THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017

VOL. XXXIX APRIL, 1975 No. 2

ST. IRENAEUS AS MYSTICAL THEOLOGIAN

THE AIM of this article is to suggest that Irenaeus of Lyons is the first really apophatic theologian to write in the West. His work is perhaps the greatest monument in the Patristic Period of Greek theology developed in a Latin setting.

Few now would doubt the importance of negative theology for the development of Christian spirituality. Significantly, it was during the 4th century, the first great age of monasticism, when St. Basil was composing the fundamental legislation for Eastern monks, that his brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa, was drawing on his profound initiation into the Greek philosophical tradition to provide the intellectual undergirding for the growing ascetical movement. This Cappadocian theologian was essentially apophatic. Since the God of faith transcends every concept or image we may form of him, we can only know him by a supra-rational mode of cognition, a way of unknowing.

This is true *theoria (Oewpia)* or contemplation, and such is the inexhaustible goal of the spiritual life.

The importance of Irenaeus's doctrine of transcendence is that this is the work of a Biblical theologian, not at all given to Platonic speculations, with no time for any kind of Christian intellectual elitism. For him, God's progressive self-manifestation is realized in the spiritual advance of man, called to grow in the deifying vision of God by participation in the divine life. But we intend to show that this hope of glory is grounded in a truly Biblical grasp of the transcendence of God and in a profoundly religious sense of man's dependence on him. This is why piety demands a proper agnosticism beyond the sphere of revelation; and why our knowledge of God can never be a mere rationalism presupposed by the innate powers of the human mind. That the Invisible should become visible and the Unknowable known is always a miracle of grace, and if this is so, then we must be dealing here with a genuine *connaissance mystique.*

Studies in the past, e. g., the work of Lawson and of Wingren, have rightly elaborated the Biblicism of Irenaeus and the robust Paulinism of his soteriology. I£ then we can establish the centrality of the doctrine of transcendence for the spirituality of a great teacher, little moved to look to philosophy for the content of his theology, then it may well be that a grasp of the unknowability of God might be basic to *any* truly Christian account of man's religious quest. Apophaticism, with its implication that *all* religious knowledge is limited and given is not just a basic position of Christian Platonism. It may be claimed-and here lies Irenaeus's importance-that the Via Negativa is implied as much by Isaiah's sense of the sovereign otherness of Yahweh as by the Platonic axiom of the simplicity of the One. Philosophy merely provided the Fathers with a set of concepts with which to defend and expound a sense of Transcendence inherent in the Tradition from the beginning, and reinforced by the data of contemplative experience.

1) *The setting of Irenaeus's Mystical Theology.*

Our contention is reinforced in the case of Irenaeus, if we consider the nature of his detachment from Greek *Paideia.* The polemical pressures have changed from the need to challenge fairly straightforward polytheism to an attack on a world-negating religious outlook often highly sophisticated-sometimes absurdly so-in its philosophical complexities. The gnosticism of men like Valentinus was a danger-sign as to where unbridled Hellenistic speculation might lead the Church. The Gnostics too preached an Unknowable God, but this implied for them not a democracy of grace but an intellectual elite, alone fitted by nature to attain to knowledge of God. Hence, we should not be surprised to detect a change of key in comparing Irenaeus to the Apologists: he is more cautious in his attitude to Hellenism, less inclined to laud the natural capacities of man, or even the Logos-inspired achievements of the great philoosphers of old. He is concerned not so much with an Absolute, impassibly beyond being, as with a unique, universal, and inexhaustible Creator; and again, the Glory of Man consists not primarily in his intellectual powers but in his creation in the Image of God, called to grow in God-likeness by cooperation with the indwelling Spirit. Where Justin is positive and conciliatory to Hellenism, Irenaeus must first repudiate those heretical versions of the Faith in which non-Biblical elements have gone too far. As Chadwick says, in him the conflict with Gnosticism became the historic occasion of a more balanced catholic theology.

The nature of his achievement may be indicated by his profound Johannine insight into the integrity of knowledge and life. It is not enough to grasp alleged truths about God, however esoteric, with the mind. The vision of God is in fact not an intellectual illumination but participation by grace in the life of God. Thus, while not immune to contemporary culture, Irenaeus radically corrects Hellenism to expound a rich Christian humanism. Man fully *alive,* in the fullness of all his God-given power-intellectual, spiritual, and physical-is the *Gloria*

Dei of our title. Far from offering a reductionist and illiberal doctrine of man, Irenaeus attacks the *t/Jev86wp.os yvwcns* precisely because it despairs of man in his integrity and denies the dignity of creation by (and in the image of) the One Supreme God. But if Gnostic metaphysical transcendentalism had the effect of banishing God to a remote Pleroma, with Irenaeus, it was quite a different case. For him, it is the sovereign otherness of God that guarantees his freedom in creation and redemption, whereby he freely comes into saving relationship with those he has created in his image.

2) *The Hidden God.*

In repudiating Gnostic distortions Irenaeus is quite capable of using the conceptual tools at hand and bringing a full gamut of negative abstracts into play to counteract gratuitous speculations. We must not underrate his loyalty to the tradition of the Apologists, confessors, and martyrs of a previous generation. Nevertheless his use of negative theology is not just a bow to his predecessors. Rather, he is turning the weapons of the heretics against themselves in such a way as to make a doctrine of Divine Transcendence (in the spirit of Job) the basis of his essentially Biblical soteriology. Although we can never adequately express the majesty of the Creator, we can at last fittingly say what he is *not.* If the otherness of the Living God can best be safeguarded by negative terms, such concepts may be used. The language is often Platonic but, basically, the thought merely reiterates the warning of Isaiah, that God is not as men, and his ways are not our ways.

Thus, Irenaeus can assert God is simple, uncreated, and unchangeable. (II. xiii. 3) His simplicity stands over against the shifting, disunified imperfection of all created natures. Will, thought, and actuation are co-terminus with him (I. xxi. 2) for " none is of greater knowledge than the God of the Universe." We cannot imagine what Creation can be like in the case of God; he has only to *conceive* the idea for it to be. Again he is ineffable (I. xx. 2) : hence the folly of the Gnostic notion

that the *aeon* should name the Unnameable. (I. xv. *5)* Even Christ refused to name the power by which he wrought his miracles.

As Creator, God must be self-contained (II. i. I, Dem. 4), and self-sufficient (II. 34. 2)-"Being moved by curiosity . . . would cease to be what God is." We cannot say he *n.eeds* our love (IV. xvi. 4), or obedience (II. xiv. 1-2); he is in no way dependent on us, though the whole cosmos is entirely sustained by his creative hand. (II. iii. 2)

The intellectualist ring is clear in II. iii. 2 (the Universe a thought in the Divine Mind) as also in II. xiii. 3/4: God is all *vov<;, 7TV€Vf.La,* and *cpw<;,* one entire *rf}<; aya06r7JTO<;.* God is simple, uncompounded Being, yet (para. 4) beyond all this, indescribable. Just as his Understanding, which comprehends all, is in no way like the understanding of men, so " in all other particulars, the Father of All is *in no way* similar to human weakness. We use these terms [i.e., good, wise, etc.] from the love we bear him; but in point of greatness, our thoughts regarding him transcend these expressions." This shows a sophisticated grasp of that fundamental of negative theology, that the transcendence of God implies the approximate and analogous nature of *all* theological language. Humanly speaking, we may properly talk of the God of Abraham, (Dem. 8) but the sublimity and greatness of this God is ineffable. In II. xxviii. 4 Irenaeus repeats the same two correlated truths: God exists ever one and the same, and hence defies all definition and analysis. The Gnostic chains of *aeons-Ennoia, Logos, Christos* and so on-are ruled out as " not fitting to God." " Our carnal tongue cannot minister adequately even to the rapidity of the human mind-how much less can it express God?" It must be admitted there are difficulties relating to our use of the word "apophatic" in relation to Irenaeus's doctrine of God. It is not always clear whether he is speaking of what is unknowable *in se,* above all, the divine essence, and what is knowable in principle but opaque to us because of our human weakness. Or, to put it another way, he does not clearly

distinguish between what is unrevealable, and what we could in principle grasp but do not know because God has not seen fit to reveal.

By thus reverently setting a fence around the Deity Irenaeus reminds us of our human limitations; of ourselves, we cannot plumb the divine mysteries and can only receive God's self-revelation as pure gift. God's inscrutability and omnipotence are axiomatic for our author; and this is the basis of his freedom and actuality as Creator and Redeemer. His purpose is not conditioned by our response, even though he is by no means indifferent to our welfare. Indeed, God's transcendent freedom is part and ground of his grace towards us. The fact that he remains *Deus Absconditus,* impenetrable in essence, implies a permanent distinction between God and man, and a definite limit to our knowledge of God-even within the Church-unless specially enabled by God himself. However close the Creator may draw to us in love, God is always sovereign, man always his creature, albeit made in the Divine Image.

3) *The Word from Silence.*

Irenaeus's first positive task was to underline the Old Testament proclamation of God in action, without sacrificing a sense of the infinite greatness of the One Creator-God. He has no doubt of the partial knowability of God *KaT' otKovo,.dav* in both Creation (IV. 30. 3, V. Q8. 4) and revelation. (IV. xx. 6) The Divine Hands denote the approachability and nearness of One who while " unknowable in greatness," yet out of pure love," leads us to himself by his Word." (IV. xx. 6) Only those without (sc., experiential) knowledge could speak of God *needing* tools to create: he himself " in indescribable, inconceivable fashion . . . formed all in harmony through the unwearying Word." (II. ii. 4) Negative theology and economic trinitarianism are here complementary: since God is ineffable, so too must be his mode of operation. We need have no qualms about the Father of the " his " with <;reation,

What is being asserted in strong, personalized language is that it is the Supreme God we know by his mighty acts, as never-failing source of life even though we may have only the faintest notion of his nature *secundum magnitudinem.* Irenaeus's doctrine of the Creator-God bypasses at once comfortable polytheism and the bare Monad of philosophy. What it implies in Biblical terminology concerning our knowledge of God is not so far from the later, preciser, more doctrine of energies and essence. We know the transcendent God only insofar as he deigns to impinge upon the world he made. To know him is to participate in the life he brings, not to speculate upon the generation of the Son.

The heretics despise the God of the Bible (III. xxiv. because out of love he has come within reach of human fellowship, but none has ever measured his greatness and essence. (cf. II. xiii. 3) Without apophatic controls the wonder of revelation and restoration is necessarily eroded. In this passage (III. xxiv. Irenaeus clearly contrasts our certain knowledge that God has made and sustained all by his Word and Wisdom, with our ignorance of God *secundum* ... *essentiam*-- not that we can even understand God completely Kar' olKovofttav. "Who understands his hand, which comprehends all things?" (IV. xix. 1) The Gnostic elite fondly pretend to "knowledge of the unspeakable greatness," itself constituting perfect redemption. Irenaeus however appeals to Scripture; the prophets foretold that God should be seen by men, but " not in respect of greatness of glory, since the Father is incomprehensible, but in respect of his *love,* kindness, and infinite powers." Transcendent grace, not human noetic prowess, is the ground of the Christian hope.

Irenaeus proclaims that the Father is knowable *only* through the Son/Word. The Word realizing that the Father is invisible and infinite as far as we are concerned, " and that *none* other could declare him (IV. vi. 1-7) .... declares him to us by his manifestation."

The Incarnation of the Word, unique *mensura Patris,* (IV.

iii. 2) is in fact the point of coalescence of negative and positive in the theology of Irenaeus. Christ is set forth as sole revealer of the Father, "the Incomprehensible [made known] by the comprehensible, the Invisible by the visible, since there is none beyond him who exists in the bosom of the Father." (cf. III. xii. 6) The Son is the unique way to knowledge of God, for " since it is impossible without God to know God, he teaches us through his Word to know God." (IV. v. 1) The whole process of revelation is grounded in the gracious will of the Father: we can only know what he deigns to teach us by his Word, " since the Father is invisible and unapproachable to created things." (Dem. 47) Citations could easily be multiplied to illustrate the paradox that, although God is ineffable regarding his nature and greatness, (IV. xx. 5) yet he is by no means unknown. He freely reveals himself in the Incarnation, and this truth is implanted in our hearts by the Spirit, (V. i. 1) " who sets forth in our hearts the dispensation of the Father and the Son." The philosophical conundrum raised by the Gnostics-and later the Arians-is left unresolved by the religious teaching of Irenaeus: if the Divine Father remains incomprehensible *in se,* how can the Son reveal him to us, *if* he is God in exactly the same sense as the Father is God? Irenaeus is concerned simply to assert that with God, immeasurable in power and greatness, what is inconceivable to men becomes possible, that" those who draw near to God have access to the Father through the Son." (Dem. 47) Moreover, this revelation is a vivifying vision since, as we shall see, to know God is to share in his life. "For if the manifestation of God in creation gives life to all on earth, how much more does the revelation of the Father through the *Word* give life *to those who see God."* (ibid.)

The paradox remains: God is indeed invisible and ineffable, yet men, renewed by him, do see and know him. What to the metaphysical speculator becomes a stumbling block can be simply accepted by the man of faith at the hands of the Transcendent God.

4) *The limitations of Theology.*

Irenaeus is clear that an awareness of our inability to know God *in se* should result in an increased sense of our dependence on him in matters of revelation. Hence his reaction against the arrogance of Gnostic *cognoscenti* claiming *natural* knowledge of the high matters of theology.

Irenaeus is unashamedly un-Greek in his neglect of abstract speculation for its own sake. God is for him a datum, not a problem, and his revelation in Christ a free gift for all alike. Hence his opposition to the " vain imaginings " of the Gnostics whose myths are a stumbling-block to the simple and obstruct the shining of the light of the Gospel. We cannot hope to improve on the doctrine of the Apostles who, far from disclosing "unspeakable mysteries" to an elite, "openly taught the salvation revealed to all." (III. v. I) They were endowed with all perfect [i.e., necessary] knowledge at Pentecost. (III. i. 1) This is why the Catholic Church is sole repository of truth. (III. iv. 1)

But this problem goes beyond the ecclesiological. The esoteric pretensions of the heretics spring from a lack of piety, proper reserve in religious matters, a failure to understand the *gratuitousness* of revelation. " Let us not be embarrassed because God has reserved for himself things that are beyond us." (III. xiii, 2-3) Man is as inferior to God in knowledge as the creature is to its Creator. (II. xxv. 3) This is not surprising, for we are quite ignorant even of many things of sense. Gnostic heresy comes (as Dr. Chadwick has pointed out) from the itch to speculate where Scripture has given no clear guidance. We must be content not to know where the Word of God is not explicit and accept the finally irreducible nature of its teachings. Indeed if we knew God comprehensibly, we would no longer be creatures, for to know God *fully* would be to be divine.

The Gnostic claim to exceed orthodox Scriptural limits in matters beyond creaturely capacity to grasp [and/or unrevealed by God] implies a fundamental lack of trust and love.

(II. xxvi) We must not seek to rise above God and find one above the Creator: such reflections are opposed to our natures; and insolent attempts to fathom God lead only to madness. (c. f., II. xxv. 3) Rather, it is better to be among the simple who attain nearness to God by love. (II. xxvi. 1) To see the root of false *gnosis* not so much in intellectual error as in failure of love is typical of Irenaeus. The heretics are devoid of that fundamental sense of dependence which springs from any real awareness of transcendence and dream of an unknown other above God. (III. xxiv. 2) They impudently try to " change God himself " and refuse to learn of the Father from the Son (IV. ii. 5): they consider human speculations more reliable. The Gnostics despise a God who out of love has come within reach of human knowledge. But we know that "as regards greatness and essence ... this none has handled or measured." We are not called to speculate about the Divine Nature but to believe that it is the Only True God who has vivified us by his Word and Wisdom. (cf. IV. xx. 1-4) Such despisers rob themselves of the gifts of life. (II. xix. 1) In their insatiable desires they " attempt to be god before becoming (true) men " and to destroy the distance between God and creation (IV. 28. 4)- a salutary reminder of the place of *patience,* humble waiting upon God, in the Christian life. We see the results of this refusal to accept the limits of Scripture in the fluctuating, random, and often bizarre nature of Gnostic teaching, all " handed down according to inclination." (I. xxi. 1-4)

We can surely infer from these passages the basic principle that we are dependent on God for any knowledge we possess of him: where God has not revealed the mystery of his person, man is utterly ignorant. Irenaeus is clear that Scripture only tells us what we need to know, that we may have faith and obedience (c£. IV. v. 1: "By God alone can God be known"). Where blanks in our knowledge of God exist, it is not for us to try to amplify our circumscribed knowledge by our own speculations. Scripture shrouds, as well as reveals, the mystery. This points to a fundamental hiddenness in divine matters

which no Gnostic *theologie savante* can hope to plumb. Why, for instance, rack one's mind concerning the generation of the Word? (cf. II. 18. 5) Since the generation of the Word is *ineffable,* how can the Gnostics dare discuss it " as if they had assisted at his birth?"

This refusal to " act as midwife to the Word " might, in a wider context, be thought to have an obscurantist ring. It is the *Charisma* of the Bishop to expound the great central truths of Christianity enshrined in Scripture and transmitted in the Apostolic Church. The difference between this explication and Gnostic elaborations is that the former limits itself to finding in Scripture solution of problems which Scripture intends to solve, not what God has not seen fit to reveal. Biblical texts are not so many counters to be manipulated according to individual preferences or virtuosity. Intellectual gifts must not be suppressed but used to clarify (not pervert) Apostolic teaching. We must *exercise* ourselves in the "mystery and administration of the Living God, and increase in love of him who has done such great things for us." (II. xxviii. 1) But the revelation of the mysteries can only be left to God, " that God should forever teach, and man forever learn . . . that ever truly loving him, we may hope to receive from him boundless riches in *inexhaustible* instruction." *(ibid.,* 88) In both these two passages loving dependence on God is clearly seen as *sine qua non* of any real advance in knowledge of God. But we note also the human requirement of " exercise," and also the ultra-positive content of this true *')'VWtrt<;.* There is explicitly said to be no limits to the depths which such a disciple may find in the mysteries God reveals. (cf., doctrine of *epectasis* in Gregory of Nyssa)

Irenaeus rejects the double standard of the alleged Apostolic preaching of the Demiurge to the .simple, but the " declaration of the unspeakable mystery to those capable of comprehending the unnameable Father " (III. v. 1) through " parables and enigmas." The Apostles, like Christ himself, are no respecters of persons.

All believers are capable of receiving the gifts of the Spirit, (I. iv) though all do not progress equally in knowledge. There are degrees of advance within the Church, as God gradually grants "fuller illumination of the mind." (IV. 29. 1) Weak eyes cannot bear the full light all at once. The achievement of the more advanced does not depend on a discovery of a " higher god " but on greater efforts to penetrate and assimilate (I. x. 3) the truth of Scripture as a whole (*TJ {J1ro0ecrt<;* r.ry., murew<;)• Divine study should by no means dissipate the mystery but should lead one to increasing and adoring contemplation of it. Significantly, where (IV. iv) Irenaeus lists the great "mysteries " of Scripture set forth for our instruction, he ends with the ecstatic cry of Paul, " 0 the depths of the riches of the knowledge of God! " (Rom xi. 33)

All this is slowly opened up to the spiritual man (according to his advance in *yvwcrt<>),* and he comes to see how Christ is the key to the whole history of salvation, a great mystery of creative and redemptive *agape.* For the" *dise-ipulus spiritualis vere ree-ipiens spiritum Dei ... omnia ei constant."* Thus we may say that Irenaeus (as well as Clement) has an ideal of the the " true Gnostic " ; but it is a hope of perfection democratized. Knowledge of God is open to all (III. v. 1) who strive to progress in love in the power of the Spirit and who are fully incorporated into the living tradition of the Church. (cf., IV. liii.) As Bouyer observes, "True *yvwcrt<;* is indistinguishable from the Apostolic *didae-he* fully realised." This then provides the inexhaustible content of Theology for Irenaeus.

The otherness of God should inform our attitude to the Incarnation. The surpassing majesty of God is the measure of his condescension and love in becoming man. We do not possess God in his greatness by the Incarnation, but we can know him in his goodness and love. The heretics blasphemously despise (III. xxiv. 2) a God who out of love has come within reach of human knowledge. They cannot accept-because devoid of a proper sense of awe and dependence-that Christ gives us the power we do not have by

nature: not only to come to know God but to become his sons. This reconciliation and adoption is beyond our capacities both to conceive and achieve; and unless we recognize the transcendence of the Giver, we will not have the humbleness to accept Christ as pure gift. Conversely, we are not dealing with the Otherness of a static Essence; and unless we allow the *agape* revealed in Christ to be determinative of our concept of God, the Incarnation will remain what it is for the Gnostics, a metaphysical absurdity.

We are not to think of God and man as an antithesis o£ two incompatible substances but as a communion of persons, which presupposes distinction as much as it does mutual devotion. We are involved in a relationship (not an opposition), in which God freely gives and man receives. The life God bestows is not something alien to our nature but that by which we grow and become more truly ourselves. In so advancing, we also become more *like* God, thus realizing the purpose of our Creation, fellowship with God. But man is never transmogrified into God. The doctrine o£ transcendence means God alone is Creator and Life-giver. The Glory of man is always to accept re-creation at the hands of God, thus allowing his original creation *in imagine Dei* to become complete.

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HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS: AQUINAS ON THE HOLINESS OF THE EPISCOPAL STATE

"PERHAPS IN SOME more adequate Church we could ask for more, but at the present time in England they (the bishops) provide merely an administrative context within which the really vital and immediately relevant institutions can exist. . . . It would be quite unrealistic to expect them to be sources of enthusiasm and original thought." [1] If the negative experience of episcopate that finds expression in the above lines were ever to become the experience of Christian people as such, it would be difficult to imagine a more radical departure from what the episcopate should mean in the life of the Church. That what is most vital in the Church should have to find its normal expression outside the context of an ecclesial life centered on the bishop would mean an ecclesial situation that would run directly counter to a tradition that stretches right back to earliest Christian times. For Ignatius of Antioch, in whose writings we find the first clear references to the monarchical episcopate, " the bishop is, in a certain sense, the incarnation of the Church over which he presides, in such a way that to receive him is to receive his Church, to contemplate him is to contemplate his Church," [2] and in the middle of the third century St. Cyprian of Carthage could write " the bishop is in the Church and the Church in the bishop." [3]

If the relationship between Church and bishop is so intimate, then the distinctive marks of the Church should manifest themselves in a special way in the bishop. That the apostolicity of

[1] H. McCabe, "Comment," in *New Blackfriars* 48 (1967), p. !188.

[2] G. Bardy, *La Thiologie de l'Eglise de saint ClCment de Rome* d *saint [renee*

[3] Ep. 66, par. 8 (ed. Hartel, CSEL, t. 3.!l, p. 733).

the Church is verified in a special way through the line of episcopal succession is a constant of Christian tradition.[4] While individual bishops are the principle and foundation of unity in their local churches, they manifest as a college the unity and catholicity of the universal Church (cf. *Lumen Gentium,* 22, 23). So too with regard to the holiness of the Church. A most ancient and constant liturgical and patristic tradtion expects the bishop's primacy to be a real primacy in the Spirit, constituting him in his Church the incarnation of that holiness to which his flock is called.

There is no question in this article of justifying this last assertion in detail. Our task is to show how this tradition was taken over and developed by St. Thomas. It finds its systematic expression in his doctrine, so juridical and odd-sounding at first sight, on the episcopate as a state of perfection. Its ecclesiological significance lies in the fact that it is the classical medieval expression of the doctrine that the often neglected mark of the Church, her sanctity, should shine forth in her bishops above all others. It has also, perhaps, a more immediate relevance today. At a time when people are experiencing a renewed thirst for the things of the spirit, when they look for gurus in the paths of prayer and Christian experience rathei than administrators, it confronts us with an episcopal ideal that has ben largely lost sight of, with a contemplative and charismatic episcopate whose primacy is a real primacy in Christ. It also indicates in the process the broad lines of a priestly spirituality rooted in the Church's tradition.

I. The Bishop and His Sanctity in St. Thomas.

A. *The Bishop in the Church.*

As a preface to a consideration of episcopal perfection it will be useful to situate our subject by saying a few words on what we might call St. Thomas's mystique of the bishop. It will en-

[4] Cf. A. M. Javierre, "Le theme de la succession des ap(\tres dans la litterature chretienne primitive," in *L'Episcopat et L'Eglise Universelle* (Paris, p.

able us to see the significance of the episcopacy in the eyes of St. Thomas and bring home to us the fact that he sees more in him than a mere superior functionary in the Church.

The bishops are the successors of the Apostles.[5] This is a commonplace enough statement, but it had not exactly the same sense for a medieval theologian as it has for us. " We think of an historical succession of individuals possessing by transmission, and exercising, the same function, and this idea is exact. The ancients, however, thought more in terms of the permanence of a certain *type* . . . . "[6] The bishop, therefore, has a sign-value in the Church insofar as he represents for the Christian community what the Apostles represented for the primitive Church.

But it is not only the Apostles that the bishop represents in the Church. Where the ruling of the Church is concerned he is also the vicar of God.[7] St. Thomas sees him acting in the place of God in a special way when he confers mission on others to preach the word of God.[8]

But above all, the bishop " takes the place of Christ in the Church."[9] Every Christian priest, it is true, acts " in persona Christi,"[10] but the bishop represents Christ in a more perfect way:

> The priest, indeed, represents Christ insofar as he himself fulfilled a certain ministry; but the bishop represents him in this that he instituted other ministers and founded the Church.U

In summary

[5] Cf., e. g., II *ad Cor.,* c. 1, lect. 1 (ed. Marietti, par. 4); *Summa Theologiae,* III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3.

[6] Y. Congar, "Aspects ecclesiologiques de Ia querelle entre mendiants et seculiers dans Ia seconde moitie du XIIIe siecle et le debut du XIVe," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age,* t. 28 (1961), p. 62.

[7] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3.

[8] *In loannem,* c. I, lect. 4 (ed. Marietti abbreviation: Mar., par. 112); *In Romanos,* c. 10, lect. 2 (Mar.; par. 838).

[9] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 72, a. 3, ad 3.

[10] *Ibid.,* q. 22, a. 4.

[11] *IV Sent.,* d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3.

insofar as he [the bishop] is a public person he possesses in the Church the image and place, not of himself, but of Christ.[12]

As a result of his special place in the Church which makes of him the image of Christ,

the bishop, in a special way, is called the spouse of the Church, as is Christ.[13]

This relationship to the Church is symbolised by the bishop's ring, for the Church has been espoused to Christ through the sacraments of faith, and the bishop is the spouse of the Church in the place of Christ.[14]

As spouse of his Church in the place of Christ the bishop has now responsibilities to fill in her regard. He must devote himself totally and for life to her well-being. In fact, the essential notes of the episcopal office are in function of the mystical Body of Christ, for, as being in the image of Christ, the bishop fills the role of Christ in her regard. He is the image of *Christ the King* and as such he enjoys over the Church "a princely and quasi-royal charge."[15] He is the image of *Christ the Priest,* and as such is the *"divine high priest"* of his local Church; u "the *Pontiff* is bound ex officio to administer spiritual goods to his neighor, established, as it were, as a *mediator* between God and man, acting in the place of him who is *mediator* between God and man, Jesus Christ. . . . And hence he offers prayers and petitions to God as the representative of the people (in *persona populi)* . . . And again he takes the place

[12] *Quodl., VIII,* a. 7: " gerit typum et locum non sui-ipsius, sed alterius, scilicet Christi, in Ecclesia."

[13] *IV Sent.,* d. fl4, q. 3, a. *fl,* sol. 1, ad 3.

" *Ibid.,* q. 3, a. 3. On the importance in the Middle Ages of this idea of the bishop as the spouse of the Church cf. Cougar, *art. cit.,* pp, 105-106.

[15] *De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis* (abbreviation: *De Perf. V. Sp.)* c. fl4 (Mar., par. 715); cf. also *Quodl.* III, a. 17, ad *5; Summa Theol.,* III, q. *65,* a. 3, ad *fl.* " One must give a strong sense to the expressions that he [St. Thomas] employs to speak of the episcopal charge: cura *principalis* et quasi regalis: an office of prince "-Y. Cougar, "St. Thomas et les archidiacres," in *Revue Thomiste,* 57 (1957), p. 666.

[16] *Contra Impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem,* c. 4 (Mar., par. 90).

of God *(personam Dei gerit)* with regard to the people, ministering to them .... "[17] But above all, he is the image of *Christ the Prophet,* for the office of teaching has absolute precedence *(principalissimum)* over the other functions of the bishop.[18]

Successor of the Apostles, vicar of God, image of Christ as Prophet, Priest and King, and spouse of the Church-this high conception which St. Thomas has of the episcopate gives us already an indication of the sanctity he will require of the bishop.

B. *Designation to the Episcopate and Acceptance.*

Given the centrality of the bishop's position in the diocese and the fact that he was normally designated through election by the diocesan chapter, it was natural that the medieval theologians should turn their attention to the duties of electors in this matter.[19] One was obviously not justified in voting for a candidate purely on the basis of relationship or personal benefit. What exactly were one's obligations?

St. Thomas, who treats of this question in a number of places, requires that one elect as bishop the better *(melior)* candidate. However, he always specifies what he means by "better." Commenting on Our Lord's question to Peter: "Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?", a question which preceded the confiding of the Church to Peter's care, St. Thomas asks whether one is obliged to elect (as bishop, as is clear from the context) the one who is the better *simpliciter.* He replies that one is obliged in conscience to do so:

But, nevertheless, someone may be better *simpliciter-one* is thus called better who is holier, for it is holiness which renders one good-but may not be better with regard to the Church. In this

[17] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 16 (Mar., par. *655);* cf. *ibid.,* c. 18 (Mar., par 664).

[18] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 67, a. ad 1. We just mention the teaching function of the bishop in passing, for we shall be giving it special consideration later.

[19] On the bishop's position in the medieval diocese, the method of choosing him, his powers, etc., cf. G. Le Bras, *Institutions ecclesiastiquesde la Chretiente medievale,* Part 1, Books (Fliche, Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise,* vol. Paris, 1964, pp. 865-876.

latter respect, one is better who is more learned, more competent, and more discreet and who is elected with more concord. But if, those things being eqnal which regard the utility of the Church and greater suitability in this respect, one chooses the one who is less good *simpliciter,* then one sins .... [20]

This is the constant position of St. Thomas. In the other texts in which he treats of this point he expresses in various ways the qualities which render one better for Church government. The elect should be the one more suited for instructing, defending, and peacefully governing the Church, [21] the one more endowed with" industry, knowledge, capacity *(potentia),* and other such qualities." [22]

Where qualities of personal holiness are concerned, St. Thomas asks for no more than the minimum:

. . . One should elect to the prelacy or to ecclesiastical office one who is good *simpliciter;* because by a mortal sin one is rendered unworthy of performing anything of a spiritual nature. . . . It is not however necessary that one always elect the one who is the better *simpliciter.* [23]

Given his doctrine on episcopal perfection, this minimalism of St. Thomas is at first sight astonishing. But St. Thomas is in no way departing from his doctrine on the high sanctity required of the bishop. What suffices to render one apt for election will no longer suffice once one has been consecrated as bishop. If one has not reached perfection before this, then after consecration

One must strive to he pre-eminent over others in knowledge and sanctity ... However, it is not to be imputed to one if, before undertaking the prelacy, one was not more excellent than others. [24]

However, we must conclude that on this point of the choosing of a bishop St. Thomas shows himself less exigent

[20] *In Joan.,* c. 21, lect. 8 (Mar., par. 2620).
[21] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 185, a. 3.
[22] *Quodl.* VIII, a. 6; cf. also *ibid.,* ad 2.
[23] *Ibid.,* corp.
[24] *Summa Theol., loc. cit.,* ad 2

where spiritual qualities are concerned than many of the patristic and liturgical witnesses that we have considered.

Corresponding to the duties of the electors we find an elaborate doctrine on the attitude that one should adopt with regard to the acceptance of the episcopate. Here two points were of particular interest to the medieval moralist. Could one legitimately aspire to the episcopate? And if one were appointed or elected to this office, what should one's attitude be?

On the first point, the doctrine of St. Thomas is quite clear. In principle, to desire the episcopate is " vicious." His most elaborate treatment of this point is found in the *Summa Theologiae* (II-II, q. 185, a. 1). Here he distinguishes three aspects of the episcopate: the episcopal activity, by which the bishop dedicates himself to his flock; the high rank of the bishop; and the various benefits which flow from the episcopate, such as honor and material security. The desire of the episcopate for either of the last two reasons is clearly vicious. But surely it is virtuous to desire to be of service to one's neighbor? St. Thomas concedes that such a desire is, in itself, praiseworthy and virtuous but, nevertheless, because of the sublimity of rank attendant on the episcopal state he judges that the desire to occupy a position of superiority over others, even though it be to benefit them, is a desire not free from the vice of presumption.

St. Thomas specifies in another place in what this presumption consists: one judges oneself superior to others " because greater honor and power belong only to those who are better." [25] But this is not the only sort of presumption involved. Later on in the same chapter he asserts that, since the bishop's task is to lead his flock to perfection, he himself should be perfect. Thus, to desire the episcopate, even for the most worthy of motives, is to assert by implication that one considers oneself perfect,. which is presumptuous. [26] The last text is a key one

[25] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 19 (Mar., par. 673).

[26] *Ibid.,* (Mar., par. 674). The same doctrine is found in *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 185, a. 1, ad *fl.*

for St. Thomas's doctrine on the perfection of the bishop; we shall return to it later to analyse it in more detail.

But what of the case where one is elected or appointed to the episcopate? Must one always refuse if one is to avoid the sin of presumption? St. Thomas touches on this point in a number of different places, and there seems to be a certain development in his thought.[27] His final position is that expressed in the *Quodlibetum* V, a. 22, which dates from 1271. I£ one is elected to the episcopate, then it is praiseworthy to accept out of fraternal charity, so that one may help in the salvation of one's neighbors. On the other hand, the one who refuses out of humility is also worthy of praise, for the greatest suitability is required for the episcopate. St. Thomas's preference goes to the man who adopts the second line of conduct, for, since it is extremely difficult to know if one is sufficiently purified for the undertaking of this high office, it is safer to decline it.[28]

What concerns us more directly is to know why St. Thomas advises refusal. In *Quodlibetum* V, a. 22, it is because one is never sure whether one is sufficiently purified *(purgatus).* In this same corpus St. Thomas refers to the " *maxima idoneitas* " required for the episcopate. What is this *idoneitas?* He tells us in another place: " a man becomes suitable for the pontifical throne in virtue of a pre-eminent charity *(per caritatem excellen.tem)* ."[29] In a text in which he is most negative on the question of acceptance of the episcopate he states his motive clearly:

Such a one can rightly desire the episcopate who is sufficiently equipped for the episcopate. But for this no one is suitable, because a prelate, in virtue of his rank and because of a certain fittingness *(secundum gradum et convenientiam),* should be pre-eminent over all others in behavior and contemplation, so that in comparison

[27] For a table of the various positions of St. Thomas cf. *Summa Theologica* (Deutsch-Iateinische Ausgabe), Band 24: Staude und Standespflichten, Heidelberg-Graz, 1952), p. *375.*

[28] However, it is the constant teaching of St. Thomas that one may not obstinately refuse if the divine will is clearly manifested, as would be the case when a formal command by one's superiors is involved---d. *De Perf. V. Sp.* c. 19 (Mar., par. *675); Quodl.* V, a. 22; *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 185, a. 2.

[29] *Quodl.* III, a. 9.

with him the rest are as a flock. It is the greatest pride to presume that one has this suitability. . . . And hence the episcopate is not to he accepted unless it is imposed.[30]

To conclude this consideration of St. Thomas's attitude toward desiring and accepting the episcopate we could say that his position is in general negative, and the reasons he invokes have their roots above all in the sanctity that is expected in the episcopal state.

C. *Sanctity and Holy Orders.*

For St. Thomas " the hierarchy is something that is properly social: it is based, not on interior, personal sanctity, but on a power that is of a public nature; the hierarchic situation does not necessarily coincide with the level of grace or of sanctity, of intelligence or of natural gifts." [31]

This power is conferred by the sacrament of Orders: " For whenever anything spiritual is conferred by means of a bodily sign, one has a sacrament. It is clear therefore that in the conferring of a spiritual power there is question of a sacrament, which is called the sacrament of Orders." [32] By this sacrament one receives "a certain excellence of power in matters that pertain to the divine ministry." [83] In this the sacrament of Orders differs from Baptism for, while the principal effect of the latter is the interior purification worked by the infusion of grace, the infusion of grace is not of the essence of the sacrament of Orders; it is the communication of a spiritual power that is primary. [34] Conversely, one's rank in the hierarchy is not determined by one's level of personal sanctity but by the sacrament that one has received.[35]

In this clear distinction which he makes between the power of Orders and personal sanctity St. Thomas dissociates himself

[80] I *ad Tim.,* c. 8, lect. 1 (Mar., par. 9).

[81] Congar, *art. cit.,* in note (6), pp.

•• *IV Contra Gentiles,* c. 74.

•• *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 84, a. 4.

•• *IV Sent., d.* q. 1, a. 1 sol. ad 1 ad

[35] *Ibid.,* q. 1, a. 8, sol. 8.

from the doctrine of the Pseudo-Denis. As is well-known, St. Thomas gives, wherever possible, a benign interpretation to statements of the great figures of antiquity with whose doctrine he is not in agreement. Such is the case on this point. Thus, citing the text of Denis in his letter to Demophilus in which the Areopagite clearly teaches that a sinful priest is no priest, St. Thomas interprets it to mean that a priest who falls into grave sin is unworthy *(indignus)* of any spiritual ministry.% But such reverent treatment cannot conceal the radical difference between the two doctors. St. Thomas parts company with Denis

> above all in separating the personally possessed quality of illumination and hierarchical function. For Denis, hierarchical quality is a quality of existence, it corresponds to an ontological degree of participation in the divine light. For Thomas, it is a question of *potestas*. ... For Denis, as is known, one can illuminate only if one is oneself illuminated; the efficacy of an excommunication or of an absolution depends on the spiritual dispositions of the minister. St. Thomas knows these texts of Denis and rejects the doctrine contained in them . . . The whole of the answer of St. Thomas is based on a true notion of the hierarchic structure of the Church, which rests on sacramental and juridical realities that are, of themselves, of a public order. Likewise, to the extent that this expression belong to his vocabulary, Thomas Aquinas understands by " hierarchical acts " not a superior activity in the line of personal qualities but sacramental acts proceeding from the *potestas* that is constitutive of the sacrament of Orders . . . The hierarchical priesthood is likewise constituted not by a virtue that allows one to act well with regard to a personal end but by a power, ordering a man to the placing of the hierarchical acts of which we have spoken.[37]

But to assert that for St. Thomas the essential element in performing hierarchical acts is the power conferred on the minister by the sacrament of Orders and not personal sanctity is not to say that he considers the holiness of the minister as being of no importance.

[86] *Quodl.* VIII a. 6.

[87] Congar, *art. cit.*, in note (6), pp. 123-125.

On the negative side, St. Thomas asserts that one who is in the state of mortal sin is unworthy of any spiritual office[38] and that in performing a sacred function in such a state one sins mortally.[39] The reason is that ministers should be conformed to the Lord whom they serve; to act in God's name while they themselves are offensive to him through their sin is to be guilty both of irreverence towards God and, insofar as in them lies, of contamination of sacred things.[40]

But freedom from sin is only the minimum requirement. While the sacraments would be valid even if the minister were in sin-a minister does not communicate his own grace but that of Christ-nevertheless it is fitting that the minister should have a higher sanctity than those to whom he minister.[41] For this fitting exercise of the ministry, nothing less than an *"amplissima gratia"* is required.[42]

St. Thomas is quite precise on this sanctity required for the exercise of Orders:

> Eor the suitable exercise of Orders no ordinary goodness suffices, but a pre-eminent goodness is required: so that just as they who receive Orders are placed in rank above the people, so they may be superior to them in merit of sanctity.[43]

Though ministers may not be in an ecclesial state of perfection, nevertheless an inner perfection is required of them for the worthy exercise of sacred action;[44] in fact a greater sanctity is required of them than is required even of those who are in the state of perfection of religious.[45]

St. Thomas gives various motives for this requirement of sanctity in those constituted in holy Orders. Before one pre-

[38] *Quodl.* VIII, a. 6.

[39] *IV Sent.,* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 5.

[40] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 64, a. 6.

[41] *IV Sent.,* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3, ad 2; cf. also *Summa Theol., loc. cit.,* a. 5 ad 3 and a. 6 ad 1.

[42] *IV Sent.,* d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

[43] *Ibid.,* d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3.

[44] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 6.

[45] *Ibid.,* a. 8.

sumes to lead others to God, one should oneself be most like to God *(Deo simillimus);* [46] one called to be a mediator should shine before men by a good conscience. [47] The sanctity required of a minister of the Eucharist is singled out for special mention, because

> by holy Orders one is deputed for most elevated functions, by which one ministers to Christ himself in the sacrament of the Altar, for which a greater inner sanctity is required than is demanded in the religious state. [48]

Finally, while the holiness of the minister does not affect the efficacy of the sacraments themselves, nevertheless the efficacy of the annexed prayers can be increased by the *devotio ministri*.4a

It is precisely the sacrament of Orders which gives to the minister the grace to live up to the demands of sanctity that his office imposes on him. The fact that St. Thomas insists so much on the aspect of the communication of a spiritual power does not mean that he loses sight of the aspect of the communication of a grace of sanctity. In one text, in fact, this aspect is the only one mentioned:

> the efi.ect of this sacrament [i.e., Orders] is an increase of grace, so that one may be a suitable minister of Christ. [50]

In each Order the *septijormis gratia* of the Spirit is given. [51] Just as no ordinary goodness but a *bonitas excellens* is required of a minister, so:

> there is required as a pre-requisite [to ordination] a grace which renders one a worthy member of Christ's people; but in the reception of Orders itself there is conferred a further gift of grace, by which those ordained are rendered worthy of greater offices. [52]

[46] *IV Sent.,* d. q. 1, a. 8, sol. 1.

''' *Ibid.,* ad

[48] *Summa Theol., loc. cit.*

•• *Ibid.,* III, q. 64, a. 1, ad

[50] *De Articulis Fidei et Sacramentis Ecclesiae.* Earlier in the same opusculum, however, he does mention the impression of a character.

'''IV Sent., d. q. a. 1, sol. 2.

•• *Ibid.,* q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 8.

From what has been said it is clear that there is a definite teaching in St. Thomas on the inner sanctity required of those in Holy Orders. It will have been noted that so far we have made no explicit mention of the bishop. In fact, however,-and without prejudice to the question of whether or not the episcopate was regarded by the older Thomas as a sacramental order-what has been said of the sanctity required of. other ministers applies a fortiori to the bishop.

For the whole plenitude of this sacrament is in one Order, namely, in the priesthood; but in others there is a certain participation of orders; and this is signified by what the Lord said to Moses . . . " I will take of your spirit and give it to these so that they may share the burden of the people."[58]

Now in the line of the priesthood the bishop holds the first place:

For just as we see that the whole hierarchy finds its consummation in Jesus, so each local one finds its consummation in its own divine high-priest, that is, the bishop.[54]

Certain sacred actions-notably the administration of the sacraments of Confirmation and Orders-are reserved to him.[55] Unlike the simple priest, he wears the vestments of the inferior ministers because

the power of the ministers is in the bishop as in its origin; but it is not in the priest, since he does not confer these orders.... [56]

[68] *Ibid.,* q. a. 1, sol. 1, ad

[6'] *Contra Impugnantes ...* , c. 4 (Mar., par., par 90).

[66] Cf. *IV Sent.,* d. q. 8, a. 8. The bishop's office as minister of these two sacraments presupposes a special sanctity in him. " The imposition of hands takes place in the administration of the Church's sacraments to designate a certain copious effect of grace, by which those on whom hands are imposed are linked, as it were, by a sort of similitude to the ministers, in which the abundance of grace ought to be present. And hence the imposition of hands takes place in the sacrament of confirmation, in which is conferred the plenitude of the Holy Spirit; and in the sacrament of Orders, in which there is conferred a certain excellence of power with regard to the divine ministry." *Summa Theol.* III, q, 84, a. 4.

•• *Ibid.,* ad 8; "ipsa sace1·dotalis potestas ab episcopali derivatur." *IV Cont. Gent.,* c. 76.

Hence we can say that the sanctity demanded for the worthy exercise of Orders will be demanded above all from one constituted in the episcopacy.

D. *The Gratia Episcopalis.*

Sanctity is required of the bishop, then, since he is the one to whom pertains *par excellence* the exercise of Holy Orders. But can one be more precise on episcopal sanctity and say that St. Thomas holds for a specific grace of the episcopate?

It is here that one might discuss the question of St. Thomas's position on the sacramentality of the episcopate. However, we do not intend to consider the point here. The reason is not that we consider the question of episcopal sacramentality to be of no interest in a discussion of episcopal perfection-quite the contrary is the case, for the massive testimony of Fathers and liturgies shows that the most profound source of episcopal sanctity is to be sought along these lines. But the very fact that the question is still disputed means that nothing certain can be deduced with regard to St. Thomas's position on episcopal perfection if one uses his position on episcopal sacramentality as a basis.[57]

But there can be no doubt that St. Thomas holds for a special grace of the episcopate. When, in fact, he asserts that the episcopate is not an order,[58] that it is" *magis dignitas quam ordo,"* [59] we must understand him exactly. To the objection that Denis speaks of only three orders, and hence that a sevenfold division is not justified, he replies:

[57] On the much discussed question as to what St. Thomas's position of the episcopate might have been had he lived to write the tract on Orders for the *Summa,* cf. especially L. Lecuyer, "Les etapes de l'enseignement thomiste sur l'episcopat," in *Revue Thomiste* 57 (1957), pp. and J. A. Ramirez, *De Episcopatu ut Sacramento deque Episcoporum Collegia* (Salamanca, 1966), pp. Both authors maintain that S. Thomas held for the sacramentality of the episcopate at least at the end of his career. The present writer must confess that he remains unconvinced.

[58] *IV Sent.,* d. q. a. 1, sol.

[59] *ArtiC'lfli.'JFidei et f$acramel(ltis*

Denis speaks of Orders not insofar as they are sacraments but insofar as they are ordained to hierarchical acts; and hence, on the basis of these acts, he distinguishes three orders: the first of whom, namely the bishop, has all three [acts]; the second, that is, the priest, has two; but the third, the deacon, has one, namely, to purify .... But Orders derive their sacramental nature from their relation to the greatest of sacraments; and it is on this basis that the number of sacraments should he calculated. [60]

Hence Orders can be looked on in two ways, and this twofold consideration lies behind one of the clearest texts that St. Thomas has left us on the episcopate. To the assertion that the episcopate is not an order he replies:

The assertion ... that the episcopate is not an order is clearly false, if this be understood absolutely. For Denis says expressly that there are three orders in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, namely, those of bishops, priests, and deacons . . . For the bishop has an order with regard to the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church; over which he receives a princely and quasi-royal charge. But with regard to the true body of Christ, which is contained in the sacrament, he does not have an order over the presbyter. The fact that he has a certain order and not merely jurisdiction ... is clear from the fact that the bishop can do many things which he cannot commit to others, such as confirm, ordain, ... consecrate basilicas, etc: whereas those things which pertain to jurisdiction can be committed to others. The same is clear from the fact that if a deposed bishop is re-instated he is not re-consecrated, indicating that the power of Orders remains, as happens with other Orders (*tamquam potestate ordinis remanente, sicut et in aliis contingit ordinibus* ...) "

Hence the power of the bishop is truly a *potestas ordinis,*[62] and one can truly speak of the *ordo episcoporum;* [63] and the ceremony by which one is assumed into this *ordo episcoporum* is a true ceremony of ordination. [64]

[60] *IV Sent., loc. cit.,* ad I.

[61] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. (Mar. par. 715); cf. also *IV Sent.,* q. 3, d. q. I, a. ad

[62] *Ibid.,* d. q. 3, a. sol. ad 3.

[68] Cf. *Contra Pestiferam Doctrinam Retrahentium Homines a Religionis Ingressu* (abbrev.-Contra *Retrahentes,* c. 16 (Mar., par. 853).

6. Cf. *Summa Theol., 11-II,* q. 184, a. *5 De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 16 (Mar., Par. 656).

This last text we have referred to brings us directly to the question of a special episcopal grace. In this ordination ceremony, in fact, a special grace is conferred. St. Thomas seems to be quite explicit. Showing how there is both a quasi-profession ceremony and an external solemnity in the conferring of the episcopate, he writes:

Hence the Apostle says, in Tim. 6:12: "You confessed a good confession before many witnesses," that is, " at your ordination," as the gloss says. There is found also a certain solemnity of consecration with the above profession: as we read in II Tim. 1:6: "Stir up the grace of God which is in you through the imposition of my hands," which the Gloss expounds as being the *"gratia episcopalis."* [65]

However, this text is not as clear as it might appear at first sight. One may ask whether a grace of sanctity is in question or merely the conferring of the power of Orders, which is certainly a grace also. In fact, we read in a later text of St. Thomas:

In conferring the Church's sacraments one imposes hands to indicate a certain copious effect of grace ... And hence the imposition of hand takes place in the sacrament of Confirmation, in which the plenitude of the Holy Spirit is conferred; and in the sacrament of Orders, in which is conferred a certain *excellence of power* in what pertains to the divine ministry; hence II Tim. 1: 6 says.... " [66]

Commenting on St. Paul's admonition to Timothy not to neglect the grace given him by the imposition of hands, St. Thomas understands by this grace " either the episcopal dignity, or the gift of knowledge, of prophecy or of miracles." [67] It is only in commenting on that other admonition of Paul urging Timothy to stir up the grace that is within him through the imposition of a grace of sanctity:

And he [Paul] adds "[the grace] which is in you through the imposition of my hands," an imposition performed by him, that is,

[65] *Ibid.*
[66] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 84, a. 4.
[67] I *Tim.,* c. 4, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 173) .

who ordained him a bishop. In which imposition of the hand was given to him the grace of the Holy Spirit . . . For there is a twofold spirit, that of this world, and that of God. The difference between them is this: spirit signifies love, because the name of "spirit" implies a certain impulsion, and love impels. Now there is a double lov.e, namely, love of God, and this is through the Spirit of God, and love of the world, and this is through the spirit of the world.[68]

A grace of sanctity, then, is conferred on the bishop at his consecration. That this is a particularly abundant grace IS signified by the rite of imposition of hands itself because:

By the imposition of hands there is given a plenitude of grace, by which those ordained [S. Thomas is here considering only priests and deacons] become suitable for great oflices.[69]

To conclude this consideration of what can be deduced on episcopal sanctity from a consideration of the holiness required of those constituted in Orders, we can summarize by saying that St. Thomas expects a pre-eminent holiness of those called to exercise the sacred ministry: what he says of Orders in general applies *a fortiori* to the bishop, who alone can perform all the sacred functions and from whom are derived in a participated way the powers of the other ministers. As in the case of the sanctity of other ministers, this sanctity has its source in the grace of the sacrament of Orders. While it is not certain whether St. Thomas held for a special sacramental grace of the episcopate, or whether the sacramental grace of the bishop IS

[68] II *Tim.,* c. 1, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 13-14).

[69] *IV Sent.,* d. 24, q. 2, a. 3. One might ask at this point if the doctrine of St. Thomas that the imposition of hands at episcopal consecration confers a grace of sanctity does not make of this rite a sacrament. Fr. Lemonnyer, who posed the question in these terms, satisfactorily answered it by showing that S. Thomas likewise held that a number of other rites-such as the consecration of monks and virgins and the anointing of kings--confer grace, and yet denied at the same time that they were sacraments (cf., e. g., *IV Sent.,* d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, ad 9; d. 38, q. 1, a. *5,* ad 2). Hence one cannot argue with certainty from the fact that grace is conferred with the episcopate to the sacramentality of the latter. Cf. A. Lemonnyer, "Memoire theologique sur l'episcopat" :part two, in *La Vie Spirituelle* (April, 1936), :p:p. [40]-[4Il.

that which he holds in common with the presbyter, he does maintain that there is a special episcopal grace which is conferred on the imposition of hands during the ceremony of episcopal consecration.

II. The State of Perfection of the Bishop.

Since perfection already acquired is distinctive of the episcopal state, we should investigate how St. Thomas understood " state of perfection " and its realization in the bishop as contrasted with the religious.

A. *The Notion of State.*

At the time when St. Thomas was obliged to express in very precise terms his doctrine on the states of perfection-during his second teaching period in Paris (1Q69-1Q7Q)-the expressions *ordo (officium)* , *status* and *gradus* were used indifferently by the secular theologians of the time.[70] Hence, the first step in the elaboration of his theology on this point had to be an exact definition of what he meant by " state," involving a corresponding precision of the notions of office *(officium)* and rank *(gradus).* Thoughout the many texts which date from this period of his career he never fails " to define *status (per-*

[70] Y. Cougar, *art. cit.,* in note (6), p. 66. Since frequent reference will be made in what follows to "prelates," a few words on what this term implied are called for. In our period the Church prelate was, in general, one who had pastoral jurisdiction (cf. Cougar, *art. cit.,* p. 66). Hence, having discussed the state of perfection of bishops and religious, St. Thomas can go on to ask " whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in a state of perfection," and proceed to discuss the situation of "presbyters and deacons with the charge of souls" *(Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 6) .... However, speaking more precisely, St. Thomas can say that "the bishop alone is, properly speaking, a prelate of the Church ... But the priests who have charge of souls are not prelates simpliciter but, as it were, coadjutors " *(IV Sent.,* d. q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1--cf. Cougar, *art. cit.,* p. *95).* It is the bishop who is, strictly speaking, the pastor, succeeding Christ and the Apostles in this office (cf. *In loan.,* c. 10, lect 3- Mar., par. 1398). In one very important text St. Thomas speaks of the state of perfection of prelates, and it is clear that he is referring to bishops (cf. *In Matth.,* c. 19-Mar., par. 1594-1595). We must judge each text from the context, but in general we will find that when St. Thomas speaks of prelates he is thinking of the bishops.

fectionis) with a constancy and a force which leads us to suspect that this notion is an essential element of his representation of the Church and of his own condition as a religious. The whole nub of the position in his confrontation with the Seculars is found in his very precise notion of *'status.'"* [71]

In the final, synthetic expression which he gives to his position in I-II, q. 188, a. 1 (written about 1272) we read in the " *sed contra* " the text from Roman law that gives us the source from which St. Thomas derives the sense that he gives to the word " state." " When a summons has been issued in a process in which life or state is involved, then one must act personally, and not by means of investigators (exploratores) ." [72] St. Thomas adds, correctly, that state in this text is to be taken in the sense of freedom or slavery.

In the body of the article St. Thomas justifies this use of the word " state." The verb *"stare,"* from which the word " state " is derived, involves two elements in its meaning. In the first place, it signifies a situation of the body which is most in keeping with man's nature. The natural situation for man is to be in an upright position, head in the air, feet on the ground. Hence one who sits or lies down is no longer in the most natural position and can no longer be said to " stand." In the second place, a certain immobility is required. Thus a man who is moving around is no longer " standing."

Going beyond the primary, physical sense of the word, one can speak in an analogous way of the properly human state or condition of a man. In this sense, a man's state will be judged on the basis of something that is intrinsically related to the human person and not on the basis of something accidental; and, in the second place, this condition must be of a permanent nature, must have a certain fixity. Thus St. Thomas requires

[71] Cougar, *art. cit.,* p. 85.

[72] The text is corrupt, and should in fact read " procuratores," not " exploratores." On this text and St. Thomas's use of it, cf. J-A Robilliard, "Sur Ia notion de condition (status) en S. Thomas," in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 25* (1936), pp. 104-105.

for a properly human state " an immobility m what pertains to the condition of a person" (ad 3).

Now the most basic human distinction between persons living in a society is not that which depends on their wealth or on their honorable rank but rather on their condition as *"sui iuris"* or *"alieni iuris."* [73] If the element of permanence be added to such a condition of the person, then one is constituted in a state. The element of permanence is necessary, for a man may be " *alieni iuris* " for a limited period only-thus a minor, though *"alieni iuris,"* does not change his state on reaching his majority, for the element of permanence was lacking in his condition as *"alieni iuris."* Hence the basic human states, as St. Thomas conceived of them, were those of being permanently " *sui iuris* " or permanently " *alieni iuris,"* i. e., " state refers, properly speaking, to *freedom* or *slavery,* whether it be in the spiritual or civil spheres." [74]

Not every one who serves is a slave, nor is every one who does not serve a free man. A slave is one who is obliged to serve; a free man is one who is absolved from this obligation. But, in human society, this obligation, or the absolution from it, is not sufficient in itself to constitute a man in a civil state of slavery or freedom. The change of state must be accompanied by a certain solemnity, as is customary among men when anything involving perpetual binding force is in question. The contract is thus given greater firmness. [75]

[78] " It seems that that alone to the state of a man which has reference to the obligation of the human person: insofar, namely, as one is "sui iuris" or " alieni iuris." On this text Cajetan notes: " Our author never says that ' state ' demands an obligation in every state: but he says that each state ' has reference to an obligating.' There is all the difference in the world between these two. For the first requires that every state have an obligation to that which is proper to the state. But for the second it suffices that there be reference to an obligation, so that under 'obligation' one can distinguish affirmatively and negatively, i.e., one may have an obligation or one may not have it. And in this way the state of a free person is distinguished from that of a slave: because servitude has an affirmative reference to obligation, while liberty has a negative one" (In 11-II, q. 183, a. 1. n.

[74] *Summa Theol.,* 11-II, q. 183, a. 1.

[75] *Ibid.,* q. 184. St. Thomas mentions the civil solemnity which accompanied the manumission of a slave, cf. *De Perf.* V. Sp., c. (Mar., par. 711).

Furthermore, a totality of commitment is necessary to constitute one in a state. A person, in fact, may oblige himself to serve another in a particular task only. In such a case he cannot properly be said to surrender his freedom, and hence his state does not change. "If, however, he puts himself totally in the power of another, in such a way that he retains no freedom of action for himself, then he changes his condition *simpliciter,* becoming *simpliciter* a slave." [76]

Finally, to distinguish clearly between state, office, and rank, St. Thomas defines office in terms of relationship to an activity to be exercised, and rank *(gradus)* in terms of any superiority or inferiority. [77]

B. *The Notion of State of Perfection.*

These precisions of St. Thomas were meant to serve as no more than an introduction to his consideration of what is involved in a state of perfection. Hence, from the physical sense of the word " state," and then the properly human sense, St. Thomas goes on to discuss what" state" involves when applied to the realm of the spirituallife. [78]

Just as the basic human states are those represented by liberty and servitude, so the basic spiritual states are those which are seen in function of one's spiritual servitude or freedom. Here St. Thomas can invoke St. Paul in his support.

The Apostle, contrasting the situation of Christians before their conversion with their present one, speaks in terms of a " servitude with regard to sin, liberty with regard to righteousness " which has been replaced by " liberty with regard to sin, servitude with regard to God" (cf. Rom. 6: 910-9191).

Glossing this text St. Thomas explains that: " there is servitude to sin or righteousness when a person is inclined either to evil from a habit of sin, or is inclined to good from a habit of righteousness." As the inclination to evil grows there is a

[76] *Ibid.,* c. *15* (Mar., par. 651).
[77] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 183, a. 1, ad 3.
[78] Ibid., a. 4.

corresponding freedom from the inclination to good; as the inclination to good grows there is a corresponding freedom from the inclination to evil. Since habits are the resultant of human acts, one is personally responsible for the state in which one finds oneself. Human effort is particularly required when it is a question of freeing oneself from sin to subject oneself to righteousness. The subjection to righteousness will normally be attained only progressively, so that one speaks in this context of the states of beginners, proficients, and perfect.

St. Thomas treats of these three states when discussing the different grades in the growth of charity.[79] The charity of beginners is characterized by the struggle to acquire liberty from the state of servitude to sin, that of proficients by the effort to adhere more and more to the good. When this habit inclining towards righteousness has become a second nature, so that one is now constrained, as it were, by a profound inner urge to a total commitment to the good, charity is perfected. Corresponding to these three grades of charity are the states of beginners, proficients, and perfect.

But a state, as we have seen, involves the element of a *total* commitment. A person who serves another while reserving a certain liberty to himself is not properly in a state of servitude. Thus the states of beginners and proficients are states only in an imperfect sense; they have an inner tension towards that state which, constrained by an interior law, is a total yielding of oneself to God.[80] It is only this last state, that of the perfect, which is a state in the full sense.[81]

It is at this point that a closer analysis of the nature of Christian perfection is called for. Christian perfection is the

•• *Ibid.,* q. £4, a. 9. It is hardly necessary to insist on the fact that, for St. Thomas, Christian perfection is a perfection of charity. He treats of this in a number of places: cf. esp. *De Perf. V. Sp.,* cc. 1-2 (Mar., par 559-563), and *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 1.

[80] Cf. *Quodl.* I, a. 14, ad £.

[81] Thus, in the prologue to q. 184 St. Thomas speaks of "the state of perfection, to which the other states are ordained " ; cf. the useful remarks of Cajetan on this point fo1lnd in his CO!J.lmentaryon q. 183, a. 1 (n. 3).

perfection of charity. But the precept of charity as found in the Gospel is two-fold: one must love God with one's whole heart, and one must love one's neighbor as oneself. Hence perfection consists primarily in the love of God, secondarily in the love of one's neighbor.[82]

With. regard to the love of God there is a triple perfection. God can be loved to the extent that he is lovable; such a perfection of the love of God would require an infinite power of loving, and hence is found in God alone. In the second place, God can be loved with such a totality that the lover is ever totally and actually borne towards him in love; such a perfection of charity can be found only among those who enjoy the Beatific Vision. Finally, God can be loved with the totality that is consonant with the condition of wayfarer, i. e., the lover excludes, as far as in him lies, everything that would absorb his attention and tie him to the things of earth "so that the mind may more freely tend towards God, contemplating him, loving him, and doing his will."[83]

The call to th:ls perfection of the love of God is not reserved to a chosen few but is given to all, and the command has no limit.[84] Every Christian is called to the full perfection of charity. We have already remarked that there are many factors necessarily involved in man's pilgrim condition which prevent a totality of concentration on God comparable to that open to the blessed. These are limit-situations from which man cannot escape. However, these limiting conditions can be reduced to a minimum by the exclusion of certain human concerns which, while not inconsistent with the perfection of charity, nevertheless render its attainment more difficult. It is precisely towards the elimination of these non-essential absorbing factors that accompany the human condition that the counsels of

[82] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. (Mar., par. 562-568).

[88] *Ibid.,* cc. 8-6 (Mar., par. 564-569). St. Thomas also speaks here of that minimum perfection of God's love without which charity cannot be preserved (c. 5), but this aspect does not concern us here.

[8]· *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 8-III *Sent,* d. a. 8, sol. St. Thomas specifies: to actually be perfect is not of precept, but to *tend* to perfection.

poverty, chasity, and obedience are geared.[85] St. Thomas is careful to emphasize, however, that perfection is not found in following the counsels but in obedience to the precept of the total love of God and neighbor. The counsels are no more than instruments for the more effective acquisition of this love by the removal of those things, non-essential for the individual, which are impediments to the act of the love of .God.[86]

Perfection consists secondarily in the love of neighbor, and in this regard also there are varying degrees of the perfection of love. As in the case of the love of God, there is a perfection of the love of neighbor which is not possible in this life-one cannot actually love every human person in his individuality.[87] At the other end of the scale there is that minimum perfection of love of neighbor without which fraternal charity cannot be preserved. This requires a love of neighbor that is true, ordered, holy, and efficacious, excluding everything that is contrary to this love.[88] Between both of these, there is a perfection of love of neighbor to which everyone is called, but which is not a matter of precept, and without which charity can be preserved. Such a love can attain perfection in three directions: with regard to extension, intensity, and efficacy.[89]

[85] In *De Perf. V. Sp.* St. Thomas devotes a long section (cc. 7-10, Mar., par. 570-608) to a consideration of the value of each of these " ways to perfection " in turn.

[86] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 8. St. Thomas treats in a number of places of this question of the relationship between precepts and counsels-d. esp., *Ccmtra Retrahentes,* c. 6 (Mar., par. 757-767), and, above all, *Quodl.* IV, qq. At the time when he wrote these last questions, towards the end of his second Paris period, St. Thomas had come to realize the importance of stating with absolute precision the relation between precepts and counsels, for he saw that many of the theses of the Seculars in the quarrels about the states of perfection were based on fundamental misconceptions on this point; cf. P. Glorieux, "Contra Geraldinos ... ", in *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale,* 7 (1985), pp.

[87] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. *i'l,* ad 8.

[88] The minimum requirements for a real fraternal charity are developed at length in *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 13 (Mar., par. 6£6-685).

[89] St. Thomas analyzes in detail each of these dimensions under which ·fraternal charity can reach its highest perfection here below in *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 14, (Mar., par. 686-649). What follows is a summary of the doctrine in this key text. The same matter is treated much more briefly in *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 2 ad 8.

With regard to extension, purely natural love embraces those bound in friendship in any way and may even extend in a general way to complete strangers providing there is nothing in them that makes them obnoxious in any way. But that one should love one's enemy is a grade of love that is properly Christian. But even this love of enemies admits of degrees. It may not go beyond the minimum necessary to fulfil the precept: in such a case one does not exclude one's enemy from the general love that one must bear for all men, and one must be ready to show him love and assist him as an individual should a case of necessity arise. But that one should seek out one's enemies to show them special love and to benefit them even when there is no question of necessity is a perfection of love which, while all are called to it, is nevertheless not a matter of precept and without which charity can be preserved. St. Thomas remarks that such a love can only come from an abundance of the love of God. When love of God is
then the loveableness of one's neighbor as an image of God more than counter-balances the aversion that one feels towards him on the purely human level. This precision will be of importance when it comes to showing how the episcopal state, seen in terms of the love of neighbor, is superior to the religious state, defined in terms of the love of God.

In the second place, there are grades of intensity of the love of one's neighbor. The intensity of one's love can be gauged from what one is willing to sacrifice to benefit the person loved. In the first place, there is a willingness to surrender one's possessions; in the second place, there is a willingness to spend oneself totally by a lifetime of bodily toil in the neighbor's interest. But beyond this sacrifice of external goods and goods of the body, there can be a willingness to sacrifice life itself to benefit one's neighbor. This is the sign of the greatest possible love, as the Lord himself testifies. In a case of necessity one is obliged to sacrifice one's bodily life for the salvation of the neighbor's soul. But, outside such a situation, freely to expose oneself to the danger of death for the spiritual good of one's neighbor pertains to the perfection of fraternal charity.

Finally, the perfection of fraternal love can be judged from the effect that it produces. In this respect St. Thomas judges that a greater love is shown in devoting oneself to the spiritual good of one's neighbor on the human plane-by teaching, advising, etc.,-than by devoting oneself to his purely material well-being. But the greatest love of all is shown by devoting oneself to the properly supernatural well-being of others by communicating to them spiritual goods, "namely, doctrine on divine things, direction on the path to God, and the spiritual communication of the sacraments." [90] An additional perfection is added to this last degree if these goods are communicated not only to one or two but to a whole group. [91]

In his precise theology of the states of perfection St. Thomas thus restricts the use of the phrase " state of perfection " to designate a clearly defined reality in the life of the Church, and hence he habitually distinguishes between being perfect and being in a state of perfection.

C. *The Ecclesial State of Perfection.*

St. Thomas has defined a spiritual state in terms of spiritual liberty or servitude. Now such a spiritual condition may be of two sorts: it may have reference to the purely interior life of a man-in which case " state of perfection " is identified with the state of being perfect-or it may be something which pertains to the external forum and is of a public nature. God

[90] The critical edition of the *De Pm-f. V. Sp.* reads " the communication of the spiritual sacraments," which make more sense (ed. Leonina, c. 17, lines 23-24).

[91] In fact, in his prologue to q. 184, St. Thomas does use the phrase "status perfectorum," but the context indicates that he is referring to the states of bishop and religious. By an analogy of attribution St. Thomas can call " perfect " all those constituted in an ecclesial state of perfection. One might object that the element of *solemnitas* is lacking to this purely interior state of perfection. This is so if we limit *solemnitas* to something that involves an external manifestation. If, on the other hand, we see the essence of a spiritual *solemnitas* in a spiritual consecration (c£., *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 88, a. 7), then this is not lacking, for a choice divine blessing accompanies, and causes, entry into the perfect state of divine union. For a purely inner state of perfection no external manifestation is required. God solemnizes this state without the intervention of an ecclesial minister.

alone can judge whether or not a man is in a state of perfection in the first sense. But in the second sense " state of perfection " is something which belongs to the visible structure of the Church, and it is. this sense alone that St. Thomas intends ·when he speaks from now on of the "states of perfection."

To constitute an ecclesial state of perfection St. Thomas will require that the conditions laid down for the constitution of a state in general be realized. The conditions are, as we have seen: that one be obliged to serve or be absolved from this obligation; that this situation be of a permanent nature; that there be a totality in either service or liberty; and that the assumption of the state be accompanied by a certain solemnity.

Each of these conditions must be verified in the ecclesial state of perfection. Hence, in the first place,

> ... properly speaking, those are said to be in a state of perfection who submit themselves to a servitude with a view to fulfilling works of perfection. Now, it is clear that servitude is opposed to liberty. One's liberty to do something is taken away by a vow ... Hence, he who binds himself by vow to something, insofar as he submits himself to a necessity, makes of himself a slave, depriving himself of liberty .[92]

The first condition, then, for a state of perfection is that one binds oneself by vow to perform works of perfection.

In the second place, this obligation must be perpetual. If the obligation is only for a limited period, then one is not constituted. in a state of perfection. [93]

Thirdly, there must be a certain totality about this obligation.

> Should a person, therefore, bind himself by vow to perform any particular good work, he makes of himself, in a certain way, a slave-not *simpliciter,* however, but *secundum quid,* namely, in respect of that to which he obliges himself. If, however, by vow he should give his whole life to God *simpliciter,* for the performance

[90] *Quodl.* m, a. 17.

•• *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. (Mar., par. 679).

of the works of perfection for God's sake, he makes of himself a slave *simpliciter,* and is thus placed in a state of perfection .... [94]

Finally, it is required that this obligation be undertaken with a certain solemnity.[95] By " solemn " St. Thomas means something of a public nature, connoting the intervention of ecclesiastical authority .[96] The most profound reality of the states of perfection is the inner sanctity which animates them, but the states are essentially ecclesial and as such are incorporated into the external structure of the Church as a sign to the world of her inner sanctity. [97] It is precisely by the solemnity that accompanies the assumption of the state that this ecclesial status is conferred. Hence, though the external solemnity is not the cause of one's being in a state of perfection-for the cause is the perpetual obligation to perform the works of perfection-nevertheless it is the indispensable sign.[98]

However, the solemnity which accompanies the introduction into a spiritual state involves more than an intervention of ecclesiastical authority. The solemnity which accompanies the assumption of any state is proportioned to that state, hence the solemnity which accompanies a marriage differs from that which accompanies the conferring of a knighthood. Now the assumption of a state of perfection-whether episcopal or religious-involves a vow made to God (cf. II-II, q. 19, a. 7). Hence the solemnity:

consists in something of a spiritual nature, which pertains to God: that is, it consists in a certain spiritual blessing or consecration *(ibid.,* q. 88, a. 7),

•• *Quodl.* III, a. 17; cf. also *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 15 (Mar., par. 651).

[95] *Summa Theol.,* 11-11, q. 184, a. 4; *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 20 (Mar., par. 681).

•• Cougar, *art. cit.,* p. 86, n. 146. This solemnity in the case of ecclesial states of perfection involves a solemn consecration or *benedictio* (coming from God through his ministers), which accompanies the assumption of the state-d. L.-B. Gillon, "L'Episcopat, etat de perfection," in *L'Eveque dans l'eglise du Christ,* (DDB) (1968), pp. 284-285.

[97] *Summa Theol.,* 11-11, q. 184, a. 4, first paragraph-to be read in conjunction with q. 188, aa. 2-8.

[98] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 24 (Mar., par. 711).

a blessing " of which God is the author, although man may be the minister" *(ibid.,* ad I) .

St. Thomas many times insists on the difference between being perfect and being in a state of perfection.

> But it is to be noted that it is one thing to be perfect and quite another to be in a state of perfection. For there are those who are in a state of perfection who are not yet perfect, and who may even be sinners, while there are others who are perfect but are not in a state of perfection.[99]

But does not this mean that a person who has entered a state of perfection, and yet is not perfect, is a hypocrite? No, because " men enter a state of perfection not as if claiming that they are perfect, but professing to tend to perfection." [100]

In summary, then, St. Thomas requires for an ecclesial state of perfection that one oblige oneself in a permanent and total way to the performance of the works of perfection and that this obligation be accompanied by an ecclesiastical solemnity, involving a divine consecration.

D. *The State of Perfection of the Bishop.*

The elaboration of the doctrine of the episcopal state of perfection represents an original contribution of St. Thomas to theology, although many of the elements which he employed in his own synthesis were already to be found in earlier theologians.[101]

For an ecclesial state of perfection St. Thomas requires a permanent and total obligation to the performance of the works of perfection, with an ecclesiastical solemnity accompanying the undertaking of this obligation. Now we have seen that the works of perfection are of two sorts. With regard to the perfection of the love of God the observance of poverty, chastity, and obedience are choice instruments for attaining to as total a dedication to God as is possible here below. Hence

[99] *Quodl.* III, a. 17; cf. also *Summa Theol,* II-II, q. 184, a. 4; *De Perf. V. Sp.,* cc. 15, 20 (Mar., par. 651, 679).

[100] *Summa: Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. *5,* ad 2.

[101] Cf. Gillon, *art.* cit., pp. 221-225.

they are works of perfection, insofar as they are means to perfection. Should one bind oneself by vow to the observance of all three counsels (necessary for the element of totality) by a profession recognized as public by the Church, then one is constituted in a state of perfection-the state of perfection of religious.[102]

With regard to the love of neighbor we have seen that there can be a perfection of this love with regard to extension, intensity, and efficacy. Should one permanently and solemnly bind oneself to a service of neighbor that is perfect in each of these three dimensions (necessary for the element of totality), then one is likewise constituted in a state of perfection. This is the state of perfection of bishops.[103]

The most complete treatment of this episcopal state of perfection is that found in *De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis,* c. 16.[104]

The perfection of charity with regard to extension is shown when one seeks out one's enemies to show them a special love

[102] Cf. *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 16 (Mar., par. 652); *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. *5.*

[103] There seems to have been a clarification of St. Thomas's thought on this point during the course of the controversies of 1269. *Quodl.* I, a. 14, ad 2 (March, 1269) sees both states of perfection in terms of the love of God. Both states are linked with the perfection of this love: that of religious-characterized by the three vows-is preparatory to this perfection; that of bishops-characterized by dedication to one's neighbor-is the effect of this perfection. Hence *both states are called states of perfection in reference to the love of God.* In the *De Perf. V. Sp.,* on the other hand, which dates from the end of 1269, the state of perfection of the bishop is seen *formally in terms of the perfect love of neighbor:* a love perfect with regard to extent, intensity, and efficacy. There is no mention of this perfection of fraternal love in *Quodl.* I, a. 12, ad 2. The position of the *De Perf.* is that found in *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. *5* (dates from
It is quite true that the perfection of fraternal charity can flow only from a perfect love of God; it is quite another thing to define the state of perfection of the bishop formally in terms of this love of God.

[104] Mar., par. *653-656.* The question is also treated in *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. *5,* but here St. Thomas contents himself with mentioning only one aspect of the perfection of fraternal charity: the bishop's obligation of laying down his life for his flock. Since the bishop is obliged to this in virtue of the assumption of the pastoral office, he is constituted in a state of perfection. Note the contrast in this same text between the two states of perfection: the religious are the *"abstinentes,"* the bishops are the *"assumentes."*

and to help them, even outside a case of necessity. But the bishop is bound to such a love in virtue of his office:

Since they [bishops] have undertaken the universal care of the Church,[105] in which are often found those who hate, persecute, and blaspheme them, they must show love and help to their enemies and persecutors. An example of this appears in the Apostles, whose successors the bishops are: for, living among their persecutors, they procured their salvation.[106]

That one should be ready to lay down one's life for the spiritual benefit of one's neighbor, even outside a case of absolute necessity, shows that one has a perfect fraternal charity with regard to intensity.

Bishops are likewise obliged to lay down their lives for the salvation of their subjects. For the Lord says, in John 1011: "I am the Good Shepherd. The Good Shepherd lays down his life for his sheep" ... From which words it is clear that it is necessarily linked with the pastoral office that, for the salvation of one's flock, one should not shrink even from mortal danger. [The pastor] therefore is obliged, in virtue of the very office committed to him, to that perfection of love which consists in laying down one's life for the brethren.[107]

The perfection of fraternal love with regard to efficacy consists in conferring on others properly supernatural benefits, ordained to their eternal salvation.

Likewise, in virtue of his office, the pontiff is obliged to administer spiritual goods to his neighbour, being constituted, as it were, a sort of mediator between God and man, acting in the place of him who is *the* mediator between God and men: Jesus Christ .... And hence he offers prayers and supplications to God in the person of the people . . . Again, he takes the place of God with regard to the people, in administering to the people, as it were by the power of God/[08] judgments, doctrine, example, and sacraments.[100]

[105] The Leonine text, has the much more significant reading " the care of the universal Church" (c. 19, line 25).

[106] Mar., par. *658.*

[107] Mar., par. 654.

>M "quasi virtute Domini"; the Leonine text has "quasi vice Dei" (c. 19, line 90).

[109] Mar., par. *655.*

In itself, however, this obligation to the perfection of fraternal charity is not sufficient to constitute a state. The element of permanence must be added. However, this element too is involved in the assumption of the pastoral office. St. Thomas sees the bishop, in virtue of his consecration, as being bound " by a perpetual and solemn vow to the retaining of the charge of souls." [110] To maintain that the fact that the bishop cannot surrender his charge without the permission of the Pope " is in virtue of a Church ordinance, is clearly false; [the necessity of a Papal dispensation] arises from the very obligation by which bishops oblige themselves to retain perpetually the charge of souls.[111]

To this perfection of fraternal charity-perfect with regard to extent, intensity, and efficacy-the bishop obliges himself " in his ordination or consecration ... Hence bishops are placed in a state of perfection, just as are religious.[112] This same or-

[110] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 189, a. 7. It is because this element of permanence is lacking that priests and archdeacons with the charge of souls are not in a state of perfection, though they may well " perform the works of perfection and be perfect in charity " *(De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. par. 680). "An evident sign of this [that they are not in a state of perfection] is that when one is perpetually deputed or obliged to something, the assumption of this obligation is accompanied by certain ecclesiastical solemnity . . . It is clear that no such thing accompanies the commission of an archdeacon or a parish priest, but such are simply invested with their charge . . . . " (ibid.,-Mar., par 681). Ordination does not suffice for this perpetual obligation, for, after ordination, they can always leave the care of souls and enter the religious state without consulting the bishop; or, with the bishop's permission, they can resign their charge and live on a prebend or in retirement *(Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 6). " One can abstract from all idea of the care of souls when one defines the presbyterate, because, in theory, there is nothing to forbid the idea of all priests deprived of jurisdiction; while, when speaking of the episcopate, one must keep in mind that by the very institution of Christ, the bishops are destined for the government of Churches." A. Martimort, *De l'eveque* (Paris, 1946), p. 19.

[111] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. (Mar., par. cf. J. Gaudemet, "Recherches sur l'episcopat medieval en France", in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law* (Vatican, 1965), p. 149: "Once designated, the bishop is bound to his see by a sort of mystic marriage, in principle perpetual. One of the most striking features of the episcopate of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is, without doubt, its great stability."

[112] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* 16 (Mar., par. 656).

dination serves to provide the final element required for a state of perfection-the solemn benediction or consecration, which is the external solemnity required for a spiritual state.[113] " [In the case of the bishop] the *consecratio,* the *benedictio* are evident. But one might still ask what is the connection which exists betwen the conferring of the power of Orders and the promise of a total giving of oneself to the works of fraternal charity, a giving which is essential to the state of perfection. Is it a question of a formal and essential connection? St. Thomas is in no doubt. It is truly *in* the consecration itself that *mancipatio* and promise intervene, the solemn consecration, however, being only a *sign* and not the cause of the state of perfection .... "[114]

The episcopal state of perfection, then, is seen in terms of the perfection of fraternal charity. For St. Thomas the episcopate is a true Order, to be seen in relation to the Mystical Body.[115] In virtue of this ordination, or episcopal consecration, the bishops are constituted *servi* of the people:

> Should anyone desire to have a primacy in the Church, let him know that this is not to possess a position of domination but of service. It is the duty of a slave to dedicate himself totally to the service of his lord: thus the prelates of the Church owe everything which they have, everything which they are, to their subjects.[116]

He may never desert his charge as long as he can be of use to his subjects, so that even such an excellent vocation as the religious life may not be embraced by him.[117] If he is needed, he must stay with his flock in times of danger, even at the risk of his own life.[118]

In normal circumstances this service of his flock will consist in the administration of "judgments, teaching, example,

[118] *Ibid.*

[1u] Gillon, *art. cit.,* p. cf. *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. *5.*

[115] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. (Mar. par. 715).

[116] *In Matthaeum,* c. (Mar., par. 1669); cf. also *Quodl.* III, a. 17; *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 17 (Mar., par. 660).

[117] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 185, a. 4.

[118] Cf. *ibid.,* a. *5; In loan.,* c. 10, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 1406).

and the sacraments," [119] the feeding of it " with word, example, and temporal aid." [120]

However, of all the functions of the bishop in relation to his flock, one holds pride of place, the office of preaching, the *"officium . .. principalissimum"* of the bishop. [121] So important is this office, and so closely connected is it with episcopal perfection, that we shall devote special consideration to it in Section III.

* * * * *

The sublimity of the episcopal state of perfection may be seen in a clearer light if it is compared with the state of perfection of religious.

We have already seen what is involved in the religious state: one obliges oneself by vow to the observance of the three counsels, which are instruments for the attainment of perfection. Hence St. Thomas can define the religious state as " school of perfection." [122] It is related to the perfection of charity as a preamble or preparation. [123]

The episcopal state, on the other hand, is related to the perfection of charity as an effect.[124] It is only because divine love has reached perfection in the heart of the bishop that he dedicates himself totally to his flock:

> For the perfection of fraternal love, as has already been said, derives from the perfection of divine love, which love has taken possession of the hearts of some to such an extent that they desire not only to enjoy God and serve him but also serve their neighbours for his sake ... It is dear that it is a sign of greater love that, for the sake of his friend, a man should serve another, than if he wished to serve his friend alone. [125]

[119] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 16 (Mar., par. 655).

[120] *Ibid.,* c. 17 (Mar., par. 660).

[121] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 67, a. ad 1.

[122] *Quodl.* IV, a. ad 7.

[128] *Ibid.,* I, a. 14, ad

[12, *Ibid.*

[125] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 18 (Mar., par. 668); cf. also *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 184, a. 7, ad St. Thomas is well aware of the objection that might be urged against this position, namely, that de facto those engaged in the active apostolate have

Hence one may not argue to the inferiority of the episcopal state on the grounds that it is seen in terms of the love of neighbor, while the religious state is seen in terms of the love of God.

The relation between the two states is clarified by the answer to the question of whether a religious who is raised to the episcopate is bound to the regular observances of his Order.

> The religious state pertains to perfection as a way of tending to it, while the episcopal state pertains to it as a certain magisterium of perfection. Hence the religious state is related to the episcopal state as a discipleship to a professorship (*disciplina ad magisterium)* and a disposition to its perfection. Now the disposition is not taken away when the perfection comes ... but is rather confirmed,-just as it behoves a disciple when he obtains a professorship ... to read and meditate even more than before.[126]

As a result of this relationship the episcopal state IS higher than any religious state:

> It is clear that a greater perfection is required so that one may confer perfection on others than that required in order that one may be perfect in oneself; just as it is greater to be able to make others of such a kind than merely to be of such a kind; and every cause is superior to its effect. Hence one must conclude that the episcopal state is of a greater perfection than any religious state whatever.[127]

And hence the famous distinction of St. Thomas on this matter:

often not attained the perfection of the love of God: "However, such a perfection of charity is not found in many who are devoting themselves to the good of their neighbors, in whom it is more a weariness of the contemplative life that has led to external activity than such a desire of it which would make it pertain to the perfection of love that they should lay it aside, as something beloved, for a time. But the defects of some cannot prejudice a state or office: that one undertake the care of others is to be considered an act of perfection, since it belongs to the perfect love of God and neighbor." *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 23 (Mar., par. 698).

[126] *Summa Theol.,* II-II q. 185, a. 8.

[127] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 17 (Mar., par. 658); cf. also *Summa Theol., loc. cit.,* q. 184, a. 7.

The state of perfection is two-fold: that of prelates and that of religious; but the word "state" is used analogically *(aequivoce),* because the state of religious is for the acquisition of perfection; hence it is said: " If you wish to be perfect," and if you wish to come to a state of perfection. The state of prelacy, however, is not for acquiring [perfection] for oneself but for communicating that which one has: hence the Lord said to Peter: " Peter, if you love me, feed my sheep " ; and he did not say: "If you wish to be perfect," etc.[128]

This brings us to the question of the relationship between the episcopal state of perfection and the actual perfection of the bishop. From what we have already seen there can be little doubt as to the nature of this relationship.

The episcopal state and the religious state are related to perfection in different ways, for the state of bishops presupposes perfection ... but the state of religious is a way [to perfection] and hence an already acquired perfection is not required but only that one tend to it should one not have it.[129]

The state of perfection of the bishop presupposes that he be actually perfect. While the link is not intrinsic-a bishop living in serious sin does not fall from the episcopal state of perfection [130]-nevertheless the very nature of the one demands that the other be present. This should already be clear from our comparison of the state of perfection of the bishop with that of the religious. However, let us consider here a few texts of St. Thomas which bear directly on this point:

Perfection of life is demanded as a pre-requisite *[praeexigitur]* to the episcopal state .... because, according to Denis, perfection belongs actively to the bishop, as to the perfector ... It is required that one be perfect if one is to be able to lead others to perfection .... [131]

He expresses the same idea even more strongly in another text:

[128] *In Matt.,* c. 19 (Mar., par. 1594). It is clear from what follows shortly afterwards (Mar., par. 1596) that St. Thomas means "bishop" here when he speaks of prelate. On the date of this text, cf. Gillon, *art. cit.,* p. 228, note 8.

[129] I *Tim.,* c. 8, lect. 1 (Mar., par. 90).

[130] Cf. *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 23 (Mar., par. 701).

[131] *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 185, a. 1, ad 2.

The religious state does not presuppose perfection, but leads to it; the pontifical dignity, however, presupposes perfection, for he who undertakes the honor of the pontificate assumes a spiritual magisterium ... Now it is *ridiculous* that one should become a master of perfection who does not know by experience what perfection is *[qui perfectionem per experimentum non novit]* ... When indeed the Lord committed the office of prelacy to Peter, he asked him: "Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?" and when he answered: "You know that I love you," he added: "feed my sheep." By this we are clearly given to understand that the assumption of the prelacy demands as a pre-requisite the perfection of charity. [132]

This is the clear doctrine of St. Thomas: the religious state is ordained to the acquisition of perfection, while the episcopal state presupposes it. However, one text poses a certain difficulty when an objector to his doctrine on the states of perfection maintains that this position would mean that all prelates and religious who are not actually perfect are guilty of a mortal sin of deception, in that by their state they profess to be what they are not. St. Thomas's reply makes no distinction between the states of perfection of the religious and of the bishop:

Men enter on a state of perfection, not as if professing that they are perfect but as if professing that they tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says ... "Not that I have already attained it, or am perfect: I follow after it, however, that I may by some means attain it." And later he adds: "Those of us therefore who are perfect, let us feel in this way." Hence one who undertakes a state of perfection is not guilty of lying or deceit if he is not perfect; but only if he renounces his intention of tending to perfection. [133]

Given the clear teaching of St. Thomas in other places on the perfection presupposed to the episcopal state, we cannot, on the basis of this alone, make of the episcopal state merely a higher form of the religious state, a superior way of tending

[139] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 19 (Mar., par. 674); cf. also *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 186, a. 3 ad 5: " The episcopal state is not ordained to the acquisition of perfection, but rather that one may direct others by means of the perfection that one already has ... "

[133] *Ibid.,* q. 184, a. 5, ad

to perfection. The bishop does not profess to tend to perfection; he professes to perform works of fraternal charity that presuppose perfection. It seems, then, that we must find the key to the interpretation of this text in a later passage of St. Thomas.

An objector, trying to show that only the candidate who is the most saintly should be chosen for the episcopate, quotes a text found in Gratian, in which it is stated that he who is constituted in a position of honor "is to be regarded as most wretched unless he is pre-eminent in wisdom and sanctity."[134] St. Thomas replies:

> This *auctoritas* is to be understood in reference to the preoccupation of one who is constituted in a position of honor; he should strive to present in himself one who precedes others in wisdom and sanctity ... However, it is not to be imputed to him as something blameworthy if before the assumption of the prelacy he was not more excellent ....[135]

St. Thomas's position, then, would seem to be this. Both the bishop and the religious are obliged to tend to perfection because of their state. However, the titles under which they are so obliged are different. The religious is bound to tend to perfection, because this is what is directly intended by his profession of the three vows; in his case, perfection is never presupposed but intended. In the case of the bishop, on the other hand, the acquisition of perfect charity is not what finalizes his state, as happens in the cast of the religious; in virtue of his state, the bishop is obliged to the performance of works which rather presuppose this perfection of charity. Hence, if he is to satisfy the obligation of his state, he must set about the immediate acquisition of perfection if he had not already attained it before his consecration. It is important, though, to realize that this tending to perfection is not what is directly envisioned by his state, as it is directly envisioned in the case of the religious. The bishop tends to perfection be-

[134] *Ibid.*, q. 185, a. 3, obj. 2.
[135] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

cause he should already have had it. He is striving to become what he should already be.

E. *A Traditicmal Compariscm.*

Before concluding this consideration of the perfection presupposed to the episcopal state, mention should be made of a traditional expression given by St. Thomas to this doctrine on the superior sanctity required of a bishop. He makes his own a comparison found in Gregory the Great, and likewise in Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom-the bishop should stand in the same relation of superiority to his people as does the shepherd to his flock.

Thus, showing that it is presumptuous to aspire to the episcopate, he remarks that " the prelate, in virtue of his rank and by a certain fittingnes, ought to precede all others in behavior and contemplation, so that, in comparison with him, the rest are as a flock." [136] He gives fullest expression to this idea in his commentary on Jesus' question to Peter as to whether he loved him more than the others:

> And he Jesus adds: "More than these," because, as the Philosopher also teaches in his *Politics,* he who presides and governs in the natural order ought to be more excellent ... So ought the prelate to be with regard to his subjects. Hence, according to Gregory, the life of the pastor ought to be such that in comparison with him the subjects may be as flock with regard to their shepherd. And hence [Jesus] says: "J\fore than these," for to the extent that one loves more, by so much is one the greater. [137]

III. The Doctoral Function of the Bishop.

A. *The Bishop as Teacher.*

Considering the forms which service of his flock should take, the bishop is obliged in virtue of his state to administer to the people, in God's name, " judgments, doctrine, example, and sacraments." [138] Among these episcopal functions, however, one holds pride of place, the teaching office of the bishop.

[186] I *ad Tim.,* c. 3 lect. 1 (Mar., par. 89).

[137] *In loan.,* c. 21, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 2619); cf. also *Quodl.* VIII, a. 6, ad 2.

[188] *De Pen'/. V. Sp.,* c. 16 (Mar., par. *655).*

For St. Thomas "prelates ... alone are the teachers of the Churches " ; [139] he can speak in the same breath, thus indicating the inseparable connection, of " the rank of prelacy and the office of teaching." [140] To the objection that "preaching the Gospel does not pertain to religious but above all to the prelates, who are the pastors and doctors," St. Thomas replies by acknowledging that preaching pertains to prelates *ex officio,* but he maintains that religious can also undertake the office if they receive a mission from those competent to give it. [141]

As we have already remarked when discussing the state of perfection of the bishop, the term "prelate" in St. Thomas's time designated in general one who had pastoral jurisdiction, but St. Thomas himself sees in the bishop alone one who is properly speaking a " prelate," since he alone has immediate jurisdiction in his diocese. [142] All the lower clergy are in total dependence on the bishop, since:

> the power of the priest by its very nature and by divine law is subject to the power of the bishop, since it is something incomplete *[imperfecta]* with regard to it ... The priest, however, who is subject to the bishop by divine law, is subject to him in all things. [143]

Hence the right of the local pastor to preach to his flock is a right ultimately derived from the bishop, and since it is a derived power, he himself cannot in turn confer canonical mission on others to exercise the apostolate, above all that of preaching. [144]

The bishop, then, being the only prelate in the strict sense, is the one on whom the preaching office primarily devolves. Among the offices of the bishop this one, and not the adminis-

[139] *Contra lmpugnantes,* c. 2 (Mar., par. 45).

[140] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 39, a. 3 ad 2.

[141] *Ibid.,* II-II, q. 187, a. 4 ad 2.

[142] Cf. supra, c. 13, note (138).

[143] *Contra lmpugnantes,* c. 4 (Mar., par. 157). "For St. Thomas, for the Franciscan doctors, there existed by divine law a structure of hierarchical dependence, in virtue of which all simple priests, be they parish clergy or religious, have to receive their powers from the bishops "–Y. Congar, *art. cit.,* in note (6), p. 77.

[144] Cf. Congar, *art. cit.,* p. 69.

tration of the sacraments, is the one that is absolutely primary *[prin.cipalissimum*]; [145] it is so characteristic of his state that if another should preach he is spoken of as exercizing an office that is properly episcopal. [146] In virtue of this the bishop is constituted the prophet, as it were, of his local Church. Having remarked that Scripture uses indifferently the words " pseudo-prophet," and " pseudo-apostle," St. Thomas goes on:

Now the office of the prophet and apostle is to be mediator between God and men, announcing God's words to men.... True prelates are true apostles. [147]

However, there is something particularly characteristic about the bishop's preaching, which distinguishes it from that of lower ministers, be they priests or deacons.

Instruction may be of many sorts. One is that which converts to the faith, which Denis attributes to the bishop ... and which can pertain to any preacher, and even to any lay person. Another is that instruction by which one is informed about the rudiments of the faith and about how one should prepare oneself to receive the sacraments. This pertains in a secondary way to ministers [= deacons], but primarily to priests. The third instruction is that which concerns Christian behavior, and this pertains to god-parents. The fourth instruction is that which treats of the profound mysteries of faith and the perfection of the Christian life, and pertains *ex officio* to bishops. [148]

This teaching o£ the bishop will take on the form of an exposition o£ the deep sense o£ the Gospel, for such is the proper sense of " teaching " [*docere]* when applied to the bishops:

To teach, that is, to expound the Gospel, is the proper office of the bishop, whose task it is to perfect, according to Denis . . . ; now to perfect is the same as to teach. [149]

[145] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 67, a. 2 ad 1.

[146] *Contra Impugnantes,* c. *5* (Mar., par. 167).

[147] *Ibid.,* c. 22 (Mar., par. 519, 521). On the link that St. Thomas establishes between preaching and prophecy cf. A. Rock, *Unless They be Sent* (London, 1955), pp. 21-22.

[148] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 71, a. 4, ad 3.

[149] *Ibid.,* q. 67, a. 1, ad 1.

B. Christ: *PTimus et PTincipalis DoctoT Fidei.*

The bishop's teaching office is concerned with the exposition of the profound mysteries of faith. In this he is continuing the work of Christ. Christ, in fact, is "the first and principal teacher of spiritual doctrine and of faith," [150] who carried out his redemptive mission insofar as " he showed us in himself the way of truth." [151]

Now " every action of Christ serves as instruction for us." [152] This dictum is verified in a special way when it is a question of preaching, that distinctive activity of Christ, for those who undertake the office of preaching, teaching, and the care of souls are the imitators of Christ *paT excellence.* [153] Hence the sort of life lived by Christ during the years of his public ministry should be the ideal of the bishop, his successor in the ministry of preaching.

Only two of those aspects which characterized the public ministry of Christ need detain us here because of their particularly close connection with the office of preaching. In the first place, St. Thomas sees in Christ the charismatic *paT excellence:*

> The *gratiae gratis datae* are ordained to the manifestation of the faith and of spiritual doctrine ... Hence it is clear that all the *gratiae gratis datae* were present to a superlative degree in Christ, the first and principal doctor of the faith. [154]

In the second place, the form of life adopted by Christ was of a very characteristic type--a type required of one called to be a teacher of the deep things of God. His active life of preaching was one which had its source in a life of profound contemplation. In Christ is found realized the ideal of the Christian teacher: *contemplata aliis tmdeTe:*

[150] *Ibid.,* q. 7, a. 7.

[151] *Summa Theol.,* III, proloque.

[152] *Ibid.,* q. 40, a. 1, ad 3.

[158] *In Matt.,* c. 19 (Mar., par. 1598).

[154] *Summa Theol.,* Ill, q. 7, a. 7.

That active life in which one gives to others, by preaching and teaching, those things which one has contemplated is more perfect than a life which consists in contemplation alone, because it presupposes an abundance of contemplation. And hence Christ chose such a life.155

Needless to say, the contemplative life of Christ was of a depth beyond the reach of any other " viator." Because of the nobility of his soul he attained to a most profound intimacy *[propinqui88ime]* with God in knowledge and love/[56] enjoying the beatific vision from the first instant of his conception.[157] He had the plenitude of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, with a consequent perfection of the *contemplatio viae,* as well as of the *contemplatio patriae.*[158] Yet, though the mode be unattainable, the form of life constitutes the ideal for the one who, in virtue of his office, succeeds Christ as the doctor of the faith-the bishop.

It seems that we can establish a parallel between the life of Christ as the *Doctor Fidei,* with its charismatic and contemplative characteristics, and that of the bishop.

C. *The Bi8hop a8 a Chari8matic.*

St. Thomas defines a charism, or a " *gratia grati8 data,"* as a gift of God which is not ordained to personal sanctification but which enables one to perform acts which exceed the power of human nature in itself, acts by which one cooperates in the salvation of one's neighbor.[159]

Thus defined, there is one sense in which the bishop's proceeding office quite definitely does not belong to the realm of the charismatic. Unlike the case of the Apostles, the saving truth which the bishop communicates in virtue of his office is a truth not acquired by inspiration but by hard study. Excusing modern preachers from the necessity of manual labor, St. Thomas writes:

155 *Ibid.,* q. 40,. a. I ad 2; cf. also a. Q ad 3.

156 *Ibid.,* q. 7, a. I.

157 *Ibid.,* q. 34, a. 4.

158 *Ibid.,* q. 7, a. *5,* corpus and ad 3.

159 *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 111, a. 1.

Modern preachers would be more easily impeded from preaching by manual labor than were the Apostles, who had by inspiration the knowledge of what they were to preach; since preachers of modern times must prepare themselves by continual study for preaching. . . .[160]

On the other hand, during the actual exercise o£ the preaching office the charisms still play their part, and, without overstraining St. Thomas's texts, we can see how they are linked in a special way with the episcopal office, precisely because the bishop alone is the preacher *ex officio.*

Commenting on the list o£ charisms given by St. Paul in I Cor. St. Thomas links the first three charisms- those o£ faith, the word o£ wisdom, and the word o£ knowledge-with the office o£ the teacher o£ the faith. By means o£ them:

a man is endowed with a plenitude of knowledge of divine things, so that he may *be enabled [possit]* to instruct others.[161]

To the objection that faith is not a charism but a virtue which pertains to personal sanctification St. Thomas replies that faith as a charism is not a theological virtue but rather:

it implies a certain pre-eminent certitude of faith, by which a man is rendered *suitable [idoneus]* for instructing others about what pertains to the faith.[162]

We have italicized" be enabled" and" suitable" because such words would seem to imply that these charisms should be found o£ necessity in the one who is the *doctor fidei* in virtue o£ his office. We find a confirmation o£ this, in £act, in an article £rom another part o£ the *Summa.*

St. Thomas, when treating o£ the gift o£ "wisdom" [*sapien.tia*], asks whether it is found in all who are in the state o£ grace. In his reply [163] he distinguishes two degrees o£ this wisdom, a gift which assures a rightness o£ judgment both in the contempla-

[160] *Contra Impugnantes,* c. *5* (Mar., par. 196); cf. also *Quodl. VII,* a. 18, ad 7; *Summa Theol.,* IT-II, q. 188, a. *5* (Where there is a direct reference to the bishop).

[161] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 3, a. 4.

[162] *Ibid.,* ad

[168] *Ibid.,* IT-II, q. 45, a. *5.*

tion of divine things and in the using of them as a rule for human activity *[divina et conspicienda et consulenda].* In the first degree of wisdom a sufficiency of the gift is conferred to enable one to work out one's own salvation, and all in the state of grace possess this degree of wisdom. St. Thomas goes on:

> Some, however, receive the gift of wisdom to a higher degree, both with regard to the contemplation of divine things insofar as they grasp and can manifest to others certain deeper mysteries; and with regard to the direction of human affairs according to divine rules, insofar as they can regulate not only themselves but also others in terms of them. And this degree of wisdom is not common to all in the state of sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the realm of charisms....

This ability to grasp and to manifest to others " certain deeper mysteries" *[altiora quaedam mysteria]* recalls the teaching office of the bishop, whose precise function is, as we have seen, the " *instructio de profundis mysteriis fidei."* [164] St. Thomas himself, in fact, links this second, charismatic, degree of the gift of wisdom with the office of prelacy in the answer to the second objection.

It seems, then, that one would not be guilty of unfaithfulness to the thought of St. Thomas to maintain that he establishes, at least by implication, a link between the charisms corrected with the teaching of the faith and the bishop considered as the *doctor fidei.*

D. *Contemplata aliis tradere.*

Because of his function as doctor of the faith, a distinctive type of life characterizes the episcopal state-the life of Christ the preacher, i.e., an active life flowing from a plenitude of contemplation.

The problem about whether teaching and preaching pertain to the active or to the contemplative life is one to which St. Thomas returns on a number of occasions. [165] In the *Sentences*

[104] *Ibid.,* III, q. 71, a. 4 ad 8.

[105] Cf. *Ill Sent.,* d. *85,* q. 1, a. 8, sol. 1, ad *8;De Verit.* q. 11, a. 4; *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 181, a. 8. For St. Thomas there are two sorts of teaching: that

St. Thomas offers two solutions. His first is that if teaching *[doctrina]* is ordained purely to a knowledge of the truth-even though there is question of communicating this knowledge to it pertains to the contemplative life; if, on the other hand, teaching is ordained to the urging of others to the practice of virtue-in which case teaching is identified with preaching-then it pertains to the active life. His alternative solution is that if teaching is seen as something that is for the the benefit of the teacher-insofar as it provides him with intellectual exercise and can lead to his own growth in knowledge-then it pertains to the contemplative life; but if it is exercized with a view to its effect on others, then it pertains to the active life.

It is this second solution which St. Thomas finally adopts in the *Summa.* Doctrine has a double object: the intellectual concept, and the person who is listening. With regard to the first object, doctrine may be seen as pertaining either to the active or to the contemplative life, depending on the intention of the teacher. But doctrine only becomes doctrine when it is given verbal expression and ordained towards the hearer. As such it belongs to the active life. Hence one could say that, simply speaking, teaching belongs to the active life. Thus St. Thomas can say later that the works of the active life are of two sorts, one being that which " is derived from a plenitude of contemplation: as are doctrine and preaching." [166] The life of prelates, then, is the life of Martha, traditional symbol of the active life.[161]

But one has not characterized with sufficient precision the life of the bishop by speaking solely in terms of the active life: the bishop's life is an active life of a very distinctive type. To the objection that the active life must be superior to the con-

which pertains to prelates and which is identified with preaching; and that which is proper to masters of theology. However, he sees the difference between them as more one based on one's *title* to teach than on the *matter* that one teaches *(docere sacram Scriptnram contingit dnpliciter ... em officio praelationis ... ex officio magisterii.-IV Sent.,* d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 4).

[168] *Snmma Theol.,* II-II, q. 188, a. 6.

[167] *ln loan.,* c. 12, lect. 1 (Mar., par. 1595),

templative life insofar as it is the life of the " *maiores* " in the Church, namely, the prelates, [168] St. Thomas replies:

The life which pertains to prelates is not the active life alone, but they should also excel in the contemplative life.[169]

The active life of teaching of the bishop, in fact, is a life " derived from a plenitude of contemplation." [170]

The reason why this sort of life is required of the bishop is, as St. Thomas repeats on a number of occasions, because of the bishops' function as mediator between God and his flock.

For since the bishop is constituted as a mediator between God and men, he ought to excel in action, insofar as he is constituted a minister of men, and he should be pr,eeminent in contemplation, so that he may draw *[hauriat]* from God what he gives to men.[171]

In this, the bishop shows himself a successor of the Apostles:

The Apostles are mediators between God and the people ... It was necessary therefore that they should draw from God what they poured forth to the people. Hence it was necessary that sometimes they should raise themselves to God by contemplation, so that they might grasp divine things *[ad percipiendum caelestia],* and sometimes that they should conform themselves to the people to pass on those things which they had received from God.... [172]

This last text allows us to see why contemplation is so important for the bishop: by means of it he can grasp, penetrate to the extent granted him by God, those " *profunda mysteria fidei,"* the instruction about which constitutes, according to St. Thomas, the distinctive preaching function of the bishop. [173]

[168] The third objection to this article *(Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 182, a. 1) as well as the quotation from Augustine in our objection (obj. 1) make it clear that by prelate here St. Thomas is thinking above all, if not exclusively, of the bishop.

[169] *Ibid.,* ad 1.

[170] *Ibid.,* q. 188, a. 6.

[171] *De Perf. V. Sp.,* c. 18 (Mar., par. 664); cf. *III Sent.,* d. *35,* q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3: "medii sunt inter Deum et plebem, a Deo recipientes per contemplationem et et populo tradentes per actionem."

[172] II *Cor.* c. *5,* lect. 3 (Mar., par 179).

[178] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 71, a. 4, ad 3. Obviously we cannot treat here of St. Thomas's doctrine on the active and contemplative lives in themselves, for it would take us too far afield. His main treatment of this subject is found in

But this contemplation presupposes perfection in the bishop, for one can attain to it only after the long exercise of good works/ [74]

The active life serves as a disposition for the contemplative life ... And hence, as long as a man has not reached perfection in the active life, the contemplative life cannot be pr.esent, except imperfectly and in an incipient way: for them the acts of the moral virtues cause one difficulty and one must give all one's attention to them, so that one is drawn away from the exercise of contemplation. But when the active life is already perfect, then the acts of the moral virtues come easily, so that one can freely give oneself to contemplation without being impeded by them .... And since it pertains to prelates to be perfect in both lives, insofar as they are mediators between God and the people, receiving from God by contemplation .and passing on to the people by action, they ought to be perfect in the moral virtues, as should also be preachers .... [175]

This way of life that characterizes the bishop insofar as he is the *doctor fidei* is normally designated as the " mixed life," to distinguish it from both the active and contemplative lives. There is no question here, however, of a third form of life that can take its place on an equal footing with the active and contemplative lives. For St. Thomas the division of human lives into the active and the contemplative is the most fundamental one, and it is adequate. [176] What he refers to as " the middle kind of life" is not a totally distinct form of life but is virtual-

II-II, qq. 179-18fl. It will suffice for our purpose here to describe contemplation as a simple intuition of the truth of faith (cf. II-II, q. 180, a. 3), illuminated by the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding (cf. III, q. 7, a. *5,* obj. 3), having its motive force in the love of God and neighbor (cf. II-II, q. 180, a. *fl,* ad I). By action, as opposed to contemplation, is meant the exercising of the moral virtues, whether those concerned with the acquisition of personal holiness or with one's relations with others (cf. *ibid.,* q. 181, a. 1); however, the active life is seen as having to do principally with one's relations with others (cf. *ibid.,* ... ad 1): and, in a Christian context, implies above all the exercise of the corporal and spiritual works of mercy-hence the definition of St. Gregory the Great, frequently quoted by St. Thomas: " The active life is to give food to the hungry and to teach the ignorant the word of wisdom." (cf. *ibid.,* a. 3, sed contra).

[1 ...] *Quodl.* IV, q. fl3, ad 16.

[175] *III Sent.,* d. *35,* q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3.

[176] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 180, a. *fl.*

ly contained under the active and contemplative lives, just as any medium is composed of extremes, and in such a life there will always. be a predominance of either the contemplative or the active aspect.[171] Such a threefold division into active, contemplative, and mixed is not so much " *ex parte vitarum* " as " *ex parte viventium."* St. Thomas elaborates on this point in the *Sentences:*

That third member [the composite life] is put forward by Augustine not as constituting a diversity with regard to forms of life but rather as constituting a diversity with regard to those who live them *[ad diversitatem viventium].* For there are some who concentrate mainly on the works of the active life, although they also engage in the acts of contemplation from time to time. There are others, on the contrary, who, laying aside the cares of the active life occupy themselves mainly with contemplation. Others again occupy themselves with both. There are, however, certain activities which require both such as preaching and teaching which, begun in contemplation, terminate in action, going as it were from cause to effect; and such a middle [way of life] is included in the extr.emes.178

As is clear from this last text, a simple juxtaposition of action and contemplation-the third of the four possibilities mentioned by St. Thomas-is not sufficient to constitute a " mixed life." Thus a Cistercian who divides his time between contemplation and teaching non-religious subjects in a school is not leading a " mixed life," as St. Thomas would conceive of it. For such a life there must be an intrinsic link between the contemplation and the activity; one communicates in activity what one has penetrated in contemplation.[179] Such is the life

[177] Cf. *ibid.,* ad *fl.*

[178] *III Sent.,* d. 85, q. 1, a. 1, ad *5.*

[179] "Ordo contemplationis ad praedicationem et doctrinam non est in hac vita apostolica ordo medii ad finem-tunc namque haberemus vitam activam-verum ordo formae ad materiam, non quidem formae extrinsecae-prout contemplatio inspirare potest et alere redemptionem captivorum omnino pariter ac peregrinorum susceptionem-sed formae intrinsecae: non enim praedicatores hi vel doctores tradunt quidvis ex contemplatione, sed tradunt contemplata-sic intellectus speculativus fit extensione practicus et amor Dei se extendit usque ad proximum, quin praxis sit finis speculationis, vel proximus sit finis amoris Dei." P. Lumbreras, *De Sta#bu$ lfominum Variis* (Madrid, 1957), p. fl4£, .

of the bishops, " to whom it pertains to contemplate not only for their own benefit but that they may instruct others." [180]

Such a sublime life presupposes, obviously, a great sanctity in the bishop, so that, in addition to the other titles in virtue of which sanctity is linked with the episcopal state, titles which we have already discussed, perfection is required of the bishop in virtue of his office as the *doctor fidei.* So St. Thomas can say, when discussing the most perfect form of religious life:

The work of the active life is two-fold. One, indeed, which is derived from the plenitude of contemplation: such as teaching and preaching ... And such is preferable to simple contemplation. Just as it is a greater thing to illuminate than merely to shine, so it is a greater thing to give to others those things which one has contemplated *[contemplata aliis tradere]* than merely to contemplate. . . . Hence, among religious orders, the highest rank is occupied by those which ar.e ordained to teaching and preaching. *Such Orders, indeed, approach most closely to the perfection of bishops*. ... [181]

An interesting consequence of this intimate link which St. Thomas sees between perfection and the doctrinal function of the bishop is that he finds in it the basic reason why we read that, while Christ and Paul did not administer the sacraments themselves but delegated others, they exercised the ministry of preaching in person.

The Lord enjoined on the Apostles, whose place the bishops now take, both offices, namely, that of teaching and that of baptizing, but in different ways. For Christ committed the office of teaching to them so that they should exercise it in person, as being the most preeminent *[principalissimum]* [of their offices].... But the office of baptizing he committed to the Apostles so that they should exercise it by means of others ... The reason is that in baptism the merit and wisdom of the minister is of no importance, [while it is] in teaching ... A sign of this is the fact that the Lord himself did not baptize .... [182]

[180] *Summa Theol.,* II-II q. 184, a. 7, ad S.
[181] *Ibid.,* q. 188, a. 6.
[182] *Ibid.,* III, q. 67, a. 2, ad I; cf. also I *ad Cor.,* c. I, lect. 2 (Mar., par. 39).

IV. CONCLUSION

There is a mystery of the episcopate just as there is a mystery of the Church, or rather, the episcopate is a mystery precisely because the Church is.[183] The Church lives in the bishop; in a special way he is meant to be the embodiment of what is deepest in her, her sanctity. His position as head of the local Church requires that he hold, like Christ himself, the primacy in the Christian community, not only in terms of governmental and sacramental powers but also in terms of charismatic and spiritual quality. The community leaders of the New Testament period were not seen as mere functionaries; in the mind of St. Paul, " it is impossible to establish a distinction between the charismatic and the non-charismatic ministries. Even those that belong rather to the realm of function are charismatic in his eyes." [184]

But unfortunately " the subsequent development of the life of the Church took place along the lines of a perhaps excessive separation between these two orders that one could designate as the *ex spiritu* and the *ex offioio,* personal gifts and gifts of function." [185] Certain points of doctrine which were clarified as a result of the Donatist controversy may well have been largely responsible for this. In fact, it is arguable that St. Augustine marks a turning point in the history of the Christian conception of the bishop. Before his time men like Ireneus, Origen, and Cyprian laid great emphasis on episcopal holiness-in fact many of the earlier Fathers expressed themselves in terms open to a Donatist interpretation. To be sure, Augustine too demands sanctity if one is to be a " true " bishop.[186] But in his controversies with the Donatists he is led to insist strongly that

[183] Cf. J. Lecuyer, "La grace de la consecration episcopale," *Rev. Sc. Phil. Th.* 36 p. 389.

[18.] H. Schiirmann, "Les charismes spirituels," in *L'Eglise de Vatican II* (Paris, 1966)' t. p. *551.*

[185] Y. Cougar, "La hierarchie comme service ... " in *L'Episcopat et L'Eglise Universelle* (Paris, p. 87.

[186] Cf., e. g., *Contra Litteras Petiliani,* Bk. c. 30 (ed. Petschenig, CSEL, t. p. 58).

the valid exercise of the episcopate does not demand personal holiness in the bishop himself. He was defending a profound truth, in that he emphasized the active presence of Christ at work in the liturgical life of the Church. But as a result the bishop now comes to be seen as an instrument of liturgical action who can remain detached and uncommitted with regard to the sacred acts which he performs. The precisions of Augustine, because of their very clarity, prepare the way for a conception of the bishop that is more and more that of an administrator and liturgical functionary. But the weighty testimony of patristic and liturgical tradition makes it clear that Augustine has not said the last word on the subject of episcopal sanctity. It is this older and broader tradition that is consecrated by the Second Vatican Council: its teaching on the sacramentality of the episcopate and its strong insistence that ecclesiastical office has a character of service serve to direct our attention once more towards " the essential link that exists between office, interior conformation to Jesus Christ, and his imitation." [187] It is likewise this tradition that is enshrined in St. Thomas's firm teaching on the sublime holiness of the episcopal state.

Called on to re-incarnate, as it were, in his own diocese the person of Christ the Prophet, Priest, and King, the bishop is placed in a sublime state. It presupposes perfection, and hence to aspire to the episcopate is presumptuous. If designated to this office, it is, all things considered, better to refuse it if possible.

A great inner sanctity is required of all ministers for the worthy exercise of Orders. This is above all necessary in the minister of the Eucharist, for the exercise of this function demands a greater holiness than is demanded even in the religious state. Since all the other ministries in the Church are derived from the bishop, in whom the powers of all the lower Orders are found as in their origin, this inner perfection will be

[187] M. Li:ihrer, "La hierarchie au service du peuple chretien," in *L'Eglise de Vatican II* (Paris, 1966), t. 3, p. 735.

required *a fortiori* of him. But it is also demanded of him by a special title. He is the ordinary minister of those sacraments which confer a special plenitude of grace-Confirmation and Orders; these sacraments are conferred by the imposition of hands, which signifies that the " copious effect of grace " is, as it were, a sharing in the abundance of grace already possessed by the minister. [188]

Apart from the bishop's properly sacramental activity, he is the pastor of his flock and must lead to perfection the Christians confided to his care. Now it is "ridiculous" that one should be a master of perfection who does not himself know perfection " *per experimentum.*" Hence the episcopate presupposes perfection. [189]

This sanctity demanded by the bishop's pastoral function-sacramental or otherwise-has its source in the grace of the sacrament of Orders. Not only does he benefit from a special plenitude of sacerdotal grace, a grace which he shares with the presbyter, but there is also a special *"gratia episcopalis* "–whether St. Thomas conceived of it as being a sacramental grace is still an open question. This episcopal grace is conferred by an imposition of hands, a gesture which symbolizes the communication of an " *amplissima gratia."*

The bishop's life is one of total dedication to his flock. At his consecration he obliges himself in a solemn and perpetual way to a service of those Christians committed to his care, a service that is so all-embracing that it implies the perfection of fraternal charity on the three dimensions of extent, intensity, and efficacy. He is thus constituted in a state of perfection, which differs from that of religious in that it presupposes perfection already acquired.

Among the services which the bishop must render to his flock, one holds pride of place-his office as *doctor fidei.* Treading in the footsteps of Christ, the " *primus et principalis doctor fidei,"* the bishop too is a special beneficiary of the charisms

[188] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 84, a. 4.
[189] *De Perf. V. Spir.,* c. 19-Mar., par. 674.

of the Spirit which are ordained to the effective communication of the Christian message. His teaching office is set apart from that of other preachers of the Christian faith in that to him pertains in a special way the exposition of the "*profunda mysteria fidei.*" Before he can communicate these truths, however, he must have penetrated them himself, sounded the depths of their riches, so that he can pass them on to others, inspiring his flock by his own communicative enthusiasm and combining a radical fidelity to the content of the message with a truly Christian daring in unhesitatingly enlisting in his service new and more adapted modes of expression that will assure a more efficacious transmission of his good news. All this is only possible if he himself has first penetrated and assimilated, and been in turn inflamed by, the deep things of God. Hence the bishop's life, like Christ's, stands under the sign of the "*contemplata aliis tradere.*" To have attained such an abundance of contemplation presupposes, obviously, a high personal sanctity. In both contemplation and action, then, the bishop will be as superior to his people as the shepherd is to his flock.

The stress which St. Thomas lays on the functionality of episcopal sanctity should not allow us to lose sight of its more profound significance. It is true that episcopal sanctity is demanded for the worthy exercise of Orders, for the fulfilling of the service due to the flock, for the penetration of the mysteries of the faith. But there is more to it than this. Episcopal sanctity has an ecclesial significance in itself. The re-incarnation of Christ, as it were, in his local Church, the bishop must render present to his community in a preeminent way the sanctity of Christ. This is the real significance of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the episcopate as a state of perfection. Asking whether there should be a diversity of states and offices in the Church St. Thomas [190] distinguishes three aspects of the life of the Church: her inner perfection, her activity, and her exterior beauty. The distinction between states has reference to the

100 II-II, q. 183, &.

first of these aspects, namely, the perfection of the Church.[191] With regard to this aspect St. Thomas remarks:

> Just as in the order of natural things that perfection which is found in God in a simple and unified way could be found in the universality of creatures only in a diverse and multiform way, so also the plenitude of grace which is united in Christ as in the head, overflows in different ways to his members, so that the body of the Church may be perfect. And this is what the Apostle says in Eph. 4:11-12: "And he indeed gave some to be apostles, some however to be prophets, others to be evangelists, others pastors and doctors, for the consummation of the saints." [192]

The state of perfection of the bishop, then, the highest state in the Church, superior to that of religious, is the state in which the plenitude of Christ's grace is participated to the highest degree. Episcopal sanctity has a sign-value in the Church insofar as it represents the high-point of the ecclesial incarnation of the grace of Christ.

We can conclude this examination of the testimony of St. Thomas to episcopal perfection with the words of Y. Congar: " In his conflict with the secular Masters St. Thomas constructed a theology of the episcopate which makes of the bishop a successor of the Apostles, not only from the point of view of dignity and powers but also from the point of view of a spiritual upbuilding of the Church by charisms and sanctity. He united, in his idea of the bishop, as in that which he had of the Apostles, juridical structure and grace, the grandeurs of hierarchy and the grandeurs of sanctity." [193]

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[191] *Ibid.,* a. 8.
[192] *Ibid.,* a. il.
[193] *Art. cit.,* in note (6), p. 128.

REFERENCE TO THE NON-EXISTENT

"DISCOURSE " IS THE English word which, perhaps, better than any other, designates the center of gravity or principal focus, as it were, of contemporary philosophical thought. For, from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, linguistic analysis and phenomenology are the two dominant movements or schools of contemporary philosophy, and *"Wiscourse,"* signifying, as it does, thought and language equally, is a rubric that covers-as well as any rubric can-the central concern of both of these characteristically different philosophical movements. As its name plainly tells, linguistic analysis is a philosophy concerned with the analysis of language, whether simply to get clear about common usage, and so obviate needless philosophical perplexities consequent upon careless speech (" ordinary language analysis ") , or to supply for the deficiencies of common speech by substiuting for it, at least in scientific and philosophical contexts, a technically exact, formalized mode of discourse (" logical analysis ") .

Phenomenology, in contrast to both forms of analysis, is more "mentalistic" or" thought" oriented, inasmuch as it seeks not so much to clarify the patterns of speech as to explicate-by a careful attention to and description of immediate experience in all its variety-the forms and laws according to which thought constitutes the objects given in and by experience.

In general terms, then, still speaking from the external standpoint of sociology of knowledge, philosophy today is centered on discourse.

Shifting now to an internal standpoint, we can say that one of the problems for any philosophy so centered is the problem of non-being, insofar as the question of non-being arises, more

or less ineluctably, out of the fact that discourse appears to refer to things regardless of whether or not they exist in fact. In the philosophy of St. Thomas, for example, the celestial spheres are repeatedly referred to as explanatory factors decisively involved in the phenomena of life and death, the specific constancy of biological forms, the genesis of cognition from .sensation, and many other philosophically significant occurrences.[1] Yet few today believe in the reality of the celestial spheres. Nor is such a profound confusion of non-being with being by any means limited to medieval times. The history of science and ethnology is jam packed with references to what does not exist-or at least is not regarded as existing by contemporary lights; and no doubt our own culture harbors its fair share of non-beings parading in the guise of beings.

Indeed, what would become of literature generally if human discourse did not have, or at least appear to have, the capacity to refer to what does not exist as if it did exist? It 1:-tight almost be said that non-being, which plays no positive role in the physical world, finds a comfortable home indeed in the world of human discourse. It hardly seems too much to say that the relativity of discourse to objects, and its indifference to the being and non-being of those objects, are the two properties that define discourse and reveal its essential character.

I. *The Impasse over Non-Being*

I£ we look at the ways in which the analytic and phenomenological traditions have construed the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist, we find that they have come to terms with this. phenomenon in ways that not only are characteristically different but also lead to a kind of fundamental impasse in the area of methodological assumptions. For, whereas the phenomenologists descended from Husserl regard this apparent indifference of discourse to the physical world as real and a fundamental *given,* the analysts

[1] See Thomas Litt, *Les corps celestes l'univers de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: 1963),

descended from Russell regard it as a mere appearance, to be explained away with the help of the techniques of mathematical logic.

But while the programmatic statement and detailed working out of these two opposed programs is owing, respectively, to Husserl's theory of intentionality and Russell's theory of descriptions, the basic inspiration for both programs came from somewhat earlier background figures-Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Gottlob Frege (1848-19'25) .

The terms of the later phenomenologists' attitude toward the possible non-being of the objects of discourse were set, as it turned out, in the original text wherein Brentano introduced the notion of intentionality into contemporary discussion:

> Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence *(Inexistenz)* of an object *(Gegenstand),* and what we could call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality in this case) or an immanent objectivity.[2]

Thoughts or mental acts, thus, are allegedly distinguished by virtue of placing the one who has or makes them into a relation with objects, regardless of the factual status-the "reality"- of those objects. This alleged characteristic of the mental, subsequently known as the property of intentionality, became for Edmund Husserl-as Spiegelberg puts it-" the central insight in his phenomenological analysis of consciousness." " From now on," i. e., after Husserl, " the expressions ' intentional ' and ' intentionality ' stood for the relational property of having an intention, or being aimed at by it." [3]

There we have the guiding view from which phenomenology comes to terms with the apparent capacity of discourse to refer

[2] Franz Brentano, "The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena," trans. by D. B. Terrell, in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology,* ed. by Roderick Chisholm (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. *50.*

[3] Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (2nd ed., rev.; The Hagne: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), Vol. I, p. 107.

to what does not exist in fact. Thought itself, by virtue of its essential intentionality, constitutes the relation to its objects in the same way whether or not those objects have a further existence in fact. Since language is but the expression of thought, it is not to be wondered at that we can refer in speaking to what does not exist: the indifference of thought to being and non-being, which language merely records outwardly, and which constitutes the capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist, is an immediately evident feature of common experience, a primary datum, a *fundamentum inconcussum* that is to phenomenology what the Cogito was to Cartesianism. That we can refer in discourse to what does not exist in fact, in short, is not something problematic for phenomenology-something that, over and above being noticed and named as of the essence of thought, calls for an explanation of its possibility. It is rather what determines the problematic of phenomenology and fixes the horizon within which phenomenological philosophy moves. The description and analysis of consciousness and experience generally begins from this very fact: discourse is not bounded by the world of physical realities.

Brentano himself did not accept the consistent and purified development of his doctrine of intentionality in the hands of Husserl and the phenomenologists. Indeed, in first introducing the notion, he had had his reservations. From the outset he looked with suspicion on the proposition that objects of discourse need not be real, and consequently, even on the proposition that discourse is genuinely relative to objects. In the case of discourse, seeing that " the term of the so-called *relation* need not be given at all in reality," he wrote, " one might doubt that we are here really dealing with something relative, and not rather with .something only apparently relative, which one might accordingly call a *relation-like* thing." [4]

It was the doubt voiced here that finally won out in Brentano's mind over the more straightforward doctrine of inten-

• Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Hamburg: *1955* and 1959), Vol II, p. 184.

tionality. "All mental references refer to things," [5] he finally concluded, and the things referred to are really existing things, concrete individuals. The apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist, he held finally, is merely apparent-fictitious, not real. Pieces of discourse ostensibly referring to non-existent objects are but shorthand or abbreviations that would, on a fuller and more careful statement, be found to consist of a complicated discourse "whose terms refer," as Chisholm puts it, "only to 'genuine objects'-to individual concrete things." [6] All mental references, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, refer to things.

This is not to deny that in many cases the fiction that we have, as an object, something other than a real entity-for example, that that which lacks being as such, as well as that which has it, may be an object-proves itself harmless in logical operations; indeed, by means of this fiction these operations can be facilitated, because they are simplified in expression and even in thought itself. It is similar to the way mathematicians are accustomed to use with advantage the fictions of numbers less than zero, and many others. By this method a presentation and judgment, complicated in various ways, permit themselves to be handled as if they were simple, and one is spared the trouble (which is useless in some cases) of clarifying more exactly a confusedly grasped mental event ....

The fact that such fictions are useful in logic has led many to believe that logic has non-things as well as things as its object and, accordingly, that the concept of its object is more general than that of the real. This is, however, thoroughly incorrect; indeed, according to what has been said, it is downright impossible, for there cannot be anything at all other than real objects, and the same homogeneous concept of the real, as the most general concept of all, comprehends everything which is truly an object. Also, the terms of ordinary language are most often not psychologically, but only grammatically, names. They do not name things, but it remains none the less true that the discourse in which they are involved is concerned with nothing other than things. [7]

[5] Brentano, "Genuine and Fictitious Ohjects," trans. hy D. B. Terrell, in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology,* p. 71.

[6] Editor's Introduction to *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology,* p. 5.

[7] Brentano, "Genuine and Fictitious Ohjects," *loc, cit.,* p. 75,

Thus the Brentano who inspired Husserl is someone quite different from the Brentano who philosophized in his own right. The original statement of the doctrine of intentionality, purified of ambiguities and rendered consistent by Husserl and others, affirmed that discourse really does just what it appears to do-make reference to objects regardless of whether those objects exist in fact as concrete individual things. Brentano, however, finally and firmly denied the reality of discourse's apparent capacity to refer to the non-existent. Sentences appearing to refer to non-existent objects, he held, are translatable with the loss only of convenience and confusion into other sentences that refer exclusively to objects existing in fact.

This later view of Brentano, little known in comparison with his earlier doctrine of intentionality, is substantially the same as the view that early came to the fore in the analytic tradition's dealings with the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to the non-existent. The analysts, however, unlike the phenomenologists, do not owe to Brentano the psychologist their initial inspiration for how to come to terms with the non-existent. The analysts found their clue rather in the writings of Frege the logician, who had maintained from the first that "it is a defect of languages that expressions are possible within them, which, in their grammatical form, seemingly determined to designate an object, nevertheless do not fulfill this condition in special cases; because this depends on the truth of the sentence." [8]

There are two aspects to Frege's position on this matter. First, and most important for the subsequent developments in analysis, is Frege's firm identification of the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist as a "defect," "fault," or "imperfection," together with his programmatic statement-which we will come to in a moment-of how this defect might be remedied, this imperfection eliminated. Second,

[8] Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Nominatum, "trans. by Herbert Feigl, in *Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory,* ed. by I. M. Copi and J. A. Gould (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 85. Cf. Max Black's trans. of this same proposition in *The Philosophical Review,* LVII (May, 1948), p.

and of equal interest from the standpoint of logical thory, but of lesser interest from the standpoint of a philosophy of discourse, is the non-programmatic, *ad hoc* means chosen by Frege in his own work to compensate for this alleged " defect " or "imperfection of language of which, by the way, even the symbolic language of analysis is not entirely free." [9]

With regard to the first point, Frege not only leaves no doubt that, so far as he is concerned, reference to what does not exist is a " defect of languages," an " imperfection," and " a major source of fallacies," but he also implies that it could and should be eliminated from discourse-at least from discourse that has been logically perfected-for once and all:

It is to be demanded that in a logically perfect language (logical symbolism) every expression constructed as a proper name in a grammatically correct manner out of already introduced symbols, in fact designate an object; and that no symbol be introduced as a proper name without assurance that it have a nominatum. It is customary in logic texts to warn against the ambiguity of expressions as a source of fallacies. I deem it at least as appropriate to issue a warning against apparent proper names that have no nominata. The history of mathematics has many a tale to tell of errors which originated from this source. The demagogic misuse is as close (perhaps closer) at hand as is the case of ambiguous expressions. 'The will of the people' may serve as an example in this regard; for it is easily established that there is no generally accepted nominatum of that expression. Thus it is obviously not without importance to obstruct once for all the source of these errors, at least as regards their occurrence in science. Then such objections as the one discussed above will become impossible, for then it will be seen that whether a proper name has a nominatum can never depend upon the truth of a proposition. [10]

But, having seen and said this much, Frege fails to take the further step of actually finding the means " to obstruct once and for all the source of these errors " that creep in to our theoretical and practical affairs through the door of non-being. Instead, Frege adopts an *ad hoc* solution to the problem based

[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

only on reasons of convenience. "Whenever something is asserted," he says, whether by means of ordinary discourse or of the symbolic language of analysis, " then the presupposition taken for granted is that the employed proper names, simple or compound "-i.e., the linguistic means employed, be it a word or a sentence-" have nominata," i.e., refer to objects existing in fact.[11] This being the case, even though " we may be in error as regards that assumption, and such errors have occurred on occasion," Frege considers that " it will suffice for the moment to refer to our intention in speaking and thinking in order to justify our reference to the nominatum of a sign, even if we have to make the proviso: if there is such a nominatum." [12] Frege then proceeds to circumvent the demand that a logically perfected language designate only objects existing in fact by adopting a convention that allows him to postulate what an object referred to shall be in a given case.

It is the privileged position of Bertrand Russell in the analytic tradition to have faced the recognized demand squarely and to have refused to be .satisfied with anything less than a logical device that would in principle allow for the elimination from discourse of any reference to what does not exist, and so would remove from discourse the deceptive appearance of being able to deal indifferently with being and non-being. The measure of any philosopher is to see clearly the requirements of an issue, to choose among the alternatives according to the end in view, and to work out in principle the requirements of the chosen alternative to the point where the proportion between means and end comes unmistakably into view. By this criterion, it is easy to see why Russell is in fact the most important single figure in the tradition of analytic philosophy, and why it is from him, rather than from Frege, that the analytic tradition derives its distinctive heritage, even as the phenomenological tradition stems from Husser! rather than Brentano. Brentano and Frege planted seed in stony ground.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. *85.* See also p. 77.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 79.

Husser! and Russell transplanted the seeds, germinated them, and made them blossom.

Given the apparent indifference of discourse to being and non-being, and given the assumption that this appearance is merely an appearance and not the reality of the matter, Russell saw clearly both the required alternative to Frege's treatment of the alleged logical imperfection of language and (what is partly the same) the radical inappropriateness of Frege's means to the desired end. Consider the cases in which the denotation of denoting phrases used in propositions appears to be absent.

> Now it is plain that propositions do *not* become nonsense merely because their hypotheses are false. The King in " The Tempest " might say, "If Ferdinand is not drowned, Ferdinand is my only son." Now "my only son" is a denoting phrase, which, on the face of it, has a denotation when, and only when, I have exactly one son. But the above statement would nevertheless have remained true if Ferdinand had been in fact drowned. Thus we must *either* provide a denotation in cases in which it is at first sight absent, *or* we must abandon the view that the denotation is what is concerned in propositions which contain denoting phrases. The latter is the course that I advocate. The ·former course .... is adopted by Frege, who provides by definition some purely conventional denotation for the cases in which otherwise there would be none. Thus " the King of France," is to denote the null-class; "the only son of Mr. So-and-so" (who has a fine family of ten), is to denote the class of all his sons; and so on. But this procedure, though it may not lead to actual logical error, is plainly artificial, and does not give an exact analysis of the matter. [18]

" Taking the latter course," i. e., finding a way to analyze propositions without having to allow-whether by convention (Frege) or by confusion (the later Brentano) -for anything unreal among the objects referred to, is the genius of Russell's celebrated theory of descriptions and the reason why it is justly described, in F. P. Ramsey's words, as" a paradigm of philosophy."

[13] Bertrand Russell, " On Denoting," in *Logic and Knowledge,* ed. by R. C. Marsh, pp. 46-47.

Russell's theory of descriptions first appeared in *Mind* of *1905* in the form of an article titled "On Denoting." The most technical and logically simple exposition of the theory is found, as one might suspect, in the *Principia Mathematica,* specifically, in the third introductory chapter, "Incomplete Symbols." The most philosophically important exposition of the theory, however, at least insofar as philosophy is more concerned with underlying assumptions and principles than with the resolution of problems formed into definite conclusions, is to be found in chapters 15-17 of his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.* For, from the point of view of the assumption that discourse is only apparently and owing to confusion on the part of its users indifferent to the being and non-being of its objects (rather than really and essentially thus indifferent), we may grant to Russell not only that" language is misleading, as well as.... diffuse and inexact," but also that "logical symbolism is absolutely necessary to any exact or thorough treatment" of the objects of discourse, "in particular as regards existence and descriptions." [14] But if we wish to understand the motives for adopting this particular assumption, we must do so apart from the particular conception of the so-called " symbolic " or " mathematical logic " that depends for its philosophical applicability on one's having already assented to the view that a reference to what does not exist is only apparent and not real or " true." The exposition of the theory of descriptions in the *Principia* presupposes the truth of this assumption; but the less technical exposition in the *Introduction to Mathematioal Philosophy,* precisely because it is not " only available to those who have mastered logical symbolism," is required to make explicit just what is involved in making the crucial assumption upon which is based, as Russell puts it, "the method by which mathematical logic can be made helpful in investigating the traditional problems of philosophy." [15]

[14] Bertrand Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (New York: Humanities, 1919), p. *205.*

[15] *Ibid.,* p. xii.

What one finds is that an uncompromising passion for reality and truth lies behind Russell's formulation of his theory of descriptions:

In obedience to the feeling of reality, we shall insist that, in the analysis of propositions, nothing " unreal " is to be admitted. But, after all, if there *is* nothing unreal, how, it may be asked, *could* we admit anything unreal? The reply is that, in dealing with propositions, we are dealing in the first instance with symbols, and if we attribute significance to groups of symbols which have no significance, we shall fall into the error of admitting unrealities, in the only sense in which this is possible, namely, as objects described.[16]

Thus Russell clearly recongizes that non-being enters into history only through discourse and does so in the form of objects. Wars have been fought, lives have been lost, and endless miseries have been inflicted upon men because of non-being parading itself—thanks to discourse—in the guise of being. Might it not be, then, that a correct analysis of discourse would put an end to the tyranny of non-being over human affairs and "obstruct once for all," as Frege proposed, "the source of these errors, at least as regards their occurrence in science " ? Such a goal goes beyond the narrow concerns of logic and is surely worthy of the philosopher. It is the way to this goal that Russell set himself to find. " My theory of descriptions was never intended as an analysis of the state of mind of those who utter sentences containing descriptions," Russell testifies; " I was concerned to find a more accurate and analysed thought to replace the somewhat confused thoughts which most people at most times have in their heads." [17]

Consider again the apparent indifference of discourse to being and non-being in its relativity to objects:

The question of "unreality," which confronts us at this point, is a very important one. Misled by grammar, the great majority of those logicians who have dealt with this question have dealt with it on mistaken lines. They have regarded grammatical form

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 170.

[17] Bertrand Russell, "Mr. Strawson on Referring," *Mind,* LXVI (July, 1957), p. 888.

as a surer guide in analysis than, in fact, it is. And they have not known what differences in grammatical form are important. "I met Jones" and "I met a man" would count traditionally as propositions of the same form, but in actual fact they are of quite different forms: the first names an actual person, Jones; while the second involves a propositional function, and becomes, when made explicit: "The function 'I met *x* and *x* is human' is sometimes true." . . . This proposition is obviously not of the form "I met *x*," which accounts for the existence of the proposition "I met a unicorn" in spite of the fact that there is no such thing as "a unicorn." [18]

Thus, by the simple expedient of distinguishing between propositions and propositional functions, Russell has, in principle, a means for eliminating from discourse all reference to what does not exist. Whenever a statement appears to refer to a non-existent object and to assert something about it, that statement must not be taken, as traditional or "Aristotelian" logic would take it, as expressing a simple proposition; it must be taken, rather, as the symbolic or "mathematical" logic would take it, as expressing a complex combining a proposition and a propositional function together into what, grammatically considered, *appears* to be a simple proposition but really is not. Thus all parts of discourse, *seemingly* constituted by propositions about unreal objects, are *really* compounds of propositional functions and false propositions about the real world, and this is what the analysis of such propositions by the techniques of symbolic logic reveals, though it is what analysis by the techniques of traditional logic conceals and glosses over. "For want of the apparatus of propositional functions," Russell concludes, "many logicians have been driven to the conclusion that there are unreal objects." [19] This conclusion-or confusion-can henceforward, in principle at least, be avoided, now that the propositional function has been discovered (or perhaps we should say: invented). "For clear thinking, in many very diverse directions, the habit of keeping proposi-

[18] Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy,* pp. 168-169.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 169.

tiona! functions sharply separated from propositions is of the utmost importance, and the failure to do so in the past has been a disgrace to philosophy." [20] It is with an eye to the absence of this distinction in traditional logic that Russell claims of the modern truth-value logic that "the description of the subject as symbolical logic is an inadequate one. I should like to describe it simply as logic, on the ground that nothing else really is logic." [21]

Let us grant the ingenuity of Russell's device whereby, as Harman remarks of Quine's developments of it, "talk about ideal objects is reduced to loose talk about real objects." [22] Let us grant, too (at least for purposes of the present discussion), Russell's claim that it is through the habit of distinguishing propositions from propositional functions that the modern, symbolic, or mathematical logic achieves its decisive superiority over the traditional or Aristotelian logic.

It remains that the theory of descriptions does not exclude non-beings from among the objects of discourse but merely enables us to eliminate in a technical manner all references to objects which we believe, for reasons of our own, to be unreal. Of course, our belief in point of any given object or class of objects might be mistaken (heaven forbid). But there is nothing within the system of modern logic-or of traditional logic, for that matter-that enables us to know that the beliefs about reality, upon which our regimentation or formalization of some theory is based, are correct. H they are not, though our formalization will eliminate from discourse all apparent reference to objects other than those we assert to be real, the discourse will yet contain reference to unreal objects. Even if our beliefs happened to be completely correct, apart from the fact that we would have no way of knowing this, it would remain the case that our formalized discourse would still appear and be taken to refer to unreal objects by anyone not sharing

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 166.

[21] Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in *Logic and Knowledge,* p.

[22] Gilbert Harman, " Quine on Meaning and Existence, II," *The Rwiew of Metaphysics,* XXI (December, 1967), p. 361.

our beliefs. How one will formalize or " regiment " (express in the quantificational terms of modern logic) any given philosophical theory, therefore, will depend: (1) on what one understands that theory to assert to be real; (Q) on what one believes concerning those assertions.

Suppose, for example, two modern logicians, one who believes exactly like Paul VI and one who believes like Jean-Paul Sartre, set out to formalize the *Summa* of St. Thomas. First, let us suppose that they would each formalize it in terms of the various entities they took Thomas to assert to be real. And then they would each formalize it a second time, but now according to what they themselves take to be real. In the first case, the quality and worth of the formalizations would exactly match the quality and worth of their respective understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas and would differ accordingly. In the second case, the manner of binding the variables-referring to objects-would differ wildly between the two men, not according to their different understanding of St. Thomas now but according to their radically opposed conceptions of what there is to reality. In both cases the techniques of formal logic serve no more than to express differences in understanding; they provide no means whatever for adjudicating or eliminating those differences. The extent to which mathematical logic "appears," as Russell thought," to invalidate much traditional philosophy, and even a good deal of what is current in the present day," [23] is a deceptive appearance indeed. For it has its whole being from the extent to which a given user of symbolic logic disagrees-for whatever reasons, and rightly or wrongly-with the traditional or current views, and in terms of which disagreement he gives symbolic expression to these views in order to " invalidate " them.

Subjectivity, in the form of the beliefs of the user, is built in to the very foundations of the logistic method. [24] All the

[28] *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy,* p. xii.

•• This point is well remarked by Guido Kling, *Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language* (rev. ed.; New York: Humanities, 1967), pp. 8-9: "Be-

properly philosophical differences over what there is precede any use that can be made of the method. Far from providing a tool for the adjudication of philosophical disputes, philosophical discussion *ceases to be possible* as soon as and as long as one has recourse to the logistic method, for that method cannot be employed at all except to the extent that one has decided-rightly or wrongly-what a given theory-to-be-formalized asserts to be real.

Carnap's distinction between questions internal and external to a framework or language-system is useful here. Prior to or independent of the selection of a language-system *L* with a domain *D* of objects as its fundamental domain, the quantifiers are without meaning. They are given meaning only with the formulation of *L*, *i.e.*, by the explicit listing of the syntactical and semantical rules determinative of L.[25]

For purposes of expressing philosophical differences over the fundamental units of being, modern logic achieves, at least initially, unparalleled clarity. For purposes of coming to understand the reasons behind those differences, however (which is, after all, the most proper concern of the philosopher), modern logic serves no essential use at all, for the reason finely stated by Alston: "Just as no sentence is necessarily misleading, so none is guaranteed, by its form, to be used without confusion. The supposition to the contrary is one of the unfortunate effects of philosophic preoccupation with artificial languages."[26]

cause they are artificially made to conform to a logical ideal and because of the precision of their rules, logistic languages present a completely different case than do the natural languages. We still find a wide range of possible syntactical systems or 'grammars' ... but these consciously contrived logistic languages are all alike in the fact that they are determined explicitly by the definite logical and ontological views of their inventors.

"The translation from a natural into a logistic language, i.e., the logistic analysis of language, involves an ontological commitment for every sentence translated."

[25] R. M. Martin, "Existential Quantification and the 'Regimentation' of Ordinary Language," *Mind,* LXXI (October, 1962), pp. 528-529.

[26] William P. Alston, "Ontological Commitments," in *Philosophy of Mathematics,* ed. by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 257. Reprinted from *Philosophical Studies,* 9 (1958), pp. 8-17.

The apparatus of symbolic logic, as incorporating Russell's theory of descriptions, therefore, does not solve the problem of non-being in discourse any more than does the phenomenological method based on Husserl's theory of intentionality. The phenomenologists' doctrine offers no explanation of the appearance of non-being in discourse. But the analysts' doctrine, while it does show the possibility in principle of eliminating non-beings from among the objects of discourse, also signally fails to show how in fact this elimination could be successfuly carried through, for, to borrow again Alston's words:

> In any context where questions of existence arise the problem is whether or not we shall assert *that* so-and-so exists, not whether we shall choose some particular way of making this assertion. This means that assertion of existence, commitment to existence, etc., does not consist in the inflexible preference for one verbal formulation over any other, however gratifying such preferences may be to logicians.[27]

Yet this is short of saying that the whole enterprise of mathematical logic has been, after all, without substantive philosophical point. When the delusions of grandeur generated by its practitioners have been seen for what they are, it can also be seen that " the point of the translation " of any given piece of discourse into symbolic form, is, in Alston's phrase/ [8] "essentially a strategic one," specifically, it enables us to neutralize, " wherever they arise," confusions as to what we are affirming to be real, insofar as such confusions might arise from the ambiguities of common language; for, by translating the problematic statements into canonical notation, we can identify the precise *locus* in language of the ontological commitment we wish to make. [29] At the same time, this strategy

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 254.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. 257.

[29] In addition to this "advantage," Ki.ing, in *Ontology a;nd the Logistic Anmysis of Language,* pp. 185-186, adds two others equally thin and dubious-the making possible of " a new kind of pragmatical evaluation " of ontological standpoints (an advantage which even Ki.ing does " not wish to claim" as " of primary importance"), and a sharpening and increase of our ontological knowledge (which does not seem to me a defensible claim, for the reasons already given) .

enables us to escape from the triviality, well-remarked by Quine,[30] of the ordinary language wing of analytic philosophy with its tacit claim that the ontological commitments apparent in common usage are the ontological commitments philosophy is bound to accept as its own. For what Russell achieved was a logical system based on the philosophical truth that, for a sufficiently informed observer-more exactly, for an omniscient one-it would be possible to .so correct human discourse as to eliminate all mistaken references resulting from the confusions of non-being with being.[31]

Thus the impasse: where phenomenology sees the inexplicability of the self-evident, analysis sees confusion and something to be explained away. But the' self-evident' phenomenon to which phenomenology appeals- the relational character or " intentionality" of thought whereby it relates thinkers to objects thought of indifferent to the reality or unreality of those objects-is at least as puzzling as it is evident: for how can there be a relation between being and non-being, between a thought, which exists in a thinking subject (be it only as a brain state), and an object, which exists nowhere? How can there be a relation connecting what exists with something that does not exist, a relation whose term is not given at all in reality?

This is hardly a question about discourse which phenomenology is entitled to ignore. It will not do, without a word of explanation, to accept such a bizarre phenomenon as patently the case. A word of explanation is in order; yet phenomenology gives us only descriptive analyses which presuppose the validity of what is here up for question.

On the other hand, analysis, in seeking to explain away the problem of discursive reference to the non-existent, fails to provide a resolution any more satisfactory. For in denying

[80] W. V. 0. Quine, "Philosophical Progress in Language Theory," *Metaphilosophy,* 1 (January, 1970), p. 18.

[81] This truth, argued in a slightly altered formula, is one of the " theses " of classical Thomism: see John of St. Thomas (ne Jean Poinsot), *Cursus Philosophicus,* ed. by Reiser (Turin: Mariett, 1930), Vol. I, *Ars Logica,* Part II, Q. II, Art. V, "Utrum Deus Formet Entia Rationis."

that anything but confused discourse can appear to refer to what does not exist, the analysts fail to provide any standard for what clear discourse would be other than discourse which makes reference only to real objects. The elaborate program for such logically perfect discourse, called for by Frege, worked out in its fundamentals by Russell (with his theory of descriptions) and finally by Quine (with the elimination from Russell's theory of the last vestige of uncontrolled reference, the singular term[32]), is little more than an elaborate circularity and proves in the end unworkable: for the program depends for its successful implementation on the prior judgments made by those who implement it concerning the reality of any given object of discourse, and yet it is just these prior judgments concerning the line between being and non-being that is the very point at issue between any two scientific or philosophical theories. Since the original problem of non-being for a philosophy centered on discourse concerns the capacity of discourse to deceive us in point of the reality of objects, the elaborate program of the logicians, so far as it holds any properly philosophical prospect or interest, proves to be a program that would only be realized after there was no longer a need for it. For if the problem is to decide why there is a problem as to which (and in what way) objects of discourse are real, the predicate calculus of modem logic provides no help whatever. All that it can do is to enable us to eliminate the references to the unreal objects once it has been decided what the real objects are. But how it is that unrealities appeared or seemed to appear among the objects of discourse in the first place remains as much in the dark as ever. The ex post facto account o£ non-being by the analysts, I conclude, is in its own way as unsatisfying as the silent appeal to self-evidence by the phenomenologists.

[82] W. V. O. Quine, "Descriptions," and "Elimination of Singular Terms," in *Methods of Logic* (rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1959), pp. 215-219, and 220-224. See also Quine, "Notes on the Theory of Reference," in *From a Logical Point of View* (2nd ed., rev.; New York: Harper, 1961), pp. 130-138; and "Variables Explained Away," in *Selected Logic Papers* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 227-235.

Surely there must be yet a third way of coming to terms with the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist, which will bridge the gap between these dominant contemporary approaches.

II. *To Overcome or to Acquiesce in the Impasse?*

We have found in the non-beingofcertainobjectsofdiscourse a problem common to any philosophy of discourse, and we have found further that the way of handling this problem in the currently dominant species of such philosophy has resulted in a kind of stand-off that leaves us as much in the dark as ever as to how it is that discourse has the appearance of indifference to the reality of its objects.

But perhaps it is our guiding question that leads us inevitably into blind alleys. Perhaps it is simply a mistake to seek for an explanation of the apparent indifference of discourse to the reality of its objects, a mistake based on a misunderstanding of the way language functions-the purpose it fulfills in human life. Within the analytic tradition a view just such as this was developed by Wittgenstein in reaction to the logical excesses in the analysis of language inspired by Russell's theory of descriptions'-" as if," Wittgenstein remarked scornfully, "it took the logician to show people at last what a correct sentence looked like." [88]

It was the very requirement for a logically perfect language laid down, as we have seen, by Frege, that Wittgenstein held suspect. " The more narrowly we examine actual language," he noted, " the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement." [84] Actual language is simply not tied down to any one concept of " reality " in the expressions of common life. Attention to this fact, thought Wittgenstein, should lead us to abandon " *the preconceived idea* of crystalline purity "

[88] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (3rd rev. ed.; New York Macmillan, 1958), no. 81, p. 38 (reading "correct" for "richtiger," instead of Anscombe's "proper").

•• *Ibid.,* no. 107, p. 46.

as logically required for authentic discourse, " by turning our whole examination around." [35] What is called for is neither an explanation showing how reference to what does not exist is possible, nor an explanation showing that reference to what does not exist is but a confused reference to what does exist. What is called for, rather, is the abandonment of the very aim of philosophy to explain discourse at all.

> We must do away with all *explanation,* and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us realize these workings: *in despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.[36]

This view of Wittgenstein has been widely adopted, and has resulted in a split of the analytic tradition into two factions or schools-the logical analysts, who look to mathematical logic for the tools of philosophical work; and the ordinary language analysts, who look to the actual workings of common speach as the proper object of philosophical consideration. Where the logical analysts think up " protocols " for translating this or that sort of discourse into logistic systems, Wittgenstein counsels the ordinary language philosophers to seek a different route: " don't think, but look! " [37] And where logical analysts look for real objects in terms of which to implement their translation procedures, Wittgenstein counsels the ordinary language philosophers to subordinate such concern to a more fundamental goal-the elucidation of usage. " Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything." [38] It "may in no way interfere with the actual use

[35] *Ibid.,* no. 108, p. 46.
[36] *Ibid.,* no. 109, p. 47.
[37] *Ibid.,* no. 66, p. 31.
[38] *Ibid.,* no. 126, p. *50.*

of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give language any foundation either." [39]

Wittgenstein's counsels here have prima facie plausibility, an intuitive soundness about them, as it were, in the face of the changes wrought in common speech by use of the theory of descriptions (changes that even Russell allowed to be " somewhat incredible " [40]), and even in the face of the sometimes bizarre formulations of the phenomenologists. The earlier analysts and the phenomenologists latched onto the referential aspect of discourse as though this were the whole-the former, by making reference the key for logical translation; the latter, by making reference the key to consciousness itself as something irreducibly " mental " or " intentional." But the ordinary language philosophers make it clear from the start that referential use of words is only one feature of discourse; non-referential use, however, is another feature of discourse that must not be neglected. Why then subordinate the latter to the former? Why not rather simply regard them as equal partners, each instancing in different ways the primary feature of language-service in public life? The use of words to refer to what does not exist, then, is neither something to be explained, nor is it something to be explained away. It is simply a matter to be clarified through attention to the actual workings of language, according to the perfectly general formula, " the meaning of a word is its use in a language." There are words, and there are the uses to which they are put in discourse-that is all the philosopher of discourse knows or needs to know. When he knows this, he knows all there is for philosophy to know about language, save for details.

What goes on " inside the heads " of the users of language may be safely left to the psychologist and neurologist, just as " what there is " outside of language may be safely left to the other sciences. When the philosopher has mapped the usages of language, he has done all that he can or can be expected to do.

[39] *Ibid.,* no. 124, p. 49.

[40] Russell, " On Denoting," *loc. cit.,* p. 44.

On this view, the shift in interest from being to discourse that has taken place in modem times signals more than just a new perspective on ancient problems. It heralds a radically new age, a clean break with what has traditionally been known as philosophy. As Richard Rorty puts it, "analytic philosophers have in common the view that the pursuit of wisdom cannot be served by continuing the inquiries traditionally grouped together as ' philosophy'." [41] Russell and the logical analysts thought they had discredited traditional philosophies of being by the simple application of their new logical method to the old problems. But this opinion, we now see, was without foundation, inasmuch as the application of the new method to such an outcome is possible at all only to the extent that the outcome is presupposed in the very application. The ordinary language philosophers avoid this vicious circle by the simple expedient of eschewing all explanation. "Philosophy" becomes, as Wittgenstein put it, "what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions." [42]

From the point of view of our question, however, there is little to choose between (1) the logistic translations made by the logical analysts to conjure reference away from discourse, the elucidations of usage made by the ordinary language analysts in precision from all questions concerning the reality or unreality of objects, and (3) the descriptions of consciousness or experience essayed by the phenomenologists on the postulate of intentionality: all three shed no light at all on how it can be that discourse seems to put us in a relation to what does not exist with as much facility as it brings us into relation with what does exist.

The position of ordinary language analysis alone confronts and does not conceal the question, even though it does so only to deny the legitimacy of the inquiry. This denial may seem arbitrary from the point of view of a traditional philosophy of

[41] Richard Rorty, "Do Analysts and Metaphysicians Disagree?", *ACPA Proceeedings,* XLI (1967), pp. 89-53.

[42] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* no. p. 50.

being. And it must be admitted that it is by no means clear either how empirical research of the sort that characterizes thf" sciences could ever provide the answer to our question, or how the question itself is based on a misunderstanding of the workings of language-particularly in view of the fact that it is the workings of ordinary speech itself that give rise to our question. Is it not the case that discourse does proceed with an apparent indifference to the reality of its objects? And if the possibility of so proceeding is not explained by any avenues of empirical inquiry, is it not arbitrary, or at least indecently hasty, to assert baldly that no explanation-no answer to our question-is possible or desirable? [43]

Still, the stand of the later Wittgenstein and his school on the question of meaning does serve to make clear a key requirement any answer to our question must meet: it must establish a nexus between being and discourse, a point of contact or " perspectival overlap " between a philosophy of being transparent to itself and a philosophy of discourse aware of the capacity of speech to convey and designate reality.

If Wittgenstein is right, if the clarification of ordinary language in a manner that neither explains nor infers anything is all that philosophy could ever be, then there is no way out of the impasse reached over the issue of non-being by the phenomenologists and the analysts. And the reason why there is no exit is clear: to overcome the impasse, an explanation of how language really refers to objects would be necessary, and no explanation is possible within philosophy.

On the other hand, if an explanation of how language really refers to objects is possible, and if such explanation does not

•• " Indecently hasty " is about as charitable a description as justice authorizes regarding Wittgenstein's pronouncements on the nature and history of philosophy. For in fact, Wittgenstein's knowledge of ancient philosophy consists almost solely in an acquaintance with Plato's *Dialogues,* while his knowledge of medieval thought consisted principally in a quite limited familiarity with St. Augustine. Read against the immediate background of Russell's work and his own *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein's *Investigations* have an authentic ring. Read as an adequate assessment of the philosophical enterprise, however, they have rather the ring of gratuitousl;r

depend on the laboratory studies, field researches, or mathematical hypotheses of science, then a way out of the impasse is possible, the ordinary language analysts are mistaken in excluding all explanation from the domain of philosophy, and the opposition between the traditional philosophy of being and the modem philosophy of discourse will-in principle at least-have been overcome. For whatever will really explain the capacity of discourse to refer equally to being and non-being, will by that very achievement establish a nexus or point of contact between the universe of being and the universe of discourse.

III. *Overcoming the Impasse.*

To the best of my knowledge, no *ex professo* account of the apparent indifference of discourse to the reality or unreality of its objects has ever been given by any philosopher. Of course, there may be such a treatise of which I am simply not aware; but what is certain is that, after four years of investigating the literature on language and philosophy-in the course of which this question only gradually took on clarity and central importance-! came across no full account of the relativity of discourse to objects and its indifference to being and non-being. The closest thing I found to the required treatment, curiously enough, is a 17th century *Treatise on Signs,* essayed in Latin by a singularly obscure Iberian philosopher, Jean Poinsot. The problem of explaining the referential capacity of discourse, according to Poinsot, is dependent upon a careful understanding of the nature of relation, more specifically, upon an understanding of the fact that relation is the only category or kind of being that need not be instantiated physically in order to really occur. Poinsot, for his part, gained this understanding of the peculiarity of relation from St. Thomas Aquinas. By taking Poinsot's application of St. Thomas's theory of relation to the theory of language, and by developing certain features of that application beyond Poinsot's own exposition, I find it is possible to arrive at an account of the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist in

a way that meets, so far as I am aware of them, all the difficulties that led the later Brentano and both camps of analysts to eschew the relational or " intentional " view of discourse. In doing this, the account I am about to give overcomes the impasse reached by the phenomenologists and the analysts in their manner of coming to terms with non-being, by *explaining* precisely what the phenomenologists *presuppose,* namely, how it is possible for there to be a relation whose term is not given in reality apart from discourse. And finally, by providing such an explanation, my account establishes a nexus betwen the being-centered philosophies of the past and the discourse-centered philosophies of modern times, thereby restoring unity to the philosophical tradition and dignity to the philosophical enterprise as an avenue to understanding the world more and more clearly than is possible through the heritage of natural languages, even when this heritage is supplemented (as in the view of ordinary language analysis) or supplanted (as the logical analysts would have it) by knowledge acquired through the methods of experimental and mathematical science.

Let me develop my account of the referential capacity of discourse from a point that can be agreed to by all philosophers interested in discourse, be they analysts, phenomenologists, or whatever; then, in a separate section, I will show how my account owes its chief inspiration to the theory of the sign Poinsot developed on the basis of St. Thomas's insight into the peculiar nature of relation as a kind of being. The point of common agreement, which I take as providing a starting point for a new attack on the problem of non-being generated by ordinary discourse, has been satisfactorily formulated by A. J. Ayer. " Certainly there is a difference," he writes, " between understanding what another person says and merely hearing the noises that he makes." [44]

No more than this need be admitted in order to get onto the way out of the impasse. Let us re-state Ayer's observation in

[44] A. J. Ayer, *Thinking and Meaning* (London: H. K. Lewis, 1947), p. !'ll. I am indebted to Mortimer Adler for the suggestion of this as a starting point.

the form of a question: In the case of a mark, sound, or movement-be it a word or a sentence, and be it verbally or graphrically manifested-actually used to refer to an object, what is it that transforms the in itself physical mark, sound, or move-.ment into a linguistic occurrence? My thesis is that in any case where discourse concerns an object, that is, in any case where heard or seen noises are understood linguistically, it is the difference between the mark, sound, or movement *as such* and *as conveying the linguistic reference* that is the key to understanding the nature and function of discourse, and that is, therefore, *de jure,* the fundamental *datum explanandum* for any philosophy of discourse that wishes to be grounded in principle. The apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist will be adequately judged as merely apparent or as real only to the extent that such a judgment is based on an understanding of this difference. To overcome the impasse over non-being, therefore, and to solve the problem of the difference between the physical. *as such* and *as making a linguistic reference,* are one and the same.

Let us state the factors involved in this problem in neutral terms, i. e., terms that should be acceptable to any philosopher who accepts as a descriptive definition of meaning the dif- it may be-between a given mark, sound, or movement *as such* and *as sign* of something other than itself, and accepts also (even if only tentatively) our proposal to make the explanation of meaning so· defined the touchstone for deciding whether the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist is real or merely apparent.

Whenever a mark, sound, or movement is employed successfully as a linguistic sign (i.e., to make a linguistic reference), whether that sign be a word or a sentence (i. e., whatever it is that one takes the unit of linguistic reference to or phrase, subject of a sentence, whole sentence: whatever), it seems clear that its status as a piece of discourse involves three factors. *First,* there is the linguistic expression itself, which occurs outside the organism; let us call this the extraorganisrn.ic

factor X. *Second,* there is the object that X is a sign of, the significate of X, what X refers to or is about: let us call this the objective or signified factor O. *Third,.* there is the factor within the organism using or apprehending X as a sign of O, the organism's "understanding," on the basis of which factor precisely X is, over and above a mere mark, sound, or movement occurring extraorganismically, a *linguistic* mark, sound or movement signifying or referring to 0: let us call this the intraorganismic factor C, inasmuch as it is the cause, here and now, of X's actual functioning .status as sign of the object O. For, if C does not occur in connection with the perception of X, clearly, X will not be perceived by the organism in relation to 0 as a sign thereof. It is thus C, the intraorganismic factor, that holds, in final analysis, the key to the of meaning. I say, "in the final analysis," for it is clear that there are many ancillary considerations that may be pursued in connection with C-for example, the analysis of the conventions of use surrounding the occurrence of X as evocative of C (the province of ordinary language analysis) or the analysis of the behavior of the organism consequent upon the occurrence of C (the province of psycholinguistics and behavioral psychology). But just as clearly, such pursuits *are* ancillary, and the heart of the problem lies in C itself. X functions as a sign of 0 on the basis of C, the intraorganismic factor whereby the language user apprehends 0 as object signified by X.

Notice here that the being of 0 as an object for the user of X is dependent upon the factor C. Even supposing that 0 exists in the world independently of C, it exists here and now as something actually signified by X dependently upon C. As an object of discourse, therefore, as something signified by X, 0 has its being dependently upon C. In the analytic tradition, the tendency has been to give physical objects pride of place precisely because here, at least, we tend to have confidence in the reality of that about which we discourse. But, from the standpoint of C, this tendency suppresses a fundamental insight. Whenever an object exists as an object of discourse, it is not its

supposed physical reality that is decisive, for the physically real object as physically real is thought to be such on the grounds that it seems to have being *independently* of discourse. But an object of discourse as such has its being *dependently* upon discourse, regardless of whether it *also* has an independent or physical being.

The dependence of 0 on C for its being an object of discourse raises immediately a problem whose importance cannot, I think, be exaggerated. Given that the factor C, regardless of whether it be called an " idea" or a brain state or a muscular disposition of some sort, is-as intraorganismic-a subjective or "private" factor; and given that C is the *raison d'etre* of 0 so far as 0 actually enters into discourse, it must be asked at once: how is it that 0 does not participate entirely in the subjectivity of C? How is it that two language users of X, each of which has his own C, can have or seem to have in common the object 0? They do not have the same C. They have or seem to have the same 0. But 0 exists in discourse as an effect of C. Therefore it would seem that there are as many 0 s as there are C s, and that each 0 is private in just the way that each Cis.

Yet such a conclusion flies in the face of common experience. We live in a public world, not a merely private one. Language is an instrument for sharing the world. Here all the arguments of Wittgenstein against the possibility of a private language are appropriate. We may take it as a touchstone for any sound account of discourse that it give an account of meaning as public and common, not as private and subjective. The existence of C and its necessity for actual discourse here and now, I think, cannot be gainsaid. But some account must be given which reconciles the privacy of C with the publicy of 0, and of X as sign of 0. Otherwise, our theory falls prey to all the standard and valid objections that have led analysts-both " ordinary " and " logistic " ones-to eschew any role for psychology and mental entities in the philosophy of discourse. How are we to reconcile the dependence of 0 (for its being

as object) and of X (for its being as sign of 0) upon C, with the fact that 0 and X function publicly, while C functions privately? [45]

To get clear about what is at stake here, let us proceed for the moment on the assumption that the object 0 is a really existing thing factually given in the physical world quite apart from discourse. The advantage gained by making this assumption is simply that in the stipulated case-the case where 0 exists in fact independently of discourse-it is clear that not only C and X are really distinct as well as really related- (really related, that is, inasmuch as it is by virtue of C that the organism is aware of O), but also that distinction between 0 as something existing in the physical world--0 as thing, let us say-and 0 as something apprehended by a given organism-0 as object, let us say-is precisely the difference, for purposes of discourse, between 0 as related in its existence to a given organism and 0 as unrelated to that organism, a difference made by the presence or absence in the organism of C. When C exists, 0 exists as apprehended as well as in fact; when C does not exist, 0 exists in fact but not as apprehended. C, therefore, is the basis of the cognitive relation R between an organism A and an object 0. Here we have a preliminary answer to the problem posed by the privacy of C

[45] The denunciation of " psychologism " has been a rallying cry for both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions from their very beginnings. Yet neither tradition offers any clear account reconciling what I am here calling the privacy of C versus the publicy of 0. The phenomenologists, to their credit, have from the first recognized that 0 necessarily depends upon C, whatever the difficulties in explaining this fact. The analysts, to their discredit, have proceeded as though the mere eschewing of any consideration of the intraorganismic factor C were by itself sufficient to avoid all difficulties in the explanation of objective discourse. This ploy is most explicit, perhaps, in Quine's distinction between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, drawn in the spirit of what we have seen in the first part of this article is the mistaken belief, inherited from Russell, to the effect that, as Quine puts it: " There are no ultimate philosophical problems concerning terms and their references, but only concerning variables and their values; and there are no ultimate philosophical problems concerning existence except insofar as existence is expressed by the quantifier '(:;Ix) '." *(The Methods of Logic,* p. 224) .

vis-a-vis the publicy of **O:** just as one and the same thing can serve as the term of several different relations, so one and the same object can be the term of relations founded on the C's existing in diverse individuals. One and the same object **O** can stand at the term of several different relations **R** founded on the different C's existing in different individuals. Thus the publicy of **O** is reconciled with the privacy of C by the diversity of status between 0 and C: **O** exists as the term of the relation R, whereas C exists as the fundament or basis of that same relation **R.** C and **O** differ as fundament and term of a relation differ. The fact that C and 0 are located in physically disparate subjects, and that several subjects can be related to one and the same term, provides a preliminary resolution of our problem, though we shall soon have occasion to add some essential refinements.

Let us now reintroduce into the picture the linguistic factor-word or sentence or whole treatise-X, which, in conjunction with C, refers to O. Our preliminary assumption about 0 as a thing need not be altered, for X, obviously, insofar as it is a mark, sound, or movement (or a series of marks, sounds and movements), is also a thing existing in fact independently of any C here and now. This is an important point, whose significance has generally not been appreicated by philosophers of language.

Up to now, we have spoken of C and X as co-occurrent, the former intraorganismically and the latter extraorganismically, whenever X actually refers, here and now, to **O.** From this point of view it seems sufficient to say that X is able to be referred to 0 owing to the fact that **O** is apprehended by the user of X thanks to C. But this appearance of sufficiency is an **il**lusion, for it glosses over the fact that X is every bit as much an object-a term of a C-hased relation-as **O** itself is. C and X, as the thought and the word, do not belong on one side of discourse, and **O,** object and thing, on the other side. On the contrary, C belongs on one side and X and **O** belong on the other, for X and **O** have in common the character of being objects, while C is known to exist only analytically, as the

basis that must be posited for the difference between one and the same thing now existing only in fact, now existing also in apprehension. Here we arrive at a conclusion whose consequences are definitive: the difference between X as physical and X as significant or linguistic, is the same as the difference between 0 as thing and 0 as object of discourse.

The importance of the point demands that we spell it out in detail. Whenever a given individual, A, let us say, uses X, the X too is something that he is aware of, and so is an object of apprehension-something A is aware of:_in its own right, as well as and as a necessary condition for X's being a sign of O. Both X and 0 must be apprehended as objects in order for either to function as a sign of the other. This means that, since C is posited precisely and only as the intraorganismic factor making the difference between A's actually being aware or not being aware of a given object here and now, before (logically, not always temporally) X is used to refer to O, there are not one but two C's involved, one whereby X exists as apprehended and one whereby 0 exists as apprehended. Strictly speaking, then, the sign character of X relative to 0 is due to the establishment of an association not between C and X but rather between X as one object and 0 as another object, which association in turn results in the formation of a third C, which is the " idea " or " concept " neither of X nor of 0 disjunctively but of X and 0 conjunctively. It is *this* C, properly speaking, that X evokes when it functions linguistically as a sign of O.

The situation can be clarified, perhaps, by a sequence of diagrams:

Diagram 1: A is aware of O. by of. Ct. the idea of 0, prescinding from the question of how Cl was formed.

Diagram II: A is aware of X by virtue of C_2, the idea whereby X exists as something A is aware of.

@--<X

A

Diagram III: A is aware of X and 0 together, making possible the formation an idea of the two as a unity-a unity of thought.

(C:\----< 0

A

Diagram IV: A is aware of X and 0 not only together, but also as connected, by a.· connection consequent upon the idea, C_3, whereby X and 0 exist as something A is aware of conjunctively.

A

Viewed in this way, there is no chance of committing the blunder of thinking that thoughts and words are two separate processes, each of which would be just what it is if one or the other were to be removed. On the contrary, discourse-the whole of thought, language, and object-is profoundly one, so unified that the intraorganismic thoughts and the extraorganismic words and objects are what they are precisely and only to the extent that each is simultaneously. For, while the object of cognition exists dependently on the thought from the standpoint of being, object and thought co-exist in perfect proportion to one another from a temporal standpoint. The object cannot be as apprehended save when and as an idea of it exists, and an idea as idea cannot be save as giving an existence of presence to an object. In a certain sense, therefore, only upon the formation of C3 in our sequence of diagrams do we have the existence of discourse properly speaking.

This reveals a profound import to the contemporary expression, "universe of discourse." For, from the standpoint of the

concept or idea, words are not opposed to objects as words are to things. On the contrary, words and things known are equally objects, but objects differing in status primarily as regards their manageability. Thus, words and sentences call things to mind and order our thoughts about things, but, equally, things suggest words and patterns of words. For both words and things exist, in discourse, in an objective unity derived from the concepts or ideas which give them their being-which "constitute them," the phenomenologists say-as cognized or known.

A linguistic remark .can fail to be understood-Q, on hearing X, may think of N rather than O. Or a perceived object may suggest no words to the perceiver but present itself, as it were, mutely. But in any case, whenever anything enters our consciousness, it does so by virtue of an intraorganismic occurrence C.

These remarks bring out the utter peculiarity of the intraorganismic factor C, the con.cept or idea: unlike objects, including words, that are also signs, ideas cannot fail to give presence to something besides themselves. Inasmuch as a sign is anything that makes present in awareness something besides itself, ideas are pure signs: they do nothing but signify, i.e., make present the objects of awareness-be they words or things or whatnot-that the ideas themselves are not. Unlike the objects which are also signs, ideas cannot fail to signify. They alone, among all the furniture of the world, signify by necessity. For them, to be and to signify are simply one. The object of which we are directly aware, be it word or thing apprehended disjunctively or .conjunctively, is, in every case, just what C *qua* C is not. If we were or could be directly aware of C, it would not be C, but something else, for C is just that factor that makes us aware of something that it itself is not. No matter how the matter is approached, careful attention to the function of C in relation to X and O reveals that, while C can be known to exist by a reflexive analysis of discourse, it can under no conditions be directly observed or apprehended. This is a point of some importance that was well understood by the

older scholastics and by a few recent philosophers-notably Jacques Maritain and F. H. Bradley-but that seems never to have been adverted to in a systematic way by anyone in the analytic or phenomenological traditions excepting Heidegger. Substituting the word " physical " for " psychical," the following text can be cited from Bradley's *Logic* with even more timeliness, in many respects, than when Bradley wrote:

An idea, within my head, and as a state of my mind, is as stubborn a fact as any outward object .... but, intent on this, we have as good as forgotten the way in which logic uses ideas. We have not seen that in judgment no fact ever *is* just that which it *means,* or can mean what it is; and we have not learnt that, wherever we have truth or falsehood, it is the signification we use, and not the existence. We never assert the fact in our heads, but something else which that fact stands for. And if an idea *were* treated as a physical reality, then it would not represent either truth or falsehood. When we use it in judgment, it must be referred away from itself. If it is not the idea *of* some existence, then, despite its emphatic actuality, . . . it is a something which, in relation to the reality we mean, is nothing at all.[46]

Or again, substituting " discourse " for " judge " :

Not only are we unable to discourse before we use ideas, but, strictly speaking, we can not discourse till we use them *as* ideas. We must have become aware that they are not realities, that they are *mere* ideas, signs of an existence other than themselves. Ideas are not ideas until they are symbols, and, before we use symbols, we ·can not discourse.H

So far, then, we have given a preliminary explanation of how the privacy of C reconciles with the publicy of X and O. C, as subjective or private, is not something experienced or known but the basis or fundament of all experience and knowledge. What are experienced and known are words and things, O's and X's insofar as they enter into relations R with us on the

•• F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic* (2nd ed., rev.; London: Oxford University Press, 1922), Vol. I, p. 2.

*7 *Ibid.*

basis of C's. And O's and X's have a common or public character, precisely because they exist at the term of the diverse relation R's founded on the several C's.

But so far we have also been proceeding on the assumption that the O's in question exist in fact as well as in discourse. How does the foregoing analysis clarify or apply to the case where 0 does not exist in fact and where, accordingly, Quine, Russell, and the logisticians generally assert-not without plausibility-that the apparent reference of the discourse is *merely* apparent or at least thoroughly confused?

It is in the systematic clarification of the privileged sign status of the intraorganismic factor C that the answer to this question, and the explanation of the apparent indifference of discourse to being and non-being, is found. Clearly, in calling ideas " intentional," and in assigning them the property of intentionality, Brentano and the phenomenologists after him were getting at the fact that ideas cannot be save as giving the being of presence in cognition to objects. Brentano, in later rejecting the doctrine of intentionality as a truly. relational property on the grounds that the object terminating an intentional relation is often unreal, seems to be getting at the fact that the notion of a relation without a term is unintelligible. But what he failed to see, and what Husserl glimpses in his doctrine of ideas as constituting their objects, and even in his perverse doctrine of the *epoche,* is the fact that the term of a relation, as it is a term, has its being from the relation; and hence there can be a true relation between idea and object even when the object has no further being than that of a term.

Consider again the unique status of C, the idea or concept. In its function as C, it is neither experienced nor experienceable but has its whole being in provenating-" dimanating," as Poinsot would say-the relation R terminating in 0. If C were to exist without engendering this relation R, it would not be *as* C that it existed, for as C it is precisely the fundament of R. C as C gives rise to R by necessity. This is what constitutes its uniqueness among the furnishings of the world. This is also

what endows discourse with its indifference to the being and non-being of its objects, for the following reason: the term of any relation, inasmuch as it is a term, owes its being to the relation it terminates.

To see how this is so, consider the case of a non-cognitive relation, say, the relation of "larger than." A, for example, is something larger than B, only so long as both A and B exist. A's .size as a natural thing provides a basis for its being related to B, but only on condition that B actually exist. Given' the existence of B in itself, then B will also have an existence as term of A's relation to it based on A's size, and vice-versa. Thus the existence of B relative to A as something smaller than A is owing to or based upon A's .size, just as the existence of A relative to B as something larger than B is owing to or based upon B's size. The point this proves is perfectly general: even when the term of a given relation is something existing in fact, it owes its being as term to the relation that it terminates.

> A term, insofar as it is a term formally, is the term of something; for nothing terminates except another. The term of a relation, therefore, is something of the relation; if the relation is real, its term is a term purely, that is, it does not have other than to terminate or be opposed to the relation and to be something of the relation itself as of the respecting. In this it differs from the fundament, because it is necessary for the fundament to give existence to the relation according to inherence, in which existence the relation coincides with an absolute determination of the subject of the relation. The term, however, does not give existence to the relation, but the opposition of termination. Therefore the formality of the term is not something absolute.[48]

Applying this perfectly general point to the case of C, we see that the dependence of 0 as object upon C is but a special case of the dependence of any term as such upon the relation of which it is the term. The case of CRO differs from the case of A>B only in this, that where A functions as fundament contingently upon the existence of B in fact, C functions as a

[48] Jean Poinsot, *Cursus Philosophicus,* ed. B. Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1930), Vol. I, p. 596a46-b 15.

fundament by virtue of what C in itself is, that is, C functions as a fundament necessarily. Hence A will generate B's status as term only if B also eiists in fact. But C will generate O's existence as term regardless of whether 0 also exists in fact. This explains the capacity of discourse to refer to what is not. All objects of discourse, as such, exist as terms of the relation R generated by C. Since C cannot be without generating R, and 0 exists *qua* object as term of R, 0 will exist as an object whenever C exists as a fundament, regardless of whether 0 also exists as a thing in fact. Hence the objects of discourse need not be independently of discourse in order to be really referred to.

Here we must refine our preliminary solution to the publicy of objects. If every term of a relation qua term has its being from the relation, and if every object of discourse exists as such in the capacity of term, will there not be as many terms as there are relations founded on C's? And if there are as many terms as there are C's, is not the common or public status of the object destroyed after all? Does it not merely become the extraorganismic correlative of the intraorganismic C, as private in its own way as the C founding the relation R that gives 0 its being as term?

The answer to this difficulty involves some unavoidable subtlety but continues to be a firm No. In every case of an actual relation the three factors-fundament, relation, and term-are existentially inseparable but really distinct. For example, the A that is larger than B differs from the A that continues to exist when B exists no longer, only by a difference in mode. It is one and the same A existing in both cases but once with an added dimension or mode-fundament of the relation " larger than." Similarly with the term of any relation. Apart from the relation it does not exist as term; yet if, besides existing as term, it also exists in its own right, those two existences differ in mode only.

Suppose then two persons, A and B, each having his own concept-C1 and C2, respectively-of an object 0 which happens to exist in fact. The object O, existing in relation to C1

and C2, differs from the thing 0, existing in fact, only modally—just as a point qua terminus of a line has a mode of being superordinate to the being of the point as such. HencetheobjectOis identical with the thing 0 but adds to it the mode of being as term-something 0 has, not from itself but from C. Cl and C2 generate R1 and R2 both terminating at the thing 0 in its mode as object. But just as 0 as object is also 0 as thing, so also 0 as term of R1 is also 0 as term of R2. All three—0 as thing, 0 as term of R1, 0 as term of Rz—coincide in being, though they are also modally distinct. Similarly, one and the same point can terminate two different lines, even though that point, considered as terminating, exists dependently on each of the lines it terminates and as modally distinct from each of them. More concretely, two individuals, each perceiving the same cloud, give the very cloud floating in the world a new mode of being as object perceived. Each perceiver has his own intraorganismic factor C founding the relation terminating at the cloud as perceived. Each, therefore, gives a modally distinct objectivity to the cloud: yet it is one and the same cloud that is objectified in the two cases. Cl and C2, located in spatially diverse subjects, terminate in the numerically same space with a difference only in the mode of the termination.

This unavoidable subtletly, actually, saves the public character of discourse in a manner that is more genuinely satisfying than the more facile formulation of our preliminary solution could provide. For the modal distinctness of one and the same object as cognized by two or more individuals (or by one and the same individual at two separate times), together with the modal distinctness between things as such and things become object, fits very well with our experience of the "slipperiness of things " and of the great difficulty with which any deep agreement is reached in human discourse; for it is precisely through these modal distinctions that differences in experience slip in between man and man, and through them too that history insinuates itself between man and the physical world.

We have seen now how it is that the objects of discourse

can also be things of the world, and why they need not be; and we have also seen how it is that discourse has a public character, even though it is based on an intraorganismic or "private" factor C, which I have repeatedly referred to as an " idea " or " concept."

This choice of terms bears closer scrutiny, for according to a celebrated theory widely held in current scientific and philosophical circles-the so-called " identity hypothesis "-the intraorganismic factor C is in fact a state of the brain of the organism A which uses X to discourse about O. What I have called an" idea" or" concept," according to this view, is more properly called an event or state of the central nervous system-an identification that must he made because, if the postu--lation of such intraorganismic factors " is going to prove fruitful," as Charles Osgood remarks, " and serve as anything more than a label for ignorance, properties must be attributed to them." [49]

We can agree with Osgood on the importance of assigning properties for C, but to ascribe to C the properties of a nervous event or state is possible only to the extent that the above-described manner in which C functions relative to X and 0 has been systematically misunderstood. If what I have said is the function of C in discourse be admitted, then the view that " mental states are brain states " must be false- A brain state is something that is observable in principle. Therefore C as such is not a brain state but must be other than and superordinate to any state of the central nervous system; for, as we have seen, since an idea (C as C) cannot be save as giving an existence of presence to something which it itself is not, an idea as idea is intrinsically unobservable. It can be objectified only by inference, never by observation. [50] To repeat an earlier re-

•• Chares E. Osgood, *Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 410. Cf. p. 681: "We must *postulate material events for meaning* and then investigate the theoretical consequences of this postulation." (Osgood's emphasis)

•• Cf. Poinsot, *OurBUS Philosophicus,* III, 185a33-M5.

mark: " careful attention to the function of C in relation to X and 0 reveals that, while C can be known to exist by a reflexive analysis of discourse, it can under no conditions be directly observed or apprehended."

Physical marks, sounds or movements, when functioning in discourse, undergo-thanks to C-a singular and mysterious "elevation" (as Cajetan puts it[51]), during which they exist in a higher way than is proper to them as observable, physical occurrences; and they do so inasmuch as they are the objective effects of the intraorganismic factor C-the concept or idea-within the speaker and hearer of language, a factor which, as it functions in discourse, is itself no more directly inspectable than the significance it causes. This is the point of view proper to a would-be philosophy of language; it is on this point that an account of meaning can properly turn. Here we may apply another of Cajetan's remarks:

> From this it will appear how crude is the thinking of those who treat of sense and the sensible, of understanding and the understandable, as also of the processes of sensation and understanding, according to the canons of judgment applicable to material events. *Et disces elevare ingeniuln, aliulnque rerurn ordineln ingredi*--you must learn to raise up your mind, and enter into quite a different order of occurences.[52]

The point is not to deny that brain states are somehow correlative with and indeed necessary conditions for the existence of ideas. It is simply to point out the error of reductively identifying C, as that which is conditioned, with a brain state, as that which doubtless conditions C.[53] Whatever difficulties one may have with the terminology of ideas and concepts, they are as nothing compared to the difficulties consequent upon the failure to grasp this principle: the conditioned as such is always other than its necessary and even sufficient conditions.

[51] Cajetan, *Commentaria in summam theologicam S. Thomae,* I, q. 14, art. 2, nn. 4 and 7; q. 79, art. 2, n. 14.

[52] *Ibid.,* I, q. 14, art. 1, n. 7.

[63] Cf. Poinsot, *Cursus Philosophicus,* III, 185b26-186b40, esp. 186b3-16.

IV. *A Thomistic; Perspective on Discourse (The Classical Doctrine of Intentionality).*

Brentano, in introducing the concept of intentionality into modern discussion, contented himself with a vague reference to the origins of the notion among " the scholastics of the Middle Ages." [54] To judge from the manner in which he formulates the doctrine, and from the reasons that led him finally to evacuate the doctrine of its relational content, it seems fair to say that Brentano was rather poorly informed as to what the classical scholastic doctrine of intentionality actually contained. [55]

The notion of an intentional mode of existence, or at least the invention of the terminology, seems to have come from Averroes, and in particular, from his remarks in commentary on Aristotle's discussion in the *de Anima* of the character of the stimulus engendering the sense impressions that form the basis of our perceptions of the physical world.[56] In St. Thomas himself, this notion of an intentional determination of being, or *"species,"* as distinct from the natural or entitative determinations of being-the *"formae naturales* "-became the organizing concept for the account of the genesis o£ concepts, beginning from the " species impressae sensuum externorum "–the intentional stimuli of sensation-proceeding up through the workings of the internal senses to the culmination finally in the " species express a intellectus possibilis "-the concept or intentional form made by the understanding itself as the medium in which the world exists as understood.

It was the privilege of Cajetan to clarify, principally in his *Commentary* on Aristotle's *de Anima,* the exact basis of the distinction between the *formae* and the *species* as two typically

[54] Brentano, " The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena," *Zoe. cit.,* p. *50.*

[55] I have given some detailed evidence for this judgment in " The Ontological Status of Intentionality," *The New Scholasticism,* XLVI (Spring, 1972), pp. 220-233.

[56] Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libras,* ed. by F. S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), II, sec. 60, pp. 219-!i!21.

diverse ontological realities, the one (the *formae)* by which the affected subject is primarily altered or changed, the other (the *species)* by which the affected subject is primarily identified with something that it itself is not.[57]

However, the nature o£ this intentional union and the mechanism, so to speak, that underlies its possibility, was not systematically clarified until the 17th century, when Jean Poinsot, called by Yves Simon the last Commentator of genius on the work of St. Thomas, took up the doctrine of the *species* in order to develop a comprehensive theory of the sign and of cognition.[58]

In Poinsot's theory, unlike most other versions o£ the nature o£ discourse essayed in recent times along Thomistic lines, the doctrine of the intentional form is not deployed in an opaque fashion as a fundamental datum not susceptible of further elucidation. On the contrary, the capacity and function of the intentional form is shown to be possible as a direct consequence of the peculiar status of relation among all the possible modes of being. This peculiarity, which Poinsot exhibits as constituting the prior possibility of signs in general and of human discourse in particular, Poinsot learned from St. Thomas:

> Relation is said to be in a way different than any other kind of being. For in the case of other kinds of being, each one is said to be in two ways, both as regards its existence, and as regards the character of its essence. . . . But relation is something according to the existence it has in a subject, while according to its essential character it has not to be something, but only to be referred to another; whence according to its essential character it does not posit anything in a subject. . . . Thence also is it that something is found to be related in which there is only a mind-

[57] Cajetan, *Commentaria in de anima Arif!totdis,* ed. by P. I. Coquelle (Rome: Angelicum, 1939), Vol. II, sees. 264-267, pp. *251-255.*

[58] Poinsot's theory of the sign is in the *Cursus Philosophicus,* Vol. I, Part II, Qq. XXI-XXIII, pp. 646al4-749b47, but draws also on other parts of the work. This entire matter is discussed at length in my article, "The Two Approaches to Language," *The Thomist,* XXXVIII (October, 1974), pp. 856-907.

Poinsot's treatment of cognition runs throughout in Vol. III of the *Cursus Philosophicus.*

dependent or mental relation, and the relation is not posited there according to physical being, as when the knowable is referred to knowledge[59]

Following out this clue, Poinsot was able to elucidate the nature of signs and the function of concepts or ideas in discourse with an unrivalled profundity. From the standpoint of their role in discourse Poinsot divided the sign into two classes, which he called *formal* and *instrumental.* Formal signs are all signs that correspond to what we identified above as the intra-organismic factor C, that is, they are the signs whose whole being is exhausted in the function of signifying or presenting to mind objects other than themselves. These signs, since they are never objects directly apprehended (this is precluded by their mode of being, as we have seen), are known only reflexively and by inference,[60] from the fact that, if there were no such signs, the interpretation of words would involve us in an infinite regress, as would the awareness of any object.[61]

Instrumental signs, by contrast, are all signs, including, therefore (and principally), words and sentences, that are perceived directly as objects, and whose functioning as signs depends on their being objectively perceptible.

The class of formal signs, thus, includes the whole of what traditional philosophers have variously called ideas, concepts, images, imaginations, etc. They exist as such only in the cognitive act[62] and only as presenting objects that they themselves are not-which objects, in turn, often (indeed, *normally)* , by the associative processes so familiar to modem psychology, become signs in their own right (instrumental signs) as well as objects. Since the class of instrumental signs is comprised of

[59] I *Semt.,* dist. 20, q. I, art. I. St. Thomas makes this point in numerous other passages as well-e. g., *Quodlib.* I, a. 2; *Quodlib.* IX, a. 4; *de Verit.,* q. I, a. *5* ad I6; *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 28, aa. I and 2; *et alibi.* I have cited the text from the *Semtences* only for reasons of convenience in the present context.

[60] See Poinsot, *Oursus Philosophicus,* III, 185 a 33-b 10.

[61] See John A. Oesterle, "Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning," *The Thomist,* VII (April, 1944), pp. 258-260; and John N. Deely, "The Ontological Status of Intentionality" (cited in fn. *55* above), pp. 229-230.

[62] Poinsot, *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, 303b29-38; III, 185b26-186al5.

signs that are apprehensible objects besides, and since objects as apprehended depend upon formal signs, if there were no formal signs, there would be no signs of any kind. "The formal sign," as Poinsot put it, "is a sign simply and absolutely";[63] the instrumental sign is a sign only in a certain respect. Or as Bradley put it, "in the end, there are no signs save ideas."[64]

Formal signs were also called by Poiusot (here following Cajetan, Aquinas, and Averroes) intentional forms, in order to contrast them with the natural forms or determinations of things. The point of the contrast lies in the fact that an intentional form functions to generate a relation necessarily, by virtue of what it is. Natural forms, by contrast, though they may indeed serve as the basis or fundament generating a relation, do not do so necessarily, but only contingently-contingent, that is, upon there being in fact an entity to which the mode of being as term can be added. The further point, that every term *qua* term owes its being to the relation it terminates-"is something of the relation," as Poinsot says[65]-even when that term (as is normally the case outside of relations of cognition) is also something existing in reality outside of the relation, becomes, as we have seen, the key to interpreting the apparent indifference of discourse to the real being or non-being of its objects. Poinsot himself does not make this point an explicit element in his treatise on the sign; but he does devote an entire article to it in his earlier treatise on relation,[66] of which treatise he says the theory of the sign is but an extension and particular application.[67]

With the addition of this explicit element to Poinsot's theory, then, it becomes perfectly clear why the objects of discourse need not be independently of discourse in order to be truly and really referred to. Given the nature of relation with its neces-

[63] Poinsot, *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, 694 b !'l3-69.

[64] Bradley, *The Principles of Logic,* Vol. I, p. *5.*

[65] *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, 596 b !'l-3.

[66] *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, Part II, Q. XVII, Art. V, "Utrum relatio formaliter terminetur ad absolutum vel ad relativum."

[67] *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, 64!'l a !'l5-37.

sary elements of fundament, connection, and term, the indifference of discourse to being and non-being becomes the direct consequence of the difference between intentional and natural forms-between, if you like, the " mental " and the " physical." Both an intentional and a natural form can function as fundament of a relation, but only the intentional form does so by necessity. Hence, any form (any determination of being), insofar as it is the fundament of a relation, is mediately the cause of the existence of the term regarded formally as term of the relation in question. But a natural form gives being to the term of the relations it generates contingently-contingent, that is, upon the real existence of something which, besides existing in relation to another as term, also exists in itself as more than a mere term; while an intentional form, an idea, gives being to the term of the relation it generates necessarily-necessarily, that is, regardless of whether or not there is a real existent which, besides being a term in relation to the idea, has a being in fact independently of discourse. When my uncle dies, he continues to exist as an object of discour:se, for this existence he has as term of the cognitive relations my ideas engender.

The crucial point to be noted here is that, while every object of discourse as such exists necessarily as term of the relation generated when, as, and while an idea exists, not every object of discourse need exist *only* as such, i. e., *only* as term of cognition. In other words, it can perfectly well happen, as common experience suggests does often happen, that the very object existing in discourse as an object also exists as a thing in the world independently of discourse here and now. Objects existing only as objects Poinsot, following an ancient tradition, calls "beings of the mind" *(entia rationis).* Objects *also* existing as things or "in fact," Poinsot calls "real beings" *(entia realia).* Real beings and beings of the mind, as objects of discourse, have in common the existence as terms of cognitive relations. For this existence as " objective beings," both alike depend upon being known, " since indeed it is from the actual termination of a relation that it results that a given thing is said to be the term of that

relation." [68] But real beings, in addition to their being known-i. e., in addition to their being as terms of relations founded on ideas-also have being independently of being known, and in this consists their reality in point of fact. Beings of the mind, by contrast, have no being in addition to being known-i.e., have no being in addition to their being as terms of relations founded on ideas-and in this consists their unreality in point of fact. Beings of the mind are precisely non-beings relative to the beings of nature-the physical or " real " beings. "A being is properly said to be of the mind," writes Poinsot, " because it has no being independent of the understanding, but is said to exist in the understanding only objectively, and so is opposed to real being." [69]

Being and non-being, thus considered, belong to objects in point of fact according as they are or are not something more than pure terms of idea-based relations. The objects of discourse, however, *as such,* are *nothing more than pul·e terms* of idea-based relations. These relations have the ontological character of relations both when the objects at which they terminate are and when those objects are not also things in the world. But the objects are considered by " common sense" to be realities only to the extent they are or are believed to be things in the world *besides* being objects; to the extent the objects are or are believed to be *only* objects (cognized terms) and nothing more, they are considered unrealities. The crucial point for a philosophy of discourse, however, is that in point of the existence they receive from ideas, objects, real and unreal, are on an equal footing and are equally public. Once this is understood, it is perfectly understandable also why discourse should really be as it appears to be-endowed with a certain internal indifference to the being and non-being of its objects, not, indeed, insofar as they are objects but insofar as they are things in addition to being objects.

It is this last point-that nothing prevents some objects of

[68] *Ibid.,* 596 a 86-89.
[69] *Ibid.,* 285a89-48.

discourse, existing as such as terms of relations founded on formal signs, from also existing in themselves as things of nature independently of discourse-that Husser! and the practitioners of his *epoche* (suspension of belief in the factuality of any objects) systematically neglect, but that seems to be allowed for in the development of later trends known as "existential phenomenology."

In any event, this application by Poinsot of the theory of relation found in St. Thomas to the explanation of the sign does seem to provide a way out of the impasse reached by the phenomenologists and the analysts over the apparent indifference of discourse to being and non-being. This indifference is a consequence of the very nature of discourse as relational, for, as Cajetan put it, since what is essential to relation as such is a being toward, and not a being mental or physical, "the consequence is that the toward as such is neither physical nor mental by necessity, but either permissively,"[70] depending on the conditions concerning the nature of the fundament (is it a natural or an intentional form?) and-primarily-of the term (is it a pure term and nothing more, or is it a thing of nature besides being a term?). When the *term* of a cognitive relation is a pure term and nothing more-when it is an object only, let us say, and not also a thing existing in fact as well as and while it is apprehended-it lacks a positive character possessed in its own right. But when the cognitive *relation* is merely cognitive and nothing more, that is, when the cognitive relation is between an idea in the knower's mind and an object having no other existence than the being of term given by the relation and its fundament (the idea); when, thus, the cognitive relation obtains between a physical reality or being in fact-the knower-and a physical unreality or non-being in fact-the object as mere term and nothing more-it is still a true and genuine relation possessing the positive or ontological character of relation in its own right. In the case of relation alone, therefore, as Cajetan puts it, "to be in the mind is not a diminishing

[70] Cajetan, *in summam theologicam,* I, q. 28, a. 1.

condition, as in the case of all other modes of being that admit of physical instantiation. For a rose existing only in the mind is not a genuine rose, any more than the Homer existing in belief is genuinely Homer. But a relation in the mind is a genuine relation." [71]

The doubts of Brentano and the analysts concerning the relational character of discourse, and the silence of the phenomenologists when asked to explain how it is possible for discourse to really refer to what does not exist, alike stem, it would seem, from the failure to articulate the peculiar status of relation as a mode of being-the failure to understand that, as Poinsot learned from Aquinas, relation alone among the ontological categories retains its positive content whether its existence is physical or merely mental, because

> only relation has to be a being and toward a being, and from the side whence it has a being toward it exists positively, and yet it does not have thence the character of being real. But the real being of a relation originates from one place, namely, from the fundament; the positive character of [the relation as a] being toward from another place, namely, from the term, whence the relation does not have to be a being, but toward being.... That therefore something could be considered ontologically, or positively, even if not really in an entitative or physical way, is something peculiar to relation. [72]

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] Poinsot, *Cursus Philosopicus,* I, 581 b 1-13. One *caveat* must be entered before concluding this discussion of the " classical doctrine." Throughout this and the preceding Section, I have spoken about objects of discourse being, as such, terms of idea-based relations. In speaking thus, I have been viewing objects under a restricted and, to tell the truth, " improper " formality-to wit, solely and wholly from the standpoint of the *here and now cognized.* It would be a mistake if the reader took from this the impression that such a notion of object is a fully adequate one, in need essentially of no further analysis. Since such further analysis lies outside the scope of the present argument, however, suffice it to note here that the notion of object adequately considered reduces to that of a " cause " in the order of extrinsic formal specification, and applies not only to cognition. These points are expressly made by Poinsot in his theory of signs (which intentional forms are in the line of), and the interested reader is well advised to have a close look at Poinsot's adequate and formal consideration of objects in the *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, 670all-679b5, esp. 673b50-674a4, 677b5-ll, and 678a7-32, where it is asserted and explained why the consideration of objects as here and now cognized, i. e., as

V. *Conclusion.*

The analytic tradition in philosophy began when Bertrand Russell turned to mathematical logic as the instrument for vindicating the standpoint of pluralistic realism that G. E. Moore had adopted around the turn of the century in order to escape from the pseudo-Hegelian idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet then dominating British and American thought. The standpoint of pluralistic realism, the standpoint that lies at the base of analysis, lies also at the base of Thomistic philosophy. But what about Russell's appeal, followed, morever, by that of the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and the so-called " logical analysts" generally, to mathematical logic as the means of justifying this standpoint?

Russell turned to mathematical logic because he found in the theory of polyadic functions, developed by mathematicians since the middle of the 19th century, a pure logic of relations that could express relational structure without reducing the relative element to a mere attribute of a subject conceived in a certain way by the mind. In other words, Russell turned to mathematical logic because, unlike the traditional logic with which he was acquainted, mathematical logic allowed for the reality of relations as something external to the related subjects and so something existing over and above those subjects and their respective attributes.

Two things must be said about this appeal from the standpoint of Thomistic philosophy. First, Russell, in the eyes of St. Thomas, is unequivocally correct in rejecting the idealistic view that relations are not real, either in the sense that all relations are reducible to inherent attributes of subjects *(esse* in), or in the sense that all relations are products of the requirement that certain aspects of subjects, which in themselves are not relations, nonetheless must be conceived by the mind through a comparison with elements other than themselves *(relativa secundum* dici-things relative according to the terms

terms of idea-based relations, is not the formality most proper to objects as such *simply.*

in which the understanding must give expression to them). This view that the being of relations as relations is something unique *(esse ad),* reducible neither to the inherent attributes of a substance *(esse* in), nor to the activity of the mind *(secundum dici* ,[78] is fundamental to Thomism and a direct consequence, for Thomas as for Russell, of the pluralistic character of the world.

Second, there is little room for doubt that the modern logic allows for a purer and more straightforward expression of relational facts than does any developed technique of traditional logic and has the added advantage of making explicit, in the quantification of predicates, the fact that our knowledge of the world is a highly constructional, historical achievement. These advantages, however, are not sufficient to support the hopes Russell entertained for the new logic-hopes that continue to be vainly sustained in a large part of the analytic community.

For it is simply not true that the whole of logical development prior to modem times was based on a system of thought committed to denial of the extramental reality of external relations. Nor is it true that the analysis of relational facts admittedly real is impossible to achieve according to protocols compatible with the general framework of a logic of the Aristotelian type. The relational analysis of the sign essayed by Poinsot, for example, is embedded completely in one of the purest and most complete treatments of the pre-modem logical tradition, a massive volume titled simply the *Ars Logica.*

No man knows the whole of any tradition, however, and when a learned man such as Russell is actively engaged in the creative solution of distinctive problems, he may be excused for lapses of historical knowledge. A man is justified in not relying overmuch on the thoughts of men long dead to the extent that their systematization was not achieved with an eye to encompassing the novelties and difficulties consequent

•• Not that a relation *secundum dici* is an activity or result of the mind exactly, but that the activity of the mind, in expressing the absolute ontological structures of finite being, must express them as intrinsically dependent on another *(circa oliud:* relative in .this sense) in the order of existing and acting. See Poinsot, *Cursus Philosophicus,* I, and esp. 67Ib6-9.

upon fundamental shifts in the patterns of philosophical interest and cultural belief. Were this not so, reading and thinking, information and understanding, would be one and the same-which they are not.

But Russell did seem to confuse the singularly powerful expression of the view of pluralistic realism made possible by the new logic, with the quite different matter of justifying philosophically the viewpoint so expressed. To silence an opponent is not to prove him wrong; yet the new logic, as we have seen, is intrinsically limited to the elimination of alternative claims in the giving of expression to the existential commitments presumed or preferred by its user. In short, the new logic becomes applicable only when and to the extent that philosophical debate has already ended, and then only to systematize and codify, as it were, the conclusions reached-or, more often in fact, the conclusions preached. As A. J. Ayer neatly comments in his recent book on the analytic tradition, the " analysis of existential statements " allowed for by the logistic system "gives an illuminating and correct account of one way, perhaps the most common way, in which they are employed," but "it does not cover their use in philosophical ontology." [74]

The dependence of the new logic upon presupposing as settled what, philosophically considered, is always the point at issue-our beliefs concerning the structure and content of what there is-is, therefore, the Achilles' Heel of logical analysis, and it is there that Wittgenstein, himself once a promoter of Russell's confusion, directed the shaft of his *Philosophical Investigations.* Ordinary language-common speech, if you like-succumbs to the power of modern logic only to the extent that that logic conceals a preconceived idea of the world, a preconception, moreover, that invariably proves to be much poorer and more restricted than the rich and varied world on which the evolution and continued survival of even *homo logicus*-insofar as he is a sub-species of *homo* sapiens-patently de-

[74] A. J. Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1971), p. *35.*

pends. The trouble with the philosophical application of modern logic, Witgenstein warns, is that it cuts the world down to the size of the mind of the one applying the symbols, and then insists that the world *so* trimmed and the world created by the hand of God are one and the same. *Hubris,* the ancient sin of reason, thus proves to be in a special way the temptation proper to the tradition of logical analysis, for that tradition owes its allegiance to a system that reduces all opposition to silence in the assertion of what there is, a system that claims to perfect and logically remedy the referential confusions and deficiencies of ordinary language in a way that would be possible only for an omniscient observer.

The rebellion led by Wittgenstein, thus, was certainly correct in redirecting the attention of philosophers to the incompatibility of ordinary language with any one philosophical theory of reality. For in truth, all the philosophical controversies over how to draw the line between being and non-being, between reality and unreality, are latent in the common speech of men. But the further claim that philosophy can do no more than take note of this diversity, which is the heart of Wittgenstein's claim in the *Investigations* and of the so-called "ordinary language analysts " after him, is at least as arbitrary and philosophically stultifying as the most arrogant applications of logical techniques in the service of views closed by their very formularly to the type of discussions proper to philosophy.

Far more promising is the work in progress by the descendants of Husserl, with their rich descriptions of the varieties of experience and their uncovering of typically verified structures within this variety.

Yet, on examination, the theory on which these phenomenological " discoveries " depend for their justification-the Husserlian doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness-proves as unsatisfying in its own way as the arbitrariness of the analysts either in their application of logical symbols or in their confinement to common usage. For intentionality, it turns out, is taken by phenomenologists for the essential fact about con-

sciousness, without any explanation that justifies the attachment to it o£ this essential importance. Phenomenology as a method, being itself the result o£ a name given where an explanation is called for, thus proves incapable o£ developing reasons for the facts it uncovers.[75]

Thomism, inevitably in a kind of competition with theserival traditions from a sociological point o£ view, has been at a distinct disadvantage, for it is straightforwardly a philosophy centered on being, whereas analysis and phenomenology alike find their center-the center o£ modem interests-in discourse. For this reason, the sociological opposition between Thomistic thought and the dominant modem trends has long been taken by many to be itself but the symptom o£ a deeper and ineradicable opposition in the very perspective o£ philosophy itself.

It is my conviction that this transposition o£ hostility from the sociological perspective into the perspective of philosophy proper has been the result o£ a mistaken belie£ that the difference between discourse-centered and being-centered philosophizing admits of no common ground, a belie£ based on the proposition that there is no path starting from the mind-with its ideas or its words considered as its own-that can lead back to being as it is independent of the mind.

It was the genius o£ Russell, in effect, to seek in the reality o£ relation a way through the mind-dependent structures o£ discourse to the mind-independent reality o£ things. It was the genius o£ St. Thomas, after all these years, to have given rise to a tradition that has within its resources the wherewithall to uncover the very path whose existence Russell suspected

[75] See my book, *The Tradition Via Heidegger* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), Chs. IX and X, pp. 134-170, for detailed amplification of this point, which amounts to a vindication of Heidegger's claim that his philosophical differences with Husser! stem from " a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology," as witnessed by the fact that " the historicity of thought remained completely foreign to [Husserl's] position" while it became increasingly central to Heidegger's. (See Heidegger's "Vorwort" to Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963], p. XV.)

but failed to uncover. This discovery within Thomism is not something to crow over. Only one man-Jean Poinsot-in the long tradition of Thomistic thought, seems ever to have suspected, as Russell did, that the path was there. It took all the work of the analysts to make the possibility of such a path socially credible, and all the work of the phenomenologists to make clear the importance of finding it.

For if I have accurately sketched the impasse reached by the modern philosophies of discourse-the heirs of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel-and if the way out of the impasse that I have argued for is sound, then it may be that the opposition between the philosophers of Ideas and Words, on the one hand, and the philosophers of Being, on the other hand, is not as irreconcilable as it has long and generally been taken to be by thinkers on both sides. For what is now disclosed is a veritable common ground in the category of relation, a meeting point or nexus wherein, for all their independent variability, the universe of discourse and the the universe of being partially coincide. Here indeed, in the coincidence of objects with things, being and non-being are reconciled, ontology and historicity become mutually intelligible, the philosophy of being finds its way into the world of modern concerns:

> It is true that the character of a knowable thing and of an object can be univocal between a real being and a being of the mind; for the divisions of being in the physical world are one thing, but those in the order of discourse quite another .... And so the character of the knowable is not the character of being formally, but presuppositively only is the character of the knowable being and modelled upon being; for the true is a property of being, and so is not being formally, but modelled on being and presuppositively being; but the true is one with the knowable. Whence it can well be that some being incapable of existence is capable of truth, not as a subject, but as an object, inasmuch as it does not have in itself an entitative character, which as subject founds truth and knowability, but has this, that as object it can be known on the pattern of real being and so can exist in the understanding as true. Whence although entitatively considered real being and being of

the mind are only analogous, yet objectively, since the one is represented on the pattern of the other, even things which are not univocal entitatively, can coincide in a univocal character or pattern-as, for example, God and a creature, substance and accident, come together in the character of a metaphysical knowable, or of something understandable. Moreover, the character of the sign, since it consists, not in the character of an object absolutely but in the ·character of substitution for another which is supposed to be the object or significate as represented to the mind, does not pertain to the order of the knowable absolutely, but relatively and ministerially; and for this function it takes on something of the entitative order-specifically, as it is a relation and as it assimilates the category of the knowable to the category of the relative.[76]

Whether these long neglected insights of Thomism will be taken up and developed, of course, I cannot say. But it does seem clear to me that they open the way to a new and heretofore unsuspected dimension of the tradition-the uncovering of the intelligible structure or ground of historical experience and of the ground out of which the diversity of cultures and epochs springs. Along this path, I suspect, lies the understanding of how and why man, the rational animal, is also the historical animal, the-as Heidegger puts *it-Seinsgeschichtliches Wesen.*

For the capacity of human discourse to mistake what is not for what is, is after all a defect or imperfection essentially only relative to the standpoint of an omniscient observer. From a properly human standpoint it is an imperfection only accidentally; essentially, it is a perfection, a perfection whereby a being, otherwise limited to the immediately given here and now, becomes alive to the prospect of realities both other and more than what is perceived at any given time. The indifference of discourse to being and non-being, after all, is not without the remedy of intuition and judgment. And if it often leads us into error and habitually shrouds us in a cloud of unknowing, it also enables us to share in a common and public life superior to the divisions of the materiaL world.[77] And because we are aware of the ever

[76] Poinsot, *CU1·sus Philosophicus,* I,

[77] Cf. *Ibid.,* III, 405 ◇

present tendency of discourse to present what is not as though it were, we can by reflection live with the possibility of discovering truths and realities beyond the immediately given semblances of being that contour common life. The capacity for being deceived, after all, turns out to be the price finite beings must pay for the capacity to create literature, art, science, and philosophy.

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PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S REALITY

IT IS INTERESTING to notice that, although he vehemently denies that the question of God's existence is a legitimate question, Paul Tillich does have arguments for God's "reality." Tillich, of course, does not use the term "reality" here, but there must be some term to denote God's ontological status in Tillich's system. When Tillich speaks of something that " exists," he means something which is finite, is limited by the "categories of finitude" (time, space, substance, etc.) . God, Tillich says, is most assuredly not this. God, he says, is being-itself.

The purpose of this article is to show that such a ploy does not succeed for Tillich. Indeed, one can raise the question of the reality of being-itself. In fact, Tillich himself raises this question and gives at least two arguments to prove the reality of his God. The notion of non-being plays a central role for Tillich here. Hence, in this essay I shall explicate Tillich's notion of non-being as an ontological power/ and examine his arguments for God's reality. In so doing I hope to show two things: (1) that Tillich does offer arguments for God's reality; that those arguments are not sound.

The notion of non-being, says Tillich, has a long history in philosophy, beginning with Parrnenides and continuing to Sartre and Heidegger." There have, however, been two basic ways to try to avoid this notion.

[1] Though Tillich mentions non-being in many places, the major sources for his views on it are as follows: *Systematic Theology,* I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 186-189; *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 32-63; *Love, Power, and Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. *35-53.*

[2] Tillich, *The Courage to Be,* p. 33. Here Tillich lists the major philosophical figures who have made use of the concept of non-being and states briefly the way he thinks the notion functioned in their thought.

(1) Some philosophers, says Tillich, try to discard non-being as an ontological notion by saying that negativity is only a quality of negative judgments.[3] Tillich's argument against this view[4] is that negative judgments themselves presuppose a being (man) who can transcend the present moment by expectations and then be disappointed when the events which would fulfill those expectations do not occur. The judgment made by that being, then, was mistaken. The important thing to see, though, says Tillich, is that expectation itself would not be possible unless being were structured in such a way as to allow man to have expectations and fall into error. For this to be possible, man himself "must be separated from his being in a way which enables him to look at it as something strange and questionable."[5] Further, this separation is itself possible only because man participates in the ontological ground of negativity, non-being. Thus, Tillich concludes, negative judgments themselves presuppose non-being.

The second way to attempt to avoid non-being is by placing it in absolute contrast with being.[6] If non-being is in no way related to being then non-being is not. This was Parmenides' move. The answer to this, says Tillich, is to speak of non-being as "dialectical," as *related* to being.[7]

Tillich distinguishes betwen two types of non-being by referring to the Greek distinction between *meon* and *ouk on.*[8] *Meon* is dialectical non-being. In Platonism *mean* was "that which does not yet have being but can become being if it is united with essences or ideas."[9] It is the *meontic* "Matter" from which the demiurgos formed the world in Plato's *Timaeus. Ouk on,* on the other hand, is the "nothing which has no relation to being."[10]

[3] Tillich, *Systematic Theolo,gy,* I, p. 187. Cf. also Tillich, *The Courage to Be,* p. SS.

[4] *Ibid.* Cf. also Tillich, *The Courage to Be,* p. 34.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* I, p. 254.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. *254-255.*

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 188.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 187

[10] *Illid.*

It is never exactly clear just what Tillich means by " non-being " when he uses it in his system. He definitely does want to speak of it as having ontological status, thus rejecting *ouk on.* However, he does not want it to be an independent reality over against God, thus rejecting *meon.* He states that the Christian doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* is to be taken as creation out of *ouk* on.[11] What Tillich seems to do is to combine some qualities of both concepts. He retains *ouk on* insofar as things are said to be threatened with the total loss of their being. But he retains *meon* in that his non-being *is* related to being. In fact, it is said to be "within" being.

For Tillich, the notion of non-being is part of a discussion of being, though such a discussion is of necessity symbolic. Actually the notion of " power " is the closest Tillich comes to saying anything literal about being-itself. Although it is symbolic or metaphorical to speak of being-itself as the " power of being " (the power by virtue of which things are rather than are not), this symbol seems to be Tillich's favorite: "Being is the power of being." [12]

However, if being is spoken of as the power of being, something over which the power is proved is presupposed, says Tillich.[13] The problem is that everything participates in being (and, thus, in the power of being) . So what is left to resist it? " What can be that which tries to negate being but is negated by it?" [14] The answer is non-being. As I said, such talk is symbolic. It touches, says Tillich, " the basic mystery of existence." Hence, any attempt to explain non-being will include terms which " bear in themselves the scars of non-being." [15] That is, they will be paradoxical.

11*Ibid.*

[12] Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice,* p. 37. Cf. also *Systematic Theology,* I, p. 189. There Tillich says: "The concept of being as being, of being-itself, points to the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting non-being. Therefore, instead of saying God is first of all being-itself, it is possible to say that he is the power of being in everything. The infinite power of being."

[18] *Ibid.*

"*Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 38.

The reason non-being is able to resist being is that it is *part of* being. "Being' embraces' itself and non-being."[16] As part of being, non-being is eternally present and cannot be dispelled. It is, in fact, a necessary part of being. Without it being would be .static and dead. However, if non-being is within being, how is it that it does not overcome being? Tillich's answer is that being "logically precedes non-being."[17] If non-being did overcome being then it would also overcome itself-it would have nothing to negate and, thus, would not be.[18] Thus, being and non-being require one another and *cannot* be separated. God is the power of being constantly overcoming non-being, which is part of being!

Certainly one can describe being in terms of non-being; one can justify such a description by pointing to the astonishing prerational fact that there is something and not nothing. One could say that "being is the negation of the primordial night of nothingness." But in so doing one must realize that such an aboriginal nothing would be neither nothing nor something, that it becomes nothing only in ·contrast to something, in other words, that the ontological status of non-being is dependent on being.[19]

Now such remarks make for very rough sledding indeed! However, it would seem that Tillich is .saying something like this: Non-being is not absolutely nothing at all. It is an ontological power, the power of negating what-is and of driving what-is on beyond itself or destroying it. As such, Tillich's non-being is really not absolute nothingness; it is *something*. It has ontological status and, as such, is included within being. Were it not included within being it would not be at all. As included within being, non-being•is manifest in all the things that are, that have being. Hence, the tendency of things to change and to die. Hence the anxiety of man, which we experience in terms of the categories of being and knowing.[20]

[16] Tillich, *The Courage to Be.,* p. 34.
[17] Tillich, *Love, Porwer, and Ju,stice,* p. 39.
[18] Tillich, *The Courage to Be.,* p. 40.
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* I, pp. 191 ff.

In other words, Tillich is basically an ontological realist. He not only maintains the reality of essences as " powers of being," [21] but, beyond them, the reality of an ontological ground for the existence of beings and for the transitoriness and passing-awayness of beings. Not only are there essences as powers to make things *what* they are, there is also the Supreme Power of Being-Itself to provide things (as well as essences) their *thatness.* As such, this power includes within itself its own negation and overcomes it continually, thus giving a ground even to negation!

This is still not sufficiently clear. However, I think it can best be made clear if we see it now in light of Tillich's own arguments for God's reality. In his article "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," [22] Tillich examines the ontological and the cosmological approaches to God. Here he is not referring to these as arguments, but as approaches. The ontological approach, he says, is Augustinian. It is the way of overcoming estrangement. The cosmological approach is Thomist, and is the way of meeting a stranger.

On the ontological approach, which Tillich accepts, man is immediately aware of the unconditioned and its reality cannot be inferred. [23] Tillich agrees with the Augustinian assertion that in doubt and the quest for truth, *verum ipsum* is presupposed. It is the norm of all approximations to truth. [24] Tillich also agrees with a point he claims Kant makes in his moral argument for God-that good acts presuppose *bonum ipsum.* This is the norm for all approximations to goodness. [25] Further, both *verum ipsum* and *bonum ipsum* are manifestations o£ *esse ipsum,* being-itself, " the ground and abyss of everything that is." [26]

[21] Tillich, *The Courage to Be,* p. 179. See also a reply by Tillich in *Philmophical Interrogations,* eds., Sidney and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964), p. 45.

[22] Tillich, *The Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 10-29. Cf. also *Systematic Theology,* I, pp. 204 ff.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. 28.

[2.] *Ibid.,* pp. 12-18.

[25] Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* I, p. 207.

[26] *Ibid.*

If, as Tillich says, "*Veritas* is God,"[27]-or presupposes God-then God must be real. This is so, Tillich claims, because truth can be denied only in the name of truth; if there is no truth, then it is *true* that there is no truth, but that is itself a truth. Hence, it is impossible to deny truth-hence it is impossible to deny God.[28]

Putting this another way, Tillich says that thought presupposes a unity of subject and object, else thought would have no content. This fundamental unity or ground of all thought, Tillich says, is God. In God, being and knowing are identical. Such a God "is a necessary thought because it is the ground of all thought."[29]

In short, Tillich maintains that man has a fundamental awareness of the Unconditioned, God, which involves his whole being. All of man's thought and activity presupposes this fundamental element. "Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the *prius* of the separation and interraction of subject and object, theoretically as well as practically."[30]

Tillich attempts to explicate what he means here by "awareness." He says it is the "most neutral term," it avoids the connotations of "intuition," "experience," and "knowledge."[81]

It is not "intuition" because intuition (in the Kantian sense) has the character of a *Ge8talt.* But the Unconditioned appears as" an element, a power, as demand."[32] It is not" experience" because that connotes" the observed presence of one reality to another reality."[33] The Unconditioned is not an object of observation. It is not "knowledge" because in knowledge the separation of subject and object is presupposed, and a theoretical act is implied. This is "just the opposite of aware-

[27] Tillich, *The Theology of Culture,* p. 12.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 13.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 15.
[ao] *Ibid.,* p. 22.
[81] *Ibid.,* p. 23.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] *Ibid.*

ness of the Unconditioned." [34] This awareness is immediate, not inferred. " It is present whenever conscious atention is focused on it, in terms of an unconditional certainty." [35]

> This power of being is the *prius* of everything that has being. It precedes all special contents logically and ontologically. It precedes every separation and makes every interaction possible, because it is the point of identity without which neither separation nor interaction can be thought. This refers basically to the separation and interaction of subject and object, in knowing as well as in acting. The *prius* of subject and object cannot become an object to which man as a subject is theoretically and practically related. God is no object for us as subjects. He is always that which precedes this division.[36]

In other words, Tillich seems to be saying that, if God is conceived as being-itself, rather than as *a* being, then the subjective reality of God entails his objective reality-objective as ontological ground as opposed to objective as a being or subjective only (i.e., being real only in thought) . If thought and truth both presuppose this foundamental ground then, as Tillich says, " God is the presupposition of the question of God." [37] Hence, since the *question* of God is clearly real,[38] God too is real.

Tillich's *second* argument for God's reality as being-itself is actually more implicit than explicit. Nevertheless, it is working as a kind of " hidden assurance " behind all of Tillich' s claims that God does not exist but is the ground of being. The" argument" appears in Tillich's discussion of the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" [39]

This question, says Tillich, is " meaningless," because no matter what answer is given to it, the same question can be asked

•• *Ibid.*

•• *Ibid.*

•• *Ibid.,* p. *25.*

•• *Ibid.,* p. 13.

[38] See *Systematic Theology,* I, pp. 204 fl'. Tillich's main point here is that though none of the traditional arguments are valid in the sense of proving God's existence they do show that the *question* of God is inevitable.

•• Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* I, pp. 163-164.

again. Hence, one is caught in an infinite regress.[40] The question does serve the function though, of expressing the " metaphysical shock " which one has when he realizes that there *is* something but no good reason why there should be-that there could just as well have been nothing, and that this possibility or " power " of nothingness is present in all existing being.

Tillich says, "If one asks why there is not nothing, one attributes being even to nothing."[41] In other words, thought can imagine the negation of everything that is, but one must realize that, even if there were not anything, then there would *be* nothing. This, however, is contradictory, for nothing cannot " be." If nothing cannot be then some fundamental ground or power must necessarily exist or, better, be real. Hence, being-itself as ultimate ground of everything is necessarily real!

These two arguments are obviously inter-related and, I think obviously spurious. To take the second one first, I should think Tillich would see that if everything ceased to exist that would not mean that, suddenly, nothing, as a kind of ontological "thing," had "come into being." The term "non-being" is merely a linguistic sign which stands for the fact that it is possible for things to cease to be. We need not say that, if all things ceased to be, then there would " be " nothing, and so, nothing would have ontological status, and, so, would not really be nothing but something-thus requiring being-itself as even more fundamental. On the contrary, if all things ceased to be then there would be a return to what Tillich calls the "primordial night of nothingness."[42] Further, as Tillich says, such a nothing would not " be " anything at all. It would not " be " something and it would not " be " nothing, if such language entails that an ontological power (being-itself) would have to be presupposed even for there to "be" nothing. Such a state would be gained simply by the *absence* of all that is. And, if one replies that then the *absence* of all things would

[40] *Ibid.,* p. 163. Cf. also *Philosophical Interrogations,* p. 408.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Tillich, *The Courage to Be,* p. 40.

have "being," and, thus, presuppose being-itself, I can only say that he is bewitched by language. To say that there are no unicorns does not entail that the non-being of unicorns has some kind of ontological status. It just means that unicorns as objective realities are not available to any experience whatever.

It is easy to see now, in light of this argument, why Tillich wishes to make a case for non-being as dialectical, "within" being. He wishes to do away with non-being as *pure* nothingness because that kind of non-being does not require being-itself to give it "being."

The reply to Tillich's *first* argument is two-fold: (1) even if there *is* some ontological ground which provides the unity of subject and object, which is the *prius* of all thought and being, this *prius* is not *clearly* God.[43] It may well be that any legitimate concept of God would have to say that he is the ground of thought and being. But that does not mean that such a ground is *God.*

(2) One can easily say that truth is only a quality of the propositions which correctly describe the world. Clearly Tillich does not want to say God is a quality of propositions. In light of his previous remarks concerning negativity as a property of judgments, it is reasonable to think that Tillich would reply to this criticism by saying that in order for propositions ever to correctly describe the world there must first be a "ground" for this correctness, just as there must be a "ground" for negativity. But, as was pointed out in connection with negativity, there is no need for such a "ground." One can simply deny Tillich's ontological realism. He nowhere argues for it but only asumes it. One certainly cannot establish anything about God (or anything else, for that matter) by simply assuming a particular brand of metaphysics which leads inevitably to what one desires. Hence, Tillich's arguments fail.

To sum up then: Paul Tillich offers at least two arguments

•• John Smith, *Reason and God* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 169.

to prove the reality of his God. One argument claims that if anything at all exists, then there must be an ontological ground by virtue of which whatever exists does so. This is being-itself, the power of being. The second argument claims that even if nothing at all exists there would still have to be being-itself to give the "nothing" its being. I have tried to counter these arguments by showing that, in the first case, Tillich is simply appealing to an ontological realism which he only assumes, and, in the second case, that Tillich is either bewitched by language or (more likely) has developed a special notion of "non-being" which presupposes being-itself.

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CONTAINMENT, ANALYTICITY, AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

As AN EXTRAORDINARILY resilient source of philosophical fascination, Anselm's ontological argument has generated a plenitude of criticism [1] as well as eloquent and dogged support from a variety of thinkers culminating in such contemporary proponents as Hartshorne and Malcolm. In this article I want to focus upon what is assuredly among the most influential (and putatively" decisive") of these criticisms, namely, that real or denotational existence [2] can never be *contained* in, or be *part of*,. any concept whatsoever. One has only to consult the critical literature on the ontological argument to appreciate the way in which this objection makes its appearance by way of "conclusion." Terence Penelhum, for example, has argued:

[1] Cf., for example, Part II of *The Ontological A1·gument,* edited by Alvin Plantinga (New York, 1965). Also, for a very novel sort of criticism, cf. William E. Mann's excellent article, "The Ontological Presuppositions of the Ontological Argument," *Review of Metaphysics* (December 197£), pp. 260-277. One of Mann's rather central contentions is that the argument ought not be interpreted in a manner congenial to the principles of modern modal logic. While I think he is on solid ground in that regard insofar as the argument of *Proslogion* II is concerned, one must account for the undeniably modal character of *Proslogion* III. Particulary in view of Hartshorne's eloquent argumentation in *Anselm's Discovery* concerning the validity and significance of the modal argument of *Proslogion* III, I find it unfortunate that Mann makes no mention of the latter argument. In this article my use of the expression "Anselm's ontological argument" or simply "ontological argument" should be taken to refer essentially to the modal argument, though this is not necessarily to imply a belief in the logical separability of the modal argument-as argued by Hartshorne and Malcolm-from the argument of *Proslogion* II.

[2] In "Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument," *Mind* (1972), pp. 307-325, Jerome Shaffer maintains that the ontological argument establishes only the " intensional existence " of God. Shaffer's argument will be discussed somewhat briefly in the final section of this article.

From an examination of the concept of deity we could never discover that God exists; we could do this only if His existence were *part of* the concept of deity, and indeed Anselm and Descartes talk as if it were--but it cannot be part of *any* concept.[8]

Likewise, Wallace Matson has assured us:

If . . . denotation can, as a matter of logic, never be *contained in* a concept, then nothing-not even God-can have existence guaranteed it. There is not, then, nor can there be, anything the existence of which is inconceivable or involves a contradiction.[4]

Finally, John Hospers has found that the ontological argument fails for the very same reason, i. e.,

... if existence is *no part of* the concept, we cannot use the ontological argument ...[5]

I

To begin with a moderate disclaimer, it needs to be made clear that I shall *not* be concerned in this essay with an explicit attempt at positive *support* for the ontological argument. Rather, my sole purpose shall consist in the effort to show that the very influential and widely-held objection embodied in the quotations delineated above probably constitutes one of the reddest of the red herrings ever to be directed against that argument. Hence, I find it rather surprising that-at least insofar as I have been able to determine from the wealth of

[8] Terence Penelhum, *Religion and Rationality* (New York, 1971), p. 17 (my emphasis on " part of "). The criticism in question is, I take it, *somewhat* related to, and perhaps a *versicm* of, the classical " existence-is-not-a-predicate " objection. In any case, Penelhum seems to virtually identify the latter with the " containment " objection. However, I think it would be best for purposes of clarity to divorce the two objections, particularly in view of the rather opaque nature of the " existence-is-not-a-predicate " objection. In the event that the "containment " obi.ection *is* a version of-or identical to--the " existence-is-not-a-predicate " objection, then, 'insofar as the arguments to follow are cogent, so much the worse for the latter objection.

• Wallace Matson, *The Existence of God* (Ithaca, 1965), p. *55* (my emphasis on "contained in").

• John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, 1958), p. 825 (my emphasis on "no part of").

relevant literature-that no explicit attempt has been made to establish what I hope to show is the logical *irrelevance* of such an objection to the success or unsuccess of the ontological argument. On the contrary, proponents of the argument have continually responded to the objection in question in a way which reveals an *acceptance* of what that objection presupposes, i.e., that the validity of the argument *is* dependent upon whether real existence can be *part of* the concept of God. Consequently, they have directed their best efforts toward a *refutation* of the claim that real existence cannot be contained in the concept of God. As I hope to show, however, that has been an unfortunate misdirection of effort.

The popularity of that line of defense, however, would largely to be due to what has come to be the equation of the claim that no concept can *contain* real existence with the standing injunction-having, of course, deep-seated epistemological roots in Hume and Kant-that no affirmative existential proposition *can* be logically necessary. Concerning this latter admonishment, proponents of the ontological argument have responded (correctly, I believe) that it cannot be established that no affirmative existential proposition is logically necessary *independently* of its being established that the logical modality of " God exists " is that of contingency rather than necessity. That is," God exists" must be *shown* to be logically contingent rather than begged to he so on the basis of an a priori dogma [6] that necessarily true propositions are always *de dicto* as opposed to *de re.* Now while I believe it is clear that to argue against the ontological argument on the basis that no affirmative existential proposition can be logically necessary *does* beg the question of the logical modality of " God exists," I want to maintain that the claim that real existence cannot be part of, or contained in, any concept is perfectly compatible with the suggestion that " God exists " is a logically necessary, i. e., *analytic,* truth. Hence, both the critics and an unfortunately

[6] As pointed out so well by Norman Malcolm in "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," *The Philosophical Review* (1960), p. *55.*

large number of proponents of the ontological argument have been seriously mistaken in believing that " God exists " can be analytic *only* if real existence is *contained* in the concept of God.

Presupposing, then, that the concept of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is internally consistent (and there would .seem little reason for believing otherwise when one considers the notorious unsuccess of " ontological disproofs ") , all that the proponent of the ontological argument *needs* to insist upon is the analyticity of " God exists " and, as I hope to show, that is not *necessarily* to claim that real existence is *contained* in the concept of God. Rather, while conceptual containment is obviously a logically sufficient condition for analyticity, it seems reasonably clear that such containment is not a logically *necessary* condition for the latter. Consequently, what I hope to establish is that whether or not " God exists" is analytic (and thereby that "God does not exist" constitutes a contradiction) is *logically independent of whethe-r or not the concept of God " contains" real existence.* However, assuming this to be correct, while the proponent of the ontological argument thereby *need* not maintain that real existence is " contained " in the concept of God, I shall conclude this article by arguing that there seems to be no good reason why he *should* not maintain exactly that once the proper status of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is clarified.

II

According to the critics who have maintained that the ontological argument fails because real existence cannot be contained in the concept of God, it is clear that " discoveries " based solely on conceptual analysis are necessarily limited to what the relevant concept contains. However, this is the case only if analyticity is reducible to conceptual containment. Further, while Penelhurn is correct in noting that Descartes [7] " talked " as if real existence is "included " in the concept of

[7] In Part IV of the *Discourse on Method* as well as the Fifth Meditation.

deity, I do *not* find that Anselm talked that way at all. Rather, as will be discussed, there seems to be adequate reason for interpreting Anselm in such a way that the analyticity of " God exists " is not to be understood in terms of the *containment* of real existence in the concept of God. However, it is somewhat irrelevant to our central purpose here to suggest that certain proponents of the argument-notably Descartes-have talked *as though* the validity of the argument depended upon the containment of real existence in the concept of God. Rather, the point to be driven is that they *need* not have talked that way.

Granted that conceptual containment clearly constitutes a logically *sufficient* condition for analyticity, is it not equally clear that it does *not* constitute a logically *necessary* condition for analyticity? To begin with, while "Lincoln was assassinated or Lincoln was not assassinated" is analytically true, it is obvious that nothing in that proposition is *contained* in anything else. It might, however, reasonably be objected here that such a proposition exemplifies a *formal* tautology (Pv-P) the truth of which is logically independent of the meaning postulates governing linguistic convention. Let us, then, consider the following implications:

(1) If John is my father, John is a male.
If something is blue, it has spatial location.
(3) If this object is a cup, it is not a speck of radioactive cloud dust.

Now what I want to maintain right off-in contradistinction to" rationalists" such as Blanshard and Ewing (their thought in this regard to be explored below) -is that *all* of the above implications-not just (1) -are *analytically* true, i.e., true solely by virtue of the meaning of their constitutent expressions (and can thereby of course be *known* to be true *a* priori). If one knows the intensions of " blue" and " located in space," that is *suffioient* for knowing the truth o£ (2). Similarly, if one knows the intensions of " cup " and " speck of radioactive cloud dust," that is *sufficient* for knowing the truth of (3) . HenGe, and (3) -as well as (1) -are analytic truths. However,

while (1) clearly constitutes a case of conceptual containment insofar as the intension of " father " *contains* the intension of " male," is there any good reason for believing that being located in space is *contained* in the intension of " blue," or that not being a speck of radioactive cloud dust is *contained* in the intension of "cup" ? Rather, (2) and (3) constitute paradigms of the sort of *meaning-entailment* that clearly does *not* reduce to *meaning-containment.* In this regard consider that " Einstein was a great scientist" *entails* " If Einstein had white hair, then .some great scientists had white hair" ; however, since the former proposition in no way includes the notion of white hair, it in no way *contains* the latter proposition. Such is the case with implications (2) and (3) . Could it seriously be maintained that the enormous number of items *entailed* by calling something a *cup* (or *blue)* are thereby all *constitutive* of what is *meant* by " cup " (or " blue ") ? Surely not. Rather, (2) is analytic simply because being blue *entails* being located in .space, and (3) is analytic because being a cup *entails* not being a speck of radioactive cloud dust. As Blanshard puts it in his strictures against the positivist dogma that all *a priori* propositions are assertions of conceptual containment:

> Silly as it is to say that part of what I *mean* by calling anything red is that is is not green or the south pole, it is only good sense to say these things are *entailed* by what I mean.[8]

However-and unfortunately, I believe-thinkers such as Blanshard and Ewing, while correct in their recognition that not all conceptual entailment is reducible to conceptual containment, conclude from this that Kant and company were correct in their insistence that there are propositions (e. g., if something is blue, it has spatial location) which must necessarily be construed as *synthetic a priori* [9] in character. On the contrary, I would maintain that the proper conclusion to be drawn in this regard is precisely the opposite. That is, while

[8] Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis* (La Salle, Illinois; 1972), p. 290.

• Blanshard, *ibid.,* pp. 291-292 fl'. and A. C. Ewing, "Criticisms of the Linguistic Theory of the A Priori," in *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* (London, 1951).

it seems clear that there are meaning-entailments which do not reduce to meaning-containments, why must this lead to the conclusion that there are *synthetic a priori* truths? On the contrary, what I am suggesting is that it is far more reasonable to conclude that not all *analytic* truths *(other* than formal tautologies such as Pv-P) *are* analytic truths because of conceptual containment. The reason why it is difficult to deny that such propositions are analytic-and thereby why it is more reasonable to conclude that they are analytic rather than synthetic-is that their truth is guaranteed solely by the meaning of their constitutent expressions. If one knows the meanings of " cup " and " speck of radioactive cloud dust," that is all that is needed to know that nothing *could* be both the former and the latter; and, if one knows the meanings of "blue" and "located in space," that is all that is needed to know that nothing *could* be blue which did not have spatial location. Such is the case with regard to all propositions which are true as a consequence of meaning-entailment, and, since synthetic propositions are *defined* as those the truth of which cannot be known strictly on the basis of meaning analysis, it would seem clear that such propositions cannot correctly be construed as synthetic.

Hence, assuming that what has been argued thus far is correct, it is of very clear significance for our central concern insofar as it collapses into irrelevance the long-standing criticism against the ontological argument that, since real existence can never be *contained* in the concept of God, " God exists " cannot possibly be an analytic truth. Rather, all that the proponent of the ontological argument *need* maintain in order to support the claim that "God exists" is an analytic truth is that God's real existence is *entailed* by the concept of God. Since entailment constitutes a sufficient condition for analyticity but *not* for conceptual containment, the question concerning the analyticity of " God exists " is logically independent of whether or not real existence is (or *can* be) *contained* in the concept of God. (One might raise an objection here that-strictly speaking-concepts as such cannot entail anything, but

rather that only *propositions* have entailments, and that it is thereby a " category mistake " to suggest even the possibility of God's real existence being entailed by the *concept* of God. This, however, is easily responded to insofar as it is clear that " conceptual entailment " must necessarily be *defined* in propositional terms, i.e., the claim that the concept of God entails (without containing) God's real existence is intensionally equivalent to the claim that it is logically impossible for the proposition " God exists " to be false and the proposition " God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived" to be true) .

As a point of historical as well as polemical interest, however, we might turn to a consideration of the relevant chapters of Anselm's *Prosologion.* While we find there considerable emphasis upon "conceivability" and the view that God's real existence is entailed or necessitated by the very concept of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived, there is very little to suggest Anselm's support for any claim that the real existence of God is *contained* [10] in that concept. In Chapter III, Anselm states:

> ... if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction.

To begin with, it is clear that on the basis of his claim that an " irreconcilable contradiction " is generated by the denial of God's existence that "God exists" is, for Anselm, an analytic truth. However, it seems that Anselm nowhere suggests that the real existence of God is thereby *contained* in the concept of God. Rather, he goes on to state in Chapter IV:

> For no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive fire to be water ... So, then, no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist although he says these

[10] All quotes are from Anselm's *Proslogion,* translated by S. N. Deane (Open Court, 1903). Also, it seems clear that there is nothing in Anslem's "Reply to Gaunilo " to suggest any hint of support for the notion that real existence is *contained* in the concept of God; cf. Plantinga, *op. cit.,* p. 13-27.

words in his heart, either without any, or with some foreign signification.

Now this analogy drawn by Anselm between fire and water/ God and existence is a most telling one insofar as the point at issue is concerned. That is, Anselm can consistently and plausibly be read here as maintaining that the analyticity of " God exists " is a consequence of the sort of meaning-entailment that does *not* reduce to meaning-containment. Surely, there is no implication whatsoever in Anselm's reasoning here that existence is to be understood as any more *included* in the meaning of " God " than not being fire is *included* in the meaning of "water," and, while it is clear that not being fire is *entailed* by what we mean by " water," it seems equally clear that there is little basis on which to suggest that it is *included* in what is meant by " water." Consequently, "if x is fire, x is not water " is an analytic truth. To know the meaning of " fire" and the meaning of " water " is epistemically sufficient for recognizing the "irreconcilable contradiction" inherent in the suggestion that something is both fire and water. Hence, Anselm's analysis appears to lend considerable support to our thesis that the analyticity of " God exists " is logically irrelevant to whether or not real existence can be contained in the concept of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.

Consequently, it is now clear that the proponent of the ontological argument can with consistency maintain the following:

a) " God exists " is an analytic truth.
b) The concept of God does not *contain* God's real existence.

Clearly, the logically central question on which the analyticity of " God exists " and thereby the possible validity of the ontological argument depends is: *Assuming* the truth of b) above, does the concept of God *entail* God's real existence, i.e., does the proposition " God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived " entail the proposition " God exists" ? Since, as emphasized previously, I am not concerned here with explicit *support* for the ontological argument, no attempt will be

made to justify an answer of Yes to that question. Rather, my essential concern has been one of locating (what seems to me to be) the fatal deficiency of the widely-held "containment" objection. Hence, it is hoped that what has been argued up to now might serve as somewhat of a prolegomenon to future discussion of the ontological argument. In short, insofar as entailment provides a strict guarantee of analyticity without constituting a logically sufficient condition for conceptual containment (though such containment is undoubtedly one important *form* of entailment), the proponent of the ontological argument is not (logically) *oonstrained* to insist that real existence is *part of* the very concept of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.

III

Let us, however, change course somewhat abruptly. Assuming that what has been argued thus far is correct, i. e., that the proponent of the ontological argument need not insist that God's real existence is included in the concept of God in order to support the analyticity of " God exists," is there any good reason why he *should* not insist upon it? I want to argue here that there is not, and that much of the confusion in this regard has resulted largely from the failure of critics to get clear about the precise *ontological* status of the *concept* of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can- be-conceived.

For example, in admonishing proponents of the ontological argument for their " illegitimate attempt to deduce actual existence from the mere definition of a word ... ,"[11] Flew states:

> Say, if you like, that by the word *God* we are to mean " a Perfect Being;" and then go on ... *Manoeuvre how you wish and for as long as you like with the definition.* Still you will not have taken one single step towards establishing that there actually is any being such that the word so defined can there correctly be applied.[12]

[11] Antony Flew, *God and Philosophy* (London, 1966), p. 79.
[12] *Idem.* (my emphasis) .

Also, early in his influential critique of the ontological argument Jerome Shaffer states: "Let the expression, 'God,' mean an almighty being who exists and is eternal," [13] and then goes on to show the failure of such a definition to establish anything further than a recognition that nothing could be God which did not really exist. It in no way establishes that the concept of God has application. Hence, the sort of "existence" thereby established as indigenous to God would be purely intensional, having no extensional force whatsoever. As neatly put by Shaffer, then, "... the statement 'God necessarily exists, but there is no God,' is not self-contradictory." [14]

Now while Shaffer and Flew are undoubtedly correct in pointing out that real or denotational existence can never be a logical consequence of conventional connotation or definition, exactly what does that have to do with the import of "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" for the proponent of the argument? Surely very little indeed. For, to use Flew's expression, there is simply no "maneuvering" possible at all with a *real definition,* i. e., no sincere proponent of the *argument-regardless* of how he might feel about a Platonistic ontology in general-would dare to suggest that what is *meant* by the expression "God" (though not, of course, the expression itself) is subject to the vagaries of linguistic maneuverability. Rather, is it not clear that the proponent of the argument must necessarily regard the "concept" of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived as *logically independent* of human convention? [15] *Of course* we cannot *argue* God into real existence by virtue of conventional intension, and who would ever suggest that we could? Now maybe there *are* no such things

[13] Shaffer, *op. cit.,* p. 307.

"*Ibid.,* p. 319. Cf. Hartshorne's rejoinder to Shaffer 'in *Anselm's Discovery* (La Salle, lllinois 1965) pp. 267-278. Hartshorne argues rather persuasively that Shaffer has missed the significant "modal" structure of Anselm's argument.

[15] Cf., for example, Anton Pegis, "Four Medieval Ways to God," *The Monist* (July 1970), pp. 322-328 for an excellent treatment of Anselm's commitment to Platonism, which, it seems to me, any proponent of the ontological argument-simply to the extent that he does support the share.

as "real essences," not even one of God, but the point to be driven is that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is (and *must* be) *construed* as a real essence by the argument's proponents. Hence, while it is no doubt *true,* it is simply irrelevant to the ontological argument to point out that real existence can never be deduced from a "mere definition." Insofar as the proponent of the argument is concerned, while one might try his best to maneuver with God, one had better *not* suggest maneuvering with what is *meant* by "God."

However, exactly how does all of this bear upon the question at hand? Assuming-as I believe we clearly must-that "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is, for the Anselmian, expressive of nothing less than a *real essence,* of what consequence is this for the question of whether God's real existence can be *contained* in the "concept" (i.e., essence) of God? The answer, it would seem, is simply as follows: While it is clear that real existence cannot *possibly* be contained in any "conventional concept" of God insofar as it would be absurd to suggest that real existence could ever be incorporated into a linguistic convention, this has no logical bearing whatsoever upon the question concerning the valdity of the suggestion that real existence *can* be (and is) contained in a *real essence* of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived. Consequently, to show that the containment thesis fails, one of the following must be shown to be the case:

1) No real essence can contain its own instantiation, or
2) That-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived does not constitute a real essence.

But exactly *how* could either of these claims be shown to be true? Once again, since it is not my purpose here to defend the validity of the ontological argument, I am not suggesting that the concept of that than which nothing greater can be conceived *is* a real essence; nor should I be undersood as even suggesting that *if* it is a real essence, it would thereby contain real existence. Rather, the only implication of what has been argued above is that it will take a lot more work than has

normally been supposed to *refute* the claim that the real existence of God is guaranteed by the very concept of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived, since, while it is clear that real existence could never possibly be contained in a linguistic or *nominal* essence, this in no way comes close to refuting the presupposition of the ontological argument that such existence *can* be (and is)· contained in a *real* essence. Finally, however, we have seen that the proponent of the ontological argument is free to abandon the containment thesis entirely insofar as the analyticity of " God exists " would be guaranteed by the sort of logical entailment which does not reduce to conceptual containment. Hence, all that he *needs* to maintain is that the" concept" of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived *entails* God's real existence. Perhaps it does not, but then *that* is what the critics must show in order to refute the ontological argument. [16]

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[10] I am grateful for all of the clear thinking provided me by Carol Ann Smith during the writing of this article.

ARISTOTLE, *DE CAELO* 279 a 18-85 (or 279 b 8), A "FRAGMENT" OF THE LOST ARISTOTELIAN *ON PHILOSOPHY*

IN *DE CAELO* 277 a 27- 279 b 8 (Book I, chaps. 8-9) Aristotle maintains, among other matters, that "the cosmos (heaven) [the physical universe] is one," that "more than one cosmos is impossible," that "the cosmos is eternal," that "nothing corporeal [physical] can exist outside the cosmos," and that "all corporeal things (or everything corporeal or physical) are 'congregated' within the cosmos." From all this it must be inferred, Aristotle continues *(ibid.,* 279 a 11-18), that "no place or void or time can exist outside the heaven," because place or void or time are dependent "on the presence (or existence) of a physical body." "It is clear, then," Aristotle concludes (ibid.), "that there is neither place nor void nor time outside the cosmos."

After having stated all this *(ibid.,* 279 a 11-18), one would surmise that in keeping with what he had said *ibid.,* 277 b 27-29, to wit, in accordance with his statement that "we must show not only that the cosmos is one, but also that more than one cosmos is simply impossible . . . as well as that . . . the cosmos is eternal," beginning with 279 a 18 Aristotle would set out to dicuss the eternity, ungeneratedness, and indestructibility of the cosmos. As a matter of fact, Aristotle touches on the eternity of the cosmos in 279 b 4 ff. But between 279 a 18 and 279 b 4, we find what seems to be an "insertion" which, owing to its particular style and specific content, definitely appears to be somewhat out of place.

This "out-of-place insertion" *(ibid.,* 279 a 18-85, or 279 b 8 reads as follows:

Hence, whatever is there [to wit, outside the cosmos or heaven], is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age

it, nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost motion. These " things " continue through their entire duration unalterably and without modification, having the best and most self-sufficient existence. As a matter of fact, the term " duration " did possess a divine meaning for the ancients, because the fulfilment, which includes the period of life of any creature outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called its duration. On the same principle the fulfilment of the whole heaven, the fulfilment of which includes all of time as well as infinity, is "duration "-a term based upon the fact that it is always *(aiwv)-that* is, duration immortal and divine. From it derive being and life which other things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy. So too, in its discussions concering the divine and addressed to a general public (*€yKvKAw*
the view is propounded that whatever is divine, that is, whatever is primary and supreme is completely unchangeable. This fact also confirms what we have said. For there is nothing stronger than it to move it, because this would imply a greater degree of divinity. It also has no defect and does not lack any of the excellences proper to it. [Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable. Because everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper place. But the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal]."

In brief, *De Caelo* 279 a 18-22, or the :first part of the "insertion " begins with the assertion that the " beyond " or " outside " (raKeZ)/ which is " outside " the outermost sphere of the heaven, has" no place nor void nor time." Neither is it subject to change, but throughout all of eternity remains unchanged and, hence, enjoys" the best and most self-sufficient of all existences." At this point we ought to clarify the exact meaning of the term *raKet-"* outside" or "beyond "-in the Aristotelian passage. Alexander of Aphrodisias, according to the testimony of Simplicius: is of the opinion that this term refers to the outer sphere of the fixed stars. In the words of Simplicius, Alexander of Aphrodisias [3] seems to have arrived at

[1] The meaning of the term " *rcit<eZ* " is discussed in some detail by M. Untersteiner, *Aristotele: Della Filosofia* (Rome, 1963), pp. 286-287.

[2] Simplicius, *In Arist. De Caelo Comment.,* CIAG, vol. VII (ed. J. L. Heiberg, Berlin, 1894), 287, 19 ff'.

[3] *Ibid.,* 291, 22 ff'.

this conclusion because of Aristotle, *De Caelo* 279 b 1-3, where the Stagirite speaks of the unceasing movement of the heaven or " *npwrov rrwp,a."* This being so, Alexander of Aphrodisias concludes, though erroneously, that throughout *De Caelo* 279 a 18 - 279 b 3 Aristotle speaks of the outer sphere of the fixed stars and of nothing else.

Simplicius, on the other hand, by relying on several authorities whom he fails to mention by name, insists that by the term Aristotle refers to some unnamed (nameless), incorporeal and " transcendent entities " which are the original or prime movers.[4] Arguing his thesis in great detail and with much vigor, Simplicius maintains, among other matters, that this in fact refers to something which is wholly outside, and completely independent, of the outer sphere of the fixed stars, because the latter-and this is Simplicius' main argument against the thesis propounded by Alexander of Aphrodisias [5]- is subject to change or, to be more exact, is in motion which implies spatial change. Admittedly, Simplicius is fully aware of the fact that his particular interpretation of Aristotle, *De Caelo* 279 a 18-35, in a certain way seems to be refuted by *ibid.,* 279 b 1-3.[6] This impasse may be resolved in the following manner: Aristotle, *De Caelo* 279 a 18-35, constitutes an obvious" insertion." This being so, *ibid.,* 279 b 1-3, is in fact not related to 279 a 18-35 but actually refers to what had been said prior to 279 a 18.[7] This would also lend some support to Simplicius' insistence that the term " " definitely contains an allusion to something " transcendent" as well as divine [8].

• *Ibid.,* 1 ff.

[5] See note *supra.*

[6] Simplicius, *op. cit.,* ff.

[7] This is the view advanced, for instance, by H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore, 1944), p. 588. Cherniss' view was rejected by F. Solmsen, among others. See F. Solmsen, *Aristotle's System of the Physical World* (Ithaca, 1960), p. 308, note

[8] See *supra,* note 4. In modern times Simplicius' views were accepted, among others, by W. Jaeger, *Aristotdes: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Philosophie* (Berlin, 1955), p. 317 W. Theiler, "Ein vergessenes Aristoteleszeugnis," *Journal of Hellenic Studies,* vol. 77 (1957), p. I. During, *Aristoteles: Darstdlung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg, 1966), pp. 360 ff.

to a transcendent and incorporeal reality which constitutes the most perfect as well as absolutely autonomous form of life devoid of all change and motion,[9] in brief, to an " unmoved mover " (or to several " unmoved movers ") . It cannot be fully determined, however, whether the expression" *TaKe'i:"* refers to a single (supreme) "being" or to a plurality of such " beings " ; and whether in the latter case it relates to several "movers" of the different spheres.[10]

Apparently in order to give additional support to his thesis that there exists a transcendent, incorporeal, unchanging, eternal, and divine reality, in *De Caelo* a ff. Aristotle makes reference to his *eyKvK)ua cptAo(J"oqn}p,am:*

As a matter of fact, as has been stated in several passages of the *iyKvKiua* which deal with things divine, the view is frequently propounded and discussed that the first and supreme divinity must of necessity be completely unchangeable. This proposition confirms the very essence of what has just been said. In fact, there does not exist any power greater than this [first and supreme] divinity to move [the heaven], for this would mean something even more divine. And this [first and supreme] divinity has no defect nor does it lack in any of the excellences appropriate to the supreme divinity. [11]

E. Bignone, among several scholars, maintains that the expression *eyKVKAta cptAO(J"ocpiJp,am* refers to some " introductory

• Compare, for instance, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* b "·we maintain, therefore, that God is a living being, eternal and most good; and that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God. For this is God." See also *ibid.,* 1073 a 11 fl'.; 1091 b 16 fl'.

[10] Some scholars, perhaps due to the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias (see note !2, *supra,* and the corresponding text), are of the opinion that the early Aristotle did not advocate the doctrine of an "unmoved mover." For a contrary view, see, for instance, H. Cherniss, *op. cit. supra,* note 7, pp. 581 fl'.; M. Untersteiner, *op. cit. supra,* note 1, p. !29!2.

[11] According to Philo of Alexandria, *De Aeternitate Mundi* VIII. 39-43 (frag. !21, Rose"; frag. 19c, Walzer; frag. 19c, Ross; frag. 17, Untersteiner), Cicero, *Lucullus* XXVIII. 119, Plasberg (frag. 18, Rose[2]; frag. !22, Rose"; frag. !20, Walzer; frag. 20, Ross; frag. 22, Untersteiner), and Lactantius, *lnstitutiones Divinae* II. 10. !24-all these passages have been identified as fragments of Aristotle's *On Philosophy-the* first and supreme divinity must be absolutely unchangeable.

writings for the study of philosophy," [12] that is, to " writings addressed to a larger public or audience," [13] or to what is frequently called Aristotle's " exoteric writings." [14] As a matter of fact, Simplicius already had insisted that the reference to Aristotle's f.yKvKAta <fnA.oU"o<f>-ryfLam is definitely an illusion to Aristotle's *On.Philosophy.* [15] This observation has induced a number of modern scholars to include Aristotle, *De Caelo* 279 a 18 - 35 (or 279 b 3), among the authentic fragments of the lost Aristotelian *On Philosophy.* [16] Moreover, Simplicius' lengthy and detailed report as regards the manner in which Aristotle had argued the existence of a transcendent, incorporeal, unchanging, and divine reality in his *On Philosophy* should make it amply clear that in *De Caelo* 279 a 18 ff., and especially in 279 a 33-35, Aristotle in fact summarizes what he had said previously and in greater detail in the *On Philosophy.* [11]

[12] E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele Perduto e la Formazione Filosofica di Epicuro,* vol. I (Florence, 1936), p.

[18] *Ibid.,* vol. I, pp. 135ft.

[14] *Ibid.,* vol. II, p. 360, note 1. See also I. A. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin, 1870) 105 a ff. In his *De Anima* 407 b Aristotle refers to *rois* KO!Pcp 'Y•"'fvop.lvo•s M'Yo•s, an expression which likewise alludes to the " exoteric discus- 'sions." See further P. Moraux, *Les Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1951), pp. B. Meister, " Die Entstehung der hOheren Allgemeinbildung in der Antike," *Wiener Studien,* vol. 69 (1956), p. M. Untersteiner, *op. cit. supra,* note 1, pp. 197-198, and *ibid.,* p.

[15] Simplicius, *op. cit. supra,* note ff. See also frag. 15, Rose[2]; frag. 16, Rose•; frag. 16, Walzer; frag 16, Ross; frag. Untersteiner.

[16] W. Jaeger, *op. cit. supra,* note 8, pp. 316 ff.; F. Blass, "Aristotelisches," *Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie,* vol. 30 (1875), pp. 481 ff. R. Walzer (in 1934) and M. Untersteiner (in 1963), in their respective collections of Aristotelian fragments included this passage (frag. Walzer; frag. 38, Uutersteiner). In recent times a number of scholars, though by no means all of them, have accepted, at times with certain modifications, the views held by Walzer and Untersteiner.

[17] H. Cherniss, *op. cit. supra,* note 7, p. 119, note 77, remarks that Simplicius probably did not have direct access to Aristotle's *On Philosophy.* The same Cherniss, however, concedes *(ibid.,* p. 587) that Simplicius might have known of this passage from the *On Philosophy* through some intermediary source or sources. According to P. Wilpert, " Reste verlorener Aristoteles-Schriften bei Alexander von Aphrodisias," *Hermes,* vol. 75 (1940), pp. 368 ff., especially p. 387, Simplicius derived his information about the *On Philosophy* primarily from Alexander of Aphrodisias who was acquainted with, and liberally cited from, tlle early but

The unchanging nature of the ultimate divinity or divine reality, in all likelihood, was argued by Aristotle in the *On Philosophy* along the following general lines: A change in the ultimate divine reality might be caused (I) by something else, or (II) by this divine reality itself. If the divine is changed by something else, this " something else," which causes a change in the divine, must (A) either be mightier than the divine, or (B) must be better than the divine. Conversely, (II) if the divine is changed by itself, then it must do so (A) either "in the direction" of something better, or (B) "in the direction" of something more beautiful or more desirable.[18] The possibility cited under IA is rejected with the remark that there cannot possibly exist anything that might be better than the

now lost writings of Aristotle. See also the detailed comments on this issue in M. Untersteiner, *op. cit. supra,* note I, pp. 198-200, and *ibid.,* pp. 218 ff.; p. 285 ff.; B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der aristotelischen Schrift " Uber die Philosophie;'* Zetemata, Heft *50* (Munich, 1970), p. 105.

[18] It will be noted that Philo of Alexandria, *De Aeternitate Mundi* VIII. 39-4!!, which is considered a fragment of the Aristotelian *On Philosophy* (frag. 21, Rose"; frag. 19c, Walzer; frag. 19c, Ross; frag. 17, Untersteiner), argues this issue in almost the same manner:

> They asked, why should God destroy the universe? Either in order to save Himself from the trouble of continuing in His creationist activities, or in order to make another universe. The former of these two purposes is alien to God. For what befits Him is to turn disorder into order, not order into disorder. Moreover, He would thereby be admitting to Himself repentance, which is an effection or disease of the soul. For He should either not have created a universe at all, or else, if He judged the work becoming to Him, He should have rejoiced in the product. The second alternative deserves full examination. For if in the plare of the present universe He is to make another universe, this new universe He makes will be in any case either worse or better than the present universe, or just like the present universe. Each of these three possibilities is open to objection. (I) If it is worse, its artificer will be worse. But the works of God are faultless, exempt from criticism, above criticism, incapable of improvement, fashioned, as they are, by the most perfect art and knowlegde. For, as the popular saying goes, "not even a woman is so lacking in good judgment as to prefer the worse when the better is available." And it is proper for God to give form to the formless, and to deck the ugliest things with marvellous beauties. (II) If the new universe is like the old one, its artificer will have labored in vain, differing in no ways from mere children, who often, when they make sand-castles on the shore, build them up and then pull them down. It would be far better, instead of making a new universe just like the old one, neither to take away nor to add anything, nor to change anything for better or for worse, but to leave the old universe in its place. (III) If He is to make a better universe, the artificer himself must become better, so that when he made the former universe he must have been more imperfect both in art and in wisdom-which even to suspect is not permissible. For God is always equal and like to Himself, admitting neither slackening towards the worse nor intensification towards the better.

divine, unless it would also be "more divine "-a statement which can also be found in *De Caelo* 279 a 33-34. The mere thought that the better may be affected or " conquered " by the worse is simply unlawful and, hence, not permissible, as it is not permissible to surmise that God might ever consider the creation of a better universe. For in the first case the better would have to accept something worse (or some deficiency) -a thought wholly repugnant to the notion of a perfect God who, in the words of *De Caelo* 279 a *35,* cannot possibly have a defect. The possibility mentioned under IIA-B, namely, that the divine might change itself " in the direction " of something better or " in the direction " of something more beautful or more divine or more desirable is rejected on the grounds that the divine is without defect and, hence, cannot possibly aspire to something better or more desirable-a thought which is also alluded to in *De Caelo* 279 a 34-35. And finally, the very thought that God or the divine may change into something worse-a thought which also implies that God or the divine or the perfect or the absolute good is capable of acquiring something imperfect or deficient-is rejected (by Simplicius) with the remark that even imperfect man " does not willingly make himself worse," an argument to which *De Caelo* 279 a 34-35 also seems to allude.[19]

In order better to understand the preceding paragraph, it might be helpful not only to study Philo of Alexandria, *De Aeternitate Mundi* VIII. 39-43, cited in note 18, *supra,* but also to read Simplicius, *op. oit. supra,* note 2, 289, 1-15/[20] who makes the following observations:

Aristotle speaks of this *[scil.,* of some of the problems discussed in the preceding paragraph] in a work entitled *On Philosophy.* In general, where there is a better, there is a best. Since, then, among existing things one is better than another, there is also something

[19] See also P. Wilpert, "Die aristotelische Schrift 'Uber die Philosophie'," *Autour d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1955), pp. 110 ff.

[20] Frag. 15, Rose•; frag. 16, Rose[8]; frag. 16, Walzer; frag. 16, Ross; frag. 25, Untersteiner. See also the interesting comments on this fragment by M. Tintersteiner, *op. cit. supra,* note I, pp. 197-205.

that is best, which is the divine. Now that which changes is changed by something else or by itself. And if it is changed by something else, it is so either to something worse or through the desire for something better. But the divine has nothing better than itself by which it might be changed (for that " other" would then have been more divine), nor on the other hand is it lawful for the better to be affected by the worse. Moreover, if the better were to be changed by something worse, it would have admitted into itself some evil. But nothing in the divine is deficient. On the other hand, the divine does not change itself through a desire for something better, because it lacks none of its own excellencies. Nor again does it change itself for the worse, since even a man does not willingly make himself worse. Nor has it anything evil such as it would have acquired from a change to the worse.[21]

A comparison of Philo of Alexandria, *De Aetern.itate Mundi* VIII. 39-43, Simplicius, *In Arist. De Caelo Comment.* 1-15-both of which have been called fragments of Aristotle's *On Philosophy* by numerous scholars-and Aristotle, *De Caelo* a 18-35 (or b 3), should make it abundantly clear that *De Caelo* a 18 ff. in a most compressed form restates what the Stagirite had discussed in greater detail (and in a more systematic manner) in his *On Philosophy.* In this sense Aristotle, *De Caelo* a 18-35 (or b 3), too, may be called a fragment of the *On Philosophy.* something which, although in vastly different ways, has been asserted by R. Walzer (frag. and M. Untersteiner, as well as suspected by other scholars. In the light of what has been said in this essay it is certainly reasonable and justifiable to consider Aristotle, *De Caelo* a 18-35 (or b 3) , a significant fragment of Aristotle's *On Philosophy.* Obviously, we will have to rely on, and make judicious use of, Philo of Alexandria, *De Aeternitate Mundi* VIII. 39-43, and Simplicius, *In Arist. De Caelo Comment.* 1-15, in order to reconstruct and fully understand the overly com-

[21] Simplicius concludes his remarks by pointing out that "this last proof, too, Aristotle took over from the second book of Plato's *Republic,"* that is, Plato, *Republic* SSOD- 381E. B. Efl'e, *op. cit. supra,* note 17, p. 107, note 150, insists that Aristotle cited Plato, *Republic* 380D fl'., that is, Plato's doctrine of the unchangeability of God, in order to disprove Plato's doctrine of the creation of the universe advanced in the Platonic *Timaeus.*

pressed report found in *De Caelo* a 18 ff., a "compression" or" abridgement" which makes this passage from the *De Caelo* almost incomprehensible as regards its ultimate meaning.

There remains a final, though relatively unimportant, question: since the Aristotelian *On Philosophy* consisted of three books, to which of these three books did this fragment originally belong? There are, in brief, two possibilities, namely, either to Book I or Book III. In Book I, it is commonly held, Aristotle, among other matters, discussed the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the universe, thus rejecting the creationist thesis advanced in Plato's *Timaeus.* This being so, it is quite possible that in Book I the Stagirite also touched upon issues outlined in this article, thereby adding some further arguments to his thesis about the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the universe. In Book III, on the other hand, the Stagirite expounded his " theological " views, that is, questions such as, for instance, the existence, perfection, eternity, activity, and knowability of God. In the light of his particular understanding of Aristotle's *On Philosophy,* the present auther is inclined to assign this fragment, to wit, *De Caelo* a 18-35 (or b 3), to Book III rather than to Book I.

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THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF *EPISTEME*

THE AIM OF THIS communication is to provide a succinct account of the Aristotelian conception of (This term shall be rendered by variations on " science," " scientific knowledge," or " scientific understanding.") Aristotle articulates its inner structuration primarily in the *Posterior Analytics.* Hence the exposition will concentrate on this treatise.

The antecedent task of interpretation is to locate the concept in its milieu and in the corpus as a whole. Against Sophistic skepticism of it, Plato urges the essential possibility of an organized field of knowledge that justifies, according to principles, every new apprehension. To an arbitrary conglomeration of impressions he contrasts a realm of consistent and founded cognitions. Such a realm comprises one or another domain of meaning, i. e., it is relatively universal; and it counters a naive miscellany of data, i.e., it is necessary. Plato raises the question of its inner logic, but Aristotle presents the first extensive articulation of that structure. In him, the term becomes technical and especially names this realm of consistent and founded cognitions.[1] Among the sciences that make up his corpus is that " science which inquires into demonstration

[1] The original sense of the term *e7run1u.<7J* is knowledge with a practical orientation, know-how (e. g., Homer, *Il. 5,* 60; 14, 92; 15, 282; also Thucydides, I 49, 3; I 121, 4; II 87, 4; VII 63, 3) . This earlier sense still resounds in some passages of Plato (e. g., *Ion 536* C; *Gor.* 511 C). But it gradually comes to mean assurance about something, and then understanding in general. Eventually, Plato uses the term to name the special knowledge of the philosopher (e. g., *Rep.* V 477 B). From this sense the technical Aristotelian meaning develops. It is cognition delimited by two oppositions: first, *e7rLCTrf}p,7J* opposes the grasp *(atcriJ'l)CTLS)* of an individual as only individual, i.e., it is universal (e. g., *An. Post.* I 31); and second, it opposes the grasp of a phenomenon insofar as the latter could be otherwise, i.e., it is necessary (e. g., *An. Post.* I 33). Located at first through oppositions, *emcrrfJp,'lJ* is to be defined in detail.

and science." [2] His systematic explorations in the science of science are collected into the *Organon.* Since all science, as discourse, is composed of terms and propositions, an inquiry into science must clarify these; and Aristotle does so in the *Categories* and *On Interpretation.* Next, the interrelation of propositions constitutes the specific field of universal and necessary knowledge; and the *Prior Analytics* studies this formal interrelation-mainly syllogism. But knowledge in general and hence scientific knowledge may founder, and the *Sophistical Refutations* especially studies this; while the *Topics,.* originally a part of the same treatise as the former, especially studies the process of delimiting a realm of meaning before it is scientized. Finally, the *Posterior Analytics* contains the full theory of knowing in a scientific way.

What is the inner logic of a *universal* and *necessary* knowledge, of a *realm* of *consistent and founded* cognitions? To let Aristotle answer this question is the burden of the following exposition.

"We consider that we have scientific knowledge of anything," Aristotle begins in the *Posterior Analytics,* "(as contrasted with the accidental knowledge of the Sophists) when we believe that we know (i) that the ground [*alrtav]* from which the fact [*1rpii:yfLa]*results is indeed responsible [*al7ia]* for that fact, and (ii) that the fact cannot be otherwise." [3] This kind of knowledge comprises syllogism [4] and is obtained only if the premises are "true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and responsible [*al7twv]* for the conclusion." [5] Evidently, in order to construct scientific knowledge, one must (aside from logical rules) already know (1) the premises (7a 1Tpw-ra)or first principles *(al apxai),* and (2) the fact-to-be-proved (70 SetK'VVfLEVOV, 70 on) .[6] On the one hand, the first principles

• *Met.* K 1, 1059 b 18.

"*An. Post.* 71 b cf. II 11, 94 a *E. N.* VI 3, 1139 b 18-33. All Bekker numbers unless otherwise specified refer to the *Posterior Analytics.*

• I 71 b 16-19; *E. N.* VI 3, 1139 b 31.

"I 71 b

[6] For *ra 1rpwra,* I a 6 and *passim.* For *a! apxal,* I a 7 and *passim,* For *r0 O«KvvfJ-evov,* I 71 b And for *r0* 5n, I 1-2 *passim.*

state the existence and the definition of the phenomena that concern the science.• On the other hand, the fact, though not known as entailed by the premises, is nevertheless known antecedently: " Before the process of relation is completed or the conclusion drawn, we should presumably say that in one sense the fact is understood scientifically, and in another sense it is not." [8] Thus the process of science is to systematize what is already known-the *apxat* and the on-so that " the observed fact follows from these premises as a conclusion." [9] The syllogism which explicitates the relation of known principles to known fact constitutes precisely *scientific* knowledge.[10]

The fact-to-be-proved, already in a way known, *can* be a fact, however, only within a definite context or framework: there are no isolated, horizonless facts. In Aristotle the framework is the " about which " (*1rep'i* o) of the science, in other words, the genus (yivo<>).[11] That is the issue now to be exhibited. "A single science is one whose domain is a single genus." [12] " Hence it is not possible to prove a fact by passing from one genus to another." [13] Indeed, the fact-to-be-proved is precisely an internal possibility *(vmipxov)* of a specific genus, and it is reached somewhere along a (logical) series of internal possibilities (middles or reasons[aiTta]). [14] Now the subject-genus (To *yivo<; To V1ToKEtfLEVov)*[15] forms a universal (To *Ka86A.ov)*.[IR] But " it is clear that the fact is not scientized in any unqualified fashion but is rather scientized as pertaining to a universal." [17]

[7] I 2, 72 a 19-23; I 10, 76 b 3-7, 35-38. *An. Pr.* I 30, 46 a 17-22. *E. N.* VI 3, 1139 b 26-30, and VI 6.

[8] I 1, 71 a 24-26 cf. b 6-8.

• John Herman Randall, Jr., *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960)' p. 40.

[10] For this whole paragraph, see in general I 2, 4, 6, 10, and II 3.

[11] For the identification of *ro* || and *ro "'ivas,* cf. I 7, 75 b 7; I 10, 76 b 12-23; and I 11, 77 a *25.*

[12] I 28, 87 a 37.

[18] I 7, 75 a 38.

[14] I 6, 75 a 28-37; I 7, 75 a 37-b 2; I 10, 76 a 81-34; II 14, 98 a 1-13.

[15] I 7, 75 b 1.

[16] II 19, 100 a 15-b 3. Cf. I 18; I 24, 85 h 24-28; I1 13, 76 b 2-6, 15-25; IT 14; IT 16, 98 b 32-33; *Top.* I *5,* 102 a 32-b *5.*

[17] I 1, 71 a 28-29; cf. 16-23.

Thus any fact is to be known scientifically only as subsumed under a universal. " Objects so far as they are an indeterminate manifold are not understandable scientifically, so far as they are determinate, understandable: they are therefore knowable scientifically insofar as they are universal rather than insofar as they are particular." [18] It is manifest that" by or in a universal we see the particulars." [19] One would never recognize which facts belong to a specific science did he not already know them "in" that (framework) which underlies a science (i.e., *T0 v1roKe£p,evov),* the genus. If the facts are knowable scienfically, or intelligible, insofar as universal, then the universal will be the intelligibility of the facts, " the one beside the many which is the single identity within them all." [20]

If science presupposes knowledge of the fact-to-be-proved, and this comes to pass only within a universal (genus), then science assumes knowledge of that genus. And Aristotle is explicit. The first step in science is " to posit the genus which is common to all the particulars." [21] Now the genus and that which belongs *(v7r(£pxet)* to it [22] are precisely the first principles *(apxa£)* that science assumes and that constitute the premises from which the fact (-to-be-proved), i.e., another peculiar possibility, will be concluded: " First principles are of two kinds: the premises by means of which demonstration proceeds [sc., the logical rules], and the genus with which the demonstration is concerned. The former are common, while the latter are peculiar." [28] As first principles, the genus and what immediately belongs to it comprise nothing other than the subject of the science.[24] A science begins by delimiting them. " The definition of immediate terms consists in an indemonstrable as-

[18] I 14, 86 a 5-7.

[10] *An. Pr.* II 67 a *(rii p,ev ovv tca.86Xov 8ewpovp.ev r0. ev p,epe•* •••); cf. b 1-8. Cf. also *An. Post.* I 1, 71 a 17-19, II 19, 100 a 16-b

•• II 19, 100 a 6-7. Cf. I 11, 77 a 5-9; II 8, 98 a

[21] II 14, 98 a 8.

•• II 14, 98 a 8-5.

•• I 88 b Cf. I 10, 76 b 10; I 88 a 86-b 8.

•• I 10, 76 a 81-87, b 8-7, and esp. b 85-88.

sumption of the essence [*Tt €a-rtv]*. Thus in one sense definition is an indemonstrable account of the essence." [25] This type of definition " is a first principle of demonstration." [26] " In all demonstration a definition of the essence is required as first principle." [27] The inner possibilities or attributes *(ra 1nn£pxovra)* of a genus are explicitated into definitory premises by means of division, generalization, [28] and especially dialectic. [29] From these premises another definition is eventually concluded, sc., of what belongs to the genus, or the fact-to-be-proved.30

Science, then, will be the systematization of prior knowledge: on the one hand, of the principles (*ai apxat),* the premises (*ra 1rpwra),* the "about which" (ro *'li"Ept* o) the genus (ro "fEVoc;), the subject (ro *V'li"OKEtfJ-EVov),* the universals *(ra Ka06J...ov),* the one (o ev), or the internal possibilities *(ra v7rapxovra);* and on the other hand, of the fact (ro *1rpuy11-a),* the "that" (ro on), the "self-display" (ro *i)HKVVfJ-EVOV),* the "in-turn" Or "successive shares" or particulars *(ra Kara* 11-f.poc;),or the many *(ra* 7roAA.r£, *ro a1rav).* This twofold prior knowledge Aristotle already intimated at the opening of the *Posterior Analytics:* "All teaching and all learning that involves thought proceeds from pre-existent knowledge [*yvwa-ewc;]*." [31] Even though *twofold* at the beginning of scientific construction, this knowledge is at its origin the simple act of knowing *(yvwpt,ew)* the universal, since it is only " by or in the universal that we observe the particular." [32] Thus it may be said: "Science depends upon knowledge of the universal" (Tj r0

[25] II 10, 94 a 9-11. Cf. II 9, 93 b fl1-fl4.

[26] I 8, *75* b 3fl.

[27] *De An.* I 1, 40fl b *fl5-fl6.*

[28] II 8, 13, 14.

[29] *An. Pr.* I fl7, 30. *Top.* I 2, 101 a 37-b 4; I 12-17 VII 4-5, Vill.

[80] I 30, 75 b 31-33 II 10, 94 a 13-24. For the main of the whole scientific process, see I 2-4, 6, 8, esp. 9; II 1-3, 10, 13, 19; *An. Pr.* I 27, 43 b 1-38; I 30; *Top.* I 14; and *E. N.* VI 3,6.

[81] I 1, 71 a 1-fl. Cf. *E. N.* VI 3, 1139 b *fl6.*

[82] *An. Pr.* II fl1, 67 a fl7.

Ka06A.ov yvwpt,ELV E(rrtv) .[33] What more does Aristotle disclose about this knowledge

Knowledge of the universal Aristotle calls usually rendered " intuition " or " abstraction." [84] It is the immediate grasp of the intelligibility of the fact or phenomenon; it is the grasp of the framework in which a fact may arise; it is prior knowledge (but not in time) of the intelligible structure of the factual object. As such, it may well be called the " precomprehension." Let us render as precomprehension.

Now the intelligible structure of an object is its "objectivity." Hence science begins with a precomprehension of this or that objectivity (universal) and step by step explicates it until the internal possibility of the phenomenon comes to light. It :first formulates what-is-precomprehended as a definition, and then proceeds. These objectivities (intelligible structures, genera) of the facts-to-be-proved are, especially by dialectic, explicitated into the definitions that form the first principles or premises of science. "Now precomprehension is the foundation [for knowledge] of the universal as well [as the particular], while syllogism proceeds *from* universals. Consequently, there are :first principles from which syllogism proceeds and which are not reached by syllogism. They are, therefore, *pre*-comprehended." [85] " Clearly it must be by precomprehension that we accomplish knowledge of the primary preinises." [36] Thereby it is the condition for knowledge of particulars: "For in no case do we find that we have previous knowledge of particular facts, but we do :find that by or in the process-of-precomprehension *[rii E1Taywyfi]* we at once *[ap.a]* secure knowledge of particulars just as if we were remembering them." [37] Of course, this process-of-precomprehension differs essentially from logical induction (also called ; the latter comes to pass through numerous instances, while precomprehension (as im-

[33] I 31, 87 b 38.

[3,] II 19.

[35] *E. N.* VI 3, 1139 b !'18-31.

••n 19, 100 b 3; cf. esp. b 5-17.

[31] *An. Pr.* II !'11, 67 a *!'l!'l-!'l5.*

mediate) need not: "As soon as one of numerous indiscriminables has made a stand, the earlier universal is present in the soul (for even though it is the particular that is perceived, perception is within the universal) ." [38] The soul is so constituted that it "comes unto the origin or essence" of particulars (E1Tt .ryx.eev) [39] Finally, the comprehension of that which is (7t EcTTi) in the sense of the essence (7o 7t .ryv eivat) is always true; this comprehension is not the assertion of something, of the belonging of P to S (7t Kan£ .[40] The comprehension of the essence, or intelligible structure, or objectivity, of a phenomenon is non-mediate; it is prior to any mediation through syllogism or even through proposition.

This precomphehension (is the operation of Thus may Aristotle say: " It remains that accounts for the origins or first principles " of science (A.ei7e7at vovv eivaL 7WV apxwv) .[41] Clearly, then, will be the origin for scientific knowledge " (äv EL'YJ ' ' ápx'Y) .[42] N " founds " science (syllogism) inasmuch as knows the premises (the universals:, the genus, the " about which," the essence, the intelligible structure, the objectivity) . And the universals, in tum, "found" the many particular facts. Hence Aristotle concludes the *Posterior Analytics:* "And will be the origin of the origin [i. e., of universals], while the whole of this has the same relation [of foundation] to the whole of fact " (i} p,ev EL'Y} av, i} 8€ ITUU"U EXEL 70 ITUV ITpuyp,a).[43]

The procedure of the sciences may be summarized. Beforehand, they" circumscribe some particular way-to-be [ov] or genus as an object of special concern," [44] i. e., they focus on a par-

[38] II 19, 100 a 15-17. Cf. esp. *Rhet.* II 23, 1398 a 32-b 18. See Sir David Ross, *Aristotle* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1964[5]), pp. 38-41.

[39] II 19, 100 a 10-14.

[40] *De An.* III 6, 430 b 27-28.

[41] *E. N.* VI 6, 1141 a 8-9. Cf. *An. Post.* I 3, 72 b 24-25; I 33, 88 b 35-89 a I; II 19, 100 b 12-13.

[42] II 19, 100 b 15.

[43] II 19, 100 b 15-17. This sentence is persistently mistranslated, due to a miscomprehension of the phUosophical sense,

[44] *Met.* E I, 1()25 b S-9.

ticular realm of meaning; and then they work out definitions of the genus or realm and its internal possibilities or attributes to serve as premises. This is the discipline of dialectic, generalization, and division. Then science proper begins. It orders the premises into syllogisms and draws the conclusions, that is to say, constructs other definitions of what belongs to the genus (an internal possibility). This process continues through middles or possibilities until the fact-to-be-proved is reached and so defined; and to do this is to state what is necessarily responsible for it. Thus it is that syllogism answers the two questions that motivate inquiry, namely, the fact {-rooT£) and the reason (TO *SL6T£)* •[45]

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•• II 1, 89 b !M; II 8, and in 8 esp. 93 a 45. Cf. Hugh Tredennick's Introduction in his Loeb Classical Library edition of the *PosteriorrAnalytics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. and Ross, *op. cit.,* pp.

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

Introduction

ST. THOMAS'S FIRST Way admits of fruitful study from many perspectives on its differently distinguishable stages. But it is only finitely divisible, even *in intellectu,* at least to any good purpose. However cheering one may find the light of reinterpretative reason, some perspectives and some such stages may remain most crucial of all for evaluating the lasting importance of the argument. Saint Thomas himself at *Summa contra Gentiles* I, 13, assures us that the crucial stages of his argument in the *Summa Theologiae* are two in number. These are, (I) the stage of showing whether every" change" [1] *(kinesis, motus),* in our experience of natural bodies is caused by something other than that which is " changed " ; (II) the stage of arguing that one cannot allow the chain of concurrent causes of " changes " to go on to infinity or else one can give no real explanation of any " change " at all.

It does not seem unreasonable to concede a Comon Sense analogue of (I) . It is less momentous, but not very audacious, to say that no " change " in anything which we abserve seems causally quite independent of any sets of concurrent events. The " leap " from $p1$ to p2 of what is said to be an " essentially unpredictable " nuclear particle at t3 seems pretty plausibly to depend at least in good part on the position and velocity of a great many microscopic and macroscopic co-existent things in the universe and their concurrent behavior. This particle within the nucleus of that atom in my right hand might not

[1] For a valuable discussion of *"motus"* and its technical meaning as *"change"* see Anthony Kenny, *The Five Ways,* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 7-9.

be taking its particular leap now if an atomic war had just begun with an irradiating bang, or if the sun had just started radically disappointing Hume's expectations of solar consistency.

The sceptic who cheerfully grants this to be eminently plausible may well suggest yet again that the very existence of Nature viewed as a complete, self-subsistent, law-governed physical system of " changes " would he quite as good a First Cause as any. In nearly two decades of scientifically erudite championship for Saint Thomas, Dr. William Wallace, O. P., has argued that such a sceptical move betrays an ignorance of science and its history. [2] Father Wallace protests that such talk of a "self-subsistent, law-governed, etc., physical system" *abstracts* away too many important characteristics of natural bodies. But his protest, I shall argue, may tum out to be, (scarcely less than the sceptic's move), an *irrelevant* response to a religious person who poses the question "Why?" as a religious question and to a Christian theist's attempt to reply as a theist. For the religious type of" Why?" questioning may tum out to engulf the sceptic with expressions of fresh wonder-like "Why is there then a complete, self-subsistent physical system in which this ' change ' occurs? " And it may tum out to engulf Wallace and his historical Newton with utterances of new bafflement like: " Why then is there a universe with *this* kind of ' change ' in it, and also with a higher intelligence maintaining its gravitational laws, and also with other scientifically describable regularities? " " How could *this* happen if the universe were controlled by an *intelligent* being? "

This sort of question about the first stage will be taken up in a brief Part II, *The First Way in Moral Space,* which will bring this essay to a close. It may turn out that not only Newton's

[2] See W. A. Wallace, O. P., (i) "Newtonian Antinomies and the Prima Via," *The Thomist* XIX, 2, (1956), pp. (ii) "Saint Thomas, Galileo, and Einstein," *The Thomist* XXIV, 1, (1961), pp. 1-22; (iii) "The Cosmological Argument," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* XLVI, (1972), p. 43-57; (iv) *Causality and Scientific Explanation,* Volume I: *Medieval and Early Classical Science,* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

but even Aristotle's physics sometimes seems to result in too much abstracting away of fundamental" OUGHT "-properties or value-laden features in Nature, although these are the very properties which should most concern aNatural *Theologian* who is considering "change."

Non-Thomists in the English-speaking world are most likely nowadays to look to a noted teacher of the Gregorian University and to a noted alumnus for the clearest possible exposition and logical appreciation of the First Way: Frederick Copleston, S. J.,[3] and Anthony Kenny.[4] Both in *Aquinas* and in his *History of Philosophy* Father Copleston gives the impression that he tries to steer us away from an idea which might " turn off " modern readers, the idea that Aquinas in the First Way is taking any particularly controversial stand on the concept of *Infinity.* He would have us conclude that, since Aquinas accepts the intelligibility of talk about an infinite series of successive stages in time, nothing particularly daring is being held about Infinity. This approach, I shall try to show, tends to mask what is most exciting both about Aquinas's First Way and about much of the Aristotelian reasoning cited by him in its favor at *I Cont. Gent.,* c. 13. Kenny's attempts to be blistering about the second stage o£ First Way also reveal at times an extraordinary reluctance to look at how boldly Aquinas and Aristotle have made their stand on Infinity. (Kenny, still more than Copleston, seems anxious about losing the interest of modern Science Fiction readers in the First Way much too

[3] F. C. Copleston, S. J., *Aquinas* (London: Penguin Editions, 1955); *A History of Philosophy,* Vol. II, Part 2: *Albert the Great to Duns Scotus,* (New York: Doubleday Image Books Edition, 1962), Chapter 34. In the latter Copleston writes: "the so-called mathematical infinite series has nothing to do with the Thomist proofs. It is not the possibility of an infinite series as such which he denies but the possibility of an infinite series in the ontological order of dependence. [There must be] ultimate and adequate ontological ·explanation." (p. 61) But Aquinas is denying much more than an event without an explanation. He is denying the possibility that God could be the First Caus·e of an infinitely extended world in space, or even of infinitely many actual beings in a finite space. Aquinas, I shall argue, is less bland, thank heaven, than Father Copleston construes him to be.

[4] Anthony Kenny, *The Five Ways.*

soon if he should take that stand seriously. But such anxiety can lead one to make oneself as well as others miss a most crucial point!)

In Part I of this essay, *The First Way in Physical Space,* an attempt will be made to clarify the view that Kenny's recent criticisms may be a good deal more anachronistic than Aquinas's second stage-and thus to clarify the perennial importance and excitement of that stage for lovers of fundamental problems in philosophy. Some recent words from G. E. R. Lloyd's *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought* [5] may help to set the scene:

> The antithesis between form and matter may be connected in turn with that between limit and the unlimited, and this takes us to a further set of related doctrines, including the ethical and aesthetic doctrine of the mean .... Aristotle's preference for the limited rather than the unlimited comes out in a different context in his discussions of infinity, especially in *Physics* III, Chapters 4-8. He allows that the idea of the infinite has some valid uses; thus magnitudes are infinitely divisible, and both time and number are infinite by addition, although only potentially so-the infinity of motion consists in a process of coming-to-be and is never actual. But it is striking that Aristotle holds that mathematics does not require an infinite line, only a finite line as long as one wishes, *(Physics,* ff). And he argues at length that an infinite body cannot exist and that the universe is finite. The infinite, he concludes at *Physics* 34 ff., is a cause in the sense of matter, and its essence is privation.

The following passage from Copleston himself, written when he is not troubled about making the Five Ways interesting to modern readers, usefully points to the general closeness of fit between Aquinas and Aristotle on Infinity:

> One of the reasons adduced by St. Bonaventure to show that the world must have been created in time and could not have been created ·from eternity was that, if it had been created from eternity, there would be in existence now an infinite number of immortal human souls and that an infinite actual multitude is an impossibility .... St. Thomas followed Aristotle in rejecting the pos-

[5] G. E. R. Lloyd, *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1968. Citation from pp. 290-291.

sibility of an infinite quantity. In the *De Veritate* (2, 10) the Saint remarks that the only valid reason for saying that God could not create an actual infinite multitude would be an essential repugnance or contradiction in the notion of such an infinity, but he defers any decision on the matter. In the *Summa Theologica* he affirms categorically that there cannot be an actual infinite multitude, since every ·Created multitude must be of a certain number, whereas an infinite multitude would not be of a certain number (Ia, 7, 4; 1, 46; ad 8.)

(In the remainder of this paragraph Father Copleston suggests that, if in the occasional passages St. Thomas may appear reluctant to lay down the law about Infinity, "it would seem rash to conclude to more than a possible hesitancy on St. Thomas's part as to the impossibility of an infinite multitude in act.") [6]

If Lloyd and Copleston are right here, and if on the score of Infinity Aquinas and Aristotle are both agreed and internally consistent, then the core of the First Way *is* highly controversial about Infinity. It probably follows that, whatever *supplementary* reasons the Angelic Doctor's commentators may misrepresent as *primary* reasons for rejecting an infinite series of actual coexistents in any of the Ways, St. Thomas in giving supplementary reasons like " then there would be no first mover" will already have a primary reason for dismissing as absurd any objector's appeal to the idea of an infinite series of actual, concurrent " changes." The supplementary reason is basically meant to show the objector various epi-absurdities of his basically absurd position. The epi-absurdities and the basic absurdity are meant to illuminate each other. *A nos moutons!*

Part I: *The First Way in Physical Space*

Let us return now virtually to Square One and relate Aristotle's views on Infinity to a few simple modem notions about sets and semantics.

For Aristotle, assertions of the finite extent of physical space

• F. C. Copleston, S. J., *A History of Philosophy,* Vol. II, Part 2, p. 87.

and of the numerical finitude of physical objects actually existing at any one time in space were closely related necessary truths of reason. Aristotle, to repeat the repeated, had no prejudice against the idea of an infinite series: *as such.* He believed tke world to be eternal and so believed that infinitely many successive changes of some sorts could and would occur in space in the course of eternity. Even if history were " cyclical," and even if the untidy sublunary world of " *for the most part things* " (by clumsily following the realm of *aei energounta)* exhibited series after series of eternal recurrence, there would still be infinitely many changes of such sorts. For Atlantis's rising from the waves 10,000 years ago and sinking back under *5,000* years ago would not (in an important sense of "same") be the same changes as Atlantis's rising 300,000 years ago and sinking 295,000 years ago. Again, Aristotle had no quarrel with certain abstract thoughts about the infinite repeatability of the dividing operation in mathematics: one can think of a particular log's being halved into *A* and *B,* with *B's* next being halved into *C* and *D,* with *D's* next being halved into, etc., etc. What of the further fact that a human mind can grasp the *generating relation of* the series "{a log-part three feet in circumference and ninety-six feet long; a log-part three feet in circumference and forty-eight feet long ... a log-part three feet in circumference and *fn* feet long etc., etc., *ad infinitum}"?* Even this fact about our capacity to grasp the generating relation would not, in Aristotle's (or Aquinas's) view, entail that a human mind could *understand as a coherent truth-candidate* the sentence SI:

SI: *"Infinitely many distinct but quite contiguous pieces of wood three feet in circumference actually exist at the same time in space-a piece ninety-six feet long, a piece forty-eight feet long . .. a pwce* $\frac{1}{2}n$ *feet long, etc., etc., ad infimtum."*

Still less does our mathematical understanding of the generating relation behind "{2 X 1; 2 X (2 X 1); 2 X (2 X (2 X 1)); ... *ad infinitum}"* entail that we can understand as a coherent truth-candidate the sentence SII;

SII: "Infinitely many distinct pieces of wood three feet in circumference actually exist in physical space at the same time, the first being two feet long, the second four feet long,. the third being eight feet long, and so on ad in;finitum."

Note that SI, even if intelligible, would not entail S III, if also intelligible.

Sill: *"Physical space is infinite."*

For the pieces said to exist in SI might perhaps be so all but perfectly contiguous as to never exceed one hundred and ninety two- (or, for generosity's sake instead of perfection's, one hundred and ninety three) -feet in length. On the other hand, should both SII and Sill be intelligible, then SII would entail Sill, that *physical space is in;finite.* Next consider SIV.

SIV: *"There actually is a log (L) three feet in circumference and infinitely long."* If SIV were intelligible as well as Sill, then SIV would also entail Sill. But Aristotle, as we see from *Physics* E, 204a34- 206a7, would reject SIV as an intelligible truth-candidate. For, he would say, the use of the term "long" in SIV implies that *L* is a particular body, bounded by a definite surface on all sides, but SIV's use of "infinite" immediately excludes this. Again, if the log were said to be *n* many feet long and three feet in circumference then " *n* many" could not have "infinitely many" as a value. Any actual *number* of feet of loggish spread could be numbered, whereas a so-called" infinite number" could not be numbered.

In so distinguishing the conditional entailment relations first between SI and Sill and next between SII and Sill, and in trying to draw morals about Aquinas's First Way, one needs to show caution and bring matters into better perspective. Father W. A. Wallace has very helpfully argued in *Causality and Scientific Explanation,* Volume I, (see footnote 2) , that one must see Albert the Great and Aquinas as committed to at least two distinct positions on Aristotle: (a) Aristotle, far from being divinely infallible on matters of physics, does sometimes go astray on important claims- (about astronomy in *Libri*

Meteororum, for example) -by relying more on hearsay than on experiment and demonstration; (b) contrary to the *amici Platords* at thirteenth-century Oxford, "neither Albert nor Aquinas saw mathematical form as ·existing in physical things antecedently to sensible quality and individuality; unlike Kilwardby they understood it as form abstracted from an existing physical entity by a mental process that leaves aside all irregularities and individual characteristics resulting from matter and motion." (p. 80) The business of the natural scientist, Wallace reasons from a plethora of crucial texts, is largely the same for Aristotle, Albert, and Aquinas. It is business taken to be different from that of those who afford primacy to mathematical abstractions in science. In Albert's words, that business is to study " what may happen in natural things on the grounds of causes inherent in nature,"or, more concretely still, "to look for the causes in natural things." (p. 70) Let us turn now from Wallace's recent book to a related passage in an earlier essay where Wallace writes of Aquinas as a neo-Aristotelian (and as a foe of the hyper-mathematical thinker) on Space:

> This conclusion [that the earth is spinning on its axis] ... does not commit the theorist to the Newtonian conception of a subsistent absolute space . . . in which such spinning motion is executed. The notion of absolute space is again an extreme of mathematical realism ... Space for St. Thomas, does not exist apart from *bodies* that are extended and in motion; itself based on the relation of distance between bodies, it is rather a relative thing, not an absolute. More properly it abstracts from matter and motion, and as such is conceived statically by us.[7]

These passages from Wallace throw valuable light on what the conditional entailment relationship between SI and **Sill** and what the lack of such a relationship would amount to in Aristotle and Aquinas:

(A) SI, "Infinitely many distinct but quite contiguous pieces of wood exist at the same time in space-a piece ninety-six feet

• "Saint Thomas, Galileo, and Einstein," p. 17. (Cf. Footnote 2)

long, a piece forty-eight feet long . . . a piece 1.... feet long, a
n
piece l feet long, etc., etc. *ad infinitum,"* (IF SI MAKES SENSE), DOES *NOT* ENTAIL Sill "Space is infinite"- (EVEN IF SI and Sill BOTH MAKE SENSE) !

(B) IF Sil MAKES SENSE, " Infinitely many distinct pieces of wood actually exist in physical space at the same time-a piece 1 foot long and 1 foot in circumference, a piece feet long and feet in circumference, a next piece twice the previous piece's size, etc., etc., *ad infinitum,"* THEN Sil *DOES* ENTAIL Sill "Space is infinite," *(IF BOTH* SII AND Sill MAKE SENSE) .

I£ SI and Sill make sense and SI is true, then space need not be infinite because the actual particular bodies are tightly contiguous and have sizes that would prevent their infinite sum from stretching more (or slightly more) than feet in length, while their circumference would, of course, be of the same finite size throughout. The idea that *infinite absolute 8pace would still be real because a vacuum that is conceivable by intellectual abstraction would be capable of " absorbing " each of the infinitely many pieces so that each might lie at a distance of at least 100 yards from any other piece* would strike Aristotle, Albert, and Aquinas as a boringly " mathematical " hypostatisation of the " *nothing* " in the disguisedly nonsensical sentence " there is nothing to prevent each piece of the infinite series from being situated simultaneously at a distance of at least 100 yards from any other piece." Unless infinitely many actual concrete particulars *(perimpossibile) simultaneously lay* at such definite distance from each other (while undergoing particular *moiJUs)*, there might be little temptation for a physicist to talk of infinite space. But if Sil and Sill make sense, then we can intelligibly speak of SII's entailing Sill because space would not now be conceived,[8] in Wallace's just

[8] For areas of disagreement between Aristotle and Aquinas on the concept of a *vacuum* or *void,* cf. Father Wallace, *Causality and Scientific Explanation,* pp. 178 and

cited words, to " exist apart from *bodies* that are extended and in motion " and would not now be conceived not to be " based on the relation between bodies."

It might be retorted that, from what one hopes to be an Einsteinian point of view, $talk_1$ of the *simultaneous* existence of all the spatially separate members of the infinite series envisioned by an affirmer of SII would make no sense. And (it would seem to follow) $talk_2$ of the simultaneous existence of one infinitely long log's different areas would be just as nonsensical. Why? Because verifying the tenets of $talk_1$ and $talk_2$ that all the pieces of areas simultaneously co-exist across infinite space would require something physically impossible-travel faster than the maximum possible speed, the finite speed of light. But perhaps this objection involves a confusion between knowledge of a proposition's Fregeau *Sinn* (meaning) and knowledge of its Fregeau *Bedeutung* (truth-value).[9] The objection may be a sort of Positivist *petitio.* Who can yet be sure? The more radical objection of Aristotle and, surely, of Aquinas to $talk_1$ would go:

> I can make no sense of $talk_1$ about the actual infinite of co-existent material bodies situated next to one another or lying at particular distance apart from one another. I know how to conceive a mathematical generating relation and say "For any number *n* of actual things (including the counter) that I or a Superman might count at *t* as co-existent at *t,* there are always *n* plus I things coexisting at *t."* "I can understand that if it means that there are finitely many things, but more actual things at any time than any human counter could actually succeed in counting at a time or than any finite human numberer could succeed in intelligibly expressing the finite number of at a time. But I can't understand it if it means that infinitely many things actually exist at once. Nor can I understand $talk_2$ about an infinitely long log's infinitely numerous areas since no principle of individuation can be given for its being *a* log or a *log."*

[9] Cf. John King-Farlow and William Niels Christensen, *Faith and the Life of Reason,* (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishers, 1972) pp. 78, 130. This point about Sense-Reference confusions is developed further in John King-Farlow "Immortality, Analogy and the Phenomenology of Death," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* Vol. XLVII, (1973), pp. 191-200.

Again, suppose that it were suggested to Aristotle:

The members of the set X of {mere vegetative things coexisting now in the universe} could be placed in one-to-one correspondence with the members of the set Y of {animal-vegetants *and* mere vegetative things} coexisting now in the universe. For this would be essentially no more problematical than setting the infinite series of prime numbers in one-to-one correspondence with the infinite series of primes and square numbers.

Let Aristotle now be told that this Cantorian device would enable him to understand what it is for two series of actual physical co-existents to be infinite series-hence what talks of infinite physical space might mean. Aristotle would surely reply that, *unless* one *already* had both an intuitively clear and a clearly consistent notion of what it is for two or even just one series of actual physical co-existents to be infinite, he would rule out the intelligibility of such talks about any such" placing in one-to-one correspondence" the individuals of what are intuitively grasped to be smaller or larger sets.

Whether Aristotle would be right to make such replies is one of the profoundest questions in philosophy-a question on which I am far too much in doubt to pronounce any judgment in this essay. This involves a cluster of issues on which mathmatical logicians, like " Platonists," " Formalists," and " Intuitionists " of distinction, may well find themselves divided despite their technical skills. (The issues are hardly to be resolved by citing any physicists' dogmas). It is enough for present purposes merely to distinguish five very probably Aristotelian assumptions which were very likely shared by Saint Thomas:

(1) If (as is the case) there are finitely many distinct coexistent things set at finite distances from each other, dist-ances which do not differ greatly in the case of the interestingly large entities, then space (a relationship between concrete particulars) is finite.

(2) The idea of space as largely an infinite vacuum stretching beyond the finite realm of actual co-existents-a vacuum

into which these co-existents might indefinitely expand-is an idle hypostatisation of certain mathematicians' abstract thinkmg.

(3) The "ideas" of infinitely many (actual and separate) things co-existing in finite space and of infinitely many (actual and separate) things co-existing in infinite space are both unintelligible.

(4) The "idea" of an infinite distance between two coexisting actual things is the " idea " of two co-existents between which an infinity of finite actual things could co-exist-hence this " idea " too is unintelligible.

Each member of these asumptions has something to do with Aristotle's and Aquinas's belief that space is finite. So presumably does (5) :

(5) If we are inclined to think that there can be a single continuous physical body of infinite length in space, then we must admit that we could lay an actual infinity of co-existent and suitably finite bodies along that body's length-and thus we see that no such thing can exist.

At this stage it may be objected that Aristotle and Aquinas frequently do talk seriously about infinite sets of actual coexistents or about a thing of infinite magnitude in order to demonstrate the existence of a Prime Mover. Consider the following passage on the First Way's second stage from Chapter II (" The First Way") of Anthony Kenny's earlier mentioned and scathing book *The Five Ways.*

> The argument continues as follows. I£ whenever you have a series of moved movers, the motion of the moving body is the same with the motion of the moved body, then if you have an infinite series of moved movers, you have an infinite number of bodies in motion whenever one of the series is in motion. " Omnia ista infinita simul moventur dum unum eorum movetur. Sed unum ,eorum, cum sit finitum, movetur tempore finito. Ergo omnia ilia infinita moventur tempore finito. Hoc autem est impossible." *(I Cont. Gent.,* c. 13, *Quarum prima.)*
> What is wrong, we might ask, with an infinite number of bodies being in motion for a finite time? "An infinite motion in a finite time " sounds shocking; but only because there seems something

odd in a body's travelling an infinite distance in a finite time. But why should not an infinite number of bodies travel a finite distance in a finite time?

Well, says Aristotle *(Physics* VII, 45 ff.), add together all the finite distances travelled by the infinite number of bodies and you will get an infinite distance which cannot be traversed in a finite time. But, we might retort, there is no single thing which travels an infinite distance, only many things travelling a finite distance. Not so, he retorts 59 ff); one body can move another only if it is in contact with it; so all these contiguous bodies make up one large body (which need not be infinite). And *this* body will have to travel an infinite distance in a finite time; which is impossible.

This argument, which is partially reproduced by St. Thomas, seems to fail partly because it is not the case that if a body has parts each of which travels a certain distance then the body as a whole travels the sum of those distances. Moreover, if, as Aristotle argues, an infinite number of bodies together make a merely finite body, why should not an infinite number of journeys added together make a merely finite journey? [10]

Of course, Aristotle does give quite a few teasing arguments in the *Physics* for the existence of an Unmoved Mover. And Aquinas's clarification of the *Summa Theologiae's* condensed First Way in the *Contra Gentiles* refers specifically to parts of the *Physics* where such arguments occur. These arguments seemingly tend to warrant the supposition that there *can,* after all, be infinitely many actual and co-existing bodies, that an infinitely large body *can* exist, that an infinitely long spatial journey *can* actually be made. But if Aristotle and Aquinas held to all or most of the five doctrines which we just gave about (A) finite space and (B) the finite number of co-existent bodies, then something is badly wrong with Kenny's line of exposition and criticism just quoted. Consider the famous passage in Aristotle himself which infuriates Kenny and which the *Contra Gentiles* relates to the First Way.

But since the immediate and direct ·cause of a physical movement in space must (as we see in all cases) be either in contact or

[10] Anthony Kenny, *The Five Ways,* pp. 24-25.

continuous with the thing it moves, our series of movers and moved must be either continuous or in contact with one another so as to form one thing composed of them all. *For our present purpose* [not, of course, Aristotle's italics] it makes no difference whether this one thing is limited or unlimited; for in any case, since they are unlimited in number, the whole movement will be unlimited, if we assume as actual what is theoretically possible, that each movement is either equal to or greater than the movement prior to it. If then *A, B, C, D,* etc. make up an unlimited magnitude which accomplishes its motion *E F G H* in the limited time *K* this involves the conclusion that an unlimited movement is gone through in a finite time by something which is either limited or unlimited; and whichever it is the conclusion is an impossibility. *(Physics,* 242b 21-35) .

Why cannot an infinite amount of change or movement *(kinesis)* be undergone in a finite time? What Kenny does not realise is that Aristotle's reasoning here must, in a way, be either virtuously or viciously *circular* and *ironic.* The standard Aristotelian assumptions about Infinity- (1) to (5) -are still all assumed by Aristotle! Aristotle wants to grant his opponents as great a number of what may be called" IF, *(PER IMPOSSIBILE),"* suppositions as may be needed to lure them into argument. But at a certain stage, he still supposes, the opponents can be directly or indirectly called back to plain Good Sense or to what some would call " basic intuitions." Aristotle invites us somewhat ironically to suppose, *per impossibile,* that each of an infinite number of co-existent things are simultaneously moving and being moved. Then, *per impossibile,* we would get infinitely many changes or an infinitely great change in a finite time. But this would require, as Kenny fails to see, something yet more absurd for Aristotle, something incompatible for Aristotle with the finitude of *physical spaee* and with the *numerical* (as well as the spatial) finitude of simultaneously actualisable bodies. All this infinite amount of " change," which, *per impossibile,* would require infinite *space* to occur in at one time, would be taking place in a finite *space* at a finite further shows the absurdity (hidden to Aristotle's opponents) of supposing that infinitely many

co-existent contiguous things may be needed to explain an everyday occurrence. The circle is virtuous here, as elsewhere in the *Physics,* if all or most of the assumptions (1) - (5) are philosophically sound and kept clearly before Aristotle's ironical mind. The circle may be vicious if it is not so virtuous. But at least the *kind* of reasoning needs to be discerned and relevantly discussed.

Perhaps this account is unduly charitable, however, to Aristotle or Aquinas or both. *Perhaps* Aristotle is not as consistent about the finite and the infinite as he should have been-perhaps what is taken here to be his generosity with" IF, *(PER IMPOSSIBILE)* ," concessions to draw what seem to him to be counter-intuitively operating opponents into argument results in radical inconsistencies. Or *perhaps* Aristotle's views on infinity, actuality, and space simply evolved and changed in ways that Aquinas should have noticed and bewared of combining for consistency's sake. Or *perhaps* Aquinas did not fully realize how radically dependent the First Way and Second Way were on certain Aristotelian assumptions about infinity, actuality, and space. Unfortunately Father Wallace, in a recent attack on Kenny [11] entitled " The Cosmological Argument," confines himself to Aquinas's "first stage" and breaks off his criticisms before reaching the passage in Kenny that we cited. Possibly the explanations offered here will induce Wallace to extend his studies to analyse the second stage of the First Way in depth so as to complete his reply to Kenny. In his very challenging paper of 1956, "Newtonian Antinomies against the *Prima Via,"* [12] Father Wallace had already sought to defend the First Way against numerous misunderstandings. Thus I leave him and other admirers of that way with two questions still inadequately answered. To what extent is the First Way dependent on the sorts of assumptions we have suggested? To what extent are these still really sound assumptions, however

[11] W. A. Wallace, O. P., "The Cosmological Argument: A Reappraisal," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* XLVI, (1972), pp. 48-55.

[12] *The Thomist,* XIX, 2, (1956), pp. 151-192.

boldly some modern mathematicians and mathematical physicists may talk about infinite space, infinity and orders of infinity?

The second part of this essay will take up in a new way some of Wall ace's complaints in his paper on Aquinas and Newton of 1956, complaints resurfacing in *Causality and Scientific Explanation* about the undue reliance on abstractions from concrete particulars that is found in Aquinas's critics and competitors. But before one turns to this, it may be usefully germane to venture a few more comments on Kenny's treatment of the First Way as it continues in his third chapter " The Second Way."

Kenny writes:

> The Five Ways have a formal structure in common which is applied in turn to each of the Four Causes and the different types of causality provide different contents for this formal structure .... Basically each of the Five Ways takes a two-place relational predicate " *R* " and shows the relation in question to be irreflexive (nothing has *R* to itself) and transitive (if *a* stands in relation *R* to *b* and *b* stands in relation *R* to *c* then *a* also has *R* to c). It concludes from this that either there is an endless series of things standing in relation *R* to each other, or else there is something to which others may have *R* which does not itself stand in relation *R* to anything. In the First Way, *"aRb"* is to be interpreted as *"a* is being moved by *b."* This basic formal structure is a sound one. For the following formula is not satisfiable in a finite domain:
>
> $(x) -Rxx \ \& \ (x) \ (y) \ (z) \ (Rxy \ \& \qquad\qquad \& \ (x) \ (Ey)Rxy$
>
> For a given interpretation of " *R,"* this formula says in effect that the relation *R* is irreflexive and transitive and that everything stands in the relation *R* to something or other. If, therefore, we have a relation which we know to be irreflexive and transitive, and *we know that the domain of the relation is finite,* [not Kenny's italics], we can conclude that not everything stands in that relation to something. In symbols:
>
> $-(x) \ (Ey)Rxy$
>
> and from that we conclude:
>
> $(Ex) - (Ey) \ Rxy$

which, if we interpret " *R* " as ".... as caused by " says

There is an uncaused thing. [13]

Two pages later Kenny suggests another formula to be *valid for every finite domain,* a formula which he takes to be crucial for understanding the argumentative strategies of Aristotle and Aquinas. This complex formula runs *(Ex) (Ey)Rxy* & - *Rxx* & *(x) (y) (z) (Rxy* & & *(Ez* (w) - *Rzw*. Of the forgoing formula Kenny writes:

> This indeed is valid for every finite domain. It is unwise, therefore, for a critic of the Five Ways to attack their formal structure. To refute one of them one must rather show either that the relation in question does not hold of anything, or that it does not have the properties of transitivity and irreflexivity, *or that there is no reason to restrict it to a finite domain.* [14]

If what we originally wrote about Aristotelian and related Thomist assumptions concerning infinity, actuality, and space in connection with the First Way seemed unduly bold, here perhaps one has a measure of serious confirmation from a scholar who *attacks* Aquinas violently, but only after formerly having made a sympathetic and profound study of many Thomist texts. For here, where Kenny is giving sympathetic exposition instead of rather contemptuous criticism, Kenny himself stresses (at least by hearty implication) the importance for understanding the Ways of realizing that St. Thomas wishes Nature to be understood as a *finite domain.* Now Kenny has already admitted in *The Five Ways* (pp. 12-18) that Aquinas (like Aristotle) was not opposed on philosophical grounds to the idea of Nature as exhibiting " an endless series of temporally ordered causes." Presumably the finitude of Nature as a domain for Aristotle and Aquinas is thus indirectly implied by Kenny to be (at least partly) *spatial* finitude. But Kenny seems unable to profit by this implication in his chapter on "The First Way." Kenny thus evades what should be

[13] Kenny, *The Five Ways,* pp. 36-37

[14] Ibid., p. 39

central to any book devoted today to the Five Ways: the problem of actual infinities, especially actual infinities of physical co-existents.

Quite how much reliance should be placed on Kenny's use of logic in assessing Aquinas is by no means clear. Consider the relation *R* in the formula which he says is " not satisfiable in any finite domain " :

(x) - *Rxx* & (x) (y) (z) *(Rxy* & & (x) (Ey) *Rxy* (p. 37).

Since according to Kenny, the essential thing is that this relation is meant to be transitive but not reflexive, one is tempted to rewrite this as

(x) - *Rxx* & (x) (y) (z) (*(x#y* & *y#z* & *x#z)* & & (x) (Ey) *(a;#y* & *Rxy)*

Let the domain be a seven numbered circle of beads which can be seen or loked at from any angle. Let " *R* " express the relation "can be seen as situated to the left of." We then get: *For any one bead x that bead cannot be seen as situated to the left of itself. For any three distinct beads x, y, and z,. IF x can be seen as situated to the left of y and y can be seen as situated to the left of z then x can be seen as situated to the left of z. For any particular bead x there is always a distinct bead y such that x can be seen as situated to the left of y.* Here, all seems to go well for a finite domain-or at least for a finite domain of more than two but very few, or of many, or of very many members. If, however, Kenny insists rigidly on his original formulas being spared the addition of the distinctness clauses above, then one is driven to work up possible counter-examples with accounts of more curious sorts of relation which respect our flexible natural intuitions about relating and relatedness, but eschew the unnaturally rigid intuition of "formal logicians" that relations be accountable in terms of *Straight-Forward ORDERED N-TUPLES.* Consider one odd candidate. Let the formation rules of the relevant calculus dictate, say, that Kenny's formula be written

out clearly with square brackets for the conjuncts after the quantifiers thus:

(x) *[-Rxx]* & (x) (y) (z) [*(Rxy & Rzy)* & (x) (Ey) *[Rxy]*

Following our odd interpretation of " *R* " for the same even membered circle of beads we read:

For all *x* it is not the case that *[x* being mentioned only once as *x* in the appropriate square brackets lies in the same circle as *x* being mentioned only once as *x* in the appropriate square brackets].

AND for all *x, y,* z,[IF *x* being mentioned only once as *x* in the appropriate square brackets lies in the same circle as y being mentioned only once as yin the appropriate square brackets, AND if *y* being, etc., lies in the same circle as *z* being, etc., THEN *x* being mentioned only once as *x* in the appropriate square bracket lies in the same circle as *z* being mentioned only once as *z* in the appropriate square bracket]. [15]

AND for any *x* there is a *y* such that[x being mentioned only once as *x* in the appropriate square bracket lies in the same circle as *y* being mentioned only once as *y* in the appropriate square bracket].

Here again the formula seems to be satisfied in a finite domain. One may leave to the reader's imagination the task of assessing Kenny's claim that the *other* formula is satisfied by *every* finite domain. Of course, when " *Rxy* " becomes " *x* is greater in physical size as a material object than *y"* the domain *D1* must be infinite in actual members and infinite in spatial extension-whatever the sense or nonsense of being said to be such a domain. Now suppose a domain *D2* to be like the one mentioned earlier of the log-piece three feet in circumference and ninety-six feet long, followed in all but perfect contiguity by one of the same circumference but forty-eight feet long, and so on by halves *ad infinitum.* Suppose our relation to be " is spatially smaller than." Although there are infinitely many contiguous log-pieces, they can extend no further in space than one hundred and ninety-two or one hundred and

[15] Such a conditional with a necessarily false ant·ecedent (as the variables are repeated) is necessarily true.

ninety-three feet. Thus one needs not only the Aristotelian assumption about the senselessness of talk about " infinite space " to exclude *D1* but one needs his further assumption about the craziness of belief in infinitely many actual co-existents if one is to exclude *D2*. Kenny's loose talk about "finite domains obscures a distinction that is germane to understanding where Aristotle and Aquinas really stood on Nature as a *finite* domain. Notice next that *D2* involved a *single-sided* infinite series somewhat like the domain of positive integers in its contrast with the domain of all negative and non-negative integers gushing out from *Zero* at its "centre." Here we might construct a corporeal domain *D3 bilaterally* infinite in members but still finite in physical extension. The ninety-six foot log-piece is "in the middle " with smaller and smaller log-pieces stretching contiguously out on either side up to form a three hundred and eighty-eight (or eighty-nine) foot line. Either " stands to the left of " *or* " stands to the right of " would each be admirable readings for " *R* " to many a mathematical logician untroubled about the metaphysical problems of possible semantics. For Aristotle and Aquinas this attempt at a description of the bilateral infinite series of actual pieces would, I take it, be bilateral Nonsense. And *perhaps* they would indeed be right. I can only repeat that problems about Infinity, actuality, and space remain among the profoundest in philosophy; that Wallace's fascinating and extremely sympthetic discussions of the First Way, like Kenny's ambivalent and sometimes bitter sounding commentary, have failed to bring these problems into sharp enough focus. Since Father Copleston's still more influential writings have also succeeded in obscuring the relation between these problems and the *Prima Via,* I hope that authors of future history books or of future editions of present history books will do something to make Aquinas's and Aristotle's real lines of reasoning stand out much more clearly.

Part II: *The First Way in Moral Space*

For so many ancient Greek thinkers *physis* (" Nature ") was not the value-free domain of Newtonian physics-at least

as Hume and Kant envisaged the latter. *Physis* had a *logos,* a saving and precious rationale fit to be the goal of *sophia:* even for the classical atomists Leucippus and Democritus everything in *physis* happened "*ek logou kai hyp' anangkes.*" Understanding of this *logos* made the universe seem far from "absurd" to such devout materialists. To some ancient Greeks there seemed to be intuitively necessary connections between *sophia* and *logos* and *peras* (limit) and one or more words of the *eidos* (form) family. (For *peras* brings *eidos*). With no few Sophists their ethical relativism and their interest in rhetoric as an instrument for manipulating men's *opinions* and *feelings* tended to go with an abandoment of the philosophical quest for *sophia* through grasping the *logos* of *physis.* To put matters a bit colorfully, natural things for many a Sophist had no intrinsic value but were given different values as instruments or impediments by different goals. Each man was the measure of everything. According to a traditional seeker for the *logos* of *physis* like Plato, one could only think about natural things in this crudely pragmatic way of the Sophists if one had turned a largely blind eye to the most crucial properties of those things to focus on others considered immediately attractive in relation to fulfilling one's present confused intentions.

In "Newtonian Antinomies against the *Prima Via*" Father Wallace offered some very striking suggestions about the implicit procedures of those who argue against the *Prima Via* of Aquinas (or against some of Aristotle's earlier related arguments). Father Wallace's favored words here and also in his discussion of Aquinas's opposition as a neo-Aristotelian to thirteenth-century Oxford "Platonists" in *Causality and Scientific Explanation* are "*abstract*" and "*abstraction.*" Consider the following passages from "Newtonian Antinomies against the *Prima Via*":

(A) Now the peculiar thing about an equation is this: if it does not express a tautology, then the only way it can equal two things that are not identical is by *abstracting* from certain features that

are not common to both. In fact *abstraction* must be made from everything that would either disturb the equality or does not enter into it essentially. (p. 163)

(B) But this does not necessarily derogate from the utility of the principle of inertia as a physico-mathematical principle. What it does indicate is that this principle does not have the broad applicability of a generalized physical principle that would be universally verified in all real motions. Rather it gives an idealized account of local motion and *abstracts* from extrinsic factors present in the real world and affecting such motion. And since it *abstracts* from extrinsic factors acting on real bodies moving in a physical enviroment, it should not be surprising that it also *abstracts* .from efficient causality influencing the body in motion. (p. 180)

(C) But while this [the action-reaction principle] is a valid principle of mathematical physics, it is not true when the total reality is considered. The reason is simple enough. If there is a strict equality between agent and receptor, there can be no motion. Nothing dynamical can proceed from strict equality . . . A rope, of and by itself, cannot pull a horse, but a horse can pull not only the rope but also something tied to it. If *abstraction* is to be made from this fact for the purposes of noting physico-mathematical equalities, all well and good. But the physical reality contains much more than the physico-mathematical equality ... Newton's third law of motion, like his other two, has its only solid foundation and ultimate justification in the physical movers which lead their discoverer inexorably to the existence of God. (pp. 190-191)

Kenny suggests that a sound critic might well seek to show that what is demonstrated to be a " Prime Mover " by an argument like the *Prima Via,* were it cogent, "would not necessarily be a candidate for being called God." *(The Five Ways,* p. 39) And indeed there is the danger that a seemingly cogent formulation of the First Way might come up with the existence of something which theists would consider an idolatrous thing to worship as divine. We might come up, for example, with a unique, self-sufficient being whose mere **POWER** accounts for all the motion in observed Nature. Such a being might appeal to extreme Voluntarists whose equation of *Goodness* and of *the Logos or Reason that makes sense of it all* with *Complete*

POWER strikes them as making such a First Mover the ideal answer to religion's demand for a *Justifying Explanation.* A Justifying Explanation, as I have characterised it elsewhere/ [6] offers us an ultimate causal explanation of anything and everything which exists or happens. But it offers this in terms of a causal agent whose existence and agency makes " sense of anything and everything"; makes it cause for joy that things exist and exhibit the " changes " of the First Way; makes the " sense of everything " a consolation to rational persons who grasp it for every disappointment, however tragic, and an addition to any joy. That is what *Christian theism* offers. The Christian God for whose existence Aquinas was arguing was not Aristotle's Prime Mover wrapped up forever in self-contemplation but a Biblical God whose Sel£-Comtemplation is one with his love and concern for all other (created) persons' history, happiness, and opportunity to share in his ultimate triumph of Good over Evil. Aristotle in depicting his Prime Mover as a Perfect Person or God *abstraGted* too many essential properties of perfection *as a Person* away from what could answer many men's cry for a Justifying Explanation of "changes" familiar to them. A Perfect Person would necessarily care about other persons, all of them, however imperfect. (An Unmoved Mover might seem *logos* enough for Athens and Stagira, but it could hardly be so for many who turned for fulfillment to Jerusalem or Benares, to Mary's grave in London, or to the New Communism (cum-Sinophilia) of Peking.)

What is it that is to be explained when one is asked to explain why *kinesis* or *motus,* or "changes" occur as they do? Aquinas, it seems, abstracts too carelessly from the ordinary

[16] See John King-Farlow, *Reason and Religion,* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1969), Chapters 6 and 7; John King-Farlow and William Niels Christensen, *Faith and the Life of Reason,* Chapters 1 and 2. Cf. Robert C., Coburn "A Neglected Use of Religious Language," in Dallas M. High, (ed.), *New Essays in Religious Language,* (Oxford U. P., Oxford and New York, 1969), pp. *215-235;* John King-Farlow and W. N. Christensen, "Faith and Faith in Hypotheses," *Religious Studies* VII, 2, (1971), pp. 113-124; John King-Farlow and W. N. Christensen, "Two Sides to a Theist's Coin," *Philosophical Studies of Eire,* XIX, (1970)' pp. 172-180.

fact to be explained when he argues in the First Way for a Prime Mover. What is to be explained is "change" in a universe where persons able to pose a host of evaluative questions, (including moral and aesthetic questions), find themselves given a history. The physicist *(qua* physicist of a certain type) may want us to focus on what he considers to be the Hard Facts for physicists of his type when at work. Even Aristotle at times when he is devoted to " efficient causes " or " material causes" may want us to focus on a somewhat de-valued set of *Hard Data:* the nameless spinners who deliberately move their average hands that move some sticks that move some bits of wool; the moving spheres beyond the Sublunary Region which move with complete regularity, while on our changing Earth we have epistemological or perhaps even ontological surds among the motions of " for the most part things " ; the potentially hot wood placed on the fire and caused to burn by the actually hot fire. Aristotle's reader can become too far abstracted away from the " formal causes " or characteristic excellences that make things' explanation important. Kenny may be right to hold that the First Way is directed like the Second to efficient causality but to a different aspect of efficient causality .. *(The Five Ways,* p. 36) Or Father Wallace may be right to hold that it is more faithful both to related Aristotelian and Thomist texts and to Aquinas's lasting importance for philosophy of science to emphasize material rather than efficient causality-or to do so at least during the first crucial stage in the *Prima Via.* (See " The Cosmological Argument," pp. 44, *55,* etc.). But if" changing" Nature, which is a domain that includes persons aware of values, is to be given a Justifying Explanation by natural theology, and if "changing" Nature cannot be adequately described by persons in a more or less value-neutral way,[17] then no very satisfying *religious* argument for theism can be given in abstractedly value-neutral terms of what " changes " because of chains of " efficient causality " and "material causality" culminating in an Unchanged Change.

[17] Cf. John King-Farlow, "Value and 'Essentialist Fallacies," *The Thomist,* XXI, I (1958), pp. 162-170.

It is tempting to say that the First Way is possibly like the start of a satisfying *theist* argument, because Aquinas follows it soon after with the Fifth Way and its talk of *Final* Causes. But a good many teleological explanations, at least those in terms of intelligent agents' intentions and goals which count among Final Causes, may be pursued by cultural relativists in a value-neutral manner: What is sought may be a *Verstehen* of what an individual conventionally intends and desires as a member of a particular community; no ultimate value judgment about the wisdom or foolishness, etc., of the agents' intentions or the community's system of values need be allowed. Of course, Aristotle and Aquinas do have a wider variety of Final Causes in mind than would interest exponents of pure *Verstehen.* But the Fourth Way, which most directly stresses belief in absolute values familiar to men's experience, brings out far more clearly, if still more controversially, why the Fifth Way's Final Causes go beyond the interests of cultural relativists.

It is a curious conclusion, yet I think it fairest to St. Thomas, to say that in his far more Platonistic *Fourth Way* he is much more directly bent on capturing the evaluative dimensions of "The Hard Facts " at their hardest for persons-dimensions like the moral and the aesthetic. Here Aquinas is least prone to abstract away reality's most challenging features in order to explain very partially what we experience in reality. The Fourth Way has its violently controversial logical problems. But at least it points to logically better dividends for religious theism. Before he comments with special harshness on the Fourth Way, Kenny writes:

> Admirers of Aquinas are divided in their attitude to the Fourth Way. Some, such as Geach, suspect it of being indefensible; others, such as Gilson, say that " the Fourth Way can be said to be the deepest one from the point of view of metaphysical knowledge." *(Elements of Christian Philosophy,* Doubleday; New York, 1960, p. 76) All agree that it is the Way in which, for better or for worse, St. Thomas comes closest to Platonism. [18]

[18] Kenny, *The Five Ways,* p. 71.

But why not say rather that Aquinas's Fourth Way is the closest to our religious needs and to our ordinary understanding of the world in its most crucial dimensions for personal agents? Why not say that the Fourth Way is in many respects closest to plain Common Sense at least in that it focusses on predicates like "good" and "noble" instead of all but abstracting such properties away from what is to be *metaphysically* explained? Or why not say that the First Way would benefit from a reconstruction in which these normative properties are stressed as much as those physical properties taken by Aristotle in a relatively value-neutral way when the First Way's " changes " are to be explained? Reconstruction or serious reformulation would be in order because the First Way is a *Ch1istian* thinker's argument-for religious conclusions-which proceeds from the data of our *Lebenswelt.* The First Way belongs in moral space. It deserves to be set much more clearly in moral space, and this is where admirers of Saint Thomas ought much more clearly to set it.

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THE FIRST WAY: A REJOINDER

IN THE PRECEDING article Pro£essorJohnKing-Farlow has raised a number o£ intriguing questions relating to the *prima via* o£ St. Thomas Aquinas'---questions, indeed, that cannot be answered with any measure o£ completeness in a brief reply. The queries he raises, however, do present the opportunity to offer some further observations on the traditional understanding o£ the proof and on its validity in the light o£ modern science, and these will be the focus o£ this rejoinder.

The *prima via,* it would seem, is a clear instance o£ a cosmological argument £or the existence o£ God. It starts from an observable aspect o£ the cosmos, i. e., the motion or movement or change that is sensibly observable in it, reasons *a posteriori* £rom this to an ultimate cause, and so concludes to the existence o£ a First Unmoved Mover who is incorporeal, immaterial, infinite in power, etc., and who in the sequel can be identified with the God o£ Revelation. Although in its later stages the proof makes use o£ metaphysical reasoning, its beginnings actually pertain to natural philosophy. (Indeed, as most Thomists hold, i£ the natural philosopher could not prove the existence o£ some type o£ being that really exists and is neither material nor in motion, there would be no need £or metaphysics as a discipline, since its subject matter would be essentially the same as that o£ natural philosophy.) The natural philosopher, moreover, abstracts from certain features o£ the physical world in elaborating his discipline; this abstractive process is found in all sciences, although some abstract in ways different £rom others, and their manner o£ abstracting can unfortunately have a restrictive influence on the types o£ arguments and proofs they are able to elaborate. [1]

[1] For a succinct account of Thomistic teaching on abstraction and its relation

On this understanding the *prima via* is only one of several possible cosmological arguments, all of which, precisely as cosmological, operate at the same " degree " of abstraction. Thus the *secunda via,* the *tertia via,* and the *quinta via* may be viewed as different proofs,[2] complementary in some respects, following the same basic logic or methodology, each of equal abstractness, and yet each capable of independent formulation and justification.[3] Moreover, insofar as these proofs focus attention successively on particular aspects of the cosmos, it is admittedly quite legitimate to say that each one " abstracts from " other aspects of the same cosmos. Such a use of the notion of "abstraction," however, is different from the way in which the abstractive process may be said to differentiate the sciences. King-Farlow calls attention to my frequent use of the terms " abstract " and " abstraction " and makes a play on these expressions in urging his own interpretation of the *prima via-one* essentially at variance with that given it in the Thomistic tradition. The difference between his use of " abstraction " and mine is that he gives the term the rather broad, precisive meaning just illustrated, whereas I use it in the technical Aristotelian- Thomistic way employed to differentiate the various sciences.[4]

to the classification of the sciences, see the articles by E. D. Simmons entitled "Abstraction" and "Sciences, Classification of" in the *N()W Catholic Encyclopedia,* 16 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill and Publishers Guild, Inc., 1967, 1974), Vol. 1, pp. 56-59, and Vol. pp.

[2] Here the *quarta via* is consciously omitted as being more metaphysical in character than the other four ways.

[8] My affirmation of the partly complementary character of the proofs is shared by King-Farlow in his books *Reason and Religion* and *Faith and the Life of Reason.* He would stress, however, that the proofs are only *collectively* valid, whereas I am further claiming their *individual* validity. See notes 4 and 13, *infra.*

• Correspondence with King-Farlow shows that we agree to disagr.ee on this matter of " abstractness " thus. A description *D1* is a *more abstract* description of the world *W* than is description *D2,* when *D1* covers fewer sets of predicates required for indicating the most important features of *W.* It is Aquinas's claim and mine that the existence of a physical universe to which predicates of the natural sciences, $N_1, N_2, \ldots N_n$, are truly applied offers *sufficient reason* to affirm the existence of a Being to whom related predicates can be assigned and who is identifiable with the God of Revelation. It is King-Farlow's view that some

To be more specific, the over-riding concern in my articles cited by King-Farlow has been with mathematical reasoning and the mathematical physics this generates, which Thomists commonly think of as operating (at least partially) at the "second degree" of abstraction, i.e., an abstraction that leaves aside sensible matter and motion and concentrates exclusively on the quantifiable aspects of natural phenomena, which aspects are refractory to analysis in terms of efficient and final causality. The natural philosopher, as opposed to this, operates at the "first degree" of abstraction, i.e., one that leaves aside only the individual aspects of natural phenomena so as to consider them universally, but still as involving sensible matter and motion in their definition, and for this reason open to the discovery of agents and ends. All cosmological arguments, to the extent that they are cosmological and in this sense pertain in some way to natural philosophy, may be seen as functioning (at least in their initial stages) at this first degree of abstraction. It is preferable, on this account, not to speak of the ways in which the various cosmological proofs differ among themselves as differences of "abstraction" or of "abstractness." Here the Thomistic tradition appears to be at odds with King-Farlow, who in the foregoing article speaks first of the *prima via* "in physical space" and then of the same proof "in moral space." Seemingly he regards the latter consideration as less "abstract" than the former and as more appealing, on that account, to the Christian theist because of its openness to moral and personal values. In the traditional view neither of these considerations is more "abstract" than the other; what is important is that they are precisive of different aspects of the world of nature and thus may provide the basis for different cosmological proofs. So, when King-Farlow speaks of "the *prima via* in physical space," most of what he says is unexceptional, for he is talking about the *prima via* as Thomists have

ethical predicates, E_1, etc., *as well as* N_1, etc., must be applicable if *sufficient reason* is to be given. This accents, in a different way, our basic difference over the *merely collective* validity as opposed to the *individual and collective* validity of the proofs.

generally understood it; when he speaks of the same proof " in moral space," on the other hand, it is somewhat difficult to follow his argument. In this second manner of speaking he may well be on the track of a valid proof for God's existence, but if so, one would not wish to call this new proof the *prima via.* Perhaps what he is proposing there is a nuanced version of the *quinta via,* or alternatively, he may be working out a *sexta via,* or a *septima via,* etc. In my published writings, as opposed to this, I have dealt exclusively with the *prima via* in its traditional understanding and resist being drawn into a related area of discourse, however enlightening this might be to the Christian theist, particularly when much yet remains to be done in the domain of" physical space "-as King-Farlow himself has effectively shown.

To concentrate, then, on the first part of the foregoing article, the question of the finitude of physical space or of physical movers and things moved) is certainly integral to both Aristotle's and Aquinas's arguments for the existence of a First Unmoved Mover. The difference between the arguments lies in the fact, as is well known, that Aristotle was convinced of the infinite duration of the universe whereas Aquinas believed in its creation in time and thus in its temporal finitude; for purposes of argument, however, Aquinas was willing to admit the theoretical possibility of an infinite temporal regress, and so his argument does not develop in a way essentially different from Aristotle's. [5] Both thinkers, moreover, thought of the hierarchy of movers and moveds in the context of what is now referred to as a Ptolemaic universe, i. e., a closed world of finite dimensions and composed of a finite number of concentric spheres. In such a universe no physical body can be actually infinite, although, as King-Farlow rightly discerns, physical bodies can be thought of as made up of a potentially infinite number of parts, when they are either divided into, or

[5] A fuller exposition of Aquinas's view on the temporal finitude of the universe is given in my article, " Aquinas on Creation: Science, Theology, and Matters of Fact," *The Thomist,* 38 (1974), pp.

addition is made to them by means of, proportional parts-the type of geometrical progression favored by peripatetics and illustrated so well in King-Farlow's article.[6] For the cosmologist of the present day, of course, the context is quite different and so the problematic must also be stated differently. It is precisely his awareness of this situation that has led Anthony Kenny to reject the Five Ways as hopelessly imbedded in a medieval cosmology.[7] One need not agree with Kenny's pessimistic evaluation,[8] however, and in fact one can be quite sympathetic to King-Farlow's analysis above, for the concept of potential infinity may well prove adequate to handle objections arising from modem mathematical theories of the universe. This adequacy cannot be assumed, however, and requires more detailed argument and substantiation than could possibly be given in this rejoinder.

Apart from the problem of the finitude of the physical universe, there are other special difficulties associated with the *prima via* that arise in the context of modem physics and that perforce could not have been considered by either Aquinas or Aristotle. The thorniest problem would seem to be that posed by inertial motion and the way in which this threatens the general applicability of the Aristotelian- Thomistic thesis on the simultaneity of cause and effect (or of mover and thing moved) to the elimination of the infinite regress possibility. Some aspects of this problem have been examined in the article on Newtonian antinomies cited by King-Farlow, but one of my more recent publications also takes note of a number of texts where Aquinas admits the possibility of antecedent (i. e.,

[6] Some aspects of King-Farlow's exposition, it may be noted, are adumbrated in late medieval and scholastic discussions of infinity see especially Domingo de Soto, *Super octo libros physicorum Aristotelis questiones, 2d ed.* (Salamanca: Andrea a Portonariis, 1555), fols. 52r-58r.

[7] *The Five Ways* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 3.

[8] See my review of this in *The Thomist,* 36 (1972), pp. 721-724, as well as the article cited by King-Farlow, "The Cosmological Argument: A Reappraisal," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* 46 (1972), pp. 43-57.

non-simultaneous) causality in physical processes.[9] To my knowledge Aquinas nowhere resolves the enigmas that such an admission creates for the *prima via,* although a resolution appears generally possible and needs only to be worked out in detail for types of causal regress that interest the modern physicist. In fairness to Kenny, moreover, it should be admitted that contemporary Thomists have not adequately answered the questions he raises relating to the motor-causality principle and the infinite regress as applicable to cases that have arisen in recent science. This failure would seem to be traceable in no small part to the proclivity of Thomistic metaphysicians to answer every objection to theistic proofs in terms of being and the act of existing, and to their failure, as a consequence, to take a close look at the world of nature. If they pretend to offer cosmological arguments at all, unfortunately they do so in terms of what the late R. J. Nogar referred to as a " cosmology without a cosmos," [10] one that is clearly at variance with both the spirit and the letter of Aquinas himself. On this account it is refreshing to see King-Farlow addressing himself to these concrete cosmological problems-for it is only by solving them that one can promote acceptance of the *prima via* by the modern mind.[11]

With regard to the apparently abrupt dismissal of the second part of King-Farlow's article, the following clarification may now be in order. The introduction of a moral dimension into discussions of the *prima via* is particularly distasteful to me because it inadvertently concedes too much to the two philosophers who have made the *prima via* unappealing to our contemporaries, namely, David Hume and Immanuel Kant. As

[9] "Aquinas and the Temporal Relation Between Cause and Effect," *The Review of Metaphysics,* 'll7 (1974), pp. 569-584.

[10] See his essay of that title .in *From an Abundant Spring.* The Walter Farrell Memorial Volume of *The Thomist* (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1952), pp. 363-391.

[11] I also endorse King- Farlow's view that, if modern commentators like Copleston and Kenny present Aquinas over-sympathetically in failing to stress Aristotle's pertinent view on the finitude of space, then they offend fewer modern physicists, but they seriously misrepresent St. Thomas's own reasoning. Now is a good time for us both to stress this.

argued in my second volume on *Causality and Scientific Explanation*[12] neither Hume nor Kant was consistent in his understanding of causality, and each effectively adopted a subjectivist approach to knowledge reached through causal analysis. For Hume causality became nothing more than a psychological projection into reality, a matter of " feeling " or of human anticipation, whereas for Kant it became an *a priori* category of the understanding that would serve to organize phenomena but could yield no knowledge of any reality behind the appearances. For both, therefore, *a posteriori* demonstration became an impossibility, as did any science of nature in the epistemic (as opposed to the empiriological) sense, and cosmological proofs for God's existence could lead at best to transcendental illusion. Thus for them the way to God through the intellect and its understanding of the universe was effectively blocked, and if one wished to assent to God's existence he would have to do so on moral or affective grounds. (This is not to deny, of course, the validity of theistic proofs based on such ethical and valuational grounds, but it does oppose reducing all proofs to this kind, and particularly the *prima via*.[13])

As noted in the recently published supplement to the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*,[14] both Hume and Kant tried to elab-

[12] (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974), pp. 38-51, 60-75.

[13] The fundamental difference between myself and King-Farlow on this point has been well put by him in our correspondence, as follows: "You take the Five Ways to be complementary and individually adequate; I take them to be complementary and collectively imposing. You think of deductively sound demonstrations; I think in terms of 'Good Reasons' arguments which wise people can come to find overwhelming. Burne and Kant may have sometimes thought that reasoning with normative premises is the soft underbelly of philosophical theology as they understood it. But the enthyrnernatic premise that some arguments are good and some are bad, some wise, some foolish, etc., then becomes the soft underbelly of aU intelligent reasoning, including Burne's and Kant's. As I argne in *Faith and the Life of Reason,* the ' positivist ' attack on the ethical dimension of what we seem to experience generalizes itself into an attack on all normative dimensions. But this could only be sound if it is unsound-that is, if we know some reasoning to be good, bad, worthy of attention, dishonest, etc."

[14] In my article entitled "Cosmological Argument," Vol. 16, pp. 105-108.

orate philosophies of science, but they did so only in a context provided by classical mechanics, and their efforts have proved singularly sterile for evaluating realist claims arising from high-energy physics. The discovery of vast numbers of so-called "elementary particles," with non-classical properties that render them unobservable even in principle, suggests that scientists are now *(contra* Hume and Kant) *de facto* employing causal reasoning to transcend sense experience and to arrive at deeper ontological explanations of the physical universe. Such scientists, rather than recent philosophers of empiricist and analytical bent, are the thinkers who are developing canons of demonstrative inference that can be used to establish the existence and attributes of entities unlike those falling under sense observation. In this they have much in common with Aquinas and with the type of reasoning he employed to elaborate the *quinque viae.* The obvious task awaiting those of us who are interested in defending cosmological proofs for God's existence is to refine and complement their methodology and show how it can sustain a plausible inference to such a transcendent cause. And, as has been suggested in the same supplement/ [5] such an enterprise must be directed, not to the " religious " person who regards his commitment to God as an affair of his heart or will and not of his intellect but rather to the hard-headed thinker who uses his mind to study the world of nature in objective fashion and so to penetrate to its underlying causes.

This is not to say, of course, that King-Farlow would be unsympathetic to such a program. But he will probably agree that it would have to avoid pursuing some of the leads he suggests in the second part of his article so as to devote full time to clearing up the difficulties he raises in the first.

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[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 107-108.

BOOK REVIEWS

Les Sacr,ements d'initiation et les ministeres sacres. Edited by STANISAS DocKx, O. P. Paris: Fayard, 1974. Pp. 272.

This attractively printed paperback should prove ecumenically helpful. It will enable a much wider public to have access to the proceedings of a significant dialogue held under the auspices of the International Academy of Religious Sciences. During the colloquium in question sacramentality was the unifying theme. Major papers were read by authors representing various Christian traditions: J. C. de Stage (Anglican), Edward Schweizer (Lutheran) , Max Thurian (Reform), Paul L'Huiller (Orthodox) , and a pair of Roman Catholics-Pieter Smulders and the editor. Four of these speakers concerned themselves with Baptism in one context or another. They centered in respectively on its relation to: 1) faith; 2) personal salvation; 3) the Lord's supper in Johannine Literature; and 4) the Holy Spirit. The remaining two dealt with the Church's ordained ministry: 1) in its relation to the universal priesthood of the baptized (Max Thurian) and 2) from the perspective of the different powers vested in priest and bishop (Paul L'Huillier). An appendix presents Edmund Schlink's reflections on problems connected with infant Baptism in societies where large numbers of parents are Christian in name only.

After each paper a discussion took place. At this point others besides the colloquium-speakers had an active part in the proceedings. Included in this category were: Ernst Kiisemann, Hans Kiing, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Joseph Ratzinger, Harald Riesenfeld, J. J. von Almen, B. D. Dupuy, M. J. Le Guillou, J. Hajjar, K. Schelkle, Rudolf Schnackenburg, Edmund Schlink, and A. de Vooght. Their interventions have been preserved in the form of brief resumes. Sometimes this entailed translating into French observations made in another language. The results show that the effort this involved was well worthwhile. Indeed without this record of what must at times have been a rather lively exchange, the book would lack much of its value. A pertinent example may help to illustrate the point.

The New Testament does describe the three distinct ministries of bishop, priest, and deacon in the way they appear in the teaching of certain churches of the present day. For example, between the bishop who figures in the *Pastoral Epistles* and the one who is prominent in the documents of Vatican II there is a definite family relationship but a considerable difference as well. Similarly one should not pretend to discover in the New Testament the presbyterian-synodal polity of certain Protestant churches or to assert that their Elders correspond exactly to the presbyters

in the *Acts of the Apostles* or *Pastoral Epistles.* So argued Max Thurian in his presentation entitled: "Le ministere au sein du sacerdoce universe!." He also posed the logical question at this point. Given the non-conclusive character of the biblical precedents for church order, how does one find an ecclesiology that is both ecumenical and true? He gives as well at least the beginning of an answer.

Such a theology of the church will have to strike a balance between the importance of recognizing charisms and diverse ministries on the one hand and due acknowledgement of institution, continuity, and ordination on the other. (p. 196) A church especially concerned with effecting and preserving order among the ministries in the Body of Christ easily shuts itself off from prophetic renewal, while another that is more sensitive to the distribution of charisms by the Spirit readily blocks the organization of those charisms in the ordained ministries. The organization of Christ's body and the freedom of his Spirit should not contradict each other. To be specific, the universal priesthood of the faithful exists primarily to render service pointed *ad extra-beyond* the confines of the church, while the ordained ministry is called first and foremost to serve the church itself. Such a position leads to a consideration of ordination. He states that on the basis of the *Pastoral Epistles* an episcopal ministry as a function providing for government of the church, protection of the deposit of faith, and regulation of the church's stance in relation to the world seems essential to the church's life. To be sure, this episcopal function is one situated in the context of presbyteral collegiality and one assisted by the diaconate. (p. Still the Body of Christ must recognize that certain of its members have been entrusted with the role of expressing the will of Christ its head. (p. Indeed God himself wills that in the church there will always be a ministry that is to continue the work of the Apostles, who were sent by the Son in the power of the Spirit. (p. In this perspective ordination is: 1) a prayer to the Holy Spirit for the gifts necessary for ministry; the actual reception of the charism sought from the Spirit; 3) the transmission of the power of the Spirit from generation to generation; 4) the consecration of an individual to Christ in the Spirit of power, love, and prudence; and 5) a recognition by the Church that God has actually given it a new messenger of his word, presence, and authority. (p.

To all of this Ernst Kasemann quite predictably reacted. He noted that there are two ways of understanding Christ's Lordship in the present age. One looks at that Lordship as something perpetuated and imaged in the church's ordained ministry; the other sees it as a function exercised directly by Christ himself. The latter is the view of the New Testament; the former is Ignatian. The threefold ministry of bishop, priest, and deacon is an "emanation" or a "fully legitimate development" from the New Testament but not for that fact necessary for all times. If one looks at the matter

in terms of recent history in Germany, Protestant bishops-says Kiise-mann-failed more than did their communities in remaining steadfact in the service of Christ. Existentially speaking, he can no longer, he says, accept the proposition that an ordained minister possesses power and authority for the mere fact of having been ordained. (pp.

To this Max Thurian replied that he was not sure communities were more exempt from infidelity than their ordained ministers. Calvin was right in the *Institutes.* Bishops are bishops only if they preach the word of God. Bishops who do so, however, provide as such an intermediate position between accepting the idea of a ministry that as ordained always reflects Christ's Lordship and a conception of the one Lord who shows himself here and there without ordained ministers. (p.

Joseph Ratzinger argued that the Lordship of Christ is precisely and paradoxically safeguarded in holding fast to one conviction of the primitive church; namely, that even when the ordained minister does not respond properly to calls for evangelical service, we cannot for that fact declare his power dissolved. Only because Christ alone confers and continues to confer the Sacraments-even if the minister is Judas-is his Lordship safeguarded and the ministry withdrawn from human whim and caprice. (p.

At this point Hans Kiing is reported as trying to locate some common ground shared by the positions of Kiisemann and Ratzinger. (p.

Wolfhart Pannenberg says he is astonished and overjoyed to learn that Kasemann concedes at least the possibility that from an evangelical perspective what existed from the beginning does not comprise the sum total of what is legitimate; that change as such can be legitimate (even change to the monarchical episcopate}. In his own opinion, the ascendancy of the monarchical episcopate was legitimate because it was the only way at the time to secure authentic tradition by way of recourse to Christ as the source of all Christian proclamation. But determination of the canon of Scripture was necessary as well and during the same period. In other words, the rise of the monarchical episcopate was perhaps inevitable at a time when the certitude of Christian tradition was not guaranteed save through the principle of authority. Thus for his own day Augustine was right. But when it became possible (to use Max Thurian's words) to say that bishops are not always bishops even though they are in office, then the force of conviction became the criterion for judging authority. This shift occurred at the time of the development of methodical study of the Bible. Today such study allows church authority itself to be judged as successful or wanting. That Christ works through and in unworthy ministers is not so much an assertion of his Primacy (and that of christology) as a christological assumption in a particular type of assumption that must itself be assessed. (pp.

Ratzinger rejoins that the uncertainty of historical research today leaves us about where Christians were in Augustine's day without it. (p.

Kasemann, not to be silenced, returns to the fray to register " fundamental opposition on one point." The independence, autonomy, and non-absorption of Christ into the Christian community cannot be realized through the ordained ministry but through the word. (p.

The present reviewer would have to side with Ratzinger. But the exchange that occurred confirms him in one conviction he has had for some time and conveyed to churchmen and theologians alike (e. g., in his paper at the September meeting in 1974 of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Bilateral Ecumenical Consultation in the USA and in his address to the United States Catholic Conference in November of the same year). That conviction comes to this. In consensus statements that deal with the church but not with what the authors think of the Lordship exercised by Jesus Christ today, agreement may be more apparent than real. Is it right to *assume* without further ado so broad a consensus on christology? He thinks not and has recommended that attention be paid by ecumenists to christological concerns both for the sake of the churches involved and for a far wider audience. The reader will not be surprised to find out that the reviewer finds his conviction not only not challenged but actually confirmed by the discussion recorded in the present volume.

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St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Vol. 49 (a. 7-15) *The Grace of Christ.* By LIAM G. WALSH, O. P. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974. Pp. 259. $12.50.

Liam Walsh does honor to Dominican scholarship by his careful, lucid English translation and commentary on questions seven to fifteen of the "Tertia Pars " of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae.* The volume is entitled, *The Grace of Christ,* since this question is developed most fully. It might also have been subtitled, " The Human Condition of the Incarnate Word," a title which St. Thomas himself used to introduce this section of his *summa.* Four main divisions are found in the work: Christ's grace; Christ's knowledge; Christ's power; Christ's physical disabilities.

What is particularly attractive and helpful in this volume is the Introduction {pp. XVII-XXVII) in which the author situates the question treated in this part, explains St. Thomas's method, his use of Scripture,

his anthropological principles, and his theology. The author is not defensive, nor apologetic. He succeds in making a case for a current appreciation of the thought o£ St. Thomas, while at the same time he freely admits that there are limitations to the Thomistic synthesis especially in the area of Christ's knowledge. One does not come away with the impression that one has been sold a bill of goods. Rather, one finds an honest appraisal of the advances made in Christology with the aid of more contemporary philosophies. One cannot help but be impressed.

In addition to the footnotes proper to the *Summa* there are many (yet, not too many) excellent explanations of the meaning o£ the text, particularly in relation to developments which have occurred in modern Christological studies. Again, one finds no attempt to defend but only an attempt to clarify the context of the particular question and an openness to other approaches more in line with modern thought and more apt to coincide with biblical thought-patterns. In his brief, concise commentary there is evidence of a real familiarity with the documents of tradition, as well as with recent scriptural syntheses, something which would please the Master Theologian himself.

The area of St. Thomas's Christological synthesis which is most often criticized by biblical scholars and modern theologians is that which is concerned with the knowledge of Christ. This is handled very well in the commentary: there is a good exposition of Thomas's reasoning and an appreciation of new insights.

The volume concludes with a glossary of important technical terms. It is to be hoped that the remaining volumes of this series will be o£ the same quality as this one.

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Theology Today. 17 *The Theology of Grace.* By CoRNELIUS ERNST, O.P. Pp. 96. 23 *The Theology of Secularity.* By GERALD O'CoLLINS, S. J. Pp. 94. Notre Dame: Fides, 1974. $1.25 each.

When theologians of our time have provided the Church with a well-rounded theology of grace they will have performed perhaps their greatest service. *The Theology of Grace* is a notable contribution in that direction. In the opening section on "The Language of Grace" we read: "It is not as though we were to itemise God's gifts and call one of them ' grace '; it is rather that ' grace ' qualifies the whole of God's self-communication as a gift beyond all telling." (p. 29) The second of

the book's three chapters gives a brief but incisive history of the doctrine of grace where the factors shaping our recent and somewhat improverished treatment of ' grace ' are outlined. Among these is the divorce of the gift of grace from the Giver and the philosophy of the real which was used to express this theology. These two enlightening chapters prepare the way for the last in which the author gives his " Perspective for a Theology of Grace." Because grace is not " one item among the many gifts God bestowed on man," the author believes that there is no such thing as a theology of "grace" which would parallel a theology of Christ, say, or the sacraments. Rather he tries to "elicit some kind of centre in experience . . . from which . . . we might refresh our awareness of the whole of human existence under God as *gift*. ... " (p. 93) Toward this end he presses into service the notion of "meaning" which he feels is more relevant in our times. "Grace" brings new meaning into man's life, a transformation, because it implies a totally new destiny, a new communion between God and man, made possible by Christ's death and resurrection. The relationship of grace to nature, freedom, sin, sacraments, Holy Spirit is dealt with from this fresh point of view; a pity it has to be so brief. The profundity and originality of this volume is such that a bigger book would be needed to do it justice. Those who study this work, and study is needed, will be richly rewarded for their efforts.

Secularization is one of the more important elements in the theologian's milieu in our time. If many find themselves ill-at-ease believing, it may be because they have not yet come to terms with the role the secular world (the "non-religious") should play in their interests and commitments. In his search for the ultimate basis of a theology of secularity the author of *The Theology of Secularity* regards the doctrine of creation (which he deals with only in its Old Testament context) together with God's intervention in saving-history as providing only provisional lines. The Incarnation and the ministry of Jesus too are considered inadequate for this role, and the conclusion is that " only the death and Resurrection of Christ provide the adaequate backing for a theology of secularity." (p. 49) Christ "died a degrading, radically secular death," but this was the occasion "when the divine initiative commenced the process of effecting the new creation." By the Resurrection the most secular becomes most radically transformed. This means that there now is the promise that the tension between the "secular" and the "religious" will be resolved, partially here, and totally hereafter. This Christian hope is the source of man's responsible service to the world, where he holds the delicate balance of respecting its good without idolizing it. This doctrine is applied to the Church in its worship, its relation to the world, and as an institution, where a plea is made for greater democracy in elections, shorter periods of rule for bishops, and for ordained women, this last in the name of St. Paul and of the

popular press! The style is racy, readable, and light, and in parts the content has no " weight problem " either. Overall, the book is fresh, original, and stimulating, and a worthwhile contribution to an area in theology needing profundity and integration.

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Authority. Edited by FREDERICK J. ADELMANN. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. 118. Guilders 27.50.

In his Foreword editor Frederick J. Adelmann says of these collected essays: " It is up to the reader to try to discern the truth enunciated partially at least in each of these essays, keeping in mind, of course, that any of us in our human philosophical speculations is also limited." (p. 5) In general, the limitations are more pronounced than one would hope; more significantly, the collection as a whole suffers from the weaknesses of each essay, which weaknesses are highlighted by the lack of any truly integrating thread which might collect the parts into one. There are moments of promise, but the brevity of each essay prohibits the internal development of such promises; externally, the promises of one essay tend not to complement the hope raised in some other essay.

In spite of such criticism one welcomes a volume on" authority." What structured group of people in the contemporary Western world does not ache for a sane experience of saving authority? The words "my country-right or wrong " are too hauntingly familiar; hearing them reminds us of those who could not obey an authority they judged to be without moral undergirding. "Law and order" sounds like a call for strongly-exercised authority; those who recoguize the underlying code anticipate selective repression, not true authority. The Roman Catholic Church writhes in the agony of having no well-understood authority. Episcopal collegiality is seen by some as a challenge to papal authority; one often surmises, righty or wrongly, that episcopal proponents of collegiality are less enthusiastic when such a doctrine would appear to diffuse episcopal authority, extending the responsibility for decision-making to sub-episcopal realms. And yet most everyone dreams of the emergence of truly authoritative voices; the same tongue which acidly eats at recent expressions of " authority " cries longingly for leadership.

Karl Rahner's "Theology and the Church's Teaching Authority after the Council" engagingly raises the issue, while typically (for Raimer) not pretending to resolve it definitively; one can discern an appreciation for

the " will " element of authority while also being reminded of the significance of the " intellect," the content of what is stated with authority. Indeed, the most profitable theme which recurs spurtingly and with uneven clarity in this little volume is that " authority " very much involves the communication of some value from one to another (which is most usually a grouping of others). (Joseph M. Bochenski's spirited foray into the formal logic of authority, albeit unfulfilling for those on a rather more metaphysical journey, even reminds us that authority is a triadic relation.) Probing what it means to call Einstein an "authority" in physics serves to open up new possibilities for re-understanding ecclesial "authority"; as soon as one recalls that disputes about ecclesial " authority " are most often about "teaching authority," one is reminded that Einstein is a more felicitous analogate than is Hitler. Richard T. DeGeorge incisively sorts out four types of authority in morality and uses this distinction to clarify some existing painful misunderstandings; it is good for him to remind us that when " authorities " disagree among themselves, the " authority " of each is diminished, and it is likewise good to be convinced that the parent/child relationship is not an appropriate paradigm for most instances of moral authority.

The volume is dedicated to John Wild whose death punctuated the months between the completion of his essay "Authority" and the publication of the collection *Authority;* such a dedication would have been merited solely by the clarity and wisdom of his essay which enjoys first position in the collection. Having shown the triadic nature of "authority," he speculates on the errors which can arise when the one who is an authority shifts his stance too near to (a) the value being communicated or (b) the one (s) who depend upon him as an authority. When religion is the arena, the former alternative leads to an " authority " who seems to identify himself with God himself (rather than serve merely as a reputable authority within the God/man matrix); the second alternative forecloses any appreciation of the transcendent by identifying the " authority " with those purported to be subject to authority. While Wild draws the distinction between Roman Catholicism and the communities of the Reformation, one can fruitfully illustrate intramural Roman Catholic debates today by borrowing from Wild on this point.

If Wild shifts the emphasis to the content, the value, the intellectual component (in distinction from a heavily voluntaristic theory of authority), William H. Davis reminds us of the "will" component in "authority "; a true experience of authority always involves the subjection of oneself to another to some degree. For Davis the authority of interest is God himself; just as the scientist enters upon new knowledge only by submitting himself to the limitations of the matter being studied, structuring his investigations according to the laws (a word laden with overtones

of " authority ") , so will the religious creature only truly know his Creator to the extent that he is subject to him.

One should report the inclusion of a very few pages by Bernard Lonergan. One unfamiliar with Lonergan can only fail to grasp his words on " authority " because they are cast totally in Lonerganian categories. One who has already exposed his mind to Lonergan will recognize here a sketetal summary of the introductory chapters of *Method in Theology,* which were themselves a matured distillation of *Insight;* hence, one is offered a potentially-helpful unnuanced overview of the basic Lonergan, but the joy of that insight tends to give way to displeasure with the murkiness of " authenticity," a concept integral to Lonergan's understanding of "authority."

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Lions and Foxes: Men and Ideas of the Italian Renaissance. By SIDNEY ALEXANDER. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1974. Pp. 386. $12.95.

Two periods in the history of western culture have exercised and continue to exercise unabated fascination: the "golden age" of Pericles in ancient Athens and the Renaissance in Italy. The differences between these periods are deep and significant; but their basic similarity, from which that common fascination stems, is even more profound and replete with meaning for modern man. The differences can best, perhaps, be rendered visual by a contrast between an artistic masterpiece of the one period and of the other: the Milonian Venus, for example, and the Pieta of Michaelangelo (by preference, not the early Vatican version but the profoundly moving version of his old age). The cool, remote, and chiseled perfection of the first, in which all movement has been arrested in a moment of perfect equilibrium, all commotions of the heart stilled to a dreamlike calm; the sinuous and even agonizing expressivity of the marble of the second brought to pulsating life by the inner turmoil of emotion: these define the differences more clearly than any words might do. But the similarity between the two ages, as signalized in those same masterpieces, is even greater. Each is a monument to the creative movement by which the human spirit lives in *every* age: for man in every age *is* what he creates. In every period of his history his great emprise is to release the creative power within him and, in doing so, bring into being, not something other than himself but his own profoundest reality. For this reason every age in which this creative power has found compelling expression fascinates men of all other ages, for in that age men see mirrored their own highest possibilities.

A profound narcissism, one will say; this cannot be denied but, it must be added, a fruitful narcissism as the spirit's history proves.

The stated purpose of Alexander's book is to hold up the mirror of the creative life of the Italian Renaissance to contemporary men; even more, to transmit to him, not the mere outer image and appearance of that age but something of the creative principle from which those marvelous manifestations spring, whence, whether in word or ikon or emprise, they draw their life and power. This is a purpose which cannot be praised too highly. It may, perhaps, draw upon itself some measure of disdain from the scholarly who have in memory as paradigms the great and exacting works of Wittkower, of Panofsky, of Garin, and their peers; the word "popularization " may even rise to their lips. There is, without question, a strong element of popularization (" divulgazione" is the term Alexander, with his love of all things Italian, might prefer) in the present pages. The disdain, on the whole, however, is unwarranted. Popularization is in itself one of the chief functions of culture and, in its own way, a creative process. That disdain would be especially unwarranted in the present case, moreover, because at every point in the popularizing process Alexander gives ample evidence of his more than adequate control and mastery of the sources. He does not, to be sure, parade those sources or his mastery of them in classical academic fashion; but when he needs them he can call upon them with complete assurance that they will answer and sustain him. His power of exemplification and illustration is pointed, his quotations almost unfailingly apt and authoritative. The reader feels at once that he is in the presence not, perhaps, of a great and original scholar but of a versatile, sensitive, and articulate *cognoscente-a* reassuring feeling which makes it possible for the reader to surrender himself to the narrative without reserve.

Alexander's purpose is to project for the contemporary reader the creative power and tone of the period. To do so he selects, as his title announces, two channels: men and ideas. Between these he does not, in these pages, establish a meticulous balance. The men predominate, easily. The term "idea," moreover, is understood in a large and liberal sense as including, not rigidly formulated scientific and philosophical concepts alone but rather the whole range of guiding and inciting insights by which the imagination and the will, as well as the intellect, of man can be stirred. Granted the purpose and the cultural framework of this book, this is an entirely defensible employment of the term. Science and philosophy form but two dimensions, though very basic dimensions, of culture while the creative principle draws its inspiration from many other sources as well. Following the author's lead, then, we may profitably review, first, some of the figures, the men *and* women to whom he calls attention and then, in turn, some salient ideas.

How rich the pageant of illustrious personages that traverses these pages!

It is as though the pages of Vespasiano da Bisticci had opened wide or the thronged panels of Montegna's murals in the Sala dei Sposi in Mantua had quickened into life. Popes, cardinals, princes, warriors, artists, scholars, philosophers, prophets follow one upon another, not in orderly array but pressing close in eager clusters, crying out to history, like the souls of Dante's nether regions, not to be forgotten, hungering for that shadowy immortality which may be theirs in the fickle memories of men. To attend to all their voices would be the merest justice-for all are so vital, so hauntingly human. We can only hearken to a very few, however, choosing those who reflect, in their personalities, so diverse and yet so similar, the diverse aspects of the age.

It is clear at once that Alexander possesses a special predilection and affinity for Michaelangelo. Indeed, it could be argued that he interprets the age as a whole essentially on the model of that volcanic genius. There are many who would argue that the essential Renaissance man is Leonardo, not Michaelangelo. In this case, the quality of the life of the age, interpreted in function of that unquestioned genius, would be very different indeed. But before Leonardo Alexander displays a certain diffidence the source of which is difficult to fix. It may be that what most attracts those who would lift Leonardo to that pinnacle-the element mystery which envelops him, the haunting and not entirely benign aura of the *magus* which cloaks him (and which Merezhkovsky projects so powerfully) does not awaken sympathy in Alexander's essentially robust spirit. It is very clear, however, that the volcanic energy of Michaelangelo does. How Alexander savors the appellation " titanic" which he unstintingly invokes in Michaelangelo's regard. The sweep of the imagination, the will and power which release those forms by direct "levatura "-hard steel on resistent marble under the relentless pressure of the human hand-thrill him. But the attraction of this aspect of the complex soul of Michaelangelo does not blind him to its other nuances. He senses as well the suffering inward spirit, struggling to release itself from the heavy armature of time and matter like the inward, hidden form struggling to emerge from the heavy burden of stone-but with no hand to wield the liberating chisel and mallet. Alexander is especially impressive in his sensitive response to the poetry of Michaelangelo--a sculptor's poetry. It is perhaps the kind of poetry he would write himself (the sentiments, ideas, images are hewn from the resistent language-Michaelangelo is perhaps the only tongue-tied Italian to appear in history) like the David from the stone, with muscle and sweat. Impressive too is Alexander's sensitivity to the gradual inward transformation of Michaelangelo's spirit, the steady taming of the titanic energy with the passing years and growing knowledge of life, until it reaches that lyric melancholy-expressed in the second *Pieta* which defies words to convey and draws tears to behold.

The principle which draws Alexander to Michaelangelo also draws him to Savonarola: concentrated and condensed power, hard compressed, packed down and straining to burst forth. Savonarola is the sculptor of the soul, his own and that of the people among whom his life was cast. Out of the resistent flinty matter of Florentine materialism and worldliness he tried, by the sheer " levatura " of his prophetic soul and his fiery word-his growth as a preacher is one of Alexander's more felicitous insights-to hew a monument of spiritual and civic virtue. Savonarola had Michaelangelo's power; what he lacked was his inward perceptivity, that perceptivity which finally surfaced and transformed Michaelangelo's genius, rendering it more human in its melancholy humility that it was in its power and pride. Perhaps time was not given Savonarola to undergo a like .transformation; no one can say. What time does not grant nothing can repair. But Alexander does bring out the strongest features of this enigmatic, tragic, and yet withal attractive man-attractive in those very features which, abstractly, should render him abhorrent; for every man does feel the attractive power of absolute sincerity, and no one who has contemplated that fiery consummation of his life endured with superhuman fortitude-even accepted-has ever imagined Savonrola devoid of sincerity.

The Renaissance was not, viewed candidly, a philosophic age. Its energies flowed too abundantly in other channels, and it had to go too much to school to the ancients before it could deploy its own capacities in this elusive field. It does abound, however, in philosophic sensitivity, and this sensitivity finds exquisite expression in Marsilio Ficino. Alexander senses the importance of Ficino in the integral pcture of the Renaissance; he mentions him often, but confronts him never. Perhaps this is not too difficult to explain. A man with so strong an affinity with Michaelangelo would hardly be expected to respond with equal warmth to the introspective genius of Ficino. This lack, though comprehensible, nevertheless constitutes a serious flaw in the exposition and for two reasons. The first has already been suggested: Ficino is integral to the Renaissance though ancillary to the history of philosophy in its major movement; any neglect of him, consequently, does slight the movement as a whole. The second is even more serious: Ficino was a true, though not a strong and original, philosophical mind. The doctrine of the *Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum* reveals the innermost soul and longing of the Renaissance-the longing to rise to God on the Pegasus of the Platonic idea. The commentary on the *Symposium* of Plato is one of the greatest documents of the synthesis of the Greek and Christian insights of love-eros and *charitas-that* we possess. Not to know and appreciate Ficino fully is not to know the Renaissance or to appreciate it in one of its richest themes.

More than by any other figures of the Renaissance, Alexander is in-

trigued by the popes of the period. Bewildered, perhaps, were an even apter term to convey his stance in their regard-belwildered, yet fascinated. He does parade them before us: Alexander, Julius, Leo, but it is apparent that his vision of them is impeded by the stereotype which hovers before his eyes. Alexander does not see the papacy for what it is: a promise of Christ that his spirit will be present with the Church always. Consequently he cannot make the distinction between the office and the man who transitively occupies it which is absolutely necessary for historical and spiritual comprehension. He is, consequently, forever making an invalid illision from the character of the one to that of the other. Alexander is always somewhat scandalized by his namesake, for example, whereas a true grasp of the functional relation between the abiding and the transient-the papacy and the pope-would have endowed him with some perception and compassion-and even a little humor (of which, incidentally, he displays appallingly little throughout the book), such as surely would be awakened in a believer by the sight of a Pope wearing armor beneath his papal robes. Factually, his account of these figures, absolutely integral to any treatment of the period, cannot be faulted; but in insight it must be accounted amazingly impoverished.

Where a true measure of praise must be rendered to Alexander is in his treatment of Guicciardini. This truly great historian and critic-the Thucydides of his time is not, perhaps, too high an accolade-has for the most part been completely overshadowed by Machiavelli. Croce, with his exquisite sense of historical balance (and justice), tried, without prejudice to Machiavelli, to place Guicciardini in a truer light, and de Caprariis, in Croce's footeteps, tried to advance this purpose. Alexander, sketchily in the relevant chapter of this present work and more substantially in his translation and introduction of Guicciardini's *History of Italy,* follows them with great profit. Of Guicciardini it may be said that he fulfilled even more than Machiavelli the latter's avowed purpose "videre come stanno le cose." Realistic insight into men and affairs, a judgment exquisitely balanced, neither moralistic nor amoral but moral in the most human and humanistic sense of the term and a high standard of critical (for the time and the subject) scholarship, plus a vivid, inexhaustibly fertile style mark his writings-and Alexander appreciates every aspect of his talent.

It is through ideas also, however, that Alexander would project for us the creative power of the Renaissance. Here, unfortunately, his touch is much less sure and his success, consequently, less than might have been hoped for. First of all, there seems to be lacking in his presentation the presence-or at least the adequate presence--of an entire dimension of the culture of the Renaissance, namely, the emergence of the modem scientific consciousness which is surely to be traced here in this vibrant age. However one may evaluate this dimension of modem culture-positively or negative-

ly, to slight it, as Alexander does (for one would not care, in the light of his sweeping mastery of the period, to suggest that it has eluded him) would seem unjust simply from an historical point of view and leaves a serious lacuna in an otherwise rich and detailed depiction. The citation of the testimony of a single witness, authoritative as Marie Boas surely is, repairs the fault to some extent, but not nearly enough. Randall's work on the school of Padua (Abano), for example, is utilized not at all.

This lack in the order of ideas is not as arresting or as disturbing as another, namely, Alexander's whole manner of treating ideas. He treats them wholly in function, it seems to the present reviewer, of men. Now it is true that ideas come into the world, like human offspring, wholly through the agency of men (bracketing, but by no means questioning the doctrine of the immediate creation of the individual soul) ; it is equally true, nevertheless, that, again like the human being, ideas, once delivered, also have lives of their own; more accurately, have a life principle, immanent to themselves and not reducible to that of their progenitors. This is a fact which the historian of ideas holds to be elementary and which becomes a cardinal principle of his methodology: he treats the ideas and does not reduce them to dimensions of the consciousness of their originators. He seeks, in other words, to respect their autonomy.

The historical fact is that the Renaissance did see the birth of ideas in this sense, i. e., as having an autonomous life principle of their own. Indeed, it was an age drunk with the heady wine of ideas which it did not see as mere extrapolations of the life-consciousness or life styles of their progenitors. Here again the witness of a Ficino, a Pomponazzi, a Pico della Mirandola may be invoked with confidence. And as further witness one need but cite such historians as Koyre, Cassirer, Duhem, Carin, Kristeller and others of this same order. The transition from the closed to the infinite universe, as Koyre correctly records and analyzes it, traceable to the genius of Bruno, is a transcendental transaction and in no way a mere function of the consciousness of Bruno; and so of other key ideas of the period in the treatment of these other authorities. But frankly one would never suspect from Alexander's book that this exciting and historically important dimension of the life of the Renaissance possessed an irreducible life of its own. On this point it does not seem possible to exculpate him.

Nevertheless, all in all, his is a hearty book, to be quafted, like a hearty ale, with gusto and relish. It has little of what is new in it, but what it has is hearty fare, nourishing and served up with attractive style. The neophyte will find much to learn from it, while even the seasoned scholar will find that it gives him occasion to pour over again with renewed pleasure and satisfaction familiar persons places and images-surely not the least of joys to be garnered from a good book.

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Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God. By BERNARD TYRRELL, S. J. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. Pp. 216. $12.95.

This book is a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation, written under the same title and successfully defended at Fordham University. The first section deals with "the new context" which distinguishes Lonergan's philosophy of God both from "more classical approaches" and from " diverse contemporary efforts " as well. The second studies in detail the internal development of that same philosophy over the years and comes to the conclusion that despite important shifts of emphasis on his part, Lonergan still regards as valid the proof for the existence of God that is found in chapter 19 of *Insight.*

There is an epilogue by Dr. Philip McShane, who says he wishes to associate himself with the stance taken by the author in the text. Lonergan himself has a brief Foreward in which he asserts that, despite appearances to the contrary, the cognitional theory given in *Insight* involved not a faculty psychology but rather intentionality analysis. The latter, however, has implications he did not advert to in the work in question. In retrospect the way he expressed his position at that time may now appear incongruous and reminiscent of the older Aristotelian-Thomist approach to the question of God. As to the issues this raises, Dr. Tyrrell has given them full and professional treatment; so Lonergan on the present volume.

With this judgment the reviewer agrees. A former student of Lonergan, to whom he owes more than he is probably aware of, he found Tyrrell's presentation clear, fair, and to the point. There were, however, two aspects of Lonergan's philosophy of God that he hoped would be treated in a more developed fashion.

The first has to do with the world-relatedness of God. For Lonergan it would be a contradiction in terms for God as the formally unconditioned, unrestricted act of understanding, to be in any sense in intellectual dependence on anything else. (p. 158) Schubert Ogden errs in thinking that the result is an existentially repugnant divine indifference. (p. 175) On the contrary, God is not indifferent to man's choices and actions. Transcendence is the way to account for the divine plan's effectiveness and man's contingent choices. *(ibid.)*

Lonergan wants to say just this and does actually do so. But does it do justice to what he also writes regarding contingent predications about God? The latter require for their truth the existence of a finite term. So Lonergan; and so Tyrrell reports accurately. For the reviewer there are unanswered questions at this point. That finite term, distinct from and caused by the divine being, is a condition for the truth that God is, for example, Creator. The creature may be simply the subsequent condition for the *truth* of God's being Creator. Or it may be as well the

hypothetically necessary, subsequent, and real condition for God's *being* Creator? It seems God is somehow conditioned in either case-and this may have implications not adverted to by Lonergan. To be sure efficient causality does not involve a change in God as agent. But does it not make for *Actus* differently constituted from what *Actus Purus* would have been eternally .had God with equally free self-determination and without modification in his perfection willed not to create; not to be a Creator God? The reviewer has answered affirmatively in this journal (Vol. 83, pp. 150-61). Perhaps he is mistaken; he did however hope that this issue would be treated more in detail than it was. Greater elaboration of the implications involved in positing creatures as a subsequent condition for the truth of God's being Creator might well meet Ogden's concern more effectively than is the case when the matter is settled by recourse to divine transcendence. Nor would, the reviewer maintains, this have to imply change in *Actus Purus.*

The second matter has to do with the genesis of Lonergan's cognitional theory. The reviewer has already asked, again in this journal (Vol. 87, pp. 60Q-10), whether acceptance of Vatican I's doctrine about doctrine may not have influenced Lonergan's theory of judgment as involving a virtually unconditioned. Pannenberg seems to have his own serious reservations about the virtually unconditioned character of judgments. In other words, it is still possible to attempt to appropriate one's own consciousness and come up with a different description of judgment. Surely Lonergan thinks his own view of the matter is independent on a doctrinal position regarding doctrine. The reviewer thinks that may be true but is not so sure as to dismiss the question. Efforts at some sort of an answer would have significant bearings on one's assessment of Lonergan's philosophy of God. To that degree the matter would have been pertinent in the present work.

Clearly the reviewer has expressed his scruples and tried to explain why. Still he thinks Dr. Tyrrell deserves credit not merely for his intention of investigating Lonergan's development but also for the professional skills manifested in bringing the task off. In short, the reviewer is happy to recommend this book, especially to the philosophers and theologians who wrongly in his view seem to have formed premature judgments regarding Lonergan's significance.

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Cla.'Ssical Approaches to the Study of Religion. Aims, Methods and Theories of Research. Vol. 1. Introduction and Anthology. By JACQUES WAARDENBURG. The Hague & Paris: Mouton, 1973. Pp. 742. $21.75.

This is the most significant work in an impressive series on method and theory in religion study now being published by Mouton under the general editorship of Jacques Waardenburg. Waardenburg's own contribution to the series is a two-volume resource book. The first volume consists of a full historical introduction to scholarly research and an anthology of those scholars who have contributed most to the methodological framework in the study of religion.

Reflection on the history of religion study is compounded by the multiplicity of disciplines, methodologies, and subjects that scholars employ. Clarification of method and discipline in religion study began with the first university chairs in religion in the 1870's and continues with greater refinement today. Resources in the history of *religions'Wissenschaft* have been somewhat scattered and thus limited to a few scholars, but the book under consideration both gathers together resources and encourages reflection on the history of religion study.

From its inception in the last century to the present, religion study reflected both the history of the emergence of new disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology, and new methodologies such as historical, comparative, and phenomenological approaches to religious understanding. Waardenburg, beginning in the introduction with the new rationalism of the 18th century, traces the interests of 19th-century scholars who forged the new disciplines and methodologies and finally grounds the search for intelligibility in religion study in the 20th century. A supplemental text which offers greater comprehensiveness at this point is *The Study of Religion* by Jan de Vries (New York: 1967), who begins his historical survey with the Greek philosophers to the moderns. Waardenburg, nonetheless, is especially good within the limits set to show the changing subject matter in religion study as it advances from myth to origin questions, and from the broad range of religious phenomena to phenomenological structures. The contributions of the early anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists in their methodological framework and their religious questions set the stage for contemporary religion study. A fivefold framework is employed in both the introduction and the anthology itself, namely, the study of religion established as an autonomous discipline, connections with other disciplines, religion as a special subject of research, contributions from other disciplines, and finally perspectives of a phenomenological study of religion. A genetic understanding of the history of the field and the development of method is set forth. Other works which have attempted to do what Waardenburg does are usually thematic.

In Walter H. Capps' *Ways of Understanding Religion* (New York: 1972), for example, an excellent thematic anthology and methodological study is presented which offers a more readable text for teacher and student but remains inferior as a resource tool.

The anthology is limited to forty-one scholars. The perimeters are set by Max Muller, the so-called father of *religionswissenschaft,* from the middle of the last century to the middle of this century, thus excluding any living scholar. An anthology obviously needs perimeters, but by eliminating living scholars a whole moment has been lost. Waardenburg is specifically concerned with the birth and development of the phenomenological method in religion study, but by excluding important contributions from Mircea Eliade, C. J. Bleeker, and Ninian Smart, all living scholars, the anthology becomes significantly dated. Moreover, the work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith in the history of religions, Claude Levi-Strauss and Georges Dumezil in structural understanding have advanced religion study so greatly that to exclude them immediately dates the field prior to the 1950's. In fact, the anthology should more properly be titled religion study from 1870 to 1950. These comments are not meant to reduce the value of this book but to indicate that with limited supplemental works, a complete overview of the field may be grasped.

The selection of texts is generally excellent, showing constructive editorial skill. In order to delineate Frazer's method in the *Golden Bough,* for example, excerpts from the three different prefaces of the three editions of the study trace the author's self-understanding. One norm adopted by Waardenburg in the selection of texts is to use only material which has been translated into English. It is difficult to understand why such an arbitrary norm is followed, but it has not in general lessened the value of the work. In one case, in the opinion of this reviewer, a substantial text on method in religion study is absent, namely, material from Joachim Wach's untranslated *Verstehen.* What runs through the anthology is Waardenburg's concern for phenomenology, and some rarely considered texts are included here which enhance considerably the understanding of the phenomenological method. Max Scheler's distinctive essay on the difference between descriptive and essentialistic phenomenology, and his effort to show the dialectic and difference between psychology and phenomenology, is usually not included in the history of phenomenology but is wisely included here.

The only criticism one could have with Waardenburg's editorial work is that he has not highlighted enough the classic contributions. Not all forty-one authors are of equal importance in religion study. From the point of view of *religionswissenschaft* the work of Otto, Van der Leeuw, and Wach must be seen as classical both in terms of religion as an area of study and as setting a methodological framework. An anthology should

not eliminate the necessity to return to the classical writers and their work in their entirety. This is clear today in psychology of religion with Freud and Jung and in socio-anthropology of religion with Weber and Durkheim. No anthology in method can be a substitute to return consistently to the classics of Otto, Vander Leeuw, Wach, and Eliade, for no discipline cancels its classics without fundamentally altering itself.

Mention should be made of the three indices in this volume: an index of personal names; an index of scholarly concepts; and an index of concrete subjects. The second, the index of scholarly concepts, contains terms which are both theoretical and methodological in the study of particular materials. A historical development is found in this index itself. Rarely is an index so useful in research. This indicates the perduring value of the book as a research tool. The second volume, which is now in print, is an extensive bibliography of the forty-one scholars in this anthology and over 170 scholars treated in Waardenburg's introduction. The outcome is a basic research tool rarely found in publishing today.

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The Reluctant Vision: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion. By T. PATRICK BURKE. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974. Pp. 136. $3.00.

One of the curiosities of recent philosophy of religion in English-speaking countries has been its narrow focus. The point of departure has been almost invariably a set of problems associated with· the crisis of modern Western theism-the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the ethics of belief. The authors and editors evince little awareness that these issues have no such prominence in non-Western cultures and that they consume less than the total attention of Judaism and Christianity. Consequently it does not dawn on them that the " philosophy of religion " might start with larger concerns likely to embrace the wide range of religious experiences and traditions.

T. Patrick Burke's slender but eloquent *The Reluctant Vision* provides a fine antidote to this narrowness. Burke attempts a functional analysis which would illuminate religion in its diverse as well as in its common features. What he sees as common is a structured interpretation of life which involves a problem of over-riding importance, a proposed solution and a corresponding path towards the solution. The difference of problems, solutions, and paths appears, in this scheme, to distinguish one religion from another. Thus, Chinese religions (Taoism and Confucianism) have a char-

acteristic preoccupation with the relation of man to nature, Indian religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism) dwell more on the problem of suffering, and the semitic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) on the relationships of men with each other. The nuances of problem, solution or path make for the more precise distinctions within these broad cultural groupings. It is, then, interest rather than sheer curiosity which is at the heart of religion and the diversity of interests which makes for the diversity of religions. The Buddhist stands apart from the Christian, to take one instance of diversity, more because of the centrality of pain in his interpretation of life than because of any directly theoretical disagreement about Gautama or Jesus.

The problem-solution-path analysis is reminiscent of the familiar presentation of the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism: there is pain; desire is the cause of pain; the elimination of desire eliminates pain; and the Eightfold Noble Pathway is the road to the elimination of desire. Applied to other religions in *The Reluctant Vision,* the method proves fruitful in abundant insight. Yet the same fecund method can be a procrustean bed when applied as single-mindedly as in this book. Burke would make the questions he calls factitive or metaphysical (questions about the nature of Brahman or Nirvana or God) secondary, albeit important matters for religions. The Christian churches have, nonetheless, generally given these same questions a priority and have claimed to draw the interpretation of life from authoritative answers. This author prefers to let the strength of his method justify itself by a method of disclosure, but he needs some argument for bypassing the self-understanding of some of the religions he studies.

The Reluctant Vision draws much of its strength from its valuable reflections on apparently simple concepts such as "interest," "purpose," "community," "recognition" and their application in an account of the religious life. One is reminded, both by its style and by its approach, of Alfred North Whitehead's *The Modes of Thought* to which Burke pays explicit homage. But even here one looks for a more extended treatment, and the brevity of remarks on a concept like "metaphor" ill befits the stress placed upon it in the discussion of change and continuity in religious communities. In his concern for brevity and simplicity the author runs the risk of becoming cryptic.

Burke tried his analysis of religion as an interpretation of life previously in a long esay entitled "Theology as Part of the Study of the Phenomenon of Religion" and published in Franklin Littell's *Searching in the Syntax of Things.* He has more recently been pursuing the question in an American Academy of Religion seminar on the study of religion as a phenomenon. Perhaps a still more satisfying presentation of the method of *The Reluctant Vision* will come from this continuing investigation. It will need to be

longer and more cautious, but the quality of these first two efforts warrants hopeful anticipation of future work.

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The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. In the Latin T1·anslation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (t *1253).* Critical edition with an introductory study by H. PAUL F. MERCKEN. Vol. I. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973. Pp. XII+ 135* + 371. Guilders 108.

This is the first volume of a three-volume edition of the Latin version by Robert Grosseteste of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE) plus several partial commentaries. Paul Mercken (Sarah Lawrence) has worked a long time on this important collection of ethical treatises. His excellent training and patient research at Louvain and Oxford are guarantees of the quality of scholarship evident in this book. The second and third volumes *(Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum)* will be edited with the assistance of J. P. Reilly, Jr. (Yale) and will contain the last six books, plus *scholia* and indexes. Mercken published in 1964 (Brussels) a preliminary edition of the first two books of this collection, under the Flemish title, *Aristoteles over de menselijke Volkomenheid* (my review appeared in *The Modern Schoolman* XLIII, 1966, 198). The present volume adds two more books.

Bishop Grosseteste perfected his knowledge of Greek in his mature years and seems also to have used the services of several Greek scholars in England to produce a number of Latin versions (many were revisions of earlier imperfect translations) of Greek works of science, philosophy, and theology. It is difficult to determine how much Grosseteste contributed personally to these translations and how much was done by assistants such as Robertus Graecus, Nicholas Graecus, John of Basingstoke, and possibly Adam Marsh. However, D. A. Callus, 0. P., who probably knew this field better than anyone, considered Grosseteste a very good Greek scholar-and Mercken agrees.

At some point Grosseteste had procured a Greek codex of the NE, to which had been added several sets of annotations which formed a Greek commentary on all ten books. This collection is still extant in two Greek MSS at Oxford, where Mercken spent three years of research. Besides the text of Aristotle, the collection included a remarkable gloss on Books I and VI written by the Byzantine theologian, E\lstratius, who died in the

early twelfth century. Although he was learned in Aristotelian philosophy, especially logic, Eustratius' comments show him to have been a Christian Platonist in his personal convictions. The compiler of the collection filled the commentary gap with older Greek scholia on Books II, III, IV and V, probably dating from the end of the second Christian century. These anonymous glosses are inferior in quality to the work of Eustratius but historically of interest. So, this first volume prints a Latin version of NE, plus Eustratius on Book I, plus anonymous scholia on the next three books.

Subsequent volumes will contain the main text and the anonymous scholia on Book V, commentaries by Michael of Ephesus (11th c.) on Books V, IX and X, another anonymous commentary on Book VII (possibly by a Greek physician (12th-early 13th c.) and finally a commentary on Book VIII by the Greek master, Aspasius, who taught in Athens at the start of the second century A. D. The whole compilation is important for the history of ethics, from classical, through Byzantine and Latin medieval scholarship. Grosseteste's translation of this gathering of moral treatises provided the only complete Latin text of NE, translated directly from the Greek, for thirteenth-century students at the universities and monastic houses of study. Aristotle's *Ethics* was eagerly studied all through this century. From the work of R. A. Gauthier, O. P., and others, it now seems quite clear that there was never a version of NE made by William of Moerbeke, O. P. Furthermore, the Bishop of Lincoln added his own notes *(notulae)* to these commentaries: they are printed within parentheses right in the text of Mercken's edition. Many of Grosseteste's comments are philological (after all, he was adapting Latin to a new terminology), but some notes are longer and of doctrinal importance. In the second chapter of Book III, for instance, the Greek commentator remarks, in typical utilitarian and situationist style, that lying and adultery at times may not be immoral, if the consequences (such as the overthrow of a tyrant) are important and good. To this Grosseteste appends the following note:

> Now the Christian religion professes and holds that one must not sin for the sake of any advantage of consequences *(utilitatis consequendae),* or to avoid something unsuitable. Hence, since to lie or to have intercourse with another's wife are both sins, neither is to be done under any conditions *(aliquo modo).* So the above doctrine is not doctrine but error in the alleged examples. For the evils of sin must not be done in order to bring about good results, although the evils of punishment *(mala poenae),* even when they are truly bad *(turpia)* but not sins, are to be accomplished and endured so that good results will occur. (Mercken text: p. 239, lines 75-82.)

Several points are noteworthy in this typical Grosseteste coment. First of all, he was convinced that there are some kinds of sin that are in-

trinsically immoral: lying and adultery, for instance. In the second place, his use of the phrase " *utilitas consequendae* " is very significant for students of the history of utilitarianism. There are some who claim that the term " utility " was first used in ethics by French writers of the eighteenth century. Finally, the phrase that I have translated as "under any conditions" *(aliquo modo)* is quite typical of Grosseteste's frequent use of *modus* for a wide variety of meanings.

Both Mercken {whose long *Introduction* is a mine of historical information) and Father Gauthier (the editor of Aquinas's commentary on NE in the Leonine edition) agree that Albert the Great used Grosseteste's version of NE, and the Greek commentaries, and Grosseteste's *Notulae,* when in he gave the Cologne lectures that were recorded by Thomas Aquinas. However, when Aquinas years later made his own commentary on NE, he showed little acquaintance with Grosseteste's annotations and used only some of the explanations of Eustratius and possibly Aspasius. It is my conviction that this is but one indication that St. Thomas commented on the NE in Italy, during the decade, where he did not have the library facilities that were available at the University of Paris. In any case, the Robert Grosseteste version of Aristotle's *Ethics* provided the base for dozens of other Latin commentaries from the thirteenth century down to the Renaissance.

As to the quality of the critical texts in this volume, it is impossible for a reviewer who has not done the work on the MSS that Mercken has to make a judgment of accuracy. However, the editorial job gives every appearance of first-class scholarship. Compared with the Marietti printings of the *versio antiqua* of NE, which accompanies St. Thomas's commentary, this Grosseteste version is obviously the same basic text. The *versio recens* in volume XXI of the Parma edition of St. Thomas (reprinted from the Firmin Didot *Opera Omnia Aristotelis)* is, on the other hand, quite different throughout and of no value for the study of medieval commentaries.

Mercken has studied all twenty-one extant Latin MSS in which the Grosseteste version of this compilation occurs. Not all are useful for a critical edition. The second part of Mercken's *Introduction* gives details on his reduction of the MS evidence to four codices whose readings are represented in the text and whose variants are given in the apparatus. Throughout, the editor provides references to the Berlin Academy editions of the corresponding Greek texts. Mercken uses three critical apparatuses at the bottom of each page: 1) provides complete variants from the four base MSS; notes divergencies of the Latin text from the Greek editions; and 3) identifies references to names, works, and places mentioned in the NE text and commentaries.

In a collection of such complexity indexing is an absolute necessity.

It is to be hoped that the third volume will soon appear and provide access to the details of the text. A table listing all the Grosseteste *Notulae,* for instance, is much needed. There is in volume I, pp. 181*-184*, a *Table of Proper Names in the Introduction;* this is a great help. When complete, this edition will constitute an extremely valuable source of primary information for historians, theologians, ethicists, and philologists.

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Aristotle and His School. By FELIX GRAYEFF. New York: Barnes and Noble, Pp. $11.50.

This book is about the authorship and arrangement of the treatises of Aristotle. Its central thesis is that Andronicus's edition of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* contained treatises which were neither exclusively nor even mostly written by Aristotle himself. Instead, according to Grayeff, these treatises were in part written and arranged by various members of the Peripatetic School over a considerable period of time after Aristotle's death.

To substantiate his thesis, Grayeff first draws evidence from Aristotle's life, the history of The Peripatos after Aristotle's death, and the history of the school library. Then, in the main section of the book, he analyzes several books of the *Metaphysics,* especially Book Zeta, with a view to showing that not only external factors in the history of the Peripatetic School and the library but also, and most important, the internal structure of the texts themselves goes to establish that the Corpus was actually the work of many hands.

As regards Aristotle's life, Grayeff concedes that, while nothing we know about it could show irrefutably that the Corpus was not the work of Aristotle himself, still, the fact that his life was an unsettled one would make it unlikely that Aristotle could have had the time or the opportunity to have authored the entire Corpus.

But in addition to this, Grayeff points out that Strabo's account of what happened to Aristotle's books conflicts with what we know from other sources. First, points in Aristotle's philosophy were debated during the very period when, according to Strabo, the Aristotelian manuscripts were buried. Second, the text of the Corpus, Grayeff points out, is " a very good text and by no means bears out the story (of Strabo) of the moth-eaten manuscripts with their many gaps." (p. 75) Further, Grayeff presents ample evidence to show that, so far from being buried in a hole

by the heirs of Neleus, Aristotle's books were housed in the celebrated library of Pergamum. Moreover, Theophastus himself admits in a ·letter preserved by Diogenes Laertius that the Peripatetic philosophers had to revise and amend their lectures over and again, a procedure which was doubtless caused by the emergence of the new philosophical challenges of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism. The upshot of all this is that quite apart from internal evidence based on a detailed examination of the Corpus itself, there is external evidence to support the thesis that the Corpus was the work of many members of the Peripatetic School.

Turning to the internal evidence for Grayeff's thesis, let us consider his examination of *Metaphysics* Zeta. Grayeff's holds that the discussion at several places in Zeta only makes sense if it is viewed as a response to Sceptical and Stoical inquiries. At Zeta X, for example, two problems of definition are discussed. (I) How are the parts of a definition related to the parts of the thing defined? and (2) Is the whole prior to the parts or *vice versa?* Grayefl' observes that it was the Stoics who " methodically set out the parts of the proposition " and " the Sceptics who questioned both the possibility of definition and of distinguishing a whole and its parts. Further, there is a close connection between Zeta XII and Sceptic Sextus Empiricus' discussion of definition," Grayeff argues. Sextus Empiricus had argued that, since genus is either identical with its different species or is none of them, it does not exist. There appears to be a reference to this at Zeta XII (36a6). But the Peripatetic writer answers this objection in Zeta XII by holding that species exist and contain the genus (rather than *vice versa).* Grayeff thinks that this connection between Zeta XII and the Sceptical arguments is so close as to warrant the conclusion that the Peripatetic writer was actually answering Sceptical objections and hence that he (the writer) could not have been Aristotle himself but a later peripatetic philosopher.

Another indication of this conclusion according to the author is found in Z XIII (39a3). According to Grayeff, in that section the argument presupposes that some philosophers had used the concepts of actuality and potentiality in defending separately existing universals. But since these concepts are not as such found in Plato, Grayeff argues that the argument in this section is directed not against Platonists but against fellow Peripatetics with a Platonic tendency. But this evidence of intra-school debate in the Corpus supports the hypothesis that the Corpus was in part at least written by various members of the Peripatetic School over a period of time.

Still another piece of textual exidence Grayeff cites in support of his thesis occurs in Z XV. Grayeff contends that it is obvious that the writer here has seriously considered Sceptical arguments. This is indicated, he thinks, by the repeated use of the Sceptical expression *ouk endechetai* ('maybe not'). There are also several points of similarity in this chapter

to Stoic thought and terminology: the distinction between knowledge and opinion, the use of the term *logos* and the emphasis on epistemology. Finally, two clear-cut indications that Zeta is a multi-authored book are (1) the doctrinal discrepancies it contains and (!il) the presence of gaps or omissions in the text. As regards the first point, Grayeff points out that there are in Zeta several and conflicting views on the concept of substance. For example, being is said to be substance in Zeta I but is rejected as substance in Zeta XII. Further, substrate is rejected as substance in Zeta III but is considered as substance in Zeta VI. And as regards the second point, Grayeff observes that there are two examples in Zeta where the author announces that a topic is about to be considered but fails to consider it. For instance, Zeta II begins a doxographic-critical course but the discussion is cut short, leaving a gap in the text. This critical discussion foreshadowed in Zeta II is actually contained in *Metaphysics* M and N, as well as in *Metaphysics* A and in *Physics* A and B. From this Grayeff concludes that when the volume which included this discussion was compiled, the doxographic-critical course in Zeta was shortened and mostly transferred to separate volumes.

By way of criticizing Grayeff's thesis, it seems that neither the supposed doctrinal discrepancies in Zeta to which Grayeff refers nor the supposed influence of Stoic and Sceptical thought on Zeta, nor even the fact (if it is a fact) that there are parts missing in Zeta but preserved elsewhere in the Metaphysics-it seems that none of these points establishes the mult-authored character of Book Zeta.

With respect to the first point, even if there is a doctrinal discrepancy in Zeta as regards substance, it by no means follows from this that Zeta was written by more than one person. Instead, the discrepancies may only indicate that Aristotle had several opinions on this difficult matter and was unsure himself as to which one of them was correct. Second, there is no evidence that there was in fact any influence of Post-Aristotelian thought on Zeta. The fact that we find Sceptical and Stoical terminology and themes in Zeta says nothing as to the *direction* of the influence. Since it could just as easily been the case that the Stoics and the Sceptics borrowed both terminology and thought-content from the Aristotelian treatises rather than the other way around, Grayeff's assumption that it was the Aristotelian treatises which were influenced by Sceptic and Stoic thought is unwarranted. Finally, the gaps or missing parts in the text of *Zeta* and their reappearence in other contexts shows, at most, that the arrangement of the original texts was changed either by Aristotle himself or by one or more of his followers. But this is far from saying that Zeta was *written* by more than one person which is what Grayeff contends.

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Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism. By I. C. TIPTON. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974.

This book was very difficult to review, partly because Professor Tipton seems at times to be writing for the professional Berkeley scholar, and at others for the intermediate Berkeley student. He sometimes states the theses he is going to examine in misleading ways. For example:

> . . . (Berkeley) committed himself to the *negative* thesis that there is no material reality . . . (and) the *positive* thesis that sensible objects are just mind-dependent sensations.

We all know that Berkeley never denied the existence of material reality, only material substance, and that if one seriously considers what he says about God, as Tipton belatedly tries to do in his eighth chapter, it is at best misleading to say that Berkeley thought objects to be " just mind-dependent *sensations"* (my italics), since for Berkeley God has *no* sensations. He spends inordinate amounts of time examining theses which, from a philosophical point of view, seem to me to be either uninteresting, or unimportant, or both. For example, he takes many pages (all of one chapter and parts of others) to examine the question of whether Berkeley is justified in characterizing his view as " common sense," which Tipton takes to mean "in accordance with the common man's views," whatever they are. Berkeley students will recognize of course that Berkeley's claim to "speak with the vulgar" is just that; and that further, he pretends to speak with the vulgar about only a narrow range of subjects, and not in philosophical depth. He does not pretend that philosophy is either obvious or simple-minded. He does not pretend to speak *or* to think with the vulgar about God, (aside from his "necessary" proof for His existence), or about scientific explanations, the refutation of material substance, causality, motion, notions, (including relations), mathematics, vision, and a plethora of other things. Nor does Berkeley depend, in any place I can find, upon agreement with received vulgar opinion alone to support a *philosophical* point. It is of passing interest, I suppose, that he thought the contemporary ordinary man would find the doctrines of material substance and abstract general ideas foolish; but this is not why Berkeley rejects either theory, and for the philosopher the philosophical is the issue.

Tipton has a tendency from time to time to accept unusual or controversial positions too easily. One example which comes to mind is his acceptance of the claim that Locke took material substance rather lightly. He characterizes Locke's position as his" ... case against taking substance too seriously." But surely it is one thing, Yolton and Warnock notwithstanding, to claim as Locke does that we can know nothing much about material substance except to say that it exists and must exist, and quite

another to say that we should not take it too seriously. Indeed, given that Locke thinks it essential for explaining reality, given that continuity is explained in terms of it, that the causal origin of our ideas is too, that we supposedly have an abstract general idea of it, and that it plays an essential part in the theory of material powers, one would think the thesis centrally important to Locke's metaphysics, if not to his epistemology.

This carelessness is reflected in other misleading statements purporting to represent Berkeley's position. He implies that Berkeley "... dispensed with material things altogether," (page which he did not, and in another place (page he takes Berkeley's claim that

... it (is) a manifest contradiction, that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in Nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in *being perceived*

to be used by Berkeley as support for the claim that" ... when I perceive something (though not necessarily by sense) I can be sure that is exists (though not necessarily in nature)." But surely even a superficial examination of the passage and the context in which it occurs *(Principles* provides no evidence of this whatsoever.

Sometimes it is difficult to know whether the misleading nature of some of Tipton's assertions is due to simple ill choice of language or whether it rests on some basic misunderstanding. For example, "... For the plain man the real knife can cause us pain, but for Berkeley (strictly) no idea can *do* anything." (page 83) One is tempted to say-ah, yes, but he *means* that there is no efficient causality in the natural world, even though he would agree that the perceptions of the knife at certain consecutive spatial and temporal points relative to a body would be followed by pain; but then one would be confused by Tipton's apparent failure to appreciate Berkeley's theory of signs, and Berkeley's analysis of natural causation in terms of that theory. Further grounds for suspicion along these lines is provided by Tipton's seeming misunderstanding of what real causes are for Berkeley. He notes (page 307), that in his opinion, Berkeley did *not* believe ("in the spirit of entry 107" of the *Commentaries)* that om "volitions" are efficient causes. Well, they are certainly causes, or at least, willings are, and if they are not efficient, then the proper conclusion is that "efficient" in the Aristotelean sense may not fit Berkeley's use-- our willings are certainly not formal, material or without God," the obvious context being the necessity for God's concurrence in order that our willings be effective.

In his analysis of what Berkeley means by "physical object " Tipton seems to ignore the fact that, for Berkeley, objects are composed not just of ideas, but of relations of which we have *notions.** He has little to say

*Desiree Park, *Complementary Notions: A Critical Study of Berkeley's Theory of Concepts* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).

about the role of relations in the physical world, which may have something to do with his failure to deal with the theory of signs. In connection with this it might be noted that, although the concept of the " Language of the Author of Nature" is really important to Berkeley (he mentions it nine times in the *Principles* alone) , Tipton hardly refers to it; once, if I recall. Tipton seems to share the standard underestimation of the role of God in Berkeley's philosophy, even though his treatment of this subject is much more thorough than that of most other commentators today. Certainly, Tipton is honest enough about why he does not pay more attention to God in Berkeley, although his comment suggests that, in a book about Berkeley, much attention to God is needed:

> Implicit in the decision not to devote much space to Berkeley's views on God is of course a judgment as to what is most challenging and important in his philosophy ... *It so happens that Berkeley's main preoccupations are not ours,* and that we regard his views on the nature of the sensible obj.ect as more worth discussing than his views on the nature and attributes of God. (page !'299) (my italics)

Since Tipton then goes on to show us how one cannot understand the nature of the sensible object, nor the answers to such questions as the explanation of continuity without an understanding of God's role, this remark leaves me somewhat puzzled.

And this brings me to another criticism. Given that Tipton uses material in his discussion of God and continuity from the *Three Dialogues, Siris,* (at least a reference), the *Correspondence with Johnson,* and with Lady Percival, not to mention the references to *Commentaries,* why does he not bring in this material much earlier on? Most of that material is of philosophical interest in connection with continuity, the problem of resemblance, the inherence problem in connection with presently unperceived (by humans) objects, and with the structure of Nature as a language through which we learn God's will. *Sttrely* it cannot be systematically excluded in a book about Berkeley's ontology and epistemology. But, at least in the first three quarters of this book, it is. For motives I cannot fathom, writers about Berkeley persist in ignoring the absolutely clear fact that the mind in which objects ultimately inhere, or if you prefer, upon which they ultimately depend, is the mind called God. Berkeley is *not* a twentieth-century philosopher, and he understook the philosophical enterprise to disprove scepticism and to prove theism. To ignore his explicitly stated purposes and to relegate the capstone of his philosophy, God, to a secondary place in a discussion of his thought, is to distort his thinking and to do injustice to the man. I emphasize that this is not a failing unique to Tipton; most commentators on Berkeley do the same thing.

The bibliography in the book is poor. For example, no item from Colin Murray Turbayne's considerable literature on the Irish Bishop is included,

and many of the more important recent articles, such as those by James Cornman, W. H. Hay, Richard Van Iten, Edwin B. Allaire, and others are not mentioned. Even such an oft discussed article as Moore's " The Refutation of Idealism " is not noted, and again, one wonders just for whom this book was written.

The notes, which are copious, are by and large informative and explanatory. But they are often unjustifiably opinionated. I mention only one personal example. In note 3, on Chapter Five, page 367, Tipton says:

> I don't think anyone would want to claim that those doctrines in the *Principles* which are related to claims about meaning (and to criticism of Locke's theory) are such as to reflect Wittgensteinian insights.

Mr. Tipton might consult my article, "Wittgenstein's Refutation of Scepticism,"* for suggestions to the contrary.

Finally, two more remarks in a critical vein. Tipton has a tendency to set up straw men and then spend much time nibbling them down. He does this in his discussion of Bennett's arguments about Berkeley's position on continuity, Graves' on the relation of ideas to God's Ideas, and in his brief (too brief) mentions of notions. Second, a personal dislike: Tipton keeps referring to Berkeley's " moves " in reaction to this or that philosophical position. This terminology has always suggested to me that philosophy is a sort of game, even if titillating. However accurate or inaccurate this feeling, Berkeley did not think that he was playing a game; he thought he was refuting sceptism and proving theism.

In spite of all these negative remarks, Tipton has written a book about Berkeley that is worth working through. His summary of Locke's position is good, as is his discussion of the difficulties raised for Berkeley, and any Berkeleyan, by the scientific view of objects. At times, he gives illuminating comparisons between Berkeley and other thinkers, for example, Malebranche, and he understands the importance of historical context to the understanding of Berkeley, with the exception (common to others) of the place of God in his thinking. He notices, as many do not, the validity (if not the soundness) of most of Berkeley's arguments, and although I believe my comments about his neglecting the place of God are well founded, this is still one of the best sources of information in English about the role of Berkeley's God. Had he worked harder on style and clarity, taken greater care with his technical language, put more effort into a bibliography, and studied Berkeley more carefully on the issues of efficient causality and motion, and on God, this could have been a very important book.

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* *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* vol. XXVI (Dec. 1965).

The History of the Concept of Association of Ideas. By DAVID RAPAPORT. New York: International Universities Press, 1974. pp. 185. $8.50.

This short work is the doctoral dissertation submitted in 1929 at the University of Budapest, translated by L. Juhasz, and discovered among Dr. Rapaport's papers after his death by Mrs. Elvira Rapaport, who edited and checked it for publication. It is interesting as the early work of a man who became one of the foremost exponents and theorists of the psychoanalytic movement, bringing perspectives from the philosophy of science and general philosophy to a largely clinically based enterprise.

As a doctoral dissertation it has expectable limitations in depth and clarity of conceptions, coherence of thrust towards a clear purpose, and clarity and suppleness of expression. Nevertheless, within its class it is a more than representative work-product of a superior student who was already coming to grips with the philosophical and psychological issues which were to be the center of his intellectual pursuits. He surveys the role played by the concept of the association of ideas in the philosophies of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. Admittedly, the association of ideas was not a major philosophical theme for these men, not the object of intensive reflection, but insofar as their interests were methodological and epistemological, the process of idea association had to be considered and evaluated, and the role in mental life assigned to the process was contributive to and reflective of deeper philosophical concerns. And admittedly the intensive consideration of association of ideas post-dated the philosophical period considered and was the work not so much of philosophers as of psychologists who were more or less free of philosophical persuasions and uninfluenced by the philosophies of the past. Nevertheless, the vicissitudes of the development of the concept and its relations with the psychological and genetic aspects of the philosophies under study-Rapaport's expressed focus of concern-offer occasions for fruitful insights.

It is interesting in the light of his later work in psychoanalytic theory that Dr. Rapaport had already concluded that " the emergence of associations is determined by curiosity, by interest-in a word, by desires " and that this is " the guiding thread in the history of the concept." That conclusion sems perhaps overdrawn, but that is in itself significant in the development of the author's thought.

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Philosophy of Psychology. Ed. by S. C. BROWN. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1974. Pp. 362. $16.50.

This book presents the papers and discussions of a "conference on the Philosophy of Psychology at the University of Kent in 1971 " sponsored by the Royal Institute of Philosophy. (Preface) The Philosophy of Psychology which is here endorsed as a topic of contemporary interest in the dialogue between philosophers and psychologists from Britain, Canada, and the United States consists mainly in a defence of opposing views on certain aspects of problems discussed in today's so-called philosophy of mind. The problems assigned as topics for the six symposia of the meeting are listed as parts of the book.

Part One: "Psychology as the Science of Human Behavior " (3 ff.) offers first in Sigmund Koch's paper, " Psychology as Science," a psychologist's critical look at the condition of his discipline. Prof. Koch who is known as an expert analyst of methodological and theoretical problems of psychological studies intends to extend his earlier critical attitude towards different forms of behaviorism to an investigation of the meaning of the hundred-year history of psychology as science. As a result of his evaluation he finds " that psychology cannot be a coherent science, or indeed a coherent field of scholarship." (21) The application of the methods of physical sciences to the empirical study of man, that John Stuart Mill had recommended as a recipe for curing the backward state of psychology, could obviously yield fruit only in subfields of this science, such as physiological and biological psychology. In a study of genuinely psychological problems as, for instance, of perception, cognition, motivation, learning, creativity, development, and conditions of the healthy and pathological personality the analytic pattern of the physical sciences is not meaningfully and fruitfully applicable. So it is not surprising that the occasional germane facts or sparks of insight which "a massive hundred-year effort to erect a discipline" (6) had produced, "the bits and pieces into which psychology falls," (22) cannot be considered as a science. Psychology is " a discipline of deceit " ; its literature " consisting of an endless set of advertisements for the emptiest concepts, the most inflated theories, the most trivial 'findings,' and the most fetishistic yet heuristically self-defeating methods in scholarly history." (27)

The second paper of this section, Donald Davidson's "Psychology as Philosophy" (41 ff.), which was supposed to comment on this view of psy- as science, seems to confirm Prof. Koch's evaluation of the scientific status of psychological endeavors. Human actions are essentially intentional. When described in psychological terms, i.e., " a system of concepts in part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires of the agent himself," (42) they "resist incorporation into a closed deterministic system."

(42 f.) This "nomological irreducibility of the psychological means, ... that the social sciences cannot be expected to develop in ways parallel to the physical sciences nor can we expect even to be able to explain and predict human behavior with the kind of precision that is possible in principle for physical phenomena." (42) Since Prof. Davidson admits that his personal experience of the inability to predict and theoretically to explain the results of his psychological experiments led him to give up his career as an experimental psychologist (48) and to turn philosopher, Richard Peters in his Chairman's Remarks (53 ff.) is primarily interested in an answer to his question whether the title of the paper is intended to imply that " the study of philosophy is the appropriate way of pursuing an interest in the explanation of behavior." (55) In the answer to these Remarks that Prof. Davidson gives during the Discussion (60 ff.), he agrees with the Chairman about the possibility of modest rather piecemeal types of psychological inquiry and denies that his paper was intended as an attack on psychology or its right to be called a science. Only the unique character of this science was to be emphasized. And since propositional attitudes, the specific object of psychology, refer to questions that belong also to the traditional concern of philosophy, the title of his paper seemed to him to be justified.

Various objections are raised against the consistency of Prof. Davidson's "anomalous monism " during the Discussion. A defence of the irreducibility of psychological concepts and the denial of strict psycho-physical laws are maintained to be incompatible with a materialistic monism. In his attempt to meet the objections Prof. Davidson clarifies the position he intended to defend in his paper. His anomalous monism truly is supposed to be monism, "because it holds that psychological events are physical events." (43) The fact that these events do not fall under strict laws when described in psychological terms and that this monism has thus to be described as anomalous does not render this physicalism inconsistent. For there is only a dualism of psychological and physical concepts, not a dualism of causal factors or types of causation. (65) However, one probably has reasons to doubt whether Prof. Davidson truly meets the objections against his position. After all, psychological concepts and descriptions, as a rule, do not represent arbitary creations of the human mind, and one can certainly think of sufficient reasons to question the truth and validity of the "first premise" of his argumentation for physicalism, i.e., that " psychological events such as perceivings, rememberings, the acquistion and loss of knowledge, and intentional actions are directly or indirectly caused by . . . physical events." (43)

Part Two: "Action" (69 ff.) is introducted by William P. Alston, who in his paper, "Prolegomena to a Psychological Theory of Intentional Action," (71 ff.) proposes to present the outlines of an analysis of intentional action concepts and then to determine the extent of a possible use of

these concepts by two main types of psychological behavior theory. Restricting himself to a consideration of concepts of overt intentional action Prof. Alston finds three conditions essential for the realization of such an action: overt intentional action involves a bodily movement (Bodily Movement Condition), which has a state of affairs as its success (Success Condition), and which did occur because the subject wanted this success (Purpose Condition). (75 ff.) Prof. Alston recognizes that his analysis is incomplete and will not be universally accepted by representatives of contemporary philosophy, where intentional action is a subject of intense controversy. However, he is convinced that an adequate analysis must include the conditions he listed and that more complete philosophical action concepts will offer still greater difficulties to an attempt at integrating them into scientific theories than the concept he proposes. (82) The investigation of the possible use of his basic intentional action concept in psychological theory reveals to Prof. Alston that there are "conceptual-methodological barriers to incorporating them bodily into the dependent variable slots of behavior theories." (100) One type of scientific theories, which is called "physicalistic," (83) obviously has no use of distinctively psychological concepts, and thus they are unable to represent the essential element of an intentional action, the role of "want" in producing a bodily movement. The other main type of psychological theory, the intentionalistic or cognitive-purposive theories, do utilize traditional psychological concepts; but "they cannot get past an *intention* to do something" (97) and "leave it open as to whether that aim is realized." (100) Especially "by virtue of their success conditions, ordinary action concepts far exceed the proper limits of *any* sort of psychology." (90)

To these philosophical proposals about action concepts and their use in psychology Robert Borger gives a psychologist's response in his "Human Action and Psychological Research." (102 ff.) He is of the opinion that psychologists are not "missing something essential" when disregarding the criticism of philosophers who demand a scientific concentration "on the essentially *human* aspects of human beings," question psychological efforts "inspired by the assumption that people and animals . . . are physical systems," and expect the psychologist to produce an account continuous with ordinary talk. (102 ff.) Mr. Borger decidedly prefers physicalistic to so-called cognitive-purposive theories in psychology and finds that the use of concepts of everyday language, such as "intention" or "purpose," within psychological theory will meet difficulties "in providing such theories with an empirical anchorage" (104) or in establishing links with bodily movements or with anything that is publicly observable. (128) Because of such publicly observable features of human behavior, a psychological analysis from a mechanistic standpoint is not only possible but seems to be demanded by the character of psychology as an empirical science.

It is most regrettable that the manuscript of the remarks of Prof. Charles Taylor who presided as chairman of the second symposium was lost. His paper certainly would have helped to clarify the issues concerning a psychological or mechanistic psychology and concerning physicalism as a philosophy of mind and of man and as a method in psychological studies.

In Part Three: "Human Learning," (137 ff.) Prof. D. W. Hamlyn offers under the same title a philosopher's observations about psychological studies of learning and his ideas about the essential conditions of genuine learning. Its identification with a simple modification of behavior, as understood by psychologists, is seen to have its foundation in a preoccupation with animal as opposed to human learning; (140) true learning worthy of the name "must at least involve the acquisition of knowledge through experience." (141) The knowledge which is presupposed by this understanding of learning as a basis for the acquisition of further knowledge does not require innate ideas, as maintained in Chomsky's theory of learning a language, nor does it have to be temporarily prior. " The priority that is necessary is a logical priority only." (150) The child is not to be conceived as a solitary inquirer set over against a world which he has to construct on the basis of his sense data. (146) He is in the world and a part of the world from the beginning and as a social being learns originally by a way of initiation into a common form of life, of common interests, attitudes, and feelings. (151) "Late learning" will obviously differ from modes of early learning which is primarily a function of personal relationships betwen the child and other human beings. (154)

John Morton agrees with Hamlyn's rejection of Chomsky's theory of learning in his "The Use of Natural and Linguistic Concepts in Psychological Explanation." (158 ff.) However, he is not satisfied with the philosopher's appraisal of psychological studies of learning nor with his definition of learning. Modern empirical psychology, which studies animals in their natural environment, has much richer concepts at his disposal than Hamlyn allows. Empirical studies stand " in the continual need for our conceptual framework to expand." It should thus be expected that " the use of natural language has acute limitations as a tool for discussing psychological phenomena." (163) The term "knowledge " which Hamlyn uses in his determination of learning remains undefined " until psychological models of brain functions have been developed well beyond their current state." (164)

In Chairman's Remarks, " Language Learning and Innate Knowledge," (175 ff.) Theodore Mischel questions the usefulness of such explanations of knowledge in terms of brain functions for an understanding of a child's learning of his first language. In support of Prof. Hamlyn's view he points to the fact that even competent speakers, unless they are linguists, do not know Chomsky's "deeper" rules of language either consciously or uncon-

sciously, "so that there is no need to explain how the child learns them." (16)

In Part Four: "Perception " (193 ff.) Richard L. Gregory proposes to interpret Perceptions as Hypotheses. (195 ff.) Starting with a consideration of the duck-rabbit figure which, presenting one and the same stimulus, may be perceived as either of the two animals, Prof. Gregory rejects the traditional stimulus-response theory of perception and demands an " informational account," according to which perception is, as Prof. Gregory explains during the Discussion, " based on but going beyond sensible data," (ft33) and one stimulus configuration may be followed by several alternative perceptions or permit various hypotheses as compatible with the available sensory evidence. The greater part of this paper is dedicated to an enumeration and explanation of " hypothesis-like characteristics of perception" (30ft) that are supposed to justify the thesis that perceptions are hypotheses, not mere copies of a physical stimulus situation.

G. E. M. Anscombe questions this justification in her "Comment on Professor R. L. Gregory's Paper." (ftll ff.) She examines various meanings of " hypothesis " and the possible application of the term to different conditions of perception and finds difficulties especially with regard to an understanding of the subject forming such perception-hypotheses and concerning the mode of their confirmation.

Godfrey Vesey continues this attempt at an analysis of the concept of " hypothesis " and of its possible use for an explanation of perception phenomena. He concludes his considerations " by inviting Gregory to answer " the question whether in determining perception as an hypothesis he means more than the fact that in perception as sensory output there is more given than the mere sensory input. (266)

In his answer Prof. Gregory tries to clarify his interpretation of perception. He wishes, he declares during the Discussion, to regard all perceptions as hypotheses, " based on sensory data much as hypotheses in physics are based on instrumental data " and, a scientific hypotheses, answerable to data. (ft33) The "framer" of these perception-hypotheses is to be sought in " brain mechanisms, accepting current sensory data and storing past data, mainly as generalizations, generally arriving at a good bet as to what is before us, in space and time." (234)

Reviewing this clarification Prof. Anscombe still finds "a residual unclarity about the theory." Not only does she consider the assumption concerning the brain functioning as a computer as a " mere fashion " but she wonders especially about the identity of the subject evaluating these brain-produced hypotheses. Is it the brain, the supposed computer itself, or the person that " judges " the perception hypotheses, she asks. Prof. Anscombe concludes with a complaint. Prof. Gregory had used the opportunity of answering objections against his theory by repeatedly ex-

pressing his conviction about the scientific uselessness and worthlessness of ordinary language philosophy. Prof. Anscombe gets the impression that he hopes to criticize her " by having a swipe at ' linguistic analysis ' as a stance or critical position." She rightly observes that " he has no justification for doing this." f.)

In Part Five: "Computer Models in Psychology" fl'.) Hubert Dreyfus and John Haugeland offer a paper intended to show "The Computer as a Mistaken Model of the Mind," ff.) while N. S. Sutherland deals with " Computer Simulation of Brain Function." fl'.) The first paper of the symposium seems to be primarily concerned with an alleged all too optimistic use of computer programming as a method of psychological explanation. It intends to prevent such an uncritical acceptance of computer models by describing the difficulties of computer programming of ordinary human behavior and by insisting upon the impossibility of simulating even brain processes on a digital computer. Computer programming of human behavior, for instance, the coordination of a state of anger as output to the organism's being slapped as input, faces the problem " that there is not a set of physical conditions which always amount to a slap." And since the human nervous system does not represent a system composed of discrete parts, a simulation of brain processes by discrete computer programmes is impossible.

Prof. Sutherland disputes the justification of such views about the impossibility of an explanation of behavior in terms of the working of a physical system such as the nervous system, and he questions the related opinions concerning the constitution and function of the brain as a system of discrete units. At any rate, the claims on which " Dreyfus' argument appears to be based " do not seem to have been established by him.

D. M. Mackay, Prof. of Communication, agrees with this evaluation of Dreyfus' empirical evidence for his assertions in his Chairman's Remarks. ff.) He is of the opinion that" in any case Sutherland advances some good reasons for not granting them in our present state of knowledge." However, he is also inclined to believe that there are necessary limits to our ability " to specify mental processes in the terms required by a rule-following computer."

During the Discussion Mr. Roger Harris argues for " an a priori obstacle " to the use of computer simulation in the explanation of the regularity of specifically human behavior. The logical character essential to human activity is not reducible to regularities of their physical components and their interactions with one another and with the environment. The activity, for instance, of inferring can "just in so far as it *was* logical," *not* be identified " with any finite physical process to which a man, or a machine, and some part of his/its environment are subject." f.)

The last symposium had " Determinism " as its theme of discussion.

Aaron Sloman opened the meeting with his paper, "Physicalism and the Bogey of Determinism." (283 ff.) Physicalism is defined: "All physical behavior, (i.e., of human bodies and everything else) conforms to physical theories." (285) Possible "alarming implications" (290) of this thesis are easily disposed of. It does not imply any identity or composition of human actions with or out of physical behavior; for " the physical behavior has to be *interpreted* ... as the action," (287) and thus there is a "three-termed relation " between the physical phenomena, the action, and the mode of interpretation, not a two-termed relation as "being composed of or being identical with" would be. (289) Nor does physicalism imply a denial of actual mental states and processes and of their influence on our behavior. However, the author does not see any conceptual impossibility in designing and building a purely physical system that would enjoy private inner experience, and he lists the " conditions sufficient for the applicability of psychological concepts" (298) to his possible conscious, intelligent, and morally responsible robot.

George Mandler and William Kessen, "two old experimental psychologists," as they introduce themselves, (324) entitle their contribution: "The Appearance of Free Will." (305 ff.) They consider it as their first day to remove or, at least, to point to " one of the fundamental difficulties of modern philosophical analysis," i. e., " a basic misunderstanding of what empirical psychology is about." To identify the investigation of the human mind with an investigation of " psychological terms used by human beings in their common language, with its rather dubious history " is a philosophical, not a psychological enterprise. The mind studied in psychology is understood as " the theoretical assignments or descriptions to a person of psychological process and structures . . . useful in explaining, predicting and ordering his behavior." (306) Refined and translated in psychological theory, common language statements about mental events are not to be confused with those scientific statements they thus turn out to be through this psychological transformation. Ordinary language does not deserve " the intense attention it has received in the search for mental explanation." (307 f.) After all, why should contemporary philosophy show this "preference for common language rather than psychological explanations and descriptions of human behavior and mental phenomena " when nobody would think to recommend or use ordinary language descriptions of non-human phenomena, for instance, as a scientific method in engineering or astronomy. (311 f.)

As an empirical science, psychology presupposes the strict determinism of its subject matter. This determinism is "a metatheoretical convention ... an axiom for theory and research " and has, as such, nothing to do with reductionism or with physicalism. The psychologist considers human bodies primarily as psychological, not physical systems; and within psy-

chological theory human actions are assumed to have purely psychological explanations. (309) But the possibility to explain, predict, or control psychological phenomena within the realm of psychological theory is, in principle, of the same order as the scientific treatment of physical phenomena within the theory of physics. (3ll) Objections raised against the determinism of psychological phenomena on the basis of the free will argument and doctrine, which merely are "inherited word play," (3ll) can be easily put aside. The freedom of independence of antecedent conditions, of alternative choice, or of self-determination, which philosophical definitions ascribe to the human will, is either a useless theologcal remnant or the expression of a psychological determinism. Choice behavior certainly exists; but it is scientifically established to be dependent on a number of variables that influence choice deterministically, and is thus "not beyond the reach of systematic investigation." (314)

The doctrine of the free will, opposed to determinism, is false. Distinct from the doctrine is the *belief* in free will, which is a "'good thing' for personal and social development." (315) This belief "has an important determining function." It will lead to a delay of choice, and thus more potential aspects of the alternatives will " come to the fore, to be in turn weighted by whatever final choice mechanism we wish to invoke." The process of delay will, then, most likely " increase the quality of the final choice." (316) In short: "the belief in free will, the desire to choose freely and well contributes to the ability of the human being to face delay, to countenance anxiety in order to make the better choice and to lead the better life." In spite of this overwhelming evidence for human freedom, listed by our two old psychologists, they still insist in the next line that they cannot discover any trace of evidence of its reality. Asserting the need for the belief, they profess to be forced to do so " even in the absence of any evidence for the doctrine." (317)

In the Chairman's Remarks (325 ff.) Alan R. White first feels obliged to state that both papers failed to discuss the topic of the symposium. As a contemporary British philosopher he confirms the self-description of the psychologists' approach to the problem of free will, that refuses all examination of man's " inherited word play " in favor of a Dictionary's definitions, as truly "simple-minded." (326) In connection with his remarks concerning the relations between a human being and his body, which he does not find clarified in the papers, Prof. White takes issue with Dr. Sloman's view that, because of the interpretation required in an action, the physical movement involved in that action cannot constitute or be identical with a human action. "A specific item can very well be identical with an interpreted item." (328) And finally he asks for " a straight answer ... to the question ... whether psychological processes are determined or not, and whether, if they are, this is compatible only with the appearance of free will or also with its existence." (329)

In the Discussion Dr. Sloman admits the justification of the Chairman's critique of his paper. He condemns his argument concerning the difference of physical behavior and action due to a three-termed relation of human action as "not only fallacious, but stupid." (331) Professors Mandler and Kessen give Prof. White the straight answer he desires: "Man is as free as a falling leaf," they express their conviction about the existence of human freedom. (341) In other words, they do not realize, and not one of the participating philosophers and psychologists seems to have been able to help them realize, that they confuse methodological with philosophical determinism, or that their " metatheoretical convention " prescribed by *their* scientific approach to a study of human behavior does not demand the defence of a philosophical determinism or a denial of the freedom of the human will, as they believe, and, following the dictate of their scientific conscience, preach.

However, they are certainly right when in their Concluding Remarks they confess that the Conference has confirmed " an antique truth " : "Philosophers and psychologists not only play different language games, they also inhabit different cultures." (340) Mutual misunderstanding of philosophers and psychologists concerning the meaning and value of their work is not uncommon and, as this case of dealing with determinism in psychology shows, most regrettable. The lack of an appreciation of philosophical problems and considerations prevents the psychologist fully from recognizing what he is actually doing when applying the methods of his science, and may lead him to overstep the boundaries of his field and to defend philosophical doctrines which actually he has no right or reason to defend and practically he even does not maintain.

The reason for this deplorable situation is not only to be sought in " the psychologist's impatience with looping discussions " of philosophers or with "autistic philosophy," as psychologists assume. (340) It must partly also be seen in the methodological approach characteristic of contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Not certainly in those tendencies of ordinary language philosophy, which in this Conference were attacked by almost all the participating psychologists as worthless and useless for a psychological understanding of human beings. The philosophical insistence upon the mental aspects of human activity, upon a necessary differentiation of types of human behavior and of their relations to somatic processes, and upon a psychological understanding and explanation of human existence is obviously unacceptable to a psychology which consciously or unconsciously is inspired and directed by a behavioristic ideal of scientific studies or even by a behavioristic philosophy of man; it is, however, essential to a realistic, " psychological " psychology. When the contemporary philosophy is not living up to the demands and needs of a realistic empirical psychology, it is the result of its intentionally cultivated piecemeal, microscopic ap-

proach to philosophical problems. The conceptual analysis of psychological concepts of ordinary language is not the only service the psychologist may expect from philosophy. What he primarily needs in order to avoid those hopeless starts and meaningless theories which Sigmund Koch deplored as typical shortcomings of psychology in his critical review of the historical efforts of his science is a realistic philosophy of man that offers basic information about the philosophical problems concerning the essential constitution of a human being and concerning the differentiation and relationships of the components of his existence. And it is this philosophy of man which our contemporary philosophy of mind, at least, overtly and publicly does not dare to risk. It is interesting to observe that the psychologists of the Conference, who were so eager in their condemnation of ordinary language philosophy, did not have any complaint about this deficiency of today's philosophy. Considering their work as scientific, they deny any relationship of psychology to philosophy and are unaware of the fact that their psychological methods and theories necessarily are expressions of some kind of a philosophy of man.

As a whole, the papers of this Philosophy of Psychology do not bring many surprises. As was to be expected, they deal with certain aspects of the contemporary philosophy of mind, generally in an interesting and informative manner. However, a student of this philosophy of mind and of the meaning of empirical psychology will have to turn to more comprehensive and explicit studies of the problems discussed, both for a better understanding of the problems and of their present discussions.

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La filosofia di Marx. By GIOVANNI GENTILE. A cura di V. A. Bellezza. Florence: Sansoni, 1974. L. 3,000.

This volume contains not only the fifth edition of Gentile's *Filosofia dl Marx* (first published in 1899) but also a long Appendix where the editor has collected various documents intended to provide some historical context for Gentile's book. *La filosofia di Marx* is the book that in 1915 was praised by Lenin as one of the most interesting works on Marx by non-Marxist philosophers. It is also the book whose first edition contained a dedication to Benedetto Croce expressing Gentile's gratitude for the many fruitful discussions they had had. Croce was at the time one of the leading interpreters and critics of Marx, as may be seen from his *Historical Mater-*

ialism and the Economics of Karl Marx (first published iu 1900). Thus in the first section of the Appendix the editor has collected all relevant correspondence between Gentile and Croce, consisting of 100 letters of various lengths covering a total of 94 pages. But those were " the good old days," that is, the times when Gentile and Croce were friends and collaborators, before the former's support for fascism and the latter's opposition broke their long friendship in the 19QO's. The editorial history of *La filosofia di Marx* reflects this, for in its second edition in 1987 the dedication to Croce of the first edition was taken out of its original place and appended as a footnote to the author's preface. Be that as it may, the rest of the Appendix in the present volume contains the following: six letters between Gentile and Antonio Labriola, a well-known Italian Marxist of the time; two letters between Gentile and Georges Sorel, a leading French Marxist whose interpretation of Marx overlaps with Croce's, though they had worked independently of one another; four book reviews by Gentile, including one of Kausky's *Die Geschichte des Sozialismus in Einzelderstellungen* (Stuttgart, 1895), and one entitled " Croce's Marxism " dealing with the third Italian edition of Croce's *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* of 1918; and a facsimile of one of Labriola's letters to Gentile.

Gentile's work consists of two parts: the first is an examination of historical materialism, the second of the so-called philosophy of praxis. The apparent structure of the two essays is similar; in each case the examination is carried out in three steps: an explanation of the doctrine as can be found in certain texts; a defense of the doctrine from certain current objections; and a " philosophical " criticism of the doctrine as being self-contradictory. The texts are, respectively, Marx's summary in the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* and his *Theses on Feuerbach.* Gentile argues that Marx was a philosopher insofar as his historical materialism must be regarded as a philosophy of history and insofar as the philosophy of praxis inherent in the *Theses on Feuerbach* constitutes a " materialistic monism distinct from any other similar system by the concept of praxis applied to matter . . . [where] praxis, for Marx, is synonymons with human sense-activity." (p. 156) This is not to say, Gentile notes, that there exists an original system of ideas-Marxism-which is a workable philosophical system, since he thinks that Marx's philosophy is an eclecticism of contradictory elements, which when taken in isolation are often insightful, but Hegelian rather than original to Marx. In fact, I think that deep down what Gentile tries to show is the following: Marx's philosophy is valid insofar as it is Hegelian and invalid otherwise. From this point of view the long chapter entitled "Recent Interpretations of the Philosophy of Praxis," (pp. 1Q5-55) which might seem a digression, has a definite function, for it argues that Engels' criticism of transcendent,

abstract metaphysics in *Anti-Dilhring* is right insofar as it is a repetition of Hegel's own criticism, and wrong insofar as it misunderstands Hegel or ignores the later's original criticism of abstract, transcendent metaphysics.

Gentile's book is valuable when so interpreted, i.e., as a justification of the thesis that Marx's philosophy is valid insofar as it is Hegelian and invalid otherwise. But there are two problems in this interpretation. First, the concept of philosophy presupposed by this thesis, though common and supposedly rigorous, is rather implausible since it implies that it is possible, and often the case, that one is a great thinker but a poor philosopher; and this makes philosophy irrelevant at best, and perhaps even harmful. The way to solve this problem is to call the kind of philosophy that Gentile is talking about by its proper name: metaphysics. So I reformulate my interpretation of Gentile's book as follows: a plausible justification of the thesis that Marx's metaphysics is valid insofar as it is Hegelian and invalid otherwise, and an implicit and probably unintended justification of the irrelevance of metaphysics in the thought of an individual.

The second problem with my interpretation is that it makes the book difficult to understand in terms of the historical context in which it was created. In fact, the Croce correspondence in the Appendix makes clear something indirectly implied by ·certain passages and footnotes in Gentile's book, namely, that his first essay is a reaction against Croce's interpretation of historical materialism as a historiographical canon of revolutionary importance and universal *applicability* though of limited *validity;* and Gentile's second essay is a reaction against Croce's belief that the metaphysical elements of Marx's thought were of no importance. This problem may be solved as follows. It is true that the substance of the book consists of two arguments, one discussing the reason why historical materialism should be regarded as a philosophy of history rather than as a mere historiographical canon, the other discussing the evidence for the pervasiveness of metaphilosophical elements in Marx's thought. However, these arguments are inconclusive as the counterarguments in Croce's letters (as well as Gentile's actual accomplishment mentioned above) show. Hence I do not find that the *value* of Gentile's work lies in those arguments, though they are there. Hence, the present volume, of which *La filosofia di Marx* is only a part, is itself valuable insofar as it allows us better to understand and evaluate Gentile's book.

An important and interesting document in the Appendix is Gentile's essay entitled "Croce's Marxism." Croce's relation to Marx is a problematic one because the period of his active interest in Marx was rather brief (from 1895 to 1900, in his long life from 1866 to 195Yl) and because he never regarded himself as a Marxist (not even in a qualified way), never regarded Marx as a philosopher, and never acknowledged Marx's influence for his own thinking. Gentile explains Croce's interest in Marxism, which

while it lasted was very intense and productive, as a case of convergence. As regards specific points of overlap, Gentile accepts (p. the two alleged by Croce himself (in the preface to the 1917 edition of *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx),* namely, (1) historical, concrete philosophizing, and political realism. Gentile adds two others, namely, the principle of the basic independence and primacy of action vis-a-vis thought, and the idea of the inapplicability of moral judgment to social facts and historical events.

I am inclined to agree that Croce's thought does have these four " marxist " elements, but I would caution that in Croce one finds such elements in a form that I would call "spiritualized." To explain this I wish to mention a fifth Marxist element which I detect in Croce. One of the most fundamental doctrines in his philosophy is a general value theory which is succintly stated in one passage as follows: "Activity and value are the same thing. For us, valuable is only whatever is an effort of the imagination, of thought, of the will, of our activity in every one of its forms. Just as Kant said that nothing else in the universe can be called good but a good will, so we can generalize and say that nothing else in the universe has value but human activity." [1] In spite of Croce's explicit reference to Kant, this concept of value looks more like a generalization and deepening of Marx's labor theory of value. For Kant was contrasting the good will to other human traits such as wit and intelligence and hence presumably to what Croce calls thought and the imagination. Whereas Marx's labor theory of value was attempting to define the specifically human contribution to prices, profits, and economic value, as Croce himself must have believed since he explicitly argues that the labor theory of value must be interpreted not as a descriptive empirical law (in which case it would be false) but as a valid principle helpful as an element in the sociological explanation of the profit of capital. [2] So it seems that Marx's " labor " and " economic value " become respectively Croce's " human activity " and " value in general."

In summary, the present volume will be useful not only to those interested in the history of Italian philosophy and to those interested in the history of Marxism but also to all those interested in exploring Marx's Hegelianism (in metaphysics) and Croce's Marxism (in philosophy, as distinct from metaphysics).

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[1] Benedetto Croce, *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica* (Edizione economica. Bari: Laterza, 1968), pp. !'l!'l8-!'l24.

• *Ibid.,* pp. 57-74.

Methodological Foundations of Relativistic Mechanics. By MARSHALL SPECTOR. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972. Pp. 192. $10.95.

The Field Concept in Contemporary Science. By MENDEL SAcHs. American Lecture Series, M. Farber, ed. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1973. Pp. 132.

Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. Second, enlarged edition. By ADOLF GRUNBAUM. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XII, R. S. Cohen & M. W. Wartofsky, eds. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973. Pp. 907. $17.90.

The three titles listed above are recent works in the philosophy of science, similar in their addressing scientific topics that are somewhat esoteric for the ordinary philosopher and yet quite different in their levels of approach and degrees of sophistication. While none of the three offers a definitive solution to current problems in the philosophy of science, all are worthy of notice as providing useful background and for suggesting new insights that may help decide substantive issues within this discipline. In their editorial introduction to Griinbaum's work Robert Cohen and Marx Wartofsky agree that this is "one of the few major works in the philosophy of the natural sciences in this generation " and go on to praise the author for his admirable exemplification of the "Aristotelian devotion to the intimate and useful dependence of actual science and philosophical understanding." (p. xiii) All three of the works under review show a deep awarenes of such mutual interdependence between science and philosophy, an awareness that was shared also by Thomas Aquinas when he had reached the peak of his intellectual career, and for this reason alone merit being called to the attention of readers of *The Thomist.*

* * *

Spector's analysis of relativistic mechanics is the work of a philosopher who is concerned with the methodological foundations of the special theory of relativity, who can and does employ sufficient mathematics to state his position unambiguously, and who is concerned to go beyond positivist interpretations of Einstein's special theory to suggest a conceptual understanding of that theory more sympathetic to realism. Unlike many popular expositions of special relativity, which concentrate on its kinematic aspects and treat such well-worn topics as simultaneity, light cones, world lines, and the four-dimensional manifold, Spector's work by-passes most of this material and focuses instead on the dynamical aspects of the special theory, paying particular attention to the changes induced in the concepts of force, mass, and energy in the transition from classical to relativistic dynamics.

The author is concerned exclusively with the special theory, mentioning Einstein's general theory only in passing.

Spector's book may be roughly divided into three parts. The first deals with the methodological foundations of classical mechanics, with primary emphasis on dynamics and on delineating the paradigm this provides for mechanical explanation. The second part goes into the foundations of classical electrodynamics, introduces the concepts of frame of reference and Galilean transformation, and delineates the crisis situation that developed towards the end of the nineteenth century as proposed mechanical models of the ether proved unsatisfactory. The third part then explains how special relativity arose as a response to the crisis situation in classical mechanics and electrodynamics, and how Einstein's laws of mechanics differ from those of Newton, tracing the implications of this for understanding various force functions and the famous equation, $E = mc^2$. Some of Spector's distinctive theses include the following: that $F = ma$ represents the essential content of Newton's second law of motion, and that the first law of motion is actually a consequence of, and not a propadeutic to, the second law; that mechanical explanations in the classical sense are causal explanations made through the application of Newton's second law and particular force laws; that an element of conventionality enters into classical mechanics through the constraints that are placed on the kinds of force laws regarded as allowable; that the luminiferous ether was originally conceived to supply a mechanical explanation of light phenomena; that the failure of the program to reduce electrodynamics to classical mechanics did not automatically entail the rejection of an ether, nor did it necessitate the identification of an ether with absolute space; that Einsteinian dynamics essentially rewrites Newton's second law in more abstract form; and, as a consequence of all of this, that there is no real meaning-invariance with regard to the terms force, mass, and energy as these pass from classical to relativistic mechanics, or, to put it another way, that Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics are conceptually commensurable. With regard to the last point Spector maintains that the concepts of force and mass are both primitive to the systems of mechanics he has been analyzing and that a " deeper explanation " of these concepts is not possible within either system, although it may be forthcoming from various interpretations of general relativity or from more " metaphysical " types of premises.

As may be seen from this overview, Spector's study is unpretentious. It purports to be not so much concerned with an accurate historical account of the context of discovery from which the special theory emerged as it is with a philosophical evaluation made in a context of justification to show what the special theory ultimately means. Inevitably, however, the attempt to separate the two contexts lays the author open to the charge that he is offering an idiosyncratic interpretation of relativistic mechanics-

one that is at variance with either the historical record or the results of formalistic analyses or both. It is noteworthy that Spector is indebted to Thomas Kuhn for some of his terminology, but he actually takes issue with, and decidedly rejects, Kuhn's stand on the revolutionary character of Einsteinian (vis-a-vis Newtonian) mechanics. If the book has any defect, apart from being poorly indexed, this might be the modesty of its claims, and particularly its failure to move beyond the narrow problem of meaning-invariance to a broader realist interpretation of mechanics as this relates to problems of causal analysis and causal explanation generally.

* * *

Mendel Sachs's study of the field concept covers some of the same ground as Spector's work, but it does so from a different perspective and with an entirely different intention. The author is a physicist who is in the process of developing a general field theory of matter and who has a subsidiary interest in the history and philosophy of science. He presents his work as being " at an elementary level " and unlike Spector eschews all formal mathematics so as to concentrate on what he regards as " the logical and historical aspects" of field theories of matter. Sachs begins with the field concept as it was introduced by Michael Faraday in the mid-nineteenth century and traces its development into the full-blown classical theory of electromagnetism. Faraday's contribution, in Sachs's estimation, was a unified field theory that was essentially different from the " action-at-a-distance" theory of Newtonian mechanics (the author actually attributes action-at-a-distance to Newton himself, apparently being unaware of Newton's express repudiation of that concept in his well-known letter to Bentley). He then takes up special relativity as arising out of the impasse to which mechanical theories of the ether had come but is concerned almost exclusively with showing how Einstein's principle of relativity relates to the continuous field concept, and so deals more with kinematic concepts that require continuous functions for their representation than with the dynamical concepts analyzed by Spector. Sachs further expands his discussion to include the general theory of relativity, explaining how Einstein generalized Newton's law of universal gravitation in terms of the "metrical field" derived from Riemannian geometry. He also describes Mach's work on inertia and himself proposes what he refers to as " a generalized version of the Mach principle," namely, "that all of the manifestations of interacting matter are consequences of their mutual coupling, and not a consequence of the intrinsic properties of bits of matter." (p. 70) From this Sachs moves on to " the mechanics of atoms and the continuous field of probability " to sketch recent interpretations of quantum theory and to point out the difficulties inherent in producing any generalized theory that truly combines quantum and relativity concepts. The author's intuition is that " elementary interaction field theory " is more basic to

a description of matter than is the currently-accepted "elementary particle theory." His own option is for a continuous field of mutual interaction that underlies " a single closed system, without actual parts, as the fundamental existent of nature." (p. 113)

Because of the tentative and somewhat intuitive character of Sach's presentation, it is difficult to give a critical evaluation of the work. The author undoubtedly manifests an interest in the history of science, but the many vignettes of scientists he intersperses throughout his development, from Galileo all the way to Einstein, can only make an historian of science uneasy, to say the least. Somewhat like the medieval hagiographer Sachs uses biography for didactic purposes, extolling the putative virtues of great scientists of the past as they have been canonized in the minds of present-day scientists, and drawing liberally on legends long discredited by historians. Sachs's philosophy is almost in the same class as his history, as it shows little awareness of the type of problem discussed by Spector or of the analytical sophistication necessary even to delineate the logical and substantive issues at stake. In fairness to Sachs, however, it should be remarked that he writes as a physicist and that he is attempting to articulate a thesis of great philosophical import. His work is of less significance for the history and philosophy it contains than for revealing the extent of his realist and metaphysical commitments, even though it fails to articulate the precise grounds on which these are based.

* * *

The third title listed above is the second, enlarged edition of Adolf Griinbaum's *Philosophical Problems of Space and Time,* the first edition of which was reviewed by the present writer over ten years ago *[The Thomist,* 28 (1964) , pp. 524-529]. The work has more than doubled in size since its first appearance, as the author remedied defects in the early work and developed his thought under the stimulus of criticism, some of which is still on-going. The additional materials elucidate Griinbaum's considerable debt to Riemann for the ontology of physical geometry that was fundamental to the thesis developed in the first edition, and also provide a fuller account of space and time as these ftmction in Einstein's general theory of relativity, which was treated sparsely in the first edition because of the extensive development accorded there to the special theory.

To spell out in more detail the amplification of contents in the second edition the reader needs be reminded that the first edition was divided into three parts, treating respectively philosophical problems associated with the metric of space and time, the topology of space and time, and the theory of relativity. In the second edition, three new chapters supplement part one, a single chapter supplements part two, and three chapters supplement part three. At least four of these chapters have already appeared as articles elsewhere, but it is extremely useful to have them re-

printed here along with the photographic reproduction of the first edition. Because of the latter method of reprinting the author was unable to make any textual revisions, but he has remedied this defect by a lengthy appendix in which he corrects errors, explains the changes from the first to the second edition, and indicates work still in progress that will amplify his views further.

The resulting volume is so extensive in scope and exhaustive in detail that it is impossible to give it fair notice in this review. Of particular interest, however, is Griinbaum's continued discussion of Pierre Duhem's epistemology of physics in terms of his own views on physical geometry, his appraisal of Eugene Wigner's dictum that "entropy is an anthropomorphic concept," and his revised statement on the bearing of philosophy on the history of the special theory of relativity. Also noteworthy are his discussions of current philoosphical issues in the general theory, particularly the ontology of empty curved space and the bearing of the time-orientability of space-time on an understanding of " time's arrow." Gri.ibaum articulates his position with reference to his supporters and critics in recent philosophy-of-science literature, of whom Gerald Massey, Hilary Putnam, and Gerald Holton are representative. He has much to say also about falsification and the philosophy of science of Karl Popper, which he promises to amplify in a volume to be entitled *Falsifiability and Rationality,* forthcoming from the University of Pittsburgh Press.

In relation to the other two titles here reviewed, Gri.inbaum covers roughly the same area as Spector and Sachs, but he does so in the advanced, highly technical way one now expects to find in journals devoted exclusively to the philosophy of science. Spector's book, on the other hand, is at a more intermediate level; on this account it would be a useful propadeutic for reading Griinbaum. Sachs's work, as he himself acknowledges, is elementary; one may fault it for its historical and philosophical simplicity, but for directness of expression and commitment it commends itself to anyone who lacks the technical background to comprehend the other two.

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Man's Responsibility for Nature. By JOHN PASSMORE. New York: Scribner's, 1974. Pp. Ql3.

This is an ambitious and broad-ranging reflective study of man's relationship with nature in terms of Western Christianity and contemporary problems. The first two chapters study the man-nature relationship as

found in the tradition of " man as despot " and in the two dependent but connected traditions of "stewardship" and "cooperation with nature." The author finds that the tradtion of despotic domination and exploitation of nature has always been dominant in the Christian West. Little distinction is made between Catholic and Reformation traditions; there is no reference to the well-known " Protestant ethic " thesis, and the treatment of the first creation narrative is somewhat simplistic. These defects are continued into the description of the Christian tradition of the stewardship of nature, which the author finds to be not biblical and, although important, clearly minor. The tradition of Christian cooperation with nature is also held to be minor. Passmore does not seem to realize that this tradition is the main Catholic one since Thomas Aquinas, and in fact labels it as, from a Roman Catholic point of view, unorthodox. (note, p. 33)

The remaining five chapters are far more successful. Using a more or less general philosophical method, Passmore takes up the current questions of environmental pollution, the conservation of natural resources for future use, the preservation of nature, and the increase and control of human population. Most of the judgments in these chapters seem well weighed and moderate. Certainly, to reflect philosophically on these four major problems and on their interrelations is a large and difficult undertaking. Given the obstacles as well as the scarcity of precedent, the author has done a remarkable job of philosophical pioneering. These chapters are somewhat marred, however, by occasional poor taste (Martin Luther is called a "spoiled monk," note, p. 144), by some passing tendentious or temerarious judgments (e. g., " ... the anti-human bias of so many ecologists," p. 127; " The Roman Catholic Church has never placed much store on the reduction ... of suffering," note, p. 131), and especially by a surprising lack of familiarity with the Anglican and Roman Catholic traditions concerning nature's relation to man. These faults are made more evident by their contrast with the author's excellent and sprightly style, one in which there happily flickers a bright if donnish wit.

It would, of course, have been impossible to write a book on these problems which would not be quickly outdistanced by world events and outdated. Unfortunately, the present book appears to have been written before the " limits to growth " debate and before the energy crisis. This makes it of limited usefulness for most readers. Theologians will find it only slightly helpful. Philosophers in the area of the philosophy of nature and its importance for today's macro-problems of environment, resources, and population, will find Passmore's study interesting and, probably, stimulating.

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Anatomy of the New Testament. By ROBERT A. SPIVEY and D. MOODY SMITH, JR. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. Pp. 539. $9.95.

The Twelve Apostles. By RONALD BROWNRIGG. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. Pp.

This Hebrew Lord. By JOHN SHELBY SPONG. New York: A Crossroad Book/The Seabury Press, 1974. Pp. 190. 5.95.

Although appearing only five years after the first edition, the second edition of *Anatomy of the New Testament* is clearly a brand new, up-to-date introduction to the New Testament. The present edition has been significantly reorganized for the sake of both simplicity and clarity. Most important, however, are the revisions that take account of the many scholarly advances during the past five years, e. g., the Son of Man problem and the value of epistolary evidence for understanding Paul's ministry. In addition, the footnotes and bibliographies have been carefully brought up to date.

The work as a whole achieves the remarkable goal of providing for the lay reader a thoroughly adequate treatment of the background, composition, and content of the New Testament. It presupposes nothing more than an ability to read English and an interest in Scripture. Nevertheless, the work is an invaluable tool for students, clergy, and scholars for it is both simple and complete, clear and profound, abounding in charts and illustrations as well as containing a glossary, indices, and comprehensive bibliographies. For anyone desiring to enter into the world of the New Testament and encounter the Word of God this work is strongly recommended.

The Twelve Apostles, richly illustrated with more than one-hundred-and-forty photographs, maps, and reproductions of religious art, is a critical examination of the lives, work, and religious significance of the Twelve and much more besides. Ronald Brownrigg examines all of the available evidence on the Twelve and their impact on the last two-thousand years of Christianity: the sketchy information of the New Testament, the legendary material in the apocryphal writings, the witness of the Fathers, and the traditions that have enriched the lives of Christian communities all over the world. The result is a commendable synthesis whose balanced, critical judgments clearly separate fact from fiction while at the same time giving to the average reader of today a vivid appreciation of the apostles in the origin, spread, and present-day life of Christianity.

John Shelby Spong has admittedly run the risk of heresy in his presentation of Jesus in *This Hebrew Lord,* and some will undoubtedly insist that he has indeed succumbed. The critical scholar will search in vain for affirmations of traditional beliefs about Jesus, e. g., the pre-existent Son

of God, the redemptive incarnation, the sacrifice offered on the cross, the bodily resurrection. Nevertheless, Spong should not be faulted for not doing what he never intended to do. His work " is not offered as a definitive Christology but as a personal witness." (p. ix) He has taken seriously the criticisms of traditional formulations put forward by J. A. Robinson in *Honest to God* but has gone far beyond Robinson in his effort to explain his personal faith in Jesus Christ in terms that are meaningful in today's society.

His method, as indicated in the title, is to return to the Hebrew milieu into which Jesus was born and in which he lived and worked and died. He then attempts to uncover the fundamental faith experience to which the early Church gave witness and then to give expression to this same faith experience in the context of contemporary society.

His results are to some extent valid but at the same time limited. He views Jesus in terms of what he came to do, i.e., to "bring love to the unloved, freedom to the bound, wholeness to the distorted, peace to the insecure." (p. 170) He is certainly correct as far as he goes, and one might even argue that he is correct in going no further, i.e., in not raising questions of dogma that are really irrelevant to the faith and life of contemporary Christians. However, he is certainly incorrect in his attempt to explain how Jesus accomplished his purpose. Spong sees Jesus as uncertain and groping: first he taught, then he acted out his purpose in his deeds, then he shared his deepest feelings with his disciples and finally, when all else had failed, he went to the cross. Perhaps Spong is correct in seeing a progress in Jesus' understanding of his mission, but he fails to grasp the full meaning of the cross and the transforming effect it has on those who believe when he sees the result of the cross as nothing more than what Jesus might have accomplished by his words and deeds.

This reviewer suspects that Spong has either missed the full impact of the early Church's faith in the cross and resurrection or he has so re-mythologized that faith in contemporary terms as to render it as inaccessible as he claims it was in the out-dated credal formulations he seeks to avoid.

In spite of the above criticism, Spong's work has much to recommend it: his grasp of the Hebrew mentality, his ability to translate that mentality into today's language, his understanding and formulation of the fundamental purpose for which Jesus came into the world. This work represents what one sees far too little of in today's literature: a positive effort, using the insights of contemporary scholars, to communicate to the educated lay reader the truth in Jesus.

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Your People, My People: The Meeting of Jews and Christians. By A. ROY ECKARDT. New York: New Times Book Company, 1974. Pp. 255. $8.95.

Roy Eckardt, chairman of the Department of Religious Studies at Lehigh University, outlines in this volume the present status of Christian-Jewish relations. Against a background of long years of experience as lecturer, panelist, activist in the dialogue, he presents a progress report on the main subject areas: antisemitism in the New Testament, the Holocaust, the Vatican II declaration on the Jews, the Palestinians and Israel, the Jewishness of Christianity.

His purpose is exhortatory. Deploring Christians' inadequate contrition for their sins against the Jews, he declares: "The obligation remains of how to make ourselves aware of the divine judgment and mercy so that ... our lives may be transformed and the future influenced." In a clear, punchy style he strives to raise Christian consciousness out of its apathy over antisemitism. He feels his Christian guilt intensely and affirms it passionately, but this very intensity becomes at times so overpowering as to be self-defeating by antagonizing the very reader he aims to influence.

Eckardt contends, for instance, that every display of historic Christian antisemitism can be traced directly or indirectly to events recorded in the New Testament. "The foundations of Christian antisemitism and the Church's contribution to the Nazi holocaust were laid 1900 years ago: the line from the New Testament through the centuries of Christian contempt for Jews to the gas ovens and crematoria is unbroken." (p. 13) This lack of nuance contrasts sharply with the guarded approach of certain Jewish scholars he praises, such as Hesche} and Buber. In one sub-chapter, entitled "Enter the Devil," his compulsive indignation leads him to suggest that our Christian antisemitism is "our own below-conscious wish " to kill Christ, which has involved us Christians in a primordial conspiracy with "the demonic powers." (p. 81)

Aware of his own emotional extravagance, Eckardt admits that during lectures his own emphatic manner of presenting Christian guilt seems to have prompted listeners "to accuse me of self-flagellation." (p. 3) The wise reader, however, will not pass up this otherwise valuable book simply because of its flights of moral indignation.

The author's approach to the antisemitism question is distinctly theological but is this the right approach to a sociological disease in a secular age? The secularist regards discussion of " deicide " or " the new Israel " as " rumors of forgotten wars and battles long ago," yet antisemitism is endemic here and now in our society and might become epidemic at any moment. I say this not in criticism of Eckardt's book but simply as commentary. The book is a highly colored but stimulating report, full of rich insights into a deplorable religious tragedy.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Citta Nuova Editrice: *Studi Tomistici.* 2 *San Tommaso e l'Odierna Problematica Teologica.* Saggi. (Pp. 346, L 5.000); 3 *San Tommaso e Il Pensiero Moderno.* Saggi. (Pp. 330, L 5.000)

Columbia University Press: *Twentieth Century Ethics,* by Roger N. Hancock. (Pp. 240, $10.00)

Editorial Moneda y Credito, *Realitas. Seminario Xavier Zubiri.* I *Trabajos 1972-1973.* (Pp. 514)

The Free Press: *Magic, Faith, and Healing,* ed. by Ari Kiev. (Pp. 492, $2.95)

Instituto Francisco de Vitoria *Francisco Suarez, De Legibus* III, ed. by L. Perefia & V. Abril. (Pp. 414, 850 pesetas)

Inter-Varsity Press: *The Unraveling of America,* by Stephen V. Monsma. (Pp. 228, $4.95); *The Clock Work Image,* by Donald M. Mackay. (Pp. 112, $2.25)

Macmillan Publishing Co.: *Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World,* ed. by Ismail Ragi al Farugi & David E. Sopher. (Pp. 364, 12.50); *Atlas of the Arab-Israel Conflict,* by Martin Gilbert. (Pp. 101, $6.95)

Pflaum Publishing Co.: *Becoming Human. An Invitation to Christian Ethics,* by William E. May. (Pp. 155, $4.50)

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: *Master Eckhart. Parisian Questions and Prologues,* tr. with Introduction & Notes by Armand A. Maurer, C. S. B. (Pp. 123, $3.50)

Prentice-Hall, Inc.: *Readings in Philosophy of Art & Aesthetics.* (Pp. 603, $13.50)

Tulane University: *Tulane Studies in Philosophy.* Vol. XXIII, *Studies in Process Philosophy* I, ed. by Robert C. Whittemore. (Pp. 105, $5.00)

University of Notre Dame, Press: *Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part I of the Summa Logicae,* tr. & introduction by Michael J. Loux. (Pp. 234); *Art and Scholasticism,* by Jacques Maritain, tr. by Joseph W. Evans. (Pp. 240, $9.95 cloth, $3.25 paper)

University of Oklahoma Press: *Philosophy of Beauty,* by Francis J. Kovach. (Pp. 360, $9.95)

Yale University Press: *The Ethics of Fetal Research,* by Paul Ramsey. (Pp. 125, $2.95); *The Practice of Death,* by Eike-Henner W. Kluge. (Pp. 259, $10.00)