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SOME PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

THE PROBLEM of biological evolution, as we understand it now, appeared in the 19th century as a consequence of scientific data totally unknown to philosophers and theologians before Darwin. It makes little sense, therefore, to search for this problem in the writings of St. Thomas. Sharing the opinion common to his time, he believed the universe to be no more than 6,000 years old.

The ancient theologians did, however, discuss a type of evolution; that is, that the universe was created in six days. St. Augustine, for example, maintained that all six days were one since God created all things simultaneously: the inorganic in act, that is, in their present state; and the organic in potency, namely, in their quasi-seminal state. Plants and animals were implanted in the world "after the manner of seed *(tamquam seminaliter mundo indita)* by virtue of the Word of God when he created all things simultaneously, and from which all things,

each in its proper time, would be drawn in the course of the ages." [1]

According to other saints the six days of Genesis denoted the order of time and succession in creation. There was an order not only of nature but also of time and duration in the work of the six days. This latter opinion held that various creatures were produced successively, whereas St. Augustine believed that all was created instantly. Whereas the latter interpretation emphasized the creative power of God through the passage of time, St. Augustine taught that God created the whole world instantaneously-if not entirely in act at least in potency. For St. Augustine, the world, bit by bit, was transformed into actuality. [2]

It is most significant that St. Thomas simultaneously accepted both interpretations:

> The first explanation of these things, namely, that held by St. Augustine, is the more subtle and is a better defense of Scripture against the ridicule of unbelievers; but the second which is maintained by the other saints is easier to grasp and more in keeping with the surface meaning of the text. Seeing, however, that neither is in contradiction with the truth of faith and that the context

[1] St. Augustine *De Gen. ad litt.* 6. *5,* 8; *ML* 34, 342. Cf. *ibid.,* 4, 33, *52; ML* 34, 318: "God created all things simultaneously." *Ibid., 5,* 4, 11; *ML* 34, 325: " Therefore, it has been said that then the earth produced the herb and the plant in their causes, that they received the power to produce. For in it were already, as it were in their roots of times, those things that were to come about *in future times* ..." *Ibid., 5, 5,* 14; *ML* 34, 326: In reference to animals St. Augustine says: " ... all the swimming creatures and the flying creatures and these also potentially in numbers, which would come forth in their proper cycles in time. Similarly the animals of earth, as if the last from the last element of the world; nevertheless potentially, whose numbers time would manifest visibly."

• St. Thomas, *On the Power of God,* q. 4, a. 2. Cf. *ibid.,* ad 28: " ... the plants were brought forth then, not into actual existence but only in certain seed-forms, inasmuch as the earth enabled to produce them. . . . Hence the plants were not actually produced on the third day but only in their causes: and after the six days they were brought into actual existence in their respective species and natures by the work of government. Consequently, before the plants were produced causally nothing was produced, but they were produced together with the heaven and the earth. In like manner the fishes, birds, and animals were produced in those days causally and not actually. "

admits of either intepretation, in order that neither may be unduly favored, we now proceed to deal with the arguments of either side.[3]

A gradual appearance in time of the different genera and species was acceptable to St. Thomas, the concept of evolution was plausible. We must be cautious, however, not to color the process of St. Augustine's evolution with our modern views. Nevertheless, it is most interesting to explore the philosophical principles of St. Thomas in the light of modern scientific evolution.

Evolution and Philosophy

In St. Thomas there does exist the possibility of a science of evolution. A philosophy of evolution, however, is not easy to formulate since so complex and intricate a matter needs a whole philosophical system to account for it.

Evolution is definable in general terms as a one-way, irreversible process in time, which during its course generates novelty, diversity and higher levels of organization. It operates in all sectors of the phenomenal universe, but has been fully described and analyzed in the biological sector.[4]

Evolution, first of all, is intimately connected with change and must depend on the process of generation and corruption at work in the cosmos. The Greek philosophers were the first to ascribe to motion or change the importance it deserves and to attribute to the whole cosmos the property of motion. Everything existing in nature moves and changes; new beings come into existence and in their turn disappear. This ever-recurring cycle of generation and corruption is also integral to evolution, yet biological evolution adds a specifically new dimension to the problem as conceived by the Greeks. The particular dilemma of biological evolution is this: Is the transformation of one species into another possible? And if this transformation is possible, what are the philosophical principles involved in this

[3] *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 2 c. *Cf.Summa Theologiae* vol. 10, *Cosmogony* (Ia. 65-74), William A. Wallace, O. P. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

[4] *Evolution After Darwin* (ed., by Sol Tax, Chicago, 1960) Vol. 8, p. 107.

transformation? In other words, since evolution presupposes the gradual transformation of one species into another, it poses three philosophical and scientific problems: (i) the nature of the species; (ii) the philosophical and scientific explanation of the transformation of one species into another; and (iii) the causes that produce this transformation.

I. THE NATURE OF SPECIES

Nature of Species in Philosophy

In theory, the determination of the nature of species is relatively simple. In his *Metaphysics* Aristotle says that the order of species is analogous to the series of integral numbers: " Substance is a complete reality and a definite nature. And as a number does not admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of forms, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter." [5] This criterion is obviously true in the case of the generic hierarchy of beings in which the higher being possesses a perfection which the inferior one lacks. For example, animals are endowed with the property of knowledge which is lacking in plants, and man possesses rationality which is not found in animals. For this reason Aristotle says that " it is certainly difficult to find a state intermediate between life and the absence of life." [6]

This criterion *per se,* however, is sometimes difficult to apply to concrete cases. Aristotle himself admits in the *History of Animals* that "nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form would lie." [7] In particular instances it is often difficult to pinpoint whether or not a living being is a plant or an animal, and primitive manifestations of life can barely be distinguished from inorganic objects. In

• Aristotle, Met., VIII 3, 1044b9-13. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 47. a. 3.

[6] Aristotle, *On Plants,* 815b36.

[7] Aristotle, *History of Animals,* VIII,

theory, however, the criterion is applicable, in spite of its concrete difficulties.

The distinction of species in comparison to that of generic kingdoms is less clear-cut. The easy dichotomy of degrees of perfection which locate the different genera in the *Porphyrian tree* cannot be applied to various species. That classification may be useful in logic but not in natural philosophy. Here the criterion of " like numbers " cannot be interpreted as different degrees of essential perfections but rather as irreducible characteristics which cannot belong to other species. In Aristotelian philosophy each species is different from any other species because its substantial form is irreducible to any other substantial form. Since the substantial form gives the species its unique determination, there are as many species as there are substantial forms.

> The form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher; for as a unit added to, or taken from, a number changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species .... [8]

We shall see later how this criterion is applied to physics and biology.

The individual, however, cannot be identified with the species because individuals do not result from the formal distinction of beings but rather from the material multiplication of any one species by means of the division of matter. One and the same species is shared by many individuals which are numerically different because of the division of matter. These individuals participate in the perfection of the species to a greater or lesser degree, although all of them participate in the same essential perfection: "When we have the whole, such and such a form in the flesh and in the bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for this is different), but the same form; for their form is indivisible." [9] All men are

[8] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a 5.

[9] Aristotle, *Met.*, VI, 8, 1088b22.

men, and we cannot say that some are more " man " than others. Though some are more perfect than others, the degree of perfection depends upon the different individual dispositions of the matter to which the individual form is proportioned.

That from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisible, fixed and constant in something indivisible ... And for this reason no substantial form is participated of more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says that as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance; that is, in respect to its participation in the specific form; but in so far as substance may be with matter; i. e., in respect to material dispositions, more or less are found in substance. [10]

Nature of Species in Biology

In the light of scientific discoveries is species a necessary concept for evolution? Do species exist? The majority of biologists take for granted the usefulness of the term, since they refer to it continually and tell us that every species of living things usually has its own characteristic genetic code. The fundamental discrete steps in evolution are the " species " because they are independent evolutionary units. Thus, the existence of species is crucial and affects the whole idea of evolution.

The evolutionary significance of species is now quite clear. . . . The species are the real units of evolution, as the temporary incarnation of harmonious, well-integrated gene-complexes. And speciation, the production of new gene-complexes capable of ecological shifts, is the method by which evolution advances. Without speciation there would be no diversification of the organic world, no adaptive radiation, and very little evolutionary progress. The species, then, is the keystone of evolution.U

Naturalists such as Darwin, however, sometimes call natural species merely artificial devices.

[10] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. *52,* a. 1 c. Cf. *ibid.,* I, q. *65,* a. 7 ad 8: " The difference of form, which is due to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter."

[11] E. Mayr, *Animal Species and Evolution,* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1968), p. 621.

I look at the term species as one arbitrarily given, for the sake of convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and ... it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences, is also applied arbitrarily, for convenience's sake.[12]

This is equivalent to the denial of their objective reality and would seriously jeopardize the whole concept of evolution since, then, the evolution would exist only in our mind. Consequently, " whoever, like Darwin, denies that species are non-arbitrarily defined units of nature not only evades the issue but fails to find and solve the most interesting problems of biology." [13]

Dobzhansky observes that species is both an artificial and a natural reality by illustrating his reasoning with an example:

Any two cats are individually distinguishable, and this is equally true of any two lions. And yet no individual has ever been seen about which there could be a doubt as to whether it belongs to the species of cats *(Felis domestica)* or to the species of lions *(Felis leo)*. The two species are discrete because of absence of intermediates. There, one may safely affirm that any cat is different from any lion. Any difficulty which may arise in defining the species *Felis domestica* and *Felis leo*, respectively, is due not to the fact that in common as well as in scientific parlance the words " cat " and "lion " frequently refer neither to individual animals nor to all existent individuals of these species, but to a certain modal, or average cat and lion. These modes and averages are statistical abstractions which have no existence apart from the mind of the observer. The species *Felis domestica* and *Felis leo* are evidently independent of any abstract modal point which we may contrive to make. No matter how great may be the difficulties encountered in finding the modal " cats " and " lions " the discreteness of these species is not thereby impaired. [14]

Here Dobzhansky clearly points out the difference between the multiplicity of individuals within the species as well as the

[12] Ch. Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (New York: Modern Library Giant G27, n. d.) p. 46.

[13] E. Mayr, *Animal Species and Evolution*, p. 29. Cf. Th. Dobzhansky. *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (New York, 1951), p. 5: "It must be stressed that this discontinuity exists whether it is or is not used by the systematists for their purposes, and for that matter whether it is studied at all. "

[14] Th. Dobzhansky, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-11.

distinguishability of the two. They are discrete, because of the absence of intermediates. Although he notes the difficulty entailed in the discovery of the true concept which corresponds to these species, he does not doubt their objective reality.

If species do exist, then what is the nature of this important concept? Philosophers and biologists are usually looking for different things, but even among biologists the concept does not always mean the same thing. The first modem classification of living organisms is Linnaeus's *Systema Naturae* published in the mid-19th century which is classical in taxonomy. This essentialist conception of reality pleases the philosopher but has been rejected by many biologists. Mayr says that "more important for the development of the synthetic theory of evolution than the rejection of ill-founded theories of it was the rejection of two basic philosophical concepts that were formerly widespread if not universally held: preformism and typological thinking." [15]

For the geneticist focusing on the science of heredity, the concept of species is naturally connected with the reproductive process. For Dobzhansky "evolution is change in the heredity, in the genetic endowment of succeeding generations. No understanding of evolution is possible except with the foundation of a knowledge of heredity." [16] For Mayr, Simpson, and Beck evolutionary taxonomy replaces the idea of an essence identical in each species, with the notion of a collection of physical characteristics inherited by all the members of the same group. Species is then defined as a " population of procreation " made up of individuals capable, at least in potency, of having common offspring. The totality of genes of all individuals of a species characterizes the species and inasmuch as they are

[15] E. Mayr, *Animal Species and Evolution,* p. 4 Cf. John Deely "The Philosophical Dimension of the Origin of Species" *The Thomist,* Vol. 33, 1 and fl (Jan. and April 1969), pp. 75c149, 251-335.

[16] Th. Dobzhansky, *The Biological Basis of Human Freedom* (New York, Columbia, 1956), pp. 10-11. Cf. Julian Huxley, *Evolution in Action* (New York, Mentor, 11)53), p. 35: "The discovery of the principle of natural selection made evolution_comprehensible; together with the discovery of modern genetics, it has made all other explanations. of evolution untenable. "

communities of reproduction, the species are biological realities. " The species can thus be succinctly defined as follows: it is a community of individuals possessing common essential sets of genes, and actually or potentially related (proximally) through interbreeding." [17]

In this sense species are dynamic realities undergoing continuous change in space and time. The frequency of genes varies from one population to another of the same species, giving rise to different races. Therefore, the criterion of community of procreation serves to identify the individuals of the same species and to distinguish different species from each other. The man and the gorilla belong to different species because they cannot have common offspring. Species are discrete and independent units of evolution. [18]

The Greek concept of essences, of species, as something eternal and immutable is often misunderstood. Species are immutable and eternal in the sense that every species is characterized by a series of fixed and permanent traits that make every species what it is and not another. If a man is a man he will be a rational animal. If such an essential characteristic is not fulfilled, then that being is not a man but something else. The essence of beings are necessary, immutable, and eternal with an eternity which is called "negative "-in the sense that it is not limited to a particular place and time. Their existential realization, however, is temporal and contingent. In other words, the essential traits of species are immutable but not

[17] E. Mayr, *op. cit.,* pp. Cf. Th. Dobzhansky, *op. cit.,* p. 5: "In organisms which reproduce sexually and by cross fertilization, the reality of species as biological units can also be demonstrated by a quite different method .... These communities consist of individuals united by the bonds of sexual unions, as well as of common descent and common parenthood .... A species is, consequently, not merely a group and a category of classification. It is also a supraindividual biological entity, which, in principle, can be arrived at regardless of the possession of common morphological characteristics. "

[18] F. Ayala, "Evolucion, Tiempo y Filosofia" *ARBOR,* Madrid, 1967, n. pp. Cf. Th. Dobzhansky, *Evolution, Genetics, and Man,* p. 182: "It is, then, not a paradox to say that if some one should succeed in inventing a universally applicable, static definition of species, he would cast serious doubts on the validity of the theory of evolution. "

their existential realization in nature, which inasmuch as they are individuals are generated and corrupted in time and space without affecting their essential traits. [19]

Science conclusively states that species, like individuals, have a certain span of life and sooner or later disappear. Simpson gives a species *50,000* years for transmutation and says that the fossil record which manifests the history of life is involved in four grand processes: expansion, progression, equilibrium, and extinction. [20] Species often survive for a longer period of time, for " paleontologists have described many lines that remain unchanged, completely stabilized for IQO to 140 million years, and then suddenly broke out during a new evolutionary outburst. Just what can cause such loosening up of tightly knit systems is something I think we should work out, if we can." [21]

The long-lasting constancy of biological species, which is realized by the identical replication of genes, is a primary law of evolution. Yet, although one form of natural selection tends to conserve the species as its primary goal, in the long run the species is corrupted and disappears either through extinction or transformation into another species. Extinction occurs when the species is unable to adapt to an adverse environment and it disappears, as individuals do. The data of science shows species to reflect the dual tendency in nature: the primary tendency to remain constant and the secondary tendency to change. St. Thomas says:

> Nothing prevents a thing being against nature as to the first intention of nature and yet not against nature as to its second intention. Thus, as stated in *De Coelo,* all corruption, defect, and old age are contrary to nature because nature intends being and perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second intention of nature because nature, though being unable to preserve being in one thing,

[19] E. Mayr, *Evolution After Darwin,* Vol. III, p. 141.

[••] G. Simpson, *Evolution After Darwin,* Vol. I, pp. ff. Also in "Rates of Evolution in Animals " in *Genetics, Paleontology and Evolution,* Ed. by Jepsen, Mayr, and Simpson, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1949), p.

[21] E. Mayr, *op. cit.,* Vol. III, p. 141.

preserves it in another which is engendered of the other's corruption .... [22]

Now it is necessary to consider the idea of species as numbers in the light of modern scientific data and the dynamic concept of species.

(i) In physics, the Aristotelian criterion for the distinction of species agrees completely with quantum theory and with Pauli's exclusion principle. The principle says that "the quantum numbers of two or more electrons can never entirely agree. Two systems of quantum numbers which are deducible from each other by interchange of two electrons, represent one state." [28] As a result of this principle every chemical being is characterized by different quantum numbers. It is absolutely impossible to find two different chemical compounds, two elements of the periodic table, or two elementary particles having the same quantum numbers, to which Aristotle would agree.

(ii) In regard to living organisms, it also appears to be possible to classify all living organisms according to the structure and composition of their DNA and amount of chromosomes in a way similar to the classification of chemical elements according to quantum numbers. "Biologists now know that every species of living things has its own characteristic number of chromosomes. Man has 46, white rats 42, pea plants 14, etc." [24] This does not mean that any given number of chromosomes belongs to only one species, but to every biological species corresponds a unique structure and shape. Even more, geneticists are now reducing different species to different quantum numbers. If every species is unique and discrete, then the discreteness is like the discreteness of numbers, and biology, like physics, can in a sense be quantified. [25] This

•• St. Thomas, *Summa Theol., Suppl.,* q. a. 1 ad Cf. *On Truth,* q. c.

•• M. Born, *Atomic Physics,* (New York, 1954), p. 173. Cf. Wolfgang Pauli, *Exclusion Principle and Quantum Mechanics,* (Neuchatel, Zurich, 1947).

•• *The Cell* (New York: Life Science Library, 1964), p. 57.

•• I owe this oral information to F. Ayala.

discreteness, however, should not be confused with the different degrees of perfection which correspond to different generic beings. As a lion and a cat are members of two irreducible species, so all species of living beings are irreducible to each other.

II. THE PROCESS OF GENERATION AND CORRUPTION

General Ideas

The evolution of one species into another must be intimately connected with the general process of generation and corruption of corporeal beings. The generation of the new being necessarily presupposes the corruption of the old. By way of simple analysis, it is easy to determine the existence of two incomplete principles which complement each other and constitute the essence of all corporeal beings. The first principle is passive and totally potential: prime matter; the second principle is active and determines the being to be what it is: substantial form.

Naturally, it would be pointless here to delve into all the subtleties involved in the hylemorphic theory. With regard to evolution, however, we must emphasize one subtlety: that which is generated and corrupted is not the form as such but the concrete individual. "For as the brazen sphere comes to be, but not the sphere nor the brass, and so too in the case of the brass itself, it comes to be, it is its concrete unity that comes to be (for the matter and form must always exist before)." [26] Or in St. Thomas's words in his commentary on Aristotle: "For it is not a form that comes to be but the composite. For a form is said to exist in matter, although a form does not (properly) exist but the composite by its form." [27] Thus, the Aristotelian distinction between the species

[26] Aristotle, *Met.*, VI, 9, 1084b10. Cf. *ibid.*, 1088b17-20: "It is obvious, then, from what have been said, that that which is spoken of as a form or substanee is not produced, but the concrete thing which gets its name from this is produced, and that in everything which is generated matter is present, and one part of the thing is matter and the other form."

[27] St. Thomas, *In Met.*, VII, lect. 7, n. 1428. Cf. *ibid.*, n. 1422: "The of

and the individual. That which is generated essentially, namely, the concrete individual, and that which comes into being accidentally, the form, is of primary importance in causality, as we will see later, and affects the whole theory of evolution.

Prime matter in the abstract is indifferent to all substantial forms. In concrete cases, however, there must always exist a proportion between matter and form which is both specific and individual because there always ·exists a proportion between potency and act. No species can be generated unless matter is endowed with the disposition required for that species; and in like manner a form cannot inform concrete matter unless that form is proportioned to its individual conditions. [28]

Insofar as evolution is concerned, this means that the required disposition of matter is an absolutely necessary condition for the eduction of new form and, consequently, of a new species. The more perfect a species, the better a disposition is required in the matter to which it corresponds. Corruption results from the lack of this disposition: " As the form is not educed unless matter is endowed with the right disposition, if the proper disposition no longer exists the form cannot inform that matter." [29]

Changes Required in the Disposition of Matter to Generate New Species

In the process of substantial generation the individual being which belongs to one species is corrupted and replaced by another individual being which belongs to another species, as

a thing refers properly to its form. Hence individual conditions, which pertain to a form accidentally, are excluded from it. And species and other individuals are generated only accidentally, when singular things are generated."

[28] Aristotle, *Met.* Vlll, 4, 1044a15; St. Thomas, II *Contra Gentes,* c. 81: " Thus, form and matter must always be mutually proportioned and, as it were, naturally adapted, because the proper act is produced in its proper matter. That is why matter and form must always agree with one another in re9pect to multiplicity and unity." *Ibid., Vlll MetapkyB.,* lect. 4, n. 1780: "From the things which are said here then it is evident that there is one first matter for all generable and corruptible things, but different proper matters for different things. "

•• St. Thomas, *Quut. de Anima,* q. 1, a. 9 ad 16.

occurs, for example, in chemical reactions. This disposition of the matter gradually becomes less proportioned to the existing form until the moment when the original being is corrupted and a new being is generated. This transformation takes place instantaneously, for there is no possibility of two forms simultaneously informing the same prime matter.

In chemistry this process offers no difficulty; in biology, however, when one takes into account the experimental data, the problem is much more complex. According to many geneticists, the process of transformation of one species into another seems to be opposed to the hylemorphic theory, for the species changes so gradually it seems impossible to determine the instant the new species is generated. " The distinction of species is in a sense arbitary. The transition of morphological traits occurs more or less gradually and irregularly. It is impossible to establish a precise temporal level which may constitute the division between species. . . ." [30] Hence, for geneticists, any philosophical system which claims to be meaningful needs to integrate the creative dimension of time and the essential trait of change in reality, especially in organic reality.

From the philosophical viewpoint, if by species we mean the " community of procreation," then the gradual transformation of one species into another offers no difficulty, for the philosopher considers the gradual transition of one species into another, e. g., of different species of cats, as accidental changes within one species. For the philosopher, the species of cat undergoes accidental transformation without thereby changing the species. Here, we face a semantic problem, for philosophers and geneticists do not share the same concept of species.

This consideration, however, is one part of the problem, for experimental data seems to prove that the transformation of one species into another in the Aristotelian sense of the word takes place in nature, which requires a new substantial form. In this case it is difficult to explain how the change can occur at an instant, and not gradually, as geneticists contend. Charge of form

•• F. Ayala, *art. cit.*, p. 61.

must take place instantaneously: if the form F_2 of the new species replaces the form F1 of the corrupted one, there is not room for intermediate states. The riddle does not seem insurmountable, however, if we recall how generation and corruption occur. The disposition of matter changes gradually, without the loss of the first form, F1, until the precise instant when this form is corrupted and the new form, F2, is generated. Though we may be ignorant of the precise instant that it takes place, this could be a valid description of the transformation of species. Through mutation and natural selection, the disposition and the structure of the DNA gradually changes, until the instant when the new disposition and new structure corresponds to a new substantial form and, consequently, to a new species. Geneticists tell us that many mutations are required to produce new species. " One thing no single mutation has done is to produce a new species, genus, or family. This is because species and supraspecific categories differ always in many genes, and hence arise by the summation of many mutational steps." [31]

Time and the Evolution of Species

How does time influence the generation and corruption of individuals and species? It is evident that time favors the corruption of things:

> A thing, then, will be affected by time, just as we are accustomed to say that time wastes things away, and that all things grow old through time, and that there is oblivion owing to the lapse of time, but we do not say the same of getting to know or becoming young or fair. For time is by its nature the cause rather of decay, smce it is the number of change, and change removed what is.[32]

Since time is the measure of motion and motion is the cause of corruption of things, time does by its nature tend to corrupt things. St. Thomas notes that corruption can be ascribed to time and generation and existence to the agent which causes the generation. [33] It is also true, however, that time indirectly

[31] Th. Dobzhansky, *Genetics and the Origin of Species,* p. 81.
[••] Aristotle, *Physics.* IV, 12, 2lla28-84.
[••] St.Thomas, *IV Phys.,* lect. 22, n. 621.

causes the generation of new being inasmuch as it favors the corruption of the previous one which is new life's necessary pre-condition.

Time is also related to the second law of thermodynamics, the law of entropy. Entropy indicates a gradual diminution of the process of generation along the millennia, which eventually leads to the "heat death" of the universe. The law of entropy does not violate the principle of conservation of energy, but it indicates that the total energy gradually loses the possibility of being used. Consequently, the whole process of generation is gradually slowing down. Time and entropy could be said to operate in opposite directions, for time by its nature tends to favor corruption and entropy to slow down that process. Time cannot be a creative factor in evolution except indirectly, in the sense that it favors corruption, which is the prerequisite for generation.

Schrodinger believed that the entropy of a living organism did not increase but decreased. It is obvious, however, that in the organic as well as in the inorganic world entropy increases in closed systems. It does not necessarily, and in fact it often does not, increase in every element of the system. Palacios demonstrated experimentally that, if an organism is placed in a closed system, the entropy of the system increases as the organism develops. Although the biological organism evolves over time-and needs a long time-time by its nature is only in an indirect way the cause of a new species. The positive element of biological evolution lies in the agent, which is the creative factor in producing a new species, not in time *per se*.[84]

Another philosophical problem regarding time presents itself. We are often told that the theory of relativity unifies time and space and that, consequently, time influences the categories of human thought. Such a view is misleading since the theory of relativity does not consider, as does philosophy, the ontological reality of time but merely its measure; and this not in direct relation to space, for time without motion does not exist:

•• E. Schrodinger, "Heredity and Quantum Theory," in *The World of Mathematics* (New York, 1856), Vol. I, pp. 975-1001.; Julio Palacios, *De la Fisica a la Biologia* (Madrid, 1947).

" Hence, since motion in respect to place is motion from something in respect to magnitude, and since every magnitude is continuous, then it is necessary that motion is consequent upon magnitude and continuity. That is, since magnitude is continuous, motion is continuous. And, consequently, time is continuous. . . ." [35] In Aristotle, as well as in Newton, there exists a necessary connection between time and space, that is, the motion which takes place in that space.

The theory of relativity, it is true, changes this relation somewhat, as Einstein himself observes:

First, a remark concerning the relation of the theory to the " four dimensional space." It is a widespread error that the special theory of relativity is supposed to have, to a certain extent, first discovered, or .at any rate, newly introduced, the four dimensionality of the physical continuum. This, of course, is not the case. Classical mechanics, too, is based on the four dimensional continuum of space and time. But in the four dimensional continuum of classical physics the subspaces with constant time value have an absolute reality, independent of the choice of the reference system. Because of this (fact) the four dimensional continuum falls naturally into a three-dimensional and one-dimensional (time), so that the four dimensional point of view does not force itself upon one as *necessary.* The special theory of relativity, on the other hand, creates a formal dependence between the way in which the special coordinates on the one hand, and the temporal coordinates, on the other, have to enter into the natural laws.[36]

It is the quantitative relation between space and time through motion that relativity has changed in physics as a consequence of the invariance of the velocity of light. The theory of relativity, however, does not essentially change the ontology of time as a category of thought.

III. CAUSALITY

Disposition of Matter

After an analysis of the process of generation and corruption we must now investigate the causes of this phenomenon.

•• St. Thomas, *IV Physic.,* IV, Iect. 17, n. 576.

[86] A. Einstein, *Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist* (New York, 191i7), pp. 57-58.

First of all, since matter and form are proportioned, the generation of any being requires the right disposition of matter as a necessary condition for its becoming. What kind of cause produces this disposition? This question offers no difficulty, for natural agents change the disposition of matter until that matter is no longer well disposed to the existing form. Accordingly, that being is corrupted and a new being simultaneously generated. These natural agents operate by transmuting matter, and this causality as with all corporeal agents is exercised by motion. Since local motion is the first motion, any transmutation of matter depends initially upon that motion, which is a way of saying that the right disposition of matter depends on its structure, the spatial disposition of its parts. Changes in this disposition affect the structure of the being and, accordingly, the nature of the being as such.[37]

Is the disposition of matter merely a necessary condition, or is this disposition a necessary and sufficient condition for the eduction of the new form? Does the eduction of the new form necessarily follow the right disposition of matter? According to St. Thomas, such is the case. He holds the principle that the individual form depends upon the disposition of the individual matter, and the specific form upon the disposition of the specific matter. The disposition of matter, then, conditions the nature of the individual and specific form. Naturally, this disposition is not the direct cause of the generation of the new form, but since the new form must be in proportion to the matter, its disposition conditions the nature of that form. To a new disposition of matter automatically follows the education of the form which corresponds to that disposition.

[87] St. Thomas. *On the Power of God,* q. 5, a. 1 ad 5: "Inasmuch as corporeal agents do not act except by transmuting, and *as* nothing is transmuted except by by reason of matter, the causality of corporeal agents cannot extend beyond things that in some way are in matter." *Ibid., III Cont. Gent.,* c. "Nor can alteration be accomplished unless there be a preceding local change. . . ."

Causes of the Becoming of the Individual Being

The causality which accounts for the generation of forms leads us to the heart of philosophical speculation. Plato was the first to realize the difficulties in the concept of forms existing in matter as something permanent and universal, since these forms as they exist in individuals are eventually corrupted. Hence, for Plato the generation of forms can only be explained by transcending the material realm. Consequently, he postulated the existence of Ideas, of separated forms, which were the cause of everything that is made. The natural agent merely disposes the matter, but the generation of forms demands a spiritual cause: the forms existing in matter are forms by participation, wherefore the physical world is merely receptive. Man (essentially) is the cause of the participation of" humanity " in man.

Plato held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, insofar as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separated forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he called it, participation .... [38]

For Aristotle, however, the starting point is nature which manifests the general property of mobility, and local motion as the first motion. The eduction of forms is also a natural process, for

the artist makes or the father begets, a " such " of " this." And when it has been begotten, it is a " this such." And the whole, " this " Callias or Socrates, is analogous to " this brazen sphere," but man and animal to "brazen sphere" in general. Obviously, then, the cause which consists of the Forms (taken in the sense in which some maintain the existence of the Forms, i. e., if they are something apart from the individuals) is useless, at least with regard to coming to be and to substances .... [39]

For St. Thomas, the realm of Ideas is not necessary for the explanation of generation of forms, because Plato sought a

[38] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. *65,* a. 4.
[39] Aristotle, *Met.,* VI, 8, 1088b22 ff.

cause of forms as though the forms were of themselves brought into being whereas what is made, properly speaking, is the composite:

> Such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated and corrupted, but by reason of the generation and corruption of the composite, since even forms have no being, but composites have being through them: for according to a thing's mode of being is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like we must not look for the causes of corporeal forms in any immaterial form but in something that is composite. . . . Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanation from some immaterial form but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. [40]

For Aristotle and St. Thomas, the only subsisting being is not the form but the composite, the individual: Callias and Socrates are the individuals that come into being. And since individuals are material, there is no need for the realm of Ideas as the cause of these concrete individuals. The cause of the generation of individuals is another individual, although the individual is not the cause of the species:

> This individual man is the cause, properly speaking, of that individual man. Now, this man exists because human nature is present in this matter, which is the principle of individuation. So this man is not the cause of man, except in the sense that he is the cause of human form coming to be in this matter. This is the principle of an individual man. [41]

Plato's error was to consider the forms as subsisting, whereas it is the composite which actually comes into being and subsists.

[40] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol., loc. cit.;* cf. *ibid.,* q. 45, a. 8: "But his opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsistent, but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing 'llone, ... it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to concreated. What indeed is properly made by the natural agent is the composite, which is made from matter. "

[41] St. Thomas, *III Cont. Gent.,* c. 65. *Cf. Summa Theol. I,* q. 91, a. 2: "A form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. "

For St. Thomas, the corporeal agent is the cause not only of the disposition of matter, but also of the generation of the form. [42]

The Causality which Corresponds to the Species

The causality which corresponds to the process of generation appears to be solved by consideration of the causality which accounts for the disposition of matter and the eduction of form. The problem is deeper, however, because these causalities are responsible merely for the becoming of things, not their being.

> Motion is apart from the being of the thing. Now nothing corporeal, unless it be moved, is the cause of anything, for no body acts unless by motion as Aristotle proves. Therefore, no body is the cause of the being of anything, insofar as it is being, but it is the cause of its being moved towards being, that is, of the thing's becoming. [48]

This is equivalent to saying that the agent is the cause of the generation of the individual but not of the species:

> No particular univocal agent can be the unqualified cause of its species; for instance, this individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for he would then be the cause of every individual man, and, consequently, of himself-which is impossible. But this individual man is the cause, properly speaking, of that individual man. Now, this man exists because human nature is present in this matter, which is the principle of individuation. So this man is not the cause of a man except in the sense that he is the cause of a human form coming to be in this matter. This is the principle of generation of an individual man. So, it is apparent that neither this man, nor any other univocal agent in nature, is the cause of anything except the generation of this or that individual thing. [44]

.. *Ibid., On the Power of God,* q. *5,* a. I ad *5.*

•• *Ibid., III Cont. Gent.,* c. *65.*

u *Ibid.,* III, c. *65,* Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 45, a. *5* ad 1: "A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man ... "

Naturally, this is incomprehensible unless we admit the distinction between individuals and species. Aristotle summarizes the problem by saying that the same form is shared by many individuals, but the form remains the same. Although Callias and Socrates differ in their matter, they share the same form.[45] The form of a species by its nature is indivisible and immobile. Hence, the multiplication of the form by individuals is not a consequence of the division of the form but of the division of matter, which *is* divisible. The form is divisible only indirectly, accidentally *(per accidens),* inasmuch as the matter which informs is divisible.

Hence, the distinctions between the becoming and the being, the individual and the species, motion and immobility, are grounded at the same point. This justifies the causality of becoming as different from that of being. St. Thomas illustrates this distinction by an analogy noting that with artificial beings the builder of the house is merely the cause of its becoming not its being. Its being, on the contrary, depends upon the brick, steel, stone, wood, etc., and not on the builder. And he continues:

> The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of being which results from that form: but it will be the cause of the effect, in its becoming only. Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the others; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter-in other words, it may be the cause that this matter receives this form. And this is the cause of the becoming, as when man begets man.[46]

> And in like manner, since the becoming depends on the being, the cause of becoming is subordinated to that of being, as an instrument to the higher cause.[47]

•• Aristotle, *Met.,* VI, 8, 1033b32.

•• St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 104, a. 1. Cf. *II Sent.,* d. 9, q. 2, a. 2 obj. 1!.

[47] *II Cont. Gent.,* c. 21: "Whatever is caused as regards some particular nature cannot be the first cause of that nature but only the second and instrumental cause; for example, since the human nature of Socrates has a cause, he cannot

We must ask now the nature of the cause of the form or species. The first efficient cause of the form transcends the causality of corporeal agents which operate exclusively by motion; and motion is apart from the being of the thing. Accordingly, the causality of the form requires a non-corporeal cause, which St. Thomas explains thus:

> The existence of a thing made depends on its efficient cause inasmuch as it depends on the form of the thing made. Now there can be an efficient cause on which the form of the thing made does not depend directly and considered as a form but only indirectly: thus the form of a generated dog depends on the generating dog directly and by reason of its species, and the form of dog is in the same way in both the generated and in the generating dog, and is distinguished therefrom only by a material distinction, though being seated in another matter. Hence, since the generated dog has its form from some cause, this same form must depend on some higher principle that is the cause of that form directly and in respect of its very species. Now, seeing that properly speaking the existence of a form in matter implies no movement or change except accidentally, and since no bodies act unless moved, as the Philosopher shows, it follows of necessity that the principle of which the form depends directly must be something incorporeal, for the effect depends on its active cause through the action of a principle. And if a corporeal principle be in some way the cause of a form, this is due to its acting by virtue of an incorporeal principle and as its instrument. . . . Now this incorporeal agent by whom all things are created is God from whom things derive not only their form but also their matter. And it makes no difference whether they were all made by him immediately, or in a certain order as certain philosophers have maintained. [48]

In summary: (i) The material cause produces not only the disposition of matter as proportioned to the form but also the eduction of the new form; man generates man and dog

be the first of human nature; if so, since his human nature is caused by someone, it would follow that he was the cause of himself, since he is what he is by virtue of human nature. Thus a univocal generator must have the status of an instrumental agent in respect of that which is the primary cause of the whole species. Accordingly, all lower efficient causes must be referred to higher ones, as instrumental to principle agents .... "

•• *On the Power of God,* q. 5, a. lc.

generates dog. This generation, however, is exclusively reduced to the becoming, not to the being, to the new individual which exists in "that" particular matter, and this causality is exercised by transmuting the matter through motion. (ii) The generation of the form as such, however, transcends motion, and since motion is the exclusive property of material beings, then the cause of the form has to be incorporeal.

The consequences which follow St. Thomas's ideas on causality are of great significance to the theory of evolution, for according to these ideas the causality of natural agents in the evolution of species is reduced to the preparation of matter and the eduction of form. But the cause of the being, of forms as such, is ascribed to spiritual causes.

The Final Cause and the Process of Generation and Corruption

Is the process of generation and corruption a consequence of blind laws and pure chance or does it proceed by following a purpose, a design? According to St. Thomas, the process of generation tends towards superior beings and, ultimately, to man as the most perfect being. Although prime matter is by its nature indifferent to all forms, the concrete actualization of forms is the result of the subordination of external agents, which by acting upon one another, tend towards superior forms. What is more perfect acts upon that which is less, what is actual upon potency, thus producing through billions of years higher and higher beings. Ultimately, the whole process of generation is ordered to man's generation:

> Since any moved thing, inasmuch as it is moved tends to the divine likeness so that it may be perfected in itself, and since a thing is perfect as it is actualized, the intention of everything existing in potency must be to tend through motion towards actuality. And so, the more posterior and more perfect an act is, the more fundamentally is the inclination of matter directed towards it. Hence, in regard to the last and more perfect act that matter can attain, the inclination of matter whereby it desires form must be inclined as towards the ultimate end of generation. Now, among the acts pertaining to forms, certain graduations are found. Thus, prime matter is in potency, first of all, to the form of an element ... and a

sensitive one to an intellectual one. . . . After this last type of form, no later and more noble form is found in the order of generable and corruptible things. Therefore, the ultimate end of the whole process of generation is the human soul, and matter tends towards it as the ultimate form. So, elements exist for the sake of mixed bodies; these latter exist for the sake of living bodies, among which plants exist for animals, and animals for men. Therefore, man is the end of the whole order of generation. [49]

The tendency of nature towards superior forms is realized through evolution, as we now understand this term.

Another teleological trait exists in nature: the individual exists for the sake of the species. According to St. Thomas, the reason there are many individuals in a single species is that the specific nature, which cannot be perpetuated in one individual, may be preserved in several. [50] "Furthermore, in each individual that which belongs to the species is superior to the individuating principle, which lies outside the essence of the species. Therefore, the universe is ennobled more by the multiplication of species than by the multiplication of individuals of one species." [51] Hence, the process of generation teaches us that the individual exists for the sake of the species and that the ultimate goal of the whole process of evolution Is the generation of man.

The last teleological feature of the universe is due to the absolute dependence of the universe upon God who directs the motion of all beings towards their goals.

It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God. In created things good is found also as regards order towards an end. The good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God . . . and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. [52]

If the dynamic orientation of created things towards their goals constitutes providence, then how great is its extension?

•• *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 22. Cf. *ibid.*, 9: " ... The whole of generation is ordered to man, as to an ultimate end in the genus of generable and mobile beings. "

[50] *II Cont. Gent.*, e. 98.

[51] *Ibid.* Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, 47, a. 2.; *II Sent*.. d. 8, 1, 4 ad 8.

•• *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 22. a. 1.

If this dynamic orientation does not consider the individual, then it is possible and logical to introduce chance in evolution. Divine providence, however, subjects all beings and all actions to itself:

> We must say that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends .... But the causality of God, who is the first ag.ent, extends to all beings, not only as to the constituent principles of species but also as to the individualizing principles. Hence, all things that exist in whatever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end .... [53]

Since all particular causes are included under the universal cause, no effect could take place outside the range of that universal cause.

According to Thomistic philosophy, then, evolution is completely directed and planned by the Creator to the last detail. Nothing escapes divine providence, certainly not the appearance of man through evolution.

IV. SciENTIFIC EvoLuTION AND CAUSALITY

The Genetic Code

In general, heredity consists in a self-replication of the genetic material, or DNA, which with slight modifications is always similar to the DNA of the parents. Evolution, however, "appears to depend on self-replicating and self-varying (mutation) strings of DNA, and this self-replicating and self-varying inevitably lead to natural selection.[54] Geneticists contend that, although sexual reproduction reshuffles the DNA deck of cards, no new genes can be created. Only various new combinations of existing genes come into play. Evolution, however, presupposes changes in the gene pool of a population, and there are four known processes which change this pool: (i) mutation; (ii) random fluctuation of genetic frequencies

[53] *Ibid.,* q. 2 ad 1. [54] In *Evolution,* p. 95.

known as "sampling errors"; (iii) migration of individuals in and out of the population; and (iv) natural selection.[55] Mutation and natural selection, however, are the two primary factors in the process of evolution.

In order to understand the change of one species into another it is necessary to keep in mind that in every chromosome, in every cell, of every individual there exists a molecule that makes a mouse a mouse and a man a man-DNA. The secret of its creative diversity is not in its composition but in its structure. The way in which DNA is built accounts for the billions of forms it can command.[56] Geneticists now think that it is the order of the steps of the DNA molecule which gives every gene its special character. The amount of DNA in a living organism and the complexity of the organism also seem to be somewhat correlated.

The Change of Species Through the Code and Causality

The distinction of species depends upon the amount of chromosomes and the structure of the DNA, for every species is materially determined by these traits. A change in species, then, must be the result of a change in the structure of its particular DNA molecule. Are the four factors mentioned previously capable of changing this structure and producing a completely new one? According to geneticists, mutation plus natural selection gradually change the structure and shape of the DNA until a new species is generated.

[55] F. Ayala, "Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology," *Philosophy of Science,* Vol. 37, n. 1, p. 3.

[56] *Evolution,* pp. 100-103; *ibid.,* p. 96: "In greatly simplified terms ;t is the line up of the DNA, whether normal or mutated, that dictates the order of amino acids in the protein. This in terms dictates the " shape " and hence the specific activity of the proteins; and protein activity dictates the form of all living things. Or to put into numbers, the 4 bases of DNA arrange 20 universal amino acids in patterns forming the thousands of proteins that control life's infinite variety." *The Cell,* p. 61: "Geneticists now think that it is the order of these steps, the arrangement of TA's etc. that gives every gene its special character. The amount of DNA in a living organism, and the complexity of the organism seems to be correlated. "

In general, the philosopher has no difficulty in simultaneously accepting the general theory of causality and the role of the DNA molecule in evolution. According to causality, the evolution of species first requires a new disposition of matter. A new structure of the DNA molecule corresponds to the concept we have characterized as the disposition of matter. To a profound change in the structure of the DNA, then, corresponds a new species, inasmuch as the form of the species must be in proportion to the new structure of the DNA. "One thing no single mutation has done is to produce a new species, genus, or family," Dobzhansky says. "This is because species and supraspecific categories differ always in many genes, and hence arise by summation of many mutational steps." [57]

This leads us to a crucial issue: How is it possible to dispose the genetic material for a superior form? Where is the cause which produces this disposition? Here natural selection appears to be the primary factor. Natural selection is not merely a negative force in evolution but an element which creates new and superior structures in the DNA molecule that demand the emergence of new forms and new species.

Natural selection is comparable not to a sieve but to a regulatory mechanism in a cybernetic system. The genetic endowment of a living species receives and accumulates information about the challenges of the environment in which the species lives. The evolutionary changes are creative responses to the challenges of the environment. They are not alterations imposed by the environment as Lamarckists mistakenly thought. [58]

It is possible then, to dispose a new a.nd superior matter through natural selection which also demands a superior form and species.

Evolution has achieved more than to preserve life on earth from destruction. It has created progressively more complex and adaptively more secure organizations. The human species has achieved the peak of biological security. [59]

•• Th. Dobzhansky, *Genetics and the Origin of Species,* p. 81.
•• Th. Dobzhansky, *The Biology of Ultimate Concern* (New York, 1967), p. li!!t.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 129.

From the philosophical viewpoint, this is perfectly acceptable because natural agents act as instruments of superior agents which are the principal causes of that disposition. [60]

Natural Selection

This schematic explanation of the causality corresponding to evolution depends, even philosophically speaking, on natural selection which was Darwin's greatest contribution to the science of evolution. The adaptation and diversity of life and the appearance of new highly organized forms can be explained by the orderly process of change which Darwin called natural selection.

> We feel sure that any variation in the least injurious could be rigidly destroyed. This preservation of favorable variations and the rejection of injurious variations I call natural selection.[61]

Of course, natural selection is not exactly as Darwin conceived it, for

> ... the selectively fit, or if you will, the fittest, is not necessarily a fellow with big muscles, or a lusty fighter, or a conqueror of all his competitors. He is rather a paterfamilias who has raised a large number of children who in turn become paterfamilias. [62]

National selection is basically differential reproduction; it enhances the development of the life of the individual and ultimately of the species.

Instead of being purely a process of statistical chance, natural selection, on the contrary, is an orderly process of change governed by natural laws. As a directive force in evolution, natural selection is not predictable as are physical laws which are based on the repetition of similar circumstances. Although

[60] St. Thomas, *On the Power of God.* q. 5, a. 1 c. "This corporeal agent acts by virtue of the incorporeal principle, and its action terminates in this or that form . . . Accordingly, these corporeal agents are not the cause of the forms in things made, except they do not act except by transmuting, and this is by transmuting matter and educing the form from the potentiality of matter."

[61] Ch. Darwin, *The Origin of Species.* Quoted by Ayala in "A biologist's view of nature," *A New Ethic for a New Earth,* p. 30.

[••] Th. Dobzhansky, *Heredity and the Nature of Man* (New York, 1966), pp. 153-154.

such repetition does not occur in biological evolution, natural selection is certainly not haphazard. [63] As the geneticists say, causal relations, not caprice, prevail in nature. [64]

For the philosopher interested in evolution the significance of natural selection is best summarized by Dobzhansky, that natural selection tends to maximize the probability of the preservation and expansion of life. The adaptation of plant life to a desert climate, for example, is a consequence of natural selection:

> The fundamental adaptation is the condition of dryness which carries the danger of desiccation. During a major part of the year, sometimes for several years in succession, there is no rain. Plants have satisfied the urgent necessity of saving water in different ways. Cacti have transformed their leaves into spines, having made their stems into barrels containing a reserve of water. Photosynthesis is performed on the surface of the stem instead of on the leaves. Other plants have no leaves during the dry season, but after it rains they burst into leaves and flowers and produce seeds-all within the space of the few weeks while water is available. The rest of the year the seeds lie quiescent in the soil.[65]

Natural selection can also generate new organs by increasing the probability of otherwise extremely improbable genetic combinations. For instance, geneticists regard the formation of the vertebrate eye as an example of natural selection:

> ... the combination of genetic units which carries the hereditary information responsible for the formation of the vertebrate eye have never been produced by a random process like mutation-not even if we allow for the three billion years plus during which life has existed on earth. The complicated anatomy of the eye like the exact functioning of the kidney are the result of a nonrandom process-natural selection.[66]

The Finality which Corresponds to Evolution

Some geneticists explain evolution in terms of teleology. In general, teleological explanations imply the existence of means-

[63] See *Evolution After Darwin,* Vol. 8, p. 107.

"'Th. Dobzhansky, *The Biology of Ultimate Concern,* pp. 126, 122. C. G. Simpson, *Evolution After Darwin,* Vol. I, p. 166.

[65] F. Ayala. "Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology," *loc. cit.,* p. 7

•• F. Ayala, "A biologist's view of nature," *loc. cit.,* p. 35.

to-end relationship in the system under consideration, thereby suggesting that the system is directly organized and intelligible. " Teleological explanations imply that such contribution is the explanatory reason for the presence of the process or object in the system." [67] For example, it is appropriate to give a teleological explanation of the operation of the kidney in regulating the concentration of salt in the blood; we have a kidney because the regulation of the concentration of salt in the organism is a necessity. The philosopher accepts this concept of teleology, for he defines finality as " that for the sake of which something is done." " That for the sake of which something is done" is the justification of the existence of a means-to-end relationship.

In Darwin's theory purpose is absolutely indispensable to his reasoning. As Cassirer points out:

> it is safe to assert that no earlier biological theory ascribed quite as much significance to the idea of purpose, or advocated it so emphatically, since not only individual but absolutely all the phenomena of life are regarded from the standpoint of their survival value. All other questions retreat into the background before this one.[68]

The survival value is the ultimate purpose in Darwin's theory.

Teleology also corresponds to contemporary natural selection, for the adaptation of organisms is an observed fact which enhances the conservation and development of individuals, and as its ultimate goal, the conservation and improvement of species. In general terms, natural selection is teleologically oriented in that it produces and maintains end-directed organs and mechanisms when the functions they serve contribute to the reproductive efficiency of the organism. [69] More difficult to explain teleologically is the operation of the genes and their mutation. It is clear that mutation alone would produce chaos,

[67] F. Ayala, "Biology as an autonomous science" in *American Scientist*, Vol. *56*, n. 3, p. 214. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 214.

[68] E. Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (Tr. by W. H. Woglom and C. W. Hendel, New Haven, Conn., 1950), p. 166.

[••] F. Ayala, "Biology as an autonomous science," *loc. cit.*, p. 217.

not evolution. But natural selection redresses the balance; harmful genes are reduced in frequency, and useful ones perpetuated and multiplied. [70]

Dobzhansky observes that the history of life is comparable to human history since both proceed by trial and error, with false starts, yet achieving progress on the whole. The paradoxical feature of, biological evolution, however, is that design and chance appear simultaneously.

> Adherents of finalism and orthogenesis contend that, since it is quite incredible that evolution could all be due to " chance," one must assume that it has had a design which it has followed. The reality is, however, more complex and more interesting than the chance vs. design dichotomy suggest.[71]

It is more complex, because in the evolutionary process life had innumerable other potentialities which remained unrealized since only a tiny fraction of possible gene combinations can be actualized. Certainly, there is an element of chance in mutations, yet chance is directed by an anti-chance agent in evolution-natural selection responding to environmental challenges.

Together with natural selection, especially in the evolution of higher organisms, there are discernible elements of creativity and freedom. For example, all desert plants must cope with dryness; but different plants do so by a variety of means. Animals must have some organs for respiration; yet these may be gills, tracheae, lungs, and so forth. As Dobzhansky concludes,

> the multiplicity of ways of becoming adapted to similar environments is not in accord with hypotheses of design and orthogenesis in evolution; these hypotheses would lead one rather to expect that a single and presumably most perfect method, will be used everywhere. On the contrary, natural selection is more permissible .... Only a minuscule fraction of the potentially possible gene combinations are ever actualized. [72]

[70] Th. Dobzhansky, *The Biology of Ultimate Concern,* p. 122.
[71] *Ibid.,* p. 125.
[72] *Ibid.,* p. 127.

Yet, we must not personalize natural selection, Dobzhansky warns, for it is not some kind of spirit or demon who' directs evolution to accomplish some set purpose. " Groping in the dark " is the only way natural selection can proceed, and this "groping " is " opportunistic and shortsighted." Lacking a preview of the future, natural selection adapts the living species to the environments which exist " here and now." [73]

Dobzhansky's brilliant interpretation of natural selection must be examined carefully. Rejecting the hypothesis of design in evolution he sees natural selection as opportunistic and short·-sighted and often culminating in failure. [74] He notes the danger of natural selection being personalized as if it directed evolution to accomplish some set purpose. Dobzhansky is followed with some difficulty here since the philosophical concept of purpose and design, when applied to genetics, must necessarily be shortsighted, for nature can only work with " here and now " circumstances. Dobzhansky rightly points out that the transmittal of particular maternal and paternal genes is a matter of chance. [75] But natural selection directs these genes by "shortsightedly " adapting them to the immediate environment. It is true that natural selection is opportunistic; it cannot be otherwise. Sometimes natural selection fails-it cannot always cope with an adverse environment, but even in these cases it does not cease to struggle. The same purpose is manifested in

•• *Ibid.,* p. 128. Cf. *ibid.,* p. 128. "Evolution has achieved more than to preserve life on earth from destruction. It has created progressively more complex and adaptively more secure organizations. The human species has attained the peak of biological security. It is unlikely to become extinct because of any conflicts with its physical or biological environments. "

"' Th. Dobzhansky writes this on Teihard de Chardin, *ibid.,* p. 128: " Groping in the dark is, indeed, the only way natural selection can proceed. Now, groping may lead to discovery of openings toward new opportunities for living. It may also end in a fall from a precipice. It may preserve and enchance life, or it may lead to extinction. Teilhard was a paleoneologist, and he was quite familar with extinction of evolutionary lines. Yet he devoted strangely little attention to this phenomenon in his writings. It would have caused him no difficulty had he realized that natural selection is necessarily opportunistic and shortsighted in its groupings. "

•• *Ibid.,* p. 126.

failure as well as in the instances of success. In both cases, individuals and species struggle for survival and for adaptation to the environment. Among human beings there are many individuals who cannot cope with the " here and now " circumstances and die. There are tribes in the Amazon River on the verge of extinction, in spite of their life-and-death struggle for existence. Many species of animals are now disappearing, not because they do not strive for survival but because their opportunistic and shortsighted reaction to the " here and now " situation is insufficient to overcome adverse conditions created by man. In all these cases natural selection is at work, and certainly has its effect on the species continuing struggle for survival, though it fails. The concept of finality and design does not necessarily presuppose success but rather a certain orientation or intention.

Dobzhansky's main thesis, again, must only be accepted with reluctance, if at all: " The multiplicity of ways of becoming adapted to similar environment is not in accord with hypotheses of design and orthogenesis in evolution, for these hypotheses would lead one rather to expect that a single and presumably most perfect method will be used everywhere." [76] Is it not questionable that this conclusion is contained in the premises? Certainly physical bodies always follow the single and most perfect method in motion, according to relativity, the geodesic, and the law of minimum energy. [77] But this is not the way evolution proceeds, because biological evolution is not deterministic in the way physics is. Natural selection depends upon mutation and chance and, as such, the genetic code possesses an almost infinite number of possibilities. Yet the actualization of these potentialities is restricted by the laws of statistical probability to one at a time. In other words, the

[76] *Ibid.,* p. 127.

[77] Although the uncertainty principle *seems* to reject the deterministic pattern of physical laws, the interpretation of this principle is far from easy. Einstein still believes in the absolute determinism of physical laws, contrary to Bohr and Heisenberg. In addition, we should bear in mind that the laws of physics are idealizations, and, consequently, no more than approximations.

nature of living beings necessarily presuppposes the impossibility of the simultaneous actualization of these possibilities. It also presupposes-due to the variety of genes and " here and now " circumstances-that " a single and presumably most perfect method " can hardly ever be achieved. It should be emphasized that the design for survival in genetics always implies a means-to-end relationship which by its nature must be opportunistic and shortsighted. The well-known failures do not invalidate the existence of design; even extinct species witness to the finality and design that is realized through natural selection. In man, too, there exists purpose and design which is realized in free actions. There are many potentialities in a single individual which will never be actualized, although this does not destroy purpose or design. It only tells us that design is realized in a particular way and not always by following the most perfect method.

Philosophical Teleology and Scientific Teleology in Evolution

The philosopher benefits from the discoveries of contemporary biology. Natural selection explains concretely how St. Thomas's idea of the gradual actualization of prime matter towards superior forms takes place: this gradual actualization is realized through evolution. In addition, natural selection fined as differential reproduction presupposes the preservation and development of species, as St. Thomas believed.

The philosopher observes the existence of two basic instincts in living beings: the instinct of self-preservation and of the preservation of the species. The former is subordinated to the latter, as natural selection most conclusively indicates. Rejecting Freud's death instinct, or death drive, as highly irnprobable/8 Dobzhansky attests to the instinct of self-preservation, for " all organisms, from the lowest to the highest, react to stimuli that commonly occur in their habitual environment in ways that tend to maximize the chances of their survival." [79] Placed in novel conditions, however, the body loses its wisdom,

[78] Th. Dobzhansky, *The Biology of Ultimate Concern*, p. 75.
[••] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

"in short, there is no instinct of self-preservation, if by such an ' instinct ' one means an ability to react to all environmental stimuli always in such a manner as to preserve the individual's life." [80] Here Dobzhansky is in complete agreement with the philosophical concept of self-preservation. There is no such thing as universal wisdom, for the living being reacts in ways which subordinate everything to the preservation of its life in a limited way. A creature is naturally not always aware of everything that may endanger its life, so the instinct of self-preservation necessarily operates within the limits of concrete knowledge. But this knowledge is, of course, subject to further development. Even dogs, for example, can learn through experience that crossing a busy street can be dangerous. :Man is physically unaware of atomic radiation, but as soon as he learns of its existence, he takes measures to avoid that danger.

As a final question it is important for the philosopher to consider how living organisms adapt themselves to the environment since they do not do so consciously. If natural selection presupposes a means-to-end relationship in the system, who determines the end, who decides the means, and who knows the relation between ends and means? Plants in the desert, for example, store water since otherwise they would perish. The storage of water is the means by which these plants preserve themselves and their species. But how do plants know they have to store water? It is remarkable to observe the following hierarchical subordination of means tn ends: the preservation of the species is the ultimate end, which requires the preservation of the individual plant; but this is impossible unless the plant stores water, which in turn requires a change of the normal process of photosynthesis. The ultimate goal, the preservation of the species, subordinates everything to itself and is the reason and explanation for the whole process, which then becomes more intelligible.

If natural selection is truly teleological, in other words, then the process of evolution follows a scheme, a design. The kidney exists, for example, because the living organism requires a

•• *Ibid.,* p. 74.

certain concentration of salt in the blood and not vice versa, that is, there is a certain concentration of salt in the blood because we have a kidney. The phenomena occurs because it is intended; if it happens without being intended then the process is not teleological, but merely a consequence of chance. The biologist is not interested in this speculation, which belongs properly to philosophy. Yet in the last analysis, it is the problem of intention and knowledge that gives full intelligibility to evolution.

St. Thomas summarizes the need for knowledge of a teleological process thus: " The right ordering of a thing to a due end requires knowledge of the end, and the means to it, and of the due proportion between both: and this knowledge is found only in an agent with intelligence." [81] The full explanation of the biological process of evolution and of natural selection demands an intelligence. The old aphorism that " the work of nature is the work of an intelligence-Opus *naturae est optts intelli-. gentiae,"* seems apropos here. The concrete realization of St. Thomas's three main ideas on finality makes evolution more intelligible: [82] (i) man as the culmination of the whole process of generation; (ii) the individual for the sake of the species; and (iii) a supreme being directing the dynamic process of the universe. Even Darwin in his early writings did not rule out the possibility of a supreme being hidden behind the process of nature. He declared at the very end of his *Origin:*

There is a grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few .forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved. [83]

[81] St. Thomas, *II Cont. Gent.,* c.

[82] When we postulate a supreme being as directing the dynamic process of the universe, we do not mean that he directs the cosmos as we drive a car. He probably directs the biological and cosmic process by using as instruments the very physical and biological laws he created. A thermostat works without the actual direction of those who constructed it who simply used physical and chemical laws to produce the desired effect, namely, the regulation of temperature. In like manner God intervenes in nature by using natural laws in order to produce the desired efft-ct.

[88] Ch. Darwin, *The Origin of Species,* end.

The explanation of St. Augustine of the creation of the universe in six days accounts for the gradual appearance of the species along the millennia. St. Augustine, however, does not pose the problem of evolution as it is formulated in contemporary terms, namely, as a gradual transformation of one species into another:

> The elements of this corporeal world have as a definite power and as their proper quality that which each one can or cannot do, that which can or cannot be made from each one. From these, as it were, the beginnings of things, all that is produced receives in its proper time its birth and its growth, the limits and the separations of its own nature. Thence it is that a bean does not grow from a grain of wheat, nor wheat from a bean, nor a man from an animal, nor an animal from a man. [84]

For St. Augustine, species are in potency, after the manner of seed, which are actualized in due time. For every seminal *ratio*, there will exist a species at the right time, but that new species is not the result of the transformation of another species, which is what modem evolution tells us.

Whether such a transformation is possible or not according to St. Augustine's philosophical principles, it is impossible to say. But the principles of a Thomistic philosophy can indeed be applied to our modem view of biological evolution. In Teilhard de Chardin's words: "Aristotelian hylemorphism represents the projection, upon a world without duration, of modem evolutionism. Rethought within a universe in which duration adds a further dimension, the theory of matter and form becomes almost indistinguishable from our contemporary speculations on the development of matter." [85] We heartily agree with the French paleontologist.

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•• St. Augustine, *De Gen. ad litt.*, 9, 17, *ML* 34, 406.

•• Teilhard de Chardin, *Oeuvres*, Vol. 3, p. 181. Cf. Raymond J. Nogar, 0. P. *The Wisdom of Evolution* (New York, 1963). Raymond Nogar shows that evolution is not at variance with Christian thought.

RAHNER AND HEIDEGGER: BEING, HEARING, AND GOD

THE IMMEDIATE GOAL of this essay is to delimit the essential difference between Rahner's philosophy of religion and Heidegger's philosophy of Being. Why is it necessary to establish the ground of disagreement between these thinkers? For one thing, it has been claimed by some that Heidegger's philosophy has had a profound effect on Rahner's thought. Louis Roberts, for example, has maintained "that Heidegger's influence on Rahner is nearly as great as Marechal's." [1] Rahner himself suggests that "perhaps Dr. Roberts overestimates this . . . influence somewhat." [2] In any case, it will be maintained here that any valid interpretation of the influence of Heidegger on Rahner must take into account the fundamental difference between them. It will be maintained that this difference is at the level of the most basic questions which each poses and therefore has ramifications which go beyond mere methodological differences. This is not intended to be a refutation to the claim that Heidegger has influenced Rahner, for he certainly has. It is merely hoped that the delimitation of the fundamental difference between their thought will make it possible to assess most accurately how the one has influenced the other. This essay, however, will not attempt such an assessment, nor will it attempt a point by point comparison of Rahner's philosophy with Heidegger's.

A second reason for delimiting the difference between their philosophies has to do with the relation of Heidegger's thought to Thomistic philosophy, and more generally to metaphysics. It is hoped that the investigation will clarify quite emphatically

[1] Louis Roberts, *The Achievement of Karl Rahner* (New York, 1967), p. 17.

[2] Karl Rahner, "Forward" to *The Achievement of Karl Rahner*, p. viii.

the fundamental differences which underlie any apparent similarities between Heidegger's perspective on the question of being and the metaphysician's perspective.

The alleged influence of Heidegger on Rahner is evident, in part, in the notion of "hearing" or "attending" *(horen)* which plays a central role in the thought of both. In *Hearers of the Word* Rahner definies man as essentially a potential hearer of a word from God. The philosophy of religion must prepare for this hearing by demonstrating metaphysically that man has this potentiality. Consequently, Rahner defines theology (theology in the "positive" and fundamental sense as the reception of Revelation and not in the sense of its elaboration) as a "hearing." Theology is fundamentally the " hearing " either of an historical word from God or of his silence.[3] Similarly, Heidegger's philosophy of Being could be defined as a type of thinking which is essentially a " hearing," or better an " attending," but as will be shown, a very different kind of hearing than is developed in Rahner's thought.

More fundamental for both thinkers than the notion of hearing, however, is the notion of " being." Rahner argues metaphysically to the notion of man as " hearer of the word " from man's *Vorgriff* (pre-comprehension) of being. Similarly, Heidegger's notion of man as a hearer is developed in his attempt to think the meaning of *Sein* (Being) .[4] The difference between the notion of hearing in these two philosophies is ultimately grounded in the difference in the question of being posed by each. Fundamentally, therefore, this essay is concerned with the issue of being as it is developed in Rahner's transcendental Thomism and Heidegger's philosophy of Being.

It is necessary to make explicit several further restrictions of our topic. Since the essay is concerned with the point of difference between Rahner and Heidegger, and since the volume

"Karl Rahner, *Hearers of the Word,* trans. Michael Richards (New Ym-k, 1968), pp. 10-11. Hereafter: HW.

• For reasons which will become apparent Heidegger's *Sein* is translated here as *Being* (capital B). Rahner's *Sein* which for him is equivalent to esse is translated as *being* (small b).

and complexity of Heidegger's reflection on Being are so extensive, no attempt will be made here to give a balanced or comprehensive presentation of Heidegger's thought in itself. The primary focus of attention will be determined by the presentation of Rahner's thesis. Nor will it be possible to consider comprehensively the system of transcendental Thomism, as it has come to be called, except insofar as it is involved in the definition of man as a potential hearer of God's word. Finally, although it is hoped that this essay will help to indicate how one would proceed to investigate the relation of Heidegger's philosophy to theology, such an investigation-very involved in itself-will not be pursued.

Since Rahner has published a reflection on Heidegger's thought-although not an extensive one, and based only on the early works-it seems quite natural to consider it first.[5] Hopefully the consideration of that article will enable us to take an initial stance with regard to Rahner's evaluation of Heidegger, and will also serve as a general introduction to Heidegger's thought. An examination of Rahner's philosophy of religion as developed in *Hearers of the Word* will follow, with attention focused on those elements which subsequently will be shown as the fundamental bone of contention between Heidegger and Rahner. Having done this it will be necessary to re-evaluate Rahner's critique of Heidegger's thought in the light of what will be maintained is a more faithful reading of Heidegger's question about Being. It will then be shown what sense "hearing" comes to have in regard to such a question. It will not be possible to limit the consideration of Heidegger to one or two statements of his position and so indications will have to be gleaned from a number of his works. The essay concludes, contrary to the general consensus, that the philosophies of Rahner and Heidegger differ at the very level of the question asked.

* * *

[5] Karl Rahner, "The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger," trans. Andrew Tallon, *Philosophy Today,* 13 (1969), pp. 126-37. Originally published in French in 1940. Hereafter: CE.

Rahner's essay on Heidegger is brief and attempts merely to introduce its readers to the broad outlines of his philosophy. It does not attempt either a comprehensive evaluation of his thought or a comparison of it to other systems of thought. Since Rahner does restrict the scope of his article, it would be unfair to evaluate it as an extensive and nuanced interpretation, much less as necessarily representing Rahner's current evaluation of Heideggerian philosophy. Nevertheless, the essay does situate Heidegger's question within a specific context, and it does project and evaluate the possible development of Heidegger's thought from that context. Although Rahner's conjectures are only provisory, they nevertheless firmly establish the ground on which Rahner's thought confronts Heidegger's. It will be shown in the discussion of *Hearers of the Word* how Rahner moves from this ground himself. In our own re-evaluation of this essay, however, it will be shown that the ground upon which Rahner bases his interpretation of Heidegger is indeed very shaky ground. Although few of Heidegger's later works were available in 1940, Rahner's interpretation misunderstands the most essential points made even in the works which he did consider, sc. SZ, KM, WM, and WG.[6] This is, of course, not meant as a criticism of Rahner but as a preparation for the delimitation of the difference between his philosophy and Heidegger's.

Rahner considers Heidegger a metaphysician. As a meta-

[6] The following abbreviations will be used to refer to the translations of Heidegger's works:

EM-An Introduction to Metaphysics trans. Ralph Manheim (New York, 1961).

KM-Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics trans. James S. Churchhill (Bloomington, Indiana, 1968).

SZ-Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, 1966). The pagination of the German edition is given in this translation and used also in this paper.

WG-The Essence of Reason, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, 1969).

WM-" What is Metaphysics? " trans. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, in *Existence and* Being, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago, 1970), pp. 325-61.

Intro to WM-" The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York, 1969), pp. 206-21.

physician Heidegger, according to Rahner, asks about being as such, in its totality, as that which is most general. Rahner understands this concern with being as that which is most general, as a concern about the act of being, the *esse* characteristic of all beings (ens). Likewise, he understands Heidegger's concern with being in its totality as a concern with *esse* as the unifying aspect under which all possible objects are able to be comprehended and summed up, and as the ultimate cause to which they can be related. Metaphysics insofar as it asks this question about being is called "ontology," and insofar as it looks for the universal basis of all being it is " theology." All philosophy since Plato and Aristotle is at its base, therefore, "onto-theological." According to Rahner, Heidegger accepts this heritage-this concern about being as such-and makes it his own. (CE, 128)

What is distinctive, according to Rahner's interpretation, about Heidegger's approach to metaphysics is that he seeks to put it on a new foundation. The whole tradition of philosophy from Plato to Hegel has conceived being in terms of *logos* and thus as correlative to thought or reason. J\ian was defined as the *animal rationalis* and the question of being was " interpreted from the *logical* grasp of being by thought." (CE, 130) Rahner maintains that Heidegger's originality lies in the fact that he asks the " question about being without conceiving it beforehand as *onto-logy."* (CE, 130) Thus Heidegger situates the question about being on a new plane which does not presuppose the definition of man or being in terms of *logos,* but which sees man as the place where being is "comprehended " in a more fundamental way. According to Rahner, this is why Heidegger defines his task as the establishing of a more "fundamental ontology." It is also for this reason that Heidegger wants to go back beyond the traditional starting point of metaphysics to the point of its origin with the Pre-Socratics when being was not conceived beforehand in terms of logic. (CE, 130)

Rahner maintains that this more fundamental investigation of the being question assumes the form of a transcendental

analysis. For this reason Rahner situates Heidegger within the tradition of modem philosophy which according to Rahner is essentially transcendental philosophy. As Rahner sees it, "a question is posed on the transcendental plane when it asks for the a priori conditions that make knowledge of an object possible," that is to say, when the investigator himself becomes the object of investigation. (CE, Since being as such is not accessible as this or that being, and since it cannot be obtained in its pure state, the only access which one has to being is through man who must already possess some knowledge of being to raise the question in the first place. In other words, Rahner tells us, in order to ask about the a priori conditions which render possible the knowledge of being, the investigator must become the object of investigation. (CE,

Rahner notes that it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger's sole concern is always with the question about being. The transcendental analytic of man, therefore, aims at resolving the question about being. It is not in any sense aimed at establishing an anthropology. The question of man is always subordinate to the question about being. (CE, 129)

Accordingly, Rahner maintains that we are able to define Heidegger's philosophy as:

> the transcendental investigation of what man is insofar as he raises the question of being, an investigation that rejects the initial traditional stance in this matter-exclusively intellectual-and undertaken with the intention of providing an answer to the question of being in general. (CE, 131; printed entirely in italics)

Rahner tells us that Heidegger's transcendental investigation of man is an analysis of man as "Dasein." What does Heidegger mean by this term? According to Rahner, "Dasein" does not designate simply being-present-there *(etre-la-present)* in the sense in which one could affirm anything whatever, but rather "Dasein" is being-human itself-each of us. It is characterized inherently by the transcendence which orients man towards being, and from which derives the ability to understand oneself in a definite way, to take an

attitude towards oneself. As a conquence "existence" in Heidegger's special terminology denotes not the fact that a being is, but rather it denotes ". . . man, insofar as he is in some way the object of this free self-disposition." (CE, 131) The existential analytic of Dasein, therefore, consists in the determination of the general and formal structures which are proper to Dasein as a mode of being-human, in other words as "existence," as a state of "openness" (transcendence) to being. These structures are called "existentials." SZ is almost entirely devoted to an explication of these structures. The analysis displays itself, Rahner maintains, in two stages. The first consists in a phenomenological description of Dasein as " being-in-the-world." The second reduces this being-in-the-world to its ultimate sense as "being-in-time." (CE,

Rahner explains that being-in-the-world describes Dasein's " existence " as Heidegger conceives it. Man is, only insofar as he is in the world. This being-in-the-world is not a secondary process by which Dasein as a closed subject in some way comes into contact with an exterior world. Rather, from the very start Dasein is already outside of itself in the world and in the things of the world. Being in the world according to Rahner, therefore, consists in the a priori possibility of Dasein to be related to the things of the world and the world itself.

> Man is from the very start open to the totality of the world, and the totality of the world is, albeit under an empty form, given him right from the outset. (CE, 132)

Rahner explains that this being-in-the-world has a triple aspect which is described by Heidegger as *Verstehen, Geworfenheit,* and *Verfallenh!eit.* The first term refers to Heidegger's contention that Dasein is not present to itself by a static knowledge of properties but rather is present to itself by a stretching-ahead-of-self-toward-the-future. This "tension-a-head-of-self-toward-the-future" is "understanding, man's way of comprehending and grasping himself, of grasping and re-structuring his own power-to-be." *(CE,* 133) Through this *Verstehen* Dasein finds itself always brought into question and

is thus present to itself. Rahner notes that according to Heidegger this stretching of Dasein towards its "subjective possibilities" must always begin from Dasein's past-a past which has been imposed upon Dasein and of which it has no hold. This "state-of-being-thrown into this or that condition" *(etat-de-jete-dans-teUes et telles conditions)* Heidegger calls " thrownness " (*Geworfenheit)* . Furthermore, the tension-a-head-of-self-toward-the-future from the past-into-which-it-has-been-thrown necessarily involves Dasein with the things of the world to such an extent that Dasein becomes prey to them and enslaved. This enslavement Heidegger calls "Verfallen-heit." Being-in-the-world as *Verstehn, Geworfenheit,* and *Ver-fallenheit* is summed up by the term " Care " (in German " Sorge," in French " Sollicitude ") . (CE, 132-33)

The second stage of the analysis of SZ-the reduction of Dasein to its ultimate sense-becomes evident, Rahner observes, when, on the one hand, it is noted that the proper and strict possibility towards which Dasein carries itself is the certain possibility of its own impossibility, of its death, and when, on the other hand, it is noted that to the three aspects of Care correspond the elements of human duration *(la "duree" humaine):* future, present, and past. Duration, here, does not refer to the " time " we calculate, but rather to the foundation of such time in the temporal structure of Dasein as: the stretching-ahead-of -self-towards-its-ownmost-possibili-ty or future (sc. death), from its depenedence on a past into which it has been thrown, realized in the present as a response to the attraction of the future, and the compulsion and con-straint of the past. Rahner concludes, then, that for Heidegger Dasein as Care and as a being essentially towards death, is by its very structure temporal. Dasein is intrinsically finite. (CE, 133-34)

Having outlined the general structure of Heidegger's exist-ential analytic of Desein, Rahner returns to the original question-what is being as such?-and discovers that SZ never directly addresses itself to this question, leaving its answer to a proposed second volume. But although Rahner is unable to

extract the kernel of Heideggerian metaphysics from SZ, he does attempt to draw from it and from indications in WM and WG some" conjectures" about Heidegger's answer to the being question.

Dasein, Rahner observes, is a being-towards-death-a projection out of past and present towards Dasein's future. This projection is not a property of Dasein, but rather is the very act of being-human. The original mode of the projection or anticipatory grasp is not a theoretical knowledge in terms of logic, but rather it is an experience or state-of-disposition (Tallon translates " *etat d'ame* " as " state of soul ") which Heidegger defines as "anxiety." This dispositional state reveals "nothingness" *(neant)* as the ultimate "virtuality" of Dasein, and as that in which Dasein is already engaged. Dasein's transcendence, his passing beyond beings, is a passing to nothingness. Rahner maintains, therefore, that Heidegger appears to identify pure being and pure nothingness. Consequently, all beings as participants in nothingness are necessarily finite. Rahner observes that this view does not seem to allow even the possibility of raising a question about the existence of God. As far as Rahner can tell, Heidegger's ontology offers no support for a pure Being positively superior as such to all finitude. (CE, 134-35)

Although it seems like Heidegger's thought allows no room for the idea of God, Rahner notes that Heidegger, himself, denies that his analysis says anything either for or against the possibility of God. Thus Rahner maintains it is impossible until the completion of his ontology to tell for sure if it will give to metaphysics " a meaning that is either the most radically *atheist* or the most profoundly *religious."* (CE, 137) All we can do, Rahner insists, is note that up till now the existential analytic of Dasein logically seems to be not an ontology but an *Ontochronic* (an expression Rahner attributes to Heidegger himself) **—''** a science which showing that the meaning of all being as such, and, absolutely, the meaning of Being, is nothingness." (CE, 136)

Rahner does not attempt to analyze Heidegger's thought

from the point of view of Christianity, but he does explain a little more fully what he means when he suggests that the ultimate resolution of Heidegger's philosophy will be either most radically atheistic or most profoundly religious. Heidegger's eventual ontology will lay the foundation for atheism if, as Rahner seems to think it is to be feared, the last word of its anthropology is nothingness, for then the last word of the ontology still to come must also be nothingness. On the other hand, Rahner claims that Heidegger's philosophy could lay the groundwork for a profoundly religious view if the analysis of Dasein in its ultimate stage discovers the infinity of the absolute as the first a priori of human transcendence, and if it discovers the true destiny of man in the choice between eternal nothingness and eternal life before God. In this case Heidegger's analysis of man as an historical being, as an essentially "finite creature," and as a temporal being renders possible an attentiveness to Revelation.

> In this case, to jar man loose from the pure idea and cast him into his own existence and history, as Heidegger is doing, would be to prepare him, to make him attentive to the fact-existential, historical-of a divine revelation, would be to open him to "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," to the "Word of Life, seen, heard, touched" by human hands, "Jesus of Nazareth . . . . " (CE, 137)

This description is striking because it serves as a nearly perfect introduction to and crystalization of the philosophy of religion developed in *Hearers of the Word.*[1]

Rahner's aim in *Hearers of the Word* is to lay the foundation for a philosophy of religion faithful to the principles of the Thomistic tradition yet unique in that it raises a question never explicitly posed by St. Thomas. (cf. HW, 33) He suggests that the nature of this philosophy of religion could be most clearly defined by comparing it with theology. It is necessary, therefore, to ask the question about the relationship

[7] This similarity of Rahner's philosophy of religion and his projection of the possible developments of Heidegger's philosophy of Being suggest the value of following the argument of HW in this preliminary delimitation of the essential difference between their philosophies.

of these two sciences. The question of the relationship between sciences, however, is ultimately a question about their common foundation, and that science which serves as foundation for all other sciences and grants them their a priori attitudes and principles-whether or not these principles are self-conscious-is called metaphysics. The question of the relationship between the philosophy of religion and theology is consequently a metaphysical question. Science of any kind, however, is a human activity. Thus, the question of the relationship between the philosophy of religion and theology is ultimately a metaphysical question about the nature of man. It is what, in the previous article, Rahner called a transcendental question. (HW, 3-7)

If the question presented so far is probed deeper, Rahner maintains that a series difficulty will be discovered. "For classical Christian philosophy of religion . . . knowledge of God ... is no static, self-contained science, but a profound element of ontology in general." (HW, 7) But if this is true, then the philosophy of religion as ontology (or the metaphysics of being) is the same as the science in which it finds its ground. The question of the philosophy of religion is thus a question about the "self-establishment of metaphysics." Ultimately, therefore, " the question about the philosophy of religion becomes the question as to why man pursues metaphysics and being, and how human metaphysics can reach up to God." (HW, 8)

If this philosophy of religion is to be truly a " philosophy " and not a" theology" there can be no question of its justifying or explicating a revelation from God. On the other hand, if theology is to be truly "theology" and not "philosophy," then the philosophy of religion cannot a priori reduce revelation to merely what is discovered by reason. To establish itself the philosophy of religion must ask if there is any " reason " to suppose that man is a potential hearer of a divine revelation. The asking of such a question is a purely philosophical venture, but as such it lays the foundation for theology-the actual hearing of the revealed word-by pointing out to man whether or not he should seek such a revealed word in history. Rahner

proposes that, in fact, it can be shown that man by his very nature is a potential hearer of a possible revelation from God in history. (HW, 7-27)

Rahner describes the method which he chooses to achieve this end in terms very similar to those with which he described Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein. Rahner proposes:

> to sketch the outlines of a metaphysical analytic of man with reference to the capacity to hear the word of God which is addressed to man as the revelation of the unknown God allowing the history of man to appear. To put a question metaphysically, however, is to put a *question about being.* (HW, 32)

Rahner's pursuit of this question about the being of man establishes the three propositions of metaphysical anthropology that constitute the essence of his philosophy of religion: 1) that "man is a spirit (a characterization which stamps his whole being as man) and thus has an ear that is open to any word whatsoever that may proceed from the mouth of the Eternal" (HW, 67); 2) "that man is that existent thing who stands in free love before the God of a possible revelation ... (and who) is attentive to the speech or silence of God in the measure in which he opens himself in free love to this message of the speech or silence of the God of revelation" (HW, 108); and 3) that " man is that existent thing who must listen for an historical revelation of God, given in history and possibly in human speech." (HW, 161)

These three propositions and the philosophy of religion which they constitute are based on Rahner's notion of being as that which is revealed to man through a preconceptual, non-thematic grasp, but which at the same time is hidden from man because of his finitude. It is at this level where the essential difference between Rahner and Heidegger emerges, so this is where the present essay will find its focus.

* * *

Rahner begins his analytic for the being of man in a manner that appears to be similar to Heidegger's posing of the ques-

tion about being. Metaphysics asks about the being of tha.t which is. It "enquires into the ultimate reasons, into the final cause of reality ...." (HW, 33) This questioning is unavoidable. "We are compelled to ask: What is the' being' of that which is?" (HW, 34); and it is precisely as men that we are compelled to do so. Rahner develops this notion more fully in *Spirit in the World.*[8] There he observes that man questions, and that this questioning is irreducible because every question presupposes a placing in question. Rahner maintains that man necessarily questions because being in its totality is given to him only as something questionable. For Rahner the ontological implication of the fact that man necessarily questions is the conclusion that man exists as the question about being in its totality. Thus, the question about being as posed by man is the point of departure for metaphysics.

Since nothing can be asked about the totally unknown, Rahner observes that the fact that man poses the question about being attests to an a priori grasp of being in general. Thus Rahner believes that he is able to deduce from man's existence, as "the question about existence," the familiar Thomistic teaching that "human thinking is always accompanied by an unexpressed knowledge of being *[esse]* as the condition of all knowledge of the existing individual." (HW, 36)

Rahner proceeds further to note that being can obviously be questioned only insofar as it is known. From this Rahner deduces the Thomistic position that knowability is the most fundamental note of being. "A thing which is, and the possible object of a cognition, are one and the same, for the being of that which is, is knowability." (HW, 38-39) This implies, Rahner argues, the Thomistic position that "being is knowing and being known in their original unity." (HW, 44) The sense of knowing here is not that of reaching from something inside to something outside but is rather conceived as a presence-to-self.

[8]Cf. Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World,* trans. William Dych (New York, 1968), pp. 57-78. Hereafter SW.

For Rahner, therefore, "the essence of being is the being-present-to-itself of being or the luminosity of being to itself as "subjectivity." (HW, 37-44)

Rahner argues, furthermore, that although man can deduce the unity of being and knowing from the fact of his existence as the question about being, the questionability of being as such-that is to say, the fact that man *has* to raise the question, the fact that he is not absolute self-presence-rules out any form of pantheism or "debased idealism." Man "has being," but is not pure absolute being itself. Man is finite. From this fact Rahner argues to the Thomistic notion that being is " analogous." By this term Rahner means to suggest that the "attribution of being itself is an interiorly variable quantity." (HW, 47) In other words, the degree of self-presence or self-luminosity varies from being to being. A finite being *is,* therefore, only to the degree that it "has being," only to the degree that it has a potentiality for self presence. (HW, 45-52)

But what is this being as such which Rahner conceives as self-luminosity and as analogically attributable to all beings? Furthermore, what is man's relation to being? Rahner suggests that the answers to these question can be discovered by an analysis of the act of judgment. In every judgment a predicate is affirmed of a subject. Furthermore, insofar as the judgment is true, it is itself affirmed of something that is in itself independent of the passing of judgment. By this process man establishes the object of his judgment as something different from and independent of his judgment, and therefore as different from and independent of himself. In this way man constitutes himself as a subject opposed to an object. As subject he is able to return to himself by turning out towards (that is to say, by objectifying) the objects with which he is initially one. It is only through this process that man is able to comprehend himself as a subject who subsists-in-himself and who is free (i.e., of that which stands against him) .

Now the question which Rahner poses is this: what is "the ultimate cause of the possibility of man, in his subsisting-in-himself, taking a position distinct from the things he handles

in conscious thought-judgment"? (HW, 56) He argues that in essence this question is only another side of a more familiar problem in Scholastic philosophy. In every judgment a thing is affirmed as a " this " or a " that." This is also true of human activity considered more generally. Man always deals with this particular thing or that. The ability to take hold of this or that particular thing presupposes the ability to comprehend it under a general concept, that is to say, the ability to elevate the perceptions of the senses to the level of the concept. This is what in Thomistic epistemology is called " abstraction." To ask about the condition of possibility of human subsisting-in-self, therefore, is to ask about the possibility of abstraction. (HW, 53-57)

Rahner describes absraction as the ability to " *loosen away from* " or to detach the " thisness " (in Scholastic terminology the form or quiddity) from any example of a particular " this." " Abstraction is thus the recognition of the non-restriction of the ' thisness ' that is given in the particular sense." (HW, 58) Now in order to elevate the sense impression of a particular "this" to a recognition of a non-restricted "this," the intellect must grasp the particular as "limited." But to recognize this "limit," it must already have grasped it in reference to a " something more." This " something more " is what Rahner means by " being in general." The grasping in terms of this more is what he means by the preconcept (*Vorgrifj).*

> In each particular cognition it [the intellect] always reaches out beyond the particular object, and thus grasps it, not just as its unrelated, dead "thisness," but in its limitation and reference to the totality of all possible objects. . . . The pre-concept is the condition for the possibility of the universal concept, of the abstraction which in turn is what makes possible the objectification of the datum of sense perception and so of conscious subsisting-in-oneself. (HW, 59)

Rahner argues that the object of this *Vorgrifj* cannot be an object like those which are made known through the *Vorgrifj* itself. Thus it would appear that to an extent Rahner's position

is similar to Heidegger's who, as was shown, holds that " Being " is not like beings. It is in the further elaboration of this a priori grasp that Rahner seems to consciously distinguish his position from Heidegger's. As was seen previously, Rahner believed that Heidegger's Dasein as a transcendence to being is essentially a transcendence to nothingness. This alleged notion, as it was elaborated in WM, was based on the argument that negation can only be grounded in a prior comprehension of" nothingness." Here Rahner argues that just the opposite is the case-that the notion of negation is derived through man's Vorgriff of an absolute "having being" and that the concept of non-being is derived from the notion of negation. [9] Why?

Rahner argues that human cognition is related to that which *is*, and not what is-not-at least insofar as all knowledge begins in sense perception. He maintains that, if the knowledge of the limitation of the objects of knowledge can be explained in terms of a *Vorgriff* of being as positive, there is no need to posit a transcendence to nothingness. But, Rahner continues, it has already been shown that beings *are* to the extent that they "have being." They are grasped not in terms of nothing but in terms of a *Vorgriff* of the perfection of pure "having being." Rahner maintains that this can be deduced from the fact of the question of being, from the judgment, and from the freedom of human activity. "To the extent that judgment and free action are necessarily part of man's existence, the pre-concept of being pure and simple in its own intrinsically proper infinitude is part of the fundamental constitution of human existence." (HW, 63) Since Rahner has already ruled out the possibility of pantheism, that being which has being absolutely must be God himself. Thus Rahner claims that:

> God is posited, too, with the same necessity as this pre-concept. He is the thing of which is affirmed absolute "having existence."

[0] I do not mean to suggest that the arguments we considered in *Hearers of the Word* were intended as a direct answer to Heidegger's analysis. Rahner appears to be speaking much more generally. But it also seems that Heidegger's position, as Rahner understands it, is among those which he believes his arguments refute.

It is true that the pre-concept does not present any object at all along with itself. But in this pre-concept (as the necessary and ever already actualized condition for every human cognition and every human action) the existence of an existent thing of absolute "having being" (that is, of God) has already been affirmed if not presented. In the pre-concept the cause of his specific possibility is unknowningly affirmed. (HW, 63-64)

Thus Rahner claims that from the very movement of the human intellect we are able to establish the existence of God.

Granting this, it is not difficult to see why Rahner rejects any metaphysics which claims that negation must be grounded in a transcendence towards nothingness. Because of the *Vorgrijj* of absolute being, the subject is able to perceive finite beings as limited. Negation is thus derived from the comprehension of a " less " or " limit " in terms of a " more " or " full," The concept of non-being is thus also derived from the *Vorgriff* of *esse absolutum.*

Non-being does not precede negation, but the pre-concept relative to the unlimited is in itself already the negation of the finite, to the extent that, as condition for the possibility of its cognition, and through its rising above the finite, it reveals, *eo ipso,* its finitude. The affirmation of the thing that is in itself unlimited is therefore the possibility for negation, and not the other way around. Thus we are not required to assume a transcendence relation to non-being, which, preceding all negation and providing its foundation, would have to disclose the finitude of an existent thing for the first time. Positive unlimitation of the transcendental horizon of human knowledge automatically displays the finitude of all that does not fill up this horizon. (HW, 62)

These analyses lead Rahner to the conclusion that man by nature is a spirit who is able to affirm the existence of God, and furthermore, because of the analogy of being, he has the potentiality for a more extensive knowledge of God. " Man is the absolute receptivity for being pure and simple." It is not possible to pursue Rahner's existential analysis further. In the discussion which follows, he argues that although being is luminous, man's grasp of it is necessarily limited because of his own finitude. He argues, furthermore, that God as absolute

being must be conceived as a free spirit who could reveal more about himself to man if it was his divine will to do so. Because of the very nature of man's receptivity as a composite of body and spirit, the place of such a free revelation would have to be human history and the mode would have to be the sensible word (understood in its broadest meaning as either word or act) . Man, therefore, has a potentiality for "hearing" such an historical word if God speaks. Furthermore, the philosophy of religion can show man his need to look for such a word in history.

Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to summarize. Rahner maintains that Heidegger is essentially a metaphysician concerned with establishing a new, more fundamental ontology through a transcendental analysis of man as the one who necessarily poses the question about being. As far as Rahner can tell, however, Heidegger's analysis seems to lead to the conclusion that man transcends towards nothingness. In *Hearers of the Word* Rahner is also concerned with carrying out an existential analytic of man as the one who necessarily poses the question about being. Like Heidegger he appears to maintain that man is able to raise the question about being because man already has a comprehension of being as such. Like Heidegger he appears to maintain that the being of which man has a pre-comprehension is distinct from all other beings. But unlike Heidegger (as Rahner understands him) , he maintains that the ultimate sense of being is not nothingness but rather God, grasped in the movement of all human affirmation, whether in act or deed, towards pure and absolute "having-being." As such, God constitutes not only the object of human activity, but also more significantly, the condition of its possibility. As a composite of body and spirit man possesses the potentiality *to* receive a further revelation from God if one is given. Man is thus a potential " hearer " of a divine word.

* * *

Rahner's evaluation of Heidegger's ontology in the article discussed and his implicit refutation of Heidegger's alleged

"nihilism" in *Hearers of the Word* presupposes that Heidegger, like Rahner, is asking about "being as such, under its most general and total aspect." It presupposes that "by most general is meant, ultimately the simple fact of being, *esse*, characteristic of every *ens,"* and that " by most total is meant *esse* again as the unifying aspect under which every possible object can be grasped, summed up, and related to its ultimate and unique explanation." (CF, 128) Rahner, therefore, is asking about" beings as beings" or" being as being" *(ens qua ens)* , just as Aristotle and St. Thomas. The difference is that he founds his metaphysics on a transcendental analysis. What is more significant to our discussion is that he presupposes that Heidegger's problematic is, and must be, the same. As Heidegger's thought has developed, however, it has become increasingly clear that his understanding has emerged out of what he believes is a very different question.

In the" Introduction" to WM (written in 1949), Heidegger notes that the science which traditionally has been called metaphysics has always asked about being as beings, or about being (the totality of beings) as being. The asking of this question, as Rahner noted, has led according to Heidegger's analysis to two distinct pursuits. The one seeks to understand, that is to say, to *represent*, that which is common to all beings-their beingness, or in Thomistic terminology *esse.* This study is called "ontology." The other seeks to understand the beingness of being in terms of their cause or sufficient reason-which for Rahner is *esse absolutum* (God) -and it is called "theology." [10] Both questions ask about beings, or in terms which Heidegger would insist are misleading, about finite being. Heidegger argues that he is asking a very different question. He is not asking about being but about Being itself as distinct from beings. Thus it will be maintained here that Heidegger's question about Being (it will be helpful to use a capital" B "to designate Heidegger's "Sein ") is different from Rahner's question about being.

[10] Here " theology " refers to a branch of metaphysics, not to the Church's explication of Revelation.

In *An Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger attempts to introduce the question of Being as he understands it. He maintains there that because metaphysics, in the ordinary sense of the term, is concerned only with questioning beings as beings *(ta physika),* it can be called a "physics." If philosophic thought is to have a solid foundation, however, it is necessary to go beyond questions about being to the question about Being itself *(meta ta physica)* . As he saw it in 1935, "even in the doctrines of being as pure act (Thomas Aquinas), as absolute concept (Hegel), as eternal recurrence of the identical will to power (Nietzsche) , metaphysics has remained unalterably 'physics.'" (EM, 14) Heidegger believes that the question of Being which he asks is not at all the same as the question which metaphysicians through the ages have asked.

Although this position is more obvious in these later works, it has been the direction of his thought from the very beginning. As his problematic has developed it has become clear that it is not a question of Heidegger giving up metaphysics or gradually disengaging himself from the metaphysical understanding of being. Rather, it is a question of a difference, there from the beginning, between his problematic and that of the tradition, gradually becoming more explicit.[11] It is at the level of the very question asked where the difference begins to emerge between Rahner's question about *esse* and Heidegger's question about Being itself.

It is just this difference, however, which is overlooked if the existential analytic of *Dasein* proposed in SZ is interpreted, as Rahner interprets it, as an attempt like those of Kant, Descartes, or any modern metaphysician to put metaphysics on a new foundation. It is true, of course, that in the introduction to SZ Heidegger describes his task as the establishing of a " fundamental ontology" through the *"existential analytic* of *Dasein."* (SZ, 13)[12] He also suggests, however, that " funda-

[11] The analysis here does not wish to deny that there has been a " tum " in Heidegger's thought; but the fact that there has been a "tum " does not mean that his problem has essentially changed. The fundamental question remains the same even though the questions asked have changed.

[12] Italics here and in all following quotes are Heidegger's unless otherwise stated.

mental ontology " is fundamental not because, as Rahner suggests, it bases the knowledge of being on a new foundation or because it asks the question about beings in a new way but because it asks a question which is more original than any such question about beings. The aim of SZ is not to lay the basis for an answer to the question about being, nor to ask the same question in a new way, but rather "... to work out the question of Being ..." itself. (SZ, I) Thus, when he says further that " our provisional aim is the interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being," (SZ, I) this should be understood to suggest not only that " time " will help to answer the question of Being but primarily and more significantly that time will indicate the very sense of the question itself. It is easy to assume that Heidegger is only polemicizing against Neo-Kantains when he says that it is necessary " to raise anew *the question of the meaning of Being."* (SZ, I) It becomes clear as he progresses, however, that he is speaking to the whole metaphysical tradition.

What are the indications of this thesis in SZ-the principal work that Rahner considered in his essay? In the first place, Heidegger speaks of the need for a " destruction of ontology " and the "history of ontology." (SZ, I9-27) He explains that the need for destruction " is essentially bound up with the way the question of Being is formulated ...." (SZ, 23) Is it to be supposed that Heidegger intends a complete denial of the philosophic past? No, for he insists that the aim of the destruction is positive, as well as negative, and that it can achieve this aim only if it starts within the history of thought. But how begin from a destruction? What is the aim of the destruction? He seems to hint-and seen from the perspective of Heidegger's later works it is a hint difficult to miss-that fundamental ontology will begin from a rediscovery of an original beginning though a destruction of what has followed from it.

> . . . taking *the question of Being as our clue,* we are to *destroy* the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at

those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being-the ways which have guided us ever since. (SZ, 22)

In the pages which follow Heidegger states that this forgottenness of Being applies alike to the Greeks, the Scholastics, Decartes, Kant, and Hegel. Now Rahner had maintained that Heidegger wanted to go beyond the traditional starting point of Metaphysics because he sought a foundation for ontology which did not conceive " being " beforehand in terms of logic. This is true, but only half true. Heidegger is seeking not merely a new foundation but is seeking a new foundation in the asking of a new question. It is because a new question is asked that his ontology is more fundamental.

But how precisely is the question of Being as Heidegger understands it different from the metaphysician's notion of being? What is the meaning of the word "Being" in the phrase" the question of Being"? The problem which the metaphysician confronts with SZ, as Rahner noted, is that Heidegger never gets to the task of defining the sense of Being-at least from a metaphysical point of view. What then can be discerned about the question of Being from the SZ analysis?

For one thing, it has already been noted that to ask for a metaphysical definition, or even the grounds for one, from SZ is apparently contrary to Heidegger's intention. It seems that what ought to be sought is Heidegger's understanding of how the question should be asked. How? He maintains that the clue to how will be discovered, as Rahner observed, by examining Dasein, the place where the question is asked, and seeing in this examination that " time " is the ultimate transcendental horizon for the question of Being. The existential analytic of Dasein could, then, be called " transcendental " but not in the sense that Rahner gives to the term. In seeking an understanding of Dasein's comprehension of Being Heidegger is proposing to lay the basis for a question which he maintains that Kant never posed. Heidegger wants it to be understood that the question which guides him has been ignored and forgotten in metaphysics and ontology. The term of that question-Being

-should not be understood in terms of the history of philosophy and so not as a "transcendental philosophy" in the traditional sense. Rahner's contention that Heidegger is essentially a transcendental philosopher is thus very misleading if not altogether incorrect.

What, then, does Heidegger reveal about the term of his inquiry in SZ? First, he tells us that Being is "that which determines beings as beings, that on the basis of which beings are already understood ...." (SZ, 6) Although-or perhaps because-Being is that which determines beings and is common to them all, Heidegger insists that Being is not a being or in any way like beings.

> The Being of beings "is" not itself a being. If we are to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophic step consists in not *p:u86v nva* in not "telling a story"-that is to say, in not defining beings as beings by tracing them back in their origin to some other beings, as if Being had the character of some possible being. (SZ, 6)

Heidegger makes the same point when he says:

> Being as the basic theme of philosophy is no class or genus of beings, yet it pertains to every being. Its "universality" is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every being and every character which a being may possess. *Being is the transcendens pure and simple.* (SZ, 38)

This transcending, however, is not an abstraction, nor does Heidegger propose to seek it through abstraction. Rather, he intends to "work out the question of the meaning of *Being* and to do so concretely." (SZ, I)

A further indication of what Heidegger intends to interrogate in the question about Being can be found in his analysis of the word "phenomenology." The term originates from two Greek words: *cf>avvofLEvov* and Heidegger maintains that *cf>avvOfLEVov* signifies that which shows itself in itself or manifests itself as itself. "Accordingly the *c/>atvofLEVa* or 'phenomena' are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light-what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with *Ttl. oVTa* (beings)." (SZ, 28) For Heidegger, however, this

"showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered." (SZ, 31) Heidegger maintains that the real meaning of the second term, A.Oyos-, has been covered up by later interpretations of it as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground or relationship. He argues that the word originally meant to make manifest what one is talking about. It is a " letting something be seen." Phenomenology thus means to let be manifest or un-hidden that which manifests itself. What then does phenomenology let be seen? Heidegger argues that:

> Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does *not* show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden,* in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. (SZ, 35)

What can this something be? Heidegger argues that it is Being.

> Yet that which remains *hidden* in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets *covered up* again, or which shows itself only "in disguise," is not just this or that, but rather the Being of beings, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can be cove.red up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no questions arise about it or about its meaning. (SZ, 60)

This analysis of the meaning of " phenomenology " is not meant merely as a digression into the nature of Heidegger's methodology. Rather it intends to reveal a basic characteristic of Heidegger's understanding of Being which gets developed already in his conception of phenomenology as the only adequate way to do fundamental ontology. That which shows itself is the Being of beings. Being as a "showing-itself is not just any showing itself." It is not just something like appearing. Being is the foundation of any kind of appearing at all. It underlies all beings. Behind this showing-itself (Being), there is nothing else. Yet it is the character of this showing-itself, that it can be hidden and forgotten while one gazes on the beings it lets be manifest. (SZ, 36-37)

Heidegger is thus seeking the meaning of the Being of beings.

Although Being appears to be correlative with the beings which it manifests., it is also distinct from them. It is not in any sense a being, or like beings. For this reason one cannot speak about Being in any way like one would speak about beings. Nor can Being be thought of as proceeding from a being. It is a " pure transcending " which is beyond beings. But note, Heidegger does not say Being is a transcendent (noun), for example, a transcendent Being. He rejects as missing the issue any question which like the one posed by Rahner seeks to trace beings to a cause (i.e., God). This is why Heidegger insists that his thought does not speak either for or against the existence of God. From the perspective of his question the problem of God does not arise. Since Rahner, however does not note the difference between his question (the metaphysical question) and Heidegger's, he is not able to see how Heidegger can claim that the analysis has not prejudged the God issue. Heidegger, however, is not seeking to determine the source of beings, but the meaning of Being itself. Being is that manifesting by which beings are " present " to Dasein. Although Being manifests itself in its manifesting of beings, in the coming-to-presence of beings, it remains itself concealed. It remains itself a manifesting, not a manifested. Being needs therefore, to be brought from concealment to non-concealment. The analysis of Dasein as the place where Being is revealed, and also forgotten, shows that this comprehension takes place through the temporal structure of Dasein and thus suggests that " time " is the clue or horizon through which the meaning of Being can be questioned. SZ has not thought Being, however, merely by giving this clue or discovering this horizon. Heidegger concludes his analysis insisting that " the dispute in regard to the interpretation of Being cannot be straightened out, *because it has not even been begun."* (SZ, 437)

It can be surmised from this that Heidegger would argue that the trouble with Rahner's evaluation of SZ is that it has not even recognized the question. It completely misses the point.

Rahner's principle criticism of Heidegger, however, is not based on the analyses of SZ so much as on the arguments of

WM. According to Rahner the conclusion of these arguments seems to be that the ultimate sense of being is " nothingness." This criticism again misses the real issue. It is true that in WM Heidegger proposes to understand Being in terms of the: problem of" Nothing" *(Nichts).* Heidegger's use of this term, however, is carefully nuanced and should not be equated with some sort of metaphysical " nothingness."

WM was originally written as a lecture for an audience composed mostly of scientists. It proposed to introduce a question which the sciences as such do not consider, namely, the metaphysical question. It must be noted from the start, however, that Heidegger is defining metaphysics as he conceives it, not as it has been conceived historically.

Heidegger maintains that the sciences consider that which-is and nothing more. He claims that the " and *nothing* more " is intrinsic to the sciences' conception of their subject matter. But how conceive this Nothing without representing it as some thing? The question, "What is Nothing?" seems to demand the illogical reply that, "Nothing is this or that thing," when it is known perfectly well that Nothing is not any thing. To avoid this" logical" problem Heidegger suggest an examination of the off-the-cuff definition of Nothing as the negation of the totality-of-what-is. This could perhaps be reasonably maintained if the totality-of-what-is could be known or conceived in itself, but it cannot. Thus another impass has been reached. It is not an inescapable impass. Even though the whole of what-is in its totality is not accessible in itself, " it is equally certain that we find ourselves placed in the midst of what-is and that this is somehow revealed in totality." (WM,333) How is it revealed? Recalling the analysis of SZ, Heidegger maintains that the totality is grasped on the level of " disposition," and that this grasp is revealed in moods such as boredom or the joy felt in the presence of a loved one. This dispositional awareness constitutes an essential mode of Dasein's being-in-the-world. As Rahner noted, it is not just a matter of feeling but the ground for the possibility of any knowledge of beings. Unfortunately this awareness of the totality-of-what-is still does

not tell anything about Nothing, for it is a revelation of and absorption in the totality-of-what-is. It appears to exclude any revelation of the opposite, that which absolutely is not, namely, Nothing. Heidegger maintains, however, that there are moods, although perhaps rare, which reveal Nothing itself. Such is the mood of profound dread *(Angst).* Heidegger's description of this mood is classic.

> In dread, as we say, "one feels something uncanny." ·what is this "something" (es) and this "one"? We are unable to say what gives " one " the, uncanny feeling. One just feels it generally (im *Ganzen).* All things and we with them, sink into a sort of indifference. But not in the sense that everything simply disappears; rather, in the very act of drawing away from us everything turns towards us. This withdrawal of what-is-in-totality, which the,n crowds round us in dread, this is what oppresses us. There is nothing to hold on to. The only thing that remains and overwhelms us whilst what-is slips away, is this "nothing."
>
> Dread reveals Nothing .
>
> . . . Dread hold us in suspense because it makes what-is-in-totality slip away from us. (WM, 336)

> The experience of dread witnesses, then, what Heidegger describes most evocatively as the failure of all " ' Is '-saying (' *Ist'-Sagen)* ." (WM, 336)

Heidegger concludes from this analysis that negation does not precede or ground the grasp of Nothing, but on the contrary, the grasp of Nothing precedes and grounds negation. Nothing is revealed but not as any thing, and not as the negation of any or even all things. This grasp of Nothing is not just an interesting but irrelevant fact. Science, our knowledge of what-is, knows what-is only in distinction from what-is-not (i.e., Non-being or No-thing). Similarly, SZ and KM argued that knowledge of beings (what-is) is possible only because Dasein can pass beyond that which-is. What is the term of this passing beyond? It is not any thing, not what-is-in-totality, but rather Nothing-that is to say, no thing. Nothing turns out to be one with Being as such. It is to Being as not any thing that Dasein transcends, and it is Being as Nothing which makes the revelation of what-is possible.

> Nothing is neither an object nor anything that" is" at all. Nothing occurs neithe.r by itself nor "apart from" what-is, as a sort of adjunct. Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence. (WM, 340)

Here is the essential difference between Rahner's notion of Being and Heidegger's. Rahner maintains that the subject can know beings only because it sees them within the horizon of a " more." This seeing within the horizon of a more is possible because the subject already grasps (though non-thematically) absolute being in the direction of all human thought and activity. He claims, therefore, that negation and the concept of non-being are derived from this grasp of the limited as limited (i.e., partially negated) in terms of absolute being. What is most important is that he claims that these observations constitute the basis for a proof of God's existence.

Heidegger, on the other hand, does not maintain as Rahner suggests that Dasein transcends toward nothingness. Rather, he argues that Dasein transcends (the term is misleading) to Being as no thing. Heidegger claims that a metaphysical analysis such as Rahner's leaves unasked the question about the meaning of Being as different from beings and as that " different " which makes the revelation of beings possible. Rahner had argued that the knowledge of beings demands as its condition of possibility a *Vorgriff* of an absolute being. Heidegger maintains to the contrary, not that knowledge of beings must be explained by nothingness but that it can be explained sufficiently only by the recognition that Dasein grasps Being as different from beings. In the later works Heidegger comes to the realization (the famous "tum") that it is not just that Dasein grasps Being as different from beings but rather that Dasein itself is grasped-grasped in the " event " of the ontological difference. Still it is the ontological difference which opens up the world of beings and Being to Dasein.

Rahner uses the term "ontological difference" in *Hearers of the Word,* and in *The Thomist Spectrum* Helen John claims

that Rahner is aware of the ontological difference.[13] It appears from what has been seen here, however, that in a metaphysical context that term must have a very different meaning than Heidegger gives it. Heidegger would argue that to think the meaning of this difference in terms of being-even in terms of a supreme absolute having-being-is an extrapolation which has avoided the real question that needs asking. Such thinking represents Being as a being instead of probing the meaning of Being as such. It assumes an answer to the question which Heidegger wants to pose. WM, therefore, does not propose that man transcends toward nothingness. Rather it suggests that before we ask about the possibility of Dasein transcending to something, we ought first to ask what is Being as such, as different from beings. The reflection on Non-being or Nothing was intended, like the analysis of Dasein in SZ, to serve as an introduction to the question about Being as Heidegger understands it. How, then, phrase the ground question of metaphsics? Heidegger suggests the formula: "Why is there any being at all-why not far rather nothing? " (WM, 345)

The implications of this formula are developed in *An Introducticm to Metaphysics.* It should be clear by now that for Heidegger the phrase "rather than nothing" is not a mere explication of the question, "Why are there beings?" Rather, it indicates that the question asked is *not* a question about beings. It is a question about Being as such, for it " remains unclear what is to be thought under the name' Being.'" (EM, 26) Heidegger claims that " here we are asking about something which we barely grasp, which is scarcely more than the sound of a word for us . . . . " (EM, 27) Intrinsic, then, to the question "Why are there beings rather than nothing?" is the question "How does it stand with Being? " It is "indispensable that we make it clear from the very outset how it stands at present with Being and with our understanding of Being." (EM, 27) In asking this question Heidegger does not propose to define Being, for, as he insisted even in SZ, Being

[18] Helen James John, *The Thomist Spectrum* (New York, 1966), p. 168.

is not a thing and therefore cannot be defined. Rather, he claims that the question "How does it stand with Being?" seeks to rediscover for its own what the word "Being" says. It does not seek meaning in a statement but in a question and in a questioning attitude, through which Heidegger hopes to recapture or retrieve the beginning of our "historical-spiritual existence." (EM, 32) Heidegger insists again that "fundamental ontology " in SZ did not designate a branch of philosophy which deals only with a doctrine about beings (i.e., their cause and nature) but rather signified "the endeavor to make Being manifest itself, and to do so by the question ' how does it stand with Being?' (and not with beings as such)." (EM, 34) Heidegger maintains that the very asking of this question is the only way to experience the sense of Being. In asking it Being is manifested even though in a way which is at once both totally indeterminate and highly determinate. (cf. EM, 60) The question of Being, therefore, does not seek something which we know, or can know-except by questionmg.

> The true problem is what we do not know and what, insofar as we know it *authentically,* namely *as* a problem, we know only *questioningly.*
>
> To know how to que,stion means to know how to wait, even a whole lifetime. But an age which regards only what goes fast and can be clutched with both hands looks on questioning as " remote from reality" and as something that does not pay, whose benefits cannot be numbere,d. But the essential is not number. . . . (EM, 172)

This last statement perhaps raises more questions than it answers. How does one know Being questioningly? How does one think Being as such, that is to say, as different from beings? It is just this question that focuses Heidegger's reflection in his later work, and it is in reference to this question that the sense of " hearing " or " attending " is developed. A thorough and adequate examination of this problem would demand more attention than it is possible to give it here, but some idea of what sense "hearing" can have in regard to Heidegger's

question of Being can be indicated by pursuing the analysis of EM a little further.

In Rahner's summary of Heidegger's thought it was observed that Heidegger opposes any consideration of the Being question in terms of *logic.* In our analysis of WM it was shown that the reason Heidegger opposes the domination of the question of Being by logic is that logic as understood today is a science which deals with the consideration of beings. In the third section of the fourth chapter of EM Heidegger considers the relation of Being and thought. In that discussion it becomes clear that Heidegger opposes logic because there is a more primary sense of which is the ground of what we now understand by the term. This more primary sense of *logos* is what ought *to* determine our thought. In the development of this notion the sense of " hearing " is presented.

Heidegger maintains that logic as the science of thought is today understood as the science of statements. Thinking, in this view therefore, is determined by the statement. *Logos* means " word " or " discourse " and *legein* means " to speak," as in *dialogue* or *monologue.* Heidegger argues, however, that for the Greeks *logos* originally meant " to gather" or " to collect." Heidegger cites examples from Homer and Heraclitus to illustrate his point and claims that the sense of these passages can be understood only if we understand *logos* as originally denoting the collecting collectedness of Being as that which manifests beings.

> *Logos* characterizes Being in a new and yet old respect: that which is, which stands straight and distinct in itself, is at the same time gathered togetherness in itself and by itse,lf, and maintains itself in such togetherness. (EM, 110)

Logos is thus, according to Heidegger, originally understood as Being itself insofar as it is the gathering together of all that is. *"Logos* here signifies neither meaning nor word nor doctrine, and surely not' meaning of a doctrine'; it means: the original collecting collectedness which is in itself permanently dominant." (EM, 108)

Heidegger notes that there is one text, however, which seems to contradict his theory. In Fragment *50* a connection is made between *logos* and " hearing " which seems to suggest that *logos* is something " audible" (i.e., a word or speech) : "If you have heard not me but the *logos,* then it is wise to say accordingly: all is one." (EM, 108) Heidegger argues that Heraclitus is not referring here to a hearing of " words " but to a hearing or attending to that which makes words possible, namely, an attending to Being itself. Only in this way can it be explained why men are described by Heraclitus as uncomprehending when they confront the *logos.* Heidegger maintains that properly understood Fragment *50* says "do not attach importance to words but heed the *logos."* For Heidegger, then, " True hearing has nothing to do with ear and mouth, but means to follow the *logos* and what it is, namely, the collectedness of beings itself." (EM, 109)

Thus by " hearing " Heidegger once again refers us to the Being question. There can be true speaking and hearing only in an attending to Being itself. As Heidegger sees it, this attending is in fact the origin of the definition of man in terms of *logos.* The definition is not accomplished by "seizing upon any attributes in the living creature called ' man ' as opposed to other living creatures." Rather " being-human is *logos,* the gathering and apprehending of the Being of beings: it is the happening of that strangest of all, in whom through violence, through acts of power ... , the overpowering is made manifest and made to stand." (EM, 143) "Hearing" for Heidegger, therefore, defines the essence of man as " existence," as the place where Being is manifested and is thus quite different from Rahner's notion of man as a "hearer."

* * *

It is unfortunate that Heidegger's notion of the type of thought proper to Being cannot be pursued further. [14] This

[14] See William J. Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague, 1963), to which the thesis presented here is much indebted.

essay, however, was meant only as a preliminary delimitation of the essential difference between Rahner's thought and Heidegger's, and this aim has been reached. It is at the very level of the question asked that their philosophies confront each other. It seems necessary to stress that this difference is prior to, although not separate from, the question of methodology. I say this because Thomists who attempt to evaluate Heidegger's philosophy often seem to suggest that the real difference between their metaphysics and Heidegger's phenomenology is that the latter, because of the limitations of his method, cannot pursue the question of being as far as the metaphysician can. This interpretation seems to imply that the limitations of this methodology are due primarily to epistemological presuppositions. Rahner, for example, does not seem to feel that there is any reason why, if he wanted, Heidegger could not advance his thought beyond fundamental ontology to the question of God-which, of course, is vvhat Rahner does as a follower of Aquinas. But this interpretation presupposes that, although Heidegger's method is different, his question is the same.

It has been shown here, however, that the question is not the same-or at least Heidegger does not believe it is the same. The question of Being as Heidegger experiences it is a question about Being as such. It is a question about that " manifesting " by which beings are manifest. It is not a question of representing the "beingness" of beings either in terms of what is common to them or in terms of the being (absolute or otherwise) that is their cause. In fact, the question of Being is not a question of representing any thing. It is a question about that which is not a being, which cannot be thought (represented) as a being, but which nevertheless is manifested as the manifesting of beings. It is a question, which as far as we have followed it here, finds its resolution in the questioning itseif-man *attending* to Being. If this is true, Heidegger's notion of Being is not so much determined by his method, as his method is determined by the question itself. Heidegger does not make the metaphysical move beyond Being to God, because he

believes that such a move originates from a radical misunderstanding of Being.

Does this mean that, if one accepts Heidegger's analysis, one must forsake the problem of God and consequently the philosophy of religion? Although it seems clear that one would have to forsake the metaphysical " God " and the philosophy of religion as Rahner understands it, it is not at all clear to me that one would have to forsake either God or theology, although both would have to be thought through at a much more fundamental level.

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WILLIAM JAMES: FACTS, FAITH, AND PROMISE

ONE OF THE CENTRAL criticisms of the empirical tradition is that it cuts the heart and spirit out of man and sorrowfully limits him to the starkly cold realm of facticity. Empiricism, say its critics, radically limits man to the world of objective facts and dogmatically asserts that the only things which exist are those things of a material and immediately knowable nature. Those things that are not knowable to science or to some form of objective analysis or measurement simply do not exist. Within such a perspective such questions as God, the reality of the soul, and the concept of infinity are immediately denied as being *de facto* impossible. While this criticism may be true of a number of empiricists, there are highly influential exceptions, among whom is William James. Although James was an avowed spokesmen of pragmatism and radical empiricism, he was never willing to absolutely limit man's perspective of reality to the immediate facts of experience. James contended that facts are simply not enough and that man can out-strip the bald facts of experience through the actualization of his willing nature or personal commitments of faith.

Early in his career James discovered what he felt to be the proper vehicle for escaping the limitations of a radically empirical world view through his readings of the French philosopher Charles Renouvier. "I think that yesterday (April 29, 1870) was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's second 'Essais' and see no reason why his definition of Free Will-' the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts '-need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present-until next year-that it is no illusion. My first acl:

of free will shall be to believe in free will." [1] By accepting the reality of faith, belief, and/or free will James freed himself from the " Bayblonian Captivity " of " brute facts " and opened himself to the possibility of fulfilling his existential desires and religious needs. It is my contention that, for James, the *fiat* of faith became the main ingredient for all adjudications that man makes in the fields of philosophy, science, daily living, and, most importantly, religion.

The burden of this study shall be an attempt to show how faith pervades the various sectors of James's over-all thought, especially in regard to religion. I shall attempt to specify all those factors which go into each personal act of faith in regard to the various circumstances in which faith acts are necessitated. By so doing I hope to free James from the usual pejoratives associated with the empirical tradition. I also hope to show that Professor James was not merely a spokesman for " popular pragmatism" who was only interested in the "cash value" of men's individual and immediate actions but that James was a highly refined philosopher whose sensitivities also included the ultimate goals and morals needs of all men.

* * * *

Let us begin our investigation of the doctrine of "free will" or the " gospel of belief or faith" by defining the terms " will," "belief," and "faith." First of all, by the term "will" James does not wish to indicate a specifically definable organ of the body or a section of the brain. The will is a generic term which expresses the volitional, active, or selective nature of man. The will is man's natural ability to choose or select between two or more alternatives. Thus, " to will " means to " act " or " choose " between a this or a that. In a very real sense, then, "to will" is to "act" on a singular "commitment" between a plurality of possible options; or another way of expressing it would be to say that the will is man's power or faculty of de-

[1] Wm. James, *The Letters of William James*, ed. by Henry James, III (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., pp. 147, 148.

liberate choice and action. By the term " belief " James meant an individual's consent or assent to the existence, reality, or truth of a specific something, somewhere, rather than something-else. Belief is an aspect of our active nature, which like will is interested in the acceptance or rejection of a this or a that.[2] For James, belief in a particular subject matter, hypothesis, or situation means a man's willingness to act irrevocably upon it to the exclusion of its contradictory ideas, hypotheses, or situations.[3] In *The Principles of Psychology* James accepts the Scottish psychologist, Alexander Bain' s statement that "in its essential character, belief is a phase of our active nature-otherwise called the will."[4] In other words, James felt that the concepts of brief and will are so closely tied together that in actuality belief served as the trigger to man's will and powers of active choice; that action, itself, and the will to act are the end results of a man's belief. James later goes one step beyond this by stating that will and belief are not merely closely allied but that they are, in fact, "two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon."[5] In short, both operations are acts of specific and deliberate choice in conjunction with the alternatives available; therefore, to believe is to act or to believe is to will to act: all deliberate actions are guided by our beliefs.

Building on the insights he gathered from Renouvier and Bain James went on to develop his own understanding of the term "faith." " Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; as the test of belief is the willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance. It is, in fact, the same moral quality which we call courage in practical affairs . . . . "[6] What is important

[2] Cf., Wm. James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.), Vol. II, p. 283.

[3] Cf., Wm. James, *The Will to Believe* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.), p. 3, (Hereafter: *WTB).*

[4] *The Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II, p. 296.

[5] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, p. 321.

[6] *WTB,* p. 90.

to notice in this definition of faith is James's commitment to action. That is to say, faith does not merely mean intellectual acceptance or just *saying* that one has faith in this or that; faith means active engagement or a willingness to act, especially under conditions of risk in ways dictated by the meaning of the particular act of faith in question. At its face value James's definition of faith in using the term "belief" seems clumsy. However, I believe that this clumsiness can be resolved if we are willing to accept the following interpretation. The notions of faith and belief are so interrelated and intertwined that they not only serve as synonyms for each other but are, in fact, one and the same thing. I base this statement on James's own pragmatic theory of truth which states that, if no practical differences can be found between two alternative positions or terms before us, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing. That is, if each term's respective consequences are the same, then the terms mean literally the same thing.[7] Is this not the case between the terms faith and belief? Both terms refer to a specific and deliberate choice between a this or a that; both terms suggest that one's *choice* should then be implemented by specific actions in regards to that choice. If this is the case, then, the dispute or problematics of the situation is idle and meaningless. Moreover, since faith and belief mean pragmatically the same thing and since belief and will are essentially the same psychological acts, I submit that all three terms refer to one and the same happening or occurence and, therefore, can be used in a synonymous fashion. Furthermore, these three terms are also synonymous with the expression free will. Again this identification is well warranted because, pragmatically speaking, one cannot identify any essential difference between an act of free will, a commitment of faith, or an act of belief. In other words, an act of free will is the actual manifestation of a faith commitment or an act of belief which chooses to accept as true one particular statement, thought, or thing when others are possible. Another more Jamesian way of ex-

[7] Cf., Wm. James, *Pragmatism* (Clevland and New York: Meridian Books, 1968), pp. 4ft-48.

pressing this same point would be: Free Will-is the specific acceptance or belief in a thought because I deliberately choose to when I might have accepted or chosen other thoughts or alternatives. Taking all of this into consideration, I do not believe I am bastardizing the spirit or the letter of James's own words by suggesting that what James means by a man's will, free will, faith and/or belief ultimately and only refers to each man's ability and right to accept as true any aspect of reality, which does not immediately confute reality, on the strength of his own personal desires or needs.

* * * *

In all of Professor James's work and writings on the question of faith or free will his purpose was always and only to establish the reality of the act of faith and not the reality of the particular facts of faith. Professor R. B. Perry helps to substantiate this thesis when he pointed out that James wrote *The Will to Believe* in an attempt to justify belief and not for the purpose of trying to convince us that God exists.[9] James stated that faith is an essential ingredient of our mental make-up.[10] In fact, he stated that faith is one of mankind's inalienable birth-rights[11] and that the only escape from the powers of faith is mental nullity.[12] He suggested that we cannot live or think at all without some degree of faith; that in the total game of life we stake our persons often and regularly on commitments of faith. James accepted the proposition that faith is one of man's basic abilities; that man's freedom to choose the attitude he takes toward his own fate *may not* change the fate but it will greatly change the man! Certainly, we are all born of woman, struggle through various stages of growth and ulti-

[8] Cf., George Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York: George Braziller, 1955), pp. 45, 46.

[9] Cf., Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William JamefS* (Briefer Version), (New York and Evanston: Harper Torch Books), p. *215.*

[10] Cf., *WTB,* p. 91.

[11] Cf., Wm. James, *Some ProblemB of Philosophy* (New York: Longmons, Green and Co., 1940), p. *225.*

[12] Cf., *WTB,* p. 93.

mately die; what we think about and believe in will not change these brute facts. However, our thoughts and beliefs will vastly change how we negotiate these three-score and ten. Clearly, James was convinced that it was not only pragmatically efficient but clinically sound for a man to ultilize his powers of belief; he was totally committed to the proposition that each individual at his own risk has a right to believe in any hypothesis that is alive enough to tempt his wil[13] For him, faith, like life, is a gamble. Therefore, he felt that each man can either doubt, believe, or deny as he sees fit because he runs his own risk, and he has the natural right to choose which one it shall be.[14] Each man must act as he thinks best and if he is wrong, so much the worse for him.[15]

For many people, *The Will to Believe* has been taken to mean that you not only can, but that you should, believe anything you care to believe and that, with regard to anything you desire to be true, you can force yourself to believe it to be true against all incoming evidence if only your will is strong enough. This is simply not the case at all. James placed clear limitations on our right to believe. It is only under certain well-defined conditions that the will or right to believe becomes operative at all. James never intended this doctrine to serve as a blanket policy covering all occasions, and he never suggested that it gives us an unlimited license which entitles us to determine truth as we so see fit even in the face of evidence to the contrary. In other words, James's formal and intended definition of faith should not be confused with the negativity and pure subjectivism of the age-old school boy dictum: " Faith is when you believe something that you know ain't true." [16] James maintained that the definition of faith is a positive assertion based not on mere blind trust but on warranted or at least hypothetical possibility: i. e., " Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still *theoretically possible."* The key term in this phrase is the word " possible." In fact, the basic premise underlying James's assertion that

[13] Cf., *ibid.,* p.
[14] Cf., *ibid.,* pp. 94, *95,* (Note) .
[15] Cf., *ibid.,* pp. 30, 31.
[16] *Ibid.,* p.

man has the right to choose or believe is the brute reality that the world continuously offers each man the possibility of acting in many diverse ways. In other words, in a world where possibilities exist, belief is not only justified but necessary.

Professor James suggested that every student of philosophy is all too painfully aware of the myriad of possibilities and choices that the actual world and the academic community are constantly placing before him. A quick look at the contradictory opinions which exist about the same topics helps to give a picture of the range of the problem and leads one to believe that we can find no proposition ever regarded by anyone as evidently certain, that has not either been called a falsehood or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by someone else: the world is rational through and through -vs- its existence is one ultimate brute fact; there is a personal God -vs- a personal God is inconceivable; there is an extra-mental physical world immediately known to the mind -vs- the mind only knows its own ideas; a moral imperative exists -vs- obligation is only the resultant of desires; there is an endless chain of causes -vs- there is only an absolute first cause; there is this -vs- there is that; etc.[17] All of this serves to indicate James's belief that the actual facts of experience, pure reason, and logic are sometimes insufficient in themselves to mitigate and explain the occurrences and happenings of reality. Reason or facts may be lacking on three separate accounts: 1) the given evidence whether-rational or factual is insufficient, i.e., it does not take us far enough to warrant a decision; 2) the evidence as presented is incomplete, i.e., all the facts are not in yet; 3) finally, it is also possible that the mind simply cannot grasp the evidence presented to it, i.e., the intellect even with truth directly in its grasp may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be true or not![18] *In concreto* what James was saying is that because of natural limitations of reason and fact very often the actions and activities of men's lives are triggered or inaugurated by something other than our intellectual nature. James called

[17] Cf., *ibid.,* p. 16.

[18] Cf., *ibid.,* p. 16.

the non-rational aspect of the human character man's passional nature, and he stated that " our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide on options between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances ' do not decide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision,-just like deciding yes or no,-and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth." [19] In lieu of this, what James is implying is that man does not merely have a " will to believe," which is in effect a " right to believe," but in a very real existential sense, taking into consideration the laws of the mind and the laws of experimental science, man has a "need to believe." For James, man cannot live or think at all without some faith in the various hypotheses concerning reality. [20] Without the powers of belief, based on at least warranted assertability, man is led to the edge of the slope, at the bottom of which lies pyrrhonistic skepticism, absolute pessimism, and intellectual suicide. [21]

In the final analysis, said James, not *all* things are available to the laws of logic, nor are they knowable to the laws of science. It is true that in the last three hundred years science has mushroomed, but what we know now is but the minutest glimpse of what the universe will prove to be when adequately understood. In other words, our knowledge and our science is but a drop and our ignorance is a sea, therefore, man must oftentimes base his decisions on the subjective propensities of his personal feelings and desires. [22] When reason and facts break down, a man's temperament is the tyrannical and controlling force which determines all faith options and belief commitments.23 Human passions, he said, are often stronger than technical rules, [24] and when all else fails, pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we form our opinions, philosophical and otherwise. [25] James suggests that no matter

[19] *Ibid.,* p. **11.**
[20] Cf., *ibid.,* p. *95.*
[21] Cf., *ibid.,* p. 39.
[22] Cf., *ibid.,* p. 54.
[23] Cf., *ibid.,* pp.
[24] Cf., *ibid.,* p.
[25] Cf., *ibid.,* p.

how undignified and unacademic it might sound, the whole history of man's opinions and ideas are to a great extent passional decisions and judgments based on a certain clash of human temperaments. Each man's temperament loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe. Men *trust* their temperaments, and they seek a representation of reality that suits them. Each man feels that men of the opposite temper are out of key with the real character of the world.[26] The diversity in man's active impulses, said James, can be easily examplified by suggesting that a philosophy fit for Bismarck obviously will not be fit for acceptance by a valetudinarian poet.[27] By reason of Bismarck's postulates of faith or rationality (i.e., choices or active decisions) he perceives the world to belong to the strong, and a world in which cold steel and strength determines all. On the other hand, the poet, by his postulates of rationality, perceives reality to be quiet, weak, and in poor health.[28]

In the introduction to *The Will to Believe* James adamantly denies that he can be accused of preaching the use of blind or reckless faith. His intended purpose from the very beginning was to preach the right of man to indulge his personal faith when he felt it was warranted. He agreed that at best this was a risky business and that there was no sure or definite method of always attaining truth by this means. However, he said, we must expose ourselves to the dangers and try to steer the middle ground between believing too much and believing too

•• Cf., *Pragmatism,* p. 19.

•• Cf., *WTB,* pp. 88, 89.

•• James's argument concerning the tyrannical character of our temperament is based on two fundamental suppositions: " first, when we make theories about the world and discuss them one with another, we do so in order to attain a conception of things which shall give us subjective satisfaction; and second, if there be two conceptions, and the one seems to us, on the whole, more rational (i.e., more suited to our needs) than the other, we are entitled to suppose that the more rational one is the truer of the two." *(WTB,* p. 146) In other words, each individual accepts as true oniy those theories, ideas, or philosophies which not only account satisfactorily for his sensible needs and experiences but which also appeal most urgently to his aesthetic, emotional, and active needs.

little. It simply does not follow, said James, that because faith can be reckless that faith commitments should never be trusted or never be indulged in. He believed that there are certain safeguards, which if followed closely, help to minimize the irresponsibility of faith and help to give it real credibility and import in our lives.[29] First of all, he suggests that we give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be proposed to our belief; furthermore, he stated, that, just as electricians speak of live and dead wires, let us refer to any hypothesis as either live or dead. Very simply, a live hypothesis is one which appears as a real possibility to whom it is proposed. James maintained that the aliveness or deadness of any given hypothesis is not an intrinsic property of the hypothesis but exists only in relationship to the individual thinker. That is to say, the acceptance of every hypothesis is a purely subjective affair. Secondly, he suggested that we call the decision between two hypotheses an option. He stated that options may be of several kinds: living or dead; forced or avoidable; momentous or trivial. In regard to a faith commitment we may call an option genuine when it is forced, living, and momentous. A living option is one in which the both alternatives are real possibilities or choices for the individual involved; e. g., "Are you going to go to college or are you going to work instead? " A forced option is one in which there is no possibility of not choosing; e. g., "Either accept this particular truth or go without it, you have no other alternative! " A momentous option is a unique opportunity that happens usually but once in a lifetime: e. g., "Would you like to be a crew member on one of the forthcoming space flights?" Finally, James pointed out that faith cannot be so independent that it can contradict at its own pleasure matters of fact which are either immediate or remote. In other words, just by willing it we cannot believe that Abraham Lincoln's existence was a myth, nor can we by any effort of our will believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed;

•• Cf., *WTB,* pp. X,XI, (Preface).

or feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars. It is true, said James, that we can" say" any of these things, but that will not change the reality of their objective existence. Whether I like them or not, certain facts are given irrespective of my wishes, and in all that concerns truths such as these subjective preferences do not and should not play a part.[30]

In effect, Professor James is saying that all living options are judgments and, since every specific judgment requires a specific act of faith. Faith is that active and necessary element which pervades every situation in which man is required to make a judgment concerning the world of objective reality. Moreover, besides all of man's volitional actions, James felt that most of man's habitual actions are dependent on the operation of his will and the powers of faith and selectivity. In a broad sense, said James, the faith act designates our entire capacity for an impulsive and active life, including our instinctive reactions and those forms of behavior that have become secondarily automatic and semi-unconscious through frequent repetition. In the narrower and more usual sense acts of faith and will are such acts which cannot be inattentively performed. In all vital decisions or judgments a distinct idea of what is involved and a deliberate *fiat* on the mind's part must precede their execution.[31] Thus, in every instance where a judgment is necessary, the individual's choice is all important; this choice is determined by the amount of faith one has in a particular alternative before him. To be more precise, we choose a particular alternative because we believe that the results of our choice will be the most beneficial for us.[32] In this manner faith verifies itself by virtue of its own actions. In other words, every faith commitment must be judged by its fruits and not by its roots, for in the last analysis faith is measured by the action it produces. If its actions prove beneficial and useful, one can assert

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 4, 5.

[31] Cf., Wm. James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (New York: Dover Press), p. 83.

[32] Cf., *WTB*, pp. 96, 97.

that a particularfaith commitment in an object or in an idea has justified itself and proven itself real and true. The conclusion to be drawn from all of this is that, for James, every preference we make, whether it be in philosophy, science, psychology, theology, ethics, or the everyday questions of living is dependent on an explicit personal act of faith; faith, then, is an element of our active nature which, in effect, completely determines all of our decisions. Every branch of science and every aspect of life must make some assumptions. After all, said James, all men are but fallible mortals, and we must sometimes begin somewhere with something which we at least titularly accept as true. [33]

James found it interesting that the necessity of faith as an ingredient in our mental attitude was strongly insisted on by the scientific philosophers of his day; yet, he thought it indeed strange that they maintained that it is only legitimate when used in the interests of one particular proposition, namely, the proposition that the course of nature is uniform. That nature will follow tomorrow the same laws that she follows today is, they all admit, a truth which no man can know; but in the interest of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or assume it is true. However, with regard to all other possible truths most of these scientific philosophers think that an attitude of faith is1 not only illogical but shameful. [34] James considered all those philosophers who denied the importance of faith in our lives guilty of a grave misculculation and misinterpretation of human nature.

> It is almost incredible that men who are themselves working philosophers should pretend that any philosophy can be, or ever has been, constructed without the help of personal preference, belief or divination. How have they succeeded in so stultifying their sense or the living facts of human nature as not to perceive that every philosopher, or man of science either, whose initiative accounts for anything in the evolution of thought, has taken his stand on a sort

•• Cf., Wm. James, "The Function of Cognition," from: *The Meaning of Truth*, in *The Writings of William James*, ed. by, John J. McDermott (New York: Random House), 1967, p. 139, (hereafter: McDermott).

•• Cf., *WTB*, pp. 91, 92.

of dumb conviction that the truth must lie in one direction rather than another, and a sort of preliminary assurance that this noting can be made to work; and has borne his best fruit in trying to make it work? [35]

Although James maintained that specific acts of faith are involved in all our assertions concerning reality, he warns us that faith cannot create something out of nothing. That is, faith does not and cannot create a solipistic dream world, or a situation in reality, by the force of sheer wish-power or will-power.36 According to James faith is but a. tool to help explain and substantiate reality only in reference to our experiencing of it. Faith is not totally subjective for it cannot create new reality a.s such nor can it perpetuate itself beyond its ability to generate some sort of supporting da.ta..[37] Every faith commitment must have some warranted assertability behind it, and there must be some sort of positive feedback of facts for a. faith commitment to continue in a specific direction. Thus, for James, although faith is all-important in directing and guiding men's lives, viable faith cannot be completely detached from or contradict reality: " Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere or else make false connection." [38]

However, James did maintain that there is a. whole class of truths whose reality depends on our faith or the vigor of our own will power and our active implementation of their possibilities. That is, James believed that there are times when man can rise above the merely given and, by having faith in a fact, can actually help to create a fact. James fully explicated this point by the use of a.n example which speaks for itself.

Suppose, for example, that I am climbing in the Alps, and have the ill-luck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Being without similar experience, I have no evidence of my ability to perform it successfully; but hope

•• *Ibid.,* p. 98.
•• Cf., *ibid.,* p. 146.
[87] Cf., McDermott, p. XXIV, (Introduction).
[88] *Pragmatism,* p. 186.

and confidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, and nerve my feet to execute what without those subjective emotions would perhaps have been impossible. But suppose that, on the contrary, the emotions of fear and mistrust preponderate ... why, then I shall hesitate so long that at last exhausted and trembling, and launching myself, in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll into the abvss. In this case . . . the part of wisdom clearly is to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of the indispensable preliminary conditions of the realization of its object. *There are then cases where faith creates its own verification.* Believe, and you shall be right, for you shall save yourself; doubt, and you shaH be right, for you shall perish. The only difference is that to believe is greatly to our advantage. [89]

This example typifies James's conviction that "again and again success depends on the energy of act; energy again depends on (the) faith that we shall not fail; and that faith in turn on the faith that we are right-which faith thus verifies itself." [40] In other words, desire for a certain kind of truth can bring about that truth's existence, if we apply ourselves to the task and do not sit around merely wishing or hoping that this or that were true. [41]

Before concluding this section, I think that it is important to point out that, although James maintained that each specific act of faith must fulfill its intended practical purpose, it was never James's intention to suggest that in so doing one's faith commitment had the right to over-throw or openly clash with the individual's backlog of accumulated beliefs and interests. Furthermore, each act of faith must look to the future with an eye toward the attainment of the greatest possible good. That is to say, acts of faith cannot occur *in vacuo,* many factors must be taken into consideration. Consequently, acts of faith or will, for James, are good, practical, and true only insofar as they serve the immediate need but without distorting or destroying one's previous fund or experience, truths, and beliefs and as long as each action is open

[89] *WTB,* pp. 96, 97.
[40] *Ibid.,* p. 100.
[41] Cf., *ibid.,* p. 24.

to and geared toward the greatest possible good which the future may contain.

* * * *

The next and obvious question concerns the role of faith commitments in regards to the religious hypothesis. James called the question of whether this world is at bottom a moral or immoral universe the most radical question of life.[42] In no uncertain terms James insisted that "man needs a rule for his will, and he will invent one if one be not given to him."[43] Specifically, he maintained that this need is a need for "an eternal moral order" which gives direction and purpose to man's life. This search, he said," is one of the deepest needs of our breast "[44] and it is a search that man is not easily distracted from. For James, man has an intrinsic "need" to be subjugated to a higher power which we commonly refer to as God. In a very real sense, said James, man seemingly has a psychic want to believe that" all is *not* vanity in the Universe, whatever the appearances may suggest."[45] Man wants to accept the existence of God, because an acceptance of God guarantees to man an ideal order which shall be permanently preserved no matter what happens to the world as we now know it. In other words, belief in God is a belief in the presence of *promise* in the world. In effect, God is the ultimate mitigator of the harshness of reality because a belief in God gives man a feeling of security, banishes man's cosmic fear, and gives him hope that tomorrow may prove more sanative than today.[46] Accordingly, each man has a vital stake in the unknown![47]

The question now arises, just how do we come to know of God? The sa.cred texts of organized religion, said James, tell us of a loving God, yet immediate experience is full of contra-

•• Cf., *ibid.,* p. 103.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 88.

"Pragmatism, p. 77.

[45] Wm. James, "Circumscription of the (Religious) Topic," from: *Variaties of Religious Experience,* in McDermott, p. 748.

[46] Cf., Wm. James, "Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism," from: *The 1Ueaning of Truth,* in McDermott, p. 313.

•• Cf., *WTB,* p. 54.

diction, i.e., beauty and hideousness, love and cruelty, and life and death. It is, therefore, difficult at the level of plain facts to perceive a "Good God." [48] Moreover, said James, the physical order of nature, taken simply as science nows it, also cannot be held to reveal any one harmonious spiritual intent. It is a mere " weather," as Chauncey Wright called it, doing and undoing without end but with no specific order or purpose in sight. [49] Yet, man cannot live by facts alone, and therefore when facts are not enough and when reason is insufficient man has the right to assert his will when the possibility that something might be true does not openly confute given experience. In the question of God, said James, man has a right to believe that the physical order is but a partial order and that we can supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust. [50] In other words, since real possibility is the key to all faith commitments, the very possibility that God exists is enough to warrant belief. Quoting his friend William Salter, James suggests that" as the essence of courage is to stake one's life on a possibility, so the essence of faith is to believe that the possibility exists." [51] After all, said James, what really has the authority to debar us from our religious demands? Science, as such, certainly has no authority, for she can only say what is, not what is not; that is, science can only tell us of what is known, not of what is not known. Surely, said James, no one will contest the statement that it is a fact of human nature that men can live and die by the help of a sort of faith that does not have a single dogma or definition. This being the case, the bare assurance that this natural order is not ultimate but a mere sign or vision; (the external staging of a many-storied universe in which spiritual forces have the last word and are eternal) , this bare assurance is to most men enough to make life seem worth living in spite of every contrary presumption suggested by its circumstances on the natural plane. [52]

That the world of physics is probably not absolute, and that our whole physical life may lie soaking in a spiritual atmosphere

•• Cf., *ibid.,* pp. 41, 42, 43, 44.
•• *Ibid.,* p. *52.*
•• Cf., *ibid.,* p. *52.*
[51] *Ibid.,* p. 62.
•• Cf., *ibid.,* p. *56, 57.*

or dimension of being that we, at present, have no organ for apprehending is vividly suggested to us, said James, by the analogy of the life of our domestic animals. For example, our dogs are in our human life but not of it. They witness hourly the outward body of events the inner meaning of which cannot, by any possible operation, be revealed to their intelligence,- events in which they, themselves, often play a cardinal part. Let us suppose, said James, that my pet terrier bites a teasing boy, and the father demands damages. The dog may be present at every step of the negotiations and even see the money paid, and yet be without an inkling of what it all means, without a suspicion that it has anything to do with him. The dog quite simply does not have the ability to know what is going on around him. Now, said James, let us turn from this to the life of man. In the dog's life we see the world invisible to him because we ourselves live in both worlds. In human life is it not possible that, although we see only our world and the dog's within it, there yet exists a still wider world encompassing both of these worlds which is as unseen to us as our world is to the dog? And is it not also possible that to believe in this world may be the most essential and important function of our lives? But "may be! may be! " one now hears the agnostic positivist contemptuously exclaim; " what use can a scientific life have for maybes? " Well, said James, is not the scientific life, itself, based on " maybes? " James maintained that, so far as man stands for anything and is productive or imaginative at all, his entire vital function may be said to deal with " maybes." For not a victory is gained, not a deed of faithfulness or courage is done, except upon a" maybe." Nor is there a service or a single act of generosity, or a scientific exploration or experiment or textbook that may not be a mistake, for in everything there is an element of risk or chance. Yet, said James, it is only by risking our persons from one hour to another that we live at all. Therefore, he said, if this is the state of matters, then why not risk, why not believe, for if we win we win all and if we lose we lose absolutely nothing! [58]

•• Cf., *ibid.,* pp. 57, 58, 59.

James maintained that the religious question is a burning one in the hearts of all men of every generation. He believed that each man must make a commitment on this topic one way or another, because he felt that there can be no neutral position in regard to God. Man cannot escape the issue by assuming a position of skepticism and sit back and wait for more evidence, because although we do avoid error in this way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve.[54] In such instances, said James, skepticism and immovable doubt are themselves decisions of the widest practical reach, and it is often pragmatically impossible to distinguish doubt from dogmatic negation. Moreover, skepticism in moral matters is an active ally of immorality: who is not for is against! In theory as well as in practice, dodge, or hedge, or talk as we like about a " wise skepticism," we are in the end really doing volunteer military service fol" one side or the other.[55] James pointed out that the skeptic's supposed position is like the man who hesitates indefinitely to ask a certain women to marry him because he is not perfectly sure that she will prove an angel after he has brought her home. Would he not, said James, cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility just as decisively if he went out and married someone else? Skepticism, then, is not avoidance of an option; it is an option of a certain particular line of risk: it is better to risk loss of truth than take a chance on error. The faith-vetoer is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. Therefore, said James, to preach skepticism to us as a duty until " sufficient evidence " for religion is found is tantamount to telling us, when in the presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being an error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. I, for one, said James, simply refuse obedience to the skeptic's demand to imitate his kind of option. If

•• Cf., *ibid.,* p.

•• Cf., *ibid.,* p. 109.

religion be true and the evidence for it is still insufficient, James will not put an extinguisher on his willing nature and by so doing forfeit his only chance in life of getting on the winning side.[56] James exclaimed that he and all men have the right to run the risk of acting on their passional need,-because in the present such a commitment gives man a "peace that passeth understanding," and more importantly, this belie£ may in the future prove itself not only prophetic and right but also eternally rewarding.

In essence James is saying that given the limitations of the world of objective facts, science and logical reasoning, religion is a living, forced, and momentous option which can neither be escaped or avoided and must be resolved by each individual.[57] In other words, the religious option, like all moral questions, immediately presents itself as a question whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof, because all moral questions are questions not of what sensibly exists but of what is, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us of what exists; but to compare the worth of what exists and of what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls the heart.[58] James stated that Pascal's wager theory is possibly the most decisive argument ever presented on the question of the existence of God. Following Pascal's lead, James stated that the acceptance of the reality of God is a " leap of faith " which transcends the natural inadequacies of the human mind.[59] In the final analysis, said James, the factual proof for God's existence will remain unsolved and insoluble forever; therefore, acceptance of God is an emotional and practical thing based on faith. Man, he said, must recognize the opaque limits of his speculative insight;[60] he must realize that, if his heart does not want a world of moral reality, his head will assuredly never let him believe in one![61]

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When all is said and done, the pragmatic significance of Professor James's acceptance of the free will is that this decision

[56] Cf., *ibid.,* p. 101.
[57] Cf., *ibid.,* p.
[58] Cf., *ibid.,* p.
[59] Cf., *ibid.,* p. n.
[60] Cf., *ibid.,* pp. 185, 186, 187.
[61] Cf., *ibid.,* p.

allows for a " cosmological theory of promise." That is, in a world where conclusive evidence is not always readily available for making definite judgments concerning the make-up, structure, and meaning of reality, the activity of man's passional nature at least affords him the "possibility" that he might be true or correct in regards to his decisions concerning reality. James contended that there is no more crippling source of deception in the investigation of reality in general which can compare with a fixed belief that certain kinds of phenomena are *de facto* impossible.[62] The real strength and power of free will, said James, is that it releases man from the captivity of" brute facts." Acording to James, the concept of freedom holds out to man the real possibility of hope and expectation but never the assurance of absolute certitude. Opting for free will, allows man to cast aside scientific reasoning or logic as the only acceptable vehicles for the formulation of everyday judgment and for the development of a viable *Weltanschauung.* That is to say, once armed with the knowledge of the power of faith and with full consciousness of the responsiblities and risks involved, man is now free to give himself over to anything strong enough to catch his eye. James suggested that one's faith-tendencies usually proceed along the lines of a seven-point procedural method which he called the " faith-ladder:"

1) There is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true, nothing self-contradictory;
2) It *might* have been true under certain conditions;
3) It *may* be true, even now;
4) It is *fit* to be true;
5) It *ought* to be true;
6) It *must* be true;
7) It *shall* be true, at any rate true for *me.*

"Obviously," said James," this is no intellectual chain of inferences, like the *sorites* of the logic books. Yet it is a slope of good-will on which in the larger questions of life men habitually live."[63]

[62] Cf., *The Letters of William James,* Vol. I., p. 248.
[63] *Some Problems of Philosophy,* p. 224.

James found in man a will to believe, and he put this at the base of all of man's thinking concerning reality. Moreover, he argued that every system of philosophy depends, in the last analysis, upon the will to believe. Man wants to believe in a certain way, because the belief seems to satisfy him most completely; therefore, said James, man has the right to chose as he sees fit-but always at his own peril. According to Professor James, then, for each thinker the ultimate authority must be his own understanding o£ reality as he sees it. For James," the *fons et origo* o£ all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view is thus subjective, is ourselves." [64] In other words, we are the sum total of our own choices within the limits of our given world. [65] Furthermore, since each man is captain of his own ship and master of his own fate, no one has the right to issue vetoes to others with whom we do not agree. James felt that we must "tolerate, respect and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us." Moreover, he believed that " the first thing to learn in intercourse with others is non-interference with their own particular ways of being happy, provided those ways do not assume to interfere by violence with ours. No one has insight into all the ideals. No one should presume to judge off-hand. The pretention to dogmatize about them in each other is the root of most human injustices and cruelties, and the trait in human character most likely to make angels weep." [66]

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[6]. *The Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II, pp. 296, 297.

[65] Cf., Rollo May, "The Emergence of Existential Psychology," from: *Existential Psychology,* ed. by Rollo May, p. 13.

[66] *Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals,* pp. 129, 130.

WHITEHEAD AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

THE QUESTION whether Whitehead's speculative philosophy can be adequately applied to the fact of personal identity has long been a thorn in the sides of Whiteheadians. Personal identity seems to be a fundamental aspect of experience to which any comprehensive and systematic philosophy simply must do justice. Yet the distinctive features of Whitehead's thought, particularly its atomism, appear to militate against, if not indeed preclude, any such adequacy.

In his *A Christian Natural Theology,* John Cobb considered this problem and attempted to provide a solution.[1] The purpose of this article is to examine that solution, to raise some questions about it, and to present some alternative suggestions.

Although it has been several years since Cobb's book was published, it seems appropriate to review his contribution because of the fundamental importance of the issue. For the success of Whitehead's speculative philosophy can be viewed as resting upon the cogency of its claim to be a "one-substance cosmology."[2] The one categoreal scheme is to provide one conceptuality applicable to God, man, and the natural world alike. The cogency of this claim is reduced, however, if the scheme is really inapplicable to man's experience of personal identity. In this context Cobb's proposal becomes fairly important. If it cannot bear the weight he places upon it-and

[1] John B. Cobb, Jr., *A Christian Natural Theology* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 47-91. Subsequent references to this work are abbreviated as CNT and incorporated within the text.

[2] *Process and Reality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 1'!9, see p. 168. references to this work are abbreviated as PR and incorporated within text.

he admits to some dissatisfaction with his own solution-an alternative must be sought. [3]

I

Cobb locates the problem of personal identity as resting with Whitehead's account of the soul, that center of consciousness and experience which we otherwise, and more usually, identify as the self. In more technical terms, the soul is that living person which is the series of dominant occasions within a body. Cobb does not think that questions about the role of the body in personal identity are really to the point, for in the last analysis "it is the soul that is truly personal, the true subject." (CNT 66) [4] The body is rather the environment for personal existence and is itself " ontologically distinct " from the soul. (CNT 66) Thus it is apparent that by personal identity Cobb has in mind the identity of the person construed as a centered self or soul rather than a mind-body unity of which the soul is only a part.

Now it is quite clear that Whitehead's categories repudiate any notion of a numerical or absolute self-identity through time. Such self-identity belongs only to individual actual entities. The fact of personal identity through time cannot then be construed in Whitehead's system in any absolute sense. The question is whether it can be clearly construed in terms of the soul.

Cobb argues that Whitehead presents two categoreal or systematic resources for this task. Both pertain to the relationship between successive actual entities in a personally ordered society. The first resource which might explicate

[3] Cobb himself points out the seriousness of the issue (CNT 74, 76).

[4] I think Cobb is incorrect in this position, but I am unable to argue the point here. Whitehead does observe that if " human occasions of experience e«sentially inherit in one-dimensional personal order, there is a gap between human occasions and the physical occasions of nature," *Adventures of Ideas* (New Yol'k: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 243. (Subsequently references to this work are abbreviated as AI and incorporated within the text.) The whole thrust of Whitehead's endeavor is directed against such a gap. Cobb's position only widens it.

personal identity is the inheritance of a common pattern or character. The second is some special mode in which the past is inherited. Cobb's solution involves the complete rejection of the first resource and a development of the second beyond the few enigmatic statements in which Whitehead announced it.

The rejected resource is that "the identity of the person through time points to the inheritance of a common character through the successive occasions." (CNT 73) Cobb regards this explanation as inappropriate for two reasons.

His first argument is that we do not in practice ascribe personal identity on these grounds. Neither a common character nor the transmission of this character from moment to moment "causes us to judge personal identity." (CNT 73) Twins share commonness of character, Cobb says, but we clearly do not regard them as the same person. And commonness in what is inherited explicates only the personality which can change, he claims, without the loss of identity.

His second argument is that a common character suggests repetition, whereas the problem to be accounted for is novelty. The identity of a person is the identity of a living thing, and "the decisive feature of life is novelty and not the repetition of past patterns." (CNT 74) Indeed, Cobb regards it a "perplexing fact" and perhaps a sign of "desperation" that Whitehead would attempt to account for personal identity in these terms. (CNT 74)

Accordingly, Cobb contends that the case for the adequacy of Whitehead's categories can be made only in a development of the second resource, the notion of a special mode of inheritance. This is "the only satisfactory approach to personal identity allowed by his system." (CNT 75) It is here that the "whole burden" of explanation must rest. (CNT 74)

This special mode emphasizes a "peculiar completeness" with which occasions of one's own past are objectified and summed up in the immediate present. (PR 244, 531) Cobb interprets this notion of a peculiar completeness, left undeveloped by Whitehead, in terms of unmediated hybrid prehensions of earlier members of the enduring object. Unmedi-

ated prehensions are those not restricted to the immediate, or contiguous, predecessor occasion. Such prehensions, he claims, are unmediated because they are objectifications of the mental rather than the physical poles.

It is precisely such direct prehensions, Cobb thinks, that can explain the peculiar completeness to which Whitehead referred. Through them successive occasions of the living person have direct, unmediated access to earlier moments of experience. Likewise, the events of yesterday, or of months or even years ago, have in this way a direct, unmediated influence in one's self-experiencing and self-understanding of today.

Thus the merit of this proposal, Cobb claims, is that it permits a Whiteheadian interpretation of memory. And by memory in this context Cobb means remembering one's past experiences from within rather than from without. He means remembering them as such rather than remembering something about them. It is this notion of memory which Cobb regards as the basic and indeed sufficient factor in one's sense of personal identity with his past. "Only memory can serve in my self-understanding to determine self-identity through time." (CNT 76) Accordingly, only the second systematic resource, the special mode of inheritance which hybrid feelings effect, can account for personal identity.

Cobb completes his argument by extending the scope of memory to those experiences which can be recalled under hypnosis or through the expertise of a psychoanalyst. With this extension he contends that "personal identity obtains whenever there is a serially ordered society of primarily mental occasions (a soul) in which each occasion actually or potentially prehends unmediatedly the mental poles of all its predecessors." (CNT 79)

II

Cobb presents this account as faithful "both to Whitehead and to normal human intuitions." (CNT 78) Unfortunately some problems remain. One of these is raised by Cobb himself

and leads me in this section to an immanent criticism of the specific way he employs the resources he identifies. The other problem rests with the general way Cobb appropriates the Whiteheadian resources and leads me in the next section to more methodological comments.

Cobb calls attention to telepathy as illustrating the concept of unmediated feeling. The problem is that telepathy suggests that just this notion of unmediated prehension is really working against a viable understanding of personal identity as constituted solely by memory. For any such genuine experience of telepathy would require interpretation as an unmediated prehension, or a remembering from within, of experiences in that series constituting another's personal identity. But since Cobb has defined personal identity solely in terms of memory, those experiences of others which I directly intuit would, by definition, become part of my own identity too. If it is my Aunt Agatha whom I am immediately prehending, then by Cobb's account she and I are-for however briefly-the same. As an account of personal identity this is clearly unsatisfactory.

Cobb notes that the problem can be solved " definitionally by appealing to the fact that the living person is serially ordered .... " (CNT 78) But it does not appear that he has understood the full requirements of this solution. For it involves the reintroduction of the rejected resource, the notion of the common character. There must be a reason why in the special mode of inheritance the objectification of past occasions is as complete as it is. Objectification is selective. If this mode is not arbitrary, and thus a matter of incoherence, there must be a reason why there is such a minimum of abstraction from the full content of the past. And the best available reason can only be that the subjective aims of the occasions in the series share a common underlying character.

Indeed Whitehead himself calls attention to this when he states that " the defining characteristic of a living person is some definite type of hybrid prehension transmitted from occasion to occasion of its existence." (CNT 163) We can say that the defining characteristic emerges, and is derivative from,

the constituent occasions of the series. Indeed the ontological principle requires this. One's individuality is thereby rooted in the constituent actual occasions of his existence. But the common character thus established requires conformal inheritance, thereby limiting the sorts of full objectification which can also occur in that series.

It follows that the second resource, unmediated prehension, cannot function without the first, inheritance of a common character. And this suggests that as a ground of personal identity, memory does not stand alone.

Now is it true, as Cobb claims, that the inheritance of a common character suggests a kind of repetition inappropriate to personal identity? Need repetition result in trivializing of novelity or of mentality? Contrary to Cobb, I believe that the transmission of this common character does not inappropriately restrict the freedom of each member of the soul.

In the first place, even with respect to this defining characteristic, there is no predictably determinate content to any specific occasion. There is no predictably determinate content because the defining characteristic, as a complex eternal object, enjoys a sort of neutrality with regard to alternative possibilities which can express this form. There is often a wide variety of ways that I can be myself in a certain situation, although there may be one way more so than others. The point is that the specific actuality, the concrete content, of the members of that society is not prescribed by the defining characteristic.

In the second place, each occasion in the series remains living in its capacity for conceptual initiative. The inheritance of a common form does not take away the occasion's own autonomy in self-creation. There is conformation to the defining characteristic, for it is genetically inherited. But such conformation is also characterized by originality of response. Each occasion contributes from its own being to the special definition of its subjective forms, even those giving the series as a whole its special characteristics. We ratify who we are with various degrees of completeness and of enlargement in

each successive moment of our existence. Inheritance of a common character does not require sacrifice of originality. [5]

What about Cobb's other argument? Do twins really share commonness of character, in the sense in which character has here been defined? Doubtless some, perhaps many, common characteristics are shared. But if they are twins, and not one person, then they do not share a common defining characteristic. In the senses that we differentiate them, we ascribe differentiated defining characteristics.

Nor is it any clearer that in every case the personality can change without loss of identity. For some purposes we do draw the line. The callous rapist is not the same as the selfless choir boy he once was. There has been a tragic loss of identity. That we still connect the two is a function of other criteria we are applying.

Thus it appears that it is simply not correct to say, as Cobb does, that " the whole burden of Whitehead's case must fail on the fact of inheritance." (CNT 74) There are at least two resources: a character transmitted and a special mode of inheriting. As Whitehead asserts, the "concrete moments" of a living person "are bound together into one society by a partial identity of form, *and* by the peculiarly full summation of its predecessors which each moment of the life-history gathers into itself." [6]

III

The example of the choir-boy-turned-rapist suggests that personal identity is something we ascribe on the basis of various criteria. Some of these may well be in conflict with others. Arguments to adjudicate them are then in order. At this point

[5] A complete response to Cobb on this issue would involve consideration of the body. The condition for spontaneity is intense physical experience. "But such an experience is derivate from the complex order of the material animal body, and not from the simple 'personal order ' of past occasions with analogous experience." (PR 161)

• *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1959), p. 27, my italics. Subsequent references to this work are abbreviated as S and incorporated within the text.

I feel some uneasiness about the way Cobb is appropriating Whitehead's thought. It is as though he understands that the categories constructed in *Process and Reality* release us from arguments. Attractive though such a possibility is, I find it unpersuasive. Some illustrations may help expose and focus the difficulty I sense in Cobb's procedure.

One illustration has to do with the "normal human intuitions" to which Cobb refers in speaking of personal identity. Surely any statement of these is important and as such demands careful analysis. But Cobb, after noting that the body changes-though not enough to give us difficulty in identifying it-is content to assert that "it is highly questionable that we would correlate closely the identity of the person and the actual identity of the body." (CNT 72) Now certainly the body figures very heavily in most criteria to which we would appeal in judging personal identity. Why should it be otherwise when we are using Whitehead's categories?

A second illustration of the weakness of Cobb's procedure is to be found in the unacknowledged shift in his study from the grounds on which I ascribe or refuse to ascribe personal identity to others, to those I use in speaking of my own personal identity. The first person singular pronoun has a logically different referent and use from the second person singular pronoun. This logical difference is not obviated by the categoreal scheme. It requires the recognition and appreciation of logically different criteria.

However, with the rejection of common character as a resource, Cobb's whole treatment of personal identity involves the assumption that it rests *only* upon memory. Accordingly his analysis culminates in a definition in which it is asserted that "personal identity *obtains* whenever there is a serially ordered society . . . . " (CNT 79, my italics)

Although Cobb's procedure suggests otherwise, Whitehead's categories do not release us from arguments about criteria and context. To attempt to establish personal identity *qna* personal identity, with no further specifications, is a fruitless effort. As Whitehead noted, the proper question is, Identity is respect

to what? "The baby in the cradle and the grown man in middle age, are in some sense identical and in other senses diverse." [1] What we intend when we speak of personal identity shifts from context to context. Our requirements are richly textured and variegated. Whiteheadian accounts ought to recognize this.

IV

In issues of this sort Whitehead's system of categories can provide a context of theory in which we can express without contradiction the many facts we acknowledge in practice. We acknowledge the fact of personal identity in different ways. In practice the fact appears in different perspectives. These different ways and perspectives are reflected in the various criteria to which we appeal in declaring that some person, ourself or another, is in relevant respects the same today as he was earlier. For instance, we may appeal to bodily characteristics, skills, or mannerisms, or to memory, dispositions, or intentions, or to still other criteria. No one of these would seem to be by itself all that we use to ascribe personal identity or to indicate its meaning.

Whitehead's system is adequate to the fact of personal identity to the degree that it permits interpretations of these perspectives, relating them to each other and to other facts of our experience. The scheme of categories is adequate if it is rich and fertile enough to provide the necessary resources. Corresponding to the variety of ways in which we speak of personal identity, there should be a variety of different systematic explanations that can be brought to bear.

In the remainder of this essay let us look briefly at what this sort of interpretation might involve. We shall consider dispositions, memory, and intentional action as ways in which we speak of personal identity. To this end we need to return to the two resources mentioned earlier. We need also to recall what Whitehead said of Descartes' *cogito* argument: "the 'he' which is common to the ... egos is an eternal object

[7] *Modes of Thought* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 146.

or, alternatively, the nexus of successive occasions." (PR 116)

Sometimes by a personal pronoun we mean a character sustained over a stretch of time, or, in Whitehead's terms, a complex eternal object ingredient in a succession of events. At other times we may have in mind the history of the person, the succession of occasions in which that eternal object is ingredient. The two resources reflect these two perspectives. With the one resource, the common character, we emphasize the complex eternal object definitive of the series. When speaking of the special completeness of transmission, we are drawing attention to the soul as a nexus.

Now the soul has as its defining characteristic " some definite type of hybrid prehension transmitted from occasion to occasion of its existence." (PR 163) Each hybrid prehension characterizing the living person has a distinctive datum and a distinctive subjective form. Because it is a hybrid prehension, the datum is a form of definiteness prehended as a possibility rather than as a physically illustrated pattern. Because the datum is a possibility, the subjective form is a valuation. By categoreal obligation there will be reproduction of the data. Since it is a physical feeling, there will be conformation of subjective forms.

Antecedent occasions impose upon successive ones these common elements of definiteness to be conformally inherited. In a living person these possibilities and valuations, derived from the past, are structured, thereby gaining intensity and efficacy through reinforcement. Together they come to constitute the defining characteristic of the living person. This common character enters integrally into each of the successive occasions, determining what is and what is not compatible for objectification.

If we emphasize the valuations as definitive of the series, then we are urging that personal identity is a function of the continuity of the purposes, appetitions, or, more generally, dispositions which characterize the person. Quite often we do speak of personal identity in this fashion. There are patterns of behavior which identify us as the persons we are. There are

fundamental valuations which distinguish us and thereby separate us from others.

To return to more systematic terms, there is empowerment of the present by the immanence of the past. The various appetitions and valuations of the living person are all informed by, and are particular specifications of, that complex eternal object giving the series as a whole its stability of direction and identification with the past. This specific complex can be actualized in a variety of ways in a variety of situations. But as it floods into each concrescing occasion in the series, it determines that present as in some way a continuation of itself. " The man-at-one-moment concentrates in himself the colour of his own past, and he is the issue of it." (S

To be sure, this factor of " colour " is not all to which we would point in accounting for personal identity. "The *how* of our present experience must conform to the *what* of the past in us." (S 58) This " what " is not simply valuation. The " he " which is common to the occasions in the series can also refer to the nexus of successive occasions. Here the element of identity appears as the connectedness of occasions with their reiterated content. In addition to disposition there is also memory. The scheme of categories can interpret both.

As a third ground of personal identity there is that special sense of identity we invoke when we speak of intention and its execution. It is to this notion that Stuart Hampshire, for instance, appeals in speaking of personal identity. "·we carry our intentions with us, and this carrying forward of intentions, together with the perception of movement, provides the natural and necessary continuity of our experience." [8] Vve are who we are, we may say, because we intend some of the things we do, as well as because we do some of the things we intend. This awareness is not simply of past experiences. That would be mere memory. It is rather the awareness of the present realization of past intention.

Whitehead's account of this reason for claiming identity

[8] *Thought and Action* (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), p. 72.

would involve the eighth categoreal obligation and the aim at intensity of feeling in the relevant future as well as in the immediate subject. In the later phases of the concrescence of the immediate subject, anticipatory propositional feelings emerge, functioning as lures for feeling. Part of this "anticipation of kinship with the future assumes the form of purpose to transform concept into fact." (AI 250) The future will prehend the past as having intended some factor in it. In this way there will be present awareness of past intentions as Jealized or not. Either way there is some explanation of the notion of identity involved. [9]

In ways such as these, Whitehead's scheme can be used to present interpretations of personal identity. There is more than one ground for ascribing personal identity. And there is more than one systematic resource for interpreting the personal identity thus ascribed. His categories are not to supplant the various modes of discourse in which these senses of identity are presented. They are rather to render systematic interpretations of the features of experience these other modes disclose. In interpretations of personal identity, Whitehead's categories should be able to provide clear, systematic senses to the notion that a person is present in and through his experiences and so enjoys personal identity.

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[9] For an application of this notion of the soul to the problem of agency, see my "Process or Agent: A Response" in *Philosophy of Religion and Theology:* 1972, ed. David Griffin (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Religion, 1972), pp. 146-159.

ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF THE UNMOVED MOVER

ONE OF THE PERENNIAL problems in Aristotelian studies is the difficulty of reconciling Aristotle's account of the unmoved mover-particularly the number of unmoved movers-presented variously in the *Physics* and in book lambda of the *Metaphysics.* Numerous explanations have been offered, most of which either explain too little or too much. The result is that Aristotle is either left enmeshed in hopeless contradiction, or his unmoved mover is something less than was understood by his medieval interpreters.

The thesis of this study is that the distinctions made in the *Physics,* particularly Book VIII, must be applied to Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover in *Metaphysics* lambda. In making this claim I am aware that any successful attempt at exegesis must take into account both the textual problems in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* and recent attempts to interpret the unmoved mover as a principle of intelligibility analogous to scientific " laws."

ARISTOTLE's ARGUMENT

The argument for the existence of the unmoved mover is found in chapter 1 of Book VIII of the *Physics* and is based on Aristotle's proofs, for the eternality of motion. Here is how the argument goes: Motion is the fulfillment of the movable *qua* movable. Motion presupposes the existence of things capable of motion. Furthermore, these movable things must have a beginning, or else they are eternal. To say that movable things had a beginning is to say that there was a motion, or change, before there was anything capable of being moved, which is absurd. Therefore, motion did not have a beginning.

The same kind of argument is used to prove the imperish-

ability of motion. To posit a motion that destroys motion would involve one in an infinite series of destroyers, for

> the destructive agent will have to be destroyed, after what it destroys has been destroyed, and then that which had the capacity of destroying *it* will have to be destroyed afterwards, (so that there will be a process of change subsequent to the last,) for being destroyed also is a kind of change. [1]

Eternal motion must be continuous motion, for motion that is merely successive is not eternal. There are three kinds of motion: (1) rectilinear, (9l) rotary, and (3) a combination of the two. Rectilinear motion cannot be continuous, for a straight line has a beginning and an end; a rectilinear motion would involve a turning back at its terminal points. [2] Infinite rectilinear motion is impossible because the universe is finite, and an actually infinite body cannot exist. [3] Since rectilinear motion cannot be continuous, neither can " mixed " motion be continuous, for the latter is continuous only if both elements are continuous. Rotary motion, however, is not subject to the limits of rectilinear motion, for in circular motion there is no beginning point and no terminal point. Rotary motion, therefore, is primary and continuous. [4]

From the eternality of motion Aristotle argues for the existence of the unmoved first mover. A good Platonic principle that Aristotle applies here is that " all things that are in motion must be moved by something." [5] This is possible in either of two ways: either the movent moves itself, or else it is moved by another. If the former is true, we have already reached the eternal, self-moving principle. If the latter is true, we likewise arrive at an eternal self-mover, for an infinite regress is impossible.

[1] *Physics* Iff. Cf. *Metaphysics* 107lb 5-10. All quotations from the *Physics* are from the translation by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gay•e; citations from the *Metaphysics* are from the translation by W. D. Ross. Both translations (tre included in *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941).

• *Physics* 259• 15-20.

• *Ibid.,* 206• 1-7.

• *Ibid., 265•* 14ff.

• *Ibid., 256•*

If then everything that is in motion must be moved by something, and the movent must either itself be moved by something else or not, and in the former case there must be some first movent that is not itself moved by anything else, while in the case of the immediate movent being of this kind there is no need of an intermediate movent that is also moved (for it is impossible that there should be an infinite series of movents, each of which is itself moved by something else, since in an infinite series there is no first term)- if then everything that is in motion is moved by something, and the first movent is moved but not by anything else, it must be moved by itself.[6]

A similar argument is repeated in chapter 6 *of Metaphysics* lambda, based on the priority *of* act over potency.

Thus far, both the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* are in agreement. In both treatises Aristotle recognizes the eternality *of* motion. From this he argues for the existence *of* an eternal, incorruptible unmoved mover. His remaining problem is to discover the number *of* such movers. Is there only one, or a plurality?

TEXTUAL CoNSIDERATIONS

That the text *of* both the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* has suffered emendations and interpolations is beyond doubt. In his monumental study, *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung,* Werner Jaeger isolated several passages in both the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* that were not part *of* the original works. Since these passages are central to an understanding *of* Aristotle's doctrine *of* the unmoved mover, it is important to look briefly at them.[7]

Interpolations in the "Physics"

The first addition in the *Physics* that is significant for this study is in Book VIII, Ch. 6 (258b 10). Aristotle here states the conclusion *of* a proof for the existence *of* an unmoved mover. "Since there must always be motion without inter-

[6] *Ibid., 256*• 18-20.

[7] The English translation of this work will hereafter be cited. Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle,* Trans. Richard Robinson, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948).

mission, there must necessarily be something, one thing or it may be a plurality, that first imparts motion, and this first movent must be unmoved." Jaeger insists that grammatical considerations prove that the phrase, " one thing or it may be a plurality," is a later addition. [8]

The second addition is found at 259a 7-13. "Motion, then, being eternal, the first movent, if there is but one, will be eternal also: if there are more than one, there will be a plurality of such eternal movents." Jaeger notes that not only is this statement tautological, it is also stylistically distinct, and the succeedings lines (159a 15 ff.) do not presuppose the disputed passage. [9]

The third interpolation is at *259b* 28-31.

> We must distinguish, however, between accidental motion of a thing by itself and such motion by something else, the former being confined to perishable things, whereas the latter belongs also to certain first principles of heavenly bodies, of all those, that is to say, that experience more than one locomotion.

The implicit assumption here seems to be that each planetary sphere requires a mover, and each sphere is moved accidentally. Jaeger argues that the passage is an addition, basing his conclusion partially on linguistic grounds and partially on contextual considerations. [10] These three additions in chapter 6 of book VIII are the only relevant passages under question. [11]

Interpolations in the "Metaphysics"

Basing his arguments on the earlier conclusions of Bonitz, Jaeger insists that book lambda is not the intended conclusion

[8] Jaeger, *Aristotle,* p. 362.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 363.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 364ff.

[11] G. Verbeke, in the *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 46 (1948), p. *151,* argues that chapter 1 of book VIII of the *Physics* (dealing with the eternality of motion) was originally an independent treatise that was added later. That this is far from conclusive is shown by Professor Fredrich Solmsen, *Aristotle's System of the Physical World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 224, n. 8. "It is correct that ch. *3* does not make use of the conclusions reached in ch. 1. Yet are not the opinions combated in ch. *3* sufficiently different from those opposed in eh. I? The question of ch. *3* is no longer whether movement had a beginning."

of the *Metaphysics.* [12] He argues that originally the *Metaphysics* was only a ten-book collection which omitted books alpha minor, delta, kappa, and lambda. Jaeger further argues that book lambda was originally an independent work-possibly a lecture on metaphysics which was composed for some special occasion, a " complete system of metaphysics *in nuce* " [13]-basing these conclusions not only on an analysis of the argument of book lambda but also upon its stylistic characteristics. He observes that book lambda is unusually brief, even for Aristotle, and employs a style foreign to the rest of the *Metaphysics:* " It contains only the main points, sketchily put together, sometimes merely jotted down one after the other with a recurring 'Note, next, that ... ,' and bare of all stylistic polish in detail." [14]

There is one exception to this, however. In chapter 8 Aristotle considers the problem of whether there is only one unmoved mover or a plurality. The chapter is fully out, unlike the rest of book lambda which is a marvel of what Jaeger calls "Aristotelian brevity." [15] Not only is chapter 8 stylistically incongruous with the rest of the book, it also interrupts the train of thought in chapters 7 and 9. Chapter 7 considers the divine characteristics of the unmoved mover; chapter 9 begins with the words, " the nature of the divine thought involves certain problems .... " Jaeger is right when he observes that "chapter 9 interrupts this continuous train of thought and breaks it into two parts. Remove it, and chapters 7 and 9 fit smoothly together." [16]

These difficulties are further compounded by the fact that within chapter 8 there is a passage which is assumed to be a later addition. It is found at 1074a 31-38.

> Evidently there is but one heaven. For if there are many heavens as there are many men, the moving principles, of which each heaven will have one, will be one in form but in *number* many. But all things that are many in number have matter; for one and the same definition, e. g., that of a man, applies to many

[10] Jaeger, *Amtotle,* p. 194.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 345.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 219.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 346.
[H] *Ibid.,* p. 344.

things, while Socrates is one. But the primary essence has not matter; for it is complete reality. So the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number; so too, therefore, is that which is moved always and continuously; therefore there is one heaven alone.

Jaeger argues, on linguistic grounds, that this passage is an addition, noting that " with its first words, ' evidently there is but one heaven,' another style begins, and with the last word of the insertion, ' therefore there is one heaven alone,' it ceases again." [17] The style of this passage, Jaeger states, "is the same shorthand style as obtains in the rest of Book A, and contrasts sharply with the impeccable language of chapter 8." [18] Jaeger also points out that the grammatical connection of the preceding and succeeding sections is disturbed by the addition of lines 31-38. Furthermore, it seems explicitly to contradict Aristotle's earlier contention that there is but one unmoved mover. Jaeger's conclusion is that this passage was originally a marginal comment, a piece of self-criticism, which Aristotle's "faithful editors " introduced into the text. [19]

The upshot of all this is that the passages most relevant to a study of the Aristotelian doctrine of the unmoved mover are questionable, to say the least. There is good evidence, on linguistic grounds alone, to assume that the three previously discussed passages in *Physics* VIII were not part of the original work. There also is good evidence, both on contextual and linguistic grounds, for believing that book lambda, perhaps originally a separate treatise, was not included in the earliest formulation of the *Metaphysics.*

The evidence, however, for insisting that chapter 8 is a later insert is not conclusive. The Dutch scholar, Augustine Nolte, suggests that at this point Aristotle was on unfamiliar ground and that the more fluent style of the chapter simply indicates that he was here following material previously worked out by astronomers. [20] Whether or not lines 1074a 31-38 of

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 353.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Augustinus Nolte, *Het Godsbegrip bij Aristoteles* (Nijmegen-Utrecht: Dekker

chapter 8 disrupt the unity of the chapter is likewise subject to dispute. Jaeger feels that this passage involved Aristotle in contradictions. [21] Joseph Owens, on the other hand, insists that this passage, which proves the unity of the universe, is vital to the arguments of the chapter.

> If the change in style must mark it as a later addition, it could have been added subsequently by Aristotle to take care of an actual or possible challenge to the basis of his reasoning. That would explain the abrupt and precise style. In any case, the literary connection with the preceding sentence is quite smooth. [22]

These conflicting interpretations indicate emphatically that the textual evidence is far from certain, even though Jaeger makes a strong case for his textual analysis.

The significant factor in all this is that, even given Jaeger's textual analysis, it can be scarcely doubted that all the passages in question are from the pen of Aristotle. Jaeger's thesis is that Aristotle originally began with the theory of one, primal unmoved mover, which is reflected in the earliest versions of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics.* Astronomy, however, convinced him that " the hypothesis of a single uniform ultimate motion was too primitive to account for the complications of the actual heavenly motions .... " [23] So Aristotle turned to astronomy for an explication of the actual number of first principles. A further implication of Jaeger's view is that the emended

& Van de Vegt V. N., 1940), pp. 147-48. cited by Joseph Owens in *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), p. 415, n. 36. Owens adds that Nolte holds that this chaper is nol a later addition and accounts for the difference in style by Aristotle's need to have before him the exact statements of the astronomers.

[21] Jaeger, *Aristotle,* p. *353.*

[••] Owens, *op. cit.,* pp. 282-83. Concerning this passage, Owens continues: " So if it is a later insert, it is more likely something written expressly for this place, as Jaeger thinks, rather than a previously composed remnant as in v. Arnim's theory." [Hans von Arnim held that this passage had no connection whatsoever with the surrounding text.] I think here that Owens slightly misunderstands Jaeger. Jaeger did not argue that this addition was expressly prepared for this section but was rather a piece of " self-criticism " which Aristotle jotted in the margin and did not intend to be included in the text itself.

[••] Jaeger, *Aristotle,* pp. 350-51.

sections in *Physics* VIII come from a period of doubt "when Aristotle, though seriously considering the possibility of extending the principle of the prime mover to the planetary spheres, still hesitates to draw this consequence." [24] Jaeger concludes that the addition of book lambda to the *Metaphysics* was only a "makeshift" arrangement which indicated Aristotle's dissatisfaction with his earlier formulation. At this point Aristotle "was wrestling with these problems anew and failing to solve them . . . . " [25]

Chapter 8 of book lambda must then be seen as an earlier version of Aristotle's attempt to solve the perplexing problem of the first principles, and even if it was an editorial addition to book lambda, it was doubtless from the pen of Aristotle himself. The disputed comments at 1074a 31 ff. were marginalia -Aristotle's own "self-criticism "-which were later incorporated into the text by subsequent editors. Such are the conclusions of Jaeger. The willingness of Aristotle to adapt his earlier theory of one prime mover to the demands of astronomy for a plurality of planetary movers indicates Aristotle's devotion to what Jaeger calls his "unbending sense of fact." [26] But Jaeger argues that this revision led Aristotle into hopeless contradiction.

This is really the point at issue. Assuming the text to be genuinely Aristotelian, though agreeing with Jaeger that it probably underwent several redactions, must one conclude as Jaeger does that Aristotle contradicted himself? Is there no way to reconcile the apparent conflict between *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* lambda? Or must one say that in his old age Aristotle suffered a period of intellectual senility which allowed him blandly to overlook a manifest contradiction in his revision of earlier positions?

THE NuMBER OF UNMOVED MovERS

If Jaeger is right, and there is no good reason to contest him on this point, Aristotle began with his theory of one eternal

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 357. [25] *Ibid.,* p. 354. [26] *Ibid.,* p. 351.

unmoved mover and later made additions to the text in order to accommodate the findings and demands of astronomy. The perennial question is whether Aristotle contradicted himself in so doing. In the *Physics,* Book VIII, chapter 6, the first two interpolations merely suggest the possibility of more than one unmoved mover. In the third interpolation Aristotle introduces the self-movers of the heavenly bodies and remarks that there is a self-mover for each planetary sphere. Then in chapter 8 of *Metaphysics* lambda, which originally did not include the passage at 1074a 31-38, Aristotle assumes the probable existence of a plurality of unmoved movers-one for each planetary sphere. In Jaeger's account, Aristotle, having advanced his theory of the plurality of movers, jotted down in the margin a note in favor of the uniqueness of the prime mover which Aristotle's "faithful editors" later introduced into the text where it remains as a contradiction to the arguments in the rest of the chapter. [27] If this addition does contradict the rest of the chapter, as Jaeger insists, perhaps one would agree with Professor Guthrie that it was added by a "not too intelligent editor." [28]

On the face of it, Jaeger's theory accounts for the interpolated passages; but there is still something unsatisfying about accusing Aristotle of being so clumsy in his revision of these portions of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics.* Does it not seem strange that Aristotle would have allowed one interpolation three lines long *(Physics* 259b 28-30) to suffice as a revision of his entire theory of the unity of the unmoved mover? If Aristotle were revising his theory to include the existence of a plurality of prime unmoved movers, does it not seem as though this would have called for a more drastic revision of the eighth book of the *Physics?*

Does it not likewise seem strange that Aristotle would have left chapter 8 of *Metaphysics* lambda in such a condition that

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 353.

[28] W. K. C. Guthrie, "The Development of Aristotle's Theology- II" *The Classical Quarterly* (New York and London: The Classical Association) XXVIII (1934), p. 97.

a "self-critical" note in the margin would contradict the arguments of the entire chapter? And is it not equally difficult to believe that Aristotle's "faithful editors" understood him so imperfectly that they introduced a glaring contradiction into the body of the text? If one accepts Jaeger's interpretation, viz., that Aristotle is changing from a belief in only *one* prime unmoved mover to a *plurality* of prime unmoved movers, he is left with no choice but to insist that Aristotle is enmeshed in flagrant contradiction. If, on the other hand, one can find an interpretation that does justice to the text but avoids the alleged contradiction, so much the better for Aristotle.

RANDALL's SoLUTION

One fairly recent, and obviously attractive, solution to this difficulty is offered by Professor Randall in his book on Aristotle/ [9] in which he argues that the unmoved movers are really principles of intelligibility analogous to Newton's laws of motion. By this interpretation he attempts to extricate Aristotle from the difficulties in which traditional interpretations have entangled him by insisting that much of Aristotle's language is metaphorical and even mythical.

Randall argues that Aristotle's First Philosophy, i.e., the science of any existent as existent, sustained a relation to Aristotle's physics analogous to the relation of mathematics and mathematical logic to modern physics. He characterizes mathematics and logic as the " metaphysics " of modern science in the Aristotelian sense of" first philosophy." Contemporary mathematics sets forth the formal structure or order which makes natural processes intelligible. " In very much the same sense," Randall argues, "Aristotle's First Philosophy is the 'metaphysics' growing out of his logic and biology . . . . " [30]

Given this view of Aristotle's metaphysics, it is a small step

•• John Herman Randall. *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). For an excellent critical review of Randall's book, see Troy Organ, "Randall's lnterpretation of Aristotle's Unmov•ed Mover," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (October, 1962), pp. 3-11.

[80] Randall, *Aristotle*, p. 110.

to conclude that the first mover of *Metaphysics* lambda is only a principle of intelligibility. Randall correctly points out that for Aristotle motion has no efficient cause, but it must have a "reason why," a *Oto r£;* and to discover this "reason why " is not to attempt to find a cause of motion but rather to discover its function. Randall asks:

> How are we to understand the fact that it is motion, and only motion, that " causes" motion, world without end? The answer to this question will be a principle of intelligibility: it will be the *arche* of motion. In our own physics, motion is understood in terms of the "laws of motion," Newtonian or Einsteinian. Aristotle's answer, the Unmoved Mover, is just such an answer to just such a question: it is the Aristotelian counterpart of Newton's *principia mathematica* of motion, the laws of motion, the laws of motion of the science of dynamics.[31]

One fact that Randall uses to support his view is that the unmoved mover is not a creator either of motion or of anything else. From this Randall concludes that " it is a logical explanation, not a physical cause, a natural law, not a force .... It is an *arche,* a principle of intelligibility, a ' reason why.' "[32]

Because Randall views the unmoved mover as a principle of intelligibility rather than a physical cause, he insists that it is a principle of physics rather than a principle of metaphysics. " Book Lambda," he says, " thus has no real place in Aristotle's metaphysics, taken as his mature First Philosophy." Randall goes on to assert that it has no place in theology either and "is not to be identified with' God,' in any Moslem, Jewish, or Christian sense."[33] The reasons Randall gives for this are that the unmoved mover does not create anything; it does not sustain the world; in fact, it does not even know the world and does not have the power of intelligence in the' sense in which man is intelligent.

Randall concludes that since Aristotle's unmoved mover has no power, no knowledge, and no moral or religious relevance; inasmuch as there are really fifty-five unmoved movers corresponding to the fifty-five heavenly motions to be explained;

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 184. [32] *Ibid.,* p. 135. [33] *Ibid.,* p. 136.

and since the unmoved mover is a purely intellectual idea and " the mature Aristotle did not understand and apparently had no interest in investigating " religion, it is a " colossal irony " that the medieval tradition made use of Aristotle's thought. [34] Obviously Randall interprets book lambda in purely naturalistic terms, a task which he must reconcile with the language of the book. For there can be little doubt that the terminology of book lambda is not the language of a scientist-a fact to which Randall agrees. He observes that Aristotle was in general a poor writer, and his language is usually technical. There are, however, a few passages which exhibit what Randall calls " artistic form," among which is " One swallow does not make a summer," the eloquent passages in the *Ethics* on friendship, and the description of the unmoved mover in book lambda. Randall argues that, although Aristotle's thought is thol'oughly naturalistic, his feelings and em(otions in book lambda clearly are not. He admits that the language and metaphors-even the " religious exaltation "-are all theistic; but they are to be compared to statements such as Dante's line, '"Tis Love that makes the world go round!" [35]

Randall retreats somewhat from his earlier contention that the unmoved mover is comparable to Newton's laws of motion, for to Aristotle it would be unintelligible to talk in terms of blind forces of nature, such as Newtonian inertia. For rationalists like Aristotle (and Whitehead), "there must be a force like 'love '-desire, aspiration, the striving toward perfection. That is what makes men go round; and if men are a fair sampling of nature, that may be what makes nature go round too." [36] Randall argues that there are two " logics " interacting here-the "logic of perfection," the logic of the lover's discourse and the " logic of existence," the logic of physics and natural science. Randall's conclusion is that Aristotle unites the two " logics " in the language of myth, analogous to the "likely language" of Plato's *Timaeus.* "The Unmoved l\1over may well be called a Platonic myth, like the ' Active Intellect '

•• *Ibid.* [85] *Ibid.,* p. 188. [86] *Ibid.,* pp. 188-89.

of the *De Anima."* [87] The mythical element is not the positing of fifty-five separate unmoved movers-this is to be taken literally-but rather the unification of them into a single cosmic unmoved mover.

But if God is the highest activity in the world, what must he be? Aristotle himself answers that this activity must be pure understanding, pure *nous.* Randall adds: "For Aristotle, indeed for any Greek, the perfected functioning of *nou.<f* must be a 'life.' It is ' the life of *nous,'* the 'life of reason': that is, *nous* eternally present to the highest object it can conceive, itself." [88] Randall then poses two additional questions: (I) Does God exist "apart from" the world? and (2) Where is *nous* actualized? In answer to the first question, Randall says that to be consistent Aristotle would have to answer" No, God could not possibly exist apart from the world. God is the form of the world's matter, the *energeia* and *entelecheia* of its *dynameis,* and he would be nothing without the world in which he is an essential factor." [89] In answer to the second question, Randall argues that *nous,* i.e., the unmoved mover, does not sustain a separate, ideal existence. He states, "To be consistent, Aristotle must answer " that *nous* is actualized only " in the minds of men." [90]

Randall's interpretation of book lambda of the *lJ!letaphysics* must be challenged at several points. The most basic of these is that his understanding of what metaphysics was for Aristotle is faulty. It is just not the case that modern mathematics and mathematical logic sustain the same relation to contemporary physics that Aristotle's First Philosophy sustained to his philosophy of nature. In the first place, mathematics today is used in theory construction and in axiomatiza.tion. Foundational mathematics is postulated as a mathematical model, and mathematicians do not (or at least should not) claim that they are accounting for the most general features of reality. [91] In-

[87] *Ibid.,* p. 141.

[88] *Ibid.,* p. 142. Cf. *Metaphysics* 1074b 30.

[89] *Ibid.,* p. 143. citing *Metaphysics* 1075• ll-15.

[90] *Ibid* .. p. 144.

[91] I owe this observation to J. M. E. Moravcsik's review of Randall's book in *Archiv fUr Geschichte der Philosophie* 44 (1962), pp. 204-09.

deed, many modern logicians think that an attempt to uncover the nature of ultimate reality is not only outside the realm of mathematics, it is impossible. For Aristotle, on the other hand, First Philosophy was foundational science-the science of being *qua* being-and was his attempt to investigate the nature of the most general and ultimate reality. If modern mathematicians are offended today by metaphysics, they will be offended by Aristotle's First Philosophy as well.

Randall is perfectly justified in his insistence that Aristotle was a naturalist. But Randall goes too far when he assumes that it is impossible for a naturalist to be at all interested in theology or to include within his metaphysics any reference to a supreme substance. consistently interprets all references in Aristotle to the unmoved mover as purely " artistic form " or a mythical union of the logics of perfection and existence. Yet one fact that Randall seems to overlook-and this is devastating to his interpretation-is that Aristotle seemingly did not wish to continue the mythical explanations of his predecessors. In chapter 8 of lambda, after describing the unity of the prime mover, Aristotle adds what is almost a footnote:

> Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expedience; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone-that they thought the first substances to be gods, one must regard this as an inspired utterance. . . .[42]

Aristotle's intention seems perfectly clear: he wishes to demythologize the ancient traditions, stripping away the personifications, especially the anthropomorphisms and the anthropopathisms that were added. But he retains the central insight that the first substances are divine, i.e., they are gods. The

•• *Metaphysics* 1074b 1-10.

term " theology " is used in book lambda to describe First Philosophy, but it is used in book epsilon the same way.' [3] While discarding the mythical element in the ancient traditions, Aristotle did not go so far as to strip the first movers of their divine status. Obviously Aristotle did not consider calling the first movers " gods " a mythical use of language.

Consider also Randall's contention that the unmoved mover cannot exist apart from the world. I£ the unmoved mover is just a principle of intelligibility, it may be the case that God is only the form of the world's matter. In other words, the notion that the unmoved mover is only the *energeia* and *entelecheia* of the world's *dynameis* depends upon Randall's insistence that the first mover is only a principle of intelligibility. Aristotle insisted that motion was eternal and self-sufficient; consequently the unmoved mover would likewise be eternal and self-sufficient. Randall, in effect, denies this Aristotelian doctrine when he insists that *nous* is actualized only in the minds of men. I£ the unmoved mover could not exist apart from the world, it would be the case that the first mover is contingent. But this is not Aristotle's doctrine. He explicitly states:

> The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle .... On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. [44]

The unmoved mover is more than the actuality of the world's potentiality. It is true that he is the "order of the parts " of the universe, but he is this by virtue of sustaining a separate existence from the world, just as the general of an army sustains a separate existence from the troops. The unmoved mover is not simply the *esprit de corps,* as Randall would have it; he is the commandant, to extend the metaphor, who is not only a principle of order but a separate existent. Randall seems to misinterpret the very passage he cites, in defense of his contention that God cannot exist apart from the world.

•• *Ibid.,* 1025b-I026• 33.

•• *Ibid.,* 1072b 10-14

A further argument against the view that, for Aristotle, *nous* is actualized only in the minds of men is chapter 7 of book lambda which describes the nature of *nous.*

> If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a, better state this compels it yet more. And God *is* in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this *is* God.[45]

Randall would probably insist that this is mere poetic language, the point of which is that the unmoved mover is an ideal which transcends the world as its ideal end. It is true that the first mover is an ideal which transcends the world, but this can be only by virtue of the fact that the first mover sustains a separate existence from the world. Aristotle is explicit on this point in his conclusion to chapter 7 of book lambda. "It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things." [46] On the basis of this text, it is impossible to conclude that the first mover is only a principle of intelligibility actualized in the minds of men.

Perhaps part of the attractiveness Randall's solution offers is that it provides a way of reconciling the problem of the number of unmoved movers as presented in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics.* But it does so at the expense of distorting the explicit statements of Aristotle. It is one thing to come to a study of Aristotle from the problems of twentieth-century logicians and American pragmatists. It is quite another thing to remake Aristotle into a twentieth-century naturalist.

TowARD A RAPPROCHEMENT

A better solution to the difficulty of resolving the question of the number of unmoved movers would be to find a way to make Aristotle consistent without introducing naturalistic

[45] *Ibid.,* 1072b 24-29. [46] *Ibid.,* 1078• 8-4.

biases. One possibility is suggested by Professor Wolfson, who observes that the key to understanding the disputed passages in the *Physics* is the term "first." He notes: "Now in *Physics* VIII, 6, it will be noticed, in the two places where the question of a plurality of movers is raised, the subject of the question is not simply ' movers ' but rather ' first immovable mover ' or 'first mover.'" [47] In the first interpolation in *Physics* VIII, 6 (25Sb 10) Aristotle merely suggests the possibility of a plurality of first movers. In the second interpolation (259a 7-13) he considers the problem in some detail. Aristotle insists that " it is sufficient to assume only one movent " and describes this as the " first of unmoved things." He then concludes the passage with the statement that " the following argument also makes it evident that the first movent must be something that is one and eternal." [48] Wolfson understands the passage in the following way.

> From all these [arguments] it may be gathered that in this chapter, as it now stands, Aristotle started with the assumption that there were many immovable movers, at the head of which was a first immovable mover, and it is with regard to this first immovable mover that he raised the question whether there was one or more than one and decided that there was one.[49]

With his typical thoroughness Aristotle then considers the question of whether the movement of the " first " unmoved mover is analogous to the movement of animals, which in a sense are self-movers also. He concludes that the self-movement of the animals is not strictly originated by them but is wholly due to such things as increase, decrease, respiration, and nourishment, which are caused by the atmosphere and the other things that enter into them. Aristotle calls self-motion of this type " accidental " motion but insists that the first unmoved mover must be unmoved even accidentially. [50]

[07] Harry A. Wolfson, "Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes" *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press LXlli (1958), 285, citing *Physics* Vlll, 6, 25Sb 10-12 and 259• 7-18.

•• *Physics* 259[1] 15.

•• Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. !!85.

•• *Physics* 259b !!0-!!5.

Aristotle further distinguishes between two kinds of accidental motion: (I) "accidental motion of a thing by itself" and accidental "motion by something else." The former kind of accidental motion is the motion of animals; the latter belongs "to certain first principles of heavenly bodies." [51] Although Aristotle does not draw the conclusion suggested by this statement, it is obvious that the intended conclusion is that the heavenly spheres, which are moved accidentally "by something else," derive their motion from the circular motion of the outer sphere, which is moved by the first mover. But the first mover is unmoved even accidentally.

Why did Aristotle make this distinction between the two kinds of accidental motion? Wolfson argues that it is for the purpose of asserting that the heavenly movers are transcendent and do not exist in the spheres of which they are movers. This is in contrast to the souls of animals which are moved accidentally by the motion which is produced in the animal. [52]

The upshot of all this is that the *Physics* insists that there are many unmoved movers-one for each celestial sphere-which are moved accidentally by the motion of the outer heaven. These movers, unlike the self-motion of the animals, are transcendent final causes. The motion of the outer heaven is caused by the first unmoved mover, which cannot even be moved accidentally.

The Unmoved Movers in the Metaphysics

The first issue to be decided is whether the *Metaphysics* assumes the distinction of the *Physics* or whether it can be treated separately apart from these distinctions. Wolfson makes a strong case for the view that Aristotle implicitly assumed the distinctions of *Physics* VIII in book lambda of the *Metaphysics.* It must be admitted that Aristotle does not strictly state in *Metaphysics* XII, 8 that the planetary movers are "separated," but even Jaeger asserts that this is surely

[51] *Physics* 259b 28.

[52] Wolfson, *op. cit.,* pp. 237-38.

what he had in mind.[53] While admitting that Aristotle does not explicitly describe the planetary movers as moved accidentally, Wolfson argues that Aristotle implicitly assumes this.

> In his description of the first immovable mover under the name of "the principle and the first of beings" or "the first and immovable substance," he says that it is " immovable both essentially *(KaO'avro)* and accidentally *(Kara uvp.{3€{37JK6<>),* "but, when from the fact that the eternal spatial motion of the universe requires a first immovable mover he raises the question whether the eternal spatial motions of the planets similarly require immovable movers, he drops the terms "accidentally" and argues only from the existence of a " first mover " who must be "immovable essentially " to the existence of a " substance " as the mover of each planetary sphere which is also "immovable essentially." [54]

The crucial point is that Aristotle never describes the planetary movers as *first* movers; he reserves this term for the mover he describes as the first principle which is not movable either in itself or accidentally.[55] The planetary movers are described as only " first and another second according to the same order as the movements of the stars .... " "[6]

In light of *Physics* VIII, 6, it seems obvious that Aristotle applies the distinctions concerning accidental motion in book lambda of the *Metaphysics.* As Wolfson notes, "Aristotle assumes that the mover of the planetary spheres are movable accidentally, with the qualification, of course, as stated in the third passage in *Physics* VIII, 6, that they are movable accidentally, not by themselves, but by something else."[57] This "something else" is the first immovable mover, which is neither moved essentially nor accidentally.

Seen from the vantage point of this interpretation of *Metaphysics* XII, 8, the interpolation at 1074a 32 ff. becomes less of a problem. Aristotle is simply arguing that the first unmoved mover is one both in species and number. Without going

•• Jaeger, *op. cit.,* p. 861.
'"Wolfson, *op. cit.,* p. 288, citing *Metaphysics* XII, 8 1078• 28-27.
[55] *Metaphysics* XII, 8, 1078• *25.*
•• *Ibid.,* 1074b 1.
[57] Wolfson, *op. cit.,* p. 289.

into the details of Aristotle's argument at this point it can be noted that his proof applies only to the *first* unmoved mover. His conclusion is: "So the unmovable first is one both in definition and in number; so too, therefore, is that which is moved always and continuously; therefore there is one heaven alone." [58] The important thing to note in this passage, Wolfson points out, is that " the unity in both species and number is established only with regard to the first immovable mover, that first immovable mover which previously in the same chapter he has described as being ' immovable both essentially and accidentally.' " [59]

But how can there be a plurality of planetary movers? Unfortunately, Aristotle does not tell us explicitly, and we are forced to reconstruct-as accurately as possible-a good Aristotelian answer. The genus of all the planetary movers is the same, viz., they are immaterial, immovabable movers. Since matter is the principle of individuation, and since the planetary movers are immaterial, they can be many in number only if each is a pure form comprising a separate species by virtue of the fact that each planetary mover moves a different planetary sphere. This is the interpretation favored by both Wolfson and Ross. [60] It should be noted, however, that at best this and all other similar interpretations of the problem are reconstructions and as such may not have been the answer that Aristotle himself would have given. The interpretation suggested above does offer a viable solution to the question of the number of unmoved movers without violating any Aristotelian principle and makes Aristotle consistent without reading into the text points of view which Aristotle did not share.

This rapprochment between the *Physics* and the *Meta-; physics* is based on the assumption, for which I have argued above, that book lambda of the *Metaphysics* assumes the distinctions of the *Physics.* But not all interpreters agree on this point. Joseph Owens, for one, objects to any solution

•• *Metaphysics* XII, 8, 1074• 36ff.

•• Wolfson, *op. cit.,* p. 240.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 241, and W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. cxxxiv-cxl.

which considers the first unmoved mover to be immobile both essentially and accidentally while considering the planetary movers to be unmoved essentially but not accidentally. He states: "This distinction applies to the Movers of the *Physics* (Ph., VIII 6, The Movers of the *Metaphysics,* however, have absolutely no matter, nor are they forms of matter. So they cannot be mobile in any way whatsoever. Cf. A 6, 107lb ." [61] Owens seems to be assuming two things here: (1) the unmoved movers of the *Physics* and the unmoved movers of the *Metaphysics* are two different classes of entity; and the unmoved movers of the *Physics* are material substances, whereas the unmoved movers of the *Metaphysics* are not. The thrust of the preceding sections of this essay has been to argue against the first assumption by showing that the unmoved movers of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* are identical. The second assumption is completely without foundation in the *Physics.* Nowhere in the *Physics* does Aristotle state that the planetary movers are material substances. Moreover, Aristotle devotes the last chapter of *Physics* VIII to the task of proving that the first unmoved mover is without magnitude. A similar argument with regard to the planetary movers would have been fairly straightforward for Aristotle, but it has already been shown that Aristotle's concern in the *Physics* was initially the first unmoved mover and references to the planetary movers were added later. This would explain why Aristotle did not offer such a proof.

Owens' reference to *Metaphysics* 1071b17 is really irrelevant to his argument. Aristotle is here arguing against those who identify the planetary movers with Platonic forms. His point is that the planetary movers are pure act and of necessity can have no admixture of potentiality. Although it is true that the planetary movers are not forms of matter, as Owens points out, they nonetheless can be conceived as pure forms. Even Owens admits that this is the only way they can be .a plurality. [62]

[61] Owens, *op. cit.,* p. 415, n. 41.

[62] Joseph Owens, "The Reality of the Aristotelian Separate Movers," *The*

Further light is shed on the subject at *Metaphymcs* 1073!l U-23.

> The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or accidentally, but produces the primary eternal and single movement. But . . . since we see that besides the simple spatial movements of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements-those of the planets-which are eternal . . . each of *these* movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal.

The view being defended in this article is that Aristotle here assumes the distinctions of *Physics* VIII, exemplified by the fact that he reserves for the *first* unmoved mover the description "not movable either in itself or accidentally." But when referring to the planetary movers he only says that they are unmovable *per se* and eternal. Why does Aristotle not say of them that they too are unmoved accidentally? Precisely because they receive their accidental motion from the first unmoved mover; yet they are unmoved essentially *(per se)* and are therefore eternal.

Owens, however, objects to this interpretation of *Metaphysics* 1073a 24-34.

> The difficulty in drawing this interpretation out of the text, however, is that in the latter sentence Aristotle refers to the First Mover and the other]\lovers in exactly the same terms-" *per se* immoble and eternal" (a27; 33-34). If he had meant any contrast, he should *in this sentence,* have characterized the First Mover as per accidens immobile, and not in the preceding sentence where only the First Mover was in question.[63]

It is difficult to understand why Owens says that Aristotle refers. to the First Mover and the other Movers in " exactly the same terms," for the subject under discussion in the latter

Review of Metaphysics, III (March, 1950), 333-34. Owens denies that there is a distinction here between the first unmoved mo¥er and the planetary movers, but he does state that " They are all forms without matter, distinct only by the fact of being different forms; and even this distinction is known to men only through the order of the heavenly motions."

•• Owens, *The Doctrine of Being,* p. 415, n. 41.

part of the text at *Metaphysics* 1073a is not the first mover at all but only the planetary movers. Evidence for this is the fact that the demonstrative pronoun *rovrwv* in line 33 refers back to TCIS row a present active participle, which is in apposition to *aAAa<; cf>0pas OV(Ja<;.* In other words, the first unmoved mover is in no sense the subject of the last part of the citation.

It is also precarious to state with assurance what Aristotle *should* have written. And it does not follow that Aristotle should have made the distinction between the two kinds of motion in the last sentence, as Owens claims. For if one accepts the view that the distinctions of the *Physics* are assumed in the *Metaphysics,* there would be no particular reason for Aristotle to repeat them. Note, too, that in lines 31 and (at 1073a) Aristotle states: "for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises." This is a reference to *Physics* VIII-the same book in which Aristotle introduced the distinctions between essential immobility *(per se)* and accidental immobility *(per accidens).* What further evidence is needed to justify the claim that Aristotle is assuming throughout the the prior treatment of the subject in the *Physics?*

If the view argued for in this article is accepted, any difficulty in reconciling Aristotle's treatment of the unmoved mover in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* disappears. By applying the distinction of *Physics* VIII to the discussion of the unmoved mover in *Metaphysics* lambda, one can make Aristotle consistent without doing violence to the Aristotelian texts. In the *Physics* Aristotle distinguishes between essential immobility and accidental immobility. The *first* unmoved mover is immobile both essentially and accidentally. The planetary movers, in contrast, are unmoved essentially but not accidentally. The implication is that the planetary movers receive their accidental motion from the *first* unmoved mover, which moves the outer sphere. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state in the *Metaphysics* that the planetary movers are not unmoved accidentally, this poses no problem if one agrees (as

there is good reason to) that he is assuming the distinctions of *Physics* VIII. But it is worthy of note that Aristotle does 1eserve for the *first* unmoved mover alone the designation of being unmoved both essentially and accidentally.

The upshot of this is that there seems to be in Aristotle a hierarchy of being implicit in the doctrine of the unmoved mover. The first unmoved mover is prior in that it is unmoved both essentially and accidentally, whereas the planetary movers are only unmoved essentially. The first unmoved mover is also prior in the sense that the planetary movers receive additional motion from the movement of the outer heaven, which is moved by the first unmoved mover.

A MEDIEVAL PERSPECTIVE

It adds weight to the interpretation being defended in this study to discover that it is consistent with the Thomistic understanding of the Aristotelian doctrine of the unmoved mover. One would perhaps have to admit that St. Thomas was a little too anxious to identify Aristotle's unmoved mover with the father of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but this is beside the point. Many modern commentators on St. Thomas and his Aristotelianism candidly point out that the Prime Mover of Aristotle is not the Christian's God. But Owens, and other interpreters of Thomas, are left in somewhat of a quandry if they insist, as Owens does, that all fifty-five planetary movers are ontologically equal with the first unmoved mover. It leaves Aristotle in a hopeless inconsistency and causes interpreters to puzzle themselves as to the reason Aristotle left the text of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* in such terrible shape.

I have argued that there is a hierarchy among the unmoved movers. The planetary movers are immobile only *per se,* whereas the first unmoved mover is unmoved both *per se* and *per accidens.* This is exactly the way in which Thomas Aquinas interpreted Aristotle. In *Surnrna Contra Gentiles,* Book One, Thomas basically followed the same line of argument used by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* XII, while at the same time assuming the distinctions made in the *Physics.* The following citation verifies this.

> Again, we see that among beings that move themselves some initiate a new motion as a result of some motion. This new motion is other than the motion by which an animal moves itself, for example, digested food or altered air. By such a motion the self-moving mover is moved by accident. From this we may infer that no self-moved being is moved everlasting whose mover is moved either by itself or by accident. But the first self-mover is everlastingly in motion; otherwise, motion could not be everlasting, since every other motion is caused by the motion of the self-moving first mover. The first self-moving being, therefore, is moved by a mover who is himself moved neither through himself nor by accident. [64]

This is practically a paraphrase from *Physics* VIII. In reference to the planetary spheres, Thomas comments:

> Nor is it against this argument that the movers of the lower spheres produce an everlasting motion and yet are said to be moved by accident. For they are said to be moved by accident, not on their own account, but on account of their movable subjects, which follow the motion of the higher sphere. [65]

That Thomas goes on to refer continually to the *Physics* in the same context is proof enough that in interpreting the *Metaphysics* he assumes the distinctions of the *Physics.*

In Book II of the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* chapter *95,* Thomas offers a solution to the problem of how genus and species are to be taken in separate substances. His conclusion is that each separate substance comprises a separate species and that there is a hierarchy of "diverse grades." This is the same conclusion reached in the disputed question *On Spiritu.al Creatures,* Article 8. The ways in which St. Thomas departed from Aristotle so as to identify the Aristotelian separate substances with angels is sketched out in his *Treatise On Separate Substances,* Chapter 2. It is not the purpose of this essay to go into detail at this point. But the important thing to note is that St. Thomas did not naively identify God with the first mover of Aristotle, nor did he glibly identify the planetary

[64] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* trans. Antoo C. Pegis (New York: Doubleday Image Books, 1955), Book I, 13, fl6.

[65] *Ibid.,* Book I, 13, 27.

movers with angels. Rather, these items are to be considered within the context of Thomas's total philosophical system.

CONCLUSION

One can certainly accept the textual criticism of Jaeger without involving Aristotle in hopeless contradictions, but one is by no means forced to Randall's position which brings a degree of consistency to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by impugning the substantial reality of the unmoved movers. It has been shown in this article that the argument of the *Metaphysics* flows smoothly without contradiction if one applies the distinctions of *Physics* VIII. This was doubtless Aristotle's intention, and the interpretation of the *Metaphysics* by Thomas Aquinas likewise proceeds along these lines. It is also significant to observe that nowhere in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* does Thomas find the hopeless contradictions that have plagued modern interpreters.

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DEELY AND GEACH ON ABSTRACTIONISM IN THOMISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

IN THE JANUARY, 1971 issue of *The Thomist,* there appeared a quite long and involved article by John N. Deely entitled "Animal Intelligence and Concept Formation." Deely admits that the provocation of the article was his reading of Peter Geach's *Mental Acts.*[1] As Deely notes, Mortimer Adler, in his *The Difference in Man and the Difference It* remarks that Professor Geach had adequately treated the theory of abstractionism and had found it to be epistemologically wanting. Adler appeared convinced by Geach's arguments. Furthermore, Geach purported to find support for his anti-abstractionist position in the writings of St. Thomas. In *Mental Acts,* Geach both explicitly quotes and makes allusions to the *Summa Theologiae* on numerous occasions. Moreover, Geach includes an appendix exclusively devoted to a "Historical Note" on "Aquinas and Abstractionism." Throughout his text Geach affirms that St. Thomas would structurally agree with his own remarks on the epistemological errors latent in the theory of abstractionism.

Deely is very much concerned about Geach's negative critique of abstractionism and its relation to St. Thomas's epistemology. He explicitly proclaims that he has a two-fold goal in his article; he intends to show the "utter absurdity" of:

a. Geach's historical claim-" that the 'mature Aquinas' was not an abstractionist ";

[1] Peter Geach, *Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects* (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, Ltd.).

[2] John Deely, "Animal Intelligence and Concept-Formation," *The Thomist,* XXXV (January, 1971), pp. 43-93.

b. Geach's personal claim-" that the ' whole idea ' of abstraction is completely incoherent." [3]

In this article I intend to argue that Deely has conceptually blurred two aspects of Geach's treatment of abstractionism. First of all, I believe that Geach's comments are intricately connected with the "use theory of meaning." Although Deely notes that Geach begins from a linguistic basis-and Deely finds fault with this beginning point for a philosophical analysis [4]-he seems unaware of the great significance played in Geach's critique by the "use theory of meaning." Secondly, I believe that Deely has misunderstood the structural account of abstractionism as used by Geach and *a fortimi* of abstractionism as found in the epistemological treatises written in the analytic tradition of British Philosophy since 1900. Accordingly, I believe that if Geach is to be understood in his critique of abstractionism, a necessary condition for such an understanding is both an awareness of the connection of the "use theory of meaning " to Geach' s analysis as well as a thorough elucidation of the concept of " abstractionism " as utilized by the early twentieth-century analytic philosophers. Furthermore, I believe that only in this light can Geach's claims about St. Thomas's epistemology and abstractionism be critically evaluated.

In order to understand Geach's position on abstractionism, it would be well to begin with Geach's own description of this purported epistemological process:

> I shall use "abstractionism" as a name for the doctrine that a concept is acquired by a process of singling out in attention some one feature given in direct *experience-abstracting* it-and ignoring the other .features simultaneously *given-abstracting* from them. [5]

Geach is arguing that a process of singling out discriminative data in direct experience-what has been referred to as " direct acquaintance "-is not a sufficient condition for an analysis of the acquisition of concepts. Furthermore, it must be re-

• *Ibid.,* p. *56.* • *Ibid.,* p. 89 ff. 'Geach, p. 18.

membered that Geach is concerned over how we acqmre a meaningful command of language. [6]

A *prima facie* consideration of these remarks by Geach would indicate that St. Thomas could hardly be used in support of Geach's anti-abstractionist position. It is obvious to any reader even vaguely familiar with the Thomistic epistemological texts that the term "*abstractio*" and its various derivatives appear quite frequently when St. Thomas considers both concept-formation through the workings of the *intellectus agens* and the actual understanding of a concept by means of the *intellectus possibilis.* Nevertheless, I will argue that Geach's remarks must not be immediately dismissed. First of all, one must discuss the structure of the concept of "abstractionism" as criticized by Geach in *Mental Acts.* It is only after this elucidation has been accomplished that one can justifiably make a judgment as to whether or not St. Thomas would agree with Geach's critique of abstractionism.

A consideration of *Mental Acts* might best begin with a brief discussion of the philosophical milieu in which this epistemology text first appeared. *Mental Acts* was published in 1957. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* was posthumously published in Ryle's *Concept of Mind* was in its first edition in 1949. The philosophical insights and discussions of both Wittgenstein and Ryle, I believe, must be considered as contextual material for an enlightened understanding of *Mental Acts.* Both books are an example of what has come to be called "Ordinary Language Philosophy." Geach himself follows this philosophical methodology in some of his analytical work. This methodology is characterized by the systematic attempt to provide "conceptual elucidations" of puzzling philosophical

[6] Geach analyzes a concept as an acquired mental disposition. A concept is defined by Geach as a "mental capacity belonging to a particular person." (*Mental Acts,* p. 13) This is connected with a theory of language in that Geach argues that "...the central and typical applications of the term 'having a concept' are those in which a man is master of a bit of linguistic usage." (/bid.) That St. Thomas used a dispositional view in analyzing both the formation and the exercise of concepts is apparent in his remarks in his *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul,* Nos. 359-361.

concepts. Another way of describing this methodology is that ordinary language philosophers attempt to discover the" logic" of various concepts and expressions found in philosophical discourse. Understanding the" logic" of a concept is analogous to what scholastic philosophers have called "understanding the nature of a thing." That Geach places his allegiance with ordinary language philosophy is explicitly stated in *Mental Acts* when Geach describes his philosophical task as one of providing an elucidation of the " logical role " of " mental language ":

> Such and such object expressions are used in describing these mental acts; what is the logical role of these expressions?

Not only is Geach to be associated with ordinary language philosophy, but he is also a Wittgensteinian. During the 1950's the *Philosophical Investigations* was serving as a philosophical spring-board for much creative and useful analysis. It is no understatement to affirm that the *Investigations* revolutionized analytic philosophy. I believe *Mental Acts* is the result of Geach's reflections on both the methodology and the insights of Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks.

Some philosophers, however, were claiming that Wittgenstein himself was arguing against the existence and meaningfulness of mental activity. That Ryle's "Descartes' Myth" chapter in *The Concept of Mind* [8] strongly attacked mental activity associated with the " ghost in the machine " is quite obvious. Accordingly, in light of Wittgenstein's remarks in the *Inve,<?tigations* on "private language" and the general consideration of public rules as necessary criteria for language games, it was being claimed that Wittgenstein himself was structurally a type of Watsonian behaviorist. One of Geach's primary claims in *Mental Acts* is that it is philosophically mistaken to attribute behaviorism and its corresponding denied of mental activity to Wittgenstein. Accordingly, Geach argues that the Wittgen-

• Geach, p. 2.

[8] Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), Chapter I, pp. 11-24.

steinian account of language and an elucidation of the language of mental activity are not incompatible. Quite the contrary, Geach will explicitly utilize the " use theory of meaning " m providing his own acount of mental activity.

The following passage is illustrative of Geach's position m interpreting Wittgenstein's view of mental activity:

> Wittgenstein has been understood as denying the existence of mental acts; and certain remarks of his about "private language" are very easily taken this way. I am sure, however, that I have not so far maintained anything Wittgenstein would have attacked. Of course, Wittgenstein did not want to deny the obvious truth that people have a "private" mental life, in the sense that they have for example thoughts they do not utter and pains they do not show; nor did he try to analyse away this truth in a neo-behaviouristic fashion. In one of his lectures he mentioned Lytton Strachey's imaginative description of Queen Victoria's dying thoughts. He expressly repudiated the view that such description is meaningless because "unverifiable"; it has meaning, he said, but only through its connexion with a wider, public "language game" of describing people's thoughts; he used the simile that a chess-move worked out in a sketch of a few squares on a scrap of paper has significance through its connexion with the whole practice of chess. It is useful to observe Frege's distinction of sense *(Sinn)* and reference *(Bedeutung)* in stating Wittgenstein's position; what Wittgenstein wanted to deny was not the private *reference* of psychological expressions-e. g., that "pain" stands for a kind of experience that may be quite "private"-but the possibility of giving a private *"sense* "-e. g., of giving sense to the word "pain" by just attending to one's own pain-experience, a performance that would be private and

The above passage, although quite lengthy, is important in that Geach explicitly argues that Wittgenstein was not denying the existence of mental acts. Rather, Wittgenstein is to be interpreted as providing an analysis of the " logic " of mental language in terms of a " public language game." In examining Wittgenstein's remarks on private language I have found Geach's illustration using Frege's "sense" and "reference" distinction to be quite illuminating. The sense-i. e., the mean-

• Geach, pp. 8-4.

ing or significance of a term will always be in the context of the " use " of a term in a public language game. This is also what Geach is referring to when he discusses the notion of a " practice " in the above quotation. Furthermore, the " use " or "practice" of a term is always determined or satisfied by public criteria. I believe this analysis by the means of a " use theory of meaning" whose criteria of significance is always public is a crucial insight into why Geach argues so vehemently against abstractionism. That Geach considers abstractionism as connected with a " private language " is indicated in the following passage:

> The view that psychological words are given a sense in this way (i.e., by private introspection) is part of a theory *(abstractionism,* as I shall call it) which Wittgenstein rejected *in toto* and not only as regards psychological words. [10]

It is apparent that Geach considers abstractionism as opposed to the "use theory of meaning." Having accepted such a Wittgensteinian view of meaningful discourse, Geach is quite concerned to show that abstractionism, with its affirmation of private direct acquaintance, cannot be a necessary condition for the obtaining of a concept, which concept is manifested through the speaker's command of language.

> The central and typical applications of the term "having a concept" are those in which a man is a master of a bit of linguistic usage. [11]

Accordingly, *Mental Acts* is an attempt to develop a "logic" of mental terms using the "use theory of meaning."

Furthermore, it is important to note that Geach believes that Ryle is philosophically mistaken in reducing mental activity to a set of counterfactual conditional propositions about physical activity. [12] Geach is interested in showing that "reports of mental acts are logically different from reports of physical acts. " [13] In theory, it seems to me that such an

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 4.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 13.
[12] *Ibid.,* pp. 4-7.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 4.

analysis is a necessary condition for the scholastic distinction between *esse intentionale* and *esse reale.* Furthermore, I believe that it is obvious that Aquinas would hold that mental activity belongs to a different category than does physical activity. Textually, in his *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Sottl,* St. Thomas explicitly argues that a mental act, both as an acquired disposition and as an exercise of that disposition, is not to be classified as a physical change.[14] Insofar as this is the case, Geach is obviously quite different from Ryle in his theory and structure of mental activity. Geach is ultimately claiming that it is a "category mistake "-to use Ryle's term-to have the same "logic of discourse " apply to both physical and mental activity. I am sure that Ryle would not admit such a distinction into his epistemological discussions.[15] Geach will affirm the existence of mental acts. He does this by showing that the "logic" for mental terms is not the same as the "logic" of physical terms. So far, I believe that St. Thomas can agree with everything Geach has claimed. This is not to assert that St. Thomas adopted fully the " use theory of meaning"; however, there are instances in which Aquinas

[14] Nos. *365-369, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul.* That St. Thomas's analysis i:n this present set of texts depends upon a matter-form ontology is obvious. Nevertheless, mental activity and physical activity are placed in two separate categories in St. Thomas's epistemology.

[15] I am aware that considerable debate has ensued over whether Ryle's position in *The Concept of Mind* is that of a materialist-behaviorist. G. J. Warnock has the following interesting observations on this problem of analysis:

> There are here and there in Ryle's book some traces of a more extreme, and in a way much simpler thesis. This is the thesis that there *really exist* only bodies and other physical objects, that there *really occur* only physical events or processes, and that *all* statements ostensibly referring to minds are really categorical statements about current bodily behavior, or more commonly hypothetical statements about predicated bodily behavior; that, hence, there is really no such thing as a private, inner life at all, and that in principle everything about every individual could be known by sufficiently protracted observation of his bodily doings. . . . It cannot, I believe, be wholly an accident that many people have believed that Ryle's book presents this tlwsis.

G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy Since 1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 100-101.

The marked difference between Warnock's account of Ryle's position and the view expressed by Geach should be obvious.

explicitly philosophizes about the various uses of philosophical terms. [16]

The gist of my first argument is that Geach's comments on abstractionism are intimately connected with a " use theory of meaning." This is not to assume that a "use theory of meaning " is correct. Yet it must be admitted that many twentieth-century philosophers have been convinced of the tremendous significance of this Wittgensteinian theory of meaning. However, my present discussion does suggest that if Deely is correct in his refutation of Geach's critique of abstractionism, then he must also be prepared to discard the "use theory of meaning." Furthermore, I believe that Geach's implication that abstractionism is incompatible with a "use theory of meaning" is fundamentally sound. However, I can find no evidence in Deely's article that he was aware of any relationship existing between Geach's comments on abstractionism and the later Wittgensteinian theory of meaning as use. I do maintain, however, that if one is to critically evaluate Geach's account of abstractionism, then a necessary condition of such an evaluation is an acknowledgement of the incompatibility between " abstractionism " as Geach understands this concept and the " use theory of meaning."

That the presupposition of the " use theory of meaning " as being intricately connected with public "language games " is crucial to Geach's anti-abstractionist position should be apparent now. In addition, however, I believe that there is an extremely fundamental metaphysical issue that must be confronted in analyzing Geach's account of abstractionism. This issue involves the metaphysical analysis of the nature of mental activity. I do not know if Geach explicitly had this in mind when he wrote *Mental Acts*. However, Geach's consideration of the mind's ability to "make " a concept is, I believe, structurally opposed to the important points which will be made concerning epistemological theories formulated in

[16] *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul,* Nos. 359-361. In discussing the different senses of " act " and " potency " St. Thomas is using a methodology which is quite similar to the Wittgensteinian notion of " family resemblance. "

analytic philosophy previous to the advent of ordinary language philosophy.

One fruitful way to understand *Mental Acts* is to consider Geach as reacting against the epistemological theories espoused by Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and H. H. Price. This type of theory of knowledge is associated with the epistemological efforts of the early members of the analytic school of British Philosophy. This epistemological movement is structurally characterized by what I will call a "diaphanous mental act." Historically, this position goes back to Plato. Plato argued that knowledge is " acquaintance." Moreover, such a relation of "acquaintance" was Plato's structural reason for arguing for the theory of recollection in the *Phaedo.* The theory that knowledge is "acquaintance" states that in any type of awareness situation there is a strict relation between the knower and the object known. In other words, when there is a knowledge relation, there must be an *object* with which the mind is acquainted. In Plato's case, in order to explain the possibility of a knowledge of universals, he was structurally forced into asserting that at one time the mind was directly acquainted with the universal entities subsisting in the world of the forms. It is important to realize that if "to know P" is equivalent to "to be acquainted with P," then "P" must of necessity have some type of existence. Accordingly, the theory which postulates a diaphanous mental act is structurally connected with the axiom that " knowledge is acquaintance."

When Russell and Moore first reacted against Idealism-both the Absolute Idealism of Bradley, Bosanquet, and McTaggart as well as the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley-they took structural hints in epistemology from Plato. Philosophically, the Berkeleyian dictum, *Esse est Percipi,* was the crucial presupposition upon which Idealism rested. In attempting to philosophically refute this principal idealist presupposition Russell and Moore utilized structural notions from intentionality theory which had recently been discussed by Brentano and Meinong. This thesis of intentionality focused attention upon the act-object distinction. Moore emphatically endorsed this

distinction in his celebrated 1903 paper, "The Refutation of Idealism." What is important for our present consideration is not the embracing of intentionality theory or the acceptance of the act-object distinction but rather the Platonic characterization given to the mental act itself once the general tenets of intentionality theory were adopted into the epistemological accounts of Russell and Moore. The following passage from Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism" briefly describes the unstructured character of a mental act:

> ... the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see *what,* distinctly, it is it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous[17]

With the mental act having no structure or make-up of its own, it is completely determined by the object that it is aware of. When Russell discussed "knowledge by acquaintance," he was affirming the same status for a mental act of awareness. The following passage from Russell's *Analysis of Mind* should be noted:

> If there is a subject (knower), it can have a relation to the patch of color (or any object), namely, the sort of relation which we might call awareness.[18]

Such a characterization of a mental act has many implications for epistemology, most of which Geach himself in *Mental Acts* wants to avoid. It is at this point that I believe Deely has misunderstood Geach's study. "Abstractionism," as Geach understands this concept, is intricately connected with the diaphanous mental act of acquaintance. This mental act, moreover, is essentially Platonic in character.

In order to account for our everyday awarenesses, a diaphanous mental act forces the epistemologist into postulating all

[17] G. E. Mooore, "The Refutation of Idealism," *Mind,* N. S., XII (1903), as found in G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies* (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1965), p.

[18] Bertrand Russell, *An Analysis of Mind* (London: George Allen and Unwin, p. 141.

sorts of entities into his ontology. I believe the whole consideration of sense data, for example, as provided by Russell, Moore, and Price, was brought about because of the insistence by these epistemologists on a diaphanous mental act. The following passage from H. H. Price's *Perception* considers the relationship between " acquaintance " and the postulation of entities like sense data:

> This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is called *being given,* and that which is thus present is called a *datum.* The corresponding mental attitude is called *acquaintance, intuitive apprehension,* or sometimes *having.* Data of this special sort are called *sense data.* And the acquaintance with them is conveniently called *sensing*. . . . [19]

This passage from Price is important in that it is an explicit philosophical description of the requirement of an ontological entity to serve as object for the diaphanous mental awareness of acquaintance. The identification of " acquaintance " with " intuitive apprehension " will become extremely important when the discussion of " abstractionism " and " universals " begins. In addition to the postulation of sense data, in *So-me Main Proble-ms of Philosophy* Moore argues for the existence of " propositions " as ontological entities of which the mind is directly aware. [20] In other words, the term of the relation of " believing " is an entity called a proposition. " Believing " here is serving as a different species of the genus of " awareness." Russell, in *The Proble-ms of Philosophy,* likewise argued for the existence (or rather " subsistence," as Russell would

[19] H. H. Price, *Perception* (New York: McBride, 1933), p. 3. On this same topic, A. J. Ayer writes the following:

> What, according to them (Locke, Berkeley, Russell) is immediately given in perception is an evanescent object called an idea, or an impression, or a presentation, or a sense datum, which is not only private to a single observer, but private to a single sense.

A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (Edinburgh: Penguin Books, 1956), p. *85.* This passage is interesting in that it further elaborates upon the private character of direct acquaintance as demanded by a diaphanous mental act.

[20] G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Collier Books, 1953), Chapter III.

claim) o£ universals. [21] In addition, Russell's *Essays on Logical Atomism* [22] are prime examples o£ explicit claims £or the necessary postulation o£ " negative £acts," " general £acts," and " logical £acts." [23] The point I must insist upon-and I believe this is behind Geach's vehement critique of abstractionism-is that, i£ the mental act is indeed a diaphanous act of acquaintance or intuitive apprehension, there is a corresponding *a priori* necessity to postulate as many entities as objects of acts of awareness as there are unique species o£ awareness. The result o£ such an epistemological analysis and its corresponding ontological postulations is what Professor Quine has correctly called "the over-populated universe." As I shall presently argue, such " strange entities " are indeed quite foreign to Geach's epistemology. And as a diaphanous mental act demands these extra entities, so too is such a theory foreign to St. Thomas's epistemology.

I believe that the analysis o£ abstractionism and its accompanying problems is a necessary condition £or formulating a theory o£ mental acts which can philosophically alleviate the need o£ postulating many and diverse objects o£ reference into one's ontology in order to have an explanatory epistemology. I will grant that in *Mental Acts* Geach does not explicitly write

[21] Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Pl'ess-Galaxy Book-, 1959), Chapters IX and X. Russell also argues for the subsistence of universals in his 19ll presidential address to the Aristotelian Society.

[22] Robert C. Marsh, editor, *Bertrand Russell: Logic and Knowledge* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1956).

[23] It is true that Russell exerted much philosophical effort between 1903 and 19!!!3 attempting to bring a "robust sense of reality" back to philosophy. In fact, Russell radically changed his ontological demands from the extremely overpopulated universe of his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* to his important 1905 paper, "On Denoting." This latter paper explicitly laid out the logical machinery for Russel's extremely influential theory of definite descriptions. This theory aided Russell in prescinding his overly rich ontology expressed in his Meinongian *Principles of Mathematics.* Nevertheless, even though the theory of definite descriptions eliminated the need for postulating a referent for every term-since all terms were now not looked upon as proper names--still Russell wa.:; epistemologically committed to the diaphanous mental ad. This commitment is obvious when one reads the *Essays on Logical Atomism* which first appeared in 1918.

about a diaphanous mental act. However, a theory of a "structured" mental act-which is opposed to a diaphanous mental act-does indeed follow from Geach's analysis of concepts as acquired dispositions. To affirm a structured mental act is to deny a diaphanous mental act. A structured mental act affirms the active contribution on the mind's part in making concepts. A concept is not completely determined by an ontological referent; such an existent referent is what the epistemological relation of acquaintance or intuitive apprehension demands. The resemblance to Plato's theory of recollection should be obvious. Furthermore, the nature of a diaphanous mental act is necessarily connected with abstractionism as acquaintance. Accordingly, if St. Thomas is an abstractionist in the same sense that Geach is using this concept, then St. Thomas too is using a diaphanous mental act in his epistemology. And since a diaphanous mental act is fundamentally Paltonic, then St. Thomas must be considered as a Platonist. I do not think that Deely would want to make such an assertion of Thomistic epistemology. In essence, Geach's claim about abstractionism in St. Thomas revolves around the acceptance of either Platonic or Aristotelian epistemology. To be an abstractionist, as Geach is using this epistemological concept, is to adopt a relational view of acquaintance or intuitive apprehension; such an acceptance is Platonic. Since Geach realizes that St. Thomas is not a Platonist in his epistemology, he could not have adopted such a relational view of abstractionism.

In criticizing Geach's account of abstractionism as being incompatible with St. Thomas's epistemology, Deely mentions Geach's anti-abstractionist critique of "color concepts." It is true that the acquisition of sensible concepts-the proper and common sensibles-is the most obvious case used in establishing the possible soundness of abstractionism. Yet Deely fails to mention that Geach has a very detailed argument against the acquisition of the concept of "chromatic color" by means of abstractionism as acquaintance or intuitive apprehension. [24] In the case of "chromatic color" the very same

[20] Geach, pp. 37-39.

sensible object-what Aristotle and St. Thomas would refer to as the" proper sensible "-has been perceived. However, the concept of a " particular color "-be it red, green, blue, or whatever-and the concept of " chromatic color " are two distinctly different concepts. For one could possess the former and not the latter. If abstractionism is true, then there must have been some element perceptible in direct experience-i.e., by acquaintance or intuitive apprehension-which is different and discernible in each separate case. However, the proper sensible is the *same* in both cases. There is nothing which serves as a referent which is capable of distinguishing the particular color from the chromatic color. Accordingly, I believe that the example of having the concept of " chromatic color" provides a persuasive counter-example against the abstractionist-as-acquaintance position. Moreover, although Deely considers the acquisition of color concepts by abstractionism in *Mental Acts*, he fails to mention Geach's other examples. Geach provides detailed arguments indicating that the acquisition of " logical " concepts, " arithmetical " concepts, and " relational " concepts are incoherent on an abstractionist model.[25] In addition, Deely fails to mention how these concepts are indeed acquired by means of abstraction.

In treating of those concepts used in logic, Geach gives reference to Russell's famous example from *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* concerning the acquisition of the " sense " of the concept of "or." Russell had argued that we acquire such a sense of " or " by abstracting or being directly acquainted with the psychological feeling experienced when one is forced to decide which fork in the road to take. To this Geach, somewhat facetiously but perceptively, remarks:

> To many people, such recitation of the word " or " suggests a feeling of dithering between two alternatives; to me, on the other hand, it naturally suggests a threat-"---, or else---! "[26]

The point Geach is making is that nowhere either in the sensible world or in the private psychic realm could one be

[25] *Ibid.,* pp. 22-33.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

directly acquainted with any object that could be suitably labeled "or," "not," "if-then," or any other logical connective. No such acquaintance could ever sufficiently account for the meaning of the logical connectives. In other words, Geach is asking what possible ontological or psychological referent could we be directly acquainted with when we acquire the concepts of the logical connectives. In addition, St. Thomas would agree with Geach in claiming that logical concepts are not attained by acquaintance or intuitive apprehension. St. Thomas and the Thomistic tradition have consistently argued for the second intentional character of logical concepts. This discussion of logical concepts makes it apparent that Geach's notion of abstractionism demands that the " common element " of every concept be first found in direct sense experience. Geach concludes that such a demand of acquaintance or intuitive apprehension for the acquisition of logical concepts is indeed incoherent. Geach provides similar arguments indicating the implausibility of abstractionism in accounting for both arithmetical and relational concepts.

One additional consideration made by Geach might prove interesting in this present discussion. Geach discusses why, on an abstractionist's view demanding acquaintance, the concept of " substance " is reduced to a Lockean " *je ne sais quoi.*" [21] Although the concept of substance does indeed become inexplicable for an abstractionist-as Locke himself noted-this certainly was not the position of St. Thomas. The latter certainly did not hold the Lockean view of primary substance nor did he claim that a perceiver is aware of primary substance by means of the external senses. [28] Yet Thomistic epistemology

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[28] The awareness of a primary substance in St. Thomas's epistemology has always been a difficult bit of analysis for me. It seems to me that St. Thomas is not " abstractionist " in the sense of Locke. I believe that the *vis cogitativa* is the internal sense whose "structured " mental awareness by means of phantasms explains the possibility of our knowledge of individual primary substances even though the external senses are always only directly aware of proper and <'Ommon sensibles. The following passage from St. Thomas illustrates my present con<:'ern;

does argue for the acquisition and possession of a concept of primary substance. Hence, it must be had independently of the abstractionist thesis criticized by Geach. Obviously, there are structural similarities between Geach's remarks on the acquisition of the concept of "chromatic color" and on the acquisition of the concept of "primary substance." For nowhere in the sensible world is chromatic color found as discernible from the individual colors themselves. Likewise nowhere in the sensible world-the world of the external senses-is primary substance found as discernible from the collection of proper and common sensibles. This cannot be the case if abstractionism as acquaintance is true.

If Deely is correct in his analysis of abstractionism, then he must show how logical, relational, arithmetical, and primary substance concepts are acquired by means of abstractionism utilizing a diaphanous mental act and still remain faithful to the other philosophical insights found in the texts of St. Thomas. In fine, I do not think that Deely has correctly understood what Geach means by abstractionism. Upon analysis Geach can be interpreted as not only providing an ordinary language analysis of mental activity but also as indicating the need for a structured mental act which will replace the diaphanous mental act common to the epistemologies of the early twentieth century analytic philosophers.

The above discussion has been an attempt to elucidate how

it is important to note that the primary substance-the individual man-is not *per se* perceived by the external senses:

> Sense knows things from being impressed with their likeness. Now this likeness can be taken at three stages. First, immediately and directly, as when the likeness of color is in the sight; so also with the other proper sensibles in their appropriate senses. Secondly, directly but not immediately, as when the likeness of bodily shape or size is in the sight; so also with the sense-objects shared through several senses. Thirdly, *neither immediately nor directly,* as when the likeness of man is in the sight; he is not there because he is a man, but because he is a colored object. *Summa Theol,* I, q. 17, a. 2 (Italics mine).

Here the words *"neither immediately nor directly"* explicitly denote that St. Thomas would not structurally accept the account of abstractionism as criticized by Geach. If St. Thomas were an abstractionist as Geach has elucidated the concept, then St. Thomas would have to adopt the relation of direct acquaintance, which adoption would be inconsistent with the above passage.

Geach has used the concept of abstractionism and how this notion is related to Platonism via the diaphanous mental act utilized in early analytic philosophy. Deely seems quite concerned that Geach's position cannot connect sense and intellect as demanded by Thomistic epistemology. Deely notes this concern in the following passage:

> This is the very heart of Aquinas' teaching on the relation that obtains between sense and intellect, rooted in the distinction between the potential and the actual existence of a world of intelligible natures. [29]

In studying Deely's article I have come to the conclusion that the "potential" existence of a "nature" might very well be the crucial and critical issue in his disagreement with Geach. Deely is very much concerned that, without abstractionism, the connection between intellect and sense in Thomistic epistemology will be lost. Deely claims that Geach's argument entails that the intellect is independent of sense both in the formation and the exercise of concepts. [30] In other words, Deely's point is that, unless Geach accepts abstraction, then he is denying the influence and dependence of sense on inte]-lect.31 Furthermore, Deely appears to make Geach into a Cartesian innate-idea epistemologist despite Geach's explicit anti-Cartesian remarks in *Mental Acts.* [32] Decartes would be a prime exponent of a private language with his introspective criteria of meaning -Ryle's "ghost in the machine "-and I have already indicated what Geach, following Wittgenstein, thinks about a private language. Furthermore, Geach is very much concerned over the analysis of the *"conversio ad phantasmata* " relation. Geach accepts this relation, so he is at least *prima facie* holding for some connection between sense and intellect. I suspect that Geach is troubled over the exact structure of a phantasm. This is why he refers to the phrase " *conversio ad phantasmata* " as being metaphorical. It is true that Geach does not spell out the precise relationship between

[29] Deely, p. 54.
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 46.
[31] *Ibid.,* p. 76.
[32] Geach, pp. 117-121.

sense and intellect. Yet this is not the same as denying that there is any such relationship and thus becoming a Cartesian. Geach is, however, arguing definitely that insofar as abstractionism as acquaintance is incoherent, this relational view of intuitive apprehension cannot explain the sense-intellect relationship. In other words, if abstractionism is acquaintance or intuitive apprehension, then this structurally rules out any relationship of dependence between sense and intellect. Such an acquaintance model has two alternatives. Either there is only one type of awareness-as Berkeley argues-so thus there is no distinction between sense and intellect. Or, on the other hand, there are two generic types of awareness-as Plato argues-each with its corresponding set of objects. This latter view fundamentally denies any connection between sense and intellect. I do not think that Deely intends that abstraction be seen as acquaintance. But the point of the matter is that Geach definitely did. Accordingly, I believe that Deely has misunderstood Geach's account of abstractionism, and because of this misunderstanding, he cannot accept Geach's remarks concerning the anti-abstractionist nature of St. Thomas's epistemology.

Furthermore, when one considers the "potential" existence of an intelligible nature, one must ask the question regarding the precise connection between this " potential " existence of a nature-which I take to be the " essence " serving as the foundation *in re* for law-like statements-and the possibility of abstractionism as Geach has characterized this notion. For even if a nature is potential, it cannot be grasped by abstraction in the manner in which Geach has analyzed abstraction. For how could a diaphanous mental act of acquaintance or intuitive apprehension be directly aware of an object which is itself *not actual?* This is structurally the theoretical reason why Plato, Russell, Moore, and Price have demanded the real ontological existence of universals, general-negative-logical facts, sense data, propositions, and other such entities in their " overpopulated" metaphysical systems. For that which is to be the object of a diaphanous mental act-the diaphanous arrow

of itself be a fully "fleshed-out" ontological entity and not merely a potential entity. Any awareness of the "*universalia in re*" by a diaphanous mental act is such that this awareness demands the full existence and reality of the object of that relation of awareness and not a mere potential reality. That St. Thomas realized the Platonic character of what I have characterized as a diaphanous mental act is found in the following passage in which he is discussing knowledge:

> Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known itself. . . . Therefore, he concluded that the things which we understand must subsist in themselves under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.[33]

In conclusion, I believe that the crucial issue in determining if Geach is correct in denying that St. Thomas is an abstractionist is to carefully analyze just how Geach has used the concept of abstractionism.

In a more positive manner, I shall interpret Geach as arguing for a structured mental act when he claims that the mind "makes" concepts. As I noted earlier, a concept is judged adequate by a correct use of a term in language. Nevertheless, in Geach's account, a concept is never acquired by a direct awareness or intuitive apprehension of a fully existent actual entity. In addition, Geach does indeed appeal to St. Thomas's interpretation of the *intellectus agens* as providing historical evidence for an anti-abstractionist epistemology. And this, I am suggesting, might not be a miscreading of the Thomistic texts, as Deely argues. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles* St. Thomas does indeed use the notion of "efficient cause" when discussing the function of the *intellectus agens.*[34] Furthermore,

[33] *Summa Theol,* I., q. 84, a. 1.

[34] In *II Contra Gent.* e. 77, the following passage appear:

> .'.. there is in the soul an active power *vis-a-vis* the phantasms, *making* them actually intelligible; and this power is called the *intellectus agens.*

when considering the *intellectus agens* in the *Snrnrna Theologiae,* St. Thomas writes as follows: ". . . *per quarn anirna hurnana facit intelligibilia in actu."* [35] In addition, there is the following text: ". . . *dicendurn quod intellectus agen.c: causat universale abstrahendo a rnateria."* [36] This last passage is important in that St. Thomas explicitly refers to his notion of abstraction as one of "causing." Structurally, the entire Aristotelian analysis of causality indeed demands more than a mere acquaintance. Therefore, I will strongly suggest that Geach has not mis-read the Thomistic texts as Deely has argued. Accordingly, St. Thomas's use of abstraction is definitely not to be equated with Geach's view of abstraction as acquaintance or intuitive apprehension. Clearly Deely is

#2.

And in Chapter 78, the following texts are found:

The other principle, having the role of *efficient cause* in the soul, " is the intellect by which all things are *made"* (namely, actually intelligible), and this is the *intellectus agens.* . . .

#2.

. . .and there also is something which, in the capacity of an *efficient cause,* makes all in act-and this is called the *intellectus agens.*

#4.

For he (Aristotle) had already said that the *intellectus agens* is like an *efficient cause*....

#8. (Italics mine in above).

I am aware that the exact analysis of this " efficient cause " is very important in elucidating the Thomistic epistemology of concept-formation. Yet in order for Thomistic epistemology to fall into Geach's category of abstractionism, the *intellectus agens* would have to be a type of intellectual intuition immediately discerning " *universalia in re.* " This would be the relation of " direct acquaintance " or" intuitive apprehension" which the early twentieth-century analytic philosophers have adopted. Structurally, such an immediate awareness is quite similar to G. E. Moore's analysis of "intuition" in *Principia Ethica.* However, St. Thomas does not talk as if the functioning of the *intellectus agens* is that of immediate apprehension of existing realities. On the contrary, he is quite explicit in proclaiming the inherent difficulty in fully " grasping " an essence or nature. On this point, the reader is referred to Appendix 2, "The Simple Understanding of *Quidditas,"* in Volume XII of the New English Translation of the *Summa Theologiae* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), pp. 170-172.

•• *Summa Theol.* I., q. 79, a. 4.

[36] *Ibid.,* a. *5,* ad 2.

correct in stating that Aquinas does indeed use the term " *abstractio* " when discussing the *intellectus agens.* However, St. Thomas could not possibly have meant abstraction to be used in the same sense as that which Geach has attacked in *Mental Acts.*

I do not propose to analyze the concept of the *intellectus agens* in this article. That indeed would be a topic in and of itself. However, I do think that I have successfully argued that to rule out Geach's critique of abstractionism as being anti-Thomistic as well as being unsound is not warranted once the concept of abstractionism as used by Geach has been sufficiently elucidated. Furthermore, it does seem to me that this essay has indicated that a structured mental act might be able to resolve some of the epistemological problems raised by the acceptance of a diaphanous mental act on the part of the abstractionists. I would further suggest that more analysis need be done on the structure of the *intelleGtus agens.* The *intellectus agens* does appear to be able to meet the demands for a structure for the mind without going to the extreme of postulating either Cartesian innate ideas or Kantian categories. In addition, the *intellectus agens* would support the dependence of intellect upon sense. As I have argued, if abstractionism as acquaintance were true, then St. Thomas would have no need for the *intellectus agens.* Thus, abstractionism as acquaintance or intuitive apprehension is itself fundamentally anti- Thomistic.

In conclusion, therefore, I have argued that Deely has been incorrect in his claim that Geach is anti-Thomistic in his critique of abstractionism and that the mature St. Thomas was not an abstractionist. These two rebuttals of Deely's article, however, necessarily depend upon a clear elucidation of what Geach structurally meant by abstractionism. Once this view of abstractionism as acquaintance or intuitive apprehension is understood, it is evident that such an analysis of abstractionism is both far from epistemologically adequate as well as quite foreign to the epistemology of St. Thomas Aquinas.

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HISTORY, OBJECTIVITY, AND MORAL CONVERSION

WHAT IS SPECIFICALLY at issue in this study can be expressed in several historical contexts. First of all, it can be indicated by asking whether Lonergan's " pure desire to know " as fact can become the " pure desire to know" as achievement apart from the process of Blondel's *la volonte voulante* becoming *la volonte voulue.* That is to say, can one talk of "the actual orientation of consciousness coinciding with the exigences of the pure, detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know " [1] without explicitating the moral conversion which seems to be a necessary condition (in the concrete order) for the realization of such a fact? [2] Again, does not the nature of judgment-in Lonergan's terms-as a " virtually unconditioned " require explicitation of all conditions that need to be fulfilled-i. e., not only formal-transcendental conditions, but also existential-contextual? [3]

Again, what is at issue is implied in Heidegger's notion of *Befindlichkeit* [4] (already-having-found-itself-there-ness [5]) . For

[1] Bernard Lonergan, " Openness and Religious Experience, " in *Colledion: Papers by Bernard Lonergan,* ed. by Frederick E. Crowe, S. J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 199.

[2] The question I am raising here is similar to that raised by David Tracy in "Lonergan's Foundational Theology: An Interpretation and a Critique," in *Foundations of Theology,* ed. by P. McShane (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), pp. 217-19 and *passim.* There are two points of difference in my question: (I) I am concerned with moral conversion in the functioning of intelligence generally, and not simply as a requisite prior to God-talk; (2) I am focusing primarily on moral conversion here-Tracy's central concern is with both religious conversion and moral conversion.

[3] Cf. Tracy, *loc. cit.*

[4] Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 172-79. Cf. also J. B. Metz, "Befindlichkeit," *Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche,* Vol. II, pp. 102-104; and William J. Richardson, S. J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 64-65.

acording to this notion one does not so much '" find onself " as a neutral subject prior to reflection, as one " is found " in a subjectivity already informed by its own freedom.[6] Hence the issue arises as to the sense in which one's ongoing decisions are immanent in the cognitional process itself-in the very act of knowing.

Finally, in a Thomist context, the issue is expressed by asking in what sense the act of willing is a necessary condition for the proper functioning of the intellect in the speculative order. Hence by implication the question is whether, or in what sense, the Thomistic distinction between the speculative and practical order is adequate, or again, whether an authentic intellectualism does not demand a kind of thoroughgoing voluntarism.[7]

My intention in this essay is to address, principally in the latter (i.e., Thomist) context, the systematic issue which I believe to be implied in all three contexts:[8] specifically, whether, or to what extent, judgments of truth are simultaneously, and with equal necessity, the consequence of both intel-

[5] Macquarrie, in his translation of *Sein und Zeit* cited above, translates " Benfindlichkeit " as " state of mind. " Richardson, *loc. cit.,* to avoid all connotation of the ontic dimension, translates it as " ontological disposition. "

[6] Cf. Karl Rahner, *Hearers of the Word,* trans. by Michael Richards (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 106, n. 8.

[7] The contexts in which essentially the same issue emerges could, of course, be multiplied: cf., for example, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* wherein he holds that perceiving truth is a function of living truly: only the *phronimos* perceives moral truth. (Aristotle is, of course, referring exclusively to moral truth; the key, in terms of the purpose of this article, is to determine whether, or in what sense, the same principle is operative in the "speculative" order.) For further discussion of Aristotle on this point, cf. Stanley Parry, "Reason and the Restoration of Tradition," in *What Is Conservatism,* ed. by Frank S. Meyer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 109-ll4 and pp. 107-129, *passim;* Lonergan, *The Subject* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), pp. 24-2.5; Michael Novak, *The Experience of Nothingness* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 65-88. In my judgment the same issue emerges also in Pascal, *Pensees;* Newman, *Grammar of Assent;* Blonde!, *L'Action:* I submit that, despite vast differences in approach, presuppositions, etc., each of these authors holds that, in a decisive sense, one's already constituted-willed self mediates one's understanding of "reality."

[8] My claim is simply that one can distill a systematic issue common ta (or at least implied in) each of the contexts: I do not at all intend to deny that this issue emerges in a quite distinct way in each case (i. e., with its own presuppositions, points of emphasis, etc.) .

lectual and moral conversion. Or, to put it another way, in what sense is volitional appropriation of truth solidary with, and the necessary condition for, cognitional appropriation? In general terms, what is at issue is a central aspect of one's notion of objectivity: [9] in what sense are the notions of involvement and commitment integral to (i.e., indispensable for) an adequate understanding of objectivity? My purpose will be to set forth, in a principally Thomist context, a notion of objectivity (i.e., in the specific aspect already indicated [10]) which clearly and positively recognizes the dynamic input (i. e., here moral and affective) of the subject in all judgments of truth, and hence which by implication rejects the behaviorist-positivist notion-shared in an important way by much of traditional Catholic thought [11]-that (implicitly or explicitly) denies such an input. More generally, I intend to explore a limited aspect of the widely recognized historicity of human being in terms of a particular (i.e., Thomist) perspective, and, in so doing, to suggest a way of overcoming, alternatively, the positivist (i.e., a-historical) and relativist (i.e., historicist) theories of objectivity.

I begin, then, by stating my contention that recognition of the primacy of the act of existing in human being, and of history as the way in which man participates in existence/ [12] is

[9] I am focusing on a limited aspect of the question of objectivity: namely, the interrelation of cognition and volition in the apprehension of reality. I do not intend to deal with its numerous other aspects: notably, the issue as to when the mind knows being-is inteUectual contact with reality immediate or mediated?

[10] Cf. n. 9.

[11] For comments on this tendency in a philosophical context, cf. Frederick Wilhelmsen, "History and Existence," *Thought,* XXXVI (Summer, 1961), 207fi. For comments in a theological concept, cf. Avery Dulles, *Apologetics and the Biblical Christ* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1961), pp. 6-11. Insofar as this tendency implies a denial of the historicity of human being, it falls under the rubric of the principle which Lonergan has called the "Principle of the Empt;J< Head." Cf., for example, his *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd 1972), pp. 157-58, 223.

[12] I use the term " existence " in this essay neither in the sense of Heidegger's *Existenz* (being of Dasein) , nor in the sense of *Vohandensein* (" be present-at-hand": i.e., "mere entity"). Nor do I use it in the sense of the "existentia" of the tradition, insofar as its meaning is synonymous with that of *Vorhandensein.*

essential generally in developing a sound notion of objectivity [18] and specificalfy in making sense of the texts of Aquinas dealing with this issue.[14] Man both *is,* and *is-as-having-been.* To be for man is to be in hlstory. [15] These perhaps trite observations are decisive for a notion of objectivity that is " relevant "-i. e., grounded in man *as he is.* Their acceptance entails rejection of any analysis of man that is purely formal. The issue here can be articulated in several contexts: in Whiteheadian terms, the question is whether being is to be affirmed primarily as process or as substance; in Heideggerian terms, whether *Sein* is to he collapsed into *das Seiende;* in Thomist terms, whether *esse* is to be reduced to essence.[16] In sum, the issue is whether being is to be reduced to formal structure (s); whether metaphysics is to be patterned after logic.

(cf. Richardson, *op. cit.,* p. 35, n. 20.) The precise meaning of the term-and its cognates " existing, " "existentialist, " etc.-is closely bound up with the thesis of the article and hence will hopefully become clear as we proceed.

[13] Again, in the limited aspect which I am addressing in this article: cf. n. 9.

[14] In terms of the focus in this article the Thomist texts I am referring to are two key texts dealing with the relations between the intellect and the will.

[1-] In my treatment of being, history, and objectivity in its Thomist context I am indebted to the study by Frederick Wilhelmsen, *op. cit.* On the problem of history generally, cf. Eric Voegelin, *Order and History* (3 vols.; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956-57); cf. also his " On Debate and Existence, " *The Intercollegiate Review,* III (1967), 143-52.

[16] For the purposes of this article I am suggesting here an important point of agreement between these three systems in terms of the kind of metaphysics each is rejecting. Each is attempting to overcome traditional metaphysics insofar as it patterned after a kind of subject-predicate logic: Whitehead attempts to do so in his appeal to the principle of creativity; Heidegger in his appeal to *Sein;* Thomism in its appeal to *esse.* Each of these principles is so central to the respective systems that exhaustive study of their comparative significance i.:, quite beyond our limits here. In general, for a study of the parallel between Whitehead and Thomism on this point, see my article " Creativity as Ultimate: Reflections on Actually in Whitehead, Aristotle, and Aquinas," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* June, 1978.

In drawing this parallel, I do not at all intend to imply that there are not also profound differences between the three philosophers. But such is not my primary concern here. Rather my primary concern is to urge that the distinction between creativity/Sein/esse and that-which-is provides grounds for a new understanding of science, history, and objectivity. I am attempting in this article to show how it does so in a limited context-namely, that of the relation between will and intellect in Thomism.

If being is reduced to form, then it follows that meaning is ultimately rooted in formal structures. Formal structures as such *are not,*[17] and hence are not in history: they are immutable. Hence science is of the necessary, and history, as being "essentially" contingent (i.e., changing, etc.) is unintelligible and extrinsic to science. Study of man in his concrete reality, however interesting, is a merely psychological or "ontic" concern, purely "accidental" to science's mam thrust.[18]

If one patterns metaphysics after logic-that is, if one holds "that the subject-predicate form of statement conveys a truth which is metaphysically ultimate"[19]-then one tends to conceive "reality" as "made up of substances of which accidents are predicated and of accidents which are attributed to substances."[20] If the "structure" of being is thus exhausted in a composition of substance (essence) and accidents, then it necessarily follows further that all change must be interpreted as "substantial" ("essential") or "accidental."

The crucial significance of the issue I am raising here for the problem of history and objectivity can, I think, be clearly exemplified by reference to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey. For Dilthey, the key to the possibility of historical knowledge is the assumption of a human nature common to both the subject and the object of historical inquiry.[21] That is to say, the very

[17] That is to say, ideas, forms, and eternal objects as such are not (real, actual) apart from some "participation in" a concrete act of being.

[18] Such, for example, is necessarily the case in an Aristotelian framework wherein being is a composite of substance and accidents. The thesis of this article is precisely that, in articulating a further dimension to being, that of *esse--Sein*--process, one provides grounds for a new understanding of science, history, and objectivity.

[19] Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press. 1969), p. 160. This, of course, is precisely the position that Whitehead is rejecting.

[20] Cf. Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas,* trans. by L. K. Shook, C. S. B. (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 31. In the context from which this statement is taken Gilson, of course, is denying that such a statement accurately represents the philosophy of Aquinas.

[21] The point, of course, is central to the whole of Dilthey's work. Cf., for example, the following passage:

"Das Verstehen ist ein Wiederfinden des Ich irn Du: Dcr Geist findet sich auf

possibility of achieving objective historical knowledge rests upon the perdurance of an " essentially " self-identical human nature. My concern here is not so much to point out the relative adequacy or inadequacy with which Dilthey maintained his position; it is rather to show that what is ultimately in question here (and for the problems of history and objectivity generally) is one's understanding of the metaphysical problem of identity in difference (i.e., a variant of the classical problem of the one and the many). That is to say, insofar as one raises the question regarding the possibility of historical knowledge/ [2] one necessarily raises the question of identity (i.e., continuity) and difference (i.e., discontinuity) in history. [23] If the present structures of reality (e. g., human nature) are wholly discontinuous with (i.e., different from) those of the past, then such a phrase as " knowledge of the past " becomes finally meaningless. If the present structures of reality are wholly continuous

immer hoheren Stufen von Zusammenhang wicder: diese Selbigkeit des Geistes im lch, im Du, in jedem Subjekt ciner Gemeinschaft, in jedem System der Kultur, schliesslich in der Totalitat des Geistes und der Universalgeschichte macht das Zusammenwirken der verschiedenen Lcistungen in den Geisteswissenschaften moglich. Das Subjekt des Wissens ist hier eins mit seinem Gegenstand, und dieser ist auf allen Stufen seiner Objektivation derselbe." *(Gesammelte Schriften,* Band 7; Stuttgart: B. G.Teubner, 1968, p. 191.)

[22] In terms of the general theme of this article I understand historical knowledge to mean not only " know1edge of the past " but any knowledge by an historical being. On the connection between the two, cf. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften,* Band 7, p. 278.

[28] My point here is to argue that this issue is central to the work of Dilthey and to subsequent discussion of hermeneutics-though the issue comes t(expression quite differently in different contexts. Cf., for example, the discussion by Howard Nelson Tuttle, in *Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of Historical Understanding* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), pp. 29-30, wherein he points out the ambiguity in Dilthcy's understanding of human nature insofar as the constancy and identity of human nature, and its multiplicity and relativity, are both asserted by Dilthey to be the central facts of history. Cf. also Gadamer's critique of Dilthey for conceiving the task of historical knowledge as the overcoming of one's relativity, in *Le Probleme de la Conscience Historique* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1963), p. 25, and pp. 21-37, *passim.* Finally, cf. Hirsch's critique of of Gadamer for asserting the impossibility of sameness in the construing of textual meaning, in " Gadamer's Theory of Interpretation. " Appendix II, *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 256 and pp. 245-64, *passim.*

with (i. e., identical to) those of the past, then " history " itself is finally meaningless. If one wishes to maintain both identity (continuity) and difference (discontinuity), then the question still remains as to *how* one is to do so. My point thus far has been precisely that the issue is insoluble in a context wherein being is reduced to form (formal structure (s)) and/or metaphysics is patterned after logic. For, in such a context, of necessity one is led either to a kind of "a-historical formalism" or the most thoroughgoing historicism. The former gives us a kind of continuity (i.e., " identity") but no real history: formal structures remain " essentially " the same-all (historical) influence is necessarily extrinsic (i. e., " accidental ") . The latter gives us a kind of history (i. e., " difference ") but no real continuity: formal structures change "essentially "-all influence is interpreted after the manner of a kind of sublation of " essences " (" formal structures ") which is destructive of any enduring self-identity. In sum, the former leads to a-historical dogmatism: objectivity is simply absolute. The latter leads to historical relativism: objectivity is finally a meaningless word.

Reference here again to the classical philosophical problem of the one and the many is illustrative. For in an "essentialistic" horizon, there are, in the final analysis, only two alternatives with respect to what is metaphysically ultimate: monism or unrelated pluralism.[24] Within the same horizon, in terms of the problem of history, there are likewise finally only two alternatives: simple identity or pure difference (unrelated differences). That is to say, insofar as being is exhausted in formal structure (s) , all change, influence, and the like is necessarily conceived in terms of such formal structure (s) (e. g., substance, accidents, qualities, etc.) . Thus either all (historical) influence upon a given object (formal structure) is extrinsic (" accidental ") and hence not a " real " influence: the influence never "really" " gets inside" and thus never " really " (i.e., " essentially") affectS! the object: ultimately the object maintains a simple identity. Or the influence (change, relation) is intrinsic ("substantial") and hence "essential." The influ-

•• Whitehead, *loc. cit.*

ence " really " " gets inside " and thus affects its " object " "essentially "-i.e., destroys its ("essential") self-identity: there is ultimately only pure difference (or ongoing unrelated differences) .[25] In terms of the specific problem of this article-the relation betwen intellect and will-the implications of this same horizon are as follows: Either one conceives the relation between the intellect (as one formal structure) and the will (as another formal structure) as extrinsic-i.e., "accidental," and hence falls into a kind of mechanism [26] (i. e., a variant of the behaviorist-positivist position); or one conceives the relation as intrinsic, and falls into a kind of voluntarism (i.e., a variant of the historicist-relativist position). And while I think the latter problem is in a sense the more pervasive one today, nevertheless in the history of scholasticism the former problem I think has been the crucial one. Since I am working here principally in a Thomist context, my focus will be primarily on this aspect of the problem.

In terms of this aspect, then, the most important implication generally is the (implied) denial, in any finally meaningful sense, of the historicity of human being (understood here in the specific sense of the influence of one's past-and ongoing-moral decisions, loves, fears, hates, on one's present reflection). For, in the "essentialistic" horizon just delineated, the past never really" gets into" the present: history never really gets "inside" man's being. Human nature is what it is-immutably and eternally-in the formal order; all change in the sense of historical conditioning is merely "accidental "-extrinsic to human nature's perduring self-sameness. More specifically in terms of the problem of this article, the intellect is a formal structure which, precisely insofar as it is such, excludes all contextual influences-moral decisions, loves, hates, fears-as

•• Ironically, in this case difference (change, etc.) itself becomes, in the final analysis, the only self-identical "formal structure" which perdures through history-a contradiction in terms. This, it seems to me, is precisely the difficulty with any philosophy which conceives history in terms of a thorough-going dialectic: for the dialectic itself is ultimately non-dialectical.

•• Cf., for example, Andre Hayen, *L'Intentionnel selon saint Thomas* (!M ed.; Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1954), pp. n. 4.

"essentially" (i.e., "formally") extraneous to its operation. Hence solution to the problem of objectivity is relatively simple: one merely has to peel away all the extrinsic influences to get at the "pure intellect" which makes the " objective" (i.e., immutable) statements. In my judgment, the attempt to peel away these influences entails no less than the attempt to peel away the reality of the concrete, living, human subject; the attempt to get out of history is the attempt to go literally nowhere. [27]

To be is to be in a context; to be is to undergo influences. Contexts and influences are extrinsic only in an " essentialistic " horizon (i.e., only in the order of being qua formal structure); they are intrinsic in an " existentialist " horizon (i. e., in the order of being qua act of being) . That is to say, the historicity of human being is finally a meaningful notion only within the framework of the distinction between the act of (human) being and its formal structure, wherein primacy is accorded the former. For only in such an "existentialist" perspective is history " inside" man (i. e., in such a way as not to be simply destructive of his enduring self-identity). It is never a question of whether one is going to undergo (historical) influences (i.e., the influence of one's past decisions, loves, etc., etc.) : they are intrinsic to him precisely because, and to the degree that, they are intrinsic to his act of being. Thus, in terms of the problem of this article,

> if history is a way in which man experiences his participation of existence; if that participation in existence precludes strict " objectivity" because man is within the existence he participates; if these things are so, then it follows that not only is this objectivity impossible theoretically, but it is not even an ideal to be desired. The achievement of . . . " objectivity " would destroy man's participation in existence because it would require him to empty himself of the substance of his being. [28]

[27] I do not at all intend to deny here that formal structures can be penetrated abstractly (i. e., can " really " be distinguished) , and that such penetration is vali(! within certain limits. I would only add that one must ultimately transcend the formal order and return to existence, precisely because being is more than form. Wilhelmsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-04.

In the remainder of this article I wish to explore the implications of this " existentialist" perspective in terms of the specific context of Aquinas's treatment of the relation between intellect and will. The discussion will be in two parts: I wish first to discuss the role of the will in the general functioning of the intellect (in the speculative order); and second to discuss its role in areas which deal directly with the question of the meanmg of human existence.

* * * *

The following statements by Aquinas capture a central aspect of his teaching on the relation of intellect and will:

From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way, the good is contained under the true, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and the true under the good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.[29]

The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; for the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.[30]

The relation between the intellect and will is, then, according to Aquinas, mutual: the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. The will wills the truth as a particular good included in the universal good which

[29] " Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt: quia intel1ectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est quoddam bonum desideratum." *(Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 82, a 4 ad primum.)

[30] " --- voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus: quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determination actus, quae est ex parte obiecti, intellectus movet voluntatem: quia et ipsum bonum apprchenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri." *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad tertium.

is its proper object. The intellect understands the good insofar as it is a particular instance of the universal truth that is its proper object. The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act. The intellect moves the will insofar as it determines (i.e., specifies) the act of willing. I wish to single out two aspects of this rather commonplace Thomistic teaching for discussion here: first, the will as an agent moves the intellect to its act; secondly, the good that the will wills is always an *understood* good.

According to the first statement, then, there is no act of intelligence (i e., " intellecting ") that does not in some way presuppose an act of the will. The issue is precisely to understand the relation between the two. In terms of the context of essentialism discussed above, only two alternatives are available: either one must interpret the relation mechanistically- and end up with no " real " relation at all, or one must confuse their proper functions-and end up with no real distinction. The former issues in formalism; the latter in voluntarism.

More concretely, my meaning here is this: in a" formalistic" perspective, one might, for example, will to study, and enjoy the fruits of study (i.e.,. take pleasure in the truth that is a particular good), but the willing is never immanent to the " intellecting" proper to study. That is to say, willing is "essentially" extrinsic (i.e., "accidental") to "intellecting." The will is necessary, as it were, to get the intelligence into operation, but its influence ceases once the operation is underway. The will is "accidental" to the intellect qua formal structure. On the other hand, in a "voluntarist" context, willing is considered to be intrinsic to "intellecting" in such wise that willing the truth becomes confused with knowing the truth. The will is " essential " to the intellect qua formal structure.

It is precisely such an " essentialistic " context which, in my judgment, constitutes the horizon [31] in terms of which Aquinas

[31] That is to say, in those parts of the *Summa* and the *De Veritate* where Aquinas treats of the relation between the intellect and will, he is dealing " formalistically "-i.e., he is dealing with formal structures qua formal structures. My

maintains his position that the disposition of one's will is not an "essential " condition for the proper functioning of intelligence in the speculative order.[32] That is to say, in the formal order, the speculative intellect has no intrinsic need of moral virtue.[33] Moral virtue is" accidental" to the proper functioning of speculative intelligence.[34] My intention is not at all here to deny the validity of distinctions in the formal order-such a denial would lead precisely to the error of voluntarism mentioned above. Rather, my intention is to transcend the formal order. That is to say, the problem is *to* be solved by moving from the formal order *to* the existential (i.e., concrete) order. Specifically, the problem is solved, in my judgment, by distinguishing the formal structure of " intellecting " from the concrete act of " intellecting." Hence, while willing may be " accidental " in the former case, it is intrinsic in the latter: the act of willing is immanent in every act of " intellecting " precisely insofar as that act perdures. Willing is intrinsic to "intellecting" qua act (i.e., not qua formal structure) . It is precisely necessary condition (in *the concrete order)* for all functioning of intelligence-even *"speculative" intelligence.* This seems to me to be the deepest meaning of Aquinas' position that the will is intrinsic to the intellect in the order of exercise *(quantum ad exercitiurn actus)* -i.e., in the concrete order of *acting;* and that it is extrinsic (" accidental ") in the order of specification *(quantum ad specificationern actus)* -i.e., in the formal order.[35] In my judgment, it is likewise this distinction which allows us to give its deepest meaning Aquinas' statement that *"voluntas est in ratione."*[36]

thesis is precisely that the distinction Aquinas makes elsewhere between essence and *esse* demands finally that this formal perspective be transcended.

[32] Cf., for example, *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. *56,* wherein Aquinas takes the position that moral virtue is not essential for virtues of the speculative intellect.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Cf., for example, *De Veritate,* q. 14, a. 3 ad 10.

[35] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 9, a. 1 corpus and ad 3. On this point, cf. Joseph Marechal, 8. J., *Le Point de depart de la metaphysique,* Cahier V (2d ed.; Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1949), pp. 381-412, esp. 392-95; cf. also Hayen, *L' lntentionel,* pp. 216-22.

[36] *Summa Theol., ibid.,* a. *5.* Cf. also Aqui:las, *III de Anima,* lect. 14, n. 802: "Quaedam appetitiva est in parte rationabili, idest voluntas." Cf. also *Summa*

The implications of this distinction for the problem in this paper are twofold: first, by establishing-in Thomistic terms-that the act of willing is a necessary condition (in *the concrete order)* for all functioning of intelligence, *even* " *speculative* " *intelligence*, it shows by implication that thematization of this act is integral to (i.e., necessary for) the development of an adequate notion of objectivity (at least any such notion that intends to speak to man *as he* is). In other words, the notion of objectivity cannot be adequately dealt with in exclusively cognitional terms-i.e., in terms of the intellect alone. Secondly, this distinction enables us to avoid falling into the alternate error of a kind of voluntarism (i.e., relativism) . That is to say, if one attempts to establish an *intrinsic* relation between intellect and will in the formal order, one inevitably tends to confuse willing the truth with knowing the truth,-and hence the criterion for truth tends to become the intensity of one's affections and/or the degree of freedom immanent in one's decisions rather than the intelligibility of one's understanding.

The second aspect of the Thomistic teaching that I wish to focus on here is that the good that the will wills is always an *understood* good.[87] Such a statement argues to a certain priority of intellect over will-i. e., the good must in some sense be *first* understood *bef01·e* it can be willed. I wish here again to attempt to make sense of this priority in terms of the " existentialist" perspective of this essay. First of all, then, I think it is quite true logically that the intellect is prior to the will: understanding the good is logically prior to willing the good as understood. Nor do I mean by this that the distinction of priority is merely a notional, and not a real distinction. On the contrary, the distinction is ontologically true [38]-i. e., rooted in the " real" formal structures of will and intellect. On the other

Theol., 11-11, q. 24, a. 1 ad. 2; I-11, q. 9, a. 2. This is the po3ition that Marcchal holds to be the precise point of convergence between Aquinas and Blonde!: Cr. M.A. Milet, " Les 'Cahiers' du P. Marechal. Sources doctrinales et influences subie, " *Revue neoscolastique de philosophie*, XLIII (1940-45) , 243-44.

[37] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 4 ad 1.

[38] I. e., ontological in a Thomistic rather than Heideggerian sense: namely, ontological as distinct from merely logical.

hand, in an " existentialist " perspective it is my judgment that the priority is no longer relevant: that is to say, in the concrete order of existing there is a circle always operative in understanding: the intellect is in operation precisely to the extent that the will wills it to be in operation-i.e., the intellect knows precisely to the extent that the will is immanent to it in the order of exercise (i.e., the order of knowing qua *act)* ; the will wills an understood good-i.e., the will wills precisely to the extent that the intellect is immanent to it in the order of specification. In sum, in the concrete order of existing, the problem is never one of either-or; it is always one of both-and: in the concrete *act* of understanding it is always a question-simultaneously and with equal necessity--of both an act of willing and an act of "intellecting."

To summarize this section of our study, then, it is my conviction that the tendency in Thomistic circles to relegate the will to an " accidental " role in the functioning of human intelligence (in the " speculative " order) is due to the essentialistic horizon of the discussion.[39] If one remains in an essentialistic perspective, the distinction between the order of exercise and the order of specification reads something like this: first, in the order of exercise, the will moves the intellect as agent. This is taken to mean that the function of the will is simply to get the intellect to its proper "place"; once it (i.e., the intellect) is "there," it (i.e., the intellect) takes over and goes about its task of thinking, pursuing the truth, etc. Hence objectivity in this context means cutting away all extraneous influences, letting the intellect do its work-the work it is "essentially" equipped to do. Volitional influences have "essentially" nothing to do with the achievement of objectivity.[40] Secondly, in the order of specification, the intellect

•• Again, from the preceding discussion I hope it is clear that I do not wish lo deny the validity of formal (essential) distinctions. I am simply affirming that these distinctions are in a sense irrelevant in the existential order qua existential order.

[40] Again, I think it is in the formal order that volitional influences have esentially nothing to do with the achievement of objectivity: otherwise one would necessarily fall into the problem of voluntarism (or, variantly, historicism,

provides the understanding necessary before the will can will. This is taken to mean that the intellect understands literally *before* the will wills. Hence the will's role is to accept or resist the truth presented to it.[41] The act of the will is subsequent to understanding, and hence again the role of the will is " accidental " to the achievement of that understanding-i. e., the attainment of objectivity. The purpose of the discussion in this section of our essay has been to show the fallacy of such a position. While emphatically not denying what is *formally* true in that position, our aim has been to show the integral role of the will in the achievement of objectivity.[42] That is to say, our aim has been specifically to show that the will is integrally (i.e., "essentially") related to the intellect qua *act.*

Up to this point, then, I have attempted to show the integral relation of will to intellect generally-i. e., irrespective of any distinction between the " speculative" and " practical " orders. My aim in the final section of this article is to take up discussion of the relation between the intellect and will specifically in the context of the question of the meaning of human existence. That is to say, the specific intent I have in mind is that of addressing-again in a Thomistic context-the problem of objectivity as it emerges in the context of questions bearing upon ultimate meaning in human life.

The Thomistic text which is crucial for the discussion is the following:

relativism, etc.). However, my point in this article is that this formal order must finally be transcended if one is to be faithful to reality-i. e., if one is to recognize the primacy of the act of existing.

[41] This is basically the view taken by Frederick E. Crowe, S. J., in "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas," *Theological Studies,* XX (19.59), pp. 1-39, 198-230, 343-95, *passim.*

[42] Hayen summarizes our thesis exactly: " Mais la perspective de saint Thomas est tout autre: c'est une perspective *concrete,* celle de l'exercice actuel de l'activite humaine. La volonte est intrinsequement constitutive de !'intellection, non comme acte *d' intellectuel,* mais comme ACTE *d' intellection;* le jugement trouve sa perfection dans !'engagement volontaire non pas comme acte *de !'intelligence,* mais comme ACTE *de connaissance.* " (" Le lien de la connaissance et du vouloir dam l' acte d' exister selon saint Thomas d' Aquin," *Doctor communis.* III (1950), 58.)

of necessity everything that man desires he desires for the sake of the ultimate end[43]

Thus-in terms of our problem-the question of ultimate meaning is immanent in every human act (in a Thomistic context, a human act is any act which proceeds *ex voluntate deliberata* [44]-from the " deliberated " will or the will according to reason-or *ex deliberatione rationis* [45]-from the deliberation of reason: in short, an act which proceeds from both reason and will) . This is not at all to say that what that ultimate meaning is is explicit in man's consciousness. It simply affirms an unthematic dynamism for the good, for happiness, which is operative in man and which is the driving force behind any and all of his decisions. Implicit in each decision is a judgment about what one thinks is good for oneself. That is to say, in so far as one acts, he makes a decision regarding what he considers to be good-i.e., meaningful for him. And this decision implies-in the limit-a judgment about the good or meaning for him in general-i.e., ultimate meaning. Thus every human decision is at once both a formation of oneself and a decision concerning the ultimate end in one's life.[46] The implications of this position-in terms of the theme of this article-are as follows. First of all, in every discussion which bears upon the meaning of human existence-e. g., questions re God, life, death, the nature and destiny of man, etc.,-and to the precise extent that it does so, one necessarily comes to the discussion *already disposed toward an answer.* One never confronts the subject matter in a " neutral " fashion: *not being neutral* is synonymous with *having lived.* For man, to live is to have acted, and to have acted is continuously to have decided vis-a-vis the ultimate meaning in life. Again, the "existentialist" perspective is decisive. For if one operates in an essentialistic horizon there can be no question o£ any influ-

[43] " --- necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat propter ultimum finem." *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 1, a. 6.

[44] *Ibid.,* a. 1.

[45] *Ibid.,* ad. 3.

[46] Cf., for example, Rahner, *Hearers of the Word,* p. 105.

ence or disposition internal to one's reflections. Lived conditions remain "essentially" extrinsic ("accidental") to the mind's functioning. Thus, for example, in dealing with the problem of a demonstration of God's existence the context is purely cognitive: it is simply a question of the mind's "essential" ability to effect such a demonstration. [47] In an " existentialist " context, one the other hand, man's intelligence always functions in the context of *lived meaning*, and this lived meaning, with all its volitional and affective dimensions, is thus necessarily structured into every context: that is, in the existental order, there is never any purely cognitive (i.e., intellectual) context for reflection.

We are now in a position, I think, to take up briefly the problem of objectivity specifically in the context of the notorious fact-value distinction (and by implication the distinction between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissen:whaften)* . There are first, then, the "facts" which we ordinarily associate with the natural sciences-for example, the " facts " of the physical chemistry of rocks. There are secondly the "facts" which we ordinarily associate with the human sciences-i.e., human acts-for example, the "facts" of the Vietnam war. The decisive difference between the two kinds of "facts" is that the latter are constituted by meaning. [48] That is to say, lived human meaning is constitutive of their very " reality " as " facts." This is a precise implication of the position advanced above that every human act is for the sake of the ultimate end. [49] If this is true, it necessarily follows that every " fact " which is a product of human activity-such as an act of war and the like-is precisely an embodiment of meaning vis-a-vis the ultimate meaning in human life.

The implications of this in terms of a notion of objectivity are twofold: there is first a kind of objectivity proper to the natural sciences: for the " facts " of natural science are not

[41] Such seems to the context for the statement at Vatican I regarding the mind's ability to effect a demonstration of God's existence.

"Such a position is central to the work of Dilthey. Cf. also Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collection*, pp. 252-267.

•• Cf. n. 43 above.

"essentially" constituted by lived human meaning. Judgments, for example, regarding the physical chemistry of rocks are not built into the very fiber and structure of one's ongoing decisions-simply because such judgments bear only peripherally on the question of the meaning of human existence. One thus comes to reflection on such a topic in a somewhat neutral fashion: he has not built up habits of thought (action, volition, affectivity, etc.) with respect to the subject matter. Hence attainment of objectivity in this realm demands no special "moral conversion" with regard to that subject matter. Nevertheless, as I have attempted to show-in a Thomistic context-in the preceding arguments, a kind of " moral conversion" is still necessary inasmuch as the will to truth is necessary for the knowledge of truth. That is to say, willing is necessarily immanent in the act of knowing. Hence even in the domain of the natural sciences (i.e., " speculative " sciences generally) a notion of objectivity which excludes the dynamic input-here volitional and affective-of the subject is fallacious. And in this sense the erecting of a difference between a notion of objectivity proper to the natural sciences and another proper to the human sciences in invalid. All knowing is simultaneously and with equal necessity an achievement of willing. In sum, all objectivity is the achievement of human subjectivity. [50]

[50] In other words, this is an important sense in which any dichotomy between an *Ekliirung* proper to the natural sciences and a *Verstehen* proper to the human sciences is invalid. For additional ways of showing the fallacy of such a dichotomy, cf. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 212-13, and Michael Polanyi, *The Study of Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 78-85. I am in full agreement with the positions of both men. In connection with Polanyi, however, I should like to point out that my discussion takes place within a considerably narrower horizon: that is to say, the focus of my concern is on the nature of the specifically *moml* involvement of the scholar in his investigations. Though a kind of moral commitment (i.e., purely " formal " with to subject matter: the ongoing willing of the truth) is immanent in the investigations proper to both kinds of science, a distinct kind of moral commitment (i. e., both " formal " and "material" with respect to subject matter) is necessary when the "facts" under investigation are essentially constituted by moral (i. e., distinctively human) acts-as in the case of the " human sciences." Hence my conclusion, though articulated a narrow context, is nonetheless in essential agreGment with that reached by Polanyi *(op. cit.,* p. 85): "A theory of knowledge which regards the study of history [i.e., human sciences generally] as akin to the natural sciences and acknowledges the fact that history [human science] refers to a distinc-

On the other hand, there is an important sense in which the distinction is valid. For in the human sciences the " facts " with which one deals are largely constituted by lived human meaning: they are embodiments of value regarding man, God, and the final sense of the world.[51] Hence one never comes to reflection on such "facts " in neutral fashion: to the extent one has lived one has necessarily already built into oneself values regarding such " facts." Hence one's cognitive grasp of such "facts" is radically affected by one's decisions vis-a-vis the values embodied in these facts. One's perception of these "facts" always and necessarily involves a decision regarding one's own values. Hence objectivity in the human sciences demands a kind of moral conversion over and above that necessary to both kinds of science: that is to say, while both sciences demand a kind of "formal" moral conversion (i.e., purely formal with respect to subject matter-the ongoing willing of the truth) , the human sciences demand also a moral conversion with respect to content (i.e., material with respect to subject matter-the ongoing disposition to convert oneself to the new and better values concerning the ultimate meaning in life which may be embodied in that subject matter) .

In summary, then, I have argued in this essay that the distinction between act of (human) being and formal structure, and the emphasis on the primacy of the former, enables us (1) generally to develop a sound notion of historicity and objectivity-i.e., to show that history is intrinsic to man, while not being (simply) destructive of his enduring self-identity; and (2) specifically to show the integral relation of will to intellect while not confusing their proper roles-precisely by

tive leV'el of reality, neither accepts nor rejects the ' secession ' of history [human science] from the domain of science." Further, in my narrowing of the context, I do not at all intend to deny that there are many other kinds of value judgments (i.e., kinds of "indwelling of the observer in his subject-matter") which are common to both kinds of science, and hence that the continuity in methods between the two sciences can be more broadly conceived (as in Polanyi, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81).

[51] Cf. n. 48 above. For a discussion of this position in terms of the fact-value dichotomy, cf. Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University o£ Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 35-80.

transcending the mechanistic horizon so endemic to much of the traditional manual discussion of the problem. In more general systematic terms, affirmation of the primacy of the act of existing (i.e., of the concrete order) has led us to the thesis that all judgments of truth are simultaneously, and with equal necessity, the consequence of both intellectual and moral conversion: in questions bearing upon the meaning of human existence, the moral conversion is both formal and material with respect to the subject matter; in other questions, the conversiOn IS only formal. [52]

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[52] An authentic " intellectualism, " then, demands a kind of thoroughgoing " voluntarism " precisely in the sense that the will is always integral to the *act* of understanding.

LONERGAN'S *METHOD IN THEOLOGY* AND OBJECTIVITY IN MORAL THEOLOGY

THE PUBLICATION of Bernard Lonergan's long-awaited *Method in Theology* [1] is an event that promises to further much-needed discussion on the question of method in moral theology. The discussion has been underway for some time, but in the welter of comments and suggestions it is obvious that broad agreement has not been reached, in spite of some common ground among the discussants.

In this essay we propose to outline briefly a possible contribution of Bernard Lonergan to the on-going discussion among moral theologians, with particular reference to the problem of objectivity in morals.

I.

Method in Theology is a significant attempt to integrate values into the very definition of theology. Lonergan conceives of theology as a related series of " functional specialties," [2] but the foundation of "mediated theology," which includes the doctrinal affirmations and systematic elaborations of moral theology, is established by "conversion." [3]

Conversion can be three-fold, according to Lonergan: intellectual, moral, or religious. Intellectual conversion is the elimination of the myth of the " already out there now real " as the criterion of reality, objectivity, and human knowing. For the intellectually converted, knowing is not like seeing;

[1] New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.

• The notion gained some familiarity from the publication of the chapter on functional specialities in *Gregorianum* 40 (1969), pp. 485-504.

• On conversion see *Method,* pp. 287-44. What follows summarizes pages. We should state clearly from the beginning that conversion for Lonergan is not an event *within* theology. But it is within the horizons established by the conversions that the theologizing subject operates.

the real is not what is " out there " to be looked at. Rather the real world is the world mediated by meaning and not the world of immediate experience. The real world is that which is known by a cognitional process of experiencing, understanding, judging, i.e., by a process of progressive cognitional self-transcendence.

Moral conversion means a shift from satisfaction to values as the criteria of one's decisions and choices. The realization of such a shift, however, can be a long process even after a basic choice has been made.

Religious conversion is the culmination of this process of self-transcendence:

> Religious conversion is to a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence, whether in the pursuit of truth, or in the realization of human values, or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground, and its goaJ.4

The relationship of the conversions to one another is one of sublation in Karl Rahner's sense: what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis; yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, it includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

Conversion, therefore, implies a radical shift in the horizon within which meanings and values are perceived.[5] And in that fact lies a point of interest to the contemporary discussion among moralists.

As a preliminary remark, we note a comment Vernon Bourke makes at the conclusion of the chapter on axiological ethics in his *History of Ethics:*

• Lonergan, *Method,* p. 241.

[5] Lonergan describes a horizon thus: " So there has arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the word, horizon. In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge. *(Method,* p. 286) The description differs verbally, but not in content, from the often quoted definition in "Metaphysics as Horizon," in *Collection,* ed. by Frederick E. Crowe, S. J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 218-14.

In a sense value ethics has been too successful. Practically all ethicians now talk about values and mean many different things when they use the term. As a result, the notion of value has become so diluted that it is almost a transcendental term in contemporary ethics. Value enabled people to discuss the possibility of a rather ill-defined realm of moral standards without too clearly committing themselves on their status in being. And so, except for its usefulness as a general term, value is no longer a major item in strictly contemporary ethics.[6]

James M. Gustafson writes in a similar vein about value theory, although he sees the possibility of further theological discussion if phenomenology becomes important. [7]

It is precisely to the phenomenology of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand that Lonergan has turned for the description of value found in his chapter on the " Human Good." [8]

The " status in being " of value is not in doubt for Lonergan. Value is a "transcendental notion," i.e., that to which the dynamism of conscious intentionality is directed when a man asks questions for deliberation and decision. As a transcendental notion, value is in the same category as truth and being, which are the transcendental notions to which the dynamism of a man's questions for understanding and reflection are directed. The " objective status" of value, like that of being, is therefore defined in correlation with the dynamic activity of man's intentional consciousness.

One of the most interesting developments of Lonergan's more recent work, in contrast with the chilly rationalism of *Insight*, is his account of feelings and the development of feelings with reference to values. His account is borrowed almost entirely--and quite uncritically [9]-from von Hildebrand's *Christian*

• *History of Ethics* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), p. 248.

[7] James M. Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in *Religion,* ed. by Paul Ramsey (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 340-41.

[8] Lonergan, *Method,* pp. 27-56.

[9] James M. Gustafson, for example, referring to the work of Nicolai Hartmann, points out the conflicting ways in which men have valued all sorts of things. The phenomenological adequacy of the work of Scheler and von Hildebrand, and the validity of axiological ethics generally, must be a major issue in the evaluation of

Ethics/ [0] There is no need to repeat here the details of the analysis of intentional feeling responses and the scale of preferences which von Hildebrand describes. We note, however, that there are for von Hildebrand and Lonergan not only transient feelings but also states of feeling, and in particular "being-in-love," which Lonergan identifies with the results of religious conversiOn.

Lonergan's sketch of the moral subject is briefly but rather fully developed, from the level of feeling through the ascending levels of intentional consciousness: experience, understanding, judging, and deciding. " Being-in-love" with God, religious conversion, is an event at the very *apex animae* which sweeps up the whole conscious subject. The existential decisions of the subject are what constitute his very being as a conscious, responsible human being. Religious conversion brings a man to the very peak of human self-transcendence. [11]

This briefest of sketches indicates that Lonergan provides a portrait of the functioning, maturing moral subject that can bring together a number of themes in the contemporary discussion.

At the level of feelings, Lonergan, following Scheler and von Hildebrand, affirms an intentional response by the subject to value. An analysis of the scale of preference indicated by responses to values gives an insight into the variety and hierarchy of values. But the perception of values is but the first level at which the moral subject functions. At a higher level of consciousness he must make a value judgment. And it is here that Lonergan makes some interesting suggestions. One of them has to do with the nature of "objectivity " in morals and thus also with the nature of moral " absolutes."

Lonergan's contribution to theological method. See Gustafson's *Christian Ethics and the Community* (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1971), pp. 144-49, reprinted from the *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America* (1969), pp. 96-108.

[10] New York: David McKay, 1953. (Reprinted Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,

[11] See the earlier remarks of Lonergan on subjectivity in *The Subject,* The Aquinas Lecture, 1968. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968)

According to Lonergan/ [2] value judgments are objective or merely subjective inasmuch as they proceed or do not proceed from a self-transcending subject. The criterion of their authenticity is authenticity or the lack of it in the moral subject. Just as man's drive to rationality compels assent to a judgment when the evidence is sufficient and refuses assent when it is not, so the drive to value rewards success in self-transcendence with a happy conscience and saddens failures with an unhappy conscience. [13]

It would be well to stress at this point that for Lonergan the subject is always located in a matrix of inter-subjective relations. The world mediated by meaning in which the adult lives his life is the world of language and culture. Moral objectivity is not, therefore, measured by the satisfaction of an isolated individual's subjectivity but by the good conscience of the virtuous man who is a part of an historically and culturally situated community of moral agents seeking authentic self-transcendence.14 That self-transcendence, of course, consists in *doing* the good, not merely in making correct judgments about it.

Such a conception of morals and moral judgments, which parallels and expands upon Lonergan's ideas about metaphysics presented in *Insight,* would seem to demand a reconsideration of the notion of " absolute " with its underlying metaphysics which has played so prominent a role in traditional Catholic moral theology. [15]

Value judgments for Lonergan include three elements: a knowledge of reality, an intentional response to value, and an initial thrust toward moral self-transcendence constituted by

[10] Lonergan, *Method,* pp. 36-41.

[13] Lonergan, *Method,* p. *35.* See *Insight,* pp. fl84-85 for Lonergan's parallel description of the " invulnerable insight. "

uSee *Insight,* p. fl86 and Lonergan's remarks there about the self-correcting process of learning. See also Bernard Lonergan, "Revolution in Catholic Theology," in *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America* 27 (1972), pp. 18-23.

[15] See Josef Arntz " Die Entwicklung des naturrechtlichen Denkens innerhalb des Thomismus" in *Das Naturrecht im Disput,* ed. by Franz Bockle (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1966), pp. 87-1fl0.

the value judgment itself. Lonergan thus rejects an empty moral idealism divorced from experience of human life and points out that the moral judgment is itself an ingredient in the constitution of the subject as a moral agent, as a self-transcending being. Moral conversion, i. e., the initial option to make values and not satisfactions the criteria of one's actions, is only the first step in the process of moral growth which constitutes the subject a principle of benevolence and beneficence, which develops affectivity into a single piece and realizes Augustine's maxim, love God and do what you will.[16]

Lonergan, therefore, has something significant to say to the on-going discussion in moral theology on the subjects of value, value perception, value judgment, moral decision, and the constitution of the self-transcending moral and religious subject.

There is another tool which Lonergan's methodology provides which could prove useful to moral theology. That tool is the functional specialty he describes as "dialectic." It is in dialectic that differences in theological positions that have emerged in research, interpretation, and historical study are handled. Differences in doctrines and systematics are often rooted in research, interpretation, and historical study, and the differences in " mediated theology " could thus be handled in dialectic too.

In dialectic the roots of these differences are explored. Such roots are not to be found by the application of the canons of method proper to the diverse functional specialties but in the differing subjects and their variously differentiated consciousnesses, and in the presence or absence of the three conversions in them. It is Lonergan's contention that apparently irreconcilable differences are attributable to the presence or absence of the conversions in one or other of the disputing subjects, or they are attributable to the fact that one or other of the subjects has not achieved the differentiation of consciousness requisite to handle the conflict. The identification of the root

[18] Lonergan, *Method,* pp. 88-89. See *The Subject,* pp. 19-!!0.

of differences among theologians will, hopefully, lead to that new differentiation of consciousness or conversion which will create a new horizon within which differences can be resolved. It is not our purpose to repeat the details of Lonergan's explanation [17] but rather to offer an example of how dialectics might function in the contemporary discussion.

II.

Questions about objectivity, value, and the dispositions of the moral subject have been much discussed in recent contributions to the discussion of method in moral theology.[18] Among those commenting most frequently on this and other epistemological questions in moral theology is John Giles Milhaven. [19] Recently Milhaven has devoted an essay to "Objective Moral Evaluation of Consequences." [20] His essay is in response to the work of Gustafson, [21] a point worth noting since Milhaven nowhere in his article defines the sense in which "objective" is being used.

For his part, Gustafson is concerned about the problem of objectivity in morals, as he suggests in the remark:

> ... For Christians, and many others presumably, love is at work, not merely as a word to be defined and as a subject of propositions so that inferences can be drawn from it, but love as a human relationship, which can both move and inform the other virtues, including prudence and equity (to make a reference to St. Thomas). All of this does not mean that a moral judgment is a total mystery, it does not mean that it is without *objectivity.* [22]

[11] Lonergan, *Method,* pp.

[18] See, for example, James M. Gustafson, "Moral Discernment in the Christian Life," in *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics,* ed. by Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Scribners, 1968), pp. 17-36.

[19] See his *Toward a New Catholic Morality* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1970), especially pp. and 69-84.

[20] *Theological Studies* (1971), pp. 407-30.

[21] Milhaven, "Objective Moral Evaulation," p. 407 n.

[22] James M. Gustafson, "A Protestant Ethical Approach," in *The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives,* ed. by John T. Noonan, Jr (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. at p. 113. Emphasis added.

Or again, after discussing a case in which he found abortion to be legitimate:

> . . . There can be no guarantee of an *objectively* right action in the situation I have discussed, since there are several values which are *objectively* important, but which do not resolve themselves into a harmonious relation to each other. Since there is not a single, overriding determination of what constitutes a right action, there can be no unambiguously right action. [23]

Milhaven had already written that actions are to be adjudged right or wrong in the light of their consequences. The rightness or wrongness of the consequences is decided in view of values which are immediately intuited. [24] In his recent article Milhaven investigates the objectivity of this moral evaluation of consequences.

In the absence of an explicit statement by either writer, we must be appropriately tentative, but both seem to appeal for objectivity to the correspondence between the moral evaluation one arrives at and some state of affairs *already out there* in the world of moral values.

Still, Milhaven does not hesitate to cite Gustafson's description of the affective element in moral discernment and conclude that the affective stance of the moral agent inescapably influences his moral judgment and can be responsible for some of the objective insight the individual has into value.

> Far from being blind, love can enable a man to *see* more value than he would otherwise have seen. [25]

What is remarkable here is not the introduction of a subjective disposition, love, but the suggestion, given without further explanation, that such dispositions help produce a *more objective* moral evaluation. [26]

•• *Ibid.,* p. 119. Emphasis added.

[24] See Milhaven, *Toward a New Catholic Morality,* pp. 132-34.

[25] Milhaven, " Objective Moral Evaluation, " p. 421. Emphasis in original.

•• In support of this position Milhaven cites another of the participants in the discussion of his consequence-empiricism, Richard A. McCormick, S. J., who wrote: " For it is virtue that orders the appetite and it is the well-ordered appetite which orders the person to obj-ective goals." "Christian Significance and Human

The role of the affective dispositions of the moral subject is of further interest because Milhaven cites Robert 0. Johann's statement that reality is disclosed to us only in experience (a term Milhaven does not further define):

> ... In short, we think in order to act better. But we shall act better only if the map is accurate. The validity of our theories rests on their conformity to what is disclosed. If, unexpectedly, they lead us into a swamp, the map should be revised.[27]

These brief indications would seem to authorize the conclusion that for both Gustafson and Milhaven the "objective" is being contrasted with the " subjective," and that in morals the " objective" is what corresponds to reality, i. e., to the world of moral values disclosed to us in experience.

Gustafson has discussed at length the role of the dispositions of the subject in moral discernment; McCormick has alluded to the role of the virtues. Milhaven in turn takes up the role of the dispositions of the moral agent in moral discernment. He does so by referring to Pierre Rousselot's analysis of the act of faith, with its notion that love enables the believer to find in the evidence for faith new and adequate grounds for belief. Trying to explain how faith can be both free and rational, Rousselot concludes that " Liberty generates evidence." Milhaven paraphrases, "Love creates new evidence." [28]

Now I would suggest that all this gives a rather unusual extension to the word "objective," especially if its sense is that suggested earlier, i. e., a corespondence with some reality " out there" which is disclosed in "experience." Unless perhaps Rousselot offers a more nuanced notion of experience.

Milhaven finds suggestive Rousselot's notion that " evidence for the intellect is generated not only by incoming facts and

Significance" in *Norm and Context,* cd. by Outka and Ramsey pp. 233-61, cited by Milhaven at pp. *454-55.*

•• Robert 0. Johann, *Building the Human* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 17-18, cited by Milhaven at p. 419.

[28] Milhaven, " Objective Moral Evaluation, " p. 424. The theories of Rousselot are discussed at length by Roger Aubert, in *Le probleme de l'acte de foi* (3rd ed. Louvain; Warney, 1958), pp. 422-70.

ideas but by the 'synthesizing activity ' of the intellect itself . . . Love and liberty merely stimulate the dynamism of the intellect to generate evidence." [29] Nevertheless, Milhaven does not discuss at any length Rousselot's thomistic epistemology. He is content to accept, at least tentatively, Rousselot's contention that evidence is not just what comes in from the outside but is somehow the product of the mind's own activity. At the very least this concession (if indeed it is that) is quite a shift away from the Humean empiricism on which Milhaven has often insisted.

From this now-modified notion of the source and meaning of evidence Milhaven concludes that, for the consequentialist, it is consistent to maintain that

> the lived love of the individual gives him *objective* insight into the respective worth of the values he has experienced.

And he asks:

> would not such insight, after emprical data and analysis indicate what consequences are in a given situation likely to follow on the various decisions possible, make possible an *objective* evaluation of these consequences?

In other words, consequentialism's ultimate reliance on the experience of values to evaluate consequences objectively, could be justified by a love epistemology. [30]

How then can one assure himself that his appraisals of the values in a given situation are "fully objective?" Milhaven suggests the test of action.

> If the whole life of a given doctor contains little service, direct or indirect, of the poor, then it is unlikely that he has the pertinent affective orientation or the consequent objective insight into the disvalue of poverty. On the other hand, there is some ground for hoping that one who consistently serves the poor at personal sacrifice has objective appreciation of the evil.[31]

[29] Milhaven, p. 424.
[30] *Ibid.* emphasis added.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 425.

The limitations of this technique when applied to epistemological problems are clear, but Milhaven's presumption appears to be that values and disvalues like " consistent service," "personal sacrifice" and "little service, direct or indirect" are obvious enough to answer the question of who is loving and thus capable of discerning the objectively good.

Milhaven then proposes moral education, especially one oriented to experience and active involvement, as a tool of increasing objectivity by the " spiral of affective involvement and understanding of value." The kind of affective involvement he has in mind is illustrated by the experience of members of the American Society for Christian Ethics in 1970, when they spent some time living in a black community. They returned from the experience " with a far more objective assessment of the values involved in the black question than if they had discussed it among themselves in another milieu." [32] The anger of black theologians generated " a more objective evaluation of the wrong done the blacks and the urgency for action such as the black power movement." And Milhaven adds: "Such anger is, of course, a form of love." [33] Here " objectivity " seems to include the appropriate affective intensity with which values and disvalues are perceived. In any event,

> Whether it be one's own personal experience or the shared experience of another, only experience generates the love that makes possible insight into values and disvalues. [84]

We are not told what " experience " means, nor are we told how this sentence can be reconciled with Rousselot's conception of the dynamism of the intellect and its synthesizing activity, which earlier were said to generate evidence. We have been told, however, that experience generates love and that love generates evidence from some kind of experience. The role of subjectivity in this generation of evidence from experience under the influence of love is not at all clear.

""*Ibid.,* pp.
•• *Ibid.,* p.
•• *Ibid.,* p.

III.

By contrast, the role of experience and the dispositions of the subject in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence is clearly formulated by Lonergan. He does not believe that " love generates evidence " for a value judgment. Human intentionality at the level of moral self-transcendence produces a value judgment in response to value, i. e., in response to questions for deliberation and decision. What then is the function of love? Lonergan contends that love transforms the subject and trans--values his values in the sense that being-in-love opens the subject fully to the perception of the whole universe of values and adds a note of efficacy to one's apprehension of values by a change in one's antecedent willingness to do the good he apprehends. [35]

"Evidence" here is used in much the same sense in which Lonergan uses the term in *Insight* to describe the conditions which must be fulfilled if a judgment-an affirmation or negation-is to be possible. A judgment which is made when the requisite conditions have been fulfilled Lonergan calls a "virtually unconditioned judgment." [36] The requisite conditions for a judgment are known to be fulfilled when there are no further questions to be asked. " The link between the conditioned (the judgment) and its conditions is a law immanent and operative in cognitional process." [37] But the ability to make good judgments, to recognize that there are indeed no further pertinent questions, is an acquired ability and demands experience, the acquisition of habits of thought that tradition since Aristotle has called intellectual virtues.

The analysis of value judgments in *Method in Theology* is analogous. The criterion of the objectivity of value judgments is not measuring them against some reality at which one takes a look. Instead the criterion is the satisfaction of man's moral

[35] " Bernard Lonergan Responds," in *Foundations of Theology*, ed. by Philip McShane (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), p. 226.

[36] Judgment is studied at length in Chapter x of *Insight*, pp. 279-316.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 284.

being by moral judgments which are made by an authentically self-transcending subject-a morally virtuous man.

Dialectic reveals, therefore, that what we have here is a contrast between what Lonergan calls the " position " and the "counterposition" in cognitional theory.[38] The identification of the issue sets the stage of the reversal of counterpositions and the development of positions, if one is to be faithful to the imperatives of conscious intentional life: be attentive, be intelligent, be reflective, be responsible.

It is the contribution of dialectic to locate the roots of differences. In the case we have been examining, the issue between Lonergan and Milhaven over the nature of objectivity and the status in being of value can be shown to have its roots in their contrasting positions in epistemology and cognitional theory.

In the present state of the discussion of moral theology it is surely a major contribution to proceed in a methodical way to locate differences where they in fact are-often enough not immediately at the level of ethics but at the level of metaphysics, epistemology or cognitional theory. It remains to be seen whether Lonergan's exposition of cognitional theory will precipitate the moral and intellectual conversions which might finally resolve outstanding differences among moral theologians.

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[88] Lonergan, *Method,* pp. 251-54.

A WORD ON BEHALF OF *METHOD IN THEOLOGY*

IN AVOWEDLY PRACTICING their discipline theologians often perform the widest variety of operations. Perhaps this is true as well of engineers and physicists. They however have not occupied the attention of Bernard J. F. Lonergan during the past decade. Neither, to be exact about the matter, have theologians. But theology surely has- if one can validly distinguish it from its practitioners and the functions they as a matter of fact *combine* in their professional activities. *Method in Theology* argues that one not only can but should so distinguish. Indeed the whole point it seeks to make is simply missed if this is forgotten. That, I submit, would be a tragic fate, for this study bids fair to leave its mark long after most of its reviewers and critics are dead and forgotten. Of course, such a truth claim calls for some sort of corroboration.

Theology seeks to mediate between a cultural matrix and the influence of religion in that matrix. (p. xi) So B. J. F. Lonergan advises his reader at the outset of his long awaited book.[1] Whatever the theologian as such should be about, religion appears as central in the undertaking. And religion is the experience of unrestricted love giving rise to knowledge (faith) and the latter's articulation or objectification (belief). Beliefs, to put it somewhat differently, result from judgments of value coming from faith, the eye of religious love, an eye that can discern God's self-disclosures. (p. 119) *Cognitum quod et quia prius amatum.* This is one pole of what theology is all about. The other is culture or the set of meanings and values that inform a community and contribute to making the latter what it is as distinct from all others.

[1] *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 19'1!).

Theology seeks to mediate in this sense. It is carried out within a particular culture and under the latter's influence. But, of course, so are other intellectual endeavors. Theology is nevertheless different and for this reason. Within that culture it seeks to understand religious love; the knowledge the latter gives rise to; the objectification of that knowledge; and the influence of all these on culture itself. A quest of understanding the varying relationships between culture and religious faith is therefore a fair way to describe what Lonergan means by the theological enterprise.

Today it is widely recognized that the components of culture change rapidly and combine various forms or clusters throughout the world. Furthermore the ways of objectifying faith, even the same faith, are numerous. Augsburg and Trent provide good examples. As a result theologians understandably do very different sorts of things while plying their trade. To speak of the general characteristics of theologizing, to describe the method of a particular theology as distinct from another- both would make for a reasonable task or project. But to write a book entitled *Method in Theology* and put the emphasis on the singular of both substantives probably strikes many as pretentious and unrealistic. This, however, is precisely what Lonergan has been about full time for ten years at least. Many did not grasp this when they looked for a different style of lecturing in his public appearances and expected him to enter more enthusiastically into discussion periods following his speaking engagements. A natural shyness and continuing struggle with poor health had much to do with his reserve on such occasions; but there is more as well. He really has been a man with a ten-year program and one who stuck to that plan with utmost discipline. If his stage presence and mannerisms as a lecturer replying to audiences on such occasions are made the basis on which history will judge his achievements, that would be unfortunate. If the challenges proceeding from *Insight* and *Method in Theology* are a more decisive factor, his influence will prove to be lasting and beneficial. But how and why?

VVHAT SoRT oF

As early as 1964 Robert Richard, an astute young theologian destined for a premature death, observed that if ours is an age of exegesis, criticism, and historical research, it is also one of theoretical science. The context of a general theory of human understanding was where he thought Lonergan's contribution to a study of the development of Christian doctrine ought to be located.[2] To be sure, there was no implication that he thought Lonergan had proposed a full-blown theory covering the gamut of Christian doctrine. In fact, there were at the time and still remain unanswered questions regarding the wider application of the hypothesis Lonergan proposed to elucidate trinitarian and christological development.[3] recently Professor David Burrell has argued that Lonergan offered no *theory* of cognition in *Insight* with the result that the work in question is to be understood as an invitation rather than an overview.[4] But saying that Lonergan, despite his wide-ranging research and conclusions, has offered no comprehensive theory of doctrinal development or of human cognition is one thing. Furthermore, those who observe that the present work contains few surprises regarding its author's views of theological method are right. But none of this implies that he has failed to make a significant contribution to any and perhaps all of these three areas. Indeed it is my conviction that the present work will be looked back on as one of the most comprehensive efforts made so far in this century to challenge readers to understand what should go by the name of theologizing. That, of course, is an assertion more easily made than

[2] Robert L. Richard, S. J., "Contribution to a Theory of Doctrinal Development," in *Continuum fl* (1964), p. *5fll.*

[3] In addition to the article cited above, Richard also raised certain questions in his article " Changeable and Unchangeable Elements in Conciliar Teaching" in the *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America flfl* (1967), 24-7. In an ecumenical perspective, cf. George A. Lindbeck, "Protestant Problems with Lonergan on the Development of Dogma," in *Foundations of Theology* (Dublin: Gill, 1971; ed. by Phillip McShane), pp. 115-fl3.

[4] David Burrell, "Method and Sensibility: Novak's Debt to Lonergan," in *Joumal of the American Academy of Religion* 3 (1972), 349-67.

corroborated. The verdict of history will come in slowly; in the meanwhile a word can be said to back up the contention even from this point in time. That is intended in what follows.

Lonergan's work rests on a conviction that is easily articulated. In the procedures of the human mind one can discern a basic pattern of operations employed in every cognitional enterprise. (p. 4) Man's intentionality or active interiority involves a sequence of experience, understanding, judgment, and choice. Any effort to demonstrate this conviction would beg the question and rest on the confident exercise of the same operations. Hence Lonergan's purpose has not been to make a case that these are in fact the ultimate foundations of cognition and volition but to cha.llenge readers and students to look within themselves to see whether this is or is not the way they function intellectually .[5] This was, it seems clear enough, the purpose of *Insight,* on which *Method in Theology* very obviously depends.

In fact, one might describe the logical pattern followed in *Method* in the following fashion. If every cognitional enterprise that is complete involves a basic pattern of operations, then theology as a cognitional enterprise does as well. It does not follow that everything that goes by the name of theology or deserves it will either involve all those operations or possess the name *theology* only by grace and favor. Nor is it impied that there can be no specialization within theology as a result of which one of those operations rather than the others becomes the object of major concern for the practitioner. What is more, schools and departments of theology should not expect to find in those operations and the corresponding functional specializations a ready-made basis for a reorientation of their program or curriculum. Still this logic does have its consequences. If theology is a cognitional enterprise and in every instance of the latter that is complete there is a basic pattern of operations, then theology at a particular period or place is obtruncated if the influence of any one of those operations is missing as a functional specialization. One individual may perform several

• In this Professor Burrell's assessment of *Insight* seems very accurate. See note 4.

of those functions. A number of individuals may perform one. But none of those functions can be lacking without the discipline's suffering badly.

Writing a book entitled *Method in Theology,* Lonergan knew people would expect him to mean something definite by method. He does. It stands for a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. (p. 5) The natural and behavioral sciences have methods in such a sense. But too often it seems that taste, preference, and fancy are the determining factors in what the theologian does; why he does that rather than something else; and why doing that is supposedly doing theology rather than literary criticism or philosophy of religion.[6]

To put it somewhat differently, Lonergan speaks of method rather than methods in theology because he is convinced there is a structure basic to human knowing and choosing and because he thinks that structure must characterize the theological enterprise as well. As a result, if it is an intellectual discipline, theology must involve levels of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. But how do the latter enter into the mediation between a cultural matrix and the role of religion therein?

As an inquiry theology concerns itself with the influence of religion on man and the influence of men thus influenced on other people, events, and things. In the first sense theology is mediating; it mediates an encounter with the past (through texts and other instruments to persons behind them) and leads through experience, understanding, and judgment to corresponding decision or conversion. But if theology involves an encounter with the past, it also leads to another stage. That is when the theologian, enlightened by the past, confronts the problems of his own day and takes his stand toward the future. (p. 133) Then theology is inquiry mediated to others.

[6] I have tried to elaborate on this ·elsewhere; cf. " Christian Eschatology and a Theology of Exceptions" in *Transcendence and Immanence: Reconstruction in the Light of Process Thinking-Festschrift in Honor of Joseph Papin* (Saint Meinrad: Abbey Press, 1972), pp. 141-50.

At that point the decision in which mediating theology spontaneously culminates is reflected on, illuminated, and objectified. This provides the horizon in which doctrines are affirmed; their content is understood; and possibilities of communication to others are explored. Theology as inquiry both mediates and is mediated.

The four levels of structured human knowing and choosing occur in each of these two phases of theology but in reverse order. What results are specializations based on function. For Lonergan, there are eight such functions: research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. One practicing a functional specialization operates on all four levels of consciousness but with the goal of pursuing the end of one rather than the other three. Thus the systematician experiences, understands, judges, and chooses in an inquiry seeking to *understand* doctrines within the horizon objectifying authentic conversion. And the researcher engages in all four levels of activity in an effort to determine as accurately as possible what the data from the past are that provide the grounds for efforts to understand, judge, and undergo conversion. If communications and pastoral theology involve consummate skill and artistry and at times profound understanding and erudition, they really aim at providing occasions and data for others to experience and react to religiously. This then is a sketch of the method Lonergan thinks theology must embody on the pain of ceasing either to be a cognitive enterprise or one concerned with religion in a cultural matrix.

WHY SIGNIFICANT?

Lonergan's achievement has been discussed very ably by Professor David Tracy.[7] But that was before *Method in Theology* appeared in final form and before a number of other developments had taken place in the world of thought today. As a result it may not be repetitious to see what if any con-

[1] David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970).

tribution the present work makes in four important areas of concern at present.

In the limited but crucial field of theological education rapid changes of curricula are a phenomenon hard to ignore. This work does not offer a blue-print for yet another change. But it can serve as a needed corrective. It aims at pulling the grounds out from under any sort of theological imperialism whereby one of the eight functional specializations would reduce the others to ancillary status at best. For a while in the '60's Lonergan feared that a narrow attitude of biblicism would try to measure the full dimensions of theology. Today that is no serious danger but the rush to what is called pastoral theology often threatens a constitutional crisis within faculties. The eight specializations are necessary and none should seek to lord it over the others. But a *laissez-faire* approach is no less a danger at present. Theological programs are sometimes built around a principle that " total coverage " of material is impossible and pluralism in teaching methods, goals, and philosophies is to be maintained as the *sine qua non* for survival. Lonergan's present work is a corrective against this as well and a warning that, when faculty members do their own thing without much concern for the nature of the discipline, the latter will suffer. One may ask whether the same will not be true of students as well.

As far as the practitioners of theology are concerned the book should likewise be of service. There is always the danger of seeing only the trees and not the forest. Theologians are not exempt from myopia in their view of what their discipline is all about. Professor Burrell described as one of the most salutary aspects of Lonergan's thought the fact that it can be so liberating. This would be a fair assessment of the present work as well. A discipline that is in danger of losing its identity altogether and being crushed under the weight of unassimilated data in printed form needs to ask itself what it aims at both as a cognitional enterprise and as one mediating between religion and culture. What loses its sense of unity tends to disintegrate. The perception of a *possible* unity in

theological enterprise may be the single greatest contribution Lonergan has made to theologians with this work.

In the broader context of Anglo-Saxon culture his book likewise deserves serious consideration. Avery Dulles, in a perceptive review, has described it as outstanding and has referred to its originality and internal consistency.[8] That consistency in particular and the originality as well result from its relation to a philosophy of human knowing. To some that philosophy becomes more plausible or increasingly convincing as time passes and other efforts in the same direction are found wanting. This reviewer finds it that way. To many, however, that philosophy is defective. But no one convinced of the importance of reason should fail to pay tribute to this work's author for one thing. He has made a decided effort to reverse the flight of theology from rationality. He insists he is writing about method and not theology.[9] But theologians should see what is implied in his analysis. Theology is a cognitional enterprise and has hope of surviving and flourishing only if it seeks to live by its nature, which involves the structure basic to human knowing and choosing.

Finally, Lonergan has something to say to those who are concerned about the relation of method and content in cognitional endeavors. At least as far as theology is concerned, he thinks the two are not only distinct but in need of distinction. His basis is what he considers the verifiable non-identity of conscious human activity and what is experienced, understood, judged, and reacted to therein. This effort is probably the most comprehensive and consistent case made yet for such a position. Those who take the opposite point of view will

[8] Avery Dulles, Review of *Method in Theology,* in *Theological Studies* 33 (1972), *553-5.* This review, while critical, regards the work in question more favorably than apparently did many of those who participated in the international seminar concerned with it at Saint Patrick's College, Maynooth earlier in 1972. Cf. Michael Ledwith, *"Method in Theology:* Report of a Seminar," in *1'he Irish Theological Quarterly* 39 (1972), 288-98.

[9] Cf. Philip McShane, "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S. J.," in *The Clergy Review 56* (1971) p. 413. Also helpful is R. M. Liddy's "Lonergan's Method," in *America,* Augnst *5,* 1972, pp. 68-71.

have reason to stop and reflect on what he has tried to do.[10] He says that he is a Roman Catholic with quite conservative views on religious and church doctrines. But he goes on to say that this notwithstanding he has written a chapter on the functional specialization of doctrines without subscribing to any but the doctrine about doctrine set forth in the first Vatican Council. (p. 332) Does this mean he thinks the analysis of theological method as related to the basic pattern of cognitional activities confirms what Vatican I said of the relation of faith and reason? It surely seems to. Schubert Ogden has asked whether Lonergan's metaphysics follows from his cognitional theory or vice versa.[11] With Lonergan I subscribe to the doctrine about doctrine in Vatican I and regard it as perhaps the single best statement by any Christian Church on the interplay of faith and reason. Still I think we can ask whether his subscription to that doctrine about doctrine may not have influenced his discovery of cognitional theory and if so to what extent. By applying himself to such a question he could add yet more to the contribution he has already made to the discussion not only of theological method but of faith as related to critical thought.

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[10] At least when it comes to Faith itself, Gabriel Moran takes a contrary position; cf. *The Present Revelation* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967).

[11] Schubert M. Ogden, "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle," in *Language, Truth and Meaning* (Notre Dame, Notre Dame Press, 1967; edited by Philip McShane) pp. 115-85.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Problem of Evolution: A Study of the Philosophical Repercussions of Evolutionary Science. By J. N. DEELY and R. J. NoGAR. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973. Pp. 486. $Hl.95

Over-all this is a good book, but it does not seem to have much of a place in modern North American intellectual life. By this I mean that it is either too long and diffuse or not long and diffuse enough. For those already convinced of the book's main thesis the work gives the impression of beating a dead horse. For those not so convinced the introductory essay and the various readings, all more or less in the same vein !n that they assume the truth of the thesis, are hardly sufficient to win the day.

The book is divided into three main parts: An historical-doctrinal introduction by Deely of about 80 pages, six groups of readings totaling about pages, and about 30 pages of bibliography. There is also a 7 page Retrospect recalling the unfortunate and untimely death of Fr. Nogar, 0. P. The six groups of readings center around six themes, namely, the animal background to man, the cultural foreground to man, the moral consequences of accepting the evolutionary vision, some " metaphysical " issues, some aspects of evolution and Christian thought, and the evolutionary world-view. The readings are taken from fifteen different people, four of whom appear twice: Dobzhansky White Deely Steward, Bidney, Adler, Ayala, Dewey, Ashley, Waddington, Dubarle, Chardin, Nogar J. Huxley, and Eiseley. The 10 page general conclusion, which begins on page 393, emphasizes the differences between the static, picture, eternity-minded outlook and the dynamic, drama, change-minded outlook. The latter accepts the " bitter truth " that the natural world is a mess in which man, left with nothing but his freedom, must thrash around while working and hoping for the best.

The work was in the main complete in late 1968 and, although the bibliography is somewhat updated to the main text still remains early in date. From time to time this shows up in the text as, for example, on page where Adler's *The Difference of Man and The Difference It Makes* is called his most recent book. The reader, however, is assured (p. 441) that during the several year delay in publication nothing of any great importance has transpired that would make several of the contributors change what they had to say.

As for as the content of the work is concerned, one main theme and several sub-themes stand out. The main point of the book seems to be to continue the work of Chardin and complete the task of convincing the

world, and especially old-fashioned philosophers and conservative churchmen, of the promiscuous and ever-changing, ever-ongoing, process-nature of the world. A world of constant, endless, and radical change is the central fact of evolution regardless of exactly how particular events are explained. This is the postulatory, "as if," *mythos*, "vision" of evolution (see pp. 27-29, 77). It represents a "mentality" which soars up, beyond, and around the lack or presence of facts of the moment. In agreement with Nogar and Crespy, Deely asks us to keep our eye on the donut (the continuity) and not on the hole (the gaps) and thus experience the evolutionary world-view at first hand. (p. 22) All the readings were chosen to reinforce and develop this outlook on life. Concerning the book as a whole, " The point most worthy of note is that the time for theologians and philosophers to question whether evolution is a fact now demonstrated has gone. " (p. 403)

The problem of reconciling being and becoming, eternity and time, stability and change, in the same world is certainly a real and serious one. But is the removal of a part of a problem a serious solution? Under pressure to get-with-it and get-modern, this seems the tendency of the present volume. As modern men " it is high time that we begin to take seriously what scientific experience has long since testified, but what has only just begun to be acknowledged in philosophy, and as yet not at all in theology, namely, that the evolution of life, and the emergence of man, is a natural process in which chance, failure, waste, disorder and death may ultimately prevail. " (p. 396) By playing down order and rationality in favor of process, disorder, and chance the scales are tipped toward becoming to the point of almost falling over. In Sartrean fashion, in the face of such overwhelming irrationalism there is little man can do but shoulder the burden of redirecting the world by exercising his one truly distinctive feature: freedom. It is only the vision of evolution which can prevent an attempted escape from a feeling of responsibility for the future of the human race. (see pp. 401, 442-443)

As one might suspect, "traditionalists" like Aquinas are not very weil treated. In his article on "Change and Process" Fr. Ashley depicts Aquinas as a static-minded, picture person (p. 280), while Fr. Nogar, in his article, "Aquinas, Sartre, and the Lemmings," sees Aquinas's *sub ratione aeternitatis* approach sharply contrasted with Sartre's "existentialism." (p. 370) Aquinas, who was at heart a Greek in philosophy, did his best but " too quickly ... abandoned the imperfections and the grandeur of a universe of space-time, the very being of which is unfolding contingency." (p. 371) If Thomistic eternal essences could be gotten out of the manuals, everyone would be better off even today. (p. 371, note 1) This historically erroneous, straw man, picture of Aquinas could have been corrected if more attention had been paid to metaphysics. However, given the author-editor's view of the subject, seen variously as

epistemology, (p. viii) the philosophy of nature, (pp. and then as epistemology again, (p. the possibility of a clear statement about the proper subject-matter of the philosophy of being seems to have been precluded in advance.

Prof. Deely and Fr. Nogar would be the last to claim that God and evolution are incompatible. Yet they seem to neglect the fact that the great divide today is not between evolutionists and anti-evolutionists but between those who claim evolution is totally undirected chance process and those who say that God is somehow at the source of all the changes that have and are taking place. The front line of the battle has been moved for some time now. If the main point of the book is to drive home the fact of gradual change in the world from lower to higher forms with perhaps some largescale changes, the work is an anticlimax; that argument was won on a wide scale back in the 1950's, and the time for works which keep redoing the subject has gone. If the intent is to open the door to a more extreme form of process philosophy, which seems to be the case at times, the task was hardly begun. If, however, the 1973 problems of specific theories of evolution are to be tackled, then the work has missed its opportunity. The work includes statements about the still current issues of the literal truth of common descent by some specific means, the quantity-quality leap, the problem of universals, etc., but these are not given the systematic, integrated, all-sides, dialectical treatment they deserve. What the work does do is to pull together some good readings, extensively annotated, on some of the biological, cultural, philosophical, and religious aspects of the non-problem of evolution.

The book itself is a well made and printed hardback.

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Theology Today Series. 6 *The Theology of Evolution.* By ERVIN NEMESSZEGHY, S. J. and JoHN RussELL, S. J. Pp. 96; *The Theology of Confirmation.* By AusTIN P. MILNER, O. P. Pp. 37. *The Theology of Mission.* By AYLWARD SHORTER, W. F. Pp.

It is possible to have a theology of evolution because reason and faith, though different orders of truth, are related to each other. As the authors of *The Theology of Evolution* put it: " The fact that several scientific

theories of cosmogony and biology are compatible with the biblical notion of creation does not warrant the conclusion that none is incompatible with it. " (p. 38) The task of a theology of evolution, then, will be to determine under what form the theory of evolution will be compatible with faith. It has been accomplished admirably here, with special reference to the doctrines of Original Sin and the special creation of the soul. Polygenism is seen to be a necessary ingredient of evolution and at the same time theologically acceptable. From Genesis to *Humani Generis* the relevant texts are analyzed with the help of a number of simple principles, e. g.,: " Council texts should always be interpreted strictly ... ," (p. 59) and: non-infallible documents such as *Humani Generis* decide" not whether a teaching is ture or false, once and for all, but whether it is safe from the pastoral point of view at a certain point of history." (p. 62) The book ends with an account, sympathetic but by no means uncritical, of the essentials of Teilhard de Chardin. Teilhard's vision, as set out in *The Phenomenon of Man,* is to be regarded neither as science nor theology but as a successful myth for the twentieth-century man.

The Theoloogy of Confirmation is valuable because of the author's broad knowledge of the history of the rite of this sacrament. As far as Confirmation is concerned, that is the chief interest of the theologian. Especially interesting is the long quotation from a sermon of Abbott Faustus of Lerins, also Bishop of Riez, preached at Pentecost between 451 and 470. For him it is the sacrament of the spiritual life of the adult Christian. In addition to the historical survey Father Milner discusses the evidence of the Sacred Scripture, St. Paul, St. Luke, and St. John, humbly acknowledging his indebtedness to the article PNEUMA by E. Schweistzer in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament.* The book contains much genuine scholarship and reverence for history and Tradition. But the author's hesitancy about Infant Baptism is strange in a Dominican. He seems to think that one must be mentally mature to receive the gift of Faith. That is very like semi-Pelagianism. And is it accurate to say that "at the present time the defection from the Church of young people who have been baptized as infants and are supposed to have received a Christian education is very general?" As Newman said so well, even Oxford has its own own provincialism.

The Theology of Mission contains twelve chapters concerning Development, the era of Foreign Missions, Old Testament background, the Risen Christ as the foundation of Mission, the relation of the Church's mission to human personality and to human cultures, the salvific role of the world religions, neo-colonialism in the Church and human communication in a secular age. The chapter on the era of foreign missions begins was an admission that is hardly allowable in a scientific study. The author says that he is giving a picture which is a "trifle exaggerated." Trifle is an understatement. Bishop Shanahan is mentioned only to belittle his

simple faith in seeing the Devil's opposition to Christian progress. Did not Our Lord meet with a similar interference? They were saints, giants, loved and admired, the author magnanimously concedes, but the implication is that they were theological fools. The author pleads rightly for justice as far as developing countries are concerned. Do we not owe these missionaries a just assessment of their work? " The easiest way to start a mission was to collect orphans or ransom slave-children and then start a mission school." But will the author quote this as the constitutional policy of any missionary congregation? If the missionaries refused to save the lives of these children, would they be truly Christian? Not knowing that any and every religion has a salvific role, they were in a hurry to save souls and, like St. Luke, they counted the Baptisms. Rigid in their Western ways, they made no allowance for the vagaries of marriage systems in Africa. But Jesus was also rigid in his attitude to prevailing custom in Judea. There are many good things in the rest of this book. But as theology it is unsatisfactory. For theology is a continuity of intellectual understanding of the implications of our Faith. One gets the impression from the author that before the Second Vatican Council there was only erroneous theology of the mission, if any at all. Besides, a theology of mission should cover more than the end of missionary activity. Emphasis is given to statements made by Pope Paul in the presence of government officials in Africa-courtesy exchanges at airports-but his explicit teaching on the priorities to be observed in missionary activity is not quoted. The missionary mandate of Our Lord is soft-pedalled. I wonder why? A Theology of Mission should consider also the means. From that point of view I consider Father le Joly's book, *Proclaiming Christ*, far more practical in its approach.

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Approaches To Natural Law: From Plato To Kant. By FRANCIS H. ETEROVICH. New York: Exposition Press, 1972. Pp. 194. $6.50.

The brevity of this book offers the advantage of broad treatment enabling the student to discern the larger contours and general continuity of the history of natural law theory. It follows the usual divisions of that history into classical, Christian, and post-scholastic, or modern, periods. Under the last of these are treated the empirical, rationalist, and idealist versions of natural law. The ambivalence of the term "natural law " is amply conveyed as successive philosophers are considered, as is also the bearing of their metaphysical and epistemological positions on their respective moral and juridical doctrines.

The advantage, however, is largely offset by a treatment which is in places oversimplified and inaccurate. The less than three pages devoted to the Roman law jurists are bound to confuse and mislead a reader not already familiar with Justinian's *Institutes* and the complications of its section on *ius naturale.* Justinian is twice mentioned as being himself a jurist-indeed "the greatest of all Roman jurists." (p. 43) The jurists themselves are first lumped together as understanding natural right to presuppose society (which would not be the case with Ulpian) and on the following page (44) are again collectively presented as sharing Ulpian's view of the difference between *ius naturale* and *ius gentium.* A bit further along we are told that the compilers of the *Institutes* " preferred not to distinguish *ius gentium* from *ius naturale,"* while in fact it was the *Institutes* that canonized Ulpian's restrictive and awkward definition of *ius naturale* which, in its context, stands sharply opposed to *ius gentium.* Most of the confusion is owing, of course, to the compilers themselves. For after accepting Ulpian's understanding of *natural* as comprising only those activities common to man and animals, they went on immediately to incorporate Gaius's definition of *ius gentium* as stemming from "natural reason " (*naturalis ratio)* .

Exception must also be taken to the handling of Suarez. Dr. Eterovich writes:

> Suarez takes a middle course in answering the question: " Is natural law only a preceptive or a demonstrative law?" In other words, does it command, or does it just state what is to be done?

It should be noted in the first place that the question included in quotations does not appear in the Latin text of *De legibus* and, secondly, that to make the two formulations equivalent-and bring them closer to an expression of Suarez's problem-the adverb *only* should qualify *demonstrative* rather than *preceptive.* Then it will be seen from the author's own exposition that Suarez is not taking a middle course but opting for one of the alternatives, viz., that natural law is preceptive. The words of the Latin text," *mediam viam tenendan censeo,"* (if these are what the author has in mind in reference to a middle course) refer not to the alternatives themselves but to the extremely opposed grounds on which some were arguing for them. In other words, the *via media* lay between rationalism and voluntarism.

Again, it is a mistake to attribute to Suarez the teaching that " natural law does not reveal God issuing commands, but simply indicates what is in itself good or evil." (p. 72) These words are cited from the passage (II, vi, 2) in which Suarez is expounding the reasoning against which he is himself to argue. While rejecting the voluntarist position (" *legem naturalem omnino positam in divino imperio"),* he concludes nevertheless that natural law is properly law (preceptive) and properly divine.

" *Concludo et dico tertia, legem naturalem esse veram, ac propriam legem divinam cujus legislator est Deus"* (II, vi, 13).

In his preface Dr. Eterovich, who is Croatian-bom, acknowledges the services of those who carefully checked and improved the book's language and style. In spite of this the work is replete with misprints, misspellings, lapses in grammar, and a legion of printer's devils. Man enters the world without accounterments, naked and unshed (p. and with a tendency to self-preserve. (p. 51) Grotius "advocates that one can treat of natural law without reference to God" (p. 83) and a sovereign "can perform an iniquity." (p. 106) Isidore-in his *Ethymologies-is* described as" making *ius gentium* contained under positive law. " (p. 58) On p. 85 we have " subjective definition of right " for definition of subjective right. Aquinas talks "as a matter of fact" (p. 57) instead of in a matter-of fact manner. Treaties of peace " must not only be observed ... but also heeded and not refused" (p. 75)-for *"admittenda et non neganda."*

It is especially unfortunate that in a book aiming to secure a fair hearing for natural law (p. 11) the handling of the scholastic doctors is burdened and obfuscated by labored, awkward, and erroneous translation and by a slavish transliteration of technical scholastic terms that cannot but rebuff and bafHe a reader unacquainted with their sense or context. (For that matter, even one so acquainted must mentally revise as he reads). Right or just may be defined as " an equal work due to others. " (p. 58) " General moral principles are the same for all in their moral rectitude and they are known to all," (p. 54) but " even when the moral conclusion is the same for everyone in its inner objective evidence it may not be equally known to all." *(ibid.)* It happens that men "because of their ignorance, passion or bad character, forgo some proximate moral concluions. " (p. 55) "Divine values are immensely distant from frail human lives and faulty human affairs," (p. 57) and "the nature of human affairs (feelings, volitions, actions, results) is contingent and particular." (p. 89) A right is " a moral quality of a person. " (p. 85) Aquinas demonstrates a point " on the first principle of natural law " (p. 5!2) and finds a not unanswerable objection "not to be an ultimate one. " (p. 53) And how is even the expert in scholastic moral theory to expound the statement: "The moral commands of reason are thus the very form of good human acts as the moral prohibitions of reason are for the bad ones? " (p.

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The Edges of Language: An Essay in the Logic of Religion. By \'Aur, M. VAN BuREN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 197!'!. Pp. 178. $2.45.

When the" death-of-God" controversy was making headlines in the secular and religious presses, Thomas Altizer, William Hamilton, and Paul Van Buren were often listed as the principal advocates of the proclaimed demise. Van Buren's *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel* was an effort to show that the word *God* was meaningless and to reconstruct Christian discourse without it. His point of departure was twentieth-century analytic philosophy and biblical criticism, and the distinction of the book, in contrast to the writings of Altizer and Hamilton, was its modesty, clarity, and reasonableness. Since that time Van Buren has been engaged in an intense reconsideration of the position taken in *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel.* The essays collected in *Theological Explorations* represented the development of his reconsideration over several years, and now *The Edges of Language: An Essay in the Logic of Religion* gives coherent form to his most recent reflections.

Van Buren takes his inspiration in *The Edges of Language* not from the positivistic wing of linguistic analysis but from Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and John Austin's *How to do Things with Words.* Both Wittgenstein and Austin suggest to him that one errs in seeing human language as chiefly a vehicle for making factual claims and in taking words as uniquely means of naming. The error is significant for Van Buren ecause he discerns it at the heart of many of the disputes about religious beliefs, for instance, the dispute between theists and atheists about the existence of a transcendent, benevolent being. Each party to this latter dispute tends to understand God-talk as talk about "factual" realms beyond the experience and discourse of men. The alternative proposed in *The Edges of Language* is to focus more sharply on the " doing " involved in religious language, especially as it arises among educated Christians of the mid-twentieth century. Van Buren expects this shift in focus to reveal the extent to which the Christian navigates along the edges of the rule-bound activity of speech in his God-talk. In making his way along this border he engages in an enterprise akin to that of the poet and the punster: he stretches language right up to the limits of its intelligibility and *God* marks the final edge of that intelligibility. In interpreting the language of the Christian thus Van Buren puts aside his previous conviction that God-talk is meaningless and useless. He likewise refrains from taking its significance and value as straight-forwardly ethical or metaphysical in the sense of **R. B.** Braithwaite's " An Empiricist Analysis of Religious Language " or of John Wisdom's " Gods. " Rather it has both significance and value for him as do all attempts to extend language and experience

through paradox. One may prefer to remain on the home-field of speech where ambiguity is excluded, but he need not stay there. What is more, the move away from the center can enrich and illuminate the existence of human beings. The peculiar ethical and metaphysical side of Christian discourse will have its genuine sense when one grasps the relationship of such discourse to the other fashions of taking a stand on the edges of language. Van Buren believes that a reconsideration of God-talk along these lines is in continuity with the best of traditional theology and of great importance for the contemporary man who would speak as a Christian despite his uneasiness with the " factual " interpretation of his utterances.

The Edges of Language has one great similarity with *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel:* it manifests the author's capacity to write clearly and simply and his concern to state his case fairly and honestly. It makes a major advance over the earlier work in its richer perspective on language in general and on religious language in particular. One cannot but be grateful for the endeavor to study the latter in the light of the moves of the poet and the punster. Yet Van Buren is surely right in finishing the book with an admission that he has made only a beginning in drawing out the implications of these moves for the philosophy of religion. One needs still to appreciate more fully the type of language at stake here. Thus ordinary punning and poetry as well as the religious use of such speech styles must receive closer attention if the task is to reach completion. Something in the order of Donald Evans's detailed application of Austin's methods to biblical texts in *The Logic of Self-Involvement* must eventually grow out of the suggestions in *The Edges of Language.* One benefit of such a delineation should be to make some of the lines drawn between the " factual " and paradoxical uses of religious language by Van Buren untenable. It would become evident, for example, that this analysis embraces and does not undercut the theism-atheism clash. The main fruit of a more detailed study would, however, be that an excellent essay on the logic of religion would gain the body it requires in order to be properly effective. But Van Buren has made the start, and the dissatisfaction which has led from *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel* to *The Edges of Language* has been a boon for everyone interested in either the philosophical or theological consideration of religious discourse.

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Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia III: *De Coniecturis.* Ed. By JosEF Kocn and KARL BoRMANN. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, Pp. DM

The periodization of history may be a requirement inherent in the historical enterprise itself, but it involves some unavoidable distortion. Thinkers like Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) find themselves relegated to the expiring gasps of the Middle Ages or to the secondary status of mere precursors of a dawning era. Periodization requires its terminal personages, and these are inevitably assigned a marginal importance.

But what the historical enterprise has created it can also destroy, and slowly but surely our persective into the no-man's-land of the late 14th-early 15th centuries is developing both in depth and breadth. One example of this development has been the increasing scholarly interest in Ockhamism and the nominalist influence. Another promising sign that our understanding of fifteenth-century culture is being steadily enriched is the remarkable growth of interest in the life and thought of Cusanus. In the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences embarked on the production of its critical *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia.* That work might well have been completed by now had it not been interrupted (indeed partially obliterated) by World War II. In the last few years several important additions to this critical *Opera* have been published, thus bringing the entire project to a point from which completion no longer seems that dim distant dream it did a few short years ago.

Along with the progress of the critical edition international interest in Cusanus grows apace. Apart from the incomplete Heidelberg *Opera Omnia* but in conjunction with it the Felix Meiner Verlag has been publishing a series, *Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues in deutscher tJbersetzung.* These texts initially did not contain the Latin version but more recent additions to the series are bilingual. The paperback volumes are of convenient size, are fully annotated, and contain substantial introductions by renowed Cusanus scholars. They are ideally suited for seminar work, perhaps even upper division undergraduate study. Furthermore, they make the works of Cusanus accessible to the specialist who is unable to afford the price of the increasingly expensive additions to the critical *Opera Omnia.* Italian, Portuguese, and even Japanese editions of select philosophical and religious works of Cusanus were published recently and, as unlikely as it may seem, a Japanese Cusanus association has been established! Regretably, English-language works and translations are not nearly as well represented in the Cusanus bibliographies as one might reasonably expect. With the availability of a critical text of Nicholas's works, British and American students of philosophy and religion should be encouraged to turn their attention to their 15th-century forebear. Cusanus studies could profit immeasurably, for example, from language-critical analysis.

With the exception of the *De concordantia catholica,* a reform document which Nicholas presented to the Council of Basel in 1433 or 1434, the *De coniecturis* is his longest and most ambitious work. It was written some few years after his famous *De docta ignorantia* (completed Feburary 12, 1440) and was referred to by name in that earlier, programmatic work. *De docta ignorantia* had not only raised again the crucial question of man's knowledge of God but had reemphasized the utter disproportion of the finite to the infinite. Compensating that anxiety-raising doctrine is Cusanus's well-known language describing God's relation to the world as a *complicatio omnium,* language which clearly gives rise to another kind of disquietude. For the consolations offered by pantheism and mystical vision collide at many points with Christian tradition and ecclesiastical authority. Fortunately for Cusanus, his political sagacity and indefatigable energy had won him the red hat and thereby immunized him from the attacks of theologians like Johnannes Wenck.

As Josef Koch pointed out some years ago, although Cusanus had envisaged the *De coniecturis* as an elucidation of several issues presented in *De docta ignorantia,* by the time he got around to completing *De coniecturis* his ideas had evolved in the direction of Proclan Neoplatonism, a metamorphosis from a *Seinsmetaphysik* to an *Einheitsmetaphysik.* It seems that Nicholas had been introduced to the writings of Proclus during his mission to Constantinople just prior to the Council of Florence but had not yet really assimilated Proclan ideas until after *De docta ignorantia* was written.

In one sense, Cusanus's *coniectura,* which he defines as" positiva assertio, in alteritate veritatem, uti est, participans," (p. 58) is a corollary of " learned ignorance. " Because knowledge proceeds by comparing the unknown to the already known it is essentially a matter of establishing proportions. But since proportion between the finite and the infinite is out of the question, the human mind can never know God, indeed can never know the full truth about anything. This realization is "learned ignorance." But we can nonetheless arrive at approximations to truth. These approximations are *coniecturae.* Although Nicholas engages in *coniectura* in *De docta ignorantia* as he employs mathematical symbols to illustrate the *coincidentia oppositorum,* it is only in *De coniecturis* that he attempts systematically to establish his *ars coniecturalis.* Based on the "four unities "-God, intellect, reason, sense-Cusanus's noetic sees these four existing in mathematical relationship to each other, a relationship generated by the natural progression 1, 2, 3, 4. The sum of this progression equals 10, the basis of a further progression equalling 100, in turn giving rise to a similar progression equalling 1000. The elements of the series I, 10, 100, 1000 are to each other as God, intellect, reason, sense. All of this presupposes, of course, that mind's creativity is a true image of divine creativity and that human processes

in bringing forth *coniectura* are participations of the infinite divine *ratio* which produced the real world. (p. 7)

As might be expected, the elaborately contrived formulae of the *De coniecturis* do not really do for knowledge what Cusanus's contemporary, Leon Battista Alberti, did for painting. By applying Alberti's rules of perspective, artists were able to create a truly unified spatial representation. But there can be little doubt that Cusanus's *ars coniecturalis* is a response to the same cultural impetus toward scientific mastery and precision. Nicholas, however, was not dealing with the merely secular, and his mathematical conception of intellectual life was difficult to reconcile with faith. Not only is the latter subject not treated in this work; the word *fides* is not so much as mentioned! This despite the fact that Cusanus does deal with *theologia* and *religio.* It is difficult to attribute such an omission to mere oversight. Dissatisfaction with the state of theology was widespread among those intellectuals who saw themselves identified with humanistic values. Cusanus considered his works *De doctra ignorantia* and *De coniecturis* to be innovative and untraditional. They can be regarded as his initial contribution to a reform program conceived along intellectualist lines, as contrasted with his earlier canonical conception.

De coniecturis is usually considered a work of purely philosophical interest. Nietzsche's observations about the biographical basis of philosophy find some confirmation in the case of Cusanus and his *coniectura* doctrine. Scholars have been unable to give a truly satisfying explanation of Cusanus's abandonment of the conciliar movement in favor of the papal party. Not only had he supported conciliarism at the Council of Basel; his *De concordantia catholica* was the last great canonical defense of that position. During his own lifetime his change of allegiance was attributed to base political motives. To Aeneas Sylvius it smacked of schism not only because the future Pius II was then himself an ardent supporter of conciliar authority but also because Cusanus had based his own conciliar theory on theological grounds, on faith itself. His subsequent elaboration of *docta ingnorantia* and *coniectura* should be seen in the context of his need to defend his move and supply it with theological justification. In a letter to Rodrigo Sanchez de Arevalo he referred to the Church as *ecclesia coniecturalis,* a conception which allowed him to defend a hitherto unpalatable papal authority by reducing it and its claims to the realm of the less-than-certain.

This important fifteenth-century text should be given serious attention by scholars from a variety of disciplines. The *apparatus fontium* and the 48 appended adnotationes are remarkable testimony to the unsurpassed scholarship of Josef Koch whose death interrupted his work on this text. As this volume shows, Koch's work has been brought to a worthy conclusion by Karl Bormann. This latest addition to the Heidelberg *Opera* not only meets but often surpasses the high standards we have come to expect

from the series. The only serious improvement we might suggest would be an *index rerum et verborum.* This deficiency should be at least partially remedied by the projected final volume of indices.

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Repertorio de historia de las ciencias eclesiasticas en Espana. Vol. 4. Salamanca: Instituto de historia de la teologia espanola, Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, 1972. Pp. 361.

This volume is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the intellectual history of the Middle Ages and Renaissance on the Iberian Peninsula. It contains the following articles: {1) Vicente Munoz Delgado, "La logica hispano-portugesa hasta 1600 (notas bibliognifico-doctrinales) " (pp. 9-122); (2) Salvador Gomez Nogales, "Filosofia musulmana espanola" (pp. 123-148); (3) Jose Luis Rojo Seijas, "Valoracion amorruibalista de Abengabirol" (pp. 149-184); (4) Jose Maria da Cruz Pontes, " Contribuciones recientes a la historia de la filosofia portuguesa de los siglos XIII-XV" (pp. 185-202); (5) Jose Riesco Terrero, "La metasfisica en Espana (siglos XII al XV) " (pp. 203-259); and {6) Mariana Ameilia Machado Santos, " Ensaio de sintese panoramica da filosofia dos portugueses no seculo XVI" (pp. 261-343). Particularly valuable are the contributions of Munoz Delgado, Riesco Terrero, and Machado Santos, which are rich bio-bibliographical compilations serving to bring to more general attention many rare and obscure publications dealing with Spanish and Portuguese philosophy.

The piece of Fr. Munoz Delgado is perhaps the most valuable contribution of all. It presents an excellent survey of the development of logic in Spain and Portugal from Seneca down to the end of the sixteenth century. It helps to show just how extensive and varied has been the intellectual life of the Iberian Peninsula. In addition to Seneca, we find treatments of Isidore of Seville, Averroes, Maimonides, Raimon Lull, Peter of Spain, Vincent Ferrer, Juan de Celaya, Antonio Coronel, Pedro da Fonseca, the Coimbra Commentaries, and many others. Of especial value is the section dealing with logic in the sixteenth century, to the understanding of which Fr. Munoz Delgado has himself contributed in so important a way. Like all of his publications it is based on a firm grasp of the relevant primary and secondary literature.

On the whole the volume provides a biographical foundation for further detailed studies in the field. It indicates what an immense amount of material still remains from the flowering of scholastic philosophy in

sixteenth-century Spain and Portugal. It also indicates how little of this material is ever discussed in general histories of philosophy and how little it is known outside of Spain and Portugal. Though much of the sixteenth-century philosophical activity was indeed of purely local interest, the impact of Sanches on French sceptical thought, of Fonseca on the development of logic, of Suarez on German scholasticism (both Catholic and Protestant), and of the *Cursus Conimbricensis* on Decartes have new been clearly documented. It remains yet to study all of this more carefully before we can see precisely how seventeenth-century philosophy, theology, and science are to be linked with the late Middle Ages. The sixteenth-century developments in these fields are still not clearly understood, but, with research tools such as the present volume available, it is now becoming easier to study the extant materials with the view of eventually making sense of this very complex cultural situation.

The *Repertorio* is well printed, though there are many misprints, especially in bibliographical entries in foreign languages. It has an index of manuscripts cited (which is quite extensive), as well as an index of authors, and is a scholarly tool which should be in every research library.

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Christian Political Theology: A Marxian Guide. By JOSEPH PETULLA. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1972. Pp. 266. $3.95

The contention of the author is that Christianity and Marxism share ab asic " commitment perspective " on the questions of man's alienation and liberation which justifies the theologian's use of Marxian analysis of history. He tries to recover some historical evidence that shows that Christianity " has reason to look at the world in a manner compatible with a Marxian world view. " The primary purpose of the book is said to be " the presentation of a Marxian conceptual device as a contribution to an understanding of economic, political and social processes from within a Christian theological perspective." (p. 3) Mr. Petulla feels that this is necessary because " the man of our current moral treatises is the individual loaded with obligations toward God and neighbor; he is not the man engaged in the construction of the world and called to take a position in the cause of justice, of peace, of progress and organization. "

Whatever use this effort may have, it depreciates, on the one hand, the roots of Marxist concepts and their own unique revolutionary meaning, and on the other, the political revolutionary quality of Christian theology itself. Rather than suggest that the Old and

New Testaments are radically Marxist, it would be more nearly accurate to say, with Barbara Ward, that Marx was the last of the great Jewish prophets. Mr. Petulla seems to feel that religious values of themselves are inadequate to furnish significant interpretation of man's role in " the construction of the world. " The great early theologians are accused of failing " to include provisions for social change in the temporal order." (p. 10) One wonders what Mr. Petulla would make of the text of St. Thomas which reads: " The world was made to be man's dwelling. Therefore it should benefit man ... Man has some likeness to the universe, wherefore he is called a little world. Hence man loves the whole world naturally, and consequently desires its good. Therefore, that man's desire be satisfied the universe must needs ... be made better." The renewal of the world after the Last Judgement is made to serve as an inspiration to man to change the world now: St. Thomas insists that politics is concerned not only with " government " of the *status quo* but with creating a perfect society by continually renewing its structures. (Chapter XIII, *On the Rule of Princes)* St. Augustine, to whom Mr. Petulla imputes the view that " the history of the earthly city will never improve, " called upon men to care for and to distribute earthly goods in imitation of " that most just Disposer of all the adjuncts of temporal peace-the visible light, the breathable air, the potable water, and all the other necessaries of meat, drink, and clothing. "

" Alienation, " " liberation, " and " praxis " have very special meanings in Marx. They cannot be transferred in a simplistic fashion to Christian political theology.

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A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation. By GusTAVO GuTIERREz. Translated and edited by Sister Caridad lnda and John Eagleson. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1973. Pp. 308. Hardbound $7.95; paperback $4.95.

Two combinations make this book noteworthy: it combines the intellectual insights of the professor of theology at the Catholic University of Peru with his practical knowledge of the harsh realities of poverty and oppression. It also relates important and pertinent ecclesiastical documents (e. g., those from Vatican II and the Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops held at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968) to the author's own carefully constructed theology of liberation.

Gutierrez identifies three interpenetrating meanings of liberation: the political liberation sought by exploited peoples and classes; the freeing of man in history to accept conscious responsibility for his own destiny; and liberation from sin to communion with God and realization of human brotherhood. Appropriately, he explores these meanings with special reference to Latin America," the only predominantly Christian continent among those inhabited by oppressed people. " Whereas Westerners tend to conceive concern for society in terms of development and progress, Third World peoples see it as the demand for justice and liberation.

For the author, theology of liberation is in the nature of theology itself. Theology is critical reflection on historical praxis in the light of the Word accepted in faith. It therefore inevitably concerns the existence of Christians in the world. Theology of liberation examines the classic question of the relation between faith and social reality in a new context which demands the abolition of exploitation and the achievement of freedom. Gutierrez considers representative doctrines from this perspective.

Sin, for example, is a social, historical fact, involving simultaneously broken relationships with both men and God as well as an interior, personal fracture. We encounter the Lord in encountering other human beings, and likewise separate ourselves from God as we erect barriers against our fellows. Hence sin has collective dimensions, appearing in oppressive and exploitative social structures as in concrete instances of alienation.

Salvation also entails the liberation of persons in society. Defined as the communion of men with God and among themselves, it is an intrahistorical reality that embraces and transforms all human life and leads to its fullness in Christ the Liberator. The doctrines of creation, eschatology, incarnation, and kingdom all concern a God whose salvific action underlies all human existence and includes the struggle for a just society.

Inevitably this involves a new conception of the mission of the church in the world. The church is" a sacrament of history," a sign of God's call to all men to become a community of justice and love in communion with him. As Medellin made plain, the God of the Bible is a liberating God, and the Gospel contains a revolutionary thrust.

With such a theology, the church must be unqualifiedly committed to the abolition of injustice and the building of a new social order. Obviously a church which casts its lot with the poor and downtrodden confronts the question of the universality of Christian love, and it risks disrupting its own unity and forfeiting the support of the economically and politically powerful. But the class struggle is a fact, and neutrality is impossible. The church cannot help influencing society in one way or another, and in the perspective of the kingdom its only option is participation in the struggle for liberation. However, universal love seeks also the liberation of the oppressors from their selfish love of power.

The struggle must be rooted in "spirituality," a life-style dominated and inspired by the Spirit of God and nourished by prayer and worship, a way of living " before the Lord " in solidarity with all men. The touchstone of such spirituality is evangelical conversion to God and the neighbor-the radical transformation that leads us to think, feel, and live like Christ in relation to alienated people. A church so grounded will evangelize the world in a new sense which includes conscienticizing and politicizing-helping the exploited to become aware of their true personhood.

Affirming the importance of dialogue between Christians and Marxists, the author calls on both to move beyond discussion to experiments in action.

One misses in this perceptive interpretation any critical examination of the role of revolutionary violence from the standpoint of Christian ethics. Gutierrez rightly insists that Christians recognize the constant presence of " institutionalized violence, " and makes clear that those who condemn violence by the oppressed for the sake of justice must condemn equally the covert violence by which oppressors maintain injustice. But he nowhere examines the ethical pros and cons of violent activity, and l1e offers no guidelines for those who, committed to liberation, seek a sound harmonization of means and ends. He has proclaimed convincingly the gospel of liberation. We shall be still more in his debt if he can now go on to examine how Christians and the church should proceed in the difficult decisions required by liberating action.

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The Church and Revolution; From the French Revolution of 1789 to the Paris Riots of 1968; From Cuba to Southern Africa; From Vietnam to Latin America. By FRAN<;:ms HouTART and ANDRE RoussEAU. Tr. by VIOLET NEVILE. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1971. Pp. *$3.95.*

The subtitle of this work describes the scope but not the emphasis of the volume. Houtart and Rousseau spend more time analysing the church in France and revolutionary movements there (fully one-third of the bouk) than they expend on any church in a revolutionary situation. In addition, contrary to the impression that the subtitle might convey, the major orientation of the volume is not historical but sociological. Thus the authors' opening chapter offers a sociological approach to revolution, while the concluding chapter presents a "tentative sociological interpretation" of the role of the church (primarily the Roman Catholic Church) in revolution.

Technically, the book is flawed. There are numerous misprints, and in

many instances the meaning of the text is unclear due to unhappy translations that leave pronouns and demonstrative adjectives pointing nowhere. The book has bibliographical footnotes but no index.

The first element of Houtart and Rousseau's argument is that a post-Marxist sociology of revolution must be developed in light of the fact that the historical situation has become enormously more complex since Marx developed his analysis. In such a situation revolution is not simply a take-over of the power of production but a takeover of power to determine the ends toward which production is geared. Revolution, therefore, challenges the orientations, values, and legitimations of an entire socia-political structure. The purpose of revolution is profoundly humanistic and utopian: so that society may " ' produce ' man and accomplish its own qualitative transformation. " (p. 15) The revolutionary challenge, in a post-Marxist world, may be directed against any socio-political system that dehumanizes man, whether it be socialist or capitalist.

A second element of the argument it that, since the gospel is a gospel of liberation, the church should side with movements of liberation. But socio-historical analysis of various revolutionary movembents indicates that the church has consistently refused to identify with such movements, siding instead with conservative and even reactionary social forces. Thus the church has been regarded as an obstacle by revolutionaries and has, by implication, been untrue to the gospel entrusted to it.

The church has resisted revolutionary movements for many reasons-some of them having to do with self-preservation and some with differing historical ideals. In modern times the church has decided that, as a transcendent reality, it ought to remain above politics. And so it has refused to identify with revolutionary movements. Houtart and Rousseau argue forcefully that no institution can be apolitical. Even political apathy, in current political science, is regarded as a tacit political position. Similarly, the claim to be above politics means that one is pragmatically content to let things be as they are; that is, it is a choice not to support change and a tacit affirmation of the political status quo. Thus willy-nilly the church has found itself aligned with socio-political regimes that obstruct human liberation. (The authors do note, however, that certain Third World churchmen have begun to reassess and to realign the church's commitments.)

The third major element in Houtart and Rousseau's argument is a prescription for the church: it must become aware of its identification with oppressive socio-political structures. Essential to such awareness is hard-headed, competent scientific analysis of modern socio-political structures; such analysis will enable the church to verbalize concrete criticism rather than well-meaning, abstract admonitions which offend and instruct nobody and which potentially support everybody.

Criticism by the church of oppressive socio-political structures does not necessarily entail support of violent revolution (although the authors do

not foreclose this option) . But criticism, insofar as it recognizes a distance between social reality and the gospel, *does* necessarily entail a commitment to revolutionary social change.

The authors maintain that the church should exercise its critical function everywhere and always. Thus criticism of a capitalist economy would not mean that the church identifies with a socialist replacement. This action would politicize the faith all over again, this time in a different direction. The church, contend the authors, has no stake in any nystem: it " exists not 'in-itself' but for the parousia. " (p. 344) Thus the church is the revolution within revolutions that speaks to man the hope of a future reality in which all men will be definitively liberated. The authors ' final argument is that the church cannot do for society what it has not done for itself. Thus the church must reorganize itself and eliminate oppression within its own structures, so that it becomes a credible sign of the hope it speaks to society.

One can appreciate the authors ' urgency: as they note, " it is impossible to live in today's world without being aware of the underlying thrust of social and cultural change of which the revolutionary movements are a sign. " (ix) The authors are confident that, if Christians will open their eyes, with help of *The Church and Revolution,* they will support revolutionary social change.

The authors' confidence hinges upon the conviction that Christianity is a " proclamation of man's total liberation. " (ix) Certainly this could not mean liberation, I would hasten to add, in a socio-political sense *alone:* otherwise one could not be both oppressed and Christian. Yet total liberation *must* include socio-political structures: otherwise one could be both a Christian and an oppressor. The latter intolerable position, according to the authors, has in fact been that of the church. Ignoring man's concreteness, his being-in-the-world, the church has treated him as a duality whose ills are " soul " ills and whose liberation is therefore solely spiritual. Thus to describe the mission of the church in terms of socio-political liberation is not to describe it exhaustively but simply to redress a tragic imbalance. The strength of the authors' approach is that they do not propose the opposite imbalance: they accord salvific power to no socio-political system.

Yet, the authors have not answered all the questions they raise. They think the church should not be politicized. They want the church to be critical of all socio-political structures. And yet they want the church to support revolution. It is difficult to understand how the church could support revolution without making political commitments. It is also difficult to understand how the church could support revolution and still exercise its critical function. Revolution, whether non-violent or violent, demands deep commitment, rigorous discipline, and uniform conviction. No revolution could tolerate serious internal criticism and remain viable. Yet, from the critical perspective of a Christian theology of history, one

would have ask if the rational models upon which revolutionary progress is founded could include the paradox of the Cross. Would there be any room in revolutionary ideology for a doctrine of grace? If room were found, the tension between freedom and grace would be screwed up to an intolerable tightness-at least, so it would seem to the revolutionary.

To put it another way: revolution confronts the church with a dilemma: either the church supports revolution concretely and loses its transcendent character or it maintains its transcendent character and loses the revolution. The authors are trying to find a middle ground from which neither transcendence nor revolution is lost. The " critical " position, they would say, is midway between absorbing identification with any political system and lofty abstraction from any political position. Most crucially, they could argue that the critical position is a *concrete* position that does justice both to the transcendent dimension of the church's proclamation and to the immanent dimension of the church as institution. In other words, the critical position allows the church to be political with integrity: true to its dialectical proclamation of now and not-yet, of present but future reality, of liberation that is real but incomplete; in short, to paraphrase the Epistle to Diognetus, the church can be *really* in the world but not of the world.

My difficulty with this finely balanced position is that, if I were a revolutionary, I would say that tranferring the transcendent" pie" from the sky to the end of the road is no more than a conceptual shift that lets the church "cop out" when the shooting starts. Transcendence, conceived of in contemporary political theology as temporal rather than spatial, " future " rather than "above, " is still transcendence. As a revolutionary, I would not trust the church.

The question-how does the church concretely support revolution-is not answered adequately in this book. But when one translates the question one is less likely to be impatient with Houtart and Rousseau for not having resolved it. The question translates to: if there is to be human freedom, how can there be grace?; or, if the secular order is autonomous, how can it relate to the sacred?; or if there is human striving, how can the existence of a God not rob it of meaning? The best answers to such questions have not destroyed the complexity of the questions before answering them.

The importance of the book rests not upon the answers that it attempts but upon the questions that it raises. By providing hard-headed socio-political analysis Houtart and Rousseau recall the church from illusory political abstinence and confront it with the modern context of its paradoxical existence. Much work needs to be done; yet enough has been done " to have persuaded some people to continue their struggle for man's liberation now and in the future within the framework of the Church. " (p. *845)*

I recommend this competent and provocative book to all who are

concerned either with the Third World or with the role of the church in the modern world.

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The Return of Magic. By DAVID FARREN. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. Pp. 128. $4.95.

The Behavioral Theory in Psychology has made a great deal of human needs in explaining the adjustive responses of the human organism and psyche to various stimuli. It appears that David Farren (pseudonym) sees *The Return of Magic* in our society as just such an adjustive response. Perhaps magic can fill a human need for modem man where both science and religion are falling short. Magic adds a dimension of subjectivity to the cold logical approach of science, making room for the warmth of imagination and will, in its view of reality. To religious faith magic adds a certitude. It purports to understand the universe though a systematic causality, different from that of science, by which the magician can command the forces of nature.

Mr. Farren tells quite honestly of his rejection of faith after a strong commitment to Catholicism evidenced by ten years in the Jesuit Order. It is only after marriage that he found out that his new spouse was a genetic witch, as distinguished from a cultural witch of the Sybil Leek ilk. Particularly fascinating is the account of her initiation to witchcraft through a strange sequence of experiences which led to a diagnosis of schizophrenia and a stay in a sanitarium for the mentally ill.

Generally the author displays a refreshing honesty and openness to other points of view, even stimulating the reader to religion, interest in the science of parapsychology, or commitment to magic. These parallel three suggested interpretations of magic as supernatural, paranormal, or natural.

It has become quite common, if not even fashionable, in this twentieth-century Western world to undergo crises of faith; this is the logical consequence of an existential philosophy and psychology which focuses on the subject in an isolated milieu of feelings, relationships, and often loneliness. Those who see faith as not only satisfying a human need but also giving insight into the truth-of a real God who gives meaning to our satellite existence-frequently wonder about the thought processes of a crisis of faith. *The Return of Magic* will provide considerable understanding at least of one such case.

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