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TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF" GOD IS LOVE"

I. *Problem and Method*

OUR CONTEMPORARIES discuss statements about God. Our problem might be expressed in this way: Nouns in common language are derived from within this spatia-temporal cosmos, "x ". The really transcendent God is not enclosed within that cosmos, " non-x." Consequently affirmations about God seem contradictory: " non-x is x."

Such sentences have been called non-cognitive and literal nonsense.[1] At other times they are considered literally cognitive though analogous. Many, however, object that the meaning of analogy is not clear; and it admittedly is complex.[2]

Rather than adding another plea for analogy in general, we

[1] Alfred J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (London, 1950).

[2] Eleven different kinds of analogy are presented just in an *Introduction to the Philosophy of Being,* by George P. Klubertanz, S. J. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 290.

might try the currently fashionable analysis of one statement. [3] "Every statement has its own logic" enables today's mind to ask its meaning before indulging in the fun of hurling about epithets like truth and falsity. [4]

"God is Love" has been thought to express literally an ultimate name of Supreme Being and by that very fact to provide a distinctive orientation for both speculative and practical thinking. In spite of modern philosophy's long preoccupation with problems of knowledge, the fact of love's central position has been acknowledged in recent years by diverse writers. They use "Love," though, in varying meanings. When a Divine Narne detached from God falls on earth, it shows a strange ambiguous face to men, and faces itself a strange, ambiguous destiny."

To discover the first essentials of love, and thereby some principle for evaluating these varying concepts, there is nothing better than to look at the First Lover. But can we? Can philosophy discover in experience a notion of love which can be purified to such a degree that when it is analogously affirmed of God the statement is literally meaningful? Or must natural human reason be now content with at best a symbolic meaning?

The difficulties are well expressed by Walter Stace:

> ... let us consider how the statement that God is love will fare at the hands of the philosophic sceptic. . . . We are, of course, taking the proposition that God is love in its literal meaning, and not merely as symbolic .... Love is some kind of emotion or feeling or attitude or desire or at least a purpose-perhaps the purpose to act in a certain way, for instance, to achieve the happiness and good of created beings. But can any of this be literally true of God? Only, apparently, if God be thought of as a finite centre of con-

[3] This has even been called *The Age of Analysis,* by Morton White, A Mentor Book (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1956).

[4] J. 0. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis, Its Development Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 179 ff.

[5] Jacques Maritain proposes his meaning particularly in *Carnet de Notes* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1965), pp. 301-354. Cf. "Love in the Thought of Jacques Maritain" in *Jacques Maritain, the Man and His Achievement* (ed. Joseph Evans) by William Rossner, S. J. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp.

sciousness, one mind among other minds. This mind, God, loves that mind, a human soul. But apart from this, to attribute emotions to God conflicts with the very definite religious intuition that God is unchanging .... For it is of the essence of a mind to move, to change, to be active .... And if we say that this is not true of God's mind, that we are only using analogies from human consciousness and experience to help us understand something which is in fact quite different, if we say this, we may be saying what is true, but we have abandoned the literal interpretation of God as a mind.[6]

Mr. Stace seems to imply here two points which are both valid and important. First, some sorts of things signified by the term love can never be affirmed of God. (But this does not prove that a more patient search cannot discover, besides the impossible meanings, some meaning of love which does not preclude such possibility.) Second, no reality within the universe of limited things called love (or any other name) can be affirmed of God, as it is in limited things. (But this does not prove that some suitable concept cannot be purified sufficiently to be affirmable of him.)

II. *Toward a Solution*

Consequently, if we wish to affirm the literal predication which Mr. Stace denies, we shall first have to search patiently through the meanings of love for one which does not preclude such possibility; and then, if that succeeds, we shall have to try to purify the likely notion to such elevation that it can be affirmed of God without contradiction. Such affirmation, however, can never be as summary as the denial. *Hie labor est.*[7]

A. *The search for a suitable meaning of love*

First we must search through meanings of love, carefully rejecting the unsuitable in the hope of discovering a suitable one.

[6] *Time and Eternity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 57-8.

[7] Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1959), p. 369, n. 6: "The great Thomists have admirably deepened and developed the questions concerning the being of knowledge; fruitful principles for a similar development concerning the intentional being of love and the spiration of love can also be found in their works. But this development itself is yet to be made."

Following the method of analysis, we can begin with examples of the varying uses of " love " in common language. Common language is used because it preserves for us the enduring insights of our cultural heritage and helps prevent philosophy from getting lost in an unintelligible stratosphere. In dictionaries, literature, and ordinary speech, we find such usages as " roses love sunlight " and various plants named " love-plant," "love-flower," "love-tree." Or again, we say, "My dog loves bones" and call animals "love-birds," "love-parakeets." Or finally: " Parents love their children." " I could not love thee, dear, so much loved I not honor more." " The score in this tennis game is thirty-love." Can we conceptualize the meanings of " love " in such contexts?

1. *Naturallove*

"Roses love sunlight " and other uses of the word in connection with sub-sentient things sound odd to our modem ears, for we have bought our advance in understanding of the difference of human nature from nature in general with the price of dimming our awareness of the continuity throughout the universe, until we tend to feel no longer at home in a physical world which appears as a vast f(x) alien to human values.

However, our fathers spoke this way. St. Thomas called this " natural love." [8] They did not mean, of course, that roses literally know the sun and consciously strive toward it. Such a concept could be affirmed of roses only in some non-literal

[8] *Summa Theol.*, 1-11, q. a. 1. H. D. Simonin lists St. Thomas's more important texts about love in *Autour de la solution thomiste du probleme de l'amour (Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et itteraire du Moyen Age*, Annee I98I, ed. Et. Gilson et G. Thery, 0. P. [Paris: J. Vrin,

He considers major: *Ill Sent.*, d. q. I, a. I; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 19; *Com. In Div. Nom.*, c. IV, 1. 9; *Summa Theol.*, 1-11, q. He considers minor: *De Verit.*, q. a. 4, c.; *De Spe*, a. 8, c.; *De Carit.*, a. 8, c. There are also, of course, many other explicit and implicit references. On " natural love " one might consult: *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60; 1-11, q. 10, a. I; 11-11, q. q. U6, a. 1; *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 80; *de Verit.*, q. 8, a. 6; *I Sent.*, d. I, q. 4, a. I; *Ill Sent.*, d. q. 1, *I Physic.*, lect. I5. The order of natural appetite, of which natural love is the first moment, was studied in *The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas*, by Rev. Gustaf Gustafson, S. S. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, I944).

way, a "pathetic fallacy." To have even symbolic meaning, such predication of love would have to stand for something literally in roses.[9]

Still, roses do literally thrive in sunlight. There is something in the very nature of roses whereby they tend to grow up out of the ground toward the sun. They differ from, let us say, radishes which are inclined to grow down into the ground away from the sun. What is common to both is that whereby each tends to move towards what is suitable and good for it. This natural tendency or appetite is consequent just upon the nature of the thing, not upon any knowledge within the appetent as in sense or intellectual appetite.

In each of these appetites, as St. Thomas Aquinas puts it, love is the first moment, the source of the entire motion tending to its end.[10] Natural love is an intrinsic principle of change which is not itself change and is in fact as unchanging as the nature. He used an example even humbler than the roses, the *gravitas* of a heavy body inclining it towards the earth.[11] This weight, this *pondus* was the crucial point of departure for an entire philosophy of love. *Amor meus pondus meum.* That *gravitas* is interesting in being an example, which as a scientific fact has become inadequate in our progress beyond Ptolemy, but still an example of a philosophic fact which remains correct, the natural love which is the connaturality of an appetent to that toward which it tends. Without such orientation to something nothing could change, for an indeterminate motion is impossible. This natural love is called a connaturality because it is a naturalness with another, which other is necessarily entailed as that with which it is to be. This resonance with and inclination to that other towards which the

• " The condition of legitimate metaphor is that both terms of the symbolic relation, the metaphor or symbol and that for which it stands, should be present to the mind. In non-religious symbolic language this means that the symbolic proposition must be translatable into a literal proposition." Stacc, *op. cit.,* p. 68.

[10] "In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum." *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. a. 1 c.).

[11] " --- ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis." (ibid.). Cf. I-II, q. c.; *III Sent.,* d. q. 1, a. 4, sol.; *passim.*

thing moves pertains, therefore, to the perfection of the thing not absolutely, as it is in itself, but as ordered to another beyond its static self.[12] By its very nature a being not only is what it is but also is inclined towards existence beyond its own limits of "now " and " here " and " such" toward the good of existing in some further form. And since the good in some form implies the good simply, it is inclined toward the good simply. But no limited nature is in itself the good simply; and so it is inclined to another. [13]

Such natural love *(inclinatio naturae in aliquid)* [14] may be affirmed literally of both roses and radishes. Even if we include difference as well as similarity, meaning" roses have an inclination toward the sun and radishes have an inclination toward the subsoil," we have not lost literalness by going into analogy, for realities which differ in their very similarity and remain similar in their very difference have been conceptualized, their inner intelligibility disengaged before the direct gaze of intellect. In fact, even if one has not directly studied radishes but does know his roses, he can still know something literally about the loves of radishes and of other things too, for he knows what they are like.[15]

In other words it is meaningful to talk about literally predicating one term of different subjects, either univocally, with the same meaning; or analogously, with meanings which are different yet somewhat the same; or, finally, equivocally, with

[12] *III Sent.,* d. 9!7, q. 1, a. 4, solutio.

[13] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. *5,* a. 1; q. 6, aa. 3 and 4.

[14] " Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem, quae est appetitus vel amor ... ordinem naturae in aliquid." *(Ibid.,* q. 60, a. 1 c.).

[15] " Dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus; quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. *De Div. Nom.:* ' Omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile '; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam." *(Ibid.,* I-II, q. *9!6,* a. 1, ad 3.) Cf. I, q. 59, a. 2; q. 60, a. 1, c.; I-II, q.10, a.1; *III Sent.,* d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 c.; *I Physic.,* lect. 15. There would seem to be an implication here that love is transcendental, but this is a large question which needs a discussion of its own. "Love and Being" in *Wisdom in Depth* (eds. Daues, Holloway, Sweeney), by William Rossner, S. J. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1966)' pp. 187-202.

simply different meanings. About the equivocal meaning of love in "The score is thirty-love," where "love " means "nothing " we could simply obtain no clue from our knowledge of roses. If this literal equivocality could be the case whenever we affirm terms of God, then, for all we could ever know, "love " when affirmed of God might mean "nothing"; and we would never really be able to choose among symbols nor even in the last analysis attach any meaning to religious symbolic sentences/ [6] for we would remain in the dark about what they are supposed to stand for in reality.

What can we do in regard to God with this concept of love so far attained ? If we exclude God from the class of material and non-knowing things, then love as the inclination of a nature lacking knowledge can be literally predicated only negatively: "God is not that."

However, this entire via negativa, valuable as it is, is not ultimately self-justifying, for one can not say what something is not unless he has some knowledge of what it is. We must search for a higher notion of love which is affirmable of God. If we succeed we can justify the literal negation and also judge whether or not the rose itself (or a triangle) is an illuminating symbol of love divine.

When I speak of searching for a higher concept, I do not mean to forsake that of natural love. That concept must be enriched, but not deserted. To abandon the love of nature is to misunderstand the nature of love. Insight obtained through scrutinizing the rose and gravity remains crucial in the love of the dog, of the man, and of God. For a sense or intellectual appetite remains something with its own inner ontological structure, one kind of nature; and the prior which is proper to nature endures in the latter which is some kind of nature. [17]

[16] " --- the symbolic proposition must be translable into a literal proposition. In religious symbolism this is impossible, because any literal proposition about God would involve the conceptualization of that which is above all conceptions." Stace, *op. cit.,* p. 68.

[17] " --- semper prius salvatur in posteriori. . . . Unde id quod est naturae, oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum." *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 60, a. 1, c.).

2. *Sense love*

" My dog loves bones " and " love-birds" introduce sense love. Men as well as brutes experience this inclination toward objects pleasant to sense, especially food and sex/[8] In men sense love is intermingled with and should be subordinated to the analogous intellectual love;[19] but because of its vividness and force, the sensual tends rather to draw the intellectual to itself, not only in practice, but worse in theory. Some thinkers conceive love itself and consequently all dynamic psychology according to characteristics true only of sense love.[20]

a. *as passwn*

One characteristic of love which appears vividly in sense love is that it is a passion.[21] The animal is vehemently attracted by some things. Within those things exists some suitability, some congeniality to the animal which makes them agreeable and pleasant to it. Only when it is known by sense knowledge can this attractiveness in those things actually allure the animal. The sense knowledge, however, is not the passion-not even that knowledge which is an awareness of the value of the object, nor even the delight of the eye in seeing or the pleasure

[18] " Propter hoc etiam pugnae animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in VIII De Anima." *(Ibid.,* q. 81, a. 2 c.). This would seem to be the philosophical locus for the root of the Freudian libido.

[19] " Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex judicio libero. Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum judicium." *(Ibid.,* I-II, q. 26, a. 1 c.).

[20] The characteristics of sense love may be masked in refined style using the vocabulary of intellect. St. Thomas warned against this contemporary error. "... secundum appetitum sensitivum ... operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Non est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi." *(Ibid.,* q. 4, a. 2, ad 2.). The nature of sense love is a large and important question, which needs much discussion, particularly in relation to modern thought; but we can only touch it briefly here.

[21] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 26, a. 2; I-II, q. 22, aa. 2 and 3; I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1; q. 81, a. 1; *III Sent.,* d. 25, q. 3, a. I; *de Verit.,* q. 26, aa.1-3; *de Div. Nom.,* c. 2, lect. 4; *II Ethic.,* lect. *5.*

consequent upon the natural love of any conscious power for its operation.[22] Knowledge is a reception, sometimes pleasant, of the known into the knower.

Love, on the contrary, from its first moment as passion is a being drawn *(trahi)* by the external thing precisely as existing outside the animal and as possessing an attractiveness in itself. This external thing attracts to itself the whole animal, not just some particular power. Its allure is felt, consequently, within the appetite of the animal as such. This fundamental appetite of the animal was called the concupiscible appetite, from its most noticeable operation, *ooncupiscentia,* a desire to be *with* another, to acquire an absent beloved.

The existence and nature of this desire for another (and of the whole process of emotion) is caused by the nature of the first moment of appetitive activity which is love as passion. In the concupiscible animal appetite there now exists this being-tugged-at or pulled by that other thing and toward that other thing. That thing, as sensibly pleasurable to the animal, as a *bonum delectabile,* is the proper cause of love; and its causality is love as passion, as being wounded, as being conquered and enmeshed and subjected to that other's conquering allure. The lover is caught, is dragged, is possessed by the good; love passively surrenders to another.

b. *and as action*

With apparent paradox love is not only passion but also the primary action which is the dynamic source of a whole universe of consequent activity. In fact, because it is passion par excellence, passively drawn to another as it is in itself, love becomes par excellence active, the principle of actions by which that other is attained.[23]

Love is the first immanent operation elicited by and in the concupiscible.[24] The animal, being drawn by the good, ratifies its inclination in actively committing itself to that good. It

[22] *III Sent.,* d. 26, q. 1, ad 8.
[23] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 22, a. 2 c. and ad 2.
[24] *Ibid.,* q. 26, a. 1.

adapts and proportionates its affection to the good which is now its beloved. Love becomes an affective coadaption or complacency in that other which is not the lover's good in absolute ontological reality but which it makes its good appetitively as its beloved and *to be with* which it now inclines.[25]

Consequently, while the love may not change, it causes whatever changes are involved in attaining to the actual physical union to which it is an unchanging affective inclination.[26] The external good now dwells as beloved within the love, drawing it like a magnet to dwell in its turn ecstatically outside its ontological self in that other to whose ontological good it gives itself. The love sets in motion an entire emotional and physical life; desires for the beloved when absent, delights in its presence; hatred, aversion, sorrow for what is repugnant to the love; zeal generating aggressiveness (called by St. Thomas the irascible appetite) regarding difficulties involving the beloved, with the consequent hopes and despairs, fear and boldness and anger;[27] the myriad physical changes and operations which tend to terminate in existential union with that thing whose goodness or lovableness had started the whole process.

c. *and finally as psychosomatic*

A third important characteristic of sense love is that it is not only psychic, a passion and operation of soul, but also somatic, essentially material. Because it is psychosomatic (which like its realism embarrasses post-Cartesian dualism) it may be viewed as an inclination of animated matter as well as an inclination of soul animating and acting in matter.[28]

The good which as proper cause specifies sense love is the sensibly pleasurable, a material thing which is proportionate and suitable to the animal body according to the delectation

[25] *Ibid.,* q. 'Z7.

[26] *Ibid.,* qq. 'ZS-48.

[27] Aggression is not hatred, nor an effect of hatred; nor are both evil, nor is love necessarily good, as Plato insisted in the Symposium. The Adlerian aggressive-submissive personality traits might find their philosophical place in the irascible passions originating in love's zeal.

[28] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. *'Z'Z,* a. 1; a. 'Z, ad 3; q. *'Z5,* a. 'Z; q. 'ZS, a. *5; passim.*

of sense. The resulting sense love contains the bodily reaction as essentially intrinsic to its nature (which is not true of sense knowledge) . Corporal change is of the essence of sense pleasure; sense love is inconceivable without it. The very nature of sense love contains inclination of soul as formal element and correlative bodily change as material element.

Following from this essential materiality are three characteristics of sense love which are important in the present problem: it is changing, hedonistic, and self-centered.

Because matter fundamentally is pure potency, its inclination is to be actuated, to be moved, to receive existence.[29] When it enters sense love, then, it is the first element to be changed by the psychic or formal element which is the source of this motion.

Because potency is the principle of limitation, matter is pure limitation, the principle of individuation. Sense love, therefore, is essentially limited and can attain only the good as an individual material thing pleasant to the individual animal. It is true that the useful to the individual and species (as food and sex) is loved, and that the formal objects of passions subsequent to love are not always apparently the pleasant; bnt the love itself which begins the emotive process and the joy in which it terminates have as formal object the sensibly agreeable as such. Sense love is essentially hedonistic.

Finally it is an ego-centric inclination to receive, but in a way different from knowledge. As I have insisted, sense love (in fact, any love) has a germ of generosity, for it is first of all an inclination out to a trans-objective known as it exists in itself where alone its goodness dwells. This appetitive approval of the goodness of the good is necessary even for the enjoyment of the good (as we can see in negative instances of some people with diseased affections. They get so locked within their citra-objective selves that they no longer respond emotionally to the trans-noetic attractiveness of being, even their own; and so they cannot enjoy anything, becoming at times psychotically

•• *I Physic.*, lect., 15; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 59, c; 1-11, q. a. 1, ad 8.

depressed.) However the inclination, having gone out to the good, then turns back to the lover, where it rests; for it is an inclination to a *bonum alteri,* the pleasant to the lover. The material nature of sense love makes it inevitably eager to grasp for its individual self. Self-love is thus by nature archetypal in sense love.

Sense love is the love most readily understood by men. As material, it is among the proper objects of the human intellect. Also it can be known " from within " in that privileged knowledge which each one has of his own inner experience. We are tempted, consequently, to conceive all love in the image of sense love. A general trend of modern thought has been to limit literal meaning to the observable, even using verifiability by sense observation as the criterion of literal meaningfulness. If such a criterion is accepted, even implicitly or inadvertently, then the nature of any love will be conceived as mutable, hedonistic, utilitarian, self-centered. This meaning gives point to Shaw's Schopenhauerian epigram: "The only thing worse than to have loved and lost is to have loved and won."

To affirm such a concept of God is literally meaningless and involves contradiction. It can only be denied of him; or perhaps it could be meaningfully affirmed in a symbolic manner if some literal affirmation could be discovered which could guide a discriminating use of such symbolism. But such a concept of love, no matter how reconditely refined, will always contain these characteristics of matter; [30] and to remove them would destroy the concept. Consequently, one must "Sail on."

3. *Intellectual love*

" I could not love thee, dear, so much,
Loved I not honor more."

The poet is speaking of intellectual love. Love of such intellectually known goods as honor is the fundamental operation

[30] Kant translates such love into obedience to law. (Jacques LeClercq, *La Philosophie Moral de Saint Th= devant la Pensee Contemporaire* [Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1954], p. 370.) One is also reminded of Spinoza, epicureanism and utilitarianism.

of an intrinsically immaterial intellectual appetite in a person. It is by nature different from, and at times, alas, opposed to sense love. By no means is it merely a sublimation, no matter how lofty, of the same sort of inclination. I refuse to yield to positivism and concede that the poet literally means:

" I love not honor, dear, at all,
I sublimate thy mouth."

Since intellectual love is immaterial, it is not among the proper objects of a human intellect. However, with due care it can be conceptualized literally and analogously to the concept of sense love.

a. *Friendship*

"Parents love their children" is one of the sentences expressing the loftiest sort of thing within the universe of love. This noble love between distinct persons who hold each other dear as other selves is nowadays called at times an "interpersonal subjectivity" or "personal intersubjectivity." This interpersonal relation of " I " and " Thou " has been studied by Johann in his book *The Meaning of Love.*[31] I have elsewhere expressed the gratitude I feel for many things about the book,[32] particularly for raising a comparatively lonely voice about the subject, and for confronting this element of contemporary thought with traditional metaphysics. For our present problem the book offers many helpful insights. Its central concept of love, however, cannot, unfortunately, be the one we seek. God might be named Interpersonal Subjectivity in the supernatural judgment of faith and sacred theology which know the plurality of Divine Persons. For natural human reason working within the formal object of philosophy, however, it remains literally a *mysterium stricte dictum* which could be

[31] Robert 0. Johann, *The Meaning of Love: An Essay towards a Metaphysics of lntersubjectivity* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955). The notes and bibliography indicate works of this trend. Niebuhr criticizes Buber for exaggerating this concept of love, but he admits his own puzzlement as to what it does mean.

[32] *The Modern Schoolman* (May, 1956), pp.

affirmed at best symbolically. This mutual love of benevolence existing between equal persons who enjoy intimate life together was conceptualized somewhat more objectively by St. Thomas as friendship and can be analogously affirmed by sacred theology not only of the Blessed Trinity but also of the supernatural charity between man and God.[33] One might say that this is the ultimate meaning of love; but it cannot be literally affirmed of philosophy's One Divine Nature, for no one is properly a friend to himself.[34]

Between love as friendship which is too high and love as material which is too low there exist fortunately other kinds of love. When parents love their children, their children do not always love them back. It is a melancholy fact that the love of one person for another, even a sublimely generous giving of oneself, does not always command reciprocity and intimacy of life, sometimes because of inequality between the persons; and so there is no friendship, but there is a benevolent love like the love in friendship. Furthermore, although a person is indeed the most perfect thing in the universe[35] and the only direct object of friendship itself, still it is not the only good which can be an object of love, even benevolent, even a self-giving love. One can love honor, or art, or science, or one's country, or a cause, even to giving one's life for it. One can even love music, which is high among aesthetic values, as a relief from humans, who are the lowest of persons. One can simply judge something to be good for him and set his heart upon getting it. " Misers love gold."

b. *Love, unlike knowledge, is inclination to something*

Consequently it now becomes necessary to analyse these in-

[33] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 23, a. I; cf. qq. 23-46; I, qq. 27-43; I-II, q. *65,* a. *5; III Sent.,* d. 27, q. 2, aa. 1-4. The love of which Bergson, Merton, and Zaehner speak is charity.

[34] " --- amicitia proprie non habetur ad seipsum - - - - " *(Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. *25,* a. 4 c.).

[35] ". . . persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura." *(Ibid.,* I, q. 29, a. 3 c.)

tellectual loves with the technical precision possible m our brief space.

Intellectual love is discovered by human intellect as the primary and fundamental actuality in a human intellectual appetite or will.[36] Consequently it is an inclination to something insofar as it is presented as desirable or good by an intellect.[37] Although the human intellect, acting as it does through sense, first knows material things as proper objects of its immediate vision and only secondly rises to knowledge of immaterial realities, nevertheless even its first object is received into that intellect according to the intellect's own intrinsically immaterial or spiritual mode of existence without matter or its conditions. The good is now de-materialized; it is not limited to an individual pleasurable as such, but it is an instance of the delectable good, or of the useful, or even the good in itself, known and present according to its own nature and reality as such and therefore common to various individuals. Intellectual knowledge is the crucial condition for differentiating intellectual from sense love. Characteristics of matter which limit the perfection of love are removed. It becomes immaterial.

Intellectual knowledge is an intrinsically necessary condition for the existence and causality of the intellectually known good which is the sole proper cause determining the nature of intellectual love. However, in escaping sense we must not go into another exaggeration, of intellectualism. Knowledge is a necessary condition. But it is not love, nor even a proper cause specifying or determining the nature of love to the likeness of its own nature. Knowledge is an immaterial intentional existence of the known within the knower and pertains therefore to the absolute perfection of the thing knowing as it exists in itself; knowledge by nature receives something in the mode of

[36] " In unoquoque horum appetituum amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. . . . Sicut amor intellectivus in intellectivo appetitu." *(Ibid.,* I-II, q. a. 1 c.) "Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiusIibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor." *(Ibid.,* q. a. 1 c.)

[37] Cf. *The Sin of the Angel,* by Jacques Maritain, translated by William Rossner, S. J. (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1959), pp. 5-37.

immaterial identity. Love is quite the converse,[38] but it (or things pertaining to the appetite, whose nature necessarily partakes of the nature of love as the fundamental appetitive act) is at times described in such terms as an awareness of a value or as an attention to or presence of a beloved, or as being specified by knowledge, or as having self-love as its archetype. In such expressions the existence of a love distinct from both sense love and intellectual knowledge seems in danger of being drowned in the epistemological flood. At any rate it is not clear to me how such a concept could ever be affirmed of God. If the archetypical nature which we discover in finite being and call "love" is self-love in the sense that a citra-objective self receives perfection or rests in its own perfection, then it seems that " God is Love " would either mean the same as " God is knowledge" or contradict " God is Infinite Perfection." [39]

No, the sole proper cause of love remains the good which is in trans-objective things as they exist in themselves, now with masking opaque matter removed by intellectual knowledge which manifests the reality itself to will. The good's causality is an objective diffusion of its attractiveness, actually attracting the appetite to itself, both in the order of value as intrinsically valuable and in the order of existence as end.

[38] In fact, because of their quite different natures, knowledge attains God last; but love, first. *(Summa Theol.,* 11-11, q. 27, a. 4.) Cf. I, q. 80, a. 2, ad 1; 1-11, q. 27, a. 9, ad 1; q. 81, a. 8, ad 1; q. 80, a. 8, ad 2; *de Verit.,* q. 22, a. 4, ad 1; q. 25, a. 1, ad 6.

[39] "Pierre Rousselot, S. J. *(Pour L'Hi:rtoire du Probleme de L'Amour au Moyen Age,* in *Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,* Sechster Band (Munster, 1909), p. 1) formulates the "problem of Love" in this way: "Is a love possible which is not egotistical? And if it is possible, what is the relation of that pure love of another to love of self, which seems to be the foundation of all natural tendencies? " This way of positing the problem reechoes through others before and since, e. g., Martin C. D'Arcy, S. J., *The Mind and Heart of Love* (New York: Henry Holt, 1947); Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros,* tr. A. G. Hebert (New York: Macmillan, 1987). It seems to be understood *as* the problem of the nature of human intellectual love; and it seems to be a false problem, which perhaps arises from a failure to disengage the existence of something distinct from both sense and knowledge, before asking its nature, much less positing as central a problem based on an unproven presupposition that love is in itself egotistical. Do we have here a parallel to the Cartesian Cogito?

Again, then, intellectual love is a passion, analogous to sense passion, in that it is a passive being attracted and drawn to the good as outside the will;[40] and again simultaneously love is the fundamental voluntary active inclination to that other as good.

c. *Inclination to get (love of concupiscence)*

This inclination may be either an inclination to get or an inclination to give. Those two were called by St. Thomas Aquinas the love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae)* and the love of friendship *(amor amicitiae)* .[41] But he warns us explicitly that love of concupiscence is not concupiscence and love of friendship is not friendship. "Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship and love of concupiscence." [42] This distinction is important for our present purpose. For although philosophy cannot literally affirm of God either friendship (as we saw) or (as we shall see) love of concupiscence, nevertheless it can affirm of God himself (and therefore between creature and God) the love of friendship.

Love of concupiscence is like sense love (whose most vivid effect is *concupiscentia,* the desire to get an absent beloved) in being an inclination to get something-for oneself often; but, if one loves another as oneself, also for this second self. The object which specifies this love is *bonum alterius,* the good of another (other than the good itself) .[43] This is a true good; and so the love first inclines outwards toward it with the incipient appetitive approval of willingly granting to it its good. But it

[40] " Sic ergo cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor est passio; proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate." *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 26, a. 2 c.)

[41] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 26, a. 4; I, q. 60, a. 3; II-II, q. 23, a. 1; *Ill Sent.,* d. 29, q. 3; *IV,* d. 49, q. 1, a. 2; *de Div. Nom.,* cc. 4, 9 and 10; *de Spe,* a. 3.

[42] " Dicendum quod amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus; illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis." *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 26, a. 4 ad 1.)

[43] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. *!l6,* a. 4.

is only good in a certain respect, the good of another; and so the inclination fails to rest in it but turns away to that other in which it rests. It is a *motio 1·ecurva* again, and a self-love. This inclination to get something cannot be literally affirmed of an already infinitely perfect God.

d. *or to give (love of friendship)*

The love of friendship is an inclination to give. The object of this love is that to which we will good, from which consequently the appetite does not curve away, but in which it takes its rest. The attraction of the good in itself is final.[44]

This love is benevolent and altruistic. However, it is not mere benevolence. One can will good to something or someone whom one does not love. Love adds to benevolence the element of passion and its consequences. The will is captivated by the good in itself, suffers the wound of this conquering good which is outside the will itself and of which the will within itself is now deprived as of its own good. Consequently the will enacts an operation which orientates a whole universe of elicited and commanded acts toward the beloved. It voluntarily ratifies its being drawn by that other good. It willingly commits itself to that good, generously gives its good to its beloved. This love is a straight inclination toward that to which one wills good, to the good simply.

1) *to a beloved in potency*

The love of benevolence or friendship may will to another some goodness which the other does not already actually posesss. From the inclination to make *(ad factibilia),* to engender in beauty, for example, springs the creative process of poetry and the arts. " It is not enough for a painter to be a clever craftsman," said Renoir," he must love to' caress' his canvass too." Or, the inclination toward moral good to be actuated into existence (ad *agibilia)* is such a love. This love may give various

[44] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 26, a. 4; I, q. 30, a. 3; II-II, q. 23, a. I; *II Sent.,* d. 3, p. 2, q. 4; *Ill,* d. 29, q. 3; *IV,* d. 49, q.I, a. 2; *de Div. Nom.,* c. 4, lect. 9 and 10; *de Spe,* 3.

goods to a person, a home, a school, an institution, a country, a cause; but all such communications imply the first gift of self, for love is the first gift and consequently the giving of all other gifts: of its time, its labor, its existence, the many comniunicative actions actuating beloved potentialities. [45] Such a concept could sustain purification sufficient for God's Creative Love for creatures but not for his Love In Itself, if we are to avoid putting potency and change in him.

2) *or to a beloved in act*

This love of a lover in act for a beloved in potency, however, implies a prior love of friendship for a good already actually existing. "Every picture shows a spot," as Sisley remarked, "with which the artist himself has fallen in love." The object which arouses this love already possesses perfection by which it is actually good in itself, prior to its being loved by this will. It is actually good but not yet actually beloved. When its glory is known, it attracts the will to a voluntary approval and ratification of what already entitatively exists. Simultaneously, the will, being drawn to and captivated by this external good, wills to it its goodness. The will generously grants and voluntarily gives the goodness to the good; and since the will is itself an inclination to the good, it thereby surrenders and commits itself to this good. This is the simply straight inclination to another as good. The good exists within this love as term of the inclination, as actually beloved; [46] and since a present beloved good causes joy, and this beloved is actually good, this love generously rejoices in the good of the other.

•• " Ratio autem gratuitae donationis est amor; ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo quod damus ei, est amor quo volumus ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod amor habet rationem primi doni, per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur." *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 88, a. 2 c.)

•• Although love produces no intrinsic term univocal with the concept in knowledge, the arguments against an analogous term need more discussion. Bernard Lonergan, S. J., "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies,* VIII (1947), pp. 404-8; A. J. Bruneau, 0. P., "Dieu, Terme Immanent de la Charite?" *Revue Thomiste* (1952-1), p. 225 ff.; William Rossner, S. J., "The Process of Human Intellectual Love, or Spirating A Pondus," *The Thomist,* XXVI, 1 (January, 1972), pp. 89-74.

This is love simply.[47] Its object is the good simply in which it begins and ends. Other analogous kinds of love, through some of the principal types of which we have searched, are related to the love of friendship as the *secundum quid* to the *simpliciter:* they are this love as qualified. It may be qualified by intrinsic limitation, as in material loves or love of concupiscence. Or it may be qualified by an extrinsic condition, such as friendship's need to be loved in return by a person sharing life with the lover. The principal act of the habit of friendship itself, however, is to love rather than to be loved; and charity itself adds, not something foreign to its nature, but further perfection of this love.[48] We may recall that the generous nature of this love was present at least germinally even in the lowest, throughout the hierarchy of love. Here is the perfection of love, as to exist is the perfection of being which is constitutively present throughout the hierarchy of the real. There is no obvious reason why this cannot be affirmed of God. Raissa Maritain express this beautifully,

> For each time we give to God our " only," we give all, we give infinitely, and it matters little if this our " only " is but a poor object, created, perishable, mortal. The life of our soul in this world, indeed our very life in this world, is our "only"; or our happiness in this life is our "only"; or the one we exclusively love is our "only." He who gives his "only "-his soul, his life, his beloved, or his happiness-gives infinitely. And with his son Isaac, Abraham gave to God the very soul of his life and of his joy; he consented to the destruction of all his hope.[49]

e. *Literal analogous affirmation of God*

This intellectual love of friendship cannot be affirmed of God as it is found in human beings. Like any other metaphysical accident or limited perfection it must be denied of him. How-

[47] " --- amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter." *(Summa Theol.,* I-11, q. 26, a. 4 c.)

[48] " Caritas autem addit amorem perfectionem quandam amoris - - - - " *(Ibid.,* a. 3 c.)

[49] "Abraham and the Ascent of Conscience," translated by William Rossner, S. J., *The Bridge,* I (Pantheon Books, 1955), p. 40.

ever, we can try to disengage from its limitations the pure perfection involved here so that it may be affirmed substantially and supereminently of its First Efficient, Exemplary, and Final Cause.

The purification necessary to raise love to divinity is even more laborious than was the discovery of a concept with which to start. The difficulties in affirming any name of God are involved in the peculiar problems and mystery of the gospel name of Love. But this is life, to know God; and the arduous need not render love's labor lost.

The central problem lies in the very nature of love as an inclination to another, to an intellectually known good precisely as existing *outside* the will, with which the lover is thereby united in the mode of surrender and gift.

As St. Thomas posits the problem; "Amor est vis unitiva et concretiva. Love is a uniting and joining power. But this cannot have any place in God, for he is simple." [50] In other words, love as unitive implies realities somehow distinct to be united. It is a union precisely because its *most* intimate nature is presented to us as an inclination to another.

In the reply to this objection, undaunted in the daring of his speculation, St. Thomas offers a clue. The act of love always tends to two, namely, to the good which one wills to someone, and to him to whom he wills the good. " For this is properly to love someone, to will good to him." An application of this general position to God's love for creatures would be that his love gives us existence. But the meaningfulness of Divine Love for creatures depends on the meaning of Divine Love in itself.

The application to God's love of himself is the primary point. Here, too Thomas does not falter.

> Wherefore, in that someone loves himself, he wills good to himself. And so he seeks to unite that good to himself insofar as he can. And in that degree love is said to be a unitive power even in God; but without composition, because that good which he wills to himself is not other than himself, who is good by his essence.[51]

[50] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 20, a. 1, obj. 8.

[51] *Ibid.*, ad 8.

What do we really have here? The Good is not other than himself; and yet a union with that Good is really present which would not be present if Love were not really there. Thomas is not normally a man merely to play with words, particularly in order to dodge or mask contradictions.

The first step in investigating how there can be a union implying otherness in God must be to inquire what otherness can mean when raised to the divine. In other words, if for the sake of conciseness we formulate love in Latin as " inclinatio ad aliquid cognitum intellectualiter ut bonum," what could *aliquid* mean when raised to God?

Aliquid is a transcendental attained by human reason after " being " and " thing," and before " one." [52]

Once the human intellect has attained metaphysical insight, it sees reality first as being, existing, that whose act is to be. Then, secondly, it realizes that only that exists which is intelligible, possessing inner structure or essence, a" thing." Thirdly, it sees that by the very fact that the being confronting it is a thing of definite or defined and delimited intelligibility, it is divided from all the rest. It is some other thing, *aliud quid,* another. This division so conceived implies the imperfection of limitation in the many things presented to us. Hence, in conceiving *aliquid,* we get the conception of division. Only then can we conceptualize the one. That imperfection of division is now denied within the thing itself: "The one" is being as undivided. Unity in itself is a positive perfection; but it is too simple and ultimate to be grasped positively by our limited intellects, and so can be expressed only as a negation of division in being.

However, and here we arrive at the pertinence of this to the present problem, *aliquid* is not just the implied imperfection of divisions. It is not only, or even necessarily, some other thing, something else. Like "one," and the others, it is a true transcendental, a vision of a unique aspect of the richness of existence, although it is an incomplete knowledge of that existence.

[52] *Ibid.,* q. 11, particularly ad 4; *de Verit.,* c. 1; *de Pot.,* q. 9, a. 7.

In " something" the intellect sees the point that existence is too rich to be confined within any distinct real essence, just as it is too rich to be comprehended in any one limited concept. Existence must overflow into others, other ways of existing which by that very otherness manifest this super-abounding wealth of existence itself. *Aliquid* speaks to us of the superabundance of existence. In other words, it is true that *aliquid* comes from *aliud quid,* another thing; but it is not the same. Otherness emphasizes the division but also implies the positive superabundance. When applied to God, the division implied in otherness must be removed and only the superabundance retained.

B. *Solution from the viewpoint of the human concept*

Now when " inclinatio ad aliquid" is applied to God, all real division in reality must be denied. There is no inclination to another really distinct being or principle of being. God's Goodness is not other (except to our way of thinking) than his knowledge or his Essence. Our concepts are necessarily different; but the Thing Divine is One. In fact, he is supremely One, with no slightest possibility of division, for his very Essence is To Be; and the intellectually known good is in reality his own Essence as Goodness, which is in reality completely identified with himself as Subsisting and Knowing and Loving.

However, we note that in the very expressions we have just used this Unity is affirmed only by negation of entitative division among these distinct concepts. We can only conceive distinctly and then in judgment deny the objective reality of the distinction. Even when we speak of God in the most refined metaphysical conceptions we must speak of his love in some similar fashion. God conceived as existing and knowing his own Infinite Goodness is not that Infinite Goodness conceived as loved. Divine Goodness as beloved must be conceived as *aliquid,* beyond God conceived as existing and knowing, and must be so judged and expressed if one is not to falsify. The Divine Goodness as Actually Known, and also as Actually Beloved is real. And it is a Reality Beyond that Reality as

explicitly expressed in our knowledge of God as Existing and Knowing. At the peril of falsification, then, we must in that sense say (we can say it only in human words interior and exterior) that Divine Love is an inclination to himself as other (according to our way of thinking) than his mere entitative being.[53]

That is considering the problem from the viewpoint of our human knowledge as related to the Divine Reality. But just that much is by no means the entire problem or solution. If we were to leave it there we might be accused of having really remained in a pure, though refined, *via negativa;* and of confessing that this mysterious union of Divine Love is not a reality in God himself, since the distinction implied in union is purely in our human concepts. No, even within the Divine Existence as it is in itself, considered independently from the mode of its conceptualization in our human words, there is a foundation for our multiple concepts, namely, the Infinity of the Divine Perfection.[54] Before the difficulty of speaking of such things the pen is tempted to falter and stop; but one should speak not only of the limitations of human knowledge but also of its grandeur, the reality of its grasp of the real, the real similarity of finite being to the Divine, and the union with God attainable in human knowledge and consequent love.

C. *Solution from the viewpoint of the Divine Being*

John of St. Thomas remarks that because of its infinite perfection or inner superabundance the Divine Essence is both a one most simple thing and also virtually multiple. This virtual multiplicity in God's essence, which is grounded upon its being other things supereminently, enables it to be conceived truly though inadequately in diverse concepts. To borrow an example from supernatural theology, the Father is the Divine Essence, and the Son is the Divine Essence; but it does not follow that the Father is the Son, because of this supereminence of Abso-

•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. q. 13, aa. 1-11.
•• *Ibid.,* I, q.13, a. *I Sent.,* d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.

lute Subsistence and this virtual multiplicity, which is actual in relative opposition. [55]

This offers a clue in our research into the meaning of God's loving himself as a known good.

Knowledge is an intrinsically necessary condition for the existence of intellectual love, in finite being. Nothing unknown can be so loved. This in fact is a metaphysical principle, true of being as being, and consequently analogously verified in the Divine Being.

Even in God, the nature of knowledge influences that of love, for love is an inclination to himself as an intellectually known Good.

In creatures, knowledge implies an intentional otherness. A knowing subject must be confronted by an object known. In becoming known a subject of existence must be objectified, made an object in a sense which founds the vigorous figure in the original meaning of the word, " object." It is from the Latin, *objicio,* literally " throw against." There is an inescapable opposition of object "thrown against" a subject confronted by it and looking at it. Knowledge is that by which a thing becomes or is another insofar as it is other. Without that intentional otherness persisting there could be no knowledge. There is indeed an intentional unity here, of knower and known: the knowing is a knowing only by virtue of knowing this. And the known is a known only in its existence in an act of knowing. *lntelligere in actu est intellectum in. actu.* To know actually is the actually known. This unity is uniquely intimate. [56]

But it is a uniquely intimate unity because it is a unique unity. It is an intentional unity sui generis, a unity grounded in intentional otherness without which the very unity is inconceivable. If the thing which is knowing became the known entitatively, then one would be destroyed. In fact, both knowing subject and known object as such would be destroyed. If

[55] *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, Log. I.P. *Summul. Lib.* III, Cap. X; cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. 4.

[56] *Summa Theol.,* I, qq. 84 and 85; *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 44; *de Verit.,* q. a. 2; *Comp. Theol.,* c. 83.

there were no other at which to gaze, knowing would be impossible; and if there were no subject looking at something other, there could be no known object. Intentional otherness is of the essence of the intentional unity which we discover in man.

1. *Divine Knowledge as precondition of Love*

This intentional otherness discovered in human knowledge cannot itself be predicated of God but from it may be disengaged concepts which are ascribable to him.

The reason why this intentionality itself cannot be literally affirmed of God is his transcendent unity and the real plurality necessarily implied in intentional existence. Intentional otherness is not proper to the object of knowledge as such but comes to the object of human knowledge from the fact that in human knowledge the thing which is object is other than the thing which is subject. Human knowledge is to be another insofar as it is other. The ultimate reason for this is that the actually known is the actually knowing (*intelligere in actu est intellectum in actu),* and no creature is itself, by essence, actually knowing or known. To know implies to be, and no limited essence is to be. Hence, to know is other than the creature's essence or entitative existence, as is also the actually known which is one with the act of knowing. Intentional existence, therefore, is by nature a unification of the entitatively distinct and is what it is precisely because of this limitation and multiplication of entitative existence which it perfects. Consequently intentionality cannot be predicated of God who is supremely entitatively one.

However, a perfection can be disengaged from this intentional otherness, a perfection implying no imperfection. It is the subject-object unity in knowledge. But what is that? [57]

a. *as Object Known*

Viewing it first from the standpoint of the object, by the very fact that it is an object known it not only is what it is

[57] *Summa Theol.,* I, qq. 14-18; *I Cont. Gent.,* cc. *45-50; Comp. Theol.,* cc. 28-31.

but also, simultaneously and by its very being known, transcends or overflows its being what it is, by communication of its own intelligible quiddity to the act of knowledge in which it is known. That is to say, its own inner ontological structure not only determines and specifies it to be what it is entitatively but also supra-entitatively determines and specifies the act of knowledge to be a knowing this. The light of its intrinsic intelligibility with a sort of radiant transparency glows outwards and illuminates, somewhat as the sun does not just exist as does a dead star but also radiates light into an eye. This perfection of the object as such, which in the object as human is intentional otherness, may be called a supraentitative determination or specification of intellect as exercised by the object.

b. *Act of Knowing*

As to the act of knowing, what is by virtue of its being a creature's act of knowing the intentional otherness or becoming or existence is by virtue of its being an act of knowing as such a supra-subjective existence, or a supra-subjective unity with the object as object. The more perfectly something is understood, the more intimately its reality and intelligibility is immanent within the act of knowing it. As we say: "He really grasps that." "I have it now." "It is a part of him." "He is self-possessed because he understands himself and life." The known is more and more perfectly assimilated into his very being. He not only exists but also possesses existence and life with the more perfect integration and union of understanding. The knower as such exists with the existence of the object as well as his own entitative existence. Or, perhaps better, insofar as an act of knowing is an act of knowing, its own existence is perfect to the degree it assimilates the determination and specification of the object. It is alight with the brightness of the ontological structure which is the object as actually understood. It is an act of knowing precisely in this transcending or surpassing itself. Let us call this perfection of the act of knowing a supra-subjective existence or supra-subjective unity with the object.

This then is a purification of the concept of the intentional otherness of knowledge. The perfection of the object which is disengaged is a supra-entitative determination or specification as exercised by the object. The perfection of the act of knowing is a supra-subjective existence or supra-subjective unity with the object. The perfection in the intentionality of knowledge is, consequently, a super-existence in the mode of immaterial identity. Thus super-existence or overflow in creatures always implies a real melioration, an intentional otherness. In God there is no melioration, since he is Infinitely perfect by essence; but the otherness is there superminently. There is the perfection of the superexistence.

This perfection, then, of the subject-object unity of knowledge is predicable substantially of God. As object known his Essence not only makes him to be what he is but also radiates a supra-entitative specification of his knowledge determining him to know what he is. As Act of Knowing, his Essence is a supra-subjective Existence, possessing Itself as Known, or a super-subjective unity with himself as Known. The subject-object unity of Divine Knowledge is therefore a superexistence by mode of immaterial identity supra-subjective and supra-entitative. He is himself, possesses himself, not only by being himself but also by the unity of knowing himself.

2. *Divine Goodness as Object Loved*

This unity of Divine Knowledge offers a clue for the purification of the concept of the union of love necessary for its application to God.

To return to creatures once more, we discover there also a proper intentionality of love, an *esse* transcending the merely entitative *esse* and also the intentional *esse* of knowledge. It is an *esse intentionale fluens*, a super-existence which is an inclination towards another as known good but an inclination to its trans-objective concrete subjective existence. We can disengage here the perfections which properly belong, first to the object loved, and second to the act of loving.

The object in love is the good as actively attracting the lover

to itself, or acting in the mode proper to a final cause. Present here is a pure perfection which can be disengaged from the accompanying imperfections. These imperfections arise from the fact that good is the cause of which love is the effect.[58] Cause necessitates real distinction from its effect and a real dependence of the effect upon the cause.[59] The love is really dependent upon a distinct good. The being drawn is in the will and from the good. This is implied in the intentional inclination to another which is the proper intentional existence of love in creatures.

When we remove these relations of in and from, the distinction and dependence, the perfection which remains is the actual attractiveness and attraction of the good, its proper glory. That is to say, the goodness exists, not just as real, nor even just with the supraentitative existence proper to an object known. It also transcends both these modes of existence in actually attracting an appetite to its own trans-objective concrete existence. The good completes the circle, as it were. The process ends where it all began but with a new enrichment. For the good first exists as subject of entitative existence. Then, as a known good, it overflows in a supra-entitative objectivity. Finally, retaining but in turn transcending this objectivity as known, it draws an intellectual appetite to the very subjectivity of its own existence, now as supra-objective. The very interiority of its own concrete existence not only transcends itself as object known but also overflows in turn this transcendence by an attractiveness which allures an appetite over and beyond the cognitional objectivity back into the subjective depths of itself as beloved.

This perfection proper to the good, then, is a supra-objective evaluation and determination of a will in the mode of attraction. It is the pure perfection of self-diffusion proper to the good: *bonum est diffusivum sui.*

•• Joannis a Sancto Thoma, 0. P., *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Tomus* II, *Prima Pars Philosophiae Naturalis, ll.* XIII, *De Fine* (Turin: Marietti, 1933).

•• *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 33, a.1, ad 1.

In God this perfection is supremely actual. He is by essence Goodness Itself, supremely attractive and attracting. As Goodnes Itself, his Essence evaluates and determines the divine will in this mode of supra-objective attraction. Divine Goodness not only exists by essence, not only as known radiates intelligibility in supra-entitative determination and specification of the Divine Knowledge whereby it is Known Goodness; it also radiates and diffuses its proper glory as Goodness in its own mode of attraction or allure or inclination whereby it is to be Beloved. It overflows or transcends itself as being and as known, in communicating itself to the Divine Will by determining and evaluating that Will in the mode of inclination, so that what will be willed primarily is Goodness Itself. The *aliquid* which terminates the divine inclination is the superabundance which is the supra-objective allure of Divine Goodness. By virtue of this superabundance the Divine Goodness not only exists and is known but also attracts the Divine Will as its primary and necessary object. [60]

3. *Divine Act of Loving*

That is the perfection of the *aliquid,* the object loved. What of the act of loving? Its perfection is fundamentally different from that of knowledge, which is unity, while that of love is union. The appetitive activity is circular: *appetitivus motus circulo agitur.*[61] Good is both principle and term of love. Consequently, two elements or ontological moments must be distinguished within the perfection of loving. The first is in creatures final causality in act which is love as passion; the second, the active inclination to the other, love as operation.

a. *as " passion," being inclined, by way of ESSE*

When we consider the first phase, once the imperfections involved in final causality are removed, the perfection remaining is a pure being drawn or inclined, *inclinari.*[62] This being inclined

[60] *Ibid.,* q.l9, a. 1 and
[61] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. a. c.
[62] *Inclinari* (and *Inclinare)* become personal in God by virtue of their super-

is a supra-subjective existence and knowing, since it is an appetitive being drawn into the known good as it is in itself. It is similar to the supra-subjectivity of knowledge in this, that in both a more intimate and abundant existence is present by virtue of either knowing or loving something. Love, however, unlike knowledge is not itself a unity in immaterial identification with the object. To know is by nature wholly active, actively assimilating and manifesting an object which of itself is merely being known.

But a reversal of these roles occurs in love. Here the object, the good now, is active; for goodness is in things. The good is the principle or source of love as well as its term. It is actively attracting as well as in a state of being loved. Consequently, the act of loving possesses a proper correlative state of being inclined as well as an operation of actively inclining to another; for the good which is its object is not, like the true, formally within the love itself but outside it in the thing. Since there is an actual attraction of the good, there is an actual being attracted in love. This being inclined is a state of existence. It is an act and perfection but an *esse* rather than an operation. As such it is supremely actual in God. As he is supremely attractive, so he is supremely attracted by his Goodness. There is an enrichment of the Divine Will as there is of the Divine Knowledge. However, in the Divine Will the determination is not as such in the mode of immaterial identity within that Divine Will as Will. Rather it is in the mode of a being drawn to the divine goodness precisely as transobjectively existing in itself.

The "wound" of creaturely love becomes in God's love its necessity. He is not free not to love his Goodness, for the natural love of his nature is also His Will.[63] That will is necessarily captivated and enraptured by The Good. There is a super-suprasubjective existence which is the determination and

abundance. *(Ibid.,* I, q. 37, a. I.) They are also essential, for what is personal necessarily includes something essential since the essence is included in the person. *(Ibid.,* I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 4; q. 34, a. 3, ad 1.) Here we are attempting to disengage this essential as natural from the supematural.

•• *Ibid.,* I, q. 19, a. 3.

evaluation of the Divine Will in the mode of being drawn. It is a super-existence by way of *esse,* a state of being inclined.

b. *as giving, by way of operation*

Although God's love for his Goodness is not free, still it is supremely spontaneous and voluntary. Since freedom and voluntareity are not the same, this is not contradictory. Freedom is an active indetermination of a will which can determine itself regarding limited goods precisely because its natural determination is to the good, and not to any particular limited good; and this natural determination itself is that of a will, hence voluntary. Voluntariness is the proper inclination of a will, an inclination from within the will, fundamentally from its nature and therefore necessary as the will is necessarily what it is.[64] This brings us to the second aspect of intellectual love, that it is the fundamental voluntary operation of an intellectual appetite.

In this second phase, love is the active inclination to a beloved good. We speak here, of course, of simple love for actual goodness in itself and for itself. The love willingly gives to the good the goodness it already possesses entitatively. Love transcends the subjectivity both of being and of knowing in a superabundance of generous communication. The perfection here is a super-existence (which is intentional and meliorative in creatures, who get the giving, but not in God). In both God and creature, as the first phase of love is an act in the mode of *esse,* a state of being inclined, so this second phase is an act in the mode of operation.

The will now ratifies the goodness which is the very existence of the beloved in its subjectivity and interiority. That goodness now is present not only by virtue of its being but also by virtue of its being given to it in a loving will. The good which is being as desirable or loveable now in actual love attains the fullness of its proper perfection as actually beloved. And only the active

[64] "... hoc enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria inclinatione." (*Ibid.,* I-II, q. 6, a. I c.) Cf. *ibid.,* q. 6, a. 5, ad !il; q. 6, a. 7 c; I, q. !il0, a. I

love attains union with that goodness as such in generously giving it to it. Only in the love giving itself to the good does the good exist as beloved. Only by the love is the ontological perfection of the goodness as such possessed appetitively and formally. The good of the beloved is the happiness of the lover, for it is what he wants. By this generosity and by it alone the love enjoys the goodness of the good. *Nemo habet quod non dat* is even more profoundly true than the customary *nenw dat quod non habet.* No one fully has what he does not give; and as the giving increases in perfection so increases the perfection of possession by will until, in the case of God, where willing generosity is his own existence, possession is complete.

This super-subjective super-existence which is a superabundance in the mode of giving is in God. He not only is Goodness, and by knowing his Goodness super-exists in the unity of immaterial cognitional identification with that Goodness, but also overflows his very subjectivity of knowing, in a willing approval of his trans-objective goodness as it is in Itself.

In other words, as in knowledge there is an *esse* superior to merely entitative *esse,* a super-existence by mode of immaterial identity, so in love there is an *esse* superior to merely entitative *esse* and to the super-existence of knowledge, an *esse* of superabounding generosity, a super-existence in the mode of gift. The three *esse's* (entitative-of knowledge-of love) are the very *Esse* of God.[65]

Literally love may be affirmed of God, but analogously, as both somewhat the same and also simply different from creatures. The affirmation is somewhat the same in creature and God in that this perfection which we have conceptualized is predicated of both; but simultaneously the predication is simply different, for in God it is identified with his Essence, while in creatures it is not. We have love, but we are not love. God is Love.

If this is literally meaningless or contradicts the Divine Immutability I should want to be shown how. It seems to me

•• *Ibid.,* I, q. 13, aa. 3-12.

rather to perfect the concept of unchange. A man can have existence with that participated permanence proper to human life. He can also in some degree understand existence, of the world and of himself in the world, thereby attaining union with the intelligible aspect of being. He can also simultaneously hate to be. This hatred, an appetitive turning away from life, decreases his participation in immutability even to the point of actual suicide.

In fact, however, being is desirable. And one learns to acquiesce voluntarily in that goodness, if he learns to love to be, he attains a union with that aspect of existence which is its glory; and by that very fact he is farther from suicide and possesses deeper stability.

Analogously, God would be less perfectly immutable if he were Pure Existence Subsisting of Itself and Knowledge of it but hated It or at least did not love and enjoy It. However, he also loves *To Be.* And this ultimate union of unchanging Love is an ultimate perfection of Immutability.

The Unmoved aspect of the Unmoved Mover has indeed been more emphasized in seeing him as Supreme Being and as Knowledge. Love, it is true, emphasizes the Mover aspect of Unmoved Mover, for love is the unchanging and in God unchangeable source of change.[66] The dynamic, the active mover of another, however, is not and cannot be itself changed as such, for it must be in act and the moved in potency. God's necessary Love of Goodness Itself grounds his free Love of goodness as communicated to creatures. Creatures' ontological good and motion to good are God's good appetitively, since he wills our good with that ecstatic characteristic which is consequent upon the nature of love.[67] God's love is a point where puzzlingly expressed insights of a thinker like Whitehead about the mutual inclusion of God and the world [68] can be welcomed into peren-

[66] *Ibid.,* q. 19, a. 7.

[67] *Ibid.,* q. aa.

[68] Alfred N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York; The Social Science Book Store, pp. 519 ff.

nial philosophy, emphasizing his Reality as well as process.[69] St. Thomas himself did not hesitate to say that even our defects are taken by God as his own because of the union of love insofar as he loves us as something of his own. Even sin is a real evil and offense to God in depriving his consequent Will of a good which he wills antecedently to us as his other selves.

There are many avenues for further reflection in the important subject of love;[79] but this begins to go beyond the scope of the present essay whose purpose is to offer some suggestions toward an analysis of "God is Love."

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•• *Philosophers Speak of God,* by Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese (The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. vii, pp. 273 ff.; cf. pp. 1 ff. and pp. 499 ff. "Non-Being and Hartshorne's Concept of God," by Houston Craighead and "Could There Have Been Nothing? A Reply," by Charles Hartshorne in *Process Studies,* Volume 1, Number 1 (Spring, 1971), pp. 9-28. "The Impossibility of Whitehead's God in Christian Theology," by Robert C. Neville; and "The Viability of Whitehead's God for Christian Theology," by Lewis S. Ford: In *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* Vol. XLIV (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1970), pp. 130-151. "Reality and Metaphysics" by Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., in *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. XXV, No. 4 (June, 1972).

[7°] For example Sikora calls the transcendentals " meta-concepts " and Renard calls attention to the fact that in God the perfections predicated contain an implicit judgment of existential identity.

THE WORK OF OPTATUS AS A TURNING POINT IN THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

THE INFLUENTIAL LECTURES of Pierre Batiffol on the three zones of papal power in the early Church were first delivered a half century ago in Strasbourg. The steady increase of Roman power and influence over the Western Church, the second zone in Batiffol's construction, is one of the clear developments of the early centuries. Nevertheless, one vital section of the Latin Church remained throughout its history a reluctant witness to the reception of that growth of Roman power. The Catholic Church of Latin North Africa [1] consistently maintained an ambivalent attitude of simultaneous respect for Rome as a see whose apostolic credentials were most impressive, combined with a considerable sensitivity about its own autonomy and traditions.

It is the purpose of this study to consider the position of one of the lesser lights among the African churchmen, Optatus, bishop of the Numidian town of Milev or Milevis (fl.c.370), the earliest theological defender of the Catholic position in the Donatist schism. Further, it is the contention of the study that, due to the circumstances in which he lived and wrote, the

[1] For earlier bibliography, see J. Quasten, *Patrology* II (1953), especially the articles on Tertullian and Cyprian. More recent studies include:

J. P. Brisson, *Autonomisme et Christianisme dans l'Afrique romaine* de Septime Severe a !'invasion vandale. (Paris, 1958). (CyprirL 33-121).

W. Marschall, *Karthago und Rom.* Die Stellung der nordafrikanischen Kirche zum apostolischen Stuhl in Rom. (Stuttgart, 1971).

J. Ratzinger, *Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche. (Munich,* 1954). (Tertullian-Cyprian-Optatus, 44-123).

W. Simonis, *Ecclesia Visibilis et lnvisibilis.* Untersuchungen zur Ekklesiologie und Sakramentenlehre in der afrikanischen Tradition von Cyprian his Augustinus. (Frankfurt, 1970).

U. Wickert, *Sacramentum Unitatis.* Ein Beitrag zum Verstlindnis der Kirche bei Cyprian. (Berlin, 1971).

discussion of the position of Africa in relation to the Roman Church attained a new and crucial level with Optatus. It may even be said that with Optatus the African tradition reached a turning point in its history but that, as A. J. P. Taylor observed of the year 1848 in German history, it failed to turn. The African attitude failed to develop much further in its view of Rome during the years of Augustine and Aurelius of Carthage. It could be profuse in its words of respect, as in the *Epistola familiaris,*[2] or proud and even harsh as in the Apiarius affair and the question of African appeals to Rome.[8] The thought of Optatus is an opening for the future but it is also a development that must be seen in the context of the African tradition, above all that of the ecclesiological thought of Cyprian. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to survey briefly the ideas of Tertullian and Cyprian on the place of Rome in the world Church.

TertuUian

The attitude of Tertullian (+ after 220) toward the question of the position of Rome in the Church can best be judged from two writings in particular, the early *De Praescriptione Haereticorum* and one of his last works, the *De Pudicitia.* In seeking a short way with all heretics, Tertullian brilliantly takes up and develops the argument formulated by Irenaeus in his *Adversus Haereses.* This argument, devised principally with the spurious traditions of the Gnostics in mind, combines the elements of the monepiscopate from Ignatius with the idea of apostolic succession from Clement of Rome. To the Gnostic's boast of being the spiritual heir of one of the Apostles, usually one of the more obscure ones, Irenaeus counters that the logical place to seek the teaching of Christ in the contemporary world is the Churches which his Apostles founded. Christ undoubtedly entrusted his teachings to these same Apostles who in tum passed them on to the Churches they founded. The essence of the argument applies to any Church of apostolic foundation

• *Epistola familiaris* =Augustine *Ep.* 177. *(OSEL* 44, 669 ff. Goldbacher).

[8] Marschall, *op. cit.,* 161 ff.

but, for brevity's sake, Irenaeus confines himself to stressing the greatness of the Roman community. Though he also mentions Polycarp, and the Churches of Smyrna and Ephesus, subsequent debate has centered on the interpretation of his words about Rome.

Tertullian's version of this argument is clearer and more incisive. These Churches of apostolic foundation are the *matrices* and *originales fidei*, which have undoubtedly transmitted through time and space what they received from the Apostles/ Conversely, then, if any doctrine does not conform to the teaching of these Churches, it is to be rejected as false, a foreign body in the bloodstream of the Church's life. Since dialogue over the interpretation of biblical passages is usually fruitless, the intelligent activity for the diligent searcher after truth to pursue is to turn to the Church of apostolic foundation geographically closest to him. It is at this point that Tertullian makes it clear that this appeal to the testimony of the apostolic churches does not place unique emphasis on the beliefs of the Roman community alone.

"Run through the apostolic churches, where the very thrones of the apostles preside to this day over their districts . . . . If Achaea is nearest to you, you have Corinth. If you are not far from Macedonia, you have Philippi and Thessalonica. If you can go to Asia, you have Ephesus. If you are close to Italy, you have Rome, the nearest authority for us also." [5] The Church of Rome is prestigious in its martyred founder-Apostles, Peter and Paul (to whom Tertullian adds the legend of John), but the appeal to apostolic truth is fulfilled with as equal validity by Ephesus as by Rome. A later echo of this same reasoning is found in the author's *Adversus Marcionem* IV.5.1.

From this evidence taken from an early and orthodox point in Tertullian's Christian life, we move to a moment near the end of his life when his opinions had become much more extreme. These late references are much more problematical

• Tertullian, *De Prae. Haer.*, 21 (CCL I, 202-3 Refoule).
[6] Tertullian, *De Prae. Haer.*, 36 (CCL 1, 216).

insofar as the much discussed opponent bishop of the *De Pudicitia* remains unknown. Earlier scholars were convinced that the object of Tertullian's scorn was a Roman bishop, possibly Zephyrinus (+c.217), or, more probably, Callistus (+c.222), who was attacked by Hippolytus, a Roman traditionalist, for alleged laxist innovations in the penitential discipline. More recently, the weight of opinion has swung in favor of an African bishop.[6] At present there seems to be no consensus upon which a decision can be made in favor of a clear reference to Rome and its bishop.

It is plain, however, that Tertullian indignantly rejects this extension of special indulgence to adulterers and fornicators within the Christian ranks. With heavy sarcasm he sees in his opponent a "bishop of bishops."[7] It may be said by way of inference that he rejects this pretention as well. But the significance of such a rejection is lessened considerably by a glance at what his own ecclesiology has become by this time. Tertullian agrees that the Church has the power to forgive sins, but this is not the Church which is identified with the *numerus episcoporum.*[8] Rather it is the Church of the Spirit through the man who has the Spirit.

It is in this same chapter that the intriguing phrase occurs: ". . . *ad te, id est, ad omnem ecclesiam Petri propinquam."* Tertullian uses the phrase in discussing the opinions of the bishop who claims the authority to forgive these serious sins. Inasmuch as the identity or even the location of this bishop remains a subject of continuing disagreement, one is at a loss to know how to evaluate such an expression. In short, Tertullian's writings, fascinating as they are from other points of view, contribute little to answering our questions about African-Roman relations in the early third century. The clearest references to Rome as a norm of doctrine, in the *De Praescriptione,* do not attribute to it any fundamentally different or unique position.

[6] See J. Quasten, *op. cit.,* 234-5.
[7] Tertullian, *De Pud.,* 1 (CCL 2, 1281-2 Dekkers).
[8] Tertullian, *De Pud.,* 21 (CCL 2, 1328).

Cyprian

The ecclesiological position of Cyprian (+ is more complex and, from the point of view of its legacy, more significant. The complexity arises in part from the quantity of material to be found in Cyprian's correspondence where ecclesial questions predominate. From another point of view, his conception of the structures of the Church is rather clear and definite. Yet his use of a certain Petrine terminology has made his theology a battleground for Catholic and Protestant polemicists over the centuries.

Cyprian's Church is a communion of essentially equal local Churches. "His Church is one and the faith is one; and the cement of fellowship binds all the people together into the body's solid unity. That unity cannot be broken; that one body cannot be divided by any cleavage of its structure .... " [9] These local communities which are the Catholic Church in the various cities and localities around the world are united with one another by multiple ties/ [0] yet it is in and through the bishops that these links are most clearly made visible. The Church is built on the bishops. " Thus through the changes of times and successions, the ordination of bishops and the organization of the Church run through so that the Church is governed through these same leaders." [11] The people are to follow their bishop closely: " . . . the people united to their bishop and the flock clinging to their shepherd are the Church." [12] Those who are not found with the rightful bishop are simply not in the Church. This Church, which for Cyprian is largely identified with the *numerus episcoporum,* is held together by the union of the bishops among themselves. " ... The Church which is one, Catholic, is not divided nor rent, but is certainly united and joined, in turn, by the cement of the bishops adhering to one another." [13] Though many, they are one, or should be one

• Cyprian, *De Unit.,* 23 (OECT 94 Bevenot).
[10] Similarly for Tertullian. Se *De Prae. Haer.,* 20 (CCL 1, 202).
[11] Cyprian to the Lapsed, *Ep.* 33. I (Ed. Bayard Paris, 1962" 84).
[10] Cyprian to Florentius, *Ep.* 66. 8 (Bayard 226).
18[bid.

" • . . episcopate diffused in a harmonious multitude of many bishops." [14]

Cyprian never specifies exactly what this *glutinum concardiae* is and, as his later history shows, it could wear dangerously thin in times of friction between Rome and Carthage. Another of Cyprian's ecclesiological principles almost guaranteed such a crisis. He expresses it succinctly in the *De Unitate:* " The authority of the bishops forms a unity, of which each holds his part in its totality." [15] The whole episcopate is to be united but, whatever authority and power there is, is held equally by each bishop. His opening statement to the Council of Carthage in September is equally unmistakable.

It remains that upon this same matter each of us should bring forward what we think, judging no man, nor rejecting anyone from the right of communion, if he should think differently from us. For neither does any of us set himself up as a bishop of bishops, nor by tyrannical terror does any compel his colleague to the necessity of obedience; since every bishop, according to the allowance of his liberty and power, has his own proper right of judgment, and can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another. But let us all wait for the judgment of Our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the only one that has the power both of prefering us in the government of his Church and of judging us in our conduct there. [16]

These words, of course, were spoken in the course of the controversy with Stephen, but they do not represent novel ideas or ad hoc solutions for Cyprian. For example, he had recently rebuked an African bishop for constituting himself an *episcopus episcopi* when he judged Cyprian rashly. [17] Unlike Stephen, Cyprian and his African colleagues do not " apply force to anyone, nor do we give any law since each leader has in the administration of the Church, the free will of his own volition as one who will render an account of his action to his Lord." [18]

[14] Cyprian to Antonianus *Ep.* 55. (Bayard 147).
[15] Cyprian, *De Unit.* 5 (OECT 64) .
[16] *Sententiae Episcoporum* (CSEL 3, 1 435-6 Hartel).
[17] Cyprian to Florentius *Ep.* 66.3 (Bayard
[18] Cyprian and other African bishops to Stephen, *Ep.* 3 (Bayard

Among the early letters of the Cyprianic corpus, there are several representing an exchange between the Roman clergy, probably led by Novatian after the death of Bishop Fabian in the Decian persecution, and Cyprian who had escaped arrest by going into hiding. In *Ep.S* the Romans, writing to the Christians of Carthage, seem to cast doubt on the validity of Cyprian's decision. In replying, Cyprian apparently feels the need to justify his course of action to Rome.[19] Some would see this as evidence of Roman superiority in that Cyprian feels obliged to explain his decision to Rome and to its presbyterium at that. The somewhat agitated tone of *Ep.9* can be explained adequately by Cyprian's upset about slanders being circulated in Rome against him.

More generally, these letters and others must be understood within the context of the ecclesiology of *communio, koinonia.* Each Church is obliged to concern itself with the welfare of its sister Churches: e.g., Rome for Carthage, *Ep.S; Ep.36.4* " For it becomes all of us to be on our guard for the body of the whole Church .... "; Carthage for Aries, *Ep.68.3.* Roman letters of admonition and advice are read in Africa but so are African letters of similar purpose read in Rome. *(Ep.* 59.19)[20] Cyprian's principle of the autonomy of each bishop is even cited with approval by the Roman presbyters in a letter acknowledging the justice and wisdom of Cyprian's measures taken during and after the persecution. Minds sanctioned by the vigor of evangelical discipline are accustomed to be content with God alone as judge, they say, but Cyprian is doubly praiseworthy for his modesty in that he has sought approval for his actions from his brethren.[21] To these sentiments Cyprian replies by extolling the value of mutual consultation among the Churches. A similar appeal for consultation directed

[19] Cyprian to the Roman Clergy *Epp.* 9 and 20 (Bayard 22 and 58).

[20] Roman Clergy to Cyprian *Ep.* 86.4 (Bayard 92); Cyprian to Stephen *Ep.* 68.8 (Bayard 286); Cyprian to Cornelius *Ep.* 59.19 (Bayard 188).

[21] Roman Clergy to Cyprian *Ep.* 30.1 (Bayard 71). Fr. Bevenot, basing himself on this reference has suggested that Cyprian's concept of episcopal autonomy originated in Rome itself. See "A Bishop is responsible to God alone" *RSR* 89 (1951), 897-415. *(Melanges Jules Lebreton* I).

to Stephen a few years later seems to have fallen on deaf ears.[22]

The broad outlines of Cyprian's views on Church organization and government stand out clearly enough. Where does Rome fit into this picture? Like all the African authors, Cyprian honors Rome as the first see of the West because it is a greater city than Carthage and especially because of its relation to the greatest of the Apostles, Peter and Paul. But he does not thereby grant it authority over Carthage, the second see.[23] Carthage should be emphasized because there are two instances recorded in Cyprian's correspondence of Roman intervention outside of the Italian peninsula. As usual in these early centuries, it would be very helpful to have more information than we do in order to clarify these affairs. In the first instance, that of the deposed Spanish bishops, Basilides and Martial, the former of whom had appealed to Stephen, Cyprian urges non-compliance or resistance on the Spanish faithful. He does not contest Stephen's right to act but simply blames him for negligence in not ascertaining the facts. We do not know the outcome of the case, but it can be assumed that some Roman power of intervention or at least of moral suasion was recognized because it was sought by the deposed bishops and its use distressed the Spanish Christians.

Ep.68 presents the opposite situation. Cyprian urges Stephen to intervene, this time in Gaul where bishop Marcian of Aries is flaunting his ties with the Roman rigorist, Novatian. Again, many of the circumstances are not clear: Why have the other bishops of Gaul taken no action? What is Stephen being urged to do? In partial answer to the latter question it should be noted that one of Cyprian's more pressing concerns here is the fact that the world Church still appears to tolerate Marcian in its communion. Marcian insults the college of bishops by his views but does not yet seem to be cut off.[24]

Stephen is to tell the local bishops in Gaul to desist from

[22] Cyprian to Roman Clergy *Ep. 35.* I (Bayard 88). Cyprian and other African bishops to Stephen *Ep.* 72. I (Bayard 259-60).

[23] Cyprian to Cornelius *Ep. 52.* 2 (Bayard I27).

[24] Cyprian to Stephen *Ep.* 68. 2 (Bayard 235).

tolerating Marcian by remaining in communion with him. Furthermore, Stephen should write to the province and to the people of Aries that another may be substituted in place of Marcian. This phrase " province and people " has the ring of a formula indicating a call for a new election in Aries rather than that Stephen is simply going to appoint a new bishop himself, as some have claimed. Finally, Cyprian's request that Stephen inform him of the name of the new bishop points up Rome's position and function as a center for communicating such information which is so basic to Cyprian's view of the Church as a communion.

The terms *matrix, radix* and others of some import for our subject occur frequently in Cyprian's correspondence. It will be recalled that Tertullian referred to the Churches of apostolic origin as the *matrices et originales* of the faith.[25] Cyprian's use of terms like *matrix* and *radix* refer normally to the Catholic Church as opposed to its schismatic rivals and counterfeits rather than to any local Church in particular. This is true, for example, in Ep.48.3 where Cyprian, writing to Cornelius, reports that he has advised travellers leaving for Rome to recognize and cling to the " *ecclesiae catholicae matrix et radix."* This expression has sometimes been understood as referring to the Roman Church itself. In reality, it means that the African Catholics must, upon reaching Rome, adhere to the party of Cornelius rather than that of Novatian, for it is the former that is the Catholic Church in Rome. Novatian, on the contrary, has refused the *"radicis et matris sinus,"* whereas Cyprian and the Catholics hold to the " *ecclesiae unius caput et radicem."* [26]

The *matrix et radix* to which Cyprian refers, then, is the Catholic Church rather than the Roman Church. In later literature it becomes clear that Rome is increasingly looked upon as the center of communion for the Western Church. In Cyprian, however, this point is sometimes obscure. In some

[25] Tertullian *De Prae. Haer.* 21 (CCL 1, 202).

[26] Cyprian to Cornelius *Ep.* 48. 3 (Bayard 118); Cyprian to Cornelius *Ep.* 45. 1 (Bayard 112); Cyprian to Jubaianus *Ep.* 73.2 (Bayard 263).

places, for example, it seems that Cyprian is referring to communion with Rome precisely as a sign of communion with the world Church. Writing to Antonianus, an African bishop, Cyprian notes: " You also wrote that I should forward a copy of this same letter to Cornelius, our colleague, that casting aside all solicitude, he might know immediately that you are in communion with him, i.e., with the Catholic Church." [27] The context shows, however, that what is in question is, again, the issue of which Roman leader, Cornelius or Novatian, represents the Catholic Church in Rome. In *Ep.55,* there evidently has been some question about which party Bishop Antonianus supports. Similarly, in Ep.48.3, Cyprian assures Cornelius that the African bishops " firmly approve and maintain you and your communion, i.e., the unity and also the charity of the Catholic Church" as opposed to the communion of Novatian.28

One final aspect of Cyprian's ecclesiology that is most likely to confuse the modem reader is his use of the phrase *Cathedra Petri* and related terminology. In warning his own Carthaginian Christians against the schismatics among them, Cyprian more than once makes use of the formula: One God, One Christ, One Church and One *"Cathedra ... super Petrum Domini vove fundata."* [29] To the contemporary Catholic reader such references to Peter and unity, such wording, automatically triggers thoughts of Church unity under Petrine, i.e., papal aegis. But another' reality, a more symbolic, i£ not less real one, is operative in Cyprian's mind.

Cyprian elaborates his ecclesiology in the context of schism within two local churches, his own and Rome. His aim in invoking Peter looks largely to the unity of the local Church under one lawful head, Cyprian himself in Carthage and Cornelius in Rome. The Petrine references, then, usually do not point to Rome alone but to the internal unity of the local

•• Cyprim to Antonianus *Ep.* 55.1 (Bayard 181).

•• Cyprian to Cornelius *Ep.* 48.8 (Bayard 118).

•• Cyprian to the Catholics of Carthage *Ep.* 48. *5* (Bayard 107). See also *Ep.* 70. 8 (Bayard 255).

Church which should be one and undivided within itself under one bishop. Peter, then, as the one who received the keys, bears within his person the symbolic reality of the unicity of the Church. Cyprian writes that in bestowing the keys on Peter first, the Lord "instituted and manifested the origin of unity." Peter shows and vindicates unity. The Church is founded on Peter " *origine unitatis et ratione."* [30]

The principal locus of debate remains, as it has been for a long time, the treatise on the unity of the Church, especially chapter four with its rival versions. Without entering the controversy over the authenticity or priority of either version, it can be stated that the Church polity in either case is the same and that this polity is consistent with what has thus far been discerned in Cyprian's letters. The fact that the Church is founded on Peter shows forth the unicity of the local Church. The fact that Peter is one and his *Cathedra* is one is meant to show forth unity. (TR) Christ established one chair" ... thus establishing by his own authority the source and hallmark *(rationem)* of the (Church's) oneness." (PT) A *primatus* is given to Peter. (PT) Here again a word is used without the connotation with which later centuries would endow it. [31] By this is meant simply that the unity symbolized by Peter is heightened by the fact that he received the power and authority first. What is important to note is that in either version Cyprian's basic ecclesiology is clearly maintained. "No doubt the others were all that Peter was," (PT) "endowed with equal dignity and power," (TR) The meaning of chapter four can be summarized neatly in Cyprian's own words. " ... The start *(exordium)* comes from him (Peter) alone, in order to show that the Church of Christ is unique *(una)."* (TR)

The Petrine-Unity symbolism had a long history in the

[30] Cyprian to Jubaianus *Ep.* 73. 3 (Bayard Cyprian to Pompeius *Ep.* 74. 11 (Bayard Cyprian and the African Council of *Ep.* 70. 3 (Bayard .

[31] References to the *De Unit.,* Ch. four are from the Bevenot edition, OECT, TR = *Textus Receptus,* PT ="Primacy" text. Attention should be called to the use of the term *primatus* by Cyprian with reference to the false claims of NovatilliD.. See *Ep.* 69.8 (Bayard

African ecclesiology. It can probably be seen already in Tertullian.[82] It is the most prominent strain in Augustine's interpretation of Matthew 16: 18-19; for him, Peter is the *figura* or *persona ecclesiae*.[83] For Cyprian above all, the *Cathedra Petri* is the symbol of the divinely willed unicity of the local Church. As such, this *Cathedra* is found in every see, not just in Rome. A significant turning point would be achieved when this Petrine-Unity concept would be extended to the contemporary successors of Peter on the *cathedra episcopalis* of Rome. In at least one place Cyprian comes close to this key breakthrough. I refer to the well-known phrase of Ep.59.14, where, in speaking of the boldness of schismatics who have sailed from Carthage to Rome, he refers to their destination as " . . . *ad Petri Cathedram adque ad ecclesiam principalem unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est*. . . . "[84]

This description of Rome does not contradict Cyprian's habitual theology as the remainder of the passage abundantly demonstrates. Here the words "Chair of Peter" are used in the double sense of rightful unit of the Catholic Church and the *Sedes* of Peter himself. What is of more interest is the designation of Rome as the *ecclesia principalis.* This may well be translated not as the " principal Church " but as the " primordial Church" (Bevenot) or the" Urkirche" (Poschmann), an interpretation for which there are interesting parallels in Optatus. More importantly, this whole clause, the expression *ecclesia principalis* as well as what follows, gives the hint of a transference of the Petrine-Unity symbolism to the contemporary third-century Church of Rome. Peter the symbol of unity in the local Church is also the founding Apostle of the local Roman Church. The theological symbolism associated with Peter in Cyprian's mind is here transferred to Rome. Peter, the symbol of the primordial unity of the local Church and whose temporal priority or *primatus* is the symbol of the unity of the

•• Tertullian, *Scorp.* 10, 8 (CCL 1088 Reifferscheid-Wissowa).

•• See A.M. La Bonnardiere, *"Tu es Petrus.* La Pericope Matthieu XVI, dans l'oeuvre de S. Augustin," *lrenikon* 34 (1961), 451-499.

•• Cyprian to Cornelius *Ep.* 59.14 (Bayard 183).

Apostles among themselves now sees his symbolic significance extended to the Petrine local Church *par excellence,* Rome. In this sense, Rome, which obviously is not the first Church historically, can be the symbolic primordial Church in that it inherits and extends in time and space the primordial unity symbolized by Peter himself.

Needless to say, all this does not mean that Cyprian recognizes a superior authority of command in the contemporary Roman Church or bishop. A glance at the final unfortunate correspondence concerning the baptismal question is enough to put such thoughts to rest. Cyprian and especially Firmilian of Caesarea are not impressed by what seem to be Stephen's claims to authority based on his See and succession to Peter. [35] In summary, then, Cyprian's ecclesiology remains remarkably consistent and uniform throughout the relatively short period of his literary activity. It is an ecclesiology of episcopal communion with wide freedom of discretion left to the individual bishop. There is no bishop of bishops. Only the good will and moderation of the bishops of the world can preserve the "*... collegii honor, vinculum fidei et concordia sacerdotii."* [36]

Optatus

The earliest Catholic apologist of the Donatist controversy played an important role as a precursor of Augustine. Writing c.367 Optatus first collected and preserved many of the documents, both civil and ecclesiastical, associated with the complex origins of the schism. Similarly he made significant initial contributions to the solution of the theological issues of Baptism and the *dotes ecclesiae,* a concept suggested by his adversary, the Donatist leader, Parmenian. For our purposes, the relevant material is what Optatus has to say about Rome and Peter.

The African situation had altered considerably in the fourth century. At the Council of Aries (314) the African Catholics

[35] Cyprian to Quintus *Ep.* 71. 3 (Bayard Finnilian to Cyprian *Ep.* 75 (Bayard f.).

[36] *Sententiae Episcoporum* (CSEL 3, 1, 436); Cyprian to Jubaialllus *Ep.* 73. (Bayard

had finally agreed to abandon their traditional, but increasingly isolated, custom of rebaptizing those baptized in heretical sects. (Canon 9[81) This in itself was something of a turning point. But the vital element to notice in Optatus's argumentation is this: the Cyprianic ecclesiology with its stress on the unicity of the local Church no longer suffices. It is no longer a question of a division in this or that local Church. Now a whole great area of the world Church finds itself divided. Every town and village has its representatives of the two rival communions. Both claim to be the one Church outside which there is no salvation. The question is simply this: Which is the true Church and which the counterfeit? *Ubi ecclesia?*[37] Optatus realized that appeal had to be made to the Church beyond Africa. In response to this unprecedented situation he develops the argument from Catholicity as geographical extension and universality, a weapon that quickly became standard in the Catholic arsenal. As a particular facet of this line of reasoning, he appealed to communion with Rome as a decisive sign of communion with the whole *Catholica.* It is this last area that concerns us in particular and which has considerably impressed some modern authors.[38]

The Catholic Church is the Church that is spread over all the lands of the earth. The African faction that is in contact and communion with this world Church is the Catholic Church in Africa. The *Pars Donati* does not fill this description. Thus the simple and constantly repeated Catholic argument. "Is she not to be in Spain, in Gaul, in Italy, where you are not? ... in all Egypt and Mesopotamia, where you are not?" asked Optatus.[39] Is there something wrong with being in communion

[87] The importance of Optatus is recognized by Ratzinger, *op. cit.,* 108 f. and by Brisson, *op. cit.,* 161.

[88] For example: For Marschall, *op. cit.,* 79!, Optatus goes far beyond Tertullian, Cyprian, and even Augustine. Also L. Vischer, *Basilius der Grosse* (Basel, 1958), Excursus on Optatus, 79!-85. Vischer remarks that Optatus's views seem surprisingly modern when considered in relation to contemporary Roman Catholic ideas.

[89] Optatus, *Contra Parmenianum Donatistam* II, 1, 11; III, 9. (CSEL 26, 88, 47, 98 Ziwsa). An English translation of Optatus was made by 0. R. Vassall-Phillips in 1917.

with the Thessalonians, Corinthians, Galatians, and the seven Churches of Asia? [40] The intent of this line of reasoning is clear enough.

One of the similarities between Cyprian's terminology and that of Optatus is to be found in their use of the concept of the Catholic Church as the *radix.* Unfilial children that they are, the Donatists have cut themselves off" from the root of Mother Church." Catholics, on the other hand, are faithful and remain in the root with the rest of the world." [41] Initially, at least, Optatus's discussion of the concept of the *Cathedra Petri* is also a legacy from Cyprian. In Book I, while discussing the question of where the original blame for the schism should be placed, he notes that it was not Caecilian but Majorinus, the short-lived predecessor of Donatus, who separated himself *"a Cathedra Petri vel Cypriani."* This use of the *Cathedra Petri* does not refer to Rome but to the rightful see of Carthage. The present *Cathedra* of Parmenian, on the other hand, had no existence before Majorinus wrongfully established it. [42] As with Cyprian, Optatus has at least the rudiments of the symbolic use of Peter as the representative of the whole Church, a symbolism which Augustine will expand. For the sake of unity Peter alone received the keys which he communicated to the rest. He is the *"forma unitatis* " and the *sanc,taeec,desiae ... persona."* [48]

Optatus's most significant discussion of the *Cathedra* concept is to be found in Book II, where he considers Parmenian's theory of the *dotes* or endowments of the Church. These *dotes* are six in number: *Cathedra, Angelus, Spiritus, Fons, Sigillum,* and *Umbilicus.* The first is the decisive one as Optatus realizes. Parmenian, of course, claimed that the Donatist Church possessed these endowments. Optatus sets out to reclaim them

[40] Optatus, II, 6, 14; VI, 8. (CSEL 26, 42-3, 49, 147).

[41] Optatus, I, 11, 15, 28; III, 7. (CSEL 26, 14, 18, 31, 88).

•• Optatus, I, 10, 15. (CSEL 26, 12-3, 17) .

.. Optatus, I, 10; II, 9; VII, 8. (CSEL 26, 12, 45, 170-1). In Book VII, Optatus argues strongly against the Donatist rejection of the Catholic Church as the Church of sinners and traitors by pointing out that, though Peter denied Christ, he was still singled out for special honor.

for the Catholics. The question, he says, is this: "We must see who was the first to sit on the *Cathedra* and where he sat." [44]

You cannot then deny that you know that upon Peter first in the city of Rome was conferred the episcopal chair, on which sat Peter, the head of all the Apostles, whence he was called Cephas,[45] that in this one chair unity should be preserved by all, lest the other Apostles might uphold each for himself separate chairs, so that he who should set up a second chair, against the unique chair would already be a schismatic and a sinner.[46]

This passage could be interpreted completely in the same line as Cyprian's argumentation in the *De Unitate Ecclesiae.* The one Chair of Peter has been established to preclude the dangers of possible centrifugal tendencies on the part of the other apostles or bishops. Anyone setting himself against this chair is a schismatic.

Yet it is immediately evident that there is more here. Specific mention has already been made of Peter *in Rome* and the passage continues at once with the list of Roman bishops who have succeeded to that one chair on which Peter first sat. The list ends with Optatus's contemporary, Siricius, " *qui noster est socius: cum quo nobis totius orbis commercia formatarum in una communionis societate concordat."* [47]

The Donatists are challenged to demonstrate the origins of their *Cathedra.* At once, a second time the discussion returns to Rome, for the Donatists also have a Roman bishop. Optatus easily demonstrates the fatuousness of this argument. The Donatists constitute only a tiny minority in the city. It is ludicrous for them to claim the *Cathedra Petri* since their man in Rome probably has never even been allowed to approach the *memoriae apostolorum.* There is a Donatist episcopal succession at Rome but it can be traced back only to Victor of Garba in the early fourth century and no further. Optatus

.. Optatus, II, *!'l, 5,* 6. (CSEL !'l6, 36, 4!'l-3).

•• Optatus is the first to make the connection: Caput-Kephale-Cephas. See Y. Congar, "Cephas-Cepha1e-Caput," *Revue du Moyen Age Latin,* 8 (195!'l) *5-4!'l.*

[46] Optatus, II, *!'l.* (CSEL !'l6, 36) .

[47] Optatus, II, 3. (CSEL !'l6, 37).

can ridicule the Donatist Church of Rome whose only *Cathedra,* he suggests, is the *Cathedra Pestilentiae.* He labels this Roman bishopric of theirs a subterfuge, yet he also admits that there were pastoral motives involved in the original despatch of Victor from Africa. While the original Donatist motivation may have been mixed, the discussion of this small Roman community by Optatus must be interpreted as showing that the Donatists of his day attempted to use it as a proof that they too were in communion with Rome.

The *Cathedra Petri* symbolism has been expanded to meet the new regional challenge of Donatism that has replaced the old problem of local schism. The Chair of Peter in the old Cyprianic framework is still a valid concept, but the further decisive step has been taken of seeing a special Chair of Peter in the world Church. This is the Church in Rome where Peter had first sat on the *cathedra episoopalis.* Rome is now the center of communion, at least for the West, through which pass those papers of ecclesial recognition, the *(litterae) formatae* or *communicatoriae.*[48] The fact that the Catholics can show that they are in communion with Rome proves that they alone have rightful claim to the *dos* of the *Cathedra* and through the *Cathedra* to the *Angelus* and the other endowments enumerated by Parmenian. Peter is at the head of the Catholic line of bishops as opposed to the Donatist line.[49]

All of this, let it be said again, does not indicate any belief on Optatus's part in some kind of modern understanding of the papal primacy. Even in the question of communion with the Churches outside Africa, Optatus mentions the importance of communion with the seven Churches of Asia.[50] Yet the new

•• *Ibid.*

•• Optatus, II, 6, 9. (CSEL 45), According to Optatus, Peter is *"princeps noster,"* II, 4 *(CSEL* 39) whereas the Donatists have their own founders," *"principes vestri,"* VI, 3 (CSEL 147). As with the Cyprianic " *ecclesia principalis* " the words " *princeps* " and " *principalis* " point to the origin of the Churches.

[50] Optatus, II, 6 (CSEL He has the strong statement: "Extra septem ecclesias quicquid foris est, alienum est." Optatus probably brings in the seven churches of Asia at this point because he is discussing the *Angelus* endow-

element hinted at in Cyprian emerges full blown in Optatus. This is the transfer of the Petrine-Unity symbolism from the local level to the world level of the universal Church or at least of the Western Church. Optatus's use of the *Cathedra Petri* concept, while based on Cyprian's usage, has gone beyond it. This leap to a new level of understanding has been brought about by the new and hitherto unknown experience of total regional schism with rival groups offering basically the same doctrines, the same practices, the same sacraments. The shift in meaning was probably brought about more rapidly by the appeal to geographical catholicity, the most commonly repeated argument against Donatist particularism.

A new plateau was reached by Optatus, but there were many other, much steeper ascents to be made before any conception of Roman authority comparable to that found in the modem Western Church would be attained. Yet, intriguingly enough, it can be argued that neither Augustine nor any other African theologian ever really advanced beyond Optatus in recognizing a special position for the Roman bishop in the world Church. Because the triumph of Islam forever closed the book of the history of Christian North Africa, we shall never know what might have been the African reaction to a Gregory VII, a Boniface VIII, or a Pius IX.

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ment and this brings to mind the *Angeli* of the book of Revelation. The reference occurs at other places in this literature, e. g., Cyprian, *Ad Fortunatum* 11: "Cum septem liberis plane copulatur et mater origo et radix quae ecclesias septem postmodum peperit, ipsa prima et una super Petrum Domini voce fundata." (CSEL, 3, 1, 338). Augustine also makes use of the same argument.

THE FUNCTION OF THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

TO EXAMINE the various uses of reason in Aristotle from a functionalistic point of view brings forward a number of questions directed to central concerns in his speculations. In this essay we are investigating Aristotle's use of reason in such themes as the moral life, the theoretical life, animal motion, and the world-system. Reason put to these various uses seems ambiguous and obscure especially considered from one topic to another. Within Aristotle's teleological framework we find a dysfunctionalism in man as a part of the world in relation to the complete world-system. The *nous* of theoretical speculation seems described as escaping this limitation and we, therefore, are constrained to ask how it differs from that *nous* which is a component of human choice, and from *n.ous* expressing purpose for the human being as a natural entity and a part of a species. The essay comes to no reconstructive conclusions and hazards criticisms, in a tentative spirit, in the process of locating difficulties.

Aristotle, understanding man to be a rational animal, suggests a cooperative and synthetic arrangement of rational and irrational aspects in the human soul. He finds these aspects not separable in considering the efficient cause and origin of action. This is most significant; for Aristotle, action is uniquely characteristic of man:

> True action cannot be ascribed to any inanimate substance, nor to any animate being except man; clearly, therefore, it is man who has this power of originating actions. [1]

The moral life depends upon the dovetailing of rational and irrational aspects; this is emphasized in Aristotle's employment

[1] *Magna Moralia,* I, xi, I.

of " *proairesis,"* sometimes translated as " choice " and sometimes as " purpose."

The origin of action-its efficient,not its final cause-is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason or intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character .... Hence choice is either desiderative reason *(orektikos nous)* or ratiocinative desire *(orexis dianoiatika)* and such an origin of action is man.[2]

The presence of a rational aspect in choice secures the moral life from indeterminateness. For moral virtues are not *by nature;* that is, unlike, say, the determinate motion of a stone falling downward, the moral virtues are acquired through exercise. It is through exercise forming dispositions that man's nature is determined and ought to be determined.

Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted for receiving them, by nature, and are made perfect by habit.[3]

Habit expresses the condition of interchange between person and his environment which, if not arbitrary, must express a rule of governance. Without such a governance, an *orthos logos,* moral life would be arbitrary and indeterminate.

A right rule of action relates to pain and pleasure in terms of a" view to an end." Ideally, pain and pleasure monitor the appropriateness of any particular activity. Aristotle takes the mean between excess and deficiency to express appropriate choice in terms of pleasure. He suggests each virtue has its domain *(taxis kai kosmos)* where pleasure is obtained in a manner maximally beneficial to the organism as a whole, a *silstema.* His ultimate view of the virtues is synthetic, based on the principle of the well-functioning whole as the criterion for interpreting the proper function of the parts.

Choice, then, cannot be identified with mere appetite *(epithumia)* or passion *(thumos).* These "animalistic aspects"

[2] *Nick. Eth.,* 1139a3fl fl'.
[8] *Ibid.,* 1103al9.

of man tend unrestraintly to seek pleasure (though this way of speaking must not be confused with speaking of the proper functioning animal. Indeed, the concept of choice makes more complex the system of nature operating on moral behavior). An hydrolic mechanism " by nature " conspicuous in other animals seems, if not missing, then modified in man. For example, a cat will tend to stop eating when physically satisfied, likewise a human infant: to continue would not be pleasurable. However, though it may be true, to some extent, that a well-functioning adult man may by nature respond as the cat or the infant, having a kind of natural virtue of temperance, we know his pleasure is usually stimulated and the activity is made to continue through art, e.g., eating beyond the point of food nourishing him. It is only by a rational principle employed in interpreting for himself his concrete situation, either intuitively or by a maxim, that makes: him forgo such pleasure. The principle working intuitively expresses an habitual (temperate) respone and, working by a maxim, expresses a continent response. Ideally, a fundamental property of natural functions is the pleasantness of the temperate response.

Habit, a sort of second nature, can be seen as the organism's attempt to secure the pleasant and, it is most useful to the organism when in conformity to the *telos* of man. It is appropriate to man's *telos* as an instrument. That the virtues are considered fixed states of character emphasizes the importance of art in the proper functioning of man. For, as Aristotle puts it, the way a man is educated not only makes a difference but, rather, it makes all the difference for moral action. Habit concretizes the perception necessary for appropriate action. Since a man's education is intimately dependent on the arrangement of political and social activities which, on the one hand, expresses and, on the other hand, modifies the generic human principle of arrangement, so moral virtues will depend, to an important extent, on the art of politics.

But how one gets from art, with its various possibilities of making arrangements, to the *telos* of man is not an easy matter to understand. Ultimately, one must provide, it seems, an

explanation of how the virtues which we are *adapted by nature* to receive proper pleasure become part of man *by nature.* Only thereby the end of man, a fulfilled, well-functioning, and happy creature, can be an actuality. It seems that part of the explanation depends on the manner in which man uses intelligence to express his proper function or work *(ergon)* ; " The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work." • For the proper functioning of man is concomitant with the proper pleasure for man. Man's *telos* is expressed through his activity; and, granted action is characteristic of human activity, the origin and proper choice of his actions will help us understand the proper end fo:r man: the character of action leading to happiness. Further, the *praxis* or context of action must be considered: choice is for the sake of an object of action within our own power. As a synthesis of deliberation and desire choice will surely be important in investigating man's nature:

> The nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. [5]

Choice, considered as a property of the mature person, is intimately involved in man's realization of happiness and well-being:

> There are two things in which all well-being consists: one of them is the choice of a right .end and aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions which are means toward it; for the means and the end may agree or disagree. [6]

Dysfunction may be due either to the faulty nature of the functioning thing or else to the imperfection of the environment or conditions in which it functions. In choosing, either or both the deliberation or the desire may be faulty. Also, the situation in which choice is made may not be ideal, to a greater or a lesser degree. The lower limit of choice, in terms of the external situation, is the impossible: we cannot choose the impossible.

•*Ibid.,* 17. • *Politics,* 1252b88. [6] *Ibid.,* U2!b26-80.

Let us consider what it would mean for the deliberative component of the choice to be faulty. First, it is appropriate to point out that the separation of deliberative components from the situation in which it functions is merely for the purpose of analysis since in reality we lose choice when we separate. When Aristotle treats the rational he always emphasizes that it is the nature of the rational *qua* rational not to err; therefore, the breakdown of the deliberative component in choice is due to the physical basis of its operation, e.g., remembering.

> Now mind is always right but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates the movement, this object be the real or apparent good.[7]

A dysfunction in choice is more usually attributable to the element of desire. A breakdown of the proper movement toward or away from pleasure and pain: desire initiates movement. Aristotle's discussion of the practical syllogism clearly makes exactly that point. We find the animalistic element of human action the most vulnerable.

The animalistic element makes for movement toward or away from an object. Unlike intellectual activity *per se,* which is considered simply pleasurable, physical pleasures reside in a domain where pain is also a possibility. (Aristotle even comments that seeing, which seems solely pleasurable, is a " mixed pleasure," has a painfulness to which we are accustomed.) The moral virtues have this imperfection, a tendency to disorder. One is reminded of Plato's "Wandering Cause" in the *Timaeus,* a metaphysical theme. It is difficult to know how much to make of this for Aristotle's functionalism, in what framework one ought to place statements like the following:

> Every man should be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain *the evil which is inherent in every 11Wn.*[8]

[7] *De Anima,*
[8] *Politics,* 1319al-4.

Are we to take " inherent in every man " to mean that the ratiocinative desire of the individual is in principle imperfect and, consequently, no man can become a good man? This not only in some unqualified sense but even to the extent of being a healthy, well-functioning individual:

> The good man is he for whom because he is virtuous, the things that are absolutely good are good; it is also plain that his use of these goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense good.[9]

But this interpretation is absurd; it goes against the main thrust of Aristotle to consider man incapable of well-being and appropriate moral perception; the very *raison d'etre* of the *Ethics.*

The external conditions for human choice must, after all, to some extent also be dysfunctional. Certain classes of action such as chastisements, punishments, etc., speak to imperfect external conditions, conditions intrinsic to the realm of becoming: "The conditional action [chastisements, punishments] is only the choice of a lesser evil." [10] In these actions we see the possibility of a healthy organism adapting itself to less than optimum conditions, though, in one way, we can think of the conditions of correction as part of an appropriate functional development or education, e.g., in the case where a person might enjoy correction because it is for the sake of becoming better. The correction is not enjoyed *per se* whereas an activity of health, needing no correction, is enjoyed *per se.*

These considerations bring to mind the more difficult discussion: the moral life in relation to the supreme end of man, contemplation. Aristotle tells us:

> Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and to those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is of itself precious. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation. [11]

Now, if contemplation is man's proper function, it is also his proper pleasure: "Each animal Is thought to have a proper

[9] *Ibid.,* 1832a28. [10] *Ibid.,* 16. [11] *Nick. Eth.,* 1178b28-88.

pleasure, as it has a proper function, viz., that which corresponds to its activity." [12] Thus, we seem to find the bodily and animalistic elements of man, a condition of human contemplation, also an impediment to the *"fullness"* of man's striving for total and continuing happiness. What is crucial to notice is that the impediment is not merely in the imperfection of physical activities, e.g., the pleasure/pain syndrome involved in nourishing the organism. More important, it is in the human condition itself. The composite nature of man demands a physical condition for its fulfillment where the end *per se* does not express itself in an enmattered, complex condition. This suggests a previous point, i.e., moral training is somewhat painful. Learning habits and dispositions, the ground of virtues, are not only impeded by a more or less imperfect political life, (which itself provides a guidance for education taken either or both as *paideia* or as *askesis)* but, more deeply, it is impeded by the very developmental and sustaining conditions of animal existence. Let us recall, Aristotle ultimately finds supreme pleasure to be unimpeded activity in contemplation and this, taken to be the end of man, makes the moral life with its enmattered, animalistic basis at best merely the condition for this end. The moral life does not have authority over the end from beneath, though it must be fulfilled as the condition of the noblest human aspiration, contemplation.

What does it mean to be fulfilled in this sense? It does not mean perfected *per se* but only perfected for the sake of that for which it is the necessary condition: contemplation. Therefore, only God, the self-contemplator, whose necessary and sufficient condition is his own contemplation, is functionally perfect. Man is not a functionally perfect creature. A gap exists between the moral and the theoretical life, for which the moral is, at most, merely a necessary condition for the *bios theoretikos.* This implies that we should not be startled to find a measure of dysfunction even in the ideal life pictured for man and also, of course, in the generally good life. On the other hand, a func-

[12] *Ibid.,* 1176a3-4.

tional inspection of man is the very way we come to this truth, which, if it adds a measure of" ontological modesty," need not cause *angst*.

> . . . the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at *no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself* . . . all attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man .... But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not insofar as he is a man that he will live so but insofar as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior *to our composite nature* is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue, ... that which is proper to each thing by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else *is* man. This life, therefore, is also the happiest. [13]

This passage clearly expresses the view of a certain ontological disorientation in the human situation. Man is not made for the divine, rooted in becoming, the best in his existence, *naus,* seems to share in being, in some sense beyond the ontological complexity of the material substratum. It is wise to retreat from the heights of this conclusion about man's ultimate dysfunctionalism. We will start afresh by considering man, and animals generally, in terms of dysfunctionalism on anothe1 level, that of physical movement, (of *kinesis* rather than *energy ea.)* Introducing this discussion, we present a remarkably suggestive passage from *De Motu Animalium:*

> The movement of animals may be compared with those of automatic puppets, which are set going on the occasion of a tiny movement; the levers are released, and strike the twisted strings against one another .... Animals have parts of a similar kind, their organs, the sinewy tendons to wit and the bones; and bones are like the wooden levers in the automation, and the iron; the tendons are like the strings, for when they are tightened or released movement begins. However, in the automata ... there is no change of quality ... In the animal ... this chang.e of quality is caused by imaginations and sensations and by ideas.[14]

[13] *Ibid.,* 1177b17 fl'.

[14] *De Motu Animalium,* 701b.

What strikes one as crucial in the passage is the implied distinction in a principle of movement between the automatic puppet and an animal. The characterization of this difference rests upon the notion of change of quality. In the case of animals, change of quality relates to "imagination, sensations, and ideas." (More precisely, all animals have sensations but not all animals have imagination and none except man, have thought.) Since we are told "the affections of the soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life" [15] and "the affections of the soul are enmattered formulable essences" [16] we must conclude that the material factor in the automatic puppet is dissimilar to the qualitative or formal factor of an animal. The truth of this, and the manner in which it is true, should be disclosed by observation.

But what in our observation of the puppet shows us that it does not have a change of quality? We seem to be looking for an indication in the automatic puppet which shows its movements to be unrelated to a change in its essence, as say, an essential change in the sequence of movements whereby an acorn becomes an oak. Essence for the living thing is taken as the ratio of parts in its development and not that the mature individual of a species is the fulfillment of the callow individual: the oak the fulfillment of the acorn. The latter would not provide a characterization of different movements.

The quality or essence is not changed in the automatic puppet whereas this is not so in the acorn or the animal. We may speak of a well-functioning child as well as a well-functioning man. Therefore, some principle is disclosed by the organization of matter in animals which makes their motion fundamentally different from that of the puppet.

If, however, we were to construct a zooid, an entity whose movements involve a feedback system so that future movements would be changed just because of past movement, then we seem to eliminate the important difference between the movement of animals and the movement of mechanical devices: devices, like the automatic puppet, do not change in

[15] *De Anima,* 403bl8.

[16] *Ibid.,* 403a24.

their quality or essence by the fact of their movements. Aristotle does not have available such a zooid for his consideration whereas we have: Turing machines, retrieval systems, etc.

In other words, goal-directed activity is present simply whenever (1) a sequence of events is for the sake of a certain state of affairs or end E, (fl) the functioning which promotes E is either repeated or continued, and (3) with repetition the functioning of X for the achievement of E (and the continuance of E) makes for or tends toward making every aspect of the functioning relevant to achieving E. This teleological approach seems to exclude the non-qualitative changes of automatic puppets. Also, it excludes such natural phenomena as rivers running toward the seas, which is ultimately important to Aristotle's conception of the world. (In this instance, the exclusion is because there is no negative-feedback; the river cannot, except metaphorically, be considered as a whole for it is difficult to conceive it to be a simple thing.) This teleological model, however, does include animals and zooids. Consequently, it is not from an examination of their motions that we can exclude some fabricated entities from a teleological view. Our conclusion is against Aristotle's ascription of action (or learning) only to human beings.

Aristotle's characterization of nature is teleological: in a broad sense nature does nothing in vain though it can make " small " mistakes. It is to be assumed, a teleological approach excluding the river's motion must be amended when the world system is considered. Perhaps, the character of mind *(nous)* in nature provides for order and purpose in nature, allowing one to deal teleologically with the river in its relation to nature as a whole. The world is finite for Aristotle. The logical ground is it could not be otherwise considered a system. Without finitude it would not be determinate and purposeful, and, consequently, capable of expressing mind. (Aristotle, after all, called Anaxagoras " a sober man among drunkards " for introducing the principle of *nous* into cosmology, though he criticizes him for not showing its: efficacy.)

In one sense nothing but the entire universe can be considered

as a whole; though here, as in the human soul, the relationship of *nous* to activity is problematic and obscure. Is *nous* to be considered a part of the universe? How a part? Men or even their organs, e.g., liver, heart, etc., can be considered both as complete systems and, also, as systemic parts. A complete functional explanation of them will be a kind of diastole and systole investigation where their activity is considered in terms of both " wholes " and parts. Can *nous* either in man or in the system of nature be so treated? Is *nous* necessary as the " inner principle " of any teleological explanation? Is it more than an explanatory principle, is it an entity?

> For those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some completion: the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance completion, but always the tendency in each is toward the same end, if there is no impediment[17]

If we take the motion of the automatic puppet as its particular activity we contrast it to the motion of an animal or a zooid. But, if the goal-directed movement of the animal or zooid is unimpeded, what makes for discovering an internal principle of motion here, when we could not find one in the motion of the puppet? Could we find a different arrangement of physical parts in one and not in the other explaining *nous* as a principle of internal movement? [18]

That the one may be more complex than the other, even if it were invariably true, does not make for the distinction. Aristotle says, "Whatever comes to be is always complex." [19] Complexity, in itself, cannot make for an ontological distinction

[17] *Physics,* 199b15-20.

[18] An interesting passage in the *Physics* indicates *nous,* or some principle, itself unmoved, is the cause of the motion in God, "the supreme reality," and "in that which is coming to be." What is obscure is how this principle works in two such substantially different ontological orders.

"Now the principles which cause motion in a *physical way* are two, of which one is *not* physical, as it has no principle of motion in itself. Of this kind is whatever causes movement, not being itself moved, such as (1) that which is completely unchangeable, the primary reality, and (2) the essence of that which is the end or 'that for the sake of which'." *(Physics,* 198a35-b3).

[19] *Physics,* 190b10.

among things that come to be, either by nature or by art. The invariability of performance that one (the mechanical) might tend to have cannot in our ideal example make for the distinction: "In natural products the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment." [20] Consequently, a natural goal-directed entity, e.g., an acorn, granted it satisfies the logical condition that it has no conflicting elements, considered from the standpoint of an ideal environment-if it would invariably fulfill its nature-its development would be sequences of proper motions in each stage toward its end. If its parts move without being impeded, a parallel invariance exists with the mechanical. We conclude that impeded motion is necessary to natural entities. It is in their very "imperfection" that they can be contrasted to the artificial.

Suggestively, Aristotle tells us "Reason forms the starting-point, alike in works of art and in works of nature." [21] On this account, it does not seem to be reason *per se* which makes for the distinction between the motions of one and the other but how reason is manifested. The motion of automatic puppet or toy wagon, a non-zooid work of art, has one quality or essence, its activity is in time but not of time: it does not develop into a mature individual whose quality has changed through time. (Note: by idealizing the motion of animals we have divested them also of the temporal. Not that time in itself is anything for Aristotle but it is precisely the domain of impediments.) The puppet has no need to exercise the virtue of reacting properly to impediments. This is not a matter of a distinction between reason and non-reason, in the sense that to the puppet can be ascribed a rational end and proper functioning. In another sense, however, because of the difference of the manifestation of reason in terms of the origin and quality of the movement involved, Aristotle often seems to make just such a distinction:

> ... some things can produce change according to a rational formula and their potencies involve such a formula, while othe:r things are

[20] *Ibid.,*

[21] *Parts of Animals,* 689bl6.

non-rational and their potencies must be in a living thing, while the latter can be both in the living and in the lifeless; as regards potencies of the latter kind. When the agent and the patient meet in the way appropriate to the potency in question, the one must act and the other be acted upon, but with the former kind of potency this is not necessary. *For the non-rational potencies are all productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects,* so that if they produce their effects necessarily they would produce contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible. There must, then, he something else that decides; I mean by this desire or will *(proairesis).* For whichever of two things the animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is present and meets the passive obj.ect, in the way appropriate to the potency in question. Therefore everything that has a rational potency, when it desires that for which it has the potency and in the circumstances in which it has the potency, must do this. [22]

Perhaps, after this rich passage, it is not too misleading to say that choices develop the rational creature. We must note the ambiguity or shift in meaning in Aristotle's use of" choice." Previously, we saw it applied, seemingly, only to human beings, thereby emphasizing the synthesis of desire with reason as something distinctively human: choice leads to action, a unique characteristic of human beings. Yet, in other than Aristotle's ethical writings, "choice" applies to animals generally, and the quality or kind of reason is not differentiated between man and other animals. However," choice" or" purpose " or " will *"-proairesis-is* not considered as a synthetic capacity in animals; their desires indeed have an element of reason, as does man's desires-" rational potencies "-but they lack the deliberative component of human choice. The rational is after all, in the broad teleological view, "disseminated" through the world-system. Compare the following general statement of animal activity:

> For all living things both move and are moved with some object, so that this is the term of all their movement, the end, that is, in view. Now we see that the living creature is moved by intellect, imagination, purpose, wish and appetite, and all these are reducible to mind and desire .... The1;efore the object of desire or of intellect

[22] *Metaphysics,* 1048al-15.

first initiates movement, not, that is, every object of intellect, only the end in the domain of conduct. Accordingly, among goods that which moves is a practical end, not the good in its whole extent. For it initiates movement only so far as it is the object of that which is for the sake of something else. And we must suppose that the seeming good may take the room of the actual good, and so may the pleasant, which is itself a seeming good.[23]

For animals generally, the principle of desire may be corrupted and activity may be dysfunctional. In man, some examples of dysfunction involving desire are brutishness, vice, and either incontinence or continence. In brutishness the principle of desire is corrupted to an extent where it is dissimilar to desire in a human being or, a breakdown occurs in choice in the *synthesis* of desire and reason; at any rate, the brutish individual engages in unhuman activity. In vice, desire is corrupted so that a right relation to pleasure and pain does not occur: "For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first principle." [24] For continence, desire is corrupted, as in vice; however, here a rational faculty makes the appropriate choice despite bad desire. Unlike the vicious condition, choice is not led by the corrupted desire, thus continence may be considered a retrieval system by which the habitual application of the right rule leads desire into harmony with the right rule or " first principle." It makes for temperance, the proper virtue.

Let us return to consider that a purposive and rational principle works throughout the universe. That this principle is not a producer of perfect rational order is attested to by monstrosities in nature and, seemingly, by the fact of brutishness, vice, and continence / incontinence in man. Indeed, nature's plan for man is most complex and, as we have suggested, proper virtue, rather than natural virtue (which is a sort of" blind appropriateness ") depends on habit becoming part of the efficient causality of the moral life. In the final analysis, the moral level of human functioning is a condition for man's proper end, the contemplation of theoretical truth. *Praxis* is for the sake of *theoria,* the highest goal of *nous,* uniting man with the divine.

[23] *De Motu Animalium,*
"'Nick. Eth., 115lal5.

" Nature, habit, and reason " work together for the health of the person. A central philosophical difficulty arises in that nature and art or habit both are a cause, *principium,* (and a manifestation) of rationality. Therefore, how is rationality the same and different in each? Man needs art seemingly to supplement the apparent deficiencies of nature, but since man is by nature equipped to use art for this purpose we ultimately find art not in opposition to nature but an expression of a natural condition relative to man's activity. The virtues, grounded in habit, educated, depend on art as a necessary condition for their development. We can see the dependence as natural. Art is natural to man's attainment of his *telos;* yet, on another level, natural virtue is contrasted by Aristotle with moral virtue. In fact, the contrast is expressed in terms of the manifestation of rationality, so it seems "rationality" is used ambiguously. In natural virtue and in moral virtue the same objects are chosen, also the performance is the same, yet, in the former, Aristotle says, " the individual is as if blind " (in some ways a mere mechanism *viz.,* the social virtue of bees.) Aristotle also states that "rationality is reflexive " when we perceive or think we know that we are doing it. This is rather mysterious: its functional importance is obscure.

Consider: could there be a perfectly functioning human being in terms of the moral life if all of that individual's virtues were of the natural kind? Would not man be closer to the zooid? This is difficult to deal with in two respects. First, we are tempted to say no because the individual would be morally deaf to intentionality-some development of the rational principle in a non-mechanistic manner seems missing; yet, how are we to characterize in theoretical terms this difference? Second, considering the contemplation of truth the final cause of human activity, why cannot natural virtue be as, or more, efficient as its proper condition for contemplation than that achieved through educated habit, and, thereby, for man's ultimate good? But Aristotle holds that the intellectual element in properly functioning virtues, practical wisdom, cannot be excluded. It is necessary for a conception of the human. There does then

seem to be a relationship between practical reason and theoretical wisdom, but it is obscure. This relationship seems much stronger than Aristotle suggests in the *Ethics* when we approach it, as we have, through viewing the function of the rational principle.[25]

This rather aporetic incursion into Aristotle's functionalism does not wish to suggest that the problems or " the problematic " of a rational principle is not philosophically answerable, nor, for that matter, that Aristotle himself did not provide an adequate answer. Rather, the inquiry wishes to elaborate the difficulty and elusiveness of understanding *nous* and *proairesis,* in relation to man and in the teleological view of the natural system. These concepts are inextricably connected and make for overlapping questions. The accumulation of the right questions is itself no easy task and, as Kant pointed out, the kind of questions one asks determines the kind of answers at which one arrives: the right questions are the only philosophic propylaeum to the right answers.

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[25] The following passage emphasizes the epistemic condition in practical activity. Though Aristotle at times expressly denies it, it is hard not to assume that the rational principle in practical activity is ultimately the same as that in contemplation.

" What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and *of truth* is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical or productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively *(for this is the work of everything intellectual);* while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire." *(Nick. Eth.,* ll89a21-81).

Of course, the rub is that " right desire " is also something we wish to see as having a rational principle just as deliberation has a rational principle and one might wonder, along with Hegel, if they are ultimately equally grounded in their rationality.

For a study focussing on the relation of pleasure to happiness compare my " Pleasure and the Two Kinds of Happiness in Aristotle," *Apeiron: Journal of Ancient Philosophy and Science,* Vol. 6, No.

SUBSTANTIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL TELEOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE AND SOME LOGICAL EMPIRICISTS

"MEN DO NOT THINK they know a thing till they have grasped the 'why' of it," observes Aristotle in the *Physics.*[1] "Why?" however, is not a simple question. According to Aristotle there are four different senses in which the question may be taken, each determined by a different kind of causal condition for being and change. One might, for instance, seek to discover that out of which a thing is composed, or what agent produced it, or what its essential features are, or what its function is. Of the four senses of the question the most important for Aristotle is the last: What is that for the sake of which it is? Or more simply: What is its final cause?

In opposition to Aristotle many contemporary philosophers of science, particularly the Logical Empiricists/ contend that teleological categories are eliminable from the substantive analysis of goal-directed systems and that, consequently, the explanatory framework for such systems can-and some say should-avoid a teleological construction. On the contrary, I believe that teleological categories and explanations are logically acceptable and in important ways indispensable not only for goal-directed systems but for all explanatory analyses in science. In order to test these convictions I propose in this study first to investigate Aristotle's doctrine of finality, and

[1] 194bl9-20. Throughout this study I have used the Hardie and Gaye translation of the *Physics* as found in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

[2] " Logical Empiricists " is not an altogether precise designation. By it I mean especially to refer to those philosophers of science who accept the covering law model of scientific explanation. Thus Braithwaite, Carnap, Feigl, Hempel, Nagel, Oppenheim, Pap, Reichenbach, Rudner, etc.

then to measure its suggestive implications against the considerations of Nagel, Braithwaite, and Hempel in their interpretations of and objections to teleological categories and explanations.

I. THE ARISTOTELIAN DOCTRINE OF TELEOLOGY

A. *Explanation according to the conditions of change.* Since science for Aristotle is not simply a catalogue of empirical observations of natural phenomena but reasoned demonstrations according to the necessary conditions of things, a methodological requisite is that those conditions be distinguished with respect to their type. There are four kinds of condition which must be determined before we may be said to have full scientific knowledge of any natural object: the material condition, "that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists"; the formal condition, " the statement of the essence, and its genera, . . . and the parts of the definition"; the efficient condition, "the primary source of the change or coming to rest"; and the final condition, " [the] end or ' that for the sake of which ' a thing is done." [3]

Of the four kinds of condition the physicist must consider in order to fully explain the changes which natural objects undergo, the formal and telic coincide both in the ontological and logical orders. In the *ontological* order it is the essential structures of things which dynamically determine them to develop into all that they potentially are. The paradigm example for Aristotle of this kind of form-end identification is the biological development of an individual of a certain species: each member of a given species carries the plan of its own evolvement within itself, and through the course of its transformations it becomes structured according to that plan.[4] In the

[3] *Phys.,* 194b24-34.

[4] The notion that species, just as individuals, evolve and assume new genotypic characteristics would be foreign to Aristotle. It was his consistent view that end-directed activity is engaged in only by individuals, not by their substantial forms. However, insofar as teleology is understood in an Aristotelean, non-vitalistic fashion, there seems to be no reason for not analyzing species evolution using

logical order it is the same description of the structure of each object which, according to the use made of it, can be considered now the essential description of the species, now the plan of development for members of the species, that is, the description of the set of goal-directed functions and behaviors characteristic of the species.

B. *Empirical evidence for substantive teleology.* Aristotle laments [5] that most philosophers have given their attention only to the material and efficient conditions of physical change, while overlooking the most important-the final conditions. Empedocles and Anaxagoras, for instance, assume that nature works according to the absolute necessity of her efficient and material states; they reason that since, for example, the rain does not fall in order to make the corn grow but because of the antecedent conditions involved, natural types generally, biological and inanimate, operate in a similar way. On these grounds the appearance of biological types, in the opinion of Empedocles, [6] is the necessary result of the efficient activity of antecedent conditions. That certain features of animals and plants seem to indicate purpose (e.g., that the front teeth of men are sharp and fit for tearing and the back ridged and fit for grinding) is simply fortuitous-these occurred spontaneously and because of survival value they endured.

Aristotle believes that the early philosophers had overlooked some important facts which demand the notion of teleology in order to make them intelligible. [7] (1) Substantial natures function for the most part in certain ways: the spider spins his web and usually in the same fashion; the seed, through definite stages, normally develops into the tree, etc. This would not be the case if such functions were merely the result of unlawful chance and spontaneity; for these latter do ndt occur "always

substantial teleological categories. As a matter of interest Ayala (" Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology," *Philosophy of Science,* 87 [1970], 1-15) does precisely this.

• *Meta.,* 988b6-16; *Phys.,* 198a88-S4.

• *Phys.,* 198128-88.

[7] *Ph'IJS.,* 198b88-199b82.

or for the most part." [8] If chance and spontaneity did hold sway in the developmental process, then the seed should not always mature into the tree but rather be transmogrified in perfectly random ways. (2) If we use intelligent action as a model, we see that where there is a terminus to such action the earlier stages have been accomplished for the sake of the later; but since in nature we too find action coming to term, we may assume that nature also acts for the sake of certain ends. (3) Even the lower animals manifest activity which is analogous to human intelligent action; this seems to indicate that they likewise act for ends. (4) The fact that we recognize monsters shows that there are definite teleological vectors in nature; for " monster" has no meaning except where there are normal kinds. (5) There is a definite maturational progression observable in all species. (6) In addition to the telic activities of animals, non-intelligent plant life responds in certain characteristic ways to changes in the environment: a plant deprived of water will send its roots searching for it; injuries sustained are repaired through its self-preservative action, and so on. (7) To deny ends to nature simply because nature does not consciously deliberate is unwarranted. The artist does not ponder every brush stroke, he is not immediately aware of every twist of the palette knife; yet it would seem unreasonable to deny that each of his actions was for the sake of the completed picture.

[8] Spontaneity and chance, for Aristotle, do not imply lack of causation but rather "the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation" (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* [New York: Barnes and Noble, 5th ed., 1956], p. 78). Specifically, Aristotle analyzes chance, which occurs only with intelligent creatures, and spontaneity, which happens only to the nonhuman, in this manner. Chance and spontaneity are names for that type of sequence of events which occurs in either of two ways: (I) when the proper result of a purposive action (either intelligently deliberative or 'naturally telic) is incidentally concomitant with another event which might have been, but was not in fact, an object of the purposive action; or (2) when a purposive action, by reason of a concomitant action, leads to a result which might have been, but was not in fact, an object of purposive action. In other words, event A is said to cause B by chance if either B is a concomitant of C, which is the proper effect of A, or A is incidentally cojoined to C, which is the proper cause of B.

These arguments support three major propositions of Aristotle's theory of teleology: (1) The dynamic structure (i.e., the form) and consequent goal-directed development and activities of natural objects are to be understood in terms of the physical laws which determine their character. (2) The fundament in nature for the intelligibility of these lawful sequences lies in their accomplished termini. (3) Consciousness is not a necessary feature of telic activity; it is simply a component of the most familiar kind of such activity.

C. *The necessity of nature.* The question of finality in nature, for Aristotle as well as for many contemporary philosophers, hinges upon the type of necessity that obtains in the world. Aristotle believes that necessity must reside in nature, otherwise the physicist could have no determinate knowledge of natural objects. However, reflection reveals two different kinds of natural necessity, simple and hypothetical. [9] Simple necessity is that attendant upon the mechanical determination of a temporally subsequent state of a natural object by prior material and efficient conditions. Many physicists, observes Aristotle, locate the necessity of nature in the process of production; they see the states of a natural object as being mechanically and unswervingly determined by preceding states. On this account it is the terminus of a thing which is necessitated by its antecedent stages. But this explanation is short-sighted from the Stagirite's viewpoint, for it would be as if a wall came to exist as a necessary result of blocks being of a certain weight and shape, the mortar of a certain consistency, etc. Rather, " though the wall does not come to be without these, it is not due to these, except as its material causes: it comes to be for the sake of sheltering and guarding certain things." [10] Hence Aristotle does not deny that changes in things demand materials of certain kinds-in any natural process material causality is required-yet the things are not due to the materials but to the end.[11] So in this view, the necessity which governs the coming-

• *Phys.,* 199b34-200b10.

[10] *Phys.,* 200a5-7.

[11] *Phys.,* 200a7-9. It would be a mistake to think that for Aristotle efficient and

to-be of certain structures in nature is a hypothetical necessity: *if* a given term is the outcome of a natural process, then stages of a certain kind *must* precede it. In nature, of course, changes are sometimes wrought which require only material and efficient causes for their analysis. These changes are governed by simple necessity, and occur when objects impinge upon one another in chance ways. Thus, for example, rain produces a healthy corn crop, though this does not mean that summer showers were necessitated by the corn. On the other hand, if the corn has attained vigor, water must have been present in an earlier stage of its development-though not necessariJy from rain.

While Aristotle's discussion of hypothetical necessity is provocative, a rendering of it as an ontological analysis leaves several questions dangling. Is simple necessity concomitantly operative with hypothetical necessity, or are these merely two perspectives on the same thing? Are the changes in natural objects the result of the form-end also acting as an efficient cause? [12] Yet these difficulties are alleviated if Aristotle's im-

material causality are excluded by teleological causality. As is evident from his analysis, in the complete account of natural kinds all four causes must be employed. In the contemporary discussion this point has been observed by Mace (" Mechanical and Teleological Causation," in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis,* ed. Feigl and W. Sellars [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949], p. 538): "... it is obvious that on this view mechanical and teleological causation are not to he conceived as alternative or opposed processes. On the contrary, to as&ert that a process exhibits teleological causation *entails* that the end in question and each of the intervening phases of the process are mechanically determined."

[12] The identification of efficient causality with formal-final causality, with its consequent conceptual confusion, is sometimes abetted by Aristotle himself; and certainly Ross (pp. 74-5; 98-9) urges that this kind of identification is made by Aristotle. However, I think there are sufficient grounds in Aristotle for regarding agential action as *always* extrinsic to the thing changed--else natural objects become unmoved movers. It is the Stagirite's fundamental and persistent view that the motion of both animate and inanimate beings is not self initiated, but arises from other terrcstial motions ultimately translated from the eternal movements of the spheres (see especially *Phys.,* Bk. VIII, ch. vi). Consequently, those who attack Aristotle's doctrine of causality on the basis of this supposed identity (e. g., C. S. Pittendrigh, "Adaptation, Natural Selection and Behavior," in *Behavior and Evolution,* ed. A. Roe and G. Simpson [New Haven: Yale University, 1958], p. 394) are perhaps tilting against a shadow rather than a substance.

plicit distinction between physical and methodological teleology is made explicit and the roots of his analysis of the former are traced through the soil of the latter.

D. *Physical an.d methodological priority of final conditions.* The discussion of finality in Aristotle takes place on two levels, often confused in the text. The first level, the one emphasized in the *Physics,* ostensibly governs the second. The first level is the physical. It is the empirical confrontation with nature, especially biotic nature, which establishes in Aristotle's mind the reality and priority of ends in nature and their typical kind of necessity. Ontic priority is given to final causality, since, according to Aristotle, the direction of natural development is determined by the specific teleological orientation fixed by the lawfully ordered structure of the object. The hypothetical necessity proper to the telic activity of nature occurs, then, in this fashion: if this is a natural object of a given kind, it must develop and behave according to the structure of its kind.

The second level of the discussion of finality, and perhaps really the controlling level, is methodological. Here Aristotle's four causes become logical conditions for the scientific explanation of natural transformations; in this sense they are not ontic features of things but principles of demonstration. It is on this level that the question recurs concerning which principle is to be judged most important for scientific explanation. The very logic of explanation compels Aristotle once more to choose telic principles. His reasons are two. The first is sketched in an interesting argument in the *Posterior Analytics:*

> Can causes and effects different from one another form, as they seem to us to form, a continuous succession, a past effect resulting from a past cause different from it, and an effect which is coming-to-be from a cause different from and prior to it? Now on this theory it is from the posterior event that we reason (and this though these latter events actually have their source of origin in previous events-a fact which shows that also when the effect is coming-to-be we still reason from the posterior event), and from the prior event we cannot reason (we cannot argue that because an event A has occurred, therefore an event B has occurred subsequently to A but still in the past-and the same holds good if the occurrence is future)-cannot reason because, be the time interval definite or

indefinite, it will never be possible to infer that because it is true to say that A occurred, therefore it is true to say that B, the subsequent event, occurred; for in the interval between the events, though A has already occurred, the latter statement will be false.[13]

In this argument Aristotle is discussing causal activity which takes place over an interval of time, i.e., when the cause is temporally antecedent to the effect, which seems to be the case in most scientific explanations of empirical events. In such cases, he reasons, one cannot argue that because an antecedent event has occurred a definite consequent must occur. One cannot argue in this fashion because in the interval it simply will not be true; and, to expand his line of reasoning, because of possible intervening factors the expected effect might never occur. The only assurance of an actual connection between a putative cause and its effect is that the effect has actually taken place. When an effect has actually occurred then we can argue that its specific cause has necessarily also occurred. In short, we can only produce necessary scientific explanations when we argue from outcomes, that is, from ends to their efficient and material conditions. Hence the very logic of scientific explanation demands that a teleological pattern be employed and that priority be given to the description of the end of the natural process as the controlling methodological factor.[14]

[18] *Post An.*, 95a24-34, the G. R. Mure translation in McKeon. See also *On the Parts of Animals*, 639b32-640a8. The pattern of argument sanctioned by the quoted passage displays this kind of logical form:

(where D is an event or state which is temporarily subsequent to A). To illustrate this pattern Aristotle provides an argument demonstrating that a house having been built (a final condition) necessitates stones having been quarried: " The reason is that a house having been built [D] necessitates a foundation having been laid [C], and if a foundation has been laid blocks must have been shaped beforehand [A]" *(Post. An.*, 95b31-34). The syllogistic pattern offered is obviously valid. Doubts arise, however, concerning the justification of the premises. These difficulties will be studied from various vantages in the remainder of this essay.

[14] It might be objected that the teleological pattern of explanation for which

To this analysis the contemporary philosopher of science might object that we can have no assurance that an effect of a particular kind *must* be produced by only one sort of efficient or material cause; he might retort that a given event or object may be producible by a rather large set of different conditions, and therefore that the existence of a particular explanandum event does not necessitate the prior existence of a specific antecedent cause.[15] Although this objection has some force, the search for specific antecedent conditions could not even begin unless an assumption is made that an effect has been necessitated by a cause of one certain general kind (e.g., that malignant growth occurs because of some particular arrangement of nucleotides in the DNA of the cell-though we are presently ignorant of the *specific* arrangement that directs abnormal cell development). This as well as related defenses will be more thoroughly discussed below. Objections to Aristotle's positive doctrine aside, his criticism of a purely mechanistic interpretation of explanation is sound: though explanans statements of certain conditions and relevant laws may necessitate a determinate conclusory statement, they nonetheless do not necessitate the occurrence of the event described in the conclusion.

In the *Parts of Animals* Aristotle offers a second reason, similar to the first, for maintaining the priority of finality. In

Aristotle is here arguing does not meet his requirements for scientific explanation *(Post. An.,* One of those requirements is that a scientific demonstration must proceed from prior causes to subsequent effects. But since the logical movement of teleological explanation is from effect to cause, it fails to be a case of valid scientific demonstration-so the objection might run. A twofold response can be made to this objection. First, even if it were sound, Aristotle's remarks concerning explanations of temporally disparate events remain cogent. Second, I do not believe the objection is sound. The use of the terms "cause " and " effect " is not confined by Aristotle to *efficient* causes and their effects. The term " cause " is used analogously and can refer to any of the four causes. Thus in the case of teleological explanation one is not *formally* arguing from effects to their efficient causes, but from final causes to their " effects." As a matter of interest, in the *Posterior Analytics* the causes which Aristotle feels best exemplify his criteria for valid scientific explanation are formal causes, i.e., the kind of causes used in mathematical demonstration.

[16] Hempel makes this observation in " The Logic of Functional Analysis," in his *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp.

noting that many philosophers select the efficient and material conditions as primary in their attempts to explain natural transformations, he contends that from the logic of the situation this cannot be done:

> Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call the final one. For this is the Reason, and the Reason forms the starting-point, alike in the works of art and in works of nature. For consider how the physician or how the builder sets about his work. He starts by forming for himself a definite picture, in the one case perceptible to the mind, in the other to sense, of his end-the physician of health, the builder of a house-and this he holds forward as the reason and explanation of each subsequent step that he takes, and of his acting in this or that way as the case may be.[16]

This passage indicates, at least seminally, a major philosophical insight concerning the methodological necessity of teleology: in order for the physicist to explain certain natural changes he first must, logically must, be aware of both the particular and the generic termini of those transformations. To illustrate more exactly what is involved here, consider this example: a mercury thermometer is placed in hot water; there occurs a temporary drop in the column, then a swift rise. How are we to explain this? We do it, according to the Logical Empiricists, by stating certain antecedent conditions (e.g., a glass tube thermometer is partially filled with mercury and it is immersed in hot water) and by producing certain relevant laws (e.g., laws of the thermic conductivity of glass and the thermic expansion of mercury and glass); from these the description of the change can be deduced. However, even to begin to construct this explanatory framework one must *first* be aware of the completed phenomenon to be explained; one must have prior knowledge of the end (in this case the temporary drop in the mercury and then the swift rise) in order to *select* the particular antecedent conditions and the general laws one is going to employ to explain the final condition.

The requirement of prior conceptual elaboration and, per-

[16] *On the Parts of Animals,* 639b14-20, the William Ogle translation in McKeon.

haps, linguistic description of the end or explanandum event may seem obvious. However, it is methodologically and epistemologically significant beyond the immediately apparent. To conceptually construe an event means we have placed it within the common-sense or scientific framework at our disposal. Thus located the implicit rules governing concepts within the framework determine the direction of our search and the permissible selection of conceptual descriptions for the explanans. If the proper explanans has yet to be discovered (e.g., the cause of cancer), then the direction in conceptual space is general and the permissible set of descriptions could characterize several possible explanans events; if the explanandum event already has a definite explanans sanctioned by the framework (e.g., the fall and rise of mercury in the glass tube), then the direction and descriptions are specific.

This thesis may be put more formally and can serve as an example for the formalizing of subsequent theses, which, in this study, will be only informally expressed. Let" L " stand for a given language system (e.g., the system composed of the interlocking subsystems of contemporary theories in genetics, cell biology, and virology) and "Lc" for the equivalent conceptual system.[17]. Let" A1, A2, ... An; B1, B2, ... Bn; C1, C2, ... Cn" be terms in L and "A1e, A2e, ... An°" etc. the equivalent concepts in L_0. Let "R1, R2, ... Rn" refer to the semantic rules governing L (i.e., rules of formation, transformation, and conformation) and let" R1c, R2c, ... Rnc" refer to the equivalent rules of Lc. Now among the rules of Lc will be a subset Rc' which relates definite syntatical arrangements of members of Ac with members of Be. Thus, for instance, "Rse' (A1e, Bse)" says that there is a definite relation RGc' between A1c and Bsc. This rule will be isomorphic with a certain law spoken of in L. In addition to the subset Rc' of Lc there will be another subset Rc* which is a set of authorization

[17] The kind of semantical-epistemological theory that would justify this equivalence, as well as several other formal devices employed, is argued for by Wilfrid Sellars. See for instance chapter three, his *Science and Metaphyaics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).

rules. These rules state what *classes* of concepts can be permissibly arranged together and what *general kinds* of arrangements are possible. Thus Rsc* (Ac, Be) would permit only members of Ae and Be to be related in the general syntatical structure Rse*, and thus would prohibit *N* and ce in that kind of arrangement (note that Rse* is a functor whose arguments are class constants and refers only to more general syntatical structures, not specific-just as, in the material mode, the young Newton contended that the law of universal gravitation would have to be an inverse square law, without having yet discovered its specific numerical value) .

Now the thesis that in constructing an explanation we must select certain antecedent events as part of the explanans by reason of our conceptual construal of the explanandum may be formally exampled in this fashion:

If some explanandum event is conceived as $A\{x \cdot A_4ex \cdot A_5ex$, then we must postulate as its antecedent cause event y, conceived as B1eY · B3ey by reason of rules R3e' and R6c' of Le.

The thesis that our conceptualization of the hitherto unexplained event x guides our search and gives a definite direction within conceptual space (of V) may be formally exampled by:

If explanandum event x is conceived as $A_6ex \cdot A_7ex \cdot A_9ex$, then a definite direction is established in conceptual space Le such that a possible explanans event is conceivable only through use of members of the set Be by reason of R_5e^* of Le.

These examples of our two theses are expressed in the formal mode. If they were to be expressed in the material mode of speech, they would state reasons for constructing explanations in a certain way and for developing hypotheses of a certa.in type.[18] These reasons, of course, would be those imbedded in

[18] From hypotheses of a certain *type* the *particular* one we select for development and investigation may have indeed been chosen at random and by chance. This is the valid point made by those who contend hypothesis generation cannot be rationally analyzed. For a provocative though not completely satisfactory theory of problem solving within constraints see Donald Campbell's "Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes," *Psychological Review,* 67 (1960), 380-400.

the theories and assumptions in light of which we describe the phenomena to be explained. These two theses, incidentally, support Hanson's general distinction between reasons for accepting hypothesis and reasons for suggesting an hypothesis in the first place; consequently they articulate, I believe, at least two foundational principles for a rational reconstruction of the process of scientific discovery. [19]

Another aspect of our general thesis, which was originally prompted by Aristotle's considerations and which will later be more fully expanded, is the recognition that in inquiring after antecedent conditions of a hitherto unexplained phenomenon, the very significance of those conditions will be more finely specified by the conceptual appraisal of the terminus: the conceptual significance of a particular chain of nucleotides, for instance, will be determined by the fact that it directs the development of cancerous cell growth. Termini achieved by objects in various circumstances fix the conceptual meanings deployed within the explanatory framework for those objects. [20]

[19] Hanson gives a brief explanation of his distinction in his " Is There a Logic of Discovery," in *Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science,* ed. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1961). His position and the thesis expressed here is in opposition to the orthodox view of the Logical Empiricists that discovery is not a rationally analyzable process. As Popper expresses it *(The Logic of Scientific Discovery* [New York: Basic Books, 1968]): it is not " the business of epistemology to produce what has been called a ' rational reconstruction ' of the steps that have led the scientist to a discovery-to the finding of some new truth" (p. 31). The orthodox view is also maintained by the unorthodox historiographer of science Thomas Kuhn when he contends that the discovery and promulgation of major theories is not a matter of rational consideration but of individual and social psychology.

Ironically, support for the rational reconstruction of discovery which I have offered does come from psychology. Newell and Shaw, in their "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving" *(Psychological Review,* 65 [1958], 151-166) argue that scientific discovery is amenable to a logical analysis. Their own view, similar to the one I am proposing, is that the discovery of solutions for particular problems does " depend on problem ' structure,' " and that in generating possible solutions one " works backward from the problem expression." They conclude that their analysis indicates " the concept of proceeding in a ' meaningful ' fashion is entirely clear and explicit. Trial-and-error attempts take place in some ' space ' of possible solutions."

[20] Support for this thesis may be drawn from several quarters. Further on in

This, then, is the hypothetical necessity which governs methodological procedures: *if this particular phenomenon is to be explained, these particular antecedent conditions and laws must be employed.* It is in this respect that the scientist must first be aware of the terminus of the transformation in order to bring to bear a particular explanatory apparatus. In addition, he must be aware of what I have called above the generic terminus, which is characterized by the laws governing natural changes. Such laws describe the certain kind of end that a particular kind of thing achieves in given conditions. In order to establish these laws he must be apprised of the specific ends a certain kind of thing usually attains in given circumstances, and in applying the laws he must bring to the particular case the knowledge of the ends an object of a certain kind usually achieves. The conclusions of an Aristotelian analysis of methodological teleology are, therefore, that in all demonstrative explanations in science one must begin, by tacit assumption at least, with the particular and generic final conditions; and that these latter conceptually determine the antecedent conditions and explanatory laws.

II. TELEOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

A. *Common elements in the Logical Empiricists' view of teleology.* The Logical Empiricists, taking Nagel, Braithwaite, and Hempel as fair representatives, generally accept four theses concerning the status of teleological notions in scientific discourse. First, consonant with one stream of Aristotelian interpretation, they hold the explanatory category of teleologi-

this essay Dewey's views are brought to bear. In the more contemporary discussion Wilfrid Sellars' semantical and epistemological theories are pertinent. Sellars contends (" Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable without Them," *"Philosophy of Science,* 15 [1948], 287-315) that our concepts of objects and events are infused with meaning by reason of the physical laws and relationships into which those objects and events enter. Or, putting this in the formal mode, Sellars argues that the significance of a predicate within a linguistic system reciprocally determines and is determined by its relation to the array of other predicates to which it is referred by reason of the rules of conformation (these latter being similar to Carnap's P-rules).

cal causality to be conceptually and logically distinct from that of efficient causality (though Nagel does see a special logical relation between the two). Second, they do not regard "consciousness," divine or cosmic, to be a necessary component of the concept of teleology. Third, they concede that teleological concepts are often helpful in the analysis of goal-directed systems; Nagel and Braithwaite even contend that in some measure such concepts can function legitimately in scientific explanations. Finally, even in acknowledging some legitimacy for such concepts, the Logical Empiricists-again judging the three mentioned to be representative-believe that, if teleological concepts and explanations are taken to be essential to any of the sciences, then the task of bringing either substantive or methodological unity to science is rendered extremely difficult if not impossible. Consequently they have attempted to demonstrate the eliminability, in principle at least, of teleological concepts and explanations from the various sciences, without, however, affording any loss of validly asserted content to the body of those sciences.

In the following pages I wish to examine the arguments offered by Nagel, Braithwaite, and Hempel for what will be called the eliminability thesis of Logical Empiricism, namely, that teleological categories can in principle be dispensed with in the sciences. With the aid of Aristotle's distinction between substantive and methodological teleology and his analyses particularly of the latter, I believe it can be shown that the arguments for the eliminability of teleology are unsound. Indeed, even more: that for all the sciences the logical character of explanation requires teleological concepts for its adequate analysis and that in those sciences dealing with goal-directed systems the concept of substantive teleology is indispensible.

B. *Nagel: the eliminability thesis.* Nagel and most contemporary investigators of the problem agree that, though conscious purposes are frequently useful as conceptual tools in the examination of human behavior, they need not be regarded as analytic to the meaning of teleological explanations in general. For, especially in the biological sciences, "explanations are often

said to be ' teleological ' only in the sense that they specify the *functions* which things or processes possess." [21] What is necessarily characteristic, then, of teleological locutions is that they signify a "means-ends" nexus. [22]

Despite the efforts of many of the Logical Empiricists the biological and other sciences yet contain explanations which depend on appeal to functional laws. To take a well-worn example of such from Nagel: "The function of chlorophyll in plants is to enable plants to perform photosynthesis." Provided with the empirical observation that plant A performs photosynthesis a functional law of this kind can apparently be used to explain why plant A contains chlorophyll. Yet, because of certain methodological and philosophical considerations, Nagel insists that functional explanations of this sort can easily be replaced by explanations devoid of telic import.

Nagel argues [23] that the functional law just exampled can be adequately reformulated " without loss of asserted content " to state only necessary efficient conditions; to wit: " A necessary condition for the occurrence of photosynthesis in plants is the presence of chlorophyll." This translation does not explicitly ascribe a function to chlorophyll, and in this sense is not a teleological law. Nagel believes this reformulation may be used as a paradigm for all functional explanations.

It is noteworthy that Nagel's reformulation in terms of necessary conditions is logically identical with Aristotle's formula for "hypothetical necessity" (e.g., "If photosynthesis is to occur in plants, chlorophyll must be present ") . The two philosophers are thus in agreement that teleological or functional laws imply propositions stating necessary antecedent conditions. Aristotle's analysis, however, suggests that *more* is implied by teleological propositions and, consequently, that such propositions cannot without loss of content be replaced by propositions stating only necessary conditions. But here too the views of these philoso-

[21] Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), p. 40fl.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 408.

[••] *Ibid.,* pp. 408-406.

phers are not completely divergent; for Nagel also believes that *more* is implied by teleological propositions. According to Nagel, though, this " more " plays no part in the explanatory power of such propositions; its value is only heuristic. Nonetheless he feels compelled to expunge even this component of any teleological flavor. We will return shortly to his attempt at this expurgation.

An objection has frequently been brought against Nagel's translation hypothesis, which could as well be lodged against Aristotle's affirmation of the implicatory relation. The objection holds that Nagel's hypothesis renders a translation which makes an unsupportable assertion: for though chlorophyll may be a sufficient condition for photosynthesis, it need not be a necessary condition; conceivably some other chemical could perform the function of chlorophyll in plants. [24] We have already seen this objection during the investigation of Aristotle's concept of hypothetical necessity, and there a partial reply was suggested. Nagel himself is not unmindful of this particular objection. He responds:

> ... although living organisms (plants as well as animals) capable of maintaining themselves without processes involving the operation of chlorophyll are both abstractly and physically possible, there appears to be no evidence whatever that in view of the limited capacities green plants possess as a consequence oftheir *actual* mode of organization, these organisms can live without chlorophyll. [25]

Expanding on this reply it can be argued, in an Aristotelian vein, that laws stating necessary conditions (and functional laws for that matter) find their place within the logical structure of a given science; hence, the validity of their modal character is secured by the skein of physical and biological laws and theories operative at the time such laws are used. Thus, in the example of chlorophyll, biochemical investigation and theory reveal that no other chemical has the requisite properties of

[24] Michael Ruse ("Discussion: Functional Statements in Biology," *Philosophy of Science*, 88 [1971], 87-89) takes this objection to be damaging to Nagel's analysis.
[25] Nagel, p. 404.

producing photosynthesis and doing so in a way which is not detrimental to the plant.

Nagel does admit that the meaning of a teleological explanation is not exhausted by its translation into an explanation employing only necessary conditions. " For the former presupposes, while the latter normally does not, that the system under consideration in the explanation is directively organized." [26] But this presupposition is declared by Nagel merely to add " surplus meaning " and only to be " connoted " by functional explanations. [27] He thereby implies that this fund of meaning is inessential to the adequate rendering of the concept of teleology within the explanatory structure of a given science. (In the Aristotelian analysis, of course, the reference to goal-directedness plays a necessary part in the concept of teleology; indeed, since for Aristotle the final cause is substantively the same as the formal cause-this latter being the expression of the congeries of natural laws dynamically interacting in the government of organic activity-goal-directedness is a feature of the behavior of all physical objects.) However, though Nagel maintains an explanatory isomorphism between teleological and correlative conditional explanations, he thinks a translation of laws in the physical sciences into their logically equivalent teleological form would be decidedly odd. [28] He thus acknowledges that teleological explanations "presuppose" that we are dealing with goal-oriented systems, whereas conditional explanations do not. How this acknowledgement is to accommodate his suggestion that such reference is " surplus " meaning is unclear.

Perhaps because of his uncertainty about precisely what a teleological explanation does imply, Nagel moves to purge the concept of goal-directedness of any teleological import. The conclusion of his analysis, strongly supportive of the thesis of

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 421.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.* Aristotle also holds that explanations using necessary antecedent conditions do not of themselves imply that the conditions and their result are involved together in a directively organized system.

eliminability, is that even the" surplus meaning of teleological statements can always be expressed in non-teleological language." [29] His emetic examination yields the following conditions that a directively organized system must satisfy: (1) Sis a system having parts or processes (say A, B, C) which are causally relevant to the occurrence in S of some property or mode of behavior G. (2) If S is in a G-state and there is a change in the value of only one of the variables A, B, or C, then Swill be taken out of its G-state. (3) The parts A, B, and C are so related that, when the primary variation in S occurs, the remaining parameters also vary such that the combined values are precisely those required to maintain the G-state of S. (4) The parts of S are organized such that a variation in one (within certain parameters) is compensated for by a variation in one or both of the other parts so as to maintain S in its G-state. A system which satisfies these conditions is, according to Nagel, a directively organized system. [30] From this analysis Nagel concludes that the

> *prima facie* distinctive character of so-called "goal-directed" or teleological systems is thus formulated by the stated conditions for a directively organized system. The above analysis has therefore shown that the notion of a teleological system can be explicated in a manner not requiring the adoption of teleology as a fundamental or unanalyzable category. [31]

Whether the untoward notion of teleology has been excised so easily is not as obvious as Nagel suggests. For instance, his conditions (3) and (4) speak of a system in which the parts are so organized as to maintain a certain state despite changes (within certain limits) of the parameters of one of those parts. But what is this other than a teleological or functional system? It seems Nagel has assumed the notion of teleology to analyze the concept. (Compare: A necessary condition for something being a triangle is that it be a three-sided plane figure; thus the

[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 414-415.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

concept of triangularity is eliminated.) [32] However, if we take Nagel's analysis as explicative of the concept of teleology, rather than eliminative of it-as surely we must-then it would not disturb Aristotle. For Aristotle's own investigations of substantive teleology are such that they describe a natural object as manifesting telic behavior if its parts are so organized into a system that they lawfully accommodate one another to preserve or achieve a certain end state. In both Nagel's analysis and Aristotle's the notion of a system of parts mutually compensating for each other in lawful ways for the attainment and maintenance of a certain state-i.e., what is commonly called a teleological or functional system-this notion is primitive and, hence, not eliminable. The concept by any other circumlocution is still that of teleology.

Of course, Nagel's failure to eliminate what he takes to be the deleterious concept of teleology does not mean that all such

[82] " Concept " might mean sever:tl things depending on one's semantic proclivities. It could refer to the term. The elimination of the concept would then consist in the replacement of the term by one or more equivalent terms or definitions. But surely this is not what Nagel has in mind; for any proponent of teleology might well agree to the replacement of the term by another term or terms, as long as the meaning was equivalent. The argument is not merely over words. "Concept" could refer to the individual object or property. Thus the phrase " concept of teleology " would denote a particular property of a goal-directed system. However, Nagel cannot mean this. For when a concept is eliminated Nagel surely does not suppose that something has been eliminated from the physical world. "Concept" could refer to a mental entity. But if we eliminate the concept is it simply that we refuse to mentally entertain it any longer? Certainly this is not what is meant. Perhaps in eliminating the concept we refuse to *use* it in thinking about goal-directed systems. This seems to be closer to what Nagel has in mind. However, would we indeed eliminate the concept of teltJology if we replaced it by another concept of equivalent meaning-perhaps a complex concept-whose meaning is constituted by the four conditions Nagel isolates? If with Wilfrid Sellars *(Science and Metaphysics,* pp. 60-90) we hold that concepts as mental entities have the meaning they do by virtue of the role they play within the mental economy, then if two concepts, complex or simple, have the same role or use, they have the same meaning and are thus the same concept (just as the word "the" is the same whether it is printed all in capital letters, lower case letters, or written in various hands). One does not eliminate a concept by replacing it with a complex concept or set of concepts which have the same role and, therefore, the same meaning-yet this is what Nagel attempts to do.

attempts are likewise doomed. However, until a way is offered to construe goal-directed behavior which avoids the logical structure of the Aristotelian analysis of substantive teleology, the latter remains presumptively coherent and adequate.

C. *Braithwaite: the plasticity* of *behavior.* Braithwaite observes that a common misconception concerning teleology is the view that a teleological explanation implies the determination of an explanandum event by a future event. Rather what is characteristic of a teleological system is that such a system " can attain the same goal under different circumstances by alternative forms of activity making use frequently of different causal chains." [83] What is distinctive of those systems which we call teleological, therefore, is their plasticity of behavior.

The analysis (in a slightly abbreviated form) which Braithwaite offers of a goal-directed system is this.[84] Let *b* equal a goal-oriented behavior system (an animal organism, for instance); let *c* equal any causal chain, or stages in *b's* behavior; let *e* equal the initial state of *b;* let *f* equal the field or environmental conditions which impinge upon *b;* let *G* equal the final goal-achieved event; let those *c's* which are able to attain *G* (and there may be many of them, just as there are several ways a hungry dog can attain food) equal *T;* and finally, let *V* equal that class off's which uniquely determine those *c's* which are members of *T.*

Now, argues Braithwaite, in order to give an efficient causal explanation instead of a functional explanation for any given *c* one must be able to determine what *f's* comprise the variance (the class of V). Thus, for example, to give an efficient causal explanation of the behavior of a dog seeking food-his barking, licking the food dish, bringing the dish to his master, etc.- one must be able to specify those environmental conditions (the cla.ss of V) which are the necessary determiners of each of those chains of seemingly goal-directed behavior (the *c's* in T). In such instances, Braithwaite asserts, we are almost never, by

•• Richard Braithwaite, *Scientific Ewplanation* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960)' p. 829.

'" *Ibid.,* pp. 829-SM.

rettson of the undeveloped state of psychology, in a position to specify the determinate conditions which necessitate the particular chains of behavior. What we typically do in these instances in order to explain such activities is to argue from past experiences of similar behavior which we know to have terminated when a certain goal was reached; in other words, we argue by analogy from previous cases of similar goal-directed behavior. Hence in these cases, where relevant laws of efficiency are unknown, we must settle for teleological explanations based on generalizations from experience:

> It is when our knowledge of the relevant variancy has been obtained independently of any knowledge of the causal laws concerned that a teleological explanation is valuable. For in this case we are unable, through ignorance of the causal laws, to infer the future behavior of the system from our knowledge of the causal laws; but we are able to make such an inference from knowledge of how similar systems have behaved in the past.[35]

Though teleological explanations are expedients of our ignorance and subject to replacement when relevant mechanistic explanations become available, Braithwaite does not wish to deny them a valid explanatory function in science. This is quite consonant with his instrumentalist interpretation of scientific explanations, theories, and theoretical concepts. In lieu of precise causal determinations, if such explanations function to organize "our empirical knowledge so as to give both intellectual satisfaction and power to predict the unknown," they can serve a legitimate explanatory role.[36]

In spite of this degree of legitimacy granted to them, Braithwaite, as most philosophers in the tradition of Logical Empiricism, maintains that teleological explanations are a measure of our lack of empirical knowledge rather than an indication of an intrinsic feature of the subject matter or of the very character of our knowing ability. Contrary to this view, if the Aristotelian analysis is correct, the kind of descriptions and explanations we offer for goal-directed systems is not due simply

[36] *Ibid.,* p. 839.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 884.

to our ignorance but stems precisely from the nature of the knowing subject and the known object.

What Braithwaite fails to show us is how laws of efficient causality can' be arrived at in any other manner than that in which we establish teleological explanations-namely, by semi-inductive generalizations from the typical behavior organisms of a certain species exhibit. Moreover, the Aristotelian logic of science implies that we cannot even begin to formulate a causal law or develop a theory from which such can be derived unless we are first apprised of the typical goals systems achieve under given circumstances.[31] This characteristic of our epistemic endeavors accommodates the nature of the subject of such explanatory attempts: the behavior of a complex system whose parts are governed by various natural laws but whose laws of interaction remain underivable from those antecedently specifiable laws of independent parts. In fact, because of the ever-changing environment-internal and external-in which the system operates, new contextual grounds are continually provided for the development of hitherto unspecified laws of interaction. Our only recourse in dealing with behavior systems exhibiting these features is to examine persistently various contexts in which activities occur and then to formulate rather broad laws of behavior on this basis.

To highlight and expand these objections to Braithwaite's conclusion the observations of John Dewey are pertinent and clearly within the Aristotelian vein. The concept of a reflex arc as the determiner of behavior in an organism appears to be the kind of concept Braithwaite has in mind when he suggests that the ideal explanation would isolate those various environmental factors which impinge on the organism and produce certain behaviors. Dewey, however, opposes the use of

•• If one accepts the Aristotelian position that theories and generalizations arise from semi-inductive procedures based on empirical occurrences, this does not entail acceptance of an Aristotelian intellective induction yielding necessary universals. (For Aristotle's discussion of this latter see the *Posteriur Analytics*, 99b-100b17.) The first position can well support a neo-Kantian epistemology which argues that our very observations are controlled and shaped by prior theoretical conceptions. More of this will be briefly discussed in the conclusion of this presentation.

the reflex arc concept in the analysis of organismic behavior. His fundamental objection is that the concept supposes that stimuli are *simply given* to the organism and evoke precisely determinable and mechanical responses. This view overlooks the fact that the " stimulus " emerges out of the momentary " coordination " of the organism and receives its value from that coordination. By " coordination " Dewey means that matrix of conditioning history, momentary biochemical and physiological states, present goal-directed activity, and surrounding environmental variables. These all combine to form the " coordination " of the organism which *uniquely* determines the precise value it bestows on any stimulus at a given moment. Thus the organism actively endows the efficient cause with a value which both comprises the meaning of the response and is reciprocally determined by that response. Using these notions, we can examine the situation of a sound frightening a student at study and causing him to get up and run. Dewey observes:

> We do not have first a sound and then activity of attention, unless sound is taken as mere nervous shock or physical event, not as conscious value. The conscious sensation of sound depends upon the motor response having already taken place; or, in terms of the previous statement (if stimulus is used as a conscious fact, and not as a mere physical event) it is the motor response or attention which constitutes that which finally becomes the stimulus to another act. Once more, the final " element," the running away, is not merely motor, but is sensori-motor, having its sensory value and its muscular mechanism. It is also a coordination. And finally, this sensori-motor coordination is not a new act, supervening upon what preceded. Just as the "response" is necessary to constitute the stimulus, to determine it as sound and as this kind of sound, of wild beast or robber, so the sound experiences must persist as a value in the running, to keep it up, to control it. The motor reaction involved in the running, is, once more, into, not merely to, the sound. It occurs to change the sound, to get rid of it. The resulting quale, whatever it may be, has its meaning totally determined by reference to the hearing of the sound. It is that experience mediated. What we have is a circuit, not an arc or broken segment of a circle. This circuit is more truly termed organic than reflex, because the motor response determines the stimulus, just as truly as

sensory stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the movement is only for the sake of determing the stimulus, of fixing what kind of stimulus it is, of interpreting it.[38]

Thus Aristotle and Dewey offer persuasive arguments against a Braithwaitean analysis of teleology. They suggest that an adequate discrimination and appraisal of the initiating external stimulus can only be made in light of the organism's typical kind of behavior and goal orientation at the moment of evocation of behavior. The very selection and meaning of the stimulus depend on the " coordination " of the organism; prior determination of the efficient cause is impossible. Because of this, attempts at a purely mechanistic explanation gain their plausibility only by ignoring their foundations within an essentially teleological context.

D. *Hempel: the logic of functional analysis.* Hempel, in a tough-minded move, draws what must be the ultimate implication from the treatment afforded the concept of teleology and teleological explanation at the hands of the Logical Empiricists.[39] He insists that teleological or functional explanations really have no explanatory power, either deductive or inductive, and at best serve only an heuristic role. This conclusion is derived from his very careful analysis of the logic of functional explanations.

Hempel observes [40] that a functional explanation is designed to account for some recurrent activity or behavior pattern in an individual or group, with the ultimate aim directed toward the contribution which that activity or pattern makes to the preservation or development of the individual or group. More exactly, the object of a functional analysis is

[38] John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review,* 3 (1896), 362-363. Though Dewey's observations and arguments are sound models of functionalistic psychology, yet their epistemological foundations are not without some difficulty. See my "Materialism and Natural Events in Dewey's Developing Thought," *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 10 (1972), *55-69.*

[39] The analysis is found in " The Logic of Functional Analysis," in his *Aspects of Scientific Explanation.*

[40] *Ibid.,* pp. 304-805.

some " item " i, which is a relatively persistent trait or disposition (e.g., the beating of the heart) occurring in a system s (e.g., the body of a living vertebrate); and the analysis aims to show that s is in a state, or internal condition, C_i and in an environment representing certain external conditions c_e such that under conditions c_i and c_e (jointly to he referred to as c) the trait;, has effects which satisfy some " need " or " functional requirement " of s, i.e., a condition *n* which is necessary for the system's remaining in adequate or effective, or proper, working order.[41]

A functional explanation, according to Hempel/[2] displays the following pattern:

(1) s functions adequately in setting of kind *c* at time *t*
('2) s functions in *c* only if a certain necessary condition, *n*, is satisfied
(3) If trait i were present in s, then, as an effect, condition *n* would be satisfied
(4) Hence at *t*, trait i is present in s

Hempel urges that this kind of argument is obviously invalid, for premise (3) affirms the consequent. The conclusion, proposition (4), could be validly deduced from the three premises if the third premise stated that *only* trait i could satisfy condition *n*. But this is exactly the kind of information to which we are not privy in most cases. Thus the functional or teleological pattern gives us no logical grounds for expecting the explanandum event, and, consequently, cannot serve as an explanatory tool in science.

Perhaps, however, a functional explanation might be construed as an inductive argument" which exhibits the occurrence of i as highly probable under the circumstances described in the premises?" "Might it not be possible," muses Hempel/[3] "to add to the premises [of the argument] a further statement to the effect that the functional prerequisite *n* can be met only by i and a few specifiable functional alternatives?" (This possibility grounds Nagel's hypothesis of an isomorphism between

[41] *Ibid.,* p. 306.
[••] *Ibid.,* p. 310.
[••] *Ibid.,* pp.

functional and conditional explanations.) But Hempel rejects this possibility: for, "in most, if not all, concrete cases it would be impossible to specify with any precision the range of alternative behavior patterns, institutions, customs, or the like that would suffice to meet a given functional prerequisite or need. And even if that range would be characterized, there is no satisfactory method in sight for dividing it into some finite number of cases and assigning a probability to each of these." [44] Since a functional pattern of analysis violates both deductive and inductive requirements for explanations Hempel concludes that it is not truly a legitimate form of explanation, but at best serves an heuristic purpose.

Hempel's conclusions concerning the inadequacies of the teleological pattern of explanation would constitute a telling case against the employment of such putative explanations in science if his own covering law model, which he uses as a standard for acceptable explanation, were not liable to the same difficulties. But I believe it is. If this case can be sustained, then it would be quite arbitrary of Hempel and those accepting his account to credit his nomological-deductive and statistical models with the ability to bear adequate explanations, but to refuse it to the teleological model.

In his classic characterization of the covering law model, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" (1948) / [5] Hempel stipulates four methodological requirements for an adequate explanation in science: (1) the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans; (2) the explanans must contain general laws which are actually required for the derivation of the explanandum; (3) the explanans must be capable of empirical test; and (4) the sentences constituting the explanans must be true so as to yield a correct explanation. Since his original statement these requirements have come under close scrutiny and briefs have been lodged against each as variously

[44] *Ibid.,* p. SUI.

[45] Originally published in *Philosophy of Science,* 15 (1948), 135-178, and reprinted in his *Aspects of Scientific Explanation,* pp.

requiring too little or too much. In his more recent work[46] Hempel has dealt with these objections, and, most importantly, has informally enlarged his criteria of adequacy in recognition of strong claims against the nomological-deductive model. For our considerations that important broadening of his criteria consisted in remarking the necessity of offering explanations against a background of implicit assumptions.[47]

To the extent that we are unable to make certain assumptions about auxiliary hypotheses and antecedent conditions, to that extent a profferred explanation, according to Hempel, becomes less adequate:

> When ... the relevant conditions or laws remain largely indefinite, a statement of causal connection is rather in the nature of a program, or of a sketch, for an explanation in terms of causal laws; it might also be viewed as a "working hypothesis" which may prove its worth by giving new, and fruitful direction to further research.[48]

But for the Hempelian model the question of "relevant conditions" becomes poignant. It is precisely on this question that Hempel has judged teleological explanations to be logically inadequate. But what answer must we make when the question is put to the nomological-deductive model?

The assumption of certain background conditions can only be made by examining the "relevant" evidence and in light of that evidence and certain "relevant" theories concluding, for instance, that no intervening causes were present. But, we may ask, what is the probability that we have isolated all the relevant conditions? What is the probability of the evidence supporting the application of a particular background theory and thus the conclusions that theory offers concerning the background conditions? Indeed, what is the probability of the

[46] "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, pp. 881-496.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 848-849; see also his *Philosophy of Natural Science* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 22-25.

[48] "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, pp. 849-850.

" truth " of that particular theory in respect of the available scientific data? The information these questions demand is not the kind of which we are ordinarily apprised. Yet without satisfactory answers to these questions it seems we should not accept the nomological-deductive model as logically adequate for the purposes of scientific explanation. Recall that these are exactly the arguments constituting Hempel's indictment of the teleological pattern of explanation. Hence, for him to credit the nomological-deductive pattern with the ability to bear the burden of explanation and yet refuse it to the teleological pattern is surely arbitrary.

Not only is Hempel's dismissal of the teleological pattern arbitrary, but if our Aristotelian analysis is correct, there is a logical dependence of the nomological-deductive pattern on the teleological pattern. The construction of an explanation of efficient causality (i.e., a nomological-deductive explanation) logically depends on a conceptual characterization of the end or terminus of the causal process in question. That is, given the semantic and conceptual constraints of our characterization due to the background data and theories at our disposal, we argue teleologically to the antecedent conditions that must have obtained if the terminus is to have obtained. If we are unable to argue in this teleological manner for the reasons Hempel suggests, then we will be unable to construct an Hempelian kind of explanation; and to the degree the teleological pattern of argument lacks adequacy, to that degree so also will the nomological-deductive pattern of argument. Thus, not only is it arbitrary of Hempel to exclude teleological explanation from scientific discourse, to the extent that his arguments tell against that type of explanation, to that extent his own preferred model is rendered unacceptable. It may be, of course, that Hempel's exclusory arguments are telling unwittingly against both the teleological and nomological-deductive models. While I do not think this is the case, a discussion of that possibility falls outside the scope of the present examination. The major purpose of this study has been to argue for the logical adequacy of teleological explanations and for the

necessity of teleological considerations in the analysis of the discovery and construction of the type of explanations sanctioned by the Logical Empiricists. In light of my purposes, the demonstration of arbitrariness is sufficient to preclude the easy elimination of teleological explanation from scientific discourse by Hempel and those persuaded of his general view.

III. CONCLUSION

In Aristotle's analysis of teleology two complementary aspects of that concept are isolated: the logical-methodological and the ontic. He contends it is a methodological prerequisite that we begin our investigation of any phenomenon to be explained with the final conditions; these in tum guide our selection of the proper antecedent material and efficient conditions of explanation. Without a knowledge of the end of a process under consideration, the selection and meaning-endowing determination of those antecedent conditions and the formulation of appropriate laws could never occur. This situation indicates one way in which teleological considerations are built into the construction of any explanation in science. But for Aristotle there is not only this teleological feature to all explanations, there is also an absolute priority of teleological explanation to any other kind: for logically we cannot hold that because certain material and efficient conditions obtain, therefore an explanandum event obtains; we cannot hold this because in the interim between the explanans event and the explanandum event such as explanation will not be true, and, too, in the interim conditions may intrude to prevent the actual occurrence of the event. The only assurance we have of an actual connection between a cause and its putative effect is that the effect has already occurred. Hence, the most basic form of explanation for Aristotle is that wherein the effect necessitates the efficient conditions.

Though Aristotle's objections to mechanical explanation are compelling, his argument for the priority of teleological explanation suffers slightly from difficulties analogous to those of which he complains-i.e., assumption of a connection between

effect and putative necessary cause. Nevertheless, within the Aristotelian approach can be found the requisite analesic. That approach suggests that our analysis of causal relationships takes place within a matrix of more comprehensive theories and empirical information. From this matrix we can generate teleological explanations with appropriate scientific assurance.

The grounds for Aristotle's methodological considerations are his empirical theories concerning the nature of physical objects, organic and inorganic. These objects have natures which are so constituted that they behave in certain ways in given environmental contexts; what determines the behavior of these objects and thus their essential character is simply the complex of interacting natural laws.

l\1ost strains of Logical Empiricism have rejected Aristotle's logical and ontological views concerning teleology. Nagel, Braithwaite, and Hempel have argued that, though teleological explanations appear in the sciences, their explanatory power is really grounded in explanations of nonteleological import (Nagel); or that they are at best analogical explanations which should be replaced in due course (Braithwaite) ; or that because of their logical defects their value is merely heuristic (Hempel). In short, the Logical Empiricists plead that teleological explanations are at best temporizing measures and are in principle replaceable by those employing only explanans of efficient conditionality.

These representative positions have been examined in the light of the Aristotelian analysis. We have seen that in Nagel's treatment of the dispensability of teleological concepts he replaces them by concepts which are teleological save only in name. The investigation of Braithwaite led to the conclusion that his suggestion of developing conditional explanations to replace teleological ones must also indicate how we can arrive ultimately at such explanations in any other way than that which we employ in arriving at the less reputable kind. Finally, we tested Hempel's objections to functional or teleological explanation by subjecting his nomological-deductive model to the

same criteria and discovered that his model suffers from the same deficiencies and is remedied in the same manner as the teleological model.

If teleological considerations are indispensable for scientific explanations, a way is provided for looking at the lawful activities of natural objects which indicates a reversal of Aristotle's assumption of dependence of methodology on ontology yet preserves his analysis of methodological teleology. Several philosophers of science with neo-Kantian inclinations (e.g., Wilfred Sellars,[49] Nicholas Rescher [50]) have recently argued that our concept of physical bodies and the properties we attribute to them are dependent not so much on our sheerly empirical observations and experiments as on the explanatory schema or theory through which we come to observe and test them. Recher maintains:

> Kant finds the source of lawfulness in the way in which the mind inherently works. We find its source in the conceptual that we in fact deploy for explanatory purposes: As we see it, lawfulness demands an imputational step made in the context of a certain concept of explanation. Both these divergent views agree, however, in making lawfulness fundamentally mind-dependent. [51]

If the laws and lawful properties of things we "find" in nature are the result of the imputation or projection of explanatory schemata on the natural world and if teleological explanations and schemata are legitimate and even indispensable, as we have urged, then there seem to be no immediately obvious objections to the imputation of functional laws. The neo-Kantian thesis wedded to the Aristotelian analysis suggests our acquiescence in final causality as an ontological and physical category.

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[49] See especially Sellars' *Science and Metaphysics*, chapters 3-5.

[50] See especially Rescher's "Lawfulness as Mind-Dependent," in *Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel*, ed. N. Rescher (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1970), pp. 178-197.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

HEGEL: THE THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HIS DIALECTIC

SHORTLY BEFORE he died of cholera in 1831 Hegel completed a third edition of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.* Since he bestowed on no other one of his ponderous works comparable care, this one has therefore special authority. It is, moreover, the most comprehensive single statement of his thought and, of all his strictly theoretical writings, the one easiest to read and understand.

This relative lucidity of the work was due to the circumstance that Hegel wrote it for the classroom. And although in that situation he made considerable demands upon his students/ he could not totally disregard their ability to understand and to react. Responding to these restrictions he had therefore of necessity to give the *Encyclopedia* something of the form of a dialogue. He had to curtail metaphors and speak more directly to the point.

As a consequence of this he left in the work clearer evidence of how he in the first instance came to posit the dialectic as the principle of nature and thought, and how, subsequently, he developed his notion of it. In the *Encyclopedia* he shows that it has at least three consistent sources: Aristotle's doctrine of the *Nous;* Kant's expose of the antinomies of Pure Reason; and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

By terminating the work with the citation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* Hegel strikingly acknowledges the first source:

> Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which is in the highest sense best. And thought thinks itself through participation in the

[1] Hegel's Letter to Niethammer, cited in *Owl of Minerva* 4 (June, 1971), p. 1.

object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the object, i.e., essence, is thought. And it actually functions when it possesses this object. Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvelous; and if it is greater, this is still more marvelous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold then that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is.[2]

By terminating the *Encyclopedia* with this text Hegel approved it as a resume of what he was trying to say. And by this approval he professed his essential agreement with Aristotle that everything begins and ends in the self-consciousness of the supreme *Nous.* All that is not this *Nous,* he thereby implied, is *from* and *for* it. The dialectic, which structures such intermediary things, is therefore a relational and dynamic structure grounded in absolute self-consciousness, which self-consciousness is, as Aritotle puts it, the highest thought thinking itself, God living on the loftiest plane.

Hegel came to this conclusion, the *Encyclopedia* reveals, by critical reflection upon the implications of Kant's antinomies. The section in which he describes this reflection is perhaps the best in the work. Essentially it argues the thesis that Kant made the most important contribution to the philosophy of his day by discovering that the use of the categories of judgment to think the transensible necessarily leads to contradictory assertions. But he did not fully understand the significance of this result. He thought that it served only to demonstrate the impossibility of metaphysics. But if he had applied it not only to cosmology but also to the analysis of all representations, concepts, and ideas whatsoever, he would have realized that it

[2] *Metaphysics* xii, 7, 107fl b 18.

actually discloses the inner structuring principle of thought and reality.[8] It reveals, in short, the dialectic which, as lifting contradiction in synthesis, sustains it and thereby sustains all that lies between *Nous* as ground and *Nous* as end. Philosophy is essentially the knowledge that this is so. For critical reflection, to know this is to have the supreme insight.

The third source which led Hegel to this same conclusion was Christian Trinitarian doctrine.[4] In the *Encyclopedia* the dialectic can be seen as a filtrate of this too. It is, in other words, an abstraction from the formal structure of the traditional Christian Trinitarian God. That Hegel should so see it, is consistent with his grounding of the dialectic in Aristotle's doctrine of the *Nous*. For the younger Augustine, this was the legitimate ground for Trinitarian doctrine on whose basis, he thought, the Neo-platonists, using natural reason alone, had discovered the doctrine. Although he later energetically retracted this opinion, nevertheless, he continued to use the doctrine of the *Nous* to ground a more tentative presentation of Trinitarian theology. In the *Encyclopedia* Hegel makes it clear that he was similarly motivated. The dialectic, which was for him the essence of philosophical insight, arises out of religious consciousness which reveals its existence and its character. It is therefore a filtrate of Christian religious consciousness. To have this knowledge is to bring concept to religion, but in this importation religious consciousness has priority such that without it there is no philosophical consciousness. In other words, religious consciousness can exist without philosophical but philosophical consciousness cannot exist without religious.

Thus to make explicit the structure of the Christian Trinitarian God as this is found in Christian religious consciousness is to reveal the dialectic which is, in the last analysis, *Nous* thinking itself, that is to say, God living his life. And this is

[3] *Encyclopedia* I, A, 48.

[4] J. F. Findlay, *Hegel* (London, 1958), pp. 80, 181. Findlay refers to Hegel's "long brooding" on the meaning of Christian faith while he was in Bern and Frankfort.

what, surfacing in the Kantian analysis of Pure Reason, creates the antinomies.

There are therefore these three sources for the doctrine of the dialectic, but they are not independent. For Hegel, they all spring in the final analysis from religious consciousness which, in its Christian Trinitarian form, alone embraces the dialectical structure of the Godhead. This being so, what was it then that Hegel saw in Aristotle's keenly penetrating doctrine of the Nous? It contained the movements of the dialectic, but it did not recognize them as such. Aristotle could not, in this analysis, have known the significance of the movements. A purely natural theology could not have made this possible for him. Theoretical thought arising from speculative ness could not suffice, since it does not contain God as triadic and therefore does not contain the dialectic in a way which makes it accessible to critical reflection and reveals it as the root structuring principle of all being and thought. Thus theoretical insight will not of itself rise to philosophical consciousness understood properly as ultimate insight, namely, as insight into the ultimate nature and function of the dialectic. This is contained in an accessible way only in the worship attitude of Christian religious consciousness. Philosophical consciousness, reflecting on this, explicates its structure, thereby bringing the concept to conceptless religious piety and revealing the dialectic.

Recollecting the long line of theologians who have speculated on Christian Trinitarian doctrine, one sees that Hegel followed a similar path. He too saw Christian piety as both the fundamental consciousness and as *fides quaerens intellectum,* a worship attitude ordered intrinsically to the quest of understanding.

The truth contained in conceptless piety could be seized upon in knowledge of the dialectic. This truth, so grasped, made it possible for Hegel to understand why Kant, when he analyzed pure reason, discovered antinomies. It showed him also why Kant's purely theoretical discussion of these, divorced from their grounding in religious consciousness, could not reveal their true significance. When Hegel then iutrodqced religious

consciousness to discover this true significance, he could then understand what Kant was really about and, by the same token, the meaning of all contents of thought and manifestations of nature.

His conviction that Aristotle had at least a glimmering of this understanding was undoubtedly the basis for Hegel's deep respect for the Stagirite.[5] This was the conviction which prompted him to terminate the *Encyclopedia* by citing the famous text on the *Nous* from the *Metaphymcs.* In it he saw the key to the dialectic.

The fact that Aristotle should have had this key without grounding it in Christian consciousness was not, from Hegel's point of view, an inconsistency. The non-Christian religious consciousness was for him simply an imperfect *Christian one,* containing therefore in potentiality what the latter has in act. Aristotle, by the acuteness of his mind, was able to transcend this limitation and dimly perceive the truth. Such is the implication of the citing of the *Metaphymcs* text.

On the basis of these considerations Hegel is therefore able, as he sees it, to conciliate speculative reason and religious consciousness. He does this by making philosophical insight ultimately depend upon religious piety. At the same time he thinks that he does justice to philosophy when he concedes it what he does not concede to religious consciousness, namely, insight.[6]

The purpose of philosophical consciousness thus becomes by this the conceptualizing of religious consciousness. In achieving this end, it guarantees that religion will survive. In Hegel's opinion conceptless piety alone cannot guarantee this. Of its very nature it seeks, as faith, understanding and, if it cannot find this, perishes.

While obviating this possibility by bringing the concept to piety, philosophical consciousness itself comes into being, that is to say, it emerges as the actualization of a capacity of re-

[5] *Logik* I, ft, I, A.

• *Encyclopedia,* Preface to flud ed., p. 15.

ligious consciousness. Religious consciousness, or piety, remains therefore always immanent in it. For Hegel this is the insight which provides the key to the understanding of all thought and reality. For all understanding whatsoever, then, religious consciousness is the ground.

The depth and power of this conviction in Hegel's mind is indicated by what he has to say in the foreword to the third edition of the *Encyclopedia.* In this statement, made so shortly before his death, he angrily rejects the charge that he has in fact destroyed religion and Christianity by making man to be God.[7] He finds the charge outrageous. It could only be made by one who pretends to have the power to judge in the name of Christ what constitutes true Christianity and who is a true Christian. Hegel will allow no one to make that claim and judge him. And if anyone should attempt to do so, he would not accept his judgment, nor would he, on its basis, or any other basis, divorce himself from Christian tradition or from Protestant piety. By his philosophy he wants only to introduce science into both. This, in his opinion, is necessary for their survival. At least in intention if not in execution, this late statement shows that he had, in his own judgment, made the Christian religious consciousness his point of departure of all of his philosophical life.

Other serious thinkers have agreed that this is so. Kierkegaard thought that Hegel was in fact trying to philosophize on the basis of the Christian religious consciousness, although he came to the conclusion that Hegel misrepresented this consciousness and, because of this, constructed a false philosophy. For Kierkegaard, however, even a true evaluation of Christian consciousness could not ground the construction of a rational, systematic philosophy, such as Hegel's was, which would be true to being. Reason even in this circumstance could always grope for insight, but it could never terminally attain it. Its insight would therefore never truly transcend religious consciousness as Hegel proposed.

[7] *Encyclopiidie,* Preface to 3rd ed., p. 23.

Nietzsche held the same opinion. For him Hegel proved that German philosophy was really theology in disguise.[8] In his opinion, this was what had ruined it. He did not, however, agree with Kierkegaard that Hegel had falsified the Christian consciousness and that this falsification corrupted his philosophy. Quite on the contrary for Nietzsche Hegel's picture of Christian consciousness was accurate. The inadequacy of Hegelian philosophy lay not in this but in the defectiveness of Christian consciousness itself. A philosophy grounded on it could not be valid. It would of necessity canonize the imperfect will of the mediocre mass man. It would exalt the moral standards of the weak. It would not reflect the will and the morality of the excellent man. The very rationality of Hegelian philosophy, essentially a negation of will, was a sign of this as well as its effect. In this harsh judgment, if Nietzsche does nothing else, at least he agrees with Hegel that the latter's philosophy arose from his theology.

That is why, in Henrici's opinion and that of many other Hegelian scholars, if not all, theologians instinctively turn to Hegel more than to any other modern or contemporary philosopher when they want to enrich their theological thought with philosophical concepts.[9] They find in him not simply tools for theological discourse, such as they find in every other philosopher too, but a *theology* from which the tools naturally arise-a theology, therefore, which not only explains but also creates them.

This may be what theologians are now beginning to realize. And their consequent use of Hegelian terminology and conceptualizations to state their points of view make them inevitably feel that Hegel's thought is again theologically relevant. At the very least they have become aware that they cannot do what they want to do theologically without employing this thought. That itself may have something to say about its relevance.

[8] *Anti-Christ,* Section 10.

[9] Peter Henrici, S. J., "Hegel und die Theologie," *Gregorianum* 48, 4 (1967), 706.

But there are indications that this practical approach to Hegel's accomplishment is not the only one involved. The so-called "theologians" of hope use more than Hegel's formal philosophical tools. In part, at least, they agree with the spirit of his approach, and they can point to no other modern philosopher with whose spirit they can similarly agree. In their eschatologies and in their attempts by these to transcend scientific consciousness, they too ground philosophy, such as they present or imply it, in religious consciousness. True, this is not so much the consciousness of the Christian assenting to the Trinitarian God as that of the Christian assenting to the Kingdom of God to come. But as this message is presented in the gospel of Christ, it implies and involves the Triune God. Its Christology, to this extent, is intimately connected with its Trinitarianism.

What they are finding in this is again the uniqueness of Hegel among modern philosophers. In a non-theological period such as the present, this uniqueness is what makes him so difficult to understand. He simply does not fit into the categories by which the present makes itself intelligible to itself. As Fackenheim justly puts it, when one confronts him one confronts, as in no other modern philosopher, not only the modern period but also the medieval and the ancient.[10] One cannot therefore, simply by seeing him in relation to the Kantian critique, understand him adequately. One must see him also in relation to the scholastics and to the ancient Greeks. The fact that he should terminate the *Encyclopedia* with the quotation from Aristotle is indicative of this. No other modern thinker could meaningfully have done the same.

Hegel could do this because he saw in Aristotle's text a core doctrine which in the hands of the Neo-platonists provided a philosophical basis for the Christian theology of the Trinity. For Hegel, this was a theological insight of prime importance. To him it seemed to show that religious consciousness can and must give rise to philosophy which, in its highest realization, is the consciousness that the dialectic is the structuring principle of thought and reality.

[10] *The Religi®s Dimension in Hegel,s Thought* (1967), Preface, xii.

No wonder that he took the theological criticism of his work so seriously and, in the *Encyclopedia,* devoted so much space to a reply. His attitude in this was entirely different from Kant's, for whom theology was peripheral. This is why it is imperative for one who would sound the meaning of the dialectic to probe into Hegel's theological convictions and specifically his understanding of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. This is why, in the present upsurge of theologies of hope, Hegel, in his theological roots, again begins to surface.

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SUBJECT ANALYSIS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATIONS

LET "SUBJECT ANALYSIS" stand for any complexity of probes aimed at understanding the subjects that men sub-ject to predication. Subject analysis is distinguished, therefore, from the attention that we focus on predicates, upon *what* is said of subjects. Subject analysis looks principally to the beings grasped in subjects and only functionally to meaning expressed in predicates. Let " saying " or " talking " mean not only communication in the language of words but communication in the broadest sweep of its complexity, even the communication that a man carries on with himself.[1] Subject analysis presupposes a certain epistemology of judgment, i.e., the subject component, whatever it is that we are " talking about," is grasped in sensorial perception and, more often than not, is symbolized as opposed to predicated meaning; the predicate is an intelligible formality or " aspect " under which the subject is understood here and now in this act of judgment. Given that the subjects about which we talk. which engage our attention, very often form symbolic patterns which reveal diverse ways of being and styles of life, the use of subject analysis is valuable for whatever light it might throw on men themselves and on their cultures. Subject finds its constitutional charter to philosophical existence in Socrates's" Know Thyself."

When the same subjects are reiterated in constantly repeated symbolic structures we encounter the iconic. Let " icon " stand for form in the sense of *Gestalt* or structure constituted by a tissue of images, often metaphors, that are repeated without

[1] Walter J. Ong, "Communications Media and the State of Theology," *Cross Currents* (Fall, 1969), pp. 462-480.

perspective and hence without conscious irony. What Susan Sontag says about poster art is an admirable instance of a species illustrating the genus of the iconic: " Posters have come to be regarded as mysterious cultural objects, whose flatness and literalness only deepen their resonance, as well as ... rich emblems of society." [2] The iconic, due to its flat literalness, is repeatable because any one of its elements is interchangeable with any other. This recalls Aristotle's insistence that metaphor obey the structure of any proportion, "a transference being from either genus to species, or from species to genus, or on grounds of analogy." [3] Irony, on the contrary, always involves the critical interjection of a fresh consideration, a perspective. All subject analysis partakes of the ironic.

It is by no means perverse that Arthur Koestler's study of creativity commences with an analysis of humour as paradigmatic of the novelty marking all creative thinking. The iconic, however, eschews novelty, and its very flatness and lack of perspective permits the anticipation of the iconic act. This familiarity, to return to Susan Sontag's observations on poster art, indicates that we are confronting an art form which " is usually parasitic on other forms of art-on the world itself, or a highly stylized image of it." [4] The American cowboy, our icon, acts in a predictable way or the genre is offended. [5] The iconic, as understood in this essay, must not be narrowed to staged and stylized theater. Iconography embraces every playing dimension of life in Huizinga's sense of the term. [6] A classical " Saturday night on the town " with the boys is an iconic gesture in that it involves a series of repeated and anticipated acts whose specific content will often vary but whose formal structure is rigidly predictable. The issue is well illustrated by games: the content of chess or baseball, for example, always

[2] Dugald Stermer, Introductory Essay by Susan Sontag, *The Art of Revolution, Castro's Cuba* 1959-1970 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. xx.

• Aristotle, *Poetics,* p. 21, 1457b-1458a.

• Stermer/Santag, *op. cit.,* p. xx.

• Jane Bret, and Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *The War In Man: Media and Machines* (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1970), pp.

[0] Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1955).

changes but the rules remain the same, and it is the game, not its content, that is played. Repeatability and predictability are the rule. The novel monkey wrench of humour spoils the sport.

The iconic, therefore, mixes the univocal and the analogical (in the Thomistic understanding of these terms). An iconic structure is univocal in that it is repeatable and hence predictable; it possesses a model or paradigmatic structure. This is true even when the icon is a man. J. Edgar Hoover," the closest thing to a national icon " we possessed in America according to *Life,* had a consistent image and the nation expected him to behave according to a fixed pattern. [7] But the internal structuring of the iconic *Gestalt* is thoroughly analogical. Icons are not understood by tracing " rational connections " between clear and distinct Cartesian ideas but by an insight in depth of likenesses within unlikenesses. There is no reduction of the grey flannel suit associated with the popular image of an F.B.I. agent, the close cropped hair, the attache case, the submachine gun, the American flag, etc., to any generic or specific intelligibility. The unity between these images is analogical. This is a *Gestalt* fashioned by a set of proportions that reflect one another analogically. Univocal predictability *ad extra* linked with analogical diversity *ab intra* are marks of all icons.

The icon is shattered only when a fresh consideration invades the structure and renders it a subject illuminated by a new predicate. Irony always is the interjection of a" point of view" or a perspective from beyond the cluster of imagery forming the icon. A man who can laugh at himself is literally " on top of his icons." This univocal invasion of the quasi-sacral, often fully sacral, character of the icon is the mark of the iconoclast, the breaker of images. The iconic must be lived with deadly seriousness, especially when it is comic, e.g., laughing at a professor's jokes or the humour of an after-dinner speaker. Tacitus' *"Capax imperii nisi imperasset"* is classically iconoclastic in that it consists of a judgment in depth looking to a failure of proportion within a given proportion: i.e., imperial rule stands

[7] Tom Wicker, "G-Man Under Fire," *Life,* Vol. 70, N. 13, April, 1971, p. *55.*

to the emperor as does the emperor stand to that rule. Thanks to the introduction of the univocal " capax," the proportion is turned on its head without any alteration of the poles: he would have made a marvelous emperor had he not been one! This type of ironic perspective is forbidden the fully iconic structure.

Authors Kinser and Kleinman of *The Dream That Was No More a Dream* subject the German historical experience from Wilhelm IT to *Gotterdammerung* under Hitler to a searching analysis which illustrates our understanding of the iconic.[8] Germany, according to the thesis of the book, emerged as a nation annealed into unity by Bismark which then found itself constrained to actualize historically its own mythic or lived understanding of its corporate existence. Granting the ambiguity of the term " myth," Kinser and Kleinman distinguish between myth as the non-rational ground which produces a conscious and rational structure of meaning and myth as the very structure thus produced. The stunning success of the book makes an admirable introduction to the theme of this study: the elucidation of icons through an analysis of the subjects making them up. The work in question details a number of typical self-representations of the German experience in the late nineteenth and twentieth century: the stab in the back of the German Hero of the Wagnerian Ring of the Niebelung; the exaltation of vigorous male childhood; the Knight in Armor, *der alte deutsche Michel;* the castle on the Rhine; the betrayal of the grandfather by the son and the mystic bonds uniting betrayed old age with the promised vengeance by youth; The Watch on the Rhine; the Enemy from the East; and, again, the feudal castle; containment; heroic defence frustrated by treason from within.

Without elucidating the thesis of the authors, let it be noted nonetheless that the conceptual articulation of the German Dream destroys the myth. The Knight in Armor is illustrative of this truth. He is always without family. He is never por-

[8] Bill Kinser, and Neil Kleinman, *The Dream That Was No More a Dream: A Search For Aesthetic Reality in Germany, 1890-1945* (New York, Evanston, ood Books, Harper and Row, 1969).

trayed as a father. Usually he is quite young or quite old. Rationally, of course, there is no intelligible " connection " or " link " between a Knight in Armor and the single state of life. The disappearance of the father before the militant child and the militant grandfather is mythic. Conceptually we can ideate a Knight in Armor who is neither all that old nor all that young and who is also the father of a family. Symbolically, however, the father stands for the generation that betrays the nation: the future (warrior child) embraces the past (warrior grandfather) by repudiating the evil present. The symbolic imagery at play cannot be grasped by the analytic articulation of com-possible Leibnizian predicates with subjects. The authors of *The Dream That Was No More a Dream* suggest that the German tragedy consisted of a massive national will to convert the myth into historical reality, a tragedy compounded by irony in that Germany's own past had produced the myth.

It would seem to follow that there is something in the structure of the icon that is consubstantial with man's encounter with being, something mythic which is part and parcel with reality but which is hostile to historic existence, to time. We suggest that this constant dimension in man's psychic life is rooted in the intentionality of knowledge, both sensorial and intellectual. The mythic belongs more properly to simple understanding and the historic to judgment. The terms are used in their strict Thomistic sense. The mind, bathed in the sensibility, is capable of halting the projector of being and of freezing the dynamism of the real, thereby producing a still life or a slide of the cosmic motion of the universe.[9] The mind knows

[9] " When the essence or common nature is shared by several supposits, it has to be participated according to other and other being. Because it has different being in every case, it is divided as often as it is participated. The difference or otherness of being in every instance becomes the reason for the division of the common essence among different supposits. Essence is regarded as the principle of unity, being is viewed as the principle of otherness or division. The unifying principle, essence, and the diversifying principle, being, are known through two different intellectual operations. What is *(ens)* is grasped in the manner of a picture *(imaginatio intellectug).* As such it may well be complex in the way of a still life painting that consists of different and related elements; but it is not

a complexity which was grasped initially in judgment *as complex,* but the mind knows this complexity as though it were "incomplex " or " simple." This grasping of a complexity through a simple gaze or " look " stiffens reality into a *Gestalt.* This both mythologizes history and halts time. In motion and time, of course, no being is already constituted as a completed given or datum; all things, rather, are now " being-constituted " through an active synthesizing and unifying of a kaleidoscope of principles which *are* and are *as* they are in dynamic fluidity and concrete individuality. [10] This "togethering" or "heaping together " of the principles of the real is *esse's* function as an active composing which follows on *esse* as absolute act. [11] If the act of existing had *already* completed its job of composition, being in the active sense would now be done and over with. Being would be a past. " To be " would then entail " not to be." This ultimate contradiction would render reality nonsense.12 The real is never " already done " unless we reduce the real to biography. It follows that reality as grasped in judgment is always open to the future and hence to novelty and

complex in the sense of exercising engagement or variation in motion and time. It is regarded as though it were something steadily looked at, fixed in itself before the mind's eye as somehow a still and permanent unit." Joseph Owens, "Diversity and Community of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies,* 22 (1960), pp. 288-4. Owens' description of a "common essence" differentiated in several units through its reception in diverse acts of existing is the epistemological spine, we are convinced, of all iconic structures.

[10] " unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem," *Q. de Ani'I7W,* q. 1, a. 1 ad 2; ed. Calcaterra-centi, IT, 284a.

[11] " Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum EST consignificat compositionem, quia non earn principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute; nam EST, simpliciter dictum, significat *in actu esse;* et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus subst81Iltialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alieni subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum EST, vel *simpliciter* vel *secundum quid:* simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum EST significat compositionem." *In Libros Peri Her?7Wneias,*L. V. n. 22.

[10] Cf. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence* (Irving, Texas: The University of Dallas Press), pp. 75-77.

surprise. This teaching is consubstantial with Aquinas's insistence that the very touchstone of all knowledge is our sensorial marriage to a fleeting and moving and surprisingly novel creation. Nonetheless, we are capable of understanding the "being-now-composed" as an "already-there-composed." The principles of the real-in this state of existence and when known to be in this state of existence-take on the timelessness and universality of intentional being. When distended into analytic differentiation, nature so understood yields science in the older Aristotelian meaning of the term. When suspended within the sensorial imagery in which reality is first grasped, the " simple understanding" of things is converted into the mythic and the iconic. The *Gestalt* is precisely this kind of suspension of time and motion. The fleetingness of life is halted. The agony of personal decision in an unrepeatable moment of crisis is tempered. The repetition of theater is experienced as being more real than history itself. The permanent is known and the bitterness of the inexorable failure of all being subject to time is softened. To fashion icons is human. To adore them, presumably, is blasphemy.

Let us call myth the here and now unconscious backdrop to rational discourse/ [3] Let us restrict the term " icon " to a more-or-less rational (hence more-or-less non-rational) *Gestalt* or formal structure. The mythic produces iconic structures such as conventional ways of greeting people, ceremonial acts, ritual, and " parasitic " art forms aimed at convincing, motivating, and comforting. Iconic structures can be penetrated critically, but one does so by running the risk of alienation, of emptying the psyche of everything *salve* the purely temporal and historical. Paul Ricoeur suggests that the critical penetration of the myth, demythologization, can be followed by a reentrance into the mythic which permits us to " hear " again what we have now" interpreted." [14] Reminiscent of Vico's "spiral"

[18] Walter Ong, S. J., "Myth and the Cabalas," *The Modern Schoolman,* XXVII, March, 1950; Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, "The Philosopher and the Myth," *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence* (University of Dallas Press, 1970), pp. 157-175.

[14] Paul Ricoeur, *Symbolism of Evil,* trans. Emerson Buchooan (Boston, 1969), pp. 450-1.

theory of history in which one age takes to itself as ideals activities and stances which were once social and economic necessities, Ricoeur's hermeneutic tactic still leaves a certain ambiguity between rationality and non-rationality. The tension is only thoroughly destroyed when " playing the myth," but knowing that we *are playing* is reconverted into "being the myth": i.e., secularized and thoroughly westernized Japanese kamikaze pilots in World War II coming finally to truly believe in the divinity of the Emperor; Dr. Joseph Goebbel's ultimate acceptance of his own sorcerer's den of lies as the truth, a warning to all men who would use myths rather than be used by them. [15]

By symbol we mean the participation of reality in a meaning which both englobes and transcends its carrier. [16] The mythological roots of all icons proliferate in symbolization, but not all symbols are iconic. The icon, as suggested by its origin in the Greek " eikon," image, must lack perspective, and therefore it must lack any consciously articulated or experienced tension. Icon is both cliche and archetype. [17] Both the splendid Virgin of Guadalupe and the plastic Madonnas of the style of Saint Sulpice are iconic; they resemble (verb "eiko ") each other. The same is true of the classically Byzantine Christus Pantokrator. Iconic art is expectation, repeatability, timelessness. A new icon can be created, but once created the symbolization forming its structure invites repetition.

This comforting timelessness is not typical of artistic creativity as such. Genuine poetic tension, involving-as shall be indicated, the introduction of novelty-destroys the iconic. The poetic symbol (in this context) involves the use of disconnected relationships, patterns, which mirror one another aes-

[15] Willi Boelcke, *The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: The Nazi Propaganda War 1939-1943,* translated by Ewald Osers (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1970). The subtle transformation from the use of propaganda to the being used by propaganda is evident in this work which sees Goebbels passing from victory to defeat.

[16] Our use of the term " symbol " corresponds roughly to that of Paul Tillich, cf., *Systematic Theology,* Vol. II, pp. 48-49.

[17] Cliche as point of departure and archetype as culmination.

thetically *through what logically would be contradiction.* The art of Robert Louis Stevenson is an admirable instance of non-iconic tension. In *The Master of Ballantrae* the Devil is a gentleman but he is none the less very much the Devil. Logically, to be the Devil is one thing and to be a gentleman is something else indeed. But within the texture of the novel both meanings are fused, not by being mixed together but by permitting the one to refract and thus deepen the other. The analogy is not strictly speaking an analogy between meanings. " Meanings " ultimately are univocal and are only used analogically. The analogy in the novel in question is a proportional relationship within an existent bearing a diversity of meanings held in tension. Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* is a double analogical triumph because the outside excitement belongs to the world of Conan Doyle and the inside to that of Henry James. [18]

Cleanth Brooks, in a now celebrated essay that has become a minor classic in criticism, " The Language of Paradox," defined tension in terms of paradox. [19] Following Eliot, Brooks insisted that paradox was " that perpetual slight alteration of language, words perpetually juxtaposed in new and sudden combinations. . . . The tendency of science is necessarily to stabilize terms, to freeze them into strict denotations; the poet's tendency is by contrast disruptive. The terms are continually modifying each other, and thus violating their dictionary meanings." [20] Allan Tate maintains that good poetry " is a unity of all the meanings from the furthest extremes of intension and extension." [21] A kind of " synthetic accretion " permits the poet to fuse literal " extension " and " intension," an intensity of meaning that moves inwards. [22] This recalls Hopkins' "inscape." The active synthesizing (Aquinas would have called this,

[18] Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *The Victorian Age in Literature* (London: The Home University Library of Modem Knowledge, 1932), pp. 243-49.

[19] Cleanth Brooks, " The Language of Paradox," *Critiques and Essays in Criticism, 1920-191,8,* selected by Robert Wooster Stallman (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1949), pp. 60-79.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 70.

[01] Allan Tate, " Tension in Poetry," *ibid.,* p. 59.

[••] *Ibid.,* p. 60.

" active composing " or " togethering ") of all these meanings in poetic imagery *is* tension. Marshall McLuhan aptly named this "the analogical mirror." [23] Every symbolic image within the poem mirrors every other image, not by " resembling " anything but simply by being intensely itself. Poetic tension is proper proportionality in the Cajetanian sense of the formula.[24]

The above-mentioned critics have explored mimesis in action. Their conclusions are proper to literary criticism but their epistemological structure presupposes the theory of judgment as articulated by St. Thomas Aquinas. Very briefly, the principles at play can be rehearsed in a number of basic and well-known propositions. " To know is to be the other " and not to sketch or form an image or idea of the other. [25] In knowing, both sensorially and intellectually, everything that there might be of activity is the knower's and everything there might be of structure is of the thing known. *Quidquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis.* When I know the real I *play-do,* exercise, perform-that reality according to my own mode of being. If an American watches a Chinese play, the play is converted into American theater. ·we put on the world according to the measure of our own personalities. Mimesis in knowledge is an analogical interfacing in action of knowing and known. The principle of knowing, in turn, is reality itself acting on man's knowing powers where the real produces, through specification, the sensible and intelligible species. This determination is the act of knowing's formal content, given that the determination is actively the knower's; it belongs to him: "to know" is "to be the other as other." In judgment-the understanding of the complex as complex, as indicated-the determination is the predicate, full conscious " meaning," Tate's "extension," the dictionary" denotation," rationality in full act. This rationality

[23] Marshall McLuhan, *The Interior Landscape,* selected and edited by Eugene McNamara, (New York, Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1969), esp. "The Analogical Mirrors," pp. 63-74.

[24] "Thomas de Vio Caietanus, *De Nominum Analogia,* ed. by P. N. Zammit, O.P. (:Romae: apud lnstitutum Angclicum, 1932).

[25] Cf. my *Man's Knowledge of Reality* (Prentice-Hall, 1956), esp. pp. *50·75.*

plays over and is applied to a subject of being which, in judgment, is grasped as a moving and individuated (imaged, perceived) reality in time, concreted in matter, the intentional reiteration of the real in phantasm or percept. The subject is known by its being reiterated or mimetically *done* in the interplay of the diverse sense powers which are bathed fully in the emotional and volitional life of man. The symbolic interplay of pre-conscious meanings and affectivities clustering around the subject of judgment, absorbed into the psyche through the alchemy of imagination and memory, constitute the dimensions of connotativity and intension wrapped thoroughly in the intentional being of reality thus lived on the level of cognition. The two orders-consciously intended or predicated meaning and the symbolic meanings carried by the subject-when set in tension, when constituting a paradox, together form an analogical whole. This whole, when paradoxical, possesses an ironic depth which is poetic but poetic in a non-iconic fashion.

When this tension of meanings is understood, thanks to their having been synthesized in the intentional being exercised by predicate in subject, the full import of poetic symbolism emerges. Paradox and tension, to say nothing of irony and humor, are constituted by this logical disparity of extension and intension. Rationality and symbolic resonance form the paradox of poetic language. Mimesis is often mockery. Antonyms become synonyms.

This tension, we have maintained, shatters the iconic. The issue can be illustrated in a myriad number of instances. Here we choose a marching song sung during the Spanish Civil War by the Carlist *requetes: "iViva Dios que nunca muerel* ":

" Long live God who never dies
And if He dies, He rises
Long live the woman who has
A love affair with a Carlist." [26]

•• " Viva Dios que nunca muere
Y si muere, resucita
Viva la mujer que tiene
Amores con un carlista." (anon.)

The extreme of all paradoxes, Christ's conquering of death in Resurrection through dying, is formed out of the twin paradox of an Eternal God who dies and of *anybody* who rises from the dead: two logical impossibilities; two contradictions in terms. This double intensity is then contrasted and relieved by the soldier's praising the woman who will have a love affair with him or his companions in arms. The iconic Risen Lord of the classical Byzantine tradition, the Pantocrator of Ravenna, when brought into tension with the iconic crucified Christ of the Latin West form a paradox which shatters the iconic structure *of both.* Eternal Lordship of the Universe-saluted by the " *iviva!* "-is logically incompatible with divine death. Death is equally incompatible with life. The theological paradoxes are so intensely baroque that they can be relieved only by another paradox, ironic and humourous in nature. The Carlist soldier is a soldier for Christ, but he is very much a man. By confessing cheerfully his predilection for the arms of a woman, he refuses to take himself too seriously no matter how seriously he does take his cause. He winks at his own dedication, and this wink achieves distance, perspective, a stance. No such distance or stance is permitted the participant in Leni Riefenstahl's magnificent propaganda film of the Nazi Nuremberg Party Convention in 1934, *Triumph of the Will.* No external critical perspective was permitted; participation was total and with that totality went the death of all paradox and irony. Whatever tensions did exist in the film (e.g., the medieval city next to the ultra-modern weaponry of the German army) were thoroughly *intrinsic.* Their intrinsic resonances invited an absolute identity that blocked not only humour and irony but criticism as well. *Triumph of the Will* is the cinema's greatest iconic achievement thus far in history.

The" *iViva Dios que nunca muere!"* contrasts sharply with the elegaic German barracks song often sung at military funerals, *"Ich hat ein Kamerad."* A simple soldier mourns the death of a fallen comrade. The situation is perennial to all war. The emotion is expected. When played by a military band the dirge is stately, monotonous, comforting. Without

irony or paradox, bereft of surprises or tricks of any kind, the German song recalls the brilliant and overwhelming flatness of Cuban revolutionary poster art. Although the former is reflective and mournful whereas the latter aims at "ideological mobilization," [27] both share the iconic because both are repeatable and undisturbed by external perspective. The iconic, to recall Susan Sontag's description, is "parasitic" in that it borrows forms already invented. They can be projected forwards in time and can be extended quantitatively in space. In this sense of the term older artistic media become the content of newer media, e.g., the novel of the motion picture; the motion picture of the television; the road of the radar screen. The master of the media knows what to expect because he has seen the *genre* at work before. What once may have been fresh with novelty and creativity has now hardened-the term is not used with disapproval-into the iconic structure.

The hermeneutics of iconography is subject analysis. Subject analysis was defined provisionally at the beginning of this study as the rational penetration of subjects of which meanings are predicated. It involves the conversion of subjects into predicates in order to understand what is "being done" within the iconic act or structure. Speech is the paradigm of subject analysis. Predicate analysis, on the contrary, is conscious insight into fully conscious rationality. It is an "after the fact" situation. The performance is roughly equivalent to what Bernard Lonergan means by an insight into an insight. [28] The mark of successful insight by one man into the insight of another man is the former's capacity to think through the conclusion of the second man by resolving the reasoning back to its premises. Checking out the evidence, following upon an understanding of understanding, issues into communication between two or more men. Communication does not necessarily involve agreement because communication in meaning leaves untouched the question of affirmation or negation, judgment. In fact genuine disagreement on the level of judgment demands previ-

[27] Sontag, *op. cit.*, xii.
[28] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).

ous communication in meaning. Meaning is not being any more than essence is identically existence. Were it otherwise, false judgments would be meaningless, and a man in error would not know literally what he was talking about.

The subject analysis of speech does not proceed in this fashion. Here the probing act does not seek a univocal communicated meaning predicated of subjects nor does it search out the identity of a major and minor through their identity in a middle term. Subject analysis seeks a pattern not precisely " between " subjects but " in" subjects which form a structure or a situation. This pattern is not comparable to mathematical proportions which are always orchestrated by a generic proportion. Casual conversation as a social art is an instance in question which is highly illustrative of subject analysis; speech is crucial in all communication because it is the highest species within the genus.

There is only one constant in free owing conversations: i.e., that there be none. " Changing the subject," often maliciously restricted by men to women, is the rule. But subjects are not changed according to set rules-so much time for this subject and so much for the next as in the iconic structure of a committee meeting. In casual or social conversation the spoken word designating a predicate given a subject by one conversational participant suggests another subject to a second participant. In this fashion the conversation proceeds, not in linear sequence, but by skipping from one issue to another. These " topics " are not linked analytically or logically but are scattered into random discontinuity. Every meaning is simultaneously present in free spoken discourse because, as McLuhan insists, the auditory field is simultaneous. [29] Continuity in time in the life of an:y sane man permits this compactness of meanings signifying through one or more spoken words to be distended in use " backwards " or " forwards " towards new or old subjects of conversation. Knowing what magic words will

[29] Marshall McLuhan, *The Guttenberg Galaxy* (University of Toronto Press,

trigger off a bore on his favorite hobby horse permits a skillful conversationalist to steer a conversation into safe waters. The trick of subject analysis consists in judging accurately analogical proportions between subjects. Metaphysically, everything, of course, is proportionately like everything else. This truth is the extramental root of casual conversation as of other iconic structures, but it is not of much help in determining why any given random set of subjects forms the unity of any given conversation. We must appeal to the cognitive power of the symbolic image or phantasm, including, as it does, the spoken word, to concentrate within itself a host of meanings simultaneously entertained, any one of which can designate a subject and prompt a predicate, which subject, in turn, can suggest another predicate; or, more commonly, which predicate can shift attention to another formally unrelated subject. These symbolic structures reflect a life and a history, affectivities and decisions, interests and fears.[30] They form icons whose ultimate *content* (in conversation) is not any sequential link between subjects through univocal predicates but the *user* of these subjects.[31] The catalyst here is Eliot's "logic of the imagination" which implies an historical continuity. Where the history of a man is shattered by neurosis or psychosis the discontinuity between subjects is accentuated, and it takes professional skill to discover the causes at work. In normal situations the causes of *subject-Gestalt* are more readily discernable. Anti-pornography zealots are as obsessed by sex as are atheists by God. The subjects people " think about," talk about, reveal who these people are and where their priorities are located. The analysis of subject-preoccupation is a far better tip-off to what a man or a society is than are articulated ideologies or even reasoned doctrines. An in-depth insight into a man (or a culture) is not revealed through his predicates which very often designate priorities and commitments only "notionally " enter-

[30] Cf. my *Man's Knowledge of Reality,* "Judgment: Its Structure and Meaning," pp. 101-121.

[31] The suggestion that the *user* of any medium is its *content* was made to the author by Dr. Marshall McLuhan in private correspondence.

tained (to use Newman's language). Human iconic structures are revealed, therefore, by subjecting subjects to submarine analysis. Discover what a man talks about and note well how he brings up the subjects he talks about and in what formed pattern, if any. Conversation is not only a good instance of iconography as a social form but it illuminates the human icons who participate therein. This type of formed pattern, spontaneous and uncontrolled from without, is far more revelatory of personality and character than are the more mechanical and electronic devices in use generally today.

Speech is but a supreme instance of the iconic which is the warp and woof of culture. Hitherto little attention has been given by philosophers to the iconic as such. Although it is difficult to document this contention in any satisfactory fashion, we are convinced that the basic cause of this absence of interest grows out of efforts to understand the mythic either in terms of comparative history (e.g., Eliade) or in terms of its genesis (Freud). Granting the fruitfulness of these approaches to the mythic, we insist that they fail to provide a technique for moving a critic *into* iconic structures as forms to be explored. The very flatness and lack of perspective within the purely iconic blocks effective Freudian depth analysis. Unquestionably every iconic structure has a history but the effects made on the participant of the icon are not reducible to its historical causes. An understanding of iconic causes is no more an understanding of icons than an understanding of a painter's life is an understanding of his painting. The iconic, in a most special way, cannot be grasped by getting *behind* it. This is supremely true today when speeded-up time cuts down the old Freudian tensions between subconscious and conscious, between the clash of the constructs of" *id-ego-censor."* In a highly oral culture such as our own is rapidly becoming, everything tends to be spoken out loud. Nothing-or very little-seems to be suppressed or hidden. This is a mark not only of the Youth Culture and the Counter Culture but of the age itself. Whereas the Freudian depth analysis of the hidden symbolic springs behind conscious behavior may well have been a proper hermeneutic for the

Victorian Age and for the early to mid-twentieth century, today we need a methodology capable of grasping intentional relations between actively exercised structures forming an imagery related proportionately or analogically in patterns. These patterns are tissues of meanings that are simultaneously present in act within the iconic play itself. Understanding is less the consequence of seeking a background than the effect of exploring a foreground without depth perspective. It goes without saying that the perspective must come from the practicioner of subject analysis who rises above his age in order to understand it.

Kinser and Kleinman in *The Dream That Was No More a Dream* illustrate their thesis in a " Discourse Through Pictures " which does for the nonverbal what we have suggested can be done for the verbal:

> To understand uniqueness, one must also be able to place individual examples within a larger continuum. An individual gesture will make no sense unless one has seen the gesture in a number of different situations which .expose its meaning and implications. The grammar of gestures is very much like the grammar of language: meaning accumulates with an increased experience with different patterns of usage .... Analyzing the nonverbal, then, is very much like using a microscope; each setting exposes a different slice ·of the total structure. No one setting is completely right; but then, no one setting is completely wrong. The truth of the whole rests in being able to remember the details of the individual layers while trying to reconstruct the total structure from which the slices have been cut. [32]

The iconic structure of the Germanic myth bears characteristics which were detailed in our analysis of conversation as form. No one" individual example" or" subject" talked about of itself reveals an iconic whole. " The grammar of gestures is very much like the grammar of language": one topic leads to another but it does not do so in sequential fashion. Internal imagery refracts internal imagery thanks to the catalyst of the mythic imagination working through the polysymbolic function of phantasms, perceptual images, which reiterate subjects of

•• Kinser and Kleinman, *op. cit.,* p. *25.*

existence. Penetrating the " total structure " involves the capacity" to remember the details of the individual layers." No visual generic *imaginatio* emerges as a result of understanding the "Discourse Through Pictures " anymore than any conceptual *imaginatio* is formed as a result of patterning the subjects forming an iconic conversation. The effect is a judgment discovering an analogical unity between disparates. The rationalist mentality is incapable of coming to grips with iconic unity because iconic unity defies either visual representation or conceptual definition. Reductionist solutions must be discarded along with psychoanalytic reduction to causal genesis. The conclusion seems inevitable: iconic forms are experienced on their own terms through critical judgment. It follows that the difference between grasping or failing to grasp the iconic is measured precisely by that very difference. Paul Ricoeur "wagers" that he will have a better understanding "of man and of the bond between the being of. man and the being of all things if I follow the *indication* of symbolic thought." [33] Our study has suggested that the best way to place the bet, to follow the indication, is to take analogy seriously, not by necessarily articulating it in " signified act " as a philosophical conclusion but by " exercising " analogy as an effective cognitive instrument for understanding iconography.

Insights into the icon as icon, collecting the wager, will involve judgments made from a stance beyond the iconic itself, but this "beyond" will have been rendered possible only because the iconic has been initially lived from within itself. Ricoeur's reintegration is more of a risk than he suggests, although it would be unfair to state that he is not aware of some risk to the undertaking. Masters of the Lie of Propaganda, such as. Dr. Joseph Goebbels and those who massage us daily with the lures of advertising, often fall for their own lie. Total surrender to an iconic existence is Pavlovian. Subject analysis reveals this failure in irony by noting that action and reaction can be predicted in men who cannot transcend their own myths. And whatever can be predicted is at least open to control and

•• Ricoeur, *op. cit.,* p. *855.*

manipulation. We need only think of how many friendships have been ruined; how many commercial transactions frustrated; how many positions lost; how many romances shattered, because an enemy on the outside knew how to trigger into action opposed mythic structures. In a post-modern world of shifting myths and dissolving cultural patterns, the irony provided by subject analysis may be an effective instrument of communication in an increasingly divided and tribalized world.

Subject analysis is demythologization, but demythologization with philosophical sophistication, not as a banner. Actually existent mythic content in discourse-and, by extension, in that larger discourse which is history-is penetrated rationally by the critical consciousness. But *total* demythologization is an impossibility. Because the mythic is the potentially rational; because this potentiality inevitably accompanies the subject component in judgment; because the mind can entertain in any one act at any one time only one defined and specified intelligibility, that of the predicate, it follows that the removal of one symbolic-mythic structure implies the introduction of another. Nobody can be totally rational and critical about everything falling within the structure of any one knowledge act. A radical divorce of reason from the mythic would involve the total separation of predicates from subjects. This is an evident contradiction because predicates are *only in subjects.* Nonetheless, the ideal of complete purgation of the mythic is a late Cartesian dream which would separate consciousness from sensation, memory, and affectivity; in a word, from the historic continuity of the human thing. Immersion in mythic iconography is dangerous, but it is not as dangerous as being duped into thinking that pure rationality, pure critical exegesis or analysis, is a desideratum. There are no" objective observers." The last fool is the man who believes himself to be untroubled or unbuttressed by the mythological. The non-ironic character of the icon is a final irony.

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A NOTE ON WITTGENSTEIN AS AN UNWILLING NOMINALIST

WAS WITTGENSTEIN a Realist or a Nominalist in pistemology? Wittgenstein considered himself to be neither. If you are a Realist you maintain that the " thing" and relation words people use have extramental, objective counterparts in one way or another. If one is a strict empiricist and holds the preeminence of particulars the Realist position is unacceptable because it would seem to necessitate the extramental existence of something simultaneously both universal and particular. But such a combination is impossible. If you are a Nominalist " thing " and relation words have no outside counterparts but instead are entirely the work of the human knower who arbitrarily sets up ideas and names for the particular things and particular situations he experiences. To an objectivist in epistemology such an approach is unacceptable because the subjectivist approach makes knowledge empty and hollow. It reduces meaning to the arbitrary whim of the one who creates the idea or name.

For ages philosophers have struggled with the so-called problem of universals, and more recently scientists, especially biologists, have had to face the issues squarely.[1] The thought of Wittgenstein, which is one long epistemological dialogue spread out over many years, represents one of the more modem attempts to escape between the Scylla and Charybdis of this problem. That some escape is needed seems to have finally become clear to both Wittgenstein himself and his disciples. That the " second " Wittgenstein remained empiricistically inclined and so rejected Realism outright requires no defense. What marks him as different from his empiricistically inclined

[1] See, e. g., F. F. Centore, " Neo-Darwinian Reactions to the Social Consequences of Darwin's Nominalism," *The Thomist,* 85 (1971), 118-142.

predecessors (including himself), however, is that he also rejected Nominalism. [2]

As he matured Wittgenstein became more and more concerned about the dangers of the various forms of extreme subjectivism. Nominalism represented an extreme subjectivism. How does one ever manage to escape his own little private inner world and achieve communication with the great outside world? Wittgenstein devotes a great deal of space to the problem in his *Philosophical Investigations.* The topic is usually referred to today as the "private language problem." [3] "But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences-his feelings, moods, and the rest-for his private use.... So another person cannot understand the language[?]," asks Wittgenstein. [4] His answer is an emphatic no. An affirmative answer to the question would mean that a "language," which would always involve at least one communicator and one receiver, could be had even though there was nothing common between the speakers of the language. That is to say, "If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments." [5] There must be some way of determining when a word means the same thing. But in a strictly private series of sounds (they cannot really be called a language) this would be strictly impossible. How, for instance, would one ever know that another person was "in pain" if there were not some public, extramental, non-subjective way of telling? There would be no way of knowing. As Malcolm has put it, "On the private-language hypothesis, no one can teach me what the correct use of 'same' is. I shall be the sole arbiter of whether this is the *same* as that. What I choose to call the 'same' will *be* the same." [6] In other

• On the earlier and later Wittgensteins see G. Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964).

[8] See, e. g., J. T. Saunders and D. F. Henze, *The Private-Language Problem* (New York: Random House, 1967).

• *Philosophical Investigations* (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1958),

[5] *Ibid.*,

[6] N. Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations,*" *Wittgenstein: The*

words, there would be sheer arbitrariness with respect to the relationships between ideas and names and those extramental realities for which they are supposed to stand. Wittgenstein would have nothing to do with a doctrine which so obviously flew in the face of one of the great facts of human existence, namely, meaningful intersubjective communication. [7]

But what are the alternatives? Wittgenstein was sure that whatever the solution might be it had to depend upon something objective. What is objective can be shared, and so objective knowledge can be shared. But what could the objective counterparts to the knowledge represented by ideas and names possibly be? Names can label resemblances, but how does one know where to look for resemblances? In any event, Wittgenstein knew where one should not look to see them. In his *The Blue And Brown Books* he tells us what he could not accept. First of all, the abstract Realism of a Plato or of the early Russell is eliminated. Rather than one, single, extramentally real common nature the most Wittgenstein could allow was a system of interlocking and overlapping family resemblances. Secondly, the approach of those who wanted to reduce meaning to some kind of general picture or image that could be pointed to had to be discarded. The "craving for generality" could not possibly be satisfied by so contradictory a notion as a universal particular, even though the notion was superficially at least very empiricistic. An image was something concrete and material. But could it simultaneously be common? [8]

At this point the later Wittgenstein felt constrained to adopt his now well-known contextual linguistic doctrine concerning

Philasophioallnvestigations (ed. by G. Pitcher, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 78.

[7] Wittgenstein was so much opposed to subjectivism that he tended toward Behaviorism. However, he actually never went so far and in fact disputed some of its main points. See, e. g., P. *I.,* #880 ff.

[8] See *Preliminary Studies far the "Philosophical Investigations," Generally known as the Blue and BrCYWn Books* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), pp. 17-18. He goes on to give two psychological motives for wanting generalization, namely, confusing a state of consciousness with an extramental state of a mechanism and the scientific desire to simplify and condense phenomena into general laws. Cf. P. *I.,* #115, #189, #140, #801.

the meaning of words. Ordinary, every-day language understood as a tool is the key to understanding how knowledge can be objective without having to commit one's self to an abstractionistic Realism. Wittgenstein reasoned that the only classical empiricistic way of accounting for extramental generality was via some sort of ostensive fuzzy material image. But this was impossible. However, he could not accept the mere arbitrariness of Nominalism. This posed quite a dilemma: How to explain generality in terms of all-important particulars without becoming a hollow and empty Nominalist? "The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term," he argued, " one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone have helped him to understand the usage of the general term." [9] What is individual and concrete and yet can account for generality? The best answer he could find was language. Words and syntax are intersubjective. They are there, outside of us. We can be trained in their use. They are real, and in and among them we find how it is possible to speak in generalities.

At times Wittgenstein tends to look upon the outward combinations of words and signs (i.e., the material parts of language) as something substantial and even alive. They seem to become objective beings taking the place of the older but anti-empiricistic pure possibles and extramental universals. He states: " Every sign *by itself* seems dead. *What* gives it life?-In use it is *alive.* Is life breathed into it there?-Or is the *use* its life?" [10] Use becomes the soul of the material parts of language causing them to spring off the page like living creatures.

How far, though, can such a metaphor be pushed? Just how objective and independent of personal dictate is language? Wittgenstein certainly wanted to think of language as independent of individual minds. We grow into a language; it does not grow out of us. Words do not stand for something intra-

• *Ibid.,* pp. 19-20.
[10] *P.* I., #482. Cf. *ibid.,* H-8.

mental, neither immaterial concepts nor sensations or images of which we are conscious. There is no internal mental essence, no "what" expressed by a word.[11]

Where, then, does language come from? Wittgenstein's great problem is that he must treat language as somehow existing on its own and yet always and everywhere tied up with an ever-changing society. "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs* (uses, institutions) . To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique."[12] "The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language."[13] "The point here is not that our sense-impressions can lie, but that we understand their language. (And this language like any other is founded on convention.)"[14] "The rules of grammar may be called' arbitrary,' if that is to mean that the *aim* of the grammar is nothing but that of the language."[15] These statements are only a few of those in which he either explicitly or implicitly acknowledges the transitory and arbitrary nature of the matter and syntax of language.

How then can Wittgenstein be interpreted, either by himself or others, as being neither a Realist nor a Nominalist?[16] There seems to be an inner strain and conflict in Wittgenstein's

[11] See *ibid.,* #363, #371, #373, #501 ff.

[12] *Ibid.,* #199.

[13] *Ibid.,*

[14] *Ibid., #355.*

[15] *Ibid.,* #497.

[16] The best over-all critique of the later Wittgenstein is that by L. J. Cohen, *The Diversity of Meaning* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963). H. J. McCloskey in his article "The Philosophy of Linguistic Analysis and the Problem of Universals," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* (1963-1964), 338, also makes some telling points. Ryle and others, he states, were attacking straw men when they argued that universals were merely substantializations of sentential subjects and predicates. Also, neither Wittgenstein, Pears, nor Bambrough ever properly stated the problem of universals. He does not, however, mention Wittgenstein as a Nominalist. It is mainly R. Bambrough who is remembered for defending the epistemological neutrality of Wittgenstein. See his "Universals and Family Resemblances," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 61 (1960-1961)'

thought of which he never became fully aware. On the one hand, he wanted to avoid the contra-factual yet necessary consequence of Nominalism while, on the other hand, he wanted to reject the anti-particularistic stand of Realism. The main problem with Nominalism is the way it makes everything private and peculiar to just one person. A common language enabling its users to recognize some things as similar seemed to be the solution, the happy medium, the ideal compromise.[17] It is, however, no compromise at all. As it turns out, and as Wittgenstein himself admitted, language is founded upon societal customs. These are conventions, that is, arbitrary rules which could have been otherwise. But does this solve the problem or merely multiply it many times over? How can a series of arbitrary decisions add up to any less arbitrariness than the arbitrariness of one person?

Although his intentions were good, and although he was working in the right direction, his linguistic solution was really no more objective than the position he was fighting against. In the end he succeeded in only substituting a group arbitrariness for a one-man arbitrariness; a corporation Nominalism for a do-your-own-thing Nominalism. If he had attempted with respect to *things* to determine what in similar *things* accounted for their similarity he might have been on his way to Realism.[18] But he stopped short of that. His epistemological barrier was an arbitrary linguistic screen interposed between the knower and the world. He could have penetrated it in order to try to discover some not so obnoxious moderated Realism-but then, if he had, he would not have been Wittgenstein.

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[17] Cf. *P.* I., #!'ll5: "Then are two things the same when they are what *one* thing is? And how am I to apply what the *one* thing shews me to the case of two things? " The answer is said to be built into the rule-governed grammar of language. Once the technique is learned, "I obey the rule *blindly."* (P. I., #!'ll9).

[18] As R. I. Aaron has pointed out, this would have made Wiittgenstein into a traditional thinker on the subject. Sec *The Theory of Universals* (flnd ed., Oxford U. Press, 1967), pp. 167-168. Aaron, however, does not comment on his failure to escape the traditional alternative positions.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Theology of the Primacy of Christ according to St. ThomatJ and its Scriptural Foundations. By THOMAS R. POTVIN, O. P. Fribourg: The University Press, 1973. (Vol. *50* of *Studia Friburgensia,* New Series)

Under the direction of J. H. Nicolas, O. P., Fr. Thomas Potvin has published his thesis which is a through study of Christ's primacy according to the theology of St. Thomas together with its scriptural foundations.

Since any authentic theology must flow from God's revealing word as a reflection upon it Potvin begins his study by considering the biblical context for Christ's primacy or lordship. He finds this in the term, "Head," a multi-faced term involving the notions of leadership and influence as well as the biblical categories of " recapituation " and " principle. " When Paul speaks of reestablishing all things in Christ he is speaking of making Christ the Head, and this implies the Semitic concept of authority based upon preeminence and the Greek concept of a life principle. The Greek and Latin Fathers emphasize the notions of plenitude and of influence on the part of the Head toward the members. St. Thomas underlines the preeminence of the Head in terms of dignity, nobility, and perfection; it is likewise a principle or source. The relationship between Head and members is one of distinction and conformity: distinction by virtue of its dignity, its role of governing, its causality; conformity through nature, order, and continuity.

Of great importance for the question of Christ's primacy is Phil. *fl:5-ll* which is possibly Pauline in origin, according to Potvin. In this text we probably have the beginnings of the Church's meditation on the preexistent Christ, a reflexion initiated by the experience of Christ on the part of the early Christian community. What seems to be emphasized here is the dignity of the preexistent Christ. The exaltation of Christ to the position as Lord of the cosmos, though mentioned in the context of his preexistence, would seem to be the result of God's gracious act toward the historical Christ who had suffered and died of obedience.

In regard to Col. I: 15-flO the author believes that modern exegesis sees an immediate reference to the second Person of the Trinity in his state of preexistence. Christ is seen " from above, " as God coming to man. Any reference to the Incarnate Christ is due to the communication of idioms. The preexistent Christ is seen to be already present in the cosmos before presiding over mankind's history; in Col. 1:18-flO there would be a

reference to Christ's earthly mission seen in the light of its fulfillment with his glorification.

Potvin considers John's doctrine of the Logos as in fact Johannine. Logos is not merely a functional title but also an ontological one, describing Christ's divine nature. Augustine and Thomas legitimately utilize the Johannine doctrine on the Logos to express the inner-Trinitarian life of God. He finds in the Prologue the pattern of pre-existence, descent-ascent.

The message of Hebrews 1:1-4 is likewise centered around the pre-existent Son who participates in creation. He has become one of us in order to deliver us from sin. His divinity and preexistent glory have been manifested to us through his glorification and enthonement.

The primacy of Christ in the scriptural message of the sacred authors is placed within the context of salvation history: the manifestation-actualization of God's salvific plan for man. Yet ultimate questions concerning the identity of Christ in terms of preexistence, equality with the Father and distinction from him are also posed and answered by the New Testament authors. Christ's authority and lordship, according to these authors, are rooted in his divine Sonship. As Son of God Christ is active in creation; as Incarnate-Son he is the summit and perfection of all creation. The New Testament provides the basis for such a systematization.

In chapter three Potvin undertakes a study of Christ's role in creation, beginning with methodological principles. " Functional " theology and " ontological " theology are not mutually exclusive. Revelation cannot be reduced to salvation history; there is a theology of the sacred authors which must be taken into account. St. Thomas's methodological schema is founded upon notions of causality implied in the " exitus-reditus " schema of Neo-Platonism and also in the scriptures.

In the fourth chapter the author considers creation in St. Thomas's theology. He begins by applying the theme of the " exitus-reditus ' to creation. God is the first and final Cause of all things; his goodness is the ultimate reason for creation. From a consideration of God as the one Principle of creative work he passes to a consideration of the doctrine and role of appropriation. This will contribute to a better understanding of Thomas's thought on Christ's primacy of order in creation.

St. Thomas speaks of creation according to the one divine essence and according to the Trinity of Persons. On the one hand, creation is common to the three Persons; on the other, the three Persons make an individual contribution to creation: as an artificer works through an idea and is motivated by an intention, so too God the Father creates through his Word and out of love. There is an order in this creative power: the Son receives his creative power from the Father while the Spirit receives his from Father and Son.

In considering the intratrinitarian relations in terms of creation we see

that the Father speaks himself and all creatures in his Word. The divine Word expresses not only the Father but all creatures, even though it is a personal name of the Son. This is so because the (divine) nature is included indirectly in the name of the Person. Because he is a principle from a Principle, the Word is a source of creation. From all eternity he proceeds from the Father as his Word and through his Word the Father is related to all creatures.

Appropriation is described by Potvin as " bringing a common name to play the role of a proper name. " It is founded upon a likeness between what is appropriated and the property of a particular Person within the Trinity. Appropriation enables us to express more clearly the mystery of the Trinity without falling into either Tritheism or a rigid monotheism (in the sense of a monopersonalism). Creation is a work common to the three Persons with attributions of its various aspects being made to the three Persons individually. The Father is the Source, the Son the Exemplar, the Spirit Love. Father, Son, and Spirit are commonly the Creator on the level of efficient causality; they likewise share commonly in exemplary causality; yet the humanity of Christ, God's most perfect work, is a subordinate model of creation. For St. Thomas, Father, Son, and Spirit alone can be and are the ultimate end of creation; Christ's human nature can be said to be the end of the universe in an intermediate, subordinate sense.

Chapter five deals in more detail with the question of Christ's role in creation. In the *Summa* the role of Christ's humanity in creation is described in terms of recreation. This role is ultimately due to the hypostatic union. In the *Summa* St. Thomas mentions many reasons for the fittingness of the Incarnation. There is some discussion as to the implications of these reasons, yet all agree, says Potvin, that they are based upon the " exitus-reditus " schema: God is the beginning and the end of all things.

The first reason given by St. Thomas for the fittingness of the Incarnation is an application of the axiom " Bonum est diffusivum sui," a principle based upon the notion of final causality: God's own goodness is willed by him of necessity; God, however, freely chooses to diffuse his goodness outside of himself; the actual order of creation is not proportionate to God's wisdom which is infinite. Potvin asks whether in order to speak of the fittingness of the Incarnation the only possibility is that of positing a necessity of supposition, namely, on the supposition that God chose to communicate himself to his creature, it was convenient that he do this in the highest degree possible, i.e., through Incarnation. We know only what God has, in fact, revealed to us: according to God's plan, the highest possible union with God is realized in the Incarnation and that is in conformity with God's goodness.

St. ThomM distinguishes between the common notion of person

emphasizing subsistence and particular modes of subsistence proper to each of the Persons of the Trinity. In speaking of the Incarnation he utilized the common notion of person and thus he never spoke in terms of an intrinsic, necessary reason why the Son assumed human nature rather than the Father or the Spirit. He did, however, give fitting reason for the Son's assumption of humanity.

In regard to filial adoption, the exemplar for this is natural filiation. In the Trinity the Father speaks the Word and he is the Son. In the spoken Word the Father knows himself, the Son, and the Spirit, and all created reality. Adoptive sonship through grace is intended to be a manifestation of the whole Trinity. Since the whole of creation is spoken in the Word, it is fitting that all creation be recapitulated in the Word. In this way the Son becomes the Exemplar of creation by appropriation. The reason why it is an appropriation is the fact that we do not have a scientific knowledge of the contrasting relations in the Trinity; we do not have a grasp of the absolutely singular character of each of the divine Persons.

Potvin then touches upon the fittingness of the Incarnation from the point of view of man's proper nature. He examines closely the notion of obediential potency and concludes that man's obediential potency (understood as a non-repugnance) to see God as he is, is the foundation for the fittingness of the Incarnation according to the nature proper to man. Because man is capable of God his nature can be assumed by the Person of the Word. This assumption was fitting because man's nature was in need of restoration.

Finally, Potvin arrives at the question of the motive of the Incarnation: if man had not sinned, would the Word of God have become man? There are two aspects to St. Thomas's answer: a) theological-we know God's will only from Revelation; b) ontological-there is no absolute necessity for a divine Person to assume a human nature. St. Thomas was inclined to hold that the Son of God would not have become man if man had not sinned because Revelation tells us that this is in fact why he did become man. He admits, however, that the other opinion is tenable.

For St. Thomas, those texts which speak of a predestination by which man is called to share in Christ's power and sonship do not mean that God's decision is determined by what he foresees will happen. Sin in no way causes the Incarnation; by one eternal, simple act God ordains that sin be permitted and that it be repaired by the coming of his Son into the world. Christ is. no less Lord of the universe because he came into the world to destroy sin.

In chapter six the author considers the headship and judicial role of Christ. In the third section of this chapter he considers the lordship of Christ and its relation to merit. He had already spoken of Christ's headship, judiciary power, and lordship in terms of the hypostatic union as flowing quite naturally from it. Now he asks whether through his earthly

activity (passion, death, resurrection) Christ merited to be Lord. St. Thomas emphasizes the theandric (ontological) status of Christ in relation to glory: he is always glorified since he is always Son of God; his human soul enjoyed the beatific vision from the beginning. Yet St. Thomas also indicates the " functional" aspects of Christ's glory. His body is glorified in the resurrection; men do come to appreciate his glory through his resurrection because of which they recognize his divinity.

The seventh and last chapter presents a lucid synthesis of the major points under consideation.

This work has much merit. It clarifies and reiterates many points of Thomistic doctrine which have either been misunderstood or forgotten. The author is aware of the limitations of St. Thomas's thought on some issues; yet he helps one to better understand the reason for these limitations, and in so doing he creates an atmosphere for a greater appreciation of the contribution made by Thomas to the theology of the Incarnation.

The bibliography is quite extensive and well arranged. There are a few typographical errors as well as misspellings and expressions which seem to be literal translations of French expressions. These do not, however, detract to any serious degree from the overall value of this thesis.

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A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. By JASPER HoPKINS. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. Pp. *300.* $10.50.

In his preface Jasper Hopkins speaks of a recent renascence of Anselmian studies. His own translations-with Herbert J. Richardson-of various theological and philosophical works of Anselm that were all too little known in the English-speaking world have made a major contribution to that renascence. The present work promises to prove equally beneficial.

First, it should be noted that Hopkins' *Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* is precisely what its title proclaims it to be-namely, a guide for those who intend to study St. Anselm and bring to that task all the serious effort which the subject demands. For those who would prefer a brief synoptic presentation of Anselm's spirit there are a number of simpler works available-notably Gerard Phelan's delightfully readable *The Wisdom of St. Anselm* (regrattably absent from Hopkins' bibliography). But for those intent on probing the wisdom of Anselm in all its wealth through careful study of the texts, there is perhaps no better starting point or

companion for their journey than the present work, whose chief merit lies in the fact that the author attempts to present the principal problems of Anselmian scholarship in all their complexity, setting forth for the reader the diversity of opinion on the questions under consideration and at the same time making his own position quite clear.

After an opening chapter on the general nature and background of Anselm's writings a chapter each is devoted to the relation of faith and reason and to the ontological argument. Then, in keeping with Hopkins' and Richardson's wish in publishing their earlier translations to extend the scope of interest beyond these perennially controverted issues, there follow three chapters on the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of man, freedom and evil, and on Christology and soteriology respectively. Finally, an appendix entitled "Anselm's Philosophical Fragments" provides the first complete English translation of the work published by F. S. Schmitt under the title *Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury.*

I will here mention and comment on a couple of specific points, particularly with regard to faith and reason. First, while it is surely correct t.o assert that Anselm offers no formal definition of faith, it seems somewhat misleading to go on to affirm, as Hopkins does, (p. 87) that he never overtly explicates or distinguishes various notions of faith. For, over and above the numerous implicit distinctions which he makes (Hopkins on p. 102 mentions what seems to be a rather dubious distinction between *fides catholica* and *fides christiana)* , Anselm on several occasions compares and contrasts modes or aspects of faith. His most basic distinction is between *fides viva* and *fides mortua.* Since the faith which he as a theologian is concerned with is a living, ·fruitful, grace-:filled reality, he asserts quite baldly that *fides mortua* is not really faith at all and proceeds in various passages throughout his writings to explicate various aspects of living faith.

Living faith, he says, is operative faith, which works through charity and leads to rectitude of will and the keeping of God's commandments. His favorite formula for the expression of faith as assent, *corde credo et ore confiteor,* shows how the believer's acceptance of the divinely revealed and ecclesiastically mediated truth leads him irresistibly to the worshipful proclamation of that truth. To illustrate the difference between the two basic types of faith, he employs (Hopkins says " we may be sure that he was familiar with and subscribed to ") the distinction used by Augustine between *credere in Deum* and *credere Deum esse* (or *credere Deo)* . The first formula alone expresses living faith, he says, because it alludes to the believer's movement along the way toward full and complete uniop with the object of his belief.

Furthermore, as *fides quaerens inteUectum,* Anselmian faith involves the quest for intellectual understanding of what one has at first simply believed. Here arise all the disputes concerning whether Anselm's elaboration of *rationesnecessariae* for divinely revealed truths makes him or his theological

method rationalist and whether his derivation of arguments *sola ratione* for the existence of God makes him an apologist vis-a-vis the unbeliever.

The dispute over the latter question has centered about the *Proslogion* with Karl Barth and Anselm Stolz each stoutly denying that it was written in order to lead the infidel by a rational demonstration from unfaith to faith. Such a procedure, they say, would subvert the order of the *credo ut intelligam* and besides is ruled out by the *genus literarium* of the work In insisting on the apologetic character of the *Proslogion,* although agreeing that it was written primarily for believers, Hopkins follows a traditionalist interpretation and takes up a hard line against Barth and Stolz. He does not mention the middle way proposed by Henri Bouillard, who suggests that the argument is not an apologetic directed to the unbeliever but rather the product of the believer's contemplative reflection on the Psalmist's words about the fool's denial of God. It is thus a theological argument, arising from faith and developed in order to nourish the prayer of the man of faith. At the same time, Bouillard maintains against Barth, it is a philosophical argument inasmuch as it seeks to elucidate the rational structure of the experience of faith. Hopkins, it seems, maintains a good deal more when he writes:

> The command *crede ut intelligas* is addressed fundamentally to the Christian .... The skeptic, on the other hand, is challenged first to understand ... and on the basis of this understanding to believe. (p. 48)

Nowwhere, however, does Anselm indicate that he expects by his argumentation to impart an *intellectus* to the unbeliever, nor does he ever speak of an intellectual understanding as either a possible or necessary foundation of faith. (Hopkins does affirm that for Anselm faith and the *intellectus fidei* are gifts of divine grace.)

On the question of the *rationes necessariae* Hopkins asserts that Anselm intended to keep them distinct from mere *convenientiae* and suggests that the two species are conflated in the *Cur Deus Homo* only when something is found to be inappropriate to God. (pp. 50-51) In doing so he neglects a text found toward the end of chapter 10 of Book I (Schmitt, II, 67: 1-6)-and which he himself cites later, on p. 65-which asserts that the slightest reason (either affirmative or negative, it would seem) concerning God assumes the force of necessity unless it is contravened by a weightier reason.

With regard to the question of demonstrating the existence of God, the reader-after years of having heard the positions of St. Anselm and St. Thomas simply contrasted-may be interested to discover that Hopkins finds a fatal similarity between the. Anselmian " modal argument " (the second separate and distinct ontological argument, outlined in *Proslogion,* chapter S, according to many modern interpreters) and the Thomist *via tertia.* For, although Anselm and Aquinas have somewhat

different notions of necessity, both, Hopklls claims, misapply the logic of necessary propositions and hence, in analogous ways, come up with invalid arguments. (pp. 78-89)

Finally, the detailed bibliography of texts, translations, and studies is excellent, although-as is perhaps inevitable--incomplete. Modesty forbids mentioning whose article the present reviewer particularly missed. However, a check among the listings of translations for Pedrizetti's " Letters of Saint Anselm and Archbishop Lanfranc " suggests that the author has simply overlooked one important, if little-known, journal-namely, *Tke American Benedictine Review.*

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Cardinal Newmatn In His Age: His Place In English Tkeology and Literature. By HARoLD L. WEATHERBY. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1973. Pp. $11.50.

One fascinating aspect of Cardinal Newman's thought is its seeming coincidence of opposites. This stubborn individualist and arch-defender of the primacy of conscience is the most obedient of men; this insistent proponent of the subjectivity factors active in the mind's grasp of truth, above all religious truth, dedicated his life to a defense of the authority-based Catholic tradition. These and other intriguing polarities provide Harold Weatherby, associate professor of English literature at Vanderbilt University, with his subject matter and with a bold, clear thesis. Weatherby argues that, despite his best efforts, the epistemological principles which Newman embraced inexorably lead to the subjectivism and relativism which mark the rapid dissolution of Catholic thought since Vatican TI.

In pursuit of his thesis Weatherby first strives to establish the idealistic nature of Newman's epistemology by contrasting him with the straightforward realism of Richard Hooker, the Caroline divines, and the Metaphysical poets, a realism inherited from the medieval scholastic tradition. Subsequently, he argues Newman's affinity for the platonized world-view of the Alexandrian Fathers, Coleridge, and Wordsworth. Weatherby then reviews and passes a detailed, negative judgment on the various "safeguards" by which Newman sought to reconcile his premises with Catholic orthodoxy. The consistent point of contrast here is the epistemology of classical Thomism. The closing, and perhaps weakest, section of the book considers the broad socio-political and literary consequences of Newman's thought. Newman's fixation on the ,. idea," or "spirit," of an institution, and his interpert'ative view of symbols, renders his approach to any and all

traditional inherently relativistic. Weatherby concludes that Newman's attempted synthesis of Catholic orthodoxy with his epistemological premises was a predicatable, tragic failure.

Clearly Weatherby has written a provocative book. He states his thesis boldly and argues it tenaciously in clear, attractive prose. Yet, I fear, the end result is more caricature than penetrating analysis. Putting aside the assumption that the epistemology of St. Thomas Aquinas provides the sole philosophical validation for " the Catholic tradition of fifteen hundred years," a large assumption indeed, Weatherby's exposition of Aquinas's epistemology leads to attributions scarcely different from the axioms of eighteenth-century rationalism as found, for example, in Paley's *Evidtmees.* Beginning with the premise that the only true knowledge of which the human mind is capable consists in the apprehension of the quiddity of sensible, external objects of this world, Thomism is made to assert the following. In the acquisition of all knowledge the human mind is essentially the passive recorder of intelligble species by a congenital process of abstraction universally operative in all men. The achievement of truth on any level proceeds by way of rigorous, rational scrutiny of the objective evidence, that is, evidence patently manifest to any reasonable man. The only valid religious experience of God possible to man in this life is by the way of abstract reasoning on objective evidence. The God of Christianity is *plainly* manifest in the objective harmony present in the laws of created nature and civil society, as well as in received moral and religious tradition. Christian faith is ultimately grounded neither on personal experience, nor on the authority of the Church, but on the rigorous exercise of autonomous reason. Other attributions might be added: man never really *knows* concrete, singular beings, only universals; the genuine Catholic assent of faith is necessarily " notional, " never " real " in Newman's sense; St. Thomas accepted the doctrine of transubstantiation not on authority but on grounds of its inherent reasonableness. In a word, Thomism is represented as irrevocable at odds with intuitive, interpretative reasoning.

To what extent this represents a balanced assessment of St. Thomas's thought, much less of the scope and drift of " the Catholic tradition of fifteen hundred years," I leave to those more learned. Certainly Aquinas's *intellectus agens* demands an intuitive grasp of being itself, prior to the abstraction of particular intelligible species. Certainly Schillebeeckx, Rahner, and Lonergan find much in St. Thomas's epistemology that is interpretative and intuitive. Certainly the sacramental world-view, so deeply imbedded in the biblical, patristic, and Augustinian traditions, and so dear both to contemplatives and ordinary faithful, is more than a dangerous tendency in the body of Catholic thought.

Equally unconvincing is Weatherby's interpretation of Newman's epistemology. Newman certainly held that, both in the religious and

Christian faith experience, the believer achieves a knowledge of God which exceeds those instinctive processes of intellection necessarily operative in all men by the fact that they are men. Religious knowledge is personal in that it is in function of definite, prior judgments which arise in the mind only in proportion to a man's fidelity to conscience, and hence, viewed psychologically, are man's personal achievement. Moreover, for Newman, this pre-conditioning of the knowing subject fits the general pattern of all human knowing once one passes beyond the immediate knowledge of sense objects imposed by our nature. The ability to achieve truth, wherever truth is not self-evident, is always in function of certain antecedent judgments, or "first principles," which we bring to the data, judgments gained from experience in the light of some interpretative standpoint. This is why otherwise intelligent men evaluate the same objective data differently; this is why some men consistently achieve true judgments in a given field while others do not. The intellect which is informed by the right antecedent judgments necessary to a given field of inquiry is called by Newman the "illative sense." In the ethical and religious sphere the right judgments necessary to arrive at truth are formed only through exact fidelity to conscience. Hence, Newman certainly held that human knowing is much more interpretative than we normally realize, and that the validity of the process of interpretation rests on the validity of the mind's habitual, antecedent judgments, or first principles.

Weatherby understands this in a general way, but two misrepresentations largely vitiate his interpretation of Newman. First of all, Weatherby strongly implies that Newman's theory derives from his temperament, which is defined in terms of fragmentation, alienation, and fear in face of the visible world, whereas Newman himself claimed to base his view on empirical data, namely, the teaching of Scripture and our experience of how men actually do come to believe. Moreover, Newman consistently pointed out serious difficulties in the object-centered epistemology which Weatherby defends. For example, if all valid knowledge consists in the instinctive abstraction of quiddities, then there can be no fundamental difference between the way we know a tree and the way we know a person. If the religious and Christian faith experience does not bring a distinctive, personal knowledge of God beyond that available to any intelligent man, then faith belongs to the purely affective order; believer and non-believer possess exactly the same cognition of God. If faith, to be valid, must be grounded on the rigorous assessment of patently objective evidence, then faith in children and the uneducated can never be more than superstition. If the cognitive content of faith is grounded on demonstrative reasoning, then unbelief is either inaccurate reasoning or hypocrisy, never a consistent or honest state of mind. If faith is grounded on objective reasoning, then there can be no ultimate deference to the authority of a teacher guided by the Hoy Spirit, that is, the Church. For Newman,

none of these inferences squares either with scriptural teaching or with experience. Yet Weatherby never presents Newman's objections to the interpretation of human knowing which he defends, nor does he take any noticeable account of the strong empirical bent of Newman's mind.

Secondly, Weatherby misrepresents Newman's teaching both on conscience and on human reasoning. Conscience is portrayed as an epistemological faculty which impresses a clear image of God directly on the mind, independent of the normal rational processes which accompany the reception of sense data. This image, fully constituted, precedes all reasoning and can be known by a simple turning inward. Weatherby then easily reduces Newman's conscience to an innate idea or infused species and represents the inward-turning process (which he identifies with Newman's "implicit reasoning, " informal and natural inference, " and " illative sense ") as an esoteric mode of cognition which is known only to the privileged few and remains beyond the reach of rational discourse.

But this is a serious misrepresentation. Newman's descriptive analysis of the genesis of religious and Christian faith purports to be grounded on an empirical analysis of *all* human knowing, and he consistently gives the data. This is true of his fundamental insight that, beyond what is self-evident, the mind does not simply record but achieves truth, and achieves it in terms of definite foundational judgments which are the personal acquisition of the knowing subject. Moreover, Newman insists that in the ethical and religious sphere these foundational judgments are timeless and true; they do not arise in function of temperament or culture but in function of submission to that sense of sanction (conscience} which is a constitutive element of human nature. They are, then, grounded in the objective real. It is unfair to dismiss such an epistemology as hopelessly at odds with metaphysics, or as bearing a tendency toward scepticism and idealism. Weatherby's object-centered epistemology bears ·an equal tendency toward a crude rationalism which can never escape a desiccated natural theology.

Furthermore, for Newman, conscience is not a kind of second intellect which imposes a fully constituted image of God, much less the God of Christianity, independently of our normal cognition of the visible world. By conscience Newman normally means that vague, undefined sense of moral contingency which is achieved intuitively in our immediate awareness of ourselves. This instinctive sense that we live under an imperious summons to transcend· our natural desires is the necessary, prior condition for acknowledging the binding force of those particular moral judgments which, in their initial state, are partly instinctive and partly derivative from one's culture. Conscience, then, is not a faculty so much as a descriptive term for one aspect of the human person's self-awareness; it is an insistent pressure, a horizon which, when faithfully submitted to enlightens our normal intellection. Reductively this awareness of sanction

is an intuitive awareness of God, but only reductively. The image of God arises in the intellect slowly, laboriously, in proportion to strict fidelity to conscience, yet, in the end, never of itself represents more than a supreme Someone. It is only in and through the Christian tradition that the vague God of conscience is known clearly. Hence, for Newman, conscience can never directly impress the image of the God revealed in Christ, as Weatherby implies, nor can it be an independent judge of the content of Christian revelation. Conscience inherently needs Christian revelation, though the judgments it induces are the necessary pre-conditions for seeing Christian;ity as true. Hence, Newman's firm adherence to the received Catholic tradition is not a voluntaristic leap but an exigency of his own understanding of the function and limits of conscience.

Professor Weatherby, then, has written a thoughtful, earnest book which defends the kind of epistemology which Newman rejected as consonant neither with empirical facts nor with the teaching on faith implies in Scripture. This is fair enough. To what extent his attribution of this view to St. Thomas is accurate, I have severe doubts. His interpretation of Newman's mind I find uncovincing, for it is based on misrepresentations which are pervasive and cumulative.

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Dogma 4: The Church Its Origin and Structure. By MICHAEL SCHMAUS. Translated by Mary Ledderer. New York: Sheed and Ward, 197fl. Pp. 214. *$3.95* (paper).

Professor Michael Schmaus presents a straight-forward description of the Church which is sensitive to the contemporary theological questions of ecclesiology but avoids becoming involved in controversies. The simplicity of his arguments belies the depth at which he treats problems and the care with which he balances disputed questions. We have here the work of a master dogmatician suitable for use as a textbook in the college classroom or the adult study club.

The basic research upon which this work rests is Schmaus's *Die Lehre von der Kirche* (Munich 1958). This monumental 933 page treatise which includes 46 pages of bibliography, which ranks with those of Journet and Cougar as preparatory of *Lumen Gentium,* considers the origin of the Church from the viewpoint of God, salvation history, and the foundation in Jesus Christ. This conditions the divine-human character of the Church which is presented around the biblical images People of God, Body of Christ,

and Spouse. From the nature of the Church flows the mission and structure of the visible organization, treated in terms of services for salvation.

Dogma 4 follows the outline of the *De Lehre* but updates the treatment to incorporate Vatican II documents and the ecclesial theses of contemporary theologians, especially colleagues and former students of Schmaus at the university of Munich. There are four parts to the work: a kind of introductory section on the Church as mystery of faith; next, the substantial treatment of the role and the relation of Christ and the Spirit in the Church; thirdly, the development of the theology of the Church; and finally, the extensive section on the structure of the Church.

Schmaus shows his awareness of contemporary Protestant exegesis, e. g., that the Church was born out of the common faith of Jesus' disciples, but argues for the Roman Catholic interpretation, e. g., that Christ is the origin of the Church and the continuing ground for its life and existence. His teaching on the activity of the Holy Spirit in the Church exemplifies the celebrated thesis of Schmaus's student, Heribert Muhlen, which expresses the relation of the Spirit and the Church analogously with the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation: " One Person in many persons. "

Schmaus's historical study of the development of ecclesiology follows Yves Congar's treatment of this subject and traces three periods of development: the age of the Fathers to the seventh century (Isidore), the Middle Ages, and the modern era.

Ecumenists will find that Schmaus is faithful to the Vatican II documents on the unity of the Church's structure; his presentation is open to development, but it does not go beyond the Decree on Ecumenism. He follows a theme on the unity of the life of the Church in faith, hope, and charity which is very close to that of Congar and Thomas Aquinas.

The treatment of the laity reads like Congar's revision of *Lay People in the Church.* The sections on the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome and Papal Infallibility manifest a greater originality on the part of the author but a similar balance or orthodoxy and openness to development.

The quality of this volume of *Dogma* matches that of the first three volumes and leads us to anticipate the fifth and final volume on the Church's sacramentality.

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John of Damascus on Islam. The" Heresy of the Ishmaelites." By DANIEL J. SAHAS. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972. Pp. 187. 61 guilders.

The present work, arising out of a dissertation for the Hartford Seminary Foundation, is a contribution to the Christian-Islamic dialogue from the historical point of view, and, in this case, to John Damascene's role in that dialogue. The author inve!ltigates the relevant declarations of the Synod of 754 and their significance in the first chapter, the familiar background and the political developments in Syria at the time of the Islamic conquest in the second, and the life of John Da:nascene in his Islamic environment in the third. With the fourth chapter the author enters into the most important part of his work, an examination of c. 101 in John Damascene's catalogue of heresies-first of all, its tradition. Then, in the fifth chapter, he deals with its contents, particularly (and in great detail) with the express reference to the Koran; but he also seeks to uncover traces of the Koran which appear in a general sort of way throughout the Damascene's theological writings. The sixth and seventh chapters are dedicated to the *Dialogue between a Christian and a Saracen,* and this is analyzed in the same fashion that c. 101 of the catalogue of heresies is analyzed. The author comes to the conclusion that both works (the latter at least according to its contents) are original texts of John Damascene and betray a great familiarity with the Koran and early Islamic theology. In its present format the *Dialogue* does not come from the Damascene, although its contents seem to; it is an expansion and a development of the introductory questions in *Haer.* 101, a summary of the most essential doctrines of early Islamic theology and thus an aid for the Christian in an encounter with Islam. Between *Haer.* 101 and the *Dialogue* there is a mutual dependence. In the eighth chapter the author touches upon still more writings, whether rightly or wrongly attributed to the Damascene *(De draconibus, strygibus, The Life of Peter of Capitolias, The Refutation of the Moslems,* the *Formula of Abjuration),* and he shows that these contain no position regarding Islam and should not be denied him. In the appendix the texts of *Haer.* 101 and the *Dialogue* are given in both Greek (Migne) and English. Pp. 160-168 list pertinent literature, and an index of names and of subjects follows on pp. 169-171.

Sahas is repeatedly obliged to note that particular questions cannot be answered because of the lack of a critical text (e. g., pp. 66, 67', 74). The relevant selections in the new edition of John Damascene are not yet ready for publication. Of *Haer.* 101 only the most important manuscripts have been collated so that, as a preliminary, some things can be brought up, namely, the discussion concerning *uKda* in place of *8pTJCTKEla* (p. 68); this reading is either the peculiarity of a previously unestablished manuscript or simply a printing error. In 769 as a more serious variant to *ti}v*

xaf3afHw there is still only *rov xaf3o0av;* *TOV* *ya{3ofUv* and *TOV* *f3ax0av* probably have no significance whatsoever. Four manuscripts read *xaf3ap* instead of *xaf3lp* (769 B5; cf. p. 86). The epilogue of *Haer.* ff) is no longer considered certainly genuine, so that its statements prove nothing more with reference to the extent of the 100 chapters (cf. p. 57). It should be stressed here, however, that, according to the witness of the manuscripts, *Haer.* 101 is authentic *(pace* Poggi in *Or. Chr. Per.* 38 514) and that the conclusion of *Haer.* from Migne cc. 99 and 101 is able to stand. Whether c. 101 ends with D8, as is the case in nine manuscripts (cf. my *tJberlieferungsgeschichte,* pp. 196 and gen. tree g), or with 773 *A5* has yet to be determined.

The current edition of the chronography of Theophane the Confessor would be that of C. de Boor, Leipzig 1883, reprinted in Hildesheim 1963, that of Georgios Kedrenos by I. Bekker, 1838/39 (cf. p. 3[1]). that of John Zonaras by Pinter and Biittner-Wobst, 1841/97 (cf. p. lln.)-both likewise in the Bonn Corpus. With regard to Beser (p. 10"), in *Byz. Z 56* (1963) 6 B. Hemmerdinger gives a newer meaning; he is answered in *Byzantion* 33 (1963) For Byzantine theological literature Ehrhardin Krumbacher has been outstripped by Beck's monumental opus; this should be indicated (cf. pp. 44", *59",* 99'). In the survey of the Damascene's writings (pp. 5If.) , and especially when dealing with questions of authenticity and tradition (e. g., p. 99), the work of Hoeck or Beck should have been mentioned. Probably contemporaneous with Sahas, N. Q. King worked on what was to a large extent the same subject, "S. Joannis Damasceni De haeresibus Cap. CI and Islam, " in *Studia patristica* VIII *(TU* 93) Berlin 1966, pp. 76-81. E. Trapp also deals with the *Formula of Abjuration* (pp. ff.) in the introduction (p. 15*f.) to his work on *Manuel II. Palaiologos, Dialoge mit einem "Perser" (Wiener byz. Studien* Vienna 1966.

For John Damascene's acquaintance with Arabic the author adduces the fact of the Arabic environment of the monastery of Mar Saba as well as the fact that Arabic was spoken within (p. 47) , but no proof for this is given. Thus it is an arguable point. Two hundred years earlier the monastery had been a polyglot community, and the different groups had celebrated the Liturgy of the Hours each in its own language, coming together in the church only for the Eucharist. Sahas contests the common opinion that the Damascene had already died by the year 754, and he mentions VailM's demonstration, but he puts his own argumentation, with a reference to Sauget, in some doubt (pp. 47, 48[4]). Garitte's article in *Anal. Boll.* 77 (1959) or Hoeck's in *LThK* on John Damascene would have been valuable here. " Codex of Regium " should read "Paris., B. N. gr. (Fontebl. Reg. " (p. 56[1]). and "Codex R. should be *ibid.* gr. (Mazar. Reg. The Damascene

could hardly agree to all if, in Sahas' opinion (p. 76), he was concerned in the *Expositio fidei* primarily with the knowability of God and not with his existence and his essence. Otherwise why would he have devoted his first chapters to a proof of God's being and unity and set down at length his Trinitarian doctrine in the eighth chapter? With reference to Peter of Capitolias on p. 124, his *Passio* has only been transmitted in Georgian, and it is ascribed here to the Damascene; cf. the pertinent literature in Hoeck's article *(Stand und Aufgaben),* no. 80. The Damascene's encomium of Peter is mentioned by Theophane in his chronography (ed. de Boor I 417, 14s). Mansi is not numbered by pages but by columns (cf. p. 95). "BS" (p. 484) is not explained in the index of abbreviations.

On p. 78, line 7, *xat* ΓΟ *nvri!p.a* (765 AI5) remains untranslated. In the same place as well as on p. 135 the translation is free, not to say incorrect; the reader wonders why what was correct was not immediately put in the text and why the mistake was only mentioned (as an afterthought?) in footnote 12. In the same place add the word " for" at the beginning of line 11. If it had already been determined on p. 624 that Akominatos was a pseudonym it should not have been used thereafter; cf. excursus 4 in G. Stadtmiiller's monograph on Michael Choniates *(Orientalia Christ.* 91) Rome 1934. The sayings on the cow in Sure II of the Koran appear in verses 63-66 and not 67-71. The index is not exhaustive, which is a pity.

The following typographical errors are to be noted: p. 19" should have "Delespine" rather than "Delessine"; p. 531 "Hans-Georg" rather than "Hanz-Georg"; p. 100• "Vorsehung" rather than" Forschung" (cf. also p. 161); p. 113" "Book III" rather than" Book IV"; p. 123 "Strygibus" rather than "Stygibus" (twice); p. 142, line *3,* "XCVI" rather than " XCIV "; p. 156, line 2, "XCIV " rather than "XCVI "; pp. 66" and 163, under Hoeck," XVII" rather than" XVI" (p. 1238 and 9 are correct). Typographical errors in the Greek, aside from the frequently unusual accentuation taken over from Migne: p. VII, line 4, should have *€rrrtv* rather than *€rrnv;* p. 4, line 1 of the Greek text, rather than *ibid.* line 8, rather than p. 62 *€Vayy(>..{t·rrrat* rather than *roayy£Att£rat;* p. 9, line 11, *MavuoVp* rather than *Mavuoilp;* p. 123 *£KKA'YJIT{q.* rather than *lKKA'YJIT{a;* p. 27 6 *<lv* rather than *6v;* p. 40, line 9, rch rather than nt<>; p. 545 *Kat* rather than *Ka{;* p. 731 *'Ef3pa{ot<>* rather than *'E{3patot<>;* p. 1046 *ra* rather than nf; on p. 134 insert *Kat* after *Mwvulw.,* in C7, and after *oi\n* in Bl; p. 136, line I, *8£6v* rather than *8£ov,* and in A3 *'Ay&.p* rather than *yap.*

The mistakes that have been pointed out do not detract from the essential value of this book, which seems to me to lie in the fact that the author introduces into the study of Christian-Islamic relations the invaluable element of a solid professional knowledge of the Koran and of the spiritual and intellectual history of early Islam. This together with his

listing of the relevant literature and his calm, factual point of view, puts the reader deeply in his debt.

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Savoir et Pouvoir. Philosophie thomiste et politique clbicale au XXXe siecle. By PIERRE TamAULT. Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, $10.00.

The thesis of this book is simple: theories of knowledge are theories of power. Pierre Thibault originally presented and defended this work as a thesis at the Sorbonne early in 1970. It was then entitled *L' origine et le sens de la restauration du thom·isme au XIXe siecle* and had been directed by Henri Gouhier. He was awarded the title, *docteur de l'Universite de Pan-is.* M. Emile Poulat, who wrote the Preface to this volume, had sat on the jury.

It is an exciting book: it will excite some to fear, resentment, even fury; it will excite others to further research. The author applies the sociology of knowledge to a philosophical development in the 19th century. The great discovery of the sociology of knowledge was that thought, the content of the mind and its structure, are socially grounded, are reflections of the social and political conditions of the thinker's world. While in biblical studies this principal has been accepted and is referred to as *Formgeschchte* (with its interest in the *Sitz im Leben),* philosophers and theologians have in general overlooked this. The author tries to show that various philosophical trends in Catholicism have built into them certain social and political consequences and that the struggle of the papacy to affirm neo-thomism was not only a wrestling in the intellectual order but also an affirmation of a particular view of society over against the social and political implications of the competing philosophies.

It is not a *these de recherche* (in the French sense); it does not offer new documentary evidence; indeed, the author leans heavily on the work of Hocedez, Aubert, Foucher, Pelzer, Dezza, Masnovo, Walz (spelled "Waltz" in the text), Van Riet, T'Serclaes, Des Houx, Daniel-Rops, Rougier, Lagarde, Arquilliere, Gilson, etcetera. However, he interprets the evidence in such a way that it opens up new perspectives on the whole history of thomism, not only in the 19th century but in the 13th as well. In the Avant-Propos the author tells us that his book is a settling of accounts. " But one settles an account to the past only by rendering an account " ("On ne regie son compte au passe qu'en rendant compte," p. xxiii). In a sense, then, the work is a therapeutic exercise.

According to Thibault, the restoration of thomism in the 19th century is the restoration of an ideology. Thomism (with its conception of the world in general, its naturalism, its theory of ideas-especially that!-and its theory of indirect power (Taparelli d'Azeglio and Leo XIII) was precisely the *savoir* the Church (the clergy, especially the Pope) required to legitimatize its strategy, namely, to maximize priestly power *(pouxiors)* in the new order: " le savoir y est discours de legitimation." (p. xxvi} The epistemologies of traditionalism (Louis de Bonald) and ontologism (of Kantian variety, Rosmini; of Malebranchian-Hegelian variety, Gioberti) were unsuitable for the Church's purpose: traditionalism because of its irrationalism; ontologism because of it subjectivism. In France, traditionalism, while it supported Rome's ultramontane claims and seemed to be an antidote to Cartesian skepticism, " upset the bases of Christian polemics, of religion itself, and of all certitude" (Chaste!, quoted on p. 55). Ventura presented St. Thomas as a traditionalist. He denied any natural metaphysics in the name of a thomism that required the absolute subordination of reason to faith. The damage done by traditionalism was great. However, in its polemic with eclecticism (Cousin), it was the unconscious promoter of ecclesiastical thomism (the thesis of Michelet and Foucher adopted by Thibault, see pp. 8-5) .

In Italy, ontologism was the Christian platonism or augustinianism of the 19th century. Kleutgen, the German-Roman thomist, said that ontologism attributes to the natural power of reason a knowledge which belongs to the supernatural order. The divine essence could be grasped directly by the intellect. It was antischolastic and anti-aristotelian. It was unfavorable to any extension of the doctrinal and dogmatic authority of the Holy See. In a way, ontologism was the ideology of the Italian national movement. Paradoxically enough, Rosmini and Gioberti were the harbingers of neo-guelphism! After 1848 the Pope and the Jesuits were opposed to this kind of liberalism and modernity. At Vatican I the most eager adversary of ontologism was Cardinal Joachim Pecci (future Leo XIII) . He demanded that the proposition, *naturalis est homini cognitio Dei immediata et directa* be condemned.

In Germany, the attempt of Hermes to assimilate kantian criticism to Catholic philosophy failed because he made faith the term of a philosophical reasoning process. He was condemned by Gregory XVI because he denied the liberty of the act of faith, et cetera. The hegelian Gunther gave Catholic thought the kind of rationalism the epoque sought, but he made faith the very object of philosophical reasoning. This eliminated the notion of mystery. His writings were condemned in 1857 by Pius IX. The criticism of Hermes and the idealism of Gunther were too threatening to the teaching magisterium (clerical power) because they were philosophies either deprived of objective ideas or in which ideas could be grasped directly by the individual subject.

After the Avant-Propos and Introduction Thibault's book comprises three parts, an appendix, a conclusion, a bibliography and an index of proper names (in that order).

In the Avant-Propos the author briefly outlines the history of his own research and explains his thesis in sociological terms. *Aeterni Patris* had been his *point de depart* at the start of his research; it became, however, his *point d'arrivee.* His initial proposal was to examine how the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of 1879 had been so effective in Catholic milieux. He laid aside certain commonplaces regarding the restoration of thomism (e. g., that the focus was the Dominicans, that thomism was essentially a response to the need for an apologetics, et cetera) when he realized that the political implications of thomism were overwhelming. It was the political dimension that would explain the extraordinary interest Leo XIII took in thomism-Leo XIII who was not much of a philosopher at all. Thomism had an essential meaning and function beyond its explicit discourse.

Part I, the longest portion of the book, is " The origins of neo-thomism, " and covers a lot of ground. The first chapter deals with the various philosophical orientations in Europe in the 19th century, e. g., ontologism in Italy, traditionalism in France, critical rationalism in Germany, scholasticism in Spain, the reappearance of thomism in Italy (Piacenza, Rome, Naples), and the good relations that obtained between the early thomists and the other catholic intellectuals (Buzzetti and La Mennais, Taparelli and Rosmini, Gioberti, Cousin). I feel Thibault could have taken G. F. Rossi's work more seriously, especially in view of the retractation of A. Pelzer and the review of A. Mansion. He incorrectly allies Fabro with Pirri. (p. 29, fn. 67)

Chapter I dealt with the reappearance of thomism; chapter II deals with its restoration. The story of the foundation of the *Civilta Cattolica* in Naples, its transferral to Rome, and its conversion to thomism in 1853 is told briefly and in an interesting way. This doctrinal review would be the antidote of revolutionary ideas and be the ally of papal politics in the 19th century. It would go back to the Middle Ages and restore in the modern world the role played then by the Church. A number of events paved the way for this restoration: Ventura's lectures in Paris, Taparelli's defense of Ventura, the diffusion in Rome of Balmes' *Filosofia fundamental* in 1853 and Kleutgen's *Theologie der Vorzeit* in the same year, the Jesuit *Ordinatio Studiorum* of 1858 prepared by Liberatore, Taparelli, Kleutgen, Sordi, and Curci, the debate on hylomorphism between the Roman College and the *Civilta Cattolica* in 1861, Minerva's support after 1860 and that of the *Syllabus* in 1864.

A whole section is devoted to *les grandes Polemiques* (pp. 52-67): traditionalism, ontologism, and German rationalism. The author finally underscores the importance of Vatican I. *Quanta cura* and the *Syllabus*

of 1864 condemned practically everything that was not scholastic. The proclamation of papal infallibility was in conformity with the spirit of thomism and created the conditions which made its official and authoritative restoration possible. The relative impenetrability of the mysteries (proclaimed by the *Con.stitutio dogrnatica de fide.. catlwlica)* rendered the role of the ecclesiastical magisterium necessary to explain them. Thibault then outlines briefly the effects of the Council in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany. Throughout this whole development the author keeps us very aware of the influence of Pius IX's struggle with the *Risorgimeuto* on the restoration of thomism. Restoration meant the setting up of things in the closest approximation to conditions as they had been before the Revolution (of 1848).

Chapter III is entitled " A Certain Apologetics at Stake. " The early thomists were obsessed with epistemology or its anthropological foundations. Thibault contends that it was not primarily a question of saving Catholic dogmatics by saving the Aristotelian ontology integrated in it. Rather, it was a question of restoring in philosophy a catholic, social, practical frame of mind so as to dislodge an omnipresent subjectivism which engendered a heterodox and anti-social spirit, hardly suitable for action. What was involved was a certain conception of the Church and of clerical power. The fall of monarchies and the weakening of national churches allowed one to envisage the restoration of that conception. The ultramontanes wanted to restore the bureaucratic design of medieval Christianity which had elaborated the Catholicism of the Counter Reform and which had clashed with royal absolutism and the autonomy of universities and national churches. Of course, with Leo XIII, political ultramontanism under the form of indirect power became a reality. The Jesuits were the chief force behind its establisment. Thibault says that Dollinger knew what the real stakes were. In 1863 he uncovered the sociological conflict within the clerical world that the philosophical polemics of Roman scholasticism masked. The epistemological problem did not arise from philosophical research. It was imposed by disciplinary and political imperatives and the expediency of their theological implications. In other words, theological and political objectives had posed the problem. The political objectives needed no justification. To realize these, a suitable formulation of the problem had to be found *a posteriori.* Thibault proceeds to demonstrate why traditionalism failed to provide a rational apologetics and a natural foundation for the *preambula fidei.* The obsession of the Roman thomists with authority and spiritual unanimity is manifest. Spiritualism and anthropological dualism had to be suppressed also, because they constituted the soil in which cartesianism, criticism, and ontologism grew. For example, the theory of innate ideas in Descartes implies human dualism, human dualism implies idealism, and this leads to pantheism.

Subjective and idealistic pantheism exalts the autonomy and dynamism of the individual soul in religious experience and hence is a constant threat to the authority of the clerical machine. Taparelli had said in 1854: " In spiritual matters, lay people are incompetent and powerless. " Thirty years later Liberatore will defend clerical supremacy. It is of divine institution. " The church of Jesus Christ is essentially clerical, because the clergy is the formal element in it. " (see p. 94) In a section on " Thomism and Clericalism " the author contends that clerical power, an institutionalized spiritual power, is a ministerial power. It becomes absolute when its source and mandate are undisputed and are directly acessible only to the one who exercises it. This power is exercised in the moral and metaphysical domains; it is founded on the monopoly of essential theological truths and the exclusive right of access to the source of their revelation. The justification for such a prerogative is the object of apologetics and cannot be accommodated by *any* epistemology. Thomism, however, was appropriate.

In Chapter IV, "A certain Politics at Stake," Thibault shows that the history of Catholic philosophy in the 19th century has a political dimension without which the rise of thomism is unintelligible. Political thomism did not appear with Leo XIII; it was advocated by the neo-thomists from the beginning. Social and political considerations won Taparelli, Sanseverino, and Liberatore to thomism after 1850. Taparelli and the *Civilta Cattolica* were the formulators and promoters of indirect power. Balmes had set forth the thomistic political naturalism that was the basis of the doctrine of indirect power. In 1872 Liberatore wrote *la Chiesa e lo Stato* defending papal supremacy in Hildebrandian fashion. So that, Thibault concludes, as far as ecclesiastical politics go, thomism already had the characteristics and ambitions it will display under Leo XIII-once he officializes it. Aristotelian-thomistic epistemology responds to the need of establishing precise apologetical and political positions, characterized by the absolute supremacy of the Holy See over bishops and theologians and over civil authorities. (p. US) Throughout the chapter the author emphasizes once again that it is against the backdrop of the vicissitudes of papal politics (especially the internal situation of Italy and its alliances with the Holy See) that one must see the astonishing dialect which characteries the history of Catholic liberalism into which neo-thomism will be inserted. (p. ll4)

Part Two deals with the intervention of Leo XIII in three chapters, culminating in chapter VII, " Papal Thomism. " Thibault gives a resume of some twelve encyclicals and official acts of Leo XIII (from 1878 to 1901) to recall how he has systematically sought to restore a certain politics, the philosophical framework of which was the thomistic doctrine. Leo XIII's " *grande politique* " assumed a certain relationship between the

Church and secular governments: the latter were indirectly subject to the former. The Church alone possesses the solution of social problems. She can offer her services to the established powers disquieted by the rise of socialist aspirations.

Part Three is concerned with the permanent vocation of thomism. While reading this section the reviewer remembered a statement from one of Christopher Dawson's *Medieval Essays:* "It is impossible to understand the history of the medieval church, and its relations with the State and to social life in general if we treat it in the analogy of modem conditions. " Thibault contends that what thomism was for Leo XIII in the 19th century has always been its vocation. In the Middle Ages the success of Thomist politics precedes that of its apologetics. The thomists rallied to the defence of Boniface VIII over the gallican question (Phillip le Bel). Thomism is situated in the long tradition of clerical theocracy. Thibault says, quoting Gilson, that " with St. Thomas, we remain on the level of papal theocracy, which does not consist in suppressing the temporal power of princes, but in subordinating it to the royalty of the earthly vicar of Christ the King. " (p. 207) He seems to think there is a connection between the career of St. Thomas at the papal court (1259-65, 1267, 1268) and the content of his doctrine. The pattern set by St. Thomas vis-a-vis the augustinians and averroists is the very same pattern we find throughout the history of thomism. An important section in this part of the book is "Epistemology and Power." I think this Part Three needs to be challenged most. I wonder what Ignatius Eschmann would have said about it. His edition of the *De Regimine Principum* is not listed, but apparently it has not been studied.

Recently J. K. Galbraith wrote a book in which he demonstrates that economics is a branch of politics in contemporary America. Pierre Thibault has written this book in which he shows, with the help of the sociology of knowledge, that theology and philosophy in the 19th century were branches of papal politics. It is indeed a challenging book. In the age of Watergate the language is alas too familiar! Let the author have the last word:

> Pour le thomisme, done, l'exigence de la transcendance et de sa revelation surnaturelle est en droit accessible a tous. On peut pretendre sommer !'intelligence de la percevoir, ou au moins taxer d'infirmite ou de malhonnetete quiconque pretend n'en avoir pas une vision claire. Mais cette demarche de !'intelligence ne peut que la conduire humblement a la porte de l'Eglise-le *thomisme est une sorte of Canossa* inteUectud-laquelle detient seule l'essentiel de la verite. (p. author's emphasis)

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Problems of Marriage and Sexuality Today. By PETER J. RmA. New York: Exposition Press. Pp. 126. $5.00.

The prolific Peter J. Riga has in this book turned his hand to some of the problems surrounding the understanding of sexuality and the meaning of marriage in a way that is much less than the " definitive treatment " advertized on the jacket of the book. What we have here is a popular exposition of some of the themes drawn from the biblical and phenomenological fields that are now the argot of a renewed moral theology. There is also a treatment of several specific problems arising to-day: "The New Morality" Abortion, Over-Population, Women's Liberation, etc., as well as several pages of advice to pastors on how to direct their apostolates towards the needs of the threatened nuclear family. This is a useful book for young adults, young marrieds, and those who serve them.

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Psychology for Church Leaders Series. By GARY R. CoLLINS. Vol. m. *Fractured Personalities: The Psychology of Mental Illness.* Carol Stream, Ill.: Creation House, 1972. Pp. 217. $2.95.

This volume is not intended to be a comprehensive introduction to the field of mental illness but psychological conclusions which are most relevant and practical for a church leader. An earlier volume imparted an understanding of counseling skills. More than skills are needed, and so this book's purpose is to give the church leader some knowledge about the nature and causes of mental illness. The author does this very well.

According to Collins, a normal person is one who is at peace with society, himself, and God. A person is abnormal if he is at odds with the social expectations of his society or experiences internal conflict which leads to intense and prolonged feelings of insecurity, anxiety or unhappiness. Finally, a person is abnormal if he is alienated from God.

Abnormality is considered under the concepts of cause, symptom, diagnosis, treatment, and types. Collins is more successful in integrating the religious dimensions than in previous volumes of this series. Each chapter contains a discussion of the related religious dimensions, and he is convinced that religion has a role in overcoming mental stress. In fact, the pastor has a unique role in dealing with the mentally disturbed, and he should be a member of the hospital team. Clinical Pastoral Education and similar programs are assisting chaplains and pastors to handle this

role in hospital settings. Collins is of the opinion that many forms of therapy ignore the spiritual needs of man.

The church counselor should let his values be known, because " the counselor's ethics, values and philosophy influence and even determine the goals of therapy. It follows that counselor values will also influence the methods and techniques which are means toward these goals." (p. 109) He seems to opt for the idea that a client should choose a counselor with the same value system.

The rather complex material of abormal behavior is handled with great clarity of language. Its intended audience should be able to grasp the material with relative ease.

The present volume makes more generous use of case studies and overcomes one of the criticisms this reviewer made about volumes I and II in the series. Each chapter has a short annotated bibliography, and the general bibliography and index are also most helpful.

Fractured Personalities is a good introduction for the seminary student or church leader with little background in abnormal behavior. It can also serve as a refresher or a handy reference book for the busy experience pastor.

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The Self Beyond: Toward Life's Meaning. By BENJAMIN S. LLAMZON. Chicago: Loyola Press, 1973. Pp. 184. $5.95.

The meaning of life is correlative to the nature of personhood; the meaning of life is the meaning in terms of the person, and a person, as reflective consciousness, is perforce intimately connected with " meaning. " As the author puts it: " the problems of the self and the meaning-of-life question are merely two different aspects of the very same reality." (p. 37)

Granting the correlation, there are many ways the reality may be approached. Dr. Llamzon, whose book is a moderately long philosophical essay on the topic, chooses to strike for the heart of human personhood and, in terms of his solution of this long-debated puzzle, unfold what he conceives to be the essential dynamic in terms of which its meaning-of-life emerges.

He selects, for the essence of the person, the free and reflexive will, the juncture in man of being and becoming, the meeting ground of the " is " and the " ought. " He proposes, as the meaning-full process of the self, the growth in love as a wholing process, the impulsion of the fragment towards the whole.

By way of evaluation, we should note what this procedure accomplishes and what it leaves unaccomplished. The first point at issue is, of course, the election of " free and reflexive will " as the essence of human personhood, which invites us to re-introduce the unending debates of the intellectualists the voluntarists. It is probably wiser, however, to resist the invitation. A review of this caliber is not the forum in which core philosophical controversies are best debated, nor is Dr. Llamzon concerned in his work with the final distinctive nicety which most aptly defines the person. As long as voluntarists admit that the will is the will of a conscious being whose knowing what he is willing is the significance of the willing, and intellectualists allow that a self-consciousness without a self-determinism is an unreal and eviscerated conception, there is enough agreement for progress. In any realistic consideration of human personhood both aspects have to be given full valuation, and if it exercises and intrigues subtle minds to inquire into their relative preeminence, minds with other concerns can validly, without prejudice to the arguments they are further developing, decide the issue by simple election.

Dr. Llamzon is, in any event, not presenting a tightly argued position. He proceeds from point to point juxtaposing his progressive steps rather loosely, depending on the appeal of the over-all position more than on the intrinsic necessities of his series of links. Furthermore, he does not aim at presenting a total picture of the dynamics of the human person in relation to the meaning of life. He singles out what he considers the primal and ultimate dynamic-love as a wholing process, and relates this dynamic and its implications to several of life's crucial issues-encounter, infinity, marriage, death, and rests his case. This procedure leaves essential elements of the human person unconsidered and unrelated. There are the vital differences of sex and individuality, the intricate process of growth and maturation and the critical issues of "timing " in relation to a person's successful wholing. There are the issues of love as a sharing process and reverence as a recognition of the unsharable, the relation of achieving and sharing as mutually enchancing one another or as mutually opposing each other, the relation of .the individual to those he loves within the system of rights and obligations established by community, the relations of needs to be fulfilled to the call to transcend needs, the relations of individuals as fragments to each other's whole and participations in a divine whole, the relation of urge and affect pressures on the cognitive processes and the subrelation of their effect on the actual process of arriving at meaning in life.

There are the inequalities of persons and their consequent distribution into hierarchies and the effects this has on their modes of wholing, and there are the balances of freedom and commitment and submission to restraint to be worked out as the wholing process unfolds. There is personal vocation and destiny to be sought within and perhaps outside of

whaling and incidentals like premature tragedy and unforeseen good fortune. And finally, if the thrust toward wholing is the supraordinate dynamic in life, the subordinate dynamics must somehow be related to it: tension discharge, unfolding, adaptation, homeostasis, personal fulfillment.

It would be unfair to demand that the author engage in the discussion of all these issues in a book that purposes to limit itself to one vital issue, but it is fair to point out that they exist and must be considered eventually.

What Dr. Llamzon does is simpler. After an introductory chapter pressing home the depth of the obscurity of the mystery of the meaning of life, he argues to the conclusions that the heart of man is the free, reflexive will, and the meaning of life is the whaling process of love. He touches briefly on Greek and Medieval ideas of love as whaling, and then, more extensively, on Christian love as purely altruistic (Bishop Anders Nygren) and Christian love as both self-and other-centered (Martin D'Arcy, S. J.), with additional insights from Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer. He enlarges the concept with contributions from depth psychology (Freud), and existentialism (Marcel), and finally, to bring all the preceding into focus and to indicate where his own preferences lie, he presents Jules Toner's theory of radical love. In the last three chapters of the book he applies his conclusions of love to friendship, to love in marriage, and to love and death.

In sum, Dr. Llamzon has presented the results of his own earnest study of the meaning of self and self's meaning in life, not to end but further the search.

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Plato. By GEORGE KIMBALL PLOCHMANN. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973. Pp. 543. $1.95.

The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue. By RODOLF H. WEINGARTNER. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1973. Pp. 215. $2.95.

Despite the different aims of these two books there is a common ground: their authors share a conviction that interpretation of Plato must take into consideration the wholeness and unity of the Platonic writings. Indeed the authors see their task as partly the rescue of Plato from the hands of contemporary philosophers who persist in dissecting his writings into short passages and subject them to analysis, apart from the context of his dialogues.

Thus Weingartner is critical of approaches to Plato that tend to isolate and interpret independently parts of what Plato wrote from the context of the whole dialogue, and also of those scholars who take the pronouncements of the participants of the dialogues to be in a sense beyond the dialogue in which they occur, to be contributions to a Platonic doctrine. He sums up this approach-which he calls the "doctrinal view"-as follows:

> Whatever the variations, however, the distinctive mark of this approach to Plato's work is the dual assumption that some personages in his dialogues are merely masks for their creator and that the words they speak may be removed from their dialogic context and then conjoined to make up a continuous exposition of the Platonic doctrine. (p. 2)

He is also critical of the approach whereby

> Particular arguments, conceptions, or myths, as well as passages that contain more or less elaborated philosophic principles, are detached from their contexts and subjected to detailed scrutiny. That Plato wrote dialogues is more often than not ignored: the words are taken as if they were asserted by their author; no attention is paid to the fact that they are spoken by one of the characters of his creation. (p. 3)

Weingartner insists that, despite the fact that the extraction of Platonic doctrines and the scrutiny of individual passages might produce important philosophical insights, these approaches are inadequate for understanding Plato and most probably will lead to distortions of his thought and intentions. What Plato said cannot be understood without considering the whole of which isolated passages, arguments or speeches are parts:

> Plato wrote dialogues. The dramatic context of a particular argument or speech may have important bearing on its meaning; to consider a speech or argument in isolation-however interesting it may be when taken up for its own sake--may not lead to an understanding of what the dialogue actually says. And because Plato wrote dramatic works, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It therefore cannot be taken for granted that when interpretations of isolated passages are placed side by side, the result will be an understanding of a Platonic dialogue as a whole. (pp. 3-4)

Similarly, Plochmann is concerned with the dangers of scrutinizing individual passages without considering the unity of the Platonic dialogue:

> Not everything is of equal weight in assuring the unity and coherence of a dialogue, not everything is of equal weight in forcing a correct interpretation upon us. The "seeing" of truth which the dialogues in some measure afford us is contingent upon our being aware of the sources of the unity of each work; this is a far cry from happening across some impressive passage and pulling it out of the dialogue and merely agreeing with it, for such a reading, however sympathetic, is really a dismemberment, and plunges us back into the particular, the episodic--into becoming (p. 98).

In fact, Plochmann finds faults with the common ways of interpreting Plato. (pp. 31-34) And although he will use the good features of these types of interpretations, he himself insists that the Platonic writings must be looked at in the way that is appropriate to a dialogue. He distinguishes three components of the dialogue form as perceived by Plato: (a) Sentences of opinion and of reasoned conviction; (b) The dialogic component-i.e., the participants of the dialogues, each with his character, experience, background (pp. (c) The dramatic devices-i.e., scene, movements of participants, entrances and exists, gestures. (pp. And although the author seems to agee with most scholars that philosophical ideas are of paramount importance for Plato, he nonetheless claims that Plato wrote as he did for good reasons, namely,

> ...to demonstrate the relation between what a participant says and what he himself is... .Philosophical concepts are not connected in propositions in a vacuum, but in a concrete context of human beings and their very complex interrelationship. What Plato is attempting to accomplish is nothing less than a union, little tried and very rarely succeeded in by other philosophers, of a drama and conflict of ideas and the similar but not quite parallel drama and conflict of persons .... To both of these the " dramatic touches " provide vivid clues, but only clues, for they are not substantive statements and proofs. (pp. 26-27)

I do not think many scholars would disagree with Plochmann's contention that the dramatic elements of the Platonic dialogue must be taken into account. To do so, however, in a way that is both interesting and illuminating philosophically is not an easy task-and is moreover a task at which Plochmann largely fails. He contents himself with sporadic generalities and vague statements about the dramatic elements of the dialogues which fail to provide insight into the philosophical ideas Plato is examining.

Plochmann's book consists of selections from Plato's writings with schematic outlines (pp. 155-534) and a long introductory essay. (pp. 9-155) The selections include the *Ion, Protagoras, Symposium, Apology, Phaedo, Republic* (Books VI in part, VII, VIII, IX in part), *Timaeus* (in part), and *Critias.* The author uses the Jowett translations but only mentions this indirectly on p. 158, an unhelpful omission. The introductory essay contains some biographical material (pp. and some general remarks about the Platonic corpus and the problems with interpreting it (pp. ; but the greatest part is devoted to a discussion of the Platonic Philosophy, (pp. and of Platonism and the History of Western Thought. (pp. The discussion of the Platonic Philosophy covers God and the Gods, Cosmos and Animal, Man's Soul, The Virtues, The Arts, The State, Education, Mathematics, Types of Cognition, Ideas or Forms, Truth and Being, Dialectic, Eight Impostor Methods. These same topics are then discussed in the section on Platonism and the History of Western Thought, where the author traces the influence of Platonism in subsequent Western thought.

It would be impossible to discuss all of the above topics critically and in detail here. I will therefore make some general comments and then briefly touch on two or three of these topics. Plochmann's writing is certainly neither the most clear nor the most precise in the philosophical literature. Excessive use of figurative, metaphorical, and allegorical language often makes it difficult to see what he has in mind. What is gained, for example, by writing in the following manner?

> It seems that something would try to creep in and occupy the honorable place of dialectic, unseat it, shame it, and dismiss it as being of no consequence. To accomplish this such an imposter would be required either to look very much like dialectic-so that only a close dialectical examination could show up the differences--or else be able to refute dialectic, or both. (p. 116)

At other times it is hard to believe that Plochmann is serious-especially in his discussion of the history of Platonism. This part of the introductory essay consists primarily of vague generalizing statements without clearly defined terms, and of assertions without evidence, concerning the influence of Platonism that will certainly amaze even the most fertile imagination. On p. 131 he writes that

> ... the conception of a host of lesser divinities and demigods which we find in the *Timaeus, Republic, Phaedrus,* and elsewhere, is transmuted into the Christian doctrine of the angels, principalities, and powers, levels of goodness and semi-divine strength.

And noticing that in contemporary thinking the existence of these divine beings has been denied, Plochmann concludes by saying that

> This does not mean that the issue is settled, but we should point out again that the struggle in the pulpit mirrors exactly the dilemmas which Plato's Socrates had to face, both within himself and in the court of his accusers.

On the same page, commenting on Plato's influence on later conceptions of the Cosmos and Animal, Plochmann writes:

> Plato's atomism is joined with his theory of an active soul in the monadic centers of spiritual force that are forever associated with the name of Leibniz, and his atoms, deprived of their ability to develop spirituaJ!y, are again found in the "hard, massy particles that never wear" of Sir Isaac Newton.

On p. we learn that " a theory, called vitalism, is a simplification of what Plato says concerning the primacy of reason and soul. " On p. 134 that " one interesting sidelight on the influence of Platonism in the twentieth century, especially in the United States, is the tremendous upsurge of enthusiasm for the art of astrology." The list of assertions of this type is far too long to be given in its entirety here. But no reviewer of this book would want to deprive his readers of the following two passages

which seem to me to be some of the more bewildering assertions about the history of Platonism. Discussing Plato's contribution as a philosopher of education on pp. 140-141, Plochmann writes:

> Socrates' method seems to require individual attention, penetrating insight, and many gifts of patient and inspired explanation and interrogation. Where does one get a chance to practice this? Perhaps in the best graduate colleges or tutorial systems, but certainly nowhere else. Consequently the educators have proposed that machines supplement live teachers, and do the drilling. This overlooks the fact that the drilling is not always a matter of bare repetition, which thus far is all that a computer can perform. On the other hand, computers are barely three decades old, and perhaps some day a little part of the Socratic ideal might be realized in them.

And concluding his discussion of the influences of Plato's theory of Forms on subsequent thought, Plochmann writes:

> Because devices of persuasion of the masses have received so much suspicious attention in the past four decades, we have become highly sensitive to the use of universal expressions. Thus, " glittering generalities " is a term of disapproval, and indeed one need do little more than charge an opponent with using one of these in order to discredit him. By coincidence, we have in these same decades seen the decimation and even the disappearance of species after species of animal, owing to the befouling of earth and atmosphere, and this too has shaken the belief in any kind of type or form more permanent than the individual. At the moment, then, the existence of the species as anything more than a word is generally held up to doubt, if not to scorn.

Turning now to the discussions of the various topics that make up the Platonic Philosophy, it is obvious that, although the discussions vary somewhat in quality, all suffer from lack of clarity, vagueness, and the author's unwillingness to discuss in depth the main ideas of Plato. Although the discussions of Cosmos and Animal, Man's Soul, and Dialectic fare better than those of other topics, some of the important topics of Platonism, however, are treated in the most inadequate way. Take for example the discussion on the State, and in particular Plochmann's account of the *Republic*. Plochmann in one paragraph mentions very briefly the whole problem of social justice and its relation to the individual soul. His account is simply that,

> The excellences, or virtues, of the three pairs [three parts of the soul and three classes] are, in order, wisdom, courage, and temperance. But this ignores the unity, the cohesiveness, both of the soul and of the state, and justice is the principle of this balance in the soul and the state. To each faculty, to each class, belongs its own function; this is the essence of political justice, as opposed to busy-bodying or meddling, which is the principal meaning of injustice. (p. 65)

I doubt that this discussion will be of any use to a student of Plato attempting to understand the important problems of the *Republic*. I find

the discussion on Education equally inadequate. Commenting on the apparent contradiction between the conclusions of Meno-that virtue comes from divine dispensation-and that of the *Protagoras-where* Socrates claims that virtue is not knowledge and hence is not teachable, and Protagoras claims the contrary-Plochmann says that this seems to be contradictory till we see the following: (a) In the *Meno,* unlike the *Protagoras,* "we are dealing with rough-and-ready formulas about virtue .... which may or may not be satisfactory (the gods will decide!) as a guide to action in the community." (b) "In the *Protagoras* the issue is between the Sophist's day-to-day compound of instruction and persuasion which is evidently not based upon sound principles ... and Socrates' more exact, thoughtful instruction which uses the most careful tests for all ideas at issue, and which is aimed at the reform of one's character." (p. 74) Plochmann never makes clear where the apparent contradiction between the conclusions of *Meno* and the *Protagoras* is nor how the above distinctions do away with it. He then argues that this same problem can be viewed from a different perspective, i. e., the role of tradition in education. He takes Plato and Socrates to have emphasized this role of tradition and writes:

> Plato, then, is telling us that tradition is one of the fundamental factors required in any successful grasp of teaching, whether it be the dry and pedestrian arguments of Parmenides or the lightfooted treading by Socrates in his more prankish moods. The sense of time and of the past and change is of the utmost importance to Plato, who evidently scorned those who thought they had been born yesterday. (pp. 75-76)

He then turns to the "politics of education" where he discusses Plato's account of education in the *Republic.* This discussion stays on the whole close to the surface and fails to bring out any of the philosophical issues and problems. Why does Plato think that his account of education would be conducive to virtue? What are the psychological theories underlying his views on education?

The discussion of the Forms and of Being and Truth seem to me, however, to be the most inadequate. In reading Plochmann's account of the Forms I found it impossible to determine what he takes these entities to be. He writes,

> It makes a difference to man whether ideas exist; the only thing is, they exist in many senses, but to assert that they also exist in certain other senses winds up in nonsense. Socrates is not impartial. but he is highly selective. We might say that all beautiful girls are beautiful, for example, not because of certain details of nose, eyes, hair, etc., but because they imitate or participate in an idea of beauty-this is Socrates' proposal, and Parmenides misses the point in thinking that there must be a part-by-part or whole-by-whole correspondence between thing and idea. (p. 94)

Whatever the first part of this passage means, the last part of it is certainly mistaken. Parmenides had a point and Plato was well aware of its significance, which Plochmann misses. In trying to elucidate the permanence of the Forms, he writes:

> We should say that the idea of the number three, which is different from the number two, is permanent in the sense that whatever is two will never become three, what is even will never become odd *(Phaedo* 106b), and what is intelligible in this way will never become unknowable. (p. 96)

This cannot be true. If it was, then the idea of Beauty (Justice, Piety, Goodness, Largeness, etc.) is permanent in the sense that whatever is beautiful (just, pious, good, etc.) will never become ugly (unjust, impious, bad, etc.). If Platonists ever agreed about anything, it seems to me they agree that Plato never said anything like the above.

I will conclude by touching upon Plochmann's discussion of Being. He says with regard to change that there are four possibilities: (1) *"No* changes, only static being"; (Q) "only *uniform* change, with no other being, no fixity"; (3) "only *random* change"; (4) "If, on the other hand, the world at large is made up of *all* of the first three ... then what we have is a vastly complicated set of adjustments as being, uniformity, and randomness rule, now in one way, now in another." (p. 99) Plochmann thinks that Plato takes the cosmos to be as described by the last alternative, i. e., that it has all three aspects. He then tries to show that the dialogues themselves display this threefold " layered " aspect: fixed structures, e. g., the necessities of proof; transient but predictable events, e. g., the execution of Socrates after sentence had been passed and after he had refused to escape from prison; chance occasions, e. g., unforeseen meetings, interruptions, misunderstandings. He then goes on to argue that all these aspects must be reconciled in order to see the true relation between being and becoming in Plato's thought:

> These three are not easy to reconcile, but they must be reconciled, or we miss what is most important in Plato. Nor is it easy to tag a single incident or personage with a single designation: wei are tempted to think of Socrates, the man having wisdom, as representative of being, of stability, of permanence. But at the end of the *Symposiumr--a* colossal masterpiece, by the way-he is not deified, he is not revealed as anything more than a man who is somewhat baffiing to his admirers: and he goes about the business of the day, which is to say he is again taken up with becoming. In the *Phaedo,* which can well claim to be the literary .equal of the *Symposium,* Socrates really dies and is not resurrected, as we have already pointed out. So in any literal sense we cannot assume for him any special privilege of a higher cosmic rank, a divine nature. (p. 100)

I hope the reader will find this explanation of Being and Becoming more illuminating than I do--otherwise he will be in the dark.

I am quite certain that the reader will find Weingartner's book vastly

superior to Plochmann's. Weingartner writes clearly and precisely. He judiciously examines the Platonic texts as well as the secondary literature on the topics he discusses. The reader will profit from the careful analysis of these texts, even if he disagrees with some of Weingartner's interpretation. The most important aspect of Weingartner's book is its thesis about the way the Platonic texts must be interpreted in order to determine what Plato himself wanted to say, convey, or show.

Weingartner points out that Plato wrote dialogues in which he never himself appears as participant. It would be a mistake therefore to disregard this dramatic idiom and take the utterances of the participants of the Platonic dialogues as being statements of Plato's own philosophical positions:

> *Plato* wrote dialogues: a mind-one that is not identical with the minds of Socrates, the Stranger, Parmenides, Callicles, Protagoras, Meno, and all the rest-composed each of the works, and for a purpose that is not the same as the purposes displayed by these characters. p. 6)

It would be equally a mistake, according to Weingartner, to take the dialogues to be historical accounts of what these participants said and did at particular places and times. Rather

> The existence of those words and gestures can be accounted for only by reference to the author of the dialogue in his role as philosopher-artist .... Once again we must interpret the various components of the dialogue as fulfilling an *authors* purpose, a purpose that goes far beyond recording what might in fact have happened. (p. 10)

Plato's purpose, acr.ording to Weingartner, is to "speak to his readers through his dialogues." Plato, by *means* of his dialogues, conveys philosophical themes. A theme is something that unifies a particular dialogue itself:

> Plato is not reduced to choosing between showing and saying: a dialogue may have a theme-even a conclusion-which is Plato's and not that of his creatures, a theme which is upheld by the entire work, although it may never be explicitly stated within it... The theme of a Platonic dialogue is extrinsic to it only in the sense that it is not stated as such by one of the participants in the discussion; in a vital, though different, sense it is an all-pervasive feature of the work. (pp. 6-7)

But if a theme is not stated in a dialogue, what is the evidence that Plato was conveying such themes? We can only support a claim about the theme of a particular dialogue by a close examination of that dialogue, by showing how the theme unifies the dialogue and makes its parts intelligible:

> No evidence can be given for such a claim about the Platonic dialogues in general; support must come from the detailed examination of particular works... Evidence that Plato was conveying specific philosophical themes by means of his dialogues

must take the form of showing how, on the one hand, that theme unifies the work and renders it a whole and, on the other, how it makes intelligible its component parts-- speeches, arguments, characterizations--in relation to each other. (pp. 7-8)

The aim of Weingartner's book is precisely this: to examine three of Plato's *dialogues-CratylU$, Protagoras,* and *Parm.enides-and* show how each one of them conveys a philosophical theme. But, first, it is not clear to me on what grounds we can make the general claim Weingartner makes that what the participants assert are not their own nor Plato's philosophical views. Undoubtedly this is true in some cases. But are we to say that what Socrates asserts about the Forms in the *Phaedo* and *Republic* are not Plato's positions-at least at that stage of his philosophical development? And are we to say that Socrates' assertions in the *Republic* regarding Justice, the State, etc., are not accounts of Plato's views on these matters? I doubt that Weingartner would want to say this. For he himself takes the *Parmenides* to be primarily an effort to resolve some of the difficulties with the theory of Forms of the Middle Dialogues, a theory which he takes to be Plato's own theory. Second, there is a danger in finding a theme extrinsic- to a dialogue-even if such a theme unifies the whole dialogue-and claiming that this is what Plato wants to convey. For there is always the danger of leaving the texts behind and making claims about Plato's philosophical beliefs which are not to be found stated anywhere in the texts. We shall see below that Weingartner himself does not manage to avoid this danger.

Turning now to a brief discussion of the individual dialogues, Weingartner claims that, through the subject of discussion in the *CratylU$* is the true nature of names, the " single overriding purpose " (p. 15) is to convey the following theme: " Hermogenes and Cratylus maintain theories of naming which, were they sound, would make dialectic impossible. Plato's aim is to keep the way clear for dialectic inquiry." (p. 8, see also p. 16) Weingartner then sketches the theories of Hermogenes and Cratylus about the nature of names and attempts to show how they would make dialectic impossible. He then argues that Socrates puts forward a third theory which would make dialectic possible. I cannot discuss here all of Weingartner's contentions about the Cratylus, although I think that many of them are not borne out by the text. I will say a few things about the three theories of the nature of names and their relation to dialectic. In discussing Hermogenes' theory Weingartner focuses only on Hermogenes' extreme form of conventionalism, or what we should rather call naming by fiat or autonomous idiolects. He fails to see that Hermogenes puts forward several other forms of conventionalism. Weingartner then claims that Hermogenes' naming by fiat makes dialectic impossible. (p. 18) However, even if this "\Vere true, it is not clear that it applies to all the other forms of convention.;

alism advanced by Hermogenes at. the opening of the Cratylus. In any case, one would not find in the text any indication that even naming by fiat makes dialectic impossible. No such thing is discussed in Socrates' attempt to refute Hermogenes' extreme form of conventionalism. And Weingartner's only evidence comes from Socrates' remarks against Heracliteanism at the end of the dialogue. But I fail to see what this has to do with Hermogenes' position. Concerning Cratylus' theory Weingartner claims that, if the nature of names were what Cratylus claims it is, one would have the nature of the thing named represented in the name. And therefore there would be no room for dialectic inquiry into the nature of things. Again there is nowwhere in the dialogue a discussion that I know of concerning this claim. In any case I find this a worthless argument against Cratylus and one that it is not likely to be Plato's argument. I know of no place where Plato makes dialectic an end in itself. He rather thinks of it as a means to attaining the truth about the nature of things. And if one has the truth in the names of things, so much the worse for dialectic. Indeed, Socrates expresses a preference for a language consisting of natured names-in Cratylus' for the reason that such names would give one the truth about the nature of things. Weingartner claims, contrary to what practically all others have written, that Socrates puts forward a theory on the nature of names which is different from the ones advanced by Hermogenes and C:t:atylus. He nowhere, however, states precisely what his theory is. At one point he says that "If the shift from names to naming is not seen, the fact that Socrates and Cratylus maintain very different positions can never become clear.,. (p. 29) He then goes on to say that it is the *user* of names who determines their adequacy in relation to their function. (p. 84) And that for Socrates correctness of names is measured by their suitability for the dialectician's work. (p. 85) I do not see, however, how all this constitutes a theory. And I think a close reading of the text shows that Socr!ltes' .discussion of the function of names is but one step in a long argument to refute Hermogenes' conventionalism and establish that there must be what Cratylus calls natural correctness in names. All in all, I believe a close examination of the text will show that Weingartner's claimed theme has very little to do with what the *Cratylus* is all about-but this is no place to discuss what the theme of the dialogue is.

Weingartner's discussion of the *Protagoras,* to which the greater part of his book is devoted, is certainly on better grounds. The author makes niany *:* remarks about the personages of the bli:ck!!'l'oui::td, mannerisms, behavior, speeches, claims to carefully. analyzes is .asserted by .them. At the same time he' oontinuously focuses the discussion on what he takes to be the theme of· the .and tries to shpw how each part of the dialogue points this theine: · ·

Plato pits two conceptions of morality and education against each other and shows, by means of a dramatic interchange between Socrates and Protagoras, that the very problems the Sophist aims to solve require the philosophic methods and commitments of Plato's Socrates. The many components of the dialogue can, in this way, be seen as constituting a unified work. (p. 10, see also pp. 45, 46, 47)

Protagoras, according to Weingartner, represents the uncritical educator and moralist. He accepts without examination the customs, practices, and precepts of the many as being what the good life is-although, unlike the poets, he reflects upon these practices, customs, etc., by finding and articulating the principles that are implicit in them (p. 65). And he professes to be an educator of virtue without examining whether and how it can be taught. Socrates, on the other hand, represents the critical mind. He forces Portagoras to see the problems and even contradictions in the views of the many about morality-e. g., the unity of virtue, the relation of knowledge and virtue, the involuntariness of evil, the role of knowledge in action, etc. He also forces Protagoras to examine what he takes for granted in his role as the great teacher: that virtue can be taught. Here then Plato paints a contrast of two types: the unphilosophic one who does not inquire but settles for easy answers, and the philosophic one whose method is critical and whose goal is truth.

The last chapter of the book deals with the *Parmenides.* The relation of the two parts of the dialogue has always been a puzzle. As Weingartner points out, even Ryle, who ventured a suggestion as to how the two parts are related, later admitted his attempt to unify the dialogue " may have been gratuitous." Weingartner thinks that Ryle gave up too easily. He claims that there is a theme which the dialogue conveys and which in turn unifies its two parts:

Plato is here [in the *Parmenides]* engaged in revising his views on *both* the method by which knowledge is attained and on the nature of the objects of knowledge themselves. This principal not only holds together the two major parts of the dialogue, but serves as a key, as well, to the puzzle of the first section .... I propose to show that if the arguments Parmenides makes against the forms are taken *mtmulatively,* that is, in relation to one another and to the purpose of the entire series, a good deal of the mystery that has surrounded them disappears (pp.

Weingartner concentrates almost exclusively on a discussion of the first part of the *Parmenides,* and at the end of the chapter indicates how the problems raised in the first part are related to those raised in the second. He claims that in the first part Plato is re-examining the theory of Forms that was presented in the Middle Dialogues. In that theory Forms play various roles: they are paradigms, exemplars of the highest reality and value, having causal functions, and they are also universals. The Forms are the only objects of knowledge and the method of knowledge in the Middle

Dialogues is " hypothesis and deduction." In the *Parmenides* he came to realize that there are problems and contradictions involved in the above conception of the Forms. In a careful discussion of the two versions of the Third Man Argument, Weingartner argues that Plato comes to realize that it is the self-predication of Forms-a necessary element in the conception of Forms as exemplars-that leads into infinite regress and that therefore it must be abandoned. (pp. 155-178, 191-194} This criticism, together with the other ones raised by Parmenides, of the conception of Forms as exemplars, is related to what Plato discusses in the second part of the dialogue. For Plato there, according to Weingartner," investigates a number of hypotheses regarding the relation of the One to the other Forms." (p. 195) That is, we have here a preliminary working out of the method of Collection and Division which is to be developed fully in the *Sophist* and *Statesma:n.* This method studies the " weaving together " and " blending " of the Forms. But, Weingartner argues, " self-predictional paradigms are eminently unfit for such exercises," since paradigms are viewed as " super-particulars " which do not blend. (p. 196) Thus emerges is a new theory of Forms, which is articulated fully in the later dialogues.

> Such forms cannot be model instances, but are more likely criteria which models of that sort must satisfy. They are not super-things to be seen by the mind's eye, but definitional principles to be arrived at by reflection…the form of Plato's late dialogues are genuinely objects of knowledge: while it would be wrong to say that they are linguistic in nature, they are very like the definitions that tell what characteristics things have (p. 197).

I certainly find the above suggestion of Weingartner concerning the unity of the *Parmenides* to be interesting. It seems to me, however, almost impossible to determine its validity without a careful examination of the second part of the dialogue. Weingartner does not offer an analysis of that part to *show* that in fact Plato there investigates how the One blends with the other Forms. But whatever the results of such an analysis might be, it seems to me there is a puzzle here in calling the suggestion about the unity of the *Parmenides* the theme of the dialogue. For in what sense is this extrinsic to or conveyed by the dialogue? The arguments of the first part *are* explicitly a re-examination and criticism of the Forms and do not merely " convey " or " point " to a certain theme. This, however, does not detract from the value of Weingartner's suggestion concerning the unity of the dialogue; it only raises a doubt about the preciseness of the notion of a theme as a tool for interpreting Plato's writings and the usefulness of its application to every dialogue.

Finally, the book closes with a brief discussion of the place of the *Timaeus* in the order of the dialogues. Weingartner is aware that the theory of Forms in the *Timaeus* is the theory we find in the Middle Dialogues and not the theory which, according to Weingartner, Plato held in the late

dialogues. And this conflicts with the traditional view that the dialogue is one of the latest. The author is not eager to accept G. E. L. Owen's thesis that the *Timaeus* belongs to the period close to the *Republic,* although it would be consistent with his own view of the development of the theory of forms. And he is not willing to accept that the dialogue belongs to the late period and " exemplifies a reversion, on the part of Plato, to an earlier view; the dialogue is a symptom of a relapse, so to speak." (p. f.!00) Weingartner then offers an interesting suggestion which is consistent with placing the *Timaeus* in the late period but does not fall back to claiming a relapse on Plato's part. Rather, he claims that the different conceptions of Forms were arrived at by Plato in order to solve at least two types of problems: logical and metaphysical. And that in the *Parmenides* Plato does not really abandon either of these conceptions but rather separates them or sorts them out. Plato, then, never made a final choice between these conceptions but utilized the one which was appropriate to the problems that concerned him at the moment:

> One conception of forms is subsequently utilized in the late " analytic " dialogues as the object of a dialectic that is understood to be collection and division, while forms as exemplars are utilized in the cosmology of the *Timaeus*. ... Without impatience, he [Plato] refrains from a final commitment and eschews converting reflections into doctrines. (p. 201)

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Language and Belief. By JEAN LADRIERE. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 197f.l. Pp. f.l04. $10.95.

Collected essays written at unrelated occasions are by their nature likely to be slightly disparate, occasionally repetitious, and generally sketchy in their argumentation. In view of those inherent defects one is all the more struck by the unifying power of Ladriere's collection. The author, professor in the philosophy of science at the University of Louvain, skillfully controls a number of fields and manages to create synthetic unity out of an impressive diversity of subjects. Specialist in formal logic and the philosophy of science, he handles philosophy of religion, ethical theory, structuralist theory with equal competence. One of the few important linguistic analysts outside the Anglo-American world Ladriere refuses to copulate analysis to the empiricist assumptions which it adopted from the cultural tradition of its country of origin. In fact, he constantly connects it with such leading trends in continental philosophy as hermeneutics and phenomenology, disciplines which the average analyst here has relegated to the antipodes. Thus Ladriere throws solid bridges between the formal

systems of the natural sciences, the hermeneutic methods of the human sciences and metaphysics the science of the totality of real as such. The first part of his essay on " Science, Philosophy and Faith " is a classic that deserves to be anthologized in every collection on the scope and method of philosophy. Yet, beyond this "novum organum" of human knowledge, Ladriere still feels the need for a further horizon which places the sciences themselves in a new perspective-the dimension of faith. His discussion of revelation, religious language and, especially, of the nature and function of myth reveals an intimate acquaintance with the problems of faith and its theological articulation.

Personally I feel some reservations about treating faith and revelation exclusively from a Christian and, indeed, Barthian perspective, without placing it in the totality of the religious experience as such. The *scientia universalis* becomes somewhat abruptly connected with a particular theological interpretation of God's "word." Aside from the self-transcendence suggested in modern science by the principle of indeterminacy and an allusion about philosophy as circumscribing the locus of revelation, *Lang'!Wge and Belief* contains little of what used to be "natural theology" and what has at least partly been revived and rejuvenated in contemporary studies on the universal nature of the religious experience. The author feels no need to establish the existence of a religious " universal, " a " natural " connection with God independent of the particular nature of the revelation, even though he never denies such a connection.

One other limitation of this rich and evocative book is that, despite its title, little space is devoted to religious language as such. The conclusion which deals most directly with it presents more a statement of the problem than a solution. It focuses on the unique combination of constative with performative language, which induces the believer to make truth claims. At any rate, the reader will undoubtedly desire to see this further developed.

But, rather than critizing the author on problems to which he himself has introduced us, we ought to be grateful for what he has given. Anyone interested in the question of religious language in its wider scope, or, for that matter, anyone interested in situating the problem of science within a fully human context with all its dimensions, may learn from this excellent book.

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Du Langage, A. Martinet et M. Merleau-Ponty. By GHYSLAIN CHARRON. Editions de L'Universite d'Ottawa, Collection Philosophica, Pp. 187.

This book is a careful and intelligent piece of analysis which will be read with profit by any philosopher interested in the philosophy of language and, more particularly, in the philosophical (i.e., conceptual) investigation of contemporary linguistics.

But there is something a little schizophrenic about this work. It consists of two parts which are more juxtaposed than interrelated. The first part is a careful, analytical exposition of the major conclusions of A. Martinet's work in linguistics. The second part is an exposition of the linguistic philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. The purpose of the author, as stated in the preface, is to teach philosophers something of what they need to know about contemporary linguistics and at the same time to teach the linguists why philosophers continue to be interested in the problems of language even after the creation of their new science. Why is it that even after the advent of Structuralism some questions about language still remain which the linguist is incompetent to answer?

Charron takes the corpus of Martinet as typical of the structuralist approach to language as it was developing in France from 1980-1960, at the very time during which the first major philosopher of the French (or any other) tradition began to address himself to its problems in their importance for philosophy. This exposition is meant to serve as the basis for a discussion of what the structuralists, on the one side, and the phenomenologists, on the other, have in common in order to focus on the points at which they diverge (if we are hard-headed) or at which they complement one another (if we are more eirenic). The trouble is that the author is very good at putting himself in the place of and in speaking the language of each of the combatants; what does not quite come off is the dialogue which is supposed to take place between them.

The section on Martinet's contributions to linguistics will be very useful for the non-specialist philosopher who is unacquainted with linguistics. It is, in fact, an excellent non-technical introduction to the methods of linguistic structuralism as exemplified in the work on phonology by this one author. But it is by the same token considerably out of date and will be of little value to those who have followed the development of linguistics past Martinet up to the present time, since a large number of the theses Martinet propounds arid defends {such as, for instance, his attempt to ·suppress the concept " word " as being insufficientJy rigorous to be useful in scientific linguistics, pp. 45 ff.) can only be fully understood in the light of later criticism, refinement, and development. It will also dissatisfy the linguist inasmuch as we are given here. only Martinet's

conclusions and none of the reasoning which led him to them. While, at the same time, the philosophical reader will remark that Martinet was only one of the structuralists whom Merleau-Ponty read and by whom he was influenced, others, like Saussure and Guillaume especially, had a much wider and deeper influence on him.

Nevertheless, in spite of these criticisms, this book serves a good and important service at the present time. Merleau-Ponty was the first major philosopher we know of to concern himself with linguistics as a science and with the importance of this developing science for philosophy. By contrast, until most recently, Anglo-American philosophical analysis (in Wittgenstein, in Ryle, in Austin, in Strawson and their numerous colleagues and followers) has limited itself almost exclusively to the commonsensical analysis of speech-acts without showing much interest in the science of linguistics as such. This state of affairs has now begun to change rapidly, and we find that many of the younger American philosophers of language-particularly as a result of the challenges of Chomsky and his students-are becoming more and more sensitive to scientific linguistics and its value for philosophy-not only because it gives us a body of scientific literature which nobody, least of all philosophers, can neglect, but also because of the importance of the methods of structural linguistics for philosophical methodology itself.

It is now being proposed by many that the science of structural linguistics provides us with the best (and perhaps, in the whole history of science, the *first)* model of scientific explanation uniquely and specifically applicable to the human sciences. This structuralist model may very well serve in the near future to free all the social sciences from their awkward and increasingly indefensible reliance on the " Galilean " model of scientific explanation used in the physical sciences. Though most social scientists still pretend to be using a model of explanation received from physics and chemistry, the day of Structuralism is dawning and hardly anyone who has reached his intellectual maturity since 1960 doubts that the discoveries of structural linguistics (and the various less well developed structuralisms it has spawned) will revolutionize scientific work as it applies to specifically human social behavior.

But before we begin to make grandiose claims concerning the importance of the discoveries of linguistic structuralism for the human sciences in general we should, perhaps, turn first of all to its importance for philosophy and that is the aim of the book under review (and it is this which, in spite of its defects, makes this book worth careful study) . Philosophers have a special interest in language; from antiquity they have been the custodians of logic and rhetoric, of the *artes sermocirudes,* and until the nineteenth century the only serious studies of language which were undertaken were from a philosophical and logical point of view; Perhaps this the initial reluctance on the part of philosophers to learn still

another new science. In any case there is no point in our blaming now either Husserl and the early phenomenologists or their later contemporaries, the Logical Positivists, for their ignorance of linguistics. Linguistics is a very young science, younger even than depth psychology, having developed in recognizable form only within the last forty years. Its founders were people like Troubetzkoy and Jakobson at Prague, Bloomfeld and Sapir in the United States, and, above all, Ferdinand de Saussure in the French-speaking world. Martinet, whose work in linguistics is exclusively examined in this volume, already belongs to the second generation, while we are living in the third or fourth.

In this book Mr. Charron expounds the thought of Martinet almost without reference to Merleau-Ponty and then, as if *de novo*, gives us a repetition of some well-known themes from Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body, of expression, of the intersensorial unity of human perceptual experience, almost without reference to Martinet. While his exposition of Merleau-Ponty's thought on language is very sure and very sound (it is, in fact, a good introduction to Merleau-Ponty's thought as a whole), it contains no new revelations or surprises, no new interpretations--not even in its repetition (following Ricoeur and Lagueux) of Merleau-Ponty's recklessly unhistorical reading of Saussure for his own purposes. (pp. 97 ff.) Those who have already followed Merleau-Ponty through his unconscionably inaccurate expositions of Husserl, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Gurwitsch, Goldstein, Piaget, and the Gestalt psychologists (in which he nevertheless frequently gets his sources to say better than they themselves could have what they really meant) will not be disposed to become exercised now over his misrepresentations of Saussure. What is more disconcerting in this account is Mr. Charron's failure to zero in on those few texts we have from Merleau-Ponty which were written *after* his discovery of linguistic structuralism and to describe and assess his reaction to this new science.

The name of Saussure does not occur in any of Merleau-Ponty's early works, including *The Structure of Behavior* and the *Phenomenology of Perception.* It was only during the period after 1945, when he was also beginning to confront the problems of the philosophy of history, that Merleau-Ponty took up the subject of linguistic structuralism, most particularly Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics.* He first used this and other linguistics materials in the course on language which he taught at Lyons in 1947-1948, and which he then greatly expanded and developed in the courses he gave at the Sorbonne after he moved there the following year, namely, "Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language," and "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man" (which contains a special section entitled "Linguistics"). From this point onward (1949) Merleau-Ponty's writings on language multiplied rapidly a;qd his expressions of discipleship to Sausslire "Were, for a few years, total. This ne\V mterest

culminated in his Inaugural Lecture at the College de France in 1958 in which he states that the linguistics of Saussure provides us with a " theory of signs " which could serve as a sounder basis for a philosophy of history than the thought of either Marx or Hegel (to whom he had first turned).

From 1949-1958 Merleau-Ponty wrote a number of important essays on structuralism all of which are collected in *Signs* {including " On the Phenomenology of Language," "The Philosopher and Sociology," "From Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss," and others). But, after 1958, this special interest in linguistics begins to diminish and his work on the posthumously published manuscript, *The Prose of the World*, which was his major concern at the time he assumed his chair of philosophy at the College de France, gradually languished until he completely lost interest in it after 1959 and left it unfinished and unpublished during his lifetime.

It is nevertheless in *these* works primarily that Merleau-Ponty worked out his own attitude towards linguistic structuralism, adopted certain of its features and methods, and attacked its shortcomings as a complete account of language. Charron does mention most of these works, at least in passing, and even quotes from them-but always casually and without clearly focusing on Merleau-Ponty's primary linguistic concerns. He never confronts the problems of the relation of thought to language, of the levels of meaning, of the relation of words to syntax, of the possibility of universal grammar as these problems were dealt with by Merleau-Ponty. He pays most attention to the works, primarily the *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible* in which linguistics as such is hardly mentioned, and certainly never evaluated in detail.

The concluding section of this book, in which the theses of Martinet and Merleau-Ponty are finally brought together, is extremely short and remains more of a juxtaposition than the kind of dialectical confrontation we had been promised. Charron's major conclusion (pp. 168 ff.) seems to be that the kind of philosophy of language espoused by Merleau-Ponty "anticipated" the kind of scientific linguistics eventually produced by Guillaume and Beneviste-but not by Martinet. Martinet and Merleau-Ponty had almost nothing to say to one another (certainly nothing good as Charron shows on p. 151) during their historical co-existence, and Mr. Charron does not manage to get them to say much to one another now. This rather disappointing and negative conclusion leads one to ask why Martinet was chosen as one of the two principal interlocutors in this debate and whether 1t would not have been more profitable to widen the linguistic scope of the discussion.

Finally, we have to say that the whole discussion is a bit too" Frenchy," a bit too provincial. Charron seems unaware of the fact that the principal works he treats (of Merleau-Ponty but also of Martinet) have t.raJ;l&l_ated.into English and other languages and that there is a

considerable body of literature available on the subjects he deals with in languages other than French. There are a few English titles in his bibliography (as often as not by Dutch authors) but almost none in his footnotes, and the only works of such writers as Husserl, Hegel, Gurwitsch, and even Chomsky which are listed are those which exist in French translation. Does the author of this work feel that the discussions of these problems which can be found in English, German, Dutch, Spanish, and Italian, to go no further, are irrelevant to his investigation? In asking this question I am not suggesting an impossible extension of his panorama; I am speaking only of those specific issues in the philosophy of language and in the relevance of linguistic structuralism for philosophy which concern Merleau-Ponty, Martinet, and their possible dialectical confrontation.

This book, therefore, presents us with an interesting and stimulating discussion of topics which are of central relevance to contemporary philosophy, but it can be recommended to other scholars only with reservations.

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Logic Matters. By P. T. GEACH. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 347. $11.50.

This collection anthologizes articles published during the last twenty-five years by P. T. Geach, Professor of Logic at the University of Leeds and Fellow of the British Academy. There are forty-nine articles all together, ranging in scope and content from brief discussions originally published in *Analysis-there* are fourteen articles reprinted from *Analysis-to* extended treatments on various structural and historical topics relating to what scholastic philosophers would call formal and material logic. Professor Geach states that this collection contains all of his articles not previously collected or edited in any of his other works such as *Reference and Generality, Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas and Frege* and *Mental Acts.* Geach has arranged the articles not in a chronological fashion but rather topically under ten different headings. With the exception of a major rewriting of his 1963 article, "Quantification Theory and the Problem of Identifying Objects of Reference, " each article appears as it had been published originally, except for, Geach notes, the incorporation of some " stylistic changes " and the removal of some " incidental errors."

As would be expected in a collection of articles representing nearly a quarter century's work of an exceptional philosopher, the breadth and scope of this anthology is vast. There are studies providing in-depth elucidation of problems in the structural history of logic (e. g., "Aristotle on Con-

junctive Propositions," "Plato's *Euthyphro,"* "A Medieval Discussion of Intentionality," and Geach's 1968 inaugural lecture on being the first recipient of the Chair of Logic at the University of Leeds, " History of the Corruptions of Logic ") , insightful if not generally accepted discussions into the weaknesses of traditional logic (e. g., "Distribution: A Last Word?" and "Strawson on Symbolic and Traditional Logic"), and brief and extended discussions illustrating Geach's contention that the mathematical logic instituted by Frege and Russell is a necessary condition for solving some old philosophical chestnuts (e. g., "Some Problems about Time, " and " The Identity of Propositions ") . In reference to the last point, passages found in many of the articles illustrate Frege's contribution to the development of mathematical logic. Of particular interest to scholastic philosophers will be Geach's claim asserting that tremendous structural similarities exist between Frege and St. Thomas. I will develop this point later. There are four articles dealing with the "ascriptivism " of the Oxford philosophers and Geach's elucidation of the logic of moral discourse (e. g.," Imperative and Deontic Logic" and" Kenny on Practical Reasoning"); obviously, R. M. Hare's *The Language of Morals* provides the background for the Geach's discussion on these questions of modal logic. Finally, there are articles dealing with the role of logic in ontology and theology (e. g., "Nominalism" and "God's Relation to the World").

In all of these essays Geach is determined to convince his readers that in doing philosophy indeed logic does matter, I think it fair to say that the over-riding theme of Geach's philosophy is, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, that all logical differences are big differences. In his article, " Assertion, " Geach claims that when philosophers fall into error, the reason all too often is that they have little regard for formal logic as a valuable philosophical instrument. To quote Geach:

> For myself, I think logicians have an all-purpose utility, as accountants have for all kinds of business; and the resentment at oo accountant's inquiries is not a healthy sign in any business. When a philosopher manifests annoyance at someone's counterexamples to a theory that runs smoothly enough for the philosopher's own chosen examples, he acts like a delinquent clerk: " Why should the accountant meddle with *that* book, when these other books are all right? " But logicians, like accountants, are paid to look out for discrepancies. (p.

Geach is convinced that a necessary condition for doing philosophy well is the possession of the tools and techniques of formal logic. Understandably, Geach is aghast at the suggestion made in the *Dutch Catechism* (p. 220 of the English edition) that the theological application of a, " developed formal logic " and " the burning of witches " were two signs of the degeneracy of the late medieval church. In fact, there are times in the book when one feels that one is back listening to St. Thomas debate the Latin Averroists over the relation of the propositions of faith to the

propositions of philosophy. Geach is concerned that logical errors often found in scholastic manuals of logic-especially the two-name theory of of predication-can lead to serious errors in dogmatic theology. Ockham, Geach claims, is a good historical exemplification of this type of position. Geach also asserts that some of Ockham's alleged theological truths were in fact Nestorian heresies. On the relation of logic to theology Geach affirms the following three propositions (found in "Nominalism," which was originally read to the Priest's Philosophical Group of London) :

1. If an argument has true premises and a heretical conclusion, then a logical rule that would make it out formally valid is simply a bad bit of logic.

2. A statement of a logical rule will not be correct if it is vitiated by a theological counter-example; nor, in order to avoid this, will the rule expressly advert to theological prospositions.

3. Whenever a logical form is shown to be invalid by a theological counter-example, we could if we were clever enough construct a non-theological counter-example. (p. 299)

In this analysis by Geach any similarily to the theological irrationalism characteristic of Kierkegaard is obviously absent.

At this point I think it important to discuss briefly Geach's understanding of the nature of logic. I believe it fair to say that Geach regards logic as second intentional. In "Nominalism" Geach argues explicitly that no particular terms of first intention-whether theological, geological or psychological-fall under the scope of logical rules. On the contrary, " a logical rule must contain only syncategorematic words and second intention terms." (p. fl97) A second intention, however, must not be understood as pure formalism. Geach does not consider that the rules of logic are mere marks on paper. In referring to the widely-accepted logic text by Lewis and Langford, Geach claims that Lewis and Langford begin their analysis of the nature of logic by asserting that " whatever more it may be, the matrix method at least is a certain kind of game which we play with recognisable marks, according to certain rules. " Geach argues that all this amounts to is that in doing logic we must write down definite symbols in an orderly way. This, Geach tells us, throws no light at all upon the nature of logic. (p. 104) When disputing Quine's claim that the distinction between concept and object is unnecessary in logic (" Class and Concept ") Geach responds that " I hold with Frege that this distinction is founded in the nature of things, and that a logical system will either express it somehow or turn out inconsistent." (p. fl34) Since Geach has already argued that the rules of logic are not first intentional and has indicated that formalism says nothing important about the nature of logic, I suggest that one proposition found in Thomistic manuals of logic with which Geach would agree deals with the fundamental second intentional characteristic of logical rules.

There is a further Aquinian strain found in some of Geach's discussious about topics usually classified under the rubric of material logic. In "The Identity of Propositions " Geach notes that the Polish logician, Kotarbinski, has vigorously argued for an ontology recognizing only concrete objects and has an aversion for postulating Platonic entities. Geach notes that "I should like to think that this programme could be carried out." (p. 166) I suggest that Geach's claims can be interpreted as a suggestion for an ontology structurally similar to Aquinian primary substances. Of course, one might retort that this could also be nominalism. Not so, however, as Geach notes in the concluding remarks of " The Identity of Propositions " :

> Allowing pvedicates like "necessarily P " commits us to denying Locke's thesis that there is nothing essential to individuals; but those who uphold this thesis, so far as I know, have little to say for it beyond bare assertion. Quine has sometimes said that quantified modal logic would commit us to Aristotelian essentialism; but why should we not be Aristotelian essentialists? (p. 174)

This remark about Aristotelian essentialism is very interesting. This indicates that formal logic and ontology are indeed far from incompatible. I suspect that there are very some very interesting structural similarities to be unearthed between the ontology of Geach and that prosposed by Everett J. Nelson. It should be remembered that Professor Nelson was one of the founders of the *Journal of Symbolic Logic.* This hardly deterred him from a rigorous pursuit of metaphysical issues. For example, in his 1966 Presidential address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, "The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Induction," Nelson argued forcefully for the real existence of the categories of substance and causality. I have suggested elsewhere that Nelson's ontological categories might indeed be structurally similar to St. Thomas's notion of substantial form. At any length, the examples of Geach and Nelson-both excellent formal logicians-should forever nail the coffin lid on the suggestion that analytic philosophy and Thomistic metaphysics are *a priori* incompatible.

As I indicated earlier, Geach argues that the techniques of modetu Iogie serve as necessary conditions for successful philosophical analysis. The converse of this claim is that traditional logic is insufficient for the analysis of some philosophical problems. At times, it is difficult to figure out exactly what Geach means by traditional logic. He assumes at times that everyone will automatically know the nature of traditional logic. There are places where Geach argues that " class " logic is traditional logic. In addition, any logician who adopted the " two-name " theory of predication is lumped together with those who adhere to traditional logic. Those who continue to expound exclusively on traditional logic as if no contributions have been made to logical studies by mathematical logicians are located in what Geach continually refers to as the" Colleges oi Unreason." At any length, Geach wants his readers to both become aware of and

acknowledge the fact that traditional formal logic is incompetent to resolve some problems which only modern logical theory can handle. For example, Geach argues that the use of " scope!' and " quantification " are instruments capable of providing solutions to some problems unsolvable in traditional logic. Also modern logic holds that not every proposition admits of a subject-predicate analysis. Geach also strongly indicates that modal logic is a necessary instrument for adept philosophical analysis. An example of the necessity for using modal logic is found in " Some Problems about Time "-which, incidentally, Geach presented before the British Academy-in which he suggests that the rules for employment of temporal connectives--" at the same time," "before," "after "-belong to modal logic. Geach provides a promissory note suggesting that much fruitful research is to be expected in the area of reducing the rules governing temporal discourse to modal logic. On this point, incidentally, Geach criticizes Russell for not paying close enough attention to modal logic. In addition, Geach believes that modal logic is indispensable for a thorough analysis into the foundations of mathematics. Geach expresses this belief in the following way:

> What I think is not to be hoped for is a satisfactory foundation of mathematics in a conceptual scheme that admits *neither* modal operators *nor* quantifiers over an infuiite domain. (p. 166)

Geach's criticisms of traditional logic are not to be taken as a wholesale repudiation of past efforts into logical research. By his many favorable references to medieval logicians Geach shows that he takes Russell's epigram seriously: "Not all wisdom is new, neither is all folly out of date. " In his discussion of Buridan's logic in " A Medieval Discussion of Intentionality" Geach writes as follows:

> I hope this paper shows why modern logicians still need to take medieval logicians seriously. In a great measure their problems are ours; for some of these, like the problems of *suppositio,* modern logic provides adequate solutions, but there are other problems, about modal and intentional contexts for example, that are still wide open; and the talent that was shown by medieval logicians in wrestling with their problems demands our deepest admiration. {p. 138)

Acknowledging this respect for the medieval logicians, nevertheless Geach has been influenced very much by the progress made in formal logic during the first half of the twentieth-century. Geach argues that the development of " genuine " logic is due to the logical works of Frege and Russell. Although Geach doesn't mention this in any of these papers, certainly Boole and deMorgan· had something to do with symbolic logic too. Moreover, Geach appeilrs convinced that a logician can maintain very high standards of rigor without exercising any of the special apparatus of numbered theorems, unique symbols, new terminology, excessive formulation of meUrla.nguage, and so forth. Geach notes that much of Frege's·work ;ri

semantics maintains very high standards of rigor without excessive use of any formal apparatus. On the other hand, Geach also argues that the use of formal apparatus alone does not prevent philosophical blunders. As examples of works containing errors notwithstanding the presence of an overwhelming formalism Geach mentions Camap's *Logical Syntax of Language* and *Meaning and Necessity.* All philosophers who are not formal logicians *per se* will appreciate Geach's remark that "perhaps after all it is not so foolish to undertake 'direct analysis' in language everybody can read. " (p.

Given the above discussion, it should be obvious that the modem logic of Frege and Russell is called" symbolic" or" mathematical," not because of the *use* of symbols or mathematical notation but rather because of new and sophisticated techniques involved in elucidating the matters of logic.

It should be apparent by now that the figure of Gottlob Frege stands behind much of Geach's work. Geach's review article of Austin's translation of Frege's *Grundlagen (A Logicomathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number)* is perhaps one of the most crisp and succinct expositions of Frege's thoughts about number that I have read. Geach shows how Frege was very concerned about Mill's view that numbers are physical properties. Shades of the ontological worries found in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* appear in Frege's concern about postulating a physical property for zero. Frege also attacks subjectivist account of number-e. g., William James's account as found in the *Principles of Psychology.* For the interested reader Geach has treated these problems, especially the relation of abstractionism to logical and mathematical concepts, in *Mental Acts.*

Geach is not alone in attributing to Frege's work the importance it deserves as a pivotal set of writings in the development of modem logic. Quine has noted that " all of modem logic owes an incalculable debt lo Frege. If anyone can be singled out as the founder of mathematical logic, it is by all odds he." ("On Frege's Way Out," *Mind,* LXIV-1955-p. 159)

I suspect that, historically, Geach owes much of his interest in Frege to his former mentor, Wittgenstein. Frege was one of the few philosophers that Wittgenstein took seriously. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* appears to hover over much of Geach's philosophical work. Of course, there are differences. Logical rules for the early Wittgenstein, although they could be shown but not said-every one is all to familiar with the last line of the *Tractatus* "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."-nevertheless had an ontological ring about them. For Geach, as I noted earlier, logical rules appear to be second intentional. Nevertheless, there is much about Wittgenstein which has influenced Geach. This is true of both the early and the later Wittgenstein. That Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* reshaped twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy is obvious. Yet Geach, although certainly influenced by some of the insights provided by

the *Investigations-!* believe this influence is more explicit in *Mental Acts-is* not an excessive ordinary language philosopher. In a number of places Geach attacks the minute linguistic investigations that. philosophers like Austin and his followers at Oxford have carried out during the last twenty years. The following two passages indicate Geach's apparent disdain for the Austinean methodology: " It helps to make things clear; and if people protest in the name of ordinary language, they are probably the sort of people who don't want things made clear "; (p. 160) and " ... the natural selection of words is not so uniformly beneficent as John Austin perhaps supposed." (p. I suspect, if one must classify Geach's philosophy, he would fit under the rubric of "Descriptive Metaphysics" as this concept has been elucidated by Strawson. Yet there are certain "Logical Reconstructionist" tendencies apparent in Geach's work also. But I suspect Geach is more of a realist than many of the Logical Reconstructionists. As always, it is very difficult to classify the work of a good philosopher.

There is one. final point which must be considered in any discussion of Geach's philosophy. Gustav Bermann once wrote that," In what a great philosopher says there is a pattern. It all flows from one source, a few fundamental ontological ideas. In the light of this source and only in this light, it can all be understood. " I suggest that Geach's strong affirmation of the radical difference between subject and predicate in any analysis of predication and the corresponding denial of the " two-name " theory of predication is one of these " fundamental ontological ideas " which pervade Geach's philosophy. This notion of the uniqueness of subject and predicate, Geach asserts, found its way back into contemporary logical discussions with the writings of Frege. Geach suggests that this theory of predication had its historical orgins in Plato's *Sophist.* Plato put forward the view that the simplest form of a proposition was composed of two heterogeneous elements, a noun *(onoma)* and a verb *(rhema).* For instance, "Man walks " and " Theaetetus flies. " On the other hand, a string of nouns-like "man lion" or a string of verbs, like "runs walks "-is not intelligible discourse at all. Given this account of predication, Plato suggested that any predicative proposition must split into two logically heterogeneous parts, a noun and a verb. Geach claims that in *De lnterpretatione* Aristotle-before the "Fall," as Geach would say-accepted Plato's view of predication regarding the relation of subject to predicate. However, in the *Prior Analytics,* Aristotle changed his position. Geach suggests that the reason behind Aristotle's change of view was the development of the syllogism. Instead of the view that the subject and predicate were indeed heterogeneous, Aristotle adopted the position that predication is an attachment of one term *(horos)* to another term. On this view, it is impossible for any term to be essentially predicative. Geach notes that " Aristotle's going over to the two-term theory was a disaster, comparable only to the fall

of Adam. " (p. 47) The two-term theory evolved into the two-name theory in medieval logicians like Ockham and Buridan and nineteenth-century logicians like Mill. Geach claims that it was Frege and Russell who restored to logic most of the insights that were lost by "Aristotle's fall. " To Frege, Geach suggests, modern logicians owe the insight demanding an absolute category difference between names and predicables. Geach's review article," Frege's *Grundlagen,"* provides a good discussion of how Frege viewed a " concept " as essentially predicative and incomplete. A logical predicate-a concept-is in need of completion. It can be completed only by the addition of a name of an " object. " The individual object then assumes the role of a " logical subject. " Frege held that only expressions exemplifying this sort of incompleteness could possibly stand for concepts. There is a very important ramification entailed by this type of predication theory. It removes the need for having a connective relation between the subject and predicate. I suspect that Bradley's idealism which hung together only by his denial of the possibility of relations-and the relation of predication was a prime example Bradley used to illustrate the infinite regress in any relational context-together with Wittgenstein's claim that subjects and predicates hang together like "links in a chain" provide the structural background for appreciating the extreme importance Geach attributes to Frege's claim of heterogeneity regarding subjects and predicates. Geach agrees with Frege that " the 'is' of predication, *die blosse Copula,* has no force at all." (p. *265)* As a corollary, Geach categorically asserts that " the class of 'terms' which can be indifferently subject and predicates is in fact empty." (p. 291)

Of interest to Thomistic is Geach's claim that St. Thomas explicitly rejected the two-name theory of predication and truth. Aquinas, Geach suggests, indeed held that subject and predicate terms have different roles. In Aquinas's system a subject related to a *suppositum* and a predicate related to a form or nature. The truth of an affirmative predication consists, Geach suggests, "in con-formity-the form that exists intentionally in the mind, signified by the predicate, answers to the form in the thing .... " (p. 300) Geach further suggests that, because St. Thomas took the subject-predicate distinction seriously, he can provide a better account for some of the philosophical problems which proved to be pitfalls for two-name theorists like Ockham and Buridan. Geach also suggests that there are two other important logical distinctions emphasized by Aquinas but ruled out by the proponents of the two-name theory: 1) the distinction between substantival and adjectival terms, and 2) the claim that true predication depends not only on what the subject term signifies but also on what the *modus significandi* of the subject term. (p. 301) Accordingly, Geach places the theory of predication held by St. Thomas with the "genuine" expositions of logical rules found originally in Plato's *Sophist,* developed in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* and reinstated rein-

stated contemporarily by Frege. For further development and analysis of the manner in which Geach utilizes Frege's philosophy in providing conceptual elicidations of St. Thomas's philosophy I suggest that the interested reader consult Geach's *1955* paper, "Form and Existence," which originally appeared in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1954-55,* pp. and is reprinted in Anthony Kenny's anthology, *Aquinas: A. Collection of Critical Essays.* These notions have been incorporated in *Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas and Frege* (Cornell University Press, 1961) which Geach co-authored with Elizabeth Anscombe. This important article, regretfully, does not appear in *Logic Matters.*

It should be emphasized that Geach believes that the Fregean notion c.f concept is not only of historical importance. In " Quine on Classes and Properties " Geach suggests that if property is used as Frege elucidated *Begriff-i.* e., in the sense of what a logical predicate stands for-then abstract expressions cannot serve as names of properties. Obviously, Geach accepted in principle the notion of " naming " as referring which Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein opted for: " .. .for I agree with Parmenides that one cannot name what is not there. " (p. 153) Geach explicitly attributes to Russell's theory of descriptions the important claim that significant-many-worded expressions-e. g., " the present king of France "-can never possess the logical role of" naming." As Geach notes: " What is not cannot be named-anymore than you can christen a baby, bell or battleship that is not there to be christened." (p. 155)

Geach further suggests that an interesting consequence of this logical role for predicates-properties understood as Frege's *Begriffe-is* that a paradox like Russell's-i. e., the paradox concerning the class of all classes that are not members of themselves-cannot be generated. This insight on Geach's part does away with any need for a theory of types. I suspect this is all to the good, as the theory of types never did work well anyway.

In this discussion of predication, and the role of " naming, " there is one point on which I am confused. In his 1968 inaugural lecture at Leeds Geach made the following remark:

> What we still have got is a formal theory that recognizes the status of some general terms as names without blurring the distinction between names and predicables. " (p. 61)

This demand for a logical rule capable of handling general names is reiterated in his 1970 *Analysis* paper, " Contradictories and Contraries. " Yet in his 1964 paper," Nominalism," Geach claims that he totally agrees with Aristotle's requirment that names must be "syntactically simple." Geach goes on:

> Complex names are a chimerical category. For the role of a name is simply to stand for the thing named; and then a name must signify its bearer directly, and not *via* other signs in the language, as any complex sign would have to do. (p. 290)

I am confused about the nature of " general " and " complex " names. Are they structurally the same? Has Geach changed his mind? Or is Geach using " complex " in order to refer to contextual expressions like " the present king of France " ? If the latter is the case, then a complex name is like an incomplete symbol for which Russell devised the theory of descriptions. This would make a category difference between general and complex names. A general name, nevertheless, is certainly more complex than a simple name, even if a general name is not an incomplete symbol. More analysis of these issues is obviously needed, especially to theoretically elucidate how general names do not vitiate the category distinction between subjects and predicates, a worry which Geach himself acknowledges.

This is a significant and often rather demanding collection of essays. It is an anthology putting together the uncollected works of an important twentieth-century philosopher. Many of the articles treat one or another of the more important issues considered by analytic philosophers during the last quarter-century. Of significant importance to philosophers interested in researching the many topics contained in *Logic Matters* is the inclusion in this anthology of a rather extensive eight-page name-topic index. All too frequently this type of scholarly aid is omitted from anthologies. With the exception of the historical essays analyzing the structure and development of problems in logic, this book is probably not the best place for a scholastic philosopher unfamiliar with Geach's work to begin. I would suggest reading the first forty-four pages of *Mental Acts* and the " Aquinas " section in *Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas and Frege* before attempting to unearth the philosophical nuggets in *Logic Matters.*

I must end this review on a sad note. It is indeed unfortunate that many members of the American Catholic intellectual
scholastic philosophers interested in the principles found in the philosophy of St. Thomas-have by and large so throughly overlooked the writings of the single philosopher who has done more during the last twenty-five years than anyone else to the philosophical insights of St. Thomas known and appreciated by Anglo-American philosophers. It is to be hoped that this oversight will not continue.

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A Guide to Philosophical Bibliography and Research. By RICHARD T. DE GEORGE. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971. Pp. 149. $5.95.

New Encyclopedia of Philosophy. By J. GROOTEN and G. Jo STEENBERGEN, with the cooperation of other contributors. Translated from the Dutch, edited and revised by Edmond van den Bossche. New York: Philosophical Library, Pp. 468.

The first of the above titles is one of the best research instruments to have appeared in many years, and is invaluable for the student and professor of philosophy alike. The author has culled through hundreds of source materials, limiting himself for the most part to work produced after 1900 and emphasizing those available in the English language, although also describing sources written in French, German, Italian, Latin, Russian, and Spanish. De George starts with dictionaries as sources of definitions, and then proceeds through encyclopedias, histories of philosophy, philosophical classics, bibliographical tools and specialized bibliographies, library and trade catalogues, philosophical journals, guides to writing and publishing, and biographical sources. He concludes with information on works concerning philosophical professional life. For each entry there is a brief but accurate descriptive or evaluative comment. The end result is a work that is comprehensive but simple to use, and on this account can serve as an introduction for the beginner who wishes to get an overview of the sources and tools of philosophical research, or as a guide for students writing papers and dissertations, or finally as a handy reference manual for the teacher and professional. The work is very well indexed, and its price is reasonable considering the vast amount of information it contains. Users of this guide will wish that the publisher had decided to use a larger type size, but this is one of the few criticisms they will be able to make of an otherwise excellently produced book.

By contrast the second title listed above can only be disappointing. This one-colume work, an English translation of the *Filosofisch Lexicon* appearing originally in 1958, is hardly an encyclopedia by any standard, and at best can lay claim to being a dictionary. Brief articles have been contributed by over thirty European philosophers, and a goodly number of entries are identified by the authors' initials, but the majority are unsigned. In general the English translation is good, but there are places where it is awkward. There are also editorial slips, as in the article on Rudolf Carnap, where it is announced that he " is now professor in Los Angeles " and then in the next sentence that he died in 1970. (p. 64) Again, in the entry for Regis Jolivet, his birth date is given but no mention is made of the fact that he died in 1966, six years before this work's publication. (pp. The type size is large and legible, but, considering the amount of information this permits the publisher to put in the compass of 468 pages, the price is

exorbitant. It is difficult to see what use such an expensive work can have, considering the availability of so many superior instruments of philosophical research listed in De George's *Guide.*

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The Philosophy of Biology. By MICHAEL RUSE. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1973. Pp. 224. £3.

Professor Ruse has written a good work in the nco-Positivistic tradition. It is one in spirit with Nagel's *The Structure of Science* and Rundner's *Philosophy of Social Science.* In style, the work combines a literary approach with scholarship. There are few notes in the usual sense, but there are many remarks put in brackets, along with abbreviated references to sources, in the text. The presentation is a straightforward problems-theses-objections-answers approach which could easily be rearranged into a little *summa.*

In ten chapters we see that for Ruse the philosophy of biology mainly means: (1) a defense of the covering-law model of the theory of natural selection based upon population genetics against rival theories; (2) a discussion of which nominalistic theory of classification in biology is best; (3) the role of teleology; (4) the possibilities for reductionism.

According to Ruse, the covering-law or axiomatic-deductive system is the ideal scientific model of explanation toward which all true scientists should work. Since the ability to predict is not an essential ingredient in such scientific models anyway, the fact that evolutionary theories based upon such models usually are not predictive is no mark against them. Regardless of their predictive value, such models are the paradigm cases in the ideal science of physics, and in order to protect the dignity of biology as a science it too must use such models. (see pp. 26, 41) This in a nutshell is his main thesis.

In defending and developing his thesis Ruse concentrates on *the* one main *theory* of evolution, namely, "Evolution is, to put it simply, the result of natural selection working on random mutations. " (p. 96) To be a true living evolutionist means accepting this true mechanism of biological change. The *theory* of evolution, though, should not be confused with the *history* or actual course of evolution. In this regard, even though evidence for the theory may be great, evidence for the course of change may be small. (see pp. 120-1) One need not, therefore, worry too much about the poor fossil record. Instead, one must concentrate upon what

genetics teaches now and then interpolate by analogy backwards to show what *must* have happened long ago.

As a philosopher I think one has a right to feel uncomfortable about this arrangement. Are there not at least three elements to be separated out: (1) Evolution as a slow change from common beginnings to different and qualitatively higher levels of being. In its theistic form, at least the potentials for such development were created by God. In its atheistic form, the claim is that from eternal matter chance and " leaps " explain all. (2) The mechanism of development (natural selection, Lamarckism, saltation or macromutations, orthogensis, etc.). (3) The actual path (s) of change. As far as philosophical theory is concerned, (I) is of prime importance. Yet Ruse starts and ends with (2) .

With respect to speciation Ruse assumes a nominalistic approach and then struggles with the problem of reintroducing objectivity. He discusses gene-pools and morphology, as well as genealogical and phenetic taxonomy. His own view is a combination of the gene-pool theory and morphology with overtones of Wittgenstein. (see pp. 133-7) Again, although the delineation of the various positions is good, there is no real coming to grips with the underlying philosophical issues. Indeed, his myopia in this regard is so strong that in another context he states that some biological entities can be both unique and identical. Instances of Mendelian genes, for example, " are *absolutely identical.* If I pass on a blue-eye-causing gene to my son, .. .instances of my gene and instances of his gene are the same kind. They are not more or less alike; rather, just like two hydrogen atoms, they are indistinguishable (even to God)." (p. 210) Such confusion is the price one pays for not understanding the philosophical issue in the first place.

As far as theology is concerned, there isn't any in any so-called traditional sense. In 1973 the author is still fighting off the old bugaboo about " future causes. " How can the future, which doesn't exist, act as an efficient cause now? It can't. Consequently, reasons Ruse, "strong" teleology must go, to be replaced with straightforward matter-of-fact statements about actual processes. At this late date in history it is a shame to see so much effort expended upon hacking to pieces the same poor old straw man.

Ruse ends with a discussion of reductionism in biology. He would like to see it happen, but it does not seem possible right now. He shows little sympathy with the organicists on this question. He presents five arguments used in favor of organicism (which he seems to confuse with vitalism) for refutation. The central argument, however, namely, the unity and self-acting of living things, is not given.

In the course of the book many interesting points are raised. For instance, on page 40 he attempts answering the charge that *the* theory of evolution is merely a tautology (the survivors survive) by saying that

sometimes in fact those more fit do not survive. Saying this implies that he has some objective standard or design in mind. It is, in effect, saying: " Look, those creatures are the fitter and should be surviving but they're not. Too bad! " How can the biologist appeal to designs which supposedly do not exist? Ruse seems to forget that, according to his own view, evolution means never having to say you are sorry.

On pages 151 to 158 an interesting logical issue is raised: can biologists violate the rule that each genus must have at least two species and get away with it? This seems to happen when evolutionist taxonomists classify the aardvark. Ruse's solution is to switch from "extensional" to "intensional " definitions. Instead of listing individuals (Joe, John, Mary), list their characteristics (two-legged, big brained, etc.). Thus, to be in a broader class (e. g., primate) would require certain traits (e. g., two-legged) while belonging to a narrower class (e. g., man) would require added traits (e. g., big brained). Although he does not quite make it, Ruse seems to think it is very modern to return to Aristotelian logic.

Over-all, the work leaves two general impressions. One is that it is a parochial operation. Ruse gives numerous objections and answers but they are almost all from the same closed circle of neo-Positivistic thought, i. e., there is no attempt to go out to other traditions for new insights and points of view. Most of his time is spent acting as a mediator among conflicting scientific views rather than handling philosophically such views from all sides. This is in keeping with the tradition wherein one does not presume to have factual knowledge over and above that possessed by scientists. The first leads to the second. Ruse leaves you with the feeling that the only real task left to biology is to make itself obsolete thus doing away with the philosophy of biology altogether.

The book itself is well-made and can be acquired in either hardback or paperback.

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Science Is Philosophy. By CHARLES HOLLENCAMP. Carthagena, Ohio: The Messenger Press, 1978. Pp. IIS. $8.00.

The aim of this book, as the author himself puts it, is to introduce the philosophy of nature as physical science and physical science as the philosophy of nature. To do this Charles Hollencamp give us first a synthetic historical survey of the philosophy of nature from the early Greek thinkers to the various systems of contemporary philosophical thought.

This is the best part of the book and a necessary introduction to the problem of philosophy of nature in its relation to modem science, for science and philosophy had been considered to be the same discipline until the sixteenth century. Scientists were philosophers of nature, and philosophers of nature considered themselves scientists. Now, however, the majority of scientists and philosophers believe that science and philosophy are essentially two independent disciplines. This is paradoxical because even now it is difficult to perceive concrete scientific problems which are not, at the same time, problems of philosophy. True, the methodology of science is different from the methodology of philosophy, but both science and philosophy study the same subject matter, namely, the cosmos, man, and God. Hence the artificial dichotomy which started chiefly with Descartes and which has harmed philosophy as well as science. More than ever the insight of philosophy is necessary for the better understanding of science, and equally the data of contemporary science should be taken into consideration by philosophy if philosophy is to be worthy of its name. All the great scientists have been outstanding philosophers of nature. This book helps us to understand this historical conclusion.

We must bear in mind that strictly speaking, the problem of science and philosophy is not a problem between scientists and philosophers but of philosophy and science as such. Hense it is crucial for the sake of clarity to set up the philosophical principles of the division and specification of the sciences as they are found in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics.* In this sense the book is somewhat incomplete. The author shows too much dependence on Vincent Smith and Charles De Koninck. Perhaps more explanation based on original sources would have improved the understanding of the philosophical principles involved in this thorny problem. The volume is recommended to all those who are seeking a brief historical and philosophical introduction to the philosophy of nature.

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The Christian Faith In The Doctrinal Dow,ments Of The Catholic Faith. Edited by J. NEUNER, S. J. and J. DUPuis, S. J. BANGALORE: Theological Publications in India, 1973. Pp. 710.

This new collection of the Church's doctrinal documents is the fruit of the collaborated effort of the professors of the two theological faculties of Vidyajyoti, Institute of Religious Studies, Delhi, and of Juana-Deepa,

Institute of Philosophy and Religion, Pune, under the able editorship of the Jesuit professors Joseph Neuner and James Dupuis.

Stemming from the 1938 publication by J. Neuner and H. Roos of *Der Glaube der Kirche in den Urkunden der Lehrverkundigung* and down through the 1967 and 1969 English *The Teaching of the Catholic Church*, deriving in a measure from other collections, especially Denziger-Schonmetzer, the present book provides a number of more relevant and recent documents. A long introduction on the value, limitations, and use of such a collection of doctrinal texts is a sound contribution and caution, and a valuable guideline for the reader. Chapters have been rearranged and new ones inserted. The prefaces to the chapters and the evaluations of the individual documents or offerings have been in great part presented to reflect later scholarship and the viewpoint of Vatican II. A concordance with other familiar collections follows the usual indexes.

This new collection may be used with profit by those who are interested in an authoritative guidance provided by doctrinal documents which serve as witness of the Faith.

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A Reply to Vernon J. Bourke's final judgment-" an example of how not to interpret a philosophical classic "-on: *Aquinas On Metaphysics. A historicodoctrinal study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics.* By JAMES C. *Dow.*

When I first read Prof. Bourke's review of my historical study of Aquinas's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, I became concerned. I am still concerned, and not because of the statement I have chosen as a title, nor for these other words either: " This is a grandiose project: it would take a marvelous mind and very mature scholarship. . • " etc.[1] I, no more than anyone else, like to read such words when they refer to oneself, but these are not the source of my concern. Ordinarily I would try to shrug off such comments and the review containing them. Yet I find I cannot shrug off this review, for there is something very peculiar about it, to wit: I) the review contains completely inaccurate statements about the medieval period and uses them as the basis for judgment on my work; 2) the reviewer leads the reader to form what are obviously false impressions about the content of my book; and 8) the review seems to indicate that its author failed to notice Chs. III-VI of the book (186 pages). As

1 *The* 87, (Jan. 1978), p.

noted, I would ordinarily attempt to ignore the type of comment chosen as title, or all other comments of a personal nature. Yet I do not think it proper to shrug off the review itself. Aquinas's *CO'mmentary on the Metaphysics* is an important work, and it would be wrong if the study of it were to suffer because of Prof. Bourke's improper attack on my book. Accordingly I feel obligated to stand up in defense of what surely is the proper way to study Aquinas's work; I feel it necessary to defend it against what apparently passes in this country as " scholarly medieval criticism," that is, the type of thing found in Prof. Bourke's review. Medieval studies, and in particular scholarship in the study of medieval philosophy, not to mention Aquinas's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*- these are important to me. Hence I am responding to Prof. Bourke's review and responding in the only way I judge proper, that is, by speaking directly to him on the following topics:

1) the value of studying the Spiazzi-Cathala edition of Aquinas's *Cvmmenta1'1J;*
2) the five Latin versions of the *Metaphysics* used by Aquinas in his *Commenfu1'1J;*
8) the date of Albert's *Commenta1'1J on the Metaphysics;* Albert's knowledge of Averroes; Albert's influence on Aquinas;
4) Neplatonism in my study of Aquinas;
5) Aquinas's view on knowledge of *esse;*
6) miscellanea, including the dating of Aquinas's *Commenta1'1J.*

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Dear Professor Bourke:

Over 700 years ago Thomas Aquinas :finished his *Commentary on the Metaphysics.* This is a work which would have established his reputation as a brillant philosopher had he never written anything else. Because of this I have always found it very strange that after seven centuries no book-length study of Aquinas's *CD'mmentary* had ever been published! What is more, only four men other than myself have bothered to write articles about the work! Because of this, Professor Bourke, I truly expected at least a small " thank you " for my effort. After all, as one of our American philosophers has said, " if something is worth doing, it's worth doing poorly." Even were we to suppose that I have written a rotten book, at least I would have focused attention on an important medieval work. In this regard, I deem it inappropriate to refer to my study as " a grandiose project, " and then to explain this by " it would take a marvelous mind and very mature scholarship" to carry it off. However, I am not writing to take you to task for such statements. I have decided to write this response because I think it important that we clear up certain inaccuracies and false impressions promulgated by your review. These inaccuracies and false impressions are important because, if accepted, they will undoubtedly keep philosophers and historians from studying Aquinas's

Commentary in the proper way. I have grouped these inaccuracies and false impressions under the six points that follow.

1) The value of studying the Spiazzi-Cathala edition of Aquinas's Commentary.

You seem to imply, Professor Bourke, that at the present time, that is today-1978-no one should spend a great deal of time and effort studying Aquinas's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* because our world does not yet possess a critical edition. I cannot convey the consternation with which your words fill me! Philosophers and historians have quoteG. this work for centuries. Yet you say " solid interpretation will have to wait " for a critical text! [2]-In this regard I would call the following to your attention. In the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples there is a most interesting manuscript (no. VIII F. 16) which was written in part by the scribes to whom Aquinas dictated his revisions of Books II-III, and of Books V, 7, 856-VII, 16, 1647. It is true that this manuscript does not contain a complete *Commentary dictated* by Aquinas, but it does contain a *complete Commentary:* to these dictated, revised sections, were added the remainder of Aquinas's exposition of the *Metaphysics.* So we have here an interesting 13th century manuscript copy of Aquinas's *Commentary.* Now the scholars have studied this, but, course, you know that because you could read it in my book, and one conclusion reached is that this manuscript presents roughly the same text as our present edition-even *in those sections dictated by Aquinas,* which after all constitute over one-third of the *Commentary.* [3] So it would seem that our Spiazzi-Cathala edition does with some probably deserve to be studied.-lf you do not wish to take my word on this issue, I suggest you read the work of the quite reputable scholars to whom I have just referred in footnote 3: T. Kiippeli, A. Mansion, J. Duin. (Incidentally, did Cajetan have a critical edition of the *Summa?)*

2) The five Latin versions of the Metaphysics used by Aquinas in his Commentary.

Now let us turn to the Latin versions which Aquinas used in composing his exposition of the Aristotelian *Metaphysics.* I explain in my book that

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 242.

[3] Cf. T. Kiippeli, "Mitteilungen iiber Thomashandschriften in der Biblioteca Nazionale in Neapel. II. Ein Autograph des Metaphysikkommentars des hi. Thomas?," *Angelicum,* X (1933), 116-25. A. Mansion, "Saint Thomas et le 'Liber de causis'. A propos d'une edition recente de son Commentaire," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain,* LIII (1955), 63-64. J. Duin, "Nouvelles precisions sur la chronologie de 'Commentum in Metaphysicam' de S. Thomas, " *Revue Philosophque de Louvain,* LID (1955), 511-34.-I discuss this manuscript in my book, cf. pp. 10-14.

Aquinas used five of these translations: *Vet'U8, Arabica, Media, Moerbecana,* and *Litera Boethii.* Now my claim in this regard is quite accurate. More to the point, I do not simply claim that Aquinas used these five versions; I devote several pages to summarizing the research on this issue. I might mention too that I refer to some 20 separate works of scholars who have studied this problem, works by men such as Grabmann, Minio-Paluello, Dondaine, Geyer, Salman, Pelster, De Couesnongle, and A. Mansion-a veritable " who's who " of scholarly research, would you not agree? Imagine then my surprise, Prof. Bourke, when I read in your review: " Whether five versions were really used by Aquinas, as Doig suggests, I do not know."• Of course Aquinas used these five versions. However, if you choose not to take the word of these scholars, why not avail yourself of the numerous quotations of and references to these Latin versions that I give in my book? Prof. Bourke, if you really want to know whether Aquinas used these five Latin versions of Aristotle, just get to work and compare Aquinas's text with them and discover the answer yourself. This is an important point. I have presented the evidence. When you write, " I do not know, " does that not serve to mislead the reader into thinking one of these: a) either no one has studied the issue or at least not studied it sufficiently; or b) the authorities do not agree; or c) this Doig fellow has not given the evidence needed to decide? Let me assure you that all three are false.

3) *The date of Albert's CommentaTY on the Metaphysics; Albert's knowledge of Averroes; Albert's influence on Aquinas.*

We must tum now to the relation between Aquinas's *CommenfaTY* and that of his friend Albert the Great. You have made several errors in regard to Albert's *Commentary on the Metaphysics.* First, you are out of touch with medieval research when you give the date of tiie work; 'second, you are wrong in thinking that Albert's *Commentary* does not show a great deal of influence from Averroes; and finally, you are also wrong in saying we are ignorant of the manner in which Albert's work influenced Aquinas. I regret that I must take you to task on these issues, Professor, but to paraphrase what Aquinas wrote about his relation to Aristotle, " more a friend to truth than to you. " Let us examine then each of your views about Albert. In the first place, it is not at all correct to say, as you do, that his *Commentary* "could have been produced at any time betwen 1255 and 1275."[5] I was quite amazed by that statement, and it took me quite awhile before I realized what you must mean. Surely you refer to the theory advocated by F. Pelster in 1920 and 1982, the theory now sometimes referred to as the " extreme " theory. According to Prof. Pelster, Albert's Aristotelian commentaries were written between

4 *Thomist, loc. cit.* p. 242.

5 *Ibid.,* p. 241.

1256 and 1275-surely that is where you got those dates; however, he claims the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* was written between 1270 and 1274.[6] Yes, there is (or maybe we should say, there was) such a theory concerning the dating of Albert's work. It does not, of course, as has often been pointed out, conform very well to the fact that Roger Bacon angrily criticized his contemporaries for regarding so highly Albert's commentarieS, and all this between 1240 and 1248![7] Be that as it may, there is another and quite contrary theory, that of P. Mandonnet, according to which Albert's Aristotelian commentaries date from between 1245 and 1256.[8] So you see, there are these two theories, and even though you write as if everyone knows the first is correct, there are some, and you may count me among them, Prof. Bourke, who think the first theory, and the second one too, to be wrong. I'm not asking you to accept this on my authority, of course, but can you not accept the word of J. Weisheipl and D. A. Callus? They have both published some interesting discoveries on a little known work of Albert that he wrote circa 1271. In this context Prof. Weisheipl claims that we can now "establish definitively" that Albert's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* was completed before 1271 and maybe even by 1267.[9] But I find Prof. Callus's discovery even more interesting (Prof. Weisheipl did not see it until after he had finished writing his own comments, but he introduced a note to bring what he called this" astonishing" discovery to the attention of his readers.) [10] Prof. Callus has found evidence showing Albert was nearly blind in 1271 and that all his work had been completed by that time. On the basis of this discovery, we now know, as Prof. Callus explains, that Albert's *Commentary* was completed by 1262-63, in plenty of time to come to the attention of Aquinas who began to write only after 1265.[11] I hope I am not repeating

s Cf. F. Pelster, *Kritische Studien zum Leben und zu den Schriften Alberts des Grossen* (Freiburg i. B., 1920), esp. pp. 156-61; "Zur Datieruug der Aristoteles-paraphrase des hi. Albert des Grossen, " in *Zeitschrift fUr katholische Thealogie,* LVI (1982), 428-86.

7 Some information of this topic may be found in M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas* (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), p. 42.

s P. Mandonnet, "Polemique Averroiste de Siger de Brabant," *Revue Thomiste,* V (1897). *95-105.*

9 J. Weisheipl, "The Problemata Determinata XLIII ascribed to Albertus Magnus (1271)," *Mediaeval Studies,* XXII (1960), 815.

10 *Ibid.,* p. 808.

11 D. A. Callus," Une oeuvre recemment decouverte d'Albert le Grand: De XLID problematibus ad Magistrum Ordinis (1271)" *Revue des sciences philosophiques,* XLIV (1960), 259-60. B. Geyer's view in the introduction to his critical edition of Albert's *Commentary* should be mentioned here; approaching the dating of Albert's work from evidence other than that noted by Callus and Weisheipl, Geyer nonetheless concludes that Albert's exposition was finished not long after 1262-68,

myself needlessly- perhaps you read about Prof. Callus's discovery in my book on page 5, note 8, referred to also on page 83, note 1.

A second place where you are incorrect in your view of Albert concerns his knowledge of Averroes and the extent to which he was influenced by him. You say that, if Albert's *Commentary* was early enough to be used by Aquinas in his exposition, then it would show little awareness of Averroes but much of Avicenna. Prof. Bourke, you do Albert a great injustice. As Prof. De Vaux showed in 1933, Albert should be regarded as a pioneer in the effort to introduce Averroes to the Latin world! During the first decade or so after Michael Scot translated Averroes very few seemed to know anything at all of him. No one in fact seemed to pay much attention until Albert in his *Summa de creaturis-written* circa to use him; to get down to facts, De Vaux listed some 48 citations of Averroes in the first two parts of that work from circa [12] I am surprised that everyone does not realize how highly Albert regarded Averroes. Not only did Prof. De Vaux bring this out, but Prof. Robert Miller in 1954 agreed with De Vaux and in addition showed how Albert's comprehension of Averroes had improved by a56.[18] Even more, the indices of the new critical editions of Albert's exposition of the *De Anima* (finished by and of the *Metaphysics* contain fairly lengthy lists of references to Averroes. So on this issue too, your are incorrect in your view of Albert, Prof. Bourke, and therefore once more your criticism of my book flounders on the hard, cruel rocks of fact.

There is a third and final aspect of your statement about Albert to which I must beg permission to object. You write that we are ignorant of the manner in which Albert's metaphysics influenced Aquinas.[14] I assume that you mean we do not know how Albert's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* influenced Aquinas's *Commentary,* because that is the only relation of Albert to Aquinas that my book deals with. I assure you Professor, I am correct when I say that Aquinas wrote his *Commentary* with the exposition of Albert (and the exposition of Averroes too) open before him. Why I have shown in my lengthy comparative analyses of Albert and Aquinas how Aquinas used or opposed Albert as the occasion demanded! I will not give a detailed explanation of this in my letter, as Chs. ID-V were written to show primarily the fashion in which Aquinas used or opposed Avicenna, Averroes, and Albert-and used and opposed them as was needed

and then ends on this note: " ... certo constat commentarium Alberti Ionge ante commentarium Thomac confectum esse." Cf. p. viii of *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia,* T. XVI, P. I, (1960).

12 R. De Vaux, "La premiere· entree d'Averroes chez les Latins," *Revue des sciences phuosophiques et theologiques,* XXII (1988), 198-242.

1a R. Miller," An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St. Albert," *Mediaeval Studies,* XVI (1954), *59-69.*

14 *The Thomist,* 87, (Jan. 1978), p. 242.

to bring out what he, Aquinas, thought Aristotle's metaphysics was all about. I do not want to enter into any detail at this point as my book has done that abundantly. But permit me, Prof. Bourke, to ask one question here. Why does your review present its " I do not know " and its " we may wonder at the value " and at the same time hide from its readers the fact that my book presents nearly 800 pages of comparative analyses of Averroes, Avicenna, Albert, and Aquinas? More, why does your review hide from its readers the fact that all assertions I make about Albert's relation to Averroes, and of Aquinas's relation to both, rest on the evidence of these comparative studies? Let me underline this as it is important. My contention, clearly expressed again and again in my book, is that one must compare Aquinas to his predecessors in order to understand his *Commentary on tJ,e Metaphysics.* These comparisons are the *basis* of all my affumations about these philosophers, and yet your review never even hints at this aspect of my book but goes its own way, " wondering " at the value of a comparison of Albert and Aquinas. There is no need to wonder when the comparisons are there in the open to be studied and judged.

4) *Neoplatonism in my study of Aquinas.*

Before turning to one of the central issues of Aquinas's *Commentary* I would like to speak of your statements regarding my book and Neoplatonism. What is involved is this: I said, as you noted, that *certain* Neoplatonic elements in Avicenna's metaphysics were irrelevant to what Aquinas does in his *Commentary.* Seeing how you use this, I wish I had phrased it differently; however, in the context I feel it was fairly clear that I meant that we could understand the essential points of Aquinas's metaphysics without comparing his thought with Avicenna's Neoplatonic views on divine attributes, on emanation, and " so on. " In other words, I was saying that we need not bother with these *few* doctrines. You take this statement of mine and charge: " These things are not irrelevant: one cannot understand the metaphysics of any of these men in the Middle Ages without some awareness of the influence of Nco-Platonism." [15] Come now, Professor! You know I did not say Neoplatonism was irrelevant. If I had, then I woud gladly help you start the bonfire. But nowhere do I state or imply such a patently absurd thing as that Neoplatonism was unimportant to Avicenna, Averroes, Albert, and Aquinas. However, your reader, who surely skims his reviews rather rapidly, will carry away the impression that my book ignores Neoplatonic elements. Let us set the record straight. I am not overly fond of titles, tags, and categories as I believe they hinder us in thinking, and so I am not given to littering the landscape with terms such as "Neoplatonic." Yet the reader will find many discussions of Neoplatonic doctrines in my book. For example:

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

" metaphysics as defining all things in terms of 'God' " (page 44}; "the sending forth of being by the prime mover " (page 47}; " quiddity as a reality is a radius and a light of the first form, God " (page 50}; " a real quiddity is intelligible because it is saturated with the light of the intellect from which it comes" (page 50}; "the movement of metaphysics is to search for the light proceeding from God into the first entity and substance of things" (page 52); and so forth and so forth.

5) Aquinas's view on knowledge of esse

Now then we come to my principal objection to what you have written. It is my principal objection because first, it would seem to be most important in your mind, taking up as it did nearly *25* per cent of your review; and second, because the very nature of your objection hides most effectively the historical aspects I judge essential to the study of Aquinas. I will begin by quoting some of your words; I wish us to have them before us, as they express a certain *esprit* that I wish us to feel, even though I perfer to leave it unnamed.

What lies behind all of this is Doig's understanding of intellectual conception and judgment. He is sure that " the 'is' of judgments never means exists," and he can be quite critical of Aquinas (1) for not havilng understood this in his early period, and (2) for not saying it in his later writings... The fact of the matter is that Doig approached his task with an obvious preconception. He is dead set against any suggestion that metaphysical *esae* is expressed or known in the judgment. Gilson and his associates are wrong on this point, in the view of Doig. Indeed, in the course of his discussion Doig disagrees with almost everyone in the Thomist establishment (Fabro, Forest, Geiger, Maritain, Marechal, Owens, Phelan, De Raeymaeker, Van Riet, and Van Steenberghen) except Charles Hart and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange!' What is important in Doig's mind is the concept of being, taken both essentially and existentially. His book should stand as an example of how not to interpret a philosophical classic.[18]

In the jargon of our youth: " WOW! " But let us be serious. What on earth is this " Thomist establishment? " Do all those learned men actually agree on anything? Why Fabro and Geiger cannot even define "participation " in the same way! And as for the Louvain scholars you mention (Van Riet, Van Steenberghen, De Raeymaeker} , why they hardly entertain a single view that would be accepted as Thomist by Gilson, Owens, and Phelan! And Marechal! Mon Dieu! I thought he was the KANTIAN-Thomist! If the members of the " Thomist establishment " can be as diverse as these, then the fact that I disagree with some aspect of each' work should make them receive me with open arms!

But let us tum to a substantive issue. Your readers can be very certain

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 242-48.

that you believe I approach Aquinas with a preconception, namely, that metaphysical *esse* is not known in a judgment. It is this charge, and your emphasis on it, that hides most effectively what I consider to be the only correct method of studying Aquinas, the historical method. Now perhaps I have presupposed this-it is possible; but before we state this definitely, permit me to ask you this: do my words and my procedure truly show you the presence of this preconception? I must insist on phrasing my question this way, because I try in my book always to insist on asking what the words and procedures of Aquinas really mean; I try in my book always to anchor my interpretations in the sense of the words and procedures themselves .. So Prof. Bourke, do my words and my procedure show you this preconception? I suggest we look to those places where I claim to have discovered that Aquinas would not want to say that " is " means " exists. " In this regard, you do your readers an injustice when you write that the "kernel of Doig's view of judgment is based on his reading of certain texts in the *Commentary (In IV Meta.,* lect. 17, n. 736; *In V Meta.,* lect. 9, nn. 889 et 895; *In VI Meta.,* lect. 4; see Doig, p. 349) .[17] You do your readers an injustice. You refer them to page 349 on which they will find listed, but not explained, nor analyzed, those texts you list. But what am I doing on page 349 and in the entirety of Chapter VII, Prof. Bourke? Permit me to answer my own question by parphrasing what I presented as the raison d'etre of that chapter: "the necessity of studying Aquinas's *Commentary* through textual analyses may have obscured some aspects of his metaphysics; therefore the final chapter of my book will present the most important doctrines of the *Commentary,* though now independent of any analysis of texts. "[18] The references to those few texts you find on page 349 and elsewhere are references to texts *in which the reader can find* the notion that *esse* is not known in a judgment; those references are not references to the texts *on which I primarily base* my reading of Aquinas. What your statement does, Prof. Bourke, is to obscure the issue once again; you have managed to hide from your reader: 1) the fact that I interpret Aquinas's thought on knowledge of *esse* by reading his *Commentary* in the light of the parallel expositions of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, and Albert; and 2) the fact that I find Aquinas saying or implying that *esse* is not known in a judgment in a fairly large number of texts and doctrines which are scattered through his *Commentary.*

This brings me to a point that I truly regret mentioning in this fashion, but as I have said, " more a friend to truth than to you. " You write in your review, Professor, as if you failed to note the lengthy comparative analyses presented in my Chs. III-VI. I have mentioned this oversight earlier, but now it seems I must underline it. What is my book, Professor?

[17] *Ibid.,* p.
[18] P. 341,

And by asking that question, I am not trying to claim total truth for it. But what is it? Let us be fair: it is a quite lengthy analysis of the text of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averres, Albert, and Aquinas. Yet nowhere in your review do you clearly state that! To the contrary, your "I do not know " about the Latin versions of Aristotle, your " area of doubt " about the value of studying the Spiazzi-Cathala text, your " we do not know " about the date of Albert's *Commentary,* your "we may wonder at the value" of comparisons of Albert and Aquinas, and your throwing the charge of "obvious preconception "-all these serve one end which I truly hope was not intended: they hide from your reader the content and method of my book, while they lead him to conjure up an image of a book whose conclusions are founded on assumptions, oversights, omissions, and preconceptions. Now even were all theseassumptions, oversights, omissions, and preconceptions in my book, there would still remain a mountain of evidence I present for my conclusions.

But let us return to what you call an " obvious preconception. " I will try to summarize, as briefly as I can, a few of those places in which I try to show why we must conclude that Aquinas rejected the theory that metaphysical *esse* is known in a judgment. (Of course, I am speaking of the Aquinas of the *Commentary on the Metaphysics;* in the beginning of his career, Aquinas held that *esse* was known in a judgment, but after his study of Boethius's *De hebdomadibus* he grew ever further away from that early view.) [19]

a) *Ch. II, pp. 24-35.* The context is a short summary of Avicenna's view of metaphysics. My book notes that for Avicenna everything studied by the Metaphysician is grouped around *esse.* Avicenna seems to have had an unusual notion of *.esse* as he wrote such cryptic things as this: to study the *esse* of motion is to study the concrete reality of motion, " not in so far as it is in matter, but according to the *esse* it has." I was initially puzzled by this view, and I am sure, Prof. Bourke, that you will agree that it is somewhat unusual: does it not seem to you that the " *esse* of motion " and "motion insofar as it is in matter" must be inseparable and the same thing? Where after all does motion exist if not in matter! But it is precisely because the existence of motion is material that I was convinced that Avicenna did not mean by *esse* what we would think he meant. And so, as I explain in this section of my book, we need to discover what exactly he did mean.

My treatment of Avicenna continues by noting the following: if we accept the distinction of existence and essence (which, of course, Avicenna did) , we would not ordinarily say that a concrete being is existence: we

[19] In my study of Aquinas I treat this point in footnotes, e. g., p. note I; p. 847, !J.Ote I; p. 860, note I; p. 862, note 1.

would not say that *ens eat esse.* Nor would Avicenna say such a thing. Rather, he claims that "a concrete thing is an essence which is, or which exists "–" ens est certitudo seu essentia quae est. " In all beings one has to distinguish the *esse* of a thing and the essence or certitude by which a thing is what it is. It is precisely the *fact of having* a certitude or an essence that Avicenna refers to as *esse* proprium--proper existence. When he attempts to explain exactly what he means by *esse* Avicenna clearly indicates that he is referring to the *de facto* presence, here and now of a quiddity. *Ease* signifies what is often referred to by contemporary philosophers as" brute facticity." Accordingly, one can say that the study of *esse qua esse* is the study of the "fact of having a quiddity, considered precisely as such a fact. "

Let us pause here a moment, Professor, to make certain we understand this point. I am claiming that for Avicenna metaphysics must study things *qua esse.* That means the formal object. our point of view is *ease.* And *ease* taken as a point of view becomes the " fact of having a quiddity, considered precisely as such a fact." With this in mind let us consider the following text of Avicenna, which I have put into English for convenience.

> Everything has a certitude by which it is what it is. . . And this is what perhaps we call proper *esse;* nor do we mean by that expression wnything but the meaning [or concept] of affirmative *esse,* because the word *ens* signifies many meanings, [or concepts], among which is the certitude by which each thing is; and this is like the proper *esse* of a thing.

By " proper *ease*" then is meant the " affirmative *esse* " ; *ens* is said to mean many things, among which is essence-these doctrines appear to be references to the Aristotelian theory of *ens* as meaning either " predicaments of substance and accidents " or " truth. " In speaking of *ens* in the first sense one refers to "what a thing is"; in the latter, to "that a thing is." To know " that a thing is " is to give an affirmative answer to the question *an est?* is to posit the "affirmative *ease*"-the *Eat!* It would appear thus that by the proper *esse* of a thing Avicenna is thinking of the knowledge we have" that a thing is *"-Eat!* Not that Avicenna confuses our *knowledge* with the *existence* of a quiddity. Rather, in the passage quoted above he merely wished to pin-point the act of knowledge in which we grasp the existence proper to a thing. In other words, for Avicenna it is in answering the question " Is it? " that we grasp the " fact of having a quiddity. "

If I may be permitted to summarize my explanation, I shall simply say that, for Avicenna, the metaphysical point of view is " factually present," or as I often put it in my book, " here-and-now presence " that we know when we judge the truth of our knowledge. One cannot help but note the great similarity between my understanding of Avicenna and M. Gilson's view of Aquinas! I point this out because in the next section we shall note

how Averroes and Aquinas reject this Avicennian position because it is un-Aristotelian. [20]

b) *Ch. IV, passim.* On page 161 I explain that Averroes, in order to attack Avicenna's metaphysics, had but to point to some fallacy in the idea or theory of *esse.* Earlier I showed that Averroes thought "Avicenna sinned greatly" regarding *esse* (page 145}. In addition my book claims the crux of Averroes's criticism is this: the source of Avicenna's error was a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between *ens* as referring to the truth of our knowledge and *ens* as referring to substance and accidents; when we speak of that *ens* which refers to truth, we are speaking of an *act,* of an act we perform; we do not thus refer to the categories of substance and accidents (page 162).

I trust Averroes's position is clear, Prof. Bourke; he is rejecting the act in which we know truth, he is rejecting the " is " of the act of judging-the " is " of the judgment " Socrates is real." This " is," Averroes means, has nothing to do with metaphysical being. I find this very interesting, because it shows what Averroes would have thought of the so-called " existential Thomism " so much in vogue in some quarters. But let us return to this thorny issue of *esse.*

Aquinas's attacks on Avicenna parallel those attacks found in Averroes's *Commentary,* as my book explains on numerous occasions. One of these attacks, owing a great deal to Averroes, is on pages 112-114.[21] But the later treatment on page 164ff is more important to us at the moment. Here I will simply steal from my book.

But without examining Thomas' second attack on Avicenna *(In X Meta.,* S, 1981-82), we can not correctly understand what Thomas has done either to Aristotelian metaphysics, nor to the Avicennian theory of the real distinction. Even the briefest reading of pargraphs 1981-82 reveals how Thomas has followed Averroes' criticism. Avicenna was deceived by the multiple uses of the word *ens,* writes Thomas, practically copying Averroes' expression. There is a difference, unnoticed by Avicenna, between the *ens* which signifies the truth of a proposition, and the *ens* which is divided into the ten predicaments. The *ens* which signifies the composition of a proposition is an accidental predicate. That is, when we say (judge): "Socrates is white," the "is" is our way of denoting that we have correctly joined " Socrates " and " white" ; such a joining is made by the intellect today, instead of yesterday or tomorrow. What we do in a judgment is express that our present knowledge is true. It is completely accidental to Socrates, however, whether we know him today or tomorrow. "Is white" may be

[20] Albert rejects this Avicennian theory as well, but I am omitting all discussion of his position here for reasons of space; in my study Albert's view of this theory is treated on pages 145-52 and 168-64.

[21] For Averroes and Albert on this text of Aristotle and their influence on Aquinas, see pages 145-52.

Bill actual accident of Socrates; yet the fact that we know it is (or the fact that we say knowledge is true), this is totally accidental to the reality of whiteness in Socrates. Hence, when Avicenna tried to study all things " here-and-now realized, " he was actually studying them as " here-and-now known by us as realized. " Metaphysical *tms* is not that type or *ens,* Thomas writes; metaphysical *tm11* is that being which is divided into the ten predicaments, and which expresses thus· the natures of the ten genera of beings.

Thus it is that Thomas categorically rejects the Avicennian metaphysics which studied all things as realized here and now. Yet Thomas accepts the distinction of *esse* and essence. How he manages to distinguish *esse* from essence, and what exactly he means by *esse,* these are topics to which we shall return in Chapter VI (pages 164-65).

It would seem Prof. Bourke, on the basis of such expositions that my book *attempts present evidence* for the following points. 1) Avicenna held that the formal object of metaphysics was " here-and-now existence " or" presence "-the" is" known and expressed by a judgement. Both Averroes and Aquinas reject this, saying that the" here-and-now presence," or Avicennian *esse,* is the mind's realization that it has correctly known some object; as such this *esse* is not important for the constitution of real being. 3) Yet Aquinas retained *esse* in his metaphysical view expressed in the *Commentary,* through just how is not shown until Ch. VI.

c) *Chs. V-VI, passim.* We must follow this point just a bit further, so let us be patient Professor. I devote Ch. V to a further comparison of the interpretations of Aristotle given by Avicenna, Averroes, Albert, and Aquinas. Here, however, I concentrate on three topics: the relation of universal science (the study of· being as such) to the first science (the study of the first cause of being) ; the study of *communia* (the notions such as "being" which are common to all knowledge); and metaphysics as " lord" of the sciences (metaphysics as giving principles, subject matter, etc. to the other sciences) . What I discover in these analyses confirms what was noted in Ch. IV concerning the object of metaphysics. Aquinas is everywhere presenting a *single, unified* metaphysical synthesis in opposition to the other three commentators; moreover, Aquinas constantly indicates this metaphysical synthesis is Aristotle's, even though it is tainted from end to end with *esse* as a metaphysical principle-but *esse* means something other than the Avicennian notion which Aquinas has rejected. This is indeed a complex situation, don't you agree Prof. Bourke. In fact, it is so complex with all the analyses carried out in my book that, even if I did begin with a presupposition, it would be a monumental task to discover exactly where I first slip it in! But back to the grindstone. What exactly did *esse* mean for Aquinas? That question I try to answer in Ch. VI.

I really wish it were possible to present the discussion of this issue as

I give it in Ch. VI but this letter would become much too lengthy were I to do that. For you see, Prof. Bourke, in Ch. VI I undertake the task of reconstructing the metaphysics operative in Aquinas's *Commentary.* To do that I enter into the following:

1) a listing of the basic doctrines bearing on the movement of metaphysics from its birth to affirmations of God (pages 239-241)
2) a discussion of the texts dealing with the birth of metaphysics (pages 241-247)
3) a study of what Aquinas has called the "investigation of predication," an investigation to be used in metaphysics (pages 247-255)
4) a study of how Aquinas seems to have used the investigation of predication to discover the concept of " being " (pages 255-275); and to discover the distinction of matter and form (pages 275-281)
5) a study of texts dealing with the discovery of the existence of God (pages 281-295)
6) a study of texts dealing with the human attempt to speak of God (pages 295-302)

Throughout these 64 pages I am trying to reconstruct the metaphysics which is demanded by Aquinas's opposition to Avicenna, Averroes, and Albert, and which as well is demanded by his intention to present his understanding of Aristotelianism. It is in this context that I try to explain the meaning of *esse* that this *complex historical reality of the Commentary* seems to demand, and that is demanded too by the six groups of texts mentioned above. What is this meaning of *esse* demanded by these six groups of texts and by this historical situation? This is undoubtedly the question, Prof. Bourke, and so I shall attempt to answer succinctly. I} *Esse* is known in the first operation of the intellect-in a concept. *Esse* is understood as "actually received" or "actually present, when it needn't be. " Because of this I describe the meaning of *ens* as " actualized essence. " To know something as *ens* is to see " the essence actually constituting the thing what it is, when the essence need not be so constituting it. " Such formulations may sound strange, but they seemed necessary to take into account the following historical facts.

1} Avicennian *esse* is rejected because it is un-Aristotelian:

Aristotle knew the ' is " of judgment to be metaphysically uninteresting;
2) Esse was retained in the metaphysics Aquinas saw as Aristotle's;
3) " manifestly false is the opinion of those who say Aristotle does not have a proof of a first cause of being "-so Aquinas informs us at the very point Averroes and Albert give the contrary opinion; and *esse* as the creature's participation in its First Cause seems to be the corner-stone of the proof. Such an *esse* cannot be the *esse* known in a judgment because brute facticity needs only an efficient cause and involves no participation.
4) *Ens* and *esse* will be found through an "investigation of predication," says Aquinas, echoing Averroes. By " predication " Aquinas and Averroes **(not to**

mention Albert) did not mean what goes on in judgment, but they meant the concept *used* (and I stress *used)* in the first act of the intellect. " Socrates is a philosopher " is the expression of the first act of the intellect, an expression of the use of a concept to know Socrates. " It is true to conceive Socrates as a philosopher" is the expression of judgment. Avicenna took his *esse* from the "is true" of judgment; "nonsense," said Averroes, Albert, and Aquinas, who insist on taking *ens* from the " is a philosopher " of the first act of the intellect, and there too Aquinas found his *esse.*

These are some of the more important historical aspects surrounding the *Commentary* of Aquinas, and bearing on the meaning of *esse;* but there are many more, Prof. Bourke, that you will find discussed in Chs. III-VI. Still different historical facts are found in other works of Aquinas too, and I try to mention some of those in footnotes. Among those is the following:

5) " *Esl!e* as known in a judgment " was the metaphysical principle Aquinas valued prior to the time he commented on Boethius' *De hebdCYI7/A,l],ibus.* The Platonism of Boethius wrought a profound change in Aquinas' metaphysics however, and gradually that *esse,* derived from Avicenna, disappears from Aquinas' thought. Note for example the change in arguments for God: prior to the study of the *De hebdCYI7/A,l],ibus,*the proof from *esse* is one of causality, afterward it is through participation and causality (see footnotes on pages 360 ood 290 for example); prior to the *De hebdCYI7/A,l],ibus,esl!e* is a brute fact, afterward it is the actuality of actualities-the richest notion of all (see footnotes on pages 362 and 347).

I suppose it is fair to ask where we are after all this. To answer my own inquiry, we are right here: regardless of whether or not my view of Aquinas is correct, these brief remarks about the content on my *historical* study show that you, Prof. Bourke, were somewhat hasty in saying that I wrote with an obvious preconception.

6) *]Jfiscellanea, including the dating of Aquinas's Commentary.*

Prof. Bourke, I fear I have demanded much of, your patience in asking you to read all this. I trust, however, that you do not begrudge me this, since we are both seeking truth, whatever it might be. It was necessary in this case, I felt, for me to point out certain failings and short-comings in your review. To be quite honest about it, it seems that I have taken you to task for all save one or two small aspects of your review. Though it pains me to point this out, you have erred in those remaining elements too. Your statement that I think there were two redactions of Aquinas's *Commenta:ry,* "one from 1265-67 in the Papal States" and the second from 1270-72 is Paris, is not exactly what I said.[22] What I concluded was

[22] *The Tkomist,* 37, (Jan. 1973), p. 242.

as follows. 1) There were two drafts-you were correct on this. But we do not know which of the following is true as they all fit our evidence:

a) the *Commrntary* was begun and finished in Paris between and
b) an early draft was written in Italy (U65-67) and reworked in Paris or in Italy (after or c) the first draft dates from the Paris period and the second after the return to Italy (after [2.11]

In this connection I would like to note what Prof. A. Pattin, in a review of my book in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* has pointed out. Aquinas in paragraph 468 *(In III Meta.*, lect. 11) refers to Simplicius's exposition of the *Categories*, translated by Moerbeke in This parapragh then has to be after that date[24]-this is something I had missed.- This paragraph is in that section revised by Aquinas sometime after June, in that dictation-session I referred to much earlier. If the Naples ms. VIII F. 16 shows this to be one of the revisions I speak of in Ch. I, then we still do not know when Aquinas wrote the first draft. If, however, the Naples ms. does not show the reference to Simplicius as something new in then we know it is possible that the first draft of Book III was written only after

The final element of your review that I will mention concerns the three books you mention; one you chide me for not listing or using, while by implication you seem to say I missed something important in overlooking the others. However, Prof. Bourke, the book that you say I neither listed nor used, the work by Garceau, was published in 1968 which is the year after the completion of my work, as I indicated by the date "April, 1967 " on page xvi. The work of Peghaire, *Intellectus et Ratio*, is one I enjoyed, and in fact cite on page *65* when I am treating those terms in Aquinas's thought. You are, however, quite correct if you intended to imply that the third work, by Muller-Thym, was not used by me. I am not certain, but I believe that book deals with the various metaphysics positions of Albert that lead one to conclude that he did not have just one metaphysics; as I say, I am not certain, but I would suppose that, if it does treat that topic, the reason I did not cite it is because I was dealing only with the way Albert's *Commentary* might have influenced Aquinas's *Commentary.* Hence the question of what metaphysics Albert actually held was irrelevant to my work.

Now I come to the end of this letter. Let me remind you again why I wrote. I was concerned over your review, as it seemed to he founded on historical inaccuracies, incorrect implications about the content of my book, and criticism based on your apparent failure to notice a central

[2.11] Cf. pages 20-21 for these conclusions.
[24] *Tijdsckrift voor Filosofie*, 87 (1972), p. 578.

section of 9l86 pages, namely, Chs. III-VI of my book. Yet it was not the content of your review, nor the fate of my book, that directly bothered me. It was what could result to the study of Aquinas's *Commentary* if I did not respond and point out the true issue. You are wrong when you call my approach " an example of how not to interpret a philosophical classic." Nor have you pointed to anything in my book that justifies your conclusion. My book has taken the only correct approach to the study of Aquinas's *Commentary*, namely:

1) a study of the Latin Aristotle and the commentaries on Aristotle that Aquinas knew;

2) only through that study, and on the basis of that study, is a conclusion reached concerning the nature and content of Aquinas' work.

Undoubtly my work has faults, and perhaps no one can be more aware of that than I. But no evidence has been evoked to show it has faults of method. Quite the contrary, medieval research supports my method. The faults of my book, whatever they are, will concern the implementation of that method, not the method itself. I would welcome criticism, Prof. Bourke, if it were really directed to my book, because such criticism would benefit scholarship in the field of medieval philosophy, such criticism would help us understand Aquinas's magnificent *Commentary.*

Respectfully,
JAMEs C. Dom

Clayton Juni01' College
MMrow, Georgia

BOOKS RECEIVED

Adams Press, Chicago, Ill.: *Value Systems. The Moral and Eudemonic Components,* by John E. Guendling. (Pp. 151)

Alba House: *Traces of God in a Secular Culture,* by George F. McLean, 0. M. I. (Pp. 423, *$5.95); The Ministry of the Celebration of the Sacraments.* Vol. I *Sacraments of Initiation and Union* (Pp. 216), Vol. II *Sacraments of Reconciliation* (Pp. 221), by Nicholas Halligan, 0. P. ($3.95 each)

Barnes & Noble: *Reason, Truth and God,* by Renford Bambrough. (Pp. 164, $3.50 paper, *$5..25* cloth)

Cedam, Padova: *Tomismo e Principio di Non Contraddizione,* by Maria Cristina Bartolomei. (Pp. llO, L. 1.750)

Consejo Superior de investigaciones cientificas: *Jacobus M. Ramirez, 0. P., Opera Omnia.* Tomus V *De Passionibus.* In I-II Summa Theodogiae Divi Thomae Expositio (QQ. XXII-XLVIII). (Pp. *552,* 500 ptas paper, 550 ptas cloth)

Creation House: *Man in Motion,* by Gary Collins. (Pp. 167, $2.95); *How to Choose a Christian CoUege,* by Robert Webber. (Pp. 208, $4.95): *Joy!,* by Barbara Evans. (Pp. 144, $3.95); *A Special Kind of Man,* by Gary Warner. (Pp. 236, $1.95)

Dept. of Philosophy, University of Kansas: *Reflections on Evil,* by Albert Hofstadter. The Lindley Lecture 1973. (Pp. 24)

Editorial Universidad de Buenos Aires: *Continuidad de la Materia.* Ensayo de interpretacion cosmica, by Juan Enrique Bolzan. (Pp. 190)

Harper & Row: *The Concept of Peace,* by John MacQuarrie. (Pp. 82, $4.95)

InterVarsity Press: *Knowing God,* by James I. Packer. (Pp. *256, $5.95)*

Macmillan Publishing Co.: *The Inquisition,* by John O'Brien. (Pp. 244, $6.95)

Orbis Books: *Why is the Third World Poor?,* by Piero Gheddo. (Pp. 158, $3.95)

Oxford University Press: *Frontiers for the Church Today,* by Robert McAfee Brown. (Pp. 166, *$5.95)*

Les Presses de l'Universite Laval: *Hasard, Ordre et Finalite en Biologie. Negation de la Negation,* by Michel Delsol & Henri-Paul Cunningham. (Pp. 242, *$5.95)*

The Print Shop of Edina: *Logical Analysis: A New Approach,* by Richard J. Connell. (Pp. 472)

The Seabury Press: *The Mission of the Church,* by Edward Schillebeeckx. (Pp. 244, $9.75)

Sheed & Ward: *Abortion and Social Justice,* ed. by Thomas W. Hilgers & Denis J. Horan. (Pp. 353, $6.95 cloth, $1.95 paper.)

Theological Publications of India: *The Christian Faith* in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, ed. by J. Neuner, S. J. & J. Dupuis, S. J. (Pp. 709)

Verlag Josef Knecht: *Gottes Wirken in der Welt.* Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur Frage der Evolution und des Wunders, by Bela Weissmahr. (Pp. 198)