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IS PHILOSOPHY STILL POSSIBLE?

PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* (470E, 499C-D) describes a small Greek city implacably hostile to all non-Greeks whom it calls barbarians. Since Socrates admits the possibility of philosopher-kings among barbarians, his utopia might find itself killing some of the wise men who alone should rule it. The only regime able to avoid this waste of rare managerial talent would seem to be a communist world-state in which the wise have complete control, assigning to everybody what he deserves and what is good for him. Socrates nowhere explicitly defends his preference for a tiny Greek aristocratic utopia. The present study attempts to show that this preference arises from awareness of a theological-political problem always central to philosophy, but most apparent in Greek philosophy and, especially, in Socrates or Plato. Awareness of this problem discourages the full success of either modernity's global moral orientation or antiquity's tribal or civic piety. Thus Plato's

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philosopher-kings rule their small polity in virtue of their knowledge of a global or cosmic justice which seems more appropriate to a global regime. Would not the civic religion of Athens or Sparta fit better with the political limitations of Plato's utopia? Considerations of this sort lead modern critics to deplore Plato's inability to liberate his global or cosmic sympathies from the political prejudices of his age. This essay contends that the prejudice is with the critics and not Plato whose inability or unwillingness to wholly transcend his city's gods springs from awareness of an ignorance native to philosophy.

Philosophic ignorance arises from the belief that one lacks an adequate answer to the question of how (or whether) to live. Serious entertaining of this belief was precluded in ancient tribes or cities by unquestioning reverence for the gods, the ultimate moral authorities, of one's community. Fear of the Lord (or Lords) presented itself as the beginning of wisdom. Any activity—from carpentry to science—which did not arise from this pious origin could not lead to wisdom. At best it would be foolishness; at worst, it was abhorred as a blasphemous enterprise fated to deprive the tribe or city of its most important allies, its gods (or god). Philosophers are unlikely to refute this charge adequately, so long as they remain convinced that they lack wisdom and that its attainment probably is impossible.

How can men who believe themselves ignorant of how to live seriously challenge their city's moral orthodoxies? More importantly, how can they challenge these authorities in their own soul? For they, as it were, imbibed their society's authoritative morality with their mother's milk. All important institutions and sentiments fostered in their community strengthen this overwhelming compulsion. Consequently, philosophy's case appears weak and problematic not only to its pious opponents but, especially, to itself. Since nobody is born philosophic, philosophy's emergence and survival require appeasement of the apparently omnipotent passions encouraged in the soul by the morality dominant in the philosopher's

community. Those sovereign passions vary from community to community; the gods of Lycurgus or Manu are hostile to each other and to the God of Moses. Yet all prephilosophic regimes share the conviction that fear of their gods (or god) is the sole beginning of wisdom. Thus nothing seemed more insane than the philosopher's belief that he (and his fellow citizens) lack an adequate answer to the question of the good life. Obviously, obedience to the laws revealed by the city's gods constitutes the good life. No wonder that Socrates' questions about how (or whether) to live seemed futile or perverse to pious Athenians! Socrates was not condemned for his wisdom but for the effect of his stupidity on impressionable youth.

The crucial point is that Socrates, insofar as he was philosophic, shared pious Athenian inability to discern wisdom in philosophy's questionable quest. Philosophy is not sufficiently knowledgeable to refute the claims of prephilosophic religions. So long as it remains quest for wisdom and not wisdom itself, philosophy remains as dubious to itself as does the piety which it questions. Consequently it cannot dismiss that piety as mere prejudice unless it finds itself guilty on the same count. In its original form philosophy does not "debunk" prejudices. Its job is to determine whether what pious fellow-citizens hold to be knowledge of piety or justice is truly knowledge or merely belief mistaken for knowledge.

Belief and *opinion* or *prejudice* and *superstition* reflect the difference between the way civic piety is perceived by philosophy which remains quest for wisdom and by philosophy confident in its possession of wisdom. Legitimate condemnation of civic piety as superstition or prejudice assumes a science or knowledge unavailable to philosophy, but available to wisdom. If philosophy's transformation into wisdom is humanly impossible, philosophers know too little to despise civic piety's authoritative claims. Perhaps all citizens-including philosophers-would be better and closer to the truth, if they refused to succumb to philosophic temptation.

Although philosophers admit that their city's piety might be

the wisdom sought by them, their pious fellow-citizens discern nothing but impious foolishness in the philosophic enterprise. For the same reason the passions nourished by civic piety probably are far stronger within the philosopher than philosophy's self-doubting cravings. That is, they were more powerful in the small, pious cities in which philosophy first embarked on its quixotic voyage. There philosophy could never liberate itself from civic religion, since it could not adequately refute that religion's condemnation of a quest for wisdom uninformed by fear of its gods.

Some philosophers or scientists took refuge (against civic piety's power) in the claim that detached, autonomous rational inquiry is a permanent possibility guaranteed by a human nature not subject to divine will. Armed with this contention, philosophers could despise their persecution by the pious as "witch-hunts" springing from mindless bigotry. Yet, if philosophy must remain quest for wisdom, this conviction is mere belief, not knowledge. **If** one assumes-never forgetting that it is an assumption-that a satisfactory answer to the question of the good life will forever elude men, superhuman guidance would be required to know how (or whether) to live. The revelations of divine knowers or lawgivers would be responsible for whatever wisdom men may have. Consequently, the Athenians revered the gods whose existence and worth were thrown into doubt by Socratic inquiry.

Socrates questioned whether the Athenian gods, the gods governing the prephilosophic elements in his soul, were the true source of wisdom. Although he conceded that they might be, he no longer shared the pious citizen's certainty. His life, and the lives of all subsequent philosophers, is primarily a hunt for the true gods (or god). Philosophy is a search for theology. The rest of what is called philosophy or science is ancillary to this hunt or it is mere window-dressing. For only philosophy's culmination in theological wisdom could determine whether its quest is impious or the right way to live. Prior to that culmination the philosopher's philosophic craving hardly can stand its ground against powerful passions sanctified by the authority of ancestral piety.

Something resembling Socrates' philosophic demon, an un-Athenian deity, was required to reinforce his philosophic aspirations against passions inspired by civic piety. Thus Socrates made himself guilty of importing un-Athenian gods in order to support his philosophizing against internal and external threats. Unlike more pious cities such as Sparta, Athens tolerated Socratic importation of new deities for seventy years before executing him. Yet even Athens, a city defective in piety, finally killed Socrates as it had killed or exiled others whose impiety corrupted its youth. Consequently Plato, Aristotle, and other devotees of new, Socratic gods realized that the world would not be safe for philosophy until civic piety lost its hold over their fellow citizens.

Probably Plato first attempted a theoretical subordination of civic gods to global or cosmic gods. In his *Laws* (884A-907B) and *Epinomis* he replaces belief in civic gods with belief in global or cosmic gods as the main sanction for obedience to human laws. Under Plato's new order not Socrates but his Athenian accusers would be guilty of impiously importing foreign gods. Yet Plato does not go so far as to abolish civic piety. Instead he subordinates it to his global or cosmic piety. His philosophic ignorance precludes condemnation of his city's religion as superstition. The real question is whether it precludes even civic piety's devaluation to mere beliefs as distinct from divinely revealed wisdom. This devaluation is reflected in Platonic subordination of civic piety to cosmic gods, deities of an inquiry not bound by obedience to the divinely revealed laws of the inquirer's city. Nevertheless, subordination is not extermination. Plato's *Laws* and *Republic* still advocate small, exclusive Greek cities with civic gods, however subordinate.

Plato never forgets the inevitable tension between philosophy's global gods and the civic religion of the city out of which, and against which, philosophy emerged. This tension is unavoidable, if philosophy is fated never to secure the wisdom permitting it to know whether the true gods are global, civic, or tribal. We noted that this tension imperils philosophy's

survival internally and externally. Consequently, philosophy's survival seems to require transformation of even comparatively tolerant cities such as Athens into larger, more cosmopolitan states in which civic piety has as little authority as possible. Perhaps this need led Socrates to the potential world conqueror Alcibiades and Aristotle to Alexander the Great.

According to ancient accounts, Aristotle tried unsuccessfully to restrain Alexander's zeal to assimilate the Greek cities to a homogeneous world empire in which the distinction between Greeks and barbarians was no longer important. Like Plato, Aristotle wanted the subordination, not the destruction, of civic religion to global religion. However, when Alexander and, more decisively, Caesar destroyed the ancient city's freedom, they also undermined confidence in the civic gods whose main job was preservation of that autonomy. In Rousseau's *Social Contract* (IV, 8), he rightly notes:

The Jews-first as subjects of the Babylonian kings and then the Syrian kings-took it into their heads never to recognize any god but their own. This act of rebellion against the conqueror, for so it was regarded, brought down upon them persecution, but this persecution is without parallel in all pre-Christian history. It had for its purpose the punishment of sacrilege, not the subjugation of unbelievers. Every religion, then, was uniquely associated with the laws of the city in which it was prescribed. Thus the only way to convert a people was by conquering it, and only conquerors could be missionaries. Since the law that governed the vanquished imposed upon them the obligation to change religions, the thing to do-if you wanted to talk to someone about his changing religions -was to start by conquering him. This does not mean that pagans fought for their gods-far from it. The gods-as in Homer-fought for them, the custom being that each citizen besought victory from his gods and paid for it with new shrines. The Romans, before they occupied a town, always called upon its gods to abandon it.

By overcoming his city's Jupiter, Caesar became a global Jupiter who "doth bestride the narrow world like a Colossus." After his destruction of republican piety, the civic gods, which Plato's *Laws* subordinated, lost their authoritative hold over civilized men. Caesar's victory eliminated the tension, so

dangerous to philosophy, between global and civic piety. Consequently he might be interpreted, as he frequently was in medieval Christianity, as a savior of true religion and science from narrow superstition. In Dante's *Hell* the worst sinners are the betrayers of Julius Caesar and Jesus Christ. However sinful Brutus and Judas appear on the horizon of global religion or science, rebellions of their kind may be most philosophic after the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment of civic piety. For that disestablishment eliminates the tension between global and civic piety, although this tension is philosophically indispensable if philosophy is forever unable to secure the theological wisdom which it seeks. Seen in this light, the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment is responsible for globally oriented prejudices which make philosophy infinitely easier (or more moral) than it was for the Athenian souls of a Socrates or a Plato. Indeed it was as difficult for them to be philosophic as it is for men born after the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment to be "unphilosophic." Who can fail to think globally, if his character is molded in regimes dedicated to the brotherhood of man or the rights of man?

The conviction of global morality's superiority to civic piety, of Caesarian Rome to Lyncurgus' Sparta, obfuscates the tension which reminds philosophy of its dubious status in the human soul. The obfuscation is reflected in the fact that utopian writings informed by this conviction usually lack the tension which makes Plato's *Republic* an impossible compromise between global and civic piety. In Caesarian-Christian utopias the global gods of Plato's *Laws* usually find themselves anchored in commensurately global political regimes guaranteeing human brotherhood in the next world (medieval Christianity) or in this world (Marxism). Currently the most Caesarian or this wordly morality, Marxism, has far more authority than its other-wordly, Christian counterpart. This is another sign of the decay of civic piety in globally oriented regimes whose "ecumenical spirit" discourages moralities which divide men into opposing camps.

Consider the Catholic church since the death of Pope Pius

XII. Prior to his death it was the strongest bastion of old-fashioned religion in the modern world. Like the medieval church, if to a much lesser degree, it still fostered some of the anti-Caesarian passions native to civic piety. To be sure, it preached a unity of men, but primarily of the faithful in heaven, not of all men on earth and certainly not including those eternally damned in hell. Perhaps no traditional doctrine is less ecumenical than Platonic (*Gorgias*, 5'25 B-E) and medieval insistence upon eternal damnation of incurable sinners. While medieval fear of eternal damnation moved Catholics, they were understandably reluctant to compromise on crucial theological issues with Protestants or Jews, not to mention Marxists.

Love of one's own family was the element of civic piety which survived longest, after the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment. Here again the Catholic church, prior to Pius's death, was particularly influential with its adamant stand on divorce, insisting that the family was a sacred institution whose main job was proper education of its children. Since all members of a family were expected to subordinate their private inclinations to this pious goal, divorce was almost impossible. Convinced that divorce was anathema, the Church urged its flock to bear inevitable marital frictions piously, compelling members of Catholic families to subordinate their secular rights as individuals to their pious duties as parents and children. Since Pius's death the pious duties are increasingly assimilated to the secular rights with a consequent secularization of marriage and divorce laws.

Piety fostered by the contemporary ecumenical spirit tends to admire Ivan Illich and Daniel Berrigan more than Thomas Aquinas or Pius XII. Like Plato's *Republic*, that spirit would see no grave objections to elimination of strong ties to one's own private family or property or to anything which divides men instead of unifying them. However, the *Republic's* elimination of the family and private property occurred only within the tiny aristocracy of a small Greek city whose civic piety would have frustrated Plato's scheme. Plato realized that

strong family loyalties and private property conflicted with the global communist sympathies of his philosopher-kings. Nevertheless, his belief in his ignorance forced him to accept an obviously unworkable compromise between global and civic piety. In his utopia, tribal or family piety, but not civic loyalty, is abandoned and only the ruling class is denied private property. In the *Laws* all citizens may own private property. Unhampered by Platonic ignorance and moved by pity for individual frustrations and inequities, ecumenical Catholics demand relaxation of both sacred divorce laws and the Church's opposition to political communism.

Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks: The Decay of a Family* demonstrates the fatal infirmity of families weakened by secularized global piety. The fate of the house of Buddenbrook is apparent on the first page when old Johann Buddenbrook demonstrates his enlightenment by amusing himself at the expense of traditional piety as his grand-daughter repeats her catechism. On the last page, after the family is virtually destroyed, that grand-daughter, now practically the only surviving Buddenbrook, is comforted by an old servant who insists upon faith in the divine justice of the next world. If no twentieth-century novel (it was published in 1901) shows greater awareness of modernity's threat to traditional family ties, *Buddenbrooks* is the century's most philosophic novel. Of course, Mann's *Magic Mountain* or Hesse's *Magister Ludi (Bead Game)* appear more philosophic to readers unaware that the tension between global and civic piety is indispensable, if philosophers are to remain alive to the dubious worth of their enterprise.

In Mann's later novels (*Magic Mountain, Doctor Faustus*), he fell increasingly under the spell of modern global morality and its politics. Like the Catholic Church after Pius XII, he became less convinced of the need for strong family and property ties in regimes whose global orientation blinds them to the problematic side of their projected Tower of Babel. By contrast, *Buddenbrooks* presents the terrifying emptiness or homesickness inevitably accompanying decay of the family.

Naturally moralities preaching pity for all thrive as this decay progressively makes more men rootless or "alienated." That ecumenical compassion is the reverse side of homesickness, yearning to belong to the sacred community of one's own tribe or city or, at least, one's own family.¹ Yet modern global piety eagerly discards traditional Catholicism, the last relatively powerful reminder of the disestablished civic religions.

Today it is difficult for civilized men to seriously evaluate civic piety's case against global piety. For moderns do not experience the authoritative demands of civic piety as an ancient Spartan or even an Athenian did. At most, its absence is felt as homesickness or rootlessness.² Consequently few see a problem in Socratic devaluation of Athenian piety to mere belief. On the contrary, they share something of Plato's Protagoras's impatience with Socratic insistence on serious examination of opinions which they dismiss as prejudices or superstitions, (*Protagoras*, 352C-353B). They fail to discern that Socratic unwillingness to dismiss them springs from inability to refute civic piety's authority in his own soul. Had he refuted it to his own satisfaction, it would have ceased to be a powerful element in his psychological make-up or he could have discounted its power as irrational. Then he might have considered examination of Athenian piety no more pressing than that of Spartan, Egyptian, or Persian piety. However Socrates, if he was philosophic, did not enjoy an unphilosophic liberty available only in regimes whose morality arises from the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment of civic religion. Prior to Caesar's victory, the philosopher could not persuade either his pious fellow-citizens or himself that his city's piety was mere belief and not knowledge. Nor could he discount the possibility that his belief in his ignorance of that piety's worth was a blindness placed on him by his civic gods to make him ridiculous.

Perhaps the gods wished to use their city's philosophers to reveal the madness of subordination of civic piety to a truth,

¹ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, IX, 39-41; *Beyond Good and Evil*,

² Heidegger, "700 Jahre Messkirch," *Martin Heidegger 80. Geburtstag von Seiner Heimatstadt Messkirch* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), pp. 36-45.

or a search for a truth, valid for all men. Perhaps attempts to unify all men necessarily culminate in impious Towers of Babel whose destruction in Aristophanes' *Clouds* is wiser than their partial or complete realization. Consideration of this possibility appears futile or frivolous, if not sinful, to moral tastes shaped by the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment. However, philosophers contemplate it seriously, if their quest is as questionable as this essay assumes it is.

Philosophy emerged when Socrates or somebody else first came to believe that his civic religion was perhaps not the wisdom which it claimed to be but only a belief. Did Socrates (or anyone since) demonstrate the validity of his belief in Athenian piety's fallibility? The worth of all subsequent philosophic and scientific inquiry would seem to hinge upon the answer to this question.³

The question of philosophy's genesis would be trivial, if subsequent philosophic or scientific investigation has shown, beyond reasonable doubt, that the pious opponents of the first philosophers wrongly perceived their piety as the highest wisdom available to men. In that case Socrates would have been justified in condemning his city's religion as superstition. Thus Socrates complains that his fellow Athenians give "particular," Athenian answers to questions which demand global, "universal" definitions of piety, justice, and wisdom. However, Socratic zeal on behalf of universally sharable goods assumes that philosophy has won its quarrel against civic piety. Before Caesar became a global Jupiter, civic religion's authority in philosophic souls prevented this assumption from being experienced as more than an opinion, and a dubious one at that. After Caesar's apotheosis, the pious accusers of Socrates came to resemble narrow-minded philistines unable to share his lofty vision of a justice or piety common to all men.

³ Cf. the beginning of Marx's Introduction to the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*: "Critique of religion is the premise of all critique. The profane existence of error is compromised, after its heavenly defense of altars and hearths is disproven." Consider H. V. Jaffa, "The Case against Political Theory," *Equality and Liberty* (New York, 1965), pp. 209-229; V. Gourevitch, "Philosophy and Politics," *The Review of Metaphysics*, 22 (1968), p. 294, note 113.

Ancient thought's so-called rebirth (renaissance) in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was, in reality, the result of a long transformation in which the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment encouraged philosophy to take its value for granted. However much modern philosophy's founders (Galileo, Machiavelli, Descartes) took issue with Greek and medieval philosophy, they never questioned the worth of philosophy as quest for wisdom. However, they contended that Greek and medieval philosophy's failure to liberate itself from prephilosophic prejudice prevented it from becoming truly scientific. As understood by its partisans from Bacon and Galileo to Husserl and Dewey, modern science is ancient philosophy, but rigorously and methodically purged of its dependence on prephilosophic prejudice.⁴

As the main intellectual spokesman of the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment, modern science is philosophy which believes it has won its fight for survival against civic piety. This modern philosophy frequently is divided into two "cultures," humanistic and scientific, which are sometimes said to have little in common. Actually science needs the humanities to divest men of the prescientific prejudice and superstition which prevent scientific thought. For science will be in the service of prescientific bigotry, if the scientist is not purged of his prejudices prior to entering his laboratory. Just as Plato's *Republic* was a monstrous combination of global thought and civic piety, so science's global thought is enslaved to superstition, if scientists are not humanistically educated. Only then can one rightly use a science which consists of mathematically rigorous, exact methods of inquiry resulting in experiments able, in principle, to be performed by all men regardless of family, race, religion, or nationality. In this sense, science is the way of thinking proper to the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment of civic or tribal piety.

Humanistic schools and educators strive to exterminate the

• J. Klein, *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 117-118; cf. V. Gourevitch, *op. cit.*, p. 1185.

remaining vestiges of civic piety in the hearts of potential scientists. Thus they oppose everything which divides men, making them competitors or enemies, instead of unifying them into a global community in which all men are created equal. In this ecumenical spirit, humanists weed out trivial (war toys, academic standards or "grading") and serious (religious orthodoxies, firm attachment to one's own country, family, and property) unscientific prejudices. In short, they mean to eradicate everything conducive to strong differences and, therefore, to a strong sense of individuality. Thus the differences between Spartans and Athenians were far greater than those separating any two men in modern regimes dedicated to the present (United States) or future (Russia) freedom and equality of all men. These modern opponents can, in principle, be reconciled, while citizens with opposed civic religions were, in principle, opposed on the most important matters. Insofar as individualism implies crucial ultimate differences, it was deprived of its *raison d'être* among civilized men by the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment. Thus, when humanists and scientists speak of inalienable rights to liberty or privacy, they mean rights equally shared by all men in virtue of a common human dignity. Far from distinguishing men from each other, such global rights discourage any significant differences.

Humanists rid scientists and scientific schools of narrow unscientific prejudices which often are not as visible to scientists as to humanists. For example, scientific schools frequently fail to note temptations to competitiveness inherent in traditional "grades" (A, B, C, D, E, F), unless such dangers are brought to their attention by *avant-garde* humanities schools ever on the alert against relapses into a discredited past blinded by civic piety's divisive superstitions. Thus, defenses of scientific method from Descartes's *Discourse on the Method of Conducting One's Reason Well and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* to Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* have seconded Bacon's (*New Organum*, I, 61) contention that scientific method "leaves but little to the acuteness and strength of wits but places all wits and understandings nearly on a level. For as in

the drawing of a straight line or a perfect circle, much depends on the steadiness and practice of the hand, if it be done by aim of hand only, but if with the aid of rule or compass, little or nothing; so it is exactly with [scientific method]." Nietzsche noted the egalitarian morality responsible for modern scientific methods of thinking.⁵

If scientific method is inherently global and egalitarian, humanists eager to establish equality and cooperation through elimination of "grades" and other incentives to competition are more scientific than scientists burning to excel the achievements of an Einstein or a Heisenberg. Yet, perhaps the best scientists have been spurred by the passion to excel, the craving for excellence. If that passion is molded by prescientific prejudice, perhaps the whole scientific enterprise is informed by a prejudice which global piety condemns as pride, the impious drive to be exceptional, to except oneself from the common lot of mankind.⁶ Since pride makes men enemies, humanists from Bacon and Kant to Skinner and Mao have urged its eradication in the name of world peace and brotherhood. Far from opposing science, the humanities strive to make all men scientific by eradicating prejudices which make global application of science's globally applicable methods difficult or impossible. The humanities are science's loyal watch-dogs.

So long as philosophers found adequate refutation of civic piety impossible, that is, so long as they had not become humanists or scientists, they had to create a morality capable of competing with civic piety's martial virtue which, in Macaulay's words, knew no "better way to die than facing fearful odds for the ashes of one's fathers and the temples of one's gods." Its monuments are Plutarch's heroes whose unquenchable thirst for civic honors shaped all noble competition prior to the Caesarian-Christian disestablishment. In order to compete, philosophy needed to demonstrate that its heroism was more worthy of honor than Homeric greatness. Thus

• Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 22, 30, 204, 213, 264, 269; cf. Gourevitch, *op. cit.*, p. 306, note 156 and p. 296, note US; Jaffa, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-229.

⁶ Nietzsche, "On Science" and "The Leech," *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, IV.

Achilles, the model of Plutarch's heroes, fails to pass an examination graded by Socratic standards of excellence. If philosophy was to be prized in regimes dominated by civic religion, Plato's hero, Socrates, had to supplant Homer's Achilles as the model for gifted youth to imitate.⁷ Seen in this light, Plato's campaign against Homer, the *Republic's* (607B) "old quarrel between philosophy and poetry," constitutes a decisive landmark in philosophy's ambiguous conflict with civic piety.

In Plato's *Apology* (28A-31C), Socrates presents himself to his fellow Athenians as a philosophic Achilles summoned by their god, Apollo, to make them as philosophic as possible. Refusing to desist from philosophy no matter what the consequences, he compares himself to Achilles who preferred death to a cowardly life devoid of heroic virtue. Socrates is the new Achilles whose victory over the old Achilles must wait until the apotheosis of Caesar as the new Jupiter. The humanistic or post-Caesarian Socrates fights for global, cosmic causes such as the medieval city of God or the modern rights of man, disdaining honors arising from excellence in defense of his city's sacred laws.

Like modern secular crusaders, medieval heroes fought for a brotherhood of man which, however, existed in the next world. God's last judgment will join all the saved in a heavenly fraternity, while condemning incorrigible sinners to eternal damnation. Since the medieval brotherhood of man occurs in the life after death, medieval chivalry could still share some of the martial virtues of Plutarch's heroes in this life. For enemies of the Church required chastisement by a Roland or a Charlemagne and, in peace, knights won glory in tournaments or in combat with dragons or evil knights. Medieval Christianity's most characteristic deeds were crusades undertaken to destroy the Church's enemies and to capture Jerusalem from them. After the death of Pius XII the last powerful traces of

• A. Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (New York, 1968), pp. 353-361, 426-436; Nietzsche, "The Problem of Socrates," *Twilight of the Idols*, II; *Will to Power* 4&0, 457.

medieval heroism are rapidly assimilated to modern rejection of other-worldly salvation and damnation. Purged of prescientific "prejudice" by humanists, contemporary scientific thought demands this-worldly salvation for everybody through democratic (United States) or dictatorial (Russia) implementation of human rights on a global scale.

Medieval chivalry is a half-way house between the civic piety inspiring Plutarch's heroes (and, to some extent, their Socratic opponents) and the humanistic or scientific morality responsible for the heroes of modern democracy and communism. Medieval heroism found opportunities for glory so long as this world endured. However, modern heroes strive to end all this-worldly conflicts in this world. The victory of scientists, purged of prejudice by humanists, culminates in a world with no place for Achilles or Roland. There will be no war, competition, or even serious arguments, since science, protected by the humanities, will resolve all discords with a globally applicable precision and exactitude whose technology favors all men equally. If scientific enlightenment can settle all human differences, men presumably will spend their time consummating the brotherhood of man in mutual love (quite literally and physically according to Marcuse and other champions of the "sexual revolution"). Will these efforts at universal love be more than pitiful attempts to drown modern homesickness⁸ or "alienation" in a sea of bestial passion?

Once America, and then the rest of the world, undergo their "greening," the passions of Plutarch's heroes will seem absurd or immoral. Nietzsche predicts that anyone still harboring them will go voluntarily to the insane asylum. On the horizon of Nietzsche's last men, Homeric striving for excellence seems more foreign than Gulliver in Lilliput.⁹ Obviously, the egali-

⁸ Above, note Cf. also my "Eros and the Maternal Instinct: A Note on Civilization and its Discontents," *The Psychoanalytic Review* (to be published).

⁹ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Prologue, 5): "The earth has become small and on it hops the last man who makes everything small . . . They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth . . . One no longer becomes poor or rich: both are too burdensome. Who still wants to rule or to

tarian global society of the last men is in harmony with the ecumenical sympathies of modern humanists and scientists. However, that does not necessarily make its acceptance wiser than civic piety. Is it wiser to be last men or Plutarch's heroes? To be sure, the question makes sense only in globally oriented regimes whose morality culminates in something akin to the last men. For questions about what is good for all men are unimportant to tribal or civic piety, since its concern does not extend beyond the small community protected by its gods. The rest is either forbidden fruit or unimportant.

Consciences molded by civic piety cannot seriously ask whether it is superior to global piety. Nor can convinced modern humanists and scientists. The question is at home only in a Socrates whose passion for global or cosmic justice is seriously challenged by his civic piety. For only the satisfactory conclusion of philosophy's quest for wisdom would reveal whether Plutarch's heroes are morally superior to the last men. Plato's inability to reach a satisfactory conclusion compelled him to keep the question open in his *Republic* and *Laws*. Consequently the apparent inconsistency of anchoring his global justice in a Greek city is philosophically consistent.

If the above interpretation is right, those deploring the Greek prejudices which made Plato's utopia a Greek city are the ones guilty of prejudice. As humanists or scientists they assume the moral superiority of global to civic piety, prejudging the issue which, for philosophers, remains an open question. Philosophic belief in one's ignorance makes problematic the devaluation of civic piety to a belief, not to speak of its further reduction to a prejudice or superstition. Plato's political philosophy reflects this problem which has haunted philosophy since its dubious birth in Socrates or some other Greek.

To enjoy Socrates' philosophic openness in modern, post-Caesarian regimes, philosophers must struggle against moral

obey? Both are too burdensome. No shepherd and one herd. Everybody wants the same; everybody is the same [or equal]. Whoever feels otherwise goes voluntarily to the insane asylum. 'Formerly the whole world was insane,' say the most sophisticated among the last men."

forces in their soul fostered by humanistic or scientific education. Consequently modern philosophers strive to secure a fair hearing for civic piety within their society and, most importantly, within themselves. Socratic openness questions the dominant orthodoxy in the name of moralities despised or ridiculed by it. In regimes whose authoritative morality demands contempt for Plutarch's heroes, philosophers champion Homeric virtue for the same reason that Socrates condemned it in regimes which bred Plutarch's heroes. Thus, Nietzsche's defense of pre-philosophic civic morality against Socrates actually is philosophic in modern, globally oriented regimes. The same modern version of Socratic openness probably is responsible for Rousseau's defense of Sparta or Geneva and Heidegger's philosophic solicitude for his home town, Messkirch.¹⁰ Men struggling to be philosophic today will support traditional religious orthodoxy's effort to save threatened institutions such as the family.

With the virtual disappearance of civic piety, strong sanctified family ties are among the few obstacles to the victory of the last men. Another obstruction is the relatively strong constitutional safeguard for private property and competitive free enterprise still available in liberal democracies as distinct from international (communist) and national (nazi) socialist regimes. Consequently a contemporary *Republic* would support liberal democracy against communism or fascism for the same reason that it would condemn elimination of the family or the hegemony of humanists or scientists, those modern philosopher-kings. A contemporary Socrates would champion government by moderate, old-fashioned pious democrats for the same reason that the Athenian Socrates challenged their authority in the name of an impious, avant-garde socialist elite. Alive to their need to re-enforce the embattled remnants of civic piety in liberal democracies, modern philosophers prefer a Pericles, a Lincoln, or a Churchill to an Alcibiades, a Lenin, or a Hitler.¹¹

¹⁰ Above, note 2; cf. R. Masters (ed.), Rousseau's *First and Second Discourses* (New York, 1964), p. 11, note 14.

¹¹ Gourevitch, *op. cit.*, p. 818, note 190.

However, Nietzschean fears about the emergence of the last men probably are groundless. For the more liberated cosmopolitan regimes become, the more they seem to arouse passions destined to destroy them. Dostoyevsky, Kafka, and other perceptive psychologists have noted that the hallmark of modern cosmopolitan communities is the experience of rootlessness. The scientific jargon for the same experience is "alienation." Heidegger uses the lovely word *Heimweh* which literally means the pain of home or "home-pain" and might be translated as homesickness. I suggest that this all-pervasive homesickness is the voice of tribal or civic piety in globally oriented regimes. Put differently, it is the lament of what was traditionally called the soul in regimes fostering soullessness.

Traditionally the soul's fundamental experience was of dependence on gods or moral authorities outside of itself. Psychology was dependent upon theology. To be sure, philosophers worship gods unknown to them, until they receive a revelation of piety's true nature (Acts 17: . . .). Yet, their souls also experience moral enslavement, although, in the absence of divine revelation, they do not know their real master (or masters).

Citizens in modern global regimes have increasingly less awareness of the moral dependence traditionally native to the soul. As a result, the word "soul" has been replaced by "self." For the modern self, as distinct from the traditional soul, is essentially rootless and homeless, until it creates its own roots and home-and even its own Gods (or God). The self's characteristic experience is freedom and independence, not slavery or dependence. It insists that its own creativity is responsible for all truth, goodness, and meaning in life. Its morality of freedom opposes the soul's morality of obedience.

In more "liberated" cosmopolitan regimes, even college catalogues and other popular magazines trumpet the need to abandon dependence on moral authorities which restrict the self's freedom. Yet, in the same regimes, more and more young (and sometimes old) people who have the wealth and leisure for this unrestricted freedom escape to drugs and violence. For

they suffer from the homesickness or "identity crisis" which is the hallmark of the self's essentially uprooted existence. This suffering is responsible for violent rage in modern regimes which permit relative freedom for self-expression.

Fury and violence is the soul's answer to regimes which attempt to compel its transformation into a liberated and liberating self. Autonomous selfhood is fundamentally cosmopolitan while the soul is tribal or civic at heart. Consequently souls will fight to the death to avoid the universal orientation of Nietzsche's last men or his supermen.¹² In his defense of Sparta against more cosmopolitan communities, Rousseau clarified the reason for this determination. He preferred Sparta's civic piety as more in harmony with the natural limits of man's capacity to know and love others. By nature, nobody can know or care for ten thousand or a billion men. Only supernatural grace could make all men brothers. From a natural point of view—the point of view of the soul without such grace—any man who claims that all men can be brothers or even friends does not know what it means to have a brother or a friend. Thus Aristotle naturally preferred to be the real cousin of someone in Athens to being the brother of everyone in Plato's communist utopia.

Demands for a brotherhood of all men are unnatural or supernatural. When men live in regimes which make unnatural demands upon them, their nature rebels. This rebellion informs the frustration and violence which is becoming the hallmark of youth in regimes permitting them to express themselves freely. Their rebellion proves that those regimes suffer from the same discord afflicting Plato's utopia, an impossible compromise between civic and global piety. Similarly, contemporary cosmopolitan regimes inevitably foster the wrath burning to destroy them. Perhaps that wrath is the most philo-

¹⁰ See my "Plato's Defense of Socrates," *Liberal Education*, 56 (1970), 470-472. While writing that article I still believed that Nietzsche's last men (above, note 9) were possible. In other words, I failed to grasp the violent consequences of contemporary and future rootlessness. On this point Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* are more prophetic than Nietzsche's last men or supermen.

sophie passion possible in regimes dominated by global piety's ecumenical spirit. If it is, must not contemporary philosophers curb their philosophic passion if they wish to continue investigation of philosophy's problematic status today? Otherwise they might hasten the catastrophe against which the *Pirlice Aboth* (III, 2) warned: "But for the fear of the government, men would swallow each other alive." Under such circumstances, can anyone but the unphilosophic be philosophic? Is philosophy still possible?

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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE

IN THE PHILOSOPHY of mind of Aristotle and Aquinas a very important role is given to the so-called "first principles." These are the mental laws or rules according to which the mind must function. Such principles would be, for example, the principle of non-contradiction ("For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultaneously of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible"),¹ the principle of excluded middle ("It is not possible that there should be anything in the middle of a contradiction, but it is necessary to assert or to deny any one thing of one thing"),² and so on. In this essay the investigation into the principles of knowledge is to be a *psychological* one, not a *logical* one. In other words, it is to be an inquiry into the actual workings of our mind, not an inquiry seeking to devise a logical system, perfectly consistent and coherent, along the lines of a mathematical system. In such a system principles would have the role of axioms. But in the "psychological" inquiry we are pursuing we are seeking to detect the basic drives, forces, and activities which characterize our mental make-up and which form the foundation underlying all our thinking, determining the kind of activity that human thought is. These basic features of our conceptual system do have some characteristics in common with logical axioms, but they should not be equated with, nor reduced to, such axioms.

Many philosophers of late have considered the principles exclusively in terms of verbal formulations or logical formulae. However, a philosopher must also investigate the basis for the validity of such formulations. Such a basis must lie within

¹ Aristotle, *Met.* Γ, c. 3, 1005b19-1i!O, translated by C. Kirwan, Oxford, 1971. All quotations from Aristotle will be taken from this version.

• Aristotle, *Met.* Γ, c. 7, 1011b23-24.

the mind itself as it actually functions in real situations. Hence in a "psychological " inquiry it would be wrong to think of the principles as propositions already explicitly formed in our mind as it were innately or *a priori*. Still less are they logical formulae. Rather they should be thought of as forces within the mind itself guiding it to act in a certain way. Just as the law of gravity is not a proposition floating in the air but a force pulling all solid objects towards the center of the earth, so is, for example, the principle of non-contradiction (from now on abbreviated to PNC) a force guiding the mind to conceive things as being one thing and not at the same time not that thing. These principles can be described or *expressed* in propositions, just as physical laws can be captured in mathematical formulae, but this does not mean that the propositions are explicitly formulated and lodged in our minds. The formulations are merely abstractions, expressing perhaps the most important and salient aspects of that far greater reality—an energy or force of many diverse effects—which is the ground of the formulation. Just as a description of a man is not the reality that is the man himself, neither is a formulation of a principle the mental reality which the formulation seeks to express or describe.

Aristotle and Aquinas called the principles *first* principles, because they lie at the base of our knowledge. They are ultimates, not because we first (temporally) know the principles and then consequently (temporally) come to know other things but because the whole structure of our conceptual system is built on them as on foundations. (This will become clearer as we proceed further.)

The origin of the principles is puzzling. We do not seem to acquire knowledge of them the way we usually come to know things. We do not sense them. We do not seem to reason to them, though we may have to reason to explicit formulations of them. Normally they can be detected only through careful reflection on our knowing and thinking processes. We are not usually explicitly aware of them. Many people never have them explicitly as objects of thought. Yet they are present

and effective whenever anything is known,³ even in our first acts of knowledge, for they are the principles of that knowledge too. They are not primarily things we come to know, i.e., objects of knowledge. Rather they are parts of our *mental equipment*, laws and forces regulating our thinking. Hence when Aristotle and Aquinas call them the "best known" (" *yvwptp.wr&:r7Jv,notissimum* ") parts of our knowing faculties, these terms must be carefully and rightly understood.

Aristotle says that PNC is part of what is necessary for knowing anything; ⁴ it is part of our mental equipment. **It** and the other principles are *natural* to us, just as the law of gravity is natural to our physical world. Since it is part of our human nature to have faculties for knowing and thinking, the laws according to which these faculties function must also be natural. **It** would be *unnatural* to deny these laws or to attempt to think without them or in variance with them, just as it would be unnatural for a fire to ignore the laws of combustion and chill rather than heat a room, or just as it would be unnatural for a ball thrown into the air not to fall to the ground again (presuming there was no interference in its flight). The cognitive laws we are considering include the laws according to which we particularize what we know, the laws according to which we form universal concepts, and the laws governing identification. Also laws such as PNC and the principle of excluded middle (henceforward PEM) are natural to us and pertain to our intellectual equipment. Apart from these laws, however, there is another kind of law such as the law of sufficient reason (henceforward PSR) or the principle of causality, and also what Kant calls the principles of Natural Philosophy (such as "in all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged," and "in all communication of motion, action and re-action must always be equal"),⁵ which, although in a certain sense natural to man and his reason, pertain nevertheless more to the kind of object

³ See e. g., Aquinas: *De Verit.*, q. 1, a.

• *Met.* I, 1005b15-18.

• "Critique of Pure Reason," Introd. V,

he knows rather than to the nature of the mind itself. However, such a distinction must not be pushed too far for, of course, all the former kinds of principle are related to objects of knowledge also, and the latter kinds of principle are related to the mind inasmuch as we must conceive things (i. e., our objects of knowledge) as conformed to such principles. But the emphasis in the former principles is more on the workings of the mind, and the emphasis in the latter is more on the kinds of object attained by such mental operations.

Aquinas often maintained that the principles are also *known* naturally.⁶ Not only are they natural to our mental powers and their function a natural part of the operation of knowing but we also know them naturally. In other words, they are known whenever the mind functions properly and according to its nature. There is a problem here with regard to the use of the word "know." How do we *know* the principles? In what sense of "know" do we know them? Wittgenstein questioned Moore's use of "know" when he (Moore) declared that he knew for certain that this was his hand, that the world had existed for many years before his birth, that at no time had he been far from the surface of the earth, and so on.⁷ The sense of puzzlement experienced by Wittgenstein⁸ also arises when Aquinas maintains that we naturally *know* the principles. Certainly it cannot be in the same sense of "know" as when I declare that I know 8×3 come to or that trees are green, or that the motorcar is going down the road. However, knowing that the car is going down the road is not merely a matter of knowing the relation of the car to the road, but such knowledge includes at least implicitly knowledge of the environment in which this event is occurring. The knowledge contained in that statement is not limited to the car and the road. Much more is involved: the relative positions of the car and the road

⁶ See e. g., *In Ill de Anima*, lect. 11, n. 372.

⁷ G. E. Moore: "Defense of Common Sense" in *Philosophical Papers* (London; George Allen & Unwin, 1959).

⁸ See L. Wittgenstein: "Notes on Certainty," edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and D. Paul (Blackwell, 1969), n. 6, 136-137, and elsewhere.

during the time of my observation, giving me knowledge of the speed; the awareness of a road as something solid, supported by a solid stable world; the awareness of time—all these and more are included in what we would call our knowledge of the car travelling down the road. Knowledge of the principles is a knowledge *something like* these implicit features of the explicit knowledge expressed in our observation statement.

Aquinas gives the example of the principles being known in the same way as light is known when we see colors. For someone uninitiated in theories of the physics of light this is a helpful illustration. Our awareness of light usually comes from seeing something colored. (By "colored" I include not merely chromatic colors, but also black and white and their variants). Our attention is directed to what we see, e. g., the motorcar going down the road, but at the same time we cannot help but apprehend light as well. We do not perceive light by itself but things illustrated by the light. Even when we say we saw a ray of light pierce the darkness of a room, it seems that what we really saw was something (e. g., dust particles) of some area suddenly illumined by the light, whereas previously all was in darkness. Light is a *means* whereby we can perceive colors and colored things: without light we cannot perceive the colors. Hence in the direct apprehension of colors we also perceive the means whereby this apprehension is possible, viz., the light. Light is thus an important factor contributing to our perception of colors; it actually influences our perception. It is in some way a cause, and more than a *conditio sine qua non*. If the light were not a "white" light but a red or a blue one, our perception of colors would also be tainted red or blue as the case may be. At midday in bright sunshine a ripe wheat field looks golden; as the sun goes down in the evening, it looks rosy pink. Thus light is perceived as a contributing cause or influence at the same time and in the same act as we directly and explicitly apprehend colors or colored objects. We do not as it were first see the colors and then see the light, though we may have our attention exclusively fixed on the colored objects and only by a subsequent change of attention

advert to the light. But this is a switch of attention in the one cognitive act which is apprehending both colors and light at the same time.

Our knowledge of the first principles is something like our apprehension of light in the perception of colors. In an ordinary act of judging not only do we have in mind that which we are judging about but the very principles influencing that judgment are present in our act of thinking also. They are present not merely on a mechanical, extra-consciousness level but also at the cognitive level so that they are known together with the direct object of the judgment. Aquinas says that *immediately* ("statim") something is known the first principles are known too.⁹ Just as light influences and contributes to our perception, so do the principles influence and contribute to our judgments, which must be made in accordance with the principles. Our judgment is explicitly directed to the object or situation we are judging about, but indirectly and implicitly that judgment includes the principles which regulate and guide its formation. A judgment, for example, must follow the principle of non-contradiction, for if that principle is violated, nothing is said and there is no judgment. As Strawson says, when a person contradicts himself or is inconsistent, he says nothing.¹⁰ Violation of PNC leads automatically to inconsistency. Also every judgment must conform to PEM: there is no judgment, if we neither affirm nor deny but seek some middle path. In judging properly we are implicitly aware of these principles: they are "known" by us. The principles may be in an empirical proposition and known in such a proposition; nevertheless my knowledge as expressed in the proposition ("the cat is on the mat") is *direct*, whereas my knowledge of the principles can be only *indirect*, i. e., through and by means of the direct knowledge. We do not first *know* the principles and then *know* (in the same sense) that the cat is on the mat. Part of our knowledge of the cat's position consists of the first principles-not in the sense that such

• See e. g., *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 12.

¹⁰ *Introduction to Logical Theory* (Methuen, 1952).

knowledge is made up of a complex of principles but in the sense that the principles are exerting an influence on that knowledge, so that the proposition expressing our perception is formed according to the principles-in such a way that once we are directly aware of the cat and its position on the mat, and express that awareness in a judgment, we cannot but help know of the influence of these principles too.

However, this "knowing" of the principles rarely expresses itself in an explicit statement to which we have assented. Usually we are not explicitly aware of them, as we are explicitly aware of the car going down the road. However, if someone were to propose a statement of a principle for our assent, and if we understood the statement, we would have no difficulty in agreeing with him. This is what Aquinas means by saying that the principles are self-evident from their very terms: once the terms are understood, assent to the statement of the principle is given.¹¹ Similarly any person with normal understanding would reject a statement violating PNC; for example, if someone were to declare that something could both be and not be at the same time and under the same respect. When a person spots a contradiction in another person's or his own discourse, he is displaying his knowledge of PNC. Similarly, when a person points out the invalidity of an argument, he is showing that he knows the logical laws concerned. Thus our knowledge of principles is usually revealed in these negative ways, which do not bring us to new knowledge but make explicit knowledge we already have implicitly in our direct judgment and thinking.

Another example illustrating the way we "know" the first principles would be the way we know the law of gravity in watching a stone fall from a height or even the rain pouring down from the sky. Most people would not know the mathematical formulation for the law of gravity; many possibly have never heard of such a law. Yet they would know that heavy objects tend to fall if support is withdrawn from under

¹¹ *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 7, n. 1214.

them, and they know of this tendency, this law, in the perceiving of the fall of any solid object. Their surprise would indeed be great if an elephant suddenly floated before their eyes. Another example of this kind of indirect knowledge would be our perception of time in the direct perception of something moving or changing. It is precisely this peculiar sense of "know," this indirect implicit way of knowing, which prompted Augustine to cry that, if no-one asked him what time was, he knew, but once he was asked he was at a loss.¹² To make this implicit knowledge explicit and clearly expressed is extremely difficult and takes a great deal of sharp, careful, and analytic inspection. It is a sign of the genius of the early Greek philosophers that they were able to detect, isolate and express the principle of non-contradiction, a principle lying at the foundation of human knowledge, that holds the key to any satisfactory theory of knowledge. Because of its very universality and its indispensability in thought, it is all the more difficult to detect and very often taken for granted.

Other examples of implicit knowledge which one might at first think would illustrate the kind of knowledge that we have of the principles would in fact be misleading. I am thinking of examples such as the observation of a car speeding down a road, which would include a presumption that a person was driving the car; one could say that knowledge that there was a driver was included in the original statement—a justified presumption, if in our original observation we took in (perhaps almost unconsciously) that the car was travelling in a controlled way. Or perhaps the use of the term "my mother-in-law" implies that the speaker is or was married—such would count as presumed or implicit knowledge. But these kinds of knowledge do *not* illustrate what is meant by "knowledge of the principles," for the facts that the car has a driver or that the speaker is married can be expressed in statements of the same order as the original statements: all are empirical statements of observation or description. Yet knowledge of the

¹² *Confessions*, XI, 14.

principles is different. Although the principles can be expressed in propositions, these propositions are of a different order, of a different kind, from the original statements in which they are implicit. For example, PNC can be detected in any empirical statement, but itself it is not empirical but logical. Similarly for PEM. The principle of causality might indeed be a general empirical law, but its very generality puts it in a different order from the statement expressing an observation of a particular exercise of causality. Knowledge of these principles is indeed had in our ordinary everyday statements but it is an indirect knowledge, an implicit knowledge *had through* the understanding of the explicit content of the statement (though not actually contained in it), whereas the other examples were of implicit knowledge *contained in* the explicit content of the statement. *Knowledge of the principles is knowledge of the structure, grounds, and causes of the statement* which are present to the mind as making the statement possible, whereas the other kind of implicit knowledge is really what is contained in a fuller understanding of the explicit meaning of the statement. The latter is revealed in a direct analysis of the statement: the former (the principles) are detected by a more complicated procedure-as in depth analysis-which seeks to determine what is necessary for the statement to be possible.

It must be remembered that these principles which permeate our knowledge are not starting points for knowledge, such that we first know them, then build up our knowledge as from a base. Moreover, to say that the principles *support* our knowledge or that they are the foundations of knowledge does not mean that all our empirical propositions can be reductively analysed into the first principles; just as a house cannot be reduced to merely its foundations and joists and supports, or a human body to its skeleton. Rather (in the words of Wittgenstein with reference to Moore's common sense propositions) they "lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry."¹³ They form the structure or "scaffolding"¹⁴ within which our

¹³ "Notes on Certainty," n. 88; see also n. 210.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 211.

direct knowledge finds itself: they are "adjustments of the human mind." ¹⁵ As Wittgenstein says: "The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life." ¹⁶ Without the principles our knowledge would be dead, because it would be nonsense, unintelligible. Just as a skeleton makes it possible for us to recognize or learn to know a person by giving support and shape to the body, even though we do not explicitly advert to the skeleton, so do the principles give support and shape to a proposition. Take away the skeleton and the body collapses, becoming unrecognizable; remove the principles, or contradict them, and the proposition collapses, becoming meaningless.

This explicit detection of the principles is done through reflection on our actual thinking and leads to a *knowledge that*. But the kind of implicit knowledge we have of the principles in our actual direct thinking or perceiving of a fact or object is more a *knowledge how* (to use Ryle's distinction) ¹⁷ It is implicit, because in order to know, for example, *that* the cat is sitting on the mat, we must know *how* to come to such knowledge and how to form the judgment. Whenever we know anything it is obvious that we know how to know, just as when a man walks he obviously knows how to walk. The principles determine the way we know. This distinction between *knowledge how* and *knowledge that* helps us to understand how it can be that we know the principles immediately ¹⁸ we know anything, i.e., how we can know the principles in the one and the same direct act of grasping something else. The answer must be that in knowing *that* the cat is on the mat we must know *how* to know that fact. There must be some sort of awareness of how to set about knowing this fact, otherwise we just would not be able to know it. And it is the principles that determine how we set about knowing it.

Our language owes a great deal of its meaningfulness to the principles, as can easily be seen from the nonsense we fall into

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 89.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 105.

¹⁷ G. Ryle: *The Concept of Mind* (Penguin, 1963), c.

¹⁸ *De Verit.*, q. 1, a.

if we deny them. Aristotle in his attempts to show the validity of PNC¹⁹ resorts to pointing out the undesirable consequences of any attempts to ignore or deny the principle in our thinking. Chaos in our thought would result. Our speech, reasoning, and thought are limited by the principles; we must think, speak, and reason in accordance with the principles under pain of otherwise talking nonsense. Words must have a definite meaning; if they do not mean one thing but an indefinite number of things, then in effect they would mean nothing. If through denial of PNC all contradictories are compatible, then everything would be one, for we would be able indifferently to assert or deny a predicate of any subject. The collapse of PNC would automatically bring about the collapse of other principles, especially that of excluded middle.²⁰ Denial of the other principles, or hindrance of their operation, would have similar, though perhaps not so far-reaching, effects as does denial of PNC, which enjoys a certain primacy even among the principles.²¹ In fact, however, consistent and sincere denial of the principles is impossible in our actual mental life, for they govern all our thinking and hence even the thinking that goes into denying them.

The meaning of a word is to be determined by the way it is used (according to Wittgenstein).²² Our words are used to express our thoughts, to make known what we are thinking; they may indeed be our thoughts as it were made visible or audible; our speech can be our thought.²³ Nevertheless the rules determining the use of the word must also determine its meaning. Words must be used in accordance with the principles: otherwise they are meaningless. If the word "horse" is not used according to PNC, for example, if it could stand for what is both a horse and is not a horse, it does not mean anything—neither a horse nor not-a-horse. Similarly if our statements sought to express something between affirmation and

¹⁹ For points made in this paragraph, see *Met.* I, c. 3-6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 4.

²¹ Aquinas, *Comm. in IV Met.*, lect. 6, n. 605.

²² Wittgenstein: *Philosophical Investigations*, I, n. 139.

•• *Ibid.*, n. 329-332.

negation in violation of PEM, what sense could we make of them? What meaning could they have? Nor could we make sense of a world which did not abide by the law of sufficient reason. The question " why?", so important in our mental life, would have no purpose.

Consistent with his teaching that PNC is part of what is necessary in order to know anything, Aristotle maintained that it is not arrived at through demonstration.²⁴ We can extend this to apply to all the first principles: we do not reason to them, they are given and we take them for granted. Our principle are part of the mechanics of our thinking and knowing processes, just as physical laws are part of the mechanics of the universe. We must accept them as such, take them as given, just as the physicist and astronomer accept the universe's laws as given in the world that is. The physicist may reason and use hypotheses to discover the laws, but the laws are not produced by his reason. Similarly, the philosopher may have to reason to detect the principles of reason, but this does not make them products of reason.

Demonstration in Aristotle's view is always made through other principles, the certainty of which guarantees the certainty of the conclusion (the principle demonstrated). Yet obviously not all principles can be demonstrated in this way. Otherwise we would have to demonstrate within a vicious circle or by means of a regress to infinity; in neither case would there be demonstration nor ground for certainty.²⁵ The only kind of " demonstration " that Aristotle would allow is *ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν ἀποδείκτων*

or what Aquinas calls " *sylogismus ad contradicendum*," which depends on showing the nonsensical consequences of the opponent's position. For example, with regard to PNC, once Aristotle has got his opponent to admit something which has a definite meaning, he can show that PNC is already presumed to be valid, at least in that case.²⁶

The principles are certain and provide a ground for certainty.

²⁴ *Met. Γ*, 1006•6-27.

²⁵ Aristotle, *loc. cit.*, 5-10; Aquinas, *loc. cit.*, nn. 607-608.

²⁶ *Met. Γ*, 1006•19 seq; cf. also Aquinas, *loc. cit.*, nn. 608-610.

Aristotle cites this as another characteristic of PNC,²⁷ and we can extend it to the other first principles as well. PNC must be taken as the "most firm" ("*firmissimum*") of principles. Aquinas commenting on this passage of Aristotle²⁸ calls the principles most certain and most firm ("*certissima et firmissima principia*"). But earlier he maintains that the certitude of our knowledge depends on the certitude of the principles: "*certitudo cognitionis ex certitudine principiorum dependet.*"²⁹ However, if the certainty of our ordinary knowledge depends on the principles, the principles themselves must have a different kind of certainty. Certainty is something derived from, and reducible to, the stability of the principles. The principles themselves are not dependent in this way.

The principles are not reasoned to and hence are not "certain" in the way a conclusion is certain from the firmness of its premisses. Moreover, they are not "certain" in the way we are certain of the evidence of our senses: when I see a motorcar approaching, my whole behavior in getting out of its way and letting it pass shows my certainty that a motorcar is truly approaching. Rather the "certainty" of the principles—or better, our reliance on the principles or our confidence in the principles—is not a reasoned one nor one based on evidence. Nor is it really based on the self-evidence of the terms of the principle, as Aquinas maintained.³⁰ For usually we have taken the principles as certain before we are aware of any explicit formulation of them, and hence before we can see their self-evidence from the terms. Of course, once a principle is formulated and presented to us, we can see from the terms that it is indeed valid and certain. But such an explicit presentation is not usually available to us, and in fact our acceptance of it is based on the fact that we have already been taking the principles implicitly for granted ever since we began our conscious life.

The principles are the solid grounds of our mental activity and their stability is taken for granted. They are given along

²⁷ *Met.* 1, 1005b22.

²⁸ *Comm. in IV Met.*, lect. 6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, n. 596.

³⁰ *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 12.

with our mental faculties, for they are part of our mental equipment. They cannot reasonably be questioned or doubted, for any reasoning automatically presupposes their validity. As Aristotle remarked, only an untrained person would think it possible to question them or demand that their validity be demonstrated.³¹ In feeling certain that we know how to know or how to reason, we at the same time feel certain of the principles. Just as in speaking intelligently we are implicitly certain of the meaning of our words, so must we be certain, for example, of PNC which determines and guarantees the meaning of our words. Right from the beginning of our mental life the firmness and stability of the principles are taken as the solid and stable foundation of our thinking and knowing. All our conceptual system is built on them as on a solid foundation. However, they are not actually present in our conceptual system until we actually do know something. We should not conceive of them as a scaffolding which first (temporally) is there and on which we later hang our knowledge. No, they are a scaffolding which appears *together with* our first acts of knowing (whenever they might be), for they are there as an integral part of that knowledge. Just as there would be no law of gravity before there were objects to be attracted to the center of the earth (or indeed before there was an earth), similarly there would be no principles before there was actual knowing or thinking. Logically they are prior to knowing, but temporally they enter our mental life simultaneously with knowledge. Aquinas many times insisted that the principles entered our cognitive life through knowledge from the senses, i. e., sense perception.³²

Another characteristic that Aristotle especially noted with regard to PNC was that it was *not hypothetical*.³³ This, with regard to the other first principles as well, stems from what has been said already about the principles not being demonstrated,

³¹ 'YaP d:rratOevula rO f'YWOKeiv rlvwv DeL S1Jre'iv Kat rlvwv oV
oei-Met. Γ, 1006•6-7.

³² See e. g., *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 83; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 78.

³⁸ *Met.* Γ, 1005bi4.

reasoned to, nor dependent upon other principles, but being taken for granted as stable and solid. If the principles are indeed like this, they cannot be hypothetical, they cannot depend upon conditions for their validity. If the principles are at the basis of the conceptual system, they themselves can condition subsequent knowledge but cannot be conditioned themselves. They have to be taken unconditionally as unconditioned grounds of knowledge.

However, this independence of the principles must not be exaggerated. The principles are not so independent that they stand isolated and in possible conflict one with the other. Rather they form a compatible network of principles at the base of our system and behind any act of knowing. In fact, some principles are in a certain sense dependent on others. For example, all the principles obey PNC and operate in accordance with it: if meanings of words were not definite according to PNC, PEM and PSR could not operate. PNC operates in a special way on the most basic level of formation of concepts. The other principles, for example PEM, operate rather on the level of judgment, logically presupposing already the formation of the relevant concepts. However, not even this is to be pushed too far, for a full grasp of a concept, such that we know when and how to use it properly, demands an awareness *oi* why it is such and not otherwise, and here on this level PSR is already in play. And so this dependence of some principles on PNC is not such that other principles are deduced from PNC as lower principles from a higher. The other principles cannot be reduced to, or analysed away into, PNC. But neither are they entirely independent of it nor does each one operate in splendid isolation from the rest. Rather they all work together, influencing each other as they govern and guide our knowledge.

Having looked at the first principles in general, let us now turn to two of them in particular. We shall develop some of the details of PNC already mentioned and then explain the psychological foundation of PSR.

PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION

Aristotle has given a formulation of PNC which we will use here: "For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultaneously of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible."³⁴ There has long been discussion among philosophers as to whether this principle is primarily a law of being or a law of thought. According to Ross this formulation shows that for Aristotle PNC was primarily a law of being.³⁵ But Aristotle himself, from his treatment of the principle in *Met. 1*, seems quite clearly to have thought of it as both a principle of thought and of being. These two aspects of the one principle do not seem to be considered separately in his treatment but he seems indiscriminately to emphasize one aspect and then the other.

However, while admitting both aspects of the principle, it could be argued that they are both on the side of thought. Although at first sight PNC seems to be a law of being governing the beings in the world, it applies only to beings in the *world as we know it*, in our world. It is only in our world, in the world that we know or can know, that the same thing cannot hold good and not hold good simultaneously of the same thing and in the same respect. Our concept of the world does not admit of things not in conformity with PNC. The various objects, their various aspects, relationships and so on, which go to make up our world view—the components of our concept of the world—are all governed by PNC. Because all these objects fall under (or within) our *concept* of the world, PNC is thus a *law of thought*. But to call PNC a law of thought in this way is really very trivial, for every law of science and human life can have prefixed to it "in the world as we know it," or "in our world." The chemist, the biologist, the physicist, the lawyer can all add this prefix to their laws. To call such laws "laws of thought" is tantamount to denying the possi-

•• *Ibid.*,

³⁵ *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, a revised text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross (O.U.P. p.

bility of laws of being. All laws have elements of human thought in their formulation. But these elements should not be sufficient to call them in a special way "laws of thought."

However, there is another sense in which PNC could be called a law of thought, and it is one I think Aristotle recognized. It is a fact of human thinking that we do not think of the same thing holding good and not holding good simultaneously of the same thing and in the same respect. Everything we think of does in fact conform to PNC; we think according to PNC. And even more, we *cannot* think rationally and sensibly unless governed by PNC. The mind can make no sense of a thought which violates the principle. In fact it could be argued that there is no thought there at all. Although we can formulate in words a proposition violating PNC, it does not make sense, for it is not a thought. It is nonsense. The mind boggles at such a sentence and rejects it. Thus PNC is a *law of thought* inasmuch as it governs all our thinking, so that we cannot think at all in opposition to the principle but always must think in conformity with it. In this respect PNC differs from, for example, the law of gravity; we could perhaps imagine a world without gravity, but not a world ungoverned by PNC.

Aristotle did not make such a clear distinction between PNC (being) and PNC (thought). Although I think such a distinction is valid, it must not be pressed too hard or forced into a separation. Each is closely entwined with the other and they cannot be adequately separated, as if PNC (being) could be considered in isolation from PNC (thought). They are really complementary aspects of the one principle. Aristotle constantly mixes them up, and in his defense of the principle he often switches from thought to being and back again, without apparently considering that this in any way damages his argument.³⁶

Proponents of PNC as a law of being sometimes claim that it governs all things in the world independently of anyone knowing them, i.e., whether or not they are known. PNC as

•• *Met.* 1, 1011b15-18; 1006a9! & 1006b33; 1005b9!6-33 & 1005b35-1006a1.

a law of thought claims that everything we know is in conformity with the principle; it lays no claims beyond what is known or can be known. It merely says: if it is known, it is known according to PNC. If there is anything beyond our ken, PNC (thought) has nothing to say about it; for if it did, it would immediately bring it within our knowledge. PNC as a law of thought, however, is not limited to what is actually known but includes in its scope what can be known, what is conceivable. It governs all possible objects of knowledge, all the beings of our world. Because we know them as governed by PNC, we believe they are *really* like that; we could not imagine them *really* being otherwise.

I am interested here in the aspect of PNC as a law of thought, i.e., in its influence on our cognitive life. PNC, considered exclusively as a law of being, seems to me to be so utterly universal as to be trivial. Nothing would escape from it, and hence it would say nothing informative about anything. However, as a law of thought it has great influence on our thinking, and although it is not informative, what it *does* to our thinking is most interesting. Its role is not to inform but to support and govern.

Although we have expressed PNC in the above formulation, the principle must not be thought of crudely as a proposition lodged in our mind, which we hold up as a sort of standard according to which we think and against which we judge the results of our efforts. As mentioned before, we do not have any consciousness of any such explicit proposition affecting our mental life in this way and I do not believe there is one. PNC is detected and explicitly formulated only after intensive effort and concentrated reflection on our thinking and judging. The formulation is the result of this intensive inquiry and is formulated precisely as a conclusion to the inquiry. Although we have talked about detecting PNC in our conceptual system, this "detection" or "discovery" should not be thought of as the uncovering of something already lying there waiting to be discovered but hidden by the more complex and explicit aspects of the process of our everyday thinking and speaking. Rather

it is the discovery of something already operating and brought to light in explicit formulation: just as a rule in a game can be detected in the successful performance of a manoeuvre guided by that rule and then expressed in a proposition. PNC is thus brought to light clothed in a formulation, which we can all see, study and recognise as indeed making explicit the principle lying behind, and operating in, all our thought.

Aristotle argues for his principle not by means of strict logical demonstration—he considers this to be impossible—but through a certain "reduction." PNC is indemonstrable in a broad sense, because it is without grounds; it does not rest on any prior principles and cannot be argued for on the grounds of any other proposition or knowledge. Its only justification can come from the collapse of our whole conceptual system, if it were taken away or denied. In his argument he tries to show how inconvenient and how inconsistent this would be. Many of the points he brings forward, beside their main aim of justifying PNC, also throw much light on what PNC does as a law of thought. They show how PNC functions in supporting and governing much of our mental activity, not only in the contemplation of ideas or thoughts but also in reasoning, attainment of truth, certainty, and so on.

Aristotle makes it clear that PNC demands *clarity* in our thought. He considers that, if he could get his opponent to say one word and signify something definite by that word, then he will have vindicated the principle and shown his opponent to be inconsistent in denying it.³⁷ Thus the principle enforces clarity in thought, for it ensures that whenever we *know* anything it is always something more or less definite and determinate. Although we may indeed know something that is not as precise as it might be, precision and clarification of that knowledge come about in part through the influence of PNC. However, PNC is not the only mental force involved in such a clarification, nor is it even the most important one. The twin mental abilities of affirmation and negation play the central role in

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1006•19 ff.

clarification of knowledge, and of concepts in particular. We clarify a concept by eliminating all that the object is *not*, and thus what the object *is* will eventually emerge in a clearer light. At the same time the mind grasps more firmly and surely the object, this is merely the reverse side of the same process. This is done through our affirming-negating powers, not primarily though PNC. PNC for its part ensures that if a thing is X, it is not at the same time and according to the same respect not X; it does not ensure that it is not Y or Z. PNC ensures that if something is a horse, it is not not-a-horse; it does not ensure that it is not a pig, a cow, or a rabbit, etc. Nevertheless, if we know already that X is an animal, in order to clarify our notion of X, we must exclude pig, cow, rabbit, etc. so that we can arrive at a clearer notion of X as a horse. Our negating powers do this, not PNC. What PNC does do, however, is to give us :firm assurance as to what X is as far as we know it to begin with. We are certain, for example, that X is an animal and not not-an-animal. The significant thing about this is that this :firm knowledge shows us which category of concepts we are to work in. Thus with regard to our example, PNC by giving sure knowledge of X as an animal ensures that we work in the category of animal concepts in our attempt to clarify X, not in any non-animal category, such as those of minerals or vegetables. And so we see here a twofold function of PNC: it contributes to *definite* knowledge of a determinate thing; and it contributes towards *clarifying* our knowledge by determining us in one category of possibilities within which to exclude alternatives and positively to identify the object.

PNC is also the force that regulates our *judgments and statements*. It helps to ensure that predicates are not linked to incompatible subjects. We may form a sentence linking an incompatible predicate to a subject, but PNC would prevent us from uttering it meaningfully as a statement. For example, PNC helps us to avoid saying such things as "the widow married the postman's daughter." Understanding the concept of "widow" involves understanding that anyone meriting that

description must be a woman and "being a woman" is not compatible with the predicate "married the postman's daughter." Of course, we may mistakenly say such a sentence as this, but once our attention is drawn to the meaning of "widow," our innate familiarity with PNC would ensure that we corrected the sentence to the "widower" or withdrew the statement as inconsistent (unless through special circumstances compatible meanings of subject and predicate are agreed upon).

PNC may also prevent us understanding a statement made to us by another person. If our understanding of the subject was such that the predicate the other person attached to it was incompatible with it, we could be puzzled and think that either he did not know properly what he was talking about or meaning by those words, or that he was talking nonsense, or that he had attached a meaning to the words that was unknown to us. In the latter case we would have to ask for an explanation.

PNC has an important role to play also in all the various kinds of *reasoning* (taken broadly) that we are capable of. In formal logic a familiar method of proving the invalidity of a propositional function is to show how it contradicts PNC; it also plays an important role in other testing procedures. These are just formal procedures reflecting the many and varied ways this principle influences the reasonings and inferences that form such a great part of our everyday mental life. Whenever someone objects to another's argument, protesting "You can't say that, you're contradicting yourself," he is judging according to PNC. Or when someone argues carefully avoiding contradiction, he is reasoning according to PNC. In fact, any logical inconsistency in our speech, whether in strict reasoning or in inference or even in such non-reasoning transitions from one statement to another as introduced by the words "in other words," "that is to say," and so on, any such logical inconsistency violates PNC and can be judged as wrong or invalid on that score alone (although other principles may also be involved). An inconsistency which violates PNC does not have to be the strong

contradiction defined by formal logicians. A broader notion of contradiction is here meant, such as that implied by such everyday sayings as "You are contradicting yourself," "this contradicts what you said before," which can be applied to many different kinds of logical situation. Thus PNC serves to guard against all forms of inconsistency in our speech and reasoning and also to act as a standard against which inconsistencies can be judged and appraised. However, we must note that there are usually other logical laws also violated in many cases of inconsistency: PNC is not the only principle involved (except possibly in cases of strict contradiction in the formal logical sense). For example, if I were to say: "He is an only child, but his sister says . . . ," someone could interject that I had contradicted myself, protesting: "An only child is one who does not have a sister, yet you have said that he has one"; or he might protest: "Either he is an only child or he has a sister-not both"; or possibly: "If he is an only child, he does not have a sister." ³⁸

It may be misleading to think of PNC merely as a force or rule regulating our thinking and reasoning processes. This would be too narrow a view. It can also be seen as a *dynamic driving force* urging the mind to further inquiry and never allowing it to rest until full knowledge and satisfaction are achieved. For example, although PNC may have helped to bring us to knowledge of X as an animal, the mind is still not satisfied as to the question whether X is a horse or not a horse. PNC assures us that X cannot be both, and there is a tension in the mind until the question can be settled one way or the other. PNC ensures that the mind cannot rest so long as this possibility of entertaining both alternatives remains. PNC cannot tolerate the conjunction of contradictories and forces the mind to settle for one side of the contradiction or the other.

PNC is a principle of knowledge. As such it is a foundation of knowledge and does not claim to be knowledge itself. It does not carry information itself: it is tautologous. But this

³⁸ For a discussion of points raised in the last three paragraphs, see P. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory* (Methuen, p. 178 ff.

does not mean that it has no cognitive content, no meaning; for we do understand what it means. We cannot be said to know PNC in any of the more usual senses of "know." Nor does it have any claim to truth in the way any ordinary empirical statement can claim truth. Rather it is a ground for truth: because PNC stands firm in our conceptual system, other statements can be true.

Since PNC has such a privileged and radical position in our conceptual system, it is something beyond doubt: it is "a principle about which it is impossible to be in error."³⁹ If it is to be one of the criteria for truth and falsity, it cannot be measured or judged by itself.⁴⁰ Hence, it should not properly be said to be true or false. Aristotle says we cannot be mistaken about it; he does not refer to truth or falsity in his introductory treatment of PNC.⁴¹ First he says that it is the philosopher's task, whose "subject is the things-that-are *qua* things-that-are," to state the firmest principles of everything. The firmest principle of all is the one "about which it is impossible to be in error." We cannot make a mistake about it, and because of this it is the best known of all principles. Note that Aristotle does not say that PNC is the best known of all principles, therefore we cannot be mistaken about it. Rather he puts it the other way: we cannot be mistaken about it, therefore it must be best known, (for error can arise only when something is not understood or is inadequately understood).⁴²

³⁹ Aristotle, *Met.* Γ, 1005bJf2.

⁴⁰ See Wittgenstein: "Philosophical Investigations," I, n. 50, where he discusses why it would be inappropriate to say that the metre standard in Paris is one metre long.

⁴¹ *Met.* Γ, 1005hS ff'.

⁴² Kirwan (see above note 1) translates $\gamma\upsilon\omega\upsilon\tau\eta$ as "most intelligible," whereas Aquinas and the translations he used have "*notissimum*" - "best known" - a translation which Ross preserves. Although $\gamma\upsilon\omega\upsilon\tau\eta$ could mean "intelligible," the use of it to mean "best known" is more probable and not unknown to Aristotle. *a-\gamma\upsilon\omega\upsilon\tau\eta* $\kappa\alpha\tau\ \gamma\upsilon\omega\upsilon\tau\eta$ *p.o-N.* E. 11Q6bf25 where "intelligible" would be an impossible translation. This point could be important. "Intelligible" does not necessarily involve actually being known, whereas "best known" does imply that it is actually known, not merely able to be known. It is part of Aristotle's thesis that wherever there is knowledge of any sort, PNC is known.

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

Another very important principle in our mental make-up is the so-called principle of sufficient reason. There have been various formulations of this principle. Leibniz, perhaps the greatest champion of the principle, gives several versions, but the following formulation is the simplest and sufficient for our purposes: "There is nothing without a reason."⁴³ PSR is not to be equated with the principle of causality, which is usually interpreted in terms of efficient causality only, i.e., in terms of *what makes this happen*. However, PSR includes the principle of causality but extends itself beyond the limits of efficient causality. Leibniz in fact includes causality in an extended version of the principle: "there is nothing without a reason, or no effect without a cause."⁴⁴ But elsewhere he excludes some things from the requirement of a causal explanation, though they cannot escape having a sufficient reason.⁴⁵

PSR is the principle or dynamic force in our minds that sends us *seeking* explanations for what we are aware of. **It** prompts the question "why?". **It** prompts us to find out why such and such a thing happened, or why X is in such a state, or why X behaves in such a way, and so on. **It** is the principle behind

⁴³ G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, translated and edited by Leroy E. Loemker, 2 Vols. (Chicago, 1956), p. 122 & 349. Other versions given by Leibniz help to bring out the full character of this principle as he understood it: "Assuming that things must exist, it must be possible to give a reason why they should exist as they do and not otherwise" (p. 1038); "nothing happens without a reason why it should be so and not otherwise" (p. 1100); the "principle of sufficient reason (is that) in virtue of which we observe that there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases" (p. 1049); "there must always be some foundation for the connection between terms of a proposition, and this must be found in their concepts" (p. 517). This last formulation is repeated in clear logical terms by Loemker in his introduction to these volumes of Leibniz's papers and letters: "A reason for every predicate must be found in the complete subject (analytically), and, conversely, each predicate serves as a partial reason for the complete subject (synthetically)" (p. 412).

•• *Ibid.*, p. 413.

⁴⁵ - For even though there be no cause for eternal things, there must yet be understood a reason for them" (p. 790).

the curiosity, the spirit of inquiry, which to greater or lesser extent is a mark of a rational human being.

Early on in our conscious life we become aware of relations between one thing and another: relations brought about by one thing influencing another. Our world is a connected world and we do not see things in isolation, uninfluenced by their surroundings. We expect each thing to be related to others and to be influenced by others. We seek explanations through discovering the connections, influences, and relations. *PSR is thus a "contextual" principle*: it urges us to look beyond the individual or particular considered by itself and in isolation, for no thing is a complete explanation of itself. Each thing is to be seen in the context of other things which influence it and which it influences.⁴⁶

First of all then, PSR urges us to find out why a thing is the way it is. Such a question admits of various different kinds of answer and the most obvious perhaps is the answer to the question "who or what made the thing the way it is?". Once we realize that something did not happen by itself, or did not become what it is solely from itself or like "a bolt from the blue," we wonder what did indeed make it so; and once we realize it is an effect, we seek its cause. However, the line of causality which we seek to discover as an explanation may be *horizontal*, spread out through time: one thing causes another and this in turn causes another in such a way that the causation by the first of the chain can be temporally distinguished from the causation by the last in the chain. For example, parents are causes of a child and are themselves caused by their own parents; the thrust of a billiard cue causes a ball to move which in turn moves another ball after the original impulse from the cue is over; or the firing pin of a rifle causes the bullet to shoot

•• I am using "influence" in the widest possible sense, and do not want to limit it to any narrow efficient causal sense, though of course I am not excluding any such sense. Whenever I use "cause" in this section, I am intending "efficient cause," which is the common understanding of the word. If I intend another kind of causality, the use of "cause" will be qualified by the appropriate epithet or description.

ahead and kill a man: the rifle is indeed a cause of the death but the rifle's action is distinct from the killing stroke of the bullet.

However, there is another type of causality-chain which also "causes" or "makes" something but which can best be called *vertical*, for each member of the chain exercises its influence simultaneously. There is no temporal distinction. For example, a man standing on the deck of a ship is dependent on a variety of causal influences, all functioning at the same time and together enabling him maintain such a stance. One such causal chain could perhaps be unravelled in the following way. The man's standing on the deck depends on the support and solidity of the deck (if the deck were like water he would not be able to stand), which in turn is dependent on the solidity of the ship's structure. That the ship can support the man at this moment depends on the nature of the sea on which the ship can float, the sea in turn finds supports in the earth and its law of gravity and also depends on the influence of the sun and moon, and so on. At one and the same time all these factors must be exercising their influence and together cause (or contribute towards the total cause of) the man's being able to stand on the deck. If any one of these factors were prevented from exerting its influence, the later links in the causal chain would also fail and the man would collapse.

This kind of *vertical* causality is always a necessary part of any adequate explanation of why anything is the way it is. The mind is not content with only explanation along the lines of *horizontal* causality. A reflective or philosophical mind always wants to know why X is as it is *now*. PSR is thus a cardinal principle of philosophical inquiry. It spurs the mind on to wonder, and a sense of wonder is a mark of a philosopher, PSR by prompting us to seek also *vertical* explanations throws us beyond the immediate object of inquiry and leads us to broaden our horizons and eventually look more to the world as a whole. It prompts us to deeper and more philosophical explanations by demanding that we take into account the *whole context*, both *vertical* and *horizontal*.

Often our quest for explanation of the world about us, however, is not completely satisfied even after we have investigated both horizontally and vertically the causes which make such a thing the way it is. The question "why is it so?" admits another kind of answer, which at times may be a more relevant 'explanation-an answer explaining the purpose behind the thing, what it is for and why it was made. Part of the explanation and understanding of a motorcar is an appreciation of what it is used for and what it can do. This is the case for everything that has been made by design and not by chance. Not only things made by human agents require explanation in terms of the purpose for which they are made-cars, books, paintings, musical compositions, computers-but also things made by animals and other non-rational creatures: a birdnest is explained (partially) by the purpose for which it was built; a spider weaves a web in order to catch its prey. Sometimes explanation for non-conscious things can be found at least partially in purposes; for example, plants have an important function and purpose in replenishing the earth's atmosphere with oxygen. Aquinas believed that everything in the world had a purpose, was directed to an end, and this for him was a way to showing the existence of God (fifth way). Even chance happenings could be explained in terms of purpose: chance is the coincidence of two or more "purposeful" happenings. This fifth way of St. Thomas (especially in its claim that all things have a purpose) has come under strong criticism from Anthony Kenny in his book "The Five Ways."⁴⁷ However, whether or not all things in the world are directed towards specific ends, we do recognize that some things are indeed done or made for a purpose, and once this is recognized in a specific case, we do not rest content until this purpose is detected: our explanation of the thing is incomplete and PSR urges us to further inquiry along the lines of its purpose.

Related to the idea of explanation through purpose there is explanation through *motive* and *intention*. Kenny has pointed

⁴⁷ *The Five Ways* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), c. 6.

out how important it is not to confuse the two, especially in moral philosophy or ethics, though he is wrong when he says that Aquinas failed to make the distinction.⁴⁸ "Intentions are forward-looking reasons for action and motives backward-looking reasons: in the picturesque phrase of the jurist Austin 'the intention is the aim of the act of which the motive is the spring.' To assign an intention to an action is to explain it in terms of its hoped upshot; but an explanation in terms of motive (e. g. 'out of envy' or 'because he helped me in the past') may give a reason for action in terms of a previous rather than a subsequent state of affairs."⁴⁹ Explanation in terms of previous and subsequent *states of affairs* are all part of the total explanation urged by PSR as a "contextual" principle.

Another kind of inquiry into the reasons for a thing or situation would be along the lines of Aristotle's *ro rē €cmv* and *ro rē dvat*, or what Aquinas called "*quod quid est*" and "*quod quid erat esse*." According to Lonergan, the principal meaning of the first of the two formulae in both Aristotle and Aquinas is essence and the principal meaning of the second is form. Aristotle was aware of this distinction but his emphasis was on their radical equivalence.⁵⁰ And so there seems to be another way of seeking explanation-within the thing itself rather than in the states of affairs preceding or following, or in the maker or doer.

Depending on the way one looks at the thing, one can distinguish within it two principles which have been called the *material* and *formal causes*. A traditional example (especially in neo-scholastic handbooks) illustrating the distinction between material and formal causes is that of a clock. The material cause answers the question "what is it (the clock) made of?", to which the reply is "the various parts" (cogs, wheels, springs, and so on). The formal cause answers the

⁴⁸ See e. g., *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 7ii, a. 8.

⁴⁹ Kenny, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁵⁰ B. Lonergan, *Vm-bum: Wo-l-d and Idea in Aquinas* (Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968), pp. 16-25.

question" what makes these parts to be a clock and not a pile of spare parts?", to which the reply is" the arrangement of the parts so that they function together as a clock." The formal cause is that within a thing which makes it the kind of thing it is. Sometimes it can be a principle of organization of parts (as in a clock or a motorcar) . Or it can be a quality (e. g., color or heat). Most basically for Aristotle, it is a principle determining what kind of substance the thing is (horse or gold, cabbage or water). It does not apply only to artificial things, but Aristotle considered it to be the internal explanation of all things, why they are what they are. Geach, interpreting St. Thomas, describes matter or material cause as the "stuff" the thing is made out of;⁵¹ whereas the forms (every formal cause is a "form") are represented by predicates.⁵² A predicate indicates the form found in the thing we are making the judgment about. For example, Mrs. Smith's hat is green: "green" is a predicate and represents the color green, which is a form in the hat, determining it to be this kind of hat, a green hat.

It may seem idle today to look for formal causes on a level of Aristotelian metaphysics in the highly complex, artificial, and technological age in which we live, where so many things find their explanation in the use, purpose, to which they are put and in the arrangement and design of parts which allow them to function properly. However, PSR does still function *analogously* on the level of formal cause and prompts scientists, especially chemists and biologists, to investigate the inner constitution of the things about us. Although their investigations may not result in discovering what Aristotle would have called a formal cause, nevertheless their quest is a related one: they are looking for an explanation of things within those very things. They are looking for an explanation, seeking to understand the things, not in terms of what they were made for, nor in terms of what or who made them, but in terms of *what they are*.

⁵¹ P. T. Geach & G. E. M. Anscombe: *Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege* (Blackwell, 1961), pp. 69-75.

⁵² P. T. Geach, "Form and Existence," essay in *Aquinas: a collection of critical essays*, edited by A. Kenny (MacMillan, 1969), pp.

Another factor contributing to a full explanation of some things (not necessarily all) can be sought along the lines of the influence a plan of a house has on the house constructed according to the plan, or the influence a person whose portrait is being painted has on the finished product. This type of influence has been called "exemplary causality" or even "extrinsic formal causality," and it is present whenever one thing influences another in such a way that the latter is similar to the first. The influence of the one is such that the other can be said to imitate or represent it in some way. The similarity may be in the way a church is like the picture in the architect's or master builder's mind, or like the plan which he draws, or like the model he constructs,-three different kinds of exemplar, yet traces of their influence can be found in the finished building. This kind of influence can be found in a scene or person depicted in a painting. In reading a book "exemplary causality" exercises an influence, though this is only part of a complex process, which includes many other influences and reactions as well. The relationship between a sheet of music and the corresponding music played on the piano is another type of an exemplar's influence. PSR demands that this line of inquiry be pursued also in the the mind's quest for explanation.

However, a peculiar thing about this last kind of influence ("exemplary causality") is that it applies only through the medium of intelligence. An artist paints the face of a lady intelligently and with artistry. An architect builds according to his plan with skill and forethought. Reading or playing music are also intelligent operations. But when we find similarity in situations or mechanical processes, we do not try to explain it along the lines of "exemplary causality" but rather through other different causes. We say "something similar happened yesterday," or "the same sort of thing happens every day," but we do not seek to explain this "thing" or "happening" in terms of plans or models. Similarly, we do not attribute the likeness of son and father to intentional operation. Although the parents are intelligent beings and the act of genera-

tion might have been fully intentional, nevertheless the appearance, features, and even sex of the child are (at present) beyond the control of the parents. His looks are not planned by them. Hence, although in many cases the influence of a model, plan, or exemplary idea will help to explain the similarity between two things, there are many other cases of similarity which are not susceptible to such explanation. Only where the similarity is brought about deliberately by an intelligent agent precisely intending to effect the similarity will "exemplary causality" be an admissible explanation.

Analogous to the full notion of "exemplary causality" would be cases of the behavior of animals acting by what is popularly known as "instinct"-birds building nests or migrating to distant shores in particular seasons, spiders weaving webs, bees forming honey-combs. Although these animals do not have intelligence in the same way as that notion is applied to man, they do have some form of knowledge; and there are similarities in this kind of activity with human planned activity, for their actions do seem to follow set patterns or plans. Hence perhaps the notion of "exemplary causality" should be loosely expanded to account for cases such as these.

What about photographs? At first sight one would think they have a close similarity with portraits and scenic paintings. Yet (leaving aside the human activity of pushing a button, finding focus, etc.) there is no intelligence involved between what is being photographed and the photograph itself. Indeed, we would prefer to find the explanation in terms of chemical properties, action of light, and so on, not in terms of plans, patterns, exemplars, or models.

And so even more than in the case of PNC it becomes evident that PSR is a force in our mental faculties driving us to greater knowledge. It provides a great part of the dynamism of the human mind. Ever proposing questions it forces us to seek answers. Some philosophers in the past have talked of the questioning mind, the intellect open to the infinite, of the mind being a "*tabula rasa*" which has to be covered with knowledge. Logicians early discovered and formulated PSR. The basis of

this formulation, that which makes it a valid formula, is this dynamism, thirst for explanation, or thrust into the world, which characterizes the human intellect.

PSR is a *conviction* we have that the questions we ask are not idle queries but do admit of answers. In other words, are convinced that the things of the world that we perceive and think about are susceptible of explanation. Nothing in our world stands so entirely on its own that it is completely self-explanatory and independent of all else. Things are caused, are made up of other things, can be understood only in relation to others, influence or are influenced by other things, lead to knowledge of others, are capable of affording deeper and more intimate knowledge of themselves than what is given in first impression, and so on. It is only when one gets to the bases of our conceptual system that the question, "why?" in all its many forms loses significance. This conviction (PSR) is at the root of the scientist's inquiry: the chemist, for example, is convinced that there must be an explanation (in chemical terms) why hydrogen is active and helium largely inert; the physicist is convinced that the laws of gravity have an explanation. The philosopher wonders at the world about him. PSR is peculiarly his own principle, for he is loath to admit that the world is absurd, not susceptible to rational explanation.

Moreover, PSR urges us to seek "proportional" explanation: explanation in terms of causes and influences proportional to the effect. A cause that is inadequate to bring about a greater effect is no explanation (or at most, a partial one) and does not satisfy the curious mind. Conversely, explanations in terms of the magical or the supernatural are not satisfying either. The thinking man will not accept superstitious explanations in terms of causes which bear no natural relation to the effect; e. g., the waving of a wand and a magical incantation are not an explanation for a cure from illness. Nor is he prepared to propose "the will of God" as an explanation for misfortune and an excuse to relapse into fatalistic inaction. The thinking man will either not accept miracles as direct work of God but instead consider them as susceptible to natural (though still

unknown) explanation; or if he is also a religious man, he might consider that the very nature of a miracle is such that it contravene this basic law of his understanding (**PSR**), and hence it is to be wondered at and not fully understood.

Finally, we may note that, although we began our "psychological" inquiry into this principle by calling it the "principle of sufficient reason" and accepting it as such, our investigation has shown that it would be better called the "*principle of complete explanation*." For this is the force urging the mind to full and complete understanding of the world about us and the individuals within it. The mind is not satisfied with just a sufficient explanation of something but is restless till it knows *all* about it. For a time it may be satisfied with a sufficient explanation of a thing in a certain context, but later that context may change and new relations of that thing *in* its context will come to light and further explanation will be desired. In fact, the human spirit is not satisfied with less than a complete explanation, and its idea of a "sufficient" explanation merges into its demand for a "complete" one. The world is always greater than the human mind and this quest is a never-ending one as long as man is alive.

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SOME ELUCIDATIONS AND COGNITIVITY PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE

GIVEN THE WIDE variety of philosophical expectations, it is not surprising that philosophers have often demanded either too much or too little from their theories of knowledge. Some philosophers have circumscribed the boundaries of knowledge so rigidly that the oppressive standards of their theories have made it impossible to say of what is obviously known that it is known, or indeed could be known. These philosophers are somewhat like the incorrigible cartographer who upon discovering that the mountain on which he stands does not correspond to his cartographical calculations persists in holding that his topographical map is right and that the world is somehow wrong. The mountain, he argues, simply belongs somewhere else.

In contrast to the inordinately frugal philosopher is his lavish brother, the paragon of philosophical prodigality. He designs his theories so liberally and so unrestrained that even he is occasionally embarrassed by the chimerical contrivances the standards of his epistemology assuredly allow. He can deny nothing and must admit nearly everything.

Many philosophers still find either one or the other of these epistemic extremes irresistible. It has been difficult, therefore, to rid the philosophical market place of inequity and reach a point of equilibrium at which epistemology neither exaggerates nor underplays the logical functions of language. To tip the scale too much one way or the other seems to be a natural mistake, but it is, nonetheless, a mistake.

This mistake of epistemic inequity, as I shall call it, has had a profound effect on the species of treatment employed to cure sundry philosophical illnesses. In particular it has resulted in a faulty treatment of certain problems concerning

the logic of religious discourse. The attempt to remedy this mistake has led me to consider seriously the relation between knowledge and meaning. For the way in which we "mean" things seems to have much to do with the way in which we "know" things. "Meaning" and "knowing" might well be seen as two sides of the same coin. Thus the more familiar we are with one side, the easier it is to preclude the intemperate inclination to demand too much or too little of the other. In what follows, therefore, I will endeavour to say something of how our view of meaning affects the epistemic demands of religious discourse environments. In so doing I hope to indicate points at which the logic of religious discourse has been misunderstood.

A sphere of religious discourse that has received only minimal treatment might be said to consist of a number of questions and answers concerning an individual's general state. These questions and answers might vary enormously, but for the sake of simplicity I shall confine myself to an examination of the question "Why did this happen to me?" At the outset it is important to distinguish the logical environments in which the same question might have both a secular and a religious use. That is to say, it is quite feasible that in one logical environment the question could require a straightforward empirical answer, while in another it might require an answer of the sort we could call religious. Let us examine these possibilities more closely.

Suppose one were to use the expression "Why did this happen to me" as a straightforward empirical query. Assuming the respondent has sufficient information in the appropriate subject area, there should be little difficulty supplying an answer to the interlocutor. Where there is a lack of sufficient information it is generally agreed that the nature of the query is such that it allows for an answer which is in principle possible to provide. The possibility of answering a straightforward empirical query is thus a function of procuring the relevant information. It is worth noticing that only an answer which appeals to "the way things are" will satisfy the conven-

tions governing the use of a straightforward empirical question.

If a man were suddenly to lose the vision in his left eye, it would not at all be unusual for him to inquire regarding the "reason (s) " for his tragic loss. If his question were intended as a straightforward empirical question, a descriptive account by an ophthalmologist concerning structural differentiation of the retina might suffice to satisfy his inquiry. By "satisfy his inquiry " I mean that an answer could be supplied such that its acceptance would make it logically odd for an individual to continue asking the *Jame* question and mean it in the *same* way.

However, the same grammatical question, "Why did this happen to me?", might require for its logical completion something other than an appeal to "the way things are." For instance, imagine that a man who has recently lost the vision in his left eye asks, " Why did this happen to me," and yet is not satisfied with the empirical account offered by his ophthalmologist. Thus he continues to ask what appears to be the same question. If the ophthalmologist were really a philosopher at heart, he might try to show that the patient *is confused*-there are no other facts which will satisfy his inquiry. Medical science has done all it can do; for it has exhausted its description of what is the case, its appeal to the way things are.

Insofar as medical science has done what it can do in the way of an empirical account, a question which requires more than "that" for its completion has been (and is usually) considered to be a pseudo-query. A large number of present day philosophers who would hardly consider themselves positivists concur that such pseudo-queries should be eliminated. Queries such as these, it is claimed, only pretend to be questions. Since they ask for what cannot be given, pseudo-queries are held to be grammatical formulations without logical content.

There have been other philosophers, who are less parsimonious and less eager to preclude such queries from the logical network of significant discourse. The view that these queries were intended spiritually (as religious questions) and called for " the method of the heart " rather than " the method of the

intellect " was applauded heartily by many Wittgensteinians. S. E. Toulmin, for example argued,

Indeed, such questions have a positive value, as both psychology and history show. Psychologically, they help us to accept the world, just as the explanations of science help us to understand it.;

Just as religious *questions* are not "rational" and are not to be taken literally, religious *answers*, so it is claimed, are not "cognitive" and to be interpreted intellectually. Therefore, Toulmin reminds us that we must be particularly careful not to misconceive their function and understand such questions and their answers literally. But it has never been made clear how such queries and their answers are to be understood when they are not understood literally. Surely, it is uninteresting to say, as Toulmin does, that such questions and answers show "a desire for reassurance, for a general confidence about the future." ² I find this an inadequate and yet recurrent account of the logic of religious discourse.

Toulmin's account of the matter gives us no reason to believe that religious answers could provide the reassurance he claims they provide. In fact, if his view that these questions and answers should not be taken literally were tenable, it would be extremely difficult, indeed, to explain on what grounds they reassure us about the future. Moreover, if they are not true about the world and informative, why should we be reassured by them? If they say nothing about reality, then about what reality can they reassure us?

Toulmin's treatment makes it seem as if the users of religious discourse were small children who are continually reassured about the world by their exposure to fairytales, which logically can say nothing cognitive about the world. Moreover, he implies that the fairytales will still have their reassuring power even when their readers know that they are not true.

Despite the wide currency of acceptance given to positions

¹ S. E. Toulmin, *Reason and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p.

• *Ibid.*, p.

which spiritualize the claims of Christianity in order to give them an appearance of reasonableness and credibility, I believe that such positions are seriously mistaken and undermine the very credibility they claim to provide. Toulmin and other proponents of this sort of view³ have neglected the relation between reassurance and belief. They have failed to see that reassurance is a function of an individual's belief that the stories are literal and true. One can hardly be reassured by a claim he knows to be false. It is difficult, indeed, to disbelieve the claim that "God is working his purposes out in history," while simultaneously finding the claim reassuring.

As I suggested earlier, treatments such as Toulmin's are based on faulty presuppositions concerning the relation between meaning and knowing. If we are to cure the disease and not simply treat its symptoms, it is necessary to recognize its cause. In the exposition that follows I will therefore examine briefly the development of these mistaken presuppositions and their application to problems such as Toulmin considers.

The development of philosophy during recent decades has precipitated critical changes of perception in philosophical-theology. As far as I can see, however, the critical changes that have occurred within philosophical-theology have generally manifested the mistaken epistemic inequities of twentieth-century philosophy. The most conspicuous and perhaps the earliest influence of this sort on philosophical-theology was Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In that extremely important work Wittgenstein proposed the restrictive theory that the meaning of a word is that which it names. This rigid correlation between language and reality implied that religious expressions were outside the dimensions of meaningful discourse.

Where there is a restrictive theory of meaning, there is usually a restrictive epistemology based on it, and this was

³ See R. B. Braithwaite, *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955). Braithwaite held, of course, that religious utterances need not be true or false. They need only motivate us to a certain behaviour, which might be called Christian.

no exception. Many logical positivists were quick to cash in on Wittgenstein's "naming-theory," and they quickly developed a restrictive epistemic economy to match it. In A. J. Ayer's infamous *Language, Truth and Logic*, for example, theologians witnessed the introduction of the verification principle and the absolute rejection of religious discourse and of theological knowledge entailed by it. Many philosophers adopted Ayerian tendencies to some extent, and it became fashionable to hold that theological claims to knowledge were not legitimate claims at all but rather formulations which had no claim to meaning and thus no claim to knowledge.

It was not long, however, before Wittgenstein abandoned his earlier *Tractatus* view of language. In his *Philosophical Investigations* he suggested the view that for a large class of things, but not all, the meaning of a word is its use.⁴ Although Wittgenstein never intended his later view of meaning as a dogma or rigid theory of language, his view was soon misunderstood and became popularized as "Wittgenstein's use-theory."

The use-theory was exploited to suit a number of philosophical needs. Logical positivism had left an epistemic deficit, so to say, in its treatment of sundry issues, and theologians and philosophers alike welcomed the unrestrained epistemology which seemed to be immediately derivable from Wittgenstein's use-theory. It is from this perverted milieu that philosophical-theologians inherited the language-game phenomenon. Different uses of language, it was said, presuppose different language-games, each with their own peculiar logic that could not be evaluated by any logic external to it.

The number of language-games was increased exponentially and not unsurprisingly. Discussions among theologians of divergent traditions looked more like epistemic solitaire than true discussions. In the face of contradiction one could simply claim that he was playing his own language-game and thus was inoculated against foreign criticisms. Unfortunately, the state

•L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, edition, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), Part I, Sect. 43.

of philosophical-theology has changed very little since the days of the language-game phenomenon in the fifties. The move from restrained epistemic inequity to unrestrained epistemic inequity has been firmly established, and the latter is now a commonplace in philosophical-theology. Toulmin, for example, pretends to have accounted adequately for religious discourse by specifying its use, that is, its attachment or web of attachments within a particular language-game. In this way he has separated out religious discourse from "ordinary discourse" and has presumably preserved it from ill-conceived polemic.

Although many theologians are still content with the sanctuary effect of the language-game phenomenon, they are content, I think, only because they are unaware of what they are sacrificing. One of the philosophical problems with the proliferation of language-games to account for differences between conceptual schemes is that what it preserves as meaningful discourse it often relinquishes as *tUe* discourse. That is to say, Wittgenstein's notion that "meaning is use" is not equivalent to the notion that "truth is use." Just because a piece of language is used in a certain way is not to say that it is true in that way. Such a view would mistakenly encourage the temptation to say that a proposition is true in one way and false in another.

The corruption made of Wittgenstein's notion of use preserves only determinations of meaning and *not* unrestrained determinations of truth-both of which, however, are essential to Christianity. There are a number of technical philosophical reasons which make this complex relation between meaning and truth more evident, but it would be irrelevant to the purpose of this piece to adumbrate them here. Let me say, however, that the great ambivalence and hesitancy on the part of philosophical-theologians to account for religious expressions as true or false seems to me a direct result of the corruption that has been made of Wittgenstein's notion that meaning is use. That philosophical-theologians have tried to give a logical account of religious expressions as meaningful but not true or false represents an error of the utmost seriousness. In depriving

Christianity of its capacity to make truth claims, one relinquishes so much of what is of fundamental importance that what remains can hardly be said to be Christianity.

It has been an egregious error for theologians to allow the claims of Christianity to be diluted into a history of vague claims that can be spiritualized to suit any philosophical vagary. An essential feature of the Christian faith is that certain of its claims were intended to say something literal and true about the world. To deny this fact is to give up far too much of what Christianity has been since its birth. All that remains after this endless spiritualization is but an insipid world view that could have come as easily from Tolstoy as from Christ.

In view of these difficulties the burden of philosophical-theology is not made lighter. The epistemic inequities of extreme stringency and extreme liberality must both be modified. Requisite to providing an account of religious expressions such as "Why did this happen to me?" is a balanced epistemology based on a balanced notion of linguistic meaning. Such a notion of meaning can, I think, in large part be furnished by a more adequate examination of Wittgenstein's later work. Once this balance has been attained, the philosophical-theologian must recognize that Christianity is a body of knowledge. It may differ in epistemic degree, but it does not differ in epistemic kind from other bodies of knowledge. And as with any body of knowledge, he must allow that certain of its claims may be true and certain others may be false. It has long seemed strange to the pure philosopher that Christianity is supposedly a body of knowledge whose claims are all unquestionably true.

In saying that some claims may be true and others false, it means also that the philosophical-theologian must not continually readjust the claims of Christianity to satisfy the criteria of pure philosophy. This stretching or reinterpretation of claims is like the stretching of an elastic band to fit the additional papers its user thinks it should encircle. There is a point at which the elasticity of the band has exhausted itself

and will break. So it is with the continual reinterpretation and adjustments made to Christian claims in order to make them encircle the apparent realities its users think they must. There is a point at which the original claim has been stretched so thinly that either it fails in its task or it becomes something else other than what it was intended to be. The philosophical-theologian, in the last analysis, must appraise his inheritance honestly. If Christianity has taught us anything, surely it has taught us this.

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TEILHARD DE CHARDIN AND "THE MYSTERIOUS
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THE RELIGIOUS WRITINGS of Teilhard de Chardin, which met with a very mixed reception both in and outside of the Roman Catholic Church during his life, now seem to be facing less and less opposition and no censorship. Indeed almost all of his writings (including many letters) have now been published and have evoked widespread praise for one who seems to many perhaps to have adapted Bergson's system to Christianity in a way equalled only by St. Thomas Aquinas's treatment of Aristotle's theology. Teilhard has actually been called "the Aquinas of the Atomic Age." ² He has not only been widely read by intelligent people, but his attractive synthesis of science and religion, so the report goes, has persuaded many non-believers to adopt Christianity as their faith. One of his most cherished ideas is that his whole system is scientifically based and attains faith by logical progression rather than by the irrational "leap" of faith made by Christian existentialists from the time of Pascal to the present. As Teilhard states at the beginning of his best-known book, *The Phenomenon of Man*, "If this book is to be properly understood, it must be read not as a work on metaphysics, still less as a sort of theological essay, but purely and simply as a scientific treatise." ³

It should be understood in the first place (as we examine Teilhard's claims) that he uses the word *scientific* in a somewhat broad sense to include hypotheses or "extrapolations"

¹ Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Writings in Time of War*, translation by Rene Hague (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 78.

² Quoted in Eugene R. August, "Tennyson and Teilhard: The Faith of *In Memoriam*," *PMLA*, LXXXIV (March, 1969), 218.

³ Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man*, translation by Bernard Wall (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 29.

for the future (see especially his *The Future of Man*)⁴ which cannot be proved but seem to many reasonable enough to justify their use in this way. There are also unverifiable "scientific" assumptions about the past. He interprets evolution as a vast process in which the earliest form of matter had both a "without" (the exterior) and a "within" (the interior), the latter being a very rudimentary pre-consciousness or incipient consciousness. From this earliest beginning, pre-life over a vast period of time (by what Darwin called "minute variation," though Teilhard does not refer to Darwin) became life and then reached its highest peak thus far in human consciousness, which Teilhard sometimes refers to as "complexity-consciousness."⁵ At every stage in this vast process the increasing complexity of the "without" was matched by a comparable increasing complexity of the "within."

Because of the enormous size and extent of the process and the great numbers involved, great difficulties, both natural catastrophes and moral evils, were inevitable, a "statistical necessity." Many Christians (and with good reason) have been unable to agree with Teilhard on this point, since such an interpretation seems from one standpoint to limit God's power and from another to relieve man of the responsibility for his sins. Evil, according to Teilhard, seems to have positive value when viewed in the light of evolution; at least evil is not "theoretically outrageous." "Evil, in all its forms-injustice, inequality, suffering, death itself-ceases theoretically to be outrageous from the moment when, Evolution becoming a Genesis, the immense travail of the world displays itself as the inevitable reverse side-or better, the condition-or better still, the price-of an immense triumph."⁶ Under the heading "The Meaning of the Cross," he identifies the Cross with the travail referred to in the above sentence. "The earth groans in travail with Christ." "Suffering and wickedness" are the price of spiritual progress, ". . . for one cannot build up a

- Translation by Norman Denny (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
- *The Future of Man* and various books by Teilhard, *passim*.
- *The Future of Man*, p. 90.

mountain without digging a great pit. . . ." ⁷ Thus evil, it seems, is the pit necessary in the building up of the mountain of evolution. This idea seems to be reinforced when he says a little later, "Without Christ, suffering and sin would be the earth's 'slag-heap.' The waste-products of the world's activities would pile up into a mountain of laborious effort, efforts that failed. . . . Through the virtue of the Cross this great mass of debris has become a store of treasure" ⁸

Teilhard's eagerness to have nothing "wasted" in the great plan of "the mysterious Divinity, Evolution" results here in several bad errors. In the first place, he does not distinguish between the suffering of the righteous and that of the wicked but simply puts suffering and sin together as a "store of treasure," which, without the virtue of the Cross, would be "efforts that failed." It would certainly have been more accurate to say that through the virtue of the Cross sin most fortunately became an "effort that failed." But he is determined to consider sin as an effort that did not fail, as the pit that had to be dug before the mountain of evolution could be built. De Lubac says, in concluding a more ingenious than sound defense of Teilhard's treatment of sin, that Teilhard belongs in the company of the "greatest doctors of Christian tradition" who "refuse to attribute to evil, in Manichean fashion, ontological reality." ⁹ But there is certainly as much ontological reality for Teilhard in the necessary "pit" as in the "mountain" whose "building" required it. Contrary to Teilhard, there is no "easy solution" to the problem, and his thinking that he has found one is one of the main defects of his system. Teilhard was certainly not a Manichean, but he came dangerously close to the Cainite heresy, which interpreted all moral evil, including Cain's murder of Abel, as part of God's great plan, since without evil there would have been no need for a Redeemer.

• *Writings in Time of War*, pp. 65, 67.

• *Ibid.*, p. 67.

• Henri de Lubac, *The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin*, translation by Rene Hague (New York: Desclée Company, 1967), p. 118.

Indeed it is noticeable that Teilhard refers to redemption, salvation, and Incarnation as words which call for an evolutionary rather than the traditional interpretation. For example, he believes that the Incarnation has not been completed but can be brought nearer as "I multiply the links that attach me to things. . . ." The more I multiply such links, he says, "the more closely does He hold me-the God who pursues in me the task, as endless as the whole sum of centuries, of the Incarnation of his Son." ¹⁰ Indeed his adherence to things, to "hallowed matter," made him interpret the future of evolution in physical terms to some extent like the physicalized prophecies of the Fundamentalists. Consider his vision of the Last Judgment as reported in the biography by Robert Speaight:

The 'live' matter would free itself from the accidents of pluralism, and the 'dead' matter would be segregated in the fullness of time As for the contingent matter-the tissue of habits and circumstances which have formed the envelope of our earthly life—we shall shed these like a chrysalis, but enough of them will remain even in our separated souls to form the matter of an eventual resurrection. These souls will still feel the necessity of union but they can unite in a way which 'integrally reflects their own history'; and so long as their attachment to matter remains broken this union is impossible. Was it not conceivable that in activating their need for union, God would 'reconstitute in an identical cosmos this dust of floating monads according to the particular texture of each'? ¹¹

Such a description as the above of the future evolution of our body and our soul, with highly speculative details of the merging of the two, was directly against the advice of his friend and counselor, Maurice Blondel, who warned him against "building a principle of explanation on what our scientific mentality or our anthropomorphic images suggest to us." ¹² Blondel also warned him against supposing that "the

¹⁰ *Writings in Time of War*, p. 61.

¹¹ Robert Speaight, *The Life of Teilhard de Chardin* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) p. 104.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 105, quoting Blondel.

natural order has a divine stability as such, that Christ plays the same physical role that pantheism or monism attribute to the vague and diffused deity with whom they are satisfied." ¹³ In other words, Blondel did not approve of Teilhard's rather physicalized vision of the "cosmic Christ" or "Christ the evolver," whose fulfilment will not be completed until the evolution of the universe has reached the "Omega point," a kind of heaven on earth, in which all mankind will be completely collectivized and yet at the same time "super-personalized." Blonde! felt, and with good reason, that Teilhard was degrading the mystery of eschatology by "presenting the immanence of the supernatural 'in a way too physically imaginative,' as if the supernatural were only a constitutive element." ¹⁴ Blonde! warned that "the true prophet was the opposite of the visionary; he was 'the man who discovers in the darkness of contemplation the infinite richness of mystery.'" ¹⁵

Speaight, who reports this exchange, minimizes it as being merely "one of emphasis; where Blonde! laid his stress upon transcendence, Teilhard put his accent on the physical." ¹⁶ Or, says Speaight, the temperament of Teilhard was cast in the Thomist, that of Blonde! in the Augustinian, mould. But certainly St. Thomas Aquinas never went so far as to say that "the supernatural plenitude of Christ rests upon the natural plenitude of the world." ¹⁷ And it is hard to imagine St. Thomas making the following indictment of traditional Christianity: "Christian faith, through its mysteries of the Incarnation and even of the Redemption, adorns this world with many charms, but does it not, on the other hand, rob it of all interest-even, maybe, make it contemptible to us-by insisting on God's self-sufficiency . . . ?" ¹⁸ St. Thomas would never have exalted man to the extent of denying God's self-sufficiency, and,

¹³ *Ibid.*, quoting Blondel.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106, quoting Teilhard.

¹⁸ Emile Rideau, *The Thought of Teilhard de Chardin*, translation by Rene Hague (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 508, quoting Teilhard.

although St. Thomas tried to make the mystery of God's plan as clear as possible to the intellect, he says that we "know God as unknown," and he would certainly have agreed with Blondel that "the true prophet was . . . the man who discovers in the darkness of contemplation the infinite richness of mystery."

Teilhard's exaltation of man almost allies him in this respect with the transcendentalists, as may be seen further in his idea concerning the Incarnation. In comparing Teilhard with Pascal, E. Borne has considered this point as follows:

Pascal . . . is more conscious in the God-Man of the mystery of God making himself man and having, by an inconceivable condescension, become a single individual existence, incarnate; while Teilhard sees in Christ more the divinized man, and divinizes the whole. Here again it is as though there were two ways of reading this central mystery of Christianity, which can be apprehended either by descending from above or by ascending from below. There would appear to be in this a Christological dualism, that characterizes the whole history of Christian theology: and neither Pascal nor Teilhard de Chardin can be dissociated from that history.¹⁹

But by "ascending from below," man does not need to be saved by Christ. Such an "ascension" is an entirely different procedure, somewhat like the exaltation of man by the transcendentalists, whose doctrines are not usually designated as part of Christian theology. Indeed in reading Teilhard's works, one may frequently note his similarity to Emerson, as, for example, in his admonition that we should "make up our minds to accept wholeheartedly the manifestations of the divine will registered in the laws of nature" ²⁰ Emerson also was an ardent "transformist." We are reminded also of Whitman's supreme confidence (in "Passage to India" and many other poems) that physical progress in unification of the world was always accompanied by spiritual progress.

In *The Future of Man* especially (but the same message

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 653-654, quoting E. Borne.

²⁰ *Writings in Time of War*, p.

appears in most of Teilhard's work) we have the exultant proclamation of our superiority to the "sixteenth century men in general," who "thought of space and time as though they were limited compartments in which objects were juxtaposed and interchangeable And then one day, influenced by a variety of internal and external causes this attitude began to change. . . . To accommodate this expansion of our thought . . . the spirit has acquired an added dimension." ²¹ We are even superior to Plato in a very important way: "When Plato acted it was probably in the belief that his freedom to act could only affect a small fragment of the world, narrowly circumscribed in space and time; but the man of today . . . feels in himself the responsibilities and the power of an entire Universe." ²² If we may be inclined to think that this is the ultimate in romantic imagination about man's progress, we are mistaken. Modern man is just getting started: "As he awakens to a sense of 'universal unification' a new wave of new life penetrates to the fibre and marrow of the least of his undertakings, the least of his desires." ²³ The Pauline conflict between the spirit and the flesh apparently no longer bothers modern man; he can depend on "the least of his desires" to cooperate as he pushes forward in this marvelous evolutionary voyage.

Furthermore, the completion of this movement toward "universal unification," involving "convergence" upon the universal Centre, or the "cosmic Christ," is certain—"the overriding super-determinism which irresistibly impels Mankind to converge upon itself." ²⁴ Somewhat paradoxically, however, he combines this "super-determinism" with the quality of freedom. "*Evolution, by the very mechanism of its syntheses, charges itself with an ever-growing measure of freedom.*" ²⁵ And if "the forward march of the Universe" is as he refers to it again and again in much of his writing, "inevitable,"

²¹ *The Future of Man*, pp. 58-59.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 18.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 128.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 711.

"irreversible," "inexorable," "then it must mean that individual acts are bound to follow, *in the majority and freely*, the sole direction capable of satisfying all their aspirations towards every imaginable form of higher consciousness." ²⁶

Teilhard's loyal followers have made ingenious attempts to defend his combination of a "super-determinism" ("we are in the grip of forces millions of times stronger than we") with freedom. It is true that Teilhard asserts that there is freedom, from which this possibility for the future follows: "... evil may go on growing alongside good, and it too may attain its paroxysm at the end in some specifically new form." ²⁷ De Lubac says that Teilhard regards this hypothesis as more probable than the other one, which predicts that, "as our planet approaches maturation ... evil on the earth at its final stage will be reduced to a minimum. . . . Some sort of unanimity will reign over the entire mass of the noosphere." ²⁸ But Teilhard says that the more optimistic hypothesis "would of course conform most harmoniously with our theory." ²⁹ Even if the more pessimistic of the two hypotheses presented here should prove to be true, the evil will have been useful, indeed necessary, because "There are no summits without abysses," or, as he says elsewhere, "The mountain cannot be built without first digging a great pit." But certainly Teilhard is right in saying that the more optimistic of these two hypotheses is the one that conforms most harmoniously with his theory. And all Christians can share his hope in the coming on earth of the Kingdom of God, but in his eagerness to combat pessimism in our age and to cooperate with science, especially "the mysterious Divinity, Evolution," he often found signs of spiritual progress which seem highly questionable.

Occasionally he says that all this wonderful progress will be impossible unless we learn to love our neighbor as ourselves, but love of this kind, he hastens to add, is made simpler and far more effective in the modern context of evolution.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²⁷ *The Phenomenon of Man*, p.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.

•• *Ibid.*, p.

Hitherto, the 'supernatural' gift of ourselves which we were required to make to God and to our neighbour appeared to be something opposed to and destructive of the bonds attaching us to the things of this world.

But if Charity is transplanted into the cone of Time nothing remains of these apparent limitations and restrictions. Within a Universe of convergent structure the only possible way in which an element can draw closer to its neighbouring elements is by *tightening the cone-that* is to say, by causing the whole layer of the world of which it is a part to move towards the apex.³⁰

And this evolutionary salvation of the physical universe along with man inhabiting it is much nearer than we may think. "Throughout the world at this moment, without distinction or country, class, calling or creed, men are appearing who have begun to reason, to act and to pray in terms of the limitless and organic dimensions of Space-Time."³¹

This constant emphasis on the physical universe leads us to a consideration of Teilhard's "two faiths" -one in God, the other in the world. We have seen that he referred to "sacred Matter," and his *Hymn of the Universe* contains a "Hymn to Matter,"³² almost as if he were adoring an earth-god or demi-god. From the "Hymn to Matter" the following are characteristic examples of his poetic and almost pagan religious fervor:

I acclaim you [matter] as the melodious fountain of water whence spring the souls of men and as the limpid crystal whereof is fashioned the New Jerusalem.

I acclaim you as the divine *milieu*, charged with creative power

Your realm comprises those serene heights where saints think to avoid you-but where your flesh is so transparent and so agile as to be no longer distinguishable from spirit.

Raise me up then, matter . . . until, at long last, it becomes possible for me in perfect chastity to embrace the universe.³³

³⁰ *The Future of Man*, p. 95.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³² *Hymn of the Universe*, translation by Simon Bartholomew (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 68-71.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

The editor advises that an inexperienced Christian would be in error if he interpreted matter in this way "without first of all treading, like Teilhard, the traditional paths of asceticism."³⁴ But an ascetic can also be in error in thinking, as Teilhard does here, that he can make the mystery of spirit clearer by merging spirit and matter so that there will be either a spiritualized (rarefied?) matter or a materialized spirit.

Such adoration of the universe smacks of a kind of pagan pantheism³⁵ and may help to explain why Teilhard insisted on making his Christ the "cosmic" or "evolutor" Christ, whose "supernatural plenitude rests upon the natural plenitude of the world."³⁶ Such dependence upon the natural world is effective because it is really part of the "divine milieu," matter having been "divinised" from its beginning. The extent of Teilhard's dependence upon this "sacred matter" is indicated by this passage:

If, as a result of some interior revolution, I were to lose in succession my faith in Christ, my faith in a personal God, and my faith in spirit, I feel that I should continue to believe in the world. The world (its value, its infallibility and its goodness) -that, when all is said and done, is the first and the only thing in which I believe . . . I surrender myself to an ill-defined faith in a world that is one and infallible, wherever it may lead me.³⁷

That Teilhard was not entirely certain about this "surrender" is made clear in his earlier letter to Pere Victor Fontoyont: "I would like to be able to love Christ passionately (*by loving*) *in the very act* of loving the universe. Is it a wild dream or a blasphemy?"³⁸ However, in Teilhard's opinion an important argument proving that he was right in

"Ibid., p. 71.

•• I use the adjective *pagan* here to distinguish this present adoration of matter from St. Paul's prophecy of the time when "God shall be all in all," which Teilhard calls "a superior form of 'pantheism'" (*The Phenomenon of Man*, p. 294).

•• Speaight, p. 106.

³⁷ Rideau, p. 876, quoting Teilhard.

³⁸ De Lubac, p. 245, quoting Teilhard.

this devotion to matter was that matter was the "matrix" for spirit; indeed God himself emerged from the world, "for, if he had not pre-emerged from the world, how could God constitute for the world a way out and a consummation in the future?"³⁹

Where, one may ask, in this modern world of tremendously destructive wars did Teilhard find evidence for the great spiritual progress that he feels with great emotional intensity going on all around him? "We can feel it at this moment quivering beneath our feet! The ship that bears us is still making headway."⁴⁰ Paradoxically, one of the main events that induce this ecstatic utterance is World War II. "This tremendous war which so afflicts us, this remoulding, this universal longing for a new order, what are they but the shock, the tremor and the crisis, beyond which we may glimpse a more synthetic organisation of the human world?"⁴¹ This attitude toward war, of course, was nothing new to him. Before the battle of Douaumont in World War I, in which he served with distinction and devotion as a stretcher-bearer, he wrote the following: "In a few days' time we shall be thrown into battle for the recapture of Douaumont: a grandiose, almost a fantastic exploit which will mark and symbolize a definitive advance of the world in the liberation of souls."⁴² As Speaight says of Teilhard's attitude toward war: "Force, rightly understood, was at the heart of his gospel ... and there is a sense in which he converted the *Urbemensch* of Nietzsche into the cosmic and resurrected Christ."⁴³ Teilhard, for example, had praise for the motivation of the Germans in World War II: "I am just as convinced as anybody else that 'the others' are mistaken in the violent methods that they are employing to unify the world. But they are perfectly right in feeling that the moment has come to think about a new earth; and they are formidably strong precisely because this is how they see things."⁴⁴ In the middle of World War II

•• Rideau, p. 496, quoting Teilhard.

•• *The Future of Man*, p. 70.

Ibid.

•• *Hymn of the Universe*, p. 55.

•• Speaight, p. 253.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*... quoting Teilhard.

again he could say, "everything suggests that at the present time we are entering a peculiarly critical phase of super-humanisation," ⁴⁵ so that "it is finally the Utopians, not the 'realists,' who make scientific sense. They at least, though their flights of fancy may cause us to smile, have a feeling for the true dimensions of the phenomenon of Man." ⁴⁶

The most important evidence of this "super-humanisation" is the "increasingly rapid growth in the human world of the forces of collectivisation," ⁴⁷ and one of the main forms taken by this movement is "the totalisation of political regimes." ⁴⁸ He admits that such a development may in some respects seem "monstrous" to us, but, if we reflect carefully upon it, we should be able to understand that "the totalisation in progress in the modern world is in fact nothing but the natural climax and paroxysm of a process of grouping which is fundamental to the elaboration of organised matter. Matter does not vitalise or super-vitalise itself except by compression." ⁴⁹ He clearly considers "the totalisation of political regimes" to be in principle a step in the right direction, but as to whether "recent totalitarian experiments," were justified, he, with some degree of caution, makes the following statement: "I do not think we are yet in a position to decide whether, all things considered, they have produced a greater degree of enslavement or a higher level of spiritual energy." ⁵⁰ Whether or not Teilhard knew at the time when he wrote this of the wanton destruction of six million Jews by the Nazis I do not know, but even a reasonably close observation of the actions of Hitler beginning with the early destruction of his political opponents in the bloody Munich "putsch" should have made Teilhard understand that any "spiritual energy" developed in this "natural climax and paroxysm of a process of grouping" was of the demonic variety.

De Lubac, who tries to defend "The Legitimacy of Teilhard's Extrapolation," is forced to admit that Teilhard is not always

•• *The Future of Man*, p. 113.

•• *Ibid.*, 71-72.

"Ibid., p. 113.

•• *Ibid.*

•• *Ibid.*, p. 115.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 118.

successful in his bold venture, but de Lubac finds only minor difficulties, and these mainly with Teilhard's language, which is in need of clarification. Thus de Lubac objects, quite rightly, to Teilhard's calling spirit "*the* phenomenon";⁵¹ indeed, spirit could not properly be called phenomenon at all. But de Lubac does not see that this error is symptomatic of a far deeper error; in Teilhard's eagerness to cooperate with secular, especially scientific, projects, in which he (like many liberal theologians of this century) often saw more hope than in specifically Christian efforts, he converted most of his language into terms which would presumably not offend purely secular, but lofty-minded, sceptics. Teilhard hoped that in thus cooperating with such sceptics he could then prove to them that their lofty schemes for human improvement led logically and directly, without a difficult "leap," into faith. In other words, the "forward" movement of evolution envisaged by such non-believers as Teilhard's friend Sir Julian Huxley and even by the Marxists would be successful and, if not already truly spiritual without realizing it, would eventually merge into the "upward" movement of the spirit. Of course, it is not wrong for a religious man to cooperate with a truly altruistic project of a sceptic, but, as we have seen, in his eagerness to find men of good will everywhere, Teilhard was sometimes deceived, especially when the project seemed to indicate a "convergence" and a political unification of a large segment of mankind.

According to de Lubac, Teilhard "believes that it is pure Utopia to believe that men will ever be able to love one another, unless they love another in God."⁵² Of course, de Lubac would say that it is merely a matter of Teilhard's inconsistent use of language, but in the middle of World War II, as we have seen, Teilhard said confidently that it was the Utopians "who make scientific sense," and I am more and more led to believe that Teilhard was indeed a Utopian. I don't mean that he believed that men can truly love one another without loving God, whether or not they realize it, but in his eagerness to

⁵¹ De Lubac, p. 212.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 216.

find verifiable evidences of spiritual progress thus far and indications that its continuance to the Omega Point is "irreversible" and "inexorable" (guaranteed by a "super-determinism"), the wish was too often father to the thought.

The defects in his ambitious attempt to combine science and religion are not merely linguistic. His attempt to elevate nature, even inanimate nature, into the holy must forever remain a failure. Matter will never be "the limpid crystal whereof is fashioned the New Jerusalem." This adoration of matter as something whose "flesh is so transparent and so agile as to be no longer distinguishable from spirit" is dangerously close to a kind of pagan pantheism.⁵³

The translator of *Hymn of the Universe* in a note attempts to defend Teilhard's exaltation of matter by saying that this is poetic language designed "to communicate *reality* itself" by "the ambiguity-or rather ambivalence-of paradox, of symbol" rather than scientific language designed "to provide exactly defined and unambiguous statements *about* reality." He adds that "there is no need for us to be alarmed at such ideas as that of God 'animating' the world of matter, or of the whole world 'becoming incarnate': we shall plenty of parallels in St. Paul and in the traditional doctrine of the omnipresence of God."⁵⁴ Certainly the poetic idea of God "animating" matter may be found in numerous places in the Bible-St. Paul, the Psalmist, Isaiah, etc.-but nowhere in the Bible do we find, even poetically, the idea that God "pre-emerged from the world" or that matter is "the melodious fountain of water whence spring the souls of men." The Biblical passages are eschatological, referring to that far distant time when the whole world (all mankind symbolically referred to as "the new heaven and the new earth") in harmony will sing the praises of God. But Teilhard, with his usual "flame-like" intensity, has all this happening, or about to happen, now. Furthermore, the earth seems to be of equal importance with Christ in enabling man "to contemplate the face of

•• See footnote 85.

•• *Hymn of the Universe*, p. 10.

God ": " The man who is filled with an impassioned love of Jesus hidden in the forces which bring increase to the earth, him the earth will lift up, like a mother, in the immensity of her arms, and will enable him to contemplate the face of God." ⁵⁵

Instead of St. Paul's truly realistic conflict between the spirit and the flesh we have in Teilhard the adoration of matter as something whose " flesh is so transparent and so agile as to be no longer distinguishable from spirit." Instead of Christ's "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world," we have Teilhard's "mother earth" that will lift man up "in the immensity of her arms, and will enable him to contemplate the face of God." In Teilhard there is no need to overcome the world, for it is "sacred matter," "divinised " from its beginning, which not only provides no opposition to, but is really the " matrix." of spirit.

Teilhard's excessive reliance on "the mysterious divinity evolution " has been well expressed by Karl Stern as follows:

Teilhard's idea that man is as yet embryonic and unfulfilled is typical of a precarious role with dual commitments. As far as it is eschatologically inspired, it is Christian. As far as it is biologically inspired, it smacks of the nineteenth-century optimism of progress . . . the idea of progress by evolution is pragmatic. **It** becomes questionable the moment we introduce aesthetic and moral values. **If** we do this, we perceive heights and ebbs in history but no "cone." The cave drawings of ten thousand years ago are more "advanced" than all the academic art of Darwin's contemporaries. The sculpture and architecture of the nineteenth century are far below Greek sculpture and architecture two and a half thousand years before. **It** is quite conceivable that our time, with its tremendous burst in technological progress, will in the judgment of history be related to the lowest phases of moral human development. Thus within recorded history at least there is no unequivocal evolution. Moreover, the Christian fulfillment is entwined with history and, at the same time, mysteriously outside historical progression. While I am writing this, a state of sanctity is being attained by "little souls" anonymously scattered on the globe. Ever since the Incarnation fulfillment is free, *hie et nunc-it*

•• *Ibid.*, p. 50.

cannot wait for occurrences on the timetable of an external process. . . . The idea of an ultra-synthesized mankind which, as a developmental stage, represents the Mystical Body appears like Comtean optimism in a baptized version.⁵⁶

With one exception, I agree completely with the above statement of Teilhard's errors. Stern may be right in saying that as far as Teilhard's "idea that man is as yet embryonic and unfulfilled . . . is eschatologically inspired, it is Christian," but Teilhard's understanding of eschatology is in error, since, as we have seen, he gives to "mother earth" a major role in lifting man up "in the immensity of her arms" and thereby "enabling him to contemplate the face of God." As Maritain says, "The new world will be born of the pains and groans of the creature, but as the fruit of its transfiguration by an act of God above the entire natural order and the evolution of the world. . . . To see God . . . the human intellect must be supernaturally transfigured, and it must see God not through any of the intelligible forms the reception of which can 'actualize' it naturally, but through God himself" ⁵⁷

In short, in his eagerness to appeal to the sceptical scientist, Teilhard gave too much credit to science and human reason (based on "sacred matter" and "holy evolution") in preparing the way for the ultimate ("Omega Point") spiritual synthesis. He says that "the progressive, and later final, convergence of the noosphere must already, through its own effort, achieve an absolute, conquer a totality, fulfil history in an insurpassable state of thought and love. . . ." ⁵⁸ Even though at times he says that such an accomplishment is dependent "on the gratuitous approach" of God to man, still he thinks this approach was made long before man appeared on the evolutionary scene, because, as Teilhard says, matter

•• Karl Stern, "Saint Augustine and Teilhard," in Neville Braybrooke (ed.), *Teilhard de Chardin: Pilgrim of the Future* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1964) p. 77.

⁰¹ Jacques Maritain, *The Peasant of the Garonne* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 162-263.

⁰⁸ Rideau, p. 65, quoting Teilhard.

was "divinised" from its very inception. With this true, how very much more must even the earliest form of man have been "divinised." It would indeed follow, then, that Teilhard would refer to evolution as "the mysterious divinity."

It is no wonder that the Church has found "grave errors" in large portions of Teilhard's writings. Cardinal Joumet has said this concerning Teilhard's influence: "... a kind of apologetics that, anxious to be timely, founds upon the evolutionist synthesis of Teilhard, must, under penalty of lapsing into a 'Religion of Evolution,' constantly intervene *from outside that synthesis* in order to right it and turn it in the direction of orthodoxy. Such a kind of apologetics will perhaps have partially happy results in the short run, but not without laying the groundwork for serious disappointments in the future." ⁵⁹ Maritain quotes this criticism by Cardinal Joumet, and then, more bluntly but not less appropriately, asks the following question: "... is it the function of apologetics to lead minds to the Truth by using the seductions and approaches of any error whatever, as long as with such tricks the takings are good, since the only thing which matters is efficacy, and a maximum output in the manufacturing of baptized souls? Is it its function to produce shock Christians with respect to whom any kind of stimulant is enough, as soon as they help to make a crowd and are organized?" ⁶⁰

Of course, Maritain is not implying that Teilhard consciously used the "seductions of error." Teilhard's devoutly religious, even saintly, life rules out any but the very loftiest motives. But such motives do not always guarantee freedom from grave errors, which in Teilhard were due to the romantic intensity of his "flamelike" (he is very fond of the word *flame*) desire to speed up the coming of the Millennium or, as he puts it, the "Omega Point." The following example is typical: "The human mass is spiritually warmed and illumined by the grip of planetary compression," which will result "in a chain-reaction of increasing rapidity." ⁶¹ This is a close cooperation

•• Maritain, p. 268, quoting Cardinal Joumet.

•• *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *The Future of Man*, p. 1183.

between, if not merging of, spirit and matter which he expresses in a more general way in another typical passage:

. . . let there be revealed to us the possibility of believing *at the same time and wholly* in God *and* the World, the one through the other; let this belief burst forth, as it is ineluctably in process of doing under the pressure of these seemingly opposed forces, and then, we may be sure of it, a great flame will illumine all things: for a Faith will have been born (or re-born) containing and embracing all others⁶²

In conclusion, Teilhard's reputation as a philosopher and theologian seems to have been considerably inflated by his enthusiastic followers. They will, of course, consider my estimate inadequate, but I am firmly convinced that he should be considered, somewhat as Emerson is now generally considered, mainly as a romantic poet in his prose, which contains many lyrical passages with memorable, even inspiring, imagery. but which falls far short of attaining an adequate synthesis of science and religion-its main goal-and certainly, in its eagerness to synthesize, is seriously deficient in its treatment of evil.

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•• *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

ANIMAL LABORANS AND HOMO FABER:
REFLECTIONS ON A THEOLOGY OF WORK

THE EXPRESSION, "the theology of work," is of rather recent vintage. According to the noted Dominican theologian, M. D. Chenu, it appeared for the first time at the beginning of the 1950's.¹ Chenu suggests that the subject of human work was not a matter of concern for theologians until this time primarily because an awareness of the theological significance of work had not developed prior to the tremendous advance in industrial technology achieved during the last century of man's existence. These advances compelled theologians to recognize that work confronts man, "physically and spiritually, with a new reality, the conditions and structure of which profoundly affect not only his standard of living but also his whole way of life."² Later we shall see precisely why recent technological achievements have endowed human work with a "new reality" compelling theological attention; our purpose here is merely to note that a theological investigation of the reality we call "work" is still in its infancy and that the literature on the topic is primarily in the form of essays and tentative explorations.³

¹ M. D. Chenu, *The Theology of Work*. Translated by Lilian Soiron (Chicago: Regnery Logos Books, 1963). This book was originally published in 1955 under the title *Pour une Theologie du Travail* by Editions du Seuil, Paris. On p. 4 of the English translation Chenu says that "the expression itself may be said to be quite recent; for, although the phrase 'morality of work' has been current since the nineteenth century, and 'mystique of work' for some twenty years, the term 'theology of work' appeared for the first time only five or six years ago." This would place the use of the expression toward the end of the 1940's or the beginning of the 1950's-

• *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³ The lengthiest book on the subject in English is Edward Kaiser, *Theology of Work* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1963). This volume runs to pages.

Before looking at the new character that "work" has acquired during the past century, however, it seems imperative to make some initial observations about work itself. Here the first thing to note is that the English language (and every European language for that matter) contains two distinct words relating to work that must be taken into account and given serious consideration. These are the words *labo-r* and *work*. Although the two words are frequently used synonymously or interchangeably, it is important to note their differences and the analogical character of the human reality they are used to designate. Etymologically the two words are quite distinct, and some of the theologians who have written about work-among them Chenu⁴ and Kaiser⁵-have drawn atten-

However Kaiser's work contains little that is directly applicable to the "theology of work" in the sense intended by Chenu, Schoonenberg, and other writers on the subject. Kaiser's work is nevertheless a valuable study. The first five parts (pp. 1-244) deal with the background and history of work from pagan antiquity until the present. Part Six is concerned with theological perspectives, but it is primarily a discussion of the dignity and discipline of work, the values of human association and virtuous activity to which work can contribute. The seventh and eighth parts (pp. 817-467) are devoted to a discussion of the contemporary moral issues centering around such topics as the right to strike, the just wage, etc., and to a consideration of papal social teachings.

Louis Savary, S. J., in *Man: His World and His Work* (New York: Paulist Press, 1967) provides us with a useful anthology on the subject of work. He includes representative passages from the writings of economists, sociologists, anthropologists, educators, philosophers, and theologians. The "theology of work" represented in this volume consists of two articles by Joseph Thomas, S. J. that originally appeared in *Revue de l'action populaire* in 1968 and an article by Savary himself. Thomas's articles sketch the general outlines of a "penitential," a "creationist" (or what others have called an "incarnational") and an "eschatological" approach to a theology of work. Both Thomas and Savary represent the eschatological approach, and in developing his position Savary draws on the theology of the world set forth in the writings of J. B. Metz. See note 51, below, for comments on the "eschatological" school.

• Chenu, "Work," *Sacramentum Mundi* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970) 6, 869. Here Chenu calls attention to two Hebrew terms in the Old Testament. He does not use "labor" or "work" to translate them, but from the context it is clear that this is their significance. Chenu writes: "Two terms are used: *melakka*, denoting God's creative work and defining his presence in history as carrying out the plan drawn up on the first day; *avoda*, which means the work of a slave or servitude, including the slavery imposed by Nebuchadnezzar. But the words overlap; and work has the paradoxical connotations of inexorable constraint

tion to their etymological difference. Nonetheless the distinction does not seem to have been operative in their theological consideration of the meaning of work. This is unfortunate, for a significant insight into the Christian understanding of human work as a whole may be lost unless a closer look is taken at the difference between *labor* and *work*.

That there is a distinction between *labor* and *work* is the obstinate testimony of language. As Hannah Arendt observes:

every European language, ancient and modern, contains two etymologically distinct words for what we have come to think of as the same activity, and retains them in the face of their persistent synonymous usage. Thus the Greek language distinguishes between *ponen* and *ergazesthai*, the Latin between *laborare* and *facere* or *fabricari* ... the French between *travailler* and *ouvrer*, the German between *arbeiten* and *werken*. In all these cases, only the equivalents for "labor" have an unequivocal connotation of pain and trouble. The German *Arbeit* applied originally only to farm labor executed by serfs and not to the work of the craftsman, which was called *Werk*. The French *travailler* replaced the older *labourer* and is derived from *tripalium*, a kind of torture.⁶

We have, thus, two different words to refer to human activities that are usually lumped together. But more than a difference

and joyful expansiveness, unremitting compulsion and liberating self-fulfillment. And many languages bring out the contrast between labour which is tiresome, slavish, deadly, and work which is exalting, perfecting, sacred." Nonetheless Chenu, while distinguishing *labor* from *work* in the last sentence in this passage, does not deal explicitly with their differences either in this article or in his book. On the paradoxical character of work see the first chapter of Remy Kwant, *The Philosophy of Labor* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1960).

⁵ Kaiser, *op. cit.*, p. 4: "Various languages reflect the varied experience, culture, and temporal or social conditions in the word *work*. It is often equated with toil, hardship, need, burden. In High German and Old Saxon, *Arbeit*, or work, meant the same as *Muehsal*, *Not*, *Beschwerde*, all involving hardship and creating the image of need, suffering, and fatigue. In French the word *travail* derives from the vulgar Latin *tripalus*, a structure of three posts to which horses were tied when they proved difficult to shoe. *Travailleur* meant executioner in the middle ages. . . . In the languages of the American Indian the term for working had the same root as the word for dying. In Vietnamese *are* means craft, art, religion: work, beauty, and the holy are one reality."

• Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 80, n. 3.

in words is at stake; there is a difference in meaning and in the way these words speak to us about man and his condition. This is surely an indication that the term *work*, when it is used to cover not only intellectual activity, artistic creativity, teaching, plumbing, servicing automobiles, and even the toil of the hod-carrier, is analogical, not univocal." The difference between *labor* and *work* is strikingly brought out by John Locke when he writes of the "labour of our body and the work of our hands,"⁸ and it is also brought keenly to mind if we reflect on the difference between man conceived as *animal laborans* and man conceived as *homo faber*.

Arendt believes that "Locke's distinction between working hands and a laboring body is somewhat reminiscent of the ancient Greek distinction between the *cheirotechnes*, the craftsman ... and those who, like 'slaves and tame animals with their bodies minister to the necessities of life.'"⁹ Labor, in other words, is a human activity that implies pain and anguish, that in some way keeps man from doing more "worthwhile" things. It is, indeed, the laborious character of "work" that is at the basis of what are called "penitential theologies" of work, because theologians who stress this aspect of work are thinking primarily of work in terms of the suffering that it entails, suffering brought on by man's sin.¹⁰

Because there is a harsh reality of human existence indicated by the term *labor*, it seems to me that Arendt is quite justified in wanting to preserve the distinction between *labor* and *work*, despite the claims of some contemporary writers, among them Remy Kwant,¹¹ that this distinction is no longer valid. *Labor*,

⁷ On the analogical character of the term *work* see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, 187, 3 and *Quod*. VII, 7, 17. See also Herbert McCabe, "Theology and Work-A Thomist View," in *Work: Christian Thought and Practice*, edited by John M. Todd (Baltimore: Helicon, 1960), pp. 215-£16.

⁸ John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, sec. £6.

• Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 80. The internal citation is from Aristotle, *Politics*, 1£54b£5.

¹⁰ See McCabe, *art. cit.*, p. £16 and Joseph Thomas, in Louis Savary, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180 for descriptions of penitential theologies of work.

¹¹ Kwant (*op. cit.*, pp. 51-5£) rejects Arendt's distinction between labor and work as irrelevant to conditions today. To sustain his view he goes on to say:

as distinct from *work*, does indeed point to the painfully bitter and agonizingly harsh aspects of human existence experienced by men of every age, the modern as well as the ancient. Arendt eloquently describes the harshness of labor in the following passage:

all ancient estimates of human activities, including those which, like Hesiod, supposedly praise labor, rest on the conviction that the labor of our body which is necessitated by its needs is slavish. Hence occupations which did not consist in laboring, yet were undertaken not for their own sake, but in order to provide the necessities of life, were assimilated to the status of labor, and this explains changes and variations in their estimation and classification at different periods and in different places. The opinion that labor and work were despised in antiquity because only slaves were engaged in them is a prejudice of modern historians. The ancient,; reasoned the other way round and felt it necessary to possess slaves because of the slavish nature of all occupations that served the needs for the maintenance of life. It was precisely on these grounds that the institution of slavery was defended and justified. To labor meant to be enslaved by necessity and this enslavement was inherent in the conditions of human life. Because men were dominated by the necessities of life, they could win their freedom only through the domination of those whom they subjected to necessity by force. The slave's degradation was a blow of fate and a fate worse than death, because it carried with it a metamorphosis of man into something akin to a tame animal.¹²

To contend, as Kwant for instance does, that this appraisal of labor is no longer relevant is to close one's eye to the facts of life. The prejudices of the ancients are with us today if we are honest with ourselves. Contemporary man does not hold in high esteem the toilsome drudgery of the garbage man or trashman, the "cleaning lady" and the dishwasher. One of the hallmarks of our day is the presence of "labor-saving"

" When Ricoeur speaks of the actual 'apotheosis of labor' he certainly does not mean that the troublesome strain of the human body is gloried in our period." (p. 52) Kwant and Ricoeur are surely right, but this statement actually indicates the validity of Arendt's distinction between *labor* and *work*, for surely even in our present period the reality of labor as the "troublesome strain of the human body" is acutely experienced.

¹² Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

devices in our homes and the insatiable desire for more. Labor once performed by slaves is, it is true, being taken over more and more by machines, but to deny the reality of this kind of work in the world today for millions of human beings is totally naive if not absurd.

Because of these pain-laden and negative connotations of labor, there is some reason to be skeptical about theologies of work, most of them formulated within the framework of an eschatological interpretation of the world and earthly realities, that speak glowingly about work as the Christian's "task ... to intensify worldly reality,"¹³ and identify it with man's effort to "accept the world as world and set it free."¹⁴

Certainly, as many theologians have noted, the Christian's attitude toward work as a whole, including both labor and work, is profoundly different from the ancient pagan attitude that saw all human activity as in some way opposed to the *nec-otium* and *a-skholia* that should characterize the truly free man. For the Christian all human endeavors, including the agonizing toil of man as *animallaborans*, can be seen from the perspective of faith and love and, hence, as perfective of man. As Chenu observes, "The Christian man of wisdom--contrary to the aristocratic Greek sage or the Cartesian philosopher--finds unity in the combination of these two functions [work and thought]."¹⁵ Chenu, in this passage, is speaking of human work conceived as the activity of *homo faber* rather than *animal laborans*, but his remarks can be extended to indicate the different framework for appreciating the reality of work provided by a Christian perspective as opposed to a pagan perspective.¹⁶ Of pertinence here is the motto of the Bene-

¹³ Savary, *op. cit.*, p.

"*Ibid.*, p.

¹⁵ Chenu, *Theology of Work*, p. 12.

¹⁶ What is at stake here is a fundamental of attitude, one well expressed by Schoonenberg in his comment: "Formerly labor was conceived as a precondition for the authentic kind of human existence, namely contemplation in freedom from work. Today we see labor as a form of human life and of becoming man." Piet Schoonenberg, *God's World in the Making* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), p. 189. It is instructive to note, in passing, that Schoonenberg here uses *labor* and *work* synonymously.

dictines-whom Lynn Whyte has called the first intellectuals to get dirt under their fingernails *"-ora et labora.*

Still, in noting the fundamental difference between a Christian and a pagan attitude toward work, theologians have not, to my knowledge, explicitly adverted to the distinction between labor and work. In fact, their positive appraisals have, as we have already indicated, occurred when they are thinking of work in terms of the activity of *homo faber*. Perhaps if we now look at a second difference between *labor* and work—the first was the pain and toilsomeness associated with labor and not with work—we will be in a position to highlight some specifically Christian themes that are critical, in my view, to an adequate theology of work.

A second difference between *labor* and work—and one closely linked to the low esteem of labor both in the ancient world and in contemporary society¹⁶—is that labor issues in no enduring product whereas work does. Labor is the sweat necessary to provide the necessities of man's biological life, a tiring and toilsome activity that must be done over and over again, as in cultivating the fields, that leaves as its result *no* commercially valuable product. Labor, in other words, is primarily a *bodily activity*; it is, as Locke's phrase puts it, "the labour of the body." Quite possibly the fact that labor is bodily activity provides the clue to the low esteem in which labor is held.

¹¹ Lynn Whyte, "Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered," *American Scholar* (1958) 187.

¹⁸ Arendt is very perceptive here. She detects a similarity between the ancient's contempt of labor and the modern Marxist's contempt of non-productive work. As she puts it: "both Smith and Marx were in agreement with modern public opinion when they despised unproductive labor as parasitical, actually a kind of perversion of labor, as though nothing were worthy of this name which did not enrich the world. Marx certainly shared Smith's contempt for the 'menial servants' who like 'idle guests . . . leave nothing behind them in return for their consumption' (*Wealth of Nations*, Everyman's Edition, II, 302). Yet it was precisely these menial servants, these household inmates, *oiketai* or *familiares*, laboring for sheer subsistence and needed for effortless consumption rather than for production, whom all ages prior to the modern had in mind when they identified the laboring condition with slavery. What they left behind them in return for their consumption was nothing more or less than their masters' freedom or, in modern language, their masters' potential productivity." *Op. cit.*, pp. 85-87.

Labor is degrading because the body is degrading, an impediment to the soul, to the true man, to the inner person. The work of our hands, on the contrary, is valuable and ennobling because it is an expression of the inner man, of the creative spirit operative through the instrumentality of the body.

Surely this was the attitude operative in the ancient world, one conformable to the dualistic view of man common to the Orphic mysteries, Platonism, Gnosticism, and Manicheism. It is likewise an attitude attractive to a culture permeated, however subtly, by Cartesianism and a Christianity interpreted in a Platonic and Cartesian sense. It is the attitude we find reflected in the *Playboy* philosophy, a philosophy that glorifies the body to be sure, but still a philosophy that views the human body as a thing, as a spectacle to be seen, but not as the incarnation of a person. It is the attitude reflected in talk of "body counts" and of managerial efficiency in the use of numbers. But it is an attitude totally different from the biblical notion of man as a living body¹⁹ and from the traditional Christian notion of man as the living image of God and of the human person as a genuine composite of spirit and matter, wherein the person is not one reality and the body another but rather wherein the body is itself constitutive of the person.²⁰ Because of the vast difference between a Christian and a pagan understanding of the significance of the human body, there is to be expected a vast difference between the Christian appraisal of labor as bodily activity and a pagan appraisal of the same reality.

Still the bodily activity of *animallaborans* is pain-laden and toilsome, and labor has, in fact, frequently degraded man in the course of his history. What can a Christian say to this? Here some reflections offered by Herbert McCabe may be of value. He does not, it is true, distinguish *labor* from *work*, but

¹⁹ On this see John A. T. Robinson, *The Body: A Study in Biblical Theology* (London: SCM Press, 1952) and Wulstan Mork, *The Biblical Meaning of Man* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1967).

²⁰ On this see, for example, Thomas Aquinas, *II Contra Gentes*, cc. 56-57; an excellent discussion of the unity of the human body and soul is provided by Herbert McCabe, *What Is Ethics All About* (Washington: Corpus Books, 1969), pp. 90-91.

his observations help provide a framework that will enable us to come to a keener appreciation of the role labor can play in the story of man's salvation.

McCabe seeks to understand the significance of human work (including both labor and work) in a world of sin that has been redeemed in Christ. Through sin, McCabe notes, man not only rejected God and damaged his own nature, he also handed himself over to the power of Satan, to the power of darkness. Although the world remained subject to God, God allowed it to be ruled by hostile forces, much as he might have allowed it to be ruled by a Hitler or an Attila. Satan, McCabe points out, "is the enemy of the good, and for that reason he is directly and immediately the enemy of man, for the good of man is goodness as such. Whatever, therefore, tends to degrade mankind contributes towards the power of Satan and shows forth that power. The external signs of Satan's power, the sacramentals of his reign, are of their nature degrading to man, *but they need not necessarily degrade him*. When the Christian bears them with the dignity which comes from his union with Christ in his passion, the weapons of Satan are turned against himself." ²¹

Among these weapons of Satan may legitimately be included the harsh and oppressive nature of labor as contrasted to work, the groaning and travail that compels us to "eat bread in the sweat of our brow," the unpleasant, distasteful tasks customarily associated with chattel labor. Labor can be an instrument of satanic or evil power because it can degrade man and keep him from reaching the fulfillment of his humanity in divinity. The *animal laborans* can be and frequently is regarded not as a man, a person, but as a number, a body to be manipulated, used when serviceable and cast aside when no longer needed. Squalor, degradation, and pain are three characteristics associated with man as *animal laborans*, and these characteristics can indeed serve as weapons of satanic power. But, and here we must note a point of capital importance that is stressed by

²¹ McCabe, "Theology and Work," in *op. cit.*, p.

McCabe, "it is important to see that the weapons of Christ are *not* simply the opposites of these, they are not wealth, honour, and comfort [the hallmarks of the leisure class], but Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist."²² Later we shall return to look at the positive weapons of Christ and their relationship to human work. Our present concern is to show, with McCabe, that the acceptance of poverty and pain, of degradation and the toilsome burden of labor, *can* become a source of human perfection for the Christian, and because of this a Christian theology of work differs profoundly from a humanist philosophy of work. The humanist, McCabe notes, must view work in terms of wealth, honor, and comfort. For him "the purpose of work is to provide a world in which man can live in reasonable security and comfort and dignity."²³ For the Christian, on the other hand, all work, while concerned in the end with imposing a human order on the world and with building the human,²⁴ must be seen as the imposition of a divine-human order, one that discerns positive values for man in the sweat and dirt of *animal laborans*, that sees human dignity in the bodily activity that *is* labor.

From a consideration of labor and *animal laborans* we turn now to a consideration of work (as distinct from labor) and *homo faber*. It is in discussing the meaning of work as a human achievement and man as fabricator and artisan that most contemporary writers on the theology of work speak in glowing and enthusiastic terms. The positive and optimistic mentality characteristic of these theologians in their appraisal of the activities of *homo faber* is easily seen if we examine a few typical statements. Chenu, for instance, describes work as the activity whereby man shares in God's creation: "Man fulfills himself by dominating, through his discoveries, reason, strength, and virtue that Nature which is his kingdom and out of which he creates a new world, a human world. God appointed him lord of creation."²⁵ Again Chenu writes: "In the encounter of man with nature, work is his proper activity, the original

•• *Ibid.*, p.

•• *Ibid.*

•• *Ibid.*

²⁵ Chenu, *Theology of Work*, p. 10.

condition of man, the embodiment of his being." Through his work, Chenu continues, man "humanizes the world," making it his "home."²⁷

Along with Chenu Schoonenberg sees work as a humanizing force. Thus he writes:

In prehistory, and even today, we know of clans and tribes which live almost literally from hand to mouth. When we compare them with ourselves, we realize that civilized man by his work has not only transformed the face of the earth but has also developed himself as a human being.²⁸

Again Schoonenberg states:

Labor [and from the context we realize that "labor" here means "work "] means to make the earth subservient but also, through it, to liberate ourselves from nature, to give ourselves the freedom to be ourselves, to have dominion. Maurice Merleau-Ponty ... has well said: "History rests on labor, for labor is not a mere production of wealth; it is, more generally, the activity by which man projects around himself a human milieu and transcends what nature gives to his life."²⁹

Finally, to illustrate this theme in contemporary writers on the theology of work we may cite the following passage from Louis Savary:

Human work lies at the intersection where man confronts creation. Here, in that spending of human effort which each man calls his work, is the locus of man's productive self-expression and a place where we can begin to search for an understanding of today's Christian.³⁰

In other words, for these theologians (and here I surely agree with them) human work must be viewed within the context of an incarnational theology.³¹ These theologians take their

²⁶ Chenu, "Work," *Sacramentum Mundi*, 6, 371.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Schoonenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

³⁰ Savary, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

³¹ An incarnational motif runs throughout Chenu's writings on the subject, as it does in Schoonenberg, Thomas, Savary, and others. McCabe's comments are

inspiration from the texts of Genesis that describe man as the lord of all living things, as the steward of creation, as the image of God who has the power to name the animals, to till the soil and make it bear fruit. Obviously work considered in these contexts is productive, and man through his work continues the creative activity of God. Thus work is regarded by Chenu, for instance, as "first of all the making of a product . . . it is precisely by creating a product, by accomodating himself to it, and by accepting the laws which govern its manufacture, that the worker achieves his completion as man."³² In fact, Chenu insists, man is *homo sapiens* only because he is *homo artifex*, "which is his first definition."³³

Certainly it is true that man, through his work, reorders nature and constructs a new world, a world that has been humanized and constitutes a new reality. This is why Chenu, as we noted at the beginning of this article, can maintain that man's achievements as *homo faber*, as the technological animal, transform work into a "new reality." Work, as Arendt notes, "provides an 'artificial' world of things distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all."³⁴ Because man is, as *homo faber* or *homo artifex*, the maker of a new order, it is true to say that

worthwhile in contrasting a penitential view with an incarnational. He writes: "The view that work is a fundamentally human thing, that it belongs to man as God's steward on earth, is not of course universally accepted. There is a surprisingly widespread belief amongst Christians that work is simply a consequence of the Fall. . . . These people place great emphasis on the phrase from Genesis: 'Cursed is the ground because of you, in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life.' Work is simply identified with the difficulty and general unpleasantness of work. St. Thomas found it necessary to insist against certain theologians that there would have been sexual intercourse without the Fall. . . . In the same way it seems to be the business of one who claims to be a thomist to insist that there would be, and in fact was, work apart from the Fall. The Christian cannot see the worker simply as one who must patiently suffer the penalty of sin, he sees work primarily as an expression of human dignity" ("Theology and Work," *op. cit.*, p.

- Chenu, *Theology of Work*, pp.
- *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

through the work of his hands he humanizes the world and makes of it his home. He does so because the work of his hands is something that endures, at least for a time, and "stands opposite" to man, providing him with a universe of objects or things. From this perspective it is possible to observe, as Arendt does, that

the things of the world have the function of stabilizing human life, and their objectivity lies in the fact that—in contradiction to the Heraclitean saying that the same man can never enter the same stream—men, their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity, by being related to the same chair and the same table. In other words, against the subjectivity of man stands the objectivity of the man-made world rather than the sublime indifference of an untouched nature, whose overwhelming elementary force, on the contrary, will compel them to swing relentlessly in the circle of their own biological movement, which fits so closely into the over-all cyclical movement of nature's household. Only we who have erected the objectivity of a world of our own from what nature gives us, who have built it into the environment of nature so that we are protected from her, can look upon nature as something "objective." Without a world between men and nature, there is eternal movement, but no objectivity.³⁵

It is precisely because man has become so adept as *homo faber*, as the fashioner of a world of his own making, that the subject of the theology of work has come to the fore today. Indeed today, because of his enormous technological achievements, man has become, as Schoonenberg describes him, "a technologically equipped nomad, roaming a megalopolis and even entire continents."³⁶ We can legitimately add, in view of developments since Schoonenberg penned these lines, that the technologically equipped nomad, man, can now roam the entire universe.

In addition, because man through his work creates a world of objects that confront him, we can say, with Arendt, that "the human condition of work is worldliness,"³⁷ i. e., man adds

•• *Ibid.*, p. 187.

³⁶ Schoonenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

•• Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

to the worldliness of the world by his technological inventions. Thus we find some basis for the paeons of praise that Savary feels compelled to utter in contemplating the immense possibilities open to man through his capacity as *homo faber*, and in developing his theology of work Savary and others seek to root it in the wider context provided by a "theology of the world," such as the one elaborated by Johannes B. Metz.⁸⁸

The optimism and hope voiced by Savary, Joseph Thomas, and others with respect to a theology of work (i. e., a theology of *homo faber* as the artifex of a developing world) certainly has a basis. Yet it seems useful to call attention to a threat to human values and human existence that lurks in the creative endeavors of *homo faber*. It seems that work, as labor, can also be a weapon in the arsenal of Satan. We have seen that labor can degrade and dehumanize, and possibly the dehumanizing potential of labor is one reason why theologians have apparently failed to give labor explicit recognition in their efforts to think theologically about the reality that we call work. We have also seen that work as productive has been, historically, a factor contributing to the "humanization" of life. But what about the dehumanizing potential of work? There is the perduring temptation on man's part to consider himself a god, to regard himself as the lord of creation (a tendency to regard man in this way seems detectible even in the citation from Chenu given above).⁸⁹ Although this temptation is a misreading of Genesis, it is not uncommon, particularly in the contemporary world.⁹⁰ The very products of man's

⁸⁸ Savary, *op. cit.*, p. ff. Cf. J. B. Metz, "A Believer's Look at the World: A Christian Standpoint in the Secularized World Today," in *The Christian and the World* (New York: Kenedy, 1965), pp. 68-100.

⁸⁹ "God appointed him lord of creation," Chenu, *Theology of Work*, p. 10. The question, I believe, can be stated this way: "Is man the lord or steward of creation?" Obviously Chenu means that man is "lord" only in a derivative and limited sense. If man is lord in the strict sense, then obviously anything that man *can* do is legitimate. McCabe (cf. note 31 above) is more cautious, stating that man is the steward of God's creation. Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140, n. 3, has some interesting comments to offer regarding the interpretation of the passages in Genesis relating to man's dominion over the world.

⁹⁰ Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-144, has some perceptive comments to offer on the

creative and inventive genius, precisely because of their "objectivity," can become his idols, captivating his mind and winning from him the religious awe due only to what is *tremens et fascinans*, so that a love for the products he makes can arise within man that is in some ways akin to the erotic love that can seize a human person and put him in a state of frenzy.

Moreover, today, because of man's enormous strides in the life sciences and the behavioral sciences, there seems to exist, at least in the opinion of many, the real possibility that *homo faber* may be able to bring into being a new "product." The product in question is man himself. Men now possess the knowhow to store sperm in "banks," and soon the same possibility will be available with respect to ova. In all likelihood the first baby developed *in vitro* rather than *in utero* will soon arrive on the scene, and Dr. Paul Edwards of Cambridge University in England has vowed to continue his efforts in this direction.⁴¹ In the very near future it will be possible, so we are informed by geneticists/² to generate the human species in a completely asexual manner, through the process known as cloning (it has already worked with frogs). In addition, the behavioral scientist can, to large measure, control human behavior by the use of chemicals, electronic devices, and brain surgery. The prospect of a world "beyond freedom and dignity," as proposed by B. F. Skinner in his recent book/³ must surely be taken in all seriousness.

At issue here is the very meaning of man, of the human reality, and it is essential that men today take a definite

Promethean temptation for man to regard himself as complete master over the "world" he has created through his work. She sees the element of reification operative here.

⁴¹ Edwards explicitly affirmed his intention to proceed with producing *in vitro* babies at the Kennedy Foundation's Symposium, "Choices on our Conscience," held in Washington, D. C. during October, 1971.

•• On this see Robert Francoeur, *Utopian Motherhood* (New York: Doubleday, 1971) and Gordon Rattray Taylor, *The Biological Time-Bomb* (Cleveland/New York: World, 1968). See also Paul Ramsey, *Fabricated Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

•• *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Knopf, 1971).

stance with respect to the question involved. The traditional posture of Western civilization, a posture stemming from Socrates and reinforced by the Judea-Christian tradition, is that the "good" man is the product of free choices intelligently made. Despite the limitations on human freedom recognized within this tradition,⁴⁴ this was and is a key truth about man's identity. Because free choices are involved in achieving the good attainable by action, to use Aristotle's phrase/⁵ risk too is implicit in the construction of the "human," a risk undertaken in Christian hope and faith. Today some propose that the "good" man is not the product of free choices intelligently made but is rather the product of genetic engineering exercised during the process of man's coming to be and of behavioral engineering during the process of his life. The proposal, in other words, is that not only man but the "good" man is the product of *homo faber*, of the technologically equipped nomad.⁴⁶

If the ultimate achievement of *homo faber* is the production of men and their manipulation and use, then, it seems to me, the "work of our hands" is an even more potent weapon in the arsenal of Satan than the "labour of our bodies." Those who wish to "play god" in this way seem possessed, as Arendt says, "by a rebellion against human existence as it has been given, a free gift from nowhere (secularly speaking)," and to exchange it for something that man "has made himself."⁴⁷

Having pointed to a potential threat to human dignity and values posed by an erroneous view of man as *homo faber*, I should now like to call attention to some of the exciting and

«For an excellent discussion of the various meanings of freedom and, in particular, of the freedom of self-determination necessary for man to a morally responsible agent see Mortimer Adler, *The Idea of Freedom* (New York: Doubleday, 1958, 1960) 2 volumes, especially Volume II, chapter 3.

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097a22.

•• On this point see the remarkable study of James V. Schall, *Human Dignity and Human Numbers* (Staten Island: Alba House, 1971). Mortimer Adler's *The Difference of Man and The Difference It Makes* (New York: Meridian, 1968) is of inestimable value in evaluating the factors that are operative in shaping attitudes on this question.

⁴⁷ Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

challenging ideas concerning human work that have been developed by contemporary theologians.

First of all, most modern writers on the subject seek to show how human work, in addition to building up a world that can serve as a home for man, is an indispensable means for achieving man's potential as a social being. Chenu, for instance, insists that one of the principal purposes of work is to create a "kind of social energy, at the immediate service of humanity as a whole."⁴⁸ Rondet discovers the joy of work in the creation and service of a human community/⁹ while McCabe observes that "the Christian's work of itself brings him into unity with his fellow workers, it relates him directly and immediately to all his fellow men."⁵⁰

Second, most contemporary writers, such as Chenu, Savary, McCabe, Schoonenberg, and Joseph Thomas stress the eschatological importance of human work. They see work as in some way intimately linked with the mystery of Christ, of the "whole Christ" spoken of in the Captivity Epistles of Paul. The eschatological dimensions of human work, in fact, seem to preoccupy the attention of many theologians at present, but it must be noted that articles on this subject, such as those by Savary and Thomas, are unusually vague in meaning.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Chenu, *Theology of Work*, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁹ Henri Rondet, *Theology Digest* 4 (1956) 39.

⁵⁰ McCabe, "Theology and Work," *op. cit.*, pp. 220-221.

⁵¹ I confess to some difficulty in appreciating the efforts of theologians such as Thomas and Savary to show the eschatological significance of work. Their statements are exceedingly vague and strike this reader as more poetry than theology. For example, take the following passages. Thomas writes: "Work . . . *I* is *I* a completion of humanity and of creation. Christ completes them by integrating them into himself. . . . Then will the boldest projects of men find their realization. The material world, liberated from the incoercible weight which causes it to fall back into the poorest, elemental forms of existence by the dissolution of its elements, will no longer be an obstacle for humanity, but the instrument of its total freedom" (in Savary, *op. cit.*, p. 183). This is beautiful, but not too helpful, in my view, for understanding the reality of work in a theological way, Savary, pondering the eschatological meaning of work within the framework of a theology of the world, writes grandly: "The Christian must, like God, allow the world to be wholly worldly. This is the goal of his work; not to divinize the world but to remove the aura of divinity from it. . . . The Christian's task . . . is to accept the world as world and set it free" (*op. cit.*,

Third, some contemporary theologians, among them Joseph Thomas, a French Jesuit,⁵² and McCabe stress the sacramental character of human work. McCabe's views here seem quite instructive, and it may be valuable to see how he relates human work to the sacraments of the redeeming Christ. McCabe writes:

What can it mean to talk of work as sacramental? I think that there are two mistakes to be avoided here. There are, strictly speaking, seven sacraments. . . . When we say that work is in some way sacramental we must avoid on the one hand the error of thinking that it is an eighth sacrament in the strict sense, and on the other hand, the mistake of thinking of it as a sort of quasi-sacrament in a diminished sense. Work, in my view, is sacramental simply because of its relation to the sacramental order in the strict sense. . . . Work becomes sacramental just in so far as it plays a part in the Christian's sacramental life. Now what sort of part does it play? . . . In the first place, the Christian's work can be an exercise of his baptismal character, his priesthood. . . . As a worker it is his business to humanize the world, to make it his own so that he can offer it to God. . . . The Christian cannot view work simply as a conquest of the hostility of nature. He views it too as a conquest of the antihuman hostility of Satan . . . an offering of the human thing to the Father. . . . The Eucharist is, first and foremost, the Christian sacred meal. It is the center of Christian unity; and because our unity is in the body of Christ, we eat sacramentally the body of Christ. Now work has an immediate relation to this unity. The Christian's work of itself brings him into unity with his fellow men. . . . In their actual work they can feel themselves depending upon and in unity with their fellow workers. Human community becomes something felt, not merely an ideal.⁵³

p. fl06). Precisely what does Savary mean here? Set the world free from what and for what? In candor I must say that the rhapsodies of theologians about the worldliness of the world and the eschatological significance of work seem to have little substance. It is true, of course, that the Christian faith sees the world as a created reality, with an autonomy of its own conferred upon it by its creator. It thus does de-sacralize nature, exorcizing the false gods of the pagan religions and of a nature religion. Likewise the Christian faith does see the entire universe as redeemed by Christ, and there is indubitably a process operative here, a process in which man is called to participate. But the nebulosity of some writings on the eschatological significance of work remains.

⁵² Thomas, in Savary, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁵³ McCabe, "Theology and Work," *op. cit.*, pp. fl20-221.

Finally, it is necessary to note, with Schoonenberg, that there is more to human life than work. Work occupies a central place in human existence, but it is "not the whole of human existence. Work is a way to become man, but not every human self-realization is work."⁵⁴ "Our Christian image of man," he continues, "which is also authentically human, makes us state that there is something more in our earthly existence, a 'plus' that cannot be reduced to productive labor."⁵⁵ And what is this plus? I submit that it is the dynamic love or *caritas Christi*, made possible for human beings through the incarnation of the living God, of the Emmanuel who is the God with us, that enables us to become more than beings of nature, more than products of a creativity however intelligent. It is this love that enables us to become participators in the divinity. Through this love, which we possess because we are possessed by God through grace, we are able to open ourselves to all men, not just our friends and associates, those with whom we share common interests and common bonds both of friendship and hostility, but to all men simply as men. It is this love that makes us realize vividly that the basic reason behind the second commandment is that it is impossible for man to make an image of God because God has himself made this image. This image is man, who is a living ikon of the living God, the locus of our encounter with the saving God of history. Because this is true, we can see that the production of men is not an achievement within the scope of man as *homo faber*; the endeavor to ape God in this aspect of creativity is not to fulfill man's task as artifex but to pervert it and to turn work into an instrument of the "Father of lies."⁵⁶

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•• Schoonenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 141.

•• On this subject McCabe's comments in *What Is Ethics All About* merit careful consideration. His section dealing with the meaning in which Jesus is the "perfect man" is particularly noteworthy, as well as the section in which he offers a sacramental theology stressing the corporate redemption of men in Christ.

SOME SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SPINOZA AND HEGEL ON SUBSTANCE

I
IN THIS ESSAY I shall attempt to emphasize some basic similarities between the modes Spinoza and Hegel conceive substance, arguing that their endeavors to comprehend reality in a terminal system by a univocal method make irrelevant the differences between rationalism, idealism, and mysticism. ¹ Like Spinoza, Hegel maintained a theory of identity within a tight and unified structural system which recognizes only one reality-called substance by Spinoza and "notion" or Absolute Spirit by Hegel-all parts of the universe and all acts and events fitting together in a systematic form.

In the line of some critics, from Jacobi and Fritz von Baader and left-wing Hegelians more than a century ago down to Nicolai Hartmann and A. Kojève in our times, who pursued the logical implications of the Hegelian principles, I would like to suggest that Hegel's system is Spinozism brought to its full necessary conclusions and to some possible ramifications. In this sense Nicolai Hartmann was correct in stating that "the exposition of the categories of the Absolute in Hegel's logic is

¹For a detailed analysis of Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza's concept of substance see my article in the *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, No. 3, (Fall, 1970). The emphasis on similarities rather than on differences between Spinoza's concept of substance and Hegel's Absolute Spirit rests on a now widely-accepted interpretation of Spinoza's substance as being a dynamic activity of ordering all particulars within one system rather than as a static "thing in itself," totally independent from and outside the particulars, as discussed below.

Laurence Foss in his paper "Hegel, Spinoza and a Theory of Experience as Closed," *The Thomist* XXXV 3 (July, 1971), replaced the overworked labels "rationalist" and "idealist" by "panist." He pointed out very aptly how in both these systems the possibility of indeterminacy in experience was eliminated by the "panist" method.

to be regarded as the fulfillment of Spinoza's intention: as a strictly methodical 'geometry' of sequence of the divine attributes and modes ... within the strict a priori intelligibility, although not 'mathematical' necessity. In this perspective Hegel's philosophy appears as Spinozism led to its ultimate conclusion." ² A highly plausible argument seems to be that underlying both systems is the mystical Neoplatonic idea of the "One," conceived as a universal power in nature and in man's creativity. Instead of creation of the world and the soul, both systems offer the emanation as physically and logically necessitated; instead of revelation, both propose intuitive cognition of which the soul is capable by its own natural power, although ultimately this power has its source in the "One." The redemption of man through love of a personal God is replaced by the climbing of the mind upwards through a series of logical operations in Hegel and through the *amor dei intellectualis* in Spinoza. Hegel too had Spinoza's "audacity" to penetrate into the innermost thoughts of God and to make God and the world one entity.

Perhaps the best way to de-emphasize the differences between Spinoza's and Hegel's conceptions of substance would be to refute some arguments against such a de-emphasis. The arguments against looking at Hegel's Absolute Spirit as a legitimate heir of Spinoza's substance can be easily advanced. Some of them, as a matter of fact, have been advanced vigorously. I believe that these arguments can be classified into three principle categories. In the following I shall discuss these categories one by one, interpreting the concepts of both thinkers in a way, warranted by the respective texts, which highlights similarities.

The intention of this study is to open again a question,

² Nicolai Hartmann, *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, Vol. II, *Hegel*, (Berlin and Leipzig, 1929), p. 26. H. A. Wolfson states as Spinoza's purpose in all this writings "to bring to its logical conclusion the reasoning of philosophy throughout history in their effort to reduce the universe to a unified and uniform whole governed by universal and unchangeable laws." The pursuit of this purpose closely resembles Hegel's project. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, (Cleveland and New York, 1965), Vol. I, p. 33.

always puzzling but in the Spinoza-Hegel context neglected and almost forgotten, namely, the question of the recurrent attempts to harmonize radical rationalism and speculative mysticism.

As identity-philosophies both systems run into the risk of being interpreted either as "atheism" or as "acosmism." I submit, therefore, that at least some monistic philosophies exemplify the closest converging of naturalism or radical rationalism, on the one hand, and of speculative mysticism, on the other hand.

II

First, it has been argued that, while Spinoza's method meant analysis, its paradigm being geometry as a basis of principle of order, Hegel's method was rather the dialectics of an infinite process of the self-positing Spirit, its self-differentiation, and its coming back to itself. Whether in the face of actual or historical facts Hegel's dialectics has done better than Spinoza's geometric method, understood as a principle of order, is here beside the point. Some scholars maintain that the dialectical method was even more helpless in the face of reality. However, it was widely accepted as evident that the self-unfolding Absolute Spirit of Hegel is totally different from Spinoza's always actual and fulfilled substance. The stress upon this difference is indeed the core of Hegel's criticism of Spinoza's substance whenever he opposes it. The essential being of all reality, the Spirit in the certainty of itself, is for Hegel always in motion and never fully actual. One sentence may illustrate the dynamics of the dialectic of the self, the Spirit, in its activities: "For knowing is itself the process and movement of those abstract moments; it is the universal self, the self of itself as well as of the object, and, being universal, is the unity of this process, a unity that returns into itself."³

• *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated by Baillie (New York and Evanston 1967), p. 600. Hegel's fundamental assumption that true being can only be that which knows itself, i. e., the basis of the idealistic ontology of being as consciousness, was probably also shared by Spinoza who followed, in some respects,

Against this argument, however, one must emphasize that Spinoza's ultimate ground for identifying his substance with its attributes and the infinite intellect was his notion of substance as an activity and not as a static "thing in itself" perceived by the intellect from the outside. Spinoza's substance stands for fullness of acts, for the active essence of God. Substance realizes itself not in a relationship of an object to its perceiver but in modifications of its attributes. The manifoldness of the substance is the multiplicity of its activities, the diversification of the acts of the finite intellects in the lawful order of the whole universe as conceived by the infinite intellect.

Throughout his speculation Spinoza employs the concept of analysis with its possibility of a rigid deduction of all the results from a self-evident, intuitively defined principle and criterion-substance. Substance (or God) is for him not the object of proofs, as for Descartes, but the principle of all proofs. Substance is not a principle of order conceived according to human, finite, and relative criteria. It is the supreme infinite condition of all ideas which defines all things analytically. However, as the principle of order substance not only comprises all intelligible orders but also produces and forms them. "*Quod in se est et per se concipitur*" is a term for the universality of order and the totality of conditions within which anything can be conceived. But as such it is neither in back of nor beyond the attributes and the modes, but through and in them as their activating power. In this sense it is *natura naturans* and the infinite intellect.

True, the difference between the geometrical and dialectical method, mentioned above, is most significant and we shall return to it later. Some scholars maintain that Spinoza employed the geometrical method in order to avoid the need of arguing against opponents, whereas it seems obvious that Hegel's dialectics were intentionally designed to cope precisely with this need, namely, to elaborate his criticism of traditional philosophy. However, this difference does not pertain to the Cartesian-idealistic lines. See below the brief discussion of the idealistic possibility in Spinoza.

character of substance in both systems as both full actuality and dynamic *vis activa*. The ambiguities of this character in Spinoza's concept of substance is a problem in itself, since substance is also characterized as the Scholastic *ens realissimum*, the plenitude of all beings and perfections, the whole of reality which comprises all possible essences of being. However, the main characteristic of Spinoza's substance, according to our interpretation, is its all-comprising and all-conditioning ordering of the universe in a manner that all modes of beings are necessarily connected. The pantheistic system thus becomes rather an analytic set of propositions on necessary connections of all particulars within the whole universe.

Secondly, it has been argued that, whereas Spinoza's substance is the universe as thought and extension, Hegel's spirit is predominantly thought, the unfolding of the "notion" or the "idea." Hegel himself emphasized this difference on many occasions. Indeed, Spinoza's theory of the interrelation of mind and body was often interpreted as a materialistic conception of the meaning and function of ideas. The mind apparently was, for Spinoza, the idea of the body, i.e., the form or nature of the body of which it is a mind. In other words, the mind is nothing other than what the body is. Since body or matter, unlike matter in Plato or Aristotle, is for Spinoza not anything potential but always actual, every bodily change is a mental change. This is apparently the meaning of Spinoza's proposition that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Thus, the mind and the body are really one and the same individual which at one time is considered under the attribute of thought and at another under the attribute of extension.⁴ The body as it actually exists and nothing else is the object of the idea constituting the human mind. The natures of the mind and the body are one and the same.

• *Ethics*, II, Prop. 21, proof and note, in accord with II, Prop. 7: "Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object. . . ."

However, this line of interpretation with its emphasis upon the strict identity of idea with form or nature of that of which it is an idea can be, and was often, opposed by an idealistic or rationalistic interpretation of Spinoza's position. Both the materialistic and the idealistic interpretations have apparently good grounds in a metaphysical system in which the mind is not conceived as an independent substance, located in the body in a mysterious way, and on the other hand a true idea is a self-evident or necessary act of thought which cannot be doubted. A self-evident proposition does not require any comparison with an external reality since it states the logically necessary connection between the properties according to the definition.

Thus, the idealistic tradition seems to be preserved in Spinoza. This is evident in his theory of truth. The Scholastic conformity of the thing and the intellect becomes in his system a relation of identity. Agreement in itself does not provide truth; it is rather the coherence with other ideas, the consistency of the idea with the idea of the whole which makes truth. The ideatum can never be known directly, it must be represented in the idea. However, no problem of transcendence arises, since the idea as essence alone provides all the knowledge necessary for the adequate cognition of the ideatum. Ideas are not dependent upon sensation, mind is not dependent upon body. External sensation does not precede internal ideation; they are simultaneous processes, since both are modifications of the same substance. The employment of the conceptional operation is sufficient for obtaining truth and no external criterion is needed for the evidence of truth. To have a true idea is to know that one has it and to be certain of its truth (*Est enim verum index sui et falsi*). Since all knowledge of every true idea is of the essence, of the immutable and eternal nature or form, a reality intrinsically intelligible, it must be within the grasp of mind. In a word, the truth of an idea consists in this essence or ideatum, not in any correspondence with, or conformity to, an external counterpart.

The idealistic tradition is most manifest in the superior

status of the attribute of thought over and above the attribute of extension. Let us recall that, according to Spinoza, the two orders, the order and connection of ideas and the order and connection of things, i. e., thought and extension, are the same; they comprise the varied identity of the substance. That which is connected is of different kinds and belongs to different attributes, but the manner of connection is the same, in the both known attributes, and manifests a primary unity.⁵ The whole is one, although our minds perceive it in two fundamental forms, as a world of extension and as a world of ideas. "Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes—that is, the same things following in either case."⁶ One has to consider, however, that the order and connection of ideas, the domain of the attribute of thought, is intimately connected with the function of the mind or of the intellect. Since reality is attributed to an object, to an ideatum, not because of any external compulsion which it imposes upon the mind but rather through logical criteria and thinking acts, all being is mediated and posed by cognition. The function of the intellect to conceive every attribute of substance as constituting its essence, expresses the very reality of all being or substance.

Although Spinoza admits an infinite number of attributes which are not accessible to the human mind, opening thus the door to the "Pyrrhonian crisis,"⁷ that is, to the doubting whether human knowledge is not limited to a section of the whole universe, all the infinite attributes must necessarily be defined in terms of the intellect. The intellect, or the mind, therefore, is the fundamental premise of all reality in its unity and manifoldness. Thought, then, is more than one of the

⁵ *Ethics*, I, Prop. 15, proof.

• *Ethics*, II, Prop. 7.

⁷ How the "Pyrrhonian crisis" troubled Descartes is well documented by R. H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* (New York, 1960). Spinoza showed his deep, but generally well concealed, concern with skeptical arguments especially in his responses to the perceptive questioning of Tschirnhaus.

infinite attributes but rather the condition of substance and its modes, i. e., the very condition of both the unity of the universe and the multiplicity of its beings.

The materialistic-idealistic ambiguity in Spinoza conceals an inherent difficulty in his theory of knowledge which attempts to reconcile two different positions, namely, the view that the mind is a reflection of the body, the idea of the body insofar as it manifests the nature of the body and its modification and affections, with the view that the mind is an independent center of acts which encounters the world in a creative way. According to the materialistic view it is hard to realize how the mind is able to emancipate itself from the attachment to the affections of the body and grasp general contents of cognition, let alone the order and connection of all beings. The road from individual affections of the body which the mind is conscious of to the cognition of the whole of all beings seems to be shrouded in a mystery. Spinoza attempted to clarify this difficulty by his concept of the "idea of the idea," or "*cognitio reflexiva*" to which he attached the greatest methodological importance: "Whence it may be gathered that method is nothing else than reflective knowledge (*cognitio reflexiva*) or the idea of an idea." ⁸

The concept of this idea of the idea has the function to

⁸ *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, 38, Opera, II, p. 15, whether this kind of knowledge can be properly be called method is controversial. Joachim argued that Spinoza's reflective knowledge or method is not in a position to remodel or rearrange the true ideas on which it reflects. If it does so, it tampers with the knowledge and perverts it into errors. The idea of idea seems, then, to be one and the same as the idea upon which it reflects. Moreover, Joachim argues that the idea *ideae* is not even an integral act of thought, a genuine or true idea. "And far from its being true that we first have knowledge and then reflect upon it, it is only in and by reflection that we for the first time 'know' in any genuine sense at all." Harold H. Joachim, *Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione: A Commentary* (Oxford, 1958), p. 111. However, it seems to me that the reflective knowledge has a broader function than simply to know the true ideas. Its most crucial endeavor, as can be proven by the whole context of the *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*, is to recognize the types of pseudo-cognizance, the fictitious ideas, the errors and doubts as confused thinking. When reflecting upon true ideas, methodological knowledge and substantive knowledge are indeed the same. In this case, the mind reflects upon knowledge which it already possesses truly, and self-reflection or method has nothing to change and

explain how ideas are not only expressions of certain bodily affections or states but are able to disentangle themselves from material realities and become objects of their own reflections in an endless series: "He who knows, knows that he knows/" and so on. Through the endless series of self-knowledge thought is apparently constituted as self-conscious experience, and thus, indeed, elevated above all other attributes. The reason for this elevation is the following. Whereas, each modification of the attribute of extension does not signify more than it is, the nature of the idea as an idea of idea possesses an inherent qualitative infinity which cannot be found in any other attribute. The idea of idea, as self-reflection, is therefore not merely an equal correlate of a mode in other attributes; it occupies a special position of significance. For this reason it can be argued that the attribute of thought is not just one of the many attributes or one which can be substituted by other attributes. Thought, therefore, is always needed for constituting the being of substance itself and the infinite attributes which it comprises.⁹

On this second point then, on the spirituality of Hegel's "notion" or "idea," i.e., on his concept of the Absolute Spirit superseding Spinoza's substance, one may conclude that Hegel developed fully, in his own way, Spinoza's concept of self-reflecting knowledge.

There remains the difference in historicity or temporality, the third most common counter-argument. Spinoza conceives substance-it is argued-as existing before all determination, preceding all definite beings as immanent, in the sense of an a priori

can only derive joy from the accomplishment of the mind. Its central controlling and guiding function, however, starts when the mind employs fictitious ideas.

• This point was emphasized long ago by E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, II (Berlin, 1911), pp. 73-125, and recently by E. M. Carley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics, An Essay in Interpretation*, (Harvard, 1969). Carley states, "Here, I contend, we have a key to understanding those passages in which Spinoza speaks of things as following from God's nature. For things to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, for them to exist and be conceived through the one substance, is for them to be determined by and intelligible in terms of scientific laws.", p. 49. See also p. 59, where the writer argues that the relation of logical consequence, ". . . is clearly closer to what Spinoza has in mind than the relation of temporal succession."

condition of all beings. Substance or God seems to be identified with the absolute universality of order. The totality of conditions which are the essence of substance guarantees the reality of nature as an unchanged objective order and not as a mere facticity of temporary sense-data. Beings are defined in relation to the order of things which is the same as the logical order. Every particular object which orders another object to move has its cause in God, and insofar as the order of objects forms a causal series, causation is identical with logical entailment and deduction.

However, we always have to keep in mind that according to this analytical view the object of adequate cognition is not a particular as such, but rather, the order of particulars. In their lawful interconnection and mutual interdependence the particular beings constitute an order which is simultaneously both universal and individual: universal, since a cosmic law is realized in all its members, and individual, since this law is instantiated by it but yet remains in this encounter with each individual member, the all-encompassing and super-ordinating principle. The material of our empirical cognition remains unchanged. The individual things (*res particulares*) are in no ways transformed into universal entities in bad scholastic manner. However, the same particular things and occurrences are now intuited in a new form of interconnection, and what was previously a mere aggregate of unrelated particularities, associated only contingently by sense perceptions and imagination, becomes now a system within which each member follows from others on intelligible and necessary grounds. The whole reality becomes thus rationally structured, and knowledge, through its own creative activity, is able to reconstruct it through a series of premises and conclusions. The substantive-ness of the particulars, that is, their dependence upon the substance, is thus an everlasting quasi-mathematical dependent. In this sense, substance is the immanent cause of all particular things. Substance as such, therefore, cannot properly be conceived in Spinoza's system as an independent being outside individual objects and separated from them by its own essence

and existence. Nor, on the other hand, can it be conceived as merely the sum of particular things. The law of the interconnected order which rules all particulars is not the product or the result of their existence.

How different, actually, is this position of Spinoza's from Hegel's conception of the "notion" or Spirit as the unfolding God of history is a matter which cannot be decided easily, the pivotal issue being the interpretation of Hegel's "pantheism" or "panlogism" and their relation to time and historicity. It is clear, however, that Spinoza's concept of substance, or God, escapes the great difficulties of theodicy which trouble Hegel's historical God-Spirit conception. In Hegel, history as the reality of the Absolute Spirit must assume the reality of evil in God himself. God according to Hegel, endeavors to return to himself dialectically, via the negativity of the finite, as an infinite and intensive totality. Meanwhile, God is struggling with his own evil, thus being a tragic World-Spirit. His life and creativity is a majestic universal tragedy. In this sense, H. Glockner pointed out the "pan-tragism" of Hegel's system. Spinoza's conception of substance certainly avoided those tragic aspects.¹⁰

III

Although both thinkers ridiculed mystical short-cuts and any appeals to immediacy of intuition as poor substitutes for

¹⁰From a religious point of view, Emil L. Fackenheim stated Hegel's dilemma as follows: "Either God is ultimately other than man, as is the religious testimony of the believer who stands in relation with Him. But then religion is true in form as well as in content, and philosophic thought must recognize both as well as itself remain finite reflection. Or philosophic thought can become an absolute, all-encompassing self-activity. But then it discloses the illusoriness of the gap between the Divine and the human, and hence that-in the decisive respect-religion is false in content no less than in form." Fackenheim assumes rightly that in the second case historical events and beliefs, like the sin of man and the death of God, are merely aspects of a divine play and not serious realities. Thus, the pan-tragic aspect may be eliminated by God's and the philosopher's enjoyment of the play. History will then become, as for Spinoza, a theatre of spectacular events which one has to observe and take into account "without laughter and tears."

patient efforts of philosophical conceptualizing, both nevertheless, attempted to render a cognitive account of some basic mystical insights, particularly of the mysteries of identity-in-distinction and of the interpenetration of the divine and the human. The self-caused, infinite, and unconditionally independent being is in both systems not a totally transcendent being. It is rather experienced, as in mysticism, in a mutuality of interdependence; the infinite and the finite, the divine and the human need each other for their own fulfillment. By abolishing the traditional "static" logic of assertions and negations, within the dialectical synthesis, Hegel tried to overcome the shortcomings of Spinoza's "acosmism," as he termed pantheism, and his "abstractedness of understanding." Evidently there are some differences between the two systems of thought conceived in an interval of approximately 150 years of intellectual endeavors of greatest intensity.

Ultimately, however, both Spinoza and Hegel assert substance as God but deny his transcendent personality. For both, substance (or God) coincides with its own speculative activity which is also its content and form, inception and result. For both philosophers, God is the absolute necessity of identity of being and thought. For both, philosophical reflection is capable of attaining the highest kind of knowledge, which was traditionally called beatific vision of God with all its delectations. Both thinkers, then, were "God intoxicated" and "acosmic," as Hegel described Spinoza, and as Richard Kroner described Hegel: a "Christian mystic seeking adequate speculative expression,"¹¹ or even in a more extreme formula: "Hegel is undoubtedly the greatest irrationalist ever known in the history of philosophy."¹²

¹¹ R. Kroner, *The Philosophy of Hegel* (London, 1965), p. 103. Some recent studies might confirm this assertion, see F. C. Copleston, "Hegel and the Rationalisation of Mysticism" in *Talk of God*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. II (New York, 1969), pp. 118-132. Compare, however, the different evaluation of Karl Loewith, *Nature, History, and Existentialism*, edited with a critical introduction by Arnold Levison (Evanston, 1966), particularly pp. 165, 202-203.

¹² R. Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Vol. II, p. 271: "Hegel ist ohne Zweifel der grösste Irrationalist, den die Geschichte der Philosophie kennt."

The risk of pantheism to be accused either as "atheism" or as "acosmism," that is, as naturalism and radical rationalism, or as mysticism, seems to be inherent in any philosophical monism. The divergent elements of the monistic system burst apart. The tension between them remains even in what is seemingly a justified synthesis. There persists always the possibility of emphasizing one element of the synthesis over and above the other. It seems, then, that every identity-philosophy suffers from the difficulties which are manifested by the antinomies of Spinoza's conception of substance and of Hegel's conception of "notion" or Absolute Spirit. Are they to be interpreted in a pan-logical or pan-mystical, pan-realistic, or pan-idealistic manner? The similarity between the systems discussed in this article might be confirmed in no minor degree by the similarity of the problems their interpreter's pose.

The attempt of radical rationalism to grasp all realities deductively, as instances of the universal substance or of the Absolute Spirit, (if the pan-logical interpretation of Hegel is accepted), and the intellectual intuition of speculative mysticism are both most bizarre adventures in the impossible. Spinoza and Hegel, however, combined precisely radical rationalism and speculative mysticism in their persistent attempts to reconcile apparent irreconcilables in impressive systems of metaphysics. The enduring fascination of their systems is in the way they failed. Both thinkers attempted to define an intuitional claim that the world is capable of being known as a single, ordered and continuous totality, since its substance is rational, coherent and all-encompassing. Both systems insisted, each in its own manner, that every philosophical flight from the world is a mark of failure but neither could they stay with the world; they sought intensely to rise to eternity. Needless to say, their failure does not necessarily annihilate other possibilities of metaphysical transcendence.

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DEWEY ON SCIENCE AND RELIGION

((**IT** IS MORE OR less of a commonplace," wrote John Dewey, "to speak of the crisis which has been caused by the progress of the natural sciences. . . . The crisis is due . . . to the incompatibility between the conclusions of natural science . . . and the realm of higher values." ¹ Modern science has, in other words, helped to create "the standing problem of modern philosophy": the relation of science to supernatural religion. ²

In the following pages I will attempt to explain and to criticize John Dewey's resolution of the popular conflict between science and religion. This discussion will focus primarily on Dewey's philosophy of religion and will consist of four parts: a brief summary of Dewey's views on science and religion, a consideration of his contributions to the philosophy of religion, an analysis of four main assumptions latent in Dewey's humanistic naturalism, and an investigation of three critical questions which seem to be left unanswered by his resolution of the dichotomy existing between science and religion.

I

Dewey's views on science and religion may perhaps best be summarized in terms of three theses: (1) that the denial of supernatural religion and of the existence of a transcendent being (God) is necessary for the continuity of, and continuous progress within, the natural world; (2) that this denial is the valid result of an application of the scientific method to all realms of experience; and (3) that, once delivered from super-

¹ *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action* (New York, p. 40. Hereafter cited as: Dewey, *Quint.*

• *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 103. See also Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, pp. 173, Hereafter cited as: Dewey, *Reconstruction.*

natural religion, man can divest himself of his spectator attitude which encourages desertion from human responsibilities.

Since he maintains that the existence of a transcendent being (God) and of a supernatural realm of values neither has any factual basis nor is capable of unambiguous interpretation,³ Dewey concludes that man's supposed belief in God and in supernatural values should be reinterpreted according to a "purely naturalistic explanation" of human actions and events.⁴ Not only is there no factual basis, according to Dewey, for positing the supernatural realm, but the consequences of belief in anything transcendent are also detrimental to mankind. Such beliefs, he maintains, are grounded in fear and arise from the false supposition that "the heart of man is totally corrupt."⁵ Hence such beliefs "must weaken and sap the force of the possibilities" inherent in men themselves,⁶ since they force men into the roles of corrupt and passive pawns moved by an omniscient and omnipotent God.

After arguing that a denial of supernatural entities and values is essential to a high valuation of nature (thesis (1)), Dewey argues (thesis (2)) that this denial is the result of the valid application of the scientific method to all realms of experience.⁷ This scientific or experimental method is characterized by open or public inquiry and discovery, such that "validation [and] demonstration become experimental, a matter of consequences."⁸ In other words, the hallmark of this scientific approach is the examination both of the conditions for the occurrence of specific situations and of the consequences of possible courses of action. Moreover, since "modern science no longer tries to find some fixed form or essence behind each process of change," a proponent of (Dewey's) scientific method "tries to break down apparent fixities and to induce changes."⁹

³ Dewey, *A Common Faith* (London, 1934), pp. 2-8. Hereafter cited as: Dewey, *Faith*.

• *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5. See also p. 46.

• *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 31, 33-34, 38-39.

⁸ Dewey, *Reconstruction*, p. 174. See also Dewey, *Faith*, p. 39.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

He tries, that is, to destroy all "reliance upon precedent, upon institutions created in the past, ... upon unexamined customs, upon uncriticized tradition," so as to critically evaluate the consequences of past beliefs and therefore modify them in order to insure future consequences which are beneficial to mankind.¹⁰

The great result, according to Dewey, of man's acceptance of the scientific or experimental method, and hence of man's consequent deliverance from false beliefs as to the existence of a supernatural world and a transcendent God, is that man's inherent potentialities for growth will be realized. If man is delivered from the encumbrances of religion, then Dewey asserts that he will be able to assume the active "responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage" of humanistic values which comprise "the common faith of mankind."¹¹ In other words, man's true destiny will be realized only to the extent that he knows that the validity of his religious ideals is not bound up with assent to the proposition that these ideals are embodied in a supernatural framework.

II

Dewey's contributions to the philosophy of religion, as suggested by the brief summary above, are significant in that they antedated by at least fifteen years the same insights of the death-of-God and other contemporary theologians. Dewey's *A Common Faith* was published in 1934, whereas American theology did not become open to the historical and cultural reality of the death of God until after World War II. As prophet, Dewey can be said, I think, to have prefigured such tendencies as Bultmann's demythologizing of theology/² Van Buren's use of empirical premises in speaking of God/³ Bon-

¹⁰ Dewey, *Quest*, pp. 272-273.

¹¹ Dewey, *Faith*, p. 87.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 10, 31. See Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in Hans Werner Bartsch (ed.), *Kerygma and Myth* (New York, 1961), pp. 1-44.

¹³ Dewey, *Faith*, pp. 11-13. See Paul M. van Buren, *Theological Explorations* (New York, 1968), pp. 45-59, and *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel* (New York, 1963) pp. 88-89.

hoeffer's "religionless Christianity,"¹⁴ and Vahanian's view that belief in the existence of God is an admission of man's failure.¹⁵ In short, Dewey was the precursor of the death of God movement in modern history. The third chapter of *A Common Faith* reveals how acutely he sensed this shift in the "social center of gravity."¹⁶

Like those of the death-of-God theologians, Dewey's insights were the product (in part) of Hegelian dialectical logic. Dewey, as did they, realized that man had culturally come of age and that theism was outgrown or at least reduced to humanism or immanentism. Prefiguring the contemporary theologians Cox, Rahner, and Haring, respectively, Dewey emphasized such themes as the secularization of man/⁷ action as a result of personal choice rather than social organization/⁸ and the emptiness of individuality isolated from community.¹⁹

But besides being the exponent of the insights of a generation to come, Dewey's philosophy of religion has at least two additional merits. First, it has laid bare the substructure of fear and ignorance which is sometimes the basis of, or the reason for, man's recourse to the supernatural.²⁰ Secondly, in defining the unreligious as what is attributed to man in isolation from the physical world and his fellows/¹ Dewey has delivered

¹⁴ Dewey, *Faith*, pp. 3-28. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Act and Being*, tr. Bernard Noble (New York, 1961), pp. 109-110, and *Christ the Center*, tr. John Bowden (New York, 1960), pp. 65-66.

¹⁵ Dewey, *Faith*, pp. 5, 27, 46. See Gabriel Vahanian, *The Death of God* (New York, 1957), pp. 106-189, 213; *No Other God* (New York, 1966), p. 79; and *Wait Without Idols* (New York, 1964), pp. 229-247.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁷ Dewey, *Faith*, p. 65. Dewey, *Reconstruction*, p. 65. Dewey, *Quest*, p. 288. See Harvey Cox, *On Not Leaving it to the Snake* (New York, 1964), pp. 91-151 and *The Feast of Fools* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 82-97.

¹⁸ Dewey, *Faith*, p. 66. Dewey, *Reconstruction*, p. 113, and *Quest*, p. 308. See Karl Rahner, *The Christian Commitment*, tr. Cecily Hastings (New York, 1963), pp. 3-38 and *Grace in Freedom* (New York, 1969), pp. 48-49, 58-59.

¹⁹ Dewey, *Faith*, pp. 78. Dewey, *Reconstruction*, p. 199, and *Quest*, p. 306. See Bernard Haring, *This Time of Salvation*, tr. Arlene Swidler (New York, 1966), pp. 11-28, 123-132, 201-216, and *Morality is for Freedom* (New York, 1971), pp. 59-86.

²⁰ Dewey, *Faith*, pp. 24, 76.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25. Dewey, *Reconstruction*, p. 199.

religious experience from dualism. He united man with nature by means of free intelligence and thus joined the secular with the religious.

III

Dewey's religious insights into secularized man, however, were not an unmixed blessing. Although his arguments for the elimination of doctrine, practices, and institutions of religion are not inconsistent, they do include certain assumptions which should be recognized as such. In this section, four of these assumptions will be investigated.

Dewey rejects the existence of God and all beliefs, practices, and institutions of religion, first of all, on the basis of his assumption that (supernatural) religion breaks the continuity of nature. This supernaturalism supposedly posits a dualism between the profane and the religious, between the actual and the possible.²² Hence his dualism represents "an impotence in interaction ... limitation of power to regulate and thereby to understand " nature."²³

Although Dewey seems to be correct in rejecting, as have Rahner and Kling, all religion that is "unnatural " or that sets up a dichotomy in the hearts of men, he seems to assume too much in his criticism of the supernatural. Within his metaphysical framework it is certainly logical for Dewey to assume that introduction of transcendent entities or values into nature would break the continuity of the latter. Why, however, does Dewey assume that this continuity can only be based on homogeneity? With another metaphysical framework, continuity between the natural and the supernatural could be based, e. g., on God's causal relationship with man and nature, or on man's knowledge of God through analogy. It does not seem to be necessarily characteristic of religion that it breaks with nature; one of the truisms of at least one version of theism is that " grace builds on nature."

•• Dewey, *Faith*, p. 66. See also Dewey, *Quest*, pp. 270-271, 308, and *Reconstruction*, pp. 173-174.

•• Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, 1958), pp. 241-242.

Secondly, Dewey assumes that belief in God and the practices of religion involve a devaluation of the finite and the natural.²⁴ Now while it seems reasonable to assert that such devaluation of the finite is to be avoided, it does not seem that Dewey is justified in connecting this devaluation with religion. Logically, distinguishing between two things, i. e., between the natural and the supernatural, does not necessitate the devaluation of one of them. Factually, Dewey seems unfamiliar with the teachings of Christianity. Contrary to what he says, Christianity, although plagued by heresy, neither teaches that the heart of man is totally corrupt nor does it have a "pessimistic belief in the corruption and impotency of natural means."²⁵

Had the Incarnation never occurred, had Christ never consecrated the natural by becoming man, then perhaps Dewey would have a point. As it stands, his arguments seem to me to be directed toward a misrepresentation of Christianity. Perhaps this misrepresentation is due to Dewey's conception of God as some sort of Hegelian absolute beside whom man would be devalued. It can be conceded, however, that the plausibility of Dewey's claim, that religion devalues the natural, rests on the fact that certain religious minorities have devalued the human and finite. Admittedly such a partial devaluation has occurred, or else the humanistic and optimistic emphases of a writer like Chardin would never have received such long-awaited acclaim. But, on the other hand, this devaluation seems to be one limited interpretation of, or aberration from, the actual teachings of Christianity. These teachings have always focused on the primacy of the Gospel law of love of neighbor.

Thirdly, Dewey assumes that belief in supernatural religion destroys the continuity of the scientific method. Although within the Deweyan metaphysics, it is consistent to limit what is cognitively attainable to that which is given through scientific ("open and public") inquiry,²⁶ it is a moot point as to how broadly the scope of scientific methodology should be

•• Dewey, *Faith*, pp. 5, 27, 46.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46. See also, pp. 5, 67.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 89. Dewey, *Quest*, pp. 221-222.

interpreted. In other words, Dewey correlates acceptance of supernatural religion with a rejection of scientific method. Rather, it seems that one could, in another philosophical framework, either validly correlate acceptance of supernatural religion with acceptance of scientific method or deny the plausibility of the thesis that science is the measure of all that is.

Dewey's point seems plausible, however, because he views "mystical experience" as the methodological criterion which makes religion sacrosanct.²⁷ Were this the sole means of validating theism, many of us would probably join Dewey in rejecting religion. But religion seems not to be based only on a theological appeal to privileged knowledge; rather it seems also to be grounded on inferences made on the basis of sensible reality and causal relationships. Claiming no *a priori* intuitions, most religions would not seem to be averse to scientific method. The point at issue is not a simple Deweyan one of accepting or rejecting scientific method and then, respectively, rejecting or accepting religion. Rather, the issue is much more complex. It involves understanding the diversity of kinds of explanation and of relevant experiences, in order to evaluate the validity of causal inferences to the supernatural. Furthermore, even if the beliefs and practices of religion could not be accommodated to some broader interpretation of scientific method, this would not in itself show that religion is not a valid object of knowledge. To show this, Dewey would have to prove, and not merely assume, that the only type of knowledge is scientific knowledge.

In limiting the scope of scientific inquiry, Dewey has already predetermined the objects to whose existence he will assent. There seem to be inadequate grounds for his assuming that there is no "intimate personal experience wherein other [than this interpretation of scientific] methods and criteria hold sway,"²⁸ and that there is "no other recourse for knowledge."²⁹ Moreover, Dewey has accepted the findings of an absolute scientific methodology on the grounds that this method breaks

²⁷ Dewey, *Faith*, p. 85.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 84.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 88. Dewey, *Quest*, pp.

down the "older dualism." He has not, however, answered the prior question of whether this dualism is *in fact* capable of being validly "broken down." That is, he has assumed that all experience is homogeneous, and because it is homogeneous, open to, and only to, a particular scientific methodology. As was stated before, it is irrelevant whether one wishes to argue for or against the homogeneity of experience. **I**t should be made clear, nevertheless, that certain metaphysical assumptions seem to put conditions on the acceptability of Dewey's conclusions in the of philosophy of religion.

A fourth assumption of Dewey's is that belief in religion and in God encourage passivity and a lack of responsibility in man. He maintains that theists wait on their external power to "do their work" and do not use their own powers to advance the good in life.⁸⁰ Thus human effort is depreciated on behalf of the supernatural.⁸¹ While it seems plausible to agree with Dewey that faith should not be merely intellectual assent, but also practical working toward realization of the good, it does not seem plausible to maintain that belief in God and in the supernatural necessitates a purely intellectual faith.³² Again, what is at stake is a fact concerning the teachings and practices of religion, just as in considering religion's depreciation of the finite and natural we were concerned with a *fact* of Christianity. Simply put, I think that (with few exceptions) traditional Christianity has made religion a matter of both faith and works, or in Dewey's terms, both intellectual and practical. Therefore Dewey's assumption seems based on a factual misrepresentation. Moreover, for Dewey's critique of supernatural religion to be clear, it seems that he should specify of which religions he is speaking, since the extent to which faith is intellectual and/or practical depends on whether one is speaking of, for example, Lutheranism, Catholicism, or Buddhism. Admittedly, however, Dewey's censure of the passivity of the theists is partially justifiable. Cox, in *On Not Leaving it to the Snake*, makes the same point regarding the theists' adoption of

³⁰ Dewey, *Faith*, p. 46.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

the spectator attitude.⁸³ But again, the fact of the existence of passivity among theists seems to represent an aberration from, and not a characteristic teaching of, Christianity.

It seems that for Dewey's conclusion to hold, i.e., that religious experience should be divested of the supernatural, he has to prove that the beliefs, practices, and institutions of religion entail (1) a break in the continuity of nature, (2) a devaluation of the finite, (3) the use of an invalid method destructive of scientific inquiry, and (4) the encouragement of passivity and irresponsibility among men.

Although it has been argued that all four assumptions are consistent within the Deweyan schema, it has also been argued that: the first assumption seems to be based on too restricted a notion of continuity; the third assumption neither justifies the particular sense in which "scientific method" is used nor does it justify the application of this method to all types of knowledge; and the second and fourth assumptions are based on a misrepresentation of the actual facts of most types of Christianity and of religion in general. The conclusiveness of Dewey's arguments for the elimination of religion seems to depend upon whether or not the four adverse consequences, i. e., the "facts" represented by the four assumptions, are entailed by the theists' beliefs and practices. Because of Dewey's misrepresentation of the facts of Christianity and because of his own metaphysical assumptions, this entailment does not seem to hold.

IV

Having exposed what seem to be inadequately-justified assumptions in Dewey's philosophy of religion, I would now like to consider three questions which his version of humanistic naturalism seems to leave unanswered. First, there is the problem of the ambiguity of Dewey's definition of "religious." On his own admission "religious" does not denote any specifiable entity.³⁴ It is an attitude which can be taken toward

•• Cox, *On Not Leaving it to the Snake*, pp. viii-x, xiii-xviii, 44-46, 87. See also Cox, *The Feast of Fools*, pp.

" every object . . . and or ideal." ³⁵ Its single, but nebulous, criterion seems to be that it " introduces genuine perspective " into one's life.³⁶ It is not bound up "with any single item of intellectual assent, not even that of the existence of the God of theism." ³⁷ Dewey's vague notion of "religious" seems to lead to such unacceptable consequences as: (1) anything would seem to count as a religious experience, e. g., communism, fanaticism, hedonism, because of the vagueness of the criterion of "perspective"; (2) no one could be irreligious, because everyone seems to take something *seriously* in life; (8) aggrandizement of one's own ego could constitute religious experience, in spite of Dewey's emphasis on community and not on individuality.³⁸

Besides these difficulties involved with the ambiguity of "religious," there is a further problem: Dewey speaks of following the logic of disposal of outgrown traits of religion,³⁹ yet such a disposal presupposes a criterion for what is essential and unessential to religious experience. Dewey's "perspective" criterion would seem to render religious experience so lacking in content that it would be almost impossible to either distinguish religious experience from other experience or to distinguish what is essential from what is unessential within religious experience.

This problem of the ambiguity of " religious " leads one to ask a second question, and this is whether or not Dewey's main work in philosophy of religion, *A Common Faith*, is actually a presentation of a faith which is common. It seems that the ambiguous formulation suggested above might render the aim

•• Dewey, *Faith*, p. 9. Dewey maintains "that there is a difference between religion . . . and the religious; between anything that may be denoted by a noun substantive and the quality of experience that is designated by an adjective." (*Faith*, p. 3.) Denying that there is any coherent meaning in the term " religion," Dewey maintains that " religious " is a meaningful term and attempts to describe what it might denote. (*Faith*, pp.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 10.

•• *Ibid.*, p.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

of a common faith impossible of attainment. Dewey seems to leave the ideals pursued by religious activity without roots in existence, i. e., without God. He says that since ideal values exist in "character, personality, and action," they are not imaginary.⁴⁰ It seems, however, since there is not a sufficiently specific criterion for these values, and since they exist only insofar as they are exemplified in men, that these ideals will be diverse. Thus there will be no common faith at all. It is not clear precisely what Dewey means by saying that "there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals."⁴¹ Hence it is certain, neither *what* these forces are, nor *that* they exist.

A third question left unanswered within Dewey's philosophy of religion can be expressed thus: does Dewey's naturalistic humanism have sufficient power, without admission of a deity, to motivate man? Dewey asserts that the validity of ideals and their authority over us is an "undoubted fact" and that it is "unnecessary" for us to encumber ourselves with dogma, since "the reality of ideal ends as ideals is vouched for by their undeniable power in action."⁴² Now, neither is it evident that the validity of ideals and their authority over us is an "undoubted fact" nor is it evident that the *reality* of the ideals is vouched for by their power in action, since many men seem to act in a manner which does not bespeak high ideals. Furthermore, even if one assumes that these ideals do exist in action, it is not clear how one would *know* that they exist, since what is "vouched for" could be almost anything, so long as it introduces "perspective."

Despite his above-mentioned remarks to the contrary, Dewey himself seems to give implicit assent on two counts to the proposition that naturalistic humanism does not have sufficient power, without admission of a deity, to motivate man. (I) He admits that the existence of God adds "force," the power to reward and to punish, to ideals.⁴³ This admission seems to be

•• *Ibid.*, p. 48. See Dewey, *Reconstruction*, pp. 170-174 and *Quest*, pp.

"Dewey, *Faith*, p. 51.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 48-44.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 45.

that ideals plus theism have more motivating power than do ideals alone. (2) Dewey also admits that his "use of words ' God ' or ' divine ' to convey the union of actual with ideal may protect man from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defiance." ⁴⁴ Here again he seems to admit the motivating power of theism, although he says that finite goods constitute a sufficient motivation for man and that belief in religion and deity are unnecessary .⁴⁵

A related difficulty elicited by Dewey's treatment of religion is based on what seems to be his unsatisfactory method of formulating the arguments for and against supernatural religion. This unsatisfactory formulation is based on the either / or mentality implicit in two of Dewey's above-mentioned assumption, i.e., that (2) one either believes in God and devalues the natural or one does not believe in God and values the natural; (4) one either believes in God and in man's lack of responsibility for achieving the good or one does not believe in God but believes in man's responsibility for achieving the good. In arguing in these either /or terms, Dewey seems to have left himself open to the question of what a *priori* metaphysics he was employing.

It seems that Dewey consistently argues in terms of an inadequately-justified dualism. He says, for example, "One alternative is dependence upon the supernatural; the other, the use of natural agencies." ⁴⁶ There seems to be an inadequate basis for his neglecting to consider the possibility of man's both depending on God and on his own agencies. Perhaps the *a priori* grounds for this dualistic form of argument is Dewey's Hegelian background, especially since Dewey adopts Hegel's interpretation of the three stages of history. ⁴⁷ Other than an *a priori* metaphysics, there seems to be no basis for Dewey's assumptions regarding the incompatibility of supernatural religion with the responsibility of man, with scientific method, and with a high valuation of the natural.

Ibid., p. 58.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 71.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 81.

Ibid., pp. See Dewey, *Quest*, pp. 61-68.

V

This investigation of Dewey's views on science and religion included: first, a resume of the main arguments as to the grounds for, and the consequences of, the identification of religion with the supernatural. Next an account was given of the contributions of Dewey to contemporary philosophy of religion: (I) his acute insights which antedated those of the death-of-God theologians; (II) his laying bare the substructure of fear and ignorance that was sometimes the basis of religion; and (3) his providing a framework for the integration of man into nature, rather than posing a dualism between man and nature.

Thirdly, I tried to show that four consequences of the supposedly "unscientific" identification of the *religious* with the *supernatural* were really *assumed* results of this identification: (I) a break in the continuity of nature; (II) a devaluation of the natural; (3) the use of an invalid method destructive of scientific inquiry; and (4) the passivity of man.

Lastly, I considered what seem to be certain questions raised by Dewey's naturalistic humanism: (I) the ambiguity of "religious"; (II) the insufficient motivating power of naturalistic humanism, when divorced from theism; and (3) the *a priori* assumption of Hegelian methodology.

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THE SHAPE OF LONERGAN'S ARGUMENT IN
INSIGHT

LONERGAN'S *INSIGHT*, one can say without fear of contradiction, has puzzled many. The difficulty, however, is not simply one of coming to terms with the immense background, notably mathematics and physics, of the book. Nor is the problem limited to the intrinsic one posed by any major philosophical work. Even once beyond these hurdles, Lonergan's argument seems extremely difficult to pin down exactly.¹ This article, then, is an attempt to outline in simple language the essential shape of the logical procedure of *Insight*.

A number of reasons might be given for approaching such a complicated argument with simple terms and from a common-sense starting point. The first point is rather obvious, if honored sometimes more in the breach than the observance. There should be something like a principle of subsidiarity in philosophical writing; the vocabulary should be no more convoluted than the task demands.

Secondly, and perhaps more pertinently, the problem of communication between varied traditions comes today more and more to the fore. Anyone who has been present at a congress bringing together exponents of varied viewpoints will likely have had the painful experience of seeing a thinker, accustomed to dealing in fluent and incredibly nuanced terms with his students and colleagues, suddenly reduced to childish babble and inane remarks directed to superficial questions when confronted with a similarly sophisticated thinker from another

¹ Edward M. Mackinnon makes clear what a complex and protracted process the assimilation of *Insight* may be. "Understanding According to Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J.," *The Thomist*, 128 (1964), pp. 97, 478.

tradition. Short of agreeing on one philosophy to use as a lingua franca, which seems a rather hopeless project, what would seem most advantageous in promoting such dialogue is a somewhat disciplined but basically common sense vocabulary in which communication might at least begin. Each philosophical tradition, then, should be willing to attempt to express its basic approach in some more-or-less common sense terms. After all, no one is simply born a philosopher; he comes to inhabit that thought world only from a previous existence in a common-sense world; and there should be some intelligent way of retracing his steps. This is not to suggest that every philosophy, or even any one, can be reduced without remainder into a popular presentation. Presumably the technical jargon exists for more than gnostic mystification. Nor is it to suggest that real dialogue can ultimately evade the task of appropriating another's vocabulary and thought forms. But it is to affirm that dialogue has to start somewhere; and if vulgarization is painful for the specialist, it is perhaps less painful in the long run than the specter of profound thinkers glibly and endlessly talking past one another.

A third point is that such simplification may have a critical function. Lonergan speaks somewhere of Peter Lombard who, by simply juxtaposing two streams of thought in his *Sentences*, innocently laid bare the incoherence of previous theological thought. The present essay may have the effect of more-or-less innocently laying bare either the coherence or incoherence of Lonergan's thought. The *may*, of course, is stressed: this will be so only if the presentation manages to capture representatively, even if in a simplified way, the essential movement of the author's presentation.

These reasons for adopting a rather simple mode of exposition imply two qualifications. One is that the simplified explanation does not pretend to substitute adequately for the more rigorous and, in fact, incredibly nuanced train of thought in *Insight*. The second is that the attempt is no more than a hypothetical interpretation of what Lonergan is doing; it stands in need of verification by the reader or critic.

THE INVESTIGATION

An obvious premise of the search for the structure of Lonergan's argument is that *Insight* does present an argument of some kind. That seems clear enough from the long chains of syllogisms introduced, and from Lonergan's observation that in ". . . constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way . . ." ² For the literary genre of "philosophy-construction" is normally the presentation by the author of some process of reasoning which hopes to persuade the reader of the appropriateness of the philosopher's viewpoint. Almost as clearly, that argument must have something to do with the critical problem, because of the philosophers dealt with—Descartes, Kant, etc., the stress on knowing, and Lonergan's explicit mention of the problem. ³

From a common-sense point of view, the critical problem may be expressed in the interrelation of two basic areas or fields. On the one hand, there is knowing. The man of common sense knows, and further is aware of knowing. He is quite clear on the fact that he has thoughts; he knows how to distinguish between understanding and being puzzled. On the other hand, there is reality. Reality is extremely difficult to define, but it may be characterized as the independence of the real, the stubbornness of fact, the finality of what "is so." The child soon comes to understand that while he may imagine anything he pleases, there is also a world outside him that remains the same no matter how hard he tries to wish it away. Facts are similarly stubborn.

Let the first area of experience be called Knowing, and the second Reality. The critical problem may then be expressed as the linking of the two. The man of common sense simply assumes that Knowing reaches Reality, though he is also aware of having been wrong at times on particular points. It is the philosopher who raises the question, "How do you know that

* Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. xiii.

a *Insight*, p. 877.

Knowing attains Reality? Perhaps what seems real is just an illusion!" Having once raised the question, he is then faced with the difficulty of making a bridge, through some form of proof, from Knowing to Reality.

A second premise of this investigation is that Lonergan's argument must have a beginning and an end. As he mentions more than once, the first half of the book serves ultimately only to offer examples; the first judgment is made in chapter 11.⁴ On the other hand, Lonergan states in the Introduction that "by chapter 17 the reader will be able to hold in a single coherent view the totality of contradictory positions on knowledge, objectivity and reality."⁵ The obvious break between proportionate and transcendent being,⁶ the heavy reliance of the argumentation in chapter 19 on previous foundations, and the rather clear fact that chapter 18 is simply an extension of the analysis from knowing into doing/ would also tend to support the view that the argument is concluded in its essentials at least by chapter 17. As a first approximation, then, some kind of solution to the critical problem must lie somewhere between chapters 11 and 17.

BASIC DEFINITIONS

Chapter 11 begins immediately with the first judgment, already spoken of, and it has to do with a determination of "knowing."

I am a knower, if I am a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole, characterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and judging.

But I am such a unity-identity-whole.

Therefore I am a knower.⁸

At first sight this seems to be a simple matter of a definition, Let X be Y. Lonergan cautions that the judgment does not affirm ". . . that an individual performing the listed acts

• *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

• *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.

• *Ibid.*, p. 891.

• *Ibid.*, p. 601t.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 819.

really does know, but merely that I perform them and that by 'knowing' I mean no more than such performance." Further, the major premise, which Lonergan calls the link, ". . . offers no difficulty; the link itself is a statement of meaning "

Now a philosopher, as anyone else, is perfectly free to define terms any way he chooses. But there are two practical restraints on this theoretically unlimited freedom. The first is that the person must not delude himself into thinking that by that very process he is making significant additions to his knowledge. One might well define terms until blue in the face and be no wiser than at the outset. The second restraint applies not to coining a new word but to re-defining an old one. Words have already established meanings, and the author or speaker must take care that his audience understands his modified usage. A person who defines "pizza" as "beer" and "cabbage" as "lemonade" may expect to run into trouble in a restaurant. Especially, the author himself must be careful not to trade on the ambiguity, referring to the new meaning of a word and appealing in his argument to the traditional one.

Lonergan makes a parallel distinction between the analytic proposition and the analytic principle.⁹ The analytic proposition is very similar to the definition; one arrives at it by merely supposing. But such a proposition remains rather useless unless it becomes validated somehow, thereby becoming an analytic principle. The analytic principle is a proposition whose terms occur as defined in some judgment of fact.

Now a closer look at the judgment above will show it to be intended as a judgment of fact; "... the affirmation to be made is a judgment of fact; "¹⁰ consequently the definition is intended to be more than just a definition. By accepting the proposition the reader does more than say, Let's play the authors' game and accept for the moment his supposition; in making the judgment one commits oneself to a rather definite theory of knowledge. But that point can be returned to. What should be obvious in any case is that the argument rather

• *Ibid.*, pp. 804-806.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 819.

clearly begins in the realm of Knowing. This becomes even clearer in a statement later in the chapter:

A thing is a concrete unity-identity-whole grasped in data as individual. Describe it, and it is a thing-for-us. Explain it, and it is a thing-itself. Is it real? Is it objective? Is it anything more than the immanent determination of the cognitional act? These are well quite reasonable questions. But as yet we answer neither "Yes" or "No." For the moment, our answer is simply that objectivity is a highly complex issue and that we shall handle it satisfactorily only if we begin by determining what precisely cognitional process is.U

The next significant moment seems to be the definition of being, which takes place at the beginning of chapter 12. One might expect that, having dealt with Knowing, it is now the turn of Reality, but this expectation is not fulfilled. "Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know."¹² Rather obviously, Lonergan has chosen to define being in terms of Knowing; more specifically, in that unlimited, all-pervading eros of the mind which precedes every question and drives it on to knowing and still proceeds to question further.¹³ However, a philosopher may define as he wishes; and the present procedure seems plausible enough. Only, as a reminder of the rather special meaning it has, let those terms coming from the field of Knowing be given the subscript 1, and those from the field of Reality subscript 2. Thus, "being₁ is the objective of the pure desire to know."

The reader probably does expect that by Chapter 13, "The Notion of Objectivity," Lonergan is finally going to come to terms with the critical problem and build some bridge to Reality. Once again, however, the expectation is disappointed. The notion of objectivity is described by pointing to a series of judgments. There must first be some judgments that distinguish objects from each other: This is not that. There must also be a judgment that affirms the subject-for this, Lonergan

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 339-40.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 348.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 74, 348-50.

refers back to the self-affirmation of the knower in chapter 11. Finally, there must be a judgment distinguishing subject and object: This subject is not that object. In this series of judgments the notion of objectivity appears. This certainly bears some resemblance to the normal meanings of "objectivity" and "object"; but, because it appeals to judgment, what just as clearly is in question is objectivity¹.

Lonergan does have one statement dealing specifically with the critical problem in this chapter:

Sixthly, the principal notion of objectivity solves the problem of transcendence. How does the knower get beyond himself to a known? The question is, we suggest, misleading. It supposes the knower to know himself and asks how he can know anything else. Our answer involves two elements. On the one hand, we contend that, while the knower may experience himself or think about himself without judging, still he cannot know himself until he makes the correct affirmation, I am. Further, we contend that other judgments are equally possible and reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry and reflection there arises knowledge of other objects both as beings and as being other than the knower. Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between subject and object. Inasmuch as such judgments occur, there are in fact objectivity and transcendence; and whether or not such judgments are correct, is a distinct question to be resolved along the lines reached in the analysis of judgment.¹⁴

The gist of the argument here seems to be that Knowing and Reality must be put on the same footing; one spontaneously assumes Knowing, and then tries to reason to Reality. But in fact one does not spontaneously know Knowing; one has to come to it; and having done that, it is no more difficult to come to know Reality; because both take place by the same process of judgment. Since there is no great gap between Knowing and Reality, there is no need for a bridge. In other words, Lonergan solves the problem by denying it. Such a curt dismissal will leave unpersuaded many a reader, but this point also may be returned to later.

Ibid., p. 377.

Shortly into chapter 14, Lonergan gives what may be taken, leaving aside for a moment the context, as a definition of "real":¹⁵ "... the real is the concrete universe of being." Once again, since being was originally defined in terms of knowing, what is being dealt with here is real1. Similarly, one may notice that Lonergan seems to have simultaneously redefined "universe" as "universe1." By now a pattern should be emerging. Indeed, on a closer look, even the "known" becomes "known1," in a text at the end of chapter 15.

What is known inasmuch as one is understanding, presupposes and complements what is known by experiencing; and what is known inasmuch as one is affirming, presupposes and complements what is known by understanding. Finally, the contents of cognitional acts either refer to the known or are identical with the known, and so the dynamic structure of knowing is also the structure of proportionate being.¹⁶

Fact, too, becomes fact1 for Lonergan: "Fact, then, combines the concreteness of experience, the determinateness of accurate intelligence, and the absoluteness of rational judgment. It is the natural objective of human cognitional process."¹⁷ Finally, truth is defined, and if the liberty of entering the subscript may be taken, it is done as follows:

The definition of truth was introduced implicitly in our account of the notion of being1. For being1 was identified with what is to be known through intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation; but the only reasonable affirmation is the true affirmation; and so being1 is what is known truly. Inversely, then, knowing is true1 by its relation to being1, and truth1 is a relation of knowing to being1.¹⁸

This article does not pretend to include in its scope Lonergan's chapter 19 on the existence of God. But it may serve as

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 888.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 486.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 881.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 557. The point being made here is, I think, similar to that of W. Reiser in "A Note on Lonergan's Notion of Truth," *Modern Schoolman*, 46 (1969), pp. 141-47.

a summary of the above and at the same time an indication of what Lonergan is and is not doing in that chapter if selections of it too can be read with the subscripts.

If the real₁ is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real₁ is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists.

To begin from the minor premise, one argues that being₁ is completely intelligible, that the real₁ is being₁, and that therefore the real₁ is completely intelligible.

Now being₁ is completely intelligible. For being₁ is the objective of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know; this desire consists in intelligent inquiry and critical reflection. ¹⁹

Or again,

Granted that the real₁ is being₁, granted that being₁ is known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, then God is a reality₁ if he is a being₁ and he is a being₁ if intelligent grasp conceives him and reasonableness affirms what intelligence conceives.²⁰

The procedure is fairly clear: Being₁ is completely intelligible, because defined as the object of the pure desire to know; for the desire is intelligent, and therefore being₁ must be intelligible; and the desire is unrestricted, never resting until every intelligent question is answered, and therefore being₁ is completely intelligible. But the real₁ is being₁, because defined in those terms; therefore the real₁ must be completely intelligible.

So far, then, Lonergan has produced all his definitions by an appeal to Knowing. Still, there is in all this a nagging question: What about Reality? What about being₂? And objectivity₂? Do the definitions point to some real₂? Are they facts₂? Are they true₂? Lonergan seems at one point to sense this disquiet in the reader: ²¹

An account has been given of a principal notion of objectivity and of its three partial aspects, the experiential, the normative, and the absolute. However, there also exists subjectivity, and the reader may be inclined to find in the present section a full confirm-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 672-73.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 675.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

ation of a suspicion that he has for some time entertained, namely, that we have failed to place our finger on what is objective, that we are confusing with the objective either in part or in whole what really is subjective.

In any case, one feels that one has finally come to the answer in chapter 16, where Lonergan deals with the metaphysical elements. These too were defined, as may be expected, in terms of knowing; ²² the time has now come to deal with their status. "Cognitional or Ontological Elements?", the sub-title asks, and the second paragraph begins, "The question has to do with the relation between knowing and reality." We have come at last to the problem of Knowing and Reality.

But a close look at the argument will reveal that, once again, it is reality that is in question. The following argument makes sense, and only makes sense, in terms of the words as defined by the subscripts.

So, as far as their differences go, the differences of the metaphysical elements are differences in the process of knowing, and, unless further evidence is forthcoming, they are not differences in the being to be known. Still, one may expect the further evidence to be available, for the simplest reason why our knowing has its peculiar structure would be that proportionate being has a parallel structure.

A first point, then, is that intelligibility is not extrinsic but intrinsic to being₁. By intelligibility! is meant what is to be known by understanding. By the intrinsic intelligibility₁ of being₁ is meant that being₁ is precisely what is so known, or, in negative terms, that being₁ is neither beyond the intelligible₁ nor apart from it nor different from it.

Now if by being₁ one means the objective of the pure desire to know, the goal of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, the object of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, then one must affirm the intrinsic intelligibility₁ of being₁. For one defines being₁ by its intelligibility!; one claims that being₁ is precisely what is known by understanding correctly; one denies that being₁ is anything apart from the intelligible₁ or beyond it or different from it, for one's definition implies that being₁ is known completely when there are no further questions to be answered.²³

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 481-87.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

The procedure is somewhat similar to that in the argument for God's existence, and as there is rather clear. Lonergan argues that being₁ is intrinsically intelligible₁, which is not overly difficult since both "being" and "intelligibility" are defined in terms of knowing. But, the reader may expostulate, what about reality₂? No doubt being₁ is intrinsically intelligible; it should be, it is defined that way. But suppose that being₂ is different from being₁; then being₂ may not be intrinsically intelligible at all!

Lonergan seems to raise the same objection: ²⁴

However, a further difficulty can arise. After all, as intelligence, so intelligibility is intrinsic to human cognitional activity. Since by that activity being is to be known, it follows that intelligibility will be intrinsic to being as known. However, the knowing is extrinsic to the being, for the knowing is one thing and the being another. Therefore, what is intrinsic to being as known, may be extrinsic to being itself, to being as being.

The answer to this objection is as follows:

Now, if by being one means an "already out there now," it is quite possible to argue that knowing is extrinsic to being. Again, once one has posited an appropriate set of judgments, one again can claim that knowing is extrinsic to certain beings; for example, one will judge that there is a knowing, that there is a known, and that the knowing is not the known; clearly, when the knowing is not the known, it is extrinsic to the known. However, this distinction between knowing and known is within being, and it presupposes the intrinsic intelligibility of being; for without that intrinsic intelligibility, our intelligent activities would give us knowledge of the intelligible but not of being, and the distinction between knowing and known would be a distinction within the field of the intelligible but not a distinction of two beings.

This answer seems in part to be similar to those which preceded it. It begins by saying that if one changes the definition of being, one might, of course, argue that being as known is extrinsic to being as being. One might keep the definition and argue that knowing is extrinsic to certain beings: there is a knowing; there is a known; this knowing is extrinsic to this

•• *Ibid.*, p. 500.

known. But what one cannot do is keep the definition and affirm that knowing is extrinsic to all being₁. For to do that one must affirm the knowing; but affirmation is a component of the pure desire to know; so to affirm knowing is to make it an object of the pure desire to know; being₁, however, is defined as the unlimited object of the pure desire to know; therefore the knowing is within being₁.

Suddenly, however, the argument seems to pivot at "... for without that intrinsic intelligibility ..." and take a negative form. To interpret a very compact statement, the argument seems to say: Suppose that there is no being₁, but that there is rather a being₂ which is not the object of the pure desire to know and is not attained by it. Then one may understand as much as one pleases, but one will only grasp intelligibility; and one may judge as much as one pleases, but one will only succeed in distinguishing intelligibilities. One may still not affirm that knowing is extrinsic to being; for to do that one must affirm the knowing, affirm being, and affirm their distinction. But by the supposition one cannot affirm being₂. One may only distinguish the idea of knowing from the idea of being; thus the supposition not only does not bring the supposer any closer to his goal; it would also lock him into a pure world of ideas.

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Without pursuing that further, it may offer a hint for reflectively going back over the ground that has been covered. The process started with the question: How does Lonergan get from Knowing to Reality? The investigation showed that he neglected Reality to define everything in terms of Knowing: being₁, objectivity₁, reality₁, universe₁, known₁, fact₁, truth₁.²⁵ Further, when he faces most directly the question of Reality, he decides that being₂ is ruinous to human knowledge.

One might begin with the question: Is Reality, aspect of

•• Lonergan, of course, was not unaware of this shift. "The most shocking aspect of the book, *Insight*, is the primacy it accords knowledge." Bernard Lonergan, "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," in *Collection*, ed. by Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 15'il.

all the above terms, really all that necessary? If one can have being, objectivity, reality, a universe, fact, and truth by seeking them in knowing, why add the same realities from some other source? Will they not be superfluous? Lonergan manages to treat in *Insight* of physical science, mathematics, psychology, common sense, history, metaphysics, the history of philosophy, hermeneutics, ethics, and God, and there is no suggestion there is anything else to be excluded on principle. Would the intrusion of Reality even be useful? Perhaps it would only complicate things!

Such supposition is rather fanciful. But one comes to the bone in asking the next question: Is it even possible to have a being₂, objectivity₂, fact₂, truth₂? Two questions may be distinguished here. The first is: Could there be a being₂? The second is: Could it be known? To begin with the second, it is obvious that it could not be known if knowing is defined as Lonergan defines it, because the object of that knowing is by definition being₁. There would have to be another kind of knowing. Is there another kind of human knowing? Is human knowing different from what Lonergan presents it to be? Perhaps now the importance of the judgment of chapter 11 begins to emerge. What is at issue is simply a matter of fact. Is human knowing like this, or like that? This is what Lonergan means when he says that his philosophy is empirical;²⁶ it may be verified or falsified by being reduced to questions of cognitional fact. Conceivably Lonergan's account is inadequate or completely wrong. If so, what would seem to be required would be an alternative account to that of the first part of *Insight*, one which more adequately details the facts of human knowing. But such accounts cannot be produced at will and in an infinite variety. As Lonergan points out,²⁷ there are certain inevitabilities in the process. If someone were to write a better account, he would presumably point to areas of knowing that Lonergan overlooked; he would try to help the reader identify those activities within his own cognitional experience. Or he would present a better understanding,

•• *Insight*, p. xi.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 885 ff.

a clearer interpretation, of the same basic activities. Or he would do both, giving a more lucid account of a more nuanced experience. In any case, he would want to claim that his account was better, precisely because it gave a more coherent explanation of the pertinent data. And in so doing he would in his own cognitional activity be exhibiting the same pattern-experience, insight, and judgment-that he is trying to find a substitute for.

So far from being an infinite multiplicity, in fact, Lonergan seems to take it for granted that there is really only one other account of human knowing that has to be dealt with. Thus he sets up the basic antitheses of chapter 14,²⁸ distinguishes positions and counter-positions,²⁹ critically separates them in science and common sense,³⁰ continually appeals to them in the metaphysical discussions,³¹ outlines a dialectical history of philosophy³² and the possibility of a methodical hermeneutics,³³ and shows the relevance of the basic division to the question of God.³⁴ The alternate account of knowing is persuasive, because also founded on cognitional fact. It takes two forms: the first is that of empiricism or materialism. Being and reality are not the objective of the pure desire to know; they are what is felt, touched, smelled. The determinant of reality is the eye-the real is what can be seen. This is not to say that on Lonergan's position one does not see what is real. And it may well be that the reason I have for affirming something is precisely that I see it before me. "Seeing is believing." Still, it remains that the knowing takes place in the affirmation; the real is known in judgment. The eye sees what is real, but it does not know it to be real. To know it as real, the eye would have to have some notion of reality; and that the eye just does not have.

There is a second form of this account, however, and it involves a spiritual transposition of the first. Then there is a spiritual look that grasps being and reality. Just as one

•• *Ibid.*, p. 385.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 387-88.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 399 ff'.

⁸¹ E. g., *ibid.*, pp. 479 ff'.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 364-74.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 562 ff'.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 680-83.

sees as soon as one opens one's eyes, so the intelligence intuits immediately the existence of things, without the complicated process of experience, understanding, and judgment. Against this interpretation, Lonergan argues that while some people may intuit being, he has never had that experience; further, that it is unnecessary to postulate it to give a satisfactory account of reality; and, finally, that the facts of cognitional process it points to are accounted for in his own theory. For immediate realism is based on (partial) cognitional fact; there is such a thing as experience; but immediate realism errs by taking the part for the whole, making a criterion of reality of what is only a component of the process of knowing. The accounts given above, it should be noted, are presented in a pure form; what is more common, Lonergan says, is that there is some pre-critical mix of both kinds of realism; and a good part of the problem in arriving at a fully coherent philosophy is to arrive at this critical discrimination.

To summarize, to ask whether being² could be known is to raise the possibility of a different kind of knowing. While many might be conceived, Lonergan at least deals only with one main alternative, or set of alternatives; and he discredits it by saying that it is only a partial grasp of his own more adequate account.

There remains the question of whether there could be a being². Perhaps reality is very different from what we know. Perhaps our intellects are congenitally unable to encounter reality as it really is. A recent science fiction story pictured a man on a strange planet. All around him catastrophes were happening-his best friend was killed, his fiancée was carried off, strange animals were attacking him. At the end of the story it was explained to him that none of these things had really happened-it was only the master of the planet causing in his brain the corresponding sense experiences. Might not one think in a similar way that there may be a perverse creator of the universe who creates all the illusions of a reality, while reality itself is quite other?

Lonergan's answer, if I have it correctly, would be that this

is simply a possibility. There is no way, by definition, to prove that it is not so. By the same token, there is no way to prove it is so; it is a merely theoretical possibility that could never be verified. For if it were verified that being₂ existed, it would by definition already be being₁. So one has the alternatives of accepting knowing as it is found to be, or abstaining, because of a theoretical possibility, from knowing, to become a human vegetable. And even here there are inevitabilities involved; ³⁵ one cannot simply decide to stop knowing; one's intelligence has been active for years and there is little way, short of suicide, to stem further questions, further insights, further judgments.

Having dealt with the question of being₂, showing that by definition it could not be known, and that it is a possibility only in such a way as to leave human living quite untouched, perhaps it may be clearer now what Lonergan is doing in his discussion of the problem of transcendence.

Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between subject and object.

The original statement of the problem was: How does one get from Knowing to Reality? Lonergan suggests that the first question, if one accepts knowing as defined as chapter 11 and being as defined in chapter 12, is: How does one get to Knowing? For one may experience his knowing and be vaguely aware that he knows, but, to be consistent with the definition, he cannot know that he knows until he understands and affirms his knowing, in a process similar to the judgment of chapter 11. But once he has done that, he has also affirmed knowing to be within being. And then if the second question is put: How does one get from Knowing to Reality, the answer is: In exactly the same way. By understanding and affirming a reality, one knows it, and by that act also affirms it to be within being. The first judgment may be hedged about with more inevitabilities than the second, but the process is basically the same, for both knowing and reality are within being. In

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 829 ft.

other words, once one gets beyond the illusion that there is any reality beyond that accessible in some way to human knowing; the illusion that being is anything other than the object of the pure desire to know; the illusion that there are beings other than those to be understood and affirmed, then it is easy to answer how one gets to reality and being-by accurately understanding and reasonably affirming something.

AN INVERSE INSIGHT

The discussion began from a search for a bridge from Knowing to Reality; it has terminated in what Lonergan calls an inverse insight; ³⁶ one which grasps, not the direct answer to a question but that the question itself was somehow misformulated. To ask whether Knowing attains Reality is to ask for some kind of super-knowing which grasps at once Knowing, Reality, and the correct relationship between them. There is in human knowing no such thing. Even if there were, it would not help much, because there would be a further question: Does the super-knowing grasp correctly the reality? Which would demand a further knowing, etc. The alternative account of a direct intuition of reality may be simpler, but it may be noted that it too leaves the same basic problem. **If** there is a look which grasps being, one might still raise the question whether it really sees being. The only solution would be a super-look, etc.⁸⁷

One might recall here the statement that one cannot expect more in the conclusion than one has in the premises. Only here the premise is not to be conceived as a statement on a piece of paper, but as the very first premise—the human mind itself which makes the statements to be written down. And that premise is finite. **It** is too much to ask of such a premise that it create the absolute necessity proper only to Infinite Being.⁸⁸

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 19 ff.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 634-35.

⁸⁸ As Lonergan says elsewhere, "It follows that not only our knowledge of the concrete universe but even our knowledge of metaphysics is just factual." "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," p. 160. And again, "Husserl! pursued philo-

The most basic validation of knowing, therefore, is actually the process of knowing itself. Any rational process presumes this; it cannot therefore prove it or recreate it. There are certain inevitabilities, as has been seen, in the defining of knowing; these . . .

constitute the possibility of knowing, not by demonstrating that one can know, but pragmatically by engaging one in the process. Nor in the last resort can one reach a deeper foundation than that pragmatic engagement. Even to seek it involves a vicious circle; for if one seeks such a foundation, one employs one's cognitional process; and the foundation to be reached will be no more secure or solid than the inquiry utilized to reach it. As I might not be, as I might be other than I am, so my knowing might not be and it might be other than it is. The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it.³⁹

CONCLUSION

Attention has already been directed to an inverse insight that has occurred in the course of the article but as a concluding word that disappointed anticipation may be further unfolded. The study began with an anticipation that Lonergan was presenting an argument that would get him (and, presumably, the reader) from Knowing to Reality (section 1, "The Investigation"). At every key point, however, this expectation was shown in the second section, "Basic Definitions," to be systematically frustrated. Indeed, where Lonergan even entertains the possibility of an argument from Knowing to Reality (as something simply outside of knowing), he declares it to be fatal to human knowledge. A third section therefore follows up this hint to explore the direct implications of the search for a bridge from Knowing to Reality and concludes that such an investigation is self-contradictory; while a Reality beyond

sophy *als strrmge Wissenschaft*, as grounded in necessity and yielding absolute certitude. This ideal with its Greek and Cartesian antecedents is in need of distinction. All human judgments rest on [the] virtually unconditioned; they are true as a matter of fact; the pursuit of absolute necessity and absolute certitude is doomed to failure because it seeks more than there is to be had." "Notes on Existentialism " (unpublished, 1957), p. IS.

•• *Insight*, p. 882.

Knowing may be conceived, it cannot by definition be affirmed. To attempt to make such a theoretical possibility the basis of practical living is, first of all, practically impossible; and even if it could be done, the only result would be to paralyze human knowing. Finally, the reasons why this should be so were given, in Lonergan's categories, in a fourth section—"An Inverse Insight." For to seek a logical argument that Knowing attains Reality is to ask just those two things which the human mind cannot give—a "super-knowing" or a "super-look," and an access to absolute and unqualified certitude.

This thought of the limited human mind suggests a second disappointed anticipation. For at the beginning there was assumed not only a transition from Knowing to Reality but also that this process would be by logical argument. What became clear in the course of the article was that the presuppositions of the search had to be criticized; and, in the limit, the relevant first premise was found to be not some logical formulation but the human mind itself. What this disappointed expectation suggests is that the process to a metaphysics is not simply a matter of logical argumentation but a personal discovery; not some abstract, third-person procedure to be caught within the covers of a book but an interpersonal guidance of the philosopher-to-be by the philosopher-already-becoming. Somewhat like the development of the article itself, which moves through an inverse insight, the procedure into a metaphysics is a process of self-development and self-criticism, as one begins to understand what is wrong with one's initial questions, comes to know oneself as a knower, grasps the inevitabilities present in that judgment, unfolds the implicit metaphysics contained therein.⁴⁰ This is the process Lonergan terms self-appropriation.⁴¹ *Insight*, therefore, is not in the end a theoretical work but a personal invitation to the reader to appropriate his own cognitional structures, to enter upon this process of self-development.⁴²

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•• *Ibid.*, p. 892.

" *Ibid.*, pp. xviii ff.

•• *Ibid.*, p. :xix.

BOOK REVIEWS

Hugh of Saint-Cher's Theology of the Hypostatic Union: The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century. Vol. III.
By WALTER PRINCIPE. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. 1970. Pp. 265.

This work is the third in a series by Fr. Principe dealing with the theology of the Hypostatic Union in the early thirteenth century. Previous studies examined the doctrine of William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales. An analysis of the theology of Philip the Chancellor is in preparation.

His work on Hugh, however, is perhaps the most important of the three thus far published. It is not that it evinces greater scholarship than the others but rather because of the place Hugh of Saint-Cher himself occupies in the history of theology. It was he who initiated the theological literary form of the *Scriptum super Sententiis*, a commentary on the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard. The *Glossae* of his predecessors were limited in their scope, adhering closely for the most part to the text of the Lombard and explaining its difficulties. The purpose of Hugh in the *Scriptum* went far beyond this. Within the framework of the *Sentences* he introduced the questions of his day and the solutions proposed by his contemporaries. He was the master of the *status quaestionis* and with clarity and order presented a comprehensive view of the state of theology in the early thirteenth century. Because of his frequent use of the works of his predecessors and contemporaries, his *Scriptum* was undoubtedly a useful tool for theological students and for other masters in theology. In fact, the *Scriptum* must be considered one of the most popular theological works of the time.

It would be a mistake, however, to consider Hugh merely a compiler of opinions. He took a personal stand concerning the questions under discussion, and at times added significant and original insights of his own, insights which in some instances have become part of the heritage of later Catholic theology. As Fr. Principe notes, he was among the first, if not the first, to teach the simplicity of the human soul and to mention, while vehemently rejecting it, the thesis of the hylomorphic composition of the human soul from form and spiritual matter. In sacramental theology he was the first theologian to discern a matter and form in all the sacraments and to understand these principles in the Aristotelian sense of determinable and determining elements. He appears to have introduced the application of the concept of *res et sacramentum* into the theology of sacramental character. He was also the first theologian to achieve a complete assimilation of the Sacrament of Penance into the theology of the other sacraments of the New Law. Many of these original positions were the foundations for

further development and clarification by later theologians of the century, especially St. Thomas. Hugh then is to be numbered in a special way among those theologians who in the development of Scholastic theology were the major intellectual links between the *Sentences* of the Lombard and the *Summa* of Aquinas.

Fr. Principe's specific concern, however, is Hugh's doctrine on the Hypostatic Union. The *Scriptum*, of course, is the main source of his investigation of Hugh's doctrine. Written between 1230 and 1232 it represents the clearest and most comprehensive study of this mystery in the thirteenth century before the so-called *Summa Fratris Alexandri*. The author, however, does not limit himself to Book III of the *Scriptum*, wherein Hugh formally considers the Hypostatic Union. He gleans from the whole *Scriptum* the doctrine and thought of Hugh on whatever pertains to the question at hand. Furthermore, he also includes in his analysis Hugh's scriptural commentaries, as well as one of his theological questions. As the author points out, however, caution must be used in regard to the latter work, since there is some question as to its authenticity. The scope of this approach to the sources gives Fr. Principe's work a unique value for scholars, since no previous study on Hugh gives so comprehensive an analysis.

There is a further feature of Fr. Principe's study which is of immense value to the student of medieval theology. As an introduction to the study proper, he gives a survey of the various meanings of the philosophical terms employed by Hugh in his discussion of the Hypostatic Union, such as *ens*, *esse*, *existere*, *essentia*, nature, substance, hypostasis, the individual, and person. He also explains Hugh's understanding of the various kinds of composition in created being. In this way the reader, even one highly competent in Scholastic philosophy, is safeguarded from misunderstanding the thought of Hugh and reading into him the later refinements of the terminology of Aquinas and the other Scholastics. Hugh's understanding of *esse* should amply illustrate this. In some of his texts *esse* seems to be the equivalent of *ens* and to signify the being of a thing without any connotation other than that added to it by the qualifying word or idea linked with it, for example, *esse gratiae*, *esse proprietatis*, etc. In many other texts the term *esse* may include, together with the general notion of being, the idea of the fact of existence. But this added meaning is by no means always evident. In still other places the expression *esse actu* appears to mean the real physical act of existence. This understanding of *esse* is indeed far from that of Aquinas!

Peter Lombard in his *Sentences* presented three opinions concerning the Hypostatic Union. According to Hugh, the Lombard in citing these opinions was merely presenting them as solutions of other theologians for two problems that Peter himself leaves unsolved, namely, whether God's becoming or being man meant that God became or was something (*aliquid*) and whether it is true to say that man became God as to say that God became

man. It is in the framework of the Lombard's three opinions that Hugh proceeds to answer these two problems.

He begins by describing each. He designates the first as the *Homo assumptus-Theory*, the second as the Subsistence-Theory, and the third as the Habitus-Theory. Commenting on each in a general way, he states that the first no longer has any convinced supporters but is maintained in the schools only for the sake of debate (*non sustinetur in scholis nisi per petitionem*). The third is recognized by all as heretical. The second opinion, on the other hand, is accepted by all as true. Thus by the year

at least, the Subsistence Theory had gained the universal approval of the schools. This is an important fact for the historian of theology.

The analysis of the Subsistence Theory thus becomes the basis of Hugh's doctrine on the Hypostatic Union, as well as the key to answering the questions implicitly posed by the Lombard. Accordingly, he treats of the following questions, as well as the implications flowing from them: the mode of union, the divine participant of the union, the nature assumed in the union, and the communication of properties or idioms in the union. Fr. Principe deals with these questions and their implications in chapter III through VI. Space does not permit a detailed exposition of Hugh's doctrine on these points, nor of Fr. Principe's commentary. There are two points in chapter III, however, which deserve examination, at least in broad outline, because of the special interest of contemporary Christology on these very same topics. The first concerns Hugh's understanding of the meaning and constituent of person; the second deals with the problem of unity or plurality in Christ.

Although Hugh owes something to William of Auxerre for his doctrine on person, his teaching on this point does represent an original contribution to the theology of the period, inasmuch as he makes explicit and formal in his doctrine what was implicit in the doctrine of his predecessors.

As Fr. Principe notes, in three different places in the *Scriptum* Hugh explicitly states the requirements for the constitution of person: the distinctions of "singularity," natural incommunicability," and "excellence of dignity." Employing these distinctions, then, Hugh can say that the substantial form, humanity, is the source of human personality, provided that the form is singular and that it is the noblest form in man. It is by the mere possession of a singular humanity as his own that each man is a person. There is no need for a new being or a positive entity to be added to the singular humanity to constitute a person. Only one requirement is necessary: this singular humanity is independent of any higher form. The perfection of personality, therefore, consists in privation; "... *patet quod privatio perfectio est personae.*"

The application of this doctrine to the Hypostatic Union should be clear. There is no human person in Christ, therefore, but only that of the Word of God, because Christ as man, or in his singularity, lacks the distinction

of dignity and is joined to one more excellent, that is, to the person of the Word of God. One further note might help to clarify the above. Hugh seems to conceive the personal property of a divine person in terms of a form. **It** is this higher form of the Word which takes the substantial form of humanity to itself and makes it its own.

There are many difficulties in this position, but one must not let these difficulties obscure the profundity of Hugh's thought. This is a graphic example of *fides quaerens intellectum*. **It** must be realized that Hugh is a pioneer in the development of Scholastic theology. One of his tasks is to forge, create, and, at times, clarify a new philosophical vocabulary. This alone should explain and excuse any obscurities in his doctrine. But above all, Hugh is not interested in the meaning and the constituent of person as such. **It** is the truth of faith that engages his entire attention; Jesus Christ is true man, and yet he is not a human person. **It** is to defend this truth and to bring Christians to a richer appreciation of this mystery of faith that urges Hugh to investigate the secrets of being and personality.

Although Hugh depends again on William of Auxerre for his statement of the problem on the unity of Christ, as well as for some of the solutions, he shows considerable independence and personal originality in this question. For he is the first theologian, with the exception of Alexander of Hales, and apparently independent of him, to affirm the unity of Christ in terms of being (expressed as *esse* or *essentia*). Here Fr. Principe's discussion of Hugh's philosophical terminology has special value. *Essentia* has diverse meanings in the context of the Hypostatic Union. Thus he can speak of two essences in Christ, human and divine. But in other places, and specifically in this question, it has the meaning of physical, concrete being, the level of factual (if not metaphysical) existence. *Esse* has the same meaning in this context. Thus Hugh refuses to grant that Christ's created *esse* is other than his uncreated *esse*. Christ does not have two beings or two existences. Although a creaturely being and a divine being may be mentally distinguished in Christ, nevertheless, in actual existence they are not distinct from one another. Christ *is* only one. Hugh's teaching on the unity of Christ is a definite foreshadowing of some of the later masters of the thirteenth century, especially Aquinas.

Part II of Fr. Principe's study will be of most special interest to the professional scholars of medieval theology. He has prepared a new edition of Book III, distinctions B, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 1B, 21, and BB, of the *Scriptum*. This edition is constructed from the critical study of all the available manuscripts. This is another unique contribution by Fr. Principe, since prior studies on Hugh's doctrine on the Hypostatic Union have not been based on such a comprehensive and all-inclusive examination of the sources. Dr. Brenning, for example, in his work on Hugh (*Die hypostatische Union in der Theologie Wilhelms von Auxerre, Hugos von St. Cher und Rolands von*

Cremona: Trier, constructs his edition on too limited a basis as far as the manuscripts are concerned. For the most part his text is based upon the Vatican manuscript text. In doubtful places he consulted three other manuscripts, namely, MS. Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale 130 and 131, as well as MS. Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, *Conv. Soppr.* I. VI, 32. According to Fr. Principe, the Vatican and the Assisi texts belong to a family of manuscripts which represent the weakest text-tradition. In the author's study of Hugh, therefore, we have, if not a critical edition, a carefully constructed text representative of what is best in all the extant manuscripts of Hugh's *Scriptum*.

The renewal of theology consequent upon the teachings and inspiration of Vatican II has necessitated careful and scientific historical study of the past. This is not a surprising phenomenon. For, although theology must always concern itself with the task of discovering new insights in God's revelation, its progress must always rest on the solid foundation of authentic tradition. If this is not the case, then theology distorts and obscures God's revelation.

Fr. Principe's study on the work of the first Dominican Cardinal is not history for history's sake. It is history put to the service of theology and the faith. For many of the teachings of Hugh on the Hypostatic Union are reflective of the Church's understanding in faith of the person and mystery of Christ. And similarly, some of the problems concerning the mystery of Christ which Hugh so acutely analysed—for example, the unity of *esse* in Christ—are again problems, but in a different context, for contemporary theologians. Undoubtedly the argumentation of Hugh in this matter is one which no contemporary could accept, but is not his conclusion, long in theological tradition, one which should command their attention?

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Merton's Theology of Prayer. By JOHN J. HIGGINS, S. J. Spencer, Mass.:
Cistercian Publications, 1971. Pp. 183. \$5.59.

We do not know how long a man will live until he dies; with a writer on the spiritual life the durability of his influence is discovered only after his death. Every indication is that Thomas Merton is here to stay. Since his tragic death on December 10, 1968, the impact of Merton on American thought has increased rather than slackened. Several of his works have been published posthumously and the avalanche of books on Merton himself and his ideas is just beginning.

Fr. Higgins has made a major contribution to Mertonology with his study of *Merton's Theology of Prayer*. The basic premise of his thesis is taken from a statement of Father Merton himself: "Whatever I may have written, I think it all can be reduced in the end to this one root truth: that God calls human persons to union with Himself and with one another in Christ." Four engaging chapters substantiate and document this assertion of Merton's. Two final chapters offer an evaluation. The point that Higgins wishes to make is that Merton is completely consistent in his theology of prayer. Although the author does not delay on the issue, one might add that Merton is also perfectly orthodox. Indeed, the very strength of Merton's contributions to spirituality is founded in his own deep and solid roots in the tradition of the Church. As Higgins notes, Merton's interest in Zen Buddhism was not a drifting away from orthodoxy but rather a search for truths in other religious forms as well as efforts to integrate what was assimilable into Christian practice.

A subtitle to this book might have been "The Necessity of Prayer." As Fr. Higgins unfolds the main lines of Merton's thoughts on union with God and union with neighbor in Christ, the importance of personal prayer becomes increasingly evident. Current popular but superficial theories on prayer and spirituality are deftly dismantled as the author cites text after text from Merton's writings to support and promote the role of prayer as the all-embracing means to holiness. Yet the book avoids polemics, concentrating on a positive exposition of Merton's theology.

Since Father Merton's passing, wild rumors about the cause of his death and stories that the famous monk was abandoning his Trappist ideal for some form of Buddhism have been circulating. Such speculations will no doubt continue for a while as the sensationalists milk the memory of a great man for all the cheap publicity they can derive from it. This book should help put to rest these foolish and groundless reports. That in itself would make the book worthwhile. However, Fr. Higgins has written a volume which not only clearly delineates Merton's theology of prayer; it also has the intrinsic value of being a tremendous study of the spiritual life. The author displays a solid grasp of the issues himself and one can hopefully anticipate his own contributions in this field. The book closes with an exhaustive bibliography of the works of Thomas Merton.

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Paths in Spirituality. By JOHN MACQUARRIE. New York: Harper & Row, Pp. 184. \$4.95.

A reader is rightly apprehensive about any volume in which seven of the twelve Chapters are based on materials published previously in disparate journals of spirituality. Given the theological profundity and deep personal holiness of the author of this book, such apprehension is quickly dispelled. The themes of this book—worship, prayer, and spirituality—are woven into an integral unity which should prove both insightful and inspiring to the serious Christian. Macquarrie clearly establishes how the proper use of divinely established or inspired means of growing to maturity in Jesus & Christ are perennially valuable despite the "slings and arrows" of the modern iconoclastic gnostics who would uproot these gifts of God from our Christian heritage.

As the author states in Chapter I, *homo sapiens* is also *homo religiosus*. True religion and sound devotion springing from it are always humanizing, though sinful man can always pervert them into an escape from reality. Given the humanizing character of true religion, true Christian spirituality can never be self-centered but self-giving.

In the first half of this book, through Chapter VI, Macquarrie sets forth in detail the relation of worship, prayer, and spirituality. The central theme of this portion of the book is that worship is "the indispensable strand in the Christian religion, bringing together faith and action." (p. Chapter III is a profound elaboration of the simple catechism response that prayer is "the lifting up our hearts and minds to God." Chapter IV dispels the stigma attached to the term "spirituality" by a scriptural analysis of "spirit": "a kind of being that is somehow shared by man with the Spirit in God. Spirit is present in and constitutive of man as well as God." (pp.

It is the capacity for openness and self-transcendence. Indeed, Macquarrie teaches us the true meaning of being a "man for others." The fullness of the human person as well as the Christian Community is realized through the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit who endows both "with the capacity to go out from itself." (p. One hears the echo of St. Thomas in the author's insistence in Chapter V that the transcendent God lies beyond objectivity and subjectivity, though theological thinking, absorbing the cultural milieu, tends to swing between the pendulum of objectivism and subjectivism, the latter being in vogue today among "popular" theologies. Macquarrie describes how the liturgy might well preserve the balance between these two polarities. *Lex orandi is lex credendi*. Macquarrie is not unaware, however, that liturgical reformers are under the same cultural pressures as the theologians. The final Chapter (VII) in this half of the book describes the consequences of separating the pursuit of the acquired human wisdom of theology from a profound personal spirituality—prayer, worship, discipline; one without the other

can only result in a deadly schizophrenia. With this premise Macquarrie proceeds to the second half of the book which is avowedly and necessarily autobiographical.

Continuing the theme of worship as unifying faith and action Macquarrie sees clearly the problem confronting liturgists, bringing together the transcendence and immanence of God in ritual. He is especially conscious of the pitfalls confronting the liturgists who attempt renewal without a true historical perspective. The great sadness of this volume is that in Chapter VIII, while confessing the unique presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist, Macquarrie's own theological ambiguities about the true doctrine of transubstantiation leave him naked about the central mystery of worship, the Mass. Given his doctrinal uncertainty, one can readily understand the distortion of a volume which, while emphasizing the centrality of worship, devotes one entire Chapter to Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament (IX), but none to the Mass!

The final Chapters, X, XI, treat of the Office and Stations of the Cross.

All Christians are grateful to Macquarrie for sharing his faith and worship with others. As a Roman Catholic who has the profoundest respect for him, I shall earnestly pray that his evident openness to the Holy Spirit will guide him to a deeper understanding of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

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Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. by R. A. MARKUS. New York: Anchor Books. Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972. Pp. 439. \$2.50.

As the title suggests, this is a collection of critical essays on the thought of Augustine. Save for two exceptions, these essays are collected from articles appearing in publications on both sides of the Atlantic as far back as 1950. These authors of the English-speaking world, with some exceptions, consider insufficiently the continental Augustinian scholarship, whether French or German. Nor is there consideration given to the *Quellenforschung* into Augustine's thought, certainly a vast part of Augustinian research today.

Many of the articles, e. g., the three contributions of Gareth B. Matthews, the essay on foreknowledge and free will by William Rowe, and the essay on empiricism and time by Hugh M. Lacey, are written by linguistic analysts. Augustine's intricate and flowing terminology contrast rather sharply with the precise propositional forms of these men. Further, the spirit of

Augustine's works, open to the metaphysical, the mystical, and the theological as they are, largely eludes the grammatical analysts. Surprisingly, these linguistic analysts do not find it necessary to comment critically on Augustine's Latin. Though there is a certain contribution that these men have to offer philosophical and historical research, this reviewer cannot help but think that in these articles we learn more about the thought of the authors than about the thought of Augustine.

Needless to say, as in any collection of essays from various authors, the quality varies from piece to piece. There are, however, some excellent articles by some of the best Augustinian scholars in England and America. The reprinting of Armstrong's St. Augustine Lecture of 1966 from the Villanova Series, comparing Augustine with Christian and non-Christian Platonists previous to him on the questions of the divinity of the soul, attitudes toward the material universe, and the universal will to save all mankind, represents, by and large, the high quality of work that we have come to expect from him. Likewise, I found the article "The Theory of Signs in *De Doctrina Christiana*" by B. Darrell Jackson, reprinted from the *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes*, to be good. Neither time nor space allows me to comment in detail on many of the articles which are worthy of critical comment in the sufficient depth that they deserve. However, the article of F. Edward Cranz, "The Development of Augustine's Ideas on Society before the Donatist Controversy," deserves special attention since it has raised issues which are still current in Augustinian research, although it was published some eighteen years ago. I will therefore spend the remainder of this review commenting on some issues raised by his article.

The purpose of Cranz's contribution is to follow the evolution of Augustine's social thought from 386-400 A. D. His work is divided into four sections: 1) The early ideas as stated in Greco-Roman philosophical terms; the early ideas as stated in biblical and ecclesiastical language; 3) the development of Augustine's ideas from 393 A. D. to the *Ad Simplicianum* of 396 A. D.; 4) the elaboration from 396 A. D. to 400 A. D.¹ In studying the development of Augustine's thought, Cranz follows the axiom that at any given period Augustine's thought must be studied as a coherent whole, not allowing evidently for development within each period.² Such a principle would be denied by some modern critics who believe that Augustine's evolution, especially during his early years, must have been rapid indeed.³

¹ P. 886.

•p, 887.

³ For example, O. du Roy, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinite selon saint Augustin* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966) *passim* presumes that there is a constant evolution in Augustine's thought concerning the Trinity from 886 A. D. to 391 A. D. R. J. O'Connell, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1969) *passim* would probably agree with him.

In his first two sections Cranz emphasizes what I believe to be an important point, that in his early period Augustine parallels the process of salvation in the individual man (in terms of the stages of the Neo-platonic ascent of the soul) with the salvation of the human race (in terms of the various stages of man).⁴ Both man and mankind ascend to the fatherland in various stages. However, this identification goes beyond what Cranz himself imagines. In this regard the experiences which govern Augustine's early conception of salvation are his attempts at a mystical ascent of mind, inspired partially by Plotinus's *Ennead on Beauty* and recorded in *Confessions* VII, 10, 16; 17, B3; B0, B6. It is undeniable, it seems to me, that these accounts report historical experiences, attempts by Augustine to sustain a prolonged vision of God.⁵ The fact that he failed to do this only inspired in him a loving memory of his instantaneous vision and a desire to do it again, but this time to sustain the vision.⁶ Cranz disagrees with this opinion, thinking that such attempts left Augustine disillusioned and discouraged.⁷ Cranz cites only the vaguest textual evidence for this opinion.⁸ Cranz also makes a distinction in kind between the experiences at Milan and the experiences at In this he is in disagreement with the latest textual study of Mandouze wherein he has shown, definitively I think, that these experiences were parallel.¹⁰ The over-riding belief of Augustine at this time is that man is able to reach a terminal vision of God in this life.^U

• The Neo-platonic ascent of the soul is found in many places in the early works, for example, *Soliloquia* I, 13, 23; *De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* VII, 11; *De quantitate animae* XXXIII, 70-76, *De musica* VI, *passim*; *De libero Arbitrio* II, *passim*. Augustine's views on the ages of man can be found in the *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, 23, 35-41 *Sermo* 259, for example.

⁵ Some, however, have denied the historicity of these accounts: For example, H. I. Marron, "A Review of P. Courcelle's *Recherches sur les Confessions*," *Revue des Etudes latines*, XXIX, 1951, pp. 403-4; J. J. O'Meara, *The Young Augustine* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1954), p. 140. The historicity of events have been upheld by P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions* (Paris: De Boccard, 1950), pp. 157 ff. and *Les Confessions dans la tradition litteraires: Antecedents et posterite* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1963), pp. 43 ff.; du Roy, *L'intelligence*, pp. 72, 85, 88, 92, n. 4; A. Solignac, *Les Confessions, Bibliotheque Augustinienne*, vol. 13, p. 699.

⁶ *Confessions* VII, 17, 23 B. A. IS, 630: "... non mecum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem, quae comedere nondum possem."

⁷ P. 361. In this he agrees with P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions*, p. 165.

⁸ Cf. p. 396, n. 114.

• P. 361.

¹⁰ A. Mandouze, *Saint Augustin: L'aventure de la raison et de la grace* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967), pp. 686-714.

¹¹ That Augustine believed at this time that man could reach the terminal vision of God in this life is shown in *De ordine* II, 19, 51; *Soliloquia* I, 13, 23; *Retractiones* I, 2.

Again and again, Augustine identifies the Neo-platonic return to the fatherland or the ascent of the soul with Christian salvation.¹² In his earliest works he three times identifies the intelligible world with the kingdom of Christ.¹³ However, Cranz tends to overemphasize the unity that the early Augustine sees between Platonism and Christianity.¹⁴ Augustine's adherence to Plotinus even at Cassiciacum is provisional.¹⁵ At Cassiciacum there is evidence in the *De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* that Augustine believed in the resurrection.¹⁶ Nevertheless, Augustine tends to amalgamate the Neo-platonic ascent of the soul and the Christian notion of salvation, even to giving an intellectualist bent to the ascent toward mystical vision.

The importance of the identification can be seen in Cranz's observation that it is only as Augustine begins to realize that this ascent to God is the product of grace and that man cannot reach the vision of God except as a special gift of God that he begins to change his social ideas. Although there have been some attempts to date precisely this turn of events,¹⁸ there has been no definitive success yet. By the year 400 A. D., Augustine must have given up this notion. As this idea recedes into the background the emphasis on Neo-platonic philosophy diminishes, although Augustine's thought will always remain ascensional in a certain sense.

Cranz traces the origin of the motif of the two cities, which culminates in the *De civitate Dei*, to the *De libero arbitrio*.¹⁹ There Augustine refers to two classes of men, one which loves things temporal, the other which loves matters eternal.²⁰ If this is to be considered the origin of the notion of the two cities, then certainly this is at least implicit in Augustine's writings since Cassiciacum where there are contained those who love things corporeal as contrasted with those who love things spiritual.²¹ However, such dualism, based as it is on Platonist philosophy, is a doubtful origin for the notion of the two cities, whose genesis is probably found in the scriptures.²²

¹² *Contra Academicos* III, 19, 42; *De ordine* II, II, 30-19, 51; *Soliloquia* I, 13, 123; *De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* VII, II; *De musica* VI, *passim*.

¹³ *Contra Academicos* III, 19, 42; *De ordine* I, II, 32; *Soliloquia* I, I, 3.

"P. 338.

¹⁵ *Contm Academicos* III, 20, 43, Green's edition, p. 71: "Quod autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est-ita enim iam sum affectus, ut quid sit uerum non credendo solum sed etiam intellegendo apprehendere impatienter desidero apud Platonicos me *interim*, quod sacris nostris non repugnet, reperturum esse confido." polemic against Porphyry for non-acceptance of the Incarnation. ¹⁶ Also,

¹⁶ *De ordine* II, 5, 16; 9, 27.

¹⁷ *De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* XXII, 40.

¹⁸ Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), p. 147; cf. also *De consensu evangelistarum* IV, 10, 20.

¹⁹ P. 3412.

²⁰ *De libero arbitrio* I, 16, 34.

²¹ For example, *De ordine* I, 8, 23-4; 10, 29; *Soliloquia* I, 13, 23.

•• G. Bardy, *Le Cite de Dieu, Bibliotheque Augustinienne*, 33, 52-74.

It is of interest that Cranz places the *Ad Simplicianum* (a. d. 396) as a turning point in Augustine's career. According to Cranz, Augustine in this work first makes explicit tendencies previously present in his thought, that mankind is a *massa peccati*²³ and that grace is absolutely necessary for man's salvation.²⁴ In this same volume, Rist has come independently to the same conclusion in studying the question of free will and predestination in Augustine.²⁵

Cranz's treatment of the *Confessions* also deserves some comment. He thinks that the division of the *Confessions* into Books I-IX and Books XI, XIII corresponds to the private and public aspects of divine providence.²⁶ In the *Confessions*, he sees a definite movement away from the early works where man could use the created universe as a stepping stone to God to an emphasis on the grace of God. In this, Cranz is correct. Although it would be idle to deny that the *Confessions* was influenced by the theme of *exitus-reditus*, so common in Greco-Roman philosophy, nevertheless this motif is also influenced by the parable of the prodigal son.²⁷ In general, I think that Verheijen's theory that the theme of the *Confessions* is probably to be found in the various meanings of *confessio* and in a contrast between the *miseria* of man and the *miser cordia* of God is closer to the truth than Cranz's theory concerning divine providence.²⁸

It should be clear by now that I consider certain essays in this volume to be worthwhile contributions to Augustinian scholarship. While those that are abreast of modern critical research can be found in other places, the presence of those four or five in one volume makes the purchase of this book, at the price, a bargain for the Augustinian scholar.

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•• *De diversis quaestionibus* LXXXIII, 68, 3.

•• *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola Apostoli ad Romanos* 44; 55.

²³ Cf. John M. Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," *St. Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays*, editor R. A. Markus (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1971), p. 140.

²⁴ Cf. *De vera religione* XXV, 46.

²⁵ Cf. P. Courcelle, *Confessions dans la tradition*, p. 74, n. 4; *Confessions* I, 18, 118; II, 10, 18; IV, 16, 30.

²⁶ M. Verheijen, *Eloquentia Pedisequa, Latinitas Christianorum primaeva* (Nijmegen: Dekker and van de Vegt, 1949), pp. 1-83.

The Theology of Original Sin. By EDWARD YARNOLD, S. J. Pp. 96. *The Theology of Marriage.* By RosEMARY HAUGHTON. Pp. Theology Today Series & 31. Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides, 95¢ each.

In *The Theology of Original Sin* we read: ". . . the biblical doctrine of corporate personality cannot be totally demythologized," (p. 81) and "... it is inconsistent to reject fundamentalism in the exegesis of the Bible while insisting on a fundamentalist interpretation of the Church's definition of dogma." (p. 88) These two crucial assertions give the key to the author's position on the highly topical doctrine of Original Sin: the Genesis Adam is to be thought of not as an individual but as a symbol for the whole human race; and neither St. Paul nor the Council of Trent may be cited as favoring monogenism rather than polygenism, since their interests lay elsewhere. But what about *Humani Generis*? Father Yarnold does not tell us how this Encyclical of Pius XII is to be understood, and, indeed, the extract from it which he quotes on page states that Original Sin "proceeds from a sin truly committed by one man Adam" His silence on this point is unfortunate. One of the many excellent features of this little book is a remarkably detailed historical summary of the subject from Genesis to *Humani Generis* in which, for example, Didymus the Blind and Henry of Ghent are allotted, respectively, fifteen and five lines. It will be all the more surprising, therefore, to readers of *The Thomist*, that St. Thomas's quota for the entire book should be a meagre ten!

Mrs. Haughton in *The Theology of Marriage* attempts to discover for us God at work in a human union, disclosed first in Scripture, and then progressively unfolded, in spite of mistakes and failures and crimes, through the centuries. (p. 85) It is a very readable exposition. The fact that it has been written by a married person enhances its value, because, as Father Yarnold says in the Preface, the ideal person to write on the theology of marriage is one who has experienced it for himself. (p. 11) I found Mrs. Haughton's sources a bit too selective and exclusively confined to publications in English, which are by no means the best on the subject. On p. 75 we are told that "up to about the eighth century, at various times and in various places, re-marriage was allowed by the Church in cases of adultery." Mrs. Haughton is not the first of some contemporary writers to attempt to defend this claim in the case of the innocent husband of an adulterous wife, but, according to scholars of accuracy and reliability, it is a claim that has no solid support apart from Ambrosiaster and an Irish canon of St. Patrick. In the Greek world there is no worthwhile evidence for it in the first five centuries.

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The Universal Treatise of Nicholas of Autrecourt. Translated by LEONARD A. KENNEDY, C. S. B., RICHARD E. ARNOLD, S. J., and ARTHUR E. MILLWARD, with an introduction by Leonard A. Kennedy, C. S. B. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971. Pp. 1792. \$3.00.

This is a translation of the only major work of Nicholas known to be extant and hitherto known to most scholars as the *Exigit* or *Exigit ordo* because of its *incipit*. It will fill an important gap in medieval philosophy for those who want to investigate the celebrated "medieval Hume" but are unable to deal with the Latin text.

This seems to me a very good translation. However like Hume Nicholas may be in epistemology, he is assuredly not to be compared for clarity of expression. Nicholas's way of expressing himself is often elliptical and very obscure, and it seems important that the resultant uncertainty as to his meaning be accurately preserved in a responsible translation. The present work meets that standard well. By unscrambling Nicholas's syntax and filling out his often incomplete way of expressing himself, the translators have maximized intelligibility, while restraining any impulse to force an interpretation on the text.

Father Kennedy's introduction is a brief summary of Nicholas's life and work, followed by a summary presentation of the main line of argument in the work. It is competent and accurate, though the orderly arrangement of the text and the use of subtitles largely obviates the need for such a review.

Using this edition, contemporary analytic philosophers with a penchant for resurrecting things medieval should have a field day, since the work is filled with controversial and somewhat unclear and ambiguous arguments. But, for the historian of philosophy, the primary value of the work is as a document in fourteenth-century thought. And as such it is an extremely difficult one to understand. In his introduction Father Kennedy writes that the treatise "has as its intention to call university professors, especially at Paris, to the study of Christianity and ethics. The means to achieve the end is the discrediting of Aristotle and his disciple Averroes (11Q6-1198), the study of whose writings occupied most of the time of these professors." As a statement of Nicholas's avowed intention, this is correct. But there still seems to me real doubt as to whether Nicholas is to be believed. Perhaps I can state briefly some of the sources of my confusion.

Nicholas claims to be calling for a return to the study of higher things by showing that there are metaphysical and epistemological positions that are more probable than those of Aristotle and Averroes. Of course, he tells us, many of these positions are in conflict with truths of the Faith, but he insists he wants only to argue that they are probable, not that they are true.

First of all, on the face of it, this sounds very suspicious as a declaration of program. It seems at least odd to try to call men to a study of Christianity by establishing a host of heretical opinions as more probable than the

opinions of the Church. But there is another consideration that is even more perplexing. If we are to believe Nicholas's statement of intent, then we must take seriously his claim to be developing a philosophy that is highly probable, at least more plausible than Aristotle's. And yet it seems very clear that no such claim can be supported. Weinberg's study of Nicholas has shown that, while the metaphysics he develops is daring, it is markedly unconvincing. The entire structure rests on a principle of the maximal goodness of the world which is scarcely supported at all. His arguments for the eternity of things and for atomism both seem weak. His discussion of the continuum is confused; his argument rejecting motion is unsound. And so on.

On this basis alone it might be supposed that Nicholas is serious in his project but is simply unsuccessful. However, what gives pause before so concluding is that Nicholas's work in the theory of knowledge is extremely powerful and imaginative, in both its critical and positive aspects. In other words, we have good reason to suppose that Nicholas had an exceptionally clear, critical, and rigorous mind and was accustomed to applying very strict standards to knowledge claims. And recognizing this, it becomes more difficult to take seriously his claim to be debunking Aristotle and so recalling professors to matters of relevance.

But the above is simply a statement of confusion, not a firm conclusion, since I am unable to decide what other purposes Nicholas might have had. The development of "probable" argumentation was much in vogue at his time, and one might regard the treatise as no more than a kind of exercise in that way of arguing, but that seems not too likely. On the other hand, the work does not seem to lend much support to any of the better known schools or movements of the time. It cannot be regarded as Thomist or Scotist or Augustinian or Ockhamist. While some of the epistemological analyses seem fairly near Ockham in spirit, the conclusions reached are not Ockhamist. And while the rejection of motion may seem to support nominalism, Nicholas also develops a sort of extreme realism, though it is one based on his doctrine of eternity, which no standard realist could accept.

In short, it is a most perplexing work, an undoubtedly important document in the history of ideas, of considerable philosophical importance for the theory of knowledge and perhaps of some value as a stimulus to metaphysical analysis. But its appearance should also remind us how little we understand of the development of fourteenth-century philosophy.

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Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism. Ed. by JOHN DONNELLY. New York: Fordham University Press, Pp. 348.

Professor John Donnelly's work is a collection of essays in philosophical analysis directed toward issues in the philosophy of religion. Most of the essays have been written by philosophers justly famous in analytic circles. In fact, essays by five of the seven members scheduled to participate in the 1973 Council for Philosophical Studies Conference in the Philosophy of Religion are included in Donnelly's anthology: Roderick Chisholm, Anthony Kenny, George Mavrodes, Nelson Pike, and Alvin Plantinga. Any student even vaguely familiar with analytic studies in contemporary philosophy of religion will immediately recognize nearly all of the authors whose essays are contained in this impressive anthology.

The collection contains twenty essays. Of these, fifteen were originally published in journals known for their exemplification of critical philosophical analysis. Of the remaining five, Kenny's article is from his quite good Doubleday anthology on Aquinas. The essay by John Hick, certainly a well-known philosopher of religion in analytic circles, first appeared in the *Scottish Journal of Theology*. Two articles are from the *Proceedings of the 1970 Convention of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, whose general theme is the "Existence of God." Lastly, Donnelly has included a previously unpublished study of his own on Kierkegaard. Of these twenty essays, only two appeared prior to 1960, while eleven had originally been published during the last five years. Obviously, the accent of this anthology is on the contributions of contemporary logical analysis on theism.

In a very real sense the gist of Donnelly's collection is a definite attempt to show that much "natural theology" has been done in the circles of analytic philosophy since the publication of Flew and Macintyre's *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*. The determined bent of *New Essays* to deal directly with the epistemological, ontological, and linguistic ramifications of logical positivism and its corresponding verification criterion of meaning on philosophical theology is well known. During the last fifteen years probably every graduate student concerned with the philosophy of religion has confronted *New Essays* at one time or another. Donnelly is anxious to show, nevertheless, that philosophical analysis need not accept nor has not accepted the negative conclusions of much of *New Essays*-and, *a fortiori*, of logical positivism-regarding the issues of philosophical theology. In his essay contained in the anthology Paul J. Dietl probably best sums up the general direction of the material contained in *Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism*:

Some of the most remarkable turns in recent philosophical discussion have been the resurrection of issues original readers of *Language, Truth and Logic* would have thought forever dead. (p. 286)

It is manifestly evident from a reading of the essays contained in Donnelly's anthology that "God-talk" certainly has not passed into the realm of meaningless discourse as demanded by the logical positivists. Two important correlative implications of this series of essays are: (1) analytic philosophy has certainly not paid strict adherence to the verification criterion of meaning and its ramifications for ontology, epistemology, and theodicy; and (2) analytic philosophers have not been convinced that the non-cognitive conclusions of much of *New Essays* is the last word in the question of significance of religious language. In other words, the overall direction of *Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism* seriously points to the claim that non-cognitivism, as demanded by the verification criterion of meaning in matters of philosophical theology, is false. This assertion, I believe, parallels Professor Henry Veatch's claim that an adequate ethical language demands cognitivity. To paraphrase Veatch, as non-cognitivism in ethical discourse leads one to a bankrupt meta-ethics, so too will non-cognitivism in religious discourse lead one to a bankrupt theodicy. The converse of the above claim, I would suggest, is that both meta-ethics and natural theology demand an adequate ontology. Although this demand for an ontology as well as an adequate epistemology is not expressly stated in all of the essays contained in Donnelly's collection, nevertheless there are strong structural indications in some of these essays—three of which I will consider in detail later in this review—that an ontology and epistemology beyond that deemed acceptable by radical empiricism are necessary conditions for a consistent philosophy of religion.

Donnelly's judicious choice of essays, furthermore, explicitly affirms that the methods utilized in analytic philosophy are not *per se* foreign to theological discussion. In fact, I believe it is quite fair to say, as both Donnelly indicates in his introductory remarks and James Ross illustrates in his essay, "On Proofs for the Existence of God," that the entire scholastic tradition, from its origins with Abelard, through its development in Aquinas and Scotus, its precision in the Renaissance commentators, and the eventual rise of Neo-Thomism in the late nineteenth century, has always been adroitly concerned with, as Oxford philosophy would put it, "conceptual analysis." I enthusiastically endorse this position. For too long a period too many scholastic philosophers have looked with askance at analytic philosophy and its linguistic methodology. If nothing else, Donnelly's anthology merits serious perusal by those philosophers and theologians not yet convinced that analytic philosophy has indeed gone beyond the superficial treatment of language found in *Language, Truth and Logic* and its much too sketchy treatment of problems in ontology and philosophical theology.

In a review such as this it is especially important to mention a few things about the method of linguistic analysis. I tend to regard analysis as just *that-a* "method" used in approaching philosophical problems

which is itself intrinsically neutral. It is merely a way of seriously "unpacking" very complex philosophical issues. I believe this was G. E. Moore's principal point when he first distinguished the "truth" of statements from their "analysis." Accordingly, such a method is itself quite neutral regarding subject matter. On the other hand, I will not deny that many practitioners of linguistic analysis have also brought along much excessive ontological baggage under the guise of presuppositions. Structurally, it indeed has been the case that the pre-suppositions of Rume's radical empiricism have often been accepted by analytic philosophers as established philosophical principles. Furthermore, it is certainly historically true that logical analysts, in the not too distant past, have been entrenched in logical positivism. Positivism and its corollary, "Philosophy of science is philosophy enough!", have been quite moribund for some time. But analysis as a methodology used to seriously confront the basic issues of human existence, be these issues ontological, epistemological, meta-ethical, or religious, has continued successfully. It is philosophical analysis in this sense which I want to argue is of great use to theodicy. But this usefulness can only be appreciated if one distinguishes the analytic method and all of its linguistic devices from the epistemological and metaphysical trappings—usually of radical empiricism—sometimes identified with analytic philosophy. To put the matter differently, logical positivism and its negative ramifications to substantial ontology, epistemology, and meta-ethics, is *incidental* to the analytic method. I believe many of the essays contained in Donnelly's anthology admirably illustrate this philosophical claim.

In a much too brief introduction for this type of anthology Donnelly makes one serious claim which demands pondering by those of us interested in the philosophy of religion. Donnelly argues that philosophical analysis, although it obviously does concern itself with language and its implications, especially as related to the world-after all, that was the central claim of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*—is in effect a serious search for wisdom and not a mere solving of linguistic conundrums. Historically, this is a claim similar to the division many historians of philosophy use in distinguishing the fourteenth-century nominalists from the thirteenth-century metaphysicians. That a sufficient analysis of philosophical issues demands an adequate ontology I would endorse; that such an analysis is explicitly accepted by all of the contributors to Donnelly's anthology I would question. I shall treat of these issues as related to some of the essays contained in *Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism* shortly.

The central figure throughout this collection of essays, as well as of most analytic inquiry into the philosophy of religion, is David Rume. This is the case explicitly because of Rume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and implicitly because of Rume's empiricist critique of metaphysics and epistemology. Fundamentally the *Dialogues* are nothing more than an application of Rume's radical empiricism to theodicy. That

Hume thought little of either ontology or theodicy is evident from the following passage:

If we take in our hand any volume-of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance-let us ask, "Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?" No. "Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence?" No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. Inquiry, XII, iii.

Since the verification criterion of meaning as postulated by the Vienna Circle is nothing but an extension of the Humean distinction between matters of fact and matters of logic, logical positivism is structurally identical to Hume's critique. Accordingly, it is rather obvious why Humean radical empiricism is central to any group of essays crediting significance to statements of religious discourse and purporting to advance beyond the non-cognitivism of *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*.

I will presently treat three essays contained in *Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism*. These essays indicate the demand for a reworking of metaphysical and epistemological theories as a necessary condition for a viable philosophical theology.

Regarding a structural criticism of Hume's radical empiricism as pertaining to perceptual intentionality, perhaps Roderick Chisholm's essay best illustrates the demand for an adequate epistemology as a necessary condition for a natural theology. Chisholm's essay, entitled "On the Observability of the Self," is an extremely enlightening analysis of the epistemological presuppositions found in both analytic philosophy and the phenomenological tradition. Chisholm begins his analysis with the premise that both these contemporary methodologies in philosophy assert that the "self" cannot be observed. Chisholm in turn claims that both traditions take their structural hints from Hume. Chisholm argues that, insofar as Hume is tremendously mistaken in elucidating his perceptual intentionality, so also are those metaphysical and epistemological positions mistaken whose fundamental principles are Humean. Behind this discussion involving Chisholm's essay is a crucial point once made by Frederick Copleston that if one is to adequately deal with the issues in the philosophy of religion, then one must "get on the metaphysical chessboard." Moreover, the only way I know to get a Humean philosopher on the "metaphysical chessboard" is to indicate the destructive inadequacies and internal inconsistencies of Hume's radical empiricism. I believe this is the crucially important ramification of Chisholm's article as far as the philosophy of religion is concerned.

Chisholm argues that the Humean account of perception as being nothing more than an awareness of a "bundle of sensations" is fundamentally mistaken. Chisholm's positive thesis should strike scholastic philosophers as structurally quite familiar. Chisholm's analysis of an awareness of

individuals as something other than a "bundle of sensations" is similar to the Aristotelian claim that the perceiver is aware of individuals—the incidental object of sense—and not just of collections of proper and common sensibles. Although I would demand more of an account of how this process occurs than is argued for by Chisholm—to be more specific, I would want to emphasize the role of inner sense, especially the *vis cogitativa*, in perception of the individual as an incidental object of sense—nevertheless, structurally both Aquinas and Chisholm have argued against the "bundle theory" of perception so common in analytic philosophy of perception. The important point here is that, if one can philosophically undercut the Humean epistemology, then one is on the way towards avoiding Hume's trenchant criticisms of metaphysics and theodicy. This epistemological critique of Humean radical empiricism is, I would strongly suggest, the important ramification of Chisholm's study for philosophical theology.

The above analysis reminds me of a discussion I once had with George Tavard. The content of our discussion was the possibility of philosophical theology in light of the criticisms contained in Hume's *Dialogues*. The point Tavard and I agreed upon was that a radical criticism of Hume's epistemology is a necessary condition for admitting metaphysical language into one's philosophical system and, consequently, of "getting on" Copleson's "metaphysical chessboard." This radical criticism definitely has been initiated by Chisholm. Accordingly, in a very real sense, Chisholm's article can be looked upon as a necessary propaedeutical analysis towards establishing the ontological conditions for theodicy. Such fundamental analysis, moreover, is one purpose Donnelly gives for the publication of his anthology. One wishes Donnelly had further developed these points in a much longer and more scholarly introductory chapter than he in fact did.

A different view of the analysis of epistemology relating to religious claims is made by Jerry Gill in his essay, "The Tacit Structure of Religious Knowing." Gill develops what he calls "contextual epistemology" as part of a view towards establishing the possibility of religious knowledge. In the beginning of his essay Gill provides some very interesting and quite perceptive historical remarks which should be mandatory reading for anyone seriously involved with the philosophy of religion. Gill treats the fact-value dichotomy, especially as formulated by Kant and as consequently developed in both late modern and contemporary philosophy. This fact-value dichotomy, Gill argues, is both the undoing of much "religious knowledge" as well as the focus of divisiveness between the analytic philosophers and the existentialists.

Gill's positive account is to view religious knowledge as a form of "tacit knowledge." This concept of "tacit knowledge" is appropriated from Gill's understanding of the contextual epistemology already elucidated in the writings of Michael Polanyi. Gill is convinced that Polanyi is on the

right track as far as an epistemological analysis is concerned. In fact, Gill categorically affirms that Polanyi's epistemological treatment in terms of "explicit knowledge"-which is analyzed in terms of "focal awareness and conceptual activity"-and "tacit knowledge"-which is elucidated by "subsidiary awareness and bodily activity"-renders Ryle's much-accepted analytic distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that" obsolete. To further support his analysis of the tacit structure of religious knowledge Gill judiciously utilizes the insights of John Hick, Ian Ramsey, and Max Black. Hick and Ramsey are concerned with "religious dimension" in human experience-what Ramsey refers to as "cosmic disclosure."

I must admit that I am not yet convinced of Polanyi's epistemology as elaborated by Gill. It seems to me that much more sophisticated analysis needs to be done on this notion of tacit knowledge. At times I think both Polanyi and Gill have packed too many multi-faceted concepts into this one category. For instance, what Aristotelians might call an "innate epistemological disposition"-e. g., the ability to acquire language-and an "acquired epistemological disposition"-e. g., the ability to speak Polish-are both given equal status as types of tacit knowledge. It is not this blurring of categories, however, that really bothers me about tacit knowledge. Quite frankly, I am suspicious that a form of subjective idealism is creeping into Gill and Polanyi's analysis. The discussion, at times, seems structurally similar to Mannheim's "sociology of knowledge." Insofar as subjective idealism and its counterpart in sociology of knowledge have serious epistemological problems, so too would the concept of tacit knowledge. Gill does quote Ramsey in trying to provide a "realist" foundation. However, as is the case with some phenomenological discussions, I am quite concerned over a covert acceptance of subjective idealism. Nevertheless, Gill has provided an interesting bit of analysis in utilizing tacit knowledge as a way of elucidating the possibility for religious knowledge.

James Ross's scholarly and thought-provoking essay, "On Proofs for the Existence of God," indicates the role of metaphysics in an inquiry into theodicy. Ross claims he is providing an argument clothed in a "modernized-Scotist framework." This essay, in particular, is a good example of the intense structural similarities which exist between the best of scholastic philosophy and those philosophers using the methodology of linguistic analysis. For example, Ross provides a good discussion of the difference between a "necessary property" and a "constitutive property." A necessary property is what scholastic philosophers have called a *proprium*, while a constitutive property is an essential property belonging *per se* to the essence. Parenthetically, one interesting ramification of this distinction which Ross has brought to light, I would suggest, is that it seems to render it highly improbable that one could ever formulate an adequate definite description of God. In a definite description, how are the constitutive properties to

be distinguished from the necessary properties? Yet philosophers of religion continually talk as if such a definite description of God were possible. I will admit that possibly a perspicuous enough meta-language might be devised in order to account for this distinction. Yet such a logical device would mean much more for a definite description than ever envisaged by Russell when he devised the definite description in order to help solve some vexing problems of reference. Russell obviously would reject outrightly any type of "factual" necessity let alone ranking two types of "necessary properties" in a definite description.

Ross also provides an interesting account of a distinction rather important when discussing proofs for the existence of God. Ross distinguished between (1) the soundness of an argument and (2) the persuasive power of an argument. In Ross's article the conceptual consistency of an *a priori* argument for God's existence is the more important task for philosophical theology. It should be noted that Gill, in utilizing "contextual epistemology" with its emphasis on tacit knowledge, would probably reject such a distinction.

Ross's primary claim is that there can be a consistent *a priori* argument that God exists. Ross is convinced that by means of the concept of "heteroexplicability" a consistent proof can be given demonstrating that a being exists necessarily in virtue of what sort of being it is. The *a priori* structure of Ross's conceptual analysis is, I am inclined to believe, similar to the second form of the ontological argument as elucidated by Anselm in the *Proslogium*. "Heteroexplicability" is defined as an explanation by way of an independent state of affairs. Accordingly, an heteroexplicable explanation is one in terms of either producing a state of affairs or preventing a state of affairs. Ross claims that it is analytic that any state of affairs which is unproducible and unpreventable is heteroexplicable. He argues that it is not inconsistent to have a non-heteroexplicable event, which event is Anselm's "Necessary Being." Thus he is convinced that it is not inconsistent to talk about a necessary being, or, to use his language, a non-heteroexplicable state of affairs.

Although I found Ross's proof very interesting and subtly acute, I am not quite convinced of the ontological force of his argument. I still do not know how Ross gets from the conceptual order to the existential order. Even if one has an adequate and conceptually elucidated "intensional" apparatus (what Descartes referred to as "*realitas objectiva*"), still one must get from this "intensional" content to the "extensional" level (what Descartes referred to as the "*realitas formalis*"). My comment here is structurally similar to the reason given by St. Thomas in rejecting the validity of the ontological argument. At any length, I am not convinced at this time that Ross has indeed reached the extensional level of reality, even though his intensional structure is quite sophisticated, apparently consistent, and philosophically impressive.

Ross also provides some extremely interesting insights into the role of metaphysics in philosophical theology. Part III of his essay is entitled "*Hoc est quod omnes vocant Deum.*" The original source for this quotation should indeed be familiar to readers of this journal in particular. Ross's important claim is that it very much depends upon one's metaphysical system as to how one is to generate all of the properties of the divine nature from the conclusion of the original proof-be it a necessary being, first cause, non-heteroexplicable event, or any other conclusion of an *a priori* proof for God's existence. To quote Ross:

Without a metaphysical system to allow me to pass from the narrow group of predicates used in the proof of existence to the wider group used in the identification with God, it is very difficult to justify claiming that one has proved the existence of God. . . . It is more nearly correct to say that one has established the existence of a being which may be God. . . . (p. 17)

Ross illustrates this point by using St. Thomas's ontology as an example:

The identificatory stage of a proof of the existence of God encounters difficulty in relation to the elaborateness of one's metaphysical system. For instance . . . it is very easy for St. Thomas to go from the assertion that there exists a being which is in pure act to the conclusion that there is a being which, without any limitation at all, exists, lives, thinks, loves, chooses, and is therefore simple, eternal, good, omniscient, omnipotent, etc. (pp. 16-17)

In this context, Ross is claiming that a metaphysical system is only necessary as to the identificatory stage in an *a priori* proof for God's existence. Such a claim probably applies equally to *a posteriori* proofs also. Ross is especially concerned with the metaphysics of "process" adopted by Charles Hartshorne in his contemporary revision of the ontological argument. That ontology is crucially important for this identificatory stage is affirmed by Ross. However, it might be the case, I wish to suggest, that a metaphysical system is also important in order to get any proof for God's existence beyond the intensional realm to the extensional level.

I have spent time discussing the essays by Chisholm, Ross, and Gill somewhat in detail because I think the ramifications of these analyses, in that they explicitly treat issues concerning ontology and epistemology, are crucial for any contemporary development in philosophical theology. Yet there are many excellent articles in Donnelly's anthology. Professor Donnelly is to be commended greatly for collecting such valuable source material and placing it together under one cover. Philosophers generally familiar with scholastic philosophy should be able to read and comprehend readily most of the articles in this collection. The only article which might prove difficult is the second article by James Ross in which Ross constructs a new theory of analogy. This ingenious essay requires at least an elementary familiarity with categories used in linguistic theory.

In order to provide a wider view of Donnelly's impressive anthology I will make the following brief comments about the remaining essays contained in this excellent collection. William Rowe has an interesting article dealing with the cosmological argument. Readers will be reminded of the issues argued in the famous Russell-Copleston BBC broadcast debate. In considering the argument from design R. G. Swinburne provides an intriguing analysis of two kinds of order. This essay contains a very nice critique of Chapter XI of Hume's *Dialogues*. As is the case with most analytic philosophers, however, Swinburne talks about analogy as if it is to be identified with the process of induction. It seems to me to be extremely difficult if not impossible to talk about God and analogy without considering the analogy of *being*. This use of analogy is different from the usual concept of analogy as induction as discussed by modern philosophers.

William Alston's article argues for the possibility of "God-Talk" as opposed to the claim that religious knowledge is the exclusive prerogative of the mystics. The implied refutation of Demea's mystical position in Hume's *Dialogues* is obvious. John Hick provides the usual acute conceptual analysis which has come to be expected from him. Hick analyzes the difference between "logical" and "factual" necessity. Such an analysis is crucial if philosophers are to get beyond Hume's argument that the only use of necessity acceptable to philosophers is that of logical necessity, which in turn applies only to analytic *a priori* statements and never to matters of fact.

Nelson Pike provides an intricate analysis of Hume's treatment of the problem of evil. Pike shows two things: (1) God and evil are not contradictory items, and (9!) Evil does affect any *a posteriori* argument (a la Cleanthes of Hume's *Dialogues*) for God's existence. One important implication of Pike's analysis, I would suggest, is that one cannot give a proof for God's existence independently of ontology. This claim entails that there are two types of *a posteriori* arguments: (1) the ones intricately bound to a metaphysical system (e. g., the *Quinta Via*), and (9!) Those not so bound (e. g., Paley's "Watch in the Desert" argument and the position of Cleanthes in Hume's *Dialogues*). I would further suggest that Pike's claim might just apply to the non-metaphysical *a posteriori* proofs. Pike's article should be read in conjunction with Hick's article discussed above. In addition, Pike's article brings to bear all of the metaphysical worries about an adequate theory of ontic analogy.

Alvin Plantinga and William Rowe (Rowe's second article) are analyzing the claim asserted by C. B. Martin that there is an inconsistency between the doctrine of God and the doctrine of Christ in orthodox theology. Both Plantinga and Rowe make use of some modal logic in elucidating their analyses. In the same pattern, George Mavrodes and C. Wade Savage analyze a paradox involved in God's omnipotence-can God create a stone *so* heavy that he himself cannot lift it. Mavrodes argues, I think success-

fully, that the "stone example" differs in structure from the "square-circle example" familiar to readers of the *Summa Theologiae*. Savage, using the methods of symbolic logic, criticizes Mavrodes's account while providing his own solution to the paradox. R. F. Holland and Paul J. Dietl consider the problems involved with miracles. Holland's distinction between the "contingency" concept of the miraculous and the "violation" concept I found quite philosophically interesting. Again, quite obviously, the shadow of David Hume and his critique of miracles lies behind these discussions of miracles.

Anthony Kenny analyzes two aspects of the relation of divine foreknowledge as it applies to human freedom. Kenny distinguishes two aspects of the problem as found in the treatment by St. Thomas. In conjunction with Kenny's article, I would strongly suggest that R. W. Mulligan's criticism of Kenny, which appeared in the April, 1971 issue of *The Thomist*, be read. Mulligan criticizes Kenny's ascription of a temporal predicate to the *event known* rather than to God's manner of awareness. Mulligan's analysis is interesting, although I wonder if such an analysis demands an act-object distinction in the act of divine awareness.

Concerning the relation of philosophical analysis and questions of the divine nature Donnelly has included an essay by Daniel Bennet. Bennet provides an acute analysis of the concept of divine simplicity. In addition, H. J. N. Horsburgh analyzes the concept of religious experience and its relation to God's existence.

Donnelly includes two of his own articles. The first one is an in-depth analysis of the concept of "*creatio ex nihilo*," while the second provides a conceptual elucidation of the structure of Kierkegaard's suspension of the "Ethical" in the situation of divine commands. Both articles are good, although, apart from the intrinsic value of any good conceptual analysis, I am not sure that the Kierkegaard essay fits in well with the rest of the articles in the collection.

I have been greatly impressed with this collection of essays. Professor Donnelly is to be commended for collecting and editing some of the more important and conceptually illuminating articles written in philosophical theology since the publication of Flew and Macintyre's *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*. I believe it ranks along with *New Essays* and Ronald Santani's *Religious Language and the Problems of Religious Knowledge* as a marvelous set of essays by philosophers engrossed in the methods of linguistic analysis. This is, in fact, a collection of essays for philosophers and is certainly not an elementary text. Obviously, as is the case with any anthology, there are additional essays I wish Donnelly had included. However, there is more than enough material in this collection to keep philosophers of religion busy for some time. Whether *Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism* will replace *New Essays* as the standard set of essays for graduate seminars in the Philosophy of Religion I do not know. At

any length, it does indeed command a place along side of *New Essays* as an explicit indication that analytic philosophers have not rested assured with the conclusions of *New Essays*.

My only really negative comment, one which I have already indicated, is that such a collection demands more of an introduction than Donnelly's brief sketch in two and one-half pages. Such an introduction would indeed have been of value to graduate students confronting these essays for the first time. In addition, it would have been of assistance to all of us as we forge ahead in reconstructing a cognitively significant philosophical theology.

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The Philosophy of Wonder. An Introduction and Incitement to Philosophy.

By CoRNELIS VERHOEVEN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1979.
Pp. 9104. \$6.95.

Cornelis Verhoeven's book is a frivolous musing which proves nothing. *The Philosophy of Wonder* sports a finesse of language which will outrage the interpreters of all philosophical systems. Logical precision is sacrificed to poetry; paradox takes precedence over rigorous distinctions; gratuitous assertions disclaim the need for justification. The work comes to no conclusion, deferring all indefinitely. **It** is amazing that such writing still passes as philosophy.

By Verhoeven's own standard, the above paragraph is more accolade than diatribe. An author who praises Plato for his inventive frivolity must welcome such a characterization of his own work. When he argues that Philosophy is from beginning to end a radicalization of wonder, he refuses to confine himself to any system. A poet who could write "every realization is but a drop which condenses from the cloud of possibilities" naturally eschews the philosophical formalities. In a word, what are generally accepted as weaknesses in philosophical discourse are the strength of Verhoeven's book. **It** is an incitement to philosophize. His words are not addressed to the novice so much as they are directed to those inside and outside the philosophical profession who have grown complacent in their dogmatism, cynicism, or alienation.

Verhoeven acknowledges no special method for treating radical wonder, yet he does in fact approach his subject phenomenologically. His method is to prescind from all characteristics of the enduring philosophical experience until nothing is left but the primordial and persistent provocation in the face of being. He meticulously unravels the fabric of philosophy to

reveal its essential thread, variously called deferred identity, dwelling in deferment, bewilderment, panic, surprise, and wonder. The phenomenological method links him intimately with Heidegger, Sartre, and Marcel, whom he acknowledges generously throughout.

In one of the more imaginative and provocative passages of his work Verhoeven studies the central role of Socrates in the philosophy of wonder. He calls Socrates the "*daemon meridianus*, whose questions cause people to panic." By no mere play on words, he brings the radical meaning of panic back to the god, Pan, the daemon of mid-day who shepherds his flocks through the dangers of high noon. Most men sleep through midnight and siesta through mid-day because they can stand neither darkness nor hard light. Only Pan ventures across the surrealistic landscape of threatening light which exposes "the impossibility of man's possibilities." Socrates is the personification of honest panic at the possibility that everything is really quite different from what it appears to be. This is panic. This is wonder.

Verhoeven's thesis is thus stated: "I wonder that a thing is so only because in this form it is different from what I expected or because it impinges upon my nonthinking self as a strange phenomenon and compels me to think. The realization that a thing is so is the shock that moves me." Wonder perceives the classic tension between reality and appearance. Identity of subject and of object are experienced as endlessly deferred, as unfinished business. "Nothing is identical of itself." Verhoeven sympathizes with the inventive frivolity and religious playfulness of Plato's assertion that beyond all appearance there lies the perfectly realized idea of everything, the only true identity. If Verhoeven does not accept Plato's conclusion, he does accept his beginning, namely, no individual thing is the last word in its or the whole of reality. Verhoeven embraces the Platonic challenge to disturb the tranquility of the cave by questioning the authenticity of shadows.

Heidegger's influence is strongly felt throughout *The Philosophy of Wonder*. He is seen as *the* philosopher of thought whose position Verhoeven interprets as: "being is granted in thought and thought is a grateful commemoration of the fact of being given." The author elaborates on the implications of being as a gift, suggesting that the relationship of thought to being is triad, i.e., the relationship of gift, giver, and recipient. The wonder of being and thought is that nothing stands alone unrelated to the whole. All identity is therefore deferred, drawing the thinker into a hazardous adventure full of ambiguity and uncertainty, but replete with rewards. Relying upon Heidegger, Verhoeven develops the conception of wonder as *retardando*, i.e., as the deceleration which allows possibility to manifest itself, of being as a surprise, and of thought as the only ethical and religious expression of gratitude. At this juncture one is reminded of the sizable contributions the American philosophers, Peirce, Royce, and Whitehead have made to this issue. Peirce provides a particularly brilliant statement

of the essential triadic relationship that constitutes thought-reality. He acknowledges the triadic nature of gift but puts the greater stress upon the participation of man's mind in the "living entelechy of symbols " which encompasses all processes and meanings. It is Royce who emphasizes the distinctly religious and ethical implications of thought's participation in the whole of being.

In a work as idiosyncratic as Verhoeven's one cannot complain at his decision to concentrate on certain dimensions of wonder to the exclusion of others. If the book intended to be the last word, which it certainly does not, the author could be chided for not making more explicit several essential aspects of his subject. What follows therefore is intended, not as complaint, but as complementary and complimentary. Four such notions that would warrant fuller treatment than Verhoeven gives them are 1) analogy 2) God 3) passivity, and 4) chance. Some reflections on these dimensions of wonder should only enhance the appreciation of this fundamental philosophical concern.

Much of Verhoeven's writing touches but does not explicate the question of *analogia entis*. The endless deferment of identity is philosophically imperative because all beings are essentially interrelated. They participate in the same explosion of possibility. No nominalist could write about this as Verhoeven does. He clearly affirms the impact of being on thought and the symbolic nature of all marginal participants in the meaning of reality.

Verhoeven paraphrases Heidegger as saying that the thing " things " in the sense that it gathers together gods and men, earth and heaven. " The thing is not simply *the thing*: it is the object of endless contemplation, since it is itself a concrete infinity." This is actually the original sense of Pragmatism, namely, that the knowledge of a thing is a sharing in its way of behaving itself. The behavior of the mind is an ontological sharing in the ongoing realization of all possibility. Peirce claims that this view is essentially Aristotelian. There are a few places where Verhoeven almost grasps this point.

He consistently asserts the interconnectedness of everything with the whole of being. What he fails to do is to show the impact upon philosophy of the sameness as well as the differences in being. If deferred identity has a startling impact upon the open mind, so does the commonality. That things hang together, that they share and in fact participate in a reality greater than themselves provokes no less wonder. He is correct in suspecting those system builders who contrive unity where it does not exist, but he should recognize the wondrous fact that there is as much communion in being as there is. Analogy is not only a way of talking about things; it claims that things are in their innermost being analogous. Man's reality, for example, is an articulation of all of reality. He shares with all animals their common mode of being alive and sensitive. He shares in the total evolution of consciousness. He participates in the cohesiveness of all that is, still

retaining that illusive difference from all else which makes him as unlike as like. The continuity and discontinuity of being reveals itself simultaneously. "Dwelling in deferment" is dwelling within the walls of continuity. The windows and doors are discontinuity. Those traditions which share this view should find in Verhoeven's writing an important contemporary richness, although he does not care to acknowledge how subtly he exposes the analogous character of being.

A similar point might be made about the radically religious implications of wonder. Verhoeven complains against Aristotle's *primum movens immobile*, interpreting it as the goal of thought which explains everything away and puts an end to philosophy. He grants that, even if Aristotle has hit upon the truth, his conclusion is the last possible one for Philosophy, allowing for no further conclusions. For Verhoeven, such a conclusion is to be endlessly or infinitely deferred as long as wonder persists. He argues that "the contemplation of a causal series is in fact a perception of nonidentity. The fact that everything has a ground means that everything is different, that the 'other' is revealed in the like and that they are radically connected." This near definition of *analogia entis* is much closer to what Aristotle might actually be saying. If one interprets Aristotle as maintaining that all being which is composed of act and potentiality moves under the entelechy of pure act, then it follows that all things are radically connected yet never themselves in perfect actuality. Aristotle's conclusion that the hierarchy of being ends in pure actuality and self-contained thought does not necessarily remove man from the temporal contemplation of being in potency to ultimate realization. This conclusion of metaphysics is a unique conclusion, arrived at, not once and for all, but only through the living experience of wonder. Aristotle's conclusion that all being leads to the infinite opens the mind to wonder. It does not close the mind in self-righteous complacency. What is the real difference between infinite deferment and deferring to the infinite possibilities of being? Wonder would indeed arbitrarily limit itself if man were to be content with his own limited being. Wonder is enhanced, if not uniquely realized, when man dares to give rein to "the divine dwelling in us" as Aristotle counsels. This is the particular burden of Anton-Hermann Chroust's study of wonder in Aristotle's writings. (*Divus Thomas*, Jan.-Mart, 1972, p. 56) It is worth noting that the Americans Peirce, James, and Royce, each in their respective ways, also struggled with the religious demands of endless enquiry. Whether the ultimate implication behind all fact is ever realized or not, all facts demand a pursuit to some final community of perfect information. In other words, wonder is infinitely serious and endlessly demanding. It seems to be Verhoeven's point that, within time, there can be no end to wonder. Aristotle's claim that outside time there is an end or perfection of being is no less astounding.

When Verhoeven writes of religion and of God he does so with reverent

understatement. He refuses to dismiss as a-religious or as a-theistic those philosophers who begin with nothingness, emptiness, and the absurd. For him, one who endures the uneasiness and panic of wonder is more pious and religious than the man who fabricates a god to explain the unexplainable. He says this especially in criticism of Descartes who mistakes methodical doubt for wonder and who destroys doubt by the invention of god. Wonder leads to a theology of *deus absconditus*, Verhoeven insists. If god is the giver of being and the answer to the question, "Why is there anything and not nothing?", then his existence is best asserted by his absence and by his anonymity. Verhoeven's analysis of the nature of total giving, in which the giver always remains unselfish and hidden, echoes the demand of Plato that all things are the mere shadows of ultimate goodness and being. It also reflects the Aristotelian notion that pure act can never be contained or adequately manifested in being struggling with possibility. Verhoeven avoids saying that the hidden giver is known to be hidden, a wondrous possibility worth exploring.

A notion which Verhoeven constantly raises is the central significance of passivity. In a world of frenzied activity, compulsive doing and pragmatic overkill, his observations are telling, yet, unfortunately, are not fully developed. Thought is "playing with possibilities, creating space around things." With "defenseless passivity," thoughtful musing is "holy thought, because it is drawn into the whole which is holy." For him, being can only be accepted. Joy in the goodness of all that exists is the only ethical response. The ethical obligation is "an invitation that emanates from things." Wonder for Verhoeven is therefore salvation from total alienation, despair, and disgust. But man is not saved by his own activity alone. It is holy passivity which leads him on endlessly, which brings him hope. Henricus Rumke has developed the psychological and theological implications of passivity in a way that parallels and extends the suggestions found in Verhoeven.

One final observation will illustrate the kind of wonder Verhoeven's book is capable of stimulating. He suggests that "chaos is more self-evident than the cosmos," yet the cosmos requires the greater effort to be understood. This is true and profoundly provocative of wonder if it is realized that the cosmos and chaos, law and chance, are manifestations of each other. This is becoming more recognized in philosophical anthropology as the catalyst of primitive speculation. What reveals law as a real force is the chance variations of law. What reveals chance is the continuity of law. Law and chance together convinces man that the universe behaves itself. It does not behave man's mind. It has a way of working out its own unfinished destiny, which includes the orderly and chaotic functioning of the human mind itself. Verhoeven shows some recognition of the importance of this when he explains how history is the great event: it is being as happening and as recognized as happening. The same point is further developed by C. S.

Peirce when he cites the unidirectional movement of history as convincing evidence that reality is tychistic. Peirce argues that a perfectly mechanistic universe should function equally well in both directions, as for example, when heat causes increased pressure on a gas and vice versa. But infants grow into men, never in the reverse order. All of being moves in this way, in only one direction, which Peirce considers to be the universal marvel.

One might add to this wonder the experience of the finite mind reflecting upon itself. That the universe includes a kind of mind which is only provisionally capable of grasping a part of reality is itself an anomaly. In the experiences of error, doubt, and surprise, the mind discovers an inadequacy to its own task. In a perfectly determined universe the mind ought to be perfectly proportioned to its task, albeit limited. It should not even wonder at what lies beyond its capabilities. However, the human mind is constantly reminded by the impact of things that there is more to the stuff of meaning than meets the eye. In short, wonder is itself a revelation of chance. Any universe which includes the vagaries of human intelligence cannot be a finished product with a certain meaning. Looked at this way, wonder is provocative of wonder, surprise is the biggest philosophical surprise and error, paradoxically, provides overwhelming evidence of the amplitude of the truth. Again, much has been done by the Americans cited to elucidate this point. Verhoeven reflects the same unpretentious depth but does not go as far as one would like to see him go.

In conclusion, Verhoeven accomplishes his objective, to sow disquiet in the cave. Unfortunately, not too many cave dwellers are likely to read his subtle and at times brilliant reflections. Cave dwellers do not crave light. His book is not for the unsophisticated, although it is called an introduction, and the sophisticated do not always welcome this kind of prodding. Yet the work will achieve increased recognition as time passes and fixed dogmatic positions of right and left become unfixd. Its theoretical soundings are well balanced by occasional timely observations about the quality and pacing of today's intellectual life. It will prove valuable and exciting for any reader who can follow the author with ease from "the infinitely serious to the infinitely frivolous." A possible subtitle might have been *Metaphysics With a Smile*.

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The Five Ways. St. Thomas Aquinas' Proofs of God's Existence. By ANTHONY KENNY. Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. General Editor, D. E. Phillips. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. Pp. 139.

The Cosmological Argument. A Reassessment. By BRUCE R. REICHENBACH. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Pp. 164. \$8.75.

With the renewal of interest in natural theology prompted by the publication of Flew and McIntyre's *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (1955), attention has been directed once again to rational arguments for God's existence. The ontological argument was the first to benefit from this resurgence of interest, but in the two books under review cosmological argumentation and its various formulations come in for their share of attention. Kenny's work, which shows more the negative influence of Flew, stresses the difficulty involved in separating Aquinas's five ways from the medieval cosmology in which he sees them as imbedded. Reichenbach's work is more positive in spirit, the author's major concern being to reformulate St. Thomas's first three ways so as to meet the objections of Hume and Kant and contemporary critics in the analytical tradition. Both works merit a brief exposition and critique, if only because they consider much the same subject matter and yet come to contrary conclusions.

After a brief introduction wherein he allows that "the criticisms of Kant are certainly still the most effective obstacle any rational theism has to meet" (p. 3), Kenny devotes a chapter each to the five proofs for God's existence offered by Aquinas in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 3. In the case of each *via* he attempts a rather complete exegesis of the text, supplementing this with St. Thomas's arguments in parallel places and with elucidations supplied by commentators, mainly recent, including Roberto Masi, Joseph Owens, and Peter Geach. In each instance Kenny raises objections drawn from modern science and from Humean, Kantian, and more recent philosophies to show not only that the *ipsa verba* of St. Thomas are unacceptable to the modern mind but also that "scholastic modernizations" must share the same fate (cf. p. 4).

With regards to the *prima via* Kenny experiences special difficulty with the principle "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur," and so sides with Suarez's evaluation of the proof that it is impotent "to prove that there is anything immaterial in reality, let alone that there is a first and uncreated substance" (p. 33). The chapter has some interesting material on the chains of movers involved in inertial and gravitational motion, particularly when the author attempts to explain these in terms of Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics, but unfortunately his discussion here comes to no conclusive results. Kenny's examination of the *secunda via* focuses on the principle of efficient causation, which he formulates in mathematical logic

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following Salamucha and others. His difficulty here is with essentially subordinated series of causes, which he sees as intelligible in terms of medieval astrology, as thus based on an "archaic fiction" (p. 44), and hence unacceptable in the light of modern science. The discussion of the *tertia via*, admittedly one of the most difficult proofs to make sense of, permits Kenny to range through contemporary discussions of possibility, necessity, and contingency. His evaluation is that the proof concludes as well to the "everlasting existence of matter with a natural indestructibility" (p. 69) as it does to God's eternal existence. In analyzing the *quarta via* the author dwells at some length on Platonic Forms, predicates, and existence, using Geach as a foil for much of the discussion; his own conclusion, predictably, is that "the notion of *Ipsum Esse Subsistens*, ... so far from being a profound metaphysical analysis of the divine nature, turns out to be the Platonic Idea of a predicate which is at best uninformative and at worst unintelligible" (p. 95). His critique of the *quinta via*, finally, allows Kenny to discourse on contemporary problems relating to teleological explanation and the philosophy of mind, again coming to the negative result that the argument from design has no more claim to validity than the other theistic arguments.

Kenny's book is clear and well written, and for advanced students is an excellent problem text against which to measure their understanding of Aquinas's arguments and their ability to cope with the agnosticism and skepticism that characterize so much of contemporary philosophy. This reviewer agrees with Kenny that substantial work is required to recast the traditional five ways in a terminology and conceptual setting that will make sense to the modern mind. To do this, however, requires a complete review and reconstruction of the concept of causality and how this relates to scientific explanation, and until this is forthcoming it would be fruitless to attempt a step-by-step refutation of the objectionable points in Kenny's treatment.¹ In the interim, however, a counterbalancing assessment of the cosmological argument has become available, and this too deserves our attention.

Bruce R. Reichenbach's *The Cosmological Argument* takes off from the

¹ A noticeable defect of Kenny's book is the lack of detailed historical scholarship, particularly of Aristotelian and Thomistic commentators in the centuries before our own. For example, Kenny dismisses rather summarily Aristotle's and St. Thomas's cosmological proof of the "omne quod movetur" principle (p. 19), while manifesting little or no acquaintance with substantial commentators such as Simplicius, Averroes, and Nifo, who have explained the proof in intelligible and convincing fashion. For details, see the reviewer's "The Cosmological Argument: A Reappraisal," to appear in the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* for 1972. For further background, see also the reviewer's *Causality and Scientific Explanation*, soon forthcoming in two volumes from the University of Michigan Press.

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same point of departure as Kenny's book, viz., Flew and McIntyre's *Neu' Essays*, and covers much the same ground as does Kenny, though in somewhat more elementary fashion and coming, as already noted, to quite opposite results. Reichenbach restricts himself to Aquinas's first three ways and seeks a general form of cosmological argumentation that will serve to structure each of these. He hits upon the notion of contingency as the most plausible and arguable instance of St. Thomas's type of proof, and formulates his argument as follows:

A contingent being exists; this contingent being depends on something else for its existence; this something else, as a cause, is either another contingent being or is non-contingent (necessary) ; if contingent, it in turn cannot be caused by an infinite series of contingent beings; therefore, a necessary being exists.

The explanation and articulation of the various components of this general argument occupies the whole of Chapter 1.

Chapter 2 and 3 are concerned respectively with causation and with the principles of causation and of sufficient reason. Reichenbach's main target throughout these chapters is Hume's analysis of causation as constant conjunction and his critique of the causal principle; he argues also against Braithwaite's covering-law analysis of causation and against Camus's objection that the universe is absurd and thus it is vain to employ any principle of intelligibility such as that of sufficient reason. In Chapter 4 Reichenbach establishes that there is no repugnance in a proposition's being informative and necessary at the same time, distinguishing between logical and real necessity, and showing how the Kantian account of necessity can indeed lead to a regulative principle for unifying man's experience but not to knowledge of a real cause operative in the universe. Chapter 5 is addressed to Bertrand Russell's objection that the notion of causality cannot be applied to contingent beings considered as a totality, and it shows how this may be a valid criticism of the Scotistic way of conceiving causal series (used by Copleston in his famous debate with Russell), but that it has no force against the Thomistic way of so conceiving them. Chapter 6 takes up the problem of necessity in the conclusion of the proof and argues that this is not merely a logical necessity, as J. J. C. Smart and Paul Edwards have maintained, but is better characterized as a conditional necessity leading to knowledge of a being that is necessarily existent. In Chapter 7 Reichenbach returns to Kant to disprove the latter's thesis that the cosmological argument is dependent on the ontological argument. Then, in the eighth and final chapter, the author takes up the question of the identification of God with the necessary being that terminates the cosmological argument and explains why this being cannot be matter or a material universe necessarily existing. While maintaining that the identification with the divine is actually extrinsic to the argument itself, Reichenbach urges the plausibility of such an identification. He concludes with some reflections

suggested by this on the relationships between faith and reason, arguing contrary to Kierkegaard that a faith grounded in reason is superior to a commitment that is based on the improbable, the absurd, and the irrational.

Reichenbach's book is not as scholarly as Kenny's and at times the author's use of rhetoric impedes rather than advances his argument. Also, he takes no notice whatever of Kenny's work, which seemingly is unknown to him; this is unfortunate, since his own exposition would have benefitted by attempting to meet Kenny's objections, which are more pointed than those he actually considers. Again, Thomists will not be too happy with Reichenbach's attempt to reduce the *prima* and *secunda viae* to the *tertia via*, or with his implicit contention that the third way underlies and is more fundamental than the first two. These criticisms notwithstanding, however, Reichenbach's work is still an intelligent and worthwhile exposition of a difficult subject matter, and one that is more suited for beginning philosophy students than is Kenny's. The fact that these two books come to such disparate results, of course, is an indication that much serious work yet remains to be done on the cosmological argument.

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Value and Valuation: Axiological Studies in Honor of R. S. Hartman. Ed.

by JOHN WILLIAM DAVIS. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1972. Pp. 358. \$12.95.

Of the three summary names descriptive of contemporary value theory, the deontological, the teleological, and the axiological, *Value and Valuation* is a paradigmatic instance of the axiological. Central to this way of doing value inquiry is the integration of diverse bodies of science extending from economics to psychotherapy to linguistics. The axiological perspective takes a comprehensive attitude toward the field in that it does not exclude or limit the sources for human data from which it draws observations, principles, or conclusions. R. S. Hartman's *The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology* (1967) presented the background formalities within which the present work, a *Festschrift* in his honor, has been formulated. Although this supposition is not applicable exactly in each instance, one might read *Value and Valuation* as a commentary upon the theory of value proposed by Hartman, with the advantage of gaining fuller understanding of that subtle and profound work. On the other hand, though many of the papers advance the reader's attention toward that goal, one should not pick it up as containing a set of papers each working to that end. Value theory

in general is the object of their inquiry rather than the specific ideas of Hartman. Each of the twenty-five papers presents a statement independently of the others.

The table of contents, modeled upon Hartman's theory, seems to have been imposed by the editor upon the contributions after they were composed. It manifests Professor Davis's clear awareness and deep appreciation for Hartman's originality and genius and a subtle interpretation of the content in each contributed paper. That Hartman's terminology is being fleshed out can be intuited, although explicit reference to it is sporadic. The editor organized the papers under the rubrics: The Nature and Logic of Value, Problems of Methodology, and Types of Value (intrinsic, extrinsic and systemic). The first two overlap in meaning, with the result that it is difficult to estimate why, for example, Paul Weiss's "The Possibility of a Pure Phenomenology" was placed in the second part when it might as appropriately have been placed in the first. Or why Thomas E. Hill's "The Distinctiveness of the Concept of Good" is put into a different section from Wayne R. Leys's "Use and Abuse of Normative Definitions," since both papers focus on the *prima facie* difficulty of ambiguity in the word "good." Similarly, this can be observed in the case of Manfred Moritz's "The Naturalistic Fallacy and its Different Forms." These three papers, if not others, could have been grouped together without injustice to their content. This point creates the impression that the editor stretched the meanings of his categories in order to locate the contribution into his own presupposed formality whereby they could be related to R. S. Hartman's system. What is at issue in this item is the question: where does *Value and Valuation* fit in the extensive bibliography of axiological literature? and specifically, how should the contributions be conceived in relationship to the views of the honoree? Since the format appears forced, they should be recognized as pertaining to the general body of axiological literature rather than as an elucidation of Hartman's thought.

For Thomist interest, Bertram Morris's "Happiness: Intrinsic or Extrinsic" deserves explicit comment. His paper addresses the traditional problem of what constitutes the essence of happiness. It inquires into the question of subjective as distinct from objective beatitude, rejecting the latter by the categorical claim: "no namable object satisfies the demands of happiness." (p. 183) He takes the position that happiness consists in "activity of a certain kind." (p. 186) By rejecting pleasure as the identifying component in happiness, Morris takes issue with the utilitarian view which insists upon the very opposite. The article makes a strong case for virtue as an essential factor constitutive of happiness. This is a piece in the work to which a contemporary Thomist can make a qualified yes nod. This is not to imply, however, that "*Value and Valuation* challenges the Thomistic synthesis. Quite the contrary is true. For the vision pervading this work, speaking generally, presents a value theory in which the moderate

realism, the epistemology, and the ontology, as well as other Thomistic suppositions are viable while proposing the desirable effect of updating Thomistic language and range of inquiry.

This is exemplified in the following fields: in political economy as present in Nicholas Rescher's "Welfare: Some Philosophical Issues"; in linguistics by Adam Schaff's: "Language and Human Behavior" which argues that "Human behavior is often conditioned by mental suggestion owing to the orientation of the mind ... by language" (p. 297); in legal philosophy by Luigi Bagolini's: "Time and the Concept of Ought in Legal Experience"; in Aesthetics by John William Davis's "A Defence of Unique as an Aesthetic and Value Predicate"; in History of Philosophy by Fritz-Joachim van Rintelen's: "Philosophy of the Living Spirit and the Crisis of Today." Incorporation of these insights into the Thomistic synthesis can benefit its contemporary intellectual pursuits. A caution should be indicated, however. Since the speculation being done by these authors requires time, criticism, and thorough reflection before it can be judged as "thoroughly convincing," *Value and Valuation* is far from being a definitive work or final statement. But this is what gives to the Thomist opportunity for development. The essays launch the ship of axiological science out of port, but the destinations frequently are being finalized during the expedition. Or to switch the image, the utility of the work can be expressed in the statement that it is a moderate advance in building the edifice of axiological science to which R. S. Hartman claims to have set the foundations.

The bibliographical list of Hartman's works updated to 1972, the index helping to unify disparate areas of inquiry in the articles and its overall content, lead to the recommendation that *Value and Valuation* is a necessary work on the book shelf of all those who are attempting axiological investigation in our day.

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Existence, Existenz and Transcendence: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers. By OSWALD O. SCHRAG. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1971. Pp. 140. \$8.95.

It is only since the mid-fifties that English translations of Karl Jaspers' *Ternunft und Existenz*, *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, and the three volume *Philosophie* have been deemed publishable. Yet the ambivalent character of much in Jaspers' thinking-blamed by some on his inability to dismiss once for all Cartesian dichotomies and Kantian inhibitions-is offset by the

key role it is possible to allot him, especially in the philosophical and psychological life of Germany in the pre-Second War period. True, his verbosity remains a problem, but it is difficult to see how his emphasis on description, on the various tonalities of human existence, could be conveyed otherwise. This situation gives rise to the need for commentaries to accompany the translations; Schrag's joins those of Wallraff (1970) and Samag (1971) in meeting the need.

Because he reflects the temper of his time and that of existentialist origins in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Jaspers is now emerging as a focus thinker along the existential-phenomenological axis in its German version. Although his is too synthetic a thought to grant him a pivotal position in Continental metaphysics, Jaspers still touched upon all strands of this development and thus provides us with a smoother entranceway to the trend as a whole than could a major figure such as Husserl or Heidegger. At the height of his achievement Jaspers was working in a verdant vineyard.

Schrag divides his study into three Parts, one each for the notions of existence, *Existenz* and transcendence; for each there is an introduction and the whole work is preceded by a generous historical orientation. Although we might wish for critique in addition to exposition, the author may have judged the latter as a more basic requirement at this stage of Anglo-American familiarity with Jaspers, and he cannot be scored for such a position.

In Jaspers' observation that "... solitude always became painful after I had indulged it a while" we have echoes of both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. However, the difference between these two thinkers, and that between Kant and Hegel, two other influences on Jaspers, might well account for the ambiguity mentioned above. In a 1959 study of Max Weber, Jaspers identified this figure as "the greatest German of our time." Perhaps it was Jaspers himself who brought all these orientations into a dialectical harmony when he remarked in an autobiographical note regarding his youthful attitude that something was "radically wrong not merely with humanity, but also with myself; at the same time, however, I felt the magnificence of that other world, namely, of nature, of art, of poetry and of science." Such tensions will be recognized as their own by the introductory students for whom Schrag has written. Indeed, it is Jaspers' work on psychopathology and also the creative process which aligns him with Continental developments apart from metaphysics.

Part Two of the book is devoted to the notion of *Existenz*, the idea most closely associated with Jaspers' thinking. This untranslatable term is traditionally retained to distinguish its notion from that of existence. The latter, in all its forms, is always orientation towards immanence; this remains true of existence albeit in manifestations of empirical existence, in consciousness-as-such, or in spirit. On the other hand, it is *Existenz* which is oriented

towards transcendence. **It** is Schrag's efforts in this Part that distinctly mark his contribution to Jaspersian studies. **It** is here, too, that his attempt to paraphrase the elusive Jaspers is most successful, given the necessity to explain his idea of *Exiatenz* in the first person. Thus Schrag for Jaspers:

Existenz is the center from which I am aware of all the modes of the encompassing that I am. It is to be distinguished from all and yet cannot be severed from any. As possible *Existenz* I am a being which holds itself back in its possibility and therefore cannot exist for consciousness-as such. Consciousness-as--such is the universal and impersonal selfhood, making it possible to substitute one selfhood for another; *Existenz* as my unconditional acting, freedom, historicity, as the unique source of self-being which is given to itself out of transcendence cannot be replaced or substituted for another.

Another theme associated uniquely with Jaspers is that of cipher. A discussion of this, culminating in the so-called last cipher, foundering, climaxes Part Three. Cipher is distinct from the more mundane symbol and is the authentic opening to transcendence. For Jaspers, cipher is the only way through which transcendence opens up for our existential consciousness; it is the sign that, for *Exiatenz*, transcendence is indeed veiled yet not unavailable. Valued ciphers of this dimension are the foundering (*Scheitern*) of empirical existence as a whole and also the foundering of what appears, and wrongly, to be self-sufficient *Existenz*. Foundering is encountered in every attempt to construct world views or systems for ethics, aesthetics, and religion. A new meaning for the notion of freedom emerges precisely in *Existenz*, as it dares to founder with courage, all the while resisting its inbuilt desire to do so. In this way the terror of the world and its abundant richness are both uncompromisingly revealed.

It must be said that the tensions experienced by the young medical student with regard to his world were in later years to know no alleviation. Still, the challenge of a mind such as Jaspers' upon these dark ramparts resulted in the end with the coming of a peculiar and special light, not unlike that experienced by Camus a decade or so later. Schrag has presented us with adequate resources to follow the assault.

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BOOK REVIEWS

How Philosophy Shapes Theology: Problems in the Philosophy of Religion.

By FREDERICK SoNTAG. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Pp. 510.
\$7.95.

In a work of such vast length, said to be on problems in the philosophy of religion, a work advertised as valuable because it "guides the student towards understanding what philosophy means, what religion does," the reader is normally entitled to expect one of two things. Either there should be a plenitude of thoroughness, clarification, and real *depth* for advanced students, or there should be carefulness in exposition with lucidity and attractiveness of style, as well as a compelling unity of structure to keep the introductory student interested in reading half a thousand pages. Somehow Terence Penelhum's recent and similarly lengthy *Religion and Rationality* manages to offer *both* these sets of desideranda for students. Somehow Sontag fails to provide *either*. It is Sontag himself who tells us: "Detailed arguments are seldom given and little attempt is made to rehearse the history, past or present, of the traditional problems ... that would be too much to attempt in one book." (xii) The details can be filled in, he assures us, by reading eight other books by the same author which get very vaguely outlined. (xii-xv) If this is not enough to "turn off" students at the beginning, Sontag's tendency to increase the proportion of mere preaching to the converted (liberal Protestants), a tendency which characterizes most notably the closing Part III (211-482), "Some Problems Facing Us," could eventually serve to discourage all but the most ardent seminarians from studying more philosophy of religion.

The most interesting part of the book for introductory students is the relatively short Part II (123-212), "The Role of Philosophy in Shaping Theology." Here Sontag sticks to what his book's title promises. He concretely discusses how varying philosophical assumptions strike him as a variously affecting the religious outlooks of Origen, Augustine, Bonaventure, Luther, Hegel, and Kierkegaard. Contrasts between the latter two philosophers are vigorously drawn in ways that should stimulate the beginner to relate concepts of *philosophy* and *religion* with a sense of real excitement. (186 ff.) The publishers might sensibly have offered to philosophy students and teachers in a book with this title *just* Part II, preceded by a short and crisp introduction distilled from Part I. They could then have appropriately offered the 275 pages of Part III under separate covers for a quite distinct market as: *Faith and Freedom-Assorted Topics for Lay Christian Discussion Groups*. Such ecclesiastical groups could best address themselves to Sontag's chapters there on "Sin," "Grace," "Witness," "Mediator," and the like. Caustic as such suggestions might initially sound, they are offered quite seriously: *The Thomist* is a proper place for protest to publishers and authors against the abuse of sprawling, costly compilations with misleading

titles, also against the conflation of quite different sorts of interests in philosophy and religion.

Part I, "Philosophy, Theology, and Religion" evinces welcome concerns with important ideas about modern philosophy, theology, and science. The ideas could have been usefully related to current discussions among philosophical analysts and philosophers of science: Sontag's Index gives the impression that he sets across so much space a strict ideological embargo on recent philosophers of science and modern analysts, including neo-Thomists; Sontag's nebulous style in Part I compares badly with such people's for clear exposition. Nevertheless, Sontag is on a valuable tack when he suggests that the failure of post-Cartesian philosophers to establish certainties and the acceptance by many modern scientists of *tentativeness* about their *Hypotheses* and *Theories* may now make it much easier for theologians and independent-minded philosophers to reason fruitfully together:

"If philosophy follows science into this new variability and into a continued receptivity to novel theories produced without end, the interesting thing is that science could lead philosophy back into cooperation with theology just as it once led it away Theology, of course, must give up its own claims to finality, which it developed in reaction to the early years of modern science and as a defense against philosophy's rationalistic withdrawal. Yet, on the basis of these revised aims, theories of origin can again become central in theology-and in philosophy too." "The uncertainties inherent in the religious spirit inevitably tie religious action to philosophical speculation-that is, unless they are hidden by a rigid unyielding attitude which ultimately kills the spirit. Philosophy has the sensitivity and tentativeness needed to keep religion from destroying itself by attempting to cover up its uncertainties" (65)

Such promising remarks are felt dangling without mention of the sort of things students should soon go on to consider in relation: notably the recent contributions of Quine, Popper, and Feyerabend to a tentative spirit in philosophy of science; the greater wisdom of the Intellectualists' tradition in philosophical theology (medieval and modern) compared to that of the Voluntarists'; the daring and openness of Scholastics like Aquinas and Occam in utilising new paradigms from rediscoveries and developments in science and logic.

Worse still for the student is Sontag's failure even to grasp, let alone properly to articulate, distinctions between *epistemic* contingency and *ontological* necessity. His remarks on pages 48 and seem to confuse (i) questions about the epistemic contingency or *non-certainty* characterizing the open-minded man's beliefs when he offers propositions about things with (ii) questions about the ontological necessity of some things talked about. To say one is not completely certain that God exists in the way one is certain that " $\dagger = 4$ " is true is not of necessity to deny that God necessarily

exists. For the open-minded man can say he finds it wise to believe, if he is not certain that God necessarily exists. Here Sontag could have fruitfully pondered on Aquinas's *analytical* argument against Anselm concerning *id quo maius cogitari nequit*: what is *self-evident in itself* for Omniscience by virtue of ontological necessity need by no means be *self-evident to us humans*. (Some further probes, needed by students at any level, into "Divine Necessity" are offered in, e.g., Penelhum's book and my recent *Faith and the Life of Reason*).

How Philosophy Shapes Theology should be divided into two quite different books. The emerging philosophical work should be thoroughly revised. It would be unhelpful and even unfair to ask students of the philosophy of religion to buy this book as it stands.

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Inquiry into Science: Its Domain and Limits. By RICHARD SCHLEGEL. New York: Doubleday, Pp. \$4.95.

In a brief 108 pages the author presents clearly and pleasantly an introduction useful to philosophers just beginning to think about science, or to scientists just beginning to reflect philosophically. The main theme of the author (a professor of physics at Michigan State) is the inherent limits of the scientific method and its great power within its limits. This he emphasizes in order to relate science more fruitfully to the humanities.

He first shows the limits which result from the fact that science is a human activity in which nature is approached by alternative theories that man himself constructs with some limited purpose. Next he shows that scientific descriptions are always incomplete, although in regard to a defined domain we may be able to achieve the degree of completeness needed for our purposes. Then he develops the limitations of "atomic description" that result at the level of quantum phenomena because of the Heisenberg Principle of Uncertainty. Finally he discusses the cosmological limits that result from relativity and the vastness of space and time.

Chapter 6, "Scientific Explanation" is the most interesting of the book, because here Schlegel shows that at the root of all these limits is the basic truth (which Goedel's Theorem has demonstrated for formal systems) that "self-reference places limitations on knowledge," i.e., the knower always enters into his knowledge of other things, yet no human knower completely knows himself. He then shows how humanistic knowledge supplements and

complements scientific knowledge. In the last chapter he gives a neat summary of his argument.

The material of this work is sufficiently familiar to those acquainted with the current state of the philosophy of science, but it is "cool" presentation without technical jargon. For me it leaves unsatisfied the obvious questions: "What are the ontological implications of modern science?" The author is not a positivist, yet he does not move very far beyond the positivistic denial of ontology.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

- Arlington House Publishers: *Loving and Curing the Neurotic. A New Look at Emotional Illness*, by Anna A. Terruwe and Conrad E. Baars. (Pp. 495, \$14.95)
- E. J. Brill, Publisher: *John of Damascus on Islam. The Heresy of the Ishmaelites*, by Daniel J. Sahas. (Pp. 187, 61 guilders)
- Creation House, Inc.: *Our Society in Turmoil*, ed. by Gary R. Collins. (Pp. 306, \$5.95); *Toward a Theology for the Future*, ed. by Clark H. Pinnock and David F. Wells. (Pp. 399, \$4.95); *Man in Transition*, by Gary Collins. (Pp. Q03, \$4.95); *Effective Counseling*, by Gary Collins. (Pp. Q00, \$4.95)
- Fairleigh Dickinson University Press: *Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus*, by Rose Pfeffer. (Pp. Q97, \$10.00)
- Fides Publishers: *The Theology of Original Sin*, by Edward Yarnold, S. J. (Pp. 96, \$.95); *The Theology of Marriage* by Rosemary Haughton. (Pp. 9Q, \$.95)
- Harper & Row, Publishers: *The Return of Magic*, by David Farren. (Pp. 1Q8, \$4.95)
- Holt, Rinehart & Winston: *Journey to Garakhpur: An Encounter with Christ beyond Christianity*, by John Moffitt. (Pp. 318, \$7.95)
- Inter-Varsity Press: *Morality, Law and Grace*, by J. N.D. Anderson. (Pp. 1Q8, \$1.95); *Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi. An Introduction and Commentary*, by Joyce G. Baldwin. (Pp. Q53, \$5.95)
- The Macmillan Co.: *The Planetary Man*, by Wildrid Desan. (Pp. 380, \$9.95)
- Officium Libri Catholici: *New Dialogue with Anglo-American Philosophy*, by Richard Webster. (Pp. Q97)
- Philosophical Library: *New Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, by J. Grooten and G. Jo Steenbergen. (Pp. 468, \$00.00)
- Sheed & Ward: *The Mystery of Christ and the Apostolate*, by F. X. Durrwell, C. SS. R. (Pp. 190, \$7.50)
- Charles C. Thomas, Publisher: *The Cosmological Argument. A Reassessment*, by Bruce R. Reichenbach. (Pp. 164, \$8.75)
- United States Catholic Conference: *The Catholic Priest in the United States. Psychological Investigations*, by Eugene C. Kennedy and Victor J. Heckler. (Pp. Q71, \$7.95); *The Catholic Priest in the United States. Sociological Investigations*, by National Opinion Research Center Study. (Pp. 458, \$8.95)
- The University of Kansas: *Moral Rationality. The Lindley Lecture, 197Q*, by Alan Gewirth. (Pp. 40)
- Villanova University Press: *The Thomism of Etienne Gilson. A Critical Study*. (Pp. Q04)