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METAPHOR AND ONTOLOGY IN SACRA DOCTRINA

THIS ESSAY is intended as a contribution to hermeneutic theology, the theology of meaning.[1] Hermeneutic theology can concern itself with any topic within the theological tradition; in this article we shall try to allow a certain conception of hermeneutic theology to arise out of the consideration of a particular conjunction in Christian theological tradition, the interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius on the divine names by St. Thomas Aquinas. For both these writers the divine names were revealed in Scripture; so the conjunction will be viewed in a perspective which refers itself to our own concern today with Scriptures, with its ramifications into matters of exegesis on the one hand and modern awareness of language on the other. Thus four hermeneutical loci mark

[1] *Hermeneutik* saw its original rise to common consciousness and eventually the commonplace in Germany, with Bultmann, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ebeling. It is now going through a second phase in France, largely in dialogue with structuralism. As well as Ricoeur's more recent 'lvritings, see the collective work, *Exegese et hermeneutique*, ed. X. Leon-Dufour (Paris, 1971).

out the general area of our concern: the Scriptures (making the large assumption here that the Scriptures can be taken as a single locus), Pseudo-Dionysius, St. Thomas, and our own times (this latter in the sense of an invisible point of vision). Clearly no claim is made here to be the master, in a scholarly way, of all these fields; and while I have tried to make use of scholarship, this study is not itself offered as a piece of scholarship. Many of the footnotes, and even parts of the text, are best seen as triangulation points from which bearings might be taken; the points chosen are arbitrary but not random. By speaking of hermeneutic theology as theology of "meaning" the intention is to appeal to the English notion of "meaning," which has no adequate equivalents in French or German, and which has been the theme of all sorts of reflection in the English-speaking world. If St. Thomas interpreting Pseudo-Dionysius on the divine *names* is at the centre of the discussion, then the primary concern of this article is the hermeneutic theology of meaning itself: the theology of meaning reflecting on itself as it comes to light in a particular historical conjunction.

By *sacra doctrina* we understand that "science" which St. Thomas discusses in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae.* The unity of this science is guaranteed by the uniqueness of its *formalis ratio obiecti,* the *divinitus revelabile* (art. 3) the *subiectum* of this science is God (art. 7). If we ask how the God of *sacra doctrina* is related to the God of philosophy, the answer is always clear: the *same* God is known by different lights, different *media* (art. 1, ad 2); *sacra doctrina* is a kind of stamp, *impressio,* of divine science, and therefore has access to all that may be known (including God) in a higher or more universal way (art. 3, ad 2); and indeed it has access by revelation to God's knowledge of himself (ad *id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso),* this same God who is otherwise known by philosophers only through the created world (art. 6).

All this is familiar enough. But it may be that in spite of a great deal of scholarly work in this area we are still not quite ready enough to accept the implications of St. Thomas's iden-

tification-verbally at least-of *sacra doctrina* and *sacra Scriptura.* Let us now resolutely make this identification, in the sense that" theology" (using the term neutrally) is indeed the rational exploration and declaration of the unified self-disclosure of God in himself and in the world, *mediated by Scripture* (cf. art.8). There are then three modes of determining the basis of theology: the infallible truth of God himself, *Veritas Prima;* the *articuli fidei;* and the canonical Scriptures; these three are modes of a single revelation. That these modes are distinguished in this way is a reflection of St. Thomas's epistemological principles and again raises the question with which we are concerned in this article. " Veritas Prima " is a physical expression, " articuli fidei" (= "principia ") is a logical expression, " canonicae Scripturae " is an empirical-historical expression. The unifying base of theology is determined in three modes, thought of as pretty well equivalent, though there can be no doubt that the metaphysical expression is the primary one (cf. II-II, q.l, a.l). That is to say, even the God of revelation, the God who reveals himself, is conceived of in metaphysical terms-which is not to say that these metaphysical terms still have the same *definite* content as they would have if they were being used purely metaphysically, on the basis of philosophy alone. Because these terms are used to refer to the God of revelation, their content is *indefinite,* or, more exactly (though St. Thomas does not and probably would not say so), their content is defined "contextually," the context being the Scriptures. St. Thomas can identify *sacra doctrina* and *sacra Scriptura* because he is guided, both explicitly and also, with a certain sense of the obviousness of it, tacitly, by ll. " literal " determination of what God *must* be: the Being who is spoken of in metaphysical terms, terms which are now " transferred " to the God of revelation, and yet are not " metaphors."

It is of course, from this viewpoint that we must understand article 9 of the question on *sacra doctrina:* "Utrum sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris." This article is pervasively Dionysian, as the citations would be enough to show. But an

examination of St. Thomas's commentary on the *de divinis nominibus* of Pseudo-Dionysius will allow us to see more clearly what basic assumptions St. Thomas shared with Pseudo-Dionysius and in what ways he importantly departed from them.[2] For our purposes, the first chapter of *de div. nom.* is the most instructive. Pseudo-Dionysius insists that he draws his account of the divine names exclusively *EK Twv iepwv 'Aoy£ow* of the Scriptures (PG 3.588C; cf. 588A; Pera text nn. 8.4), and St. Thomas follows him in this without hesitation:

> De eo quod ab aliquo solo scitur, nullus potest cogitare velloqui, nisi quantum ab illo manifestatur. Soli autem Deo convenit perfecte cognoscereseipsum secundum id quod est. Nullus igitur potest vere loqui de Deo vel ·cogitare nisi inquantum a Deo revelatur. Quae quidem revelatio in Scripturis sacris continetur. (Pera, lect. 1, n. 13; see the whole treatment, nn. 6-21)

Now although St. Thomas does contrast the *doctrina fidei* he and Pseudo-Dionysius are treating of with any merely natural knowledge (lect. 1, n. 7), he rather surprisingly makes no reference to any natural knowledge of God. St. Albert, however, does see this as an objection to Pseudo-Dionysius's assertions (ed. Simon, n. 16), quoting Rom. 1:20, and deals with it by trying to show that philosophical arguments do not lead directly *(directe)* to the knowledge of God; hence the frequency of error about God in philosophy. This would hardly be St. Thomas's view; on the contrary, he does allow that the same matters *(eisdem rebus)* are sometimes dealt with by philosophical theology and that theology which belongs to *sacra doctrina*, under different lights (1, q.1, a.l ad 2).

In fact, St. Thomas's view is more radically "theological"

• The text of St. Thomas used is that of Ceslaus Pera, who also supplies a revised Greek text and a Latin version corresponding to Sarracenus. A useful comparative tool is the fine edition of St. Albert's commentary by Paulus Simon (Miinster, For Pseudo-Dionysius himself, see the numerous writings by R. Roques, in particular *L'Univers dionysien* (Paris, 1954), and his introduction to the edition of *La Hierarchie celeste,* Sources Chretiennes 58 (Paris, 1958). M. de Gandillac's *Oeuvres Completes du Pseudo-Denys* (Paris, 1948) is extremely useful (his translation of *CH.* in SC. 58 is thoroughly revised).

in a modern sense; even that activity of reason which might seem in a philosophical context to be purely natural is to be understood in the context of *sacra doctrina* as operating within revelation, guided by the truth of sacred Scripture, that light which derives like a ray from first truth *(In de div. nom.* 1, lect. 1, n.15, a Dionysian text frequently quoted by St. Thomas) . The philosophical activity of reason is at the service of revelation and integrated into *sacra doctrina.* Now while this general statement may be accepted with some hesitations in regard to the argumentative role of the mind, there is likely to be more resistance to it once the perceptive role of the mind is considered, especially when it is directed to the created world as a source of our knowledge of God. What we have to see is the way in which for Pseudo-Dionysius, followed in this apparently by St. Thomas, the *Scriptural* names of God seem to include, without any special distinction, names of God which would seem to derive immediately from created nature. There can be no doubt that Dionysius, and St. Thomas after him, thought themselves to be expounding a *Scriptural* revelation of God. Thus, however remarkable it may seem to us, the vision in the Temple of Isaiah 6 is offered as an example of the way in which " ex bonitate Dei intelligibilia circumvelantur per sensibilia, sicut cum Scripturae de Deo et angelis sub similitudine quorundam sensibilium loquuntur " (lect.2, n. 65) . It is the Apostolic logia, whether by way of Scripture or also of liturgical tradition, which are held to confer symbolic and revelatory power on the sensible world. The world which is offered to our senses is made transparent by the light of verbal revelation. A list of Scriptural divine names proposed by Dionysius includes the following: good, beautiful, wise, lovable, eternal, existent, mind, intellect, powerful, as well as fire, water, cloud, stone, rock (596A; Pera n. 25). It seems that Pseudo-Dionysius, and, with some important modifications, St. Thomas, see the revealed names of God in Scripture as at least sometimes doing no more than pick out a revelatory significance with which items in the created world are already charged; for the two authors there seems to be a single seamless " veil " between

our perception and the transcendent truth of God. In immediate support of this claim we may draw attention to articles and 13 of I, q.l2, a question dominated by the idea of the beatific vision as the culmination of all knowledge of God. Certainly by natural reason alone we cannot know of God *quid est* but only *an. est;* but what does grace add to this knowledge? Only, so it seems, what can be referred to St. Thomas's standard epistemological structures: fresh *phantasmata,* a stronger *lumen intellectus* (as in the prophets) , sometimes special sensible realities like the dove at Jesus's baptism (art.13). We still do not know of God *quid est,* though we have more and better *effects* from which to know of him, and by revelation can make certain new assertions, e. g., Trinitarian ones, about him .[3]

It is surely not enough merely to feel some embarrassment at this account and bury it out of sight and mind. Is this, for instance, a satisfactory way of talking about the revelation of God in Jesus Christ? We must inquire more searchingly into the explicit and tacit grounds for such a theological epistemology, in particular the view of language and reality it assumes.

The key-passage here would seem to be St. Thomas's *Proemium* to his commentary on the *de divinis nominibus.* According to Thomas, Pseudo-Dionysius makes an "artificial" fourfold division of what the Scriptures say about God. Firstly, there is the treatment of what bears on the unity of the divine essence and the distinction of persons. Secondly and thirdly, there is what is said of God in virtue of some likeness in created things:

> Quae vero dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis, quarum aliqua similitudo in creaturis invenitur, dupliciter se habent. Nam huiusmodi similitudo in quibusdam quidem attenditur secundum aliquid quod a Deo in creaturis derivatur. Sicut a primo bono sunt omnia bona et a primo vivo sunt omnia viventia et sic de aliis similibus. Et

• Cf. the excellent article by G. Ebeling, originally in *Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche* 1964, now translated as "The Hermeneutical Locus of the Doctrine of God in Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas," *Journal for Theology and the Church,* vol. 3 (1967), 70-111.

talia pertractat Dionysius in libro *de divinis nominibus,* quem prae manibus habemus.

In quibusdam vero similitudo attenditur secundum aliquid a creaturis in Deum translatum. Sicut Deus dicitur leo, petra, sol vel aliquid huiusmodi; sic enim Deus symbolice vel metaphorice nominatur. Et de huiusmodi tractavit Dionysius in quodam suo libro quem *de symbolica theologia* intitulavit.

But because every likeness of creatures to God is deficient, we have to proceed by way of negations *(remotiones).* "Non solum Deus non est lapis aut sol, qualia sensu apprehunduntur, sed non est talis vita aut essentia qualis ab intellectu nostro concipi potest." Hence Dionysius's fourth treatise *de mystica theologia* (Pera, p. 1) .

The key-text in this key-passage for our purposes is "symbolice vel metaphorice." We shall have to try to show briefly that the " vel " conceals a fairly deep division between the Platonisms of Pseudo-Dionysius and St. Thomas; and that both Platonisms are fairly remote from any view of metaphor, symbol, language and reality which we could comfortably hold today.4 It may be noted that this "vel" is taken for granted by St. Thomas from his earliest writings: in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* I, d.34, q.3, a.l, obj.3 (Moos I, p.796) we have " huiusmodi metaphorae, vel symbolicae locutiones," where he is speaking of the Scriptures and goes on to refer to Pseudo-Dionysius (the answer to the objection does nothing to modify the language); again I, d.22, q.l, a.2, contra 2 (Moos I, p.534) .

Relying on the copious indices of Chevallier's *Dionysiaca,* it may be said with some confidence that *metaphora* occurs nowhere in the Greek or in any of the Latin versions of Pseudo-Dionysius's works. Why then does it seem obvious to St. Thomas that " symbolice " and "metaphorice " are equivalent?

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(A note on Latin *metaphora).* The question is complicated by

• I take it that my description of Thomas's perspectives as a Platonism is not unduly provocative in view of the works of Geiger, Fabro, and most recently Klaus Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin* (Leiden, 1966).

the fact that Eriugena, although he does not use *metaphora* in his version of Pseudo-Dionysius, uses it frequently in his main work, the *de divisione naturae* or *Periphyseon.* For example, we have "quemadmodum fere omnia quae de natura conditarum rerum proprie praedicantur de conditore rerum *per metaphoram* significandi gratia dici possunt ... non ut *proprie* significent quid ipsa (i. e. causa omnium) sit sed ut *translative* ... probabiliter cogitandum est suadeant." [5]

Ultimately any use of *metaphora* must, of course, go back to Aristotle, primarily *Poetica* and *Rhetorica* III, or *Topica* The Moerbeke translation of *Poet.* has *metaphora,* but it can be exactly dated to The Moerbeke translation of *Rhet.* has not yet been edited, but the MSS are dated at about [7] no earlier version of *Poet.* is known, while an earlier version of *Rhet.* seems not to have been used in the schools. Quintilian's *Inst. Orat.* was certainly used and in the section *de tropis* (VIII, 6, 4) identifies *translatio* with *ftETacpopa.*

The position regarding the translation of *Top.* has recently been clarified by Minio-Paluello. [8] It now seems clear that the Boethian translation available for most of the Middle Ages is not accurately represented by the version printed in Migne, *PL* 94, which represents a revision made by Lefevre d'Etaples. In Minio-Paluello's edition, is represented by *translatio* or *secundum translationem* (*ed. cit.,* pp. 115 £.). MSS of this version are listed, while only three, two of them fragmentary, are known of another version printed by Minio-Paluello and ascribed by him to an anonymous author of the twelfth century. In this version we have *metafora* and *secun-*

[5] Johannis Scotti Eriugenae *Periphyseon,* Liber Primus, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1968), p. 86, !l. 1-8; *PL* 122, 468C. My italics. Sheldon- Williams translates " translative " here by " by analogy " ; but on the same page, 1.20 he translates it "metaphorically."

[6] Ed. A. Franceschini et L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles Latinus* XXXIII (Bruges-Paris, 1958), pp. 26 f.; p. vii.

[7] *Aristoteles Latinus.* Codices descripsit G. Lacombe et al. (Rome, 1989), pp. 77-8.

[8] *Aristoteles Latinus* V. 1-8 (Leiden, 1969).

dum metaforam (ed. cit., pp. although both versions have *transferen.tes, transferunt,* for *f.LEracpf.povre<;, f.LETacpepovaw* (140 a 10-11) in the text cited by St. Thomas, "Omnes enim transferentes secundum aliquam (anonymous version 'quandam ') similitudinem transferunt." [9] In what is almost an exact parallel to St. Thomas's use we find in St. Albert's little treatise on the Trinitarian names of God, where he is discussing Pseudo-Dionysius: "In alio (libro) tangit de his quae secundum translationem, quod ipse *symbolum* vocat, de Deo dicuntur, et de hoc £acit symbolicam theologiam" *(In I Sent.,* A, *Ad aliud* (5); Borgnet XXV, pp. 567b-8a. Compare *Ad ultimum* (6), p. 569b: "Duplex est translatio, scilicet secundum rem, et secundum nomen. Translatio secundum rem in divinis nominibus non est nisi in symbolicis.")

Without claiming any great authority in this matter, I feel bound to conclude that St. Thomas could make such free use o£ his equivalence *symbolum=metaphora* in theology because he could rely on a general familiarity among the thirteenth-century Paris masters with the so-called " Dionysian corpus," containing a very large number o£ texts £rom Eriugena's *De div. nat.* among the scholia attributed to Maximus. [10]

* * * * *

Whatever may be the position regarding the Latin use o£ the word *metaphora,* we can be certain that it does not adequately represent the Dionysian idea *o£* symbol. It is true that Pseudo-Dionysius makes a significant distinction between the names

[9] *De Veritate,* q. 10, a.7 obj. 10. In the new Leonine edition, vol. XXII, p. 315, the text from *Top.* is referred to one of the MSS. consulted by Minio-Paluello for his edition of the Boethian version. Readers of M. D. Chenu's fascinating chapter on " The Symbolist Mentality " in *La Theologie au douzieme siecle* (Paris, 1957), translated in *Nature, Man and Society* (Chicago, 1968), will realize that a great deal of the above is dependent upon (and revises) the footnote n. 1, p. 186 (French), n. 73, pp. 138-9 (English), where the *de Veritate* reference is wrongly given in both versions, and the Boethian authorship of the *Top.* version is glanced at.

[10] See H. F. Dondaine, *Le Corpus dionysien de l'Universite de Paris au XIIIe siecle* (Rome, 1953); also the chapters " L'Entree de la theologie grecque " and "Orientale lumen" in Chenu, *La Theologie au XIIe siecle.*

proper to symbolic theology and those which belong to the intelligible order, which he treats of in the *de divinis n.ominibu.'J* (597 A, B; Pera nn. 27, 28). In the former group he refers to the divine manifestations *(Beiwv <f>rurt-tarwv)* in temples and elsewhere, illuminating initiates *(t-tvcna<>)* and prophets so that they name the transcendent good according to its diverse powers and causalities and attribute to it human forms and figures as well as other *JLV(J"T£Ka,* mysteries. But a little earlier Pseudo-Dionysius discusses the way in which the "theologians," the sacred writers, praise God as beyond all names; and precisely by way of a " symbolic theophany," *f.v t-ttct- rwv JLV(J"T£Kwv r.ry<> (J"VJLf3oAlKij<;Beo</>aveia<;opa(J"EWV* (596 A; Pera n. 25) . The Latin version St. Thomas is following here has " in una mysticarum visionum Dei apparitionis," which Thomas strikingly amplifies to " apparitionem divinam *imaginativam* " (Pera. 96) . Dionysius's "symbolic theophany" has become Thomas's "appearance in the imagination."

It is extraordinarily difficult to pin down a single definite sense in which Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of symbols. He is not, of course, interested in such a definite sense; his writing is incantatory in style and requires of the reader that he commit himself to the way of *anagoge,* ascent: Dionysius is a mystagogue.11 However, we may say that his valuation of symbols depends on whether they are being treated of on " the way up" or on "the way down " : whether, that is to say, they are being treated of apophatically *(via negationis)* or kataphatically *(via affirmationis).* But this distinction of modes of theological consideration itself depends on a prior ontological distinction: the procession of things from their source (7rp6o8o<>) or their ascent and return to it *(avo8o<>,* St. Thomas's *conversio;* cf. *CH* 1,1; ed. SC, pp. 70 f.)

On the " way down " symbols are valued positively and participate (deficiently) in the ontological fullness of their

11 On Pseudo-Dionysius's dependence, in language and ideas, on the Neo-Platonic tradition of the mysteries see, e. g., de Gandillac's note to his translation of *CH.,* ed. SC, pp.

source: "We must not despise them (the sacred symbols) for they are begotten of the divine characters and bear their stamp, manifest images of ineffable and sublime spectacles " *(Ep.* IX; *PG* 3, 1108 C). Again, the symbols used by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, when they celebrate litmgical rites, are valued positively *(CH* 3; ed.SC. p. 72-3). But there can be no doubt that just because the way of ascent to a transcendent mystical union beyond words is the dominant movement of Pseudo-Dionysius's thought, symbols tend to be valued negatively, and this in the special form of a recommendation of " dissimilar similitudes," which are less likely to mislead the initiate on his way up than those similitudes which partially convey the richness of their source *(CH* 2, 3; ed.SC. p.77 f.) Certainly Dionysius recognizes that even the most vile and inferior likenesses still resemble their source by participating in it *(CH* 2, 3; ed.SC p. 80).

It is here that a modern reader is most acutely aware of an ambiguity which does not seem to have made itself felt to Pseudo-Dionysius himself, and which is partially solved by St. Thomas's equation of symbol and metaphor. On the one hand, Dionysius is quite aware that his symbols are the product of human creation; he even speaks in one place of the " holy poetic fictions *CH2,* 1; ed.SCp. 74), and in *Ep.* IX he gives as an example of the function of symbols for the "passionate" part of the soul the way in which some hearers of unveiled theological instruction fashion in themselves some figure *TV1TOV nva,* 1108 B) so as to help themselves to understand the pure theological teaching.

On the other hand, in the lines immediately preceding this last reference, Dionysius says that the "impassible" part of the soul is destined for " simple and interior spectacles of deiform images" *aya'Ap,aTwv).* The word *agalma* has a long and interesting history going back at least to Plato; [12] the basic sense is "image," " statue," "object of religious veneration." For Dionysius, the celestial hierarchy makes of its

[12] *Phaedrus,* D; *Timaeus* 87 C, with F. M. Cornford's commentary, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1987), pp. 99 f.

followers perfect images, *agalmata*, of God, stainless and transparent mirrors *(CH* 3, 2; ed.SC p.88). Pseudo-Dionysius belongs to that whole archaic tradition of thought about symbo]s and images which finds in them the embodiment of the reality they are meant to express.[18]

It seems likely that for Pseudo-Dionysius symbols belong to the same conceptual world as ikons, which although made by human hands are invested by consecration with the presence of a divine reality.[14] Thus symbols, whether words or rites, are " fictions," constructed by the sacred writers or ministers, and yet communicate ontologically *with* the divine reality by participation and communicate this reality *to* the initiate. The gap between" symbol" in this sense and St. Thomas's "metaphor " is striking. We may perhaps say, simplifying somewhat, that for Pseudo-Dionysius symbols belong to a single continuous hierarchical chain of ontological participation, which includes cosmos, hierographer and hierophant, and initiate; for St. Thomas, the symbol (=metaphor) has become partially detached from this chain and is treated by the theologian as a product of the human mind, although sacred writer and theologian still belong to an undivided cosmos of divine creation. Pseudo-Dionysius's practice, of course, is pregnantly symbolic; St. Thomas's is almost bare of metaphor.

What, for our purposes at least, distinguishes the whole medieval tradition, from Eriugena to St. Thomas (and beyond), is an interest in language, grammar, rhetoric, and logic.[15]

[18] For a discussion of patristic usage, see interestingly J. Betz, *Die Eucharistie in der Zeit der griechischen Vater,* I/1 (Freiburg, 1955), pp. 217-39. Also F. W. Eltester, *Eikon im Neuen Testament* (Berlin, 1958). A modem attempt to exploit this notion of symbol, K. Rahner, " The Theology of the Symbol," *Theological Investigations* IV (London, 1966), pp. 221-52. Cf. the articles on "Bild" in *RAC, RGG, LTK.*

[14] St. Thomas is acquainted with this use of language. See his remarks in the prologue to the question on oaths, 11-11, q. 89, where he speaks of the "assumption " of something divine for worship, whether this *aliquid divinum* is a sacrament or *ipsum nomen divinum.* But this is not the theologian's use of language.

[15] See the stimulating book by MarciaL. Colish, *The Mirror of Language* (New Haven, 1968). **It** is a pity that, in spite of some perceptive criticism of modem " metaphysical " interpretation of analogy, she goes so badly wrong on St. Thomas,

The procedures of human articulation have become the object of independent study, and the whole grasp of the world is mediated by an analytical consciousness of the linguistic modes of that grasp. Here we are primarily concerned with the particular form this analytic consciousness took in St. Thomas's mind, in particular his account of the divine names.

The passage from the *Commentary on the Sentences* mentioned earlier (/ *Sent.* d, 34, q. 3, aa. 1-Q) is of considerable interest here. We should bear in mind while reading these articles Chenu's extremely perceptive remarks when he discusses "the mental operation proper to symbolism " :

> namely, *translatio,* a transference or elevation from the visible sphere to the invisible through the mediating agency of an image borrowed from sense-perceptible reality. This is what we mean by "metaphor," except that here the term had a particular orientation; metaphor was obedient to the necessities imposed by transcendent realities, above all in pseudo-Dionysian theology....
>
> Twelfth-century masters made ready use of the term *translatio;* but its inadequacy led them to transliterate its Greek equivalent into *anagoge,* as Latin versions of pseudo-Dionysius had already done. *(Nature, Man, and Society,* p. 138)

Tran.slatio then can bring together what we should understand by " metaphor " and by " ascent to the transcendent." So when Thomas takes up the *translative* from Lombard's text and questions it, he is firmly within a tradition for which *translatio* meant not only" transference" within a single order of reality, but also, and indeed primarily, "transference" from one order of reality-sensible and material-to a higher order of reality-intelligible and immaterial. Hence Thomas's remark (art. *Q* ad 3) that names, such as " cherubim," expressing a limited mode of intelligible perfection, cannot be applied to God even " metaphorically," *quia metaphora sumenda est ex his quae sunt manifesta secundum sensum.*

failing to distinguish the analogical analysis ◇f predication from the recognition of, say, Trinitarian "analogies" in the soul. Pseudo-Dionysius gets a passing mention, p. 169. More general treatments, still of great value for the non-specialist: H. I. Marron, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (London, 1956); E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and Latin Middle Ages* (London, 1953).

But still more interesting from our point of view is Thomas's reply to an objection from the *Topics* (the text quoted above as it appears in *de Verit.,* q.10, a. 7 obj .10) and Boethius, where it is argued that no *similitudo vel metaphora* can be taken from the sensible world to be applied to God *translative.* Thomas distinguishes in his reply between two sorts of likeness, *similitudo:* that which obtains by participation in the same form, and *quaedam similitudo proportionalitatis,* as for instance 8:'t as 6:3. This latter sort of likeness allows of *transumptio ex corporalibus in divina.* So God can be called " fire " ; as fire makes liquescent things flow by its heat, so God pours out his perfections in all creatures by his goodness (" vel aliquid huiusmodi," he says, rather offhandedly!) .

The language of " proportionality " comes we know from Euclid.[16] Still from the early period of St. Thomas's teaching, we have a parallel distinction of *similitudo,* here referred by Thomas to *Top.* I.[11] The corpus of the article has contrasted the two ways in which names can be predicated of God analogically: one *symbolice,* where the usual " metaphorical " names are given as examples; the other where no defect is included in the definition of the principal *significatum.* The notion of "proportion" in metaphor occurs in *Rhet.* (e. g., III, 4; 1407 a 14, *TTJV f-tETacpopavTTJV* EK *TOV avaA.oyov)'* but its most detailed treatment is found in *Poet.* 1457 b 16-33. As we have seen, St. Thomas probably had no direct knowledge of this treatment of analogical or proportional metaphor; but it is deeply interesting that from his earliest writings his account of "symbolic" or "metaphorical" names predicated of God should be formulated in terms of a four-term "proportion" or "proportionality." The same account occurs, of course, in I, q. 13, a. 6.

[16] Cf. B. Montagnes, *La Doctrine de l'analogie de l'etre d'apres s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1963), p. 76, n. 9!3, "Note lexicographique sur la distinction *proportio-proportionalitas.*"

[17] *De Verit.* q. 9!, a. 11 ad 2. *Top. I,* 17; 108 a 7-16, wrongly referred in the Marietti edition to *Top.* II; I have not been able to consult the new Leonine edition of the early questions of *de Verit.*

The reader need have no fear; we are not about to embark on yet another examination of the " doctrine of analogy." In fact, a subordinate concern of the present article has been to relativize what seems sometimes to have been an obsession on the part of commentators, who have extracted St. Thomas's rP-marks on this topic and used them to pile up enormous metaphysical constructions: towers of Babel, one might suggest, since in general the " doctrine of analogy " is not placed in what we have tried to present as its proper context, namely, the revelation in Scriptural tradition of divine names, transmitted and interpreted in particular by Pseudo-Dionysius. It is only when this context is appreciated by the modern reader that he can recognize St. Thomas's originality within the tradition, and also perceive its limitations.

The originality consists firstly in the formal application of Aristotelian epistemology to the " symbolic " tradition of divine names; St. Thomas's preference for *metaphora* rather than *translatio* would seem to indicate a sharper awareness of the human conditions of talk about God. Thus he begins his treatment *de nominibus Dei* in I, q. 13 with a general account of the genesis of the word: " Secundum Philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, *mediante conceptione intellectus"* (art. 1). We have to note that this crucial shift of perspective-from words as *logia* to words ao;; human products-involves an entire analytic procedure; for what is now analysed is explicitly "names " as *predicates.* That is to say, we have both a (metaphysical) psychological epistemology and a logical epistemology, the latter benefiting from the tradition of "grammar" in theology.[18] While Thomas's

[18] Cf. the chapter " Grammaire et Theologie " in M. D. Chenu, La *Theologie au douzieme siecle,* pp. 90-107. The earlier version of this chapter, in *AHDLMA* X (1935-6), carries the discussion on to the thirteenth century. The introductory portions of the basic book by J. Pinborg, *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittdalter* (Munster, 1967), and of the essay by H. J. Stiker, "Une theorie linguistique au Moyen Age: l'ecole modiste," *RSPT 56* pp. 585-616, offer summaries of grammatical theories, up to the time of St. Thomas, in regard to the treatment of *modi significandi.*

account of *modi significandi* is not strikingly original, it is interesting to note that, according to Pinborg (p. his view allows greater freedom to the creative activity of the mino. What is certainly true is that St. Thomas stands for a demythologization of the word, some of the consequences of which in later times he could hardly have expected. The full consequences of Thomas's recognition of the human creation of the word are still contained for him within an archaic order; for even the human word is still related by *similitudo* to the cosmic world, and thus to the pure perfections deficiently represented in that world.

Here it seems desirable to stand back from St. Thomas for a moment and place his views in a wider context. We need perhaps do no more than mention the critique of the exclusive analysis of propositions into subject and predicate by logicians who have been concerned to analyse the propositions of mathematics.[111] More important for our purposes are the implications for an account of metaphor of abandoning the assumption that metaphorical assertions are primarily the application of predicates. If we recall the famous description of ShakespearC"s later plays by the critic G. Wilson Knight as" extended mebphors " we may see how the notion of metaphor-predicate is much too narrow to do justice to metaphorical language. Given our ordinary literary use of " metaphor," it is only by " extension " (by " metaphor ") that we can call an entire play a metaphor; but just this extension of " metaphor " surely draws attention to the important truth that metaphor only functions as such *within* a given human " world," where tacit assumptions as· to what counts as " literal " prevail. The play as a whole can count as a metaphor when it is set over against the ordinary world of our everyday habitation; and the "local " metaphor of a particular act of speech or writing is a " play " in detail-a " play of speech." Metaphor belongs not to isolated

[18] For a modem (favorable) discussion of "Subject and Predicate," see the chapter by that title in P. T. Geach, *Reference and Generality*, amended edition (Ithaca, 1968). This might be the place to mention the interesting book by M. Durrant, *The Logical Status of •God'* (London, 1978), though it deserves more than a mention.

propositions but to entire " language-games " ; in fact, the particular metaphor always involves more than just the given statement with its claim to represent a given state of affairs *(Sachverhalt)* .[20] Thirdly, we may consider Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard's reflections in the chapter "The Problem of Symbols" in his classic account of Nuer religion.[21] The characteristic of Nuer thought about "God" is that, while their God-term *Kwoth* is predicated of all sorts of things and events, it is rarely that anything is predicated of *kwoth.* Evans-Pritchard analyzes the predication of *kwoth* in terms of a general formula: "the problem of something being something else." In connection with our second observation in this paragraph we may note again that metaphorical language *in divinis* cannot always be assumed to consist of predications about God but that we need to take into account the whole language-game of the linguistic community (" tribe ") and its " world," a world which cannot be unambiguously identified apart from the linguistic community which contributes to its manifestation.

Now, of course, St. Thomas muut insist that it is in fact possible unambiguously to define the world, to speak about it *proprie,* literally; and so to argue that in some cases at least it is possible to speak *proprie* about God. Here again his originality needs to be recognized so that we may at the same time recognize its limitations. Briefly, St. Thomas both takes for granted and establishes his own presupposition that the literal sense of language (and we may say the literal sense of the world) can be unambiguously defined in metaphysical terms. Even God can be spoken of *proprie,* not *aequivoce,* because of a similitude of participation between creatures and God which can be in certain cases extracted from the creaturely *modus*

[20] The use of Wittgensteinian language of the later (" language-games ") and earlier *(Sachverhalt)* periods is deliberate. It is a pity that Marcus B. Hester's *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor* (The Hague, 1967) has tried to "amplify" Wittgenstein by introducing a notion of " seeing as " involving " mental images." I cannot refrain from mentioning what seems to be Hester's extraordinary misreading (pp. *25-6)* of Hopkins's lines " 0 the mind, mind has mountains," where he seems to suppose that Hopkins is relying on a mental image of the *brain!*

[21] *Nuer Religion* (Oxford, 1957). Reviewed by the present writer in *Blackfriars* (December, 1957), pp.

essendi by an appropriate negation of the *modus significandi* of our language. The " certain cases " are those in which materiality or corporeality is not inseparably part of the *modus essendi* or *significandi.*

For St. Thomas the world manifests itself as a dualism of spirit and matter, even where the dualism is manifested in substantial unity. Thus it is possible to lay down conditions for "proper" or "literal" talk about God in two stages: (1) in general, " proper " and " metaphorical" language can be unambiguously distinguished; in particular, proper and metaphorical language *about God* can be distinguished unambiguously on the basis of the dual manifestation of the world. The consequences of this twofold distinction are obvious throughout the writings of St. Thomas, not only in his explicit use of the distinction (e. g., I, q. 19, a. 11 on *voluntas signi* and generally to exclude " anthropomorphisms ") but in the way in which a Scriptural or other authoritative text, say in a *sed contra,* is expounded metaphysically in the *corpus articuli,* without any apparent sense of hermeneutic discontinuity. The process is most clearly to be seen in the Scriptural commentaries, which throw a great deal of light on the way in which Thomas saw his own world of interpretation rise without rupture out of the Scriptural world (reminding ourselves of the " seamless veil" of symbols mediating revelation of God through Scripture and the cosmos). We may compare this lack of sense of rupture to that with which modern readers can comfortably use " existentialist " language to interpret the Scriptures.

Behind St. Thomas there is, of course, a long tradition, especially in regard to the " anthropomorphisms " of the Bible. Consider, for example, Philo's astonishing exegesis of Gen. 17: 1, **"I** am thy God," where he insists that this is an abuse, or at least a licence, of language *(Ka/raxpYJa-nKwc;,0V Kvp[wc;).*[22] The

•• I take this reference from the deeply interesting book by U. Mauser, *Gottesbild und Menschwerdung* (Tiibingen, 1971), p. '27. Philo is discussed pp. '23-'28. Relying on the impressive and moving account of the divine *pathos* in Abraham Heschel's *The Prophets* (New York, 196'2), Mauser sets out to show how the " anthropomorphism " of God and the " theomorphism " of man in the Old Testament find their key and consummation in Jesus Christ and are further exhibited

Existent (*r0* ov) " is full of himself and is sufficient for himself . . . He cannot change nor alter and needs nothing else at all, so that all things are his but he himself in the proper sense belongs to none" *(De JJfut. Nom.* 4, 27-8, tr. Colson and Whitaker, *LCL* V, p. 157) . There are however certain "potencies" *(8vvaf.Lewv)* which can be spoken of in a sense as relative; one such is " the creative potency called God, because through this the Father who is its begetter and contriver made the universe." [23] Again, the whole point of Maimonides' *Guide for the Perplexed* is to resolve the apparent contradiction between philosophy and religion. " Human reason has attracted him (the religious man) to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions" found in the prophetic books. [24] Judaism and Christianity have shared the same tension between a certain metaphysical determination of what is to count as literal, and the metaphorical expressions of the Scriptures. [25] This (" Platonist") metaphysical determination of what is to count as literal is not, of course, the only one. An alternative version

in Christian life, especially in the " suffering Apostle." H. Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Abrabi* (London, 1969), finds *pathos* in Islam.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 159. Cf. *Quod Deus immutabilis sit*, 5, 20-6, 82; 11, 51-14, 69, for n further treatment of anthropomorphisms. Philo himself stands in a tradition. I•'or the Septuagint, see the chapter "Names of God" in C. H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks* (London, 1954). An interesting example of LXX interpretation in the area "knowledge of God" is found in Exodus 88: 18, quoted by Philo, *de Mut. Nom.* 2, 8. On the names of God in the Psalms, see the excursus (4) to Ps. 24 in H. J. Kraus, *Psalmen* I (BK XV/1) (Neukirchen, 1960), pp. 197 f., with its indication of Canaanite formulae. See also the articles *'el, 'elohim* in Jenni-Westermann, *Theologisches Handworterbuch zUJn Alten Testament* I (Miinchen-Ziirich, 1971), and in *Theologisches Wiirterbuch zum Alten Testament* I (Stuttgart, 1971). For the tradition prior to Philo, see the magisterial work by M. Hengel, *Judentum und Hellenismus*, 2. ed. (Tiibingen, 1978).

•• *Guide for the Perplexed*, 2 ed. (London, 1936 (1904), tr. Friedlander), p. 2. See especially Pt. I, chapters 46 f. St. Thomas, of course, refers to Maimonides *(Guide,* I, *58)* in I, q. 13, a. 2 to criticize his views but in the same tradition.

[25] For Islam and the Qur'an, as well as the standard treatment by Gardet and Anawati, see the useful small book by W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh, 1962) .

is analyzed with great power by Michel Foucault for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe,[26] and this version, condensed in the notion of "facts," has continued to be influential in both explicit and implicit ways; recently it has been revived in the sophisticated form of the mathematical theory of "models," another avatar of *similitudo.*[27]

This article has attempted to disentangle some of the implications of St. Thomas's "symbolice *vel* metaphorice," especially in a theological context. The consequences of such an exploration may seem to indicate that he has very little to offer us today except a purely historical interest. The whole tradition of interpretation of Scripture to which he unmistakably belongs is obviously archaic, although his own equivalence of "symbol" and "metaphor" suggests in germ the emergence of an acosmic humanism which is still with us. St. Thomas contains the humanism within a metaphysical and hierarchical subordination of all being, including the being of interpreting mind, to God.[28] It is here precisely that I should want to claim for St. Thomas more than historical interest, in the sense that his approach to the problem of theological interpretation of Scripture has laid down what I take to be an inescapable requirement for theologians of any epoch: that their interpretation must exhibit the ontological primacy of God, God as the ultimately really real. How may we do this today when we

[26] *The Order of Things, ET* (London, 1970).

[27] See, e. g., the appendix by Rolf Eberle to Colin Murray Turbayne, *The Myth of Metaphor*, revised edition (Columbia, South Carolina, 1970). Turbayne seems to use the phrase "extended metaphor" to mean "model "-an interesting alternative to Wilson Knight's usage taken over in this article.

[28] I am sorry not to have been able to discuss in this article the interference of Pseudo-Dionysian and Augustinian Platonisms in St. Thomas, especially tbe historico-temporal and eschatological orientations of the latter. I cannot refrain from referring to Thomas's treatment of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, I-II, q. 99, a. 8 ad 8 with q. 101, a. 9!, where *similitudo, metaphorica locutio,* and *figura* are simultaneously at play. In beatitude, the expressive role of the body in praising is not "figurative," *non consistit in aliqua figura.* Note also the shift to pure allegory from the "pregnant" symbolism of *imago* in III, q. 88, a. 1 corp., and ad 2. On allegory, see the remarkable book by Angus Fletcher, *Allegory: the Theory of a Symbolic Mode* (Ithaca, 1964), especially the chapter on "Psychoanalytic Analogues."

seem no longer to be in command of a criterion, metaphysical or other, for unambiguously distinguishing the "literal" from the " metaphorical " ? Is " God " a literal or a metaphorical expression? The whole of the present article has tried to lead up to this question in a theological context; it would require something much more substantial than an article to begin to answer it and what follows may be regarded merely as programmatic notes.

To begin with the simpler aspects of our problem, we may say that the context in which " God " is used will tell us whether the expression is intended literally or metaphorically; the texture of the context can be roughly discriminated. Ordinarily by this rule "God "-'el, ',elohim, *theos-will* have to be called a metaphorical expression in its Biblical context, as compared to its use in philosophical contexts. Of course, this conclusion must make one feel uneasy; in fact, our ordinary reading of the Bible is, I suspect, universally dependent on the assumption that "God" there is somehow literal. Now that we are more accustomed to reading " Yahweh " in our Bibles than "the Lord" ('ad6nay, *Kurios),* we need to feel, for instance, that the identification of " God " and " Yahweh " is doing more than claiming the same reference for two names, say, "Julius" and " Caesar." In fact, what this means is that we *cannot* read the Bible without interpreting it (" as literature"), that we *must* have some prior understanding of" God" in order to make sense of the Bible. But can that prior understanding of " God " be called *literal?* Our ordinary contexts for " God " (prayer, ritual, even swearing) are ways of life and behavior which are discriminated from ways of life and behavior which are tacitly identified as everyday and which count to make the language which belongs to them " literal." The point of .the Five Ways was to show how one might *go on* speaking of " God " in the ordinary world-et *hoc omnes dicunt "Deum."* What if or when the Five Ways no longer perform this function? Does one start looking for other " ways " ?

Obviously other " ways" must be looked for, though hardly in the sense of " proofs " ; even for Aristotle and St. Thomas

the notion of *demonstratio* is more complex than the usual sense of" proof" (c£. the *Posterior Analytics* and St. Thomas's commentary thereon). The most plausible "way," it seems, is the exploration of the genesis of meaning, understood as the manifestation of the real. The significance of this "way," in the present context, is that it is *prior* to any conventional discrimination of " literal " and " metaphorical." It would, I believe, render more adequately our intention when we speak of God or to God to understand " God " as also prior to any distinction of literal (whether or not analogical) and metaphorical. The later writings of Heidegger [29] are the most important exploration of this " way " known to me, not least because they can be seen in continuity with the ontological interpretation of the divine names in Catholic tradition, notably by St. Thomas.

Finally, this" way," reaching beyond the distinction of literal and metaphorical, allows Jesus to show himself as the center of the revelation of God (thus "Jesus" as the fulfilment of " Yahweh ") . This is not merely a matter of the words of Jesus, his parables, for instance, though we can recognise in them instances of what we have called above, with Wilson Knight, " extended metaphor "-whole " plays " rather than predicate-metaphors. [30] Nor again is it only a recognition of the background in apocalyptic without which the figure of Jesus becomes unintelligible in its New Testament setting. [31] Nor, yet again, is it a matter of the actions of Jesus, say his " parabolic " actions, healing or presiding at the Last Supper; though it is important that we should see the seamless continuity of those actions, in a total behavior which cannot be divided into " everyday " actions and " religious " actions, corresponding to "literal" and "metaphorical." To see Jesus as

[29] Some of the most interesting essays are collected in a remarkably successful translation, *Poetry, Language, Thought,* by Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1971).

[30] See J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus,* revised edition (London, 1963), especially the discussion of the introductory Aramaic 1•, no "like" but "as in the case of," pp. 100 f.

[31] See K. Koch, *The Rediscovery of Apocalyptic* (London, 197:l).

the center of the revelation of God is all this and more, something for which a distinction into " sensible " and " intelligible " could not possibly do.

We want to see Jesus as someone who walked in Galilee and Jerusalem, who from the originating source of meaning in himself, prior to a literal-metaphorical distinction, was and is the supreme and unique revelation of God, beyond distinctions of meaning. We want to see his whole life, culminating in the Resurrection, as the revelation of ultimate meaning. If by "meaning " we may provisionally understand the process or praxis by which the world to which man belongs becomes the world which belongs to man, then we may see a man's life as transformation in and of meaning, a " metaphor " beyond metaphors. In the Resurrection, the world which belongs to man becomes the world which belongs to God; the Resurrection is the ultimate " metaphor " of the world, its trans-lation aml trans-figuration. This seems to make better sense of the Johannine *logo8;* for it is important to insist that what is at the end is also in the beginning. Jesus is the " way."

These concluding remarks are enough, it may be felt, to suggest what might be involved in surrendering St. Thomas's metaphysically based distinction of literal and metaphorical in theology, while trying to retain a version of outology, here an ontology of meaning. We need perhaps in our own times what St. Thomas was in his:

> The impossible possible philosophers' man,
> The man who has had the time to think enough,
> The central man, the human globe, responsive
> As a mirror with a voice, the man of glass,
> Who in a million diamonds sums us up. (Wallace Stevens,
> "Asides on the oboe ")

I hope it will not seem too unpleasing a paradox to celebrate St. Thomas in a metaphor.

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MAN'S TRANSCENDENCE AND THOMISTIC RESOURCES

CHRISTIANITY PRESUPPOSES that man is a religiously transcendent being, that is, that he is oriented by his knowledge and love, as these emerge from and reflect his being, toward a personal relation to God within the human community. On this view man's unawareness or rejection of this relation to God and his fellow men is an alienation from himself, a failure to know or appropriate himself on the deepest level of his being. It is not evidence that this orientation does not exist; rather it shows that the Christian revelation and gift are not only a fulfillment of man's orientation but a liberation from ignorance and inclinations that are destructive of himself and the human community. Without this orientation the Christian proclamation can have no meaning or relevance to him. There is, however, a very strong tradition in modern philosophy that questions and even denies such a transcendence. These denials or questions are normally based on interpretations of man's horizon as experienced in his scientific knowledge and his values in modern secular life. The importance of this question for a philosophy of religion and theology calls us to raise the question of the fact and character of man's transcendence from an examination of man's modern experience of knowledge and values.[1]

The present article addresses the question of how one who comes from the Thomistic tradition in philosophy should be related to his tradition when he faces a problem like this. Although many of us in the Thomistic tradition claim as our own

[1] In "Religious Reflection and Man's Transcendence," *The Tkomist* 87 (1978), 1-68, I present evidence for this interpretation of the difficulties and suggest an approach to the question of transcendence.

the whole background of modern science, life, and philosophy, we were introduced to philosophy in a specific tradition, and so we face the question of our relationship to that tradition when we approach philosophical problems. We have seen radically differing attitudes toward this tradition by men so introduced to philosophy. At one period many Neo-Thomists when facing a modern problem would seek the full answer from St. Thomas in a way that indicates they did not recognize that modern experience and problems pose a question of the adequacy of this philosophy. More recently we have seen many reject or abandon this tradition almost totally when they face modern philosophical problems, out of their sense of an unbridgeable chasm between current problems and Thomas's philosophy. Most of us from this tradition are somewhat confused about the way we should relate the philosophy we initially accepted to the current problems we face. In this situation it seems worthwhile to reflect on the use we should make of the resources of Thomistic philosophy as we face a question like man's transcendence in our time.

It may seem to some that there is opposition between facing a philosophical problem personally and creatively and doing so within a philosophical tradition. True, we must honestly acknowledge the full dimensions of a philosophical problem like that of man's transcendence and try to understand and be open to the difficulties against it as these are expressed in modern philosophies. And because of the nature of philosophy we must address ourselves to a problem of this sort largely on the basis of the experience we as modern men have and our reflection on this. This is not because modern experience is more valid in all instances than an earlier experience. In fact, there may well be much in the experience claimed and explained by earlier philosophers that we have valid bases to appropriate as our own, and much in more recent philosophies that we cannot validly appropriate as an adequate articulation of our experience. But the difficulties against man's transcendence in our time are said to derive from modern experience; we share many experiences with men of our time that seem to argue against

transcendence, and we must communicate with these men. While it is characteristic of creative philosophers generally to reflect on their own problems and experiences, it also seems to be characteristic of them to make use of the resources of a philosophical tradition rather than to create totally on their own a framework of interpretation. The richness of their philosophical answers, right or wrong, comes from their use of a rich tradition and from their modification of this tradition as this is called for by new problems and new experiences. For example, Kant made great use of rationalistic and empiricist philosophies that preceded him, and Heidegger made great use of Husserl's phenomenology. These men, as well as so many creative philosophers, seem to have found in their experience a challenge to the adequacy of their inherited intellectual scheme and value system, and the philosophical position each developed is related in some way to a resolution of the dichotomy experienced, by a use and adaptation of an inherited intellectual framework. This situation is not only a factual one; it seems to be an essential condition of man's philosophical work, because it is part of the human condition. If philosophy is to be valid, it is not by escaping this condition but by finding that it is an opening rather than an obstacle to philosophical truth, since philosophy's growth is dialogic and dialectical. Recognition and acknowledgement of how we depend on and have been enriched by our philosophical tradition is all the more appropriate for those of us whose main service is sharing with men of our time insights we have gained from others rather than some unique philosophical creativity.

The Thomistic tradition, or the tradition to which St. Thomas contributed so much and which has developed since his time, particularly in our own century, is very rich indeed. Its roots go back to the beginnings of philosophy, and it has experienced a development that could not conceivably have been achieved by one individaul, no matter how brilliant. Modern philosophy owes much to this tradition, whether this is acknowledged or not. Specifically in the question we are dealing with, Thomas finds in human experience a basis for asserting man's religious

transcendence and articulates this philosophically, while most prominent modern philosophies deny this. If modern experience continues to justify a philosophical assertion of man's transcendence and calls for an anthropology that will explain this, both a premodern philosophy that bases its affirmation of this on human experience and modern philosophies that base their denials of it on later human experience must change and grow internally through acknowledging what is valid in positions other than their own. In this situation and with reference to our question it would appear to be as unwise to reject or abandon Thomas's philosophy totally as it would be to accept it totally. There can be no philosophical reason against rejecting or modifying our tradition when evidence calls for this, but there is as much philosophical reason against being uncritical in our rejection of our tradition as in our acceptance of it.

This article is a prolegomenon to a future direct philosophical treatment of the question of man's religious transcendence; it limits itself to asking how one from the Thomistic tradition in philosophy should relate to the resources of this tradition as he faces the question of transcendence in a way appropriate to the contemporary problem. The article will develop an answer to this question through examining different models for relating the Thomistic tradition to the contemporary problem of man's transcendence. We will indicate what these models are and then comment on their adequacy, clarifying the answer we propose in the process of examining these alternatives. The alternatives we will study are (1) the recovery of St. Thomas's philosophy, (2) Thomistic dialogue from the Marechalian tradition, specifically as found in Karl Rahner and Bernard Longergan, and (3) a rejection of a metaphysics of being in Leslie Dewart. We are not giving a full analysis of these positions; we are addressing ourselves primarily to those who are familiar with these positions, and for others a fuller treatment of them may be found elsewhere. We will simply recall what we understand to be central elements of each of these positions and then briefly reflect on these elements in reference both to

the Thomistic tradition and to the current problematic. The full justification for a program such as the one we are calling for in this article can be found, of course, only in implementing it. But it seems necessary for us, before such a study, to attempt to identify the position from which we carry on a philosophical dialogue on man's transcendence appropriate for our age.

1. The recovery of St. Thomas's philosophy

One model we should recall is the recovery of St. Thomas's objective analysis of the hierarchy of being and of man's place within this hierarchy. There are very few Thomists in our time who would think that this recovery is sufficient as an answer to the modern problem of transcendence, but this model should be examined so that we can establish, as it were, a base line and face honestly the limitations as well as the resources of Thomistic philosophy in this regard. Without recalling here the historical and theological context of Thomas's philosophy of man, we suggest that essential elements of this alternative are a recovery of his metaphysics, his philosophy of human nature, and his reflective analysis of man's knowledge and moral activity. After recalling some elements of these aspects of Thomas's thought, we shall indicate what we think are some basic modern difficulties to this thought and point to some developments in Thomism that are both honest to Thomas's basic principles and contributions toward overcoming the gap that exists between his thought and the modern problematic.

In his *metaphy8ics* Thomas studies the structure of being. That is, he studies concretely existing things; it is these that the word and notion " being " primarily designates, for being is that which is. What simply *can* be is not being but possible being. In this study Thomas analyses the principles *constitutive* of beings as they are being, such as substance and accidents, act and potency, and particularly essence and existence. The principle of being is primarily *esse* or the act of being, because " being, or that which is, is insofar as it participates in

the act of being." [2] In virtue of the principles of being and their relationship Thomas explains the properties of being such as their truth, goodness, and unity, and the hierarchy that exists among beings, a hierarchy in perfection that is determined by the form or substance as receptive of the act of being. This act is proportioned to the potency it actualizes, that is, to the substance, nature or form. The powers and actions distinctive or a certain kind of being similarly find their source in these principles. But there are other principles of being that Thomas also studies, namely, the *causal* principles. Here we think particularly of the first cause, God, who can be known by causal inference from the imperfect and material beings we directly know, and in whom being is found as subsistent. God is total actuality, free from matter and potency, and so he is transcendent being " par excellence." Thomas articulates the interrelation between God and creatures in terms of causality and participation. He also reflects upon the whole of this metaphysical analysis. For example, in his sophisticated analysis of analogy, he reflects upon the modes of predication found here; and in his study of the relation between metaphysics and other kinds of knowledge (e. g., mathematics and natural philosophy) , he shows the status of metaphysics as knowledge.

St. Thomas's philosophical *analysis of man's transcendence* is primarily objective and is in the context (though not the confines) of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, and more specifically his hylomorphic theory. That is, he like Aristotle infers from certain general human experiences of material things enduring and changing over a continuous period of time a view of the constitutive principles of the material thing that can explain this continuity and change. Man also is a material being, and thus the primary philosophical principles in virtue of which material things are explained in Aristotle's "physics" are operative in the philosophical explanation of man. These help to explain both what man shares with other material things and

[2] St. Thomas, *In Librum Boethii de Trinitatl),* q. *5,* a. 4 (quoted here from *Opuscula theologica,* Rome, 1954).

what his transcendence is in relation to the rest of material reality. Thomas examines the *acts* distinctive of man, and he explains them philosophically through rooting them in natural human *powers* proportioned to these acts and both of these in human *nature* composed of matter and a form proportioned to man's acts. In developing this he analyses the relation between matter and form in man, shows that the human soul is his sole substantial form, and defends its character as spiritual to account for man's intellectual activity. He analyses the specific powers (and the interrelation among them) that one must infer to account for the different kinds of human activity, giving particular emphasis to man's intellectual knowledge. He explains our experience of knowledge by sense powers (both external and internal-like memory and imagination) and intellect. What man primarily knows intellectually are the natures of material things, and the way he knows these is through sense knowledge and intellectual abstraction mediated by a power St. Thomas infers (along with Aristotle), namely, man's abstractive or agent intellect. One summary statement of this interrelation can be recalled here:

> In this way then our intellectual operation is caused by sense from the part of the phantasms. But since phantasms do not suffice to affect the possible intellect-it is necessary that they be made actually intelligible by the agent intellect-it cannot be said that sense knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather, in a way, the matter of the cause.[3]

The principles of our knowledge that Thomas investigates are not only the objective principles, such as the physical thing and how it informs the intellect, but also the subject. Knowledge is properly *our act;* it is then primarily action or operation *(actus perfecti)* and not being acted upon. That is, the proper "cause" of our knowledge is the subject; knowledge is an operation or activity of the subject through the mediation of its powers. This knowledge occurs in man only through a succession of acts-apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. (We will

[3] *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 84, a. 6.

have occasion later in this article to refer to these acts again, and so here we shall not recall more o£ St. Thomas's very developed philosophical thought o£ man's intellectual activity.) We should note that he also analyzes how man is oriented to the good through desire and love, powers in him that can account for these acts (appetitive powers, on both the sense and rational level) , and their relationship to man's cognitive powers and acts. Here we have simply recalled that an important element o£ Thomas's philosophical articulation o£ man's transcendence is his analysis o£ the structure through which man is able to engage in operations o£ knowledge and desire or love.

There is anther sense in which Thomas articulates the transcendence o£ man, one that is closer to the modern question. Here we refer to his *reflective analysis of man as knower and as moral agent,* as one who is naturally oriented toward God in his desire to know and in his quest for value. With reference to man as knower Thomas's practice in developing the five ways by which we can know naturally the existence o£ God shows the orientation and capacity that he finds in man as knower. This exists in man even before he engages in metaphysical knowledge. Before knowing metaphysically, man possesses a primitive knowledge o£ reality as being, for" that which the intellect first o£ all conceives as the most known, and in which it resolves all its concepts in being." [4] And although there is much that stands in the way o£ its actualization, there is in men generally and not simply in the metaphysician a natural capacity and orientation to the knowledge o£ God.

> There is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause when he sees the effect, for wonder arises in men from this. **If** therefore the intellect of the rational creature is not able to attain to the first cause of things, the natural desire remains unfulfilled. [5]

In metaphysics this knowledge is possessed reflectively, systematically and scientifically, £or it is in metaphysics that we study the principles (constitutive and causal) o£ beings as

• *De Verit.,* q. 1., a. 9.
• *Summa Theol., ibid.,* q. 12, a. 1.

being. While God is not the subject of metaphysics, he is the principle of its subject insofar as he is known through his effects.

Something of man's transcendence in knowledge is shown by Thomas when he critically and reflectively shows what sort of knowledge is found in metaphysics. In one key passage he associates knowledge found in natural philosophy and mathematics with the first act of man's mind, apprehensive abstraction, and metaphysics with the second act, judgment or separation. [6] In abstraction one aspect of the thing is considered without other aspects as when, for example, in natural philosophy we consider man without considering the individual (abstracting the universal from the particular) or when in mathematics we consider quantity without considering the material substance it determines (abstracting form from matter). (We can note here that how the object is known and conceptualized depends in part upon the active and constructive character of the intellect and its act.) Thomas associates the metaphysical level of knowledge with judgment because it is in the judgment that we affirm being (asserting that something or not). He associates it with judgment specifically as separation, since metaphysics is justified only if reality demands some science in addition to those that treat it as material or quantified; and reality justifies this only if it legitimately evokes a judgment that there are dimensions of reality that do *not* exist in matter or are *not* intrinsically dependent upon matter. We should note that there is disagreement among Thomists in their analyses of the intellectual act whereby man knows being or knows metaphysically, some using as basis the above text, and others calling upon a later passage where Thomas distinguishes metaphysics from natural philosophy and mathematics as another degree of abstration, thus associating it with the first act of the mind rather than with the judgment. [7] The difficulty of explaining man's knowledge of being as Thomas understands

• See *In librum Boethii de Trinitate,* q. *5,* a. 1.

[7] See *Summa Theol., ibid.,* q. 85, a. 1

being (in distinction from Aristotle) within the noetic of Thomas persists among his modern disciples. The understanding of being that is within the orientation and capacity of the human mind for Thomas is, as we see, one that is not restricted to a descriptive level but is explanatory, and explanatory not only by constitutive principles of being but by causal principles. In its furthest reach it includes an inference to the assertion of the existence of God as first cause of the reality proportioned to man's knowledge.

In interpretations of Thomas's understanding of man's transcendence we frequently find mention only of man's transcendence in knowledge. But for a more adequate view one would have to recall his analysis of man's orientation to his goal in the beginning of his moral treatise.[8] Here he analyses the final goal in general, showing that an immediate goal or good moves us in virtue of the ultimate end, and thus that the immediate end is for the ultimate end. He asks what things happiness consists in; and he shows that ultimate happiness forman cannot consist in goods external to him (such as riches, honors, fame or power) , in goods of the body such as pleasure in goods of the soul such as virtue, or in any created good, but only in God. Nothing less than God has the perfection that fulfills the longings of the human heart. Happiness is ultimately man's operation (an activity of his higher powers and more properly of his intellect than of his will, though including both) as this has to do with man's highest intentional object, namely, God himself. Man has even a natural desire for the beatific vision, a desire that cannot be fulfilled save through God's gifts.

What should we think of the appropriateness of this model for a philosophy of man's transcendence in our time? We will make three comments on this model, comments that take their origin from basic difficulties many modern philosophers would have with it. These difficulties are against the fact of an opera-

[8] See *ibid.*, I-II, qq. 1-3. A full study of Thomas's thought on man's religious transcendence would also include his teaching on the virtue of religion and what evokes man's dedication of himself to God (e. g., *ibid.*, q. a. 3).

tiona! transcendence of man, against the structure of man, and against the relation of man to the rest of the material order as expressed by Thomas.

In the *first* place, the above view of man would be rejected because much of modem philosophy denies man's transcendence; that is, it denies that man is oriented to and capable of a dimension of knowledge that extends as far as a knowledge of God, and specifically one found in a metaphysics, or that he is in his activity seeking a value not restricted to the secular order and, indeed, properly seeking this. In reference to this problem we agree that, while Thomas did on the basis of human experience reflect and articulate man's transcendence in knowledge and quest for value, this problem was not central for him. In his age of faith and the science of his day this fact of man's transcendence had an obvious character that for many it does not have in our time. In a sense, this problem of the fact of man's transcendence is the central problem for philosophy in our time and it is a more radical problem than those that were central for Thomas. Before there is point in articulating philosophically the structure of man in a way that accounts for his transcendence, the question of the fact of this transcendence must be raised, and raised within the context of modem experience and philosophy. In this we are agreed with the Marechalians, and in our next section we shall recall how Rahner and Lonergan face this problem. But if modern experience as well as pre-modem experience justifies the philosophical assertion of this transcendence, as we think it does, the question of the structure of man that accounts for it returns to us. In fact, one may say that the question of the structure of man faces modern philosophers even before they are willing to assert the operational transcendence of man. If they antecedently associate such an assertion with a structure of man that is static and already totally given, and thus opposed to man's process in nature and history, they have great difficutly in acknowledging the fact of man's transcendence. An so even at this point there is reason for us to recall that a static view of man is not a consequence of an assertion of his transcendence.

In the *s'econd* place then, philosophers today who do accept a religious transcendence in man agree that this gives rise to a need for a philosophical articulation of the structure of man. But many of these react against Thomas's philosophy as reflecting a view marked too much by an intellectualism, an approach to man as static substance, and an objectivism. To these it may seem reasonable to opt for a philosophy that has been developed after modem science has shown the processive character of man. They may, for example, turn to A. N. Whitehead or to Teilhard de Chardin. We certainly agree that these men have essential contributions to make to a philosophical articulation of the structure of man, and they have gone far to integrate process with transcendence rather than, as so much modem philosophy does, oppose them. Moreover, in their philosophies they go far toward escaping the dilemma between a reductionism to the scientific account of man or an isolation of man from the physical order, between a scientism and an existentialism, between an objectivism and a subjectivism, between a view that relates man solely to nature and one that relates him solely to history. However, these philosophical traditions too are called to an enlargement today, and one that may diminish the distance between them and a Thomism that has been modified by modem science and experience. For example, some of Whitehead's disciples question whether his view of man as a succession of actual events accounts adequately for man as agent,-as one who is, endures, and acts.[9] Teilhard de Chardin's position has been criticized because it brings together in one view science, philosophy, and theology in such a way that what is distinctive to the method and implications of each is no longer preserved clearly in their interrelation. Moreover, at times he uses as his categories of explanation metaphors (e. g., he attributes consciousness to the lowest of physical organisms) which, if they were clarified, could well

[9] In some cases these questions are addressed to Whitehead's position from a perspective influenced by John Macmurray. See, for example, Macmurray's, *The Self as Agent* (London, 1957), and F. Kirkpatrick, "Process or Agent: Models for Self and God," *Thour;ht* 48 (1973), 33-60.

lead to distinctions articulated in Thomas's philosophy. Here we simply wish to recall several points to show that Thomas's philosophical articulation of man's transcendence toward being or, more properly, toward God, has a capacity for growth that allows it to explain much beyond the experience that he centrally articulated, a capacity that goes far toward overcoming the dichotomy between being and subject in process that many see in him.

Thomas's articulation of man appears to many to place much more emphasis on the intellectual dimensions of his transcendence than is reflective of modern experience. The limited transcendence in man's operations that is acknowledged by a number of modern philosophies is primarily in the order of values that man seeks in history, and there seems to be no place in Thomas's philosophy of being to articulate this experience. In answer to this we should recall that Thomas's articulation of man's transcendence has reference not only to his knowledge but to his desires and the actions that come from these. Man's desire for value or the good and his action for these is an orientation toward being. That is, Thomas associates the good with being since the good is the actualization or perfection of the one who is in quest, and *esse* is the actualization of being. For example he writes

> The good is that which all desire ... but all things desire to be *(esse)* actually according to their manner, which is clear from the fact that each thing according to its nature resists corruption. To be actually then constitutes the nature of the good.[10]

For St. Thomas, this good must be intentionally present to man's will for him to elicit his free acts through which history is constituted. Without developing here the bases for this opinion/ [1] we can suggest that Thomistic philosophy can account for the

[10] *I Contra Gentiles,* c. 37, para. 4. See also *de Verit.,* q.. 22, a. 1 ad 4; q. 21, 2; *de Pot.,* q. 3, a. 6.

[11] I offer these bases in an article, " Existence, the Intellect and the Will," *The Nf!IW Scholasticism* 29 (1955), 145-174. A relation between Thomistic principles and modern experience to explain man's action is found to be very fruitful in J. de Finance, *Essai sur l'agir humain* (Rome, 1962).

good as intentionally present to man through the act of the agent intellect. This is an act emerging from the principles of man's very being, an act that Thomas describes in ways that associate it with *esse,* and an act that is present to the will (somewhat as the intelligible species is present to the possible intellect). Man's object in the sense of the good of the agent is present to the will through such an act, and his object in the sense of what he wants for his good is present to the will through man's knowledge of a thing or operation. Larger dimensions of the good, such as that which includes both the agent and other men, or both man and God, would be present to man in some way that is in continuity with this. Being then, in this view, faces man as his horizon not simply in his intellectual transcendence but in that value orientation that is his as a free agent. It faces him as a lure calling for his free acts through which his nature is perfecterl or actualized. And since as a temporal being his actualization emerges only through many acts, it faces him as a future that is brought about by an historical process.

St. Thomas's explanation of man's actions through rooting them in a human nature or substance appears to many to give a static view that does not do justice to the dynamism in man's history. For this reason some identify Thomas's philosophy with a Greek view of man and oppose it to what they call a Semitic view. In answer to this we can say that Thomas's enlargement of Aristotle's understanding of being has consequences here that go far to meet this difficulty. It is true that Aristotle interpreted man's actions through their relation to human powers and the nature in which they were rooted and that Thomas also emphasized man's substance or nature, and particularly his form or soul, in his explanation of man's actions. But there are many bases in Thomas's writing that call us to relate man's actions to his being and not simply to his nature. For example, if one must infer from man's operations that the good is mediated to him through the agent intellect, and that this properly participates in man's *esse,* then we must give a fuller development than Thomas has explicitly given of *esse*

as an intrinsic constitutive principle from which man's distinctive powers and acts emerge. An explanation of man's distinctive actions (insofar as it is appropriate for a philosophy to give) is impossible if we keep ourselves within the confines of human nature. There is much in Thomas's philosophy to support the view that the intrinsic constitutive principles of the human person include both the substance and the *esse,* and that the context of explanation of man's acts and powers should be the human person or human being rather than human nature. [12] The basic intrinsic principles that account philosophically for man's operations include a dynamic principle as well as a formal principle (which is also dynamic formally). Being for Thomas is so un-opposed to process in man that man's being demands and is the root of the process that is distinctive of him. This can be seen since man's *esse* calls forth as a lure the process through which man brings about the actualization of his being. The opposition between a Greek and a " Semitic " view of man is diminished by this consideration; if a Greek philosophical view of man has to account for his dynamism and process, a " Semitic " view of man, if it is to have any philosophical elaboration, has to account for the distinctiveness of man.

Thomas's understanding of man's moral activity has appeared to many to be incapable of articulating modern man's experience of himself as *subject* creatively realizing himself in history. They interpret his view of man's moral activity as a conformity to a totally given nature. This may have some semblance of foundation in the way Thomas's view is at times presented, but there is much in his analysis of man's operations that, if brought to the fore, can allow us a more adequate basis for judgment about the capacities of his philosophy to account for modern man's experience of transcendence. Thomas (and indeed Aristotle) radically distinguishes man's operations of

[12] See, for example, *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3. Also Thomas's understanding of person as "subsistens rationalis naturae" *(ibid.,* I, q. 29, a. 3) has implied for many of his disciples that *existing* as a substance of a rational nature is all mtri!lsic principle of the person.

knowledge and free choice from the activity of a physical body moved from one location to another; he expresses this by calling the former an " actus perfecti " and the latter an " actus entis in potentia prout in potentia." If I move a pencil across a page, it gains its movement from another " a retro " ; if I choose freely, it is I who "move" or act, and I so act through being empowered not " a retro " but by the value or good I am seeking; I am empowered by the good, but it is I who act-in virtue of that power that has actualized me.[13]

If the implications of Thomas's analysis of man's free operation as an " actus perfecti " are brought out by properly rooting man's operations in his being, it would appear that his philosophy has much to contribute to an elucidation of man's moral activity. This accounts for man being truly agent in his activity rather than passive, the more so because he is reflective agent-reflecting upon himself and his relation to value. In this view the actualization of man's nature faces him as his human horizon, the value soliciting his engagement in history, and a causal influence enabling him to act humanly. In this view the way in which human nature is a norm for man's actions is radically different from the way a twelve inch ruler is a norm for a line that is a foot long. The ruler is a norm that is fully constituted before one draws the line, and one that is identically the same for all the lines drawn according to its specifications. Man's nature is a norm for moral action only through the mediation of right reason. It is normative as it is related to man's moral activity. Since this moral activity is

[13] An analysis of St. Thomas's philosophy of the "actus perfecti" may be found in my *Predestination, Grace and Free WiU* (Westminister Md.: Newman, 1964), 180-185, 192-196. I may add, in view of some criticisms of Thomas's philosophy from process philosophers, that in the same book I show that Thomas's nuderstanding of God's eternal knowledge of man's free acts is not opposed to the reality of freedom and newness in creation. The same cannot be said about the interpretations found in some of Thomas's disciples. On the comparison between Thomas's view of God's relation to the world and that of Whitehead, one may profitably consult Walter E. Stokes, "A Whiteheadian Reflection on God's Relation to the World," in Ewert Cousins (ed.), *Process Theology* (New York, 1971), 137-152.

for the actualization of man's nature (individually and socially), his nature is a norm for his action not so much as that to which his action conforms as that which establishes what his possibilities and fulfillment are as fully actualized. Therefore man's reason is a norm not so much as he knows his nature insofar as it is antecedent to his action but as he knows that for which it is potential, that possibility and value to which man and his acts are oriented. Also, while the norm present in a ruler is unchanging, man's nature is present in individuals only analogically, being existentially different in individuals of different ages, sexes, cultures, environments, and heredities; there is a certain indeterminateness in human nature when abstracted from the circumstances in which it is a moral norm. Right reason as a moral norm then is more an intelligent grasp of man's possibilities and fulfillment appropriate to (or mediated by) his specific environment of nature and history and its implications for present activity, than a directive from a static nature unchangingly oriented to its proper fulfillment in similar circumstances and structures. [14] The differences among cultures or human environments and the relation of these differences to human behavior-both as mediating to men universal human values in differing ways and as the effects of men's behavior-were not recognized or articulated by Thomas as they must be today if a continuity in human nature is to be related properly to man's development and change.

In the *third* place, many who admit a transcendence in man and a need to articulate a structure in man in virtue of which he has this would say that this problem today involves man's relationship to the rest of the material world. Here the state of the question is so radically different from what it was in the time of Thomas that, they would add, there is no reason to look to to the resources of his thought for help in articulating philosophically this relationship. Evidence of man's transcendence in an evolutionary world should make us turn to the

" A specific example of the use of human nature as a moral norm in this way is suggested in my article, "The Principle of the Family Good," *Theological Studies* Sl (1970), 262-274.

philosophies, for example, of Whitehead or Teilhard de Chardin. These were developed to account, in part, for man's evolutionary or processive relationship to the rest of the physical world. They are not in their philosophical articulation of this bound to a static view of the world and of species. Specifically, they allow for a spontaneity, newness, process, and relatedness in the material order below man that give a better philosophical articulation of its relation to man than one can expect from the resources of Thomistic philosophy.

We acknowledge, of course, that in this area the problems and data on which philosophy must reflect have changed radically since the time of St. Thomas. We are interested in making a response here to this difficulty only to the extent of showing that in this area Thomism has changed also and that the current reflection in the Thomistic tradition deserves critical evaluation rather than simple neglect in a modern philosophical articulation of man's relation to the rest of the physical world. As a basis for this view we will recall something in general about the relation between Thomas's philosophy of nature and the data of science, and then point to the fact that in spite of all the changes in our understanding of the physical world the modern data give rise to problems that Thomas addressed in a non-evolutionary framework, and addressed in such a way that his answers are not restrictedly relevant to such a framework.

In reference to the fact that Thomas's philosophy developed from a pre-evolutionary world view, we wish to recall different types of philosophies of nature when related to science, as these hav:e been classified by E. McMullin. One type takes its basis *outside* of physical sciences (PN 1) ; one in an *extension* of physical sciences and takes its data from them (PN 2); and one *in part* takes its departure from outside the physical sciences but uses the conclusions of science (PNM) .[15] According to McMullin,

[15] See E. McMullin, "Philosophies of Nature," *New Scholasticism* 48 (1969), He distinguishes these from philosophies of science some of which he surveys in his article, "Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science," *ibid.,* 40 (1966), 478-518.

Aristotle's seventeenth-century successors and some of Thomas's twentieth-century disciples opted for the first position, with the result that they have lost contact with the sciences and their views have become vacuous. John Dewey's position is of the second type, but philosophies of nature of this character are inadequate:

> Such second order philosophies of nature are legion: The myriad speculations of those whose imaginations are sparked by some new scientific advance, so that they leap to a speculative claim about Nature whose only real warrant is the original piece of empirical science.[16]

The PNM model can escape the inadequacies of these extremes; this model, however, embraces many diverse philosophies of nature. It includes that of Whitehead who called upon both the data of the physical sciences and his experience of human consciousness to explain organic processes; and more recently, it includes, for example, that of Errol Harris, the foundations of whose view are both:

> the empirical data underpinning the various theories whose results he generalizes, and also the metaphysics whose internal coherence and adequacy give it a claim that transcends that of the scientific theories from which it originally took its origin.[17]

There is much reason to think that Thomas's philosophy of nature falls into this last type, even though science and the philosophy of nature were not distinguished in his age as in ours. It did draw upon the physics of his day, for example, the physics of the celestial bodies and their influence upon terrestial bodies, but it certainly had bases outside these sciences, as in man's general experience of different kinds of physical change, and in Thomas's metaphysics of act and potency. A view that Thomas's philosophy of nature has resources that contribute to the philosophical elucidation of man's evolutionary emergence from lower physical reality depends then upon the possibility

[16] *Ibid.*, 60.

[17] *Ibid.*, 57. See E. Harris, *The Foundations of MetaphysiC$ in Science* (New York, 1965).

that certain principles in his philosophy can be disengaged from the science of his time and that these are positively and profitably related to the data of modern science/[8] We may also note here that Aristotle's philosophy is not as deM pendent upon the " science ;; of his times as is popularly supposed. For example, in his elaboration of his hylomorphic theory, he does not even mention his view on the physical elements. This theory depends not upon the science of the elements but rather upon a first order human knowledge, an awareness of physical becoming and change within the context of a more basic continuity of existence.[19]

Can Thomas's philosophy of nature positively and profitably relate to the modern data that supports man's emergence from lower physical organisms? This question of the relationship

[18] The dependence of Thomas's metaphysics and cosmology on the science of his day is more candidly admitted now by his disciples than it has been at times in the past. See T. Litt, *Les Corps celestes dans l'univers de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1963), 367:

" Les . . . chapitres de cet ouvrage montrent que . . . Ia *metaphysique* . . . des corps celestes . . . est incontestablement une piece constitutive de Ia synthese philosophique du Docteur commun ... : ses conceptions sur Ia nature et !'action des spheres celestes prenn.ent place dans une vision grandiose de l'ordre universe!; tous les aspects de cette cosmologie typiquement medievale se completent d'une maniere rigoureusement coherente et revelent !'esprit de synthese si caracteristique de Ia pensee du maitre."

And on page 372:

" Une . . . question, capitale pour les thomistes actuels, se pose aussitot: le systeme philosophiqne de S. Thomas peut-il etre ampute, sans inconvenient serieux, de Ia pseudo-metaphysique [pseudo cosmologie] des spheres celeste? . . . il est possible de reprendr.e a S. Thomas les theses essentialles de sa metaphysique tout en sacrifiant les conceptions pseudo-metaphysiques et pseudo-scientifiques de sa 'physique celeste'. Celles-ci, en effet, sont des applications erronees ou imaginaires des principes ....

"Mais il ne suffit pas de supprimer, il faut remplacer. Les philosophes thomistes d'aujourd'hui se trouvent devant Ia tache redoutable de mettre sur pied nne nouvelle cosmologie, une nouvelle philosophic de l'univers materiel, et notamment nne reponse valable au probleme de Ia finalite dans l'univers materiel en meme temps qu'une epistemologie et nne critique des sciences."

These quotations are found also in John Deely, "The Philosophical Dimensions of the Origin of Species," *The Thomist* 33 (1969), 75-149, 251-342, on p. *258.*

[19] See Aristotle, *Physics,* I, vii; and U. Thobe, "Hylomorphism Revisited," *New Scholasticism* 42 (1968), 226-253.

between Thomas's philosophy and evolutionary biology ia different today than it was in the early days after Darwin. For example, biologists in our time more fully acknowledge the fact and dimensions of *progress* in biological evolution than they did in the early twentieth century. Dobzhansky writes:

> Despite numerous attempts, biologists have not succeeded in formulating a rigorous definition of what constitutes progress in biological evolution. And yet the progress is intuitively evident. [20]

Relating this progress specifically to man, we see that modern phenomena as well as pre-modern phenomena support the *distinctiveness* of man and so give rise to the problem of philosophically articulating this distinctiveness. John Deely, in a treatment of this problem, turns to a modern expression of this distinctiveness:

> In terms of the adaptive phenotype, the radical basis of human cultural capacity means this: "The human organism has a constitutional capacity to react to objects . . . without the specific content or form of the reaction being in any way physiologically given " and on the basis of this capacity " the human attains levels of organization beyond those open to animals." [21]

There is a genetic basis necessary for this constitutional capacity. This does not imply a fixed biological human nature, but it does imply a first human nature from which the human nature that we experience today has developed. Once we accept the fact,

> namely, that the human evolutionary uniqueness is constituted by the norm of reaction which admits of certain non-physiological phenotypic modalities, and that such a reaction range is established in consequence of a kind of awareness which ... transcends the biologically given, we have the evolutionary basis for the very potency-act analysis by which, at another observational level and

[20] T. Dobzhansky "Teilhard de Chardin and the Orientation of Evolution: A Critical Essay," in E. Cousins (ed.), *Process*, p. 237.

[21] John Deely "The Emergence of Man: An Inquiry into the Operation of Natural Selection in the Making of Man," *New Scholasticism* 40 (1966), 166-167. The quotation in this text is from T. Parsons and E. Shils (ed.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (New York, 1962), 10, 17.

in a non-evolutionary perspective, St. Thomas pointed out the spirit in man ... that is not strictly educible from the potentiality of matter-even though it appears in time exactly as though by way of biological causation.""

If modem science gives rise in a new way to the philosophical problem of accounting for the distinctiveness of man, it also gives rise in a new way to the philosophical problem of the progressively larger capacities evident in the physical world or the problem of the interrelation of *species.* In an earlier period of evolutionary biology and of classical philosophy the answers to this problem were diametrically opposed. For Darwin, species were arbitrary divisions within a continuum of nature; one derived from the other by the mechanistic and chance factors implied in the principle " the survival of the fittest." For an earlier philosophy species signified static kinds given in the physical world, kinds that were unchanging, differing from one another as essentially and abruptly as whole numbers, and interrelated in a strictly hierarchical manner. When a correlation between the two views of species was attempted, confusion was multiplied. More recently each side has so modified its position that there is communication between many scientists and philosophers on the issues.[23] From the biological side, some prominent theorists of evolution accept the existence of discontinuities and progress (not as defined as orthogenesis, but nevertheless real) among species as well as of continuities. They explain evolution through change in genetic endowment in succeeding generations and thus through reproduction and

•• *Ibid.,* 169-170.

[23] For a treatment on this matter on which I largely depend here, see Deely, " The Philosophical Dimensions of the Origin of Species," cited above. Also see James Anderson, "Teilhard's Cosmological Kinship to Aristotle," *New Scholasticism* 45 (1971) and Claude Savary, "About Aristotle and Evolutionism," *ibid.,* 47 (1978), 248-52.

On Jacques Monod's reduct.ion of the evolutionary process to chance in his book *Le hasard et la necessite. Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne* (Paris, 1970), see A. Bauchau, "La biologic modeme selon Jacques Monod," *NouveUe revue theologique* 98 (1971) 290-800, and M. Corvez, "La philosophie de la biologie modeme. Reflexions critiques," *ibid.,* 801-816.

heredity. And they recognize that a mechanistic interpretation of macro-evolution may be all that science as such is capable of, but it cannot do justice to the progress that is evident or to the finality implied in the adaptation of organism to enviroment.24 From the philosophical side, the notion of species has been disengaged from a variety of associated notions. For example, in the Greek view of the eternity of the world, species can seem to be eternally given; in Christian doctrine of creation, species, and the ideas they give rise to, have an origin. The modern recognition of evolution shows that this origin is a progressive one in time. Certain traits proper to species in its meaning as a term in logic have been disengaged from the notion of species as this refers to a structure of physical being: species in the latter sense designates the nature or essence of the physical being, that basic inner principle that structures its existence and operation; and it is found in individuals only in an analogical way, not in a univocal way. According to some, there are basically only four species in this philosophical sense: inanimate material being, vegetative life, animal life, and

•• See T. Dobzhansky, *Genetics and the Origin of Species* (8rd ed., N. Y., 1951), 88: " Evolution is change in the heredity, in the genetic endowment of succeeding generations; no understanding of evolution is possible except with the foundation of a knowledge of heredity." Also see Dobzhansky, "Teilhard - - - ", "Natural selection is, on the contrary, an anti-chance The selection perpetuates genetic constitutions which are adaptive in a given environment and fails to perpetuate the less well-adapted one . . . The environments present challenges to a living species-to which the latter may or may not respond by adaptive alterations-of its hereditary endowment."

See also C. H. Waddington, "The Theory of Evolution Today," in Arthur Koestler and J. R. Smythies (ed.), *Beyond Reductionism* (Boston, 1969), 857-895. In one place he presents the evolution of the horse as an example of development. Then in answer to a question about the spontaneous emission of behavior that has adaptive value, he says (879):

" I think I gave an example of this when I said that horses had several strategies available, either to stand and fight or to run fast and escape. Of course in using terms like ' strategy ' one is being rather anthropomorphic. I think that there are both dangers and advantages in being anthropomorphic in thinking about evolution. If you are not at all anthropomorphic you run a great danger of being confined to very simple minded mechanical models; . . . there is the danger of being too anthropomorphic and implying that the evolving horses made a conscious choice whether to run away or stand and fight."

human life, and there are subspecies mediating these basic kinds of physical beings and individuals. Moreover, there is nothing in Thomas's philosophical understanding of species to indicate that a species cannot have an origin in time from material beings of another species.

There is now more communication between scientists and philosophers on the issue of the character of the progress evident in the physical world not only because certain unnecessary obstacles have been overcome but also because the modern data do give rise to philosophical problems if the scientist does not so absolutize his method as to prevent these arising. Some of these problems have been treated by Thomas at another observational level in a way that a contemporary philosopher (not a scientist as scientist) may profitably consider them, and some of these problems call for a marked change in a philosophy of the Thomistic tradition if this philosophy is to justify any claim to relevance or value as a reflection on our modern experience of the physical world. Philosophical problems are acknowledged by Dobzhansky and Waddington among others. The latter, for example, defends a theory of evolution that holds that the unit of evolution is the phenotype, which is identified on the basis of behavior, even more than the genotype. To explain evolution he calls upon factors such as the challenge presented by the environment (e. g., that posed by enemies of the horse in the Tertiary period) , the spontaneous response of organisms to these challenges (e. g., the horses' strategy of running away rather than standing and fighting), the feedback of both the environment (e. g., through the survival of the horses that became proficient at this strategy) and behavior (e. g., horses that have genes capacitating them for this response mate and enhance the capacity in their offspring) on the genetic system, and the gradual changes in this system that bring about a population of organisms that shows an appropriately altered phenotype. [25]

The problem of finality and spontaneous behavior evident,

[25] See Waddington, *art. cit.*, 372-374.

for example, in this evolutionary theory poses at another observational level and in an evolutionary perspective a problem Thomas addressed. If what we have said earlier about *esse* as well as nature evoking behavior and about *actus perfecti* is true, it has much to contribute to a philosophical explanation of the finality and spontaneity of the behavior that contributes to the evolutionary process. (We may note that, in their explanations of evolutionary process, Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin call upon their experience of acting for a goal as a partial principle, applying this analogically of course to lower organisms. In the Thomistic tradition also, it would seem that we must agree with them and call upon our experience as agent operating for a goal, applying the philosophical explanation of this analogically to lower organisms.) On the other hand, the philosophical problem of behavior as contributing to a change in physical structure and as relational to environment as well as to the organism's inner structure poses a problem of adjustment to Thomistic philosophy that treated behavior too prominently as function of nature (or, preferably, the physical being).

From what we have seen in this investigation of a recovery of Thomas's philosophy as a model for the interrelation between his thought and the present problem of man's transcendence we have suggested that a simple recovery is totally inadequate for the present problem but that there is a capacity in his philosophy for development that lessens the gap between it and man's modern experience of himself and the world and that encourages us not to neglect the resources of his philosophy as we address the problem of man's transcendence in our time.

2. Thomistic dialogue from the Marechalian tradition

Other models for the interrelation between the philosophy of St. Thomas and the modern problematic of man's transcendence are presented to us by Marechal and those who his dialogue with modern philosophy and particularly with

Imannuel Kant. Like Kant Marechalstarted withman'sknowledge; he attempted to show the possibility of metaphysical knowledge as a condition for the possibility for man's judgments. Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan have also taken this general approach, and so both have as a central theme in their study the question of man's transcendence, though they treat this in ways that differ from one another.

Karl Rahner's central concern in the philosophical part of his work is man's transcendence. This centrality is shown in the fact that Rahner considers all modern philosophical difficulties against Christianity to have behind them man's non-acceptance of his transcendence; what is then of prime importance is man's appropriation of this transcendence.[26] To indicate how he articulates this transcendence, we may recall some elements of his early work defending the possibility of metaphysics and man's openness to an historical revelation, and then something of how he adjusted his view of man's transcendence in his later work.

In *Spirit in the World*[27] Rahner presents as his central ques-

•• See K. Rahner, "Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today," *Theological Investigations,* vol. *5* (Baltimore 1966), 7-9:

" The real argument against Christianity is the experience of life, this experience of darkness. And I have always found that behind the technical arguments levelled by the learned against Christianity-as the ultimate force and a *priori* pre-judgment supporting these scientific doubts-there are always these ultimate experiences of life causing the spirit and the heart to be sombre, tired and despairing.

"---- For what does Christianity really declare? Nothing else, after all, but that this mystery wishes to communicate Himself in absolute self-communication-as the infinite, incomprehensible and inexpressible Being whose name is God, as self-giving nearness-to the human soul in the midst of its experience of its own finite emptiness. . . . For anyone who really accepts *hi'llt$elf* accepts a mystery in the sense of the infinite emptiness which is man. He accepts himself in the immensity of his unpredictable destiny and-silently, and without premediation-he accepts the One who has decided to fill this infinite emptiness (which is the mystery of man) with his own infinite fullness (which is the mystery called God)."

Also see "Philosophy and Theology," *ibid.,* p. 74: "philosophy in the strictest sense cannot be anything other than the methodically exact, reflected and most expediently controlled representation and articulation of this original and never quite attained self-understanding."

[21] K. Rahner, *Spirit in the World,* translated by Wm. Dych from the second

tion " the possibility of metaphysics on the presupposition that all human thought remains permanently dependent on sense intuition." [28] There is a certain similarity between Kant and St. Thomas insofar as the former held that man's knowledge was confined to the order of possible experience, and the latter held that our knowledge always involves a turning to the phantasm and thus to the order of space and time that is given to us through sense knowledge and the imagination. From these similar premises, however, Kant denies our knowledge of the noumenon and the absolute, while Thomas affirms it. Rahner uses Thomas's noetic, or his interpretation of it, to show that a condition for the possibility of our questions and our objective judgments is knowledge of the absolute and being.

It is a fact that man questions, and indeed questions necessarily. Man can turn away from particular questions, but there is one question from which he cannot turn, namely, " the question about being in its totality." This question is one which " he *must* ask if he wants *to be* at all." [29] Granted the necessity of the question of being for man, how is it that this question occurs in him, or what are the conditions for the possibility of its occurrence? Among these conditions is some knowledge mediated by sense intuition and by intellectual knowledge through phantasm and abstraction under the influence of the agent intellect, a condition which Rahner accepts from St. Thomas. But furthermore, and more basically, the necessity of this question of being " can only be grounded on the fact that being is accessible to man . . . only as something questionable,

edition, an edition that was somewhat revised, with Rahner's approval, by his student Johannes Metz (New York, 1968). The first edition was published in 1939. A study of the views of Rahner, Lonergan, and Dewart concerning our knowledge of God may be found in Wm. Hill, *Knowing the Unknown God* (New York, 1971), Chapter 3, "Theological Intuitionalism: Beyond Concept," pp. 59-109. For the theological center and context of Rahner's reflections on man's transcendence, see Karl Lehmann, "Karl Rahner," in R. Vander Gucht and H. Vorgrimler (ed.), *Bilan de la theologie du xx6 siecle* (Paris, 1970) II, 836-874. We may also note that in his later work Rahner accepts a pluralism in philosophy as inevitable, although he continues to use his own early philosophical insights.

•• *Ibid.,* 387.

•• *Ibid., 57-58,*

that he himself is insofar as he asks about being, that he himself exists as a question about being." [30] Not only is man a dynamic orientation or thrust toward being as a question about being; being must be somehow known to him for him to ask this question. The question, that is, presupposes that:

> man is already at the goal when he begins, since he must already know of being in its totality if he asks about it; and at the same time he confesses by his question that he himself is not the goal, but a finite man. [31]

This knowledge of being does not properly derive from what is delivered to man through sense, imagination, and abstraction since that is limited to the world of space and time. In the question of being, being is somehow known in its totality. There is then a " certain *a priori* knownness of being as such " on which man's question depends. How being is thus present to man can be understood if one recalls that, as St. Thomas taught, the intellect, the known, and the knowing are the same. Rahner interprets this to mean that the "object" primarily known by man is the object with which he is identical, namely, himself. Being is present as known to man through his self-presence.

> Knowing is the being present-to-self of being, and this being-present-to-self is the being of the existent .... If being is primarily presence-to-self, then the real and original object of a knowing being is that with which it originally is, itself. [32]

The same conclusion, namely, that the preapprehension of being is a condition of man's knowledge, results from an analysis of man's affirmation (in the judgment) of the object, both as object and as limited. Such knowledge depends on what is gained through sense and abstraction, it is true. But it also presupposes a knowledge of self and of the absolute or being. To know the object as object is to know it as standing against oneself as knower, and this presupposes presence-to-self. To

[30] *Loc. cit.*
[31] *Ibid.,* 61.
[32] *Ibid.,* 69, 75.

know it as having a quality concreted in the individual and thus to know it as limited in its being is to know in some sense that which transcends these and any limits; this is to have a pre-apprehension of *esse,* or absolute being.[83] The affirmation found in the judgment then presupposes a knowledge of being that is not derived from the physical world through sense knowledge and abstraction.

This pre-apprehension, we should note, is not an intuition of absolute being, nor is it conceptual knowledge. It is not knowledge that initially man is formally aware of possessing, nor is it knowledge of absolute being as an *object.* Rather it is knowledge of being as that which is given *with* objective knowledge of the world. This knowledge is available to the possible intellect through the agent intellect and its light that actualizes the species informing the possible intellect. This light which mediates self-presence, being, and the absolute, is co-apprehended by the possible intellect in its apprehension of what is offered through abstraction.

Even this skeletal recall of Rahner's position shows us basically how he establishes the possibility of metaphysics by the transcendental method, for its shows us how being is known by man in spite of man's knowledge being directed to the order of space and time. This approach also determines the character of the metaphysics which it founds. Metaphysics here is not cosmocentric; it is anthropocentric, insofar as it is a reflection on being given through man's self-presence and the absolute as mediated by this self-presence. We should note that while being is not known objectively in this pre-apprehension, in metaphysics it is known objectively. Concerning the relationship between the knowledge of being we have been discussing and that given in metaphysics, Rahner writes:

> When man takes as the" object" of his knowledge in metaphysics that which he affirms simultaneously in the pre-apprehension which makes possible his knowledge of the world, then he necessarily makes it a represented object in the only way in which he can

•• See *ibid.,* 897-898.

have such an object at all: he represents it as a thing, as the things of the world are, because he can have no represented object at all without a conversion to the phantasm.[84]

In *Hea?"ers of the Word*[85] Rahner sought to show how man is open to a possible historical divine revelation. Man's transcendence toward being in part makes this understandable, but in part it seems to posit an obstacle to such openness. It makes it understandable because man as a finite spirit does stand out toward being, and so we see that " man ' is' absolute receptivity for being pure and simple."[86] However, the fact that God is known through man's "excessus" to being raises a difficulty to the possibility of revelation, for it could imply that what is highest in man's knowledge of God is a natural mystical nonconceptual experience.[87] Contrary to this, Rahner argues that man is open to an historical divine word from God in revelation, because man's self-affirmation that mediates his knowledge *ol* God is an affirmation of his own contingency, and indeed a free affirmation of his contingency. God is then known as the condition for the possibility of man's affirmation of his contingency; and since this is a free human act, God is himself known as the free power that is the ground of man's contingency.[88] Man stands before a God who is free. This shows the possibility of a further and historical revelation of himself by God, and it also implies that while the free act of God toward the finite is love, so too what is the core in man's response or transcendence is love.

At the heart of the transcendence of the finite spirit there arises a love of God. Man's openness to the absolute being God is the affirmation of his own existence ... a deliberate attitude to himself, and at the very foundation of his nature, a reaching out of finite

•• *Ibid.,* 899.

[85] K. Rahner, *Hearers of the Word,* trans. by M. Richards (N.Y., 1969). This is a translation of the second edition of this work; the first edition was published in 1941; the second edition was, at Rahner's request, prepared by J. Metz and published in 1968.

•• *Ibid.,* 66.

[67] See *ibid.,* 77-78.

•• See *ibid.,* 89.

love toward God ... a love of God as the deepest fact of his very knowledge. The love of God is not something which can be merely added retrospectively to this knowledge, but, as the deepest factor of knowledge, is both its *condition* and its *cause*.[39]

In his later writings Rahner has modified somewhat his interpretation of man's transcendence. This has been due partly to criticisms directed against him by his student, Johannes Metz. Metz, influenced by the Marxist Ernst Bloch, denies that a purely contemplative vision, such as that of metaphysics, can do justice to history or take up an appropriate attitude towards the future, To adopt such an attitude demands:

an active awareness, a new and authentic combination of theory and practice, as it were of reflection and revolution, which lies wholly outside metaphysical thinking and its conception of being. The essential hiddenness of the future in metaphysics is, however, at the same time the essential hiddenness of history altogether. [40]

While Metz is more sympathetic to Rahner's anthropocentric metaphysics and the theology associated with it than he is with more traditional Thomistic philosophy, he thinks that Rahner's approach also distorts the Christian message.

The prevailing theology of recent years, a theology of transcendental existential personalist orientation is well aware of the problematic situation created by the Enlightenment .... (but) the societal dimension of the Christian message was not given its proper importance but, implicitly or explicitly, treated as a secondary matter. In short, the message was " privatized " and the practice of faith reduced to the timeless decision of the person.H

Rahner's later interpretation of man's transcendence, influenced by this criticism, is in continuity with his earlier one, but it

[39] *Ibid.,* 101. This is in continuity with what Rahner says elsewhere in the same book: "Man's will with regard to himself appears as the inner condition of the possibility and necessity of the question about being, and thus as the condition of knowing about being in general." *Ibid.,* 87. And: " In its ultimate essence knowledge is but the bright radiance of love." *Ibid.,* 100.

[40] Johannes Metz, *Theology of the World,* translated by Wm. Glen-Doepel (New York, 1969), 98-99.

[41] *Ibid.,* 108-109.

brings in the added dimensions of the future, of society, of change, and of man's active experimentation with himself to achieve an improved social future. For example, man's transcendence is not one that is timeless but is rather openness to the future, and indeed the absolute future.[42] He notes also that man's openness to other human beings is an essential inner moment of his transcendence; the transcendental experience of God is in and through man " who has already (in logical priority) experienced the human Thou."[43]

Rahner's approach has much value as a model for the relation of Thomas's philosophy to the modern problem of man's transcendence, though there are questions that arise as to its adequacy when compared to either of these poles. In the *first* place, Rahner properly begins with man's experience of transcendence, because it is here that the modern problem primarily exists. The specific aspect of transcendence he centers on is one that is widely denied in our time and one that must exist in man if we are to appropriate ourselves as religious beings. This transcendence is man's orientation to an infinite goal or value; that this is central to Rahner's experiences and view of man is indicated in the very title of his first book, *Spirit in the World.* This way of viewing man has a certain continuity with German idealists and their successors, although Rahner defends man as *capax infiniti* while these modern philosophers claim for man only a limited transcendence. Thus Rahner meets a very real modern problem. And his use of Thomas's philosophy to articulate the structure of man as an" excessus" to *esse* is of value both in reference to this dimension of transcendence and in showing the capacity Thomas's philosophy has

[42] See K. Rahner, " Marxist Utopia and the Christian Future of Man," *Theological Investigations* 6 (1969), 59-68. "The man who opens himself to his absolute future experiences also what is really meant by the word God." (59) And: "Absolute future is just another name for what is really meant by 'God.'" (62)

[43] K. Rahner, "Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbor and the Love of God," *ibid.,* 245. Also see Rahner, "The Experiment with Man. Theological Observations on Man's Self-Manipulation," *Theological Investigations* 9 (London, 1972), 187 ff.

to articulate this experience. There is value and importance also in Rahner's analysis of man's knowledge of being through man's orientation to *esse,* or through the interrelation between the practical and the speculative order in man's knowledge. This is not the central meaning of knowledge for Thomas, nor is the self the first object of knowledge for him. For Thomas, it is the nature concreted in the material thing that is man's direct object of intellectual apprehension. But Rahner is speaking of a different kind of knowledge, and there is no contradiction between his and Thomas's view. Man's knowledge of being *when* being is taken as the object of man's thrust to the good is indeed mediated by affectivity and decision, and so also by man's self-presence. We agree that there are rich resources in Thomas's philosophy to articulate this knowledge of being. Since, as we indicated earlier, *esse* is more properly the object of man's love or desire than of his knowledge, knowledge of it is present to man's intellect properly through what Thomas describes as a knowledge by inclination or connaturality.44 It is present by the intellect's participation in the dynamism of the will or in man's love. In some aspects I would differ from Rahner's articulations of this; it seems that man knows *esse* not by a knowledge he has of the agent intellect but by his intellectual participation in the will's dynamism to *esse* as mediated by the agent intellect. Such a dimension is an intrinsic and essential element in our knowledge of being.

In the *second* place, the phenomenology presented in Rahner's early works to help us appropriate our transcendence seems inadequate in view of the many serious difficulties modern men have in appropriating this. Rahner in his later works seems to have realized this, for he insists that man's transcendence to the absolute is mediated by his orientation to

•• See article, "Existence" cited in fn. 11, pp. 173-174. St. Thomas discusses knowledge by connaturality primarily in reference to the judgment in the intellect by participation in man's affectivity. See, e. g., *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 28, a. 2; q. 57, aa. 4 and 5 ad 3; q. 58, a. 5; II-II, q. 45, a. 2; q. 51, a. 3 ad 1; q. 60, a. 1; *In Romanos,* c. 12, lect. l, in medium; *In Phil.,* c. 1, lect. 2, proem; *In Heb.,* c. 5, lect. 2, circa finem.

other men and to the future. In such a phenomenology we should examine man's value quest in relation to his social and physical environment as well as to his inner dynamism, for both the external and internal elements are essential factors in the emergence of man's dynamism toward an absolute value. Moreover we should examine this quest as it is manifested in man developmentally, for it is only through its enlargement to gradually more adequate horizons that its full dimensions come about consciously in man. It seems to us that the work of Erik Erikson has much to offer to such a phenomenology, since he does treat man's development through stages to a fully human dimension and he uses the resources of modern psychology to illuminate this development.

In the *third* place, we question whether Rahner's analysis of man's transcendence adequately meets modern difficulties against the possibility of metaphysics (and of knowledge of God) or reflects St. Thomas's understanding of metaphysical knowledge of being. We agree with Rahner that we must defend the possibility of metaphysics in view of modern difficulties and that a defense of man's transcendence in his quest for value is essential here since man's knowledge of being is in part mediated by this. However, Rahner does not give a defense of the possibility of metaphysics that is appropriate to the modern empiricist difficulty, for example, that "being " is simply a word and that statements about being are tautological and empty of empirical significance. It can also be argued that Rahner does not defend metaphysics adequately against Heidegger's strictures. If being is identified with *esse,* then there is a sense in which metaphysical knowledge of being, which is objective knowledge, is only a representative knowledge of being. On this basis Heidegger claims that metaphysics is based on a forgetting of the ontological difference between being and beings; and Rahner, with his view of being, may not have an adequate answer to this difficulty. On the other hand, his defense of the possibility of metaphysics does not seem to be adequate to Thomas's understanding, an understanding that in ways is more appropriate to the modern difficulties. For example, i£

one accepts Thomas's basic understanding of metaphysics, the possibility of knowledge of the absolute is a problem consequent on, and not prior to, establishing its possibility; for Thomas, God or the absolute is not, as for German idealism, the subject of metaphysics but the principle of its subject. Also, Thomas's view is not subject to Heidegger's strictures, even when it is rightly recognized that our knowledge is mediated by our orientation to *esse.* For Thomas, *esse* is a principle ot being, namely, the act of being; but since the essence of a being is an intrinsic principle of being, a knowledge of being through the way that is central for Thomas-through intellectual insight into the nature concreted in the individual and the judgment dependent on this-is properly knowledge of being. For Thomas, metaphysics is not simply representative knowledge or an objectification of being since it also reflects knowledge of being through intellectual insight and judgment. An objective knowledge of being is not a forgetting of the ontological difference unless it presumes to be our only manner of knowing being or our most proper and primitive knowledge of *esse.* While our knowledge of being is dependent both upon the physical beings we know and our knowledge of *esse* by self-presence, it is not a distortion of the latter as long as we recognize the differences involved. These reflections have an importance for our understanding of man and God, as well as for our understanding o£ the possibility and nature of metaphysics. Rahner's analysis of man's transcendence within an existential and an historical framework does not perhaps give adequate emphasis to man's insertion into nature, an insertion that the modem ecological consciousness calls for, and for which the resources of Thomas's philosophy have something important to offer. And Rahner's insistance upon man's self-presence (and later his historical future) as the locus of God's self-revelation similarly seems to lose touch with an adequate recognition of the place of nature or the physical world as a locus of God's self-manifestation.

Bernard Lonergan's work offers us another model for relating Thomas's philosophy to the problematic of man's transcen-

dence in our time. His early work began with studies of St. Thomas and found its culmination in his book *Insights* in which he attempted to bring his readers to appropriate their knowledge and become aware of their transcendence in a way that gave some basis for metaphysics and religious faith. His later work finds its developed expression in *Method in Theology,* where he centers his reflection on that transcendence found in religious conversion understood as unrestricted love and its implications for method in theology. We will dwell primarily on his earlier work although we will briefly indicate his later direction of thought as it relates to our theme.

In his early interpretation, Lonergan found that St. Thomas's noetic was based largely on his experience of knowledge and his use of this as an introspective and empirical basis for many of his assertions in his philosophy of knowledge. For St. Thomas, understanding or insight is located between abstraction from sense knowledge on the one hand and the concept or "inner word" on the other. Antecedent to our understanding there is our sense knowledge of the sensible qualities of the physical world, our imaginative grasp of physical objects in a way more unified than offered by any external sense or combination of them as such, and the illumination of the phantasm in the imagination by the agent intellect that offers the intelligible species to the intellect-an act that Lonergan calls "objective abstraction." Insight, understanding or what Lonergan calls "apprehensive abstraction " is an insight into the phantasm or the quiddity found in the phantasm. [45]

[45] "Apprehensive abstraction, insight, into phantasm, actually understands what objective abstraction presented to be understood. But what was presented to be understood was the imagined object, the phantasm .... what is known, precisely by understanding is the *forma intelligibilis,* the quiddity, the *species intelligibilis quae.* This is known in phantasm just as actually seen colors are seen in colored things." [B. Lonergan, *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas* (ed. by D. Burrell, Notre Dame, 1967), 179]. This was originally a series of articles published in 1946-1949. There are many passages in St. Thomas's reflections on knowledge (e. g.. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 88, a. 1) that support the validity of Lonergan's view of the experienti&l bltSis of 'rhomas's noetic,

Consequent upon this act of understanding there is the concept or " inner word " that is formed or constructed by the very act of understanding; the concepts then reflect the intellect and the object understood. [46] This first act of the mind, intellectual apprehension, is not the termination of the process of knowledge; this process terminates rather in that reflective understanding or the judgment in which alone truth, the end or goal of the intellect, is found formally. Through knowledge of the truth, the intellect knows real being.[47] In accord with

But we must note here a difference from Lonergan's specific interpretation of this noetic. While at times St. Thomas says that the intellect knows the nature of sensible things *in* the phantasms, at other times he speaks more exactly and says that we know the nature of sensible things *through* the phantasms. See *ibid.,* q. 85, a. 8; and *de Verit.,* q. 10, a. 8, *sed contra;* q. 10, a. 9. What we directly know, for Thomas, is the nature concreted in the individual thing. His analysis at times in a more ontological vein of the causes of our act of knowledge can confuse our interpretation of his view of the intellect's intentional object. Although he infers the phantasm, the intelligible species and other principles as principles *by* which we know, *what* we first know, or the direct intentional object of the intellectual apprehension, is the natures of material things.

•• Lonergan's interpretation of Thomas in this manner has solid basis in such texts as the following: *de; Verit.,* q. 3, a. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 85, a. ad 3: "Qua quidem formatus (i.e., specie intelligibili) *format* (intellectus) secundo vel definitionem, vel divisionem, vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur." Another interpreter of Thomas who emphasizes this constructive character of understanding is G. Rabeau, *Species. Verbum. L'Activite intellectuelle elementaire selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1938). I have briefly examined this active character of understanding and how the inner word emerges as a product or term from it in *Predestination,* pp. 180-185.

•• Lonergan writes in *Verbum,* p. 140, that: "... on the level of judgment the agent object is the objective evidence provided by sense and/or empirical consciousness, ordered conceptually and logically in a *reductio ad principia,* and moving to the critical act of understanding. Corresponding to this agent object, there is the other terminal object, the inner word of judgment, the *verum,* in and through which is known the final object, the *ens reale."*

We should note another difference here from Lonergan. It is true enough that Thomas holds that the perfection of the intellect is truth as known, and therefore that truth properly speaking is in the judgment and not in intellectual apprehension (see *Summa Theol.,* I. q. 16, a. This can be interpreted in two ways. One may say that what the intellect seeks to know is the truth, and we designate the complete objective of the mind in this sense as being, as Lonergan does. Or one may say that what the intellect seeks to know is being, but this knowledge of being while occurring in part in the first act, is found formally only in the second act because only there is it affirmed and only there do we reflectively know that

this, Lonergan interprets the concept of being in St. Thomas as the conceptualization of intelligibility. For example, a story is told us, and we answer" that may be so." It may be so because it is intelligible; if it is intelligible it is possible, that is, it can be. Experience and judgment are needed to assert real being here.

> From this it follows that the concept of being is natural to intellect; for intelligibility is natural to intellect, for it is its act; and conceptualization is natural to intellect, for it is its activity; but the concept of being, on the above showing, is the conceptualization of intelligibility as such, and so it too is natural to intellect. [48]

In *Insight* [49] Lonergan addresses himself to the understanding of human understanding and through that to the question of our knowledge of being and the possibility of metaphysics. The first part of this book offers us an extended phenomenology of knowledge to lead us to an appropria.. tion of understanding. Lonergan takes instances from mathematics, science, and common sense, and thus he begins with twentieth-century man's experience of knowledge; but the analysis of knowledge Lonergan offers here does not lack continuity with what he discovered through his earlier interpretation of Thomas's noetic. He gives an illustration of understanding or insight from mathematics. If we consider the genesis of the definition of a circle, we see that it involves a dependence upon an imaginative grasp of phenomena (e. g., a wheel, with spokes equally imbedded in the rim) and upon an insight that is constructive rather than simply passive. The gradual development of our definition depends upon our *supposing* certain things about the object given us in experience or imagination (e. g., we suppose that the rim of the wheel is re-

we know. In this latter interpretation truth is the perfection or term of the intellect in the sense of an act properly completed. It is this second interpretation that seems to accord more with St. Thomas" view. (See *ibid.,* a. 8 ad 8).

•• *Ibid.,* 44.

•• B. Lonergan, *Insight. A Study of Human Understanding* (New York, 1957). For a study of *Insight* and Lonergan's thought as a whole, see D. Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York, 1970).

duced to the breadth of a line ...). Here we see that the act of understanding is both an insight into phenomenon and a constructive formation of a definition, concept or inner word. Insight itself, however, is secondary to the intellectual drive to which it is an answer:

> This primordial drive, then, is the pure question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words, for insights, concepts, words, have to do with answers; and before we look for answers, we want them; such wanting is the pure question.
>
> On the other hand, though the pure question is prior to insights, concepts, and words, it presupposes experiences and images. Just as insight is into the concretely given or imagined, so the pure question is about the concretely given or imagined. It is the wonder which Aristotle claimed to be the beginning of all science and philosophy.[50]

Lonergan turns particularly to science for examples of the heuristic structure of our intellectual dynamism. There is a certain anticipation of the unknown that is evident in scientific inquiry and in the methods it devises to search for this unknown. Even after a particular inquiry has progressed through its levels (experiences, understanding, judgment) and terminated satisfactorily, there still continues to be an unexplained, a surd that in turn calls for inquiry at another level and from another viewpoint (e. g., a reflexive or second order inquiry, or a more all-embracing inquiry). Scientific inquiry has a certain structure in classical physical science and another in statistical theories. (Lonergan asserts an isomorphism between the structure of intelligence and the structure of the world, and he works out a generic design of the world that rests upon " the dynamic structure of inquiring intelligence." [51]) Inquiry terminates in the reflexive understanding that we call judgment, judgments being steps in " the pursuit of the logical ideal." [52] The character of the judgment is at least implicitly a hypothetical syllogism: "If B, then A; but B, so A." It depends upon certain

[50] *Ibid.,* 9.
[51] *Ibid.,* 116.
[52] *Ibid.,*

conditions being fulfilled; when it is found that these conditions are fulfilled, the judgment is affirmed. As Lonergan puts it, "To grasp evidence for a prospective judgment is to grasp the judgment as virtually unconditioned." [53] The judgment is not actually unconditioned; but since it is affirmed only through the recognition that its conditions are fulfilled, it is asserted as virtually unconditioned. Thus the intellectual dynamism does find a partial termination in the judgment through the relation the judgment has' to the unconditioned and some awareness of this relation by the intellect. Intellectual dynamism then is a process toward the unconditioned, and it is in virtue of the relation of the particular judgment to this final goal that it is affirmed. Thus somewhat parallel to the way Rahner sees the presence of a pre-apprehension of the absolute and of being in man's question of being or judgment about an object as limited, Lonergan sees an implicit affirmation of the absolute and thus a knowledge of being in man's achievement of a limited intelligibility in the judgment. "Only in the act of judgment itself does one posit the absolute; only in positing the absolute does one know being." [54]

In the second half of his book Lonergan moves from his phenomenology of understanding to a study of understanding or insight as knowledge. Here he defends our knowledge of being by a transcendental method, that is, as a condition for the possibility of our making a true judgment; and he develops his explanation of being and his assertion of the possibility and nature of metaphysics from this. He begins this part by affirming a judgment as true by, in fact, the self-affirmation of the knower: "I am a knower." This judgment is certain; even one who would deny it would implicitly be affirming it in the process of denying it. This judgment, like every judgment, is affirmed as a virtually unconditioned. The condition for the possibility of affirming it is that we affirm implicitly the unconditioned since it is by its

[53] *Ibid.,* 280.
[54] *Ibid.,* 486.

relation to the unconditioned that we affirm the particular judgment; it is because absolute intelligibility that is the total goal of our intellectual dynamism is really found in some way in this particular judgment that we affirm this particular judgment. Lonergan concludes that this act of self-affirmation shows the invalidity of Kant's denial of the possibility of our knowledge of the absolute:

> For Kant's dialectic has but a single premise, namely, that since the demand for the unconditioned is not a necessary ground for judgment, therefore, it is a transcendental illusion; in other words, since the unconditioned is not constitutive of knowing an object in the sense of making a judgment, therefore it has a purely regulative function in our knowing. On our showing, the unconditioned is prior and constitutive; to affirm a fact is to affirm an unconditioned.[55]

Lonergan (as in *Verbum)* moves from his analysis of knowledge to his analysis of being. As we know possible being through knowing intelligibility, and we know real being through knowing the true in the judgment, so we can define being through knowledge: " Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know." [56] And from his analysis of knowledge he moves to a development of metaphysics, his metaphysics of proportionate being (i. e., " whatever is to be known by human experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation " [57]), and his metaphysics of transcendent being. His affirmation of the existence of God, to take the major instance here, is a conclusion from the complete intelligibility of the real; and the real is affirmed as completely intelligible because of the complete intelligibility of being.[58] Without pretending to do justice to

[55] *Ibid.,* 841.

[56] *Ibid.,* 848. Lonergan recognizes, of course, that his " finalistic notion of being " differs from the understanding of being by Thomists such as Gilson. See B. Lonergan, *Collection* (N. Y., 1967) *"Insight:* Preface to a Discussion," 152 ff.

[57] *Insight,* 891.

[58] See *ibid.,* 672-678: "Now being is completely intelligibile. For being is the objective of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know . . . . Being, then, is intelligible, for it is what is to be known by correct understanding; and it is completely intelligible, for being is known completely only when all intelligent

Lonergan's treatment o£ this particular position we simply want to recall that he leads us to an affirmation that we know being through leading us to appropriate our dynamism to intelligibility and indeed absolute intelligibility; an affirmation o£ the latter is implicit in any particular judgment.

I£ we ask o£ Lonergan in his later work what he means by human transcendence and how we appropriate it, we see a continuation o£ a shift he began earlier. He emphasizes the wa;y in which meaning is different £or modern man than it was £or classical man. In earlier times, £or example, men thought they could escape history and gain universal concepts valid £or all times. Now we see that social orders differ in the process of history and that men in seeking meaning £or what they do construct different orders o£ meaning £rom the variety o£ orders o£ human action. Our order o£ meaning, and specifically that differentiated order o£ meaning that is theology, is related to the order or science and life o£ modern times; the result is that "An old theology is being recognized as incomplete . . . there is the collapse o£ Thomism .... " [59]

The implications o£ this £or our question about how we reflect on man's transcendence can be found in Lonergan's *Method in Theology*. This book is centered on method, as the title indicates, but it contains Lonergan's later thought on man's transcendence and how we reflect on it. In £act, there *is* a certain parallel between *Insight* and *Method;* in the former there is a central £act o£ consciousness that allows us to appropriate our transcendence (" I am a knower ") , and in the latter there is a £act o£ consciousness that is the central foundation £or religious reflection, namely, the £acto£ religious conversion.

Foundational reality, as distinct from its expression, is conversion: religious, moral, and intellectual. Normally it is intellectual conversion as the fruit of both religious and moral conversion; it

questions are answered correctly .... being is all that is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation."

[59] Lonergan, "The Absence of God in Modern Culture," in C. Mooney (ed.), *The Presence and Absence of God* (N. Y.: Fordham U. Press, 1969), 171-17ft.

is moral conversion as the fruit of religious conversion; and it is religious conversion as the fruit of God's gift of his grace....

At its real root, then, foundations occurs on the fourth level of human consciousness, on the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision ....

Such a deliberate decision is anything but arbitrary. Arbitrariness is just unauthenticity, while conversion is from unauthenticity to authenticity. It is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love.[60]

This being in love with God is the fulfillment of man's capacity for transcendence.

If we ask what the principles are from which this emerges in man, or how we can justify it for ourselves or for those who deny man's transcendence in our time, the answer seems to be that Lonergan in *Method* is in continuity with his earlier work in centering on intentionality analysis but diverges from it by stressing the fact of decision as central in such a way as to leave us without a clear relationship between this decision and man's intellectual insight and judgment about the world in which he lives. His tendency here to stress the self-validating character of decision [61] may be due to the fact that he is reflecting on the normal process of religious conversion. But it may be due in part to the way Lonergan interprets meaning, for this is the framework in which he understands conversion and modern religious reflection on it. The question of God is a question that rises " out of our conscious intentionality, out of the a priori structured drive .... In the measure that we advert to our

[60] B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York, 1972), 267-268. In the realm of religious experience there is an unassailable fact in the existence of love (290); this being in love with God is "love in an unrestricted fashion." (105).

[61] For example, see *ibid.,* pp. 283-284 where religious conversion as defined " provides the real criterion by which all else is to be judged; and consequently one has only to experience it in oneself or witness it in others, to find in it its own justification." And p. 338: " Basically the issue is a transition from the abstract logic of classicism to the concreteness of method. On the former view what is basic is proof. On the latter view what is basic is conversion." See p. 22: "Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity." And finally see p. 339 for his current interpretation of Vatican I's statement that God can be known through creatures with certainty by the natural light of human reason.

own questioning and proceed to question it, there arises the question of God." [62] God is the intentional object of man's questioning, and man's religious conversion constructs the encompassing horizon of meaning for man. Meaning is accord with Lonergan's constructivist interpretation of human understanding and judgment is formally an act of man operating on one of the levels of consciousness. With reference to the fourth level of consciousness, that on which conversion takes place, he writes that "Active meanings come with judgments of value, decisions, actions." [63] Man comes to conversion through God's grace and his own dynamism as a drive to value, a theme that Lonergan analyses in a chapter on the human good. His reflection on religion is within an interpretation of the development of Western tradition through three stages of meaning from undifferentiated to differentiated consciousness. The first stage was characterized by meaning in the mode of common sense; the second by meaning not only in this mode but also in the mode of theory controlled by logic; and the third, our present mode, is characterized by the fact that" science asserts its autonomy from philosophy, and there occur philosophies that leave theory to science and take their stand on interiority." [64] Lonergan opts for a philosophy then that finds its proper data in intentional consciousness, while leaving theory about the physical world to science. Philosophy as he uses it has as its primary purpose man's self-appropriation a self-appropriation that "cuts to the root of philosophic difference.; and incomprehension." [65]

In reflection on Lonergan's approach we *first* of all agree with him on the necessity of treating the problem of the possibility of metaphysics and on the approach to this through the ques-

[62] *Ibid.,* 1OS.

[63] *Ibid.,* 74; Also *loc. cit.,* "The formal act of meaning is an act of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining, supposing, formulating. There has emerged the distinction between meaning and meant, for the meant is what is conceived, thought, considered, defined, supposed, formulated .... "

[64] *Ibid., 85,* also see *95.*

[65] *Ibid. 95.*

tion of our knowledge of being. An appropriation of our understanding through a phenomenology of knowledge as found in or supposed by modern science is an essential element of such an appropriation both because philosophy is a reflection on experience that we recognize as our own in our age and because some major difficulties against the possibility of metaphysics are dependent upon interpretations of modern scientific knowledge in an anti-metaphysical sense. Specifically, we think Lonergan is correct in bringing out aspects of St. Thomas's noetic that modern science has made us particularly aware of, for example, the active, constructive, and dynamic character of our knowledge, and the dependence of the character of our knowledge of the world upon the dynamic structure of our intellects as well as upon the world known through experience.

In the *second* place, we would differ from some specifics in the way Lonergan uses an analysis of knowledge to approach the question of metaphysics, because we understand both the current problem and St. Thomas somewhat differently. While we agree on the necessity of dialogue with Kant and other modern philosophers in our attempt to show the possibility of metaphysics, we do not locate the grounds on which Thomas agrees with Kant exactly where Lonergan does. Lonergan's view that what we know in intellectual apprehension is not the nature concreted in physical things but rather the phantasm and what it contains does not seem to represent Thomas's position; nor does it relate to what is most basic to Kant's critique of realism or metaphysics. Kant's interpretation of knowledge as a construction of phenomenon results from his specific experience of knowledge according to Newtonian physics and his interpretation of this through principles he inherited (and adjusted) from empiricism and rationalism. And, as Lonergan has shown, Thomas's view of knowledge rests upon an experience of knowledge. Therefore, it would appear that the basis of our dialogue should be the experience of knowledge available to us, and particularly that which is supposed by modern science, but not a specific interpretation of this experience.

We do agree with Lonergan then on the need of a phenomenology of our knowledge, particularly as this is related to modern science, for our approach to the question of metaphysics or of our knowledge of being. But we understand this phenomenology differently. To show phenomenologically what enables man to engage in scientific knowledge, we must, as Piaget holds, give a developmental analysis of man's knowledge and its structures. The hypothetical reasoning found in science is a structure of knowledge characteristic of the adolescent, and this depends on his development of conceptual knowledge, about the age of 5-7 and later; this in turn depends upon the pre-school child's development of symbols in an internalization process; and this rests upon the sensori-motor stage of the child's knowledge in infancy. What accounts for this development is the interaction between organism and environment-an enlarging environment and the child's structures of knowledge adjusting to this enlargement. We think that this analysis should be developed and that in this we should consider an alternative explanation of the child's knowledge, particularly as this is found in some American psychologists e. g., Eleanor Gibson. Moreover, we understand Thomas's meaning of being, and therefore the question of the psychogenesis of being, somewhat differently from Lonergan. While Lonergan understands being to be for Thomas the conceptualization of intelligibility, we, with the more common view, understand intelligibility to be the conceptualization of being, since we call something intelligible and true insofar as it is the basis or object of a true judgment. Since Lonergan understands being as he does, he defends the possibility of our knowledge of being through showing that we affirm the absolute, or total intelligibility, implicitly in the judgment. We understand our task to be different-namely, to show that the enlargement of the environment and the knowledge structures in the child that capacitate him for scientific reasoning lead to an affirmation of being, an affirmation pre-supposed implicitly by the hypothetical syllogism. In adopting this approach we in part agree with many modern disciples of St.

Thomas that we must show a dimension in reality about us that calls us to a form of knowledge beyond that of the physical sciences, somewhat as the biologist in defending his discipline has to show that there is a dimension in physical reality that the physicist and the chemist do not properly reach. In part we agree with Lonergan that we must show the development of structures in man's knowledge process, for it is in virtue of these as well that the psychogenesis of being occurs.

In the *third* place, Lonergan in his later work rightfully makes religious conversion central in his reflection on man's transcendence; he rightly stresses the dependence of conversion on grace and decision, and the dependence of man's moral life and religious knowledge on this decision. Moreover, he gives us in his analysis of religion, meaning, and the human good much that is of value and that complements his earlier analyses of man's transcendence. Man's transcendence is indeed primarily shown in his religious life, and his religious life should be central in our reflection on the transcendence that characterizes man. There are a number of difficulties, however, that we have with the model of reflection on transcendence that Lonergan presents to us. Some of these we will not recall here (e. g., the fact that he seems to give an undue centrality to the individual's religious conversion rather than the community's of which he is a part). What is relevant to our purpose is to present the following difficulties. Does Lonergan's view of the " collapse of Thomism " owe something to the fact that his specific interpretations of or development of Thomism does not offer interpretations of or development of Thomism does not offer an adequate context for his interpretation of man's religious conversion and his orientation to value in modern life? For example, Lonergan interprets being in St. Thomas as the conceptualization of intelligibility; on this view being does not offer an adequate context for the interpretation of man's orientation to the good or value. However, as we suggested above, intelligibility is only one property of being for Thomas; the goodness of being is another, and thus Thomas's understanding of being has a more positive relation to the order of value and good than Lonergan recognizes or exploits. Secondly, while

there is a sense in which it is true that man constructs the meanings of his life by his actions, such as his decisions, and Thomas does not sufficiently analyze this active relation of man toward values, there is also a sense in which meaning is given to man and is antecedent to his construction. [66] Man's decisions may as easily lead to a loss of meaning in his life as to its construction. Particularly in religion man has the impression that he is seized by an order of meaning on which he depends totally and to which he must submit himself. Moreover this order of meaning that calls man to respond is related to both the structure of man and his environment of nature and history. We question then whether Lonergan's reflection on conversion by an intentionality analysis that is as constructivist as his is and that is based rather narrowly on interiority is adequate to religious man's experience. It does not really seem possible to make a philosophical intentionality analysis that is as divorced from philosophical theory of the world as Lonergan supposes since man's intentionality is in interaction with his environment and cannot be known or judged save in this context. This context and man himself are in part changing and indeed changing through man's decisions, it is true; but if we are able to evaluate these changes as progress or decline, we once more presuppose a framework of meaning that is antecedent to man's decision and discoverable by us. To escape limitation to a particular culture in philosophy we need not turn to interiority to the extent that Lonergan appears to do. We may discover in the interaction between man and his environment of nature and history both man's transcendence and his environment's mediation of ultimate values.

3. Rejection of a Metaphysics of Being

One who, after largely accepting St. Thomas's philosophy,

[66] Langdon Gilkey brings out this character of meaning in man's life very well in *Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language* (New York, 1969), 335 ff.; and there is a criticism of Lonergan's understanding of meaning in Wolfhart Pannenberg, "History and Meaning in Bernard Lonergan," *The Irish Theological Quarterly* 40 (1973), 103-114.

seeks to address himself to the problem of religious reflection in our age in a creative philosophical way has another alternative open to him, namely, to reject this philsophy and continuity with it. Leslie Dewart's position is one model for this option. We will indicate what seem to be the major reasons for his option by examining briefly his central question, his understanding of consciousness and the bases for his rejection of a philosophy of being.

Dewart presents what is perhaps his central question when he writes:

> We have now determined that the question which the development of philosophical thought as well as the history of Christian dogma has led to in our time is this: What does the analysis of religious experience reveal about the nature of reality? And, specifically, does it reveal a reality that transcends being? [67]

There has been a development of human experience and consciousness in our day that leads us to ask questions that classical philosophy did not ask. In fact, the dichotomy between Christian belief as expressed in Thomistic theology on the one hand and contemporary experience on the other is so profound that we need a reconceptualization of God today, and specifically one that is based on a rejection of classical metaphysics and epistemology. [68] We can see this if we recall aspects of human consciousness, as we are now aware of it, and the character of religious experience.

Man is distinguished from the animal by consciousness. He is not distinguished by the fact that he knows things other than himself, for the animal does this as well. Nor indeed is the basis of the distinction the fact that man, having knowl-

[67] Leslie Dewart, *The Foundations of Belief.* (New York, 1969),

[68] L. Dewart, *The Future of Belief, Theism in a World Come of Age* (New York, 1966), 41: "The integration of Christian belief and contemporary experience, especially in what concerns the concept of God, could not be successfully attempted by a Christian theology which .... assumed any fundamental principle or essential part of that very mode of philosophical enquiry (and particularly the classical epistemologies and metaphysics) on which was erected the concept of God which can no longer be integrated with contemporary experience."

edge of another, is then able fully to reflect upon himself and know that he knows. This view supposes that in man's consciousness the opposition between self and non-self is what is most primitive. But man does not first become conscious when he fully reflects upon himself as knowing. He is conscious in his first act of knowing; differentiation between himself and the object known emerges within consciousness and is secondary to it.

> Consciousness is, thus, the self-presence of being, and man is being present to itself .... The subjectivity of conscious being is nothing less than the being of consciousness itself.[69]

Man then is a subject or a self; and in knowing, a subject knows itself most basically as be-ing itself, which self is not an object and not an-other.

Development then for man differs from development for the animal. For the animal, because of its form of knowledge, development is a knowing of more things; but for man it is a process of the "mind's self-differentiation of its-self out of a reality with which it was originally continuous and united un-differentiation." [70] Man's growth of consciousness is not the possession by knowledge of other beings but rather an achievement of self-possession, a facing of self and a becoming present to self, that is, the development or coming into being of a being that is present to self. The emergence of such a being is the result of the self's activity; what brings this about is a self-making action. Man is indeed a creature, but he does not come into being ready made, with a determinate nature or a predetermined structure that he can exercise in only certain specific ways. Rather he is in an historical situation, and:

[69] *Foundations 257.* In *ibid., 504-505,* Dewart quotes Rahner's view of being as being-present-to-self and acknowledges his agreement in general with Rahner's view of knowledge. However, he disagrees with Rahner's " historical judgment that this concept of knowledge can be remotely attributed to St. Thomas." Dewart's interpretation of Thomas to the effect that to know is to know the other *as* other is not sustained by the texts. See *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 16, a. 2, and L. Dewart, " Leslie Dewart, St. Thomas and Knowledge." *Downside Review* 91 (1973)' 51 fl'.

[70] *Future,* 91.

To that situatiDn his existence is a *response.* But his response 1S *creative,* in the fullest sense of the word.

Hence, man is not free not to create himself. But *how* he responds to his situation, *what* he does with himself, and even the *orientation* he gives to himself-thus, the very possibilities which he opens up for himself-all this is very much the result of his conscious, if not always, alas, deliberate, mature, or wise decisions.[71]

What creates here is not an object but the self. The medium of this creation is the self's action, but action not so much on the self as on the world about the self, through which a self-differentiation from the world emerges.

One consequence of this understanding of the subject is that St. Thomas's explanation of knowledge as" the operation of a faculty of a substance which would alone exercise primary existence " is unacceptable, since consciousness is " a reality which constitutes the very being of man." [72] Man's being is his subjectivity, and this is constituted by his consciousness; consciousness, then, is the origin of his being, rather than an act of his being as St. Thomas held. Another consequence is the necessity of a revision of the meaning of truth. If consciousness is not primarily possession in knowledge of another being but rather being present to self, and if man's self is constituted by consciousness, then, " Truth is not the adequacy of our representative operations, but the adequacy of our conscious existence. More precisely, it is the fidelity of consciousness to being." [73] With this modern development of our understanding of consciousness and of truth there is a change in man's understanding of himself, and an evolution of human nature necessarily accompanies this new self-understanding.

[71] *Foundations, 9!66.*

[72] *FutuTe,* 90.

[73] *FutuTe,* 9!'!. Dewart continues with an explanation of this fidelity as fidelity to man's own being, and as the self's action by which "the world is objectified, that is, conceptualized, systematized, organized, *lived with* and *made meaningful* for our consciousness." *Ibid.,* 93. Perhaps it is relevant here to recall Thomas's words: "verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur, quam verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in 6 *Ethic.:* nam verum intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad rem; ... verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum." *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 57, a. *5,* ad 3.

Dewart's reinterpretation o£ consciousness and the primacy o£ self-presence is related to his view o£ religious experience. He holds that the question o£ what is delivered to us by religious experience is central today. What is revealed to us by religious experience is not being but presence; and, i£ this is the case, we have to recognize that there is a reality beyond being. Dewart articulates what he understands and what Thomas understands by being:

> By *being* ... I mean that-which-is, ens-although according to context, and by reason of the grammatical characteristics of English ... *being (essendum)* will also have to be used in order to refer to the act of being, the act by which being *is*, ... *being* must be defined as an *objective reality*.[74]

While being is an object-the object known by intellect in its orientation to the world, what is delivered to us in religious experience is definitely not an object or a thing, but rather a presence:

> What the religious experience of God discloses is a reality *beyond being* ... For unless we retain the Greek metaphysical outlook, the ordinary facts of Christian experience are sufficient to establish that we do *experience* God, but that we do not experience him as being .... God's real presence to us (and, therefore, his reality ' in himself ') does not depend on his being a being or an object. In fact, our belief in the Christian God is post-primitive to the degree that we apprehend that although there is no super-being behind beings, no supreme being who stands at the summit of the hierarchy of being, nevertheless a reality beyond the totality of being reveals itself by its presence.[75]

Dewart then understands God to be reality, but not being. Reality is that with which the sel£ can have real relations. Being is a part of reality; it is an object of thought or what is empirically given as such. Dewart recognizes that it is difficult £or men who are introduced into their knowledge or talk about reality through Indo-European languages to accept his view that reality is larger in scope than being. But he finds that this

•• *Future,* 175-177. See *Foundations,* 442-444.
•• *Foundations,* 397-399.

difficulty is largely induced by the peculiarities of the Indo-European languages and that an investigation of Chinese shows that not every language uses the word " is " or its equivalent in the way that we do in our family of languages.[76] The conclusion he comes to then is that philosophy should transcend Greek metaphysics, and indeed every metaphysics. We now enter into " a post metaphysical age in philosophy ... a meta-metaphysical age."[77]

In reflection on Dewart's view, we agree that the experience of men in our day differs in many aspects from the experience of the Middle Ages, and that it should be primarily upon the experience of our time that we as philosophers reflect. This is not because we start philosophy with the assumption of the

[76] See *Foundations,* 396 ff. In *Religion, Language, and Truth* (New York, 1970), Dewart continues to evaluate Thomas's philosophy from the standpoint of language. While we acknowledge that this constitutes an essential part of a contemporary evaluation of classical philosophy, we question whether Dewart's view adequately represents a modern interpretation of language and its relation to thought and the physical world. For example, he writes that Aristotle and Thomas hold that we know the necessities inherent in the things of nature, and that such knowledge must be infallible (see *Religion, 5'il,* 54, 8'il, 83). Both of these positions must count against classical philosophy. However, contrary to Dewart's position on these matters, Henry Veatch in *Two Logics. The conflict between classical and neo-analytic philosophy* (Evanston, 1969) holds that we cannot account for our everyday knowledge unless we acknowledge that we do know to some extent what things are, and thus the necessities inherent in them. This counts against the adequacy of modern logic and for the need for Aristotelian logic. Moreover, since our knowledge of what things are depends upon experience, this knowledge is of its nature fallible (see chapters 3 and 4, e. g., p. 97 f.).

Dewart also holds that " thought is voiceless speech, and speech voiced thought " ; " there is no difference, other than voicedness or voicelessness, between thought and speech" *(ibid.,* 66). However, contrary to this virtual identification between thought and speech, Jean Piaget (e.g., *The Psychology of the Child* [New York 1969] 84 ff.) finds that speech is secondary to knowledge and logic in the child. This view is more in accord with Thomas's position on the relationship than is Dewart's. Similarly, Veatch (op. *cit., 65)* notes a degree of independence between language and thought in that the Arabs were able to appreciate Aristotelian logic even though their basic sentence structure did not permit a subject-predicate form. Veatch concludes that there can conceivably be different ways of symbolizing "the form or structure of the logical tool that comes into play whenever we attempt to understand things for what they are " *(loc. cit.)* .

[77] *Ibid.,* 361.

superiority of the way men experience life and the world today over any experience in the past but because philosophy is an interpretation of experience, and it is the experience that we personally have that we first recognize as our own. This experience may distort as well as reveal, may be an obstacle as well as an avenue to a philosophical interpretation of man and of reality more generally, but the way for us to overcome its limitations is not through escaping our experience or its importance in philosophy. We transcend our experience by sifting it and recognizing how we do at times distort reality by the way we experience it, a recognition that the remembrance of our past experience and our awareness of the views of others help us to gain. Without then asserting that the experiences of men of past ages are experiences that we would reject as our own, we must, it would seem, begin with our own experience. The acceptance as ours of an experience of a past age is through an expansion of our own experience, not the point of departure for us in philosophy. (The relation of philosophy to human experience may not be in all respects the same as the relation of theology to Christian experience, because the experience that is definitive for Christian theology is that of the particular historical events in the past that mediated its historical revelation.) Moreover, we agree with the central importance of certain questions Dewart asks, namely, the question about man as a self and specifically a developing self, and the question about religious experience.

We also agree that Thomas's philosophy must be judged solely by its philosophical merits, and that without marked adjustment and development it cannot articulate many experiences or data that have come to the fore in the modern age. We are in need of the contributions toward an elucidation of our experiences that later philosophers have made available to us; what Dewart offers up depends in large measure upon Gabriel Marcel and Martin Heidegger. But what we *question* is both the adequacy of Dewart's analysis of our current experience (both of self and of God) and his view that classical metaphysics must be rejected if we are to do justice to our

experiences and what they reveal. (We are not reflecting here on Dewart's view of truth, since in practice he does not seem to adhere to this view.)

We question whether Dewart's interpretation of religious experience is adequate and whether the implications he draws from this for metaphysics are valid. Is he correct when he states that in Christian experience God is not experienced as a being? He is indeed correct in asserting that religious experience reveals a presence (and, we must add, an absence). But his analysis does not do justice to the ordinary Christian experience or prayer if he denies that God is revealed here as in *some sense* subsistent Being, for Christians experience God and pray to him as personal (e.g., as one who hears our prayers), and consequently in some sense as "one-who-is," and so the question posed by contemporary experience to religious reflection is somewhat different from the one Dewart treats.

Also, we may question the adequacy of the other pole of Dewart's premise, namely, his understanding of being and its relation to religious experience. For Dewart, being is the object of thought-thought in the sense in which he interprets St. Thomas and the Greeks. While we acknowledge that there is a justification for part of Dewart's interpretation, is he not calcifying St. Thomas's understanding of being? St. Thomas did not restrict being to the object of thought; rather he recognized that being *as* the object of thought (or as related to the intellect) is designated by *one* of the transcendentals, namely, as truth. Being as related to desire or will is designated as good. If our understanding of the implications of this (as we expressed them earlier) is correct, then being as Dewart understands it is not being as it fully is, because being is also the object of will, and as such it is known by connaturality as presence. If this is the case, religious experience does not justify the claim that there is a reality beyond being; rather it calls us to transcend an excessively intellectualist notion of being. Our relation to being by intellectual knowledge is just a part of our relation to being; for our full understanding we must also depend upon our affective relation to being and the presence

that is mediated through this. It is true that we must transcend metaphysics in the sense that we must acknowledge that our affective relation to the good and the experience of being mediated by this is not properly metaphysical knowledge nor a knowledge that is derived properly from abstractive apprehension and concept. This is not to reject metaphysics but simply to recognize that intellectual knowledge of being (and specifically that systematic knowledge of being that is metaphysics) is simply a part of our relation to being and our knowledge of being. Metaphysics continues, if this view is correct, to have an importance in the articulation of religious experience and of man in his relation to God. Although metaphysics does not mediate the knowledge of being found in religious experience, it can help us speak objectively about this experience and reflect on its foundations. If this is the case, we must conclude that metaphysics is of continuing importance in human knowledge-in fact, that it is indispensable for the community of men.

In reference to Dewart's view on the subject as self-presence and as self-creative in an historical situation we agree that an analysis of man as subject in history is essential for religious reflection today. Man's religious relation is a free and intelligent human act, an attitude adopted by the subject because he appropriates it as his possibility and, in some sense, as his greatest possibility, and he freely engages himself in it. The subject's attitude present in his appropriation of his religious transcendence is not divorced from his self-making in history, his commitment to and his work for social goals, or his adoption of a personal relation to men and women about him. The structuring of his personality and the integrating character found in his religious commitment is not totally separate from such structuring and integration found in the person's attitude toward less ultimate horizons. This is one reason why study of man's subjectivity is a prerequisite for a philosophical reflection on man's religious transcendence. The subject's act of " self-creation " and his experience and knowledge of himself as subject is most properly not a philosophical act or knowledge. Philosophical reflection on the subject is completely

secondary to man's being a subject, acting as subject, and experiencing or knowing himself as subject, and philosophy can never take the place of what it reflects upon. But restricting ourselves to the limits proper to a philosophical reflection, question whether Dewart's account correctly captures modern experience of subjectivity and correctly estimates the resources of St. Thomas's philosophy in reference to this.

It would seem that modern man does not experience himself as a subject or as making himself in a way that is divorced from experience of himself as being. Men generally experience themselves as ones who act, that is, as human *beings* who act and who decide or make themselves only in the sense of realizing possibilities that are in some real sense possibilities of their being previous to their decisions. While they may experience their consciousness and particularly their decisions as the origin of what they become, this is not in a sense that is isolated from their being as *agent* or as *possibility* to be actualized. On the other hand, we agree that Thomas's philosophy of man as it stands is too objective and too static; it treats man too much of a piece with the whole of nature, as understood in his times, and thus does not adequately articulate modern man's experience of subjectivity and process. But Thomas does assert that man's acts of understanding and of love or desire are the acts of us as subjects, or *actus perfecti* appropriate to the rational level of being. This implies a very sharp differentiation between man's acts and those of the animal world, and it reflects our experience of ourselves. Moreover, while Dewart interpret-; Thomas as holding that our action is "the operation of a faculty of a substance," we understand man's act to be related to his *being* in a profound manner. The implications of Thomas's philosophy is that we as subjects engage in our decisions in such a way that we indeed are the initiators and sources of our decisions, but initiators in a way that is related to our being, since it is by our being that we are empowered to decide, and it is for the actualization of the possibilities of our being that we decide. Therefore, we understand modern man's experience of self-creation and the potentialities of

Thomas's philosophy somewhat differently from Dewart. In our view then, we should examine more thoroughly than Dewart does the possibility that our philosophical resources may help us in our creative philosophical endeavor before we reject these resources and start off on our own, or start with some twentieth-century philosophy isolated from its relation to its precedessors and specifically from Thomas's philosophy and what it can contribute.

* * * * *

In we suggest that the approach to the question of man's religious transcendence that we have proposed for those of us who come from the Thomistic tradition does face honestly the question of transcendence as it is posed in our time; [78] it also faces honestly the perspective we initially accepted in this tradition. Critically evaluating the position from which one comes is as important for a successful facing of the issue as being open to modern experience and the contributions of modern philosophers. We should ask the question of man's transcendence in reference to being, understood in a sense that is found in a legitimate development of St. Thomas, and we should look to evidence for and against this; not to do this for one who initially accepted this tradition is to abdicate a critical evaluation of his tradition. This question of transcendence as it is related to man's knowledge should be raised in dialogue with modern philosophies and with the help of a phenomenology that makes much use of Jean Piaget's developmental psychology, a psychology closely related to the question of what makes modern science possible. If modern experience of knowledge supports this transcendence, or the possibility of metaphysics, we must also ask what the principles are on the part of the knower and the environment that account for this. And here we should face the question of the adequacy of Thomas's account of these principles. Similarly, in the question of man's value orientation, we should ask whether man is oriented to a dimension of being that transcends the merely

[78] See article "Religious Reflection," cited in fn. 1, p. 65-68.

secular and human; we should ask this in dialogue with modern philosophies, and in our phenomenology we should make use of developmental psychology, e. g., in Erik Erikson. If modern experience does support this transcendence, we must also ask for the principles on the part of man and his environment of nature and society that account for this-asking here specifically about the adequacy of Thomas's principles in this matter. Here the question of man as subject (and the relation between man as subject and man as human being) enters, the question of how he structures himself and the princples operative in this structuring. Only if we face this modern problem on the basis of experience we can appropriate as our own and with a correct evaluation of the Thomistic tradition in regard to it can we preserve the value of the resources this tradition offers us as we transcend its limits.

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AQUINAS ON CREATION: SCIENCE, THEOLOGY, AND MATTERS OF FACT

WERE ONE to search for a central teaching of Thomas Aquinas that most characterizes his contribution to theology, he would do well to find an exposition more notable than Aquinas's analysis of the problem of creation. Historians of medieval philosophy, seconded by present-day scholastics attracted to existentialist thought, have focused on Aquinas's real distinction between essence and existence as his greatest contribution to metaphysics. [1] The abundance of literature on this subject attests to its key role in Aquinas's philosophy, and yet this distinction itself has deeper roots in his theology. It has been argued, for example, that the Common Doctor's concern with the "I Am Who Am" of Exodus gave basic inspiration and ultimate precision to his distinctive treatment of *e88e* or existential act. [2] A similar case can be made, perhaps with even fuller historical documentation, for Aquinas's continued concern with the arguments over creation that were being agitated during his lifetime. Whether or not creation is indeed so pivotal a doctrine for him, however, there can be little doubt that his treatment of the problem it poses is most typical of his style of theologizing. And just as, several decades ago, when metaphysics had fallen into dissuetude and was given new life through Aquinas's "authentic existentialism," [3] so to-

[1] Notably Etienne Gilson and his school; see the writings of James F. Anderson, Charles A. Hart, and Joseph Owens, among others.

[2] See Gilson's *Elements of Ch1'istian Philosophy* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 104-135, for a clear exposition of this teaching; Gilson also considers the relation of essence and existence to the Thomistic treatment of creation, *ibid.*, pp. 164-183.

[3] The expression is Jacques Maritain's in his *Existence and the Existent*, Eng. tr. by L. Galantiere and G. B. Phelan (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957),

day, when speculative theology is in similar straits, his teaching on creation can perhaps be re-examined, and re-asserted, for the assistance it may give to contemporary theology.

Such an aim is the main burden of this essay. It proposes to achieve that objective by examining one aspect of Catholic teaching on creation, an aspect that has been questioned recently by some theologians,[4] that, namely, of creation in time. This topic is of particular interest for the light it can shed on the relationships between reason and faith or, more precisely, between science and theology, and this in the context of present-day discussions of man's knowledge of "matters of fact." To appreciate Aquinas's contribution in this area, however, it will first be necessary to set up the contemporary problematic. This can be done most expeditiously by examining the origins and development of the science-religion controversies of the nineteenth century, for these, as we shall see, have had serious and debilitating influences on recent theologies of creation.

1. Science, Theology, and Matters of Fact

The year 1584 marks a convenient starting point for this account, for it was in that year that the young Galileo Galilei is said to have penned a series of student notes on the origin of the universe. Galileo's professors were apparently good scholastics in the Thomistic tradition,[5] for he affirms in the notes the necessary existence of some first "uncreated and eternal being, on whom all others depend, to whom all others are directed as ultimate end," and who is "the efficient cause of all in an unqualified way."[6] This first uncreated cause is God,

p. 18; it has been used by Leo Sweeney in the title of his textbook, *A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).

• Protestant as well as Catholic, viz., Langdon Gilkey, John Macquarrie, Robert Guelluy, Donald Ehr, etc., as will be detailed *infra.*

[6] For documentation, see my study, "Galileo and the Thomists," in *St. Thomas Aquinas Commemorative Studies 1fl374-1974,* 2 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), Vol. 2, pp. 298-880.

[6] Antonio Favaro, ed., *Le Opere di Galileo Galilei,* Edizione Nazionale, 20 vols. (Florence: G. Barbera, 1890-1909, reprinted 1968), Vol. 1, pp. 24-25.

Galileo explains, who "not only could, but actually did, create the world *de novo,"* as can be readily known " on the authority of Sacred Scripture and from the determination of the Lateran Council." [7] This creation, Galileo goes on, took place in time. Indeed, " no one has been found among writers worthy of credence," he writes," who affirms that the world existed previous to six thousand years ago." [8] He himself can provide a more precise date:

> To anyone asking how much time has passed from the beginning of the world I reply ... that the figure we give is most probable and accepted by almost all educated men. The world was created 5748 years ago, as is gathered from Holy Scripture: for between Adam and the Flood 1656 years elapsed; from the Flood to the birth of Abraham, 322; from the birth of Abraham to the exodus of the Jews from Egypt, *505;* from the exodus of the Jews from Egypt to the building of the temple of Solomon, 621; from the building of the temple to the captivity of Sedechia, 430; from the captivity to its dissolution by Cyrus, 70; from Cyrus, who began to reign in the 54th Olympiad, to the birth of Chirst, who was born in the 191st Olympiad, *560;* the years from the birth of Chirst to the destruction of Jerusalem, 74; from then up to the present time, 1510.[9]

This text turns out to be extremely important for Galileo scholars, for not only does it give clear indication of the young Pisan's Catholic orthodoxy, but, by supplying information for dating the time of composition of the notes, gives one of the few guides to the chronology of his early education. [10]

[7] *Ibid.,* p. f26.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.,* p.

[10] Favaro *(ibid.,* p. 12) calculates that they were written in 1584, simply adding the 74 and the 1510 in the last sentence of the text just cited. According to this calculation, which has been accepted uncritically by most Galileo scholars, the notes would have been written by Galileo when twenty years of age while a medical student at the University of Pisa. A difficulty with this computation, however, is that it neglects the fact that the destruction of Jerusalem took place, not in A. D. 74, but in the year 70. If to this 70 is added the 1510 years said to have elapsed, the time of composition of the notes would be 1580, a full year before Galileo had even begun his studies at the university. Such a circumstance makes it unlikely that the text is based on Galileo's own computation and is more

A quarter of a century later, now a professor at the University of Padua, Galileo made his famous discoveries with the telescope, confirming him in his suspicions that the geocentric theory of Ptolemy would have to be abandoned in favor of the Copernican world system. This, in turn, set in motion a sequence of events that led him into Biblical exegesis,[11] specifically on how the account of the creation of the world in Genesis was to be interpreted, and ultimately to his condemnation by the Inquisition. [12] Thus was started what has been referred to as " the warfare between science and religion," a warfare that was to continue for almost four centuries, wherein scientifically-inspired arguments over creation would recur down to our owu day.ls

Galileo, in point of fact, never renounced the beliefs detailed in his student notebooks with regard to creation in time or the date of the world's origin. He held only that revisions would be required in the interpretation of Genesis so that the sun, rather than the earth, would be located in the center of the universe. But his very insistence on this interpretation reveals a deeper conviction on his part, namely, that the growth of scientific knowledge must have important consequences for Christian theology. Once a person knew, by reason, the details of the structure of the solar system, he could no longer accept on faith an interpretation that failed to take that structure into account. The interpretation of Scripture, in other words, from

probably something he found in a source composed in 1580 but which he copied at a later date.

[11] See Galileo's Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, "Concerning the Use of Biblical Quotations in Matters of Science" (1615), translated by Stillman Drake, *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957) pp. 175-fH6.

[12] For a good account of the condenmation and the events leading up to it, see Jerome J. Langford, *Galileo, Science and the Church,* rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1971).

[13] E. g., Andrew D. White, *A History of The Warfare of Science with Theology* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1896, Dover reprint); it is noteworthy that the index of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959) contains no entry for creation.

now on would have to respect" matters of fact" as these were established by science. As a corollary to this, theology could no longer stand in independence of science. There would henceforth have to be continuous dialogue between scientist and theologian, the former supplying knowledge of " matters of fact," the latter using these for the fullest possible understanding of divine revelation.

These ideals notwithstanding, Galileo's personal dialogue with Bellarmine and other Roman officials, as is well known, proved nothing less than disastrous. But three quarters of a century later, in the year 1692, another dialogue occurred that seemed more promising for realizing the Italian physicist's ideal. This took place in Protestant England between the great Isaac Newton and a young Anglican theologian, Richard Bentley, who was about to inaugurate a series of lectures under a bequest " of the great and pious Christian philosopher," Robert Boyle.[14] Pursuant to Boyle's intentions, Bentley proposed to use Newtonian science as a defense of Christianity against the attacks of atheists and first focused on the problem of the world's origin. He felt that Newton's *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* could be used to support Christian belie£ in creation and wrote to Newton himself for assistance in showing this. In reply, the great English scientist wrote four letters that explained, in some detail, how his laws of mechanics failed to account for certain aspects of the solar system's structure and how it therefore seemed necessary to invoke God as a further explanatory principle. In what was later to be identified as a" God-of-the-gaps" doctrine, Newton saw God, in a vast creative act at the beginning of time, orienting the planets in space and impelling them by forces exactly calculated to put them in elliptical orbits around the sun. And parenthetically, his calculations showed that this momentous event took place in the year 3988 B.C., thus making the uni-

[14]For details see the essay, "Newton, Galileo, and Plato" by Alexandre Koyre in his *Newtonian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 201-202.

verse 180 years younger than it would be according to the figures recorded over a century earlier by Galileo! [15]

Had Newton stopped there the concordist dialogue between science and theology could have remained on safe ground for another century and a half. Unfortunately, however, he did not, for he wished to show how God's intervention was necessary not only at the beginning of time but also to conserve the planets in their continuing orbital motions. According to his calculations, the effects of the planets' mutual gravitational attractions should result in a basic instability of the solar system whereby they would all ultimately fall into the sun, if corrections were not continually introduced to preserve them in stable orbits. Newton saw the necessity of such interventions as a new proof of God's existence, for, in his mind, God's action could be conceived as the requisite physical force, steadily applied to the planets, maintaining the stability of the solar system. Newton's arch-rival, Leibniz, was quick to point out that this was not a particularly complimentary estimate of God and his handiwork, for he seemingly had produced a clock-work universe that ran so poorly it had to be continually adjusted in order to be kept going.[16] Yet others, like Bentley, were willing to take this type of argument and use it as a new proof for the existence of God.

The success of this proof, however, was short-lived. Continental physicists, following up Leibniz's criticism, were soon able to point out the inadequacy of Newton's calculations; specifically, they showed how the perturbing effects of planets on each other would cancel out, thereby preserving the stability of the solar system without the necessity of a special divine intervention. The net effect of the Newton-to-Bentley corres-

[15] See William Hales, *A New Analysis of Chronology and Geography, History and Prophecy*, 4 vols. (London: C. and F. Rivington, 1830), Vol. I, p. 283. Newton's letters to Bentley are contained in I. Bernard Cohen, ed., *Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

[16] Koyre has an interesting account of this interchange in his *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), pp. 235-272.

pondence, on this account, proved quite detrimental for the science-theology dialogue. By the time its full consequences had come to be realized the Enlightenment was well underway, and even religious-minded people were inclined to place less credence in Scriptural belief than in rationalist-inspired argumentation. As soon as Laplace had succeeded in showing that the "gaps" Newton saw in his system no longer existed, there was a strong temptation to make the " God of the gaps " disappear along with them. Like Galileo, Newton had thought to place his science at the service of religion, but in so doing he had unwittingly prepared the way for a rejection of God in the name of science. Such a repudiation of God as an explanatory factor, of course, was not complete and unequivocal; it was meant to apply only to the present universe and to the causes effecting its daily operation. At this stage in science's history there was little suspicion that arguments of Laplace's type could be extended back into history, that God might become a superfluity even there. In the eighteenth century men were content to limit God's activity in the universe to his creative acts at some remote epoch at the beginning of time. But as far as present "matters of fact" were concerned, these had now become matters for scientific inquiry alone, and theology would have nothing further to contribute towards their explanation.

The foregoing has been concerned solely with the impact of astronomy and celestial mechanics on theological reasoning. As the eighteenth century wore on, and extending well into the nineteenth, discoveries in other scientific disciplines led to yet further retrenchments in matters of religious belief. Scientists turned their attention to the bowels of the earth, and men began to dig in earnest. A great variety of fossil remains were uncovered and the stratification of the earth's crust was revealed in ever greater detail. With this it began to dawn on men's minds that the earth too had a history. [17] Such a realiza-

[17] The story of this awakening is told graphically by John C. Green, *The Death of Adam.* Evolution and Its Impact on Western Thought (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1959), pp.

tion, coupled with geographical exploration of the earth's surface and the eventual cataloguing of all its extant flora and fauna, prepared for even more startling disclosures. For strata and fossils were uncovered revealing not only that vast changes had occurred in the earth's structure, but that still more radical changes had taken place in the plant and animal types inhabiting its surface.

Such discoveries were of immediate and momentous importance for the dialogue between science and theology. With regard to the geological changes, granted that these had indeed taken place in the course of the earth's history, how were they to be explained? Were they caused by "mighty acts of God," analogous to creation, whereby catastrophes such as the Flood had been caused in ancient times? Such questions were not considered irrelevant in the early history of geological science, when Neptunists and Vulcanists vied with each other for satisfactory explanations of the upheavals that had altered the earth's surface.'[8] Cataclysmic geology then found a ready ally in Scriptural geology, and once more scientists and theologians saw their disciplines united in a common search for the factors that would render the earth's history intelligible to mankind.

But again the cooperation was to be short-lived, for another great scientist soon appeared on the scene, Charles Lyell, the father of modern geology. Lyell's major program, known as uniformitarianism, consisted in showing that all geological changes in the earth's history could be explained by causes similar to those known still to be acting, according to physical laws that reman uniform throughout time. The systematic aplication of this principle of explanation quickly ruled out God's intervention as an explanatory factor in geology. It did not, to be sure, entail an actual denial of the Biblical Flood but only the acknowledgement that, i£ such a flood did take place, it would now require explanation along lines similar to those accounting for floods in more recent history.

[18] See Charles C. Gillispie, *Genesis and Geology*. A Study in the Relations of Scientific Thought, Natural Theology, and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 1790-1850 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), esp. pp. 41-1!'l0.

Thus was Lyell effectively convinced that theology had no place in geology, just as Laplace had been convinced that it had no place in celestial mechanics. Yet Lyell was not rejecting God entirely; he still allowed that the divine creative act was the only way of explaining how *1nan* had come into existence on the earth's surface. Like Newton before him, he did not quite anticipate how his methodology might be used to undermine even this personal religious conviction. Uniformitarianism, as it turned out, could be applied in the biological sciences as well as in the geological, and when this was effected by Charles Darwin, the way had finally been prepared for the rejection of divine intervention even in the matter of man's origins. The full story of that development cannot be gone into here; suffice it to mention only that Darwin took Lyell's *Principles of Geology* with him while on the voyage of the Beagle and later felt that he had successfully applied its uniformitarian doctrine to biology, initially to explain the origins of all sub-human species, and finally even to account for the " descent of man " himsel£.[19]

With Darwin's work, the dialogue between science and theology inaugurated by Galileo was in reality reduced to a monologue. In the early seventeenth century, of course, science was in its infancy and theology reigned supreme as the queen of the intellectual disciplines. By the end of the nineteenth century the tables had been turned completely. "Matters of fact" had by then come to embrace not only the state of the present universe but all knowable events throughout its long history. H such events were to be explained, they could now be explained uniquely by science; theology was no longer necessary or even relevant for their understanding. J\1:oreover, as evolutionary doctrine continued to be refined and clarified, the time scale for its application came to be expanded exponentially. The age of the earth had been revised upward, from Archbishop Ussher's estimate of 5654 years in the mid-seventeenth century,

[19] A good account is Loren Eiseley, *Darwin's Century.* Evolution and the Men Who Discovered It (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958).

to Lecomte de Buffon's "rash guess" of over a hundred thousand years in the late eighteenth, to Lord Kelvin's calculation of some ten million years in the mid-nineteenth, to current estimates of :five billion years in the mid-twentieth. [20] Naturally, the thought would have to suggest itself that time too might be unending, that creation, if still a matter of religious belief, could be postponed indefinitely, and that even the ancient view of creation at the beginning of time might prove incompatible with the ever advancing knowledge provided by science.

The adjustments of theologians to these developments were quite predictable. In a battle wherein they were constantly being defeated, not surprisingly many decided either to join forces with the enemy or to change the ground of battle entirely, so that theological discourse would remain forever unaffected by subsequent advances in science. Protestant theologians, true to their Lutheran and Kantian heritages, were the first to offer such agnostic alternatives, but in an ecumenical age they could not be expected to remain completely alone, and so a few Catholic theologians have been attracted to their style of reasoning also.

The first such movement to be discussed here, liberal theology, in effect joined forces with science by assimilating all of its discoveries within a weakened religious context. Theologians in this movement were content to relinquish God's transcendence and to see him as immanent within nature, as part of its evolutionary process. Man they viewed as essentially sinless, proceeding from an undeveloped and imperfect state traditionally associated with "original sin" but ever progressing and working toward a state of perfection. Again, they did not think of Christ as divine and thus as radically different from other human beings; rather they saw him as an outstanding man, providing inspirational leadership and an excellent example of human goodness, certainly someone to be imitated and followed. Finally, for them God was not to be discovered through his activity in the physical universe but rather within

[20] See Eiseley, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-42, 233-241.

man and particularly through religious experience, through the "miracles" he works in the lives of individuals. [21]

Such a radical adjustment to the scientific world-view still has some appeal for Unitarians and Universalists, but most religious thinkers find this progressivist and optimistic doctrine incomprehensible in the face of two World Wars and the many disorders plaguing modern man and society. A typical reaction is that of Karl Barth, a seminal thinker within neo-orthodoxoy, who was taught liberal theology in his youth and later came to reject practically all its teachings. Instead of seeing God as immanent within nature or cosmic process, Barth strongly affirmed God's transcendence and the fact that he is "wholly Other." Rather than share the liberals' view of man as sinless and ever-progressing he stressed that man is blinded by sin, is so sinful in fact that his reason is powerless to understallll the world as God's handiwork. Again, Christ is not like other men; for Barth, he is radically dissimilar, being the primary revelation of God, the Word made flesh. And finally, the sover, eign and transcendent God is separated from sinful man by a gulf so vast that it can never be crossed by man through moral consciousness, religious experience, or any philosophical reflection based on his own initiative. God can only be known when he chooses to reveal himself, and this primarily through Jesus Christ. [22]

Part of God's revelation to man, for Barth, is the fact of creation, which he sees as an actual historical event that took place in time. Knowledge of this event, however, will always remain inaccessible to science or to man's unaided reason and thus no truly scientific problems can arise in relation to the creation account. Barth did not agree, for this reason, with othe1· Protestant thinkers who had ceased to regard creation as an historical event and were interpreting it as God's timeless relation to creatures and their existence. [23] As neo-orthodoxy de-

[21] For a summary, see Ian G. Barbour, *Issues in Science and Religion* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 101-108.

[22] Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 116-119.

[23] For an analysis of Barth's views on creation, see Thomas E. Rosinski, " Crea-

veloped, however, Barth's literal appraisal of the creation event fell out of favor and in its place was substituted a more mythical interpretation of the opening chapters of Genesis. Langdon Gilkey is the best spokesman for this newer interpretation, which has come to be widely accepted in Protestant circles, and which, far more effectively than the Barthian solution, belief in creation from any possible attack by modern science.[24] As Gilkey sees it, the revealed doctrine of creation has nothing whatever to do with the temporal origins of the universe or of man but is merely a symbolic way of teaching man's complete ontological dependence on God. So viewed creation is not an event but a relationship, which would be true whether time were finite or infinite, although in the creation story proposed to primitive peoples only the former possibility is envisaged. In Gilkey's words:

> The myth of creation does not tell us about the first moment of time, any more than the myth of the Fall tells us about a first human being. What it does tell us is that every moment of time, likely every contingent thing, comes to be from the creative power of God. The question of the first moment of chronological time is a question for the astrophysicist, not for the theologian, just as the question of the first Homo sapiens is a question for the anthropologist, not for the biblical scholar. The event of creation of which we speak in theology is not just an initial event within a first moment of time: rather it points to the relation of all events to their eternal source. It is a theological myth which speaks to us of God and of his deeds not ultimately of the universe and its workings.[25]

This citation not only makes precise Gilkey's position on creation in time but supplies some indication of his reason for adopting it. Just as he would leave to science answers to questions about man's origins, so he would vacate the field of cosmogenesis entirely and not presume to commit himself as to when creation

tion and the Origin of the Universe: I," *Thought,* Vol. 48, No. 189 (1973), pp. 121212-12126.

[24] See Gilkey's *Maker of Heaven and Earth.* The Christian Doctrine of Creation in the Light of Modem Knowledge (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959); Gilkey's main thesis is summarized by Rosinski, *loc cit.,* pp. 1226-1231.

[25] *Maker of Heaven and Earth,* pp. 317-318.

took place, or even whether belief in creation Is reconcilable with a universe of infinite duration.

Other prominent Protestant theologians, such as Paul Tillich and John Macquarrie, are in substantial agreement with Gilkey's analysis. "The doctrine of creation," writes Tillich, " is not the story of an event that took place ' once upon a time.' It is the basic description of the relation between God and the World." [26] Macquarrie is no less explicit:

> The exposition of creatureliness in terms of dependence puts to the side the question about creation as a beginning in time, . . . [a] problem that nowadays must be turned over to scientific cosmology. . . . In principle [it] is capable of being settled by empirical observation, and ... probably will be settled as, by radio-telescopes and other means, science probes further into the remote history of the universe. We shall then learn whether there was a time when the cosmic process began, or whether it has always been going on much as we see it now. Theology can have nothing to say on this matter, and, on the other hand, whatever answer science may produce, this would not affect the doctrine of creation, as it is expounded here. For this doctrine is not an assertion that things began at a given time in the past, but is an attempt to describe the characteristics of creaturely beings. If this is the true purpose of a doctrine of creation, then we see once more the value of an existential approach, and the corresponding danger of an approach through nature, since the latter can so easily become the question of how things began and can trespass into an area that properly belongs to science. [27]

This development within Protestant theology is not to be unexpected in the light of higher Biblical criticism, which made greater advances in Protestant circles than in Catholic, and in Protestantism's non-acceptance of the conciliar teachings set forth in the Fourth Lateran and First Vatican Councils. Because of the authoritative interpretation given these sources of revelation by the Catholic Church, Roman Catholic theologians have generally been less fearful of the so-called ad-

[26] Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963), Vol. 1 (1951), p. *252.*

[27] John Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 199.

vances of science and have continued to proclaim creation as an historical event that took place at the beginning of time. Recently, however, some Catholic theologians have questioned whether this teaching is truly authoritative and so have moved closer to the newer Protestant position. Among the first to initiate the move in this direction was the Dominican theologian, A. D. Sertillanges. Discussing the question as to whether a teaching on creation in time is explicit among the Church Fathers Sertillanges writes:

> The Councils of the Lateran and of the Vatican, true to say, seem to be more explicit. They speak clearly of creation as having taken place at the beginning of time, *ab initio ternporis.* But it remains to find out if the intention of the text actually bears on this particular circumstance, or does not simply mean to exclude errors which would equate the creature with God in the matter of duration, or particularly those that would take something away from the creator's domain, such as the eternal matter of the ancients. [28]

Having previously mentioned that Aquinas had held that philosophers could never prove, one way or another, whether the universe had a beginning in time, Sertillanges goes on:

> If the position that St. Thomas says is tenable in philosophy had been mentioned in our religious documents and excluded, then there would not be any further room for doubt. Lacking that, I am hesitant, and for myself I would not condemn a physicist who might say: there is no stopping point in the regress from the course of phenomena; because every phenomenon is explained by an antecedent from whence it proceeds. [29]

Other Catholic scholars have taken up this questioning attitude, [30] with the result that Donald Ehr, when writing the article on creation for the *New Catholic Encyclopedia,* decided against the traditional position on the matter of creation in

[28] Antonin G. Sertillanges, *L'ldee de creation et ses retentissements en philosophie* (Paris: Aubier, 1945), p. 19.

[29] *Ibid.;* it is difficult to see, of course, how the Fourth Lateran Council could have discussed and excluded Aquinas's opinion, since it was held in 1215 before he was born.

[30] Notably Robert Guelluy, *La Creation.* 2 ed. (Tournai: Desc!ee, 1963).

time. Inquiring whether the world actually did begin in the sense of having "a first moment," Ehr notes initially that philosophical arguments seem unable to provide a definitive solution. [31] He continues:

Moreover, it also seems difficult to assert that revelation gives the answer with the certitude of faith. Scripture, the creeds, the councils speak unanimously of the beginning of the world and contrast strongly creatures, which began, with God, who alone enjoys the privilege of being eternal. But perhaps one sufficiently maintains what the texts intend to affirm if he distinguishes eternity, in its transcendence with regard to time and temporal duration, from the creature that receives its total reality from the eternal. [32]

Apparently not wishing to depart more explicitly from tradition, Ehr then resorts to rhetorical questioning:

Is it contrary to revelation to think of a world always dependent on God, that has received from Him a duration without beginning? Does this alter what one knows about the history of salvation from revelation? It is important to stress that this point is secondary in the doctrine of creation. The essential thing is that at every moment the universe has been in the same need of God and has always received its reality from the absolute free liberality of God, who is entirely transcendent and above its work. [38]

The mention of transcendence in the last citations echoes a theme of Barthian theology and its radical separation of the domains of science and religion. This is not the only movement within Protestantism, however, that would so dispose of the science-religion controversy. Existential theology and linguistic analysis, each in its own way, adopt similar stances with respect to scientific discourse. Existentialists such as Martin Buber and Karl Heim distinguish science from religion on the basis that the former's concern is objectivity whereas the latter's is subjectivity. [84] For a thing to be objective, and thus charac-

[81] " Creation," *The New Catholic Encyclopedia,* gen. ed. W. **J.** McDonald, 15 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), Vol. 4, p. 423.

[••] *Ibid.*

[""] *Ibid;* cf. Peter Schoonenberg, *God's World in the Making* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), p. 28.

[••] See Karl Heim, *Christian Faith and Natural Science* (New York: Harper &

terized by the "I-It" relationship, is for it to be "out there," something in the past, something that already "has been." As opposed to this, subjectivity, operating within one's interior and putting him in contact with the moment "now," defines an area of personal communication and understanding, characterized by the "I-Thou" relationship, that shows a person what really is, what is actually existent.[35] Linguistic analysts such as Frederick Ferre dissolve any conflicts between science and religion by showing that these use quite different languages, which in turn are characteristic of their mutually exclusive areas of concern. The language of science is instrumental, since it enables one to summarize data, make predictions about future events, and even control the course of nature. Religious language, on the other hand, orients a person's life in terms of matters of ultimate concern, worship, and devotion. For neither language, moreover, is it essential to make strong metaphysical commitments or even statements about the structure of reality.[36]

This should suffice for a brief survey of the way in which contemporary theologians have reacted to the challenge posed by the advance of science. Rather than contest issues that share a common ground, they have left the arena entirely and attempt to define the theological enterprise in such ways that it can flourish in complete independence of any scientific discovery. The resulting solution, neat and tidy though it be, unfortunately will not stand close scrutiny, for like most such solutions it gives rise to more serious difficulties than those it was designed to solve, difficulties in fact that threaten to emasculate theology and religious belief entirely. Specifically, if the story of creation as recounted in the Scriptures is a myth that communicates a spiritual truth but in no way refers to an historical event described literally in the objective, space-time framework of scientific

Brothers, 1953), pp. 35-150; note also the "existentialist approach" advocated by Macquarrie in the text cited *supra*, p. 497.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

[36] See Frederick Ferre, *Language, Logic and God* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961); also the summary in Barbour, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-H!5.

language, then the way is prepared for the removal of all historical, not to say ontological, content from revelation itself. If creation in time is not a "matter of fact," to put it bluntly, then why not deny the same status to all the "mighty acts of God" and to every key belief in the Judaeo-Christian religion from the crossing of the Red Sea to the Resurrection of Christ?

Protestant theologians and the neo-orthodox in particular, by zealously removing all "matters of fact" from religious discourse, have thus performed too radical a surgery on the body of religious knowledge. In a recent work Gilkey himself calls attention to the serious consequences of this move and lays its blame at the doorstep of the new hermeneutics which, although advertizing itself as a biblical theology, actually was dictated by a naive attitude towards modern science. In his words:

> However biblical they tried to be, the acceptance by neo-orthodox theologians of the modern scientific world view forced on them a new form of hermeneutic, and as a consequence a radical transformation of their understanding of the whole bible story from Adam right through to eschatology. And what is important is that the way they told that refashioned story reveals their acceptance of scientific truth in every sentence.[37]

The retelling of that story also showed its weaknesses and incongruities, as Gilkey goes on to detail:

> God had acted, yes, but no longer had He acted upon the observable surface of nature history. Rather His activity was an *incognito,* an activity related, to be sure, in *some* manner to the observable events of space and time, but *seen* as God's activity only by the eyes of faith, since to the ordinary observer all this would have looked like ordinary events, like in fact the world pictured by naturalistic science and historical inquiry .... That activity was "there," and that activity was "real," but it could be seen only by faith. What that "there" was, if it was not in observable natural or human history, ... was thus left a problem which has hounded biblical theology almost to its death.[38]

[37] Langdon Gilkey, *Religion and the Scientific Future.* Reflections on Myth, Science, and Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 27-28.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 28,

Gilkey's point in calling attention to this situation, finally, is to stress that it had its source, and most basic explanation, " in the nineteenth-century history of the altercations of science and religion which forced theologians and biblical scholars to admit that religious language, and therefore biblical language, does not entail any affirmations of ' matters of fact.' " [39]

This, then, is the contemporary problematic with respect to creation in time. Protestant theologians, followed now by some Catholics, have been so intimidated by scientific thought within the past century that they have effectively relinquished all claim to knowledge of "matters of fact." And because creation in time has traditionally been regarded as such a matter, they would delete it from the articles of faith and search for other interpretations, however bizarre, that might confer new meaning on this age-old teaching of the Church.

fl. Aquinas on Creation in Time

It is in such a context that Aquinas's teaching on creation in time takes on new importance in the present day. Living as he did well before Galileo, Aquinas could not be expected to know the challenges modern science would present to religious belief. Yet even in his day there were strong reasons that might impel one to retrench on the matter of creation in time. Aquinas, as we shall see, did not do so, being firmly convinced that creation in time was an article of faith. His metaphysics of essence and existence, already alluded to, enabled him to work out a consistent position that preserved the article and still allowed full play to reason and faith, without imposing arbitrary restrictions on what one might be entitled to believe. Since that metaphysics has already been well worked over, the accent in what follows will be on Aquinas's hermeneutical procedures, since such procedures, as Gilkey has just reminded us, were the single most important factor in creating the impasse to which the " new orthodoxy " has come,

•• *Ibid.,* pp. !'l8-!'l9.

in its abortive attempts to deal with challenges to faith arising from modern science.

The question of the world's eternity, and whether or not this can be proved or disproved by reason alone, occupied St. Thomas's attention from his earliest writings to the last years of his life. The reason for this is that it typified the oppositions between Averroist Aristotelians, who were convinced that the world's eternity could be demonstrated by reason alone, and traditional Augustinian theologians, who felt that they could. demonstrate the world's creation in time. Steering a middle course between the opposed positions, Aquinas taught that it was impossible to demonstrate either that the world has always existed or that it had a beginning in time, but that the issue had been decided in favor of the latter by divine revelation. [40] Whereas his metaphysics enabled him to prove that the world must have been created, it did not force him to hold that it was created in time. To demonstrate the world's temporal origin, he explained, one would have to proceed either from an analysis of the world's essence or from a knowledge of the efficient cause placing it in existence. Questions of essence, however, abstract completely from the "here and now," and thus any analysis of the world in its nature *(quod quid est)* is powerless to shed light on when it came into existence. A consideration of the cause producing it could provide such knowledge, provided the cause were such that it acted necessarily, for then the necessity of its action would be open to demonstrative proof. If the cause acted voluntarily, on the other hand, knowledge of the circumstances of its operation would depend upon its will and how this might be made manifest. God's action in producing creatures, however, Aquinas has already shown to be voluntary. [41] God may therefore reveal to man how and when

[40] *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 46, a. 2. For an excellent account of the controversies and the basic documents necessary for its understanding, see St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure, *On the Eternity of the World (De Aeternitate Mundi),* translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Cyril Vollert, Lottie H. Kendzierski, Paul M. Byrne. Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, No. 16 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964).

[41] *Ibid.,* q. 19, a. 4.

the world were created, should he will to do so, but otherwise man can have no certain knowledge of the universe's beginning in time.

The first systematic exposition of this teaching is in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* written at the beginning of Aquinas's first Paris professorship *circa 1256,* wherein Aquinas acknowledges his debt to Moses Maimonides for the basic lines of his solution. After leaving Paris he took up the question again in the portion of the *Summa contra Gentiles* written in Italy. During the Italian sojourn he also devoted a question of *De potentia* to whether the world has existed forever and further wrote an exposition of the first *Decretal* bearing on this question, which will occupy us later. It was during this period that Aquinas wrote the first part of the *Summa Theologiae:l* wherein his treatment of creation in time took definitive form. Then, recalled to Paris for an unprecedented Paris professorship from 1269 to 1272, he became embroiled in a series of controversies that forced him to reiterate his position and state it yet more clearly. This is apparent in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics,* in a *Quodlibet* where he explicitly states that creation in time is an article of faith, and again in a polemical treatise directed against the Augustinian traditionalists, *De aeternitate mundi.* Following these controversies Aquinas returned to Naples and there continued to reassert his teaching in his *Commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo* and in two questions of his *Compendium theologiae,* probably his last work on systematic theology.

What is curious about all of these tracts is that they concentrate almost exclusively on the *rationes* that support Aquinas's conclusions but supply very little indication of the authoritative sources on which his doctrinal interpretation is based. Even when asserting that the world's beginning in time is an article of faith, he does not refer to conciliar teaching but gives only Scriptural passages in support of his assertion. For purposes of future reference, all of these statements will be

Iwre i11 their approximate chronological order, with st&te-

ments relating to "divine revelation," "Catholic faith," etc., being shown in italics:

1. *Commentary on the Sentences* (c. 1256) Bk. 2, dist. **1,** q. **1,** a. 5: "... Secunda positio est dicentium quod mundus incepit esse postquam non fuerat. . . ; volunt etiam quod mundum incepisse non solum fide teneatur sed etiam demonstratione probetur. Tertia positio est dicentium quod omne quod est praeter Deum incepit esse; sed tamen mundum incepisse non potuit demonstrari, sed *per revelationem divinam* esse habitum et creditum. . . . Et huic positioni consentio: quia non credo quod a nobis possit sumi ratio demonstrativa ad hoc, sicut nee ad Trinitatem, quamvis Trinitatem non esse sit impossi, bile...." In support of this interpretation Aquinas here cites the authority of Gregory the Great, in his first homily on Ezechiel, where he mentions that prophecy, meaning by this divine inspiration, can concern the past, and instances Moses's revelation in Genesis **1.1,** "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." [42] Aquinas further notes the weakness of the arguments offered by those subscribing to the second position, and the fact that they expose the faith to ridicule when they employ such arguments to prove, against the philosophers, the newness of the world.

2. *Summa contra Gentiles* (c. 1260) Bk. 2, ch. 87: "Sic igitur evidenter apparet quod nihil prohibet ponere mundum non semper fuisse. Quod *fides catholica* ponit ..." Here Aquinas again cites Genesis **1:1** and then adds the assertion from Proverbs 8: 22-28: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. I was set up from eternity, and of old before the earth was made."

   Ibid. ch. 88: "Rae autem rationes quia non usque-

•• *Patrologia Latina,* ed. J. P. Migne, 217 vols. (Paris: 1878-1890), Vol. 76, col. 786.

quaque de necessitate concludunt, licet probabilitatem habeant, sufficit tangere solum, ne victeatur *fides catholica* in vanis rationibus constituta, et non potius *in solidissima Dei doctrina."*

Ibid.: "Ab omnibus enim his ponitur aliquid praeter Deum aeternum. Quod *fidei catholicae* repugnat."

3. *De Potentia* (c. 1Q65-69), q. 3, a. 17: "Dicendum quod firmiter tenendum est mundum non semper fuisse, sicut *fides catholica* docet."

4. *Summa Theologiae* (c. 1Q67), I, q. 46, a. Q: "Sed contra,. *fidei articuli* demonstrative probari non possunt: quia fides de 'non apparentibus' est, ut dicitur ad Heb. 11.1. Sed Deum esse creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus incoeperit esse, *est articulus fidei:* dicimus enim: ' Credo in unum Deum etc.' " Here Aquinas again cites Gregory on Genesis, and concludes " Ergo novitas mundi habetur *tantum per revelationem."*

Ibid., corpus: " Respondeo dicendum quod mundurn non semper fuisse, *sola fide* tenetur, et demonstrative probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est." In addition to these statements it should be noted that Aquinas, in the Sed contra of art. 1, again cites Proverbs 8: QQ and adds to this John 17:5, "And now glorify thou me, 0 Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had with thee, before the world was." Similarly, in the body of art. 3, where he gives a further exegesis of Genesis 1:1, he takes support from Psalms 103: Q4, "Thou hast made all things in wisdom ... ," and from Colossians 1:16, "For in him [the Son] were all things created in heaven and on earth .. ."

5. *Commentary on the Physics* (c. 1Q70), Bk. 8 lect. Q:, n. 16: "Hae igitur rationes sunt ex quibus Aristoteles probare intendit motum semper fuisse et nunquam deficere. Quod quidem quantum ad unam partem *fidei nostrae repugnat,* scilicet quod ponatur rnotus semper fuisse .... Quantum vero ad aliam partem, *non omnino*

est contrarium fidei: quia ut supra dictum est, non agit Aristoteles de motu caeli, sed universaliter de motu. Ponimus autem *secundum fidem nostram* substantiam mundi sic quandoque incepisse quod tamen nunquam desinat esse. Ponimus etiam quod aliqui motus semper erunt, praesertim in hominibus, qui semper remanebunt, incorruptibilem vitam agentes, vel miseram vel beatam."

Ibid. n. 17: "Sunt enim huiusmodi rationes efficaces ad probandum quod motus non inceperit per viam naturae, sicut ab aliquibus ponebatur: sed quod non inceperit quasi rebus de novo productis a primo rerum principia, ut *fides nostra* ponit, hoc iis rationibus probari non potest . . . . "

Ibid., lect. n. 7: " . . . Quod patet esse falsum tam secundum opinionem ipsius quam *secundum sententiam fidei christianae,* quae ponit substantiam mundi in infinitum duraturam."

6. *Quodlibetum tertium* (c. q. 14, a. Sed contra: ". . . Sed mundum ex quodam principio temporis esse creatum est *fidei articulus,* . . . " and here again Aquinas cites Gregory on Genesis as his authority.

7. *De aeternitate mundi* (c. "Supposito, *secundum fidem catholicam,.* mundum ab aeterno non fuisse, sicut quidam philosophi errantes posuerunt, sed quod mundus durationis initium habuit, *sicut Scriptura sacra, quae falli non potest, testatur,* dubitatio mota est utrum potuerit semper fuisse."

8. *Commentary on the De caelo* (c. lect. 6, n. 7: " Non tamen dicimus *secundum fidem catholicarn* quod caelum semper fuerit, licet dicamus quod semper sit duraturum."

Ibid., lect. n. 12: "Nos autem *secundum fidem catholicam* ponimus quod incoepit esse, non quidem per generationem quasi a natura, sed effiuens a primo principio, cuius potentia non erat alligata ad dandum ei esse infinito tempore, sed secundum quod voluit, postquam prius non

fuerat, ut manifestetur excellentia virtutis ems supra totum ens . . . . "

9. *Compendium theologiae* (c. H72-1273), ch. 99: "Sed cum ostensum sit supra quod etiam materia non est nisi a Deo, pari ratione *fides catholica* non confitetur materiam esse aeternam, sicut nee mundum aeternum."

   Ibid.: "Sic ergo *fides catholica* nihil Deo coaeternum ponit, et propter hoc ' creatorem et factorem ommum visibilium et invisibilium' confitetur."

This series of texts reveals an interesting progression of thought, particularly when one focuses on the content of what Aquinas asserts to be of faith. Things that are known by divine revelation, for him, are equivalent to those assented to by " our faith," or " the Catholic faith," or " the Christian faith," by all of which expressions he mean nothing more than the faith of the Roman Catholic Church.[43] Apparently his reflection on that faith, as he interprets and explicates it with ever greater precision, enables him to see a certain equivalence in the following series of affirmations: (1) that the world began [nn. 1 & 4 of the texts cited above]; (2) that the world did not always exist [nn. 2 & 3]; (3) that nothing is eternal .except God [n. 2]; (4) that motion did not always exist [n. *5];* (5) that motion began like something produced *de novo* by a first principle [n. *5];* (6) that the substance of the world is not of infinite duration [n. *5];* (7) that the world was created at a certain beginning in time [n. 6]; (8) that the world did not exist from eternity [n. 7]; (9) that the world had a beginning of its duration [n. 7]; (10) that the heavens have not always existed [n. 8]; (11) that the heavens began to exist [n. 8]; (12) that matter is not eternal [n. 9]; and (13) that nothing is coeternal with God [n. 9]. In these assertions Aquinas successively affirms the beginning, or non-eternal duration, of the world or the earth or the universe,

[43] Ludwig Schlitz, *Thomas-Lexikon* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1895, reprinted Stuttgart 1958), p. 305.

the Latin *mundus* being the same for all; of motion; of the substance of the universe; of the heavens; of matter; and finally, of everything that exists apart from God.

The hermeneutical base proferred by Aquinas for all these interpretations of Catholic teaching is, as already observed, not very substantial. Apart from two references to the Nicene Creed [nn. 4 & 9], neither of which explicitly states the point at issue, Aquinas seems to rely most heavily on the first sentence of Genesis, which he regards as an inspired statement of Moses, and this merely on the authority of St. Gregory the Great, a pope who reigned at the end of the sixth century. What is most surprising is that Aquinas does not cite, nor do his words show an explicit awareness of, the teachings of the Fourth Lateran Council held in which could have given firm support to his interpretation. [44] Both Galileo and Sertil-

[44] are, however, two pieces of circumstantial evidence that indicate such an awareness on his part and that, taken with the materials to be presented below, strongly support the conjecture that conciliar teaching was part of the hermeneutical base on which he erected his theological arguments. The first is the use of the word " firmiter " in text n. 3, which is also used to designate the decree of the Fourth Lateran bearing on creation in time, to be discussed *infra*. The second is an incident in the life of Aquinas reported by his biographer, William of Tocco, and graphically described by Fr. James A. Weisheipl, O. P., in *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1974), p. 287 in the following words. "According to William, a certain religious held his *vesperies* for the magisterium in Paris and defended a view contrary to the position Thomas had determined in his school, but Thomas allowed the matter to pass unperturbed. On the return journey to Saint-Jacques, the students accompanying Thomas were most indignant that the new master should defend such a position contrary to Thomas's and that Thomas should have allowed such an injury to truth to go unchecked before all the masters of Paris. Thomas replied, more in effect than in words, ' Children, it seems to me that one should be indulgent to a new master at his *vesperies,* lest he be embarrassed in the presence of all the masters; so far as my doctrine is concerned, I do not fear contradiction from any doctor, since with the help of God I have established it firmly on the authority of the saints and the arguments of truth. However, if you think otherwise, I will try to make up for it tomorrow.' On the next day, in the *aula* of the bishop, the young master maintained the same position without any change. Then Friar Thomas got up and said modestly, 'Master, that opinion of yours, with all due respect to the truth, cannot be maintained, for it is contrary to such and such a Council, and if you do not wish to oppose the Council, you will have to take another stand.' But when the young master changed his wording, but not his

langes, it may be recalled, point to this teaching as the major source (albeit thirteenth-century) of Catholic doctrine on creation in time.

Why Aquinas chose not to make explicit use of the Fourth Lateran in the texts cited is a problem in its own right that is best left to historians of medieval theological methodology. In any event, the decrees of the Fourth Lateran were not unknown to him, and in fact were probably the single most important factor shaping his foregoing interpretations of Church teaching on creation. Evidence in support of this thesis may be marshalled from a brief analysis of a work recently issued in critical edition by the Leonine Commission, namely, St. Thomas's *Commentary on the First Decretal* of Gregory IX.[45] This decretal contains the decree *Firmiter* of the Fourth Lateran, itself directed against the heretical teachings of the Albigensians and the Cathari. Aquinas composed the commentary probably at the instigation of Gifiredus of Anagni, who was socius of the provost of Saint-Omer, Adenulf of Anagni, at whose request, in turn, Reginald of Piperno published St. Thomas's lectures on St. John's Gospel. Gifiredus was archdeacon of Todi from HWO onwards; as Adenulf's socius he was probably present with him in the curia of Urban IV, then residing at Orvieto. It is known that from to Aquinas, being on particularly friendly terms with Urban, was in residence at the curia during academic terms, and it is probable that Gifiredus attended his lectures while there.[46] The time of composition is not certain,

opinion, Thomas again adduced the authority of the Council, and ' forced him to confess his error, and humbly ask the aforesaid doctor to elucidate the truth more fully,' which Thomas is supposed to have done."-Weisheipl then notes that "to this day no one has been able to name the Council in question or the point of the argument," but himself goes on to argue persuasively that the incident probably took place at the inception of the Franciscan John Pecham at Paris in the early months of 1270. Since one of the questions propounded by Pecham at his inception was concerned with creation in time, the Council whose authority was invoked by Aquinas in this incident could well have been the Fourth Lateran.

•• *Expositio super primam et secundam decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum,* in *Opera Omnia,* Tomus XL (Rome: Sancta Sabina, 1969), pp. E1-E50.

•• For details on Giffredus, see A. Dondaine and J. Peters, "Jacques de Tonengo

although it seems that Aquinas wrote the commentary for Gi:ffredus when he returned to Rome to set up the studium at Santa Sabina from *1265* to 1267, at which time he also began his masterwork, the *Summa Theologiae*.

Two decrees are commented on by Aquinas, the first *Firmiter* as already noted, and the second *Damnamus*, which refutes and condemns the *libellus* of Joachim of Flora directed against the Trinitarian doctrine of Peter Lombard. Aquinas treats the two quite differently, glossing over the second in summary fashion but analyzing the first precisely and completely, explaining it lemma by lemma with great care, and using all of the resources of the theologian in so doing. It is difficult to know what historical documents were available to him for this purpose, for these are not dearly indicated in the commentary, but some reconstruction will be attempted in what follows. The Leonine editors cite only the commentary of Henry of Susa *(Hostiensis)* on the first decretal, to which portions of Aquinas's exposition bear some resemblance and which they feel he may have used in preparing it.[47]

The portion of the text of *Firmiter* that bears on the problem of creation in time is the following:

Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus ... , unum universorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium: qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam; ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali .... [48]

et Giffredus d'Anagni auditeurs deS. Thomas," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, Q9 (1959)' pp. *5fl-7fl.*

[47] *Opera Omnia*, Tome XL, p. E6. See Henricus de Segusio, *In primum decretalium librum commentaria* (Venice: Apud Juntas, 1581). A summary description of this work is given by Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "Commentaires sur les deux premieres decretales du recueil de Gregoire IX au treizieme siecle," *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter*, ed. Paul Wilpert. Miscellanea Mediaevalia *Q* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1963), pp. 103-109.

[48] Denzinger- Schonmetzer (hereafter abbr.eviated DS), 800.

Each of the phrases or lemmas after the ellipsis, beginning with " unum universorum principium," is the subject of comment by Aquinas and worthy of note for the conciliar hermeneutics it embodies. Before translating these portions, however, it may be mentioned that Henry of Susa is extremely brief when commenting on the above passage. At the phrase, " unum universorum principium," he merely notes that this is directed against the " Marchionistae," who hold for two principles, one good and one evil. From this he jumps to the phrase, " simul ab initio," where he writes, somewhat cryptically, that "the Church which will endure to eternity, created all things *simul,* wherefore in the beginning God created heaven and earth." He then goes on to note that God's creation "cannot be said to be *simul"* and summarily explains the creation of angels and men: " but he first created angels, and on the sixth day created men, *quasi communem,* i. e., as an intermediate between the angelic and the earthly .... " [49] As opposed to this brief exposition, Aquinas's commentary is lengthy and proceeds *articulatim,* reading as follows for the successive lemmas indicated in italics:

unum universorum principium

> The Son is not another principle of things as if he were inferior to the Father, but both are one principle. And what is said here of the Son is to be understood of the Holy Spirit also.[50]

Instead of taking this phrase as part of the exposition relating to God the Creator, as Henry had done, Aquinas annexes it to the preceding portion of the decree treating of Trinitarian doctrine and sees it as directed against an Arian teaching to the

•• *Ed. cit.,* fol. 5v. The text reads as follows: [Universorum.] Contra Marchionistas, qui asserunt duo principia bonum et malum ... [Simul ab initio] lnde ecclesia, qui manet in aetemum, creavit omnia simul, under in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. [simul] et tamen simul dici non potest. [Humanam] Sed primo creavit angelos. et sexto die creavit homines. [Quasi communem], i. e., mediam inter angelicam et mundanam. . .."

[60] E84.889-898. In this method of citation the figures before the period give the page number and those following it the line numbers in the Leonine edition.

effect that God operates through the Son as his instrument or minister. The passage is not otherwise noteworthy, merely showing that Aquinas does not follow Henry on the interpretation of this lemma, if indeed he used him as the basis for his commentary.

creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium

> Some heretics like the Manicheans posited two creators, one good who created invisible and spiritual creatures, the other evil who they say created all visible and corporeal things. But the Catholic faith holds that everything apart from God, both visible and invisible, has been created by God. Whence Paul says in Acts 17:24, "God, who made the world and all things therein, he being Lord of heaven and earth, etc." and Hebrews 11:3, "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God, that from invisible things visible things might be made." [51]

The reference here to "two creators" occurs also in two of Aquinas's other writings.[52] Of more interest is the identification of "the Manicheans," which might be taken to mean the ancient sect but more probably refers to the Neo-Manicheans against whom the decree was directed. It is difficult to document the teachings of the latter in detail, since most of their manuscripts were destroyed by the Inquisition. The essential elements, however, are recorded in an anonymous *Liber de duobus principiis* written around the middle of the thirteenth century, which incorporates a section "De creatione." [53] One of the adversaries of the sect was the Dominican master, Moneta of Cremona, who composed a lengthy *Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque* at about the same time. The first chapter of Bk. 1 of this treatise is devoted to a de-

[51] E34.396-407.

[52] *In II Sent.,* d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, and *De potentia,* q. 3, a. 6.

[53] A. Dondaine, ed., *Un TraiU neo-manicheen du xiii• siecle, le 'Liber de duobua principiis,'* ... (R-ome: Institutum Historicurn Fratrum Praedicatorum, 1939), pp. 99-109.

tailed exposition and refutation of their teaching on the two principles.[54] Both works accord with the brief description given above by Aquinas.

qui 8'Ua omnipotenti virtute

> Another error was that of those holding that God is indeed the first principle of the production of things, but that did not create this world directly but through the intermediary of angels. This was the error of the Menandrites, and to exclude this it adds " qui sua omnipotenti virtute," because, namely, it is only by the power of God that all creatures have been produced, according to the Psalmist 8: 4, "I shall see the heavens, the works of your hands ..." [55]

The reference to the Menandrites Aquinas might have gleaned from the exposition of the *Decretals* ascribed to Isidore; they are also discussed by Isidore in the *Etymologia* and by Augustine in *De haeresis.*[56]

simul condidit utramque creaturam, scilicet spiritualem, et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam

> Another error was that of Origen, holding that God at the beginning created only spiritual creatures, and afterwards because certain of them had sinned he created bodies to which he would bind their spiritual substances by some

[54] Moneta Cremonensis, *Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri Quinque,* ed. Thomas A. Ricchini, 0. P. (Rome: Typographia Palladis, 17413), pp. 1-35. This edition contains an account of the life and writings of Moneta, as well as histories of the Cathari and Waldenses. Moneta is best known to Dominicans as the friar in whose cell at Bologna their founder St. Dominic died in U21. Already a master of arts at the University of Bologna, Moneta became a Dominican in 1220 at the urging of Dominic and Reginald of Orleans. Dominic, of course, had preached against the Albigensians, Cathari, and Waldenses in Languedoc until 1217; then, in 1220 and 1221, enlisting the help of Moneta and others, he launched a similar mission in northern Italy. He had solicited Innocent III in 121.5, precisely at the time of the Fourth Lateran Council, for confirmation of his new Order of Preachers, for which approval had been given the following year, on December 22, 1216.

[55] E34.410-418.

[56] See the references given by the Leonine editors at line 414.

> kind of bond, as if corporeal creatures were not produced by God's principal intention because it was good for them to be, but only to punish the sins of spiritual creatures. For it is said in Genesis, 1: 31., "God saw all that he had made, and it was very good." [57]

This passage is extremely important for Aquinas's exegesis of the decree because of the way in which he divides the text. Instead of commenting on the entire lemma, " simul ab initio temporis utramque condidit creaturam," he deletes the phrase " ab initio temporis " so that the " simul " need not take on a strict temporal sense but instead is made to modify the verb " condidit." Possibly Aquinas here had his eye on the Greek text of the Septuagint, which translates the " simul " of Ecclesiastes 18: 1," Creavit omnia simul," with the word" koine," thereby permitting a translation such as, " He created all things equally." This procedure allows Aquinas to avoid some of the difficulties regarding the teachings of the Fathers on the simultaneous creation of the spiritual and corporeal orders, on which there was far from unanimous teaching. [58] The exegesis given above, of course, still permits a temporal interpretation but does not highlight this as strongly as the text on which Aquinas is commenting with its immediate juxtaposition of " simul " and " ab initio temporis."

ab initio temporis

> Another error was that of Aristotle, holding that all things were indeed produced by God but from eternity, and that there was no beginning of time. But it is written in Genesis 1:1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." [59]

Here we are back to the key text and the Biblical support used so frequently by Aquinas. What is most noteworthy is the ex-

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[58] For some details, see my introduction, notes, and appendices to Vol. 10, *Cosmogony*, of the new English translation of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967).

plicit identification of Aristotle as the adversary behind the decree. Over a century earlier Peter Lombard had called attention to this " error " in distinction 1 of the second book of his *Sentences,* and already in his commentary on this work Aquinas had identified the opinion as " heretical." [60] The question that naturally suggests itself is whether Aristotle's teachings were being actively proposed by the Albigensians and the Cathari, and thus should be considered the object of ecclesiastical condemnation. Dondaine's study of the *Liber de doobus principiis* provides some evidence of Aristotelian influence in Neo-Manichean doctrines, [61] but these are scant compared to Moneta of Cremona's *Adversus Cartharos et Valdenses.* In chapter 11 of book *5,* entitled "De novitate mundi et de rationibus quibus philosophi probant mundum esse aeternum" and running to 34 folio pages in the edition of 1743, Moneta reveals the extent to which his adversaries were indebted to Aristotle and his various Arab commentators. [62] Thus it is not unlikely that this teaching had been taken up by those against whom the decree was directed and hence was the object of its censure.

de nihilo

> Another error was that of Anaxagoras who held that God made the world from some beginning in time, but that the matter of the world preexisted eternally and was not made by God. But the Apostle, [speaking of God,] states in Romans 4: 17, " Who calls those things that are not, just as those that are." [63]

The reference to Anaxagoras here is similar to that to Aristotle in the previous comment and is supported by other identifications in Aquinas's works, where he traces the teaching on the eternity of matter back to this Greek philosopher. [64] Again there

[60] *In II Sent.,* d. 1, q. I, a. *5.*
[61] *Ed. cit.,* pp. 18, 50, 141.
[62] *Ed. cit.,* pp. 477-501.
[63] E85.487-448.
[64] *In 11 Sent.,* d. 1, q. I, a. 1; *In VIII PhysicCYTUm,* lect. 1, n. *5.*

seems little doubt that this was an Albigensian or Neo-Manichean teaching, for the *Liber de duobus principiis* teaches that creation does not take place " ex nihilo," but rather consists in a type of making *(factio)* from something as from a pre-existing matter. [65] Moneta touches on much the same material without addressing the speculative issue explicitly but concentrating on arguments to show that God actually did create the visible, corporeal, and material things of this world. [66]

deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam

> There was another error of Tertullian teaching that the soul of man is corporeal, but the Apostle says in 1 Thessalonians 5: "Let your whole spirit and mind and body serve," and here he manifestly distinguishes soul and spirit from the body. To exclude this [error] the decree adds, " then" God created a nature that was " human, as constituted of both spirit and body " : for man is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. [67]

Aquinas's source for Tertullian's teaching is probably Isidore's *Etymologia* and the comments attributed to him on the *Dectetals.* [68] As Moneta shows in detail, the "heretics" of his time had developed an elaborate doctrine proposing a traducianist explanation of the origin of the human soul along lines similar to that taught by Tertullian. [69] Thus Aquinas is probably correct in also seeing this ancient error, revived in the century previous to his writing, as a target of the decree.

diabolus autem et alii daemones quidem a Deo natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali

> According to the aforementioned error of the Manicheans

•• *Ed. cit.,* p. 103; the title of the relevant section reads: "Quod creare et facere sit ex aliquo tanquam ex preiacenti materia."

[66] *Ed. cit.,* Bk. 1, cc. 6, 8 & 9, pp. 69-104.

[67] E35.444-453.

[68] See the references given by the Leonine editors at line 444.

•• *Ed. cit.,* Bk. ch. 4, pp. 129-138.

> holding for two principles, one good and one bad, not only was a distinction made with respect to the creation of visible and invisible creatures, namely, that the invisible were from the good God, the visible from the bad, but also with respect to invisible things themselves. For they taught that the first principle was invisible and that certain invisible creatures were produced by it which they said were naturally bad; and so among angels there were certain who were naturally good pertaining to the good creation of the good God, who could not sin, and certain others who were naturally bad-whom we call demons-who could not not sin. This is contrary to what is said in Job 4:18, "Behold those who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness." [70]

With this Aquinas rejoins the Neo-Manichean doctrine with which he started this portion of the commentary. The teaching on the angels, of course, was a major issue with the Albigensians, and a considerable portion of the *Liber de duobus principiis* is devoted to this type of teaching. [71] Similarly, this is a substantial matter for Moneta, who devotes chapters 4 through 7 of his first book to a refutation of the errors it contains. [72]

The foregoing analysis, while far from complete, should serve to indicate Aquinas's general competence as a conciliar exegete and to fill in some of the authoritative sources on which he probably relied, but which he does not mention, in his various systematic treatments of creation in time. In presenting the text translated and annotated above the Leonine editors remark that the literary genre of the work is that of a summary exposition intended for private use and not a technical work intended for publication. [73] Even in spite of this circumstance, however, it is still possible to reconstruct some of the apparatus known in a general way to Aquinas and hence providing the docu-

[70] E35.454-470.
[71] *Ed. cit.*, pp. 82-98.
[72] *Ed. cit.*, pp. 44-80.
[73] p. E6.

mentary background for his commentary. When all this is taken into account it appears that, with one or two exceptions, his statement of the " Catholic faith " is quite consonant with the positive teaching and the censures of the Fourth Lateran Council.[74]

Before returning to recent theologies of creation and their relation to problems raised by modern science, it may prove worthwhile to pursue briefly the question whether Aquinas had a true *sensus ecclesiae* and whether his reading of the Fourth Lateran still accords with Church teaching as developed since his time. The principal addition to that teaching came in the second half of the nineteenth century, when atheistic, materialistic, and pantheistic teachings were being propagated throughout Europe. The First Vatican Council, in its constitution *Dei Filius,* at that time reasserted the doctrine on creation defined by the Fourth Lateran.[75] The major part of the decree bearing on this subject is actually a verbatim repetition of the text from the Fourth Lateran beginning with the words " simul ab initio temporis " and concluding with " ex spiritu et corpore constitutam." The Vatican decree did, however, amplify the doctrine somewhat, for it added that the world was created by "God alone" *(hie solus vems Deus),* thereby excluding angels or devils acting as God's instruments in the creative act, and that God in so creating acted of his own free will *(liberrimo consilio)*.[76] It also appended five canons condemning specific departures from the Catholic faith, including materialism, which would assert that nothing exists apart from matter[77]; pantheism, which would identify the substance or essence of all things with God,[78] or would hold that such things emanated from the

[74] The exceptions would be the assertions regarding motion, which are made in the context of Aristotelian physics and thus are quite remote from the matters taught by the Fourth Lateran.

[75] DS 3002.

[76] *Ibid.;* note that these additions incorporate the teachings of St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 45, a. 5 and q. 46, a. 2, into the statement of the Fourth Lateran.

[77] DS 3022.

[78] DS 3023.

divine substance or are its manifestation in an evolutionary process, etc.[79]; or some combination of the two that would deny that the world and all it contains, in both the spiritual and material orders, was produced by God from nothing "according to its entire substance."[80] The final canon further condemned the teachings of Georg Hermes and Anton Gunther, asserting explicitly that creation was not necessitated in any way but was a completely voluntary act of God ordered to the manifestation of his own glory.[81]

An interesting question arises as to whether, in reasserting the "simul ab initio temporis" phrase of the Fourth Lateran, the Fathers of the First Vatican Council intended to make any further precisions in this teaching. Among the documents of the Council is a disputation by the future cardinal, J. B. Franzelin, S. J., delivered before twenty-four deputed conciliar fathers and bearing on the schema from which the definition was finally made.[82] There were four different versions of the constitution *Dei Filius*,. but each contained this very same expression.[83] Franzelin pointed out to the conciliar fathers that it was not completely certain that the word *simul* in the Lateran decree was meant to define the temporal simultaneity of the creation of the material and angelic orders. In substantiation of this he called attention to Aquinas's commentary on the *Decretals* and the way in which his exegesis of the text permitted a reading of *simul* in the sense of the Greek *koine* to mean that all creation proceeded equally from a single divine plan. Arguing from this and similar documents, most theolo-

[79] DS 3024.

[80] DS 3025; the Latin text reads "secundum totam suam substantiam," which echoes Aquinas's teaching in the *Commentary on the Physics*, Bk. 8, lect. 2, cited *supra*, p.

[81] *Ibid.*, cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 44, a. 4.

[82] Document 554; see J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, 53 vols. in 60 (Paris: 1889-1927), Vol. 50, p. 337, n. 6.

[83] These are given in an appendix to Jean-Michel-Alfred Vacant, *Etudes theologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican d'apres les actes du concile*, 2 Vols. (Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1895), Vol. 1, pp. 686-687; see also pp. 690-693.

gians hold that Vatican I did not intend to go beyond the Fourth Lateran in making more precise the time at which angels and the material universe were created. They did intend to affirm, however, that such creation took place broadly at the beginning of time and that man was not created until some later

From this it should be apparent that Aquinas's exegesis of the decree *Firmiter* is not only consonant with the constitution *Dei Filius* but was possibly influential in the way in which the latter was formulated and hence can throw light on how it is to be understood. Moreover, that the teaching of the Catholic Church on creation in time has not changed since Vatican I is clear from the encyclical letter *Humani Generis,* which lists the denial of the world's having had a beginning *(mundum initiurn habuisse)* among theses contradictory to the decrees of the First Vatican CounciJ.[8] Finally, in the preparatory schema for a dogmatic constitution of Vatican II to be entitled *Dre deposito fidei pure c.ustodiendo,.* it was proposed to devote chapter S to the creation and evolution of the world and therein to assert again and explain more fully the world's creation at the beginning of time.[86] Because of the decision to concentrate on pastoral rather than dogmatic matters, however, this schema was never adopted and thus did not become part of the Second Vatican's decrees.

* * *

From the foregoing it should be clear that Aquinas's teaching on creation in time is in continued accord with the Catholic faith as proposed by the *magisterium.* Apart from this it is of special value today, as already suggested, for the distinctive way in which it permits one to judge " matters of fact " vis-a-vis the science-theology controversies of the nineteenth century.

[84] E. g., Vacant, *op. cit.,* pp. 221-227; see also the article on the angels by the same author in the *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique,* ed. A. Vacant et al., *15* vols. (Paris: 1903-1950), Vol. 2, cols. 1267-1272.

[85] DS 3890.

[86] *Schemata constitutionum et decretorum de quibus disceptabitur in Concilii sessionibus.* Series prima, cap. 3, n. 12. Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium *Vaticanum Secundum* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis, p. 33.

Recent theologians, as we have seen, have sought novel interpretations of the traditional doctrine on creation, but in so doing they have shown themselves naive in evaluating the force of objections arising from modern science. Not aware of the hidden presuppositions that colored their thought, they proceeded as if one could do exegesis, both Biblical and conciliar, in complete abstraction from any philosophical framework or context. Such a framework was, of course, there, and it was that provided by a nineteenth-century so-called " scientific" outlook. In their efforts to preserve the faith or to delineate an area of discourse in which faith commitments would be valid, they conceded too much to their supposed adversaries and as a result effectively denuded religious discourse of its factual and historical content.

Twentieth-century philosophy of science, by contrast, has developed mostly in a positivist or instrumentalist direction and has grown more and more agnostic with regard to its own ability to attain truth and certitude. As a consequence there has been a weakening of epistemological claims from two directions: neither scientists nor theologians are now prepared to take a stand on such important matters as those relating to the universe and its temporal origins. This, in turn, has led to a false irenicism, itself based on the weakness of all cognitive claims. There is no longer a warfare between science and religion, because neither pretends to have any final answers. The void thereby created is filled by a type of fideism or voluntarism that enables the interested party to believe or feel as he will. Even in Catholic seminaries the tract on creation is rarely taught, science no less than philosophy is shunned by seminarians, and emotional involvement is substituted for disciplined rationality in an absurd attempt to make religion " relevant " to modern man.

In such a situation Aquinas's distinctive teaching on creation in time has special significance. With his realistic philosophy of science Aquinas would never underestimate the power cf the human mind to arrive at factual or historical knowledge relating to the cosmos. With his deep faith and profound

ology he would never fall into hermeneutical errors that deny the very possibility of man's knowledge in these fields being supplemented by divine revelation. The fact of the world's temporal origin, as has been explained, offers an excellent illustration of a teaching that embodies both these features of Aquinas's thought. The factual status of creation posed a problem that loomed very large in Aquinas's lifetime, to whose solution he devoted all his intellectual energies. In our day, admittedly, that solution is of secondary importance compared to other lessons that may be learned from the creation account.[87] But it and the polemics with which it was surrounded still provide a most interesting case history showing how the theologian can have something to say concerning "matters of fact," and indeed how he can enjoy some autonomy when so doing, despite the exorbitant claims made by some in the name of science. To deny such a possibility out of hand is one of those " little errors in the beginning"[88] that can have disastrous consequences for speculative theology and for religious discourse generally.

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[87] And here we would express appreciation for the valuable insights provided by Gilkey and others for a deeper understanding of the traditional teaching on creation and its meaning for modern man. It is not a question of rejecting these insights, particularly when they seem able to give creation doctrine fuller significance for many individuals in the present day. They can do this, however, without placing undue restrictions on the very possibility of divine revelation relating to "matters of fact," and it is only such restrictiv.e interpretations that are being implicitly criticized in this article.

[88] See the essay of this title by Mortimer Adler, *The Thomist*, Vol. 88 (Jan. 1974)' pp. 27-48.

FREEDOM AND EXISTENCE IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY AND IN ST. THOMAS

BEING AND FREEDOM are not synonyms nor are the two themes or two different or heterogenous inquiries, but they mutually belong to each other: one points to the other. They are, so to say, as concave and convex, the ground and its foundation, the contained and the act of containing, that is, they constitute a dialectical couplet within which the realization of the being of man arises, develops, and ought to be completed. To attain freedom one starts from being, but the same meaning of being and its expansion within man concerns, refers to, and has meaning only as related to freedom. It seems obvious at this point to everyone belonging to the modern period, more than to any other period in history, that the concept of freedom has been brought to the summit of the spirit: in science, in economics, in politics, in the sphere of the sacred, which is religion .... the modern age has summoned man to the conquest of the principal dimensions of freedom. New institutions and new constitutions have given and continue to supply the initial start, on different continents, to the new man engaged in his own formation and that of his civil life.

There is no doubt that with the advent of modern thought a decisive jolt has been produced in the attitude of man toward truth which has brought on the crisis-not yet resolved and perhaps never soluble because constitutive of the very essence of freedom-of the freedom-authority tension. More than to positive juridical systems, which are certainly always indispensable, men today look to new types of relationships-some already in existence-issuing from the deepest dimensions of conscience, from scientific and technological progress, which are the content of that dimension and in general of that activity of

universal range, those which have shaken and compromised irremediably the so-called established order and have placed in the hands of man the secret energies of the cosmos and of the psyche. Hence the irresistible and fascinating race to investigate the structure of matter and of the origin of life, to explore the mystery of the unconscious and of psychic drives, individual and collective tensions, on which very probably the society of the future will rest. Yet today as never before, man-master of so much of nature-senses his own inner insecurity, the frailty of his structure, the unarrestable rise of anxiety and loneliness in a cosmos which is always populated more with machines laden with threats and terrors.

One need not be pessimistic in order to recognize that man's own growing involvement in nature and his submergence in the dark mysteries of the psyche have caused him to shudder, as it were, which is a feeling of a growing insecurity as though every conquest in the exploration of the cosmos and in the pretended mastery of matter reveals to him with horror the loss of ego in the waste of freedom and the reinforcement of a threat advancing on all fronts of the forces of nature ready to break loose and sweep away the incautious wizard. And so the era of the greatest power that man has ever reached coincides today with the essential insecurity of man toward himself which, evident or concealed, circulates in the most intimate fiber of the spirit, and man realizes that he has marched too far along the path which he believed was that of supreme freedom and which, on the other hand, revealed itself-in many respects-as the path of his supreme alienation. It is not by chance today that both philosophy and science find themselves facing the possibility of nothingness, of decline into an apocalyptic EK7n1pwcn<; of man's entire civilization, of his insignificance in a world which at every conquest seems to become more hostile.

To say that the situation has become dramatic or tragic is not of much importance nor does it mean much: it has been outlined, with unequivocal clarity, by philosophy more than three centuries ago with the advent of the principle of immanence all.d more tha11 a century- ago with the elevation $_1$ es-

pecially by idealism and pragmatism, of consciousness to will of being as will of power. What a wonder then if today freedom is at the mercy of shady and touchy confrontations of the greatest nuclear powers and if the borders of nations are not so much those of earthly geography as those which are being contested in the race for the conquest of cosmic space!

And this is a sign, it seems to me, that with the advent of modern thought the inner axis of the spirit has been changed, and with it the relationship of man to nature, and that the criterion of truth has been turned upside down precisely from the orientation that it had from Being itself to the activity of mind, from the time when Parmenides stated that " without being there is no thought," [1] and from transcendence to immanence.

One could certainly say that in the period of a little more than three centuries of modern thought man has made more progress in the arts, in science, in technique, in institutions, etc., than in all the previous history of mankind. But one should also recognize that man has never as today found himself facing a cross-road which poses the radical question of the meaning of his being and of his freedom and destiny. The presumption of deterministic and mechanistic science of the end of the last century and of the past decades of our century has now been replaced among more responsible men of science of our time by some form of anguish and " silent despair" : there are today those who urge men to draw nearer to each other and to lay aside pretexts and motives of discord and division in order to defend themselves from the common enemy which is the loss of the very criterion of truth and justice much more than the excessive power of nuclear arms (cf., e. g., the Nobel prize winner Max Born) .[2] And it is therefore this relationship to being through truth, and to goodness through justice, which man today feels more need for as for essential

[1] *Fr.* !lB B 84 s.; Diels I, 288; s; Riezler, *Parmenidea* (Frankfurt a. M., 1988), p. 84.

• Cf. Max Born, *Experiment and Theory in Physics* (New York, 1956).

food: what can modem philosophy answer to this supreme entreaty which now invests entire humanity?

Modern philosophy has replied and continues to reply that only man can save man; but science today replies that nature has become because of man stronger than man, and history warns us that the will of man, when it becomes will to power, can destroy and tear apart and lose, never build and preserve. Of course, man today as always-as in the times of St. Augustine, Pascal, Shakespeare, Vico, Manzoni-finds himself at the edge of the abyss, but he rebels against the law of necessity and fate; he no longer believes the myth of " eternal return of the same," and he does not want to believe the inevitability of catastrophe. Is it possible to preserve and to feed the flame of this hope?

* * * * *

Modem man, and especially contemporary man, has lost his serenity before nature and seems to have lost the key to peace before his fellow-man; everywhere relationships become tense and dissolved in the incommunication at all social levels. Would there not be involved in this destiny of transcendental failure thought also, and even that modem thought which has lifted up freedom on the heights of all the realms of the spirit?

Characteristic indeed of modern thought is the basing of truth on freedom, because only in this way it seems to guarantee the essential belonging of truth to the being of the existent which is man: it seems in fact that only by resolving matter into form and object into act that the ego can make that complete return into itself which defends it from the dispersion and corrosion of doubt and from the determinism of the content. With modern philosophy truth is interiority and interiority is thinking and thinking is self-determination, that is, willing: first, up to Kant, the basis of being is the *Wille zum Wissen,* then from idealism on and in contemporary "philosophies of the fall " it is the *Wille zur Macht.* Indeed, the absoluteness of knowledge, according to the formula of Fichte, does not proceed, in the modem *cogito,* from knowledge but is

a product of the absolute freedom which therefore is not subject to any rule or law or to any extraneous influence and is itself this absolute liberty. [3] It is the immanent absoluteness and freedom of knowing: the absolute autonomy of the subject, the immediate necessary connection and material belonging of acting and knowing.

The basis of this decisive turning-point in thought derives from *Fichte's* principle of reduction of being to consciousness: "No being without being conscious" *(Kein Sein ohne Bewusstsein),* which in its turn refers to the transcendental reduction of being to freedom: " No nature and no being if not through the will, the products of the will are the true being" *(keine Natur und kein Sein, ausser durch den Willen, die Freiheitsprodukte das rechte Sein)*. Hence the affirmation that consciousness of freedom is for the idealist the first immediate principle from which being flows; the idealist, however, certainly does not find the feeling of freedom or of the subsistence of his own ego in his consciousness, but he knows how to find it and to produce it in himself through the free act of asserting himself. The horizon of truth is therefore turned upside down; it is no longer the presence of the world, the being of the world, that causes the beginning: it is the Ego which, as act of freedom based through itself, is an absolute beginning. [4] Thus the circle of the real closes in order to open to the infinite.

Once placed on this point of departure from which the priority is of the act over content and of existence over essence, the absolute Being is drawn inside subjectivity and freedom. Indeed, either the Ego rests on the character of absolute freedom which becomes knowledge only through a further determination such as is therefore simply presupposed; it looks only to the other, to pure act, and in this glance the Ego looks like the absolutely free and therefore also empty and void substratum *(Unterlage)* of knowledge grasping itself simply and altogether,

[8] Fichte, *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre von 1801,* §§ 11-12; Medicus IV, 22, ss.

• *Ibid., AngeJ.Wendete Philosophie: Die Staatslehre,* Erster Abschnitt; VI_1 4$6,

because the Ego grasps itself without any higher basis and Being or the Absolute (of knowledge) that springs out from this is the interior sight, the luminous situation. The entire point of view of this conception is form or freedom of knowledge, Ego-ness, interiority, light, or, the reflection rests on the character of the absolute Being so that a simple subsistence is presupposed and this is elevated to a subsistence in itself and for itself. This reflection looks therefore inside this self-grasping to a subsistence of knowing, thus a quiescent capacity of the act should be presupposed to the act itself; a *zero* in relation to the act which however, can be simply and altogether elevated through freedom to a positive fact. This, the fact *that* the act is accomplished according to the pure form, must depend as the first condition on freedom; but that it can be accomplished must be based on a being and on a particular reality. Knowledge cannot be absolutely *empty* as in the first case, and generate light with freedom, but it must have light absolutely in itself and grasp and develop only the same with freedom. The permanent point of view of this conception is absolute subsistence.[5]

It is this identity of freedom *(Freiheit)* and knowledge *(Wissen)* which constitutes that "intellectual insight" *(Intellektuelle Anschauung)* which, taken up again by Schelling, will provoke the sarcasms of Hegel, who in his *Phanomenologie des Geistes* will qualify it as that "night of the Absolute in which all the cows become black."[6] Inexorable logic of a principle which was pressing to arrive at its final consequences!

For Fichte these were not academic exercises of sedentary professors but constituted the cry of freedom against Napoleon whom Hegel on the contrary had greeted on his entry into Jena as the "Spirit of the world" *(Weltgeist)*, and whom Fichte instead pointed out to the condemnation of history as the violator of men and the oppressor of peoples.

[5] *Ibid., Darstellung deJl' Wissenschaftslehre von 1801,* § IS; Medicus IV, 28.

• Cf. Hegel, *Phiinomenologie des Geistes,* Vorrede; ed, Jo. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1952)' p. 72.

Many consider the enemy, Fichte writes in our context, as an instrument in the hands of God with which he wishes to execute some plans of divine providence, e. g., the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. But it is a matter of a basic error: their fundamental blindness consists in this that they do not look at freedom as the root of every true being, being benumbed and blinded by a shallow concept of divine providence. These people are totally wrong. There is no natural law and no physical connection of things through which the good comes to us. God does not will, cannot give us the good that we can do without difficulty, except through our freedom, and God is not in general a power of nature, as short-sighted simpletons nonsensically say, but he is a God of freedom. Nature is simply the reflection of this from the viewpoint of the universal freedom: but in freedom God has given us himself and his kingdom and the inner fullness of his beatitude, and he depends on us only that we might develop all this in us. " *Without freedom we remain without God and in the nothing."* [7] And Fichte proclaims that this is also the conception of Christianity which is the gospel of freedom and equality. Thus willing is being, pure willing pure being, and with that the surmounting of becoming in order that the Ego be established in possession of itself *aeterno modo:* I do not become at all, but I am absolute through pure willing. Through it all my nature, and my being, is determined. I am only a being which wills for all eternity. This *pure* willing is my being, and my being is my willing; both are one thing only and are self-sufficient. One cannot add anything more. This we have called the original *reality* (the *root)* of the Ego; because only willing and pure willing are capable of becoming immediate object of consciousness. This *pure* willing must then have a primary reality. And the Fichtean formula must be taken in the stronger meaning: *my* true *being* is determination of my willing. This is my whole being.
whole is a being determined by a willing; this is my whole con-

• Fichte, *Angewendete Philosophie*, Zweiter Abschnitt: *Ueber den Begrifj des wahrhaften Krieges;* Medicus VI, 465.

dition.[8] And it is to this formula therefore that first of all is referred the diagnosis of the last thought of Heidegger of the *cogito* as identity of being-willing in its essence.

Under the thrust of Fichte and at the same time preceding him by his metaphysical daring as Fichte himself recognized, *Schelling* carried the resolution of existence into freedom as into the ultimate essence of being. The result of this unique and exceptional springtime of German thought is the surmounting of the so-called *libertas indifferentiae;* this hybrid concept would imply, observed Schelling, the complete casualness of single actions, analogously to the much discussed casual deviation of the atoms that Epicurus, as is known, devised to explain becoming guided by the same purpose, that is, of escaping from fate. Thus, if you wish to escape as much from casualism as from pre-determinism, you cannot avoid having recourse to, or requiring, if you so like, an internal necessity which springs from the very essence of the agent himself; only idealism speaking in general has elevated the doctrine of freedom in that sphere in which alone it is understandable. The intelligible essence of every thing, and principally of man, is, as a consequence of that, withdrawn from causal concatenation, as that which is outside space and above all time. It cannot thus have been determined by anything preceding, more by reason of the fact that it precedes every other thing that is or will be in it, not so much in time as because of the concept as absolute unity, which must always already exist as entire and completed, so that the single action or determination might be possible in it. This was in its essence the intimate requirement of the kantian principle of the autonomy of the Ego for which, as Schelling remarks, the Spinozian principle: *omnis determinatio est negatio,* is no longer valid, since it forms one whole with the position and the concept of the same essence; therefore, freedom which is necessary spontaneity [of the act] is properly the essence of the essence. If it is true, Schelling thus argues, that

[8] *Ibid., Wissenschaftslehre 1798 "nova methodo,"* § 18; ed. Jakob (Berlin, 1987), p. 481 s.

intelligible being operates freely and absolutely, it is also true that it may not operate except in conformity with its own intimate nature that is, action cannot avoid following from its inner self, according to the law of identity and with absolute necessity, which alone is also absolute freedom; because that is free which operates only in conformity with the laws of its own essence and is not determined by something else from within or from without.

The essence of freedom is thus not taken from the examination of the empirical behavior of consciousness, but it should be referred to the very source of the spiritual act, namely, at the point from which necessity and freedom must spring and at which they must join. Because really this innermost necessity, Schelling states, is also freedom, the essence of man is essentially its own act *(seine eigne That);* necessity and freedom are implied by one another, as one sole essence, which when only considered from different aspects, appears as one or the other thing-that is, either as necessity or as freedom-freedom in itself, necessity from the formal aspect. The derivation from Fichte here is evident, which Schelling openly recognizes: the Ego, Fichte says, is its own act: consciousness is self-creation ... the Ego is not at all different from this but is precisely the very self-creation. But this creating of self presupposed, as does every pure knowing, authentic being *(das eigentliche Sein).* This being, conjectured (presupposed to knowing) , is not being unless it is at the same time knowing; it is real self-creating, is a primordial, basic willing, which makes of itself something and the foundation and ground of every essence. The act which is the foundation of man's life in time, according to the bOhmian spinozism of Schelling, is an eternal act through which the life of every man is joined to the principle of creation and in such a way he is at the center of being and for that reason also outside creation; thus he is free and whatever action he performs he accomplishes it not against but by his will. And recalling Luther (in *De Servo Arbitrio)* Schelling thinks that with such a synthesis of necessity and. liberty we can solve the problem of evil and elevate it to the

form of pure happening, even in the case of Judas: " the fact that Judas betrayed Christ could not be prevented either by himself or by an other creature, and nevertheless he betrayed Christ, not constrained but voluntarily and with full freedom." As much must be said of the good man. He does not become such by chance or by caprice, and nevertheless he is not forced, there is (thus) a freedom for good and for evil whose foundation transcends the life of the individual, of which there has, however, still remained some traces in his soul: " In consciousness, inasmuch as it is a simple apprehension of itself and is purely ideal, that free act certainly cannot appear which becomes necessity because it precedes consciousness just as it precedes essence, it is first of all this (the act) which *makes* it." [9] But not on this account, he specifies, is it an act of which no consciousness has remained for man because, when it is a question of excusing himself from some evil action, he is ready to make his excuses by saying that he could not do otherwise. The act of freedom thus assumes, in this insertion *a parte ante* in the eternal creation and *ab aeterno,* a dimension of eternity and therefore of absolute meaning and value.

To this opposite extreme of Schelling, who projects freedom into eternity *a parte ante, Hegel* projects the realization of freedom *a parte post,.* i.e., in the becoming of universal history, and man is effectively free in proportion to the part that man himself takes in the activity of the absolute Spirit in the develpment of history. "In fact men," he observes, " are all rational, the formal aspect of this rationality is that man be free; in this consists his nature, this belong to the essence of man. And nevertheless slavery has ruled over many peoples, and in part it still rules, and nevertheless peoples feel satisfied. The Orientals, e. g., are men and as such in se are free, but they are not because they do not have consciousness of freedom, but they let themselves fall under the despotism of religion and political situations. The whole difference between Oriental

• Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen uber das Wesen di'Jl' menschlichen Freiheit* S. W. Abt. I, Bei VII, 386.

peoples and peoples where slavery does not rule is that the latter know they are free, that their duty is to be free." [10] Further on Hegel gives a summary sketch of the development of philosophy in the West in relationship to the development of the concept of freedom as identity of thought and self-consciousness; this first happened in Greece and for this reason it is in Greece that philosophy begins (p. ss.). Hegel attributes this decisive progress of the concept of freedom in the West to Christianity, but it becomes explicit only in modern philosophy which has established "freedom of thought" so that thought does not proceed from something which is presupposed but only from itself, in a way that it begins from nothing; even if it begins from what is recognized as truth.

* * * * *

Most recent philosophy has from this stage on developed the concept of freedom with a further reversal, that is, after having divested it of every further theological or metaphysical reference and returned it to its original ontological status already glimpsed by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte which is the pure Ego: the will which creates itself and by creating itself creates being in accordance with the possible ways of existence.

What is man? Thus indeed, in the new atmosphere, the psycopathologist and philosopher K. *Jaspers* asks himself.[11] Man by physiology is a body; by psychology a soul; by sociology a sociable nature ... in these and similar disciplines man becomes object. But there is in him a final element which transcends all such card-index filing and which escapes every scientific classification and which nevertheless is present to it as an inseparable possibility and which never can become object: freedom. Of this man has direct consciousness and through it his activity escapes the determinism of physical laws, to open itself to the Absolute. By means of freedom he can

[10] *Ibid., Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie,* Einleitung A. 1; ed. Jo. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1940), p. 105.

[11] Cf. Jaspers, *Einfiihrung in die Philosophie* (Ziirich: Artemis-Verlag, 1950), p. 61 ss.

escape from what he does not will since freedom is in its sphere the first motor principle of the person as such. And since the Person is the whole of the rational being which projects its own destiny toward the future, Jaspers finds that in the constitutive dynamics of freedom Transcendence enters, that is, relationship to God. "Man is the being which refers itself to God" (der *Mensch ist das Gottbezogene Wesen)* . Thus the more man is after all free, the more God is certain for him. Where I am truly free, I am aware that I am not free for myself. Thus we push ourselves above ourselves, and we grow with the profundity of the awareness of God thanks to which we become first of all transparent in our nothingness. We must bear in mind, Jaspers concludes, that the relationship of man to God is not a natural property. Because it is jointly liable with freedom, it shines for each individual only when he completes the leap *(Sprung)* from his affirmation of an existence purely vital in itself, that is, when free from the world he is now completely open to the world, when he can be independent from the world because he lives bound to God. God is for me in the measure in which I live authentically. In this complex of ideas is realized that which for Jaspers is the constitutive category of existence, that is, "philosophical faith" *(der philosophische Glaube)* which affirms that" man can in his behavior live by God." The existential behavior which is spoken of, Jaspers observes with accuracy, is that achieved by Kierkegaard every day with self-reflection in a way that he was aware of being always in the hands of God; through what he did and saw happening in the world, he was listening to God and experiencing what he was hearing in the multiplicity of its meanings. What guided him was not the comprehensibility or the clarity of the precepts but behavior through freedom itself which knows how to come to a decision because bound in transcendental foundation. This behavior through transcendence stands for the opposite extreme of behavior which develops in the world because behavior through freedom coincide. The " voice of God " (*Gottes Stimme)* is in that which arises for each individual when he is open to all that comes to him from tradition and milieu. In

Jasperian freedom, as in Kantian, the connection with the Absolute, although it is not the first element, is however constitutive of freedom as actuated which is given by the metaphysical H leap " from finite to Infinite in the risk of the choice.

Not so *Heidegger* [12] who intends to proceed with absolute fidelity to the modern *cogito* according to which truth springs from freedom inasmuch as it springs from "behavior" *(Verhalten)* which renders the subject open to the revelation of being. In this way the basis and the place of truth is not at all the judgment, as tradition contended until Kant came, who sanctioned in this regard the oblivion of being. Instead, the original appearance of being must be pre-predicative, and in that sense prelogical, because it itself is the original logos and basis of every logos. For this reason the basis of the intrinsic possibility of opening myself, of being able to open oneself, or the opening of the behavior which reveals being and therefore renders possible truth as conformity of judgment, is freedom. In this opening oneself there is thus a preliminary giving of oneself which is a " gift " and a " preliminary giving of oneself " (V*orgabe,.Vorgeben),* and it is this radical way of" being free., *(Freisein)* which reveals the until now unaccomplished essence of freedom. We then say that the being open of the behavior as that which founds the intrinsic possibility of exactness [of the conformity] is based on freedom. And therefore " the essence of truth is freedom " (*das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit).*

This does not signify first of all and only, Heidegger hastens to specify, that the search for truth" depends" on liberty and on the motion of the will but exactly that the essence or the constitutive of truth is in freedom or that objectivity is based on subjectivity. And this clashes against the traditional conception, realistic or idealistic, which places metaphysics as knowledge of truth in itself above man. Now the situation on the other hand is reversed and it is this change of horizon-to

[12] Cf. *Vom Wesen der Wakrkeit,* II Aufl. (Franfurt a. M. :V. Klostermann, 1949), spec. §§ 34, p. l!'l ss.

the extreme side of whatsoever formalism or essentialism, both idealistic and realistic-which must be made clear. More than the pseudotheologizing conception of Jaspers and the phenomenologico-anthropological dilettantism of Sartre, the position of Heidegger respects the uneasiness and the aspiration of contemporary consciousness in the ambiguity of its plans for the essence of man.

Against a whole tradition of thought dominating Western culture, which made a "property" *(Eigenschaft)* of freedom and bound it to the cart or Procustean bed of objectivity, the situation has to be reversed and we have to say that the essence of truth is freedom, that is, it must be admitted that " freedom is the ground of the intrinsic possibility of conformity only because it receives its own essence from the more original essense of essential truth alone." Freedom indeed is first of all determined as " freedom for what can be revealed in something which is open" (als *Freiheit fur dM Offenbare einer Offenen).* This means that the opening of the existent, which renders possible the conformity of the judgment, is rendered possible each time by open behavior. Therefore freedom with regard to what can be manifested in what is manifest is a letting be each time the being of the being existent which is; therefore freedom is now revealed as letting be the being of the existent. " Letting-be " has here, one must keep in mind, the meaning not only of rendering possible the appearance of the existent, i.e., its manifestation, but at the same time of maintaining itself indifferent to the way and the content of this manifestation, not in the sense of indifference or of carelessness but instead in order to surrender itself *(Sicheinlassen)* to the existent, to let itself be invaded, so to say, by the existent as it presents itself in its presentation.

This is the original meaning of a- this says exactly non-hiddenness, i.e., the unveiling of the being of the existent and not first of all "conformity" *(Richtigkeit -op80T'YJ<>)* as formalist rationalism has contended. Thus truth is the going out and the let going out from the hiddenness *(Entbergenheit, Entbergung)* , and it is freedom which renders it possible by

letting be precisely the being of the existent. In this way, if the essence of truth is freedom, i.e., to situate itself and to keep itself *outside-ex-sistere-the* essence of freedom is this " exposure" *(Aussetzung)* in the unveiling of the existent. Freedom then is in no way to be confused with the " caprice " of protesting and para<loxical attitudes, nor is it the simple non-impeded spontaneity or the concrete availability toward something or for some object; it is not first of all a negative freedom. First of all and as problematic base of all this, freedom is the abandoning of oneself to the unveiling of the existent as such, This is the original meaning of " existence " *(Existenz, Ex-sistere);* not that (scholastic, wolffian ...) of giving oneself de facto *existentia,* or that moralistic as ethical commitment as it is, for instance, in the pseudotheological existentialism of a Jaspers or of a G. Marcel or in the ontological existence of a Sartre. The existence, which is rooted in freedom, is the placing oneself outside or ex-position *(Aus-setzung)* in the unveiling of the existent as such.

Having thus clarified the essential pertinence of freedom to truth, it is also clear that the ex-sistence of man in history and the beginning of his culture arrived at the precise moment in which the first thinker, in positing to himself the question of the unveiling of being, put to himself the question of what the existent is. And it is the unveiling of the existent as a whole that the Greeks called thus the initial unveiling of the existent in the Whole, the question of interrogation on the existent as such and the beginning of Western history are the same thing, and contemporaries in a " time " from which history takes its beginning-and, we can add, only the people have a history who, as those of the West, adopt this behavior, i.e., who place such a radical freedom as the basis of the unveiling of the being that is the radical freedom of the existent.

Freedom thus understood is not then properly a " property " of man, something that man possesses on his own account; on the contrary, it is the freedom, in the sense of being-there (outside) as revealing *Da-sein,* to possess man and this in such an original way that it alone guarantees to a humanity the re-

lationship which bases and characterizes every history for an existent in the whole. While" nature" properly has no history. It is this freedom, one can conclude, understood as the letting-be of the existent, which fulfills and realizes the essence of truth in the sense of unveiling of the existent, through which there is realized and shown that opening which is precisely the truth and which the behavior of man renders possible. And it is this freedom (Heidegger, who has delved into its (freedom's) historical-transcendental dimensions in Western culture, makes us understand marvellously) which is also the essence of man; man indeed is that existent which happened to be under the mode of the ex-sistence.

Here the discourse of Heidegger has reached its *apex* and seems to be interrupted or be left in suspense; in reality this is not so, because freedom is just this hovering over or the condition of hovering over the unveiling of the manifested in the unlimited opening of time which is history. And not by chance has Heidegger condensed his thought into the formula that " the essence of [man as] *Da-sein* consists in his Ex-sistence "ɯ which Sartre has turned into another: " existence precedes essence," [14] a version which nevertheless Heidegger-perhaps because of the publicity stunt used by the French writer-did not accept, wrongfully in our modest opinion. In fact the Heideggerian formula of truth as freedom through the unveiling of the existent suggests, and Heidegger is certainly not one to deny it, the resolution of subjectivity into the freedom which begins with Kant, is deepened by Fichte and Schelling, and culminates in the Hegelian doctrine of the absolute Spirit. And the " unveiling," of which Heidegger speaks, recalls spontaneously the "pure looking at" *(rein Zusehen)* of Hegel in which Heidegger precisely places the original disposition of consciousness in the face of reality. Only that in Heidegger the sole spectator or such a spectacle is also its single actor, that is, that which i'l the sole subject of history, the absolute Spirit. But Heidegger

[13] Cf. *Was ist Metaphysik?* V Aufl. (Frankfurt a.M., 1949), p. IS.

[14] Cf. J.-P. Sartre, *L'Etre et le neant,* P. IV, ch. 1 (Paris, 1943). P· 513.

does not allow his philosophy to go that far and rather turns it back again-if one may say so-on Fichte and Kant, but converging toward a pure historicism of " pure happening," matured and filtered with the inimitable experience of Nietzsche and through the analysis of Dilthey. A discourse hence carrieJ to the infinite and without end of which man appropriates each time the segment which belongs to him, departing from his own historical situation. And not by chance, one observes, has Heidegger (above all the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit)* exercised and is exercising a considerable influence not only on contemporary German historiography but also on the sciences, on medicine and psychopathology *(BinffWanger),* and on theolOg"'J itself (Bultmann, Rahner) .

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In this formula, that free will constitutes the basic *prius* with regard to the being of the existent, the most recent philosophy can meet *St. Thomas.* The Angelic Doctor expressly affirms that the will in the subjective sphere is the very principle of the person because it is not enough to aspire to the good in general-to which man naturally tends-but it is proper to it to choose in the concrete the highest end (riches, fame, knowledge, etc., or eternal life) and to pass on to the choice of the means proportioned to the end already selected. *The will therefore not only moves the powers of the lower appetite, but also the intellect itself toward the ultimate determination of the end in concreto.*

For this concrete end, which is the existential real object of such a choice, the principle is valid:

> In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum ea quae sunt propter finem non appetantur nisi ratione finis.[1.5]

And it must be said, in recognition of his perspicacity, that Thomas himself has a certain inkling that the situation is to be put in these terms, for instance, when he writes:

[1-] St. Thomas, *De Veritate,* q. 22, a. *5.*

Voluntas vult naturaliter bonum, sed non determinate hoc bonum vel illud; sicus visus naturaliter videt colorem, sed non hunc vel ilium determinate. Et propter hoc, quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni; non tamen oportet quod semper hoc vel illud bonum velit.[16]

And in a positive form he affiirms:

Finis est in quem ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem. Cum enim voluntas moveatur in suum obiectum sibi propositum a ratione, diversimode movetur, secundum quod diversimode sibi proponitur. Unde, cum ratio proponit sibi aliquid ut absolute bonum, voluntas movetur in illud absolute; et hoc est velle. Cum autem proponit sibi aliquid sub ratione boni, ad quod alia ordinentur ut ad finem, tunc tendit in illud cum quodam ordine, qui invenitur in actu voluntatis, non secundum propriam naturam, sed secundum exigentiam rationis.u

All this presupposes the reality of a concrete choice of a concrete end of his own life.

1. *The existential choice of the concrete end and moral determination.*

It is through this choice of the ultimate end *in concreto* that freedom is constituted as existential determination from which springs the basic morality of the human act so that the human will is called good or evil, and it is through the development of this choice that the moral personality of man in his integralness is being formed and qualified. To this man, engaged in the radical choice *in concreto* of the end, is then applied the declaration, wonderful in its simplicity and profundity, provided that the concrete choice of the ultimate end is subtended:

Quilibet habens voluntatem dicitur bonus inquantum habet bonam voluntatem: quia per voluntatem utimur omnibus quae in nobis sunt. Unde non dicitur bonus homo, qui habet bonum intellectum; sed qui habet bonam voluntatem. Voluntas autem respicit finem ut obiectum proprium.[18]

[16] *Ibid.,* a. 6, ad *5.*

[17] *Ibid.,* a. 13. St. Thomas knows this situation and warns against £alse "choices" of the ultimate end (cf. *III Cont. Gent.,* cc. *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. aa. 1-8.

[18] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. *5.* a. 4 ad 3.

But the will is called good or evil which makes a free choice of the end which is *in concreto* good or evil in which the will chooses its own happiness, as St. Thomas himself recognizes:

> Felicitatem indeterminate et in universali omnis rationalis mens naturaliter appetit, et circa hoc deficere non potest; sed in particulari non est determinatus motus voluntatis creaturae ad quaerendam felicitatem in hoc vel illo. Et sic in appetendo felicitatem aliquis peccare potest, si earn quaerat ubi quarere non debet sicut qui quaerit in voluptatibus felicitatem; et ita est respectu omnium bonorum. [19]

The reality of sin and the horrors of human freedom with which human history is bloodied are there to show that the crisis of choice is not stirred up and resolved in the area of means but in the sphere of the concrete ends to which man devotes himself with his choice for life and for death.

The most complete and explicit text in my awareness of this existential dialectic of freedom is the youthful *Commentary on the Sentences:*

> Bonum, quod est obiectum voluntatis, est in rebus, ut dicit Philosophus in VI Metaph. et ideo oportet quod motus voluntatis terminetur ad rem extra animam existentem. Quamvis autem res, prout est in anima, possit considerari secundum rationem communem praetermissa ratione particulari; res tamen extra animam non potest esse secundum communem rationem nisi cum additione propriae rationis; et ideo oportet, quantumcumque voluntas feratur in bonum, quod feratur in aliquod bonum determinatum: et similiter quantumcumque feratur in summum bonum huius, vel

[19] *De Verit.*, q. a. 7, ad 6. Cf. also ad 11: "Quamvis homo naturaliter bonum appetat in generali, non tamen in speciali, ut dictum est, in solutione ad sextum argumentum; et ex hac parte incidit peccatum et defectus." Thus St. Thomas himself speaks because of the morality of the act, of "finis debitus" (and "indebitus "), a distinction which is applied obviously to the concrete and which each individual chooses: "Ad hoc quod voluntas sit recta, duo requiruntur. Unum est quod sit finis debitus; aliud, ut id quod ordinatur in finem, sit proportionatum fini. Quamvis autem omnia desideria ad beatitudinem referantur, tamen contingit utrolibet modo desiderium esse perversum; quia et ipse appetitus beatitudinis potest esse perversus, cum quaeritur ubi non est, potest contingere quod id quod propter hunc finem appetitur, non est fini proportionatum, sicut cum quid vult furari, ut det eleemosynam per quam mereatur beatitudinem." *(In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. S, sol. 4 ad *5)* •

illius rationis. Quamvis autem ex naturali inclinatione voluntas habeat ut in beatitudinem feratur secundum communem rationem, tamen *quod feratur in beatitudinem talem,* vel talem, hoc non est ex inclinatione naturae, sed *per discretionem rationis,* quae adinvenit in hoc, vel in illo summum bonum hominis constare; et ideo quandocumque aliquis beatitudinem appetit, actualiter coniungitur ibi appetitus naturalis, et appetitus rationalis; et ex parte appetitus naturalis semper est ibi rectitudo; sed ex parte appetitus rationalis quandoque est ibi rectitudo, quando scilicet appetitur ibi beatitudo ubi vere est; quandoque autem perversitas, quando appetitur ubi vere non est; et sic in appetitu beatitudinis potest aliquis vel mereri adiuncta gratia, vel demereri, secundum quod eius appetitus est rectus, vel perversus.[20]

The " discretio rationis quae adinvenit in hoc vel illo summum bonum" supposes the motion of the will which bears a judgment of choice-the basic choice on the existential plane-according to the principle: ". . . *de hov potest esse e"lectio quod sub iudido nostro vadit."* [21] Thus, while the *appetitus naturalis* of the will tends to the *bonum in communi* spontaneously, the *appetitus rationalis* makes the precise choice of the good in which it places its own happiness, i. e., " selects " from among the various possible goods offered to freedom what it " prefers " from whose goodness or malice the goodness or malice (merit or fault) of the will itself depends. [22]

The concrete end of life is that which first and above all falls under our judgment of choice: because it depends on the will. Hence this " adinvenit " can deceive as if it were a simple act of the cognoscitive sphere, while in reality it depends on the motion of the will. A happier expression, it seems to us, is that which St. Thomas uses a bit previously between *voluntas naturalis* (of the end *in communi)* and *voluntas deliberativa* (of the concrete end) in a context (the will of the damned) which eminently puts our question in focus:

In damnatis potest duplex voluntas considerari, scilicet *voluntas deliberativa,* et *voluntas naturalis.* Naturalis quidem non est eis

[20] *In IV Sent.,* d. 49, a. 1, a. 8, sol. 8.
[21] *De Verit.,* q. 24, a. 1, ad 20.
[22] *Ibid.,* ad 2.

ex ipsis, sed ex auctore naturae, qui in natura hanc inclinationem posuit, quae naturalis voluntas dicitur; uncle cum natura in eis remaneat, secundum hoc bona poterit in eis esse voluntas naturalis. Sed *voluntas deliberativa est eis ex seipsis, secundum quod in potestate eorum est inclinari per affectum ad hac, vel illud;* et talis voluntas in eis est solum mala; et hoc ideo, quia sunt perfecte aversi a fine ultimo rectae voluntatis; nee aliqua voluntas potest esse bona, nisi per ordinem ad finem praedictum; uncle etiam se aliquod bonum velint, non tamen bene bonum volunt illud, ut ex hoc voluntas eorum bona dici possit.[23]

St. Thomas still admits this implicitly when he seeks in men and angels the origin precisely of bad will and therefore of sin. For man in the first movement of the will, which is the *intentio finis in communi,* there is no possibility of error or sin:

Cum voluntas tendat in bonum intellectum naturaliter sicut in proprium obiectum et finem, impossible est quod aliqua intellectualis substantia malam secundem naturam habeat voluntatem, nisi intellectus eius naturaliter erret circa iudicium boni ... Impossibile est igitur quod aliquis intellectus sit qui naturaliter in iudicio veri decipiatur. Non igitur possible est quod sit aliqua substantia intellectualis habens naturaliter malam voluntatem. [24]

Equally explicit is the admission to explain sin in the fallen angel:

Licet enim naturalis inclinatio voluntatis insit unicuique volenti ad volendum et amandum sui ipsius perfectionem, ita quod contrarium huius velle non possit; non tamen sic est ei inditum naturaliter ut ita ordinet suam perfectionem in alium finem quod ab eo deficere non possit; cum finis superior non sit suae naturae proprius, sed superioris naturae. Relinquitur igitur *suo arbitrio* quod propriam perfectionem in superiorem ordinat finem.[25]

There is involved here the prevalence of the subjective *bonum proprium* over the objective supreme good which is God himself and over what is willed by God; here is why the creature can deviate, ean will another end or " his ", that of his pride, his passion, his caprice, etc.-this is the existential choice into

[28] *In IV Sent.,* d. 50, q. a. 1, sol. 1.
[2]. *III Cont. Gent.,* c. 107, Praeterea.
[25] *Ibid.,* c. 109.

which the first man and the rebel angels fell and into which every man can fall and by means of which also each one of us can lose or save ourselves.

2. *Existential choice and origin of moral evil.*

It is here, then, in the concrete choice of the existential end, that is realized in the alternative of good and evil the dialectic of horizontalness and verticalness of freedom and that is decided the quality of its morality; good if the concrete end is ordered to God, bad and perverse if the end chosen is bent toward the ego which takes the place of God. It is this which St. Thomas himself has eminently seen, and it is on this that is based his marvellous treatise on the virtues and the vices.

Perhaps-and it was not the task of our research to decide on the difficult argument-the Thomistic doctrine of freedom has remained formally closed within the limits of Aristotelian rationalism or intellectualism, as the constant references to the Nichomachean Ethics make us suppose. There is no doubt at all that if we consider the doctrine both as a whole and in its effective spiritual milieu, it reveals not a few and profound hints of the existential nature of freedom or of the metaphysical emergence of freedom in the formal sphere of reason. First of all, the superiority of freedom *quoad exercitium* or subjective over objective freedom *quoad determinationem*, a distinction which if not completely unknown remains however only implicit or, for all practical purposes, inoperative in Aristotelian ethics. Because of this superiority, as it was said above, all the operative sector of consciousness and indeed the cognoscitive faculties themselves and above all reason passes, according to St. Thomas, under the dependence on the will. The first effect of this superiority of the will is revealed in the control which it can exercise on the very choice of the ultimate end:

> Voluntas est secundum hoc determinata et in unum naturaliter tendens, ita quod in alterum naturaliter non tendit; non tamen in illud in quod naturaliter tendit de necessitate, sed voluntarie tendit; unde et potest illud non eligere. Similiter potest etiam non eligere illud peccatum in quod sensualitas corrupta inclinat; quia inclinatio

naturalis, ut dictum est, est secundum exigentiam naturae in qua invenitur talis inclinatio.[26]

It is the decisive moment; if the content of the act would suffice to move the will, the voluntary movement of the act which consists in the formal aspiration for good and the free movement which consists in the real choice both of the concrete ultimate end and of the means would end up by being one and the same thing, and freedom would be identified with rationality *in act.*

Therefore and consequently, the superiority of the control of the *libertas quoad exercitium* always holds open a breach in the circle which tends to be closed on the part of reason and is such that objectivity-rationality and freedom-responsibility can and must remain distinct. And this emergence of freedom is valid first of all for the "existential choice," that is, the concrete choice of the end, a principle whose importance St. Thomas knows well and which maybe he does not always explicate in all its consequences, as we have seen:

Voluntas neque subiecto cogi potest, cum non sit organo affixa, *neque obiecto,* quantumcumque autem aliquid ostendatur esse bonum, in potestate eius remanet eligere illud vel non eligere.[27]

Certainly the will, which necessarily aspires to happiness, will make its choices but by beginning with the choice itself *in concreto* of the concrete end of its own life.

3. *Primordiality which grounds the existential choice.*

The consequence then of the emergence of the freedom of

•• *In II Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 3, ad *5* (Mandonnet II, 994). And a bit before he states with vigor what the principle of "active indifference" as constitutive of freedom might say: "Ipsa enim potentia voluntatis, quantum est de se, indifferens est ad plura; sed quod determinante exeat in hunc actum vel in ilium non est ab alio determinante, sed ab ipsa voluntate" *(Ibid.,* q. 1, a. 1; Mandonnet II 985).

[27] *Ibid.,* d. *25,* q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet II, 648). And a bit above: "Hoc ad libertatem arbitrii pertinet ut actionem aliquam facere vel non facere possit" *(ibid.,* a. 1, ad 2; Mandonnet II, 646). Again: "Ex hoc liberum arbitrium in nobis dicitur quod domini sumus nostrorum actuum" *(ibid.,* a. 2 Praeterea); "In voluntatis potestate est actum non facere sicut et facere" *(ibid.,* d. 35, q. 2, a. 3, ad *5;* Mandonnet II, 907).

exercise is that is has repercussions on freedom of specification controlling it; this is the reason why all of those yet desiring happiness eventually choose different ends in the concrete, and sometimes also opposed ends, for their own life; some pleasures, some glory, etc.:

"... vita ergo voluptuosa dicitur, quae finem constituit in voluptate sensibili. Vita vero civilis dicitur quae finem constituit in bono practicae rationis, puta in exercitio virtuosorum operum. Vita autem ·Contemplativa, quae constituit finem in bono rationis speculativae, vel in contemplatione veritatis. [28]

For this concrete choice of the end which founds the prime morality of human activity, the first to be held responsible is the will, not the passions, not even the intellect because the will has the capacity to control the former and to direct the latter. This is already included in the very notion of the rational appetite which is distinguished from the natural and animal appetite, which is "... determinatus ad unum ab alio" (that is, by the Author of nature), inasmuch as man, knowing the reason of the end, "... finem sibi praestituere potest." [29] It is obvious that in this existential choice of the end the will and reason colloborate in such a way that, while the aspiration of the end which follows on the indetermined knowledge of the good is the simple response of the will to the presentation of the good in general made by the intellect, on the contrary in the concrete choice of the end the first movement comes from the will itself and is a true choice inasmuch as "... eligere est alterum alteri preoptare." [30] It is interesting to observe that St.

[28] *I Ethic.,* lect. *5,* c. 3, n. *59.*

[29] *In II Sent.,* d. *25,* q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet II, 645). Thus: "... etsi ratio obnubiletur a passione, remanet tamen aliquid rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc potest aliquid vel totaliter passionem repellere; vel saltern se tenere ne passionem sequatur" *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 10, a. 3, ad 2).

[30] *Ibid.,* d. £4, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet II, 593). Fo St. Thomas himsel£ the fact that ". . . ratio beatitudinis nota est" does not take away the fact that "... beatitudo sit occulta quoad substantiam; omnes enim per beatitudinem intelligunt quemdam perfectissimum statum; sed in quo consistat ille status perfectus, utrum in vita vel post mortem, vel in bonis corporalibus, vel spiritualibus, et in

Thomas, still with reference to the Philosopher, approaches as it were the nucleus of the problem, but in a disheartening way, that is, after having reaffirmed that" libertas arbitrii (electio) non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt ad finem." Indeed he writes:

Quod autem in hoc particulari hie homo ultimam suam felicitatem, ille autem in illo ponat, non convenit huic aut illi inquantum est homo, cum in tali aestimatione et appetitu homines difl'erant, sed unicuique hoc competit secundum quod est in se aliqualis. Dico autem aliqualem, secundum aliquam passionem vel habitum; unde si transmutetur, aliud ei optimum videbitur. Et hoc maxime patet in his qui passione appetunt aliquid ut optimum, cessante autem passione, ut irae, vel concupiscentiae, non similiter iudicant illud bonum ut prius. Habitus autem permanentiores sunt, unde firmius perseverant in his quae ex habitu prosequuntur. Tamen quandiu habitus mutari potest, etiam appetitus et aestimatio hominis de ultimo fine mutatur. [81]

St. Thomas himself affirms expressly that ". . . agens per voluntatem praestituit sibi finem propter quem agit," [32] which can be different from the Summum Bonum, as it is said, and becomes then the fall (*defectus et peccatum)* into sin as fixed in its own subjective good, "... per hoc quod voluntas remanet fixa in proprio bono non tendendo ulterius in summum bonum, quod est ultimus finis." [83] And the soul of the damned, not differently from that of the fallen angels, will remain fixed eternally in its wrong and obstinate choice in the evil in which it will be seen found at the moment of death, as the elect and

quibus spiritualibus, occultum est" *(Ibid.,* d. 38, q. I, a. 2, ad 2; Mandonnet II, 972).

[31] *Co-mpendium Theologiae,* c. 174 (ed. Taur., n. 346, p. 82 a). The (implicit) allusion to Aristotle is in the expression "... sed unicuique hoc competit secundum quod est in se aliqualis " which is customarily quoted in the formula: " Qualis unusquique est, talis finis videtur ei" (cf. for example, *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 9, a. 2). In the original: ... dXX' *tnroi6s* 11'11. *oKa.u.,.6s ou'Tl, 'TlJ.WV'TO Ka.i* „c, TeXos *¢a.lvera.<.,.{J.,.ij,* (E. N. III, 5 1114 a 32). The expression remains undetermined and St. Thomas understands it of the situation of passion. On the other hand, freedor.:t according to the Angelic Doctor can control also the passions and thus its supremacy is reaffirmed also for the choice of the end.

•• *Ibid.,* c. 96 *(ed. cit.,* n. 183, p. 46 b).

[83] *Ibid.,* c. 113 (ed. *cit.,* n. 222, p. 55 b). Cf. also c. 120.

the good angels" ... habebunt voluntatem firmatam in bono." [84] Thus on the existential plane the final and decisive exit from life depends on the ultimate concrete choice of the end *in concreto* in its conformity or disformity with respect to the attainment of God.

But there is more, to show that under the Aristotelian framework there abides in the Thomistic doctrine of freedom a new spirit of existential impression. For Aristotle, the happiness of man on this earth consists in the consideration of the speculative sciences with which he becomes a bit like God.[85] The lack then of the prospective of personal immortality in Aristotle results from his affirmation that it is a question of aspiration of an " impossible thing " *(f3oVA'Y)(J"tr:;o' f(J"Tt Kat TCOV aovvchrov,oiov MJava(J"iar:;)*.[36] Thomistic ethics, in this regard, has exactly reversed the situation through the ideal of Christian hope which makes God himself and not vaguely happiness reachable in the other life as the real beatifying end of man.

Therefore, in Thomistic ethics, it is now clear, the *ultimate real end* of man is God who is and becomes " object of choice " and thus of deliberation and who can be also rejected on the existential plane, while on the formal plane the *bonum in communi* is only the object of "intentio"; as end freely chosen God must control every intentional sector of the further choices required to reach him ". . . post hanc vitam." And thus the interior dynamism of the will is stabilized in the good, and

[34] *Ibid*, c. 174 fine *(ed. cit.*, n. 846, p. b).

[35] Cf. *Metaph.* XII, 7, b s. R. Schaerer has made very pertinent observations on the difficult intertwining of necessity and freedom in the aspiration for happiness in poetry and Greek philosophy in his *L'homme devant ses choix dans la tradition grecque* (Louvain-Paris, 1965), spec. p. 48 ss.

[86] This radical and final frustration of man in the classical world, and especially for Aristotle, is expressly noted with sadness and delicacy by St. Thomas himself: " Quia vero Aristoteles vidit quod non est alia cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per scientias speculativas, posuit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam, sed suo modo. In quo satis apparet quantum angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus angustiis liberabimur si ponamus, secundum probationes praemissas, hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente in quo statu anima intelliget per modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatae " *(Ill Cont. Gent.*, c. 48 in fine) .

therefore the moral quality of the interior person who is called " good " by reason of the " good will," as has already been alluded to.[37] And the reason for this dignity and responsibility is taken from the *motio quoad exercitium* which the will exercises over itself and over all the powers with respect to the attainment of the end.

> Homo non dicitur bonus simpliciter ex eo quod est in parte bonus, sed ex eo quod secundum totum est bonus; quod quidem contingit per bonitatem voluntatis. Nam voluntas imperat actibus omnium potentiarum humanarum. Quod provenit ex hoc quod quilibet actus est bonum suae potentiae; unde solus ille dicitur esse bonus homo simpliciter qui habet bonam voluntatem. [38]

This active existential supremacy of the will is the more felt need of modern thought which nevertheless has timorously swung between the absorption of the will by the intellect and of the intellect by the will opting either for the control of reason or the titanism of action.

The dynamic priority of the will is thus the expression itself of the prime source of the act, and therefore of human responsibility, in the same secret sanctuary of truth:

> *Voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia est ipsum verum quod est perfectio intellectus continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare.* [39]

Thus with a phrase no less bold than the modern *cogito* St. Thomas proclaims the dynamic priority of the will over the

[37] And in a context similar to those already cited: " Simpliciter autem et totaliter bonus dicitur aliquis ex hoc habet voluntatem bonam, quia per voluntatem homo utitur omnibus aliis potentiis. Et ideo bona voluntas facit hominem bonum simpliciter; et propter hoc virtus appetitivae partis secundum quam voluntas fit bona, est quae simpliciter bonum facit habentem" (De *Virtut. in Comm.,* q. un., a. 9 ad 16). Also in a youthful text: "Quamvis voluntas bonum appetat non tamen appetit semper quod est vere sibi bonum, sed id quod est apparens bonum; et quamvis omnis homo beatitudinern appetat, non tarnen quaerit earn in eo ubi est vera beatitudo, sed ubi non est, et ideo nititur ad earn pervenire non per rectam <viam; et propter hoc non opportet quod ornnis voluntas sit bona" *(In // Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3; Mandonnet II, 979).

[38] *De Virtut. in Comm.,* q. un., a. 7, ad

•• *Summa Theol.,* I-II, a. 9, a. 1, ad 3.

intellect in which the existential realization of the person consists, *"lntelligo quia vola et similiter utor omnibus potentiis et habitibus quia vola."* [40] And, whatever might have been the formalistic objectivism of Scholasticism and the tradition itself of the Thomistic school, this is brought back to the ultimate root of the subjectivity of the person: " *omnis actus voluntati.y est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus; voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus qui est beatitudo."* [41] Therefore this moves the intellect to intend, but the basic reason of the establishment of freedom, according to St. Thomas, as for modern philosophy, is that the will is free because it can move itself:

Quia voluntas domina est sui actus et in ipsa est velle et non velle; quod non esset si non haberet potestatem movere seipsam ad volendum. [42]

Mistress of itself, the will can go out into the world and face the risks of life, the conquests of technique, the contest against death.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that St. Thomas in articulating the whole of his thought, above all on the theological and mystical levels (of the control of the will in the economy of the theological virtues, of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and especially of charity " mater et forma omnium virtutem ") has generously filled up the Aristotelian lacuna in the constitutive moment of the choice of the end on the natural plane of the existential choice. One cannot therefore reduce the essence of the Thomistic freedom to the " negative indifference " of the subject with respect to finite goods.[43]

[40] *De Malo.,* q. 6, a. un.

[42] *Ibid.,* q. 9, a. S.

[41] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 4, a. 4, ad

•• For example, W. Hoeres, *Der Wille als reine Volkommenheit nach Duns Scotus* (Miinchen, p. ss. Pompanazzi who, in the Renaissance, made the most extensive and acute analysis of our problem, seems to restrict the activity of freedom to the " suspensio actus," that is, to the refusal of the *velle* in face of the

1. It is in virtue of the active emergence of the *libertas exercitii (velle, non velle)* over the *libertas quoad determinationem* (*velle hoc vel illud)* that for St. Thomas the will can control the multiple pressure which is not only objective from things (real values, utility, advantages, etc.) but also subjective (inclinations, passions, aspirations, etc.) .

2. It is the *libertas exercitii,* inasmuch as the will moves the intellect to *consilium* (which St. Thomas expresses as *refiexio, oollatio,* etc), to check the immediate objective and subjective impulses in order to put the will in the condition of carrying out with responsibility its choice of the concrete good and to orientate the choice of the means towards the good (ultimate concrete end) which it alone and of itself can and must choose at its own risk and peril.

3. Because inasmuch as the *libertas exeroitii* can make "by itself alone" the first active choice putting into action the *velle* or *non-velle,* this creates and resolves of itself the tensions toward the option and fundamental choice of the (ultimate) concrete end (which St. Thomas implicitly admits and which Scotus because of the unconditioned primacy of the will seems to ignore).

4. Consequently, with the terms "indifferens," "indifferenter," etc., St. Thomas indicates the will with respect to goods (ends and means) at the moment of the *libertas quoad determinationem,* that is, acting as the reflection and *collatio* of the *oonsilium* which precedes the radical option or *electio* of the concrete end and the choice of means.

5. Hence properly in the absolute sense, for St. Thomas the will " follows " simply the intellect alone in the first moment of the *simplex apprehensio entis ut perfectivi (bonum)* to which it responds with the *simplex intentio boni et finis* but in order

good presented hy the intellect *(De fato,* lih. III, c. 8; ed. Lemay, p. 263, l. 8.23). It must he admitted that, because the *suspensio* which refuses and the *acceptatio* which welcomes coexist in the potentiality of the will, the decision (whatever it is) must he made in relation to an active choice which is precisely the existential choice of the good and end *in concreto* (of which Pomponazzi gave no hint, it seems to me), a choice which is an initiative and a risk precisely of freedom itself.

to take at once the command of the interior life of the Spirit. Hence in a paradoxical sense the indifference which is called objective (as when, for example, Kierkegaard says he has 1'7 motives for marrying and 17 for not marrying!) manifests itself to be also this *in concreto* subjective, and it is properly the very condition of " radical freedom," that is, it is the platform which freedom itself creates in order to make the leap to venture on the risk of the radical choice.

In the modern thought from the extreme intellectualism of freedom-spontaneity-necessity (Spinoza-Leibnitz) and of the extreme formalism of "you must" (Kant) one has reached with Fichte-Schelling-Hegel the resolution of the being into freedom, which forms precisely the " beginning " in the life of the spirit according to the drastic and lapidary formula of Fichte which can be valid for all modern thought " whether you derive being from freedom or rather freedom from being, it is always and only the derivation of the same thing, considered only in a different way; indeed freedom or knowledge is *being* itself." [44] And in this intensive act consists the fichtean "intellectual intuition" *(intellektuelle Anschauung)* . This extreme reduction of being to knowledge and of knowledge to will depends, as was said in the beginning, on the pretense of the absolute radical doubt or of *willing* to base being on thought " without presuppositions " *(Voraussetzungslosigkeit)* . This is a pretence in itself without sense and without possibility of success, as it is on the way of demonstrating, with tragic consequences of total loss of life and of culture, the consistent development of contemporary thought which has solved this *cogito-volo* in the loss to the infinite of the Ego as possibility of possibility or without aim because it always relapses into the nothingness of being which constitutes it. Whence also the surmounting of the metaphysics and the radical historicism of the so-called " transcendental anthropology " which then is a desire to introduce in this second post-war period in philoso-

[44] Cf. C. Fabro, *La Svolta Antropologica di Karl Rahner* (Milano: Rusconi, 1974).

phy and theology itself as realization of the program of " aggiornamento" of Christian thought with modern thought. But more than aggiornamento, in this tactic one surrenders with arms and baggage to the adversary (as Hermes, GUnther, Frohschammer, etc., did a century ago, until K. Rahner today); [45] by this means one does not entirely safeguard freedom but one discharges it in the becoming of the Ego in history. [46]

It can be recognized that Hegel had come sufficiently close to the core of the essence of freedom as tension of choice of the Ego (and mutual basis of transcendental osmosis, as was said above) in the convergence of horizontalness (the finite) and verticalness (the Absolute), when he wrote that "first of all then self-.consciousness as immediate is prisoner of its naturalness-corresponding, I think, to the *simplex volitio boni* and to the *intentio finis in concreto* of St. Thomas-this is free only formally, it is not the consciousness of its infinite freedom; !t is determined and therefore also its object is determined and therefore also its object is determined and freedom is as united with it only formally, it is not united in se and per se." [47] Fo:r

•• " Ob das Sein von der Freiheit, oder die Freiheit von dem Sein ableitest, ist es immer nur die Ableitung desselben von desselben, nur verschieden angesehen; denn die Freiheit oder das Wissen ist das *Sein* selbst " (Fichte, *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre 1801,* § 17; Medicus IV, 34).

•• The cartesiam phenomenologist Sartre is correct when he restores to the hegelian Heidegger the proper notion of freedom wholly centered on the act, that is, reduced to only the "libertas quoad exercitium" (horizontalness): "La condition fondamentale de l'acte est la liberte n'a pas d'essence. Elle n'est soumise a aucune necessite logique; c'est d'elle qu'il faudrait dire ce que Heidegger dit du *Dasein* en general: "En elle l'existence precede et commande l'essence'." Hence the disturbing definition of freedom as permanent void, negativity, negativization, etc. (cf. J.-P. Sartre, *L'Etre et le neant* [Paris, 1943], p. 513). The opus terminates with the definition which sanctions the continuous loss that the Ego makes pf itself" "Un.e liberte qui se veut, c'est en effet un etre-qui-n'est-pas-ce-qu'il-est et qui-est-ce-qu'il-n'est-pas qui choisit, come ideal d'etre, l'etre-ce-qu'il-n'est-pas et le n'etre-pas-ce-qu'il-est. II choisit done non de se *reprendre,* mais de se fuir, non de coincider avec soi, mais d'etre toujours a distance de soi " (p. 722) .

''' Zuerst aber ist das Selbstbewusstein als unmittelbares in seiner Natiirlichkeit befangen; es ist nur formell frei, nicht das Bewusstein seiner unendlichen Freiheit; es ist bestimmt, und daher ist auch sein Gegenstand ein bestimmer und die Freiheit als Einheit mit ihm nur formell, nicht die an und fur sich seiende" (Hegel, *Vorles. uber die Philosophie der Religion,* Lasson I, p. 260). The Thomistic line

Hegel then as the *Erscheinung* has no truth without reference to *Wesen* nor the finite has reality without basis in the Absolute, so freedom of the subject (finite) wastes away in the loss of the finite choices (the *schlechte Unendlichkeit)* and is authenticated only in reference to the Infinite. It is on this radical reference to the Absolute that also for St. Thomas, unlike Aristotle, radical freedom is realized and can " go in itself " in its accomplishments.

St. Thomas on his part refers eminently to " freedom of reflection " as act of " reflection of freedom " ; in this one must realize not only the responsible choice of means with respect to end but first and above all the choice of the end itself in the awareness of the tension of finite and Infinite ... , of the opposition of pleasure and integrity ... in which consists the risk of liberty itself which, immersed in time, opts with obsolute abandonment in God for eternity. But one is scarcely dealing with signs: the theoretical structure of Thomistic freedom has remained formal, so at least it has been interpreted and so also it has passed into the polemics of history, even if a "more interior" reading of the texts would have been able to temper this formalism. And so one can still point out in St. Thomas some other flash of genuine advertence of the basic

seems to be perfectly consistent: Just as God who is the intensive *lpsum esae,* principle and cause of every reality and in particular of the *actus essendi* (esse) which is participated by creatures, so God is the first intensive principle, that is, total and embracing (as First Cause) of action and thus also of freedom itself according to the analogy of being itself. It is understandable then that the obscurity to which the notion of *actus essendi* and the capital distinction of *essentia* and *esse* were subjected immediately after the death of St. Thomas in the Thomistic school itself which lead it from the profound metaphysical plane to the phenomenologicalontic plane of *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae,* then reduced to *essentia* and *existntia* has lead to the obscurity also of the notion of freedom and to the misunderstanding of the *De Auxiliis* controversy according to the opposition of the rigid horizontalism of Molina (God and man as two partners ... as two horses drawing a ship) and of the rigid verticalism of Bafiez. Not by chance does Bafiez also treat *esse* as *existentia* and therefore does not succeed in grasping the sense and the original metaphysical burden of the Thomistic distinction of *essentia* and *esse* (C. Fabro, *L'obscurcissement de l'esse dans l'ecole thomiste, Revue Thomiste,* 3 [1958], 443 ss; *idem, Participation et causalite* [Louvain-Paris, 1960], p. *ed. it.,* Torino, 1960, pp. 465 nota, 614 ss.).

subjectivity, which pertains to the will and to freedom, which brings us back fully to the existential sphere. As the following text which precises the relationship of the influence of God on created freedom:

> . . . dicendum quod Deus operatur in unoquoque agente etiam secundum modum illius agentis; sicut causa prima operatur in operatione causae secundae, cum secunda causa non possit in actum procedere nisi per virtutem causae primae. Uncle per hoc quod Deus est causa operans in cordibus hominum, non excluditur quin ipsae humanae mentes sint causae suorum motuum: uncle non tollitur ratio libertatis. [48]

This " relinquitur " sweeps away every schema of simple vertical descending causality and exalts to the infinite the synthesis, in human freedom, of horizontal and vertical causality ascending in the conscious and free fullness which the finite spirit assumes" before God" (Kierkegaard) of his own destiny. But also the situating of man before God is therefore a choice, and it is the choice of choices, the more intense act of subjectivity which creates the supreme leap of quality of the spirit.

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[48] *De Verit.* q. 24, a. 1 ad 3. Similarly, with equal precision, in *Summa Theol.* (I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3): "Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle, sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum; sicut in his quod movet per gratiam."

LITURGY IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST. THOMAS

SINCE LITURGY became respectable there have been numerous attempts to write a theology of it. Obviously one can, and does nowadays, write a theology of almost anything-from history to revolution, from leisure to clothes, from sin to sport. But when liturgy is recognized to mean the substance no less than the shape of the Church's worship it becomes imperative to examine it on a theological level. In its program for liturgical studies Vatican II puts the theological aspect of the subject in the first place.[1]

The literary form of theological studies on the liturgy can be the theological monograph or some chapters in a book that also deals with liturgy on other levels-historical, pastoral, spiritual, ceremonial, aesthetic. These forms have, of necessity, to take a great deal for granted about theology. They apply theological categories, principles, and presuppositions to the subject in hand without having the time or space to analyze or evaluate them. Their theological assumptions are often unspoken or barely confessed. If theology were being done within a single tradition, where there is general agreement on principles and presuppositions, there might be no cause for concern here. But in an era of theological pluralism and inter-Church debate one cannot presume such agreement. If the writer on liturgy does not declare his standpoint and explain his theological horizon he will find it difficult to engage in theological debate about liturgy, as about anything else, with those who stand outside his tradition. And he will say nothing much of interest to those who stand outside the ground of faith and who would require the liturgical life of the church to be submitted to some kind of rational verification.

[1] Constitution on the Liturgy, *Saerosanctum Ooncilium,* nn. 16, !'l8.

It might be claimed that contemporary theology of the liturgy avoids the pitfalls of pluralism by going back to categories that are predominantly biblical and patristic. Apart from the fact that these are the indispensible source categories of revelation, they predate the dogmatic disputes of the churches and the theological particularism of the schools and are generally accepted by all Christians. However, the course of contemporary theology surely shows that what is built from a common fund of biblical and traditional material is inevitably influenced by the dogmatic and philosophical stance of different writers. A theologian of the liturgy who is honest about his hermeneutical presuppositions will not be deceived by a convergence' of terminology. In any case, the critical and rational function of theology and its task of building a bridge between faith and the capital of human thought require it to verify the ontological ground of revealed ideas. The fact that the Bible records the belief of a group of people in God and gives details of their worship is no guarantee that there is any such thing as God in reality; their belief that the mystery of salvation is embodied in certain events, persons or rituals is of itself no guarantee that the divine can be contacted by the human through created intermediaries. A theology of the liturgy that limits itself to a biblical and traditional explanation of the Church's worship offers a specious prospect for communication between religious men and can leave the liturgy defenceless and threatened with absurdity in the face of rational humanistic criticism.

An alternative theological approach to the liturgy is to situate the subject within a comprehensive theology, a theology which is dealing in the broadest possible way with God and his relationship to the created order. Such a theology will have to analyze and justify its own basic assumptions about God and man. If it is Christian theology it will have to examine the historical working out of the relationship between God and man and explain how it culminates in Christ. Then, with its theological, anthropological, and christological presuppositions confessed and defended it will come to examine the place of the Church and its liturgy in the actual bringing about of that rela-

tionship. The fact that few contemporary theologians are prepared to attempt such a comprehensive task is less a sign of the impossibility or undesirability of the project than of the priority that has to be given at present to assembling and assimilating the vast store of source material that has been presented to the systematic theologian by biblical, patristic, and historical studies of all kinds. Meantime, however, it should be interesting and methodologically instructive to look at how the task was accomplished at an earlier age of theology.

St. Thomas did not write a theology of the liturgy. His thinking about liturgical matters is to be found mainly in his comprehensive theological works-in the two *Summa's* and in his commentary on the *Sentences.* It is found there, not in the form of a block of material that could be called a theology of the liturgy, or even a theological tract on the liturgy. When he comes to deal with the core of the Church's liturgy, in his discussion of the sacraments towards the end of the *Tertia Pars,* he is not opening up a new tract but simply coming in his own good time to discuss the actual working out of the relationship between God and his creation that has been the subject of his singleminded study from the first questions of the *Prima Pars.* Throughout the *Summa* he is writing theology pure and simple, not the theology of this or that. He does not present a theology of the liturgy but incorporates liturgy in his theology.[2] He examines the actual practice of the Church, as he knew it, in the light of the general principles he has established about God and man, the possible relationship between them, and the historical phases of that relationship that have a bearing on present reality (creation, original justice and sin, the Old Law, the community of salvation, Christ, the Church). These principles and historical precedents are his presuppositions. They have been critically examined and explained throughout the *Summa.* Now they are being used to provide a theological interpretation of liturgical data. One may disagree with his principles. But at least one knows what they

• Hence the title of this article.

are. And one has been invited to debate them to the ultimate limits of dogmatic and philosophical enquiry.

The working out of these theological presuppositions by St. Thomas is not entirely independent of the data that they are ultimately employed to interpret. The given norm of theological endeavor is the life of the believing community. The theologian must know the expression which the faith of the community finds in its Scriptures, Creeds, and liturgy. He must be aware, too, of the direction which the contemporary community is taking in its attempts to realize its belief and its hope in a constantly evolving human situation. This datum, which is the expression of Revelation, is sovereign in theology. The theologian who does not begin his work by listening to it risks wandering off on irrelevant, a prioristic speculation. And, if he ever does get back to employing the speculative principles he works out to the life of his contemporary Church, he may find himself at variance with its beliefs and practices and the directions these are taking in the world of his day. If, for example, a theologian found himself committed to a religious anthropology which held that ritual symbolical activity is unworthy of man in his dealings with God, he would find himself embarrassed by the sacramental practice and beliefs of the Church.

There is good reason for claiming that St. Thomas gives due theological weight to liturgical data.[3] In his treatment of the sacraments the *usus* or *consuetudo Ecclesiae*, the *ritus ab Ecclesia servatus* is a solid unquestioned *auctoritas.*[4] If objections

[3] Cf. C. Borobia, "La liturgia come lugar teol6gico en la teologfa sacramentaria de santo Tomas," in *Miscelanea* P. *Cuervo* (Salamanca, 1970),229-254; Y. Congar, 0. P., "Faits, problemes et reflections a propos du pouvoir d'ordre et des rapports entre le presbyterat et l'episcopat," in *La Maison Dieu* 14 (1948), 107-128; H. Hering, "De loco theologico liturgiae apud S. Thomam," in *Pastor Bonus 5* (1941), 456-464; F. Marin-Sola, 0. P., *L'Evolution homogene du dogme catholique* (Fribourg, 1924). Tome I, p. 291 sq.

[4] To take the *Summa Theologiae* alone cf. III, q. 60, a. 8; q. 66, a. 10; q. 72, a. 4 sed contra.; q. 72, a. 12 sed contra; q. 73, a. 1 sed contra.; q. 73, a. 2 ad 1; q. 75, a. 2; q. 76, a. 8 sed contra.; q. 78, a. 6 sed contra.; q. 79, a. 3, obj, I; q. 79, a. 5 sed contra.; q. 80, a. 12 sed contra.; q. 82, a. 2; q. 83, a. 2; q. 83, a. 3 sed contra.; q. 83, a. 4; q. 83, a. 5 sed contra.

suggest a conflict between principle and practice, it is the principle that has to be adjusted. In his more abstract theological investigations he is also ready to appeal to liturgical practice and texts for confirmation of his options.[5] And there is an even more basic indication that St. Thomas builds his theological edifice from its very foundations towards an eventual understanding of Christian liturgy. In the general prologue to the *Summa* he explains " propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est ea quae ad *christianam religionem* pertinent ... tradere." When he further specifies that " principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae "[6] he is maintaining his concern for *religio.* In abstract terms he understands *religio* to mean " ordo ad Deum" of those things which take their origin from him.[7] In concrete terms *religio* is man's *ordo ad Deum* worked out historically until it is fulfilled in Christ and mediated to mankind in the "cultus Dei secundum ritum *christianae religionis."*[8] This *religio* is the subject matter of his theology. His method, beginning as he does with God and proceeding to examine the *exitus* of all things from him and their *reditus* to him, provides a profoundly theological perspective for understanding liturgy. Movement from God to man and back to God is the fundamental pattern of liturgy. A liturgist, then, is entitled to claim that, even in the most abstract speculations of St. Thomas, presuppositions are being established and ideas forged which will be readymade for an eventual theological explanation of the Church's worship.[9]

[6] I, q. 23, a. 7; q. 25, a. 3 obj. 1; q. 28, a. 2; q. 52, a. 1 sed contra.; I-II, q. 103, a. 3 ad 4; q. 113, a. 9 sed contra.; II-II q. 82, a. 3 ad 2; q, 82, a. 4; q. 83, a.17; III, q. 27, a. 1 sed contra.; q. 27, a. 2 ad 3; q. 31, a. 5 obj. 1.

• I, q. 2, prologus.

[7] II-II, q. 81, a. 1.

[8] III, q. 63, a. 2.

• For an historical survey of the relationship between liturgy and theology, with a list of contemporary works on the subject, cf. P. Fernandez, "Liturgia y

In fact, most of the theologies of the liturgy that already exist within the Catholic tradition are happy to claim support from St. Thomas. They use his ideas and principles in varying degrees. However, it may be worth asking whether any of them represents St. Thomas deepest theological thinking about liturgy. These theologies can be characterized by the key idea which they select as the starting-point for understanding liturgy. One will usually find this at the heart of the "definition" they offer of the liturgy. While few of these writers would claim to be giving a definition that measures up to all the technical requirements of logical definition they usually do attempt a concise, orderly statement of what they consider to be the essential features of liturgy/ [0] The key idea in some of these definitions is worship, *cultus;* in others it is sign, *signum;* still others define liturgy in terms of the priesthood of Christ. While each of these ideas is prominent in St. Thomas's thinking about liturgy, one is entitled to ask which, if any of them, represents his most basic insight on the subject. They can be examined in turn. If none of them proves entirely satisfactory, another idea will need to be put forward and its claim to bring the full weight of St. Thomas's theology to bear on the liturgy justified. Such an idea will put one in touch with the ultimate presuppositions of his theological thinking about the liturgy. And it will mark the point at which dialogue might be undertaken with those outside the thomistic tradition, whether within the Catholic Church or outside it, and a basis offered for an intellectual justification of Catholic liturgy to non-believers.

Liturgical Material

Before various definitions of the liturgy are examined in the

Teologia. La historia de un problema metodologico" in *Ciencia Tomista* 99 (1972), 185-179. This article deals at some length with the position of St. Thomas.

[1°] Cf. *Introduction to the Liturgy* (English trans!. of Part One of *L'Eglise en priere,* 8rd edit., edited by A. G. Martimort), Shannon, 1968, 1-12; H. Schmidt, S. J., *Introductio in Liturgiam Occidentalem* (Herder, 1960), 47-87; J. H. Miller, C. S. C., "The Nature and Definition of the Liturgy," in *Theological Studies* 18 (1957). 825-856.

way that has been proposed a preliminary word has to be said about what is being defined. For purposes of comparison one must be sure that the ideas being put forward are all meant to define the same thing, since any debate about definition supposes agreement on the material or objects to be covered by the definition. And if one is appealing to ideas taken from an author of the past, such as St. Thomas, one has to establish that he was dealing with the same range of material. Otherwise his ideas cannot be compared with those of the present.

From the time the word liturgy came to be used in its modern sense there has in fact been some uncertainty about what precisely should be covered by it. Nowadays, however, there seems to be general agreement to let the teaching authorities of the Church be the arbiters of what is liturgical and what is not. The official liturgical books of the Church separate liturgies from *pia exercitia* or private devotions. Of course, the frontier between the two areas shifts from time to time, and some ceremonies may find themselves now at one side now at the other. The *sensus fidelium* has a legitimate right to dialogue with the Magisterium on these matters. The theologian, for his part, will try to work out criteria to help the Magisterium decide what is liturgical and what is not. But at the beginning of his work he must adopt a provisional classification of liturgical material based on the practice of his contemporary Church. At the present day he will take as his guideline the constitution *Sacrosanctum Concilium* of Vatican II, with the various instructions and liturgical books that have been issued to implement it. This is the material that contemporary definitions of the liturgy will want to make intelligible.

The liturgical material which St. Thomas considered was presented to him by the legislation and practice of the mediaeval Latin Church. It was not the most enlightened period of liturgical history. The tradition had become somewhat narrow and static. There was not a great deal of historical information available, and the criterion of development was

canonical precedent rather than living tradition. Allegorical interpretation tended to obscure the real meaning of liturgical forms. A clerical and monastic bias left little room for active ceremonial participation in the the liturgy by the laity. St. Thomas was certainly influenced and limited by prevailing attitudes and practices. But one can hardly claim that he deviates substantially from the essential liturgical tradition of the Church. All the main elements that we now recognize as liturgical-the seven sacraments, the prayer of the hours, the main feasts of the calendar, and the architectural, artistic, and musical setting of these activities-are certainly identified by him as special subjects of theological analysis. He attempts to cope with such historical material as was available to him; [11] he recognizes the legitimacy of the Greek rite; [12] his commentaries on the ritual of sacraments are quite realistic, with only occasional concessions to allegory; [13] his discussions on the *subjectum* (i.e., recipient) of sacraments and on the sacramental character show a fundamentally sound appreciation of the need for active participation/ [14] and therefore for what he calls the *solemnitas* [15] built around the essential core of liturgical signs. A contemporary liturgist, then, can identify quite well with St. Thomas's choice of liturgical material. He can feel confident that ideas used by St. Thomas to understand the *ritus christianae religion.is* are relevant to his own field of investigation.

[11] There are frequent references to earlier liturgical legislation in his sacramental theology. Among the admittedly rare attempts he makes to explain the historical evolution of a liturgical practice cf. III, q. 80, a. 10 ad *5;* a. 12.

[12] Baptism-III, q. 60, a. 8; cf. q. 66, a. *5* ad 1; Eucharist-III, q. 74, a. 4; cf. *Cont. Errores Graecorum* II, 28; for a general remark supporting the principle of liturgical pluralism cf. *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 93, a. 1 ad *3.*

[13] Cf. for example his analysis of the eucharistic liturgy in *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 83, a. 4. On the reaction against allegory spearheaded by St. Albert the Great cf. J. Jungmann, S. J., *Missarum Sollemnia,* vol. 1, english trans!. p. 113. Jungmann, however, claims that the *Summa* still makes too many concessions to allegorism, p. 114.

[14] Cf. C. O'Neill, O. P., "The role of the recipient and sacramental signification" in *The Thomist* 21 (1958), 257-31, 508-540.

[15] *f umma Theol.,* III, q. 64, a. ad 1; q. 66, a. 10; q. 72, a. 4.

Liturgy as worship

Once it was established that liturgy was something more than the Church's external pomp and circumstance, to be defined descriptively, liturgists began to search for its deeper theological meaning. In constructing their theological definitions of the liturgy they turned first to the notion of *e1dtus* (cult, worship) .[16] Here was a ready-made idea, with profound theological resonances, which seemed to give its essential theological intelligibility to liturgical activity. A thorough analysis of cult was available in St. Thomas's treatment of the virtue of religion. His ideas were gratefully employed in working out the implications of defining liturgy in terms of worship.[17] His thinking on the relationship between internal and external worship was considered particularly valuable. There could be little danger of reducing liturgy to external ceremonial when one conceived cult as a personal moral act of the virtue of religion. To say liturgy was cult was to say it was primarily an interior relationship with God; all its external features were meant to serve that relationship.

There is little doubt that the notion of cult is essential to a theological understanding of liturgy. But whether it is the best starting point for such an understanding may be questioned. Some theologians are slightly suspicious of it insofar as it is a " rational " notion, derived from a philosophico-ethical analysis of the relationship between man and God.[18] This objection has some weight if the idea of worship is being put forward as an a priori concept from which one claims to deduce the reality of Christian liturgy. But when it is simply being used, and used analogically, to provide an understanding of the given

[16] There is a comprehensive list of these definitions in Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-60.

[17] J. M. Hanssens, "De Natura Liturgiae ad mentem S. Thomae," in *Periodica de re morali, canonica, liturgica* 24 (1935), 127*-165*; J. Menessier, 0. P., "L'idee du sacre et le cult d'apres S. Thomas," in *Rev. des Sc. Phil. et Theol.* 19 (1930), 63-82 and "Les realites sacrees dans le cult C'hretien," *ibid.* 20 (1931), 276-286, 453-471; J. Lecuyer, "Reflexions sur la theologie du cult selon saint Thomas," in *Revue Thomiste 55* (1955), 339-362.

[18] Cf. *Introduction to the Liturgy* (Martimort), pp. 183-186.

reality of Christian liturgy, which is what St. Thomas is doing, one can have little ground for complaint-unless one is prepared to discredit the whole idea of a philosophical theology.

A more serious difficulty about the use of cult as the generic element in the definition of liturgy is that it gives first place to what may be called the upward movement of the liturgy (from man to God) and does not make explicit its downward movement (from God to man). Certainly any Christian idea of worship carries an implicit awareness of the movement from God to man, because it comes out of a background of belief that in the order of grace nothing can come from man that has not first been put there by God. But it is one thing to say grace is a prerequisite for liturgy, quite another to say that grace is actually given in and through the liturgy. A definition which does not make the sanctifying power of the liturgy explicit would seem to be inadequate. It is worth remembering that when the notion of cult was first employed to define the liturgy there was still some uncertainty about whether and in what sense the sacraments belonged to liturgy .[19] The Mass easily earned its place because as a sacrifice it was obviously an act of worship. But as long as sacraments were conceived almost exclusively as means of sanctification their relevance to the liturgy was not immediately obvious. When the liturgical movement began to make it clear that all seven sacraments were liturgies, and together formed the very core of liturgy, the cult movement of the sacraments had to be recognized. But at the same time the sanctifying power associated with the sacraments had to be predicated of the liturgy as such. Now it has been found difficult to fit the idea of sanctification into a definition of liturgy which is committed to the idea of cult as its starting point. If one were looking to St. Thomas for guidance on how to do it one might note that when he comes to discuss what is now recognized as the heart of the liturgy, the sacraments, it is not to the notion of cult he first turns. Nor does he begin with the notion of sanctification: he

[19] *Ibid.* p. 186.

refuses to define sacrament as a cause of grace. He opts instead for a more general idea, which will allow him later to co-ordinate cult and sanctification-the idea of sign.[20] And it is, in fact, with this very idea that some more recent theologians have begun their definitions of the liturgy.

Liturgy as Sign

The notion of sign has been current in Latin sacramental theology at least since St. Augustine. After its prominence in St. Thomas it had a somewhat uncertain career. Because the Council of Trent was preoccupied with the causality of the sacraments, it tended to play down their sign value. It has never been easy to coordinate signification and causality in thinking about sacraments: the temptation, to which many of the Reformers seem to have succumbed, is to reduce their causality to that exercised by merely human signs. Post-Tridentine Catholic theology, taking no chances on the *ex opere operata* causality of the sacraments, did not make much use of the concept sign at the heart of its sacramental theology. Eventually the theories of Cardinal Billot on sacramental causality thrust the question of sign back into the center of the debate about sacraments. And modern personalist theologians have made sign once again a key feature of their explanation of sacraments.

The liturgical movement was obviously a force in the restoration of sign to sacramental thinking. Its pastoral instinct about the celebration of sacraments was confirmed by this kind of sacramental theory. But liturgists were more aware than most theologians that the sanctifying effect of sacraments took place in a context of worship. They were also more aware than most that the sanctification occurred not just in and through the essential matter and form of the sign but through the entire liturgical ritual. Hence it was natural that they would extend the notion of sign from sacramental theology to the theology of liturgy, and that they would come to define liturgy as a com-

[20] *Summa Theol.,* Til, q. 60, a. 1

plex of signs that express and realize both sanctification and worship.[21]

Although it must be admitted that cult definitions of the liturgy are still more common than sign definitions, an indication of how theological thought on the matter is developing can be gained from a comparison of two major Church statements about the liturgy. The encyclical *ll!fediator Dei* defined the liturgy solely in terms of cult.[22] There is no mention of sign, nor does the idea get much prominence anywhere in the encyclical. Sanctification is not included in the definition, although it is dealt with elsewhere in the text. The corresponding passage of Vatican II, *Sacrosanctum Concilium* shows a definite development.[28] The double movement of the liturgy is explicitly recognized, and the notion of sign is introduced. The Council says explicitly that sanctification is done through signs; it does not say explicitly that worship is expressed by these same signs. However, in other passages where it is dealing with the worship movement of the liturgy the Council draws· conclusions from the fact that the liturgy is a system of signs.[24] It seems to be quite in accordance with current Church teaching, therefore, to define liturgy as a complex of signs that simultaneously expresses and effects the sanctification of men by God and the worship of God by men.

[01] C. Vagaggini, 0. S. B. *Theological Dimensions of the Liturgy,* vol. 1 (translated from Italian edition of *// senso theologico deUa Liturgia)* Collegevai.,, 1959, defines liturgy as " the complexus of the efficacious signs of the Church's sanctification and of her worship " (p. 17) .

[••] " Sacra igitur Liturgia cultum publicum constituit, quem Redemptor noster, Ecclesiae Caput, caelesti Patri habet; quemque christifidelium societas Conditori suo et per ipsum aeterno Patri tribuit; utque omnia breviter perstringamus, integrum constituit publicum cultum mystici lesu Christi Corporis, Capitis nempe membrorumque eius" *Mediator Dei,*

[••] " Merito igitur Liturgia habetur veluti Iesu Christi sacerdotalis muneris exercitatio, in qua per signa sensibilia significatur et modo singnlis proprio efficitur sanctificatio hominis, et a mystico Iesu Christi Corpore, Capite nempe eiusque membris integer cultus publicus exercetur." *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* 7. Cf. *Introduction to the Liturgy* (Martimort), pp. 4-6.

[••] Nn. 88, 47, 59, 60, The description of the Church itself as a sign, introduced in *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* and developed in *Lumen Gentium* adds considerably to the theological worth of the concept.

Such a definition can also claim to be faithful to St. Thomas, even more so than a definition in terms of cult alone. St. Thomas is far more aware of the double movement of the liturgy than is often supposed. He has a principle that in the use of the sacraments (i.e., in their liturgical celebration) two things have to be taken into account: divine worship and the sanctification of men-the first being from man to God, the second from God to man.[25] The fact that he defines sacrament as sign of sanctification has, perhaps, given the impression that sign is only applicable to the downward movement of the liturgy. But in his treatment of the virtue of religion he has already applied the concept to cult: exterior actions are signs of interior worship.[26] Sign-making activity is therefore both sanctification and worship. It is in his analysis of the sacramental character that St. Thomas most fully exploits the double movement of sign. The characters equip the Christian to make cultic signs, and it is precisely in those signs that he is sanctified.[27] A definition ofliturgy, then, in terms of sign is very much in line with the theology of St. Thomas, and can be articulated theologically by means of his principles.

One may ask, however, whether sign is the first and most fundamental concept that St. Thomas would predicate of the liturgy. It is a concept that has the advantage of presenting liturgy as a distinctively human activity; it draws attention to the anthropological values of the liturgy; it justifies the pursuit of subjective satisfaction and self-expression. But liturgists, particularly when they are theologizing about their subject, have to reconcile the subjective, anthropological values of the liturgy with its objective, given structure. Liturgy is an objective divine reality and not merely the creation of man's religious subjectivity. There is a real danger that anything described

[25] " Dicendum quod in usu sacramentorum duo possunt considerari, scilicet cultus divinus, et sanctificatio hominis: quorum primum pertinet ad hominem per comparationem ad Deum, secundum autem e converso pertinet ad Deum per comparationem ad hominem." *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 60, a. *5.*

[26] *Ibid.,* II-II, q. 81, a. 7 and q. 83, a. q. 84, q. 85, a. I.

[27] Cf. C. O'Neill, *art. cit.* in note 14.

as sign will be looked at merely from man's point of view, that its legitimacy and efficacy will be judged solely by its power to express his beliefs, feelings, and needs, that its conduct will be organized on a criterion of human satisfaction. The post-Tridentine theologians were not just tilting at windmills.

The simplest way to guard against this forgetfulness of the objective, given reality of the liturgy is to specify that the signs being talked about are instituted by God. That tempers the freedom allowed to man's subjectivity. But, apart from the fact that divine institution can be claimed for only a very limited area of the Church's actual liturgy, the notion of institution by itself may give the impression that the objective standing of the liturgy is based on little more than a juridical determination. A more comprehensive way of examing the question-and one in which the debate about institution finds a more profound context-is to consider the liturgy as mystery. The mystery theology initiated by Dom Odo Casel has drawn compelling attention to the objective reality that is realized in the rituals of Christian worship. The influence which the ideas introduced by Casel have had on the theology of the liturgy has gone a long way towards ensuring that the objective dimension of the liturgy will not be neglected. However, the notion of mystery is not of itself very helpful in the work of theological definition. Its biblical and patristic richness has to be translated into something more technically manageable, if it is be be used in general theology.[28] Out of the attempts to do this one thing at least has emerged, particularly in debates about the liturgy: the mystery can be explained in christological terms. To say the liturgy is a mystery is to say it is an act and presence of Christ. The specific act of Christ that has caught the attention of theologians of the Jiturgy in this context is his priestly act. The objective reality (mystery) of the liturgy is expressed by defining it as an act of Christ's priesthood.

"" Th. Filthaut, *La Theologie des mysteres, expose de la controverse* (Tournai: Desclee, 1954); J. Gaillard 0. S. B., "La theologie des mysteres," in *Revue Thomist*• 57 (1957)' *510-551.*

Liturgy as priestly work of Christ

Definitions of liturgy in terms of the priesthood of Christ have, in fact, been offered by many authors side by side with or as part of their cult and sign definitions.[29] The concept has found favor in official teaching. *Mediator Dei* uses it, although not as its principal definition of the liturgy.[30] Vatican II makes it the starting-point of its definition and deduces its judgment about the objective value and efficacy of the liturgy from it.[31] In both these documents the link between the priestly work of Christ and the liturgical activity of the Church is made by means of the head-member relationship within the mystical body. It is this relationship that allows one to see acts of the Church as acts of Christ and conversely find the priestly act of Christ visibly realized in liturgical signs.

St. Thomas would certainly approve of this way of explaining the objective reality of the liturgy. By defining the sacramental character as a sharing in the priesthood of Christ he provided a technical theological explanation of how human liturgical acts can be in reality acts of Christ the priest.[82] His series of questions in the *Summa* devoted to the position of Christ between his Father and the rest of mankind allows one to understand how the personal liturgy of Christ is the ground and prototype of the Christian liturgy.[33] Christ's subjection to the Father, his prayer, his priesthood, his being adored by us and accepted as our Mediator provide a christological articulation of the objective mystery which is entered into by the Church when it addresses itself to the Father in submission, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, and thereby achieves its own predestined adoption through Christ. The basis of the Church's union with Christ through bodily, institutional contact is developed in the analysis of the Mystical Body, and Christ's head-

[29] References in *Introduction to the Liturgy* (Martimort), p. 4.
[80] *Mediator Dei,* n.
[81] *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* n. 7.
[82] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 63, a. 3.
[88] *Ibid.,* qq.

ship over it.[34] A definition of the liturgy, then, in terms of the priesthood and headship of Christ can be given detailed technical precision from the resources provided by the christology of St. Thomas.

But there are features of the christology of St. Thomas which suggest that a definition of liturgy in terms of the grace, headship, and priesthood of Christ cannot be the last word about it. The created qualities and prerogatives of Christ's humanity can only be understood in relation to the Incarnation. His grace is measured by his divine sonship. The human power and authority which stems from his grace is ministerial and instrumental. The action by which he causes salvation is theandric. To explain the full objective mystery of the liturgy it is not enough to appeal to the human activity of Christ. One has to raise further questions about how this human activity is a manifestation and realization of divine activity. This, in turn, involves appealing to presuppositions about the nature of God and the nature of man.[35] A christology supposes a theology (including a theological anthropology) . And for that very reason a christological definition of the liturgy supposes a theological one. Liturgy is the mystery of God before it is the mystery of Christ.

Certainly when liturgists are exploring the idea of mystery they admit that its ultimate explanation lies in God. But more often than not they seem to take God somewhat for granted. Even when they develop the trinitarian pattern of the liturgy they seldom go beyond an economic trinitarianism. It is arguable that St. Thomas would want to do more than this, that he would want to employ a strictly theological category to define the liturgy before specifying the christological property of it. In fact, some of his most basic statements about liturgy

•• *Ibid.,* q. 8.

85 Thus St. Thomas establishes the *convenientia* of the Incarnation by showing how it accords with the nature of God as benevolent self-giving *(ibid.,* q, 1, a. 1) and the status of man as an embodied, sinful creature set in history (aa. !'l-6). His views of God and man are the presuppositions which underlie all his christology. They have been critically established in the two earlier parts of the *Summa.*

come in the pre-christologicallevel of his theology, both in the *Contra Gentiles* and in the *Summa.* It is there that he gives his primary account of the objective divine dimension of the liturgy.

Liturgy as the Work of God

Liturgists recall that in the Bible the word *mystery* originally meant the plan of God's wisdom for the salvation of mankind. It is this plan that is objectively embodied and revealed in the liturgy. St. Thomas discusses the objective institutions of liturgy in this very setting of the plan of God-technically under the heading of Providence. He situates the subject interestingly in the *Contra Gentiles.* In the course of a discussion on how Providence looks after rational creatures in a special way he introduces the concept of divine law.[36] Having explained how divine law provides for love and faith he goes on to explain why it also provides man with institutions of worship:

> Since it is connatural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, and since it is most difficult to arise above sensible things, divine providence has appointed sensible things as a reminder to man of things divine, so that thus man's intention might the more readily be recalled to divine things, not excluding the man whose mind is not equal to the contemplation of divine things in themselves. For this reason sensible sacrifices were instituted .... Again, sensible things are employed for man's sanctification, in the shape of washings, anointings, meat and drink, and the uttering of sensible words, as signifying to man that he receives intelligible gifts from an external source, and from God whose name is expressed by sensible words. Moreover, man performs certain sensible actions, not to arouse God but to arouse himself to things divine: such as prostrations, genuflexions, raising the voice and singing. . . .[37]

It is also under the heading of law that he deals with the institutions of worship in the *Summa,*. More than in the *Contra Gentiles* he deals with the actual historical liturgies that have been provided by God in the Old and New Laws. But a more significant advance in the *Summa* is the way in which he co-

[86] *III Contra Gentiles,* c. 114.
[87] *Ibid.,* c. 119.

ordinates the providence of Law with the providence of grace in his explanation of liturgy. This whole section of his theology is, in fact, an examination of the twofold way in which God is at work in man's search for self-fulfilment by law and by grace.[38] And while St. Thomas distinguishes the two levels of divine activity, he is very sensitive to their interaction and to the way the balance between them changes from the Old to the New Testament. This contrast between the Testaments, in terms of law and grace, is important for understanding his views on the liturgy. What he has to say about the worship of the New Law is expressed by way of comparison with the institutions of the Old Law. Consequently it is important to study his discussion of the *Praecepta Caeremonialia,* not alone for the valuable general insights it has into the dynamics of liturgy but because it provides the point of reference and the terminology for his study of Christian worship. Those who would relegate the long, forbidding questions on Old Testament ceremonial to the limbo of historical curiosities run the risk of misunderstanding St. Thomas's thinking about liturgy.[89]

By treating liturgy under the heading of law St. Thomas gives basic recognition to its communal, public character.[40] The institutions set up by law are social: they create the community and provide the objective setting and support in which the individual can practice virtue. Because the liturgical institutions of the Old Law are found in the Bible they are attributed to positive divine law.[41] They embody a revelation

[38] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 90 prol.

[39] He deals with the liturgy of the Old Law in I-II, qq. 101-103 and with the liturgy of the New Law, *ibid.,* q. 108, aa. On the historical background and methodology of his treatment cf. M.-D. Chenu, "La theologie de la loi ancienne selon saint Thomas," in *Revue Thomiste* 61 (1961), 485-497; Beryl Smalley, " William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle and St. Thomas Aquinas on the Old Law," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies.* Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (Toronto, 1974). Vol.

[4°] For a more general discussion on this point cf. C.-M. Travers, 0. P. *Valeur Sociale de la Liturgie* (Lex Orandi *5)* (Paris, 1946) .

[41] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 98, a. It is because they are in the Bible that St. Thomas devotes so much space to the ceremonial precepts. He is a theologian who takes the Bible seriously, cf. Chenu, *art. cit.*

made to a particular people, who have a special role in the history of salvation, of how the general moral precept to worship God should be concretely carried out.[42] Such an elaborate code was needed to protect them from idolatry and to encourage them to direct all their life to God.[48] But there is a second, even more fundamental reason why God should have legislated in such detail: the ceremonies of the Old Testament had to prefigure Christ.[44] St. Thomas considers that this reference to Christ has to be found in all liturgy, even in those extra-biblical liturgies which he believes can be legitimately created by prophetically inspired men.[45] It provides him with a fundamental explanation of why the ceremonies of the Old Law had to be replaced. They were signs of a Christ who was to come: they looked forward to him. Once he had come they were no longer truthful, no longer expressed the objective reality of salvation; they had to be replaced by commemorative signs, which looked back in faith and charity to the Christ who had come.[46]

The law-making activity of God, then, which gives external shape to liturgy, must be coordinated with his grace-giving activity. In Christ grace is objectively realized and available to humanity.[47] Hence, according to St. Thomas, the New Law is primarily a "lex indita," an inner enabling impulse of the Holy Spirit producing justification and virtue.[48] But the new dispensation does not dispense entirely with external law. Because grace became available in the humanity of Christ it is fittingly communicated and expressed by men in bodily actions.49 These external actions, to the extent that they are

[42] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 101, a. 1.
[43] *Ibid.*, a. 8.
[44] *Ibid.*, aa. 2-8; q. 102, a. 2.
[45] *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 1. On the basis of this remark of St. Thomas one could find a meaning and value in the liturgies of non-Christian religions, even in the present day.
[46] *Ibid.*, q. 101, a. 2; q. 108, a. 8. On the need for truthfulness in liturgical signs cf. II-II, q. 98, a. 1.
[47] I-II, q. 108, a. 2.
[48] *Ibid.*, q. 106, a. 1.
[49] *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 1.

necessary for the gaining and right use of grace, become the object of legislation in the New Testament. For the gaining of grace divine law brings the sacraments into existence.[50] Although the shape of these sacraments was prefigured in the ceremonies of the Old Law,[51] their objective reality is quite different. They contain the justifying grace of God. The liturgies of the Old Law could carry the faith and charity of God's People forward to Christ and so play a part in their justification; but they could not objectively embody the grace of Christ, because Christ did not yet actually exist.[52] Because they contain Christ, the sacraments of the New Law are the work of God both as legislator and giver of grace.

But what is true of the sacraments need not be true of the totality of Christian liturgy. St. Thomas, in fact, says that, apart from the institution of the sacraments, there is no divine legislation about worship in the New Testament. Other ceremonies do not give grace and are not given by God.[53] He sees the detailed ceremonial of the Old Law fulillled, not in Christian liturgy (in spite of many similarities) but in the life of Christ or in acts of Christian virtue.[54] In taking this line St. Thomas would seem to be supporting the separation of sacraments from liturgy, of sanctification from worship. It is here, however, that one must be sensitive to the categories in which St. Thomas presents his thought and remember that he is analysing the New Law, not in isolation but in contrast with the Old. When he says, in effect, that there are no ceremonial precepts in the New Law he is not saying that there is no place for ceremonial. The New Law legislates for the human actions by which we are introduced to grace and by which we use grace aright. If the sacraments are necessary for the giving of grace, then their use is necessary for those who would have grace. The New Law requires participation in the sacraments.

[50] *Ibid.,* a.
[51] *Ibid.,* q. a. 5 ad 8.
[52] *Ibid.,* q. 108, a.
[53] *Ibid.,* q. 108, a. and ad
[54] *Ibid.,* q. aa. especially in replies to the objections,

It also requires that this participation should take the form of worship. The moral precept of worship has not been abrogated in the New Law, and obedience to it is an essential requirement for the reception of grace. And while this worship is essentially an interior attitude, it has to take external ceremonial form. St. Thomas denies none of this. What he does deny is that there are any specific ceremonies, other than the basic ritual of the sacraments, that are necessarily required for worship under the law of grace. The response of worship must be made with all the liberty, personal initiative and pursuit of reasonableness that marks the law of the Holy Spirit.[55] The individual conscience has its rights here. But because grace is given and used concretely in the Christian community, there will be a place for human legislation. St. Thomas takes it for granted in his sacramental theology that, while the Church has no right to interfere with the essentials of sacraments, it has the right to legislate for their liturgical use and the ritual in which they are solemnized. Here he mentions the special authority of the "Sancti Patres " in the determination of Christian worship/[6] and also the rights of prelates;[57] and when he is dealing with the subjective moral values of worship he shows how seriously the obligations arising from this human liturgical legislation must be taken.[58] Yet he counsels moderation in liturgical law" so as not to burden the way of life of the faithful."[59] And by presenting it as the work of human legislators he frees it from the burdensome absoluteness that went with the ceremonial precepts of the Old J..aw.[60]

Those who are interested in the renewal and reshaping of the Church's liturgy will be encouraged by this teaching of St. Thomas on the human provenance, and therefore on the rela-

•• *Ibid.,* q. 108, a. 1 and ad !l. On the reasonableness of the New Law in contrast to the Old cf. q. 10!l, a. 1 ad 1.

•• *Ibid.,* q. 107, a. 4.

[57] *Ibid.,* q. 108, aa. !l-8.

""II-II, qq. 98, 94, 99.

•• I-II, q. 107, a. 4: "ne conversatio fidelium onerosa reddatur."

[00] Note, for example, the difference he sees between the obligation of observing Sunday and observing the Sabbath in II-II, q. U!l, a. 4 ad 4.

tivity, of most liturgical law. But from the theological standpoint it would seem that he is making the liturgy much less the work of God. Again, however, one has to keep the context of St. Thomas's statements in mind. The reason there is so little divine liturgical law in the New Testament is that grace is now available in Christ. The more grace abounds the less need there is of law. New Testament man can be trusted to worship God without much guidance from divine law. He can be trusted as an individual because he is transformed by the grace of the Holy Spirit, perfected by the virtue of religion and inspired by the gift of piety.[61] But more importantly, he can be trusted insofar as he belongs to the community of the Church. When one remembers that the ecclesiology of St. Thomas is primarily an ecclesiology of grace[62] and that acts of the Church are acts of grace, one can appreciate why he sees so little need for its life to be arranged in detail by divine law. The worship that New Testament man produces, provided it is done within the order of the Church, is the work of grace. And the work of grace is more effectively divine than the work of law. New Testament liturgy, for all its freedom and man-made forms, is the work of God far more profoundly than was the liturgy of the Old Law.

As an illustration of how the theological categories of law and grace are used by St. Thomas to give a profound explanation of the mystery of the liturgy it is worth looking again at his sacramental theology. At the heart of his analysis of sacraments he has a question entitled *De Caums Sacramentorum.*[63] He is isolating the actual causes that bring a sacrament, as defined formally in previous questions, into real existence. In other words, he is looking at an actual liturgy

[61] II-II, q. 121 It is to the gift of piety that St. Thomas attributes the trinitarian quality of the Christian's worship.

[62] Cf. Yves Congar, 0. P., *"Ecclesia* et *Populu,s (Fidelis)* dans l'Ecclesiologie de S. Thomas," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies* (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1974) vol. 1, pp. 159-174.

[••] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 64.

of the Church and asking what agents are at work to make this to be a sacrament of the New Law. Before asking about the minister, the Church, the Apostles, Christ, he asks about the action of God. He studies this on two levels, of interior action and of institution. [64] This con·esponds to the double pattern of grace and law that he has found in God's salvific action in the *Prima Secundae.* To situate the question of the institution of sacraments in this context is to make it a genuinely theological rather than a merely apologetical issue. It is to ask, not have individual sacraments been divinely instituted but why and to what extent a sacrament has to be so. And the answer, that a sacrament has to be from God because he is the one whose *virtus* is present in the sacrament, joins the sacramental expression firmly to the *virtus* that is at work. God acts within and without, in a balanced presence of law and grace. The power of the sacraments to cause grace is likewise better understood when seen within the general pattern of grace-giving and its relationship to liturgical law in the New Testament. The causality of the sacraments is not a surreptitious, unannounced intervention by God but a visible offer made in a way that gives man the opportunity for a congenial, personal response. The external shape corresponds to the internal movement: and both are from God. The importance of liturgical celebration is also clarified. The distinction that St. Thomas makes between what is " de necessitate sacramenti " and what is " ad quandam solemnitatem " [65] may seem to be restricting the work of God to the essential matter and form. But when one remembers that what he is excluding from the New Law of grace is not the exercise of worship or the need for some external forms of it but simply the divinely imposed necessity of this or that particular form, one can be satisfied that liturgical self-expression of the Christian community is an integral part of the economy of grace. As St. Thomas makes

•• *Ibid.,* aa.
•• *Ibid.,* q. 64, a. ad 1.

clear in his formal analysis of grace, everything that prepares man for grace and enables him to cooperate with it and act externally in accordance with it is itself produced by God's grace.[66] Hence the full liturgical celebration of sacraments is the work of God, not as the product of divine law but as the product of divine grace. While the presence of grace in a sacrament depends indubitably on the making of a divinely instituted sign, the taking hold of grace requires the creative liturgical response of the Christian community. The Church's freedom to create an appropriate liturgical setting for the sacraments is the grace-assured freedom of the children of God.

Theological definition of Liturgy

The conclusion suggested by our examination of St. Thomas's treatment of liturgical material is thgt he would prefer a definition of the liturgy to begin with a strictly theological idea rather than a anthropological one such as worship or sign, or a christological one such as priesthood. God has to be brought into the definition of liturgy somehow. The definitions we have already examined do so by way of specific difference-qualifying, for example, the generic notion of sign by the notion of divine institution. But it does seem more sensible in a theological definition to make the divine to be the generic element rather than the specific difference. To define liturgy as " the work of God" or "the action of God" takes one immediately to the ontological reality of the mystery one is defining. One could then go on to qualify this action of God as one which, for example, appears in a system of signs which sanctify members of the Church for the worship of the Father through Christ in the Spirit. The qualifying details of such a definition would need to be worked out and balanced more carefully. The only point at issue here is that these details should be qualifications rather than starting points, and that the first thing a theologian should say about liturgy is that it is the action of God.

To describe liturgy as an action of God ... can, of course,

[66] I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 111, aa. 2-3.

be a form of intellectual and pastoral escapism. In mundane matters or in a purely secularist ideology to call something an act of God can mean that we simply do not understand it or can do nothing about it. But in a theologian like St. Thomas " act of God " is an expression of neither agnosticism nor irresponsibility. It is not agnosticism, myth or metaphor because his explanation of how liturgy is the work of God as lawgiver and giver of grace is rooted in a careful metaphysical analysis of the action of God on his creatures, and particularly on man. His study of divine government in *Prima Pars* sets out to justify and explain how God is present and active in all things, and how his action on intelligent creatures occurs both on the level of interior transformation of mind and will as well as on the level of external presentation of images and motivation. [67] Indeed his complex analysis of what would today be called interpersonal relationships (involving different combinations of God, angels, men, and things), and the place of signs in this, offers a facinating groundwork for understanding the personalist dimension that so interests contemporary liturgists. These patterns of divine government are in turn an application of St. Thomas's more fundamental analysis of God, his providence, the work of creation and the kind of relationship that exists between God and his creatures. The fact that God is, that he gives himself out of sheer goodness to others, that he directs these others to participate in his goodness by predestinating providence are the ultimate presuppositions for his theological interpretation of the liturgy. Some of them are more immediately relevant to the liturgy than others. For example, the discussion on the names of God [68] has a bearing on the evaluation of prayer language in the liturgy. The credibility of the trinitarian pattern of liturgy is supported by the establishment of basic trinitarian dogma, and the correlation of the visible mission of the Word with the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit shows how the pattern of visible shape and m-

[67] Cf. I, q. 105, aa. 8-4.
[68] *Ibid.*, q. 18.

visible grace found in the New Testament liturgy (law and grace in St. Thomas's terms) is grounded on the trinitarian economy of salvation. [69] The explanation of the purpose of creation as the communication of God's goodness provides the basic key for understanding how in promoting the glory of God liturgy is not benefitting God but perfecting his creatures. [70]

Nor does defining liturgy as the action of God undermine the pastoral responsibility of men for the actual carrying out of liturgy. The basic anthropology of St. Thomas presents man as a creature who is master of his own destiny. Made as he is in the image of God he has a capacity for the gift of personal relationship with God, freely accepted and pursued in accordance with the psychological and moral structure of his own nature and his essential dependence on community. [71] Man's self-perfecting action is no less his own, no less free, no less typically human for being exercised under the sovereign premotion of God. It is no less personal for being worked out within patterns set by human law. Man's existential situation as sinner does not alter the essential pattern of his relationship with God but rather accentuates its humaness. The place of the body in liturgy, the remedial redemptive necessity of Christian liturgy, the need for conscious, deliberate correspondence with the grace it offers, the worshipful use of its forms whether they are given by divine law or created by human ingenuity-all this is justified and made intelligible by the general anthropological options of St. Thomas such as they appear, for example in the *Prima Pars* and *Prima Secundae.*

This is not the place to debate the value of these fundamental theological and anthropological positions of St. Thomas in any detail or to fully explore their relevance to liturgy. They are listed simply to show that from the very beginning of his theology St. Thomas is saying things which take account of and provide a method for understanding the liturgical material

•• *Ibid.,* q. 43.

[70] *Ibid.,* q. 44, a. 4; cf. II-II, q. 81, a. 7.

[71] I, q. 93; cf. I-II prologue.

which he will encounter in his progressive exploration of all the principles, values, and historical happenings that make up the existential relationship between God and his creation. And since it is in the Christian liturgy that this relationship is being worked out in the final phase of salvation history, one can claim that he offers a method of thinking theologically about-if not a self-contained theology of-the liturgy.

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PAUL AS PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY

THE IMAGE OF THE APOSTLE IN S. TH. THOMAS'S THEOLOGY*

Paul wrote fourteen letters ... Their entire doctrine deals with the grace of Christ. This grace can be considered in a threefold way. First of all, inasmuch as it is in Christ the head himself-and this is the concern of the epistle to the Hebrews. Second, inasmuch as it is in the principal members of the mystical body-and this is the concern of the letters to the Prelates. Third, inasmuch as it is in the mystical body itself, which is the church-and this is the concern of the letters to the Gentiles. [1]

THIS IS WHAT Thomas writes in the prologue of his commentary on the epistles of Paul. And he works out this classification until all fourteen letters of the Pauline Corpus have their systematic place within the whole.[2]

* This article is the revised and enlarged English text of a German radio-lecture, transmitted November 14, 1970 by Radio Hilversum (Netherlands) within a series of radio-lectures on the exegesis of Paul in the course of the centuries. The German text has first been published in the Dutch edition of the entire series of lectures under the title: *De dertiende apostel en het e/jde gebod. Paulus in de loop der eeuwen.* Onder redactie van dr. G. C. Berkouwer en dr. H. A. Oberman (Uitgeversmij J. H. Kok N. V., Kampen, 1971), pp. 53-67. The English text-translated by the author-is first published in this volume.

[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Super Epistolas S. Patdi lectura,* prol., ed. Marietti (Turin-Rome, 1953), no. 11. Quotations from the Commentary on Paul are given according to the individual letters (for example: *In Rom.* = *In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos expositio),* indicating the verses which are commented on and the *lectio* to which that part of the commentary belongs (as it well known, traditionally the chapters of the commentary which correspond to the chapters of the biblical text are subdivided into *lectiones).* In order to facilitate the search of the quotations we add (in brackets) the current number of the edition of Turin mentioned above. About *lectura* and *expositio* cf. *infra* p. 5. For English cf. St. Thomas Aquinas *Commentary on Saint Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians* Books, 1966), ... *to the Galatians* (1966), ... *First Letter to the Thessalonians and the Letter to the Philippians* (1969).

[2] For illustration I quote the entire text: " Scripsit enim quatuordecim epistolas

The modern reader cannot believe his eyes: the medieval commentator stresses a picture according to which the most spirited and least systematic author of the New Testament sits at his writing table, far from the world, and meditates on the suitable division of a dogmatical monograph about the grace of Christ. The results were fourteen chapters which treat the whole topic in an exhaustive way and in a definite sequence. Only an unimportant accident diffused this monograph over the whole world in the form of fourteen letters.

But that is Paul in the eyes of Thomas Aquinas! The Apostle is for him the greatest systematician of the New Testament, the professor among the Apostles. How could such an image of Paul arise, in which the features of the Apostle obviously assimilate the traits of Aquinas and of his time?

The "Evangelical Movement"

Whoever thinks of the Middle Ages and particularly of

quarum novem instruunt Ecclesiam Gentium; quatuor praelatos et principes Ecclesiae, id est reges; una populum Israel, scilicet quae est ad Hebraeos.

Est enim haec doctrina tota de gratia Christi, quae quidem potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum quod est in ipso capite, scilicet Christo, et sic commendatur in Epistola ad Hebraeos. Alio modo secundum quod est in membris principalibus corporis mystici, et sic commendatur in epistolis quae sunt ad praelatos. Tertio modo secundum quod in ipso corpore mystico, quod est Ecclesia, et sic commendatur in epistolis quae mittuntur ad Gentiles, quarum haec est distinctio: nam ipsa gratia Christi tripliciter potest considerari. Uno modo secundum se, et sic commendatur in epistola ad Romanos: alio modo secundum quod est in sacramentis gratiae, et sic commendatur in duabus epistolis ad Corinthios, in quarum prima agitur de ipsis sacramentis, in secunda de dignitate ministrorum, et in epistola ad Galatas in qua excluduntur superflua sacramenta contra illos qui volebant vetera sacramenta novis adiungere; tertio consideratur gratia Christi secundum effectum unitatis quem in Ecclesia fecit. Agit ergo Apostolus, primo quidem, de institutione Ecclesiasticae unitatis in epistola ad Ephesios; secundo, de eius confirmatione et profectu in epistola ad Philippenses; tertio, de e;us <iefensione, contra errores quidem, in epistola ad Colossenses, contra persecutiones vero praesentes, in I Thessalonicenses, contra futuras vero et praecipue tempore Antichristi, in secunda.

Praelatos vero ecclesiarum instruit et spirituales et temporales. Spirituales quidem de institutione, instructione et gubernatione ecclesiasticae unitatis in prima ad Timotheum, de firmitate contra persecutores in secunda, tertio de defensione contra haereticos in epistola ad Titum. Dominos vero temporales instruit in epistola ad Philemonem. Et sic patet ratio distinctionis cot ordinis omnium epistolarum."

Thomas Aquinas [3] thinks first of all of works like the " Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard," or the " Quaestiones Disputatae," or the " Summa Theologiae." He remembers a " scholastic " manner of thinking and presentation, that is to say, sophisticated divisions, stereotyped and sometimes tiring literary forms, definitions, syllogisms, constant appeal to " authorities," in short, a dry intellectualism which seems to have forgotten the vivid originality of the Holy Scriptures. In fact, this theological literature is the result and at the same time an indication of the qualitative change of the educational system which leads from the monastery school of the early Middle Ages to the city schools of the twelfth century and thence to the university of the thirteenth century. We know the main factors of that dramatic intellectual development. Let us recall only a few high points. There is the change from the feudal system to the city culture of merchants and craftsmen; the increasing desire for educatioll within the emancipated citizenship in the cities; the increasing reception of logical and dialectic methods in academic teaching on the basis of the logical works of the old Greek philosophy; the progressive rediscovery and translation of the physical, metaphysical, and ethical works of Greek philosophy, particularly of Aristotle; the dialogue with Jewish and Arabic philosophy and their interpretation of Aristotle, entering the West, as happened, via Spain. The consequence of all this was a self-conscious intellectual

[3] For a general historical introduction to Thomas Aquinas see, first of all, the masterpiece by M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* (Chicago, 1964; French original: *Introduction a l'etude de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris,• 1954); *St. Thomas et la theologie (Maitres spirituels*, 17: Paris, 1959); " Scholastik," in H. Fries, ed., *Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe*, II (Munich, 1963) pp. 478-494; E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956); French original: *Le thomisme. Introduction a la philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris,• 1948); the English version has an excellent "Appendix" on the works of St. Thomas by I. T. Eschmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-439); see also H.-F. Dondaine-D. Schliiter-0. H. Pesch, "Thomas von Aquin" in *Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche*, 2nd ed., v. X (1965), col. 119-134; see last, but not least, the marvellous and intelligent booklet by G. K. Chesterton, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, (New York, 1933). The most recent scholarly study is by James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomaa D'Aquino, his life, thought and works* (Garden City, N. Y., 1974).

optimism which stimulated scholars to attempt a synthesis of philosophical and theological thinking, of obedience of faith and rational reflection on the Christian message. The results were the gTeat theological masterpieces of the thirteenth century.

What is less known but decisive for an understanding of this theology and its literary expressions is, however, that this " scholasticism " is developed on the basis and in the framework of what we might call an " evangelical movement." The period of the last third of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century is characterized by the breakthrough of a desire for biblical knowledge which could not be satisfied either by means of glosses between the lines or on the margin of the biblical text or by means of meditation presented by an abbot to his monks and which was intended only for religious edification.4 Obviously, this thirst for knowledge had a sociological ingredient: by means of a more exact hearing of the biblical word one expected an impulse and criteria in favor of a renewal of the Church, and soon this evangelical movement expressed itself in new institutional forms as, for example, the Orders of the Franciscans and the Dominicans. [5] Nevertheless, this thirst for knowledge soon developed as an academic tendency in its own right. New methods were invented to diffuse the text of the Scriptures in greater quantity; corrected copies of the text were attempted, both Latin and vernacular texts; the text was divided into pericopes; the first concordances appeared; and, above all, the theological educational system in harmony with these tendencies was rearranged. The consistent presentation of systematic theology was the concern of the assistant pro-

• In addition to Chenu, *Towards Understanding Thomas Aquinas* (see n. 3) pp. 39-46, 233-262 see B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford," 1952); H. de Lubac, *Exegese medievale. Les quatre sens de l'Ecriture* (2 vols. in 4, Paris, 1959/64) .

[5] On Francis of Assisi and the Franciscans see A. Fortini, *Nova Vita di S. Francesco* (4 vols, Assisi, 1959); I. Gobry, *St. Franl}oisd'Assise et l'esprit franciscain (Maitres spirituels*, 10: Paris, 1958). On Dominic and the Dominicans see M. H. Vicaire, *Ilistoire de Saint D01ninique* (2 vols., Paris, 1957; English: *Saint Dominic and his Times, New York*, 1964); *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, IV, 974-982, *Dominicans;* VI, 38-46, *Franciscans.*

fessor, of the so-called "baccalaureus," who explained the " Sentences " of Peter Lombard. The ordinary professor, the so-called "magister," was alone concerned with continuous commentary on the Holy Scriptures. Only in public debate, the so-called " quaestiones disputatae," did the magister teach as systematician. And these " quaestiones disputatae " had also been developed from the commentary on the Scriptures, both as an academic exercise and as literary form. For in the text of the biblical commentary it had long been customary to deal with " questions " which arose in the context of the text in the form of a systematic excursus. Thus, the "magister in sacra theologia " has been produced by the " magister in sacra pagina," and not vice versa. Even Thomas Aquinas wrote his main work, his *Summa Theologiae,* without direct relation to his academic work. It was to help students in their work *outside* the classroom.[6] But, except for the debates, his daily courses were concerned with the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.

Scholastic Exegesis of Paul

In this intellectual atmosphere, where biblical testimony, philosophical curiosity, and didactic technique influenced one another mutually, Thomas dealt with Paul. Twice he commented in his courses on the fourteen epistles of Paul, all of which he, according to the knowledge of his time, considered to be authentic.[7] He first lectured on Paul during his stay in

[6] Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I prol. On the didactic construction of the *Summa* and on the theological meaning of this construction Eee 0. H. Pesch, " Urn den Plan der Summa Theologiae des hl. Thomas von Aquin," in *Munchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 16 (1965), pp. 128-137; this article refers to further literature and gives a summary of the intensive discussion on this topic. This discussion has, more or less, concluded to a partly confirmed, partly precised and modified position of M.-D. Chenu in his chapter on the *Summa Theologiae, op. cit.* (see n. 8), pp. 297-322.

[7] Most recent surveys on the problems of Thomas's commentary on Paul under the aspect of literary criticism cf. Chenu, *op. cit.,* pp. 200 sq; M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des heiligen Thomas von Aquin. Eine literarhistorische Untersuchung und Einfiihrung* (Miinster, 1949), pp. 266-272; I. T. Eschmann in the "Appendix" mentioned above, (see n. 3). See also the editor's *Introduction* in the ed. Marietti of the commentary (seen. I).

Italy between 1259 and 1268 and a, second time towards the end of his life, probably between 1269 and 1272 during his second stay at Paris.[8] Reginald of Piperno, the student and secretary of Thomas, had made a solid report, a so-called " lecture," of the first course on Paul. Thomas used this report later in order to revise it in the context of his second course. For unknown reasons this so-called" expositio "-the name of a report personally revised by the author-reaches only the tenth chapter of the first letter to the Corinthians. Reginald completed the missing elements, using his fOi.'mer report, and thus the commentary on Paul has come to us in this mixture of " expositio" and" lecture." Only the commentary from I Cor. 7:14 to I Cor. 10:33 has been lost by an accident of textual transmission. Yet Thomas does not deal with Paul only in his commentary on the Pauline Corpus. The thinking of the Apostle is omnipresent in the Thomistic theology, particularly, of course, in the context of the doctrine of grace and justification.[9]

But let us first consider the literal commentary. How does such an exegesis of Paul look in Thomas Aquinas when it has gone through the scholastic sieve? Let us point out some of the characteristics.

1. The text is divided into large, small, and minuscule units, in order to clarify its inner structure, the exact sequence and the connection of the ideas. Nobody at that time was afraid to drain the text of its original vividness and the particular trait of its author. God is a god of order, also in his written

[8] For solid and, in my opinion, incontestable arguments that the second course on Paul and particularly the second redaction of the commentary on Romans belong to the time of Thomas's second stay in Paris see H. Bouillard, *Conversion et grace chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1944), pp. Bouillard's thesis, however, has not yet been commonly accepted. Neither Chenu, *loc. cit.,* nor Grabmann, *op. cit.,* p. nor the *Introduction* of the ed. Marietti (cf. p. VI) mention it. Eschmann, *op. cit.,* p. 399, mentions Bouillard's thesis, but without giving his own opinion.

[9] That will become impressively clear by consulting the *Indices* of the *Editio Leonina* (S. *Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu Leonis XII edita* (Rome, sqq.), t. XVI, partly reprinted in the ed. Marietti, (Rome, 1948); Paul's epistles are quoted more frequently than the four Gospels together; Pentateuch and Psalms follow at some distance.

word. Therefore, nothing in the text can be by accident or without intention.[10] Analysis, therefore, has to investigate each word right to the last letter. We read, for example, the following, in which Thomas deals with the epistle to the Romans:

> This letter is divided into two parts, namely, into the greeting and the epistle itself, which begins with the words " First I thank my God." Concerning the first part, Paul does three things: First, the person who is greeting is described; second, those who are greeted-by the words" To all God's beloved in Rome"; third, the salvation wished by the greeting-by the words " Grace be to you." As to the first, Paul does two things: first, the person of the author is described; second, his office is commended-by the words " which he promised long ago." The person who is writing, however, is described under four aspects, and first of all by his name, when he says " Paul." In this regard we have to consider three things ... .U

And now a long commentary about the meaning of the word " Paul " follows, the first word in the first verse of the epistle to the Romans.[12] Before we disqualify such a method as the monotonous pedantry of a schoolmaster, we should realize the progress it represented when compared with the various types of paraphrase, which, at that time as today, could bend the text to any purpose whatever. Here, however, the exegete is forced to follow the text word for word and to rise to the

[1°] Cf. *infra, p.* 18 sq. Thomas nowhere explains the principles of interpretation of the Scriptures in a coherent way-there was not yet a " hermeneutical problem " at that time. The most detailed texts are *Summa Theol.,* I, q. I, aa. 9-10; *Quodl.* VII, 14-16 (q. 6 a. I-8); *de Pot.,* q. 4, a. 1; further significant remarks, but made only incidentally, e. g., *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 24, a. 8 c; q. 68, a. I c., a. 8 c.; q. I02, a. 1 c.; I-II, q. 82, a. 2, ad 1; q. 98, a. 8 ad 2; q. 108, a. 4 ad 2 (!); II-II, q. 11, a. 2 ad 2; q. 89, a. 1 ad 1; III, q. *55,* a. *5* c.; q. 60, a. 8' ad 1. Cf. also the *Indices* mentioned in n. 9 *(Index Elementorum,* under "Scriptura "). An impressive example of the seriousness with which Thomas examines the biblical text up to the last detail is his exposition of the literal and the "mystical " senses of the "ceremonial precepts" of the Old Law *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 102-the largest question of the entire *Summa).* Cf. 0. H. Pesch, " Exkurs 4: Exegese des Alten Testamentes bei Thomas " and the commentary on I-II, q. I02 in *Daa Gesets. Kommentar su Summa Theologiae I-ll 90-105 (Deutsche Thomaa-Ausgabe,* Bd. 18: Heidelberg-Graz, I974).

[11] In *Rom.* 1:I, lect. 1 (15 sq).

[12] *Loc. cit.,* (16-20).

" sententia," to the doctrine, only on the basis of the " littera " and the " sensus," on the letter and the immediate meaning of the words. Such was already the procedure of Hugh of St. Victor a whole century before. He outlined the program of the thirteenth-century exegetes with the following methodological direction:

> An exposition ·Contains three things: letter, meaning, doctrine. The letter means the fitting order of the words, which we also call construction. The meaning is the obvious and open significance which the letter evidences outwardly. The doctrine is the more profound insight, which is only found through exposition and interpretation. In these three things there is an order, following which first of all the letter, then the meaning, and then the doctrine should be investigated; when that is done, the exposition is completed.[13]

With such a method no one could construct a sermon, a catechesis or a meditation but rather an " expositio," an academic explanation and interpretation of the text.

Under certain circumstances one could even develop a sermon that way. In 1273 Thomas delivered Lenten sermons at Naples about the Creed, the Our Father, and the Ave Maria. We have a Latin report of these sermons, originally given in Italian, in the three small works under the title *Exposition of the Apostolic Creed, Exposition of the Lord's Prayer,* and *Exposition of the Angelic Salutation.* When we read these small works[14] we are made to realize that Thomas has given his audience (probably students) the same scholastic methods of presentation, the same endless divisions and subdivisions, the reasons and different manners of consideration with which we are very familiar from his biblical commentaries.

2. The interpreter looks for " reasons " for what is said in the text. The biblical author *must* have reasons in his mind, if in the Scriptures nothing exists by accident. "And he gives a reason," " first of all he established the meaning, and then

[13] Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalion,* III 6: *P. L.* 176, col. 771 D.

[14] They are printed in ed. Marietti, *Opuscula Theologica,* vol. II (Turin, 1954).

he proves the meaning " ; " First he states his reason, then he explains it"; "And he draws a conclusion "-we meet such formulations on every page of Thomas's biblical commentaries. These formulations may be related to important theological matters and also to the smallest peripheral nuances of the text. [15] Even more, according to the mind of Thomas, Paul wrote his letters as a philosopher trained by the logic of Aristotle. He used the methods of syllogism. Already, a century before Thomas, the monk Honorius of Autun signalized this method in a famous bon mot: " Syllogisms are covered in the Holy Scriptures like fish in the depth of the water. And as the fish is drawn out of the water for the benefit of men, from the Scriptures the syllogism is formulated, so that they may be useful." [16] Thomas followed this rule. For example, Romans 8: 5-6:

> Paul brings in two syllogisms ... First, he posits the minor premise of the first syllogism ... Second, he posits the minor premise of the second syllogism ... Third, he posits the major premise of the first syllogism ... Fourth, he posits the major premise of the second syllogism ... [17]

Thomas then does not refrain from showing us how Aristotle would have formulated these two Paulinian verses:

> Those who follow the prudence of the flesh are led to death. Now, those who have set their minds on the flesh follow the prudence of the flesh. Therefore, those who have set their minds on the flesh are led to death. [18]

The second syllogism, which deals with those who have set their mind on the spirit, is similarly structured.

3. Hence it was not a big leap to the integration of small

[15] Some examples of the commentary on Romans, collected at random: *In Rom.* 1:14, lect. 5 (92); 2:1, lect. 1 (170); 2:9, lect. 2 (201); 2:28, lect. 4 (Z4Z); 3: ZO, lect. Z (Z95); 5:20, lect, 6 (454); 6: ZO, lect. 4 (507); 8:2, lect. Z (631); 11:17, lect. 3 (894); 11:25, lect. 4 (91Z) and so on.

[16] Honorius of Autun, *Expositio in psalmos selectos*, on Ps. 1: *P. L.* 172, col. Z79 D.

[17] *In Rom.* 8:5-6, lect. 1 (614-618).

[18] *Loc. cit.*, (614). Further Paulinian " syllogisms" e.g.: *In Rom.* 5: 17-18, lect. 5 (438-444); 6:2-5, lect. 1 (470-477).

systematical chapters into the context of the biblical commentary. The "quaestiones," which for a long time had become independent, returned in a stylized form to the biblical commentary. Indeed, they remained connected with the course of the literal commentary, but the relationship to independent systematic methods which had been developed in the meantime was obvious. In an extreme case we meet within the commentary the structure of an " article " customary in systematic works, i.e., objections, counter-objections, systematic statement, and answers to the objections. Examples are the commentary on Romans 5:12 concerning the question of original sin/[9] and on Romans 8: 29 regarding the question of divine predestination.20

Thomas or Paul?

Can Paul remain Paul, if one stylizes him in such a way as to be a professor? Can the Paulinian theology unfold its explosive power under the pressure of such a sophisticated method of interpretation?

To answer this question we have an absolutely sure method. Paul was no professor, his letters are not at all a compendium of dogmatics; we all know that very well. Paul remains Paul even in the mind of Thomas, if we hut perceive that the latter agrees even to be challenged by Paulinian thought, both in his technical procedure and in his theological ideas. Does Thomas permit Paul to challenge him? Is it Paul or is it Thomas who has the last word?

Justification of the Sinner

Let us note first of all two relatively harmless challenges to which Thomas exposes himself and which are nevertheless important when considering the history of theology.

The first challenge: Thomas interprets Romans 1: 17 exactly

[19] *In Rom.* 5:12, lect. 3 (407-420).

[20] *In Rom.* 8:29, lect. 6 (702-706). Further examples: *In Rom.* 1:1, lect. 1 (20-21); 1:4, lect. 3 (43-59); 5:20, lect. 6 (450-460).

as Martin Luther does later on. "This (the Gospel) is what reveals the justice of God to us: it shows how faith leads to faith "-this verse, under which as is well known, suffered so much, gives in the eyes of Thomas the reason for verse 16 which immediately precedes it: "I am not ashamed of the Good News! It is the power of God saving all who have faith." Verse 17 will show, according to Thomas, " that the Gospel words have salvific power." [21] The "justice of God" is therefore not that righteousness by which God is righteous in himself and rewards or punishes men according to their merit-which inner righteousness really exists-but the righteousness by which God makes us righteous. And if one nevertheless prefers to interpret this verse in relation to the inner righteousness of God, then it is always to be understood that God is righteous in keeping his promises. [22] But where at Erfurt or Wittenberg would Luther have been able to find precisely the commentary of Thomas Aquinas on the epistle to the Romans?

And even if Luther could have found it, he would have had much more reason for being surprised if he had read it. For, explaining Romans 4:5, Thomas exposes himself to a second challenge of his thought by the Apostle. He does exactly that which later on offended Catholic exegetes so much in the case of Luther: without hesitating he joins the "sola" to the " fides," the " alone " to the " faith," and interprets the verse

[21] *In* Rom.l:l7, lect. 6 (lO!l).

[22] The righteousness of God in Rom. 1:17 " dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo de iustitia qua Deus iustus est, secundum illud Ps. 10:8 ... Et secundum hoc, sensus est quod 'iustitia Dei', qua scilicet iustus est servando promissa, 'in eo revelatur ', scilicet in homine credente evangelio, quia credit Deum implesse quod promisit de Christo mittendo; et hoc 'ex fide ', scilicet Dei promittentis ... ' in fide ' scilicet hominis credentis.

Vel, alio modo, ut intelligatur de iustitia Dei, qua Deus homines iustificat. Nam iustitia hominum dicitur qua se homines, propriis viribus, iustificare praesumunt, infra c. X, S ... Quae quidem iustitia revelatur in evangelio inquantum per fidem Evangelii homines iustificantur secundum quodcumque tempus, unde subdit ' ex fide in fidem,' id est ex fide Veteris Testamenti procedendo in fide Novi Testamenti, quia ab utroque homines iustificantur et salvantur per fidem Christi, quia eadem fide crediderunt venturum qua nos venisse credirnus" *(loc. cit.).*

to mean: the sinner receives his justification "by faith alone, without works." [23]

These challenges from the ideas of the Apostle are harmless for Thomas, because they can take place even in a mind that is not accustomed to thinking in paradoxes and antitheses but in logical connections of one thing with the other. The problem that the righteousness of God, in opposition to the definition of justice given by Aristotle and ancient philosophical ethics, means in Romans 1:17 really the same as "mercy of God," is overcome by Thomas by means of an extended notion of justice: to be righteous means to act according to one's own essence.

[23] *In Rom.* 5:8, lect. 1 (329-331). "Deinde cum dicit 'Ei vero', etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat merces aeterna ad fidem, dicens 'ei vero qui non operatur', scilicet exteriora opera, . . . ' reputatibur fides eius ', scilicet *sola* sine operibus exterioribus, 'ad iustitiam ', id est, ut per earn iustus dicatur, et iustitiae praemium accipiat, sicut si opera iustitiae fecisset, secundum illud infra 10:10 . . . , et hoc 'secundum propositum gratiae Dei', id est, secundum quod Deus proponit ex gratia sua homines salvare" *(loc. cit.,* 330). Alia expositio est ut hoc referatur ad hominis iustificationem. Dicit ergo 'ei autem qui operatur ', id est, si aliquis per opera iustificetur, ipsa iustitia imputaretur quasi ' merces non secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum '. Infra XI, 6 . . .–' Ei vero, qui non operatur ', ut scilicet per sua opera iustificetur, ' credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium ', computabitur haec eius 'fides ad iustitiam secundum propositum gratiae Dei', non quidem ita quod per fidem iustitiam mereatur, sed quia ipsum credere est primus actus iustitiae quam Deus in eo operatur. Ex eo enim quod credit in Deum iustificantem, iustificationi eius subiicit se, et sic recipit eius efl'ectum.-Et *haec expositio est litteralis, et secundum intentionem Apostoli,* qui facit vim in hoc quod Gen. XV, 6 dictum est . . .–Et ideo Apostolus dicit quod haec reputatio locum non haberet, si iustitia esset ex operibus, sed *solum* habet locum secundum quod est *ex fide" (loco cit.,* 331).

This text sounds different-one would like to say: simultaneously more simple and more rigorous-than the relevant texts of St. Thomas's systematic works. Nevertheless, also in the systematic works the incomparable importance of faith for the justification of the godless is strongly underlined in the framework of the general systematic concept. See especially *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 113, a. 4, where the faith which accepts the grace of justification is interpreted, referring to Rom. 5:1, as the fundamental "conversion" (" conversio ") of the "mens" toward God. *Mens,* however, means in Thomas the spiritual center of man as a *whole, before* all distinctions of potencies and single acts are in question. On this and other problems of the relationship between faith and justification accorcJing to Thomas see 0. H. Pesch, *Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin. Versuch eines systematisch-theologischen Dialogs* (Mainz, 1967) pp. 719-737.

God's essence, however, is love. If he enters into communion with men by love, keeping his promises, precisely then is he righteous.[24] And also the formula " faith alone without works " is understandable for Thomas's mind without too many difficulties. Luther does not exclude works *proceeding* from faith, nor can Thomas exclude those works/[5] since he finds no problem in developing a doctrine of "merit" which, by the way, does not justify the criticisms which have often been leveled against it.[26]

Logical mistakes

Let us consider more serious challenges. First of all, those in the area of technical procedure.[27]

Already the presentation of the " syllogisms " which Thomas surmises in Paul's mind shows Aquinas's willingness to agree with a challenge of his procedure by Paul. Paul is allowed in the eyes of Thomas to do what a teacher of Aristotelian logic would never be allowed to do: he is allowed to mix up the premises of his syllogisms and to confuse thereby the syllogistic procedure.[28]

Another example is Thomas's interpretation of Heb. 11:1. According to his opinion, Paul has given an exhaustive definition of the virtue of faith in the verse: " Faith is that which gives substance to our hopes, which convinces us of things we

[24] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 21, a. 1 ad 2 and ad 3; a. 4 c. Cf. Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 599-603.

[25] Detailed interpretation of the relevant texts in Thomas is tried by Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 758-771. In this context it is particularly interesting how Thomas interprets James 2:17, 26 and Gal. *5:* 6; cf. Pesch, *op. cit.* p. 745 sq., n. 134.

[26] *Summa Theol.*, 1-11, q. 114. Cf. Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 771-798; "Die Lehre vom 'Verdienst' als Problem fiir Theologie und Verkiindigung" in L. Scheffczyk-W. Dettloff-R. Heinzmann, ed., *Wahrheit und Verkundigung. Michael Schmaus zum 70. Geburtstag* (Munich-Paderborn-Vienna, 1967), vol. II, pp. 1865-1907.

[27] Hence we no longer refer to the commentary on Paul only but also on the exegesis of Paul occurring in Thomas's systematic work. This is necessary since we are now dealing not only with the methods cf medieval exegesis in Thomas but also with its *results.* On this, indeed, the systematic works of Thomas are as relevant as the biblical commentary.

"" Cf. *supra,* p. 8 (n. 17) .

cannot see." Obviously, notes Thomas, this definition does not fulfill the requirement of a *formal* definition of the Aristotelian type, which must always give the higher genus and the specific difference. But we can excuse the Apostle, for-as Thomas remarks- things like that happen sometimes even in the writings of philosophers. [29]

But what to do if there is no longer a question of correct definitions and syllogisms but rather of when the *idea* of Paul leads to a challenge and if, moreover, not only the procedure of Thomas is strained but also his thinking? Thomas exposes himself to such a challenge in a threefold way. Either he allows such a text to remain and renounces any attempt to elucidate it by means of speculation. Or he contents himself with an improvised, almost sophisticated distinction in order to exclude the threat of a misunderstanding as he sees it. Or he adjusts his entire thinking to the text and feels stimulated by it to a completely new speculative conception in which he cannot hope for support either from philosophical statements or from theological tradition. Each of three possibilities can be illustrated by an example.

Stumbling-block and folly of the Cross

The first example: according to a profound, pre-theological, basically spiritual inspiration, which we can perceive throughout the whole of Thomas's theology, God is, as already mentioned, a God of wise order. [30] Accidents, meaningless and un-

[29] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 1 c. (in *principio):* "... tamen, si quis recte consideret, omnia ex quibus fides potest definiri in praedicta descriptione (sc. Heb 11:I) tanguntur, licet verba non ordinentur sub forma definitionis; sicut etiam apud philosophos praetermissa syllogistica forma syllogismorum principia tanguntur." The same doctrine *In Heb.* 11:1, lect. 1 (552). The paragraph of the commentary is another instructive example of the mutual penetration of textual commentary and systematic analysis: the article of the *Summa* systematizes the results of the commentary whereas the commentary formulates all arguments and " questions " which the *Summa* deals with in the form of an " articulus," and indeed partly even in the literary technique of an article (" Videtur quod ... ", "Respondeo dicendum ... " and so on); cf. *supra,* p. 9 (nn. 19 and 20).

[30] On this basic idea of St. Thomas's theological thinking see Pesch, *Theologie*

intelligible things, do not happen within his creation. All events, even the least important, reflect his wisdom. " Et disponit omnia suaviter "-"He arranges everything in a smooth manner "-Thomas likes to quote this phrase of the Song of Solomon (in the Latin translation available to him) as an expression of his concept of God.[31] If the theologian looks hard enough, he can realize or at least guess many of these thoughts of God's wisdom governing all things. The theological procedure which corresponds to this basic inspiration is the method of the so-called " argument of convenience," the presentation of reasons which show the " fittingness," the good sense of the event in question, and sometimes instead of saying " convenience " even the strong word " necessity" is used.[32] Thomas has not invented the method of convenience-arguments. The Church Fathers had already used it frequently .[33] But he used this method in a magnificent way and, it must be conceded, with much more theological " tact " or simply with much more sensitivity than some people before him.

What now when this aristocratic conception of God is confronted with the phrase about the stumbling-block and the folly of the Cross? Where Thomas is not bound immediately by the Paulinian text, he becomes the victim of his basic inspiration and his procedure. In a long chapter of his *Summa The-*

der Rechtfertigung, pp. 918-948; also pp. 840-881; *955* f.; "Existential and Sapien tal Theology. The Theological Confrontation between Luther and Thomas Aquinas," in J. Wicks, ed., *Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 61-81; 182-193 (notes); *The God Question in Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther (Facet Books, Historical Series*, 21; Philadelphia, 1972).

[81] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 22, a. 2 sed contra; q. 103, a. 8 c.; q. 109, a. 2 c.; I-II, q. 110, a. 2 c.; II-II, q. 23, a. 2 c.; q. 165, a. I c.; III, q. 44, a. 4 sed contra; q. 46, a. 9 c.; q. *55*, a. 6 sed contra; q. 60, a. 4 c.

•• On " convenience " and "necessity " in Thomas see Chenu, *op. cit.* (see n. 3), pp. 181-186; M. Seckler, *Das Heil in der Geschichte. Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin* (Munich, 1964), pp. 42-47; 0. H. Pesch, "Urn den Plan der Summa Theologiae" (s. n. 6), p. 129 sq.; "Besinnung auf die Sakramente. Historische und systematische iiberlegungen und ihre pastoralen Konsequenzen" in *Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie* 18 (1971), 266-321; 275-280.

•• Examples in Pesch, *loc. cit.*

ologiae [34] he questions every perspective and viewpoint of Christ's death on the Cross: was Christ obliged to die on the Cross? Was that the most fitting way of redeeming mankind? Did he suffer at a convenient time? Did he die at a suitable place? Was it meaningful that he was crucified with two robbers? Was it proper that Gentiles killed him? Was he buried in a fitting manner? Thomas answers all these questions with a Yes-and lists the " arguments of convenience." [35] In the final analysis the Cross seems to be the most reasonable thing in the world.

But all that is seemingly forgotten when Thomas interprets I Cor 1: in the context of his commentary on Paul. He allows Paul to challenge him. In a concise commentary [36] and without discovering a " deeper " meaning he explains why the Cross is a stumbling-block for the Jews and folly (that is to say: a mean*ingless* thing!) for the Gentiles: The Jews "demanded power which works miracles, and what they saw was weakness bearing the cross." To the Gentiles, however, "it seemed according to human wisdom impossible that God die and that a righteous and wise man deliver himself voluntarily to the most ignominious death." Some phrases later on, indeed, the " convenience " of the Cross comes back into the argumentation. But it is the "convenience" precisely of *God's* mysterious acting, therefore no human reason (including theological reason) and faith alone can maintain this divine convenience of the Cross against all appearance.

The Law "kills"

The second example: the Paulinian understanding of the Law culminates, as is well known, in the assertion that the Law "works wrath" and "kills," that it reveals sin and even augments it. [37] No one is able to provide an adequate meaning of those texts, if he bases himself on philosophical ethics, or even

[34] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 46.
[35] *Ibid.,* aa. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11; q. 51, aa. 1, 2.
[36] *In I Cor.* 1:23, lect. 3 (58 sqq.).
[37] Rom 4:15; 7:9-13; Gal 3:19,

on the faithful conviction that in the Law of the Old Testament the obligatory will of God for man is expressed. Today we know from the results of modern exegesis that in such statements Paul made a tremendously delicate attempt on his own account to demonstrate that his unlegalistic proclamation of the Gospel is the only one which is in agreement with the Scriptures.[38] The differences clearly perceptible in this area between the epistles to the Galatians and to the Romans show how much Paul himself wrestled with this problem. Our knowledge was not at the disposal of Aquinas. He had nothing else before him than the confusing Paulinian text, and he faced the challenge once again.

If we but call to mind how much Thomas was interested in emphasizing the idea that God consistently guides history toward Christ as its focal point, then we can surmise that Thomas, in harmony with his contemporaries,[39] would have preferred to say simply: the Old Law is the imperfect, indeed, but throughout the positive and pedagogically first step to the New Law, to the Gospel. But Paul must have the last word. With the Apostle Thomas establishes that the man of the Old Testament is through the Law hopelessly entangled in sin. Thomas explains this as follows: only by means of God's grace is man able to fulfill the Old Law and its supreme commandment, the commandment of love of God and neighbor. The Law, how-

[88] See any modem exegetic commentary on these verses. We point particularly to 0. Kuss, Der Romerbrief (Ratisbon, 1957/59) pp. 186-190; 441-450; "Die Rolle des Apostels Paulus in der theologischen Entwicklung der Urkirche" in *Munchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 14 (1963), *1-59;* 109-187; "Nomos bei Paulus," *loc. cit.* 17 (1966), For English commentaries consult the bibliography of "The Letter to the Romans" by Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S. J., in *The Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1969), p. and the bibliography of "Romans" by A. Theissen in *A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture* (Camden, N. J., 1969), p. 1103.

[89] On Thomas's idea of " Heilsgeschichte " and on agreement and disagreement between Thomas and his contemporaries concerning the understanding of the Old and the New Law see U. Kiihn, *Via caritatis. Theologie des Gesetzes bei Thomas von Aquin* (Gottingen, 1965), pp. 37-43; Seckler, *op. cit.*, pp. see also Pesch, *Das Gesetz* (see n. 10), especially "Exkurs and "Exkurs S."

ever, did not endow man with this strength of grace. Thus the demand of the Law becomes strained. The attempt to fulfill the Old Law must lead to defeat, man remains short of the Law, commits sin anew, and is lost.[40] Only a few people of the Old Covenant escaped this necessity: those who understood the prophetical meaning of the Old Testament cult and the ceremonial Law ruling it and who thereby were guided to faith in the coming mediator and thus were living in the New Covenant at the time of the Old Covenant.[41]

By means of this construction, which is not without intellectual violence, Thomas permits his simpler and more obvious conception to be mixed up. There is only one thing for which he wishes to provide by a distinction: does not the Apostle give occasion for misunderstanding, namely, that God himself wills sin, if it is finally *his* Law which increases sin and kills man? But that is not what the Apostle means, Thomas assures us. The Law does not kill in an " effective " way, " *effective,"* impelling directly to sin; it kills rather by giving the " occasion " for sin, *"occasionaliter."* It is men's guilt and not at all the guilt of God, when man actually grasps this occasion. And that is what Paul himself declares, following Thomas, for, we read in Rom 7:11 (in the Latin version): *"Occasione accepta* " ... –" sin took advantage of the commandment to mislead me ... "[42] Therefore in the verse (5:9W): "The Law intervened that the offense might abound " the word " that " must not be translated in a final sense (" causaliter ") of " in order to " but in a consecutive sense (" consecutive ") ; the Law intervened, *so that* the offense might abound.[48]

No one will imagine that the distinction given by Thomas is sufficient to solve his own problems regarding this text, not

•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 98, a. 6; q. 100, a. 10 ad 3; *ibid,* a. 12.

[41] *Ibid.,* q. 98, a. 2 ad 4; q. 101, a. 2; q. 103, a. 2 c.; q. 107, a. 1 ad 2; for an interpretation of these and other relevant texts see Kiihn, *op. cit.,* pp. 169-191; Pesch, *Theologie der Rechtfertigung,* pp. 424-439.

•• *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 98, a. 1 ad 2; q. 99, a. 2 ad S; *In Rom.* 7:11, Iect. 2 *(550).*

•• *Summa Theol, loc. cit.,* q. 98, a. 1 ad 2; *In Rom.* 5:20, lect. 6 (459 sq.).

to mention ours.[44] But Thomas is content to have made his reservation in favor of a correct idea of God. As for the rest, the paradox of the Paulinian text dominates, and Thomas remains on its track by the assertion that God really *wanted* to permit sin coming through the Law with the purpose that men, thereby humbled, did then desire Christ's grace.[45] From this great distance we can hear the sound of innumerable words of Martin Luther!

Law of freedom

The third example: how will the medieval Christian Thomas, sincerely involved in the framework of the well-established medieval Church, react to the emphatic words of the Apostle about Christian freedom and the autonomy of the faithful? How will he deal with the pathos of the Epistle to the Galatians? Here Thomas does not only admit to a challenge, but he develops a conception which is without equivalent in the Middle Ages.[46] The word about the "Law of the Spirit" (Rom. 8: combined with the word of the prophet Jeremiah about the New Covenant (Jer 31: 31-33), induces Thomas to identify the Law, according to which the Christian lives, with the grace of the Holy Spirit itself. Let us quote the famous text of I-II, q. 106, a. 1 (so seldom interpreted in Thomistic Schools!):

Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it, as the Philosopher states in *IX Eth.* Yet, that which is preponderant in the law of the New Testament and whereon all its efficacy is based is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given through faith in Christ. And this is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (Rom 3: 27) : " So what becomes of our boasts? On the contrary,

« These problems belong to the context of the ideas which Thomas develops on " God and evil " and, finally, on " predestination " and " reprobation " of men by God. See Pesch, *op. cit.,* pp. 513 sq.; 846-855; 861-864; 879-881; *The God Question* (see n. 30), p. 24 sq.

'"Summa Theol., loc cit., q. 98, a. ad 3; q. 106, a. 3 c.

•• Detailed analysis by G. Sohngen, *Gesetz und Evangelium. lhre analoge Einheit, theologisch, philosophisch, staatsbiirgerlich* (Freiburg/Br.M-unich, 1957) pp. 44-78; Kiihn, *op. cit.,* pp. Pesch, *Theologie der Rechtfertigung,* 439· 451.

it is the law of faith" : for he calls the grace itself of faith a law. And still more clearly it is written (Rom 8: : "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death." Hence Augustine says *(De Spiritu et Littera,* : "As the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the hearts of the faithful." And elsewhere in the same book he says: "\Vhat else are God's laws, written in the hearts by God himself, but the very presence of his Holy Spirit?" Nevertheless, the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Spirit and pertain to the use of this grace; such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law, and the faithful needed to be instructed concerning them, both by word and by writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Thus we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed in our hearts, but that secondarily it is a written law.[47]

The Christian is no longer confronted with a Law coming from outside, he bears God's Law in himself. And this Law is no longer a burdening demand but a spontaneous inner inspiration and strength to do what God wills we should do. We need the letter only insofar as the content of the New Law has to become manifest and inasmuch as the" use" of this inner New Law is to be clarified. But all that is secondary, and the written letter of the Gospel kills in the same way as the letter of the Old Law did, if it is isolated from that which principally and first of all is the essence of the New Law: the grace of the Holy Spirit in man's heart itsel£.[48] Thus the New Law is a Law of freedom, and Thomas does not neglect to point out that therefore also the leaders of the Church are obliged to be reserved in making new laws. For God has given, compared with the Old Covenant, only a few commandments and prohibitions in the New Law. If one does not follow this rule, then one risks finally the danger that to live under the New Law will become more intolerable than to live under the Old.[49]

"*Summa Theol., lac. cit.,* q. 106, a. I c; Jer. 31:31-33 is mentioned in the "sed contra." The same doctrine *In Rom* 3:27, *lect.* 4 (313-316); 8:2₁ lect. l (600-605).

•• *Summa Theol., loc cit.,* q. 106, a. 2 c. (in fine),

'"*Ibid.,* q. 107, a. 4 c.

" *Domesticated* " *Paul?*

Has Thomas " domesticated " Paul, a charge frequently leveled as an immanent danger to the Paulinian exegesis in the Catholic tradition? [50]

One has to say Yes and No at the same time. In fact, it does mean to "domesticate" Paul, if his letters are read and interpreted as the academic of a professor. Frequently, too, we have to establish that Thomas did *not* admit a challenge to his thought by the Apostle but rather submitted the latter's ideas to the traditional theological schemas or to his own Aristotelian " pre-understanding " or to both of them. We should recall, for example, questions like those about divine predestination, [51] virginity, and marriage,[52] the doublet of" flesh and spirit," [58] the faith coming from what is heard, [54] the image of Christ in the Epistle to the Colossians,[55] and so on. But are not things like that-interpretation according to an inevitable "pre-understanding "-the fate of *e·very* interpretation of Paul and of the whole of Scripture, even in a strict *historical* explication of modem style?

Only then would Paul be really domesticated and have lost his explosive power, if finally he no longer appeared as the preacher of God's unconditioned, non-deserved mercy and as the declared enemy of all legalism and work-righteousness. But

[50] See e. g., Kuss, "Die Rolle des Apostels Paulus" (see n. 88), pp. 12-16; SS-51; 178-187; "Nomos bei Paulus," p. 227.

[51] *In Rom* 8:29, lect. 6 (701-706); 9:18-28, lect. 2 (762) to lect. *5* (795); *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 28.

[52] *In I COT* 7:1-9, lect. 1 (812-885); *Summa Theol.,* 11-11, q. 152; q. 184, a. 4; q. 186, a. 4; and the "Opusculum" *De perfectione vitae spiritualia (OpuaC'!da theologica,* ed. Marietti, vol. II, Turin, 1954), ch. 8 and 9 (English *On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life,* Westminster, Md., 1950).

[58] *In Rom* 8:8-6, lect. 1 (606-618); *In Gal* 5:16-17, lect. 4 (807-815).

[54] *In Rom* 10:16-17, lect. 2 (842-844).

[55] The relevant texts of the Epistle to the Colossians on creation in Christ are commonly referred not to the Savior but to the trinitarian Logos. These biblical texts, therefore, do not inspire the author of the *Summa* towards a " Christocentric " theology. On the problem of "Christocentrism" in Thomas's theology see Pesch, *Thealogie der Reehtfertigung,* pp. 581-584; 864-866; 921-985; collection of all references to Col 1:15-17 in the *Summa Theol., op. cit.,* p. 980 n. 48.

Thomas Aquinas did not become guilty of such a perversion of the Apostle's theology.[56] His exegesis corresponds to what he says in the prologue of his commentary, characterizing the person of the Apostle:

> Thus, just as from among the books of the Old Testament the Psalms of David, who received forgiveness after his sin, are most frequently used, so in the New Testament the Epistles of Paul, who obtained mercy, are most frequently used. The reason is so that sinners might be aroused to hope.[57]

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•• On this we must call to mind the entire doctrine of Thomas on grace and justification. See Pesch, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 596-79fl.

[57] *In Epistolas Pauli*, prol. (6).

KNOWLEDGE OF THE SINGULAR: AQUINAS, SUAREZ, AND RECENT INTERPRETERS

OCKHAM'S NOMINALISM carne as a severe blow to *philosophia perennis* and prepared the groundwork for Modern Philosophy. Several factors contributed to this upheaval. On the one hand, neither Augustinian Scholasticism nor the followers of Scotus were properly equipped to oust once and for all the anti-conceptualistic tendencies introduced by the *Venerabilis Inceptor*. On the other hand, despite the tremendous contributions of Cajetan and Franciscus of Ferrara, the Thornist School was ill-prepared to resist the attack which was strongly reinforced by Francis Bacon's opposition to the scholastic *apriorism* in natural philosophy and by the brilliant confirmation of the " experimental method " as it was put into effect in the works of Galileo.

It is true that in the early sixteenth century the tide seemed to be on its way back for a moment. The School of Cajetan indeed had just received a new momentum though Franciscus of Vitoria who had been himself a student of a very serious and progressive thornist, Peter Crockaert, at the University ot Paris. This would seem to be a significant event, for through his own teaching at Salamanca Vitoria was about to give Europe a whole generation of outstanding professors such as Melchior Cano and Domingo Soto, who in turn would pass on the thomistic torch to others, such as the Jesuit Cardinal Toletus, a disciple of Soto, who used his influential chair at the Roman College to spread the word throughout the Continent. In this chain, Peter Fonseca, S. J., was undoubtedly one of the most effective links through the publication of his *Cursus Conimbric.ensium* which he undertook while teaching at the University of Coi'rnbra in Portugal and which was designed to update in a critical way traditional Aristotelianisrn. However, all this

impressive anti-nominalistic effort would be overpowered and even undermined by the eclectic mind of another illustrious Jesuit, Franciscus Suarez, who joined Fonseca at Co'imbra and was destined to dominate the Scholastic stage for three cen·· turies. His teaching indeed was bound to touch even a young man called Rene Descartes who would study at the" College de la Fleche " in Paris, and his frame of mind would impress the new philosopher thereby exerting a decisive influence on the whole Modem Philosophy. [1]

Yet, this is not to say that Suarez did nothing more than to convey Ockham's message, nor is it necessary to say so in order to uphold the aforementioned impact. Although his sympathies indeed were not all with Ockham-as they were shared also by St. Thomas and Scotus-, his eclectic position was enough to commit him to two allegiances totally irreconcilable with each other which in the end were to give a considerable boost to nominalism as they were bound to weaken and further discredit thomistic terminology.

Furthermore, not even his doctrinal disagreement with Ockham regarding the principle of individuation did in fact immunize him against a nominalistic approach to universals despite that Suarez could not altogether go along with the *Venerabilis Inceptor's* conception of the individual for he tried

[1] See Joseph Marechal, *Le Point de Depart de la Metaphysique* (Paris: Desclee-De Brouwer, 1965), Cahier II, pp. 39-40: " Cette Scolastique renouvee, soit thomiste, soit eclectique, inspira de nombreux titulaires de chaires publiques ou privees, disperses par !'Europe entiere. Descartes, eleve au College des Jesuites de La Fleche, dans le premier quart du XVIIe.s., fut atteint par le mouvement general. Il connut directement ou indirectement les ouvres de saint Thomas, de Tolet, des Commentateurs de Coimbre, et meme de Suarez; si mauvais souvenir qu'il ait garde des lecons de philosophie scolastique qu'on lui infligea, on voudrait en connaitre d'une maniere plus precise !'inspiration; car !'esprit le plus independant garde toujours quelque chose d'une initiation premiere. Nous n'avons pas le moyen de satisfaire cette legitime curiosite; mais nous ne croyons pas superflu de rappeler, aujourd'hui meme, que la philosophie cartesienne n'est, ni logiquement, ni psychologiquement un 'commencement absolu '. Si originale qu'elle puisse etre ou se pretendre, elle entre en scene grevee d'un heritage de presupposees, dont les plus lourds ne sont pas ceux dont Descartes eut explicitement conscience." See also Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, Part II, pp. 199-200, (Garden City, New York: 1963), Image Books, A Division of Doubleday and Co.

to be a genuine metaphysician even while doing Epistemology. Alejandro has emphasized the gap that separates both philosophers in this respect:

> We think that it is impossible to speak of a true principle of individuation in Ockham. He who sees in a thing that he intuits nothing more than a whole presenting itself in its total *phenomenal* reality, and does not penetrate the metaphysical principles or components that constitute it, cannot appoach a problem that supposes those very principles. Those who admit a composition of act and potency, of matter and form, will have to wonder in which one of them lies the ultimate constitutive of individuality; but he who does not acknowledge such a plurality of principles cannot find any sense in that question.[2]

Nevertheless, no matter how true this divisive metaphysical concern of his may have been, Suarez's emphasis on the individual in its capacity as the very first object of our knowledge far out-weighed it and seems to have driven the *Eximius* closer to Ockham than to Aquinas and Scotus.

This finally leads us to the statement of our problem. Tf both Suarez and Ockham are allegedly credited with having fostered nominalism in Modern Philosophy without nevertheless fully agreeing with each other, it follows that we cannot criticize their respective positions on the same grounds. There is need then to draw a clear line of division between the two nominalistic theses for evaluating purposes. In so doing, though, we cannot overlook Suarez's claims of allegiance to St. Thomas, as any Thomist handle used by him necessarily had to have an adverse bearing on his ability to uphold the primacy of the individual. As Camille Berube has brilliantly established in his book *La Connaissance de l'lndividuel au Moyen Age:* " Only under the condition of a fundamental disfiguration of itself could the doctrine of the intelligible species adapt itself to the direct intellection which by nature tends to eliminate a-; superfluous the whole mechanism of Aristotelian intellects." [3]

• Jose M. Alejandro, *Estudios Gnoseol6gicos,* Juan Flors, Editor (Barcelona, 1961)' p. 160.

[8] Camille Berube, *La Connaissance de l'Individuel au Moyen Age* (Presses Universitaires de France, 164), p. 93.

Ockham himself perceived it most clearly, and this was the reason why he divested himself of any belief in common nature, principle of individuation, agent intellect, and intelligible species. It is a law indeed that the thesis of the epistemological primacy of the individual can succeed only to the extent to which its path is made clear of any Aristotelian encumbrance. According to this law, for instance, Matthew of Aquasparta and Pier di Giovanni Olivi could cling smoothly to the new epistemological position, whereas Vital du Four fell prey to the delusion of believing that he had proved the direct intuition when in fact his position was still basically thomist, and John Duns Scotus had to settle for a compromising distinction between human ability to conceive the individual *ex natura potentiae* and man's frustrating inability to do so *in statu isto.*

In this respect Franciscus Suarez holds a very unique place in history. As a Jesuit he was bound to the teachings of St. Thomas, but as a man of his century he could not escape the powerful attraction of the new theories. Unfortunately, as in everything else, he opted once again for compromise as a way out. Now his position raises two important questions which will constitvte the thread of our work: Can a diminished Thomism such as his really account for our knowledge of the individual? Would it not have been better for him to go Thomist all the way if he had really understood Aquinas's theory? It is the contention of this article that through his eclectic solution Suarez jeopardized both the nature of the agent intellect and the thesis of the primacy of the individual in epistemology, thus forcing us to review the thesis of *indirect knowledge* of the singular which, if examined in the light of Lonergan and Rahner's writings, finally proves to be fully satisfactory.

* * * *

First of all, Suarez' determination to remain on the side of Aquinas and Scotus even while laying the foundation for the proper concept of the singular becomes most evident in his constant recourse to the agent intellect. In order to show this

we divide his reasoning into three stages: (A) our intellect knows the singular, whether material or not, through a proper and separate concept; **(B)** in particular, it knows the material individual in that way; (C) and it does so without resorting to any kind of reflection.

In connection with the first thesis the outline of our procedure is as follows: we shall sum up Suarez' argumentation, sprinkling it here and there with brief comments aimed mainly at its methodological aspect, and then we shall examine at length the chief assumptions on which Suarez bases his whole case.

(A) According to Suarez, our understanding does not need universal concepts to reach all kinds of individuals, and this is clear for the following reasons.[4] First of all, any time the intellect forms a proposition such as *"Peter is a man"* it undoubtedly knows each of the terms including the singular one.[5] And it does not help to say that the subject is known through the cogitative and the predicate through the intellect, because in any act of judgment the same intellect must know both terms since it has to compare them with each other.[6] This first rea-

[4] " lntellectus cognoscit singulare formando proprium et distinctum conceptum illius." *(De Anima,* IV, 3, 3).

[5] " --- intellectus format propositionem ex singnlari et universali termino: ergo concipit utrumque extremum proprio conceptu. Quod vero quidam volunt in tali aliqua propositione, verbi gratia *Petrus est homo,* subiectum esse in cogitativa et praedicatum in intellectu, omnino est alienum a ratione, nam ubi quaeso erit copula? aut quomodo una ipsa potentia poterit comparare praedicatum cum subiecto nisi utrumque cognoscat? " *(ibid.).*

[6] Alejandro, *op. cit.,* p. 195, footnote 38, supports Suarez in his reply to Cajetan: " Suarez es fidelisimo en la referencia de Cayetano: ' Sufficit cognitio argnitiva. Concipiendum enim in nobis hominem et singularitatem ab intellectu nostro non proprio sed alieno conceptu, qui tamen est aliquo modo, scil., confuse et arguitive ... non reprasentative ... " **(1,** q. 86, art. 1). Suarez dira oportunamente que para esta explicaci6n, 'neque ratio adducitur apparens '. El que el concepto universal no sea propio y con todo en algun sentido lo sea, y no *representativamente* (es decir, cognoscitivamente), sino *arguitivamente,* exige una mayor explicaci6n pues dificulta seriamente el problema del conocimiento. La situaci6n de Cayetano no seria muy ventajosa en frente de Kant." Both Suarez and Alejandro base their argumentation on the same regrettable *petitio principii* which supposes the nature of the knowledge of the singular alr.eady definitively dealt with. Alejandro,

son, then, begs the question, whereas it is the nature of the judgment itself which is fundamentally at stake A second argument proposed by Suarez is not any more fortunate. Our understanding, we are told, distinguishes *man* from *Peter,* which means that it possesses a distinct cognition of each of them.[7] Indeed, the validity of this impressive agrument is impaired as soon as we realize that our intellect does not distinguish these two extremes as two things but only as a "logical whole " and one of its inferiors. A third attempt is made by focusing on two intellectual activities, namely, the virtues of prudence and of faith, and then pointing out that very often they refer to singular objects. To what extent this is a conclusive argument depends on whether or not a sound explanation of the pinpointed cases can be obtained through reference to acts of judgment as understood by the Thomists.[8] Finally, we are told, is it not childish to deny to the more powerful intellect what we grant the lower rank faculty of sense, namely, the cognition of singulars?[9] There is no question, of course, of the superiority of the intellect over the sense-faculty. Again, there is no question of this same ontological superiority carrying with it in the case of subsistent intellects the same power which belongs to the sense. Even here, however, it should be pointed out that the subsistent intellect knows more of the individual than the material sense, since the former knows the individual's being which is totally impervious to any sense-activity. However, none of this is really in question here. It is rather the superiority of human intellect over human senses which is of direct

in addition, refers to the universal what Cajetan says of the singular ... Finally, both seem to take for a real reason their utopic desire of absolute clarity, which in this matter is impossible.

[7] "Praeterea intellectus distinguit hominem a Petro, ergo utriusque habet distinctam coguitionem ..." *(De Anima,* IV, 8, 8).

[8] "... Item prudentia versatur circa singularia ... Sed prudentia est intellectualis virtus . . . Rursus fides divina saepe singularium est . . . et tamen est virtus intellectualis ..." (ibid.).

[9] ". . . Ratio a priori sumitur ex universalitate potentiae, est enim superior et potens omnia quae inferiores sensus, imo dirigens illos errores illorum corrigit: multo ergo melius singularia novit ..." *(ibid.)* ,

concern in this investigation. And yet, we should remember that the Thomist thesis does not rest on any kind of " *hierarchical* consideration " but is forced as it were on its patrons by a sort of "force majeure" imposed by the extrinsic dependence of the human soul upon the body. It is within this inevitable context that both epistemologies, that of Suarez and that uf Aquinas, will have to be evaluated. In other words, the argument we have been commenting on is one more instance of the "begging the question" procedure with which we have met so often up to this point.

(B) It would seem that Suarez is most anxious to make his point in all ways possible but most of all insofar as material things are concerned.[10] To this effect he calls our attention to his particular conception of the agent intellect. The use he makes of it reduces to the following argumentation: it is neither impossible nor absurd for the agent intellect to produce a spiritual "species impressa" of the singular; consequently, the possible intellect can react with a corresponding " species expressa " of the same, i. e., man can know the individual compound of matter and form. The possibility of such a production is evident to him on the assumption that the agent intellect, by performing a *specific* abstraction-not a *generic* one-removes the conditions of material existence from all concrete modes of being and thus obtains an *abstract intelligible singular.11* On the other hand, he does not see why and how such a performance of the agent intellect should involve an absurdity.12 He starts off with a very debatable antecedent, which

[10] " Intellectus noster cognoscit singulare materiale per propriam ipsius speciem." *(De Anima,* IV, 3, *5).*

[11] See Alejandro, *op. cit.,* p. 199; Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* V, 1, f.!; V, 8, 13-14; V, 6, 3.

[12] ". . . nihil repugnat dari speciem spiritualem impressam repraesentativam singularis rei materialis, ut sic: ergo talis species produci valet ab intellectu agente: ergo a possibili iam cognoscetur singulare per propriam speciem. Antecedens suadetur primo: nam potest dari species expressa ... ergo et species impressa ... Probatur secundo . . . nam in Angelis . . . dantur species spirituales, et singulares repraesentantes propria singularia materia, ut sic; ergo . . . Tertio res universales materiales repraesentantur per speciem spiritualem, ergo, et singulares poterunt

openly begs the question: as a matter of fact, he says, we have " species expressae " of singular material things; therefore we must have the coresponding "species impressae" as well. It is true that we know individual things, but why could this not be through judgments rather than through concepts? To say that it is through a " species expressa " of the singular is to assume as already proven what constitutes the main point in this whole inquiry. But Suarez does not seem to see the problem. After all, he says, is it not true that angels have such species? *A pari,* then, they can be found in human minds as well. Of course, he does not realize that such entities may not be absurd in the case of subsistent intelligences and nevertheless be impossible in human souls, as we shall show in the main section of this criticism. There too we will deal with another weak parity to which he resorts as to a final argument; it can be stated in this way: universal *material* essences can be represented *spiritually* through universal concepts, therefore the materiality of the object is no obstacle at all, and consequently individual material things can be represented spiritually through direct concepts. In other words, once a material thing can be represented spiritually, it can be always and under any kind of circumstances the object of a proper concept.

(C) Finally, on the basis of his special conception of the agent intellect it is not surprising that he could not see any reason for any kind of reflection over or return to the phantasm.[13] If such a reflection were necessary, he thinks, it would be either because the singular thing is to be known through it as through a " medium cognitum," i. e., through something which only by being known itself leads to the knowledge of the other, or else, because the individual material reality must be known through it as through a real *species* which, without being known, enables us to know the object. But none of these hypotheses are admissible. The first one can be dismissed for

repraesentari. Nam si semel per spiritualem qualitatem potest repraesentari res materialis, nihil interest singularisne sit an universalis." *(De Anima,* IV, *3,* 5).

[18] " Intellectus noster coguoscit directe singularia materialia absque reflexione " *(ibid.,* 7).

three reasons. First of all, we do not have any experience of our knowing the phantasm when we know something, as we would be required to do in this alternative. In the second place, is it not repugnant to reason that our intellect should know something in something else of an inferior order? Finally, does not this hypothesis already grant what it is designed to disprove, namely, the direct knowledge of a particular material thing, since the very phantasm itself is such? As to the other alternative, it is summarily dismissed by Suarez for the very simple reason that it would be outrageous to say that a material thing such as the phantasm is actually concurring in a spiritual action of the intellect.[14] This difficulty, says Suarez, becomes further compounded in Soto's theory according to which not only the material phantasm would determine spiritual intellect but the spiritual intellect thus determined to know would attain the singular material thing directly through a universal concept.[15]

* * * * *

[14] "Nam vel cognoscitur per phantasma tamquam per obiectum seu medium cognitum: vel tamquam per speciem. Tamquam per obiectum cognosci est impossibile primo, quia alioquin prius foret cognoscendum ab intellectu phantasma ipsum quam singulare in eo repraesentatum quod est contra experientiam . . . Secundo, quia rationi dissonum est, ut intellectus in re materiali et inferioris ordinis tamquam in obiecto quippam cognoscat. Esset quin magna quaedam illius imperfectio, nullaque cogens ratio ad illam asserendam . . . Tertio quia phantasma ipsum est quid singulare ac materiale: ergo si cognoscitur ... iam singulare ipsum materiale directe cognoscitur. Quarto si cognoscitur singulare repraesentans. Iam vero cognosci singulare per phantasma tamquam per speciem seu medium non cognitum dici nullo modo potest. Quia res materialis et inferioris ordinis non potest concurrere in actum spiritualem ..." *(ibid.).*

[15] Even Soto's account is dismissed by " Tertium tamen modum assignat Soto I Phys. q. 2, art. 2, dicens singulare cognosci ab intellectu per determinationem ad particulare phantasma; sed vel modus hie coincidit cum praecedenti, vel illud certe novum continet, quod phantasia operante circa tale aliquod singulare ita determinatur intellectus, ut per speciem universalem possit iam singulare attingere, quod tamen impossibile est: namque operatio phantasiae impertinens est atque insufficiens, si intellectus ipse intra se non habet sufficiens principium cognitionis qualis non est rei universalis species, sed sola species rei singularis ..." *(ibid.)* .

There is no point in denying beauty and articulateness to this construction. However, does it not overlook a third alternative which might be the true one, namely, the elevation of the phantasm by the agent intellect? This leads us to the main portion of our criticism.

Beyond the superficial flaws (of a rather methodological character) already mentioned, we must now point to some fundamental premises that underlie the whole Suarezian discourse about the cognoscibility of the individual as such, premises that are either false or most debatable. Suarez, in fact, continues to to an " *ad hominem* " argument based on the parity between angelic and human concepts, which entails a misunderstanding on his part both of what St. Thomas really taught about the cooperation between senses and understanding in the human being and of the Thomist doctrine of angelic species. In addition, there is in Suarez a constant reference to a special theory of the agent intellect on which most of his arguments are based, a theory which must be subjected to a thorough criticism if the Suarezian doctrine of the cognoscibility of the singular is to be accepted in any knowledgeable manner.

There are several points in Aquinas's epistemology that elude Suarez's grasp. For one thing, St. Thomas never taught that the individual as such is unintelligible. How could he, if according to his doctrine of intelligibilty which is rooted in Being whatever " is" is intelligible and the individual really" is" ? It is only with regard to us that, in thomistic terms, the individual is not intelligible; and this is so because we are constituted to know it through two faculties-sense and intellect-and each one of them has alloted to it only one part of the composite, namely, either matter or form, whereby our intellect is forced to separate the form from the matter if it is to really "understand " anything at all in the individual. Our mind, therefore, understands the singular " by way of analysis," whereas the angel intellectually grasps the whole composite as such " by way of synthesis " because its species is the likeness of the divine essence precisely insofar as the divine essence is productive of both matter and form in the

individual thing.[16] This alone destroys the "parity" which constitutes the strength of several of Suarez's arguments. We do not know individual things in the same way in which angels know them because our proportionate object differs from theirs. Ours is the essence of material things, theirs is whatever is intelligible through itself/[7] namely, all separate substances-including their own-and all material individuals as such. However, separate substances know themselves directly through their own essence, not in the way we know our own mind which is in the process of knowing other things and is being actuated by their species.[18] This is clear since our intellect must be actualized by species inasmuch as by essence it is only *possible;* but the intellect of separate substances does not encounter such a limitation since it is always in act.[19] However, in connection with separate substances other than the one which is knowing, intelligible species become necessary even for pure spirits.

St. Thomas argues that a separate substance does not know other separate substances by knowing its own essence, its essence would provide it only a *generic* knowledge of the other.[20] The only way it could know others through its own

[16] See *II Cont. Gent.,* 100, 4: " The species of intelligible things come to our intellect in an order contrary to that in which they reach the intellect of separate substances. For they reach our intellect by way of analysis, through abstraction from material and individuating conditions; that is why we cannot know singulars through them. But it is as it were by way of synthesis that intelligible species reach the intellect of a separate substance, for the latter has intelligible species by reason of its likeness to the first intelligible species-the divine intellect-which is not abstracted from things but productive of them. And it is productive not only of the form but also of the matter, which is the principle of individuation. Therefore, the species of the separate substance's intellect regard the total thing, not only the principles of the species but even the individuating principles. The knowledge of singulars, ther.efore, must not be denied to separate substances, although our intellect cannot be cognizant of singulars." Ironically, Alejandro *(op. cit.,* p. !200, footnote 4), while trying to give us a better understanding of the crucial " parity " argued by Suarez, sends us precisely to that chapter of the *Cont. Gent.* See *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 57, a. !2, c; *II Cont. Gent.,* 100, !2, 4.

[17] See *11 Cont. Gent.,* 98, 1.

[18] *Ibid.,* 96, 6; 97, 3.

[19] *Ibid.,* 98, 2.

[20] *Ibid.,* 3.

essence would be if it were their cause, but it is not since the cause of separate substances must be a creator and only God can create.[21] It does not help to insist on the fact that it knows its essence as it really is, namely, as the likeness of God insofar as God is the cause of all things, because this still does not make an angel the universal cause of all things.[22] It ia, therefore, only through species that a subsistent form can reach its peers. And this conclusion is confirmed by Aquinas in the following way. As a subsistent form is an understanding which is always actual, it follows that it does always know the whole of Being.[28] Now this requires that either it has of itself the perfect likeness of the whole of Being and of all its differences, and then it is an infinite being itself; or else, not being an infinite being it is in potentiality to the likeness of the whole of Being, and this implies that the likeness of the whole of Being is given to it in an imperfect and finite way, as a manifold which is total only by addition.[24] Of course, the choice is not at stake since it is evident that separate substances are not infinite, although they most certainly are always actual. Consequently they reach their peers through species which are always present to them.[25] Does this mean that they are a sort of carrier of an infinite number of species? This question makes sense only insofar as it flows spontaneously from an anthropomorphic conception of the angels. St. Thomas's answer, though, does not overlook the fact that pure forms are placed at a midpoint between God, who knows an infinity of individuals through his unique self-subsisting species, and men who cannot even know even one individual through each one of their species. As a result, his answer is altogether in the negative. Separate forms, he tells us, are so far from needing an infinite number of species in order to know an infinite number of individuals that in fact their species are even less

[21] *Ibid.,* 4-6.
[22] *Ibid.,* 8.
[23] *Ibid.,* 9.
[24] *Ibid.,* 10.
[25] *Ibid.,* 13.

numerous than those of human minds. He does not see any mystery in this. It is only that, as he sees it, the nearer a form approaches to the perfection and goodness of the universal beeing-which is also the universal likeness or species of all individuals-the more it enjoys through its intelligible species the all encompassing cognitive ability of the divine subsisting species and consequently the more individuals it can reach through each one of its general species.[26]

It would seem that Aquinas has sufficiently proved that angels need intelligible species in order to know other objects different from themselves. He did not think so. For one thing, in answer to a possible objection he makes it clear that, despite the fact that a separate substance is intelligible through itself, an angel does not become actualized directly by the essence of a known pure spirit but rather by its species.[27] There is an exception, though, for St. Thomas. If a separate substance is spiritually in immediate contact with another separate substance, then it can know that form in its own essence, whether the other is higher or lower than itself in the hierarchy.[28] But once again this is a circumstantial exception that regards only separate forms. As for material substances, the same regular procedure described above, and for exactly the same reason, applies to the understanding of them on the part of pure spirits.[20]

Once the alleged parity between angelic knowledge and human understanding has been shown to be false, we are able to perceive the necessary limitations affecting the latter. What first strikes our attention is that, being essentially *possible*, our intellect must be actuated for each act of knowledge including the act whereby it knows itself. The least that is entailed in this conclusion is that a kind of determination coming from the object is unavoidable. But since material singulars first affect the knower through his external senses and his imagina-

[26] *Ibid.*, 10-12; 100, 2.
[27] *Ibid.*, 98, 14-19.
[28] *Ibid.* 20.
[20] *Ibid.*, 99, 1--2.

tion, it becomes imperative to posit also a certain cooperation between the sense-faculty and the intellect. On account of the basic unity of the soul [80] some amount of interaction between the phantasm and intellection in their capacity as operations of two faculties of the same knower does not seem to be much of a problem. However, on the account of the unbridgeable gap between the material level of the former and the spiritual character of the latter, such cooperation must necessarily undergo drastic qualifications. That the cooperation must respect the irreducibility of one order to the other not only must be agreed upon by Thomists and Suarezians alike but in addition it must constitute the final test of their respective theories, in the sense that they either adhere to this canon or in practice at least forget its demands.

St. Thomas, for one, certainly remained faithful to his master Aristotle who had insistently emphasized the sacredness of the foregoing criterion. His theory of abstraction, based on conversion to the phantasm, is well known, but it creates some confusion in certain circles and might induce some readers to prefer the appar.ent simplicity that characterizes Suarez':: theory of the cognoscibility of the singular. However, it is quite in order to remind oursehoes of the golden advice so long confirmed by the History of Philosophy: beware of over-

[80] See *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 12, a. 4c: " Therefore, what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, since our soul, through which we know, is the form of some particular matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers. One is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Therefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not indeed as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the consideration of the intellect. Hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand things in a universal way; and this is beyond the power of sense." He further explains this basic inability of the sense: "An indication of this is that sight cannot in any way know in abstraction what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider in abstraction what it knows in concretion. For although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both elements, and considers the form separately by itself " *(ibid.,* ad 3).

simplifications. As we are going to show, Suarez's neat explanation falls short of reality, whereas the rather complicated approach followed by Aquinas truly accounts for the way in which we intellectually come to grips with the most concrete singularity of things.

* * * *

In order better to understand the Thomist position let us first consider Suarez's account of our knowledge of the individual as such. It becomes quickly apparent that it falls prey to a devastating dilemma which at best leaves the *Eximius Doctor* saying no more than the Angelic. Indeed, focusing on a certain ambiguity in the use of the term " material individual substance " as it appears throughout the Suarezian writings, two possible positions become immediately evident. Either one says with Picard that Suarez nev.er clearly stated that our intellect directly grasps the existential singularity of sensible objects as such,[81] or else one holds to the position of Alejandro who maintains that he did.[32] In the first case, the whole of Suarezianism crumbles insofar as epistemology is concerned. In the second, though, some appearance remains but it soon vanishes as well. This is so because either one means by existential singularity the accumulation of individualized accidents, and then the problem reappears in connection with each one of those particular accidents without it ever being possible to find any solution but only bold empty affirmations; or else, one means the very hidden substance, and then one gets from Suarez only an analogical and discursive knowledge which amounts more or less to what Aquinas himself has consistently held.

[81] See N. Picard, in *Antonianum,* XIX (Jan.-Apr. 1944), pp. 76-77, where he writes: " Admet-il, en outre, l'intelligible de la singularite existentelle? . . . Quoi qu'il en soit de la valeur de ces arguments remarquons que ... Suarez n'affirme pas nettement que !'intelligence humaine saisisse, directement comme telle, la *singularite existentielle* des objects sensibles." (Quoted by Alejandro, *op. cit.,* p.

He does not emphasize either the distinction made famous by Scotus between perceiving the existence of this nature and knowing this nature as existing.

•• Alejandro, *op. cit.,* pp.

Alejandro makes his case as carefully as possible but perhaps not as convincingly as we would have desired. First, he draws a clear distinction between an individual material thing taken in a metaphysical sense and the same considered from an existential vantage point. Evidently, the former is the real thing insofar as it includes in its own being a metaphysical distinction between its specific nature and its individuation, the individuation itself being in Suarezian terms a real " difference " which contracts the species to the individual in exactly the same way in which the specific difference contrasts the genus to the species, i.e., by adding to the specific nature something positive although "ratione distinctum" only.[33] Accordingly, the metaphysical concept of the individual would have to include necessarily these two essential marks, a concept of the species and a real concept of the individuation of *this* particular thing. Consequently, had Alejandro chosen to credit Suarez with the contention that we have such a concept, he would have been in genuine trouble because Suarez painstakenly barely arrived at a general concept of individuation, and this he did through a discursive procedure. Perhaps for this reason Alejandro decided to attribute to the *Eximius Doctor* the thesis of the cognoscibility of the " existential singularity." But such an attempt carries with it a throng of puzzles and riddles.

Alejandro understands by "existential singularity" the very individual material thing insofar as it is tied to the *"hie et nunc"* of existence and moves in the midst of the accidentality of the two existential dimensions, space and time. He is no longer concerned with the fact that the specific nature becomes differentiated by its metaphysical individuation but rather with the existence of the thing which requires in addition to the metaphyseal individuation further determinations such as the thousand details which differentiate *this* from *that.* In his view, it is this kind of global individual that, according to a sound

•• See *DM,* V, !!!, ## !!!, *5,* 6, 8, 9, 16, !!!0; see also Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy.* (Garden City, New York: Image Books), vol. 3, part II, pp. 180-181.

epistemology, our mind would grasp directly. He makes the point that Suarez dismisses outright the difficulty ensuing from the fact that material things are tied to spatio-temporal conditions. To show this he reminds us that Suarez concerned himself with the tight bond that ties the material thing to the conditions of space and time,[34] and that he nevertheless did not grant it the category of a real obstacle to intelligibility. The only way, says Alejandro while summing up Suarez's reasoning, in which the spatia-temporal circumstances would hinder intellibility would be in their capacity as sequels of materiality itself. If therefore materiality is not a real obstacle-since even we know material common substances as material and angels can reach the material individual itself through their understanding-, it would follow that spatio-temporal conditions cannot really constitute any kind of problem. All that would follow is that material objects-singular or universal-must be represented in a spiritual way by the mind. But this is neither impossible nor absurd, as argued by Suarez in group (B) of the expose we have presented above. Evidently, he persists in holding the parity we dismissed at some length.

It is fair to say that so far Alejandro has been accurate, because Suarez did indeed really hold the general thesis of the intellectual cognoscibility of the particular through proper concepts, and he even solved the difficulty coming from the spatio-temporal aspect of existence. But as soon as we ask about the particular mode in which this happens, the inevitable ambiguity reappears, and it becomes extremely difficult to decide in favor of Alejandro against Picard's contention. It does not in fact matter which way of defining the existential singular, as allowed by Suarez/[5] is chosen; in both cases unsurmountable hindrances are encountered.

•• See *De Angelis*, IV, 3, 10: "Ad primam rationem --- die intellectum dici et esse potentiam singularem spiritualem abstrahentem a conditionibus materialibus non obesse quominus possit cognoscere res materiales cum omnibus conditionibus individuantibus, ut in Angelis patet: solumque posse inferri speciem, per quaa intellectus cognoscit singularia, debere esse spiritualem cum quo stat repraesentare posse rem singularem ut ostensum est." See also: *De Anima*, IV, 3, 9.

[85] See Alejandro *op. cit.*, p. !'lll: "Mas ann Suarez, como ya antes vimos, define

If we say that the existential singular is an aggregate of sensible data and as such not only commensurate to our understanding but also *"cognoscibile per speciem propriam,"* we may be able to provide some passage in which Suarez would appear to consider such a position as not absurd,[36] but it will be difficult to prove on a strictly textual basis that he really thought that such is the way in which things happen. For one thing, a very simple argument will convince us that the suarezian texts brought up by Alejandro do not match his polemical aspirations. Disregarding the question whether that would suffice, it is evident that *the very least one should require* from anyone who holds that we know the individual as such through its accidents is that he show as well that we have a proper concept of each *individualized* accident, that is, of all *sensibilia,* both *propria* and *c-ommunia,* precisely insofar as they inhere in this particular substance. For, unless the notion of a particular accident includes the intellectual grasp of the individuating actual inherence of that accident in a particular substance, we are barred from including it in the brand of " concepts of individualized accidents." In other words, the thesis of the proper conceptualization of the individual material thing through the proper conceptualization of all its accidents goes hand in hand with the belief in the conceptualization of the *sensibile per accidens.* And yet, we realize that Suarez does not grant us a direct concept of *sensibilia per accidens.* On the contrary, whereas he sees no difficulty in our direct grasping of " *sensibilia per s'e,"*[37] he is adamant in denying any proper con-

la cosa material o como esencia material que se sumerge en los accidentes, o como un cumulo de accidentes, o sea cumulo de datos ofrecidos a los sentidos. Pues bien, afirma que ese conjunto de datos ofrecidos a los sentidos (sensibles propios) es algo proporcionado a nuestro entendimiento y, por lo tanto, inteligible: *'cognoscibile per speciem propriam'."*

[36] See *De Anima,* IV, 3, 7: "Alii tandem ponunt cognosci singnlare oognita integra collectione accidentium illius. At tunc redit quaestio de accidentibus, an in universali an in singnlari potius cognoscantur. Si primum, per illam profecto non deveniemus in cognitionem huius singularis. Si secundum: ergo accidentia singularia cognoscuntur directe per propriam speciem, quod est intentum."

[37] See *ibid.,* 4, 1: " De accidentibus ergo per se sensibilibus nulla difficultas est,

cept of *"sensibilia per accidens."* [38] It is true that, while recognizing that our concept of the particular accident does not include its actual inherence as such (" *non dicit ordinem ad subjectum* ") , Suarez still persists in calling it a proper concept on the grounds that, since the substance is a part of the accidental concretion, it still includes a kind of *confused,* obscure, apprehension of the subject *("sed* illud-namely, the order to the subject-potitts *in confuso indudit* ") .[39] **But** then the very intellectual character of that confused apprehension becomes questionable. Is it essentially obscure or does it rather constitute only the first stage of a process of intellectual illumination? If the latter holds true, then it really " *dicit. ordinem ad subjectum,"* and Suarez has just voided his previom negation. If it is rather the former that holds then Suarez is not really talking of a conceptual grasp because it is essential to real conceptions that they be open to enlightenning analytic processes. Futhermore, even if he were ready to lower his standards and have Suarez go along with the thomistic solution-according to which we have a real intellectual knowledge of that particular accident insofar as it leaves out its inherence as such but that knowledge is obtained not through proper concept but only through an instantiating judgment-he would still be faced with the objection he was trying to refute and would have to grant that he has only a universal concept of that accident. At any rate, the objected text does not make things better for the thesis of the direct cognoscibility of the individual through the collection of concepts of its accidents. It would be too risky to rely on a passage which does not manage to overpower in clarity the neat conclusion to which

qua ratione ab intellectu cognoscantur, nam cum ea species suas sensibus imprimant, consequenter etiam imprimunt in intellectu possibili virtute agentis intellectus."

[38] See *ibid.:* "Sensibilia per accidens non cognoscuntur primo ab intellectu per proprias species."

[80] See *ibid.,* 6: " Ad secundam obiectionem dicendum, primam cognitionem accidentis non terminari ad abstractum, sed ad concretum, quod non dicit ordinem ad subiectum, sed illud potius in confuso includit sicque substantiam quodammodo cognosci simul cum accidenti, hoc est, in confuso, in quantum videlicet pars est talis concreti accidentalis."

a combination of sound and well-established suarezian premises have led us. After all, not even Suarez himself seems to have dared to lean on his own theory about the proper conception of the individual accident in order to support direct intellectual access to the individual as such.[40] For when he referred to this position he made it clear that he did not share it *("Alii tandem ponunt cognosci singulare cognita integra collectione accidentium illius* ") . Far from appropriating it to himself, he instead pointed out a very serious problem that it raises, and ironically that difficulty happens to be the same one we have been raising as an objection to Alejandro's contention in connection with its first alternative, namely, that it is not clear whether we can really have a concept of an individual accident without conceiving simultaneously its substance *("At tunc redit quaestio de accidentibus, an in universali an in singulari potius cognoscantur* ") . And it is only as an hypothesis that he took advantage of the singularity of such concepts to corroborate his own contention that our intellect can form proper particular concepts both of substantial and accidental entities (" *Si secundum: ergo accidentia singula1ia cognoscuntur directe per propriam speciem, quod es intentum.")* It is an argument *"ad hominem"* pure and simple.

One thing is clear, however, and it should spare us the effort of considering Alejandro's second alternative. For by now we already know that Suarez would never allow us to say that we have a proper concept of the very individual substance which hides behind the totality of its accidents. However, it is important to hear Suarez saying to us that the only way to grasp substances is through a discursive and analogical process.

His thesis is clearly stated in the *De Anima,* where he tells us that those things that are not sensible" per se," even though they may be material in substance, cannot be known through proper concepts-understanding by that concepts which are formed from the very similitude of the object without resorting to any analogy or negation-, but must be obtained discursive-

[40] See *ibid.,* 3, 7 quoted here in footnote 36.

ly.[41] According to his account, the final discourse develops as follows. It begins with the production of the phhntasm which represents the material thing. This quasi-portrait of the object in turn triggers in the possible mind the impression of a spiritual image of the particular being which apparently includes at once the spiritual representation of all the proper accidents as well as all its common *sensibilia* and becomes thereby suitably modified and adjusted to the changing singularity of the particular object. This inclusion of all *sensibilia* in the spiritual representation of the particular thing serves another more important purpose too. It enables the actuated intellect to trace the substance by pursuing the signs shown by the "understood" accidents which *confusedly* point toward the subject, as noted above by Suarez himself. At this point then all that is needed for the mind to bring about the indicated result is a rapid reasoning based on the consideration of the series of accidents-such as heat, cold, clearness, darkness-which alternately shine in its permanent concept of the same object and call for a steady substratum to support them.[42] Then, taking advantage

[41] See *ibid.,* 4, 2: ". . . proprius conceptus alicuius rei dupliciter dici potest. Uno modo si rei conveniat, ut non conveniat aliis . . . neque de hoc procedit conclusio ... Altero modo dici rei conceptus proprius, quando formatur ex propria rei similitudine absque analogia vel negatione: res ergo quae sub sensum cadunt propriis conceptibus secundo modo a nobis concipiuntur, ut experientia constat: quae vero non cadunt, esto materiales sint, non ita a nobis concipi valent pro hoc statu ..."

[42] See *ibid.,* 3: "Quare processus intellectus nostri in cognoscendo esse videtur, ut primo quidem accipiat speciem spiritualem repraesentantem rem sensibilem et materialem eamdem ipsam quae repraesentatur in phantasmate, atque adeo primo repraesentantem accidentia sensibilia propria substantaie alicuius; tum etiam sensibbilia communia, quae propriorum modificant cognitionem, ac eandem in confuso repraesentantem subiectum accidentium, cum accidentia ilia repraesentet in concreto. Intellectus ergo tali formatus specie proprio conceptu attingit sensibilia propria, atque etiam communia quae aliquo modo per se in specie relucent: Subiectum tamen accidentium quae ac caeterea quae per speciem non repraesntantur, discursu colligit, quatenus considerant ipsa accidentia ac praecipue cognoscens illorum mutationem quae fit circa idem subiectum (nun enim calidum, nunc frigidum experitur, nunc lucidum, nunc tenebrosum, etc ...) discursu colligit aliquid substare illis, sicque concipit substantiam per modum subiecti substantis ..."

of this new vantage point, the possible intellect finally evokes an analogical concept of the newly detected particular substance and stores it in memory, as can be seen from the with which we use it thereafter as often as we wish.[43] It should be noted, however that the initial spiritual concept of the individual that provided the subject matter to the foregoing reasoning was not obtained through the accumulation of all the particular concepts of the individualized accidents of the thing itself, as Alejandro seemed to want us to believe. Such an opinion never appealled to Suarez, as we have seen, at least sufficiently to have him committed to its support; nor is it required by his account. According to him, (a) the mind, through the cooperation of the phantasm and the agent intellect, directly forms the spiritual image of the individual and (b) simultaneously and in the same way causes as many concepts of *individualized* accidents as the senses can reach; (c) finally, it has the latter modify and perfect the former in the best interests of a truly successful grasp of the individual as such.[44] From there, and always using analogical reasoning, the intellect can go whereever it decides, even to the formation of the concept

•• See *ibid.,* 4: "... et quia postea facilius easdem cognoscit, quod indicium est relictas fuisse proprias, cum per alienas tam prompte id praestare non potest."

.. See *ibid.,* 3 cited here in footnote 42. This is a difficult text. On one hand, it gives the impression that the spiritual *species imprBSsa* of the individual is but a solid transposition of the phantasm, with all the particularities it contains (such as color and size), to the spiritual level and that it is carried out in cooperation with the agent intellect. This would account for the fact that it actually represents all the *sensibilia communia et propria* that presently affect the thing and the phantasm, and, together with *De Anima,* IV, 3, 7 (quoted here in footnote 36), make it unnecessary to resort to the opinion that holds its *cumulative* formation. But, on the other hand, the fact that the accidental characteristics are represented in the same particularized way discussed by Suarez in *De Anima,* IV, 4, 3 (see here in footnote 39), would lead us to conclude to the presence of particular concepts of the individualized accidents, and, ultimately, to a cumulative formation of the concept of the thing. However, *De Anima,* IV, 3, 7, still prevents us from abiding by that opinion. Hence, we are forced to introduce point (b) as a middle solution. Accordingly, we would posit a basic global concept of the thing, obtained *via* transposition, and some *transient* concepts of changing qualities which modify and readjust it while enabling the mind to undertake its substance-oriented reasoning process.

of" matter." Ironically, listening to him, one has the impression of listening to St. Thomas.

* * * *

The way is clear now for a better understanding of St. Thomas's protracted and complicated but really safe account of our contact with individual reality. It is imperative in the first place to do away once and for all with the misconception of the Angelic Doctor's theory which has contributed in large part to the suarezian opposition to his account. This misconception would have St. Thomas stating that the possible intellect, once it has been actuated by the *species qua,* produces in itself a *verbum mentis,* a *species in qua;* " in which," in a rather cartesian way, it knows the essence before comparing it with the phantasm. Ironically, such an entity had the devastating virtue of rendering the whole of Aquinas's epistemological production unintelligible and contradictory. As a matter of fact, the exegesis provided by many a celebrated thomist of the past, such as John of St. Thomas, was badly damaged by their concern with such a requirement. Fortunately, with the highly probable proof of the unauthenticity of the troublesome opuscle attributed to the Angelic Doctor, *DeNatura Verbi lntellectus/* [5] the direct intercourse between the possible intellect and the phantasm came to the fore as St. Thomas intended. [46] Very wisely, therefore, Bernard J. Lonergan, taking the elimination of the *verbum mentis* as a solid basis, undertook a giant revision of all the works of Aquinas from the vantage point of the theory of knowledge and gave us a new thomist epistemology, with a

[45] See Edition Mandonnet, V, 369-375.

[46] See *de Verit.,* q. 10, a. 2, ad 7.: "... nulla potentia potest aliquid cognoscere non convertendo se ad obiectum suum, ut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo se ad colorem. Unde cum phantasmata se habeant hoc modo ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut patet per Philosophum in *III de Anima,* quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem apud se habeat, numquam tamen actu aliquid considerat secundum illam speciem nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata: et ideo, sicut intellectus noster secundum statum viae indiget phantasmatibus ad actu considerandum antequam accipiat habitum, ita et postquam acceperit."

human face as it were, in which all the parts articulately cohere with each other and with the most trivial psychological experience as well.[47]

It is in the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* that the final stand of St. Thomas is to be looked for if we want to know what he really meant by" Conversio ad phantasmata." [48] Next, we must bear in mind that his problem reduces to the question: how can we be sure that the universal that we understand is the same as the singular that we imagine? [49] Lonergan maintains that in pure Thomism the solution lies in the thesis that understanding is insight into phantasm. Since insight means seeing inside in a certain light, it must be made clear what is properly being illuminated, immaterialized, universalized, and in what does such an illumination consist. It is the phantasm itself in the sense of that which is imagined that is being illuminated, we are told. As for the illumination itself, Lonergan successfully points out that it does not consist in the reception of any quality or virtue in the phantasm, but rather in a very obvious process that could even be called "experienceable" in

[47] Bernard J. Lonergan, *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 161: "This account of conversion *[De Verit.,* q. 10, a. 2, ad 7m.] throws a new light on such a passage as *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 7. The influence of the doubtful *De Natura Verbi lntellectus* forced older interpreters to take it as genuinely Thomist that the verbum was formed prior to any understanding; in consequence they held that intellect first knew the quiddity in the *verbum* and then converted to phantasm to know it again existing in corporeal matter. But once the *opusculum* is recognized as doubtful, the whole position falls to the ground. Thomist conversion does not mean reflecting nor turning back but simply a natural orientation; q. 84 of the *Pars Prima* does not seem to mention the *verbum;* indeed the whole treatise on human intellect in the *Pars Prima* mentions the *verbum* only in incidental fashion."

[48] Lonergan, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-172, mentions the early writings in which an account was provided which would explain only the way in which metaphysicians know the singular. Essentially it is this: " first, intellect grasps the universal; secondly, it reflects on the act by which it grasps the universal; thirdly, it comes to know the species that is the principle of that act; fourthly, it turns to the phantasm whence the species is derived; and, fifthly, it comes to know the singular thing that is represented by the phantasm." (p. 170). But, we are told, due to its exclusiveness and perhaps also to the influence of the Paraphrases of Themistius, he gave up this explanation.

[49] See Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 172.

some sense. He makes his point, first in a negative way, and then in a positive and descriptive manner.

Indeed, how could St. Thomas have held a kind o£" receptive abstraction," having objected so strongly to the averroist "irradiatio phantasmatum" on the grounds that, £ar £rom beinK an abstraction, it would rather be a " reception " and as suc11 would have to downgrade the spiritual to the level o£ the material recipient? [50] On the other hand, given the description o£ the process provided by him, it is impossible to discover in it the least trace o£ a need £or a reception. In £act, St. Thomas lists only a £ew requirements £or a true abstraction: [51] first, the presence o£ both the agent intellect and phantasms which tend to increase the sensitive power [52] ; second, proper dispositions in the sensitive faculties, which are to be bestowed on

[50] See *De Unitate lntellectus,* c. IV, ed. Keeler, paragr. 98; quoted by Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 173: " Secundo, quod talis irradiatio phantasmatum non poterit facere quod phantasmata sunt intelligibilia actu: non enim fiunt phantasmata intelligibilia actu nisi per abstractionem; hoc autem magis erit receptio quam abstractio. Et iterum cum omnis receptio sit secundum naturam recepti, irradiatio specierum intelligibilium quae sunt in intellectu possibili, non erit in phantasmatibus quae sunt in nobis, intelligibiliter sed sensibiliter et materialiter."

[51] See *Sum. Theol.,* I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 3: "If the relation of the agent intellect to the possible intellect were that of an active object to a power (as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight), it would follow that he could understand all things instantly, since the agent intellect is that which makes all things in act. But the agent intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act; and for this, besides the presence of the agent intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation. For from one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms propositions are made, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view, it matters not whether the agent intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul."

[52] See *ibid.,* q. 85, a. 1 ad 4: "Not only does the agent intellect illumine phantasms, it does more; by its power intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms. It illumines phantasms because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so through the power of the agent intellect phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction of intelligible intentions from them. Now the agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phaitasms inasmuch as by its power we are able to take into our consideration the natures of species without individual conditions. It is in accord with their likenesses that the possible intellect is informed."

them by the *cogitative* [53]; and finally, practice which makes scholars better prepared to understand the most difficult concepts.[54]

With these factors working together a *nature* passes through an elaborate process of transformation. First, it becomes *intelligible in potency-in* the same way in which a color is visible in potency while still in the dark-as soon as it is imagined by an " intellectual-sensitive " subject. This is what happens in the state of reverie. The nature of the knower makes the whole difference here, it being impossible for the same object to be intelligible in potency if it is being imagined only by an animal. Next, it becomes *intelligible in act but understood only in potency-as* colors which are present in daylight but are not actually seen by anyone may be called visible in act but seen only in potency-as soori as the agent intellect starts making us care for the why and the wherefore and thus constitutes it into something to be understood. It is then that the illumination of the imagined object takes place, and it happens by reason of the object being received within the field of intellectual light. This light, though, falls only upon the nature of the imagined thing: it is abstractive. The corresponding illumination, therefore, is a real abstraction. We shall call it *objective* abstraction. Inasmuch as it is effected by the agent

[53] See *ibid.,* q. 78, a. 4 ad *5:* "The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part bnt to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not dictinct powers but the same yet more perfect than in other animals."

[50] See *II Cont. Gent.,* c. 73, nn. 14-16. Ibid., n. "Seemingly, the fallacy of locating the habit of science in the passive intellect resulted from the observation that men are more or less apt for scientific studies according to the various dispositions of the cogitative and imaginative powers." And *ibid.,* n. "This aptitude, however, depends on these powers as on remote dispositions, as it likewise depends on a fine sense of touch and on bodily temperament. In this connection, Aristotle remarks in *II De anima* that men possessed of a highly developed sense of touch and of soft flesh are 'mentally well endowed.' Now, the habit of science gives rise to an aptitude for reflection, being the proximate principle of that science; for the habit of science must perfect the power whereby we understand, so that it act easily at will, even as the other habits perfect the powers in which they inhere."

intellect it is *efficient,* whereas as affecting the image it is *instrumental.* Finally, our travelling nature becomes actually *understood in* act-in the same way in which colors actually seen may be called seen in act-as soon as the actual insight or understanding of it takes place. This happens when the possible intellect both (a) is actually informed by the species qua-produced by the agent intellect working as the principal cause and the illuminated phantasm cooperating in its capacity as an instrumental cause-and thereby is enabled to understand, and (b) actually understands the actually intelligible object prepared by objective abstraction. To the extent that this operation lifts the nature to a higher state it too should be called an abstraction. We shall call it *apprehensive* abstraction because by means of it we apprehend or contemplate the nature in itself. Apprehensive abstraction, we should point out, is the gordian knot of the mystery of science and speech, and so it calls for further elucidation.

Seen from the viewpoint of the possible intellect apprehensive abstration consists in being perfected or actuated twice in a row by two acts or perfections which are (I) the species *qua* which informs the possible intellect and thus makes it *true,* itself being the product of the agent intellect and the phantasm, and (2) *intelligere* which transforms the same possible intellect into something which actually grasps an intelligible species *quae* in the imagined object and thereby constitutes it a *knower,* itself being remotely the product of the above-mentioned causes. From this vantage point, therefore, there is a twofold *pati* caused by two *processiones.* Lonergan says that there are two *processiones operati.*[55] However, in the course of the second *processio operati* there is a partial procession that does not end directly in a *pati* but rather in an action. This is the procession of one act, *intelligere,* from another act, species *qua,* which takes place instantly, even automatically as it were, in the same way in which *esse* follows the form. Lonergan calls it *processio operationis.* As a result, we can conclude that ap-

•• See *op. cit.,* p. 178.

prehensive abstraction consists of a double *processio operati* and a *proc·essio operationis.*

The process of knowing, though, has not yet come to an end with the actual *intelligere.* At this point, the possible intellect finds itself still isolated from the particular things because its contemplation, although sinking into the imagined individual, does so only out of concern for its essence. It is only *saying* something, and *apprehensive* abstraction is nothing more than a *dicere.* If one prefers, we might say that at this point our understanding is *saying* an inner word without *meaning* any particular thing yet, still less *defining* the very nature it is actually contemplating, since defining entails a reference to the individuals of a whole class whereby the latter becomf's limited and circumscribed. The possible mind is saying an inner word but has not yet turned it into a linguistic item or meaning of an external word. In order to achieve this goal it has to lift the travelling nature to a higher state: it must posit a universal *ratio* or an *intentio intellecta.* This in turn will bring to it a new perfection or act whereby it will become actually *meaning* or *defining.* Inasmuch as this will be the result of the continuation of the *processiones operati* that began with the agent intellect and the imagined thing and terminated in the *pati* " intelligere " and itself will terminate in a new *pati* of the possible intellect, namely, the actual knowing of a universal, it should be called also a *processio operati.* On the other hand, inasmuch as it will constitute a lifting of the nature it should be considered as an abstraction. We shall call it *formative* abstraction. However, with regard to this new abstraction, *intelligere* or *dicere* is not a sufficient cause; it is only the ground of defining. Meaning or defining itself formally emerges as an *emanatio intellectualis,* i.e., as a rational activity which supposes the essence already fully known in the same way as an existential judgment presupposes the reason for it as already understood.

Speaking in terms of material and formal objects, we might say that objective abstraction, by constituting the imagined thing as something to be understood with regard to its nature,

gives us the material object of our understanding, whereas apprehensive abstraction, while actually understanding the phantasm, concentrates on our intellectual formal object, i. e., on the *forma intelligibilis* or *quiddity* of the thing and, to put it in more graphic words, on the *species intelligibilis quae* which is known "in" the phantasm just as actually seen colors are seen "in " colored things. Phantasm and nature, therefore, should not be considered as two isolated objects of two independent actions-imagining and understanding-but rather as two intrinsically related targets of a unique operation carried out within the essential unity of the knower by a team of well-disciplined faculties, imagination, and understanding. [56] In the

[56] See *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 5m. (quoted here in footnote 53). We might account for this cooperation more conclusively perhaps if, following Karl Rahner *(Spirit in the World* [Herder and Herder], pp. 290-309), we viewed man's form as a *Dasein* whose essence is transcendence. According to this conception, being a "finite spirit," man *pre-apprehends* an absolute negative infinity *(esse)* without ever being able to really *apprehend* it thematically. We can only speak of his " experience of *esse"* which happens when man experiences himself in his movement towards *esse* in totality as surpassing all possible knowledge, i.e., as being " in some way everything " *in excess.*

Now, if man, insofar as he is a drive towards *esse,* pre-apprehends always and already *esse* in totality, it follows that by the same token he "can" actualize this pre-apprehension i.e., he has the faculty of actually *apprehending* Being. This is what Aquinas calls the agent intellect. On the other hand, the actual apprehension of *esse* takes place only when a particular thing is viewed in the light of Being, Hence, man has the faculty of knowing things as *entia,* i. e., he has a possible intellect. The possible intellect, therefore, is nothing more than Being insofar as it can be present to itself as self in a complete return (judgment) but not " of itself " nor always and already, since being present to itself of itself and always is the .essential characteristic of the antithesis of a possible intellect, i.e., of a subsistent intellect. This requires that man's possible intellect can know or come to itself only by *receptively* allowing another to encounter it. Consequently, it is ultimately that definite intensity of Being whereby a form has of itself the pow.er to know something receptively but not to know itself except through that by which it becomes actual or knowing. It is therefore an intensity of Being which is at once a form subsisting in itself-since it is not condenmed to lose itself in matter-and *sensibility* as well-because it is a drive to let itself be encountered by another and thus it is the form of matter. This means that the possible intellect both depends on and controls sensibility in the sense that without sensibility it cannot come to itself and without the intellectual activity sensibility itself has no *raison d'etre.* But if the possible intellect controls sensibility, it must let it emanate from itself. It must, that is, create the possibility that

course of the execution of such a naturally well-concerted plan the imagined object is presented as something to be understood and the "in-seeing " apprehensive abstraction grasps the intelligibility of the imagined object "in the imagined object." To put it in a concrete way, while imagination presents a bundle of equal radii in a plane surface, our insight grasps " imagined equal radii in a plane surface " as being " the necessary and sufficient condition of an imagined uniform curve."

But the two groups of cognitive faculties do not only work together in the processing of our first act of understanding. Both-external senses, imagination and cogitative on one hand, and agent intellect and possible mind on the other-do so precisely because they do not lose touch with external reality. We

another can encounter it objectively as its first known by becoming itself the form of matter without thereby compromising its spiritual transcendence, i. e., while remaining free from matter in its complete return. As Heidegger puts it so well: " Human intuition, therefore, is not ' sensible ' because its affection takes place through ' sense' organs. Rather, the converse is true: it is because our *Dasein* is finite-existing in the midst of the essent which already is and to which our *Dasein* is abandoned-that it must of necessity receive the essent, that is, offer it the possibility of giving notice of itself." *(Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* [Indiana University Press], p. 31).

Sense faculty thus considered as integrated within the process of transcendental intellection is what St. Thomas calls the *Cogitative Sense* or lower reason. Although it rests on an organ which may be structurally the same as the corresponding organ in some beasts, its functional abilities leave far behind those of the " *aestimativa"* which is its conterpart in irrational animals. The Angelic Doctor saw it in full light: " *Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte sensitiva quia vis sensitiva in sui supremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in quo sensus conjungitur. In animali vero irrationali fit apprehensio intentionis individualis per aestimativam naturalem, secundum quod avis per auditum vel visum cognoscat filium, vel aliquid hujusmodi."* (II. *de Anima,* lect. 13, n. 397). He explains himself further saying that man's *cogitativa* apprehends this man insofar as he is this man, whereas animal *aestimativa* does not apprehend an individual under the universal's extension, but approaches it only insofar as it is the term or the principle of some action or passion *(Ibid.,* n. 398) . The same conclusion was reached many centuries later by Martin Heidegger in his book *What is a Thing?* (Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, pp. 220-222). And the whole conception of knowledge as a spiritual development which cannot be mistaken for an aggregate of several faculties' operations but must be attributed to man himself was already pointed out by Aquinas in his enlightening saying: *"non enim, proprie loquendo, sensus aut intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque."* *(De Verit.,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.)

can be assured that when the mind actually understands the form in the phantasm the knower is actually attaining the real thing. The chain that links it to the outside world is certainly long but effective. It begins at the level of external senses which take in the superficial characteristics of the object and transmit them to the imagination and the cogitative for further elaboration, making it possible for the very " shining appearance " of the real thing-as Heidegger would say-to show up at the threshold of the agent intellect which in turn will unpack its essential constitution and present it to the knowing mind with all the guarantees of a safe product, which happens to be the real thing as existing with an intentional existence.[57] Unlike

[57] Karl Rahner's studies cast a precious light on the Thomist process of identification with the object in sensation and its further separation from the subject in abstraction. The kernel of his reasoning :ceduces to this. The mind, whose Being consists in being able to be everything, becomes self-conscious when it becomes actual, and it becomes actual any time it becomes something other than itself. But, given the nature of its own Being, the mind becomes the other by substituting its own Being for the Being of the other in the function of informing the " this " of matter of the other. This, however, is done without its own Being being given away absolutely to the other precisely because the reception of the determination produced by the other does not take place until the actuality of the others's " this " has been produced by the mind's own substantial ground as well, and it so happens that the mental substantial ground produces such actuality precisely because it is always and already being driven towards the ultimate actuality d its total potentiality and while it is being so driven. The mind thus remains free in the very act of sensation because in it the substantial ground, while giving its own Being to the "this" of matter, is self-conscious of the "being-with-matter" of its Being not being given away absolutely to such "this" of matter. Therefore, even in the act of sensibility the subject perceives itself as ' more than " and consequently somehow "other than" the object. But this virtual experience of otherness--which shows as yet the traces of sensibility's emanation from the possible intellect-becomes crystal clear through the act of abstraction that it makes possible (See *Spirit in the W01-ld,* pp. 84-97; 366-374).

On the basis of the foregoing, the need for Ontology to account for abstraction comes out rather clearly. In human sensibility, indeed, the other is given to the mind-i. e., the other gives itself or is present to the mind-through the mind's self-consciousness which in turn results from the mind's giving its own Being to the other while keeping an awareness in perspective of its total potentiality insofar as the latter has not been exhausted by this given away determination. Human mind is thus led to understanding the Being of the other as a specific *limitation* of *esse* and thereby to perform the act of abstraction of the form from *esse.* Thence it further proceeds to limiting *esse* to the *initself* which is present to it in

the empiricists, St. Thomas does not think that the key to success lies at the level of senses and imagination. Of course, we must rely upon them if the very epistemological question as a problem is to be possible, since, it is the data presented by our sensibility that raise the question about the validity of our knowledge. If they were not assumed as reliable, not even empiricism itself would stand a chance.[58] But, since the epistemological question is not " whether we sense something " but rather "how do we understand the real being of that something," it is at the level of the agent intellect that the real test arises. This amounts to saying that, if the whole cognitive operation is to end successfully, the phantasm-which certainly does not " represent" the *esse* of the thing-must at least "present" it lest objective abstraction-which is supposed to constitute the imagined object as some *intelligible in* act-not even be in a position to contact it due to the fact that it works exclusively through the intellectual light provided by the agent intellect which, being essentially" the light of Being," can only be effective where it comes across Being itsel£.[59] Therefore, either we do not understand at all, and then we can do without agent intellect, or else we do understand, and then the agent intellect must be posited as attaining the *esse* of the thing in

its self-consciousness and thus to perform the act of perceptive judgment. This shows that *esse* has been apprehended all along as *limited.* But since what is apprehended as limited presupposes the apprehension of the same as *limiting* and thereby as somehow *non-limited,* and since furthermore *esse* as non-limited is negatively infinite, it finally follows that the otherness of the object is experienced through the actualization of the pre-apprehensive drive or transcendence of the mind (See *ibid.,* pp. 396-398; 124, 134, 160, 172, 221, 226-227).

[58] Idealism is not to be taken into consideration because it does not start with true data but rather with an initial mistrust in our senses which already supposes our epistemological problem solved albeit with a deviant solution only.

[59] See *In Anal. Post.* c. 15, 1, 20 (Leonine Edition, p. 402): Manifestum est enim quod singulare sentitur proprie et per se, sed tamen sensus est quodammodo etiam ipsius universalis. Cognoscit enim Calliam non solum in quantum est Callias, sed etiam in quantum est hie homo. Et exinde est quod tali acceptione sensus praexistente, anima intellectiva potest considerare hominem in utroque. Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis, et nullo modo hoc apprehenderet universalem naturam in particulari, non esset possibile quod ex apprehensione sensus causetur in nobis cognitio universalis."

and through the phantasm. But, of course, there is no doubt that we really understand and thereby are above mere beasts, since it is precisely this simple *fact of* life-assumed without hesitation by the whole of mankind in the very process of making history, i.e., of "ek-sisting," of deciding unceasingly in time at all levels of activity: private, political, commercial, industrial, practical, speculative, and moral-that gave rise to the epistemological question, which is not " whether we understand" but rather "how do we understand." Therefore, unless a nonaprioristic account of the " how " of our understanding proves absolutely satisfactory, the agent intellect-or, if preferr.ed a la kant, productive imagination-will remain an indispensable explanation, a must. But even then no one will ever have the right to say that the thomistic apprehensive abstraction or first simple concept was not meant to he essentially " realistic." There is no trace, here, of the depressing cartesian dogmatic realism which stops short at the reality of the ide:>. known in itsel£.[60] According to St. Thomas, our concept is not known in itself but through it we know the very being of the thing which is "present "-although not "represented "-in the phantasm. [61] It is indeed no overemphasis at all to say that Aquinas would unhesitantly have subscribed to the following heideggerian quotation: "Thus thought is that *presentation* of the thing which is *present,* whereby the thing which present is made available to us in its own presence and brought forth in front of us, to the effect that we be enabled to persevere in its presence." [62]

Let us bear in mind, though, that apprehensive abstraction is not really an intellectual representation of the individual thing as an individual. In order to grasp the object in this

[60] See Joseph Marechal, *Le Point de Depart de la Metaphysique* (Paris: Desclee-De Brouwer, 1964), Cahier I pp. *!!!53-!!!55.*

[61] See Jacques Maritain, *The Pre-Conscious Life of the Intellect,* in *Challenges and Renewals,* Selected Readings edited by Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward (Cleveland-New York: The World Publishing Company), p. 57.

[62] Martin Heidegger, *Que veut-dire "Penser"? in Essais et Conferences* (Paris, *Gallimard),* pp. 166-167.

way the mind disposes of another *genuinely* intellectual operation based on pure conceptualization and constituting a further step in the process of knowledge which will be studied later in this essay. It is only through an act of judgment that we can really know Peter as Peter and John as John. However, as Lonergan puts it, " while apprehensive abstraction is not of material conditions, still it is not of something apart from material conditions." [63] It is essentially attached to Mother Earth through the epistemological tie, essentially oriented we might say to the very individual thing. On the other hand, such an orientation is so undestructible and penetrating because it is ontological in nature due to the fact that the "concept " itself is nothing more than the result of the fruitful intercourse between the agent intellect and the *esse* of the thing, as shown above. And it is precisely because it is essentially dependent on *esse* that apprehensive abstraction can enable the mind to proceed to its judicative act whereby it finally reaches the individual as such. We might even say with Marechal that the insight of the essence in the phantasm is already in a sense an *inchoate judgment:* "If we call' affirmation' in the broadest sense of the word the active relation of the conceptual content to reality *(ad rem),* we will have to say according to what has foregone that the representations indwelling in our thought have in it an objective value solely in virtue of an implicit *metaphysical affirmation,* i. e., of an affirmation that links the object with the absolute of being." [64]

We can therefore conclude that, while objective abstraction is not yet an understanding but prepares and makes possible the actual knowledge, apprehensive abstraction really grasps a nature *that is* at the *physical level* although it certainly does not apprehend that nature *insofar as* it is there. In other words, it *does not consider* that nature at the physical level. However, it enables the mind to elicit an act of judgment whereby it finally knows the essence as it is in the individual and thereby

[63] Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 179.
[64] Marechal, *op. cit.,* V, p. 459.

considers that nature at the physical level. Perhaps we should say that apprehensive abstraction disregards the surrounding individual characteristics of the object and only focuses on its nature, which in turn presents itself for the mind to inspect and know it as it is in itself without attempting to define it, since definition presupposes verification. The result is that accordingly apprehensive abstraction *considers a nature at the metaphysical lev'el,* that it *says* it, but does not define it or means anything through it. A nature gets the status of " defined" or "meant" solely at the end of a rational process that begins with a series of circumstantial " insights " of it followed by the corresponding particular judgments which by being subjected to a comparative inspection finally yield suitable "generalizations." At this point, that essence is known by the mind as a nature *that* is common to many. This new act of understanding is what Lonergan calls *formative* abstraction, and it results as an *emanatio intellectualis* which in turn presupposes the *concept* of the thing. Therefore, far from the understanding of essences being the result of generalizations as Locke contends, it is rather the latter that presuppose the former[65]. Now, inasmuch as formative abstraction is the outcome of a logical reasoning, the nature as attained by it can be perfectly said to be considered *at the logical* level. It is a real universal, that is, a nature *that is* common to many, an object that is apart from material conditions because it is not inseparably tied to any particular thing, although it is equally oriented towards many individuals specifically identical. It, therefore, can be- and in fact is-defined and meant without meaning any particular instance. However, while conceiving the nature that is universal and thereby knowing that it is universal, we do not necessarily know it yet " as universal," because we may be perfectly well aware of its being universal without paying

[65] See Marechal, *op. cit.,* V, pp. *455-456:* "Car le processus comparatif de generalisation *n'affecte pas* !'abstraction, comme le supposent les nominalistes, mais la *devoile* et en expresse tous les degres; cette exploration en profondeur fait retrouver successivement les ' objects formels ' respectifs des diverses facultes qui concourent a !'intellection directe."

special attention to what constitutes it as a universal nature. It takes further reflection at the logical level to attain what we might call a " second degree " universal nature. This leaves us with two kinds of proper universal: a direct and a reflexive universal.

If now we compare the objects of apprehensive and formative abstractions, we see that they are essentially the same, insofar as both work on the same essence, but modally different. While apprehensive abstraction knows that essence only " in the imagined thing," formative abstraction grasps it apart from any instances. However, both abstractions somehow cross each other in virtue of a kind of inner relation existing between their objects. This is borne out by the fact that, while apprehensive abstraction takes place only with respect to an instance, it must nonetheless always be of a universalizable nature; and, on the other hand, while formative abstraction posits the universal apart from any instance, as an act of meaning, however, it can mean the individual just as easily as the universal. And it means the latter precisely in virtue of apprehensive abstraction on which it builds; whereas it means the particular only in virtue of a consequent, indirect, judicative, knowledge of the same. This is the reason why the particular can be meant but not defined explanatorily and quidditatively. Again, while apprehensive abstraction or insight focuses on the quidditas, that is, the *forma intelligibilis,* or that in virtue of which the particular thing is what it is-for instance "humanity"-, formative abstraction points to the *res-for* instance," homo"-, i.e., the composite "that which has humanity," as a direct universal in which therefore a metaphysical analysis is bound to uncover a *forma naturalis.*

Although the process of abstraction is essentially dependent upon and oriented toward the very *esse* of the particular thing, it is clearly not through concepts alone that St. Thomas grasps the individual as such but rather through judgments. Now, judgment is to be integrated within the same ontological process of understanding and does not therefore lose contact with the real thing for one moment. Remotely indeed, and as it were

materially, judgment results from developing insight which unites distinct intelligibilities into single intelligibilities; but proximately, and as it were formally, it springs from a reflective activity of reason which involves the whole man and ultimately rests upon a basic and simple act of understanding, benefitting from the ontological value of simple concepts.[66]

Insofar as it involves the whole man, judgment is conditioned psychologically by a necessity of being wide awake, since it is evident that in dreams we are liable to err, and judgment consists in a return from the syntheses effected by developing insight to their sources, both in sense and in intellectual light. This leads us to a basic understanding because reason is nothing else than understanding in an upward-downward process.[67] We build first both on the direct and the reflective levels, but in this way we only acquire problematic notions of things. On our way up, at the direct level, we elicit daily numerous insights into phantasms (apprehensive abstractions) which express themselves in tentative formative abstractions or notions. As time goes by and our experience grows we become able to effect coalescences of insights which result in hypothetical syntheses of simple quiddities or provisional definitions. Thus, for instance, we manage to recognize in the notion of man other notions that we find scattered in other beings. In this way we focus on notions such as "living," "body," " animal," etc. Reflecting upon those same formative abstractions we come to recognize them as hypothetical syntheses and thereby transform them into questions which will be answered only through a painstaking " *resolutio in principia"* on our way down. Such questions concern themselves with the exact" defining power" of those notions. For instance, we ask ourselves, "Is *rational animal* the right definition of man? " i. e., " Does it apply to all individual men and only to them? "

As soon as such riddles take over our minds we are on our way down and necessarily steer our reflection toward an intel-

•• See Lonergan, *op. cit.,* pp. 64-65.

[67] *Op. cit.,* pp. 65-66.

ligible ground where all doubt is expelled by the direct and unobstructed light of the agent intellect. In other words, we long for the evidence of a necessary connection between the sources and the hypothetical syntheses. The first rest worth noting in that descent takes place when we encounter the necessary dependence of our conclusions upon the first principles, which are the immediate insight of forms in the phantasm and the first laws of Being; and the final rest occurs simultaneously with the understanding of the necessary connection of the first principles with intellectual light. *Compositio vel divisio,* i. e., judgment follows suit as a *self-expression* of such a grasp which, as shown above, is endowed with the full guarantee of ontological objectivity. [68]

Summing up: we assent to first principles because of the intellectual light and to conclusions because of their necessary connection with principles. As Lonergan puts it: " With regard to the *quod quid est* and with regard to principles known immediately from such knowledge of quiddity, intellect is infallible; but with regard to further deductions intellect may err; still, such error is excluded absolutely, whenever a correct *resolutio in principiis* is performed." [69] But we have opinion alone when we only grasp a probable connection between conclusions and principles because that is not a sufficient determinant reason and therefore cannt coerce assent. As Lonergan points out: until the resolution reaches the first principles, doubt is possible, but once it has reached them, doubt is excluded." [70]

This short incursion into the elaborate double-checking process from which the act of judgment ensues reveals that the second operation of our mind is not concerned only with our

•• See *Sum. Th.,* I, q. 79, c.: " Ratiocinatio humana ... in via iudicii revolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat " ; see *ibid.,* 12, c.: "Ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquomm, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili; et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per pricipia naturaliter nota de his quae ratiocinando inveniuntur."

•• Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 68.

•• *Ibid.* See also *In II Sent.,* d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, c.

knowledge of things but most of all with our knowledge of the truth of our conclusions about them. The act of judgment, in other words, is not merely synthesis but also positing of synthesis. Hence the issue is not knowledge as true or false but knowledge " as known to be true or false." [71] Through conceptualization (apprehensive and formative abstractions), therefore, the intellect attains its similitude to the object, whereas through judgment it judges, that is, reflects upon, that similitude and apprehends it as such. But this seems to give rise to a very serious problem. Indeed, judgment thus defined supposes a comparison between the "knowing" and its "standard." Now, either we say that *the standard is known,* and then the comparison really takes place between two items of knowledge and therefore one might better maintain that we know directly without comparing, or else, we choose to say that *the standard is not known,* but then there cannot be any comparison at all. St. Thomas was not blind to the difficulty. Not only did he admit the necessity of a standard but he even suggested that it was so essential to the mind to be a " measuring faculty" that the very word mind *(mens)* was taken from the verb " to measure " (mensurare) . As he put it: " *nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum."* [72] However, the standard he was referring to was neither the thing-in-itself insofar as it is such, i. e., " unknown," nor some second representation of the thing itself. His standard was rather to be found in the principles of the intellect itself through a *resolutio in principia.* Yet, this resolutio, warns St. Thomas, is not to be understood as a *via inventionis vel inquisitionis--which* is used by scientists and mathematicians who respectively rely on induction or mathematical hypotheses combined with verificative steps-. but rather in the sense of a descent to a primordial evidence based on an immediate intentional contact with reality which is worked out by the agency of the intellectual light as established above. After all, he points out, the very word intellect

[71] See Lonergan, *op. cit.,* pp. 59-63.
[72] *De Veritate,* q. 10, a. I, c.

(intellectus, intus-lectus, intus-legens, i.e., inside-read, inside-reader, in-sighter, insight) suggests that it is in the essence or the mind to be so equipped as to be able to find the being of things in its own being.[73]

Therefore, if we take the word judgment, not in the sense of proposition, which means only the expression of a judgment, nor as a process of judging (judgment *in fieri)*, but precisely as a personal mental commitment, i. e., as judgment *in facto esse,* we must say that (a) it includes the apprehension of the relation between a formative abstraction and a particular or a universal *ens,* but that (b) it adds to it an act of *assent.* An act of assent, on the other hand, is an act of the possible intellect and must therefore be counterdistinguished from the act of *consent* which belongs to the will. To be more precise, let us hasten to state that assent is a motion of the intellect with respect to a conception and that it occurs when we judge a conception of the thing to be true or false.[74] Paraphrasing Lonergan,[••] we might add that assent comes out as the end result of the following process. Knowledge of the *quod quid est* takes us outside time and space; knowledge of the universal returns us but only hypothetically to the concrete; whereas the act of *compositio vel divisio* involves a categorical return to the concrete.75 Consequently, assent is nothing more than the very judgment " as based upon an apprehension of evidence," as in eluding an awareness of its own validity, as a truth in the subject.

We are now in a position to collect our findings and assess the epistemological status both of apprehensive abstraction in its capacity as the very first mental act and of the individual as such. It is abundantly clear by now that the former is neither a concept of the singular-because it is only *the understanding of the form* which is in and shows up in the phan-

[73] See *ibid.:* "nomen mentis dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus mensurando eas quasi ad sua principia."

[74] See *De Malo,* q. 6, a. 1, ad 14.

[••] See Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

tasm-, nor a real act of judgment-because it does not include an assent to this proposition, "this form is in this singular "-; but it is no less evident that, on one hand, with Marechal we call it an inchoate affirmation if we take into account its essential dependence on the ontological contact of the agent intellect with the being of the object, and, on the other hand, it constitutes the material of a potential judgment and can itself become an actual judgment provided that it be subjected to a *resolutio in principia* by means of a reflection upon sense evidence and that an act of assent be added to it. As for the individual as such, it is obvious that it cannot be *understood* or *conceived* in the strict sense of the words. However, it most certainly can *be known with certitude* since through *resolutio in principia* it is quite possible for us to clearly understand that the universal we understand is the nature of the singular we are imagining and then give our assent to this proposition: "this is so and so."

St. Thomas, therefore, has managed to give us a direct acces:3 to the individual as such which is safe and does not force us to posit any proper concept of its substance or even of its matter. As for this, he always requires a kind of reflection if it is to be attained at all.[76] In fact, *materia signata* is known by probing the essential relation to it that we discover in the form *(per habitudinem ad formam)* , and *materia prima* presents itself to our understanding solely at the end of a discourse based on analogy (per *analogiam)* .

In connection with *materia signata,* which is that part of matter which limits a form to a particular individual, three points are clear in St. Thomas's doctrine: (a) as such, it is attained directly by the senses, but only through its relation to the accidental forms of the object; (b) it cannot be reached directly by apprehensive abstraction but only indirectly through an act of judgment; [77] (c) finally, when it is integrated within

[70] See Ambrosio Rebollo Pena, *Abstracto y Concreto en la Filosofia de Santo Tomas,* Burgos: Publicaciones del Seminario Metropolitano de Burgos, 1955), pp. 123-129.

[77] See *Quodl.* VII, q. 1, a. 3: "Ad hoc quod particulare cognoscatur, oportet

a universal judgment by means of formative abstraction it is not as this *signata materia* that it is known but only as this kind of common matter. [78] As can easily be seen, only particular judgments in which we explicitly compare the apprehensive abstraction-with or without the special illumination originating in formative abstraction-with its corresponding phantasm can give us some intellectual knowledge of this particular matter. It is in this way, for instance, that we come to know the matter of the nose through the apprehension of snubness in this nose.[79] Since *signata materia*, when it actually exists, is

quod in cognoscente non solum sit similitudo formae, sed aliqualiter materiae ... Species autem quae est in sensu causata a re sensibili, in quantum non est omnino a conditionibus materialibus depurata, est similitudo formae secundum quod est in materia; et ideo per earn cognoscitur particulare. Sed quia secundum quod in intellectu nostro recipitur species rei sensibilis, est omnino iam a conditionibus materialibus depurata, non potest intellectus noster per earn directe particulare cognoscere." See *In Anal. Post.*, c. *15*, I, (Leonine Edit.), p. See also *De principia individuationis:* "Manifestum est enim intellectum incipere ubi sensus desinit. Sensus autem exteriores ipsa sensibilia accidentia, communia scilicet et propria habent pro suis per se obiectis. Quidditas autem rei particularis in particulari non sp.ectat ut per se obiectum ad illos sensus exteriores, cum quidditas ista substantia sit, et non accidens nee ad intellectum pertinet ut per se obiectum eius propter suam materialitatem. Ideo quidditas rei materialis in ipsa sua particularitate est obiectum rationis particularis, cuius est conferre de intentionibus particularibus, loco cuius in brutis aestimativa naturalis est: quae potentia per sui coniunctionem cum intellectu, ubi est ratio ipsa quae confert de universalibus, participat vim collativam; sed quia pars sensitivae est, non abstrahit omnino a materia. Unde obiectum suum proprium manet quidditas particularis materialis. Hoc autem non est, quod ilia potentia apprehendat materiam in se, cum ipsa non possit sciri nisi per analogiam ad formam, sed quia collatio de materia in ordine ad formam per ipsam materiam individuatam, spectat ad hanc potentiam, sicut considerare de materia in communi in ordine ad formam speciei, spectat ad rationem superiorem."

[78] See *de Veritate*, q. 10, a. 5: "Cognitio enim mentis humanae fertur ad res naturales primo secundum formam, et secundario ad materiam prout habet habitudinem ad formam. Sicut autem omnis forma, quantum est de se est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit cognoscere materiam nisi in cognitione universali. Sic autem considerata materia non est individuationis principium, sed secundum quod consideratur materia in singulari." See also *De principia individuationis*, *as* quoted here in footnote 77.

[79] See *de Veritate*, q. 10, a. 4: "Ex cognitione autem formarum quae nullam sibi materiam determinant, non relinquitur aliqua cognitio de materia; sed ex cognitione formarum quae determinant sibi materiam, cognoscitur etiam ipsa materia aliquo modo, scilicet secundum habitudinem quam habet ad formam; ... et sic per

already informed by the form and thus is a particular material substance, Aquinas applies the same doctrine to the knowledge of particular material substances. This knowledge is different from sensation because it attains the very material substance itself. It is the activity of lower or particular reason which is the judicative faculty insofar as it bears on material objects. As a power, particular reason shares in both the intellect and the sense faculty-" *per conjunctionem cum intellectu ... participat vim collativam; sed quia pars sensitivae est, non abstrahit omnino* a materia." [80]-and can therefore substitute for the animal *aestimativa* while exceeding it; [81] whereas higher reason belongs to the intellect exclusively and bears only on analytical propositions.

The knowledge of ·*materia prima,* on the other hand, calls for a more complicated reasoning based on a larger-scale comparative process which covers absolutely all material beings. This is necessarily so because prime matter not only lacks a proper concept but it cannot even be detected by means of a careful judicative inspection of a particular thing or class of things. Besides the *apriori* argument used by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics,* Bk. II, the only *a posteriori* avenue for reaching *materia prima* is the way called *per analogiam,* which supposes *materias signatas* as already known. The process unfolds in this way. On one hand, it is certain that we never come face to face with absolute nothingness, and yet material things are constantly coming into existence and fading away. On the other hand, the actuality of a material composite depends on the actuality of its form which in turn is the end-product of the generative action whereby the composite itself comes to exist and is absolutely incompatible with the corresponding corruptive process. Therefore, for the uninterrupted flow of existence that we witness to be possible as one form goes and another

similitudinem formae ipsa res materialis cognoscitur, sicut aliquis ex hoc ipso quod cognoscit simitatem, cognoscit nasum sinum."

[80] See here, footnote 77, the quotation from *De principio individuationis.*

[81] It is called *cogitative* also. See *In III Sent.,* dist. QS, q. 2, a. 2, ad Sm.: *In IV Sent.* dist. *50,* q. 1, ad Sm.

comes, there must be a something potential that remains and in which the change gradually takes place. That such potentiality really exists when change is considered only at the level of accidental composites is a matter of experience. So, we see that the same wood remains when we make a table out of a bed. Consequently, insofar as substantial change is concerned, there must be something that remains in its capacity as pure potentiality.[82] Now, that is what St. Thomas calls prime matter. " Therefore," he writes, " we call prime matter that which is in the same relation to natural substances as bronze is to the statue and wood to the bed and everything that is material and unformed to its form." [83] As can easily be seen, at this point the Thomist epistemology and the Suarezian theory which began with different premises converge in .their approach to prime matter.

* * * *

In retrospect we can say that, regardless of the transitory coincidence between Suarez and St. Thomas concerning this mode of knowing matter and material substances, the allegiance of the former to the latter breaks down all the way insofar as the intellectual grasp of the individual is concerned. We would like to venture an explanation which goes to the bottom of the

[82] See *De natura materiae*, cap. !il: " Ex generatione ergo quae est primus terminus actionis physicae accipi potest quae sit natura materiae. Cum enim non requiratur aliquod subiectum actu in actione physica nisi propter notum, sicut de alteratione dictum est, et subiectum necesse sit manere in toto motu, sequitur necessaria, quod quamdiu est aliquid de natura alterationis et motus, subiectum esse in actu. Cum vero motus alterationis deficit, deficit subiecti actualitas. Haec autem est in eius termino qui est generatio. Unde in generatione necessaria tota actualitas subiecti alterati peribit. S olum ergo ens in potentia manet in generatione. Ens autem in potentia est materia solum. Et ideo materia nuda est subiectum generationis. Cum ergo materia impediat cognitionem, et unumquodque non cognoscatur nisi secundum quod est actu, . . . idea materiae non est scibilis nisi in ordine ad formam, . . . Ideo formam per prius oportet cognoscere, et per earn requirere naturam materiae: forma enim est terminus actionis physicae ut dictum est ... Quod ergo manet derelictum a forma substantiali, hoc est materia, quia per actionem creaturae non devenimus in nihil, ut dictum est. Sic ergo per formam cognoscibilis est materia."

[83] *I Physic.* cap. 7, lect. 13.

fact. Whereas St. Thomas based his whole theory on the ontological value of objective abstraction, Suarez did not manage to understand the real mechanism of the agent intellect and thereby fell prey to a kind of cartesian epistemology made up of itemized, piecemeal, pictorial " representations." And so, although almost every word of the thomist vocabulary remains in Suarez's theory of knowledge,-enough to induce him to make the deceitful claim of enjoying a true thomistic discipleship-they mean totally different concepts. We should add that, whatever its merits, Suarez's innovative position is the result of an unscholarly and faulty method. His research on St. Thomas's thought, as Ercilla points out,[84] is based only upon an isolated text, and his actual interpretation seems to be dominated by an aprioristic attitude of self-sufficience combined with a kind of snobbish indulgence in the fashion of quoting the Angelic Doctor and abiding by his sayings, as the following typical statement bears out: "However," he writes, " the true meaning is the one proposed, and St. Thomas' words must be forced into it, or else, they should not be taken seriously." [85]

Suarez is adamant on two counts: there is an agent intellect perfectly attuned to evidencing the phantasm, but there is no real interaction whatsoever between the two, unless we choose to call such a mere quasi-material and exemplary influence he considers on the part of the phantasm. [86] The second statement

[84] Jose de Ercilla, *De la imagen a la idea* (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1959), pp. 306-310.

[85] *De Anima,* IV, n. lli.

[86] See *ibid.,* n. 11: "Sit ergo conclusio prima. lntellectus agens numquam efficit speciem nisi a phantasiae cognitione determinetur ... Secunda conclusio. Praedicta determinatio non fit per influxum aliquem ipsius phantasmatis, sed materiam et quasi exemplar intellectui agenti praebendo ex vi unionis quam habet in eadem anima. Prima conclusionis pars probata relinquitur ex dictis circa refutatas opiniones. Secunda vero explicatur ex dictis de sensibus interioribus, lib. 3, cap. 9. Nam ad eum modum quo ibidem postremo loco dixi fieri species in interiori sensu iudico fieri in intellectu; est enim notandum phantasma et intellectum radicari in una eademque anima: hinc enim provenit, ut mirum habeant ordinem et consonantiam in operando, unde (quod patebit infra) eo ipso quod intellectus operatur, imaginatio etiam sentit. Ad hunc ergo modum arbitror intellectum pos-

of course, completely voids the first, as can be shown on the grounds that an agent intellect of that sort would be both useless from an epistemological viewpoint and impossible.

The *Eximius Doctor,* of course, believes that his account is not only possible but also necessary and sufficient. However, such a contention is far from being vouched for by the justification he presents in its favor. For one thing, the reason that leads him to posit an agent intellect does not prove that this faculty is endowed with those qualifications called for by om experience. In fact, he requires an active mind for exactly the same purpose for which he posits an " agent internal sense," namely, for picturing the individual thing (" *Nam ad eum modum quo . . .dixi fieri species in interiori sensu iudico fieri in intellectu.").* This leaves us with an agent intellect which *does not illuminate* the phantasm-because the phantasm does not need any illumination since it cannot even claim a really cooperative role, having been called upon simply to be there and serve as a pure quasi-exemplar or, we should say, as a mere *occasion* vis a vis its partner-, but does only *effect* at the spiritual level a *species impressa* of the " particular thing " in exactly the same way in which the agent sense effects the phantasm at the material stage. This alone shows us that the Suarezian agent intellect has nothing to do with intellectual light. But the same fact might be confirmed on another count. The agent intellect, indeed, does not perform any abstractive operation. Its function, as described, is only to reproduce or portray the individual as a block on a spiritual canvas. On the other hand, while doing that it cannot even abstract or isolate the specific unity of the thing in order to focus on it and thm; give us an objective concept of the same for the very simple

sibilem de se nudum esse speciebus, inesse tamen animae rationali vim spiritualem ad efficiendas in intellectu possibili species earum rerum, quas per sensus cognoscit, ipsa sensibili cognitione minime concurrente efficienter ad earn actionem, sed habente se instar materiae, ut excitantis animam, aut vero ad instar exemplaris atque ita fit ut anima cum primum phantasiando cognoscit rem aliquam, per virtutem spiritualem quam intellectum agentem vocamus, quasi depingat rem eamdem in intellectu possibili, atque adeo per actionem transeuntem, quae proinde cognitio **non est."**

reason that, according to Suarez, the common nature, being not really different from *haecceitas,* or at least from existence, is not a thing that stands on its own and that can be pictured without its surroundings. [87] In other words, apprehensive abstraction has no room in Suarez's epistemology. The very first concept of the specific nature that he allows is the *definition* or *j01·mative abstraction,* which does not face us with any *real object* but only with a *logical product* obtained through a comparative process which envisages the individuals exclusively on the basis of the *similarities* their individual natures

If we are entitled to call formative abstraction an objective representation, it is certainly not because it represents an e:>sence really different from the particulars but only because

[87] See *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* V, I, n. 10: "Besides, the nature itself, could it be by us in itself (that is, according to those characteristics which belong to it of itself as it is isolated in the mind from individuals) , is nevertheless not truly a real being, unless it is in individuals." translated by J. F. Ross in: Franciscus Suarez, *On Formal and Universal Unity,* [l\1arquette University Press, Milwaukee, I964], p. 84) .-See also *DM,* V, I, I4; in Ross, p. 87: "... for although the specific nature may not be further divisible through essential divisions, it is nev.ertheless divisible further through individual differences, and in each individual it has formal unity, distinct from that which it has in others; and this suffices that such unity cannot be common in reality."

[88] See *DM.,* V, 2, I8; Ross, pp. 47-48: " ... for when this identity is said to obtain between distinct things, it cannot in fact be anything beyond a similarity, by reason of which they are also said to share or to have the same definition, *fundamentally* indeed by reason of the mentioned similarities, *formally,* however, through reason, for definition is the work of reason."-See also: *ibid.,* I, 12; Ross, p. 86: "... it is one thing to speak of formal unity and another to speak of the community of this unity ... no unity which is found in reality is common . . . , but there is in singular things a certain similarity in their formal unities on which the community which the intellect can attribute to such a nature as it is conceived, is based. "-See also *ibid.,* I8; Ross, pp. 86-87 " For this, the formal unity, which the nature has in any individual whatever along with the similarity of all such unities among themselves is enough; for it arises from this that the intellect conceives and defines that formal notion in one common concept. Whence, when it is said that a nature does not have its definibility through the agency of the intellect, it must be said that this is true fundamentally and remotely but not, however, true proximately, or (what is the same) that it is true with regard to the essence which is explained in the definition, for the essence precedes in the thing but not indeed with respect to that condition, namely community which the nature demands in order for us to define it; for this is had solely through the thinking of the mind."

it can be traced to real individuals. If, therefore, according to Suarez, the agent intellect has nothing to do with intellectual light, which is the light of Being, one must wonder where is the guarantee that the spiritual *species impressa* really puts our possible intellect in touch with the Being of the thing known. And we must wonder all the more so if we take into account the vagueness of the performance attributed to the agent intellect by Suarez.

He, of course, does not see any difficulty in his account, fascinated as he is by that kind of magical harmony between imagination and agent intellect which he traces to the unity of the subject. It so happens, therefore, that in virtue of that wonderful sociability of faculties among themselves, as soon as the former imagines and without it cooperating in the action of the latter *("ipsa sensibili cognitione minime concurrente efficienter ad eam actionem* ") a spiritual similitude of the individual thing is simultaneously catapulted by the agent intellect and impinges upon the naked possible intellect which thereby is moved to produce its own version of the object, i.e., the *species expressa*, which in turn by informing it constitutes it in the act of knowing. Everything went so fast that we barely realized that neither the agent intellect really knew it only caused the possible mind to know (" *atque adeo pe'r actionem tran8euntem, quae proinde cognitio non est* ") —, nor did the phantasm do anything at all except *to exist* and thereby behave *"as though"* it were an exemplar with regard to the agent intellect, or an object which in a figurative way might be called a "stimulant " of the soul (" *sed habente se instar materiae, ut excitantis animam, aut vero ad instar exemplaris* ".) How vague this whole explanation is can escape no one. John of St. Thomas rebuked Suarez most severely for stating that, if this " ad instar " does not point to a real exemplary cause, then it is incumbent upon the author to determine its real causality .[89]

[89] Ercilla, *op, cit.,* p. 808, quotes him saying: " Sed totum hoc quod est dicere ' ad instar ' relinquit rem obscuram et inexplicatam, quia in praesenti inquirimus

Following John of St. Thomas we can argue thus with Suarez. Since the agent intellect as stated does not know and however effects a spiritual picture of the individual thing, it follows that we ·are trapped in a real dilemma. Either we understand by " effects " the same as " selects " the fitting spiritual picture from a certain collection that it already precontains in store, or we mean by that word a real causal action. The first alternative, though, cannot be sustained because in order to "choose" one must be able to know. But the second is no more fortunate. Since neither the agent intellect can " recognize " any data in the phantasm nor the latter effectively guide any kind of " blind " picturing taking place through the agency of the mind, it follows that the action of the agent intellect must be a " cr:eation from scratch." For this not to be branded as "arbitrary," we must assert that it takes place through a real " pre-established harmony " a la Leibnitz. But this is no less absurd, because it cannot account for the *specification* of the causation, which cannot come from the phantasm, since the phantasm neither cooperates nor can be consciously followed by the agent intellect, or from the agent intellect itself, since both by definition and as a result of our having denied validity to the first horn of the dilemma we must take it to be a faculty fully in act without thereby being actually knowing. Only a kind of *occa8ionalism* ala Malebranche could save this sort of harmony from being absurd.

One wonders why Suarez let himself be led to such fantastic accounts from the sound premise of the essential unity of the subject since he could have stopped halfway at a very reasonable explanation offered by St. Thomas and based also on the same principle. There is only one possible answer: he did not fully understand St. Thomas's epistemology. Unfortunately, this lack of understanding cast him on the side of the nominal-

quem concursum vere et proprie habeat phantasma, non ad cuius instar se habeat. Nam esse ad instar materiae et exemplaris vel extrahit a vera et propria causa materiali vel relinquit vere et proprie intra limites talis causalitatis. Si extrahit, restat explicare in qua alia causalitate ponit. Si relinquit, ergo non ad instar sed vere et proprie materia vel exempler est."

ists. In conclusion, as things stand in his work, there is no real utility in the agent intellect; and consequently, Suarez's position was bound to be a logical "go ahead" for all the occamists and materialists yet to come during the three centuries of suarezian preeminence.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Gottes Wirken in der Welt: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur Frage der Evolution und des Wunders. By Bela Wiessmahr, S. J. Frankfurter Theologische Studien, 15 Band, Frankfurt Am Main: Josef Knecht, 1973, Pp. 208.

This work is a valuable contribution to a theological question of the greatest importance: how does God work directly and personally in our world, which is developing through its own proper activity? The sub-title points to two areas that place this question with greatest insistence: evolution, especially as it concerns the production of the human soul, and miracles, as signs of God's direct action and self-communication. These areas correspond to the action of God in " nature " and " supernature."

The first part of the book traces the development of theological understanding and sets out the varieties of opinion on God's direct action in the world, beginning from the scholastic period up to the present. The changes in theological teaching beginning in the 19th century about evolution and miracles are carefully examined.

The second, and much larger, part of the book lays out his own position. He first seeks to establish his basic principle for all further discussion: God acts in the world only through secondary causes. He then distinguishes between two kinds of human knowledge: univocal, conceptual knowledge, proper to the natural sciences, and analogous, radically non-conceptual knowledge, proper to metaphysics-though this latter must be finally expressed in concepts and words. After discussing how these two different kinds of knowledge view the world, he explains how a metaphysical view of created causality provides room for a personal, direct action of God in the world, acting always through the proper activity of secondary causes.

It is his contention that nothing happens in the world that does not depend entirely on secondary causes as well as entirely on God, the primary cause. Thus, evolution and miracles are both, in their entirety, effects of secondary causes, acting in dependence on the primary cause. It may seem to restrict the freedom of God in the world to affirm that he can work in the world only through secondary causes and can produce only effects ultimately proportionate to the activity proper to these causes. But the contrary view, he maintains, destroys the transcendence of God by making him in some degree a secondary cause-an obvious contradiction. Furthermore, we simply do not know the full capacity of secondary causes under all circumstances. Miracles are special instances of this general

pattern of God-creature causality; essential to recognizing them as such are religious significance and personal witness.

This work has much to recommend it. It deserves serious thought and discussion. The author proposes his views carefully and modestly. Occasionally his treatment lacks the depth necessary to his subject; for example, in a discussion of the unity and distinction of beings in preparation for a treatment of divine immanence and transcendence, he has no exposition of the question of relations, which surely are essential to the matter. But such defects are few, and the work as a whole manifests theological and metaphysical competence of a high degree.

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A Process Christology. By David Griffin. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973. Pp. $10.95.

According to David Griffin, the task of contemporary theology is "to formulate a conceptuality of God, man, and the world that will be compatible with our modern knowledge and relevant to our sensibilities." (165) Faithful to this task, he makes available to the world of theology the first full-scale Christology based on the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead. The formal thesis of his work is that Whitehead's metaphysics provides a conceptuality appropriate to the Christian faith. For Griffin, such a conceptuality "allows one to maintain both his formal commitment to rationality and his substantive conviction as to the truth of the essentials of Christian faith." (10)

A key element in the development of his Christology and, in the opinion of this reviewer, a key element in appreciating its inadequacy, is his acceptance of Whitehead's definition: "the essence of Christianity is the appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of his agency in the world." (164) This definition makes Revelation the central notion for understanding Christianity. Griffin admits that it "was not a central category for explicating Jesus' significance in the New Testament," (19) but he holds that in the modern situation "Jesus can only be understood as 'savior' if he is seen as the decisive clue to the nature of reality."

He begins his study by considering various problems with the concept of Revelation in the context of four modern theologians: Paul Tillich, H. Richard Niebuhr, Rudolf Bultmann, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. In the first four chapters he shows how all of their theologies are inadequate for resolving these problems and, in fact, attempt to avoid these problems both by driving a wedge between faith and reason and by minimizing the role

of doctrinal ideas in the working out of salvation. Nevertheless, Griffin shows that in each of them essential aspects of their theologies demand that faith be reasonable and, further, that doctrinal ideas are really more central to their soteriologies than they explicitly admit. Significantly, Griffin deliberately avoided consideration of Karl Barth since he " rejected the aim of trying to make the Christian doctrine of revelation intelligible." (11)

In the fifth chapter Griffin outlines a new approach which, as it is worked out in the remaining five chapters, will offer a satisfactory solution to the problems with Revelation. The first problem he considers is how theology can be both rational and adequate to Christian faith. The former would seem " to imply that theology cannot be based on Revelation," while the latter "demands that it must be." (139) Griffin, however, points out that every philosophical position is based on a value judgment, i.e., some limited aspect of reality is taken to be the most important clue to the understanding of all reality. Christian philosophy, then, is no less rational when it is based on judgments made in the light of the Christ event as the decisive revelation of reality. Revelation is not, however, to be equated with explicit doctrines, rather it is an intuition, a vision of reality brought to expression in Jesus. According to Jesus' underlying vision of reality " God works on man in the present, calling him to participate in his purpose for the world, life under God's rule." (204)

Throughout history theologians have struggled with a dilemma: how to conceptualize the Christian vision of reality by means of alien philosophical systems. In process philosophy, Griffin claims, there is no such dilemma, for the metaphysics of Whitehead is rooted in the Christian vision of reality. It is "a philosophy that takes personal relations, and hence temporality and events, to be fundamental." (139)

Using Whitehead's metaphysics to explicate the Christian vision of reality, Griffin then proceeds to resolve another problem with Revelation: how can the unique presence of God in Jesus be explained apart from miraculous intervention? For Griffin, if divine revelation involved a miraculous intervention, then modern man's conviction that all events have natural causes would render unintelligible that event which is supposed to make all other events intelligible. There is only one possible solution: "God is conceived as active in *all* events." (143)

The process metaphysics competent to explicate the Christian vision of reality views " actual occasions," both spatially and temporally atomic, as the ultimate building blocks of reality. These "actual occasions" are constituted in their moments of immediacy by their " prehension " of other "actual occasions." Human beings are what Griffin calls monarchial corpuscular societies, i. e., aggregates of " actual occasions " among which there is a dominant member, the psyche. Further, these "actual occasions" are " enduring objects," i. e., they are series of " actual occasions " each

member of which, in its moment of immediacy, prehends the past member of the series and repeats certain structural characteristics. Each " actual occasion " not only prehends its own past member but it also prehends and is constituted by many other past " actual occasions " among which is God. " Since God is the one actuality that is objectified by all other entities, he is present in every actual entity." (179) This fact is the basis of the process notion of " panentheism," God is incarnated in everything. Hence, the problem for Christology is to understand how God's presence in Jesus is, in some way, special.

Griffin explains the special presence of God in Jesus in chapter nine, the central chapter of the book. There he draws an analogy between the psyche's relation to the body and God's relation to the world. The psyche's aim or intention is prehended by all the actual occasions composing the body and hence the acts of the body are in some way revelatory of the character of the psyche. However, since each "actual occasion" is radically free, the aim of the psyche is not perfectly realized in each act; further, many are not especially suited for revealing the character of the psyche. Likewise, God's aim for the world is objectified more or less perfectly in every "actual occasion," while some are more suited than others for being revelatory of the character of God. In Griffin's Christology Jesus is the supreme act of God, revealing perfectly God's aim for the world. "In actualizing God's particular aims for him, Jesus expressed God's general aim for his entire creation." {fU.!0)

One further notion which expresses more completely Jesus' specialness is Griffin's concept of "self" as that " relatively continuous center within human experience around which the experience attempts more or less successfully to organize itself." (228) The "self" is not the psyche but only an element within the psyche. In Jesus the prehension of the divine aim was not one prehension among others as it is for all other men, rather, the prehension of God constituted Jesus' "self." Thus Jesus was transparent to God's reality. All of this allows Griffin to conclude that "the vision of reality expressed through his sayings and actions is the supreme expression of God's character, purpose, and mode of agancy, and is therefore appropriately received as the decisive revelation of the same."

Anther significant element in Griffin's Christology is his explanation of how God's decisive revelation in Jesus has an effect on the rest of mankind. God, in process thought, is always influencing man, influencing him by persuasion, not coercion. After the revelation in Christ the manner of God's activity does not change; however, man's convictions about the nature ot God have been clarified with the result that he is more likely to heed those impulses that are consonant with these convictions, i. e., " after the revelation in Christ man is capable of receiving aims which more directly express God's character and purpose."

A final note, which for Griffin is of crucial importance, is the verifiability of the Christian vision of reality. Perhaps it was not so in past centuries but " nowadays the credibility of Christian faith rests only upon its intrinsic coherence, adequacy, and illuminating power." For Griffin, process thought provides an indirect way of testing the truth of Christianity. The Christian vision of reality " authenticates itself by giving rise to a conceptual understanding of reality which is judged superior in terms of the criteria of consistency, adequacy, and illuminating power." (159)

Griffin is certainly to be commended for the thoroughness and consistency of his work of articulating the reality which is Christ in terms of process metaphysics, the most recent metaphysical system to be utilized in the understanding of Christianity. Yet, one is often left with the feeling that his insights are not all that new. The English Deist John Toland in his *Christianity Not Mysterious* (London, 1696) held that Revelation had to be reasonable and, further, that it had to be judged by the criteria of consistency, utility, and intelligibility. Much deeper, however, than English Deism are the elements of Platonism that one finds in process thought. The subjective aim of each " actual occasion " being an imperfect expression of the ideal aim provided by God is not unlike Plato's theory of the forms, while Whitehead's essentially deductive metaphysics is most likely a product of the Platonic mentality present in all mathematicians. Griffin's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, Whitehead's metaphysics, no less than that of Aristotle, is founded not on the Christian vision of reality but on alien philosophical assumptions.

Not only is Griffin's metaphysical system, like all metaphysical systems, inadequate for expressing the mystery of Christianity, but Griffin's understanding of Christianity, while not original, seems nevertheless conditioned by a concern to fit it into process metaphysics. God is not immutable nor omnipotent, he is a changing being who affects his creatures by persuasion and is in turn affected by them. Jesus is human differing from other men by the degree of God's presence in him. He is unique in that he alone is transparent to the divine reality. Griffin really is not far from Scotus' concept of person as a negative attribute. For Scotus, all other men have their own proper person insofar as they are " not assumed " by the divinity; Jesus lacks this negative attribute insofar as he is assumed. For Griffin, all other men have a subjective aim which falls short of the divine ideal aim for them; Jesus lacks this " falling short " insofar as the divine ideal aim was his subjective aim. Griffin departs from Scotus, however, in his understanding of divine Person and Trinity where his position differs little from Sabelliam modalism.

The most serious defect in Griffin's understanding of Christ, lies in his emphasis on the centrality of Revelation. Like Abelard, who saw salvation as brought about by the example and teaching of God, Griffin falls into a one-sided emphasis on the subjective side of redemption.

Again like Abelard, Griffin rejects the notion of a moral stain in human nature needing restoration. Hence Griffin can propound an essentially Pelagian view of salvation in which God merely persuades and man ultimately creates himself anew in each moment of immediacy.

Viewing the essence of Christianity in terms of Revelation is, of course, essential to Griffin's concern to, render Christianity rational. Unfortunately Christianity is not rational, at least not in Griffin's sense, while the Christ of Griffin's Christology is not the Christ who died and rose to save mankind. A Christology that pretends to be " rational," " adequate," and " self-verifying" might satisfy the criteria of seventeenth-century Deism but not the criteria of St. Paul: "Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles." (I Cor 1:22)

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On the Church of Christ: The Person of the Church and her Personnel. By Jacques Maritain. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973. Pp. 315. $9.95 cloth, $3.95 paper.

Maritain considers this book a series of meditations on the mystery of the Church. And just as a meditation is not a simple act, but a complex one, combining elements of the rational and the intuitive, the past and the present, consolation and desolation, so this book is a complex one, bristling over with all of these elements and more. The most one can hope to do in a review like this is to isolate various elements, in the hope that the reader's imagination will hold the whole together.

First, Maritain has written this book *as a man.* I think this needs saying, for Maritain has not written this work simply as a certain kind of Neo-Thomist philosopher, easily categorized and interpreted according to our own *a priori* views of Neo-Thomism. He has written as a man, that complex being who just won't so easily adjust himself to our categories, who is neither simply " black" nor " white," but "gray." As he puts it, this is "the last testimony of a old solitary," (241) someone who thinks that this book " has been written by an ignorant one for ignorant ones like himself." (vi) In other words, this work is written by a fellow human, and anyone with an inkling of how complex man can be will not be surprised to find that complexity manifesting itself in this book. And so we find a love of the Church's past and a basic openness to its future; an appreciation for its humanity and sinfulness, and an awe in the presence of its offer of Christ's grace and the ability to share in the communion of saints;

a critical spirit, reminding one of the prophets, and a docile spirit, ready to submit itself to the Magisterium. To the extent that someone is a *man,* he can surely appreciate this book.

Secondly, Maritain has written as a *philosopher.* And by this he does not mean a servile *ancilla* to the theologian but someone who exercises his critical faculties with the aim, perhaps, of proposing " to the competent doctors new views." (v) This shows up clearly when he mentions Cardinal Journet as his ecclesiological guide: at times he will depart from the Cardinal on some point, as he departs from Aquinas, for " a true disciple is a free disciple, is he not? " (10). And true to the critical philosopher, few are spared criticism: he speaks of clerics who are "first-rate simpletons," (40) only seeing sin and weakness in the Church; of the Papacy and Roman Curia, about which he says: "... there is still in Roman circles a good deal of progress to be made" *(65);* and of theologians: "Too many theologians" are destroying the Church's intellectual treasure, " throwing it to the four winds; blessed be the others. . . . Experts are useful and necessary informants; they are not worth much as counselors; they are not worth anything at all if they claim to present themselves as doctors" (89; cf. his comments on some of the Vatican II *periti* on pp. fl90-fl91, n. flfl).

To my mind, it is in his role of philosopher that Maritain perhaps has offered some important insights, not all of them of equal importance. For example, he speaks of the need to speak more frequently of ecumenical *friendship* rather than simply ecumenical *dialogue,* for the former is the indispensable condition of the latter. (Ill) And in this I think we catch a glimpse of the Maritain who, early in his career, emphasized the role of intuition, of what cannot so easily be dialogued about, of that deeper experiental realm which we all somehow know and could perhaps share through friendship. His sensitivity to intuition appears clearly in his comments on what the theologians commonly call "ecclesiastical faith" also: " I rather think that ' ecclesiastical faith ' was invented in the sixteenth century and baptized in the seventeenth by theologians who had lost the sense of the intuitivity of the intelligence, and who embarked theologians much better than they on a pseudo-problem, concerning which they could, while making a great expenditure of subtlety, only find themselves in disagreement." (fl05) These are, you could say, issues on which Maritain thinks his philosophical method would lead him to depart from such a thinker as Journet. But these are clearly secondary issues.

More importantly, Maritain, exercising his philosophical intuition, has isolated issues of major importance needing especially to be faced in our time. As he puts them (fl41): " the notion of the person of the Church, who is a single and same person in Heaven and on earth, and in whom are inherent holiness and infallibility; the distinction between the person of the Church and her personnel; the distinction between the personnel of

the Church acting as instrumental cause of the latter (whose voice then it causes to be heard and through which she herself acts then) and the personnel of the Church acting as proper cause (then it is exposed to mistake and to error) .... " What has caused to single out these issues is his desire to avoid the mistakes of the " left " and the " right." And by this I take it that he means the radical humanizers of the Church on the one hand, and the radical divinizers of it, on the other. But to deal with this we must turn to Maritain the " theologian."

Thirdly, then, Maritain has written as a *"theologian."* Perhaps not a theologian in the technical sense of the word, but perhaps one in its original sense, of a person adhering to the faith by way of critical reflection. And it is perhaps here that contemporary theologians will have difficulty with Maritain. And this, I think, not because of the importance of the issues he deals with (we have enumerated them above), nor because of his intention to avoid either a radical humanizing or divinizing of the Church (even Richard McBrien has declared his intenton of avoiding that), but because of the Nco-Thomistic framework with which he works. Besides the highly questionable "proof-text " method of using Scripture {and Maritain does this constantly in this book) , the propositional view of Revelation (see especially p. 17) , and the debatable approach to the relationship of the natural and supernatural orders (especially p. 12) -all generally characteristic of Nco-Thomistic theology-it is its basic approach itself which is increasingly being called into question.

What does this mean? Neo-Thomism-and Maritain is surely an excellent Neo-Thomist,-is an attempt to recapture the great scholastic heritage. That heritage, especially under Aristotle's influence, was objective in its orientation. Unlike the early Church theologians, who wrote in a fashion caluclated to stimulate, arouse, and provoke their listeners, the great scholastics were more fascinated by the object of their concern. With respect to the Church, for example, they would ask, not what does the Church mean *to the people* but what is the Church *in itself.* The emphasis in their thinking fell, then, upon objects, not subjects. This same emphasis is reflected in Maritain's work. Like the great scholastics, and the modern day Journet, his focus is upon the objective structures of the Church: its nature as the real and explicit presence of God in history (its " person ") , and the various ways in which that divine presence explicitate.s itself (the Church's "personnel," acting instrumentally or properly). But that is the problem, for hardly ever does Maritain turn his attention to the subject, the person for whom his book is meant. And never does he focus on what conditions must be present in the subject before he will be able to understand this objective reality that we call the "Church." Rahner has expressed, better and more credibly that I could, my basic uneasiness with this work of Maritain's: "I believe that all the difficulties which men of today experience have a common basis: theological expressions are

not formulated in such a way that they can see how what is being said has any connection with their own understanding of themselves, which they derived from their experience." Surely if all theology is *propter nostram salutem,* then it must be concerned with man and the transformation of his life. It must, in other words, be terribly related to man's existence. But it is that relationship which Maritain leaves unexplored.

Personally, I think it would be futile to take up the argumentation of Maritain's book point by point. In substance it represents a short, easily readable, and sometimes passionate rendition of the kind of ecclesiology to be found in Carrdinal Joumet's *L'Eglise du Verbe Incarne.* And there already exist a sufficient number of studies on that subject: Rahner, Congar, Dulles, to mention a few authors. I think Maritain has correctly discerned the key issue: the need to avoid either a radical divinizing or a radical humanizing ofthe Church. But I suspect that this book will not be credible to most, simply because of its total objectivism (which is surely not the same as simply " error "), and I would personally look in the direction of a Karl Rahner for a more fruitful ecclesiology.

But finally, Maritain has written this book as a *poet,* one might almost say a *mystic,* and it was this element which personally impressed me the most. This comes to the fore especially in the last section of the book, (pp. where he takes up the knotty questions of the Church's part in the Crusades, the experience of the Jews, the Inquisition, the Galileo case, and the condemnation of Joan of Arc. From a theological point of view, Maritain is able to preserve the Church from any stain by his use of the distinction between the Church's "person" (unblemished) and its "personnel" which, in varying ways, was at fault). He further preserves God from any blame by employing the now famous distinction between God's "pure" and his merely "permissive" will. I mention these theological subtleties, not because I wholeheartedly agree with them (surely theology must find the kind of language which, on the one hand, will not allow churchmen to absolve themselves from the guilt of some of the terrible things they have done, and which, on the other, does not imply that God is in any way involved in evil), but because these are not the real point of what Maritain is offering in this section. What he is offering is the example of a man who has the courage to believe that there exists such a thing as an experience of God, and that such an experience was in some imperceptible way present even in those terrible historical episodes of the Church. And how else does one speak of this except poetically? A man who can see in the Inq11isition's fires the symbols of a divine truth "which must burn us to the bones," (187) and in Joan of Arc's condemnation " a marvellous *adieu* of the Lord God to medieval Christendom on the point of ending," may not be the best of all possible theologians, but he is, without doubt, a believing poet.

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Theology Today Series. 43. *The Church and the World.* By Rodger Charles, S. J. Pp. 89; 27. *The Theology of the Eucharist.* By James Quinn, S. J. Pp. 94; 33. *The Priest as Preacher Past and Future.* By Edward P. Echlin, S. J. Pp. 92.

The Church and the World is a title which is apt to deceive. It does not deal with what we might immediately expect to be dealt with behind such a title. The thesis of the book could be said to be this: it is from Christianity, and not from secular humanism, that man can come to a sense of his dignity as a creature of God and can learn how to live out the implications of this dignity. The claims of the secularisers: 1) that what they are rejecting of structure, and morality, and dogma is really only peripheral to Christianity; 2) that in rejecting these "medieval" inessentials man, in the famous phrase of Bonhoeffer, "has come of age"; he has somehow become more Christian than the Christians themselves. With a wicked touch of irony the author asks: the casual disrespect for life today, the rationalization of the drug menace, sexual promiscuity, the destruction of environment and resources, the belief in anarchy and licence, the greed of the more affiuent societies-are these the signs that man has come of age? And what of Christianity? It teaches that God made man in his own image and likeness that, over and above this, God offers him a share in his own divine life. There is no conflict between the life of grace and man's own personal characteristics. Far from being destroyed in this higher life, these personal characteristics are enriched. But this life must be lived according to a law-the objective law of God. This law was brought to the world by Christ, and Christ gave to his Church the mission to interpret this law unerringly for men until the end of time. That Christianity is being rejected by so many today is not an argument that the Church has failed in this mission. The Church, and it only, provides man with a purpose worth his seeking, and offers him effective means for attaining it. The book is worth reading for at least this: the amount of detail it packs into its short ninety pages. It is not a book for everyone. But anyone genuinely interested in the phenomenon of secularization, and a theologians' answer to it, has everything to gain from reading it.

The Theology of the Eucharist is an excellent little volume, one of the most satisfactory that I have come across in the Theology Today series. In fifteen brief chapters the author touches on all the important aspects of Eucharistic theology. The exposition is clear, in welcome contrast to much theological writing nowadays. The style is simple, but anyone acquainted with recent writing on the Eucharist will immediately recognize the competence that lies behind this unpretentious exterior. About half the book is devoted to a treatment of the biblical background of the Eucharist, and this should prove especially valuable to those who studied

this particular tract of theology at a time when scripture was invoked almost exclusively to prove the Real Presence and the sacrificial character of the Mass. The author shows how the Eucharist, when situated in the Passover context of berakah and memorial, takes on a rich new depth of meaning. Perhaps more might have been made of the memorial dimension of the Eucharist, along the lines indicated by Jeremias and Bouyer. A minor criticism that might be made is that the very wealth of material provided in some chapters (e. g., ch. 5) tends to confuse the clear lines of development of the author's treatment. All in all, however, this is a very satisfying piece of work. It makes one realize with a sense of regret what the Theology Today series might have been if all the volumes were of the same high standard.

The Priest as Preacher Past and Future might be described as a commentary on the statement in *Presbyterorum Ordinis* (n. 4) that " priests. . . . have as their primary duty the proclamation of the gospel of God to all." What the theology of the priest has needed for so long is a resolution of the conflict between the post-Tridentine Catholic view of the priest as essentially a man who offers the Eucharistic Sacrifice and administers the Sacraments on the one hand, and the opinion of the Reformers on the other hand, who stressed, at times exclusively, the minister's preaching role. Through a survey of scriptural, patristic, medieval, and modem ecclesiastical documents up to and including Vatican IT, Father Echlin throws considerable light on the priest's role as minister of the word and shows that it is without prejudice to the ministry of the Sacrifice. Both roles are indispensable for the wholesome exercise of the priesthood and though preaching may be the primary duty of priests, the goal of all preaching is the Eucharist.

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The English Bishops and the First Vatican Council. By Frederick J. Cwiekowski, s. s. Bibliotheque de la Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, Fascicule *5!t.* Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts. 1971. Pp. 871. FB *500.*

In this impressively researched study Frederick J. Cwiekowski gives a broad view of the English hierarchy before, during, and after the First Vatican Council. The focus is national and emphasizes " the bishops ' concerns with the ecclesiological issues " as the English prelates " saw the council largely in these terms." A background perspective is provided on the state of Catholicism in England, followed by a survey of the English

role in council preparations. The author then treats with the Council itself: its organization and management, major debates and the formation of parties, English secular interests and activities, the position and participation of the bishops on the great issues, especially those growing out of the *Schema constitutionis dogmaticae ecclesia Christi-to* which was attached the explosive chapter on papal infallibility-and finally, the resolution of the controversies. Concluding chapters concern the aftermath as it affected acceptance and interpretation of the decrees by the hierarchy, closing with " The Ecclesiology of the English Bishops at Vatican I," a return to the prefatory theme.

From cover to cover the author leaves little doubt that a majority of the prelates were prepared to follow Ultramontane leadership, with slight exception. The story is dominated throughout by the energetic Archbishop of Westminster, whose anti-Gallican convictions and personal quest for an authoritative papacy assured him prominence before, during, and after the Council, both in England and at Rome. Manning's pastoral letter of October 1869-the eve of the council-pointed the way and, as with his pastoral of two years earlier, strongly promoted infallibility. Even as Wiseman's successor waxed polemical at home, Cardinal Antonelli was assuring Odo Russell that no new dogma of personal infallibility was to be submitted to the Fathers in that the Council had no auhority over such matters.

Because so much of the literature on the Council focuses on the struggle over the definition of papal infallibility, this study is particularly noteworthy for its consideration of the attitudes of the English bishops toward other matters debated at Rome. The English hierarchy was comparatively new, the English Catholic population relatively small; it would appear that this rather insignificant delegation of twelve men wielded little power as a body, When it became conspicuous, as in the debate on the schema *Dei Filius,* efforts by Ullathorne and others to have a comma inserted after "Roman" in the chapter's opening words *"Sancta Romana catholica ecclesia"*, revealed more of the Church's sensitivities in England than in the world at large.

A concise narrative portrays participation in great detail, though troublesome questions remain unanswered. To what extent, for example, did the English hierarchy express itself on the impending loss of the Temporal Power? And to what extent did the pre-Vatican tensions within English Catholicism between the " national " bishops and the " Romanizing " bishops carry over into deliberations at the Council? Lines had been drawn long before 1869 on several key issues; battles had been fought; careers had been made, broken or frustrated. The men who gathered at Rome in the fall of 1869 were to function within the context of pre-existing struggles, and while Father Cwiekowski defines specific positions taken at the Council, he does not relate the earlier conflicts to the tensions which developed

during the proceedings. Historical difficulties between Manning and the less " Romanized " bishops such as Errington, Ullathorne, Grant, and Clifford suggest complications which are not explored.

Vatican I evokes strong currents in the minds of many as a time of intrigue, vilification, mendacity, and the arbitrary exercise of power by a much-troubled papacy and its partisans. The book brings little new light to that dimension of the story, and surprisingly, except for a brief passage near the end, the author seemingly overlooks one of the principal issues formulated by the minority bishops, namely, the assertion that the most bitterly contested doctrine of the Council could not survive the test of historical evidence. This episode would seem all the more relevant in that it was an Englishman, Lord Acton, who organized the cause against promulgation on historical grounds, forcefully expressed in a letter to his Munich mentor: " Man muss es klar machen dass nicht nur die Definition schwierig sondern die Lehre falsch ist."

How did the English bishops respond to Acton's argument? We are told neither the degree of their familiarity with the position nor their assessment of it. Most would appear to have been indifferent, but there were exceptions. Clifford led Acton to believe that they were of one mind. In his letter to Newman dated 28 March 1870, Goss suggested disbelief in the proposed doctrine. (Goss was unable to attend the Council owing to poor health.) Among the Acton manuscripts at Cambridge is a memoir in the hand of the historian's daughter, Annie. Not a lengthy document, it contains material pertinent to the subject at hand. Annie Acton's contribution to historical controversy is her observation that the failure of the minority bishops to persist in their resistance after promulgation gave rise to the keenest crisis of her father's life. While recent scholarship has softened the harshness of her assumption, the charge from one so intimately connected with Acton cannot be ignored. Among the prelates who "wavered, only to join the ranks of the triumphant majority " were the Englishmen Clifford and Errington. Father Cwiekowski's treatment of the controversy is cursory and uncharacteristically indulgent. Many historians will question his conclusion that " the forces of moderation did prevail at the Council." Acton's assertion that Clifford did not believe in the content of the definition is given as wishful thinking-hardly an adequate explanation of so controversial a matter on which the evidence is thus far inconclusive.

On balance this is an important book. Fifteen manuscript collections were consulted. There is a good bibliography and a useful index. It takes its place alongside James Hennessey's *The First Council of the Vatican: the American Experience,* a welcome addition to a growing literature on a fascinating topic.

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The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators (1922-1945). By Anthony Rhodes. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. 383. $12.50.

It is a commonly held view that the papacy has had great influence upon secular events in the modern world. Thus, popes have been condemned or applauded: Pius XI's signing of the Lateran Accords has been seen by liberal historians as contributing to the rise of Fascism in Italy, and the failure of Pius XII to speak out firmly against the destruction of the European Jews has been portrayed as a significant factor in the holocaust. The fact is, however, that the modern papacy has been far more influenced by the circumstances of the secular world than influencing them.

Mr. Rhodes appreciates this fact in his study of the papacy and its relations with other countries from the accession of Pius XI in 1922 to the end of World War II under Pius XII. His book is comprehensive in scope and powerfully written: he describes papal problems surrounding such important events as the rise of Mussolini, the Reich Concordat, the Spanish Republic and Civil War, and the condemnation of *Action Frangaise.* Almost half of the book is given over to a study of papal relations with Nazi Germany and the events of World War II. Even such relatively minor areas as relations with the Soviet Union and problems with the British in Malta are dwelt upon in great detail. No author has given us a more comprehensive view.

Rhodes' thesis is that Pius XI broke sharply with the policies of his predecessor in relying less upon Catholic political parties and more upon concordats and papal diplomacy to protect the threatened rights of Catholies in the unstable countries; thus the disappearance of the *Popolari* in Italy and the Centre in Germany. In fact, of course, the departure of these parties was less the result of papal intervention than of Fascist and Nazi oppression. Pius XII, Rhodes shows, was faced with almost insurmountable problems with the outbreak of the War. He spent the war years trying to safeguard not just the rights but the lives as well of Catholics in the occupied countries, and he tried to preserve papal neutrality so that he could offer Vatican services for peace negotiations. These factors and his excessive fear of Communism led to his " silence " on the destruction of the Jews.

Unfortunately, for so excellent a book, it must be used with a strong *caveat.* Rhodes' principal sources are German and British foreign office reports. While this makes them invaluable for the story of German-papal relations, they are much less reliable for other areas, with result that Spain, France, and Italy come through strongly colored by German and British impressions. Nor has Rhodes checked all of his facts: numerous minor errors creep in (Pius XI did not found Catholic Action, it was Benedict XV who lifted the *non-expedit,* the Spanish Republic never had a fully accredited ambassador to the Holy until 1936, etc.) . But, these errors do not affect his general interpretation.

Despite the Vatican's ineffectiveness in the modem world, there is a fascination about its activities far in excess of its influence. Vatican gossip is always more interesting that that of any other government. Part of this has to do with tradition and manners; part of it is that juxtaposition of secular and sacred so well illustrated by the remark made by the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, when the French Ambassador accused him of lying: " the Cardinal cooly replied that he was merely doing what all diplomats did, and that in any case the Pope would give him absolution if necessary."

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The Inquisition. By John A. O'Brien. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1973. Pp. 233. $6.95.

The present volume, by a well-known Catholic scholar, traces the history and operation of the Inquisition in its medieval, Spanish, and Roman forms. It closes with chapters on several celebrated cases that came before the Inquisition-of Joan of Arc, Savonarola, and Galileo-and a final chapter entitled, *A New Era,* in which the author brings out the significance of the changes that were initiated by Pope John XXIII and Vatican Council II. The book is a useful, popular, and readable account of this celebrated tribunal about which many people have only hazy ideas. Though filling a need, the volume must be read with discrimination, keeping various reservations in mind. Though the author grounds himself on the sources, primary and secondary, he serves notice in his *Foreword* that he does not aim at complete objectivity. It is best to let him speak for himself.

> Neither have I failed to let my moral indignation come to the surface when narrating the cruel and inhuman actions of the Inquisitors.
>
> For a historian to relate such incidents with icy indifference and no feeling of repugnance would be to strip history of moral values and undertones and put it on par with wrestling with a problem in mathematics.
>
> Running as a *leitmotiv* through the volume is the principle of freedom of thought and conscience against the violence and coercive measures of the Inquisitors who generally regarded a day's work wasted if it brought no victim to the jail, dungeon or stake.

This last statement is a value judgment, an exaggerated generality that must do injustice to a great many inquisitors. The author might have added a word at this point to the effect that inquisitors were, at least in

part, victims of their concrete historical environment and, like ourselves, subject to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual blindness of their age, limitations that very few men can escape.

Not only does O'Brien fail to mention this mitigating circumstance but he also labors the incongruity of the Inquisition and the actions of the inquisitors who professed to be agents of the Church of Christ and yet sanctioned systematic cruelty, torture, and burnings at the stake. He returns to this in one form or another on six separate occasions (pp. 1, 40, 45, 49, 58, 70).

From the opening paragraphs of the chapter on witchcraft an indiscriminate reader could gain the impression that all the condemnations and burnings for witchcraft were carried out by the Inquisition. The witchcraft craze was not limited to the Inquisition or to Catholic leaders and countries but was shared by the Protestant reformers, not excluding Luther and Calvin, and Protestant countries. O'Brien mentions these facts later in the chapter but in a muted key. Perhaps this is excusable in a book on the Inquisition, though the chapter does attempt an overview of witchcraft.

The author is guilty of a simplistic statement in the same chapter. He writes that "the philosopher Giordano Bruno, 1548-1600, was burned at the stake as a heretic because he stated publicly that many so-called witches were merely psychologically disturbed old women." Bruno's errors were much more profound and general. A. Puppi writes in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (vol. II, 889): "His (Bruno's) violent and imprudent criticisms against every doctrinal profession not illumined by philosophical and personal knowledge, his rejection of all authority other than reason itself, and his independent and rebellious position made him an object of condemnation and persecution in many countries and led to a tragic end." On the following page Pupi observes: " Bruno astutely used symbols to criticize positive religions by citing superstitious aspects and advancing the idea of a purely rational interpretation of traditional teachings." He says nothing about Bruno and witchcraft.

In his final evaluation of Savonarola the author practically canonizes the friar. He fails to mention that some scholars who have studied the Savonarola case judge that he was guilty of disobedience to the Pope and is a doubtful candidate for canonization. O'Brien substantiated his judgment by citing an article by Antonio Lupi, an Italian Dominican, in *Blackfriars,* 1958. He could have mentioned a companion article written by an English Dominican, Kenelm Foster, who raised grave doubts about the attitude of Savonarola toward Alexander VI. In another article, published in *The Life of the Spirit* the same year, Foster dealt with these doubts about Savonarola's final resistance to the orders of the Pope. Referring to the friar's last sermons he wrote: "As he watched the pope harden against him the prospect for Savonarola must have been heart-breaking

indeed. But would a saint have preached those last defiant sermons? The question is not merely rhetorical." (p. 194)

Considering the tendency of people of average education to lump together the entire period from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the Renaissance as a period of intellectual stagnation and darkness, the author might have added more balance to his discussion of the merits of Galileo. He writes: (Galileo) "Combined experiment with calculation and thus went counter to the prevailing system which held that laws and processes of nature were best learned by going not directly to nature, but to Aristotle." Balance could have been gained by noting that overreliance on Aristotle was a recent development. As Langford points out in his article on Galileo in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (vol. VI, 250), it developed "under the influence of Renaissance humanism." Through its influence, "the tendency to attribute definitive authority to the texts of Aristotle grew even stronger, and philosophical writings were generally more textual and philological than original or creative." Langford also notes Galileo's debt to earlier scholars: "Galileo, then, represents in many ways the combination of certain scientific trends that existed before him, especially at Paris, Oxford and Padua of a new beginning of science that led to Newton and beyond." (p. 255)

The question of the number of burnings that took place under the Inquisition is a difficult one and has not been fully researched. The medieval Inquisition was sparing in its use of the stake, as was the Spanish Inquisition under Thomas Torquemada, the first Grand Inquisitor. Apart from the burnings that occured during the witchcraft craze, in which Protestant countries shared, it may be misleading to speak of condemning " thousands to the stake to be burned alive for some alleged deviation in doctrine or some alleged involvement in witchery." (p. 143)

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Dictionary of Biblical Theology, New Revised Edition. Edited by Xavier Leon-Dufour. New York: Seabury Press, 1973. 712 Pp. $17.50.

Like the original edition published in 1967, this new edition (translated from the second French edition, 1968) makes available to English readers a wealth of information and insight in the area of Biblical Theology. This edition represents a significant advance over the earlier edition, primarily in the area of new articles, but it also retains some of the deficiencies of the former. A built-in deficiency in any such dictionary is the nebulous state

of Biblical Theology. This dictionary, by the way it treats the subject matter, opts for a systematic understanding of Biblical Theology, an understanding which is itself un-biblical. Uon-Dufour, in the new article "Jesus Christ," recognizes that "the mystery of Jesus ... cannot be reduced to a single system," yet he seems to attempt to do just that. The view of Biblical Theology taken by this work is most clearly manifest in the index which was added in this edition, an index which offers a systematic arrangement of all the subjects treated in the dictionary.

There are forty new articles in this edition which fill in most of the important areas neglected in the first edition. Among them are " Apparitions of Christ," " Conscience," "Jesus Christ," "Predestine" and "Providence "; however, there is still no article on Paul . The foreword claims that "most of the articles have been revised and corrected," (v) but a comparison of fifty articles showed that very few had been altered and what changes there were were minimal. Some notable inconsistencies between articles, inevitable in a collaborative work, have been eliminated from the earlier edition such as the conflicting views on paraclete found respectively in the articles " Consolation " and " Paraclete," but other revisions that one might have expected were not made. The article "Resurrection," for example, is identical with the earlier one although the new article "Apparitions of Christ " brings new insights to the divergencies manifest in the various layers of tradition, insights that certainly would have improved the article " Resurrection."

In spite of the above criticisms, the new edition retains all of the virtues of the previous edition with enough significant improvements *tl)* render it a most useful tool for students of the Bible.

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Causality and Scientific Explanation. Vol. II Classical and Contemporary Science. By William A. Wallace. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 1974. Pp. $14.00.

This second volume of *Causality and Scientific Explanation* proves beyond all doubt that Father Wallace has secured a permanent place among the scientific methodologists of our time and that his philosophy of scienc:e must be recognized by all future thinkers in the field. Fully acquainted in both volumes with the latest secondary sources, he is deeply immersed in the primary sources of each period of history. It would be a mistake, however, to consider these volumes a mere historical account of causality

and scientific explanation. It is much more. It is a critical justification of the principle of causality as a valid, scientific explanation of physical phenomena enjoyed by scientists in every age, including our own.

The first two chapters of this volume continue the critical analysis of modern science begun in volume one. The first chapter discusses the philosophers of classical science from Rene Descartes to Immanuel Kant. Understandably, the focal points of this chapter are David Hume's rejection of objective causation and Kant's attempt to ground the awareness of causality on an a priori form imposed by the mind on phenomena. For Kant the notion of causality is indispensable to science; and " scientific explanations, for him, are causal explanations" (p. 74) such as are found in Newtonian physics. The second chapter is a brilliant and original discussion of the main methodologists of classical science: Francis Bacon, Auguste Comet, John F. W. Herschel, William Whewell, John Stuart Mill, and Claude Bernard. While Comte and Mill followed the positivist program and embraced the Humean interpretation of causality, Herschel and Whewell reacted agagainst the Comtean restrictions, insisting on some element of production and efficacy in the exercise of real causality.

By far the most formidable and impressive part of this volume deals with contemporary science, both in its use of the causal principle and in its scientific demonstrations. The principal areas of consideration are relativity theories and quantum physics, both of which are shown to employ the notion of real causality in its scientific explanations. In three illuminating chapters on contemporary science Fr. Wallace faces the problem of causality in contemporary thought straight on and talks in terms that modern science and philosophy can understand. Here the most abstruse concepts of mathematical physics are expressed with clarity and objectivity of understanding. Philosophical readers who find the concepts of modern physics difficult to grasp will have to read, and indeed study, this part of the book carefully; but it is worth the effort because here is where the action is.

It is sometimes thought that the deathblow to causality came with Heisenberg's enunciation of the uncertainty principle in 1927, thus replacing certainty with probability. Similarly it is sometimes thought that that the principle of relativity enunciated by Einstein in 1905 dealt the deathblow to mechanical efficiency in the universe. Wallace shows that in neither field of physics is the notion of causality dead. Rather, it is demanded in any realist philosophy of nature. It is only that the Humean restriction of causality to mere succesion will not work; a much more nuanced notion of causality is needed to explain the scientists's own conviction that what they are studying is real.

Chapter three is a veritable survey of contemporary philosophies of science ranging from W. S. Jevons (1835-82) to P. K. Feyerabend and Rom Harre in our own day. But these philosophies have roots. And the

roots of the modern debate lie in the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, when Stallo, Mach, Poincare, and Duhem re-examined the foundations of scientific explanation. Since the critique of Ernst Mach is considered so carefuly in this section, one might wish to have seen an analysis of Lenin's *Empirio-Criticism,* especially as it is so pertinent and other Soviet philosophers are elsewhere considered in the book. (p. 308)

In a brilliant exposition of the changing status of causality Wallace shows that in their concern with explanation modern philosophers of science, such as David Bohm, Mario Bunge, and Rom Harre, have all urged a return to realism in scientific explanations. (pp. 197-237)

In chapter four Wallace insists that there are a variety of causal explanations which have been recognized not only by Aristotle but also by scientists of the classical period and the contemporary scene. The themes chosen for discussion, of course, diverge from the explanations given by logical positivists and empiricists. But he maintains that there is a substantial continuity in the themes selected. The underlying thesis of these themes is that " science is concerned with a study of the real, not with the logical as such, that real entitites have natures that can be understood, and that there can be progress in this understanding." (p. In this realist program Fr. Wallace's book will receive a warm welcome by many contemporary thinkers.

In the final chapter Fr. Wallace examines the reality of causation in contemporary science. Without ever relinquishing the historical roots of contemporary science and its literature, he contributes much that comes from his own profound thought. Of particular interest is his discussion of the reality of elementary particles, such as atoms, electrons, neutrons, mesons, and the like. Discussing the nature of causality found in quantum physics Wallace holds that "contemporary theories of microphysical explanation proceed not so much along lines of efficient causality as along those of material causality." (p. 303) His suggestion, based on a careful reading of Heisenberg, is that subatomic particles are determinations of a protomatter, which is completely featureless; that is, the determinants of protomatter constitute a second-level manifestation of primary matter that Aristotle posited as underlying his four elements. Thus, far from eliminating causality from quantum physics, Heisenberg presupposes it. The problem, therefore, is not the extramental reality of what is measured but the extent to which such measurements depend on the protomatter or on the very conditions of the experiment itself. (p. 306) .

In a brief section of the last chapter (pp. 308-322) the reality of causality is examined in the life and social sciences. Here the theory of evolution is analyzed to show that natural selection is an end-directed process, accounting for the internal teleology of the organism. This internal teleology determines the matter and form of biological systems. Thus, for Wallace, the most striking advances in contemporary biology as well as in con-

temporary physics have been made " through a study of material and formal causes." (pp. 318, 3fl0) Little space is given to examining causality and scientific explanation in the social sciences apart from pointing out the obvious character of causal action and purpose in human behavior. (pp.

In brief, this is a brilliant work of scholarship and lucidity, proving its case for a realist philosophy of science, its causality, and its scientific explanation. Even those who do not share such sympathies must acknowledge the care, objectivity, and precision with which the case is presented. It is a monument that will weather many a storm that is bound to ensue, especially from logical positivists and empiricists. I am convinced, however, that it will stand the test of time.

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Tomismo e principia di non contraddizione. By Maria Cristina Bartolomei. Padova: CEDAM, 1973. Pp. 110. Lire 1,750.

The purpose of this volume is " to evaluate the metaphysical implications of the Thomistic way of understanding the nature and use of the principle of noncontradiction." (p. 13) An analysis of this principle in Aristotle's philosophy, based on both primary and secondary sources but with no claim to originality or completeness, introduces the study. The results of the analysis lead the author to conclude that the principle of noncontradiction is for the Stagirite a principle of thought as well as of reality and that it would be a mistake to reduce it merely to a conventional or logical principle.

This same teaching, Bartolomei asserts, is found in Thomas's commentaries on Aristotle, where the principle of noncontradiction is presented as a clear manifestation of the relationship between being and thought (p. 45) and the foundation of all demonstration. While the principle itself defies all demonstration, it is either presupposed or implied by all other philosophical principles. (p. 47)

An important point of Thomistic epistemology, which the author rightly emphasizes along with P. C. Courtes (cf. " L'etre et le non etre selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomistre,* 67 [1967], p. 391), is that the principle in question represents " naturally " the first judgment of the agent intellect in its grasp of being. Thus the crucial problem of the relation of truth and certainty in knowledge is solved by Thomas's grounding of the principle of noncontradiction in the source itself of intelligibilty, namely, the agent intellect inasmuch as its judgment bears on the being of the objects of our experience which participate their existence in the absolute Being. (pp. 48-

49) The opposition between being and nothing, which is expressed by the principle of noncontradiction, becomes also the source of truth in our judgments, for no affirmation and negation are possible with regard to the one and same being. (pp. 58-59)

The question of whether in Thomistic metaphysics the principle of noncontraction enjoys priority over the principle of identity is answered in the affirmative by the author, who quotes to this effect Gredt, Jolivet, and Fabro (cf. the review of the latter's work, *Tomismo e pensiero mederno, The Thomist,* 84 [July, 1970], pp. 499-502). The opposite view of Maritain, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Sofia Vanni Rovighi is discussed and criticized. And so is the position of those who defend either the simultaneousness of the two principles (Suarez) or the priority of the principle of noncontradiction but merely as a law of thought (Van Steenberghen-cf. pp. 68-80).

The theological import of the principle under discussion is the subject of the last part of Bartolomei's study. Here the author shows that the principle of causality, which is the immediate vehicle of Thomas's ascent to God in his Five Ways, rests ultimately on the principle of noncontradiction. (pp. 80-97) Bartolomei concludes her study by indicating how contemporary philosophy, in its attempt to solve the problem of being and becoming, could profit from a metaphysical discourse grounded in the age-old principle of noncontradiction.

In a time when the very possibility of metaphysical discourse is challenged, especially by advocates of positivistic and analytic trends in philosophy, Bartolomei's volume is not only very enlightening but also a welcome addition to those studies which in recent years have attempted to revive interest in classic and Thomistic philosophy.

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The Fabric of Existentialism. Philosophical and Literary Sources. Edited by Richard Gill and Ernest Sherman. New York: Appleton-Century. Crofts, 1978. Pp. 640. $14.95.

In the halcyon days of existentialist thought after World War I1 Emmanuel Monnier wrote a book entitled *Introduction aux existentialismes.* His choice of the plural seems apt indeed, for there is no existentialism; there are only existentialisms crisscrossing and overlaping one another in what Wittgenstein has called a family resemblance. Accordingly, the most satisfactory way of providing a conceptual umbrella for those whom one would like to call existentialists is the listing of several family traits

which the members share in various degree. The editors of the present anthology have done just that, offering a set of eight Kierkegaardian themes in lieu of a definition of existentialism.

Few would fault them on their choice of the eight: (1) The Primacy of the Individual; (2) The Critique of Reason; (3) The Authentic versus the Inauthentic Life; (4) The Boundary Situation; (5) Alienation; (6) The Encounter with Nothingness; (7) Dread; (8) Freedom, Choice, Commitment, and Community. Nor are any major existentialists omitted. Indeed, with such exceptions as Abbagnano and Shestov, few minor existentialists fail to be represented either. The passages chosen are the standard ones for any such anthology, although the size of the volume allows for some complete works to be printed on its two-column pages. Each author is introduced with adequate biographical and philosophical information to make the texts intelligible in themselves and in relation to the movement as a whole. The introductory chapter is helpful in this regard as well.

What distinguishes the book from other such anthologies is its treatment of the "background and portents " of the movement (allowing the editors to include passages ranging from Plato to Stendhal) as well as its consideration of literary sources which develop these eight existentialist themes. Under the latter rubric the editors introduce Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan lllych* (complete text), Coleridge's "Dejection: An Ode," and Hemingway's" A Clean, Well-lighted Place." Oddly enough, there is nothing from Faulkner.

The editors' passion for completeness leads them to add a section, "English and American Undercurrents," which ushers in readings from J. S. Mill (!), Dickens, Arnold, Stephen Crane, and William James. Though each entry is justified, the sheer variety tends to dilute whatever meaning the term "existentialist" was intended to have. One is tempterl, therefore, to suggest that this particular section could well have been omitted. And yet in view of the subtitle of the book, " Philosophical and Literary Sources," this section seems less incongruous.

The root of the difficulty lies in "literary" existentialism itself. This is what William James would call a weasel word. For, aside from those authors like Dostoevsky and Rilke who have been canonized by philosophical existentialists, a literary existentialist turns out to be most any author who deals with the human condition-and that could pass for a partial description of the literary enterprise itself.

This large book is an excellent collection of important selections. It is intelligently organized and reflects that facile blend of the philosophic and the literary which we have come to associate with the name of William Barrett to whom the volume is dedicated. It should be of great use in any general course on existentialisms, philosophical or not.

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Ernst Cassirer: Scientific Knowledge and the Concept of Man. By Seymour W. Itzkoff. University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. fl86. $9.95.

In general it seems fair to say that in philosophy there are books which have something to say in their own right, and there are books written about those books. As H. L. Mencken well knew in regard to literature, simply because a book falls into the latter category does not mean that it cannot be original of itself, and in fact the best such books are. On the other hand this need not, and too often is not, so, as this work concerned with Cassirer goes some to show.

According to the author, his chief purpose is to cull, or to use his own word, *delineate* from Cassirer's writings "the historical and systematic sources for his intellectual position." (p. ix) Although he suggests that this purpose is an exegetical one, leading us to believe that he will in some measure be involved with comparing various texts of Cassirer's with an eye to illuminating their meaning for us and genuinely delineating their developmental significance, this is, unfortunately, not quite what happens. The alternate possibility, namely, that this will be an investigation of those historical and systematic sources likewise turns out not to be the case. In place of either of these two methods of proceeding, proof-texting or historical analysis, the author opts for something he considers more faithful to Cassirer's own method: he simply assembles, albeit not too obviously so, everything Cassirer said about the given range of topics. Thus, the first chapter gives us everything Cassirer said about the history of pre-Kantian philosophy, the second everything about Kant, the third everything about Newton, and so on. Oddly enough, the only clue we get to the fact that this is what is going on is in the footnotes. Whereas this would not oppose too great a problem in most instances, the editorial decision to have the footnotes conveniently less accessible at the back of the book makes it look almost as if we are not supposed to find this out. The appearance of an interpretation of pre-Kantian thought as it presaged Cassirer thus turns out to be the reality of a harmony of Cassirer's writings on the subject, and Mr. Itzkoff, looking like an author, turns out to be a compiler.

There is, however, another purpose to the book which the author would have us consider. Over and above its alleged exegetical concerns it is supposed to have some creative and original intent as well, and thus the second part of the book is meant "to examine the implications of this critico-idealistic philosophy for a theory of man and discursive knowledge." (p. ix) It is true that some attempt is indeed made to do this, particularly in chapter 8, on an evolutionary interpretation of man's status as a symbolic animal, although the importance of the results is not altogether without question. For the most part, however, the discussion is confined to thumbnail sketches of the work and intellectual positions of a wide

variety of philosophers, anthropologists, and psychologists, undertaken with a view to showing how they fit into the critico-idealistic scheme of how the history of man works, how man as a symbolic animal tends ever more towards symbolism as his primary activity. This is sometimes interesting because of the odd slant it gives on such matters, but too often it degenerates into the sort of broad-stroke cultural history where no conceivable data could disconfirm the principal hypothesis, where maverick figures somehow get reinterpreted as fulfilling the expectations of the scheme in spite of themselves. Carnap, whom ltzkoff identifies somewhat *too* closely for comfort with the *Wiener Kreig*, thus winds up pretty much as an example of how not to do philosophy. Wittgenstein, also identified as a logical positivist, suffers a similar fate but seems to have at least managed to go down fighting, as the author's bewilderment with the *Philosophical lnvestigatioM* seems to attest. When some breakthrough *is* made, i.e., when some constructive hypothesis of the author's is launched over and above this kind of cultural history, the result is refreshing but none the less unsatisfying because of a tendency to substitute prediction and futurology for program: we are told where philosophy is going but not at all what it actually ought to do to get there. This is, of course, a symptom of philosophical systems and systematicians who think themselves already to have arrived.

Is there, then, a worthwhile purpose to this book? Despite the foregoing, the answer to this must still be affirmative. Cassirer as a thinker, analyst of his culture, insatiable curiosity seeker for all that was newest in science and the intellectual life of his time, spread his thoughts and impressions far and wide throughout his writings. Some summary of his development in particular areas is thus both necessary and useful to the student of philosophy and western cultural history. Likewise, it seems abundantly clear that some effort ought to be made, difficult of success as such efforts usually are, to determine what Cassirer would have thought had he had the opportunity to develop his insights further, particularly in dialog with other elements of the philosophical mainstream. Mr. ltzkoff has tried very hard to do this, and, in some measure, has succeeded. For practical purposes, however, he seems to have fallen between two stools in that his imitation of Cassirer is too good to serve as a simpler-than-the-original introduction to his thought for students, while still being clearly only from the workshop of the master.

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Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom. By Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. Pp. $7.95 cloth, paper.

Grisez and Shaw state quite plainly in the Introduction to their book that this volume on ethics is not a technical work of philosophy; rather, "the primary audience is the college ethics class." The book is divided into twenty short chapters on relevant moral issues, and at the end of each of these chapters is a list of thought-provoking questions for review and discussion.

Due to the fact that the authors do not explicitly address themselves either to the tenets of traditional morality or to the methodological issues of the new morality, it appears that they are presuming that the reader either has some prior knowledge of what these moralities are, or he will be able to rely upon a teacher to supplement the book's presentation. Nowhere do they make specific reference to the proponents of either the traditional or the situational approaches to ethical decision making. Thus, it seems that the authors' principal aim is not to defend or to attack positions, but rather it is to involve the reader in a synthesis of both approaches to ethics.

The basic theme of the book revolves around discussing the three levels of freedom which are operative in man's moral life. For the authors, there is a corresponding level of action which is derived from each of these levels of freedom. The first level of freedom pertains to the lack of physical constraints or coercion. Physical freedom is not specifically human, since as the authors point out this kind of freedom is enjoyed typically by wild animals and can even apply to inanimate objects. At this level of freedom the action's meaning comes from its consummation. The second level of freedom is specifically human, and it is defined as " doing as one pleases," i.e., the absence of social demands and restrictions. This level of freedom seems to be identical with freedom of choice. Actions which are derived from this level receive their meaning from a specific goal the action is meant to achieve. Now, whereas the authors are concerned with these two levels of freedom mentioned above, their primary concern is with the level of freedom as self-determination. At this third level an action derives its meaning from a good in which one participates by performing the action. Based upon this contention the authors attempt to show that when man determines himself by participating in truly human goods he is acting responsibly for his own life and for the lives of others. In other words, the authors seek to prove that the problem concerning what it means to be a person is essentially the problem of self-determination. This fundamental problem of what it means to be a person (self-determination) is discussed from many different angles, e. g., from the perspectives of happiness, decision-making, the eight "modes of responsibility," etc.

For the teacher who would be disposed to use this valuable book in a college classroom, he should be well versed in both the traditional and situational approaches to ethics in order to answer intelligently the questions that could be posed by an inquiring student. In addition, the teacher should understand the distinction between freedom of choice and freedom as self-determination. The reason for this is because the authors are seemingly employing a distinction that has been developed in both humanistic psychology and theology (Josef Fuchs and Karl Rahner).

Although I feel that this book is valuable for both college classrooms and discussion groups, I also feel that that it is not without flaw. The authors have repeatedly argued that morality is essentially concerned with how man chooses in his moral life. Whereas I am completely in agreement with their view, I do not believe that the authors have adequately demonstrated the interrelation between the three levels of freedom which they discuss. They consistently argue that it is precisely on the third level of freedom (self-determination) where man becomes truly responsible for himself and others. This seems to be a bit one-sided to me. For one thing, this seems to neglect a very important emphasis upon the responsibility that must be involved on the level where man chooses between particular, concrete ends (freedom of choice). Also, by not clearly indicating the inter-relatedness between the various levels of freedom and concomitant responsibility there is a danger of speaking about man as a schizophrenic being who lives on various levels of existence. It seems to me that because Grisez and Shaw do not always clearly and sufficiently point out that how one decides about concrete ends actually does affect how one determines the self on the third level of freedom, and because they do not clearly point out how freedom as self-determination becomes operative on the level of freedom of choice, they are hindered in implicitly refuting the physicalism that is prevalent in traditional morality and the dualism that is operative in situation ethics, e. g., in Joseph Fletcher's writings. There are some isolated references wherein Grisez and Shaw attempt to make this inter-relation explicit; however, I feel that they should have devoted more effort to this important issue. The flaw, then, is more one of emphasis than anything else.

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For a Fundamental Social Ethic: A Philosophy of Social Change. By Oliva Blanchette, S. J. New York: Philosophical Library, 1973. Pp. 243. $7.50.

" This book has grown out of a double dialogue, one with the authors, both classical and contemporary, and with students, who have listened to me and challenged me to be relevant for our time." Its " purpose will not be to establish prinicples as such ... but rather to examine how principles actually operate in our real judgments and how they are assumed in our free activity." These two statements, from the author's Acknowledgments and Introduction respectively, describe the scope and content of this book. Fr. Blanchette is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston Coellge. As do many College and University professors, he feels the need to bridge the gap between theory and practice and perhaps even more between the classroom teaching and students' life experience. This is especially called for in the area of ethics which by its nature deals or should be dealing with human life and experience. In recent times, however, ethics and philosophy in general have been denied such a role in life and reduced to mental exercises of an analytical and linguistic nature. Fr. Blanchette's book reflects a growing awareness and reaction against this situation.

For a Fundamental Social Ethic is not a textbook even if it grew from a classroom experience, and the title, especially the subtitle, may suggest more than the book actually offers. The author claims no original breakthrough in social philosophy. Rather, from an Aristotelian and Thomistic perspective which he wants to make his own he discusses a number of social realities in their historical and contemporary function. The realities he chooses to discuss are social responsibility, the common good, justice and friendship, and law and authority. These constitute the first four chapters of the book. They are geared to a concluding chapter on totalitarianism and revolution or violence which the author takes as a test case " that no social ethic can fail to confront." The underlying concern which permeates the discussion in all these areas is how to find the grounds for concrete moral judgments and convince the people that there is a possibility of a more just social order in the world. In the author's mind such a possibility is real if the understanding of the common good transcends the existing political boundaries and if envisioned as a historical and human value becomes the norm of all moral actions; if justice and friendship as experienced between two persons can also become the model of relations among peoples and nations; if instead of a purely positivistic and juridical conception, law and authority are brought back into their moral foundation; if revolutions and violence, instead of being dismissed in theory while still occurring in practice, can themselves be evaluated in the context of the common good.

More could be said about Fr. Blanchette's book and more will be said about the issues he discusses, since these are pressing both for a more .realistic appraisal and more concrete action.

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Knowledge and Existence: An Introduction to Philosophical Problems. By Joseph Margolis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 301. *$6.95.*

This book has for its central thesis that "men-human persons-are cultural emergents, physically embodied but exhibiting attributes that cannot be characterized exclusively in material terms." Although he pays tribute to the impact of Descartes (the only author mentioned by name) in evoking the puzzles of his book, Margolis conducts his arguments against the background of the mind-body debates current among contemporary English-language philosophers. His case stands against a variety of reductionist theories about the nature of persons and about the relationship between mind and body which have had prominence in these debates. He argues cogently against any theory which would simply identify mind with body or eliminate language about mental states; and he argues somewhat less convincingly for his own " compositional materialism," which would admit of persons as totally composed of matter, yet as emerging within the material order with the development of human culture. Theories which allow for a non-material element (say, for a spiritual soul) get no real play here: the supposition is that only a form of materialism can fit into a satisfactory account of men and the world at the present juncture in intellectual history.

Margolis begins and ends with summary reflections on the mind-body question, but only one of the chapters (the penultimate one on "Mind and Body ") develops this question at any length. The preceding seven chapters focus on the grand issues of epistemology and metaphysics-knowledge and belief, sensation and perception, doubt and certainty, existence and reality, identity and individuation, actions and events, language and truth. In the final chapter the author turns to the connection between fact and value. Throughout these discussions he tries to highlight the intersection of problems in such a way that it will lend support to his basic thesis. What proves critical to the whole enterprise is the informality with which the concepts are applied and the import of particular cultural settings for the application. Thus, for example, *perception* and *knowledge* prove to be

normative notions with rules set roughly within this or that society. *Mind* and *person,* in their turn, qualify not only as notions which have a type of normative informality in their application but also as notions which are geared especially to single out a segment of reality emerging culturally and nonetheless composed of matter. A suggested analogy is with works of arts-works made up entirely of material elements without being reducible to them.

The sub-title of *Knowledge and Existence* is *An Introduction to Philosophical Problems,* but it is in no sense a text for beginners. Margolis's book is rather a tightly reasoned, fairly technical work which can be considered " an introduction to philosophical problems " inasmuch as it handles problems basic to almost any philosophical endeavor. As this species of introduction it provides invaluable clarification on all the issues investigated; and it could well rank as prolegomenon to any reflection or debate involving these issues. Many a meandering or confusing analysis of knowledge anJ belief, sensation and perception . . . might be set straight or simplified by attention to the careful and hard-headed treatment of them in *Knowledge and Existence.*

Praise for Margolis's rigorous and illuminating approach to fundamental problems does not, of course, mean total satisfaction with all of his solutions or with all of his arguments. The present reviewer has special difficulty with the account of existence as the relational property of " accessibility to preferred criteria " and with the insistence on the ultimately non-cognitive role of taste in fixing ontologies and values as well as with the neat bond between the correspondence notion of truth and realist epistemologies. One might fear indeed that the manner of handling the status of ontologies in general and the concept of existence in particular would undercut the strong stress on the availabilty of the public world throughout *Knowledge and Existence.* The linkage between the correspondence notion of truth and realist epistemologies has no such possibly dire consequences, but it does appear over simplifed.

Finally, on the basic problem of mind and body, Margolis seems at times to have solved the puzzles by sleight-of-hand maneuvers. As noted above, the reasons traditionally given for a more radically non-materialist theory of mind (those of Plato, Aquinas, and Descartes, for example) receive no formal attention. For the likely direction of the author's response to such reasoning, the reader must look to passing remarks about minds as " relatively late evolutionary developments " and to the " impressive power and coherence of the physical sciences " as well as to the overall emphasis on ontology as a second-order pursuit *vis-a-vis* the sciences and on the place of taste in determining the preferability of ontologies over each other. Margolis's interest is to dispute with those philosophers whose basic taste is, like his own, for a materialist ontology but whose particular species of materialism falls into incoherence through excessive reductionism. Yet con-

cern for the arguments of men such as Plato, Aquinas, and Descartes is important for making sense out of the notion of minds and persons as culturally emergent entities. Most notably, Margolis does not really attend to the sort of organism for which culture itself is a relevant concept, and this relevance is at the heart of the whole mind-body conundrum. It is one thing to say that *person* is a culturally dependent and variable notion and even that human persons and mental activities emerge within cultural contexts; but it is quite another to establish that persons are materially embodied and culturally emergent analogously to the embodiment and emergence of human products such as paintings and poems. The open question concerns the activity involved in producing paintings and poems and the capacity of some beings to produce them.

These are the hesitations and disagreements which one reader experienced on investigating *Knowledge and Existence.* Still, Margolis's mastery is evident even on the points noted in the preceding two paragraphs, and the unwillingness to accept the central thesis or to be at ease with many of the subsidiary positions is compatible with a warm recommendation of the book to anyone who would think seriously and clearly about knowledge and existence.

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Arlington House Publishers: *The Cult of Revolution in the Church,* by John Eppstein. (Pp. 160, $6.95); *Christ and Revolution,* by Marcel Clement. (Pp. 128, $6.95)

Association des Societes de Philosophie de Langue *La Communication.* Actes du XVe Congres. Vol. I (1971) (Pp. 480, $15.00), Vol. II (1978) (Pp. 58Q, $QO.OO)

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Sheed & Ward: *It's a Ziggy World,* by Tom Wilson. Pp. 96, $1.95); *The New Parents' Bedside Reader,* by Nancy Stahl. (Pp. 24, $1.50)

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