EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Since the year 1974 marks the seventh centenary of the death of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Editors of THE THOMIST are pleased to announce that the four issues of 1974 will feature articles written for this volume by distinguished American and European scholars honoring St. Thomas and the contributions he has made to contemporary thought. In so doing, the Editors are confident that this centenary volume of the journal named in honor of the Common Doctor will bring to the awareness of a disturbed world, and one divided over profound speculative issues in philosophy and theology, the enduring value and rich relevance of the heritage of Aquinas.

Among the contributors to these issues are: Y. Congar, C. Fabro, E. L. Mascall, C. Ernst, M. Adler, V. Bourke, H. Pesch, W. A. Wallace, C. J. Peter, J. A. Weisheipl, J. B. Reichmann, W. J. Hill, A. J. Kelly, L. Boyle, J. N. Deely, R. Mcinerny, A. McNicholl, T. O'Meara, and L. Walsh.

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ESCHATOLOGICAL ENCOUNTER WITH GOD

RECENT DISCUSSIONS and debates over the nature of Christian eschatology have concentrated on the question whether theological interpretation should emphasize the present or the future reality of the reign of God. Should we accept the futurist, apocalyptic option of a Pannenberg [1] or the "presentative," existentialist eschatology of Bultmann [2] and

[1] Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed., *Revelation as History,* trans. D. Granskou (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1963); James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., eds., *Theology as History: New Frontiers in Theology,* III (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); also W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," *Kerygma und Dogma,* V (1959), and A futurist, but less apocalyptic interpretation is oflered by Jii.rgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope,* trans. James W. Leitch (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). More recently, cf. Klaus Koch, *Ratlos vor der Apocalyptik* (Gerd Mohn: Guterslaher Verlagshaus, 1970).

[2] As set forth most explicitly in Rudolf Bultmann, *History and Eschatology,* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958); *Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann* (New York: Meridian Books, 1960); *Jesus and the Word* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 51, "Future and present are not related in the

his students? [3] Though hotly debated, both alternatives seem to express elements of obvious value to Christian faith. Yet a common conceptuality, the prerequisite for fruitful discussion, seems to be lacking between those on the one hand who envision the eschaton as an essentially future, developmental or final eventuality, and those on the other who see the present moment of authentic self-disposing decision as the occasion for the exhaustive outpouring of God's eschatological presence.

This impasse is the result of divergent philosophical-theological commitments as well as of correspondingly disparate readings of Scripture on the part of each side. The" futurist" approach is generally one in which the physical, corporeal, cosmological, and calendrical dimensions of space and time are assumed to fall within the sphere of either a proleptically, developmentally or an apocalyptically interpreted eschaton. And the " existentialist " approach is one which philosophically (sometimes gnostically) prescinds from the natural-objective-historical order for the sake of locating eschatology in the sphere of a " subjectivity " which is somehow disengaged from the strictly cosmological elements of time and space. The futurist position often stresses the liberating, even political-revolutionary implications of the radical relativization of the present order in the face of an absolutely future eschaton, while the existentialist hermeneutic of eschatology accentuates the significance to faith of complete involvement in each present moment, leaving the future completely open and free from the apparently deterministic overtones of apocalyptic enthusiasm.

sense that the Kingdom begins as [31] historical fact in the present and achieves its fulfillment in the future."

[8] For example, Gerhard Ebeling, *Word and Faith,* trans. James Vi. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963); cf. especially Robert W. Funk, ed., *Apocalypticism: Journal for Theology and the Church,* VI (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969); James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., *The New Hermeneutic: New Frontiers in Theology,* II (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). The severe debate among post-Bultmannians over the significance to Christian faith of the apocalyptic horizon of Jesus's proclamation has not issued in any substantial appropriation of apocalyptio eschatology on their part. The valuable research by Ernst Kasemann (cf., in particular, Funk, ed., *Apocalypticism)* has been of less theological benefit to himself than to the disciples of Pannenberg: cf., for example, Carl Braaten, *Christ and Counter-Christ* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, pp.

The present article, while in no way striving for synthesis, will attempt to exploit the possibilities of each of these apparently antithetical interpretations. Eschatology must be so interpreted as to have a bearing on present as well as future. This much every Christian can accept. The problem is precisely how to understand present and future as inextricable categories in eschatological understanding. I shall propose that we work up to this problem by way of beginning our discussion with a consideration even more basic to eschatology than that of the dimensions of time. We should ask first what eschatological encounter with God might mean in itself before we ask when it might occur, now or in the future, within history or outside of history, etc. Thus, in reducing the question of eschatology to the question of encounter with God the problem outlined above might become more congenial to a conceptual scheme in which the philosophical question as to what constitutes authentically human temporality takes a less restrictive place than recent debates over eschatology have allowed.

The thesis of this article, then, is the following: if the structure of encounter with God is in itself explained in terms of an adequately expressed theology of the symbol/ rooted in Chalcedonian Christology, then both present and future, individual and cosmological, existential and social dimensions of eschatology may receive proportionate accentuation without involving the antitheses and reductionism current in the predominantly Protestant debate outlined above. Such an interpretation may provide a basis for assimilating the elements of present urgency and eschatological intensity of the " now " advocated by existentialist hermeneutic, as well as an appreciation of the linear, corporeal, social, and cosmological features of temporal reality associated with the eschatologies of futurists like Teilhard, Pannenberg, and Moltmann.

• As formulated by Karl Rahner, "The Theology of the Symbol," *Theological Investigations* 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. 221-52. It is the intention of the present article to offer an explicitly Catholic contribution to the predominantly Protestant debate over eschatology. Rahner's theology of the symbol seems to provide an excellent foundation for such a contribution.

In order to achieve more historical scope, however, and in order to give attention to the question of individual destiny it seems fitting to begin our considerations with reference to that more traditional eschatological category-the notion of the beatific vision. Understood in the light of a theology of symbolic mediation, reflection on the notion of beatific vision will by no means be antiquarian. Instead, such reflection can readily become a significant point of departure for a quite contemporary discussion of the nature of eschatological encounter with God.

SYMBOLIC MEDIATION AND THE BEATIFIC VISION

The notion of the " beatific vision " has always been the source of inspiration but also the occasion for severe problems in Christian theology. How finite man can acquire the capacity to "intuit" the "essence" of the infinite,[5] how the infant Jesus could have possessed the beatific vision, or how in the agony of the cross Jesus could be said to have had the vision of God's glory-these are traditionally among the most enigmatic of such problems. To a great extent, though not exclusively, theology has shielded itself by resorting to the notion of " mystery " as the infinitely incomprehensible and by consigning such questions as these to the sphere of " mystery " so defined.

As in so many other areas of theology, the problems surrounding the notion of the beatific vision require not so much a definitive set of solutions as a reformulation of the *basic* question underlying all the diverse, and sometimes outlandish and trivial, queries associated with this "mystery." [6] I would like to suggest here that the fundamental issue is not what *will* take place for men in the beatific vision or what *did* take place as regards the vision of God in Jesus's earthly existence. The basic problem is whether theology can meaningfully express what encounter with God might mean in any case, and in particular

[5] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 12, a. 2.

[6] St. Thomas alone *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 12) deals with thirteen distinct, but highly significant, issues relating to the question of knowledge of the divine essence.

what might be the essential structure of such an encounter both now and in the eschatological future. Can Christian theology ascertain, for example, whether and in what way the shape of man's " eschatological " vision of God might diverge from that of human life before God *in via?* For unless speculation on the notion of the beatific vision takes its bearings from the question of present encounter with God, one may expect such speculation to degenerate rapidly into sheer word-spinning. It is only by extrapolating from the present and by avoiding the temptation to interpolate into the present from some abstract or falsely apocalyptic preconception of the future that any interpretation of eschatology can escape simple iiTelevance.[7]

Now in recent times, as well as traditionally, Catholic theologians have stressed that the typical mode of our present encounter with God involves the mediation of our fellow men understood in terms of Christ and the Church.[8] But if present encounter with God involves the mediation of our fellow men, and if eschatology should ideally be extrapolation from this present encounter, why has theological speculation so consistently held that the element of mediation drops out in the context of the beatific vision? As far as I can ascertain, this question has been only minimally and sporadically dealt with.[9] Among the major reasons for theology's failure to give consideration to the possibility of a retention of the element of mediation in its discussion of the beatific vision one can cite the apparently explicit and authoritative rejection of such a medium by St. Thomas [10] and by Benedict XII in his Constitution *Benedictus*

• Cf. Karl Rahner, "The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions," *Theological Investigations* 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 337.

[8] This theme receives its most explicit treatment in E. Schillebeeckx, O. P., *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963); and Karl Rahner, *The Church and the Sacraments*, trans. W. J. O'Hara (New York: Herder & Herder, 1963).

[9] The most explicit, but still undeveloped treatment of this question is given by Karl Rahner, " The Eternal Significance of the Humanity of Christ for our Relationship with God," *Theological Investigations* 3, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1967), pp. 35-46.

[10] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12.

Deus (1336).[11] The latter document was addressed primarily to those (including Benedict's deceased predecessor, Pope John XXII) who were of the opinion that the beatific vision in the case of individuals must await the general resurrection. But in the process of repudiating this belief the Constitution, in passing, characterized the beatific vision as involving " . . . *nulla mediante creatura in ratione visi se habente* ... " and taught the immediate, intuitive vision of God's essence.[12]

Thus, Catholic theologians in particular have been left with a dilemma. On the one hand, the element of mediation is seen as paramount in Christian faith. On the other hand, the traditional view of eschatology in terms of beatific vision apparently leaves no room for a final state of happiness still involving such mediation. But we are still left with the question whether we have drawn out sufficiently the implications *for eschatology* of the Christian belief that Christ is the sacrament of man's encounter with God. Have we radically inquired first of all into what there is about Christ that allows him to mediate God's presence to us? And have not Catholic theologians persistently held, either explicitly or implicitly, that any eschatological meeting with God must involve dispensing with all mediation in order that we may know him face to face and with unmediated immediacy?

Such a dilemma seems unwarranted. First of all, it is governed by the assumption that " eschatological " refers to an exclusively future or final encounter. And second, it is the result of an almost insurmountable prejudice that mediation always implies indirectness and lack of immediacy. If we can expose the arbitrariness of both elements of bias we may be in a position not only to render more intelligible the old problems surrounding the beatific vision but, what is more, expose ourselves to the

[11] Denz.-Schiin., 1000: The souls of the blessed " ... vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva •et etiam faciaii, *nulla mediante creatura in ratione visi se habente,* sed divina essentia immediate se nude, clare, aperte eis ostendente ... perfruuntur . . . ." [Italics mine]

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Cf. Karl Rahner, " The Theology of the Symbol," *Theological Investigations* 4, p. 244.

real issues involved in the question of encounter with God. **Our** dilemma can be removed only if we can arrive at an understanding of the beatific vision as involving both symbolic mediation and, in virtue of this (not in spite of it) an *immediate* intuition of the Divine Essence (as demanded, for example, in the constitution *Benedictus Deus).* Moreover, if such a view can be adequately supported, an interpretation of eschatology based on a theology of the symbol may prove illuminating in terms of the contemporary Protestant discussion of eschatology.

First, then, it must be noted that recent theology and exegesis apparently converge on the conviction that Christian eschatology is in some sense realized. That is to say, Christian scholars take quite seriously, for example, the Pauline pronouncement: "The hour of favour has now come; now I say has the day of deliverance dawned." (II Cor. 6: 2, *New English Bible)* or the Johannine Christ's emphasis on the presence here and now of "eternal life." While, as we have seen, there is a great deal of controversy over which tendency is dominant in the New Testament," future" or" present" eschatology, there are few Christian thinkers who would deny that the eschaton is in some way or another a contemporary reality. [14]

Christian tradition, moreover, has consistently held that encounter with God at this present moment is indeed possible, provided that we note the typically mediate nature of this encounter. From this affirmation, however, there has resulted the curious, never fully articulated corollary that future eschatological confrontation with God will differ from the present one by virtue of an abrupt and final abrogation of all those mediating elements which determine the structure of our present contact with the Divine. And if we profess that at the present moment encounter with God is necessarily conditioned by our life with other men, we are still subject to the abiding notion that eschatological, face to face rapport with God will somehow be free of such " encumbrance." [15]

[14] Cf., for example, Raymond Brown, *The Gospel of John,* I (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), cxv-cxxi.

[15] Of course, theologians have always speculated that human fellowship will

Such a restrictive view of the beatific vision as unmediated has had the obverse tendency of derogating the admittedly mediate character of man's present relationship to God, thus rendering the present theoretically bereft of the eschatological depth that rightfully belongs to it. It has often made theology impotent to formulate an adequate appreciation of the realized elements in Christian eschatology. But if it should be the case that even man's" final" vision of God is to be understood as a symbolically *mediated* intuition of the Divine glory, then present encounter with God could no longer be called " merely " mediate (and strictly pre-eschatological). And in fact, consistent theological reflection may be able to conclude that mediation is necessary for final as well as present" face to face" contact with God.

In what follows, therefore, I would like to argue that a genuinely Christian view of " the last things " and of the " beatific vision " should place great stress on the mediate character even of "final" eschatology. Such an accentuation may be able to provide a solid Christological basis for theology's assimilation of those elements of realized eschatology associated especially with the Pauline and Johannine writings. The theological viewpoint I shall pursue here will emphasize that the shape of man's " final " eschatological encounter with God cannot legitimately be conceived of as absolutely discontinuous with that of his present historical or" earthly " mode of standing in the presence of the Divine glory. For if present encounter with God necessarily involves the mediation of our fellow man, there is no sufficient reason for supposing that eschatological" face to face" intimacy with God does not also demand the mediation of humanity.

This viewpoint is premised on the theological affirmation, articulated most explicitly by Schillebeeckx and Rahner, that Christ is the sacrament or symbol of our encounter with God.

be one element of final happiness, but that this fellowship could somehow retain its symbolic-mediative function in relation to the beatific vision has not been a serious consideration. Cf., for example, J. J. Redle, "Beatific Vision," *The Ne10 Catholic Encyclopedia,* II,

But what does it mean to say that Christ symbolizes God? Rahner reasons that it is Christ's human nature that bodies forth in our own medium of existence what God is.[16] In a sense, the hypostatic union means that human nature is a medium capable of expressing perfectly the inner life and being of God. Human nature is not something which the incarnate Logos puts on like a cloak. It is not something extrinsic or foreign to the inner being of the Divine Word.[17] Rather, in Christ, manhood is inherently expressive of the Word and flows forth from the Logos as a spontaneous and" natural" expression of the latter. It is not something in which God encases himself as an afterthought.[18]

From a more basic point of view, as Rahner's theology of the symbol seems to imply, we may say that the human nature of Christ symbolically mediates God to himself. And it is this primordial symbolic actuality which grounds the ability of manhood to mediate God to us also. From the point of view of a theology of the "Immanent" Trinity, in order for the Father to possess himself in eminently personal existence he exteriorizes his being in his" other," the Divine Logos, as the necessary condition of Self-appropriation. This inherently symbolic nature of the Logos is not simply for the sake of creatures' knowledge of God but, more fundamentally, for the sake of the Divine Self-awareness. Trinitarian theology is an attempt to express the elementary conviction that God's life is such a necessarily Self-mediated one. It follows, then, that " mediation" may have an " eminent " sense which is not opposed to, but is rather the condition of, *immediacy* to Self and others. Just as the notions of multiplicity, relation, and becoming cannot be inconsistent with the notions of unity, absoluteness, and immutability when

[16] Rahner, " The Theology of the Symbol," pp. 235-45.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

[18] " --- the humanity of Christ is not to be considered as something in which God dresses up and masquerades-a mere signal of which he makes use, so that something audible can be uttered about the Logos by means of this signal. The humanity is the self-disclosure of the Logos itself, so that when God, expressing himself, exteriorizes himself, that very thing appears which we call the humanity of the Logos." *Ibid.*, p. 239.

applied to God/[9] so also mediation need not in every case imply imperfection, indirectness or lack of immediacy. I think this is a point which has been given too little consideration in speculation concerning eschatology in general and the notion of immediate vision of God in particular.[20] "Whoever has seen Me has seen the Father also." (Jn. 14, 9)

However, we must go still further. If God becomes man, if the Logos becomes embodied in or symbolized through the human nature of Christ and if this human nature is a medium perfectly capable of containing and expressing the reality of the Logos, then certain highly humanistic conclusions, usually overlooked, can be unfolded so as to have a bearing on eschatology. First, it would follow that from the mysterious freedom of the Divine existence the symbolic medium through which God " takes possession " of himself is the human nature of Christ as the self-expression of the Logos. Recognizing that Christ's human nature is also our own it could be unqualifiedly asserted that manhood is God's freely appropriated" idea" of himself. God's personal presence to himself is gratuitously mediated through his self-conception as man. If such statements seem unpalatable, this may be due to a basic refusal to take the Christological Councils seriously. For nothing emerges from these sources with less equivocation than the doctrine that the human nature of

[19] Cf. Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology," *Theological Investigations* 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst, pp. 174-185. One might also note that no philosopher has more emphatically exalted the notion of mediation than has Hegel. It is clear that Rahner owes a great deal to such passages as the following: " The horrified rejection of mediation, however, arises as a fact from want of acquaintance with its nature. . . . We misconceive therefore the nature of reason if we exclude reflection or mediation from ultimate truth, and do not take it to be a positive moment of the Absolute." G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks (New York, 1967), pp. 82-83.

[20] For further clarification of the notion of " mediated immediacy " see my article, "What is Logocentric Theology," *Theological Studies*, XXXIII (1972), 120-32. Mediation is essentially a mediation *to* immediacy. If a symbol or a medium seems to obscure or withhold that which is symbolized, this is *not* due to the mediating element of the symbol but rather to the ambiguous and non-mediating factors ingredient in the symbol or to the deficiency of the recipient of the mediation. Cf. further Karl Rahner, "Der eine Mittler und die Vielfalt der VermittlungeU:," *Schriften zur Theologie* 8 (Einsiedeln: J. C. B. Mohr, 1967), p. 234.

Christ is not a mere addition to but is the self-expression of the Logos. Human nature is thereby situated within and not outside the Divine life. (The economic Trinity *is* the immanent Trinity.) Consequently, man's nature or essential being (as epitomized in Jesus Christ) becomes the symbolic medium through which God beholds and takes possession of himself.

Now, to return to the question of the beatific vision, if God's own Self-conception occurs through the medium of the humanity of Christ, Christians may hardly expect that their own eschatological participation in the vision of God's inner being could be one which itself evades such mediation. For the vision of God may be understood as one of "mediated immediacy." [21] Mediation, if properly apprehended, does not necessarily obscure or conceal or make ambiguous the reality which is being mediated. In fact, a genuine or pure symbolic medium expresses the symbolized reality so fully that the latter is made present in full immediacy to itself and others precisely because it is so mediated.22 Now since the human nature of Christ certainly does not conceal but ratherrenders eminently lucid and visible to faith the Divine glory, this human nature possesses an eternal and not a merely temporary, significance for man's relation to God.[23] Man's eschatological encounter with God would appear to demand, therefore, the element of mediation by Christ's human nature. To meet God with " face to face " immediacy would entail first of all an encounter with human nature brought to perfection, since this is how God "knows" himself. The visage of God is manhood, even from an eschatological point of view.

[21] This exalted concept of mediation is capable of surmounting any apprehension of a loss of directness in the notion of a symbolically mediated vision of God. Benedict XU's critique of mediation appears to be directed not against mediation as such but against the ambiguities which usually encumber the symbols of finite existence. The notion of mediated immediacy or of an eminent sense of mediation certainly never occurred to him.

[22] Cf. Rahner, "The Theology of the Symbol," p. 244.

[23] This is the thesis of Rahner's article cited above: " The Eternal Significance of the Humanity of Christ for our Relationship with God," pp. 35-46. Cf. also Rahner, "The Theology of the Symbol," p. 244: "... the humanity of Christ will have eternal significance for the immediacy of the *visio beata."*

It is not that one would have to peer through or look behind human nature to get a glimpse of the Divine glory. Rather the magnificence of God is capable of being perfectly embodied in our own reality. Knowing God eschatologically involves not the dissolution but rather the heightening of humanity as the medium of our encounter with him. Eschatology does not abrogate the incarnation. [24]

It might be rejoined that we have been speaking too vaguely about man, humanity or human nature without sufficient emphasis on the specific humanity of Christ and his distinctiveness from the rest of us men. However, Christ's uniqueness certainly cannot lie in his differing absolutely from us as man. For the notion of Christ's human solidarity with other men is basic to Christian faith. His human nature, however interpreted, is also our own even though we may evade the task of realizing and expressing it adequately in the ontic-existentiell order. And yet to the extent that we might approach (asymptoically) realization of our humanity both as individuals and as a species, to that extent would we express to each other not only what man is but also what God is. And since, as we have seen, the beatific vision must itself involve the mediation of perfected human nature we could legitimately infer that the eschatological vision of God is accessible here and now to the same extent that our individual and collective manhood approaches such an ideal-even from within history.

How is this ideal approached? Christianity teaches that one's manhood becomes authentically realized in proportion to one's giving himself or self-disposal to others. There should be no difficulty, then, in apprehending how Jesus could be said to have had the beatific vision at the hour of his death. Indeed, because this hour was the occasion for his total outpouring of self to

•• The notion of the *lumen gloriae* does not become obsolete in this interpretation. (Cf. *Summa Theol.* I, q. 12, a. 5 and III, *Contra Gent.,* c. 53) The *lumen gloriae,* of course, is not itself the medium in which the divine essence is embodied. But it may be understood here as that power which enables man to " intuit " the essence of God in the eschatologically perfected human nature which is the medium of God's presence to Self and others.

others one would expect, if the notion of a humanly mediated vision of God is acceptable, that the beatific vision would coincide with the unsurpassable realization of authentic human existence in Jesus's death. Is it any wonder that the Gospel of John sees this apparently ambiguous moment as the hour of Jesus's" glory"? If the above notion of symbolic mediation is accurately expressed one would be surprised if in Jesus's final agony the " beatific vision " were not eminently present. In his grasp of himself in the act of final and absolute self-giving, Jesus grasps simultaneously and with irreducible immediacy what it is to be God.[25] For at the same time, and even more fundamentally, in Jesus's act of kenotic self-deliverance it should be emphasized that the Father grasps or takes possession of his own "essence," namely, kenotic love. God's "encounter" with himself (God's Self-knowledge), then, is freely mediated through the historical act of Jesus's human self-giving. It is not as though Jesus's activity is something outside of, or in addition to, the dynamics of God's" inner life." The" economic" Trinity *is* the " immanent " Trinity and not some afterthought or arbitrary accretion to the latter.[26] (This can be said without in any way jeopardizing the belief that God's activity in history is freely executed.)

Consequently, it seems quite legitimate to draw the following conclusions. If God is eternally present to himself (knows himself) through the medium of radical human self-giving (in Christ), then Christians themselves should recognize that eschatological encounter with God (if the " beatific vision " means

[25] This, of course, does not mean that Jesus's vision or knowledge of the beatific vision is a "looking at" involving something like a subject-object duality. For knowledge (as can be argued in the case of Aquinas as well as of many modem thinkers) is fundamentally presence-to-self *(Beisichsein)* and only dcrivately an objectifying actuality. Now *Beisichsein* does not exclude but rather requires mediation as the condition of presence-to-self. Thus it may be said that the divine Self-possession or presence-to-Self is mediated through Jesus's kenotic activity and, by virtue of this transcendental actuality, Jesus's experience of himself on the Cross is equally an apprehension of the essence of Deity, i. e., the beatific vision.

[26] This point is consistently emphasized in Karl Rahner, *The Trinity,* trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970).

" knowledge " of God) will occur and does occur to the extent that men apprehend their own humanity as continuous with that of Jesus in acts of kenotic self-giving. Or are we still to expect that we will know God without any symbolic mediation at all when sound theological speculation posits such mediation as eminently inherent even in God's Self-apprehension? After all, it is in instances of authentic human existence that the " glory " of God shines through or comes to expression both for God and for others. This, it seems to me, is a highly humanistic way of understanding man's encounter with God.

APPLICATION To CoNTEMPORARY DEBATE

We can only briefly outline how the above reflections may apply to the questions which introduce this article. First, our interpretation of the " beatific vision " as involving the symbolic mediation of human self-giving is well-suited to an understanding of the eschaton as a present and not exclusively future reality. If properly understood, this view can suffuse the present moment, and all present moments, with an element of urgency customarily reserved for the " final things." Christians should be made aware of the arbitrariness whereby unreflective views of eschatology have derogated the capacity of human nature for mediating the immediacy of God. Such a dismissal has had the effect of relinquishing the eschatological element involved in genuinely understood mediation. No matter how ambiguous or deficient concrete embodiments of human nature may appear to us in our experience, Christology implies that human nature is *essentially* expressive of God. And if essential manhood is radically kenotic, then every encounter with attempts to approximate such authentic human existence, either in oneself or in others, is to that extent an encounter with God. The intensity and depth of *present* eschatological encounter with God is, therefore, contingent upon the depth of genuine human love in this historical moment. Bultmannians are quite correct in emphasizing the significance for eschatology of present authentic (kenotic) decision. For in such moments the very essence of Godhood becomes transparent to the believer.

At the same time, however, interpretation of the notion of the " beatific vision " as involving mediation is capable, it seems, of rendering future or " final " eschatology intelligible without demythologizing these out of theology altogether. For what we have been referring to as human nature is not only the property of discrete, isolated individuals but also a characteristic embodied in a race or species in process of development. It is a collective, evolutionary, and historical phenomenon and not something consigned in a mutually disparate and static manner to various atomized individuals. Human nature must be understood as expressing the reality of God in its generic sense and not just in its privatized sense. Already in the New Testament St. Paul sensed how the " mystery " of God was being unfolded in a cosmic and historical context centered in the risen body of Christ. The notion of the *soma ChristoU* is the Pauline way of linking human nature as individually perfected with human nature as a collective historical reality.

Thus, " human nature " in the plenary sense of a cosmically rooted, Christ-centered, andhistorically-ecclesially-sacramentally extended phenomenon must stand in the foreground when we say that humanity mediates the immediacy of God (to himself and to others). Eschatological encounter with God involves filling out the personal risen body of Christ so as to render human nature as an evolutionary-social-historical reality, increasingly transparent to the glory of God. The " resurrection of the body " is primordially a communal concept which may be interpreted as an indispensable condition for beatific vision. Humanity's symbolizing of God is not a mere given but a task also.

INDIVIDUAL EscHATOLOGY

Finally, the interpretation of eschatology we have outlined in this article is open also to understanding the death of individuals as a decisive breakthrough to encounter with God. Death, however, must not be looked upon merely as something that imposes itself fatalistically upon us from without or as the mere occasion for a transition to new life. While death may include

all of this, the Christian view (which has its roots in the Suffering Servant theme of Deutero-Isaiah) is that one's fate can be surmounted if it is appropriately internalized and converted into gift for others.[27] Death as the final expression of fate which imposes itself on us can be converted by faith into a free act welling up from within. Our personal death can be appropriated (even in the present moment) as our own act and not just as an extrinsic necessity.[28] Thus death can be seen as approaching the final realization of our individual humanity if it is grasped as the final expression of self-disposal. But we have already seen that, where human existence is exercised in such a kenotic manner, it becomes symbolic of Deity to us for the very reason that it is God's way of mediately grasping himself. Death in Christ means, then, appropriating our death as an element in human self-realization, and this, as we have attempted to demonstrate, can be the occasion for a symbolic encounter with the mediated immediacy of God. What is more, we may confidently assert that if God apprehends himself through the kenotic activity of Jesus, then all of those who die in Christ are participants in the Divine Self-mediation. That is to say, God knows himself and " experiences " himself through genuinely Christian death. If it is in such human outpouring (always in the context of Christ's death, of course) that God's own inner life is made eminently lucid to himself, then the Christian's vision of the Divine glory may be understood as somehow coinciding with a Christ-like appropriation of one's own (and others') self-abandonment in death. That such death is at the same time man's access to resurrection is a theme which cannot be explored here but one to which contemporary theology is giving continually more emphasis.

CONCLUSION

The above reflections are not intended to specify the precise content, much less to anticipate the degree of intensity and joy

[27] On this point *see* Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil,* trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 3!i!4-!i!6.

[28] Karl Rahner, *On the Theology of Death,* rev. trans. by W. J. O'Hara (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967).

involved in what has traditionally been called the beatific vision. All I have attempted to clarify is that encounter with God does not preclude the mediation of humanity even when we speak of a " final " eschatological, face to face encounter with God. Moreover, our concern even here has been less to describe the contours of such a future eventuality than to expose the implications of our concrete involvement with our fellow men here and now. Such theologians as Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Rahner have rightly stressed that eschatological assertions must always have, above all, a contemporary existential bearing. It is hoped that the interpretation sketched in this article will be taken primarily as an effort toward elucidation of what is really at stake in our *present* socially human situation and that it will not be viewed as an arrogant attempt to delimit or decipher or interpolate from the future which, as genuinely Christian eschatology always professes, ultimately belongs to God. For if the implications of present symbolic encounter with God are adequately expressed, then the speculative problem of future vs. present eschatology may be dissolved and the real problem of how to render God always present in human existence may receive its proper emphasis.

Finally, we should recognize that further development of the theme presented here would have to include a more thorough scrutiny of St. Thomas's own eschatological reflections.

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WHY DID THE SON OF GOD BECOME MAN?

IT IS PERHAPS not altogether otiose to broach-yet again -one of the most famous questions in theology: if Adam had not sinned, would the Son of God have become man? .[1] In the present article I wish just to take a closer look at the "Thomist" view in the light of recent (and not so recent) criticisms. We shall therefore leave out of account such questions as, Does it matter anyway? or Who cares?.[2] I shall also not be discussing the existence of Adam!

I

To the best of my knowledge, the first writer to ask himself this question was Irenaeus.[3] *Adv. Haer.* 5,14 is devoted to proving that if our flesh had not needed saving, Christ would not have assumed it. He is combatting heretics who denied the reality of Christ's body. Irenaeus replies that if Christ has not taken on :flesh and blood he could not have redeemed us (PG 7,1160-1163). But he also states explicitly: If there were no flesh to save, the Word of God would never have become flesh. (1161)

[1] Some recent literature on the subject: R. Garrigou-Lagrange, "De motivo incarnationis," *Acta Acad. Pont. Rom. S. Thornae* 10 (1944), 7-45; J. F. Bonnefoy, "La question hypothetique," *Rev. Esp.* 14 (1954), 827-868; P. De Letter, "If Adam had not sinned," *ITQ* 28 (1961), 115-125; G. Martelet, "Sur le motif de l'incamation," in *Problemes actuels de christologie*, ed. Bouesse-Latour (Paris: Descleee de Brouwer, 1965), 85-80; G. Tessarolo, *La necessitd dell'incarnazione presso Vasquez*, Theology Dissertation at the Gregorianum, (Rome 1942). D. J. Unger, "The Love of God the primary reason for the incarnation according to Isaac of Nineveh," *Franc. Stud.* 9 (1949), 148-155; "Robert Grosseteste on the reasons for the incarnation," *ibid.*, 16 (1956), 1-86; E. Doyle, "John Duns Scotus and the Place of Christ," *Clergy Review* 57 (1972), 667-675.

[2] According to E. Mascall, *The Importance of Being Human*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 92-98: "The controversy is largely an academic one."

[3] Many of the historical data are given by Martelet, *op. cit.*, 46-60.

Irenaeus was writing about the year 180. Sixty or seventy years later, Origen asked himself the same question.[4] " As long as there is sin," he says, " sacrifice must be made. But just suppose there were no sin: if there had never been sin, there would have been no need for the Son of God to be made the Lamb (of sacrifice), and he would not have needed to be slaughtered in the flesh; he would have remained what he was in the beginning, God the Word."

Athanasius [5] and John Chrysostom [6] followed Origen in the East. In the West, Augustine taught the same doctrine. In *Sermo* 174 [7] he states categorically: If man had not perished, the Son of Man would not have come. The Gloss has the famous phrase, " Tolle morbos, toile vulnera, et nulla est medicinae causa." [8] We find the same doctrine in Cyril of Alexandria, [9] Leo the Great, [10] Gregory/ [1] and others.

In the Middle Ages, however, voices of protest began to be raised. The Fathers, particularly the Greeks, had often put as a motive of the incarnation the deification or adoption of man, almost, it would seem, apart from the fact of sin. The first, however, to answer our question explicitly in the affirmative was Honorius of Autun (died after 1130) who said that the first man's sin was the cause, not of the incarnation but of death and damnation. The incarnation came about because God had predestined man to deification. [12]

Similar theories were expounded by Rupert of Deutz/ [3] Alexander of Hales [14] and Albert the Great. [15] Alexander of Hales, for

•*In Num. hom.* 1, *PG* 756 *(Enchir. Patr.* Rouet
[5] *Adv. Arianos Or. 56* (R
[6] *In Heb. hom. 5,* 1, (R
[1] R 1517.
[8] Quoted by S. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 1, a. 3, sed contra. Cf. Augustine, *Enchiridion,* 108 (R 1929).
[9] *De sancta et consub. Trinitate Dialog. 5* (R
[10] *Sermo* 77, (R
[11] *Moralia* 3, 3 (R
[12] Libellus octo, *QQ. de angelis et homine* PL 1187.
[13] *Comment. in Mt.* 13, *PL* 168,
[10] *De Verbo inc.,* tract. 1, (Quaracchi 4, no.
[15] *In Ill Sent.,* d. a. 4 (Vives 360-362) .

example (to choose an Englishman), reasoned as follows. Man's happiness must be total. Now man has sensitive and intellectual knowledge. His happiness therefore implies that God seizes and makes his own both types of knowledge. God must therefore become incarnate in order to beatify the whole man. The conclusion is, even without sin, God would have become man.

St. Thomas first discusses the question in *III Sent.*, d.l, q.l, a.3.[16] The text is to be noted carefully:

> The truth of this question is known only to God. We can know what depends solely on the divine will only insofar as we can glean some knowledge from the writings of the saints to whom God has revealed his purpose. The canon of Scripture and the quotations from the Fathers mentioned above (Augustine, Gregory) assign one cause to the incarnation: man's redemption from the slavery of sin. Certain theologians[17] say, with great probability, that if man had not sinned, the Son of God would not have become man. This is stated explicitly by St. Leo and St. Augustine . . . Other theologians, however, hold that the purpose of the incarnation of the Son of God was not only freedom from sin, but also the exaltation of human nature, and the consummation of the whole universe. It follows that even had there been no sin, the incarnation would have taken place for these other reasons. This opinion is equally probable.

There are two things to notice about this text: 1) Thomas is basing his investigations on the data of scripture and tradition. He is fully aware of diversity of opinion on the point in question; fl) he is also aware that the scriptures are not conclusive, indeed cannot give an answer at all; and that from the patristic texts, there are arguments on both sides.

When Aquinas deals with the question again, however, nearly twenty years later, he has modified his view. The text reads: " In scripture the cause of the incarnation is always given as the sin of the first man. It is therefore more conveniently said that

[16] An early work (c. dating from Thomas's early twenties.

[17] "Quidam "-frequently used by St. Thomas to cover a large number of more recent magistri like William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, and Grosseteste. See M. D. Chenu, *Introduction a l'etude de saint Thomas* (Paris: Vrin, 1954),

the incarnation is a work ordained by God as a remedy for sin. So: no sin, no incarnation. However, God's power is not limited to this, and even without sin he could have become man "-a balanced text showing an unwillingness to come down definitely on one side or the other but favoring the first alternative. [18]

A third and final text from St. Thomas is his commentary on 1 Tim. 1,15: "It seems evident that if no one had sinned, Christ would not have become incarnate because he came to save sinners." He quotes the Gloss: " Tolle morbum, et medicinae non opus erit," and continues:

> But the whole question is not of any great importance, because if a thing happens it is because God ordered it, and we do not know what he would have ordered if there had been no sin. Nevertheless, the authorities are pretty clear that if man had not sinned there would have been no incarnation, and I think this too *(in quam partem ego magis declino)* .[19]

Not so Scotus. He disagrees, as ever, with St. Thomas. In a celebrated text he argues that Christ's primacy, on scriptural evidence, is absolute. God created the universe so that Christ the incarnate Word should be its summit and perfection. The fall could not be the cause of the incarnation, because that would mean that God's supreme work would be merely a means to an end, in itself.[20]

Thus we have two series of opinions. The first, from Irenaeus and Ambrose, leads through Bonaventure to Aquinas. The other, starting with Honore d'Autun, includes Alexander of Hales, Albert and Scotus. The two positions, now commonly known as Thomist and Scotist, may be summed up thus:

1) *Thomist.* Scripture always connects the incarnation with sin.

[18] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 1, a. 3. This text is quoted with approval by L. M. Dewally, Jesus-Christ Parole de Dieu (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1969), 36; E. Schillebeeekx, *"Die Heiligung des Namens Gottes durch die Menschenliebe Jesu des Christus,"* in *Gott in Welt,* ed. Metz et al. (Freiburg: Herder, 1964), II, 80.

[19] *In 1 Tim.*, lect. 4 (Marietti 40). This work is contemporary with the Tertia Pars; it dates from 1272-1273.

[20] *Rep. Paris.* 3, 7, 4 (Vives 23, 301-304). Eng. trans. in J. M. Carmody (ed.), *Christ and his Mission* (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1966), 218-220. See also R. North, "The Scotist Cosmic Christ," *Acta Gong. Scot. lnternat.* (Rome 1968), III, 169-217.

For example, Lk. 19,10: "The Son of Man came to seek and save the lost"; 1 Tim. 1,15: "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners"; 1 Jn. 3,8: "The reason the Son of God appeared was to destroy the works of the devil." It is therefore reasonable to suppose that, if there had been no sin, there would have been no incarnation either.

2) *Scotist.* God is love. Love is impelled to communicate itself. The incarnation is the greatest manifestation of God's love. Therefore the decree of the incarnation precedes that of grace and of the remission of sins. The motive of the incarnation is thus the diffusion of the divine love. The chief argument for this view is taken from a comparison of Prov. 8,22; Col. 1,15-20; Eph. 1,13-14.[21]

In a word, for the Thomist it is not contradictory to say that everything is ordained to Christ, and yet that Christ is not willed independently of sin. For the Scotist it is.

There is a third position which seeks to combine the insights of both. It is represented by Suarez, Martelet, and Barden.

· Suarez has an extremely detailed and complex treatment of the question, occupying eighty pages of the Vives edition.[22] His position is fundamentally as follows: the incarnation has a double complete and adequate motive: manifestation of the perfection of the divine work and redemption of the human race. The former reason would have been sufficient on its own even if man had not sinned, but since sin it is so no longer. There is one divine decree from all eternity, foreseeing sin and embracing inseparably the remedy for sin and the completion of creation. This theory introduces a hypothetical element into God's knowledge which is difficult (impossible?) to justify. Suarez tried to reconcile the Thomist and Scotist views by widening the

[21] K. Adam follows a Scotist line *(The Christ of Faith* [New York: Mentor-Omega, 1957], 207-211, 238, 341-342). For *Teilhard's* Scotist view see, for example: E. Rideau, *Teilhard de Chardin. A Guide to his Thought* (London: Collins, 1967), particularly 62 and 380-1; P. Smulders, *La vision de Teilhard de Chardin* (Paris: Desclee de B., 1965), 247-260; R. d'Ouince, *Un prophete en proces : Teilhard de Chardin* (Paris: Aubier, 1970) II, 133-190; R. L. Faricy, "Teilhard de Chardin's theology of redemption," *TS* 27 (1966), 553-579; C. Mooney, "Teilhard's approach to Christology," *TD* 15 (1967), 18-25.

[22] Vol. 17, pp. 186-266: *De incarnatione,* q. 1, aa. 3-4, disp. *5.*

scriptural horizon. His efforts, however, met with scant success, and he has not been followed.

More recently G. Martelet has attempted to find a new solution to this old problem on lines similar to those of Swirez.[23] In an article called "A Thomist approach towards Scotism,"[24] W. Barden, too, tries to show that the Thomist and Scotist approaches are closer than is often imagined. His conclusion is the same as that of Martelet: God's will to adopt man is the *motive* of the incarnation; the salvation of man supplies the *mode.*

It seems to me, however, that his position rests on a misunderstanding of both sides. Briefly:

1) He states that for St. Thomas, the incarnation, the supreme act of divine self-communication to a creature, is something incongruous, a sort of madness of divine love. God could not allow himself this madness unless it were compensated by a balancing congruity, viz., the salvation of man from sin. In other words, the only incarnation that God could permit himself is a redemptive incarnation. This does not, in my opinion, accurately represent Thomas's position.

2) He states that the argument from convenience used by both Thomas and Scotus is an a priori form of argument. This is not true. The *principle* of convenience is a priori because it is arguing to a conclusion based on congruence: *potuit, decuit, fecit.* The *argument* from convenience simply demonstrates the fittingness of something *known to be so already* for other reasons.[25]

It is on this question that Lonergan and Rahner, too, part company. Rahner teaches an absolute primacy of Christ[26]; Lonergan maintains a Thomist relative primacy only.[27]

[23] Apart from the article mentioned in note 1 above, see his "Theologie und Heilsokonomie in der Christologie der Tertia," in *Gott in Welt* (Festbabe K. Rahner), ed. Metz et al. (Herder, Freiburg, 1964), II, 3-42. Cf. A. Feuillet, *Le Christ Sagesse de Dieu* (Paris: Gabalda, 1966), 202-213.

••zTQ 26 (1959). 368-375.

[25] F. Ruiz, "El principio de convenienca en cristologia," *Eph. Carm.* 16 (1965), 41-70.

[26] *The Trinity* (London: Burns Oates, 1970); "Christology within an evolutionary view," *Investigations 5,* 157-192.

[27] *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica* (Rome: Pont. Univ. Greg., 1964)' 58-60.

II

To try to resolve this vexed question we must sketch in the biblical theology behind Christ's primacy. It will be convenient to divide our treatment into a series of separate points.

1.. *Christ's only name is Savior.* I use Savior in a sense synonymous with Redeemer, viz., one who saves from sin, who buys back. It is clear from the Old Testament that the prophets looked forward to one who would save the people from their transgressions (Ps. 130:8; Jr. 23:6; Is. 53:5; Dn. 9:24; Zech. 3:9). It transpires from the New Testament that this Savior has come in the person of Jesus Christ (Mt. 1:21; Jn. 3:14; Rm. 3:24; 2 Cor. 5:21; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14; 1 Tm. 1:15; Heb. 2) . St. Thomas comments on Lk. 2:21: Christ is given many names in the Old Testament: Emmanuel (Is. 7:14), Prince of Peace (Is. 9:6) , Ruler (Zech. 6:13) , etc., but the one name that sums up all the others is Jesus, which means Savior *(est significativum salutis) .*[28] Salvation means effecting a total reconciliation between God and man. Christ stands as the sole mediator between God and creatures.

This means that Christ is *our* Savior. He became man *for* us. This is explicitly stated in 1 Cor. 1:30. *For* implies subordination. Are we therefore to say that the incarnation is simply a *means* to the redemption? Is Jesus subordinated to sinful man? See conclusion 2 below.

2. *Predestination of Christ.* The biblical notion of predestination [29] is a divine, eternal, and absolute decree by which God decrees a thing which has some relation to the scheme of salvation. It is a divine ordination from eternity of things which are to take place in time.

Now the Bible does not specifically say that Christ was ever predestined. The Vulgate reading of Rm. 1:4 *(opurOevror;* from *opt'(J)* = determine or declare or designate) *-praedestinatus-* is erroneous. Augustine and Thomas both base their theology

•• *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 37, a. ad 1.

•• Prat, *The Theology of St. Paul* (London: B. 0. W., 433-4.

on this verse, which is unfortunate, but not necessarily invalidating.

If we deny Christ's predestination, we are forced to conclude that God changed his mind.[30] We do not have the fall, and then imagine God's saying: Well, how are we going to remedy this? God's knowledge is supratemporal, everything is eternally present.31 God's decree is unique and includes the whole scheme. And therefore we have to say that Christ was destined to become man from all eternity.[32]

3. *Pre-existence of Christ.* The New Testament is quite clear (pace Schoonenberg)[33] that Christ preexisted from eternity. "The Word was with God." This is particularly evident in Paul, who makes copious use of Old Testament themes. Identifying Christ with wisdom, for example, leads him to attribute creation and conservation to him. According to the New Testament, there was never a time when Christ was not. Nevertheless, the New Testament authors are equally clear that Christ showed himself to men at a particular moment, that he had come to enlighten the world at a precise point in history.

The reason for this apparent dichotomy is that theNewTestament authors do not distinguish two stages in the person of Christ. They do not think of the Word living with the Father from all eternity and then becoming flesh. They think of the one, concrete person Jesus Christ creating in the beginning, and being made man from Mary.[34] Now literally, it does not make sense to speak of the man Jesus before the birth at Bethlehem, so how are we to understand this pre-existence of the man Jesus?

[30] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 24, a. 1 c.

[31] *Quodl. XI*, q. 8 (Marietti, 214).

[32] The predestination of Christ refers, of course, to his humanity. As God Christ is eternal, and therefore outside time. Hence Toledo XI (675): "Christ was born of the Father from all eternity, not created and not predestined (against Arius); but insofar as he was born of the Virgin Mary, we profess that he was born, created, and predestined." *(DS* 586)

•• "Christus zonder tweeheid," *Tijd. voor teol.* 6 (1966), 289-806 and other articles.

•• Cf. J. Bonsirven, *Theologie du Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Aubicr, 1951), 408-404; L. Cerfaux, *Le Christ dans la theologie de saint Paul* (Pa.ris: Cerf, 1954), 878-4; H. Langkammer, "Christus mediator creationis," *Verbum Domini,* 45 (1967), 201-208.

It seems that in the mind of the hagiographers, Christ preexists in Old Testament prefiguration. For the Jews this presence in type was not simply symbolic but the beginning of real existence. Similarly, for example, the Torah was considered to have been with God always, even before being formally promulgated on Sinai. The Letter to the Hebrews (8:5) attributes a similar preexistence to the sanctuary and the mosaic rites.[35] Jesus was always God and man, always a creature, but somehow above our time. He lived on the plane of salvation decree. Prat[36] disagrees with this exegesis, Bonsirven and Cerfaux[37] both accept it. Benoit has given a detailed defense of it.[38]

It must be admitted that Thomas seems not to have known of this. Thus in I,q.45,a.5 creation is given as a mystery in the eternal Word, but not in Jesus (Martelet). This does not seem to reflect the biblical doctrine. Cf. also *Camp. Theol.* c.96.

4. *Primacy of Christ.* The biblical notion of Christ's primacy is complex. 1) It includes the idea that Christ is the first of the series of created beings (Col. 1:15). Christ is also outside the series, because as the divine Word he participates in the action of creation. He is also the first to rise from the dead; he inaugurates the last times; he is the eschatological point of departure. 2) Christ is also the first in rank.[39] 8) Everything depends on Christ. He created all things, and holds them in being, and everything tends to him.[40] 4) He is the principle of cohesion, reducing everything to unity. Thus Eph. 1:10. The Greek word *avaKecpaA.au!>a-aa-Oa*means repeat, reduce to a main point, recapitulate, reassume. In the context it means to recapitulate (give a head to) the whole universe. Everything is subordinated

[35] L. Malevez, "Le message de Jesus et l'histoire du salut," *NRT* 89 (1967), 182.
[36] *Theology of St; Paul* (London: B. O. W., 1927), II, 115-116.
[37] References in note 34 above.
[38] "Preexistence et incarnation," *RB* 77 (1970), 5-29.
[39] *JB* note to Col. 1:15.
[40] See also J. H. Wright, "The consummation of the universe in Christ,". *Gregorianum* 89 (1958), 285-294; G. Bonnefoy, "II primato di Cristo nella teologia contemporanea," in *Problemi e orientamenti di teologia dommatica* (Milan: Marzorati, 1957), II, 128-286; P. Munoz, "La mediaci6n del Logos preexistente a la encarnaci6n en Eusebio de Cesarea," *Estud. Ecles.* 43 (1968), 881-414; F. M. Braun, "La seigneurie du Christ dans le monde selon saint Jean," *Rev. Thom.* 67 (1967)' 857-886.

to Christ the head, and to his Church. Cf. Eph. 1:22. The capitulation of everything in Christ is realized in the Church. This concept of Christ as the focal point of the universe is justified in Paul, for whom the Redeemer is the principle which reduces everything to a unity. Christ has absolute primacy in the order of salvation. [41]

Christ's primacy has a special modality, that of redemption. Christ enjoys primacy as Savior. Now either the incarnation is redemptive or it is not. In the logical order, incarnation of another type is not denied. Redemption and incarnation are not intrinsically connected. But in the historical order, only one incarnation is known and only one Christ. Christ crucified realizes the conflux of all creation.

Consider the following argument. Col. 1: 26 states that Christ is the cause and end of everything. His task is to restore everything and bring it to perfection. The conflux of the universe is realized according to an ordered scheme which means subordination. Christ, head of the Church, recapitulates in himself all things because they are ordained to Christ the Church: " He is the head of the body the Church; he is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent" (Col. 1: 18). Domination over creation exceeds, spatially speaking, domination over the Church, and Christ's first definition is thus Head of Creation. In other words, one cannot argue: Christ is head of the Church, and therefore head of the universe (as the Thomists do) but rather the other way round. On biblical principles, creation comes before redemption.

The position just described is untenable, because spatial domination is not primacy. Christ exercises dominion over the universe as head of the Church. [42] The Church is at once part of the universe and its influxive center. The Church is Christ's

"A. Feuillet, *Le Christ Sagesse de Dieu* (Paris: Gabalda, 1966), 202; J. M. Dufort, "La recapitulation paulinienne dans l'exegese des peres," *Sc. Eccles.* 12 (1960), 21-38; I. H. Dalrnais, "La fonction unificatrice du Verbe incarne dans les oeuvres spirituelles de saint Maxime le Confesseur," *ibid.*, 14 (1962), 445-459; J. Danielou, *La Resurrection* (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1969), 68-69.

•• John Eriugena, *Homilia in Jn. 1:23, Sources Chretiennes* 151, ed. E. Jeauneau (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1969), 310.

body and as such makes him present to the world in a visible fashion. Cf. Eph. 1: "And God has put all things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the Church which is his Body, the fulness of him who fills all in all." [43]

The Church's centrality is indicated by its position in the mystery of God's salvific will. This mystery is not cosmogonic, but Christ (1 Cor. 7-8), Christ in us (Eph. 3: 9), Christ Crucified (1 Cor. 1: Christ Risen (1 Cor. 15: preached by the prophets and Paul, and manifested in the Church: " That through the Church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly place" (Eph. 3: 10). There is but one mystery in three stages: wisdom, Christ, the Church. [44]

5. Incarnation of the Son only. The Thomistic thesis [45] is as follows: the assumptive potency is common to Father, Son, and Spirit. Although only the Son became incarnate, any of the three Persons could have done so.[46] St. Anselm held a contrary view [47] and so does Rahner.

For the Thomist thesis we may argue as follows.[48] Christ is the image of God. He is the exemplar, the pattern on which man was made. To reconcile humanity with God, it was fitting for the Son to become man rather than the Father or Spirit. The second person of the Trinity thus creates and recreates. Similarly Christ is the Word, the Logos by which the Father eternally expresses himself. The immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity: just as Christ expresses the Father in eternity, so he expresses the Father also in time. [49] Christ is the mediator who

•• *RSV* translation, The English *JB* is erroneous, the French *JB* non-committal .

.. These are also the conclusions of 0. Cullrnanu, *Christology of the New Testament* (London: SCM Press, 1959 and 1963), 228-230, and E. Kiisemanu, *Jesus means Freedom* (London: SCM Press, 1969), 67-68.

•• *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 3, a. *5.*

•• B. Lonergan, *De constitutione Christi* (Rome: P. U. G., 1964), par. 61.

-*'De Fide Trin.* 4 (Corona I, 64-65); *Cur Deus Homo* 2, 9 (Corona I, 130-181), quoted by Thomas Aquinas, *III Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. *3.*

•• *III Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2.

•• Cf. *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 42; Y. Cougar, "Dum Deum visibiliter cognoscimus," *Maisan-Dieu* 59 (1959), 132-161.

communicates the Father's will to us, and our response to the Father's initiative. Communication is through the body. Christ became man.[50]

This does not mean, however, that the Father could not have become man. We cannot put a limit on God's absolute power. It is true that the Father is, by the very fact of being Mystery, unapproachable and ungenerated. It is also true that in the actual economy the economic Trinity reproduces the pattern of the immanent Trinity insofar as Christ has revealed it to us. But it is not a priori impossible for the Father to be born in time. In his divine nature the Father is unborn, but could have become man in time. The incarnation in that case could not have been called a mission/[1] it would have been another type of incarnation. This Thomist position is admittedly weak, but it is not essential to the Thomist position on the motive of the incarnation, despite misconceptions to the contrary (see conclusion 3 below).

6. The *messianic blessings* (eschatological shalom) need not have been willed by God on any hypothesis whatever.

Paul's letter to the Romans stresses the superiority of Christ's gift to man. If Adam's sin caused the damnation of all, justification delivers all not only from that sin, but from every sin. The reign of death gives way to the reign of life. In other words, solidarity in Christ does more for our good than solidarity in Adam for our harm. This is specifically stated in Rom. 5: 15-17, but it is also the theme of the first eight chapters of the Letter. To stress the wonder of God's consummate justice, Paul contrasts man's present state with the negative theme of humanity's misery without Christ. Sinful man at first sight sets at nought God's designs of love, but, to the contemplative theologian, sin has enabled God to display his love with all the greater force.[52]

The Cross is the supreme proof of God's love (Rom. 5: 8;

[6°] Cf. *In Col.*, lect. 4 (Marietti 29-43).

[61] *III Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3.

[62] A. Feuillet, "Le plan salvifique de Dieu d'apres l'Epitre aux Romains," *RB* 57 (1950), 336-887, 489-529; *II Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 8, ad 4.

1 Jn. 3: 16; Eph. 5: 2) . From permitted sin arises something greater. In the words of Feuillet, the apex of God's self-giving is Christ crucified.[53] In other words, it seems to be Paul's teaching that God's love has reached the summit, beyond which even God's love cannot go, not in Christ as such but in the crucified and risen Christ, in the Christ who shed his blood to save men from their sins. This is why we find Adam's sin apostrophized in the Fathers as a happy fault. For example, Ambrose says: "Adam's sin was more fruitful than damaging because it gave rise to the redemption "[54] My fault has become the cause of my redemption ... it is more fruitful than my innocence would have been"[55]; "Felix ruina, quae reparatur in melius."[56]

7. *The hypothetical question.* It has been said[57] that the hypothesis, if man had not sinned, is sheer possibility and has nothing to do with the incarnation. Of the possibility of other economies we know and can know nothing.

However, if properly understood, the hypothetical question "can throw a definite light on our present situation."[58] It is used correctly, for example, by J. A. Baker in "The Foolishness of God "[59]: "If Herod the Great had risen from the dead, this would not have been tolerable to reason as a testimony to God ... Conversely, if Jesus had not been vindicated (by being raised from the dead) , and in a way which demanded a divine action as its cause, the glorious hope would not have been refuted, but it would have remained-a hope."

It is misused by Martelet. He argues: the world without grace is a possible but unreal hypothesis. The conclusion is Christ's

[53] Cf. also what used to be the prayer at the Offertory: "mirabiliter creasti et mirabilius reformasti "; *Comp. Theol.,* c. 237.

[54] *De inst. virg.* 17, 104. *PL* 16, 846.

[55] *De Jacob et vita beata* I, 6, 21. *PL* 14, 637.

[56] *Ennar. in Ps* 39. *PL* 14, 1116.

[57] J. F. Bonnefoy, see note I. Cf. C. Butler, "The Theology of Vatican II," *DLT* (London, 1967 and 1968), 155: "The medieval question itself (whether the incarnation would have occurred if man had not fallen) ... seems to express an adventure into the unreal field of impossible hypotheses."

[58] P. De Letter (note I above), 115.

[59] *DLT* (London, 1970), 278-279.

priority: if there is grace, it is gratuitous; if there is Christ, he has primacy. From the possibility of a non-elevated human nature, the conclusion is that grace is gratuitous. Similarly from the unreal hypothesis, If Adam had not sinned, the conclusion is that Christ has primacy.

Yes, but only primacy with regard to sin. The hypothesis is limited to one condition, and therefore the conclusion must be, too. Perhaps we can make this clearer still. Martelet is in effect asking whether Christ's primacy (Col. 1: 16; Eph. 1:2-10), on New Testament data, is absolute or relative. To find out, he puts himself the hypothesis of a world without sin. On this hypothesis, would Christ have become man? Yes, he answers, because Christ is willed from eternity. Therefore, he concludes, his primacy is absolute. This is begging the question: we have precisely to prove that Christ is willed from eternity even in a (hypothetical) world without sin. The reasoning should be: a world without sin is a possibility; therefore, if there is sin, Christ's primacy concerns sin.

8. *Rahner.* There is some slight unease abroad concerning Rahner's application of the transcendental method to theology. For Rahner, as for Kant and Heidegger, transcendentals are the a priori conditions of spiritual activity, the conditions which make an object of thought or willing possible. Rahner tries to counterbalance the objectivism of classical theology in which the statements of Christian belief can seem mythical because they have no connexion with man's experience in his effort at self-understanding. According to this view, the theologian's task is to show the link between statements of Christian belief, as found in the various professions of faith, and man's contemporary self-understanding.

The whole problem here is the articulation between human existence as an a priori transcendental of faith and Christianity as a historical a posteriori. Rahner certainly avoids deducing Christianity from the a priori conditions of the spirit. But he leaves the impression that the only a priori conditions of the spirit that he retains are those which are needed for revelation to respond to. Does this not risk leaving out of account certain

aspects of revelation? The word of God is not sufficiently respected in itself: instead of commanding the whole of man's theological understanding, it becomes merely the *occasion* of man's own theological self-understanding. [60]

Congar, citing Lohfink, has the same criticism. [61] Rahner does not accept the given of Scripture but tends to elaborate a system or framework of philosophical concepts into which he fits scripture. The bent of his mind is above all philosophical and strives to approach questions by deepening the concepts involved; it is transcendental, in that it tries to establish what the reality considered supposes on the part of the considering subject. There is great power here, a source of intellectual strength and new ways of looking at questions. But it also imposes a rigid conditioning on the part of the theologian whose main task is to listen to the word of God.

III

After these lengthy preliminaries, we are now in a position to draw our conclusion.

1. On the precise hypothetical question the answer must be that we do not know, as God has not revealed it. But certainly from what we do know, it is more biblical and more realistic to answer in the negative, with St. Thomas. [62] The biblical justification for the Thomist view can be summed up in three phrases:

A) The only Christ we know is the crucified and risen Lord, whose death and resurrection were interpreted by Christ himself as salvi:fic (point 1 above). "Christianity's fundamental conviction on redemption and grace is such that all men are offered

[6°] For these two paragraphs, see C. Geffre, *RSPT* 54 (1970), 345-347.

[61] *Ibid.*, 868-369. Cf. Y. Cougar, "Bulletin de theologie," *RSPT 56* (1972), 311-Sl!l.

[60] W. Farrell, *A Companion to the Summa* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948), IV, 20-30. My own view, I think, is stronger than St. Thomas's. He concedes " equal probablity " to the " Scotist " position, while yet adopting the " Thomist " one. To my mind this is too charitable a concession to his opponents. The most we could allow, from all that has been said, is that the Scotist position is" possible."

divinizing and forgiving grace, but in such a way that a) only in Christ, and not simply as man, and b) only as sin-forgiving is it given. This is already clear from Jesus' own interpretation of his death as redemption for all." [63]

B) Christ enjoys primacy not as Christ in the abstract but as crucified and risen (point 6 above). This is Pauline teaching (points 2, 8, 4 above) . But Christ's death and resurrection are salvific. Therefore Christ enjoys primacy only as Savior. [64]

C) According to Eph. 1:22-28, Christ enjoys cosmic primacy as head of the Church. The Church's function in history is salvific (origin in the flow of blood and water from Christ's side). Therefore the incarnation (of which the Church is the asymptotic prolongation) is never considered apart from salvation.

Conclusion: a Christ who would be incarnated but not redeemer falls totally outside the biblical perspectives.

2. This position does not reduce Christ to a mere means. According to 1 Cor. 1:80, Christ's priority is not absolute, that is, there is a certain dependence on redemption. Similarly we might say (as Thomas does) that the king exists for the rustic. This can be expressed by saying that the *finis cuius gmtia* is first and foremost Jesus; the *finis cui* is the redemption. This is the same as saying that Christ's primacy takes on the special modality of redemption.

8. *Data non concesso* that only the Son could become incarnate, it would be because there is only one decree of salvation embracing equally creation and redemption. [65] The pattern on which God created the universe is not simply the man Jesus but the crucified and risen man Jesus. One cannot possibly conclude,

[63] K. Rahner, "Erbsiinde," *Saaramentum Mundi* (Freiburg: Herder, 1967), I, 1110.

[64] F. Amiot, *Les idees mattresses de saint Paul* (Paris: Cerf, 1959 and 41-46; S. Lyonnet, "La valeur soteriologique de la resurrection du Christ selon saint Paul," *G1·eg.* 39 (1958),

[65] " From eternity God, . . . decreed to create the race of man, and foreseeing the fall of Adam decreed to redeem the whole race by the Son's taking flesh," J. H. Newman, *Meditations and Devotions* (London: Longmans, 1953, 1963, 1967). Cf. Vat. II, *Lumen Gentium,* c. *IV Sent.,* d. 43, q. 1, a. qch., ad

with any show of logicality, from Paul's doctrine of Christ the Wisdom of God, that God created with a view to a non-redemptive incarnation, which is the Scotist position. To say, on the other hand, that for Paul and John God created foreseeing a redemptive incarnation in Jesus Christ is to say:

(a) that there is only one salvation decree embracing creation and redemption;

(b) that this salvation decree is not the only possible one, because God created and recreated in freedom:

-which is the Thomist position.

4. Scotus's conclusion does not follow from his premises. Thomas admits the force of Ps. Denis's apophthegm" *Bonum dijfusivum sui,"* [66] but where he concludes to the convenience of the incarnation, Scotus concludes to its necessity. [67]

5. Martelet's attempt at a compromise breaks down because of his misunderstanding (and therefore misuse) of the hypothetical question in theology (point 7 above). In any case, what he adopts from Scotus (the fact that the motive of the incarnation is divinization) has been shown to fall outside the biblical perspectives. Further, he is forced to appeal to the spirit of the Fathers' writings, not only the letter. [68] This already gives rise to suspicion: recourse to the spirit means that his theory does not square properly with the letter.

6. It is still possible, as Thomas points out, that the" Scotist" view represents the facts, because " the full truth of the question is known only to God." But it remains a sheer hypothesis without any evidence in revelation. [69] As a pure theological exercise, one could even elaborate a whole system using it as a working

[66] E. g., *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 1, a. I; *In Dian. De div. nom.,* lect. 1, cap. 4, text us *95* (Marietti, fl69-27l) .

[67] John Damascene concluded, from the nature of divine love as diffusive, to the necessity of creation *(De fide orth.* fl, 2. *PG* 94, 864-865). But then his theology of creation had lost the salvific bias of earlier theology: L. Scheffczyk, " Schopfung und Vorsesung," *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte* II, fla, ed. Schmaus-Grillmeier (Freiburg: Herder, 1963), Ill.

[68] "Sur le motif de !'incarnation" (note 1), 76.

[69] A. Feuillet writes: " The question whether God would have been incarnate if man had not sinned is properly speaking insoluble from scripture " *(Le Christ Sagesse de Dieu,* 21ft).

basis, but it would not perhaps find many adherents. This is perhaps why Rahner's method is criticized: it is often more philosophical than biblical-theological (point 8 above). Thus, although it is perfectly legitimate, as a philosophical process, to speculate on what would have happened if ..., one immediately puts oneself outside the framework of salvation history. There is no reason to suppose that God has revealed anything outside salvation history. The Father is revealed as the author of salvation; the Spirit is revealed in a strongly salvific context as Counsellor and animator of the Church in history; the Word is not revealed as pre-existent apart from history (point 3 above); if creation is attributed to the Word-which according to " Scotist " writers implies that the Word has a function that is not salvific-it is only insofar as creation is itself salvific. If, therefore, Rahner answers our question in the affirmative, he has simply left the realm of theology, because he is no longer pondering the *given* of salvation history.

7. Finally, Rahner's idea that the structure of man is such that he needs the incarnation of the Logos is an example of what Schillebeeckx would call an essentialistic proposition, that is, one that is theologically unfounded. [70] That man needs Christ is not a datum of revelation. The only datum of scripture in this sense, if the Bible is nothing but the announcement of salvation, is that sinful man needs Christ the Redeemer. Revelation knows only sinful man and Christ the Redeemer (that is, man as conditioned by the existentials of original sin and objective justification) ; it has nothing to say about man apart from his present condition, or about Christ apart from his redemptive function as the focus and consummation of salvation history. It could well be that man as such needs the incarnation of the Logos as such; but our source of information for such a statement could not possibly be revelation, and therefore lies outside the immediate scope of theology. It would be essentialistic where the Bible is existential.

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•• "Die Heiligung des Namens Gottes" (see note 18 above), 77-78.

THE ROLE OF NEGATIVE ABSOLUTES IN MORAL THEOLOGY: A NOTE

THE DIFFICULT TASK of trying to comprehend man both in his *being* and in his *becoming* puts moral theology in a position not unlike that of the woman who confided to her grown daughter: " The two great problems of my life have been your father and the stove; every time I turned to watch one, the other went out." In our time man's being threatens to "go out" on moral theology. This can happen if moral theology looks away from negative absolutes. The necessity and origin of such absolutes is the subject of the following reflections.

How is man aware of absoluteness at all? This question underlies the question of moral absolutes.

Prominent in man's consciousness is a type of absoluteness that can be called *logical* absoluteness. To experience this the reader is invited to voice the proposition: The whole is greater than the part. He will recognize that his utterance has the ability to withstand contradiction always and everywhere. Its pure logical consistency is the bond of rational discourse among men. Logical absoluteness, however, is not *moral* absoluteness. The reason for saying this is that man does not experience moral propositions as having logical absoluteness. For example, consider this principle: It is never licit to kill directly an innocent person. If you state its opposite, you do not create the inherent contradiction which you do when you say: The whole is not greater than the part. Besides this direct recognition, there is another reason why logical absoluteness cannot be identified with moral absoluteness. Moral acts take place in the real order-Adolph Hitler was *really* a mass murderer, and Pope John was *really* a kind man-and to insist that the real order coincide with the logical order produces a philosophical Idealism.

The failure of logical absoluteness to ground moral absolutes does not, however, necessarily doom the latter to irrelevancy. Man has a second type of consciousness of absoluteness. This is his awareness of absoluteness in the *ontological* order. While not so clear as his awareness of logical absoluteness, it is by no means an inferior type. Just the opposite. Logical absoluteness is not the model for ontological absoluteness, but rather is its servant.

Man discovers this ontological absoluteness by reflecting not on his navel but rather on his identity as a person. In acknowledging his continuity in the process of becoming, man asserts that he is somehow the owner of the process rather than its property. Moreover, such ownership is seen as necessarily uncircumscribed by boundary lines. Were it not uncircumscribed, man could read the deed of his being and thus grasp himself as a *fait accompli-an* especially unpalatable conclusion for modern man.

To say that man is aware of the absoluteness of being is to say that he recognizes that as a person he transcends time and space. It is not to say that he acknowledges pure absoluteness, though he may realize that it is possible for him to move in this direction. St. John expresses this when he writes," Beloved, we are God's children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. And every one who thus hopes in him purifies himself as he is pure." (I John 3:

Precisely because man's absoluteness is not yet pure, its expression is a problem. If man tries formally to express the absoluteness of his being he will perforce crowd out the expression of his becoming. The result will be a trip down the road toward monism. On the other hand, if man does not effectively express the absoluteness of his being, he will be swept away in the flood of becoming.

Negative moral absolutes solve this problem of expression and reflect, inasmuch as every negation must ultimately be based on an affirmation, the absoluteness (i.e., the achieved

being) of man. Inasmuch as negative absolutes do not positively affirm the absoluteness of man, they avoid exposing such absoluteness on a conceptual level to the contradiction of human becoming. Thus it is possible for man to express his absolute dignity by such an injunction as: Killing the innocent directly is never licit, without equating himself to God.

Underlying the foregoing explanation is, of course, the premise that the moral order is oriented to the fulfillment of the ontological order. Unfortunately, this premise is often obscured because *compliance* is placed as the dominant goal of moral action. Under the sovereignty of compliance man recognizes himself only as an agent designated to perform tasks separate from his core-self. He likens himself to a contractor who is commissioned to build according to architects' blueprints. He considers himself moral if he, too, "adheres to specifications." Compliance is seen as bringing rewards up to, and including, membership in the eschatological Kingdom of God. Yet, in spite of promised rewards, stress on compliance tends to alienate man. He feels the urge to revolt and " do his own thing." Such uprising is not necessarily inspired by human perversity. To say, on the one hand, that man can experience the absolute in himself, and to say, on the other hand, that compliance is his ultimate goal, is not a paradox; it is a contradiction. Even the time-honored styling of man as the servant of God deserves review today; here again, not because of insurgent pride, but because in a fast-moving world we tend to overlook the warning sign, ANALOGY. Careless univocal designation of man as servant to God-with the acme of his perfection in compliance-is simply unfair to the being of man. Moreover, it clashes with the Johannine emphasis on the superiority of friendship over servitude (John 15: 15). With compliance properly subordinated to being, however, man is able to return to his true self, and to the true worship of God. Being through becoming (in Christ as Zenith) is recognizable as the ultimate goal of man's activity, and compliance is for the purpose thereof. Consequently, the principle underlying negative moral absolutes is this: man is always and everywhere

bound by negative rules, not in virtue of what he must not do but in virtue of who he *is.*

A look at how man discovers who he is will further clarify the role of negative moral absolutes. The process is a communal one carried on in materiality. Space and time are, therefore, the dimensions in which the ever increasing (or decreasing) awareness of man's being takes place. These dimensions dictate that the process be an inductive operation. Therefore, since experience, hypothesis, and trial-and-error verification mark the way to man's understanding of who he is, they likewise mark the way to the formulation of negative moral absolutes. However, it should be noted that the induction spoken of here has an aspect not found in ordinary scientific induction. This moral induction, while it also proceeds from sense experience, ultimately results in an understanding of the one who experiences as well as his experience. It thus conveys an absoluteness which would of necessity be foreign to the process of induction as carried on by what we today term " science."

It might seem that such inductive derivation of negative moral absolutes would conflict with the function of the Church's teaching authority. However, I believe that it does not. From a natural standpoint, social authority is required to preserve what the community has inductively achieved in understanding man's being. For example, we readily call upon our Bill of Rights. Authority also functions to propose legal hypotheses to promote our well-being. These in turn are subjected to verification by acceptance or rejection, as happened to Prohibition. Now when we consider that the Church promotes in a non-alien way the even more real becoming of man (" I have come so that they may have life and have it to the full." John 10: 10), inductive derivation of moral absolutes-with the resulting intensity of conviction peculiar to the believer-can be seen as intimately connected with the Church's teaching authority.

An infallible pronouncement of a negative moral absolute, admittedly hard to find, does not have to be seen as an exclusive revelation from God. It can be seen, I believe, as the definitive confirmation of a moral truth of which the faithful have already

gained some awareness. For example, if there should be a papal definition of the absolute wrongfulness of directly killing the innocent, this would not be the injection of a truth by the Pope into the community of believers. It would rather be the solemn ratification, in virtue of man fulfilling his being through faith in Christ and his Church, of a conviction which, by an inductive process, had already entered the consciousness of mankind.

Furthermore, a non-infallible pronouncement seems to me not only not to contradict the inductive derivation of negative moral absolutes but to promote it actively. This type of magisterial teaching calls not for irreformable acceptance but for religious submission of mind and will. On the one hand, such submission allows-with all of the proper conditions met-the possibility of the believer's remaining open for the non-verification of the pronouncement. On the other hand, in a positive vein, such submission invites the believer to accept the teaching and live with it in such a way that it becomes recognized as expressing the absoluteness he himself has achieved in the community of the faithful.

It is worth pointing out again that this recognition is not the shout of" Q.E.D." The perception of negative moral absolutes is the *experience* of each moral agent, an experience especially enhanced for those in the community of faith which is the Church. Demonstration may have helped to bring the subject to the experience, or demonstration may flow from the experience. ffitimately, however, the experience of moral absoluteness is deeper than demonstration; its homeland is not logic but being.

Seeing negative moral absolutes as reflecting the achieved being (absoluteness) of man can, I think, offer a possible answer to those who question the necessity of such absolutes. For example, the well-known moral theologian, Charles E. Curran, has attempted to show that Roman Catholic theology is not unalterably committed to a generic insistence on absolute norms in ethical conduct. [1] His method is to dispute two alleged sources

[1] Charles E. Curran, *A New Look at Christian Morality* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1968), pp. 73-123.

of absolutism: natural law and the teaching authority of the Church. In addition, he maintains that a new ecclesiological and sociological understanding of the Church, on the one hand, and a new theological method, on the other, undermine the traditional support for moral absolutes. Father Curran's arguments would be compelling except for the fact, I believe, that natural law and the teaching authority of the Church are not really the ultimate fonts of negative moral absolutes.

Father Curran points out that natural law " does not designate a monolithic philosophical system with an agreed upon code of ethical conduct which has existed throughout the history of the Catholic Church." I agree with this statement. What I say in addition, however, is that because absoluteness is not found in a philosophy of natural law, we are not precluded from finding absoluteness in the being of the philosopher himself. This is what I tried to do above. Moreover, an inductive journey to moral absolutes would not seem to need the aid of a perennially existing philosophical roadmap of ethical conduct.

In like manner, I think that the teaching authority of the Church is not the basic source of the absoluteness expressed by negative moral absolutes. While the Magisterium plays an essential role in the development of awareness of moral absoluteness in the subjects who constitute the community of believers, it does not inject absoluteness itself. It could only do so by exercising a voluntarism transmitting a direct ontological experience of the Divine Will. Since such a moral Ontologism is unacceptable, the Magisterium must be seen as the educer, rather than the creator, of absoluteness. Thus the development in official teaching, of which Father Curran speaks, would not seem to me to be out of phase with the process of magisterial education. For example, I believe that we are just now arriving at the absolute wrongfulness of forced self-incrimination.

Neither do I think that negative absolutes should be retired from moral theology because they do not receive the same port from the new ecclesiological and sociological understanding of the Church as they received from an older, more authoritarian perception. If you grant that the absoluteness of negative moral

absolutes is not imposed upon man *ab extra,* the decline of authoritarian support is not necessarily to be lamented. Rather, it even can be approved. If authority contributes the major support to moral absolutes beyond the time of historical necessity, it can prevent man from developing the sense of his own being which these absolutes are meant to reflect.

Lastly, I do not see the replacement of a classicist theological methodology by an historically conscious methodology as obviating negative absolutes. I admit that it would do so if moral absoluteness were logical absoluteness. In such a case, given the demise of classicist methodology, the moral consciousness would no longer have a deductive *gridwork* to travel from universal principle to particular conclusion. Without this gridwork there would be no unity and therefore no absoluteness in any moral conclusion. However, with moral absoluteness seen not as flowing from a logical gridwork, but rather as an ontological achievement along an inductive path, the methodology must be historically conscious.

In conclusion, let me say that by no means do I think that negative moral absolutes are essentially the whole of moral theology. They do, I believe, represent moral theology's systolic grasp of man's being. Together with such an achievement goes an equally important diastolic thrust into man's becoming. This is the area of behavior in which the diversity of circumstances is potentially unlimited. Both the systolic and the diastolic must be found in moral theology until man has finished his journey through time. Only then will God be All in All.

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SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN DESCARTES' *MEDITATIONS* [1]

I

DESCARTES' WORK HAS always been among the most problematic in the history of philosophy, combining, as it does, genius and clarity with apparent inconsistency and circularity. Since these latter difficulties generally involve a tension between theological and rationalistic strains in his thought, they have occasioned such explanations as the "dual allegiance" theory, according to which Descartes was so strongly under the influence of his Catholic training, and took his religious beliefs so for granted, that he failed to perceive that they were challenged by his rationalist philosophy; and the "insincerity" theory, according to which he was aware that his religious statements conflicted with his rationalism, but maintained them for prudential reasons, such as to ingratiate himself with the powerful church. The former view may thus be said to give the benefit of the doubt to Descartes' honesty, the latter to his acuity.

The latter view has never been the dominant one, though it has been advocated periodically, beginning with some of Descartes' contemporaries. Bernard Williams, in his article on Descartes in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (New York and London: Macmillan, 1967), writes that Descartes' suppression of his early treatise, *Le Monde*, when he learned of Galileo's condemnation,

> reveals that spirit of caution and conciliation toward authority which was very marked in him (and which earned the disapproval of some, including Leibniz and Bossuet). The suppression also

[1] For much in this article I am indebted to Richard Kennington and Stanley Rosen.

affected the subsequent course of his publications, which were from then on strategically designed to recommend his less orthodox views in an oblique fashion. (p. 344)

This is, I think, undeniable. The question is, how unorthodox were his "less orthodox" views, and would his "obliqueness" extend to presenting unorthodox views masked as orthodox views which he believed to be false? [2]

Betty Powell has made use of this theory in a recent paper, [3] arguing that Descartes was more of a mechanist than commonly supposed and that his dualism was ultimately an explanatory rather than substantial dualism. Descartes' attitude, she claims, was that the mind which explains the world in mechanistic terms cannot itself be regarded mechanistically, or an infinite regress would develop which would render the explanation uncompleteable. She suggests that Descartes posited mind as distinct from body so that it would function in explanation as outside the events to be explained, thus precluding an infinite regress. Thus it does not entail, she points out, the belief that men are not machines. To be sure, Descartes speaks as if it does; but she gives evidence that, for reasons of personal prudence in an age of persecution and concern for public morality in an age of dogmatic faith, Descartes was sometimes careful not to reveal his true views to the reader.

I am interested here not so much in examining Miss Powell's thesis in particular as the general attitude toward Descartes which it implies. If, as this theory suggests, Descartes was capable of dissimulation so as to present his unorthodox views in the guise of orthodoxy, does it mean that we cannot trust his orthodox statements at all, and must be suspicious of his philosophy wherever it seems at all orthodox, such as in his theology

• The term " orthodoxy " in this context is somewhat ambiguous, since, if one takes orthodoxy to mean 17th century Thomism, Descartes is not orthodox in any case. In what follows I shall use " orthodox " (if not quite accurately) to refer to theological views which might be acceptab1e to, though not necessarily identical with, the prevailing orthodoxy.

[3] " Descartes' Machines," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 71 (1970-1), pp. 209-22.

or his anti-materialism? The present study is an attempt to discover what sort of picture of Descartes' philosophy would emerge from such an interpretation, and what evidence exists for it.

There is no question that Descartes sometimes acted from motives of personal prudence, such as in his suppression of *Le JYlonde,* and it is also obvious that he was aware of the danger to public morality posed by any statements that might undermine religious faith. Near the beginning of the letter to the theologians of the Sorbo nne, which prefaces the *Meditations,* he writes:

> And since in this life one frequently finds greater rewards offered for vice than for virtue, few persons would prefer the just to the useful if they were not restrained either by the fear of God or by the expectation of another life. (p. fl) [4]

And in the *Discourse on Method* he says:

> next to the error of those who deny God, which I think I have sufficiently refuted, there is none which is so apt to make weak characters stray from the path of virtue as the idea that the souls of animals are of the same nature as our own, and that in consequence we have no more to fear or to hope for after this life than have the flies and ants. (p. 574)

Nor is there any question but that in times of persecution people must often veil their true beliefs, or not be heard at alJ.5 Schopenhauer interprets Vanini in this way,[6] and Russell's interpretation of Leibniz is similar. That this sort of dissimulative writing was fairly common is witnessed by Kant's reference to it in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A749). Even David Hume, living at a more liberal time in a more tolerant country, put his skeptical views " Of a Particular Providence and a Future

• All page references to Descartes are to Adam and Tannery's edition of the Latin text. Translations are either by Laurence J. Lafleur (Descartes' *Jtleditations,* 1960, and *Philosophical Essays,* 1964, New York: Bobbs-Merrill) or are my own.

[5] Cf. Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, lllinois: The Free Press, *195fl)* .

[6] *Essay on Frreedom of the Will* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 71.

State " into the mouth of a presumably fictitious " friend," while expressing, in his own person, fears that these views might be detrimental to public morality-a device which he expanded when he further elaborated these views in *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.*

None of this, of course, is evidence that Descartes was less than sincere in his writing. At most it establishes a certain historical context within which such a claim might be made intelligible, whereas in our own society it would scarcely be credible, as freedom of speech and publication is prevalent, and the public is kept well informed of any opinions likely to endanger its traditional beliefs and morality. This historical dimension, particularly the historical evidence for supposing Descartes to have been insincere in his religious statements, is discussed in depth in a recent article by Hiram Caton,[7] who makes an impressive case for doubting Descartes' sincerity. It is necessary, however, to examine also the internal evidence of Descartes' work, to see whether it accords with this conclusion and, if so, exactly what is at stake in the issue. To this end, let us examine Descartes' most popular work, the *Meditations.* In particular, I shall discuss five issues in which there appears to be some tension between the religious and scientific sides of his thought and which thus seem to afford a good basis for our inquiry: 1) whether religious truths can be demonstrated by reason alone, 2) the aim of the *Meditations,* 3) whether clear and distinct ideas are indubitable, 4) the proofs for the existence of God, and 5) whether mind and body are distinct substances.

II

REASON AND FAITH

The Aim of the Meditations

As Descartes hoped to assure maximum circulation for his works, he was anxious that the powerful church give its approval to them rather than condemning them and placing them on the

[7] " The Problem of Descartes' Sincerity," in *The Philosophical Forum* 2 (1971), pp. 355-70.

index of forbidden books as it eventually did. Accordingly, he wrote to the theologians of the Sorbonne, who entirely dominated the intellectual world of France, seeking their approval of the *Meditations.* Descartes published the letter with the *Meditations,* since it purports to be " a brief statement of what I herein propose to do." (p. 1) In it he proposes to convince the atheists of the two " principal questions " of philosophy: the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Since the atheists lack the faith with which to believe, they must have things proven by natural reason alone. Accordingly, Descartes says he will show how " we can know God more easily and more certainly than we know the things of the world," (p. 2) and will attempt to refute those who argue that the soul perishes with the body. (p. 3) It is his aim to give these truths "so clear and exact a presentation that it would thenceforward be evident to everyone that they are valid demonstrations." (p. 3)

In the next paragraph, however, he states that " not everyone will be able to understand them " because of the complexity of the subject. Accordingly, he decides, " I do not suppose that they will have any great effect unless you take them under your protection," (p. 5) and he concludes that the authority of the theologians

> will cause the atheists, who are ordinarily more arrogant than learned and judicious, to set aside their spirit of contradiction, or perhaps themselves defend the arguments which they see being accepted as demonstrations by all intelligent people, for fear of appearing not to understand them. (p. 6)

I think it is fair to say that this letter ends on a different note from where it began. It begins by saying that we can know God " more easily " than the things of this world, and that the proofs will be so " clear " that their validity will be " evident to everyone," and ends by saying that they are so difficult and complicated that very few will be able to follow them. Similarly, it begins by saying that the work is directed to atheists who accept only what is proven by natural reason, and ends by saying that the atheists will be convinced more by their respect for the

judgment of the theologians (who were burning them for heresy) than by any of the reasonings Descartes advances. This vacillation provokes the question of whether Descartes was sincere in proclaiming the proofs of God's existence and the soul's immortality as the principal aim of the *Meditations.* It is worth turning to the *Meditations* to see whether this seems to be its primary objective.

In the case of immortality, the answer comes surprisingly soon. After stating in the letter that it is one of the two most important questions, he tells us in the synopsis that he has not fully treated the subject,

> partly because we have already discovered enough to show with sufficient clarity that the corruption of the body does not entail the death of the soul, and so to give men the hope of a second life after death; and partly because the premises from which the immortality of the soul may be concluded depend upon the explanation of the whole of physics. (p. 13)

Thus, although he has fulfilled his promise to try to refute those who argue that the soul perishes with the body, it can scarcely be said to occupy a prominent place in the *Meditations,* and does nothing more than give us the " hope" of an afterlife.

As to the proof for God's existence, he relates one such proof in the letter itself:

> It is absolutely true, both that we must believe that there is a God because it is so taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they come from God ... Nevertheless, we could hardly offer this argument to those without faith, for they might suppose that we were committing the fallacy that logicians call circular reasoning. (p. 3)

They certainly might. Of course, this is precisely what people have accused Descartes of doing in his own proof for God's existence, a proof which seems to be a triple circle. On the basis of the *cogito* argument he establishes the" general principle that everything which we conceive very clearly and very distinctly is wholly true." (p. 85) He then uses this principle to prove the existence of God. (e.g., p. 46; cf. the summary on p. 58) Next

he uses the fact of God's existence to prove that clear and distinct ideas must be true. (p. 62) Having now established that principle again, he uses it again to prove the existence of God. (p. 65) And, having done so, he finds that he can now" infer as a consequence that everything which I conceive clearly and distinctly is necessarily true." (p. 70) This circularity is, in fact, reflected in the chapter headings: the third meditation is entitled" 0£ God: That He Exists"; the fourth," 0£ the True and the False" (devoted to proving the truth of clear and distinct ideas); and the fifth," 0£ the Essence of Material Things, and, Once More, of God: That He Exists."

The periodic attempts to rescue Descartes from the charge of circularity, usually by drawing distinctions of one sort or another to show that the circularity is merely apparent, not vicious, have done little to alter the belie£ that the arugment is fundamentally circular. Probably the best known of these is the claim that when Descartes derives the certitude of clear and distinct ideas from the existence of God it is not to be regarded as a required deduction, which would make the argument circular, but only as a confirmation, which would not. However, Descartes explicitly precludes this. Upon completing the third and final lap of the circle, he says of the knowledge of God that " the certainty of all other things depends upon this so absolutely that, without this knowledge, it is impossible ever to be able to know anything perfectly." (p. 69) The importance of this statement is indicated by the fact that he repeats it two pages later: " And thus I recognize very clearly that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends solely on the knowledge of the true God, so that before I knew him I could not know any other thing perfectly." (p. 71) Also in the synopsis of this, the fifth meditation, he says: " I show how it is true that even the certainty of geometrical demonstrations themselves depends on the knowledge of God." (p. 15)

The fact that a work written by a brilliant mathematician and logician, which is modeled after geometrical deduction, and whose opening page contains a warning against circular argu-

ments, should contain a glaring triple circle in the main course of its argument is not in itself proof of any insincerity on the part of Descartes, but it certainly admits the possibility. In any case, since the function of the knowledge of God is to assure the truth of clear and distinct ideas, whereas this truth was already presupposed in arriving at this knowledge; the knowledge of God, like that of the immortality of the soul, turns out to be an inessential part of the overall position of the *Meditations*- whether Descartes realized this or not. I£ this is true, it would seem that, though Descartes may be sincere in his efforts to demonstrate God and immortality, he seems to have been insincere in telling the theologians that these were the *primary* aims of the *Meditations.* Since the importance of the knowledge of God is to assure the truth of clear and distinct ideas, certitude would appear to be the primary aim and knowledge of God a subordinate one.

Certainly this is the impression given by the opening paragraph of the *Meditations,* which suggests that its chief aim is to achieve "firm and constant lmowledge in the sciences." In fact, he wrote to Mersenne that the *Meditations* is actually a presentation of his physics but that he would not like this generally known, as the opposition of these principles to the Aristotelian ones would prejudice people against him. He hopes his principles will penetrate insensibly, so that people will recognize their truth before realizing the consequences to which they lead.[8] An example of how Descartes hoped to achieve this may be seen from the ensuing pages of the first meditation.

He raises the question of what can be known with certainty. The only thing certain in sense perception, he argues, is that images are present to him. Whether they resemble, or even are caused by things external to him cannot be determined, for he might be asleep. (pp. 18-9) He therefore turns from sensation to imagination: is there anything certainly true in these images, or might they all be pure fabrication? The ultimate elements, at least, of these images cannot be fabricated but are rather

[8] Adam and Tannery edition, vol. III, pp. 297-8.

" simple and universal concepts which are true and existent ... such as corporeal nature in general and its extension," (p. from the mixture of which, as with the mixture of colors, all images are formed. Corporeal nature and its extension, the only such concept Descartes mentions, includes shape, quantity (size and number) , place, time, etc. All these categories have one thing in common: they are measurable and thus reducible to number. This is true even of shape, thanks to Descartes' analytical geometry. It is because number thus turns out to be a fundamental constitutive concept of our experience,

> that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all the other sciences which follow from the consideration of composite entities are very dubious and uncertain; whereas arithmetic, geometry, and the other sciences of this nature, which treat only of very simple and general things without concerning themselves as to whether they occur in nature or not, contain some element of certainty and sureness. (p. flO)

The clear implication of this is that if any certainty is to be achieved in the sciences, the Aristotelian sciences must be replaced by mathematical sciences, since the common denominator of all our experience is number.

Similarly, in the second meditation, Descartes proposes to observe the operations of the mind by melting a piece of wax and inquiring how we know the wax is the same. (p. 30) It cannot be by our senses, for all its sensible qualities have now changed. Neither can it be by our imagination, for, although we may imagine a great many of the wax's possible transformations, " I conceive it capable of undergoing an infinity of similar changes, and I could not compass this infinity in my imagination." Therefore the understanding alone conceives the essential nature of the wax: " its perception of it is clear and distinct ... as I attend ... to the things which are in it and of which it is composed." (p. 31) The essence of the wax is thus its elemental composition, i.e., its material nature or corporeal extension. "And what I have said here about the wax can be applied to all other things which are external to me." (p. 33) So here, elaborating the implications of the earlier passage, we are told

that the essence of everything in the sensible world is its corporeal extension. In the earlier passage this argument was used to discredit the formal sciences; here, by implication, the doctrine of forms itself is swept away. Contrary to Aristotle's teaching, the essence of the wax does not lie in its form: " a body which a little while ago appeared to my senses under these forms . . . now makes itself felt under others." (p. 30)

In another letter to Mersenne, the year the *Meditations* was published, Descartes wrote:

> I have decided to ... fight with their own weapons the people who confound Aristotle with the Bible and abuse the authority of the church in order to vent their passions-! mean the people who had Galileo condemned. They would have my views condemned likewise if they had the power; but if there is ever any question of that, I am confident I can show that none of the tenets of their philosophy accords with the Faith so well as my doctrines. [9]

Descartes' aim was to oppose the principles of Aristotle, while maintaining that his own principles do not violate religious dogma. But this could not be done openly, as the people whose views he attacks in the above letter dominated the intellectual life of France, including the Sorbonne. That is why, as we have seen, Descartes had to smuggle the principles of his physics surreptitiously into discussions of epistemology, which happens with a regularity that bears out his claim to Mersenne that they are the principal purpose of the *Meditations.* I think it is fair to suggest that Descartes was insincere in giving the theologians the impression that the *Meditations* was primarily a theological work, although this does not mean that the theological aspect of theM *editationsis* itself necessarily insincere. Descartes might, after all, have been sincere in his religious statements, although knowing them to be less central to his work than he would like the theologians-whose support he needed-to believe.

It is possible, of course, that some further insincerity may have been occasioned by the need to disguise his anti-Aristotel-

• *Descartes' Philosophical Letters,* edited and translated by Anthony Kenny (Oxford UP, 1970), p. 98.

ianism. Descartes had said that the conclusions which followed from his experiment with the wax applied to all external things, but his illustration of these conclusions by means of something relatively formless like wax makes it easy not to notice that what is at stake here is the doctrine of forms. Had he chosen the human body as an example and, after rearranging its parts, asked whether the same body remains, he could scarcely have replied, "no one denies it, no one judges otherwise." (p. 30) As he himself states in the synopsis of this same meditation, " the human body becomes a different entity from the mere fact that the shape of some of its parts has been changed." (p. 14) But this is contradicted by what he demonstrates in the meditation itself: with regard to all external things (i.e., bodies), they remain the same as long as their constituent matter remains the same. Descartes may have contradicted this deliberately, in the hope of covering his tracks by paying lip service to the hallowed principle his argument implicitly denies; or he may have done so inadvertently, as a result of the lingering effects of his Thomist training. We can best pursue this question by examining the theological portions of the *Meditations.*

III

CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS

The tension between the theological and rationalist dimensions of the *Meditations* is probably most evident in Descartes' effort to prove the indubitability of clear and distinct ideas in the face of the hypothesis of an all powerful, evil deity. As the embodiment of his skeptical method, Descartes supposes the existence of a God who is all powerful and intent on deceiving him. Only if some conviction can prevail against this radical hypothesis is certitude possible. The struggle thus emerges as one between the omnipotence of a God and the certitude of reason. Is there anything, given the evil deity, not open to doubt?

"Without doubt I existed if I was convinced, or even if I

thought anything." (p. It is indubitable, then, that if one thinks, one is. The basis for this certitude is later seen to be " the clear and distinct perception of what I affirm. . . . And therefore it seems to me that I can already establish as a general principle that everything which we conceive very clearly and very distinctly is wholly true." (p. 35) But what is it about clear and distinct ideas that makes them immune to a God's omnipotence?

Every time that this idea of the supreme power of a God, as previously conceived, occurs to me, I am constrained to admit that it is easy for him, if he wishes it, to bring it about that I am wrong even in those matters which I believe I perceive with the greatest possible obviousness. And on the other hand, every time I turn to the things I think I conceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I am spontaneously led to proclaim: " Let him deceive me who can; he will never be able to bring it about that I am nothing while I think I am something, or, it being true that I now am, that it will some day be true that I have never been, or that two and three joined together make more or less than five, or similar things in which I recognize a manifest contradiction and which I see clearly could not be otherwise than as I conceive them." (p. 36)

It is clear from this that the certitude of clear and distinct ideas, including the *cogito,* lies in the fact that their denial involves "a manifest contradiction." It is also clear, however, that the certitude of clear and distinct ideas does not circumvent the omnipotent deceiver hypothesis after all. On the hypothesis of an omnipotent God *nothing* is certain: there is no justification for withholding even the law of non-contradiction from his omnipotence-as is evident from its inclusion in the contrasting half of the dilemma-and I may be wrong about even what seems most obvious, most clear and distinct. On the other hand, according to the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, some things *are* certain: I am sure that even an omnipotent God cannot deceive me on matters whose denial implies a manifest contradiction.

The doctrines are thus wholly incompatible-one making certitude possible, the other making it impossible-and there

seems to be no way of resolving the dilemma without simply rejecting one of the premisses. It is clear which hypothesis-an omnipotent God or the indubitability of logical laws-has more force for Descartes. The law of non-contradiction is equivalent to clarity and distinctness, whereas the omnipotent God was first introduced only as an "old opinion," (p. which is, after all, precisely the sort of thing that Descartes had resolved to set aside at the outset. And here the omnipotent deity is called merely an " idea " which " occurs to me," whereas the opposing ideas are perceived " with the greatest possible obviousness," are conceived "very clearly," and are depicted as indubitable. Unlike the law of non-contradiction, the hypothesis of an omnipotent God is, at least at this point, far from indubitable. It was tacitly weakened in establishing the *cogito* argument and is here sacrificed in favor of the rationalist premiss: Descartes resolves the present dilemma by reminding us that we do not yet know whether God even exists. He does not express any similar reservations about the laws of logic, and when the time comes to prove the existence of God these laws are, of course, already presupposed.

The dilemma was set up in such a way that it could be resolved only by rejecting one premiss in favor of the other. Had the theological premiss been preferred, the result could only have been skepticism. If reason is not autonomous, there is no way out of the uncertainty posed by the omnipotence of God; even our existence cannot be demonstrated if a contradiction might be made true. By their condemnation of Galileo, the theologians showed that they would not accept the autonomy of reason: reason must be in the service of faith and must demonstrate only what faith first affirms. Accordingly, this is the position from which, Descartes assured the theologians, the *Meditations* was written: to demonstrate by reason the truths of faith. (p. 3) What the *Meditations* actually shows, however, is the contrary: if reason is not allowed autonomy, if we cannot absolutely trust its fundamental principles against the possibility of deception, then the logical outcome must be rational skepticism, not rational theology.

Here again we see that the theological considerations of the *Meditations* are not as central to Descartes' purposes as he suggested to the theologians, and further, that reason must be given precedence over them if skepticism is to be avoided. But while this may diminish the relative importance of the theology of the *Meditations*, it does not, once again, demonstrate its insincerity. For this question, let us turn to his more explicit theology, the proofs for the existence of God.

IV

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

There are three (perhaps more) fundamental reasons why one might question the sincerity of Descartes' proofs for the existence of God. The first is the aforementioned circularity, which seems to render the establishment of God's existence superfluous to Descartes' system, rather than an essential part of it. It might be concluded from this that this section was arbitrarily grafted onto the work, and springs, therefore, not from any philosophical necessity but from the political necessity of gratifying the theologians. This interpretation cannot be conclusively demonstrated, but it is certainly possible.

A second reason stems from the language and style of the first, and main, proof, which is remarkably uncartesian. Descartes has been insisting on clarity, lucidity, and simplicity. To avoid error it is of the utmost importance that we move slowly and transparently, avoiding any terms that have not been clearly explained and understood, as is done in mathematics. (cf. p. 13) On the basis of these principles Descartes rejected Aristotle's definition of man as "rational animal," for he "would have to determine what an 'animal' is and what is meant by 'rational'." (p. *Q5)* Of course, it was convenient for Descartes to be able to dismiss Aristotle in so uncontroversial a manner, but there can be no doubt of the importance to him of the principles of clarity and simplicity. Yet as soon as we come to the main proof for the existence of God, these principles of clarity and distinctness are abandoned. Instead we are deluged with

the whole apparatus of technical scholasticism, without a single explanation. Whereas before he found " rational animal " too opaque for his method, he now uncritically employs such terms as " substance," " objective reality," " actual reality," "formal reality," " participation by representation," " degrees of being," "degrees of perfection," "modes," "accidents," "formal causality," " eminent causality," "material truth," "material falsity," etc., without definition, let alone inquiry as to whether they signify anything real. Far from being clear and distinct, the proof is obscure and confusing, despite the fact that it is essentially rather simple and could easily have been stated in clear terms. The style and language of the proof seem so out of character with the general procedure of the *Meditation8,* that it is easy to believe that it is not part of the fabric of the whole, and was written from a different position than the rest of the work.

The third reason is the fact that elsewhere in the *Meditatiom* Descartes denies some of the essential premisses on which the proof is based. Put briefly and simply, the argument is to the effect that if my concept of God (infinite substance) cannot have been synthesized by me from its constituent elements (caused eminently), it must derive from nothing less than infinite substance itself, as the latter's image (caused formally), and thus infinite substance (God) must exist. The minor premiss is that we cannot synthesize the concept " infinite substance " from its components, and the conclusion is said to follow. Obviously it is the minor premiss that requires the most scrutiny, as it is much less evident than the major. The reason we cannot synthesize the idea of infinite substance is that, although we can derive the idea of " substance " from ourselves, since we are substances, we cannot derive that of " infinite " from ourselves, since we are wholly finite. (p. 45) Clearly, then, if there were something infinite in our nature, we could synthesize the concept of " infinite substance " and the argument would collapse. And, as a matter of fact, in the very next meditation Descartes tells us that there is something infinite

in our nature, our will, and that " this is what principally indicates to me that I am made in the image and likeness of God." (pp. 56-7) If the infinity of our will is thus an image of God, it is also capable of furnishing us with the notion of infinity with which the idea of God can be constructed, and the proof collapses.

Suppose that we do not agree with Descartes that the will is infinite, can we derive the idea of infinity by negating that of finitude, i.e., by thinking away the limits of something finite and thus extending it indefinitely? Descartes denies this, claiming that the idea of the infinite is prior to that of the finite:

> For how would it be possible for me to know that I doubt and that I desire-that is, that I lack something and am not all perfect-if I did not have in myself any idea of a being more perfect than my own, by comparison with which I might recognize the defects of my own nature? (pp. 45-6)

Yet, after here maintaining that we cannot arrive at the idea of God by extending our idea of finite substance, he tells Hobbes that we attain the idea of God's infinite intellect, not because it is in us as the formal effect of God but that " it is by extending [our idea of our finite intellect] indefinitely that we form the idea of the intellectual activity of God; similarly also with God's other attributes." [10] It seems, then, that we do formulate the idea of infinite substance by extending that of finite substance, after all. What then of Descartes' question: how could we be aware of our finitude at all if we did not first have an idea of infinity with which to compare it? Descartes removes this difficulty on the next page:

> Is it not even a most certain and infallible proof of the imperfection of my knowledge that it can grow little by little and increase by degrees? (p. 47)

Thus it seems that we can know that we are finite by noticing that we are improvable, for which we do not require the concept of infinity but only of some higher finite state. Furthermore,

[10] *Objections*, III, reply to Objection X.

it seems, by extending this finite idea of ourselves indefinitely we can arrive at the conception of infinity, and once again the proof collapses.

Descartes thus denies in short order two of the fundamental premisses of his proof: that we are in no way infinite, and that the idea of infinity is necessarily prior to that of finitude. Does this give us any reason to suppose that the proof was insincere, or rather, since philosophers tend to contradict themselves on occasion, might it not be simpler to suppose that Descartes simply failed to see these inconsistencies? Given the un-Cartesian method and language of the proof, the fact that the circle renders it otiose in any case, the extraordinary analytical mind that Descartes possessed, and the insincerity he seems to have displayed in his letter to the theologians, I think one can at least say that the suggestion that this proof may be insincere should be regarded as a serious possibility. This would not be to suggest that Descartes necessarily did not believe in God but only that this theological element is not intrinsic to his philosophy and was deliberately imposed onto it from without.

This proof is followed by a shorter one:

> ... the whole duration of my life can be divided into an infinite number of parts, no one of which is in any way dependent upon the others; and so it does not follow from the fact that I have existed a short while before that I should exist now, unless at this very moment some cause produces and creates me, as it were, anew or, more properly conserves me. (pp. 48-9)

The term " conserves " is repeated in each of the next two sentences.

What is demonstrated here is that not only myself, but the state of all things (as the subsequent paragraph explains), must be conserved from one moment to another. Thus far, it turns out in fact to be an argument for Descartes' famous and historic principle of the conservation of motion-that the sum total of motion in the universe in any given direction (mass times velocity) is constant at all times-which was corrected by Leibniz and Newton to the principle of conservation of

force ($\frac{1}{2}mv^2$). For Descartes believed that motion was the essential principle of corporeal substance, as may be seen from *Principles of Philosophy*, part II, XXIII, which is entitled: "That all the variety in matter, or all the diversity of its forms, depends on motion." In the *Meditations*, as well, Descartes suggests that all we can clearly conceive of corporeal substances may be reduced to quantity and motion. (e.g., pp. 20, 43, 80) Given the identification of substances as species of motion, the conservation of substances, which Descartes here asserts, is implicitly an argument for the conservation of motion, a cornerstone of Descartes' physics. The further claim, that this (or any) natural law entails the existence of God as its executor, is arguable and would certainly be rejected by Descartes' intended audience, the atheists, who are perfectly willing to recognize natural laws without recognizing God.

A brief third proof follows this. One cannot have been wholly caused by one's parents, "there being no relation between the bodily activity by which I have been accustomed to believe I was engendered and the production of a thinking substance." (p. 50) Obviously this will be cogent, if at all, only if corporeal and thinking substances are independent; this is the doctrine of dualism, which will be examined in the next section.

The final proof is a version of Anselm's "ontological" proof, presented in the fifth meditation. Stated as simply as possible, it is that we conceive of God as having all possible perfections; and, since existence is a perfection, we conceive of God as necessarily existing; therefore, since "it follows that existence is inseparable from him," God exists. (pp. 65-7)

The ontological proof has always been difficult to grasp and, consequently, highly controversial. I do not wish to become involved in the complexities of this controversy, but, leaving aside any question of the merits of the proof, I should like to call attention to Descartes' handling of one of the problems surrounding it. The argument was not highly regarded in Descartes' time, as a result of the criticism by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas's most convincing attack was the claim that it made

an illicit transition from the realm of thought to the realm of being: while possibly we may have to *conceive* of God as existing (by definition) , it does not follow from this that he *actually* exists: our thought imposes no necessity on things. In modern terms, there is no assurance that our concepts do not denote null classes. Descartes' way of stating the proof makes this objection particularly obvious: "From the fact alone that I cannot conceive God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from him, and consequently that he does, in truth, exist." (p. 67) Having thus laid the proof open to the objection in question, he counters the objection in the next sentence:

> Not that my thought can bring about this result or that it imposes any necessity upon things; on the contrary, the necessity which is in the thing itself-that is, the necessity of the existence of God-determines me to have this thought.

Regardless of the merits or defects of Aquinas's objection, it is clear that Descartes' reply does nothing to meet it. All Descartes does here is to *assume* the point that Aquinas's objection demands that he prove, namely, that our concept of God's necessary existence is not arbitrary but reflects the actual existence of God. In short, his reply begs the question and should convince no one, especially those atheists who refuse to accept circular arguments. He does not further discuss this difficulty but devotes the remainder of his discussion to an analogy between the ontological argument and the necessary truths of mathematics, in which he ignores the decisive difference that, in the case of geometrical figures, conceptual existence is sufficient for their reality (" whether they occur in nature or not "-p. 20), whereas this is precisely not the case with God.

Leaving aside for the moment the proof based on dualism, it seems clear that, in each case, Descartes' proofs for the existence of God are accompanied by their own refutations, or, at least, are mitigated sufficiently to destroy their cogency. Whether Descartes was aware of this and did it deliberately, or whether it was inadvertent, is, of course, another question.

V

DUALISM OF BODY AND MIND

The basis of Descartes' dualism is the following argument:

> it is sufficient that I can clearly and distinctly conceive one thing apart from another to be certain that the one is distinct or different from the other .... Since on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am only a thinking and not an extended being, and since on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body in so far as it is only an extended being which does not think, it is certain that this **"I"** is entirely distinct from my body and that it can exist without it. (p. 78)

We must ask, then, whether in fact the idea of body which Descartes has shown us is " an extended being which does not think " and whether the idea he has shown us of " thinking being " entirely excludes extension. If the answer to either of these questions is " no," Descartes' apparent dualism must become open to serious doubt. As a matter of fact, both questions turn out to have negative answers.

The negative answer to the first question may be seen in a remarkable and puzzling passage in the second meditation:

> For to possess the power to move itself, and also to feel or to think, I did not believe at all that these are attributes of corporeal nature; on the contrary, rather, I was astonished to see a few bodies possessing such abilities. (p. 26)

In other words, Descartes had believed that it was not in the nature of bodies to think and was astonished to find that, on the contrary, some bodies have this ability. What sort of bodies he has in mind is something of a puzzle, but it seems clear that he is here asserting that the nature of body does not exclude the ability to think. From the dualist position, that body and thought are irreducibly distinct, one could never say that body has the ability to think, or the attribute of thought, but only that bodies are conjoined with minds that have this ability. But Descartes can scarcely be saying here that he once thought no bodies were conjoined with minds and was astonished to dis-

cover otherwise; that would be incredible. In the light of his assertion here that some bodies think, the argument for dualism cannot, then, be maintained.

To take up the second question, whether the idea of a" thinking being" excludes the concept of corporeality, let us review precisely what Descartes means by this idea:

> What is a thinking being? It is a being which doubts, which understands, which affirms, which denies, which wills, which rejects, which imagines also, and which perceives. (p.

But perception and imagination can hardly be entirely distinct from extension, since the images they present to us are extended, and even measurable, whether or not they represent real things. (c£. p. 9l9) This is obviously true of perception, and, as for imagination, " it is nothing else than a particular application of the faculty of knowledge to a body which is intimately present to it and which therefore exists." (pp. 71-2) The concept of thinking substance, therefore, far from excluding corporeal extension, is inseparable from it. Accordingly, Descartes now contradicts his earlier assertion that thinking includes imagination and perception and says instead that these faculties are not essential to a thinking being: it may be clearly and distinctly conceived without them, although not vice versa. (p. 78; also p. 73)

Can we really conceive of our thinking nature apart from any images whatever? It is hard to see how, and much that Descartes says goes explicitly against this; for example:

> Is there any one of these attributes which can be distinguished from my thinking or which can be said to be separable from my nature? ... I am also certainly the same one who imagines; for . . . this power of imagining cannot fail to be real, and it is *part of my thinking.* Finally I am the same being which perceives- ... it is certain that it seems to me that I see light, hear noises, and feel heat. This much cannot be false, and it is this, properly considered, which in my nature is called perceiving, and that, again speaking precisely, is *nothing else but thinking.* (p. my emphasis)

But since Descartes may conceivably have changed his position hetween the second and sixth meditations, let us see what is his

present view of the relationship between thinking and the faculties of perception and imagination. Descartes explains it by an analogy: " These faculties are distinct from me as shapes, movements, and other modes or accidents of objects are distinct from the very objects that sustain them," (p. 78) But surely this is an odd analogy to make in support of dualism, since this terminology of Aristotle was meant *to do away with* the dualism of Plato. These things for Aristotle are logically distinguishable but actually inseparable and mutually interdependent: not only can modes not exist without substances, but substances, as individual things, must have accidental properties: what is accidental about such properties is not *whether* a substance possesses them but only which ones it possesses. From Descartes' analogy, therefore, it follows only that it is a matter of relative indifference *which* images or perceptions are present to thought, but it is necessary that *some* are, and that imagination and perception in general, which involve corporeality, are inseparable from thinking substance.

Descartes' claim that imagination and perception may be conceived as distinct from the mind, on which his dualism rests, is in fact contradicted not only by this analogy, by his earlier statements in theM *editations,* and by his philosophy of mind in general, it is explicitly denied (and the position of the second meditation reaffirmed) in this very meditation. Descartes asks how mind and body differ and replies that it is because the body can be divided whereas the mind cannot.

> Nor can the faculties of willing, *perceiving,* understanding, *and so forth* be any more properly called parts of the mind, for it is one and the same mind which as a complete unit wills, *perceives,* and understands, *and so forth.* (p. 86; my emphasis)

Even if imagination and perception were distinct from thinking, however, the concept of a thinking thing would still necessarily involve corporeality. In the first meditation Descartes argued that " corporeal nature in general and its extension " are "simple and universal concepts," (p. QO) i.e., innate contents of the *understanding-and* the understanding, certainly, can-

not possibly be distinct from thinking. Thus, too, in the third meditation he identifies " astronomical considerations " as " certain innate ideas," (p. 39) and in the fifth meditation he speaks of " an infinity of details concerning numbers, shapes, movements, and other similar things " as being, in effect, innate. (pp. 63-4) If, then, the principles of corporeality are inherent in our thinking nature, the argument for dualism vanishes.

Moreover, certain important passages seem inexplicable except on this assumption. In the third meditation Descartes inquires whether he could have derived the elements of corporeal nature from his nature as a thinking being: " since these are only particular modes of substance, and since I am myself a substance, it seems that they might be contained in my nature eminently." (p. 45) He says nothing to qualify this conclusion, as he easily might do by here applying the already established principle of clarity and distinctness that he later employs in his assertion of dualism. Yet the conclusion must clearly be unthinkable for his dualism. If, however, rather than being distinct, thinking substance involves in its very nature the elemental concepts of corporeal substance, there would be no difficulty; this seems the only way such eminent causality could, in fact, be explained.

After Descartes' *cogito* experiment, when he has established that he exists but not yet what he is, he reviews the opinions he has held until now *(antehac):*

> But either I did not stop to consider what this soul was or else, if I did, I imagined that it was something very rarefied and subtle, such as a wind, a flame, or a very much expanded air which was infused throughout my grosser components. (p. 9l6)

In other words, Descartes, who supposedly was throughout his life a devout Catholic, has been holding a materialistic view of the soul. The dualism of the *Meditations* is a disavowal of materialism, but we have seen that this dualism is by no means consistently adhered to. This materialistic conception of the soul, on the other hand, would certainly explain why thinking substance (the soul) would by nature involve the elemental concepts of corporeal substance (matter). It would also ex-

plain Descartes' apparently irrelevant suggestion, in the argument about sense perception, that lunacy (a mental phenomenon) has an entirely physical explanation, the action of black bile vapors on the brain (pp. 18-9); and that other strange remark, that the immortality of the soul can only be demonstrated from principles derived from physics. (p. 18) And it would account for the otherwise seemingly unaccountable language of the very proof itself of dualism, where Descartes treats as equivalent the expressions " a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think" and " a *body* which thinks." (p. 78; my emphasis) Could this latter description of the soul be the explanation of the puzzling statement we saw, where Descartes speaks of being astonished to discover bodies with the ability to think? Are these " bodies " souls, and was his astonishment connected with the discovery of the materialistic interpretation of the soul? In any case, it is worth noting that the reference to the astonishing bodies that think occurs in the same context as his report of his materialistic conception of the soul. (p. 26)

Descartes suggested that the pineal gland is the point of interaction between mind and body, and he has been much ridiculed for this, since it is obvious that a body cannot mediate between mind and body. But if mind itself is material, the problem does not arise.

In light of the above considerations it seems clear that there is a materialistic position in the *Meditations*, as well as a dualistic one, as Caton and Powell have argued also, and on different grounds. Here, too, the tension is attributable to the difference between the scientific and religious points of view, for the science of Descartes' day was often allied with materialism, whereas theology, of course, insisted on the immateriality of the soul.

VI

CONCLUSION

It is clear that there is a great deal of inconsistency in the *Meditations.* The question is, What explanatory hypothesis best accounts for it? On encountering contradiction in a text,

one is inclined initially to give the writer the benefit of the doubt and test the possibility that some subtle distinction is implicit, which, if discerned, would reconcile the apparent inconsistency. This is quite a common approach, for example, to the circularity of God and clear and distinct ideas in the *Meditations.* But, given the extensiveness and magnitude of the inconsistency of the *Meditations* in general, I doubt that a convincing resolution of the whole is possible along these lines: not only would it require a very large number of presuppositions, it would also require us to believe that, contrary to the methodology of clarity and distinctness, Descartes made an enormous number of subtle, obscure, and arbitrary distinctions, of which he gave no direct indication.

A second hypothesis is that he was simply not a very careful writer. This might explain why such contradictions might have gone unnoticed but would not explain why they arose at all: why should Descartes have found himself on both sides of every issue, why should a devout Catholic make not only pious statements but also contradictory statements with heretical implications? To answer this the carelessness thesis becomes the dual allegiance thesis: Descartes was so convinced a Catholic that, when his scientific principles led to conclusions contrary to his faith, he closed his eyes to the resultant contradictions rather than acknowledge the possibility that faith and reason might be at variance. Thus the dual allegiance thesis is a kind of variation on the insincerity thesis, with the difference that, according to the former, Descartes' primary aim was *self* deception rather than deception of the theologians.

For a number of reasons, the insincerity thesis seems to me more convincing than the dual allegiance one. At least since the trial of Anaxagoras, and especially since the Middle Ages, it has been well known that reason and faith are likely to come into conflict. This conflict was indeed a thematic problem in the scholastic philosophy in which Descartes was so thoroughly instructed. Given this awareness, and given the acuteness, penetration, and mathematical-logical genius that Descartes so often displays, I cannot believe he would so utterly fail to perceive

in his own thought contradictions of the proportions we have seen. Again, in his *Notes Directed Against a Certain Program*, he points out (in self defence) similar contradictions in the work of Regius, and accuses Regius of insincerity. That he should be so sensitive to these contradictions in the work of another, and ascribe them to insincerity, and yet be utterly oblivious of the same contradictions in his own work, is difficult to believe. It becomes even more difficult to believe when it is remembered that, as we have seen, he has written letters expressing the intention of waging a surreptitious battle against Aristotelianism. Finally, there is the fact that at least some of the contradictions we have seen were clearly insincere, such as in the letter to the theologians, with which we may compare the following passage from the *Principles of Philosophy* (part III, XLV) :

> Far though I am from wishing that everything I write should be believed, I am going to suggest here some things that I consider to be utterly untrue. Thus I do not doubt that the world was created at the beginning with the same perfection it now has; that the sun, the moon and the stars were there from that time; that not only did the earth harbour the seeds of plants but the plants themselves covered a part of it; that Adam and Eve were not created as infants but already of a mature age.
>
> The Christian religion requires that we believe it so and natural reason persuades us entirely of this truth; for if we consider the whole power of God we have to assume that everything he has done has been perfect from the beginning. One would, nevertheless, know much better what nature Adam and the trees of Paradise had if one had examined how the child is formed in the belly of the mother and how plants grow from their seeds rather than if one had only considered them as they were when God created them.
>
> Thus we shall make the nature of everything there is in the world better understood than by just describing it as it is, or rather as we believe it to have been created, if we can imagine certain principles which are quite intelligible and quite simple. According to such principles we should be able to see that the stars and the earth and in short all this visible world could have been produced as though from a few seeds (although we know that it was not produced in this way). And since I think I have found such principles I shall now try to explain them.[11]

[11] Quoted by C. D. Darlington in *Darwin's Place in History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), p. 94. I am grateful to Michael Ruse for calling this passage to my attention.

From this it seems clear, first of all, that Descartes was well aware of the conflict between the demands of faith and the needs of understanding, even within his own mind, and this alone creates difficulties for the dual allegiance view. Moreover, I think it rather doubtful that he was sincere in his protestations of disbelief in his own principles here. If in some places it seems obvious that Descartes was aware of and deliberately perpetrated such contradictions in order to make his work seem more pious than it is, it is reasonable to try to determine whether the other contradictions can be accounted for in the same way as we have seen that they can.

I suspect the most effective obstacle to the insincerity thesis is the fact that we are relatively unafraid to express our beliefs and feel that there is something dishonorable in such fear. Thus to accuse Descartes of dissembling is to attack his character, whereas he seems to have been an honorable man. But it should be remembered that there are situations in which dissembling may not be dishonorable but rather prudent and even considerate. Even today it is common to express our more controversial views with caution; but suppose our very lives were at stake over our views. Suppose too that public morality was founded on a carefully sheltered set of dogmas, so that publication of arguments undermining such dogma might undermine morality as well-and this was certainly of concern to Descartes, as we saw at the beginning. In that case it would be hard to consider a covert presentation of such views as dishonorable.

It may be wondered what difference any of this makes. After all, it is Descartes' explicit statements that have influenced his successors, therefore they constitute the Cartesianism that is historically important, and whether he was sincere or not is of minor interest. But this is not quite accurate. For instance, several of his contemporaries and successors, such as Hobbes, Regius, and Leibniz doubted his sincerity [12] and responded to him accordingly. To see accurately his place in history, there-

[10] Cf. Caton (n. 7 above), pp. 855-6.

fore, one must see this side of him as well. And, of course, it is certainly of historical interest to decide whether he was long on sincerity but short on coherence, or vice versa. But, most important, if we wish to learn from (or against) Descartes, how we read him will determine what we learn.

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THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO ETHICS

IN THE LAST hundred years evolutionary ethics has been upheld by several well-known thinkers, besides gaining a wide popular audience. We propose to study it here from the methodological point of view. By analyzing the way evolutionary moralists proceed, we shall try to show to what extent their manner of theorizing is acceptable in the light of such usual methodological criteria as consistency and applicability. We shall therefore first review how evolutionary ethics has developed. In a second section we shall discuss various points about the procedure of its contemporary adherents. In conclusion we shall briefly indicate some general conclusions which seem required.

I

Evolutionary ethics is one form of the biological approach to moral philosophy. It thus has its roots in the hedonistic and materialistic currents of Greece and, in modern times, the English empiricists. It had other important sources in the eighteenth century: the Encyclopedists did much to spread empiricist and hedonist views; Condorcet popularized the idea of indefinite progress in all fields, including the moral; the rise of romanticism further prepared the psychological climate by its insistence on the irrational and disorderly aspects of the umverse.

The immediate sources of evolutionary ethics are found, however, in the utilitarianism and positivism of the early nineteenth century. These provided its basic positions and attitudes, while biology gave it a " scientific " basis. Evolutionary theories had been current since the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Thus, Buffon explained the biological development of species as the effects of environment, perpetuated by heredity; Lamarck

claimed these changes were due to the inheritance of acquired characteristics. It took several decades, however, for such ideas to develop into what we now refer to as evolutionary naturalism.

In 1851 Spencer published his *Social Statics,* in which he attempted to shape these trends into a cohesive unity. A real science of ethics is necessary, he held, and it shows that evil arises because we are ill-adapted to natural conditions. The development of life entails a progressive physical and mental adaptation which will result in the eventual disappearance of evil. The evolution of human society is in the direction of complete concord and cooperation. A scientific ethics can thus guide men to happiness by pointing out to them the conditions under which they can attain it.

In such a moral theory the method consists essentially of trying to infer from the data and hypotheses of biologists the direction in which the human species is developing, accepting this as the purpose of life, and deducing from it a moral obligation to act always in such a way as to be in step with evolution.

Eight years after the appearance of Spencer's *Social Statics* Darwin published the *Origin of Species* in which he amassed in a persuasive lineup the scientific evidence for biological evolution. Then in 1871, in *The Descent of Man,* he attempted to show that men's intellectual and moral faculties were also the result of the evolutionary process. Thus, he said, the purpose of life is " the rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigour and health, with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected." [1] Darwin, however, was primarily a scientist, and he preferred to leave to others the task of developing the philosophical implications of his theory. Hence his importance in the history of ethics is due mostly to the use which others made of his biological discoveries.

Thus Spencer's later work, *The Principles of Ethics,* is largely a re-presentation of his early ideas buttressed by the facts which Darwin and other biologists had established. He believed that

[1] *The Descent of Man* (American edition, 1896), p. 97.

the evolutionism he had previously championed was now substantiated scientifically. His aim and method, however, remained the same. Ethics was to be developed in the light of both the evolutionary direction of life and the utilitarian criterion of the happiness of individuals and groups.

In the nineteenth century evolutionary ethics had a number of zealous adherents and they popularized the doctrine in numerous books and articles throughout the world. In Anglo-Saxon lands Spencer did this with the aid of Leslie Stephen and W. K. Clifford. In Germany the oracles of scientific evolutionary ethics were Haeckel, Buchner and Moleschott. The French had two varieties to choose from: the strictly materialistic type of Metchnikoff and an idealist form proposed by Guyau, to whom it had been suggested by Fouillee. John Fiske and Henry Drummond developed theistic versions which appealed to religiously-minded people. Nietzsche, on the other hand, basing himself on the notion of the survival of the fittest, proclaimed the ethics of the Superman.

Spencer and his allies considered evolution as something of a new gospel, which promised heaven on earth for those who evolved rightly. Thomas Henry Huxley believed such optimism unwarranted. In his Romanes Lecture, *Evolution and Ethics* (1893), he attempted to show that civilization is the result not of evolution but of counter-evolution; for the person most fit to survive is not necessarily the best morally.

> I have termed this evolution of the feelings out of which the primitive bonds of human society are so largely forged, into the organized and personified sympathy we call conscience, the ethical process. So far as it tends to make any human society more efficient in the struggle for existence with the state of nature, or with other societies, it works in harmonious contrast with the cosmic process. But it is none the less true that, since law and morals are restraints upon the struggle for existence between men in society, the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the cosmic process, and tends to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that struggle. [2]

• *Touchstone of Ethics* (New York, 1947), p. 58.

And again, "Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it." [3]

Such views had a far-reaching effect on Huxley's conception of ethics and its method. For under such circumstances ethics is aimed "to the end of facilitating the free expansion of the innate faculties of the citizen, so far as it is consistent with the general good." [4] Its method is "the same method of observation, experiment, and ratiocination, as is practiced in other kinds of scientific work," [5] to determine the course of conduct which will best conduce to that end. But Spencer's evolutionary criterion is to be rejected.

For several decades the ethics of evolutionism seemed to have been deal a death-blow by the criticisms of Thomas Huxley. It was, however, revived. A summary formulation of the renewed theory was given by Julian Huxley in the forties. His grandfather, he pointed out, had concluded that the ethical process combated the cosmic. At present however this contradiction of the cosmic by the ethical could be resolved " on the one hand by extending the concept of evolution both backwards into the inorganic and forward into the human domain, and on the other by considering ethics not as body of fixed principles, but as a product of evolution, and itself evolving." [6]

The solution of this contradiction and the renewal of evolutionary ethics, wrote Huxley, was made possible by two developments at the turn of the century, Freudian psychology and Mendelian genetics.

Freudian psychology showed that the seeming absoluteness of moral obligation is merely due to a compulsive aU-or-nothing mechanism of the primitive super-ego.

> This quality of absoluteness is later reinforced by the natural human desire for certitude, as well as by certain peculiarities of our language mechanism .... Thus the absoluteness of moral obligation turns out on analysis to be no true absolute, but a result of the

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 99!.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 66,
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 66.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 116.

nature of our infantile mental machinery combined with later rationalization and wish-fulfilment.[7]

Since one of the stumbling-blocks of evolutionary ethics was the existence of absolutes, Freud rendered an immense service to morality by making clear the real nature of moral qualities. Besides this, modern psychology has greatly changed ethics by bringing out many new facts and a new approach. [8]

Modern genetics aided in this renewal of evolutionary ethics by stressing the fact of man's immense genetic variability, which has important results, both biologically and ethically. Among these are those personal differences which allow us to speak of moral temperaments. Modern genetics has also provided the basis for a comprehensive selectionist theory of evolution. For it has shown that, although mutation provides the raw material of evolution, it has little or no effect on its direction. All other suggested agencies of evolution, Lamarckism, orthogenesis, vitalistic immanent tendencies, and divine guidance have been proven unnecessary, since natural selection is logically necessary and is in itself a satisfactory explanation of the facts. A further development has been the closer analysis of the results of evolution. [9]

We now know, Huxley avers, that in all evidence it is better to have a realistic rather than an unrealistic ethics. Furthermore, it should be realistic both internally and externally. The first occurs when an individual adjusts himself objectively to the moral standards of his society; the second, when the standards of society are realistically adjusted to science.[10]

All this however is merely knowledge of our psychological situation. It does not tell us whether our standards are ethically better.

However, ethics do not merely vary at random: they also evolve. That fact provides our clue. Our ethics evolve because they are themselves part of the evolutionary process. And any standards of rightness or wrongness must in some way be related to the movement of that process through time.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 120.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 30.
[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 32-35.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. *125.*

Now that the moment has arrived when we are able to perceive evolution as an all-comprehensive process of which human existence forms a part, it is impossible any longer to rely on any static guarantees for ethics. Our fuller knowledge discloses not a set of absolute or fixed standards, but a direction of change.[11]

At the beginning of life evolution was biological, proceeding through mechanical interaction and natural selection. With the advent of men it has become conscious and has acquired quicker methods of gaining and transmitting experience. Since such is the case, "ethics can be injected into the evolutionary process. Before man that process was merely amoral. After his emergence onto life's stage it became possible to introduce faith, courage, love of truth, goodness-in a word moral purpose-into evolution." [12]

But how are we to know what are morally right purposes?

When we look at evolution as a whole, we find, among the many directions which it has taken, one which is characterized by introducing the evolving world-stuff to progressively higher levels of organization and so to new possibilities of being, action, and experience. This direction has culminated in the attainment of a state where the world-stuff (now moulded into human shape) finds that it experiences some of the new possibilities as having value in or for themselves; and further that among these it assigns higher and lower degrees of value, the higher values being those which are more intrinsically or more permanently satisfying, or involve a greater degree of perfection. The teleologically-minded would say that this trend embodies evolution's purpose. I do not feel that we should use the word purpose save where we know that a conscious aim is involved; but we can say that this is the most desirable direction of evolution, and accordingly that our ethical standards must fit into its dynamic framework. In other words, it is ethically right to aim at whatever will promote the increasingly full realization of increasingly higher values.[13]

Standards of right and wrong are to be worked out as an expansion of this aim but always with an eye out to reconcile the claims of the present and future. Evolutionary ethics thus

[11] *Ibid.,* p. un. [12] *Ibid.,* p. 135. [13] *Ibid.,* pp. 136-7.

presents the world with dynamic general standards to replace the older ones which are crumbling.

As we analyze this renewal of evolutionary moral theory we find that in essence its method is the same as the earlier. Huxley first marshals all the evolutionary data science can provide; this task is a good deal more complicated for him than it was for Spencer because scientists have discovered so much in the last half century, and furthermore he has enlarged the concept of evolution to start it off with the first appearance of matter, to include all the processes which it has gone and will go through, to that ultimate step in which it is consciously guided by man. From this overall view of evolution he infers its direction of change. As man is a part of nature and all nature is subject to evolution, only that is morally right which is in accordance with this evolutionary direction of change. At this point, however, Huxley slips in hedonistic considerations, just as did the earlier evolutionists. As man evolves, he says, he becomes conscious of objective values, that is, of the qualities of things whereby they are " more intrinsically or permanently satisfying." He has therefore a moral right to seek them on two counts: first, the evolutionary standard, since these values were perceived as part of the evolutionary process; secondly, their intrinsic satisfactoriness. With these standards Huxley feels he is in a position to draw up scientific rules of morality. These in effect will be merely generalized statements of what has been empirically found to be in accordance with the evolutionary direction of change or to be intrinsically satisfying.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Huxley's friend and a renowned paleontologist, had defended a view that is similar in its basics but is developed within the framework of Catholic theology. His ethical position is to be found chiefly in *The Phenomenon of Man* (1955) and *The Divine Milieu* (1957). In his view a central and crucial fact about man is that he is an evolving creature of God. Evolution, Teilhard optimistically holds, necessarily and overall brings about progress. We can determine the direction of this progress and should conform ourselves to

it. The ultimate end of the evolutionary process is convergence with the divine. But at the present stage of evolution it is up to man himself to organize and direct his social life in such a way as to further the evolutionary tendency to an ever closer communion with God. In man evolution has become conscious of itself, so, in order to be true to himself and to the universe, man has to bring about, individually and socially, the spiritual progress of nature. Thus, the approaches of Huxley and Teilhard are similar in this way that they both base themselves on what they determine the direction of evolution to be, but they differ inasmuch as Huxley interprets and completes his analysis of evolution with utilitarian considerations whereas Teilhard does so from the point of view of a theistic and theological humanism.

Another recent and prominent advocate of evolutionary ethics has been the eminent geneticist, C. H. Waddington. In the early forties he started off considerable discussion by his article, " The Relations Between Science and Ethics." More recently, he has attempted to give a fuller and more developed expression to his position in *The Ethical AnimaU* [4]

Waddington holds that Spencer and Huxley were on the right track when they defended the necessity of an evolutionary approach to moral philosophy. But, he argues, both had certain methodological shortcomings which weakened their presentation and also therefore the support they received. Both, he says, fell into a vicious circle. For they claim that evolutionary progress is good and that therefore the moral goodness of our acts can be defined in terms of evolutionary process. Then too, according to Spencer, evolutionary progress consists in and is demonstrated by the increasing complexity of what evolves. But this is to take too simple a view of the matter because the development of complexity often leads in evolution to a dead end. Huxley, Waddington says, also leaves himself open to the charge of having committed the "naturalistic fallacy" by the loose way that he identifies moral goodness and evolutionary progress.

" *The Ethical. Animal* (London, 1960).

Waddington's aim is to work out more explicitly and fully his earlier defense of evolutionary ethics and thereby to provide a theory which, he feels, will be superior to Huxley's. He also wishes to argue against the positivists and the analytic philosophers that ethics is a valid normative discipline and that it is, besides, an objective one.

Waddington frames the issue in this way. We all wish to have some rational guidance in regard to how we ought to act. As adults we find that we have acquired a set of feelings about what is right and what is wrong and about what we ought or ought not to do. We refer to these feelings as" ethical" because of a common quality we perceive in them, and we use them as guides for our behavior. The issue, then, is how do we determine whether or not any such feelings are correct, that is, are adequate guides for our conduct. It is only, Waddington holds, through a consideration of animal and human evolution that we are able to decide in such matters and also to make a rational evaluation of different systems of ethics. It must be stressed, however, that, besides animal evolution, man has also gone through an evolution that is peculiarly human, which for purposes of moral evaluation is of far greater importance. Human evolution has been primarily a cultural evolution. And it is only by understanding how culture has evolved that we can see how man has achieved those characteristics that we now consider the most valuable.

It is crucial to any form of evolutionary ethics that it can show how evolutionary processes are demonstrably progressive. There are various mechanisms whereby evolution comes. Two that most biologists today recognize are mutation and natural selection. These, says Waddington, cannot however by themselves adequately explain why evolution would be anything but directionless change. But we can now see that two further factors are involved. First, natural selection affects not the hereditary factors themselves but the total organisms throughout their lives. Thus, what is passed on from one generation to the next is not just a genetic system but a whole " epigenetic

system " whereby the information contained in the genetic system is provided a functional structure through which that information expresses itself. In other terms, throughout evolution each organism responds to environmental stresses as well as it can, but in any given population there will be a certain range of variation in the density and character of the responses; those organisms that are able to respond in the most adaptive manner are the ones which in time will dominate, that is, remain in existence. In this way acquired characteristics can be said to be transmitted. But, then, the " survival of the fittest " should be interpreted to mean, not the survival of the strongest but the success of certain kinds of individuals in transmitting hereditary qualities. A second aspect of the evolutionary mechanism is that organisms are not just shaped by the environment but to a certain extent choose and modify it also. Waddington summarizes his view here in these terms:

> Biological evolution, then, is carried out by an ' evolutionary system' which involves four major factors (Fig. 2) : a genetic system, which engenders new variation by the process of mutation and transmits it by chromosomal genes; an epigenetic system, which translates the information in the fertilized egg and that which impinges on it from the environment into the characters of the reproducing adult; an exploitive system, by which an animal chooses and modifies the environment to which it will submit itself; and a system of natural selective pressures, originating from the environment and operating on the combined result of the other three systems. [15]

As a result of the interaction of these four systems evolutionary changes always tend in the direction of increasing efficiency.

Animal evolution continues in man, but the more important and rapid changes in men are due to cultural evolution. This has been made possible by an extremely important change in the mode of evolution. In animals information (in the cybernetic sense) is transmitted from generation to generation through the genes. Consequently, any improvement in this information took a long time. Man, however, has reached an evolutionary

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 94-5.

stage in which he transmits information by teaching, thus making possible radical and rapid changes in what we know and how we live. Teaching methods themselves have evolved in a very rapid way in the last few thousand years. Among the main steps of this evolution were the formalization of rote learning and then the invention of writing and, more recently, of printing. As a result of this, new information can be acquired and disseminated in a matter of days.

The socio-genetic transmission of information by man requires a certain mechanism whereby he can not only transmit but also receive the information. This mechanism consists of developing infants into acceptors of authority. It is a logical and empirical necessity that children submit to learning from others, that they in this sense accept the authority of others. It is in this way too that we get our moral feelings and the internalized authority system that we call conscience. Modern psychology helps us to understand this process. Piaget has shown that the development of the moral sense in the child results from a spontaneous feeling in the presence of his parents that they are greater than and superior to himself. Freud and other psychoanalysts have shown how in the formation of personality systems like the ego and super-ego are formed in the mind and why they are so often stronger and more demanding than seems really necessary. The development of such" authority-bearing systems" is necessary so that children became information-acceptors. But simultaneously it also makes them acceptors of moral standards, values, and notions. Having moral feelings is then also a necessary effect and factor of the evolutionary process.

Although not every line of evolutionary change is progressive, it is clear that evolution tends in the direction of increasing efficiency and has over the long range produced newer and higher forms of life. Evolutionary progress can then be characterized by the development to higher and higher levels of various capacities: " to remain relatively independent of the environment, to incorporate into the life-system more complex

functions of environmental variables, and ultimately to control the environment." [16] In more crude terms, the progressive character of evolution is exhibited by the increasing possibility of richness of experience.

· As a result evolutionary theory can provide us with a criterion to evaluate moral feelings and moral philosophies, while also providing a more useful point of view to examine such problems. In the course of our evolutionary development we have come to consider our feelings, about certain actions, as being "ethical." Such feelings have an important function in the evolutionary scheme: to make us do certain acts and avoid others. We can determine which of these acts now are or are not in accord with evolutionary progress and thus also determine which of these feelings are warrantedly ethical. We can in the same manner establish which moral theories provide us with a correct moral code. Thus, Waddington avers, resolving moral problems is similar to resolving dieting problems. We determine what a good diet is by finding out through which foods we adequately fulfill the function of eating. We determine what acts should be considered ethical in the light of how well by them we fulfill our functions in the evolutionary scheme. The criterion of what should be done and avoided is thus a cosmic, evolutionary wisdom.

If, as I maintain, our ethical beliefs are part of the human evolutionary system, they also must be subject to evolutionary processes. Since we can discern their function, we can decide what is anagenesis with respect to them, just as we can decide what is anagenesis with respect to the biological genetic system. We can attach a real and objective meaning to the idea of an improvement in the mechanism of formation and development of the super-ego as a part of the functional machinery of human evolution. This direction of improvement undoubtedly forms one of the criteria which we must apply in judging the merits of particular ethical systemsP

In this way also we avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy and reasoning in a circle.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 187.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 174.

Despite differences in the conclusions and emphases, evolutionary moralists, it seems clear, all follow the same general approach in developing their ethics. The problem we are mainly concerning ourselves with here is how appropriate and adequate is this approach, looking at it from the methodological point of vtew.

II

It is axiomatic that a structure can be no more solid than its foundation. We may then first ask ourselves how solid a foundation for an ethical system is the evolutionary theory. We must keep in mind the difference between a fact and a theory. No one nowadays doubts the fact of evolution, that is, that living things of a higher sort have come from others of a lower sort. But the theory of evolution is another matter. To explain the facts of evolution scientists have worked out various evolutionary theories and they recognize that all of these theories have their deficiencies and inadequacies. Thus, the well-known biologist G. G. Simpson has written,

> The general outline of that history and some of its characteristic details are now so well determined as to provide a factual background open to little serious question. It is, however, still true that the unknown exceeds the known and gives room for some (yet for limited) differences of interpretation. And even were all factually known, which can never become true, interpretation would still be necessary before meaning could arise from the factual record. Differences of interpretation will no doubt always arise, and this or any other readings of meaning into the history of life can never carry compulsive authority. It can only be an opinion submitted for judgment ...[18]

E. C. Olson, in the paper he read at the Darwin Centennial, described the present situation in these terms." We are then in the position of believing, without definitive proof, that factors beyond those recognized at present are of major importance in some areas of evolution, but of not knowing just what they are or how they may be discovered. This is an unfortunate, negative

[18] *The Meaning of Evolution* (New Haven, 1949), p. 339.

situation." [19] Thus, since there is at present so much disagreement among scientists as to how and why evolution did take place, it follows that in trying to establish an ethical system on such a theory one would have to be most careful to base one's self as much as possible on those parts of the theory that are generally admitted, such as the view that the genes function in an interdependent fashion or that natural selection occurs to some extent through adaptation. But a moral theory based on such a consensus would indeed have a rather narrow foundation. If, however, a moralist develops his views on the basis of the total evolutionary theory presented by some scientist, although he would then have a much broader base from which to work, it would be a much more unreliable one. Even a cursory reading, however, makes it clear that evolutionary moralists like Huxley, Teilhard, and Waddington base their moral systems on a whole-hearted acceptance of the particular version of the evolutionary theory that they favor.

Because of the various gaps and obscurities in the facts of evolution, there is a wide range of different, indeed, contrary, interpretations and conclusions possible. On the purely scientific level the result has been a number of different schools, not only in the past but also in the present: Darwinism, Neo-Lamarckianism, Neo-Darwinism, vitalism, etc. In the present day, according to E. C. Olson,

> There are, of course, degrees of difference in evaluation of successes, from healthy scepticism to confidence that the final word has been said, and there are still some among the biologists who feel that much of the fabric of theory accepted by the majority today is actually false ... There exists, as well, a generally silent group of students engaged in biological pursuits who tend to disagree with much of the current thought but say and write little ... many who are not satisfied with current theory are to be found in the ranks of the paleontologists and morphologists.[20]

This diversity of scientific interpretation leads quite naturally to a corresponding variety of conclusions drawn by the philos-

[19] *Evoluti<m after Darwin* (Chicago, 1960), v. I, p. 54!!.
[IG] *Op. cit.*, pp. 5!!8-4.

ophers. Thus Dewey had his instrumentalist naturalism; Harris, a personalistic idealism; and Whitehead, a realistic process view. Clearly, then, the scientific theory of evolution is open to a variety of philosophic interpretations. If follows also that depending on these variations different kinds of moral theories could be developed from the same facts. It is then most necessary to distinguish clearly what is based on the scientific fact and what comes from the point of view of the interpreting philosopher.

When we consider the different versions of evolutionary ethics which have been produced, this conclusion is borne out, that they are not just inferred from scientific theory but result mainly from the philosophical presuppositions of their authors. Both Huxley and Waddington interpret the scientific data from a naturalistic point of view and their ethics is naturalistic. Teilhard starts off with the same scientific data but also with a theistic humanism and his ethics is a theocentric one. To put it in another way, science, as has been so often pointed out, is ethically neutral. Science has as its functions describing, measuring, and correlating phenomena and developing on this basis theories which enable us to some degree to explain and control nature. But when any person engages in scientific pursuits he is working within an over-all world-picture which of itself is not scientific but philosophical and which provides him with his fundamental attitudes, presuppositions, and values. In accord with his *Weltanschauung* he will then interpret his scientific data. But such interpretations are then a function more of his philosophy than his science. It is important to keep this in mind because evolutionary moralists generally think of and present their views as being simply and purely scientific inferences from established facts.

We should note further that an evolutionary ethics involves not just a general world-picture but, as its different versions have been historically worked out, they also presuppose a set of non-scientific, ethical principles. In *The Phenomenon of Man* Teilhard claims he is doing and presenting work which is purely

and simply scientific. But many of his conclusions as to how man should act are the result, it seems clear enough, not of a strict scientific deduction from the evolutionary theory but of his prescientific commitment to the Christian God. For Huxley would draw no such conclusions from the scientific data. We can see the same point rather clearly in Waddington's case. One of his cardinal moral principles is the necessity to keep an open mind and to avoid looking at the world in terms of stark opposites, as just black or white. " The practical conclusion to be drawn from this line of thought is that it is dangerous to allow questions of belief to become concentrated into a single channel. We have to recognize not merely that it is impossible to eliminate beliefs from the human mind, but that a stable and equable personality must be found, not only on one, but on several ideals." [21] The issue here is whether this is a conclusion he has derived from the evolutionary theory or a presupposition derived from his *Weltansahauung* and in the light of which he interprets the scientific data and theory. It has really to be the latter. Let us note first an ambiguity in the statement "a stable and equable personality must be found . . . on several ideals." Does the " must " indicate an evolutionary or a non-evolutionary necessity? If he means the latter, then our point is granted. If he means the former, then he is inconsistent. For it is his view that "It is necessary, before socio-genetic transmissions can operate, that some sort of' authority-bearing system' is formed in the mental apparatus of those who will transmit and those who will receive" and that" The actual authoritative system set up in human minds seems commonly to carry much more weight than would be necessary to fulfill this function adequately enough." [22] If such is the mechanism through which evolution works in man, then the acceptance of several counter-balancing ideals, as -suggested by Waddington, would not be in line with this mechanism; it would involve a transcending of and an imposition upon the mechanism. It could then only be justified on the basis of a non-evolutionary moral principle.

[21] *Op. cit.,* p. 193.

[22] *Op. cit.,* p. 203.

Besides this, we may note, the claim that a stable and equable personality must be based on more than one ideal seems counterfactual. Fanatics often have very stable and equable personalities; on the other hand, neuroses often result from following several ideals that are not unified in a hierarchical system.

From the point of view of method it is important to know what a moralist is using as a dual, scientific and philosophical foundation. We would want to know the justification for both and how they are related. For, if a moral system was actually based founded on a dual basis of this sort and this was not recognized, the result would be that philosophical principles would be covertly introduced and, despite the claim that the result is a "scientific ethics," what one would have would be simply an uncritical presentation of a set of philosophical prejudices. Unfortunately, since the more recent evolutionary moralists have not been professional philosophers, they have not been very explicit in distinguishing the philosophical from the scientific in their theories. Since the former is so crucial, this is a serious methodological deficiency.

A central tenet of every evolutionary ethics is that evolution, at least in the long run, is achieving what is identifiably and certainly progress. If this were not the case, there would then be no way of developing an ethics from an evolutionary basis. Methodologically, however, such a tenet is objectionable if biologists do not in general support it. Concerning this we may note first of all that there is general agreement that evolution has not produced a uniform progress. But some scientists insist further that there is not, in the total evolutionary process, any single, overall progressive trend. Thus, G. G. Simpson has written,

> In summary, evolution is not invariably accompanied by progress, nor does it really seem to be characterized by progress as an essential feature. Progress has occurred within it but is not of its essence. Aside from the broad tendency for the expansion of life, which is also inconstant, there is no sense in which it can be said that evolution *is* progress. Within the framework of the evolutionary history of life there have been not one but many different sorts of progress.

Each sort appears not with one single line or even with one central but branching line throughout the course of evolution, but separately in many different lines.[23]

From such considerations he concluded to the impossibility of establishing any sort of evolutionary ethics based on the notion of evolutionary progress.[24] This line of argument, however, be it found in Simpson or elsewhere, is clearly fallacious, because not to the point. The proponent of an evolutionary ethics does not base his view on the claim that progress invariably accompanies evolution, for he would agree that it does not. Nor, likewise, does he identify evolution with progress. His point rather is that through the whole course of evolution there have been successively produced increasingly superior forms of life and that biologists are in general agreement on the point.

Another example of such a straw man may be found in S. C. Pepper's *Ethics.* In the context of this issue he says," Progress ... can only relevantly mean that the forms that have emerged later in the evolution of life are better adapted than those that emerged earlier." [25] Hence, he argues, an ethics based on evolutionary progress is untenable since all life forms adapt equally well, in their own ways. But evolutionary moralists readily acknowledge this comparability of adaptions and so, when they speak of progress, this is simply not what they are referring to. Thus Pepper's objection too is without foundation.

There still however remain difficulties. The long-range sorts of progress we can point to in biological evolution are all of a vague, general kind: extension of life, increase in complexity, increase in efficiency, and increase in the richness of experience. The use of these as moral criteria allows one to infer certain moral rules. But these are also and necessarily phrased in very broad terms. Consequently they would require other moral rules providing for limiting cases, but from where except a non-evolutionary source could one derive them? If one takes evolu-

•• *Op. cit.,* pp.
•• *Op. cit.,* p. 304 and p. 345.
•• *Ethics* (New York, 1960), p.

tionary progress to consist in the extension of life, this leaves no way of resolving problems of overpopulation and of the superiority of quality over quantity. If, then, one takes progress to involve several or all of those biological trends, one would have to determine which in which cases has priority over the others. For instance, should we encourage growth in complexity over growth in the richness of experience or vice versa? In itself, evolutionary moralist is faced with the dilemma of either sticking solely with his evolutionary principles and having a system too general to be effective or of giving up his purely evolutionary system to make it more effective.

If we try to resolve this dilemma by a closer consideration of human evolution, we still have problems. The development of man manifests a number of different trends. How can we tell which really constitute progress? To do this in a scientific way we would have to derive our criteria from what we know of the present and the past. But it is a characteristic of the evolutionary process to produce novelties. Since the latter are in the nature of the case unpredictable, it is at least on the biological level risky to either affirm or deny that a given trend shall continue to be progressive, even though we could establish that from a given point of view it has been so. It might be argued that on the human or cultural level of evolution that it is up to man to continue consciously the progressive direction of the past. But even if this were granted, it would not give us any sufficiently specific indication of how we should act unless one brought in further non-evolutionary principles on the basis of which a proper direction could be maintained. Thus, the dilemma remains.

There is another difficulty. Evolutionary moralists generally consider ethics to be a normative discipline. In line with this they talk like other normative moralists of the obligations which men have. But there would seem to be an ambiguity in the use of the term. Waddington, for instance, speaks of obligation in terms of the super-ego and seems to reduce moral obligation to a feeling of having to act in a certain way, a feeling whose nature

and origin is to be explained in Freudian terms. When, however, moralists speak of obligation in the more usual and traditional sense, they mean of certain moral, as opposed to physical or psychological, necessity to act in a given way. But, to be obliged in the sense that the super-ego makes us do an act is quite different from being obliged in the sense that we have to do an act because we recognize that there is a moral order that is objective and superior to us and which requires that we do it. It is this latter sense of obligation that the layman ordinarily is using when he asks about his moral obligations. Realizing this, Waddington answers queries about why we should be moral or why we should seek to further evolutionary progress with an analogy of morality to eating. You should be moral because you will be fulfilling your natural function and will be happier, just as you should follow a proper diet because you will be healthier and feel better. The point to be noted here is this. A purely evolutionary morality does not by itself provide an ultimate justification for moral obligations but can do so only by bringing in non-evolutionary considerations: utilitarian ones in the case of Huxley and Waddington, theistic ones in the case of Teilhard.

As a normative discipline ethics has as one of its main functions providing us with a rational code of conduct. Evolutionary moralists have all tried to indicate what it should be but the results show three common characteristics: their proposed rules are all very general, they deal only with a limited number of selected problems, and they usually repeat some of the same points most other moralists arrive at. To illustrate, we find Waddington suggesting that we ought to encourage the progress of the mechanism of the socio-genetic evolutionary system, that we ought to encourage the development of varieties of communities, and that we should avoid nuclear war. One conclusion that suggests itself here is that the evolutionary approch is then one of rather limited scope and value, for other approaches provide behavior codes that are much more extensive and detailed. One could further argue that from a methodological view it is therefore an evolutionary dead-end.

An important and interesting facet of evolutionary ethics is its extension of the meaning of evolution. Evolution is now taken to mean not just biological evolution but it is used to refer to the cultural history of man also. There seem to be two reasons especially for so extending the meaning of the term. On the one hand, it is a way of acknowledging how different, indeed, how unique, man is in the animal kingdom. This difference is not simply biological, but we have in man a new dimension, that of mind, which involves quite different sorts of conditions and processes. What is perhaps most noteworthy is that with man evolution has come to a point where it is self-conscious and self-determined. On the other hand, we also make clear the nature, functions, and necessity of ethics. Men have developed ethical theories because they live together in groups and have a certain culture. All sorts of problems arise as a result of their interaction and ethics is one kind of attempt to resolve these problems. By relating cultural evolution to biological evolution it is hoped to arrive at a more adequate and scientific resolution of moral problems.

There is, however, a rather paradoxical result of the extension of the notion. It was done in order to complete and strengthen the evolutionary ethical theory, but it would seem to require its development along lines that go beyond its original premisses. It accepts as established that in biological evolution progress is guaranteed by the nature of the process, but that in human cultural evolution it is up to men themselves to ensure continued progress. In this case, however, past evolution might be able to indicate certain general directions men should take but could not give any reasonably specific goals, motives, and criteria for activities that are progressive in the present context. For instance, Soviet, Maoist, and Western ideologists would all argue that the cultural trends in their countries represent the main thrust of human evolution. The only adequate way to resolve this and similar issues seems to be through a metaevolutionary analysis of the nature and conditions of human activity.

Then too, when it is used in these ways, evolution is an

analogical term, that is, it is being used to refer to two processes which are quite different in nature but which have certain similarities and relations, and it is because of these that we call them by the same name. Clearly, they are fundamentally different. Evolution in the biological sense consists of changes that take place in organisms, over eons, as a result of conditions arising randomly, with no control over them by those affected. Evolution in the cultural sense refers to changes in how men live and act; these changes occur relatively quickly and at an increasing tempo; they are produced to some extent as a result of our choices and we can to to a degree control them. On the other hand, though they are different, cultural evolution is continuation, on a higher level, of what started in biological evolution. They also both involve continual change and, hopefully, progress. It is such similarities and relationships which justify the imposition of a common term.

As a consequence of this, however, what is true of biological evolution is not necessarily so of cultural evolution. Thus, even if we grant that biological evolution necessarily produces progress, it would not follow that cultural evolution does. What is important from a methodological point of view is that any conclusion of evolutionary ethics that is based on a comparison of or a passage between biological and cultural evolution could strictly be only a probable one, no matter how plausible it might seem. Even though such conclusions were in fact true statements and could be established otherwise to be such, taken as conclusions from such premisses, they can only be probable. Thus, for example, when an evolutionary moralist says that men have an obligation to make cultural evolution progressive because it is a continuation of biological evolution which is progressive, it may perhaps be true. But to show that it is true one would also have to somehow establish that we have a general moral obligation to live in accord with nature. Otherwise one would be committing the "is-to-ought" fallacy. Huxley and Waddington would base their view that we should live in accord with nature at least in part on hedonistic grounds: doing

so is in general a more satisfying way of living. But the hedonistic principle is not itself established by the evolutionary data, and so from within the purely evolutionary perspective has only a hypothetical value.

This leads us to another methodological deficiency of evolutionary ethics. Both Huxley and Waddington would argue that a valid ethics can be derived only through the application of the scientific method to the evolutionary data. First of all, we should note that the term " scientific " is also an analogous one. It could be used in its recent sense of consisting of the cumulation of measurements and correlations of facts or in its older meaning of productive of knowledge that is certain and of real causes. Huxley and Waddington, however, use it in the former sense. Now, we could agree with them that biological evolution is studied properly only in this way. Such an approach, though, does not work too well for the study of cultural evolution, for here the qualitative factors are the more relevant. It is, however, not valid at all when the task is to develop an ethics. Fundamentally, a scale of values and a code of conduct require a quite different method of derivation than does man's genetic structure. What is required for an ethics is an analysis of the essential characteristics and functions of men and of their activities. This cannot be done through a laboratory approach. As we have seen already, evolutionary ethics is possible only through the acceptance of a *Weltanschauung* on the basis of which biological and anthropological data are interpreted. A valid ethics can be scientific only in the older and broader meaning of the word, although it certainly should make use of data that is scientific in the narrower sense. Thus, evolutionary moralists err by conceiving of method and of science in a univocal instead of analogical fashion and concluding that the method for ethics has to be the same as that for biology.

Another deficiency that has often been noted in evolutionary ethics is that its proponents commit the " naturalistic fallacy " by identifying moral goodness with being in accord with the main evolutionary thrust. Waddington argues that this charge

is not valid against his ethical position because he does not identify moral goodness with evolutionary progress but only uses the latter as the criterion by which he can judge between ethical systems. It is clear, however, that this is merely a verbal evasion of the charge. Its plausibility, such as it has, comes from the peculiar way that he defines moral goodness, as a feeling certain activities arouse in us. He then goes on to argue that" ethicizing," or having and living according to such feelings, is a natural function directed to furthering the progress of evolution. From this he concludes that ethical systems can be evaluated on the basis of how well they guide men toward fulfilling their evolutionary goal. What Waddington is doing here, however, is to identify what are or are not desirable ways of acting with what is or is not in accord with the direction of evolution. And the former is what we usually mean by moral goodness or badness. If now someone would counter that nevertheless this identification is a valid one, we would be back to point previously discussed: Waddington would have to establish that it is so, and he can do this only in terms of his pre-scientific, naturalistic assumptions.

III

We may summarize our conclusions in this way. The evolutionary approach to ethics has the advantage of taking a strongly empirical point of view which leads to important insights into the nature of man and his situation. Nevertheless, evolutionary ethics, at least in its common forms, is from a methodological point of view inadequate for various reasons. Its proponents tend to accept a given version of the evolutionary theory as thoroughly established and beyond doubt, which is contrary to fact. Besides, there is no such thing as a purely evolutionary ethics. Every form of it is based not only on a scientific theory but also on a pre-scientific world picture of one sort or another. And what is worse, often-times this world picture is accepted without much critical analysis and thus the ethics based on it is to that extent methodologically tainted.

But certainly any adequate moral theory will have to be based on a *Weltanschauung* which gives an objective account and explanation of the world and man, and to do this it will have to give full consideration to evolutionary data. Then too, the criteria and the conduct rules evolutionary ethics can plausibly support are also only of a rather general sort. But these can usually also be established on the basis of non-evolutionary considerations, although, we may note, evolutionary ethics can provide strong arguments for certain negative rules such as those against pollution.

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TRANSCENDENT KNOWLEDGE IN *INSIGHT:* A CLOSER LOOK

THE ISSUE OF NATURAL knowledge of God in the thought of Bernard Lonergan is not new to these pages. Patricia Wilson [1] has already given us a helpful survey of Lonergan's work which compelled her to be brief in dealing with Lonergan's argument for the existence of God as it appears in *Insight.* Further illumination of this issue is needed if we are to adequately grasp what Lonergan is saying and demanding.

In Chapter 19 of *Insight*, "General Transcendent Knowledge," the move is made from knowledge of proportionate being to knowledge and affirmation of transcendent being. There Lonergan attempts to show that the affirmation "God exists" is a true judgment. Thus the specific concern of this essay is to show how the move is made from one sphere of knowledge to another and to evaluate the legitimacy of the move. Analyzing this move will be our way of seeing what it means for Lonergan to say " God exists."

The first step then is to trace the argument of Chapter 19, emphasizing its crucial points and adding comments where they will be most illuminating.

TRANSCENDENT KNOWLEDGE: ITS NOTION, SOURCE, AND POSSIBILITY

Lonergan's description of transcendent knowledge is deceptively simple: " Clearly, despite the imposing name, transcendence is the elementary matter of raising further questions." (635) [2] "Transcendence, then, at the present juncture, means a

[1] *The Thomist*, April, 1971.

[2] Unless otherwise noted, the numbers in parentheses refer to pages in *Insight.*

development in man's knowledge relevant to a development in man's being." (686) But this description would be misleading if it were not seen in the context of what is the source of transcendence in man.

" The immanent source of transcendence in man is his detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As it is the origin of all his questions, it is the origin of the radical, further questions that take him beyond the defined limits of particular issues." (686)

The nature of this unrestricted desire needs some comment here for it will soon achieve focal importance in Lonergan's argument. First, it is not just the "operator" in man's intellectual development, but it also presents a challenge to his will. As man is a single being, he will not tolerate the duality that would arise if his knowing and doing were not consistent with each other. Already we can see that if a man does not live on the level of his insight, he will not be dominated by the unrestricted desire and thus the immanent source of transcendence in him is choked off. Further, he must exercise great vigilance for " the unrestricted desire to understand is the opposite of any and every partial obscurantism, no matter how slight." (638)

Lonergan makes some further clarifications on the nature of this desire; that the unrestricted desire to understand does not mean that the understanding will be unrestricted (637) and that since the desire and the understanding are two quite different things, att2-inment of understanding requires the fulfillment of certain conditions. 'Vhat these conditions are and how they are fulfilled is the concern of philosophy. (637) Fulfillment of the conditions is, of course, Lonergan's way of characterizing the process of verification, and this occurs only in the judgment in which the intelligent grasp of the virtually unconditioned is reasonably affirmed.

Lonergan is so beautifully blunt when he directly confronts the question of whether or not transcendent knowledge is possible. Its possibility is equivalent to the possibility of grasping

intelligently and affirming reasonably a transcendent being. The proof of the possibility lies in the fact that such intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation exist. The question then is narrowed further to: will the grasp and affirmation of a transcendent being be the inevitable outcome of his account of understanding and judgment? He goes further than this when he hints that, if his attempt is not successful, then no attempts can be. For he feels that all the arguments for the existence of God can be summed up in his own. (672) Thus he raises the stakes of the game. If he succeeds, then transcendent knowledge is possible. If he fails, then perhaps transcendent knowledge must be relegated to poetic language of wishful metaphor or to a more primitive past in man.

TRANSCENDENT BEING As CONCEIVED

How must such a transcendent being be conceived? To conceive the transcendent being requires intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation and what must be done is to extrapolate from proportionate being. Thus even though the extrapolation is conceptual, it operates from a real basis of proportionate being. This must be done first for, before one can affirm reasonably, he must grasp intelligently. Therefore there will be some elements in the conception of the transcendent being that can be verified and so lead to the affirmation of that being. When the affirmation takes place, it will be by means of a grasp of a virtually unconditioned whose conditions are now seen to be fulfilled.

Lonergan's argument in the section on causality shows that proportionate being as a virtually unconditioned cannot account for its own existence, for the merely contingent is unintelligible. Since Lonergan has shown being to be intelligible (something which is realized by anyone who has ever claimed to make a true judgment), what is unintelligible is apart from being and is therefore nothing. Thus Lonergan concludes that there must be an ultimate ground of the universe totally intelligible and intelligent. For Lonergan, one must either accept that argument or admit that the universe is finally unintelligible.

But the argument falls flat without the essential component which motivates such further questions, which leads one to ask what lies beyond mere matters of fact and that is again the unrestricted desire to know. (637) Without that, one would never ask the further question nor even it seems would he assume that there was a point to asking the further question.

Next Lonergan develops the implications of the unrestricted act of understanding to fill out as much as possible the conception of God. (657-669) But this essay is concerned more with the section that follows in which he finally deals with the question of whether or not this notion refers to existent reality, whether one can reasonably affirm the existence of God as Lonergan has conceived him.

THE ExiSTENCE OF GoD

In the previous section, the unrestricted act of understanding was not itself grasped but rather the restricted act that extrapolates from itself to the unrestricted act. Once that has been done, the question remains whether this unrestricted act is a mere object of thought or a reality. (670)

He offers a *caveat* first. It is granted that there is no way to verify an unrestricted act of understanding in either our internal or external experience. But this is an objection that confuses the notions of experience and verification. The ground of verification lies not in experience but in the reflective grasp of conditions that are fulfilled. (671) Now the unconditioned to be grasped in the affirmation of the existence of God is the virtually unconditioned which consists in inferring God's existence from true premises.

The premise that must be true (and therefore verified) is that the real is completely intelligible for the argument for the existence of God in its short form is: If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. Can it be reasonably affirmed on the basis of all that has gone before in *Insight* that the real is indeed completely intelligible? David Burrell says no.

His argument runs as follows: if one affirms that being is

completely intelligible, this must be affirmed on the basis of experience or a judgment according to the line of reasoning developed in *Insight.* But we have no experience of a completely intelligible or an unrestricted act of understanding. Further, verifying this in a judgment is out of the question since this would be a verification totally foreign to our understanding of verification. For the unrestricted act of understanding would not be a virtually unconditioned and so we " cannot conceive what the judgment would be like which affirmed that all intelligent questions were in and all answered correctly." [3]

The consequences of this are that Lonergan cannot reasonably affirm the existence of God. "... if we cannot understand what it means to say that being (or the real) is completely intelligible, then we cannot affirm anything about 'complete intelligibility '-most notably, that it exists. (674) And i£ we cannot affirm that complete intelligibility exists, then we cannot complete Lonergan's argument to the existence of God." (674) [4]

Burrell's objection gains even more cogency when we consider that explicitness with which Lonergan emphasizes the meaning of verification in his schema and the mode in which it is achieved. If " it is in the unconditioned that we place the whole meaning and force of verification," (672) then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the move from being as intelligible and heuristic to being as completely intelligible is definitely a leap as far as rational affirmation is concerned. But all this is only a negative kind of progress toward answering the question with which we began: just what is going on in Chapter 19? What could have led Lonergan to make such an affirmation?

It has been seen already that the statement " God exists " follows from the premise that the real is in fact completely intelligible. Following this lead, we can ask how this premise

[3] Burrell, David B. " How Complete Can Intelligibility Be? A Commentary on *Insight:* Chapter XIX." *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (1967), 41, pp. £5£.

[4] *Ibid.*

was arrived at and, in so doing, find how Lonergan can speak of God.

The contention here is that the statement "the real is completely intelligible " is not a judgment arrived at through intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation but is only apparent to one who is dominated by the unrestricted desire to know. Thus the operative factor in Chapter 19, the element that actually effects the move from proportionate to transcendent being is not an affirmation of the virtually unconditioned but the dominance in Lonergan's own life of the unrestricted desire to know.

Therefore there will be two main parts to the following treatment: first, text indications in *Insight* that show that being is completely intelligible not to the reasonably affirmed judgment but to the pure desire to know; second, that the dominance of the unrestricted desire to know demands a disciplined life-style if it is to lead one to the affirmation of the existence of God.

CoMPLETE INTELLIGIBILITY AND THE UNRESTRICTED DESIRE

We have already seen how the unrestricted desire is the immanent source of transcendence in man and is not to be confused with the act of understanding itself, for the desire can exist and does exist quite apart from the fulfillment of it.

As Lonergan develops his argument he shows that the real is being and" being is completely intelligible." Why? "For being is the objective of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know; this desire consists in intelligent inquiry and critical reflection; ... " (672-3) That is, being is completely intelligible under the aspect of the unrestricted desire and not under the aspect of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. For we do not have the means whereby to make such a judgment. That " this desire consists in ... inquiry " we can only take to mean as " actualized in," for as has been seen, the desire is separate from the inquiry and motivates it. Thus in the crucial part of the argument it is the unrestricted desire that establishes the premise. And whenever we read in Lonergan the phrase " com-

pletely intelligible," we must mentally add " to the unrestricted desire to know," for this is the operative factor.

This is supported where Lonergan joins the reader in his attempt to see where the unjustified step was taken. He says, "... granted the exclusion of all obscurantism, intelligence is committed to the effort to conceive a notion of God...." (675) Further, "... if I am operating in the intellectual pattern of experience, if I am genuine in my acceptance of the domination of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to inquire intelligently and reflect reasonably, then I have no just grounds for surprise if I find myself unable to deny either that there is a reality or that the real is being or that being is completely intelligible or that complete intelligibility is unrestricted understanding or that unrestricted understanding is God." (675) And again, "... if the real is being, the real is the objective of an unrestricted desire to understand correctly; to be such an objective, the real has to be completely intelligible, for what is not intelligible is not the objective of a desire to understand, and what is not completely intelligible is the objective, not of an unrestricted desire to understand correctly but of such a desire judiciously blended with an obscurantist refusal to understand. Once this expansive moment is achieved, the rest follows." (676) This becomes even clearer when it is put negatively: if there is no unrestricted desire to understand, then there is a realm of being which is not able to be affirmed as intelligible, and so one could not affirm that the real is completely intelligible.

Therefore the crucial premise in the argument is established not through a virtually unconditioned but through the unrestricted desire to know which has already been seen as quite apart from the process of verification. It is the unrestricted desire that gives rise to the further questions which in turn lead to the intelligent grasp and the reasonable affirmation.

Thus one can only join Lonergan in affirming the existence of God to the extent to which one is dominated by the unrestricted desire to know. " Complete intelligibility" is the object of this

desire, the term to which the intellectual pattern of experience is moving, and so when one affirms that being is completely intelligible, he affirms it not as something that is verified in a judgment but as the promise which has been given to him in his previous experience of knowing.

The same point might be made in another way by examining the logic of the word " intelligible." " Intelligible " means not " already understood " but " able to be understood." Therefore this quality of being will not be grasped by one who has not sought to understand being and who has not reflected on his own judgments. "Intelligible" is both an " achievement-word" and an "invitation or promise-word" which can better be uttered the more one reflects on inquiry itself. One can make the same affirmation only when he makes the same effort.

So although we do not know what " completely intelligible " might mean, the phrase is an invitation to keep seeking its meaning, i.e., to let oneself be dominated by the unrestricted desire to know. That, as we shall see, requires a commitment to a disciplined way of life.

Now Burrell has shown in his article that Lonergan's language about God as completely intelligible is not contradictory. Therefore one element of language, the syntax, is in order. That leaves the question of usage. Is it in fact appropriate in Lonergan to use such language?

What Burrell has done, it seems to me, is to alert the readers of *Insight* to the fact that the proper context for Lonergan's speech about God is not intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation alone but the whole intellectual pattern of experience. Only in a life which is dominated by the unrestricted desire to know does the language of " complete intelligibility " find its true home. This illuminates Lonergan's response to Burrell in the same issue of the *Proceedings.*

In that response, Lonergan replaces the term " unrestricted desire " with " *intending* " and, in so doing, he retreats to another abstract word to conceal the fact that what he has done is comprehensible only in the context of that way of life which

domination of the unrestricted desire demands. To give Burrell the response his "objection" required would have called for the kind of self-revelation that is not found in philosophical conventions.

UNRESTRICTED DESIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE

That the unrestricted desire to know requires a way of life and the style of that life are shown in Lonergan's earlier description of Genetic Method. Therefore we shall examine the concept of Genetic Method itself and then how it is actualized in human development.

The question of being is the most comprehensive question that can be asked. Therefore, to ask that question is to seek the highest possible viewpoint (for outside of being, there is nothing), the highest integrator of all underlying manifolds.

But the question must be raised seriously and intelligently. It must be asked because one is concerned about the answer, not as part of an academic exercise or sophisticated parlor conversation. It is a question that demands strategic and critical inquiry just as do other questions.

Now there are successive levels of lower viewpoints, each less comprehensive and so less capable of integrating the entire range of data to be understood. The problem then becomes this: how does the intelligent questioner who stands at one less comprehensive level and viewpoint move from his lower viewpoint into the higher viewpoints in order to finally raise the question of being, i.e., to put himself in the position where transcendent knowledge becomes a possibility. Lonergan's response to this is found in the section on Genetic Method.

Genetic method is concerned with the sequences in which correlations and regularities occur, and so the main object of genetic method is to master the sequence, understand the development, and proceed from the correlations and regularities of one stage to those of the next stage. Mathematically, "one might say that genetic method is concerned with a sequence of operators that successively generate further functions from an

initial function." (461) Thus "the sequence of conjugate forms is a sequence of higher integrations of otherwise coincidental lower manifolds of events." (461) So a basic notion from all(earlier section has re-appeared here, for in the section on" Genus as Explanatory" it was shown how the genus defines the relation that obtains in a given manifold. New data can either confirm the explanation given by the genus or else may demand that a move is made to a higher viewpoint. The higher viewpoint accounts for what is merely coincidental in the lower viewpoint. From this it is easier to see why the field in which genetic method is located is finality, the "upwardly directed dynamism " of proportionate being, from a metaphysical point of view; from a scientific point of view, the field is generalized emergent probability. Finality can also be seen as the operator of the transition from the lower to the higher viewpoint and " is constituted inasmuch as the higher system not merely suffers but provokes the underlying instability." (466) I interpret this as meaning that the new data entering the manifold is not seen as just coincidental by the inquirer but as the first hint and determination of the higher viewpoint.

Now genetic method and its schema can be applied to the progress of human intelligence for all insights and conceptual constructions give rise to further questions. "Clearly, as the conceptual construction is the formulated higher system as integrator, so the emergence of the further question effects its transition into the operator." (469) Thus questions give rise to insights which lead to further questions. This schema achieves a further concretization when it is applied to human development. But most importantly it will finally reveal the answer to the question," What is going on in Chapter 19?"

Man, as Lonergan conceives him, is an existing unity who is differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugates. Since man is a unity, the integration of these is under the control of one level.

Now there is a law of integration in human development. (472) Initiative for a change may come from any of the levels

in man and this upsets the equilibrium which has been achieved between the levels. But development will be spotty and twisted askew unless correspondence between the levels is had.

The importance of this law of integration is that it declares what is meant by the term" human development." (472) The initiative which comes from a given level can be seen as an invitation for it asks man to advance or make adjustments in the pattern of his life. Unless a response is made and correspondence between levels effected, then man loses his unity and becomes instead a kind of collection of " conjugate forms " and their accompanying drives and demands. Thus human development involves tension for it is always moving away from the man as he now lives his life. He must break with the " inertia of his prior stage." Insofar as man is conscious, the tension becomes conscious and so each initiative can become a crisis.

But "there is a further and deeper aspect to the matter. Intellectual development rests upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know .... Still, it is difficult for man, even in knowing, to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for him to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate his whole way of life. For the self, as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in the environment, as a self-attached and self-interested centre within its own narrow world .... But the same self, as inquiring and reflecting . . . is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation." (473) Thus the actuation of the unrestricted desire hinges on the very style of life and concern for personal integrity of the inquirer himself. It does not and cannot operate independently of the rest of the conjugates in man. This same idea is echoed in the section on " Essential and Effective Freedom " wherein he says "... effective freedom itself has to be won .... But to reach the universal willingness that matches the unrestricted desire to know is indeed a high achievement, for it consists ... in the adoption of an effective attitude in which performance matches aspiration." (628-4) Deserving special attention is

his statement that this universal willingness requires " the adoption of an attitude towards the universe of being." (6!24) This allows us to set up the following schema which constitutes the answer to the question of how transcendent knowledge is possible in Lonergan and what is transpiring in Chapter 19:

Transcendent Knowledge
Raising the necessary questions

AND

Requirement that desire be actualized: way of life, attitude towards universe of being, resolution, disciplined life, effective detachment and disinterestedness, etc.

Therefore in Lonergan's view, one cannot reach transcendent knowledge (if we can speak that way) merely by raising and answering questions, for this way of inquiring is part and parcel of a way of life of critical receptivity and readiness to sacrifice oneself. It is hard to describe this way of life for it is uniquely personal to each.

The contention of this essay is vindicated in Lonergan's" law of genuineness" (475-8) which demands that one admit the tension of initiative and development into consciousness. Thus even though genuineness grows weary and discouraged, it does not retreat to passivity or substitutes like busy work. It presses on, and it knows that to fail here, to refuse to be genuine, is the root of scotosis. (478) And as we know already, "To exclude an insight is also to exclude the further questions that would arise from it and the complementary insights that would carry it towards a round and balanced viewpoint." (191) Cf. also his discussion on the will, pp. 598-600.

So we conclude that the real operative factor in Chapter 19 is Lonergan's own way of life, and only he who is willing to enter on such a life can follow him into the realm of transcendent knowledge. Lonergan's speech about God finds its true and appropriate context in a life of sustained genuineness.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Unfolding Revelation: The Nature of Doctrinal Development. By JAN HENDRIK WALGRAVE, O. P. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, Pp. 418. $9.95.

Almost a decade ago John Courtney Murray wrote in *The Problem of God:* " leaving aside the issue of what Catholic and Protestant respectively mean when they say, 'Credo,' I consider that the parting of the ways between the two Christian communities takes place on the issue of development of doctrine. " The intervening ten years have shown, if anything, that the issue slices not only between Confessions but within Confessions. Recall the breakdown of discussions between the Nijmegen catechical school and the Roman theologians, the reaction to H. Kung's *Unfehlbar,* the ferment over whose catechism to use in CCD programs, etc.. Prof. Jan Walgrave, a noted Newman scholar, makes a significant contribution to contemporary discussion on development of doctrine with his latest book, *Unfolding Revelation* (hereafter designated *UR).*

A major portion of the book is an historical survey of theological thinking on development, an impressive synthesis of various currents and opinions. The book ends with Walgrave's own theological reflection on the nature of doctrinal development, borrowing on insights from the past, especially Newman's and Blondel's, and using his own fresh approach to epistemology. I propose to present *en gros* the thrust of *UR* and conclude with some of my own reflections.

The book operates within certain presuppositions, viz., that Revelation is a possibility, that is clothed in human language-hence the problem of reconciling the truth of dogma with the fragileness inherent in human thought-and that in some sense Revelation was closed with the apostolic generation; otherwise it is ongoing and totally new dogmas pose no problem. Fair enough presuppositions. Doctrinal development is presented as an aspect of cultural development because in many respects, as Newman noted, dogmas develop the way cultural ideas do. However, Walgrave is careful to point out the ways in which the analogy breaks down (cf. p. 861 f.), due to the *sui generis* nature of revealed saving truth.

The problem of doctrinal development-how to reconcile the historical fact of development with the claim of the substantial immutability of Revelation-is posed neither by Scripture nor the earliest theologians. The passage of time had to force the issue. If, given the fact of development, however, did these earliest theologians have principles for accepting it? It seems clear to Paul and John that the nature of faith, on both the

individual and collective ecclesial level, is susceptible of growth and fuller consciousness and was to be expected. The early Fathers, such as Tertullian, lrenaeus, and Origen, viewed Tradition as alive and growing through the action of the Spirit. Admittedly, Tertullian distinguished *regula fidei* and *disciplina*, yet the latter are not merely ecclesiastical laws. The Fathers of the great Councils of the fourth and fifth centuries worked with non-scriptural ideas not opposed to Scripture but offered as a clarification of implicit truths. (The advocates of *homoousios* were accused by the traditionalists of doctrinal innovation not surprisingly.) *UR* concludes that, for these theologians, the finality of Revelation in Christ does not exclude a developing understanding of it, but because this posed no problem, these early theologians spoke loosely of development and gave no rules for what would constitute a true development.

Among the medieval theologians the idea of development becomes more distinct in their discussions on the nature of faith and of theology. In some tracts on faith as existential encounter with God utterly beyond human words implications are laid that a developing clarification of Revelation is not governed by logical rules alone. However, the general trend of Scholastic theology, under the influence of Aristotle's notion of *scientia*, is to conceive of development as logical inference; the seeds are sown for those later theories of development that Walgrave calls " logical theories. " But in this earlier stage of Scholasticism the problem of immutability versus development is not keen; the earlier dogmas were not viewed in terms of their historicity.

I should mention here in passing a particularly valuable dimension of *UR*. Walgrave has a gift for capturing the spirit of an age, a rare power at synthesis and clarity. His introduction to the spirit of medieval theology is superb, as are his later introductions to other epochs, such as German Romanticism.

A new age dawns with the Renaissance. A sense of history poses the problem of continuity versus *de facto* changes of doctrine; a sense of rationalism looks toward solutions of logical inference. Walgrave calls such a solution " logical " because " according to it the process of development is simply described in terms of logical inference and the criterion of its truth is the logical test. " (p. 165) Cano, Molina, Banez, Suarez, the Salmanticenses, are among the first proponents of logical solutions. Their problematic is whether theological conclusions can be defined. They draw intricate distinctions of how a conclusion may be contained in revealed premises, but they labor under the weakness of conceiving Revelation as exclusively propositional. The modern logical theories of Marin-Sola, Schultes, Tuyaerts, etc., are similarly weakened. Their propositional epistemology limits them to doctrinal growth through inference alone, which neither fits the historical facts (how do you deduce the

Assumption?) nor really solves anything (is the *consequentia* merely explicative or truly deductive, and hence, a new truth?) .

Walgrave calls the antithesis of logical theory a transformistic theory, as it is the expression of so-called theological liberalism. Such a theory distinguishes the essence of Christianity from its changeable accidents; the latter include all dogmatic statements. Variations of the theory will depend on what the operative philosophy is, e. g., Hegel's rationalism, Schleiermacher's idealism, Harnack's positivism, and so forth. The continuity in Christianity is religious experience (defined in various ways).

Its objectification into doctrine undergoes continual flux, depending on the culture and philosophy involved. Hence, there need be no logical connection between one doctrinal statement of the experience and a later one. A doctrine may point a man in the direction of the experience without being an objectively true statement. Given this framework, the problem of development as framed by *UR* poses no problem; liberal theology lacks, in the words of Newman, a dogmatic principle. Walgrave presents a clear synthetic sweep of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, the influence on English liberal theology through Coleridge and Tyrrell, the positivism of the Modernists, and the empiricism of Van Buren, to name a few. It is impressive and very readable.

One can briefly contrast the logical and transformistic theories as follows: Revelation is merely propositional-it is an actual personal experience; its doctrines are statements about God-they are statements of a world view using a " god language " ; one preaches truths communicated long ago-one preaches to invoke an experience; faith is the intellectual acceptance of a doctrine-faith is a change of heart and one's whole attitude toward life. Whereas the logical theory did not fit the facts, the transformistic theory eventuates in religious skepticism in the author's opinion.

Since history moves in dialectical fashion-a leit-motif of *UR* is that " the ' perspectiveness ' of human thinking is incurable "— the reader is now prepared for the *synthesis* of these ideas in the" theological theory." Beginning in the nineteenth century, the author contends that many theologians from various backrounds came to the same basic insights on development. Growth is not reducible to strict logical unfolding, but yet one has an objective dogmatic principle, viz., " true faith, although transcending the propositions in which its object presents itself, is not possible without dogma conceived as a definite unfalsifiable truth about the saving God." (p. 331)

The major contributors to this insight are the Ti.ibingen theologians Mohler and Kuhn, J. H. Newman, Solov'ev, Blonde!, von Hugel, and K. Barth. The Ti.ibingen school mediates and modifies according to Catholic principles the German Romantic stress that the content of faith is authentic

in so far as it is subjectified by becoming a personal communication with the real. It was Newman's genius to analyze the spontaneous growth of ideas in the mind and the role of moral consciousness in one's immediate contact with the *real* (recall his famous distinction of real and notional apprehension and the role of the illative sense). The section on Newman in *UR* singularly recommends itself, fruit of the author's life-study. Blonde! and von Hiigel contribute how the knower is in contact with reality transcending the range of clear notional apprehension and how the growth of doctrine occurs in this " subconscious and unreasoned " depth.

I would say the integrating idea is *beyondness;* the whole reality is present to the mind through the grace of faith but that it transcends any objectifications. The unexpressed awareness always exceeds articulated dogmas. (Rahner's transcendental method finds place here.) Growth is a gradual clarification of an intuition continually present as a composite reality. The process is *theological* because it is super-inferential and charismatic. Another reason for calling the theory theological is that only an authoritative statement of the Church can insure what is *true* development, and this role can only be recognized by faith.

Showing the influence of Aquinas, Newman, and Blonde!, *UR* concludes with the author's own theological reflection. Parallels can be drawn between the philosophical quest for " existential truth, " that which supplies meaning to one's existence and which in a sense is already within one, and theology's role to articulate the immediate presence through faith of of the divine. Notional abstraction never exhausts the *idea,* hence a continual mental motion to plumb further. Because of the unique nature of the presence of the real to the mind-whether philosophic truth or Saving Truth itself-one's moral stance vis-a-vis the real conditions insight. "The real becomes more and more real to those who love it and obey its claims on them. " (p. 373) And finally, the super-logical character of dogmatic growth is shown from the very nature of thought itself as well as from the role of the Spirit. There is, if I might call it, room for mental gestation in which a dogma may grow spontaneously, largely unconscious.

But dogma has this uniqueness. The *terminus a quo* is both an immediate presence of God and a message. All of Revelation is " ultimately meant, although incompletely expressed " by the Scriptures. Hermeneutics brings to the fore elements not expressly said but implicitly intended, and it must conserve what was explicitly meant by a statement. Subsequent to all of this is the role of authority to judge true development, under the guidance of the Spirit, which alone can save human thought from the partialness inherent in its abstractive nature. My summation ends here.

I would have liked this last point to have been developed further because even those in authoritative office think within a particular culture and

theological view. Since grace works within nature, how does the Spirit enable someone in authority to pass judgments on the rectitude of a theological development within another philosophical system? This raises the possibility that it has been done already, precipitously and falsely. *UR* clearly envisions the inevitability of error within a theological tradition. The question is, does the insuring of true development demand that every doctrinal statement of the Magisterium be errorless. The author does not raise the problem directly, but would seem to say yes. It would have been interesting to see H. Kung's question in *Unfehlbar* incorporated; unfortunately the manuscript of *UR* had been in the publisher's hands since 1970.

On the same idea, if UR develops strongly-and I think unassailably correct-the super-logical growth of dogmas, how is one to judge even in retrospect a true development? *UR* notes that "the proper role of theology is to work out a system in which primitive and later dogmas are related to one another in such a way that harmoniously and intelligibly fit into a pattern. " (p. But what would be the criteria for dogmas being harmoniously patterned especially if one wishes to leave room for non-strictly logical connections,

There are some remarkably beautiful analyses of the nature of faith, especially the idea of immediately and inarticulately but wholly possessing-or rather being possessed by-the divine. In the limp propositionai approach to faith one could never show convincingly how the simple believer, M. Unamuno's *foi du charbonnier,* could have as much faith as the theologian, yet one had to admit it as possible.

I should like to conclude with an ecumenical proposal, suggested by the analysis of the historicity of truth in *UR.* The first principles from which a man thinks-or a collectivity-is the man himself. We are not separately conscious of them in our thinking. They provide direction to our thinking, give tonality to a society's tradition. Now, when we look at the *Credo* of another Church, we may see elements there which do not fit into our own. Not in the sense that they contradict, but that they are not easily harmonizable with our first principles. In a contribution to *New Dimensions in Religimts Experience* (Alba House, 1971) I suggested that conceptualizations can be rooted in irreducibly diverse patterns of thought from which affirmations about the same reality can be made although they are not harmonizable. The ecumenical question is, what do we need minimally to mutually recognize creeds. If Prof. Walgrave's book clearly shows that we have moved away from logical theories of inclusion, could we not extend that same direction to the matter of recognizing other creeds, asking of others not that they embrace our notional affirmations and tradition but asking ourselves to accept a true development in their tradition. Credal formulae are not relative, I do not

mean that, any more than J. Walgrave would have us drop rigid logical theories for fluid transformistic theories. Newman's dogmatic principle holds, and so recognition could not be extended haphazardly. We might remember in all of this that the earliest creeds were doxological and not criteria for division, and that even the New Testament lived with pluralistic thought patterns. It took a long time to see how John's *doxa* fit in with Paul's *kenosis* Christ.

There is an extended bibliography at the end of *UR,* drawing on German, French, Dutch, and English materials. The publisher could well have put the footnotes at the bottom of the pages rather than at the back. My final word is that this is an impressive book, deserving of a slow and careful reading.

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The Crisis in Priestly Ministry. By CHARLES E. CURRAN. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides, 1972. Pp. 146. *$1.50* (paperback) .

Where to classify Charles Curran's work within the currently ever-increasing literature on the priesthood is difficult to judge. It eludes categorization as scholarly or popular in presentation, as specifically theological or behavioral in approach. It can seem to have some qualities of each of these genres, yet is actually none of them.

The author describes his brief book as addressing " some theological reflections on the crisis of priestly ministry to those who are either actively engaged in the priestly ministry or preparing for it" (p. 1) "with the aim of trying to be of assistance to" such persons. (p. 8) He identifies and discusses three crises among contemporary priests: 1) a "crisis in ministerial identity" (Chapter I); a "crisis in spirituality" (Chapter II); and a "crisis in preaching the Word of God" (Chapter III). This review will be concerned chiefly with the convictions, both affirmative and negative, which color and govern Father Curran's outlook on the three "crises" he discerns, and the theological character of these convictions.

Opinions will differ as to whether this work really consists of " theological reflections " at all. In its author's judgment, no doubt, the book is not alone theological, but something of a model of what contemporary theological methodology should produce. This is the reason, or part of the reason, why Father Curran expects his work to be of assistance to contemporary priests. But to those who hold that theological reflection springs proximately from faith's believing and pondering God's word, so that truly theological undertaking is directly illumined and guided by

the divine word enlivening the believing community, "The Crisis of Priestly Ministry " would not qualify as theological. For Charles Curran accepts and urges as ultimately normative for priestly life and ministry not the word of God but what he calls simply "the human." This point needs concretization.

Catholic faith holds that many truths about the ministerial priesthood have been revealed by God. These are preached in every age, by the Church's ordinary magisterium, and some of them have been defined, at one time or another, by her solemn magisterium. These stand as changeless. No one holds that the meaning and "the model" (Fr. Curran's term) of priesthood has been throughly penetrated by, or adequately defined in, any human conceptualizations. For priesthood is an aspect of the total, and incomprehensible, mystery of the Church; and it is a special participation of Christ's saving presence and activity in history. Consequently, it transcends all human understanding. It remains true, however, that because priesthood is a gift of God to men and not a merely human institution, the ultimate norm for judging the meaning of priesthood and its role in human salvation is the word of God and not merely human exigencies.

Nowhere in his discussion of priestly identity or functioning (in fact, nowhere in this book) does Father Curran so much as state what God's word, as understood by the Church, tells us about priesthood; nowhere does he accept and use this body of sacred teaching as normative in determining priestly identity, meaning, and function. For example, Catholic theology has taught for centuries that the priestly role includes prophetic, sacramental, and leadership functions (magisterium, ministerium, regimen); and Vatican Council II developed this point extensively. Charles Curran mentioned these three aspects of priesthood, but simply as the opinion of one contemporary theologian, Edward Schillebeeckx! Because Father Curran suppresses divine truth about the priesthood more than he is guided by it in his reflections, doubt that his work is really theological is not groundless.

For Curran, it is " the human " which must finally determine priestly identity. Impatient with a theology which "thought in terms of universal essences or natures which are true in all circumstances, " (p. 27) the author holds that " ultimately the individual minister himself must responsibly fashion his own ministerial role in terms of the people he is trying to serve ... ultimately the concrete meaning of (priestly) ministry comes from the individual minister himself." (p. 33) One premise for this conclusion seems to be Father Curran's position that "Christian ministry precisely *because it has to do with the human* is not able to have ... strict definitions and boundaries .. .*by its very nature* it can be *as broad as the human.* " (p. 31. italics the reviewer's)

Quite possibly, it is inevitable that, if our judgments about the meaning of the ministerial priesthood are not immediately rooted in God's revelation about it, we shall conclude that " by its very nature " priestly ministry is coextensive with " the human " : it includes no less than, and no more than, the human. God's word alone enables us to know the divine and eternal meaning of priesthood and priestly ministry; only that word manifests priesthood's role as the channel from Calvary to the Father, a channel through which "the human " can journey infinitely beyond the human.

One cannot fault, but can only praise, Father Curran's deep conviction about the need for profound reformation and updating of priestly life and ministry. Vatican II, as well as the personal experience of priests almost everywhere, witness that " the pastoral and human circumstances of the priesthood have in very many instances been thoroughly changed. " (II Vatican Council, *Presbyterorum Ordinis,* a. I) Urgent need for priestly change and adaptation to contemporary man, and his society, must be admitted by all. The question is whether we shall accept as *ultimately normative* in determining the adaptive processes God's word proclaimed by Christ's voice among us or the tastes, preferences, and so fallible (but always "responsible"!) whims of every individual priest in the Church. The question is whether in determining what changes are to be made God's word of wisdom or my foolisness shall decide what priesthood is "by its very nature. "

Other major points made in this work are similarly open to question. One example is the interpretation of the sacraments expressed in these reflections. We are told that " the sacraments and even the Eucharist are not primarily channels of grace, " (p. 36) but that " the sacramental rite is above all a faith celebration." (p. 38) This is hardly a new view, to be sure; elements of it can be traced back some 900 years. Certainly Catholic theological tradition holds that faith plays a key role in sacramental activity; it is the very great theologians who often speak not simply of "sacraments " but of " sacraments of faith. " In this sense, one must agree that every sacramental rite is " a faith celebration. " But is sacramental activity a faith celebration " above all " ? Is the sacrament no greater than a celebration of our faith: that faith which is resident in us, subject to our control, and which is at best a human response to God?

In Catholic teaching, the sacrament is not alone the manifestation of faith within the community and within persons, it is more. It includes, signifies, brings God's embrace of us, God's loving initiative to which, through faith, we respond. As a (relatively) total encounter between God and man, the sacrament really transforms us, making us truly "deiform," as ancient Christian usage put it. Father Curran sees the human activity of faith as paramount in the sacraments, and as, so to say, defining sacramental life; Catholic teaching sees God's self-giving to us as primary in all the

sacraments, the human faith-response remaining indispensably necessary.

Again Charles Curran's complaints (the correct term) that "ministry in the Church is practically limited to priestly ministry" (p. 3) is remarkable. His position is that, whereas scripture itself indicates " a great plurality of ministry" in the Church, (p. 32) priestly ministry, quite unfortunately, has come to include all other forms of ministry. This position seems to be historically indefensible and factually untenable.

In addition to questions raised in this review, other positions taken by Father Curran in the pages of this work are also open to discussion to say the least.

A word should be added-however disagreeable the task-about the author's style of presentation. In his Introduction Father Curran points out that the book began as a series of lectures. (cf. p. 8) This may account for the fact that a tedious repetitiveness, not merely of ideas but of identical phrases, comes to seem never-ending in this work. Only once, in this reviewer's judgment, does the writing come alive, this for a very few pages in the discussion of St. Paul's spirituality. Overall, the style is as dully repetitious as the book's content is theologically poverty-stricken.

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Toward a Theology for the Future. Edited by CLARK H. PINNOCK and DAVID F. WELLS. Carol Stream, Illinois: Creation House, 1971. $4.95. Pp. 329.

Aggressive and comprehensive are the claims made in the Editors' Preface for the essays collected in this volume. On the one hand, say the Editors, these essays by Evangelical scholars will demonstrate theological workers who have remained committed to biblical Christianity when everyone else has rejected the Bible, leaving shattered convictions. On the other hand, these essays will show that contemporary Evangelical Protestants do not deserve the charges of anti-intellectualism, cultural isolation, and social indifference made against them in the past.

Indeed, these essays mean to be a gauntlet cast into the arena of contemporary theological scholarship by Evangelical Protestants. They are to show that Evangelical scholars are " intellectually vigorous and moving toward a fully articulated theology." They are to show that Evangelical scholars have what the situation today demands: " a vigorous restatement of historic belief, " a " convincing and credible way out " of the "dangerous cul-de-sac" theology is now in. More than that, even these essays are to demonstrate a movement toward " constructive Evan-

gelical proposal " for the future of theology. These are mms and high claims.

To accomplish these goals, the editors have gathered eleven essays from a wide range of theological areas, essays written by Evangelical Protestants in America, Canada, and England. Of the American authors, the majority are teaching at or have been closely associated with Fuller Theological Seminary.

The field of Biblical scholarship is represented by three essays. R. K. Harrison writes on Old Testament study; E. F. Harrison deals with the sayings of Jesus in the New Testament; Palmer Robertson authors an essay on Biblical theology.

The areas of historical and systematic theology receive their due. Clark Pinnock, one of the editors, has an essay on contemporary systematic theology. Geoffrey Bromiley writes on Patristic studies. David Wells, a second editor, deals with the relation of theology to the institutional Church today. A discussion of Ethics in the Theology of Hope is provided by Bernard Ramm. And Stanley Obitts' chapter on Hans Kling's view of infallibility belongs also to the area of theology.

Concerning the relation of Christianity to culture, three essays are included. One by Harold Ockenga discusses preaching; another by J.D. McDonald offers an Evangelical correlation of theology and culture. And Arthur Glasser writes on the Church's]\fission and the cultural environment.

Strikingly absent is anything on hermeneutics. This is a surprising lacuna, since interpretation of Scripture is a burning problem today, a problem about which Evangelical scholars should have something important to say. This lack leads me to the major criticism I have of this collection of essays.

The reader of this book, led by the Editors' Preface, expects some positive statements about new ways to do theological work. He expects not just description of what is being done and not merely criticism of it; he expects substantive alternatives spelled out. At least, the Editors' Preface leads the reader to look for proposals articulated and defended about doing things theological scholars have not been doing but should have been doing. But what the reader actually gets is mostly criticism of what theological scholars have been doing. Substantive alternatives, spelled out and defended, are largely absent.

Take, for instance, Pinnock's chapter on systematic theology today. Writing clearly and persuasively, Pinnock lays bare what he sees as the sickness of modern theology: the refusal to reject the naturalistic ideology of positivistic scientism. What is Pinnock's constructive alternative? Theologians should resist submitting to the naturalistic ideology of positivistic scientism. They should stick to their guns and appeal to the "empirically verifiable divine activity in history," to" the public revelation

of God given definitively in the Christ event ... ," to the "verified Word received from beyond the human situation. " The reader searches eagerly in the essay for how theologians should do this today. He looks for more than these vague assertions; he looks for a constructive new way spelled out. He looks in vain. All Pinnock offers are these vague assertions.

Or take the essay of the second editor, David Wells, on the relation of contemporary theology to the institutional Church. Wells gives a fine survey of contemporary Protestant and Catholic theology. What does he suggest as a constructive remedy for the weakness of this theological development he traces so well? We should, he suggests, recover Luther's and Calvin's distinction between the *Deus absconditus* and *Deus revelatus.* This would represent, Wells says, a fresh return to the Biblical sources for man's knowledge of God rather than further immersion in secular life. It will be a return "to the 'enfleshed Christ', Jesus of Nazareth, (in whom) God has spoken His final Word to man." But how might theologians today make such a return to the " enfleshed Christ? " Wells spells out no answer.

Or, finally, consider Obitts' "discussion" with Hans Kling on the subject of infallibility. This chapter, in my view, is the most closely reasoned, the most penetrating of all the essays. And, in the light of the expectations for constructive new proposals aroused by the Preface, this essay is the most frustrating. For Obitts burrows into Kling's doctrine of infallibility and religious truth, showing its weak and tender parts. But what positive, constructive alternative is made by Obitts about this burning issue of religious truth? All Obitts finally suggests is that we need to do better than Kling. How to do better, something substantive, he does not give.

The stated purpose of these essays is praiseworthy. To address the present situation in theology offering constructive, positive proposals, to show the vigorous work being done by Evangelical scholars, to demonstrate that they are not anti-intellectual, culturally isolated, socially indifferent-all these are worthy purposes. But the specific gravity of the essays tends much more toward showing what Evangelical scholars think is wrong with what other theologians are doing today. The claim of the Preface to present constructive, positive proposals is not fulfilled. At least there are no significant proposals which are substantively stated, spelled out, and defended.

Several of these essays, especially the ones on theology and ethics, offer perceptive analyses of contemporary theology. In this lies the volume's value. More than vague assertions about how to do theology better, however, the book does not provide.

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The Thomism of Etienne Gilson. A Critical Study. By JOHN M. QUINN, O. S. A. Villanova, Pa.: Villanova University Press, 1971. Pp.

As the long and brilliant career of Etienne Gilson draws to a close (he will be 89 on June 13, 1973), it is inevitable that scholars in increasing numbers will attempt a critical assessment of his life's work. Gilson himself would be the first to welcome their evaluation of his thought and correction of any mistakes he may have made. Fr. Quinn is the first, to my knowledge, to publish an extended critical study of the part of Gilson's work that is most dear to his heart-his Thomism. Chapter 1 examines Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy, Chapter his conception of metaphysics in its relation to philosophy, Chapter 3 his doctrine of knowledge and existence, and Chapter 4 his interpretation of the first three ways to God. His judgment of Gilson is severe. He questions " the validity of the claim that the Gilsonian Christian philosopher, the wholly metaphysical thinker, and the existentialist represent the authentic Aquinas." (p. xvi) Because of the difficulty and complexity of these issues this review can do little more than comment briefly on author's interpretation of Gilson's positions and the validity of some of his criticisms.

Like others before him, the author contends that Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy is self-contradictory, for it claims that this philosophy is both strictly rational and philosophical and also " rooted in Scripture and tradition." (p. 4) While not denying the validity of Christian philosophy in the general sense of an influence of Christianity on the philosopher (e. g., in raising fresh philosophical problems), he questions the Gilsonian way of understanding Christian philosophy. What troubles him most is Gilson's contention that Aquinas, in his role of theologian, developed a philosophy that he made a part of his theology. This philosophy, which according to Gilson is "the philosophical demonstration of the part of revelation that deals with truth accessible to natural reason, " (p. 7) is established on purely rational grounds. Fr. Quinn cannot see how such a philosophical element can be part and parcel of a theology. But this is because he either misunderstands or does not accept St. Thomas's notion of theology. If the *Summa Theologiae* is truly a compendium of theology, everything in it is theological-even rationally demonstrated truths. Gilson was looking for a term to designate the rationally demonstrable part of Thomistic theology and all the philosophical notions that Aquinas elaborated in his theology for theological purposes. To these he gave the name " the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas. " More generally he considers every philosophy Christian which, " although keeping the two orders [of reason and faith] formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason " *(The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy,* p. 37). To my knowledge he never suggested that this gives rise to a hybrid theology on the model of

mathematical physics, as the author claims. (p. 9) The analogy is his own, not Gilson's. Moreover, the author misinterprets Gilson's statement that "Philosophically speaking, the way a philosopher arrives at truth is irrelevant to it" to mean that the *method of proof* is irrelevant. (p. 5) In the context Gilson means that a truth may be suggested to a philosopher in many different ways, e. g., by his faith, but this truth must be rationally demonstrated if it is to have philosophical merit. Nor does Gilson endow St. Thomas, the commentator on Aristotle, "with the narrow textual method and withdrawn posture of a modern scholar." (p. 11) In Gilson's own words, St. Thomas's commenting on Aristotle was for him "a study of philosophy in depth and in its manifold disciplines," in order "to co-operate with the work of redemption" *(The Philosopher and Theology,* p. 193). According to Gilson, however, many of St. Thomas's most profound and original philosophical notions are contained, not in his commentaries, but in his theological works.

Chapter Q, entitled "Metaphysics and Philosophy," adds to the author's misinterpretations of Gilson. He is said to depute "philosophy to an exclusively metaphysical office," to contract philosophy to metaphysics, (p. 18) presumably because he holds that "being is the first principle of all human knowledge." (p. 17) Thus Gilson is said to invert the natural order of learning, placing metaphysics first and setting "neophytes to unriddling the puzzles connected with being as being." (p. QO) Were the author well acquainted with Gilson's writings he would know that Gilson follows St. Thomas's pedagogical order, placing mathematics first, followed by the philosophy of nature, ethics, and finally metaphysics. With St. Thomas he deputes metaphysics to the latter part of one's life. In his Princeton lecture "Thomas Aquinas and our Colleagues" (1953) he writes: "Young people cannot be metaphysicians." The author thinks Gilson insists on "the empirically unascertainable notion of being," but in fact he says in the same lecture: "The intellect for the metaphysician is like any other human intellect: it draws its data from sense perception and never thinks without images." While having a predilection for metaphysics and considering it philosophy *par excellence,* Gilson does not practically place the whole of theoretical philosophy into metaphysics. (p. 19) If he did, he would leave no room for his own books on the philosophy of art, which according to him do not belong to metaphysics *(Forms and Substances in the Arts,* p. Q).

In Chapter 3 Gilson is upbraided for having a "horror of abstraction" and a "fondness for metaphysical intuition" in the apprehension of existence. The author finds in this "a residual Bergsonian influence." (p. 69) In fact, so little fond of intellectual intuition is Gilson that he denies that we have any; in particular he will have nothing to do with an intuition of the act of being or *esse,* as the author correctly quotes

Gilson as saying. (p. 164, n. 63) Gilson is critical of another very well-known Thomist for proposing precisely such an intuition of being *(Le Thomisme,* 6th ed., p. 187). For Gilson, the elaboration of the notion of being is owing to "a progressive effort of abstraction" *(ibid.,* p. 188). (The expression " metaphysical intuitions " which the author finds in Gilson's *Being and Some Philosophers,* p. is not to be taken in a technical sense; in the context it means simply "metaphysical reflections "). In stressing the role of judgment in the apprehension of existence Gilson wishes to avoid the reduction of existence to a form or essence, which is the object of simple apprehension. The author praises Gilson for drawing attention to the danger of essentializing the act of being or *esse,* but the author himself has not escaped this pitfall. He describes existence as "a form of reality," though superior to other forms. (p. 58) According to Gilson's interpretation of St. Thomas, however, *esse* is not a form but the actuality of form *(Le Thomisme,* p. 175). The author does not wish to de-essentialize existence lest it slip " beyond intelligibility. " (p. 54) "Quiddity" and "meaning" are taken to be synonyms. (p. 71) He thus loses sight of the radical otherness of *esse* in creatures from form or essence.

The same quickness to criticize Gilson and slowness to understand him mars the fourth Chapter on the ways to God. The author misses the thrust of Gilson's distinction between the first and second ways based on the difference between a moving and efficient cause. (p. 96) He criticizes Gilson's explanation of how a thing can move itself (" one part of a certain being is moving another one "), then offers the same explanation: " one part of an organism moves only because it is moved by another part. " (p. 99) Gilson is said to base the third way not upon physical possibles but upon abstract metaphysical notions of possibility and necessity. But as the author remarks, Gilson sees the starting point of the proof as " the visible fact that certain things are born and others die." (p. Birth and death certainly qualify as physical events.

It is remarkable that in a book on the Thomism of Gilson the author nowhere refers to a book of Gilson entitled *Le Thomisme,* 6th ed. 1965, which contains some of his latest thoughts on the subject. Only a few citations are made to the English translation of an earlier edition of this work. Had this book been consulted, the author might have avoided some of his misinterpretations of Gilson's mind. His own book is worthless for obtaining an accurate idea of what Gilson actually holds. Its many grave misinterpretations obscure whatever of value there is in some of his criticisms, for example, certain ambiguities and difficulties in some of Gilson's English writings. It is to be hoped that in the future Gilson will find more understanding critics.

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Morality, Law and Grace. By J. N.D. ANDERSON. Downers Grove, Illinoin: Inter-Varsity Press, 197Q. Pp. 1Q8. $1.95.

J. N.D. Anderson's book *Morality, Law and Grace* begins with a regret that it is not what it might have been, viz., a more developed presentation of the " vast range of subjects " pertaining to Christian Ethics rather than a two chapter addition to a trifold lecture series. Unfortunately, the *opusculum* suffers in that it raises more questions than it attempts to answer. Indeed, the questions it does attempt to answer hardly bristle with relevance. Interest is not vibrant in the area indicated by the title. Dr. Anderson's chapters on "Morality and Determinism " and " Morality in The Permissive Society " lay claim and credence to the fact that it is sensible to address oneself to the contemporary horizon of discussion. Such advertence would, of necessity, include delving into the nature of secularity, world-hominization, and the active virtues flowing from them-all of which are regrettably bypassed. Certainly, B. F. Skinner's contention that man is freedomless is scarcely challenged by indicating that there is " insoluble mystery " surrounding speculation on man's being preconditioned. " (p. 38) In the second chapter the author concerns himself more creditably with offering alternatives to the" man come of age" morality of J. A. T. Robinson and the distinctive situation ethic of J. Fletcher. This is, perhaps, the better segment of Dr. Anderson's work since here he argues congently for moral criteria along traditional lines. But, even here, there are reservations. He says: " To leave everything to man's better judgement presupposes a moral perfection in human beings which contradicts the basic facts of life." (p. 49) Be this as it may, this is no justification for the following assertion: "This is precisely why the Bible includes ... clear-cut moral principles or 'laws' which represent the Maker's instructions ... " (pp. 49-50) This is Biblical fundamentalism at its boldest! These statements are never integrated into the broader context of man under grace which the author refers to as " the power for moral living. " The role of Christian conscience vis-a-vis the ethical situation is never discussed. It is disconcerting-indeed, alarming-to find Dr. Anderson so superficially conclude that " ... whether abortion is or is not justified must in the nature of the case be justified by the medical profession; so it is in my view wrong to introduce any criteria which are outside of a doctor's competence." (p. 80) The peculiarity is that mention is made of the sanctity of life, but there is no attempt made to demonstrate the aforementioned " exception " to the law.

Positively speaking, *Morality, Law and Grace* does argue, even if unsystematically, to the interrelationships among morality, law, and grace. Basically, the book is apologetic by way of suggestion rather than by way of serious dialogue and demonstration. One could hardly find time and

space in lecture format to seek to establish the necessary complementarity between reason and faith. Time ought to have been allotted to set in perspective the relationship between Biblical and natural ethics.

In sum, one has no doubt that Dr. Anderson sees the broader dimensions of the topics he has chosen to put before us. If the reader lacks his perspecuity, he may be bored or deceived by his book's avoidance of more fundamental questions.

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Causality and Scientific Explanation. Vol. I: *Medieval and Early Classical Science.* By William A. Wallace. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1972. Pp. 294. $12.00.

Rapidity of change in the philosophy of science is illustrated by the fact that twenty years ago-in the heyday of the " logical empiricist " or "logical positivist" movement-it would have been considered misleading to speak of causality and scientific explanation in the same breath of voice. It was then assumed that the task of the philosopher of science was the formal representation of scientific theories in general, leaving to the practicing scientist the job of confronting his conclusions with actual scientific procedure. Philosophy of science, thus disengaged from the specific tenets of particular scientific theories, was thought to be immune from the vicissitudes of change and the overthrow of current beliefs. Since the philosopher of science could, in principle at least, outline the characteristics of all possible explanations, he could, by the same stroke, give the formal characteristics of all future explanations. Unfortunately, this attractive program has shown itself grossly inadequate, and it is now generally recognized that, in their concentration on technical problems of logic, logical empiricists lost contact with real science. If it was simplistic to read the past as the record of great men throwing off the shackles of dark inheritance and heralding the dawn of scientific objectivity, it was equally naive to assume that the concept of " explanation " in science can be divorced completely from a consideration of the history of scientific explanations. In this post-positivistic climate Fr. Wallace's excellent survey of the progress of scientific explanation from the Middle Ages through the seventeenth century becomes a fashionable book, which will appeal to a large audience beyond the circle of medieval scholars.

Fr. Wallace sets forth the characteristics of medieval science at Oxford, Paris, and Padua with a penetration and fairness which could hardly be

bettered, and he argues very persuasively for the provocative thesis that Aristotle provided the seventeenth century with its "new" scientific method. In this brief review, I shall focus on this latter aspect of Fr. Wallace's important book, and I shall choose to examine his contention that the early modern period of classical science "for all the protestations of reaction against late scholastic and Renaissance methods, was dominated by the same search for causes and thus was in recognizable methodological continuity with the medieval period." (pp. 22-23)

Fr. Wallace shows that from the thirteenth century, when Aristotle's philosophy was once more reaffirmed in the West, his methodogical canons were generally taken for granted. Robert Grosseteste, although a Neoplatonist in his metaphysic, felt he had to adhere to the methodology defined by the *Posterior Analytics,* and he sought to cast his work into this mold. Four centuries later, courses on scientific method still centered around the four causes discussed by Aristotle. However much his latter-day opponents attacked him, they still retained more of his views than they would have been fond of admitting. Fr. Wallace justly points out that Galileo's running argument against Aristotle can obscure the fact that he agreed with him in holding that there is a literally and uniquely true physical theory, that it can be discovered, and that alternative theories are consequently false. I doubt, however, whether this warrants the claim that "there seemed to be, at the close of the Renaissance, despite the continued presence of numerous and vexing substantive problems, a general feeling that the methodological canons were well in hand." (p. *155)* One has to ask not only about specific methods but about the expectations that underlie these methods. There is obviously a continuity of concepts with the Aristotelian and medieval tradition, but in many respects such linguistic ties are minimal and should not obscure the deep discontinuity between the old and the new science. At least two basic features of Aristotle's methodology were profoundly at variance with the new scientific method developed in the seventeenth century: (a) its qualitative character, and (b) its restriction to "natural experience" as opposed to "controlled experimentation."

Aristotle took quality to be the clue to the discovery of the nature of a thing, and he assumed that properties corresponding to the human modes of perception were the basic ontological features of physical essence itself. Fire, for instance, is defined essentially as the hot and dry, and no appeal is made to mathematics, the science of quantity, which can tell us nothing about the "essence" but merely about the "amount" of the substance at hand. What characterizes a natural body is a normal way of behavior, some "natural motion," which is caused by a "form," and once this form has been named and located within a conceptual network of mutual definitions, the motion has been explained and the "nature"

of the body is to that extent scientifically known. Now it is precisely this assumption that the new science rejected. Descartes, Galileo, and Newton vigorously asserted that it is not the perceptible qualities but an internal, *mathematically* expressible structure that characterizes what a body is. On the strength of the evidence adduced by Fr. Wallace himself, I submit that, inasmuch as this new attitude was foreshadowed in medieval thought, it was by way of implicit transformation rather than extension of the received Aristotelian approach. For instance, speaking of the achievement of Thomas Bradwardine, he writes: " Aristotle and thirteenth century scholastics had viewed speed as a modality or property of motion, but not as motion itself, nor would they allow speed to be taken in such a univocal sense as to permit a direct mathematical comparison of motions of various types." (p. 59) One is reminded of A. C. Crombie's characterization of the six principal contributions made by the Middle Ages to the development of modern science, where five of the six turn out to be an explicit repudiation of some Aristotelian tenet.

The shift is clear if one looks at the status of medieval astronomy which used mathematical language and was considered, for that very reason, to give no real insight into physical nature. The vehement protests of Copernicus and Galileo against the treatment of astronomical systems as mere hypotheses was not directed against the nominalists who, as Fr. Wallace clearly establishes, had lost their thunder by the sixteenth century, but against the Aristotelian division of astronomy into physical and mathematical with the attendant contention that mathematical astronomy provided useful fictions. The removal of this barrier was one of the major methodological advances of the new science.

The second feature of the methodology of the *Posterior Analytics* that was set aside in the seventeenth century was its restriction to concrete and ordinary experience. Aristotle assumed that one came to understand the essence of a physical thing by observing what it "naturally " did, disregarding chance events and instances where its motion was " constrained." Hence the close relationship between nature and theology. The behavior of a body in its normal context discloses the goal of its activity and its place in the hierarchical structure of essence.

With this view of nature, it is not suprising that the notion of experiment is not discussed by Aristotle in his account of scientific method. He could hardly have countenanced actual interference with the natural order and the use of idealized models to render manageable the complexity of everyday causation as a legitimate part of his method. This is not to disclaim that Aristotle was a keen observer of natural events, but his insistence on the primacy of experience was always coupled with the assumption that the human mind had a capacity of insight which enabled it to grasp essence via single observations, and that this power of seeing

the universal in the particular made the premises of natural sciences into necessary truths that are recognized as such without the need of further test. This is a far cry from the modern experimental method with its twofold characteristics of idealization and contrivance, and its reliance on predictive validation.

Some of the instances of" knowledge given by Fr. Wallace presuppose little more than a vague empiricism that can be found in any writer who thinks he can learn from observing the world around us. Surely very little can be inferred from the information that " Coronel notes as an experimental fact *(cognoscimus per experientiam)* that we cannot start a fire without destroying something combustible ... " ! (p. 133)

The author is, of course, perfectly aware of these objections, and it is one of the charms of his rich and scholarly work that he gives enough quotations from the primary sources to allow dissenters to marshall their own arguments and make a case for their own point of view.

Fr. Wallace has made an important contribution to our understanding of scientific explanation, and he has written a stimulating and thought-provoking chapter in the history of the continuity vs. discontinuity debate over the method of medieval and modern science. Readers of this first volume of *Causality and Scientific Explanation* will eagerly look forward to the publication of the second one which will continue this study to the twentieth century.

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Philosophy of Religion Series. Ed. By JoHN HICK. New York: Herder and Herder.

Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches. By M. J. CHARLESWORTH. Pp. $8.95.

Oppositions of Religious Doctrines. By WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN. Pp. *$6.95.*

Contemporary Critiques of Religion. By KA1 NIELSON. 1971. Pp. 163. *$6.95.*

Problems of Religious Knowledge. By TERENCE PENELHUM. Pp. 186. $7.95.

It was not too many years ago that philosphy of religion was, if not dead, in a state of advanced anemia. Theology was robust, even rambunctious. Today, constructive theology is a shadow of its old self. Valuable work is now being done primarily in the historical, social-scientific, and philoso-

phical study of theology. But especially impressive is the continuing flow of books and articles by philosophical analysts of theology in Britain and North America. Two worthwhile series of books m the philosophy of religion have been published recently.

The four books here reviewed are contributions to the *Philosophy of Religion Series* under the general editorship of John Hick. Books by Hick and H. P. Owen were published earlier, and volumes by Ninian Smart, Basil Mitchell, Nelson Pike, Donald Evans, Dennis Nineham, and H. D. Lewis are forthcoming. The editorial design is an interesting and rather unique one in that the series is intended to " consolidate the gains of the past " and yet "to direct attention upon the problems of the future, "-i. e., trying to show the student how a particular problem such as the proofs of the existence of God, concepts of deity, religious knowledge, etc., has developed to the present and what the author sees as the problems and prospects remaining for analysis. Hence each book is meant to be introductory but far more, for " each author will accordingly go beyond the scope of an introduction to formulate his own position in the light of contemporary debates. " The authors, then, do not stop at historical exposition and analysis but make clear their own theses or critical conclusions which, in turn, are meant to stimulate further analysis and dialogue. This is an admirable plan. It helps to define the issues, to give a sense of an acknowledged body of literature or problems defining the field, and a common task. This is a feature of scientific work so often missing in the humanities.

Perhaps it was the editor's concern to give a sense of coherence to the issues and tasks that lead him to invite contributions largely from philosophers committed to or strongly influenced by British analytical philosophy. It would have been less orderly but probably more instructive if the series had included contributions from philosophers and theologians representing quite disparate approaches: Thomists following the leads of Rahner and Lonergan, Whiteheadians, phenomenologists, radical empiricists, etc. Men working from these perspectives are not only, or even primarily, doing systematic theology but are wrestling with fundamental issues of epistemology and method.

Since the editor conceives of this series as a collection of essays comprising a comprehensive textbook in the philosophy of religion, it would be well to begin with M. J. Charlesworth's Philosophy of *Religion: The Historic Approaches.* Charlesworth has not, we can be thankful, written a concise history of the philosophy of religion. Rather, he presents four distinct conceptions of the nature and scope of philosophy of religion dominant in the Western tradition since Plato. While these four approaches do not exhaust the alternatives, they represent a perceptive and illuminating way of looking at the role of philosophy in the Western religious tradition.

This approach should be a great help to students, for it sets forth systematically the respective logical structures, presuppositions, and consequences of each of these important alternatives-and draws some lessons and conclusions about the relations of reason and religious belief in the present context.

The first conception of the philosophy of religion is that it is " the business of philosophy to lead men to a quasi-religious vision of reality," i.e., to make a religion out of philosophy. Representatives of this position include Plato, Aristotle, the Neo-Platonists, Leibnitz, Spinoza, and Hegel. Charlesworth concludes that this approach " results in an austerely contemplative and speculative approach to religion " and that it involves the denial or " blurring of the distinction between the sphere of natural reason and that of supernatural faith." Also, it leads to a radically a-historical approach to religion and frequently involves no directly practical ethical demands. All of these factors place this type of philosophy at odds with supernatural religions involving claims of historical revelation. However, Charlesworth argues that these objections do not count against all religion, e. g., Buddhism. The fundamental weakness of this approach stems rather from its conception of the nature and scope of philosophy, viz., its metaphysical pretension. At present this kind of philosophizing is scorned in the West, although it may well be revived in time.

The second conception of philosophy is that of handmaid of theology, as exemplified in the work of Philo, Augustine, Maimonides and, most importantly, Thomas Aquinas. Here reason and faith remain distinct, but reason assists faith by justifying its presuppositions and explicating its contents coherently. Charlesworth sees the fundamental defect of this position (and especially in the case of Aquinas) in the fact that, if philosophy justifies the presuppositions and rational coherence of faith, " then this would seem to make faith logically dependent upon reason " which " tends to usurp the role of mistress of the house. " While this is a moot conclusion, I do not interpret it as a devastating criticism of the Thomistic position. Charlesworth is on much shakier ground-especially in the case of the Augustinian tradition-when he includes among the weaknesses of this position the fact that it allows a very secondary place to the practical side of religion and that it "is also an impersonal and 'objective' view that leaves aside altogether the dimension of what Pascal calls 'the heart' and Kierkegaard 'subjectivity'. " (p. 85)

The third approach is that of Pascal, Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard in which philosophy has no justificatory role but, rather, " functions to establish the conditions of the possibility of religion and, in a negative way, to make room for religious faith." This chapter includes some excellent summaries of the faith-reason problem in the above figures and is especially good on Kant. However, Charlesworth gives an exaggerated

picture of the " harlot reason " in Luther and Kierkegaard. Brian Gerrish's study of Luther and J. H. Thomas's study of Kierkegaard indicate that these two fideists give a larger place to reason than the popular interpretations allow. Charlesworth points out that fideism guarantees the autonomy of faith and the transcendence of the religious object but, if radically maintained, at the high price of irrationalism. On the other hand, if the heart has its reasons, then to some extent faith is subject to reason-if only to distinguish the " paradoxical " from the nonsensical. Charlesworth is of the opinion that radical fideism, so dominant in modern Protestantism, inevitably leads to theological reductionism.

The fourth conception sees philosophy of religion as serving a purely analytical function, exploring the logic or grammar, hence the meaningfulness of religious discourse. Here the author discusses the later Wittgenstein and his followers, e. g., Malcolm, W. D. Hudson, Peter Winch and D. Z. Phillips. Charlesworth agrees with Nielson and Macintyre that the efforts of these men end in theological reductionism and radical relativism in which " there can be no real dispute as to the truth or falsity of religion, " between those within and which makes it " impossible for those within the religious form of life to question it and to criticize the standards of intelligibility and rationality which they have held hitherto. " But more of this with Nielson. Charlesworth makes the important point that the reductionist views of the Wittgensteinian fideists have largely failed to " show the religious form of life to be *sui generis,"* in which case " the view that the sole task of philosophy with respect to religion is to display the idiosyncratic functions of religious language, loses its *raison d'etre."*

At the conclusion of his essay Charlesworth says that " a philosophy of religion that effectively evacuates religion of any specific meaning of its own by reducing it to that which is not religion, is deficient as a philosophy of religion." One would agree, but the difficulty, of course, is in determining what is and is not the essence or legitimate sphere of religion. What constitutes legitimate interpretation, and what involves reductionism? This is *the* issue between the modernists and traditionalists over the past century, and the line becomes more difficult to draw. The philosophers like things neat and tend to draw the line with the traditionalists and accuse the modernists of disingenuousness or worse. A study of the history of modern theology will reveal that the issue just is not that tidy. The question of what constitutes orthodoxy is today very moot indeed! William Christian makes an historical judgment not appreciated by most philosophical analysts: "Knowledge of what the tradition has amounted to in the past is not enough, for if it is indeed a living and growing tradition its past will condition but not determine its present and future. " (p. 8)

Kai Nielson's *Contemporary Critiques of Religion* is not a broad study

of the critiques of religion dominant today; it does not, for instance, deal with historical socio-economic, or psychological critiques so prevalent in our time. Rather, Nielson focuses on contemporary Anglo-American logical empiricist critiques of Judeo-Christian non-anthropomorphic God-talk. Three chapters are devoted to an analysis of the challenge of logical empiricism to religious belief, primarily in the work of A. J. Ayer; to the criticisms directed against this older logical empiricism, especially by Fr. Copleston and E. **L.** Mascall; and to the responses of Platinga and Hick to Antony Flew's recent challenges.

Nielson acknowledges that Ayer's revisions of the doctrines of *Language, Truth and Logic* involve further confusions and that the best empiricist critiques need refining. However, Nielson is convinced that the theological critics have done nothing to refute decisively the empiricist challenge, and he sets himself the task of strengthening the empiricist position. Nielson tackles the best philosophical responses to the empiricist critique and attempts a genuine dialogue with the philosophical defenders of theology. He makes some telling criticisms of Platinga and Hick, but how critical these are remains debatable. One must examine the essays by Hick and Platinga, Wisdom, Phillips, etc. concurrently with a reading of Nielson to judge for oneself.

Nielson regards theistic discourse as incoherent, since he is confident that efforts to meet Flew's demand, that putative truth claims be experientially verifiable by at least conceivable experiences characterizable in non-theistic terms, have failed. Hick's post-mortem verification fails because neither the believer nor the sceptic have a sufficient understanding of God to know what would constitute an eschatological theistic experience, e. g., whether a post-mortem presence of Jesus Christ was a theistic encounter or just "throughly good human beings ruled over by Jesus." To claim to know *God* is revealed in Jesus Christ is to step into the theological circle. There appear to be a couple of maneuvers open to the theologians. **It** is evident in Nielson's discussion and elsewhere in the work of the logical empiricists that they are working with a classical notion of deity which, rightly or wrongly, is no longer operable in many theologians, and secular theologians all conceive of deity in terms very different from the God of the classical tradition. When Nielson speaks of the problematic concept of God he has in mind the God of Greek metaphysics. This is not to say that the contemporary doctrines of God are unproblematic but simply that it is important to recognize that very different concepts of deity are employed in contemporary theological writing. Assuming other than classical metaphysical concepts of deity, it need not be logically absurd to speak of God in "non-theistic" (i.e., not traditional theistic) language. Issues remain, but they would be other than where Nielson locates them.

The problem of a true or adequate interpretation of experience persists

once we recognize that there is no simple, direct, unmediated experience. Nielson is sensitive to the criticisms of a " myth-eaten empiricist " conception of the relation between language and the world-especially to the criticisms of Wilfrid Sellars. Yet, he insists, " seeing-as " and " experiencing-as " is conceptually parasitical on " seeing " and " experiencing " ; thus it is not justifiable to maintain, as do Hick and others, that all seeing is seeing-as and all experiencing is experiencing-as, especially experience of God. For we simply do not know what it would be like to experience God. Nielson recognizes that there is no vocabulary that is common to all discourse, yet with Sellars he claims that " it remains the case that certain conceptions in certain language-games can be seen as more adequate than others." (p. 91) How so? Because these conceptions, e. g., " ' Edmonton ' denotes the capital of Alberta " can be shown to have an extra-linguistic relation, while " ' God denotes the maker of the world ' never breaks out of a charmed linguistic circle." But again does this not depend on our doctrine of God and creation? Nielson's point would not be decisive with a radical empiricist theologian such as Wieman. The fundamental problem is not empiricism but interpretation. It is at this point that I do not see how it is possible to step entirely outside the theological circle. But, with Penelhum, I think this need not be an irrational stance. This leads to the second possible maneuver of the theist: the argument of conceptual relativism. Nielson devotes one brief and not entirely satisfactory chapter to this challenge-what he has dubbed as " Wittgensteinian :fideism." This position, whose religious apostle is D. Z. Phillips, argues that notions of " fact, " " reality, " " truth " are given within a particular form of disourse or language-game, hence there can be no intelligible notion of what constitutes reality *sans phrase* nor an intelligible way of comparing various universes of discourse and deciding which one is truer or more real. " The distinction between reality and illusion shows itself *within particular language-games."* Again Nielson acknowledges the force of the argument for conceptual relativism, but the cost, he believes, is destructive of Christian theology. For if it is true, then " Christian-talk ... has its own perfectly legitimate order, but it can also in no objective sense be a claim to be the truth about man or to be the way and life " any more than can Zande witchcraft talk or Haitian voodoo talk. Given the truth of conceptual relativism, "we cannot succeed in making statements about reality *uberhaupt,* but only about the realities of a particular situation. " I do not think this need be so but, if so, the consequences do not strike me as fatal to theology. I am reminded of H. R. Niebuhr's comment that " It is not apparent that one who knows that his concepts are not universal must also doubt that they are concepts of the universal, or one who understands how all his experience is historically mediated must believe that nothing is mediated through history. " Nielson is wrong to infer that a perspectivism or conceptual relativism is *per se* equivalent to

subjectivism and precludes the legitimacy of making general truth claims. Such claims cannot achieve the. form of proof reached in the laboratqry, but the effort is continuously made, not without success, in human relations. It seems to me that Nielson, and perhaps those he criticizes as well, are working with a too-static model of language-games or inner-histories. Life is more fluid and dialogical.

Nielson contends that the position of Phillips, Holland, Malcolm, and John Wisdom" when pressed, leads or should lead to religious scepticism." Such a conclusion is, I believe, unwarranted. Wisdom, certainly leads us to a *neutral* conclusion. The conceptual relativists argue for a perspectivism or relativism that need not logically argue for a stance of religious scepticism. In conceding much to the Wittgensteinians, Nielson in fact appears to give up the case for his own (meta?) linguistic canon, i.e., logical empiricism.

Contemporary Critiques of Religion should advance the present discussion of the status of religious discourse and belief among the professional philosophers. For students, some understanding of the literature of the debate of the past two decades is prerequisite. Students with this background will find Nielson's lively and probing critique an enjoyable feast.

Terence Penelhum's *Problems of Religious Knowledge* is, in this reviewer's judgment, the most valuable contribution to the philosophy of religion of the four books here reviewed. It is by no means an introduction to epistemological problems in the philosophy of religion and may well turn off the neophyte early along. The book is a sophisticated, skillful analysis of the present epistemological impasse between sceptic and believer.

Chapter I is a straightforward description of the nature of faith as understood in the Catholic (Aquinas) and Protestant (J. Hick) traditions. Chapter II analyses the conditions necessary for successful proof, using G. E. Moore's discussion as a guide. At this point Penelhum proceeds on the assumption that the traditional proofs of the existence of God have attempted to satisfy these fundamental conditions but that each one has failed to satisfy at least one of the necessary conditions of proof. For the author's purposes here, the criticisms of Hume, Kant, and others are assumed compelling. Using his account of proof, in Chapter III, Penelhum concludes that the failure up to now of attempts to prove God's existence from non-theistic premises " is clearly inadequate to supply us with a proof that God's existence cannot ever be proved. " (p. 48) Here Penelhum interjects a valuable discussion and refutation of the reasons offered by (largely Protestant) theologians for holding that the theistic proofs are doomed to failure. In countering these theological notions he succeeds in refuting some doctrines widely held by theologians: that faith and knowledge are exclusive, that proof issues in knowledge, that proof compels assent, and that there is a connection between the voluntariness of assent and the nondemonstrability of that which a man believes.

Chapter IV discusses the verificationist legacy and the possibility of

verifying theistic statements. Penelhum considers that Hick's "eschatological verification" has successfully met Flew's criterion of meaningfulness as set forth in the *Theology and Falsification* debate. Penelhum's assessment of Hick's reply thus differs from Nielson's. Penelhum argues that a radical theological nonnaturalist-i. e., one who holds that theistic ments are *in principle* unverifiable by non-theistic statements-is irrational. But most sceptics are theological nonnaturalists in the mitigated sense that

> if any non-theistic statement is offered in purported verification of some theistic claim, it is either not itself known to be true, or is such that even if it were known to be true, it would not suffice to place the theistic claim beyond reasonable doubt.

Now in relation to Hick's eschatological verification, while it is the case

> that the predicted circumstances are of a sort that could be recognized to obtain by someone who did not know that God existed . . . it is very obvious that they will not agree about the likelihood of these things coming to pass, since one's estimate of such likelihood is dependent entirely upon whether or not one considers oneself already to have knowledge of God's existence and intentions. (p. 83)

This is the impasse between sceptic and believer-the claim of the believer to have independent knowledge of God revelation. Can the deadlock be broken? Yes, by conversion-to see the world as God's world or as Godless-but this is a question-begging solution. There is another possibility of breaking this epistemological obstacle:

> A phenomenon that could be known to obtain, that could be reported in non-theistic statements, that would serve as a revelation of God and would also serve to put the theistic conclusion beyond rational doubt. I have called this a probative revelatory phenomenon-a sign. (108)

Penelhum refutes possible objections to such signs that might be offered by believers and also rejects the New Testament signs, since they are open to the objections raised by Hume and Lessing against historical evidence and witnesses. A "sign would be needed for each generation."

It may be that my imagination is not fertile enough to conceive of what kind of sign would do the trick, but I am doubtful that the sceptic would be convinced that a particular sign was a revelation *of God.* This, I think, is decisive, and here Nielson would, I'm sure, offer some of the same compelling objections he raised against Hick. This rather vitiates Penelhum's central argument.

The final chapter is a brilliant analysis of faith. I found the theological criticisms here and in chapter three (mentioned above) the most illuminating in the book, and they should be given careful attention by theologians. Thomists will be especially interested in the criticisms proferred against St. Thomas's doctrine of faith and reason.

The !!Ubject of William Christian's *Oppositions of Religious Doctrines* is of great moment in this ecumenical age. While we have all become

aware of the new spirit of dialogue among the religions, little serious attention has been given to the logic and ethics of inter-religious disscussion of doctrine and practice. For this reason Christian's book held out especially high promise. I may have missed the subtlety or the import of Christian's analysis, but in my judgment the book takes a long and rather tortuous route toward the clarification of some rather obvious points.

Christian does not examille the logic of any particular religion but rather explores " some of the types of possible oppositions which might be tried 01.1t in the dialectical process. of coming to learn the logic of some doctrinal scheme in discussion with its opponents. " He sets up a hypothetical model dialogic situation in which the several members of the discussion belong to different religious communities, each being intelligent and candid, well-educated in their own tradition, reasonably conversant in the history and literature of the other religions represented, and willing to put forward and give reasons for accepting the doctrines they propose. Unlike Ninian Smart's *A Dialogue of Religioru;,* Christian does not construct an actual dialogue between members of the group; rather he uses the situation as a framework for exploring various types of religious discourse with an eye to sorting out possible oppositions. The sentences that he uses are taken from the Judaic and Buddhist traditions, but no claim is made that these are true or normative doctrines of these traditions; but this is not required since the analysis is purely hypothetical. The exploration of Jewish and Buddhist doctrines obviously limits the study to certain types of oppositions, but it does allow for continuity and depth of analysis.

Three chapters are devoted to analyzing oppositions which (I) recommend specific courses of action; propose valuations and (3) assert beliefs. While I found Christian's conclusions unobjectionable. they were at the same time not very illuminating.

The concluding chapter touches all too briefly on some of the ethical issues that attend the serious discussion of religious differences. Hopefully we will see much more writing on the issue discussed in Christian's book.

The value of these contributions to the *Philosophy of Religion Series* will vary, depending on the audience. Charlesworth's book can be recommended for use in undergradute courses and there should do very good service. The Nielson and Penelhum studies will be of interest to the specialist student and professional philosopher/theologian. Excluding Charlesworth, none of these essays will win any prizes as works of prose. The writing is often dreary, which unnecessarily tries the reader's patience and interest. This is unfortunate, since the matters are important and :the series is a valuable effort toward the advancement of the discussion of them.

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Journey to Gorakhpur. An Encounter with Christ Beyond Christianity. By JoHN MoFFITT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, ,1972. Pp. 304. $7.95.

The author of this book, the poetry editor of *America,* joined the Hindu Ramakrishna Order under the tutelage of the popular Swami Nikhilananda after graduation from Princeton University. For twenty five years Moffitt, then known as Swami Atmaghananda, pursued the spiritual disciplines of Hinduism. In 1963 he returned to Christianity and became a Roman Catholic. This book does not concern his personal saga but may well be a result of it. His purpose is to " search for evidences of Christ's working beyond the bounds of organized Christianity," and " to see the truths of non-Christian religions in terms of Christian truth. " (p. xiii)

The literary structure is flawless and evidences a sweep of poetic insight, language, and imagination. The journey to Gorakhpur is quite literally a trip taken by the author and four Indian companions from Banares, the holy city on the Ganges, to a less significant place a day's drive away. From the experiences on this brief trip into the heart of India Moffitt is able to distinguish four distinct sequences which divided themselves into the four classic types of Hindu spirituality: intuitive wisdom, devotion-alism, mental discipline, and humane service. Within this fourfold complex he considers that reality within Hinduism which is most vital for presentation to Christians. These four aspects of the spiritual life are, according to Moffitt, the four " voices " whereby Christ also calls Christians to, himself.

The path traditionally known as *jnana yoga* is here the " voice " of intuitive wisdom which is the knowledge of God as the foundation of personal existence. This experience bears witness to the nonduality of the godhead and the oneness of the divine nature. In Christianity it can be found in the scriptures, the mystics,, and ecstatic literature such as the fourteenth-century text, *The Cloud of the Unknowing.* Hinduism best symbolized the experience in the *Atman-Brahman* equation, an experience of liberation in this life expressed in the earliest Indian religious literature. Moffitt finds most suggestive the observation of Bede Griffiths, the Bene-dictine *sannyasin,* who has said that "Christ is the Atman." Devotional self-giving, traditionally known in Hinduism as *bhakti yoya,* is the second spiritual path, and this bears witness to the differentiation attributed within the one god, an experience of personal relationship between the human and divine orders. Jesus is the highest example of devotional self-giving, the supreme *kenosis;* Hinduism has its counterpart in these experiences articu-lated in the *Bhagavad Gita, Puraxnas,* and the Hindu epics, and directed toward Krishna, Rama, Siva, the popular deities of Vaishnavism and

Saivism. •It is devotionalism that the poet-saints of medieval India so exquisitely expressed and· firmly established within popular Hinduism. The third path of conscious discipline finds its witness in any religion which requires stern personal effort. This particularly embraces the meditational

Following ·the classical writer on yoga, Patanjali, Moffitt views ·non-discursive, vertical meditation, as necessary for high religious experience; it alone attains a type of mental clarity whereby the mind is perfectly attentive, yet free from discursive thought. Within the Christian tradition, Pseudo-Dionysius in *The Book of the Divine Names* speaks of those who approach God " by the suppression of all intellectual operation;" "only through negations." (p. 165) Finally, Moffitt contrasts the path of humane service, *karma yoga* in Hinduism, and the social gospel. Here especially he finds little difference Hinduism and Christianity. In Hinduism service within the human community was a path of ·spirituality enunciated from the ancient *Laws of· Manu* to the political and religious activism of Mahatma Gandhi in our century. It is at this point that the author observes: "How is it that a substantial part of what Christians generally think of as central to Christian behavior is already so well understood by non-Christians? " (p. 186)

The purpose of this book emerges with more precision only in the final chapters. Moffitt's concern is " not to affirm a Christ already known in experience, but to find a further Christ as yet not clearly known." (p. 9t87) To search for Christ beyond the institutional forms of Christianity is to learn something new. The four "voices" should be present, according to Moffitt; in any complete religious message. Yet, they are found integral in Christ as a natural synthesis, and it is usually the mystic and religious :seeker who them. The scriptures, East and West, also attempt an integral and synthetic approach to the divine. Moffitt is profoundly ·impressed by the similarities of these four paths in Hinduism and Christianity and, for him, this is evidence of Christ's presence in other religions. But are not spiritual paths devised by man himself as a response to the human condition as well as an attempt to experience the sacred? It seem that the four " voices " are more an indication of the common sensitivities of man himself.

Difficult and radical questions, concerning the relationship of Christ and the world religions, conclude the study. They will certainly stimulate the theologian. Moffitt takes a final cue from Dom Bede Griffiths who is not as much impressed by the similarities of the spiritual paths as by their complementarity one to another and from one religion to another, since each .is necessary for a perfect understanding of the other and of divine mystery itself. Moffitt's conclusion is that a recognition of Christ's presence in another religion is always an epiphany. The non-historical Christ beyond Christianity is, of course, the Word who was from the beginning, the time-

less reality now incarnate in time. The benefit of his book rests not only in the multiple suggestions for self-understanding but in the fact that he has made this epiphany in time more evident. Mention must also be made of Moffitt's poetry which is interspersed throughout, especially the " Dance of the God, " and " A Word to the Wise, " poems he wrote while still a Hindu.

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The Problem of Scientific Realism. Ed. by EDWARD A. MAcKINNON. New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts, Pp. 309. $4.95.

This book of readings should be well received for a variety of reasons. Its organizing theme of scientific realism is both important in its own right and also of considerable contemporary interest, yet has not been anthologized to date. Further the material selected (from Aristotle, Newton, Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, Quine, Harris, Einstein, Sellars, Mac-,Kinnon, Bunge, and Heelan) is well chosen to illustrate the dimensions of the problem, and a long, annotated bibliography provides easy access to further sources.

More importantly, the lengthy Introduction (71 pages) is of considerable value and interest as a philosophical piece in itself. It would be quite desirable for all books of readings to make a similarly conscientious effort to set up the problems for the reader. Because the author calls on an enormous range of philosophical and scientific background, and also because he writes in very condensed style, the Introduction will be difficult reading for the neophyte. This however should enhance the book's value in the classroom since expansion on and critical evaluation of the material in the Introduction is clearly called for in such a setting.

The first half of the Introduction is an historical survey of the fortunes of the notion of scientific realism· from· Aristotle to the present. This accomplishes two purposes. First, the editor shows that, because of changes in the history of science itself, earlier more naive versions of realism (e. g., Aristotle's causal realism and Newton's mechanistic realism) must give way to a critical realism of some sort. .Second, he also shows that any commitment to a realism is at least partially determined by prior views on the nature of knowledge. Thus ontology must be intimately associated with epistemology (which by the way is also very much in evidence as MacKinnon works out his own views later.)

This brings us to the second half of the Introduction where MacKinnon outlines his views on scientific realism. He argues convincingly that

science as actually practised carries a commitment to a functional realism. But this is pre-critical. The main problem is how can one convert this to a post-critical realism. To make this jump the author employs a complex collage of views and methods from many philosophical sources but especially from analytic philosophy, from transcendental Thomism, and from W. Sellars. His basic conviction (derived from Sellars) is that that is existentially real which is postulated by a truly explanatory theory precisely because that is what makes the theory explanatory. Thus realism is to be critically established through the higher level theories of scien(!e. However, MacKinnon's presentation remains programmatic since he does not claim that there has yet been produced the type of transcendental metaphysics which he envisions as the required underpinning for a scientific realism.

Is this program a viable one? This depends on how one judges the author's conception of truth (since his realism is a function of his epistemology). Ultimately his commitment to scientific realism hinges on his claim that as knowers we can identify the intentional absolute within the ever-present context of conceptual and linguistic relativity. This point, by the way, is made much more clearly in the author's earlier book *Truth and Expression* (New York: Newman Press, 1971). It is in this context that one should understand MacKinnon's point that those entities are real which are postulated by truly explanatory scientific theory. But this raises further problems. Precisely how is the intentional absolute grounded in scientific theories which are clearly changing in fundamental conceptual ways and not just by addition? MacKinnon apparently does not want to claim that science at present or in the foreseeable future is or will be in a state of completion and fixity. How then does one recognize this intentional covariance amidst the actual conceptual changes of scientific theories? And if one could identify it, is it in itself ineffable and, further, is such covariance alone enough to determine what is real independently of us as knowers? If not, then have truth and reality escaped from the limited conceptual framework of a special language system which might be replaced in time?

As we said at the start, this volume deserves careful attention. It is indeed a rare book of readings in which one finds the Introduction to be of a philosophical value equal to that of the selections themselves.

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Whitehead's Philosophy. ·Selected Essays, 1935-1970. By CHARLES HARTSHORNE. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972. Pp. $7.95.

This volume, as its sub-title indicates, brings together thirteen articles of Charles Hartshorne published between 1935 and 1979. To those who are already familiar with these articles: *Whitehead after Forty-Five Years; Whitehead's Metaphysics; On Some Criticisms of Whitehead/s Philosophy; The Compound Individual; Whitehead's Idea of God; Is Whitehead's God the God of Religion?; Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially Structured Process; Whitehead's Theory of Prehension; Whitehead: the Anglo-American Philosopher-Scientist* (published here under the title: *Generalizing Power); Whitehead and Contemporary Philosophy; Whitehead's Novel Intuition; Whitehead and Ordinary Language; Whitehead and lJerdyaev: Is There Tragedy in God?,* the present edition affords, besides the advantage of having brought all these articles together in one volume, the novelity of commentaries, at times very at times more expanded, (as on p. 6) added by the author here and there and enclosed in parentheses. .

Some scholars will regret that other articles or communications of Dr. Hartshorne have not been reproduced in this collection. For those who, despite their deep interest in the thought of Whitehead, have taken no notice of Charles Hartshorne's studies, this volume will provide a valuable help, even, we may venture to say, an indispensable aid. For the thought of Whitehead cannot be penetrated in depth without taking into account the manner in which Professor Hartshorne has brought it out, even if one does not always agree with him (which would generally imply that on the point at issue one is not in agreement with Whitehead as well!).

We know for Charles Hartshorne St. John's affirmation, that "God is love, " which, in Whitehead, [1] perhaps more than in any thinker who ever lived," finds "its fully generalized interpretation," (p. 14) expresses the *divine relativity.* But when we affirm that God is love, does this truly place relativity in God, or does it affirm that the very *Being* of God i13love, that love in God is so profound and so radical that it *is* his very *Being,* and that such a love no longer implies relativity? Certainly love, on the *intentional* plane, is always relative (and love, on our level, is *always* intentional). Certainly, "love of A forB does render A in some genui:rw sense relative to B" (cf.. Ch. Hartshore, *Whitehead in French J'erspective,* in THE THOMIST, 33 [1969], 580); but if, in going beyond the intentional order, love is identical with being, then it ill no longer relative: it *is.* Evidently this presupposes a distinction between the order of intentionality and the order of being, and it .requires us to consider relation as a.mode of being and not as exhausting in itself alone all the richness of being.

In us, if I may be permitted to repeat myself, love remains in the intentional order and is not coextensive with our being (we have often enough the sad experience that we *are* not love in all our being). Moreover, our knowledge always remains intentional; it is always relative to some object; that is why Plotinus denies that there is knowledge in God. But if the object known by the is the itself, and if this no longer implies any potentiality (a potentiality that limits the full actuality of knowledge), then such knowledge is no longer relative: God's knowledge is his very Being. And it is in knowing himself, in an infinitely simple act of contemplation (where there is no longer any distinction between the intelligence knowing and the obect known), that God knows all that exists.

That is why St. Thomas can state that " the relations between God and the world are not relations for God." (p. 144) In making such a statement St. Thomas wishes to show that God knows the world in knowing himself. Far from having a limited knowledge of the world, by means of the world itself, God knows the world through the gratuitous love by which he creates the world. God does *not* know the world except through this act of creative love (and it must be clearly understood that use of the negative here does not signify a restriction on God but, on the contrary, the exclusion of every limit upon divinity arising from an object exterior to him). Thus St. Thomas cannot be made to say: "the world is perhaps known by God, but God does not know the world!" (p. 144) What can be said is that God *eminently* knows the world in the light of his Being, through the simplicity of his Being; he understands the world, therefore, in a unique way and *not as we* know the world. Let us add that, for the world to be known by God, is not the same as for the world to be known by us. God knows the world as its Creator, as an artist knows the work of art he has made.

In saying that the creature does not modify God, we do not take away anything from God. God is perfect " before " all creatures, for they depend totally on him, and their supreme dignity lies in their being linked to him. But if creatures do not modify God, this does not mean that they are *nothing* for him. The creature does not add anything to God, but it " permits " him to communicate his love. In the creature the love of God is diffused and superabounds; it is in this sense that the term " glory " applies to God. The " glory " of God actually has nothing to do with what we call " glory " on the human plane; it is simply the communication of love. And that is why, in the life of Christ, the hour of his glorification is also the hour of the Cross (cf. Jn. 12:27-18; 13: *31-32;* 17:1).

I hope that Professor Hartshorne will accept these brief remarks as a sign of my respectful esteem and of my gratitude for the kindness he has always manifested to me.

ALIX PARMENTIER

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Values in European Thought. Volume I. By FRITZ JOACHIM VON RINTELEN. Pamplona: Editiones Universidad de Navarra, Pp. *565.* $8.50.

This is the author's *Der Wertgedanke in der Europiiiachen Geiatesentwicklung* with an effort at updating the notes through the mid-sixties. Although it covers only the classical and medieval periods, the author feels its English translation is appropriate at this time given present concern with value theory. Yet here perhaps is the difficulty. Kluckholm and others agree, that the contemporary discussion of value dates back only a century and a half. Attempting to read it into the whole of the Western tradition, with whatever disclaimers, is to make dichotomies unknown to the thinkers under consideration; it is casual poking at a haystack. The result is so general that we can conclude ethical thought has .always been a concern of our tradition, but little more. The .author's attempt to integrate Eastern thought into his perspective does give the survey an interest for today it would otherwise lack.

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Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi. By **J.** BALDWIN. Downer's Grove, **TIL:** Inter-Varsity Press, 1972. Pp. 253. $5.95.

This is a highly useful commentary on three prophets about whom the pertinent literature is widely scattered. Dr. Baldwin has gathered and considered 'this literature and so has presented a useful source reference, but she, has done more than that. Her introductions have given the plausible backgrounds to these prophetic writings, and here Dr. Baldwin displays a mastery which would make the average reader wish space requirements had not been so limiting to her exposition. Her investigation into the theological significance of the temple and messianic hopes stimulates without satisfying entirely. Generally, however, rather ample footnote references suggest paths of further study.

Her wide range of scholarship is evidenced by both the scope and judicious selection of reference material. She is fair-minded in her evaluating of differing views and, one may say, ecumenical in her spectrum .of consideration. All Scripture scholars will not agree with all her decisions, but, at least, they can know the historical setting she deems likely for the prophecies and some of the reasons for the positions she takes. The work does not get bogged down in excessive technicalities,

though research references are given to satisfy the speci!tlist without wearying the reader who seeks a more intelligent appreciation of these three biblical prophecies.

Theologians especially should find this volume of assistance for, as Dr. Wiseman remarked in his general preface, " ... the author of this commentary has shown that it is possible to make a book of the Bible-:--often little read and studied outside a few well-known passages-stand out afresh in its historical and prophetic setting, yet with meaning, relevance, and application for the serious reader today. " Even an extremely long review would not suffice to illustrate Dr. Wiseman's opinion fully; only a reading of the work itself would convey these nuances of scholarship.

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Jesus And The Old Testament. By R. T. FRANCE. Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1971. Pp. Q86. $9.95.

Jesus' concept of his own identity and mission continues to preoccupy biblical exegetes, as this work illustrates. The approach of Prof. France is via Christ's use of Old Testament quotations: an approach which has not been thoroughly explored. Closely allied to this. issue is the question of the authenticity of sayings attributed by the Evangelists to Jesus. Limiting himself to the Synoptic Gospels, the author addresses his study to the solution of both problems by asking two questions: (I) Does Jesus' approach to the Old Testament represent an original line of development? and (Q) Did it form the model followed by the New Testament writers? His research leads him to an affirmative answer in each case.

An examination of the text-form of the Old Testament quotations employed by Jesus occupies the first stage of this work. Rejecting the extreme skepticism of the followers of Bultmann, Dr. France concludes that there is no substantial evidence to be found in Christ's use of the Old Testament to support other than a Semitic origin of the latter. This conclusion is reached from the observation that in no case does a quotation of Jesus *depend* upon the Septuagint reading: all *could* be based on the Hebrew text.

Jesus' use of typology bears out this initial conclusion. The author understands typology as a " pattern of the dealings of God with men " which is repeated later on in the antitype. The latter is described as " the embodiment of a principle which was exemplified in the type " through

·both-'historical and theological correspondence. His· analysis of a variety of texts leads him to conclude to an authentic use of types by Jesus in perfect continuity with the Old Testament, but manifesting revolutionary features. The treatment of Jonah as basically a type- of *one snatched from death* is cogent.

Next follows a study of Jesus' use of prediction. Here the author notes his heavy emphasis on present fulfillment-clearly exemplified in Luke 4:21, "Today this Scripture is fulfilled." Dr. France opts for what may be called a moderate eschatology on the part of Jesus: for him, the Kingdom of God is already partially realized, with a distinctive future aspect yet to 'be realized. This emphasis on the " already " aspect is taken by the author to constitute Jesus' most original contribution (over and above the fact. of course, that he identifies *himself* as the Messiah!) .

A final chapter probes Jesus' use of Daniel 7 and Second Zechariah to support the claim of originality. Dr. France notes several thrusts in the Lord's citation of these texts. And, lastly, some examples are adduced to illustrate how the early Church (including the Evangelists) followed the pattern set by Jesus with few exceptions. All of these insights plus three appendices and a table of references add up to a truly worthwhile book.

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Il Moro: EUis Heywood's Dialogue in Memory of Thomas More. Translated and Edited by RoGER LEE DEAKINS. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. *155.* $10.00.

Ellis Heywood (1530-1578) was a child when· his granduncle Tnomas More was executed in *1535.* His portrait of More is not arecollection of the historical personality' of the author of *Utopia;* it is, as Deakins says: " … a figure of myth, not df history, a *figura* of that moral and 'and spiritual idealism that animated Roman Catholic art in its post-Tridentine phase. Heywood's More is a baroque figure who turns easily from abstract discussions of moral philosophy to elaborately self-conscious word plays, and just as easily from puns to the ecstatic contemplation of God. "

Indeed *Il Moro* is an: ·exotic creation. Apparently written originally in Italian for reasons which must remain speculative, the dialogue appeared in print in *1556* in a 'mood of R6man Catholic optimism when Queen Mary reigned and Reginald Pole 'her Archbishop of Canterbury. The optimistic bubble burstbquickly, for within two years after the

publication date of Heyw-ood's Italianate effort Elizabeth was queen and Cardinal ·Pole-to whom *Il Moro* was dedicated-was dead. · Although the *Stationera Registera* for 1601 has an entry regarding a projected printing of an English· translation of *Il Moro,* there is no evidence that it was actually published. Ellis Heyw-ood'stribute to More simply was forgotten. As for its author, he Ieft England in 1564 and became a Jesuit.

Mr. Deakins' scholarly edition of what surely is a work that achieved a well-deserved obscurity is itself evidently something of a labor of love. It provides a footnote to the mass of More scholarship, but it is a footnote that has been prepared well. The critical introduction of some thirty-seven pages is in some ways more attractive than the dialogue itself. and the inclusion of the *1556* Italian text complete will, no doubt, prove useful to a limited number of readers.

There is, of course, nothing especially remarkable about *Il Moro,* except that it is so remarkably an example of the observance of certain Renaissance conventions in literature and philosophy. The dialogue as a literary genre had a life in the Middle Ages, as those who know the work of Gregory the Great or Anselm will recall. But the Renaissance revival of Platonism also saw a proliferation of dialogues, of which Aretino and Castiglione were notable among a long list of practitioners. Ellis Heyw-ood's distinguished father John Heywood himself wrote plays for the court of Henry VID which were little more than dramatized debates over such topics as the best way to find contentment. His son followed the Italian models even in the language in which he chose to write.

Il Moro handles the convention well enough, with appropriate moments of byplay, bits of dramatic action, and a proper action, and a proper setting in a.leisurely and detached world created by the picture of More's house and gardens. Moreover, the problem of the dialogue-What is true happiness?-is worked out dramatically through the conflict of the disputants to the resolution as presented by More. This resolution is that perfect happiness comes when a man is fully contented with a certain good and understands perfectly that it is the final and highest good he can desire. This, of course, leads on to the conclusions that, " The soul, then, when it judges aright, will never have more than one happiness, nor any good other than the highest, which is God Himeslf. " Having heard More develop this idea out of Aristotle, with language that suggests the mediation of Aquinas, we are told that all admired him because his life " corresponded to the words he spoke. " It is then that Heyw-ood concludes the dialogue with the dramatic reminder that it was not long after when More " lowered his head to the very blow of the axe with a happy and open face, reassured by his pure conscience, like one whose great courage faced that final end with more hope of life than fear of death. "

·In short, the conventional discussion of the dialogue (which ranges

through wealth, honor, fame, power, pleasure, speculative science, as well as Petrarchan love and despair of all earthly happiness) leads to what the work really was really intended to be: an encomium for England's greatest Christian humanist and a martyr to the Roman Catholic cause, which was then ascendant.

As for the problem in philosophy which purports to be the theme of the dialogue, Deakins himself notes what he calls the " pervasive influence of St. Thomas' discussion of happiness in *Il Moro."* This is an understatement of that influence. In view of More's own view of scholastic philosophy, which was not unlike that of Erasmus, it may also be important reason why *Il Moro* is myth rather than history.

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Grove Books: *What Priesthood Has the Ministry?,* by Jean M. R. Tillard. (Pp. 28, 20p)

Harper & Row: *Body Theology,* by Arthur A. Vogel. (Pp. 148, *$5.95); The Priest,* by Ralph Mcinerney. (Pp. 531, $8.95)

Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. : *Catholics,* by Brian Moore. (Pp. 107 $4.95)

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