the German sociologist who did pioneering work in this field until his death in 1920, the term "rationalization" (or "rationalism") refers to a process common to all civilizations but particularly pronounced in the West, so pronounced that Weber could speak of the "peculiar rationalism of Western culture" *(The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* trans. Talcott Parsons [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), p. 26). Although he admitted that the term could be used to refer to a number of things, in general he used it to signify " an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts" ("The Social Psychology of the World Religions," *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills [New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 298).

In the West, Weber saw this process of rationalization as reaching its present highest point in the modern world's highly organized bureaucratic capitalism. Admitting that bureaucracy, taken merely as a form of administration and judged solely by such criteria as precision, speed, uniformity of operation, and reduction of frictions, was superior to all previous forms, he nevertheless saw in " the rule of an uncontrolled bureaucracy" the threat of the dissolution of man's freedom: "The living machine of the bureaucratic organization, with its specialization, ... its regimentation, and its authoritarian structure--this living machine also is ' objectified mind.' Combined with the inanimate machine it would create a new bondage, . . . a framework into which people might be forced to fit as helplessly as the fellahs who had to accept the old Egyptian society " (" Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland. I. Die Erbschaft Bismarcks," *Gesammelte politische Schriften* [Munich, 1921), pp. *155* ff., quoted by Fred H. Blum, "Max Weber: The Man of Politics and the Man Dedicated to Objectivity and Rationality," *Ethics,* LXX [1959-60], p. 7) .

Weber has been followed in this analysis of the effects of rationalization by other sociologists to whom Schillebeeckx often refers. Herbert Marcuse, whose *One-Dimensional Man* is considered by Schillebeeckx to be the kind of sociological analysis which " is a *conditio sine qua non* for the overcoming of the limitations of the ' established order ' " (Schillebeeckx, " Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* p. 206), studies in this book the manner in which " independence of thought, autonomy, and the right to political opposition are being deprived of their basic critical function in a society which seems increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the

The Phase of "More Concrete Plans" and the Need to Carry Them Out

Beyond such protest, which for Schillebeeckx constitutes a first phase in the Church's contrast-experiences, there comes a second phase, "where the message of the Gospel matures through a combination of theology and the scientific analysis of a particular situation into a responsible and more concrete plan of social and political action." [75] It is not a matter of the Church's proposing merely "general principles" for social and political issues. For Schillebeeckx, the real contribution of such encyclicals as *Pacem in ferris* and *Populorum progressio* lies in their authors' recognition of this and their consequent willingness to "deal really with definite moral decisions (though obviously against a background of basic principles already gained from past experiences)." [76]

It is, in fact, precisely in the ability of the Church to formulate what needs to be done in concrete, definite terms that Schillebeeckx sees the primary value of the Church's intervention. The basic obligation to obey such ecclesiastical directives does indeed arise from the situation itself, which imposes a human duty that "ought to stir the Christian conscience even before any official pronouncement. The Church's inter-

individuals through the way in which it is organized" *(One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1964], p. I), that is, through its "rationalization." The very efficiency of this system blunts the individual's recognition that it contains no .facts which do not communicate the repressive power of the whole, a power "repressive precisely to the degree to which it promotes the satisfaction of needs which require continuing the rat race of catching up with one's peers and with planned obsolescence, enjoying freedom from using one's brain, working with and for the means of destruction" *(ibid.,* p. !'l41).

A similar indictment of the rationalized organization of society is to be found in the work of the late C. Wright Mills, for whom the guiding principles of such organization were alien to and in contradiction with all that has been historically understood as individuality (C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1959], pp. 170-71).

[75] Schillebeeckx, "Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 159.

[70] *Ibid.,* p. 156.

vention merely confirms this. The specific character of such an intervention lies in the fact that this demand is formulated in a clear, precise, concrete and definite sense (e. g., in this situation the breaking up of vast landed properties by expropriation is morally necessary) ." [77]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, the Church's protests and directives must actually become embodied in action undertaken by members of the Church working in cooperation with all men of good will. As Schillebeeckx said in a lecture given in Rome in 1964 and entitled simply "Church and World,"" it is a matter not of the loud proclamation that love is all, but of an actual, concerned involvement with men." [78] The question of just who is responsible for the proclamation of the Church's protests and who for their implementation is the subject of the following section of this article.

III. THE BEARERS OF THE FuNCTION OF CRITICAL NEGATIVITY

The Nature of the Distinction between Clergy and Laity

If, as Schillebeeckx holds, the two phases of (1) criticizing society by the standard of her" utopian" view and (2) applying this view to society through " a responsible and more concrete plan of social and political action " constitute a function which holds for the Church as such and which must furthermore be embodied ultimately in concrete deeds, the question arises as to what division of labor, if any, is appropriate for the carrying out of this function. In particular, what is the significance of the traditional distinction between clergy and laity in this regard?

In answering this question, it is first of all important to stress that, for Schillebeeckx, it is fundamentally non-ecclesial to see *all* expressions of one's churchliness in the perspective of this distinction. To do so severs the mystery of the one body

[77] *Ibid.,* p. 162.

[78] " Kerk en wereld," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 135.

of Christ and leads to the false notion that there are " two sorts of Christians " to be distinguished in the Church: those whose proper sphere of action is the Church itself (clerics), and those whose domain is the world (laymen). To avoid this, all emphasis must be placed on the communal basis of Christianity as such, which cannot be expressed in terms of laity and clergy.[79] The *consecratio mundi,* for example, is one important task for the Church, but in itself it is neither lay nor clerical but simply Christian. The relationship to the temporal from out of the community of grace plays no role in the differentiation between clergy and laity; it is a charge of being a Christian.[80] If there are these large areas in the Church where the difference between laity and clergy plays no direct role, the question then becomes: Where does this difference begin and where does it end? What is its *Sitz im Leben?*[81]

Just as Schillebeeckx understands the Church itself above all in terms of its relationship to Christ (as sacrament of the risen Christ), so too he finds the essence of Church office, and hence the *Sitz im Leben* of the distinction between clergy and laity, in the relationship of office-bearers to Christ. As we read in Ephesians, Jesus is distinct from his body, the Church, as its head: the Father " has put all things under his feet and has given him, raised above all, as head to the Church " (Eph. 1: flfl-fl3). There is, then, a certain identity between Christ and

[79] " Het kerkelijk apostolaat in verband met de situatie 1945-1954," *Wereld en kerk,* pp. 106-07.

[80] " Dogmatiek van ambt en lekestaat," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 117. This article first appeared in *Tijdschrift voor Theologie,* II (1962), pp. 258-92.

[81] *Ibid.,* p. 107. In the discussion which follows, the term "hierarchy" is to be understood in a broad sense, as synonymous with " clergy " and " bearers of office." Such equivalence of all three texms in the writings of Schillebeeckx is illustrated very clearly in the following passage: " Men have sought diligently for the place of the layman in the Church, as though that were the real point of issue. But in terms of biblical theology the question lies in precisely the opposite direction: What is the place of *office* in the ecclesial people of God? From the point of view of the Bible the negative definition that a layman is a non-cleric is perplexing. Such a definition is understandable only from out of a past where Church and hierarchy were practically identified" (" Terugblik en synthese," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 157).

his Church, but such that he is at the same time distinct from it as its principle of life and its leader.[82]

In the visible Church this aspect of Christ as head, founder, and leader of the Church is, through God's institution, represented precisely in the apostolic office, the core of which thus lies in its being a visible manifestation of Christ's mediation between the Father and the Church. Church office renders present this one aspect of Christ; just as he as head and mediator is differentiated from the Church and so stands over against it, so too the ecclesial office is a function through which the bearer of that office in his official acts formally stands over against the People of God as their leader. In the two phrases " in the name of Christ " and " over against the People of God " lies the proper basis for the difference between the clergy and the laity; only *in* this relationship to the office is the People of God to be called " lay."[83]

More specifically, the clergy manifests the guiding and teaching authority as a principle of order and, through the power of consecration, as the principle that constitutes the ecclesial character of the sacramental and cultic life.[84] Or, in terms of the "lines of force" in the Church's office of leadership which Schillebeeckx has schematically outlined, the bearers of Church office are entrusted with leading and guiding the life of the community of believers in such a way that Christ may really be their only Lord, directing the ministry of the Word in faithfulness to the apostolic confession of faith, conducting the sacramental services of the community, and providing the "consolation of the Gospel" through admonition and exhortation.[85]

[82] " Dogmatiek van ambt en lekestaat," p. 112.
[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 112-13.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 117.
[85] " The Catholic Understanding of Office in the Church," *Theological Studies*, XXX (1969), p. 572.

The Clergy's Role in the Church's Critique of the Temporal Order

While the clerical functions just mentioned derive from the first aspect of the Church's mission, the evangelical, the clergy are not thereby relieved of any part in the secondary, though still essential, aspect of her mission, namely, the Christian influencing of the temporal order where this affects human existence: "The Church's office of leadership also implies leading in the love that desires and seeks to attain justice for all men-in other words, being responsible for the evangelical care which the community must have for man in his concrete historical situation." '" This task includes not only a critical attitude towards possible failures of the community itself in this regard but also "a critique of society as a whole," for inasmuch as the bearers of office do in fact represent the community of believers in the presence of the world, " what is living in the community will crystallize out in their person," and this may well include the whole community's" critical no" to the world.[87] In its *expression,* this function of critical negativity is accordingly a properly clerical or hierarchical one, whereby the bearers of office " let the authoritative voice of the church community be heard in the guidance of humanity towards a better, more humane world." [88]

•• *Ibid.*

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] " The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *God the Future of Man,* p. 137. In terminology somewhat different from that of Schillebeeckx, Johannes B. Metz supplements this view of why it is above all the hierarchy which must actually voice the Church's " critical no " to society, which de facto sees in the bearers of office the authoritative voice of the institutional Church. Metz writes that, if faith is formed by the eschatalogieal promises, it " again and again takes on a critical task with regard to the society in which the faithful live. . . . The question now is: Can this task be left to the individual believer? Will he be able to perform it authoritatively and effectively? Is it not, therefore, precisely this *critical* task of faith which, in a new way, raises the problem of institutionalizing faith?" ("The Church and the World in the Light of a 'Political Theology,'" *Theology of the World,* p. 115). Or again, it is a question of" whether and how critical freedom is at all possible without institutionalization, if it is to gain the maximum force and efficacy for its task of criticizing society " (" On the Institution and Institutionalization," *ibid.,* p. 133) .

Schillebeeckx notes that in the past the hierarchy was often not aware of its responsibility in this area but feels that in such documents as *Pacem in terris* and *Populorum progressio* one finds the beginning of a new self-awareness in the magisterium:

> In them a new self-understanding of ecclesiastical office comes into view, for in social and political issues the ecclesiastical authorities no longer seek merely to safeguard humanity's ethical past achievements; they seek rather to let the authoritative voice of the Church community be heard in the guidance of humanity towards a better, more humane world-which, for the faith and hope of Christians, can truly be called an ascent, in Christ, towards the definitive kingdom. [89]

In his treatment of this ecclesial function in " Church, Magisterium and Politics," Schillebeeckx turns finally to the question of the morally binding force of the Church's magisterial pronouncements in social and political matters. Asking whether the magisterium can guarantee the faithful that its prescription on any such issue is the only right one, he replies that this cannot be maintained in an absolute sense simply because concrete decisions in the field of politics are not amenable to that degree of certainty. [90] Nevertheless, he continues, the Christian's belie£ that the Church stands under the guidance of the Spirit does give him a moral certainty that by acting in accordance with such directives he" will really act more in line with what the situation demands, and that [he] can therefore

[89] " The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue," *God the Future of Man,* p. 187. Although Schillebeeckx himself dwells at no great length on past failures of the clergy in their critical function, one of the sociologists to whom he refers most frequently, the late C. Wright Mills, did do so, particularly in "A Pagan Sermon to the Christian Clergy" *(The Nation,* CLXXXVI [Jan.-June 1958], pp. 199-202). After complaining that religion, as a social and personal force, had become a " dependent variable," reacting rather than originating, adapting rather than denouncing, imitating rather than setting forth new models of conduct and sensibility, Mills called upon the Christian clergy " to proclaim gospel, to declare justice, to apply your love of man-the sons of God, all of them, you say-meaningfully, each and every day, to the affairs and troubles of men. It is up to you to find answers that are rooted in ultimate moral decisions and to say them out so that they are compelling." (p. 202)

[90] " Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 168.

face the consequences of such an action more confidently, even if it should lead to complications." [91]

This in turn "leads us to the specific nature of the obligatory quality of these official directives," which Schillebeeckx sees as residing above all in the *negative* character of the Church's concrete moral imperatives, growing as they do mainly out of contrast-experiences-" This cannot go on." [92] Such protests can exert real pressure towards overcoming all limitations of man's capabilities and towards raising his activity up to " the highest human level-a level which cannot be defined, the maximum level which transcends all human expectations." [93] He grants that

> the fact that this distinctively Christian contribution to the building up of a temporal society really worthy of man is critically negative-although it is based on a positive hope-may perhaps make it appear insignificant. But it should not be underestimated. The basic question, after all, is whether what is "humanly desirable " can-again and again-be so easily recognized *without* a critical function. And from where else would this come, if not from the faith that God is man's future? ... It is ... nowhere apparent from history-apart from God's promise-whether what is worthy of man is ultimately at all possible. [94]

It is, in other words, the dynamism of Christian hope straining towards an *absolute* future which precludes our being left with a principle which, arising from social and cultural factors alone and so lacking this unique Christian dynamism, would limit what is "humanly desirable" in advance. [95]

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

[93] " Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *ibid.*, p. 194.

[94] *Ibid.* On this same point, Metz writes: " There is a negative, critical attitude and experience to which we should pay our chief attention: the experience of the threat to humanity, that is, the experience of freedom, justice, and peace being threatened. We should not underestimate this negative experience. . . . The solidarity which grows out of this experience offers the possibility of a common front of protest. This must be grasped; this must be exploited" (" The Church and the World in the Light of a 'Political Theology,'" *Theology of the World,* pp. 123-24).

[95] Schillebeeckx, " Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," p. 197.

The Laity's Role in the Function of Critical Negativity

If the responsibility of bringing to expression the Church's "critical no" to society devolves primarily upon her office-bearers, this is by no means to imply that the laity have no role or a merely negligible one in the function of critical negativity. This is a function of the *whole* Church, and the laity's role lies first of all in helping the office-bearers formulate their critique. Schillebeeckx considers such assistance to be indispensable, for in determining the best socio-economic or political order it is not just a matter of consulting those revealed principles or basic human values which the Church in her magisterium and pastoral office must safeguard but of expertly interpreting the de facto world situation and of technically analyzing this, and for this the hierarchy, at least as such, has no special mission or competence.[96] This temporal assessment therefore "belongs per se not to the competence of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, but to the Christian laity."[97] Moreover, the clergy must listen to the voice of the laity as the voice not only of expert advisors "but of children of God living out of the Spirit of Christ, as the voice of believers in whom (and insofar as!) the Good News and the Scriptures have taken concrete form and who as such constitute a 'locus theologicus,' a living tradition of faith."[98]

As an example of the way in which clergy and laity can work together in these matters Schillebeeckx refers to the various stages in the composition of *Gaudium et spes.* Up through the third session of the Council the various drafts of this document were judged by many to be deficient in their "Christian anthropology," largely because those responsible for these drafts were caught up in too static and individualistic a vision of man. These drafts were also criticized because their picture of "the world" remained too "medieval," as though the world were merely a means for the exercise of Christian charity with no

96 "Kerk en wereld," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 136.
97 "Het kerkelijk apostolaat in verband met de situatie 1945-1954," *ibid.,* p. 110.
98 Dogmatiek van arnbt m lekestaat," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 1ft0.

value of its own. With these criticisms before him, Bishop Guano, the president of the drafting commission, took the initiative of greatly enlarging the membership of his commission, not just with clerics but with many more laymen than before. In the period between the third and fourth sessions this group worked diligently on a new draft, and it was this which, with some more or less basic modifications, was finally approved by the Council as its *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.*[99]

Another and equally important task for the laity arises from Schillebeeckx's insistence that "it is a matter not of the loud proclamation that love is all, but of an actual, concerned involvement with men." This involvement includes the application to particular cases of the " more concrete plans " which the Church's contrast-experiences engender, and for Schillebeeckx this application is a task for the laity, one which they carry out "in a properly lay manner, namely, just insofar as they are daily involved in earthly matters, such that they, not magisterially or pastorally, as the clergy, but fully involved in the things of this world, are able to direct them as it were from within towards sanctification." [100]

Christianity is, then, for Schillebeeckx a matter no more for the clergy than for the laity. Both groups have their own particular tasks, their own " spiritual gifts," all of which are necessary if the Church is properly to fulfill its function of critical negativity as well as all other aspects of its mission. To conclude the expositional part of this article with the words of Schillebeeckx himself in a synthesis of his thought on the relationship between clergy and laity and on the great good that comes from their harmonious work together, it is for him precisely out of the mutual relationship of the clergy and laity's diverse " spiritual gifts " that " the body of the Church, as the community of faith, love, and eschatological hope, is being

•• " Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachting," *ibid.,* p. 47.

100 " De typologische definitie van de christelijke leek volgens Vaticanum II," *ibid.,* p. 146.

gradually built up in this world until the day comes when the community of mankind grows into 'the communion of saints.' " [101]

IV. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS oN ScHILLEBEECKX's PosiTION

Some Inconsistencies and Modifications in his Thought

The Church does, then, for Schillebeeckx have a message of her own to bring to the world, a contribution one of whose many forms is that of critical negativity, of prophetic protest " against every image of man whose lines are strictly drawn or which presents itself as a positive and total definition and against the illusory expectation that science and technology are capable of solving the ultimate problems of man's existence." [102]

In evaluating his thought on this particular ecclesial function it is first of all important to realize that, while his use of the term "critical negativity" is relatively recent, the function itself and related subjects (such as the relationship between clergy and laity) were treated by him in lectures and articles of much earlier date, something which helps make understandable certain inconsistencies in these works. In the Introduction to *Wereld en kerk* Schillebeeck.x himself notes that the fact that the articles included in this collection were written over a span of twenty years enables them " to provide a picture oE the growth in this problematic [of 'world and Church '] since the last World War"; [103] if the material treated in these articles were now to be recast into a unified whole, this very growth would call for certain revisions, especially in the earlier writings. We have seen, for example, that in a recent synthesis of his thought on the clergy-laity relationship Schillebeeckx claims that, from a Scriptural point of view, it is "perplexing" to define a layman negatively as a " non-cleric." Such a definition,

[101] " Terugblik en synthese," *ibid.,* p. 163.

[102] Schillebeeckx, "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* pp. 193-94.

[103] "Ten geleide," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 10.

he adds, " is understandable only from out of a past where Church and hierarchy were practically identified." [104] But at least as late as 1954 the influence of that past was still to be felt in his own writings. Discussing in that year the actual carrying out of societal reforms called for by the Church, he wrote that such reforms " must be the proper task of laymen competent in this field. Here only the laity, not the hierarchical Church, can extend the positive construction. The Church does indeed have a social inspiration, but the concrete application of this to specific situations falls outside her competence." [105] The doubtless unintentional omission of an adjective modifying the word " Church " in the last of these sentences reveals that tendency to identify the Church with the hierarchy to which Schillebeeckx elsewhere rightly objects.

Much more significant is the fact that Schillebeeckx has over the years altered his manner of distinguishing the clergy from the laity. In an article first published in 1958 he noted that Christians have a positive obligation to invest the temporal order with meaning, adding that " the Church as an institution of salvation, and therefore the ecclesiastical hierarchy as well, has only a supernatural mission; this [temporal] obligation is not hers. But the Church is also the laity, the community of the faithful, which belongs to this world as well, in which it has at the same time an earthly obligation to fulfill, one with a directly earthly goal: the humanization of the world and of man." [106] Far different from this emphasis on an exclusively supramundane mission of the hierarchy is the approach taken in an article published only four years later, where Schillebeeckx stresses that dedication to the building up of a better world in incumbent upon *all* Christians, both lay and clerical: " The relation to the temporal order from out of a graced

[104] " Terugblik en synthese," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 157.

[105] " Het kerkelijk apostolaat in verband met de situatie 1945-1954," *Wereld en kerk,* p. 110.

[106] "Het katholieke ziekenhuis en de katholieke gezondheidszorg," *ibid.,* p. 217. This article first appeared in *Ons Ziekenhuis,* XX (1958), pp. 317-25 and in *Hospitalia,* IV (1959), pp. *29-35.*

communion with God plays no role in distinguishing between clerics and laymen; it is *one* of the obligations simply of being a Christian." [107]

Underestimation of the Demands of Dialogue

If this exemplifies a development which has already occurred in Schillebeeckx's thought, there are other aspects of even his recent work which seem inadequate and so in need of modification. While he does see that the Church must formulate her moral decisions in the light of extensive and intensive dialogue with the " voices of worldly prophecy," his appraisal of an encyclical like *Populorum progressio* suggests that he may underestimate just how demanding this dialogue must be. Schillebeeckx is doubtless correct in regarding this encyclical as one indication "of a new self-understanding on the part of the Church's *magisterium,"* [108] of a willingness to " deal really with definite moral decisions." [109] As is pointed out by Dr. Philipp Herder-Dorneich, the transition in recent social encyclicals from comprehensive pronouncements to special directives and admonitions was only logical in an increasingly complex world where no problem exists everywhere in quite the same cast. [110] Like Schillebeeckx, he emphasizes that this new focus on specific situations calls for much specialized knowledge and that such knowledge does not just happen but is the fruit of hard work by a host of thinkers, practical men and experts: " the greater the number of people involved in this process, the better the chance for satisfactory results." [111] But in this emphasis he seems to be considerably more realistic than the Dutch theologian. While Schillebeeckx's appraisal of *Popu-*

[101] - Dogmatiek van ambt en lekestaat," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 117.

[108] "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* p. 203.

[109] - Church, Magisterium and Politics," *ibid.,* p. *156.*

[110] Philipp Herder-Dorneich, "How Can the Church Provide Guidelines in Social Ethics? " *The Social Message of the Gospels,* ed. Franz BOckle (" Concilium," Vol. XXXV; New York: Paulist Press, 1968), p. 84. Herder-Dorneich is dean of studies at the University of Cologne and director of a socio-economic research institute there.

[111] *Ibid.,* pp. 86-87.

lorum progres8io is in general quite positive (though he does stress that it and similar documents represent only a beginning) ,[112] Herder- Dorneich sees that, at least in terms of this need for specialized knowledge, the encyclical was a regression from Vatican II's relatively extensive use of experts to broaden the base of underlying opinions. A small group of theologians were responsible for the social theories of *Populorum progres8io.*[113] This was accordingly "a step backward," for the pluralistic base was narrowed and " no real legitimate basis for these socio-economic, non-theological ideas " was offered.[114]

As an example of consequent weaknesses in this encyclical, Dr. Thomas S. Molnar of Brooklyn College points to its "uncritical trust in 'public authorities' and 'government officials ' " to lay down the objectives to be pursued and the ends to be achieved in developing countries, for in fact the major criticism against a program like the Alliance for Progress " is precisely that its funds go to the government ... and are distributed by and to *its* partisans, according to plans drawn up by *its* own experts." [ns] When the encyclical singles out " government officials " for planning, distributing, taxing, and mobilizing the people and the economy, this "adds the seal of approval to their already swollen power over present and future, local and foreign funds." [116] Molnar traces such a weakness to the churches' lack of " an independent research apparatus"; [117] Herder-Dorneich echoes this with a call for the creation of lay councils to assist such bodies as the various episcopal conferences, councils made up " not [of] famous writers and theologians but competent specialists in specific

[112] Schillebeeckx, ·'Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 159, and" Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *ibid.,* p. 203.

[118] Herder-Dorneich, p. 87. He adds: " We do not know if the opinions of dissenting experts were given consideration. We do not know who chose the authors and advisers, or how they were chosen."

[1-] *Ibid.,* p. 88.

[115] Molnar, "Christian Churches and World Affairs: A View of Recent Declarations on Aid," *Worklview,* X (Sept. 1967), p. *5.*

[116] *Ibid.*

[117] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

fields who know their job. Their task in these councils will be to serve as spokesmen for a professional point of view " in an atmosphere conducive to conflict and debate.[118] All this is clearly in accord with Schillebeeckx's own insistence that the hierarchy work with competent laymen in exercizing the function of critical negativity, but Molnar and Herder-Dorneich seem to have a fuller grasp of just what this kind of dialogue reqmres.

The Question of Overemphasis on the Negative

Finally, there is the criticism which Schillebeeckx himself anticipated when he wrote that the fact that the distinctively Christian contribution to the building up of a more fully human society is critically *negative* " may perhaps make it appear insignificant."[119] One could agree with him that this negative function is important but still ask whether he does not overemphasize it. This is in fact a central question in a critique of Schillebeeckx's position by William Hill, 0. P.[120] Hill grants that "critical negativity" takes the problem of evil seriously, but he goes on to write that the negativity of faith seems uppermost for Schillebeeckx, who claims that " the Christian has as little positive idea as the non-Christian of what is worthy of man, either ultimately or here and now."[121] Hill asks whether " the illuminative power of faith does not call for something more than ' critical negativity ' in the face of human ideologies"; accordingly he maintains towards Schillebeeckx's project the reservation "that it is not clear how it makes any allowance for a positive contribution to the future that is Christian in any specific and explicit way. What is lacking is reference to the Christian *vision,* as something dogmatic and doctrinal in kind."[122]

[118] Herder-Dorneich, p. 91.

[119] Schillebeeckx, "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* p. 194.

[120] William J. Hill, 0. P., "Schillebeeckx's New Look at Secularity: A Note," *The Thomist,* XXXIII (1969), pp. 162-70.

[121] Schillebeeckx, "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* p. 191, quoted by Hill, p. 168.

[122] Hill, p. 169.

In assessing this critique it seems well to analyze carefully the statement which Hill sees as epitomizing the negative aspect of Schillebeeckx's position. For the latter to write that the Christian has " as little positive idea as the non-Christian " of what is *ultimately* worthy of man is at best an ambig-uous assertion and seems actually to be inconsistent with his basic notion of the Church as " sacrament of the world." If the Church brings to self-consciousness what is implicit in the concrete reality of human existence in the world, if in her there becomes visible that which God intends for the whole world, namely, "to bind men into a brotherhood on the basis of their communion with God in his representative, Christ Jesus," [123] then it hardly seems sufficient to say that the Christian has *no* more positive idea of what is ultimately worthy of man than those for whom God's plan for the world has not reached this level of consciousness. As Pastor Richard Neuhaus observes, there *are* certain things in our history which are " preview events" wherein Christians "have been able to see the end time and the present time; most notably it is the life of Jesus and his vindication in being raised from the dead. That is the most significant proleptic or preview event that helps us . . . to anticipate the kingdom of God." [124] Hill points to the same event in specifying what he understands by Schillebeeckx's lack of reference to the positive Christian vision: " In a real sense Christ has already achieved his future, one, moreover, that we know will be ours and that indeed is already in the process of realization. Schillebeeckx, of course, denies none of this; at the same time it is a dimension of faith that appears entirely inoperative in his new understanding of Christian secularity." [125]

If Schillebeeckx's position needs some modification in this regard, his assertion that the Christian has as little positive idea as the non-Christian of what is *here and now* worthy of

[123] Schillebeeckx, " Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachting," *De zending van de kerk,* p. 63.

[124] Richard Neuhaus, "In 1970: What does it mean to be a Christian? " [edited transcript of a conversation among the editors of the *National Catholic Reporter,* Pastor Neuhaus, and Frs. James Groppi and John Dunne], *National Catholic Reporter,* VI (Feb. 11, 1970), p. 5.

[125] *Hill,* p. 169.

man seems much more securely grounded. While stressing that Christians must commit themselves to positive, concrete plans for the building up of the human community, he cautions that the specific obligation contained in this positive element shares in the absolutely obligatory character of the negative experience only "to a degree which the situation here and now will determine." [126] To be sure, through more thorough analyses of societal ills and more open dialogue among those making these analyses it will become possible to determine ever more exactly what, in the light of the Gospel, " ought to be done here and now," but the certainty of having specified the *best* solution will never be absolute. For one thing, as Herder-Dorneich notes, "when we deal with the social order, we are always dealing in the future, and the future is unknown." [127] Moreover, " social realities are not only unknown; they are also undetermined. Individuals and social groups are historical realities. They change over the course of time, and these changes basically are not subject to human reckoning." [128]

For these reasons, Schillebeeckx seems to be correct when, while by no means denying the need for the Christian to commit himself to positive plans for a better world, he nevertheless sees this positive element as only *sharing,* to a limited degree, in the obligatory character of the " critical no " and in this sense being subordinated to a " negative theology " in practical matters. [129] Another passage from Pastor Neuhaus illustrates very well the basis for this negative theology:

> When one gets into the structuring of the social order, one must be exceedingly modest. . . .
>
> . . . What we have to recognize today is that the church is part of the uncertainty of the human condition as is any other institution or any other community in the world, that the church is radically a pilgrim community; in fact, it, of all the institutions in

[128] Schillebeeckx, "Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 164.

[127] Herder-Dorneich, p. 85.

[128] *Ibid.*

[129] Schillebeeckx, " Church, Magisterium and Politics," *God the Future of Man,* p. 164.

the world, ought to be the one most acutely aware of its provisionality and its uncertainties. [130]

Neither Neuhaus nor Schillebeeckx draw from their very similar analyses any justification for inaction. In the former's words, "we must have the courage of our uncertainties" and be willing "to surrender ourselves, even to the point of death itself, for the sake of these works [which we now envision]-well knowing that we may be wrong." For *"that,* you see, is what it means to trust God, because his rightness is greater than our wrongness, his power to forgive is greater than our power to **hurt."** [131]

It is with a similar call to trust in God that Schillebeeckx concludes his first explicit treatment of "critical negativity." After noting that man, in his freedom, bears the burden of constructing and extending the future for himself, he writes that this is "a burden that is too heavy for him to bear alone. This will create a new and hitherto unknow area wherein he may find his security in the God who is to come, [a new area] for trust in God." [132] In other words, " man, overburdened in his freedom and left alone even by his fellow-men to make free decisions, need not ultimately feel alone--as John observes in a masterly statement in his gospel, given as a pure interpretation of Jesus' life (John 8: 16), **'I** am not alone; the Father is always with me.'" [133] Within the sphere of trust intrinsic to this basic Christian spirituality of " evangelical consolation " the Christian can, for Schillebeeckx, take on what seems impossible, ready to commit himself " radically to man and society and to criticize, in faith, society as it is." [134] Thus does he " integrate faith in the God who is to come and radical commitment to one's fellow-man with the function of 'critical negativity.' " [135]

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[130] Neuhaus, p. *5.*
[131] *Ibid.*
[130] Schillebeeckx, "Epilogue: The New Image of God, Secularization and Man's Future on Earth," *God the Future of Man,* p. 200.
[133] *Ibid.* [134] *Ibid.,* p. 196. [135] *Ibid.,* p. 199.

LONERGAN'S NOTION OF THE RELIGIOUS APRIORI

THE QUESTION I am treating asks whether and, if so, to what degree religion is apriori to human living. To my knowledge, Lonergan has not employed the phrase "religious apriori" in writing, but he does speak of "transcendental notion." In *Insight* Lonergan explains that " a notion arises only in so far as understanding discerns future function in present structure." (p. 354) In a lecture given since *Insight* he discusses transcendental notion and means by this the notions of being, truth, goodness and value.[1] Such notions are apriori to the horizon of the human subject because in one's knowing and living one spontaneously makes judgments and decisions: a study of the structure of knowing reveals its intrinsic orientation towards being *(Insight,* Chapter 12) ; the structure of judgment, an intrinsic orientation towards objectivity (Chapter 13); the structure of choosing, an intrinsic orientation towards goodness and value (Chapter 18, section I). A denial that these notions are operative within the subject is met by the argument by retort. Religion, consequently, would be a transcendental notion only if it could be shown that religion arises spontaneously in human knowing, or choosing, or both. In this way the notion of religion (like the notions of being, truth, objectivity, value) would be apriori to the horizon of the subject.

These notions, although present within the field of consciousness, may not be expressly known to the subject: he demonstrates in his living that he considers some things worthwhile and other things not worthwhile, yet he may never make explicit the notion of value implicit in his decision making. The transcendental notions, then, are within one's horizon, but the subject without adequate self-knowledge will not know of

[1] *The Subject* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), pp.

their presence. Thus in *Insight* Lonergan argues that metaphysics is rooted in structures "immanent and operative in all human knowing" and that the process to explicit metaphysics is "primarily a process to self-knowledge." (pp. 396-397)

We will proceed by attempting to show why the notion of religion arises. We will do so by considering the role of religion in human living, the problem of the meaning of human living, and why the solution to this problem cannot be philosophical but must be religious.

LovE AND SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

In a recent theology symposium [2] Lonergan began speaking on "The Future of Christianity" by indicating seven areas which the major world religions share in common, basing his remarks on a work by Fredrich Heiler. [28] Lonergan went on to develop the theme of self-transcendence, stating that it is by transcending present limits of his growth that the human subject achieves "authentic human living." The cognitional aspect of the self-transcending process consists of learning, of passing beyond or transcending present limits of experience, of endless questioning which advances one to ever wider ranges of understanding, and of judgments which transcend the individual subject through an intentional, objective claim of what is or is not true for all subjects. In addition, there is an operational level where the knowing subject is also a doer, and self-transcendence on this level consists in doing what is good. A major element in this doing is love, doing good for oneself, family, and nation; and supreme among one's loves is love of God. Lonergan contended that love is what principally effects the self-transcendence of human growth; love of God above all fulfills the subject most completely, grounding and trans-

• The symposium, entitled "The Future of Christianity," was held at the College of the Holy Cross, December 14, 1968. Lonergan's paper was published, copyrighted in his name, in *The Holy Cross Quarterly,* Winter, 1969.

"• "The History of Religion as Preparation for the Co-operation of Religions," in *The History of Religions,* edited by M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp.

forming whatever else is loved in and because of God. Professor Heiler's study had shown that the high religions taught the goodness and love of God and that man must respond with love of God above all things and all else loved in God. Lonergan was arguing, therefore, that a man succeeds in achieving "authentic existence" to the extent that he transcends himself, and the highest degree of such authenticity is reached when one's potential for giving and receiving love is actuated by a recognition of and response to God's gift of his love.

· In his paper, then, Lonergan was suggesting the apriori character of love as the main technique in transcending oneself and linked love of God with this self-transcendence. But when one speaks in such terms he is implying that religion of some kind will mediate man's arrival at " authentic existence" since it is religion which talks to man about divine love. To express this idea clearly we might say that Lonergan has attempted to demonstrate that religion is a constitutive element of human development insofar as that development is linked with love and love of God actuates one's potential for giving and receiving love most fully. Such is the function of religion, a function which each religion spells out differently in its own peculiar conception of God, man, and the universe.

However, it is one thing to say that religion assists and completes the project of achieving authentic existence and another to claim that religion is, on that score alone, necessary to human living. Does this do anything more than indicate the role played by religion in human living? Might there be other ways of working out one's self-transcendence? In short, is religion apriori to man in that it alone critically and truthfully can be said to further man's development most effectively? Is openness to religion apriori to human nature? To answer these questions we must return to *Insight.*

THE MEANING oF HuMAN LIVING

The issue centers on the problem of ultimate meaning. It supposes that a mature, intelligent adult will ask himself about the meaning of his life and the value or importance even of

human history itself. For many, perhaps, ultimate meaning is not an issue; but the explicit intent of *Insight* is to bring men to raise questions, to campaign against every flight from understanding, to bring the knower to make the search for truth the effective center of his life.[3] This intention will be fruitful once the reader appropriates his own rational self-consciousness, once he thoroughly understands what understanding is. Accomplishment of this involves, first, a transformation of the subject wherein he commits himself to the search for understanding and to critical positions (for example, that one is a rationally self-conscious subject; [4] that knowing means knowing the real and that the real is what in fact is, that is, being; [5] that being is the objective of question-asking, the intrinsic orientation of the drive to know; [6] that being is intelligible) .[7]

A second transformation occurs within the subject once he realizes that he is not just a knower but also a doer, and that while the real as intelligible is the objective of the subject's desire to know, the real as good is the objective of his choosing. This represents an advance upon the first transformation, for the intelligent subject finds himself committed to the truth and, further, to action, to a living that should reflect intelligence in its decisions and operations (cf. Chapter 18, section 1).

A third transformation occurs once the subject understands that the existence of God is to be affirmed, because if the real is intelligible, if facts have explanations, then so also does the fact of existence (cf. Chapter 19, sections 8 and 10). This is

[3] Lonergan's insistence upon raising relevant questions and giving the desire to know free rein is stated at various places in the Preface and Introduction of *Insight.* The flight from understanding is studied in Chapters 6 and 7 as individual, group, and general bias. Chapter 10 treats correctness in knowing and the necessity of asking all the pertinent questions on a given issue before one can judge that he knows correctly. The aim of the book is, of course, thematic throughout all twenty chapters.

[4] *Insight,* Chapter 11, sections 1-6.

[5] *Ibid.,* Chapters 9 and *passim.* Judgment intends to affirm what is real and to deny what is not; the real is what is known when one knows correctly. Note Chapter 10, sections 2-8.

[6] *Ibid.,* Chapter 12, sections 1-4.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 499-501.

a consequence of the position that the real is intelligible and of one's intelligent anticipation that the real is to be explained fully. The explanation at least would have to require first, necessary, and self-explanatory being; since nothing within human experiencing is first, necessary, or self-explanatory being, then the explanation for the fact of existence-namely, God, the ultimate principle of intelligibility-transcends human experience; but the God question does not fall outside the range of human questioning (c£. Chapter 19, sections 1, 2, 3). An affirmation of God's existence, as worked out in Chapter 19 together with a notion of the God who is being affirmed, involves a transformation of the subject on the level of his knowing (for he judges that the existence of transcendent being is a fact) and on the level of his living, his operations (since he knows that he may not affirm the existence of an intelligent God and then relegate him to a remote corner of the universe) .[8]

Still, the issue of intelligent living pivots on the problem of the intelligibility or meaning of human existence. Lonergan raises the problem of evil in order to illuminate the larger problem of meaning.[9] In Chapters 6 and 7 Lonergan talked about the surd in the development both of the individual and of history which arises from the selfishness, the short-range views, the intellectual and moral blindness of which the human subject is capable. From an historical perspective one might conclude that sustained moral progress for man appears to be impossible. The difficulty is not technological nor sociological;

[8] Intelligent living demands a consistency between what one knows and what one does. Knowledge of God's existence and of the divine origins of the present world order carries implications for living. See Chapter 19, p. 666, "In the twenty-fourth place. . . ."

• Lonergan's statement on the problem occurs in Chapter section 1; the issue there is the surd in human progress caused by moral evil. One cannot read the chapter and fail to see a wider context than the problem of evil: it is the immanent intelligibility of human living which one seeks in asking why there is human history at all. Does this mean that this intelligibility could be known by natural religion? This is a question indirectly touching upon our topic. Lonergan takes it up in "The Natural Desire to See God." See his *CoUection* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 91-95.

the matter is man's personal and subjective inability to surmount his own condition. Each generation has to work out its own self-transcendence; the experience of father cannot be communicated to son; while fathers make convenants, their sons can break them. Evil does not primarily exist within social, political, or economic orders; it survives in the minds and hearts of men. The passions and blindness and self-interest which touched off war throughout the ages of mankind, which occasion the violence and injustice in family and state, are not now silent. This fact introduces the central questions on the meaning of history and the meaning of the individual within history.

Now the problem of meaning is intrinsically human in that one is born into it; he need not look for it, he does not create it; it is one's inheritance as he arrives in history. Yet, while the fact of the problem also brings about man's need to transcend himself, this is only part of the issue. The solution to his problem which opens the way of self-transcendence is quite another matter. For if Lonergan has argued correctly, and I believe he has, then one reasons that it is God who is responsible for the universe and this particular world order of which we are a part; he is responsible for human history and for each individual within that history. The ultimate meaning of human existence, then, cannot truthfully and critically be fundamentally a product of man's fabrication and intelligence, although men have offered many different solutions to the problem of meaning. The meaning of history must be grounded within a meaningful universe, for a meaningful history within a meaningless world order would be unintelligible. The sole true meaning will be God's own, whatever he "meant" in inaugurating this world order. It follows that, just as the problem of meaning is of human concern, though not man-made, so too the solution that meets the problem will be a solution for man, though not of his own making; man does not know ultimately why he has appeared in time. Philosophers can conjecture explanations, but only the first author of history knows why there is history at all. That there is an author the

philosopher can affirm; the specific intentions of that author, however, the meaning he intended for man in creating mankind, are known only to him. Lonergan argues implicitly that the solution to the problem of meaning will not be known by man entirely unless God makes a statement to man. This much is open to intelligence: by studying closely the nature of the problem, one can erect a heuristic structure that specifies in advance of the known solution the general lines which that solution must assume.

Chapter outlines explicitly the heuristic structure of the solution. Furthermore, one may anticipate that if God is intelligent and good, if he grounds an intelligible universe, if he is responsible for man with his desire to understand and his problem of achieving authentic existence, then the solution will be disclosed.

THE EMERGENCE OF RELIGION AS THE SOLUTION

In advance man knows heuristically that, given the prospect of a disclosure from God, he will have to take God's word for the validity of the solution for human living. Further, although such a solution exists, man will not live to see its outcome in history; his own life will end before history is finished. Consequently, one acknowledges ahead of time the presence of faith or belief as partially constitutive of the implementation of the solution in human living, and that the effectiveness of the solution depends on God, and a heart so believing is a heart aroused by hope or trust. Hope also will be partially constitutive of the implementation of the solution. Finally, since the problem of meaning is accented by the presence of moral evil in human living, the solution will not permit returning evil for evil (thereby compounding the situation) but will demand meeting evil head on with good. Such doing good is love or charity; love will also be partially constitutive of the implementation of the solution. Love, as pointed out earlier, is the chief means for achieving the self-transcendence necessary for authentic existence.

Now, the anticipated solution which is preliminarily defined

in terms of faith, hope, and charity is not a philosophy but a religion. As Lonergan puts it, "To live intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, an adult has to form some view of the universe. . . . He may do so by appealing to myth, or to science, or to philosophy, or to religion .... I have argued that man exists authentically in the measure that he succeeds in self-transcendence, and I have found that self-transcendence has both its fulfillment and its enduring ground in holiness, in God's gift of his love to us." [10] Philosophy can indicate that God is the ground to which one appeals for the ultimate intelligibility of human existence; it can set the heuristic structure of that anticipated intelligibility; but it must also await a disclosure of the divine solution to be implemented in working out human self-transcendence. It seems, then, that religion will be apriori to human nature insofar as man seeks an answer to the question about the meaning of life intelligently and critically, and discovers that the soluti<;>nlies in a transcendent source, and that putting the solution into practice will entail self-transcendence in terms of faith in God's design, hope in the effectiveness of his design, and self-sacrificing love. Faith, hope and love are characteristics of religion, not philosophy. Recognition of this requires a transformation of the subject. [11]

Lonergan outlined the solution in more detailed fashion in *Insight* than I have done here, and he remained within the context of the problem of evil. He shows, for instance, that the solution will call for human collaboration with God's work in history, that each one of us faces the task of identifying the solution and acting upon it. I feel that the solution Lonergan develops in Chapter 20 can be talked about in the context of meaning. We must locate the real intelligibility of history and

[10] From his paper, " The Future of Christianity," *loc. cit.*, p. 7.

[11] In an article in *Continuum*, VI, 2, (1968) entitled "Horizon Analysis and Eschatology," David Tracy places these transformations in tenns of " conversion " and explains how conversion is a structural category in Lonergan's thinking on the concept of horizon. This article is to date the best summary of the aim and scope of Lonergan's work. Tracy situates *Insight*, which was completed around 1953, within the broader framework of Lonergan's current reflections on meaning, horizon, and theological method.

of individual living, not in terms of what men do but in terms of what they become in their doing, that if men fail in achieving self-transcendence, then all else they do is worthless: on this level there would be no difference between pyramids and computers. The goal of human living is development on all sides---: intellectual, moral, psychological, religious-to attain authentic existence; yet in working towards this goal one finds the recurrent failure in history and in his own living to hit the mark. Man needs ever to raise himself beyond his human condition in co-operation with God if self-transcendence is to become fully realized.

Man's becoming, then, is the task of arriving at authentic existence. From a higher viewpoint and within a Christian context this task forms the basis for the notion of redemption. The lifelong job of reaching authentic existence opens man and history to a self-disclosure of God's own design and assistance. Lonergan treats the redemptive aspect of human existence as the basic intelligibility of human living, both individual and historical, in terms of "the law of the Cross." [12] For our present purposes it suffices to say that authentic human living is essentially a matter of self-transcendence. Inasmuch as the problem of meaning takes one beyond human living to its transcendent ground, and inasmuch as the working out of one's life project requires more than an intelligent answer to critical questions, more than good will, then faith, hope, and charity as elements of a religion will be permanent characteristics of authentic, critical, reflective human living. The subject that would meet the challenge of living head on will find himself engaged in the task of self-transcendence which unfolds in the several transformations sketched above. [13]

[12] *De Verbo lncarnato* (Rome: Gregorian Press, 1964), pp. 55!l-598.

[13] The reader is again referred to Tracy's article, especially to page 175. I might add that I have used the word " meaning " throughout this article in the general sense of a pattern of living and not in the sense of Lonergan's own recent usage of the term: the function and structure of meaning as a part of the subject's cognitional operations. See, for instance, Chapter 16 of *CoUection*,"The Dimensions of Meaning." Another sense of the word appears in *Insight*, Chapter 17, section S: the problem of interpretation is concerned with uncovering meaning.

CoNcLuDING REMARKS

We must now meet the question of our opening sentence with a clarification. Having looked at the way Lonergan conceives the emergence of religion in human living and in human knowing, we should ask whether religion is in fact spontaneously operative in our knowing or choosing, that is, whether it is a transcendental notion like being and goodness. I would suggest that religion arises in response to a search for meaning; without the searching, implicitly or explicitly undertaken, religious structures will remain latent and inoperative in the consciousness of the subject. Still, some respond to this seeking with other than religious solutions. We could hold that all authentic seeking implies a theism insofar as the ·earnestly inquiring subject is transcendentally open to all being, to an implied acceptance of the conditions of being, and thus to God himself. This would bring us, I believe, to the theistic atheism or transcendental theism of Rahner. (Or one could maintain that, for example, Marx was setting up an ideology which in a distorted way resembled religion: this, I find, is unsatisfactory.) Instead, perhaps wha.t we must first suppose is a consciousness differentiated enough to be aware in some way of the need for meaning, not escaping it by fleeing the demands of rational consciousness. Second, we must suppose that the quest for meaning will include the question about the existence of anything at all, for this is the core issue in all inquiry into meaning. The anticipated answer is what is meant by the notion of God, a notion that arises in our knowing even before we understand expressly what that notion is.[14] So then, a

I would add here that I have used the phrase " religious apriori" to indicate the openness of human nature to a transcendent solution to the problem of meaning. One might refer to Lonergan's essay "Openness and Religious Experience," which is Chapter 12 of *Collection;* there the reader will find brief statements about self-realization, horizon, and man's openness to the divine. In connection with that chapter one should also refer to Chapter 5, "The Natural Desire to See God." Further, the reader will find better treatment of the concept of horizon in the article by Tracy spoken of above; see also Chapters 18 and 15 of *CoUection.* I have been implicitly using the sense of horizon discussed there.

" Cf. *Insight,* p. 688.

sufficiently differentiated consciousness is capable of recognizing the ground or structures of religion within his horizon, or at least of implicitly accepting religion as it emerges somewhat inadvertently in knowing and living.

However, it can also happen that a subject with a differentiated consciousness will reflectively study the structure of his knowing. In this case he will either reach the various positions which Lonergan takes in *Insight*, or because of the polymorphism of human consciousness will wander into any number of counterpositions. [15] On the positions the knower will conclude as we did above that religion is apriori to man; on the counterpositions he will be led to deny either the intelligibility of the real, or the existence of God, or the possibility of a solution, or that meaning is a problem to be settled initially outside history in a metaphysics of the universe of being. But, by the same token, on the positions one will conclude that correct knowing is of the real and intrinsically objective; on the counterpositiom; he will be led to deny that correct knowing is possible, or that objectivity is possible, or that knowing is more than taking a look.

In other words, I am suggesting that the notion of religion is spontaneously operative in man's horizon, as are the notions of truth or being or objectivity. But in the reflective moments of knowing one can, if he is not critical, mistakenly hold that such a notion is no more than an empty form without content, or a vestige of mythical thinking in human consciousness, or that it is not present in the first place but invented. The difficulties come up on the reflective level; but the disorientation that can occur here cannot be corrected at once until the requisite intellectual and moral transformations occur, that is, not until one understands correctly the structure immanent in knowing and choosing. What is important on the reflective level, I submit, is the differentiation necessary to understand and appropriate one's rational self-consciousness.

In the genetic moments of thinking the notion of religion

[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 887-890.

emerges after one attends to the fact of God's existence; this is crucial to the consideration of religion. Still, the notion of God is more or less pre-formulated in the questioning of the human subject who inquires about the meaning of his own existence, or the existence of history, or the existence of anything at all. The notion of religion, therefore, is apriori to man's horizon but genetically dependent upon the notion of God; and the notion of God is dependent on the notion of being; and being is a transcendental notion.

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HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF GOD'S EXISTENCE IN THE THEOLOGY OF BERNARD LONERGAN

I. *GENERAL SITUATION OF his Approach.* In contrast to Barth and his followers who deny to man any knowledge of God apart from a direct and explicit divine revelation,[1] Bernard Lonergan is one who stands in an older Christian tradition which maintains that man cannot know who God is by natural knowledge but that he can know something of what he is. With a faith in the reasonableness of things, Lonergan asserts that our reason can tell us of God.[2] In his version of Marechalian Thomism, "the proof for God's existence is somehow precontained in the orientation of the human intellect toward being . . . . "[3] In this vision of man, knowledge of God is not something that may or may not come to man, but rather, by an eternal decree when he decided on the creation of this particular world order, God made a certain reflective knowledge of himself part and parcel of the human intellect's desire to know and affirm absolute truth.[4] From this point of view the question is not whether or not man could ever know of God without explicit revelation but precisely how man of his very nature knows of God.

II. *The Transcendental Method.* To understand Lonergan's approach to natural theology one must first begin with Kant. The Marechalian school depends on Kant primarily for the

[1] E. g., Karl Barth, *Dogmatics in Outline* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 23.

[2] For one of the clearest formulations, see Augustine's Letter 120 in Hazelton's *Selected Writings of St. Augustine* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962), p. 130-138.

[3] J. B. Lotz in "Immanuel Kant," in v. 8 of the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1967), p. 127.

[4] Lonergan's "The Natural Desire to See God," in *CoUection* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 84-95.

transcendental method. For Kant "... transcendental means practically the same as pure and a priori. By transcendental discourses Kant understands those which transcend experience and consider its a priori conditions." [5] The question is how human knowledge is possible; in what way does man know. For Kant, the answer can be found in going beyond the contents of knowledge to the a priori forms that make our knowledge possible, to the subjective conditions of experience. Man knows through and because of the a priori forms and thus is limited to and by them. For Kant, transcendental knowledge is an illusion, and all that can be known is the content of sense experience; things in themselves are unknowable. (Although Kant affirmed the existence of God, the basis of his argument was from the categorical imperative, not from rational knowledge.)

The transcendental method might at first seem to exclude absolutely any natural knowledge of God. But in the twentieth century Joseph Marechal confronted Thomism and Kantian epistemology and emerged with a quite different result concerning man's knowledge of a transcendent being. Marechal found that the transcendental method, if properly applied, revealed an intellect which in its acts of knowing was striving to affirm being and not just knowing. This finalistic striving is the basic condition of the possibility of all human knowing. J. B. Lotz describes the Marechalian concept of Kant's method:

> The transcendental method can be carried through in a way that goes beyond Kant himself to arrive at being as the primary condition for the possibility for human knowledge, and even of human action. This basic idea has far-reaching consequences. The proof for God's existence is somehow precontained in the orientation of intellect toward being; thus does theoretical metaphysics become possible. Being, too, enables a priori knowledge to reveal rather than conceal, as it must do for Kant. Again, the formal objects for the soul's faculties correspond to Kant's forms; thus knowledge through categories is not restricted to that which is "for man," but opens up to that which is "in itself." Finally the absoluteness

[5] Dr. Paul Carus, essay in *Kant's Prolegomena* (La Salle, ID.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1955), p. IS!t.

of the moral imperative also receives its foundation in being, and thus theory and practice are brought into harmony and unity.[5]

The Marechalian school was also influenced by Hegel and Fichte and the Heideggerian reinterpretation of Kant, but it centers its primary philosophical concern on Kant's critical philosophical analysis and the philosophy of Aquinas.[7] They did not dispute the correctness of Thomas's explanation of reality; the Marechalians tried to provide a critical method and foundation for the reflective question of how this correct view could be reached. They maintained that for Aquinas the critical question of reflection could not yet be asked. As Lonergan remarks in the preface to his *Verbum* studies, " From performance must proceed reflection on performance, and method is the fruit of that reflection. Aquinas had to be content to perform."[8] Thus Aquinas gave no methodological criteria; he had to perform the task of simply knowing being. It was left to others to reflect on the method.

A key notion that distinguishes the Marechalian school (following Thomism) from other philosophical groups is that it is intellectualistic rather than conceptualistic. ,Lonergan describes what he conceives to be the basic difference:

> The Platonist conceives knowing primarily as confrontation, but the Aristotelian conceives knowing primarily as perfection, act, identity; again, the conceptualist knows human intellect only by what it does, but the intellectualist knows and analyses not only what intelligence in act does but also what it is.[9]

For the conceptualist knowledge is a matter-of-fact looking at things and seeing or not seeing; one knows or one does not know, and if one does not see one might as well give up. One has no critical faculties by which to explain how one knows and the way in which the human mind discerns truth from falsity.

• In *New Catholic Encyclopedia,* already cited; see also Karl Rahner in *Nature and Grace* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 10.

[7] For the general history see Otto Muck, *The Transcendental Method* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968).

• *Verbum* xiii (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1967).

"Verbum Studies, 186-187.

Even in such a view of Thomism as that proposed by Etienne Gilson there is a ". . . general osmosis between sense and understanding," [10] but there is no explanation of critical judgment. **But** for the intellectualist, knowing is an act by which one reflects upon phantasms, abstracts to a knowledge of universals, and affirms in judgment. Since knowing is an action performed by the intellect, one can know more or less, have better or worse insights, and have a critical base for improving one's knowledge of reality. Thus the transcendental method stresses man's capacity to know being, demonstrating this by an analysis of the human act of knowing. In its stress on the human act of judging as the final step of the human act of knowing, it asserts that in the very act of knowing man is asserting being. He does not simply receive a concept by osmosis in his mind; he rather consciously reflects upon the information that his senses receive and asserts that the concept in his mind corresponds to or does not correspond to reality.

The dynamism of man's intellect is not to know knowing but to know being. Consequently, the a priori forms of knowing are not just inexplicably there, but these are the ways that man knows because that is the way being is. To assert otherwise is to make our knowing nonsensical, to assert that it is not knowledge of the real, and thus ultimately is a meaningless effort. But to assert this is to assert something true about reality (from the subject's point of view) which is a statement that cannot be made from the point of view that denies the intelligibility of reality. One must either assert intelligibility or keep silence.

One must conclude that to know is to assert truth about being. Being (as the most general and comprehensive term for all that is) is the object of the intellect, since the intellect seeks to know the real (all that is). Being and the real are

[10] Lonergan, *Collection,* p. 211: 217-219. In his intentions Gilson may be neither a Platonist nor a conceptualist; nonetheless his methodology involves him in a dogmatic idealism which suffers from the same weakness in its method, since Gilson cannot explain how the pertinent questions about being can be answered.

synonymous. What, then, is there to know but being? [11] Furthermore, it must ultimately be concluded that the drive to know being must be founded in the Absolute. Man's assertions about being contain a conditioned absoluteness; he asserts that he knows the truth about being, but this knowledge is always subject to fallacies (even though there is a self-corrective dynamism in the asking of further and further questions) and it is above all always incomplete. Although man is always seeking absolute knowledge of being, he can never affirm that he possesses it. The only possible explanation for such striving is that there is an absolute being which is the ground and the foundation of all this striving. (If there is no such being, then there is really not an explanation, since the intellectual dynamism of man is doomed to frustration, and reality IS unintelligible.)

III. *Lonergan's Background j1·om Other Sources.* In order to understand more fully Lonergan's concept of man's knowledge of God (which encompasses both natural knowledge of God and its relation to possible supernatural knowledge) it is necessary to examine the major influences upon him from outside the Marechalian school. In this survery primary attention must be paid to Newman.

Lonergan admits his debt to Newman, spectifically to his *Grammar of Assent.* [12] Lonergan's insistence on the importance of judgment and on its absolute character is most probably influenced by Newman's insistence on it; certainly there is a

[11] It is significant to note that apparently independently Michael Polanyi constructs, in *Knmvledge,* a fiduciary philosophy in which he emphasizes the futility of the search for absolute objectivity as a possibility for human knowing and shows that one must accept one's dependence on one's own intelligence. He demonstrates the dynamic nature of the human process of knowing and stresses that the human mind can and does know reality. He maintains that the inner dynamic of the intellect provides for critical analysis of the data for knowing, (by the total process of knowing, and the constant re-evaluation and asking further questions, we can assert with certitude that we are knowing truth). For purposes of comparison with Lonergan and the Marechalian school it is important to note that Polanyi's " post critical " philosophy also stresses knowledge as act and the real capacity of the hnman intellect to critically know reality.

[12] Proceedings of the *American Catholic Philosophical Association* (1967), p. !l57.

striking resemblance between the structure of the relation of natural theology to supernatural theology in Newman and in Lonergan. For Newman, natural knowledge of God is based on conscience and on a sense of God's holiness.[13] (In this view he was heavily influenced by his early religious background in evangelism, the spirituality of the Tractarian movement, and quite possibly by a secondhand Kantianism.) Parallel to the sense of God's holiness which all men feel is the sense of human sinfulness present in all aspirations toward God. Man's sense of sinfulness leads to a felt need for salvation, a salvation which only God can give to man. " Natural religion " can at most express this longing; only Christianity can satisfy this desire in Christ, since in him God became man to reconcile man to himself. The structure of this argument is important for Lonergan; man can know something of God by the faculties within him (the conscience); coupled with this knowledge is the experience of sin which makes God unattainable to sinful man: man can only be delivered from such a situation by God himself, and only Christianity claims to offer such a solution. Newman certainly derived this basic view from his own religious background; it is also possible that some of this formulation may have been influenced by the continental transcendentalism that was becoming well-known in England through the influence of such literary figures as Coleridge.[14]

Kant is here to be considered from a different point of view than that of the originator of the transcendental method. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* transcendental knowledge was rejected as an illusion; however, by the experience of the categorical imperative man had the assurance of the existence of an absolutely holy judge. In *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason Alone* Kant uses the fact of evil as a pivot for man's religious life, although in a quite different way from Newman's. He asserts that man must change his heart and so act as to be worthy of God's assistance by a practical faith in Christ. Kant

[13] *Grammar of Aaaoot* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. S00 ft.

[10] Basil Wiley, *Nineteenth Century Studies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), esp. p. 90.

rejects the idea of grace or of God's personal assistance, since this would take away man's responsiblity. Kant argues that, if we ought to do something, then we can. Man must do himself what God expects him to do. God's holiness (or rather, Jesus' example of godliness) is the ideal that we must live up to. Man must reverse the process of sin if God is to reward him with eternal happiness. Ethics leads to religion and not vice-versa. Evil and the struggle for moral fulfillment of duty is what leads man to religion. There is no thought of grace or of salvation, only of man's fulfillment of his duty. The experience of evil is a spur and a warning to man that he must do his duty in the face of a righteous judge. Only such an ethical man is worthy of God.

One of Kant's teachers, Knutzen, influenced by Wolffian rationalism and Lutheran pietism, formulated the problem of man's experience of evil in relation to God's holiness as follows:

1. Divine revelation is necessary to satisfy [for] man's guilt [which he knows about but does not know how to expiate].
2. It must reveal God's holiness and provide for man's salvation.
3. Christianity is the only religion which does provide for this.[15]

One immediately discerns the pietist concern with the holiness of God, but there also appears a strong concern for a logical formulation for the truth of Christian revelation from the demands of the experience of evil. There is a striking similarity to Newman's argument; and Newman was quite probably acquainted with Knutzen's approach, at least secondhand. However, there are serious differences: Knutzen appears to have paid little attention to natural religion in the formal argument, whereas Newman incorporates it into the structure as a major part of the argument for a universally experienced desire for salvation.

It is certainly true that Christianity has, in its traditional teaching, always presented evil and sin as facts of experience which cry for God's salvation. However, Newman seems to

[15] See J. Silber, essay in *Religion within the Limits of Rea:ton Alone* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. xxvi.

have been the first to formulate the relationship between natural knowledge and revealed religions so explicitly. Certainly Kant and Newman were both influenced by pietist-evangelical religious views about the importance of evil in man's relation to God. However, the differing attitudes toward the importance to be accorded to human reason gave disparate explanations of a common religious experience. It appears that Lonergan (with appropriate differences in approach-from an ethical to a more intellectual approach) seems to depend more or less directly on Newman for the structure of his argument on the relation of natural knowldge to revealed knowledge.

IV. *Lonergan and the Possibility of Natural Theology.* In order to see more completely how Lonergan approaches the problem of natural theology, we have presented relevant historical background in philosophy and theology. In the *Verbum* studies Lonergan exposed from the historical viewpoint the understanding of knowledge which he develops systematically in *Insight.* The structure of *Insight* may be sumarily given as the following: first Lonergan analyzes the process by which man knows and then explores the structure of what he knows. After this he considers the problem of what man can know of God, the fact of evil, and the possible solution to the difficulty raised by evil.

On page xxviii of the preface, Lonergan summarizes the major theme of *Insight:*

> Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all that there is to be understood, but you will possess a fixed base, an invarient pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.

The underlying reason why this can be said is that to know is to know being, and if we know our knowing, we will know what being is. The human intellect is striving to know beyond its knowing, to know being, to assert the truth of reality. Once this basic fact is accepted (and it must be if any knowledge is to have sense or if any statement is to have meaning) one can proceed with the analysis. Lonergan continues by demon-

strating an isomorphic structural relationship between knowing (sense perception, understanding, and judgment) and being (matter, form, and act). This does not mean that elements correspond but that the structure of knowing and the structure of being correspond. In this point one can depend on the old Aristotelian adage that one can know a being by its acts (because a being acts according to its nature). Lonergan systematically develops this principle through an introspective analysis of the act of knowing which brings him to an understanding of what is known-being.

Perhaps more thoroughly than any other member of the Marechalian school, Lonergan places great emphasis on the importance of the act of judgment. A complete act of knowing involves three steps: sense perception, abstraction to the level of questions for intelligence" (the whatness of a thing), and the reflective level of judgment, which is an assertion of truth or falsity about the questions for intelligence. Judgment is an absolute yes or no (unless one suspends judgment, which in itself is a claim to valid judgment about the data available for judgment). He distinguishes between the virtually unconditioned judgment, in which the conditions for judgment seem to be fulfilled in the subject's understanding, and the formally unconditioned judgment in which there simply are no conditions. The important point is that both claim to assert truth and thus claim a corresponding absolute value. In the absolute claim to truth is found the transition to being, since the subject is claiming to make an assertion about being, reality.

Lonergan is not so naive as to believe that every human subject always and invariably finds a true answer to his questioning about reality. Here he methodically differs from Fr. Coreth, who, he suggests, does not sufficiently acknowledge the real problem of human error, counterpositions, and superstitions.16 Lonergan rather views the human process of judging as a self-corrective process, if it is taken in its totality. If our knowledge itself is a progressive process in which man advances

[16] *Collection,* " Metaphysics as Horizon," p. 219.

from narrower to broader points of view which more and more are integrated into the intellectual grasp of the knowing subject, so judgment itself is subject to the same requirements of asking further and further questions and forming our judgments in the light of these questions. He describes this process in relation to judgments about concrete situations:

> So it is the process of learning that breaks the vicious circle. Judgements on the correctness of insights supposes the prior acquisition of a large number of correct insights. But the prior insights are not correct just because we suppose them to be correct. They occur within a self-correcting process in which the short-comings of each insight provoke further questions to yield complementary insights. Moreover this self-correcting process tends to a limit. We become familiar with concrete situation; we know just what to expect; when the unexpected occurs, we can spot just what has happened, and why and what can be done to prevent just such a reoccurence; or, if the unexpected is quite novel, we know enough to recommence the process of learning and we can recognize when, once more, that self-correction process reaches its limit in familiarity with the concrete situation and in easy mastery of it[17]

The two characteristic features of judgment here clearly emerge: its claim to absoluteness and its constantly expanding quality. Of its very nature the process of judgment constantly seeks to assert more and more about being, to know reality more and more fully. These two characteristics are emphasized by Lonergan, because in this dynamism of the intellect toward absolute judgments about being he finds the key that demonstrates man's natural desire to know absolute being. In this analysis Lonergan depends on Newman's analysis of the absolute nature of assent and on his understanding of the illative sense: the mind's ability to know truth, not in a knowing subject to logical form as in inference but in the critical capacity to judge with certitude even though the judgment cannot be proven on strictly logical grounds.

After sketching out the main outlines of an epistemology and a metaphysics, in Chapter XIX Lonergan makes the transition

[17] *Insight* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), p. !!86-!!87.

from a knowledge of proportionate being (metaphysics, being accessible to human experience) to a knowledge of transcendent being (natural theology, being not accessible to human experience). He has distinguished two components in the idea of being: 1) all that is known; 2) all that remains to be known.[18] Thus there is a notion of being that is heuristic, indicating all that there is to know, not as known but as knowable; there is also the idea of being, the content of " an unrestricted act of understanding,"[19] not accessible to a finite knower. Being's unrestricted quality leads to the necessity of positing a transcendental knower who can make an unrestricted act of understanding. The infinite horizon of unlimited intelligent questions, the element of transcendence and openness in a pure and unresticted desire to know has already been established. It is clear that man seeks to understand more and more about being and can never have all his questions answered (e. g., he can always ask himself why there is anything at all) . But, for Lonergan, if being can be known, then it must somehow be known by someone if the term intelligibility is to be meaningful. Knowledge can be held as possible if in fact it occurs. Yet, despite his aspirations, man cannot now everything. He does not know the aggregate of all facts; no finite being could know or knows the comprehensive pattern that includes all things, for to know this comprehensive pattern would be to stand beyond the realm of finite things in a knowledge of them in their totality. All finite knowing is inadequate to the total task of knowing, individually or collectively.

Lonergan's simplest formula of the argument for the existence of God is as follows:

1) God exists if the real is completely intelligible.
2) But the real is completely intelligible.
3) Therefore, God exists.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 880.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 644.

[19] *Ibid.,* see also Schouburg, "A Note on Lonergan's Proof for the Existence of God," *Modern Schoolman* (Mar., 1968), p. !MS-248.

In order to establish this argument, Burrell points out, Lonergan must demonstrate:

1) Being is identical with the real.
2) Being is to be identified with complete intelligibility.
S) Complete intelligibility is to be identified with an unrestricted act of understanding.[21]

In exploring these notions of being and intelligibility Lonergan maintains that the key issue is whether or not there is a being which is the unconditioned act of understanding which in knowing itself knows all beings.[22] Lonergan's conclusion would be that, since being is intelligible, there must be an unconditioned and absolute being. This notion necessitates a more detailed examination of being and intelligibility.

All knowing is a striving to know being. Knowing is not a sterile act; to seek to know reality is to seek to possess the form of thing in one's self. But if being is the object of our knowing, it must be intelligible. To say that the object of our knowing is not intelligible or is unknowable is to say that one can assert nothing meaningful about reality, which statement itself claims to be a meaningful assertion about reality. Thus, either man's basic desire to know is valid or all attempt to assert anything is an absurdity. All attempt to express and communicate and to try to know the truth would have to cease; this latter stand, if asserted, is self-contradictory. But, if one asserts the intelligibility of being, one must assert its complete intelligibility. Something which is not really known by at least someone in fact is not really intelligible. (The identity of being, the real, and the intelligible has already been demonstrated.) But, if there is only finite knowing, then something always remains unknown, since the infinite horizon of possible questions can never be comprehended by a finite knower, and thus there must be an infinite and unrestricted knower who in fact knows and comprehends all proportinate being.

[21] *Proceedings,* " How Complete Can Intelligibility Be: a Commentary on *Insight,* Chapter XIX, p.
•• *Insight,* p. 646-657.

At this point Lonergan relates his argument to the argument from causality (of St. Thomas) .[23] For him causality is "... the objective and real counterpart of the questions and further questions raised by the detached and disinterested desire to know." [24] If being is, then there must be an explanation for it; that is, it must in fact be intelligible. An infinite knowledge is a prerequisite for causality, since there must be a reason why a thing has come to be. There can be nothing without explanation. But no finite conditioned being can explain (in the complete sense) itself or other beings, since it depends on other proportionate, finite beings. Since this is so, one must conclude to the existence of a transcendent being with two basic attributes: " it must not be contingent in any respect. ..." and it "... must be capable of grounding the explanation about everything else. . . ." [25] This transcendent being is the cause of causes and the ground of value.

After demonstrating the necessity of God's existence, Lonergan asserts that the notion and the affirmation of God are one, if the terms are properly understood:

> For the real is being, and apart from being there is nothing. Being is not known without reasonable affirmation, and existence is the respect in which being is known precisely inasmuch as it is affirmed reasonably. Hence it is one and the same thing to say that God is real, and that he is the object of reasonable affirmation, and that he exists.[26]

David Burrell has objected to the conclusion in Lonergan's syllogism and asks how, if this being is complete intelligibility, man (who can never grasp the meaning of complete intelligibility) can meaningfully assert God's existence. Man can, he submits,

> ... find eminently plausible a belief in the reality of God as ground of being and the source of inquiring intelligence. . . . For

[23] From *On Being and Essence,* quoted in Vernon Bourke, ed., *The Pocket Aquinas* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1960), p. 159.

•• *Insight,* p. *651.*

•• *Ibid.,* p. *655.*

•• *Ibid.,* p. 699.

what we would be believing would be beyond our capacity to affirm, but in the line of conscious desire, which operates in every genuine affirmation. . . . But since plausibility has neither the force of demonstration nor of an imperative, the affirmation of God's reality requires an intervening decision that is at once personal and free.[27]

Lonergan replied by pointing out that in human knowing there is such a condition as intending. (Between knowing and not knowing there is the process of coming to know.) We have no immediate knowledge of complete intelligibility, but the inner dynamic of the human intellect demands the infinite horizon.

Our knowing intends not incomplete but complete intelligibility .... Since intending is just another name for meaning, it follows that complete intelligibility, so far from being meaningless to us, is in fact, at the root of all our attempts to mean anything at all.[28]

Lonergan's treatment of the notion of God is much the same in its elements as the traditional Thomistic treatment. God is primary truth, spirit, good, perfect, unconditioned, self-explanatory, one, simple, timeless, eternal, omnipotent efficient cause, omnipotent exemplary cause, free, non-developing, creator, conservor, first agent, applying every agent to its operation, ultimate final cause, ground of value, objective of all finalistic strivings, personal. All attributes are derived from the notion of God as the unconditioned, absolute knower.

The next development of the concept of natural knowledge of God occurs in the confrontation with the problem of evil. Before he had spoken of general transcendent knowledge of God Lonergan had spoken of man's tehical responsibility, that is, his free and personal acting in accordance with his knowledge of reality. Man has an obligation to act in accord with the good, the order of reality, of being. He is in a process of becoming free and needs to find a solution to the problem of a higher integration of his concrete living with what ought

[27] *Proceedings,* p. 253.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 259.

to be. Then briefly, in discussing human knowledge of God, Lonergan refers to the fact of evil only to show that God is not the cause of it. But immediately after he has demonstrated the validity of general transcendent knowledge and the existence of God, he raises the problem of evil in its full scope. It can be clearly seen by anyone that sin and evil are present and experienced, yet they are unintelligible and cannot be explained. But sin is a perversion of both knowing and doing and necessarily leads to a less and less comprehensive knowing and doing. Since man's knowledge and practice of good become more and more limited, it becomes more and more difficult for man to perform the effort of doing and knowing good. Thus he seems to be in an inextricable trap. How can man reconcile this experience of human existence with what he knows of God and his existence?

Since, for Lonergan, God is seen as creating each world order and knowing how it will unfold,[29] his activity in the world order will be in accord with the nature of the world he has created. Thus, since this world order is intrinsically intelligible, if we can understand, even though in a very limited way, the nature of the world and also, in a very real but finite way, the nature of God and his attributes, then we can conclude something about what God " ought" to do (but this is the " ought" of fittingness not that of absolute necessity). If we consider both the nature of the world order and of the God who created it, the solution " ought " to be that this good God would give man a supernatural means of charity in such a way that man can freely accept it and cooperate with God. This solution, involving faith, hope, and love, would come in history by God's free choice of possibilities, and would involve man in his own self-transcendence. ("... On the present supposition of a supernatural solution, to be just a man is just what man cannot be."[30]) The solution would be a mystery, one, universally acceptable, and permanent. It is only here that Lonergan's

[29] *Collection,* "Natural Desire to See God," p. 94.
[30] *Insight,* p.

conception of reason's capacity to know stops, at the point where reason hopes for a solution for the inextricable difficulty man has gotten himself into. In the epilogue Lonergan points out that the *intellectus quaerens fidem* can find the answer only in Christianity, [31] but he has not yet published the promised work on theology which would continue the path pointed out in *Insight.*

It is to be noted that, while Lonergan appears to depend heavily on Newman for the structure of his argument, he has developed and changed the presentation in Newman's *Grammar of Assent* into a much more intellectualistic structure and approach. Newman is concerned with reconciling man's desire for holiness with God's absolute justice and holiness, while Lonergan's concern is with reconciling man's desire for absolute knowledge with the absolute reasonableness of God. By using the problem of evil as a departure point, Lonergan shows how man has enmeshed himself in a situation in which he is more and more handicapped in his knowledge of reality and action in accord with this reality. Confronted with this problem, man can at least see, in a reasonable way, the general structure which the solution ought to take. While the solution cannot be clearly specified, the notes given are such that only Christianity could fill them.

V. *Conclusion-S.* It is extremely difficult to offer summary observations about a work which requires such intense and involved study, for the argument for the existence of God and the concept of the relation of natural theology to revealed theology depends on all the analysis previous to it in *Insight.* Ultimately the argument depends on the acceptance or rejection of Lonergan's complete analysis of man's cognitional faculties.

One can note, however, that Lonergan provides a natural theology which can be the basis of communication with non-believers (since general transcendental knowledge is accessible to all who accept the intelligibility of the real) . This analysis

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 731.

also provides theology with a methodical tool which will provide partial assessment for its procedures and conclusions. The arguments Lonergan presents for the existence of God and the reasonableness of revelation are, by the reason of the method, accessible to those who interpret the principle of verification in a broad sense [32] and are quite easily comprehensible to those who are of a speculative or idealistic philosophical tendency. [33]

On the other hand, to some, Lonergan places too much faith in human reason, in man's capacity to know the truth. While this argument is advanced against the whole system, the insistence becomes much greater when the question of the existence of God and the relation of this knowledge to revelation is concerned. Some would argue that, in Burrell's words, Lonergan has constructed an intellectual system of eminent plausibility but that the system and its affirmations have neither the force "of demonstration nor of an imperative." [34] While Lonergan's vision is most useful in providing a coherent worldview for those who accept the identity of being, reality, and intelligibility, the acceptance of this view demands a faith in reason which is a basic assumption subject of its nature neither to proof or demonstration. It requires, one might assert, an act of belief which is a personal choice, and thus the acceptance of this view is an existential choice rather than a simple acceptance of a rational demonstration already within the rational framework; it is in fact the acceptance of that rational framework.

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••" From a Historian of Philosophy," in *Spirit as Inquiry*, quoted in *Proceedings* by Andrew Reck, p.

[88] Reck, *loc. cit.*, p. 240.

•• As Burrell suggests of his argument for the existence of God.

LOGICAL NOTE ON THE COEXISTENCE OF FAITH AND REASON

CHURCH CONTROL OF human reflection has been the focus of fierce criticism on the part of the theologians. We are not saying that all theologians are engaged in this controversy, but there is a widespread uneasiness among them. Some are extremists who seem to claim an unconditional freedom of thought and expression which they entitle "academic freedom." Today, as in times past, "La libre pensee" has always been a temptation among the clerics of the French-speaking countries; and the "Free Thinkers" have also been influential in the Anglo-Saxon milieu. This state of affairs is not only proper to the domain of theologians but is also found among philosophers. Moreover, it is not only limited to Christianity but is also verified in the Jewish as well as in the Arabic intelligentsia from the time of the historical encounter of their religious wisdom with Hellenistic culture.[1] This historical situation seems to suggest that there is a common *Eidos* which characterizes the conditions of intellectual research wherever this uneasiness appears. What is this?

For all these thinkers it is nothing but the experience of the price of the meeting of God with man, the coexistence of an authoritative teaching with a self-sufficient inquiry, and the cohabitation of Faith and Reason in one and the same consciousness. In short, it is the challenge of reason by Reason, or inversely.

We propose to analyze the specific case of a person who is both a believer and a philosopher. We say first, a believer, because the philosopher will not face this crisis unless he be-

[1] Cf. Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), p. 184, for the Arabs, and the case of *Spinoza* in the 17th century for the Jewish thinkers.

lieves. It would not be very common for a philosopher to become a believer at the very moment in which he finds Faith to be problematic. We deliberately limit our analysis to the case of the Christian metaphysician. In a first section we shall briefly formulate the assumptions, explicit or implicit, which constitute his spiritual horizon, while detecting the vectorial components which determine his initial position. In a second section, we shall examine, from a strictly logical viewpoint, the four possible attitudes which can be taken by him. In a third and last section, we shall deal with the problem of Christian Philosophy as a corollary of the fourth attitude.

* * * *

Christianity claims to be a way of life proposed to us as intelligent and responsible persons for reaching salvation through a dialogue between God and mankind. Historically, this dialogue took place somewhere, at some time, and with someone. The aspect of " way of life " has been so much emphasized by a group of believers that any intellectual content seems to have been excluded or at least purposely overlooked. But this view is neither in accordance with historical data nor in agreement with human psychology. The Scriptures are clear on this subject, and Tradition has elaborated Creeds. This way of life does not result from a pure training which would produce conditioned reflexes. The reason for this conclusion is that any way of life which would entail some discomfort or trouble, both social and personal, cannot be accepted unless it makes sense. Consequently, conversion of heart cannot be understood without a free decision of the mind. But this free decision requires a minimum of noematic intelligibility for enlightening interior judgment, one of its necessary conditions. As a matter of fact, it is through God's theophanies, through the teaching of Moses and the Prophets, and through Christ's deeds and words that a doctrine which expresses God's project for mankind was made known to men. Through images, parables, and myths, a set of truths on the meaning of life was conveyed to the minds of the listeners regarding the objective

factors of its realization and of the subjective attitudes of its acceptance. Now we cannot help assenting to a group of statements which constitute Christian Doctrine; in other words, the way of life is characterized by a doctrinal content. This content can be summarily presented as a conjunction of the following points: Monotheism, Transcendency, Blessed Trinity, Incarnate Word, Universal Salvation, Propitiatory Sacrifice, Sacramental Order, Bodily Resurrection, Ethical Ideal, Human Responsibility, Adoptive Sonship, and Ultimate Coming of the Lord with Eternal Happiness. [2]

This set of statements which are objectively proposed to us by the means of a divine Revelation is subjectively received by man through a specific complex activity of human consciousness, namely, an act of Faith. Supernatural in its origin, reasonable as a noetic attitude, perfectly free in its execution, this act is first of all, but not exclusively, an assent to a noematic term which, as a divine message, is merely taught as the Good News of the Kingdom of God without any concern for a demonstration. As such, this term remains inevident, and no effort is attempted for unveiling any evidence. No self-evidence, no articulate proof will reveal the truth-value of these meaningful propositions as long as they are communicated through the ecclesial Kerygma: the noema of an act of believing is not a self-shining truth, while its noesis must be founded upon good reasons. [3] In other words, human reflection has to investigate the credentials on which the authority of a witness ultimately relies because the noesis of Faith claims to be reasonable or in accordance with reason, although its noema, which can be a mystery, escapes any logical positive analysis. [4]

• We symbolise sacred doctrine (S D) as the conjunction or the logical product of propositions as follows: (S.D.) =M&T&B&I&S&P&S&R&R&E&H &A &U &H) . By so doing, it will be easier to apply logical laws.

[8] I Peter 8: 15: " Simply *reverence the Lord* Christ in your hearts, and always have your answer ready for people who ask you the reason for the hope that you all have."

• No mystery belongs either to a set of axioms conceived by human reason or to the set of theorems derived from them by a strict logical process. In other words, there is no evidence in the sense of ground for affirming something as trne in the

What matters for a believer in this situation is to be aware of the fact that the noematic term of Faith as such is not related, even if eventually it could be so, to any factual or eidetic evidence whatsoever.

The reason for this lack of evidence in several statements which belong to the Creed, such as the affirmation of the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation of the Word, or, more explicitly, the reason why no human intellect is able to perceive any satisfying explanation of their truth has to be found in the very nature of the signifying function of their concepts when they are used in revealed propositions. For, although these propositions are expressed in human concepts, they aim at a Reality which transcends human grasping. Consequently, their notions are loaded with a "hyper-meaning." Holy Scripture, indeed, does not reveal to us new ideas, since it seems likely that our existential experience is the sole cradle for all significations for man. But, through a simple language, the Sacred Word aims at a new order of reality and intelligibility. As a general rule, the words in use are not even borrowed from a technical vocabulary which could reflect a very elaborated thought but from a level of understanding accessible to any mind. Even in the case of the term *Logos* found in St. John's Gospel, in spite of its philosophical connotation, this name has to be replaced in the context of the Jewish tradition of the theory of Wisdom and, moreover, has to be taken as employed in a very loose relation with a metaphysical system. But, if it is true that some propositions of the Creed cannot be demonstrated by reducing them to some philosophical principles, it is also true that, for some statements belonging to the set of Christian beliefs, this reduction is not only possible but is also desirable and has historically come about. In this case the believers are in a position to verify by themselves what these statements convey to them by way of authority. It is a genuine case of " fides quaerens intellectum " in a proper sense. The counter-

case of a mystery such as the Blessed Trinity: neither immediate evidence in the classical sense of an axiom understood as a self-evident proposition on account of its terms nor mediate evidence understood as the evidence of a conclusion on account of a demonstration.

part of this reduction to rational principles is that these statements are no longer an object of faith insofar as they are the conclusion of a demonstration. [5] Consequently, we are now obliged to introduce among the truths contained in the treasury of Faith, the "Depositum Fidei," a distinction of a great importance. On the one hand, we are taught a set of propositions which are "super-intelligible" as far as they signify the "mysteries hidden to any human intellect"; on the other hand, we are given several answers to philosophical problems through an authoritative method which, of course, leaves the whole problematic open from the viewpoint of the rational exigencies. They remain, indeed, actually or potentially solved by philosophers in the framework of their axioms, categories, and logical processes. Thus the class of revealed truths intersects the class of philosophical truths. Now we face this logical situation which can be described as follows. In the universal class of all the truths which can be found in a human consciousness, besides physical, mathematical, psychological, moral and other types of truths, we can determine two intersecting classes which are subdistinguished into three sub-classes: 1) the sub-class of revealed but non-demonstrable truths, the sub-class of the revealed-per *se* as far as essentially and exclusively knowable through a Revelation of God; 2) the sub-class of revealed but also demonstrable truths, the sub-class of the revealed-per *accidens* as far as essentially knowable through reason but as *de facto* historically revealed; 3) the sub-class of non-revealed at all but rationally demonstrable truths, the class of philosophical opinions about which, so far, Revelation has neither direct nor indirect concern. [6] It is the meeting of Faith

[5] This doctrine is affirmed by Thomas Aquinas in *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 1, a. 4.
[6] We might diagram this logical situation:



and Reason on this ground of intersection which creates one of the most touchy spots in the field of scientific knowledge. It is there that the problem of coexistence arises in a definite and unambiguous way in a critical, living consciousness; it is there that a conflicting situation may oppose one to another, the philosopher and the believer.

* * * *

It may happen that the propositions of Reason contradict the dogmas of Faith. For example, we may imagine this state of affairs which, as a matter of fact, has been truly verified in the course of history when some philosophical systems, doctrines, or outlooks did not square with the religious beliefs, exigencies, or ideals of the day.[7] For it is not absurd to conceive of the following oppositions: the affirmation of a necessary emanation and a blind determinism on the part of the philosopher and the profession of a free creation and a loving providence on the part of a believer; the affirmation of conditioned behavior or a situational ethics on the part of a contemporary and the conviction of a responsible freedom and a moral order on the part of a believer. Both philosophical statements and religious beliefs are contradictorily opposed: no free creation and free creation, no personal decision and personal decision, no objective standard and objective standard. These contradictions are in the mind of a religious philosopher. A historical difficulty can always be avoided by a prudent skepticism: who knows truth in this factual issue made up of so many details? But a logical contradiction is a stumbling block which brings thought to a dead end. One and the same thinker, being both a philosopher and a believer, experiences the most agonizing intellectual predicament: he contradicts himself.

The conjunction oi " Religious Doctrine " *and* " Philosophical System " implies a " contradictory consequent " on account

[7] For example, the crisis which arose in the 13th century at Paris when Averroistic doctrines were taught in opposition to Christian beliefs, such as the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect.

of at least one contradiction or several ones. This very simple conditional statement, "If I think reflectively *and* I believe religiously, then I contradict myself," contains a consequent which is acknowledged to be false by every philosopher, or at least logically unacceptable. This consensus derives from the pragmatic agreement on a minimum which conditions a constructive dialogue or a meaningful intersubjectivity, namely, the absence of contradiction. Let us postulate for the sake of simplicity that we consider a contradiction to be false and a system of logic to be the two-value false-or-true system of logic. With this assumption, this conditional proposition is no longer true unless the antecedent itself is denied as false. Consequently, it is false to accept both the religious doctrine and the philosophical system. In other words, it is false to affirm them together. Therefore, it is no longer a genuine human attitude to be both a believer and a philosopher.

The first step in the logical reflection of the believing philosopher has been to deny the truth of an antecedent because of the falsehood of the consequent by applying the mode *tollendo-tollens.* The second step will be to translate the denied conjunction into a disjunction of denials by applying the *Morgan'.'J law* according to which the negation of a conjunction amounts to the disjunction of the denied primitive propositions.[8] In our specific case this means that either we consider the religious doctrine as false or we regard the philosophical system as false. But as soon as we face an alternative concerning the truth-value of its members, we are in a situation either to reject the alternative as futile and unrelated to life or to accept it as

[8] Schematic argument:

1) (Faith and (contradiction)

But, any contradiction is false

Then, we must deny the conjunction of Faith and Reason; in symbols we shall write (F & R) · · (P & -P)

- (P & -P)
- (F&R)

Application of *Morgan's Law*

- (F & R) · = · -F V -R In other words, the denial of a Conjunction (Logical Product) is the disjunction (Logical Sum) of the denials. Then, -Faith V -Reason. Either Faith is false or Reason is false.

vital and inevitable. This last is the case of anyone who has been already committed both to religious faith and philosophical reflection. He cannot help being in a state of doubt or questioning, the Aristotelian *aporia* (cl7rop£a). Thus the religious thinker is now seriously challenged about his position, namely, the authenticity of his attitude. Is it truly fair to be both a believer and a philosopher? *Prima facie,* the situation seems to be intricate and hopeless: one will be the loser, the believer or the philosopher. Perhaps after serious reflection a gentleman's agreement can be reached to the satisfaction of both.

Since there is an incompatibility between religious dogmas and philosophical conclusions, then it follows both from the Thomistic principle of the specification of acts by objects and from the phenomenological law of the correlation between the noemas and the noeses that Faith and Reason are no longer compatible activities. Since they are no longer compatible, it follows that a choice is inevitable. Is it an exclusive choice? That is the question. Because of this need to choose we already face two basic attitudes: the philosophical system can be chosen as the ultimate criterion of truth *or* the religious creed can be preferred as the final standard of evaluation. **But in** both cases a more subtle analysis may suggest to us either an absolute application of the principle of choice or a relative use of this principle in our difficult problem. *Either* we take a position without any spirit of tolerance *or* we welcome a pacific coexistence. I must confess that our tolerance is not inspired by courtesy but by logic. Moreover, I acknowledge a certain primacy of one knowledge over the other unless we accept a, philosophically speaking, unacceptable syncretism. Thus the two basic attitudes are subdivided into four.

The first attitude consists in applying Morgan's law to Faith and Reason taken as a theoretical whole without any further analysis and in giving priority to *Reason* over Faith. In other words, both the religious doctrine and the philosophical system remain unanalysed into a set of propositions when the logical operations are applied to them. Moreover, Faith is unconditionally under the control of Reason. Sure of his own per-

sonal reflection, the religious thinker, facing an unconditional "either-or" concerning the truth-value of his belief and his system which cannot coexist as both true, chooses his philosophical outlook as not-false, namely, as true. By doing so, he rejects his Faith for the benefit of his Reason: he is a rationalist in a theological sense. In tllis sense he professes a doctrine according to which any religious knowledge that transcends the capabilities of human reflection is simply rejected. From thls perspective Reason is the sufficient and necessary condition which founds religious belief. No Revelation from God makes sense and can be *a priori* acceptable. A believer who adopts this attitude has entirely lost the Faith. If, according to this extreme attitude, either an insight into a self-evident truth or a demonstration from axioms is required for every valid assertion, there is no longer any room whatsoever for Christian Faith. [9]

The second attitude like the first keeps the priority of Reason over Faith but, thanks to a deeper logical analysis, weakens the opposition between the two types of knowledge. It presupposes that the denial of a theory does not necessarily imply the total rejection of the whole theory. For a theory can be regarded as the conjunction of many statements. Consequently, its denial amounts to applying *Morgan's law.* And so, if Faith is denied, the negation is no longer a massive discard of all the dogmas. Considered as the conjunction of several propositions to which *Morgan's law* is applied, the Creed is denied if at least *one* of its articles is denied. Since the denial of this conjunctive statement which constitutes the Creed amounts to the disjunction of the denied dogma, what is logically required is the denial of at least one article as false with the others remaining true. [10] A believer who adopts this attitude will keep his Creed intact except for at least one dogma or

[9] -(Faith & Reason)· = ·-Faith v -Reason.
Reason · -Faith. In other words, if I maintain Reason, then I reject Faith.
[10] -Faith) · = · - (M & T & ... &H)
Then, -(Faith)·=· -Mv-T · v ... v-H)
One statement, at least, has to be rejected or denied as false.

perhaps several others. In principle he accepts Revelation as a source of knowledge but reserves for himself the right to control God's teaching. Reason has no longer an unchallenged primacy as in the first attitude; nevertheless, it supervises the content of belief. By assuming this claim for supervision the believer will make a choice among the truths proposed to him by his Creed. From a strict etymological viewpoint, without the deprecatory connotation resulting from history, he may be called a " heretic." [11]

The third attitude consists in applying *Morgan's law* to Faith and Reason taken as a theoretical whole without any further analysis and in giving priority to *Faith* over Reason. [12] Confident of the truth of his belief, moreover so confident that Reason can be and is overruled, the religious thinker will simply reject philosophical reftection. [13] For him, the problems to which philosophy claims to be able to give an answer are no longer solved by the rational method. This believer may be called a fideist, namely, a man who implicitly or explicitly professes that Reason is unable to teach anything concerning metaphysical or even ethical issues, because in these matters Faith alone is the source of certain knowledge. Fideism can be regarded as a form of skepticism which is pragmatically corrected by religious belief. It can be also a form of escapism which does not dare to face criticism and reflection. In any case, as antithetic to rationalism fideism is not at all a help for religion. For if Reason is undervalued to the point of being denied any philosophical thought, some will suspect that religion has no longer anything to do with sound human behavior. Blind feeling, pragmatic decision, subjective choice

[11] This term "heretic " comes from the verb *ro alpeiP,* to choose; *alpepts* means **"choice."**

[10] -(Faith & Reason)· = ·-Faith v -Reason
Then, Faith ·-) · Reason. In other words, if I maintain Faith, then I have to reject Reason.

[13] Some Apologetes were opposed to Greek philosophy (Tatian, Tertullian); Peter Damian in the Middle Ages was not inclined to welcome logic; Ockham was a skeptic in metaphysics; Beautin in the 19th century had no confidence in human reason. All of them were fideists because they relied upon Faith for vital truths.

will be the impression made upon minds for which truth is the greatest concern. As a matter of fact, the Church has always defended the right and the power of Reason. [14]

The fourth, attitude, like the second, will consist in accepting both philosophy and religion, thanks to a deeper logical analysis which weakens the opposition between them but which accepts the right of Faith to supervise Reason. [15] There is here again an application of the principle according to which the denial of a conjunction does not necessarily entail the negation of all its conjuncts. In the case of a conflict arising from philosophical statements contradictory to the propositions of Faith, the philosopher is invited by the believer to correct his philosophy. These statements which disagree with Faith, provided it has been established that they convey the same meaning, have, of course, to be rejected. But a further reflection must deal either with the principles themselves from which the heterodox conclusions have been derived or with the method according to which they have been deduced. This work of rejection and correction amounts to a logical negative control of Reason by Faith. It is, indeed, a *control,* since an evaluation, a restraint, a test is exercised concerning the truth of philosophical knowledge. This control is *logical* since it presupposes the application of logical principles, namely, *the principle according to which* the falsehood of a consequent implies either the falsehood of the antecedent if the conditional is true or the invalidity of the consequence if the antecedent is true, and the principle according to which there is an impossibility of affirming two contradictory statements, rejecting by this rule the theory of the " double truth " which has sometimes been attributed to some medieval thinkers. [16] This control is *negative* since it is only limited to detecting an error from the viewpoint

"Vatican I affirmed strongly the ability of reason to know God against the skepticism of the 19th century. Vatican II also affirmed the right of personal conscience to guide human behavior.

[15] -(Reason)·=· -(P & Q& R .... & Z)

-(Reason)·=· -Pv-Qv-R .... v-Z.

[16] This theory, according to the judgment of Prof. Van Steenberghen, has been erroneously attributed by Mandonnet to Siger de Brabant.

of Faith. If Faith invites us to correct ourselves, it does not tell us *per se* how to proceed in rectifying the system. The error is pointed out but the process of verification has to be rationally founded. It is truly the policy of " help yourself." It is evident that the correction has to be made in the system itself from the strict standpoint of reason: new analysis of the immediate data, critical investigation into the basic principles, careful check of the discursive thought. [17] Whereas a thinker is warned by the Church against error, no philosopher can found the certainty of his system upon the agreement of its conclusions with the articles of Faith. For in logic an antecedent is not true on account of the truth of its consequent. At most, a certain probability can be conjectured. The situation of philosophy in regard to the Creed is to some extent. similar to the situation of a physical theory in regard to facts. [18]

[17] Thomas Aquinas was convinced that he corrected Aristotle's doctrine by a better understanding of the principles of the Stagyrite.

The four attitudes can be summarized in the following schema concerning Faith and Philosophy.

(F & P) · · (Antinomy)
Antinomy is rejected as false
Then,- (F & P)
Then,-FV-P
l) P,-Fv-P
-F

a) absolute rejection of Faith; Philosophy is called rationalistic and closed in Blondel's sense.
b) relative rejection -F · = ·-M •v -M .. v -H; at least, one article is rejected.

2) F,-Fv-P
-P

a) absolute rejection of Philosophy-fideistic or anti-in· tellectualistic attitude (condemned by the Church) .
b) relative rejection; -P · = · -Qv-R. ... -Z attitude of the orthodox Fathers and Doctors in the course of history.

[18] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2. St. Thomas is dealing with theological theories which are similar to atronomical theories. These theories are not necessarily true because their consequences agree with the facts. If a theological theory which " agrees " with the dogmas is not necessarily true, this is a *fMtiiYI"i* true concerning a philosophy in agreement with Faith. Cf. *II de Cael. et Mund.,* lect. 8 sq.

* * * *

The fourth and last attitude may suggest a new way of philosophizing which could be called "Christian Philosophy." As a matter of fact, this expression belongs to the title of a famous work of Prof. Etienne Gilson, *The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.* In the late twenties and early thirties this notion of " Christian Philosophy " became the subject of long, animated, and subtle controversies among the outstanding philosophers of that day.[19] Those who approached the problem from the viewpoint of history were inclined to recognize as valid the concept of " Christian Philosophy " on account of the undeniable impact of Christian thought on Western culture. Contrariwise, those who approached the problem from the viewpoint of the *Eidos* were rather disposed to reject this notion as invalid and illegitimate or to accept it with cautious and explanatory restrictions.

There is a distinction which may help to clarify the discussion and to weaken the sharp opposition between two tendencies, both of which are legitimate. It is the distinction which separates the concrete expression of " Christian Philosopher " from the abstract phrase " Christian Philosophy." The first aims at the order of facticity, the second at the order of eidetic necessity. I believe that the first expression makes sense; but I do not think that the second, strictly speaking, can avoid the criticism of being nonsensical. Historians are right in maintaining that for a period of history philosophy grew under Christian influence and environment. But philosophers are also correct in denying that philosophy at any time becomes in its very essence a sort of by-product of Christianity.

Consequently, I accept the concept of "Christian Philosopher " as a compound one, provided, of course, it is understood as follows. A Christian philosopher is a thinker who, *logically* speaking, elaborates his philosophy from his own experience and his reason alone: *pgychologically* speaking, however, he can be directed by hints or suggestions inspired by his Faith; *rationally* and *religiously* speaking, he accepts a negative control of

[19] Bnmscwig, Brehier, Gilson, Maritain, Blondel, in France, around 1929, were engaged in this controversy.

his reflection by the same Faith, as explained above. First, the logical elaboration does not distinguish a Christian philosopher from a non-Christian; both use the same reason in the same way, with the same experience, and with the same goal: truth. Nothing more need be said on this. Second, psychological direction means that the philosopher is, *as a matter of fact,* interested in statements of Faith which can have an epistemological, metaphysical, or moral bearing. These statements have to be considered by the philosopher as pure " working hypotheses" which have to be re-thought in a philosophical framework, recast in terms of philosophical categories, and demonstrated now only from philosophical principles. And so, nothing will be accepted unless it has been reshaped by reason, its criteria and its method. When we speak of philosophical statements of Faith, we mean at most, except in a specific case, philosophical truths or philosophical horizons in a pre-systematic stage. As soon as they are assumed by the philosopher they are given a special treatment to put them in a genuine philosophical status. Third, the negative control amounts to what has been described above in the case of the fourth attitude if the essential elements are taken into consideration. But here new precisions and clarifications have to be given if its exercise and domain are considered. First, I believe that the control does not have to be conceived necessarily as the operation of an "Administrative Power," such as the " Curia Romana" or the late " Holy Office." For it is in the depth of his consciousness that a thinker, sincere in respect to himself and faithful to his Church, will perceive the struggle of " meanings " and the conflict of " values." Entangled in this predicament, he will try to find a solution without hurting either his reason or his Faith. In case he fails to discover this solution, he would remain consistent with himself in saying: "I do not know," taking as his own the words of Descartes, the Prince of Rationalists: "We shall have no difficulty in believing (the mysteries of Incarnation and the Blessed Trinity) although we do not understand them very clearly. For we must not find it strange that there is in God's nature that which is immense, and in

what he has done, many things which transcend the ability of our mind." [20] Second, assuming, as above, that the domain of contention between Faith and Reason is the intersection of the truths which are both revealed and demonstrable (or revealable and demonstrated) , it is necessary to distinguish two ways of belonging to this class: either the membership of a truth in the class is *explicit,* by itself, or the membership is *implicit,* on account of consequences. The first way need not be explained; the second way has to be clarified. This second way makes it possible for a philosophical opinion to be censured in the name of a " Mystery." Let us make this clear by an example. In the philosophical theory which defines a person by its actual consciousness we shall verify a case in which a set of premisses entails conclusions which do not easily agree with orthodoxy. Since there are, indeed, two levels of consciousness in Christ, the human and the divine, it would follow from the conjunction of this statement with the assumed theory of consciousness that there are two persons in the Lord; but this consequence is formally contrary to the traditional teaching of the Church. From this case it is easy to see that the possibility of censorship of a theory, such as a theory of consciousness in our specific predicament, results from the philosophical implications of the religious truths. This theological illustration is an instance of a general principle which is rejected by some philosophers or some theologians when they exclude metaphysics either from logic, or from ethics, or from Revelation, respectively. [21] I concede that in its specific technicality any science relies upon its own principles and method without integrating in its body of knowledge philosophical principles, with the exception of sciences of man. Nevertheless, any science presupposes a certain amount of philosophical commitments on the part of the scientist himself which condition the possibility of his research. [22] Consequently, even the super-

[20] Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy,* Part I, Prine. XXV.

[01] All the contemporary tendencies which try to elaborate a logic without metaphysics or an ethics based only on facts cannot give an ultimate answer concerning their own science.

•• *Edmund Husserl Logische Untersuchungen,* I *Prolegomena.* !'ld edition, chap. I,§ *5.*

natural order does not escape the grip of a metaphysical doctrine, either realist or idealist. Therefore, a Mystery always contains an infra-structure of epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical significance. This underlying philosophy is not expressed in technical terms or linked to an elaborate system. It presents itself at least as a confused horizon which is already there, even if no one dares to be concerned about it. Therefore, even the truths which belong to the class of the Revealed *per se* can indirectly, of course, belong *per accidens,* on account of their necessary presuppositions, to the intersection of Faith and Reason. Consequently, it is not superfluous to ask whether a doctrine of idealistic inspiration can fit a religious doctrine which seems to contain an implicit theory of an " embodied consciousness " and of the facticity of " historical events." In other words, the mysterious order of God in himself and his love for mankind, which is *per se* expressed by strictly revealed truths, presupposes a set of conditions, at most necessary, which are precisely formulated through philosophical positions to be put in the intersecting class of revealed and demonstrated truths. The nominalist thinkers of the late Middle Ages could exclude the supernatural order from any metaphysical jurisdiction whatsoever; however, this was not at all the mind of Thomas Aquinas. Consequently, a seemingly innocent statement can, indirectly, shake a revealed truth by annihilating one of its necessary conditions of intelligibility. From this viewpoint Descartes was very concerned to show how his philosophy would not destroy the traditional belief in the Real Presence in the Eucharist. [23]

Now, I do reject the concept of "Christian Philosophy" if this expression means a notion constituting an intelligible unit able to be defined in itself. It is, indeed, a " hybrid notion " which according to Aristotle's logic cannot be defined as such. In a strict sense, there is no such system of thought called " Christian Philosophy " insofar as " Philosophy " is taken in

•• Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy,* Part IV, Prine. CCVII: "Nevertheless, all my opinions are submitted to the Authority of the Church." *Answers to the 6th Objections* concerning Eucharist.

its modem sense.[24] The reason is that any philosophy is at least a set of statements based exclusively upon the insight of reason and its discursive activity. It would be difficult to reject the very common affirmation that philosophy is essentially rational. A research of this type relies only upon experience, reflection, intuition, understanding, and logic. But any type of thought essentially characterized as Christian would include a new source of knowledge, namely, Revelation which transcends both insight and reasoning. Consequently, on the one hand, philosophy is the conjunction of strictly rational statements; on the other hand, Christian thought is not the conjunction of strictly rational statements; insofar as it includes also revealed truths. Since no system of thought can be both rational and non-rational, a " Christian Philosophy" would be a system which implies a contradiction in its methological procedure.

In a broad sense, a " Christian Philosophy " is a philosophy which both respects the revealed doctrine and remains" open" to the possibility of Revelation. This relation of " courtesy " does not intrinsically change the nature of the philosophical reflection since it has nothing to do with its constitutive elements, namely, its concepts, its methods, and its propositions.

As a matter of fact, from almost the beginning of Christianity there has existed a type of speculation which borrows its principles both from Faith and Reason; this inquiry is truly a type of knowledge of its own that is, *sui generis*, neither Creed nor Philosophy. It has been traditionally called "Theology" or " Sacred Science." It would be confusing now to call it " Christian Philosophy."

After reading this logical note, are some not tempted to say: "This is intolerable language. How could anyone accept it? " [25]

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[24] Christian Doctrine has been called by some Fathers the true Philosophy insofar as " Philosophy " means a way of life or a practical knowledge.

[25] John 6:60.

ANALOGY AND "KINDS" OF THINGS

THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH follow arose chiefly from reflections on two treatments of the problem of analogy by I. M. Bochenski. The first appeared in this journal over twenty years ago/ and the second formed an appendix to *The Logic of Religion.*[2] Both are excellent analyses of the problem. Nevertheless, there are difficulties which seem to resist solution by means of the proposals put forth by Bochenski. It is these difficulties to which I address myself here, following which I consider three questions which stem from them and are of the utmost importance in achieving a proper cataloging of the problems of analogy. The purpose of such an enterprise is heuristic. It is to be hoped that my remarks, which are not definitive, can contribute somewhat to the motion of the ongoing debate on analogy, whether this be by means of further developing the scheme set forth by Bochenski, or by suggesting some alternate route to the heart of the problem.

By way of brief summary of Bochenski's analysis, it should first be noted that it depends upon the following formulation of the workings of language. Words are construed as visual or auditory marks which "mean" certain properties of objects. This relation is expressed in the formula $S(a, f, x)$, or "a means f in x." Thus, "red" stands for the red of my car. Given a second expression which is meaningful, $S(b, g, y)$,[3] any relation which might obtain between the two terms a and b would be expressed by the formula $R(a, b, f, g, x, y)$: "a which stands for f in x is related to b which stands for g in y." Univocal

[1] "On Analogy," *The Thomist,* 11 (1948), pp. 424-447. Reprinted in *Logico-Philosophical Studies,* ed. A. Menne (Dordrecht, 1961), pp. 97-117.

[2] (New York, 1965), pp. 156-162.

[3] Presumably there is a misprint in *50.12* of *The Logic of Religion.* Cf. "On Analogy," 4.

terms would be those in which *a* and *b* were of the same form (" Isomorphic ") , and *f* and *g* were identical properties, while *x* and *y* were different objects: "red" in "a red house" and "a red car." Ambiguous or equivocal terms, among which he classes analogous expressions, are those in which *a* and *b* are isomorphic, while neither the properties *f* and *g* nor the objects *x* and *y* are identical: " red " in " a red house " and " a red herring." The relation of ambiguity or equivocation can thus be formalized as:

(1) $Am(a, b,f,g,x,y)$ for $S(a,f,x) \cdot S(b,g,y) \cdot I(a,b) \cdot f \# g \cdot x \# y$.[4]

In the earlier work he then tried to account for analogy in terms of this definition, adding only that there must be some further distinguishing factor to set analogy apart from other instances of equivocation, expressed as:

(2) $An(a,b,f,g,x,y) =_{Dt} Am(a,b,f,g,x,y) \cdot F$.[5]

The factor *F* is then interpreted according to the traditional notions of attribution and proportionality.

A third move which appears in the earlier work, and continues on as the basis of the later, is the notion of analogy as "isomorphy." In it, very possibly because of the difficulties involved in treating analogous meaning as a subclass while defining it by means of an added characteristic, Bochenski has opted for a limitation of those terms to he considered analogous to relational predicates alone. Once again, analogy is defined in terms of equivocity, this time with the added stipulations that there must be relations involved, and that a further relation of " isomorphy " must hold between these relations. "Isomorphy" means that the relations have the same formal properties, e. g., transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity, ect., in common. The formula given to describe this is:

[4] *The Logic of Religion, 50.14;* "On Analogy," *5.4.*

[5] "On Analogy," *8.2.* The notation has been modified in favor of the simplicity of the later treatment.

(3) $An(a, b, f, g, x, y) = {}_{Dt.}\ Ae\,(a, b, f, g, x, y) \cdot (EP, Q)\,(fPx \cdot gQy \cdot PsmorQ)$.[6]

The advantages of such a definition are clear: it very neatly accomodates the earlier divisions of analogous meaning as relations, solves the subclass problem by using a genuine subclass (relational words) as its basis and founds the strength of analogous discourse on a fairly solid characteristic, identity of formal properties. The historical precedent for such a treatment is to be found in the nineteenth century in the work of Mill and his predecessor, Whately. [7]

As indicated at the outset, the sophistication and completeness of such a scheme are plainly undeniable. Difficulties do arise, however, when we begin examining examples in an effort to uncover what the practical value of such a formulation would be for the study of religious and theological language. Bochenski's example, a comparison of "John sees a cow here" and" John sees the truth of the first theorem of GOdel," seems to me to be rather a lame one for the following reasons. First of all, the argument for the latter of these two expressions being analogous to the former relies on the rather tenuous assumption that " seeing " a cow and " seeing " something which is " the truth " of a theorem must be construed as sharing something in addition to being spelled the same way. In actual use, however, this is not the case: physiological and intellectual "seeing" are in fact never confused with each other. The blind man, on having his sight restored, does not say "Now I understand," unless it is clear that he is talking about something else: a previously unintelligible correlation of tactile data for instance. Likewise, no one mistakes the use of the expression " I see," uttered during the explanation of a complex logical proof, for a declaration of the physical ability to see, unless his sight were previously impaired and something extra-

[6] ""On Analogy," *17.2.* Cf. *The Logic of Religion, 50.41.* The notation has again been modified in favor of simplicity.

[7] J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic,* 8th ed. (London, 1930), II, iii, 20, p. 364. Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric,* ed. D. Ehninger (Carbondale, 1963), pp. 91ft.

ordinary had incidentally come to pass. In response to the proof, " I see " is clearly an accepted substitute for " I understand," and not for " I am experiencing visual sense-data." It seems to me that any further claims for the second use of "seeing" being analogous to the first would have to rely upon the sort of etymological speculation which attempts to connect such expressions as "light" and "truth," or "vision" and "understanding," but I do not think these are too germane logically.

Even granted, however, that there is a connection between these two uses of the expression " seeing " which could be termed " analogous," there remain some other problems of application. Suppose that we use as an example the sentence "John sees God," which I take to be a legitimate theological sentence describing one aspect of John's future life in beatitude. How, then, are we to take this sentence in comparison with the previous two, "John sees a cow here" and "John sees the truth of the first theorem of Godel "? Quite clearly we do not want to classify "seeing" a cow and "seeing" God together, but neither do we wish to so classify "seeing" the truth of a theorem and " seeing " God, if for no other reason than that we feel neither of these objects is a fit comparison for God: God is neither a physical object nor a mathematical theorem. On the other hand, other examples indicate that we may not be totally justified in considering a relational term analogical simply because of a difference in kind of the objects it is predicated of. For instance, would we be so quick to say that the relational term " has " occurred analogically in some of the following: "Peter has a red hat," " Peter has the sniffles," and " Peter has a holiday "? I do not think so, if for no other reason than there being no other, more straightforward, form of expressing these. I think it is thus clear that there is more plausibility than we would have suspected to the claim that " Peter has the beatific vision " incorporates an entirely ordinary use of " has," unhampered by the difference of the object term "beatific vision." If so, and "John has the beatific vision" is as tradition would have it, equivalent to

"John sees God," is it then so clear that "sees" in "John sees God" must be an analogous usage?

While I do not think that the foregoing objections need necessarily invalidate Bochenski's analysis of the various modes of analogy, it would still seem that there is a great deal more to be said on these issues. My own feeling is that much of the problem arises from the generality of the use of " identity " in his formulations, as well as the two-valued manner in which he uses it. There is, after all, a whole range of instances going from "utterly the same," " the same," " similar," " somewhat alike," " clearly different," " hardly similar," and " dissimilar " to " of a completely different kind." Further, such instances include not only objects but also properties and even uses of expressions: cataloging everything in a two-valued fashion leaves us wondering if "seeing" a herd of cows or "seeing" a stampede could not also be taken as analogous usages, in short, in epistemological chaos. In an effort to find some solid ground in the matter, I would like to consider three questions which are clearly important here: what it is to be a " different kind " of thing; whether there can be an object which is indescribable in principle, i. e., whether a thing can be so different that we can say nothing directly of it; and lastly, whether there is a binding between objects and their predicates such that it would create a hindrance to describing other objects, these latter being of a different kind. Of these questions, the last is the most difficult to answer satisfactorily, although I think the grounds for the answer are quite sound.

(i) . I should like to begin by suggesting that to say two things are of a different kind must be something very much like saying that there are two meanings we might ascribe to the sentence " This book is incomplete." The first meaning would be that some physical object, a book, was lacking an essential physical part, say twenty pages in the middle of the third chapter. The second would be that some book, here taken as the intellectual progeny of an author, did not sufficiently treat of material relevant to its subject: a history of philosophy which made no mention of middle platonism for instance. For

convenience I would like to call the respective objects and properties " book1," " book2," " incomplete1 " and " incomplete2." To save unnecessary labor I will also assume it to be obvious that, while these expressions are *prima facie* monadic predicates, they could also be expressed relationally and that any conclusion we come to about the former will hold true of the latter.

The first thing we might notice about the distinction between " book1 " and " book2 " is that, while the sentence given, " This book is incomplete," may be apparently ambiguous, we are in no doubt as to what conditions would have to obtain for the sentence to be disambiguated. Thus, if the speaker wishes to make plain what he is talking about, he has merely to say "Well, there are pages missing," or" The treatment of Numenius was a bit scanty." Likewise, we are aware of the conditions which might make each of these statements either false or inapplicable: either all the pages may be there and the topic thoroughly considered or, on the other hand, there may be no book to talk about, and if there is a book, then it may have been about an entirely different topic to which the judgment of its completeness is irrelevant. The difference between "book1" and "book2" is therefore not at all like the difference between two things, like a chair and a stool. Of a chair and a stool, which clearly are different kinds of things, we find a somewhat softer relation of mutual discreteness to obtain: some stools could be chairs if they had backs, and some chairs, with or without backs, could be used as stools, or perhaps as a third kind of thing, a hassock. In regard to books, a " book1 " does not become a " book2 " in any sense merely by the addition of a text, nor does a " book2 " become a " book1 " by being printed, although the result of both these actions is the " publishing " of both sorts of things: consider the similar ambiguity of" This book was published in 1637."

We also notice in the comparison of books to articles like chairs and stools that, although the latter are different kinds of things in some ways, they are the same kinds of things in others, i.e., both are furniture, are made of certain sorts of

materials, and have useful and/or decorative functions. We can characterize either a stool or a chair in the same terms. On the other hand, except for the cases of ambiguity already cited, this is not true of" book1" and "book2 ": descriptions of these two sorts of things are either ambiguous or mutually exclusive. As already indicated, where there is an ambiguity of properties as well, as in " incomplete1 " and incomplete2," the difference is plainly decidable by asking what would have to be done to make it complete. Further, a" book1" is never "incomplete2," nor is a "book2 " ever "incomplete1 ": consider the sentence " In this copy the author did not pay enough attention to Ammonius."

Lastly, in reference to existence conditions, it is important to note two points. The first is rather trivial, viz., that whereas a " book1 " may be said to " exist " or not in the same way as things like chairs and stools do, " books2 " do not. A " book1 " of blank pages, as a copybook or a notebook, is still said to be a " book," and is not, generally speaking, said to exist if it is not empirically evidenced. " Books2 " on the other hand, may exist in any number of ways, *in mente,* or *in pectore auctoris.* Even were we to say that a" book1" and a" book2" were both " potential " or " intentional " entities, they would still be so in very different ways. The second point is of somewhat greater interest, that the falsification conditions for both these sorts of things are different: there are some cases of existence conditions of " booksz " which would not be falsifiable in principle. By this I mean that a " book2 " which exists only *in mente* partakes of the truth-functional immunity of future contingencies, while remaining an entity to be haggled over in the present tense.

(ii) . Given, then, these characteristics of something being a different " kind " of thing from something else, we must now consider the next question which arises from this, viz., whether there can be an object which is in principle indescribable. It should be understood quite clearly that this is not the same as the question "Does an object *x,* such that it is indescribable, *exist?* " To answer such a question would be outside the scope

of the present discussion, and perhaps of any discussion, describability and existence being notoriously independent of each other. In the present context, it will not be possible to avoid the problem of existence altogether, but I content myself with the oblique remarks which do treat of it here, all of which are intended to be as neutral to the problem as possible.

Considering the three previously given conditions for an object's being a different kind of thing, and taking them each as being at least a sufficient, if not a necessary condition for this distinction's being made, it is apparent right from the outset that the notion of an object of such a different kind as to be indescribable is in trouble. The first condition would have it that, if an object is of a different sort, then it is distinguished from other objects by the simple fact of different things being said of it. The case of an indescribable object runs into difficulties because, since nothing can be said of it, it is in principle indistinguishable from anything else. Pantheism, it would appear, accepts such a version of things. Should we not wish to accept this, however, the alternative left open to us is to consider indescribability itself as a description, in fact, as a " definite " description, since we could in principle never know if there were more than one indescribable object: they would all be the same and could not be differentiated. This view, however it may solve the problem for us, is clearly self-contradictory. Both the second and the third conditions, mutually exclusive descriptions and different existence conditions, share the fate of the first. An indistinguishable object has no mutually exclusive description, and either " exists " itself or conditions which apply to it must be taken as predicates, and hence as in some way differentiating. I take it that these arguments adequately refute the claim that to say an object is indescribable is to say the class of its predicates is a null class and is so in principle.

(iii). The null class version of indescribability is not, however, the only one. If we call it the" strong form," there is also an alternative and weaker claim, namely, that there is an object such that none of the predicates available to us describe

it, or more formally, (Ex) (P) (Px), in which the domain of predicates is finite. The substance of such a view, in the classic form, is not that the object is indescribable in principle as above, nor yet that the object is one describable in principle but totally outside our universe of discourse. Rather, such an object, God, is very much within our realm of discourse, but there is some hindrance in the proper application of terms of the language to him. The substance of the hindrance is that such terms are truly applicable to earthly things alone, and if said of God imply the imperfections of these earthly things. This raises the third question I wish to consider, what sort of connection there is between properties and the objects to which they are ascribed.

A puzzlement which besets us at the outset in working at such a question is that of determining just what sort of mistake is involved when we use human language of God. At first sight, it would appear that it should be called a " category mistake " of some form to say " God is wise " when " God " is not such an object that the predicate " wise " can properly apply to him. This, however, is not a very satisfactory approach to the problem, assimilating as it does statements like "God is wise" to others like "The number 3 is green " on the one hand, or to more felicitous but nevertheless metaphorical sorts on the other hand, "New York is a summer festival " for example. Category mistakes are false, nonsensical or metaphorical, and we would not like to say that " God is wise " is any one of these unless we wished to sustain a rather extreme form of negative theology.

Another way to get into the problem is to examine a bit more closely just what a category mistake might consist in logically. For example, simple predications are not at all where the difficulty is lodged: to say that something is a P is never a problem logically, it either is or it isn't. The source of the problem is rather that, besides being a P, x may also be an F, and P and F may be mutually exclusive. Thus, as in the previous examples, numbers are not also colored objects, and the class of colored objects does not include the class of numbers. In regard to the second example, while" New York

is a summer festival " is a phrase with a sound descriptive tum to it, it is still not immensely informative in a literal way: there would be no answer to the question "Which festival?" Metaphors, conundrums, and paradoxes all depend on the fact that there is a sense in which they may be taken which is correct, though not literally so. I think, however, that we should be somewhat hesitant to group " God is wise " with such expressions, on the grounds it does not have this same sort of " sense " of being true. " God is wise " is not at all like " man has three legs in old age " in the riddle of the sphinx, largely because the latter is quite literally false. While we may well argue and create distinctions about the falsifiability of " God is wise," it nevertheless is clearly so in a different manner from riddles and metaphors.

A further elaboration of the initial argument is to consider all applications of the expression " wise " to be carrying under their cloaks a concealed modifier, "humanly" or "divinely," for example. On this view, to say " God is wise" is to say " God is wise a.s man is wise " or " God is humanly wise," both of which are plainly false. Despite this, however, they are claimed to be partially true insofar as some meaning carries over from the first to the second, and it is this partial truth which prompts us to say the second uses of " wise " are analogical.

Such an argument, however, seems to be altogether false for two reasons. One we have already seen in referring to the expression "sees" in "John sees God," viz., that difference in the objects referred to is not always sufficient grounds for inferring complete equivocity of meaning. Neither is it grounds for claiming that there is a difference of meaning any greater than that to be expected in most instances wherein the objects under consideration are not the same or even the same in kind. Ryle makes the same point using a different example:

> Consider the adjective "punctual." It can be used to characterize a person's arrival at a place, the person who arrives there, his character, and even the average character of a class of persons. It would be absurd to compare the punctuality of a man on a

particular occasion with that of his arrival on that occasion; it would be absurd to compare the punctuality of his character with that of his arrival on a particular occasion; and it would be absurd to compare the punctuality of Naval officers as a class with that of a particular Naval officer.[8]

Thus, there is no single " proper " use for an expression, all others being "category mistakes" of a sort, but rather the range of use is continuous from one instance to another and very much determined by convention as to its limits.

A second counterargument to such claims is to be seen in one of the criteria given in (i) for an object's being of a " different kind," i. e., that any apparently ambiguous use of an expression to refer to things of different kinds can be readily disambiguated either by asking for its falsification conditions or by asking what else is to be said of it in the case under consideration. This is to say that uses of the expression " wise " to refer to different objects do not have to lead to confusion of attributes between one and the other: my old dog is " wise " to stay around the hearth in cold weather and "unwise" if he chases cars; standards for human wisdom are different and more complex than those of canine wisdom. To say that different standards may likewise apply when we add the qualifier " divine" to wisdom is not to argue by analogy but rather to make an instance of a general theory of meaning as it applies to cases of difference in kind. I take it that both these arguments demonstrate that the notion that predicates are somehow bound to their instantiations in such a manner as to carry over from one to the other is an indefensible one, because language is both a more precise and a more flexible tool than the upholders of such a position wish to admit.

* * * *

As indicated at the outset, I would like to present these remarks as a stimulus for discussion. Surely, the problem of how different things are to be described is one which is of

[8] " Philosophical Arguments" in *Logical Positivism,* ed. A. J. Ayer (New York, 1959)' p. 889.

crucial importance in determining how the doctrine of analogy is to be handled in the light of contemporary discussions on the theory of meaning. I cannot pretend that what has been said here encompasses the problem thoroughly, but I do think that the basic patterns of a challenge to the traditional formulations of the doctrine are reasonably evident in it. The tone of these comments has been largely negative, but hopefully not irreverently so: in the current debate over the meaning of religious words it seems to be vital for the theologian to maintain that what he says, while it may be said in odd ways, is not so strange and novel that it is completely off the edge of our logical and linguistic maps. My feeling is that the doctrine of analogy in some forms has a tendency to make it so and that the formulation of it given by Father Bochenski has not helped the situation a great deal, despite the fact that it was his clear intention to do so. Hopefully, patient work at this issue will make it somewhat clearer in the future what the peculiarities of the theological language system are, and in such a way that the work done will provide a working theological tool for the systematician, much as did the doctrine of analogy for Aquinas.

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A RESPONSE TO MR. HEANEY

MR. HEANEY IS interested in developing the theory of analogy beyond Fr. Bochenski's application to formal languages to embrace ordinary language. Mentioning the limitations of Bochenski's important account of analogy, in terms of the isomorphism of the formal properties of relations, Heaney rightly observes that that account is not general enough to satisfy our curiosity about sets of analogous terms in ordinary language. In particular, we need to know how difference of *kinds* among things is related to analogical predication.

Heany's inquiry also seems limited by his not recognizing or at least mentioning that analogy of meaning is omnipresent in ordinary discourse.[1] And whatever the other limitations of Bochenski's account, at least Bochenski makes clear what analogy of meaning is and what conditions must obtain for analogous predication to occur. Heaney's discussion does not show this clarity about the conditions for analogy, and yet, he feels confident that Bochenski errs in thinking " sees " is analogous in the pair "John sees a cow here," "John sees the truth of the first theorem of Godel." I can't understand why Heaney thinks we must be able to *confuse* the two kinds of seeing in order to be sure they have the requisite community of meaning to be analogous. Just the *opposite* appears true to me, if we have in mind a person who understands the language. For one of the strengths of the analogy regularities of natural language is that, if a person understands the use of a certain term, *P*, with another term, *S*, where *S* belongs to a

[1] See: J. F. Ross: "A New Theory of Analogy" *Proceedings of the ACPA*, 1970; and "Analogy and the Resolution of some Cognitivity Problems," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXVII, No. 20 (Oct. 22, 1970), pp. 725-746. (See also critical comments by George I. Mavrodes, pp. 747-755.

pair of (appropriate) categorially contrasting terms (S and S'), then the person will understand the use of *P* with the other term, *S'*, without any further explanation, provided only that he understands how to use both members (SandS') of the categorially contrasting pair with other predicates appropriate to each (" the cow and "the truth of the theorem ") .

Heaney gets to the central issue when he observes, "On the other hand, other examples indicate that we may not be totally justified in considering a relational term analogical simply because of a difference of kind of the objects it is predicated of." That is quite right. Not just any difference makes a difference; yet some differences in kind certainly do. Although Socrates (male) and Xanthippe (female) differ in gender and therefore in kind, *that* difference in kind does not affect the sense of a common predicate, " is married to " or " is a person," though that difference will affect the sense of the same term predicate "has babies." When the subjects contrast *enough* in kind (in relation to the predicate), the same-term predicate is correspondingly differentiated in meaning. In fact, that is what analogy of meaning is: *regularity-controlled meaning differentiation (by semantic contagion or by contrast of modes of ascription) of same-term occurrences in categorially contrasting discourse contexts;*

The difficulty is to describe just what differences among terms are categorial differences. And the first lesson that history offers us is not to look for the basis of those differences in our opinions or knowledge of the *things* designated by the terms under discussion but rather to look to the semantic functions of the terms: to found our theory of categorial differences upon the fact that there are sem:mtical fields/ without pretending, at the outset at least, that categorial contrasts have metaphysical justifications. Heaney is right to inquire into differences of kinds of things. I think, however,

[2] See: John Lyons: *Structural Semantics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), and *lntroductioo to Theoretical Linguistics* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), Chapters 9 and 10.

that he looks in the wrong place and finds wrong conditions of difference.

I agree with Heaney that the case *for* saying that some terms applied affirmatively to God are applied univocally with other non-religious applications has not been adequately developed or adequately refuted. Possibly "sees" in "John sees God" is univocal with the occurrence such as "John sees the purple cloud." Certainly the negative case, that such predication will lead inevitably to anthropomorphism, has never been developed convincingly. But there is an additional problem that faces Heaney, and anyone else who might want to say that " wise " is univocal in " Socrates is wise " and " God is wise," namely, to provide some kind of explanation of what sameness of meaning for same-term occurrences consists in. How can we tell when same-term occurrences are univocal? What are the constitutive and the identificatory criteria for univocity? Heaney seems to think that if the entailments, the conditions of falsification, of verification, etc., should happen to be different, then a pair of same-term occurences will not be univocal. But none of these things is a sufficient condition for difference of meaning, and some of them are not necessary, either. It is extremely difficult to provide a criterion of difference of meaning for two sentences (s-1, s-2) with respect to a common term *p;* for some of the differences in entailments, etc., are attributable to the *subjects* and no criterion to separate them is easily constructed.

Aquinas and Aristotle certainly believed that a difference in the objects of which a relational term is predicated will make a meaning-difference in the same-term occurences. This object-language talk about differences in objects is just a brief way of expressing claims about the categories of the predicate or subject *terms.* Objects which are in categorial contrast, insofar as they have same term predicates, have those predicates, in comparison to one another, analogously (as meaning-differentiated through adjustment to the contrasting categories of their complements). To say a substance is visible (e. g., " The color of its leaves is visible from here ") is to use " is

visible" analogously, because the *modus mgnificandi* of a predicate is adjusted to the *modus essendi* of the subject. Nothing in one category can be anything at all in the same way as something in another category. The absoluteness of categorial difference for Aristotle and Aquinas seems to underlie the claim that *all* the same predicates of two things belonging to different categories must be analogous. This is certainly the doctrine of St. Thomas.

And it is a doctrine we shall have to amend, at least provisionally, because we do not have a satisfactory system of categories. Although it is an empirical matter to map the fields of terms in English, and although categories can be extrapolated from fields as exclusive classes of semantic fields, there are a number of things we cannot know in advance, especially whether there are any absolute categorial contrasts. For instance, " the ball " and " the train " may contrast categorially with respect to the sentence frame " He caught NP," but not with respect to the sentence frame "He saw NP." Thus, those terms stand in relative categorial contrast with respect to certain sentence frames. A "basic" categorial contrast is the contrast of two terms with respect to *every* term belonging to the semantic field to which some term in a sentence frame with which they are in contrast belongs; thus a basic categorial contrast is a relative categorial contrast between two terms with respect to every term belonging to the semantic field of some third term. And an absolute categorial contrast will obtain where there is no term with which both terms may be concatenated. Because of the " higher " terms which are available, e. g., "thing," "something or another," etc., it is unlikely that any pair of terms is in absolute categorial contrast, though this must be established more particularly. If there are none, then basic contrasts will provide the grounds for our account of categories.

It seems to me that there is considerably greater potential for our developing a theory of categorial differences by way of an investigation of semantic fields than there is by developing such criteria as Heaney has suggested, chiefly because

we already know that his conditions are not sufficient and in some cases are not necessary even for a difference of meaning. His proposal seems to come to this: the difference in two things is a relevant difference in kind, founding an analogous predication of a same-term predicate, if (a) the one thing could never be the same thing as the other is; (b) the things have different existence conditions; (c) the falsification conditions for the assertions that there are such things are different. But concealed in this account is the fact that the different existence conditions and falsification conditions must *themselves* be of different *kinds* and not simply different but of the same kind. For, consider that Socrates and Plato are such that neither thing could ever be the same thing as the other; their existence conditions are different and the falsification conditions for "Socrates exists" are different from the falsification conditions for " Plato exists " ; yet it will not follow that the term "exists" is analogous in the two cases. This shows that the conditions of difference in kind which we have been given are not sufficient, as Heaney claims. What we require is that if these conditions differ, they must differ *categorially;* but that is what we set out to explain!

Moreover, if we will allow analogous senses of "is the same thing as," then we will not be able to state that categorially different things are never the same as one another. The President of the United States is categorially different from Richard Nixon, yet right now, Richard Nixon and the President of the United States are the same thing, despite the fact that t!te falsification conditions for " Richard Nixon exists " and "The President of the United States exists" are different. Under certain circumstances, things which belong to different categories may be said to be the same because " is the same thing as" is analogous, having transcategorial uses.

The mild criticism of Bochenski for using " is identical with " as a two-valued predicate seems to come to nothing. For Bochenski could easily introduce such additional predicates as "is the same thing as," "is somewhat alike to," etc., into his formal system. I do not see why Heaney thinks we will be

in an epistemological wasteland if we wonder whether " I see a herd of cows," " I see a stampede," and " I see a cow " use "see" analogously. I have no difficulty regarding them as analogous same-term occurrences and see no special difficulties for a theory of knowledge. And I cannot see what the talk about "two-valued" cataloging of everything has to do with the problem.

If there is any sense to the idea that meaning is use and " use " is like " function " or "instrumentality " then " sees " has similar but differing functions or instrumentalities in each of the mentioned cases; it has differential but similar meanings. And wherever, with respect to some contrasting terms (subjects, predicates, objects, etc.) , a function for a term can be recognized which is partly similar to some use or function the term already has with respect to one of the contrasting terms, an analogous sense is developed by its being concatenated with the contrasting term. If this is not noticed to be a general feature of ordinary language semantics, philosophers will develop the analogy theory too narrowly and will be unable to account for the way analogy affects predicates in science. theology and metaphysics. Analogy is not a rarity, it is a semantic familiar in our linguistic lives.

The discussion of whether there can be an indescribable object seems to be confused and not particularly germane to an inquiry into analogy. Does the writer think that an indescribable object would be one about which nothing true could be said? About which nothing could be known (regardless of what could be said) ? About which all human assertions would be false, even the contradictories of false statements? It is not clear whether the assertion " x is describable " is itself a description of x. Is the negation of a description also a description? Nor do I see how "mutually exclusive descriptions" can both be true of anything. But leaving those questions aside, I take it that Heaney is concerned to isolate a sense in which someone might reasonably intend to claim that God is indescribable. It appears that he thinks it would take the form of a claim that some sort of a mistake, perhaps a category

mistake, would be involved when we use human language about God. And it also seems that he thinks there is no rational foundation for the charge, first, because our puzzlement over God-statements is not like our puzzlement over "The number three is green," and, second, because it is not true that "predicates are somehow bound to their instantiations in such a manner as to carry over from one to another."

Now it seems to me that Heaney has stepped right onto the threshold of a plausible analogy theory with this remark. Predicates, subjects, objects (as shown in my papers note 1, above) are *partly* bound to their discourse contexts by being *partly category-determined* but can be found in contrasting contexts as well, and yet, not in every contrasting context; thus they are *partly* category-determinable. And the regularities of concatenation are the result of both their determinateness and their indeterminateness. Moreover, the senses of terms adjust to the contexts. ("His handwriting is unintelligible." "His published papers are unintelligible." "He silenced the crowd." "He silenced the prosecution.") Those adjustments of sense are not without regularities which might be called rules or principles of analogous meaning differentiation. Upon these observations, it seems to me that some patience and a healthy linguistic empiricism will build the rest of a modem theory of analogy capable of achieving the explanatory effects for which the classical theories were designed.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. By GERMAIN G. GRISEZ. New York: Corpus Publications, 1970. Pp. 570. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $6.95.

This is a major work that deserves wide reading and careful study. Grisez, a philosopher at Georgetown University, treats one of our most intensely debated moral and legal problems with outstanding completeness and depth. His work shows mastery of the vast literature on abortion: he discusses all the important issues raised in biological, medical, legal, political, sociological, psychiatric, theological, and ethical treatments of the subject. It is by far the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of the abortion question. Legislators, jurists, and scholars who have a responsibility to participate in the current abortion controversy should have this book.

The first three chapters are detailed analyses of the biological, medical, and sociological aspects of the problem. There is a wealth of factual information and a careful survey of all the most important interpretations and arguments based on the data. But this is more than an encyclopedia-type digest of a vast literature. Throughout intelligent criticism is bringing order and perspective to extremely complex questions.

A long chapter on religious views of abortion (pp. 117-84) is the finest survey that has been done on the subject. Grisez studies the attitudes of primitive religions toward abortion, and of Vedic, Zoroastrian, and Egyptian sources; the Old and New Testaments; the various Jewish traditions; the common Christian tradition and the later developments of the Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic communities. The roots of many major and minor differences in attitude are exposed. But even more impressive is the overwhelming witness of the Indo-European religions to the transcendent value of human life, extending to great reverence for prenatal life. For example, it is pointed out than in the Vedas abortion has been counted among the worst of sins, because it destroys a life so near to its divine origins and so rich in its possibilities. The Old Testament literature is shown to express a philosophy of human life (based on a personal relationship between God and the individual even before birth) that established an atmosphere in the Jewish community in which abortion could not and did not flourish.

But it was in Christianity that the notion of a person as a " bearer of immeasurable and inalienable dignity " grew. In early Christianity there was an intense and severe hostility to abortion. Confronted with

the non-personal social philosophy of paganism, in which individuals were too exclusively subordinated to the welfare of the community, Christian teachers responded with emphatic insistence on the sacredness of each person. The teaching of the early Fathers (their thought is splendidly summarized on pp. 137-50) reveals their awareness of all the motives that move men to abortion even today (including a real fear of over-population). But they reject abortion totally for basic reasons: " because it is a type of homicide that is especially cruel, since the parents should most especially love and care for the helpless life they have generated; and because it violates the work of God and ignores his providence; . . . because it is a form of discrimination against some of one's children in favor of others; because it is an inhumane and dehumanizing act." (p. 149)

The Protestant tradition, which was profoundly influential in shaping American legislation aimed at protecting unborn life, has its roots in this same basic Christian philosophy. But some recent Protestant statements take a sharply different position. Grisez shows that this trend implies a profound alteration of principle. Formerly, transcendent value was recognized in prenatal human life. Even in 1958 the Lambeth Conference insists that "The sacredness of (this) life is, in Christian eyes, an absolute which should not be violated." But later declarations (e. g., the American Episcopal House of Bishops in 1967, and a document-*Abortion: An Ethical Discussion,* Westminster, 1967-from the Anglican Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility; Grisez criticizes latter document sharply on pp. 283-86) indicate that the value of the unborn is far from absolute. There are now a number of other values that outweigh human life in the unborn and justify taking their lives.

The history of Catholic moral theology on the subject has never been better treated. (pp. 165-84) Carefully chronicled here are the complex debates affected by the distinction between animated and non-animated fetuses until scientific developments secured the triumph of the immediate animation theory; the controversies about therapeutic abortion; and the major role consistently played by the Holy See in maintaining strong faithfulness to the basic principles involved. Grisez suggests that, if certain contemporary Catholic positions on the relationship between conscience and authority prevail, unified Catholic witness to this sacredness of life may also fail. (p. 184)

Chapter five treats the state of the legal question. The history of anti-abortion laws reveals a complex interplay between the religious roots of such legislation and the secular public opinion that was the immediate force behind the laws. Grisez shows that such legislation was not based simply on concern for the health of the mother but on a deep conviction on the inviolability of human life, now seen more clearly in the fetus.

(pp. The Western liberal tradition on the dignity of human life indeed grew out of Judaeo-Christian sources. But the law followed secular opinion more immediately than theological inspiration. Acceptance of biological information revealing the humanity of the youngest prenatal life led to legislation protecting that life before theologians had fully absorbed the new data. And, though therapeutic abortion did not receive general theological approval, the laws often sanctioned the practice in cases where physicians judged it necessary for saving the mother's life.

Significantly, the nation that countered this trend and first gave broad legal support to abortion was a nation with a radically different philosophy of man from that of Christianity and the liberal West: Soviet Russia. Equally important is Grisez's study of the origins of the British and American abortion movements, which exhibited strong hostility to any supernatural religious faith. Soviet practice was consistent with its theory that the state need protect and foster individual lives only to the extent that they are valuable for the purposes of the community. Western atheistic humanism is perhaps less clear in its advocacy of abortion. It often asserts a utilitarian morality not calculated to support any inviolable rights of each individual human person when these seem to oppose alleged social advantages; yet it does not want to confess any open denial of such rights.

Excellent criticisms of the legal reforms proposed by the American Law Institute and the American Medical Association are given. The first seems particularly unsatisfactory. Its model legislation is replete with vague terms, which tend to give support for far wider abortion policies than American public opinion is willing to support. Grisez reminds us that polls consistently show that the vast majority of Americans oppose abortion for socio-economic reasons, or in cases in which the mother simply does not want the child. Other significant aspects of public opinion are pointed out: women disapprove of abortion more than men do; disapproval of abortion is strongest among those of deepest religious convictions, who attend church frequently-among these differences between Protestants and Catholics are not great; and the poor disapprove of abortion more than the prosperous.

Chapter six, "Ethical Arguments," is the most important chapter in the volume. Grisez packs much into its pages: a discussion of the most important contemporary approaches to the subject (as relativism, utilitarianism, situationism), a statement and defense of his own moral theory, and a detailed study of the morality of abortion in various circumstances. The positive exposition of his own moral philosophy is a splendid original expression of a realistic ethical philosophy. It presents a philosophy of practical principles in a sophisticated form, calculated to stand against the well-known contemporary objections to such a view; it is clear, consistent, and persuasive. (pp.

Clearly a critical question is: Is the embryo or fetus a human being? Grisez insists on separating a factual question about humanity (" Is this embro or fetus living, individual, and specifically human? ") from the more important metaphysical or religious question of personality (" Is this individual a person, to be treated as a subject of real rights? ") . (p. Q73)

The factual question is solved chiefly by reflecting on biological data. At every stage from fertilization to birth and maturity there is clearly present a reality that is living, individual, and distinctively human (biologically, genetically). Though problems about individuality arise from a study of, e. g., twins, the individuality of the zygote relative to the parent is evident from conception. Arguments against counting genetic evidence as sufficiently decisive for the *factual* question are carefully considered. Garret Hardin's analogy from blueprints (immanent possession of a genetic packet of information is said to make the zygote a human no more than a blue print's possession of a house's structure makes it a young house) and Rev. Joseph Donceel's return to a rather outmoded Aristotelian view are shown to suffer, among other things, from a common defeat: failure to reflect upon the living, immanently directed, continuous development of prenatal life. (pp. Q75-83)

Grisez does not attempt a positive metaphysical demonstration that every living individual human is a person. He is fully aware that in a pluralistic society no such thesis will achieve sufficiently general acceptance as to form a basis for practical policy. Rather, he first shows that suggested narrower determinations of personhood are inadequate when critically examined. For example, many prefer to take the adult as the paradigm for personhood and declare that personhood is present only when there is a developed capacity for reasoning, desiring, relating to others, and the like. But the intolerable consequences of this view are not honestly faced by its proponents. Such a view must classify born infants as non-persons also; and it tends very strongly to deny personhood to all those who in various ways lose significant possession of such capacities. Attempts to formulate a credible notion of personhood tailored to exclude unborn infants but include all other humans have not proved successful.

Then Grisez points out that the peculiar status of the concept of person forbids us to rule away the possible rights of candidates for personhood by the arbitrary decision to count only some humans as persons. It would be interesting to compare Grisez's argument (pp. 277-87) with the one R. M. Hare uses in the final chapter of *Freedom and Reason* againmt racism. Hare argues that a universal prescription is implied in every moral judgment. To test the presence of this formal requirement an imaginative experiment is sometimes helpful. For example, one who that some human individuals (as Jews or Negroes) do not count as persons or deserve full human rights must envisage himself in the role of

one of those whose contested rights would be disregarded if the judgment in question were applied. If he cannot honestly prescribe that others should then treat him as a non-person, as one without rights, he does not in fact hold his original principle as a moral one. Similarly, Grisez argues that we must take the point of view of the fetus and judge that the fetus would opt for personhood and the right to live. Certainly, he adds, no apodictic argument can be advanced to show that the fetus is not a person. In view of this (while we may have a right to hold any metaphysical theories we choose} we must in ethics treat the fetus as a person. For " to be willing to kill what for all we know could be a person is to be willing to kill it if it is a person." (p. 306) A certain terrible pattern has been followed many times in history. Those humans whose lives, property, or freedom have been the object of exploitation were first declared non-persons by the definitions of other men: Indians, Jews Negroes, infants that were to be exposed. Those who find it socially convenient and profitable to kill unborn children for the sake of other men are not clear heirs of a liberal tradition.

Admission of the personhood of the fetus does not prejudge the question of whether circumstances sometimes make it justifiable to perform acts that deprive them of life. Certain kinds of killing in self-defense or war, for example, have commonly been considered legitimate. But in facing this issue Grisez expresses the need to have a set of consistent moral principles concerning human life. Catholic moralists have often been accused of failing to express the same concern for the sanctity of human life when capital punishment or war are concerned as when abortion is being considered. Working carefully out of his basic philosophy of practical principles, and using a revised principle of double effect, Grisez seeks to spell out a fully consistent moral approach to the taking of human life (in a recent article he has developed this attempt more fully: "Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* Vol. 15, 1970, pp. 64-96). While consistency here is certainly essential, the very sketchy treatment of extremely complex issues like those of capital punishment and nuclear deterrence do not add strength to the book. For abortion and every other kind of killing, Grisez argues that only an indirect taking of human life can be morally justified. But he argues that operations considered instances of direct killing by most Catholic moralists (such as craniotomies} are really indirect.

A modification of the double effect theory, based on reflections on Thomas's classic treatment of self-defense *(Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 64, a. 7) , is invoked to defend this contention. Grisez objects to the traditional requirement that "the evil effect must not (even physically} be the means to the good effect." Thomas, Grisez asserts, " does not make an issue of which effect (aspect of the act} is prior in physical causality." (p. 333)

In fact, Grisez sees the act of self-defense as often achieving its end only (physically) through the bad effect: it may be only the killing of the attacker that secures the defense. But that is not important. What is essential is that the human act itself should initiate an indivisible process leading to the good effect and that the agent intend only the good effect. The craniotomy, for example, immediately relieves a pressure tending to destroy the mother's life and immediately begins a process of healing; it also causes death. Because the action with equal immediacy initiates a healing process and causes death, one intending only the healing may rightly say that the healing is indirect, Grisez holds.

On the one hand, many advantages can be realized from this reform of the principle of double effect. The sharpest objections to a morality upholding any absolute principles and utilizing the principle of double effect have been largely based on an intuitive conviction that certain apparently necessary consequences of such a view are plainly wrong: that, for example, a mother must die, and perhaps die with her child, rather than have a craniotomy. (Cfr. J. Bennett, "Whatever the Consequences," *Analysis*, Jan. 1966, pp. 83-102.) Grisez escapes this difficulty. Moreover, his modifications do not labor under the same drastic defeats that he sharply criticises in the work of Peter Knauer, S. J., William van der Marek, O. **P.,** and Cornelius van der Poel. (pp. 329-33)

But these advantages are perhaps bought at too high a cost. The old danger of justifying the doing of evil that good may come of it may lurk here, in spite of the author's attempt to avoid it. I fear that many more killings than those Grisez wishes to accomodate, and many other kinds of acts commonly held intrinsically immoral among Catholic moralists, may gain support from his revised principle. Abortions that simply promote a mother's health, physical or mental, and abortions in the case of rape, can be counted indirect according to this revised principle. Grisez indeed argues that these other indirect abortions would be immoral, because in his view it would never be reasonable to try to preserve one's own or another's health by an act that would cause someone's death. But that is far from evident. Were it true, a man would be morally obliged to endure a criminal beating from a criminal assailant if he could ward off the harm only by an act that has unintended deadly consequences.

The error in Grisez's position, if it is an error, arises out of neglecting an important factor in the self-defense example of St. Thomas. There it was not a question of performing any action whatever that simply happens to save one life and destroy another. It was precisely a matter of warding off an unjust assault. Certainly it is true that the same overt behavior might serve as a vehicle for different intentions and so serve as the physical basis of morally different kinds of acts (as burning a wound might be either cauterizing or torturing) . But it is not " physicalism " in any bad sense

to say that different real contexts have major moral significance and that a proper directing of the intention is not sufficient for absolving the agent from direct responsibility for evils effected in all cases.

Thus, one who cauterizes a wound knows he is causing pain but knows also that he is not torturing. But one who performs a craniotomy knows that he is in fact killing an innocent person. And he wants to do this; not indeed as an end, but so that through this he may achieve a great good. The whole nature of an evil act remains immanent in the broader act of initiating a saving process. It is unlike the case of self-defense, where the killing of the assailant is not a necessary means, a stage on the way to the end. That killing in self-defense, if it is justifiable, is simply a consequence of an act of preventing an unjustified assault. But the killing in a craniotomy is deliberately done as an understood part of the saving process. Moralists certainly ought to examine Grisez's arguments here with great care. It is indeed true that the procedures in question are in fact virtually never required to save a mother's life; but the principle involved is of the greatest importance.

The final chapter, "Toward a Sound Social Policy," begins with a balanced treatment of the complex current debate of the relations between law and morality, largely growing out of the Devlin-Hart controversy. There follows an excellent series of studies on legal developments touching the rights of fetuses concerning property, the law of torts, and criminal law. In every instance a parallel tendency is seen. As scientific evidence for the humanity of the unborn from conception grows, recognition of their human rights in law begins to grow. Only when the special pragmatic interest of those favoring abortion becomes stronger does this liberal trend suffer.

Law suffers from many inconsistencies at present. Grisez highlights some of the intolerable consequences of counting the unborn as persons in some relationships but not in others. He realizes that law certainly need not define everything in a single way for all purposes. But when judgment on a plausible claim for full personal dignity is at stake, a clear and consistent position is essential. Grisez argues that "correct public policy for a pluralistic society is to accept the more comprehensive rather than an exclusive view." (pp. 418-19) A more comprehensive view, recognizing the legal rights of every living human, does not deny anyone's right to his own metaphysical or religious opinion. But it does give to each plausible claimant of personhood an equal hearing, and a recognition that could be denied only on the basis of restrictive dogmas devoid of real factual basis. It is noted that the Supreme Court in a recent quasi-definition of person (in *Levy vs. Louisiana,* 1968) proposed criteria fully satisfied by the unborn from the time of their conception: that they are persons who are "humans, live, and have their

being." The chapter concludes with a practical " Strategy in Defense of Life," for the use of those deeply concerned to act in defense of the rights of the most defenseless of humans. An epiloque discusses the nature and the deep roots of what should properly be called a *prejudice* of many against the unborn, a prejudice as dehumanizing as that of racism.

This review can only suggest the wealth of information and the richness of the analysis in Grisez's study. This book would certainly be a precious tool for any class in contemporary moral questions. It honestly faces all the terrible complexity of live moral debate and manages to escape a question-begging commitment on one side and scepticism or relativism on the other. No one seriously interested in the abortion controversy can afford to neglect this outstanding work.

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The Philosophy of the Church Fathers. Volume I. Faith, Trinity, !nearnation. By HARRY AusTRIN WoLFSON. Third Edition, Revised. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 663. $12.50.

The present controversy about the value of dogmatic formulas and the modern form to be given to the *depositum fidei,* to make it meaningful for today, has again raised the question of the "Hellenization of Christianity." Anyone interested in this problem should read Professor Harry A. Wolfson's book on Faith, Trinity and Incarnation which was published first in 1956 and has become a classic in the field. The recasting of Christian beliefs in the form of a philosophy and the producing of a Christian version of Greek philosophy is one of the most interesting subjects in the history of theology. While the work is primarily a study of the Church Fathers, chapters on the New Testament appear as background.

Part One provides an investigation of St. Paul's allegorical interpretation as related to that of the Fathers. The faith theories of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, and Augustine are given an excellent analysis. Part Two traces the origin of the Trinitarian formula and the differentiation of the Logos and the Holy Spirit ending with a study of the Logos and Platonic ideas. Part Three deals with three mysteries of the faith, the mystery of the generation, the mystery of the Trinity with the solutions proposed by Origen, Tertullian, Basil, Augustine, and John of Damascus, and the mystery of the Incarnation. Part Four presents an analysis of Gnosticism as an attempt to Christianize pagan

philosophy. The discovery of the papyri of Nag Hammadi has shed an entirely new light on this development.

Wolfson's book, here in its third and revised edition, forms volume I of the *Philosophy of the Church Fathers.* It is to be hoped that the other volumes will soon follow. Even if one does not agree with all of the author's conclusions, his book remains one of the most challenging of our times.

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Readings in Ancient Western Philosophy. Edited by GEORGE F. McLEAN, O. M. I. and PATRICK J. ASPELL, O. M. I. New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1970. Pp. *$3.50.*

The traditional introductory course in ancient philosophy threatens to become a true "dark night" for those who lecture undergraduates as we move into the tempestuous nineteen-seventies. Although some teachers will devise gimmicks-are Heidegger and Hesse, after all, so far removed from Hesiod and Heraclitus?-it will be difficult to do so without brooding over the fact that content has been sacrified for contemporaneity.

The present anthology probably does as much as can be done to present one segment of our intellectual history for the college audience without attaching itself to a scheme which might attract attention at the expense of allowing the development of thought in the West to manifest itself. McLean and Aspell take us from the myth-like origins of philosophy to the "standard" pre-Socratics, and then through Plato, Aristotle, and the ethical philosophies of the so-called Hellenistic-Roman period, concluding with a substantial portion of Plotinus. This latter is especially welcome, since the mystical disciple of Ammonias Saccas has tended to get lost in the "intertestamental" period of Western philosophy. Besides, if gimmicks are to be shunned, the *Enneads* have considerable possibility for making ancient thought vivid for a generation increasingly taken up with transcendental thought and spiritualism.

The editors have contoured their selections into three parts marking the origin and growth of Greek philosophy, its maturation, and the shift from metaphysical speculation to ethical concerns under the practical Roman influence. Almost half the volume, Chapters 7 and 8, are devoted to Plato and Aristotle. This procedure is defended by the editors in such wise: "The acid test of time has unveiled Aristotle's philosophy,

along with that of Plato, as. . . the two major statements of classical Greek thought." (p. 173) This observation is typical of the introductory material found thoughout the work; it is mainly factual and generalizations are so broad as to offend no one who would harbor a private thesis as to the relative significance of the ancients.

The Chapters are followed by series of study questions and a " Thematic Table " enhances the volume's value for college level courses. This latter is a valuable aid in relating the historical aspect of philosophy to the main divisions, as traditionally conceived, of the subject. The themes parcel out the texts found in the anthology under eight headings such as epistemology, psychology and theodicy; it would be a useful classroom task to run both historical and theme approaches, and in this case, at least, it would be feasible. The ten chapters are firmed up with extensive bibliography, quite up-to-date, although one would like to see included some of the more adventuresome interpretations of ancient thought, such as F. Clive's two-volume " The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy " (Nijhoff, 1965) .

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A History of Western Philosophy: Volume II, Philosophy from St. Augustine to Ockham. By RALPH M. MciNERNY. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970. Pp. 401.

To my knowledge this volume represents the latest effort of its kind in the field of Medieval philosophy; it also marks the second volume in a new series devoted to the history of Western philosophy. R. Caponigri and R. Mcinerny have joined efforts in producing a set of textbooks purposely aimed at promoting " the return of the history of philosophy to its rightful place of honor and usefulness in the academic program." (xiii) The fourth volume, *Philosophy from the Romantic Age to the Age of Analysis,* has not appeared. When it does, the series will compete with that edited under the general direction of E. Gilson (although one volume of that series is, I believe, lacking) . A. Maurer authored the Medieval volume of the Toronto set; it is presently almost ten years old. Certainly a singular feature of Mcinerny's work is that it is not written on the Toronto bias. The author is not in sympathy with the Christian philosophy thesis of E. Gilson. In fact, he implies that the entire *raison d'etre* of his work is to provide a history of Medieval philosophy which is willing to acknowledge in that period an independent and autonomous

philosophy. "If that phrase [Christian philosophy] accurately described the philosophical contribution of the Middle Ages, we would see little point in writing this present book." (p. 8)

Mcinerny's text is suitably done. He discusses everyone who should be discussed, although not everything; e. g., shortshrift is made of the Condemnation of 1Q77 and so-called "Latin Averroism." Also I do find it a mark of disproportion that the author devotes only one paragraph(!) to Jewish thought in the Middle Ages while a whole chapter is devoted to " other ninth and tenth century figures " such as Heiric and Remigius of Auxerre and Gerbert of Aurillac. His style is clear but very academic: at times it languishes under the burden of the material. One questions the need for a " sustained look " of nine pages at Gundissalinus's *De divisione philosophiae* in a college textbook. While there is ample reference to the primary sources, the bibliographies placed at the end of each section are slim. The volume certainly does not qualify as a reference tool in the way that Gilson's classic, *A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages,* does.

In brief, the college teacher who wishes to have everything " right there " will find Mcinerny's work a handy instrument and certainly adequate for that purpose. The authors, however, plainly advise instructors to avoid "teaching this book" (xiv) but rather to use it as a guide for creatively planning a course. An alternative program I personally have found more successful for planning a college course in this area is the choice of any number of high quality paperbacks, many of which contain editions of primary sources with brief introductions. The truly creative teacher can present his students three or four more specialized volumes which cover the same material and afford a refreshing change of style, attitude, and approach to the field of Medieval philosophy.

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Contemporary German Philosophy and Its Background. By FRITZ-JOACHIM voN RrNTELEN. Bonn: Bouvier, 1970. Pp. 187. DM Q6.

This survey of the German philosophical scene belongs in the respected tradition of the earlier accounts by Werner Brock and I. M. Bochenski. The author does not dig into the individual thinkers as deeply as did Brock and does not share Bochenski's concern for other European traditions. But brevity combines with sureness of touch to give a special

quality to Rintelen's book as a useful first introduction for college students. The careful organization of chapters and clear exposition of doctrines testify to Rintelen's long experience as teacher and author, as well as his firsthand acquaintance with American universities and the needs of students. The book is a revised version of lectures delivered originally at the University of Southern California.

The term " background " appearing in the title enables Rintelen to enlarge his scope to include the entire twentieth century. This gives valuable depth to the perspectives taken on each school so that some of its presuppositions can come into view. For instance, the reader will be able to find here some specific content for the much-used, yet vague term "Neo-Kantianism," which figures so prominently in discussions of the development of Husserl and Heidegger. Together with a general characterization, the book probes into the main men and philosophical issues distinguishing the Marburg and Heidelberg schools. The stress upon background also permits Rintelen to recall the work done by Dilthey in the field of historical understanding of cultural realities, as well as the contributions of Brentano to the phenomenological movement.

The five main currents presented here are: philosophy of logos, life-philosophy, essence-phenomenology, philosophy of existence, and philosophy of the living spirit. The first division is a rather uneasy unification of the Neo-Kantians and the logical positivists, taken together in virtue of their common interest in the formal analysis of science. But the Kantians tend to develop ethics and the human sciences, while the positivists move on to a new career in America as more pragmatic thinkers. Life-philosophy arouses interest mainly through Driesch, Spengler, and the inclusion here of Gestalt psychology. We come to the heart of German philosophizing in present-tense terms only with the last three schools. Rintelen is quite evenhanded in presenting the several phases of Husserl's phenomenology, neither contracting it to a logical methodology nor dissolving it in transcendental reductions without end. Having done good interpretative work previously on Heidegger and Jaspers, the author is specially lively in presenting them within their own atmosphere of problems. He also adds an interesting account of F. 0. Bollnow's efforts to move beyond the classical German existentialists.

Rintelen comes into his own territory in treating the philosophy of living spirit. Having criticized the existentialists (in a separate section) for not working out the relation between concrete uniqueness and the more comprehensive aspects of being and moral obligation to the world community, he seeks a synthesis of the existential and the phenomenological. " Hence there has come forth in Germany another direction of thought which could be called the philosophy of *lebendiger Geist,* of the 'living Spirit,' which endeavors to bring the existential and phenomenolog-

ical extremes together in a higher unity." The book culminates with an analysis of this unifying school, represented by Spranger and Litt, Leo Gabriel and Max MUller, Nicolai Hartman and Rintelen himself. The latter holds " that the order of values reveals a dynamic, *vertical* ' upward ' axis-of-meaning *(Sinnachse)* in which, however, the *horizontal* value form which is valid in this actuation should not be lost sight of." More of his realistic analysis of values can be found in Rintelen's article in *International Philosophical Quarterly* (vol. 4, 1964).

This is a well-informed, communicative, and generous-spirited invitation to the study of present forms of German philosophy. With its help, one can gain an initial orientation and can also appreciate why the questions of meaning, being, and human cultural unification are so central. With his brief mention of Ernst Bloch and Viktor Frankl, Rintelen leaves us with an opening toward other tendencies as well.

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The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T. Delos. Edited by ALBERT BRODERICK. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. *395. $15.00.*

The procedural framework of the legal system occupies a central position in recent studies of contemporary jurisprudence and the comparative philosophy of law. The processes of law, as Paul Freund recently remarked, rather than its particular judgments or results, offer insights which "may teach us to cope with the great antinomies of our aspirations: liberty and order; privacy and knowledge; stability and change; security and responsibility." [1]

The legal enterprise, defined in Henry M. Hart's studies around the principle of institutionalized decision and settlement, is a creative force in society. Law serves persons in radical interdependence by procedures to duly direct and domesticate power. The legal order is a positive context for the developing interrelationships of rights and duties between individuals and organizations within the national state and the international community.

Focusing upon the centrality of a progressive and societal role of law jurists are increasingly turning from treatises preoccupied with systematic

[1] *On Law and Justice* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1969), p. v.

conceptualization and codification to a methodology of interdisciplinary analysis. Illustrative of this trend are the recent studies of Freund, Lon L. Fuller's *The Anatomy of Law*, and two very significant studies of the judicial process, Alexander Bickel's *The Supreme Court and the Idea of Justice* and Schubert and Danelski's *Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West.*

The present collection of essays taken from the writings of Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard and Joseph T. Delos brings welcome light upon the American scene. Careful editing and meticulous annotation make this volume a valuable contribution to the analytic endeavor. An equally worthy translation serves to convey with clarity and precision the thinking of the great French jurists as they explored the dynamics of social interaction to establish law and right upon the institutional foundations of society.

Roscoe Pound classified the work of Maurice Hauriou, Dean of the Faculte de Droit of Toulouse in the first quarter of the century, as neo-scholastic sociological jurisprudence. What Kant attributed in the development of legal obligation to will, Marx to economic wants, Post to instincts, Weber to values, and William James to desires and demands in conflict, Pound says Hauriou ascribed to institutions. [2] Pound found this a dangerous shift of the basic legal unit away from the individual man. He feared submergence in the demands of the corporate state. Yet it is now clear that Hauriou compensated by a rich personalism which enabled him to strike a theoretical balance that Pound had failed to see.

Hauriou sought an explanation for the developing legal order that would avoid both an individualistic disintegration in the fictionalized citadel of contract and the denigration of legal personality by the equation of legal order with the state. For this reason he repeatedly criticized Leon Duguit, who he thought had used sociological theory in such a way as to jeopardize the very integrity of personal rights as a creation of the mass of consciences. This he thought would leave unprotected the rights of any dissident minority. But with equal vigor he opposed Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law as a formalistic construct unrelated to the dynamics of the social factor. Both extremes failed to account for the complexities or the evolution of positive law by reducing them to a single explanation, a "monism " as he termed it. The individual, Hauriou believed, is antecedent to both law and state, not in the privity of a shielded subjectivity but as a social being, as needing for growth and fulfillment the structure of institutionalized relationships.

Hauriou's studies of French administrative law, of which he is the acknowledged master, led him to the theory of institution. The integration

• *Jumprudrmce* (St. Paul: The West Publishing Co., 1959), I, 842.

of custom, contract, and legislation in a processive and relational matrix of positive law has been further developed by his two most important disciples, Georges Renard, formerly professor of public law at Nancy, and Joseph T. Delos, professor of sociology and law at Lille. These have gone beyond Hauriou into a general institutional theory or philosophy of law. Of the three, Delos alone, who contributes a retrospective essay to this volume, is still alive.

Man in his natural sociability is the basic datum, the principal " social fact " in a galaxy of interrelated phenomena which supply the concrete concern for justice in positive law. In the view of the institutionalists, these social facts tend to coalesce in structured institutions under the influence of directive ideas. The rational element or guiding idea is the leading reason for cooperation in the formation of organizations and the vital, moving force of institutions. Hauriou defined institution basically as:

> ... an idea of a work or enterprise that is realized and endures juridically in a social milieu; for the realization of this idea, a power is organized that equips it with organs; on the other hand, among the members of the social group interested in the realization of the idea, manifestations of communion occur that are directed by the organs of the power and regulated by procedures. (p. 99)

The role of authority within any institution is to further the attainment of this organizing and directive idea. The exercise of authority, however, depends on the observable stage of ideational development, wherein the role of sociology is pivotal. Social facts supply the stuff of positive law, but the directing idea remains normative. Progress in society depends upon the rational development of basic ideas in the light of critical moral principles bearing upon the values of order, justice and liberty, and the need procedurally to balance power with power to compensate for human weaknesses.

The legal enterprise is thus the art of achieving the idea, the common personal and social objectives of interdependent men and institutions. In this sense law is preeminently practical. Hauriou cited favorably the definition of Celsus that law is an art, *ars boni et aequi.* Utilizing the data of the social and behavioral sciences law properly functions to the attainment of fundamental moral ideas for the common good of society. These moral ideas can be verified by the observation of the reality of men living in society.

As Delos remarks, this means preeminently a return to reality, to an objective natural law based upon the observation of human nature, not as an abstract notion or concept but as that which is " most real and most living in each one, the principle of all the instincts, vital forces, intellectual, moral or physical needs, that give birth to the life of society and provide it with its ends." (p. *9!65)*

Social relationships are real. They constitute an "objective reality, exterior to the individuals who are the support and the terms of these relationships, and they are irreducible to psychological or interpsychological realities." (p. Thus, institutions as unlike as the family and the organized international society have an incontestable natural foundation in an observable reality.

> An institutional conception of law thus means . . . a conception of juridical reality that, applied to foundations and groups, brings out the fundamental role of the directing idea; applied to the study of the legislative act, emphasizes its nature as an "incarnate idea"; and finally, applied to contract, explains its true nature, shows that it is not a simple balance between two wills but that it too is institutional in nature and gravitates around an organizing idea. (p. fl52)

Law is never merely the manifestation of will. Thus, an analysis of the realities themselves, a study of the internal structure of the juridical act, definitively casts subjectivism and voluntarism outside the domain of the philosophy of law.

> Right and duty manifest themselves when reason fulfills its proper office and, considering the beings in question, *judges* what their reciprocal relationships should be in order to conform to their nature. Reason then discerns *an order of natural balance*, that is, an order of justice that is founded not on arbitrary subjective evaluations but on the objective value of beings. Law is born when reason is no longer content with simply verifying the nature of beings but draws normative consequences from them. The jurist is a sociologist who adds to his preoccupations a concern for order. (p. fl61)

Positive law, Delos explains, IS the normative expression of the social order of justice and balance. The order of justice is then truly a societal order, and every act of justice performed by an individual realizes an " element " of the social order.

The institutionalized conception of law is purposeful and dynamic. It sees positive law as intent upon achieving human group aims in a process of development. The juridical rule is neither a deductive concept nor the arbitrary and subjective decision of a judge. Rule and social reality are interrelated. Law develops from the society which takes priority to it and to which it is ultimately subservient. The rule of law is not a purely formal reality; it is a social form, a social manner of behavior expressed in positively juridical terms.

This brief outline fails to do justice to the profundity of legal analysis attained by the French institutional jurists. Time and again the perceptive insight of these men rises to be captured in application to contemporary problems of right and order, due process, judicial prospectivity, and rapidly expanding vistas of domestic and international law. One senses in agreement with the editor the similarity between Myres McDougal's

" goal-thinking " and Hauriou, while wondering about the influence of Fran<;ois Geny, Renard's dean at Nancy, on American jurisprudence through Benjamin Cardozo's frequent citation of him in the famous *The Nature of the Judicial Process.* Beneath the scholastic categories of Renard and Delos, matter and form, substance and accident, foreign to the ken of most American jurists, one discovers a concern similar to Freund's impatience with one-dimensional thinking and his aspiration that the courts serve as "the conscience of the country." [3]

The evolution of legal rights need not only mean the explicitation of new demands upon society nor even the unfolding of natural law through progressive applications as " the evolution of human life brings to light new necessities in human nature that are struggling for expression." [4] As Broderick himself has ably demonstrated, the insight of the French institutionalists may well transcend the naked individualism of Locke and also the static conceptualism of latter-day exponents of an objective natural law.[5] Providing a broader empirical base of observation, it gives a more convincing legal analysis of the present scene.

The French Institutionalists appears as volume VIII in the Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series published under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools. With glossary and comments by Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Andre Hauriou, Bernard Geny, and Marcel Waline, it will stand as an exemplary work of comparative jurisprudence.

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The Paradoxical Structure of Existence. By FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN. Irving, Texas: The University of Dallas Press, 1970. Pp. 175.

As Jacques Maritain wrote:

A deep vice besets the philosophers of our day, whether they be neo-Kantians, neo-positivists, idealists, Bergsonians, logisticians, pragmatists, neo-Spinozists, or neo-mystics. It is the ancient error of the *nomitnalists.* In different forms, and with various degrees of awareness, they all blame knowledge-through-concepts for

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 115 and 96.

• John Courtney Murray, *We Hold These Truths* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960)' p. 818.

• " Evolving Due Process and the French Institutionalists," *The Catholic University of America Law Review,* 136 (1964), 95-135; "Rights, Rhetoric and Reality: A New Look at Old Theory," *ibid.,* 19 (1969), 183-157.

not being a suprasensible intuition of the existing singular . . . They cannot forgive that knowledge for not opening directly on existence as sensation does, but only onto essences, possibles. *(Degrees of Knowledge,* trans. Phelan, p. 1)

Maritain's list could now be considerably enlarged. Regretably, among those included would be many who are otherwise realists; and not the least of these would be Frederick D. Wilhelmsen. This book is a well-written and learned attempt at a metaphysical synthesis which not only adresses fundamental theoretical questions but also confronts the contemporary spiritual crisis experienced by the human person. Central to the way in which Wilhelmsen has articulated the many valid insights found here, however, is his belief that "we humans simply cannot think the act of existing, cannot conceive in an idea that without which nothing would be." (p. 133) And what better reason could be offered for this belief than the description of conceptual knowledge given by Maritain? Concepts grasp "essences, possibles." Existence, on the contary, is " the supreme and perfect act." (p. 50) Rather than being a possible, existence is the act of all acts, it is that which possibility is the possibility of. So for existence to be known by a concept would be a paradox of the highest order.

On the other hand, the main theme of this book is the paradoxical structure of existence itself. Since it cannot be known by means of concepts, existence cannot be treated as a logical "something." Consequently it cannot be the subject of affirmation or denial; it neither is nor is not. Things exist; existence does not. The principle of non-contradiction therefore operates at the level of essence, not existence. And because existence is neither affirmed nor denied, our metaphysical knowledge of it is best understood as an ongoing process of reasoning about existence which never ceases but is always leading to new reasonings.

A paradoxical metaphysics accepts the tensions resulting from existence's transcendence of the principle of non-contradiction. A dialectical metaphysics of the Hegelian variety tries to resolve the tensions in a higher unity. Hegelian metaphysics is the natural result of interpreting the act of existence as the object of a concept. In other words, Wilhelmsen attempts to deduce Hegel's errors from the fallacy of objectifying being conceptually. If the act of existing is treated as a " something," it follows that it must be identified with its conceptual opposite, non-being; the Hegelian dialectic is thus generated.

From the point of view of the paradoxical structure of existence, Gorl can be approached differently from the way he is approached in the ordinary causal proofs. These proofs seek an explanation for existence seen as *in* things rather than seen as transcending the order of things and their natures. If the act of existing is that without which nothing is and if finite existence itself is not, there must be some act of existing which is.

The recognition that finite existence is not an m itself " and so cannot be affirmed implies the recognition that finite existence is something completely relational to some existence that is an " in itself " and can be affirmed. For modern man who has experienced the non-identity of essence with its own existence, the only alternative to the recognition of the paradoxical structure of existence and the affirmation of God it implies is the fall back into the nothingness of essence stripped of existence. And the experience of nothingness implies that existence is taken as a "something" which can have a contradictory opposite. Furthermore, personality is a function of existence rather than nature. Not being a "something," existence is not to be considered identical with itself. It follows that persons whose essence is distinct from existence have being only in relation to, and find their identity only in, an existence which is identical with itself, God.

But if existence's inability to be conceptualizeJ prevents us from either affirming or denying that existence exists, how are we able to affirm that pure existence, God, exists? This appears to be one of the paradoxical tensions that metaphysics must accept rather than attempt to resolve. " The affirmation of a non-affirmable existence *is* the affirmation of Being Itself, God." (p. 102) If Wilhelmsen can accept paradoxes such as the affirmation of God, however, why not the paradox of a concept of existence? In fact the proposition that God is and others like it show that we can know existence by means of a concept. As I have argued in this journal (July, 1970), paradox in indeed a permanent condition for metaphysics. There is nothing wrong with Wilhelmsen holding this. What ir wrong is that he is not sufficiently faithful to his own insight; what is wrong is that he has *conceptualized* that insight improperly.

To admit that we can formulate and judge a proposition about a being that is its own existence is to admit that we can conceive the act of existing. As Wilhelmsen himself points out, we certainly do not have a vision of this being Who is existence. And when we formulate and judge propositions about this being, we are not doing the kind of thing we do in our external-sense-life which opens onto existence. In fact, how can we even *entertain the question* of whether there is a pure existence unless we are employing a concept of existence? What are concepts after all but instruments with which we formulate propositions so that we can then judge truth from falsity thereby knowing reality? (And to say that propositions are formed by means of such instruments is not to say that a judgment is a juxaposition of concepts. Cf. pp. 164-5) While we are entertaining the question of a pure existence, we are not making any judgment regarding this existence. And though, while considering the question, we may be in a process of reasoning, reasoning employs judgments, and judgments concepts. Essential to the job that the distinction

between " conceiving " and " judging " performs both in ordinary and in philosophic language is the function of marking the difference in our state of mind when we have reached a decision on a question from our state of mind when we have not reached a decision yet know perfectly well what the question is about. Suppressing the term " concept " here would accomplish nothing more than to force us to invent another form of expression to do exactly the same job.

What now becomes of the theory that, since existence cannot be conceived, it cannot be the subject or predicate of affirmation or negation? Even if it were conclusive, the evidence Wilhelmsen presents for this (pp. 71, 95-96) would apply to only one kind of judgment about existence, judgments expressing the contingent fact that an existence exists or does not exist. No evidence he presents indicates in the slightest degree that we cannot make another kind of assertion concerning existence, assertions of a kind Wilhelmsen himself makes literally hundreds of times throughout this book. On page after page existence functions either as grammatical subject, e. g., "The act of existing encounters its identity, its 'Is,' in Him," (p. 104) or as grammatical predicate after the copula, e. g., "that 'plus' or 'excess' which is the act of existing." (p. 117) And whatever Wilhelmsen may say about existence transcending the principle of non-contradiction inasmuch as it cannot be conceived, I doubt very much whether he wants to exempt any of his propositions of this latter kind from the injunction against being simultaneously true and false.

If Wilhelmsen does not think he is employing a concept of existence when he formulates these propositions, what instruments does he think he is using? Perhaps the book does not contain an answer to this question; but on one interpretation it does. And except for the fact that it is consistent with the texts, that interpretation is almost beyond belief.

> Metaphysics advances, not by the progressive expansion of concepts, but by ever-deepening insights into the paradox of existence. . . . It follows that the philosopher penetrates the mystery of being only by fashioning a symbolic structure through which he can read the paradox of existence. . . .
>
> Ideas in a state of pure abstraction are impersonal, common, the universal property of the race. Therefore ideas are always banal. Judgements, however, always involve the whole man and are therefore personal. It follows that a penetration of existence, while rigorously scientific, is eminently personal. Since existence is neither affirmed nor denied, existence is never a (conceptual) presence to the human intelligence. It follows that existence can be " grasped " only in and through sensorial symbols. (pp. 184-5)

In other words, he appears to be doing more than g1vmg sensorial symbols a role in our knowledge of existence; he seems to be giving them

a role that replaces the one mistakenly assigned to concepts. And that amounts to replacing an intellectual grasp of existence with a sub-intellectual grasp of existence. No wonder metaphysics has always had such difficulty if all along it has been using the wrong tool, if it has been using the intelligence when it should have been using the imagination.

Whatever may have been Wilhelmsen's intentions in these texts, the place he gives to sensory symbols leads him to devote a chapter to " The Philosopher and the Myth." The interesting comments made there on the relation between myth, symbol, and philosophy are somewhat. obscured by his attempt to express that relation in terms of the traditional doctrine of the phantasm. He claims (p. 163) that, in his usage, " symbol " means the same thing that " phantasm " usually means. Consequently his theory of the dependence of philosophy on myth is presented as a valid development of the doctrine that all knowledge, including metaphysics, makes use of phantasms. But he goes on to describe these symbols as instrumental signs. "A symbol is a material action or thing consciously used to mean." (p. 167, see also 164) And the phantasm is represented not as the instrument of the agent intellect but as cause of the intelligible species in the order of specification. So his symbols are a long way from what is usually understood by " phantasm."

Still Wilhelmsen has a keen sensitivity for the dependence of intellection on the formation of adequate sense images; his appreciation of McLuhan is evidence enough for this. And like McLuhan, though going much further in his own way, Wilhelmsen sees this dependence not simply in terms of solitary images but in terms of whole patterns of sensory response and historically conditioned cultural and linguistic symbolic structures. As a matter of fact, he sees man's historical existence not merely as providing psychological conditions for philosophizing but as providing " an ontological experience which enters integrally into the act of philosophizing." (p. 132) So to fulfill its own nature, philosophy must include a penetration of man's historical existence.

Against this justification of the philosophy of history, on the other hand, it can be objected that science is of the necessary and unchanging whereas actual historical existence is contingent and fleeting. This is why many have felt that philosophy must deal with the order of the possibles and not therefore with the actually existing historical order. Conversely, Wilhelmsen feels that recognizing knowledge of existential act to be the goal of metaphysics both refutes the view that philosophy deals with being as possible and opens the way to philosophical reflection on history itself. At this point, then, let us take up the problem of possibility which was mentioned at the outset as a difficulty for the view that existence can be known by means of a concept.

In the writings of thinkers like Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain, (and

Phelan) , we find statements to the effect that the propositions of metaphysics bear indifferently on existence as either actual or possible; and since the possible includes the actual in its extension, it is enough to say that metaphysics is about existence as possible. So the phrase " about existence as possible " is intended as a description of a proposition, say (p); and it is intended to be used in epistemological sentences of the form "(p) is about existence as possible." Now our problem can be illustrated by substituting for (p) true metaphysical propositions about existence which seem to render it impossible for the science of existence to be a science about a possible. Such propositions could be that existence is what is most actual in anything, or that nothing can be in act unless it has existence, or that if existence could be a possible, nothing could ever be in act for nothing could actualize existence itself, etc. But the simplest form of such a proposition would be that actual existence is in no respect a mere possible.

Now this proposition, the proposition that actual existence is in no respect a mere possible, in its full and unadulterated truth is a perfect example of a proposition about existence as possible. It, and the other truths that were mentioned or could have been mentioned, could function as a paradigm case of what has been meant when the statements of metaphysics have been described as being about existence as possible. Substituting for (p) we get "'Existence is in no respect a mere possible' is a proposition about existence as possible." How can this be? The latter "possible " does not refer to the object of metaphysical knowledge taken in its extra-mental state, the state which is known in and by means of metaphysical propositions such as we are considering. Rather it refers to the object of metaphysical knowledge taken in its state as object of the mind. And the phrase " about existence as possible " makes an epistemological reference to our *knowledge* of what is true of existence extra-mentally; it does not refer to what is true (and known to be true) of existence extra-mentally. This point has been so often misunderstood, I will try putting it one more way. "Possible" does not refer to what metaphysics knows about existence in its extra-mental state; it refers to existence in its state as object of metaphysics, that is, the state belonging to it *as a result* of being known as it is in its extra-mental state.

In general, though something may acquire characteristics in its being apprehended by the mind which differ from those belonging to it outside the mind, this does not deprive us of an accurate apprehension of the characteristics belonging to the thing outside the mind. In the case of anything which is extra-mental prior to its being made an object, unless we had knowledge of what is true of it extra-mentally, it would not have acquired different features within knowledge; for *it* would not be

known. So the acquisition of characteristics in knowledge (in order for the thing to be known) differing from those possessed outside of knowledge does not imply any difference between what is true of the thing outside the mind and that which is known about the thing. To say that existence in its state as object of metaphysical knowledge is possible existence, therefore, does not deny that what such knowledge knows about existence is that in itself it is fully actual, the exact opposite of mere possibility.

But what is there about metaphysical knowledge which allows us to describe the status of existence not in itself nor in regard to what is known about it by metaphysics but in regard to the condition it acquires within intellectual apprehension in order to be so known, as that of a possible? Knowing a truth such as " Existence is what is most actual in anything " involves knowing that if something new should come into existence tomorrow, its existence will be act relative to anything else found in it. It also involves knowing that if something existed in the past, its existence was that without which there would have been no other actuality in it. We are inquiring about what characterizes the act of all acts insofar as it acquires the state of being present in metaphysical apprehension. Metaphysics yields categorical judgments, no doubt. But the same metaphysical apprehension of existence also gives us knowledge of the necessary truth of hypothetical propositions, propositions true with reference to the existence of things that no longer exist or that do not exist as yet. In other words, metaphysics deals with existence in such a way as to give us knowledge of propositions true of either actual or possible existence, " possible " being the more inclusive term.

If the propositions of metaphysics were not necessarily true, then it could be that tomorrow the act of existing would cease being the act of all acts, that yesterday essences were not distinct from their existences, that they will cease being distinct from their existences next Tuesday, etc. It must be emphasized here that the existence apprehended in necessarily true hypothetical propositions *is exactly the same* as that completely non-hypothetical act which holds all things outside nothingness and which is apprehended in contingent categorical propositions such as "A plot to kidnap Henry Kissinger exists." The same existence is known in these two cases; the only difference comes in the manner in which it is known. And the manner in which existence is known is what the phrase " possible existence " is all about. One and the same existence can be known as the actuality of some contingent occurrence or it can be known as a subject which has a necessary connection with a certain predicate. Any difference between the existence known in the first instance and the existence known in the second lies entirely on the side of the status this identical object has *qua* object. In metaphysics existence

is made our object in such a way that we are able to know truths about it so necessary and so unchanging as to even apply to those acts of existence which have actualized beings in the past or will do so in the future. The fact that existence is made an object in this way is described by saying that the condition it acquires in apprehension in order for it to be so known is that of a possible.

If one does not grant the validity of the kind of distinction made here, it is difficult to see how he can handle analogous problems in other areas of philosophy. For example, we know what exists individually by means of universal concepts. What acquires the relation of universality in apprehension is (by the very definition of universality) *exactly the same* as what exists outside the mind individually. Likewise, that which exists in metaphysical apprehension as possible is necessarily some form of act, even that act which is the opposite of possibility. And notice that the concept *individual* is a universal concept. That fact does not prevent it from being an instrument for thoroughly accurate knowledge of individuals and of individuality.

Likewise, we often know positive modes of reality by means of negative concepts, the non-existence of modes of reality by means of positive concepts, simpler realities by more complex concepts; we know beings which are not the proper objects of our intellect by means appropriate to our proper objects, etc. In all such cases the fact that characteristics associated with our thinking conflict with those characteristics thought of does not prevent our thoughts from being accurate. The most important case is that of our knowledge of God. What is signified by concepts such as *good* and *goodness* can be predicated of God even though he transcends the manners, concrete and abstract respectively, in which these concepts signify their objects. Because of the distinction between what is signified and the mode of signification, we do not have to "abandon, suppress radically, the very conceptual structure of our own mind" (p. 39) when dealing with God. *A fortiori* we do not have to do this when dealing with the act of all acts even though it is signified in the manner of a possible.

The necessity for making distinctions between what is true of object:,; *qua* objects and what is true of them extra-mentally is the reason a genuine realism must be a critical realism: it must be critical for tlw sake of the realism itself. If, for instance, this kind of distinction cannot be made in the case of existence. it should follow that we cannot have any knowledge of existence at all: for the conflict between what pxtra-mentally trne of it and what would have to be true of it if it were to acquire an intra-mental state would prevent it from ever becoming known. And. at certain places, Wilhelmsen can be interpreted as drawing· that conclusion. (See pp. 41 and for example.) Such n

conclusion would, of course, reduce to absurdity the premise that philosophy is not about existence as possible. But it may be the most significant merit of this book that it exposes-by unflinchingly excepting them-the logical conclusions of doctrines such as the non-conceptualizablc character of existence.

Whatever his views on the knowability of existence may be in the last analysis, Wilhelmsen sees the position I am advancing as banishing the actual contingent existence of things from the vision of philosophy. (p. 152) But what could this banishing mean? If it means the banishing of contingent existential propositions such as "There is a bone in my soup," why not? Metaphysics in not supposed to supply us with knowledge of that kind of proposition about actual contingent existence. Rather it is supposed to teach us necessary truths about contingent existence, necessary truths concerning the same existence grasped in such contingent propositions. That is what it means for contingent existence to fall under the vision of philosophy. (Here it should be noted that assertions to the effect that actual existence is known not by concepts but by judgments are true when " knowledge of actual existence " refers to knowledge of the actual exercise of existence on the part of some contingent being.)

Does Wilhelmsen think that the truths of metaphysics are necessary or that they are contingent? Your guess is as good as mine. In one place he tells us that the intelligibility seen by metaphysics is "understood apodictically and as therefore universally valid for all men and for all time." (p. 136) But later he tells us that in metaphysics we "pass beyond " the necessary-contingent distinction, that it " loses its relevance." (pp. 152-154) After all, for a system in which the principle of non-contradiction is transcended, the opposition between being able to be otherwise and not being able to be otherwise should not be an irreconcilable one.

If the distinction between that which is known about our objects extramentally considered and the conditions they acquire in the process of becoming known saves our knowledge of necessary truths concerning existence, does it accomplish this at the expense of the historical nature of human understanding? On the contrary, the fact that such a distinction. in the various forms it takes with reference to human understanding, must be made *is* the historical nature of our understanding. Of course, there must always be a distinction drawn between what is known and the relation of reason *being known* or *being an object* which thereby accrues to it. But only an essentially incarnated and historical intellect, one whose proper objects are the structurally complex natures of changing sensible things, knows its proper objects by withdrawing from actual existence, since it must abstract them from matter and therefore must signify existence itself in the same manner.

If one holds that the necessary is the object of philosophical inquiry,

does he exclude history as a field for philosophic reflection and interpretation? Wilhelmsen thinks that he must. But does the fact that mathematics deals with the necessary prevent it from being that which provides the illumination of the contingent situations in which engineers find themselves? Is a physician's knowledge of biology an obstacle to his discovering the medical significance of his patient's condition? As a matter of fact, if we want a good example of how a grasp of necessary metaphysical truths can serve us very well in an attempt to understand the meaning of the historical situation in which we find ourselves, we need look no further than this book. It has a lucid discussion of the contemporary experience of nothingness as deriving from the rationalistic focus on essence to the exclusion of existence. And Wilhelmsen criticizes thinkers such as Teilhard and Cox deftly, showing how the immanentization of human destiny reduces the person to a servant of temporal progress and how contemporary secularism has nihilism as its consequence. He describes such post-Hegelian gnosticisms as " reactionary futurisms," (p. 123) reactionary because deterministic and therefore implying that the future has already been settled by what is past.

This book definitely gives the lie to those who dogmatically assume that philosophers whose tradition is that of classical realistic metaphysics must not be addressing today's problems. But as I said at the beginning, Wilhelmsen's many valid insights suffer from the articulation (i. e., conceptualization) imposed on them by his denial of the concept as an instrument for knowledge these insights.

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Discovery in the Physical Sciences. By RICHARD J. BLACKWELL. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Press, 1969. Pp. *255. $8.50.*

Where is science? Since "science " has at least two widely different meanings, it may be found in at least two locations: libraries and laboratories. The former contain the completed and polished publications which are the *product* of science; the latter contain the efforts, usually unproductive but sometimes brilliantly successful, which are the *process* of science. One of the most profound achievements of twentieth-century philosophy has been in working out an understanding of the logical structure of science as product. But until the beginning of the last decade few philosophers ventured forth to analyze science as process. This was not unintentional, for scrutiny of the process of science soon raises

the question of the nature of discovery. And what Kepler and Kekule said covertly in the accounts they gave of their greatest discoveries was said overtly by Sir Karl Popper in his *Logic of Scientific Discovery* (!): "The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible to it."

Perhaps the late N. R. Hanson's 1958 volume entitled *Patterns of Discovery* marked a turning point, for since that time many authors have turned to the difficult question as to whether anything philosophical can be said about that seemingly mysterious event, scientific discovery. Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and Stephen Toulmin, to name a few, have in the past decade attempted this task and philosophers have returned to previously neglected writings of Whewell, Peirce, and others to find new insights.

Recently Richard J. Blackwell of Saint Louis University has joined these workers with his *Discovery in the Physical Sciences.* As he points out repeatedly, much is at stake here for, if a philosophical analysis of scientific discovery were produced, it would greatly expand and enrich, not to say alter, the philosophy of science. But many are the problems, for the maximum thesis-that there exists a mechanical or automatic process for getting from data to hypotheses-is rejected by nearly all contemporary philosophers, whereas the minimal thesis-that history, psychology, and sociology can bring a measure of rationality to the act of discovery-leaves nothing to the philosopher.

In the first of his seven chapters Blackwell introduces the problem and sketches the major positions as well as building a *prima facie* case for the existence of a theory of discovery. Chapter II which distinguishes between various types of discoveries, especially between "discovering that" and "discovering why," combines with the first and third chapters, the latter of which compares the logical, psychological, historical, and epistemological approaches to the question, to set the stage for the central argument contained in chapters four through six. Herein Blackwell develops his "adaption theory of discovery." All too briefly this may be summarized by stating that Blackwell finds that there are " repeated epistemological patterns in the act of discovery ... " which are intelligible when understood as produced through the interrelations of mind with the "dictates of nature." Blackwell carefully points out the differences between "discovery that" (e. g., a law of nature), which involves such processes as formulating a problem, "sorting out," "interrelating recognized components," and " integration with other knowledge," and discovering why," which may involve such activities as "idealization," "creative postulation," and "substitution through analogy." The final chapter diverges from the central thrust of the book but builds upon it by an analysis, showing a Whiteheadian influence, of the question of the ontological status of physical entities.

This work is clearly written and cogently argued; while the frequent repetitions of material may distract the professional reader, they surely shorten the book and increase its impact on the beginning student into whose hands the book may confidently be placed. Blackwell is both an able and fair guide into the literature of the problem and a somewhat successful creator in an area where "somewhat successful" is substantial praise. This reader would have been interested to find among the many important distinctions in the book some analysis of the difference between a methodology of discovery and an epistemology of discovery, and he wonders whether Professor Blackwell would ascribe normative potential to his description of the process of discovery.

Wherein lie the main sources of progress on the question of the nature of discovery? One of these is certainly the bringing to bear on the problem the insights of differing philosophical positions. Another, the potential fruitfulness of which is shown by the fact that many of the pioneering authors who have written most creatively concerning creation in science have also read deeply in the history of science, lies in the gradually increasing number of historical studies which tell not just of the verification of a new hypothesis but also search for the roots from which and the process by which it came to be. And lastly, progress will surely he aided if the many powerful distinctions, acute analyses, and leads for future research contained in Blackwell's *Discovery in the Physical Sciences* are studied and discussed by other humanists of science. The reader of this cannot leave it without a strong sense of the complexity of the problem, engendered by Blackwell's cautious approach, as well as a sense of the importance of this problem, the solution of which may become the chief task of philosophers of science in the last third of this century.

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Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vols. IV and V: Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, 1966/1968. Edited by RoBERTS. CoHEN and MARX W. WARTOFSKY. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Vol. IV, pp. 545, $20.00; Vol. V, pp. 490, $16.75. Vol. VI: Ernst Mach, Physicist and Philosopher. Edited by RoBERT S. CoHEN and RAYMOND J. SEEGER, New York: Humanities Press, 1970, pp. 303, $11.50.

These three substantial volumes are the latest additions to the *Boston Studies* series, bringing to six the volumes now available.

The first title, Volume IV, consists of lectures given at the Boston Colloquium from 1966 to 1968 and represent a wide range of interests in contemporary philosophy of science. The topics treated range from the neurophysiology of perceptual and linguistic behavior, through the philosophy of mind and of language, the philosophy of history and of the social sciences, and studies in the fundamental categories and methods of philosophy, to the interrelationships of the sciences with ethics and metaphysics. Most of the twenty-two authors represented are philosophers, although there are essays of philosophical significance by a sociologist, an anthropologist, a political scientist, and by three neurophysiologists.

Philosophers of science have not sufficiently addressed themselves to areas of research in the life sciences that would influence analyses of perceptual and linguistic behavior. The contributions in this volume that attempt to supply for this defect include the first English translation of the classic and fundamental work on aphasia of Carl Wernicke (1848-1905), the guiding spirit of the Breslau School in neurology and psychiatry, which is accompanied by a lucid and appreciative guide to his work by Norman Geschwind. The latter author follows this by a detailed analysis, in the Wernicke tradition, of "Anatomy and the Higher Functions of the Brain," concluding with some philosophical reflections on the whole man, the unity of consciousness, the value of introspection, and language and thought. After this is a stimulating essay by another neurophysiologist, Robert Efron, entitled " What is Perception? " wherein the author attempts to show that a precise answer to this " abstract and philosophical question " is necessary to formulate a valid methodology for any study of the neural mechanisms that underlie perception, and that any attempt to conduct such a study " prior to an adequate definition or conceptualization of perception is doomed to failure." (p. 171)

The essays on philosophy of mind and language introduce American readers to the work of two Polish philosophers, Henryk Skolimowski and Boguslaw Wolniewicz. The first is an expert on the history of technology and the author of *Polish Analytical Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967); his paper on "Knowledge, Language and Rationality " is commented on by Stephen Toulmin. Arguing against two opposed positions, the " semantic concept of knowledge " and the notion of " personal knowledge," Skolimowski opts for " the primacy of epistemology over linguistics " and attempts to demonstrate " that the so-called pure linguistic criteria of meaning are loaded with epistemological assumptions, that the criteria of meaning follow from an implicitly assumed concept of knowledge, [and] that the concept of language presupposes the concept of knowledge and is determined by it." (p. 174) His arguments depend heavily on the thought of Karl Popper and lmre Lakatos and are treated somewhat favorably by Toulmin in his critique. Toulmin

allies himself with Skolimowski's Aristotelianism, while criticizing his presentation as "weaker than the occasion demands." (p. 199) The paper of Wolniewicz, professor at the University of Warsaw, is entitled "A Parallelism Between Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian Ontologies" and is inspired by a statement of Irving M. Copi to the effect that " Wittgenstein's objects are substantial in the later sense of substrata, and correspond more closely to Aristotle's prime matter than to his primary substances." (p. The author expresses an indebtedness to the writings of Gustav Bergmann and his school, and he establishes an interesting Aristotelian interpretation of Wittgenstein which he claims is even more verified in "the variety of Aristotelianism represented by Thomism." (p. This paper is adversely criticized by Henry Ruf, of Boston University, on the grounds that it proposes a peculiar interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, " which stands in conflict with the major themes " of this work. (p. Concluding this group of essays is F. J. Crosson's "The Computer as Gadfly," which reviews the present state of the computer art in its attempt to duplicate human intelligence and points out some of the dilemmas that have been encountered in cybernetics, particularly in the field of simulation, with illustrations drawn from the areas of handwriting recognition and language translation. Surprisingly, all of the essays in this section have a strong Aristotelian cast and represent work in a direction that runs counter to the empiricist tradition that has hitherto been dominant.

The papers devoted to the philosophy of the social sciences include those of Lucien Goldmann on " The Subject of Cultural Creation," Gajo Petrovic on "Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Praxis," Leon J. Goldstein on "Theory in History," and Michael Martin on " Understanding and Participant Observation in Cultural and Social Anthropology," to the last of which are appended comments by Judith B. Agassi and Sidney W. Mintz. Goldstein's paper is a closely reasoned review of the recent literature in the debate over the " covering law " concept of historical explanation, wherein he shows quite convincingly that the methodological preoccupations of the opposed parties are quite diverse, and he illustrates this with a series of examples ranging from slavery in North America to the charge of the Light Brigade. Martin's paper is a philosophical inquiry into the importance and validity of participant observation as a methodology in anthropology. Basing his study on a semantic analysis of understanding and empathy, Martin concludes that " scientific understanding *of* a community is logically independent of being understanding *toward* a community " (p. and that in the light of this and similar conclusions participant observation has limited value as an anthropological technique. Both commentators find much to criticize in this thesis.

The last group of essays purportedly relate philosophy of science to ethics and metaphysics. Abraham Edel writes on " Patterns of Use of Science in Ethics," and there are comments by Ruth Anna Putnam and John Ladd. The metaphysical contributions are more disparate, including an article by Putnam herself, ' On Empirical Knowledge," two papers on causality (William Ruddick on " Causal Connection " and Edward H. Madden on "Causality and the Notion of Necessity"), and two fairly general papers, one lengthy by Joseph Agassi on " Unity and Diversity of Science" and the other a brief exposition by J. 0. Wisdom" On Methods of Refutation in Metaphysics." Edel argues that moral knowledge does not differ radically in kind from the sort of knowledge one hopes to gather in modern science, and thus there is no a priori reason for denying the relevance of science to ethics; in fact, he seems to be implying that there are a posteriori reasons for affiming such relevance. Putnam's paper is an attempt to buttress the sagging foundations of empiricism, wherein she proposes an improved empiricist theory of knowledge that would preserve it as a valid philosophy of science against the interpretations (and seeming attacks) of Carnap and Kuhn. In his comments on this paper John Compton admits the importance of historical studies in reshaping contemporary understandings of the philosophy of science, and he proposes as a defensible position " that philosophy of science should become philosophy of the history of science." (p. 418) The papers on causality by Ruddick and Madden are both critical of the Humean analysis of causal connection; Ruddick, in particular, has some interesting insights that derive from his consideration, not of such " true causes " as has been customary with defenders of causality but rather of deceptive causes and common causal misjudgments, which enable him to work out a theory of congruity as the source of explanatory power in causal identifications. Agassi's paper is directed against simplistic views of the unity of science; it defends a Popperian theory of rationality as essentially a problem-solving methodology; within modern science, " solutions to problems offer the element of unification, and their criticisms offer the element of diversification." (p. 463) Wisdom's paper likewise draws on Popper and attempts to show ways in which philosophers might agree on what is wrong with outdated systems of philosophy, such as those of Spinoza, Berkeley, or Kant. (p. 523)

Like Volume IV, Volume V consists of articles based on papers given at the Boston Colloquium during the years 1966-1968 but differing from the previous volume in that they are concerned mainly with the logic and the methods of the natural sciences, including mathematical, physical, and biological topics. As in most writing on philosophy of science, the physico-mathematical essays outnumber by far those devoted to biology. In the latter category, however, there are two very good papers, one by

Milic Capek on "Ernst Mach's Biological Theory of Knowledge " and the other by June Goodfield on "Theories and Hypotheses in Biology: Theoretical Entities and Functional Explanation," which is commented on critically by Ernst Mayr and Joseph Agassi.

In the realm of more formal analysis, as developed by the Carnapian and Reichenbachian schools, there are several substantial contributions. Adolf Griinbaum has a 150-page "Reply to Hilary Putnam's ' An Examination of Grlinbaum's Philosophy of Geometry,'" which is an extensive rebuttal of Putnam's 50-page criticism of Griinbaum's account of physical geometry and chronometry, which appeared originally in Vol. II of the *Delaware Seminar* (New York: 1963, pp. 205-255) and in turn was a criticism of Griinbaum's "Geometry, Chronometry, and Empiricism," which appeared in Vol. III of the *Minnesota Studies* (Minneapolis: 1962, pp. 405-526). Putnam himself contributes a paper entitled " Is Logic Empirical? " where he argnes that some of the so-called "necessary truths" of logic may be shown to be false for empirical reasons and therefore that "logic is, in a certain sense, a natural science." (p. 216) Other essays in this general category include David Finkelstein's "Matter, Space and Logic," and Bernard R. Grunstra's " On Distinguishing Types of Measurement." Articles that are less formal and possess a more metaphysical content are the following: Peter Havas, " Causality Requirements and the Theory of Relativity," with a comment by John Stachel; Aage Petersen, " On the Philosophical Significance of the Correspondence Argument " ; R. FUrth, " The Role of Models in Theoretical Physics " ; Mihailo Markovic, " The Problem of Truth " ; P. Roman, " Symmetry in Physics " ; and Wolfgang Yourgrau, "Verification or Proof-An Undecided Issue?" Only one article draws heavily on the history of science, and this is I. Bernard Cohen's excellent summary of his work, that has extended now over many years, on "Hypotheses in Newton's Philosophy."

Volume VI represents a departure from the editorial policy of the *Boston Studies* in that it includes contributions that were not presented originally in the Boston Colloquium but rather formed part of a symposium to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Ernst Mach. The symposium was arranged for the joint session of the History of Science Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Section L) held in Washington, D. C., on December 27, 1966. The published papers include some that were not presented at this symposium but were added by the editors to round out the coverage of Mach. All of the essays relate in one way or another to Mach's life, his work, and his philosophy. Of particular interest to readers of this journal will be Erwin N. Hiebert's "The Genesis of Mach's Early Views on Atomism," Robert S. Cohen's "Ernst Mach: Physics, Perception and the Philosophy of Science," and Gerald J. Holton's "Mach, Einstein and the Search for

Reality." Included in appendices are two articles by Philipp Frank on Mach's philosophy of science, one by Richard von Mises which has hitherto been unavailable in English, and biographical data and a complete bibliography of Mach's writings, including those that have appeared in English translation.

In sum, these three volumes contain a wealth of information on the current state of the philosophy of science movement. Like most collections they are uneven in the quality of their thought, in the level of their presentation, and in the philosophical background and presuppositions of the authors represented. This is not necessarily a disadvantage, since the movement has increasingly diversified within the last ten years or so, and the inputs from many different philosophical and historical traditions have contributed greatly to its vitality. In the ten years of the Boston Colloquium's existence, moreover, its discussions have aided considerably in this broadening of perspective, and Professors Cohen and Wartofsky can only be thanked for their untiring efforts to give all interested parties a hearing-ranging from voices within Communist countries that could all too easily go unheard to those of Aristotelians who courageously discuss contemporary scientific problems in terms of their roots in Greek thought. This reviewer has only two adverse criticisms, one probably beyond the control of the editors, viz., the prices of the volumes, and the other probably within their control, viz., the absence of an index of any type in Volumes IV and V. Volume VI has a helpful index of names at the end, and it is to be hoped that at least this minimal reference aid will be continued in future volumes.

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The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space. By YvEs SIMON. Edited by GERARD J. DALcOURT. Albany, N. Y.: Magi Books, 1970. Pp.!W6. $3.75.

The first word to be said of this book is that it is splendid, from every point of view. The analyses in all ten chapters are models of philosophical brilliance combined with didactic simplicity and historical exactitude. The editor has organized and polished this posthumous publication with a consummate skill; the publisher has produced a volume that is aesthetically pleasing and of high quality.

In his " Preface " Mr. Dalcourt modestly describes this book as one

" that should be of some value to the general reader and also, in some instances, to professional philosophers." (p. xiv) I agree with this description on both counts-except that I cannot imagine what the instances might have been in which Dalcourt thought the volume might *not* be of value to professional philosophers, for every issue touched on in this book is fundamental in any thorough philosophical reflection on the world and is treated with a scholarly competence at the service of philosophical genius, the kind of genius that puts one in the pure presence of philosophy itself.

The book is all the more amazing when one considers that it is composed of no more than the fragments of a volume which Yves Simon had planned as part of a comprehensive 21-volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy, to be published by the University of Chicago Press. Hardly had Professor Simon conceived and laid the groundwork for this monumental Encyclopedia than it was discovered that he was a victim of cancer that ensured an early death, much too early to afford any hope of his carrying through the carefully planned and extensive task of the Encyclopedia.

What response does a man make in the face of discovering that his lifework shall go uncompleted, cut off by a mindless and unstoppable perversion of nature itself? Yves Simon's response at least showed the stature of the man and the dedication of the philosopher who had written in his early days: " It is in order to know the truth that one establishes ideas, expresses concepts, constructs, discourses: when that has been realized, one is immunized against a great many of the false conceptions of the activity of the mind."

This present book, along with the several other posthumous volumes already published and still to come, is thus the product of a patient piecing together of notes and articles which, for all their brilliance and power, are but a shadow of what would have been had Yves Simon lived to execute himself the full task he had so well prepared. This fact is a monumental tragedy for the continuance and development of the philosophical tradition, monumental, because that was the scale of Simon's genius, and tragic, because it should not have been.

What we are left with, at any rate, thanks to the excellent intervention of Dr. Dalcourt, is yet one of the finest treatises on the philosophy of nature that is to be found outside the pages of Aristotle's own *Physics,* a treatise whose value, l}lOreover, is doubled by the historical fact of coming at a time when the philosophical study of sensible nature, as a discipline distinct specifically from experimental science and metaphysics alike, is as little understood and valued as one could imagine. That we live in a dark age of the philosophic intelligence no one familiar with our university departments doubts. Perhaps the reason Yves Simon, like

his intimate friend, Jacques Maritain, devoted so much study and writing to the philosophy of nature, was because he perceived so clearly that a genuine renaissance of philosophy in the culture of modern man depends in the most crucial way on a re-establishment and vindication of the rights of the intelligence-not the manipulative intelligence of experiment but the intuitive intelligence of being as sensibly realized in itself-at the very base of our grasp of the world. For only by being assured of its grasp on the truth as well as the behavior of the physical can the mind then dare to hope and extend its grasp to metaphysical truths. Because modern philosophy misunderstood its own dependence on nature, it can blame none besides itself for the general reception now accorded its metaphysical claims as myths and high-flown speculations devoid of soundness.

To restore to philosophy, then, what of nature belongs to it, remarks Simon (p. 17), "you can see that ... we shall have constantly to carry out an epistemological reflection on what we are doing. All that promises to be very difficult, but if we are only half equal to our task it should also be very interesting."

That is how Simon sets the stage for the main inquiries of his book. It is impossible to convey the candor and energy with which he pursues these inquiries. This is not a book with which one quarrels on particular points. The author is not interested in quarrelling but with sharing and furthering a pure philosophical inquiry. No better way and no better work could easily be imagined to overcome the ingrained prejudices of the professionals against the very idea of a proper philosophy of the same phenomena scrutinized by experimental science. If enough young students should happen to assimilate for themselves, and critically, Dr. Simon's elegant presentation of *The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space,* it might not be too much to hope that days of general acceptance of these by now hoary prejudices might at last be numbered.

It may be that, for all their relative incompleteness, these posthumous manuscripts may yet come to mark a decisive early step in the philosophical renaissance Yves Simon perceived, with all its surface improbability, as deeply possible-and necessary, if modern culture is not to lose the balance of its mind, and therewith its soul. All that promises indeed to be very difficult. But if we are even half equal to the task, it should also prove very fascinating. And enough is at stake to make the game worth playing to the end.

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The God of Evil: An Argument from the Existence of the Devil. By FREDERICK SONTAG. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. Pp. 183. *$5.95.*

The problem of evil and its implications for the existence of God remains an open question in theology. Attempted solutions take one of two directions: either they claim that God in his omnipotence freely chose this world among all possible worlds and that this is not the best possible world; or they see God from the viewpoint of process philosophy, as a God somehow perfectible, somehow acting and being acted upon by an evolving world, unable to make things better than they are at the present moment. Frederick Sontag in *The God of Evil* adopts the first and more traditional viewpoint. However, his principal concern is to show how God and evil are compatible, portraying God in existentialist fashion as one who decides among various possibilities against the horizon of Non-Being. Therefore, Non-Being or Evil are somehow within the range of God. For Sontag, if God and evil are reconcilable, the atheistic position is disarmed.

Sontag begins his work by pointing out that the concept of God must account for the existence of factors that argue against him. He wishes to describe a God that can exist in spite of destructive forces. (The term "Devil " is applied to the coalescence of the forces of destruction.) In fact, God must have intentionally designed atheism and the grounds for it. (p.

Previous attempts to prove the existence of God have failed. For example, the five arguments of St. Thomas are oversimplified and do not give sufficient attention to the disorder in the world. Kierkegaard's God seems to stand or fall on the strength of Kierkegaard's personal faith; and Tillich's God being more mystical than metaphysical is unable to address himself to the evils of the world. Anti-metaphysical, romantic, and existentialist positions on God seem to lose validity as the times and circumstances change.

Sontag's thesis focuses on the observation that to question the existence of a being implies the possibility of its non-being. Man questions the existence of God and therefore there is nothingness in God, otherwise one would not raise the question. Just as human reality emerges as a particular being in the midst of Non-Being, so God's reality can only be understood by passing through nothingness. Man experiences anguish regarding God since God's being remains always in question. However, for Sontag to question God's existence really means that God does not create out of necessity but out of free decision. God's existence is always in question in the sense that the issue over what he will create and under what conditions he will do so is forever an open question. (p. 79) If God created out of necessity man would have an immediate mental link with God. Sontag declares: "The reasons behind his [God's] action are a

question to God and therefore his existence in this sense is constantly in question, since nothing in his nature leads him precisely or unavoidably to exactly this form of creation rather than that." (p. 80)

It is through God that nothingness comes into the world in the sense that he must question himself by holding up all the possibles before himself for consideration. In doing so he puts himself "beyond Being" and next to nothingness. Since God has a choice among alternatives, this is not the best possible world. God could have freely chosen a better world but decided on this one. He could have caused or speeded up the relief of human suffering and did not choose to do so. (p. 18) "He must then, be a God who does not faint at the sight of blood or lie awake because sufferers scream." (p. 22) Man's only choice is to make the best of the situation. Here, we see that Sontag by choosing the traditional viewpoint regarding God and the problem of evil comes up against its fundamental weakness: if God could have created a better world, why did he not do so.

However, it is in the midst of evil that Sontag sees an indication of God's existence. For, in view of the destructive forces in existence, we must ask what held these forces in check in creation. What power formed a world in spite of all resistance and holds evil within limits? In other words, if God did not exist we would be hard-pressed to explain the problem of good.

God sets our being adrift in a sea of Non-Being and we must decide for our possibilities. "To be" means to possess a power sufficient to sustain a concrete mode of being against its passage into Non-Being. Personality in God is more obvious in a contingent world rather than a necessary one. For, to actualize things requires a combination of will, power, and knowledge-all attributes of personality. The personality of God allows for man's freedom, something an impersonal principle is unable to do.

The God of Evil makes a contribution in showing that philosophizing about the nature of God is still a viable study. Sontag accurately portrays the present state of affairs and where recent philosophy has failed. However, certain root questions remain unanswered or not even addressed, granted the limited scope of the book. Sontag not only presupposes God's existence but speaks of him as complete in himself, freely choosing to create this world rather than several better ones. The question still remains, why should not an all good God create the best world possible. Sontag is critical of concepts of God which are waning in acceptance, but his God who gratuitously allows extraordinary evil is not too attractive. Secondly, positing a God who is the source of good among the destructive forces of evil does not seem to be an exhaustive explanation. Furthermore, Sontag seems almost Manichean in giving such a primary role to the

forces of evil. However, the most serious objection is directed against Sontag's thesis itself. Questioning the existence of a creature immediately involves its being as opposed to not being. One would expect that questioning God's existence would also leave God's being in jeopardy. But, for Sontag, God in himself remains untouched. Rather, questioning his being indicates God's decision to choose this or that possibility in the face of being. In other words, Sontag has shifted the issue from the existence of God to a declaration that God is a free creator rather than creating out of necessity. The fact that God creates freely and that limited being shares in non-being has already been clearly drawn by Scholasticism.

In conclusion, Sontag's work will not be successful in convincing atheists of the viability of God but can only show that there is nothing contradictory to his existence. Rather, *The God of Evil* can serve to quiet the spirits of the believer. However, the problem of evil remains and Sontag's God chooses to tolerate it when he could have done otherwise.

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Was Jesus Married? The Distortion of Sexuality in the Christian Tradition. By WILLIAM E. PHIPPS. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. Pp. 243. *$5.95.*

A critic's first inclination in response to this study might be to deal with the innumerable objections and observations put forth by the author. Such an approach would, in fact, demand another monograph. This book does not deserve such a response. That is not to say, however, that this book should be allowed to pass without comment.

The extent of the author's survey and research are rather impressive (sexual attitudes in ancient Judaism, an exegesis of the Gospel texts that are related to Jesus' teaching on celibacy, the apostolic and Pauline witness to and teaching concerning marriage, virginity and sexuality, and the sexual attitudes of second-century Christianity, early Orthodoxy, and Roman Catholicism) . At first sight, while such an undertaking might frighten any serious writer, such a study could certainly have added something of value to Christology and the place of sexuality in Christian morality and piety. At first sight too, it would appear that the author had done his research thoroughly. But unfortunately all this work was for nought, or at best a superfluous exercise. The issue of the investigation

was never m doubt-the subtitle should be moved to the title position in future printings.

The study of Jesus' teaching about sexual morality and of his own sexuality are certainly legitimate and even important topics. In addition. an investigation of the teaching on sexuality in Christian tradition could be instructive and might help to explain the almost neurotic preoccupation of Christianity with sexual morality and ultimately help to put this subject in the perspective that it needs. The areas and goals, then, of this study are not in question.

The objections to the book arise from the prejudice, pettiness, and lack of scholarship that mar almost every page. The prejudices and pettiness (almost unhealthy in their petulance) need not be documented nor do they deserve to be. But it is the vincible (?) lack of serious and stringent methodology for which the author must be held accountable.

The exegetical study of relevant Gospel texts gives no indication that the author is even remotely aware of *Redaktionsgeschichte* or the aspect of the *Sitz im Leben der Kirche* of the Gospels. The credentials of the author would lead one to hope that he might escape what is almost a crass fundamentalism (despite the reference to serious exegetical studies). The exposition of Paul's teaching in 1 Corinthians 7 ignores the nuances of the Apostle's language of command, suggestion, and recommendation (and the work of S. Lyonnet).

The study of the Patristic evidence is vitiated from the beginning because, for the author, Hellenistic culture and thought have little or no redeeming features. The Hebraic mentality and tradition would have preserved balance and purity of vision on the topic of sexuality-Jesus' and the rest of men's. Justin is the bete noire of the Patristic scenario. but then any Father is scolded if his teachings do not fit the author's "hypothesis."

Furthermore, it would seem that even the most amateur reader of modern psychology is aware of the difference between sexuality anrl genital sexual expression and the relationship of both to the personality and maturity of a man. Here, the author's remarks range from the simplistic to the erroneous.

But the most serious methodological error of this study is the pre-supposition that Christian theologizing about the marital status of Jesus (and the resulting possibility of celibacy as one kind of imitation of him) cannot rest on a fact: Jesus was celibate. The author's evidence that Jesus was married (from ancient and contemporary Judaism) is not conclusive. The evidence for his position drawn from the Gospels is even less so. There remains the possibility that Jesus was not married, and it is possible that tradition witnesses to that fact. It need not be, as the author tries to show, that tradition felt a need to justify its own

bias by inventing something that is fictitious. But again the author's methodology is too limited and preordained to deal with this option.

Finally, the phenomenon of celibacy in its many forms past and present within the Christian community is a constant irritant for the author. His criticism of some of the theology on celibacy and its justification in the Christian lives of men and women is quite valid at times. But his contribution to the present debate is minimal. If those who seriously question the present discipline of the Church on this point need the support of this book, they could be in serious intellectual difficulty.

In conclusion, one wonders who the author has in view as the readers of his work. It seems impossible that he could expect any intelligent and knowledgeable reader to be satisfied with the feeble and offensive polemics of his study. And what is the value of appealing to those who already agree with him about the distortion of Jesus' life and morality perpetrated by the Church?

The author should be informed that a "celibate" is the author of this review (the word might be added to the list of pejoratives in the English language after its usage in this book); this may allow him to dismiss the preceding observations as Pavlovian responses to his conclusions. But I looked forward to more from this book; I am disappointed that it was much less than it could have been. The topic is too serious to be handled in the way in which it was in this book.

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Hervaeus Natalis, O. P. and the Controversies over the Real Presence and Transubstantiation. By KENNETH PLOTNIK. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh, 1970. Pp. 83. DM 9,80.

Once again the name of the Grabmann Institute is associated with a valuable contribution to the history of theology. This time, in connection with the Theological Faculty of the University of Munich, the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, and St. John's Abbey in Collegeville, Minnesota, the spirit of the Grabmann Institute finds expression in a study of medieval controversies over the Eucharist. Kenneth Plotnik reviews the positions of Hervaeus Natalis, O. P. and his opponents in the questions of the mode of the Real Presence and Transubstantiation, offering interpretations of important texts and evidence for possible reconciliations among the adherents of opposing schools of thought.

Plotnik addresses himself to a segment of the rational effort of medieval theologians to express the richness of the Christian doctrine of the Eucharist. Evident in his work are the strange interaction and interdependence of the medieval disciplines which forced commitments to set formulas and produced contrived philosophical positions ostensibly in defense of orthodoxy. However remote in time its subject might be from current Process Theology, this study provides a useful link between the simplistic presentation of New Testament doctrine and the expected complexities of the sophisticated theology common to speculative thinkers today.

The work is divided into three chapters. The first introduces the reader to the life of Hervaeus Natalis, his basic writings, and the character of the controversies over the Real Presence and Transubstantiation after the death of Thomas Aquinas. The second offers a brief treatment of the views of Aquinas and Hervaeus concerning the mode of Christ's presence, discusses in some detail Hervaeus's conception of relational presence, and considers the positions of Durand of St. Pourgain and Giles of Rome. It takes up the problem of quantity in the Eucharist and concludes with an overview of the relevant disputations between Hervaeus and Durand. The third chapter treats the question of Transubstantiation as decided by Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, James of Metz (through an anonymous commentator), and Durand; and the question of consubstantiation as decided by John Quidort of Paris and William of Occam.

Plotnik succeeds in presenting clearly the positions of the opponents, even though, at times, they appear to be over-simplified, and he sets in good historical perspective their textual bases. It is his purpose to bring to the attention of current theologians the variety of the Scholastic efforts made to come to grips with the mysteriousness of Christ's presence in the Eucharist. Granting to each exponent a measure of honest self-criticism and a passion for orthodoxy, he presents their various attempts to elaborate the elusive mystery central to Christian theology and explains the methodology used in the achievement and defense of each position.

In the doctrinal portion of the work the author gives a central posture to the teaching of Aquinas. For the Angelic Doctor, Christ is present by way of substance, and the matter and form of the bread and wine are changed into the matter and form of Christ's body. This establishes a relationship between Christ and the Eucharist. In addition to the fact that Aquinas's own theories concerning the Real Presence were controverted, disputes arose over the explicitation of this relationship. Hervaeus Natalis, a generation after Aquinas, restated and defended the Thomistic views without greatly developing them. Employing the principle of incomprehensibility, Hervaeus neglected the Thomistic "mode of sub-

stance " formula in favor of an emphasis on what the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is not (non-local, non-positional).

Other views are as follows: Giles of Rome held that the entire substance of the bread is changed into the matter alone of Christ's body; Henry of Ghent and the pluralists held that the matter of the bread is changed into the matter of Christ's body, but the form of the bread is changed into the form of Christ's body as into a form different from the rational soul; Godfrey of Fontaines held that the matter of the bread somehow had to remain in the body of Christ in order to avoid annihilation; Durand and the anonymous student of James of Metz taught that the form of the bread is replaced by the soul of Christ with the matter of the bread remaining; John Quidort of Paris held a doctrine of consubstantiation, later termed impanation, in which the substance of bread remains, but not in the supposit of bread, having been drawn into the supposit of Christ. In the case of the student of James of Metz, the relationship between the bread and the body of Christ became accidental, and with John Quidort, the substance of the bread remained alongside the substance of the body of Christ.

Durand, the most noteworthy opponent of Aquinas and Hervaeus, promoted a doctrine of relational presence in that, for him, the immediate relation of the body of Christ to the bread causes the Real Presence. The substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ in such a way that the form of the bread is corrupted or the matter of the bread is subsumed under the form of the body of Christ and this suddenly and by divine power. In the controversy between Hervaeus and Durand especially, but in the views of all controverialists in this dispute to a degree, the limitations imposed by Scholastic metaphysics are evident. In spite of the differences among the disputants, the basic directive and informative concepts of Scholasticism-quantity, relation, accident, substance, matter and form, can be seen at work.

One should not look to this study for a definitive statement of orthodox Eucharistic theology to end the controversies but for textual validation of expressions and interpretations of the views of the principals. In accepting Aquinas's view as a start, Plotnik explicitates the manner in which others strove to go farther and deeper in their search for expressions of revealed truth. Without reducing truly theological or metaphysical arguments to mere semantics, he offers a basis for re-thinking " minority " opinions and allows for broader tolerance among modem theologians in their common effort to penetrate the mysteries and to express that most valuable understanding in suitable formulas. The author ends on a note of ecumenical hope which, he says, arises " out of the possibility for diversity in the expression of common Christian beliefs."

Because this study deals primarily with Hervaeus Natalis, one would

expect an adequate evaluation of the opinions of this "Doctor Rarus," but there is none. It would appear valuable for the author to have clarified the teaching of Hervaeus and suggest some probable applications of his principle and method of "negative knowledge." Because so many current philosophers and theologians lay claim to progress through the study and extrapolation of non-being, this clarification and speculation could possibly have held some significance.

Subsequent printings of the monograph should be rid of an unfortunate typographical error (p. which mars the otherwise readable text and forfeits the full meaning of the paragraph. But for this, Plotnik's work comes as a contribution to any theological library. Its appearance in the midst of many non-Scholastic approaches to theological inquiry is encouraging. Many more monographs of this kind are called for by the work of illustrious historians like M. Grabmann, D. Callus, M.D. Chenu, H. Denifle, F. Ehrle, P. Glorieux, Ag. de Guimaraes, B. Haureau, J. Koch, F. Pelster, F. Stegmiiller, F. Van Steenberghen, J. Weisheipl, etc., who in the past devoted painstaking effort to uncover the riches of medieval theological writing. The science of theology has yet to assimilate fully some aspects of Scholastic thought. Work such as this will help m that assimilation.

As is expected in an historical survey, the only originality in this study seems to be found in the author's attempt to reconstruct the arguments of Hervaeus once presented in his *Evidentiae* (Munster Universitiits-bibliothek Ms 175, lost in WW II) from the counter-arguments of Durand contained in Durand's *Sentences,* Wherever possible, Plotnik seeks confirmation for translations, interpretations, and presentations of arguments from recognized authorites. He includes a valuable and rather complete bibliography.

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Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology. By CHARLES E. CuRRAN. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1970. Pp. *$6.50.*

This volume gathers together five previously published essays on social ethics, sexuality, genetics, natural law, and the sacrament of penance. The only thing new about the book is the addition of a final chapter in which an attempt is made to assess trends and approaches current in Catholic and Protestant moral theology today. The interest of Curran's work lies not so much in raising some of the main problem areas in moral

theology at present as in highlighting the underlying problem in all these areas, namely, the question of methodology. As the author says, methodological problems are central in most sciences today.

As might be expected in a work of this kind, there is a great deal of repetition. In many places the same strictures are made against the inadequacy of past approaches to moral issues. The traditional Catholic moral theology of the manuals was insufficiently conscious of the evolutionary character of world history; it suffered from a simplistic view of the supernatural as something added to the natural; it failed to take sufficient account of the existence of sin and its effect on the humallj situation; it was too legalistic and absolutist. No doubt there is much in these criticisms, but they have often been made in recent times and there seems little to be gained in continued repetition without a deeper critical analysis in view of positive reconstruction. One feels that these criticisms are themselves overly simplistic.

The main disappointment of this work is its failure to elaborate any systematic new methodology. It is easier to point out deficiencies in the older approaches than to rebuild on the foundations of the old. The author makes no claim to do this and perhaps he is not to be blamed, considering the present state of moral theology both inside and outside the Catholic Church. His aim is more modest, namely, to act as a commentator on the way things seem to be developing in the moral field. In this perspective his work is clear and readable.

Insofar as he commits himself at all, Curran endeavors to adopt a stance between an existentialism which is so immersed in the present that it has no adequate criteria of judgment of the present situation and the classicist approach which, in his view, unduly universalizes and absolutizes ethical norms of moral action. In this sense one may say that he attempts to take a balanced position. He suggests that a modern methodology ought to embrace three different yet complementary elements: I) the distinction between the subjective and objective orders, making allowance for a morality of growth which recognizes that many are as yet unable to achieve the fullness of objective morality, 2) the theory of compromise, based on a realization of the existential reality of sin in the individual and society, and 3) the refusal to identify the moral act with the physical structure of the action, with the consequent denial of negative moral absolutes when an act is described only in terms of its physical structure. These ideas are accepted without further analysis or investigation and practical conclusions are drawn from them as though they were thoroughly established. This seems to me unwarranted, especially as the so-called theory of compromise has met with serious objections. Also, while it is true that the moral action cannot be identified with the physical structure of the act, it does not necessarily follow that this physical struc-

ture may not provide a norm for judging the morality of the total human action.

In the light of these shortcomings one cannot but feel uneasy about some of the practical judgments Father Curran makes in the course of this volume. He does not claim certitude for them but puts them forward as instances of the kind of conclusions to which his premisses logically lead. Thus he suggests that euthanasia does not merit total condemnation in all cases, that direct abortion is not always wrong, that masturbation is not always grave matter and usually not so important, that homosexual actions do not generally involve the person in mortal sin, that sexual intercourse outside marriage in some cases may not be wrong, that in the sacrament of penance it is not always necessary to confess all mortal sins nor to list them in subsequent confessions. These instances of current approaches to moral issues indicate the hesitancy and uncertainty of many moralists today, a state of affairs which the author maintains will continue in the future.

The professional theologian will find little new in this volume. Pastors and students of moral theology may be enlightened about present problems and trends but, in the absence of a well worked-out elaboration of moral principles, may be either disturbed or confused by the author's practical judgments. The work could be of use to non-Catholic theologians as evidence of Catholic moralists' concern to update their science in the light of modern developments, as well as to build a bridge towards Protestant ethics. But if there is one thing that emerges from the book, it is the pressing need of further investigation into the fundamental problem of moral methodology.

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Contemporary Protestant Thought. By C. J. CURTIS. New York: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. *!'l!'l5.* $6.95.

This is one of the volumes in the Ecclesial Theology section in the Contemporary Theology Series of the Bruce Publishing Company. It should be valuable for a college-level survey course, but its use outside the college classroom will be limited.

Curtis's explicit intention is to " contribute to the construction of the ecumenical theology of the great church of the future." He has gathered summaries of the thought of a wide variety of comtemporary theologians;

his ecumenical theology indeed hopes to embrace *all.* Nathan Soderblom is the Protestant parallel to Pope John XXIII in ecumenical thought. The process theology of John B. Cobb, Jr., Schubert Ogden, and Teilhard de Chardin offers, in Curtis's estimation, the greatest promise for future ecumenical work. Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr are examples of neo-orthodox theology; Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann are the existentialist theologians presented by Curtis. There *is,* of course, a chapter dealing with the radical theology of Thomas J. J. Altizer, William Hamilton, and Paul van Buren. Judaism is represented by Martin Buber, Eastern Orthodoxy by Nicolas Berdyaev. The line which runs from Dietrich Bonhoeffer to Harvey Cox to Joseph Fletcher is analyzed in some detail. And, finally, there is a good chapter concerned with Martin Luther King, Jr.'s contribution to American theology.

The strength of this book is in its heavy dependence on the exact words of the men being considered; Curtis presents well-chosen quotations rather than his own summaries. However, no one could hope adequately to cover the thought of so many men in one volume. Hence, a teacher using this text should be familiar with the principal works excerpted by Curtis if he hopes to give some understanding to his students. This will also serve as a check to be certain that Curtis has not selected only those quotations which help him to make his point.

The inherent weakness of any book purporting to treat of contemporary thought is that it is necessarily incomplete; such a book cannot include the works written since it was sent to the publisher. It is for this reason that the significant changes in the recent thought of Harvey Cox are not included by Curtis; *Secular City* is Cox's last work analyzed by Curtis. Similarly missing is any consideration of the theology of hope, which responds in some way to the radical theology of the mid-1960's. It is especially regretable that Curtis was unable to include a chapter on hope: no doubt, he would have welcomed it as a way of inviting Marxism into his "ecumenical theology of the great church of the future." One gets the feeling that Curtis very much wants to include all ways of thought under his ecumenical cover. (Incidentally, I find it strange that there is not a chapter about John A. T. Robinson, a not insignificant thinker well before this volume was published.)

Curtis's criticism and analysis is limited; he is almost never negative in his evaluations, reflecting his efforts to build a totally inclusive ecumenical theology. Two areas of thought (process theology and secular theology) come in for high praise. Secular theology is valuable because it addresses modern technological man. Process thought offers a good tool for a systematic ecumenical theology. Curtis surely demands a philosophy for his ecumenical theology, and Whitehead is obviously his philosopher. I

agree that process thought offers great potential in this regard. Nevertheless, I do not think that a common philosophy necessarily leads to an ecumenical theology. Theology begins with a faith-stance, and it can then use philosophy in an effort to offer some degree of understanding about that faith-stance. As long as men believe different things, we cannot expect any theology to gain their universal approval. It may be true that we could all agree on some type of process philosophy as a way of understanding reality (Curtis strongly emphasizes that Chardin is a Catholic as well as a process thinker), but such a common philosophy can never wipe out creedal differences.

We are to be reminded that Catholic theology takes dogmas seriously; Protestant efforts at ecumenism often tend to forget this key point. Curtis very clearly recognizes the existing differences between Catholic and Protestant moral theologies, and I think that he appreciates that this will offer a great obstacle to any common moral theolgy. But he seems not to be greatly disturbed about what we could call dogmatic theology. We must recognize that very concept of "dogma" is rooted in a philosophy which allows for immutable and absolute truth. Most statements of process philosophy are directly opposed to anything absolute and immutable; process thinkers would quickly label " dogma " part of the static, substance philosophy which they reject.

I am not without hope that process thought will find its place in Catholic theology. Catholic theologians of recent decades have begun to grapple with the " development of dogma," a topic which could surely stand the light of process theology. But at the present time process thinkers are still much too polemical in their writings; they still find it necessary always to throw little (and not so little) barbs at substance philosophy and substance philosophers, among whom they would list Thomas Aquinas. Catholic theologians will always be on the defensive in such an atmosphere; they will continue to point to the glaring problems which Whitehead', philosophy brings to the theological endeavor. The day will come when process thinkers realize that they can hold their own in any intellectual discussion without resorting to stinging body blows at those antiquated substance philosophers. We must hope that Catholic theologians, off the defensive, will be able to appreciate what process thought offers them. Then all theologians can work for a truly ecumenical theology in those areas where they share a common faith-stance.

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Avatar and Incarnation. By GEOFFREY PARRINDER. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970. Pp. 296. $9.50.

In India there are approximately 580,000,000 people and 98% of them are non-Christians. These figures tell how important is the whole question of the relationship of the Church to the non-Christian world. Fortunately the Second Vatican Council has supplied us with magnificent guidelines for the evangelization of these peoples. " For Christians fruitfully to give testimony to Christ, they must be united to the others in mutual esteem and love. They must regard themselves as real members of the groups in which they live. They must take part in the cultural and social life through the various contacts and occupations of human life. They must be familiar with their national and religious traditions; with joy and reverence they must discover the seeds of the Word hidden in these traditions." *(Ad Gentes Divinitus,* n.ll)

In the Declaration on non-Christian religions the Council says: "And so the Church exhorts her sons, with prudence and love to meet the followers of other religions in *dialogue* and *collaboration;* while bearing witness to the Christian faith and Christian life they should *recognise, preserve* and *pronwte* the spiritual and moral and socio-cultural values found among these people." *(Nostra Aetate,* n. 2) The Church in India is becoming more and more alive to her role among her non-Christian brethren. But the task is difficult and slow and full of dangers, and yet full of hope.

Those of us who are involved in the formation of Indian missionary priests are acutely aware of the problems; the task is so easily stated and so difficult to execute. The Council says: " The minds of the students must be so opened and sharpened that they may be able to have a clear knowledge and judgement of the culture of their own people. In their study of philosophy and theology they should thoroughly examine the relationship between the Christian religion and the traditions and religion of their own country." *(Ad Gentes Divinitus,* n. 16) It is in this context that the present book is seen to have outstanding value and provides great help to the professor in a Missionary Seminary.

If one has to teach the tract on the Incarnation in an Indian context one is forced to study the doctrine of Avatar. Yet, there is no other work on the subject in English, that I am aware of, comparable to this one. Without Parrinder's book the Professor either has to do a great deal of research himself or give only the briefest of comparisons between Avatar and Incarnation. This work is comprehensive, accurate and, most of, all balanced. I began this book with a prejudice against it. During my first five years in India I studied Indian religiuos with Christian experts, but when I started formally to study under non-Christian pro-

fessors and gurus I discovered there was a big difference between Hinduism as taught by Hindus and Hinduism as taught by Christians. I stopped reading Christian authors because I felt in our work of dialogue we must know non-Christian teaching firsthand. Of course, not everyone has the time, the opportunity, the gifts or the qualifications to undertake this original study. If not, I strongly recommend Parrinder as a guide. He succeeds in presenting the various doctrines of Avatar as the adherents to these doctrines understand them. In these days of extreme irenicism, especially among some foreign missionaries, it is heartening to find a balanced judgment. He sees the riches and the dross of the Indian religio-cultural heritage. Above all, he makes no attempt to read into these various doctrines of other religions truths which are not there. Many Hindu scholars object to this tendency of Christian scholars of reading Christianity into Hindu religious literature.

Parrinder shares one defect in common with many experts on comparative religion. He is inadequate on Christianity! I would be very surprised if Parrinder is a Catholic. What he says is correct, but he leaves unsaid many important aspects of the Christian theology of the Incarnation. Here in India one frequently meets Indologists who have sadly neglected their theology and Christian traditions. Perhaps it is impossible to be an expert on more than two or three religions.

While I am happy that Parrinder has treated of avatars in Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Islam under many aspects because this helps me in teaching a comprehensive course on the subject, I think it would have been better to concentrate on one religion and compare its doctrine *of* Avatar with the theology of Incarnation, since this would have afforded more scope for a deeper understanding of one theory rather than a partial explanation of many. Also, missing from the book is the attitude of the educated and uneducated contemporary Hindu to avatars. I,iving Hinduism is very different from textual Hinduism. Parrinder probably knows more theoretically about Hinduism than most Hindus, but this can never be a substitute for living among our Hindu brethren and discovering their uneducated but authentic Hindu beliefs and customs.

In conclusion, I only hope the author undertakes comparative studies on creation, divine maternity, sacramentality, etc. They will be a great service to all Christians who are in immediate contact and dialogue with non-Christians and are looking for scholarly works to guide them. The whole Chuch in India owes a debt of gratitude to Geoffrey Parrinder for this fine contribution towards a better understanding of central doctrines that must form the subject of any dialogue between Christians and brethren of Indian religions. Of course, the book was written for a wider relationship than Christians working in India; it will be most certainly welcomed by all students in the field of comparative religion. Neither

my Hindu friends nor myself could find anything that we could seriously disagree with, and we all found this book to be the best systematic, clear, and scholarly book available on the subject of avatars in world religions. I found his theology of the Incarnation was incomplete and less satisfying, but there are numerous excellent works on this Christian mystery.

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In Our Image and Likeness. Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought. By CHARLES TRINKHAUS. *Q* vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. 10QO. *$QQ.50* the set.

Too often scholars have been seduced by their predilections for unity and common characteristics. Consequently, many accounts of particular historical periods are permeated, so to speak, by contrived descriptions of similarities and a peculiar neglect of differences. *In Our Image and Likeness,* however, might be said to represent a new weave in the fabric of this traditional historical pattern. Trinkaus says:

> However, our approach will attempt, at least, to be more pluralistic and eclectic, believing in no historical " unseen hand," whether a transcendental or an immanent one, observing a number of humanist authors in their attempts to discuss the condition of man, taking it for granted that the resulting statement will be the result both of the particular character of the writer and his knowledge and preferences among a. variety of traditional material and viewpoints available at that time for his adoption. (p. 175, Vol. 1)

In the final analysis a common characteristic of humanism does emerge, but it is tempered by Trinkaus's recognition of the philosophical ambiance in which differences figure prominently. (See p. 761)

The two volumes which consist of nearly a thousand pages (including an extensive selection of relevant original quotations, a Bibliography and a useful Index of Names and Works) is divided into four parts. One of the theses which Trinkaus hopes to sustain by this fourpart investigation is that the humanists' conceptions of the " nature, condition and destiny of man " cannot be understood without reference to the framework of Christianity in which they were originally defined. Trinkaus claims that the humanists' acceptance of Augustinian and patristic assumptions, and their dissatisfaction with classical moral philosophy and scholasticism, had a profound effect on the conception of man which resulted from their labors. Moreover, he argues that the Italian humanists' distinctive

intellectual orientation, their concern for *studia humanitatu,* provided an important kind of leadership in the Renaissance search for a new vision of man. Since the Italian humanist sought to reconcile the prevailing sense of significant human achievement within the conceptual framework of the Church, he was considered the harbinger of a cultural idiom that some feel was only ultimately fulfilled in the Reformation.

According to Trinkaus, the humanists' vision of man was engendered by (I) the patristic exegesis of Genesis which Trinkaus quotes as: "And he said: 'Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness'." (p. XIV, Vol. I), and (2) those harsher notions of the misery of man which derive force from the Biblical theme concerning man's Fall. Trinkaus interprets these conceptions as the peculiar expression of two distinct but related Christian literary genres-the *Dignitas hominu* and the *Mueria humanae conditionu.* Although his emphasis on the theological quality of humanism has been anticipated in more than in *obiter dicta* by G. Tofl'anin in his *Storica dell'Umanesimo* and C. Angelieri in his *Il problema religioso del Rinascimento* (as well as many others) , Trinka us does provide the reader with some interesting insights and a lucid exposition of several important but virtually neglected Italian humanists.

In Part I Trinkaus explores certain of the works of Petrarch, Salutati, and Valia in order to illustrate that their respective views on the nature of man were formulated in light of (and moreover, profoundly influenced by) their Christian beliefs. In particular, their concern with the nature of man presupposed prior theological conceptions of the relation of God to man. Thus, the *studia humanitatu* and the *studia divinitatis* are not separable-one cannot be understood adequately in isolation from the other.

All three humanists endeavored to define the nature of man in terms of his relation to an omnipotent yet merciful God. Questions such as the extent of man's determination, the extent of his sinfulness, and the relation of the will to the intellect, occupied a pre-eminent place in their thought. Oddly enough, their labors with these queries did not give birth to three homogeneous systems. Since they shared an essentially Augustinian and patristic viewpoint, however, one does find similarities among them. These similarities are for the most part simply their polemics against the scholastic and classical notions of the superiority of the intellect as a dominant human faculty. Nonetheless, Trinkaus holds that their "anti-dialectical" and " anti-metaphysical " dispositions are by no means trivial. For these humanists hoped to move beyond the limits of classical philosophy, logic, and metaphysics to Christian rhetoric, *theologia rhetorica,* for example, as expressed by Valla. Therefore, *theologia rhetorica* functioned as man's instrument in virtue of which he could aid or impede the process of divine providence. In fact, it is Trinkaus's view that " an essential historical

motivation for the emergence of humanism itself is contained in this struggle to achieve a new synthesis between the traditional religious faith of medieval Europe and the new social, economic, political, geographical, sensual, secular experiences of the men of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries .... " (p. *556,* Vol.

In Part II Trinkaus proceeds to an exposition of the work of several humanists who were strongly influenced by the thinkers in Part I. Basically, the humanists Trinkaus has selected represent the Renaissance preoccupation with the themes concerning man's dignity and misery-the seemingly antithetical Biblical themes of the Creation and the Fall. Here Trinkaus considers such thinkers as Bartolomeo Facio, Fra Antonio da Barga, Giannozzo Manetti (whose importance in this era has, by the way, not infrequently been overlooked), Benedetto Morandi, and Aurelio Brandolini. Trinkaus sees the humanists' struggle to reconcile the tension between the dignity and misery of man as the context out of which the Platonists of the late Quattrocentro and the Neo-Stoic representative of Paduan Aristotelianism, Pietro Pompanazzi, elaborate their views regarding man's place in the universe. It is clear, however, that thinks that the dignity of man and the misery of the human condition are complementary rather than exclusive themes. Thus, it would be misleading to suggest that his treatment of these themes in Part II shows them to be unrelated.

It would be fair to say, I think, that Part III is devoted to an exposition of the work of certain of the Renaissance Platonists who were most strongly influenced by the humanist tradition. Trinkaus's selection is by no means exhaustive, nor was it meant to be. This section is simply an attempt to demonstrate the impact which the humanists had on later thinkers, and the list includes such well-known names as Marsilio Ficino whose Faustian philosophy of man exemplified a maximization, so to say, of the earlier humanist views. Trinkaus says:

> I think it is possible therefore to claim that Ficino's exposition of the dignity and excellence of man is genuinely the culmination of the previous humanists' efforts not only in the sense that many major arguments are recapitulated but also because it goes beyond them in the depth, extent and completeness of its vision of man. (p. 476, Vol. 2)

For Ficino, man is no longer simply the image of God-now man has attained divinity in this world as well as in the next. Besides his detailed exposition of Ficino's views on immortality Trinkaus discusses the religious and poetic vision of Giovanni Picco who argues that man's dignity derives from both his origin and from his restoration by Christ who is the absolute consummation of all men. Egidio da Viterbo is also included in this part, but the account Trinkaus gives of him must be considered cursory. In fact, Trinkaus's comments about Egidio, which extend for

less than four pages, seem much more like an historical token than a satisfactory way of substantiating an historical point.

The last personality covered in Part III is Pietro Pomponazzi, and Trinkaus's explication of his views is highly suggestive and interesting. Trinkaus does well to contrast Pomponazzi with Morandi and Ficino, and his references to other relevant thinkers is extremely helpful. His perspicacious integration and comparison of sundry important thinkers (i. e., Bruni, Valla, Garzoni, etc.) with the visions of Pomponazzi make this one of his best chapters.

Part IV is a prodigious examination of the implications of the humanists' endeavor to define man against the background of the Christian faith and their own experience of the world. The implications of their philological concerns for traditional theological formulations are teased-out with considerable minutiae. Among the many salient topics treated in this large section some of the more interesting are: Italian humanism and its relation to the Scriptures as *studia humanitatis* and *theologica poetica*, the relation of humanist thought to the Sacraments as a new kind of religious emphasis, that is, the shift of emphasis from technical or logical argument to persuasive rhetorical treatises that could move individuals to a believing state of mind, the influence of humanism relevant to the dichotomy between clergy and laity, and the effect of humanist thought on the conception of poetry and the specific metamorphosis of *theolog ia poetica* to *theologia platonica* in the work of Cristoforo Landino.

Now that we have seen, at least in abbreviated form, the general format of the volumes, it seems apposite to offer some specific remarks about them that may be helpful to the reader. In a work such as this that purports to cover a large area of controversial scholarship it is inevitable that there will be defects, some more easily corrigible than others. Let us look first at what might be called a "minor blemish." Although it is minor, it is nonetheless serious because it is one that pervades the whole work. It seems to me that there are certain mechanical defects in literary style that leave much to be desired. Unfortunately (at least in these volumes) Trinkaus does not in general write engagingly. Many of his sentences, particularly in the first volume, are inordinately long and are not eminently readable. Trinkaus states, for example:

> It is my view, without wishing to push it too far or make it into a thesis, that the popularity of St. Augustine among the humanists generally and specifically in the case of Salutati, was based not only on the fact that he was a "classical-Christian," an ancient against the recent or contemporary modems, not only on the inherent appeal of his arguments, but on Augustine's appropriateness in combating the very tendencies in medieval thought which Riiegg rightly insists Salutati was trying to oppose (although I believe Riiegg has mixed up the individuals), namely naturalistic determinism and some, but not all, varieties of nominalism. (p. 57, Vol. 1)

And, in contrast to this excessively complex style, one is struck by an

occasional but patently turgid phrase such as "... fitfully guided, perhaps, by an officious band of *fratiunculi* swilling in an unctious and morbid display of hypocritical sentiment." (p. xxii, Vol. 1) Indeed, it is distressing to discover that such a scholarly work should occasionally smack of pedantry.

A second and more serious query is whether Trinkaus succeeds in delivering what he has promised. He asserts:

> The central conclusion of this book is that the Italian Renaissance, conceived essentially along Burckhardtian lines, was accompanied by a powerful assertion of a philosophy of will by leading representatives of Italian humanism and among philosophical circles influenced by them. (p. xx, Vol. I)

Despite his informative and persuasive epilogue it is not at all clear that Trinkaus has explicated his sources sufficiently enough to justify his central conclusion. There is little doubt that Trinkaus's exposition of the humanists and related thinkers is for the most part judicious. It is difficult, however, to sort out any one consistent thesis amidst his fertile exposition. Thus his occasional summary remarks look like unfamiliar landmarks along a familiar route. Perhaps this topographical confusion is due to the fact that the exposition he has offered accommodates and, in fact, inspires more than one thesis. Even his claim that " the idea of human nature during the Renaissance cannot be other than the conception of man's nature in its relation to the divine nature, and in a subsidiary way in relation to animal nature as well" (p. xiv, Vol. 1) seems too strong. Trinkaus has shown, I think, that the idea of human nature during the Renaissance cannot be understood without *reference* to the humanists' struggle with a conception of their own nature in relation to divine nature. He has by no means demonstrated, however, that this idea of human nature can be reduced *solely* to the humanists' conception of human nature in relation to divine nature. Moreover, his claim that "thus this book will deal with ideas concerning ' humanity and divinity ' in all their aspects " (p. xiv, Vol. 1) is simply extravagant. Since Trinkaus has only been able to present a limited number of humanists, it is apparent that his unrestricted affirmation is necessarily specious.

One cannot help but feel that Trinkaus has not tried hard enough to sort out adequately a single thesis. Thus the reader is left with many strands that look like theses but which remain united to the appropriate historical evidence. Nonetheless, his historical exposition of the Italian humanists is commendable, and his insights concerning humanist thought are interesting. What the volumes lack in terms of a single and justified thesis (perhaps more appropriately a philosophical and not an historical prize) is balanced by the plethora of information resident in them.

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