THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C.

VOL. XXXIX JANUARY, 1975 No. 1

EXPECTANCY OF AN IMMINENT PAROUSIA AND CONCERN WITH CHURCH ORDER: AN INVERSE RELATIONSHIP?

GIVEN THE FACT that the Parousia, understood in a futurist sense, has not come and that by the end of the Subapostolic period there is evidence of a rather dominant three-fold priestly structure, one is led inevitably to the question of the relationship between the two.

However, deciding what that relationship is, is no easily answered question. Certainly no direct answer is forthcoming from the texts themselves for the simple reason that no writer, either in the New Testament or among the Apostolic Fathers, has stated explicitly why there was concern for Church Order or how the early communities understood the " delay " in the Lord's Coming. This silence in itself is not surprising; conscious reflection often follows upon a lived experience.

Let us express the dilemma in its simplest terms: if the Lord had come in glory shortly after his Resurrection-Ascension, the

question we are asking in this essay would be meaningless. However, admitting that does not compel one to conclude that, therefore, concern with Church Order must be directly inverse to the problematic of the parousial "delay." Rather, such a directly inverse relationship smacks of a simplistic solution to a subtly complex problem.

Our aim here, therefore, is two-fold: (1) to attempt to show that a directly inverse relationship between the expectancy of an imminent Parousia and concern with Church Order, though perhaps a significant factor, is not sufficient alone to explain the fact of Church Order; (fl) to suggest that a more fruitful avenue of approach to the whole question of Church Order may lie in the examination of the antecedent probability, given the more or less cultic character of Jesus and the Twelve, of the rise of a cultic order within the early Church.

The first aim is certainly the more fundamental one as far as we are concerned and therefore more attention will be given to it. The second aim is a mere suggestion, via a concrete example, to bring home the reality that other factors may be operative in the concern with Church Order beyond the factor of the" delay" in the Lord's return. The first aim is in a sense a negative contribution to the whole problematic; the second is a more positive suggestion that one look beyond the categories of Church Order and Parousia when attempting to understand either one or the other or the relationship between the two.

Since it is not possible to ascertain directly (i. e., from explicit statements in the sources) the relationship between the parousial delay and concern with Church Order, an indirect approach must be used. Therefore, an overview of the rise of Church Order will be given, tracing its development, in broad strokes, from the New Testament writings through and to the emergence of a dominant three-fold priestly class in the Apostolic Fathers. Once' this is done, two questions. must be brought to the texts: (1) in the earliest New Testament writings, when the expectancy of an imminent Parousia is most acute, is there any concern with Church Order or conditions for its emergence?; (2) in the later New Testament writings and into the

Apostolic Fathers, when one might legitimately expect a lessening of imminent parousial expectation, are there nevertheless still traces of interest in the Lord's Second Coming?

If the answer to either or both of these questions is in the affirmative, the conclusion would seem to suggest that at least there is no directly inverse relationship between the categories of Church Order and parousial expectation-while not thereby suggesting that there is *no* relationship.

I. AN OvERVIEW oF THE RisE OF CHURCH ORDER IN THE NEw TESTAMENT AND THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

In studying the New Testament as a whole the fact of several and apparently simultaneous types of Church Order is brought to the fore. Variety rather than uniformity in ecclesial organization seems to be the rule. The scope of organization runs the spectrum between the congregational-charismatic under Paul to the highly and centrally regulated hierarchy of the Pastorals and 2 Peter.[1] Despite the wide variety, however, two roughly inclusive categories emerge: the presbyteral and· the pneumatic.

Not surprisingly, the presbyteral forms are found localized in Palestinian communities and communities with a large number of Jewish Christians. The influence of the Jewish system of elders is obvious in these communities (cf. Acts 15).[2] Further, there is ample evidence in Acts to suggest that this development along Jewish lines was a natural one, given, for example, the presence of many former Jewish priests in the community (Acts 6: 7); these would naturally be influential in establishing a continuity in structure between the Old Testament precedent of a college of elders (presbyteroi) and the newly formed grouped of Christians.[3]

[1] Kenan B. Osborne, "A Rethinking of the Special Ministries." *Joumol of Ecumenical Studies,* 6, (Spring, 1962), p. 209.

• Hans von Campenhausen, *Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power.* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 77.

• Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Celibacy, Ministry, Church.* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 149.

Apparently more or less simultaneous with but not in conscious opposition to this presbyteral system arose the Pauline system of pneumatic churches, dominated for the most part by Gentile Christians and somewhat loosely structured. Blenkinsopp suggests that these Pauline communities in general were similar in structure " to that of Antioch which was presided over by prophets and teachers." [4] However, these churches, though loosely structured, were not without some forms of administration. Nevertheless, these administrators were in no way attached to what today would be called an " office " which had to be filled and was somewhat fixed, for ". . . the imprecise terminology which Paul uses can hardly be taken to imply a fixed 'office'." [5] As Acts 13:1 suggests, the teachers and leaders of these churches arose from among the community rather spontaneously, without necessarily a mission from an Apostle or a laying on of hands. Further, as Acts 13:2 indicates, the Spirit often directed these communities and the selection of some of their number for specific tasks and functions. Paul often includes these functions in the lists of charismatic gifts and, for him, these charisms arise neither from the community nor from an office existing apart from the charisms: " *Everyone can do that to which he has been called, that which has been given him through the charism."* [6] (sic) Though everyone can do that to which he has been called, he can do *only* that to which he has been called: no one was expected to have every charism. [7]

In the early Pauline churches, therefore, there is little evidence for concern with establishing any kind of organizational structure beyond what the Spirit would indicate and thi3 usually in the context of spreading the Word. (Acts 13:4-5) However, as evidenced in the Pastorals especially, various factors contributed to a growing concern for safeguarding and

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 149.

[4] von Campenhausen, *op. cit.,* p. 64.

[5] Joseph Duss-von Werdt, "What Can the Layman Do Without the Priest? " *Ccmcilium,* vol. 84, p. 107.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. no.

handing on the Tradition and right doctrine (cf. 1 Tim. 1:10; 4:1; 6:13; 5:17; 6:3, 20 f.). It is in fact the characteristic of the Pastorals that all the stress is on "guarding," "which is to be ensured by the men who represent the connection with th apostle who has been entrusted with the doctrine." [8] In this way the task of protecting the churches from false doctrine came to be confided into the care of overseers (episkopoi) .[9]

Despite this growing concern in the Pastorals for the guarding of right doctrine, no strict ministerial arrangement, with a precise institutional form, is in evidence. Nevertheless, these letters do add the notion-but not the word-of " succession " with their insistence that concern for right doctrine be transmitted and faithfully preserved by a continuity of witnesses. (2 Tim. 2:2) Yet there is nothing in the Pauline churches to suggest that this succession of witnesses is linked to the founding Apostle rather than to the college of episkopoi.[10]

It is becoming clear, though, in the Pastorals, that the original pneumatic character of the Pauline communities is being more and more institutionalized, with the episkopoi gaining ground as a result of their role in guarding and transmitting right doctrine and tradition. Consequently, these pneumatic churches are becoming more and more similar in structure to the presbyteral churches, and it is at least antecedently probable to expect that the two will fuse into one-once charism and office, in the Pauline Churches, converge in one person.

That this in fact happened seems to be obvious and, since there need not be opposition between Spirit and office, between charism and official authority, charismatics like Barnabas and Saul can receive official authority by the laying on of hands (Acts 13:2-3), and men like Timothy can receive both authority and charism in the same way (1 Tim. 4:14). In fact, the laying on of hands seems to have become the usual way for

• Eduard Schweizer, *Church Order in the New Testament.* (London: SCM Press, 1961), p. 80.

• von Campenhausen, *op. cit.,* p. 81.

[10] Maurice Villain, " Can There Be Apostolic Succession Outside the Chain ot Imposition of Hands?" *Concilium,* vol. S4, pp. 101-102.

one to enter upon the service of the Lord *(ibid.,* 5: . In this way, the more or less institutional roles of presbyteroi and episkopoi gradually assume the importance which the community had earlier given to the charismatic prophets and teachers. [11]

While all this is happening in the Pauline communities, though perhaps not independent of mutual influence, the elders of the presbyteral system are also gaining greater prominence and beginning to assume functions previously reserved to charismatics. For example, in James 5:14 f., the elders assume the function of anointing the sick and healing, which in Paul are duties assigned to particular spiritual men with a special charism. Further, in James the power to heal is connected with office.[12] On the other hand, Titus and Timothy are sent to teach and, at the same time, to take on administrative functions. Timothy is sent to teach (1 Cor. 4: 14-17; 1 Tim. 4: 11) and to administer (1 Tim. 5: 9-16) .

In brief, the elders of the presbyteral system are beginning to look remarkably like their counter-parts in the emerging episcopal system. Their fusion, therefore, was more easily made, the consequent confusion in terminology more readily understandable, and the coalescing of the offices of presbyteroi and episkopoi more logically acceptable. Given all this, one is not too surprised, for example, to find Clement and Hermas calling the leading men of the community both presbyteroi and episkopoi. [18]

Let us pause for a moment to assess what we have seen. The two categories of presbyteral and pneumatic structure, initially so different, have each undergone internal re-shaping, emerging with remarkably similar collegial structures. This similarity in structure, no doubt coupled with the passing of strong men like Paul and the encroaching threats from heretical teaching, led the two to fuse into one, basically collegial order.

[11] Osborne, *op. cit.,* pp. !i!09-10.
[12] von Campenhausen, *op. cit.,* p. 8!i!.
[1·] *Ibid.,* p. 84.

The next question to answer, then, is how this basically collegial structure becomes monarchical and hierarchical, with the bishop placed above and over the presbyters and deacons. In other words, how does one get from the later New Testament writings to the Apostolic Fathers, from emphasis on collegiality to emphasis on episcopacy?

To begin with, one must immediately preclude any clear-cut division between the New Testament and the Fathers. Such an arbitrary division is not justified, for even as early as the Pastorals, for instance, the episkopos is always referred to in the singular/ [4] while Clement and Hermas still use it in the plural and apparently makes little distinction between the terms presbyteroi and episkopoi.[15] In other words, in giving the broad strokes leading from the collegial structure to the monarchical structure it is not simply a question of moving chronologically from the New Testament to the Fathers, or simply a question of an unnuanced jump from one emphasis to the other, or, further, a simple shift on the level of ecclesial self-understanding: Briefly, then, in attempting to sketch the movement in broad strokes, one runs the risk of oversimplification. Having listed some of the risks involved in giving a general overview, let us now turn to the question at hand: how did the movement from collegial to monarchical structure realize itself?

Blenkinsopp tells us that, while the functions of teaching and administration were performed by a college of presbyteroi/ episkopoi, there early and often existed the practice of appointing one of the members as president.[16] Gradually this function of president gained greater and greater prominence, giving rise to the outlines of a monarchical structure and restricting the term " episkopos " exclusively to the one functioning as president. From within a community governed collegially by episkopoi and (or) presbyteroi there thus emerged the monarchical structure, which soon became the established form.[17]

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 107.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 84.
[16] Blenkinsopp, *op. cit.,* pp. 149-50.
[17] Osborne, *op. cit.,* pp. 149-50.

Clement, for example, though there is a certain ambiguity and fluidity in his terms in his letter to the Church at Corinth (c. 97 A. D), attests to the presence of bishops-presbyters and deacons. Further, he goes out of his way to ground these offices in the explicit will of the Apostles. Indeed he is at pains to trace a chain of succession from the present leaders to the Apostles to Jesus to God (chs. 42 to 44). The general thrust of what will later be called apostolic succession is grounded by Clement, and "the sacrificial understanding of the Lord's Supper here comes to the fore and is clearly connected with the theme of apostolic succession." [18] As early as the end of the first century, then, there is emerging a three-fold priestly class, hierarchically structured, grounded on the principle of apostolic succession, reaching back to God's will, and connected to a cultic context. None of these points is as clearly etched in Clement as in subsequent ecclesial thought, but with Clement " the main lines of the later development are so plainly prefigured." [19]

By c. 110 A. D. what is today understood as the three-fold ministry is more clearly established, as Ignatius testifies to in most of his letters. For example,

> . . . I advise you, be ye zealous to do all things in godly concord, the bishop presiding after the likeness of God and the presbyters after the likeness of the council of the Apostles, with the deacons also who are most dear to me, having been entrusted with the diaconate of Jesus Christ . . . *(Magn.* 6; Lightfoot's translation)

The short period between Clement's letter to Corinth and Ignatius's letters to the churches seems to have been sufficient time for the fluidity and vagueness of Clement's terms to assume cogency and consistency in Ignatius, lending weight to Depuy's hypothesis that the specific nature of the episcopal ministry was fixed at Antioch at the end of the first century but was definitively recognized only in the second century when

[18] Cyril C. Richardson, *Early Christian Fathers.* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 89.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 89.

Gnosticism posed a challenge. It was recognized everywhere later, as a result of the crisis caused by Arius.[20]

This is not to suggest that *every* Church at the time of Ignatius was organized along the lines of monarchical episcopacy. Polycarp's letter to the Philippians, for instance, is silent concerning episcopacy. Why? This silence "... may suggest that monarchical episcopacy had not yet come into existence at Phillipi or that the office was vacant at the time Polycarp wrote."[21] Nor does the *Shepherd* of *Hermas* have anything to suggest that any form of church structure, other than the presbyteral, was present at Rome at the time of the writing. In other words, monarchical episcopacy does not seem to have been immediately universal.

However, the question before us now is this: though the monarchical episcopacy may not have been universal at the time of Polycarp and Hermas, it became the dominant structure before long, as history shows.[22] What was the decisive factor which caused this trend toward a monarchical, hierarchical structure of a three-fold priestly class to become dominant?

> With the tendency to institutionalize, the two collegial systems (presbyteral and pneumatic) eventually fused and gave way to a more monarchical structure. The administrative leaders of the Christian community soon came to be the leaders of the cult. As the Eucharist was more and more understood in a sacrificial dimension, the leaders of the worship were associated ;more and more with the priesthood of the Old Testament. Extrapolation into the Old Testament gradually resulted in a separate cultic class in contrast to the general priesthood of all the Christian faithful.[23]

With that quotation we can conclude the consideration, admittedly brief and sketchy, of the overview of the rise of

[20] Bernard Dupuy, "Is There a Dogmatic Distinction Between the Function of Priests and the Function of Bishops?" *Concilium,* vol. 84, p. 88.

[21] L. W. Barnard, *Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and Their Background.* (New York: Schocken Books, 1966), p. 89, note 8.

[22] Dupuy, *op.* cib., p. 82.

[23] Richard Forti, O. S. F. S., "The Emergence of a Priestly Class." Paper delivered for Professor Carl Peter, C. U.A., May, 1970, p. 14. This work was useful not only for bibliography but also for the general development of the first part of this exposition.

Church Order in the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers The purpose has been to establish the fact of the rise of Church Order and some of its contributing factors. Now we must turn to the specific point: what is the relationship between the expectancy of an imminent Parousia and concern with Church Order? Is this relationship directly inverse?

II. Two Questions Brought To The Texts:

a) *While the communities of the earliest New Testament writings are eagerly awaiting the Lord's Second Coming, are they in any way concerned with Church Order?*

Perhaps no one would seriously doubt that the earlier writings of Paul deal heavily with the Lord's Second Coming.[24] That he deals exclusively with a futurist eschatology is in doubt. Certainly Shires does not think so.[25] But does the question of Church Order come to the fore in these writings? H. F. von Campenhausen categorically denies any concern with Church Order in the genuinely Pauline letters,[26] while Rudolf Schnackenburg, agreeing with E. Schweizer that freedom of the Spirit and juridical order cannot be opposed as they used to be, i.e., as contradictory and mutually exclusive, affirms

> that there is an order which derives from and is willed by God and in which Christ is the head of his earthly community and rules it by his Spirit.[27]

Further, when Paul writes to his communities he writes as one "conscious of full power' (egovCT[a) which the Lord had given him Cor. 10:8; 13:10)." [28] Paul's directions for divine service also have an authoritative tone (1 Cor. 11:17. 33 f.) In his letters to the Church at Thessalonica, and especially

•• Henry M. Shires. *The Eschatology of Paul.* (Philadelphia: The Press, 1966), pp. 64-65.

•• *Ibid.,* p. *58* and *passim.*

•• von Campenhausen, *op. cit.,* p. 47 and *passim.*

[27] Rudolf Schnackenburg, *The Church in the New Testament.* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p.

•• *Ibid.,* p.

when he is concerned with the moral conduct of life, he directs with authority from the Lord (1 Thess. 4:2) and is definite and concrete in his prescriptions *(ibid.,* 4:11; 2 Thess. 3:4, 6,10, 12) .29

Paul's authority is one thing. But does he, in his earlier letters, also assign or approve of specific men to function in the community?

. . . Men are mentioned who have undertaken tasks in church life, and it is difficult to contend that among these functions of presiding and governing are also meant such as we find in I Thessalonians 5: and also in I Corinthians ... 30

Kiisemann suggests that " those who are over you " in 1 Thess, 5:12 may well correspond to the pastors of Eph. 4:11 and the bishops of Phil. 1:1.[81]

Schnackenburg sees in 1 Cor. 12:28, with its listing of apostles, prophets, teachers, etc., a picture of an articulated community with graded functions. 32 This is not exactly what one would expect to find in a community upon whom the end of the ages had come (1 Cor. 10:11). Nor would one expect the Thessalonians who are eagerly waiting for God's Son to come from heaven (1 Thess. 1:1) to be encouraged by Paul to aspire to live quietly, to mind their own affairs and to work with their own hands *(ibid.,* 4.11) -in short, to plan to stay around for awhile, an obvious precondition for concern with Church Order. Other examples can be cited: in 2 Thess., for instance, Paul tells the same community, concerning the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ, that the day of the Lord has not yet come (2:2); further, if anyone does not work, he is not to eat: the Thessalonians are not to live in idleness but are to do their work in quietness and to earn their own living (3:10-12) . The expectation of the Lord's Coming is almost breathless in these letters; yet Paul insists that they lead orderly and quiet lives and

•• *Ibid.,* p.

•• *Ibid.*

[81] Ernst Kasemann, *Essays on New Testament Themes.* (Naperville, lll.: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1964), p. 69.

•• Schnackenburg, *op. cit.,* p.

wait with patience. Such a disposition of " normalcy " encourages concern with order within the community, again fertile ground for concern with Church Order in the more technical sense.

In 2 Cor. 11, where Paul is insisting that the community test the spirits-even the spirit of possible false apostles-he is doing this " in the context of ecclesiastical order and ecclesiastical authority " as according to Kiisemann who is not altogether eager to find any traces of " office" in Paul. Yet, Kiisemann understands all the charisms found in early Paul as related to service and the good order of the community.[84] The important point, then, is that he does see Church Order in early Paul:

> there *is* a concept in Pauline and sub-Pauline theology which describes in a theologically exact and comprehensive way the essence and scope of every ecclesiastical ministry and function-namely, the concept charisma.[85]

We have seen a few instances of concern with Church Order, or the necessary condition for such a concern, within some of the earliest writings of the New Testament.

b) *In the later New Testament writings and into the Apostolic Fathers, are there any traces left of a parO'lt9ial expectation, more or less imminent?*

The Pastorals are concerned for the most part with Church Order, for

> here ... there is reflected the picture of a church that regards itself as living, not through a short interval, but through an extending history.[86]

That the Pastorals reflect a later development in ecclesial consciousness and an increased concern with Church Order seems evident. Yet does this exclude parousial expectation? Timothy

•• Kiisemann, *op. cit.,* p. 67.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 67.
•• *Ibid.•* p. 64.
•• Schweizer, *op. cit.,* 77.

is urged to keep the commandment untarnished and free from reproach until the appearing of the Lord (1 Tim. 6: 14); he is told that Onesiphorus who was hospitable to Paul will find mercy from the Lord on that Day (when the Lord returns) (2 Tim. 1: 16-18); he is charged by the Lord's appearing and his kingdom (4: 1); he is told tha Paul has fought the good fight and has finished the race and he will be awarded a crown on that Day, and not only him but all men who loved the Lord's appearing (4: 8). Titus is told that all Christians are to live sober, upright and godly lives in this world, " awaiting our blessed hope, the appearing of the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ." (Titus 2: IS) The Spirit which Christians possess not only justifies but also makes them heirs in hope of eternal life. (Titus S: 6-7)

The Pastorals, then, though greatly concerned with Church Order, still witness to a parousial expectation, at times more vivid than at other times, but nevertheless present.

If one accepts the opinion of the "great majority of scholars" in dating the writing of Revelation during the persecution that raged toward the end of the reign of Domitian (81-96),[87] one is dealing with one of the latest of the New Testament writings. And though the suggestion has often been made that it is understandable that renewed interest in the Lord's Return seems almost inevitable during a period of harsh persecution, yet one is still impressed by the countless references to this Coming and the eagerness with which it is awaited. From the expression concerning" what must soon take place" (1: 1) to the" Surely I am coming soon. Amen. Come, Lord Jesus!" (22: 20), the eschatological future is vividly bearing down on the present of the writer. The important consideration as far as this study is concerned is that this interest in the Parousia is simultaneous with the presence of concern with very concrete conditions in various communities-i.e., with Church Order in the broadest sense of this word. Yet concern with Church Order in its narrower sense is not lacking either. For example,

[87] Jerome Biblical Commentary, (64:14), p. 469.

in his message to the Church in Thyatira the author is reprimanding the community for its toleration of Jezebel, a false prophetess. (2: 20-3) Whether the author is encouraging the communities to withstand persecution or whether he is urging them to rid themselves of false teachings and practices-i.e., despite the more immediate context of concern with Church Order, the more ultimate context is always this "I am coming soon; hold fast to what you have, so that no one may seize your crown." (3: 11)

The *Didache,* depending on which scholar one follows, is either a very early writing (Audet) or a very late writing. But for Richardson " there can be little doubt that we are dealing with a second century document." [88] There is also little doubt that we are dealing with a document which is very much concerned with Church Order; in fact, the second part (chs. 6 to 15) is a manual of Church Order. [89] Nevertheless, "the eschatological attitude is prominent " [90] and one wonders if the expression, "Let Grace come and let this world pass away," (10: 6) is already in the *Didache* only a more or less standard part of Eucharistic prayers or whether it instances a time " when the joyful and expectant note of the Messianic Banquet " [91] is still very much to the fore-a time when one said " Let Grace come and let this world pass away" he was confident that his prayer was a pregnant petition that what was coming would in fact come. There is also in the *Didache* an urgent concern with watchfulness and being ready, for the hour of the Lord's coming is not known to anyone (16: 2), and one's life of faith will be of little advantage unless one is proved perfect to the very end (ibid.). All of Chapter 16 is suggestive of an apocalyptic attitude and ends on the note of certainty that the Lord will come and all his saints with him (16: 7). The co-presence of concern with Church Order and

[88] Richardson, *op. cit.,* p. 163.

[89] *Ibid.*

[90] Johannes Quasten, *Patrology: Vol* I: *The Beginnings of Patristic Literature.* (Utrecht Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers, 1966, 4th printing), p. 35.

[91] Richardson, *op. cit.,* p. 166.

an expectancy of a more or less imminent Parousia in the *Didache* is a significant factor in one's evaluation of the relationship between the two.

The letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch (c 110), as has already been seen, are at a stage when the three-fold structure of ministry is on the ascendency and seems to be the dominant structure in the Churches he is writing to. Church Order in Ignatius is remarkably like we know it today and "a monarchical episcopate reigns over the communities." [42] Along with this predominant concern with Church Order, however, there are traces of a concern with a more or less imminent Parousia. For example, he tells the Magnesians (5)' that" everything is coming to an end, and we stand before this choice-death or life-and everyone will go 'to his own place'." Further, in the same letter, he calls Jesus Christ" our hope." (11) In discussing the evils of schism and the need for unity with the bishop, he warns the Smyrnaeans to come to their senses " while we still have a chance to repent and turn to God." (9) It would be misleading to see in Ignatius a breathless concern with the Second Coming. Nevertheless, even to find traces of this parousial expectation in a document otherwise almost exclusively concerned with various forms of Church Order is significant.

The letter of *Pseudo Barnabas,* which Quasten dates no later than 138 A. D./[3] is an enigmatic work concerned with explaining just how the Old Testament is to be used (allegorically) in discovering its meaning with reference to Christ and to point out the moral life necessary in pursuing the right *way.* Though it is not concerned explicitly with Church Order, in the narrower sense, it does manifest a situation in which some form of order is very much in evidence and in which the sacrament of baptism and the Lord's Day, the Eight Day, are part and parcel of this order.

At first glance this document, so taken up with Old Testa-

•• Quasten, *op.* cit., p. 66.
p. 91.

ment exegesis and morals, seems an unlikely candidate for betrayal of parousial expectation. Nevertheless, there are not a few references to hope; in fact it has been suggested that Barnabas gives the primacy to hope in the triad of theological virtues.[44] In Chapter 6 the reader is urged to set his hope on him who is about to be manifested in the flesh. And, in Chapter 11 those who place their hope in the Cross will receive their reward at his (the Lord's) proper time and he will repay. Salvation itself, in Chapter 12, is grounded on hope in Jesus. This deep parousial hope is made, in Chapter 15 and 16, to assume a chiliastic cloak,[45] but even this "corruption" belies the seriousness with which the author anticipates the Lord's return.

As with many of the Subapostolic writings, the *Shepherd of Hermas* has difficulties relative to its dating. Quasten satisfies himself as to the dates by attributing the earlier portion to the time of Clement of Rome (c. 96) and the later portions to the reign of Pius I (140-150). A strong presbyteral system is in evidence and Hermas himself acts as a prophet. A certain form of Church Order, then, is very much to the fore. And yet the whole work, which deals heavily with the theme of penance, is apocalyptic in character.[47] In Vision 8,8, for example, Hermas is eager to know whether the consummation is imminent and is given a severe rebuff for his curiosity (does this betray an impatience on the part of the Church of his day?); in Vision 4,1, he experiences a vision of the impending tribulation; in Similitude 9, 82, the theme of the whole work is recapitulated: repent while there is yet time! Repent before the tower is completed for unless one hurries to do what is right the tower will be completed and the unrighteous will be shut out. (Sim. 10, 4)

With the *Shepherd of Hermaa* the Church is well into the second century and, for the most part, some form of Church Order is everywhere present and presumed. This is certainly

Peter, Class Lecture, Fall, 1970.

[45] Quasten, *op. cit.* p. 89.

[u] Ibid.. pp. 9!!-98.

[AT] *Ibid.* p. 98.

the more obvious side of the coin. But on the other side of this same coin there are more than a few references to concern with Christ's Second Coming. It is true that certain works (for example, I Clement and Polycarp) , while showing great concern with Church Order, show next to no concern with parousial expectation. However, the bulk of the writings from the later New Testament and into the Apostolic Period (c. 150) do manifest a more or less vivid expectancy of some parousial manifestation. Not only that, but this expectancy of the future is often seen as bearing down on and determining one's action and Christian living in the present. To dismiss this show of parousial concern as simply a didactic interest in giving consolation and encouragement at a time of persecution (cf. the Apocalypse) or to drive home the practice of penance (cf. Hermas) or some other concern would seem to forget the whole thrust of the earlier New Testament concern for the Parousia as part and parcel of the Christian message and witness. *That* Jesus will come again is not just an appendix to the Good News.

While enough has been seen to suggest that there is no directly inverse relationship between the expectancy of an imminent Parousia and concern with Church Order, more than that has emerged. The point has become clear that one must go beyond these two categories and look for a hermeneutic which, while taking into account the data from these two, is also able to embrace the full thrust of the entire New Testament and the Apostolic period.

In the search for this hermeneutic there are innumerable related questions which this essay must pass over. How, for instance, is one to understand the category of eschatology? Is it only future or only realized or both, in varying degrees? Is it in fact

doubtless that the primitive Church's consciousnessand experience of the presence of the Holy Spirit, rather than the ' delay' of the parousia, (is the reality) that above all (is) responsible for the development of 'realized eschatology'? [48]

•• Jerome Biblical Co=entary, (80:47), p. 887.

And does this insight not in fact change the whole tone of the question we have posed as title? How is eschatological thought related to apocalyptic thought and how are they to be distinguished? [49] Is it simply a question of Jesus and the primitive Church being wrong about the imminent Parousia or something a bit more complex than that? Is the whole question about concern with Church Order an illegitimate one, given the" fact" that every expression of Church Order, in a juridical sense, is a " heresy " from the start and only came about as a result of the non-occurence of the Parousia (Bauer and Werner)? [50] Or is this non-occurence to be seen as a *conditio sine qua non* rather than a positive cause for the heresies of various Church orders? [51] Is concern with Church Order, in any form, simply a wrong turn and a deviation from the original freedom from the Law preached by Christ and concretized in the indisputable Pauline letters?

These questions, of course, have to be answered, but that is not our concern at present Rather, we are in search of a hermeneutic which is capable of handling *all* the data.

III IN SEARCH OF AN HERMENEUTIC

Would it not be advantageous, therefore, to look to Jesus and the Twelve in an attempt to see if there is any antecedent probability that Church Order, cultically centered, would emerge in the Early Church? If one can find indications of this, the whole question is thrown into a new perspective. Church Order could not then simply be dismissed as heresy- nor could one " blame" the non-occurrence of the Parousia for the rise in Church Order. Rather, given the beginning, the end should be antecedently probable and anticipated.

Coppens has shown just this, following the German bishops'

•• Karl Rahner, " The Hermeneutic of Eschatological Assertions" *Theological Investigations:* Vol. IV. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. S!lS-846.

[50] Rudolf Bultmann. *Theology om the New Testamoot: Vol. II.* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 187-8.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 188.

letter on the origin and development of priesthood. What follows, then, is a resume of Part I of this article by Coppens.[52]

Coppens and the German bishops investigate various texts from the Gospels and other writings of the New Testament, going back, in most instances, to the earliest strata of the New Testament tradition. An analysis of these texts lets emerge the sacerdotal character of the person, mission, and work of Jesus. Coppens does not find it difficult to deduce from these texts that Jesus came as the messenger of God's Word, announcing the arrival of the Kingdom of Heaven. He can also easily see Jesus as a pastor, occupied with gathering the flock, leading it to pasture, assuming their aspirations and needs, and promising them a new status in the reign of his Father.

However, it is not quite so easy to determine if Jesus had a sacerdotal consciousness in the narrower sense of that word, i.e., having the awareness of exercising a cultic and sacerdotal mission. One point is clear, though: Jesus was not content simply to announce the Kingdom; he wished equally to realize its coming. The *exousia* of Jesus situated itself in diverse ways within the framework of, but passing beyond, the priests of the Old Testament: he was *the* adversary of Satan, was capable of remitting sins and reconciling the world and men to God-all of which was the domain, in the Old Testament, of a ministerial priesthood, in the narrower sense. Especially in the Last Supper, sealing as it did a new and definitive alliance with God and conforming to the hopeful expectations of the prophets, does the priestly character of Jesus emerge: effecting the reconciliation of all men with God, in view of their entrance into the Kingdom of heaven. The Lord's command that the " Supper " be repeated betrays further its cultic character-the cultic anamnesis.

The German bishops stop here in their analysis of the priestly character of Jesus, wishing to build only on the most critically

•• Joseph Coppens, *Le Sacerdoce Chretien: Ses Origines et son Developpement.* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), pp. 7-27 especially *NouveUe Revue Theologique,* tome 92, 1970, pp. 225-247; 337-364. In subsequent page references, the first page corresponds to the Brill edition and the second to the NRT edition.

solid ground. Coppens, however, suggests one can go further in the attempt to see how the primitive church itself understood the person and work of Jesus. If there can be seen to be a continuity between the earliest strata and the latest strata of the New Testament, weight is given to the priestly character of Jesus.

Consequently, Coppens turns to Paul, in whose writings he sees great evidence of attributing a sacerdotal interpretation to the work and person of Jesus. Eph. 5:2., Gal. 2:20, and Rom. 8:34-all interpret Jesus as himself offering his sacrifice and discern in Christ " un ministre au plan cultuel, done un liturge, un pretre auquel, selon les croyances de l'eoque, 1'o:ffrande des sacrifices revenait normalement." [53]

The letter to the Hebrews, written before the destruction of the Temple, is another instance of a sacerdotal interpretation of the person and work of Jesus, even giving him the title " priest " and High Priest.

Even in the Fourth Gospel Coppens sees instances of interpreting Jesus sacerdotally, especially in the farewell discourse. The Apocalypse too, in its image of Lamb, betrays not only a victim but also a priest. And the long robe worn by the Son of Man (1: 13) is generally interpreted as a symbol of priesthood.

In brief, for one who receives the Scriptures as norm of the faith, norma non normata, it is clear that the Apostolic Church understood the *exousia,* the power of Christ, as implying a sacerdotal character under the triple plan of preaching, pastoring and of the liturgy, notably sacrificial.[54]

Did this sacerdotal character go beyond Jesus to others? Even during his earthly life Jesus sent certain disciples on mission, communicating to them at least some of his power and at least for a limited time. In particular the Twelve were invited to and admitted into Jesus' mission *before* the Resurrection. But, according to the Gospels, it was especially (but not

•• Coppens, *op. cit.,* pp. 18,
•• *Ibid.,* pp. 14,

exclusively) after the Resurrection that Christ transmitted to the Twelve a participation in his priestly power (Mt. 28: 18-19; Jn. 20: 23). Concerning these last two citations, the bishops are especially eager to show by them that Jesus' sacerdotal *exousia* was limited "à un groupe restraint de disciples et non pas à l'ensemble des fideles, à toute la communaute ecclesiale." [55]

An interpretation of Acts and Paul confirms, for Coppens and the German bishops, that the Apostolic Church was aware of prolonging, thanks to the ministry of the Twelve, the sacerdotal mission of Jesus.

For the Gospels in general and Luke in particular, the *exousia* of Jesus is not prolonged and perpetuated in the community of believers as a whole but by the apostolate in the strict sense, i. e., by the ministry of the Twelve, which is seen as a sacerdotal continuation of Jesus as priest: they too are to announce the Gospel of the Kingdom, pastor the flock (episkopos), pray for the people (Acts 6: 4).

It is true that explicit references to a liturgical, cultic, and sacramental ministry of the apostolate are not numerous. Nevertheless there are sufficient texts in Scripture that spell out such a priestly role indirectly: mission, baptism, remission of sins, obligation and right to celebrate the Supper, call to anoint the sick, authority over the unclean spirits: all are supported by Coppens with specific texts.

To illustrate the sacerdotal awareness of the Apostolic Church, despite the lack of many instances of explicit sacerdotal terms, Coppens turns to Paul who, for example, betrays a sacerdotal awareness of his person in Rom. 15: 15-16; he sees his life as a sacrifice in Phil. 2: 17; his life aims at a reconciliation of the world with God (2 Cor. 5: 18); and he sees his own mission as an extension in time of that of Jesus (2 Cor. 5: 18); further, he does not hesitate to qualify his mission as an exercise in the name of Christ (2 Cor. 5: 20).

That Paul associated his ministry of reconciliation with the celebration of the Eucharist is not explicitly stated in the texts,

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 154.

but " dans le cadre de la doctrine eucharistique neotestamentaire, il n'est pas interdit de le penser." [56]

Coppens feels he has established a sacerdotal mission of Christ and a participation in this mission by the Twelve. The third stage, which is the least easily established, [57] is to see the participation in the sacerdotal apostolate of the Twelve by diverse ministries, instituted and sanctioned by the Apostolic Church in its interpretation of the will of Christ.

There are many touchy problems here. First, it must be recognized that it took a while for the infant Church to define itself clearly. Then one must recognize its hesitancy to employ terms and functions-especially of a sacerdotal nature-which might smack of too strong a continuity with Judaism or be seen simply as a development out of the mystery cults or Qumran.

Given all this, however, one can still trace, especially in Acts and Paul, a development in the direction of a collegial organization of presbyters-bishops. Going from this collegial structure to the eventual emergence of a monarchical episcopacy, especially in the Subapostolic churches, is the burden of Part II of Coppens' article and would overlap too much with the earlier part of this work.

Nevertheless, enough has been seen to suggest that, given the cultic beginnings in Jesus and the Twelve, it is at least antecedently probable that this cultic function will continue in the Church and emerge as a priestly class, centering in a cult and a cultic structure. A Church Order, then, is antecedently probable even before one considers its relationship to the expectancy of an imminent Parousia. This insight cannot but throw the categories of Parousia and Church Order into a new perspective, one which would find a directly inverse relationship between the two as somewhat simplistic.

•• *Ibid.,* pp. 19, 287.
•• *Ibid.*

CONCLUSION

We began this essay with a question: Is there an inverse relationship between the expectancy of an imminent Parousia and concern with Church Order? Since a direct approach did not seem capable of providing an answer, an indirect approach was opted for. Therefore, first an overview of the rise of Church Order was presented, to establish the fact of such concern and to give the general directions it took. It was seen that, initially, variety was the order of the day, giving way to collegial and then to monarchical structures, centered around the cult. Two questions were then brought to the texts: is there concern with Church Order in the earliest New Testament writings; is there parousial concern in the later New Testament writings and into the Apostolic Fathers? An affirmative answer was given to both, though in varying degrees. This seemed to suggest that there was no directly inverse relationship between the two, where one is seen as the only or principal cause of the other. The need for a hermeneutic arose at this point, one capable of handling both categories as well as all the data form the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers. Such a possible hermeneutic was seen to lie in the antecedent probability, given the cultic character of Jesus and the Twelve, of the rise of a cultic order within the early Church. That this is the only or the best hermeneutic is certainly open to debate. But that some hermeneutic, other than Parousia and Church Order, is needed to determine the precise relationship between the two, seems established.

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CHRIST'S "MEMBERS" AND SEX
(1 Cor 6, 12-!iW)

PROMPTED BY A STUDY of Batey/ just about two years ago Burkill [2] raised a series of questions concerning, particularly, the passage 1 Cor 6: This is the well-known passage which deals with the problem of" fornication" of some kind (see below) practiced by some Christians, and with the theological implications of such practice for Christians whose bodies are members of Christ, are a temple of God, are " one spirit " with the Lord, since " the body is for the Lord and the Lord for the body " ; whereas a union with a prostitute makes a Christian's body a member of this prostitute, and he "sins against his own body."

Here are the questions this passage suggests to Burkill, who raises them against as many propositions by Batey. a) If becoming one flesh with a harlot nullifies the presence of Christ in the man concerned, why does not sexual intercourse within marriage have a similar effect? b) If intimacy with a prostitute is in some sense permanent, how can it differ from corporal union between husband and wife? c) On the assumption that Paul has a temple prostitute in mind, why cannot a Christian who resorts to a temple prostitute communicate holiness (" of the genuine sort") to her? Are we to say that Aphrodite is more effectively potent than Christ, or that Paul was confused about the whole matter and failed to give a clear answer? Then, if concerning the question of sacred meat (1 Cor 8: Iff; 10; 23 ff) , " there is no idol," the same certainty applies to sacred sex. d) What is to be made of the notion that all forms of sin

[1] Richard Batey, "The *mia sarx* Union of Christ and the Church," *NTS* 1!! (1966/7) 270-281

[•] T. A. Burkill, "Two into One: The Notion of Carnal Union in Mark 10: 8; 1 Kor 6: 16; Eph *5:* 81," *ZNW* (1971) 115-UO.

other than fornication are "outside the body"? Gluttony, just as well as excessive sex, may adversely affect physical health and become a sin against the body. Or does Paul's distinction derive from a deep-seated phobia of women? e) H "body" in this context is taken to mean "personality," why is becoming one personality with one's own wife not incompatible with Christian commitment but becoming one personality with a prostitute is? How can a Christian become and be one " personality " with his/her marital partner and remain at the same time one personality with Christ? Is this a " mystery " Paul himself did not understand? f) The respective unions with Christ and with the prostitute are at once similar and dissimilar; Paul switches from " body " to " spirit." But, how can a person become a " member " of a spirit? If " body " in 6:16 means personality, why should the apostle change his figure of speech? [8]

This list of questions discloses the problems which the text poses even today and justifies a closer look at this passage. Our purpose is not to contrast Burkill with Batey to establish who is right and who is wrong but rather to consider 1 Cor 6: 12-20 in the light of these questions and bring out its doctrinal contents. It is hoped that from this study some answer

• The answer to these questions by Burkill is based on propositions by Paul Winter (" Sadoquite Fragments IV 20, 21 and the Exegesis of Gen 1: 27 and Jesus' saying on divorce," *ZNW* 70 (1958) 260-261 and by D. Daube ("Evangelisten und Rabbinen," *ibid.* 48 (1957) 119, 126). Mk 10: 10-12 contains "an integral element of the messianic secret of the Kingdom," namely, "the androgynous character of primordial man." In Jewish-Christian circles "it was held that man is properly bisexual, and that there will be a return to a hermaphrodite type of existence " at the end. Monogamous marriage " represented an approximation to the supposed quasimetaphysical model of the primordial Adam." This applies to 1 Cor 6: 16: "a man who resorted to prostitutes would, like a polygamist, approximate not to the ideal standard of human bisexuality, but to a freakish or monstrous kind of organic existence in which a one-many sexual relation replaces the one-one balance of the original and ideal specimen of the human race." Both in I Cor 6: *15* ff and Eph 5: 21 ff the writer 'carries his analogical argument beyond the bounds of rational experience' ! What is more, the author wonders whether the " great mystery" in Eph 5: 82 " may not to some extent be a confession of relative ignorance." The reader will wonder whether all this is convincing.

will emerge also for the questions formulated by Burkill. In the first place, the particular type of union between Christ and his faithful in this passage will be explored. Then, the implications of the" fornication" Paul talks about will be considered.

The body for the Lord, the Lord for the body

It is obvious that in this passage Paul envisages the relationship between Christ and his faithful against the background of some sort of fornication. In fact, Paul writes that " the body is not for fornication" (v. 18). Fornication wag justified by some elements in Corinth [4] on various grounds (v. U f). One of them is that " food is for the stomach and the stomach for food" (v. 18).[5] The meaning being that one is intended for the other and their interrelationship and interaction is only natural. The implication is that the body and "fornication " are in the same relationship to each other.

It is not clear-nor tremendously important-in v. 18 whether the reference to the destruction of both food and stomach by God is part of the Corinthian justification or rather Paul's answer to their argument based on food and stomach, as I would be inclined to think. What is obvious and important, however, is the literary and logical correspondence between v. 18a plus b, on the one hand, and v. 18c plus v. 14 on the other.

Food is for the stomach and the stomach for food.	The body (far from being for fornication) is for the Lord and the Lord for the body.
And God will destroy both this and that.	And God both raised the Lord and will raise us (by his power).

This exact correspondence shows that it is in v. 18c that Paul starts building his answer to the problem of fornication

• This is the generally accepted understanding of v. 13a, in spite of Ceslas Spicq, *Theologie Morale du Nouveau Testament,* II (Paris: Gabalda, 1965), 6M ftn 1, who maintains that v. etc. are statements by Paul himself.

• F. Hauck-S. Schulz, *ThW,* VI note that the Greek view of life regarded sexual intercourse just as natural, necessary and justifiable as eating and drinking.

on the relationship between the faithful and the Lord. Man's stomach may find its correspondence in food, and conversely; but a Christian does not find his correspondence in fornication but in the Lord, and conversely. The correspondence between these two sentences shows, furthermore, that v. I4 is an incidental expression intended to balance v. ISh: God will destroy food and stomach, but God's attitude towards the relationship Lord-body is different: he has already raised the Lord and he will raise us also. This verification is evidence that the thought of v. ISc continues in v. I5: the body is for the Lord and the Lord for the body in the sense that " your bodies are members of Christ." [6]

Still, before we come to v. I5 some other details have to be stressed. The notion "body" in v. ISh cannot indicate the " Body " of Christ but the individual body of a Christian, of each Christian. The evidence for this is that in v. I5 we meet the *plural* " your bodies," i.e., the body of each one of you (not Christ's), as "members" of Christ; and that in v. U Paul replaces " the body " by " we " as different from Christ himself: [7] this is the difference of v. I5 between" your bodies" and Christ himself. This remark shows that Paul is thinking of a personal and individual relationship of Christ with each Christian, not of the general relationship of Christ to the group (Body) of Christians. This is borne out also by the very matter involved: this relationship is the counterpart of a "fornication " relationship, which obviously is an affair of individuals not of the Body-group of Christians as such. A further consequence of this remark is that Paul in this passage disregards the social-like or organic interrelationship among the several members of Christ.. He centers only on the direct and

• That is why Hans Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther,* (Meyers Kommentar V), 11 ed. (Giittingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1969), 184, ftn 22, commenting on v. 15 speaks of a reciprocity: "There is a reciprocity: as I act against the Lord I am thereby affected myself, and as I act against myself the Lord is thereby affected. This reciprocity is unilaterally constituted by the Lord."

[7] Notice that "our" resurrection is not linked here to the fact that Christ (as "head") has been raised (cfr. Eph 2: 5) but to the traditional doctrine of "the power of God " (Mk 12: 24 parall.)

personal relationship between Christ and each single Christian.[8] In point of fact, Paul emphasizes that our bodies are " members of Christ," but he fails to say that we " are members of each other " (Rom 12: 5) or to stress the social-organic functions of the community (Rom 12: S ff; 1 Cor 12: 4ff). The character of personal and individual relationship of each Christian to Christ, or conversely, is strongly underscored in this passage-to the point that the social aspect is entirely disregarded or, rather, purposely omitted.

Another detail to be noticed is that, for Paul, " body " in v. 1Sc is something different from stomach. The change from stomach (1Sa) to body was obviously deliberate and intentional. What is more, Paul would admit that the stomach will be destroyed (cfr. 1 Cor 15: *50* ff; 2 Cor 4: 16; 5: 4) but the body will not, it will be raised. An immediate implication of this is that it is not the stomach but the individual body of each faithful that is for the Lord. It is not the stomach-or any other particular physiological organ or member-but the individual " body " of each Christian that is " member " of Christ.[9] It is important to notice that, in the same context (v. 14), Paul could replace body-bodies by a personal pronoun, " we " : God will raise " us," which stands for our body-bodies.10

Obviously, in this understanding of body Paul stands on semitic grounds, far from Greek dichotomy and " salvation."

[8] The theological truth, in fact, is that Christ's Body "is not constituted by the sum total of Christians; but each one of them, by the mere fact that he attains the *Incarnate* Word, through this humanity of the Word becomes Body of Christ: " P. Michalon, "Eglise, corps mystique du Christ glorieux," *NRT* 74. 680.

• This is strongly stressed by Conzclmann *Der erste Brief,* 188, when he notes that the relationship fornication-body is very different from food-stomach. In fact, body---otherwise than stomach-" is I as I am not a thing but relate myself (to others). The relationship with the *p6me* is not a neutral one. It can never be indifferent. Even for the *p6rne* he who is related to her is not a thing. The relationship is a specifically human one. The Lord to whom! I belong is thereby affected."

[10] Robert Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms,* (Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums, 10), (Leiden: Brill, 1971), i59 ff.

Whether " body " in this and other similar passages should be translated by "personality " or otherwise may be a question of semantics.[11] It is clear, at any rate, that the notion " body " does not imply a division in man between two elements which repudiate each other or tend to dissociate from each other. It does not exclude the simultaneous coexistence and co-operation or activity of another (invisible) dimension of man which we usually call soul. It rather includes it, though it does not stress it particularly. " Body " stands for the entire man as he exists and acts in this world and indicates his " self " ; which is particularly clear in Rom 6: 12 (cf. "yourselves" in v. 13). This is generally admitted.[12]

Still, the notion "body," in Paul's understanding, expressed the external element of man: man " acts through his body" (2) Cor 5: 10); it is in man's body that passions are seated (Rom 6: 12; cf. 7: 5); it is man's "members" that are the "weapons" of justice or of sin (Rom 6: 13), etc. That is, the notion "body" stands for the entire "self" but stresses the "corporeal" aspect of man, as the body is the means by which man manifests himself, expresses himself, relates to others by acting, reacting and being acted-reacted upon.

This is why Paul can say that " we," rather than our bodies, will be raised by God. But this is also why, in this text, "your bodies" rather than" you," are members of Christ. Obviously, Paul does not mean that only man's body-with the exclusion

[11] Cf. an analysis of different viewpoints in Joachim Gnilka, "Contemporary Exegetical Understanding of 'the Resurrection of the Body'," *Concilium* 60, (1970) 129-141; particularly pp. 185-140 "What is Soma?"

[10] R. Jewett, *PaUl's • • . Terms,* 250-804; Claude Tresmontant, *A Study of Hebrew Thought,* (trans!. from the French by Gibson, M.F.); (New' York, etc.: Desclee, 1960), 88-106; Petrus Dacquino, "Ecclesia corpus Christi secundum apostolum Paulum," *VD* 88 (1960) 296; B. M. Ahem, "The Christian's Union with the Body of Christ in Cor. Gal and Rom," *CBQ* 28 (1961) !l00f; Joseph T. Culliton, "Lucien Cerfaux's Contribution concerning ' the Body of Christ '" *ibid.* 19 (1967) 59; Pierre Benoit, "L'Eglise corps du Christ," *Populus Dei* (Studi in onore del Card. Alfredo Ottaviani) XI (Rome: Christen, 1969), 986 fl'. Cf. Walter J. Bartling, "Sexuality, Marriage and Divorce in 1 Corinthians 6:1!l-7:16. A Practical Exercise in Hermeneutics," *Concordia Theological Monthly* 89 (1968) 861.

of other dimensions-is for the Lord or is a member of Christ; he certainly understands that it is the whole of man that is for the Lord or is a member of Christ. This is what he says in Cor "you" are the body of Christ (cf. Rom 5.1). Still, he stresses the notion" body" on account of the problem of " fornication " which is being discussed, since it is through his "body " that man-the total man-acts.

It is within this framework of total and individual involvement of each Christian in Christ that the sentence " the body is for the Lord, and the Lord for the body " is to be understood. The continuation of this thought in terms of "members of Christ " shows that Paul is reasoning on the basis of his favorite doctrine of the " Body of Christ " (I Cor 12: ff; Rom 4 ff; etc.). The faithful Christian in his totality-expressed by his body-is related to Christ as a member of his Body, since it is from Christ that this Christian receives his " spiritual " life or the Spirit (cf. v. 17). It is a living and " fertilizing " relationship or union through which Christ pours his own life into the Christian to "regenerate " him.[18] All this, of course, is projected against the background of " fornication " : the "body" of a Christian is not for union in fornication (not for a prostitute) but for the Lord (v. 13c).

In view of this fertilizing and individual union of each Christian with Christ we may consider the Greek formula *to soma. . . . . to kyrio ka'i ho kyrios to s6mati.* This formula is reminiscent of the saying in Cant !2: 16 "my beloved is for me and I am for my beloved," which really means "my beloved is mine and I am his",[14] they belong to each other; still,

[18] Lucien Cerfaux, *The Church in the Theology of St. Paul* (New York: Herder, 1959), !262-286; Pierre Benoit, "Corps, Tete, et Plerome dans les epitres de !a captivite," *RB* 63 (1956) 5-47 (particularly p. 9); *id.,* "L'Eglise," 971-1028; Culliton, "Lucien Cerfaux's ... ," 41-59; Ahern, "The Christian's Union, 199-!209; G. Martelet, "Le mystere du corps et de !'Esprit dans le Christ ressuscite et dans l'Eglise," *Verbum Caro,* n. 45 (1958), 31-53; J. Reuss, "Die Kirche als Leib Christi und die Herkunft dieser Vorstellung bei dem Apostel Paulus," *Bibl. Zeitschr.,* n. F., !2 (1958) 103-127; Dacquino, "Ecclesia corpus Christi," !292-300; *id.,* "La formula paolina in Christo Gesu," *La Scuola Cattolica* 87 (1959) 278-!291.

" This is, in fact, the translation by S. M. Lehrman, *The Song of Songs,* (Soncino Books of the Bible. The Five Megilloth) , (Hindhead, 1946) •

the Hebrew wording uses the dative case (li, lo), which is preserved also by the LXX where the text is very close to Paul's. More important is another text of Paul himself where he refers again to the Body of Christ. In Rom 7: Iff Paul refers to the marital bond uniting a wife to her husband. But this is the way Paul, in agreement with the current Greek language, expresses this relationship: the wife *ginetai andri (heterQ)* (v. 8), she is "for a (another) man." Immediately Paul draws his conclusion: the marriage of the faithful Christian with the Law has come to an end " through the Body of Christ, so that they *ginontai heterQ,* they are for another one, for him who was raised from the dead." Obviously, a Christian dies to the Law at the same time that he is incorporated into the Body of Christ, and it is at this moment that he is for Christ (and Christ for him). The similarity, both doctrinal and linguistic, with our passage of 1 Cor 6: 18c is manifest. What I would like to stress in Rom 7 is that the relationship between the Christians (as members) and Christ (as Body) is expressed in marital conceptions and in marital language. This is a theology Paul teaches again in 2 Cor 11: 2f, and which is somewhat developed in Eph 5: 28 ff.[15]

This is how Paul conceives of the relationship between Christ and each Christian in 1 Cor 6: 18 ff. The sentence "the body for the Lord and the Lord for the body " belongs to conceptions and to expressions like those in Rom 7 and it is according to them that it is to be understood [16]–in spite of the literary correspondence with v. 18a, which remains a merely literary one, whereas the fundamental thought and the words themselves have changed: the situation between a Christian and Christ is not just one of correspondence but one of " membership " ; and " stomach " has been replaced by " body."

[15] The concept goes back to the gospel traditions: Mk 2: 19 f parall; Io 3: !!9 (cf. Ape 19: 7 fl'; 21: 2.9).

[16] A. M. Dubarle, "L'origine dans l'A. T. de la notion paulinienne de l'Eglise corps du Christ," *Studiorum Paulinorum Congressus lnternationalis Catholicus,* (Analecta Biblica, 17-18), I (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1963), 231-240, expresses the view that it is the marital text of Gen 2: 24 that is at the basis of Paul's conception of the Body of Christ.

The marital imagery to express this relationship gives its true meaning to *kollasthai* (to cleave), when, in our text, the Christian is said" to cleave to the Lord" (v. 17). It is significant, in this sense, that the relationship between a man and a woman (called here *p6rne)* is defined by the same word: a man "cleaves" to the *p6rne.* This verb *kollasthai* is used by Paul (and by the entire Pauline literature) in our passage and in Rom 12: 9 only. Obviously it is not a Pauline term. In Rom 12: 9 the meaning is very general, one is " to stick to " what is good. On the contrary, in our text it has a very specific connotation, as it is suggested by the context. In such contexts this verb is a technical term expressing a marital or marital-like relationship. The evidence for this comes precisely from the basic text on marriage Mt 19: *5* (cf. Eph 5: 81), which is a quotation from Gen 2: 24 (LXX has *proskollasthai,* the reading of Eph 5: 81 and of the addition of Mk 10: 7). This text of Gen is very present to Paul's mind, in fact he quotes it in v. 16. It is likely that Paul uses the simple instead of the compound (of the LXX) because he is translating directly from the Hebrew text, and he renders *dbq* (in Gen 2: 24) by *kollasthai,* which is the more usual equivalent of the Hebrew term in the LXX. Now, this Hebrew term applies to similar contexts (cf. Gen 84: 8: 1 Kings 11: 2). Other considerations will be added later on.

At this moment, however, we may anticipate that neither the Greek nor the Hebrew term indicates primarily and directly a sexual relationship. In fact, this: is certainly excluded when *kollasthai* expresses the bond between Christ and his (" members ") faithful. At this point Paul stresses that the cleaving of a Christian to Christ results in " one spirit," and precisely " spirit." Again, Paul has the doctrine of the "Body of Christ " in mind, according to which the union of a Christian with Christ is as solid and real as the union of a " member " to the the body from which it draws life and nourishment. Still, this union- otherwise than the union between man and woman- has nothing to do with sex and nature. And this is why Paul avoids saying that this union results in "one flesh," and de-

liberately chooses to say that it results in " one spirit." Paul could say also that such a union results in " one Body," as he, in fact, does on some other occasions (1 Cor 10: 17; U: Hl f. 27; Rom 12: 5) . But he has just used this expression to indicate the union of a man and a *p6rne* (v. 16), and he is obviously careful to stress the difference betwen these unions. That is why he avoids *here,* in this particular text, an expression which he otherwise uses unrestrictedly.

Now, the fact that the union between Christ and each Christian results in" one spirit" does not imply in Paul's mind and language any metaphysical incompatibility. The word " spirit " does not necessarily imply an opposition to matter or to physical entities. It may indicate something which is related to God's world and activity in some way, something which in some way or aspect is beyond the laws of the present cosmos. Paul can say that the manna and the water from the rock (Ex 16; 17) of olden times was " spiritual," and the rock itself was "spiritual "-a qualification by which Paul certainly does not intend to deny the physical nature of these elements; rather he intends to stress the supernatural character of their donation by God. In 1 Cor 15: 4 Paul speaks in terms that for our metaphysics would be considered contradictory: he refers to a "spiritual body," which is the risen body of every Christian; this body is spiritual not because it is not a body but because it does not belong to this creation any longer; it obeys other laws and another way of existence. It is in a supernatural state. In point of fact, the spiritual body is understood to be a "heavenly" (see the variant reading "spiritual") man in v. 47. In the same context (1 Cor 15: 45) the risen Christ becomes a " life-giving spirit," by which expression Paul does not intend to say that Christ dropped his body or that his body evaporated into spirit.[17] Again, what he says is that Christ's body belongs to a realm where" flesh and blood" have

[17] *Didache,* 10, 3, defines the eucharist as "spiritual" food and drink but not to deny the physical aspect of it. Ignatius, *Eph.,* 7, 2, says that Christ was "at the same time fleshly and spiritual." Cf. Gal 5: 22; Rom 7: 14.

no place, where mortality and corruptjbility are changed into immortality-incorruptibility (I5: 50 ff) , i. e., where " mortality is swallowed up by life " through this Spirit (2 Cor 5: 4f; Rom 8: 11; I: 4).

From this text of I Cor I5: 45 another element is to be retained, namely, the risen body of Christ is a "life-giving" body for others, for those who join his" body." It is with this theology in mind that Paul states that " all of us have been baptized into one body in one Spirit .... all have been given to drink of one Spirit" (I Cor I2: IS) . Along the same line the author of Eph 4: 4 stresses that there is " one body, one Spirit ... one baptism."

The general concept intended in the " one spirit " resulting from a Christ-faithful union (I Cor 6: I7) should be clear by now. Through baptism [18] the body-self of the Christian becomes a" member" of Christ, is ingrafted into Christ's body which, through his resurrection has become a life-giving supernatural reality, body fully and completely permeated by the Spirit; through this " spiritualized " body " one Spirit "-the same Spirit in Christ-is given to drink to the Christian man in baptism. [19] Through this sacrament the channels of communication between Christ and the Christian are established and opened, and Christ's very life and Spirit flow into this Christian who now becomes " one spirit " with .Christ, in the sense that he becomes a member of the " spiritualized " body of Christ, i. e., a supernatural reality in union with Christ, vivified by a " spiritual " life flowing from Christ which is, first of all, the Spirit himself. The language of John is much more radical still when he says that the regenerated of water and Spirit is "spirit" himself (lo S: 6), not because he loses his physical dimension but because he acquires a spiritual-supernatural dimension, a divine sonship which cannot be given by blood, flesh or man but only by God (lo I: IS). This union

[18] Cf. P. Dacquino, "De membris Ecclesiae, quae est corpus Christi," *VD* 41 (1968)' 117 fl'.

[18] Cerfaux, *The Church,* !!70.

is in all truth a "fertilizing" union resulting in a "regeneration " of man, in a " new creation." [20]

After all, the " one spirit," effected through baptism out of Christ and his faithful, is not entitatively different from the " one body " that Paul sees is effected through the Eucharistic "communion" *(koin6nia)* between the "one bread and many" (I Cor 10: 16 f). The "one bread" is not one loaf but it is one Christ in both the bread and the cup, no matter the number of loaves or the quantity of wine. Paul's reasoning is very simple, but it is based on faith, the faith in Christ':"; presence in the Eucharist. Through "communion" in Christ's " body and blood " Christ becomes particularly present in each Christian as Christ is within him, active and operative; he is living there and the recipient enjoys Christ's personal life-Spirit. This is true of each and of *all* the faithful partaking in Christ's body and blood. Christ is in each one of them. Since Christ is only one, there is a dimension according to which all those faithful are one or, more exactly, "one body," namely, the body of Christ present and living in each and in all of them. Conversely, what is true of the group is true of each one: each Christian partaking of the Eucharist becomes " one body " with Christ, as Christ through his Eucharistic body is living in him. Still, this is not a material-physical body and union, this is a body-union belonging to the realm of the " spiritual " world of God. The Christian does not lose his physical dimension, but in his physical dimension he receives the life-Spirit of Christ communicated to his (Christ's) "spiritualized" body. Again, John is more radical when he maintains that through the Eucharist " I am immanent in him and he in me " (Io 6: 56), he" lives because of me" (v. 57), and the faithful possess life in himself (v. 53) -the same Greek expression which is used to indicate the presence of life in the Father and in the Son (Io 5: 26) .

The Eucharist is a means of further " transfusion " of life

[20] Benoit, "L'Eglise," 991; Dacquino, "De membris Ecclesiae." l!M. Cf. Jewett, *Paul's .•. Tcmns,*

from Christ to the faithful, by which the union between both is strengthened and tightened. But this process starts with baptism when a man is first grafted into "one (Christ's) body" to be given to drink of "one Spirit." [21] This man does not thereby lose his human-physical nature, but it is through these sacraments and communications of life that this human-physical nature too begins the process of its " spiritualization " which will end up in a total transformation into a " spiritual body" thoroughly permeated by the Spirit. [22] This is how a Christian's cleaving to Christ results in "one spirit," as over-against" one flesh-one body" resulting from a man's cleaving to a *p6rne.*

These developments show to what an extent the notion " to cleave" *(kollasthai)* can be dissociated from the idea of sexual union. This does mean, however, that the imagery of marriage persists and that Paul, in fact, describes the relationship Christ-faithful in marital terms-and this not only in Eph *5:* ff but also in our text 1 Cor 6: It is on the basis of this marital imagery, I think, that an obscurity in our text seems to become less enigmatic.

Paul writes that "whatever sin *(hamartema)* a man may commit *(poiein)* is outside the body; but he who fornicates (ho *porneuan;* see below) sins *(hamartanei)* against his own body" (v. 18). [28] It has always been difficult to see how "fornication" (only) is a sin against one's own body and other sins (like gluttony, drunkenness, suicide) are not. Conzelmann [24] thinks that Paul is concerned only with the present

[21] Cf. Ahem, "The Christian's Union," 203; Benoit, "L'Eglise," 990 f.

[22] Which does not mean absorption. Cf. L. Bouyer, *L'Eglise de Dieu. Corps du Christ et temple deJ l'Esprit* (Paris: Cerf, 1970), 603.

[23] Hauck-Schulz, *ThW,* VI 583, refer to the Stoic Muson (p. *65,* 44 ff) who maintains that he who has relations with a prostitute sins against himself. They *(ibid.)* quote also Epictetus as saying that by all unclean acts a man defiles the god in his breast.

[24] Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief,* 135. C. K. Barret *A commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1968), 150 f comes close to this view when, following Calvin, he maintains that other sins may be against one's body, but " comparatively speaking, they are outside the body."

case and he stresses that this sin is against one's own body- he does not consider the inclusion or exclusion of other possible sins against one's body: obviously, this is not very convincing. Kempthorne [25] understands Paul's text to mean that the " body " is the Body of Christ, and a fornicator sins against this Body which is also *his* body. The problem is that it is difficult to accept that at this point the text refers to the Body of Christ (Christ with his community) and not to the individual body-self of each Christian.

It seems well, in fact, that Paul again is thinking of the body-self of individual Christians. Whatever the case of 1 Clem 46: 7,[26] Paul never refers to the Body of Christ as the Body of a single Christian, nor can Paul's theological thought admit such an expression since by that expression he means the personal body-self of Christ to which Christians are incorporated as " members." Furthermore, there is no indication that the perspective of vv. 13-15 is changed, and here "body" is the individual self of each Christian. On the other hand, in this entire passage Paul, as we have seen, does not consider the relationship of Christ with the group of Christians but with each individual faithful, and it is likely (see below) that he has a single concrete individual in mind.

The very same Greek expression *(to idion soma)* appears immediately afterwards in 7: 4 where it certainly indicates the individual self of each partner in marriage. But it is above all the marital aspect of this latter passage that we want to bring into relief: a wife is not the lord of her own body-self, and the same thing is true of the husband. This is a union (among Christians) that Paul considers lawful, and in this case the apostle maintains that each partner has committed his/her own self to the other: it is the other who is the lord *(exousiazei)* .[27]

[25] Kempthome, " Incest and the Body of Christ: A Study of 1 Corinthians VI. 12-20," *NTS* 14 (1967/8) 572.

•• Cf. *id., ibid.*

[27] In Rom 7: 2 Paul understands that a married woman is *hypandros,* is "under" a man, which is a Hebrew way to say that one is married: H. Strack-P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch,* III (Miinchen: Oscar Beck, 1926), 234.

This, in Paul's understanding, is a lawful commitment, is a legitimate submission to some other's authority and will, no sin is involved in it.

The problem is different in a relationship when a man is a *porneuon* of some sort (6: 18). This man "sins" in such a relationship, Paul understands. And the presence of "sin" makes all the difference for Paul between a marital union and a union in "fornication." In the former case where the mutual commitment happens according to God's and Christ's will, there is no slavery, there is no sin against one's own self.[28] Such a slavery comes about, however, in the case of an unlawful union. This is what Paul says right at the beginning of the text under discussion (1 Cor 6, 12): to do everything may mean to constitute something lord *(exousiazein)* over myself. The application to the practical case is that a union in fornication *constitutes someone lord (YI)er someone else.* Besides the context, it is the verb *exousiazein* which suggests this concrete and practical understanding. In fact, this verb is not a Pauline term since Paul uses it only in the present context: in 1 Cor 6: 12 and 7: 4. Now "to fornicate" means precisely this: to realize an *unlawful, sinful* union by which I constitute someone else *unlawful* lord over my body-self, I enslave myself to the other, I give up my freedom and rights and put myself in an awkward and degrading situation in theological terms.

There is a juridical flavor to the idea. In fact, Paul does not say that such a Christian sins against God or Christ (1 Cor 8: 12), he sins against his own" self." The notion *hamartanein* (to sin) itself is interesting in this context. Obviously, "to sin" is the same thing as *hamartema poiein* (v. 18a). Now, Paul (and the entire Pauline literature) uses *hamartema* only in Rom 3: *25* and in our text (1 Cor 6: 18). It is very difficult to admit that, for Paul, it means the same thing as the recurrent *hamart£a.* Though *hamartema* includes the theological qualification of something sinful, it rather indicates a wrong deed or wrong doing, the sinful action rather than its sinful

[18] See Bartling, *Sexuality* ... , 862 f.

quality. So, *hamartdnein* against one self means to do wrong deeds, or make mistakes against one self-and this, within the particular context of constituting someone else as unlawful lord over oneself. It comes very close to the concept of violating one's own rights and interests, in theologoical terms, by enslaving onself to an unlawful and sinful lord. This does not apply to any other sin.[29]

This sin of fornication is *against* the body; [80] Paul does not say that it is inside the body. From this angle, the correspondence with the foregoing sentence " every wrong deed one does is *outside* the body" (v. 18b) is defective. Paul does not say whether fornication is outside or inside the body, he does say that it is against the body-self. On the other hand, the sentence in v. 18b does not say that all other sins *exc.ept* fornication are outside the body; there is no compulsory reason to make such an exception, in spite of the similar passage of Mk 3: 28 f parall. Both the lack of correspondence and of any explicit exception gives support to Maule's [81] contention that v. 18b is not Paul's doctrine but a slogan of the Corinthians, like those in v. 12: 13 and 10: 23, to which Paul answers with v. 18c. The grammatical construction surely backs such a view: just as in v. 12 f, v. 18b (the slogan) col).tains no joining particle, whereas Paul's answer is introduced by a truly adversative *de.* The meaning of the whole would be as follows. 'J.'he Corinthians defend free sex on the grounds that " whatever wrong deeds one may do lie outside one's own self," i.e., they do not affect him, he is above every moral contamination. In his answer Paul, as in v. 12 and 13, does not go into the merits of such an assertion [82] but retorts that it certainly is *against* th0

[29] And Sir 10: 28 says: "Who will justify him who sins against his own soul?"

[80] A linguistically similar expression is found in the Rabbinic literature, but the meaning is different, namely, "to sin with the body": Stract-Billerbeck, *Kommentar sum NT,* 866.

[81] Charles F. Moule, *An Idiom-Book of the NT Greek* (Cambridge: University Press, 2d ed. 1959), 196 f.

[82] It cannot be said, therefore, that Paul's reply seems to accept the general proposition, and makes an exception to it: Barret, *A commentary,* 150. Paul's reaction may express acceptance or rejection-or neither.

body-self. On this assumption no room is left £or the question as to whether in Paul's view *only·* fornication is against one's body or whether some (and what) sins are outside the body and others (and what) inside it.

The marital imagery emerges again in v. 19 f when Paul states that Christians (each Christian) are not in possession of themselves, [33] they are not lords of themselves, as they [H] have been bought with a price." True, the idea of Christians having been brought by a price is used by Paul in 1 Cor 7:28 where it connotes the concept of manumission from slavery to "serve" Christ (cf. Gal 8: 18; 4: 5). But each context gives the final shade of meaning to words. In the immediate context of our passage (1 Cor 7: 1) Paul stresses that a partner in marriage is not lord of himself. Of course, Paul would not say that Christ is not Lord of himself, but this proves only that Paul carries the comparison no farther than he can. The notion to " buy " *(agorazein)* is not against a marital imagery. This very verb is used in Neh 10: 81 (as a translation for the Hebrew *lqh)* where it certainly indicates the dowry a man pays for a bride: " we will not buy their daughters." [34] This usage is expressed in·the Hebrew bible through some other terms which convey the same concept o£ buying a bride: a man [H] shall surely pay (*mhr;* LXX *phern.iei)* a dowry for her to be his wife" (Ex 22: 15; cf. Ps 16: 4); Boaz bought *(qnh;* LXX *ktasthai)* Ruth to be his wife, just as he [H] bought" the field, etc. (Rut 4: 10.9.5; cf. 2 Sam 12: 8; Koh 2: 7) -this verb *qnh* is used also to express how Jahweh came to possess Israel (Ex 16: 16; Deut 82: 6; Ps 74: 2; 78: 54); the prophet Hosea also bought *(krh;* LXX *misthoUsthai)* an adulterous woman for himself; the same meaning is found in Gen 81: 15 where Laban is said to have "sold" *(mkr;* LXX *pipraskein)* his daughters to Jacob. The

•• An expression which, according to Strack-Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum N. T.*, III 367, belongs to the marriage language.

•• Cf. Gen 4 4 19; 6: !i!; Ex !ill: 10; 34: 16; 1 Sam *!i!5:* 43, where *lqh* applies to the fact of " taking" a wife; this verb surely has the meaning of " buying " (a field) in Prov 31: 16.

word "price" *(time:* 1 Cor 6: 20) is not foreign to this context: cf. Gen 20: 16 (LXX) .

The marital dimension of the thought " you are not in possession of yourselves " is here the only acceptable one, on account of its obvious relationship to v. 15 f; a Christian is not supposed to take (away) a member (his own "body") belonging to Christ-possession of Christ-and make it a member (possession) of a *p6rne* by becoming one " body-flesh " with her. A Christian is supposed not to do so because-among other things-he is not a possession of himself, he is a possession (consort) of Christ. To give this possession of Christ to a prostitute is an adultery of sorts.

The body is not for fornication

The doctrine expounded thus far applies in any kind of unlawful sex, i.e., of any sexual relationship undertaken by a Christian not in accordance with God's will which has its basic expression in nature. Any sort of *sinful* sex is to give Christ's members (i.e., Christian " bodies ") to fornication. In this sense the doctrine above offers a solid theological basis for a correct Christian orientation and evaluation of sex. The forms that sinful sex can take are expressed by Paul in the immediate context of 1 Cor 6: 9 and, then, in Rom 1: 26 f.

The reason why only in a marital relationship is sex correct and therefore not sinful is that, being natural (according to the Creator's will), only this sexual relationship can be taken up by Christ who, through his" body" vivifies the" members" atached to him; the life Christ infuses in his members can perform and further only that relationship which is according to the plans of God the Creator. Of course, a Christian keeps the physical powers to perform the wrong union. But it is precisely in this that the abnormality-and the sin-consists, if he does so.[35] The human being was ingrafted into Christ's

[85] Cf. Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief,* 134 f. Paul in: 1 Cor. 6: 20 requests the faithful to " glorify God with their bodies," which certainly indicates that inordinate sex does not glorify God: cf. Walter Lowrie, "Glorify God in Your Body, *Theology Today* 10 (1953/4) 492-500.

body so that it may receive life to act as a true "member,', according to the "nature,, and interests of Chrises body (or Body). If such a member does the wrong thing-in a wrong sexual union- it is making use of itself in a manner which is unnatural in some way, as it is doing something against the very nature of the " body " which provides its (supernatural) life. This is a sort of theological monstrosity or absurdity. [88] It is to *force* the members of Christ to do something the body cannot do. The absurdity is all the more blatant when this member constitutes someone as unlawful lord upon itself in an unlawful relationship, when the Christian,s body is for the Lord, it is the Lord's. That is why Paul cannot understand such an attitude: it is just an absurdity in theological terms. [87]

This doctrine applies to any sinful sexual activity, and even to all other wrong doings. Still, the question is legitmate as to whether Paul has something more concrete in mind. Not long ago Kempthorne [88] proposed that our passage (1 Cor 6:
should be read in connection with the incestuous union dealt with in 1 Cor *5*. There is much that speaks for this view--:-much more than the valuable remarks pointed out by Kempthorne in order to explain how the text fits in very well with this view'.[89]

In the first place, it is very strange that Paul goes into a discussion about " general " fornication at this point of the epistle.[4°] For one thing, such a discussion can hardly be con-

•• Joseph Bonsirven, *Theologie du Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Aubier, 1951), 888: this sin "becomes for him a true monstrosity ... to join this living portion of Christ to a harlot." Cf. Michel Barnouin, "Le caractere baptismal et les enseignements de Saint Paul," *Stud. Paulin. Congr. lntem. Cath.,* II 807 ff.

[87] Jean Hering, *La Premiere epitre de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens,* (Commentaire du Nouveau Testament VII) (Neuchatel-Paris: Delachaux et Niestle, 1949), 47: " Man is a unit, and the body of the Christian cannot orient itself towards Christ and depart from him at the same time." Cf. C. Spicq, *Theologie Morale, 556,* and fnt 8 and 4.

•• Kempthome, " Incest," 568-574.

•• In spite of Jewett, *Paul's .. , Terms,* !!60.

'" It is not very convincing to say that here Paul argnes with an imaginary opponent: John C. Hurd, *The Origin of 1 Corinthians* (New York: Seabury Press, 1965), 87, quoting from Craig.

sidered an appropriate introduction for his doctrine on marriage, which follows immediately afterwards in ch. 7. For another, this doctrine inch. 7 begins a new section of the letter in which Paul sets out to answer. the question " about which you write (to me)" (7: 1). The implications are: first, that our text (I Cor 6: 12-20) does not belong to the new section, it is not an introduction to the doctrine on marriage; second, that our text has to belong to the foregoing section.[41]

Now, to maintain that our text is completely disconnected from the foregoing context certainly is not the obvious assumption. One is rather entitled to assume that there is a connection, unless reasonable proof to the contrary is provided-which has not been done so far.[42] On the other hand, this text is the *end* of a development in the letter. It is difficult to avoid the impression that this seemingly unprepared discussion on " fornication " is the continuation-and the conclusion-of the episode concerning the incestuous [4a] " fornication " in Corinth which marks the beginning of a new development in 5: I. The discusion about law-courts in the community (1 Cor 6: l-9a) is just a digression caused by the reference to real jurisdiction in the community to deal with the incestuous man-and with other affairs. Paul, in fact, wants the jurisdiction of the community to be exerted in the case of the incestuous man (5: 12 f.4) and not to let things go, both in this case and many others (cf. 5: 11 f). This is why there are law-courts .in the community, and no recourse to pagan courts is needed. But it is obvious that this digression comes to an end in 6: 9a, and Paul returns to the subject of ch. *5* in 6: 9b: [44] the list of vices

" In disagreement with Hurd, *ibid.*, 87 f., who considers the text in question *as* a " transitional passage " in spite of the realization that several details in it " have marked oral information elsewhere " (p. 87) .

.. The different replacements and apportionments in 1 Cor proposed, v. g., by Hurd *ibid.*, are far from demonstrated.

••" It is most likely that he (the man in question) , after his father's death, married his (father's) widow " : Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief*, 116.

•• Barret, *A commentary*, 144: "Verses 9-11 (in ch. 6) provide Paul with a suitable way of working back to the theme of sexual license which he left at the end of Chapter V."

opens with a series of sex offenses (idolatry not excluded) headed by the *p6rnoi* (fornicators) -no dubious reference to the *porneia* of the young man in 5: 8.9.10 (cf. in v. 13 the assonance *(poner6n-p6rnon)* .

Then in v. 12 Paul deals again directly with the incestuous case, but not from the point of view of jurisdiction (5, *Hl* f) and legal procedures (*5,* 4 f) , but from the point of view of the grounds on which the Corinthians tolerated such a scandal in their community: "everything is lawful for me" (v. 12); " the food is for the stomach, and the stomach for the food (and both will perish)" (v. 13); "every sinful deed that a person may commit is outside the body-self" (v. 18) . There can be little doubt that these were the grounds for the " inflation " and inactivity of the Corinthians which Paul denounces (5: 2 f. 6: 11-13) in connection with the incestuous scandal.

The wrong relationship between a man and a " harlot " *(p6rne)* to which Paul refers in 6: 15 f, seems to confirm this view. Paul thinks that by such a relationship both persons "are (are being) one body"; what is more, Paul thinks that the basic marital doctrine of Gen 2: 24-" the two result in one flesh "-applies to such a relationship. One wonders whether Paul would really say that an occasional act of prostitution effects "one bpdy," a lasting and stable human compound. One wonders even more whether Paul would maintain that the sacred text teaches either that (occasional) fornication is the means whereby two persons "result in one flesh," or that actual intercourse is essential to effect " one flesh." To my knowledge, this would have been the only passage in the entire Bible conveying such a message.

Furthermore, the concept of "cleaving" to a woman in no way suggests the idea of sexual intercourse necessarily. Certainly such an idea is not suggested when, in the same context (v. 17), one of the faithful "cleaves" to Christ. As pointed out above, this Greek word is not a Pauline term. Except for Rom 12: 9 ("to stick to what is good"), this verb is used by the Pauline literature in our passage only; Eph 5: 31 uses

proskollasthai which means the same thing, and the context is that of marriage and of union between Christ and his community. In a context of marriage this Greek term is used again in Mt 19: *5* and in Mk 10: 7 *(prosk.,* in the addition) . The rest of the occurrences in the NT has nothing to do with sex at all. And where it is used in contexts of marriage it does not connote the aspect of marital sex, let alone any idea of occasional unlawful sex.

In point of fact, the Greek term under discussion when used in marital contexts certainly goes back to the text of Gen and corresponds to the Hebrew, *dbq.* Now, in the Hebrew bible the verb *dbq* expresses, besides other connotations, the concept of affectionate adhesion, loyalty, faithfulness. This is particularly true when it applies to God (Deut 11: 13: *5;* Josh 8; Kings 18: 6; Ps 63: 9; etc.) or to friendly persons (Ruth 1: 14; . In such contexts this Hebrew verb connotes rather the idea of love and, in fact, both notions appear in the texts side by side. Any connotation of sexual activity seems not to be directly intended by *dbq.* This becomes apparent when man "cleaves" to God, but also when Ruth "cleaves" to Naomi, her mother-in-law (Ruth 1: 14). But this is true even of 1 Kings 11: Solomon cleaves to many women " in love," in fact he " loved " many foreign women (11: 1)-the evil effect being that these women influence Solomon's "heart" and religion. Nor is the case of Gen 34: 3 f different: Schechem cleaved to Dinah and "loved" her independently of the fact that he " humiliated " her; he wanted her to be his wife. I could not find any passage in the Bible where *dbq-kollasthai* has a directly sexual connotation-not even in Sir 19: (or in 1 Esdr 4: It is worth noticing, in this connection, that in LXX (pros-) *kollasthai,* besides being the usual translation of *dbq,* occasionally translates also the Hebrew *ngc* and *ngs-but,* significantly, not where these two terms have a sexual connotation (v. g., Gen 6; Ex 19: 15). Accordingly, in 1 Cor 7: 1 Paul uses *haptesthai,* not *kollasthai.* The Hebrew *dbq* occurs also 6 times in Qumran,

according to Kuhn's concordance; [45] it never has any connection with sex at all.[46] The implication is that not even in Gen 2: 24 or Mt parall (or Eph 5: 31) has the notion" to cleave" a directly sexual connotation: it rather indicates that it is through love, affection and faithfulness that man and woman come to coalesce into "one flesh-body," into one single human totality or compound. [47]

The result of this survey shows that the situation contemplated by Paul in 1 Cor 6: *15* f can hardly be one of occasional intercourse. It seems to be one of a stable relationship: they "are being" one body-flesh, they "are cleaving" to each other-just as Christ and the faithful " are being " one spirit and "are cleaving" to each other. This is what the present tenses suggest also. Now, this seems well to be the case of incestuous "fornication" that Paul denounces in 1 Cor 5: 1: this man "is having" the (former) wife of his father. Notice that the Greek *echein* (to have) with a woman or man as its object and " usually without *gynaika, andra* " means to " have to wife or as husband " ; [48] the correct translation of the passage

•• 1QS 1: *5* (to cling to good works); 15 (curses cleave to an evil man); 1QH 5: 81 (tongne cleaves to the palate); 16: 7 (to cleave to the truth); CD 1: 17 (curses cleave to an evil man); Fragm. with no connection.

•• The texts on which K. L. Schmidt, *ThW,* III (f), bases a different view, are Rabbinic and later than the N. T.

07 This is the meaning of " to result in one flesh " in Gen The word "flesh" in the Hebrew bible can indicate different relationships (cf. Lev 13: 18; Dent *5:* Is 66: Jer Ps 84: 3) . A prominent use of this word is made to indicate kindred people, one family (Gen 87: Neh *5:* cf. Hebr 14). Still, I could not find any other place in the Hebrew bible where " flesh " would be used to indicate sexual intercourse. Moreover, I could not find any other passage in the Hebrew bible where " one flesh" occurs-not even in Gen 14; 87: Sam *5:* 1. Now, in Gen it is obvious that husband and wife result in one flesh in the sense that the woman is "taken from man," is " bone from my bones and flesh from my flesh," i. e., in the sense that they are intended to complete each other, to make one human compound out of two matching elements. They never were united before, they become " bone from my bones, etc.," when they become "one flesh "-and this happens, not necessarily nor primarily by sexual intercourse but by spiritual "adhesion" *(dbq),* by love. Cf. Dubarle, 'L'origine dans l' AT ... ,' lf.

•• Liddle-Scott, A, 4.

being that the man had the wife of his father as his own wife. It was an established way of life, it was a marital union effected not only (not particularly) by sexual acts but by love, affection, fidelity.

These consorts had achieved a oneness, " one body-flesh," as is the case in every other (lawful) marriage, with the only important difference that they did it in the wrong way, under the wrong circumstances and between the wrong persons. Such unions were forbidden by law.[49] And this is why such a" oneness" is" fornication" *(porneia)* instead of marriage. And such an established fornication renders the theological situation of a " member of Christ " all the more absurd-the only way to deal with such a "member," if he persists in such oneness, is excommunication (5: 4f.18).

It is obvious that such incestuous union is called by Paul *porneia* in 5: 1, which is.-Paul insists-" such a *porne£a."* Nothing, therefore, hinders the same word *porneia* in 6: 18.18 (and, as a result, the entire passage) from referring to the same fact. The assumption is that when Paul refers to *p6rnoi-p6rnos* in *5:* 10 f, by this word he indicates the man living in such incestuous union. The implication is that *p6rne* in 6: *15* f can indicate the female partner in such union, regardless of whether she is Christian or pagan or a cultic prostitute. And the verb *porn.eUein* in 6: 18 can have a more particular meaning in this connection as applying to any man who may live in such a situation.[50] It is a situation like that of the incestuous man that explains the sin (of slavery) against one's own body (6: 18) best.

The use of the concept " fornication " in such connections is not unusual in the Hebrew language before Paul. The main evidence comes from the Sadokite Fragment 4: 17,20 f; 5: 8 ff,[51] where the writer uses *zenut-the* Hebrew equivalent of

••·Not only by the Jewish Law (Lev 18: 8; 20: 11) but also by the Roman institutions cf. Barret, *A commentary,* 121; Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief,* 116, fnt 29; Abel E.-B., *Premiere epttre aux Corinthiens* (Paris: Gabalda, 1956), 119.

[50] Similar reflexions also in Kempthorne, " Incest," 570 f.

[51] Chain Rabin, *The Zadokite Documents* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1954), 16"18.

porneia-in the sense of incestuous unions forbidden by the Law (Lev 18: 18), and in the sense of some sort of polygamy. Rabin [52] says that the Rabbis find a similar use of the concept in the OT: cf. Lev 21: 7 (19: 29; 18: 17), where the verb *znh* (usually translated by *porneuein)* is used also.

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Abundant use of this concept in such sense in the Rabbinic literature is the basis of the understanding of divorce in the NT by J. Bonsirven, *Le divorce dans le Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Desclee, 1948), 50-60; in the same direction cf. Hauck-Schulz, *ThW,* VI *589, 5;*

•• *Ibid.,* 17, fnt 3; 1

AUGUSTINE'S THOUGHT AND PRESENT-DAY CHRISTIANITY: A REAPPRAISAL

WHAT FOLLOWS is an appraisal of the significance of some aspects of Augustine's thought for present-day Christianity. There are at least five reasons why this appraisal is a desideratum.

First, Augustine's interpretation of Christianity has been widely rejected in recent years. Yet in view of the significant role his work has had in Christian thought and Christian spirituality it is important to examine the grounds of this rejection. Augustine's interpretation of Christianity has been rejected on the grounds that all metaphysical language is without meaning. It has been rejected on the grounds that metaphysical thought is a waste of human creative effort, the true concern of which is the natural and social sciences and their technological application. It has been rejected for its supernaturalism, on the grounds that man's world is the sensory world and not a suprasensory realm. And most recently it has been rejected on account of the Hellenistic and specifically neo-Platonist character of his interpretation of Christianity.

Clearly the demonstration of the meaningfulness and of the specific meanings of the linguistic expressions in which he writes about his metaphysical insights and convictions would be a service not only to Augustinian studies but also to the perennially aluring metaphysical enterprise and to the unfinished work of language philosophy. This project, however, lies outside the scope of this essay. Further, the charge that metaphysical language is without meaning is less likely to be made today than it was several decades ago. An increased generosity toward metaphysics is one result of the impact of the manifold forms of phenomenological and existentialist thought on the

philosophical community. (Despite, or rather, perhaps, because, of this increased generosity toward metaphysics the question as to how the cognitive meaningfulness of metaphysical language can be demonstrated has been forgotten rather than answered satisfactorily.) Yet many thinkers hold that the traditional Christian metaphysics of the transcendent and the suprasensory, if not totally without justification, is presently without a role in the interpretation of Christianity; and few speak in its defense. Finally, Augustine's view is that the metaphysics by which his work is informed is true and that his own spiritual development has both followed upon and fostered his ar:propriation of that metaphysics.

Second, some are reinterpreting Augustine's thought along phenomenological and existentialist lines. Thus Augustine has been said without qualification to be an existentialist. And those aspects of his thought in which he is concerned with the content of man's experience (e. g., man's experience of time) are accepted as a variety of phenomenological-existentialist thought. And some existentialists at least implicitly claim Augustine as an ally.[1] And to be sure, Augustine does analyze the human existential situation, as does virtually every thinker who endeavors to illumine human spiritual potentialities, their modes of development, and the individual's relation to his world. Thus Augustine analyzes his initial doubts concerning the truth of Christianity and the process of his overcoming of these doubts. It is a disservice, however, not only to Augustine scholarship but also to the philosophical enterprise to fail to make the distinction between Augustine's inquiry into his existential situation and the thought which is informed by a type of phenomenological and man-centered interpretation of *being.* Augustine's existentialist inquiry is a part of his defense and illumination of Christianity. He accepts a realist ontology,

[1] William Barrett, *Irrational Man* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1962) p. 95. Also, *Restless Adventure: Essays on Contemporary Expressions of Existentialism,* ed. by Roger Shinn (New York; Charles Scribner's Son, 1968) Ed. Introduction, p. 14.

and when he talks about God he does not believe that. he is really talking about man. Augustine is not a precursor of twentieth-century philosophical anthropology.

Third, Augustine's work repays examination because of its intrinsic merit and quite apart from the fact that some have called attention to it by rejecting it or by adapting it to their own purposes. His work is a record of and has perennially been productive of a type of spirituality which is prized by some Christians. It is not prized by all Christians. But Christianity has produced many types of spirituality, and no one of them has been cherished throughout the Christian community. In what follows I will try to demonstrate the timeliness of Augustine's Platonized, supernaturalistic interpretation of Christianity and the importance that it not be ignored, rejected, or reductively analyzed into existentialist or phenomenological terms.

As point of departure this passage from the Confessions will be helpful:

> But when will the voice of my pen have power to tell all Your exhortations and all Your terrors, Your consolations and the guidance by which You have brought me to be to Your people a preacher of Your word and a dispenser of Your Sacrament? ...
>
> For a long time now I burn with the desire to meditate upon Your law, and to confess to You both my knowledge of it and my ignorance of it-the first beginnings of Your light and what remains of my darkness-until my weakness shall be swallowed up in You:r strength ...
>
> . . . Let Thy mercy grant my desire, since it does not burn for myself alone, but longs to serve the charity I have for my brethren: and in my heart Thou seest that it is so ... Let me offer in sacrifice to Thee the service of my mind and my tongue, and do Thou give me what I may offer Thee. For I am needy and poor. Thou art rich unto all who call upon Thee. Thou art free from care for Thyself and full of care for us . . .[2]

[9] *The Confessions of St. Augustine,* trans. by F. J. Sheed (New York, N. Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1948) Book Eleven: ll.

Here Augustine reports his discernment of what he accepts as an ethico-religious law. He tells of his former ignorance of it and of its importance to him. He also tells of what remains of his " darkness," i. e., of his ignorance of some aspects of the law and of the difficulties he finds in obeying its commands. The *Confessions* is the study of Augustine's seeking, finding, and growing in the knowledge of a metaphysico-religious way of life which has put an end to his restlessness and has satisfied his desire for peace. What he describes has been a variety of seeking. The seeking *per se,* however, did not satisfy him. Rather, he continued to hope that what he sought he would find. And above all, his seeking did not eventuate in a creation (ala Sartre) of his own values, moral law, and ethico-religious nature. Augustine has found his law. He has not made it. This discernment of what is accepted as an objective moral order, law, and values is an experience known to many persons. And doubtless much of the perennial appeal of the *Confessions* lies in Augustine's having called attention to and described this significant experience.

There are two types of discernment of values and of a moral order, only one of which is the discernment which has been Augustine's experience. There is the discernment in which what is discerned has been passive. In this case what I discern I have found either by chance or by my own efforts. This kind of discernment is at least implicitly present in the interpretation of human moral and valuational nature which, on the one hand, is grounded in metaphysical naturalism and, on the other hand, is essentialist. Thus the discernment of the relevance to man of what Erich Fromm called " the art of loving " is the consummation of a type of empirical inquiry into the human spirit.[3] There is also, however, the discernment in which what I seek has sought me and in which I accept my discernment as a gift. It is this discernment which Augustine describes. One thinks, for example, of his assertion that, though he had learned from the neo-Platonists that "in the begining was

[8] Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York, N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1956) and *Man for Himself* (New York, N. Y.: Rinehart and Co., 1947) Chap. II.

the word," he did not learn from them that " he came unto his own." [4]

There is a second mode of classification of instances of discernment which throws considerable light on Augustine's work and its relevance for the twentieth-century Christian. First, there is the discernment which is achieved by intellectual effort alone. And second, there is the discernment which is achieved only when several aspects of the self are called into play and, moreover, work together in a particular manner. Whatever may have been the conditions of Augustine's initial discernment of the law, in that experience he learned that increased discernment of the content, relevance, and demands of the law could be his only if he appropriated the law. That is, the law gave Augustine a new goal: to endeavor to conform to the law, to make it fundamentally the law of his life, and to endeavor to transform his desires, goals, and concerns in terms of its requirements. And these endeavors, which were requisite for increased insight into the law, were not the work of Augustine's intellect alone. Rather, they made demands upon his capabilities for faithfulness, aspiration, hope, and love. Clearly in this Augustine has followed Plato as well as the neo-Platonists in making spiritual and metaphysico-religious development a process which requires the activity of many aspects of the self.

We turn now to Augustine's acceptance of the supernaturalistic metaphysics of transcendence which informs all his work and which is a target of present-day critics of traditional Christianity and of Augustinian Christianity in particular. In examining this aspect of Augustine's thought I use traditional linguistic expressions with their traditional meanings. There is presently no other language with which to express precisely those meanings. And in the examination of Augustine's work it is important that his words be used with his intended meaning rather than with a twentieth-century reinterpretation of his language. Further, it is the meanings which I use which

[4] *Op. cit.,* Book Seven: IX.

have informed the perennially valued interpretation of Christianity which Augustine has provided. His appeal to the transcendent has three aspects which I will call, ontological, valuational, and explanatory transcendence.

Ontological trarz.c;cendence has to do with the distinction between the being of God, the creator of the world and the giver of the law, and the being of the world and of Augustine who has discerned the law. Clearly the *Confesmons* is informed by ontological transcendence. A corollary is that Augustine's interpretation of his discernment of the law cannot be comprehended wholly in terms of his experience of discernment. It can be comprehended only if there is added to the existential aspects of Augustine's discernment his belief that he has received the law from a being who transcends both Augustine's experience and Augustine's world. For Augustine the law and its giver are no more his " intention " than they are his creation. An anthropocentric, phenomenological interpretation of *being* and of man's world does not suffice for the comprehension of what Augustine has intended to say about God in the *Confesmons.* When he talks about God, he is not talking about his own expenence.

An existential analysis of the passage quoted above from the *Confesmons* would call attention to at least some of the content and experiential effects of Augustine's conviction of the objective reality of the ontologically transcendent. This, however, is all that it would accomplish. It would not make clear the grounds of that belief nor constitute a demonstration of the philosophical legitimacy or illegitimacy of it. And an existential analysis of Augustine's work which was informed by a phenomenological interpretation of *being* would falsify Augusine's metaphysical position by reducing his intended meanings to their existential elements.

Valuational transcendence names Augustine's belief that the values the cultivation of which the law enjoins are eternally fulfilled in God. That is, his valuational transcendence is implicitly a rejection of the view that God is the non-personal ground of his being; that values that are relevant to man are

only latent in God; and that these values ultimately find their fulfillment in man.

And *explanatory transoendence* names Augustine's view that the law and the divine giver of the law explain the ethico-religious capacities which are aspects of the universally human and which Augustine knows at first hand in himself. This law explains the nature of Augustine's spiritual seeking and aspiration. And it illumines his spiritual potentialities. If Augustine's nature explained the law, the latter would be dependent upon him for its character and importance. Augustine's transcendent theism, however, is the view that only in God is the explanation of man; that eternally God is in a divine way what man may become in a human way; and that God is not to be identified with man or with any other aspect of creation.

The nature of Augustine's hope, as seen in the passage above, will also repay examination. This hope has three aspects. First, Augustine hopes that as time passes he will achieve increased knowledge of the law and will discern more of its contents, of the demands it makes upon him, and of its promise of spiritual fulfillment: " Open thou those pages to me." Second, Augustine hopes that his character structure will be transformed according to the requirements of the law and that he will develop increased capacities to appropriate it more successfuly: " Complete thy works in me, 0 Lord." Third, Augustine hopes for the joy of fulfillment which is the accompaniment of the appropriation of the law and of the spiritual development: "Thy voice, the law, is my joy, abounding in all joys."

Augustine's hope for his ethico-religious development derives from his recognition that without increased spiritual development he cannot fulfill the law he has discerned. And this recognition derives from his awareness of his own inadequacy in respect to the demands of the law: "Do not abandon what thou hast given nor scorn thy grass which is athirst for thee." That is, in his belief in his inability to fulfill the law Augustine is not reasoning a priori from a dogmatic acceptance of the Christian view of the fall of man. Rather, he is expressing what lies at the heart of his existential situation: he has tried

to live by the law and has failed. His will remains committed to lesser goals.

Augustine's awareness of his *de facto* ethico-religious inadequacy is in marked contrast to manifold twentieth-century misinterpretations of and rejections of the Christian view of man's spiritual incompleteness, his unfathomed spiritual potentialities, and his need for grace in the overcoming of that incompleteness and in the development of those potentialities. For example, there is the desire, which informs virtually all naturalisms, to prescribe only moral ideals for which there is ample evidence that they can be realized and are, in fact, sometimes realized. And there is the " new morality " which interprets Augustine's law as a set of guidelines for decision. Augustine, on the other hand, does not wish to modify the law. Rather, he accepts it as a constant in his life and seeks to become able to fulfill its demands. He accepts the discipline of the law as a path to spiritual development. And in his obedience to the law is his expectation of the fulfillment which can quiet the restlessness of his heart.

Clearly Augustine's existential situation is informed by essentialism-i. e., by his conviction that all men, in fact , share his relation to the law. Some individuals know of their relation to the law; and some do not. Some know more of it than Augustine does; and some know less. And some make more progress than he does in appropriation of the law. Also *a propos* of the present interest in contextual ethics, it is noteworthy that in *The City of God* Augustine has asserted that, though the law is one, it is legitimately given different interpretations and different applications, depending upon the conditions of any one culture and upon the needs and spiritual development of individuals within the culture.

If the acceptance of transcendent, personalistic theism and essentialism are important ingredients in Augustine's existential situation, then they are also important ingredients in the existential situation of the present-day Christian who finds that Augustine's *Confessions* tells not only the author's story but the reader's story as well. The experiences, the qu;:tlity of life,

the commitment, and the aspiration which are described in the *Confessions* can belong only to the individual whose views of himself and reality are informed by the ontological, explanatory, and valuational transcendence of Christian theism and who in appropriating the law discovers his inadequacy in relation to its demands and his dependence on the giver of the law for the development of his ethico-religious nature.

Thus, Augustine's existential situation is informed by anumber of beliefs. First, it is informed by a complex metaphysics: God is the divine Thou who responds to the creature who desires to fulfill the law. Second, it is informed by beliefs pertaining to Augustine himself. For if he has discerned the way of life which promises to quiet his restlessness, he also has found that he is incapable of fulfilling the law. Third, it is informed by beliefs concerning Augustine's relation to God. God is transcendent, but he is also active within creation. God is the eternal and perfect exemplar of the goodness with Augustine longs to make his own. God's creative activity within Augustine's mind is the source of the light by which Augustine understands himself. And, fourth, it is informed by beliefs concerning all men. Potentially all can find their ideal peace in one spiritual path.

The foregoing implies the inadequacy of late twentieth-century attempts to reinterpret the language of the metaphysics of transcendent theism and, in particular, the language in which Augustine talks about transcendent theism. Thus, there is the view that this language is emotive and non-cognitive and that, hence, truth and falsity are not relevant to it. And there is the view that this language is an expression of the individual's self.. understanding and of the understanding of the world he has made for himself. On the first view Augustine's language is really his cry, an expression of his feelings. On the second view, Augustine's language has a cognitive meaning but does not pertain to objective reality. What Augustine intended to say, however, is a question of fact. So is the question as to whether we have understood him. In any event, the *Confessions* have had a perennial appeal within the Christian community precisely be-

cause Augustine's language has been interpreted as pertaining not only to his insight into his own predicament but also to his insight into objective reality.

In general, twentieth-century naturalists have rejected traditional forms of metaphysical inquiry. And while Augustine has not often been explicitly the target of their criticism, his creative synthesis of Christianity, Platonism, and neo-Platonism is one type of metaphysical thought which they wish to reject, in part, at least, on metaphysical grounds. Interpreted so as to pertain to Augustine's conclusions their criticisms may be classified as follows: Augustine's conclusions derive from inquiry which has no clear epistemological structure; his conclusions do not bear the *imprimatur* of scientific inquiry; and his conclusions are derivative from Hellenistic assumptions which he does not explicitly defend and which cannot at present be legitimately defended.

It is not to be expected that there will be an emphasis on method in Augustine's work. The philosophical emphasis on method is modern. In large part it takes its rise from the development of the scientific investigation of nature which has been so successful as virtually to eclipse all other means of seeking reliable beliefs. The history of man's search for reliable beliefs concerning himself and his world is, however, almost entirely the product of methods spontaneously accepted and spontaneously developed or modified as they have been used. Modern science, for example, was not preceeded by an explicit development of scientific methodology. Rather, the achievement of some insight into the method of science has been one product of both the successes and the failures of scientific inquiry. Analogous comments hold for the many forms of religious faith. And in particular they hold for the Christian faith that informed the *Confessions.*

The dogmatic assertion that scientific inquiry is the only source of legitimate beliefs concerning reality violates the ethos of science itself. For the ethos of science requires sustained attention to whatever evidence indicates that there are important questions to which science as we know it provides no

answers but which for some individuals are answered by Christian faith. And, in fact, in the *Confessions* Augustine is concerned with topics in relation to which scientific inquiry has not yet proved its usefulness. Without benefit of natural science and by rejecting the detached investigative attitude of science (i.e., by virtue of his aspiration to know the law, his willingness to appropriate it, and his capacity to love it and its divine source) Augustine's seeking achieves its end.

On this point Augustine's view is similar to that of Plato. Both thinkers deny that detached intellectual reflection is sufficient for metaphysico-religious inquiry. Augustine's view on this topic is, of course, not identical with that of Plato. For the latter sees metaphysico-religious inquiry as reaching its goal by human efforts alone, while Augustine sees it as successfully consummated only through grace. Nonetheless, the resemblances here between Plato and Augustine are too extensive and too important to ignore. Thus, there is Plato's view that metaphysical insight (i. e., what he calls *knowledge)* is essential to spiritual fulfillment and that in metaphysical inquiry the entire self is called into play, each aspect of the self having its distinctive role. One theme of the *Republic*, for example, is the lack of success of this inquiry which follows upon neglect of the investigative role of some aspect of the self or the giving to some aspect of the self a role that is not its proper investigative role. And analogous comments hold of the Augustinian metaphysico-religious inquiry. In this inquiry the intellect plays a central role, but it is supported, taught, and led by the individual's hope for the fulfillment of his spiritual potentialities, his appropriation of the law, and his love for God.

The criticism that Augustine accepts metaphysico-religious conclusions in support of which there is no positive evidence and against which there is what some persons accept as negative evidence fails to take account of the differences between the naturalistic and the Christian supernaturalistic views of man's moral and spiritual nature. It also fails to take account of the differences between scientific inquiry and the Christian faith of the *Confessions.* The various forms of metaphysical

naturalism, having taken most of their investigative cues from the natural sciences, can legitimately prescribe only those values which a secular society can foster and the relevance of which can be verified by experience. On the Platonic-Augustinian view, however, the natural is no more a measure of man's moral and spiritual nature than nature per se has been man's origin and will be his destiny. The other worldliness of Christian supernaturalism asks the individual to pursue spiritual and moral goals which the secular by itself can neither support nor illumine and for the relevance of which the natural and the secular do not provide adequate evidence.

Finally, the naturalists have perennially urged that Augustine has not offered us the individual's true good. A recurring naturalistic argument is that the other-worldliness of Augustine's Christianity is a flight from life and that the individual owes it to himself to seek his spiritual and intellectual fulfillment in this life and in the natural world which is his true home and, in fact, his only home. The truth is, however, that Augustine enjoins a commitment to the suprasensory which is in no sense a flight from this world and from life in nature. ·Rather, this commitment entails the endeavor to bring the values which are not grounded in nature to bear upon the world. And while it gives a new perspective on this world, it does not reject it. His hope for eternal life leavens, strengthens, and illumines his Christian commitment; but while this life lasts, nature is the scene of the Christian's activity.

First, there is the rejection of the Platonist and nco-Platonist elements in Augustine's thought. These elements are many. Some are Augustine's direct appropriation of certain aspects of Platonism. Some Augustine accepted as truths explicitly shared by the Christian revelation and Platonism. One thinks, for example, of Augustine's careful working out of a Christian version of the neo-Platonist elements of John **1: 1-14.**[5] Also I have already called attention to the fact that Augustine shared with both Plato and the neo-Platonists the view that

"Ibid.

metaphysico-religious inquiry makes demands on the entire self. And there is Augustine's acceptance of the Platonic ontology with its concept of degrees of being and his use of this ontology to work out a philosophy of evil.[6]

A defense of Augustine's use of any aspect of Platonism can be worked out by calling attention to the existential effects of the individual's appropriation or rejection of a Christianity which is informed by that particular aspect of Platonism. Examination of the existential effects of the present-day Christian's acceptance or rejection of Augustine's use of the logos doctrine will serve as an example. At present many persons who are members of the Christian community reject this aspect of Augustine's thought on the grounds that it has no role in late twentieth-century Christianity.[7] The truth is, however, that there is not only one type of Christian existential situation. And the analysis of Christian experiences, interests, and attitudes is not complete unless it takes account of the great diversity of Christian existential situations and of the concepts, beliefs, and concerns which inform them. Thus the analyst who does not himself accept the logos doctrine may have examined only his own existential situation and, perhaps, those situations that are akin to his own. Also, he may not be prepared-i.e., may not have the requisite spiritual development-to discern the existential effects of appropriation of Augustine's interpretation of the logos doctrine in the existential situations which it does inform. And, in fact, the logos doctrine is present in some present-day philosophico-religious thought, notably that of Martin Buber and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Buber, who writes from the Jewish point of view, does not interpret the logos as the "Word become flesh." Nonetheless, this aspect of Buber's thought is important in the present context because of his deliberate acceptance of logos in its Hellenistic origins; because of the important roles he gives logos in nature;

[6] *Op. cit.*, Book Seven: III-V.

[7] See, for example, Leslie Dewart, *The Future of Belief* (New York, N. Y.: Herder and Herder, 1966) pp. And Nels F. S. Ferre, *The Living God of Nothing and Nowhere* (Philadelphia, Penna.: 1966), *passim.*

and because of the role he gives it in the existential situation of the person who cultivates his own relation to the divine Thou.[8] And Teilhard de Chardin urges the appropriation within the Christian community of the view that the creator who has become man is also present within his creation, his presence accounting for the natural order which is the object of scientific inquiry.[9]

In any event, the total rejection of Augustine's appropriation of the logos doctrine on the grounds that it has no legitimate role whatsoever in twentieth-century Christianity fails to take account of the spiritual and intellectual needs, convictions, and expectations of some present-day Christians. Moreover, it is important that the present-day Augustinian Christian achieve intellectual clarity on this point. To his end he must seek evidence that his own Christian spirituality and commitment are illumined, leavened, and strengthened by Augustinian Platonism. If he does this he will have used the criteria of adequacy of interpretation of Christianity which Augustine's critics have used. That is, he will have examined the existential effects of the philosophical concepts which inform the interpretation of Christianity which he has appropriated. But his conclusion will be different from theirs. He will find that Augustine's interpretation of Christianity illumines his spiritual longing and points the way to his increased spiritual development. Specifically, he may find that his appropriation of the logos doctrine has profound effects on his interpretation of scientific inquiry and the status of scientific conclusions. He may also find that it has profound effects on his aesthetic appreciation of nature. This does not necessarily indicate that he has unthinkingly accepted a now outmoded view of the content of Christianity. It may indicate, rather, the continued presence in the Christian community of more than one mode of introducing philosophical concepts into Christianity, each

[8] Martin Buber, "What is Common to All," in *The Nature of Man,* ed. by Maurice Friedman (New York, N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1965) pp. 189-198.

[9] *The Divine Milieu,* (New York, N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1960), *passim.*

of which provides adequate ground for some, but only some, Christians.

Second, phenomenological and existentialist thinkers reject either Augustine's thought per se or traditional interpretations of it on the grounds that these are not " man-centered " and not stated in human terms. This type of criticism derives from the point of view that the only meaningful theological writing is that which pertains primarily to man's existential situation. On this view " to talk about God is really to talk about the existential significance of God for man." The truth is, however, that if we translate Augustine's work into man-centered, human terms we miss his essential meaning. And this is so despite the fact that Augustine's writing so abounds in references to the existential effects of his beliefs that selections from his writings are used to illustrate the feasibility and fruitfulness of an existentialist reinterpretation of traditional Christianity. The existentialist reinterpretation of Augustine's work does not provide either adequate illumination of what he intended to say or of the content and goals of his spirituality.

For example, Augustine's "Thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless till they find their rest in thee " is existentially reinterpreted as meaning" There is an alternative to despair." In this passage, however, Augustine is not talking solely or even primarily about man. He is, rather, talking about God-about God's reasons for creating man, about God's promises to man, and about the thirst for the divine which God gives to man. The existentialist reinterpretation of Augustine's assertion is related to this assertion somewhat as a corollary is related to the theorems from which it is derived and on which all its content and importance depend. If the existentialist reinterpretation is offered as Augustine's fundamental meaning, it is false. If it is offered as a corollary of Augustine's meaning, it is misleading since in the contexts in which the reinterpretation is offered no attention IS paid to Augustine's intended meamng.

Summary. The foregoing is a defense of the current importance of Augustine's spirituality and interpretation of Chris-

tianity. Of course, so far as the ethos of much twentieth-century philosophico-theological work is concerned such a goal is anachronistic. It is, rather, criticism and rejection of Augustinian Christianity which are in order today. My suggestion is, however, that the criticism and rejection of Augustine's thought are primarily important as a means of once more bringing to the fore the question as to the perennial value of his thought. Clearly, Augustine's Platonic and neo-Platonic interpretation of Christianity does not now-and never has-answered to the spiritual needs of all Christians. I have emphasized the fact, however, that Christianity premits of many interpretations and many degrees and types of insights into man, God, and the relation between them. No one of these interpretations has been accepted by all Christians, but several have proved valuable to many Christians. And Augustine's Christianity as set forth in the *Confessions* is perennially valuable to many members of the Christianity community-today no less than formerly.

Augustine's work is not discredited but rather is served and potentially strengthened by the critic who asks whether Augustine's words have cognitive meaning; whether Augustine's Christian faith is a philosophically legitimate source of fundamental beliefs; and whether the Platonic elements in Augustine's Christianity have any significant role in present-day Christian spirituality. The decisive answering of these critics must wait upon the development of language-philosophy, of our understanding of the epistemological structure of Christian faith, and of an existential analysis which is carried out without bias as to the contents, ethos, and dynamics of the Christian life. This is to say, however, that the justification in twentieth-century terms of the view from which this essay is written must wait upon the development of the most fundamental aspects of philosophy.

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THE CASE AGAINST ABORTION

THIS ESSAY has but one purpose, namely, to attempt to defend the view that abortion is morally wrong. In seeking this end, the discussion will proceed as follows: First, the main argument against abortion will be critically analyzed and its weaknesses noted. This done, the argument will be modified and, it is hoped, strengthened. Second, the traditional defenses of abortion will be considered and the following two contentions supported: (I) No argument for abortion has succeeded in establishing that such an act is morally justifiable/ and (2) the reason this is so is that the abortion advocates' moral judgment is based, not on fact but rather on subjectively distorted "fact." Finally, my thesis having been fully developed, one possible counter to my arguments will be anticipated. Here, the abortion advocates' position will be re-cast in such a way that it would appear to avoid the thrust of my criticisms. It will be shown, however, that no atempt to defend abortion along the lines thus specified can hope for success.

I

To begin, how to do those unalterably opposed to abortion usually defend their views? The argument takes various forms, but in its strongest presentation it runs as follows: From conception on, it is claimed, the organism is a human being; and as human it possesses human rights. One of these rights is, as we all recognize, the right to life. Now, when an abortion is effected, the zygote's right to life has been knowingly and

[1] This statement may have one exception; viz., it may be legitimate to permit abortion in cases wherein the expectant mother will die unless her pregnancy is terminated. Incidents such as this occur so rarely, however, that they hardly seem worth mentioning.

purposefully violated. Clearly, such action must be considered immoraP

If the above fairly represents the conservative position, how may those arguing for an opposing view hope to avoid its conclusion? The first line of attack is simply to doubt that the conceptus is human. What, it is asked, is the basis for this belief? In reply to questions of this sort the conservative usually answers as follows:

> ... humanity is an attribute which anyone conceived by a man and a woman has. . . . A being with the human genetic code is *Homo sapiens* in potency; and his potential capacity to reason makes him share in the universal characteristic of man.[8]

Or, put another way:

> Indeed, microgenetics seems to have demonstrated what religion never could; and biological science, to have resolved an ancient theological dispute. The human individual comes into existence first as a minute information speck, drawn at random from many other minute informational specks his parents possessed out of the common human gene pool. This took place at the moment of impregnation. . . . Thus it can be said that the individual is whoever he is going to become from the moment of impregnation.[4]

That is, microgenetics is said to demonstrate that it is at conception that a being with a human genetic code begins its existence. Since it is the possession of this " code " which makes something human, it is that point (conception) which must be taken as the start of human life. And if this is so, abortion must be seen as halting a human's development by terminating his or her existence. In short, abortion must be murder.

As thus stated, the conservatives' argument must surely fail.

• I shall refer to this as the conservative position or hardline view. Counted among its proponents are: John T. Noonan Jr. "Abortion and the Catholic Church: A Summary History," *Natural Law Forum*, Vol. 1!'l (1967); Paul Ramsey, "The Morality of Abortion," in *Life or Death: Ethics and Options* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968); David Granfield, *The Abortion Decision* (New York: Doubleday, 1969); and Germain Grisez, *Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments* (New York: Corpus Publications, 1970).

[8] Noonan, "Abortion and Catholic Church," pp. 128-1!'l9.

• Ramsey, "Morality of Abortion," pp. 61-62.

Simply put, it neglects to consider all the relevant evidence and may therefore be attacked in at least two ways. First, as abortion advocates are quick to point out, drawing the " humanity line " at conception may be premature, for at this point we cannot know we have a unique human being. Twinning occurs later in the conceptus' development; hence, calling it *a* human before that point is surely to jump the gun. And second, defenders of abortion could claim that if the conservatives' reasoning is accepted, one should insist that it is with the production of an egg that a human being begins existence. After all, virgin births are possible. Here, no sperm unites with the egg; rather, it becomes activated in some other manner. The offspring, of course, are all females and virtually " carbon copies " of their mothers. Still and all, the possibility of such occurrences shows that the egg alone possesses the genetic code requisite for humanity. But if this is so, must we now accept the absurd conclusion that every unfertilized egg eliminated from a women's body is a case of murder? On the other hand, if the conservatives seek to avoid this conclusion by denying the egg's human status, they are faced with an equally undesirable alternative, viz., since " humanity " is not taken to be predicable of the egg alone, and since conception never really takes place in cases of virgin births (no sperm and egg unite), the conservatives must now admit that women born virginally are non-human.

Defenders of the hard-line position are aware of the first criticism, but they have not really succeeded in dealing with it adequately. They still *feel* that conception marks the beginning of a human life, but they now admit that it is possible that they are mistaken in the mater: it could be that humans begin their existence at that stage when twinning occurs (one or two weeks from conception) .[5] At first glance it may appear that this concession is of little importance, for few women know they are pregnant within two weeks of conception. Upon closer

• Both Paul Ramsey and Andre Hellegers hold such a view. See, *ibid.*, p. 63; Andre Hellegers, "A Look at Abortion," *The National Catholic Reporter* (Mareh 1, 1967), p. 4.

examination, however, this illusion is quickly dispelled. Some conservatives have claimed that microgenetics *demonstrated* what religion could not, that it *resolved* an ancient theological dispute. Certainly these must now admit that they have somewhat overstated their case, for if a human being begins his existence one or two weeks from conception, abortive mechanisms like intra-uterine devices may be acceptable. Further, if a " morning after " pill were to be developed, its use should have to be condoned.

Given their indecision on the matter, how can the conservatives reply? Must they now admit that the discovery of a " morning after " pill will end the abortion controversy once and for all? Surely they would balk at this suggestion for, as noted, they still feel strongly that human life begins with conception. Unfortunately, an appeal to their "strong feelings" would do little to help their cause. On the other hand, if they could explain why they feel as they do, if they could show that there are *facts* which lend credence to their beliefs, then their position would not be without support. I believe that there are facts which augur in their favor, and it is in hope of bringing them to light that we now move to discuss the second of the above-mentioned criticisms.

The second criticism of the conservative's claims may be stated in the form of a dilemma: either the egg must be human and all unfertilized eggs considered murdered or, if conception marks the beginning of human life, virginally born women must be denied human status. What this criticism makes clear, and what has heretofore gone unnoticed in all discussions of abortion, is that it is an analysis of " conception " and not " human" which is central to the abortion controversy. The second horn of the dilemma assumes that " conception " means " union of egg and sperm." But this is not what we ordinarily mean when we use that term. " Conception" in its everyday use means " beginning," " start," or " creation." And if, when speaking of a woman conceiving, we are implying that a sperm and an egg have united, this is only because such unions usually cause creations of the sort being referred to. That is to say,

an egg and a sperm may unite and still no conception occur- the union could take place and the egg not become "activated." Then again, the " beginning " or " start " may take place with some other impetus as its cause, as in the case of virgin births. Thus, when one s;:tys that an egg and a sperm have united, he has given us a good *reason* for believing that conception has taken place; but he has not said that it has occurred, for " conception " does not *mean* " union of egg and sperm." Further, when one says that a woman has conceived, he has not said that a sperm and an egg have united in her body. This may be inferred or " read in," but all he has really stated is that something new has been created, or has had its beginning, within her.

Once one sees that " conception " means " beginning " or " creation," the abortion advocates " are easily dismissed. On the one hand, the second argument confuses one of the reasons we have for using a term with the meaning of the term itself. Because a conception is a beginning, even virginally born women were conceived, i. e., these eggs also had a point at which they started activation or development. As a result, they may be referred to as human, even by those who deny the egg human status. On the other hand, the abortion advocates' first criticism is faulty precisely in that it neglects to consider the meaning of " conception " at all. If " conception " means " beginning," " start " or "creation," what is it that had its beginning at that point? Surely it must be human life, for what else results? It may well be true, as the defender of abortion indicates, that we cannot know how many lives are present at conception. But if we are to take seriously our ordinary ways of speaking, we do have good reason for believing that human life has begun. And this is all the conservative need show, for the right to life is a *human* right, not a personal one. If twinning were to occur at time T, and the zygote was destroyed before that point, this only adds to the immorality of that particular abortion. Rather than destroying one human, the abortionist has now violated the rights of two. Quantitatively, at least, the crime is even more despicable.

If our analysis is correct, one of the reasons for the conservatives' past failures is now clear. Put most simply, they have sought certainty where there is none. Like Ramsey, they seek to demonstrate or prove that abortion is murder; and to accomplish this task they cast around for a definition of "human" which is broad enough to include all pre-natal organisms within that term's extension. In doing this, however, they attack the problem in the wrong way. No analysis of "human" will solve the problem; two thousand years have been spent trying to define that term, and as yet it still has " blurred edges." What is needed, it seems, is an honest and open admission that there is no certain solution to be had, that the problem cannot be *solved.* Once this is realized, once the " quest for certainty " is abandoned, a case can be made that their moral position has strong factual support and that it is, for this reason, *probably* correct. As fully developed, the conservative argument should run as follows:

First, it is undeniable that fetuses in the very late stages of their development are often referred to as unborn children. Then too, few would think it morally right to kill a fetus five seconds before it was to be born. Clearly then, " humanity " seems predicable of some pre-natal organisms. But granting this, at what stage in their development did these " unborn children " become human and thus possessed of human rights? As we have seen, an analysis of" conception" indicates that it was at this stage that their lives began. Of course, our conclusion here cannot be certain. " Conception," like " human," is imprecise, and it may be that in using that term we mean only to say that the egg's activation has begun and not that human life has been created. But this seems unlikely. When I say "conception has taken place" I think I mean to assert that a woman has begun her pregnancy, that she is now " with child." And this conclusion is not without outside " objective " support. Biology and genetics may not be able to prove the conservatives' case as some have thought, but it cannot be overlooked that various scientists who were not at all concerned

with the abortion controversy have arrived at similar conclusions.6

As thus stated, the case against abortion is a strong one. It appeals to publicly accessible facts, and even if these facts are in themselves inconclusive, they must carry *some* weight. If nothing else, they must be seen as shifting the burden of proof to those who would defend abortion. That is to say, unless the abortion advocate can show that there is something wrong with the conservatives' argument, one seeking an abortion must, at the very least, be considered morally irresponsible. For example, a woman who decides to have an abortion seems much like a hungry (though not starving) hunter who sees a motion in the bushes and fires, despite the fact that the movement was perceived to occur in an area in which she had good reason to believe others were hiking or picnicking. If the abortion advocate is to avoid such a charge, he must give us some good reason for believing either: (a) that the conceptus is not human or, (b) that, though human, its right to life may be denied. Efforts have been made to avoid the hard-line contention in both ways. What we must now do is see whether any of these ploys can fairly be said to have been successful.

II

Without doubt, the most short-sighted of the attempts to escape the conservatives' conclusion is offered by those who feel that " human " can be defined in a purely arbitrary manner. As one advocate puts it:

> Whether the fetus is or is not a human being is a matter of definition, not fact; and we can define any way we wish. In terms of the human problem involved, it would be unwise to define the fetus as human .... [7]

[8] James D. Ebert, *Interacting Systems in Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), p. 12: " When does an individual first deserve this name? In embryonic development, from the very moment the egg is activated." See also, Bradley M. Patten, *Foundations of Embryology (2nd.* ed ; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 3; and Curt Stern, *Principles of Human Genetics (2nd.* ed; San Francisco: W. H. Freeman Co., 1960), p. 38.

[7] Garrett Hardin, "Abortion-or Compulsory Pregnancy?" *Journal of Marriage and the Family,* Vol. 30 (May, 1968), pp. 250-251.

Now the problem with this kind of an analysis, it is usually claimed, is all too obvious. If we are free to define "human" in any way we wish, no action need be morally Negroes, Jews, the senile, the elderly, any group may be classified as non-human and exterminated. And our actions would, by definitional legislation, be morally " neutral." That is, although such actions may not be morally right, they are not morally wrong. To act in the manner described is not really different from stepping on an ant. Such an act is not really spoken of as one which ought or ought not be done; it is simply neutral as regards moral quality.

As presented above, the position becomes so ludicrous that one wonders how it could ever be accepted by anyone. In fact, its obvious absurdity should count as *prima facie* evidence that it has never really been advocated in this simple-minded fashion. Those holding to such a view are not fools, and when their position is attacked in this way, it is really a straw man which is being destroyed. Those who say that the definition of "human" is an arbitrary affair should not be taken as contending that it is *purely* arbitrary. Rather, they would want to claim that zygotes, embryos, and/ or fetuses should be classified as non-human because there are "most important social arguments" for doing so.[9] As thus amended, however, the position is still not without problems, for when one inquires into these " social arguments " he is inevitably disappointed. In general, the arguments appealed to are of three types; we shall deal with each in turn.

First, it is sometimes asserted-with statistical data to back up the contention-that the majority of the people in the United States are in favor of abortion. This being the case, the argument goes, abortion should be permitted. And in order to justify this action morally, pre-natal organisms need to be classified as non-human. Now even if the statistical data are true,

[8] This appears to be the argument of Father Robert Drinan, " The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born," 17, *Western Reserve Law Review,* 465,469.

• Glanville Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law* (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), p.

they have absolutely no bearing whatsoever on abortion as :t moral issue. It may well be that in a representative democracy such as the United States, the legal issue will be decided by a majority rule doctrine; but no *moral* conclusions can be reached by this means. Daniel Webster to the contrary, we do not decide whether or not slavery is morally right by putting the issue to a vote. And insofar as abortion is a moral issue, it too will not be resolved in this fashion. To restate: given the kind of " reasoning" here proffered by proponents of arbitrary definition, their decision to classify pre-natal organisms as non-human must still be seen as *purely* arbitrary, since it is not at all relevant to the moral problem whether or not the majority is in favor of abortion.

Second, appeals are sometimes made to the necessity of "balancing values." Zygotes should be classified as non-human, it is said, because their status is uncertain and such action would solve the moral dilemma presented to us in cases where an unborn child will be clearly deformed, or where the mother already has many children and wants no more, etc.[10] The problem with this kind of reasoning, however, is that it begs the question. Reasons such as these are good reasons for permitting abortion only if pre-natal organisms are already known to be non-human. What if the zygote really is human? If it is, and if " reasons " of the sort just given allow contrary definition, then it is one. short step to saying that deformed babies and mistreated children should also be classified as non-human and exterminated. But, the abortion advocate will exclaim, there is a difference between the ontological status of a zygote and that of a deformed child. The latter we know to be human, while we have no such knowledge as regards the former. This being so, do not the reasons enumerated justify " taking a chance " in the case of a zygote? To this kind of ploy the conservative has two possible replies. First, although

[10] This is one way in which arguments such as these may be used. As will be seen, they may also be taken to support a more sophisticated position (see below, pp. 81-S!l).

it is not certain that the zygote should be classified as human, there are (as shown above) several strong indications that it does belong to that class. This being so, those gambling that it is not human are betting on a long-shot. Although gamblers of this sort may not be immoral, they must still be seen as morally irresponsible, for their actions are totally without rational warrant. Second, pre-natal organisms are not the only human products lacking clear-cut human status. As Locke observed, idiots and monsters are also difficult to classify. And to this list may well be added schizophrenics, the very senile, those in coma, etc. If reasons like " giving psychological pain " justify classifying zygotes as non-human, they surely should be efficacious in these cases also.

Clearly, two separate points are being made here: (I) Do we really believe that it is right to kill an idiot just because he is a bother to someone and *may* be non-human? And (2) where do we draw the line as regards "clearly human" and "uncertain as to human status?" Given the time and inclination, one could probably make a good case that neurotics are not fully human. If we find a neurotic who is unwanted and unhappy, may we thus "take a chance," classify him as non-human and exterminate him? Obviously we do not believe so. Once again the conclusion seems clear: reasons of the sort given justify abortion only if one is already convinced that pre-natal beings are not human. This being the case, those defending abortion on the grounds just cited must be making that assumption. But why? Hopefully, an analysis of the last " social argument " will give us the explanation we seek.

The final argument appealed to in order to justify classification of pre-natal organisms as non-human is that social practices and attitudes illustrate that such organisms are usually thought of in this manner (e. g., women do not mourn the loss of spontaneously aborted zygotes as they do the death of a child) .[11] Now, at first glance this may appear to' constitute a

[11] See Daniel Callahan, A. Callahan, *Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 391.

reason for accepting the zygote as non-human. But consider the following:

> [In the late middle ages] no one thought of keeping a picture of a child if that child had either lived to grow to manhood or had died in infancy. In the first case, childhood was simply an unimportant phase of which there was no longer any need to keep any record; in the second case, that of the dead child, it was thought that the little thing which had disappeared so soon in life was not worthy of remembrance .... Nobody thought, as we ordinarily think today, that every child already contained a man's personality. Too many of them died.[12]

So many children died in the late Middle Ages that people did not identify with infants. It was a form of self-protection, to be sure, but adults could not *feel* that their children were human in the fullest sense of the word. And as it was then, so it is now. The reasons for the lack of identification are not the same, of course, but it is still their attitudes toward the entity *in utero* which are causing those in favor of arbitrary definition to insist that there is nothing moraly repugnant in their actions. Why do so many believe that they may assume by arbitrary definition that pre-natal organisms are not human? It is not just that the status of these beings is unsure; rather, the abortion advocate finds it difficult to *feel* that such organisms are human. First, they are not usually seen. And when they are seen, they do not have human form. Further, they are not (at least in the earlier stages of development) conscious. On the other hand, a mother who threatens suicide if she must bear another child *is* seen, she *is* identified with. This is why the "reasons" cited by those favoring arbitrary definition seem to have force, even though they carry no logical weight. If some doubt remains in the reader's mind concerning the truth of this hypothesis, let him consider the following two facts:

(1) One must admit that it is not normal to grieve when

[10] Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood*, trans., Robert Baldick (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 38-39.

a zygote is spontaneously aborted. Still, there do seem to be some very rare exceptions. For example, a woman who wants a child badly but has continually miscarried, may mourn such a loss. Why? Does it not seem plausible that we here have a person who, because of the abnormal depth of her feelings, *is* able to identify with the zygote as human? That is to say, she feels that she has lost a child, not simply an activated egg. And if this is an adequate explanation for her action, is not lack of identification an adequate explanation as to why those arbitrarily defining pre-natal organisms as non-human feel their actions are morally warranted? If not, some other explanation must be given for the fact that some can grieve where others find it impossible. But what this could be escapes me completely. I find it difficult to believe that those grieving have freely and arbitrarily decided to define the lost zygote as human.

(9l) Many a young nurse who favored abortion on demand soon discovered that practice is the subverter of theory. When *she* was the one handed a six month old wriggling fetus, when *she* was the one who dropped it into a basin where it slowly turned blue and suffocated, she somehow began to feel party to a crime. Why? Quite clearly, to actually see the fetus die is a shocking experience. She found, to her horror, that she could empathize with it-that she could feel the fetus was human, despite her earlier views. Obviously her attitudes and feelings were here determining her beliefs as to what is and what is not human. It would be safe to wager, I think, that very few of those who now advocate arbitrarily defining *all* pre-natal organisms as non-human would still hold to this opinion if they ever saw a six month old fetus being aborted.

If our analysis: is correct, the position of those holding that zygotes may be arbitrarily classified as non-human has come to this: either (a) their definitions are purely arbitrary, in which case any action can be " excused " by being made morally neutral or, what is more likely, (b) their classifications are not arbitrary, but are determined by their attitudes, feelings, and identifications. If their position is fairly represented by

(a), then it may be rejected out of hand. If (b) characterizes their views, however, they must be seen as subjectivists. That is to say, if their theory has any force at all, it is because their judgment regarding abortion's moral legitimacy rests, ultimately, on a subjectively distorted view of the facts. What I shall now attempt to demonstrate is that it is not just the proponenents of arbitrary definition who base their moral judgments on subjective" facts." On the contrary, the view I shall here attempt to defend is that all those who argue for abortion operate in this manner.

In addition to those seeking to avoid the conservatives' conclusions by insisting upon the arbitrary character of our definition of " human," there are those who believe that lexical definitions can be given for that term and that these uses clearly and consistently exclude pre-natal organisms from the extension of the term so defined. Upon analysis, however, it is soon discovered that, though the definitions offered exclude fetuses from the class of things we ordinarily call " human," they all have one serious drawback, viz., they also deny other groups of commonly recognized human beings that status.[1"] Is a human being a rational animal? Then infants are not human and may be killed without risk of moral sanction. Is an embryonic organism human only when it becomes viable? If so, then on any ordinary use of " viable," a person being kept alive on a heart-lung machine or respirator is also non-human. These analyses could be continued indefinitely, but I think our point may be made if we consider only one more definition.

In an issue of *The Humanist* Herman Schwartz defined " human being " as follows:

> A human being is a rational creature, with unique emotions and feelings, intellect and a personality, a being with whom we can identify.[14]

[18] This has almost become common knowledge. Certainly no sophisticated advocate would hope to argue in the way just outlined. See Callahan, *Abortion:* Law, *Choice, Morality,* pp. 886-895.

[10] Herman Schwartz, "The Parent and the Fetus," *Humanist,* Vol. !l7 (July/August, 1967), p. U6.

The problems with this definition are all too apparent. Still, it is instructive in that one of the necessary conditions listed captures the real reason for the unwavering defenses of abortion we get from those offering lexical definitions in support of their view. Why is it that Schwartz and others offering unsatisfactory definitions of "human" continue to believe that a zygote or fetus is non-human, even after the problems with their definitions have been demonstrated? The answer is simple. A zygote is not " a living being with whom [they] can identify." As such, it is not considered by them to be human, even though the lexical definitions they offer are defective. Schw;:trtz's definition, for example, excludes (at least) babies, and thus allows for infanticide-an implication of his view which he wants to reject, though he never explicitly does so.[15] In order to explain this oversight, one could claim that Schwartz and others supporting similar positions are simply confused thinkers. But this is not so. Rather, they know that *they* do not mean to ascribe human status to a zygote or fetus. And if one demonstrates that the definitions of " human » which they offer cannot be used to support their thesis without other morally undesirable consequences following, they still remain firmly unshaken in their beliefs. Why? The answer appears clear: if their position is rationally indefensible, the only possible explanation for their tenacity is that their view is not found on reason at all. If there are some who would claim that this conclusion is purely speculative and wholly without warrant, I ask that they consider the following.

I have often asked my students (who almost unanimously support abortion) whether one who was worried about the population explosion would be justified in stalking the maternity wards, killing fetuses just as their mothers were giving birth. One can imagine the uproar! Any such action would be wrong on two counts, they say, for: (a) the mother's permission has not been given (we are somehow violating her rights), and! (b) killing the fetus at this stage of its develop-

.. See *ibid.,* p. 126.

ment constitutes murder. Alternative (a) is easily avoided; I simply amend my original example, stating that the mother does not want the child, will undergo a nervous breakdown if she has it, and thus gives her permission to kill it. Still, they insist, such action is morally wrong. When I ask whether extermination would be acceptable :five seconds before birth, :five hours before, or :five days before, their reactions slowly change. When I have taken them back three or four months, some now agree that killing is acceptable. Others wait until we have traced the organism's development back six or seven months, but whatever the point at which they deem abortion justifiable, none can tell me why this action is permissible at just that point they have selected. When pushed, they give reasons such as: "It isn't human then," " It isn't even conscious," or, " It doesn't look human." When I point out to them that consciousness or form can hardly be what makes a being human (for then someone without arms and legs would not be human, and one should be justified in killing a man whose EEG has gone flat for even one second), they say no more though they do not, I am sure, change their minds. Obviously, they have not thought the problem through. They believe that " human " is ordinarily being used in such a way that zygotes and embryos are being excluded from that term's extension, but when pressed they find themselves, as they sometimes say, " unable to say what they mean."

How does one go about explaining the unwillingness of these students to reverse their moral stance on abortion, even though they acknowledge: (1) that they cannot agree upon just that point at which a fetus becomes human and, (2) that whatever point they choose, they cannot give an objective justification for its selection? Does it not appear that the " facts " upon which they found their moral judgment are not hard facts, that their judgment rather depends upon their ability to identify or empathize with the developing organism at a certain point in its development? Some feel that the organism is human when it becomes conscious; other identify with the entity's form. But whatever the case it seems clear that feeling, **not**

objective fact, is central. And if this is so, there appears to be no significant difference between those who seek to justify abortion by arbitrary classification and those who seek the same end by attempting to specify a lexical definition. If there is any difference at all, it can only be due to the depth of feeling-proponents of lexical definition feel so strongly that they refuse to believe that " human " can ever be used to include pre-natal beings within its extension.[16]

Thus far in our discussion we have dealt only with those who have tried to avoid the hard-line conclusion by seeking to demonstrate the non-human status of pre-natal organisms. But there is a more sophisticated way in which the conservatives may be attacked. Some accept the fact that the conservative has good evidence for accepting conception as the point at which human life begins, but then seek to show that the conceptus' right to life may, for some reason or reasons, be negated.[17] It may very well be true, they say, that human life begins with conception, but there is no human *person* present. Human life begins with impregnation, but the human *as an individual* does not come into existence until somewhat later in the process of development. This being so:

> If the developing embryo is not yet a human person, then under some circumstances the welfare of actually existing persons *might* supersede the welfare of developing human tissue.[18]

The problems with this position are once again all too apparent. First, if there is a problem in defining" human," that problem simply re-arises in seeking a definition of " human person." Different analyses have been given, but in general

[16] This " depth of feeling " may well explain why members of women's liberation fail to see the abortion controversy for what it is. Besides experiencing the inability we all have to identify with a pre-natal being, they are so zealously devoted to their " cause " that they cannot see why abortion is anything more than :t question concerning who has the right to control their bodies.

[17] See Thomas L. Hayes, "A Biological View," *Commonweal,* Vol. 85 (March 17, 1967); Rudolph Ehrensing, "When Is It Really Abortion? " *The National Catholic Reporter* (May 25, 1966). Daniel Callahan also seems to accept a variation of this view. See Callahan, *op. cit.,* pp. 493-501.

[18] Ehrensing, " When Is It Really Abortion," p. 4.

one finds that the traits previously taken to define " human " are now being used to specify the meaning of " human person." [19] This being so, definitions of " human person " are subject to the same difficulty we found repeatedly plaguing definitions of "human," namely, if such definitions are accepted, they exclude from the class of human persons beings to whom we would ordinarily grant that status.

The most important flaw in the argument, however, is that even if the distinction could be made between a zygote (as human non-person) and an adult (as human person), it is not at all clear why the organism at its later stage of development is better, superior, or more worthy than at the earlier stage. That is, as we have previously noted, the right to life is ordinarily spoken of as a *human* right, not a personal one. Why then may that right of the conceptus be revoked because it conflicts with a person's right to, say, peace of mind? For the latter right to supersede the former, the abortion advocate must show that a human person is better or more important than a human life. And how this could be done escapes me completely. (Indeed, given a pregnant woman of depraved character, one could make a pretty good case that she is really less important than the organism developing within her.) At any rate, if the defender of abortion can give no proof of the superiority of a human person to a human life-and I find no such demonstration anywhere in the literature-then that " fact " must simply be one which is being assumed. But why? Why is this presupposition so easily made, and why does it somehow seem the right thing to do? One seeking the answer to this question must, I think, look to the emotions, for it is our empathic identifications which once again seem to provide

[19] For example, some take self-awareness as being the condition necessary for personhood [Roy Schenk, "Let's Think About Abortion," *The Catholic World*, 207 (April, 1968), p. 16]; others take viability as the criterion [Malcolm Potts, "The Problem of Abortion," in F. J. Ebeling (ed.), *Biology and Ethics* (New York Academic Press, 1969), p. 75]; still others seem to think that it is the form which is essential [N. J. Berrill, *The Person in the Womb* (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1968), p. 46].

the causal explanation we seek. Just as we feel that a zygote is non-human because we cannot relate to it, so too we feel the mother is more important than the zygote because we cannot identify with the latter. This being so, we feel that the mother's various rights negate or supersede the zygote's right to life. Automatically, then, abortion is condoned. But if this explanation is correct, the moral judgment for abortion must once again seen to be without basis in objective fact.

TII

If our analysis of the dispute over abortion does not distort, two further points need be mentioned. First, the conservative position has strength precisely because it founds its moral judgment on objective, publicly accessible facts. One of the evidences for its objectivity is that the subjective "facts " upon which the abortion advocates' moral position is based are true. We cannot really identify with a zygote or embryo, and it is for this reason that the defenses of abortion have force. In short, we seem rationally driven to a conclusion which we do not want to hold. Far from realizing this fact and stressing it, many of those who oppose abortion have fallen into the trap of adopting the abortion advocates' style of argumentation, thus weakening their position. Germain Grisez, for example, asks us to take the point of view of the fetus-in other words, to try to "feel" its desire for life by identifying with it.[20] But any such injunction is self-defeating. Anyone honest with himself must admit that under normal conditions such identification is impossible; [21] or that if it is possible, it is artificial. By " artificial " I mean that we may be able to force ourselves into an empathic relationship, but once this forcing is begun, where do we stop? May I not also force myself to identify with cattle and thus give up eating steak? May I not feel towards the chicken just as I do towards my pet parakeet,

[20] Grisez, *Abortion: The Myths,* pp.

[21] I say " under normal conditions " here, because as we have seen (pp. 75-76), there do seem to be abnormal cases wherein such identifications are made.

thus grieving when each bird dies? Clearly, the conservative position is strongest when it presents itself for what it is.

Second, we have represented the abortion controversy as though the contending parties were all trying to be ethical objectivists. We have done so because a thorough review of the literature gave us no reason to assume otherwise. Of course, there is no necessity that this remain the case, and the argument could be re-cast in the form of a methodological dispute. The abortion advocate could claim, for example, that his subjective determination of the facts is proper in that it is only by this means that we can get value-laden facts-facts, that is, which are useful in deriving *moral* conclusions. But if anyone were to argue in this way, he would be wrong. First, it may well be true that we cannot know what we *should* do by a mere survey of the facts. But even if ethics is subjective, it cannot be so in the abortion advocates' sense. Whether or not an entity is properly classified as human is a matter of fact; in itself, this is not a moral judgment. But if ethics is subjective, that subjectivity enters when one makes a moral judgment about the facts. In the case of abortion, for instance, the subjective element would appear when one judged that it would be morally wrong to kill something which was human. But all those in favor of abortion admit that the capricious killing of humans is wrong. Hence, even granting the subjectivity of ethics, abortion must be considered immoral if the conceptus can be shown to be human. And as we saw, there are very strong indications that it is.

There is a second reason for rejecting the abortion advocates' method, namely, it cannot be a proper method for arriving at moral conclusions since it has, in the past, been used to " justify " acts which are clearly immoral. For example, when slavery of African Blacks was accepted, one justification often given for this action was that they were not quite human and thus not possessed of human rights. Indeed, these poor souls needed to be " cared for." If Americans and Europeans found this kind of reasoning appealing, it was because they found themselves unable to identify with the Africans' life-style-

they simply could not *feel* that these" uncivilized" being were fully human. But even if such an identification was at one time impossible-even if it were impossible today-these " facts " would not make slavery morally right. And when a method purporting to resolve moral conflicts tells us that it *is* right, this demonstrates, I think, that it is wholly unsuited to the purposes for which it is intended.

We would all like to condone abortion. It is true; we cannot identify with a zygote or embryo. Then too, we *do* feel for a suffering mother and her family; we *do* deeply desire to spare them needless pain and suffering. At the same time, a survey of the facts indicates that we should stand in opposition to abortion despite our feelings. Admittedly, such action is difficult. But then, nobody ever said it was easy to be moral.

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THE NOTHINGNESSOFTHEINTELLECTIN MEISTER ECKHART'S "PARISIAN QUESTIONS "

IT IS commonly supposed that the idea of the negativity or " nothingness " of consciousness is of modern philosophical vintage. In our own times this notion has come to be associated with the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, who has defended this thesis in *Being and Nothingness.* For Sartre, being is the " massive " and " opaque," a Parmenidean plenum devoid of determination and meaning. Consciousness, on the other hand, is completely translucent and empty. It is a "lack" and desire of the fullness of being. It is a freedom which cuts through the dead weight of matter. It is, and this will especially interest us in these pages, not what " is " (being) but the "revelation" of what is (non-being). Consciousness is " not " being and that alone makes knowledge possible.

One also knows that Sartre, who heard Kojeve's lectures on *The Phenomenolgy of Spirit* at the *Eoole des Hautes Etudes* in the 1930's/ was to some extent influenced in this matter by Hegel. The entire doctrine is couched in the language of the *Phenomenology.* The opaque object of knowledge is " being" or the "in-itself." The translucent consciousness is "nothingness" or the "for-itself." Indeed it is among the German Idealists that the negativity of consciousness seems to have been first introduced into Western philosophy. In Hegel and the Idealist tradition one finds a metaphysics of becoming and historical process in which the " negative" is the means by which the " spirit " advances, by which it breaks up what has

[1] Wilfred Desan, *The TTagic Finale: An Essay on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul SaTtTe* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 24, *50,* n. 21. See also George Kline, " The Existentialist Rediscovery of Hegel and Marx," in *Existentialism and Phenomenology,* ed. E. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 118-88, especially 119-flO.

become hard and lifeless and unfolds its full potentiality. The "life" of the absolute rests essentially in its capacity for self-negation.

Our effort in these pages will be to show that the idea that consciousness or knowledge is in some sense "non-being" can be found much earlier in the the Western tradition. It was proposed quite explicitly and formally, and in an unambiguous way, in two "disputed questions" held at Paris in 1302-03 by Meister Eckhart of Hochheim (1260-1327/9). Eckhart, of course, is familiar to the modern reader as the leading figure in 14th Century "Rhineland mysticism," and as one of the greatest of all Western mystics. But his acumen as a scholastic "master" *(magister)* at Paris-which earned him the very name by which he is known to us today-is almost entirely unknown or overlooked, except by a few specialists. Yet apart from a careful study of these Latin works it is impossible to reach a correct understanding of his mystical doctrines. The "Meister" was a speculative philosopher of great depth and originality-even though, as a Dominican master, he was committed to defend the views of his Church and his Order at Paris. We hope to illustrate in these pages the subtle and fertile character of the Latin Eckhart by making as careful an examination of these two disputed questions as space permits.

Our study falls naturally into two parts: (1) a textual analysis of the first two *Parisian Questions;* (2) a consideration of their modern flavor. It will be important to show with respect to the second point that the parallel between Eckhart and the later development of continental European philosophy is not merely verbal, and that the sense in which he speaks of knowledge as "non-being" is not so different from the contemporary theories as to make a comparison of the two rest on a mere equivocation. We will relate Eckhart's views to two major movements of the last two centuries in Continental thought: 19th Century German Idealism, especially Fichte and Hegel; and contemporary phenomenology, especially Husserl and Sartre.

The notion that consciousness is in some sense non-being,

we hope to show, is an important philosophical claim. It belongs to a philosophical tradition which stretches in one way or another as far back as Aristotle and as far forward as Jean-Paul Sartre. The general contention of this essay, then, is that the scholastic Eckhart is an original and important speculative thinker, and not only a great mystic. One proof of this is the masterful way in which he puts forward this idea which, rightly understood, is basic to any theory of knowledge and which, apart from Eckhart himself, has been recognized in an especially vivid way only in recent times.

Before proceeding, it is important to observe that we are not proposing that the *Parisian Questions* were historical influences on the Idealists or Phenomenologists. That is quite out of the question if for no other reason than that the *Parisian Questions* were not even discovered until when Martin Grabmann and Ephrem Longpre came upon them simultaneously although independently. [2] We argue only that the forceful and original way in which Eckhart develops the notion of the negativity of consciousness is akin to and anticipates some of the most significant developments in recent thought, which is convincing evidence that he is a speculative philosopher of much importance, a fact not widely recognized today.

I. Intellect and Being in the *Parisian Questions*

The *Parisian Questions* [3] consist of five disputed questions,

• Ephrem Longpre, "Questions inedites de Maitre Eckhart, 0. P. et de Gonzalve de Balboa, 0. F. M." *Revue neoscolastique de philosophic* 69-85. Martin Grabmann, "Neuaufgefundene Pariser Questionen Meister Eckharts," *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,* Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, Vol. B. 7 (Munich,

[3] We will use the edition of the *Parisian Questions* found in the critical edition of Eckhart's Latin works: *Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke,* Hrsg. im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, *Die lateinische Werke,* Vol. V. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlmhammer, 1936). We will refer to this and all the volumes of the Stuttgart edition as "LW," followed by the page and line number. This will be followed by an abbreviation of the work cited-in this case "QP I," "QP II "-followed by the Stuttgart paragraph number. Abbreviations of other works of Eckhart that we will cite are: *Prol.: Prologi in Opus*

the first three of which were composed in 1302-03, the others in 1311-14. The first two questions, with which we are concerned in these pages, raise two problems which have been dealt with at some length by another Dominican "master," Thomas Aquinas, whose teaching activity at Paris antedated Eckhart's own by some thirty years. Eckhart asks: (1) whether the being *(esse)*[4] of God and his act of intellection *(intelligere)*[4] are identical, and (2) whether the being of the angel and its act of intellection are identical. Like" brother Thomas," Eckhart responds affirmatively to the first question and negatively to the second.[5] God is a being of perfect simplicity, Eckhart and Aquinas maintain, and there can be no real distinction between his being and his understanding, no more than between his being and his essence; whereas in the created and composite nature-angelic or human-it is one thing to be and another to understand. In the Latin sermon " *Deus unus est,"* Eckhart explains his procedure for identifying God and distinguishing him from creatures:

> I inquire of everything whether or not there is intellection in it. If there is not, it is evident that a thing which lacks intellect is not God or the first cause of all things which are ordered into definite ends. If there is intellect in it, I inquire whether there is any being in it beyond its intellection. If there is not, then I hold that it is simply one, and again that it is uncreatable, first and such like, and that it is God. If there is any being in it other than intellection, then it is composite and not simply one.
>
> (LW, IV, 267:10-268:4, *Serm.* XXIX, n. 301)

Tripartitum; In Joh.: Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Johannem: Serm.: Sermones; In sap.: Expositio Libri Sapientiae.

• We will translate *"ens"* and *"esse"* as "being" and, to avoid confusion. put the Latin in parentheses afterwards wherever necessary. *Esse,* of course, is a verbal noun and has the active sense of "be-ing" or " act-of-being," whereas *ens* is a participal meaning "what is." We do not use "act-of-being" or "act-of existence " for *esse* in order to avoid giving a Thomistic " existential " reading to Eckhart, for it is a mistake to assimilate their theories of *esse.* See Vladimir Lossky, *Theologie negative et connaissance de dieu chez Maitre* Eckhart, Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, Vo. XLVIII (Paris J. Vrin, 1960), pp. 82-9. In order to preserve the connection between " *intellectus* " and " *intelligere* " we will translate these as " intellect " and " act of intellection."

• Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 14, a. 4; q. 54, aa. 1-2.

Eckhart seems thus to adhere strictly to Thomas's position. But the illusion is quickly dispelled that Eckhart is a somewhat daring but fundamentally faithful Thomist, a view that is sometimes put forward by those of his commentators who wish to defend Eckhart's orthodoxy.[6]

The opening sentence of the *First Question* already suggests an independent line of thought: not only are God's being and intellection identical in reality (in *re)* but" perhaps" *(forsan)* even "for reason" *(ratione)* as well (LW, V, 37:4 QP I, n. 1). From the start Eckhart's position is more radical than Aquinas's: God's being and intellection are so strictly identified, that it is dubious that one can even distinguish them conceptually, as Thomas held one could. But the decisive ture from Aquinas-and the move which characterizes Eckhart's more radically" intellectualist" [7] posture-occurs a few paragraphs into the question when, after (1) having recited six arguments for the identity of the divine intellect with its being drawn from Aquinas's works, and (2) having offered another argument of his own, Eckhart makes the following observation:

> In the third place, I (will) show that it no longer seems to me that God understands because he is, but rather that he is because he understands; so that God is intellect and the act of intellection, and the act of intellection is the foundation of his being.
>
> (LW, V, 40: 5-7, QP I, n 4)

The phrase "no longer" (non *modo)* suggests that Eckhart's views have undergone a change and that he once held the more strictly Thomistic position that in God it is being which holds the primacy and that everything else is attributable to God only on the basis of his being. Be that as it may,[8] Eckhart is

• Otto Karrer, *Meister Eckehart: Das System seiner religiosen Lekre und Lebensweisckeit* (Munich: 1926).

• The Dominicans taught that the intellect was superior to the will; Eckhart's position is even more radical in that he teaches the superiority of the intellect over being itself.

[8] Actually, in a later text, the "Prologues " to the *Opus Tripartitum,* Eckhart seems to return to the more Thomistic position. See n. II below.

striking out against the central tenet of Thomistic metaphysics, the supremacy of being *(esse)*,[9] and setting up in its stead the primacy of intellection *(intelligere)*, a notion that is distinctively his own.

Eckhart's position is that being and intellection are identical not because the divine intellection flows from and is reducible to the divine being, as Aquinas held, but because on the contrary the divine being is nothing other than its intellection and is reducible to it. Aquinas held that God is his being *(deus est suum esse)* and that the divine intellection was but another name for this same being. For Aquinas, God is the subsistent act of being itself *(ipsum esse subsistens)* and so no quality or attribute or perfection of being can be lacking to him. But since intellection is a way to be *(modus essendi)*, then God-who is being itself-not only has intellectuality but he *is* his very act of intellection, which is nothing other that his being. In Eckhart's view, however, God *is* his intellection *(deus est intellectus et intelligere)*, and if one wishes to speak of being in God then this can signify nothing other than the divine intellection. In the course of establishing this thesis, however, Eckhart radicalizes his position even further: not only is it true that God *is* his intellectuality and that his intellectuality is the foundation of his being, but it is furthermore true to say that God does not, properly speaking, have being at all. Eckhart is thus maintaining that God is so thoroughly identical with his intellectuality that it is no longer appropriate to attribute being to him unless one adopts an imperfect mode of expression and says that his intellectuality is his: "being." For Aquinas, God is properly speaking both being and intellect, but he is intellect because he is being. And indeed the two are in reality the same. For Eckhart, God is: properly speaking intellect alone and not being, and if in some improper sense one attributes being to him, then one must recall that this " being " is nothing other

[9] It is in this rather misleading sense, incidentally, that neothomistic philosophers speak of "Thomistic existentialism" or even of " authentic Existentialism." See Jacques Maritain, *Existence and the Existent*, trans. L. Galantiere and G. Phelan (Garden City Doubleday Image Books, 1956), pp. 11-9.

than his intellectuality. Hence not only does Eckhart dispute with Aquinas over which is to be taken as the primary name of God-intellect or being-but he even contests their very compatibility with one another. For if God is his intellectuality, then he is not being. For Aquinas, intellectuality is a mode of being whereas for Eckhart-and this is the unique and original thesis of the *Parisian Questions* to which we wish to draw attention in these pages-intellect is the opposite of being (LW, V, 43: 14) and a form of non-being.

Let us see how Eckhart is led to this surprising conclusion. He states his case as follows:

> ... God is not being *(esse) nor any being (ens)*, because nothing is formally present in the cause and in that of which it is the cause, if the cause is a true cause. But God is the cause of all being. Therefore being is not formally present in God. And if you wish to call the act of intellection being that is agreeable to me. But nonetheless I hold that if there is something in God which you wish to call being it belongs to him because of his intellection.
>
> (LW, V, 45: QP I, n. 8)

The argument turns upon what Eckhart means by a "true cause," a phrase which he uses interchangeably with "universal cause" and "essential cause." In his *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John.* he specifies the four conditions of an essential cause:

> First, that that of which it is the principle be contained in it as an effect in a cause ... Secondly, that it [the effect] not only be in it [the cause], but also that it prexist in it and be in it in a higher way than it is in itself. Thirdly, that the principle itself always be pure intellect, in which there is no other being than intellection itself, having nothing in common with anything, as the saying of Anaximander cited in the Third Book of *De anima* puts it. The fourth condition is that, being in and with the principle, the effect be by its power coeval with the principle.
>
> (LW, III, *In Joh.* n. 88)

A true or essential cause enjoys a higher mode of being than its effects and precontains its effects in a higher way. Now God, the creator, is the cause of being. Being is found formally

and properly in the creature. God is the source of being, the principle of being, but not being properly so called. Being belongs to God not formally but only " in a higher way " *(eminentius)* .

It is clear that there is a theory of "analogy " at work in Eckhart's thought. For an essential cause is an analogical cause, as the following text makes plain:

> Further: in those things which are predicated analogically, what is in one of the analogates is not formally present in the other, as health is formally present only in the animal, whereas it is no more in the diet or in the urine than it is in the stone. Therefore, since all things which are caused are formally beings, God is not formally a being. (LW, V, 46: 7-10, QP I, n. 11)

Vladimir Lossky has shown at some length that the kind of analogy that Eckhart is employing is called in the scholastic tradition the analogy of " attribution." [10] The standard illustration of this analogy in the Middle Ages, that of the health of the organism and the health of the urine, is borrowed from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (1003 a 33). Only a living body is healthy. Urine, a sound diet, a ruddy complexion, are signs of health or causes of health but not formally speaking healthy. Strictly speaking such things are no more healthy than a stone. Health is only " attributed " to them by reason of their relation to health. But not every cause is an analogical cause; some causes are "univocal "-as when fire gives rise to fire or when one member of species gives birth to another (LW, II,
But an essential cause is always analogical. The effects of an essential cause bear only an analogy to the essential cause, which enjoys a fundamentally higher mode of being than its effects. Hence if God is the essential cause of creatures one may only " attribute" being to him. One may claim that God precontains the being of creatures in a " higher way " but not that he possesses being formally.

One might ask at this point why Eckhart has chosen to hold

[10] Lossky, 812-!W. Actually this designation is used by Cajetan in his classification of the kinds of analogy found in Thomas Aquinas.

that being belongs properly to creatures rather than to God. Might he not have argued instead that God alone is being and that, in comparison to God, creatures, who share nothing univocally in common with God, are "nothing " ? In other words, if nothing is ever formally present in both the essential cause and its effect, why, instead of saying that creatures are being and God non-being, did Eckhart not reverse the analogy and say that God is being and the creature nothing? The first answer to this question is that in fact Eckhart does avail himself of this option. But this is another matter, and one which we cannot hope to discuss in the present study.[11] A further answer is to be found in Eckhart's neoplatonic sources. Eckhart frequently cites Proposition IV of the *Liber de causis* in which it is said that" being *(esse)* is the first of all creatures" (LW, II, 344-5, *In sap.*, n. "Thus as soon as we come to being," Eckhart says, "we come to creatures" (LW, V, 41:7, QP I, n. 4). In another place he remarks that "being is the reason why something is able to be created" *(ratio creabilitatis est esse:* LW, II, 344-5, *In sap.*, n. . To create is to bestow being (LW, I, 160 *Prol.*, n. 16). The formal notion of the

[11] In the "Prologues" to the *Opus Tripartitum* Eckhart develops the proposition which he says is the fundamental principle of his speculation: that being is God *(Esse est deus:* LW, I, 156, Prol. n. 1!'l) The relation between God and creatures is like the relation between whitness and white: as all white things are white by whiteness itself, so all things are beings by being itself. But being is God. To say that God is the cause of beings means now not that he is above being but on the contrary being itself. Accordingly the creature, insofar as it is a creature, is nothing-not a little bit, but nothing. (This latter remark was to be included in the list of propositions condemned by John XXII in 13!'l9.) The reconciliation of this text with the *Parisian Questions* which is suggested by Lossky is the most sound. Eckhart has not so much changed his mind as his perspective. God and creatures share nothing univocally in common. If one begins with creatures and takes them to be real, then God is non-being or above being. If, on the other hand, one begins with God and acknowledges his supereminent perfection, then being is God and what is other than God is nothing. God is alternately being or nothing: being *and* nothing. The two positions, Lossky holds, belong together dialectically. God is being and he is above being. This is to say that God is the "purity of being" *(puritas essendi:* LW, V, 45: 10-1, OP I, n. 9), that he is-in the *Parisian Questions-pure* of (created) being, and that he is-in the "Prologues "-pure (uncreated) being itself. Cf. Lossky, pp. !'l15-!'l0.

creature is of something that has been brought into being. Creatures are those things which have been "... causally brought forth and produced, in order that they might be" (LW, II, 342: 11-2, *In sap.*, n. 21). Hence it is more suitable to predicate being formally of the creature and to regard the creator as the cause of being and so, to that extent, as above being or other than being.

But the most basic reason of all for Eckhart's decision to identify being with the creature and to hold that God is other than being is the fact that God is intellect and the act of intellection and that intellectuality as such is non-being. Up to now we have only been considering the first two conditions of an essential cause. It is time now to consider the third:

> Thirdly, that the principle itself always be pure intellect, in which there is no other being than intellection itself, having nothing in common with anything ....

If God is the analogical cause of being in which being exists in a higher way, it is because he precontains being "intellectually":

> Again it must be remarked that a thing in its essential or original cause does not have being, either in its [the causes's] art, or in the understanding of the artist. For the house in the mind is not a house, as heat in the sun or in motion or in light is not heat. But the house receives being, as is true of the being of heat, only insofar as it is produced and brought forth outwardly. But all things are in God as in a first cause, intellectually, and as in the mind of an artist. (LW, II, 6-10, *In sap.*, n.

God precontains all things in such a way that they are found there not in their being but rather as purified of being. "Intellect" is not-as it is for Aquinas-a mode of being but rather the opposite of being, that which has been purified of being, that which is "detached" from being, or, as the saying of Anaxagoras has it, that which is "unmixed" with being.

It is in this context that Eckhart develops his direct arguments to prove that intellect is non-being. We find at least two such arguments in the *First Parisian Question.* (1) The

image precisely inasmuch as it is an image is a mode of non-being and not a mode of being. For the image is meant to be the means by which the thing of which it is the image *(re.<r oujus est imago)* is known. It is a pure means, an open window, as it were, on being. To the extent that it is itself taken as a being, knowledge is deflected and stopped short with the image itself. In the *Second Parisian Question* this point is formulated clearly:

> A thing which is useful for some purpose is made according to the of that purpose. Whence the saw, since it is made to cut, is not made out of different material for a king than for a carpenter. Therefore, since the purpose of the cognitive form *(species)* is to present the thing to the intellect, it ought to be in such a way that it best presents the thing. But it presents best if it is non-being rather than if it is being. If on the contrary it were a being, it would lead away from presentation.[12]
>
> (LW, V, 52: 6-10, QP IT, n. 6)

The image *a,s, an image,* therefore, is not a being but a means of knowing being. It is not " what is " but the way " what is " is known.

(2) Our ability to distinguish in the mind what is not tinct in reality indicates that the conditions under which the intellect acts are not the conditions under which things exist. The mind is not bound by the conditions of being. Thus the mind may distinguish fire from its heat; it may consider fire while abstracting from its heat, whereas fire can never exist apart from its heat. The intellect may combine what is not combined in being; it may separate what is not separate in being. Moreover, as he points out in the *Seoond Parisian Question* (LW V 53: 14-5, QP IT, n. 8), the "universal" is the product of the intellect and the universal does not exist. The

[12] The *"species* " is the sensible or intelligible likeness or form which resides in the cognitive power and makes the act of cognition possible. Since the cognate English "species " does not mean anything of the sort, we will always translate this word as " cognitive form." Occasionally we will speak of a " species " in the ordinary sense of that which is contained within a genus. To avoid confusion we will speak there of a "natural species."

intellect thus operates in a realm which is other than being, that is, non-being:

> Those things which belong to the intellect are as such non-beings. (LW V 44: 6, QP I, n. 7)

It is only because the intellect is free of the restraints of being that it is able to perform these activities.

There are no further arguments of this type in the *First Parisian Question,* as Eckhart is in the main content to rest his case for the identity of being and intellect in God on his doctrine of the formally created (or " creatable ") character of "being." It is to the *Seoonil Parisian Question* that we must turn in order to find further direct arguments for the nothingness of the intellect. The second question, we will recall, deals with the problem of whether the angelic being and its intellection are identical. Once again there is the apparent agreement with the great Dominican master Aquinas. With Thomas, Eckhart holds that the angelic being and intellect are not identical and, just as before, he begins by reciting a proof offered by Thomas. But then he adds the notable understatement: "But I will show this in other ways" (LW, V, 49: 11, QP II, n. 1). Eckhart's tactic will be to show that being and intellection are different things, that they differ indeed as being and non-being. This, of course, is the same premise which is used in the first question to show that in God there is no difference between being and intellection. In the first question Eckhart demonstrated that God *is* his intellection and that if one insisted on speaking improperly of God's "being" this would refer to nothing other than that intellection, fo!" God is not a being but the cause of being. In the second question, however, the problem is different because we are dealing with a creature-the angelic being-and so with something of which being is formally predicated *(ratio creabilitatis est esse)*. Hence if being and intellection are demonstrated to be different then, since being is formally present in the angel and not virtually or by eminence, it will have been demonstrated that in the angel being and intellect differ. Ulllike God, the angel is

properly speaking both being and intellect, and these are not the same.

Since it is obvious that the angel is something created and that being is to be formally predicated of it, Eckhart devotes all of his time to establishing that the angelic being is not its intellection. This *Second Parisian Question,* while it deals with a remote and esoteric problem that could only exist for a medieval philosopher, is of great interest to us and, we hope to show, of considerable modernity.

We will extract from this question three further arguments by which Eckhart attempts to establish his thesis that being and intellection differ as being differs from non-being. (I) In the first argument Eckhart reveals one of the major inspirations of this teaching. He refers to the Third Book of Aristotle's *De anima,* in which Aristotle says:

> Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the copresence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block; it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the sou,l which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing.[13]

In ·order for the mind to know it must be capable of receiving the forms of all knowable objects without becoming, or being determined by, any of those forms. But in order to be able to receive the forms of all things the soul must itself be entirely devoid and empty of any particular forms. For the presence of any one form would determine it to understand all things under that form-not unlike the way that Kant holds that the sensibility is determined to have spatio-temporal intuition and not any other kind because of the presence in it of the forms of space and time. But if the soul is able to know all things (that is, if it is· able to know at least something about any-

[18] Aristotle, *De anima,* ill, 4 a We use the translation by J. A. Smith in *The Basic Worka of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

thing, finite or infinite, material or immaterial) , then the intellect must be pure of or unmixed with everything.

Now while this teaching of Aristotle was familiar to all of the great scholastics of Eckhart's time, in Eckhart himself it takes on a special force and significance. In order that the intellect may know everything, he says, it must itself be nothing:

> ... the intellect inasmuch as it is intellect must be none of those things which it understands; rather it is necessary that it be " unmixed," "having nothing in common with anything" as it is said in the Third Book of the *De anima,* just as it is necessary that the power of sight have no color, in order that it may see every color. *H* therefore the intellect is nothing, then consequently the act of intellection [viz., of the angel] is not any form of being.
>
> (LW, V, *50:* 1-5, QP II, n. 2)

The intellect as such is nothing. It is a sheer, open-ended capacity for knowing being. Were it any particular thing, were it made into any particular nature, it would be closed off from the totality of being. In order to be open to being it must be nothing of itself.

(2) The second argument addresses itself to what is in one sense an obvious objection to Eckhart's doctrine of the nothingnes of knowing, viz., that knowledge *is* a mode of being but of a different kind than "real" being. The difference between being and knowledge is not the difference between being and non-being but rather between "real being" (en *reale, ens naturale)* and "cognitive being" *(ens cognitivum, ens in anima).* Eckhart deals with this problem as follows: The "cognitive form" *(species)* is the principle of knowledge, i.e., the form which when present in the knower actualizes the intellect and determines it to know one thing rather than another. Now if the cognitive form is a being, then it is an "accident" in the substance of the soul, for it is certainly not another substance altogether. But Eckhart denies that the cognitive form is an accident:

> But the cognitive form is not an accident, because an accident has a subject by which it has its being. A cognitive form, however, has an object not a subject, because a place differs from a subject.

Now the cognitive form is in the soul not as in a subject but as a place [cf. Aristotle, *De anima,* 529 a *25-* 30]. The soul is the place of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect.

(LW, V, 51: 8-12, QP II, n. 5)

Eckhart's argument is that the cognitive form, precisely inasmuch as it is a cognitive form, is a relationship towards something other than itself: an object. To say that it has an object rather than a subject is to say that it is in a technical sense " ec-static," i. e., projected out towards that of which it is a representation *(res cujus est imago),* directing the knower out beyond itself and into the object of knowledge. To say that it has a subject is to ignore its character as outwardly projected and to consider it merely as a possession of, or an accidental characteristic of, a knowing being. But as soon as one prescinds from the character of the cognitive form as " outwardly projected " one has ceased to consider it as a cognitive form. Hence the cognitive form *as such* has an object, not a subject. Thus it is not an accident. Nor is it a substance. It is neither substance nor accident but that by which both substance and accidents are made known. But " being " is divided into substance and accident, into the ten categories. Hence what is neither substance nor accident is not a being at all. To the extent that " cognitive being " is being it is not cognitive; to the extent that it is cognitive, it is not being.

However, since cognition obviously " belongs " to the soul in some way, and since one cannot say that the soul is the subject of the cognitive form, Eckhart has recourse to the expression which Aristotle approves in Third Book of *De anima* that the soul is the place of the forms *(locus speciorum.)* [14] The soul is " where " knowledge occurs; it is not its substratum, the way marble is the substratum of white. It is worth noting that in another argument Eckhart remarks that, while the act of intellection is not a form of being, " science is quality and a true being " because it is a habit which perfects the subject:

u *Ibid.,* 429 a 25-SO.

Whence science belongs to the realm of the subject, which is something within. But the intellect and the cognitive form belong to the realm of the object, which is something without.
(LW, V, 52: 12-5, QP II, n. 6)

Thus while to know is a mode of non-being, the knowledge that the knowing subject possesses and accumulates is a mode of being.

(3) The last argument to which we wish to call attention in the *Seccmil Parisian Question* is closely connected with the first. A being is always something determinate, i. e., something determined to a genus and species. This amounts to saying that being is always finite, a position that Eckhart can maintain in view of the fact that for him God as the cause of being is above being whereas the formal notion of a creature is being *(ratio m·eabilitatis est esse).* But the intellect is something wholly indeterminate. It is neither this nor that. It has as Aristotle says no nature at all:

... it follows that it [mind] too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own other than that of having a certain capacity.

One cannot say " what " the intellect is; one cannot determine it at all, because it eludes every quality or characteristic. The intellect is *not* anything determinate but that by which every determination is made known. But all being is determinate. Hence the intellect is not a being (LW, V, 53: 16-8, QP II, n. 9).

II. The *Parisian Questio'M* and Recent Philosophy

It is time now to tum to the question of the contemporary relevance of these two" disputed questions." As we have mentioned above, we will undertake to show the relationship o£ the *Parisian Questions* to two major movements in recent thought: (a) German Idealism and (b) the contemporary phenomenological movement.

(a) From its very inception in Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* German Idealism spoke of consciousness as a negative force which is opposed to "being." Being is lifeless and motionless,

but consciousness moves, overcomes, supersedes and returns to itself. In the "First Introduction to the *Science of Knowledge"* of 1797 Fichte says:

> The intellect, for it [idealism], is only active and absolute, never passive; it is not passive because it is postulated to be first and highest, preceded by nothing which could account for a passivity therein. For the same reason it has no *being* proper, no subsistence, for this is the result of an interaction and there is nothing either present or assumed with which the intellect could be set to interact. The intellect, for idealism, is an *act,* and absolutely nothing more; we should not even call it an *active* something, for this expression refers to something in which activity inheres.[15]

For Fichte, "being" is the realm of the objective and passive. **It** cannot initiate activity. **It** has no autonomy. In strict antithetic opposition to being stands the freedom and autonomy of consciousness or of the " ego " (*das Ich)* . The ego is not something which *is* but something which acts or more exactly, pure activity itself. Activity is not being because being possesses stable and identifiable characteristics, but activity is strife and becoming. As soon as the ego posits itself as itself, it posits the non-self as opposite to itself in order, by the mediation of the non-self, to unfold itself as both knowledge and practical moral life. The ego is action, negation and self-transcendence, whereas being is passive and derivative.

Thus in opposing the intellect to being Fichte makes being a product of intellect and identifies the absolute as itself intellect or "Reason" *(Vernunft)* . The same is true for the Eckhart of the *Parisian Questions:* being is the reason why a thing is able to be created, and the proper nature of God lies above being in intellect itself.

Of all the Idealists, however, the thinker in whom the notion of the negative character of consciousness, and so of the absolute, is formulated most forcefully and explicitly is Hegel

[16] *Fichte: Science of Knowledge (Wwsenschaftslehre): With First and Second Introductions,* Ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 21.

himself. Some of the most striking texts of Hegel to this effect are to be found in the " Preface " to the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Explaining his view that the absolute is both substance and subject, i. e., both being and knowledge, he says,

> The living substance is, further, that being which is in truth subject or-to say the same thing in other words-which is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation between a self and its development into something different. As subject, it is pure, simple negativity and thus the bifurcation of the simple, that which produces its own double and opposition, a process that again negates this indifferent diversity and its opposite. . . .[1a]

If the Absolute were being alone for Hegel it would be without life, without development. Consciousness would be " drowned " in brute matter or being. But the real for Hegel is purposeful activity, historical process, rational becoming. Hence behind it, or within it, lies ". . . the tremendous power of the negative ... the energy of thought, of the pure ego." [17] The " living substance" is not weighed down by the "gravity" of matter but" makes itself (actualy) into that which is it potentially." [18]

It is not surprising, then, that in a review in 1928 in the *Theologisehe Literaturzeitung* of the simultaneous discovery of the *Parisian Questions* by Longpre and Grabmann, Emmanuel Hirsch would be led to remark:

> Here in fact nothing less than a piece of German Idealism makes itself felt.[19]

And this does not seem to be extreme an assessment if one recalls the following text of Eckhart from the vernacular sermon " *Quasi Stella Matutina,"* which is doctrinally akin to the *Parisian Questions:*

[18] *Hegel: Texts and Commentary,* Trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1965), p. 28.

[17] *Hegel: Texts and Commentary,* p. 50.

[18] G. W. F. Hegel, *Reason in History,* trans. with an introduction by R. S. Hartman (Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1958), pp. 22-S.

[18] Cited by Lossky, p. 216, n. 179.

If we take God in his being, then we take him in his vestibule, for being is the vestibule in which he dwells. But where is he then in his temple, in which he shines forth as holy? Reason *(Vernunft)* is the temple of God. God dwells nowhere more authentically than in his temple, in Reason. As that other master said, God is his Reason, which there lives in knowledge of himself alone, abiding there only in himself, where nothing ever troubles him. For he is there alone in his stillness. In his knowledge of himself, God knows himself in himself.[20]

It would be a great mistake however to regard Eckhart as the "first Idealist." Eckhart is so suggestive a thinker that he continually provokes such comparisons to later writers, but to push these comparisons too far is to invite disaster. When all is said and done, Eckhart is a fundamentally orthodox thinker. He held a theory of creation with all that this implies: that God is transcendent and other than the world, and that he is removed from time and matter and multiplicity. While it is true that he liked to emphasize that the divine Trinity was in some sense a "process," he was a neoplatonist who held that God was the eternal One, far removed from all temporal process.[21] Eckhart's God is the fullness or plenitude of being *(plenitudo esse)*, who stands in no need of "developing" himself, of becoming actually what he is potentially. When he says that God is "reason" *(Vernunft)* or "intellect" *(intellectus)*, this must be understood in terms of the neo-platonic *Liber de causis*, as we have seen above, and not in terms of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. Moreover, Eckhart subordinates reason to faith and philosophical speculation to the Scriptures in a way that Fichte and Hegel simply repudiate.[22]

[20] *Meister Eckehart: Deutsche Predigten und Traktate*, hrsg. v. Josef Quint (Munich: Hanser 1968), p. 197, ll. 25-88.

[21] See John Loeschen, "The God Who Becomes: Eckhart on the Divine Relativity," *The Thomist* XXV (July 1971), 405-22.

[22] On this whole question of Eckhart and German Idealism see: Ernst Benz, *Les sources mystiques de la philosophie romantique allemande* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1968); Ernst Benz, "Die Mystik in der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus," *Euphorion* 46 (1952), 280-800; E. v. Bracken, *Meister Eckhart und Fichte* (Wiirzburg, 1948).

This is not to say that Eckhart is just another, but lesser known, scholastic. He is a profoundly original and seminal thinker. Even in his own historical setting his position is unique and distinctive. For while all great scholastics of his time were familiar with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mind as a pure *"tabula rasa" (De anima,* 480 a 1), as "unmixed" with its object, it was Eckhart alone who maintained that intellect and intellection was a form of non-being. It is perfectly true, as Lossky points out, that this teaching is foreshadowed in Aquinas's distinction between the *quod* and the *quo,* between " what " the mind knows, the object of knowledge *(quod)* , and the pure means" by which" the object is known (quo) .[23] But the point is that Aquinas was never moved to call the cognitive form "non-being," nor to explain the sense in which this could be so. And it is precisely this particular twist, added by Eckhart, which makes the whole doctrine so fertile and fascinating.

The truth is therefore that Eckhart is neither the first Idealist nor simply a scholastic who has nothing in common with later Idealism. He is instead a penetrating thinker who discovered in his own context and before the Idealists a principle of which the Idealists made great use, viz., the negativity of knowledge. That is why, if one studies the *Parisian Questions,* one can see *why* the Idealists said a good many of the things they did. Let us illustrate this point by recalling the following argument for the first question:

> Those things which pertain to the intellect, insofar as they are of this kind, are non-beings. For we are able to understand something which God is not able to make, as in the case of one who understands fire without having attented to its heat. Nonetheless, God is not able to bring it about that there would be fire and that it would not give forth heat. (LW, V, 44: 6-9, QP I, n. 7)

This is to argue that the intellect is free from the conditions of being, that it is free to negate being as it is, to envisage other possibilities, to make a disposition of things which does not or even cannot exist. Mind is not confined to being but can in-

•• Lossky, pp. 2!!7-8.

stead transcend it, modify it, reshape it. The point which Eckhart is making is quite comparable to the thrust of Hegel's reference to the " tremendous power of the negative." To think is to negate, to transcend. It is to surpass what is for the sake of what is not, of what can be. It is by consciousness, as Sartre will later say, that negations are introduced into the

Moreover, it is as short a step in Eckhart as it is in Fichte and Hegel from a doctrine of the negativity of consciousness to a doctrine of freedom. For Eckhart, as for Fichte and Hegel, consciousness is free because it is not " weighed down " by being and matter:

> .... that power is higher in which freedom is principally found. But freedom is principally found in the intellect because something is free if it is pure of matter . . . But the intellect and the act of intellection are the most pure of matter.

The intellect is free of being, not subject to its conditions. Hence it is a power of autonomy and self-determination.

(b) The second point which we wish to make in connection with the contemporary relevance of the *Parisian Questions* lies in its relationship to the phenomenological theory of consciousness. And because the phenomenologist owes a debt .to Hegel, particularly in the case of Sartre, we shall see that this second parallel is not unrelated to the first.

In the first place, Eckhart's doctrine of the nothingness of the intellect is acutely sensitive to the danger which Husser! first warned against in the first volume of his *Logical Investigations* and which continued to occupy him through his life, viz., the problem of " psychologism." [25] Psychologism is a theory of consciousness which holds that acts of cognition may be treated as physical realities or natural events and that they are subject to the same laws as other natural objects. It is a form of " reductionism " which attempts to make conscious-

[9] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* trans. with an intro<l. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 6-12 (Hereafter "BN ").

[••] Edmund Husserl, *Logical Inveatigations,* trans. J. N. Findlay, 2 Vols. (New York Humanities Press, 1970), Vol. 1, Nos. 17-51, pp. 90-196.

ness nothing more than a natural entity. For Husserl, psychologism was simply a form of "naturalism" and "relativism" which reduced all ideal objects, in particular moral values and cognitive "meanings," to matters of fact, i. e., *de facto* responses of organisms of a given empirical constitution to their environment. Against this view Husserl struggled to establish the independent and unique reality of consciousness.

When Eckhart argues that the intellect is a form of non-being he is making an argument very similar to Husserl's for he is in fact maintaining that the intellect is not to be reduced to a mode of natural being.[26] The intellect as such, according to Eckhart, is "neither this nor that, neither here nor now." By this he means that the intellect in order to know must be able to abstract from every determinate place and time. If the intellect comprehends the essence of a man, or of a circle, or of justice, it must be able to abstract from any particular man or particular circular object or particular just man. It separates itself from all particular subjective and accidental circumstances in order to reach an objectively valid understanding of the object. In order to do this the intellect must have "nothing in common with anything." But every particular, natural being is determined to some time and some place, to some genus and some species. Hence the intellect is not a particular, natural being. If the intellect as an intellect were of a determinate genus and species, then its considerations would be colored by, and restricted to, the kind of being that it itself is. But this, of course, is exactly the contention of psychologism. All of the principles of logic and mathematics for psychologism are principles which have been formulated by the

•• Martin Grabmann has also noted the similarities of Eckhart's arguments to Husserl's refutation of psychologism. Cr. Grabmann, pp. 73-4. It is also no accident that Martin Heidegger found some interesting anticipations of Husserl's theories in his study of the medieval treatise *De modis significandi*, which he erroneously attributed to Duns Scotus but which in fact was composed by one Thomas of Erfurt. At the beginning of his study, which was the subject matter of his *Habilitationsschrift*, Heidegger remarks upon how well the medieval author has overcome the " un-philosophy of psychologism." See Martin Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und des Duns Scotus* (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1916), p. 14.

sentient organism which we call this natural species " man." Logic and mathematics are then really " anthropological " logic and anthropological mathematics, and so too is morality nothing more than an anthropological value system. And if this natural species " man " should change, should undergo a modification of its physical make-up--for every natural species is determined by the conditions of space and time, by the " here" and the " now "-then so would logic and mathematics and morals change accordingly. That is why Eckhart insists that the intellect is non-being. And in so doing, he makes exactly the same point that Husser! does in his refutation of psychologism, viz., that if consciousness is made a determinate natural object, mathematics and logic and morals will be hopelessly relativized.

The cognitive form, and the act of intellection based upon it, ought not to be considered entitatively, as modes of being, but rather in their purely cognitive character. To the extent that the cognitive form makes knowledge possible it is not being but that by which being is known. One cannot say that the cognitive form is a substance or a quality or give it any other categorial determination, for it is only through the intellect itself that such categories arise. One cannot reduce human cognition to anything *human*, for man is a natural substance in the real world, whereas the intellect has " nothing to do with anything " ; it is pure of every this or that. Thus there is nothing anthropological about human knowledge; for to the extent that man has intellectual knowledge he is not a natural being but a cognitive agent which transcends nature and being. When man grasps the principles of logic and mathematics and moral science, he does so not as man but as intellect, and intellect belongs to no category and no genus.

There is another important point of correspondence between Eckhart's *Parisian Questions* and contemporary phenomenology, Yiz., their common belief in the "intentional" character of consciousness. Of course, the very word " intentionality" made its way into Husserl's vocabulary through Franz **Bren-**

tano, who had himself learned of it through his studies in scholasticism.

Eckhart says that the cognitive form is not a being but a relationship to being. One ought not to treat a cognitive form as a thing, an entity, but as a relationship of directedness towards entities. To the extent that the intellect possesses a cognitive form it is carried beyond itself into something other than itself. In virtue of the act of intellection the knower no longer remains " within " but passes beyond itself into that which is " without." All of this is contained in Eckhart's discussion of the cognitive form in which he says that it does not have a subject but an object:

> Further: an operation and a power, as a power, have their being from the object, because the object is [here functioning] like a subject. But the subject gives being to that of which it is the subject. Therefore the object also gives being to that of which it is the object, viz., to the potency and power. But the object is without and being is within. Therefore the act of intellection, which is from an object, and in like manner the power, insofar as they are such, are not any kind of being nor do they have any being.
>
> (LW, V, 50: 6-11, QP II, n. 3)

What" is" is either a subject (substance) or something which is "in" a subject. But the cognitive form, which is clearly not a substance, is not *in* a substance either. For the cognitive form does not lie in being in a subject but in being towards an object. It is not a quality in a knower but the directedness of the knower into the known. The cognitive form, as a cognitive form, is not sustained by a subject in which it resides but by the object to which it is directed. This is to say that in a sense the act of intellection is not sustained by the knowing subject. For one cannot think without thinking " of " something. Thus the act of intellection is sustained by its object; its very essence is to be related to its object.

And it is because of the intentional character of the intellect and its act that Eckhart insists on saying that it is not a being, for it is the property of a being to be " what it is " *(quod)* and not to make itself invisible, as it were, so that we pass right

by it into something else. Objects (being) are what " stand before us," that with which we are confronted. But the cognitive form is a pure relationship to beings. Its essence is not to be itself but to let what is "other" or "without" *(extra)* be. To the extent that something "is," it is self-identical and remains " within " itself as " something inward " (*aliquid intraneum)* . Whereas to the extent that someone " knows " he is not self-identical but is carried over into what is " without." If being is and is what it is, then the cognitive form-which gives way to the other-is not being.

Eckhart's conception of the intentional relatedness of the intellect to things represents the least common denominator of almost any theory of intentionality. While the idea of intentionality is considerably more involved than this in Husserl, while the intentional act is assigned a more complex role than simply *referring* consciousness to an object, nonetheless Husserl shares Eckhart's conviction that the essence of consciousness is to refer to an object *(ab objecto)* and this forms a minimal basis for his theory. Speaking of Brentano in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* Husserl says:

> Of his two principal differentiations, one directly reveals the *essence* of psychical phenomena or acts. This strikes us unmistakably in any illustration we choose. In perception something is perceived, in imagination, something imagined, in a statement something stated, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, etc. Brentano looks to what is graspably common to such instances, and says that " every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the mediaeval schoolmen called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and by what we, not without ambiguity, call the relation to a content, the direction to an object (by which a reality is not to be understood) or an immanent objectivity. Each mental phenomenon contains something as object in itself, though not all in the same manner." This "manner in which consciousness refers to an object" (an expression used by Brentano in other passages) is presentative in a presentation, judicial in a judgment, etc. etc.[27]

[27] Husserl, *Logical Investigations,* V. p. *554.*

The distinguishing feature of consciousness is that consciousness is always " directed towards" or " aimed at " an object. To use the expression which is most frequently associated with Husserl's theory, consciousness is always "consciousness of. .. ." In order to understand what consciousness is one must view it as a relationship to its object or " intentional correlate." This is precisely what Eckhart means by insisting that the cognitive form is to be considered as having its being " from the object" rather than "in a subject." In fact, Husserl's employment of the expression " intentionality " is actually closer to Eckhart's scholastic usage than Brentano's. This may be seen by examining one of the criticisms which Husserl makes of Brentano's theory. Brentano spoke as if intentionality meant consciousness always " contained " its object, as if its objects were " in " consciousness as something is " in " a box. But this is to relapse into psychologism and to regard consciousness as one "thing" which "contains" another. For Husserl, however, the object is not something " in " consciousness but rather that towards which consciousness is " referred to " or " aimed at." The object is not present *in* consciousness but *to* or *for* consciousness. Consciousness does not " have " an object but " intends " it. One must not slip into a " box within a box " conception of consciousness, by which consciousness is thought to contain its acts and its acts contain its objects.28

The force of Husserl's criticism of Brentano is thus to stress the "directional " or " relational " character of the intentional relationship. But this is exactly the point that Eckhart is trying to establish when he argues that the cognitive form is not *in* a subject, i.e., its essence is not to be in the knower, to be the possession of a knower, but rather to be" from the object," i.e., to originate in and be sustained by the intentional correlate to which consciousness is immediately drawn or directed.

•• *Logical Investigations,* V. !11, pp. 557-8. Cf. Edmund Husser!, *The Idea of Phenomenology,* trans. W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 27-8 for Husserl's distinction between the two senses of "immanence."

As we have already indicated, a wide gulf still remains between Husserl and Eckhart. For there is a good deal more to intentionality in Husserl than "referring to" or "pointing at" its object. In Eckhart, the nothingness of the intellect" is the nothingness of a "*tabula rasa,*" of a blank slate on which only the objects of experience write. Eckhart's doctrine in which the cognitive form was a "pure medium" through which the intellect was conducted into the presence of an integral and undistorted object or "thing in itself." And while there are similarities between phenomenology and realism, this is hardly Husserl's view. Intentionality for Husserl is not the capacity of consciousness to function like a *tabula rasa.* On the contrary, it is an active process of shaping and "constituting" its object. To "intend" for Husserl, to illustrate this point, is to "identify" its object, i. e., to recognize that it is one and the same "meaning" which is intended in a succession of different acts. Intentional consciousness unifies a series of perceptions, say of a house into a series of acts intending the same intentional object and differing only in the perspective from which the house is seen. Consciousness thus is always "consciousness of ..." its object by "constituting" its object as an object.[29] This position is not Eckhart's, nor any scholastic's; indeed if there are any parallels for it at all these are to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

All of this is as it should be. For it would be as foolish to think that Eckhart is a phenomenologist before Husserl as it is to think that he is the first German Idealist. It is enough to show the suggestive and in many ways remarkably modern character of his work, and in particular of the *Parisian Questions,* without doing violence to the history of ideas.

Perhaps the most striking testimony of all to the affinity of the *Parisian Questions* with contemporary phenomenology is to be found in the work of a more recent "Parisian" philoso-

[29] Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl,* ed. Marvin Farber (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1940), pp. 65-83.

pher, Jean-Paul Sartre. For it is no accident that Sartre, whose work has been deeply affected by both Husser! and Hegel, has likewise chosen to speak of consciousness as negativity and nothingness. It may seem too much to bear to compare the author of *L'EtJre et le neant* with a medieval Dominican friar and mystic who held a " disputed question" on the angels. But the similarity is there to be seen.

What Sartre means by the nothingness of consciousness is complex and multi-faceted. Indeed the whole of *Being and Nothingness* consists in a subtle and ingenious unravelling of the full sense of that expression. We will here select only one section from this lengthy treatise to illustrate the similarity that we think Sartre bears to the Eckhart of the *Parisian Questions,* viz., the section in Part Two entitled "Knowledge as a Type of Relation Between the For-Itself and the In-Itself." [30] For Sartre, to know is to negate. For the only genuine knowledge is intuition, which is the immediate presence of the knower to the known. But all immediate presence of the known involves non-being.

> Presence encloses a radical negation as presence to that which one is not. What is present to me is what is not me. We should note furthermore that this "non-being" is implied a priori in every theory of knowledge. (BN, 178)

To know is to come immediately face to face with what one is *not.* That is why the Idealists could speak of knowledge as the unity of the ego and the non-ego. However in Sartre's ontology the in-itself is never to be defined negatively (as the non-ego, e. g.), since it is the fully positive plentitude of that which "is" and is "what it is" (BN, lxvi). Hence the immediate presence of the knower to the known is the act by which consciousness posits the in-itself as what it is and by

[80] BN, 17!!-80 To be sure, there are other points of comparison. Where Eckhart says that the intellect is non-being because it can negate what God cannot separate, he makes a point similar to that found in BN, as we have noted above, viz., that the *pour-soi* is the source by which negations come into the world (cf. above, n. !!4). Moreover, both Eckhart and Sartre (like Fichte and Hegel) found their theory of freedom on the " nothingness " of consciousness.

which it posits itself as what is not that of which it is consciOus:

> Knowing belongs to the for-itself alone, for the reason that only the for-itself can appear to itself as not being what it knows. (BN, 175)

The whole being of consciousness is to recede before the object, to make itself vanish as it were, so that the object and the object alone becomes present. Consciousness must become nothing in order that the object may become something. Consciousness is nothing more than its relationship to the being which it reveals. It is an "ekstatic" (BN, 179) relationship which opens out onto "what is," by which the for-itself is "outside itself" (BN, 177). So thoroughly and so completely does the for-itself empty itself that Sartre is willing to say that in knowledge all there " is " is what is " known," the " object," "being":

> The knower is not; he is not apprehensible. He is nothing other than that which brings it about that there is a being-there on the part of the known, a presence . . . (BN, 177)

The most telling illustration of knowledge for Sartre is " fascination," in which the knower vanishes entirely so that the object alone exists, the knower himself being nowhere to be seen. Thus for Sartre consciousness is not something which " is " but rather the process by which what is is made to appear. Consciousness is not being but the revelation of being.

In a sense these pages of *Being and Nothingness* bring together a good deal of what we have been saying all along about the negativity of knowledge. In them one can see the Husserlian doctrine of intentionality-that consciousness is always consciousness of an object-pushed to its extreme consequence: in order to be a process of intending or revealing its intentional correlate, consciousness must be nothing of itself. Moreover, the whole Husser! doctrine is recast by Sartre into very Hegelian language. The intentional object is the " in-itself," the self-identical, the merely positive. But the intending subject is the self-transcending life of negativity, the "life of

knowledge," the " for itself." And one can certainly feel the insights of Eckhart himself here. Compare these pages of *Being and Nothingness* with what Eckhart says about the cognitive form:

> .... if the cognitive form which is in the soul were to have the character of being, the thing of which it is the form would not be known through it. Because if it had the character of being it would, insofar as it is such, lead into a knowledge of itself and lead away from a knowledge of the thing of which it is the form.
>
> (LW, V, 44: QP I, n. 7)

To know is to be directly present to the object of knowledge without any intermediary. [31] The role of the cognitive form is to make itself invisible, to become entirely transparent, so that the intellect passes directly into a knowledge of the object. If Eckhart insists that the intellect and its cognitive form are non-beings, it is because being is the object of knowledge and the cognitive form must not intervene in this process by becoming " visible " or knowable itself. Knowledge is an ecstatic relationship towards what is "without" *(extra),* towards being. What is and is known is being. Intellect, to adopt Sartre's language, is but the revelation of being.

Now the differences between Eckhart's and Sartre's views of the nothingness of knowledge are innumerable and, for the most art, too obvious to list. One difference, however, is worth noting. For Sartre the nothingness of the for-itself is a *lack* of being, an emptiness or desire for being. The for-itself is not what it is and is what it is not, i. e., it is a continual failure to achieve its projects and a continual refusal to acknowledge its failures. For Sartre, then, the nothingness of the for-itself is essentially a mark of finitude and limitation; accordingly it is a condition which belongs only to a being in time. For Eckhart, on the other hand, intellect is non-being because it is above being, higher than being. The intellect contains all that

[81] The scholastics held that the "thing" *(res)* was the "direct" object of the mind because it is "what" (quod) is known; nonetheless, the principle of the intellect's operation is the cognitive form, without whose " meditation " the thing would not be known. Hence the thing is known directly but not immediately.

is found in being " in a higher way " (*eminentius)* . Accordingly, the intellectual nature is removed from time and multiplicity and limitation, for these are conditions attaching to being. For Sartre, being is the motionless and self-identical Parmenidean plenum, and the for-itself lacks its wholeness and stability. For Eckhart being is the multiple, impermanent world of change and limitation, and intellect is " separate " or removed from its imperfections.

* * * *

While Eckhart is a thinker who must be understood in the context of his own neoplatonic and scholastic setting, we hope to have shown in this study that he is nonetheless a philosopher of great originality and suggestiveness and of considerably more universal appeal. In these two questions he develops an insight into the character of knowledge which has animated some of Western philosophy's most important epistemological theories. Like Aristotle's *"tabula rasa,"* Aquinas's *medium quo* or Sartre's *"pour-soi,"* the "nothingness of the intellect" in the *Parisian Questions* is a penetrating attempt to deal with the fundamental problem, indeed mystery, of knowledge, viz., the problem of how the knower is carried beyond himself into the object of knowledge. Eckhart's Latin works as a whole are punctuated by such insights and would repay the most careful scrutiny by the contemporary thinker. One can only hope that this will become more widely recognized and that the present study has helped to show that Eckhart is not only one of the leading figures in Western mysticism but also a distinguished speculative philosopher whom Martin Heidegger has rightly called a" master of thinking." [32]

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•• Martin Heidegger, *Vortriige und Aufaiitze,* Auflage (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1959), p. 175.

AQUINAS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENCE IN KIND AND DIFFERENCE IN DEGREE

MUCH HAS BEEN written about the roles of both genera a:p.d accidents in the metaphysics and epistemology of St. Thomas Aquinas. But no one has heretofore drawn out the implications of a comparison of genera and accidents for St. Thomas's very important theory of the relationship between difference in kind among things and difference in degree among things.

Genera and accidents can most fruitfully be compared in terms of generic and accidental *concepts* since the unity of the genus is conceptual only. A genus cannot be one in the way that, say, a species is one, i. e., in terms of a formal identity in things, since in things " generic forms " exist only as specified in various diverse ways.[1]

The relationship between a generic concept and things is nearly the contrary of the relationship between a concept of an accident and things. We are able to know many things by one generic concept because of its *indeterminacy;* all of the things known by a generic concept are more determinate than is the concept. Animal nature, for example, is perfected and fulfilled as it exists in things-various kinds of animals. However, with accidents the concept is *more determinate* than are most of the things to which it applies. Most things are not completely white, but our concept *white* is a likeness of perfect whiteness, or nearly perfect whiteness, against which things having various degrees of whiteness are measured, thus enabling us to determine *just how white* something is.

[1] See Armand Maurer, "St. Thomas and the Analogy of the Genus," *New Scholasticism,* 1955 (29), 181. Cf. F. F. Centore, "A Note on Diversity and Difference," THE TnoMIST, XXXVI (July, 1972), 472-482.

The difference in relationships between generic concepts and things and between accidental concepts and things reflects a difference in things. *Animal* cannot exist except as a particular kind of animal, but perfect whiteness can exist apart from all the degrees of whiteness (although it cannot exist apart from something which is perfectly white). White things are not equally white, but all animals are equally animals.

The difference in things between genera and accidents can be traced to their different relationships to substance. Using non-Thomistic terminology, the relationship between a genus and substance can be called *perfecting determination,* which produces differences in *kind.* The different kinds, or species, of animals each perfect animal nature in their own ways. The relationship between accidents and substance can be called *non-perfecting determination,* which produces differences in *degree.* White things, in varying degrees, subtract from the perfection of pure whiteness.[2]

Differences in kind and differences in degree are fundamentally distinct kinds of difference and are the ground for fundamentally distinct kinds of universals (that is, concepts related to things as a one is related to a many), each generated by its own type of cognitive process. A generic concept can be a universal because the mind has made it indeterminate in relation to things, while a concept of an accident can be a universal because the mind has produced, from imperfect instances, a perfected image, or representation, which can be related to things as a standard of measurement.

Although difference in kind and difference in degree are distinct kinds of difference, according to St. Thomas, one is more fundamental than the other and is, in a sense, a cause of it. Difference in degree is more fundamental than difference in kind. Difference in kind is found most prominently in genera.

: The relationship between accidents and substance can properly be called non-perfecting determination only from the perspective of accidents, since substance *is* perfected by certain accidents. But an accident itself is usually not perfected by a substance in that the accident is, in varying degrees, instantiated imperfectly.

Things differing in a genus differ in kind, as we have noted. However, they also differ in degree:

In every genus there is something most perfect in that genus, by which all the other members of the genus are measured: everything is shown to be more or less perfect as it approaches more or less to the measure of its genus.[3]

What is true of generic differences IS, according to Thomas, true of all formal differences.

Formal distinction, however, always requires inequality, because, as is said in the *Metaphysics* [VII, 3, 1043b 34], the forms of things are like numbers, in which species vary by the addition or subtraction of unity. Therefore, in natural things species are seen to be ordered by degrees.[4]

Likewise, every distinction Is either according to a division of quantity, which exists only in bodies and therefore, according to Origen, could not exist in the substances first created, or according to a division of form. This latter cannot be without a diversity of grades, since such division is reduced to privation and form; and thus it is necessary that, of the forms divided from one another, one be better and the other worse. Therefore, according to the Philosopher *[Metaphys.* VII, 3, 1043b 36-1044a the species of things are like numbers, of which one is in addition to or in subtraction from another.[5]

[8] *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 28: "In unoquoque genere est aliquid perfectissimum in il1o, ad quod omnia quae sunt illius generis mensurantur: quia ex eo unumquodque ostenditur magis vel minus perfectum esse, quod ad mensuram sui generis magis vel minus appropinquat." All English translations of passages from St. Thomas appearing in this paper are my own.

'*Summa Theol.,* I, q. 47, a. 2, ad Resp.: "Distinctio autem formalis semper requirit inaequalitatem, quia, ut dicitur in *Mtrta.,* formae rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus species variantur per additionem val subtractionem unitatis. Unde in rebus naturalibus gradatim species ordinatae esse videntur."

• *II Cont. Gent.,* c. 44: "Item. Omnis distinctio est aut secundum divisionem quantitatis, quae in solis corporibus est, unde in substantiis primo creatis, secundum Origenem, esse non patuit: aut secundum divisionem formalem. Quae sine graduum diversitate esse non potest: cum talis divisio reducatur ad privationem et formam; et sic oportet quod altera formarum condivisarum sit melior et altera vilior. Unde, secundum Philosophum, species rerum sunt sicut numeri, quonum unus alteri addit aut minuit."

Difference in kind is made possible by difference in degree, or grade, of a perfection. Thomas's general rule is that the imperfect is derived from the perfect.

> Furthermore, everything which is imperfect derives from something perfect: for what is perfect is naturally prior to what is imperfect, as is act to potency. [6]

> Likewise, if there is something imperfect in some genus, something else which is perfect is found antecedent to it according to the order of nature: the perfect, indeed, is prior in nature to the imperfect.7

But this poses a problem. If derivation of the imperfect from the perfect produces a graded formal series, and such a graded formal series results in the differences in kind among things, it would appear that, contrary to what we have said above, there is *no* fundamental distinction between the manner in which things vary within a genus and the manner in which things vary in terms of an accidental quality. In both cases, variation is in degree, the species of animals, for example,

[6] *Ibid.,* I. c. 44: "Amplius. Omne quod est imperfectum, derivatur ab aliquo perfecto: nam perfecta naturaliter sunt priora imperfectis, sicut actus potentia."

[7] *Ibid., II,* c. 91: "Item. Si est aliquid imperfectum in aliquo genere, invenitur ante illud, secundum naturae ordinem, aliquid in genere illo perfectum: perfectum enim natura prius est imperfecto." See also *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 76, a. 8, ad *Resp.:* " The species and forms of things are indeed found to differ from one another according to the more and less perfect. As in the order of things the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals than plants, and men than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are diverse grades. For this reason Aristotle, in *Metaphysics,* VIII [VII, 8 1043b 34], compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species according to the addition or subtraction of unity. And in *De; Anima,* II [II, 3, 414b !28], he compares the diverse to the species of figures, of which one contains another as a pentagon contains a tetragon, and exceeds it. Thus the intellectual soul contains in its power whatever is had by the sensitive soul of brute animals and the nutritive soul of plants." (" Invenientur enim rerum species, et formae differre ab invicem secundum perfectius, et minus perfectum. Sicut in rerum ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et homines animalibus brutis; et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus diversi. Et ideo Arist. in 8 *Meta ph.* assimilat species rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem, vel subtractionem unitatis. Et in !2 *De Anima* comparat diversas animas speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam: sicut pentagonum continet tetragonum, et excedit. Sic igitur anima intellective continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, nutritiva plantarum.")

varying as the more and less perfect in the same way that different white things are more and less perfect in their whiteness. Of course, specific forms are more fundamental than accidental forms in that the latter inhere in the former, and not vice versa; and hence specific and accidental forms can be distinguished in this way. But the kind of variation in both cases would seem to be the same, that of degree.

It would seem to follow that the only distinction between the way in which species vary within a genus and the way in which different instances of an accidental quality vary is a *conceptual* distinction: we conceive the species of a genus as equal in that genus, while we conceive instances of an accident as unequal. But, it would seem, we could as well conceive species as unequal within a genus; we could as well conceive horse, for example, as a lesser degree of man and rabbit, perhaps, as a lesser degree of horse. After all, we have quoted Thomas as saying: ". . . the intellectual soul contains in its power whatever is had by the sensitive soul of brute animals and the nutritive soul of plants." In addition, there is a passage in *Sum. theol.* where Thomas explicitly contrasts the equality of a generic *concept* with the inequality of *actual species* within a genus:

> To the first, therefore, it must be said that, when a univocal genus is divided into its species, then the members of the division have equality according to the concept of the genus, while according to the nature of things one species is prior and more perfect than another, as man differs from animal.[8]

But the conclusion we are drawing should make us suspicious. Is it not very strange to say that a horse is the same as a man except less so? True, a horse lacks some of man's abilities, his reasoning power for one, while a horse has other of man's capacities, such as the capacities to grow and to reproduce, to see and to hear. But a horse also has capacities that

[8] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando genus univocum dividitur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum rationem generis, licet secundum naturam rei una species sit principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus."

a man does not have: a horse can run faster than a man, is much stronger than a man, can eat hay, etc. Moreover, it would seem strange if the diversity of our ways of conceiving genera and accidents-our way of conceiving things having the same genus as equal in that genus, but things having the same accidental quality as unequal in that quality-were merely arbitrary: if there were no good reason in the nature of things for conceiving things differently under genera and under accidents. In fact, according to Thomas, there is a good reason.

A form cannot vary in degree simply in virtue of itself. Something in addition to the form is needed in order to reduce that form to various grades of imperfection:

> Furthermore, that which belongs to something from its nature, not from another cause, cannot be diminished and deficient in it. H, indeed, something essential be subtracted from or added to the nature, there will be another nature: as happens with numbers, in which the addition or subtraction of a unit changes the species. If, however, the nature or quiddity of a thing remains integral, but something is found to be lessened in the thing, it is clear that this [lessening] is not derived simply from that nature, but from something else, by the removal of which it is lessened. Therefore, that which belongs less to one thing than to another, does not belong to it from its own nature alone, but from some other cause.[9]

In the case of accidents, that which causes a degree of imperfection is the *substmwe* in which the accident inheres:

> ... if there were a whiteness existing separately, nothing of the power of whiteness could be lacking to it; for some white thing lacks some of the power of whiteness from a defect in the recipient of the whiteness, which receives it according to its own mode, and perhaps not according to the whole power of whiteness.[10]

[9] *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 15: "Amplius. Quid alieni convenit ex sua natura, non ex alia causa, minoratum in eo et deficiens esse non potest. Si enim naturae aliquid essentiale suhtrahitur vel additur, iam altera natura erit; sicut et in numeris accidit, in quibus unitas addita vel subtracta speciem variat. Si autem, natura vel quidditate rei integra manente, aliquid minoratum inveniatur, iam patet quod illud non simpliciter dependent ex ilia natura, sed ex aliquo alio, per cuius remotionem minoratur. Quod igitur alieni minus convenit quam aliis, non convenit ei ex sua natura tantum, sed ex alia causa."

[10] *Ibid.*, I, c. 28: ". . . si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis

In the case of species, that which causes degrees of imperfection cannot be the substance in which a species inheres because a specific form does not inhere in a substance. A thing *is* a substance because it has a specific form, since a specific form is most fundamental in a thing. Consequently, it must be the case that what causes the degree of imperfection in a species, insofar as that species is contrasted with the most perfect species in its genus, is something *contained in the specific form* itself-something integral to the specific form, something that can neither exist apart nor be thought apart from that specific form. Now, when we conceive an accidental quality, we can conceive it apart from its substance: we can conceive whiteness, for example, as something which is not limited to any given white thing, or to any given shade of whiteness. But we cannot conceive the species of a genus in this way at all. We cannot conceive of a " generic perfection " which is imperfectly realized in various substances. On the contrary, we must conceive of each species as itself a substance. Consequently, species do not differ in precisely the same way as accidents differ. We can conclude, after all, that species within a genus differ in kind, while accidents differ in degree.

This is not to say that the less perfect is not derived from the more perfect. It is to say that within species, the less perfect is not derived from the more perfect in precisely the same way that the degrees of an accident are produced from the perfect instance of that accident. Something more is needed in the case of species than in the case of accidents to produce diversity in degree; this " something more " results in difference in kind. It is probable that a human being can produce a new degree of an accident by causing that accident to inhere in a subject in a way which never occurred before. We could perhaps produce a new degree of whiteness, for example, by putting a thin coat of white paint on a specially prepared surface. But no

deesse posset; nam alieni albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, qua earn secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis."

human being, according to Thomas, can produce a new species. God alone can create species. God created species in grades of perfection in order that a hierarchy of species exist which would include all possible perfection, from the most complete perfection to the least complete.[11]

In creating the world God did not simply subtract successively from the complete perfection of his own nature. God really did create something new when he created the world: he created specific forms in order that there would be something in addition to his perfection. Because God did create something new, his own perfection has remained after the creation and is supplemented by the world of imperfect creatures. Creatures do depend upon God for their being, but creatures are not God. Hence, for St. Thomas, the fact of the creation guarantees the reality of specific forms, and this guarantees the reality of diversity in kind as distinct from diversity in degree.

For the same reason that specific forms do differ *among them8elve8* in kind as well as in degree, it is impossible that any *given* specific form differ in degree: there is no substance in which a specific form can inhere which would diversify it into degrees. Hence, a specific form is indivisible.

If, truly, we consider a quality or a form according to its participation by a subject, thus also some qualities and forms are found to receive more and less, and some not. Of this diversity Simplicius assigns the cause *[In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium]* from the fact that substance in itself cannot ·receive more or less, because it is being *per se.* And therefore all forms which are participated substantially by a subject are without increase and decrease; whence in the genus of substance nothing is said according to more and less.[12]

[11] *Summa. Theol.,* I, q. 48, a. ad *Resp.:* "... the perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality in things, in order that every grade of goodness be realized." (". . . perfectio universi requirit inaequalitatem esse in rebus ut omnes bonitatis gradus impleantur.")

[12] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 52, a. 1, ad *Resp.:* "Si vero consideremus qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subjecti, sic etiam inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus, et quaedam non. Hujusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam

A specific form is subject only to *accidental* variation in kind.

We can conclude that difference in degree is mc!'e fundamental than difference in kind and is a cause of it, but that difference in degree is not the only cause of difference in kind; that is, difference in kind cannot simply be reduced to difference in degree. The reason for this is that something is always needed to bring about the existence of degrees of something. A form cannot, simply in virtue of itself, exist in degrees. Insofar as a form is taken as distinct from that which gives it each of its degrees, we can say that the different instances of that form differ in degree. This is the case with accidents. But when a form cannot be taken apart from what gives it degrees, we must say that the instances of that form differ among themselves in *kind* as well as degree. This is the case with species. Difference in kind is not independent of difference in degree because of the order of creation: the world was so created that being could be manifested in all possible degrees of perfection. At the same time, difference in degree presupposes difference in kind, since no form can simply in virtue of itself manifest itself in degrees. Degrees of an accident require that there be different kinds of substances, and substances themselves can differ in degree only because they also differ in kind.

On should note how nicely balanced a view of reality Thomas gives· us. Existing things, in fact, are diverse in kind, yet all form a whole. An ordered hierarchy of diverse kinds is most apparent in the realm of living things, but diversity in atomic in and molecular structure is also clearly hierarchical. Thomas accounts equally well for both diversity and unity. However, lest it be supposed that Thomas's metaphysics is compatible with the Taoist principle that reality is basically composed of opposites (Yin and Yang) , it must be noted that according to Thomas difference in degree is more fundamental than dif-

non potest recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma quae substantialiter participatur in subjecto caret intensione et remissione; unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis et minus." See also *ibid., I,* q. 9S, a. S, ad S.

ference in kind because unity is more fundamental than diversity. As Thomas says:

> It must be said that in any genus, to the extent that something is first it is simple and consisting in few [principles], as primary bodies are simple; and therefore, we find that those things which are first in any genus are in some way simple, and consist in something one.[13]

> Furthermore, in every genus we see that multitude proceeds from some unity: and thus in any genus is found a prime member, which is the measure of all things which are found in that genus. In whatever things, therefore, is found some one agreement, it is necessary that this be dependent upon some one origin. But all things agree in being. It is necessary, therefore, that there be only one being which is the foundation of all things. This is God.[14]

However, although diversity is derived from unity, diversity does have reality over and above the reality of unity, just as essence-the vehicle for diversity-has reality over and above the reality of existence, although all of the reality of essence is in relation to existence.

Thomas is fond of giving Aristotle's opinion that the species of things are like numbers, "... which differ in species according to the addition or subtraction of unity." [15]

In saying this, Thomas is emphasizing both the differences in degree of species and their differences in kind. All numbers are on a scale, each successively higher number including the lower, and each successively lower number including some, but not all, of the perfection of the higher. At the same time num-

[18] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 19, a. *fl,* ad *Resp.:* "Dicendum quod in quolibet genere quanto aliquid est prius tanto est simplicius et in paucioribus consistens, sicut prima corporae sunt simplicia; et ideo invenimus quod ea quae sunt prima in quolibet genere sunt aliquo modo simplicia, et in uno consistent."

[''I] *Cont. Gent.,* c. 42: "Amplius. In unoquoque genere videmus multitudinem ab aliqua unitate procedere: et ideo in quolibet genere invenitur unum primum, quod est mensura omnium quae in illo genere inveniuntur. Quorumcumque igitur invenitur in aliquo uno convenientia, oportet quod ab aliquo uno principio dependeant. Sed omnia in esse conveniunt. Oportet esse unum tantum quod est rerum onmium principium. Quod Deus est."

[16] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 76, a. 8, ad *Resp.:* "... qui differunt specie secundum additionem, vel subtractionem unitatis."

hers are composed of units, which in the final analysis cannot be divided. Between one number and the next there is a discrete and " unbridgeable " interval, as there is between kinds of things.[16]

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[16] It may be objected that numbers can be divided into continuously smaller fractions. However, fractions themselves depend upon relationships among units. As Thomas says, number must begin with the unit "... each species of number is constituted by an indivisible unity. (... *unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per indivisibilem unitatem.)" (ibid., I-II,* q. *52,* a. I, ad *Resp.)* Numbers themselves are not properly divided into fractions; rather, things are divided by fractions into smaller units. Regardless of how finely something is divided, it is still thought of in discrete units.

ANALOGY

THE FIRST part of this essay is a discussion of a few points concerning the interpretation of the Thomist texts on anology} The second part is an attempt to show how our actual use of language supports what St. Thomas says quite independently of the question of whether any *theory* of analogy is possible. The last concerns the use of analogous terms in theological contexts.

I

"Analogy of proportionality" is understood in importantly different senses by different authors, and it is not always entirely clear what problem the analogy is designed to solve or how it would solve it. The clearest interpretation of the analogy of proportionality appears to be its construal as exactly like the following simple mathematical case: *x* is to *a* as *b* is to *c; a, b* and *c* are knowns, *x* is not; solve for *x.* This is then applied to problems of meaning in religious contexts through its apparent exact analogy with (for example)," God's wisdom (x) is to God (a) as a man's wisdom (b) is to the man (c);" " solve" for God's wisdom. But as Geach [2] and others have remarked, this is of no use at all for here *a* is an unknown also (or, at least, as unknown as x). (Another sense of proportionality is considered later in this essay.) Proportionality is often contrasted with analogy of attribution or proportion and with analogy of inequality. The first (textual) question then is how Aquinas intended his various classifications of analogy

[1] I owe some of the references to Aquinas and their interpretation in the first section to Robert E. Meagher's valuable paper, "Thomas Aquinas and Analogy: A Textual Analysis," *The Thomist* XXXIV, no. (April 1970), pp.

• P. T. Geach and G. E. M. Anscombe, *Three Philosophers* (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1963), p. 128.

to be understood. This question overlaps with two others: what sort of analogy did St. Thomas think was theologically important; and what sorts of relations are there between the various types of analogy?

One view is that there is a development in St. Thomas's views about analogy. In his early works he favors analogy of proportionality as the most useful in theological contexts and in his later works, analogy of attribution. [3] But this seems to be correct only in the following respect: that Aquinas allows *a* sense of "analogy of proportionality" (not the above one) which has some application in religious discourse but this sort of analogy of proportionality appears to be really just a species of analogy of atribution and, further, depends on the prior applicability of attribution to give it a sense. (In some non-religious contexts the last condition need not be met.) This constitutes a schematic answer to the first two questions above. In the course of trying to justify this answer I hope to provide an answer to the third question.

In the early *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* Thomas distinguishes [4] three sorts of analogy: (1) according to intention and not according to being for which he gives his stock example of "health" as applied to animals (properly), to urine (a certain kind being an effect of health), and to diet (a certain kind being a cause of health). The label here seems confusing: what must be meant, I think, is that there is no *analogy"* according to being" but an actual (causal) relationship whereas the term is being used analogously. (2) Analogy according to being but not intention: here the analogous term is used *as if* there were some property which the entities referred to had in common but actually there is none (or, at least, if there is a common property, it is not what is meant by the term) . St. Thomas gives the antique example of " body" as applied to corruptible and incorruptible bodies, but " existent,"

• H. A. Wolfson, "St. Thomas on Divine Attributes," *Melanges offerts* a *Etienne Gilson* (Paris, 1959), 673-700. (I owe this reference to Julius R. Weinberg, *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy,* Princeton, 1964.)

• *I Sent.,* d. 19, 9. 15, ad 1.

" beautiful," " good," " thing," and " number " would, I think, be acceptable examples. There is a *ratio* for the application of " existent " to a fleeting mental image and to a stone, but the explanation is not that there is a mysterious property, existence, shared by both. (3) According to intention and being: "this is when they are equally matched neither in a common intention [meaning] nor in being . . . . I maintain that truth and goodness and the like are predicated analogically of God and creatures. This means that according to their being *[esse]* all these exist in God and in creatures according to their greater or lesser perfection." Given that St. Thomas does not allow a *gradation* of value but rather stresses the unlimited gap between God and creation/ the last phrase must just mean (in part) , according to what properties they have. Given that " to be " is "to b " where the blank is filled with a general term [6] this is clear from Thomas's next remark, "From this it follows that since they cannot exist according to the same being in both, they are diverse truths," i. e., they fall under different concepts although the same word is applied analogously to them.

There are three points worth noticing about these texts: (1) none mention analogy of proportionality (in the mathematical sense mentioned above; I will leave Cajetan's sense for the moment); (2) they suggest that the "theory" of analogy is both logical and ontological (or, at the very least a theory about words based on considerations about the nature of reality); (3) all three sorts seem to have application in theological discourse: for example, the first in talking of God as Creator and Sustainer of the world; the second in saying that God exists;

• See, for instance, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 4, a. 8: "Although we may admit in a way that creatures resemble God we may in no way admit that God resembles creatures. (Ad quartum dicendum quod licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura est similis Deo nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae.)"

[6] In this I am following Geach's analysis of *esse.* It is not to deny either the distinction between a thing's *esse* and its being a such and such, nor the identification of God with his *Esse.*

and the last in speaking of God as wise or benevolent. I conclude thus far that St. Thomas is mainly concerned to discuss types of analogy of attribution (rather than to contrast this with other types) and that this is the sort of analogy he thinks is theologically relevant/ This is confirmed by what St. Thomas says in the *Summa,* I, q. 13, a. *5* where he distinguishes only two sorts of analogy, "of many to one" *(multorum ad unum)* which corresponds to the first sort mentioned in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* and " one to many " (*unius ad alterum)* which roughly corresponds to the second two sorts in the *Commentary.* Both are clearly analogies of attribution (or proportion) .

At this point it is useful to consider a slightly different interpretation suggested by James F. Ross in his valuable paper, "Analogy As a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language." [8] After quoting Aquinas on analogy of attribution *(I Cont. Gent.* c. 34) Ross says, "This argument is useful only if enough similarity has already been demonstrated between God and other things to justify a statement that a causal relation holds . . . Even if there is such an analogy, it cannot be the basic one, for it supposes true statements about God." [9] This seems to me an extraordinary remark. Of course, the analogy *does* presuppose " true statements about God," but according to Aquinas we have such statements by means of the Five Ways or through Revelation. In any case *there can clearly be no question of analogy of any sort without some statements the meaningfulness of which we are attempting to explain.* Ross might seem to be correct here on the grounds that it does not appear coherent to hold both that a certain statement, e. g., " God exists " is *true,* and yet that there is some doubt as to its meaningfulnes. But this describes the

• I take it that Robert E. Meagher has successfully shown that Cajetan (in his *De nominum analogia)* was mistaken in his interpretation of St. Thomas on this point. See Meagher *op. cit.,* pp.

[8] In A. Kenny, ed., *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Macmillan, 1969), pp. 98-188.

• *Ibid.,* p. 110, footnote IS.

situation incorrectly; rather we have a statement known (or believed) to he *both* true and meaningful, and then a question arises as to how its meaning is to he explained. If an explicit understanding of a philosophically adequate theory of meaning were a necessary condition of using a language at all, we would be in the position of not being able to speak. Ross's own view appears to be that terms applying to God initially get their sense by means of analogy of proportionality, [10] e. g., an acceptance of Aquinas's first argument for the existence of God enables us to say that God " moves" the world; an acceptance of the third that he conserves the world. These can then be transferred into " names " of God which apply to him by analogy of attribution; from " he causes the world " to " Causer," from " he conserves the world " to " conserver." Ross is here using the expression " analogy of proportionality " in a different sense from that criticized by Geach; he simply means it to cover cases where we have a similarity of *relations* rather than of one place predicates. [11] Without intending to indulge in semantics in the bad sense this would seem to make analogy of proportionality a kind of analogy of attribution; this at any rate seems to be closer to Aquinas's own mind on the matter. But there are difficulties with Ross's view. How, for instance, can "wise" or " omnipotent " be applied to God through transference from a relation? One possibility, that" God is wise" *meaw* no more than " God is the cause of wisdom " is explicitly denied by Aquinas [12] (though it may be correct that the latter statement gives us an initial hint as to the meaning of " God is wise ") . Another possibility of explaining these terms relationally stems from Aquinas's fourth argument for God's existence. Since this purports to establish that God is the exemplar of wisdom, goodness, and the like, it might be construed as providing the basis of meaningful predications concerning God through analogy of proportionality in Ross's sense (and not analogy of attribution) by reason of our understanding of the ordinary usage of " wisdom " and " good " and of the relational expres-

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 135-137. [11] *Ibid.,* p. ll'l9. [10] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. *l'l.*

sion " being paradigmatic with respect to." This would at least have the advantage of not being open to Geach's objection to analogy of proportionality, for in this case we would have three knowns (wisdom or goodness, creatures and the relation, *is paradigmatic relative* to) and one unknown (God) : we would not be simultaneously trying to solve for the relation and one of its relata. But this clearly will not work either because one could not possibly understand the application of the relevant relational term without at least tacitly understanding that the first *relatJum is* a paradigm, i. e., without understanding something by the application of " wise " or " good " to God, i. e., the meaning of x is a paradigm with respect to . . . " depends on the meaning of' x '." Hence, again, it is analogy of attribution which is fundamental/ [3] though we certainly have analogy of proportionality (in Ross's sense) as well, as when it is said that God's causing the world is somehow analogous to a composer's creation of a piece of music without the aid of any preexistent material. In short, we will have analogy with respect to a relational or non-relational term depending on which sort of predication we are attempting to make.

The answer to the scholarly question of what sort of analogy St. Thomas meant to have application in religious contexts is then, simply, all sorts depending on the type of predicate being applied to God, with proviso that analogy of proportionality in the mathematical sense has no application at all. (As St. Thomas hints, *nd* classification of types of analogy of attribution can be complete unless the classification is a purely formal one. This is discussed below.)

II

All this naturally suggests the question of whether we really need analogous terms at all or whether analogy is just an unnecessary species of equivocation. This is easily confused with

[18] Ross seems to reverse his position to one like this when he says ". . . *these* terms wisdom, simplicity and the like in application to God can all he turned into 'relation predicates' - - - " *(ibid.,* pp. 186-187).

a quite different question, viz., is it possible to construct some general theory which will explain the *mechanism of* analogous predication?

With regard to the first question, clearly some analogous usages can be dispensed with, e. g., we could always speak *of* " types *of* food which are productive *of* health " rather than "healthy" foods. But, as I shall try to show by means *of* examples, there are all sorts *of* analogous uses *of* terms which are perfectly meaningful and are not reducible to non-analogous uses, i. e., to univocal or equivocal ones. For purposes *of* giving examples I will restrict" univocal" to terms which have their meaning in virtue *of* some property common to the entities to which the terms apply. (Color words and expressions describing the dimensions *of* things seem to be obvious examples *of* such univocal usages.) Wittgenstein has already shown that there are many unambiguous meaningful terms which are not univocal in this sense. (These would be called " analogical " by Aquinas according to the account quoted at the beginning *of* this essay.) Two *of* Wittgenstein's examples are "game" and "understanding"; there is, for instance, no single criterion such as the presence *of* a certain internal " mental state " for the application of " understanding." [14] Here are some further examples. As Aristotle argued at length, " pleasure " is not the name *of* a single sensation or other mental state which is present whenever a person is enjoying himself: drinking whisky and listening to Bach are both pleasurable but not through the existence of a single " property" *of* both types *of* experience. Pleasure is defined in terms *of* its object, and these objects do not fall under a single concept *except* " pleasurable." Nonetheless there is nothing obscurantist in the ordinary application of the word to these very various things and, in fact, this usage could not be dispensed with. Hence the usage *of* "pleasure" is both analogical and unavoidable. Similarly, con-

[14] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* Part I, Sections 66-69 and 138-*155.* I owe the idea that Wittgenstein's philosophy could be an aid in understanding Aquinas to Anthony Kenny's very interesting paper "Aquinas and Wittgenstein," *The Downside Review* (Summer-Autumn, 1959), pp. 217-235.

sider " perceives " in application to humans, dogs, and amoeba. We certainly have grounds for applying the term to all three, but in application to amoebas it seems to be an analogical tension; similarly with " loyal " as applied to dogs. A different kind of example is the use of " resolution " by psychoanalysts: this obviously has important connexions with its lay usages in application to the solving of purely intellectual problems. *A* last example I will mention is " implication." This appears to have both analogical and equivocal uses. In application to propositions which state logical or causal connexions and to those which express conditional intentions it is analogical. It might be said to have a" root meaning," that expressed by the material implication of truth functional logic but, although this is certainly *common* to all its usages, it is not *the* meaning of any of them.

Such examples might be claimed to arise from the (alleged) " imprecision " of ordinary speech, but I think such a criticism would be mistaken. " Pleasure " as used by a psychologist or " matter " by a physicist have different meanings from the same terms as ordinarily used, but these meanings have important connections and we could not simply drop the one usage in favor of the other: what we do say, rather, is that the physicist has a more profound understanding of matter *(ordinary* usage) than the layman does. Also analogical usages occur *within* the sciences (e. g., "number" in application to natural, negative, transfinite, and ordinal numbers [15]).

These examples illustrate, I think, the important slogan that analogy is itself analogous, i.e., there is no one property or set of properties that all these analogous usages have in common. Hence the misguided attempt to delineate such a property is apt to leave the impression that the doctrine of analogy is just a bit of specious obscurantism.

With this in mind I would like to comment briefly on the idea of a theory of analogy. As I hope the previous examples show, that there is correct analogous usage is just a fact about

[15] The example is Wittgenstein's.

language. This fact is sometimes denied, I think, through approaching language with a preconceived and mistaken idea of how analogous usage *must* function if it is really to be intelligible. This can be illustrated by some remarks of J. J. Heaney [16] made in an article criticized by J. F. Ross.[17] Concerning Bochenski's example [18] of" sees" in" John sees a cow here" and" John sees the truth of the first theorem of GOdel" Heaney says, "First of all, the argument [sic] for ... these two expressions being analogous ... relies on the rather tenuous assumption that ' seeing ' a cow and ' seeing ' something which is ' the truth ' of a theorem must be construed as *sharing smnething* in addition to being spelled the same way. In actual use, however, this is not the case: physiological and intellectual ' seeing ' are in fact never confused with each other." (my italics] Following Ross it seems to me obvious that these two uses of " see " *are* analogous (though I would agree with Heaney to this extent, that the analogy is a rather *extended* one). Why should anyone deny this? I think in this case it is simply due to a deep prejudice about language which Wittgenstein has exposed, viz., the idea that if a term applies unambiguously in two contexts then there must be some specifiable property (or set of properties) " referred to " by the term in the two cases and which either *is* the meaning of the term or that in virtue of which the term has the meaning it has. If one operates on this erroneous assumption then, of course, one will come to the conclusion that the use of a term which is in fact analogous is equivocal, since one will be unable to discover the single relevant property. That Heaney has made this mistake comes out in his insistence that the two uses of " see " must *share smnething* if the term is to be unequivocal, and in his remark that the second use of "see" does not have as part of its meaning " the physical ability to see "-of course,

[16] J. J. Heaney, "Analogy and "Kinds" of Things," *The Thomist* XXXV, no. (April, 1971), pp.

[17] J. F. Ross, "A Response to Mr. Heaney," *ibid*, pp. 305-11.

[18] I. M. Bochenski, "On Analogy," Albert Menne, ed., *Logico-Philosophical Studies* (Dordccht-Holland D. Reidel, pp. 97-117.

it does not since the two uses are (only) analogous. The only reason there could be for Heaney making this remark at all would have to be based on the mistaken presupposition that *either* the two uses have this in common *or* the term is ambiguous.

It might be objected that, after all, I have not presented any *theory* of analogy (even less of meaning in general) which shows that Heaney's contention is incorrect; I've simply suggested that it is based on an erroneous assumption about language and appealed to our " intuitions" about the meaningfulness of terms (not intuitions in any metaphysical sense but rather beliefs based on our observation of how the language we use actually works). This is correct though I think real ex., amples do show that the relevant assumption is only a prejudice. I will now attempt some brief comments on the idea of a *theory* of analogy.

The view I wish to defend is, quite bluntly, that one type of theory of analogy is impossible, and that attempts to construct theories of this sort are based on the erroneous presuppositions discussed above. The type of theory I mean is the sort where an attempt is made to delineate some set of properties which all analogous usages have in common. *Given that analogy is itself analogous such an enterprise is bound to fail.* Even Bochenski's very valuable contribution to this problem seems to suffer to some extent from this assumption, for his fundamental idea appears to be that if two relational terms are analogous they must have the *same formal properties.* This may be a correct and important point about analogy but it is equally important to note [19] that (1) the formal properties of the analogous terms cannot be construed as the *meaning* of those terms; (2) having identical formal properties may be a necessary condition of two terms (strictly: two usages of the same term) being analogous but it is certainly not a *sufficient* condition (e. g., " larger than " and " is more spiritual than"

[10] This is in no sense intended as a criticism of Bochenski's work but only of certain ideas which it might erroneously be thought to entail.

have the same formal properties but they do not appear to be analogous in any interesting sense). Thus (as I think Bochenski would allow) although his formal analysis throws a good deal of light on the problem of analogy, it does not constitute a theoretical explanation of it.

Another example is this. Following Bochenski and others one might be tempted to explain analogy in terms of a "continuum of meaning." The latter phrase is ambiguous but one account of it is the following. For our purposes here let us suppose that the identity relation is relative.[20] This really comprises two theses which have been called by Wiggins[21] the D-thesis, viz., that if two "things" are identical they must be identical with respect to some substantival concept, i. e., some general substantival concept (like "gold" or "sodium"); "a = b" must mean "a f b" where f is an abbreviation for and the R-thesis (relativity thesis) that a may be identical with b relative to one concept and not relative to another. Let us allow that both these theses are true (Wiggins himself argues only for the truth of the first). Let A1 A2 . . . An be second-order properties of terms (analogous and otherwise), f and f stand for relational and non-relational terms, "=" be identity and "= a" be, 'is analogous to.' Then one of Bochenski's points could be put in this way: if "f = af1" is true then it must be true that "f A' f1" and "f A. f1" etc. are true where A1 and A2 etc. represent second-order formal properties. We might then be tempted to generalize this. In the case of pure univocation we have:

$$(VA) \quad (f \underset{A}{=\!=} f1)$$

i.e., the criteria for the application of f and f1 (which would usually represent the same *word)* are exactly the same in all contexts. In the case of less than pure equivocation we have:

[20] P. T. Geach has argued for this position in his paper "Identity," *Review* of *Metaphysics* (September, 1967), Vol. XXI, pp. S-12.

[01] David Wiggins, *Identity and Spatia-Temporal Continuity* (Oxford: Basil BlackWell, 1967).

but we also have $(3An)\ (f \underset{An}{>"} f^{1})$

Then as we move further down the scale we have cases where the two usages have fewer and fewer second-order properties in common-these are the analogous usages-until we finally reach pure equivocation:

$-(3A)\ (fA\ f^{1})$

Even were this correct it would provide no *precise* way of distinguishing analogical from equivocal usages, but in any case it suffers from the above mentioned defect for it reduces to an attempt to explain " analogous similarity" in terms of a (higher-level) identity *with respect to some property.* And we have already seen that f and f^{1} can be analogous without this similarity being explicable in terms of any identical property.

In general, given that analogy is analogous, it appears that any general theory of analogy is likely to fail since any account of the relevant similarity relation will be either too schematic (and thus not really *explain* anything) or fallaciously attempt to isolate some single property of the relation. The proper conclusion seems to be simply that analogy is *sui generis.*[22] (I hasten to add that this conclusion must necessarily be tentative since it is impossible to show that every *type* of explanation must fail.)

It is undoubtedly possible to give *particular* accounts of particular analogous usages (as Aquinas does of " healthy "), but it is difficult to see how one could ever give a complete *list* of types of analogy, although this does not seem to be precluded in principle, as is a general account in terms of a single set of properties.

•• Cf. one of John E. Thomas's conclusions in his paper, "On The Meaning of 'Analogy is Analogous'." *Theologique et Philosophique* (Laval), Vol. XXII, 1966, no. 1, pp. 73-79. On p. 79 Professor Thomas says, "... clearly what stands in the way of specifying the meaning of ' analogy is analogous ' is the failure to solve the problem of the *ratio communis* of analogous expressions." If my own view is correct, there simply *is* no *ratio communis.*

m

So far I hope to have established that (a) Aquinas held in effect that various types of analogy of attribution are the ones which have application in religious contexts, and that this position i$ correct (if analogy can be used at all in such contexts); (b) that in ordinary contexts analogical usage is acceptable and, indeed, unavoidable, but (c) there does not now exist nor is it likely that there ever will exist some theory of meaning which will explain analogical usage. There remain some special problems about the use of analogical terms in theological contexts that I would like to briefly discuss. The standard general problem is that the rerp.oteness of God makes it unclear as to whether the application of our terminology to God retains any content at all; more specifically, it is said, for example, that God is wise but in different sense from that in which (say) Socrates is wise, so we seem to have a piece of equivocation. There is undoubtedly a certain (probably unavoidable) lack of clarity here since, as Aquinas says, we do not have any insight in this life into God's *esse,* but given that (b) and (c) above are correct we can at least make the following negative remark. Since there is no objection to analogical usage in general, the onus appears to be on the objector to show why this particular analogical extension is unacceptable (as one might explain why the term " neurotic " cannot even be applied analogically to an amoeba). Further, given (c) there can be no theoretical logically conclusive grounds for rejecting the intelligibility of theological language (as, for instance, the logical positivists claimed) • As an example consider " good." The descriptive content of good derives from the class of things to which the term is applied [28] (e. g., a good cat is sleek, friendly etc.; a good proof is original, perspicuous). Leaving aside for the moment the fact that God is the Exemplar of goodness, it presumably follows that the word " good " in application to God

••on this point seeP. T. Geach, "Good and Evil," *Analysis,* Vol. 17 (1956), pp. 88-42.

gets its sense from God's nature. Of this as such we have no knowledge, but we have some knowledge of God's "actions" from Revelation, or, to a lesser extent natural theology (for those who believe it yields any results) or in some cases from personal religious experience.[24] It is this, at least in part, which must give " good " its content. Such a content must of necessity be incomplete, but it need not be any more imprecise than the knowledge we can be said to have of a person some of whose actions we are familiar with but whom we do not know very well. This gives the appearance of a " meaning gap "[25] which can be bridged only by belivers, a notion which is not obviously intelligible: how, for instance, can a person *try* to believe what he can only understand *if* he believes. I think it is just partly true and partly false that there is such a gap, and I shall not try to elaborate on this as D. Z. Phillips has already done so,[26] except to point out that the unbeliever can sensibly be said to understand *what it is* (in part) that the believer believes in order to give his analogical predications substance, without himself believing those things.

There is a second, more difficult, problem about analogical predication, in religion. This stems from the fact that God is said to be the paradigm of goodness, wisdom, truth, etc. From this it would appear that the primary sense of such terms is given in their application to God (as Aquinas says) and that their application to temporal things is somehow derivative. This is paradoxical to say the least: since we have no knowledge of God's nature, to say that the paradigm of the use of " good " is in application to God appears to be the worse sort of mumbo jumbo. But this problem is not insurmontable. There are perfectly ordinary cases where we learn to correctly use analogous terms without realizing that there even

•• Cf. Donald F. Duclow, "Pseudo-Diouysius, John Scotus Eriugena, Nicholas of Cusa: An Approach to the Hermeneutic of the Divine Names," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. XII, no. (June, pp.

[25] I owe this expression to Brian Calvert.

· •• D. Z. Phillips, "Religious Beliefs and Language Games," *Ratio,* (1970), pp.

is any primary application of the tenn (e. g., good as used in non-theological contexts). Consider for example" proof." One may begin by using this tenn (correctly) in application to very imprecise examples, then (say) in application to simple truth-functional examples, to mathematical ones, to meta-logical ones, and finally realize that there is no realized limit to how "good " a proof can be.[27] We thus understand a hierarchy of perfection with respect to proofs and the idea of a paradigm without any *exact* idea of what the paradigm would be like (I do not mean that *here* we are forced to say that a paradigm exists); so, again, there does not seem to be grounds for a general, theoretical objection to such an idea being used in theological contexts.

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•7 Cf. Iris Murdoch on the idea of perfection in *The Sovereignty of Good* (London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).

BOOK REVIEWS

Aristotle: .A Contemporary .Appreciation. By HENRY B. VEATCH. ton, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1974. Pp. $7.95 cloth, paper.

While this book is addressed primarily to those students of philosophy who have read, but have not seriously studied Aristotle, it is also a book from which much can be learned even by those more familiar the Philosopher. One reason for this is the point of view from which Aristotle is presented. Being one of those rare Aristotelians nowadays who is thoroughly knowledgeable of contemporary analytic philosophy, Prof. Veatch is in a position to show how Aristotelianism can be a " live option " in philosophy today. And this he does by arguing that Aristotle's appeal to "common sense " is, as Veatch puts it, " an antidote to the alienations of both modern science and and modern philosophy." Thus, in being shown how and in what senses Aristotle holds his own vis a vis contemporary philosophy, even the expert in Aristotle can, by reading Veatch's book, gain a new appreciation of "the master of those who know."

Dubbing Aristotle as " the philosopher of common sense," i. e., the philosopher who goes by the axiom that what most men most of the time take to be true is likely to be true in fact, Veatch goes on to show in succeeding chapters how this principle of common sense guides Aristotle's thought in his physics, ethics, metaphysics, and logic. Veatch's theme throughout is that, in contrast with the kind of program Aristotle offers us in these areas, the world presented to us by contemporary philosophy and science is a " world that humanly and commonsensically we simply cannot live in."

Beginning then with Veatch's account of Aristotle's physics, we find the author rightly unfolding Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes in the context of change or becoming. Veatch not only shows how Aristotle's view of change is an answer to the Heraclitean, Parmenidean, and Zenonian views on the same subject but, what is more intriguing and important for what he is about, he also contrasts Aristotle's view of causality with the modern view of causality stemming from Hume. Specifically, Veatch points out that, unlike modern and contemporary philosophers, Aristotle held that an efficient cause and its effect are simultaneous, so that for Aristotle it is not true to say that a cause *precedes* its effect in time. This temporal separation of an effect from its cause in modern philosophy has, Veatch suggests, precluded any explanation as to just *why* a certain event B follows another event A. As Veatch puts it: ". . . Substitute for this notion of

causation the one of a cause as preceding its effect, and there is no way in which there can be either any causal action on anything or anything for the cause to act upon. Rather, when the effect comes into being, the cause will already have ceased to be. Hence there is no way in which an efficient cause can any longer be thought of as acting upon something so as actually to bring about its proper effect with the result that the whole panoply of efficient, material, formal, and final causes simply goes out the window." (pp. 58-54)

Turning next to Aristotle's philosophy of animate and human beings Veatch concentrates on Aristotle's account of knowledge. First he attributes to Aristotle the following realistic dicta: (1) that things in the world are what they are independently of our attitudes toward or opinions about them, and that despite the errors to which we are prone, we human beings are capable of knowing things as they are in themselves. Accepting knowledge as a fact, Aristotle explains how that fact is possible. In showing how he does this, Veatch discusses knowledge, as he did causality, in the context of change. Knowledge and physical change both involve the reception of form by something that is in potency to that form. The difference between these two changes is that whereas something's receiving the form of red involves its actually becoming red, my coming to know red does not involve my actually becoming red. The reason for the difference can only be that in the latter as opposed to the former case, the form red is not received into matter but rather into some non-material potency. In other words, our cognitive faculties are not material either in the sense of being (primary) matter or a composite of form and matter (a body). Now since Veatch treats Aristotle's account of knowledge in the context of change and the four causes, the question naturally arises as to what the efficient cause is of, say, my coming to know the nature of a tree. How is it that the forms of things which exist in a particular way in objects come to be received without matter in the intellect? It is on this question that Aristotle's celebrated notion of the agent intellect is brought to bear, according to Veatch. Finally, Veatch raises a difficulty against Aristotle's view of the human soul which appears irresolvable. Veatch asks whether Aristotle is really being consistent in holding both that the human soul is the form of the body and also that a part of it (the agent intellect) survives death. It is difficult to understand how Aristotle can uphold both these theses at once. Nor does Veatch offer any escape-route for Aristotle on this crucial point. To all appearances, at least, Aristotle must either abandon his view that the soul is the form of the body or else deny that a man can in any sense survive death.

Moving on to Chapter IV entitled "Varieties of Human Achievement" we find Veatch presenting a brief summary of the key elements in Aristotle's ethics, politics, poetics, and the arts. As regards the ethics, Veatch ·shows how Aristotle's' penchant for common sense prevents him **'from**

expousing either an *a priori* ethics on the one hand or a moral nihilism on the other. From the fact that we sometimes are not sure which is the better course to follow in a moral situation it does not follow, as Sartre would say, that there is no objective moral knowledge at all. On the other hand, while there are certainly moral principles for Aristotle, it is fruitless to say that simply by knowing these principles one will have sure knowledge of what we ought to do in concrete moral situations. For example, Aristotle would say that the proposition " Happiness consists in the exercise of both moral and intellectual virtues " is universally and necessarily true. Yet, just how these virtues are to be exercised and just what counts as being virtuous in a given concrete situation is not something which can either be deduced from such a principle or which can always be known for certain.

Aristotle's metaphysics is the subject matter of Chapter V. Here Veatch distinguishes between Aristotle's metaphysics from his ontology. The concern of the latter was for Aristotle, as it is today, with the question of what things may be said to be ultimately real or what things exists in the most basic sense of the term. Aristotle answers that what in the strict sense exists is (1) what exists independently and (2) what is individual and particular. In other words, what really *is* is substance. Yet, if these be the criteria for substance, it appears that neither matter nor form can be called substance. For matter is neither independent nor individual and form, while perhaps individual, is surely not independent, unless, of course, it be a Platonic form. But there are also difficulties with identifying substance with the composite of form and matter. For whereas such a composite satisfies the criterion of independence in one sense, it does not satisfy that criterion in another sense. Whereas composites of form and matter do not exist in something as attributes exist in them, they are nonetheless *dependent* on form and matter as a composite is dependent on its elements.

As regards Aristotle's metaphysics (as opposed to his ontology) Veatch locates the focus of attention of this discipline, not so much on being, *qua* being in the sense of what something must be or have to be a being, but in the sense of the most perfect being. In a few lucid and closely reasoned pages (pp. 148-150) Veatch unfolds Aristotle's argument to show that there must be at least one agent or efficient cause which is pure act. Here Veatch shows how Aristotle concludes from the fact that change is eternal that not every efficient cause is changed *qua* cause, from a state of potency to a state of act.

Finally, in this chapter Veatch takes up the claim that Aristotle's metaphysics is double-visioned. Concretely, is the subject matter of metaphysics for Aristotle that which makes a being a being or is it the most perfect being a God? Veatch's answer is that for Aristotle metaphysics has to do primarily with the most perfect, fully actual being and by *pros*

hen equivocation with all other beings, since, to the extent that it is actual, every being but God depends on Pure Act to be. So it can be said that metaphysics for Aristotle is primarily about Actuality itself and secondarily about those things which are a composite of act and potency.

The final chapter deals with Aristotle's logic. Here, to a greater degree than elsewhere, Veatch contrasts Aristotle with modern and contemporary thinkers. The basic difference between Aristotle and modern logicians is that, while the latter do not use logic to gain an understanding of the world, the former sees logic as an instrument for disclosing what and why things are. This difference in turn accounts for the difference in the semantics between Aristotlelian and modern logic. No longer, for example, are all propositions cast in the subject-predicate form and no longer is the syllogism considered by itself an adequate mold into which all arguments can be put. And the reasons for these changes is that for contemporary logicians the disclosure of what things are in themselves and why they are the way they are is in nowise the function of either logic itself or the logic of scientific discovery in our own day and age. Rather, Veatch suggests, modern logic and science has taken a " transcendental turn " according to which logical forms and patterns are imposed by us on being in order that we may organize, calculate, and predict things with accuracy and efficiency. And so these same logical structures become instruments of knowing not what and why things really are but how we must understand them to be if we are to successfully organize, control, and predict phenomena.

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The Recovery of the Sacred. By JAMES HITCHCOCK. New York: The Seabury Press, 1974. Pp. 187. $6.95.

The Recovery of the Sacred is an expression of the anguish felt by a great number of Roman Catholics in the face of a profound sense of loss. For them, the liturgical renewal of the Roman Church has not brought with it a deepening of the richness of the corporate prayer of the Church but rather its impoverishment. There is no question that James Hitchcock's work is an articulate and often moving commentary on the state of affairs in present-day parochial liturgy in countless Roman Catholic parishes. That situation is a cause for concern to other Christians for whom the liturgical tradition of the Church has been known and lived as a great sign of the unity of the Church at all times and in all places in a common prayer which cuts through divisions of time and place. Hitchcock's com-

ments are not to be dismissed as the ranting of a reactionary who has failed to sense the need for reform; rather, his book is the thoughtful expression of a person who is quite well informed about what the liturgical movement set out to accomplish, is basically in accord with its principles, and yet is pained to see how its development has gone awry. The chief complaint of the present reviewer is not that Hitchcock's criticisms are wrong-headed, but rather that he does not see the situation in the right perspective and thus places the blame in the wrong quarters. This will immediately appear as special pleading, because Hitchcock plaees much of the blame on the liturgists who, he feels, perpetrated the situation. He is not alone in this attitude: shortly before his death, the previous Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, said in an interview that the liturgists are the true enemy of the Church today. The reviewer, who· is a liturgist as well as a priest of the Episcopal Church who completed his doctoral studies at the lnstitut Catholique in Paris and is currently Professor of Liturgics in an Episcopal seminary, begs to differ. For the most part, those who have been trained in liturgy and sacraments are as concerned about the present state of pastoral liturgy as any in the Church. Since Hitchcoek himself admits the sound quality of the principles of liturgical reform expressed in the *Constitution on the Liturgy* of Vatican II, the problem must be seen not as one of a working out of false principles but rather the inadequate implementation of principles which were themselves valid.

Where, then, is blame to be placedP The issue is dazzlingly complex because the excitement of a more open attitude toward reform which flowed from Vatican II faced all persons with liturgical authority with a new responsibility: how could the new principles best be put into effect in the corporate prayer life of the Church? Inevitably, mistakes were made in implementation, and in these liturgists must share the blame with many others of good intention but inadequate practical experience. The liturgical norms had been fixed for so long-and this was as much a problem for Anglicans as it was for Roman Catholics-that :no one realized that we had taken our liturgical treasures for granted. Not only had changes necessary for pastoral reasons not been undertaken, but the liturgical tradition itself had not been studied critically: most priests simply said the appointed words and did the appointed rubrics; they did not have any substantial formation in the underlying dynamics of the tradition which they were celebrating. Faced with change, the response was one of panic in many cases. If the need for change was recognized, many well-intentioned clergy implemented new rites with much good will but little. awareness of how they should be done except, it was assumed, with all the old norms swept away. Those for whom the liturgical tradition was the living center of personal devotion were faced with the loss of an essential treasure; the response could only be one of resentment and pain.

To say these things is to begin to see where the problem really lay, and that was with the character of seminary formation in liturgy and sacraments. In Episcopal seminaries, the study of liturgy was usually approached within the department of historical studies; that is, liturgy was understood as essentially a type of Christian archaeology seen through the development of liturgical rites and with much attention given to their historical context. This was particularly important for Anglicans since our Book of Common Prayer is so significantly grounded in our whole self-consciousness. (In ecumenical meetings, Roman Catholics are so often struck by the degree of emphasis placed by Anglicans upon history; this flows quite naturally out of the character of our seminary formation.) In the Roman tradition, on the other hand, liturgical and sacramental matters were very often treated as a department of Canon Law; in other words, the important thing in the formation of a future priest was that he know what is requisite for validity in his celebration of the sacraments of the Church. Both these perspectives-historical context and canonical validity-are, of course, important; but if they are, either of them, the dominant perspective through which one is formed for liturgical ministry in the Church, their inadequacies are dangerous in terms of what seems to be the true place of liturgy and sacraments in the life of the Church. All liturgy in the end must be pastoral liturgy, that is, all liturgy is the living prayer of a particular community of Christians at a particular place and time. The community does not gather to celebrate a museum piece but rather to pray as the gathered family of God. This perspective gives a heavy theological importance to the worship of the Church: it is the sacramental expression of what the Church is; the local community at prayer constitutes the Church.

To point the finger at the problem of seminary training, however, does not bring easy solutions to the present situation. Men trained to understand the liturgy as the fulfillment of the prescribed rubrics, as was the case with so many Roman Catholic priests, were ill-prepared to implement the freer liturgical norms which have emerged since Vatican II. One choice for them was to carry over all the old rubrical pattern {as, for example, the rather elaborate sequence of gestures which accompanied the Roman Canon) and to superimpose it upon the new rites. This solution violates the integrity of the new rites in that it fails to recognize the essential integrity necessary to the union of word and gesture. The alternative was, in the absence of precise rubrical specifications, to understand the new rites as requiring no norms of celebration whatever. This solution fails to recognize the essentially conservative character necessary to liturgical reform if it is not to undermine the very nature of liturgical tradition itself. It is in this latter regard that one sees so well the confusion of the present situation, for on one side the liturgists and sacramental theologian.s were viewed as dangerous radicals for proposing any changes at all; then,

from the other perspective, they were held by others to have failed in their work by not going far enough. When liturgists are accused both of being too radical and of being too conservative, the answer may be that their critics have not seen the problems dealt with in their total perspective. The pastoral imperatives as well as the recovery of a richer liturgical theology demanded change in numerous aspects of liturgical expression. But if one is to speak of liturgy at all, one is speaking of a conservative dimension of the Church's life-an element of continuity and tradition. It has proved to be the case that it is far easier to deepen our understanding of the value of a liturgical tradition which has become fossilized than to reject that tradition, recognize its loss, and then attempt to recover its meaning.

Roman Catholics would be wise to profit from an Anglican perspective from history: our debate with the Puritans was essentially on a conservative point in liturgical prayer, namely, whether or not fixedformsofthetradition might be used in public prayer. The Puritan rejection of the fixed forms of the Book of Common Prayer led eventually to their separation from the Anglican Church; yet today, much of the apologetic for the value of a liturgical tradition comes from the pens of writers coming out of the non-conformist tradition. As Hitchcock recognizes, values lost are regained, if at all, at enormous cost. The situation which his book delineates is in fact a recurring phenomenon within the history of Christian worship. The only adequate answers are those which see the Church's worship grounded in a healthy awareness of what the Church is; choices based on any other consideration will tend to emphasize the concerns of the present or the preservation of the past, and fail to recognize the marvelous interrelation of the two.

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Process and Permanence in Ethics: Max Scheler's Moral Philosophy by ALFONS DEEKEN. New York, N. Y.: Paulist Press, 1974. Pp. fl91. *$5.95.*

The year 1974 marks the first centenary of the birth of the erratic genius Max Scheler (1874-1928). Introductions to the thought, work, and influence of Max Scheler tend to repeat a number of exhuberant cliches about his personal genius, the seminal character of his work, and the many areas of contemporary thought which continue to feel his influence. In· the eleven-page Introduction to *Process and Permanence in Ethics* Alfons Deeken repeats this litany. But the other nine chapters of the book are an admirable presentation of Scheler's ethical thought. Perhaps a

corner has been turned. Introductions to Scheler in English are no longer necessary, such as the 1965 book *Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction* by Manfred Frings (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965.) We can now move forward, confidently, with genuinely substantial works on Scheler in English.

The careful, scholarly editing of Scheler's text is being ably carried out by Manfred Frings, who has assumed editorship of the *Gesammelte Werke* from his post at DePaul University in Chicago. At the same time, Frings is overseeing the English translation of Scheler's major works, including the formidable *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik.* Therefore, the basic homework on Scheler's thought is still being carried out.

But a new and exciting development seems to be occurring in English works on Scheler. Students of Scheler, with a true sense of scholarly fidelity, but yet with a genius and imagination of their own, are now able to give fresh, tantalizing constructions of Scheler's thought in English. It is like Maritain giving us Saint Thomas. Arthur Luther's book, *Person in Love: A Study of Max Scheler's Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, is an excellent example of this new genre. *Process and Permanence in Ethics: Max Scheler's Moral Philosophy* by Alfons Deeken is the most recent example. This is not an " introduction " ; this is not simply a careful textual chronological, critical analysis of Scheler's thought. The book is a positive reconstruction of all the broad bold lines of Scheler's ethical thought into a living synthesis, the likes of which Scheler himself never lived to see.

The great Schelerian themes are here: the ontological status and hierarchical ranking of values, the historical character of value comprehension, " resentment," repentance, love, ideal model persons, and the approaching "era of harmonization." On the whole, Deeken is able to present these themes, so enticing but so tangled in Scheler's corpus, as clearly and as faithful to Scheler's thought as most any exposition available. Deeken's book has two major advantages. It wields these themes into a single unified account, so that a fairly consistent, almost practical piece of moral philosophy emerges. Therefore, students can study Deeken's book simply as moral philsophy. As a matter of fact they will discover here many, if not most, of Scheler's most fundamental and widely influential ideas. Yet *Process and Permanence in Ethics* is a work of genuine moral philosophy. Students, reviewers, and critics of ethical theory may not find the book wholly convincing nor completely satisfactory as a unified, well-grounded and consistent theory of ethics, but they should find it refreshing and stimulating.

Secondly, Deeken's contribution in *Process and Permanence in Ethics* is to include the best Schelerian scholarship and correction to the various themes of the book. All the later chapters give not only a positive ex-

position of Scheler's ideas from his own works but a critique and a correction or a further application of the themes by such significant contemporary thinkers as Bernard Haring, Karl Rahner, Johannes Grlindel, Manfred Frings, and Johannes Hessen. This gives a certain rounded-out effect to each chapter and to the book as a whole. Many authors never get over the student-dissertation habit of giving a small piece of exposition with a large piece of purely personal, individualized critique. Alfons Deeken is beyond that. To read *Process and Permanence in Ethics* is like attending a first night Broadway production and then spending the next whole day with the drama critics. One is still free to like or dislike the work, but he feels re-assured that he has discussed its merits (or de-merits} with competent people. Deeken is not neutral: he feels strongly that Scheler's moral philosophy has many valuable contributions to make to contemporary ethical theory. He uses secondary sources to support and to extend Scheler's insights. He does this with careful reading and notation of primary sources and a valuable selected but up-to-date thirteen page bibliography of secondary sources. It was a bold (and, it is to be hoped, successful) decision of Paulist Press to publish a book as substantial as this.

While Deeken's *Process and Permanence in Ethics* can be strongly recommended for its many strengths, with all good grace, some weaknesses can be pointed out. First of all, the title itself is somewhat misleading. *Process* connotes too strongly "process philosophy " and suggests many things not part of Scheler's thought. Five chapters of the book use directly the word *history,* and this is more faithful to Scheler's ideas. How can one discover a catchy, selling title which does justice to the content of the book? "Absolute values in Historical Context? " " The Historical Character of What is Permanent in Ethics? "

After 1922 Scheler's theism (and Catholicism) gave away to a kind of anthropantheism by which man is the locus of God becoming aware of Himself. The debate continues whether this meant a radical break by Scheler from his earlier views or if his later position was a more-or-less natural evolution and extension of his permanent basic metaphysical positions. Deeken sidesteps this very important issue all to easily. " Since most of Scheler's ethical writings originated during the fertile second period [of his life] this study will concentrate primarily on the philosophy of this middle period. Even in his later period, Scheler never retracted the basic moral insights of his middle years." (p. 7) This book alone reveals that Deeken is far to good a Schelerian scholar to think that such a position can go unchallenged.

Chapter IV," Kairos-The Demand of the Present Hour," is perhaps an important chapter to make the book a unified piece of moral philsophy. But the chapter (small as it is) is by self-admission on shaky ground to prove that the kairos concept is either original or fundamental to Scheler

himself. If, as the sub-title indicates, the book is meant to be *Max Scheler's Moral Philosophy*, then one may wonder why the concept of kairos need be introduced so dramatically.

Finally, the author's personal background prompts him at times to make applications to Oriental thought and especially to Japanese literacy and social conditions. This adds a dash of spice which is a novelty to Schelerian studies, but in a work so traditional and scholarly as this the Oriental references seem almost out of place. The very last three pages of the book conclude with comments on Japan and The Third World. Yet in the harmonization of the Apollonian and Dionysian man through a re-sublimation of the life-force Deeken fails to use Marcuse's ideas in *Eros and Civilization* which is much more widely known and more closely proximates Scheler's ideas.

But one ought not cavil. *Process and Permanence in Ethics* by Alfons Deeken is far to good for that. The book should initiate anew the great perennial questions of ethics: how can moral values be absolute and unchanging in a sociologically conditioned historical context? Is love or knowledge primary? Can ethics be grounded on anything but God and the Holy? In discussions such as these (Deeken's book informs us) the genius of Scheler has much to contribute.

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The Edges of Language. By PAUL VAN BUREN. New York: Macmillan, 1972. Pp. 178. $5.95 & $2.95.

In the last ten years a number of writers have attempted to apply the arguments and linguistic insights of the later Wittgenstein to Christian discomse. Perhaps the best-known examples. are D. Z. Phillips' *The Concept of Prayer* [1] and W. E. Hordem's *Speaking of God.*[2] Paul van Buren's *The Edges of Language* [3] is the latest in this genre.

Van Buren sets out to understand religious discourse in the Christia:'l tradition by relying on Wittgenstein. He presents (in Chapter Three) a fairly adequate account of Wittgenstein's view of He sets about applying this to his task in Chapter 4 by recognizing the key role of " God " in religious discourse and formulating the question: " What is the contemporary Christian doing when he uses the word ' God ' as he does? " (p. 76) He then puts forward his main thesis: that religious discourse "... lies along the edges of our language .... " (p. 76)

[1] D. Z. Phillips, *The Concept of Prayer* (London: Routledge, 1965).
[9] W. E. Hordern, *Speaking of God* (New York: MacMillan, 1964).
[8] Paul Van Buren, *The Edges of Language* (New York: MacMillan, 197!l).

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the notion of the edges of language and put forward humor (punning), love-talk, poetry, and metaphysics as examples of speaking at the edges of language. In Chapter 7 he argues that speaking at the edge of language is of the essence of religion, and in Chapter 8 he argues that the answer to the above question is that "... the word 'God' functions as the decisive boundary marker at the edge of [religious] language ...." (p. 131)

As students of Wittgenstein are well aware, his later work can be dynamite. In the wrong hands the arguments and insights found there can result in disaster. Anyone wishing to "... work out ... the implications for Christian theology of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* ..." (preface) had better have a lengthy immersion in post-war Anglo-American philosophy if he is to handle Wittgenstein satisfactorily, and not just because his writing is enigmatic-like any other philosopher, he was sometimes wrong on fundamental issues. Background is especially important where one is directing one's work at those who have little acquaintance with his philosophy. The latter may feel intimidated when Wittgenstein is called forth to support a writer's position, so the writer has an extra responsibility in this situation. Unfortunately there are more than a few indications in this book that the author has not lived up to it. A passage .on pages 32 and 33 (virtually duplicated in pp. 72, 73) is typical.

Van Buren is arguing against the idea of propositional revelation. He asks, "If God were to speak how could we know it?" (p. 32) He argues first that "since he is utterly other than men, we cannot understand him, for we understand only human language. . . ." Even granting that God speaks as a voice from the clouds, his different nature does not necessarily preclude his uttering words in a human language. He is, after all, considered to be omnipotent and his speaking and our understanding might be a miracle.

Van Buren presents a Wittgenstein-like argument against this: ". . . if we understand by a miracle, this understanding is radically unlike what we call understanding." (pp. 32, 33) But why must the understanding be "radically unlike" normal understanding simply because its *cause* is abnormal? We can come to understanding by a variety of means. The argument has force if we take God to be speaking in a non-human language, but we need not accept this. The third argument is prefaced by a recognition that God would have to speak in a human language if we are to understand him. But he argues that "Understanding presupposes using language as we do, which involves behaving as we humans behave ... [God] would have to be an exceedingly human God." (p. 33) Here van Buren has fallen foul of an unclarity in Wittgenstein's work. The latter does not always observe the distinction between understanding a speaker and understanding what his words mean. Understanding God's words does

not entail understanding God. The recipient of revelation need only assume that God can say what he means. Van Buren seems to have in mind Wittgenstein's enigmatic remark that "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him." [4] *(Philosophical Investigations,* p. *flfl3)* It is generally agreed that Wittgenstein was thinking of a lion who uttered sentences in German or English, but whose behavior did not correspond to what we associate with these utterances. Without some behavioral regularities associated with utterances we cannot learn the" language" of a speaker, and doubtless the behavior repertoire of the lion would not enable us to learn to speak with him. There would not be enough regularity for us. But, of course, if the lion utters words in our language we understand what it *says* well enough. But we are in the dark about what it *means.*

Much of the force of these arguments of van Buren's depends on conceiving God's utterances as like ours physically. Few Christians would take this naive view. Wittgenstein himself recognized a fundamental difference when he said "You can't hear God speak to someone else, you can hear him only if you are being addressed." [5] *(Zettel,* para. 717)

There is not space here to scrutinize the arguments of the book in detail. The " linguistic-analysis " tone of the book makes it seem dated, and the non-philosopher particularly will find the phraseology irritating at times. For example, we are told that " To be part of this Christianity community is to talk in a certain way . . . . " (p. 69) Most Christians would prefer (to put it mildly) to say that it is a matter of what one takes to be true.

This example points to carelessness in the use of the term " rule." He says that most of us ". . . have ruled out speaking of witchcraft and black magic as explanations for human behaviour . . . . " (p. 69) In one sense we have, but if someone tries to explain behavior in these terms he is not breaking a *linguistic* rule.

This carelessness infects his characterization of speaking at the edges of language. Sometimes the edge metaphor is applied to the points at which the " . . . rules which govern the employment of . . . expressions . . . " (p. 79) in a sentence result in our approaching nonsense when we try to say something not easily said. Here the metaphor seems reasonably appropriate.

However, van Buren also has something different in mind sometimes. In taking love-talk as an example he says: "Persons in love use words wildly or loosely. They say such things as ' I love you more than all the world.' 'The stars in heaven cannot be compared to you'." (pp. 103, 4) These examples seem to be simple cases of exaggeration, and the very fact that they can be seen to be speaks for their having clear literal

• L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1958).

[6] L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel,* G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright eds., G. E. M. Anscombe trans. (Univ. California Press, 1967).

meaning. Yet van Buren insists that "To call this exaggeration is too weak and misses the point." (p. 104) These examples are supposed to qualify as speaking at the edges of language because they are attempts "... to say the most that is possible...." (p. ISS) But van Buren is confusing stretching truth with stretching sense.

The two characterizations of edge-talk are not the same. Talk verging on nonsense need not involve exaggeration, nor is it obvious that in trying to say the most that can be said one must always approach unintelligibility. Newton's *Principia* is an attempt to say the most that can be said about material object behavior but does not approach nonsense in doing so. Why should theologies, merely because they are trying to do this in another sphere?

Besides presenting these very specific criticisms, I should like to express doubt about van Buren's whole programme, about its appropriateness for the goals chosen. He gives the impression that he is setting out to determine what the status of " God " is and that he is trying to show that the term is not the name of an individual. (see p. 15) His conclusion is that the term is a marker at the edge of language. I fail to see how this is relevant to the question of the logical status of " God," unless one takes " logical status" as roughly equivalent to *raison d'etre* (I think van Buren does think of it in this way, but this is not how philosophers use the expression). Van Buren's findings may increase our understanding of *why* the religious person says the things he does, but they are of little help in understanding *what* he says.

The reason van Buren's program is inappropriate or irrelevant from a philosophical point of view is to be found in the way he states his problem. In asking " What is the contemporary Christian doing when he uses the word 'God' as he does?" {p. 76) he is adopting an approach often taken in the classical period of linguistic philosophy {the 1950's). (It is distinguished by continual talk about " use," and it is this feature that gives van Buren's book an old-fashioned tone.)

The phrase "the use of words " is ambiguous. John Searle, in *Speech Acts;*[6] says that there may be five aspects to any utterance that counts as a speech act: (1) the *utterance* act of uttering the words, either orally or in script, the *illocutionary act,* e. g., asserting, commanding, commending, etc., (S) the *perlocutionary act,* the effect the utterance has on the hearer, e. g., the hearer may be persuaded, inspired, frightened, etc., (4) *referring,* and (5) *predicating.* To this list there could be added an indefinite number of specific actions which a sentence can be said to be used to perform by virtue of its role in story-telling, praying, etc. Someone who utters " What big teeth you have! " can more often than not be

• J. R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

said to be reading a story as well as doing each of the five afore-mentioned things.

Which of these facets of the use of sentences containing the word "God " is most relevant for establishing the logical status of the word? Surely it is the referring and predicating acts. The word is used as a referring expression: is it a proper name or a disguised description, or something else? Various expressions are predicated of it: which ones can be meaningfully predicated? Answering such questions is the process of learning the meaning of the term "God." Van Buren's account of the use of the term comes closest to being an illocutionary account and represents an example of what Searle has called the" speech act fallacy." [7] One commits it when one tries to explain the meaning of a word by identifying some illocutionary act that the word is characteristically involved in. Searle singles out attempts by R. M. Hare and others who try to say something about the meaning of " good " by arguing that it is used to commend.

In *The Secular Meaning of The Gospel* [8] van Buren committed the same fallacy when he adopted " functional equivalence " (p. 156) as a criterion for an interpretation of statements of faith. He says that his "... aim has been to discover the *meaning* of their (the Gospel authors) words and to find appropriate and clear words with which to express that meaning today ...." (p. 156) The statements in question are to be interpreted "... as statements which express, describe, or commend a particular way of seeing the world, other men, and oneself, and the way of life appropriate to such a perspective." (p. 156)

I should have thought that the aim set out above was a good description of what the translators who produced the *New English Bible* were doing. Van Buren's result shows that he is trying to identify the illocutionary (and perhaps perlocutionary) acts performed by the Gospel writers. I do not wish to suggest that this enterprise is of no use or interest, but as a program there are certain technical difficulties it must face:

(1) To identify the illocutionary acts being performed one must know meaning of words used: the sentence meaning partially determines the illocutionary acts possible. For example, the utterance " That fresco is awful " made by someone viewing the Sistine Chapel ceiling can be an act of condemnation or an act of commendation depending on whether " awful " is used in the sense of " reverential wonder " or used as a general pejorative as it tends to be these days. This is the least serious of the three problems.

(2) The first point introduces the speaker's intentions as a factor. In particular there is the problem of whether the speaker intended the sen-

• *Ibid.,* pp. 186-141.

[8] Paul Van Buren, *The Secular Meaning of The Gospel* (New York: MacMillan, 1968).

tence to be taken literally or figuratively. This is an especially crucial question for religious language. When someone I encounter on the street says" Jesus lives!", what am I to make of it? I really have to know what sense he is giving to " live." And, of course, I can ask him. The intentions of the Gospel writers are vastly more difficult to establish.

(3) Even given knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, it happens that a particular utterance can be used to perform more than one illocutionary act at a time. Someone who says" Jesus is Lord" can be asserting something about Jesus *a;nd* announcing his personal allegiance to Christianity *and* "... commending a particular way of seeing the world. . .." Only the speaker could confirm which acts were being performed.

Besides these problems peculiar to illocutionary interpretation, van Buren has a difficulty that arises for any investigator of the use of religious terms: if use is to be the datum, whose use is the correct use? His answer in *The Edge8 of Language* is that of" ... educated Christians in the West in this last third of the twentieth century." (p. 1) In so delineating his user-group he is in obvious danger of " fixing " the result of his enquiry.

Perhaps the motive behind the book is exposed in this passage: "... if 'God' is conceived of as a word uttered when one wants desperately to say the most that is possible . . . then the categories of coherence employed to attack the theist simply do not apply ...." (p. 133) " God," apparently, is not a concept in the center ground of language ". . , in which concepts can be used coherently and incoherently ...," (p. 141) and as such is safe from philosophical attack. The project has been one of securing a safe place for Christian discourse. But van Buren does not seem to notice that a " concept " for which there is no contrast between its coherent and incoherent uses is not a concept at all!

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Heir8 and Ancegtor8. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Volume Six. Edited by JoHN K. RYAN. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1973. Pp. Q91. $15.00.

These ten essays range from Plotinus through Augustine, to Hume, Sartre, and Frankl. The editor himself contributes a study of Vital de Blois' Latin comedy *Gita.* Adding to this richness, B. M. Bonansea traces the history of the ontological argument at the 'hands of both proponents and opponents until the present day in a sixty-page survey and critique. This width of vision is offset by sharply focused studies of Hume's notion

of personal identity by John Driscoll and of interiority in Plotinus by John Kelly.

The editor does not indicate any unifying theme beyond that suggested in the title of this sixth volume in the series: each generation of thinkers is simultaneously heir and ancestor to other ages. Although he does not suggest a nomenclature for our present generation of humanistic philosophers, if this collection is typical we could describe it as concerned with the valuing self, and this in a sense crossing the lines of ethics and epistemology.

In his exploration of the nature of philosophy in Ortega, Felix Alluntis reveals his own concern as much as Ortega's in observing: "... a man philosophizes when he has a living past and in view of a critical situation he has reached." (p. 71) Alluntis claims that Aquinas too admitted this but could not bring himself existentially to the moment of doubt. Perhaps this cohesiveness in the atmosphere of medieval consciousness is the very factor that motivates our present generation of thinkers to look back towards thinkers who do proceed from the underminding moment, some intuition of dissolution in the moment of need. In a sketch of Frankl's stress upon the uniqueness of the human spirit, M. G. Schneider says as much: Frankl's anthropology is not solely the product of his professional work; it is " a personal conviction, deeply felt and unceasingly defended as the most decisive truth of our age." (p. 61) According to Thomas Flynn, Sartre's almost un-noticed concept of the social Third is worthy of attention, and perhaps his singling it out is as significant as the notion itself. To an age looking for authentic selfness Sartre suggests there are but two modes of reaching the self: the grammatical third person singular, or psychological Other, and the first person plural. Flynn extricates Sartre's view that the secret of the latter is the former. Multiplicity is interiorized, i.e., retains subjectivity, solely through the mediation of the Third. Confronted with what Sartre perceives as overwhelming need for group action in a defective world, our French contemporary manages to preserve a realm of freedom for the self precisely through the mediation of the Third. It was a theory developed in the middle decade of the present century, while Sartre was announcing to his descendants: "Social imperatives and individual destiny are a true contradiction; their reconciliation is not obvious." (p. 38)

In an alternate formulation this plight attracts the attention of G. J. Stack. In his essay, "Subjectivity, Facts and Values," Stack enumerates reasons for the invalidity of " a pervasive characteristic ... I have called the empirical ontological." This is the assumption that statements of fact, or world situations, are free of prior valuation. Of course, this is not new ground to break, but Stack's reflections on the issue in terms of Wittgenstein, Quine, Heidegger, and Poincare, are quite fresh. His conclusion: the oft-assumed neutrality of scientific fact is best seen as a Kantian ideal of

reason to which the actual procedure bears an asymptotic relationship. (p. 120)

Throughout the collection the reader is brought to the curious feeling that today's philosophers are drawn to the problem of the self alienated from its world and from an identity it either once knew or longs to know; perhaps both. It is appropriate, then, that John Kelly's essay on interiority in the neglected Plotinus should conclude that no meaningful grasp d reality can be achieved without a vigorous deciphering of the self's spiritual experience. Indeed, if this collection represents today's philosophers at thought, then they do their ancestors credit.

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Il Problema della conoscenza. Filosofia della conoscenza e fondamenti di filosofia della scienza. By GIOVANNI BLANDINO. Rome: Edizioni Abete, 1972. Pp. 474. L. 4000.

Comunione e obbedienza nella liberta. Una dimensione della Chiesa d'oggi. By ANDRE HAYEN. Milano: Editrice Vita e Pensiero, 1973. Pp. 232. L. 3700.

The author of *Il Problema della conoscenza* aims at offering a contribution to Christian philosophical thought in the area of gnoseology. In modern philosophy the gnoseological problem has replaced in many respects the metaphysical. Blandino is well aware of this fact. Moreover, he realizes that the spectacular development and success of modern sciences could not leave untouched the area of the philosopher, though scientific knowledge differs from the philosophical. Having a degree in biology himself, he is very sensitive to this aspect of modern investigation of the gnoseological question. What, in fact, characterizes his method is precisely to tackle the gnoseological problem from two complementary sides: the strictly philosophical and the scientific.

This volume, intended also as a textbook, is divided into two parts: the first deals with the general theory of philosophy of knowledge, the second with the basic problems of scientific knowledge, which is considered as a further development of the philosophy of knowledge.

The author's conception is fundamentally intellectualistic-realistic. He holds that man can know reality and that, in fact, man knows various types of reality in two ways: the subjective reality immediately, and the existence of realities distinct from the subject in a mediate way, that is, by way of induction. His conception is therefore realistic as opposed

to scepticism and phenomenalism, and it is intellectualistic as opposed to sensism.

Blandino has assimilated the aristotelian-thomistic tradition, but he also integrates into it insights of such authors as St. Augustine, Duns Scotus, Suarez, Descartes, Hume, Kant. When he deals with the probablistic theory-and it is worth noting that he insists on showing the probablistic character of a great part of our knowledge-the influence of the neo-posivistic approach is evident. The book, in sum, is an attempt to present classical scholastic philosophy in a constructive dialogue with modern science.

Comunione e obbedienza nella libert?L, a small and yet valuable book, is the translation into Italian of a work originally edited in French under the title "L'obeissance dans l'Eglise d'aujord'hui." The ecclesiological and anthropological shift which we have witnessed in recent years has not seldom led to a re-thinking of the vertical structures of the Church and, as a direct consequence, contributed to a situation of crisis affecting the virtue of obedience. "After Vatican II," the author writes, "it is not possible for me in conscience to hold any longer to the structure of obedience which I have accepted up until yesterday." Hence his attempt to discover the " theological meaning of the obedience that we are called to live today in the Church." He draws his inspiration from St. Thomas, from his master St. Ignatius of Loyola, but he is very sensitive to authors such as the Little Flower and Blondel. A keen awareness of the ecclesiology of Vatican II is also present in these pages.

Hayen rightly, it seems to me, centers his understanding of obedience on a christological basis. The principle originating every kind of obedience in the Church is nothing other than the obedience of Christ. Every obedience within the Christian community is the fulfillment in us of the paschal obedience of Christ. This obedience of Jesus, in turn, is to be seen as the assumption and fulfillment of human obedience. His obedience takes it start from ours, but ours in created in his. If obedience has its basis and its "causa exemplaris "in Christ, its end however is the building, or better, to offer the conditions for the building of the Christian community by God. Thus the christological principle rejoins the ecclesiological.

These sound theological principles are analyzed in the several chapters of the book. First, the author examines the foundation and the meaning of obedience in the structure of natural communities like the family and the polis, what Hayen interprets as " the rise of human obedience toward Christ." This is followed by a reflection on the obedience of Christ. Finally, the most important part of the book, an analysis of the elements, the structure, and the concrete path of obedience in the Church. The author handles in a deep, frank, and suggestive manner such delicate and complex issues as the figure and function of the superior in a community, the role of conscience, and the meaning of law and guidelines.

Hayen's book is both interesting and valuable, contributing to a deeper comprehension of obedience in the Church today. It provides enriching insights, and questions also, for Hayen does not offer easy solutions when they are not possible. The style may not always be easy, but the stimulating substance is there.

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Teologia Del Progresso Delle Realta Spazio-Temporali. By FRANcEsco NERoNE. Rome: Edizione Paoline, Pp.

This work is largely an exploration of the meaning of technological development. It relies heavily upon the teaching of Vati, *m* II, especially as given in *Gaudium et Spes,* and upon recent papal encyclicals, especially *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in terris* of John XA.III and *Populorum Progressio* of Paul VI. Besides recounting the teaching of these documents the author works out a concept and metaphysics of progress which he then situates in a theological context of creation and eschatological consummation.

An introductory chapter sets forth the importance and current interest in the question of scientific and technological development. He then elaborates a particular concept of progress as " guided becoming." After making a series of distinctions and comparisons the author locates the special object of his concern in the changes which man, as free and intelligent, is able to effect in the material world. A mutual openness between man and spatio-temporal realities makes this kind of progress possible. Man's place in creation lays upon him the responsibility to further this progress. For God has created the universe with both the subject and object of progress (man and infra-human material realities) and calls man to bring it about. Confirmation for this view is found in the teaching and example of Jesus, who labored with his hands and yet introduced a supernatural dimension into his work. Progress of this sort has finally an eschatological meaning, since it is related to the ultimate transformation of the material universe.

In spite of the real importance of this theme and in spite of the metaphysics, theology, and documentation which is brought to bear upon it, the actual treatment in this book is finally unsatisfactory. There is a lack of unifying insight which grasps the whole mater from within. The author distinguishes many types of evolution, progress, and development, but he never expresses clearly the unity underlying all of them so as to make his particular consideration luminous in itself and illuminating for other aspects. He sets out some very obvious matters as if they were profound truths, e. g., matter can be affected by human activity (cf. p. 108 ff.). He

never really makes clear from intrinsic reasons why this progress is good and desirable, and how it corresponds to God's creative purpose.

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Jacobus M. Ramirez, O. P., *Opera Omnia.* Tomus I. *De ipsa philosophia in universum.* 2 vols., ed. Victorinus Rodriguez, O. P. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. Instituto de Filosofia 'Luis Vives,' pp. xxxii + 881, with subject index, index of Thomistic citations, and analytical index. 900 pts.

The two volumes here under review, which make up the first tome of the *Omnia Opera* of the distinguished Spanish Dominican and Thomist, Santiago Ramirez (1891-1967), are devoted to a full analysis of philosophy in general, its nature, its component parts, and its distinctive characteristics. The work was begun over fifty years ago and approximately half of the first volume has been published previously, in a series of articles appearing in *La Ciencia Tomista* between 1922 and 1924. The remainder of the first volume and all of the second were written between 1956 and 1958 but have not been published heretofore. Apparently Ramirez wished to revise the manuscript in its entirety before putting the work into print, and indeed set himself to this task in 1966 after he had finished his labors on behalf of the Second Vatican Council. He was able to revise only about fifteen pages before his death, however, and these now appear among the introductory pages of the first volume. The portions of the work that appeared in *La Ciencia Tomista* were translated into Spanish by Jesu Garcia Lopez and published at Madrid in 1954 under the title *Concepto de Filosofia.* The present Latin edition is therefore the first appearance of the work in its complete form.

A superficial examination of the two volumes with their many distinctions and divisions could easily create the impression that this is scholasticism gone wild. The format, the concise Latin expression, the detailed articulation of the treatise into parts, chapters, and articles, and the many schematic diagrams will indeed appear formidable to philosophers who have not had considerable scholastic training. But like all of Ramirez's work, this is a truly exhaustive study of everything St. Thomas Aquinas has to say about philosophy in general, its various fields, and their interrelationships among themselves and with other areas of knowledge. Not only this, but the author ranges back into Greek antiquity for the sources

of Aquinas's thought, and then surveys in detail and with extensive quotation the entire commentatorial and manual traditions, as well as opposing schools of thought, down to the present day. The serious student cannot help but find the resulting work a treasure of information and rewarding insights that bear on recent discussions of the philosophical enterprise as a whole, even despite the fact that it eschews completely the modern idiom and any reference to the contemporary problematic.

Ramirez tells us in his final attempt to reorganize the matter treated in these volumes that he long wondered how to entitle it. His first thought was to call it "The Essence of Philosophy" *(Essentia philosophiae)*, but this he discarded as not broad enough for his purposes, since he wished to discuss not only the nature or essence of philosophy but also its characteristic method. Then he entertained the idea of naming it " The Philosophy of Philosophy" *(Philosophia ipsius philosophiae)*, a title which would enlarge the scope all right but at the price of being too redundant and not properly descriptive. His third choice was lengthier and more prosaic, " On Philosophy Itself, In General" *(De ipsa philosophia in universum)*, but he finally adopted this as accurately portraying his detailed reflection on the nature, division, and method of philosophy, staying merely at a general level and not descending into special problems associated with the various fields into which the discipline is divided. It was his aim from the beginning, of course, to treat such a subject matter according to the mind and spirit of Aristotle and Aquinas, and yet to do so without excluding the thought of others. In this inspiration he acknowledges a debt to Leibniz, who once remarked that having weighed all things he found the philosophy of the ancients to be solid, needing only to be enriched, not destroyed, by that of the moderns.

Part One is about one hundred pages in length and is concerned with various definitions of philosophy, both nominal and real. In elaborating the latter Ramirez first works out several descriptive definitions, some based on the lives and activities of famous philosophers of the past, others on various causes extrinsic to philosophy but nonetheless useful in defining it, e. g., the way in which it develops in the mind of man, the goal or inspiration behind it, and the characteristic abstractive and universal knowledge that produces it. He concludes with a quasi-essential definition, working first inductively through the characteristics of philosophy's various fields, and then deductively, showing how from its end, the complete and final perfection of man as this is naturally possible, can be deduced the essential characteristic that philosophy is human wisdom, containing within itself whatever truth and good man can attain naturally either by thought or by action. He then contrasts the various aspects of his definition with others that have been proposed, showing how these are either reducible to his own or else are incomplete or even false.

Part Two runs over three hundred pages and is concerned with the different fields into which philosophy can be divided. It opens with a historical account of various attempts at classification from antiquity to the Renaissance, and then surveys in detail the schemata of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Gioberti, Comte, Durand, and Globot. Then Ramirez provides his own division, approaching this through an elaborate causal analysis to show the different parts that are required according to the exigencies of final, efficient, formal, and quasi-material causality. Each causal analysis leads to the principal parts being enumerated as logic, mathematics, physics (including psychology) , ethics (including politics), and metaphysics. Having established the quantity or number of the parts, Ramirez then turns attention to their quality, or nature, arguing that as parts they are neither integral nor subjective but rather potential and analogous. It is in establishing the latter conclusion that the author's superb command of analogy comes to the fore and sheds light on a significant problem that, to this reviewer's knowledge, has previously never been discussed with any adequacy in the philosophical tradition. Following this Ramirez discourses on the relationships between the various parts of philosophy, ordering them again according to final, efficient, and exemplary causality, and concluding with a reflection on how all the other parts come to be arranged under metaphysics as first philosophy.

Part Three is the longest, over four hundred pages, and is concerned essentially with philosophical methods in investigation and in teaching and with comparisons of such methods to those of other disciplines. With regard to methods of philosophical investigation Ramirez argues steadfastly for methodological diversity in the various fields; he is particularly critical of those who would endorse either a mathematical or a metaphysical approach to every philosophical problem, the former exemplified by Descartes and the rationalists and the latter by present-day scholastics. With regard to philosophy's order of teaching Ramirez surveys every opinion from the Platonists to Ortega y Gasset, rejects most of the systematic and manualist orderings, and reverts to that taught by Aquinas himself, namely, logic first as a propadeutic, then mathematics, then physics and its extension into psychology, then ethics as subalternated to psychology, and finally metaphysics. The last section of this part examines in special detail the relation of philosophy to theology and the consequences of this for a proper understanding of the expression "Christian philosophy." Ramirez rejects the interpretations of contemporary Thomists such as Maritain and Gilson, using the analogy of Church-State relations in a well-ordered realm to indicate how philosophy must be Christian in its search for the truth just as civil society must be Christian in its pursuit of the good,

On the whole, as seen from this brief sketch of its contents, the work is monumental. Viewed in the context in which it was written and considering the aims of its author, it would be difficult to conceive of a fuller development of the nature and scope of philosophy in general as this can be presented within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. It is only when one considers the work within broader contexts, and particularly when Ramirez's views on philosophy are contrasted with those now current in Northern Europe and on the Anglo-American scene, that the work's limitations become pronounced. In his discussion of method, for example, Ramirez does not even mention analytical and phenomenological methodologies. In a particularly antiquarian way he continues to regard mathematics as a part of philosophy, and by this he does not mean philosophy of mathematics but mathematical science itself. Indeed all of the modern sciences, natural and social, are taken by him as branches of physics, although he does not articulate their interrelations in any way-probably in accord with his intention to treat of philosophy only " in general." Again, Ramirez does not countenance the expression " philosophy of ... ," and so perforce has no treatment of philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of art, philosophy of history, philosophy of language, and so forth. But to have written a work that takes account of these newer divisions of philosophy, and the piecemeal attacks on philosophical problems now common among analysts and phenomenologists that such designations reflect, clearly falls outside the task Ramirez set for himself. A man's work, it would seem, should be judged in terms of the goals he set for himself, and not in terms of other goals, however interesting, that others might like to have set for him.

The two volumes are beautifully produced, and Father Victorinus Rodriguez is to be congratulated for his editorial skill and dispatch in making this material so quickly available to scholars. This reviewer noted only one error of fact-the identification of John Dullaert of Ghent with John of Jandun (p. 9)- and although there are numerous typographical errors, as one might expect in any work printed in Latin these days, these are corrected on a sheet of *errata* supplied with the volumes. All in all, this is an auspicious beginning for Ramirez's *Opera Omnia* and augurs well for the rest of the series.

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De Analogia. By SANTIAGO RAMiREZ, 0. P. Madrid: Instituto de Filosofia 'Luis Vives,' 1971. Editio praeparata a Victorino Rodriguez, 0. P. Being Tomus II of the *Opera Omnia* of Ramirez in four volumes. Pp. 1947, with indices. pesatas. (Paper)

Father Santiago Ramirez, 0. P. (1891-1967), who in the Twenties published through several issues of *La Ciencia Tomista* a study entitled " De analogia secundum doctrinam aristotelico-thomisticam," the reading of which has been *de rigueur* for subsequent students of the subject, spent, as we now know, much of the remainder of a long lifetime in further reflection and writing on analogy in the hope of producing a massive and definitive work. These four volumes, which make up Tomus II of his *Opera Omnia* now in process of publication, contain the results of that lifelong effort. They are not, however, quite the work he hoped to write. Like the *Summa Theologiae* of his master, Ramirez's work on analogy remained incomplete at his death but, again as with the *Summa*, projected parts have been editorially completed by the substitution of earlier work of Ramirez. The editor, Father Victorino Rodriguez, 0. P., gives us in his introduction some idea as to how the work was conceived, planned, executed and prepared for the press, and we can see what the relation between the published version and the definitive plan is.

A first part of the work, devoted to the theory of analogy, was to comprise three sections: the notion of analogy; the division of analogy; the properties of analogy. A second part was to comprise two sections, the first of which would examine the use of analogy in philosophy, and the second its use in theology. That was the plan. Father Ramirez did not complete the historical survey of the development of the concept of analogy meant for section one of Part One; he got as far as Plato. The projected treatment of the properties of analogy was not written, but the editor has found a treatment of this subject which dates apparently from the Twenties and has included it here. None of Part Two was written, but Rodriguez was fortunate in finding a lengthy treatise on the analogy of being which dates, he thinks, from as well as lectures on the use of analogy in theology which were given in 1949. In this way, with the exception of the incomplete historical survey, the present work can be said to be the fulfillment of the plan Father Ramirez set himself and Father Rodriguez is to be commended for his devotion, patience, and excellent editorial work.

Clearly it is impossible to review in any detail a work which spans some nineteen hundred pages of text. I take my cue in what follows from the editor's claim for what is particularly original in Ramirez' work. "Sed specialiter originalis est nova propriaque interpretatio divisionis authenticae thomisticae analogiae in analogiam attributionis intrinsecae et extrinsecae et in analogiam proportionalitatis propriae et metaphoricae, superando

limitationes et exaggerationes tam cardinalis Thomae de vio Caietani quam Francisci Suarez, et, plus quam limitationem, extenuationem verae analogiae Mcinerny diebus nostris." (p. ix) I need not say how heady it is to find one's name on a list such as that, though the conditions of entry inspire the thought of the man who was tarred and feathered: if it were not for the honor I would forego the celebration. Since my views on analogy, in a book the editor indicates Father Ramirez read (p. xv), amount to the claim that the doctrine of analogy is a logical one, I suspected that this low estimation of my contribution had something to do with that. And indeed, in the text of the work, we find Father Ramirez, after a careful examination of the claim that analogy is logical, rejecting it in favor of the view that analogy is as such metaphysical. One is accordingly not a little surprised to find the following rather solemn remark at the end of the editor's preface: " Quandam *retractationem* quam auctor me rogavit notandum in textu introductorio, forsitan edendo, malui hie animadvertere, et textum traditum intactum servare. Discutiebat enim in articulo quarto introductionis (pp. 20-4) cuius sit tractatum de analogia instituere, an logici vel metaphysici. Tunc temporis Ramirez aestimabat veriorem et profundiorem sententiam praevalentiae aspectus metaphysici in doctrina analogiae, consentiens Dominico Bafiez, Joanni Sedefio et aliis, dissentiens autem a Caietano, Joanne a Sancto Thoma et aliis. ' Modo autem-mihi confitebatur ultimis diebus vitae suae-video veriorem esse sententiam Caietani: quaestio analogiae est prae primis quaestio praedicationis sive comparationis conceptuum proindeque logica prae primis. Corrigas, ergo, quaeso, quae scripsi in Introductione hac de re.' " (pp. xii-xiii)

I cite this, not as an example of deathbed repentance, as if Ramirez is to be thought of as having arrived at an interpretation his editor has described as an "extenuatio verae analogiae "-after all, Cajetan is singled out as the standard bearer of the view that analogy is logical-but as an alteration of judgment which must have far-reaching consequences for the issues subsequently taken up by Ramirez. It is a matter of great and genuine lamentation that Father Ramirez did not adopt this interpretation of the status of analogy early enough for it to influence the writing of this book.

What, in the text, are the arguments Ramirez considers on behalf of the view that analogy is logical? They are two. (1) The science which considers extremes should also study what falls between those extremes. Analogy falls betwen univocity and equivocity. It falls to logic to study equivocity and univocity. Ergo, etc. (p. 29) (2) It is for logic formally to treat of the logical universal which is the second intention of universality and thus an *ens rationis.* But analogy is formally a kind of logical universal, namely, the second intention of universality whereby the analogous notion is such as to be in many analogates and to be predicated of them. Ergo, etc. (pp. 29-30)

How does Ramirez dispose of these in order to clear the way for his adoption of the opposed view, namely, that analogy is metaphysical? *Ad primum:* analogy is not sufficiently defined and made known by negating and removing aspects of univocity and equivocity; the *via eminentiae* must also be called into play if analogy is to be known positively by resolution to the supreme mode of analogy which is the analogy of proper proportionality in real common being. Thus, in order to define analogy, the *terminus a quo* pertains to the logician, but the *terminus ad quem* is the province of the metaphysician. (p. 37) *Ad secundum:* "Analogia in communi non est proprie loquendo universale logicum." There are two kinds of universal, that properly so called, which is the univocal universal, and this is properly studied by the logician.

> Aliud est universale *large et improprie* dictum, quod est universalc *analogum* et transcendens, sicut entitas, unitas, veritas, bonitas et ipsa analogia, quae transcendens est et transcendentalibus necessario et essentialiter imbibitur et hoc universalc non est perfecta secunda intentio universalitatis, cum non sit perfecte et totaliter abstractum a suis inferioribus, sed imperfectc tantum et secundum quid, eo modo eaque ratione quibus secundum quid tantum et imperfecte abstrahit ab inferioribus in quibus simpliciter imbibitur actu implicite ... Hoc ergo universale, quod melius diceretur *commune,* non est formaliter secunda intentio, sed in recto dicit intentionem primam, connotando tamen secundam aut modum diminutum secundae aliqualiter in obliquo; et ideo proprie exit limites considerationis Logicae, ut plene cadit sub consideratione Metaphysicae. (pp. 38-39)

It is easy to see why Ramirez came to abandon the view that analogy is metaphysical, at least insofar as that view was grounded on arguments like these. His refutation of the first argument for the logical character of analogy assumes that there is logical analogy and that we understand the former only by reference to the latter. That is why metaphysical analogy is most truly analogy. This entails that the term "analogy" ranges over both logical entities and real entities and the question then has to be asked, how does it do this? If we say that " analogy " is analogous as used in logic and in metaphysics, we must then be prepared to say whether the explanation of *this* claim falls to logic or to metaphysics. But, of course, the very contrast is set up in a way that is contestable. The claim that analogy is logical is not tantamount to the claim that "analogy" has a use in logic alone as, for example, to explain how " genus " ranges over the predicable genus and the *genus subiectum* of science. But it is the specter of the barber shop mirror consequence, the infinite regress, that is most disturbing. If analogy is going to be invoked in explaining what we mean by "analogy," we are either going in circles or embarking on a voyage into that bourne from which no traveler returns.

The refutation of the second argument on behalf of the logical character of analogy is no more forceful. Apart from the surprise one must feel to

see " analogy " included in a list of transcendentals, it is clear that Ramirez really wants to say that analogy attaches to being, one, true, and good. To say that it thereby takes on the ontological properties of these carriers is like saying that, since genericity attaches to animal, genus takes on ontological or real properties of animal. Second intentions may all be said to be connoted *in obliquo* by terms signifying the first intentions on which the second intentions ride, so this is scarcely a distinguishing feature of analogy.

The point in stressing the fact that Ramirez ended by abandoning the position on the status of analogy argued for in the text is that his adoption of the view that analogy is logical would necessarily have affected what his editor, Father Rodriguez, regards as the chief contribution of the work, its division of analogy. Perhaps "necessarily" is too strong; Cajetan is taken to hold that analogy is logical, yet the cardinal's division of analogy involves difficulties which seem to stem from his holding that real analogy is somehow metaphysical and not merely logical.

De Analogia contains two extended treatments of the text in Aquinas which, since Cajetan, has provided the locus for discussions of the division of analogy, the famous passage in the exposition of the First Book of the *Sentences,* d. 19, q. 5, a. f.!, ad 1m. (cf. pp. 1400-1417 and 18ll-1850) As is well known, Cajetan thought he saw here a threefold division of analogous names: Analogy of Inequality; Analogy of Attribution; and Analogy of Proper Proportionality. The phrases of Thomas which respectively pick out these types, according to Cajetan, are: *analogia secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; analogia secundum intentionem et non secundum esse; analogia secundum intentionem et secundum esse.* The originality of the interpretation of Ramirez resides in the fact that, leaving aside *analogia secundum esse tantum,* he regards the remaining two to be types of analogy of attribution with the difference between them founded on intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. Ramirez's analysis of the disputed passage is careful, detailed and, in many respects, illuminating. It represents a clear advance over that of Cajetan. Nonetheless, it falls heir to the central difficulty of the cardinal's own interpretation of the passage, a difficulty which arises from assuming that the text provides a division of the analogous name into types. That the text does not support this initial assumption is something I should like to show.

Prior to doing that, however, it may be well to give a preliminary account of the analogous name which, relying exclusively on Aquinas, employs throughout the second-order or logical vocabulary we should expect. Once Thomas's own teaching on the matter is before us with all its clarity and elegance, we can turn to the vexed text in the *Sentences* and permit ourselves to be suitably surprised by what has been made of it by otherwise careful and knowledgeable students of the Angelic Doctor. One of the great merits of Ramirez' interpretation is that he has narrowed

the difficulty that the logical view of analogy might seem to face in the text to a single one. When that difficulty is faced and overcome, no impediment remains to accepting the teaching of St. Thomas that the doctrine of analogous names is a logical one.

Is it possible to give a definition of the analogously common name in second-order or logical terminology such that this definition will cover any and all instances of analogous name which occur in the text of St. Thomas? Such a definition would be of a piece with those given of names univocally and equivocally common. Things are said to be named univocally when they have a common name which means the same thing as said of each of them. Thus we have a plurality of occurrences of the same name which has the same meaning in each use. The phrase for that common meaning is *ratio propria* and this is composite in a way we shall see.

Quando aliquid pr:wdicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut *animal* in qualibet specie animalis. *(Summa Theol.,* I. q. 16, a. 6, c.)

Things are said to be named equivocally which have a name in common but that name means different things as said of each of them. Thus we have a plurality of occurrences of the same name and different meanings of accounts in each use or occurence. This difference can be complete or incomplete. How can this variation be expressed more clearly? If the *ratio* is taken to be composite, made up of a *res significata* and a *rrwdus significandi,* then the account given of a name used univocally can be said, in each of its occurrences, to signify the same *res* and *modus.* A term used purely equivocally will have quite different *res* and *modi* in the accounts given of each of its occurences. A less than purely equivocal use of a term will have accounts which are not the same but which are not completely different. This is expressed by saying that a term may in a plurality of uses involve the same *res significata* but different *modi significandi.* This controlled equivocation is what Thomas means by an analogous name and of it he speaks quite formally.

Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur. (Ibid.)

It is because commentators have taken this to be true, not of any and every analogous name, but of a particular type of analogous name that they propose divisions of the analogous name which do increasing violence to the text. In order that we might see that this charge is not made lightly, let us consider what Cajetan does with the texts we have been quoting from *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 16, a. 6, c., a text which is concerned with precisely the same question as the disputed passage in the *Sentences.*

After the formal description of analogy just quoted; St. Thomas goes on

to illustrate what he has said by reference to the venerable example of "healthy."

Sicut *sanum* dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis significativa.

"Healthy" in the various uses of it in question here has one *res aignificata,* health, which is differently signified in the various uses. " Healthy " as it ranges over the various things of which it is here predicated may be thought of as involving the following form: " health." In each of its uses the blank is filled in differently and this is productive of different *rationes* which are the same insofar as they involve the same *res significata* and different insofar as they involve different *modi aignificandi.* Thus, what fill in the blank in the example of these various uses of "healthy " are:

a) subject of . . .
b) causative of
c) sign of ...

A variation of *modi aignificandi* is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of a name's being analogously common. To this must be added the condition that one way of filling in the blank is privileged and takes precedence over the others. How do we decide which *ratio,* which combination of *res* and *modus,* is the privileged one, is, in Thomas's phrase, the *ratio propria* of the analogous term? Well, a sign that a *ratio* of the analogous name is *not* its *ratio propria* is that it invokes, if only *sotto voce,* what is the *ratio propria.* " Subject of health " is the *ratio propria* of "healthy" because when we fill in the blank with "cause of ...", say, the full explanation of this meaning would seem to be: cause of health in the subject of health. The *ratio propria* is not dependent on another *modus significandi.*

What we have been doing is showing how a logical vocabulary is constructed on the basis of the example of "healthy." The doctrine can ·be put quite schematically:

Let N be a common noun.
Let RS be the *res significata,* the denominating form.
Let MS be the *modus significandi,* the way of sigriifyingthe denominating form.

Let MSA be an abstract mode of signifying, then
MSA/RS is the account of an abstract term: that whereby something is such-and-such.

Let MSC be a concrete mode of signifying, then
MSA/RS is the account of a concrete term: that which has the form.

The passage in I, q. 16, a. 6 which described univocity could be rendered thus: When N is predicated univocally of many, it is found in each of them according to the same MSC/RS.

Let AN be an analogous name.
The *ratio communis* of AN is " /RS
The *rationes* of AN are MSC1/RS, MSC./RS, MSCa/RS.
The *ratio propria* of AN is MSC/RS insofar as MSC/RS implies, refers to, involves, MSC_1/RS.

We can now construe the description of the analogous term thus: But when N is said analogically of many, it is found according to MSC_1/RS in only one of them, from which the others are denominated.

Let me say that I am not particularly enamored of such schemata and have every confidence that God loves the unlettered expression of our views the best. The point of this quasi algebraic lapse is to underscore what it is that the example of " healthy " is an example of. For what happens when the text is read otherwise, let us glance at Cajetan's commetary on I, q. 16, a. 16. In paragraph V, Cajetan indicates that he understands the phrase " illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur," which shows up in Thomas's description of univocation, to be saying something ontological, something of a first intentional kind, viz., that the form from which things are named univocally must be intrinsically present in each of them. But " truth " said of God and creature denominates both from a form or perfection *each* has. Divine truth is not an ellipitical reference to created truth and vice versa. Given this, Cajetan has a problem. Not only does he take Thomas's definition of *univocity* to express the situation of " truth " said of God and creature, he finds in Thomas's definition of analogy the denial of it. That is, he understands the phrase " illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum," which occurs the description of analogy, to mean that only one of the analogates is named from a form intrinsic to it. Given all this, he does two things. First, he suggests that the ontological situation he takes the description of univocity to express is not confined to univocity. What is peculiar to univocity is that the formality intrinsically possessed by each of the univocates is signified in exactly the same way by the term common to them. Surprising as it may seem, Cajetan is trying to get the analogous term " truth " somehow under the umbrella of the description Thomas has given of univocity. (n. V) This leads him, secondly, to dismiss the definition of analogy Thomas offers in the text: " illa regula de analogo tradita in littera, non est universalis de omni analogiae modo: imo, proprie loquendo, ut patet *I Ethic.*, nulli analogo convenit, sed convenit nominibus ad unum vel in uno aut ab uno, quae nos abusive vocamus analoga." (n. VI) Among those guilty of abuse of terminology would have to be counted Thomas himself, so that Cajetan is explaining

this text, in effect, by saying if you want to know what Thomas means by the analogy of "truth," forget what he says about analogy, what he is calling analogy is not analogy at all, and rather reflect on his definition of univocity. The definition of univocity, rightly and not abusively understood, will provide you with a clue to what real analogy is. Clearly something has gone seriously wrong here.

Since Cajetan's desire to stress the definition of univocity in explaining true analogy stops short of saying that the analogous name is said *secundum rationem propriam* of each analogate, he should have been prepared to see that " illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum " says nothing of whether the denominating form is intrinsic or extrinsic. The fact that the denominating form of "healthy," namely, health, is intrinsic to only one of the analogates is not what the definition of analogy expresses at a level of generality. Cajetan has made central to an understanding of analogy what is accidental to it, a feature of the set of things called " healthy " which is not essential to seeing that " healthy " is analogously common to them.

When we tum to the famous text in the *Sentences* we find that the objection to which it is a response involves precisely the same confusion Cajetan is guilty of.

> Videtur quod omnia sint vera una veritate quae est veritas increata. Sicut enim dictum est in· solutione praecedentis articuli, verum dicitur analogice de illis in quibus est veritas, sicut sanitas de omnibus sanis. Sed una est sanitas numero a qua denominatur animal sanum, sicut subjectum ejus, et medicina sana, sicut causa ejus, et urina sana, sicut signum ejus. Ergo videtur quod una sit veritas qua omnia dicuntur vera.

" like "healthy " is an analogous term. But the denominating form, health, is numerically one form intrinsic to animal, which is its subject, and medicine is called healthy as cause of health in the animal, and urine is called healthy insofar as it indicates the health of the animal. But if such is the case with the things analogously called "healthy," must not the same be true of God and creature analogously called " true," viz., that the denominating form exits in only one of them?

A swift reply to this objection might go as follows. What makes a name an analogous name has nothing to do with whether the denominating form exists in one only or in all the analogates. The formally important thing is that a term said analogously of several (a) while it signifies the same *res significata*, does so in different ways, and (b) one way of signifying the denominating form is the proper sense of the term from which the other (s) is (are) derived. This is what "healthy" and "true" have in common as analogous terms. The first intentions to which these logical properties attach will involve other and various features, but these features being first intentional and expressive of the real, will not constitute a basis

of dividing the second intention of analogous naming. The fact that the denominating form of the term in question is an intrinsic form of one only, each or none of the analogates, while a matter of importance from other points of view, is accidental to what we mean by calling a term analogous. Failure to take this into account is productive of the kind of objection to which this is a reply.

That is not, however, the way in which St. Thomas handles the objection, though it contains the nub of his reply. He begins by saying that something " dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter " and there follow those famous phrases:

a) vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse,
b) vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem,
c) vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse.

The second of these, (b) is discussed first by Cajetan. He calls it analogy of inequality and denies that it is really an analogy. He calls (a) analogy of attribution, and he takes the mark of it to be that the denominating form exists only in the prime analogate so that the secondary analogates are named by extrinsic denomination from the form in the primary analogate. third phrase is interpreted by Cajetan to be analogy of proper proportionality, the chief notes of which are (i) that the denominating form exists in each of the analogates, and (ii) since each is denominated from its own intrinsic form, there really is not a primary analogate.

Ramirez, while he devotes a great deal of careful and enlightening analysis to (b), and indeed argues that it is truly analogy (Cf. p. 1560 ff.), disagrees most directly with Cajetan by saying that (a) and (c) are types of analogy of attribution, their difference lying in the fact that (a) involves extrinsic denomination in the extension of the term to secondary analogates, while (b) does not; all the analogates are denominated from their intrinsic form.

The second member of the threefold division Thomas gives is clearly the crucial one. If, as seems to be the case, the meaning of *analogia secundum esse* is such that it is perfectly compatible with the two things so analogous being named univocally, then *analogia secundum esse* has nothing to do with analogous naming. " Body " can be univocally common to physical and mathematical bodies if we mean by the term " something three dimensionally extended." Other features of these bodies not expressed by such a definition may lead us to say that, however equalized *(parificantur)* they may be in this common notion, they are, in other respect, unequal, analogous. Notice that we might then develop a number of meanings for " body " which could be said to be related *secundum prius et posterius* in that both meanings involve the same *res significata* but signify it in different ways, and one of these may be taken to be controlling for

the other. Once this has been done, however, we no longer have an example of what is envisaged in (b). The inequality, the analogy, there spoken of is one which is compatible with univocity. Very well. (b) does not express a type of analogous name. Therefore we cannot be faced with a threefold division of the analogous name. (b) indicates that things which are univocally named and are equalized with respect to the meaning of the name in question may be unequal in ways not envisaged by that name. Perhaps, then, (a) and (c) point out that the presence of an analogous name leaves unsettled other matters, e. g., whether or not the denominating form exists in each or only one or perhaps none of the analogates. If so, such matters are accidental to an understanding of the ordered set of meanings associated with the same name which leads us to say that name is used analogously. But, just as obviously, since the task of the philosopher is not to discover examples of logical relations but, qua metaphysician certainly, to determine how it is with things, he will not want to stop his inquiry with the recognition that a name is being used analogously. He is interested in things, not simply as they are known and named by us but as they are in themselves. It is a matter of the utmost metaphysical importance whether perfections like wisdom, truth, justice exist in God as well as in creatures. The metaphysician will want to say that wisdom exists in God not as a perfection he has but as the perfection he is, whereas our own wisdom is participated, distinct from ourselves, something we can lose if we have it and must strive to get if we do not. The importance of such issues is in no way diminished by observing that they are not settled by saying that God and man are called wise analogously. If we understood as the meaning of "wise" as predicated of God " cause of created wisdom," our understanding might be said to be less profound than it might be, but we could not be said to misunderstand the analogy of names.

One cannot read this *chef d'oeuvre* of Father Ramirez without being drawn into the discussion oneself, and I take it to be a tribute to its author that the reader feels invited to agree or disagree, to take exception or to want to rephrase, in short, to engage in the life of the mind which played so large a role in the spiritual vocation of Father Ramirez. Throughout his long life he remained a faithful student of his master and fellow Dominican, St. Thomas Aquinas. His writings are proof enough that such docility is a stimulus and a good rather than an invitation to intellectual laziness. It has long been the case that the student of analogy had to turn to Father Ramirez. The present massive and masterful work multiplies that necessity many times over. One can get lost for hours at a time in these four volumes, each time to his profit. It is pleasant to think that Father Ramirez, after a long lifetime walking faithfully in the Dominican vocation to which he was called, is now among the saints, in converse with Thomas and, infinitely more important, in union with Truth itself.

The editor, Father Rodriguez, is to be congratulated on a work which besides being attractively printed and conveniently edited, contains an index of names, a lengthy analytic index of the contents and, most Important, an index of the texts of St. Thomas cited and commented on.

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De Actibus Humanis: In I-II Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae Expositio. By JAMES M, RAMiREZ. Madrid: Instituto de Filosofia " Luis Vives," 197Q. Pp. 64Q.

This fourth volume in Ramirez' *Opera Omnia* is a commentary on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, qq. 6 - Ql. The contents and their ordering are roughly determined by the *Summa* topics; the form of presentation (long prenotes, definitions, outlines, syllogistic argumentation, precisely logical replies to possible objections) is quite different from that employed by Thomas in the *Summa.* Those unfamiliar with Aquinas often find him too orderly, almost cold, when they first read him; Ramirez's terribly precise work makes one appreciate the pleasantly fluid movement of Aquinas. The serious student of Thomas will be greatly helped by turning to Ramirez, but he will soon find himself anxious to return to Thomas.

The Catholic moral theologian should be interested in any commentary on I-II, qq. 18- 21; he will want to learn how Thomas handled the circumstances of the situation, the consequences of the action, and the intention of the moral agent within the framework of what has come to be known as an "objective morality." The "prudence" of Thomas's *Summa* invites an input from many sources other than the " moral object of the action " : the contemporary moralist, faced with the popular emphasis on moral circumstances and/ or a calculus of consequences and/ or the moral quality of the agent's intention, searches for a way to be honestly faithful to these contemporary emphases as well as to the traditional emphasis on the moral object of a human action.

A first glance at Ramirez will disappoint this searching moralist; a second, and longer, glance should be rewarding. Unlike so many recent publications, Ramirez makes no attempt to dialogue with the contemporary scene. His statement (one cannot truthfully call it a dialogue) is an attempt to understand Aquinas, all the while taking note of other similar attempts from the centuries which separate Ramirez from Aquinas. One can become totally frustrated by the cascade of outlines rehearsed before almost every

Question; nevertheless, it becomes clear that one's interpretation of Aquinas will be influenced by one's outline of Aquinas's articles. Ramirez reports the schemata proposed by other commentators and briefly argues about their appropriateness; the reader is thereby led to appreciate the sublety and underlying integrity of Aquinas's work. Similarly, seemingly endless discussions of definitions and divisions of terms prove helpful in understanding Aquinas. Uneven attempts (" uneven " because some attempts are far more persistent and fruitful than others) are made to recover the intellectual milieu of Aquinas, thereby helping the reader understand the significance of his teaching. (Especially valuable is the history included in Ramirez's discussion of the nature and source of morality. Like today's Catholic moral theologian, Aquinas had to concern himself with a seriously proposed moral. positivism.) Again, the refinements of definitions and divisions proposed since Aquinas are instructive in coming to understand him and to appreciate the intellectual originality of each commentator. Finally, the least useful part of Ramirez's work is the syllogistic arguments; these complete the Scholastic mode but seem especially jarring *vis-a-vis* the more gentle argumentation of the *Summa.* The syllogism, so presented, always threatens to " prove " more than can be proved, or at least suggests greater rational certitude and logical completeness than one likes to associate with the mystery of· man's return to God; here especially is the *Summa* more attuned to today's theologian.

Ramirez does not limit himself to these few questions of the *Summa* in his commentary. He draws upon other sections of the *Summa* to complement and understand these few questions; he looks to AquinM's other works to indicate growth in the Doctor's teaching. Even within the context of this single volume there is helpful cross-reference. While this reviewer is prejudiced toward the significance of qq. 18- the psychology of human acts developed in the earlier thirteen questions is not merely helpful for, but is essential to any unde;standing of the four questions which treat specifically of the morality of human acts. The contemporary moralist who hears well-argued suggestions that determinism is the paradigm for understanding human activity will want to consult Aquinas's words on free choice (it is intriguing to assert that a certain degree of effective attraction, a certain directedness of affection, one might say a certain degree of determinism, is needed for the true exercise of freedom); Ramirez helps us understand Aquinas. Likewise, as God's Pilgrim People grapple for an understanding of the role of ecclesial authority in concrete moral decision-making, theologians will want to understand the role of taking counsel; here again, Ramirez casts some light on Aquinas. .

I have said that Ramirez does not dialogue with the contemporary scene, and yet I mean to assert that theologians on the contemporary scene can profit from studying Ramirez. Theological discussion in a pluralistic atmosphere depends upon each party to the discussion understanding as best he

can the various positions; indeed, the theologian not thoroughly familiar with his own tradition sheds little light on an ecumenical stage. The temptation is to nod graciously in the direction of whatever sounds nice; this makes for pleasant tea but aimless theology. Even those whose discussion is quite intramural, within an increasingly pluralistic Roman Catholicism, often fail to understand the depth and sophistication of other points of view. Ramirez':; work should contribute to a better understanding of a not uninfluential strain of thought in the Roman Catholic tradition; dialogue with the pressing questions of today will be profitable to the extent that at least a few of the participants are familiar with the theological school which Ramirez has served so well.

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Textus Breviores Theologiam et Historiam Spectantes. Collezione della Pontificia Accademia Teologica Romana. Liberia Editrice Vaticana. (1) *Ba:rtolomeo Carranza,* ***0. P.,*** *Arcivescovo di Toledo* (t 1576) *De Mysticis Nuptiis Verbi Divini cum Ecclesia et Animabus Iustorum.* By ANTONIO PIOLANTI. Pp. *55.* L. 400 (2) *Agostino Favaroni da Roma, 0. S. A., Arcivescovo di Nazaret* (t 1443) *De Sacramento Unitatis Christi et Ecclesiae sive de Christo Integro.* By ANTONIO PIOLANTI. Pp. 77. L. 700 (3) *Guglilemo Amidani da Cremona, 0. S. A. Vescovo di Novara* (t 1366) *De Primatu Petri et de Origine Potestatis Episcoporum.* By ANTONIO PIOLANTI. Pp. 52. L. 500 (4) *Domenico de' Domenichi, Vescovo di Brescia* (t 1488) *Oratio in laudem Beatissimae Caterinae de Senis.* By ANTONIO PIOLANTI. Pp. 38. L. 400

(I) Bartolomeo was one of the Imperial theologians of Charles V at the Council of Trent, a contemporary of the great Vitoria and of Melchior Cano of the school of Salamanca. This is one of his unpublished works. **It** aims at harmonizing the community aspects of the marriage of God's Word with his Church and the more personal aspect of the marriage, so dear to St. Bernard. This suited the trend of piety fostered by the reform of Trent.

Shortly after becoming the Archbishop of Toledo the author passed through a cloud of suspicion because of his commentary on the Christian Catechism. He was imprisoned by the Inquisition, but his cause was vindicated by Pope St. Pius V, during whose pontificate his work on the

mystical marriage was written. This more than guarantees his orthodoxy, and although it is not remarkable for originality, it succeeds in systematizing a treatise that was vaguely mystical, and it gathers together the scattered sources on the subject, biblical, patristic, and theological.

The editor of these texts presents the second fruit of his painstaking research in the hope that it will help students to understand neglected periods and personalities in the history of theology.

The author of this work in mystical ecclesiology was born at Rome in 1360 and died in Prato in 1443. He was for two terms the Prior General of the Augustinians. Nominated Archbishop of Nazareth in Italy he participated in the Council of Basle, which at its QQnd session condemned a number of statements contained in his works, especially his lectures on the Apocalypse. Although he commented on the philosophy of Aristotle, he took little notice of St. Thomas, while attempting to give new and original answers to questions already profoundly examined by him. This was due to his critical reaction to the decadent scholasticism of his own time. But his errors began from this arrogant originality. This work on the unity of the Church was written to solve problems arising from the great schism of the West.

(3) Msgr. Piolanti gives another reason for publishing this series of *textus breviores* which is applicable to this fourteenth-century study of the relations between popes and bishops: this question received new attention during and since the Second Vatican Council. The editor regrets the haste with which articles were written and, in the light of this and other neglected sources, sees the need for revising inaccurate statements bearing on the history of the theology of this question.

To help scholars, the general editor of these texts has published this work of Guglielmo Amidani, who was for sixteen years Prior General of the Augustinians and later Bishop of Novara. The original title of the treatise was *Reprobatio Sex Errorum,* an answer to Marsilio di Padova and Giovanni di Gionduno in whose *Defensor Pacis* there were many disturbing statements concerning the relations of Church with State and concerning the origin and powers of the Roman Pontiff. Pope John XXII asked Guglielmo da Cremona to give him a theological judgment of the work. The errors tended to make the Church subservient to the State and contained a denial of the primacy of Peter. The six answers contain an interesting but neglected contribution to ecclesiolgy.

(4) In publishing this Oration in praise of St. Catherine Msgr. Piolanti wished to show the saint's influence extended beyond her contemporaries. He says: "After her disappearance from the stage of the world, there began for her a second life, even on this earth, because her presence was felt not only by her immediate and never to be forgotten disciples but by all those who with sincere attention read her works." One of these was Domenico de' Domenichi, Bishop of Brescia and Vicar of Rome under

Paul IT, during whose pontificate he fell from favor because· he opposed the autocratic policy of Papa Barbo.

The oration was made at the Basilica of Santa Maria sopra Minerva on May 1468, on the occasion of the first celebration of the feast after Catherine's canonization. The solemnity was transferred to Good Shepherd Sunday. The preacher built his oration around the text: "oves meae vocem meam audiunt." Pope Pius IT was present with the entire papal court. The oration is based on the documents of the process of her canonization and on the biography of Blessed Raymond of Capua. But it is her influence on this great figure of the fifteenth century that Msgr. Piolanti seeks to evoke in bringing to light the only published work of Domenichi. They were times when long orations were listened to as one listens to good music, for oratory was still an art. After turning over twenty pages the orator looked at the Pope and the Cardinals and said: " Possem, Reverendissimi Patres, multa alia persequi, sed ea quae dixi percipio fuisse longiora. Quamquam enim nihil ad commendationem eius praeclarius sit, quam in eius laudibus quis finem reperire non possit, habendum tamen est a me orationi modus, neque humanitate vestra, qui me benigne audistis, abutendum." They knew the peroration was about to begin.

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Theology Today Series. 15. *Why Were The Gospels Written?* By JOHN AsHTON, S. J. Notre Dame Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1978. Pp. 91. $.95.

The central position of the four gospels within the Christian tradition is an acknowledged fact; we rely on them almost exclusively for our information regarding the person of Jesus of Nazareth, his life, his teaching, and his message of salvation. How reliable are they as witnesses to the events that they proclaim? Do they present us with objective history, or interpreted history, or are they a combination of both? These and other related problems have been the subject of prolonged study by Christian exegetes over many decades.

Fr. Ashton, in his little booklet, traces briefly the history of the different solutions proposed by scholars to the problems posed by the gospels, evaluating the pros and cons of each theory as he goes along. In the central chapters of the book he outlines in a simple and lucid manner the development of the gospel traditions from their oral beginnings through their final written form as they are found in the four gospels, pointing out that

these traditions are "neither biography nor memoir nor catechesis nor kerygma, but a mixture of all four blended together." (p. 51) His treatment of the more important themes of each of the four gospels, e. g., the messianic secret in Mark, salvation history in Luke, etc., is both helpful and instructive.

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The Science of Sacred Theology for Teachers. I. Introduction to Theology. (Pp. 70) *II. Revelation.* (Pp. *III. The Channels of Revelation.* (Pp. 84) By EMMANUEL DoRONZO. Middleburg, Virginia: Notre Dame Institute Press, 1978.

The style and method of these three booklets suggest a close dependence on the Latin text of the author's *Theologia Dogmatica.* As they represent an attempt to adapt the latter to the needs of teachers, the result would have been more successful, one feels, had the author been prepared to move further away from the categories and procedures of the Latin text. The preponderance of terms that are crudely literal translations from the Latin can hardly be helpful to teachers, who are after all expected to pass on much of the information to their pupils. It would be preferable if the meaning of technical terms were clear from the text itself without need to refer to the glossary included in each booklet.

The author's treatment of his subject is quite satisfactory in Books one and three, which are largely positive in character. In Book 2, *Revelation,* however, it is marred by a too exclusive concern with the rational credibility of Revelation to the neglect of its more theological aspects and its relevance to the conduct of life. It is clear from the rejection of the original schema of the Constitution on Revelation at the Vatican Council that the Fathers were dissatisfied with the traditional approach. It is surprising, then, to find the author using it so exclusively. These booklets should appeal most to those who feel that the traditional approach of the theological manuals safeguards the truths of faith better than that of modern theological writing.

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Concepts in Education Philosophical Studies. Ed. by J. V. D'CRuz and P. J. SHEEHAN, Melbourne, Australia: Mercy Teachers College--Twentieth Century Publications, 1973. Pp. 96.

This survey of educational theory by a group of philosophers is a useful reference tool. That the writers are located in Australia and New Zealand may come as a surprise considering how little attention professional journals here focus on that corner of the globe. Of course, Australian novelists like Morris West and Patrick White do make our best seller lists, but philosophers from their homeland are a rarity in the academic pantheon. In nine essays the authors discuss such topics as educating and indoctrination, education and creativity, and a critique of Ivan Illich's "Descholling Society." Bibliographies accompany several of the essays.

Dr. I. A. Snook of New Zealand treats of "Moral Education," a timely topic and one which has traditionally been a concern for Anglo-Saxon thinkers. It is no mere fad that both in England and the United States moral education is very much an "in" subject just now. The work of John Wilson at Oxford and his associates on schemes of moral education which are value neutral is summarized, as is the empirical research of Lawrence Kohlberg at Harvard, with his famed six stages for moral development. On the related subject of "Religious Education" Dr. P. J. Sheehan from Melbourne enquires first how it can be a form of education and, then, if it is a religious form of education. Can there be activity, he asks, an activity which is both concerned with a particular religion, and at the same time meets accepted criteria of education? This activity is not to be equated with a study *about* religious phenomena. The question raises the thorny issue as to whether and in what sense religious education is viewed as indoctrination. The paper on "Educating and Indoctrinating" by Dr. John Kleinig offers some helpful insights here. Dr. Sheehan acknowledges that his brief attempt to describe what the concept of religious education means draws heavily on a thesis from the University of Melbourne. The essay could be improved with some references to current catechetical literature. The absence of any bibliography for this paper is particularly unfortunate.

The contributors to this collection have dealt with their specific topics on the premise that educational questions do have a philosophical basis whether they are concerned with improving the quality of teaching or scrutinizing the values that are taught. One would like to supplement this collection with still another which would focus on a much neglected area, a theology of education.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Barnes & Noble, Inc.: *Religion and Philosophy,* by Frederick C. Copleston. Pp. *205,* $16.00); *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays,* by P. F. Strawson. (Pp. 222, $11.50)

Les Editions Bellarmin: *Augustin: Qui est Jesus Christ?,* by Fernand Arsenault. (Pp. 184}; *Lea Structures Dynamiques de la GTdce,* by Jean-Marc Laporte, S. J. (Pp. 244}

Consortium Press: *Thomas Merton. The Man and his Work,* by Dennis Q. Mcinerny. (Pp. 140, $7.95)

Eglise et Theologie: *Saint Thomas Aquinas Commemorative Colloquium (127 4-197 4).* (Pp. 190, $2.50)

Exposition Press, Inc.: *Why Does Evil Exist? A Philosophical Study of the Contemporary Presentation of the Question,* by Colm Connellan, 0. M. I. (Pp. 18, $10.00}; *Allodialism-The Ownership of an Estate: The Pure Philosophy of Economy-The Case for a Non-Reciprocal System,* by Thomas A. Mulsow. (Pp. *95,* $4.00)

Fides Publishers, Inc.: *Theology Today.* 17 *The Theology of GTace,* by Cornelius Ernst, 0. P. (Pp. 96); 28 *The Theology of Secularity,* by Gerald O'Collins, S. J. (Pp. 94, *$1.25* each); *Vision and Virtue. Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection,* by Stanley Hauerwas. (Pp. 278, $5.00)

The Free Press: *The Supreme Court and Religion,* by Richard E. Morgan. (Pp. 224, $8.95)

Alfred A. Knopf: *Warriors of Peace,* by Lanzo del Vasto. (Pp. !!86, $7.95); *Make Straight the Way of the Lord,* by Lanza del Vasto. (Pp. 266, $7.95)

The Language Press: *Emotion. The Method of Philosophical Therapy,* by Warren Shibles. (Pp. 492, $8.00 paper, '$10.00 hardcover)

Littlefield, Adams & Co.: *Reason and Violence,* ed. by Sherman M. Stanage. (Pp. 268, $8.50)

Macmillan Publishing Co.: *Lions and Foxes. Men and Ideas of the Italian Renaissance,* by Sidney Alexander. (Pp. 886, $12.95); *Memoirs,* by Josef Cardinal Mindszenty. (Pp. 870, $10.00); *Crafts of Israel,* by Ruth Dayan with Wilburt Feinberg. (Pp. 175, $16.95)

Magi Books, Inc.: *Jacques Maritain: Homage in Words and Pictures,* by John Howard Griffin and Yves R. Simon. (Pp. 76, $12.95)

Martinus Nijhoff, Publisher: *The Commentary of Conrad of Prussia on the De Ente et Essentia of St. Thomas Aquinas,* by Joseph Bobik. (Pp. 208, Guilders 89.50)

Ohio University Press: *Heidegger on the Divine. The Thinker, the Poet and God,* by James L. Perotti. (Pp. 134)

Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co.: *The New Gods,* by E. M. Cioran, transl. by Richard Howard. (Pp. 120, $5.95)

Rinehart Press: *Philosophy: An Introduction to the Art of Wondering,* by James Christian. (Pp. *553,* $11.95)

Casa Editrice G. C. Sansoni: *La filosofia di Marx. Studi critici.* 5a edizione riveduta e accresciuta a cura di Vito A. Bellezza, by Giovanni Gentile. (Pp. 303, L. 3.000)

Dr. E. Sauer, *Pragmatik. Bessere Politik durch besseres Volkerrecht.* (Pp. 170, 12.- DM)

Libreria Editrice Vaticana: *Pio IX e Antonio Rosmini,* by Gianfranco Radice. (Pp. 369); *Il " Trattadello della Disposizione che si Ricerca a Recever la Gratia del Spirito Santo " di Fra Lorenzo da Bergamo, O. P.,* by Antonio Piolanti. (Pp. 42)