

THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017

Vol. XXXVIII

OCTOBER, 1974

No.4

PARIS AS A CULTURAL MILIEU OF THOMAS AQUINAS'S THOUGHT

Introduction

"A Citadel of Light ..."

I am in Paris, in that royal city where abundance of natural wealth not only holds those who live there, but also attracts those from afar. Just as the moon outshines the stars in brilliance, so does this city, the seat of the monarchy, lift her proud head above the rest.... Two suburbs extend to right and left, of which the lesser alone rivals many cities. Each of these suburbia communicates with the island by two bridges of stone; the Grand Pont towards the north, on the side of the English Channel, and the Petit Pont towards the Loire. The first-great, rich, trading, is the scene of seething activity; innumerable ships surround it, filled with merchandise and riches. The Petit Pont belongs to the dialecticians, who walk there deep in argument. In the island, by the side of the King's palace that dominates the whole city, is seen the palace of philosophy, where study reigns as sole sovereign in a citadel of light and immortality.¹

¹ Quoted in Joan Evans, *Life in Medieval France* (New York, 1969), pp. 14 f.

So writes Gui de Bazoches, shortly before the beginning of that century which would hold the brief life of Thomas Aquinas. **It** was to Paris that Aquinas would come as student and to which he would return as a young teacher or as theologian back from the papal court. **It** was to Paris that the discovered manuscripts of Aristotle and the Arabs flowed; it was in Paris that innovative artistic ideas and movements flourished. This cultural world would make _____ upon Aquinas, the twenty-year-old student, and be in turn impressed by the *magister* in his thirties and forties.

That scholasticism is one result of a wider, gothic, medieval culture is obvious; it takes no genius to see that there are *Summae* in stone as well as in parchment.² Yet, explanations of the precise relationships between cultural media with attention to detail are very few.³ Studies of the aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas are readily available/ but analyses of the work of

Albert the Great called Paris "*civitas philosophorum*"; cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Kulturphilosophie des Thomas von Aquinas* (Augsburg, 1917), p. 15.

• "Gothic is a simple translation of scholastic philosophy into stone." G. Semper, *Der Stil in den technischen und tektonischen Künsten*, cited in A. Hauser, *The Social History of Art*, I (New York, 1951), p. 280.

³ Chenu observes briefly: "It is, however, indispensable to do some essential reading on the economico-social conditions of the civilization of which Saint Thomas was to be one of the highlights. It is very Thomistic to observe, in the consubstantial union of its body and soul, in which manner human society acts and reacts from the standpoint of its spiritual comportment." *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas* (Chicago, 1964), p. 69. Harvey Cox's chronology is incorrect when he remarks: "Notre Dame had already been gathering moss for many years when Aquinas moved to Paris as a student." *The Seduction of the Spirit* (New York, 1973), pp. 265 f. But Cox is making an important point when he observes that popular culture must be studied as well as great *chefs d'oeuvre*, c. g., movies as well as modern art. The medieval cathedral appreciated popular religions with its representations of the demonic, astrology, the cycles of life and local saints; see W. Abell, "A Psycho-Historical Study of Medieval Western Culture and Its Background," *The Collective Dream in Art* (New York, 1957); M. Dvorak, *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte* (Munich, 1942), pp. 48-147. In recent years _____ in art history have begun to include material from the history of music, philosophy or from other aspects of intellectual history: W. Fleming, *Art, Music and Ideas* (New York, 1970); H. W. Janson, J. Kerman, *A History of Art & Music* (New York, 1968).

• See M. Grabmann, "Thomas von Aquin und die Kunst," in *Kulturphilosophie*, ed. cit.; Jordan Aumann, *De Pulchritudine* (Valencia, 1951); E. de Bruynes,

a medieval theologian as a representation of the currents of his cultural epoch are rare. By culture we mean the atmosphere of thought-forms and of representational models congenial to a particular time and place in the history of civilization. Culture encompasses the products fashioned by civilization as they are concretized in literature, music, economics, politics, the fine arts, philosophy, and theology.

The lack of effort towards relating theologians-whether it be Origen, Ambrose, or Aquinas-to their cultural milieu encourages serious lacunae in our appreciation of them. First of all, students of art history are hindered in their understanding of the total milieu of the subject of their study. For instance, without an adequate appreciation of the influence of Aristotelian or Platonic theologies in France from 1100 to 1250 it is impossible to comprehend fully the "programs" of gothic cathedrals. Interdisciplinary approaches recommend themselves more and more, but this will mean that theology and philosophy become hermeneutics for painting, sculpture, and architecture. This wider context precises and grounds the historical motivation of artists and the purpose of their works.

The second vagary corrected by cultural consciousness is the ahistorical understanding of a theologian such as Thomas Aquinas. The Thomistic revival of the past one hundred years (but also those of earlier centuries) took Aquinas out of history and culture and located him in an *aevum* of eternal metaphysics (*philosophia perennis*). No longer is philosophy science extending from psychology and politics to metaphysics; the *ancilla theologiae* is limited to logic and metaphysics. The dogmatic assertion by certain representatives of Thomism that Aquinas's thought is *the* universal approach to reality and grace escapes instant ridicule only when *all* cultural analysis has been removed. First, thought (and art, for they are cousins) is removed from that world which produced (and so limited in that very act) the mind of Aquinas. Next, to overlook culture is

to ignore the different thoughtforms and movements which modify the horizons of the individual and collective personality. This type of discipleship to Aquinas (unworthy of him, since he was a cultural theologian par excellence) has declined. Scholars such as Grabmann and Chenu have presented the historical context of Aquinas; and the Catholic Church has cast off its fear of modern culture and announced that the movements and hopes of the world could be those of the Church.⁵

Thirdly, the contact between different fields or media in which cultural movements of a time are incarnate has been viewed as purely horizontal and mutual: philosophers and poets talking to painters, composers, reading poets. What kind of direct contact existed between the *magistri* at the university and the *magistri* completing the Sainte-Chapelle in 1248? As important as it is to research such contact, exploring the over-arching cultural atmosphere of the time is more significant. For there is a primal explosion from whose fall-out the forms of theology, philosophy, economics, and art proceed.⁶

I

Kairos

Before we look at the cultural atmosphere in which Aquinas worked at Paris, let us pursue this theory of the cultural *kairos*. Paul Tillich is well known for his theologizing within the framework of culture. One can view Tillich's entire work, his preaching and ontology, his German and American periods, as cultural theology. Tillich's earliest writings attempted to relate German metaphysics (for instance, Schelling) to cultural manifesta-

⁵ After Grabmann sketches Aquinas's life amid the "cultural streams" of his age, he concludes: "So, Thomas stands in living empathy with the culture, with the scientific and social directions and movement of his time. His cultural philosophy is not a conceptual, aprioristic approach but one receiving its orientation from living reality, even if the speculative element dominates, and the contemporary relationships show themselves in more detail only to the initiate." Grabmann, *Kulturphilosophie*, p. 40. For a magisterial treatment of Aquinas's life and works, see J. A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (New York, 1974).

⁶ See T. F. O'Meara, "Art and Music as Illustrators of Theology," *Anglican Theological Review* 55 (1978), 467 ff.

tions of the Holy. When Tillich finished his studies in philosophy and theology in the 1910's he was immediately involved with politics: the development of a Christian socialism.⁷ American Christians were still threatened by psychology and modern art twenty years ago. After his flight to the United States for politico-theological reasons Tillich's essays in these fields were pioneering pieces. Their basic insight was that other areas as well as religion are in touch with the depths of existence.

Tillich employed the biblical word "*kairos*" to name the right time, the moment when culture and existence become transparent to their Power: the Ground of Being. The *kairos* is a moment pregnant, promising, dynamic, full of possibilities. The time for a cultural explosion arises out of a blend of economic and political currents; new forms suddenly break through. The arts as well as religion participate in metaphysical shock and ecstatic insight.

Each cultural epoch has a style; this is not merely a superficial way of behavior but a unity of forms and motifs which set it off from other times. Cultural events are channels through which the manifestations of being and the holy reach us.

One may speak of a style of thinking, of research, of ethics, of law, of politics. And if one applies the term in this way, one often finds that analogies with respect to style can be discovered in all the cultural functions of a particular period, group or cultural orbit. This makes style a key to understanding the way in which a particular group or period encounters reality.⁸

The deciphering of a style is an art in itself and, like every art, is a matter of daring and risk. Styles have been contrasted with each other in several respects. If one looks at the series of styles in the visual arts in Western history after the beginnings of a Christian art in catacombs and basilicas, one is overwhelmed by the richness and variety: the Byzantine, the Romanesque, the early and late Gothic styles precede the Renaissance ... Naturalism, Impressionism, Expressionism, Cubism, Surrealism . . . Each of them says something about the period in which they were flourishing. In each of them a self-interpretation of man is indicated, although in

⁷ Cf. J. L. Adams, *Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion* (New York, 1965).

⁸ *Systematic Theology*, III (Chicago, 1968), p. 61.

most cases the artists were not aware of such interpretation. Sometimes they knew what they expressed. And sometimes philosophers and art critics made them aware of it."

For Tillich the same would be true of theology. Theology and religion are not the Absolute, but concrete media through whose potentialities God contacts men in history. Tillich describes the Middle Ages as "a culture in which the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action; the culture is transparent, and its creations are vessels of a spiritual content."¹⁰

For us today the pressure of rapid cultural change and the perception in counter-cultures that the presence of grace is not limited to the churches and divinity schools have reintroduced views which for over a century were labeled as outlandishly Hegelian: for instance, our present decade as a time of cultural mutation; the historical diversity but global unity of movements; the formal similarity of what is happening now in different media and fields.¹¹

• "Protestantism and the Contemporary Style in the VISual Arts," *The Ohriatian ScholaT*, 40 (1957), 808. "Religion and culture are not separate. While most of human life stops short of revelatory experiences, religion and culture lead to the depth-questions. Religion is the directedness of the apirit toward the unconditioned meaning; culture is directedness of the spirit toward conditioned forms." P. Tillich, *What ia Religion?* (New York, 1969), p. 7!!.

¹⁰ *The PToteatant Em* (Chicago, 1948), xvi. "Nothing that is created, and therefore, essentially good is excluded from the life of the churches and their members. This is the meaning of the principle of the complexio oppositomm, of which the Roman church is rightly proud. There is nothing in nature, nothing in man, and nothing in history which does not leave a place in the Spiritual Community • . • This is classically expressed in both the medieval cathedrals and the scholastic systems, in which all dimensions of being found their place, and even the demouic, the ugly, and the destmctive appeared in a subdued role." *SyB-tematic Theology*, ill, p. 170.

¹¹ Behind this view of a particular cultural period as both darkening and illuminating Being lie Hegel and Heidegger. See M. Heidegger, *DeT UTsprung dea Kunstwerkea* (Stuttgart, 1970). As contributing theoreticians on behalf of this approach to cultural history we could list: Jacob Burckhardt, W. Dilthey, C. G. Jung, Ernst Cassirer, C. Levi-Strauss, certain *Geatalt* psychologists, Susanne K. Langer, Thomas Kuhn. Alfred North Whitehead wrote in the introduction to a memorial volume for Arnold Schonberg: "In every period there is a general form of forms of thought." M. Armitage, ed., *SchiinBT'g* (New York, 1987).

Theology partakes in the cultural explosions of its time. There are moments when a society moves with confidence and genius into new models for describing God and man. Beneath literature, the fine arts, the psychology or liturgy of one cultural epoch lie tremors. Their eruption influences structure, bestows form. As important as the content of any work of genius is, the formal point of organization, the nuances, the horizons within which the effort was conceived are more significant. By exploring the struggles and lasting successes of the artists living and working a dozen blocks away from Thomas Aquinas's priory on the Rue Saint Jacques we understand better both his work and theirs.

II

Paris in the Thirteenth Century

The reign of Louis IX built upon the work of his grandfather Philip Augustus (1180-1223) and brought further peace and prosperity to the *Ile-de-France*: to Paris and to the French lands under Capetian sway.¹² Cooperation between a strong French monarchy and the papacy and England secured a measure of political stability. A sharp growth in population, improvement in agriculture, and teeming commerce brought prosperity to towns and to their burgeoning middle class; these in turn provided the economic and social support for universities. Intellectual discoveries not only in metaphysics but in mathematics and medicine from the libraries of Islam and Constantinople reached a climax during the middle of the thirteenth century. Let us single out for brief consideration three aspects of this culture which we can project as influences

¹² See C. Liebman, "Art and Letters in the Reign of Philip II Augustus of France: The Political Background," *The Year 1200*, II (New York, 1970), pp. 1 ff. "... a common method of teaching and intellectual inquiry applicable to the liberal arts, medicine, law, and theology. This scholastic method was not only pertinent to the traditional academic disciplines but also was artistically expressed in Gothic monuments." J. Baldwin, "Preface," *The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages 1100-1300* (Lexington, 1970). On the relationships between literature and scholasticism, G. Pare, "Vocabulaire scolaire et scolastique," *Les Idées et les lettres au XIIIe siècle, le Roman de la Rose* (Montreal, 1947).

upon the work of Aquinas: (1) the affluence of the culture; (2) the unique cultural *kairos* on the *Ile-de-Paris*; (3) the drive towards the thought-form of the *Summa*: unity highlighting diversity.

A. *The Affluent Society*

It is possible to discern the cultural explosion of the High Middle Ages in various areas which would parallel theology, for instance, in science and technology. Just as we can trace in the works of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas their acquaintance with new works, translations and commentaries from Greek and Arabic thought, so the works of architecture display in different script technological breakthroughs borrowed from Norman, Romanesque, and Arabic styles and inventions. In politics Aquinas must have had to juggle relationships: he was guest and celebrity to Louis IX; yet, master of the university of Paris, theologian of the papal court, and related to the imperial family.

One of the signs of French economic expansion was the sudden increase of stone church buildings which sprang up everywhere. It strains our imagination to grasp the resources expanded in this construction program. In France between 1180 and 1270 a population of less than eighteen million produced eighty churches of cathedral size and six hundred abbeys. To focus on one local example in the thirteenth century, Chartres, a community of ten thousand citizens, in one generation rebuilt its cathedral in grandiose proportions. Henri Pirenne describes the expansion of monetary systems, the clearing of new land, the population explosion as factors influencing society and the university.¹⁸ An urban, mercantile middle class flourishes, while peace and taxes cream off some of this prosperity to the nobility and especially to the royal presence in Paris. This same urban

Medieval Cities (Princeton, 1952); see Lynn White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (Oxford, 1971); G. Beaujouan, "Medieval Science in the Christian West," in R. Taton, ed., *Ancient and Medieval Science* (New York, 1963), pp. 488 ff.; A. Scobeltzine, *L'Art féodal et son enjeu social* (Paris, 1973); Chenu, *Toward ...*, pp. 69 ff; Baldwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 ff.

middle class sends their sons to the universities. The earlier social fabric of monastic stability and of clerical beneficiaries for students is not adequate to this explosion of learning and money, and so the university must rent larger halls; fees are introduced. At the same time, the newly founded friars drawing their numbers (if not Thomas Aquinas) from the mercantile class or from the lesser nobility create a life-style which will blend academic proficiency with community life and urban apostolates.

The mendicant friars, Franciscans and Dominicans, who were to come and settle (in the cities and universities), were merely a normal development arising from the new orientation which religious fervor took. That principle of poverty which they professed made them break with the demesial organization heretofore the support of monastic life.... They asked no more of the burgher than their alms. In place of isolating themselves in the center of vast, silent enclosures, they built their convents along the streets. They took part in all the agitations, all the miseries as well, and understood all the aspirations of the artisans, whose spiritual directors they well deserved to become.¹⁴

The climax of this affluence can be seen in Louis IX's Sainte-Chapelle, a dazzling finale of *rayonnant* style where stained-glass walls rise upwards almost fifty feet and occupy in all 615 square meters of space.¹⁵ In a flurry of architectural and theological planning, and then through rapid construction, this enormous jewel-box was completed as a reliquary for Christ's crown of thorns by 1248 after perhaps less than six years of labor. With this gothic multi-media event technology and the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 166 f; pp. 288 ff.; see L. Genicot, *Le XIIIe siecle europeen* (Paris, 1968), pp. 10-19, 884-850; Chenu, "Monks, Canons, and Laymen in Search of the Apostolic Life," *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 202 ff. For the relationship of architectural advances to newly available scientific treatises see J. Harvey, *The Master Builder* (New York, 1978), p. 48.

¹⁵ M. Aubert et al., *Les Vitraux de Notre-Dame et de la Sainte-Chapelle de Paris, Corpus Vitrearum Medii Aevi*, I (Paris, 1959), p. 74. Louis IX had next to the Sainte-Chapelle a library for university professors; M. Pelisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrites de la bibliotheque nationale*, I (Paris, 1868), pp. 6-10; cf. J. G. Bougerol, "Saint Bonaventure et le roi Saint Louis," *B. Bonaventura*, II (Grottaferata, 1978), pp. 469-498.

will for harmony reached a peak in sumptuous decoration. Aquinas, after three years of study at Paris, leaves in the summer of 1248 with Albertus Magnus for Cologne. The solemn consecration of the Sainte-Chapelle took place shortly before, April 26, 1248. His career partakes in the affluence of the time.

Aquinas's Dominican brothers grew in numbers and influence. They controlled chairs, received scholars' fees, built convents, searched out manuscripts, started groups of specialists in textual criticism and semitic languages. They received and educated hundreds of novices, undertaking missions to Constantinople, Mongolia, Algeria. Aquinas must divide his time, accompanied by secretaries and companions, between the university and the French Court, and the Papal Court at Viterbo or Orvieto. Albert the Great successfully writes a commentary on every work of Aristotle (and finds resources for numerous opuscula, scriptural commentaries and *Summae*). Aquinas before he is dead at forty-nine composes, usually dictating, an enormous number of works. After 1260 he secures the assistance for some years of William of Moerbeke, a first-rate translator, for Greek textual criticism into Aristotle's *opera*. As *magister* Aquinas had secretaries at his disposal, night and day, for dictation. "The master (Aquinas), assisted by the Holy Spirit, dictated at the same time, in his cell to three or sometimes four secretaries on different subjects." ¹⁷ A. Dondaine concludes without discussing the size of the financial outlay necessary: "The role of the secretaries of Saint Thomas was not only to provide the works then needed but they were present to write down Aquinas' works and to serve their publication." ¹⁸ Behind all of this was a time of affluence, and in such a milieu the harmonious balance, the optimism of uniting nature and grace within the cathedral and in the viewpoint of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* are well understood.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71t.

¹¹ William of Tocco in *Fontes Vitae Sancti Th. Aquinatis* (Toulouse, 1911t), p. 89.

¹⁸ See A. Dondaine, *Les Secretaires de S. Thomas* (Rome, 1956), p. 205. On the financial outlay by the Friars Preachers for books see W. Hinnebusch, *The History of the Dominican Order*, II (New York, 1978), pp. 194 ff.

B. Gothic and the Ile-de-France

Gothic was originally a local style connected with the growing fortunes of the kings of France and internationalized through the prestige of France.

The first Gothic is so remarkably identified with one limited territory, the Ile-de-France—more exactly, the domain of the Capetian monarchy—that the late Henri Focillon suggested wisely, if somewhat paradoxically, that Gothic be defined as the Romanesque of the Ile-de-France.... Created in the very heart of Capetian power, the Gothic advanced in the wake of its consolidation and expansion.¹⁸

A hundred years after the dedication of the Suger's gothic Abbey of S. Denis in 1144, most of Europe had "gone Gothic," with one, French climax occurring during Aquinas's youth.

Explorations into the mutual similarities concretized in different media of culture must be done within well-defined limits of time and space. With Paris during the middle of the thirteenth century we have such a limited cultural epoch.²⁰ Even then detailed comparisons can be flimsy projections. Even so, pronouncements about Gothic drawing on English architecture, Florentine poetry, German painting, and scholasticism at Cologne are certainly of dubious value in comprehending an epoch, a *kairos*.

In Thomas d'Aquino, an Italian nobleman's son and relative of the Holy Roman emperor, entered the Order of

¹⁹ Otto von Simson, *The Gothic Cathedral* (New York, 1961), pp. 62 ff.

²⁰ Erwin Panofsky discusses the dangers of this approach while not rejecting every attempt: "... a pursuit of 'parallels' the hazards of which are only too obvious. No man can master more than one fairly limited field; every man has to rely on incomplete and often secondary information. . . . Few men can resist the temptation of either ignoring or slightly deflecting such lines as refuse to run parallel, and even a genuine parallelism does not make us really happy if we cannot imagine how it came about. Small wonder, then, that another diffident attempt at correlating Gothic architecture and Scholasticism is bound to be looked upon with suspicion by both historians of art and historians of philosophy. Yet, setting aside for the moment all intrinsic analogies there exists between Gothic architecture and Scholasticism a palpable and hardly accidental concurrence in the purely factual domain of time and place." *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* (New York, 1964), pp. 1 f; see Genicot, *op. cit.*, pp. 878 f.

Preachers. From the autumn of 1245 into summer of 1248 he was at Paris as a student of Albertus Magnus. As we saw, during those years on the island in the midst of the Seine the Sainte-Chapelle was rapidly constructed. The high point of construction for Notre Dame most likely had occurred shortly after the turn of the century. This coincided with Perotin's polyphonic innovations in church music with the cathedral choir. After four years with Albert at the University of Cologne Thomas returned to teach and to prepare for his reception by the University of Paris as master. For two years he lectured on the Bible, and in 1254 he turned to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. In the midst of some conflict he became Magister in 1256 and remained in Paris for three years teaching. During those years it is generally agreed that the decision was made to construct two new facades for the north and south sides of Notre Dame.

Out of the island of Paris with merchants to the right and masters to the left came innovation in music through rhythm and polyphony, in architecture through innovative vaulting and lighter walls, in statuary and the use of colored glass, and in theology and philosophy. By looking at some similar structural forms found in these different media we can understand better the cultural achievement of Aquinas's intellectual synthesis of faith. The *kairos* of Paris was a time of peace, affluence, and creativity.

C. *Order-in-Diversity*

If one cultural characteristic is particularly evident within the climax of medieval culture it is the hypnotic attraction of order. Order, subtle or bold, composing a diversity of ideas or motifs or media (or all three) into a harmonious whole. From early in the eleventh century there had been a search for harmony wherein a myriad of elements could achieve an effect greater than their sum and yet find an order friendly to that display of reality proper to each facet. The *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, the geometrical windows at Chartres, the facades of Saint-Denis and even of Chartres were intermediary

periods moving away from pure collection towards living, original syntheses.

The Jesse Tree of Saint-Denis and the western portals of Chartres make it clear that their designers were pursuing the ideals of formal unity and constitutive unity common to all branches of creative endeavour at that time. These ideals found their grandest artistic expression in the architectural design of the Gothic sanctuaries of the *Ile-de-France*.²¹

It was one thing to open space for numerous, large pictorial windows (Chartres): biblical parables, lives of saints, medieval life, the song of Roland. It was something else to organize a wall or a window (Sainte-Chapelle) into an esthetic experience

²¹ G. Henderson, *Gothic* (Baltimore, 1972), p. 57; "In Book Five of his treatise *De Consideratione*, completed in 1152, St. Bernard of Clairvaux contrasts the unity of the Three Persons of God with other lesser kinds of unity. First in his list is the unity which he calls 'collective', as for example when many stones make one heap During the first half of the twelfth century the principle of collective unity as the basis of artistic composition was replaced by the principle of constitutive unity, and as a result the Gothic style was created." *Ibid.*, p. 43. For Aquinas's employment of these kinds of *unum* see *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 2, a. 1; *In Librum Beati Dionysii Aeropagitae De Divinis Nominibus Expositio* (Turin, 1950), XIII, ii. "To realize that constitutive unity is the central aim of the new style in architecture we have only to look at the ground plan of a typical twelfth-century Gothic cathedral, Notre Dame at Paris. Romanesque planning is quite different. In planning their churches, Romanesque architects were guided by an additive collective principle. Romanesque churches were the sum of separate portions, each stated with aggressive individuality." Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 60 f. Some art historians compare the ideas of the cathedral schools in the twelfth century or the Victorines and Peter Lombard with the Gothic drive towards diversity in harmony. Climax should be compared with climax. Peter Lombard and the Victorines are contemporary with the beginnings of Gothic architecture, and their reference point would be Saint-Denis and Chartres (as von Simson develops in detail). In the concluding decades of the end of the 12th century theology like architecture is filled with potentiality. The climax of art between Notre Dame and Sainte-Chapelle corresponds more to the work of Albert and Aquinas. Whereas in the first half of the twelfth century theology seems to be slightly ahead in developing these primal thought-forms, architecture in the first half of the thirteenth century has outstripped its sisters, the sacred sciences. Different media do not participate in the *kairos* with mutual exactness. Panofsky sees this; *Gothic Architecture* . . . , p. 4. Cf. A. Priest, "The Master of the West Facade of Chartres," *Chartres Cathedral*, R. Branner, ed. (New York, 1969); A. Katzenellenbogen, *The Sculptural Programs of Chartres* (New York, 1964).

of size and form. The same tension exists between Peter Lombard's collection and Aquinas's textbook.

The thought-form of the *Summa* emerges not only from within architecture and canon law but within history, literature out of the attraction of four-part polyphony and in rhythm. From Paris with its archiepiscopal canons and *concergerie* comes the scholastic method highly developed in the *Summa* of questions, in the cathedral and in the motet. Its goal is not all encompassing arrangement, a mere totality, but harmony out of diversity, order within variety. As the society delights in its own capacity for deft creativity, the desire for masterful arrangement is enkindled; the grandiose product is the *Summa*. The delight of the master theologian or architect was that the whole, while avoiding an eclipse of the units, would be greater than the sum total. Within the totality the individual elements stand out even as they support on all sides the total fabric.

The sum total of logical calculations is therefore not in the end put forward for its own sake, but for the sake of a superlogical effect. The resultant expression goes far beyond the means by which it was attained, and the sight of a Gothic cathedral does not impress our minds as being a display of structural processes but as an outburst of transcendental longing expressed in stone.... A moment of superhuman force carries us up with it into the intoxication of an endless willing and craving....²²

The drive towards the *Summa* is not realized in an encyclopedia. There were encyclopedias at this time, representing the medieval interest in total informational control.²³ Vincent of Beauvais was wrestling with the concern which would later be Hegel's, how to philosophize order into history. The material elements, the small units have their legitimate role, their own *claritas*;²⁴ their individual brilliance as art. Hauser is correct in pointing out that the cathedral appears differently from

²² W. Worringer, *Form in Gothic* (New York, 1957), p. 108; cf. pp. 166 ff.

•• See J. Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 113; Hinnebusch, "The Encyclopedists," *op. cit.*, pp. 420 ff.

•• Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, c. IV, xxi.

different angles; it has a mobile unity with different, subjectively perceived facets.²⁵ Moreover, how many art historians select as the dominant motif of the Gothic over against the Renaissance a location of man (before or inside the Cathedral) within a larger world touched by an aesthetic dynamic drawing his contemplation upwards and beyond.

The origins of the drive to the *intellectual Summa* lie in law, philosophy, theology, and history. One current arises from the influence of Roman law upon canon law. The dialectical method of Gratian was organized to produce beyond glosses or lists of opinions a systematic and comprehensive treatise which would follow the logical order of doctrine rather than the literal order of a previous legal compilation. Since Abelard's *Sic et Non* the theologians of France had also been wrestling with the problem of theological arrangement and of the interplay between reason as well as authority in reflection on faith. By the middle of the twelfth century there are collections of opinions with Peter Lombard's achieving the greatest success.

Thus at Paris (after 1160) there were two streams of influence flowing, the one deriving from the dialectical *Theologia* of Abelard, the other from the methodical, lucid, spiritual *De sacramentis* of Hugh; they were united in the *Summae* of Robert of Melun and of the school of Gilbert de la to produce a new theological form, covering the whole range of doctrine and embodying the two strands of theological opinion and Aristotelian reasons.²⁶

Although Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great had already written *Summae*, Aquinas's *Prologue* to his *Summa Theologiae* might give the impression he is beginning anew. Working at a puzzle others had not fully solved, his work will replace

•• *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 1143f.

•• D. Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Patristic Thought* (New York, 1961), p. 179. For Chenu the goal of the Scholastic method was to expound concisely all the main doctrines of a given scientific area; to push research beyond piecemeal analysis with the subject matter organized precisely and synthetically; and to employ the final product for good teaching. "What Is a *Summa*?", *Toward*. . . , p. 1198. "What else is a *summa*, if not a concise gathering together . . . a summary of singular data." Robert of Melun, *Sententie*, cited in Chenu, *Toward*. . . , p. 1199.

the random orders of the Bible and of the public disputations with another, a more interesting and coherent order. Into his *Summa* Aquinas brings all of the information he can gather: the Scriptures and *the* Apostle; the canonists; the Greek Fathers and especially Chrysostom; the Latin Fathers and especially Augustine; *the* Philosopher and the Platonists; medical and biological and astronomical works. How mistaken Baroque and Idealistic thought was to see Aquinas's work as pyramidal metaphysics par excellence—this is like seeing only the bare stone structure of Notre Dame. *Above all the SuMMA THEOLOGIAE is an ordered presentation of the dynamic act of God, i.e., of revelation and grace reaching man through the concrete, empirical world, pemceptually presented by genuises in sciences ranging from biology to philosophical theology.*

Panofsky describes the development of the *Summa-form*. "In formal organization, too, the High Scholastic *Summa* differs from the less comprehensive, less strictly organized, and much less uniform encyclopedias and *Libri Sententiarum* of the eleventh and twelfth centuries much in the same ways as does the High Gothic style from its ancestry."²⁷ The organizational form of this culture aims at *manifestatio* ("Sacred Teaching uses philosophy to manifest . . ."²⁸) which requires (1) totality of treatment, (2) arrangement of equal parts, (3) distinction and interrelation.²⁹ Panofsky is correct, but we can go deeper and see that between the general tone of the medieval culture and the works themselves there are more precise *formal and material principles* at work in some areas.

Within the *Summa Theologiae* we can discern these two principles fashioning the order of this vast work. The first we could call the *formal* principle: a dynamic, all-encompassing focus of arrangement; it is that of exit and return; it is a Platonic movement along a horizontal ellipse arranging all realities of nature and grace. The *material* principle is a second thought-form present in the various sections and questions of

•• *Gothic Architecture* . . . , p. 7; see pp. 70 ff.

•• *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

²⁰ *Gothic Architecture*, p. 31.

Aquinas's theological work. It is Aristotelian, vertical, a construction of a unit by analysis from the more known but general through questioning dialectic to the lucid display of the issue researched.⁸⁰

These two focal points arranging the vast material of the *Summa* have often been neglected, and the neglect explains the frequent dominance in the history of dogma of tractate-theology and manualism, of explanations of Revelation as propositional and of theology as an esoteric, logical deduction of new conclusions from old truth. When the material principle loses its relationship to the formal movement of the whole work, obscuring its dialectical dynamic, the *Summa* becomes a collection of conclusions. Chenu observes that the mobile, formal, and horizontal principle is particularly theological, i.e., a historical and biblical dynamic for the work. The *quaestio* is the distillation of the scholastic method and presents a form for material to be arranged from and to its Principle of existence.⁸¹ The totality of the *Summa Theologiae* is not a rational background for individual tracts any more than the windows of the Sainte-Chapelle exist only to give light for the statues of the twelve apostles. In the medieval world-and the churches show us this so clearly-architecture, stained-glass windows, painting, friezes and sculpture, ceramics and decorative motifs combine to highlight each other, impressing upon the viewer an experi-

⁸⁰ Aquinas's first work *De Ente et Essentia* was written around 1256 as the transept towers of Notre Dame were being completed; compare both as examples of the vertical, hierarchical order of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics.

⁸¹ Chenu, "The Birth of the *Questio*," *Toward . . .*, pp. 85 ff; "In order, therefore, to understand the *Summa theologiae* as well as the purpose of its author, it is important to perceive the *ordo disciplinae* that is worked out in it-not only the logical plan of the work, with its divisions and sub-divisions, but also that inner flow of movement giving life to the structure after having created it. This movement, in fact, reveals, together with the scientific reasons that govern the whole arrangement, the intellectual options by means of which it was decided here and there to lay stress on this or that part." *Ibid.*, p. 301. The formal order of Neoplatonic movement faced the question whether biblical salvation-history could receive the imprint of *scientia*; the pattern Aquinas chose retains from biblical history the motif of movement but combines that with the diffusion of all beings, with an ontology.

ence of the whole. The balance of High Gothic is not only of space and weight but of height and motion, or of light and dark. Rarely has there been an architecture of such serenity, of moments frozen out of movement towards the transcendent.

The High Gothic cathedral is a monument to clarity and reason.... Every part has its proper place, nothing has been omitted, nothing is superfluous. Instead of the starkly opposed verticals and horizontals of the Greeks the medieval architect used graceful arches. But similar principles underlie his design. Vertical shafts support each arch or rib and the substance of the structure can be read on the surface. Never for a moment are we allowed to doubt its inherent stability. Yet the High Gothic cathedral is not a sterile exercise in logic. It is a visionary design, a vivid, a living testimony to the dream of its maker. Composed of solid blocks, it is open and vast. Rooted to the earth by massive, ponderous walls, it soars upward into aerial towers and spires. It forms a finite space with every vista clearly limited, yet it appears to be constantly expanding in size. And it has huge windows to let in floods of light, but thanks to the stained glass the interior is as dim as twilight. These paradoxes are more apparent than real, however, for the High Gothic style is not tense, but calm and balanced.⁸²

The cathedral is a *Summa*: a single ordering of many media. Its theological and iconographical plans aimed at a harmony of effects, effects experiential as well as intellectual, effects of senses and mind, of history and ontology, of nature and grace. Suger described the abbey-church under construction, the innovation of Gothic at Saint-Denis as a harmony of elements brought together out of diversity to encompass light and to lead to Light.

Two aspects of Gothic are without precedent and parallel: the use of light and the unique relationship between structure and appearance. By the use of light I mean more specifically the relation of light to the material substance of the walls.... The Gothic wall seems to be porous: light filters through it, permeating it, merging with it, transforming.... The stained-glass windows of the Gothic replace the brightly colored walls of Romanesque architecture; they are structurally and aesthetically not openings in the wall to admit light but transparent walls. . . .

⁸² R. Banner, "High Gothic Architectures," *The Year 1100*, II, p. 7.

The second striking feature of the Gothic style is the new relationship between function and form, structure and appearance. We cannot enter a Gothic church without feeling that every visible member of the great system has a job to do. There are no walls but only supports; the bulk and weight of the vault seem to have contracted into a sinewy web of the ribs. There is no inner matter, only active energy.^B

There is a similarity between these characteristics of luminosity and structural harmony and the formal and material thought-forms of the *Summa Theologiae* mentioned above. We will pursue the formal principle below in some detail.

The artists and the theological consultants³⁴ faced in the rose windows or in the facades of the cathedrals the same questions as the *magistri* did in planning their summary works.³⁵ There was an enormous space to be covered. The medieval mind will want to select a central theme of magnitude: e. g., salvation-history prior to Mary and Christ; the apocalypse, or kingship from Melchisedech through Christ Crucified to Louis IX. Innumerable scenes with a myriad of figures had to be arranged to give a single, transcendent effect.

³³ von Simson, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 4, 7. See Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 70; Chenu *Toward ...*, p. 318.

•• On the contact between artists and theologians: G. Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 f.; J. Harvey, *The Master Builders* (New York, 1973); A. Martindale, *The Rise of the Artist* (New York, 1973). "The architect lived in close contact with the sculptors, glass painters, wood carvers, etc., whose work he studied wherever he went (witness the "Album" of Villard de Honnecourt), whom he engaged and supervised in his own enterprises, and to whom he had to transmit an iconographic program ... he could work out only in close cooperation with a scholastic adviser." Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture ...*, p. 27; R. Guelluy, "La place des theologiens dans l'eglise et la societe medievale," *MisceUanea historica*, A. de Meyer, ed (Louvain, 1946), I, pp. 571 ff. These works discuss the master architect as *magister*. With regards to music: "... the twelfth and thirteenth centuries-coincided with the time when Paris rules the musical world; for men who studied or taught in the university, most of them composers and theorists as well, were largely responsible for the rapid development of polyphonic forms-organum, conductus, motet--during these centuries." N. C. Carpenter, *Music in the Medieval and Renaissance Universities* (Norman, 1958), p. 69.

³⁵ - --- three characteristic Gothic 'problems' -or, as we might say, *quaestiones*: the rose window in the west facade, the organization of the wall beneath the clerestory, and the conformation of the nave piers." Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture ...*, p. 70.

This (the order of the windows of the Sainte-Chapelle) is not, in fact, as has often been said, a "narrative" or "historical" program, following the order of the Bible ... and completed by a modern subject In our opinion we must separate out of this totality several parts or "cycles."²⁶

In the iconography *Of* the Sainte-Chapelle the first cycle is historical; a second is one *Of* prophets. Both lead to the main subject, the Passion *Of* Christ, and are culminated in the single rose window whose theme is the apocalyptic second coming *Of* the crucified Redeemer.

When compared with the programs of the first half of the thirteenth century, that of the Sainte-Chapelle is one of powerful originality and of great subtlety; it seems inspired by the tendencies of its contemporary, scholasticism, by an exegesis at times concerned with the "literal" sense of the Scriptures and by a variety of symbolic interpretations which, nevertheless, are not reducible to the type-antitype so common in the traditional iconography of the twelfth century.⁸⁷

Writers in the Middle Ages gave the multi-colored images in the church windows the purpose *Of* showing simple folk ignorant *Of* the Scriptures what they ought to believe.

In addition to their didactic purposes the stained-glass windows of a church were part of an elaborate theological program. The iconography of this program, its symbolism and meaning, was derived from many sources—from commentaries on the Bible and other theological writings. In visual terms, the underlying meaning of Christianity, as related in the Bible and interpreted by theologians was made comprehensible through image and narrative. In all probability, the plan for the decoration of the structure was devised by local churchmen. **It** is known, for example, that Suger was responsible for the iconography of his windows at St. Denis.⁸⁸

The problem for both the authors *Of* the cartoons for the windows and for gifted schoolmen intent upon their own works was the same: the formal principle *Of* ordering the whole.

•• Aubert, et al., *Les Vitraux* ... , pp. 50 f.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁸⁸ J. Hayward, "Stained-Glass Windows," *The Year 1200*, II, p. 72.

Music gives us a third example of the love of plurality ordered.

Wherever one looks (in medieval poetry and music) one perceives a trend toward animated motion. The guiding principle of Gothic architecture was to attain the greatest possible richness in architectural motion; the static image of space played a subordinate role. The same principle is manifest in Gothic music and is expressed in the rhythmical motion of the independent parts.⁸⁹

Polyphony did not begin at Notre Dame after 1160, but it did find a place there for firm innovation and lasting repertory. Leontin and Perotin (still active in the first decade of the 13th century) of the Notre Dame school and choir developed a two-part and then a three-part and four-part polyphony. Above a sustaining line, slowed down Gregorian Chant, were sung improvisations, the tropes of other, melismatic voices. Polyphony, too, is linear, horizontal, moving. It is tonal diversity organized, parallel musical intricacy possible through a technical command of multiplicity. The formal organizing of the several voices led to fixed rhythm entering Western music. Quickly the motet was at hand, and the Church was scandalized at the colorful, distracting intricacy of this music careening towards novelty and individuality.

The metamorphosis of the massive homogeneous organum into an animated structural web of rhythms and melodies in the Gothic motet was in every way analogous to the stylistic changes that took place in the fine art and literature. It required from the listener a new approach and a new conception of listening to music, for the Gothic motet did not establish an intimate relationship between listener and singer. Instead of concentrating on a group of singers, the listener had to follow three individual parts presenting three distinct moods.... The listener must make his choice, select a part and follow it, and then become a part of the polyphonic web.⁴⁰

•• Paul H. Lang, *Music in Western Civilization* (New York, 1941), p. See Dom A. Hughes, "Music in Fixed Rhythm," *New Oxford History of Music*, II (Oxford, 1954), pp. 314 ff.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 137; see "Ecclesiastical Opposition to Polyphony," *ibid.*, p. 139.

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Aquinas and Pseudo-Denis and Cultural Convergence: Neoplatonism in Theology and Glass

How to find a formal organizing principle which would bring harmony out of the old and the new within tumultuous, medieval intellectual life? This was the problem Aquinas faced in composing his *Summa Theologiae*. Its synthesis would risk more than the earlier *Summa Contra Gentes* and the unfinished *Compendium Theologiae*. The problem should be solved by arranging unity-in-diversity through a pattern which possessed both clarity and action.

Aquinas's synthesis would have to transcend yet unite all the sources and authorities summoned forth to explain God's teaching about man's sanctity and future. Would the medieval thinker search for the "form of forms" in the saving history of the Bible, or in the vertically ascending patterns of the very relevant Aristotle? As we know, curiously Aquinas turned to Neoplatonic patterns of thought.

Beyond the scientific world of Aristotle, Saint Thomas appeals to a Platonic theme of emanation and return. Since theology is the science of God, all things will be studied in their relation to God, whether in their production or in their final end, in their *exitus et reditus* [going-out from and coming-back to]. What a splendid source of intelligibility! Now, every thing, every being, every action, every destiny will be located, known, judged, in terms of the highest causality wherein the reason of their being will be fully revealed under the light of God itself. This is more than science, it is wisdom. This wonderful neo-Platonic theme-Christian or pagan does not matter right now-in continuity with the epistemology of the Greek philosophers develops the latter's potential beyond the horizon it had reached in order to explain the becoming of created being. It is the schema of a universal order in which all natures will be located within an analytical array according to genus and species, but in which, moreover, the mind's understanding reaches the root common to every nature.⁴¹

⁴¹Chenu, *Toward . . .*, p. 804. Arguing that any Neoplatonic current stems more from Plotinus than from Plato are E. Hoffmann, "Platonismus und Mittelalter,"

It is processional movement, being from higher beings and Being, the illumined participation in luminosity which gives this formal pattern its uniqueness. For it is both metaphysics and history. The hierarchy of being is evident, but so is the history of grace.

This neo-Platonic schema is also responsive to history, that sacred history whose opening page is precisely a description of the emanation of the world, whose whole course is an account of God's governing of his creatures, whose outcome is decided by the way men behave in their desire for happiness as they return to God. Upon this circuit, one can locate the facts and deeds recorded in sacred history-with all the contingency (herein is the trademark of Christian neo-Platonism) that their dependence on the free will of God and of man implies.⁴²

Upon this ellipse of destiny, coming forth from God and going back to God, every fact and moment of cosmic and redemptive history can be properly fitted, yet without suppressing the Christian dialectic of God's sovereignty and man's freedom. The theme *exitus-reditus* brings with it movement; it is a curved line which can become both mysticism (emanation from God) and history (successive events). Yet, this model is beyond history; although it may resemble the chronology of the arrangement of the books of the Bible, it does not simply reproduce the historical experience of God in the history of man. Finally, while this pattern acknowledges, it also transcends individual realism. Although Aquinas strongly espouses in his works on logic and natural science the realism of Aristotle rooted in each individual entity, the realities of the ellipse while complete in their own sphere are ultimately referable to an Absolute Reality.

How did this thought-from reach Aquinas? Can we study it as a cultural motif present in different media? Popular history has it that from his appearance upon the scene in the latter decades of the twelfth century Aristotle and his Arabian

Warburg Vorträge (Berlin, 1911) and K. Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin* (Leiden, 1966).

•• *Ibid.*, p. 85.

companions dominated, transubstantiating the world-view from Platonism to realism. In fact, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries retained a complex pattern of Platonic movements and witnessed the growth of some of these.⁴³

The emanation and return motif had been in circulation since Scotus Erigena and did not immediately connote an embrace of Plotinianism. Aquinas often unconsciously absorbed Neoplatonic ideas from Platonized works passing as compositions of Aristotle. Above all there were the extremely influential works of Denis: Greek philosopher, convert of Paul, evangelizing bishop of Paris.

Aquinas like all of his contemporaries believed the legends about Saint Denis.⁴⁴ This Dionysius was a convert of Paul from the Apostle's arduous intellectual campaigns on the Areopagus.⁴⁵ He found his way to Roman Paris to evangelize the small town and to end his life in a miracle-surrounded martyrdom on Montmartre. With this dual figure was united a third personage, the remarkable Syrian, monastic writer of

"On the presence and complexity of Neoplatonism during the Middle Ages see: R. Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages* (London, 1949); R. J. Henle, *St. Thomas and Platonism* (The Hague, 1956); E. Weber, *La Controverse de 1170 à l'Université de Paris* (Paris, 1970).

•• See Chenu, *Toward . . .*, pp. 226 ff.; J. Durante!, *S. Thomas et le Pseudo-Denis* (Paris 1919); Caramello, "De Fortuna Operum Dionysii . . .," in Aquinas, *De Divinis Nominibus . . .*, ed. cit., pp. xi ff. H. F. Dondaine, *Le Corpus dionysien de l'Université de Paris au XIIème siècle* (Rome, 1953). R. Rogues, "Introduction," *La Hierarchie Celeste* (Paris, 1958). Aquinas refers to St. Denis as a student of Paul in his commentary; c. II, 4-6; c. II, 4. Aquinas considers, however, Denis to be quite different from the *Platonici* whom he corrects; Aquinas, *Super Librum de Causis Expositio*, I, 4; Henle, *op. cit.*, pp. 424 ff. On the origin of the Dionysian legend see P. J. Leonertz "La legende parisienne de St. Denys l'Areopagite," *Analecta Bolandiana* (Brussels, 1951), p. 69. Johannes Sarracenus, whose translation of Pseudo-Dionysius Aquinas used, states: "Among ecclesiastical writers Dionysius comes after the Apostles." M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* (Munich, 1936), pp. 457 ff. Abelard, who had been a monk at S. Denis suggested that the Areopagite and the apostle of Paris were not the same; Panofsky, "Introduction," *Abbot Suger on the Abbey Church of St. Denis and Its Art Treasures* (Princeton, 1946), p. 18.

⁴⁵ "After that Paul left them, but there were some who attached themselves to him and became believers, among them Dionysius the Areopagite and a woman called Damaris, and others besides." Acts, 17:33-34.

the early sixth century, a master of Christian Neoplatonism. As patron of Paris and as Greek speculative mind, Dionysius was important to Aquinas and to Paris. For the motif of the "translation of the center of study" from Athens to Paris via Rome, the key actor became Dionysius. Thomas of Ireland, O. P., writing at the end of the thirteenth century, observes: "The Blessed Dionysius . . . came to Paris so that he might make of this city the mother of studies after the pattern of Athens. Like Athens, the city of Paris is divided into three parts . . . the merchants, the noblemen, the colleges."⁴⁶

Even amid the strong contemporary interest in Dionysian thought, Aquinas made extraordinary use of the pseudo-Areopagite.⁴⁷ As Thomas matured, he grew more critical in his evaluation of some Neoplatonic texts passing as Aristotelian. An incomplete Arabic text of Plotinus's *Enneads* existed under the title of *Theologia Aristotelis* and the *Liber de causis* (which Aquinas with the help of his Dominican translator William of Moerbeke, the future Archbishop of Corinth, identified as not from Aristotle's pen) created an atmosphere favorable to this "subliminal Platonism." In the commentary on the *Sentences*⁴⁸ agreement between Dionysius and Aristotle is normally reached, while in the later *De Malo*⁴⁹ Aquinas sees that in many things Dionysius is "Platonic." While Aquinas is critical of the *Platonici* and admits that Dionysius writes *stylo Platonico*, he will not lose any of his great respect for Dionysius and at times uses him (like Augustine) as an *auctoritas* to refute Platonism. One might ask: was propinquity to Paul seen as a guarantee of healthy Hellenism?

It is hard to know how extensive was the practice of commenting on Dionysius at Paris in the middle decades of the thirteenth century. We have in the handwriting of young Aquinas from about 1250 a *repositio* of his teacher Albert

⁴⁶ *De tribus sensibus S. Scripturae*, cited in Chenu, *Toward* . . . , p.

⁴⁷ Durante! counted citations of 466 different texts; *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁴⁸ In *II Sent.*, d. 14, a. 1, a.

•• Q. 16, a. 1, 3. For various texts see Henle, *op. cit.*, pp. . . . But Dionysius avoids the basic errors of the *Platonici*: *De Divinis Nominibus*, Proemium, IV, ii.

commenting on the *De divinis nominibus*. Albert began his commentaries while in Paris in 1248 and completed them in Cologne.⁵⁰ Around 1261 Aquinas struggled to treat "the mystical-metaphysical attire" of Dionysius through Aristotelian mental categories. This would be good preparation for the counterpoint a few years later between Thomas's chosen formal and material thought-forms to be developed as the superstructure for the *Summa Theologiae*.

For Dionysius a pristine "name" of God is *light*. "Now it is right for us to praise the intelligent naming (of God as) good light.... God is like a ray overflowing and superemanating, an effusion of light illuminating every supramundane, circumundane, and mundane mind from its own fullness, ... converting from many opinions . . . gathering to one knowledge, completing by one, unitive light."⁵¹ Aquinas, commenting, elaborates this theology of active, diffusive luminosity. "God comports himself to those in which he causes light in three ways: diffusion, excess, comprehension."⁵² After reviewing the opinions of physicists on the nature of light (Is light a body or a quality?), Aquinas follows Dionysius into the explanation of the divine persons flowing from God in terms of light.⁵³ Next, the image of light is linked to that of the good. Creatures desire sunlight as the good source of their life, and so they return again and again to it. Aquinas concludes that God is like the sun: the good, directing creator and provider of the universe. Yet, his primal light is inaccessible. The in-

⁵⁰ P. Simon, "Prologomena," *S. Alberti Magni, De divinis nominibus, Opera Omnia* 37:I (Aschendorff, 1972), pp. vi ff. G. Thery, "L'autographe de S. Thomas conserve à la Biblioteca Nazionale de Naples," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, I (1931), pp. 15-86.

⁵¹ *De divinis nominibus*, IV, iv.

•• *In Librum Beati Dionysii*. . . . , IV, iv. "The Divine Light and the being which it confers are the illuminating cascade whose steps are described by the treatises (of Dionysius). This 'illumination' must not be conceived as a simple gift of light to already existing things but a gift of light is their very being." E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), p. 83.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II, ii.

visible being of God is manifest in the world around us.⁵⁴

Explaining beauty, Aquinas can describe it as a "lightning" which participates in the divine luminosity. Beauty comes not only from clarity but from the harmony of the parts. One harmony is found in the relationship of the world to God's light (which is at the same time an "ordering of creatures back to God"), while the other is found in the parts of creation related to each other and to the whole.⁵⁵ The writings of Scripture are also light(s) derived from the first light, the primal source of truth.⁵⁶ The image of the diffusion of light analogously illustrates creation and justification-sanctification. The *excessus* is the gracious gift of being and grace. Man's comprehension initiates his mental, biological, and historical return to God. And so in the earlier commentary on the *Sentences* we find: "In the coming of creatures from the first principle, there is a kind of circling or gyration, since all things return as to their end to that from which they came as from their principle."⁵⁷

Gothic and Pseudo-Denis

Pseudo-Dionysius might link Aquinas's pattern for his *Sum-*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, iii.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, v.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, I, i. Music too suggests the importance of Platonic forms in medieval thought. Music became parallel diversity in motion. Polyphony only organized its two or three lines minimally from the vertical perspective; the parallels were swept forward. Augustine's *De Musica* exercised great influence; Pythagorean and Neoplatonic theories of music through mathematics influenced artistic creativity, so the choice of harmony was dictated by theories based upon perfect mathematical and astrophysical relationships. "According to him (Alan of Lille) God is the artful architect who builds the cosmos as his regal palace composing and harmonizing the variety of created things by means of 'subtle chains' of musical consonance. The first Gothic cathedrals were rising when these lines were written." von Simson, *op. cit.*, pp. 12 f. One could add that polyphony was expanding at the same time. This theorizing helps us to explain why Aquinas's analogy for faith / vision takes for granted music as a division of mathematics. "Some sciences proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science ... music from the principles derived from arithmetic." (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 2).

⁵⁷ In *I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2. Thomas Aquinas is not fully Dionysian for he will not limit God by such a hierarchism. God himself is the goal and source of man and he is present ("grace") immediately to man in personality and history. See O. Semmelroth, "Die Lehre des Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita vom Aufstieg der Kreatur zur göttlichen Licht," *Scholastik*, 29 (1954) pp. 26 ff.

ma with another cultural example of this Neoplatonic emanation from and return to God: light as the architectural event of the Gothic church. With some exaggeration Worringer writes:

Anyone entering a Gothic cathedral encounters something far removed from sensuous clarification. He encounters an intoxication of the sense, not the direct gross intoxication produced by the Baroque, but a mystical intoxication of the sense which is not of this world. Gothic space is unbridged activity. It does not receive the beholder with soft gestures, but carries him violently along, exacting as a mystical compulsion to which the burdened soul deems it a delight unresistently to yield.⁵⁸

Suger, Abbot of Saint-Denis, towards the middle of the twelfth century offered a religious theory for the breakthrough in church decor through large stained-glass windows and light-some stone. He turned to the Neoplatonic theories of the procession of light from Light so characteristic of Pseudo-Dionysius, the patron of the abbey which he was rebuilding and the patron of the kingdom-city for which Suger intended to offer ecclesio-theological support.

Gothic architecture through a system of skeletal supports, ribs, buttresses, arches, and vaults freed wall space for glass. The technique of stained-glass rose to the occasion to provide shimmering mosaics dominated by reds or by blues. By the year 1200 the colors had been deepened, naturalness and realism had pervaded the figures, and the medium could be integrated into the total aesthetic program of the cathedral. While the culmination of stained glass came from Arab technology and Aristotelian realism, the theology behind it was twelfth-century Neoplatonism. "The close analogy between Dionysian light metaphysics and Gothic luminosity is evident."⁵⁹ Suger was aware not only of the presence of light and lights through stained-glass but of the luminosity which the entire church would possess. A dedicatory poem for his new abbey-church

•• W. Worringer, *vp. cit.*, p. 55.

•• von Simson, *vp. cit.*, p. 106.

concluded: "*Et quod perfundit lux nova claret opus nobile.*"⁶⁰ The beige-gray stone employed, the entry of light through the windows, the new height of the structure must be experienced to comprehend what an effect was set in motion at Saint-Denis. Yet Suger's church was far from finished; it would be completed in fact as well as in theory by the master of the Sainte-Chapelle.

The abbey of Saint-Denis was a center for Hellenistic studies, for Greek translations of Christian Neoplatonic works.⁶¹ Suger read the writings ascribed to the man whose controversial legendary personality had caused the rift between Abelard and the Abbey.⁶² At the beginning of the *De caelesti hierarchia* Dionysius says that we can rise to God because all things are material lights which mirror ultimately the true light of God. Every creature, visible or invisible, is a light brought into being by the Father of lights. This stone or that piece of wood is a light to me. But this procession of lights is also movement, emanation of lightsome creatures from their source, and then their return to it. Earlier in the dedicatory poem (these lines are inscribed on the door) Suger said that believers struck by the lights of the work would travel "through these true lights to the True Light for which Christ is the true door."⁶³ At the beginning of the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas writes: "First we will treat of God, secondly of the movement of the rational creature back to God, thirdly of Christ who as man is the way for us of tending to God."⁶⁴ Later, speaking

⁶⁰ Panofsky, "Introduction," *Abbot Suger*. . . , p. 111.

⁶¹ Johannes Sarracenus dedicated his new translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, replacing that of Scotus Erigena, to Odo, Suger's successor in the abbacy. See von Simson, *op. cit.*, pp. 106 ff; L. Delisle, "Traductions de textes grecs faites par des religieux de Saint-Denis au XIIe siècle," *Journal des Savants*, 1900, pp. 715 ff. Saint-Denis was connected to Chartres in several ways. Geoffrey, Bishop of Chartres and friend of Suger, was at the consecration in 1144. The work or influence of sculptors from S. Denis is in evidence on statues and capitals at Chartres. See Branner, *op. cit.*; Katzenellenbogen, *op. cit.*

⁶² Panofsky, "Introduction," *Abbot Suger*. . . , p. 18.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁶⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 11. "If the intelligible principles, i.e., the ideas can exist for Dionysius only through a participation in being, a fortiori things in the

of God and creation, and alluding to Dionysius, Aquinas will say that according to the normal usage of "light " God is not a light, but according to an extended use, namely, making things to be manifest, then God is the " light " of all of creation.⁶⁵

Suger saw his artistic achievements as media for light. Naturally in the windows and their effect upon the experience of the viewers, the Neoplatonic schema is well verified. Suger did not invent the stained-glass window, but when the cultural time and the technological skill arrived to give it prominence he offered a theological interpretation.

The transformation of Norman and Burgundian models in the design of St. Denis can really be explained as the artistic realization of ideas actually taken over from the Pseudo-Areopagite. Thus, by recording the building of his church, Suger has, as it were, rendered transparent the creative process that translated the theology of light and music into the Gothic style.⁶⁶

We have not wanted to give the impression that Suger and Aquinas were contemporaries, or that they were influenced by culture in the same way. The *corpus* of Pseudo-Dionysius with certain thought-forms contributed to a cultural atmosphere lasting over a century. This atmosphere can be concretely seen in different media: in the earlier breakthrough to Gothic, and in the High Gothic production by Aquinas of a true *Summa. Exit"us-reditus*, the procession of lights from Light-this form was not only in the air but in the efforts of the culture.

Aquinas's theology through the skeletal indications of what his formal plan is for the *Summa Theologiae* expresses the theological analogy to, an interpretation of, the artistic experience

order of the senses exist only through participation in being. This shows us how Dionysius understands the procession of things out of God, which Christian usage calls creation: creation (Dionysius hardly uses the term) means emanation and participation in God . . . the principle out of which everything flows while in itself cannot proceed from anything else. The creature is that which participates in the *primum participatum* and flows from it." Kremer, *op. cit.*, p. 856.

•• *Summa. Theol.*, I, q. 67, a. 1.

•• von Simson, *op. cit.*, p. 133; see p. 131.

of the cathedral. Light enters our world mysteriously, an analogue to the reality of God: penetrating, diffusing, enlivening through colored glass the figures and events which are the " sacraments " of the jeweled windows. This light bearing the mysticism of color and the content of salvation-history strikes the believer whose spirit in ecstasy is drawn out of himself outwards in a return to the One, the Source, the Deity. Salvation-history is interpreted with a Plotinian nuance, losing something of its horizontal historicity. The Biblical narratives are real, just as the windows' designs are real, and without them we would not contact God or see light. Yet, the goal of history and of the window is not the figurative events, but *human contact* with the Mysterious who is God and light. As we have noted, the most sublime realities of nature or grace are described in the *Summa Theologiae* not to provide information but to nourish the moving ellipse whose source may be active, primal light, but whose focal point is man (*exitus-reditus*). In terms of the three dimensions of time, in both architecture and theology, the past is prominent (the philosophers and Fathers, the statues and windows) and exists to serve the present moment of grace-surrounded contemplation. The future exists not ahead as the continuation of the long line of history, but above, a lasting fulfillment of the present.

Students of Aquinas long neglected the kinetic, Neoplatonic lines. Did not this foster the never-satiated analyses of the tracts and questions? The cultural context of the partial and total work of Aquinas was neglected as were the horizontal relationships of section to section. Attention was paid to the vertical, the logical, the "Aristotelian." For instance, in the consideration of law and grace in the *Summa Theologiae* the horizontal lines lead backwards to the processions of God as Triune and to the dynamics of the human psyche (or moving in the other direction, to the Incarnate Word). These intermediaries culminate in God as a causal Being of participated fullness, a reality at whose source-point for our world the distinction of nature and grace is not all that clear. Chenu writes:

How often, in the interpretation of the *Ila Pars* in particular, I was shocked by the rigid and systematic way in which the Aristotelian structures present in the text were commented upon in detail, while the sap of evangelical and patristic spirituality supplying life to these otherwise dead branches was ignored or glossed over.... Yet, the effort of systematizing theology must, at any cost, respect the strange logic of the Kingdom of God.... " ⁶⁷

And so, the realism of the bird on the capitals in the Sainte-Chapelle or Aristotle's title of "the philosopher" do not represent a complete triumph over Neoplatonism. Yet we have here a Plotinian strain not of unreal symbols but of sacraments where both the human and the divine are intermingled, and then drawn outward and upward. One of the cultural discoveries concerning Aquinas's work is that the formal organizing principle of his uniquely successful attempt at a *Summa* is Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian. While Aquinas does not connect his pattern directly with Dionysius, we know that this mystical theologian held the highest position, as the result of the mixture of legends, in not only the theological but in the cultural world of Paris during the climax of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In mysticism and ecclesiology, in politics and papal theory, the Areopagite's influence was

To step into the new creations of glass and stone or into the lecture halls of the university the discerning mind might feel at home among similar enterprises and related thought-forms.

Conclusion

The preceding pages have only introduced the enterprise of situating Thomas Aquinas within his polychrome cultural milieu, an enterprise which theologians and art historians have often alluded to but rarely pursued. Other areas suggest themselves for this hermeneutic through cultural comparison.

First, the opening question of the *Summa Theologiae* has a history of interpretations. Many of them never escape the ab-

⁶⁷ Chenu, *Toward*. . . , p. 309.

⁶⁸ On these areas see M.-J. Congar, "Aspects ecclesiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants et seculiers dans la seconde moitie du XIIIe siecle et le debut du XIVe," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age*, 36 (1961), 85-151

stract and metaphysical. They appear singularly uninterested in the cultural milieu as a source for understanding the nature and purpose of Aquinas's *magnum opus*.⁶⁹ Yet, the composition of this work is woven from the strands of controversy and change. Aquinas had placed himself at the *carrefour* of Arabs and Greeks, of ancient texts and new translations, of every science and every theology. Surely a discussion of theology as *scientia*⁷⁰ is understood not only by uncovering Aristotle's definition but out of a context born of the university's attitude towards the burgeoning of information for the secular sciences. The new science and university were an offensive questioning any place in the university for *fides quaerens intellectum*. We have already noticed the Platonic theory of music (which had concrete effects on the medieval ear's preference for fourths) as the illustration in this question for Aquinas's rather unconvincing analogy supporting theology as a science. The treatment of Scripture's literal sense in the last two articles of this opening question reflects the new naturalism and realism of the time. This realism is as evident in sculpture and stained-glass as it is in textual criticism.⁷¹

A second example is the social and political context for Aquinas's work. This means not his political theory itself but how the social and political movements of the time influenced the theological forms throughout his work. The iconography of the Sainte-Chapelle is an interesting place to study St. Louis IX's image of himself in salvation-history and his rivalry with

⁶⁹ For a summary see G. van Ackeren, *Sacra Doctrina* (Rome, 1952).

⁷⁰ *Summa Theol.*, 1, q. 1, aa. 2, 3. Weisheipl describes the academic culture of Aquinas's career in Paris with painstaking detail; *op. cit.*, pp. 53-139.

⁷¹ B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1952); W. Hinnebusch, "Dominican Biblical Studies," *The History*. . . , pp. 99 ff.; Chenu, *Toward*. . . , c. VII; Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture*. . . , pp. 6, 91; C. M. Dvorak, *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gothischen Skulptur und Malerei* (Munich, 1918); *The Year 1200*, 2 vols. (New York, 1970); K. Flasch, "Ars imitatur naturam, Platonischer Naturbegriff und mittelalterliche Philosophie der Kunst," *Studien zur Philosophie Platons* (Frankfurt, 1964); L. White, "Natural Science and Naturalistic Art in the Middle Ages," *The American Historical Review*, 52 (1947), 421 ff.; A. Forest, *La Structure metaphysique du concret selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1956); E. Auerbach, *Dante, Poet of the Secular World* (Chicago, 1961).

papal influence. Aquinas was involved with all three camps struggling for decisive power in the thirteenth century: student and teacher in Louis's capital, relative to the Emperor, theologian and political theoretician to the papacy. Yet, why do the merchants and the new urban middle class play such a limited role in Aquinas's thought? Did the Dionysian, hierarchical writings exert a strongly conservative political influence in the organization of both church and state? It is striking that the *Secunda Pars* ends not with activities but with states of life. There Aquinas comes close to identifying office (ministry) with a social role and life-style in a theology of ministry which neither the New Testament nor our times can readily accept. And yet, it is a normal cultural and theological realization for his epoch.

We have stressed harmony-within-diversity as a thought-form. A third cultural factor related to this as its flesh and blood is the synthetic interpenetration which Aquinas and his entire society wove out of the spheres of "nature" and "grace." His time saw a single world grounded not on ontology or science (as real as these might be) but upon a dialectic between grace and evil. This dialectic was both origin and ground for man and angels, for science and history. Into that single view all the essences and persons, the choirs of the angels and the signs of the zodiac, all principles and logical nuances could be fitted. The result of the re-entry of Aristotle's realism was not to set up a dual world (theologians will ineptly accomplish that later) but to highlight the entities and facets which compose our one world. This real and individual world ultimately is delineated by grace. As God, as the Spirit, as the Hypostatic Union, as the New Law, grace surrounds not a forward-moving Teilhardian line, but, for the thirteenth century, the ellipse of life manifest on earth and in society in areas of vertical order.

This one world art and theology both wished to freeze for a moment-in the facade, in the rose window, in the tympanum, or in the disputation, in the *Summa*.

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CHARISM AND INSTITUTION IN AQUINAS

IN THE YEARS approaching the Second Vatican Council the great Dominican Yves Cougar spoke of one of the difficulties of the generation as a false mystique among many Christians—"The notion of a complete identification of God's will with the institutional form of authority."¹ It is one of the blessings of the Catholic community that, in large part, it has moved away from that notion. Even some Protestants, anxious over the loosening of the social fabric, occasionally echo the misgivings of those Catholics who lament this change; they ask why so effective a theology of authority has been abandoned. The fact is, of course, that a new generation of Catholics has enlivened its awareness of a variously manifested charismatic presence of the Spirit in its midst.

We measure our progress in the valuing of charisms only in terms of recent history because it would be enough to read St. Thomas Aquinas on the relation of charism to the institutional form of authority to become aware that, in some measure, our finest contemporary insights are matched in his vision. What differences there are can help us assess the strengths and the perils of today's ruling views.

There are differences, of course. One searches in vain for Thomistic texts on the Church as *institution*. Discussions on law, obedience, grace, the Incarnation, or the Sacraments would be the appropriate contexts; but these do not yield the conception familiar to us as the institutional Church, such as gained currency in the *De Ecclesia* treatises which entered the literary tradition of theology as a reaction to the Gallicanism of the early fourteenth century: And yet, the mystery of the Church

¹ "The Historical Development of Authority in the Church," *Problems of Authority*, ed. John M. Todd, (Baltimore: Helicon, 196:!), pp. 119-56, at p. 14J.

² Yves Cougar, *Lay People in the Church* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1957), p. 37.

is at the heart of Thomas's thought. Charism, too, is not a Thomistic term; we read, instead, of *gratiae gratis datae* (gratuitous graces).

Both authority in the Church and *gratia gratis data* are treated extensively in the *Summa Theologiae* in the final section of the *Prima Secundae*, qq. 90-114, devoted to consideration of the extrinsic principles of human acts. The extrinsic principle of good actions is God, who moves us to what is good in two ways: by law (qq. 90-108) which directs us and by grace (qq. 109-114) which assists us. We have, then, two treatises, on law and on grace.

I. On law (institution) .

Rather than envision the Church as a kind of society whose institution and structures are due to divine positive law (*ius divinum*), St. Thomas reflects upon the nature and exercise of law in general and sets what we call institutional elements in the Church into this context. His inspiration moves away from present-day controversies as to whether these institutional elements are simply developments in accord with a divine commission (*ius ecclesiasticum*) or whether they are specific positive divine laws (*ius divinum*).³ He seeks instead, wherever possible, points of convergence between reason and faith-between Aristotle and the Scriptures.

Law, he tells us, is something pertaining to reason (I-II, q. 90, a. 1); it is always directed to the common good (a. 2); it is made either by the whole people or by a public personage who has care of the whole people (a. 3). However, besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a divine law, for man's eternal end is beyond the proportions of his natural faculty (q. 91, aa. 1-4). The divine law is twofold, the Old Law and the New Law, and this precisely because priesthood has been translated-from the Levitical priesthood to the priesthood of Christ

³ See, for example, Karl Rahner, "Reflections on the Concept of 'ius divinum' in Catholic Thought," *Theological Investigations*, V (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), pp. 219-43.

(a. 5). This New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Spirit; as such it is written in the heart. But secondarily the New Law has things that dispose us to receive this grace; hence it is also a written law (q. 106, a. 1). Christ of himself instituted the Sacraments, says Thomas; and among the seven are "Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the Apostles and the seventy-two disciples" (q. 108, a. 2). To the objection that the New Law was insufficiently determinate Thomas answers: "Our Lord left judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge of others" (a. 2 ad 4).

Considering the visible Church, with St. Thomas, in the frame of law affords possibilities for discovering the ultimate promise, legitimacy, and necessity of its societal dimensions—finer possibilities than will arise from the mere facticity that seems at times to be associated with the concept of institution. For example, the absence of discussion under some such rubric as "ecclesiastical law" occasions the perception that ecclesiastical law is merely an area of human law, but that as such it is a determination of natural law/ which is a participation in eternal law (see I-II, q. 91, and II-II, q. 147, a. 3, concl.).

This proliferation of distinctions in the Scholastic manner is, of course, far removed from the inclinations of present-day thinking. But long after the distinctions have lost their savor, they may still make clear that "a complete identification of God's will with the institutional form of authority" ⁵ could never claim the support of St. Thomas.

Authority is studied carefully in the *Summa*. It belongs to the political order, which is natural to man (I-II, q. 72, a. 4). The fact, then, that society spawns those who command and those who obey should be attributed, not to human

• St. Thomas's concept of natural law seems in no way to lend support to the immense confidence of some in the possibilities of human reason to arrive at knowledge of the particular—a confidence which is assumed in later Scholastic casuistry. See the remarks on the limitations of reason in relation to human law, at I-II, q. 91, a. 8.

• Cougar's useful formulation. See note 1, above.

sinfulness, but to the necessity of assuring the common good. The naturalness of this situation was presented in Aristotle's *Politics* (I, q. 96, a. 4), and it may be reasoned according to a proper concept of law: "Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers ... so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority In virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors" (II-II, q. 104, a. 1). The normal exercise of authority, then, assumes a vertical operation in which superiority is conceived formally as the authority divinely given-not, however, in independence of spiritual gifts possessed by the one in authority. "If one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4: 10, 'As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another.' Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, 19.14): 'Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel.' And (*ibid.* 15), 'The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man'" (I, q. 96, a. 4).

So balanced a conception of authority suggests one reason why, in our day, Robert Maynard Hutchins speaks of the *Summa* (at I-II, qq. 90-108) as "that greatest of all books on the philosophy of law." ⁶ Before this, by force of the same treatise, F. Kern (possibly with a surplus of ardor) pronounced Aquinas "unquestionably the best student of civilization." ⁷ Interesting that in seeking out what Thomas has to say on the institutional aspect of the Church we should encounter the "philosophy of law" and the "student of civilization" ! Granting, of course, that under the rubric of law we encounter much more than this—for example, a theology of the New Law-it

⁶ *St. Thomas and the World State* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949), p. 38. From p. 45, n. 3, it is clear that Hutchins, speaking of "the *Treatise on Law*," refers to this section of the *Summa*.

⁷ See *Humana Civilitas (Staat, Kirche, und Kultur): Eine Dante Untersuchung* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 111; cited by Martin Grabmann, *Introduction to the Theological Summa of St. Thomas* (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1930), p. 175.

becomes evident that *institution* and the authority that is associated with it do not exhaust the saint's concept of that saving mystery which is the Church.

II. On *Gratia gratis data* (Charism) .

Besides the authority of law, seen in the institutional Church, is there not an authority that springs from charism?

The *charismata* spoken of in I Cor. 12:8-10 are considered by St. Thomas in a general way in his division of grace (I-II, q. 111, aa. 1, 4, 5), later in a particular way for each of the nine charismata enumerated (II-II, qq. 171-179), in the context of the Incarnation at III, q. 7, and again in his commentary on 1 Cor. *HI* (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Revelatione*, I, p. 209). Most of what interests us here is contained in the treatise on grace (I-II, qq. 109-114) immediately following the treatise on law with which we have just occupied ourselves. Created grace, we are told, is either internal or external; internal grace is such thing as preaching, good example, and opportunities for good action.

The appropriateness of the division of grace into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace (*gratia gratis data*) is studied at I-II, q. 111 a. 1. This first article endeavors to explain the text of 1 Cor. 12: 8-11, where St. Paul enumerates nine graces *gratis datae*, followed by the great hymn to charity in I Cor. 13: 8

To one is given through the Spirit the utterance of Wisdom, and to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit, to another faith by the same Spirit, to another gifts of healing by the one Spirit, to another the working of miracles, to another prophecy, to another the ability to distinguish between spirits, to another various kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues. All these are inspired by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as he wills.

⁸ This observation, obvious enough once attention is called to it—for example, by Garrigou-Lagrange—is of much significance. See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P. *Grace: Commentary on the Summa theologiae of St. Thomas*, I• II••, qu. 109-14 (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1952), pp. 150-51.

And I will show you a still more excellent way. If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging symbol. And if I have prophetic powers, etc. (1 Cor. 12:8 ff.)

St. Thomas concludes: " Thus there is a twofold grace—one whereby man himself is united to God, and this is called *sanctifying grace* [cf. love in 1 Cor.]; the other is that whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called *gratuitous grace* [cf. *charismata* in 1 Cor.], since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person" (I-II, q. 111, a. 1). Both kinds of grace are gratuitous, of course; but beyond the characteristic of *gratis datae* which is generic, sanctifying grace adds something: **It** makes man pleasing to God (a. 1, ad 8).

The peculiar " authority " of charism would be, then, that it is the Spirit who, through this special gift, acts upon the community. Thomas notes (a. 1) the words of I Cor. 12:7, "the manifestations of the Spirit *for the common good*." The thought is made explicit in the comment of Garrigou-Lagrange: " Grace *gratis data* is *per se* primarily ordained to the salvation of others, or ' unto profit ' [for the common good]. Sanctifying grace is *per se* primarily ordained to the salvation of the recipient, whom it justifies." ⁹ However, in one sense, the more a grace destined for the community as such is disassociated from the individual through whom it is mediated, the more immediately awareness of its origin is communicated. Then the Spirit is seen to move in the Church.

Thomas, however, is not intent upon expanding the phenomenon of charism in the Church. Just as St. Paul cautioned the Corinthians not to conceive a false esteem for astonishing graces, not to covet any but the *charismata meliora*, but to follow the more excellent way of love, so Thomas is careful to set strict conceptual boundaries to his *gratiae gratis datae*. (The Thomistic use of Scripture here is certainly not ornamental.) An unusual gift of nature would be outside such

• *Grace*, p. 152.

boundaries; it belongs to human nature *ex debito* (a. 1, ad 2). The nine *charismata* enumerated by St. Paul are argued to be an exhaustive catalogue (see also *De Revelationes* I, p. 29). They are divided as they pertain to knowledge, to speech, or to action (II-II, qq. 171-79). Garrigou-Lagrange notes that the division corresponds to the division of miracles in I, q. 105, a. 8. Like miracles, the *gratiae gratis datae* are generally supernatural only with respect to the mode of their production.¹⁰ Many commentators, however, believe that the catalogue in 1 Cor. 12 is an enumeration merely of the principal graces *gratis datae*.¹¹ Suarez, for example, adds the priestly character, jurisdiction in the internal forum, and the special assistance given to the Pope.¹² Today Karl Rahner speaks of "the charism of infallibility," considering this as "the divine grace of the office which is needed for its right exercise."¹⁸

III. Charism in a Broader Sense

This enlarging of the concept of charism seems, indeed, to be sanctioned in precisely the Scriptural text of which Aquinas's discussion is an elucidation. St. Paul tells us that in distributing his *charismata* "God has appointed in the Church first apostles, second prophets, third *teachers*, then workers of miracles, then healers, *helpers*, *administrators*, speakers in various kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. 12: 28). Broadly speaking, Thomas himself provides the rationale for an enlarged view of *gratiae gratis datae* when he includes among them "whatever a man needs ... to instruct" (I-II, q. 111, a. 4). But the fact remains that, in dividing all internal grace into sanctifying and *gratis data*, he seems to move in the direction of restricting *gratiae gratis datae* rather severely. These gifts are not only not sanctifying (*per se* and primarily) of the recipient, they are in no way due to human nature and are supernatural in mode only. When we

¹⁰ *Grace*, pp. 158-59.

¹¹ Garrigou-Lagrange cites Medina, Vasquez, Bellarmine, Suarez, and Ripalda. See *Grace*, p. 154.

¹⁹ Quoted by Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, p. 154.

¹⁸ See "The Episcopal Office," in *Theological Investigations*, VI (Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), pp. 313-60, at p. 316.

have sifted the notion of divine grace through this grid of distinctions, have we not been discouraged from perceiving those individual talents which may be natural in substance or modality as the Spirit's gift to the Church?

I have pointed out that Aquinas's direction here matches in some way the cautions which St. Paul himself communicates to the Christian Church regarding charismata. If the circumstances which Paul was addressing conditioned his manner, the circumstances of Thomas's milieu are likewise a determinant of his thought. Chenu rightly asks us to consider the work of St. Thomas as expressing the experience of the medieval Church. During the Middle Ages the ecclesiastical institution included and formed human society. From the eleventh century on the established direction was a strong centrism. "Underlying the most novel political problems was the mystical vision of resurrecting the Roman Empire with its universal political ideal."¹⁴ The "Renaissance" of the period moves on the hinges not only of Aristotle's entrance into the University of Paris in the thirteenth century but also of the entrance of Roman law at Bologna in the twelfth.¹⁵ After the death of Thomas and Bonaventure it will become difficult to keep legal values in balance, and treatises on the Church will, as Cougar remarks, have the character of "a theology of ecclesiastical authority," or of a "Hierarchology."¹⁶ But excesses were not yet manifest, and Thomas valued and exercised that mystical prayer which, before the rise of Scholasticism, had been thought of as the essence of *theologia*. The Christian experience expressed in his theology did not deal in authority to the exclusion of spiritual gifts. His age felt authority to be a manifestation of divine care for the Church. It did not seem necessary to locate such care strictly outside those forces which held society together.¹⁷

¹⁴ M.-D. Chenu, O. P., *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas* (Chicago: Regnery, 1964) p. 25.

¹⁵ Chenu, p. 26.

¹⁶ Yves Congar, *Lay People in the Church*, pp. 88-89.

¹⁷ Chenu (*Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*) and Cougar are of immense

Noting, with many observers, the fact that Thomas's theologizing is rooted in experience, we can here call attention once again to a certain distinction between Thomas and Thomism. The genius transcends the school. To study creation in terms of law is, it would seem, to cast creation in essentialist modes of thought at variance with much of our contemporary awareness. It would, indeed, be unobjective to claim for Aquinas, with his Aristotelian bent, the perspective of today's Process thinkers; nevertheless, no one more than the Process theologian will appreciate the merit of viewing "institution" in terms of law as revealed in experience.¹⁸ Thomas's law has a dynamism that commends it beyond the static essentialism characterizing the Thomism of a later era; it escapes as well, as I have said, the merely factual nature of institution. And let me insist that the intent of these observations is neither to build an apology for a supposed golden age of theology nor to extol the genius of Aquinas but rather to offer the hopefully useful reflection that our present-day views of authority in the Church were in some way paralleled and are therefore seconded in Aquinas's thought. Then as well as now, God is seen as revealing himself in the flux of human experience. As it is the experience of the Church today that a consciousness of the Spirit at work in the whole Church needs to be reinforced, so it was the Christian experience of the late Middle Ages that a consciousness of the Spirit's presence in authority needed to be strengthened. One need emphasize charism, the other institution.

Each emphasis has its hazards. We have been able to point

help in understanding the state of thought about the Church in St. Thomas's day. See Cougar on the mystique of authority and on political theology in *Problems of Authority*, pp. 139-43; also, "The Idea of the Church in St. Thomas Aquinas," in *The Mystery of the Church* (London, 1960), pp. 97-117.

¹⁸ See E. H. Schillebeeckx, O. P., "The Second Vatican Council," in *The Layman in the Church and Other Essays* (New York: Alba House, 1963), pp. The majority-minority tension at the Council, thinks Schillebeeckx, was not so much a progressive-conservative tension as an existentialist-essentialist one, where pastoral experience encountered and resisted inclinations to articulate the faith more exactly in definitions (pp. 9-10).

to a "Hierarchology" as the danger of stressing the institutional dimension of the Church. But long ago the great Thomist Cajetan was also able to unmask a tendency that thought of charism as "more spiritual" than legitimate authority.¹⁹

Today we broaden the notion of charism, moving away from an extrinsicist view of the relation of nature and grace as two separate layers of our being; so that what is broadened is our concept of the scope of God's salvific action in the human race. The roots of this thought are what is referred to as Transcendental Thomism.²⁰ Catholic insights on the relation of grace and nature, says Rahner, resemble the thought of St. Thomas more closely than they resemble later theologizing. We repeat Thomas's concept of a "desiderium naturale visionis beatificae"—an expression that witnesses to an era which not only antedated more precise terminology but also thought more deeply about uncreated grace than did post-Tridentine theology.²¹ But if we should discover in ourselves an inclination to oppose charism to institution, considering one as the touchstone of the Spirit to the excluding or diminishing of the other, will we not have discovered how dimly possessed is the insight in the strength of which we broaden the sense of charism?

Conclusion

The following assertions may sum up our presentation: (1) There are useful associations to be made concerning the fact that Aquinas treats our present-day dichotomy of charism and institution under the rubrics of gratuitous grace and law. (2) He does not separate the institutional form of authority from other gifts of the Spirit. The model may be found in the Scriptural text which presents the charisms (1 Cor.); this model is St. Paul himself, who takes his stand, not on his juri-

¹⁹ See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, pp. 16f-63.

•• See a brief discussion of the meaning, origins, and recent history of Transcendental Thomism in Gregory Baum, *Man Becoming: God in Secular Experience* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. f15-f17.

²¹ This summarizes a reflection of Karl Raimer in *Nature and Grace* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), pp. 119-ffl.

dical rights but on his spiritual gifts.²² (3) In the *Summa* the description given of charism is more restrictive than in our time. In this Thomas is led by the cautions of St. Paul to the Corinthian Church and by the experience of the medieval Church. (4) Both charism and institution are given for the community. They stand in balance, not in antagonism. Both are manifestations of the one Spirit.

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²⁰This is the reflection of Congar in *Problems of Authority*, p.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION ¹

IF IT IS TRUE that God has loved the world so much that he has *given* to it the bodily presence of his Only Son, may we not conclude that he will love the world enough to *leave* to it the bodily presence of this same Only Son? From the opposite point of view, when the intellect acknowledges the mystery of the Incarnation, yet takes exception to the belief of Chalcedon, how could it reject the mystery of the Eucharist, but fail to challenge the teaching of Trent?

I. The Why of Transubstantiation

"The bread that I shall give is my flesh, for the life of the world." (John 6:51)

1. Scripture sees in the death of Jesus the supreme sacrifice, in which the redemption of the world is accomplished: "He gave himself for us as an offering and a sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5: "He has offered one single sacrifice for sins, and then taken his place forever at the right hand of God" (Heb. 10: "We were reconciled to God by the death of his Son" (Rom. 5:10). "God has reconciled all things through him, in making peace through the blood of his Cross" (Col. 1: The redemptive sacrifice extends to all men of the past and the future; it saved the preceding ages by *anticipation*: the divine helps were offered to each person in view of the future sacrifice of the Cross. And by *derivation* it saved the ages that followed it: the divine helps are now given through the completed sacrifice of the Cross. "And when I am lifted up from the earth, I shall draw all men to myself" (Jn. .

Into this sacrifice men are asked to enter: not indeed to increase its value, which is infinite, but to receive from it its purifying power.

¹ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 75, a.

Fundamentally, we enter into participation of the sacrifice of Jesus by the *assent of faith and love-of* the great love which is charity. And, where the Gospel has not been preached, that can take place in a most hidden way; as soon as a heart opens in secret to the predisposing and redemptive lights of the Cross.

But the express intention of God, as manifested in Scripture, is especially to invite all men to a *visible and cultural* participation in the sacrifice of the Cross, a participation in no way destined to dismiss faith or love, but rather to draw their unitive capabilities to the highest degrees.

In the Old Law there existed a form of sacrifice to which the Jews united themselves, not simply by intention but even more by the personal eating of the victim, to signify that one was offering himself together with victim. "Those who eat the sacrifices are in communion with the altar" (I Cor. 10:18). Such sacrifices were called "sacrifices of communion."

3. The sacrifice of the New Law is to be of this kind. The Savior's intention is clear. There is nothing fortuitous in the coincidence of the Last Supper with the Jewish Feast of Passover. **It** means that the Jewish Passover must give way to a more mysterious Passover that it was prefiguring. The Jewish Passover was the sacrificial offering of a lamb to which one united himself by eating it, in recognition of God's goodness in delivering his people from the captivity of Egypt so as to enable them to enter the Promised Land. **It** prefigured the sacrificial offering of Christ, the spotless Lamb (I Peter 1:19). To this sacrifice we are united by communion, and by it mankind is delivered from sin and introduced to the peace of God. The Council of Trent tells us that, after having celebrated the *ancient Passover*, Christ instituted the *new Passover*: "in memory of his passage from this world to the Father, when he redeemed us by the shedding of his blood, he rescued us from the power of darkness, and brought us into his kingdom" (Denz.-Sch. no. 1741). The connection between the Last Supper and the Jewish Passover is clearly indicated in Scripture. At nightfall Jesus said to his disciples: "I have longed to eat this passover with you before I suffer" (Lk. 22:15). And St. Paul exhorts the

Corinthians to purify themselves from sin at the approach of the festival of Passover: " for Christ, our Passover, has been sacrificed " (I Cor. 5:7)

But is a "sacrifice of communion " possible, when the Lamb has taken the place of the lamb?

4. We are coming close to the answer to the question we have raised, that of the why of Transubstantiation. There is but one sacrifice through which we may be saved, and that is the bloody sacrifice of the Cross. It had already begun when Jesus instituted the Last Supper, "on the night in which he was betrayed" (I Cor. 11: It was completed on the Cross, where "all is accomplished" (Jn. 19:30). At the Last Supper, in order that the Apostles might unite themselves to this sacrifice, not only by faith and love but even more by partaking of the victim, Jesus deliberately makes himself mysteriously present under the appearances of bread and wine and gives himself to them as food. He wishes to be eaten by the Apostles at the very moment of his great desire to save the world by his sacrifice; at the very moment in which he is being consumed by the fire he wishes to light on the earth (Lk. 49). And he who eats a desire is consumed by this desire; he who eats fire is consumed by the fire.

5. The sacrifice by which all mankind is redeemed is a " sacrifice of communion."

It continues from the Last Supper to the death on the Cross. At the moment of the Last Supper we are shown *how* we can participate in it by consumption of the victim. At the moment of the death on the Cross We see *in what* we are participating by consuming what is concealed under the appearances of bread and wine.

"The Lord's Banquet," yes, but one calculated to immerse us actively in "the Lord's Sacrifice."

II. Transubstantiation

" Do this as a memorial of me." (Lk. 19)

1. The holy Council of Trent teaches and professes " that,

after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and true man, is contained truly, really, and substantially under the likeness (specie) of these sensible things. There is actually no contradiction between the fact that our Lord is forever seated at the right hand of the Father in heaven *according to the manner of existence natural to him*, and the fact that for us, nevertheless, he is, in numerous other places, sacramentally present in his substance, *according to a manner of existence that we scarcely find words to express*, but which our understanding, enlightened by faith, can at the same time acknowledge, and which we must firmly believe to be a thing possible to God" (Denz.-Sch. no. 1686). And this is the corresponding canon, promulgated on the same date, October 11, 1551: "If anyone should deny that in the Sacrament of the most holy Eucharist are contained *truly, really, and substantially*, the body and blood, soul and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and consequently the whole Christ, but if one declares that they are present only by *sign* or *figure* or by *power*, let him be anathema" (*ibid.*, no. 1651).

2. We are speaking of one single Christ, present in heaven after the Ascension under his proper and natural appearances, who, without leaving heaven, or changing in any way, or losing any of his splendor, makes himself present, as he does here below under the very humble appearances of bread and wine, when the words of consecration are pronounced. We insist on this point: it is accomplished *without his leaving heaven*. To imagine Christ departing from heaven in order to make himself present in the small hosts consecrated by the priest would lead us to manifest impossibilities. But would departure be the only manner of arriving really at a place where one was not formerly present?

8. There does exist a most mysterious way that would permit a being, without undergoing a shadow of change, to arrive, in a most profound manner, where he had not been previously. It is primarily thus that God makes himself present in his creation, the Word in the Incarnation, the Holy Spirit in justification. Let us examine this manner of presence rather briefly.

God was not in the world before the world existed. Divine omnipotence was necessary in some fashion to draw the world out of nothingness; it is still necessary to maintain the world in existence. What a reality is this creative and conservative presence of God to the world! **It** operates without the possibility of the slightest ripple appearing in the Ocean of the divine Being. The world began in dependence on God, and God in no way depends upon the world; the theologians express this by stating that there is a real relation of dependence of the world on God, but that the opposite is not true. We can underscore the freedom and generosity of God's initiative by stating that he has created by an *act of his omnipotence*; but, in order to remind ourselves that this act has changed nothing in him, we must have recourse to some sort of image as: God has, as it were, *summoned the world to himself*; he has, so to speak, *breathed it forth out of nothingness*.

A parallel of this is to be encountered in the mystery of the Incarnation. Without leaving the right hand of the Father, the Word was made flesh, so that he might dwell among us; he made his own the human nature that was formed in the womb of the Virgin Mary. Preexisting together with the Father, he begins to exist outside the Father, *without changing*, in a human nature, by drawing this human nature to himself, by *assuming it*—the term employed by theology—in such a way that it is he, the Word, who really, personally, will be born, crucified, who will rise in this human nature.

This is the only means in which the mystery of the Incarnation is rendered possible; and it is not at all as a contradiction of this truth that in the Creed we acknowledge that the Word, "for us and for our salvation, *came down from heaven*." Rather, it is to glorify the utter freedom of his initiative and to adore with St. Paul the humiliations which it will entail (Phil. .

Finally, there is the further parallel in the mystery of justification. When a man passes from the life of sin to the life of grace, the Holy Spirit descends on him, the divine Persons draw near him: "If anyone loves me ... my Father will love **him**,

and we shall come to him and make our home with him" (Jn. 14:23) What a transformation this works in the heart of this man! But the change takes place only in him: if from within your boat you pull on the mooring rope, you may believe that the cliff is approaching you.

A presence of creation in the universe, a presence of indwelling in souls and in the Church, a presence of Incarnation in Christ, head of the Church: these three presences are thoroughly real, but in each the change is uniquely that of things to God, and not inversely. One who has not reflected on these three mysteries is incapable of understanding anything of the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist.

4. For,-and her.ein lies the mystery proper to the Eucharist-when the words of consecration are pronounced, Christ, seated at the right hand of the Father, becomes wholly present here below-in his body, his blood, his soul and divinity-*without any change of his being*, but with *the sole*, utterly profound, *change into him of bread and wine*.

"The Lord Jesus, on the night he was betrayed, took bread, and, after he had given thanks, broke it and said: '*This is my body*, which is for you; do this as a memorial of me'" (I Cor. 11:23-24). The whole of divine omnipotence brings about what the words signify. What was bread becomes the body of the Lord Jesus, who, on the evening of the Last Supper, offered himself in the redemptive sacrifice which then began, of that Jesus who now sits in the glory of the Father: his body is indissolubly united to the divine Person, it is the body of the Word incarnate.

If we were to delimit the translation as narrowly as possible, we would have: "This is the very body of *mine* ... This is the very blood of *mine*. ..." It is folly to separate, in the Eucharist as in the Incarnation, bodily presence and personal presence.

The literal sense of the words demands that what Jesus presents to his disciples should no longer be bread but only his body. Yet nothing is changed as far as appearances go: this is a truth of experience. Weight, color, taste, resistance to

touch, properties and functions, remain the same. The *senses* that perceive only phenomena continue without deception to perceive bread and wine; but to these appearances is communicated a new, non-perceptible, reality, of which *faith* alone permits us to be aware, namely, that the power of the words of consecration has not annihilated but rather *converted* the bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus.

Let us consider for a moment the things about us. To us they appear structured. Under the *empirical activities* which manifest them exteriorly in space and time and by which they affect our senses, the human intellect spontaneously discerns what is its proper object, namely, being, substance, the *existing subject* which sustains them. These empirical activities are by nature *inseparable* from the subject that they disclose; but they are *distinct* from it, they; are not confused with it. Only an intervention of the Omnipotence by which all things have been made could disunite them. And this *miracle* is precisely what occurs in the Eucharist.

What is it then that takes place at the moment of consecration? The *empirical activities*, the externals, or the sensible appearances of bread are not touched. The *inmost being* of the bread-of this mixture which is bread-is detached from it by the effect of divine omnipotence, so as not to be annihilated but "changed," "converted" into the body of the Lord, who, according to the manner of existence that is proper and natural to him, dwells unchanged in heaven, but who, by this fact, is moreover made present under the borrowed appearances of bread. There are not two Christs, but *two modes of presence of the one Christ*: one "natural," in the glory of heaven, the other" sacramental, under the veil of the externals or empirical activities of bread. "This," which WAS bread, IS now the body of the Lord. And what enveloped the bread, now envelops the body of the Lord. *Only the veil of the appearances separates us from the radiance of his glory.*

5. There is, at the end of the Mass in the Coptic rite of Alexandria, the following solemn profession of faith in the Real Presence:

"Amen, Amen, Amen, I believe, I believe, I believe. To the last breath of my life, I will confess that this is the life-giving body of your Only Son, our Lord and our God, of our Savior Jesus Christ. He has taken this body from our Lady and our Queen, the most pure Mother of God. He has united it to his divinity without mingling, fusion, or alteration. . . . I believe that his divinity has never, for a single instant, been separated from his humanity. It is he who is given to us for the remission of sins, for eternal life and eternal salvation! I believe, I believe, I believe that all this is true!"

6. For one who rejects transubstantiation and affirms the persistence of the bread, what are the words of consecration going to signify? Their sense will no longer be: "This, which was bread, is my body," but: "This, which is bread, which remains bread, is my body;" " This, which I hold in my hands to offer to you, *TOGETHER WITH* my body, are *both* ONE." According to this view, the body of Christ, superimposed on the bread, in some manner affects it, "eclipses" it, "takes it to itself," fuses together with it, is identified with it. How are we to understand this identification?

Luther understood it in a real way: the very body of Christ suffuses itself within the bread, is encountered under every fragment of the bread: "Although the body and the bread are two different natures, each directed to itself, and although, when they are separated from one another, the one certainly is not the other, when they are reunited and become a new complete being, they lose their differences in all that pertains to this new, unique, being For now it is no longer a simple matter of bread in the oven, but of bread-flesh, bread-body, that is, of bread become one single sacramental thing with the body of Christ." ²

For *Calvin*, the bread is *here below*, and the body of Christ is *in heaven*. Their identification can thus be only one of the

• *Oeuvres*, VI, pp. 127-8 (Labor et Fides: Geneve, 1969). This treatise: *Confession about the Last Supper of Christ*, which dates from 1528, "constitutes the last word of Luther in his controversy with Zwingli and his school," *ibid*, p. 7.

order of sign- (before the reredos of Grunewald at Colmar you say to me: Behold, Christ in glory.) Calvin writes: "We must not seek Jesus Christ, insofar as he is man, anywhere but in heaven; nor dare we seek him in any other way but in spirit and faith. Hence, it is a wicked and perverse superstition to enclose him under the elements of this world. Therefore we reject as bad expositors of Scripture those who rigorously insist on the literal sense of these words: This is my body, this is my blood. For we hold as generally known that these words must be interpreted sanely and with discretion: that is, that the names of what the bread and wine signify are attributed to them. And this view must not be found novel or strange, that, by a figure called metonymy, the sign bears the name of the truth of which it is a figure, seeing that such modes of speaking are more frequent in Scripture." ³

It is Luther, even more than the Catholics, whom Calvin blames in this matter: "But we do not consider it less of an absurdity to enclose Jesus Christ under the bread, or to conjoin him to the bread, than to say that the bread may be transubstantiated into his body." ⁴ It detracts from the heavenly glory of Christ, ⁵ and from his Ascension. ⁶

7. In its second Canon, the Council of Trent has rejected the thesis which claims "that, in the Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, the substance of bread and wine *remains* together with the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and which denies this marvelous and singular *conversion* of the entire substance of the bread into the body and the entire substance of

• *Accord passed and concluded touching the matter of the Sacraments between the Ministers of the Church of Zurich and Master John Calvin, Minister of the Church of Geneva*, August 1, 1549, in *Recueil des Opuscules* (Geneve, 1566), p.

• *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Far from resting on an identity between sign and signified, the Sacrament of the Eucharist adds to the relation between sign and signified the relation of cause to effect and assumes the intervention of the First Cause, who produces the most radical change that can be conceived, a change that attains to being as being." J. Maritain, *Signe et Symbole*, in *Quatre Essais sur l'esprit dans sa condition charnelle* (Paris, 1939), p. 89.

the wine into the blood; which does not acknowledge that there subsists only the appearances of the bread and wine, - *manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini* - a conversion that the Catholic Church calls by the very appropriate name of *transubstantiation*" (Denz.-Sch. no. 1652).

Jesus did not say: This *contains* my body; nor: This *signifies* my body. He did say: This *is* my body.

III. The Bodily Presence of Jesus

" Could you not stay awake with me for even an hour? " (Matthew 26: 40)

1. Without transubstantiation there would be in the Eucharist *only bread and wine*, by means of which we might seek to be united to Christ, present only in heaven. Transubstantiation alone makes possible our union with Christ's sacrifice, not simply by *faith and love* but even more by the *consumption of the victim*, present under the sacramental signs: " He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood lives in me, and I live in him" (Jn. 6: 56).

The union by eating and assimilation, wherein the living being changes into himself what he consumes, is the most intimate union observable in the world of sensible things. If this is willed here by Christ, -yet, in that case, it will be he, the Living Being, who does the assimilating - it is to make of this action, by his omnipotence, the sign and instrument of a contact in which, at every occurrence, the union of love of the fervent soul with the redemptive Passion can be deepened and intensified. These sensible encounters with the Savior are always brief. They last for the time of a liturgy, that of the Mass, where Christ in glory touches us through his bloody Cross; and the bodily presence of the Savior in those who receive communion lasts but the space of time during which the sacramental species are still unaltered. But such visits are like flashes of fire. They invite us to follow the Apostles as on the evening of the Last Supper they entered into the drama of the world's Redemption.

2. If there be no transubstantiation, once the action of the eucharistic liturgy is completed, only bread remains on the altar table. After the accomplishment of the liturgical action, transubstantiation alone enables Christ, God-made-flesh, to be carried in communion to the absent and the sick, and to be conserved, with great reverence, so that he might be given for one last time in viaticum to the dying.

3. The passage of the centuries will manifest a constant progress made by the Church in its deepening awareness of the radiance cast on it by the silent, bodily, presence of Christ, its Head, under the sacramental sign.

4. Such a deepening awareness of Christ's bodily presence in our midst, such an intuitive and experiential knowledge of faith and love, will lead us to a more attentive study of the Gospel texts.

We know Jesus' mysterious promise concerning the prayer that is certainly heard by the heavenly Father: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in their midst" (Mt. 18:20). This is a promise that is valid until the end of time. It concerns a *spiritual presence* among us, in faith and love, of Jesus who is now in heaven and is bodily distant from us. But in this very presence an event can be produced to deepen fervor, and that is the *bodily presence of Jesus*.

It was actually in the name of Jesus and in a spirit of faith and love that the anxious disciples gathered together in the *Cenacle* on Easter evening, all the doors being closed. But suddenly, "Jesus came and stood among them. He said to them: 'Peace be with you!' Saying this, he showed them his hands and his side" (Jn. 20:19-20). "Eight days later, the disciples again were in the house, and Thomas was with them. The doors were closed but Jesus came in and stood among them and said: 'Peace be with you!' Then he spoke to Thomas: 'Put your finger here; look, here are my hands; stretch out your hand and put it into my side: do not doubt any longer, but believe! Thomas replied: 'My Lord and my God!' " (20:26-8)

At *Emmaus*, on the very evening of Easter, "while he was

at table with them, Jesus took the bread and said the blessing; then he broke it and gave it to them. Then their eyes were opened, and they recognized him. But he vanished from their sight" (Lk. SO-1). **It** is the shock of this bodily presence, suddenly revealed and recognized, that Rembrandt in his own way attempts to communicate to us.

The spiritual presence of Jesus accompanies and protects the disciples gathered in his name at the lakeshore of *Tiberias*. But, after a night of fruitless fishing, what bewilderment they felt when, at dawn, they suddenly recognized Jesus on the shore. "The disciple whom Jesus loved said to Peter: '**It** is the Lord!' At these words: '**It** is the Lord!' Simon Peter clothed himself, for he was stripped, and jumped into the water" (Jn. 9ll: 7).

5. How strange is the conduct of Jesus at the time of the sickness and death of Lazarus! At *Bethany*, Lazarus was ill. "The two sisters thus sent word to Jesus: 'Lord, the man you love is ill. . . . Jesus loved Martha and her sister and Lazarus. Yet, when he learned that Lazarus was ill, he remained for two more days at the place where he was. Only then did he say to the disciples: 'Let us go to Judea.' His disciples said to him: 'Rabbi, it is not long since the Jews wanted to stone you! are you going back again?'" (Jn. 11: S-9) The spiritual presence of Jesus to his friends in Bethany is intense. But why, after learning of the condition of Lazarus, does he prolong the separation? The reason he gives to his disciples is quite surprising: "Lazarus is dead, and *for your sake I am glad that I was not there*, so that you may believe. But let us go to him" (14-15). The Gospel continues: "When Martha learned of the arrival of Jesus, she went to meet him, while Mary remained sitting in the house. Martha said to Jesus: '*Lord, if you had been here, my brother would not have died.*'" Jesus did not deny it. "Then she went off to call her sister Mary. She whispered to her: '*The Master is here and wants to see you.*' When Mary had heard this, she got up quickly and went to him. Jesus had not yet come into the village: he was still at the place where Martha had met him. . . . When Mary had

arrived at the place where Jesus was, she threw herself at his feet and said to him: '*LOI-d, if you had been here, my brother would not be dead.*' When Jesus saw her weeping, together with the Jews who had accompanied her, he groaned, and was troubled in spirit" (20-33) The mystery of what Christ's bodily presence can add to his spiritual presence of faith and love is here unveiled for us. The Evangelist of the Word-made-flesh unceasingly draws our attention to this point.

6. The bodily presence of Christ in glory is to be found even in the most unpretentious chapel, where he is waiting. And it remains true, in a sense, to say that he is there in agony until the end of the world, amid the storms of history, and that we dare not sleep during this time.

Must a reproach still be directed to us: " So, you could not stay awake with me for even a hour? " (Mt. 26:40)

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NOTE ON THE REFORMABILITY OF DOGOMATIC FORMULAS

CAN DOGMATIC formulas-such as "one nature three persons," "one person two natures," "transubstantiation," etc.-be changed, or are they untouchable? The hitherto prevalent opinion among traditional theologians was that they are definitive and unchangeable. The recent Declaration of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "in defence of the Catholic doctrine on the Church against certain errors of the present day," dated June 1973,¹ proposes an important change in the official doctrine on this point.

I. *A New Teaching*

In its section 5 on "The notion of the Church's infallibility not to be falsified," it is said first that dogmatic formulas of the Church's Magisterium "were from the beginning suitable for communicating revealed truth," and that "as they are, they remain forever suitable for communicating this truth to those who interpret them correctly." That is, the meaningfulness of these formulas is reaffirmed for the past as well as for the present and the future on condition however that they be "interpreted correctly": this additional clause is not unimportant. For those who are unable to interpret the formulas correctly, they are no longer meaningful.

More important is what follows: some changes were made by way of "suitable expository and explanatory additions" in order "to maintain and clarify their original meaning": in such manner the ancient dogmatic formulas could "remain

¹ AAS 65 (1973) 396-408.

living and fruitful in the habitual usage of the Church." This means to say that the formulas needed explanation and interpretation in order to remain faithful to the original meaning. Shall we say that this is nothing else but the normal way of "dogmatic progress"? Under the pressure of deeper questioning and understanding arising partly from external changes and influences, partly from new philosophical linguistic or religious insights, "distinctions" were proposed to delimit a statement and narrow down the meaning of the terms so as to preclude misunderstanding. This is what happened, e. g., to the aphorism: Outside the Church no salvation: which has come to mean today: no salvation without (visible or invisible) connection with the Church.

The Declaration goes on, and here it breaks new ground in official documents: "It has sometimes happened that in this habitual usage of the Church *certain of these formulas gave way to new expressions which, proposed and approved by the Sacred Magisterium, presented more clearly and more completely the same meaning.*" In other words, ancient dogmatic formulas were set aside and gave way to new expressions in order to *keep the same meaning.*

We are here faced with a new official teaching, one which today is the crux of the rethinking of doctrine and dogma that is going on in the Church. In order to maintain the same meaning in the expressions of the faith, it was necessary at times (and so may be necessary again) to replace the ancient dogmatic formulas by new expressions. The reason is obvious: the meaning of concepts and words evolves with the changing times. The accepted dogmatic formulas, because they are ancient, may fail to convey to our contemporaries the meaning they had for the people of the time when they were coined. They then should give way to new expressions. This was done at times in the past, the Declaration says, and the new expressions were "proposed and approved by the Sacred Magisterium." In the post-Vatican II time of rethinking dogma, initiated by the Council and continued in postconciliar theology, similar changes are likely to happen again.

II. *Changing dogmatic formulas and "dogmatic relativism"*

Some theologians may ask: Does the advocated change of dogmatic formulas include the danger and error of "dogmatic relativism"? The phrase refers to what Pius XII had stigmatized as unacceptable more than twenty years ago, in the Encyclical *Humani generis*.² The Declaration mentions the error, but not in reference to the proposed change but to something else.

The proposed change of dogmatic formulas is based on the inherent inadequacy of every dogmatic formula, as explained in the Declaration. This results from two facts: first, every conceptual expression of a mystery remains "concealed by the veil of faith," it inevitably uses terms in an analogical sense, there are no direct and proper concepts of what is mystery; second, every such expression of a mystery or dogma is place- and time-conditioned. For these reasons, what in the ancient dogmatic formulas was "first expressed incompletely (but not falsely)" can later receive "a fuller and more complete expression." But the meaning "remains ever true and constant in the Church."

Dogmatic relativism is something different. **It** is mentioned in the Declaration to designate two opinions regarding the inability of dogmatic formulas to express revealed truth definitely. The first is described as stating that "dogmatic formulas cannot signify the truth in a determinate way, but can only offer changeable approximations to it, which to a certain extent *distort or alter it*." The second says that dogmatic formulas "signify the truth only in an indeterminate way, this truth being like a goal that is constantly being sought by such approximations." **It** is these opinions that involve dogmatic relativism.

In fact, the above-mentioned inevitable inadequacy of dogmatic formulas does not mean to say that these formulas "to an extent distort and alter" the truth, i.e., are partly true and

•AAS 42 (1950) 561-578.

partly false (to say this implies dogmatic relativism) ³ No, the formulas express the truth incompletely but "not falsely" ; what they express is correct and true. But they can be completed by explanatory additions or even be replaced by a new way of expressing the truth, one which maintains the previous meaning or understanding (which was not false) but which states more clearly or fully the true meaning of the dogmatic formulas. As the Declaration puts it, "the meaning of dogmas ... is determinate and unalterable," i.e., while the formulation can be changed, the meaning cannot.

Accordingly, to admit that dogmatic formulas can be perfected or even replaced by new expressions, while fully preserving the traditional meaning, is not dogmatic relativism. Nor is it the same as to say that truth is never reached but only changeable approximations to it are. Truth is reached, but only partially; what is stated is true but incomplete.

Does the teaching of the Declaration imply that *every* dogmatic formula is perfectible and ever replaceable by another expression? *Humani generis* formerly seemed to say clearly that some dogmatic formulas are not replaceable by another. ⁴ The Declaration insinuates this universal application of the new teaching without stating it explicitly. It only says that "certain of these formulas gave way to new expressions ... which presented more clearly and more completely the same meaning." This statement does not exclude that the same could happen to other, if not all, dogmatic formulas. Actually, the inherent inadequacy of every dogmatic formula would seem to include its perfectibility and even replaceability by another expression. This conclusion was not accepted by Pius XII ⁵ nor, apparently, by Paul VI, so far. ⁶

If these comments are correct, it is right to say that we are

• *Ibid.*

• *Ibid.*, 569.

⁵ *Ibid.*

• Ency. *Mysterium Fidei* (AAS 57 [1965] 757 ff.) referred to in no. 37 of the Declaration.

given in the Declaration a new teaching, a new understanding of the inevitable inadequacy of every dogmatic formulation.

III. *A Question of words?*

After reading the above some may raise the question: is there a *real* difference between saying: dogmatic formulas are definite and they express truth, but they are ever perfectible and eventually replaceable by new expressions-this is accepted by the Declaration; and saying: dogmatic formulas are only "changeable approximations" to the truth "which to a certain extent distort and alter it"; they signify the truth only in an indeterminate way, truth being a goal constantly sought (but not reached) by means of such approximations-which is rejected as "not avoiding dogmatic relativism" ?

Does it not look as though the first statement said in other words that dogmatic formulas are only "changeable approximations" to the truth, since they are inevitably inadequate and essentially perfectible and replaceable? Is that not the same as to say: they are only approximations? A question of words only?

No, there is a difference and an important one. The first statement (acceptable) says that dogmatic formulas express the truth (of a mystery), really but only incompletely and imperfectly. They are true (and *not* partly false and partly true). The second statement means to say that these "changeable approximations" to the revealed truth always distort and alter it, i. e., they are partly true and partly false. This is not correct. Dogmatic formulas do not include falsehood, they are true in what they express, though unable to express the whole of the revealed truth. Therein lies the difference.

A concrete example that is well-known may clarify the issue. Hans Kung's way of speaking about errors in the dogmas which were corrected afterwards, and his reproach to the Church's magisterium of never acknowledging errors, imply a stand that is based on dogmatic relativism. What is false in a dogmatic formula is to be corrected afterwards. This position does not

hold good when what actually happens (in dogmatic development) is this: what was absent or unexpressed in a dogmatic formula or statement is added afterwards: the expression of the revealed truth is completed (but nothing that was false is corrected, there was nothing false in it) . No correction of an error but a fuller expression of the truth is what is at stake.

Traditional theologians will suggest that at the root of the difference lies the acceptance or rejection of a valid analogical knowledge, a knowledge which is true while of necessity being incomplete.

Moreover, to prevent an overstress of the new teaching on the changeableness of dogmatic formulas, we may recall here that the conceptual formulation of a point of faith is of relative importance. More decisive than "intellectual assent" to a formula or statement is the commitment to Christ the Revealer of the whole person, mind and heart and will. Mental assents are included in this life-attitude, and the accurateness of the statements and formulas is important to the extent that inaccuracies are liable to mar the fulness and genuineness of the faith as personal commitment.

IV. *Rethinking Doctrine*

If the above conclusions are warranted, then, while keeping in mind the insistence of the Declaration on preserving unaltered the meaning of dogmatic formulas which is to remain the same in the eventual new expressions of it, we have here an important principle regarding the rethinking of doctrine and dogma. This means that no particular mystery of the faith, or rather its dogmatic formulation, is a priori excluded from the need of being rethought or revised in its expression for our day. The task may be difficult and not without risk regarding the faith. Nor should it be done rashly or hurriedly: much time and thought are needed and no less faith and wisdom. It should nevertheless be attempted. Which means to say that onlookers and critics should show understanding and charity towards theologians who attempt the task. In doing so, they would give proof of faith and knowledge of the faith, as well

as of openness to the needs, both intellectual and spiritual, of our contemporaries.

For this reason it may have been worth while to stress this new teaching of the Declaration. For it is a clear proof that this act of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, while being a warning against errors, -needed no doubt and to be welcomed, -should also be an incentive to further investigation of the riches of Christ who is the summary of our faith.

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THE NOTION OF EFFICIENT CAUSE
IN THE *SECUNDA VIA*

MUCH OF THE literature on Thomas's *secunda via*, both that produced by his friends and that produced by his enemies, seems to proceed on the assumption that "efficient cause" is for Thomas a univocal notion and one that is grasped. A close reading of the texts, however, reveals that it is, on the contrary, a quite complex sort of idea involving some very precise distinctions which the unwary reader is apt to overlook.

In the fifth book of his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, St. Thomas notes, with apparent approval that Avicenna distinguished four modes of efficient causality: *perficiens*, *disponens*, *adjuvans*, and *consilians*.² The perfecting cause is that which effects the ultimate perfection, that which induces (*inducit*) the substantial form in natural things or the artificial form in artifacts. The disposing cause³ is that which does not itself induce the form which is the end of the action but only prepares the matter which is to receive the form.⁴ The assisting cause is one which acts, not for its own end, in producing a form but for the end of the principal cause, as one who aids the king in battle acts for the king's purpose.

¹ That he does approve Avicenna's analysis is evident from the fact that he uses it in his *Commentary on the Physics*, Book II, lect. 5, without qualifying it as being the interpretation of another.

² *Expositio in Metaphysicorum*, lib. 5, lect.

³ In his commentary on the second book of the *Physics*, Thomas calls this the *causa praeparans*.

• St. Thomas cites as an example of a disposing cause one who hews wood and stone for a house. Such a cause, however, is not properly said to be an efficient cause with respect to the house; but, if the disposing cause induces into the matter the *ultimate* disposition upon which the form necessarily follows, then *magis tamen proprie erit efficiens*. It is as a disposing cause, Thomas says, that man generates his offspring. *V Meta.*, lect.

This last mode, *adjuvans*, is the disposition a secondary cause has to a first cause, for secondary causes in any *per se* order of causes always act for the end of the first in the order. A counseling cause, finally, supplies the end and form of the action to be performed.⁵ Such is the bearing of the first agent *per intellectum* to every secondary agent, for the first intelligent efficient cause in any *per se* series supplies to all in the series the end and form of the action, just as the architect of a ship supplies the end and the form of the action to those who build the ship.

To these four modes of causality, Thomas continues, one can reduce everything which makes something *to be* in some way (*quicquid facit aliquid quocumque modo esse*),⁶ whether this be according to the substantial *esse* of a thing or according to its accidental *esse*, as is the case in all motion. Not only, therefore, is that which *makes* something a cause of what is made (*esse substantiale*), but also whatever changes another is the cause of the changed being (*esse accidentale*). Any or all of these four modes, then, may enter into our definition of efficient cause.

In the *Summa theologiae* when St. Thomas treats of God as efficient cause of the universe, he does not begin, as a theologian is entitled to begin, with the biblical account of creation. Rather, he begins with what is sensible and intelligible in the universe, analyses it in light of certain metaphysical principles, and concludes to the existence of a first efficient cause, *quam omnes Deum nominant*.⁷ This *secunda via*, expounded so summarily in the second question of the *Summa*, can be broken down into a number of propositions, each of which must be investigated thoroughly if the cogency of the argument is to be examined: (1) In sensible things there is an order of efficient causes. (2) It is impossible that this order of efficient causes should precede to infinity. (8) There must

• Cf *II Phys.*, lect. 5: *Consilians ... est quod dat agentis formam per quam agit.*

⁶ *V Meta.*, lect. 2.

⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. S, c.

be a first efficient cause. (4) This first efficient cause everyone acknowledges to be God.⁸

That there is in sensible things an order of efficient causes seems at first glance to be perfectly evident; however, if this is taken to mean that one sensible thing is the cause of another's *esse*, a difficulty arises immediately with respect to the question of whether Thomas would allow that a secondary cause could be an efficient cause in such a sense. In Question Eight of the *Prima Pars* we are told that, since *Esse* is the very nature of God, created *esse* is an effect proper to God, not only in its inception but also in its continuation.⁹ Moreover the more universal an effect is, the more universal and prior must be its cause; because *esse* is the most universal of all effects, it must be attributed to the most universal cause, God, and to him properly.¹⁰ Nor can God even communicate to another the power of effecting *esse*, not even as an instrumental cause, for an instrumental cause participates in the action of a higher cause only inasmuch as the instrument, in accordance with something proper to it, acts dispositively with respect to the effect of the principal cause. But *esse* does not presuppose anything on which an instrumental cause could act dispositively; rather, everything else presupposes *esse*.¹¹

⁸ *Ibid.*

• *Ibid.* q. 8, a. 1, c.: "Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus ejus, sicut ignire est proprius effectus ipsius ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quamdiu in esse conservantur, sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole, quamdiu aer illuminatus manet."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 45, a. 5, c.: "Oportet enim, universaliores effectus in universaliores, et priores causas reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus universalissimum est ipsum esse. Unde oportet, quod sit proprius effectus primae, et universalissimae causae, quae est Deus."

¹¹ *Ibid.*: "Magister dicit in 5. dist. 4. *Sent.* quod Deus potest creaturae communicare potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria auctoritate. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi in quantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis . . . Illud autem, quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud, quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis, scilicet esse absolute . . . Sic igitur impossibile est, quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter, sive per ministerium. Et hoc praecipue inconveniens est dici

These passages however, are reconciled with the above analysis of efficient causality as making something to *be* in some way;¹² Thomas says that beings other than God cannot be causes of being (*essendi*) in the unqualified sense but causes of being *this* (*essendi hoc*).¹³

In discussing divine providence Thomas explains in what ways creatures can be efficient causes. In the case of artifacts the artificer is the cause of the thing's becoming, not of its *esse* directly. For example to *be* a house is consequent upon the form of a house, i. e., a certain composition and order of materials; it is this form which the builder supplies, but he supplies it only by making use of certain natural powers of the materials, for the form is consequent upon these natural powers rather than upon the action of the builder. That is, a house is built by the use of mortar, stones, and wood, which are naturally susceptible of, and naturally inclined to conserve, the form and order which the builder imposes upon them. Consequently, to *be* a house depends upon the natural powers of the materials; to *become* a house depends upon the builder's making use of these natures.¹⁴

Similarly, in natural things, nothing can be the cause of the form, simply as form, of another individual of the same species and, therefore, cannot be the cause of such an individual's *esse*, which accompanies its form;¹⁵ otherwise a thing would be the cause of itself by causing the form which it also has as a mem-

de aliquo corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat, nisi tangendo, vel movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid praeexistens, quod possit tangi, et moveri."

¹² *Vd. supra*, p. 755.

¹³ *II Summa Contra Gentiles*, c. 21.

¹⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 1, c: "Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad ejus fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse ejus: manifestum est enim, quod esse domus consequitur formam ejus: forma autem domus est compositio, et ordo: quae quidem formae consequitur naturalem virtutem quarundam rerum."

¹⁵ *Ibid.*: "Et simili ratione est considerandum in rebus naturalibus: quia, si aliquod agens non est causa formae, in quantum hujusmodi, non erit per se causa esse, quod consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri tantum ... S<d potest esse causa hujusmodi formae, secundum quod est in materia, id est quod haec materia acquirat hanc formam; et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri."

her of that species. However, a natural thing can be a cause of certain matter's *acquiring* the form of its own species, as in the generation of animals or in the generation of fire by fire; but this is to be a cause only *secundum fieri*. In fact, whenever the impression of the agent is received in the patient in the same way (*secundum eandem rationem*) as it exists in the agent, that is, when the agent causes the patient to acquire the same specific form that exists in the agent, the agent is a cause only of the patient's becoming, not of its *esse*. This is necessarily true, for whatever is not cause of the form, as such, cannot be cause of that which accompanies (*consequitur*) the form, the *esse*.¹⁶

On the question of whether a natural thing can truly bestow upon a patient a form other than that which the agent itself possesses, and thus be truly a cause of another's *esse*, St. Thomas was led astray by Aristotelian physics. As a consequence, he considered himself obligated to explain the relationship between celestial bodies and the less perfect bodies of whose generation they are the cause, not only in the sense that they cause the form to be received in certain matter but in the sense that they are the cause of the form as such. An example of this relationship, Thomas tells us, is that which exists between the sun and the air which is illumined by it. Air is not naturally capable of receiving the form of light in the same way (*secundum eandem rationem*) in which that form exists in the sun which is the principle of light; therefore, the "participated" form of light in the air is not of the same nature or species as that of the sun. Rather, it is a form of which the sun is cause, not only *secundum fieri* but *secundum esse*. And this explains why the air ceases to be illumined the instant the sun's action on it ceases.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Ibid.*: " Et ideo quodcumque naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum eandem rationem, secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius."

¹⁷ If the sun were to be the cause of the air's illumination only *secundum fieri*, then the cessation of the sun's action should not effect the cessation of the air's illumination just as the cessation of the builder's action does not effect the cessation

This, of course, involves an apparent contradiction of what Thomas says in many other places; i.e., that *esse* (not *feri*) is an effect proper to God alone.¹⁸ That is, if *esse* accompanies a form in such manner that whatever has a form is a being in act/⁹ then whatever is a cause of a form as such is also a cause of *esse*; and Thomas seems to have granted that at least the sun is such a cause. Moreover those things which have forms *per se* (*formae subsistentes*) would seem to possess *esse per se* in such wise that their continued existence would be no more the effect of God than the continued existence of a house is the effect of its builder. To these objections the answer is given that the *esse* which accompanies (*consequitur*) a created form presupposes a divine influx, just as the transparency of air is an accompaniment of light presupposing the sun's influx.²⁰ And yet creatures are truly causes of the *esse* of others, for that certain things continue to exist depends upon the continued existence of their causes. For example, Aristotle's *primus motus* is the cause of the continuance of generation; the *secundum motus*, of diversity; Saturn, perhaps, of permanence or fixity.²¹ Were

of the house's existing. Thomas was faced with a further difficulty, or with what seemed to be a difficulty due to the Aristotelian physics; i. e., fire is the cause of heat in any object only *secundum fieri*, and yet removing an object from a fire results in that object's gradually losing its form of heat. (Were the form to be lost instantaneously, as air loses its form of light when the sun ceases its action, Thomas would very likely have been forced to consider fire as the cause of an object's heat *secundum esse*.) That the object does not lose its heat instantaneously is due to its receiving the impression of fire *secundum eandem rationem* as it exists in the fire; that it does gradually lose the form of heat is due to its participating the form in a feeble and imperfect way. "Si autem imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter debilem participationem principii caloris." *Summa Theol.*, I. q. 104, a. 1, c. Connected with this Aristotelian analysis is the advice Hamlet gives Polonius about keeping Ophelia out of the sun.

¹⁸ *Vd. supra.*

¹⁹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 1, obj. 1: "Esse autem per se consequitur formam: quia unumquodque secundum hoc est ens actu, quod habet formam."

²⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 1: "... esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei ... Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis, et corporibus coelestibus magis est in Deo qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma, vel in materia talium creaturarum."

²¹ *Ibid.*, a. 2, c.

these to cease, the accidents of generation, diversity, and fixity would cease to exist.

With respect to this causality of form St. Thomas says that it is evident that whatever is made is similar to the maker, for *omne agens agit sibi simile*; therefore, whatever makes a natural thing bears some similarity to a composite: either the maker *is* a composite, or the entire composite which is made, both as to its form and its matter, exists *in virtute* of the maker. This last is proper to God; therefore, all information of matter (*informatio materiae*) is from God, either immediately or by some corporeal agent; it is not possible that even an angel should be the immediate cause of information.²²

This *virtus* of the maker, however, is not all that is required in the information of matter. Even though the supreme being has the maximum of universal power, the patients of that power are not *immediately* proportioned to receiving that universal power but through some mediating powers which are greatly particularized and contracted (*per medias virtutes magis particulares et contractas*). This is evident in the order of corporeal things, for the celestial bodies are the principles of generation in men and other "perfect"²³ animals, not immediately but through the particularized power which is in the human seed.²⁴

Again, it is to be noted, those beings which are posited as true causes of *esse* (through always dependent in their action upon an influx from the primary cause) are celestial bodies. It would seem that Thomas's philosophical sense demanded that he reserve the causality of *esse* to God, and yet he was forced to reconcile his own philosophical principles with Aristotle's physics. Had he been disabused of his conception of celestial bodies as being of some superterrestrial substance and exerting

•• *Ibid.*, q. 110, a. c.

•• Because the action of "imperfect" animals is so feeble, the principle of generation in the celestial spheres must act immediately in their formation: "Quamvis quaedam animalia ex putrefactione generantur per solam virtutem caelestium corporum absque semine; quod accidit ratione imperfectionis eorum." *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 9, c.

"*Ibid.*

some superphysical influence on the earth, it seems quite likely that he would have been left without a single example of one creature's being the cause of another's form as such and, consequently, of its *esse*.²⁵ As far as we are presently able to discern, there seems to be no creature the cessation of whose existence would entail the cessation of any species of form, substantial or accidental (locomotion in general is a .species of accidental form), except, of course, its own form where the creature concerned is unique in its species.

This, of course, does not eliminate efficient causality in creatures. Though it may be the case that no creature is able to effect a form as such and that no creature can operate in any way without an influx from the first cause/ ⁶ it is not reasonable. St. Thomas holds, to take the extreme position of certain of the Arabians that no created power ever exerts any influence whatsoever. Nevertheless, whenever there is an order of efficient causes, the second operates in virtue of the first; that is, the first moves the second to act.²⁷ Moreover, if the operation be one of generation by a univocal agent,²⁸ the agent can be only as an instrumental cause with respect to that which is the first cause of the whole species. This instrumental causality, it must be added, is always by way of motion, for it is of the very nature of an instrumental cause that it should be a moved mover.²⁹ Now, if the ultimate effect is a motion, then there must be a recipient of the motion; consequently, no instrumental cause can effect the unqualified existence of a being but only some modification in an already existing being.³⁰ Were an instru-

•• Doubtless, knowing that "spontaneous generation" is not found in nature would have prompted Thomas to alter his views on a celestial corporeal *datw j01'IfULrum*.

•• Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 105, a. 5, "*Utrum Deus operetur in omni operante.*"

•• *Ibid.*, c.

•• A univocal agent generates an individual of the same species as itself, as man generates man; an equivocal agent, of a different species, as the sun in the generation of man; an analogous agent, of a species which merely participates in the perfection of the agent, as the sun is the cause of the participated form of light in the air. *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 88.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 21: "Est enim ratio instrumenti quod sit movens motum."

³⁰ *Ibid.*: "Instrumentum adhibetur propter convenientiam eius cum causato,

mental cause able to effect an *ens* from *non ens*, rather than, for example, man from *something* which is not man, the case would be different.

In another analysis of secondary causality St. Thomas tells us that, though the *esse* of a form in matter does not in itself entail any motion or mutation, except *per accidens*, no corporeal thing acts except as moved. The principle on which a form depends *per se* must be an incorporeal principle; if a corporeal principle is in some way a cause of the form, this happens only because that corporeal principle acts as an instrument of and in virtue of something incorporeal. Inasmuch as a corporeal form cannot begin to be except in matter, and because not just any kind of matter can receive the form, but only the proper matter, it is necessary that matter which does not have the proper disposition be changed in order that the form may be received. It is this changing of the disposition of matter that is attributed to a corporeal agent, which, however, acts in virtue of the incorporeal principle, whose action it determines to a certain form. Accordingly, the form of the generated naturally depends upon the generator in its being educed from the potency of matter, not, however, *quantum ad esse absolutum*. As a consequence, if the action of the generator should cease, the patient's eduction from potency to act, which is *fieri*, would cease, but the form according to which the generated has *esse* would not cease to be. If the act of the first incorporeal principle should cease, however, then the very *esse* of the creature would cease.³¹

Or, as Thomas explains it in another place, no corporeal thing is the cause of another being except inasmuch as it is itself moved, for no body acts except through motion. Neither, therefore, is any body a cause of the *esse* as such of another thing

ut sit medium inter causam primam et causatum et attingat utrumque, et sic influentia primi perveniat ad causatum per instrumentum. Unde oportet quod sit aliquid recipiens primi influentiam in eo quod per instrumentum causatur."

³¹ *De* q. 4, a. 1, c.: As a conclusion to this analysis, Thomas remarks that "Hoc autem agens incorporeum, a quo omnia creantur, et corporalia et incorporalia, Deus est ... a quo non solum sunt formae rerum, sed etiam materiae."

but only of its being moved to *esse*, its becoming.³² Should the motion of the mover cease, then the motion or *fieri* of the patient would also cease; the *esse* of the patient, however, would cease only if the *divine* operation should cease, for *esse* is an effect proper to God.³³

This analysis of the instrumental causality of creatures, however, raises a difficulty with respect to the *quinque viae*. If all creatural efficient causality is instrumental, and if all instrumental causality is a case of *movens motum*,³⁴ the *secunda via* seems to differ not at all from the *prima*, unless, of course, the motion referred to in the *prima via* be restricted to local motion and the *secunda via* be interpreted to refer to quantitative and qualitative changes considered as dispositive causes of generation and corruption.³⁵

However, Thomas offers what seems to be a solution to this difficulty: it is not necessary that there be a real distinction between the motion considered by the *prima via* and the causality noted in the *secunda*, for everything which operates is in some way a cause of being, either substantial or accidental.³⁶ That is, local motion, or any kind of passage from potency to act, can be considered simply as motion, or it can be considered as a substantial or accidental determination of *esse*. Considered in the first way, it supplies the starting point for the *prima via*; considered as a determination of *esse*, it becomes the point of departure for the *secunda via*. Every mover is, of course, an efficient cause, but it is so only in virtue of the fact that it determines or particularizes *esse*. To think of a mover as an efficient cause is to advert to its effect's relation

³² *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 45: "Nullum igitur corpus est causa esse alicuius rei inquantum est esse, sed est causa eius quod est moveri esse, quod est fieri rei."

³³ *Ibid.*

•• Cf. *supra*, note 29.

³⁵ Even with this interpretation of Thomas's intended sense of "motion" a difficulty remains in the likelihood that modern science has demonstrated the possibility, or perhaps even the necessity, of reducing to local motion all of Aristotle's quantitative and qualitative changes in corporeal things.

³⁶ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 47: "Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa essendi, vel secundum esse substantiale, vel accidentale."

to *esse*, to consider its metaphysical rather than merely physical implications.

It seems, then, that when St. Thomas states, as a first proposition of the *secunda via*, that there is an order of efficient causes in sensible things, what he means is this: Certain actions of terrestrial bodies are accidental; that is, they are produced through certain active or passive properties of the agent bodies. These properties, or accidental forms, however, are caused by the substantial form, which together with the body's matter, is the cause of all proper accidents; such accidental forms, then, act only in virtue of the substantial form.³⁷ Further, certain substantial forms are caused by the celestial body which is the *primum alterans*;³⁸ these forms, accordingly, act only in virtue of this *primum alterans*.³⁹ Such a series of forms would constitute an order of efficient causality in sensible things, a series of forms each of which acts only in virtue of that which is next in the series. Since it is a form which is caused⁴⁰ and since *esse* accompanies form, each agent in the series is a cause of and, therefore, an efficient cause.

This order of causality is not to be considered as simply an accidental order; each member of the series depends upon its immediate superior insofar as the superior gives the power in virtue of which the inferior acts, conserves that power, or applies it to its act. Each member acts, then, not only in virtue of its own power but in virtue also of each superior member; consequently, not only is the last member of the series found to be an immediate cause of the final effect but each member of the series operates as an immediate cause of that effect, though

³⁷ *Ibid.*, c. 69: "Agit enim unumquodque secundum quod est actu. Et propter hoc omne corpus agit secundum suam formam."

³⁸ *Ibid.*: "In animalibus autem quae ex putrefactione generantur, causatur forma substantialia ex agente corporali, scilicet corpore caelesti, quod est primum alterans."

•• Cf. *ibid.* In the generation of more perfect animal forms, that of man, for example, a univocal agent is required along with the *primum alterans*, so that *homo generat hominem et sol.*

•• *Ibid.*: "Agens enim naturale non est traducens propriam formam in alterum subiectum, sed reducens subiectum quod patitur, de potentia in actum."

not in the same way.⁴¹ As a result, the final effect is not to be attributed partly to one member of the series and partly to another but entirely to each member of the series, just as that which is accomplished by means of an instrumental cause is to be attributed entirely to the instrument and entirely to the principal agent, but, of course, *secundum alium modum*.⁴²

That there cannot be an indefinite regress in such a series of causes is evident from the fact that each perfection, essential or accidental, in virtue of which the members of the series operate is either a participation in *esse* or a being which is essentially *esse*. Whatever participates in a perfection depends for its origin and conservation on what is essentially the participated perfection,⁴³ and it is only in virtue of such an essential perfection that the series is possible at all. Without this "first" in the series there could be no secondary causality.⁴⁴

As we have seen above every corporeal agent is a moved mover and, therefore, a mediating cause. Now, it is required that before (not in point of time necessarily) all mediating causes there be a first, which is not a mediating cause (otherwise, it would not be a first), for the first cause is the cause of all in the series. If that upon which all the causes depend be removed, then all those causes which depend upon it would also be removed.⁴⁵ Further, this first efficient cause of every

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, c. 70: "Oportet ergo quod actio inferioris agentis non solum sit ab eo per virtutem propriam, sed per virtutem omnium superiorum agentium: agit enim in virtute omnium. Et sicut agens infimum invenitur immediatum activum, ita virtus primi agentis invenitur immediata ad producendum effectum . . . ita non est inconveniens quod producat idem effectus ab inferiori agente et Deo: ab utroque immediate, licet alia et alio modo."

•• *Ibid.*: ". . . sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus."

•• *II Sent.*, dist. 2, a. 1, a. 2, sol: "Cum autem qualibet res, et quidquid est in re, aliquo modo esse participet, et admixtum sit imperfectioni, oportet quod omnis res, secundum totum id quod in ea est, a primo et perfecto ente oriatur."

•• *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 15: "Quod per essentiam dicitur, est causa omnium quae per participationem dicuntur . . . Deus autem est *ens* per essentiam suam: quia est ipsum esse. Omne autem aliud ens est ens per participationem . . . Deus igitur est causa essendi omnibus aliis."

"*II Metaphys.*, lect. 8.

series whatsoever is essentially *esse*, for every efficient cause is in some way a cause of *esse*. What is not essentially *esse* is called a being (*ens*) only because it participates in *esse*, and whatever has any perfection by participation is derived from that which is essentially that perfection.⁴⁶

That this first efficient cause in virtue of which every secondary cause operates is "what everyone acknowledges to be God" may be shown in various ways. The most obvious, however, and the most appropriate to the *secunda via* consists in pointing out that the first cause of all *esse* is the "creator" and conserver of all being; and certainly everyone acknowledges the identity between God and the creator of all things.

To create is simply to be first efficient cause, *ex nihilo* and, therefore, not as moving or altering some subject.⁴⁷ Since whatever might be considered as a subject of divine causality *is*, insofar as it is participation in *esse*, it is itself therefore an effect of the divine causality. Certainly the Being to which all actuality and perfection are to be attributed, both in their origin and in their conservation, all acknowledge to be God.

So St. Thomas concludes his "second way" of demonstrating the existence of God. To evaluate the validity of this conclusion surely the first requirement is that one understand the argument-and that one understand the usually underesti-

•• *II Sent.*, dist. q. 1, a. sol: "Cum autem qualibet res ... aliquo modo esse participet ..."

I Sent., dist. 8, q. 1, a. 1, sol: "Tertia ratio (quod qui est, est maxime proprium nomen Dei) sumitur ex verbis Dionysii, qui dicit, quod esse inter omnes alias divinae bonitatis participationes, sicut vivere et intelligere et huiusmodi, primum est, et quasi principium aliorum, prae habens in se omnia praedicta."

De Malo, q. 3, a. c.: "... cum Deus sit ens per suam essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum esse, oportet quod quocumque modo est, derivatur ab ipso, nihil enim aliud est quod sit suum esse; sed omnia dicuntur entia per participationem. Omne autem quod per participationem dicitur tale, derivatur ab eo quod est per essentiam; sicut omnia ignita derivantur ab eo quod est per essentiam ignis."

⁴⁷ *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 16: "Nihil enim est aliud creare quam absque materia praeiacenti aliquid in esse producere." C. 17: "Motus enim omnis vel mutatio est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi ... In hac autem actione non praeexistit aliquid in potentia quod suscipat actionem ... Igitur non est motus neque mutatio."

mated complexity of Thomas's conception of " efficient cause." One hopes that calling attention to some of the passages in which St. Thomas makes this complexity explicit may contribute to a more balanced verdict on the cogency of the *Secunda Via*.

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ON JUDGING

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS in thomistic critique of knowledge-usually though not too aptly called epistemology-could be summed up as centered on a growing awareness of the importance of the act of judging as the full and complete act of human knowing, that in which truth is for the first time formally present as known. These characteristics had indeed been known all along, but in a rather theoretical and abstract way. Their bearing on the critique of knowledge has been fully acknowledged by Scholastics only in the last thirty years or so, at least if one is to take the best known and most used manuals as guide.

There are many reasons for this state of affairs. Among them some doctrinal and historical ones seem particularly pertinent. Perhaps the main doctrinal factor is that in the normal course of philosophy judging was treated only from a logical perspective, as judgment, the second act of the mind. Since the first act, conception or simple apprehension, leads to the second which is logically symbolized as S is P , and therefore expressed as a proposition in which there appears to be a mental synthesis of two previously formed concepts, the act of judging was treated as such a union (or disjunction, in negations) of two concepts. The act of judging was thus supposed to display itself fully in the form of the proposition, and the logical properties of propositions were investigated. After this the act of judging was considered to have been sufficiently treated. It was not later treated from the psychological point of view, as a full-blooded act of the mind; and as a result its central significance in the critique of knowledge was overlooked. After all, if the judgment is only the union of two previously formed concepts, it does not add anything new to the content of knowledge, with the result that knowing will be reduced, in its

essentials, to conception; and the critique of knowledge will deal almost exclusively with this.

Concepts are abstract and universal. They do not directly refer to the existential order of really existing things. If the judgment does no more than unite two concepts the existence expressed in the copula "is" will be no more than mental. Thought, even when leading to judgment, will then be confined to the immanent or conceptual order, and the age-old problem of how to relate thought to reality will place itself in the forefront of critical reflection. Moreover, precisely because concepts are universal, the prototype of human judgments will be taken to be found in universal propositions such as that oldest inhabitant of logical text-books: all men are mortal. Singular, and especially existential judgments will be treated as oddities and of little value. The attempt to establish the existential reference of thought, in such a context, to reality has absorbed the energies of many an almost despairing realist.

This way of conceiving judgment and of placing the critical problem is connected with another doctrinal matter, one that is thoroughly metaphysical: the notion of being and of existence. Insofar as the judgment makes use of the copula it affirms existence, so that to consider the act of judging is at once to raise the question of existence; and if the judgment is confined to the conceptual and abstract order, such existence will be seen either as merely mental or, at most, as factual givenness of the objects represented in the terms of the judgment and reached by the mind in some non-intellectual way, by instinct, sympathy, common sense, or even by faith. This in turn leads to—or perhaps it springs from—a completely impoverished notion of existence as mere factual givenness, to the neglect of its properly metaphysical value. It is no casual coincidence that a more enlightened approach to the study of judging has gone hand in hand with a return to a genuinely thomistic appreciation of being and with developments in contemporary philosophy leading in the same direction.

The trend towards what we may call conceptualism, or essentialism, may be to some extent innate in the version of

thomism which had won most support since the revival in the last century. It can be partly explained as due to the predominance of the aristotelean elements (as typified in logic) to the neglect of Thomas's own specific contribution, particularly where existence is concerned. But the emergence of the conceptualist trend is also due largely to the influence of other historical currents of thought. One need not go back further than Descartes to detect one main source of this kind. For him, knowledge consists entirely in conception, or, as he put it, intuition; and the object of such intuition is the clear and distinct idea, the singular but totally immanent object of the mind. This not only at once raises the famous problem of the "bridge" from the mind to existent reality; it devalues the judgment, so much so that Descartes assigns it to the will, not to intellect; and evidently it can be nothing more than the mental union of two ideas.¹ This way of viewing human knowledge, and of placing the critical problem, became so common that Scholastic thought could not but be affected. The mathematicism which is explicitly central in Descartes came to be at least implicitly assumed by others, thus effectively setting philosophy upon the path of immanentism, with consequent neglect of the existential order.

This "mathematicizing" tendency passes through Spinoza and Leibniz to reach its climax in Wolff for whom philosophy deals entirely with the ideal order of essences and essential relationships, whereas all questions of existential import are relegated to the sciences. Philosophy, for him, deals only with what is possible. It shows no concern for the actual or existent. Intellect becomes the faculty of conceiving ideas, while reason is the power of grasping the relation between them and of drawing conclusions. Judging is simply the correlation of ideas.² The cartesian principle of immanence was equally fundamental to the empiricist school of thought which reduced knowledge to the basic elements of images or sense impressions and in-

¹ *Principia Philosophiae*, I, 32-34; A.T. VIII, 17.19-18.10.

• *Philosophia Rationalis sett Logica*, P.I, Sect. 1, c.1, § 40; Sect. 2, c. 4, § 198.

licated the principle of association of ideas as the basis of judgment. For Locke knowledge is therefore "nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas." ³ When this connection is certainly perceived we can speak of knowledge; otherwise we have no more than judgment "which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so." ⁴ The propositions of which we may be certain have no reference to existence; they concern "only the essences of things, which, being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence ... give us no knowledge of real existence at all." ⁵ Nevertheless, Locke maintained that we have "knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of other things by sensation." ⁶

Hume pushed this approach to its logical conclusion. If knowing is reduced to having impressions and ideas, the three acts of understanding (concept, judgment and reasoning) "all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects." ⁷ There is no such thing as a distinct act of judging; and Hume finds confirmation for this in the so-called existential judgment (v. g., God is) where, he says, there are not two ideas but only one. For "the idea of existence is no distinct idea," ⁸ so that we can form a proposition which contains only one idea. Hume seems at least to have grasped the connection between judgment and existence; to reject one implies rejection of the other." The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on it

³ *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV, 1,2.

• *Ibid.*, 14,4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7,1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 7,3.

⁷ *A Treatise of Human Nature* I, iii, 7 (Oxford: Selby-Bigge, 1951, 456); cf. I, iii, 9 (108); III, i, 1 (456).

⁸ *Ibid.*, I, iii, 7 (96n).

as existent, are nothing different from each other." ⁹ "We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects." ¹⁰ If this be so, it will be easy to show that the idea of an effect (that which begins to exist) does not imply that of a cause; for "'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle." ¹¹ The net result of all this is that, for Hume, existence is simply not known; our conviction of existence is explained away as belief.

If Hume reduced judgment to conception, Kant tended to the other extreme of reducing conception to judgment. If intuition is restricted to the order of sense, which is presumed to be that of appearances, the whole content of knowledge will be provided by the senses. There will then be no act of conception as traditionally understood. The function of intellect, and its first act, will be to correlate in purely formal ways the data derived from sense experience; and this correlation is what Kant calls judgment.

Kant seems to have retained this purely formal notion of judgment right through his pre-critical period. In one of his early works he speak of the judging faculty as belonging to internal sense. Its function is to perceive something precisely as a property of another to which it is attributed. This leads to the formation of a concept, insofar as a representation is changed into a concept when it is to a subject. Since this subject is already present to the mind, the judgment does not imply more than a clarification of the subject. It does not lead to increase in knowledge; all it does is to clarify by means of analysis. ¹² Consequently Kant hold that judgment does not bear on existence, and indeed that existence is never a predicate or a determination of anything. Like Hume he holds that, if

• *Ibid.*, I, ii 6 (66, 67) cf. I, ii, 7 (94).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, App. endix (623).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, iii, 3 (79).

¹² *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen* (1762), final section; *Werke* (Berlin, 1902-1938), II, 57-61.

one thinks of an object in all its essentials and as non-existent, and then thinks of it as existing, there is no change in that object. If existence is predicated, it will be attributed not to the object but to its idea; and the idea does not contain existence. Hence judgment is not concerned with things but with concepts. Real existence belongs only to a subject as given in reality. It means the absolute positing of a thing, not its relation to other things or to its properties. Such positing adds nothing to the essence; except where God is concerned it is known only *a posteriori*. Judgment therefore, as regarding only the analysis of the subject, bears only on the essence, whereas existence lies outside the whole order of essence.¹⁸ The judgment can do no more than attribute to a subject a predicate already, although confusedly, contained in it.¹⁴

Kant's notice for his lectures in 1765-6 gives a summary statement of his ideas at this time. The teacher, he says/; should follow the order of man's mental evolution: the intellect, by means of experience, forms judgments, and then concepts; these concepts are then ordered among themselves according to the relation of ground and consequence by means of reason, so that they may all be shown in that organic totality to which science gives expression.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* preserves and develops these same notions. The understanding is defined as the faculty of thinking by means of concepts, as distinct from knowing (which requires also intuition) . The concepts of understanding are, of themselves, pure, as divorced from sense intuition they are empty. They arise from the spontaneous activity of the understanding; and this activity is essentially that of uniting diverse representations under one. The concept is never related immediately to an object but only to another representation (whether concept or intuition). The only use which under-

¹⁸ *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* (1763); *Werkell*, 72-81; cf. *K.r.V.*, B.626-7 (the "hundred thalers").

¹⁰ *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen* (1763); *Werke*, II, 203.

¹⁵ *Werke* II, 305. 16-23.

standing can make of concepts is to judge; and this means uniting many representations together, for instance, the more particular under the more general. To judge is to reduce many representations to unity by means of concepts; it is to think by means of concepts which contain other representations by which the concepts may be related to an object. Hence a judgment is mediate knowledge of an object, the representation of the representation of an object.¹⁶ The understanding can therefore be defined as "the faculty of thinking, the faculty of forming concepts, or the faculty of making judgments; and these definitions, once brought to light, come to the same thing."¹⁷ The first act of the understanding is thus that of judging; and this is the same as having concepts which can unify different representations.

Granted this approach, it is inevitable that the speculative judgments of understanding can never express real existence; they can express only the relations of concepts among themselves or to representations. The existence which they express is uniquely that of the mental synthesis, the logical existence of the copula. Thus, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant affirms that existence can never be known from mere concepts.

Every existential proposition, that is, every proposition that affirms the existence of a being of which I frame a concept, is a synthetic proposition, that is, one by which I go beyond that conception and affirm of it more than was thought in the conception itself, namely, that this concept *in the understanding* has an object corresponding to it *outside the understanding*, and this it is obviously impossible to elicit by any reasoning. There remains, therefore, only one single

¹⁶ *Anal. Cone.* 1 c.1, sect. 1; A. 58; B. 85 Kant goes on to explain (*ibid.*, Sect. 2, § 19; B. 140-142) that a judgment is not the representation of a relation between two concepts. It implies a certain union of representations by means of the intellect; and this union consists in reducing these representations to the objective, and hence necessary, unity of apperception. The function of the copula is to distinguish this objective unity from the merely subjective unity of given representations, such as results from their association. When the intellect unites representations according to principles which objectively determine all representations, we then obtain a judgment which expresses a relation that is objectively valid.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, c.2, sect. 3; A, 126. 25-29; cf. B, 108,8-11.

process possible for reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from the supreme principle of its practical use.¹⁸

Kant's notion of understanding and judgment rules out any possibility of speculative knowledge of existence. For him, as for the logician and the mathematician, the existence expressed in judgment is, as such, that of the mental synthesis of concepts.

If we look for a more modern approach to judgment that is still mainly logical, yet with at least some awareness of the psychology of the act of judging and of its relation to reality, we could hardly do better than turn to Bertrand Russell. He is neither the first nor the only important thinker to treat of judgment in recent times. He learned much from Frege; and G. E. Moore had written an influential article on "The Nature of Judgement" in 1899.¹⁸ But Russell set to work to analyze and examine in depth the logic of propositions in current use as well as those which have puzzled philosophers. His views on this topic, as indeed his philosophy also, changed and developed, but there is a certain consistency in his approach, at least after he had abandoned the objectivist views expressed in the first edition (1903) of his *Principles of Mathematics* where, as he says himself, he "shared with Frege a belief in the Platonic reality of number."¹⁹

Assuming that we have immediate knowledge ("by acquaintance") only of sense-data (and of our own mental acts) Russell concluded that propositions deal with facts rather than things. He went on to enquire what is required on the part of such facts for a proposition to be meaningful. If we do not know things (except by "description") and yet to them in propositions, it seems that they can be no more than logical constructions out of the sense-data that are known. The only

¹⁸ *Werke*, V, 139; trans. of T. K. Abbott.

¹⁸- *Mind*, XXIV, pp. 176-199. In this article both things and propositions are regarded as colligations of concepts. The essays (1903-1920) now grouped together in Moore's *Principia Ethica* can be described as a series of questions concerning judgment in the writings of Idealists in ethics, and in relation to perception and similar topics.

¹⁹ *The Principles of Mathematics*, 2nd. ed. (London, 1937); Intro., X.

truly singular proposition will then be that which refers immediately to an empirical datum. There was a difficulty about proper names, for they seem to refer to individuals, as when one says: Scott is the author of *Waverly*. He met this by the theory of definite descriptions which reveals that "Scott" is there a description, or predicate, rather than a subject; for the meaning of the proposition is: "x wrote *Waverly*" is equivalent to "x is Scott" is true for all values of x. This, notes Russell, "swept away the contention-advanced, for instance, by Meinong-that there must, in the realm of Being, be such objects as the golden mountain and the round square, since we can talk about them."²⁰

By making use of Frege's notion of a propositional function he was then able to extend his analysis to logically proper names and to propositions which affirm existence. The propositional function is an incomplete expression with a variable such that if a definite value (a grammatical subject, or, in Frege's term, an argument) be substituted for it the function will become a proposition which is either true or false. The example already given ("x wrote *Waverly*") is such a function. The difficulty about logically proper names is that their meaning seems to lie in their denoting some singular and existing object. If so, to affirm the existence of such an object appears to be a tautology, whereas to deny its existence would be a contradiction. To escape this dilemma Russell suggested that existence can never be affirmed except by means of the properties of a thing; in other words, the proper name denotes by means of a property, namely, the property of having an instance. The individual is denoted by the argument (which can be a relation as well as a property) which satisfies a propositional function.

From this point of view existence is no longer to be seen as a property belonging to things. This is evident enough when the existence in question is that only of the copula, of definition, of equality, of implication, of membership of a class or of the

•• *Ibid.*, cf. "Logical Atomism," in *Contemporary British Philosophy* I (London, pp. 857-888.

inclusion of one class in another. These are all logical notions regarding the union of function and argument. But it is also true of existence in the sense of "to exist." The theory of descriptions shows that a judgment of existence does not attribute existence to things represented by a grammatical subject; that judgment only asserts that a certain description is applicable, a certain name is appropriate, an argument fulfills a certain function. For instance, the propositional function: "x is a man" gives rise, for certain arguments, to true propositions. Hence existence does not qualify things, even indirectly, through properties; it is property of propositional functions, the property of having certain instances so that the resulting proposition is true in at least one case. The fundamental meaning of existence is that arguments exist which satisfy propositional functions." Other meanings are either derived from this, or embody mere confusion of thought. We may correctly say 'men exist,' meaning that 'x is a man' is sometimes true Though it is correct to say 'men exist,' it is incorrect, or rather meaningless, to ascribe existence to a given particular x who happens to be a man." ²¹ To attribute existence to individuals is to commit the error of transferring to an individual who satisfies a propositional function a predicate which applies only to the propositional function. "It will be found," adds Russell, "that by bearing in mind this simple fallacy we can solve many ancient philosophical puzzles concerning the meaning of existence." ²²

This treatment of judgment—more accurately, of the proposition—by Russell may be described as logico-semantic. It is an enquiry into the meaning of propositions, particularly in view of the problems set by propositions which are false or which refer to objects which do not exist or at least cannot be known to exist. It is an attempt to explain how such propositions can have meaning, on the assumption that we perceive

²¹ *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 2nd. ed. (London, 1920), pp. 164-5.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 165; cf. *A History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1945), c. 81, pp. 859, 860.

only sense-data. Its scope is therefore restricted both by that assumption and by the perspective of meaningfulness. Russell however, like Frege, recognizes the distinction between the proposition and its assertion, or at least the assertion of its truth or falsehood.²³ He finds that "it is almost impossible, at least to me, to divorce assertion from truth, as Frege does ... To divorce assertion from truth seems only possible by taking assertion in a psychological sense."²⁴ He does not entirely neglect the act of judging from the psychological point of view, although here also his chief problem remains that of meaning.

Rejecting the view that judgment is just a complex symbol, he holds that it has a specific nature and unity of its own. At first he saw it as a multiple relation between a perceiving Ego and an objective state of affairs; although how an objective state of affairs can be judged, if all that is immediately known is sense-data, remains unexplained. Later, under the influence of W. James, he came to hold that the Ego is not known as an empirical subject but only as a sequence of thoughts and events. Judgment was then seen as an arranging of images in the mind. Some images represent individuals, others represent properties and relations. It seems to be taken for granted that these images have meaning. What is then asserted is a relation between these images as arranged in the mind and facts; while belief (as in the case: A believes that B loves C) is explained, after the manner of Hume, as a feeling of assent to a proposition.²⁵

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²³ Cf. for instance *The Principles of Mathematics*, ed., Appendix A, 5W-4. 2. *Ibid.*, p. 504.

²⁵ Cf. "On Propositions" (1919); reprinted in *Logic and Knowledge* ed. R. C. Marsh (London, 1956), ff. For a detailed discussion of Russell's theories from 1905-1919 cf. D. F. Pears: *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy* (London, 1968), especially cc. 1, 5, also A. J. Ayer: *Russell* (London, pp. E. Riverto: *La filosofia analitica in Inghilterra* (Roma, 1969) 196-9.

The Return to Judgment

One thing that emerges clearly from a review of philosophical opinions since the end of the last century is that the central role of judgment in any theory of knowledge has come to be acknowledged. This is understandable enough where the philosophers are idealists. It is something quite new in the empiricist tradition where the prevalence of the analytical approach had reduced knowing, ultimately, to a succession of isolated images or impressions which are then united or associated in the mind. It was presumably Russell's interest in logic that led him to restore judgment to something like its rightful place in the knowledge process, even if he was more interested in the proposition than in the act itself of judging. This is also true of Wittgenstein who realized that it is through study of the proposition that we can begin to understand how language has meaning. For it is only the proposition that has meaning; a name acquires meaning only in the context of the proposition.²⁶ thought is expressed in the proposition; thought is the proposition as sensed.²⁷ The proposition is distinct from its assertion and must have meaning prior to its assertion, for what is asserted is precisely the meaning of the proposition.²⁸ Wittgenstein, however, was not interested in the act of judging or of asserting. This he regarded as a question for psychology and outside the limits of his enquiry.²⁹ After Wittgenstein the central importance of the proposition for the study of thought and language was taken for granted by the English Analysts. It should be noted, however, that Peter Strawson took Russell to task for neglecting the distinction between the proposition (or sentence) and its assertion. The sentence, he says, has meaning but is never true or false. Denotation, and therefore truth and falsehood, are present only when the sentence is used, in given circumstances, to assert

²⁶ *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 8.8.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.064.

²⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 4. IIIIIa; and Norman Malcolm: *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (London, 1958), p. 86.

something; and one such use is denotation, if the sentence is used to refer to some particular thing.³⁰ In this respect Strawson agrees with Gilbert Ryle.³¹

It was more to be expected that philosophers of the idealistic tradition would retain or recover the notion of judgment as the ultimate complete unit of thought. Idealism dwells by preference on the immanent contents of consciousness and on the mental acts by which they are seized and synthesized. In England F. H. Bradley had since 1883³² attacked the empiricist tradition; and it may well be that his influence helped Moore and Russell to appreciate the importance of judgment.^{32a} At any rate, Bradley insisted that the basic unit of human knowledge is the judgment, which is far more than an association of ideas or images. In his later and best known work he maintained that "every kind of thought implies a judgment, in this sense that it ideally qualifies reality";³³ more concisely, "if there is no judgment, there is no thought."³⁴ The mind does not just entertain a thought or idea; it refers it to reality. And this shows that the traditional logical way of viewing judgment as an abstract unity of ideas is incomplete. To see what judgment is one has to consider it at the moment when it is asserted, for only then does it relate to reality.

Reality is always found to imply a "that" and a "what," or, in other words, "existence" and "character."³⁵ The

³⁰ "On Referring" (*Mind*, 1950); reprinted in A. Flew (ed.): *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* (London, 1956), pp.

³¹ "The Theory of Meaning," in A. C. Mace: *British Philosophy in Mid-Century* (London, 1957), pp. ff.

•• *The Principles of Logic* (Oxford, 1883), especially Bk. I.

•• Cf. D. Pears: "The empiricists operated with ideas rather than with judgements or propositions, and this, Bradley thought, was a mistake. Now the empiricists' neglect of judgements had always been the main target of idealist criticism: it was really the deepest difference between Kant and Hume. What Russell did was to absorb this part of the idealist tradition, and to put it at the service of empiricism. For the new philosophy is really an empiricism based on judgements or propositions instead of being based on ideas" ("Logical Atomism," in *The Revolution in Philosophy*, London, 1956; p.

³⁸ *Appearance and Reality*, ed. (Oxford 1897), p.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 143, 148.

" what " as grasped by the mind is ideal, " a quality made loose from its own existence." ³⁶ It is this which is represented in the idea, and in the judgment the idea is predicated of a reality, it is used to qualify further the " that " of a subject. ³⁷ "The point is whether with every judgment we do not find an aspect of existence, absent from the predicate but present in the subject, and whether in the synthesis of these aspects we have not got the essence of judgment. And for myself I see no way of avoiding this conclusion." ³⁸ The subject of judgment is thus an actual existence. " In every judgment the genuine subject is reality, which goes beyond the predicate and of which the predicate is an adjective." But Bradley is careful to add: " The subject is never *mere* reality, or bare existence without character . . . For judgment is the differentiation of a complex whole, and hence is always analysis and synthesis in one." ³⁹ And as regards existence, surely with Hume's view in mind, he remarks:

You will find that the object of thought in the end must be ideal, and that there is no idea which, as such, contains its own existence. The " that " of the actual subject will for ever give a something which is not a mere idea, something which is different from any truth, something which makes such a difference to your thinking, that without it you have not even thought completely. ⁴⁰

For Bradley truth implies the relationship of the object of one affirmation to all else in reality, so that all reality must form one whole, the Absolute. We find a similar conviction in his younger contemporary Leon Brunschvicg, for whom reality is a whole whose nature is revealed in thought, and especially in the central mental activity of judgment. As he puts it, " the nature of being is dependent (*suspendu a*) on the nature of the

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 144,

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 149.

•• *Ibid.* In a note on p. 324 Bradley gives us to understand that Bosanquet's notion of judgment is similar to his own: " I may refer the reader here to my *Principles of Logic*, or, rather, to Mr. Bosanquet's *Logic*, which is, in many points, a great advance on my own work."

affirmation of being." ⁴¹ But his notion of judgment is not the traditional one:

By making the judgment of attribution, where the copula signifies the inherence of an attribute in a subject, the exclusive type of judgment and the one to be considered in relation to the problem of truth, the scholastic tradition has patently begged the question.⁴²

The only reality directly accessible to us is thought itself, and the basic intellectual activity is judgment, for it is only through analysis of the judgment that we come to know the relations expressed in concepts. ⁴³ The unity of judgment precedes the multiplicity of concepts. ⁴⁴ Judgment is not a relation between two terms.

"It is raining," or "I am," express, in the clearest and most simple manner, real acts of affirmation. One must therefore hold that a judgment need contain only one term ... The diversity of forms of judgment suffices to establish that the essential and characteristic element of judgment, perhaps what alone suffices to constitute it, is the copula.⁴⁵

It is in the verb that being finds expression; under the form of necessity in the judgment of interiority; under the form of reality in the judgment of exteriority; and under the form of possibility in the judgment of contingency formed by the fusion of the other two. "Every process of the intellect is an effort to grasp being; it results in a judgment; and the verb is char-

⁴¹ *La modalite du jugement*, (1897) 2nd. ed. (Paris, 1934), p. 78; cf. p. 94.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Introd., iii.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁴ Jacques Havet thus explains this point: "the existence of the objects of knowledge is entirely relative to the truth of the judgment attesting them; the judgment precedes the terms which it brings together and the copula 'is' has no force of existence, but simply expresses the act of synthesis which is the proper function of the mind. The truth of judgment or, in other words, the objectivity of knowledge and, equally, the validity of the assertion of an object's existence, can derive only from the mutual correspondence between the series of relationships united in a single synthesis." In "French Philosophical Tradition between the two Wars," *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States*, edited by Marvin Farber (Buffalo, 1950), p. 15.

⁴⁵ *La modalite du jugement*, p. 15.

acteristic of the judgment." ⁴⁶ What is first affirmed is existence, as in the judgment of existence: "that is" (*cela est*). This is the

first form by which the spirit shows, in the presence of things, its power of affirmation. In this judgment the "that," being no more than the indeterminate subject on which the copula confers existence, adds nothing to the copula; the primitive judgment turns out to be the copula . . . whose whole content is summed up in the affirmation of reality . . . The "that is" provides the criterion of reality; reality resides in it; it is defined by it.⁴⁷

In succeeding judgments the mind qualifies this existent (which for Brunschvicg is ideal and immanent) by means of a predicate. ⁴⁸ This activity is creative; the judgment gives rise to its object. It is the history of science which reveals the journey of the spirit from its first abstract affirmations towards the completely unfolded universe which we call reality.

Brunschvicg has made the theory of judgment the cornerstone of his philosophy. Few more than he have stressed the central role of judgment in forming our view of reality our theory of knowledge, and our metaphysics. If judgment is basically the affirmation of being, our approach to the question of being should be by way of the judgment. It is this fundamental conviction, or intuition, which lies at the base of his philosophy, and it is well expressed in his own words:

If one agrees to designate by two words generally taken as synonymous two ideas which are philosophically distinct, if one designates by *copula* the union of the two terms of a determinate and concrete judgment, by *verb* the affirmation of being in general and independently of the particular judgments which manifest it, one can say that the question of the meaning and value of the copula presupposes that the question of the meaning and value of the verb has been solved. For us, this question is the fundamental one of critical philosophy. Beginning with the definition of philosophy we have been led to admit that metaphysics is reduced to the theory of knowledge, that the constitutive act of knowledge is the judgment,

•• *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 117, 118.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 170, 171.

and that the judgment is characterized by the affirmation of being.⁴⁹

Whereas Brunschvicg looks to mathematics to provide the highest type of judgment, Benedetto Croce finds it, on the contrary, in history. Like Brunschvicg he holds that all reality, insofar as known, is immanent to Spirit; but the primary activity of Spirit for him is theoretical. This includes first of all the intuitive grasp of singulars by means of imagination, and then the logical activity of thought which bears on universals. Thought comes to full expression in judgment which is its central and complete act. In it a universal predicate is referred to a singular subject, thus implying a synthesis of concept and intuition, of essence and existence, of logic and history.

Croce has little time for those who deal with the judgment from the purely logical point of view.

We must free ourselves from the false theories about judgment which for centuries have lazily spread themselves in treatises on logic and which even today are found or have taken root in them. I refer not only to its grammatical conception as a union of two words by means of the verb "to be" (whence formalistic and verbalistic logic), but also to that which makes it consist in the agreement or otherwise of two "concepts." This last, especially, is the worst and most persistent error. The process of freeing oneself from this error began with Kant in particular and was furthered by Fichte and Hegel although they did not bring it to completion. This requires that we see the judgment as the synthesis of representation and concept, of intuition and category, as an act that is at once division and reunion of the concept, of the concrete concept, in the two elements which form its unbreakable unity, the universal and the individual, the logical and the intuitive. In other words: the judgment is always a judgment of fact; and since the fact is nothing more than the history of past or present reality (which form one whole) the judgment is always a historical one.⁵⁰

His theory is set out in detail in the second volume of his *Filosofia dello Spirito*,⁵¹ especially in Part I, Section 2. Having

•• *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵⁰ *Saggi Filosofici*, VII: *Ultimi Saggi* (Bari, 1968): "Intorno all'intuito e al giudizio," p.

"*Logica come scienza del concetto puro* (1905), Srd. ed., Bari, 1917.

pointed out, in the first three chapters, that abstract and universal judgments are really concealed definitions, he goes on to consider the individual judgment which contains a concept and an individual. He holds that the subject and predicate are distinct only if one is universal and the other not so; that is, if one is a concept and the other not a concept.⁵² This means that the subject is a representation, the predicate a concept; and in Croce's theory, where representation stands for intuition, this means that the individual judgment is a judgment of perception, and this is really an intellectual intuition, since to perceive is to apprehend a thing as having a certain quality. This individual judgment completes the process of knowing as possession of reality.⁵³

It is the last and most perfect of the acts of knowing; in it the cycle of knowing is closed . . . To regard it as the first act of knowledge, as mere sensibility, and to derive concepts from it, either through psychological mechanism or by choice, is the error of Sensists and Empiricists. To conceive it as a judgment, and nevertheless place it at the start of the knowing process and draw concepts from it by further elaboration, is the error of Rationalists and Intellectualists. Against all these one must firmly hold that the first moment of knowledge is *intuitive* and not perceptive; and that concepts are not *derived* from the intellectual act of perception but enter it as constituents of the act itself.⁵⁴

From this it follows that the "is" is really a copula only in the individual judgment, for there it unites two distinct elements, one being a representation and the other being logical.⁵⁵ The individual judgment always implies that the subject exists, for in it existence is always predicated.⁵⁶ £

⁵² *Ibid.*, c. 4, p. 105.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁵⁴ **Ibid.*, p. 107; cf. *ibid.*, P. 4, c. 3, pp. 390 ff.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 5, p. 109.

⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 117: Such objections as "If existence is predicated it would imply that, in the judgment 'A exists,' one could think of both terms separately (namely, A and existence), and that to think of A is already to attribute existence to it, turn out to be sophisms; because A, outside the judgment, cannot be thought but only represented; hence it lacks existentiality, a predicate which it acquires only in the act of judging."

there were a pure form of the existential judgment, it would be this: something exists. This, however, is not really an individual judgment but a concealed definition: reality is what exists.⁵⁷ Other types of empirical judgments presuppose the pure existential one and determine its subject through classification, i.e., by reducing it to a class; but to classify is not to judge.⁵⁸ Finally Croce comes to identify the judgment of definition and the individual one insofar as in fact they are made by the one actual historical thinker.⁵⁹

Passing now from both the empiricist and the idealist schools of thought to more realist ones mention should be made of A. Trendelenburg who, during his many years of teaching in Berlin until his death in 1872 helped to direct the attention of his students to the philosophy of Aristotle. Although he himself favored a platonic kind of idealism which pointed to the presence of an ideal element in reality, and thought of reality as spiritual and evolving, he examined the epistemological and logical basis of Aristotle's logic which he thus helped to restore to favor.⁶⁰

It was partly through his influence that his student Franz Brentano came to appreciate Aristotle's teaching and to seek its help in his opposition to Kant and the Idealists. Already in his Tiibingen dissertation⁶¹ he set himself against Kant by explaining the unity of our experience, not by reference to the transcendental subject (*Ich denke*) but— in the Aristotelean tradition—by invoking the notion of evidence as the experience of an immediate presence. This recall to evidence was to become a central theme in many later trends of philosophy; so too his teaching on the intentionality of psychic acts which, for him, were basically three: representation, or having an

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, c. 6; pp. 118 ff.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Sect. 3, cap. 1; pp. 133 ff.

•• Cf. his *Elementa logices aristotelicae* (Berlin, 1936); *Logische Untersuchungen*, *ibid.*, vol. 1 (1840); 3rd. ed. (1870).

⁶¹ *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Frieburg im Bressgau,

object before the mind; judgment; and affection. Using this notion he could replace Kant's distinction between a posteriori and a priori judgments by that between experience of the abstract universal and experience of the concrete singular as two inseparable modalities of the same reality.

Brentano is just as convinced as Bradley, Brunschvicg or Croce that knowledge, in the full sense of the word, is found only in judgment.⁶² It is not the first of the acts of the mind; it presupposes the prior activity of representation.⁶³ But he is equally firm in rejecting the concept of the judgment as a simple union or separation of two representations, for it affirms or denies what is represented.⁶⁴ Representation and judgment are two quite distinct attitudes of consciousness to the one object; in the first it is just present to the mind; in the second it is affirmed or denied.⁶⁵

Judgment does not require two representations, it is quite possible to affirm or deny one and the same object represented.⁶⁶ Nor does it require the union of two terms, subject and predicate.⁶⁷ The fundamental form of judgment is what Brentano

⁶² *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), ed. O. Kranus, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1924), p. 195.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. II, 225, 263; II, (1925) pp. 33, 34.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200; II pp. 34; 44 ff.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 38, 39, 63. On p. 46 he refers to J. S. Mill's *A System of Logic*, Book I, c. 5. Mill here refers to logicians who "considered a Proposition, or a Judgment, for they used the two words indiscriminately, to consist in affirming or denying one *idea* of another. To judge was to put two ideas together, or to bring one idea under another, or to compare two ideas, or to perceive the agreement or disagreement between two ideas" (8th ed., London, 1949. p. 56). He then goes on to say: "The notion that what is of primary importance to the logician in a proposition is the relation between the two *ideas* corresponding to the subject and predicate (instead of the relation between the two *phenomena* which they respectively express,) seems to me one of the most fatal errors ever introduced into the philosophy of logic; and the principal cause why the theory of the science has made such inconsiderable progress during the last two centuries" (*ibid.*, p. 57). He writes as a logician, one however who recognizes that "to determine what it is that happens in the case of assent or dissent besides putting two ideas together, is one of the most intricate of metaphysical problems" (p.56).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48, 49.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 200-201; II, 184 ff.

calls the existential (or subjectless) one, of the type: "A is." This is also called the judgment of inner perception. It does not link a psychic act as subject with existence as a predicate; it is the simple recognition of the psychic phenomenon present in inner consciousness.⁶⁸ Hence, not every judgment is the predication of one idea of another.⁶⁹ In fact, every type of judgment, categorical as well as hypothetical, can be translated, without change of meaning, into an existential one. For, in order to be able to attribute any predicate to a subject, one must first know that the subject exists. For example, the judgment "no stone is alive" means there does not exist any living stone; "all men are mortal" means there does not exist any immortal man.⁷⁰ Hence the "is" of the copula is existential.⁷¹ The categorical judgment is really a double one: one of existence and one of predication.⁷² In summarizing his reflections Brentano concludes that the characteristic feature of judgment lies in the way the mind is related to its immanent object; not as just representing it but as affirming or denying its existence.⁷³ Judgment is thus always basically individual and existential, even though the object is attained in knowledge as something universal.⁷⁴

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⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, I, p. f.101; II, p. 49.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, II, p. 53.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 49; 56-60; 193.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 56-57.

⁷² *Ibid.*, II, p. 165 ff.; 194 n.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 64-65.

⁷⁴ This logical teaching is completed by what Brentano has to say in his work on the categories where he speaks of analogy and the immediate evidence of being as prior to all discourse (*Kategorienlehre*, Leip.:ig, 1933). In ch. I! he treats of the plurality of accidental being; in ch. 3 of the double manifestation of being as true or false in affirmation and negation; in ch. 4 of the double mode of being as act and potency; and in ch. 5 of the categorial diversity of being. He maintains that the primary function of analogy is not to control the use of the "being" in discourse but to place thought in contact with the substantiality of things. The category of substance is not an a priori one. It signifies reality and that which is the cause of all its transformations. Analogy, in other words, has a primarily ontological function. By it we can re-unite thought to reality through affirmation and negation. Things can be this or that in innumerable ways;

Scholastics and Judgment

Scholastics treat of judgment in three contexts: in logic, in psychology, and in their critical theory of knowledge. It seems advisable to take these in turn, selecting some of the best and most widely used works to furnish examples and to follow the evolution of scholastic thinking in this matter.

Logic

As far as I can make out, Scholastic logicians do not seem to have made up their mind whether they are dealing only with the proposition or with the act of judging also. Perhaps this is due to their view on the nature of logic. One of the accusations levelled against them by modern symbolic logicians is that they approached logic from a presupposed realistic philosophical standpoint, whereas logic should be free from all such presuppositions. This is a question that can be debated; and it

they can be real only in one basic way, as substances. Similarly, the proposition can be verified or denied in innumerable ways; there is only one way of being true or false. For more detailed discussion of Brentano's views cf. G. Rossi: *Giudizio e raziocinio: Studi sulla logica dei Brentaniani* (Milano, 1926); A. Kastil: *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Eine Einführung in seine Lehre*, 2nd ed. (Berne, 1950), L. Gilson: *Methode et metaphysique selon Franz Brentano* (Paris, 1955). Oskar Kraus, in his introduction to vol. II of Brentano's *Psychologie* (pp. xiv-xv), refers to the development of Brentano's notion of judgment by Franz Hillebrand, Anton Marty, and Alfred Kastil.

Brentano's views could be profitably discussed in relation to those of Bolzano and Meinong as well as of Husserl, but this article does not pretend to offer anything like a complete historical survey of the subject. The reader will find references to various theories on judgment from 1883 to 1952 in Gilbert Varet: *Manuel de Bibliographie Philosophique* (Paris, 1956) vol. 11, pp. 659-660. Among others he mentions: F. Miklosich, C. Sigwart, E. Lask, F. Weinhandl, J. Gordin, L. Couturat, D. M. De Petter, E. Morot-Sir, A. Marc. Among the numerous more recent works not mentioned by Varet I would draw attention to: E. Vinacke: *The Psychology of Thinking* (New York, 1952); D. M. Johnson: *The Psychology of Thought and Judgement* (New York, 1955); P. T. Geach: *Mental Acts* (London, 1957); M. Pradines: *Traite de psychologie generale*, 2 vol. (Paris, 1956-1958); H. W. B. Joseph: *An Introduction to Logic*, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1957); F. C. Bartlett: *Thinking* (London, 1958); F. Resile: *Psychology of Judgement and Choice* (New York, 1961); M. Navatril: *Les tendances constitutives de la pensee vivante*, 2 vol. (Paris, 1968).

may well be that it is only in the fully formalized form of symbolic logic that a purely logical study of the proposition is possible. At any rate, the fact is that Scholastic logicians do treat both of the proposition and of the judgment, sometimes without drawing any clear distinction between them. This may be due in part to the fact that they rely on Aristotle, in whom, as B. Lonergan "this distinction between the merely synthetic element in judgment (the conjunction or not of the terms) and, on the other hand, the positing of synthesis is not drawn clearly. In Thomist writings, I believe, the use of Aristotelean terminology obscures to some extent a more nuanced analysis." Aristotle concentrates on one kind of sentence, namely, the proposition, the sentence which has truth-duality. This, in its simple form, consists in affirmation or denial. It is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future. An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a denial is a negative assertion.⁷⁶ From the start it is not clear whether we are dealing only with the proposition, or the assertion, or both together.

One of the best modern thomistic manuals of philosophy was published by Fr. J. Gredt in 1909. In this edition as in succeeding ones, in the section of logic concerning judgment, we are told that the essence of judgment consists in affirmation or negation, and in perceiving the agreement (or lack of it) between two concepts. Three things are necessary for a judgment: a) the apprehension of the subject and predicate; b) comparison of these; c) perception of the agreement (or not) of one with the other. This is immediately followed by the judgment, which consists formally in predication. Although from a logical point of view judgment is complex, from a physical point of view it is a simple act by which the mind, perceiving the agreement or disagreement of subject with predicate, declares that they do or do not agree. Such perception

•• *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (London, 1968), p. 49.

•• Cf. *On Interp.*, cc. 4-6;

implies that the mind produces a new concept by which this agreement or its opposite are represented. On this view, the judgment implies two concepts, while the act of judging requires at least three stages in its formation.⁷⁷ We may refer to this widely-held view as the three-stage notion of judgment.

We find a more sophisticated version of this theory in another well-known Thomist, J. Maritain, whose *Petite logique (Elements de Philosophie, II)* was first published in 1926. In chap. 2 he deals with judgment, first of all in itself, and then as expressed in the proposition. In the first section, on the judgment itself, he gives his analysis of judgment, noting that this is a question more for psychology than for logic.⁷⁸ He distinguishes five stages in the process leading to the formulated judgment. First, there is the apprehension which provides the mind with two concepts. Next, there is the act of comparing these two concepts and of forming a mental enunciation in which they are linked by the copula as subject and predicate. This requires the formation of a new mental concept of the identity (or diversity) of the terms. Then the mind compares this enunciation with the real object about which it is formed. Next, on perceiving that the enunciation holds good in regard to the real object, the mind passes to the affirmation of the enunciation. This is formally the act of judging, that which sums up the simple essence of judgment as affirmation or denial by which the mind formally thinks the acts of being insofar as it is act. Finally, this judgment is expressed in what is called the judicative proposition. We may refer to this explanation as the five-stage notion of judgment.⁷⁹

For a quite different approach we turn to G. H. Joyce, an English Jesuit who was thoroughly familiar with the work of his fellow countrymen in the field of logic and aware of the theories of Bradley and Brentano. Like practically all Scholas-

⁷⁷ *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, I, 26; 9th ed. (Freiburg i. B., 1951), pp. 27, 28.

⁷⁸ 3rd. ed. (Paris, 1946), pp. 105-117.

⁷⁹ A similar view is advanced by several other Scholastic writers; some examples will be given later.

tic logicians he assumes that the judgment implies two concepts, and he has no hesitation in basing his logic on a realistic psychology. He treats of judgment in ch. 3 of his *Principles of Logic*, Part I, first published in 1908, insofar as the judgment is expressed in the proposition, which is defined, with Aristotle, as an expression in which one affirms or denies an attribute of a subject.⁸⁰ In every affirmative judgment the two terms are different mental expressions of the same object. Subject and predicate are different concepts of the same thing; "the subject directly expresses the *thing*, i.e., that to which attributes belong; the predicate expresses *the thing as qualified by a particular attribute or form.*"⁸¹ If the subject happens to be a significant term (e.g., "this bronze object"), i.e., if it expresses an attribute belonging to the thing, "the proposition declares the coinherence in the same subject of two 'forms of being' expressed by the terms, though the form signified by the subject is assumed, that signified by the predicate is asserted."⁸²

The copula of the judgment expresses the *being* which is determined by the form expressed by the predicate, for only what is conceived as possessed of being can be determined. The being which is directly and immediately expressed by the copula is being in the conceptual order, just as the forms expressed by the predicate are forms as conceived. The essential function of the copula is thus not to affirm existence in nature but the objective identity of subject and predicate (or their diversity).⁸³ "The copula declares that the object expressed by the subject, and that expressed by the predicate, are identical."⁸⁴ More briefly, "the copula expresses 'being,' the predicate shows us the nature of that 'being'."⁸⁵

Judgment is a simple act of the mind. It is not made up of three separate acts corresponding to subject, predicate, and

⁸⁰ Srd. ed. (London, 1916), p. 39.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁸² *Ibid.*, c. 6, § 2; p. 94

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42-44.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 7, § 1; p. 105.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 9, § 4; p. 146.

copula; but in affirmation and negation there is conjunction or separation of two concepts.⁸⁶ The primary form of judgment is that in which the subject is a concrete singular, the predicate a form apprehended as belonging to it.⁸⁷ There is indeed no singular concept. But "we may employ the universal concept to designate a particular individual by using the demonstrative pronoun, v. g., 'this gold is yellow'." ⁸⁸ Hence "only in our primary judgements—those in which the subject is an individual substance and the predicate a real form—is the 'being' of the copula the 'being' of real existence." ⁸⁹

Finally, we may note that Joyce will not accept Bradley's definition of judgment as "the reference of an ideal content to reality." ⁹⁰ This would imply that the true subject is not the grammatical one but the reality itself, and that the whole judgment is of the nature of a predicate representing attributes which are referred to the real world, with the result that the copula would be meaningless. We must hold, on the contrary, that subject and predicate belong to the thing as conceived; they are not the real entities referred to by these terms.⁹¹ This remark reveals that Joyce is still thinking of the judgment in terms of the proposition and as therefore involving two concepts rather than of the judgment as the simple act of the mind. This is understandable since he is speaking as a logician.

Psychology

The authors of scholastic manuals of philosophy frequently have nothing at all to say on judgment in the section devoted to psychology. They seem to assume that all that needs to be said has been already said, in the section on logic, even though they may point out, when treating of the validity of knowl-

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

•• *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, c. 7, § 6; p. 118.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 7, § 4; p. 114. In § 5 (pp. 116, 117) Joyce dismisses Brentano's theory, and a somewhat similar one of J. Venn.

⁹⁰ He refers to Bradley's *Principles*, Bk. I, c. 1, § 17; c. *lit.*, § 5.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, c. 7, § 6; pp. 117-118.

edge, that it is only in the judgment that truth is formally attained as such.⁹² Others do touch on the nature of judgment, though only to recall what they had previously said in their logic.⁹³ There are, however, some exceptions. One or two examples of such must suffice for our purpose.

The *Psychology* of M. Maher in the Stoneyhurst series, has been in constant demand since its first edition in 1890. The first part of ch. 15 is devoted to the judgment, and we are told that the judicial act is the type of perfect knowledge,⁹⁴ although the highest function of intelligence is not judgment or reasoning but intuition, i.e., apprehension.⁹⁵ Two definitions are offered: the mental act by which we perceive the agreement or disagreement between two ideas; the mental act by which something is asserted or denied; and St. Thomas is quoted as seeing judgment as an act of intellect whereby the mind combines or separates two terms by affirmation or denial.⁹⁶ When the judgment is analyzed, we find what is, in essence, the five-stage theory as proposed by Maritain, with the qualification that affirmation and denial are not added to but included in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of subject and predicate.⁹⁷ The logical point of view is still dominant in this psychological approach to judgment, even though the author holds that thought is differently viewed by psychology and logic.⁹⁸

P. Siwek also treats in some detail of judgment in his work *Psychologia Metaphysica*, Lib. III, c. 1, a. 4. Having rejected the cartesian thesis that judgment belongs to the will, he

•• E. g., C. Boyer: *Cursus Philosophiae*, 2 vol., 2nd. ed. (Bruges, 1939); H. Grenier: *Cursus Philosophiae*, 3 vol., 3rd. ed. (Quebec, 1947, 1948); R. E. Brennan: *Thomistic Psychology* (New York, 1941).

⁹² V. g., J. Donat: *Summa Philosophiae Christianae*, vol. 5 (*Psychologia*, Innsbruck, 1936), pp. 198-199; cf. vol. 1 (*Logica*), *ibid.* (1935), pp.94-95.

⁹³ 9th ed. (London, 1933), p. 315.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 315-318; cf. pp. 234, 243 ff'. He quotes Ueberweg (*Logie*, § 67) and Bradley (*Principles of Logic*, cc. 1 and 2) as supporting this view (*ibid.*, p. 816).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 825-826.

defines judgment as that act by which the intellect pronounces on the identity or discrepancy of its terms and further says that it expresses the relation of these concepts to being.⁹⁹ Formally it consists in the act by which the intellect perceives the identity or discrepancy of the two terms; it requires the copula as asserting such identity or discrepancy, and hence it is not merely a union of concepts. Neither is it a mere ratification or approbation of knowledge already possessed as, among others, Tongiorgi, Palmieri, Donat, and Frobes are said to have maintained; while such authors as Sanseverino, Mendive, Boedder, Mercier, De Backer and Remer are quoted in favor of the author's view.¹⁰⁰ In proving his thesis he calls judgment the act by which the intellect formally adheres to truth, which means that it explicitly knows that its concept conforms to the conceived object¹⁰¹; yet he does not conclude from this that the judgment is the known referring of the concept to the object. He does, however, hold that it is a simple act. It requires more than the understanding of the terms or their composition. It demands that the objective identity of the terms be perceived and that this identity be expressed in a new concept.¹⁰²

One more example will be enough to show how such psychologists seem to be caught between two fires, with the result that they appear unable to decide whether-as the logicians tell them-judgment implies comparison of two mental terms, or whether, as their own experience suggests, it is just one simple act by which the mind affirms or denies being. Although they give both views, they do not ask if they are compatible. Usually they are content to say that judgment can be considered either from a logical or a psychological point of view, but they continue to hold that even from a psychological point of view the judgment requires mental comparison of two concepts. This is the position adopted by R. Jolivet in his *Psy-*

⁹⁹ *Op. cit.*, Romae, 1948, pp. 314-315.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 325.

chologie.¹⁰³ Having distinguished the logical from the psychological consideration ¹⁰⁴ he, as a psychologist, describes judgment as the act of the mind perceiving and affirming an intelligible relation between two objects of thought.¹⁰⁵ At the same time he sees the essence of judgment in the act of affirming, or denying, the existence of a subject or of a determination of a subject.¹⁰⁶ The copula therefore always refers to existence. In the judgment of attribution existence is only signified whereas in the existential judgment the real existence of the subject is affirmed.¹⁰⁷ Hence judgment is an absolutely simple and indivisible act, for it consists essentially in affirmation; it is essentially the affirmation of being.¹⁰⁸

Jolivet also asks which is prior, the concept or the judgment. His answer is based on the distinction between the order of exercise (i.e., of actual performance) and that of specification. From the first point of view, or chronologically, judgment precedes concept since thought takes place only in the form of judgment. From the point of view of its specification, and hence of logical priority, the concept precedes judgment since judgment presupposes that the objects of thought have been grasped. This does not imply acceptance of Goblot's view (*Logique*, Paris, 1918, p. 87) that the concept is only a sum of virtual judgments, with the result that judgment must be regarded as the only act of the mind; for this would entail a regression to infinity because these virtual judgments themselves are formed of concepts.¹⁰⁹

In regard to this question raised by Jolivet reference should be made to the theory of the Spanish philosopher Angel Amor Ruibal who died in 1930. At the origin of all intellectual activity he placed a prelogical notion of being, one which is utter-

¹⁰⁸ *Traite de Philosophie*, vol. , Bk. c. 4; 4th. ed. (Lyon/Paris, 1950), 515-

m *Ibid.*, p. 516.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 518.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 519,

ly simple and unqualified either as to comprehension or to extension. This notion is gained by intellectual intuition on the occasion of perception, and it signifies nothing more than "it," or "something." It implies a synthesis of sensible and of intellectual apprehension through a kind of primitive reflection; it is thus at the same time both universal and particular, and capable of representing the constituent elements of things (comprehension) and their singularity (extension); it can thus serve as foundation for both predicates and subjects of judgments. It is an ontological-noetic synthesis of the real and the ideal. From the start being and knowledge are linked in this primitive notion of being; and what this notion means is existence, for this is what we first know.

Since this idea is both universal and particular, i.e., shows itself under two modalities which imply each other, it can be qualified and determined by means of judgment in two ways, in regard to the compatibility of notes in any thing, and in regard to the existential realization of things; and this is taken to mean that the judgement is always synthetico-analytic. The ideal judgment (affirming compatibility) implies the real one (affirming realization), and vice versa; both are derived from the original synthesis. The first full act of the intellect is therefore the judgment, and through judgment ideas come into being. Judgment allows for the parallel development of the aspects of being and knowledge, while ideas express the static aspect of judgment. These ideas express both the real and the ideal values latent in the primitive notion of being. At the source therefore of our ideas we find a fundamental judgment, our primary affirmation, which can be expressed as: something (or "it") exists. This judgment is the mental expression of the primary fact attained through knowledge, namely, that the individual thing perceived by the senses has existence.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Ruibal treats of this matter mainly in vol. 8 of his collected works: *Los problemas fundamentales de la filosofía comparada y del dogma* in 10 vols., (Santander, n. d.), and vol. IX, 121-149. cf. B. Martínez Ruiz: "El acto del Juicio según Ángel Amor Ruibal," in *Verdad y Vida* (Madrid) XI (1958), 885-485.

Epistemology

It is only in works on the critical theory of knowledge that Scholastics finally free themselves from this half-logical, half-psychological treatment of judgment and begin to deal with the act of judging in its full reality, at the same time acknowledging its central significance if one is to do full justice to the exigencies of thought. This is perhaps only to be expected, for Scholastics had always held that truth, in the complete sense of the word as truth which is consciously recognized as such, is to be found only in the judgment. The attention of authors concerned with the critique of knowledge was bound to center, as reflection proceeded, on the nature of this activity of the mind.

This development is no doubt due in part to the influence of those non-Scholastic writers who have already been mentioned, but other influences were also at work. D. Dubarle notes that mathematical logic helped to bring out the difference (already stressed by Kant) between, on the one hand, universal and particular judgments and, on the other, singular ones. Universal judgments enuntiate either inclusions (categorical judgments) or formal implication (hypothetical judgments); particular judgments are regarded as negations of such universal ones. The singular judgment enuntiates the relation (of pertinence) of an individual subject to a group, whereas the individual subject is not designated in either the universal or the particular judgment. Aristotle, it appears, does not treat of singular propositions, perhaps because science, as he conceives it, does not deal with what is singular. This may explain why Scholastics had come to neglect the singular judgment.¹¹¹

It is also likely that the *Gestalt* psychologists, early in this century, helped to draw the attention of critical thinkers to the importance of knowledge of the singular existent, and therefore of the judgment in which it finds expression. Starting from

¹¹¹ D. Dubarle: "La logique du jugement et les categories chez Kant," in *Rev. Sc. Ph. Th.* (1968). pp. 3-37. He notes, however, that logicians after the *Summulae* of Peter of Spain (c. 1250) and the *Summa Totius Logicae* (c. 1800) do treat of singular propositions.

the observation that movement is perceived, not as a heap of sensations but as a whole, they advanced the theory that what is grasped in perceptual experience is a unitary whole which cannot be explained merely as the result of individual stimuli. The fact that man enjoys a direct perception of configurations was seen as leading to a new approach in the analysis of consciousness, one which restores the singular judgment to its proper place at the starting place of the development of thought.

When Scholastic philosophers began to take an interest in phenomenology, an interest that has steadily grown since about 1930, they found that Husserl had been engaged in a search for a new and radical way to lay secure foundations for valid knowledge and for science. From the beginning he had realized the importance of judgment for any critical theory of knowledge; and, in relation to Bolzano, Brentano, and such logicians as Bergmann, had refined his own views on the nature of judgment. He came to see that every proposition, even the most abstract, is related to something individual which must carry with it some kind of evidence. This means that the first truths and evidences must be individual ones, and that all evidence rests on pre-predicative evidence. Logical operations are therefore to be based on pre-logical intuitions, for we can explain the spontaneous activity of the mind only as based on pre-logical data. The analysis of logical truth should, in consequence, trace its genealogy in preceding acts of consciousness and in pre-predicative evidence. Husserl's repeated investigations into this topic throughout his previous writings are summed up in his *Erfahrung und Urteil* as edited by L. Landgrebe in 1939.¹¹²

Husserl's influence remains active in the Existentialist philosophers who seem to have been mainly responsible for the "conversion" of a growing number of Scholastics from a too

¹¹² For Husserl's ideas on judgment in the *Logische Untersuchungen* cf. M. Farber: *The Foundation of Phenomenology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), especially pp.175-179; 36ff.

abstract and essentialist attitude to a more concrete and existentialist one. **I**t was they who placed the problems of the knowledge of existent and individual reality and of personal self-consciousness at the very centre of philosophical reflection. They dealt with man's experience of being; they raised the question of a concrete, subject and intuitive grasp of singular and existent reality and of existence itself. Authors such as Marcel, Lavelle, and Heidegger, despite their many differences, agreed that the mind is, by nature, open to being, and that the basic affirmation could be expressed in such formulas as: that is; things are there; reality exists. Scholastics, under the influence of this stimulating trend of thought, came to realize that their approach to philosophy had been too academic and abstract and to appreciate the decisive importance of the act of judging.

To confirm this interpretation of the way scholastic thought has developed one has only to compare the articles and books written by Scholastics up to about 1946, when the existentialist "wave" broke over Europe, with what many of them began to publish from about that time onwards.¹¹³ One notes that from about Scholastics are to be found taking up the question of the nature of judgment. Some of them did so in an attempt to refute the theories of such Idealists as Brunschvicg, for example, G. Rabeau and G. des Lauriers.¹¹⁴ Such writers usually presuppose the commonly accepted notion of judgment as a union of two concepts although des Lauriers pointed out that it is not just a simple juxtaposition of concepts but a union of intelligibility and existence. Various other articles appeared in this period, for instance, those of Johan, Noel, and Wilpert.¹¹⁵ **I**f they did not lead to any revision of

¹¹³ Cf. G. Van Riet: *L'Epistemologie thomiste* (Louvain, 1946), c. 5.

¹¹⁴ G. Rabeau: "Concept et jugement," *Rev. Sc. Ph. Th.* 10 (1921), pp. 825-851; 525-547; cf. also *Le jugement d'Existence* (Paris, 1938); G. des Lauriers: "L'Activite de jugement en Mathematiques," *Rev. Sc. Ph. Th.* 28 (1985): I. Concept et jugement," 407-433; 24 (1936): "II. Intelligibilite et existence," 76-108; "III. De l' unite a l'un existant," 269-298.

¹¹⁵ R. Johan: "La nature du jugement," *Revue de Philasophie* 81 468-

the accepted notion of judgment, they at least showed that there was a revival of interest in the topic; and Johan stressed the fact that judging is a simple perfection of the intellect, an act distinguished by its relation to existence, and that the formal element of judgment lies in assent or affirmation as consequent upon the conceptual synthesis formed in the mind.

Significant contributions from two writers around this time seem to have failed to gain the notice they deserved. B. M. Xiberta in a short but trenchant article, and in a later one on the same topic, made it clear that for St. Thomas the structure of judgment was very important indeed, and that his teaching on this point has wide implications.¹¹⁶ Xiberta maintained that a misunderstanding of the nature of judgment lies at the root of the difference between Scholastic and modern philosophy. For Locke and Kant judgment is the first act of the intellect, since it is only the senses that afford man any contact with external reality. By restricting intuition to the senses they were forced to see the activity of the intellect as that of coordinating images or phenomena by means of concepts and to conceive judgment as this kind of conceptual ordering of material presented by the senses. This, according to Xiberta, leads both to a denial of the true function of the concept and to a radical distortion of the act of judgment. He himself interpreted St. Thomas as holding that judgment does not require two concepts, but that it does require two apprehensions, one of which is the direct apprehension (by means of the concept) of the predicate, while the other is indirect, by means of the senses, and bears on the subject.

Many of the texts in which St. Thomas treats of judgment and of its relation of existence and truth are examined and

489; L. Noel: "La critique du jugement selon S. Thomas," in *Aus des Geisteswelt des Mittelalters* (Zeitschrift Grabmann) (Münster, 1935), pp. 710-719; P. Wilpert: "Das Urteil als Träger der Wahrheit nach Thomas von Aquin," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 46 (1933), pp. 56-75.

¹¹⁶ "Momentum doctrinae S. Thomae circa structuram iudicii," *Acta Pontificiae Academiae S. Thomae, Nova Series* I (1934), pp. 1-9; "Opposita sententia de apprehensione origo est atque causa divergentis directionis scholasticae et modernae philosophiae," *Sapientia Aquinatis* (Romae) 1955, pp. 367-374.

correlated in a notable article by B. J. Muller-Thym.¹¹⁷ He deals with judgment more from the metaphysical than from the logical point of view. What is characteristic of judgment is its power to affirm "to be," the act of being, whether simply or in some respect (e. g., accidental or substantive); and the subject of judgment is, ultimately, a substantial being which is attained either directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately. In judgment the intellect expresses a certain "to be" which is exercised by the thing that is known. "The subject is that through which the thing subjected to predication is signified; it is that pure mean, then, through which the thing subjected to predication possesses such determination as the predicate exercises in its regard" (p. . . .). This means that the relation of predicate to subject is analogous to that between form and matter. It also implies that in the judgment there are not two concepts as representing two things which are understood; there is but one thing, one intelligible existence, one act of the intellect (p. 239). There is, however, a third intelligible component, which is neither predicate nor subject, but which both signifies the "to be" of the thing which is judged and is the "esse" of the *ens rationis* composed of predicate and subject. The "to be" of the judgment signifies that which is exercised by the predicate in the subject; and when this signification is known we can speak of truth in the full sense of the word.

Had these articles received the attention they deserve they could have led to an earlier clarification of the thomistic theory of judgment. As it turned out, however, this had to wait until the impact of the Existentialists had stimulated Scholastics to turn to the study of judgment. Some seem to have been urged in this way to study judgment mainly for its own sake, even if they continued to treat of it mainly along the lines which had come to be generally accepted. Others, grappling with the problems raised by the Existentialists, dealt with judgment as the only act by which we obtain adequate knowledge of the

¹¹⁷ "The *To be* which signifies the Truth of propositions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 16 (1940), pp. 280-254.

act of existence, thus coming closer to grips with the specific nature of the knowledge had through judgment.

In the former group P. Hoenen is of particular importance. His *Reality and Judgment according to St. Thomas*¹¹⁸ is a sustained and systematic attempt to deal with judgment itself, what he calls a phenomenology of judgment, and its relations to existence and reality; this is followed by an examination, from the epistemological point of view, of the various types of judgment. All through the work there is constant recall to the text of St. Thomas. Thomists were thus invited to study the many key passages where Aquinas speaks of the nature and functions of judgment. This work ensured that any later thomistic critique of knowledge would have to take due account of the judgment as the act in which the knowing process reaches its term and by which the mind returns to concrete and existent reality. Hoenen himself continued to regard two concepts as essential for judgment, insisting, however, that the concepts must be grasped as a unity, that the subject is taken materially while the predicate is taken formally, and that what distinguishes judgment is its power to affirm existence. However, universal judgment are still given priority over singular ones, with the result that the singular judgment is interpreted as an application of the universal one to sense data.

More or less the same notion of judgment is found in the well-known critical works of J. de Vries and L. M. Regis.¹¹⁹ Both fully recognize the central role of judgment in any critical theory of knowledge but continue to regard it as implying two concepts; in consequence, they attach more weight to universal than to singular judgments.¹²⁰ This was indeed the typical "thomist" attitude of the period, as represented by J. Maritain,

¹¹⁸ (Chicago, 1952), translated from the original French (Rome, 1946) by H. F. Tiblier.

¹¹⁹ J. de Vries: *La pensee et l'etre* (Louvain/Paris, 1962); this is a revised version of *Denken und Sein* (Freiburg i Br., 1937); cf. also his "Urteilsanalyse und Seinserkenntnis," *Scholastik* 28 (1953), 382-399; L. M. Regis: *Epistemology* (New York, 1959).

¹²⁰ De Vries, *La pensee et l'etre*, 68-70; Regis, *op. cit.*, 312 ff.

M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, and R. Garrigou-Lagrange.¹²¹ The latter, for instance, held that the intellect first acquires the notion of being and formulates the principles of non-contradiction and identity before it can make any existential judgment.

A more free and open-minded attitude to thomistic texts was encouraged by Neo-Scholastic thinkers, notably J. Marechal and a group of later philosophers who owe much to him. In general, one can say that these writers stress the dynamism revealed in the knowing-process, its openness to horizons that are infinite if not divine, while at the same time they pay special attention to man's knowledge of singular reality, and therefore to the relation of intellect to sense. This concern with human ways of knowing existent being is evident in Marechal's study on the psychology of mystics.¹²² In his better known work,¹²³ his attempt to justify the validity of knowledge in the light of modern theories, especially that of Kant, he insisted that any critical reflection on knowledge must center on an in-

¹²¹ J. Maritain: *Les degres du savoir* (Paris, 1932); M.-D. Roland-Gosselin: *Essai d'une critique de la connaissance* (Le Saulchoir-Paris, 1932); R. Garrigou-Lagrange: "Notre premier jugement d'existence selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," in *Studia Mediaevalia in hon. P. Martin* (Bruges, 1948), 289-302. Along the same lines cf.: F. M. Tyrrell. *The Role of Assent in Judgement* (Washington, 1948); "The Nature and Function of the Act of Judgement," *New Scholasticism* 26 (1952) 393-423; F. A. Cunningham: "Judgement in St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, 26 (1954), 185-212; "The Second Operation and the Assent vs. Judgement in St. Thomas," *New Scholasticism* 31 (1957), 1-32; R. W. Schmidt: "Judgement and Predication in a realistic Philosophy," *ibid.* 29 (1955), 318-326; J. W. Elders: "Le premier principe de la vie intellectuelle," *Revue Thomiste* 70 (1962), 571-586; J. Gironella: *Curso de cuestiones filosoficas* (Barcelona, 1963), p. 54; G. Giannini: *Ateismo e Filosofia* (Roma, 1970), c. 4. One new line of approach was opened up by G. Girardi in his article: "Fenomenologia del giudizio e assolutezza della verita," *Doctor Communis* (Roma) 13 (1960), pp. 19-30. He sets out to show that it is the nature of judgment to place itself as absolute; otherwise it has no meaning. Hence, if we retain any meaningful notion of judgment, we must also assent to the existence of absolute truth. He notes (p. 24) that one should distinguish the enunciation (which represents a relation between concepts) from assent to the enunciation. It is only when there is assent that there is judgment.

¹²² *Etudes sur la psychologie des Mystiques* (Paris, 1924), pp. 70-131.

¹²³ *Le point de depart de la metaphysique* (Bruges/Paris), 1913ff.

vestigation into the act of judging; ¹²⁴ and he undertook such an investigation. ¹²⁵ If he does continue to speak of two concepts, he stresses far more the fact that the subject in the judgment stands for the suppositum known through the senses from the start, and that judgment consists essentially in relating an intelligible content to an object, thus leading the mind from immanence towards transcendence. ¹²⁶

This line of investigation was taken up and carried further by K. Rahner in a study which first appeared in 1939 and which reached a wider public in its second edition. ¹²⁷ It is an attempt to present a thomistic metaphysics of knowledge, starting from an exegesis of *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 7, where St. Thomas deals with the "*conversio ad phantasma*" as an element of human knowledge. For St. Thomas, as Rahner interprets him, ¹²⁸ the general concept is known only in this *conversio ad phantasma*; which means that our primary type of knowledge is concerned with singular existent reality, and that all objective knowledge is the relation of a general concept to a "this." Rahner speaks of the two concepts of a judgment but is careful to point out that the judgment is no mere liaison of two concepts; it is the application of general knowledge, as a possible synthesis of subject and predicate, to an object existing in itself. We have knowledge, in the full sense of the word, when the affirmative synthesis of subject and predicate is referred to the thing in itself. The function of the subject is to indicate this thing, the suppositum, to which the predicate (the general element) is referred. Knowledge is thus the designation of a composite reality (*compositum*) insofar as it is a synthesis of a form and of a suppositum.

The influence of Heidegger is more apparent in the thought of J. B. Lotz than in the early work of Rahner. In his *Das*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 5 (Louvain/Paris, 1926), pp. 78 ff.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, sect. II, c. 5 (pp. 56-280); cf. also sect. III, c. 1.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.

¹²⁷ *Geist in Welt* (Innsbruck, 1989); ed. (München, 1957); French trans. by R. Givord and H. Rochais, *L'Esprit dans le monde* (Toulouse, 1968).

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, especially Part II, c. 8.

*Urteil und das Sein*¹²⁹ he approaches the question of being through an analysis of the judgment, since he holds that judgment is the primitive place where being, and hence also transcendence, appear. Judgment, as St. Thomas taught (v. g., *ibid.*, II-II, q. 173, a. 2; *I Con. Gent.*, c., 59; *In Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 2) is not only the completion of knowledge but also the only act by which existence is affirmed (v. g., *I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3; *I Perih.* lect. 10; lect. 8, 108; *In Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3). In the course of his analysis Lotz notes that the object of our primitive judgment is individual, and that our universal judgments are derivative. He interprets the judgment as the affirmation of the synthesis of quiddity and individuality in one being. It is not a simple liaison of subject and predicate for it expresses a relation of the mind to its object, and it involves an assertion, or positing, of being. Lotz, however, is more interested in the metaphysical implications of judgment than in its psychological structure.

In the works of B. Lonergan we find a full appreciation of the role of judgment in knowing. In his *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*¹³⁰ he still speaks of the synthesis of two concepts in judgment¹³¹ but as leading to one act of understanding expressed in the combination of the two. It results from reflective activity which is a return from such a synthesis to its source in sense and in intellectual light. The judgment is the self-expression of the grasp of the necessary connection between the sources and the synthesis.¹³² This analysis of the knowing process is carried further in *Collection* (New York, 1967) with a critique of the static essentialism and closed conceptualism which looks on science as deduced from principles whose terms are had by an unconscious process of abstraction

¹²⁹ First published as *Sein unit Wert* (Paderborn, 1938); revised, under present title (München, 1957); French trans. by R. Givord (*Le jugement et l'être*) (Paris, 1963); cf. especially c. 2. sect. 8. For a critique cf. R. Cenal: "El juicio y el ser," *Rivista de Filosofia* (Madrid) 27 (1959), pp. 489-496.

¹³⁰ Notre Dame, 1967 (London, 1968); first published in *Theological Studies* 1946-1949.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 51.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 64-66.

from sensible data, so that science is seen as matter of comparing terms, discovering necessary nexus, and grinding out all the possible conclusions.¹³³ For Lonergan, on the contrary, terms are due to acts of understanding as insights into sensible or imagined data. Concepts (e.g.) express insights, and insights grasp forms immanent in sensible presentations.¹³⁴

Every judgment involves a simple act of positing or rejecting; every human judgment in this life rests, in the last analysis, upon contingent matters of fact; no synthesis of concepts, of itself, constitutes a judgment. On this view, on its cognitional side, there can be no human knowledge of real possibility or of real necessity without matter-of-fact judgments; and on its ontological side there can exist no real necessities without existing essences and no real possibilities without existing active or passive potencies. You will find that in *Insight* this radical rejection of essentialism is worked out in detail. Judgment is, not synthesis, but positing or rejecting synthesis.¹³⁵

In *Insight* (London, 1957) the psychological process of knowing is studied in great detail, with special attention to judgment in c. 9. Judgment pertains to the third stage of the process (reflection; the other two are: presentation and for knowledge is a cumulative process developing from presentation through insight to judgment. The proper content of judgment, its specific contribution to cognitional process, consists in the answers: yes, or no. "The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it."¹³⁵ The judgment of fact, however, is based on what is virtually unconditioned/³⁶ while human knowledge reveals a dynamic orientation towards being as the objective of the pure desire to know, as that which is known only when attained by the totality of correct judgments.¹³⁷

¹³⁰ pp. 87-90.

¹³¹ pp. 110, 159.

¹³⁵ pp. 159-160.

¹³⁵ p. 332; cf. 340.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 336-338.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 348, 350; 354, 361, 370.

Among the many other writers who follow Marechal in stressing the primacy of singular and existential judgments and in regarding the judgment as bearing the mind not only to objective being but also, at least implicitly, towards God¹⁸⁸ it will suffice for our purpose to refer finally to A. Marc who has repeatedly turned to the study of the act of judging. His *Psychologie Reflexive*¹³⁹ affirms the decisive role of judgment in any adequate theory of knowledge; it maintains that every judgment implies a relation to individual reality and to existence, and that universal judgments are based on individual and concrete ones; and the function of the subject of the judgment is said to be that of designating a whole in an explicit manner, while that of the predicate is to qualify the same whole.¹⁴⁰ In the work *La Dialectique de l'affirmation*/⁴¹ which is an introduction to metaphysics through a study of the judgment, we find the same recall to the primacy of individual judgment, since it is of the essence of the concept to retain a reference to what is individual. The typical judgment for us, according to Marc in another work,¹⁴² would be: this (is) a dog. He summarizes his reflections in the words:

Since no knowledge is perfect without judgment, no knowledge or thing which cannot be led back to being and reduced to it, knowledge is completed only when the mind, attaining being in the essence and in the idea of a thing, clings to it. Thanks to being, the judgment is the act of that "realisateur" which is the mind.¹⁴³

¹⁸⁸ E. g., J. de Finance: *Etre et Agir dans la philosophie de saint Thomas*, 2nd. ed. (Rome, 1960), 285-295; G. Siewerth: *Die Metaphysik der Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin* (Darmstadt, 1968); E. Nicoletti: *Giudizio ed Essere* (Roma, 1971). Another perspective is opened up by E. Coreth who owes as much to Heidegger as to Marechal. In his *Metaphysik. Eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung* (Innsbruck/Munich, 1961) he stresses the cardinal importance of the act of questioning as leading to metaphysical judgments about being. K. Hahner (*op. cit.*, P. II, c. 1, § I) had already drawn attention to this. On Coreth cf. Lonergan: *CoUection*, c.13.

¹⁸⁹ Bruxelles/Paris, vol. I, 1948.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 276 ff.; 325-336; 352-366.

¹⁴¹ Bruxelles/Paris, 1952, c. 1, § 2 (pp. 103-139).

¹⁴² *L'Etre et l'Esprit* (Paris/Louvain, 1958), p. 34.

¹⁴³ *La Dialectique de l'affirmation*, p. 114 (my translation). He goes on (pp. 116 ff.) to discuss the various types of judgment.

It is worthwhile noting that in favor of this "recall to the concrete" one may invoke the authority both of the ancients and of contemporary thinkers. Two examples must suffice. S. Mansion has tried to show that, for Aristotle, scientific judgments, and even definitions, have an existential reference since, according to him, an essence cannot be apprehended unless its subject exists.¹⁴⁴ For a contemporary view we may turn to L. Lavelle who dwells frequently on the importance of the judgment, and in particular of the judgment of existence. In one of his major works he deals expressly with the judgment of existence.¹⁴⁵ He sees the judgment as affirming a relation between the mind and being. Of the two types of judgment, that of relation and that of inherence, he holds that the latter is more fundamental and presupposed by the former; its subject is not an abstract concept but a concrete term. Our universal judgments presuppose individual and existential ones; and of these the most fundamental is expressed as: Being is. In this judgment we find "the absolute power of affirmation; and, far from believing that particular affirmations add anything to it, we must say that they would not be possible without it, that they receive from it the sap which enlivens and nourishes them."¹⁴⁶

We begin to realize the strength and extent of this movement in philosophy towards a "return to the concrete"¹⁴⁷ when we compare the teaching of these philosophers with that of the ones previously discussed in this article. We found that Croce regards the pure existential judgment as primary, the concept as always individual, and the judgment as always one of fact. For Brunschvicg the primary judgment is that of existence ("cela est"); for Bradley judgment bears on the "that" and the "what," on existence and character. Brentano saw the fundamental type of judgment as "A is." Joyce held

¹⁴⁴ *Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote* (Paris, 1946): pp. 173-183; 213-217.

¹⁴⁵ *De l'Etre* 2nd ed. (Paris, 1947), c. 5.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁴⁷ This is the theme of a book by J. Wahl: *Vers le concret; etudes d'histoire de la philosophie contemporaine* (on Whitehead, Marcel, James) (Paris, 1932).

that the primary type of judgment is the one in which the subject designates a concrete singular being, the predicate standing for a form; while for Amor Ruibal our primary judgment is expressed as "something exists."

This movement was now reinforced by the turn given to philosophical reflection by the Existentialists who set out, inspired by Kierkegaard, to anchor philosophy firmly to the individual and to man's experience of existence. We have already met the influence of Heidegger in such Neo-Scholastics as Rahner, Lotz and Coreth. From about 1946 onwards this new trend forced the more traditional Thomassists to reexamine the teaching of their master on the way in which we come to know existence, and therefore on the nature of judgment.

The Existentialist Impact

J. Maritain was one of the first of these to react in a positive way to the challenge of the Existentialists. A revised notion of judgment appeared in the fourth edition (1946) of his *Degres du Savior* (pp. 188-190); and a conference of the following year¹⁴⁸ was touched up and included in a work which reached a wider audience.¹⁴⁹ Here he explained the function of judgment as that of restoring essences (represented in concepts) to the world of subjects and of existence;¹⁵⁰ and went on to say that for St. Thomas the judgment is "the completion, the consummation, the perfection and glory of intelligence, just as existence is the perfection and glory of being and intelligibility."¹⁵¹ Since we undoubtedly know existence, which, however, cannot be adequately represented in a concept which abstracts from singularity in order to grasp the essence, we must conclude that we have an intuition of being as existent. At the beginning of thought we find, implicitly at least, that the mind conceives and judges at one and the same time. It forms its

¹⁴⁸ "L'Existentialisme de saint Thomas," in *Acta Pont. Acad. Romanae S. Thomae Aq.: Esistenzialismo* (Rome, 1947), pp. 40-64.

¹⁴⁹ *Court traite de l'existence et de l'existant* (Paris, 1947), c. I.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3fl.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

first idea (of being) in making its first judgment, and makes its first judgment in forming its first idea. This judgment can be formulated as: something .exists; it unites a subject with an existence.¹⁵² More in detail, the development of thought can be sketched as follows: With the formation of the first idea (this thing, this being) there arises a judgment which composes this thing with the act of existing. The mind, in so judging, knows the subject as singular (indirectly, by reflection on the phantasm) and affirms that it exists. It can now form the idea of .existence as an object of thought, since it has first known it in an intuition inseparable from the first judgment. After that the mind can gain its intuition of first principles, and then an explicit consciousness of the existence of the thinking subject. Only then can it attain to explicit knowledge of the extra-mentality of being and of existence.¹⁵³

Perhaps Maritain was indebted to his friend E. Gilson for this new light on both existence and judgment. At any rate Gilson, in the third edition of his *Le Thomisme* (Paris, 1941), had added an important first chapter on *Existence et realite*, towards the end of which he deals with judgment as the only act by which we really know existence. His interest in existentialism is shown by an article¹⁵⁴ contributed to the volume *Existence* (Paris, 1945) and by a conference at the Roman Study Week in 1947¹⁵⁵ devoted to this topic. His ideas are set forth at greater length in *L'Etre et l'Essence* (Paris, 1948), especially .chaps. nine and ten. Gilson is here caught between two fires. On the one hand, he insists that the act of existence cannot be represented in the predicate of a judgment, since the predicate is always a concept or form and can therefore represent only an essence or quality. On the other hand, he is persuaded that the judgment is formed by the composition or division of two concepts.¹⁵⁶ As a result he is forced to dis-

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 43-46.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁵⁴ "Limites existentielles de la philosophie."

¹⁵⁵ "La conoscenza dell'essere," in *Acta* (quoted n. 148), pp. 103-114.

¹⁵⁶ *L'Etre et l'Essence*, pp. 281, 283.

tinguish two irreducible types of judgment, the attributive one (with which the logician deals) which has a subject and predicate joined by the copula which does not then signify real existence; and the existential one affirming that an individual being exists. In this judgment (e. g., Socrates exists) there is no predicate; there is composition of subject and of the act of existing, and the verb (is) is not a copula; it affirms the act of existing. **It** is only in and by this judgment that the knower attains existence as actually exercised.¹⁵⁷

The stimulating effect of these philosophers, especially Gilson who maintained the same thesis in his *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949), can be gauged by the number of writings dealing with judgment, in itself and in its relation to existence, which were published about this time. Although few Scholastics were found to agree with his notion of judgment, many agreed with him that in metaphysics the existential judgment is of primary importance.¹⁵⁸ One of the critics who dealt in most detail with the notion of judgment was G. Van Riet.¹⁵⁹ He could not accept the thesis that existence cannot be conceptualized. As he saw it, by judgment we recognize the vital link which binds the significations expressed in concepts to reality as perceived. The existential judgment is fundamental because it explicitly affirms this link. It can be formulated in this way: this is existing.¹⁶⁰ In this judgment the subject is not a concept but a term designating the reality perceived; the verb is the simple copula, signifying the identity of subject and predicate; the predicate is the first concept, that of actual

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 261-285.

¹⁵⁸ E. g. R. Henle: "Existentialism and the Judgement," in *Proc. Amer. Oath. Phil. Ass.* 21 (1947), 40-53; H. Renard: "The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgement," *New Scholasticism* 23 (1949), 387-394; S. Mansion: "Philosophical Explanation," *Dominican Studies* 3 (1950), 197-219.

¹⁵⁹ "Philosophie et existence," in *Rev. Phil. Louvain* 46 (1948), 352-376; "La doctrine thomiste du jugement," *ibid.*, 97-108. The longer article is now available as c. 4 of Van Riet's *Problemes d'Epistemologie* (Louvain/Paris, 1960) from which we quote.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 157. Compare with L. Lavelle: *Introduction à l'ontologie* (Paris, 1967), p. 16: the judgment "il y a quelque chose" is implied in all other judgments.

existence; it expresses correctly the existent being.¹⁶¹ While Gilson holds that the subject of the judgment, as a concept, always signifies an essence, Van Riet maintains that the subject never designates an essence. In the individual judgment it stands for a really existing thing. In such a judgment as "this is existing" the logical subject is a non-conceptual term whose meaning is determined by an accompanying gesture. In the judgment "being is what is" the subject is the transcendental concept of being insofar as it signifies what is real by means of its fundamental intelligible aspect, namely, existence. In the judgment "man is mortal" the logical subject is an abstract concept which, on becoming subject in a proposition, loses its abstract signification in order to designate a concrete existent by means of some of its essential characteristics. Hence the meaning of judgment leads us beyond the realm of logic by reason of the reflection which it implies and by which the mind grasps the identity of the meaning expressed by the predicate with the real existent signified by the subject.¹⁶²

This line of reflection is continued by G. Verbeke¹⁶⁸ who sees the judicative act as essentially synthetic since it unites various partial views of reality which the mind has gained. The function of the judgment is to express actual existence; hence it cannot be called abstractive. It consists in this, that an abstract content is set in relation with a concrete existent by means of man's sensibility, either implicitly or explicitly. The relation to existence is discovered by reflection on the content of the first operation of the mind; and it is this reference to existence which is the characteristic of judgment.

¹⁶¹ *Problemes d'Epistemologie*, pp. 157, 158.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 165. In his review (*Rev. Phil. Louvain*, 1951, pp. of Tyrrell's book (cf. n. Van Riet distinguishes the intellectual judgment, the interior act by which knowledge is led to completion, and which implies a union of terms (not necessarily of concepts), and judgment as pronounced. This latter is an act of the whole man; the intellect may play only a minor part in it. The dominant role may be that of the will. In such cases judgment should be studied rather in ethics than in epistemology.

¹⁶⁸ "Le Developpement de la connaissance d'apres S. Thomas," *Rev.Phil. Louvain*, 47 (1949) 437-457.

While these developments were taking place in Neo-Scholastic circles a similar movement was gathering force among more strictly thomistic thinkers. The question of the possibility of an intuition of being had been discussed, mainly in relation to the views of Bergson and Blondel, by such authors as Roland-Gosseilin and Jolivet as well as by Maritain himself. From within this thomistic context the problem was treated once more by J.-H. Nicolas in an article which could be called existentialist in a thomist sense.¹⁶⁴ If there is an intuition of being, he tells us, it must be a judgment, for the judgment is the most characteristic act of the intellect, that by which it returns from the abstract order to the order of reality. As an affirmation of reality its validity is measured by existence, for this is its proper object.¹⁶⁵ The judgment, as St. Thomas conceives it (e. g., *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 16, a. 2; q. 13, a. 12), is an absolutely simple act whose object-represented by the subject-is also simple. In its expression (the proposition) it is complex; but in itself it is a simple act by which an abstract form is related to its subject. The concept, on becoming the subject in a proposition, is set in relation to concrete reality. It can do this only if, by means of the copula, it is set in relation to another concept which functions as predicate. The judgment is therefore not a mental arrangement of objects of thought but a simple act which attains the subject in a new concept which is the fruit of its own activity/⁶⁶

This question was approached from a new angle by D. M. de Petter in a communication to the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy (1948), on the subject: "L'Intuitif implicite dans l'acte de connaissance," (*Acts of the Congress*, Amsterdam, vol. I, 1949, pp. 384-387). He maintained that there is an intuitive element present, but only implicitly, in every act of knowledge. By intuitive he means a full and

¹⁶⁴ "L'Intuition de l'être et le premier principe," *Revue Thomiste* 46 (1947), pp. 113-134.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1121, 1124.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1125, 1126.

adequate grasp of a concrete existent, as opposed to abstract knowledge. He puts forward three main reasons. First, man is conscious of the abstract character of the content of his knowledge. This implies that the concretely determined object is accessible to him. The dynamism of knowledge is ordained to a more perfect grasp of such an object. Second, knowledge presents itself as bearing on a form in a subject which in its concreteness exceeds what that form represents. Third, judgment consists in reducing an abstract content of thought to something which exists, to a concrete subject. Not all judgments do this directly, but those which do not must rest on such a judgment as their foundation. Hence knowledge, particularly as expressed in judgment, implies an intellectual grasp of a concrete existent; and to explain this we have to invoke the intervention of sense. This conclusion is re-inforced by the consideration that being, as transcendental, is not really abstract since it includes everything, even the concrete determinateness of the singular existent. Moreover, every judgment implies a grasp of the content of the notion of being, of which the abstract form (predicated in the judgment) appears as an explicit but inadequate expression. This notion of being is confused—the role of the form is to render it more explicit.

De Petter's influence in the Netherlands has been considerable but restricted in other countries since he preferred to write in Flemish. His realistic account of judgment can be found in the article: "Zin en grond van het oordeel," (*Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 11 (1949), pp. and in his *Begrip en weTkelijheid* (Hilversum, 1964).

As was perhaps only to be expected, the thomists of this period were more interested in existence itself, in its relation to metaphysics, than in the nature of judgment by which it is affirmed. C. Fabro, for instance ¹⁶⁷ showed that the "esse" which, for St. Thomas, is the object of judgment, is not existence as the act of an essence which is really distinct from it

¹⁶⁷ In various articles, now included in *Partecipazione e causalita*, Torino, 1960; cf. especially pp. 43-45; 52-53; 58-59; 103-104; 163-167; 234-237; 547.

but the *esse* of a synthesis; for the judgment, as such, only affirms that a real synthesis corresponds to the mental one of subject and predicate. L. B. Geiger was also more interested in the metaphysical implications of judgment than in its structure. Although critical of Gilson's thesis, he agreed that the act of existence could not be properly represented by a concept. Our first concept (namely, that of *quelque chose qui est*) represents an object given to our senses and understood by the intellect as being.¹⁶⁸ While he holds that the two terms of the judgment need not both be concepts, since the subject may stand for a concrete thing, he defines the role of judgment as that of affirming a correspondence between what we grasp and what we conceive. It recomposes our partial views of the object in a mental synthesis, and then affirms that this synthesis is conformed to reality.¹⁶⁹

One effect of these discussions was to urge students of St. Thomas to reexamine the texts where he deals with judgment, especially when he considers its relation to existence. L. M. Regis made a careful study of these texts in order to show that Gilson could not invoke St. Thomas in support of his theory.¹⁷⁰ J. Isaac¹⁷¹ acknowledged the primacy of existential judgments, and allowed that existence is grasped only by means of the judgment. He held that the judgment presupposes a complex apprehension and a reflection on its relation to existent reality. A. M. Krapiec found the theories of Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain, and Gilson lacking¹⁷² and undertook a brief study of the structure of judgment. As regards its matter, he said, it does not differ from the concept. What distinguishes it is

¹⁶⁸ "Philosophies de l'Essence et philosophies de l'existence," (a paper read at Barcelona, 1948), now in *Philosophic et spiritualite* (Paris, 1963), pp. 53-70; cf. pp. 62, 66.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 68.

¹⁷⁰ "Gilson's Being and some Philosophers," *Mod. School.* 28 (1951), 111-125.

¹⁷¹ "Sur la connaissance de la verite," *Rev. Sc. Ph. Th.* 32 (1948), 337-350; cf. also *Bulletin Thomiste* Sa (1951), pp. 39-59.

¹⁷² "Analysis formationis conceptus entis \in Xistentialiter considerati," in *Divus Thomas* (Piac.) 59 (1956), pp. 320-350 the critique is set out pp. 321-331.

the act of affirmation. In the attributive judgment what is affirmed is the necessary connection between the terms, while the representations contained in the judgment must constitute a whole. Such a judgment cannot provide the basis for the proper notion of being as being.¹⁷³ For this we must acknowledge the presence of an existential judgment and regard it as our primary judgment and as anterior even to conceptual knowledge.¹⁷⁴ In the formation of this judgment the cogitative power plays an all-important role; this kind of judgment has no predicate, it simply affirms existence. This apprehension and affirmation of the existence of material beings is the real foundation of the process by which we come to know being as such; by it our existential knowledge is united to our first and imperfect concept of being.¹¹⁵

Fr. Regis, in his review of Gilson, had made the point that, for St. Thomas, every judgment consists of a noun and a verb, and that in such a judgment as "Socrates exists" the verb is the predicate. The same point would later be made by R. McInemy.¹⁷⁶ Meanwhile H. McCabe, in criticizing K. Wall for explaining the judgment as the expression of a partial identity between subject and predicate,¹⁷⁷ brought the whole discussion nearer to the linguistic level.¹⁷⁸ For St. Thomas, he pointed out, the judgment consists essentially of a name and a verb (e. g., *I Perih.* lect. 6). It does not involve three terms, the subject and predicate joined by a third term, the copula. There are only two logical parts: the subject (a name) and the verb ("is P."); the subject is the material part of the proposition, the verb its formal and principal part. We have predication in the proper sense in an attribution-statement in

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 344-346.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 338-9; 346.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.

¹⁷⁶ "Notes on Being and Predication," *Laval Theol. Phil.* 15 (1959),

"Some Notes on Being and Predication," *The Thomist* (1959), 315-335.

¹⁷⁷ K. Wall: "The Structure of the Concept," *The Thomist* 18 (1955),

¹⁷⁸ "The Structure of Judgment," *The Thomist* 19 (1956),

which the subject is used to signify a suppositum, whereas the predicate signifies a form. The subject is taken *materialiter* (it stands for the thing referred to), while the predicate is taken *formaliter*; it is not a name, for it does not stand for any thing; it signifies a form. Hence in proper predication we do not assert the identity of subject and predicate; this happens only in the identity statement. We may, however, make the same assertion in the form of an identity statement, namely, the subject is identically that thing which has the form signified by the predicate (*Summa Theol.* I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3). Hence the identity involved in judgment is not that of two concepts but of one and the same thing.

As a result of all these discussions it was clear that, if thomists had, as Gilson and Fabro maintained, lost sight of the supreme importance-for metaphysics-of the genuine notion of existence, they had more surely neglected to work out a satisfactory theory on the nature of judgment. Some, notably Tyrrell and Hoenen, had recognized this, but they were unable to rid themselves completely of a too logical approach to the subject. A more realistic attitude was called for; and this historical survey can be closed by referring to two authors who adopted such an attitude.

F. D. Wilhelmsen may have been, like many other fortunate professors, helped and inspired by the work of one or more of his students. At any rate he refers several times to an unpublished dissertation presented at St. Louis University in 1948 by G. V. Kinnard S. J. on the subject: *The Intellect Composing and Dividing according to St. Thomas Aquinas*. He cannot praise this work too highly; it is said to be brilliant, the most comprehensive study of St. Thomas's theory of judgment.¹⁷⁹ I presume, although I have not been able to verify it, that Wilhelmsen's notion of judgment is essentially the same as that of Kinnard, or at least of Kinnard's way of interpreting St. Thomas. He had dealt briefly with the nature of judgment

¹⁷⁹ "The Philosopher and the Myth," *Mod. School.* 82 (1954) pp. 89-55; p. 48, n.12.

in two articles ¹⁸⁰ before he published a book on epistemology which expressly made "the theory of judgment its center and perfection." ¹⁸¹ The article preceding the book prepared the way for it when it stated:

It is only judgment that attains being in its existence; and since Thomist metaphysics is the philosophy of being as the exercise of the act of existing, it is by now clear to all Thomists that the metaphysical act is the disengagement of what is given in all judgments-being. What is not so evident as yet is the truth that this position entails the philosopher's penetration into the whole body-soul, intellect-sensation relationship that constitutes judgement. ¹⁸²

In cc. 10-18 of his book *Wilhelmsen* sets out his theory of judgment. He rejects the view that the judgment is composed of two concepts joined by the copula. This may be the logician's way of treating the proposition, but, for St. Thomas at least, the mind cannot be informed by two different concepts at the same time. ¹⁸³ Only one concept is needed for judgment; it is that represented by the predicate. The primitive subject of judgment is concrete and individual reality; and most fundamental judgments are those which deal with existing material things.

From these judgments arise all human knowledge, and all other judgments get their strength ultimately from those that meet existing singular things as they impinge themselves upon the senses. From this it follows, not only theoretically but as a matter of direct experience, that the *subject is never understood as such in any judgment.* ¹⁸⁴

The function of the subject is to stand for the thing which is known in the first place.

The subject of judgment is, as it were, the finger of the intellect pointing at a thing; and the predicate is the voice of the intelligence

¹⁸⁰ "The Aesthetic Act and the Act of Being," *ibid.* 50 (1952), pp. 279-291, and the article just quoted.

¹⁸¹ *Man's Knowledge of Reality* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), p.v.

¹⁸² "The Philosopher and the Myth," pp. 39-40.

¹⁸⁸ *Man's Knowledge of Reality*, pp. 66, 106, 109 etc.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

declaring that the thing exists in this or that way. Therefore, there is but one meaning of which man is rationally conscious in any single judgment: the predicate.¹⁸⁵ *The intelligibility of the subject is the predicate.* The predicate makes known the subject or is the light under which the subject is understood. In fact, the subject has no other meaning in any one judgment than that given it by predicate.¹⁸⁶

The subject of a judgment may originally have been a concept. When it is used as subject in a judgment it no longer signifies a concept. The term which formerly expressed a concept now refers, by means of the phantasm from which it was derived, to the thing or object of the judgment. Wilhelmsen proposes to call this the symbolized meaning of the subject, to distinguish it from the formal or rational meaning of the predicate.¹⁸⁷ This calls for attention to the all-important function of the *vis cogitativa* (or *ratio particularis*) in the thomistic explanation of judgment, a point which several other authors had already made.¹⁸⁸ In judgment the phantasm can exercise this role in three ways: 1) if the judgment concerns a material thing present to the external senses it does not symbolize or represent that thing, for it presents it to the mind; Q) if the judgment deals with something known in the past and no longer present the phantasm symbolizes this subject; 3) if the subject is not a sensible reality the phantasm again stands as a symbol for this reality and for all that was previously understood about it.¹⁸⁹ Judgment essentially implies a reflection upon this phantasm; and " in this reflection to the phantasm the intellect

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 108. The author here refers to Newman's *A Grammar of Assent* (London, 1887), p. 14.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 105-106.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. for instance: N. Mailloux: "The Problem of Perception," *The Thomist* 4 P. Hoenen, *op. cit.*, c. 8; G. Klubertanz: *The Discursive Power* (St. Louis, esp. cc. 5-9; *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (New York, 1953), pp. 143, 187, 19ft; cf. also Krapiec: *art. cit.* (n. 172), 331-339; Regis; *ap. cit.*, pp. 271-275; A. da Castronovo, "La Cogitativa in S. Tommaso," *Dact. Camm.* 111 (1959) pp. 99-244.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. III.

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applies a form (signified by the predicate) to a thing (signified by the subject) ."¹⁹⁰

The "application of a form to a thing" (in the words of St. Thomas) must be identified with the act of predication, with composing of predicate with subject. The subject is the very thing itself, held before the intellect in the phantasm-sensation relationship. The predicate is the formal content, the "meaning" or intelligibility initially abstracted in the phantasm Judgment, as has been emphasized through all these pages, is the act in which man understands something to exist. The theory of judgment must terminate in the existentiality of judgment, in its very being.¹⁹¹ [In fine:] What is known is a thing designated by a subject; what is intended of the subject is the formal meaning designated by the predicate. All judgments reach existence in some order."¹⁹²

Since the authority of St. Thomas had been invoked in favor of widely different views on the nature of judgment, J. Nijenhuis has set out to reconstruct a theory based on careful study of the places where St. Thomas speaks of judgment.¹⁹⁸ He finds that the commonly accepted "two concept" theory can find no support in Aquinas, and he rejects it as untenable and as due mainly to a too logical treatment, to the neglect of the psychology of judging/⁹⁴ Aquinas does not confuse judgment and proposition. For him judgment stands for the act of passing a judgment, for affirmation or negation. **It** implies the use of a noun and a verb; nothing more is needed for the judgment to be complete; and a study of this can reveal what is essential in any judgment.

The fundamental and primary type of judgment for man, and that on which St. Thomas usually bases his analysis, is the one which has a singular-material subject and a universal predicate of an intellectual-essential nature.¹⁹⁵ Examination of

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-131.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

¹⁹³ *The Structure of the Judgement according to Aquinas* (Roma, 1971). This is a summary based on a revised version of a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy at the *Angelicum* (Rome) in 1960.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39; 62-72.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

this kind of judgment shows that its formation requires two apprehensions, one is the direct apprehension of the predicate, the other is the indirect apprehension (by reflection on the phantasm) of the subject (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 86, a. 1; *De Verit.* q. 10, a. 5). Hence in

the most precise and formal description of the nature of the proposition: The *Predicate* signifies an aspect, property or quality of the thing, representing one of the many "forms" of which the thing, metaphysically speaking, is made up. Its direct apprehension by the intellect may be taken as one of the many indications why it is called principal part of the proposition. The *Subject*, which is apprehended only indirectly, that is to say, by the intellect, represents, via the phantasm directly "depicting" the material thing, this thing itself in its entirety and as it is found in reality.¹⁹⁶

As regards the structure of the judgment various texts (such as *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 12 and a. 13; *I Perih. lect.* 8, 98) are adduced to show that the component parts of the judgment can form a unity insofar as the predicate is taken formally while the subject is taken materially. Here "formally" means: taken to signify a nature; while "materially" means taken to stand for the suppositum to which the judgment refers (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 16, a. 7 ad 4; a. 9). In consequence, we should say that the role of the subject is to: "stand for, designate, indicate, denote, direct attention to, point at ... the function of the predicate is almost exclusively described as: signify."¹⁹⁷ The author ends his work by quoting *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 16, a. fl: "In every proposition (the intellect) either applies a *form* signified by the predicate to the *thing* signified (!) by the subject, or removes one from it."¹⁹⁸

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At the end of this historical survey it seems undeniable that for the last thirty years or so, whether through internal evolution or through the influence of such currents of thought as

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

us *Ibid.*

ON JUDGING

existentialism or phenomenology, Scholastic philosophers have discovered and clarified aspects of the thought of S. Thomas which appear to have been ignored or at least not considered as important. One point that has been made clear is the thorough unity of the human process of knowing. There had been a tendency, due to a too narrowly logical approach to the question, to separate the concept and the judgment as well as the acts by which they are formed. Undoubtedly concept and judgment are distinct; and by reflection one can concentrate on the concept alone or the judgment alone. But an act of knowledge, from a psychological point of view, is a unity in which conception and judging are combined and inseparable. **It** is more a question of distinguishing formalities in the complete act of knowing than of designating distinct acts regarded as complete in themselves. When, for instance, one says that the essence is attained in a concept while actual existence is reached by the judgment, this should be taken to mean that by the one complete act an existing thing is known, the essence (or something pertaining to it) by reason of the concept, the existence by reason of the judgment.

It has also been made quite clear that for St. Thomas knowledge is complete only when the mind passes, in judgment, to affirmation or negation; and that man's knowing process commences in contact, through the external senses, with existent and singular material things. St. Thomas also insists over and over again (e. g., *De Verit.*, q. 6 ad 3; *I de Anima*, lect. 10, 152; *De Anima* 19; *Quodl.* IX, q. 7; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, a. 2 ad 2) that it is the whole man that knows. Properly speaking, neither intellect nor sense can be said to know, for they are not agents but faculties. They are the means by which man, as one subsisting being, knows. **It** is one and the same man who understands and senses (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, a. 1). In man's normal knowing there is no such thing as pure sensation or pure intellection. There is but one process of knowing, and it is integrated by a series of acts that occur together. As B. Lonergan puts it, knowledge is a structured whole composed of parts which are active and which constitute them-

selves as a whole. All its parts are knowledge, and all integrate one whole.¹⁹⁹

Similarly it is one and the same object that is known through sense and intellect. The same object is, in different ways, understood, imagined, perceived, and touched and seen; which means that, as St. Thomas puts it, man never knows except by "turning to the phantasm" (*ibid.*, q. 84, aa. 6-8).

This thomistic insistence on the organic and dynamic unity of knowledge entails rejection of the Lockian and Kantian view of knowledge as composed of two distinct stages, as though the senses first formed their object and then offered this as material for a subsequent act of the intellect which would order this material in its own way. In this view intellect and sense would not bear on the same object. Each would have its own object. The intellect would then be cut off from intercourse with existent beings, and its first act would be that of judgment seen as a correlating of immanent objects. For St. Thomas the knowing process starts from sensible experience and always includes it as an essential component, even where there is question of knowledge of immaterial beings. Our primitive judgments bear on material existing things as present to and acting on our senses; and all other forms of knowing refer back, in various ways, to these. In this sense he affirms the primacy of the existential judgment.

This means that, in studying the judgment, one should attend first of all to such singular and existential judgments. One can understand why the epistemologist, and so many modern philosophers from Descartes to Husserl, who are concerned with establishing the validity of science, should turn by preference to judgments of the abstract and universal type found in the sciences. But science is an artificial and highly evolved kind of knowledge; and since its object is, formally, ideal, universal and immanent, to restrict one's consideration to such judgments is to enter the way of immanence which leads to some form of idealism. It is also to deform the theory of judgment.

¹⁹⁹ - "Cognitiveal. Structure," in *OoUectim*, c. 14, especially pp. 222-!!!W.

To reconstruct the thomistic theory of judgment one should therefore carry out what may be called a phenomenology of judgment, that is, a study of the principal types in order to determine which are primary and fundamental. An investigation into these, in an endeavor to discover their basic structure, should reveal the nature of the act of judging; and this, in turn, should shed some light on the nature of the judgment which simply affirms existence. Judgment and existence are intimately related to each other; for judgment is the perfection of knowing, just as existence is the perfection of being.

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AQUINAS AND THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

EXCEPT FOR HIS *Commentary on Aristotle's "Politics"* and a brief opuscle on the *Rule of Princes*, both completed by other authors, Thomas Aquinas wrote no political treatise in the classical style. The great moral and social themes on Law, Right, Justice, and the Social Virtues are all integrated into his theological synthesis of "man's coming from God and returning to him." The work and the ideas it contains have secured for Aquinas a place among the classics not only in philosophy and theology but also in law and politics. Most Christian and especially Catholic social ethics have been a reproduction-not always the most authentic-of the principles found in the *Summa*. In addition, a considerable literature of selected political texts, commentaries, and historical and political studies has surfaced, especially since the revival of scholastic philosophy under Leo XIII. It is nevertheless true that Aquinas never made an impact on actual political forms or events comparable, for example, to the influence of Locke, Rousseau or Marx. His contribution, we would like to argue, consists primarily in his grasping and formulating some basic, timeless insights into the nature and purpose of human fellowship within his general conception of man and his universe: insights that can be tested and expanded and in continuous dialogue with other philosophical and political currents as well as with the reality of human experience itself. The purpose of this article is to highlight some of these insights as they reflect in the social teaching of the Church and bear upon some of our contemporary social Issues.

Although the seventh centenary of Aquinas's death calls for a tribute to the man, it is not our intention to present a case

for the Thomism of the encyclicals or to suggest that a thirteenth-century theologian or a twentieth-century Church has all the answers to all the questions. Indeed, the first thing we learn from Aquinas is that there are no blueprints for either personal happiness or social progress. The Church has publicly disclaimed such an expertise in human affairs.¹ What we propose is that in addressing ourselves to such questions a dialogue with the past may be as productive as a dialogue with the present. The Church does not speak in a vacuum; it speaks in the context of its own historical reality which stems from the Incarnation, since "beneath all changes there are many realities which do not change and which have their ultimate foundation in Christ, who is the same yesterday and today, yes and forever".² The historical continuity of the gospel message is essential to the Church's identity and mission. While the same cannot be said of philosophical or even of theological traditions within this continuum, their contributions do call for attention and testing, to say the least. Continuity does not exclude change and adaptation, although this has often been a slow and a painful process for the Church. Rather, such changes in the Church's position on social questions not only occur, they are also called for. Since the "static" conceptions of the Church's teachings are frequently attributed to its "fidelity to Thomas," it will be a part of this analysis to inquire not only what he might have contributed by way of unchangeable truth but also, if such be the case, by way of a spirit of openness to change and adaptation.

From a historical perspective, Aquinas's socio-political thought is often associated with and, for some, is the spokesman for the medieval conception of Christianity as a hierarchical commonwealth whose parts are harmoniously interrelated and jointly ordained to a common goal which is ultimately God himself. By the time Aquinas was formulating his version of this conception, the political reality was already quite different,

¹ *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes)*, no. 48.

• *Ibid.*, no. 10.

with both popes and emperors struggling for worldly supremacy. The result was not a harmonious Christendom but the plurality of sovereign, absolutist, and often antagonistic states that we still know today.

There is no need for us to review all the other historical changes often described as the process of dechristianization. The decline of scholasticism, the rise of modern science and philosophy, the Reformation, and the political, industrial, and most recently, technological revolutions are some of the great turning points with which we are familiar. Gradually but profoundly they changed the styles and structures of human relations. It may be useful to sketch some of the results of these changes as they appear on the contemporary scene. The first to attract the attention of the Church was the rise of the working class in the last century. It is followed now by the entry of women into public life. Related to this is the weakening of the centuries-old agrarian and patriarchal civilization on the one hand, and the expansion of urban concentrations with all their big-city problems on the other. On the international level there is the emergence of underdeveloped nations (the third world) with their problems of economic inequalities, population explosion, and environmental crises, coupled, because of mass communication, with evidence of cultural and religious pluralism, atheism as a possible world view, and Christianity as a religion proper to Western man. In the socio-moral order the multiplication of social relations started what the encyclicals now call the "process of socialization,"³ a daily more complex interdependence of citizens. Contributing to this process we can cite the computer, the possibility of genetic and biological control of human life, the sexual revolution with its effects on marriage and morality in general, and the specific problems of the young, the old, the minorities, etc., in a society which is still ruled by the law of competition rather than by a spirit of cooperation. In the area of politics and government, the power of the state and the danger of nuclear war are

³ *Mater et Magistra*, no. 59; *Gaudium et Spes*, no. 25.

still very much with us. Governments, when they are not dictatorships, are based on positivistic, contractual, and utilitarian conceptions of man. In spite of the great principles of the American and French revolutions, and contrary to Marx's expectation of the withering away of the state into a classless society, the bureaucratic, militaristic, and financial machinery of the state has increased throughout the world. Individual freedom can be challenged at any time on the grounds of "Party line" or "national interest." Yet there is a profound confusion about what such interests are. There is a crisis of the common good in contemporary society at almost all levels. Citizens do not know what the common good of their country is. The faithful are confused about the common good of their Church; the religious debate the goals of their Orders; workers question the common good in their unions; married couples search for the meaning of their marriages.

Neither philosophy nor theology has been very helpful to the human mind in recent times. It is true that currents like existentialism and the Latin American theology of liberation are awakening Christians to their responsibility for concrete action. But the anti-metaphysical strain in modern philosophy and the anti-transcendental bent in theology deprive man of any appeal beyond the positivistic instances of the human will. However, questions are being raised more and more about who should decide and on what grounds, as the basic values of human life appear at stake in such issues as war, capital punishment, abortion, euthanasia, sterilization, and other forms of human experimentation.

There is no single cause or solution for these phenomena, but two underlying thoughts come to mind in their regard; one is that man has always searched for a happy balance between his individual rights and his social interdependence, and he has never found it; the second is that the Church has always searched for an equally happy balance between its human-social and faith-transcendental function, and has never found it either. Although human relations cannot be reduced to simple categories, especially the individual-society relationship,

experience tells us that they can easily be polarized around two extremes: individualism and collectivism in politics, and secularism and supernaturalism in religion. Nineteenth-century capitalism and the twentieth-century communism what such polarization can mean in real life. It is true that the general standard of living eventually rose under both systems, but the achievements are due to mitigating rather than to enforcing the principles on which they are respectively founded. Without such mitigation and with the materialistic and competitive conception of man which is common to both, the *laissez-faire* capitalism lends itself to the oppression of the weak and collectivism to totalitarianism. We still have plentiful evidence of both.

Tossed between these two forms of the same mistake-extremism—the response of the Church grew gradually as it began to address itself to the particular issues of the day, from working conditions and private property in the time of Leo XIII to the concern for trade unions, peace and international justice of the twentieth-century popes. But the Church was divided within itself. The "conflict" between transcendental and worldly perspectives of the gospel, between the here and hereafter, is not new in the history of Christianity. There have always been within and without the Church those who conceive Christianity as primarily if not exclusively a humanitarian and social commitment and those who either refuse to be "of this world" or deny the Church's right to speak on worldly matters. The social turmoil of the nineteenth century brought the conflict to a head, as the Church was confronted, on the one hand, with capitalism and socialism as the leading ideologies, and on the other, with poverty as the common condition of the majority of people. Although the leading nineteenth-century Catholics were aware of a new situation created by the industrial revolution, and some like Cardinals Manning and Gibbons, played important roles in the change which was to come, the absence of a Christian-Catholic social "ideology" comparable to the Marxist vision and method was conspicuous. Jeremiah Newman describes the initial Catholic reaction as romantic,

aristocratic, moralistic, and paternalistic. ⁴ As late as 1878 Leo XIII's main concern was still " the defense of the religious order and civil order against subversive forces " and the preaching of almsgiving to the rich and patience to the poor as " the best method " of social reconciliation. ⁵

As often happens in similar situations, the early Catholic reactions were divided between the conservatives and the liberals: the former centered on individual and the latter on structural amelioration. Both failed in their respective efforts, although not without significant influence on future developments: the conservatives because charity was not a substitute for justice and liberals because they were too liberal for the Church and not liberal enough for the workers. A new theological foundation for the social order that would meet the new social climate and counteract both capitalism and socialism ideologically became imperative. The Church looked for this foundation in its own philosophical and theological tradition. **It** was thus that the study of St. Thomas and a new edition of his works (the Leonine) were initiated by Leo XIII's encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris* (On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy) in 1879. The source was rich and valid, but it was also suspect as a sign of looking backward instead of moving forward. Nevertheless, it soon became evident that under the dust of casuistry, legalism, and the apologetics of the recent centuries, here lay a treasure that could still be invested. The first significant breakthrough came twelve years later with the publication of *Rerum Novarum* in 1891. The encyclical opened a new path to a theological foundation for the social order. **It** was the beginning and has remained the basis of a series of subsequent pontifical documents which, under the name of social encyclicals and together with Vatican II's *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World* now constitute a substantial body of the Church's social doctrine, bearing on

• Jeremiah Newman: *Change and the Catholic Church* (Helicon, 1965), pp. 141 ss.

• Leo XIII: *Quod Apostolici muneris*, 1878.

practically all aspects of contemporary social and international problems and relations.

All socio-political ideologies proceed from some basic assumptions which flow into practical application according to a proposed method. Thus capitalism proceeds from an egoistic conception of man and proposes free competition as the road to social harmony. Marxism rests on the assumption of dialectical materialism and expects, by way of proletarian revolution (or the dictatorship of proletariat), to establish a communist society. The Church's social doctrine also rests on some basic assumptions and envisions a specific method for social betterment. The assumptions concern the understanding of man, society, the common good, and social justice, which are the underlying realities of all human relations. The method is one of moderation and reconciliation of extremes, and, as far as the Church's more recent stance toward the world is concerned, its adaptation to "the signs of the times," without renouncing its supernatural mission. It is along these lines that we propose to review Aquinas's main contribution.

Aquinas's socio-political thought and its practical implications are, as we said earlier, only one aspect of his theological synthesis. Within this synthesis his "social theology" evolves around four fundamental realities: the personal unity, dignity, and mystery of the human being; the naturalness of society; the primacy of the common good; and justice as the foundation of human fellowship.

Dignity of the human person

Compared with modern evolutionary and process theories Aquinas's concept of man appears static and has been criticized as such. It assumes the existence and continuity of what we call human nature and our capacity for knowing it. How "static" Aquinas's conception is and how it compares in practical human and social consequences with process thought may be a debatable issue. The fact is, and no one denies it, that human development, adaptation, and man's growing knowledge of himself are taken for granted. Speaking of natural law Aquinas

writes that "nothing hinders the natural law from being changed since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the divine law and human laws." ⁶ For Aquinas, every human person is a unique being, and human actions are singular (*actus sunt in particularibus*). He writes: "Our intellect can make a universal statement which is true, as in the case of the necessary, in regard to which a defect cannot occur. But of other things it is impossible that anything be said which is true universally, as in the case of the contingent." ⁷ This is an obvious warning against too hasty a codification of the natural law. But it is not a door to scepticism. There is still a world with man in it at every given time. Individual personalities, tastes, and preferences may vary, but the elementary needs for food, clothing, and shelter are constant, and they tell us something. There is still a specific human identity in a given time and place in relation to the rest of creation; an identity which is recognizable and discernible. On the basis of such a specifically human identity, Aquinas makes the point that man is not just the culmination of a natural evolution, but also-and primarily-the center of creation, the middle between the Creator and the least of creation. In the order of beings, he combines the highest, a spiritual soul, with the lowest, a material substance, in one person existing "on the horizon of eternity and time." ⁸

The individual is not just a member of a species: he possesses a rational nature which distinguishes him as person, and "person signifies what is the most perfect in nature." ⁹ It also signifies what is distinctive and complete in that nature "this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of man, and which, though not belonging to person in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person." ¹⁰ Against not only materialistic but also

• *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 5.

• *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, Book V, lect. XVI.

• *II Contra Gentiles*, c. 81.

• *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 119, a. 8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

dualistic and departmentalistic conceptions of man is Aquinas's position that in man everything is man and man is a unique person. The substantial union of soul and body, spirit and flesh, consecrates man's physical, biological, and social existence, and differentiates him from every other created being even in functions which are otherwise common. It is with the soul that "we eat and feel and understand."¹¹ On these grounds, for instance, human sexuality is inseparable from human spirituality. A complete declaration of human rights may be deduced from this conception of man: the right to life and bodily integrity: the right to knowledge and information; the right to freedom, the right to worship; the right to work and ownership, etc., since "man in a certain sense contains all things and according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things."¹² Redemption adds another dimension to this natural dignity of man since "the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural perfection of divine goodness ... Hence man's ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God."¹³

It is on the basis of these two inalienable realities, nature and redemption, of the human person that Pope John XXIII lays down the grounds for the order which should exist for the respect of the person in human society.

Any human society, if it is to be well ordered and productive, must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a person, that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will. Indeed, precisely because he is a person he has rights and obligations flowing directly and simultaneously from his very nature. And as these rights and obligations are universal and inviolable, so they cannot in any way be surrendered. If we look upon the dignity of the human person in the light of divinely revealed truth we cannot help but esteem it far more highly; for men are redeemed by the blood of Jesus Christ, they

¹¹ *Ibid.*, q. 71, a. 1; *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 56.

¹² *Summa Theol.*, q. 96, a. 2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 11-II, q. 2, a. 8.

are by grace the children and friends of God and heirs of eternal glory.¹⁴

Naturally social

Man's uniqueness finds its extension in society. Society is the result of neither sinfulness nor contract. It is the natural framework of individual existence and growth which springs from man's twofold needs of receiving and giving. "To the other animals nature provides food, hair to cover, defense such as teeth, horns, claws or at least speed to flee. Man has nothing of these prepared by nature, but instead he possesses reason by which he can procure all these with his own hands and for such preparation a single man is insufficient. One man alone cannot by himself go through life."¹⁵ Original sin is not the cause of social differences and authority. In a question asking whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man, in other words, whether social differences would have existed, Aquinas first rejecting the possibility of slavery writes:

A man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either toward his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many as such seek many things, whereas one attends only to one ... Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefits of others, according to I Peter 4:10 "as every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another ..."¹⁶

The meaning of "naturaliter sociale" has caused occasional confusion due to the ambiguity of the terms *nature* and *natural* in Aquinas's writings. Things could be natural in a cosmic, generic, specific or even individual sense, as when we say that the knowledge of medicine is natural to a doctor and that of

¹⁴ *Pacem in Terris*, nos. 9-10.

¹⁵ *De Regimine Principum*, I: 1.

¹⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 96, a. 4.

theology to a priest. In practice it makes a difference whether we conceive human sociability as a cosmic or biological whole, a heap of stones or something specifically human. It is in this latter sense that we must understand St. Thomas's "naturaliter sociale," since, according to the principle of substantial union of soul and body in one person, in man everything is specifically human. For both material and biological reasons man needs society, but such needs are specifically human, subject to man's organizational capacity and in various degrees integrated into his moral order. Consequently, society is not simply or even primarily a sociological phenomenon but a moral reality and a postulate of reason: "*civitas (est) quodam totum cujus humana ratio non est solum cognoscitiva, sed etiam operativa.*"¹⁷ Reason demands a society wherein the laws governing society are also "ordinances of reason," or they are not laws at all. Since man's sociability is based on his rationality every human society implies reciprocity: the individual is both active and passive, giving and receiving, although under different aspects. It also implies a purpose because in all human activity man always acts for an end. The end is the common good of that society. St. Thomas's concept of society as a reciprocal sharing of mutual and spiritual values in view of a common goal is reiterated in the *Pastoral Constitution on the Church*.

Man's social nature makes it evident that the progress of the human person and the advance of society itself hinge on each other. For the beginning, the subject and the goal of all social institutions is and must be the human person, which for its part and by its very nature stands completely in need of social life. This social life is not something added on to man. Hence through his dealings with others, through reciprocal duties, and through fraternal dialogue he develops all his gifts and is able to rise to his destiny.¹⁸

Aquinas offers no original thought on the institutional type of government but rather a few accepted conditions for what

¹⁷ *Commentary on the Politics*, Prooemium.

¹⁸ *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church*, no. 25.

he calls "civitas" or perfect society (equivalent to our concept of state) suggesting a pragmatic approach. A perfect society is a multitude of free people, sufficient for adequate human development (*bene vivere humanum*) and governed by a legitimate authority.¹⁹ A multitude of free people suggests a pluralistic conception of society, not only accepting but insisting on healthy differences within a fundamental unity.²⁰ The conception excludes every biological, racial, class and in principle even religious or any other totalitarian uniformity. What is sufficient for life is an open-ended perspective since needs and possibilities vary in time and place. Once again "*bene vivere humanum*" applies to the entire person and includes material, spiritual and emotional fulfillment. Man cannot live without food, and "as he cannot live without truth, likewise he cannot live without joy."²¹ The purpose of a social institution, therefore, is to assure such material, moral, and cultural conditions in which people can freely and comfortably advance in their human growth and fulfillment. Although God is not a direct objective of such human fellowship in a political society, a perfect society must at least be open to and in line with that objective because of man's natural openness to the Absolute. By the very fact that all moral order is goal-oriented Aquinas excludes an entirely secular order with its own closed standards and norms.

Because by virtuous living man is ordained to an ulterior end which consists in divine fruition ... it is necessary that the end of human multitude be the same as of individual man. The ultimate end of an assembled multitude is not to live virtuously but by virtuously living achieve the divine fruition.²²

¹⁹ *Commentary on Psalm 45*, verse 4.

²⁰ *II Polit.*, lect. 1. ". . . civitas non solum debet esse ex pluribus hominibus, sed etiam oportet esse ex differentibus specie, idest ex hominibus diversarum conditionum . . . aliud est civitas et aliud est multitudo congregata ad simul pugnandum."

²¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 114, a. ad 1; also I-II, q. 4, a. 6: "Since it is natural for the soul to be united to the body, how is it credible that the perfection of the one should exclude the perfection of the other."

²² *De Regimine Principum*, I: 14.

Natural order is distinct and, as we shall point out shortly, in a sense autonomous, but not separate from, the order of faith. In the total human destiny even secular social structures have a redemptive value insofar as they help man toward salvation.

As it is natural for man to live in society, so also is it natural to live under an authority. A perfect society cannot exist or function without someone presiding and caring for the common good. In practice this can only be done through a legitimate government "*qui curam communitatis habet.*" What kind of government, how strong, how weak, how chosen, how controlled, how changed is a matter of political experience, prudence, and wisdom. But assuming the principle of individual freedom as well as the egoistic undercurrents of human nature, a perfect society can be united only by the free union of free wills, on the basis of knowledge and in view of a common objective. It is a unity based not on the wit of either one or many but on the law which is an "ordinance of reason" and in its turn a reflection of the divine wisdom (eternal law) as implemented in human hearts (natural law.)

Along these lines and from our contemporary perspective *Pacem in Terris* takes it for granted that in the last instance the public authority in a society is human persons: individuals chosen or otherwise established to be authority or government. Since governments are the result of man's social nature, it is only by reference to this nature and ultimately to its Creator that they are socially just or unjust, legitimate or illegitimate.

Since the right to command is required by the moral order and has its source in God, it follows that, if civil authorities pass laws or command anything opposed to the moral order and consequently contrary to the will of God, neither the laws made nor the authorization granted can be binding on the consciences of the citizens, since God has more right to be obeyed than men. As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches: "Human law has the true nature of law only insofar as it corresponds to right reason, and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. Insofar as it falls short of right reason, a law is said to be a wicked law; and so lacking the true nature of law, it is rather a kind of violence." (*Pacem in Terris*, 51)

Human dimensions of the common good

Of all social factors and values the common good holds the central place. Its existence is implicit in human cooperation, but what it is and how it relates to individual goods is more difficult to define. In Aquinas's thinking to understand the common good one must begin by understanding the essence of good as such, which is philosophically puzzling. Aquinas begins with a basic experience. This essence, he writes, "consists in this, that it is in some way desirable," in other words, it is related as a fulfillment to a desiring subject, as truth is related to the intellect. Good is thus conceived as perfective of one who desires it which implies that it must be perfect, i. e., a real value in itself, existing and true since "everything is perfect so far as it exists."²⁸ There is in the works of Aquinas an ontology of good, its transcendental status, its identity with being and truth, and its analogical application, which underlies what in the social context we call the common good. Such a common good is intrinsic to all human associations beginning with friendship and the family and extending to political, religious, international and all other groupings. In all such groupings, Aquinas maintains, the common good is also the goal to which particular goods are ordained as parts to their whole. "The common good is the end of each individual member of a community just as the good of the whole is the end of each

²⁴ For this reason "it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common good of his country."²⁵ Since human fellowship, according to Aquinas, is not just an institution which one can join or leave but a community to which one belongs in virtue of his humanity, the common good is not just an accumulation in size and degree of individual goods but a reality specifically different and a value in its own right. "The common good of the realm and the particular good of the in-

•• *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 1.

•• *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 9 ad 3.

•• *Ibid.*, q. 31, a. 3.

dividual differ not only in respect of the *many* and *few*, but under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the common good differs from the aspect of the individual good, even as the aspect of the whole differs from that of the part." ²⁶ The difference and its implication echo in the distinction between what some contemporary writers call the aggregative and the distributive conceptions of the common good.²⁷ The distributive conception is limited to the distribution of existing goods or values under such principles as justice for all, equal opportunity, equal rights, and viewing the society as a balance of group interests and powers rather than as a community with a common goal. The aggregative conception is goal-oriented. Merle Longwood observes, in the article just quoted, that only the aggregative or goal-oriented common good is adequate to deal with such contemporary problems as clear air, clean water, education, crime prevention, etc., because these are not matters of equal distribution but of common sharing in the responsibility for survival.

The primacy of the common good is not without qualification. "The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both of the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe." ²⁸ Aquinas speaks as a theologian, but the principle applies on all levels, although a discernment is not always easy. There are statements on individual/ society and private / common good relationships which, if taken in isolation, appear conflicting. Thus we are told that "every individual person is compared to the community as part to a whole," ²⁹ or that being "a part of a political community he cannot be good unless he be well adjusted to the common good"; yet "to be a part is contrary to the idea of person" ³⁰ and "a

•• *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 7 ad 2.

²⁷ Merle Longwood: "Common Good and Environmental Issues," in *Theological Studies*, Vol. 84, No. 8 (September, 1978).

•• *Summa Theol.*, 1-11, q. 118, a. 9 ad 2.

•• *Ibid.*, 11-11, q. 61, a. 1; q. 64, a. 2.

³⁰ *III Sent.*, a. 5, q. 82.

human being is not subordinate to the political community until he is in his whole self and with all he possesses, and therefore it is not required that each of his acts should be well or ill deserving within the political order." ³¹ To understand Aquinas's dialectic of the common good one must recall man's personal dignity on the one hand and his natural embedment in society on the other. Since every society is always a society of human persons, the good of the society is the good of each person who in turn continuously transcends the existing good (and society) by his openness to something greater and better. A continuous cross reference to man as a person and person as naturally social is a safeguard against the extremes of both individualism, which does not go beyond a juxtaposition (distribution) of private goods, and collectivism, which deprives man not only of what he has but ultimately of what he is.

Common good is not just an ideal, much less an abstraction. In a social context it always has an existing content, a standard that can be experienced and evaluated, although not determined. "*Bene vivere humanum*," good human life is an open-ended objective. **It** "requires good things enough to insure the most developed activity this life allows." ³² Pope John defines the common good as "the sum total of those conditions of social living whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection." ³³ Because common good is an open-ended reality it becomes the object not only of sociological and political debates, votes, and decisions, but also of philosophical and theological inquiry, especially when questions are raised about the universal common good of all mankind. **It** is our understanding of the common good that determines the extent of our relationships and, consciously or unconsciously, who is "my neighbor." **It** is the understanding of the common good that determines on what level we meet another person: be it the level of friends and family, profession, race, nation, religion, or whatever, and it is the same under-

³¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 21, a. 4 ad 3.

•• *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 3 ad 2.

•• *Mater et Magistra*, no. 65.

standing also that determines the extent of our justice. Is what happens to the minorities, the unemployed, the old, the third world, etc., any of my concern and responsibility? The complexity and interdependence that we experience in the modern world, (the process of socialization in the words of Pope John) does not allow for indifference. However, an efficient and joint cooperation will be possible only in view of a common good which at the same time transcends each and fulfills all.

It is in this context that a philosophical and theological investigation into the nature of an authentic and supreme common good, as a postulate of reason, arises and through an analysis of man's needs, frustrations, and openness this investigation brings God into the picture as the ultimate fulfillment of man as man and thus the ultimate common good of mankind.

Now the supreme good, namely, God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on him, and the good whereby each thing is good is the particular good of that thing and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, God, to wit, as their end.³⁴

To the extent that man accepts God as his ultimate value every other good must be in line with this value as every positive law must be in line with the natural and eternal law, or at least not contrary to it. Introducing God into the realm of the common good does not imply a Church-dominated society. In this regard Aquinas provides the theological foundation for the changes that have taken place in the Church's attitude toward secular society and values. The principle that "the divine law which is the law of grace does not do away with human law which is the law of human reason" ³⁵ (or that grace does not suppress nor replace but only perfects nature) opens the door to an understanding and autonomy of secular values that has not always been characteristic of the Christian mentality. The position that "outside the Church there is no salvation" lent itself too easily to a chauvinistic and ec-

³⁴ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 17.

³⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 10, a. 10.

clesiocentric perspective of defending the Church and denouncing the world. This situation has changed in many regards even since the time of *Rerum Novarum*. Thus there is a de-emphasis very much in line with Aquinas's position on the inviolability of private property as a natural right which *Rerum Novarum* overstressed as a defense against socialism. Among other changes the Church now accepts strikes and allows Catholics to be members of non-Catholic unions. It has disentangled itself from particular regimes. It accepts socialism as a legitimate political system and respects pluralism in practical social and political matters. It professes religious liberty instead of mere tolerance, and affirms "the autonomy of earthly affairs."³⁶ The distinction between earthly and spiritual values must not be confused with their separation. When Aquinas speaks of man's natural possibilities and progress as distinct from the realm of the supernatural, he always adds "but not without God's help" (*non tamen sine adiutorio divino*), a thought which is reflected when the same *Pastoral Constitution on the Church* affirms that "earthly matters and the concerns of faith derive from the same God." (ibid) The idea implies not only an assumed harmony between secular and spiritual values grounded in the substantial unity of the person but also a certain primacy and supremacy of God in human fellowship. Social no less than individual life should not be split. The highest guarantee of unity and harmony on both levels is God. The *Pastoral Constitution on the Church* echoes this thought in the following statement: "Often refusing to acknowledge God as his beginning, man has also disrupted his proper relationship to his own ultimate goal. At the same time he became out of harmony with himself, with others and with all

•• *Pastoral Constitution on the Church*, no. 86. "If by the autonomy of earthly affairs we mean that created things and societies themselves enjoy their own laws and values which must be gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men, then it is entirely right to demand that autonomy. Such is not merely required by modern men, but harmonizes also with the will of the Creator. For by the very circumstance of their having been created, all things are endowed with their own stability, truth, goodness, proper laws and order."

created things." ⁸⁷ The process of socialization, as has already been pointed out, and the complex network of social and international interdependence, call for continuous self-transcendence and a clear vision of a sound, unifying objective for all. Although there are still unfulfilled secular values, such as universal peace, nutrition, freedom, etc., God is their highest guarantee for Aquinas as well as for the Church. "The Order which prevails in society," writes Pope John, "is by nature moral."

Grounded as it is in truth, it must function according to the norms of justice, it should be inspired and perfected by mutual love; and finally it should be brought to an ever more refined and human balance in freedom. Now an order of this kind, whose principles are universal, absolute and unchangeable, has its ultimate source in the one true God, who is personal and transcends human nature. Inasmuch as God is the first Truth and the Highest Good, He alone is that deepest source from which society can draw its vitality, if that society is to be well ordered, beneficial and in keeping with the human dignity. ⁸⁸

Social Justice

A major concern in modern times has been the quest for social justice. In moral theology this is a new term. Traditional moral theology listed only three kinds of justice based on a threefold social relationship of person to person, person to society, and society to its individual members. Respectively they are called commutative, legal, and distributive justice. The term social justice was first used by Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*. He writes:

To each, therefore, must be given his own share of goods and the distribution of created goods, which as every discerning person knows, is laboring today under the greatest evils due to the huge disparity between the few exceedingly rich and the unnumbered propertyless, must be effectively called back and brought into conformity with the norms of the common good, that is, social justice. ⁸⁹

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, no. 13.

⁸⁸ *Pacem in Terris*, nos. 37-38.

³⁹ *Quadragesimo Anno*, no. 58.

The concept of social justice has become fundamental to Catholic social thought and action. Nevertheless, its exact meaning as well as its relationship to the traditional kinds of justice have been a frequent subject of debate with equally frequent references to Aquinas.⁴⁰ In this regard Jeremiah Newman offers an interesting observation in his book *Foundation of Justice*. He maintains that the contemporary notion of social justice is equivalent to Aquinas's legal justice, since Aquinas's concept of "legal" must not be confused with "legalistic." The confusion, he writes, occurred when the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scholastics sought to accommodate to the new era of absolutism. As the medieval concept of a universal commonwealth faded in theory and in practice, the common good as the object of legal justice became identified with the common good of the state, and legal justice with "state justice" or the laws of the land. Such a constitutional and juridical concept of justice, which still persists in our understanding and practice, confines man to his nation or state, identifies justice with "law and order," and seeks its fulfillment in the strict adherence to existing laws as opposed to arbitrary infractions of them. The result is a freezing of justice to contractual relationships while many forms of injustice and discrimination pass unnoticed, as if they were nobody's business.

As a moral disposition, social justice opens a new dimension of social obligations. **It** calls for rendering to the other what is his due, not as a matter of charity but as a due in equality, not by the order of courts but in virtue of the dignity and natural rights of the person and in view of the highest common good. **It** thus releases justice from its contractual and legalistic limitations. In practice this means that social justice is not fulfilled if the workers are underpaid by an industry that can afford more no matter how "legal" the original contract. Similarly, it would be an act against social justice for the workers to strike for higher wages if this adversely affects the economic

•• Jeremiah Newman: *Foundation of Justice: a historico-critical study in Thomism* (Cork Univ. Press, 1954).

stability of an entire nation. Pius XI was still speaking in terms of a "national" social justice, demanding from the individual that which is necessary for the common good and insuring for him what he needs to fulfill his function. *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church* sees the same need on a global level.

Every day human interdependence grows more tightly drawn and spreads by degrees over the whole world. As a result, the common good, that is the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race. Every social group must take into account the needs and legitimate aspirations of other groups, and even of the general welfare of the entire human family.⁴¹

Viewed in this perspective social justice becomes the form of all other social virtues, a continuous call for adaptation to social development with regard to the highest perceptible common good. Commutative, distributive, and legal (state) justice must be inspired by social justice which takes into consideration the highest common good, now more and more the common good of mankind as a whole. Technical, economic, and political development, coupled with social interdependence and confronted with persisting inequalities, have created a situation in which the full content of the common good can no longer be confined to the individual state, much less to any smaller group. The true justice will be the justice inscribed in our conscience and respecting men as men. The Church wishes to inculcate this kind of justice not as a moral disposition of persons but also as a public concern of society.⁴²

The term "social justice" is not used by St. Thomas, but the idea is more than implicit both in the concept of "legal" or "general" justice and in his political thought as a whole. This is clear from Aquinas's concept of man, his flexible conception of society, his openended perspective of the common

"Pastoral Constitution on the Church, no. 16.

.. Ibid., no. 91. (Also Divini Redemptoris, nos. 51-54).

good, and his understanding of justice not as a juridical device for regulating conflicting claims but as a moral disposition which makes the possessor good by his willing good to the other. There are textual indications in this regard. One is the distinction which Aquinas makes between the legal and the moral due (*debitum legale-debitum morale*).

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral and legal ... The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue⁴³

There are things which one does because of law, and there are things one does to be virtuous. A similar point is made in regard to *epikeia*.

Epikeia is a part of justice taken in the widest sense. In this way it is clearly a subjective part. And it is called justice in a fuller sense than legal justice, because *epikeia* is a norm over and above legal justice. *Epikeia* thus stands as a kind of higher rule for human actions.⁴⁴

Commenting on this text Thomas Gilby writes:

In this context *justitia legalis* means legalistic justice; elsewhere it means the legal or general justice which serves the common good. The terms are the same, but the notions are very different, for equity is not legalistic but is the highest expression of legal justice: the common good it serves is the truest commonwealth of persons.⁴⁵

The point made is the same as the one implied in social justice. Social justice demands positive action for the good of the others beyond merely refraining from harming or simply fulfilling the law. Aquinas sees the human situation as one in which the common good of all cannot be served if limited to the letter of laws

•• *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 80, a. 1.

.. *Ibid.*, q. 120, a. 2.

•• Thomas Gilby: *Between Community and Society* (Longmans, Green and Co. 1958), p. 804 (Note).

and precepts or to the narrow groups which exclude concern for mankind as a whole, and this is what social justice aims to correct.

The significance of Aquinas's contribution

The preceding cursory assessment of Aquinas's social theology as it relates to and is reflected by the social teaching of the Church can hardly do justice to the subject. Nevertheless, it should indicate that important aspects of the Church's teaching are covered by Aquinas's theological insights. Since space does not permit us to pursue a more detailed analysis, it may be helpful, in conclusion, to attempt to synthesize what may be his essential contribution to our concrete situation. We propose to do this by returning to and focussing on the issue which by its very nature remains essential to all social relations, namely, the individual versus the common good and, as we mentioned at the beginning, a contemporary crisis in this regard.

Man is basically goal-oriented; his natural drive is for happiness and, for that matter, a personal happiness. But the common good is an integral part of this orientation since no personal happiness is possible outside human fellowship of some kind. It is because of a common good which is perceived as a necessary condition for personal good that people associate, accept common values, and submit to laws and authority. If no such common good is evident, people become confused, socially critical, politically subversive, and ultimately amoral in their private and public business. One of the main problems in our contemporary world is that we have lost the perspective of the common good as a society of human persons and, as a consequence, the authentic meaning of personhood itself. The highest common good that contemporary man perceives is the corporative interest of the group to which he happens to belong and on which his existence (mainly material) depends. This may be his political party, labor union, corporation, professional association, or some similar grouping. A significant symptom of how comprehensive such groups can be is the fact

that most of them operate on their own "code of ethics" to which the individual must conform not only as a professional member but as a human person. The human person is thus absorbed into a group whose goal is not really the human person but rather political victory, profit, success, and similar objectives that in most cases leave the individual with only one concern, "on the job security." Such goals, however, are humanly unfulfilling and socially divisive. The perspective of a humanly unifying common good is thus conspicuously missing on both the national and the international levels. The international situation, especially, is still dominated by narrow nationalism, political blocs, and economic exploitation.

The result of this is a "morality of rules and games" for both individuals and nations: how far one can go without punishment, or at best, without hurting others. There is no doubt that such amorality permeates most of our actions and relations. The symptoms are manifest not only in such arrant actions as terrorism, revolutionary movements, draft evasion, and civil disobedience, but also in more subtle expressions of selfishness in demands for abortion, euthanasia and genetic-social engineering, the high divorce rate, in indifference to the needy, and in many other forms of flight from social responsibility. The point we wish to make is not that there are no motivations in some instances (e. g., disobedience to an unjust law), even good motivations, rather that there is no humanly unifying motivation. In the absence of such motivation human rights are conceived as an affirmation of the self, not as a recognition of the other, with everyone presumed to fight his own battle.

All this is not necessarily a matter of corruption. Modern man has been ideologically prepared for his attitude by the materialistic and subjectivistic outlook of several centuries, nourished with promises, and frustrated by experience. Even such great political manifestoes as the *Declaration of Independence* and the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man* were not untouched by the spirit of the time. Although they laid the grounds for what could still be the best democracy in the

world, they missed an important component. Directed, understandably for that time, toward the expansion of individual autonomy against the absolutism of decadent monarchies, they nevertheless took a position of principle that was not immune from abuse. Marx describes this principle in one of his manuscripts as based not on the relation but on the separation of men. Autonomy and private initiative, unsupported by any other moral principle or goal, soon opened the door to private caprice which favored the rich and powerful and neglected the poor. When l'Abbe Sieyes proposed a parallel declaration of duties in the French Assembly, he was defeated.

The paradox of the present time is that, while such a subjective and materialistic outlook persists mentally, it has become unworkable in practice. The pursuit of individualistic and narrow nationalistic goals has become unrealistic under the pressure of that inescapable interdependence to which we have already referred as the " process of socialization " imposed upon us by modern living. An example in point is the present-day legislation which, unlike the declarations of human rights or even the legislation of a century ago, tends to limit rather than enlarge individual autonomy. There is an additional aggravating circumstance in this regard. In the process of affirming his autonomy the individual has lost the authentic source of his rights in his natural dignity (still implicit in the original declarations of human rights) by placing it in the power of the state or its judicial branch. Now when his autonomy is menaced by limitations he has no recourse beyond the same power which limits it.

Aquinas offers a different perspective based, as we pointed out, on the natural and redemptive dignity of the person, the naturalness of human society, a common good that has a human dimension, and a justice which considers not things but persons. Let us elaborate on this perspective by addressing ourselves to another change which, by some of its results, is not unlike the one we just described. The *Pastoral Constitution on the Church* refers to this change when it states that " the human race has passed from a rather static concept of

reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one." ⁴⁶ As new discoveries are made daily in science and technology, such that no single human mind can keep track of, much less attempt to synthesize, then also the traditional notions of substances and ultimate values begin to be questioned. The result, once again, is the disappearance of a long range vision of personal destiny in favor of concrete experience and immediate objectives as the only meaningful realities to be considered. In this context Aquinas's natural law ethic and his teleological method are often presented as inadequate for "the signs of the times." It is true and generally acknowledged that Aquinas's concept of natural law must not be confused with the "manual" interpretation of it which permeated most of pre-Vatican II morality. But even if Aquinas's natural law is purified of its subsequent juridical and physical interpretation, the question may still be raised whether, in view of the new evolutionary concept of reality, the very assumption of a natural law and a goal-oriented ethics aiming at some unifying objective of moral and social endeavor can still hold. In answering this question we believe that it not only holds but that it holds in harmony with a dynamic conception of reality and provides a means, if one is to be found, to rescue man from his confusing moral agony and society from its self-destruction.

Aquinas's concept of reality, and especially of political realities, is anything but static. In history there have been static conceptions of the common good. Christendom, feudalism, monarchy, socialism, private property, progress, tradition, law and order; and many other things have all been mistakenly identified with absolute values at one time or another. Aquinas never subscribed to such identification.

If the whole itself is not an ultimate but subordinate to a further end, then a person's ultimate end does not lie there but somewhere beyond. The universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the ultimate end but is ordered to God who is the ultimate end. And so man's final destiny is reached with God himself, not within the universeY

⁴⁶ *Pastoral Constitution on the Church*, no. 5.

⁴⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 2, a. 8 ad 2.

The transcendence of the human person over and above any given structure, and his own continuous growth, could not be put in clearer terms. But Aquinas still maintains a purpose to such social and personal becoming, and this makes a difference. The difficulty, therefore, that Aquinas would have with process thought is not process as such, but process without purpose that would leave the world in chaos and man without meaning. For Aquinas, human dynamics has a goal which can be discerned, and when it is discerned it is the duty of man as a rational and free agent to bring all his activity into line with it. It is from this stance which integrates dynamics and purpose that we derive Aquinas's first contribution in regard to our contemporary needs. This is a call for a reintegration of family, professional, economic, juridical, political, and international life into the moral order of human responsibility. We cannot play games. In this reintegration the natural law still holds its place, not as a closed, codified system but as human reason seeking understanding. Human and social conditions may and do call for a more explicit juridical expression of this law in terms of natural rights and positive legislation, but these must not be confused with the creative role of intelligence in gaining new insights into a changing reality and moving toward formulating new rights. In this respect Aquinas differs not only from the physicism and absolutism of the natural law but also from those who, swayed by evolutionism, deny any reality or purpose to human life from which a process of discovering ethical truth could begin. This is not a suggestion of compromise, it is a matter of evidence on which rests another of Aquinas's contributions.

Although the natural law must not be confused with the laws of nature, natural and anthropological, biological and psychological data are not without meaning for the goal of human life. Aquinas's position is that we may know little about human nature and less about the individual human person, but we know enough to make a significant start in moral and social investigation. We know that pain hurts and pleasure delights. Aquinas, Bentham, Freud, and everyone of us agree that to

avoid pain and seek happiness is our basic drive. It may be an exercise of frustration, but it is still a fact of life. Significantly for our modern knowledge and mentality, Aquinas, instead of beginning his study of morality by reference to extrinsic norms and established values, begins with man's intrinsic, instinctive inclination: his total orientation to good.

To be good and to be desirable signify the same, and since evil is the opposite of good, it is out of the question that any evil as such can be directly wanted, either by natural appetite, or by animal appetite, or by intelligent appetite, which is the will.⁴⁸

It is from such human experience and reality which no evolution has yet denied that our understanding of good and evil, right and wrong unfolds through trial and error. Implicit in this also is the search for meaning in life, another datum which can hardly be disputed, although some may never find meaning in their lives. The purpose of morals is to seek the meaning of life, the ultimate meaning, if possible, and to act accordingly. Aquinas makes no secret about his own findings and their implication. If there is an ultimate goal of human life it can only be God. He is the source of all fullness, stability, and continuity; everything else is contingent and limited. The conclusion is theological but not without important political implications. It keeps the perspective of growth and happiness open-ended and protects the person against submission and enslavement to the contingent systems and values of a changing world.

As the human person in his existential condition is the subject of his actions, so also is he—the image of God—the first judge of his happiness and the first (proximate) norm of his morality. The primacy of the agent (*finis operantis*) over the material objectivity of the act (*finis operis*) runs through the entire treatise on the morality of human acts (I-II, qq. 18-21). It is unequivocally expressed in a statement concerning conscience. "To believe in Christ," writes Aquinas, "is good in itself and necessary for salvation; all the same this does not

•• *Ibid.*, I, q. 19, a. 9.

win the will unless it be commanded by reason. If the reason presents it as bad, then the will reaches to it in that light, not that it really is bad in itself but because of a condition that happens to be attached by the reason of apprehending it." ⁴⁹ Although not explicitly referred to, this statement underlies in essence the Vatican II *Declaration on Religious Freedom* and condemns any conversion that is not founded on personal conviction. The same stance justifies the principle of subsidiarity in its roots and prohibits any forced absorption of the individual into collective thinking or acting.

This, however, is the beginning, not the end, of moral process. An important turn sets in as soon as we realize that we can seldom act on appearances and never in isolation. Not just man's basic drive and his own reason, but the whole gamut of the human condition—the possibility of error, the reality of others, the social nature of man, his past, his future as well as his redemption—must be brought into personal judgment if a right decision and true moral progress are to follow. It is here that we may discover Aquinas's most important contribution that permeates the Church's social teaching from the beginning to the end. This consists in suggesting a reorientation of personal and social mores from an individualistic and self-centered position toward a principle of fellowship which recognizes the other not as a limitation but as a concern. Contrary, therefore, to the aforementioned materialistic and subjectivistic outlook Aquinas's moral and social concern centers not on the affirmation of the self, which is instinctive, but on the recognition of the other, which is more difficult. Personal conscience and freedom remain fundamental, but true moral growth consists in a process of continually objectifying oneself; continually proceeding from an initial, natural subjectivism to an ever greater identification with others in search for goods and values that are common to all. The practical implications of this position are that positive laws must be kept to a minimum, even at some risk, but personal response must grow in depth; right is not what is due to the self but what is due to the other, and

•• *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 19:5. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 19, a. 5.

justice is not about things but persons. The *Pastoral Constitution on the Church* summarizes these ideas when it states that:

no better way exists for attaining a truly human political life than by fostering an inner sense of justice, benevolence, and service for the common good, and by strengthening basic beliefs about the true nature of political community, and about the proper exercise and limits of public authority.⁵⁰

In this regard we would like to mention, even if we cannot pursue a more thorough parallel, that the United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* marks a significant departure from positivistic and juridical traditions toward the direction of Aquinas's humanism. Thus the dignity of man consists in his "being endowed with reason" (art. 1); his rights belong to him as a person (art. 2, 3, 6, etc.); society is his natural setting since in "community . . . alone the free and full development of his personality is possible," for which reason the individual has not only rights but also "duties to the community" (art. 29).

Simone Weil writes in *Oppression and Liberty* that "the ideal is just as unattainable as the dream, but differs from the dream in that it concerns reality."⁵¹ Aquinas's conception of human fellowship and of the common good offers an ideal which is not a dream. Against ethically neutral social and political relations on the one hand and our failure to live unequivocally the rules of justice on the other, Aquinas's common good calls for a commonwealth of free human persons sharing their material and spiritual goods in terms of justice, which thus becomes the kernel of the common good itself. The political ideal may never be fully obtained, but once its perspective is clear it becomes and remains a challenging point of reference for the ongoing evaluation, change, and progress of an always imperfect existential condition.

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⁵⁰ *Pastoral Constitution on the Church*, no. 78.

⁵¹ Simone Weil: *Oppression and Liberty*. Translated by Arthur Wills and John Petrie (The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), p. 84.

THE TWO APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE POINT
OF DEPARTURE OF JEAN POINSOT'S SEMIOTIC

"We publish our position without yielding to contention or jealous rivalry, but giving ourselves to the pursuit of truth, which concerns doctrine and not persons."

"To the Reader" of the *Cursus Philosophicus* of Jean Poinsot. Alcalá, Spain, 1631.

((RELATIONS DO NOT exist as such; they do not constitute a mode of being; when two entities are related—whether they are related as knower and known, as father and son, as double and half, or any other way—the relation exists entitatively as an accident in each of the relata. It does not exist *as something in between them, not inhering in either of them*. There is, in short no inter-subjective mode of being; for everything that exists exists either *as* a subject (i.e., a substance) or *in* a subject (i.e., an accident)."¹

This proposition, or set of propositions, proved to be, in the light of my five years (1969-1974) as Senior Fellow responsible for the direction and development of language research at the Institute for Philosophical Research in Chicago, the dialectically and philosophically crucial one for understanding (and systematically grasping the remedy for) the inveterate subjectivism and penchant toward solipsism that has beset philosophy

¹ Mortimer J. Adler, "Sense Cognition: Aristotle vs. Aquinas," *The NIJW Scholasticism*, XLII (Autumn, 1968), p. in reply to John N. Deely, "The Immateriality of the International as Such," in No. of the same volume and journal; Adler's emphases.

throughout its career in the national languages of modern times. For, in the course of my investigations into the philosophical literature concerning language, it came to light that in 1632, during the lifetime of Hobbes, Descartes, and Suarez, Jean Poinsot, the last philosopher, practically speaking, to hold the *contrary* of the above proposition up until Hegel/ was *also* able to demonstrate that what is at stake in this straightforward proposition is the possible convertibility of being and truth within the order of human understanding, and the successful culmination-through the systematic application to discourse of the contrast between the relative *secundum dici* and *secundum esse-of* the old medieval controversies over the "transcendental" properties of being, i. e., the properties whereby the order of the knowable includes indifferently objective elements of being and non-being so far as it falls under perception and conception.

We are confronted here with a situation that is, as Jacques Maritain well remarked, "puzzling to realize."³

Even the most advanced professors and students of philosophy today are unlikely to have encountered the name of Jean Poinsot in the course of their researches and studies.⁴ The dis-

² That is to say, the last proponent at the dawn of the national language phase of Western philosophy of the view that relations as such constitute precisely an intersubjective mode of being, existing according to what is proper to it neither *as* a subject nor *in* a subject, but as a suprasubjective *means of union between* (tertium quid) a subject and some thing that subject is not.

³ - **It** is puzzling to realize that the treasures contained in their writings "-i.e., the writings of the commentators and defenders of St. Thomas, particularly, perhaps, in Iberia, between the 13th and the 17th centuries-" have remained, for so many generations, unknown except to a very few...." Jacques Maritain, letter to Yves Simon, printed as the "Preface" to *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas* [i.e., Jean Poinsot] trans. by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. v. See the "Thomistic Afterword" at the end of this present article.

⁴ Nonetheless, Poinsot, an Iberian thinker who wrote under the name "Johm of St. Thomas," was a figure of exceptional prominence in his day. The principal historical materials relating to Poinsot's person and life have been gathered together and analyzed in the "Praefatio Editorum" to Joannis a Sancto Thoma, *Cur8U8 Theologicus*, edited by the Benedictine Monks of Solesmes, France (Paris: Desclée, 1931), Vol. I.

inction between what is relative *secundum dici* and what is relative *secundum esse* is hardly more familiar. Consequently, we have to do here with a philosopher and a doctrine that are, for all practical purposes, universally unknown today, and that yet rival and surpass the importance of Immanuel Kant for understanding the present philosophical situation and interpreting its historical essentials. For in revealing how and why the ancient doctrine of the relative is essentially at issue in the celebrated controversies over the objects of apprehension (and particularly in the denial of universality), while achieving for the first time a clarity in principle at the foundation and base of the ancient doctrine, Poincot's work, for those who learn how to read it, brings into an extremely clear propositional focus the essential features of the doctrinal melange that spreads outward and across the centuries after 1300 from the circle of William of Ockham in what concerns the theory of knowledge and truth, providing-again for the first time-an entirely unambiguous *ontological* grounding for the notion of "realism." By the same stroke, Poincot's *Treatise on Signs* provides the Ariadne's thread which enables us to trace in this same area the effective influences which made their way, in the period from 1600 to 1800, across the line separating the Latin phase of Western philosophizing from the national language phase of the modern period up to the present time.

I. WIEDERHOLUNG: THE TEXT AND DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF POINCOT'S *TREATISE ON SIGNS*.

What I refer to as Poincot's *Treatise on Signs* appears embedded within a much larger *Cursus Philosophicus* entirely by the same author published in Spain in five serial volumes between the years 1631 and 1635.⁵ Within the entirety of the

⁵ The latest complete edition of this work was done in three volumes with extensive indices by B. Reiser under the title, *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus* (Turin: Marietti, 1930-1934). H.-D. Simonin, in a "Review" in the *Bulletin Thomiste*, III (1930-1933) p. 148, has said of Reiser's work: "Telle qu'elle se presente l'edition de Don: R. est desormais l'edition classique de Jean de St.-Thomas." See following note.

Cursus Philosophicus, however, Poinsoot makes it clear that the *Treatise on Signs* occupies a virtually independent and entirely privileged position. This appears from a sufficiently careful analysis of the structure of the *Cursus* as a whole, illumined by Poinsoot's remarks concerning his treatment of signs within that whole.

Ars Logica is the collective name for the first two of the five parts of Poinsoot's *Cursus Philosophicus*. It is from the *Ars Logica* that the whole of the *Treatise on Signs* (*tractatus d'3 signis*) derives.⁶ The *Prima Pars Artis Logicae*, published in 1631 at Alcalá, Spain, consists of an introductory logic text for beginners-called *Summulae* books, according to the custom of the times-followed by a series of eight "Quaestiones Disputandae" or exercises designed to illustrate some difficulties incident to the *Summulae* books.

The *Secunda Pars Artis Logicae* was published at Alcalá and is of an altogether different character, dealing primarily with questions raised by the imperfect interrelations of truth and logical form. Whereas Part I was intended for beginning students, Part II is intended for advanced students, and indeed for the author's peers. More philosophical than logical, by modern standards, the task of Part II is "to explain-leisurely, patiently, thoroughly, and with unique skill in the selection and multiplication of standpoints-a restricted number of wonderful questions."⁷ The readers of this Part,

⁶ In Part II of the *Ars Logica*, Questions l'il-l'il3 are the questions expressly devoted to the subject of signs, and it is to these three questions that Poinsoot, in a special "Preface" added to the 1640 Madrid edition of Part II of the *Ars Logica*, expressly assigns the title, "tractatus de signis." This Preface may be found reprinted in the Reiser edition of the *Ars Logica* (Turin, Italy: Marietti, 1930), p. l'il49. All page references to Poinsoot's work in subsequent notes will, without exception, be from this 1930 Reiser edition of the *Ars Logica*, and will include column and line references along with the page numbers.

• Yves R. Simon, "Foreword" to *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas*, translated by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. xx. This volume is an English translation covering three-fifths or so of Part II of the *Ars Logica*, without envisioning the unique and controlling status of the theory of signs either within the *Ars Logica* or in relation to the *Cursus Philosophicus* as a whole.

in Poincot's milieu, could all be assumed familiar with the *Organon* (the logical works) of Aristotle and with the major Latin writings related thereto; and it must be said that, taken as a whole, the series of questions comprising Part II of the *Ars Logica* acquires continuity and completeness only when set explicitly in relation to the Latin translations of Aristotle's texts together with the major Latin discussions sparked by those texts all the way back to Boethius in the 6th century. This makes for enormous difficulty in reading Poincot, because it means that 1100 years of Latin discussions of logical and philosophical questions are resumed and at issue at each point of Poincot's work.⁸ In the particular case of the discussion of signs, fortunately, this difficulty is minimized, owing to the originality of Poincot's standpoint, and to his conscious intention in giving it expression.

At the very beginning of the *Ars Logica*, in a "Word to the Reader," Poincot draws particular attention to the originality in his handling of signs:

We have taken care to cut out [of the introductory text] an immense forest of intractable questions and a thorny thicket of sophisms The metaphysical and other difficulties from the books *On the Soul* which break out in the very beginning of the *Summulae* books from the ardor of disputants, we have removed to their proper place, and we have set forth the tractate on signs and awarenesses in Logic in relation to the *Perihermenias* books. •

⁸ With characteristic dead-pan, Henry Veatch, in his book, *Intentional Logic* (New Haven: Yale, 1951), p. ix, says of the *Ars Logica*: "For all its wealth, it must be admitted that this book was written in the seventeenth century, in Latin, and with what might loosely be called a thoroughly Scholastic orientation. In consequence, the basic issues and problems of logic as they appeared to John of St. Thomas are scarcely such as they would appear to be in this day and age, after *Principia Mathematica* and the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*."

⁹ Joannis a Sancto Thoma [i.e., Jean Poincot], *Ars Logica*, new edition by B. Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1930), p. 1: "Ut brevitatem [S. Thomae] imitemur, immensam inextricabilium quaestionum silvam et spinosa sophismatum dumeta excidere curavimus, quae audientium mentibus onerosae et pungentes utilitatis nihil, dispendii non parum afferebant. Ad haec metaphysicas difficultates pluresque alias ex libris de Anima, quae disputantium ardore in ipsa Summularum cunabula irruerant, suo loco amandavimus et tractatum de signis et notitiis in Logica super librum Perihermenias expeditimus."

Why does Poinset regard the discussion of Aristotle's *Perihermenias* books as the proper context for considering the nature and function of signs? Not because of the *actual content* of the traditional books so named, he will explain (in his "Remarks Concerning the Books *Perihermenias*"), but because of the *name itself, perihermenias*, which means, in Latin, "concerning interpretation" (*de interpretatione*).

In writing his books on this subject, Aristotle (and subsequently his commentators) restricted the consideration of interpretation to the logical elements of discourse, with the result that the subject of interpretation has been (as of Poinset's time) neither fundamentally nor adequately treated. For *interpretation*, being an activity coextensive with human awareness in its entirety, is far more universal than logical analysis, and indeed, being based on signs, it includes the logicians' instruments along with the many other instruments by which sense is made out of the world. Thus, if the theory of interpretation is to become transparent to itself and grounded in principle, Poinset is saying, it must not restrict itself to logical elements as such (as in the older Aristotelian tradition) but must extend itself to include a consideration of signs taken *in their entire amplitude*. It is the recognition of this fact that leads Poinset to say that, in setting his discussion of signs in relation to the *Perihermenias* books, he has at the same time found the proper place for inserting a *Treatise on Signs* into the philosophical tradition of the Latin West. Hence the distinctive cast of Poinset's *Treatise*: it introduces a revolutionary viewpoint, but it does so in a conservative way. Nothing of the old tradition is lost, but it is yet made to surpass itself in the direction of its foundations.

A. The Task of Discriminating the Ground of the Terminology and Structure of the *Treatise on Signs*.

The order of development followed over the three questions- or "Books," as I will refer to them-of The *Treatise on Signs* seems straightforward enough: "Concerning the rationale

proper to signs," Poincot writes (642a38-b2), "there are two principal points of controversy. The first concerns the nature and definition of signs; the second concerns the division of signs, and each divided member in particular." Thus, the first "book" of the *Treatise* (Question 21 of Part II of the *Ars Logica*) deals with the ontological status or nature of signs, the second "book" (Question 22) deals with the various kinds of signs, and the third "book" (Question 23) extends the discussion of the division of signs into certain details of controversies prominent in Poincot's time on which the theory of signs has a direct bearing.

Yet the reader who seeks to master the terms of this "straight-forward" development is soon brought up short by the theoretical demands the *Treatise* places on the *Al-s Logica* as a whole in order to become fully intelligible in its own right—demands brought quickly into focus by Poincot's preliminary remark that "this inquiry into the nature and definable character of signs depends principally on an understanding of mind-dependent being and of the category of relation,"¹⁰ coupled with his setting of the problematic for the *Treatise* as a whole in terms of the contrast between what is relative *secundum esse* and what is relative *secundum dici*.¹¹ With these clues alone to guide him, Poincot leaves to his reader (and this no doubt largely explains why the *Treatise* so long lay hidden within the general oblivion that befell Aristotelian writings after the 17th century) the most difficult task of conceptually locating the ground and architectural conception of the *Treatise* as an independent whole. To accomplish this task is the aim of this first part of this article and will serve to *doctrinally* situate Poincot's work. After that, we will be in a hermeneutic position to essay an *historical* situation of the work.

¹⁰ Poincot, "Super Libros Perihermenias," in the *Ars Logica*, "... quaestiones istae de signis ... in hoc loco genuine introducuntur, post notitiam habitam de ente rationis et praedicamento relationis, a quibus principaliter dependet inquisitio ista de natura et quidditate signorum."

¹¹ *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 1 (i.e., *Ar Logica*, Part II, Question Article 1: see following note), 646b16-45 (partially cited in note below).

B. The Textual Requirements of the *Treatise on Signs* as an Independent Whole.

Of the 27 "questions" comprising Part II of the *Ars Logiea*, one Article of Question 1 and the whole of Question 16 is devoted to the topic of mind-dependent being, while the whole of Question 17 is devoted to discussing the topic of relation. A careful reading of these sections with an eye to the discussion of signs reveals that the first, second, and fourth Articles of Question 2, and the first three Articles of Question 17, provide all the terms and distinctions indispensable for following the discussion of signs in Questions 16 and 17 (i.e., the three "Books" of the *Treatise*). When I have occasion to refer to the Articles from Question 17, I will refer to them as "Appendix A," followed by page and line numbers in Reiser's edition of the *Ars Logiea*. Articles from Question 2 I will refer to as "Appendix B." The inclusion of these two Appendices meets all the textual requirements that the larger project of the *Ars Logiea* imposes as a matter of strict necessity on the reader of Poinso't's *Treatise on Signs*.¹² From a purely conceptual standpoint these two Appendices suffice to constitute the *Treatise* as an independent whole vis-a-vis the *Ars Logiea* and *CurSWJ Philosophieus*.

However, the careful reader is soon led to realize (e. g., by 290a30-34, 291b1-40) that what Poinso't calls the "*aliquid peculiare relationis*"—the ontological peculiarity of relation in the order of existence, let us say—is the guiding insight for Poinso't's discussion of mind-dependent

¹² Questions 21-23, i.e., the main parts of the tractate, I will refer to, as was said in the text above, as "Books I-III," and I will refer to the Articles subdividing them as "Questions" rather than Articles, though "Article" will be retained as the name of the main sub-divisions of the material in the "Appendices." This system of reference conforms to the translation of the *Treatise on Signs* now being completed by myself in consultation with Ralph A. Powell for publication as an independent whole. Pending the appearance of this work, if the reader will keep in mind that all page, column, and line references to the *Treatise* conform, as indicated in notes 6 and 11 above, to the text of the 1930 Reiser edition of the *Ars Logica*, there should be no cause for confusion on the part of those pursuing any references herein given.

being and relation alike and is therefore the most fundamental notion to be grasped in embarking on his theory of signs. Thus, while the Articles from both Question Q and Question 17 are essential to the reader of the *Treatise on Signs*, priority goes to the Articles drawn from Question 17. It is necessary above all to have a sure grasp of the traditional materials at Poincot's disposal in terms of which these Articles were framed. Without a knowledge of these basic texts and controversies, the starting point of Poincot's *Treatise-namely*, the assignation of sign to the class of things, ontologically relative in their opposition to transcendently relatives-is bound to seem recondite and artificial, if not arbitrary. With a knowledge of the traditional materials involved, however, the naturalness and simplicity-indeed, the necessary element-of Poincot's *point de depart* shows all the traces of philosophical genius of the purest type at work. Let us try to see, if we can, what is at stake in Poincot's beginning where he does.

C. The Discussion of the Relative in Ancient Greece from the Perspective of the *CuTsus Philosophicus*.

It was in Aristotle's attempt to work out a categorial scheme for the order of mind-independent being that the notion of the relative, in the sense that proves decisive for understanding (from the standpoint of Poincot's *Treatise*) the fate of Western philosophy at the dawn of modern times, first began to come into focus. Accordingly, we begin our account with that attempt.

According to the view of Aristotelian physics the natural world is comprised of "a many, each of which is itself one,"¹⁸ and subject to change in time. The "ones" or fundamental natural units in this scheme Aristotle called substance, and the various ways in which the being of a *substance* could be affected without losing its basic self-identity Aristotle called *accidents*,

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book III, Chapter 4, 100 lb5-6: "all things are either one or many, and of the many each is one": *lhraVta (ll Ta IlyTa i) i) TroAX&., Wv gKaUTov.*

of which he himself enumerated nine. Substance and the nine accidents make up the traditional list of Aristotelian categories. Though the number of categories that ought to be listed was sometimes argued over among the important figures in the Latin West, by the time of the high Middle Ages, there was general agreement among them as to the purpose for which the Aristotelian categorial scheme had been devised, a consensus well expressed by Poinset in the following passage:

The distinction of the categories was introduced for this, that the orders and classes of diverse natures might be set forth, to which all the things which participate some nature might be reduced; and on this basis the first thing that must be excluded from every category is mind-dependent being, because being which depends for its being on being cognized (mind-dependent being) has not a nature nor a true entity, but a constructed one, and therefore must be relegated not to a true category, but to a constructed one. Whence St. Thomas says (in q. 7, art. 9 of his *Disputed Questions on Power*) that only a thing independent of the soul pertains to the categories."

Substance and its accidents thus were understood by our author in the traditional sense as constituting the categories of mind-independent ways of being. Aristotle was of the opinion that a category of "the relative" ought to be included in the list of categorial accidents, and his first suggestion for the definition of this category was as follows:

Those things are called relative which, being either said to be something else or *related to* something else, are explained by reference to that other thing."

"*Ars Logica* (Reiser ed.), Part II, Q. XIV, Art. 1, "Quid sit praedicamentum et quid requiratur ut aliquid sit in praedicamento," "Et quia praedicamentorum distinctio ad hoc introducta est, ut diversarum naturarum ordines et classes proponerentur, ad quae omnia, quae naturam aliquam participant, reducerentur, ideo imprimis secludendum est ab omni praedicamento ens rationis, quia non habet naturam neque entitatem veram, sed fictam, ideoque neque ad praedicamentum verum, sed fictum reici debet. Unde D. Thomas q. 7. de Potentia art. 9. tantum res extra animam dicit pertinere ad praedicamenta."

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 7, 6a36-39: *ἵπ6s TL li€ ra TOLavra 'A€-yerat, liua atra a:rrp eur!v ETEpWV elvat AE')€TaL, i} C!trWG'OVV lf:AAWS 'trpOS o!ov TO p.e'ifov rov'O' 15'trep eur!v erepov 'Al-yerat*• I have cited the translation by E. M. Edghill in

Although this definition of the category of relation seemed sound to Aristotle/ ⁶ he conceded that it presented some difficulty from the point of view of constituting a *distinct* category within the substance-accident scheme:

Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible to prove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.

The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is *explained* with reference to something else does not make it *essentially relative*.^H

The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 17. Cf. the translation by J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), p. 17: "We call *relatives* all such things as are said to be just what they are, *of* or *than* other things, or in some other way in relation *to* something else."

¹⁶ For example, he explicitly re-affirms it at *ibid.*, 6b6-9: *lꝛp6s n ovv Oaa aVrCt lꝛꝛep furlv €r€pwv elvat A€""feTaL, 7} 07T'wuoVv liAAws lꝛp6s flꝛepov, olov lꝛpos pi.-ya Xt"ƒ<rat lꝛpos* •

¹⁷ *Categories*, ch. 7, 8a28-34: d p.€v ovv lKavws 0 rww 7ꝛp6s TL optiꝛLOS «i7ro3e3oTaL, 1} rfiJv rr&vw 7} T(iJv &.Ovv&.rww fuTL TO Ws oVula, T{pꝛp6s TL Ahera.L. el l{e p.7} lKavws, ciXX' ra 7ꝛp6s TL ois to .lvat ravr6v r{jj 7ꝛpos TL rws fcrws &v /JY}Bel'Y). TL 7ꝛp6s aVr&.. 0 0€ 7ꝛp6-repos 7ꝛapaKohov8e'iꝛp.fv TꝛQ.ccr. Tois 1ꝛp6s 7ꝛ. ov p:ƒv raVr6v 'Yt. Eort 7(iꝛ rꝛp6s TL aVro'is elvat TO a.VTa. ll.7ꝛep EcrTIP eTEpww A€""(eu8a.t. Edghill trans., *Zoe cit.* (in note 15 above), p. Whatever else is to be said of this translation, in this passage and in the next one I shall quote, Edghill's rendering at least conveys in English the Greek-Latin parallel between *AE"ƒ<rat* and *dicuntur* (" Dans le texte grec comme dans la version latine," notes Krempel [*La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas*, p. 398], "l'ancienne definition est dominee par un double *AE"ƒ<ra<*, *dicuntur*; la nouvelle, par *elva<*, *esse*.") This contrast, everywhere discussed in the Latin West for over a thousand years, is much obscured, for example, in Ackrill's rendering (reference in note 15 above), pp.

"Now if the definition of relatives which was given above was adequate, it is either exceedingly difficult or impossible to reach the solution that no substance is spoken of as a relative. But if it was not adequate, and if those things are relatives for which *being is the same as being somehow related to something*, then perhaps some answer may be found. The previous definition does, indeed, apply to all relatives, yet this-their being called what they are, of other things-is not what their being relatives is."

What seems to take place in Ackrill's rendering is a repetition of the now long-forgotten (in the modern languages) attenuation of the Aristotelian conception

This distinction between what must be *explained* by reference to something else without having itself to be a relation, and what is *essentially* a reference to something other than that on which it is founded or based, is the first recorded glimpse of what was to become the Latin distinction within the order of relation between what is relative *secundum dici* and what is relative *secundum esse*. Relativity in the first sense characterizes not only what falls under the category of relation in Aristotle's scheme but what falls under the "absolute" categories of substance, quantity, and quality as well (categories called "absolute" from the fact that they are defined in terms of themselves without including an essential relation to something else). Outside the mind a substance and its accidents other than relations—a subject of existence in its subjective determinations, let us say—constitute the order of "absolute" and mind-independent being. Absolute beings in this sense, the constituent structures of ontological subject-

of the categories introduced into the sixth century Latin West by Boethius under the Platonic construing of the categorial scheme at work in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, and Porphyry, according to the description of Krempel: "C'est ce qui amenait déjà Alexandre d'Aphrodise (200 avant J. C., à Athenes), et plus tard Plotin, à opposer trop brutalement *Αἴτιον* et *τύχη*. Pour Aristote, *Αἴτιον* n'est jamais un simple: on dit. Si, par principe, il commence par le mot, il finit par la chose. Les predicaments sont pour lui l'écho de la réalité. Boèce semble avoir perdu ce fait de vue quand, sous l'influence de ses prédécesseurs, il accentuait outre mesure *dicuntur* et *esse*." This description by Krempel would seem to be confirmed by Gilson's evaluation of Boethius's rendering of Aristotle (*La philosophie au moyen âge*, 2nd ed., p. 141): "La logique de Boèce est un commentaire de celle d'Aristote, ou perçoit fréquemment le désir de l'interpréter selon la philosophie de Platon. Ce fait s'explique parce que Boèce suit de près un commentaire de Porphyre (J. Bidez), et il explique à son tour les pullulements des opinions contraires qui s'affronteront au XI^e siècle sur l'objet de la doctrine d'Aristote, car tous les professeurs commenteront le texte de Boèce, mais alors que les uns en retiendront ce qu'il avait gardé d'Aristote, les autres s'y attacheront au contraire à ce que son auteur y avait introduit de Platon."

In any event, there is no question in Poinset that the *secundum dici* involves, in principle, being according to its *own* exigencies for understanding and not merely a question of being *spoken of* in an entirely contingent or dialectical fashion. It is precisely because the categories are "l'écho de la réalité" that Poinset's contrast between *dici* and *esse* establishes in principle the ground of the categorial interconnections. Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, p. 3, n. 1.

tivity, though they can be *defined* without reference to anything else, cannot be *accounted* for except by reference to something else, namely, their principles and causes; and in this sense they are relative according to the way their being must be *expressed* in discourse, even though they are not relative according to the way they essentially *have* being. At the risk of getting a bit ahead of ourselves, we may note at once that such relativity, besetting as it does each of the absolute categories, is called by Poinsoot *transcendental*/⁸ in line with the medieval custom of calling properties of being which are not restricted to any one category "transcendental," i. e., transcending the categorial divisions of the substance-accident scheme.¹⁹

Opposed to what is relative only according to the way its being must be expressed in discourse (*secundum dici*), or to the *transcendental* notion of relation, there is the second kind of relativity, the relativity which besets a thing according to the way it exercises existence and is *essentially* a reference toward another. Beings relative in *this* sense are the constituent structures of ontological intersubjectivity and can *neither* be defined nor accounted for save in terms of what they themselves are not, namely, subjects or subjective determinations of being.

The question concerning the relative raised by Aristotle in seeking to clarify the divisions of his categorial scheme thus became, in the Latin West, the question of whether there ought to be admitted among the categories of mind-independent ways of being a category of external relation between subjects (hence *categorial* relation); or ought it to be said rather that relation in a pure form, i. e., as essentially toward another ac-

¹⁸ *Ars Logica* (Reiser ed.), 590a48-591a5: Relationes "transcendentales non sunt aliquid distinctum a re absoluta, sed vere sunt absolutae entitates; neque enim habent speciale praedicamentum, sed per omnia vagantur et sic ex sua transcendentia habent imbibere in ipsa re absoluta, non distingui."

¹⁹ E. g., Poinsoot notes (*Ars Logica*, 594a43-b6) that St. Thomas "docet in 1. dist. q. 1. art. 5. ad quod res est de transcendentalibus et ideo se habet communiter ad absoluta et relativa. Ibi enim sumit rem transcendentaliter, prout est communis ad entitatem et modum." (See also note 38 below.)

ording to the way it *has* being, exists only thanks to the powers of perception and understanding?

D. The Notion of Relation as an Ontological Rationale Fully Considered.

To disengage as such the full notion of ontological relation ("*relatio secundum esse*") in its properly philosophical import, it seems, was the unique privilege of Poinsoot among all the Latin scholastics who, for more than 1100 years, debated the question of the relative raised by the Aristotelian texts. (Before him, however, St. Thomas had shown the surpassing theological import of the material elements comprising the notion by using them to reconcile the trinity of persons demanded by Christian faith with the unity of God insisted on by Islam and by the requirements of metaphysical wisdom; and, as we shall see more clearly in Part II of this article, the medieval discussion of the "transcendental" properties of being adumbrated the fullness of the notion of ontological relation as it is realized in Poinsoot's *Treatise*.)

According to the tradition of Latin Aristotelianism represented by Poinsoot there are relations given in a pure form, i. e., according to the way they have being, independently of our cognition as well as dependently upon it. Relation according to the way relation has being is both a category of mind-independent being in the strictest Aristotelian sense of category, with its instances called *categorial* relations ("*relationes prae-dicamentales seu reales*") and something that is found existing sometimes entirely dependently upon the mind ("*relationes rationis*"). "The relative" includes not only transcendental relations (which are mind-independent, but not as relations) and mental or mind-dependent relations (which are truly relations but as such are in no way independent of mind) but also categorial relations which are mind-independent in their very existence truly as relations.

Like each of the other categories relation is a rationale of being, an "ontological" rationale, i. e., a rationale expressive

of the possibilities of existence. But unlike the other categories, *relation as an ontological rationale embraces in its positive content both the mind-dependent and the mind-independent orders of being*; and so relation may be most properly called "*ontological*," when it is understood that the positive content in question is *indifferent* to realization according to its proper being in the opposed orders of what is mind-independent and what is mind-dependent. Not that mental relations can be said to belong to the category of relation-which would be a contradiction in terms-but that mental relations are relative according to the way they have being, just as are categorial relations:

Any unreal object whatever conceived as being a subject or subjective modification of being is the mind-dependent being which is called *negation*; yet it *will not be a mind-dependent substance*, because substance itself is not conceived as a mind-dependent being patterned after some mind-independent being: rather, negations or non-beings are conceived on the pattern of substance and quantity.

But in the case of relatives, not only is there indeed some non-being conceived on the pattern of relation, but also the very relation on the part of the respect towards, while it does not exist in the mind-independent order, it is conceived or formed on the pattern of a mind-independent relation; and so that which is formed in being, and not only that on whose pattern it is formed, is a relation: and for this reason there are in fact mind-dependent relations, but not mind-dependent substances."•

Thus the notion of the *ontologically relative* expresses precisely the indifference of relation to its subjective ground or cause of being, or, to put it another way, .expresses the full meaning of the intersubjective: *indifference to subjective ground*. The notion of ontological relation of inter.subjectivity in the full sense, thus, depends entirely for its force on a prior

²⁰ Poinset, *Treatise on Signs*, Appendix B, 581b47-581a16: "Sed hoc est ens rationis, quod vocatur negatio, non autem erit substantia rationis, cum non ipsa substantia ut ens rationis ad instar alicuius realis concipiatur, sed negationes seu non entia ad instar substantiae et quantitatis. At vero in relativis non solum aliquod non ens concipitur ad instar relationis, sed etiam ipsa relatio ex parte respectus ad, cum non existit in re, concipitur seu formatur ad instar relationis realis, et sic est, quod formatur in esse, et non solum id, ad cuius instar formatur, et ratione huius datur relatio rationis, non substantia rationis."

decision to the effect that there exist independently of the human mind relations which as such are distinct from and supraordinate to the subjective foundations upon which they nevertheless depend for their existence. For if categorial relation ("relatio realis") *in this sense* is denied, only transcendental relation (or some murky equivalent) remains *common* to the two orders of mind-independent and mind-dependent being; and even though mind-dependent being further contains "genuine" relations, it does not contain them in a fully intersubjective way, for it does not contain them as enjoying any indifference to the subject upon which they depend for existence here and now: for this, mental relation must be itself but a mind-dependent instance of something which is *also* given in its positive content as such independently of the mind.

E. Ontological Relation as **It** Determines the Problematic in Poinset's Discussion of Signs.

The observations in sections C and D above suffice to indicate that the fundamental option which Poinset poses at the very beginning of his *Treatise on Signs* is in no way arbitrary but is rather the necessary point of departure for any systematic inquiry into the nature of signification (including linguistic signification and reference) that has become transparent to itself and grounded in principle: are signs to be regarded as primarily and essentially relative only according to the way their being must be expressed in cognition and discourse (transcendentally), or according to the way they *have* the being proper to them as signs (ontologically) and therefore (sometimes) independently of expression? ²¹

²¹ - Quærimus ergo, an ista formalis ratio signi consistat in relatione secundum esse primo et per se, an in relatione secundum dici seu in aliquo absoluto, quod fundet talem relationem.

"... loquimur hic de relatione secundum esse, non de relatione prædicamentali, quia loquimur de signo in communi, prout includit tam signum naturale quam ad placitum, in quo involvitur etiam signum, quod est aliquid rationis, scilicet signum ad placitum. Et ideo prædicamentale ens esse non potest nec relatio prædicamentalis, licet possit esse relatio secundum esse iuxta doctrinam D. Thomæ I. p. q. art. I. ..." (*Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 1, 646b16-S7.)

These two ways exhaust the possibilities of anything's being relative: if something is relative in a given respect, it must be so either transcendently or ontologically, whether, it be mind-independent or mind-dependent. From Aristotle to Charles Morris²² all theorists of signs have defined them as *relative-signifying* something to someone (*aliquid ad aliquid*). But only Peirce, it seems, ever managed to get clear about what in principle is at stake in the fact of a sign's relativity. By contrasting ontological relation to transcendental relation he has posed the question in terms that enable him to bring together in the sign the opposed orders of mind-dependent and mind-independent being, just as they appear to be found together in our direct experience of the world.

From the standpoint of this connection the genius of Peirce's *Treatise* is to see in the distinction between what is relative *secundum dici* and what is relative *secundum esse* the resources for explaining the ontological status of signs according to their characteristically peculiar indifference to the presence and absence, the being or non-being, of what they signify. The semi-autonomy discourse displays in the face of reality and the truth about things is explicable provided only that (but *only* provided that) we resolve the pertinence of signs to the order of relation in favor of relation according to the way it *has* being. Since both physical (or mind-independent: "categorical") and mental (or mind-dependent: cognition-dependent) relations are truly relations according to the way they have being, identifying signs as ontological relations makes room for the obvious fact of *stipulated signs* ("*signa ad placita*"), without even seeming to foreclose the possibility of signs whose relation to what they signify is given independently of mind.²³ On the

•• Thus, for example, William Alston, in *Philosophy of Language*, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 51, writes: "Peirce's definition may be taken as typical. 'A sign is something that stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity' [*Collected Papers*, 2.228]."

²³ *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 1, 647b15-22: "Addimus in conclusione [signa] consistere in relatione secundum esse. . . . Et ita utimur vocabulo communi utriusque relatione, et non solum agimus de relatione reali vel rationis determinate."

contrary, the discovery that signs without exception are constituted formally by ontological relations opens the way to rooting the theory of signs in mind-independent nature by the fact that, first, some signs are as such physically related to what they signify (namely, when what they signify itself exists physically) , and, second, initially stipulated or mind-dependent signs can become through custom assimilated to the world of what is natural (for a given community) and possessed in their turn of a relatively mind-independent significance.²⁴

F. Doctrinal Resume.

The distinction between what is relative *secundum esse* and what is so only *secundum dici* is the first and most fundamental analytical couplet of Poinso's *Treatise on Signs*. All the terminology playing an architectural role in Poinso's *Treatise* is governed by the fundamental discovery in the order of the relative of an ontological rationale which at once *divides* the intersubjective from the subjective (the distinction of ontological from transcendental relation, *secundum esse* from *secundum dici*) and *unites* within the intersubjective the opposed orders of being existing now independently of and now dependently upon human (or animal) awareness; for it is this discovery that enables Poinso to explain how signs enable us to transcend the sensory here and now by reason of their indifference to the mind-independent existence or non-existence of what they signify, itself a consequence of the functional equivalence in cognition of "real" or mind-independent and "unreal" or mind-dependent relations, which springs from the indifference of relation in its proper rationale to the subjective cause or ground whence it exercises existence. Understanding the *Treatise* is, accordingly, principally a matter of mastering the complex of detail in the working out of this extended and slippery contrast as it is verified in differing ways through application to the variety of signs considered from various points of view.

²⁴ See the *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question and Book II, Questions 5 and 6.

Thus, precisely because the relative *secundum esse* unites under one ontological rationale the distinct orders of mind-independent and mind-dependent being (and so includes implicitly the second fundamental analytical couplet of the *Treatise*, the distinction *betweenensreale and ensrationis*), the systematic contrast of these two terms determines the conceptual architecture of the *Treatise on Signs* as a whole: 1100 years of Latin philosophizing are summarized and rendered *aufgehoben* in this application.²⁵ Nor does it seem too much to say that Poinso's *Treatise* is the first successful attempt in any language to construe in a systematic way the intricate network of contrasts that oppose these notions and give them unrestricted scope. For, between them, they divide the order of subjectivity taken in all its possible determinations (transcendental relation) from the order of intersubjectivity and public life (ontological relation) where truth and history are given

•• A. Krempel traces the origin of these two expressions in the Latin West all the way back to Boethius's 6th century translation of and commentaries upon Aristotle's *Categories*. From that time until the 17th century Krempel finds, "le couple au nom si étrange préoccupait tons les scolastiques": *La doctrine de la relation chez St. Thomas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), Chapitre XVIII, "Le relativum secundum dici et le relativum secundum esse," p. 394. This chapter in particular paradigmatically illustrates the strange character of Krempel's massive and remarkable volume as a whole: a most careful and exhaustive compilation of texts on the subject of relation drawn from the entire period of Latin scholasticism, combined with a flatly unsuccessful attempt to interpret the import of the compilation philosophically. Nowhere is the philosophical barrenness of this impeccable (and invaluable) scholarly study more clearly in evidence than in Krempel's conclusion concerning the *secundum esse-secundum dici* couplet. "Impossible," he writes (p. 394), "de trouver une traduction satisfaisante pour les deux terms." It is hardly to be wondered at, in light of this failure, that Krempel, when he comes to interpret Poinso (p. 411), finds (or thinks he finds, for a whole nest of misconstructions in his work come together on this point) that "à ce moment la tradition est rompue." What has actually transpired is something quite different and of another order: at this moment the latent possibilities of the tradition in the distinction in question are freed of long-standing confusions and rendered actual in their proper scope. It is not a matter of something *rompue*, but of something *aufgehoben*. And it must be said, to Krempel's credit, that, in whatever respects his interpretation falls short, it was conceived in the effort to elaborate discursively a profoundly true intuition of the scope of the difficulty: "s'il y a des cas où l'on doit remonter à l'origine et à l'original, c'est bien ici." (Krempel, p. 397.)

among men. Successful communication, whenever it occurs, and whether it transpires between men and animals without human understanding, or between men or animals and the physical world: wherever there is a "communing" between things, it occurs because and only because a pure relation—a *relation according to the way relation has being-has* arisen and serves as the medium of the communion. Unlike the subjects brought into union by such a relationship, the relationship as such is an intersubjective reality: regardless of its subjective cause—mind or nature—its positive content remains unchanged. It extends the boundaries of existence over and beyond the boundaries of the subject. *Vie* here and now, mediating (in the case of real existents) a trans-subjective contact and union between otherwise isolated members of the material world. And because of the ontological indifference relation enjoys towards its subjective ground, this extension beyond subjectivity takes place sometimes (the case of *signa naturalia*) along lines drawn by nature, sometimes (the case of *signa ex consuetudine*) along lines drawn by the customs of a community, and sometimes (the case of *signa ad placita*) along lines creatively drawn by the free exercise of genius (or perhaps the influx of a spiritual intuition, or even a divine inspiration) — a pattern which may in its turn become *naturalized* by customs to contribute to the historical achievement of humanity expressed in a privileged line of transmission, a *traditio* in the highest sense.²⁶

²⁶ These remarks suffice to indicate the dependence upon the terms of the *secundum esse-secundum dici* contrast of Poinset's division of signs drawn from the standpoint of the causes habilitating them to what they signify into natural, customary, and stipulated. Poinset has a second and more celebrated division of signs, drawn this time from the standpoint of how a given sign functions in cognition and discourse, according as it is itself first of all an object of conscious awareness (an objectified sign, let us say), or as it is not itself first of all an object of conscious awareness (an unobjectified sign). Signs of the former sort he calls *instrumental* signs, signs of the latter sort (concepts, but as including memories and imaginations) he calls *formal* signs. Because of the interest this division has occasionally sparked here and there in contemporary discussions (e. g., see the references in notes 93 and 94 below), and because of the reliance upon it of even the provisional and primitive Institute schema for the treatment of the subject of language (e. g., cf. M. J. Adler, *The Difference of Man and the Difference It*

II. THE HISTORICAL SITUATION OF POINSOT'S *TREATISE ON SIGNS.*

In the English-speaking world no name is closely associated with the theory of signs than the name of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914).²⁷ Now Peirce was one of the most learned

Makes [New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1967], p. 320 n. 8, p. 327 n.10, p. 331 n. 11), it may be useful to note that this distinction too depends for its being rightly understood on the *secundum esse-secundum dici* contrast, in the following manner.

The distinction between the subjective means of objectification intrinsic to a cognizing power as signs that need not themselves be cognized in order to function in awareness (formal signs), and the objective means of communication extrinsic to a cognitive power as signs that must be themselves cognized in order to function in awareness (instrumental signs), is a distinction based in its proper intelligibility on the fact that, since the ontological relation constitutive of signifying respects the signified object directly and a cognitive power only indirectly, the *direct* relation of sign to cognitive power *can be* merely transcendental and thereby can be entirely intrinsic to the cognitive power and the subjectivity of the knower, without the signifying as such (the formal rationale whereby the sign functions to present another than itself) being in any way affected. It is due to this fact that a concept, a "quality" and "inhering accident," as such bound up with the subjectivity and individuality of the knower *hie et nunc*, can yet serve as such to found an ontological relation to an object outside of the subject, by which relation the external object is made present in cognition even though the foundation of that relation itself remains unobjectified in that same cognition and intrinsic to it. "A sign is formal or instrumental," i.e., intrinsic or extrinsic, unconscious or conscious for its immediate user, Peirce says simply, "by reason of the fundament of the sign-relation itself but not on the part of the relation" (684b11-14). On the part of the relation itself the sign is simply ontological; and so it is that Peirce is able to reconcile in the being proper to signs (whereby they "draw the order of the cognizable to the order of the relative") the subjectivity of our means of knowing with the intersubjective character of our objects of knowledge, by showing that these subjective means do not interpose themselves between conscious awareness and being, provided we understand "being" as it includes mind-dependent as well as mind-independent patterns of actuality (*praedicamenta vera et ficta*) and provided we understand that both the signs that *need not* themselves be cognized and *cannot* be observed under any circumstances except in their effects on the sensible patterns in perception (signs) and the signs that are objects first of all (instrumental signs) can function as natural signs even when what they signify is itself unreal, by virtue of their transcendental character as foundations in a subject for the rationale of the relative indifferent in its positive content to the source of its exercise (that is, the rationale of the ontological, not of the transcendental, relative.)

²⁷ "Like Aristotle," writes T. A. Goudge, *The Thought of C. S. Peirce* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), p. 137, Peirce "saw that symbols are the

philosophers of recent times, whose background was by no means confined to the national language phase of Western philosophy, as he himself tells us:

From Kant, I was led to an admiring study of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and to that of Aristotle's *Organon*, *Metaphysics*, and psychological treatises, and somewhat later derived the greatest advantage from a deeply pondering perusal of some of the works of medieval thinkers, St. Augustine, Abelard, and John of Salisbury, with related fragments from St. Thomas Aquinas, most especially from John of Duns (Duns being the name of a then not important place in East Lothian), and from William of Ockham.²⁸

Few remarks could be better used to illustrate the oblivion into which Poinsett's 17th century work on signs fell, therefore, than Peirce's description of the situation in which he found himself in the opening decade of the 19th century as regards his attempt to work out a general doctrine of signs:

I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather, a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call *semiotic*, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of

medium through which the rationality in the universe must be expressed and communicated." The facts making this so "prior to Peirce's day," Gouge allows, "had never been systematically investigated," and Peirce "was thus forced to become the founder of a new discipline."

Charles Morris, in his book, *Signs, Language, and Behavior* (New York: George Braziller, 1955), p. 187, states flatly that "Peirce was the heir of the whole historical philosophical analysis of signs."

"Many thinkers--most notably C. S. Peirce--have supposed," writes William P. Alston in the article, "Sign and Symbol," for Edwards' *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), Vol. 7, p. 488, that all the different kinds of signs "are species of a single genus, for which the term 'sign' can be employed."

Writing in the same volume of the *Encyclopedia* on "Semantics, History of," p. 895, Norman Kretzman asserts that Peirce "went much further than anyone before him had tried to go toward the development of a completely general theory of signs."

²⁸ Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981-1988; Vols. I-VI edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Vols. VII-VIII edited by Arthur W. Burks), Vol. I, paragraph 560, i.e., I.560 according to the standardized practice of giving the volume and paragraph numbers separated by a decimal when citing Peirce's *Collected Papers*.

possible semiosis [or signifying]; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a firstcomer.²⁹

It is unfortunate in some ways at least that Peirce (to say nothing of the students of Semiotic who came after him: Cf. Note above) did not know that his was anything but the first attempt to overcome the "beastlike superficiality and lack of generalizing thought [that] spreads like a pall over the writings of the scholastic master of logic" ³⁰ in the early Latin phase of the modern period.³¹ Peirce's historical situation in this regard, as we shall see, gives the philosophical view expressed in the *Treatise on Signs* a unique importance for interpreting the history of philosophy both prior to and after the crucial 17th century-and including the Peircean effort to a systematic view of signifying.

What seems to me called for first of all is a clarification, in

•• *Ibid.*, 5.488.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.561. One is reminded of Gilson's query: "If Ockham was an Aristotelian, and St. Thomas Aquinas an Aristotelian, and perhaps even Aristotle an Aristotelian, this at least remains to be explained: how is it that Ockham's ultimate conclusions are so completely destructive of those of Aristotle as well as those of St. Thomas Aquinas?" (*The Unity of Philosophical Experience* [New York: Scribner's, 1937], p. 64.)

³¹ Despite his wide-ranging forays into Latin scholasticism and the attraction he found in Scotist thought (see his *Collected Papers*, 1.560)-which may help to explain the fantastic complexity of Peirce's scheme of divisions of signs as compared with Peirce's-Peirce seems to remain wholly a son of the modern tradition in his basic creative inspirations. In his essential definition of the sign Peirce does not seem to envisage the systematic difference Peirce demonstrates between *representation* and *signification* but speaks of signs as if they were "*representamens*" simply (e. g., see 2.228), with the result that his notion of the "interpretant," unlike Peirce's *formal sign*, readily lends itself to the construction it receives in the work of Morris and Osgood, where it is explained (in Peirce's terms) as something only transcendently relative. In his approach to the subject of signs through categories he remained entirely within the Kantian conception of categories as dependent on formal logic (see *Collected Papers*, 1.561). Finally, where Peirce sees logic as subordinate to the theory of signs as one level and type of interpretation among others, Peirce simply extends logic "to embrace all the necessary principles of semiotic" (*Collected Papers*, 4.9), in this perhaps showing a Hegelian tendency to equate interpretation *tout court* with a sufficiently sophisticated logical construction.

terms of the development of philosophy between Poinsoot and the present, of the *fundamental option* which Poinsoot poses at the very beginning of his *Treatise*, the need for a choice between regarding signs as primarily and essentially relative only according to the way their being must be cognized or expressed (transcendentally), or according to the way they *have* the being proper to them as signs (ontologically) and therefore (sometimes) independently of expression.

Yet this choice itself depends for its recognition and possibility, as Poinsoot shows and as we have seen, on a prior decision concerning the nature and reality of the relative as it belongs to the order of mind-independent being. In this, Poinsoot advances the issue a step beyond his later contemporary, John Locke, who, having set himself "to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge," soon enough "found it had so near a connexion with words that, unless their force and manner of signification were well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge."³² Thus Locke had already uncovered for modern thought the decisive connection between signs and *knowledge*, and no insight was to exercise greater influence over the immediate development of philosophical thought in both England and Europe; but it was the privilege of Poinsoot to see in exactly what way the connection between knowledge and *being* is *also* decisively at stake in the explanation of signifying, though this insight of Poinsoot's is traceable after Locke mostly by its absence.

We begin our attempt to historically situate the philosophical substance of Poinsoot's *Treatise*, therefore, with a sketch of the history in the Latin West of the discussion of whether there are pure relations in the world, existing as such dependently upon but supraordinate to and really distinct from their foundations in material subjects. It was in the discussion of this question, according to the terms of Poinsoot's theory, that the way was

•• John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book Ili, Chapter 9, par. 21. (Vol. II of the 1894 Fraser/Oxford Press edition, p. 118.)

prepared at the dawn of modern times for the split between being and intelligibility that received its classic systematic formulation in Kant and which has perpetuated itself down to our times as the characteristic heritage of philosophy after Locke and Descartes but which is already implicit in any view of signs (and therefore of concepts) as primarily relative in a transcendental rather than in an ontological way. It is this split for which Poinot's theory of the sign is the unique remedy. What is at stake in the contrast between the relative *secundum esse* (or ontologically relative) and the relative *secundum dici* (or transcendentially relative) as Poinot makes of it the foundation of his *Treatise* is nothing less than the classical medieval thesis, *ens et verum convertuntur*. It is a question of being able to explain the apparent intersubjectivity of objects in discourse (whereby they are referrable indifferently to the self and to others) and their partial coincident identity with mind-independent beings, or having to explain all this away.

A. The Discussion of Mind-Independent Relation in the Latin West up to Poinot.

Richard McKeon and others have well pointed out that an across-the-board influence of Aristotle did not make itself felt in philosophy until after the translations into Latin of the whole range of his writings in the 12th and 13th centuries. Thus, it is to a very late period (particularly) that van Steenberg applies the name, "Latin Aristotelianism."³³ Yet, as the exhausting textual surveys of Krempel show,³⁴ in what concerns the relative and its possible foundations for the theory of knowledge and truth, "Latin Aristotelianism" comprises the entire period from Boethius's 6th century translation

³³ Fernand van Steenberghe, *Aristotle in the West* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), pp. 147-197.

³⁴ See A. Krempel, *La doctrine de la relation chez St. Thomas. Exposé historique et systématique* (Paris: Vrin, 1952), particularly Chapitre XVIII, "Le relativum secundum dici et le relativum secundum esse." (As we have had occasion to remark in note 25 above, Krempel's "exposé historique" is considerably more satisfactory than his "exposé systématique.")

of and commentaries upon Aristotle's *Categories* to Poinsett's masterful *Ars Logica* of the early 17th century. From Boethius on the question of whether there are in nature relations given as such independently of cognition and mind was commonly discussed in the West, and generally, with a few exceptions, this question was resolved in the affirmative. By the close of the 13th century consensus had it that there are relations in the world existing as such dependently upon but supraordinate to and really distinct from their subjective foundations in things.

This consensus was first challenged effectively in the work of William of Ockham (c. 1300-1350), which gave rise to a movement called *nominalism*—a term which does not at all serve to define it²⁵—whose partisans were also known as "terminists" (*terministae*) and "moderns" (*moderni*).²⁶ Complex as the movement was, it was united in its denial of the mind-independent reality of relations,²⁷ a denial to which Suarez had attached by Poinsett's day the weight and influence of his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. According to this view of "modern" Latin Aristotelianism, in the order of mind-independent being as such, there are only absolute subjects with their individual determinations. Relativity in the proper sense of something *essentially* relative arises among these subjects only as a result of our perceptions and attempts to explain things. This order of being—the order of being which does

²⁵ "Nous pem\trons ici," writes Gilson (*La philosophie au moyen age*, 2nd ed., p. 657), "sur un terrain doctrinal mal connu, extremement complexe et dont on sait du moins deja ceci, que le terme de nominalisme ne suffit aucunement a le definir."

•• *Ibid.*, pp. 656-657.

²⁷ - Les noms dont on designait au XIV^e siecle les partisans des anciennes et ceux de la nouvelle doctrine, supposent que l'on tra<;ait entre eux une ligne de demarcation extremement nette," writes Gilson (*ibid.*, p. 656). This is the most fundamental such line suggested by Poinsett's *Treatise*, and one that, in the context of present considerations, gives an entirely new dimension to Jacques Maritain's contention that "A deep vice besets the philosophers of our day, whether they be neo-Kantians, neo-positivists, idealists, Bergsonian, logicians, pragmatists, neo-Spinozists, or neo-mystics. It is the ancient error of the *nominalists*." (*The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. from the 4th French ed. under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan [New York: Scribners, 1959], p. 1.)

not depend for its existence on being cognized: the *mind-independent* order of being-reveals itself as relative according to the way its being must be expressed in discourse; but apart from the work of perception and discourse, there is nothing of relative being in a way that extends beyond subjectivity. The relative, on this view, is divided, in effect (and always allowing for idiosyncrasies in sophisticated terminologies), between what Poinsoot calls *transcendental realtions*, which are not truly relations according to their way of being independently of the mind, and *mental relations*, which are truly relations but as such are in no way independent of the mind: there is a mode of being which is a relation according to the way it has being, but this mode is given existence only by the mind: it is not an *ontological* rationale. Relation according to the way it has being belongs exclusively to the order of mind-dependent being.

Thus, by the time of Poinsoot's publication in 1682 of his *Ars Logica*, Part II, the medieval consensus in this matter had given way to a clear opposition within the ranks of the Latin Aristotelians:

Those at one extreme think that relations are not distinguished on the side of mind-independent being from their fundamentals, but only by the mind. This position is traditionally ascribed to the Nominalists, against whom we argued in Article 1. Others, however, who admit categorial relations against those Nominalists, follow this opinion concerning a mind-independent distinction from the fundament. Thus Suarez in his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 47, sec. 2. And others at the opposite extreme distinguish all categorial relations from their fundamentals mind-independently, which the Thomists generally follow, although some distinguish the relation from the fundament as a thing from a thing, others only as a mode.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Poinsoot, *Ars Logica*, Part II, Q. 17, Art. 4, "Utrum Relatio Distingatur a Parte Rei a Suo Fundamento," 591a6-2S: " Circa hanc ergo difficultatem divisi sunt auctores. Quidam in uno extremo existimant relationes non distingui a parte rei a suis fundamentis, sed solum ratione; quod Nominalibus tribui solet, contra quos egimus art. 1. [i.e., the *Treatise on Signs*, Appendix B, Article 1], Aliqui tamen, qui contra illos admittunt relationes praedicamentales, sententiam istam sequuntur de distinctione rationis a fundamento. Ita P. Suarez disp. 47. Metaph.

Outside what Poinset here calls the "Thomist" line, the position of Ockham and Suarez was universally adopted by the figures who exercised the controlling influence over the transition in the 17th and 18th centuries from Latin philosophizing to philosophical discourse in the new national languages. Whether we look to the work of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in England, or to the work of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Kant on the Continent, we find the unanimous adoption of the view of Suarez and Ockham denying the reality in nature of mind-independent relations as such.

B. Poinset as Watershed of the Philosophical Tradition.

This puts into an entirely new perspective what Randall well calls—despite his own work embodying the results of several decades of research in the area—"that least known period in the history of Western philosophy, the transition from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, when modern philosophy is conventionally supposed to have begun."⁸⁹ The "essential continuity between medieval and modern philosophy" that increasingly impressed Randell "ever since the early studies of Gilson on Descartes"⁴⁰ does not at all obtain at the level of ultimate philosophical understanding of the foundations in the order of the relative for the medieval theory of knowledge and of truth as convertible with being. For Poinset's theory

sec. Et alii in alio extremo omnes relationes praedicamentales realiter distinguunt a suo fundamento, quod communiter thomistae sequuntur, licet aliqui distinguunt relationem a fundamento ut rem a re, alii solum ut modum."

Here Poinset clearly identifies modal distinction as *a type of real distinction*. Here then is clear proof of the unreliability of Krempel's entire study of relation so far as it concerns Poinset; for Krempel writes (*La Doctrine de la Relation chez Saint Thomas*, p. "Sous l'influence de saint Albert et surtout de Boecce la plupart des thomistes primitifs, tel Herve de Nedellec et Nicolas Trivet: rejeterent la distinction reele entre la relation accidentale et son fondement absolu. De meme Gilles de Rome, les nominalistes, Suarez, et Jean de saint Thomas." Nor is there a trace of Boethian influence in Poinset's fundamentally and unquestionably Thomistic conception of the categories.

•• John Herman Randall, Jr., *The Career of Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, Vol. I, "Foreword," pp. vii-viii.

•• *Ibid.*, p. viii.

of signs-contemplated and crafted over a period of about 80 years in the very heart of Iberia-precisely extends to the *means* of knowledge (the instruments whereby objectivity is structured in cognition, let us say) St. Thomas's use of the ontological rationale of the relative to explain truth as a property of being, i.e., the convertibility of *ens* and *verum*.⁴¹

This extension is impossible within the confines of the modern tradition. Having only the transcendental rationale of the relative with which to explain the connection of being and truth, in the terms of Poinset's theory, the modern tradition is without resources for explaining the possibility of even the most limited escape from the basic condition of subjectivity as something closed upon itself.⁴² The ontological relative does allow for intersubjectivity as a rationale of being equiprimordial with subjectivity, and, as realized in the particular case of signs actually manifesting in cognition what they signify, does explain the intersubjective character of discourse and the public character of objects both real and unreal. Discourse is intersubjective and objects of awareness are public, in principle because the means or instruments of discourse and objectification are *ontologically* relative as signs, not transcendently relative, and so "do not pertain to the order of the cognizable absolutely, but relatively and ministerially,"⁴³ i.e., in such a way as to

⁴¹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Q. 1, art. 1. What Maurer says of "Renaissance Scholasticism" (in his *Medieval Philosophy*, p. 347)-that "with the exception of legal and political theory it contributed little to the advancement of learning," and that "it did not even grasp with exactness and profundity the most personal doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas"-may well be true of Suarez, but, in light of the above, how can it be said of Poinset? The answer is that it cannot.

⁴² For, as we saw above, on the view that only transcendental relation is common to the two orders of mind-independent and mind-dependent being, even though mind-dependent being further contains genuine relations, it does not contain them in a fully intersubjective way, for it does not contain them as enjoying an indifference to their subjective ground. For this, mental relation must be itself but a mind-dependent instance of something which is also given in its positive content independently of the mind.

⁴³ *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 2, 663a28-34: "ratio signi cum non consistit in ratione obiecti absolute, sed substitutionis ad alterum, quod supponitur

be able to manifest otherwise than in terms of their objective self alone,⁴⁴ and otherwise than in terms of the physical presence or absence of objects signified. If signs are not ontologically relative, however, they do not pertain to the order of the cognizable in a ministerial capacity first of all, but in an objective capacity. The grounds for Poinset's distinction, first, between formal and instrumental signs (i.e., between concepts, and objects serving to signify), and second, between instrumental signs which are founded in nature and instrumental signs which are founded in custom or stipulation, are entirely removed. Being transcendently relative, concepts, even as signs, would be determinative of rather than specified by and subordinate to their objects; nor would they be mind-independently distinct from the subjective being of the knower as closed upon itself. There could be no formal signs in Poinset's sense, for being cognized would pertain to the rationale as well as to the exercise of a sign; being formed by the mind and being constituted in objective existence would be everywhere and at all points the same.⁴⁵ There would still be signs founded on custom and stipulation; but no signs founded on nature as something knowable in itself given with and by the objects of experience. Whatever necessity human understanding might think it discerns among objects would perforce be the result either of custom alone, or of custom together with some hidden mechanisms of understanding which determine thought along lines inscribed in and prescribed by an order of the "things-in-themselves," i.e., the order of things which are *absolutely* other than the objects presented in consciousness by our concepts or discussed with our fellows through signs.⁴⁶

esse objectum sen signatum, ut representetur potentiae, non pertinet ad genus cognoscibilis absolute, sed relative et ministerialiter."

.. See the *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 1, esp. 695b5-696b16; and Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, pp. 119-120. See also note 16 above.

•• Just as it became for each one of the British empiricists and Continental rationalists. See, in particular, John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Introduction, par. 8 (Fraser ed., Vol. I, p. S11).

•• This line of thought, it seems clear, is what is at stake in Chomsky's well-known study, *Cartesian Linguistics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

In the choice between signs as ontologically relative or signs as transcendently relative one chooses between the acceptance or denial of being and truth as convertible; but in choosing to deny the mind-independent reality of relation as distinct from and superordinate to its fundament, one perforce excludes the very notion of an ontological relative in the sense required to reconcile the medieval doctrine of transcendental truth with the dependence of objects in their cognized being on means of objectification rooted in the subjectivity of the being who knows.

Among those in the modern tradition conscious of the consequences of excluding relation as an ontological rationale realized independently of human understanding few were more conscious than William of Ockham himself. And it seems safe to say that the entire structure of Book III of Poinso's *Treatise* was conceived as the philosophical counter to what Gilson called "Ockham's master stroke,"⁴⁷ namely, the perception that the problem of removing *entirely* the character of relation as an ontological rationale "could not be solved unless a new classification of the various types of knowledge was first substituted for the old one,"⁴⁸ specifically, a classification beginning with our *experience* of the difference between cognition of things present and absent to sense. "Hence his division of knowledge into abstractive and intuitive, terms that had already been used before him, but to which he gave a new turn and was to use in a new way."⁴⁹

This last remark I apply to Poinso as well as Ockham; for Poinso did not simply restore this division of knowledge to its foundation in Scotus's pre-Ockhamite usage.⁵⁰ Rather, he re-

⁴⁷Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: St.ribner's, 1987) p. 68.

Ibid.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 68-69. See also Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 489-491.

⁴⁹For Poinso and Scotus alike intuitive knowledge requires physical presence on the part of the object apprehended as such. But, for Scotus, abstractive knowledge prescind from the existence or non-existence of its object, whereas for Poinso abstractive awareness prescind only from physical presence in pereep-

thought (or rather: he *projected* a re-thinking of) the experience on which it is based, entirely in terms of the systematic implications of the identification of signs as ontologically relative in rationale. It is because concept as signs are ontologically relative that they are able to mediate between the transcendental relations of objects to the order of mind-independent being (on the one side) and to the order of what depends on cognition for its being (on the other side), and to unite in the object the divisions relative to both orders—the order of *praedicamenta vera et ficta simul*.

Poinsot shows that the foundations for the prior possibility of critical truth as the *conformitas intellectus ad rem* lie in the ontological peculiarity of the relative as something realizable as such in the order of mind-independent existence.⁵¹ With his two divisions, one of natural signs into formal and instrumental, and one of instrumental signs into natural, stipulated, and customary, both founded on the contrast between the ontologically and the merely transcendently relative as explaining the presence of non-being in cognition and the mediating role of custom in structuring the apprehensive relations between human understanding and mind-independent being, Poinsot may be said to have provided, for the first time, and at the very end of a tradition founded on an 1100 year old consensus on the reality of relation as an intersubjective union, a metaphysical apparatus for analysis sufficiently refined and delicate ("ens minimum, scilicet, relatio"⁵²) to accommodate transcendental truth to history. At the very time when the

tion, not necessarily from existence. These remarks may suffice for here, but a detailed comparison of Scotus and Poinsot on these points should eventually be made.

⁵¹ Thus Poinsot's theory at once answers Heidegger's central question in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1954) and provides the foundations in ancient ontology required to ground in principle Heidegger's anti-constructivist view that (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 6ff) "Im Sichrichten auf . . . und Erfassen geht das Dasein nicht etwa erst aus seiner Innensphäre hinaus, in die es zunächst verkapselt ist, sondern es ist seiner primären Seinsart nach immer schon 'draussen' bei einem begehrenden Seienden der je schon entdeckten Welt."

•• Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent*, dist. fl6, q. fl ad fl. Cf. J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Kn()*Wledge, p. llfl.

medieval consensus entirely gave way in modern thought to the nominalist or Ockhamite tradition on the non-reality of relation (as transmitted through the work of Suarez, Hobbes, and Descartes *within Poincot's very lifetime*; and as removing the foundation of truth-its formal or categorial foundation-in the order of mind-independent being as such), Poincot was achieving in the older tradition the first entirely systematic clarification of the ontological foundations in relation for the possibility of truth as a conformity known in the structures of objectivity between thought and things, and of communication as an escape from subjectivity equiprimordial with subjectivity itself. Historically and philosophically, Poincot's *Treatise* stands astride the dividing line that separates the early Latin phase of the modern period (Ockham to Saurez) from its national language phase (Descartes and Hobbes to the present) . It is this fact that gives the philosophical view expressed in the *Treatise on Signs* a unique importance and heuristic value for interpreting the history of philosophy *posterior* as well as prior to the crucial 17th century.

C. The Modern Tradition up to Kant.

Hobbes spoke for the fundamentally new (and Ockhamite) way philosophy was to take in England, we may say, when he wrote in his *Philosophia Prima*: "De Relatione autem non ita censendum est, tamquam ea esset accidens aliquod diversum ab aliis Relati accidentibus, sed unum ex illis, nempe, illud ipsum secundum quod fit comparatio."⁵³ The implications of this view in the West for the grounds of knowledge and the understanding of signs were first put to work systematically in the national languages, it seems, with the appearance in 1690 of John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

•• Thomas Hobbes, *OpM'a Pkilosophica, Quae Latine Scripsit, Omnia* (Amsterdam: Joannes Blaev, 1668), Vol. I, Caput 11, par. 6, p. 71: "Concerning relation, however, it must not be thought to exist in such a way as to be diverse from the other accidents of the related thing, but as one of them, namely, that very one according to which a comparison is made." Cf. the *Treatise on Signs*, Appendix A, Article 1, 573b44-574a7.

Here, the consequences of choosing the transcendental alternative to Poinsett's answer concerning the rationale constitutive of *sigus* begin to come into the open, for here for the first time a systematic work appears devoted to exploring the structures of *sigus* and cognition on the supposition that "ideas of modes and relations are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer."⁵⁴

Now there is no doubt that we experience things as connected with one another in various ways. But if there are no true relations save those our mind makes, on what grounds do we experience these connections? Locke, it must be said, failed to face this question in an entirely consistent way and introduced as a result many inconsistencies into his *Essay*.

It was left for Hume to remove these inconsistencies, by giving, with his *Treatise of Human Nature* in 1739, the first of the two possible answers (within the confines of the modern tradition) to why we connect objects in our experience:

Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and to feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine.⁵⁵

This certainly improves upon Locke's contention "there is nothing more required" than that relations have reality" only in the minds of men."⁵⁶

⁵⁰ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. 31, par. 14 (Fraser ed., Vol. I, p. 5U).

•• David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946), Book I, Part IV, Section 1, p. 183.

•• John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. 30, par. 4 (Fraser ed., Vol. II, p. 449-500): "*Mixed modes* and relations, having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be so framed ..••"

To Poincot's question: "How does understanding form pure respects if it has only absolute things (i. e., transcendental relations) as the pattern on which to form them?,"⁵⁷ Hume can now answer: if anything further be required, as Locke doubted, the intervention of customs in our perceptions supplies that requirement.

Poincot has no doubt of the correctness of Hume's contention that custom intervenes to structure the relations we directly perceive in and among objects. In simple awareness, he writes, "we apprehend many things not through proper concepts but through connotative ones."⁵⁸ Indeed, it is on this ground that he explains the incorporation into nature of patterns of non-being through the transformation of free creations into customary institutions by the use men make of them in everyday life.⁵⁹ It is on this ground too that he explains how language in use becomes a *Lebensform*, wherein stipulation, which belongs to the order of non-being according to its foundation or *direct* ground in subjectivity, is sensibly transformed into custom, whereby the element of stipulated non-being is indirectly naturalized and made perceptible in the order of instrumental signs.⁶⁰ But, in Poincot's scheme, the formal recognition *in actu exercito* of mind-dependent relations as such by human understanding, whereby alone stipulation itself :first becomes possible,⁶¹ also provides the resources for *critically distinguishing* among even customary associations those which are *also con-*

•• See the *Treatise on Signs*, Appendix A, Article 1, 575a25-82: "Quomodo intellectus puros respectus format, si non habet nisi res absolutas seu relationes secundum dici, ad quarum instar eas format? Erunt ergo mera figmenta relationes ab intellectu formatae, cum non habeant in re puras et veras relationes, ad quarum instar formatus."

•• Simplex apprehensio "non semper apprehendit rem, ut est in se, quasi numquam ad instar alterius, cum plura apprehendamus non per proprios conceptus, sed per connotativos." *Treatise on Signs*, Appendix B, Article 8, 805b89-48.

•• See the *Treatise on Signs*, Book II, Question 6, esp. 721b27-40.

•• Cf. *Treatise on Signs*, Book II, Question 6, 719b15-86 and 722a11-24, with Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (8rd ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1958), p. 88, pars. 240-242, esp. 241.

⁶¹ Cf. *Treatise on Signs*, Appendix B, Article 8, 805b19-25; Book I, Question 6, 685b29-82.

nections realized independently of custom (and so of human understanding) and those which are only connections realized through custom; because, for Poinsoot, the discrimination of mind-dependent element in objective relations presupposes that relation in the ontological sense, i. e., as including mind-independent relations cognized as such before being recognized as such in their contrast to mind-dependent relations, has *already* been given in the line of being as first known (*ens ut primum cognitum*). There is room thus in Poinsoot's theory for the further difference between customary signs, i. e., signs naturalized in experience, and natural signs simply speaking, i. e., signs connected with what they signify antecedently to and independently of their appearance as associated within human experience.⁶²

Poinsoot's theory achieves in this way a connection and *commercium* between mind-dependent and mind-independent elements of objective structure knowable as such because his theory of signs as relations enables *any* given sign to "take on something of the entitative order,"⁶³ even though only *some* signs have this entitative dimension immediately from the fact that cognizability itself is something mind-independent in the order of the relative (*ens ut verum fundamentaliter*) .••

But such discrimination is impossible for Hume, because it contradicts the premise that relations as such have their being entirely from the work of human understanding. Consequently, where Poinsoot explains the discrimination between natural and customary elements on the grounds of the ontological rationale proper to relation whereby non-being becomes a functional and structural element in our direct experience of objects, Hume is obliged to explain this discrimination away as a natural illusion.

'Tis natural for men, in their common and careless way of thinking, to imagine they perceive a connection betwixt such objects as they

•• See the *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 6, 719b8-11 and 719bS7-711Oall.

•• *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 11, 66SaS5-S6.

•• Cf. *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, ch. 11, 657aS9-658b29.

have constantly found united together; and because custom has render'd it difficult to separate the ideas, they are apt to fancy such a separation to be in itself impossible and absurd. But philosophers, who abstract from the effects of custom, and compare the ideas of objects, immediately perceive the falsehood of these vulgar sentiments, and discover that there is no known connexion among objects.⁶⁴

Thus, by the middle of the eighteenth century in England, the denial by Hobbes and Locke of the mind-independent character and ontological rationale of relations has led directly to a theory where all objective structures are the free work of the mind, moderated or stayed, so far as can be known, only by custom, the warrant available to man for his seeing things as related in various ways.

The reduction of all connections among objects to custom is disastrous for the theory of the sciences, which, since the time of Aristotle, had thought to uncover *necessary* connections among things. This reduction was not acceptable to Kant. Agreeing with Locke and Hume that all relations as such are the work of mind, Kant thought to restore true necessity among objective connections by adding to the customary connections admitted by Hume relations which the mind forms by an a-priori necessity of its manner of operations.

Moreover, unlike Locke and Hume who began to treat of human thought and handled the question of relations along the way, Kant's critical reflections are distinguished by beginning, exactly as Poinot's, with the problem of the relative in being explicitly envisaged as such as the determining ground for any problematic involving concepts.

For this reason, within the modern tradition as it took form in the national languages, Kant, writing nearly 150 years after Poinot, emerges as the only figure whose work stands to the foundations of the modern tradition in a position entirely comparable to the position Poinot's work occupies within the older tradition. With Kant, for the first time in the national languages,

•• David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section 8, p. 128.

we have an entirely systematic work which not only (as with Locke and Hume) explores the structures of signs and cognition but does so from the first thematically under the guidance of the notion of relation. Just as Poinsot's *Treatise* is an attempt to think through the affirmation of relation as an ontological rationale as this bears on the order of human understanding and its possible objects, so the enterprise of Kant's *Critique* is an attempt to think through the denial of relation as an ontological rationale as this bears on the order of human understanding and its possible objects. Gilson considers that Hume's influence on Kant was, in this respect, as direct as could be:

"There are two principles I cannot render consistent," Hume says in the Appendix of his *Treatise of Human Nature*,⁶⁵ "nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, namely, *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.*" We do not know with certainty what, exactly Kant had read of Hume, but there is little doubt that this sentence was the very one that aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumber;⁶⁶

Kant's *Critique* is a systematic attempt to go to the very foundations of the modern "way of ideas" as only transcendently relative in founding the structures of objectivity, and to do so in a way revelatory of the nature of truth in connection with objective being. Since the possible conformity of concepts to mind-independent objects given in experience requires relation as an ontological rationale indifferent in its positive content to its subjective ground, from within the modern tradition premised on the denial of such a rationale, the most consistent pursuit would indeed be to "make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."⁶⁷

⁶⁵ P. 636 of the Selby-Bigge ed.

⁶⁶ Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* ed., corrected and enlarged; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, p.

⁶⁷ *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, herausgegeben von der Koniglich Preussischen Academic der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Reimer, 1911), Band III, p. "Man versuche es daher einmal, ob wir nicht in den Ausgaben der Metaphysik damit

It is instructive, with the contrast between the ontologically and the transcendently relative expressly in mind, to re-read the paragraphs in which Kant explains the revolution he wishes to effect in philosophy by bringing its assumptions concerning the relation between objectivity and truth in knowledge, into conformity with the fact that relation is not an ontological rationale; beginning with the passage in which he celebrates his proposal by comparing it to the method of Copernicus:

Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved around the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest.⁶⁸

For Poinsoot, this reduces the Copernican hypothesis down to a question of alternate suppositions concerning which was the primarily real and which the primarily unreal relation and well illustrates the functional equivalence of the two types of relation within an objective scheme. Kant continues:

A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics as regards the *intuition* of objects. If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter *a priori* [i. e., how there could be necessity in certain connections between objects-in certain *objective structures*, let us say-not reducible to the merely apparent necessity of customary association alone postulated by Hume]; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.⁶⁹

besser fortkommen, dass wir annehmen, die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserm Erkenntnis richten." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1963), "Preface to Second Edition," p. 22.

•• *Ibid*: "nachdem es mit der Erklärung der himmelsbewegungen nicht gut fort wollte, wenn er annahm, das ganze Sternheer drehe sich um den Zuschauer, versuchte, ob es nicht besser gelingen mochte, wenn er den Zuschauer sich drehen und dagegen die Sterne in Ruhe liess."

•• *Ibid*: "In der Metaphysik kann man nun, was die Anschauung der Gegenstände betrifft, es auf ähnliche Weise versuchen. Wenn die Anschauung sich nach der Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände richten müsste, so sehe ich nicht ein, wie man a priori von ihr etwas wissen könne; richtet sich aber der Gegenstand (als Objekt der Sinne) nach der Beschaffenheit unseres Anschauungsvermögens, so kann ich mir diese Möglichkeit ganz wohl vorstellen."

So far still, Poinset has no quarrel with Kant. The objects of our senses must indeed conform to the constitution of the sense faculties: objects can affect the eye primarily only as colored, and so on for each sense. Moreover, there is a sense for Poinset in which an external sense is in a privileged way called a "faculty of intuition," since its operation always requires the here and now presence in physical being of its object.⁷⁰ This is but to say, in Poinset's terms, that powers and objects are transcendently related and that, in the case of sensation, a transcendental relation alone suffices to explain the objective union attendant upon the physical influence here and now of a physical object upon a passive sensory organ.⁷¹ But here, possible agreement ends. For as cognition develops out of the passivity of sense through the active formation of concepts by internal sense (imagination, memory, natural instinct of various kinds), the transcendental relation of power to object is superseded in Poinset's scheme by an ontological relation of

⁷⁰ *Treatise on Signs*, Book III, 784a87-785a36; Appendix C,

⁷¹ For Poinset, sense knowledge, analytically distinguished as such at the foundation and core of perception, differs from all other cognition in this, that of itself it gives rise to no ontological relation of signification over and above the categorial relation in the order of cause to effect and effect to cause resulting from the action of the sensible object on the sense. Hence sensory apprehension, inasmuch as it bears on the proper sensibles directly, enjoys none of the indifference to the being of its object exhibited by imagination, memory, and understanding, *though it does involve relations* between such so-called "proper" sensibles as color or sound and such so-called "common" sensibles as movement and shape, and so does not have an "atomic" or isolated character, but immediately reveals objects as mind-independently *structured* within sensation according to size and distance, shape and movement, etc. See esp. Book I, Question 6, of the *Treatise on Signs*. Whereas for Locke and Burne (as later for Russell) the sense-data were regarded as bare effects within my subjectivity directly known and supposedly caused by unknown things, sense-data for Poinset are effects indeed, but such effects as presuppose and exhibit the *here and now* action of the cause as object, and hence effects which, as transcendental relations, are *pure means by which (principia quo)* their causes are cognized under the aspect of being noisy, colored, shaped, in motion, etc., and present in awareness in themselves here and now. Thus Poinset's view of sense experience comes much closed to the views of T. H. Greene except that with Greene even the primitive relations of sense perception (those obtaining at the level of the sensibles proper and common) remain wholly the achievement of mind.

sign (concept as formal sign) to signified (object as made naturally present in cognition as extrinsic specifier). This reversal and subordination of the internal subjective means of objectification to external specifications initially introduced through the senses is not possible from within the modern tradition, for it can only come about through the intervention of relation as an ontological rationale mediating the connection between concepts and their objects in perception and understanding. Hence Kant makes the decisive determination constitutive of his Copernican revolution when he extends the primacy of transcendental relation over the means of knowing not only into the active process of concept formation but into the actual function concepts perform as *means* of objectification: if sensory intuitions are to become known, "I cannot rest in these intuitions ... but *must relate them as representations* to something as their object, and determine this latter through them." ⁷²

Kant may be said to be the first in the modern tradition concerning the difference between a relation and its subjective foundation to have seen, with a clarity and depth comparable to that found in Poincaré's *Treatise*, the true requirements of the problem:

Either I must assume that the *concepts*, by means of which I obtain this determination [of what has been given in intuition], conform to the object [in which case the concept as it functions in cognition is ontologically relative], or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, that the *experience* in which alone, as given objects, they can be known, conform to the concepts [in which case the concept, even as it functions formally as a pure *means of cognition*, is only transcendentially relative]. ⁷³

⁷² Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Preface to Second Edition," p. *italics added*. *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften* (note above), p. "Weil ich aber bei diesen Anschauungen, wenn sie Erkenntnisse werden sollen, nicht stehen bleiben kann, sondern sie als Vorstellungen auf irgend etwas als Gegenstand beziehen und diesen durch jene bestimmen muss."

⁷³ *Ibid.*: "So kann ich entweder annehmen, die Begriffe, wodurch ich diese Bestimmung zu Staude bringe, richten sich auch nach dem Gegenstande, ... oder ich nehme an, die Gegenstände oder, welches einerlei ist, die Erfahrung, in welcher sie allein (als gegebene Gegenstände) erkannt werden, richten sich nach diesen Begriffen."

To the question "whether the formal rationale constitutive of a sign as such consists, primarily and essentially, in an ontological or in a transcendental relation,"⁷⁴ we have only two systematically conceived answers. One, published by a professor at Alcalá, in Iberia, in the year 1632, according to which concepts (being natural signs formal in type) as they function in cognition are *ontologically* relative and so sustain the convertibility of being with truth: this is Poinset's *Treatise on Signs*. The other, published by a professor at Königsberg, Germany, in 1781, according to which concepts even as functioning in actual cognition remain primarily transcendental in their relative being, and so compromise the transcendental character of truth (i.e., the character of truth as mind-independently founded) and its convertibility with being.

Poinset and Kant are, each in their own way, the culmination of two radically opposed traditions concerning the connection between being and truth. These two traditions overlap in their Latin development for about 300 years (1350-1650), at which point the older tradition that Poinset represents is effectively terminated for the time, and the initial formation of the modern tradition in the national languages takes place entirely under the influence of the modern and nominalistic position concerning the relative underlying the standpoint of the great Kantian critiques. The doctrine of intuition Poinset introduces in Book I, Question 6, and develops in terms of formal signs throughout most of Book III, clearly expresses the consequences of construing concepts and the means of knowing generally as signs and ontologically rather than transcendently relative. As such, these pages serve as well to oppose Poinset's notions of intuition and experience to those of Kant after him, as to those of Ockham and the nominalists before him in what proved to be indeed the early modern period.

D. The Twilight of Modern Times.

From the viewpoint of its foundations in the being proper to

⁷⁴ *Treatise on Signs*, Book I, Question 1, 646b16-19. See note 21 above.

relation the modern tradition as found in the national languages is perfectly continuous up to Kant, who, as we have said, brings into systematic play the innermost possibilities of that tradition concerning concepts (the formal signs of understanding) much as Poinset does for the older tradition. This unity of the formative stage of the modern philosophical mind was clearly perceived by Hegel, who wrote (in 1802): "Hume's and Locke's reflective way of philosophizing, more thoroughly and systematically worked out on German ground and soil, becomes German philosophy."⁷⁵

Hegel also brings the unity to an end. He becomes the first figure of stature to challenge and deny the all but universal assumption that every relation existing as a relation is the work of the mind.

I do not wish to say a great deal about Hegel here beyond this: first, he certainly seems to recognize, with his "absolute relation," essentially the same notion of the relative termed "transcendental relation" by Poinset;⁷⁶ second, he certainly recognizes mind-dependent relations;⁷⁷ and third, he seems also to recognize the equivalent of what Poinset terms mind-independent or categorial relations.⁷⁸ Thus, at least in a tacit and confused way, there would be operative in Hegel's thought the notion of relation as the ontological rationale whereby Poinset accounts for the presence of being and non-being alike in the objects of our experience and awareness. The univocity of being and non-being in cognition is a fundamental principle for Poinset's *Treatise*. It would not seem entirely unrelated to the

•• Hume's and Locke's "Reflexionswesen auf deutschen Grund und Boden weit laufiger und systematischer ausgesponnen wird deutsche . . . Philosophie genannt." G. W. F. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexions Philosophie der Subjektivitat," *Journal der Philosophie*, Band II, Stuck as reprinted in *Sämtliche Werke* (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1964), Vol. I, p. 874.

•• "Das Nothwendige ist in sich absolutes Verhältniss . . ." *System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Die Logik*, SW, Vol. 8, p. 887.

⁷⁷ - - - der Gedanke ist die Sache; einfache Identitat des subjectiven und Objektiven." *System der Philosophie. Dritter Teil. Die Philosophie des Geistes*, SW, Vol. 10, p. 859.

⁷⁸ - - - das Verhältniss des Kindes im Mutter eibe, --ein Verhrutniss, des weder bloss leiblich noch bloss geistig, sondern psychisch ist,-- ein Verhrutniss der Seele." *Ibid.*, p. 158.

famous text at the opening of Hegel's *Logic*: "Being, the immediate indeterminate, is in fact nothing." ⁷⁹

But it does not seem to me that Hegel ever works out in a clear way the reduction of mind-independent and mind-dependent relations to their common ground or their functional interrelation in knowledge. It seems to me that Heidegger's critique in passing of Hegel is probably sound: "when Hegel at last defines 'Being' as the 'indeterminate immediate' and makes this definition basic for all the further categorial explications of his 'logic', *he keeps looking in the same direction as ancient ontology*," ⁸⁰ whereas with signs it is the question of the prior possibility of a categorial scheme of any kind that is posed for settlement in a fundamental way. The first problem is not the derivation of one categorial scheme as superior to some other but to lay bare the possibility of deriving categorial schemes from experience and of distinguishing within experience the mind-dependent and mind-independent elements of objectivity. ⁸¹

•• "Das Seyn, das unbestimmte das Immittelbare ist in der that Nichts, und nicht mehr noch weniger als Nichts." *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Erster Teil, Erster Abschnitt, Bestimmtheit, Erster Kapitel, Seyn, par. A, *Siimtliche Werke*, Vol. 4, p. 88.

⁸⁰ - Und wenn schliesslich *Hegel* des 'Sein' bestimmt als das 'unbestimmte Unmittelbare' und diese Bestimmung allen weiteren kategorialen Explikationen seiner 'Logik' zugrunde legt, so halt er sich in derselben Blickrichtung wie die antike Ontologie, nur dass er das von Aristoteles schon gestellte Problem der Einheit des Seins gegeniiber der Mannigfaltigkeit der sachhaltigen 'Kategorien' aus der Hand gibt." Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 8, emphasis added in English rendition.

⁸¹ Much of the difficulty and originality of Poinso't's work alike, we may say, derive from his tacit recognition that the first concern of anyone who would seek to explain signs, the universal means of communication, must be to pay heed 'to Aristotle's problem of the unity of Being [as that which is first in human understanding] as over against the multiplicity of 'categories' applicable to things' (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 8: "das von Aristoteles schon gestellte Problem der Einheit des Seins gegeniiber der Mannigfaltigkeit der sachhaltigen 'Kategorien' • aus der Hand gibt"). The experience of signs and of the escape from the subjectivity of the here and now is as fundamental in its own way as is the experience of things in terms of the effects which provide experimental justification for the scheme of the categories, as is clear from the fact that the derivation of the categories from experience is itself a function of the use we make of signs in developed discourse (cf. *Troo,tise on Signs*, Appendix A, 577a10-118).

Be that as it may, if we look at modern philosophy from its national language beginnings in the 17th century up to its culmination in Kant's *Critiques*, Hegel by comparison marks a perhaps confused but decidedly new beginning. For the first time in almost two hundred years the common assumption of modern times underlying and necessitating its constant proclivity toward solipsism and subjectivism is put into question. Without anywhere gaining clarity as to its principles the influence of Hegelian thought is pervasive throughout the nineteenth century and has begun to wax again in recent times; but the confusion in Hegelianism nowhere demonstrates itself more effectively, perhaps, than in the failure of the Hegelians to isolate and develop the consequences of categorial relation with its ontological rationale.

After Hegel, there are at least two developments of particular interest in the light of Poincaré's notion of the ontologically relative.⁸² The first is introduced by Franz Brentano (1838-1917); the second by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970).

Brentano is celebrated for having introduced into modern discussions the notion of *intentionality* and for having inspired with this notion the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). With his doctrine of intentionality Brentano originally set himself to explain the difference between mental and physical phenomena precisely in terms of

The sign, as the medium of communication, functions by *distinguishing connections* within experience and so is not only presupposed to any system of categories but is also the instrument of their establishment. The analysis of the sign, therefore, must be precisely *fundamental* to any *categorial* ontology—that is to say, it must explain how it is that signs so function as to make possible the eventual assimilation of experience to a categorial scheme of whatever kind.

⁸² I pass over the developments in England from Greene, Caird, Wallace, and Ritchie, to Bradley, developments to which Russell is in his origins largely a reaction, because, despite Bradley's clear metaphysical superiority to anything that comes after him—not only to Russell, but even more to Ayer and Ryle—he remains wholly within the confines of the modern assumption concerning the categorial relative, and continues—under the opposition of appearance and reality—the ineluctably consequent split between being and the intelligible. At the same time, it must be noted that Bradley's thought on the relative is essentially unfinished, as his *ex professo* treatment of relation was interrupted by his death in September of 1924. See F. H. Bradley, *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), Vol. II, pp. 628-676.

relation. This attempt foundered in Brentano's inability to explain how a mental phenomenon could be truly related or referred to an unreal object. Failing to get clear about the ontological peculiarity of the relative whereby precisely it introduces into discourse its own characteristic indifference to physical reality, Brentano eventually abandoned his view of mental phenomena as truly relative in structure (*etwas Relatives*) and fell back upon a notion of it as after all only what Poinset would call transcendently relative (*etwas Relativliches*).⁸³

Husserl sustained and developed Brentano's original idea of intentionality as the thoroughly relational structure of consciousness, but in Husserl there can be no question of relation as an ontological rationale in Poinset's sense. For this requires the explicit contrast between and comparison of natural and mind-dependent elements in objects, a distinction within objectivity precluded by Husserl's dogmatic adherence to what Heidegger well terms the "constructivist standpoint"⁸⁴ regarding the being of objectivity. With Husserl, there is no possible ground for introducing the contrast between mind-dependent and mind-independent being in Poinset's sense and hence no possibility for developing the notion of an ontological rationale whereby the Husserlian ego might slip out of its "transcendental subjectivity." Husserl reverts entirely, but in highly suggestive and idiosyncratic ways comparable to those of Kant in their obsessive power, to the modern and nominalistic tradition uniting the mainstream of British empiricism and Continental rationalism⁸⁵ in its denial of relation as a properly ontological rationale capable of bringing together knowing and being through the instrument of signs.

⁸³ See John N. Deely, "The Ontological Status of Intentionality," *The New Scholasticism*, XLVI (April, 1972), pp. 220-233; and "Reference to the Non-Existent," Part I, forthcoming in *The Thomist*, XXXIX (April, 1975).

•• *Sein und Zeit*, p. 61.

⁸⁵ According to Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (2nd ed.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), Vol. I, pp. 92-93, "the British empiricists from Locke to Hume were Husserl's introductory readings in philosophy and remained of basic importance to him all through his later development. . . . He even kept recommending them to his students . . . as one of the best approaches to phenomenology."

In the English tradition it is Bertrand Russell who, more than any single figure, has brought the notion of relation in recent years to the foreground of discussion in British and American circles. In 1965 Weinberg could still write that "we owe to Russell, more than to any single philosopher, a clear understanding of the nature and importance of relations."⁸¹ From his earliest studies of Leibniz, and in opposition to Leibniz, Russell developed a lively sense of the independent reality of relations and of their importance for any theory of knowledge and truth.⁸⁷ Yet, from Poinot's standpoint, Russell consistently mistakes what is proper to relation as *COITWeivable* for what is proper to relation as *susceptible of existence*.⁸⁸ Because relation is *conceivable* as indifferent to physical or mental existence, Russell argued that relation as such *exists* in neither the mental nor the physical realm. But the notion of *ontological* relation derives from what is peculiar to relation not as something *conceivable*, but as something *susceptible as such of* *in nature* independently of perception and conception, though not of subjective being *tout court*. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Russell repudiated Brentano's early views without correcting them⁸⁹ and spent most of his speculative time with relations in an effort to construct a logic that would enable the sufficiently informed observer to correct, in principle at least, the supposed defect (directly consequent upon the very nature of signs as ontologically relative) whereby language can be used to speak of what does not "in fact" exist.⁹⁰

On the side of Continental rationalism, it suffices merely to recall the title and content of Husserl's late work, the *Cartesian Meditations*.

⁸⁶ Julius R. Weinberg, *Abstraction, Relation, and Induction* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), p. 117.

⁸⁷ E. g., see Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (2nd ed.; London: Allen and Unwin, 1937), pp. 14-15, et alibi.

⁸⁸ E. g., compare the *Treatise on Signs*, Appendix A, Article 1, 582a17-b36, with Russell's remarks in *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford, 1912; Galaxy ed. 1959), pp. 90 ff'.

•• See "Recent Criticisms of Consciousness," Ch. 1 of Russell's *The Analysis of Mind* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1921), pp. 9-40, esp.

•• I am thinking, of course, of Russell's celebrated "theory of descriptions,"

On the exclusively American scene John Dewey built an elaborate doctrine of experience and nature around the notion of relation.⁹¹ But this theory nowhere shows a clear awareness of its foundations or of the alternatives concerning relation that the history of thought has made available.

E. Historical Resume.

No matter where we look in modern times, we find far reaching and detailed differences, both dialectical and philosophical, directly related to the effective termination with Poinsett's *Treatise* of the influence of the older medieval tradition concerning relation as far as concerns the epistemological and critical reflections of modern times. Given the date of publication of the part of Poinsett's *Cursus Philosophicus* containing the *tractatus de signis*, it is no longer possible to accept Whitehead's position as expressed as the twentieth century entered its second quarter: "a brief, but sufficiently accurate, description of the intellectual life of the European races during the succeeding two centuries and a quarter up to our own times is that they have been living upon the accumulated capital of ideas provided for them by the genius of the seventeenth century."⁹²

If we except the remarkable studies of Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) and his school,⁹³ and some of the logical investigations conducted by Henry Veatch,⁹⁴ we can say that Poinsett's

apparently inspired by a passing comment of Frege's (in *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*), which became a fundamental part (specifically, the third introductory chapter) of Russell's and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* and a principal inspiration to a whole generation of American logicians. See John N. Deely, "Reference to the Non-Existent," *The Thomist* XXXIX (April, 1975).

⁹¹ In particular, see his *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Holt, 1922), esp. Parts I and III.

• Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1925), p. 89.

• Particularly Maritain's *Reflexions sur l'Intelligence et sur sa vie propre* (2nd ed.; Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924); *The Degrees of Knowledge*; "Sign and Symbol," Chapter IX of his *Redeeming the Time* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948), pp. 191-204; and his "Language and the Theory of Sign," in *Language: An Inquiry into Its Meaning and Function*, edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 86-101.

"In particular, his book, *Intentional Logic* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale, 1959), where he says explicitly (p. ix): "I have relied heavily on the very rich but

work in philosophy remains in its entirety to be considered in modern times. It does not seem too much to expect that at last it will be, and that the oldest Western tradition concerning truth and the relative, lost at the very period when the concepts and philosophical vocabulary of modern thought were being formed in the national languages during the 17th and 18th centuries, will once again become familiar in the world of learning and a civilizing force in the culture of the West, restoring to a yet richer unity and continuity man's understanding of himself and of his being in the world. For, as the sole figure in modern times who dared to envision the import of an adequate grasp of Poincaré's properly philosophical thought has observed, "the sign involves the whole extent of moral and human life; it is in the human world a universal instrument, just as is movement in the physical world."⁹⁵ "When we consider, as a consequence, that "there are no more complex problems, no problems of wider bearing on psychology and on culture than those pertaining to the sign,"⁹⁶ we can

sadly neglected *Ars Logica* of John of St. Thomas. Needless to say, I make no pretense of having exhausted or even adequately understood this massive work." (See note 8 above.) But also F. H. Parker and Veatch, *Logic as a Human Instrument* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), which relies on Poincaré's doctrine of the formal sign (without, however, explicitly envisioning its dependence on the *secundum dici- secundum esse* contrast); and Henry Veatch and Theodore Young, "Metaphysics and the Paradoxes," *The Review of Metaphysics*, VI (December, 1954!), pp. 199-218. Veatch's later study, *Two Logics* (Evanston: Northwestern, 1969), does not directly rely on Poincaré but continues to develop in lively and trenchant ways the contrasts between mathematical logic and the philosophical logic of the Aristotelian tradition.

Ironically, Veatch was originally directed to Poincaré by John Wild, who himself, though he drew on Poincaré's doctrine of signs (e.g., "An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Signs," *Philosophy and Research*, VIII [December, 1947], pp. 217-244), shows, by his review of Simon's translation (in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XVII [June, 1956], p. 558) wherein he expresses puzzlement as to why Poincaré thinks categorial relations exist as mind-independently distinct from their fundament, that his grasp of Poincaré's doctrine was never grounded in principle. From the standpoint of Poincaré's *Treatise*, Wild, while professing realism, develops in spite of himself in the direction of nominalism.

⁹⁵ Jacques Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," in *Redeeming the Time*, p. 191.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

perhaps appreciate just how radical and revolutionary in principle was Poinso't's return to the beginnings of his *Cursus Philosophicus* in his *Treatise on Signs*. (See the opening paragraphs of Section I of this article, above) For the first time in the history of the West the world of society and culture and history generally was brought in principle and in a thematic way into the orbit of philosophical understanding along with the subjectivity of the knower whereby he becomes inserted through his experience into a definite epoch and historical world,⁹⁷ without thereby losing the privilege of intelligence whereby it is able to grasp truths about things as they are "in themselves," and to speak languages other than its own.

* * * * *

Thomistic Afterword:

If one were to ask in recent years what transpired in philosophy along the Thomistic line between the death of St. Thomas in 1274 and the death of Descartes in 1650, one would most likely have received an answer to the effect that of this entire period should be said what Gilson said of the 14th century: "If we consider above all that which each epoch bears of the new, then it is not at all toward the commentators and defenders of St. Thomas and of Duns Scotus that we must direct our attention."⁹⁸

Since at least the time of Windelband it has been the conventional wisdom that "even the short after-bloom which scholasticism experienced about 1600 in the universities of the Iberian peninsula bore no real fruit."⁹⁹ (Though it is admitted

⁹⁷ A preliminary account of this fact is given in John N. Deely, *The Tradition Via Heidegger* (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). Ch. VII "Dasein as the Intentional Life of Man," pp. 88-110.

• Etienne Gilson, *La Philosophie au Moyen Age. Des origines patristiques a la fin du XIV^e siecle* (1st ed., rev. et aug.; Paris: Payot, 1952), p. 638.

• Wilhelm Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, authorized trans. by James H. Tufts of the University of Chicago (2nd ed., rev. and enlarged; New York and London: Macmillan, 1901), Part IV, "The Philosophy of the Renaissance", Chapter 1, section 28, "The Struggle between the Traditions", p. 363. Cf.

by all that Francis Suarez, "Professor Primarius" and "Doctor Eximius" of the University of Coimbra in Iberia, was "an important writer"-in no small part, according to the terms of Brehier's report, for reasons philosophically proper to the sociology of knowledge: "Thomism as formulated by the Jesuit Suarez was universally taught [in 17th century Europe] and finally supplanted the doctrine of Melanchthon, even in the universities of Protestant countries.")¹⁰⁰

It comes as something unexpected and definitively disruptive of the long-standing opinion, then, when we find that the work of clearing and opening up what C. S. Peirce called *semiotic*,¹⁰¹ that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis, or signifying, was first systematically undertaken not, as is generally believed, by Peirce himself, but by Jean Poincot, one of the "commentators and defenders of St. Thomas" in the 17th century Iberian "after-bloom." Known within the Thomistic school usually as "John of St. Thomas," Poincot was a younger contemporary of Suarez and intimately familiar with the writings of Suarez but opposed radically on all fundamental points in his theory of signs to the opinions of Suarez-the very opinions which, particularly in the celebrated *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, became "the main channel by which scholasticism came to be known by modern classical philosophers,"¹⁰² notably, Descartes, Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Christian Wolff, and (through Wolff) Kant.

More surprising still, perhaps, and more important surely, both in itself and for the historical interpretation of philosophy, is this discovery: With Poincot's *tractatus de signis* the realism constitutive of the metaphysical spirit in its proper and highest

Armand A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 847.

¹⁰⁰ Emile Brehier, *The Seventeenth Century*, Wade Baskin's translation of *Histoire de la Philosophie: La Philosophie Moderne. I: Le dix-septieme siecle* (1938) (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 1-11.

¹⁰¹ Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.488.

¹⁰² Armand Maurer, *op. cit.* (in note 99 above), p. 356.

realization in human understanding became for the first time critically grounded and doctrinally justified, in the bringing together, if I may so put it, of transcendental truth and history. In this work, it does not seem too much to say that we are confronted with an entire period, forgotten and ignored for the most part even by the scholars in philosophy, and hidden almost entirely from modern eyes behind the exuberant success of Suarez's writings throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, but during which, Jacques Maritain uniquely and perceptively noted, "the thought of St. Thomas had time to be mined, detailed, elaborated; the treasures of the highest metaphysics were able to be placed in reserve for a future time."¹⁰³ (In this respect, the *Treatise on Signs* forever bears the mark of its origin as part-albeit the privileged and most unique part-of a vast ontological synthesis which ambited to know the world in its proper possibilities, just as it is, and as it includes the power of human understanding whereby is made explicit the contrast between being and non-being, truth and the false.) We may at least hope that the detailed historical reconstruction and study of this lost epoch-long overdue-is finally getting underway.¹⁰⁴

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¹⁰³ "Grace a eux," writes Jacques Maritain-namely (to mention only "les noms tout a fait eminents"), "au XVI^e siecle, les theologiens et les grands juristes de Salamanque, c'est surtout, a la meme epoque, le puissant Cajetan, t-t au XVII^e siecle, Jean de Saint-Thomas"- " grace a eux, la philosophie moderne peut venir: la pensee de saint Thomas a eu le temps d'etre creusee, detaillee, elaboree; les tresors de la plus haut metaphysique ont pu etre mis en reserve pour l'avenir." *Antimoderne* (nouvelle edition revue et augmentee; Paris: Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1911), pp. 141-141.

•• Important groundwork is at least being done-e. g., Walter Redmond, *Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 197ft) one of the many volumes relevant to the period in Nijhoff's "Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Idees " series.

SPIRIT, FREEDOM, HISTORY

KARL RAHNER'S *Harer des Wortes* (HEARERS OF THE WORD)

In a manner similar to my examination of Rahner's *Geist in Welt* ¹ this review article also falls into two parts. First (I), an interpretation of the work itself offered as an introduction and an aid to a first, or second, reading; second (II), a detailed review of the English translation, ² a rendition so poor and inaccurate that it should have long ago been withdrawn from circulation.

To interpret *Harer des Wortes* it is helpful to note its setting. In 1931³ Rahner completed his doctoral dissertation in philosophy. Two years before it was published as his first major work, *Geist in Welt*,³ Rahner a metaphysics of human knowledge based on Thomas Aquinas. Equally important, however, was the clear purpose Rahner had of showing how metaphysics was possible for the sort of cognition revealed by his Thomist analyses. In brief, he concluded that while man as *finite* spirit depended on sense intuition (the *conversio ad phantasma*) for all objective knowledge, still, as finite *spirit*, that very knowledge of objects was possible only on the condition of transcending all objects toward the infinite horizon of being co-known non-objectively (that is, not as an object). This transcending openness to being allowed Rahner to consider human cognition, as spirit in sense or matter or world (*Geist in Welt*), not only as the possibility of meta-physics but also (in the terms of the very Kantian problematic within which Rahner was working, where God was considered the traditional "object" of transcendence and thus of metaphysics) the possibility of revelation. This note, the coda with which *Geist in Welt* ended, was the opening theme for *Harer des Wortes*.

¹ Andrew Tallon, "Spirit, Matter, Becoming: Karl Rahner's *Spirit in the World* (*Geist in Welt*)" *The Modern Schoolman*, vol. 48, no. 2 (January, 1971) 151-165 (hereafter MS).

• Karl Rahner, S. J., *Hearers of the Word* (translated by Michael Richards; preface by Johannes Baptist Metz; New York: Herder and Herder, 1969, x plus ISO pp., no index or bibliography), hereafter HWE.

³ Karl Rahner, S. J., *Geist in Welt. Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin* (Innsbruck: Verlag Felizian Rauch, 1939), hereafter GW. presented a series of fifteen lectures "on laying the foundation for a philosophy of religion." ⁴ The primary aim of the dissertation had been to offer

• "Zur Grundlegung emer Religionsphilosophie," which became the subtitle of *Harer des Wortes*.

The setting for these lectures was the Salzburger Hochschulwochen. In 1941 Rahner published the lectures, leaving them unchanged.⁵ In 1963, Johannes Baptist Metz, having already brought out the second edition of *Geist in Welt* in 1957,⁶ now did the same for *Horer des Wortes*.⁷ But it was not the same. Metz had made very few changes in revising *Geist in Welt*; his revision of *Horer des Wortes*, however, was far more extensive, involving more than 1300 changes, some small, such as a word added, changed, or deleted, some large, such as deleting whole paragraphs or pages, the latter justified, for Metz, because they were repetitions, appropriate for spoken style with connecting reviews, summaries, and transitions, but superfluous in written style. Further, to the single footnote in the original,⁸ Metz added 123 notes of his own, some merely reference notes, some content notes, many very long. The reader cannot judge himself concerning these changes because they are not identified, and one never knows, without access to the first edition, long out of print, whether he is reading Rahner or Metz. Though grateful to Metz for the work of making this book available at all, one cannot help regretting all deletions and most substitutions; as for the additions,⁹ some are actually quite welcome, and they

⁵ Karl Rahner, S. J., *Horer des Wortes*. Zur Grundlegung einer Religionsphilosophie (München: Kosel-Verlag, 1941). hereafter HW1.

⁶ Karl Rahner, S. J., *Geist in Welt*. Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin (Zweite Auflage im Auftrag des Verfassers überarbeitet und ergänzt von Johannes Baptist Metz; München: Kosel-Verlag, 1957), hereafter GW2. In English translation by William Dych, S. J. as *Spirit in the World* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), hereafter GWE.

⁷ Karl Rahner, S. J., *Horer des Wortes*. Zur Grundlegung einer Religionsphilosophie (Neu bearbeitet von J. B. Metz; München: Kosel-Verlag, 1963), hereafter HW2.

⁸ On pp. 71-72, n. 1; and one can count seventeen differences between editions in just this one note.

⁹ Partial List of Additions by Metz:

HWE 5 lines 6-8. 9, last 2 lines -10, lines 1-2. 9, lines 6-7. 9, lines 11-13. 12, last line- 13 line 1. 15, last 2 line- 16, lines 1-2. 17, lines 15-17. 20, lines 9-10. 23, lines 24-25. 25, lines 27-28. 25, lines 30-31. 27, last 5 lines. 35, lines 22-26. 36, lines 16-17. 36, lines 21-22. 37, lines 17-22. 38, lines 3-5. 38, lines 16-17. 39. lines 1-2. 39, line 24. 40, line 21. 41, line 2. 45, lines 7-11. 45, last line- 46, lines 1-2. 46, line 31. 46, last line- 47, lines 1-3. 47, line 21. 49, line 30. 50, lines 16-17. 50, lines 23-25. 56, lines 11-16. 59, lines 5-9. 61, lines 11-21. 63, lines 10-22. 63, line 32. 63, last 3 lines- 64, lines 1-11. 65, lines 33-35. 66, lines 12-14. 67, lines 10-11. 73, lines 11-12. 75, lines 6-8. 77, line 3. 77, lines 12-15. 78, lines 14-16. 79, lines 5-6. 83, last 3 lines- 84, lines 1-7 and 9-14. 85, lines 27-32. 86, lines 31-32. 87, lines 28-31. 89, line 10. 90, lines 4-5. 90, lines 12-13. 91, line 13. 91, lines 18-21. 92, lines 29-30. 100, lines 12-14. 111, line 5. 114, line 16. 116, line 14. 119, line 4. 121, line 12. 122, line 2. 122, line 8. 123, lines 27-28. 127, lines 23-25. 138, lines 11-13. 141, line 1. 141, lines 21-22. 141, lines 28-29.

at worst constitute nothing lost; still, although Rahner expressly endorsed, in advance, all of Metz's changes, perhaps fewer, and those clearly identified, would have been preferable. Unlike the German edition, or the English, the excellent French translation, by Joseph Hofbeck,¹⁰ set Metz's changes in another typeface or otherwise indicated differences so that now that little volume is almost more useful than the original.

But it is the exceptionally poor English version by Michael Richards (*et alii*-for the translator of the text is not the unidentified translator of the notes!) which is the occasion of this study. It would not be enough to say that the translation is "loose," or "broad," or "free "; it usually tries to be fairly literal. Its fault is not so easily named and tolerated. Nor is it even enough to say that it is often misleading,¹¹ sometimes quite careless,¹² and, finally, just plain wrong, in very obvious and thus all the

144, lines 33-35. 146, last line- 147, lines 1-2. 150 and 151: all "having-being." 161, lines 28-32. 168, lines 14-18. 169, lines 5-6. 170, line 15. 175, lines 31-35. 179, lines 11-12. 179, line 29. 180, all (6 lines).

¹⁰Karl Rahner, S. J., *L'homme à l'écoute du Verbe*. Fondements d'une philosophie de la religion (Paris: Maison Marne, 1968; Traduction et édition comparée par Joseph Hofbeck.

¹¹ Many examples will appear in the list of corrections offered below.

¹² For example, while it is quite obvious, though nowhere stated, that there were at least two translators, and that the translator of the main text was not the translator of the notes, effort could have been made to get some agreement between the two so as to avoid situations of a whole note about a word that doesn't even occur in the very text to which it refers; specific instances will be listed below. Also, the page references to GWE are all incorrect, as are some of the references internally to HWE itself; the page numbers given are always to the German; apparently the editor or translators did not bother to note the difference; a list of correct readings is provided immediately below.

Corrections to References in Notes:

HWE 35, n. 2: For: *Spirit in the World* [hereafter GWE], pp. 71 f., Read: GWE 57-61.

HWE 40, n. 6: For: GWE pp. 80 ff., Read: GWE 68-71.

HWE 48, n. 2: For: GWE pp. 84 ff., Read: GWE 71-77.

HWE 55, n. 1: For: GWE pp. 129-242, esp. 173 ff., Read: GWE 117-236, esp. 163-169.

HWE 64, n. 7: For: GWE pp. 192 ff., Read: GWE 183-187.

HWE 125, n. 3: For: GWE pp. 325 ff., Read: GWE 323-330.

HWE 128, n. 5: For: GWE pp. 345 ff., Read: GWE 344-355.

HWE 135, n. 5: For: GWE pp. 91 ff., 311-366, Read: GWE 78-116, 309-366.

HWE 141, n. 1: For: GWE 243 ff., Read: GWE 237-309 [esp. 246-264, 279-286].

HWE 142, n. 2: For: HWE above p. 123, Read: HWE 100 above.

HWE 148, n. 4: For: GWE pp. 387 ff., Read: GWE 387-408.

HWE 149, n. 7: For: HWE p. 177, Read: HWE 143.

HWE 150, n. 1: For: HWE p. 81, Read: HWE 62.

exasperating instances. It is, in a word, a bad translation, severely faulty enough that it should be immediately withdrawn ..

In order to make do, at least until a revision (hopefully) appears, or, more realistically, because one probably will not appear, I offer, besides the interpretation as introduction (I) an extensive list of textual corrections, along with reasons (II) ; for the French language reader I can suggest Hofbeck's fine work, which has only a few mistakes, to be noted in their proper places. For the reader limited to English I suggest that the corrections be copied in, or at least read along with the translation. Let what follows in Part II not be taken as a documentation or justification of my condemnation of the translation (I have no such intention nor would such detail be needed had I: I have graduate students, as do others, who try to use this book.) Let it be taken for what it is, namely a temporary. let us hope, but necessary supplement to a job that does a real disservice to a very important work, one which should have been even more carefully presented than *Spirit in the World* because many continue to bypass that larger, more difficult, yet necessary work in favor of reading *Hearers of the Word*, thereby becoming insufficiently prepared and repeatedly confused.

I

Let us turn first now to the work itself, *Harer des Wortes*, for its ideas, leaving the textual corrections to Part II. What we find is a restating anJ application of the concept of finite knowledge worked out in *Geist in Welt*, with the important additions of the concept of *freedom*, minimally mentioned in *Geist in Welt*, and the term *person*, the central concept of Rahner's entire transcendental anthropology, both philosophical and theological, which, absent from *Geist in Welt*, occurs for the first time in this work.

The Contents pages show fourteen chapters ¹³ divided into five parts. The first help in reading this work is to ignore this division. We really have a two-chapter Introduction and a one-chapter Conclusion sandwiching a single, continuous argument. That argument, most simply summarized, is that 1) despite the *openness* (chapters 8-5) of God *as* pure being and thus as the perfectly knowable in himself, and despite the openness of man *to* being-SPffiiT, 2) because of the *hiddenness* (chapters 6-8) that is a *personal* being's in his being free to open and to be open to others or not-FREEDOM (PERSON), 8) God *can* (but need not) reveal himself to man, who, though spirit, is *finite* spirit (= in matter, *Geist in Welt*) , that is, spirit whose knowing of being is by *Vorgriff* and whose intuition is limited to space and time; thus man is a being to whom God can reveal himself precisely by entering space and time (chapters 9-18)-HISTORY (INCARNATION [INCARNATE PERSON]).

¹⁸ HWI had fifteen lectures, which Metz reworked into fourteen chapters.

Hearer and *Word* are, further, synecdoches for man and God,¹⁴ and it will be another aid to clarity not to make too much of the title of the work.

We find, therefore, between the Introduction and the Conclusion, three central ideas: *spirit*, *freedom*, and *history*. These correspond to openness, hiddenness, and place, that is, in HWE, Part II: The Openness of Being and Man, Part III: The Hiddenness of Being, and Part IV: The Place where the Free Message is Found. And these three ideas really constitute one complete idea, namely, that to be *spirit* is to be open to being, to be *person*¹⁵ is to be *spirit free* to open or not to another, and to be *finite*

¹⁴ Note that nothing is said, in the previous summary sentence, of hearing or listening for the word, something which the title of the work would lead us to expect. In my judgment Rahner tries a bit too hard to make a case for hearing as the special way man is to be open to God's possible self-revelation. Despite the centrality of speech in defining man, and despite the mission of God the Son as God's Word (Logos), there seems no *a priori* basis for literally singling out the one sense of hearing. We are not, I presume, to see ourselves today as literally searching history for words, spoken or written, but for a person. Only if word and being-a-hearer symbolize synecdochically God and man can the title and the emphasis given to hearer and word carry full meaning; thus this is a study of the possibility of an encounter of man (hearer) and God (word), that is, a study of the possibility of theology, and thus an attempt to ground, to lay the foundation for, religion, the task of a philosophy of religion.

¹⁶ It is true that to be a person one must be *spirit* since *both* presence-to-self and presence-to-other (= intellect, cognition, mind, *etc.*) and self-disposability (will, freedom, love, *etc.*) are rooted in the nature of *spirit*. It is also true, however, that for many, *spirit* and mind or intellect (or self-presence) seem co-extensive, while *person* and freedom (or self-disposability) seem to go together. I believe this is true of Rahner. Theoretically, when speaking of a pure *spirit*, one could equally well use *spirit* or *person*. The trouble is, again, that one's interpreters will hear *spirit* and think *mind* (*Geist* and *esprit*, in fact, can both be translated as either mind or *spirit* [among other possibilities] and are thus neither altogether unambiguous nor innocent of blame for continual confusion; the Baillie translation of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* as *Phenomenology of Mind* is a case in point, although he later uses *spirit* where *mind* is obviously too narrow in meaning). Is one then to drop *spirit* and use *person* instead? Or is one to use both, to cover both meanings (as Rahner often does in his theological writings), in such theoretically redundant but perhaps clearer expressions as "personal *spirit*" and "spirit-person"? The problem today is that any mention of *person* is 1) either reduced, most exasperatingly, right back to *mind* (as by the linguistic analysts and the British tradition of philosophy of mind in general), or 2) equated with *personalism*, which can mean a) nothing but *subjectivism* (as some would label, wrongly of course, anything smacking of *existentialism*), b) just another name for *idealism*, with the absolute as *personal*, as in British and especially American forms (where *Geist* again becomes *almost* reducible to *mind*), or c) a rather tender-minded, voluntaristic, love-centered (always pejoratively meant by the tough-

spirit is to be person in *history*, in space and time, the where and when of God's incarnation in order for it to reach and be reached by finite spirit.

Let us now examine in just a bit more detail the Introduction, and then the development of the concepts of spirit, freedom, and history into a foundation for a philosophy of religion.

To speak of the possibility of religion is to speak of the possible relations between God and man. To do this today, after (for the Christian, but not for him alone) God has already revealed himself, is no longer to speak of mere possibility, and thus seems to place religion in the realm of theology rather than in that of philosophy. A philosophy of religion would then seem to be superfluous, a merely academic affair, unnecessary no one need demonstrate the possibility of an actuality.

But what of the man or group whose anthropology (in the sense of a philosophy of man, of an understanding of the nature of man) is such that what some say is actual must be denied as illusion for the simple reason that, according to that already defined human nature, no such actuality *is* even possible. Then it becomes the apologetic task of theology, as a necessary prelude to itself, to establish its own possibility, which, once established, becomes, as it were, its very necessity since that which is proved possible has already happened.¹⁶

Now it is obvious, from the above, that two points are pivotal, everything else turning on them, namely, the nature of man, especially the limits of his powers, particularly his ability to know, and the nature of God, especially his "limits" ¹⁷ in making himself known. But this is inevitably

minded logician), sort of sticky, pseudo counseling psychology or ethics, looked on suspiciously as a derivative of religion and (thus?) based on an emotional, even irrational (*contra Geist* as mind and reason) principle (precisely because *Geist* is mentally excluded from person by the one who insists on thinking this way). The upshot is that now when one says "man as person," he must be prepared to, must expect to, and, at least partly, must intend to have his listeners hear "man as will, freedom, love, relation, community, etc.," which is fine and good (we need a word to convey just this), but partial, since he cannot intend to exclude mind, intellect, consciousness, rationality, etc., that is, "man as spirit." Both terms include both realms; intellect and will are the person's powers of self-enactment as well as *Geistfunktionen*. Note, however, that in man spirit and person are not coextensive; *finite*; spirit is incarnate spirit, spirit in matter, in world (*Geist in Welt*), spirit that *becomes*, and thus a *human* person always means embodied spirit and besouled body.

¹⁶ To disdain all philosophy, including philosophy of religion, as some theologians seem to do, is to choose to talk only with oneself and other believers. To discuss biblical texts presupposes assent to their nature as revelation, the possibility of which is not self-evident.

¹⁷ These "limits" really amount to the limits built into the creature to whom he would reveal himself. His "willingness" so to reveal himself can only by a stretch of language be called a limit, in the sense of a self-limitation.

to get involved again in philosophy, and so the whole question of the interrelations of the various thoughtforms, and especially the interrelations of philosophy and theology need clarification. In chapters 1 and 2 Rahner tries to handle this question and introduces the problem of how one lays the foundation (that is, shows the very possibility) of something answering to the name of philosophy of religion. Special emphasis is placed on two points, namely, the fact that since a philosophy is grounded in a metaphysics and a theology is also ultimately grounded in a metaphysics, metaphysics or an understanding of the nature of being in general is at the heart of and grounds both and so could be common to both.

How this metaphysics is worked out occupies the next eleven chapters. Rahner, in GW, had already worked out such a metaphysics, an explicitly Thomist metaphysics, based squarely on texts of Thomas, especially on question 84, article 7 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*. There Thomas summed up his metaphysics of cognition, a metaphysics that is at once a metaphysics of being and of knowing. There he affirms the ultimate and original oneness of being and knowing: ¹⁸ knowing is but the self-presence of being, the non-distinctness of being from itself, the absence of absence from itself, and thus the presence of being with or to or through or within itself. Being as such is thus described in terms of itself, that is, in terms of whether there be "anything else in" being to come between itself and itself, and this lack-of-anything-else is called knowing, the *Beisichsein* of *Sein*; and God is the name man gives to the sole "place" where this event occurs perfectly.

But for a metaphysics to speak of God and man and thus provide the ground on which both can meet, it must speak now also of man in these metaphysical terms. Man is thus called the being whose being *is* mixed with something other than being; call it matter, potency, or relative non-being, that opaqueness and obscurity at the heart of the finite luminosity it possesses at least to the degree that it *is* "in," or does *have*, being. Man's knowing act is the manifestation of his level of being since knowing is but the *Beisichsein* of a being, according to the analogy of being (or of having being).

Thus GW is most truly a metaphysics of man by being a metaphysics of finite cognition, of the way *a* being is present to being; it is thus an ontology by being a metaphysical anthropology. Its most important conclusion is that man knows being by *Vorgriff* (while knowing *a* being by *Begriff*). What Rahner does in HW is take the last part of GW and spell it out: revelation is possible because man *does* know being by *Vorgriff* and *only* by *Vorgriff*; not by perception (*Wahrnehmung*), nor by intuition

¹⁸ This has led some to see Aquinas's metaphysics as a sort of Hegelian *Identitätssystem*.

(*Anschauung*),¹⁹ but by reaching past the objects thus grasped toward a horizon too "distant" to be any more than touched by fingertip, at arm's length, as it were, in no way able to be grasped, allowing no hand to close firmly around it.

This is not the place to repeat the analyses, even in summary, of GW, nor, certainly, those as they recur in HW. It would be quite a task just to restate the way Rahner gets to his concepts of spirit, of freedom, and of history. Let us put the matter into a revisable question: If being is *in se* knowable and man is openness to being without restriction, then how is revelation possible (and why necessary)? In other words, if our metaphysics, our common ground for speaking of God and man, names man as knower of being and God as being most knowable, then not only must we ask what *need* has God to "reveal" himself (what more, indeed, is there to be or do than be most pure being, that is, most perfect self-presence, knowability) but also, and more crucial, we must ask how *can* God be more and do more than absolutely be and thus be knowable?

The heart of this entire metaphysics, and it is easily missed in the midst of so much abstraction and especially with so much discussion of and terminological orientation around cognition, *is that being is personal*. That is, as a person is free to reveal himself or not, to obscure or veil himself or not, so at the very core of knowing and knowability (and thus of being), is *will*, and thus *love*.²⁰ Being is inadequately described or defined, therefore (and one cannot help wishing that Rahner had put this even more forcefully), only as *Beisichsein*, as self-presence, consciousness, or self-consciousness; being is also good and will.²¹

Besides the personness of God, and thus of being as such, there is another ground for possible revelation, namely, man's finitude, his limitation to knowing being only by *Vorgriff*. Man has no *intitio intellectualis* but onl

¹⁹ One might ask the question: Even were man possessed of an intuition of being as such, would not revelation remain possible just because God as free personal spirit could still choose not to reveal himself, to open himself to another, the power to be being and *still* remain unknown (not as merely existing, but as to one's self, one's personness or "personality," which no one can pry from the unwilling person) ?

²⁰ I have tried to emphasize this in reference to human personal becoming in "Rahner and Personization," *Philosophy Today*, vol. 14, no. 1 (Spring, 1970) 44-56.

²¹ In H/V Rahner does reach this position and thus advances over GW which, although it places desire and will at the heart of spirit, does so in terms of its dynamics toward being, a dynamics which ends up being at the service of being as the *true* (or simply as *being*, which, rather indicatively and revealingly, for Rahner seems, or seemed then, to be a case of synonymy, that is, that being as true-as the goal of knowing-is being as being). In HW he shows that he is Thomist in agreeing to three transcendentals: being is itself (one), self-presence (true), and will (good).

sense intuition. A being beyond space and time cannot be grasped by human cognition. Thus God can reveal himself by entering space and time, that is, history, and make himself available to man's sole intuition, and this would be something more, something new.

Now these two metaphysical bases for revelation are in fact one: the first (freedom) and the second (history), both possible because man is spirit, really can be interpreted to name one event: Christ, God as free person entering history (incarnation), an event Rahner leaves unnamed while issuing, as a rhetorical question, the challenge to anyone who would follow his analyses to do the naming for himself.²²

By way of conclusion I would like to take a moment to emphasize something not explicit in GW and too easily overlooked in HW, namely, this "personism" of Rahner's. By personism²³ I mean that contemporary focus on freedom (will, love) and relationality rather than on knowledge (consciousness, thought, mind, intellect, etc.) and substantiality as characteristic of man; both are there, of course, as "faculties" of spirit, but it is a matter of emphasis,²⁴ which is no small thing since "noticing" and knowing are so intertwined. To claim, now that so much of Raimon's theology is available, that Rahner's metaphysics is personist, is no news. But with only GW to work with, that *would* be news; with HW the implicit became more explicit, although less explicit than Metz, for one, would have liked, as witness his prefatorial comment and five substantial notes in *HWQ* which more or less apologize for the actually too object-ive treatment of the other, the other who is really primarily personal. Still, in HW, we do find Rahner beginning to break away from his dependence on Aquinas and Hegel (and it is, after Aquinas, Hegel and Heidegger who have influenced the content of Rahner's metaphysics of being and knowing), that is, on their neglect of freedom as constitutive of person, especially of person as capable of enacting relations, with another, whether man to man or man to God.

I do not insist, as was made clear at length above, on the word person, which is theoretically dispensable but practically indispensable, nor *c fortiori* on personism (we need no more precious isms) - nor does Rahner.

²² Rahner does not identify *Gott* and *Sein*, but metaphysically grounds the meeting of God and man by understanding both in terms of being. Not that being is "more than" God, thus making God a *Seiende*, a being; rather God in his free act places in being a being who knows all he knows in the light of being (a doubly apt expression, given knowledge as the self-luminosity of being): man is the being whose openness to being (an openness with no *a priori* limitations, which man is as spirit) is an openness to God, the very ground of being.

²³ I choose the term personism rather than personalism to avoid suggesting any connection with either American or European personalism.

•• See note 14, above.

Had Rahner avoided the term person (despite tradition), so might we. Spirit itself is an adequate term theoretically, including intellect and will and thus everything required to define spirit, finite spirit being incarnate intellect and will. To borrow some very apt expressions not found in GW or HW but, despite the critical intent of their author,²⁵ in my judgment fully in harmony with the mind of Rahner: *Erkenntnis ist das Beim-Selbst-Sein des Andern; Wollen und Liebe das Beim-Andern-Sein des Selbst*,²⁶ which can be rendered: for me to know is for the other to be present to me; for me to will and to love is to be present to the other.²⁷ Although this overworks the little preposition *bei*, which seems less correct than *fur* would be in the second clause (know-as being-with-the-other; love as being-for-the-other), the formula is useful to point out something very important.

To point this out I again refer to Kern. In the discussion following the above-cited formula, Kern is disputing the characterization of spirit as *Bei-sich-Sein* (self-presence, presence-to-self) and matter as *Beim-Andern-Sein* (presence-to-other), which he attributes to a Thomism influenced by Hegel. He correctly says that matter as the opposite of *Bei-sich-Sein* (self-presence) is really self-absence (*Nicht-bei-sich-Sein*), in the sense of Hegel's basic definition of matter as *Ausser-sich-Sein*. He then concludes that matter is incorrectly called presence-to-other, his intention being to require something more positive or active, rather than the mere negativity

²⁵ See Walter Kern, S. J., "Einheit-in-Mannigfaltigkeit: Fragmentarische Überlegungen zur Metaphysik des Geistes," in J. B. Metz *et al.*, eds., *Gott in Welt (Festgabe for Karl Rahner)* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1964, 2 vols.) I 207-230. That Kern intends to use these formulae to correct Rahner is clear from his reference to GW (and to Coreth's *Metaphysik*) in the next sentence (after the one cited), which says: Dem steht entgegen, dass sich innerhalb des modernen, an der Transzendentalphilosophie orientierten Thomismus die Charakteristik des Geistes-im Anschluss an Hegel-als Bei-sich-Sein, die der Materialität als Beim-Andern-Sein einzubürgern scheint (p. 231).

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

²⁷ Or, as I put it (approximately) in "Rahner and Personization," knowledge is the enactment (or actualization) of the other in myself, love the enactment of myself in the other (pp. 47 and 51); actually in both cases we would have to speak of a self-enactment, though in knowing my self-enactment is my co-enactment of being *from* the other while in loving my self-enactment is my own enactment, my active self-appropriation, as one willing being *for* another; in knowing, the act of another takes place in me; in love my act takes place in another. In the mutual self-revelation of persons, these acts of knowing and loving are intertwined; that is, when I know you as a person (as free) I enact as mine only that "about" you freely revealed by you; thus my knowing you depends on your loving me, on an act of yours taking place in me. In Rahner's immediate context in HW, man's possibility of meeting or knowing (hearing) God depends on God's freely loving man enough to reveal himself.

of *not* being self-present, to explain a being's knowledge of an other. But what if we say that in fact *only* matter "automatically," "by nature," without further ado *is ausser sich*, and that for a spirit to go outside himself is to *will* to do so.²⁸ In other words, we need not see Rahner and Kern in dispute here; rather Kern's point throws light on why Rahner sees revelation as possible, namely, that God as pure spirit is not "automatically" outside himself, as is a material thing, but must *will* this *Ausser-sich-Sein* in order for him to be a *Beim-Andern-*(man)-*Sein*. But this would mean that all meeting of spirits as such is impossible (since all going-out would be a materialization), which thus seems itself an impossible position. Is there a way a spirit can will to reveal himself to another spirit without his *Beim-Andern-Sein* (his presence to another and thus his being known by that other) being an *Ausser-sich-Sein* (a materialization or incarnation)? That question recalls, of course, traditional speculation about God's knowledge of himself and of his creatures, which is not the problem that interangelic knowledge is. Unless we simply have recourse to God's infusing all angelic knowledge (which, although it is the traditional answer, seems to require us, uncomfortably, I feel, to think the angels less free than ourselves), there seems no way for one angel, in himself luminous and thus, apparently, perfectly available to any other angel's desire to know him, to prevent that other's knowing him or to make that other's knowledge depend on and wait for the angel's free act of self-disclosure. But this begins to sound suspiciously like a pseudo question (How do angels "talk" to one another-and not become men?!). Obviously the conclusion, shared by Kant and Rahner, that all receptive cognition is sensible and thus material, does not apply to angels. But our pseudo question is not so absurd when it becomes: How does God talk to man, and not become man?

These concluding reflections, prompted by Kern's reflections on GW, serve to emphasize the significance of HW and the difference between the two works. In HW we move beyond the realm of spirit as pure thought (and beyond endless noetic theorizing) into that of spirit as freedom, love, incarnation, and history-thus, once again, the centrality of person in Rahner's metaphysics, in his philosophy of religion, and consequently in his theology.

II

In the list of corrections and emendations which follows I do not claim exhaustive coverage but hope that nothing important went unnoticed.²⁹ In

•• This reflection meets partly the question in note 18, above.

•• Because the same main terms treated in MS recur here, there is no need for the equivalent of MS's section A ("some notes on meanings and translations of important terms"); too much of such a section would be repetition. On the other hand, while GWE was a good translation, and thus required few corrections

general, once a frequent term has been noted, its recurrence will be left to the recognition of the reader.

HWE 16, note 15: Unverfügbarkeit³⁰ is not uncontrollability but indisposability (indisponibilit e in French³¹), that is, man's inability completely to dispose of himself in one act, thus his need to enact (vollziehen) himself, again and again (*time* and again, as the expression goes), each time being a partial self-enactment (Selbstvollzug), in space and time. **It** is just another term for concupiscence,³² for man's limited freedom (and freedom *is* self-disposability, Selbstverf ugbarkeit), and thus for man's finitude.

HWE 34: Sein and Seiende³³ occur so often that to cite a page number is only to choose an occasion to say once what would otherwise have to be repeated too often. The translator of the main text likes 'being' for Sein and 'that which is' or, more often, 'the thing which is,' for Seiende. However, 'being' remains the best translation for both, with a being or the plural beings used, along with the context, to distinguish between Sein and Seiende. To use 'that which is' leads to confusion like: What is the being of that which is itself?³⁴ To use 'the *thing* which is' misleads one to exclude persons.

HWE 36: For the reason given in the last sentence above, ein An-sich³⁰ should not be 'a thing in itself,' but simply 'an in-itself,' as one would expect Hegel and Sartre (en soi), to mention the most obvious, to have made familiar coinage.

HWE 36: The phrase zwischen Sein und Seienden³⁶ is rendered: between being and existing, and dem Sein eines Seienden is rendered: the being of a thing which exists. I suggest: between being and beings, and: the being of a being. Existing, existence, and existent, since existentialism, have no place rendering Sein. Thus: being and what actually exists⁸⁷ poorly translates Sein und Seiendes.³⁵ And: the existence-question³⁹ is

to be listed (MS, section B), HWE is an inferior translation, thus necessitating a comparatively much longer list of corrections.

⁸⁰ HW2 80, n. 15.

¹¹ Unavailability, in the sense of not being at one's disposal, of not having disposition over.

•• See Karl Rahner, S. J., "Zum theologischen Begriff der Konkupiszenz," pp. 877-414 in his *Schriften zur Theologie*, Band I (Einsiedeln: Benziger Verlag, 1954). In English translation by Cornelius Ernst, O. P., as *Theological Investigations I* (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1961), pp. 847-882, "The Theological Concept of Concupiscence."

•• HW2 51.

•• HWE 84: the text is: das Sein des Selbst sei.

⁸⁵ HW2 52.

•• HW2 58.

⁸⁷ HWE 37.

•• HW2 54.

•• HWE 87, n. 8; also HWE 61, n. 5.

incorrect for Seinsfrage,⁴⁰ the question about being (frequently also found as die Frage nach dem Sein).

HWE 38, n. 4: Erkennbarkeit⁴¹ is not realizability, of course, but knowability. The strange thing is that this term *is* translated as knowability in the main text,⁴² which inevitably leads one to wonder whether the same person did the notes. And there are more such instances of disagreement.

HWE 42: Aktuell⁴³ is not, here in a philosophical context, currently (despite its being a word taken over from the French *actuel*, where it often does mean currently). Again it seems strange that so obvious a translation be missed; I say obvious because the context is Rahner offering a translation of the Latin *in actu*.⁴⁴

HWE 47, n. 1: Sein und Seiendem⁴⁵ is here rendered, as 'being and beingness,' on its first occurrence, then, as 'being and existent,' on its second, that is, the very next sentence.

HWE 48, n. 1: God is not the being whose ontological difference is complete, as the translation would have it, but is the one being in whom that distinction is overcome; thus fulfilled or completed are better translations than complete, which suggests that in God the distinction is deepest, which is, of course the very opposite of the point, which is that in God, because of his perfection, there is no such distinction. HWE 50, n. 7 has: perfected.⁴⁶

HWR 53: Die Transzendenz auf Sein überhaupt⁴⁷ is not: transcendentality with regard to being in general, but: transcendence toward being as such.⁴⁸

HWE 56: Der Mensch ist jenes (und zwar das erste) Seiende, das sich als eine *reditio completa*, Read: Man is that being {and indeed the first one) who can enact himself as a *reditio completa*.

⁴⁰ HW2 54, n. 3; also HW2 80, n. 5.

" HW2 55, n. 4.

•• HWE 38, 39, 40.

•• HW2 58-59.

•• The German text is: Dieser ansatzpunkt muss vielmehr daren gesucht werden, dass Sein von sich aus Erkennen und Erkenntheit ist, das Sein Bei-sich-sein ist. Intellectus in actu perfectio est intellectus in actu. Das aber heisst deutsch: Die vollendete *seinsmassige* Wirklichkeit [actuality] des Intellekts ist das aktuell Erkante. The English translation has: The initial starting point must rather be sought in the fact that being intrinsically is knowing and being known, that being is being-present-to-itself. Intellectus [etc.] In English: The perfect ontological reality of the intellect is the currently known thing.

⁴⁵ HW2 65-66, n. 1.

•• HW2 69, n. 7.

•• HW2 71.

•• Sometimes Rahner writes *sein im Ganzen*, sometimes *absolutes Sein*, sometimes *Sein als Horizont*, sometimes *sein tiberhaupt*, sometimes *sein schlechthin*, and a few others; the meaning remains the same.

•• HW2 75.

SPIRIT, FREEDOM, HISTORY

HWE 57: Sinnlichkeit ⁵⁰ has entered the tradition as sensibility, and a translation as 'sense perception' is misleading. Not an act is meant but a power, capacity, faculty, or, most simply, a principle of the dual nature of human cognition. Whenever in HWE one meets 'sense perception' or 'through the senses,' and both occur often, Sinnlichkeit is usually being translated, although sinnliche Erkenntnis sometimes also has the same fate. HWE 57: Erkenntnismetaphysik ⁵¹ for Rahner never is simply epistemology, but, as the word says, metaphysics of knowledge.⁵²

HWE 57: Stichwort ⁵³ is keyword, here, not catchword.

HWE 57: Washeit ⁵⁴ is whatness, or quiddity, not thisness, which is exactly the opposite and thus seriously misleading and thoroughly confusing to say the least. One again wonders how this mistake could have been made when the German text just a bit later ⁵⁵ says: Die Washeit (die forma oder quidditas in scholastischer Terminologie).⁵⁶

HWE 58: Instead of: Abstraction is thus the recognition of the non-restriction of the "thisness" that is given in the particular in this sense. It is also grasped as a possible determination of other particulars, Read: To abstract is thus to know that a whatness given in a particular is not restricted to it, in the sense that the whatness is grasped as a possible determination of other particulars.⁵⁷

HWE 59, n. 2: Vorgriff ⁵⁸ is badly translated as pre-concept. The dictionary definition for this important term (which is not a neologism) is anticipation. This is also the literal definition, in English as well as German, if we transliterate vor as ante and greifen as capere; thus vorwegnehmen is close in meaning. Spanish and French translations have used anticipation.⁵⁹ Some previous English translations have been anticipa-

⁶⁰ HW2 76 and frequently hereafter.

⁶¹ HW2 76 and occasionally hereafter.

•• See GWE 19. The term occurs frequently and is consistently mistranslated as epistemology.

""HW2 76.

⁶ HW2 76 and frequently hereafter.

¹⁵ HW2 76; HWE 58 (five times on this page).

⁶⁶ The English, incredibly, translates this: The "thisness" (the *foiwu*, or *quidditas* in scholastic terminology).

""HW2 76.

•• HW2 77, n. 2.

⁵⁹ See Karl Rahner, S.I., *Espiritu en el mundo*. *Metafisica del conocimil: mto finito segun Santo Tomas de Aquino* (Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1963, translated by Alfonso Alvarez Bolado, S.I.)-anticipaci6n; and Karl Rahner, S.J. *L'esprit dans le monde*. *La metaphysique de la connaissance finie chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Maison Marne, 1968, translated by Robert Givord and Henri Rochais)-anticipation.

tion,⁶⁰ transcending anticipation; \mathfrak{G} prehension, ⁶² pre-apprehension, ⁶³ and illuminating anticipation. ⁶⁴ Having discussed this term before,⁶⁵ I shall be brief. The term is not *Vorbegriff*; pre-concept and pre-apprehension are misleading because they say too much, while the others say too little. There is no concept before the concept, no apprehension before the apprehension; nor does anticipation work as a translation because by it we understand that one can mentally or in thought be "somewhere" before he is there "actually" or physically. For example, when you anticipate what I am going to say or do, you have already "arrived," in thought, at the place where I have yet to go. But when the entire context is conceptual, in the wide sense, then there is no readily understandable meaning for this term (anticipation) because while the concept of an action can precede the action, the concept of that concept cannot precede that very concept itself. Thus we see that *Vorgriff* means not a concept before an act, nor a concept before a concept, but an *act before a concept*. This act (of the intellectus agens) precedes and makes possible conceptual knowledge. It is more than poetry to say, therefore, that man's reach exceeds (excessus) his grasp: man *reaches for* (*vorgreifen*, *Vorgriff*) *being* (Sein) but *grasps* only (*begreifen*, *Begriff*) *a being* (Seiende), and vice versa. Thus other terms used in German are *hinausgreifen* and *sichausstrecken* (HWQ 86), a reach or stretch beyond or over the finite (Seiende) toward the infinite (Sein) transcendence. Our translator is not unaware of this if we can judge by his translation of *Gott ist das Woraufhin des Vorgriffs des Menschlichen Geistes*, as: God is the objective of reaching out of the human spirit.⁶⁶ HWE 58: For some reason, in translating Sein als Horizont, ⁶¹ horizon was dropped.

HWE 58: Grund ⁶⁸ is better translated as ground or basis or foundation or principle than as cause (which is *Ursache*).

HWE 58: For: close to, Read: present to.⁶⁹

⁶⁰ Emerich Coreth, S. J., *Metaphysics* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968, translated and edited by Joseph Donceel, S.J.), p. 56.

⁶¹ Joseph Donceel, S. J., *Natural Theology* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), pp. 86-88.

⁶² Otto Muck, S. J., *The Transcendental Method* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968, translated by William D. Seidensticker), p. 199.

⁶³ GWE 142.

⁶⁴ Helen James John, S.N.D., *The Thomist Spectrum* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1966), p. 175.

⁶⁵ MS 155-156.

•• HW!1 III; HWE 89.

⁶⁷ HW!1 78.

⁶⁸ HW!1 78, and very often,

•• HW2 78: bei.

HWE 58, n. Grenzerfahrung ⁷⁰ is experience of limit or limitation, which is not conveyed by 'liminal experience.'

HWE 61: Metz replaced a whole paragraph here {the first new paragraph of the page). The original is much more interesting and clear, and I give here a translation of it.⁷¹

In the history of western philosophy there are three types of solution to this question. First that of the *philosophia perennis*, which means from Plato to Hegel; next Kant's; and then Heidegger's. For the first the answer is: The reach of the *Vorgriff* is toward being pure and simple and, as it includes no intrinsic limit whatever, thus includes as well the absolute being of God. For Kant: the horizon within which objects are given conceptually to man is the horizon of sense intuition which in principle does not reach beyond space and time. For Heidegger: the transcendence, which grounds the existence of man, is a reaching toward nothing.

HWE For: inner, here and elsewhere, Read: intrinsic.

HWE Instead of the meaningless: Now because the pre-concept relative to "more" is the particular object, read: But since the *Vorgriff* is a reaching out beyond the individual object toward something more.⁷²

HWE 63: *Vorgriff auf Sein* ⁷³ is not: the pre-concept of being, but: the reaching out toward being.

LWE 63: Here God is called a thing (*Seiende* ⁷⁴).

HWE 65: *das Vermögen des Vorgriffs auf das esse* ⁷⁵ is not: the faculty of the pre-concept of the *esse*, but, again: of reaching out toward *esse*. The same goes for later on (same page): 'the illuminated pre-concept of being in general,' which translation ignores the problem that *auf* means toward, not of.⁷⁶

HWE 66: In the passage: 'man "is" absolute receptivity for being pure and simple, in perpetual, unfulfilled ontological differential,' the last two words are the way the translator of the main text translates what the translator of the notes calls (correctly) the ontological difference {*Differenz* ⁷⁷}. But the translation 'unfulfilled,' is more misleading. The mean-

⁷⁰ 77, n. and often after (first mention is HWE 11, n. 11).

n Since I do not now have access to HWI, this translation is from HWF 116.

81.

88.

88.

84.

⁷¹ 84.

⁷⁶ 88: *der Vorgriff zielt auf-is* a text which shows this to be so: the *Vorgriff* aims at, drives toward (HWE 64: the pre-concept is directed towards-is a translation which puts it too passively).

⁷⁷ 86. See also HWE 75 and n. 4, where differential is in the main text and difference is in the note 96 and n. 4).

ing, once again, is that man who as spirit is openness to being without qualification, opens his "spirit-hand," as it were, and reaches out, stretches toward being without being able to close his hand around it: there is a gap he cannot close, the gap between *a* being and being, between man's being *a* being and his possessing (having: *Seinshabe*) being. That a being knows by *Vor-griff* (that is, by a movement of reaching-toward-without-grasping, without *Be-griff*) is a sign of that being's *Seinshabe*, its analogical relation to being, namely, that it is *a* being, and not being without qualifications; but this can also be expressed by saying that in man this difference (of *having* being rather than *being* being-the analogy of *Seinshabe*-called ontological for the obvious reason that it is about the difference between *a* being and being) is not overcome and remains un-overcome.⁷⁸

HWE 67: 'transcendence of knowledge correlative to being in general', is another mistranslation of *auf das Sein schlechthin*.⁷⁹ Knowledge cannot and does not, of course, transcend being in general (or as such) but transcends *a* being, indeed all beings, *toward* being as such.

HWE 67: For: 'He must necessarily actualize this already perfected transcendence', (and note that the three sentences ending with the one just quoted translate one German sentence, the whole being in the conditional structure of an if-then), Read: 'and [if the foregoing is to be accomplished] man will have to make that transcendence of which he already is the constant enactment .. .' ⁸⁰

HWE 68, n. 13: For: the transcendence in-itself-permanent and the transcending in-itself-permanence of the human spirit, Read: the human spirit as self-subsisting transcendence and transcending self-subsistence.⁸¹

HWE 78 and n. 6: *Mystik* ⁸² again shows two translators at work: we find mysticism (correct) in the main text and mystique in the note.

HWE 79: For: *Begard*, read : *Beghard*.⁸³

HWE 81: *Raum* ⁸⁴ is space, not function.

HWE 85: *Geworfenheit* ⁸⁵ has become thrownness, thanks to the translations made of Heidegger, who is the acknowledged ⁸⁶ source of this term for Rahner; it is preferable to the less neutral: abandonment.

⁷⁸ 86: in *bleibender* unvollendeter ontologischer Differenz.

•• 87; twice on this page.

⁸⁰ 87: und er diese immer schon vollzogene Transzendenz auch notwendig thematisiert. This clause was added by Metz.

⁸¹ 88, n. 13.

•• 99 and n. 6.

⁸⁸ 101.

•• 103.

108.

•• In HW1 106, deleted by Metz.

HWE 86: For lines 18-21 read instead: Insofar as he must *ask*, he affirms his own contingent ⁸⁷ finitude; insofar as he *must* ask, he affirms this contingency ⁸⁸ necessarily.⁸⁹ HWE badly misuses this sentence by inserting an extra 'necessarily' in the first clause (sentence, in HWE) where there is none in the German, and then, by omitting the italics in the second, the parallel is destroyed; finally, he runs, in English, one sentence into another distinct sentence, thus blurring the matter quite thoroughly.

HWE 86: *Setzung, setzen, gesetzt* ⁹⁰ cause problems; they are usually translated in HWE as delimitation and delimited ⁹¹ which leave much to be desired because too negative. Hofbeck uses position and pose.⁹² HWE in one place, for the reflexive form, *sich setzen*,⁹³ uses: posit (s) himself. Rahner sometimes seems to be using this verb instead of create. The meaning, plainly, is to place in being, a more awkward phrase, as usual, than one would hope to find for use in repeated instances. For example: In der Absolutsetzung eines Zufälligen aber erfährt sich *Wille*,⁹⁴ which is in HWE as: In the absolute delimitation of an accidental as absolute we experience *will*; ⁹⁵ besides the fact that that second 'absolute' is not in the German text, a certain discomfort is experienced with the translation. The point is, of course, that for the non-necessary to be at all requires explanation and implies will. The source of anything but being (and thus of every being and of all beings) is will, the will of being (that is, God as the one necessary being who freely posits, places beings 'into being' -creation). Man also experiences will when he recognizes that the non-necessary (which is not an accident in the Aristotelian sense of substance and accident, another point on which HWE is misleading here: the *Zufällig* is the contingent, not the accidental) must be affirmed necessarily: what is and must be said to be, might not be and would not be but for will, and thus for freedom; thus all placing of the non-necessary into being must be *willentlich*: willed (voluntary).

HWE 89: For: answer to a free world, Read: answer to a free word.⁹⁶

HWE 89: For: a free autonomous powerful *person*, Read: a free *person*, at his own disposal.⁹⁷

⁸⁷ "Thrown," in HWI 107, changed by Metz.

⁸⁸ - "Thrownness," in HWI 107, changed by Metz.

⁸⁹ 108: Insofern er *fragen* muss, bejaht er seine kontingente Endlichkeit; insofern er fragen *muss*, bejaht er diese Kontingenz notwendig.

⁹⁰ 108-109.

⁹¹ HWE 86-87.

•• HWF 155-156.

108.

108.

""HWE 86.

•• 111: auf ein freies Wort.

⁹⁷ einer freien, ihrer selbst mächtigen *Person*, that is, 'one who having

HWE 90: Perhaps it should be mentioned that the phrase: material knowledge, refers to the *content* rather than to form or structure. ⁹⁸

HWE 90 n 2.: For: *moduus*, read: *modus*.

HWE 95: willentlich ⁹⁹ (voluntary), in one of its occurrences on this page (line 15) is translated: deliberate, and in the next (line 17): reflexive; the first is at least admissable here; the second is not.

HWE 98: A case of one mistake confirming another: Oder steht sie ihm selbst in ihrer "Zufälligkeit," ihrer "Grundlosigkeit" unbegriffen gegenüber? ¹⁰⁰ HWE renders Zufälligkeit (contingency) as non-contingency, and then makes Grundlosigkeit mean causelessness, which misleadingly suggests the *causa sui*, God as uncaused, when the very opposite is meant, namely, that something contingent is without ground (groundlessness), without basis or foundation, without self-explanation. Thus the sentence, meant to pinpoint the problem of how a free act can be luminous, since a free act is supposed to be non-necessary (that is, contingent: if it were necessary it couldn't be free) ends the paragraph in confusion instead.

HWE 98-99: For the last 5 lines of 98 and the first of 99, Read: The free act, however, in its original nature, is not so much one's bringing into existence something other than or extraneous to himself, not the production of a product existing in a kind of otherness distinct from the producer, but rather the fulfillment of one's *own* essence, a taking possession of oneself, a making actual one's creative power over oneself.... the act is free, undeducible placing-in-being.¹⁰¹

HWE 99, lines 15-17: mitvollziehen ¹⁰² in this instance might better be 'co-enact' or 'enact with', that is, to participate in the act by placing one's own act as a ratification or seconding of the act of the other.

HWE 99, line 86: For: objection, Read: object-1⁹³

HWE 100, lines 8-9: Denn Liebe ist der gelichtete Wille zur Person in ihrer unableitbaren Einmaligkeit. ¹⁰⁴ Instead of: For love is the self-luminous act of movement towards a person in his underived uniqueness, Read: For love is luminous will to person in his undeducible uniqueness.- (The very ground, we must remember, of the being and the becoming of the non-necessary is will. To love someone is to will the being *and the becoming* of that person.)

power over himself (is master of himself)', a phrase which essentially repeats *free* (self-disposable) .

•• HW2 113. See also HWE 74, n. 3 (HW2 94, n. 3) where 'materially explain,' has the same meaning. Also HWE 91 (HW2 114).

•• HW2 118.

¹⁰⁰ HW2 121.

¹⁰¹ HW2 122.

¹⁰ HW2 122-128.

¹⁰¹ HW2 US (Woraufhin).

¹⁰HW2 128.

SPIRIT, FREEDOM, HISTORY

HWE 101: willentlich ¹⁰⁵ modifies Verhalten three times on this page; Read: voluntary, For: deliberate (thus placing will where it belongs).

HWE 101, line 23: Grund ¹⁰⁶ is, again, ground, basis, foundation, not cause.

HW 101, line 32: Wille ¹⁰⁷ is will, not desire.

HWE 102, line 2: die Erkenntnis selbst lebt ¹⁰⁸ is: knowledge itself lives, not: knowledge loves itself.

HWE 102, lines Q9-30: For: This deliberate self-delimitation, which occurs through transcendence over being in general, Read: This voluntary self-affirmation, which happens in one's transcending toward being as such.¹⁰⁹

HWE 103: werthhaft ¹¹⁰ is: valuable, not: desirable.

HWE 103, line 24: Instead of: it is presented in knowledge as will, Read: insofar as it is always also will.¹¹¹

HWE 103, line 30: der wertende Geist ¹¹² is: spirit as *will*, not: the knowing spirit. A few lines above these words, spirit as knowing was mentioned and referred to being as the known; here Rahner was obviously drawing a parallel, with spirit as will referring to being as good, a parallel destroyed by the translation.

HWE 105: For: synteresis, read: synderesis.

HWE 106, line 18: gesetzt ¹¹³ is here translated as implanted.

HWE 106, lines 21-22: Instead of: Metaphysical knowledge certainly never grasps its object before it grasps itself, read: Metaphysical knowledge indeed never has present before itself its object in its own self.¹¹⁴

HWE 107, lines 11-12: For: to contradict the deliberate understanding of being through the method of free love, Read: to place in opposition one's voluntary understanding of being and his way of loving freely.¹¹⁵

HWE 107, line 3: For: a true philosopher must lead the religious life of the cloister, Read: Ultimately only he can be a philosopher who in spirit dwells in temple and cloister.^{ns}

¹⁰⁵ and frequently elsewhere.

¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁹ Diese willentliche Selbstsetzung, die in der Transzendenz auf Sein überhaupt geschieht. See HWE liS where deliberate translates intentionale.

¹¹¹

¹¹⁸ 131; see discussion of HWE 86 above.

¹¹⁴ 131: Die metaphysische Erkenntnis hat ja nie ihren Gegenstand in seinem eigenen Selbst vor sich.

¹¹⁵

¹¹⁶ Philosoph kann schliesslich nur sein, wer geistig in Tempeln und Kloestern wohnt.

HWE 108: For: our metaphysical-religious-philosophical anthropology, Read: our metaphysical anthropology applied to philosophy of religion.¹¹⁷

HWE 111: in sein "Inneres" is here translated as: in the depths [which should be in quotation marks] of his own being.¹¹⁸

HWE 112: For: thou-to-thou, read: you-to-you.¹¹⁹

HWE 112, n. 2: For: self-revelation [in the first clause], Read: self-communication.¹²⁰ In this same sentence (in the third clause), Offenbarung is correctly translated as revelation.

HWE 113, n. 2 and n. 3: categorial ¹²¹ is sometimes rendered as 'categorical', sometimes as 'categorial ', the latter being correct.¹²² There is no textual or contextual basis for two translations.

HWE 113, n. 3: For: chiffres (untranslated), English is: ciphers.¹²³

HWE 114, n. 3: For: substantial, the German has inhaltliche ¹²⁴ which means, in this context (note the contrast with "formally" in the prior clause), 'non-formal', that is, 'material', or 'having content'.

HWE 114, n. 3: For: regaining, Read: gaining.¹²⁵

HWE 114, n. 3: For: apriority, Read: "aposteriority." ¹²⁶

HWE 116: Seven lines (four sentences) of the German were unaccountably dropped from the end of the paragraph (top of the page) ending: he is finite spirit (line 11).¹²⁷ Here is a translation:

We have to ask: what is the specific way in which man is spirit? By way of clarifying the direction of the following reflections we can in anticipation give the answer to this question: **It** is as an *historical* being [as a being in *history*] that man is spirit. The place of his transcendence is always an historical place [a place in history]. Thus the place of a possible revelation is always and necessarily the history of man.

¹¹⁷ HW2 133: unserer metaphysisch-religionsphilosophischen Anthropologie.

¹¹⁸ HW2 137.

¹¹⁹ HW2 138: Du-zu-Du.

¹²⁰ HW2 139, n. 2: Selbstmitteilung. On p. 155 the other translator this as self-impacting (HW2 142).

¹²¹ HW2 139-141.

¹²² Once also appears: categorical, an obvious misprint.

¹²³ Metz's (for this is one of his additions) allusion is possibly to Jaspers's doctrine on ciphers.

¹²⁴ HW2 140, n. 3.

¹²⁵ HW2 140, n. 3.

¹²⁶ HW2 140, n. 3: "Aposterioritat"; the English also omitted the quotation marks.

¹²⁷ HW2 123: Es muss nach der bestimmten Weise gefragt werden, in der der Mensch Geist ist. Um das Ziel der folgenden Überlegungen schon vorwegzunehmen, damit die Richtung dieser Überlegungen jetzt schon klarer sei, ist zu sagen: Der Mensch ist als *geschichtliches* Wesen Geist. Der Ort seiner Transzendenz ist immer auch ein geschichtlicher Ort. Und damit ist der Ort einer möglichen Offenbarung immer und notwendig die Geschichte des Menschen.

HWE 116: Another bad translation obscures the meaning. Instead of: An initial general and metaphysical understanding of history shows it always to exist where free delimitation exists, Read: For in a primary, universal, and metaphysical understanding, wherever there is free action ¹²⁸ there is history. ¹²⁹

HWE 117: For: 'how does the spiritual nature of man, in his historical context, arise out of his fundamentally constituted transcendental make-up? Note that man is not an historical character *de facto* but he becomes one by his openness to the transcendent, that is, to God.' Read: how is it so from the basic constitution of man's transcendence that man as *spirit* stands in history, that man's historicity is not something that merely happens to him *de facto* but something he is primarily *wi* spirit, as one whose being is open to God. ¹³⁰

HWE 118: For: The cat is black, the German is: Dieses ist ein Derartiges. ¹³¹

HWE 118, line For: deliberate, Read: intentional. After the consistent mistranslation of *willentlich* as deliberate, this mistranslation is especially misleading. One would have to ignore or be ignorant of the whole tradition, so clear in Aquinas, but also in Brentano and Husserl, which uses the concept of intentionality, to miss the point here. In fact this whole passage (lines is so garbled that a re-translation is here offered; thus, instead of: The previous conclusion is this: being is being-present-to-itself. This we concluded earlier from the analysis of the general problem of being. This means, as we said earlier, that cognition in its first and original concept is not some kind of grasping of an object or the deliberate putting oneself into a relationship with something else. But it is the self-presence of an existent thing being reflected in one's own being and the attribution of "having being" that is thus recognized by this act. Read: Recall an earlier *conclusion*: to be is to be self-present, a conclusion we previously arrived at through analyzing the general question of being. But this means, as we also said before, that to know, in its primary and original concept, is not somehow to grasp an outside object [literally; Gegen-stand], not to place oneself in an intentional relation with some being other than oneself, but rather, knowing is a being's being-with-self, is being's

¹²⁸ Literally: free placing-[in-being].

¹²⁹ HW2 143: Denn in einem ersten, allgemeinen und metaphysischen Verstandnis ist Geschichte überall dort, wo freie Setzung ist.

¹⁸⁰ HW2 145: Es ist also die Frage, wie sich aus der Transzendenz des Menschen in ihrer Grundverfassung selbst ergibt, dass er als *Geist* in der Geschichte steht, dass die Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen nicht etwas ist, was ihm faktisch eben-tlich zukommt, sondern etwas, was er gerade *als* Geist, also auf Gott hin ofTener zu sein hat.

¹⁸¹ HWg. 146.

self-reflectedness, which belongs to a being to the extent that it has being, to the degree that it is.¹³²

HWE 119: For: of the single nature of a man, Read: of the one nature of man.¹³³

HWE 119, line Before the sentence beginning: **It** is, Add: Rather.

HWE 119, line For: being-present to himself, Read: return-to-self.¹³⁴

HWE 119, line 88: Delete: 'the', Before: 'cognition'.

HWE 120, line and line For: 'profound' (line and 'interior' (line , Read: 'intrinsic'.¹³⁵

HWE For: an original receptive knowledge [which, changing original to originally, would be literally correct], Read something like: a knowledge with its origin in receptivity, Or: a knowledge that originates in receptivity.-' Original' (incorrect here as an adjective in the first place¹³⁶) and 'receptive' go uncomfortably together, each elbowing out the other.

HWE lines For: the being of any existent being must be being which has its origin outside itself, Read: the being of this being must be the being of an "other."¹³⁷

HWE n. 1: For: subject-like, Read: subjective.¹³⁸

HWE line 18: For: concerned as, Read: conceived as.

HWE line For: "having being," Read: being.¹³⁹

HWE n. For: final cognition, Read: finite cognition.¹⁴⁰

HWE n. (twice): For: accepting cognition, Read: receptive cognition.¹⁴¹

HWE For: knowledge through the senses, Read: sense knowledge, and For: sense perception, Read: sensibility.¹⁴²

¹³² HWZ 146: Es ist an ein friiheres *Ergebnis* zu erinnern: Sein ist Bei-sich-sein, so haben wir friiher aus der Analyse der allgemeinen Seinfrage festgestellt. Das heiss aber, wie auch schon gesagt wurde, dass Erkennen in seinem ersten und urspruenglichen Begriff nicht irgendwie das Erfassen eines Gegenstandes, das intentionale Sichbeziehen auf ein fremdes andere ist, sondern das Sein eines Seienden in dem Mass zukommt, in dem es Sein hat, seinsmiichtig ist.

¹³³ HWZ 147.

¹³⁴ HW2 147-148: Rii ckkunft.

¹³⁵ HW2 148: innere in both cases.

¹³⁶ HW2 150: urspruenglich hinnehmenden Erkenntnis.

¹³⁷ HW2 151: das Sein dieses Seienden Sein eines "anderen" sein muss.

¹³⁸ HW2 152-153, n. 1: subjekthaft.

¹³⁹ HW2 154: Sein (not "Seinshabe").

¹⁴⁰ HW2 153, n. 2: endliche Erkenntnis.

¹⁴¹ HW2 153, n. 2: hinnehmend. This is the sort of exasperating inconsistency that makes one wonder.

¹⁴² HWZ 156: sinnliche and Sinnlichkeit. Perception is an act, involving man as a whole, as spirit and matter; thus perception is wrong to use here. Rahner is trying to characterize the material component in the one composite human knowing, which the tradition calls sensibility, the power of receptive cognition.

HWE For: describing ... a description, Try: offering ... a description.

HWE 127: For: If being-present-to-itself and knowing are the being-present-to-itself of the existent thing as a mode of its "having-being," then the thing initially known is always the specific "being" of the knower himself. Thus the structure of the thing known, and vice versa, Read: For if to be is to be self-present and if for a being to know is to be self-present (as its way of participating being)¹⁴³ then the first known is always the being of the knower himself, such that the structure of the knower as a being is the structure of the known and vice versa.¹⁴⁴

HWE and n. 4: Here the note begins: We here say "existingness," and the note refers to a text which reads: what is this existent thing?; a careful proofreading alone should have caught this. The German is *Seiendheit* in both places.¹⁴⁵ The sentence and the note are both by Metz.

HWE Once again (lines Washeit¹⁴⁶ (whatness, quiddity) is translated as thisness and, incredibly, again placed in apposition with *quidditas*.

HWE For: profound (line 6), and inner (line 10), Read: intrinsic.¹⁴⁷

HWE 130: For: manifold actualization, Read: multiple individualization.¹⁴⁸

HWE 130: For: it is the cause of *space* and *time*, Read: **It** is the principle [or: ground] of *spatiality* and *temporality*.¹⁴⁹

HWE 130: For: "thisness," Read, again: whatness.¹⁵⁰

HWE 131: "existentness" is here (line 14) translating *Seiendheit*.¹⁵¹

HWE 131, line 17: here "quidditas" translates *Washeit*.¹⁵²

HWE line 10 and 11: For: an interior spatiality and an interior temporality, Read: intrinsic (both times).

HWE 132, line 17: this time the expression: "has-a-being," is translating *Seiendheit*.¹⁵³ The idea Metz is trying to get at requires using *Seinheit*,

¹⁴³ This phrase is added by Metz.

"" HW2 156-157: Denn wenn Sein Bei-sich-sein und Erkennen Bei-sich-sein des Seienden als Weise seiner "Seinshabe" ist, dann ist das Ersterkannte immer das eigene Sein des Erkennenden selbst, so dass die Struktur des Erkennenden als eines Seienden die Struktur des Erkannten ist und umgekehrt.

¹⁴⁵ HW2 157 and n. 4.

""HW2 158.

¹⁴⁷ HW2 159: inner.

"" HW2 161: vielfache Vereinzelung.

¹⁴⁹ HW2 161: Sie ist Grund der *Raumlichkeit* und *Zeitlichkeit*.

¹⁵⁰ HW2 161: *Washeit* (no quotation marks).

""HW2 162.

""HW2 168.

""HW2 168.

the quality of being *being*; Seiendheit then becomes the quality of being *a being*.

HWE 132, line 18: For: one of a race, Read: one of one race.¹⁵⁴ The reference to racial unity and monogenism in the note would be otherwise pointless.

HWE 133, lines 6-7: For: Man is real only as a part of humanity, Read: Man is actual [actually human] only with other humans.¹⁵⁵

HWE 133, n. 2: For: derivation, Read: deduction; For: accepting, Read: receptive; For: "*the* (personal) other," Read: "the *personal* other";¹⁵⁶ and For: mutual exchange and mutual dismissal, Read: mutual comings and goings.

HWE 134, line 1-3: For: value of position, Read: the masses.¹⁵⁷

HWE 134, line, 11: For: society, Read: community.¹⁵⁸

HWE 134, line 34: For: perception, Read: knowledge;¹⁵⁹ line 35: For: perception, Read: intuition;¹⁶⁰ For: through the senses, Read: sense (or sensible).¹⁶¹

HWE 135, line 5: For: sense perception, Read: sense knowledge.¹⁶²

HWE 135, line 22: For: **If** the materiality of the human existent thing

¹⁵⁴ HW2 163: einer eines Geschlechtes.

¹⁵⁵ HW2 164: Der Mensch ist nnr in emer Menschheit wirklich. Note that my translation is free yet accurate. Despite the earlier context of man as one race, which would suggest *humanity* as translating Menschheit, that term, as well as Mensch, in German contains in its meaning a contrast with things, with the not-human. HWF confirms this, and even puts it more strongly: L'homme n'est reel [en acte would have been better] que dans une communaute humaine (HWF 231). Metz's note attached to this also confirms a more "social" translation: see next note below.

¹⁵⁶ HW2 164, n. 2: "*der* (personale) andere "-here HWE gives us an example of "literal" translation without thought as to meaning. Metz is contrasting *das* andere (the *neuter* or *impersonal* other) with *der* andere (the *personal* other), which in German can be indicated by the article. But in English, of course, this is not so, thus requiring both that *personal* be italicized and that the parentheses (whose sole purpose is to make the article change even more explicit for the German reader) be dropped as superfluous. Note that this correction also removes another misleading suggestion, namely, that there were only *one* other (God?) involved, something commonly indicated by italicising *the*.

¹⁵⁷ HW2 165: Stellenwert. We have here a contrasting of Einmaligkeit und Eigenwert with Fallhaftigkeit und Stellenwert. The contrast is between my value as an individual and what would be valued because from or of many, done by a number of people, etc.

¹⁵⁸ HW2 165: Gemeinschaft (not Gesellschaft) .

¹⁵⁹ HW2 166: Erkenntnis.

¹⁶⁰ HW2 166: Anschauung.

¹⁶¹ HW2 166: siunliche.

¹⁶² HW2 166: Erkenntnis.

is conceived as something that knows itself in the receptive knowledge of things, Read: If the materiality of the human being is conceived as that of a being who knows himself in a receptive knowledge of things. 168

HWE 136, line 1: Place colon after examined.

HWE 136, line 34: For: specification); it, Read: specification); and it.

HWE 137, lines 16-QQ: The term Indifferenzpunkt 164 is left out of HWE in the sentence here cited. The idea is that matter provides that point in itself indifferent to its actualization: Matter *in se* as potency to all act.

HWE 138, lines 8-9: For: an ontological reality gives way, Read: an ontological reality (*forma, actus*) gives itself away.165

HWE 138, line 10: Delete: particular.

HWE 138, n. 6: This whole note needs redoing. But, instead of that, note the following; For: givenness (line 1), Read: given-away-ness; line Q: Delete: strange; line 9: For: existence-completion, Read: actualization [or enactment] of his existence; lines 16-17: For: in our hands, Read: at our disposal.166

HWE 140, line 11: For: interiorly sensate, Read: intrinsically sensible.167

HWE 141, lines 1-7: For: Such a conception of human sense perception is completely in harmony with Thomistic epistemology, which conceives sense perception explicitly as a faculty which arises out of the spirit in its self-examination of its own intrinsic nature-to be openness to being in general. Read: Such a conception of human sensibility corresponds fully with the Thomistic metaphysics of cognition which explicitly conceives the sensibility as a faculty which emanates [or springs] from spirit in its own movement forward to its own proper end: 168 to be openness for being as such.169

HWE 141: This page 170 has two couplets: 1) Ausgang and Eingang

168 HW! 167: Ist so die Materialität des menschlichen Seienden als eines in Hiimahme des Wissens von den Dingen selbst Erkennenden begriffen. (Materiality does not know itself.) Rofbeck, HWF !/85, is incomplete here.

169 HW2 169. HWF !/87 mistranslates this twice as point d'interference.

165 HW! 170: eine Seinswirklichkeit (*forma, actus*) sich von sich selbst weggibt.

166 HW! 170-171, n. 6.

167 HW2 178.

168 Metz substituted essence for end at this point, no doubt having in mind that spirit as intellect emanates the sensibility in its becoming itself, in reaching its own essence; the substitution is not smooth in this instance, however.

169 HW2 174: Eine solche Auffassung der menschlichen Sinnlichkeit entspricht ganz der thomistischen Erkenntnistheorie, die ausdrücklich die Sinnlichkeit als ein Vermögen auffasst, das dem Geist entspringt in dessen eigenem Vorsprung auf sein ihm als solchem eigenes Wesen: Of/enheit für Sein überhaupt zu sein. Note again that sense perception is not a faculty but the act of a composite being.

170 HW2 174.

(and Eingehen) and Einkehr and Auskehr. Basically 1) means going out and going in, and means turning in toward and turning out away. The underlying notion is, of course, that of the *conversio ad phantasmata* (the turning to phantasms), the heart of *Geist in Welt*. HWE unhelpfully uses terms like penetration, approach, access, return, and out-going.

HWE lines Delete: or "thisness."

HWE n. For: the closer characteristics, Read: the precise nature of.¹⁷¹

HWE n. line 4: For: as being an inner moment, Read: as an intrinsic element.¹¹²

HWE 143, line For: horizon of perception, Read: horizon of reception.¹⁷³

HWE 143, line For: through a sensate and receptive cognition, Read: solely through sensible, receptive knowledge as such.¹⁷⁴

HWE 143, line 36: For: in its sheer sensile (*sic*) givenness, Read: in its mere sensible givenness.¹⁷⁵

HWE 144, line Seiendheit eines Seiende¹⁷⁶ is this time translated as: "act of existence " of an existent thing.

HWE 145, line 8: Delete: of an object.

HWE 146 (and before): The translator of the text has consistently used appearance for *Erscheinung*, which is fine, even handy when the time comes to use the verb appear (phenomenon, though also possible, is less handy for this reason). But then in n. 3, explicitly referring to the single word 'appearance',¹⁷⁷ the again obviously different translator of the notes writes "apparition" (!).¹⁷⁸

HWE 146, n. 3: Delete the first 'as.'

HWE 146, n. 15: For: clear the, Read: clear that the.

HWE 146, n. lines For: *ultimate*, Read: ultimate.

HWE 147, line 6: For: sensate, Read: sensible.

HWE 147, line 17 and line For: definitions, Read: determinations.

HWE 147, line For: the will, and the good, Read: will and good.¹⁷⁹

HWE 147, line For: *particular*, Read: *determined*.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷¹ HW2 175, n. 2: die genauere Eigenart personaler, etc.

¹⁷² HW2 176, n. 2: als inneren Moment.

¹⁷³ HW2 176: Horizont der Hinnahme. (Note that Kant's word perception, *Wahrnehmung*, does not occur in HW1 or HW2.)

¹⁷⁴ HW2 177: durch die sinnlich hinnehmende Erkenntnis als solche allein.

¹⁷⁵ MW2 177: in ihrer blossen sinnlichen Gebenheit.

¹⁷⁶ HW2 178.

¹⁷⁷ HW2 180: *Erscheinung*.

¹⁷⁸ HW2 180: "*Erscheinung*."

¹⁷⁹ HW2 182: Wille und Gut.

¹⁸⁰ HW2 182: *bestimmtes*.

HWE 149, n. 7: Here is a case of sheer carelessness again. The single sentence of this note ends: 'and phenomenon (see above, p. 177)'. But, of course, here on p. 149, there is no p. 177 above (the translator merely took over the page numbers of the German text; since this was done thirteen times, a list of correct references has been provided in my note 12), nor does the word phenomenon appear in any case.

HWE 150, line 4: For: world. (3) All, Read: world. Thus (3) all.¹⁸¹

HWE 151, lines 11-12: For: palpably, Read: intuitively.¹⁸²

HWE 151, line 33: For: emerge and grow, Read: emerge (*cpv€u0at*) and grow.^{18a}

HWE 152, line 1: For: inane, Read: superfluous.¹⁸⁴

HWE 154, lines 9-10: For: a supra-mundane existent thing cannot be, in itself, a receptive cognition, Read: an extramundane being cannot be in itself the recipient of [literally: cannot be given] a receptive cognition as such.¹⁸⁵

HWE 154, line 18-155, line 1: For: the whole of supra-mundane existence, Read: every extramundane being.

HWE 155, lines 17-21: A two line phrase from the German ¹⁸⁶ was left out; For through the human word, we are now, Read: through the human word, which is a synthesis of negated appearance and negating transcendence, we are now.

RWE 157, lines 6-8: We have here a doubly misleading apposition; For: This presupposes on the one hand the finitude of man, on the other his ¹⁸⁷ absolute transcendence or delimitation of man by God, Read: given on the one hand man's finitude and on the other his absolute transcendence, even already presupposing God's placing of man in being. . . . ¹⁸⁸

HWE 162, line 9: For: *in the word*, Read: "in the word."^{18a}

HWE 162, line 15: For: scarcely, Read: naturally.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸¹ HW2 185: also: 3. Alles.

¹⁸² HW2 186: anschaulich.

¹⁸³ HW2 186.

¹⁸⁴ HW2 187: iiberfliissig.

¹⁸⁵ HW2 189-190: ein ausserweltliches Seiendes in seinem Selbst einer hinnehmenden Erkenntnis als solcher nicht gegeben werden kann.

¹⁸⁶ HW2 191: in dessen Einheit von verneinter Erscheinung und verneinender Transzendenz.

¹⁸⁷ Whose? Substituting man's or God's, for his, is no clearer, given the last four words.

¹⁸⁸ HW2 194: bei der Endlichkeit des Menschen einerseits und seiner absoluten Transzendenz andererseits, auch die Setzung des Menschen durch Gott schon vorausgesetzt. Note that Metz changed Rahner's word creation to placing-in-being (thereby giving some notion of how he meant to use Setzung, which thus seems especially poorly translated as delimitation) .

¹⁸⁹ HW2 200: "im Wort."

¹⁹⁰ HW2 200: natuerlich.

HWE 167, lines For: .theology and anthropology, Read: theo-logy and anthro-po-logy.¹⁹¹

HWE 175, line 24: For: loses itself in, Read: is taken up into.¹⁹²

HWE 175, last line -176, line 1: For: Philosophy, rightly understood, is always a *praeparatio evangelii* and is intrinsically Christian, Read: Philosophy, rightly understood, is always adventist, is a *praeparatio evangelii*, and thus is of itself Christian.¹⁹³

HWE 176, line 33: For: *history*, Read: " history."

HWE 176, lines 33-34: For: supernatural, Read: " supernatural." ¹⁹⁴

HWE 177, lines, 19-23 and lines 33-36: HWE makes both of these sentences declarative, whereas they are both questions, which is no small matter given their content. Even rhetorical questions, if that's what they are, allow one to get something said and still hedge a bit.¹⁹⁵

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¹⁹¹ HW2 205: Theo-logie and Anthro-po-logie.

¹⁹² HW2 215: sich . . . " aufhebt " (later: aufzuheben). We all know the ambiguities, welcome and useful though they be, of aufheben, the problem being one of preserving in translation the positive along with the negative (Hegel's intention and task in the dialectic, thus his fondness for this word).

¹⁹³ HW2 215: Philosophic, richtig verstanden, ist immer adventistisch, praeparatio evangelii, ist so von sich aus christlich.

¹⁹⁴ HW2 217: " Geschichte " ; " iibernatirlich; " I have no doubt missed many more small discrepancies like these.

¹⁹⁵ HW2 217-218. I would guess that Rahner would not, especially today, be completely happy with this sentence as it turned out, in translation, as a declarative sentence: Anyone who takes unbiased account of these things will find it difficult not to recognize the holy Roman Catholic Church as the seat of the genuine revelation of the living God (HWE 177, lines 88-86).

BOOK REVIEWS

Friar Thomas d'Aquino. His Life, Thought, and Work. By JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O. P. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974. Pp. 476. \$8.95.

The seventh centenary of the death of St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) has evoked an outpouring of articles and commemorative studies on the Common Doctor, but few will be able to match this superb monograph on his life, thought, and work by Father Weisheipl. The result of long years of study, of personal research into 13th-century intellectual and institutional history, and of critical comparison with the very detailed but unpublished lecture notes on Aquinas by the late Father I. T. Eschmann, O. P., Weisheipl's book emerges as the closest one can come to a definitive biography of Aquinas at the present time, and as the standard against which any future serious scholarship in this field will have to be measured. The style of writing is engaging and clear, well suited to carrying a message of considerable profundity, although hardly qualifying the work for endorsement as light reading. That the author should have been able to pack so much new information and critical appraisal into the pages allotted him is no small tribute to his command of the subject matter and to his own intellectual acumen—features that should especially commend his treatise to readers of *The Thomist*.

The burden of Father Weisheipl's message is carried in seven chapters that develop the following themes: (1) Thomas's boyhood in the kingdom of Sicily and his young manhood in the Dominican Order, to 1252; (2) his early days at Saint-Jacques and as *Sententiarius* at Paris from 1252 to 1256; (3) his inception in theology and his career as Regent Master at Paris from 1256 to 1259; (4) his return to the Roman province and the various services he rendered there to the Order and the papacy from 1259 to 1265; (5) his founding of the Dominican studium at Santa Sabina and his role as lector in the priory at Viterbo, to 1268; (6) his return to Paris for a second regency in theology and the attendant controversies from 1269 to 1272; and (7) his return to Naples, the last years of his life, and the events leading to his canonization on July 18, 1323. Interwoven throughout this historical account are summaries and analyses of Aquinas's more important writings, particularly as these reveal the development of his thought in philosophy and theology. Appended material includes a summary chronology, a catalogue giving most of the factual material available on Aquinas's authentic writings, a bibliography of sources and of secondary literature, notes, and two indices, of persons and subjects respectively.

From the wealth of scholarly detail thus provided it is difficult to disengage a few points for particular comment. What most impressed this reviewer, however, was the author's skillful handling of two topics that have offered difficulty to previous historians, the first being Thomas's double career at the University of Paris and the second the numerous hagiographic legends that have grown up around him. With regard to the first, Weisheipl has shown conclusively, against common teaching up to now, that Aquinas's initial teaching role as a bachelor at Paris was never that of *cursor biblicus*, a function he had already performed at Cologne under Albert the Great before being sent to Paris, but was rather that of a *baccalarius Sententiarum*. It was only after functioning for four years as a *Sententiarus* that he incepted as a *magister* in theology in the Spring of 1256, and so the entire seven years of his first stay at Paris were devoted to the teaching of theology in the systematic sense. The second Paris regency was likewise devoted mainly to systematic theology, and particularly to the defense of Aristotelianism in its employ; in discussing this period Weisheipl is especially good at delineating the apostolic as well as the intellectual motivation behind Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries, and the way in which he himself, by his skillful defense of the pagan Aristotle against the Averroists, actually provoked the renewal of Augustinism at Paris under Franciscan auspices.

With regard to the legends, Weisheipl is neither pietist nor rationalist in their evaluation, although he is professedly more concerned with intellectual history than with hagiography. There is some unevenness, however, in his treatment of the preternatural events in the saint's life: for example, he is not prepared to accept completely the traditional mystical account of the happening at Naples on December 6, 1273, preferring to join to its explanation some type of physical breakdown, whereas he accepts without question Aquinas's alleged ability to dictate to three or four secretaries on different subjects at the same time, and even to continue dictating after he had fallen asleep! Yet, in the matter of the "breakdown" and the events leading to the saint's death, it must be admitted that Weisheipl has sifted through all the facts with great care and presents an intriguing thesis that makes sense of many otherwise unexplained phenomena. His account surely takes nothing away from the Angelic Doctor; rather it accentuates the frailty of the all-too-human frame that the saint's towering spirit drove to its final point of exhaustion.

Few are the defects that mar this excellent study. There are one or two misspelled words, on p. 179 the date 1951 appears for what was obviously intended to be 1251, and on p. 161 the eleventh line is a repetition of the first line and should be deleted. On p. 109 the author states that "for Thomas the soul is created within the embryo when it is disposed by the powers of sperm and ovum," thereby unwittingly attributing to Aquinas a more sophisticated knowledge of embryology than one could possess before

the invention of the microscope. And in the "Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works" at the end Weisheipl frequently makes the notation "No English translation" when in fact such translations do exist: for example, the *Sententia de caelo et mundo*, *Sententia super libros de generatione et corruptione*, and *Sententia super Meteora* have all been translated into English by R. F. Larcher and P. H. Conway, Columbus: College of St. Mary of the Springs, 1963-1964; the polemical treatise *De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes* has been done by Cyril Volaert et al., Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964; and the *De mixtione elementorum*, by V. R. Larkin in *Isis*, 51 (1960), pp. Yet these are but minor defects, hardly worthy of mention, that in no way detract from what is obviously the best biography of Aquinas now available, in English or in any language.

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Pia IX e La Rinascita del Tomismo. By ANTONIO ProLANTI. Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1974. Pp. 113.

The sixth centenary of the death of St. Thomas (1874) was hailed by the then Pontiff, Pius IX, as paralleling the significant celebration of a few years earlier (1867) of the 18th centenary of the deaths of Saints Peter and Paul:

Hos inter laetos eventus sicut iam anno millesimo octingentesimo sexagesimo septimo celebravimus decimi octavi saecularis anni, quo Principes Apostolorum proprii sanguinis testimonio traditam confirmavit Evangelii doctrinam, sic celebraturi nunc sumus sextum saecularem annum depositionis Angelici Doctoris, Sancti Thomas Aquinatis, a Divina Providentia largiti ad eandem doctrinam miro modo illustrandum

These words of Pope Mastai express the genuine high value in which throughout his life he held the Angelic Doctor and for the rebirth of whose teaching he labored unceasingly. For this reason it should be noted that the later encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII, together with his proclamation of St. Thomas as Patron of Catholic Schools, were the fruits of the long period of promotion and encouragement on the part of Pius IX to reawaken in the Church and in the world an appreciation of St. Thomas and his teaching.

The author of this brief account of the rather forgotten relationship of Pio Nono to the rebirth of Thomism is Postulator of the Cause of canonization of Pius IX, Secretary of the Pontifical Roman Theological Academy, Vice President of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and,

among other achievements of publication, founder and director of the Biblioteca per la Storia del Tomismo, of which this monograph is number 8. His study is based on hitherto unknown or forgotten or undervalued and thus not previously considered testimonies. It is divided into nine chapters.

Chapter I introduces us to the thomistic formation of Giovanni Maria Mastai Ferretti. His early acquaintance with St. Thomas was augmented and deepened in his further studies at the Collegio Romano and the Accademia Ecclesiastica where he had as professor the convinced Thomist Canon Giuseppe M. Graziani. The latter's influence on the Thomistic orientation of Mastai as theological student and as pontiff was immense.

Chapter II surveys the magisterial documents of the thirty-two year pontificate. The first, the encyclical *Qui Pluribus* (1846), was the charter of the pontificate, the leitmotiv of the papal teaching: the concord and mutual assistance of reason and faith. By means of the many documents of Pius IX the teaching of St. Thomas found its way into the Constitutions of Vatican I.

Pius IX (Ch. III) defended the value of the scholastic and thomistic methods (cf. Denz.-Schon. fl814, fl880, fl876-2880, fl918). Monsignor Piolanti (Ch. IV) singles out the Dominican Order as one of the recipients of the papal encouragement in the revival of Thomism and the Jesuit Order with its role in the *Civiltà Cattolica*.

Chapter V describes the efforts of the pope to protect, develop, and increase Thomistic centers both in Rome and throughout Italy, such as the schools of Perugia under Cardinal Gioacchino Pecci (Leo XIII) and Naples under Cardinal Sisto Riario Sforza. His interest naturally extended to the doctrinal formation of the clergy.

Chapter VI relates the pontiff's promotion of the sixth centenary of St. Thomas's death, chapter VII singles out the various Thomistic academies in which Pius IX showed interest, especially Naples and Bologna, and Chapter VIII describes the papal encouragement of the movement which shortly after the pope's death resulted in the proclamation of St. Thomas's patronage of all Catholic schools.

Chapter IX draws up a balance sheet of the activities and teaching of Pio Nono in favor of Thomism. The conclusion is that, when he ascended the chair of Peter, he found the thomistic movement in its first and timid beginnings; when he died, he left it to his successor in the full vigor of its mature development.

It is to be hoped that, as further research into the life of Papa Mastai opens up, the direction set forth by Monsignor Piolanti may be developed and enlarged and the perennial relevance of St. Thomas, which was the conviction of this Pontiff, confirmed.

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Summa Theologiae. By THOMAS AQUINAS. Latin Text, English Translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, and London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1978.

Vol. *Effects of Sin, Stain and Guilt* 86-89). Translated by T. C. O'Brien. Pp. 168. \$10.00. Vol. 36. *Prudence* 47-56). Translated by Thomas Gilby, O. P. Pp. \$15.00. Vol. 47. *The Pastoral and Religious Lives* 183-189). Translated by Jordan Aumann, O. P. Pp. \$15.00.

With the appearance of these three volumes almost fifty of the projected sixty volumes of this series are published. And the rest, according to General Editor Thomas Gilby, are in the barn. One can only applaud the work of this good Thomist scholar, applaud too the British publishers, Eyre & Spottiswoode, whose courageous and magnanimous financial backing made the project possible.

David Tracy, in a recent *Christian Century* article, pointed to this series and especially to its editor as witness "to the continuing importance of a critically appreciative approach to the work of Thomas Aquinas."

Prudence does not disappoint that witness. It also exemplifies his superior use of the English language in translating his brother's Latin. "Prudence deals with contingent actions, in which bad may be mixed with good, as true with false. This is because human deeds are multiform; rights are often entangled with wrongs, and wrongs wear the air of good."

49, 8). And it breathes the same spirit Gilby finds in the *Summa*: "a spacious *Summa* for theologians, not a practical handbook for spiritual plumbers. It is unembarrassed by the imbrolios of the casuists."

appendices-in this volume four of them, discussing prudence and laws, casuistry, conscience, and certainty-are always provocative but tantalizingly brief.

O'Brien's work is a much tighter rendering, based no doubt on his own philosophy of what a translation should be about. "It should not by flare or folksiness put the reader off from the requirement of getting inside (the impersonal Latin) to the idea." Well, yes, but I prefer a controlled flare. It helps the readability. The Latin, which is always there to consult, is awfully dry going. Gilby's phrase translating the virtue *gnome* (which Thomas left in the Greek) is "the flair for the exceptional" (q. 51, 4, *sed contra*), and he manages to exhibit that virtue frequently in his translation.

O'Brien's appendices on guilt and punishment, mortal sin, venial sin, and a long commentary on 89, 6 are excellent. This last commentary compares the position of Thomas that a man cannot commit a venial sin until he has chosen an ultimate end to the recent thought on the funda-

mental moral option. It is enlightening and I think quite accurate. So also his addenda on venial sin. This is a brief history of the problem of the "finality" in venial sin, O'Brien's choice of solutions and his defence of that choice; all done with a masterly knowledge of the *corpus of St. ThomCM's* thought. Both he and Gilby are superb in finding other texts of Aquinas substantiate their points. I think, however, both should bring in modern discussions more explicitly. O'Brien remarks somewhere that the best interpreter of Aquinas is Aquinas himself (*Sanctus ThomCM sui interpres*). But a too great dependence on that rule shuts the door on modern criticism, tends to make a self-sufficient universe of the thought of Aquinas. E. L. Mascall has written in this journal recently of the gulf in philosophy, how philosophers are simply not listening to one another. He wonders if Thomism can act as a bridge. Of course, I think it can, and should; and I am certain Gilby and O'Brien think so too; but a greater explicit awareness of other people's thought in the appendices of these *Summa* volumes would help make that conviction more available to the scholarly world.

Aumann's translation is accurate but even drier than O'Brien's, and that again is based on his deliberate approach to the job: "It is as close as possible to the original Latin without being a transliteration." I cannot agree with that approach, though I know the rationale behind it. And Aumann's assignment was so large—a hundred pages longer than either of the others—he evidently felt he could not do much by way of appendices or long introduction. It is disappointing, then, in not grappling with some recent problems in religious life or in placing the thought of Thomas more securely in its historical setting.

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De Hominis Beatitudine. In I-II Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae commentaria (QQ. I-V). By JACOBUS M. RAMIREZ. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. Institute de Filosofia "Luis Vives," Madrid. 1972 (Obras Completas de Santiago Ramirez, O. P. Edición preparada por Victorino Rodriguez, O. P. Torno III, vol. 1-5)

The Spanish Dominican, J. M. Ramirez, is unfortunately little known and has remained for all practical purposes unclaimed outside his native Spain. And for all that he was one of the profoundest Catholic theologians of modern times and, it may safely be asserted, one of the Church's greatest thinkers in the period of crisis and upheaval—both on the level of doctrine and on that of practice—that preceded and followed the second Vatican Council. When he died in Salamanca 18 December 1967 he left

behind him a large corpus of unpublished work on theological, philosophical, and cognate problems. His thought was firmly rooted in the living and authentic scholastic and thomistic (thomasic!) tradition, but his mind was ever open to the very real problems of the day, as his three lengthy volumes on the thought of Ortega y Gasset (*La Filosofía de Ortega y Gasset; Un orteguismo católico?*; *La zona de Seguridad*) and his shorter studies on the history and structure of the *ius gentium* (*El derecho de Gentes*), on the political teaching of Aquinas (*Doctrina Política de Santo Tomás*), and on the notion of the common good (*Pueblo y Gobernantes al servicio del Bien Común*) clearly show. These studies were all published in Spanish, as was also a large work on the essence of Christian hope (*La esencia de la Esperanza Cristiana*) and on the nature of philosophy (*El Concepto de Filosofía*). The bulk of his work, however, was written in Latin and of this only a minor part had been published until his friends and admirers decided to bring out an edition of his *opera omnia*. The problem of analogy, so fundamental in all philosophical and theological thinking, was the subject of a short study written whilst Ramirez was a young professor in Rome and Salamanca (*De analogia secundum doctrinam aristotelico-thomisticam*, Madrid). This problem occupied his mind down the years and on his death a major, full-length study of the problem was amongst his papers, now edited as tome II of the *Opera Omnia*. During and after Vatican II he published two important studies: one on the concept of *order* (*De ordine placita quaedam thomistica*, Salamanca 1963) and the other on the sacramental character of the episcopate and episcopal collegiality (*De episcopatu ut sacramento deque episcoporum collegio*, Salamanca 1966).

Ramirez spent the greater part of his professorial career teaching moral theology at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, where his task was to expound the principal treatises in the second part of the *Summa Theologiae* (I-II and II-II) of Aquinas. He was always fully conscious of the difficulty of the work, for precisely the second part of the thomistic *Summa* is admittedly the most original and the most difficult of the whole thomistic corpus and the one perhaps of most immediate relevance to-day. Ramirez decided to compose a full-scale commentary on the text, a commentary that would lay bare the authentic thought of Aquinas in all its richness and profundity. The undertaking was immense. Before he died he had published no more than three volumes of his proposed commentary covering the first three questions of the tract on beatitude or the final end and completion of man (*De Hominis Beatitudine Theologicus*, t. I, 1943, t. II, 1943, t. III, 1947). At that time he had returned to Salamanca and found himself burdened not only with professorial duties but also with a multitude of administrative responsibilities. The manuscript of his commentary on the rest of the I-II and II-II was by and large completed, but Ramirez never found the time or leisure to revise and supplement it and thus get it ready for publication. The editors of his

Opera Omnia have undertaken the difficult business of preparing the master's work for publication and of making it available to the theological public. For that we must be deeply grateful to them.

Ramirez was ever convinced of the supreme importance of the tract on beatitude, that is, on the final end of man and on his completion in human goodness. He rightly saw it to be the cornerstone of every scientific presentation of moral theology. As distinct from a philosophical analysis of human and moral life, where the reality of completion and perfection (that is, happiness) can be determined only at the end of the whole investigation (see Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. X), St. Thomas saw that the question of the final end of man must of necessity come at the beginning of every *theological* investigation into the structure of human being and activity. **It** is one of the data of revelation and faith that man is called to glory and perfection (and consequently to happiness or beatitude) in the intuitive vision of God, the ground of all being and in a special way of human being. This vision, promised to man, is a perfection that is proper to divine and infinite being (see I-II, q. 3, a. 8 obj. fl) and is thus seen to be improper (and supernatural) to every created being and intellect. **It** is for that reason that the eighth article of the third question of beatitude (*Utrum hominis beatitudo sit in sola speculatione qua per essentiam videtur?*) is seen to be the supreme point of the whole investigation, the point up to which everything leads and from which everything else, not only in the tract on beatitude itself but in the whole second part of the *Summa* (and even in the whole third part!), can be theologically deduced and clarified, both essentially and existentially. **It** is precisely for that reason that Ramirez devoted so much time and care to his detailed and most complete commentary on the first five questions of the I-II. **It** was assuredly his treatise of predilection. And in its detail and completeness, both historical and speculative, his commentary is unique. Not only every article, almost every phrase and word is commented in text and context and set solidly in its doctrinal and historical background. In that way Ramirez succeeds in presenting to the modern mind in the most objective way possible the *mens germana* of Aquinas.

Perhaps one of the profoundest and most important things written in all of modern theological writing is the commentary of Ramirez on article eight of question three (in the present edition vol. 4, pp. 169-387). It is a brilliant account of the existence and structure of the beatific vision, that is, the vision of God without any *objective* species of any kind either *impressa* or *expressa*, and its prerequisite on the part of the human spirit, the light of glory, which alone, as *subjective* medium, renders possible the beatifying union of the created human intellect and being with the uncreated divine source of that being, a union so intimate and immediate that St. Thomas can claim in it the human mind becomes one with God (see *Camp. Theol.* II, ch. 9, n° 587). In view of this penetrating account

of the beatific and facial vision of God one is somewhat surprised at Ramirez' lack of sympathy and understanding for the mystical teaching of the famous German theologian and mystic and confrere of Aquinas, Meister Eckhart (see vol. 3, pp. 20-22). A careful study of the writings of the mystic Eckhart would show that his thought was substantially in accord with that of Aquinas, and that he was no more pantheistic in his teaching than was Thomas. *Quandoque et bonus dormitat Homerus!*

The scholastic method of the commentary and its Latin may well be an obstacle to many. However, the method, it should be remembered, is no more than a vehicle of thought and exposition and should not be a barrier to becoming acquainted with the profound insights of the author. Any effort expended in becoming acquainted with and even mastering the method will be amply repaid. And it should not, one may think, be too much to expect of the scientific theologian a sufficient knowledge of Latin to render this uniquely important source of theological thought accessible. The style is elevated and fluid, characterized by clarity and precision of expression, the whole redolent of Augustine rather than of Cicero. Ramirez is verily an *Augustinus redivivus*.

The present edition was prepared by the disciple and confrere of Ramirez, Victorino Rodriguez. It has been done with care and exactitude. One might regret that the format of the first edition was not retained, which the present reviewer finds more pleasing, as was indeed also the general typographical layout of the original edition. Volume 3 of the first edition has been divided so that in the present edition volume 3 contains the commentary on I-II, q. 3, a. 1-5, and volume 4 the commentary on q. 3, a. 6-8. Otherwise the volumes have been edited unchanged except for the incorporation of minor emendations that had been made by Ramirez himself in his own personal copy. Volume 5 contains the commentary on questions 4 and 5, which had been revised for publication only in part (up to q. 4, a. 5) by the author himself. In an appendix is added a very important and highly interesting *excursus* on the controversy concerning the beatific vision and its possibility before the resurrection of the body at the time of John XXII.

The publication of the *Opera omnia* of J. M. Ramirez, and in a special way of his entire commentary on beatitude, must be regarded as a major event in the field of modern theology. It is to be hoped that a fillip will thereby be given to authentic theological, and above all moral theological, thinking, which, whilst plunging its roots in tradition, must ever be prepared to come to grips with the very real problems of the day, the solution of which must be sought under the light of the revealed word of God. In that way alone can theology ever hope to remain, as Augustine might have it, ever ancient and ever new and fresh (see *Conf.* X, 27). In this connexion and in conclusion a word of Ramirez himself may be adduced. It gives an example of his style and affords an indication of his theological

thought and method. Towards the end of his preface to the whole work he writes: "Commentarium sat prolixum me fecisse non diffiteor. At, ni multum fallimur, commentaria non sunt iudicanda ex eorum prolixitate aut brevitate, sicut neque ex vetustate aut novitate. Si vera, si solida, si profunda sunt, unquam erunt nimis longa, semperque nova erunt; sin autem falsa, si imbecilla, si superficialia, unquam erunt nimis brevia, semperque erunt vetustissima." (p. XVII)

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The Remaking of the Church. An Agenda for Reform. By Richard P. McBrien. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973. Pp. 179. \$6.95.

The avowed purpose of this book is to present an exercise in practical ecclesiology taking into consideration not only the *why* of change, but also the *how*; not only the mystery of the Church, but its remaking (p. XV). In order to attain this end, Fr. McBrien addresses himself to two inextricably related issues:

... the theological and political conflict in contemporary Christianity, with special reference to recent years of change in Catholic attitudes and practice (Chapters I and II); and the determination of specific proposals for institutional change through which such conflict can constructively be resolved (Chapters III and IV). (pp. XIV-XV).

These, indeed, are ambitious goals which the author sets out to attain in 175 pages. The brevity of the book forewarns the reader that he can expect no more than a broad analysis of the present situation, as well as a schematic presentation of an agenda for reform. Once this remark is made, it must be added that the author presents a very thought-provoking analysis of the present situation along with worthwhile suggestions for institutional reform.

In Chapter I, entitled "The Passing of the Torch," Fr. McBrien vividly recalls the hope and the optimism generated in the Church, the churches, and the world by the documents of Vatican II. Yet, less than a decade later we find the Church marked by excessive conflict, polarization, and a debilitating drainage of human resources while the membership and even its leaders are often beset by a widespread sense of frustration. The two root causes of this development, according to the author, are:

. . . the failure of church leadership to provide the general membership with adequate reasons for change and, second, the failure of church leadership to demythologize its own self-image, in the light of contemporary theological perceptions. (p. 14)

Seen in these terms, the solution to the problem would lie in more participation, on the part of all members, in the life and mission of the Church.

It is especially in Chapter II, "The Fallen Torch," that Fr. McBrien tackles the problem outlined above. The root cause of this problem is a theory-and-practice gap which has existed in the Catholic Church since 1965. Practice must be firmly based on theory and flow from it. Practices, especially new ones, imposed by authority without adequate presentation of the explicit and implicit underlying theory cannot be maintained for long without disorienting the people. On the other hand, theory which is not allowed to run its normal course can only lead to frustration and discouragement among its advocates. The author presents a tripartite schema of Theories with their corresponding Practices:

Theory A: Scholastic, Counter-Reformation ecclesiology-Practices A: Pre-Vatican II Catholic Church.

Theory B: Vatican II ecclesiology-Practices B: Moderate conciliar and para-conciliar reforms.

Theory C: Post Vatican II ecclesiology-Practices C: Movement toward more radical reform.

As might be expected, it is Theory A and its corresponding practices which bear the brunt of the attack. The author proves beyond doubt that the convocation of Vatican II was well inspired, and yet it is in this section that I find that his schema suffers the most from generalizations which weaken rather than strengthen his position. During the Time of the Church, which is characterized by growth and development, it is inevitable that there be divergent schools of thought. To label any one of these as THE teaching of the Church may serve the purpose of rhetoric but not that of historical truth. To state, for instance, that the notion of the Church as the Body of Christ without spot or wrinkle was an assumption which largely controlled the preconciliar Catholic Church (p. without further clarification is, I feel, to overstate a point since it leaves aside the long standing debate between Yves Congar and Charles Journet, to mention merely one example. (Y. Congar, *Vraie et fausse reforme dans [Unam Sanctam 7Q; Paris: Cerf, 1969]; first published in 1950; C. Journet, L'Eglise Verbe Incarne [Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1951] "Excursus VI," 1115-11Q9; Y. Congar, Bulletin Thwmiste VIII [1947-1953] 746-756). One could also question the statement that "The most sophisticated and academically serious preconciliar exposition of the mystery of the Church is available in the so-called 'Spanish Summa' (*Sacrae Theologiae Summa*)" (pp. & What of the works of such men as J. A. Mohler, M.-J. Scheeben, in the 19th century; E. Mersch, M.-D. Koster, C. Journet, S. Tromp, Y. Congar, etc., in the BOth century, to mention merely a few who influenced the thought of the Church? Nor can we afford to overlook the publication of *Ivfystici Corporis Christi* by Pius XII in 1943. Furthermore, I do not find in the author's presentation of preconciliar thought,*

namely, that: "Ordination and religious profession elevate the recipient to a status of spiritual superiority," (p. 30) an adequate formulation of the Church's traditional teaching. As for the Church's traditional teaching on sacraments working *ex opere operata*, (p. 33) the author himself later nuances his preliminary presentation. (pp. 43 & 46) Moreover, whatever might have been Salaverri's teaching on the extension of infallibility to include almost all papal declarations, (pp. 28-29) it should be noted that he received criticism rather than approbation from his peers (Y. Cougar, *Ministeres et communio ecclesiale [Theologie sans Frontieres 23; Paris: Cerf, 1971]* 151 and note 24). Other examples could be produced in order to prove what the author presents as Theory A is merely one tendency which existed in the Universal Church as he himself is forced to admit on page 42. One cannot deny the existence nor the importance of this tendency in the concrete life of the Church. But, the question should be asked, if we ever wish to benefit from past history, why it was given such importance. How is it that one school of thought could so influence the life of the Church? Is it because of the tenacity of its exponents? Because of the role of certain Roman Universities in the formation of "promising" candidates drawn from throughout the world? Is it because of a concerted effort to simplify catechesis to the point of presenting the position of merely one school of thought, and this in matters still being debated? Is there an unavowed desire to replace here on earth the certitude of faith with the certitude of the Vision? And who is at fault, the leaders or the theologians? Who formed the local leadership? Were they furnished with the "intrinsic reasons for the changes" brought about by Vatican II? Was their seminary training presented as the beginning of an on-going process? The author lays the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Church's leadership. (pp. 22, 41-42, 67-68) If this is meant to include theological as well as pastoral leadership, I would be inclined to agree. There is enough blame to go around for everyone.

Fr. McBrien then goes on to present some of the highlights of Theory B, Vatican II ecclesiology compared to the teaching of Theory A as represented by Salaverri. (pp. 41-45) This section is rather short but in the main good as far as the teaching of Vatican II is concerned.

Fr. McBrien then goes on to show the connection between Theory B and Practices B in order to bridge the gap between theory and practice. (pp. 45-56)

Here again, we find statements which are unilateral. To state that: "Five or ten years earlier, an individual theologian or catechetical writer expressing such views (the royal priesthood of the faithful) would have been dismissed as a 'Protestant' or a 'heretic'" (p. 47) is to overlook the fact that Vatican II refers back to the works of Pius XII (*Lumen Gentium* 10, note 2), and that Fr. Cougar published, in 1952, his work *Jalons pour une theologie du la'icat* in which the whole of Chapter IV is dedicated to

the laity and the sacerdotal function of the Church. A cursory inventory of the authors quoted in the footnotes manifests that Fr. Cougar was not alone of this opinion. Fr. McBrien also makes a lot out of the fact that some, after Vatican I, considered the bishops as mere vicars of the Roman Pontiff in spite of the collective Letter of the German Bishops (February 1875; D.S. 311:2-3116) which was approved by Pius IX (March 4, 1875; D.S. 3117). If by Theory A, the author refers to the Ultramontanists, then perhaps he is right. But, this school of thought can hardly be characterized as *the* teaching of the Pre-Vatican II Church. Would it not be closer to the truth to say that it is the position of a school which based its ecclesiology, not to say its whole theology, too unilaterally on Canon Law where the question of jurisdiction rather than that of sacramental power can become dominant? A school which did not distinguish enough between Tradition and traditions?

Then again there is the statement: "... Because the conventional theology of the Church held that the Church was already the Kingdom of God on earth. To criticize the Church is to criticize the Kingdom, which is to criticize God himself." (p. 3:2) On the other hand, once the Church is seen to be subordinate to the Kingdom of God and not identical with it, a new critical attitude toward the Church is possible. (p. 56) I cannot help but ask to whom the author is referring when he uses the term "conventional theology." When Charles Journet states that Church and Kingdom are identical he is careful to distinguish between the Militant Church and the Triumphant Church, as well as between the historical and the future state of the Kingdom (*L'Eglise du Verbe Incarne*, IT, cf. Index: "Royaume de Dieu," 1369-1370), going so far as to refuse to identify the present and crucified Church with the future and glorified Kingdom. We need not accept his categories, but we should at least recognize his efforts to distinguish certain aspects of reality. I find it hard to believe that a sufficient amount of theologians could be found to justify their teaching being qualified as "conventional theology" and who would purely, simply, and categorically identify the militant Church with the Kingdom of God thus withdrawing the Church from all criticism on the part of its members. I am rather inclined to believe that too many in the past as well as in the present choose to neglect the "niceties" of theological reflection preferring to concentrate their efforts on the memorization of "practical" solutions found either in Canon Law, the decrees coming from Rome or, to mention a modern facet of the problem, the conclusions of well-known theologians. In other words, we are forever confronted with the temptation to over-simplify the Mystery of God revealed and realized in Christ and into whose fulness of truth the Spirit leads us.

Theory C is described as taking a principle enunciated by Vatican II, disengaging it from the residue of Theory A, and setting it in a different

context in order to bring into greater relief the element or elements that are new and distinctive. (p. 67) The specific application of this theory is to be found in Chapter III but already we can surmise that it intends to be progressive and on-going. The conciliar documents are considered as points of departure for future development as well they should be since the Church is a Pilgrim Church on its way to the fullness of the Kingdom of God which will be established definitely with the Second Coming of Christ. The author ends Chapter II by reprimanding once again Church leadership for both failing to provide the faithful with the justifications for change and for trying to rigidly and authoritatively control both the changes and theological discussions. He calls for a greater convergence between perception and behavior theory and practice. (pp. 67-69)

Chapter III, entitled "An Agenda for Reform," begins with the statement: "Practices, both institutional and personal will have to be brought into conformity with the best theory; and alternate theories will have to be modified to correspond with the practical reality."

I doubt if anyone would want to quarrel with such a principle. On the other hand, this is precisely where most if not all of the problems take root. Who is to decide what is the best theory? How is a consensus to be reached on this point? I should hope that it would be through dialogue within the Church as a whole where each person would be informed sufficiently to make a prudent judgment leading to a personal commitment. Such a process demands of all members "metanoia." It would also have to be agreed that the "best" theory is, in fact, the best at a given moment in the on-going life of the Church. The ideal proposed here seems to be the one which has motivated sincere Christians from the very beginning, and history is there to show just how difficult it is to attain. Persuasion, conversion, and love should be the guiding lights in our efforts to attain this ideal. Authoritarianism on the part of Church leaders, be they pastors, theologians, canonists, etc., might engender robots but hardly committed Christians. And was not the central purpose of Vatican II geared to re-directing our efforts toward the essentials in faith: our union with the Father through the Son in the Spirit? In such a context, all structures are secondary in the sense of being merely means which should help us to attain this end.

Fr. McBrien presents thirteen proposals which he and others feel belong to any agenda for serious ecclesiastical reform. But, before doing so, he identifies two principal goals which serve as guideposts:

(1) to bring the organizational operations of the Church into conformity with, and place them at the service of, the historical goals, or mission, of that Church; and to draw upon the resources of the whole Church in the fulfillment of this mission, by motivating the general membership to accept and pursue the Church's goals. (p. 73)

The membership is to participate actively in the identification and pursuit of these goals. The leadership is to work toward the clarification of organizational goals and motivate the people to accept and pursue them. Faced with reform, the institutional response can be one of either tenacity, elasticity or self-determination. (pp. 74-77) The response of the Church, because of her being and mission, should be one of self-determination. (pp. 79-81) As for motivation, the people must become willing, and indeed enthusiastic, participants in the process of reform. (p. 81) This can best be brought about through participative management in accord with good canonical and theological principles. (pp. 85-86)

In the remainder of the Chapter Fr. McBrien indulges in an exercise in practical ecclesiology. (pp. 86-136) It is here that he presents his thirteen proposals which make up an agenda for reform. This section is divided into two major sections: 1. a presentation of problems and proposals (pp. 86-108); a presentation of theological arguments and counterarguments (pp. 108-136). Each of the thirteen proposals is considered in both sections. For the purpose of this review, I shall treat of each proposal immediately under both aspects.

1. Principles of Constitutionalism.

The author argues here in favor of constitutionalism in the Church as opposed to a feudalistic and monarchical form of government. According to Fr. McBrien, constitutionalism involves three basic elements:

- a) The limitation of power achieved by a division of power between central and regional governing bodies; the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial power; and a guarantee of individual rights, including the right to due process of law.
- b) Accountability ensured by the electoral process; freedom of information; freedom of discussion and debate regarding the policy and performance of office holders as well as the ultimate assumptions of the community itself.
- c) Openness to correction ensured by regular meetings of legislative bodies; reinterpretation of law by the tribunals; and permanent commissions charged with the responsibility of proposing legal reforms. (p. 87)

Constitutionalism is theologically feasible since divine authority is vested in the Church, the whole People of God including laity, religious, and clergy alike with the hierarchy at the service of the Church. Moreover, since the Pilgrim Church is not identical with the Kingdom, reform, and more precisely a change in form of government, is possible as the past so amply proves, e. g., the Gregorian Reform of the 11th century. (p. 109) Nor can the belief that the Church is, by the will of Christ, an absolute monarchy be substantiated biblically, doctrinally or theologically. The notion of the Church as a communion as well as the notion of collegiality are ir-

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reconcilable with the notion of absolute monarchy. (p. 110) Much of Y. Congar's latest book, *Ministere et communion ecclesiale*, is in substantial agreement with this position. The Tradition of the Church also manifests institutional pluralism both within the New Testament and during the first 950 years of the history of the Church. (pp. 111-119)

While modern scholarship corroborates much of what the author states here, I believe that he should also mention that ministry, although known under different names, is a characteristic element which is necessary for the life of any authentic church (A. Lemaire, *Les ministeres aux origines de L'Eglise [Lectio Divina 68; Paris: Cerf, 1971] 199*). In other words, the Christian community was never an amorphous group of individuals. Mention of this fact would give greater equilibrium to the author's position by showing that, although he is proposing a change of models in Church government, he is maintaining the characteristic values of the Church of Christ. As for the new structures he does propose, I cannot help but feel that it would be adding structure to structures. I would prefer a greater emphasis on the fact that all ministry in the Body of Christ is service, is for the good of the whole, is for the building up of the Body of Christ. The Pastors are accountable to Christ (I P. 5:4; I Co. 8:10-15), to the Holy Spirit (Ac. 9:10-18) and to the Gospel (Ga. 1:6-10) as well as to one another (Ga. 9:1-8; 11-4). No doubt, the *sensus fidelium* also has its role to play (I Th. 5:19-21; I Co. 19:10; I Jn. 4:1-8). But, I doubt if structure, be it modelled after the system of checks and balances written into the Constitution of the U. S. A., will replace or even evoke the Spirit of service, love, and mutual growth into the fulness of Christ (Ep. 4:10-16) which is constitutive of the Body of Christ. Besides, my mind boggles at the thought of the investment in men and moneys which the application of the author's model would necessitate. If it be absolutely required, then by all means let us proceed to establish it with haste. But let us also recognize that the simplicity and spontaneity of the Early Church will be lost forever. I just pray that we do not suffocate under the weight of such structures. Agreed that the Son of God took on flesh and became like us in all things except sin. But, he is also the pneumatic Christ in whose Spirit we all share, be it in the first-fruits of the Spirit. Then again, there is that statement by Jefferson, I believe, "He who governs least, governs best." In the last analysis, if constitutionalism implies all Fr. McBrien suggests, I would prefer some other form of incarnation for "Communion."

9. Decentralization of Power.

The author echoes here a plea for the concrete application in the life of the Church of the principle of subsidiarity, i.e., a higher agency or group should never do for a lower group or agency what the latter can do for itself. He calls for deliberative as well as consultative power for parish, diocesan, as well as national pastoral councils. Furthermore, they should

meet regularly according to their own rules, chose their own officers, and determine their own rules of procedure and their own agenda, hold open and public deliberations, have their own secretariat with full access to relevant information and with the assistance of experts. (p. 88)

The theological arguments in favor of this proposition are the same as those presented for proposition I. The contentious point here is that of giving deliberative power to the various councils. Fr. McBrien argues that deliberative authority does not preclude distinctive executive leadership since the executive can always veto the decisions of the legislative branch while running the risk of seeing its veto overruled by a larger majority in the legislative branch or by a judicial decree.

What the author proposes here is merely the application of the three branches of government theory to the life of the Church. The monarchical model had the advantage of symbolizing the Headship of Christ. I suppose that the three branches of government theory could symbolize the Trinity of Persons. But, then again, in Trinity all is one except what distinguishes the Persons among themselves—the Father remaining the principle without principle. Furthermore, I do not find within the New Testament models of ministry the Apostles or their collaborators fulfilling the role of mere executives. They are present and active along with the *presbyteroi* and the church members at the deliberations held in Jerusalem (Ac. 15), for instance. I am not certain that either communion or collegiality could withstand the effects of the three branches of government theory. Church government cannot be modelled purely and simply on civil government (J. L. McKenzie, *Authority in the Church* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966) 1Q-18).

3. Planning and Research.

Fr. McBrien decries the fact that the Church at present has no institution dedicated to research and planning in order to determine what it is doing, how much it has accomplished, and where it is going. **If** the response of the Church to its environment is one of self-determination, then planning and research become essential to the Church. Consequently, offices devoted to such a task are necessary on every level, so is an office of financial management, a permanent means of assessing public opinion in the Church, and finally a public relations department to disseminate policies, procedures, and related matters. (pp. 88-89)

Theologically, this proposal is based on the fact that **all** baptized Christians make up the Church and are responsible for its mission. **If** they are to carry out this mission effectively, they must be furnished with all the information and data that can practically be gathered. (p. 113)

I have no qualms with the theological principle stated here. But, I think another should be added: **It** is ultimately the Spirit who guides and enlightens the Church. He can certainly make use of scientifically established

procedures, but he can also speak through events and through prophets. Furthermore, I believe that each member should be furnished with the information not only that can be "practically" gathered but also practically assimilated according to the "charisma" which he has received. There is, after all, a diversity of spiritual gifts of services, and of works in the Body of Christ. As for where we are going, our hope is that we are moving toward the fullness of the Kingdom of God which, ultimately, is his work alone. The Church must constantly re-assess its fidelity to the presence of the Kingdom in its midst and wait in joyful anticipation for the coming of Christ in Glory.

4. Principles of Accountability.

The Author advocates a public adversary system which will provide a check and balance in the area of decisions affecting large numbers of people and large amounts of money on all levels of the Church. A given adversary system would last no more than three years before being replaced by a new team. (pp. 89-90) Theologically, such a system would manifest both that the whole Church is missionary and that sin still exists among the People of God requiring that appropriate means be taken to combat its effects. (pp. 113-14) Theologically, I feel that the arguments are sound, but I would hope that those who are called to assume administrative tasks in the Church would do so in the spirit of service and that the administrators judge the administrators. If that be too idealistic, then perhaps other means should be taken without adding too many structures to an already highly structured institution. We should also ask if all administrators need participate in the ministerial priesthood.

5. Selection of Bishops.

The selection of bishops should be made by the local communities are called upon to lead. All major elements within a given local community should be included in the process of election. A committee, whose members would have limited terms of office, would examine the candidates once they have been provided with all the pertinent information. Outside influences, such as other bishops, papal delegates, and the Pope would be considered only if reasons are furnished for the rejection of a given candidate. This manner of selecting bishops would restore confidence in Church leadership. (pp. 90-91)

The author has no difficulty in showing that the practice of a local community electing its bishop is indeed the "traditional" one and that the historical circumstances which brought about its abeyance have sufficiently disappeared. (pp. 114-116)

The community elected its bishop whose authority, however, comes from Christ. Yet, I am somewhat surprised that Fr. McBrien does not speak of the importance of the co-consecrators. Not only is consecration necessary

for the conferring of sacramental and juridical power, the presence of co-consecrators manifests the communion which must exist among the local communities or churches. On the other hand, the belief expressed by the author that election of the bishop by the community he will lead will restore confidence in Church leadership leaves me somewhat sceptical. When consultations of this type were carried out in a neighboring diocese recently, the "job description" which emerged could only be filled by Christ himself and even then only in his Glorified State. Compromise, of necessity, is part and parcel of such a process with the disappointments it entails both for the minority and the majority. Nevertheless I agree that such a process should be re-established in the Church. However, I would emphasize the need for the local community to be open to the inspirations of the Spirit and to the fraternal interventions of surrounding bishops and of the Bishop of Rome. After all, the local church is not an entity unto itself but part of a communion which embraces the Universal Church.

6. Papal Power.

While recognizing the role of the papal office in the Church, Fr. McBrien proposes that its perception be brought into closer harmony with the New Testament writings (on this point, one may consult, R. E. Brown, K. P. Donfried, J. Reumann, eds., *Peter in the New Testament* [Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House; New York: Paulist Press, 1973]). The model of absolute monarchy should be abandoned. The fundamental principle of subsidiarity should be applied in church life. General policy decisions affecting the Universal Church should be the fruit of the joint efforts of the Pope and the International Synod of Bishops who should also elect the Pope for a ten year term, renewable. The function of the Curia would consist in the execution of these decisions, etc. (pp. 91-93)

The basic theological argument behind this proposition is that the Church is essentially a *communio ecclesiarum*. (pp. 116-117) The union of all local churches in the one Spirit as well as legitimate diversity in the same Spirit would be better manifested by a decentralization of power and the election of the Pope by the International Synod of Bishops elected to that body by their brother bishops themselves elected by their local communities.

This last point brings to mind an objection: Why should not the Bishop of Rome be elected by his local church rather than by an international synod? The Author answers that by the fact that the Pope is elected by the College of Cardinals the Church has already conceded the principle that the Pope can have title to his office only after he has been designated officially by a more or less representative group within the total membership. (p. 117) I find this argument from history rather weak. We know that cardinals are a relatively recent invention and that they

were originally pastors of local Roman parishes—a legal fiction which existed until very recently, **If** indeed the Pope is the Bishop of Rome, why should not the process described in Proposal Five apply to his election? True, he is also the leader relative to the College of Bishops, and from this position one could argue that they have a say in his choice. But, by the same token, should he not have a say in their choice? On the other hand, if the autonomy of the church of Rome were respected, would not the authority of the Pope take on an altogether different aspect? Does not participation in an election already commit a person in a very real sense to a certain type of government? Perhaps we should look to the Early Church for lessons in this domain; and wluwe we are at it why not look at the evolution which took place in the relationships which exist between the Federal and State governments in the U. S. A.

7. Episcopal Power.

The main points developed in Propositions 1, 2, and 4 are now applied to episcopal power. The episcopal office must be brought into greater conformity with New Testament and historical scholarship as well as with contemporary theological reflection. The notion of a bishop as an absolute monarch in his diocese limited only by personal and canonical loyalties to the Pope should also change. The diocesan community is to be governed by its pastoral council, and decisions should be reached on the basis of a consensus between the bishop and the council. A bishop should be elected by the people for a limited term of office, and he should remain faithful to his diocese instead of moving from one to another. He should also remember that he is a member of a College of Bishops and act accordingly in his pastoral care of his people. Finally, bishops should remember that there are other successions in the Church besides episcopal succession, namely, succession of prophets and of teachers, which are also to be respected and encouraged. **It** is the Spirit who will see to the unity of the Church in the last analysis. (pp. 93-94)

The theological foundation for these suggestions is to be found primarily in the notion of the Collegiality of Bishops and in the meaning of the expression "successor of the Apostles." (pp. 117-121) Collegiality implies that a bishop be in communion with not only the leader but also with his fellow members of the College of Bishops. As for the expression "successor of the Apostles," the author states:

A bishop is not himself a successor of the apostles. As most, a bishop is, by episcopal ordination, introduced into the college of bishops which, in turn, understands itself as being in continuity with the college of apostles. (p. 119)

He goes on to say:

The Church as a whole is successor to the apostles insofar as it remains bound to the word, the witness, and the service of the first apostolic generation. Apostolic

succession, therefore, is primarily a succession in apostolic faith, apostolic service, and apostolic life. There may also be succession of offices, but it would be wrong to suggest that the only office in apostolic succession are the papacy and episcopacy. There are also a succession of prophets and a succession of teachers. (p.)

The general impression one gets from these necessarily brief pages is that Fr. McBrien rushes in where angels fear to tread. What he states is, no doubt, based on the conclusions of some very learned scholars. But, conclusions often lack all the nuance a full development usually furnishes. If we ever hope to bridge the gap between theory and practice, it would be well to furnish as much information as possible so that a person may make up his own mind as to the value of the arguments. It would be unfortunate if the "teachers" were to assume the authoritative stance which the author has so rightly criticized when speaking of other functions in the Church. I would like here to present some background material for further discussion.

Since Vatican II, *Lumen Gentium*, 22, the notion of collegiality has been accepted at least in principle. The working out of this notion, however, still leaves much to be desired. Fr. Congar situates the problems which arise from the notion of collegiality vis à vis the Universal Church and the Papacy in their proper context, that of the Church as Communion, in several chapters of his recent book: *Ministere et communion ecclesiale*. All problems are not necessarily solved just by saying that the Church is a communion of believers, but I have to agree with Fr. Congar when he insists that they be attacked from this point of view and that the solutions produced be judged in its light. The Church is a communion of believers united to the one Christ in the one Spirit. The Universal Church is the communion of local churches in the same Spirit. There is both diversity (individual Christians, individual local churches) and unity (one local church, one Universal Church). Both unity (oneness) and diversity (catholicity) must be respected. Unity, then, is not uniformity either in the "expression" of dogma or discipline or liturgy. Yet, there must be basic and profound unity in faith, life, and worship. In other words, diversity cannot be allowed to degenerate into contradiction if unity is to continue to be meaningful.

Consequently, I have to agree with Fr. McBrien when he insists on communion among bishops of a given region or nation, and, I would add, of the whole world. However, I would also plead for a *legitimate* diversity in the expression of the one faith, life, and worship. This might "confuse" momentarily the "people," but it could, if well defined, furnish a very meaningful object lesson in the catholicity of the Church and help the believers to distinguish between what are the basic values of Christianity and what are merely temporal, historically conditioned models. I do not find this preoccupation expressed very often in the work under review. The

catch, of course, is to insure that the models do indeed incarnate and not suffocate the basic, fundamental values of the Christ-Event.

Turning to the notion of apostolic succession, it is quite true that it has been the object of intensive study for nearly a century. Scholars have scrutinized both the notion of "apostle" and that of "succession." The author seems to rely heavily on the works of Hans Kling and R. E. Brown in his discussion of this point, and rightly so. A. Lemaire has recently published a very interesting bulletin on the subject ("The Ministries in the New Testament," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 3 [1973] 133-166). Recent studies have shown that the Twelve were not the only apostles (there is at least the case of Paul which has to be taken into consideration as well as the enumeration found in I Co. 15:3-8). Furthermore, it is theorized that the term "apostle" was first used in Antioch to designate those who were sent out on mission (Ac. 13:3; 14:4,14) and only later reserved par excellence to the Twelve by Luke when writing independently from any given tradition. As for Paul's notion of an apostle, Josef Hainz, *Ekklesia. Strukturen paulinischer Gemeinde-Theologie und Gemeinde-Ordnung [Biblische Untersuchungen 9; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1972]* has pointed out the importance he places on the foundation of a local church as well as upon the call from and vision of the Resurrected Christ. Hainz also brings out the role of the helpers of Paul in his apostolate going so far as to say that Paul foresaw the need of successors already on the level of *Philippians* (*Ekklesia*, 210-214; 303-306), although not in the sense of a juridical apostolic succession. Antonio Javierre, "Le theme de la succession des Apotres dans la litterature chretienne primitive," *L'Episcopat et l'Eglise universelle (Unam Sanctam 39; Paris: Cerf, 1962)* 171-221, maintains that the reality if not the term of succession in relation to the apostolic deposit of Faith (*paradosis kata diadochen*) can be discerned already in 2 Tm. 2:2 and I Clement 44:1-3, and consequently was not merely borrowed from the Gnostics by Irenaeus. The question of how exactly this succession took place is admittedly complex. As for functional succession, it would seem that we can admit with A. Lemaire, *Les ministeres aux origines de L'Eglise*, 199-200, that from the beginning there existed in each community members exercising specific and recognized functions. In this sense, ministry, *diaconia*, can be considered as a characteristic and necessary element of the life of any authentic church. However, the terms used to denote this ministry were often different from church to church. A proof that terminology, in this case, was secondary. The triple hierarchy of deacon, priest, and bishop is found definitely established in Antioch at the time of Ignatius and spread to the Occident by the middle of the second century. The question of how the bishops came to be the successors of the apostles is the task of historical research and of historical reconstruction. A very good study on this subject is to be found in the article of Pierre Benoit, "Les origines apostoliques de l'episcopat selon le

Nouveau Testament," *L'Eveque dans l'Eglise du Christ (Textes et Etudes Theologiques)*; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1963) 13-57, which I am surprised not to find quoted by R. E. Brown, *Priest and Bishop Biblical Reflections* (New York: Paulist Press, 1970). While the apostles (the missionary apostles of the Antiochene tradition as well as those among the Twelve who were in fact missionary apostles, Peter in particular) were alive, there was no need for successors in the strict sense of the word but rather of collaborators and of local ministers. After the death of the major apostles, their collaborators or "second-grade" apostles continued their work. But, as they died out, eventually one member of the *episcopoi-presbyteroi* of the local church, having previously been installed by an apostle or his collaborator or by some other means, took on the succession. There are indeed "gaps" in this theory, but does not God reveal his Plan of Salvation in history, and does not the Spirit lead the Church to the fullness of truth (Jn. 16:13) in time? No doubt crises, especially in the form of heresy, helped the Church to become aware of its ministerial reality (See what is said about the Petrine magisterium in R. E. Brown et alii, *Peter in the New Testament*, 154-156), but the same may be said of its awareness of dogmatic truths. All of which boils down to say that we must turn to the living Tradition of the Church for a suitable answer to this question. I would highly recommend Fr. Yves Cougar's treatment of this whole question in two recent publications: *L'Eglise Une, Sainte, Catholique et Apostolique (Jfysterium Salutis 15)*; Paris: Cerf, 1970, and "Apostolicite de ministere et apostolicite de doctrine," *Jfministere et communion ecclesiale*, 51-94.

We certainly have to agree with Fr. McBrien when he recalls (p. UO) that the whole Church is apostolic. Such, at least, is the teaching of *Ephesians* and *Revelation* in the sense that the Apostles are the witnesses of Christ who remains the cornerstone (Ep. 2:20), the basic foundation (I Co. 3:10f). This fact, however, still allows for men to be called to serve the Church by continuing the apostolic office of pastor and leader just as the common priesthood of the faithful leaves room for the ministerial priesthood. On the other hand, it is equally true that the Church is gifted with a diversity of gifts or services which are all to be respected and fostered "with propriety and order" (I Co. 14:40) as well as with discernment (I Th. 5: I Jn. 4:1-4). When we ask who is to perform this discernment, the answer seems to be tripartite: 1) the people (I Jn. 4:1-4); those who are granted the same gift (I Co. 14:32) or the special gift of discernment (I Co. 10); 3) the Apostle (I Co. 14:36-38). All the gifts come from the one Spirit (I Co. 12:4-11) for the building up of the Body of Christ (I Co. 14:4,12,26; Ep. 4:12). Vatican II furnished some light on this subject in *Lumen Gentium*, *Ad Gentes*, *Presbyterorum ordinis*, 4,9; *Apostolicam actuositatem*, 8,80.

Among the gifts of the Spirit are to be found the prophets and the

teachers enumerated along with the apostle (I Co. 12:28; Ep 4:11) . But can we speak properly of a " Succession of prophets and of teachers " as Fr. McBrien does? (p. 120) If so, does this imply a continuous succession in time from the Apostles to this day, a material succession from, say, teacher to pupil as we find both in hellenistic philosophical schools and jewish rabbinical schools? When Georg G. Blum, *Tradition & Sukzession. Studien zum Normbegriff des Apostolischen von Paulus bis Irenaus (Arbeiten zur Geschichte und Theologie des Luthertums* 9; Berlin und Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlaghaus, 1963) 56-59, 66, 76,86,189,194, speaks of the Teacher-Pupil succession on the level of the Pastorals, Justin, Papias, and Irenaeus, it would seem that the pupil was at the same time a office-holder. Furthermore, it would seem that the use of the term "prophet" quickly disappeared in the post-apostolic period (E. Cothenet, " Prophetisme," *Supplement au Dictionnaire de la Bible* (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1972] 1331-1337), and that the function of teacher was assumed by the presbyters and bishops (G. Hasenhiittl, *Charisma. Ordnungsprinzip der Kirche (Okumenische Forschungen I: Ekklesiologische Abteilung V*; Freiburg: Herder, 1969) 205-207; A. Lemaire, *Ministeres aux origines de l'Eglise*, 180-182). More basically, we must ask who were these prophets and teachers? Did they form a permanent group in the Early Church? According to I Co. 14:1,5,31, it would seem that prophecy would be open to all members, and this in accordance with Acts 2:17-21. According to I Co. 14:26, everyone should be ready to present a psalm or a teaching at the meetings of the community whereas, in Ep. 4:11, pastor and teacher are so closely associated that one article is used in the Greek for both terms (J. Hainz, *Ekklesia*, 87-88; G. Hasenhiittl, *Charisma*, 204, n. 14). The point I am trying to make by these remarks is not that the Spirit does not furnish the Body of Christ with prophets and teachers but rather that it does not seem clear that these gifts were ever considered in the Primitive Church as offices calling forth a material succession say by the laying on the hands or some other means. Nor does it seem legitimate to equate the modern theologians with the teachers of the New Testament who would seem to embrace a much larger group of teaching activities. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the gift of "teacher " is granted to the Church and should be recognized and fostered unless one would doubt that the Spirit continues to work in the Body of Christ granting his gifts as he sees fit (One might consult the issue of *Concilium* 1972 on Ministry in the Church) . And since it is the one Spirit who is at work, order, harmony, and propriety should exist among the various gifts.

8. A Bill of Rights.

The Bill of Rights Fr. McBrien calls for (pp. 95-96) is meant to protect the individual's rights as a Christian, i.e., his Christian freedom (2 Co

3:17). He claims that it is necessary for the mutual protection of one another's freedom. (p. It would afford legal protection rather than rely on benign paternalism. It would include the right to search for truth, to publish one's opinions, to have access to objective information, to develop one's potentialities and personal traits, to meet the challenges of the present time, to a decent wage, to assembly, to due process, to protection against discrimination, etc.

I am quite sure the author would agree that our *Lex fundamentalis*, our Bill of Rights, is the Gospel. No doubt, the Gospel Message has to be explicated and applied during the Time of the Church. But, any explication or application finds its basic norm in the Gospel. This is equally true in the case of Canon Law. Furthermore, the call for a Bill of Rights and other laws makes one yearn for the simplicity of the New Law as exposed by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, qq. 106-108. The New Law is primarily the grace of the Holy Spirit which is granted through the faith of Christ and, secondarily, those realities which dispose one to receive the grace of the Spirit or to make good use of it. Precepts are kept to a minimum, and the rest left up to the free will of the faithful (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q.107, a.4, c.; a.3, ad 3). Laws, be they Church laws, cannot replace the Law of the Spirit; they can only hope to translate into all too human terms the dynamic and ever present inspirations of the Spirit who alone remains the ultimate protector and source of Christian freedom. If Churchmen ever forget this, they are proclaiming the bankruptcy of the Church. If, on the other hand, we could only live the teaching of Jesus that authority in the Church is essentially service (Mt. 10:25-28; Jn. 13:14-15), that it is given for the building up and not for the destruction of the Body of Christ (Co. 10:8; 13:10), that our virtue must surpass that of the scribes and the pharisees (Mt. 5: that "there are no more distinctions between Jew and Greek, slave and free, male and female, but that all of you are one in Christ Jesus" (Ga. 3:28), then what need would there be for the proposed Bill of Rights? It could probably serve as a reminder and a concrete realization of the New Testament Message. Granted, just so long as our freedom in Christ is founded on the Spirit and not on the Law for: "... the written letters bring death, but the Spirit gives life" (Co. 3:6). St. Thomas (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q.106, a.2, c.) goes so far as to apply this text to the written letter of the New Testament considered aside from the interior grace of faith which cures. How much more can it be applied to the proposed Bill of Rights or to Canon Law in general. Are abuses so rampant that we have to shackle ourselves with laws? If so, I for one, doubt that laws are the solution. They can engender a false security and thereby distract from what is essential: the continuous putting on of the new man in Christ. In a civil society laws are no doubt necessary to defend the freedom of citizens, but in the Church there is one ultimate authority to whom all

may appeal in the depths of their conscience: God Father, Son, and Spirit. (cf. T. R. Potvin, "Authority in the Church as Participation in the Authority of Christ According to Saint Thomas," *Saint Thomas Aquinas Commemorative Colloquium (1274-1974) [Eglise et Theologie 5 (1974). 227-251]*).

9. Ecclesiastical Courts.

Under this heading Fr. McBrien makes an insistent appeal for reform in the ecclesiastical courts, and especially in the case of the Marriage Tribunals. He asks for greater simplicity and speed in order to insure justice. (pp. 97-99) Practical measures should be taken in order to assure this end with the accent again on decentralization. At the same time, he suggests that the holiness and indissolubility of marriage be better lived and taught in the Community. Pastoral care of divorced and remarried Christians should also be taken into consideration.

Theologically, (pp. 121-123) he calls for a renewed and closer look at the whole question of marriage. This, of course, is already taking place, and at a fairly fast pace. Theologians and canonists have been actively studying the question for over a decade. A consensus does not yet seem to have been reached, but some important scriptural as well as historical points have been clarified. One important point which seems to rally the support of all is that of the holiness and indissolubility of Christian, sacramental marriage as the ideal, eschatological situation. But, during the Time of the Church, which is characterized by the "already" and the "not yet" of eschatology, would there not be room for the Father's mercy, forgiveness, and love? The Church has come to recognize this possibility in so serious a case as murder. Why not in the case of sinful or non-sinful marriage failure? (For further details see: *Le divorce: L'Eglise catholique ne devrait-elle pas modifier son attitude seculaire a l'egard de l'indissolubilite du mariage?* [Travaux du Congres de la Societe canadienne de theologie, tenu a Montreal du 21 au 24 aout 1972; *Heritage et Projet 6*; Montreal: Fides, 1973]).

10. Women in the Church.

The Author proposes that the Church finally admit women to full participation in her life and in her ministry. (pp. 99-100; IQ3-125)

This is a domain which is under full and intensive review in the Church today. The idea is making its way slowly but surely within the living thought of the Church today. There are still many who hesitate or are frankly against the idea of women being called to participate in the ordained ministry. (See for instance the remarks of Y. Congar, "Mon cheminement dans la theologie du laicat et des ministeres," *Ministere et communion ecclesiale*, 25: "Sans affirmer qu'elles en soient exclues de droit divin, je demeure reserve et meme negatif. Mais je pense que la theologie

des ministeres exposee plus haut ouvre de larges possibilites, en del;a du presbyterat."). Personally, I believe that we are faced here, once again, with a case in point of the difference between Tradition and traditions, between models and the Gospel Message, between the Eternal Word of God and its historical and cultural incarnation.

I am of the opinion that the touchstone of this whole debate is to be found in Ga.3:28: "... nor are you Jew or Greek, nor are you slave or free, nor are you male or female, for all of you are one in Christ." This text, which no one can doubt resumes a very fundamental aspect of the Gospel of Paul (I Co. 12:13,27; Col. 3:11,15; Ep. 4:4-6, 13-16), is the Magna Carta for the establishment of women's rightful place in the Church, the Body of Christ. **If** there is no longer male or female, but we are all one in Christ, why should not women take up their share of "slavery" and "service" (Mt. 20:27) in the Body of Christ? Because of historical reasons?

There are serious reasons for believing that when Paul speaks disparagingly of the role of women in the Church he is echoing the customs of the Jerusalem Community (J. Hainz, *Ekklesia*, 235, 250-252; L. Cerfaux, *La theologie de l'Eglise suivant saint Paul [Unam Sanctam 54; Paris: Cerf, 1965]* 98-100; "La Tradition selon saint Paul," *Vie Spirituelle, Supplement 5* [1953] 178-188; reprinted in *Recueil Lucien Cerfaux II* [Gembloux: Duculot, 1954] 253-263; Y. Congar, *La Tradition et les traditions* [Paris: Fayard, 1960] I, 22-23; H. Holstein, *La Tradition dans L'Eglise [Eglise et le Temps Present; Paris: Grasset, 1960] 52-53*). That these customs do not have the same binding force as the Gospel (Ga. I: 7-10) is seen in the very use Paul makes of them. In I Co. 11:5, Paul is content to ask women not to pray or prophesy unveiled, whereas in I Co. 14:33-34, he asks them to remain quiet in the communities. A similar uneasiness with the teaching on the submission of women to men is seen in I Co. 11:71-6. In verses 11-12, Paul is obliged to admit: "... though woman cannot do without man, neither can man do without woman, in the Lord; woman may come from man, but man is born of woman-both come from God." Indeed, union through Christ, in the Spirit, transcends all barriers.

More enlightening of Paul's attitude toward these customs of the Jerusalem church is his interpretation, in I Co. 8-10 and Rm. 14:1-12, of what "... has been decided by the Holy Spirit and by ourselves" at the meeting of Jerusalem (Ac.15:28-29). No doubt, Paul's interpretation is in line with James's statement that the converts were not to scandalize the Jewish Christians (Ac.15:21) but rather live their freedom in the Spirit in a context of love and consideration for one's neighbor. But, it not instructive to see that customs held fast to by the church of Jerusalem could and have been surpassed in the Time of the Church? As the whole Church is led to fuller knowledge of Christ's Message by the Spirit and penetrates deeper into the core of the Message and reality of

the Christ-Event, certain customs, which were part of the traditional and primitive catechesis (while entertaining certain similarities with stoic and judeo-hellenistic household and civil ethics, cf. H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser*. Ein Kommentar [Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1964⁴¹] were dropped altogether or transformed substantially. However, it is important to note that the seeds of fulfilment were present from the very start since there is only one true Lord, Jesus Christ, in whom all men are called to become one. It took time for the Primitive Church to realize that there is no longer Jew and Greek. It took the Church and mankind nearly 19 centuries to realize that there is no longer slave and free, and the process is not yet over. How long will it take before we realize that there is no longer male and female, but that we are all one in Christ?

The New Testament does not, of course, ignore the presence and the role of women. The Childhood Narratives express in eloquent terms the role of Mary in Salvation History. During Jesus' public ministry, women are present among his followers as they are at the Crucifixion. Then, of course, it is women who discover the Empty Tomb and are sent to announce Christ's Resurrection to the Eleven. After the Ascension, Mary and several women gathered with the Eleven and the brothers of Jesus in prayer (Ac. I: 14). It is probably to this verse, and not to verse 15, that Acts 1 refers when narrating the Gift of the Spirit. However, it may be argued that these and other texts do not refer to public, church ministry. Yet, we read that the four daughters of Philip were prophets (Ac.

9; comp. I Co. 11:5; A. Lemaire, *Les ministeres aux origines de L'Eglise*, 69-70). But, more important for the study of this question, are the indications found in Rm. 16: 1ff. In verse 1, we read that Phoebe was a minister (*diakonon*) of the Church at Cencheae. If this section of *Romans* be Pauline, the term *diakonon* should be interpreted according to Paul's usual use of the term, i.e., as denoting his (Col. I: as well as his collaborators task in the Church (A. Lemaire, *Les ministeres* ... , 94; cf. J. Hainz, *Ekklesia*, 8520ff). Verse 8 speaks of Prisca and Aquila as co-workers (*synergoi*) of Paul, another term which Paul uses to describe both his ministry and that of his helpers (J. Hainz, *Ekklesia*, 816-818). The same holds true for the term "labor" which is used in verse 6 as a verb to qualify the work of Mary (A. Lemaire, *Les ministeres* ... , 95). True, we cannot furnish the exact "job description" of the tasks which lay behind these terms at this given period of time in the history of the Church, but it is indicative of their importance that they are also used to describe the ministry of Paul and of his male associates. This fact merits, I believe, more attention from exegetes and theologians.

Finally, there is the controversial verse 7 which may be translated either as: "... to those outstanding apostles Andronicus and Junias "; or "... to Andronicus and Junias "; or "... to Andronicus and Junias who are outstanding among the apostles." Nor is it certain whether we are dealing

with the masculine *Jounias* or the feminine *Jounia* (J. Hainz, *Ekklesia*, 196-198, 295; A. Lemaire, *Les ministeres* . . . , 95). It would seem advisable to leave this verse aside in the present study until more light can be shed on its interpretation as well as on the interpretation of the term "apostle."

In order to avoid as much as possible another theory-and-practice gap in the Church, this whole question of the role of women in the Church should continue to be discussed, and prayed upon in the whole Church. It has been my experience that not only men but also women need to be informed of the discussion which is going on and of the biblical, patristic, and theological arguments involved. The Church must realize that in this domain, as in the domain of social justice for instance, she has a prophetic mission to accomplish within the context of today's culture. The Word of God to which the Church testifies judges customs and cultures.

11. Renewal of Religious Communities.

Fr. McBrien calls religious orders to reassume their prophetic mission within the Church, to be hotbeds of renewal and reform. In order to perform this task, he points out that they themselves must actively seek renewal and reform within their own communities. The members of religious orders should be provided with all those modern benefits which social progress sees as basic for one's well-being, given to participate in decisions which determine their own lives, reemphasize their solidarity with the poor, be apostles of peace and social justice, etc. (pp. 100-102)

The theology behind the call for renewal is that the whole Church is the People of God, and a pilgrim people at that. There is need for constant growth with the accompanying changes in the institutional aspects of the Church. This should also be reflected in the religious orders. Their prophetic mission comes from the fact that religious are called to testify to the presence and activity of the Kingdom of God already at work in this world. However, in order to accomplish this mission, religious are not called to abandon the world. Although they are not *Of* the world, they are called to witness in the world. This task calls for a lucid assumption of freedom in the Spirit. In a word, the renewal of religious communities can make them be for the Church what the Church is called to be for the rest of the world: the avant-garde of the Kingdom of God. (pp. 125-128)

This general outline for renewal of religious communities leaves unsaid one point which I feel merits closer scrutiny: authentic reform can only come if it touches the individual in the very core of his or her being. Reform of structures can succeed only if it favors and manifests a deeper reform, *metanoia* in the heart of the religious; if it leads to a more living contact with Christ in the Spirit. This, I feel, is the essential task on

which we should focus all our efforts and from which all our activity and ministry should flow. This, in no way, implies a return to an individualistic piety since to be in Christ is to be members one of the other; to be in the Spirit is to be one with he who unites us in and through Christ. But, it does reemphasize the fundamental Christian truth that our communion is in the Father and the Son (I Jn. 1:3; comp. Jn. 17:21). Structural reforms are meaningless if they do not find their ultimate drive and purpose in Christ.

The religious who is aware of his union in Christ with all the members of the Body of Christ will exercise his charisma so as to foster the growth of the Body of Christ. He will be aware of the fact that we are members one of another and consider the growth of the community and of the Church as his business. He will also be respectful of the charismata found in the other members. As a prophet, he will allow himself to be guided by the other prophets, the People of God, and the apostle. Moreover, in the exercise of his ministry, he will not consider himself as either above or over and against the Church but as a member seeking the building up and not the destruction of the Body of Christ. The exercise of his ministry of prophet will be characterized by that humility which comes from the realization that he is not perfect but seeking perfection, and consequently the Word of God which he proclaims judges him as well as others. His ministry will also be qualified by love so that when he, in fidelity to God's Word, must condemn attitudes and works, never condemns persons. **If** he challenges the Church, he is careful not to identify the Church with the hierarchy so that he is, in fact, challenging himself as well as well as others with the implications of the Word of God for today. The prophet, like the apostle, is not self-righteous, but" ... only an earthenware jar that holds a treasure." (2 Co. 4:7) On the other hand, he is one who is always open to the inspirations of the Spirit seeking his security not *in* institutions but in the Word of God. I repeat that I think we have flogged the horse of structural reform long enough. **It** is time we get a little spirit, or better still the Holy Spirit, into this scene. I am confident that if and when we do so the extent of structural reforms which will sprout up will surprise even the most progressive members of Theory C. But, of course, absolute openness to the Spirit is the most difficult renewal possible. **It** is always easier to fall back on traditions, sociology, psychology when it is not the "old man." In fact, re-creation in Christ is destined to be fully achieved only with the Parousia (Rm. 8:23; 2 Co. 5:1-10).

Since Vatican II the notion of religious life has come under full review. I am thinking here especially of the well-documented works of my confrere, Jean-M. Roger Tillard. **It** is encouraging to note that the accent is being placed on the essentials and not merely on external reforms which, without love, are gongs booming and cymbals clashing. There is hope for religious life if only we learn to discern the workings of the Holy Spirit from those of the spirit of man and of the adversary.

12. The Ministry of the Ordained.

Fr. McBrien begins by recalling three well-known facts: dissatisfaction among the clergy with the exercise of ecclesiastical authority and the traditional life-styles; the resignation of thousands of priests; the sharp decline in candidates for the ministry. He then proposes the implementation of three basic principles: the collegial character of the Christian priesthood; the principle of subsidiarity; and the fact that priests have the same personal rights as any other member of the Church. These principles should be translated into such practices as the deliberative participation of priests in the decisions taken in the diocese; the freedom to minister in another diocese; the liberty to resign from active ministry without exclusion from employment in church-related organizations; the freedom to innovate parish structures; accountability not only to bishop and fellow priests but to parishioners; the right to marry. (pp. 102-106)

Objections to these proposed changes in the presbyteral ministry spring, according to the author, from the understanding of the Church as a monarchical institution (Theory A Catholics); or a mistaken understanding of collegiality; too little regard for the principle of subsidiarity and an exaggerated regard for the status of the ordained minister over against the rest of the Church. Deliberative power should be granted to priests' senates because of the collegial nature of the Church, the sharing, by bishops and priests, in the one priesthood of Christ, and the fact that the mission belongs radically to all, and therefore all must have, at least in principle, a share in the decision-making processes whereby the mission is determined, planned, and executed. (pp. 128-129)

I have no quarrel with the principles of collegiality, subsidiarity, and the common sharing in the priesthood of Christ both as regards the ministerial priesthood of the ordained and the priesthood of holiness of all baptized. However, I hesitate to translate these basic principles into the theory of "one man, one vote." There is a variety of spiritual gifts, services, and works in the "one" Body of Christ. Even within one given charisma there are the "major" and "secondary" apostles or helpers. Historically, it is even possible that the "episcopoi" were the executive body of the "presbyteroi." There would, then, seem to be evidence of a variety of ways of sharing in the authority-service of the Primitive Church. I doubt very much that we will correct a situation where authority tends to be interpreted as dominative power instead of service by granting more people to participate in it. The more authority in the Church is seen for what Christ intended it to be, i. e., service, the more, I believe, members called to assume this burden will be willing to share it in order to fulfil the mission to proclaim the Good News of the Kingdom to all men.

I doubt also that one can ascribe merely to a monarchical understanding of ecclesiastical authority objections against freedom of movement for

priests as well as the resistance to alternate forms of ministerial leadership and of community. (p. Basing himself on the theology of the local church the author has already argued against the translation of bishops from one diocese to another. (pp. 118-119) But, is not the community equally involved in the call of its immediate pastors, priests? Conversely, is not the person who accepts such a call "committed" to a local church if not a local parish? No doubt, the needs of a parish community have to be weighed in the light of the diocesan community, the diocesan community in the light of the regional community, the regional community in the light of the Universal Church. But, it would be exaggerated to say that merely a monarchical understanding of ecclesiastical authority is at work here. I would suggest that the theology of the Body of Christ as found especially in the Epistles of the Captivity is at work here. As for resistance to alternate forms of community and ministerial leadership is concerned, besides inertia which plagues us all, we might be faced with the question of allowing the necessary time for trial and error; the question of the right man at the right time; the question of taking the time to bridge the gap between theory and practice; etc. As for the question of granting men who have resigned from the active ministry some form of ecclesiastical employment, I must admit that it is a very real problem. There does seem to be a tendency to treat them as if they had "fallen" from the "clerical state" and consequently can be of no further service to the Church. Perhaps some need to break away completely from the clerical milieu in order to find their own way in life. But, the Church as a whole must not forget that there is a diversity of ministries granted to it by the one Spirit and that she should be attentive to these gifts, especially the gift of love. There are many services which can be performed in the Church which do not require an active exercise of the ministerial priesthood, and even the "simple faithful" can be brought to a realization of this fact.

Objections against evaluation of ministerial performance (pp. may very well be based, for Theory A priests, on the view that accountability is always upward, but it might also be based on the fear all men have when it is question of seeing our work evaluated by others. Theological arguments may be brought into play in order to buttress one's position, especially when one's livelihood is at stake, but I would hope that they would not be as crude as those evoked here. I find it hard to imagine that a Catholic, be he of Theory A, B or C, would not admit that Pastor, Bishop, and Pope are accountable to the Father's Will as revealed in Christ Jesus whose message comes to us in the normative testimony of the Apostles, the New Testament witnesses, and the living Tradition of the Church. Such, at least, is the teaching of Trent, Vatican I, and Vatican II. There is even a long canonical tradition on the possibility of deposing an heretical Pope. The author himself is well aware of the official teaching

of the Church, and even pleads against granting Salaverri's views a longer life span than they deserve. (cf. R. McBrien, *The Infallibility Debate* [J. J. Kirvan, ed.; New York: Paulist Press, 1971] 45-46) On the other hand, throughout this question of accountability the Church must remain faithful to the Spirit and allow for the possibility of his speaking even through ordained ministers in a way which is not always popular. The whole Church is accountable to its Head, the Lord Jesus Christ. The whole Church must remember that it is in constant need of conversion. The best service an ordained minister can render is to recall this need for *metanoia* whether it be popular or not. I have my doubts as to whether or not sheer popularity is a good indication of the "sensus fidelium," and I make this remark in relation to what the author states about popular books on page 58.

I must admit that I find Fr. McBrien's selection among the arguments proposed by the supporters of celibacy somewhat perfunctory. A better case in favor of celibacy can and has been made than what we find in one brief paragraph on page 130. If celibacy for parish priests is ever to become elective, as I believe it should be, the question will have to be treated with a great deal more seriousness than is the case here. I find it hard to believe that a celibate is more dependent on the organization than is a married man who has to shoulder the financial responsibilities of a wife and family. How many married men have had to learn to toe the company, the union or the faculty line in order to keep their jobs, and this even at the expense of their personal views? Furthermore, I know of no ecclesiology which fosters celibacy in order to keep the troops in line. If one should exist, I personally fail to see in it any reflection of the Good News of the Kingdom.

13. Ecumenical Relationships.

In this final proposition (pp. 106-108), Fr. McBrien presents some practical suggestions for getting the Ecumenical Movement off the ground once again. No one can deny that there is less talk of ecumenism these days than there was in the not too distant past. Yet, important studies have appeared, dialogues have gone on on official levels. The issues have been identified more precisely and have been studied in great detail by both parties. Important points have been made. Perhaps we have come to the stage of reassessment and assimilation before going on. The author has often called for a closing of the gap between theory and practice. He knows as well as anyone that this requires time and conversion. The results of the various studies need not only be publicized at greater length, they need also to be critically examined by other specialists and by the whole People of God. Infallibility, after all, has not been transferred from the Pope to the theologians of a given study group. Intercommunion, for instance should be the source but also the sign of our union in Christ.

If there are still important doctrinal differences between two communities, what happens to the sign-value of the Eucharist celebrated in common? Is there room for "mental reservations" in so meaningful a gesture as the Eucharist? On the other hand, no true Christian can forget Christ's prayer that we all be one in him and the Father. Communion must realize and symbolize this union, otherwise it is unauthentic.

As for public acceptance of the validity of some non-catholic ordained ministry, recent studies on ministry in the New Testament and on the notion of succession have opened up some positive vistas. There would seem to have been a variety of ministries, even as regards the celebration of the Eucharist, in the Early Church. But, there is also a long tradition concerning the succession of ministers which was established universally in the Church by the second half of the first century. Are we in the presence here of Tradition or of a tradition? Is the triple hierarchy the only valid realization of Christ's will, or are there other possibilities open for the realization of ministerial services in the Body of Christ? What must be ascribed merely to the cultural milieu of the times and what to the Holy Spirit who leads us to the fulness of truth in time and space? These are some of the questions still under review among the specialists. No doubt, we must pass from study to action one day lest we all become set in our ways once again. But, there is equal necessity for conversion on all sides if union is ever to be achieved. Our desire, after all, is for union in Christ, through the Spirit, for the Glory of God the Father.

Fr. McBrien is right in saying that non-Catholic Christians who are properly baptized in the name of Christ are brought into a certain, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church, and that their communities are even called "church." (p. 131, quoting the *Decree on Ecumenism*, 3) He is also correct in stating that oneness, holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity are eschatological goals, i.e., "already" given, "not yet" achieved. The Catholic Church is not purely and simply identified with the Church of Christ which is said rather to subsist in the Catholic Church (*Lumen Gentium*, 8; *Decree on Ecumenism*, 8), while very important elements of the Church of Christ are found in other churches (*Decree on Ecumenism*, 3; *Lumen Gentium*, 15). With Vatican II the Catholic Church has firmly embarked on the road of an "ecumenism of restoration." (pp. 131-138) It is also important to note with the author (p. 133) that a greater understanding of the positions of the various churches on the "Real Presence" has been achieved in recent years. But, that this is not the only question is manifested by the fact that it is the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue which explicitly rejects eucharistic sharing under any circumstances. The author terms this "ironical." Perhaps it is an effort to safeguard the "sign-value" of the Eucharist.

The Lutheran-Catholic Dialogue in the U. S. A. has indeed furthered

a better understanding of the ministry within the ecclesiastical community in general starting from New Testament times. (pp. 133-134) Vatican II has recognized the decisive role of baptism as means for incorporation into the Body of Christ, the ecclesial character of the community of baptized, and the universal call to the mission of Christ. But, baptism is inwardly ordained to the Eucharist. Eucharist and Mission require ministry. These points, I feel, have been clearly established. But, there is also another aspect which requires study: historical succession or the incarnational aspect of the Church even in its ministry. Man is an historical being. Tradition is part and parcel of his historical reality. Most, if not all, will admit of the necessity of doctrinal apostolic succession, and this, no doubt, is the essential point (yet even here some will call for a canon within the Canon). Real Tradition, formal succession are accepted on the whole without much ado. Material transmission or succession for awhile were attributed to the influence of Gnosticism on the Church. More and more, it would seem that the philosophical and rabbinical schools offer more than enough background for the notion of Tradition through Succession (*Paradosis kata Diadochen*). That the Church became aware of this principle because of the teaching of false prophets and the gnostics may be termed an historical situation. On the other hand, if the Father revealed his Plan of Salvation in the Event-Christ, and if the Spirit leads us to the fullness of truth in time and space, the Church must learn to discern what is normative and what is merely cultural in its Tradition since both come to us through history. The sayings: "Where the Spirit is, there is the Church," "Where the Church is, there is the bishop," could easily lead to an ahistorical, disincarnate Church, at least as far as ministry is concerned. On the other hand, can the Spirit be present, can Scriptures be read and believed, can baptism be celebrated, can mission be undertaken without, at the same time, the presence of the gift of a valid ministry? Ministry is for the Church, and not the Church for ministry. But, the Church is not a purely spiritual, in the sense of ahistorical and disincarnate, reality. Is there not place for historical as well as doctrinal continuity with the Apostles? Both Scripture and Tradition must, it would seem, be taken into account even in a practical ecclesiology (For further details, see: J.-M.R. Tillard, *What Priesthood has the Ministry?* [Grove Booklet on Ministry and Worship 13; Bramcote Notts.: Grove Books, 1973]; Ulrich Brockhaus, *Charisma und Amt* [Wuppertal: Theologischer Verlag Rolf Brockhaus, Collaboration, *Le ministere et les ministeres selon le Nouveau Testament* [Parole de Dieu; Paris: Seuil, 1974]). I for one feel that the theory needs further elaboration and confirmation before it is put into practice even though a clear trend towards a more comprehensive notion of validly ordained ministry seems to be emerging. It is time, however, for these findings to be presented and debated in theological schools and in study

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groups. It would be most unfortunate if one day, out of the blue, the faithful learn that the hierarchy now recognize the validity of the ordained ministry of other churches. I agree wholeheartedly with Fr. McBrien when he states that we must bridge the Theory-and-Practice gap while adding that development in theory must be properly discerned before it is proclaimed as Church theory. Information must be furnished to the People of God so that they may exercise their "sensus fidelium."

The final Chapter (pp. 139-148) deals with the future of the Church. The absolute and ultimate future of the Church, the final establishment of the Kingdom of God, rests in the hands of God alone. The relative and proximate future of the Church, its role as sign and instrument of the power of the Kingdom of God at work now in the world, depends on the Church's openness and response to God's call. In this latter sense, the Church should constantly foster renewal, self-criticism and reform. This is part and parcel of the Church's pilgrim state. Reform, renewal, progress, development, are not the exception in such a Church but the rule. Security and stability are to be found not so much in well established, traditional structures as in the Spirit who unites us to and in Christ. Structures, of all shapes and forms, are valid only insofar as they are means of our union through Christ, in the Spirit, with the Father.

How can one bring about the necessary changes in the Church structures? Fr. McBrien reiterates the five words of counsel offered in the March 197£ statement of Catholic theologians from the United States, Canada and Europe (pp. 145-146): Do not remain silent. Do something yourself. Act together. Seek provisional solutions. Don't give up. The author feels that hard times are still in store for the Church, and I tend to agree. But, is the disciple greater than the Master?

I stated at the beginning of this review that Fr. McBrien's book, although short, was thought-provoking. After all these pages I am aware that I have merely scratched the surface of the many questions he brings before the reader. I have found myself very often in agreement with the substance of his presentation. I do tend to disagree with what seems to be his insistence on structural reforms. It is my firm hope that the remarks made here will help further dialogue within the Church of Christ in general and among "teachers" in particular.

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Ecclesial Cybernetics. By PATRICK GRANFIELD. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pp. 280. \$8.95.

The Church has survived persecutions, heresies, schisms, apostasies, and a host of other assaults upon its staying power. To this familiar catalog of institutional problems Patrick Granfield has now added the threat of entropy, "a random state of disorder" with affiiicts "a closed system insulated from its environment." Where previously the blood of martyrs, councils, reforms, and other sustaining forces enabled the Church to ride out the storm, Granfield points out that now it is negative entropy which, apart from "the guarantee of indefectibility," will enable the Church "to persevere and flourish." In the perspective of cybernetic analysis negative entropy is a function of the flow of information within an organization. The more open a system is, the greater its interaction with its environment, then the greater are its possibilities for maintenance and development through an increased flow of information. Translating this mechanism into political terms, Granfield identifies an open system with democracy and thus arrives at the thesis of his book: "that the Church needs cybernetic reform through democratization."

The author, a member of the faculty at the Catholic University of America, presents a well-developed case for his prescription. After introducing the reader to the perhaps unfamiliar world of cybernetics (the study of information transmission for communication and control in large organizations), Granfield describes the current organizational framework of the Church. He then offers four case studies of the cybernetic model applied to decision-making within the Church. The issues of slavery, birth control, ecumenism, and priestly celibacy are analyzed in terms of the interaction of inputs, the conversion process, outputs and feedback. He concludes that such an approach "reveals the forces in conflict within the Church" and that these issues "reflect the growing demand for ecclesial democratization."

Granfield then constructs a foundation for such a radical change in Church organization by examining the historical and theological justifications of ecclesial democracy. In this analysis he seeks to answer the question: "whether the democratic ideals of majoritarianism and decentralization are compatible with the hierarchic structure of the Church." He concludes that they are, while at the same time saving the other principles peculiar to ecclesial government, namely, the monarchical (papal) and the hierarchical (episcopal). Specifically, Granfield argues that it is the recognition of the egalitarian and the charismatic elements in the Church, implemented by the greater participation of the membership in selecting bishops and in other non-doctrinal decision-making, which can redress the current entropy-inducing imbalance among the three principles of Church government.

Granted the appropriateness and, indeed, the necessity of democratic reform within the Church, does democracy have a future in the Church, Granfield asks. Citing the immobility, ineffectuality, and isolation of the hierarchy and the docility and passivity of the lower clergy and the laity he recognizes that such a development will be most difficult, but not impossible, to achieve. This brings the author to his specific recommendation for implementing democracy within the Church: the fostering of commitment to community among the members; the development of a freer environment for dissent; a more highly developed system of communication; the use of study commissions as "input-processing" vehicles; and, last but not least, making the selection of bishops a community decision. This latter reform seems to be the major cybernetic mechanism of Granfield's hope for the democratization of the Church; appendices contain the 1971 plan for choosing bishops for the United States drawn up by the Canon Law Society of America, and the Vatican's norms for selecting bishops issued in 1972. Thus ends Granfield's highly innovative approach to the study of ecclesiology.

There is much to approve of in *Ecclesial Cybernetics*. The author writes clearly and skillfully; he is exceptionally well-balanced in developing his insights into so complex a subject, and he provides a well-researched instrument for the benefit of readers who may seek additional enlightenment. Theologians can find here a very competent effort to approach the study of the Church on an interdisciplinary basis. Latter-day-twentieth century men may come to agree with Granfield that the cybernetic analysis of the Church "is a normal and predictable development, and a necessary one as well." Given the author's effort to use a heuristic device such as the cybernetic model to develop insights into the complex life of the Church, there is no doubt that he has broken some new ground.

As with anything new, however, problems are encountered, and the questions they raise may help to map out the frontier in clearer detail. From my perspective as a political scientist I can cite a few problems which arise in conjunction with Granfield's thesis arguing for a cybernetic reform of the Church through democratization.

Any one-dimensional model of an organization tends to over-simplify its problems and their solutions. In the case at hand the cybernetic model does not escape this limitation upon its capacity to capture the full sense of the reality to which it is applied. While one can agree that an improved communications system within the Church may tend to improve the ability of its decision-making outputs to maintain unity among its members, there is no assurance that this consequence will be an unmixed blessing. If, for example, the racial attitudes of the laity are influenced more by the racist culture in which they live than by Christian values (and there is some evidence that such is the case), then a decision in which they participate and which embodies their racism may well achieve the cybernetic value

of homeostasis and at the same time betray the mission of the Church. This illustration points out (as does Granfield) that any democratic adaptation of the Church's decision-making structures which is not accompanied by an interior renewal of Christian values among the participating members would not be an improvement over authoritarian structures which do uphold those values.

Indeed, there is a value far more important than system - persistence when one advocates change in the Church's decision-making structures. The purpose of the Church is not to survive but to serve the mission entrusted to it by Christ. If its own man-made structures are impeding this mission, then they certainly should be changed, and insights derived from a cybernetic analysis of its structures may assist this task. But, again, the leap from this judgment to specific recommendations is one made hazardous by the presence of latent assumptions. In advocating popular participation in the selection of bishops, for example, Granfield tacitly assumes that the current method will not provide the kind of bishop needed in present necessities, and that popular participation will. However, one can conceive that a surer and faster method of obtaining better episcopal leadership in the United States could be to have an Apostolic Delegate (one enjoying great influence with the Vatican) who would nominate the kind of leaders which the American Church needs. Such a procedure might be repugnant to a democratic ideologue, but it would nevertheless solve the problem of providing the type of episcopal leadership which Granfield calls for. Thus, a much greater need than the democratization of the Church's structures is the need for political prudence in its decision-makers-whether they be found in the traditional authoritarian structures or in new participative ones.

All of this is simply to say that a rigorous evaluation of the *latent* implications of any cybernetic reform of the Church's structures should accompany specific recommendations for changes. Granfield cannot be taken to task for what he did not do; he is to be commended for what he has done. He has given the reader a base from which to develop one's own insight into the full life of the Church.

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The Present Revelation: In Quest of Religious Foundations. By GABRIEL MORAN. New York: Herder & Herder, 1972. Pp. 318. \$8.95.

One of the *most* important books to come from a Roman Catholic theologian in the United States during the 1960's was Gabriel Moran's *Theology of Revelation* (New York, 1965). The book was notable, not so much

as a piece of original theology but as a synthesis of the developing understanding of revelation among Catholic and Protestant theologians, a synthesis forged by Moran in his light of the ongoing efforts of the Second Vatican Council. *Theology of Revelation* had, along with *Catechesis of Revelation* (New York, 1966), been the substance of a doctoral dissertation in the religious education department at the Catholic University of America. The basic thrust in both works was away from a conception of revelation as the communication of authoritative and immutable "truths" from God to man towards a conception of it as "a personal union in knowledge between God and a participating subject in the revelational history of a community." Revelation was thus not a past event in the lives of certain people but a relationship which could, indeed must, obtain for men of all times and all cultures. It is not hard to see how this understanding would affect the sort of catechesis to be advocated in *Catechesis of Revelation*.

Despite its universalist tendency, *Theology of Revelation* was essentially a Christo-centric and ecclesio-centric book. Once the author had established some general principles on the question of revelation, he moved from a chapter on "Christ as Revelatory Communion" to chapters on "The Apostolic Sharing of Christ's Consciousness," "The Literary Objectification of Revelation," and "The Continuing Revelation in the Church." "Revelation to all the Earth" would come only in the penultimate position. Moran's more recent effort, *The Present Revelation: In Quest of Religious Foundations*, proceeds in the opposite direction. Once again, the opening remarks are about the state of the question among Roman Catholics, but now he is remarking the peculiar breakup of traditional Roman Catholicism in the years since Vatican II rather than the advances among theologians. The concern is with "the first generation of Catholics who have been able to suspend belief and yet remain Catholics." Moran would raise the issue of revelation for this generation within which he surely stands. The order of the four chapters he presents is significant: "The Question of Revelation"; "Revelation: Human Aspects"; "Divine Aspects"; and finally "The Jewish and Christian Experience." His conviction is that the discussion of revelation in the context of the Jewish and Christian experience will make sense only if talk of revelation apart from this experience makes sense. The central portions of the book state the case for acknowledging *revelation* as a fruitful category for interpreting experiences which would ordinarily qualify as quite secular.

The closest Moran comes to a definition of revelation in *The Present Revelation* is "relation qualified by the fact that the poles of the relation initiate activity toward the other." And, instead of tying it to one relationship, he makes it "the entire set of relations that constitute the universe." He admits that he is stretching common usage, but he attempts to justify such stretching by a brief analysis of the everyday situations in which one might speak of revelation. What he describes in these situations is the prom-

inence of mutual initiative. Having laid this groundwork, he applies the category to human experience insofar as it qualifies as "relationship in which the relata really relate." The main preoccupation throughout is to avoid the classical dissections of experience as active or passive, conscious or unconscious, bodily or spiritual, subjective or objective, dependent or independent, exclusive or inclusive, past or present or future. Moran would bridge all of these splits-however much he might acknowledge that the distinctions are valid and valuable. Even in saying that his usage of *revelation* "always includes the note of a human subject who is engaged in the revelational process," he refrains from associating the usage uniquely with the meeting of persons with each other.

The divine aspect of revelation comes to the fore in attending to the more-than-human dimension in human experience. Moran focusses on a dimension of common experience although he gives considerable play to the peak experiences remarked by thinkers like Abraham Maslow. His desire is to join theology with a phenomenology of the everyday which would not, to take a phrase from Peter Berger, reduce human possibilities to those of "the middle-aged businessman drowsily digesting his lunch." He draws heavily on Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, and Gerardus van der Leeuw in making the basic religious act "one of being enveloped by an 'other' in a way which involves the subject while leaving no doubt that there is some power that confronts the subject," and he insists that the image of life which would eliminate this envelopment and this power must surely be incomplete. *Revelation* is Moran's preferred category for elucidating the religious, and he makes revelation as relationship central in all genuine religion. If one can describe the Jewish and Christian experience as revelational, it is not because there is a collection identifiable as Jewish or Christian revelation but because this experience, too, involves the relationship of envelopment and power. Moran's concluding point is that religious communities will have purpose, for Catholics or for anyone else, only as the setting in which the relational, social and practical aspect-that is, the revelational aspect-of existence is cherished. Their chief purpose today will be to prevent "the closure of judgment on the past and collapse of imagination in considering the future," and, in doing this, they will be genuinely the loci of revelation.

Theology of Revelation and *Catechesis of Revelation*, for all their merits, had been afflicted with a species of intrinsicism: they did not provide an adequate point of connection with ordinary experience. *The Present Revelation* represents a noble endeavor to make the connection. It is a book abounding in wisdom and insight, and Moran argues cogently for his various positions. Nonetheless, the work has a somewhat disjointed and abstract quality about it. The problem is basically that the author has not developed the notion of revelation sufficiently in the first chapter to carry the subsequent chapters and that he has not dwelt sufficiently on concrete

experience to give the presentation flesh and blood. The two difficulties are intertwined. Defining *revelation* as "relation qualified by the fact that the poles of the relation initiate activity toward each other" is, as Moran notes, a stretching of common usage where *revelation* invariably has some implication of "making known." It seems obvious that "making known" can be understood in terms of the qualified relation of the definition, but it does not seem at all obvious that one can talk about revelation intelligibly simply in terms of this relation and in abstraction from the implication of "making known." Moran widens the usage much too casually, and he does not link his elucidation of the widened category to any close depiction of situations for which it would be appropriate. Not only would the depiction have clarified the import of stretching common usage, but it would also have made it simpler to see whether extending it can hold under the proposed criterion that it "makes sense out of a great amount of data." The consequence of this neglect is that *The Present Revelation* breaks up into a series of successful arguments with principal religious thinkers of the contemporary epoch.

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A Theology for Artisans of a New Community. Vol. I The COMMUNITY CALLED CHURCH. Vol. II GRACE AND THE HUMAN CONDITION. Ed. by J, L. SEGUNDO, S. J. New York: Orbis Books.
Pp. Cloth \$4.95, paper \$3.95.

Intended, according to the publisher, for college and seminary courses and adult discussion groups, both volumes have the same format. *The Community Called the Church* has five nuclear chapters, on The Church: A Reality Particular and Universal; The Essence of the Ecclesial Community; The Function and Necessity of the Church; Obligations of the Ecclesial Community; and Church-World Interdependence. *Grace and the Human Condition* has an introduction on what name we give to Christian existence, followed by four chapters on Length (the pre-human, the human condition), Height (eternal life, the new earth), Breadth (humanity, the people of God), and Depth (love, the definitive power). Each chapter is complemented by three to five "clarifications," which attempt to "develop and apply more concretely the central lines of thought, to suggest study topics and related issues, and go over one or two more points in detail" (vol. I, p. ix). Each volume ends with a summary "conclusion" of two pages, several appendices of conciliar and biblical texts, and springboard questions.

By way of judgment it should be said that these volumes could hardly serve as college or seminary text books but rather are suited for discussions or seminars under an experienced teacher. The basic defect of these works is lack of depth, theological and historical. For instance, in each volume there is a discussion of the distinction between the natural and supernatural; the "failures" of past theology are presented, but the author's own solution to the problem is not clear at all.

Despite the lack of depth, these volumes are recommended for maturing Christian students, and even for preachers. Quite a few good ideas are presented, in pithy sentences, and these are valuable in this time of transition in the Church. These works show how the basic teachings of the faith, re-read and expressed according to the signs of these times, are still valid. They do not provide solutions to current problems: rather, they are catalysts for thinking Christians. This alone is valuable, to help the whole Church toward a more adult Christianity.

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Good News and Witness. By L. LEGRAND, J. PATHRAPANKAL, M. VELLANICKAL. St. Peter's Seminary, Bangalore, India: Theological Publications in India. Pp. 190. \$1.00.

It was not with high expectations that the writer agreed to review this book, if only because he was unaware of scholarly works in the biblical field coming from India. It was, therefore, a very pleasant surprise to find an excellent presentation of a contemporary subject, that of evangelization. The word is generally associated with the missionary activity of Christian countries taking the Gospel to the pagan countries. "Its favorite biblical hero is St. Paul; its key text is the missionary command to 'go and teach' found at the end of the Gospel of Matthew." (p. vi) The approach taken here is that of the incarnational theology of St. John. "Ours is a situation of a local Church, aware of her mission to witness to the Gospel and to continue the incarnation of the Message in India." (*ibid.*)

In the first part (pp. 1-60), the work of L. Legrand, "Jesus and the Gospel" is studied in three chapters that portray the missionary character of Jesus' message inasmuch as he radically identified himself with "God's Revolution." (p. 16) It is a masterly presentation that takes into account the best of modern scholarship. Jesus was missionary not primarily because of the campaign he conducted but because of the Gospel he preached. And the Cross "is the supreme act of evangelization" because, as crucified, Jesus "is the perfect image of the new man in the Kingdom who saves his

life by giving it and is set free by making himself a servant even unto death...." (p. 45)

The second part (pp. 61-1f10) takes up "The Early Church and Paul" and is done by J. Pathrapankal and L. Legrand. Here the complexities of the early missionary work of the Church and particularly of St. Paul are analysed. While Paul evangelized in the traditional sense of the word, he was also a missionary in the more radical sense because of his constant and primary witness to Jesus Christ.

The third part (pp. 1f11-168) deals with "Evangelization in the Johannine Writings" and is done by M. Vellanickal. Here evangelization is expressed in its most profound sense since it is more than mere verbal communication; it is bearing constant witness to an experience of faith. "Evangelization in Jn is a twofold process of experiencing and sharing the Christ-event. This takes place through the realization of the life of faith in Christ, whereby Christ, the Word, becomes the interior source of a genuine Christian life. Hence evangelization in Jn takes the concrete form of 'Witnessing!'" (p. 167)

The work cannot be praised too highly as a positive contribution to New Testament theology and as a basic study of a most important issue in Christianity today. Although no publishing date is given, the date of December 8, 1978, appears at the end of the preface. There is an index of Scriptural quotations.

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Inspiration in the Non-biblical Scriptures. By ISHANAND VEMPENY, S. J.
Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 1978. Pp. 280.

This is an intriguing book for many reasons. The author apologizes unnecessarily for his sometimes quaint English, which is usually quite acceptable. His choice of language, of course, has been dictated by pragmatic considerations in respect to the situation of the Church in India. The same considerations have dictated the abandonment of some scholarly paraphernalia, and rightly so: "After spending some thirty working hours in consulting the available books and the readily accessible libraries and pandits for finding out a reference to a *Mahibhiirata* saying which the ordinary Indians versed in the vernacular literature can quote from memory, the author felt that the spending of so much time with so little advantage to the general topic, is an unjustifiable luxury in the present Indian situation." The scholarship, like the language, is quite adequate to its purpose.

The book deals with a problem that is not unique to India but is particularly acute in India where the Church has long existed—we are reminded that the Church is older in India than in most European countries—and has existed alongside other religious traditions even more venerable and, for that matter, deserving of veneration. The scriptures possessed by these traditions are only one aspect of a larger ecumenical question, it is true, but they nevertheless do pose the question.

The author's basic thesis is fairly simple, and fairly plausible. First of all, the great world religions may no longer be regarded as so many aberrations by an ecumenical church but rather as genuine ways to God divinely willed as such for a majority of mankind, in the past as in the foreseeable future. The writings which these religions regard as sacred ought, therefore, to be related somehow by the Church to the writings of the Judeo-Christian scriptural canon, the writings which the Church has always regarded as sacred. The traditional term that expresses the sacred character of Scripture is inspiration.

So far so good. The book bogs down through no fault of the author or of his thesis but only because of the inadequacies of the categories within which the question of inspiration has traditionally been argued, which occasion all sorts of difficulties for him. He wants to establish a basis for the sacred character of non-Christian scriptures by appealing to the canonizing process while at the same time precluding additional sacred scriptures from Christianity. Thus he is forced into the questionable distinction between Old Testament religion as scripture-producing (namely, the scripture which the Church inherited) and Christianity as not. One would preferred a fresh assessment of the relation of the scriptural canon to other Christian scriptures, just as one would have preferred to find here a less rigid concept of the definitiveness of revelation in Christ and of the magisterium, a finer distinction between canon as juridic formulation and as historical process, and so forth. And one would have preferred to find the category of biblical inerrancy simply discarded, since it can be retained in this connection only with the result of leading into an ultimate cul-de-sac.

It is not surprising that the author finds his easiest parallels to the Hindu scriptures in the wisdom strata of the Judeo-Christian writings. Nor is it surprising that he is much indebted to Rahner, as we have suggested above, in making the Old Testament pretty much a "provisional" religion with a provisional scripture in relation to the New Testament. He does not intend this judgment to be taken pejoratively, but inevitably it will be so taken. It would have been much better had he frankly recognized the fact that what the Church was so long concerned with under the rubric *Of* inspiration is a rather different thing from the reality we are now trying to cope with.

We would repeat that we believe the author has done a very good job within his self-imposed limitations. He has had the courage to raise some

excellent questions and to deal with them in an entirely honest and creditable way. He has been assisted, of course, by his cultural background. The Indian tradition is one thing, a generally admirable thing (the author even has some sobering words to say about caste, which sanctimonious "westerners" would do well to read). But considering his argument from the universalism of the divine salvific will to the positive value of the world religions and their scriptures, we also need, perhaps, some other witnesses and other voices. Surely, not *all* the religions of man have been divinely willed? But if not or if so, where are the grounds to judge?

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Ancient Patterns in Modern Prayer. By THOMAS A. KRASNICKI. Edited by Johannes Quasten. *Studies in Christian Antiquity* 19. Washington, D. C.: Consortium Press, 1973. Pp. 317. \$10.00.

This dissertation, completed under the direction of Dom B. Neuenheuser, O. S. B., undertakes a study of the postcommunion prayers of the Roman Missal of Paul VI (=MRN) of 1970. The text of 150 pages is followed by a supplement of 109 pages which includes the Latin texts of the 414 new prayers together with the sources of each prayer. Indexes of all the postcommunion prayers and MRN numbers cited in the text are included together with a somewhat broad bibliography. The ordering of the book is excellent and the ten charts are well executed, providing extremely useful summaries of the material under consideration.

In ch. I the author calls attention to the original purpose of these prayers: petition and not thanksgiving, which is affirmed in the MRN. He then proceeds to analyze the basic structure of the prayers which adopts the form of classical eucharology: 1) invocation of God; 2) petition; 3) grounds for the petition. This chapter closes with a detailed study of the sources of the new prayers which serves to supplement and, in ten cases, correct the work of A. Dumas.

In ch. II five working principles which appear to have been employed by the architects of the new prayers are formulated and discussed: 1) functionally precise; 2) theologically contemporary; 3) stylistically sound; 4) historically accurate; 5) textually correct. Here the author brings into focus the main concern of the *Concilium* which may be characterized as "re-creative conservatism." There is no doubt that an attempt was made to formulate integrally modern (i.e., expressing the religious sensibilities consistent with our age) and radically conservative prayers. The balance was weighed, as one might expect, in favor of the traditional prayers.

Changes were made in a number of the older prayers which find place alongside completely new creations. However for the most part they were made to correct obvious anachronisms and doctrinal inadequacies. Krosnicki is, perhaps, not critical enough in his assessment of the changes. There is a fundamental problem which has been raised by commentators on the new Eucharistic Prayers and which can be formulated with respect to the new postcommunion prayers in this way: Should a set of postcommunion prayers equally orthodox and entering more completely into the language and culture of men of today be formulated as an alternative to the more traditional prayers? The author alludes to this problem (pp. 55-56) but does not deal with it in any depth. One will certainly have to agree with the author's statement that the "Roman Missal of Paul VI ... has not uttered the last word in contemporary euchology" (p.55) but at the same time affirm with the author that these prayers are "a vast improvement over the previous missal of Pius V" (p. 75)

It is heartening to find, as the author points out, (p. 56 ff.) that the phrase "*terrena despiciere*" has been dropped and that in other respects the new prayers are purged of any trace of a Manichaean interpretation of the temporal world. The tendency found in these prayers to avoid the body-soul distinction and to stress the integrity of the human personality in view of its total resurrection is likewise commendable, (p. 63) as is the removal of petition made through the intercession of saints in favor of direct address to God. (p. 51)

Ch. III points out how the eucharistic terminology is essentially scriptural, in continuity with Roman liturgical texts, and reflects belief in the sacrificial nature of the eucharistic action and the sacramental presence of Christ. Here attention is called to the fact that no particular theories of sacrifice or sacramental presence are advocated in the new prayers.

In ch. IV the theme of the liturgical spirituality of the postcommunion prayers is considered with its two basic characteristics: Christocentric and Ecclesial. Since this chapter is only intended to offer a broad outline of the eucharistic spirituality of these prayers, there is only a cursory treatment of the major themes of Christocentric spirituality, ecclesial spirituality, Eucharist as source of spirituality, Eucharist in relation to Church, purification from sin, faith, hope and love, world and Kingdom to Come. For the most part the author is content to point out what the prayers say on these subjects. Where he adds his own reflections the results are only fair and do not give evidence of a firm grasp of the literature and fundamental problems connected with these themes.

The treatment of the presence of the eternal redemptive act of Christ in the liturgy, for example, consists of a summary version of Dom Odo Casel's view. (pp. 116-117) There is an apparent lack of awareness of the research carried on in the last few years which has attempted to correct Casel's excessive objectivizing of the mystery presence of the redemptive

act of Christ in the liturgy. In Casel's presentation the subjective-objective aspects of *anamnesis* are not satisfactorily integrated or interrelated. The newer approach appeals to the role of the Spirit in the Church which makes it a participant of the memory of Christ and so through memory in the Spirit the community is rendered present to Christ's Passover. Within this perspective it is possible to give a better explanation of the role of faith in the realization of the eucharistic event.

Influenced, perhaps, too much by Casel's rhetoric, the author states that "For a person ... to be effected by the mystery of redemption he must come into contact with the person of Christ through this time-transcending eternal redemptive action made present sacramentally here and now." (p. 116) Whatever be the author's understanding of this sentence it surely needs to be more nuanced lest it give the false impression of the actual role of the sacraments in the life of the Church. The eternally redemptive act of Christ, and so Christ, is present to the Christian at every moment of life calling the believer to deeper union with himself in the Spirit and so with the Father. What takes place in the sacraments as events of grace also takes place in the totality of our Christian lives. But what extends over all our lives receives explicitation in the sacraments which celebrate fundamental situations of life in Christ.

On the important question of the relationship between the Eucharist and purification from sin the author touches on the underlying theology but does not adequately explain how the Eucharist can be considered as "the sacrament of reconciliation." (p. 120) Some of the literature which would have aided him in this matter is not found in his bibliography.

One might dispute Krosnicki's explanation of the dichotomy expressed in the Tridentine Missal between the things of this world and the next. Rather than attributing this dichotomy to hard social and economic conditions and to the concern that Christians be not too emersed in the world, (p. 57) the more basic cause appears to lie in an undeveloped theology of history. The author's dissatisfaction with the removal of the phrase "*tremenda mysteria*" from the postcommunion prayer of the feast of St. John Chrysostom (p. ... seems to indicate a bias in favor of historical accuracy over relevancy. In his judgment the deletion is unfortunate since it was characteristic of Chrysostom to instill in his hearers an attitude of holy awe with respect to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Yet it was such preaching, with emphasis on "the table of holy fear" and "the frightful mysteries," which served as one of the main causes of infrequent reception of the Eucharist in the East during the patristic period. In any case it is questionable that the use of such terms as "*tremenda*" would be pastorally advisable in the modern Church not because it might inspire an unhealthy fear of the Eucharist but because this type of rhetoric usually makes little impression on most modern Western believers.

These last few critical remarks are not intended to detract from the fine

work accomplished by the author but simply to point out some of the limitations of this project. It may be hoped that the success of this work will serve as an inspiration to him to continue in this area of basic research in which he displays real competence.

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An Ontology of Understanding: Karl Rahner's Metaphysics of Knowledge in the Context of Modern German Hermeneutics. By VINCENT P. BRANICK, S.M. St. Louis: Marianist Communication Center, 1974. Pp.

The purpose of this book is to compare Karl Rahner's ontological analysis of human understanding with the account of understanding found in modern German hermeneutics. Noting what H. Kimmmerle calls the "ontological turn" in hermeneutics, Fr. Branick sees in Rahner and modern hermeneutics, (especially in the work of H. G. Gadamer) a common concern for ontology. Rahner arrives at his concrete method of interpretation and textual analysis through his metaphysics and particularly through his ontology of human understanding, while *vice versa*, modern hermeneutics is led back to metaphysics and to theoretical accounts of understanding as such through its empirical, factual studies of and problems with textual interpretation.

As a point of departure, the author takes up the question of humanistic understanding and with respect to the latter compares two schools of thought, namely, what he calls the Dilthey-Schleiermacher school and the school of Gadamer, who is much influenced by Heidegger. The ultimate purpose of this comparison is to show how and in what sense Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge incorporates the views on humanistic understanding expressed by these two principle schools of thought. According to Fr. Branick, Rahner's ontology is "the full expression of the goal and method of modern hermeneutics." (p. 38)

Turning directly, then, to the above-mentioned views on humanistic understanding, the author compares the salient features of each of these schools. According to the Dilthey-Schleiermacher school, the objects of the humane sciences (as opposed to the natural sciences) are life (or spirit) together with its objectifications. But if *so*, this means that humanistic understanding must consist in grasping spiritual reality in and through its objectifications, in a tracing back from the exterior objectifications or expressions of spirit to their psychological or interior sources. This means that humanistic understanding consists in tracing an expression or text

back to the motives, intentions and, in general, the frame of mind of the author. It is only by thus reconstructing the psychological conditions in which an expression or statement arises that one comes to a true understanding of what an author is saying.

And yet, Fr. Branick suggests, there is surely something wrong or at least one-sided with this Dilthean picture of humanistic understanding. For even granted that the humanities express life or spirit whereas the natural sciences do not, and granted further that the spirit of an author in the humanities, as opposed to the spirit of an author in the natural sciences, is intensely and ineluctably present in his expressions, still, as Fr. Branick correctly observes, "this life is present *in* the expression of something else." In other words, even though an author in the humanities can scarcely avoid offering his own personal insights and points of view, still they are insights and points of view with respect to some *matter*. Hence a school of humanistic understanding which reduces the understanding of a text to knowing the state of mind of the author who wrote it errs by substituting for *what* an author says *how* or *why* he says it.

With Gadamer and Heidegger, however, we find a movement away from such psychological reductionism in hermeneutic method. For Gadamer sees humanistic understanding not in terms of tracing the meanings of expressions back to their psychological origins but rather in terms of coming to grips with the subject-matter itself through the mediation of time and language. Matter must be allowed to "exercise its rights," as it were, on the understanding. As Fr. Branick puts it, "for Gadamer, if there is any transposition by the interpreter into the author, it is not into his psychological interiority but into his perspective in which he attained his thought, into the perspective in which he sees the matter." (p. 78)

But how does this contrast of Dilthey's with Gadamer's views on understanding an author's work relate to Rahner's ontology of understanding? Fr. Branick suggests that Rahner strikes a kind of synthesis of these two views—a synthesis in which the interior life of the author stressed by the former and the depth of the subject-matter emphasized by the latter converge in the concept of the act *to be*. On this view humanistic truth turns out to be "the manifestation of this act *to be*" and humanistic knowledge turns out to be an understanding of this act *to be*.

This synthesis can be elucidated by investigating the concept of transcendental experience in Rahner. According to Rahner, just as Being or *to* must be distinguished from limited concrete objects or beings, the former being the ground or horizon of the latter, so too individual subjects experiencing being and *to be* must be distinguished from the horizon within which subjects arise. Thus, just as the objective pole of transcendental experience is not an object but the field or ground out of which subjects arise, so too the subjective pole in such experience is not a subject but the ground out of which subjects arise.

Now the goal in true humanistic understanding, Rahner holds, is to understand the matter not in the sense of individual beings or objects but in the sense of the primordial ground of these objects which is *to be* itself. But the paradox in this is that in striving to understand *to be*, the intellect is striving to know something which is the very condition of its knowing, since *to be* is not only the horizon against which (objective) beings arise but also the horizon against which understanding subjects arise. Thus in understanding or finding the other, the knowing subject understands or finds himself, since the act *to be* is the origin as well as the term of understanding. In other words, the ultimate goal of knowledge, the primordial *to be* is at the same time the *a priori* or transcendental condition of knowledge. To use Fr. Brancik's illuminating metaphor, "the advance of understanding is a movement to the rear, and the mind goes forward to find its point of departure." (p. And the immediate consequence of this, one which Rahner draws, is that the interpreter can never remain detached from or indifferent to what he understands. For since he is, and since he understands what is, the interpreter himself belongs to the very subject-matter he is investigating.

To sum up, we can see how Rahner's views on understanding as such both engender his own hermeneutic method and synthesize on a higher level the views of both Dilthey and Gadamer. For if true understanding always and necessarily consists in grasping the ground or horizon of beings, namely, Being or the act *to be* itself, it follows that to understand a given text will be to understand the ground of the "what" or matter it expresses. But that ground is nothing other than the act of *to be* itself. Also, given the same condition, it follows that to understand a text is to understand not just the subjectivity of the author who produced it but more fundamentally the ground of that subjectivity, which, once again, is the act of *to be* itself.

To conclude with some critical commentary, the value of this book would have been enhanced had the author raised some critical questions about Rahner's entire programme in philosophy. For example, to what extent and in what ways is Rahner's ontology susceptible of the same sorts of criticism that have been levelled against Heidegger's philosophy, especially by contemporary analytic philosophers? To what extent, if at all, does Rahner's metaphysics arise out of a failure on his part to carefully distinguish the various usages of the verb "to be." Further, does Rahner's concept of personal engagement in understanding lead to skepticism as regards our knowledge of extramental objects? Does that same concept rule out the possibility of objective understanding and objective truth? It may be that these as well as other such critical questions can be answered by Rahner. But if so, it should be made clear just how he goes about answering them.

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The Problem of the Criterion. By Roderick M. Chisholm. Milwaukee: The Marquette University Press, 1974. Pp. 40. \$Q.50.

In the history of Western philosophy the problem of the criterion—i. e., how we distinguish our true ideas from our false ones—has functioned as the fundamental problem for many philosophers. More especially, it has dominated the history of epistemology since the time of Descartes. In fact, since the *Meditations* and the *Discourse on Method*, much epistemology has been regarded as almost co-extensive with the problem of the criterion. It is to this issue that Professor Roderick M. Chisholm directed his 1973 "Aquinas Lecture," *The Problem of the Criterion*. Chisholm himself regards this issue as a fundamental problem:

The problem of the criterion seems to me to be one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. I am tempted to say that one has not begun to philosophise until one has faced this problem and has recognized how unappealing, in the end, each of the possible solutions is. (p. 1)

Pushed to its Cartesian extreme, however, I suspect that this problem is fundamentally non-Aristotelian. I grant, however, that the "Transcendental Thomists" influenced by Kant have been tremendously concerned with the problem of the criterion. I will note later in this review that Chisholm appears to resurrect an essentially Aristotelian position. I suggest, in fact, that scholastic philosophers who read Chisholm's text closely will find many congenial themes. The overt thrust of the text is realist, empirical yet non-Humean, and thoroughly non-sceptical.

Interestingly enough, Chisholm remarks that what first set him thinking about the problem of the criterion—and he admits being "obsessed by it"—were two treatises of scholastic philosophy, P. Coffey's *Epistemology* and Cardinal Mercier's *Criteriologie generale ou theorie generale de la certitude*. Chisholm notes that Coffey and Mercier have "set the problem correctly" and have "seen what is necessary for its solution." As he proceeds, Chisholm uses Coffey and Mercier more as "touch-stones" for delineating the problem rather than philosophers providing a solution to the problem. Nevertheless, Chisholm's own elucidation of the problem and proposal for a solution have strong Aristotelian elements.

The question which gets philosophers involved with the problem of the criterion is "What can I *really* know about the world?" Put differently, how are we to decide, in any given case, whether we have a genuine piece of knowledge? Or again, how are we to distinguish the *real* cases of knowledge from what only *seem* to be cases of knowledge? That this problem is couched in Cartesian worries should be obvious.

What precisely does Chisholm understand by the problem and why is it so fundamental a problem for him? It is philosophically problematic

because a proposed solution often leads into a vicious circle. And the vicious circle pushes the epistemologist into Scepticism. Chisholm paraphrases Montaigne's formulation of this puzzle. In order to know if our ideas really correspond to things—which is, in effect, the old philosophical chestnut of Representative Realism as elucidated by Locke and Descartes—we need a *procedure* for distinguishing ideas (or appearances) that are from ideas (or appearances) that are false. But in order to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we must know if it really *succeeds in distinguishing* ideas (or appearances) that are true from ideas (or appearances) which are false. However—and here is where the circle becomes vicious—we cannot know whether the procedure really does succeed unless we *already know* which idea (or appearance) is true and which is false. Therefore, we are caught in a vicious circle. Yet, as with most philosophical paradoxes, a few precise distinctions can go a long way to clear the muddle. This is precisely what Chisholm does.

Chisholm formulates the philosophical issues involved in the problem of the criterion by distinguishing two pairs of questions. These questions are used throughout the book:

A. *What* do we know? What is the *extent* of our knowledge?

B. How are we to decide *whether* we know? What are the *criteria* of knowledge?

Chisholm remarks that if we have an answer to Question A, then we could derive a solution for Question B. And vice-versa, if we could provide an answer to Question B, then we could derive a solution to Question A. Granting this interrelation, the position of the Sceptic becomes apparent:

You cannot answer question A until you have answered question B. And you cannot answer question B until you have answered question A. Therefore, you cannot answer either question. You cannot know what, if anything, you know, and there is no possible way for you to decide in any particular case. (p. 14.)

The brunt of Chisholm's text is to provide a philosophically response to the Sceptic's position.

By distinguishing positions, Chisholm remarks that there are two alternative positions other than Scepticism. He suggests the following names and descriptions:

1. *Methodists*: Those who think they have an answer to Question B, and granting this solution, they hope to figure out an answer to Question A. (Obviously, "Methodist" has no reference in this discussion to the religious followers of John Wesley.)

Particularists: Those who think they have an answer to Question A, and granting this solution, they hope to figure out an answer to Question B.

In response to the problem of the criterion, therefore, there are three possible alternatives: Scepticism, Methodism, and Particularism.

Chisholm provides as examples of Methodism John Locke, David Hume, and most Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century radical empiricists. Why is empiricism a form of Methodism? Because the empiricists concentrate primarily on the "method of verification." According to the empiricist criterion, the "method" used in distinguishing veridical from non-veridical beliefs is whether or not the belief is derived from sense experience. We must, the Methodist-empiricist tells us, see whether the belief has certain relations to sensations. Pushed to its consistent conclusion this leads to Hume's critique of ontology and theology. Hume asserted that you could take his criterion to the library and, if you were to find a book in which the author makes claims that do not conform to the empiricist criterion, then you should "... commit it to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." (*Inquiry*, XII, iii)

Chisholm, however, finds two serious problems with the Methodism of the empiricists:

1. The criterion is "... very broad and far reaching and at the same time quite arbitrary." The Methodist "... leaves us completely in the dark so far as concerns what *reasons* he may have for adopting this particular criterion rather than some other." (p. 17)

2. When we apply the criterion of radical empiricism (i.e., Berkeley without the Super-Perceiver, Hume, and most Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century empiricists), "... we seem to throw out, not only the bad apples but the good ones as well, and we are left ... with just a few parings or skins with no meat behind them." To be a consistent radical empiricist- and Hume concedes this-entails that the only matters of fact which can really be known pertain to the existence of *sensations*. In effect, using this criterion, we cannot know whether there are any physical things (trees, houses, beer cans) much less whether there are atoms or other microscopic particles. Chisholm's criticisms of empiricist methodology should again indicate to those readers not familiar with contemporary analytic philosophy that Linguistic Analysis is neither equated with nor co-extensive with radical empiricism.

Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore- and, I submit, Aristotle, although Chisholm does not explicitly mention him-are examples in the history of philosophy of Particularists. The Particularist provides an answer to Question A and then attempts to work out a solution for Question B. Chisholm illustrates Particularism with Moore's famous example from his influential paper, "A Defense of Common Sense": Moore raises his hand and says: "I know very well this is a hand, and so do you. If you come across some philosophical theory that implies that you and I cannot know that this is a hand, then so much the worse for the theory." That there is a fundamental structural similarity with Aristotelian epistemology should be apparent. I will have more to say on this point at the conclusion of this review.

Chisholm himself admits the following: "I think that Reid and Moore are right, myself, and I'm inclined to think that the 'Methodists' are wrong." (p.

Therefore, in regard to the three positions-Scepticism, Methodism and Particularism-Chisholm suggests that the third alternative-Particularism-is the "most reasonable." The rest of Chisholm's text is an elucidation of his theory of Particularism and its role in establishing an epistemologically adequate criterion.

In adopting a Particularist position Chisholm argues that there are many things which we obviously *do know*. Our knowledge of "particular things" in situations similar to Moore's illustration mentioned above is Chisholm's realist example. Chisholm quotes Spinoza: "In order to know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to know that we know that we know." It is important to realize the force of Chisholm's assertion here. We know *particular objects* as particular objects and not as "bundles of sense data" or other "constructs" proposed by the radical empiricists. This is, I suggest, structurally similar to the Aristotelian claim that we can know the "incidental object of sense," which is an "individual" and not a collection of sense data. In opposition to Descartes Chisholm argues that, from the fact that our senses do sometimes deceive us, it hardly follows that your senses and mine are deceiving us right now. Following both Augustine and Russell-strange bed-fellows indeed-Chisholm remarks that it is more reasonable to trust the senses than to distrust them. "In short, the senses should be regarded as innocent until there is some positive reason, or some particular occasion, for thinking that they are guilty on that particular occasion." (p. To quote Russell from *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*: "... beliefs caused by perception are to be accepted unless there are positive grounds for rejecting them." Again, there is a certain Aristotelian bent towards Chisholm's description of the Particularist position.

Granting this Particularist position Chisholm then proceeds to develop his answer to the problem of the criterion. In order to solve this problem, he claims we must "... start with particular case of knowledge and then from those we generalize and formulate criteria . . . telling us what it is for a belief to be epistemologically respectable." (p. 14) With this, Chisholm begins his response to Question B above.

Chisholm remarks that a theory of evidence-a "method" used in response to Question B-presupposes an objective "right and wrong." This, in turn, presupposes a concept of "right preference": i.e., "The concept of one state of mind being *preferable* epistemically to another." (p. Chisholm explicates his theory of evidence through the concept of "Epistemic Preferability." This is what Mercier referred to by his demand that the criterion be "objective." Chisholm elucidates this objective character in the following way:

If a state of mind A is to preferred to a state of mind B, if it is, as I would like to say, intrinsically preferable to B, then anyone who prefers B to A is *mis-taken* in his preference. (p. 15)

With "Epistemic Preferability" Chisholm delineates the following hierarchy of epistemic propositions:

- a) Propositions which are "certain" (Absolutely certain)
- b) Propositions which are "evident"
- c) Propositions which are "beyond reasonable doubt"
- d) Propositions which have "some presumption in their favor."

An adequate epistemology would have a criteria for each class of propositions. Chisholm considers two such criteria in the rest of the text.

In formulating the criteria for certainty-i. e., for "certain propositions," Chisholm follows Leibniz's distinction regarding two kinds of "immediately evident propositions":

- i. First Truths of *Fact*
- ii. First Truths of *Reason*

These are propositions which are immediately evident and certain. As examples of First Truths of Fact Chisholm includes various propositions about a person's own state of mind at a given time. Using Meinong's term, these are "self-presenting" states. For example: thinking certain thoughts, entertaining certain beliefs, or being in a certain sensory or emotional state. Chisholm notes, however, that perceiving external things and remembering are *not* states that present themselves.

An Aristotelian epistemologist should be reminded here of the distinction between those propositions which are indubitable and those which are not. Aristotle and Aquinas following him insisted that an awareness of a proper sensible is *per se* veridical while an awareness of an incidental object of sense-the individual- is not *per se* veridical. This Aristotelian position is, I suggest, structurally similar to Chisholm's distinction between the "self-presenting states" and the "perception of external objects."

As First Truths of Reason Chisholm notes what scholastic philosophers would call *per se nota* propositions. These are the *a priori* axioms or propositions which are evident, as Leibniz says, "*ex terminis*." Or, to quote Aquinas from the *Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, propositions which are "... manifest through themselves."

Granting that we do know some things (Question A), Chisholm has provided a criterion for establishing the category of "certain propositions," both the "First Truths of Fact" and the "First Truths of Reason." The former are certain because they are "self-presenting states," and the latter are certain "*ex terminis*." In other words, this is *how* we know the propositions are "certain."

In *The Problem of the Criterion*, Chisholm does not thoroughly develop

a "theory of the indirectly evident," which would serve as his criterion for both propositions which are "evident" and "beyond a reasonable doubt." He refers the reader to his *Theory of Knowledge* (Prentice-Hall, 1966) for a further consideration of this problem. Those philosophers interested in veridical perception will be disappointed because Chisholm merely sketches a solution to this most important criterion problem. Yet he is consistent in maintaining his Particularist framework even in sketching a response:

Yet, as "particularists" in our approach to the problem of the criterion, we will fit our rules to the case. . . . Knowing what we do about ourselves and the world, we have at our disposal certain instances which our rules or principles should countenance, and certain other instances which our rules or principles should rule out or forbid. (p. 35)

The theme of Moore's expressed in "A Defense of Common Sense" is reiterated in this passage from Chisholm.

In the end, however, Chisholm notes that the Methodist and the Sceptic will tell the Particularist that he started in the wrong place. To this Chisholm responds:

What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the question. It seems to me that, if we do recognize this fact, as we should, then it is unseemly for us to try to pretend that it isn't so.

One may object: "Doesn't that mean, then, that the sceptic is right after all?" I would answer: "Not at all. His view is only one of the three possibilities and in itself has no more to recommend it than the others do. And in favor of our approach there is the fact that we *do* know many things, after all." (pp. 37-38)

Chisholm concludes by restating the Particularist gambit.

This gambit, as I have suggested, is structurally similar to the Aristotelian position. Think of the question Aristotle puts to the epistemologist: how can you come up with a criterion if you do not know the things which are known? This is the Particularist position. We do know certain things. Yet it does beg the question. However, not to beg the question against the Methodist—who indeed must show the Particularist *why* his position is to be accepted—is to be caught either in scepticism or, I submit, forced to introduce something extraneous into your ontology-like Descartes's God—in order to provide veridical beliefs.

This is an important little text. Professor Chisholm comes to terms nicely with the problem of the criterion. His distinctions are extremely useful and most important. Yet this text really just whets the appetite of those epistemologists interested in casting off the "Cartesian slumbers" in favor of an Aristotelian realism. I strongly recommend that the interested reader, after carefully studying *The Problem of the Criterion*, read Chisholm's *Theory of Knowledge* (mentioned above), his "On the Observa-

bility of the Self," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30 (1969), 7-21, and *Empirical Knowledge* (Prentice-Hall, 1978), a most impressive anthology Chisholm edited with Professor Robert J. Swartz. This latter selection of readings is constructively edited around the very same issues Chisholm raises in *The Problem of the Criterion*.

In conclusion, the Department of Philosophy at Marquette University is to be commended for its continuation of the impressive series of Aquinas Lectures. The 1973 Lecture-The *Problem of the Criterion*-certainly merits its place among the distinguished listing of previous presentations.

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Letters from the Desert. By CARLO CARRETTO. New York: Maryknoll Orbis Books, 1972. Pp. 146. \$3.95.

Why is the Third World Poor? By PIERO GHEDDO. New York: Maryknoll Orbis Books, 1973. Pp. 143. \$3.95.

The Desert is Fertile. By DoM HELDER CAMARA. New York: Maryknoll Orbis Books, 1974. Pp. 61. \$3.95.

These three books represent fairly well the kind of help Maryknoll's Orbis Books are offering these days. The Carretta book is on prayer. The author, a very active layman in Catholic Action in Italy for twenty-five years, gave it up at the age of forty-four to become a Little Brother of Jesus. He heard the call to prayer and went into the desert. After a while he began to jot down things. "Nothing systematic, nothing important. A few ideas matured in solitude and taking shape around an activity which has been without a doubt the greatest gift the Sahara has given me: prayer." The book was an instant success in Italy where, since its appearance in 1964 it has gone through twenty-four editions. It has been translated into Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Arabic, Japanese, Czech, and now, gracefully enough, into English. I hope it goes into twenty-four more editions. It breathes with life, with fresh insights, with wisdom, with love. Dominicans will surely appreciate the brief meditation on the rosary as a contemplative prayer (pp. 47-51).

The Gheddo book, also a translation from the Italian, is by a missionary priest who is also editor of *Mondo e Missione*. I don't suppose the word "prayer" appears in the whole book; it nonetheless could have been written only by a man deep in the spirit of Christ, i. e., the spirit of Christian intelligence and love. The book's obvious virtue is its balance. The main point is that the poverty of the Third World cannot be blamed on any

one cause: colonialism, neocolonialism, capitalistic or communistic exploitation, or whatever. No, the causes are very complex, beginning with a fatalistic view of life in many of the peoples of the Third World, a lack of any inner drive to progress, a static rather than a dynamic culture. All this is aggravated by the exploitation of the developed countries, but the solution is not now to banish the industrial sophisticated countries from the underdeveloped ones. Gheddo hates easy slogans and quick put downs. He cites facts and figures; he points to world conferences and studies on poverty and development, shows how experts differ in their analyses and programs. He is very practical. Still, the book does not leave the reader with a feeling of hopeless frustration. On the contrary, it is an excellent primer for anyone truly interested (and what Christian cannot be?) in understanding the serious problems of the Third World, in doing something about them.

As everyone knows Dom Helder Camara, archbishop of Recife in north-west Brazil, is the most notable Christian spokesman for the poor in Latin America. This book is a collection of short meditations and poems written for those individual men and women who feel themselves born to serve their neighbor, who are ready for any sacrifice to help the vast human family seek unity through love and justice. Dom Helder has in recent years become disenchanted with institutions. "I dreamt for six years of a large, liberating moral pressure movement. I started Action for Justice and Peace. I travelled half the world. I appealed to institutions, universities, churches, religious groups, trade unions, technicians' organizations, youth movements, etc. After six years I concluded that institutions as such are unable to engage in bold and decisive action for two reasons: they can only interpret the average opinions of their members, and b capitalistic society they have to be directly or indirectly bound up with the system in order to survive." (p. 2) His appeal in the book, then, is not to systems but to people, Christians, Jews, Muslims, humanists, believing or not, who share his anxiety for the poor and are driven by their conscience to help.

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IdeM About Christian Education in India. By A. VERSTRAETEN, S. J.
Bangalore, India: Theological Publications in India, 1973. Pp. 218.
\$1.20.

In a country of approximately 550 million people Christians constitute a minority of twelve million. In such a situation what should be the extent of the Church's involvement in education? More precisely, since the num-

her of Catholics in schools remains obviously quite limited, what should be the Church's educational stance vis-a-vis non-Christians? Such is the kind of question explored by the writer of this book published in India. No indication is given as to the author's own background, but the reader can readily conclude that he is a Jesuit missionary. Some of the material had been published previously in various journals and this may account for some repetitiveness that surfaces throughout the book.

The author argues a case for Christian education as an effective means of evangelization. For Christians, education becomes a means to freedom in Christ; for non-believers, a means to encourage dialogue and cooperation in furthering basic human values. This thesis mirrors a twofold thrust of mission activity today, evangelization proper (*Kerygma* and *Koinonia*) and service to mankind (*Diakonia*). Whether an extensive involvement of the Church in education is the best form of rendering service to the people of India is still not conclusive from this presentation. The term church here, incidentally, is taken almost exclusively to mean Catholic Church and thus limits somewhat the scope of the inquiry.

Two major documents repeatedly referred to are the *Kothari Report*, 1966—an appraisal by a Government of India commission of the country's educational program—and the UNESCO Report on Education. Both provide a framework for an analysis of several complex problems identified by the author. Thus, more than three quarters of the country's vast population reside in rural areas but they have only one quarter of the openings in vocational and professional institutions. The majority go to families in the services and professions. The stark inequalities of educational opportunities strengthen the case for the Church's involvement in education. On the other hand, certain reforms in Church-run schools seem called for, especially a democratization of organizational structure to allow for greater participation and shared responsibility. Here, too, the old bugaboo of State involvement or interference in school management keeps recurring. Is there not a challenge here to Church educators to establish new frontiers and models of community control in education?

Taking his lead from Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich, the writer makes a convincing case for defining education as a liberating process and as an instrument for effective social change. In this context the Church's educational mission in India should obviously be one primarily of service given the fact that non-Christian enrollment numbers some eighty million.

In planning for the future Fr. Verstraeten sets forth five priorities for the Church's (i.e., Catholic) educational enterprise: (1) pastoral objectives rooted in a Christian philosophy of educating the whole person, service to the nation in quality education and training for leadership, (2) overcoming social and economic inequalities, the liberation of the underprivileged, (3) a commitment to higher education, teacher training and research, (4) formation through non-institutional education, especially the

media. Obviously, some would disagree with the placement of those priorities. Which should come first, evangelization or service? That question only makes sense in the context of a well-developed ecclesiology, something still in the making. Regrettably, the book does not explore the religious education dimension and to that extent the term "Christian Education" in the title has to be taken in a very restricted sense. This lacuna only highlights the need for a sound theology of education, an urgent need as this inquiry into Catholic education in India shows.

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Man as Infinite Spirit. By JAMES A. ROBB, 1974 Aquinas Lecture. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Pp. 64. \$2.50.

In this highly personal essay based upon his rethinking of the ontology and epistemology of St. Thomas Professor James Robb argues that in Thomistic philosophy the following proposition is true: "A human being is an infinite spirit." The force of the argument hinges on an analysis of the objects of intentionality as demanded by Aquinas's epistemology.

Robb suggests that St. Thomas, although freely using the categories and language of Aristotle, provided an analysis of human nature that none of the Aristotelian commentators prior to St. Thomas had found in the Aristotelian texts. Moreover, Robb argues that it has taken 700 years for scholars to do justice to the profound insight and uniqueness of Aquinas's teaching on human nature. Robb agrees with the suggestions of Maritain, Gilson, and Pegis denying that Aquinas's position is strictly Aristotelian. Nevertheless, he proposes that we go beyond their work which placed emphasis on the "intensified existential dimension" of Aquinas's ontology of man, which in turn translates out as "incarnate *finite* spirit." To substantiate his claim that man is an "incarnate *infinite* spirit" Robb presents an elucidation of the nature of intentionality as found in Aquinas's texts, dealing especially with the ontological ("existential") status and the epistemological function of the *intellectus agens*. Much stress is laid upon the concept of immateriality as the fundamental characteristic of beings capable of intentionality. Although at times difficult to follow, the argument appears to go something like this:

1. There are objects of intentionality.
2. The *intellectus possibilis* knows whatever is intelligible.
 - 2 (i). In Aquinas's ontology, there are no limits to what is intelligible.
 - 2 (ii). Being is intelligible.
 - 2 (iii). Being is finite and infinite.

8. The *intellectus agens* as an "abstractive power" is a necessary condition for knowledge.
4. There is a necessary relation between the "reception" of concepts in the *intellectus possibilis* and the "actuality" of the *intellectus agens*.
5. Human knowers possess an epistemological power as fully actualized as the *intellectus possibilis* is potential.
6. The object of intentionality-Being-has an infinite dimension.
7. The *intellectus agens* is infinite.

("That is to say, it-the *intellectus agens*- is actually, somehow, the likeness of all that is or can be." p. 10.)

The structure of the argument depends upon the nature of intentionality, which, regretfully, Robb does not explicitly mention until the very end of the essay. Infinity is necessarily related to the concept of "immateriality," which in turn is the basis of intentionality in Aquinas's ontology. As there are degrees of immateriality (e. g., God-as-knower, human person-as-knower, dog-as-knower), so too are there degrees of infinity. Obviously, the isomorphism between knower and object known is fundamentally important for Robb's analysis. "Man, like any intellectual being, is open unreservedly to the infinity of being, truth and goodness." (pp. 41-42)

The status of the intentional object and the relation of isomorphism are crucial for Robb's argument. Yet one wonders if this concept of "infinity" says anything more than the concept of "immateriality." And this latter concept as used in Aquinas's thesis of intentionality is, I am afraid, in dire need of close elucidation. Furthermore, one might ask the question- does "immateriality" demand a total and complete isomorphism between object known and knower? Obviously, in knowing "red," the knower does not become red. Why, then, in knowing "being"-which has an infinite dimension-must the intellect be infinite? Put differently, does every *esse intentionale* demand a corresponding ontological counterpart? If read too strictly and in a reverse direction, then what stops Aquinas from going down the slippery slope to all Meinong's possible worlds? Professor Robb may very well be correct in his conclusion, but I suggest that the concept of immateriality and the relation of intentional isomorphism demand further elucidation.

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