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IS LONERGAN'S *METHOD* ADEQUATE TO CHRISTIAN MYSTERY?

"WHAT HAS Athens to do with Jerusalem?" Since Tertullian's question of so long ago, the two have hardly been sister cities; and the theologian who shuttles between these two centers travels a tricky road. To what degree Christian faith has been hellenized by Athenian philosophy; to what degree it has been the destruction of hellenic theology, are large historical questions that continue to tease the current theological scene. Here, as a minor variant to this great question of Tertullian, I would like to ask what Christian faith has to do with theological method. More specifically, what is the relationship of Christian faith to Bernard Lonergan's *Method in Theology?*

St. Paul expressed his conviction that a certain madness would be associated with the faith of Christians (1 Cor 1: 20-25). The Gospel disconcerts our presupposition, becoming a scandal to the practised traditions of the religious and a folly

to the rounded systems of the wise. And theology, as a reflection on such a faith, is likewise vulnerable. In relation to other disciplines, theology is often caught between defending its right to exist and pushing forward its own intelligent concerns.

Now theology must surely aim at being an exact science. However, this degree of exactitude is to be judged from its own inner exigencies and not by its degree of conformity to the precision of mathematics or psychology. Its method is exact in the measure it respects the unique data that are presented. For the Christian, such uniqueness is offered in the Word Incarnate when faith asks "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? " (Rom 8: 35) and when such faith states: " for God so loved the world that he gave his only Son." (Jn 3: 16) There is a scandal, indeed, of particularity at a time when we are beginning to have some inklings of the universal history of man and the galactic proportions of the universe. The tolerance of academe is affronted. If the Christian theologian succeeds in not giving offence, it is probably because he is cautiously restating what to other disciplines is obvious, or that he is regarded as something less than an astrologer.

It is now a few years since Lonergan offered us his *Metlwd.*[1] Anyone engaged in the business of doing theology today will recognize an outstanding contribution when he sees one. Such a book builds up theology's self-respect and helps it to manage its own household. It commends theology as a partner to the other human sciences, as cooperative and concerned in terms of modern culture. The obscurantist and especially the mystified academic colleague have a chance to see that the Christian community is capable of a critical self-awareness along with a sophisticated sense of history and the whole cultural enterprise. Since Lonergan has surefootedly occupied the vantage point of critical self-appropriation, he is in the position to send theology into the arena of learning, not as one of the

[1] London:, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1971. Hereafter cited in the text *as* MT with page number added.

dull, four-footed beasts to be tormented but as a member of the gladiatorial team. For faith shows forth a reasonableness that draws its vigor from the summons that man experiences to transcend himself in the direction of what is truly real, really good, and ultimately holy.

Lonergan has differentiated his task as a methodologist. *Insight* has stressed that any grasp of truth is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. *Method* shows how this must be the case also for religious truth. In his description of the polymorphic structure of consciousness the author of this book brings some sense into the variety of .specializations that theology employs. By developing the notion of religion as the field of self-transcending love he opens the way for an appreciation of the enduring value of religion as a depth and redeeming force in human culture. He allows that such love is expressed and promoted in a multiplicity of traditions, Christian and otherwise. Thereby he secures a foundation not only for tolerance but also for collaboration beyond the bounds of creed and culture. By taking his stand on what is fundamental to all cultures, the self-transcending drive towards authentic values, he offers the promise of a theoretical and practical coherence for the total human enterprise. Through a complex yet integrated analysis of the operations of theology he overcomes any illusion of speaking with " modern man " without becoming thoroughly modern in techniques of knowing. Communication is the genuine fruit of a personal assimilation of truth. And so it is that, if today's theologians are befuddled at the ever increasing complexity of the task, whether they are timidly fibrillating or wildly threshing, Lonergan's *Method* makes a lot of sense.

Our author cites Friedrich Schlegel's words: "A classic is a writing that is never fully understood, but those who are educated and educate themselves must learn more from it." (MT, 161) I apply such a statement to *Method.* The reviews have been written. The Ph. D. theses are worming their way to the light. But now I think it is appropriate to ask some basic questions about the meaning of this book, so that, for

the treatment of whatever it is that ails theology, we might begin to get beyond the prescription to the remedy.

Now, for me, the point at which this "classic ... is never fully understood " turns on the manner in which it respects the distinctively Christian character of theology. I think it is obvious that in this book we have a quite beautiful treatment of religion. The mind must reflect on it since a range of data vitally relevant to man's making of man is openned up. Therein, at least, we have a solid basis for "Religious Studies." Further, in his specific allowance for *Doctrines* as one of the eight functional sperialties, Longeran is demanding a thoroughgoing consideration of the force and content of religious beliefs. This is naturally of special importance for Catholic Theology. Yet, specific when compared to the religious character, and fundamental in relation to the Catholic character, there arises the issue of the Christian character of theological method. And here precisely is my question: how does this theological method take faith in Christ into its inner vitality? How is Lonergan's *Method* alive to the unique, the original, the absolute element in Christian faith? There are some puzzles.

The very asking of this question concerning the manner and degree to which faith in Christ enters into theological method might well indicate that I am thinking of method as a "set of rules to be followed meticulously by a dolt." (MT, xi) Perhaps, to borrow Chesterton's phrase, I am engaged in the elephantine pursuit of the obvious. After all, Lonergan is certainly a Christian theologian and, as a professor in Rome, has written hundreds of pages in Latin on the Incarnation and the Trinity. [2] Nonetheless, we are not discussing the faith or the fortitude of the author; the message of the book is our present concern, and I think there is a decent kind of question there. Any method is, after all, a pattern of operations. To write about such a pattern is obviously to bring such a set of operations to expression and to locate them within a certain

• *De Constitutione Christi; De Verba lnarnato; De Deo Trino* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964).

context. Such an expression communicates an approach to the subject, for it implies a tone, a stress, an attunement, a range of reference, and a field of experience-in a word, a feel for the reality that is engaging the questioning mind. To adapt the phrase of another sage of Toronto, the method is the message.

What, then, is the message that *Method* communicates? More precisely, what message is communicated about the significance of faith in Christ for our manner of doing theology? How does theological method, implicitly or explicitly, arise from and return to our living of the Mystery of Christ, the Word Incarnate, dead and risen, living now in the community of the faithful, continuing his ITJiission as universal Lord? Such questions are almost fundamentalist in their bluntness whilst *Method* is such a refined and delicately balanced piece of work. But I have come to see that there is no easy answer. On this precise and fundamental issue Lonergan is notably elusive.

Before coming to the examination of some key references, it might be as well to indicate some basic presupposotions about Christian theology so that it will be clear with what frame of mind I am reading *Method.* In the hope that I have escaped complete eccentricity on this issue, this might be shared by many others who read this book with attention to its Christian orientation.

First of all, there is the possibility of forestalling this whole question by the rather devastating " Why should Christ make any difference to theological method? " This type of question is quite illuminating. It suggests presuppositions about what is absolute and original in Christian experience, and more basically, an implicit approach to theological knowing. The extremes are clear. Either make theological method into a function of faith, or see faith as any faith, a mere range of data that theology will dispassionately survey in the light of a method designed to ensure such detachment and disinterestness. At this juncture, because of the irrationality of allowing theology to become either the ideology of a sect or a stance

of concerned religious skepticism, all we can demand of a method is that it be not so generalized as to suppress some data for fear of disconcerting its anticipations. The mold can so easily be prepared into which the mystery must fit. The occupational hazard of the methodologist is, I suppose, some kind of unwarranted anticipation of reality.

When, however, we actually consider Christian theology, our question can he answered in one obvious way. Christian faith affects method by demanding that there be a Christology. There is an exigence to express with precision doctrines concerning Christ, the incarnation, the redemption, the saving significance of his death and resurrection, his relationship to the Church, and so forth. Systematics will explore the intelligibility of such doctrines, given a contemporary context, fresh philosophical insights, the advance of scholarship, the extension of the human sciences. That is the obvious answer; but is there not something more? Does not faith in Christ enter into the very foundation of theological method? If our conversion is to him, if in him we see the Father, (Jn 14: 5-11) if all things are made in him, through him and for him, (Col 1: 15-18) does not faith in Christ offer a basis of thought and exploration that can never be reduced to the Christological theory? Does it not become the principle for the revision of all Christologies, and even, in an ultimate sense, of our knowledge of humanity itself? Theology treats of a datum, a " donum," before it considers " data." Such a datum is God's self-communication in Christ. Christ is a living presence to the Christian community to which Christian theologians belong, which invites them to exercise the special office of reflection and teaching. If God has first loved us, (Jn 4: 10 f) theology must promote to fundamental importance the "self-transcendence " of God enacted in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ. The divine self-transcendence precedes and provokes the human. Is not this self-gift of God the foundation of theology rather than man's self transcendence in the direction of the divine? Which is more fundamental to theological thinking? Here we have a question that I regard as basic for a critical reading of *Methocl.*

Then there is the reality of the theologian himself. His personal faith affects his approach, his sensibilities, the range of data he will consider pertinent, the kind of evidence he finds convincing, the authorities he holds to be worth hearing, his inspiration in expression, and the audience with whom he presumes to communicate. Since, in a word, he enters into his work, might we not expect that a specifically Christian experience will animate his explorations and make specific demands on his method? As a member of the Christian community he has access to a range of data and :t type of evidence that has its own originality. His authenticity demands that he appropriate his function with respect to this. Just as it would be bad method to dismiss the judgments of other minds as silly or irresponsible or impious (without due deliberation), it would be just as deficient to hold back from the experience, the insight, the evidences, the certainties of those who find the culmination of their existence in the revelation of God in Christ. Is he not challenged to give utterance to the self-transcendence of a redeeming God who summons man to freedom, a mystery of giving and receiving that is brought to definitive realization in Christ?

In regard to such faith, it is true that the theologian can feel his role to be that of a detached observer, a kind of transcendental camera-man . Perhaps his involvement takes him further so that he is at least a spectator in an interesting game, from time to time contributing his encouragment. He may feel that he is rejected as one who is desecrating the sacred temple by his presence. On the other hand, he may accept a special office within the community of faith, standing neither outside the mystery he reflects on nor bracketting it as an essence to be scrutinized. As radically engaged in the common faith he may offer his critical and expressive powers as a service to the community and as a homage to Mystery from which such a community draws its life.

If a Christian theology is to facilitate a distinctive self-understanding and commitment in the world, it is to be expected that there will be something distinctive about its

method and style as it seeks to bring its unique Word to expression. The " subject matter " should command the nature of the method, and certainly we must be alert against the possibility of allowing a prior method b delineate the subject matter independently. As Karl Rahner has remarked,

In the long run theological methodology will only be convincing when it brings man into immediate contact with the subject matter itself, and in the last analysis this is, once and for all, not faith and the theology that goes with it, but that which is the object of faith, because faith itself is only itself when it surrenders itself to that which it itself is not, even while the man of faith is convinced that this greater entity which he cannot comprehend can become an event in this faith of his.[3]

Theology, let alone its subject matter, can never be reduced to the methodology that the theologian may employ.[4]

I have not the slightest intention of casting any doubt on Father Lonergan's authentically Christian theology. Indeed, his Latin tracts are firmly anchored in the " *vera revelata fidei Christianae* "; *"non a datis sed a veris incipit."* [5] My concern is with the way *Method* can be read; and since I consider it a

[3] Reflections on Methodology in Theology," *Theolo{jicol Investigations II* (London: DLT, 1974), p. 84.

'Rahner, *op. cit.,* p. 83. With specific reference to a chapter in *Method* (Ch.5), see "Some Critical Thoughts on 'Functional Specialties in Theology'," in Foundations of Theology, ed. Philip McShane. S. J. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972) p. 194-196. Lonergan, on p. 233, makes this response: " Clearly functional specialties as such are not specifically theological. Indeed the eight specialties we have listed would be relevant to any human studies that investigated a cultural past to guide its future. Again since the sources to be subjected to research are not specified, they could be the sacred books and traditions of any religion. Finally, while there is a theological principle assigned, still it is not placed in authoritative pronouncements but in the religious conversion that turns men to transcendent mystery; and while I believe such a turn to be always God's gift of gmce, still it becomes specifically Christian conversion when the gift of the Spirit within us is intersubjective with the revelation of the Father in Christ Jesus." The degree to which the specifically Christian conversion is respected in *Method* is our present query.

• See *De Deo Trino II,* p. 20, and also on the development of Lonergan's thought on this point, F. E. Crowe, S. J., "Dogma versus the Self-Correcting Process of Learning," *Foundations of Theology,* pp. 22-40.

work of outstanding importance, and hence should be read, this is surely a valid concern.

Let us now approach the text more directly.

II

As we turn to the text of *Method,* we expect to find in " this framework of creativity" a model, yet " something more than a model " for the theological enterprise, relevant to more than Roman Catholic theologians. (MT, xii) For this purpose Lonergan draws our attention to the phenomenon of religious conversion, the ultimate in self-transcendence, a dynamic state of being in love with God. (MT, 104ff) Concerning this individual and social occurrence much data are to be found. The theologian's own conversion will atune him to the task. (MT, Q71) On this whole matter Lonergan has written with great devotion.

We find it stated that this dynamic state of being in love with God is, in fact, sanctifying grace.[6] As such, it is a gift, indeed, the gift of love. To reinforce this conviction, *Romans 5: 5* is cited with a repetitiousness worthy of St. Augustine.[7] This would indicate that the methodological presupposition is that the Holy Spirit is flooding the hearts of all authentically human beings with his love. I have some hestitation at this point. Is this general reality of religious love as indicated by the somewhat problematical testimony of Heiler to be immediately interpreted as the Christian reality of love communicated to us by the Spirit of Christ?[8] Can the theological theory of grace be so summarily replaced? It seems that Lonergan is suggesting a methodological, though implicit, interpretation

• " The gift we have been describing really is sanctifying grace but notionally differs from it." (MT, 107)

[7] For example, in *Method* we have this text cited on pp. 105, 278, 282, 327, 340; also in his *Philosophy of God and Theology* (Hereafter cited as PGT) (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) pp. 9, 50; "Theology and Man's Future," *Cross Currents* XIX (1969), 458; and many other essays.

[8] A doubt about Heiler's methodology is expressed in Heinz Robert Schlette, *Towards a Theology of Religions* (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1966), pp. 56-58.

of his own through the repeated citation of this text.[9] In his description of the general religious structure of self-transcendence he makes good use of the "love texts" of the New Testament.[10] But an obscurity looms when they appear to illustrate a general transcendental piety rather than the specifically Christian experience to which they natively refer. If the reference is to the specifically Christian, why is the person of Christ methodologically excluded at this point? If not, why cite specifically Christian texts to elucidate a generic religious reality? Is the Holy Spirit really the power enabling such general self-transcendence? I suspect that a more thorough explanation of why Lonergan has used these texts so selectively, and Romans 5: 5 so repetitiously, would give a clue to some of the basic methodological issues that concern us. A slight point? In itself, yes. Insofar as a methodology is being suggested, I think not.

But there is a further aspect to this general state of religious love. It concerns the theologian himself. Is he a mystic enjoying such a reality or a scholar observing it, . . . or both? Both, no doubt. (MT, 251) However, let us take the question further. If, for example, I am a Christian theologian, hopefully I enjoy this state of being in love with God, with God as presented to me in and through Christ. That is, after all, the determining factor of my religious faith. When, then, I observe religious dedication in others, am I, to express it crudely, looking at the same thing? Am I perceiving phenomenologically what I experience and commit myself to in my Christian existence? Doubtless my Christian religious experience will attune me to what is similarly religious in others, but is it to be taken so uniformly as the one dynamic state of being in love with God above all things? *Method* leaves this point fuzzy. In the *Background,* such a state is made known through the data

[9] It remains difficult to know whether Longeran might be adducing these texts as *examples* from within the Christian tradition or is committing himself to a Christian and theological interpretation of religious experience.

[10] MT:I05f for Mk 12:30; Rom 5:5; 8:88; Gal 5:22; and in PGT, 9£ there is also Deut 6: 4f and 1 Cor 13.

that various disciplines bring forward, Phenomenology, Comparative Religion, History, and so forth. In the *Foreground,* this state of religious love has become the theologian's own conversion. Now, of course, there is every reason for both being basic to *Method,* the former as data to be interpreted, the latter as the principle of interpretation, the theologian's own horizon of conversion.

Yet a confusion begins and persists when both are named " being in love " in this religious sense. The identification of both as the one Christian love poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit is a theological option. It is nonetheless vulnerable. What might have been intended as a flexible methodological description seems to be already implicitly Christian, so that the specifically Christian is read into the general phenomenon. It could be that the general phenomenon embraces the specifically Christian, which not only raises a theoretical issue but makes one ask what the New Testament texts are doing here. I doubt that either is completely the case, but since Lonergan is at pains to build up a framework of creative collaboration, this kind of latent confusion needs to be clarified.

Personally, I rejoice at this attempt to bring a strong spirituality back into the foundations of theology. However, many ways in which the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit can be linked with the process of self-transcendence (-the whole nature-grace problematic is implied here). We invite confusion, if not regression, by identifying the general impulse towards self-transcendence with the activity of the Spirit of Christ, especially when this is a basic, though admittedly implicit, methodological position. Is charity a peak (religious) experience? Is all such experience to be subtly " christened " before theology faces the delicacies of these questions? Hesitations such as these militate against a whole-hearted acceptance of *Method.*

Let us turn now from the general religious determinant of theological method to the specific, in this case, the explicitly acknowledged Mystery of Christ. Christian faith surrenders to Christ as the definitive and irrevocable Word, the Incarnate

One, the revelation of the Father. In the complex event ot the Paschal Mystery, we have the *"concretum universale et personale"* which affords its unique data and stimulates theology to appreciate it as central to human existence. The Christian community celebrates and mediates such a grace. If as Lonergan desires, theology should ground itself in interiority, Christian interiority would give rise to a theology of communion, an intersubjectivity with the Father in Christ, through the love that is the Spirit's gift: "All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son, and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him." (Mt 11: 27) There is no doubt that Christ is central for Lonergan's theology: theology is a knowledge of God " as he is known through the whole Christ, Head and members." (MT, 135) Further, he acknowledges the incarnation of meaning, (MT, 73) that there is an essential intersubjective component in the Christian religion, (MT, 327) that Christians do meet God's love for man in Christ. [11]

How then is *Method* affected by what is specific to Christian faith? Is there a point where this faith in Christ enters into the vitality of theology so that such an experience of God becomes the living ground of theology? Perhaps we would expect that Christian faith would form its own " realm of meaning."

In his treatment of this Christian element Lonergan uses a number of spatial metaphors along with a certain temporal sequence. There is the "prior word " of love and grace that is related to the" outward word of religious expression." (MT, 112) Why grace should be a "word" exactly, is not quite clear; "state," "event," "inspiration," "transformation" might have been expected in this context, since the word here is "any expression of religious meaning or religious value." Whatever the case, this prior word introduces man into an immediacy

[11] " --- the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord." (Rom 8:39)-one of the texts Lonergan quotes in MT, 105. Neither here, nor, as we shall contend, later does he sufficiently develop the methodological bearing of such a text.

with God. It gradually draws him into an immediate relationship with the divine away from the diversity of history, into a state where " image and symbol, thought and word lose their relevance and even disappear." (MT, One does wonder immediately about such a mysticism. If image and symbol, thought and word are ultimately so irrelevant and destined for disappearance, what of sacrament, what of incarnation?

There is, of course, the outward word which is historically conditioned. We are assured that this is not incidental, for it has a constitutive role. ((MT, f) This outer word modifies the reality of the meaning subject as when lovers confess their love, when believers profess their faith, as when communities so declared come to understand themselves. So for faith, there is a word of tradition, of fellowship, of Gospel. And the Gospel is a word announcing to us that God has loved us first, "and has revealed that love in Christ, crucified dead and risen." (MT, 113)

The prior word, then, is somehow complemented by the outward word. At least, it clarifies what is going on in the inner realm of grace experienced in silent, dark zone of mysticism. The experience of immediacy is interpreted through a language of Divine love, through the narration of the mysteries of Christ as the final revelation of the religious depth that man enjoys. This outward word gives the religious a tradition and brings them into a fellowship with one another. It offers them the heartening message of the Gospel.

But it does tell about a revelation reaching, in the fullness of time, a climax in Christ. What is the relationship of the Incarnate Word of revelation with the outward word of religious expression? Is it like any other " outward word," the declaration of an inner state? Does the incarnate event of God's love and self-giving not enter more deeply into the understanding of religious love? At this point, at least, Lonergan seems to make no methodological demand that it should, for "the religious leader, the prophet, the Christ, the apostle, the priest, the preacher announces in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of love that God works within us."

(MT, 113) It appears that Christ, like the prophet before him and the priest after him, merely expresses what is congruent with the hidden, inner, mystic gift of love, through his use of signs and symbols.

A reader might be forgiven for imagining two parallel zones of religiousness, the one prior, inward, hidden, mystical, immediate with regard to God, common to all; the other, secondary, outward, declaratory, historically conditioned, serving what is going on within by way of expression, focus, announcement, explanation, exhortation. It seems that Christ, revelation and incarnation of such love though he be, is assigned to this outer zone.

But soon we come to an elaboration that seems to correct such a possible interpretation. " There is a personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people . . . . " (MT, 119) This is "not just" the gift of love. It is the advent of God's word into the world of religious expression. To what purpose? How is the gift of love surpassed by God's personal entrance into history? We grope for an answer from the text before us:

> Then not only the *inner word* that is God's gift of his love but also the *outer word* of religious tradition comes *from God.* God's gift of his love is matched by his command to love unrestrictedly . . . . The narrative of religious origins is the narrative of *God's encounter with his people.* . . . Finally, the word of religious expression is *not just the objectification* of the gift of God's love; in a *privileged* area, it is also a specific meaning, *the .word of God himself.* (MT, 119) (Italics mine).

The inner word, the gift of God's love, and the outer word are both from God. Yet this outward word is no objectification merely. It can occur in a privileged area and thus have the specific meaning of a divine word. It is not only " from God " but is the word" of God." Clearly, then, when theology treats of a " word about God," it treats not just the religious expressions of man but the communications of God himself in human history.

How, then, will such a privileged area affect theological

method? Here, after all, we have a zone of unique data dealing with the presence of God amongst men in human history. Accordingly, theological method will need to adjust to such an area of data, allowing, presumably, for revelation. But as we come to the brink of an answer, the gentle slope suddenly falls away and we are left dangling, for "here we come to questions that are not methodological but theological, questions concerning revelation and inspiration, scripture and tradition . . . . To the theologians we must leave them." (MT, 119)

Indeed. The methodologist does not !eel constrained to leave to the theologians the rather momentous questions concerning the nature of grace, the universality of its occurrence, the significance of world religions; yet, he hands back to theologians the specifics of Christian experience as outside the concerns of method. What is specific does not determine the method, neither as a ground, a scope, or a style of exploration. The method is in possession independent of what is absolute or unique in the field of investigation. I think theologians could be pardoned for indulging a little disappointment when they have such " methodological " matters handed back to them. I think we could have hoped for an understanding of method in theology more responsive to the "subject matter," the occurrence of a redeeming love for man in Christ, in his death, his resurrection, in the communication of his presence, in the vitality of the Church and the promises of salvation beyond it. Yes, we might still be looking for that set of rules that would bolster the efficiency of the meticulous dolt. (MT, xi) But the fact remains we have an obscurity where we are most in need of clarification.

Such complaints may be premature. Lonergan does promise that something will be said on these matters in *Dialectic* and *Foundations.* Nonetheless, despite the immensely valuable material that follows, this basic quandary persists. Theology does indeed profit when the conflicts that agitate the members of Christ are sensitively situated. A greater good would come to Christian theology if we could promote to full awareness the presence of Christ amongst us as the ground out of which

all theolog.ical reflection emerges, even, perhaps, to the point of provoking such conflicts. "The threefold conversion introduces a fundamental and momentous change into the reality that the theologian is." (MT, 270) If this is the case, if the theologian is indeed converted to Christ, I would be inclined to think that the Mystery of Christ would enter into the fundamental vitality of methodology. We do not, after all, make the surrender of faith to a generic reality called " conversion," but to him, as the "eye of faith discerns God's self-disclosures." (MT, 119)

However, the decisive event of God's definitive presence in Christ continues to be located in an awkward exteriority; the inner/ outer language persists, with Christ seemingly situated in the outer zone. Revelation events are related to the all important inner gift as a " counterpart," though through such events God discloses to a particular people the completeness of his love. (MT, 283)

As for the initiating act of God's love, so for the dynamic state of being in love through which man responds. The *inner determinants* of such a state are God's gift and man's consent. This is related to the *outer determinants* which include the store of experience and " the accumulated wisdom of the religious tradition." (MT, 289) We presume that this outer determinant takes in the outer word of Christ and the revelation made in and through him.

"The data ... on the dynamic state of otherworldly love are the data on the process of conversion and development." (MT, 289) We note that the data on the meaning of God's love are not drawn from the Paschal Mystery but from religious experience. Doubtless, theology will be expected to interpret such data in the light of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ in a doctrinal or moral formulation. " The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending." (MT, 291) Theology, when it turns to the loving source of love begins to talk categories pertaining to the economic functions of Father, Son, and Spirit. The outer word declares the inner word; the explicit explanation clarifies the implicit state. (MT, 291)

So the question remains. Is this inner/outer model adequate to the demands of a Christian theology? Is the decisive and all-inclusive event of the Paschal Mystery really so exterior, as an outward clarifying word, albeit a dramatic and symbolic elucidation of the inner transcendental experience? Of course, Lonergan is speaking of grace, but it is so very interior, this "inner grace," (MT, 298, 361) this "gift of the Spirit within," (MT, 327) this "inner gift of God's love," (MT, 360) this "hidden inner gift." (MT, 362) .

Yet our author reassures us toward the end of the book when he cautions that " Religious conversion, if it is Christian, is not just a state of mind or heart. Essential to it is an interpersonal, intersubjective component." (MT, 327) A rather belated assurance, perhaps, but certainly an indication of the solution to the problem we have been raising. We naturally proceed to the question, what persons are involved in the interpersonal relationship, and what kind of intersubjectivity is implied? We read: " Besides the gift of the Spirit within, there is the outward encounter with Christian witness. That witness testified that of old in many ways God has spoken to us through the prophets but in this latest age through his Son." Hb 1: 1.2) So for theology, there are special basic terms naming "God's gift of his love and Christian witness." (MT, 348)

Obviously, we have a statement concerning the essential Christian component of conversion and an indication of basic terms for a specifically Christian theology. Nontheless, I still have the impression that the person and mystery of Christ is oddly exterior to theological method, even though there is no doubt that Lonergan understands the Christian message to be incarnate (in what sense?) in Christ, dead and risen. (MT, 364) Christ is present to Christian reflection through the outward mediation of a message, a testimony, as an outer word. As it is with conversion, so it is with the Church itself as the community of conversion. It is the result of " the outer communication of Christ's message and the inner gift of God's love." (MT, 361) And the Christian principle at the founda-

tion of the church community" conjoins the inner gift of God's love with its outer manifestation in Christ Jesus and in those who follow him." (MT, 360) Such a message is constructive since it " crystallizes the hidden inner gift of love into overt Christian fellowship." (MT, 362)

We do not seem to get beyond a message which is " conjoined " to, " manifests," " crystallizes " the inner hidden gift.

In *Philosophy of God and Theology* [12] there are a few tantalizing fragments that suggest an attempt at a more precise formulation of the specifically Christian component of faith, and proportionately, of theology. The author continues with his inward/outward model,. for the Paschal Mystery focuses and inflames the love that is given inwardly. (PGT, 10) However, when pushed by his questioners, he locates the specifically Christian element in " the intersubjective element of love ... inasmuch as God is expressing his love in Christ as well as giving you the grace in your heart. and this element in missing when the incarnate Lord is missing." (PGT, 20) The function of Christ is, accordingly, this outward expression of love, a manifestation and a focal point. When invited to give a further clarification, he answers:

> The religious experience of the Christian is *specifically distinct* from religious experience in general. It's *intersubjective.* It's not only this gift of God's love, but it has an *objective manifestation* of God's love in Christ Jesus. That intersubjective component creates a difference and because it creates a difference, insofar as you advert to that intersubjective element in you (r) love with Christ, you're proceeding from *experience.* Your question is coming out of *experience.* It's insofar as you are related to Christ as God. (PGT, 67) [13] (Italics mine)

[12] These lectures given at Gonzaga University in repeat a good deal of the text of *Mnhod* on the points considered, though there are some valuable clarifications and developments.

[13] The question-answer format of the discussion at the end of each lecture, though informal in expression, allowed for particular points to be raised which were very relevant. Naturally little could be developed. I hesitate then, to put too much weight on them, though I regard these conversations as good indications of the author's thought.

So we have indications that (i) Christian experience is specifically distinct from religious experience in general; (ii) this distinction resides precisely in intersubjectivity; (iii) that this intersubjectivity is not only the experience of the gift of love but is aligned to an objective manifestation of such love in Christ; (iv) such experience is finally a relationship to Christ as God.

For the moment, we might overlook the possibility of a certain terminological confusion between the genus and species of religious experience on the one hand, and the actual experience of grace and the fully articulated Christian awareness of such a state, on the other. The point at present is this: if we are proceeding from experience, and if such an experience is notably one of intersubjectivity with Christ, it would appear that a good deal more is demanded of theological method than the model of self-transcendence. The Eielf-disclosure and self-gift of God would appear to be the determinant, implying a proportionate stress on the category of revelation, the experience of originality not unlike the impact of a great work of art.

Instead of this we have a stress on a self-transcendence on the subject that bifurcates in an inner and outer dimension. The outward word is subordinated to the inner, prior word. It is the clarification, the crystallization, the focus of the hidden inner gift, the manifestation of the interior grace. The specifically Christian enactment of conversion is not concretely appreciated, it seems to me, in the community being held to its experience through special symbols and sacraments, through a communication in a common Spirit issuing from the total event of Christ. Rather, in Lonergan's presentation, the Christian component is more like the naming of an anonymous experience. The Christian event is quite awkwardly placed, and to accept this uncritically into a basic method of Christian theology would dull the ability of such a method to respond to its unique data.

Method, consequently, is pulled between the sophisticated thesis of "Anonymous Christianity," [14] a rather uncritical as-

[10] Cf. Schlette, *op. cit.* And, of course, the many occasions on which Karl

sumption that there is a universal religiousness that eventually gets itself baptized if it should occur in the right tradition, and the full articulation of Christian and even Catholic faith. Clearly Father Lonergran is attempting to combine (a) the happy fact that "there's lots of evidence of people leading extremely good lives without being Christians" (PGT, 19); b) a maximalist exegesis of biblical texts concerning God's universal salvific will as in 1 Tim 2: 4; c) an actual outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon all men of good will (Rom *5:* 5); d) the conviction that love is the one thing necessary for salvation (1 Cor: 13); e) all this essentially associated with faith in Christ (1 Cor 12: 3); f) the mediation of such grace in the historical context of the Church; g) the dynamics of growth in understanding within a cultural context.

How all these elements are united, how each bears on theological method, are large questions. Clearly a range of options is legitimate. But to leave one's option imprecisely stated is to allow a dislocation to affect one's method. If there are bad joins in the framework, the collaboration and creativity suffer.

To round off these comments on the text of *Method,* two general remarks will help to situate our line of critique more precisely. The first deals with Lonergan's notion of the transcendental realm of the mystic; the second touches on his treatment of grace.

There is a strong mystical emphasis in *Method.* This is in obvious contrast to the style of Lonergan's doctrinal works. Because of this spiritual depth, some of the emphases that are elsewhere apparent are brought into clearer light. Transcendence differentiates into a special realm when one enters into the " ultima solitudo " and attains a state of mediated immediacy with the divine.[15] This mystical world of meaning is the emergence of the gift of God's love as ‹t distinct realm:

Rahner has treated this matter, e.g., "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," *Theological Investigations V* (London: DLT, 1966) pp. 115-134.

[16] On this matter of mystical experience Lonergan seems to have constantly in mind the "peak experience" category as developed by Maslow (Cf. MT, 29 note I) and the work of his fellow Jesuit, William Johnston, S. J., *ibid.,* and MT, 278, note 4; and 342, note 7. Johnston shows great familiarity with the Zen mystical tradition.

It is this emergence that is cultivated by a life of prayer and self-denial and, when it occurs, it has the twofold effect, first, of withdrawing the subject from the realm of common sense, theory, and other interiority into a " cloud of unknowing " and then of intensifying, purifying, clarifying, the objectifications referring to the transcendent whether in the realm of common sense, or of theory, or other interiority. (MT,

The twofold effect referred to, would, I presume, resonate in some way in performance of theology. The mystic is drawn into the cloud of unknowing as his knowledge becomes more dark and pure. The objectifications occurring in the other realms of meaning are set in a more properly religious light. Well, here we have an interesting question, especially if, in a happy coincidence, theologians are also mystics. The incarnate, intersubjective, sacramental mode of the divine presence will call forth a special understanding of this transcendental realm. What really is the nature of this realm for Christian faith?- for John the Evangelist who contemplated the Father in his vision of Christ, for Paul the Apostle who esteems all his " anonymous Christianity " as loss for the sake of knowing Christ (Phil 3: 4-11)? [16] I think Christian theology has reason to be quite critical of any general mystical realm if only for the reason that it does not look on Christ as an objectification referring to the transcendent in some other realm of meaning. It seems that the Christian transcendental realm is populated by a John and a Paul, by an Ignatius of Antioch, a Bernard of Clairvaux, a Francis of Assissi, by a Bonaventure contemplating the Cross and a Thomas Aquinas adoring the Eucharist, by a Julian of Norwich, a Teresa of Avila and an Alphonsus Liguori in their appreciation of the humanity of Christ, by a Teilhard de Chardin when he perceives the whole cosmos progressing in Christogenesis. Can we not recognize an espe-

[16] I doubt whether the Pauline experience has been sufficiently accounted for in the usual theology of the anonymous Christian. Before his conversion he would seem to qualify on aU counts for that title. After his conversion he seems more impressed by " the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord " than this type of theology allows for.

cially incarnate realm of transcendent meaning? This would give Christian theology a special confidence, and liberate its proper creativity.

Lonergan's treatment of mysticism highlights darkness and withdrawal.[17] Even if theologians are not mystics (they do like books[18]), they should not be distracted from the rich data regarding specifically Christian ecstasy as it goes beyond even a "methodological" realm of transcendence in the self-forgetfulness of a love that is both contemplative and active, energizing the believer with the mystery of vitality issuing from him "who died but now lives for evermore." (Rev 1: 18)

There is, indeed, a tacit element in Christian theology. It is a fundamental mysticism that leads not only to the darkness of negation. The cloud of unknowing is also the cloud of God's glory. The "via negationis" yields to the "via eminentiae Christi." Human ideas are not only challenged but human spiritualities are broken open by the presence of the Word Incarnate.[19]

With regard to grace. Lonergan has transposed the theoretical scholastic notion of sanctifying grace into an experience

[17] "When finally the mystic withdraws into the *ultimata solitudo,* he drops constructs of culture and the whole complicated mass of mediating operations to return to a new mediated immediacy of his subjectivity reaching for God." (MT, 29) Mystical experience is one instance of a "retreat from differentiation" (MT, 58f); a "withdrawal from objectification" (MT, 77); a withdrawal from other realms of meaning (MT,266); " . . . withdrawing from the world mediated by meaning into a silent and all-absorbing self-surrender in response to God's gift. . . ." (MT,278)

[18] "Question 8: It seems, then, that the authentic Christian mystic is best suited to explore the meaning of God.

Lonergan: The trouble with mystics is that they are not interested in these questions. They consider all these books as rather silly and superfluous. They don't even want to read books on mysticism. While they have certain advantages-they're beautiful persons-you can't interest them in joining any investigation.

Question S (Continued: What good are they to theology?

Lonergan: They're good to the Church . . . . . The mystical brings things to life again and the organization keeps them going even though you have no more mystics . . . . " (PGT, 62)

[19] See Anthony J. Kelly, "The Gifts of the Spirit: Aquinas and the Modern Context," *The Thomist* XXXVIII (1974), 198-281, especially 215-219.

of being in love with God. To use the category of sanctifying grace was to speak at a stage of meaning when the world of common sense was neither sufficiently distinct from nor grounded in the world of interiority. [20] On the other hand, to speak in terms of the dynamic state of being in love with God pertains to a stage of meaning when this world of interiority has been explicitly made the ground for common-sense and theoretical speech. Lonergan's method, then, would require that we first speak of the gift of God as an experience and only after that go on to the objectification of grace in more theoretical categories. (MT, 10'7) The older theology did, however, speak of interiority (but not with exact differentiation, for it used either a common-sense figurative type of description or, in severe contrast, a metaphysically-based type of langauge, as when it referred to grace as an infused entitative habit. (MT, 120) However, in *Method*, when we have interiority promoted to a distinct realm of meaning, " we begin with a description of religious experience, acknowledge a dynamic state of being in love without restrictions, and later identify this state with sanctifying grace." (MT, 120)

I cannot object to this general procedure. Nonetheless, I must point out that there is more evidence of interiority in the older language than the common sense descriptions of figurative and symbolic speech. There is an awareness of communion. It spoke of grace being the " *gratia capitalis Christi* " with whom we constitute *"unica mystica persona* " as in Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 8, a. 1; q. 19, a. 4; q. 48, a. 2 ad 1). It spoke of grace as communion with the Trinity, a possession and enjoyment of the divine persons as they conform man to themselves. (Cf. I, q. 43, a 3; q. 43, a. 5 ad 3).

If this older theology related grace to the mystery of God as revealed in Christ, the transposition that Lonergan has attempted is not as neat as might appear. He omits the very personal component essential to the older systematization. In

•• Cf. 'A technical Note.' (MT, 120ff)

his scheme the Christocentric and Trinitarian orientation seem to become a casualty to the otherwise justifiable distinction between the various stages of meaning.[21] There results an empty space at the foundation of his method. Not only is the Christian bearing of grace downplayed, but even the gratuitousness of the divine communication is blurred. If Lonergan feels justified in taking over from the older theology the "unrestrictedness " and. " loving" quality of grace, why does he not include the Trinitarian, paschal, ecclesial components as well? Are not each of these susceptible to an experimental grounding? What really are the criteria for such a selective process?

The phenomenon of the experience of a dynamic state of being ultimately in love must certainly have a place in theology. The Word resonates; and the unstinted creativity of the Spirit is fruitful beyond the explicit confines of the Christian communion. But to use such a dimly sketched state to replace the older theoretical system seems a little too pat. The Christian component becomes almost an afterthought, to be introduced after that general though profound impulse towards self-transcendence governing Lonergan's methodology. And this despite the amplification of this state with the seven qualities that Heiler has discovered.[22] But that has its own problems.[23]

And so we return to our question. How does the definitive reality of Christ belong to *Method?* How does the dynamism of the Paschal Mystery modify the vitality o1 theological research? Must the Christian Mystery conform to the pre-arranged process of a theological method? As we have said before, a method has its own way of being a message.

[21] The older theology, of course, treats of the *missiones visibiles et invisibiles* of the divine persons. This is not Lonergan's " inner and outer word," if only for the reason that the scholastic theology is treating explicitly of the Trinity and its self-communication.

[22] " --- there is at least one scholar on whom one may call for an explicit statement on the areas common to such world religions as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Toaism," (MT,l09)

[23] Cf. note 8.

ill.

In a brief concluding section it will perhaps be useful to indicate two areas in which Lonergan's method might be brought into helpful confrontation with other theological methods. These are Mystery and Aesthetics.

1. MYSTERY

The notion of mystery is beyond a doubt quite essential for Lonergan. He cites Lateran IV and Vatican J.2[4] Further, he writes of an orientation to transcendent mystery as basic to systematic theology. (MT, 341) We have seen that he stresses the apophatic nature of religious thought, yet at the same time calls our attention to that other-worldly love that holds and grasps the man of faith. (MT, !Z4!Z) Such a mystery gives rise to problems as when believers begin to speak about and question their religious meanings. God becomes an object of enquiry inasmuch as questions about religious meanings arise in a given world of meanings. (MT, 342) And adoration itself does not exclude words, least of all when men worship together. (MT, !Z44) Such words have meaning in a cultural context; and here problems arise for theology. For this ongoing cultural context in which mystery is to be adored is " anything but free of problems." In such a context God is no comprehended object but the implied term of our transcendental orientation, and it is this orientation that provides the primary and fundamental meaning of the term "God." (MT, 341)

Undoubtedly, mystery is essential to Lonergan's scheme. but I would hesitate to say that it was a formal determinant of his method. The notion of problem seems to be a stronger point of organization. Theology is to answer specific questions in specific cultural contexts, to solve the problems that a responsibility to mystery has given rise to.

It would be profitable to take, say, Karl Rahner's approach and thoroughly contrast it to mystery in *Method.* This would

[24] *DS* 806; 3019 (MT, 341).

be a major task. Here, however, I might just indicate a few points.

Rahner's method is also "transcendental." [25] Yet there is a contrast. His primary and fundamental way of naming God would come more from the divine self-disclosure and communication: the interrelated moments of the incarnation and grace summon forth and sustain a transcendental orientation, to allow eventually for a transcendental method within the "givenness" of the Christian event. [26] And transcendental method is but one moment of theology. [27] The basic determinant is the self-communication of the Mystery that has occurred in Christ. The mystery is primary, and the transcendental orientation and its subsequent methodological articulation is a secondary consideration.

Out of such a sensitivity, Rahner has criticized Lonergan's approach. [28] He has further declared his radical mistrust of anything that would reduce theology to a methodology. [29] For him, the business of theology is to reduce all the variety and complexity of human and Christian experience to the original mystery. Mystery, not method, is fundamental. But theology must speak about method, and he admits himself that he has been rather slow to speak on this topic. [80] When it does, however, it will be convincing insofar as it brings man into contact

•• For example, "Reflections on Methodology in Theology," *Theological Investigations* // London: DLT, 1974), pp. 69-114. See especially pp. 84-101. On p. 69, note 1, Rahner notes the places where he has treated of Mystery.

08 " . . . this transcendental-theological disclosure of an *a priori* reference on the part of the knowing subject to its specific object is *de facto* possible only after this object itself has revealed itself, and so communicated to the subject the knowledge of its own reference to that object as a matter for conscious reflection." Rahner, "Reflection. . . ." 98.

•• " Certainly transcendental theology is not simply the whole of theology and must not claim to be anything more than one part or aspect of it."
" Reflections . . .", p. 84. Also p. 99f.

•• *Of.* note 4.

•• " Thus I may be permitted to express by decided and radical mistrust of any attempt to reduce theology in any adequate sense to the methodology employed in it, or to reformulate it in these terms." *op.cit.,* p. 88.

•• *Op. cit.,* p. 68f.

with the true "subject matter" of theology; when, in a word, it is an introduction to the mystery. Rahner clearly understands theology more and more as a mystagogy. [31] The *a priori* of method is always in the light of the *a posteriori* of Mystery, whether theology talks of the Trinity, the incarnation. or eschatology. All this is to say that the self-communication of God is the possibility, the ground and the goal of man's self-transcendence. In this light, theological thinking emerges from and returns to a presence.

I would consider, then, that the notion of mystery, for Rahner, really enters into the inner vitality of his transcendent method. His method is designed to be specifically responsible to the mystery whereof its treats. Thus, " mystery " is a rather powerful notion, and in considerable contrast to such a category as *Method* describes, where it is more a surplus notion, almost to the discomfort of theology, as the source of problems. Because Rahner would view mystery as the incomprehensible nearness of God to man mediated to us through Christ and his Spirit, theology must be considered as the " science of mystery." [82] He recognizes that this may be a hard saying for the modern scientific mentality, but, at least, this is where its distinction lies.

In such an understanding theology is not in the first place a solving of problems but a reduction to Mystery. [83] Every aspect of man's increasingly complex existence must be led back to the healing mystery from which come our origins and our hope. Consequently, theology has a language to learn, a

[31] " Precisely today it is of the utmost importance that we shall understand the significance which theology has a *reductio in mysterium,* i.e., we must understand that this *reductio* constitutes not a regrettable imperfection in theology, but rather that which is most proper to it of its very nature." *op. cit.,* 101.

[32] P. lOft.

[38] Rahner poses the question: " It is not possible to understand even the history of dogma and theology up to the present as a *reductio in mysterium* constantly renewed, constantly made more radical, of all theological statements, so that precisely the believer actively engaged in theology knows better than anyone else that any theological statement is only truly and authentically such at that point at which man willingly suffers it to extend beyond his comprehension into the silent mystery of God?" "Reflections . . .", p. 108.

way of speaking of, and I might say, toward mystery.[34] One would presume that this would be a truly personal kind of language, a communication of ultimate hope, a way of intimating, evoking, of wonder, surprise and joy. But this belongs to communications, and to the communicators we must leave it.

To sum up, what is central for Rahner appears to be a surplus for Lonergan. *Method* tends to repulse mystery to its final impregnable outpost within the divinity. so agressive is its scientific onrush. Rahner would see the business of theology to be precisely the fostering of the sense of mystery that calls forth, sustains, and pervades our theological procedures.

Q. AESTHETICS

There are a few points to be noted under this heading. The simple fact is, I think, quite obvious: Lonergan has not given aesthetics any central role in his theological methodology, and he makes quite an early option on this.[35] He does give us, however, the components of a certain kind of aesthetic theology, for he has written about art, about feelings, about judgments of value, about differentiations of consciousness. Indeed, he considers the refinement and education of feelings to be of great moment, even doctrinally, for the development of faith and its authentic expression. (MT, 3QO) Nonetheless he has made his options, and they are clear. He establishes his theological method by grounding it in transcendental method, the method behind all the methods. He arrives at this by examining the implications of the conspicuously successful natural and

" " I believe that theology today has very much to learn before it speaks in a manner that man can achieve a direct, effective and clear recognition of the special quality of this language." *op. cit.*, p. 112. On this whole matter of mystery in Lonergan's theology there is a very keen article by John Carmody, "Lonergan on the Divine Missions." *Laval Theologique et Philosophique* XXX (1974)' 315-332.

35 - Thought on method is apt to run in some one of three channels. In the first, method will be conceived more as an art than a science . . . Such, I think, must be the origin of all thought on method ... Such also will remain the one way in which refinements and subtleties . . . *will be communicated."* (MT,3) Lonergan's own thought will run in the " third channel."

human sciences of today.[36] As scientific emphasis becomes stronger, any aesthetic concern is suppressed. It surfaces now and then with a touch of humour, a disarming simplicity, a mystical insight, and especially in the almost lyrical expressiveness that is occasionally manifest. So, from this more specific point of view, the same question arises that has guided the whole of this study: has he made methodological options insufficiently alert to the kind of reality that is being investigated?

More than anything else I know of, the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar challenges Lonergan's approach, although I have not discovered either of these thinkers offering any comment on the other's work.[37] Von Balthasar's emphasis is to draw attention to the " glory " of revelation as it is climaxed in Christ. This is the startling originality of the Word of God that cannot be anticipated by man's transcendental awareness. It is a self-validating splendor like that of a great work of art that does not fulfil any need primarily but rather provokes the exigence to reorganize our cosmological and anthropological knowledge for the purpose of being truly open to the radiant form of the Word.[38] Accordingly, aesthetics must enter into the very heart of theology; [39] and the task of the theologian

[36] " First, we shall appeal to the successful sciences to form a preliminary notion of method. Secondly we shall go behind the procedures of the natural sciences to something both more general and more fundamental, namely the procedures of the natural sciences to something both more general and more fundamental, namely the procedur.es of the human mind. Thirdly, in the procedures of the human mind, we shall discern a transcendental method ... Fourthly, we shall indicate the relevance of transcendental method in the formulation of other, more special methods appropriate to particular fields." (MT, 4)

[37] See especially the magisterial *Herrlichkeit. Eine Theologische Aesthetik,* I-III, (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1961-1969). Also for a very convenient sketch of the main thesis of the major work, see *Love Alone* (New York: Herder amd Herder, 1969); and the essay, "Revelation and the Beautiful" in *Word and Revelation* (Montreal: Palm, 1964), 121-164.

[38] See *Love Alone,* pp. 7-50, for a discussion of the three basic approaches to revelation.

[89] Von Balthasar sums up his method: " ... a theological aesthetic in the dual sense of a study of perception, and a study of the obj•ective self- expression of the divine glory; it will try to demonstrate that this theological approach, far from being a dispensable theological by-road, is in fact the one possible approach to

is like that of the art critic.. He must continually reduce the many details and fragmentary perceptions of the masterpiece to the one simple, unanticipated radiant form.[40] Concretely this entails reducing all the images and experiences of Christian life to the glory of God's love presented in the paschal mystery of Christ.

Von Balthasar's approach has its roots in a dissatisfaction. He thinks that, on the one hand, medieval thought tended to comprehend all reality under the notion of object, in a time when there was little development of the epistemological status of the free personal subject. On the other hand, post-Cartesian thought, despite its "subjective turn" remained insensitive to the genuine otherness of personal reality, with its inclination to" posit" things that it does not know with sufficient clarity.[41] He reacts vigorously to this tendency to be overdetermined in one's methodological anticipations.[42] Indeed, he would take knowledge of a " thou," a personal, free other to be the primary instance of the meaning of human knowing.[43] This brings with it the implication of allowing for a self-disclosure that cannot and must not be methodologically anticipated if we are truly to know the other in his reality.[44]

In such a context, he elaborates his theology of " Herrlichkeit," of a glory that bows to no necessity other than that of being what it uniquely is. Consequently, he keenly guards

the heart of theology-the cosmic world-historical approach, and the path of anthropological verification, being secondary aspects, complementary to it." *Love Alone,* p. Sf.

•• *Love Alone,* 44-50; *Herrlichkeit I,* 157; 588; "Revelation and the Beautiful," pp. 151-168.

01 On this matter, see the powerful pages contained in *The God and Modern Man* (New York: Seabury, 1967), Chapters

•• " Christianity is destroyed if it lets itself be reduced to transcendental presuppositions of man's self-understanding whether in thought or in life, in knowledge or in action." *Love Alone,* p. 48. See the whole of the Chapter, " The Third Way of Love."

•• This is developed in an interesting and challeging manner in *The God Question .. ,* pp. 81-89.

•• See the positive and negative consideration of the proposition, " only love can be believed," in *Love Alone,* pp. 68-80.

against any theological *apriorism.* He certainly allows for what he calls the "religious apriori." [45] This is related to man's nature as a spiritual being. A natural "light" calls forth the experience of contingency and, in a negative way, of infinity; and thus it allows for the formation of symbols of the divine. All this leads to the longing and sense of fragility that is proper to the creature. [46]

But this " religous a priori " is not the " theological apriori " which is proper to revelation. [47] This comes as a surprise to the human spirit. It is a " shock," overwhelming man with an offer of intimacy with God. [48] This is experienced not as fulfilling an essential need within man but as a final, yet gracious fulfilment of human existence. [49] We could say, then, that the glory of revelation, as such a surprise and shock and even a scandal to man " transcends " our experience of transcendence. It leads to a unique mediation, a sole mediator, confronts us with the drama of the cross, witnesses to the glory of the resurrection. The Gospel contains too much failure and too much success, being as it the story of an excessive love.

A consequence follows should we enter into this kind of thought. We cease to think of human transcendence as a more or less neatly integrated movement to successive levels of self-transcending. Even "ultimate concern" is not enough to express the kind of love the Spirit gives. A sense of final intelligibility and value, of wonder and even awe still stop short at the transforming knowledge of Christ. The Gospel is at once

•• *Herrlichkeit I,* pgs. 31, !'l37, 433. See also, "Characteristics of Christianity", *Word and Redemption* (Montreal: Palm, 1964) !'l3-48.

•• See "God speaks as Man", *Word and Revelation* (Montreal, Palm) pp. 10!'l-106.

[47] *Herrlichkeit I,* p. 15lfl'.

[48] A thorough and well-balanced statement on the nature: grace problematic is to found in von Balthasar's The *Theology of Karl Barth* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971) especially the concluding chapters.

•• " . . . the paradoxical events with which God 'shocks ' sinful man are seen as an invitation and a stimulus to overleap the closed world of infinite ideas and to share in God's self-manifestation and openness, something to which the creaturely condition itself points, though unable to attain it." (" Revelation and the the Beautiful," p. 147.

a cross and a liberation for men, and to respect it theology must refrain from positing its objects i.n this area of surprising grace. If any " thou " can be obscureJ by the anticipations of any " I," this is all the more so with regard to the living God. The particularity of the God's Word in disconcerting. The Mystery remains incalculable, for such wisdom can be dismissed as a folly and such love rejected as unholy. It might well elude what we call transcendental and dislocate what we take to be methodological.

Theology has its own essential, intrinsic aesthetics. In some fundamental way, if it is to be aware of what it is about, such a mode of knowing must acknowledge the ecstasy of its response to the glory of the Word, to become a poetry as well as a prose, a story as well as a statement, a witness as well as a research, a contemplation as well as an analysis, a joyful communication as well as the serious tension of science.

Here, then, from the points of view of Mystery and Aesthetics as such themes are representatively elaborated in Rahner and von Balthasar respectively, we have areas of general but, I think, wholesome critique of Lonergan's *Method.* I have briefly indicated these two aspect of theological method since they they are both related to a specifically Christian type of methodology and hence have a bearing on the basic question we have been asking, namely, how does faith in Christ affect theological method?

Conclusion:

This preliminary probe into Lonergan's *Method,* especially when it has been restricted to such a narrow area, has never aimed to attack the author or his book in any radical sense. He has offered a model, and in many ways I am sure it has been more than a model, for we have been offered a way of making sense of the many ways in which many religions and faiths might be investigated. I have demurred at the point where this general model might be uncritically applied to a specifically Christian task. Those concerned to defend *Method* at every point will understandably assert that everything I

have commended is either implicitly there already in Longergan's thought under the headings of "conversion" and "sublation " [50]–or that it has no place there, since in confusing faith and theology, in failing to differentiate my consciousness, I am, like Barth, [51] lacking in intellectual conversion. This is not unlikely, and, what is more, I freely acknowledge that I am lacking in moral and religious conversion as well. But this is all the more reason why I prefer to regard theology as primarily an intelligent " ministry of the Word " originating, even as one thinks theologically from a receptivity and responsiveness to the " datum " of God's communication in Christ, mediated to me in the life, communion, and mission of the Church. I prefer this to the elitist standpoint of my own conversion. It seems to me that it is a less ideological stance, a less gnostic attitude, to take as one's foundation the self-communication of God instead of the general self-transcendence of man, however much that is sustained by the " outer word."

These few remarks have had, of course, an explicitly Christian concern. One does wonder, however, how the theologians of Jewry, Islam, Hinduism. Buddhism would adjust to the model Lonergan commends. The least that might be said is that they begin to think from phenomenologies of self rather different from "self" that our author commends, or at least envisages. [52]

Then, in this multi-media cultural context, Lonergan's mode of approach strikes me as very visualist despite his disclaimers about the visualist myth of knowing. His sensorium is hardly aural or tactile, even though he has given a generous infusion of mystical experience to theological method, even though he

•• " ... what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context." (MT, £41).

61 ▫ Only intellectual conversion can remedy Barth's fideism." (MT,318)

52 On this point, an excellent article by John T. Marcus, "East and West: Phenomenologies of Self and the Existential Bases of Knowledge," *International Philosophical Quarterly* (March 1971), pp. 5-48.

knows " that fidelity to the word engages the whole man." (MT, His underlying metaphors are predominantly spatial and visual: self-transcendence, horizon, horizontal and vertical liberty, insight and perspective, levels of consciousness, stages and realms of meaning, frameworks, inner and outer words, transposition and contexts, and so forth. The accent is on the linear, the progressive, the controlled, the methodical. Other sensoria, as matrices of expression, would accent the wholeness of reality and man's participation in it, with a consequent stress on mystery, symbol, and the personal word.

Finally, perhaps everything we have been saying adds up to this: the need of theology to become more Marian as a service to the given Word. Only such a feminism can make theological method adequately Christian. But that pertains, perhaps, to the theology of method rather than to method in theology.

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AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMA IN A HEIDEGGERIAN CONTEXT: A NON-THEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THEOLOGICAL HERESY

ONE ROLE that falls to systematic theology is that of re-conceptualizing traditional doctrines in terms of shifting cultural and theoretical frameworks. What this essay attempts within modest limits is to show what dogmatic development would look like if it were considered within a Heideggerian context. The theoretical framework in which doctrinal development is usually considered is, we believe, implicitly Aristotelian. Development itself is as much a feature of experience as permanence, and a discussion of the nature of development leads into ontology, into the question about being, about identity and permanence, change and becoming. Even so diverse thinkers as Rahner and Whitehead acknowledge this point: dogmatic development is one characteristic feature of the world that must be comprehended in a general metaphysics of being and becoming.[1] But there is something about Aristotle's ontology which is uncomfortable with change, which favors the substantial and the permanent, and which supports an understanding of truth as the permanently valid and immutable. In dogmatic theology this approach to being translates into doctrines whose meanings can be fixed for all times and which thereafter determine the limits of orthodoxy. Now, we do not mean to deny any dogma, nor to shift the ontological weights from being to becoming, from permanence to process, although it does seem to us that a theory of dogmatic develop-

[1] See Karl Rahner's essays, " The Development of Dogma" and " Considerations on the Development of Dogma" in *Theological Investigations*, Vols. I and IV (Baltimore, 1961 & 1966), and A. N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (New York, Part V, Chapte;r

ment must take novelty seriously; the history of dogma is not the endless repetition or re-conceptualization of old truths. Nor do we advocate a dehellenizing of dogma. Heidegger himself moves behind the Greeks in his task of destroying the history of ontology in order to recapture the meaning of the original Greek inquiry about being. It is precisely because the question of being and becoming is so important to a given conceptual framework that we have tied our concern with dogmatic development to ontology. However, our concern will be to show that the axis of the discussion must be shifted somewhat, for the notion of being, at least on Heidegger's terms, not only cannot be conceptualized but conceptualization itself is inimical to a proper grasp of the question about being. For this reason he spoke of destroying the history of ontology. In his manner of distinguishing art and science Aristotle elevated theoretical knowing to a primacy among the ways we have of appropriating the real. Metaphysical knowledge in scholastic philosophy is dominated by the bias towards theory and science, yet it is out of such a context that theology emerges as the fuller viewpoint on man and his world, the divine science itself.[2] In this essay we shall try to move behind this context in Heideggerian fashion.

In *De Veritate,* q.l, a.l, St. Thomas asked about truth and in what sense the true is convertible with being. " *True* expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power"; when the intellect conforms to things, to being, we can properly speak of the true: "the knowledge of a thing is a consequence of this conformity; therefore, it is an effect of truth." [3] Strictly speaking, therefore, the true is not that which is; that is the definition of being. But insofar as being, that which is, is grasped by intellect, we add to the notion of being the notion of truth. By their ontological conformity to the divine intellect things are true: " Even if there were no human intellects,

[2] For a neo-Thomist exposition of this see Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York, 1957), Chapter 20.

[3] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Truth,* Trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S. J. (Chicago, 1952), Vol. I , p. 6.

things could be said to be true because of their relations to the divine intellect. But if, by an impossible supposition, intellect did not exist and things did continue to exist, then the tials of truth would in no way remain.'"

St. Thomas points out in the same article that the divine tellect measures things, just as the artifacts of man are ured by human intellect. Our intellects are measured by ural things. But what of artifacts? Are works of art true only in the sense that they are measured by the intellect of the ist? An affirmative answer to this question will mislead us, for there is the prior issue of the relation of created to uncreated truth; this is the primary sense in which things are called true *(ibid.,* a.4). The artist is in a world where the truth of things derives from the divine intellect; what he brings forth in the work of art always supposes this prior fact in the very content and manner of his apprehension of things. To this we shall return when we inquire whether dogmas are better understood in terms of natural things or artifacts. For now let us point out that when dogmas are defined and made binding *sem;per et ubique* upon the faithful, the framework out of which dogmas arise takes being as that which is and truth as our grasp of being. Dogma is a truth expressed in a proposition, embedded in a cultural and theoretical matrix, which concerns divine revelation. But the notion of being and the notion of dogmatic truth lie in some tension, because " that which is " as reflected in dogmatic statements .sounds permanent and always identical, while dogmas emerge from contexts that are themselves torical, cultural, advancing, conditioned. Like the principles of Aristotelian science, dogmatic statements sound distinctly non-temporal, universal, and necessary against the background of Aristotle's ontology and the few passages we cited from the *De Veritate.* Temporality does not make a difference for that notion of being. The tension between being and truth exists on another level in the separation of God's immutability from his involvement in a world of historical process wherein, by vir-

' *Ibid.,* p. 11.

tue of the Incarnation, God himself has a history. For various reasons which we shall not explore, historicity was not a major concern to Aristotle or Aquinas; it is so to us. And so our first appeal to Heidegger can conveniently start with the historicity of man.

In *Being and Time,* II, *5,* Heidegger raises the question as to how we are to regard history and what makes history possible. The ordinary man thinks of history-his history- as a series of moments strung out chronologically between the twin poles of birth and death. These moments are connected from within by his conception of himself as a subject enjoying identity in the stream of change ("self-constancy") . But the moments which span the twin poles do not fill up an empty, a priori framework which unifies the moments of our daily experiences. The unity must focus in Dasein itself. The poles and the interval between *are:* the basic unity of any Dasein's history arises out of Dasein's Being as care, and the kind of movement which characterizes Dasein's stretching along the interval Heidegger calls "historizing." This characterization precedes any attempt to make history the object of a science.

> In analysing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity is not " temporal " because it " stands in history," but that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being.[5]

Again, in *Being and Time,* II, *5,* 73 Heidegger reviews some common notions of history which are in their respective ways unsatisfying. History is primarily a mark of Dasein and not a mark of the various ways in which he might think about the past. The ruins of a Greek temple, for instance, are still present, but the world in which the temple stood is past. But Dasein is never past, though always historical. Still, what makes Dasein historical? In II, *5,* 74 Heidegger outlines how Dasein, thrown into the world among all sorts of possibilities, may authentically, that is, in freedom choose what is its lot:

[5] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* Trans. John Macquarrie and E<\ward]:l9binson (New York, 1962), p. 428,

Dasein can choose and affirm its own finitude and death. Because Dasein is capable of caring, of being and feeling guilty, of being anxious, death and finitude become facts to reckon with. The basic situation of the world is not something Dasein fashioned; it is thrown into it; it is powerless in the face of the fate which presents itself as fact. But such powerlessness is transcended when Dasein resolutely hands itself over to its " there," the basic situation of the world. In short, the basis of Dasein's historicality is the authentic facing of its Being-toward-death.

Historicality penetrates the world through and through; everything which Dasein touches as entities-within-the-world becomes historical as such. World-history takes on a double meaning: it denotes " the historizing of the world in its essential existent unity with Dasein" and also" the historizing within the world of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand" (II, *5,* 75).[6] History intrinsically conditions the world even without our grasping that fact through historical study. Inauthentic historicality leads Dasein astray so that it loses itself in the present, the .scattering of moments which make up its today; it misleads Dasein into understanding the past in terms of the present. Heidegger apparently sees authentic historicality dependent on a self-appropriation or personal transformation prompted by a grasp of what it means to be finite. He writes:

> When, however, one's existence is inauthentically historical, it is loaded down with the legacy of a " past " which has become unrecognizable, and it seeks the modern. But when historicality is authentic, it understands history as the " recurrence " of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition.[7]

Several conclusions can be drawn for the science of history (historiology). Heidegger states in II, *5,* 76 that the very idea of historiology is to be projected in terms of Dasein's own historicality. The monuments,. records, and relics of the past are above all signs of Dasein's " having-been-there." More-

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 440-41.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 444.

over, the historical nature of Dasein is presupposed in the operations and procedures which historians perform and the success of historical study depends on the authenticity of the historian himself. If the historian has appropriated his own historicality, if he realizes that temporality is the ontological ground of historiology, then the historicality of the past will disclose itself to him. The nature of authentic historicality is the same for all Dasein. In every age, as it were, Dasein can retrieve and repeat the possibilities open to human existence:

> When the possible is made one's own by repetition, there is adumbrated at the same time the possibility of reverently preserving the existence that has-been-there, in which the possibility seized upon has become manifest.[8]

The development of dogma does not concern only the faithful transmission and re-formulation of necessary truths. Besides the historical and cultural adventures of dogmatic expression there is the matter of development itself. In a Heideggerian context timelessness is an inappropriate, indeed a false description of anything which man touches and to which he is related. Not only is expression radicated in historicality; so also is development itself. On the other hand, it would be inaccurate to say that Being develops, not because temporality does not refer to Being but because such a claim would betray a misconception of Heidegger's thought as to how Being presents itself. Development is not necessarily the first note which attaches to the fact of temporality. Early in *Being and Time* Heidegger introduces us to his endeavor to destroy the history of ontology by retrieving the question of being. He also speaks about destroying the history of philosophy historiologically:

> what is philosophically primary is neither a theory of the concept-formation of historiology nor the theory of historiological

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 448. This is remarkably close to Lonergan's treatment of foundational reality in *Method in Theology* (New York, 1972). Entrance to foundational reality is mediated by a triple conversion; conversion is the event by which the theologian appropriates the possibility of a radically re-oriented and authentic horizon. Conversion is repeatable by many theologians; thus foundational reality is also a shared reality. See Chapter 10, pp. 235-44, and Chapter 11.

knowledge, nor yet the theory of history as the Object of historiology; what is primary is rather the Interpretation of authentically historical entities as regards their historicality. [9]

We would like to re-phrase Heidegger's words to say that we must philosophically destroy the history of dogma in order to discover what is dogmatically primary. If one were to argue that new dogmas are squeezed out of an original deposit of divine truths through the pressure of changing historical circumstances, he would acknowledge the presence of historicity in dogmatic development, but he would also introduce nearly insoluble problems about *how* the defined dogmas have been contained in revelation. Are all dogmas implicit in Scripture? Is Scripture the only repository of revelation or is there something else? If he were to have ultimate recourse to the *sensus fidelium,* this would still not explain *how* dogmas are contained " there." Or one might be tempted to argue that dogmas are like new ideas hammered out in cultural settings where many conflicting ideas- secular, sacred, scientific, and so on-have forced religion to ask new questions and to develop new ways of thinking. The new ideas are accepted or rejected depending on how well they can be assimilated into the life of the Church. Newman suggests this, and this position is closer to the mark in that it respects historical contingencies; it is not, however, without difficulties. The development of dogma would then depend on the fluctuations of history and culture, and this not only refers to the particular expression of a dogma but to dogma itself. For what is of concern to one culture may not be of concern to another. The history of dogma would then be skewed. One could speculate what the history of Christianity might have been like had Luke the evangelist been a convert from Buddhism. Finally, there remains the underlying problematic, where does anything new come from? This is the question for ontology, the kind of question Heidegger addressed to the history of ontology in order to destroy that history historiologically.

[9] *Being and Time,* p. 81.

One can read Part One of *Being and Time* in the light of Heidegger's later chapter on historicality. His material on understanding, the as-structure of interpretation, language, and truth then take on a further dimension. Since we shall be discussing language shortly, and since interpretation and hermeneutics are ouside the scope of this article, we shall tum our immediate attention to Heidegger's conception of truth in I, 6, 44; we want to project this conception in terms of historicality.

Heidegger's concern here seems to center on the traditional definition of truth as *adaequatio intellectus et rei.* He explains what this definition means, how it arose, and in so doing, what is the primordial meaning of truth. First, he clears away Kantian and subjectivist mistakes about what is grasped in true knowledge by insisting that the cognitional activity of asserting is ordered intrinsically towards real entities, not towards mere representations. Our knowing is both a "Being towards real entities" and a "Being that uncovers." Secondly, disclosedness is a general feature of Dasein and of the world; entities unveil themselves in the clearing *(Lichtung:* I, *5,* 28) which is Dasein. If this property did not belong to entities, knowledge would be impossible. If Dasein were not a region of illumination where entities could come to presence, questions about knowing would not arise. It is important to see that Heidegger is not trying to solve the critical problem, that he is not setting down the conditions for a correct judgment or correct knowledge. Heidegger is showing what the primordial notion of truth is and, consequently, what the ontological basis of knowledge consists of. All theoretical accounts of true knowledge are only derivative from what is ontologically primary:

> To translate this word as " truth," and, above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is to cover up the meaning of what the Greeks made "self-evidently" basic for the terminological use of as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it ... In proposing our" definition" of "truth" we have not *8haken off* the tradition, but we have *appropriated* it primordially.lo

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 262,

Judgment is not, according to Heidegger-nor, on Heidegger's view, according to Aristotle,-the primary locus of truth. Assertions are derived from an original experience which encounters the uncoveredness of things, but we tend to think of assertions or judgments as primary loci. Propositions and assertions make it possible to preserve and repeat the original disclosiveness of entities. The reason for this is that what comes first in the order of knowing is last in the order of being; assertion preserves uncoveredness as what is present-at-hand, but what is present-at-hand is not first in the order of being. The temptation is to forget this, as Aristotle was well aware.

Heidegger makes it clear that Dasein is also in the untruth because it is essentially falling. Entities themselves are not totally opaque and hidden from the clearing which Dasein is. In the language of" On the Essence of Truth," [11] Being dissimulates itself when Dasein as falling is not authentically ex-sisting, when lost in everydayness it does not allow Being to disclose itself. Dasein loses sight of the primordial relationship between itself and Being. (Heidegger's move here parallels the movement Ricoeur later adopted when he followed his eidetics of the will with an exploration of the fault. The moves do not designate something good become bad but a compenetration based on a primordial relation to the true, or-in Ricoeur-to the good.)

Finally, Heidegger formulates anew what Aquinas wrote about the existence of truth and human intellect. " Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more." Aquinas believed in ontological truth as the relation between the divine mind and creation, but Heidegger is not so persuaded about the divine mind. The " true," therefore, is not a property of being (for it is not related primarily to intellect, as it was for Aquinas; see *De Veritate,* q.l, a.3) . So, without Dasein, without that region where Being comes-to-presence, without that disclosedness which constitutes Dasein and Being, Being would *n.ot be.* "Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially." [12]

[11] Trans. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick in *Existence and Being* (Chicago, 1949).
[19] *Being and Time,* p.

Now, assertions are derivatively historical. The historicity of truth denotes neither the saga of mankind's correct judgments nor the ways in which judgments have been conditioned culturally and historically. Instead, the historicity of truth, which is equiprimordial with the historicity of Being, directly refers to that region where Being is disclosed, namely, to Dasein. Primarily we mean by the historicity of truth the :finitiude which temporalizes all the different and multiple modes in which Being comes forth, since that region of disclosure is itself intrinsically :finite and temporal. This means that no assertion can escape the ontological bounds which determine Dasein.

Whenever one claims an exempt status for any single judgment or proposition by insisting that it holds universally and necessarily, always and everywhere, he offends against Dasein's constitution. Being "comes forth" historically. Or, to turn the matter around, propositions are derivatively true; they have the status of being present-at-hand, preserving through expression what was original. Expression, however, has its limits; it is derivatively conditioned by history. New expression of the same proposition would require that we retrieve its original meaning. But the original meaning is also limited in that Being does not disclose itself at once, once for all time. Truth is temporalized and thus foundationally conditioned by history. Heidegger notes that concern is the characteristic of Dasein that gives rise to historicality. Concern stems out of Dasein's :finitude, and :finitude relates to temporality. We conclude here by saying that dogmatic statements are derivatively true; the historicity of dogma is derivatively historical; that not only is the *expression* of dogma historically conditioned (and thus capable of being formulated anew) , but dogma itself necessarily unfolds "historically," and there is no reason to suppose that a complete body of dogmatic truths exists " .somewhere ,. or that the unfolding will ever be complete, or that retrieving the meaning of a once-defind dogma by " repetition " is not also something new, a new moment in the history of dogma. The unfolding does not refer to a succession of moments in time bounded by the first and second comings of

Christ; this is not the primary sense of historical. Dogmas do not develop like the squeezing out of so many truths from an original deposit along an imaginary chronological line. Nor are dogmas universal and necessary truths. The predicates " universal," " necessary," inappropriately describe the way dogmatic truth comes forth. Whether or not the unfolding of revelation follows any law or inner logic of its own is not a question that concerns us here. Still, if we are correct in our account of the contingency of all coming-forth because of Dasein's historicality, then it would seem that no immanent law operates in the history of dogma any more than history itself obeys an inner law (as if God had determined either the pattern of the unfolding of dogmas or of history in general) ; rather, the unfolding happens within the graced-clearing where Being comes forth, comes-to-presence, a clearing which is simultaneously finite, temporal, and historical.

From Language to Thinking

Heidegger's concern with language arises from a prior concern with thinking, and thinking gives rise to the absolutely prior question about Being. We usually regard language as our communication; it objectifies our knowledge; it is a universal, public forum for expression. Language guarantees that objective expression can .survive from one generation to the next and thus gives rise to tradition. It encapsulates the world-view of a people non-thematically in its structure, grammar, syntax, origins; it is also historical. For the Heidegger of *Being and Time,* Dasein has language and shows itself as the entity which talks. But because language discloses the contents of consciousness, we start to regard it as a means of communication, as a tool for handling ourselves in the business of the world. Insofar as its being is regarded as purposive, as a tool, language also conceals the very thing it ought to reveal about itself. The later Heidegger recalls us to that which lays behind language, and this is accomplished by analysing two ways wherein man allows Being, namely, thinking and poetry. His path to Being through thinking is set forth in *Was Heisst*

Denken? [13] and the path through poetry in *Unterwegs zur Sprache.* To keep our essay maneagable we have confined ourselves to the second path. (This, of course, is not to imply a bifurcation between poetry and thought: " all great poetic work always vibrates within a realm of thinking." (US, p. 69) The point merely has to do with the invitation to rediscover our roots, and the invitation can be addressed by inquiring into thinking or poetry as parallel ways to essential thinking.)

" *The Nature of Language* "

In this section of *On the Way to Language* we find Heidegger developing his idea of discourse. Throughout the general advance of this section he is slowly unfolding the connection between thinking and poetry, and he repeatedly warns against the inadequacy of calculative thinking. He begins with a poem in order to raise the question about the nature of poetic insight: how is one to express that for which one has no word? What happens at the place where there are no words? "No thing is where the word is lacking . . . . " (US, p. 60) At that point, therefore, there are no things; but does it follow that this is the point of mere nothingness, non-being? By the close of the section Heidegger will argue the same conclusion he reached in "What is Metaphysics?" on the nature of Nothing, where "no thing" does not mean negation [15]

Words commonly name things, entities, whatever is. Words must give being to things because where there is no word, there can be no thing either. If that is the case, then how do word and thing relate? When a thing is named by a word, how is this done? Why can a word be an appropriate name for a thing? (US, pp. For the poet, a word is the source, dwelling

[18] *What is CaUed Thinking?,* Trans. J. Glenn Gray and Fred Wieck (New York, 1968).

[14] *On the Way to Language,* Trans. Peter Hertz and Joan Stambaugh (New York, 1971). We have abbreviated this as US.

[18] Also translated by Hull and Crick in the volume *Existence and Being.* "'Nothing' is more original than the Not and negation" (p. 881). "Nothing is that which makes the relevation of what"is as such possible for our human existence " (p. 840).

place, wellspring of Being. The poet's experience of language is his realization of how word and thing relate to each other. " The word itself is the relation which in each instance retains the thing within itself in such a manner that it 'is' a thing." (US, p. 66) The poet, therefore, stands in that strange domain which is ever full, never exhausted, and never-to-be-handled. He is called creative; but no poet simply creates *ex nihilo,* from non-being: he" creates" from that domain where there are no things.

Heidegger is summoning us to an experience of language which has to be a thinking experience. This thinking is not calculative or purposive but foundational, a thinking not meant to produce knowledge but to " cut furrows in the soil of Being." (US, p. 70) In this sense, poetry and thinking are neighbors in the same soil. Authentic thinking is another side of Dasein's openness; just like the openness which grounds discourse, authentic thinking involves a listening. One does not question what it means to think authentically, for

> . . . the true stance of thinking cannot be put to questions, but must be to listen to what our questioning vouchsafes-and all questioning begins to be a questioning only in virtue of pursuing its quest for essential being. (US, p. [16]

In short, we discover that in asking about the being of language itself, starting with a poet's word, we are engaged in thinking that inquiries about the language of being, the domain of no thing. Such thinking brings us into a region of openness where thinking and poetry are neighbors. (US, p. 77)

The word, *Logos,* is unique in the history of thinking. It applies simultaneously to Being and to Saying. (US, p. 80) It may be that the essential nature, the being of language, simply refuses to let itself be expressed in words, for it is prior to and stands under language and words, words and things. (US, p. 81) On the other hand, the word allows a thing to be a thing, sustains it in the region of being. *Logos* holds together

[18] We find this point elsewhere; for instance, see "Language" in *Poetry, Language, Thought,* Trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1971), p. !l09.

the Saying we associate with words and the Being we associate with things. But how are Being and Saying related? Whatever that relationship is, it holds for both poetry and thinking: both of them entail Saying.

The poetic experience is content to let things be, to renounce all claims at calculative thinking, even the calculative intent of metaphor, for the sake of wonder. It realizes what the philosopher meant: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." [17] But a calculating mind will ask whether words too are things: "A thing is not until, and is only where, the word is not lacking but *is* there." (US, p. 86) But "the word for the word" is not to be discovered in ordinary vocabulary. Like Saying, the word is no thing; Saying and word designate what is there but "is" not. (US, p. 87)

Heidegger's point is that, when we speak about language, we are not speaking of something distant, but of a reality close to home. This point supposes his understanding of Dasein. In fact, Saying defines a showing, revealing, setting free, and a hiding: "This lighting and hidden proffer of the world is the essential being of Saying." (US, p. 93) But how does the world come forward as the being of Saying? Saying makes the world appear, discloses the openness of the Open, the manifestness of the manifest. Essentially, Saying gathers all things together in a primordial, non-descriptive fashion. Calculative thinking rebels at the idea. And yet, there is a profound nearness that relates all things precisely in their manifestness and openness to one another. Dasein already finds itself in this open region characterised by the nearness that touches whatever is. It is the region where all things are in their no-thing-like character. The answer to the question about language is not remote from us because Dasein is already and participates in the disclosedness of Being that simultaneously reveals and conceals.

Saying and nearness go together; language is to be understood as Saying. (US, p. 96) Language, consequently, mani-

[17] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus LoiJico-Philosophicus* (London, p. 189.

fests in the rootedness of man's Being-in-the-world because man is the one who speaks. The nearness resulting from Saying's gathering, regioning sweep grounds the harmony of all the earth's structures in a profound stillness. (US, p. **101)** Saying, then, is the being of language; Saying and nearness are the same. (US, p. 107) We are to conclude, therefore, that language discloses the gathering of all things into nearness. Language is a sign of our own being drawn into the unifying sweep in which the regions of the world come face to face. But Saying is likewise a showing. That is why the word, *Logos,* is so rich; it contained philosophy's originative insight into the *manifestness* of *what is* in the all-embracing nearness of things.

From No Thing to Art

The final step in our consideration starts with a familiar theme, namely, the thing. We shall be moving with Heidegger from " thing " through art to openness and truth. The essay on art, like his essays on poetry, involve a shift to foundational thinking. [18]

1. From Thing and Work to Truth

The phrase, " work of art," is our ordinary designation for an artistic piece. We think of such works as things, entities, that incorporate on canvas or in bronze or clay an " artistic" insight. The art work is obviously not nothing, so it must be some thing. (UK, p. 21) The problem is that "thing" is a very ambiguous term. While we often refer to things in contradistinction to animate beings, thing can refer inclusively to whatever is, to beings. But what is a thing? Traditionally, the most widely used conceptual distinction is that of form and matter, substance and accident: the most common, most familiar, and easiest of manipulative or calculative notions. One has little difficulty explaining it because its meaning is so readily apparent. According to Heidegger, the originative Greek insight understood the meaning of thing as being, without the form-matter distinction. (UK, p. 28) **But**

[18] " The Origin of the Work of Art" *(Der Ursprung des Kunswerkes)* in the volume *Poetry, Language, Thought.* We have abbreviated this as UK.

as he pointed out, originative insights have a way of getting obscured in interpretation. (see *Being and Time,* I, *5,* 33)

" Thing " can be defined in three ways which do not approximate the true sense of the word. Thing can be the core, the substance to which properties adhere. (UK, p. 23) Or it might indicate the unified perception of what is given to us through our senses. (UK, p. 25) Or rejecting these as insufficient, we could claim that a thing has to be allowed to be, " to do its own thing," to stand forth in its own self-consistency. Yet this view also supposes the form-matter distinction: and this distinction is the general conceptual scheme lying behind most theories of aesthetics. (UK, p. 27)

To give us a clue for uncovering what a thing is, Heidegger recalls us to the notions of equipmental being and usefulness, but this time we are to expand our understanding of useful things in order to see the domain which gives rise to usefulness in the first place. For the primary note which attaches to things is not that of matter and form constitution but usefulness, an equipmental determination. (UK, p. 28) The matter-form distinction only appears to be the basic structure of all things and works; we spontaneously want to think in these terms. Yet, the most difficult task is allowing things to be things, allowing the thing-being of things (UK, p. 31) and foregoing any definition of thing rooted in the equipmental being of equipment.

However, Dasein finds itself in the world relying on equipment. We are at home in the world because things are useful, reliable; we depend on their being just what they are. Equipmental being is not characterized by form-matter distinctions but by the intrinsic reliability of things, their oneness with themselves that precedes the substance and property posture of thought:

> The equipmental being of equipment, reliability, keeps gathered within itself all things according to their manner and extent. The usefulness of equipment is nevertheless only the essential consequence of reliability. (UK, pp. 34-5)

In the analysis of *Being and Time* Heidegger founds equipment in care and finiteness. The deeper origin of things is, of

course, the truth of being, what a thing is in truth; finiteness discloses to us the meaning of " in truth." The piece of art, then, rests on the coming forth, the coming to light, the uncon-cealedness of its being. (UK, p. 36) " Art is truth setting itself to work." (UK, p. 39) In order to explain the nature of this display Heidegger develops an example-the Greek temple-to show how this work of art gathers, holds, and signifies a world.[19]

The temple brought together everything that the country and its people were. Political life, social order, war and peace, divine curse and grace, agricultural bounty, culture: all these things were really the temple. But then there was the building itself stretching heavenwards out of rocky soil, perhaps set on a cliff overlooking valley and sea. Now, the Greek mind named this rising out of the earth, nature: that dynamic principle by which things came forth. The earth too was somehow set forth by this rising up of mortar and stone, a periphrastic of architectural design. The earth came forth as man's place, his ground and abode. The temple, then, opened up a horizon or world and put this world back again on earth. (UK, p.

> The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves ... as long as the god has not fled from it ... it is a work that lets the god himself be present and thus *is* the god himself. (UK, p. 43)

The temple was a work that opened up a world and sustained it in its openness. World is that ever non-objective " place " where we are, we and all things with us-our values, life, grace, peace, sorrow-all that we are, all that makes us to be. Work

[19] Heidegger wrote: " The answer to the question " What is a thing?" is different in character. It is not a proposition but a transformed basic position or, better still and more cautiously, the initial transformation of the hitherto existing position towards things, a change of questioning and evaluation, of seeing and deciding; in short, of the being-there *(Da-sein)* in the midst of what is *(inmitten des Seienden).* To determine the changing basic position within the relation to what is, that is the task of an entire historical period. But this requires that we perceive more exactly with clearer eyes what most holds us captive and makes us unfree in the experience and determination of things." See *What is a Thing?,* Trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago, 1967), pp. *50-1.*

engenders world, setting it up out of the stuff of earth which neither destroys nor impoverishes but enhances by causing it to come forth. What comes forth is the Earth. " The work moves the earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps it there. The work lets the earth be an earth." (UK, p. 46) By its very nature the earth is not penetrated by calculative thinking; it resists this; it hides from us. A work sets forth the earth in its openness; yet once set forth, the earth remains the ground on which the work is set. (UK, p. 47) It is in the agitated tension of the opposing terms earth and world that work rests. And so it is here that the work of art discloses truth; we are far from the superficial vantage point of form and matter. Work gathers into itself the most primordial conflict between the closing and disclosing of Being.

Truth and Art as the Unconcealed

Heidegger summarizes the lines of his argument in the essay "On the Essence of Truth" by rapidly moving from a definition of truth as propositional to an understanding of truth as openness. We should remember that his intention was to show that form and matter were residual traces of a primal insight into the " rift " between earth and world, and that this rift is a manifestation of the concealing-unconcealing nature of truth. Yet, the essence of truth will point to the truth of essence. And so we are raising anew the question of Being in its manife.stness and hiddenness.

In brief, Being .stands in unconcealedness, and Dasein, Being-in-the-world, is already situated within the unconcealedness of whatever is. " In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs." This is the *Liehtung,* the lighting, clearing, open center, place of unconcealment, though a clearing which is at the same time a concealment. (UK, p. 53) Beings may conceal themselves by refusing to come forth or by simulating one another. Their refusal to disclose themselves in fact reveals the beginning of the clearing, the lighted region. Their concealment by simulating something else causes us to mistake them one for another. The open place, moreover, is not a fixed

state but a happening-unconcealedness happens: it is not a property of beings or of propositions. The concealment belongs to the essence of truth as unconcealedness; untruth belongs to the essence of truth, for beings both disclose and hide themselves. (UK, p. 54)

The open and the closed constitute a primal conflict: earth rises up as the self-closing, while world, rising through work, is set on the earth as disclosing. Truth accordingly happens as "the primal conflict between clearing and concealing." (UK, p. *55)* In the case of the temple truth happens precisely in the temple's " standing there " and gathering to itself earth and sky, man and gods; it thus forms a world which is set upon its counterpoint, the earth. The truth of a work consists in the opposition of clearing and concealing. (UK, p. 60)

In so many ways Heidegger is portraying truth as openness, the Open as the place of conflict, Being as allowing openness to happen, and so on. Truth cannot be said to be pre-existent. Truth is the stamp of a work, a creation, wherein things are allowed to come forth. (UK, p. 61) On the other hand, in his work man " creates createdness " in the product of his hands. Createdness, in short, is what Being allows when the conflict between earth and world issues in truth. What is art?" Art then is the becoming and happening of truth." (UK, p. 71).

What is Called Heresy?

We have now established a context for discussing a new meaning of heresy. After so much talk about the being of language, we must look into the being of heresy and dogma. We want to see how the development of dogma could be framed in a Heideggerian context. At the outset we might say that development is one of the ways in which the manifestness of being is disclosed to us. Development cannot be some thing. It is not a category, a quality, a relation, a substance, a predicate. Development is one of the ways in which Being comes forth.

But what is called heresy? What does heresy name, and

what does heresy have to do with development? Truth, we have seen, is not to be taken as a simple *adaequatio*, as a mental duplication of a state of affairs. Heresy, therefore, does not name a proposition, should not be taken as the mere denial of dogma, a propositional statement touching on religious matters. To be " in heresy " cannot mean that one has simply refused assent to a dogmatic proposition. Then what is called heresy? What does heresy name when that which it calls comes forth?

Truth is bound up with the conflict between the unconcealed and the hidden. It is not something set up in a noetic heaven, given through clear and distinct ideas. Truth is a primordial relationship. To be in the truth means to stand forth in the open center where disclosedness is illumined. It means, on Heidegger's terms, that one is in the clearing in a free, non-volitional, non-intentional, non-calculative stance. To be in the truth does not merely mean to give assent to a body of propositions, no matter how beautiful, revered, traditional, " correct," religious they may be. One stands in the truth when in fundamental openness he is prepared to listen, to behold whatever manifests itself. It is a matter of letting things be so that they come forth as they are. No one, we must add, has a once-for-all grasp on the truth. In fact, the very conviction that one does " seize " the truth as his possession betrays a fundamentally improper posture such that one closes himself to the voice of Being.

What is called heresy? What calls forth heresy? It would be easy to say that heresy is the foundational closing-off, turning away from the divine reality which in its comprehending nearness reveals, gives, and conceals itself. This revealing and giving has traditionally been termed grace. Yet, is not concealing also one of the ways that Being comes forth? And in concealing, is not the clearing itself disclosed? Even the divine reality's concealment, which is also a disclosure, is called grace. Heresy would appear to consist of refusing the manifestness of grace by not hearing, by closing oneself off, by calculating the divine, by willing, intending or otherwise stepping out of

open center which is *given* to Dasein as foundational grace. Such a claim is justified. Still, what calls forth heresy might itself be a refusal to be contained in merely propositional belief. One may find himself rejecting what is considered orthodox out of a profound belief that he is called. But called to what and by whom? And how is that call named? Authentic listening is what grounds all orthodoxy and heresy. We are not attempting to solve here the mystery of grace and faith or to argue to a definition of the faith community which would impose no limits on beliefs. Rather, we are moving to discuss development as it touches upon dogma, where development is of the manifestness of things in their coming forth. Neither orthodoxy nor heresy on this showing are essentially understood in terms of propositional allegiance.

What calls forth heresy? To say it is dissent is to say too little. Where there are no words, how can some thing be? What does heresy name, or dogma either? Perhaps a dogma is a thing. According to theological manuals, the revealed deposit of divine truth does not undergo change. The deposit may be re-conceptualized and reinterpreted for new generations of believers; but it does not change: it is" ever ancient, ever new." identity in difference. But this is exactly that application of the form-matter device which we earlier found wanting. On the one hand, change becomes the accidental and variant shell surrounding an unchanging matrix, and this view just bankrupts the notion of novelty which is so familiar a component of human experience. Novelty does not deny the enduring, permanent features of experience; it rather takes seriously the fact that human beings themselves are major instances of novelty. Tragedy in love may be an age old occurrence, but each occurrence is something new, and the subject which experiences the misfortune is a non-repeatable, novel subject. Similarly, a doctrine may signify a permanent feature in a given religious history but the appropriation of that doctrine by new believers is always a novel occurrence. And the historicality of the individual believer requires us to admit the historicality of his appropriation

On the other hand, the form-matter device accents the permanent and recognizes the unchanging as especially valuable, as an achievement of religious consciousness. The dogma may even be taken as part of revelation itself. Yet if we recall that the form-matter constitution is not our ontological starting point, that something more primordial stands behind it, then we must say that the permanent aspect of dogma is not what is religiously "first," primordial. Both its variable and invariable elements are expressions of something more fundamental. Consequently, to avoid the ontological oversight which overestimates the importance of either timelessness or change, we must appeal to the fundamental ground, to reality which is foundational. We initiate this appeal by asking, What calls forth heresy? We initiate our answer by replying that perhaps it is Being which calls forth heresy by its concealedness.

The work of art, like the poet's word, is framed against the primal conflict of earth and world, the simultaneuos closure and disclosure of Being. A dogma, like the work of art, expresses the tension between divine disclosure and the closure which hides from our too calculative, too volitional, too intentional grasping. We designate this phenomenon in religious terms " mystery." By this we mean the following.

In later thought the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals, and divinity are the symbols which underlie his ontology. For him there are no " principles of being " as such; Being is spoken of in terms of disclosedness; Being is what is most universal and most concrete. The fourfold is the reality beneath the infinite vari"etiesof Being's coming forth in poetry, in art, in essential thinking. We are not to regard the history of art, for instance, as the history of the fourfold any more than we can identify the history of the world with the history of Being. Adding up all the moments of art history would not bring us a bit closer to some imagined totality, nor to a closer approximation of the fourfold. No function of integration sums up the whole of Being, for the unity of Being is not to be conceived in a calculative way. The fourfold instead represents both the possibility of artistic creation and its underlying unity, however

a particular artist might thematize it. The fourfold reveals symbolically what disclosedness is all about. Similarly, we want to think of dogmas not as increasing approximations of a mysterious whole but as expressions of the disclosedness of Being, expressions which gather and give rise to a world. Between sound ontology and theology there can be no contradictions. What is the object of revelation-divine reality-relates to the fundamental presencing of things. Dogma, however, concerns more than divine reality. Dogma also bespeaks the finiteness of man, his historicality, the conditions which occasion the rise of any given dogma. While this observation could be elaborated in concrete detail, we wish to do no more than indicate the general sense in which dogma sets up a world. Dogma, as a work, is true only insofar as it holds the tension between the disclosedness of Being upon which it is based and the domain of faith which it sets up. Dogma regions; it regions that vast Open which is not distant and in which all things dwell in profound nearness. Dogma arises when the man of faith .stands in his own openness before and in the manifestness of Being. And like the artist's work, when the primal experience is gone, dogma, like art, dies. (UK, p. 79)

We have not answered our original query about development. Yet by repeating the question" What calls forth heresy?" we have been drawing near to a reply. We appeal to Heidegger's view on the connection between word and thing, between thing and nothing. Where there are no words, there is the region of no thing, the region of fullness, of undisclosed Being, of the language of Being. What calls forth heresy and what constitutes the calling? Heresy is not the mere denial of propositions, yet without that denial propositions would not have been affirmed. While Heidegger does not attend to the notion of development, in the notion of calling-forth we find its Heideggerian analogue. What comes forth is Being; what calls forth is thinking, poetry, or maybe art also. We are already proximally related to Being; in the openness of essential thinking Being both summons and reveals itself within the clearing, the lighting, the open center of Dasein.

For us the answer to "What calls forth heresy?" must be stated in similar terms. Faith regions. Grace is the lighting and simultaneously the disclosure of divine reality. As in essential thinking, so iu authentic faith, man as Dasein is already situated in the regions where no things are. The :finding of words for where there is no thing is impossible without losing that for which, on account of which, and in the presence of which we are. Nevertheless, we try to name even as the artist creates a work, even as he responds to the call of Being which both closes and discloses itself, even as the poet tries to compose out of language what language resists Saying. Sometimes, in fallenness, forgetfulness misleads us and we go astray; Being is dissimulated, conceals itself, and to speak theologically heresy is called forth. " What is called heresy " and " What calls it forth " bring us in faith face to face with the silence that calls us to itself.

The development of dogma in a Heideggerian context, we submit, is to be understood in terms of calling and letting-be. " Out of what " does dogma develope To say revelation is to .say both too little and too much. Should we ask this question within the calculative stance of much philosophy and theology we shall never understand the coming to be, the coming forth that occasions the question in the beginning. We have attempted to explain how the question about development can take on altogether different dimensions if raised in this context. When the history of dogma is taken as the cumulative differentiation of an initial deposit of revelation, we can fail to notice that there may be truth in heresy, that dogma also conceals, that heresy is a kind of interpreting that is radicated in the "falling state" of man *(Being and Time,* I, *5,* 38) and the dissimulation of Being. The internal relations of dogmas to one another may be quite random because no law or logic governs their historical unfolding. Any one dogma by itself, or even taken conjointly with some others, does not say all there is to be said about revealed truth. While dogmas are an indication of what has been disclosed to us, they can lead us astray into forgetting the limits of disclosure; they thereby

conceal the all-embracing primal ground from which they emerge. Or dogmas can lose their life by becoming disengaged from their ground like the ruins of a Greek temple. In this case dogmas become heretical insofar as they cut one off from the truth; the truth has been dissimulated. And heresy, on the contrary, may alert us to the limits of our slight grasp of that ground, to how finite our grasp is. In short, heresy may lead more quickly "into the truth" than dogma. As for the novelty which is a feature of development, we suggest re-thinking this in terms of historicality. What the history of dogma displays are successive moments in a differentiating grasp of revelation, but their historicity is not primarily constituted by a succession of moments. Where does new dogma come from? The answer may be given through a second question, Where does anything new come from? For now, our only answer in a Heideggerian context is offered in terms of calling forth, letting-be, disclosedness. One thing is clear: a theological grasp of the relations between revelation, Scripture, tradition, and dogma depends on a conversion to an ontology which respects all four of these terms by refusing to identify the true with what is certain and unchanging, or with what is being approximated over a long series of historical moments, or with anything else apart from the disclosedness of Being and the Dasein where that disclosedness is allowed to happen.

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PAUL RICOEUR'S HERMENEUTICAL THEORY AS RESOURCE FOR THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

THE WORK OF the French phenomenologist, Paul Ricoeur, has become increasingly prominent among American theologians, as well as philosophers and psychoanalysts, and he himself continues to be an enigmatically promising figure on the American intellectual scene in general. Since he has been remarkably clear in setting forth the various modes of reflection he has employed while working toward the completion of his three-volume philosophy of will, it is regrettable that many American readers are acquainted with only isolated texts, such as his *F1·eud and Philosophy: Interpretation Theory* (1965). Although the latter, together with three collections of *essays-Husserl, An Analysis of His Phenomenology* (1967), *Le conflit des interpretations* (1969), and a collection of essays on metaphor (to be published late in 1976)-are important by themselves, they are not, in terms of Ricoeur's life work, central texts. Then, too, it is unfortunate that the English translations of his major volumes have not permitted an easy overview of the development of his thought.

Even though book-length studies of Ricoeur's work have appeared in English since 1970, a succinct introduction which would clarify the availability of his work for theological reflection is lacking.[1] What makes his work immediately interesting to theologians is his treatment of several keys terms in psychoanalytic and linguistic theory/ such as "symbol," "conflict of

[1] Don Ihde designedly underplays "religious concerns" in his excellent study of Ricoeur's early work, *Hermeneutical Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur* (Evanston: Nothrwestern University Press, 1971). David M. Rasmussen focuses his investigation on the philosophical and anthropological aspects in *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

[2] Because Ricoeur has taken seriously the injunction that a philosopher must

interpretations," " second naivete," and " text-appropriation." Beyond the suggestiveness these concepts have for constructive theology, however, is another, more explicitly theological achievement: namely, his demonstration of the subjectivist bias of the nineteenth and twentieth century hermeneutical tradition and his efforts to emend it.

In the first part of this essay I wish to present the aspects of Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory that have already proved to be helpful as theological resources but which, on the whole, have lacked a systematic treatment. Finally, I shall try to indicate why his understanding of the hermeneutical tradition, if taken seriously, would seem to allow for a significant breakthrough for the conception of religious consciousness in general, as well as for particular doctrinal traditions, such as Christianity.

General Background

Ricoeur deserves to be presented as the most theologically sophisticated of the major contemporary theorists of interpretation. Among them he is distinguished by his commitment to "empirics " or the utilization of scientific explanation. He is unlike Heidegger, who, having as his major interest the question of " being," is concerned most about the " presencing " power of language; [3] Ricoeur, on the other hand, is wary lest the immediacy of such " presencing" may too quickly preclude a maximally intelligent response to it. He is unlike Betti, who stresses the autonomy of the object. [4] For Ricoeur focuses on the relationship of theoretical understanding and praxis. Having as his primary concern the relation of experience to

re-think the history of philosophical inquiry, his explication of these terms is a powerful, initial reason for the trustworthiness of his works.

[8] Cf., for examp1e, the poetic and descriptive, as distinct from the systematic, treatment of language in Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Tiibingen: Neske, 1956).

[•] Betti's major work is *Teoria generale della interpretazione,* vols. (Milan: Dott. A. Giurffre, 1955). In it he tries to define valid interpretations objectively by demonstrating their occurence in theological, psychological, and in particular, juridical interpretation. From these demonstrations he derives a specific set of "canons" by which, he says, human actions can be sufficiently understood.

thought as it appears in language, he emphasizes neither theory nor praxis; rather, he is always" on the way" to theory.[5] And he is distinct from Gadamer, who in his interest in the relation of the human sciences to truth, emphasizes the precedence of understanding over method.

In the projected structure of Ricoeur's major work, the three-volume philosophy of will, we can see the guiding thread of his method: from eidetics (Volume I, *Freedom and Nature*[6]) through empirics Volume II, *Fallible Man*[7] and *The Symbolism of Evil*[8]) to poetics (Volume III) .

Volume I is an investigation of the voluntary and invountary as the basic context for the phenomenon of human " will." Discovering early in Volume II that, in a strictly descriptive method, the concept of " fallibility " cancels out human " freedom," he moves in the second part to " hermeneutics" in order to study the matter-of-factness of " fault " as it appears in symbol and myth. His *Freud and Philosophy* is a further step in his empirics. In it Ricoeur holds that the poetic imagination is best understood by way of a " detour " through cosmic and oneiric symbols. He holds that, before the interpreter can appreciate the poetic image as a sensory vehicle, he or she must know something of the total field of the experience of humankind, as revealed in the study of the cosmic, and something of the subtlety with which individual experience comes to knowledge, as this may be understood through empirics. " Detour " is the notion by which Ricoeur emphasizes the

[5] Cf. Ricoeur's abjuration of the theory/practice dichotomy in his *History and Truth* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965): " Saying and doing, signifying and making are intermingled to such an extent that it is impossible to set up a lasting and deep opposition between ' theoria ' and ' pra'"is ' " (p. 5) .

[6] *Freedom and Nature; The Voluntary and the Involuntary (Philosophie de la volonte,* I: *La Volontaire et l'involontaire* [Paris: Aubier, 1950]), trans. by Erazim V. Kohak (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

• *Fallible Man (Philosophie de la volonte: Finitude et culpabilite,* I: *L'Homme faillible* [Paris: 1960]), trans. by Charles Kelby (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967) .

[8] *The Symbolism of Evil (Philosophie de la volonte: Finitude et culpabilite,* II: *La Symbolique du mal* [Paris: Aubier, 1960]), trans. by Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).

plurality of stages in the interpretative act and the distinction between immediate perception and reflective thought. *The Syrnbolisrn of Evil* and *Freud and Philiosophy* are the amplification of this notion. Ricoeur's latest publication in hermeneutics, *Le conflit des interpretations,* together with his later studies of text-interpretation, the philosophy of ordinary language, metaphor, and action, represent a further detour as he prepares Volume III, a poetics of the will

Toward a Theory of Syrnbol

Ricoeur's pre-hermeneutical work *(F1·eedorn and Nature, Fallible Man)* treats of human consciousness (which he terms "the essential structure" of human existence) as the threshold of speech. In retrospect, his hermeneutical theory (beginning with *The Syrnbolisrn of Evil)* can be best appreciated as providing the crucial insight that the philosophical threshold to speech is itself accessible only through language, even though Ricoeur's affirmation of this insight does not take place until later. This delay is opportune, however, because it allows for a greater emphasis upon the link between symbol and experience. Moreover, the polysemy of symbolic expression acquires a "bodiedness" through this delay: by means of Ricoeur's analysis of the complex thinking-acting and thinking-feeling relationships, symbol is seen to be the linguistic structure best suited to represent the full range of human experience.

Ricoeur introduces symbol as a cultural-religious phenomenon in *The Syrnbolisrn of Evil.* He regards symbol as primordial language, systematically relating it to myth (already a first-level interpretation, according to Ricoeur) and speculation (a second-level interpretation). Here he employs several diagnostics (" objective characteristics as signs for obscure or border experiences ") [10] to highlight the linguisticality of the symbol: namely, philology, exegesis, phenomenology of religion,

[9] See forthcoming publications (University of Toronto Press).

[10] See my forthcoming article "Paul Ricoeur's Notion of 'Diagnostics': a Constructive Interpretation "; also Don Ihde, *op. cit.,* pp. 29-30.

historical and theological criticism. *The Symbolism of Evil* marks his formal entry into hermeneutics and illustrates his use of the concept of limit, explicated in *Fallible Man.* Earlier, in *Freedom and Nature,* where the descriptive approach (eidetics) is taken to be sufficient for the study of essential human structure, Ricoeur appeals only to intentional experiences of the Cogito-thereby excluding those transcendent experiences of love, reconciliation, and poetry. For example, in describing the self-reference which is not yet reflective, he cites the French expression, "je me decide a ...," to indicate that even in self-reference there is a reference to the "project " of the will.[11] In the last part of *Freedom and Nature-in* the discussion of "consent and necessity "-however, Ricoeur already begins to tum to myth and symbol to find typologies of this paradox and expressions of the " upper limit " of reflection on self and the world. As an example he presents the " dream of innocence" as an "unfulfilled intentionality "-albeit fully "intentional" when it appears as an object of consciousness.[12] As unfulfilled, this direct intentionality requires an indirect expression. Pursuing the contrast between direct and indirect expressions in *The Symbolism of Evil,* Ricoeur contrasts the experience of innocence with the experience of guilt and points out that in the matter of guilt, one can speak only of a contradictory fulfillment because the evil act cannot be accounted for by direct intentionality. As such, the phenomenon of guilt requires an indirect or even more complex expression than does the dream of innocence. These two experiences-innocence and guilt-both involving limit-questions, demonstrate the limit of direct intentionality: pure reflection and direct expression leave

[11] It is interesting to note that the distinction between direct and indirect language (although superseded in his later work) originates in Ricoeur's linguistic analysis of isolated statements. Later Ricoeur becomes progressively more interested in the problem of contexts.

[12] For a contrasting theological use of this term-which demonstrates, I think, the use of an inadequate philosophical foundation-see Paul Tillich's " state of dreaming innocence " in his interpretation of Genesis 1:11, according to the Christian doctrine of original sin. *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), II, 88-86.

" everyday reality outside," particularly when everyday reality involves "enslavement to the passions." From this it might appear that, since pure reflection constitutes the condition of anyone's realizing selfhood through ultimate consent to his or her limitations and achievements, philosophy must stop short of any appeal to myth or symbol. Ricoeur shows, however, that the " need " of philosophy for symbol is substantiated through a dual capacity of the symbol. On the side of intentionality it evokes, lights up and puts "in order a whole field of human experience, not otherwise accessible to pure reflection." On the side of the conscious subject, it "sensitizes our outlook" toward a domain of experience which cannot be reduced to " error or emotion or habit or even finiteness." [13]

Symbol, then, becomes intrinsic to Ricoeur's philosophical method. He uses the Kantian concept of limit to provide an understanding of Husserl's ideality of consciousness, and Hegel's phenomenology of spirit to criticize Freud's naturalism. In the end, Ricoeur's use of .symbol as the primary object of his phenomenological investigations guarantees that his own philosophy will not exhaust itself methodologically and that it will keep as its goal an ontology, beyond both introspection and anthropology.

The task of the philosopher guided by symbols is to break down the enchanted wall of self-consciouness and subjectivity, to strip reflection of its exclusive rights to go beyond anthropology.

He moves steadily toward a dialectical relationship between philosophy and symbol:

In contrast to philosophies wrestling with starting points a meditation on symbols starts right out with langauge and with the meaning that is always already there. It takes off in the midst of language already existing, where everything has already been said after a fashion; it gladly embraces thought with all its presuppositions. Its big problem is not to get started, but, in the midst of words, to remember once again.

[13] Ricoeur, "The Symbol ... Food for Thought," *Philosophy Today,* IV (Fall, 1960)' 206.

This dialectical relationship is auspicious for our time: " With the bleak sand of criticism behind us, we want a new hearing "[14] -that is, a hearing which will not reduce myth and symbol either to explanation or to archaic truth, however necessary it is initially to demythologize-but a hearing which is capable of revivifying contemporary language.

Ricoeur's later work in psychoanalytic theory, structuralism, and linguistic analysis all can be seen as elaborations of this crucial problem: the reciprocal relationship between symbol and thought. It is stated best in his own aphorism, " the symbol gives rise to thought" [15] and its converse, "thought is always informed by symbol." By means of this formulation, the human sciences evidence the need they have for philosophy-that is, for a clarification of the starting points of their analytic thought. Philosophy also, in Ricoeur's aphorism, acknowledges the limits of reflection in declaring its need to return to symbol as the fullest expression of lived experience. We already begin to see Ricoeur's basic argument: without symbol there can be no fullness of expression; without comparison and interpretation, no authentic self..appiropriation; without philossophical thought, no truth.

From Symbol to Interpretation Theory

Symbol becomes Ricoeur's paradigm for the expression of multiple meanings. His successive definitions of symbol-from an implicitly religious thematization to an areligious, structural possibility of sevel"alunivocal thematizations-provide an index to the development of his hemeneutical theory.

An avowal by which humankind witnesses to the actuality of evil, in The *SymboliMn of Evil,* represents multiple torical and cultural intentionalities: the " symbol-thing" is distinguished from " image " by its function-" to gather to-

a *Ibid.,* pp. 196-97.

16 It should be noted that in *The Symbolism in Evil,* this aphorism as stated represents only " half " of the hermeneutical circle-even though, in the same context, Ricoeur speaks of the " whole circle made up of confession, myth and speculation" (p. 9) and also refers to the circle as "the believing for the sake of understanding which is also understanding for the sake of believing" (p. 854).

gether at one point a mass of significations, which before giving rise to thought, give rise to speech. The symbolic *manifestation* as a *thing* is a matrix of symbolic meanings as words." But the salient point in *The Symbolism of Evil* is that, even in the most archaic expressions of evil, the symbol is intended to express not just some *thing* but" the sinner's situation in the dimension of the sacred." A spot or stain, for example, can refer univocally to an obvious thing or event, or it may, in addition, designate the way a man is situated with regard to the sacred in his life.[16] Hence the symbol depends upon the sign, through which it intends something other than what is immediately referred to by the sign: the intentionality is assumed to be religious, and Ricoeur, at this point, does not raise the question of the adequacy nor of the relationship of the religious thematization to others.

Ricoeur's later definition of symhol in *Freud and Philosophy* has suspended the exclusively religious thematization and is designed both to accomodate the possibility of false consciousness and to raise the problem of multiple interpretation:

> Symbols occur when langauge produces signs of composite degree in which the meaning, not satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another meaning attainable only in and through the first intentionality[17]

It is within the circumscription of these expressions of double or multiple sense that his theory of hermeneutics is initially

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 26. It is interesting that Ricoeur's first definition of the symbol is overtly ontological. The ontological referent disappears, however, as the definition is transposed into structural terms but returns after several "detours": "Now I am prepared to say and to recognize that the ontological dimension of the symbol is precisely ' world-disclosure." In other words, if I give only a semantic definition of the symbol as a double-meaning structure, I still remain in a kind of structural analysis. But the main function of a symbolic structure is to say something in an indirect way about reality and therefore I should be inclined now to emphasize the ontological dimension of the symbolic structure." (Faculty Conference tape, University of Chicago, 1971) Notwithstanding this return to ontology, both the subjective and objective referent of symbol have been profoundly illuminated by Ricoeur's "detours " through myth criticism, psychoanalytic theory, and structuralism.

[17] Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosohpy,* p. 16. See also *Le conflit,* p. 16.

constituted. Later, as we shall see below, he defines symbol entirely in terms of structure and function.

But before moving into this further investigation of symbol by means of structuralism and phenomenology, Ricoeur enumerates three domains wherein symbols can be seen to emerge: the cosmic, the oneiric, and the poetic. Cosmic symbolism is closely tied to rites and hierophanies in primitive religions. Ricoeur regards them as the exemplary models of expressions for man's relation to the sacred and reaffirms Eliade's notion of the "cosmo-theological function of symbols while emphasizing the factor of intentionality by which man is reintegrated into the whole sacred past." Oneiric symbolism, dealt with primarily in Part Two of *Freud and Philosophy,* has to do with nocturnal dreams and has as its locus of investigation the individual psyche. Poetic symbolism differs from the cosmic and oneiric, according to Ricoeur, in that it refers to a word-image instead of a representation image. In the poetic symbol language does not have "hieratic stability under the protection of rites and myths." Instead, "it puts language in a state of emergence." [18]

These three zones wherein symbols reside-the cosmic, oneiric and poetic imagination-are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are initially somewhat like "world views" which serve only to qualify the various ways in which symbols come to be within human consciousness and how they might best be explicated. None of these zones has any temporal priority with respect to others, although the cosmic is more prevalent in classical history and the oneiric and poetic are more easily associated with the modern and contemporary. Nor are the cosmic and oneiric, of themselves, generically different: "To manifest the 'sacred' *on* the cosmos and to manifest it *in* the 'psyche' are the same thing." [19] It is helpful at this point to recall Ricoeur's treatment of feeling in *Fallible Man* where he showed that the condition for the possibility of "reading" feel-

[18] *The Symbolism of Evil,* p. 14.
[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 12, 14. Cf. also *Freud and Philosophy,* p. 16.

ing was an object or person on which felt qualities could be manifested. vVe notice, however, that quite properly Ricoeur does not refer to " feelings " in his discussion of symbol, for, as he said in *Fallible Man,* "the affective aspect of feeling vanishes as soon as its intentional aspect fades away, or it at least sinks into an inexpressible obscurity":

> It is only thanks to its aim, overspilling itself into a felt quality, into an affective " correlate," that feeling can be expressed, said, communicated and worked out in a cultural language. Our "affections " are read on the world they develop, which reflects their kinds and nuances. [20]

By eliminating the factor of feeling from his discussion of symbol, Ricoeur acquires an even more rigorous, through tentative reading of the object-intentionalities of feeling.

Ricoeur approaches the poetic imagination by way of " detour " in order to prevent a negative understanding of the category of the" imaginary":

> Too often it has been said the imagination is the power of forming images. This is not true if by image one means the representation of an absent or unreal thing, a process of rendering present-of presentifying-the thing over there, elsewhere, or nowhere. In no way does poetic imagination reduce itself to the power of forming a mental picture of the unreal; the imagery of sensory origin merely serves as a vehicle and as material for the verbal power"'whose true dimension is given to us by the oneiric and the cosmic.[21]

The three zones through which symbols emerge are, after all, united within language, for the symbols that emerge in any of them are all lignuistic expressions of multiple meaning.

Ricoeur begins to differentiate the various levels of possible meaning of the symbol by comparing it with other kinds of linguistic expressions. As language, first of all, symbol must be studied as reflective consciousness, that is, consciousness twice removed from as an affirmation of a non-lingistic experience which is signified in direct expressions, and

[20] *Fallible Man,* p. 127.
[21] *Fri'!Ud and Philosophy,* p. 15.

once as a self-reference which calls for indirection. What distinguishes symbol from sign, for example, is the subject's awareness of the primacy of the act of his own existence and of the desire to signify the quality of his immediate consciousness indirectly. This double awareness constitutes the distinctive intentionality of the symbol, whereas the sign has as its primary intentionality, a direct signification. In every sign a sensory vehicle is the bearer of a signifying function. This directly intended meaning may be, at the same time, the primary or literal meaning of symbol. A symbol has " the peculiarity of designating an indirect meaning in and through a direct meaning"; it calls for " something like a deciphering, that is, an interpretation. . . . To mean something other than what is said-that is the symbolic function." It is this *relation* of symbol to sign that is signified by the term, " double-sense " of symbol.[22]

Ricoeur differentiates symbol from analogy on the grounds that symbol cannot be satisfied with reasoning by proportionality: A is to B as C is to D.[23] Ricoeur argues that the meaning of symbol is not one constituted by likenesses apparent " from the outside." Rather, it is " the very movement of the primary meaning intentionally assimilating us to the *symbolized*, without our being able to intellectually dominate that likeness."[24] Nor is symbol like allegory. That which is signified by allegory is directly accessible to understanding whereas the symbol "means " by way of suggestion: " the symbol yields its meaning as enigma and not through translation." Symbols differ from characters in a system of symbolic logic in that the formal logic of the latter is maintained by translation which is similar to the higher mathematical functions.

Symbol is different from myth by virtue of temporality. As

•• *Ibid.,* pp. 11-lS.

•• It must be conceded that not all theories of analogy are as unsophisticated as that which Ricoeur cites as an example here.

•• *Freud and Philosophy,* p. 17. The 'need for an adequate interpretation of symbol leads Ricouer to question the usual meaning of verification. He observes that out of the many possible functions of an utterance, the logical selects only one for the process of verification. His goal is to achieve an " existential verification" for symbol.

a form of recitation, myth poses the problem of an originating, "fundamental time"-a temporal orientation, directed from a commencement toward an end-which must be treated over and above the interpretation of the basic symbol. Moreover, by incorporating a concealed social web in its relationship to rites and multiple institutions, the myth does not have the inexhaustible "temporal potential" of the symbol. The narrative structure of the myth limits the fund of potential significations of the symbol.[25]

Having defined symbol in relation to other kinds of linguistic expression, Ricoeur finally comes to define symbolism and interpretation reciprocally in order to "contain them within the strict limits of a semantic analysis." Symbol is that special form of linguistic expression that "calls for" interpretation. And interpretation (as distinct from translating, analogizing, or allegorizing) becomes that approach to the symbol which will be most adequate to what the symbol has to say. *Just as symbol is the model for that linguistic object which cuts across all empirical categories in its complexity and fullness, interpretation is the model for that most difficult operation of the subject who tries to articulate existential meaning for himself or herself in the situation referred to by the symbol, through and beyond known empirical categories.*

Ricoeur's theory of symbol can be seen to have developed out of his philosophical thought at a strategic point. His move to symbol was not a "concession" *to* philosophical thought but rather was essential to the philosophical task at a specific point, namely, in Ricoeur's analysis of the question of fault. This suggests that the relationship between philosophy and symbol can be an integral one, only if it is properly structured-a point reinforced by Ricoeur's own careful reflections on method.

Furthermore, such a structured context for the understanding of symbol can now be seen as necessary if polysemy is to be discussed as a *question* rather than simply as a *fact,* contrary

•• *Le conflit des interpretations,* p. 81!!, #82.

to the approaches of many theologians. The symbol is a problem for interpretation, according to Ricoeur, not only because its meaning is unknown or because its many meanings can never be completely known; rather, because it is legitimately investigated from several disciplines, it continuously gives rise to several univocal meanings.Ztl Basic to all meanings engendered by the symbol, however, is a " knowing "-an act always "constituted" by a subject and object of consciousness, perhaps best described in Husserlian phenomenology. In this view, the object becomes "object" and the subject " subject" only in the constitutive act of consciousness. One cannot, therefore, *know* anything about subject or object apart from each other, hence, strictly speaking, can know nothing about an a priori subject or object.[27] Ricoeur has, by way of explicating the complexity of the symbol as a linguistic expression, made self-evident the need for a highly sophisticated understanding of the thought which may emerge from reflection on symbol or from its cljtical interpretation.

Ricoeur's shift from his early consideration of symbol as religious to his later consideration of symbol as structural, reinforces his discovery of the complexity, not only of symbol, but of meaning. It is important to notice, however, that while he no longer denominates certain symbols as exclusively or

[26] The key insight is that interpretation is always a mediation of meaning (cf. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, p. 18). See also *Ibid.*, p. 24: " The notion of being is but ' the problematic unity of an irreducible plurality of meanings.' " Ricoeur notes that in ordinary language analysis-which assumes the priority of univocal meanings-we are unable to construct a typology of questions. Without philosophy, there is only an infinite regress of analysis.

[27] Ricoeur questions the adequacy of Husserl's concept of "constitution " as follows: if one takes as one's starting point any privileged experience, which is, by definition "constituted as revelatory of my ontological situation," one incurs the possibility of an experience of deficiency, of "non-being." as well as of experiences of sufficiency, of "being." On this basis Ricoeur censures as naive " the pretensions of the subject to set himself up as the primitive or primordial being under the pretext that he has, in a limited but authentic sense, the transcendental function of 'constituting' the involuntary aspects of his life and world." (Ricoeur, *Ilusserl*, p. 214). For another, more positive, interpretation of Husserl's concept of "constiution," however, see Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Ilusserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofl', 1964), esp. pp. 167-223.

necessarily "religious," he continues to find traditionally religious symbols as the most significant sources for thought, including religious thought. [28]

Confiict of Interpretations

Ricoeur's concept of the" conflict of interpretation" is most directly derived from his investigation of Freud's several notions of the term " overdetermination " and the problem of "false" consciousness. Ricoeur designs the concept to relate the "mediation" of consciousness to philosophical reflection.[29]

In *Fallible Man* Ricoeur already shows how intentionality

[08] Cf., for example, his essay, "La paternite: du fantasme au symbol," *Le conflit,* pp. 458-86.

•• Meaning, according to Ricoeur, is always "intentional," in the sense of its involving consciousness of some object. From the beginning the object of understanding is whatever has appeared in man's consciouS'lless. These objects include not only matters of conscious identification, but all the sedimented meaning of cultural objects of all the "disguised, substitutive, and fictive expressions of human wishing or desire " *(Freud and Philosophy,* p. *5)* . The overwhelming range of data which presents itself to contemporary man is only one explanation for what Ricoeur calls the " triple crisis of language, interpretation and reflection " (p. *55)* . Then too, many ways of explicating human experience have been shown to be incapable of dealing with the vast extent of the " modern horizon." One such way-the notion of "immediate consciousness"-has been found to be potentially misleading when it is employed in discussions concerning " meaning." It is a parlous notion because, since consciousness is merely assumed in most descriptions of human knowing, the fact of " mediation " is apt to be overlooked, not only in these descriptions but perhaps with greater consequences in related epistemological issues. In the major philosophical and theological traditions, for example, the notion of" immediate consciousness " has been especially problematic: Nietzsche and Freud attribute the rise of " false consciousness " to it. In order to replace the inadequate notion of "immediate consciousness," Freud creates the notion of the "unconscious," a region to which we have access only through " secondary processes" or "reflective consciousness." *(Ibid.,* pp. 78-80, 109-118). Ricoeur, therefore, turns to Freud as the one who most clearly presents the interpretative dimension of human experience. It is true that, since Freud, more suitable therapeutic methods and more accurate descriptions of the structure of human experience have been developed. Nevertheless, Freud is to be credited with having successfully argued for a primary world in which consciousness is rooted, a grounding world which is accessible to reflection only by way of " mediation." Cf. Ricoeur's discussion of " illusion " in Alasdiar Macintyre and Ricoeur: *The Religious Significance of Atheism,* pp. 61-67, where he compares Freud's and Nietzsche's use of the term; *Freud and Philosophy,* pp. and *Le*

must be read in terms of the progressions of the thinking-feeling and thinking-acting correlations as they are projected upon objects. He claims that only by means of those readings can one have some insight-limited though that always is-into the basic project of the self. In his critique of Descartes Ricoeur shows how the immediate consciousness is itself a forgetfulness both of how it came to be and of its need for a critical judgment to confirm the truth or falsity of its way of being:

If it is true that the language of desire is a discourse combining meaning and force, reflection, in order to get at the root of desire, must let itself be dispossessed of the conscious meaning of discourse and displaced to another place of meaning. This is the moment of dispossession, of relinquishing. But since desire is accessible only in the disguises in which it displaces itself, it is only by interpreting the signs of desire that one can capture in reflection the emergence of desire and thus enlarge reflection to the point where it regains what it had lost.

In *Freud and Philosophy* he observes that "it is no doubt necesary for us to be separated from ourselves, to be set off center, in order finally to know what is signified by the *I I am."* Ricoeur sees a special need for a notion of " reflective consciousness " that will be faithful to the linguistic character of consciousness-which is why he wishes to work toward a general hermenuetics that will go beyond Freud's psychoanalytic attempt to heal the " rupture " caused by " false consciousness." Given the need to go beyond the mere positing of the *I think, I am,* Ricoeur's theory of interpretation represents the necessary risk that a " true consciousness " must undertake of submitting itself to " harsh hermeneutical discipline." [30]

Psychoanalysis functions as the paradigm for the conflict of

conflict des interpretations, pp. 101-!'ll. Cf. also Emerich Coreth, *Metaphysics* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 192-95, where he states the fundamental principle that there is no real immediacy without mediation nor any mediation without immediacy . Cf. also Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," *Collection,* pp. !'l5!'l-67.

•• Freud and Philosophy, pp. 424, *55-56.* See also *Le confUt,* pp. 101-104, 149, 17!'l,

two interpretations-one progressive and one regressive-in *Freud and Philosophy.* is for Ricoeur a" ileged" interpretation because it preserves the centrality of the subject as posing the question of meaning and ultimately of being: we are confronted with " not a reduction to consciousness but a reduction *of* consciouness. Consciousness ceases to be what is best known and becomes problematic." Moreover, in psychoanalysis, even the object of intentionality becomes suspect insofar as it is treated as a variable with regard to basic desires and instincts. Intentionality does, of course, again become the guide of analysis, but only later by way of a " highly mediated reflection." Ricoeur credits Husserl with sketching the boundaries of research for this problem by presupposing a " passive genesis " as the starting point for all structuring of the investigation of intentionality. Freud's linking the "genesis of object with the genesis of love and hate " and his notion of " primary narcissism " further enable Ricoeur to speak of the "dispossession of the subject of consciousness" and lead him to regard the question of consciousness to be as obscure as the question of the unconscious.

Whereas Ricoeur previously refers to the empirical sciences as diagnostics, he now regards them also as conflicting interpretations; hermeneutics becomes, in this sense, a way of arbitratmg among the conflicts. The " true " consciousness, as opposed to the " false," is one that has been mediated through reflective, as distinct from immediate consciousness. This mediation, to be best understood, must itself pass through conflicting interpretations in order to be thoroughly saturated with " meaning " over and above its initial " meaningfulness," which is based on immediate consciousness.

One example of conflicting interpretations is seen in the question of the validity of religious interpretation of human experience. Ricoeur cites Freud's dual view of civilization as the product of instinct and as the defense of man against the crushing superiority of nature. In Freud's view, religion appears as an illusion employed by civilization whenever the "war against nature runs aground"; then the gods are invented

in " order to exorcize fear, in order to reconc,ile man with the cruelty of destiny and in order to compensate the malaise which the instinct for death renders incurable." Illusion becomes, then, the most controversial point between the disciplines of psychoanalysis and a phenomenology or religion. But it is precisely at this point that a critical self-understanding becomes possible:

> After Freud, the only possible philosophy of conscience will appear to be the Hegelian phenomenology of spirit. In this phenomenology of the immediate, consciousness does not know itself - - - - Man becomes adult, becomes " conscient," if and when he becomes capable of these new figures of which the succession constitutes " the spirit," in a Hegelian sense. An exegesis of conscience will consist in an inventory which conscience ought to re-encounter and appropriate, in view of self-reflection as a Self, as a human, adult, ethical me. This process is no longer an introspection and immediate conscience; it is no longer a figure of narcissism since the threshold of self is not the psychological ego, but the spirit, i.e., the dialectic of the figures themselves. The " conscience " is only the interiorization of the movement which it is necesary to recover in the objective structure of institutions, the monuments, the works of art and of culture. [31]

In *Le conflit des interpretations* Ricoeur uses the phrase " conflict of interpretations " in a strictly hermeneutical sense. He explores the contemporary philosophical ways of grafting the hermeneutic problem on phenomenological method. Recalling that the hermeneutic problem is both historically and functionally located within the boundaries of exegesis, he notes that exegesis itself requires a larger context:

> [this] is because all readings of the text themselves-also bound to " the what," to " the that in view of which " it has been written- are always made at the interior of a society, of a tradition. or from a stream of living thought, which develop presuppositions and from exigencies.

Exegesis, in this sense, is always and only the origin of hermeneutics. In the introductory essay of *Le con;flit des inter-*

u *Freud and Philosophy* pp.

pn§tations Ricoeur calls attention to the liason between interpretation (exegesis of texts) and comprehension (understanding of signs) and notes that all major interpretations influence and are influenced by "modes of comprehension available to a given epoch." Ricoeur again mentions myth, allegory, metaphor, and analogy as traditional forms of hermeneutics: **"It** is signifying discourse which is interpreted, which ' inteprets ' reality in the same measure where it speaks something of something." [32]

By means of this of interpretation and comprehension Ricoeur relates the technical problems of textual exegesis to more general problems of the signification of language. In order to do so, he describes the nineteenth century development of exegesis into general hermeneutics. Dilthey, who tried to achieve a Kantian validity for the human sciences, is the major figure in Ricoeur's account of this transition period in the history of hermeneutics-along with Schleiermacher, who before Dilthey, recommended that the theory of interpretation start from the act of understanding rather than from texts. In more recent hermeneutics Ricoeur sees the early Husserl as the most important influence because of his efforts to replace an epistemology of interpretation with an ontology of comprehension. Ricoeur contrasts Heidegger's *voie oourt* of founding hermeneutics in phenomenology with his own long route to ontology and proposes three successive states: **(1)** a problematic of langauge, that is, a semantic stage wherein the "form of interpretation is relative to the theoretical structure of the hermeneutic system being considered"; (2) a problematic of reflection, that is, a reflexive stage whereby the self ascertains the conditions of the possibility of appropriating the equivocal meanings derived from the first stage; (3) a problematic of existence, that is, an ontological stage whereby the interpreting-being is himself indirectly apperceived in the act of interpretation.

Viewed within Ricoeur's long route to ontology, hermeneutics

[82] *Le confiit,* pp. 311-29, 7-8 (my translation).

can be reformulated as the problem of relating exegesis to a theory of understanding:

> How can we arrive at an epistemology of interpretation, issuing from a reflection on exegesis, on the method of history, on psychoanalysis, on phenomenology of religion, and so forth, by which it is touched, animated and, so to speak, aspired after, by an ontology of comprehension?

Hermeneutics, reconstituted in this sense, is no longer only a method designed to compete with the natural sciences. In Ricoeur's hermeneutics, comprehension is itself put on a different level; it is more of a mode of being than of knowing- " the mode from that which *exists* in comprehending." Accordingly, Ricoeur will substitute "for the short way of the Analytic of Dasein the long original way of the analysis of language." In so doing, he intends to guard " steadily the contact with disciplines which seek to practice interpretation by means of a methodical manner " and will resist " the temptation to separate the *trutft,,* proper to comprehension, from the method taken in works by the disciplines issuing from exegesis." In essence, Ricoeur is seeking a new "problematic of existence " based on the processes of interpretation as conducted in each of the separate disciplines. [33]

In the first stage of semantic analysis Ricoeur still uses symbol as a paradigm, this time defining it, however, in terms of linguistic *function* related to *method of interpretation:*

> I call symbol any structure of signification where a direct, primary, literal sense, designates in addition another indirect secondary figurative meaning, which can only be apprehended by traversing the first.

Correlatively, interpretation, in this view, signifies the work of thought which consists not only in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning but " in deploying the levels of implied signification in the literal signification." The initial attempt to interpret very quickly engenders " disparate, indeed

•• *Ibid.* pp. 7-28.

opposed methods." What begins as an inquiry into the understanding of symbolic structures develops into " a confrontation of hermeneutic styles " and into a task of relating the "diversity of hermeneutical methods to the structure of corresponding theories." Such conflicts of interpretations become, according to Ricoeur, a true arbitration among the total claims for each single interpretation: " in showing from what manner each method expresses the form of a theory, it justifies each in the limits of its proper theoretical conscription."

In the second stage of reflective analysis Ricoeur points out the insufficiency of the first: semantic analysis itself demands a reference to existence since langauge is a "signifying medium." Lest the first stage become absolute in itself, two other aspects of comprehension must be recalled. First, the remoteness of the self to oneself must be surmounted in some way, for example, in psychoanalysis or textual exegesis. Here the reflection of the Cogito is " the appropriation of our effort to exist and our desire to go through the works which give witness to this effort and of this desire." Second, the exegesis of the text of conscience collides with misinterpretations arising from the false conscience. For these two reasons reflection "ought to be doubly indirect" -in the realizations that existence is attested to only in the documents of life, and that immediate consciousness is initially to be suspected as possibly false, thereby needing always to be elevated from misunderstanding or premature understanding to comprehension by " a corrective critique."

Ricoeur only sketches the framework of how the third stage of ontological analysis might be constructed:

> The ontology of comprehension resides implicitly in the methodology of interpretation, according to the ineluctable " hermeneutic circle " which Heidegger himself taught us to trace. Moreover, it is only in a conflict of rival hermeneutics that we catch sight of something of interpreted being: a unified ontology is inaccessible to our method as a separate ontology; it is each time each hermeneutic which uncovers the aspect of existence which grounds it as method.

The question of ontology, even though it remains unresolved, is for that reason not hopeless, according to Ricoeur. For it is announced and anticipated, for example, through the dialectic of archeology, teleology, and eschatology in language: " This coherent figure of being which we are, in which the rival interpretations will come to be implanted, is not given other than in this dialectic of interpretation." In other words, the unity of interpretations presupposes the conflict of interpretations for the completion of the hermeneutical task:

> Only a hermeneutics, instructed by symbolic figures, can show that these different modalities of existence appertain to a unique problematic; because these are finally the more rich symbols which assure the unity of these multiple interpretations; they alone carry all the vectors, regressive and prospective, that the diverse hermeneutics dissociate. The true symbols are the main part of all hermeneutics, from ones that make their way toward the emergence of new significations and of those which make their way toward a resurgence of archaic phantasms.

For truth is to be gained only through reflection and struggle:

> reflection will no longer be the positing, as feeble as it is peremptory, as sterile as it is irrefutable, *I think, I am:* it will have become concrete reflection; and its concreteness will be due to the harsh hermeneutic discipline.

The uniqueness of Ricoeur's theory lies in this "concreteness" of reflection.[34]

In his most recent remarks Ricoeur reiterates that hermeneutics must not be regarded as being "everything." That is, hermeneutics does not replace, for example, exegesis, comparative studies, philosophy or ethics. At the present time, however, it seems to be the discipline most capable of illuminating the relationship among the other major disciplines that have to do with interpretation. As exegetical, this discipline will encourage men and women to interpret in order that they might under-

Ibid. The implications of " concrete" reflection for an ontology, of course, calls for a separate and more extended treatment that can be afforded by this introductory article. In a sequel to this article I will discuss the concept of "universality " in relation to the ontology sketched by Ricoeur thus far.

stand more comprehensively. As comparative, hermeneutics prevails upon them to range ever more widely in order that they may understand more selectively. As philosophical, hermeneutics demands that they order and relate their methods of interpretation critically and that they understand themselves as interpreters mov,ing through levels of reflection. Only in this way is the circular character of the hermeneutical circle transcended: "By the comprehension of ourselves, let us say, we ourselves appropriate the meaning of our desire to be or of our effort for existence. Existence, we can now say, is desire and effort." [35]

Theological inquiry into religious symbols, then, presupposes the same kind of rigorous criteriology that is demanded for a phenomenology of symbol in general. Theological understanding also participates in the conflict of interpretations in an ongoing ontology, especially as theology pertains to the understanding of the history and practice of the proclamation of religious symbols. [86]

Text-appropriation

Ricoeur's clearest explication of the act of critical appropriation occurs in his most recent articles. [37] In "La meta-

[35] *Freud and Philosophy,* p. 24. Much remains to be said about Ricoeur's concept of the hermeneutical circle. For this introduction, it may suffice to point out that in a certain sense, the interpveter is always " inside" the hermeneutical circle. Yet by Ricoeur's notion of critical appropriation the narcissistic self is abandoned and a new self-image is literally made possible.

[36] Several further questions on the relationship of history and theology need to be asked at this point: for example, on the apparent paradox of the sense in which theology is at any time contingent and also constituted once and for all times. In another article I will further explicate how Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory is helpful in understanding how theology can proclaim a universal link between "then" and "now." (See footnote 34 above.)

[37] See, for example, " Interpretation Theory " (Paper presented at the University of Chicago Faculty Conference, Spring, 1971); "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" (Paper presented at the Gadamer Conference, New School of Social Research, 1971); and "Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor" (Paper presented at Levi-Strauss Conference, Lexington, 1972). Unless otherwise indicated, the quotations in this section are from the published article " La metaphore et la probleme central de l'hermeneutique,"

phore et la probleme centrale de l'hermeneutique," he suggests that the notion of metaphor taken as " emergent meaning " can illuminate the task of text-explanation by providing ways to identify the " sense" of the text. His is an interaction theory of metaphor: " a word receives a metaphorical meaning in specific contexts within which they are opposed to other words taken literally." The "sense" of a metaphor is an "immanent design "; it is that which is made manifest by the event of metaphor in the " clash " among literal meanings. The problem of metaphor in one sense, then, is the inverse of the problem of ideal meaning, where the invariability of the context is essential for the reidentification of meaning. According to Ricoeur, " sense " is no problem in trivial cases of metaphor; only in novel instances of metaphor is there need for " more than a plain-language substitute." Indeed, the meaning of a fresh metaphor is not " drawn from anywhere:

> it is a momentaneous creation of language, a semantic innovation which has no status in language as already established, neither as designation nor as connotation.

The problem of identifying this " momentaneous creation " makes it imperative for the reader to construct the meaning from what he knows from other contexts and from his own past as a counterpart of the metaphor to be understood. Ricoeur suggests various ways of fulfilling this preparatory stage of interpretation. One way is to substitute for the word-metaphor, the " system of connotations and commonplaces." This way seems equivalent to the "commonsense " approach to understanding a text. Another way establishes identities by way of various scientific perspectives. Ricoeur suggests that it is at this level that literary criticism is related to psychology and sociology. Although Ricoeur does not speak of methods by which the sciences might be employed in the act of interpretation, his own earlier work suggests that they might function as diagnostics. Commonsense and scientific approaches can all intersect in the "conflict of interpretations":

Revue Philosophique de Louvain, LXX (February, 1972), pp. 98-112; trans. in *New Literary History,* VI (Autumn, 1974), pp. 95-110.

The decisive moment of explication is that of the construction of the network of interaction, which makes of this context an actual and unique context. In doing that, we point to the semantic event as to the intersection point between several semantic lines; this construction is the means by which all the words taken together make sense. Then-and only then-the " metaphorical twist " is both an event and a meaning, a meaningful event and an emerging meaning in language.

This stage is only preparatory to the task of interpretation. It only sets the stage for understanding the " sense " of the new meaning. Nevertheless, this stage is *de facto* necessary if the interpreter wishes to claim objectivity for his or her interpretation.

Ricoeur points out that the way of deciphering the sense of the text is similar to the identification of the sense of the metaphor. In each case the movement of understanding is from " local meanings to regional meanings " and *vice versa.* For both the text and metaphor an understanding of the context or work as a whole " gives the key " to the understanding of a metaphor or to each part of the text. The process of explanation, in this view, both obscures and devaluates the "mental meaning" originally intended by its author. Moreover, the" validation" of this process of construction, although assisted by passing through the conflict of interpretations, is ultimately in terms of the clues offered by the text or metaphoric statement:

> . . . the construction relies on the " clues " contained in the text itself: a clue is a kind of index for a specific construction, both a set of permissions and a set of prohibitions; it excludes some un-fitting constructions and allows some others which make more sense.

Two principles determine the degree of adequacy attending ,any given construction. The principle of convergence permits that construction to be more probable which is able to account for the "greatest number of facts provided by the text " and " offers a better qualitative convergence between the traits which it takes into The principle of plenitude allows for all the connotations that can possibly fit " to be

attached." The principle of plenitude provides Ricoeur with a transition from metaphor as "sense" (that is, the consideration of the intersection of a given work or word in the language system) to a consideration of metaphor as "reference." If the context or work as a whole has been significant in giving a clue to the *sense* of a metaphor or text, a consideration of the whole is even more essential to the deciphering of its *reference.* If explanation is the process by which the "sense" of a text is discovered and understood, then interpretation is the process by which the two kinds of reference-world-reference and self-reference-are understood.

On the level of appropriation, then-under which term Ricour subsumes both world-reference and self-refernce-the intention to intepret is fulfilled:

> The interpretation of the text is completed in the interpretation of self by a subject who henceforth comprehends himself more, comprehends himself in another way, or even begins to comprehend.

At stake here is what Ricoeur speaks of in *Freud and Philosophy* as concrete reflection-not an abstract reflection about disengaged objects but a reflection arising from participation by the subject in the concrete world:

> Hermeneutical and philosophical reflection are here correlative and reciprocal. On one side, the comprehension of self passes through the detour of comprehension of signs of culture in which the self documents and forms itself; on the other, the comprehension of the text is not itself the end, it mediates the relation to the self of a subject who does not find in the short-circuit of immediate reflection the meaning of his proper life.

Appropriation is not only the overcoming of cultural distance, time, or strangeness. It is even more the contemporaneous " constitution of self and that of meaning." Truly an event of discourse, it completes the act of writing. From that moment the movement of reference in the text, having been intercepted in the act of writing, is retaken toward the world of the reader and its subject becomes the reader himself. By its *sense,* preserved by graphic signs, " the text has only a semiological

dimension," but through its *reference* it gains a semantic dimension.38

By emph,asizing the appropriative function in interpretation Ricoeur's own theory of interpretation avoids the subjectivistic bias so derogated by contemporary scientists: for him, appropriation occurs only at the end of the processes of interpretation. It is the other end of the hermeneutical arc, the " last pillar of the bridge." At the same time, since it must be understood as taking place within an indefinitely continuous dialectic of explication and interpretation, Ricoeur cautions ag,ainst three mistaken notions of appropriation: (1) appropriation is not a coincidence with the intention of the author, his experience, nor his representation of history or culture. Instead, it is a " direction of thought opened up by the text." That which is to be appropriated is the true reference of the text, "the power of disclosing a world." (2) The text is not limited to its original audience. Instead, there is a kind of " universality of sense " which is itself capable of generating new speech events. The text-whether for its author or a subsequent reader-is always already a "first interpretation." The hermeneutical arc, then, can be taken in two senses: one, pertaining to the movement in any single act of interpretation from *Erkliirung* through *Verstandnis;* another, pertaining to the meditation of the interpretation-appropriation correlation through a series of interpretants. In this view the "meaning" of the series of appropriations is successively lost as it is re-taken. The one " resaying " is both preserved in the hermeneutic arc and reactivated in every interpretation of the text. (3) The text is not at the mercy of its interpreters or their prejudices. Quite the contrary:

> what is "made one's own" is not something mental, is not the intention of another subject, presumably hidden behind the text, but the project of a world, the *pro-position* of a mode of being in the world that the text opens up in front of itself by means of its

38 Ricoeur, "Qu' est ce qu' un Texte?" *Hermeneutik und Dialektik, Vol. II Sprache und Logik Theorie der Auslegung und Probleme der Einzelwissenschaften,* edited by Rudiger Bubner, *et al* (Tlibingen, 1970), pp.

non-ostensive references. Far from saying that a subject already mastering his own way of being in the world, projects the *a priori* of his self-understanding on the text and *reads* it *into* the text, I say that interpretation is the process by which the disclosure of new modes of being ... *gives* to the subject a new capacity for knowing himself.

Appropri,ation, then, is not so much a " possession " of the text as it is a " dispossession of the egoist and narcissist ego." By passing through the level of explanation, a kind of " universality " is achieved, which suspends the text and reader from ostensive reference for the time being.

Finally, it is through his analysis of the text and metaphor that Ricoeur arrives at another elaboration of his earlier concept of the hermeneutical circle-introduced as existential in *The Symbolism of Evil,* developed as phenomenologial in *Freud and Philosophy,* and formulated as methodological in *Le conflit des interpretations.* In his most recent analysis he places the circle on the ontological level:

> The circle is between my way (or my mode) of being-beyond the knowledge I may have of it-and the mode (or the way) of being disclosed by the text as the work's world.

This revision-essentially a new context for the hermeneutical circle, as distinct from a new formulation of it-enables Ricoeur to venture as close as he has dared until now to an ontology.

Reconstruction of the Hermeneutical Tradition

In Ricoeur's work we find the possibility of reconceiving and, I believe, of resolving the great hermeneutical debate of the nineteenth century, beginning with Schleiermacher and Dilthey. This debate is momentous because hermeneutics became philosophical with these two figures. Their departure from the older concept of *hermeneia* as text exegesis, commentary or translation is the occasion for two levels of the hermeneutical problem to emerge: (1) the need for exegetical principles to be understood over and against those of the natural sciences, at that time dominating the field of human understanding; (fl)

the need for a theory of understanding in which the rules of interpretation themselves might be better understood. In addressing himself to the latter Ricoeur both utilizes the best of the Romantic tradition and eliminates the adverse influences that tradition has had on the contemporary understanding of interpretation.

First of all, he recognizes that the formulation of a general theory of interpretation is decidedly a post-Kantian enterprise, for which Kant's theory of pure reason is of little help, however, since, for Kant, mind is an impersonal center of forms of expression. Ricoeur sees the Romantics, among whom Schleiermacher was the first m,ajor figure in the hermeneutical tradition, emphasizing a different aspect of mind. For them, mind is the seat of the creative unconscious, most clearly manifest in the phenomenon of individual genius. With this general notion of mind Schleiermacher attempts to elaborate the conditions for the possibility of developing universal rules of understanding which can relate literary and aesthetic works to all processes of creation. The Romantic theory of understanding depends, for the most part, on the marriage of reflection and intuition. [39] Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, for example, has for its ambition the reconstruction of another's intuition. As Dilthey later comments, Schleiermacher believes it is possible to understand an author better than he understands himself. For Ricoeur, Scheiermacher's hermeneutics emphasizes subjectivity at the expense of objectivity.

Eighty years later the context of the debate changes and Wilhelm Dilthey faces a more intransigent positivist opposition, one that eclipses even the Romanticist conception of mind, philosophically best formulated by Hegel in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). Dilthey shifts the starting-point of the debate from nature *to* mankind: he proposes that the individual is better understood against a whole history of mankind rather

•• Cf. Meyer Abrams' excellent literary-historical assessment of the Romantics' understanding and employment of this concept, in *Natural, Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1971 esp. Chapters VI-VIII. It should be noted, however, that Abrams does not avail himself of resources to be found in the hermeneutical tradition,

than in terms of an isolated natural being. He builds his theory of understandjng, of which interpretation is to be only one province, against the positivist concept of *Erkliirung* (explanation), which tends to reduce life to process. In attempting to give a scientific status to interpretation Dilthey attaches his theory of understanding to the human sciences, which although based on psychology in his conception of them, have as their goal, *Verstehen* (understanding) .

Dilthey's genius, according to Ricoeur, is to have united the sense of a subjective dimension in historical knowledge to an "object-structure" of understanding. His short-coming is that he regarded *life,* rather than *meaning,* as the proper goal of understanding. This conclusion leads Ricoeur to regard the relationship of *Erklarung* to *Verstehen* as the major unsolved hermeneutical problem for today. He thinks that Dilthey's treatment of this problem as a dichotomy belongs to the "prelinguistic" era of interpretation theory. That is, Dilthey lacks adequate epistemological tools to relate the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Geisteswissenschaften,* even though he recognizes the problem and tries to .solve it. Today, however, the availability of semiotic and semiological models points to a new situation which allows Ricoeur to reopen the problem in a dialectic of explanation and understanding. In this new situation the dialectics and models belong to the same field, and there is no need to borrow models from the physical sciences.

What strikes one initially as one examines Riceoeur'.s position in the whole debate on hermeneutics is Ricoeur's ambition to provide a conceptuality to account for all real claims for rendering a text intelligible and meaningful. Such a conceptuality would be no small achievement, since some of the oppositions within the debate, such as Gadamer's "truth *versus* method," have, until now, appeared to be irreconcilable from existing points of view.

Once also notices that Ricoeur is not especially interested in *winning* the debate. His way of reconciling all the opposed positions not only forbids one to think that he has found *the* method by which one can unlock all texts but also prevents one from believing that a merely attitudinal disposition, such

as " openness " or" respectfulness " might be sufficient for the work of interpretation. His is a truly *critical* reconciliation. It is not surprising, therefore, that one finds an emphasis on the drama of hermeneutics; this is especially evident in Ricoeur's use of the metaphoric language of conflict and war. The point of this imagery seems to be that, before any mature understanding can be received-usually referred to by Ricoeur in the metaphoric language of " gift "-there is something *to be* won. One cannot, in his hermeneutical theory, "wait on" or read one's text passively. One must, so to speak, enter the debate over meaning and take a position within the war of opposing interpretations, for it is only by so doing that one can authentically appropriate what has been understood within one's world of many possible meanings. Such a position does not preclude the so-called passive modes of being, such as silence and receptivity. Indeed, they are presumed, since the assertion of a position at any given time must be commensurate with the point at issue. Nevertheless, Ricoeur's theory emphasizes that what is at stake is not merely a verbal game, but an authentic way of being in the world.[40]

Conclusion

I have attempted to show how Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory eliminates the subjectivist bias in the hermeneutical tradition and how it provides a splendid way of understanding the act of critical appropriation. It remains to specify the implications these resources of his thought have for major tasks in contemporary theology. I take these tasks to be (I) the development of principles for a critical pluralism, ('2) a demonstration of how such critical principles can assist the retrieval of central religious symbols of the major religious traditions, and (3) a demonstration of how such critical principles can force an enrichment of experience for anyone aspiring to a religious consciousness.

[40] It can be noted that in several ways Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory is opposed to Heidegger's.

Regarding the first task, Ricoeur addresses the three-fold crisis of contemporary culture-a crisis of reflection, interpretation, and meaning-on many levels. Since 1950 his underlying ambition has been to incorporate hermeneutic (e. g., in this case, religious) discourse within a philosophy of essential structure. His work allows for a maximum utilization of the sciences as " diagnostics." At the same time, his philosophical explication of subjectivity, in the first volume of his philosophy of will, discloses the extent and limits of scientific discourse. Without sacrificing the Reformation emphasis on the subject's faith, as distinct from beliefs, Ricoeur's notion of subjectivity enables religious and theistic interpreters to take seriously the modernist critiques of religion and naive understandings of conscience, especially those of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. His discussions of " first" and " second " naivete indicate both the need and the possibility of overcoming and mediating the prejudice or fear common to immediate experience. His " detours " into psychoanalysis and structuralism provide examples of how to arbitrate, by means of philosophical reflection, the multiple interpretations to which symbolic and narrative avowals of religious experience give rise. Since this arbitration involves a multiplicity of methods, Ricoeur's approach promises a better accommodation of empirics and aesthetics than has been customary to philosophical theology. At the very least, such arbitration enables symbol and myth to acquire a cognitive status among other ways of re-presenting and understanding human experience.

Ricoeur's contribution to the second task can best be seen in his theory of symbol, together with his own comparative study of Babylonian, Greek, Judaic, and Christian symbols in *The Symbolism of Evil.* Here he initiates the notion of " existential verification" which signifies the entire process of discovering the " field of experience opened up by a myth." In his most recent work the notion of " appropriation " may well be indispensable for understanding the culmination of " existential verification." " Appropriation," as the ultimate goal of all theological reflection, is traditionally formulated as part of the hermeneutical circle: believe in order to understand-where belief,

according to Ricoeur, is a wager that one's investment will pay off in "power of reflection, in coherent discourse." By his careful insistence on the privileged status of the text and methods of interpretation Ricoeur has made it possible for contemporary readers to hear anew the principal symbols of major religious traditions and to work toward an authentic critical pluralism among traditions as well as disciplines.

Finally, Ricoeur'.s emphasis on imagination provides a needed counterpart to the faith-decision emphasis in recent theology found, for example, in the Bultmannian tradition of Fuchs, Ebeling and Ott, the radical theology of Bloch, Altizer, and Hamilton, and the third world revolutionary theology of Metz, Gutierrez, and Freire. Like these theologians, Ricoeur recognizes the centrality of decision: he begins his philosophy of will with a study of decision as the most complex human act which integrates, as it were, all the levels of the involuntary and voluntary. He continues to see decision as the projection of an integrated self toward some "event-like" possibility in the world in his most recent articles, especially where he develops the notion of a dialectic between speech and action. But his detour from an initially direct treatment of decision to interpretation and imagination-both of which would seem to be intrinsic to the maturation of faith-has crucial implications for the foregoing theologies. For other theologians, notably the transcendental theology of Lonergan and Rahner, the revisionist theology of Tracy, and the process theology of Ogden and Cobb, Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory satisfies the need for a way of returning to the images and insights which give rise to theological concepts. And while Ricoeur himself up to the present has been more interested in retrieving symbols, myths, and primordial religious expressions than theological concepts, his work nevertheless offers a nuanced explication and exemplification of interpretation which can serve as a model for anyone engaged in any one of the many tasks comprising contemporary religious studies.

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THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF THE RETRIBUTIVE APPROACH TO PUNISHMENT

RECENTLY THE pros and cons of our prison system and our modes of punishment have been seriously questioned. Evidence seems to indicate that our current modes of punishing have little deterrent effect. When confronted with this fact the man on the street will usually react in one of two ways. Either he will insist that our mode of punishment does deter, or he will say that, even if punishment does not deter, we must still punish because a criminal deserves to suffer since he has committed a moral wrong and it is just that he be punished. This position has been termed the " retributive " approach to punishment. It is apparent that the retributive approach has wide appeal in the United States today, for otherwise it is inconceivable that we would continue to punish in spite of the lack of evidence of its deterrent effect.

Given the fact that the retributive justification of punishment appears to be popular it is of utmost importance to make explicit the following positions which it must assume. First, the retributive approach must of necessity view the state as having a moral obligation with regard to punishment (i.e., the state must see to it that justice be done). Secondly, it must assume that what is just can be known. That is to say, it must assume that we know it is just that the criminal suffer for the evil he has done.

These basic popularly held ideas did not simply arise among us. This article attempts to analyze how it is that many Americans hold these ideas. Specifically, I shall attempt to indicate how the retributive idea of punishment and its concomitant assumption is born out of Western religious notions.

Although secular retributivists give apparently secular arguments to back up their approach, their arguments really stem

from a basically Western religious approach to punishment-specifically, that it is just that the criminal suffer and that the state should see to it that this religious or moral "duty" is done.

The Old and New Testaments made the retributive idea of punishment the accepted rationale for punishment throughout the ancient and Medieval world, but the biblical conception of punishment continues even today to strongly influence the Western Mind.

The original rationale for the retributive approach derived from religious ideas of rewards and punishments meted out by God. The basis of the biblical idea of punishment is that there is a Divine Justice in the world, that God will punish evil doers because they are wicked, as he will reward the righteous because of their righteousness. Thus the Bible says, "The righteous shall rejoice when he sees vengeance ... So that a Man shall say, verily there is a reward for the righteous, doubtless there is a God that judgeth the earth." [1] "As thou has done, it shall be done unto thee: thy reward shall return upon thine own head." [2] "For I will not justify the wicked." [3] "And I will visit upon the world their evil and upon the wicked their iniquity." [4] "And thou art full of the judgment of the wicked. Judgment and justice take hold on them." [5] God "will render to every man according to his works ... to them that obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulations and anguish upon every man that doeth evil." [6]

Whereas both the Old and the New Testaments consider Divine punishment of the wicked as one of the primary pillars of Divine Justice in this world, the New Testament and later Christian thought are more terrifying in their emphasis on torture of the wicked in an existence after death: "The fear-

[1] Psalms 58:10-11.
[2] Obadiah 1:5.
[3] Exodus 23:7.
[4] Isaiah 13:11.
[6] Job 36:17.
[8] Romans 2:8. See also Psalms 1:6, 94:12, 9:18, 37:28, 145:20; Proverbs 10:27; II Chronicles 6:23; Isaiah 11:4.

ful . . the abominable and murderers . . . shall have their past in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death." [7] " The Son of Man will send forth his angels and they will gather out of the Kingdom all scandals and those who work iniquity, and cast them into the furnace of fire, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth." [8]

St. Augustine devotes much of his work to discussing the meaning of the New Testament passages concerning punishment, the extent and type of suffering to be endured by the wicked. Augustine expounds on how both the soul and body feel pain from the fires of hell and how "living creatures can continue in fire without being consumed in pain without suffering death." [9] Augustine not only expounds on the meanings of types of punishments referred to in the Bible but he adds to Christian thought the conception of eternal punishment of the wicked after death. This is the meaning of hell-a place for the everlasting punishment of sinners.

While there are references to eternal punishment in the New Testament-for example "And these will go into everlasting punishment, but the just into everlasting life," [10] and " Depart from the accursed ones into the everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels "[11]-Augustine takes these passages and explains them unequivocably as referring to everlasting punishment of the damned in hell. His language is unambiguous, "One thing that will happen and most certainly happen," says Augustine, " is what God . . . said concerning the punishment of Hell being eternal." God will " raise bodies from the dead and allow the bodies of the damned to suffer in eternal fire. . . . " [12] This concept of unending punishment for

[7] Revelations 19: 20.

[8] Matthew 3:41-43.

[9] St. Augustine, *City of God,* Introduction by Etienne Gilson, Trans., by Gerald G. Walsh, Demetrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan and Daniel J. Honan, ed. by Vernon J. Bourke (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1950), Book XXI, Chaps. 3, 9.

[10] Matthew 25:4.

[11] Matthew 25:41. See also Mark 9:42-47.

[12] Augustine, *op. cit.,* Book XXI, chap. 9.

evildoers embodies the most thorough conception of retributive justice. Here it is most obvious that evildoers suffer only because it is just that they suffer. It is obvious that punishment here serves no other purpose at all, for eternal punishment after death can certainly not benefit society, nor can it benefit the transgressor in any way/ [13]

St. Thomas accepts St. Augustine's basic ideas concerning retributive justice. First, it is obvious that " all works, both good and evil, will have to be judged " [14] and that " as reward is to merit so punishment is to guilt. . .." [15] Secondly, St. Thomas accepts the fact that the wicked will be punished not only in this world but in a world to come. Man is subject to judgment after death since punishment in this world, "the punishment which before the (final) judgment was not incompletely will be completed at the last judgment." [16] Third, like St. Augustine, St. Thomas devotes considerable effort in describing the nature of the punishment after death. Hence, he considers " whether in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire." [17] And finally, like St. Augustine, St. Thomas fully accepts " the everlasting punishment for temporal sins." [18]

It should be noted that the conception of retribution in the form of punishment after death had its origins in pre-Christian pagan societies. One of the most thorough and articulate descriptions of hell in pre-Christian times comes to us from Plato. At the end of his *Republic* Plato describes how after death the soul reaps the consequences of its deeds; he describes the divine origin of the soul, its fall, its incarnation in a cycle of births as a penalty for former sins. The judgment after death involves torments of the unjust and the happiness of

[13] On the other hand, if we refuse to take these sources from the New Testament as what they purport to be (Revelation) and interpret them as human inventions, then a tacit utilitarianism seems to be at work.

"Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologiae* ITI, p.87, a.l.

[15] *Ibid.*, q.99, a.l.

[16] *Ibid.*, q.88, a.l.

[17] *Ibid.*, q.97, a.l.

[18] *Ibid.*, q.99, a.l.

the just. Hence, Plato says, "We receive the prize of justice ... not here only, but in the journey of a thousand years. . . ." [19] Therefore, when we see suffering of the righteous, it is due to offenses in a former life.[20] Similarly, says Plato, if the unjust person suffers, if he

> . . . is afflicted with poverty or sickness or any other seeming evil, all this will come to some good for him in the end, either in this life or after death. For the gods, surely, can never be regardless of one who sets his heart on being just and making himself by the practice of virtue as like a god as man may.
>
> No, naturally they would not neglect one who is like themselves.
>
> And we must not think the opposite of the unjust man?
>
> Most certainly.[21]

The history of Western ideas concerning divine retributive punishment is long and formidable. But while our religious heritage established the conception of retributive justice meted out by God, still it did not directly establish the conception of retributive justice meted out by a secular government. For St. Augustine, in fact, secular society did not dispense retributive justice. This is because St. Augustine contended that while justice was perfect, the justice of the earthly state was imperfect. The state could not know, for example, whether a punishment imposed was too heavy or too light. The judge could never be sure that he was not condemning an innocent man.[22] The purpose of punishment in a secular state was not to realize any type of justice but to keep people in line. Peace and order were made possible by fear of coercion and punishments. Through fear of laws and punishment attached to them, men could be kept from performing injurious actions to others.[23] Hence, punishment by the secular government, for Augustine, is in no way retributive; it is employed only because of its utility and has nothing to do with justice.

[19] Plato *Republic,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. *859.*

[20] *Ibid.,* pp. 346-348.

[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 347-348.

[22] Herbert A. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 134.

[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 140-141.

To those familiar with Augustine's argument for state persecution of heretics, it would seem that punishment by secular governments is retributive. Yet this is not so. It is true that Augustine calls for state persecution of heretics. He could not be more clear on this point. "How," he asks, "are kings to serve the land with fear except by preventing and chastising with religious severity all those aspects which are done in opposition to the Commandments of the Lord?" [24] Yet Augustine is equally clear when he says that the sole purpose of persecution is to instill fear. "Through fear of suffering what he does not desire, he (the heretic) either renounces his hostile prejudices, or is compelled to examine the truth of which he has been contentedly ignorant, and under the influence of this fear (he) repudiates the error he was wont to defend . . . . " [25] This punishment of heretics by the state is not because the state dispenses true justice in the form of punishment; rather, punishment of heretics by the state is employed for its utility- to make heretics reconsider their position. Although St. Augustine defended imperial laws that provided for punishment of heretics, he did not seek to have the penalty provided by law actually levied on the heretics who were actually tried and found guilty. Herbert Deane, a known scholar on St. Augustine, states: "He seems to view the law and its penalties as a threat rather than a direct punishment of heresy." [26] "The purpose of the state's enactments against heresy . . . is to admonish the wanderers to return to the church of Christ, rather than punish them for thier crimes." [27] That punishment of heretics by the state is not retributive is emphasized when St. Augustine clearly rejects the death penalty- for that would defeat the purpose of state punishment-as a threat to force one to reconsider his position. [28] Had punish-

[24] *Letters of St. Augustine*, CLXXXV, 19, in *The Political Writings of St. Augustine*, ed. by Henry Paolucci (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970), p. 212.

[25] Letters XCII, 16-19, in Paolucci, p. 203.

[26] *Deane*, p. 189.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

[28] Letters C, 2 and CXXXIII, 1, in Paolucci, pp. !291-!298.

ment of heretics been retributive, capital punishment would have been perfectly acceptable. But when the end of punishment is utility for the particular person who is punished, the death penalty serves no purpose. Thus, for St. Augustine, punishment by the state is strictly utilitarian.

At this point let me clarify that, when I refer to utilitarian punishment, I mean punishment that is useful as opposed to punishment that is just. Utilitarian punishment here, then, refers to punishment that is useful in any sense, not only in the classical utilitarian sense of useful in increasing happiness. Thus utilitarian punishment includes punishment that is useful in keeping order in society, or that is useful in making men good. Here punishment is utilitarian because the aim of punishment is to deter or reform, whereas the aim of retributive justice is to punish in order to mete out justice. Thus, if the aim of punishment is to deter someone from evil actions (which have nothing to do with society's happiness), this is still utilitarian punishment.

Bearing this "in mind, it is apparent that even St. Thomas's arguments for punishment by the state are partially utilitarian. For the purpose of punishment, for St. Thomas, is to deter men from evil-not to cause suffering among men because they deserve it. Thus Aquinas says, " From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law even by punishing, leads men on to being good." [29]

Nevertheless given St. Thomas's general conception of law and the state, he almost inevitably had to be led to a concept of retributive justice. This is because, for Aquinas, " a law is a dictate-of the practical reason." [80] Since human law was derived from natural law based on reason, laws could objectively be called " good " and "evil."

Since human law was based on natural law, and one could know what good and evil was, it seems only reasonable that a

[29] *Summa Tkeol.,* 1-11, q. 92, a.!l. [80] *Ibid.,* q.91, a.Sl.

secular court could mete out justice in the form of punishment for violation of human law which was part of the natural law, i.e., the just law. If those governing knew what justice was, and knew what was good, they could reasonably punish those who violated such laws. Such punishment would be deserved and would be just, since the offender violated what was objectively "good." (Although St. Thomas' theory of punishment no doubt was largely retributive, it should be pointed out that his theory of law and the state does not necessarily lead to a retributive theory of punishment. For example, it could be argued that, even if one knows the good and the evil, he may still not think that it is just for people to suffer because they have committed evil.)

St. Thomas was probably largely responsible for Christian beliefs that men could know good and evil and that they should impose God's justice on man through secular governments. Thus, the concept of retributive justice was linked to religious beliefs until modem times.

Modern retributionists abondoned the idea that violation of God's laws should be punished by secular governments but kept the core idea of retributive punishment-namely, that punishment is given because it is deserved. But if punishment is deserved, then obviously *some* moral wrong has been committed, which means that laws should reflect a true form of justice. Once God and religion are eliminated from man's concepts of justice, it is debatable as to how one can know true justice, unless it is socially defined (which the retributionist cannot accept). In other words, if concepts of justice are not derived from religion and if justice is not socially defined, it is encumbent upon the retributionist at least to state from where he derives his concepts of what morality or justice is. Modern retributionists generally assume the Western religious conception of justice with regard to punishment but formally do not state their case as such.

Most outstanding of the secular retributionists are Kant, Hegel, and F. H. Bradley. Although in secular terms, their theory of punishment re-echoes Biblical and Christian ideas concerning the justness of punishment. One is punished be-

cause he deserves it. Hence, Bradley says, " Punishment is punishment only when it is deserved; we pay the penalty because we owe it.... " [31] Kant also maintains that punishment is given because it is deserved and the consequences of such punishment should have nothing to do with the decision of whether or how much to punish. In order to stress this point, Kant states that, even if a society resolved to dissolve itself, the last murderer in prison ought to be executed beofre the resolution was carried out. " This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds and that blood guiltiness may not remain upon the people: for otherwise they will all be regarded as participators in the murder as a public violation of justice." [32]

In order to strengthen their theory Bosanquet and Hegel developed the idea that retributive justice is a kind of tribute to the moral personality of the criminal. It is precisely as a morally responsible agent, recognized as capable of making reasoned choices and accepting the consequences, that the criminal is punishable. [33] Hence, Bosanquet says that punishment is the right of the criminal of which he must not be defrauded. [34] Punishment is thus to be distinguished from discipline administered to children. The retributive theory of punishment views a criminal as a responsible moral agent who is accountable for his actions. No one has the right to treat rational adults as children or madmen. (These cannot know moral distinctions, and therefore are not responsible.) [35] It diminished a criminal's stature as a rational adult to deny that he is responsible for ordering his life.[36] Hegel puts the matter succinctly when he

[81] F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (!'lnd. ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1876), pp.!'l6-!'l7.

[82] Immanuel Kant, *Kant•s Philosophy of Law,* ed., and trans. by W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1887), p. 198.

[83] Stanley I. Benn, "Punishment" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: MacMillan Co., and Press, 1967), vol. 7, pp. 29-35.

•• Bernard Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1899), p. 2!'l7.

[85] Bradley, p. 6.

[36] Benn, "Punishment," p. 34.

says, " . . . punishment is regarded as containing the criminal's right and hence by being punished he is honored as a rational being. He does not receive this due honor unless the concept and measure of punishment are derived from his own act. Still less does he receive it if he is treated as a harmful animal who has to be made harmless or with a view to deterring or reforming him." [37]

Modern retributivists also consider punishment as the will of the criminal. " The injury (penalty) which falls on the criminal," says Hegel, " . . . is his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right." [38]

For Kant, "No one undergoes punishment because he has willed to be punished, but because he has willed a punishable action." Kant explains that it is, in fact, no punishment when anyone experiences what he wills, and it is impossible for anyone to will to be punished. [89] But the penal action is regarded as an expression of the will of the criminal since he has consented to be part of this system with all its laws. Thus it is more correct to .say that a criminal has tacitly consented to his punishment by his very membership in the society which punishes him. Accordng to Kant then, justice demands that a person accept his part of the bargain and that a state must punish for violating this moral obligation.

Bosanquet and Hegel both add the concept of " punishment as annulment" to the retributive theory. By punishment, .says Bosanquet, " we annihilate the wrong and manifest the right." [40] Punishment is thus necessary to annul the wrong done by the criminal. " The criminal has upset the balance of the moral order which can be restored only by his being made to suffer." [41] Punishment for Hegel, as well as for Bosanquet, is " an exercise of force annulling the force originally brought

•• Georg Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* trans. by T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), notes on Section 100, p. 91.

•• *Ibid.,* Section 100, p. 70.

•• Kant, p. 201.

[0] Bosanquet, p. 28.

[41] Benn, " Punishment," p. 88.

against it." [42] By use of his logical apparatus involving the negation of negation (or annulment) Hegel professes to establish what is a mystical bond between wrong and punishment. He is convinced that guilt of the offense is in some way wiped out by the suffering of the offender.[43] This is indeed strange since crimes, unlike marriages, cannot be annulled. One's death or punishment after a crime does not make things as they were before. Further, it is perplexing as to how crime, which is an evil, is apparently to be annulled by the addition to it of punishment, which is another evil.[44] Hegel himself is aware of this predicament, and he explains, "If crime and its annulment . . . are treated as if they were unqualified evils, it must of course seem quite unreasonable to will an evil merely because another evil is there already." But the point is that, according to Hegel, punishment is not an evil. Rather, "punishment is inherently and actually just." Therefore, it can right the wrong.[45]

For Hegel and retributionists in general punishment restores a moral principle.[46] He explains that punishment may look like revenge but it is not, for revenge is the act of a subjective will whereas punishment is based on universal will of law. . . .[47] Punishment is not private revenge but a demand for justice. Bosanquet also stresses the point that social indignation is not the same as the selfish desire for revenge.[48] Interestingly enough, Emile Durkheim, while holding an entirely different view of punishment, also maintains that "when we desire the repression of a crime, it is not that we desire to avenge personally, but to avenge something sacred which we feel more or less confusedly outside, and above us." [49]

•• Hegel,p. 67.

•• Hegel, p. 10.

.. Edmund L. Pincoffs, *The Rational of Legal PunUihment* (New York: Humanities Press, 1966), p. 10.

•• Hegel, Section 99, pp. 69-70.

•• Ted Honderick, *Punishment: The Supposed Justifications* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1970), p. 37.

[47] Hegel, additions to paragraph 101, 102, p. 244.

•• Bosanquet, p. 211.

•• Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society,* trans. by George Simpson (New York Free Press, 1965), p. 100.

Thus the retributive theory views the state as an agent which can and should enforce that which is above the subjective, that which it conceives to be moral. The state is viewed as necessarily concerned with the moral quality of human existence. Hence retributionists constantly assert that" The end of the state is moral purpose." [50] The connection between this concept of the state and retributive punishment is obvious. " The specific attribute of moral government is that it takes the moral quality of men's actions as the basis of its rewards and punishments. It " consists not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their actions which the most tyrannical person may do, but in rendering to men according to their actions considered as good or evil." [51]

The retributionists thus conceived of the state as having a moral purpose whose aim with regard to punishment is to punish crime because it is evil. This theory also assumes that man is a responsible moral agent who is therefore rightly punished for his evil actions. Finally, this theory assumes that what is " evil " or " just " can be known.

The retributive theory, as has been shown, was prefaced by a long history of religious thought. Western thought has long been conditioned to the idea that there is a Power who punishes evil and rewards the just; that man, made in the image of God, has a moral responsibility, and that God's justice, or objective good and evil, can be known.

While modern retributionists have abandoned these religious teachings, they have retained the basic ideas that man is a responsible moral agent and that there is an objective morality or justice which can be known. However, for the modern retributionist, the state, not God, fulfills the Divine function of dispensing justice.

If these basic assumptions are challenged, if the role of the state is not conceived as primarily having a moral purpose, if justice is viewed as subjective, if man's total responsibility

•• Bosanquet, p. 188.

[61] Joseph Butler, *Analogy of Religion* (London: S. and P. Knopton, 1786), p. 44-45.

for his deeds is questioned, a different conception of punishment must emerge. It is the historical utilitarian concept of the state and society which did challenge the above assumptions and which subsequently developed an entirely different rationale of punishment. But despite the fact that these traditional ideas concerning the role of the state have been challeged in secular society, the very strong religious basis concerning punishment has continued to influence Western man even in that secular society.

Given the fact that ideas concerning retributive punishment have been heavily influenced by our religious tradition, one might assume that the cruelty of our system of punishing also has its roots in religious bases. Yet this is not necessarily true. For cruel punishment cannot be based on the theory of punishments here discussed. The retributive theory in general does not justify it. Sophisticated retributionists insist on decent treatment while punishing the criminal. [52]

It is true that, historically, theocratic states and the retributive theory which supported its form of punishment seems to have justified the most extreme tortures. And it was the utilitarian rationale for punishment which, in fact, brought about more humane types of punishment. Indeed, the main purpose of Beccaria's and Bentham's works were to make punishments themselves more humane and at the same time to take certain crimes out of the realm of punishment. Yet, if one appeals to history, one can find instances of the most barbaric punishments used solely for their deterrent effect. Also, from a logical point of view, " purely reformatory or deterrent theories of penalty-fixing which lack an upper limit to penalties run the risk of becoming far more inhumane than even a purely retributive theory." [53] Further, it is unfair to condemn retributionism as being responsible for cruel punishments .since there is, in fact, no reason why a retributionist should call for extreme suffering. A criminal may deserve punishment in the

[59] J. D. Mabott, "Punishment," *Mind,* Vol. 48 (1939), p. 165.

[58] K. G. Armstrong, "The Retributivist Hits Back," in *The Philosophy of Punishment,* ed. by H. B. Acton (London, 1969), p. 158.

form of loss of liberty but not in the form of any torture or dehumanization.

But most often people do identify retributive punishment with cruelty. Retributive punishment probably picked up its bad reputation from St. Augustine who expounded on great physical sufferings meted out in hell. Delight in such torture, however, is accidental, rather than essential, to the retributive theory. Biblical sources, for example, do not call for torture and in fact condemn excessive punishment. The fact that a criminal is viewed as deserving his punishment does not mean that he deserves inhumane treatment. [54]

Severe and brutal treatment of criminals as exists today has nothing to do with any respectable theory of punishment. It has not been justified by the retributive theory as the theory attempts only to justify the institution itself. That is to say, retributivism views the criminal as deserving his punishment-but not necessarily as deserving inhumane punishment.

If the theory is to be rejected, it must be not on the basis that it encourages inhumane punishment, but on the basis of rejection of the fundamental principles which underlie it. The principles underlying the theory must be clearly understood. The purpose of this article has been to make obvious the roots of some of this theory's most vital assumptions.

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for 'example, Deuteronomy

MARITAIN'S THEORY OF SUBSISTENCE: THE BASIS OF HIS "EXISTENTIALISM"

MARITAIN INTENDED his final metaphysical work, *Court Traite de l'Existerwe et de l'Existant* (Eng. trans. *Existence and the Existent)/* as an answer to contemporary existentialists, such as Sartre,[2] who maintain that the doctrine of essence, with its emphasis on necessity and universality, is incompatible with the contingency, uniqueness, and freedom of the existential realm. Maritain's reply was that an existentialism which denies essence is really " apocryphal existentialism."[3] Such an existentialism is self-destroying because an existent must exist as a specific entity and, hence, must possess an intelligible structure. An existence without essence is unthinkable.[4] Conversely, he insisted that Thomism is an " authentic existentialism,"" for it not only affirms the primacy of the existent over essence but also accounts for the possibility of the existential realm by maintaining that the existent possesses an essence or intelligible .structure.

But is Thomism-as Maritain interpreted it-really an " existentialism"? Or is this merely an effort to make Thomism appear fashionable? Can Maritain's position on essence be reconciled with genuine contingency, uniqueness, and freedom? It is true that over the years Maritain developed a socio-political philosophy which, although based on the immutability of the

[1] J. Maritain, *Court Traite de l'Existence et de l'Existant* (Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1947). Eng trans!.: *Existence and the Existent,* tr. by Lewis Galantiere and Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc. Paperback, 1957).

[2] *Existence and the Existent,* pp. *15-16.*

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

[4] Ibid., p. 15.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

Natural Law and the universality of human essence,[6] nevertheless focused on the uniqueness and freedom of each person,[7] the creativity of the moral act,[8] and on the demand that political society progressively adapt its socio-political institutions te the individual person's capacity for self-expression and "freedom of personal expansion."[9] The question, however, is whether this dynamic, libertarian view follows from a metaphysical view of the universe which emphasizes these things or is simply coincidental to a static and basically essentialist view.

Existence and the Existent does contain a metaphysics which purports to justify Thomistic existentialism. On a preliminary level Maritain does there distinguish the manner in which things exist in our minds-the manner in which they are represented to us *via* concepts-from the manner in which they exist outside our minds in their existential state. We know things by grasping their essences through simple apprehension. This, to be sure, affords us a genuine knowledge of what is intelligible in them, i.e., of that by which they are what they are. But, in apprehending the essences of things, we know them as *objects,* which, for Maritain,[10] is to be recipients of action, not sources of action. It is in the act of affirmation or judgment that we apprehend, by intuition, beings as individual existents or *subjects.*[11] The existence *(esse)* of things, far from being a static something that is received by essence or a mere actualization of essence, is primarily an act that is exercised.[12] It is the being (ens) which exists, and it does so by exercising its own act of existing *(esse)* according to the specifications

[6] Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Paperback, 1956), pp. 84-89.

[7] Maritain, *The Rights of Man and Natural Law,* tr. by Doris C. Anson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), pp. 4 & 7.

[8] Maritain, *Neuf Lecons sur les Notions Premieres de la Philosophie Morale* (Paris: Pierre Tequi, 1951), pp. 31 and 165; *Existence and the Existent,* p. 60.

[9] Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics,* translation edited by Mortimer J. Adler, (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. Paperback., 1960), p. 84.

[10] *Existent and the Existent,* pp. 23-24 & 74.

"Ibid.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 82-88.

of its essence. But only a subject can exercise an act, £or to do something requires a central organization whence the activity flows. Hence, Maritain states [13] that " . . . only subjects exist, with the accidents which inhere in them, the action which emanates from them, and the relations which they bear to one another."

The distinction between subject and object, then, is intended by Maritain to reveal the difference between the existential and mental realms. But the profound difference that Maritain sees between the two can hardly be appreciated apart from an understanding of what he means by "subsistence."

> What we call *subject* St. Thomas called *suppositum.* Essence is *that which* a thing is; suppositum is *that which* has an essence, *that which* exercises existence and action ... *that which* subsists. Here we meet the metaphysical notion which has given students so many headaches and baffies everyone who has not grasped the true-the existential-foundations of Thomist metaphysics, the notion of subsistence.
>
> We are bound to speak of this notion of subsistence with great respect ... because, in the philosophical order itself, it bears witness to the supreme tension of an articulated thought bent on seizing intellectually something which seems to escape from the notions or ideas of the intellect, namely, the typical reality of the subject. [14] (Maritain's emphasis)

Maritain regards subsistence as the positive mode or perfection[15] which enables a being to exercise its act of existing *(esse);* subsistence accounts for the fact that the existent, whether a blade of grass, a dog, a human being, etc., is a subject.

It is argued below that an explanation of Maritain's theory of subsistence establishes his interpretation of Thomism as legitimately existential. Others in the Thomistic tradition, such as Cajetan, have insisted upon the importance of subsistence;

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 70.

[H] *Ibid.,* pp. 70-71.

[1] "Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge,* tr. supervised by Gerald B. Phelan (New York: *Charles Smibner's Sons,* 1959), p. 438.

but, although heavily influenced by Cajetan's writings on subsistence, Maritain evolved his own distinctive theory. Possibly the most difficult point in his philosophy, this theory is nevertheless absolutely crucial to a proper understanding of his metaphysics. An historical approach is used in order to show that he was truly an existentialist early on in his philosophical carreer, even if it was only with the appearance of *Existence and the Existent* in 1947 that he began to apply the term in reference to Thomism.

I

Maritain presented the first outlines of his theory of subsistence in his *Introduction Generale a la Philosophie* (Eng. trans. *An Introduction to Philosophy),* which first appeared in 1920.[16] Although lacking the philosophical argumentation and fullness of his later, more mature presentations of the theory, the presentation is nonetheless important, as it provides clarifications of the terms " substance," " substantial essence," and " subject of action," all of which are presupposed by these later presentations.

As noted above, Maritain distinguishes two ways in which the being of a thing may be apprehended: from the standpoint of its intelligibility, in which case the being of this man, namely, Peter, is apprehended in its universality, i.e., in terms of its essence or nature as man or humanity; or from the standpoint of its existence, namely, this man, Peter, in which case it is apprehended as an individual.[17] The being which the mind apprehends primarily as existing is individual being, such as Peter, this dog, this blade of grass, etc. What all these examples have in common is that they are "individual concrete and independent subjects, fully equipt to be and to act. . . ."[18] Hence, Maritain calls them *subjects of action.*[19] In contrast,

[16] *Introduction Generale a la Philosophie* (Paris: Pierre Tequi, 1920). Eng transl.: *An Introduction to Philosophy,* tr. by E. I. Watkin (London and New York: Shecd and Ward, 1930).

[17] *An Introduction to Philosophy,* p. 164.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.*

being apprehended under the aspect of intelligibility, i.e., as an essence, is an abstraction from the concrete individual.

Despite this distinction, Maritain applies the term "substance," in *Introduction to Philosophy,* not only to the subject of action but also to the essence or nature of the subject, i.e., to what a thing is, to *that in virtue of which* Peter, say, exists. [20] It might be supposed that the subject of action, Peter, lays sole claim to the title of substance, since it alone exists as a whole-not whole in the sense of a collective whole but rather a "whole that is one in itself"-instead of as a part of a being or subject, while its essence or nature, on the other hand, is a part of it; for Peter is composed of more than an essence: he also has distinctive, individual qualities which individuate him from other men, to say nothing of the fact that he also exists. Nevertheless, Peter's nature or essence constitutes him in the .sense that he exists in virtue of it. Essence, for Maritain, is that in virtue of which a thing is what it is. Since Peter's essence constitutes him, it cannot be said to exist in the sense of being received in some previously existing thing, as, for example, the theory of Relativity exists in Peter's mind today, whereas last year he existed in ignorance of it.

This kind of observation leads Maritain to defend the correctness of maintaining that the essence is capable of existing per se-not in the Platonic sense as a self-subsisting idea or form but, rather, in the sense that, in order to exist, it does not become part of another, previously existing being which receives it into itself. On the contrary, it constitutes the subject of action in the sense of being that in virtue of which the subject is what it is.[21]

Accordingly, Maritain defines "substance" as "a thing or nature whose property is to exist by itself, or in virtue of itself *(per se)* and not in another thing." [22] He qualifies the application of the term "substance" to essence, however, by saying that the essence is substance in a secondary sense *(sub-*

[20] *Ibid.,* pp. 168-169.
[21] *lbid.,* p. 169;
[22] *Ibid.*

stantia secunda), since it does not refer directly to the individual substance, this man, Peter, for example, which he calls substance in the primary sense *(substantia prima)* .[23]

But the individual substance-substance in the primary sense-is not in itself what Maritain means by the existent, the " individual concerte and independent subject . . . fully equipped to be and to act. . . ." It is not, in other words, the subject of action.

In the Aristotelian and Scholastic vocabulary the term *substantia prima* . . . denotes . . . the *individual nature* of the subject of action without determining whether or not it is terminated by subsistence. Usually indeed it does in fact denote the terminated nature or subject of action, the *hoc aliquid.* It does not, however, denote formally the subject of action taken as such and contrasted with the (non-terminated) nature. That function belongs to the terms *suppositum* and *personna* ...[24]

The subject of action ... is nothing but the substantial nature completed by a particular modality (subsistence ...) which terminates it, as a point terminates a line (without adding to it in the order of nature) and renders it absolutely incommunicable ...[25] (Maritain's emphasis)

What does it mean to say that a substantial nature is "completed" or "terminated"? That it is rendered "absolutely incommunicable"? What is this "particular modality" called " subsistence " which terminates it?

Any attempt to answer these questions must take into account that by " subject of action " Maritain wishes to emphasize that, in order to exist, the existent must be capable of existing entirely by itself alone. He does not suggest that it is uncaused; after all, Peter has been procreated by his parents and now depends upon air, water, sun-light, and food, etc., to keep him in existence. Rather, Maritain means that the subject of action possesses in itself everything necessary to receive It is

[98] *Ibid.,* p. 176.
[99] *Ibid.,* pp. 176-177, n.l.
[95] *Ibid.,* p. 168, n. 1.
[96] *Ibid.,* p. 164.

a being existing by itself *(per se)* or in virtue of itself, in virtue of its own nature, *ens per se existens.* Since a being of this kind exists as a whole and in no wise as a part of another being or subject in which it exists, we may also say that it exists in itself, *in* se.[27]

The subject of action, *that which is,* possesses no distinctive characteristics beyond those which constitute it what it is, none beyond the individual nature.[28] Yet, Maritain insists that a modality must be present to explain that Peter's individual nature constitutes a whole which exists in nothing other than itself. For, in contrast, Peter's essence, *man,* is an essence that is distinct from the whole which it constitutes and instead exists in him, in that whole.[29] "In short, the subject of action possesses a nature or essence; the concept of that nature or essence taken as such *(what* or *that in virtue of which)* is not the concept of the subject of action (that which) ." [30]

If the individual nature is not of itself sufficient to account for the termination or completeness of the subject of action, to account for the fact that it is a whole existing independently in itself, then it seems that we can infer that, for Maritain, individuation by signate matter is insufficient to account for the termination. Maritain follows the Aristotelian tradition in holding that matter is the principle of individuation. That is to say, how are we to account for more than one member of the same species? If Socrates and Plato are both human beings, if they have the same essence, namely, man or humanity, then something other than their essence is necessary to account for individual men, this man, Socrates, and this man, Plato. Hence, it can be argued that they are individuated by their respective quantities of matter, this flesh and these bones, etc.[81] From the texts cited, it looks as though Maritain agrees that

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 164-165.
[28] *Ibid.* p. 165.
[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 165-166.
[80] *Ibid.,* pp. 166.
[81] *Ibid.,* pp. U4 ff:

signate or designated matter accounts for the individuated essence and for primary substance but not for its termination, i.e., not for its being a subject of action.

It can fairly be asked why Maritain does not find the act of existing *(esse)* sufficient to account for the termination or completion of individual essence. For *esse* is what, in Maritain's view, makes the being *(ens)* actual, makes it an existent. Yet, although not addressing himself to this question in *An Introduction to Philosophy,* the general thrust of his words points to his reason for rejecting this view:

> The term *substance* signifies a thing ·Capable of existing in *itself,* or of subsisting: that is to say, of being self-contained as an existent thing (its function *subsistere)* , so that, once it exists, it sustains in being the additional qualities or accidents with which it is invested (its function *substare).* But it is only as a suppositum that substance is immediately capable of performing these two functions. Considered as a nature or essence it merely seeks to perform them.[32]

Note that "substance" refers to that which is "capable of existing in itself," not to that which exists in itself; and that the suppositum-which is produced by the mode called " subsistence "-renders the substance " immediately capable of performing " the functions *substare* and *subsistere:* it does not render it an existent thing. Hence, rather than refer to the subject of action as that which exists *per se,* Maritain prefers to designate it as " a being immediately disposed to exist *per se."*[33] He prefers this formulation because he maintains that existence itself cannot be a constituent part of the definition of anything created.[34] This would be contradictory, since if it existed by definition or by nature, then it would not be created; it would exist by nature and, hence, exist necessarily.

To summarize: In *An Introduction to Philosophy* Maritain's presentation of the theory of subsistence amounts to this: In order for a substance to be a subject of action, it requires a

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 169, n.2.
[33] *Ibid.,* p. 165.
[••] *Ibid.,* n.I.

termination which enables it to be a whole capable of existing independently and for itself. It can be inferred from the texts cited above that neither signate matter nor *esse* suffices for this termination, but only the mode which Maritain calls " subsistence." Subsistence does not individuate the substantial essence -i.e., substance in the primary sense-,nor does it make it exist. Rather, it renders the substantial essence *capable of existing.*

This view of subsistence raises fundamental questions, such as, What exactly is the difference which subsistence makes in the individual, substantial essence so that it is capable of existing? In what sense is the subject of action a whole, terminated and complete, while the primary substance, i.e., the individuated essence is not? How can subsistence effect any change or mode in a being before it exists? And, perhaps, the most formidable question: Since the act of existing *(esse)* is, by Maritain's own admission, that which makes an individual essence actual, makes it to be, why is not *esse* itself sufficient to terminate it? As noted above, it can plausibly be inferred that Maritain, when he wrote *An Introduction to Philosophy,* rejected this position on the ground that *esse* can be a constituent of no created nature. Still, this point is not developed there and must await the writing of *Distinguer Pour Unir, ou Les Degres Du Savoir* (Eng. trans. *The Degrees of Knowledge)* [35] for its philosophical defense.

Although Maritain makes no attempt to argue the case for the theory of subsistence in *An Introduction to Philosophy,* the work remains the best source for an understanding of his use of the terms " substance " and " subject of action," both of which are crucial to the later presentations of the theory.

II

Maritain's argument for his original version of the theory of subsistence, as he sets it forth in *The Degrees of Knowledge,*

•• J. Maritain, *Distinguer Pour Unir, ou Les Degres Du Savior* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1935).

rests on the doctrines of act and potency and the real distinction between essence and existence. It would be well, therefore, to say a word about how he understands them before confronting the argument itself.

Adhering to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Maritain seeks to explain the fact of change by appealing to the doctrine of act and potency. For example, the rib roast which I eat for my supper is, before I eat it, actually a rib roast, i.e., it has actual being as a rib roast. After I eat it and assimilate it into my body, it is actually my flesh and bone and no longer a rib roast. This change is possible because the being in question, although actually a rib roast at t1, has a certain potential or capacity to become part of my body at t2. This potential is not mere nothingness, even though it is not actual before its assimilation. For its potential to be assimilated into my flesh and bone follows from what it actually is at t1, viz., a rib roast. Conversely, a stone has its distinctive potencies, but just because it is actually a stone, these potencies are the potencies of a stone and, hence, do not include becoming flesh and bone. Maritain, accordingly, recognizes a twofold division of being: actual being or being in act and potential being or being in potency. Potential being always presupposes actual being; being is prior to change or becoming.[36]

Maritain regards essence and existence as the ultimate examples of potency and act.[37] He maintains that every finite existent is composed of an essence or nature, i.e., a *whatness,* and an act of existing *(esse).* Consider for example, this man, Peter. He actually exists, yet there is nothing in his nature or essence which explains the fact that he does exist. To be sure, there are many causes for this fact, such as his parents, etc. But Maritain's point is that these causes arise from outside his essence. His essence reveals that his existence is *possible* and is, as discussed above a causal principle in that it specifies in what manner he shall exist; it is that in virtue of which Peter is what he is, i.e., a rational animal or a man, rather than a dog,

•• *Degrees of Knowledge,* pp. 133-134.

•• Cf. *Introduction to Philosophy,* Pt. III, Ch. 5.

etc. But his essence does not necessitate or imply his existence as the notion of triangle implies the notion of two right angles. Hence, in an existent being whose essence does not imply its existence, a real distinction obtains between its essence and its act of existing *(esse).* Maritain regards it as a *real,* rather than a merely logical, distinction in that existence is not an essence, but instead, belongs to an entirely different order.[38] Essence and existence cannot be deduced from each other and yet they are components of the being that exists: essence specifies what that being is, while *esse* causes it to be, makes it an actual being.

Given the context of these two doctrines, Maritain argues, in the original version of his theory of subsistence, from the premise that, of all the instances of the potency-act relationship-cold to hot, strong to weak, ignorant to learned, rib-roast to human organism-, the relationship between essence and existence is unique.

> In all other cases where we have to deal with the potency-act couple-for example, in the case of a faculty in relation to its operation-there exists between the potency and the act, which are in the same line, a proportion such that, all the conditions being given, the act received in the potency can be received only in it, and is strictly adapted to it alone because in itself it limits that act to itself, to the exclusion of every other potency. It is *its* act, its determination, its actuation.[39] (Maritain's emphasis)

The example that Maritain uses to illustrate the proportion that exists in every other instance of the act-potency relation is the relationship between the intellect's capacity (potential) to know and its actual knowing. In this case the potency and act are in the same line in the sense that if *cognitive capacity* is the potential and *cognition* the actualization of that potential, then cognition can be the act of no other potential than that of *cognitive capacity.* It cannot be the actualization of digestive potential or capacity, for example. Similarly, an oak

[88] *Degrees of Knowledge,* p. 430.
[39] *Ibid.*

tree can be the actualization of an acorn but never the actualization of any other kind of seed.

To be sure, these examples are quite different from that of essence, since they refer to real potencies, i.e., to potencies which already presuppose an actual substance, as the capacity to know presupposes the existence of an intellect. Substantial essence, on the contrary, is not a *real potency,* for it presupposes the existence of no faculty or power, or substance, of which it is the actualization. But this radical disproportion .seems to be exactly Maritain's point! The relation between essence and existence, Maritain insisted at the time, is unique in the sense that, whereas cognition is properly the act of cognitive potential owing to the very structure of the intellect, which structure specifies its potential to cognition, existence is not properly the act of essence. For there is nothing in the specific capacities of any given essence which specifies it to this act of existence rather than to any other.[40] Granted, a specific essence, say *man,* certainly implies specific actualizations, such as teachable implies that its actualization is *taught.* But, although the essence *man* has the potency to exist, this actualization cannot be said to refer to any of the potentials unique to it, such as teachability and risibility. Rather, existence is an actualization which comes to essence from the outside, so to speak, for it cannot be deduced from essence. Maritain, therefore, described, at this point in his career, the relation that obtains between essence and existence as a "transcendental relation."[41] If cognition can be the actualization of no other capacity or potential than that of cognitive capacity, existence, on the other hand,

> . . . is the act which, if it does not receive, at least holds essence up and sustains it by causing it formally to be. In other terms, if I may be allowed to put it so, there is a sort of transcendence of the act of existing by reason of which (not being the achievement of a potency *in the order proper* to that potency-for existence

[40] *Ibid.,* p. 431. How can essenee specify existence before it exists? This question is discussed below in the third section of this article.

[41] *Ibid.,* pp. 430, 437.

is not the achievement of essence: it does not form part of the order of essence), the potency which the act achieves, considered with respect to its quidditative constituents, has not *in itself anything by which to make* its own the act in question.[42] (Maritain's emphasis)

Maritain rests the claim asserted above upon the principle " potency limits act." [43] and it is implied in the earlier claim that the oak tree is the actualization of an acorn and, hence, in the line of essence, can never be actualized by anything else, e.g., a com stalk. In the light of this principle, Maritain's argument so far can be synopsized in this manner: Since cognition is the actualization or realization of *cognitive potential*,. it is specified and, hence, limited or confined to being the act of *cognitive potential* and of no other potential. But the potency with regard to the actualization of the quidditative constituents of essence has nothing in it which limits the act of existing to it rather than to any other essence. From this Maritain draws a remarkable conclusion: " Consequently nothing .stands, metaphysically, in the way of its [essence] being joined with another substantial essence in the act of existing; under this aspect it is unterminated." [44]

Maritain does not say that two substantial essences can share the same act of existing. What he says is that" nothing stands" metaphysically, in the way ..."of their doing so. This adverbial qualification seems to have been intended as a caution against conceiving the substantial essences in question in .such a way as to presuppose their existence *per se separatim*, i.e., as subjects of action, already terminated by subsistence, and then trying to conceive of them as sharing a single act of existence. This would be contradictory; it would be to say that two substantial essences at once enjoy the integrity of their own respective existences and that they do not enjoy it. What Maritain apparently had in mind in writing the first version of the theory of subsistence, on the contrary, is that

u *Ibid.,* pp. 480-481.
•• *Ibid.,* p. 481.
•• *Ibid.*

without the termination conferred by subsistence, there could be no existents, or subjects of action, which subjects we take for granted. Since our experience testifies to the existence of individual things-subjects dominating their own respective beings-a reality in addition to essence existence, and signate matter is needed to terminate substantial essence. Then, just as cognition can be the actualization of no potential other than cognitive capacity, so the existence of a substantial essence can be the actualization of no other substantial essence than itself. Maritain calls this reality *subsistence.*

> When it [substantial essence] is thus terminated, it will limit existence to itself and to its own finitude. It will be terminated in this fashion by a substantial mode which is precisely *subsistence,* and which is not a quidditative constituent of essence any more than the point which terminates a line is itself an extent, a segment of the line. On the one hand, this subsistence is not one of the quidditative constituents of essence, and, on the other hand, it is not yet existence. Its proper office is to terminate substantial essence, to bring it to pass that the essence be rendered incommunicable- by which it is to be understood *not to be able to com;m;uJnicate. with another substantial essence in the existence that actuates it;* to cause it to be divided off from every other, not only as regards that which it is (as individual substance) , but divided off from every other *in order to exist.'*[5] (Maritain's emphasis)

The argumentation of this, the original version, proved unsatisfactory and Maritain eventually found it necesary to revise his approach to subsistence. The argumentation contained two major difficulties which are illustrated by the questions raised above with regard to the presentation in *An Introduction to Philosophy:* 1) Why is not the act of existing *(esse)* sufficient to account for the termination of the individual substance? 2) Exactly what reality does the mode of subsistence confer on the individaul essence to make it a subject of action? How do they differ?

It was essayed in section I above that in *An Introduction to Philosophy* Maritain's implied answer to the first of these ques-

[5] *Ibid ...*

tions is that the act of existing *(esse)* can be an essential constituent of no finite being. The contrast between the potency-act relationship as it applies to essence and existence and to other potency-act relationships was designed to provide a dialectical defense of this view; hence, the claim that, metaphysically, one substantial essence can share the act of *esse* of another substantial essence unless these essences are terminated by subsistence. But, in his critique of the original version/6 H. Diepen objected that this whole argument rests on a univocal rather than an analogous conception of the potency-act relationship of essence to existence.[47] If the act of existence has only a single meaning, then Maritain would be correct in holding that there is no reason why a given act of existence should belong to one substantial essence rather than another; nor, for that matter, would there be any reason why one substantial essence could not share with another substantial essence a single act of existence.

Diepen pointed out, however, that the act of existence has an *analogous* significance, not a *univocal* one.[48] The to-be of this thing and the to-be of that thing are two distinct acts, acts which are uniquely specified by the essence. These acts of existence actuate the distinctive potentialities of each respective essence. Two members of the same material species represent two individual, absolutely diverse acts of existing because they are two distinct singular things.[49] True, they have a nature or essence in common; but, if potency limits act, each individuated nature specifies and limits the act of existence to itself. Far from representing a unique instance of the potency-act relationship, therefore, existence is specified to substantial essence in the same manner as the actuation of a faculty is specified to that faculty alone.[5°] From this Diepen con-

•• H. Diepen, "La Critique du Balsieme Selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Review Thomiste,* 1950 and 1950, II.

[47] *Ibid.,* pp. 114-115.

•• *Ibid.* p. 115.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 114.

""Ibid., p. 116.

eluded that the exercised act of existing *(esse)* is of itself perfectly adapted to a given substantial essence, which is the act's formal principle, i.e., accounts for a thing's *whatness.* So perfect is this adaptation that it can be joined to no other substantial essence in the actuation of this one. For just as the eyes can only see and the ears hear, so a human nature or essence is the .sole principle-i.e., as opposed to any principle in existence-of a subject which has a human existence. To be a man, a human nature is necessary and to be a horse, a horse's nature is necessary. All of which led Diepen to say that Maritain'.s .conclusion that it is metaphysically possible for two substantial essences to share a single act of existence is a contradiction. Presumably, Diepen's meaning is that it is a contradiction in the sense of saying that it is possible for the eyes both to see and hear. The substantial essence makes the act of existence its own in that it is the only individual essence which can be its (the act of existing) formal principle. [51]

Maritain' own writings show a recognition of the analogous character of the act of existing. [52] Once reminded of this analogous character, Maritain conceded that Diepen was correct in holding against him that the act of existing " is of itself perfectly adapted and accommodated to the essence which is its formal principle; so perfectly that it can be joined to no other essence in the actuation of the latter." [53] And, *a fortiori,* he also admitted that he was in error in holding for the possibility of two essences being joined together in a single act of existing.[54] Maritain attributed these errors to his acceptance of a traditional theological interpretation- mainly Cajetan's-of the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ. [55] Cajetan advanced the theory of subsistence to account for the doctrine that Christ is both God and man yet only one personality. According to the doctrine, the Incarnation did not consist of two separate

[51] *Ibid.,* pp. 115 and 114.
[52] *Existence and the Existent,* p. 40.
[53] *Degrees of Knowledge,* p. 434, n.l.
[54] *Ibid.*
[55] *Ibid.*

persons-a human person and a divine person; nor did Christ lack a human consciouness, intellect and will, for it is dogma that he became like us in all things except sin. The only solution to this which Cajetan found acceptable was that Christ could assume an individuated human nature, without destroying that nature, and thereby becoming one being, only if that individuated nature were unterminated, i.e., lacked subsistence. These two natures were terminated in a single being by the subsistence of Christ's divine personality. [56]

Hence, the only example of two substantial essences sharing a single act of existing seems to be found in theological dogma, not in natural experience. Grenet, who advances an argument for subsistence that is, in essence, identical to Maritain's original version, proposes the myth of the god Pan, which symbolizes the oneness of all things, as an example of a plurality of substantial essences or individuals sharing a single act of existing.[57] But it is hard to see how this example is helpful. As myth, it is at best a poetic expression of an insight into the harmony and mutual dependence of things in nature. It does not purport to give a philosophical or literal account of the interrelationship.

With regard to the second question-What is the difference between the individuated substance itself and the individuated substance after subsistence has been conferred upon it?-the original version fails, again, to provide a satisfactory answer. Maritain's assertion that subsistence is not a" quidditative constituent of essence any more than a point which terminates a line is itself an extent, a segment of the line," is unsatisfactory. In the same critique, Diepen called the aptness of this analogy into question.[58] It tells us nothing about the reality conferred by subsistence. Diepen pointed out that sub-

[88] Cf. Thomas Mullaney," Created Personality," *New Scholasticism,* Vol 29, 1955 pp. 888-884, and James B. Reichmann, "St. Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan, and the Created Person," *New Scholasticism,* Vol. 88, pp. 1959.

[87] Paul Grenet, *Thomism: An lntToducticm.* Trans. by James F. Ross (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 84.

[58] Diepen, pp. 109-11.

sistence is a positive mode, for it adds a reality to substance which renders it capable of existing. But it is far from clear that a point adds anything to a line. To be sure, it terminates the line, but this is a sense of the word " terminate " which is quite different from the .sense in which Maritain uses the word with regard to subsistence: the former sense is negative, the latter positive. The most the analogy can be said to accomplish is to give rhetorical emphasis to the statement that subsistence *marks off* or *delimits* the substantial essence, making it an entity which belongs to itself and cannot be absorbed into the existence of another substantial essence.

III

In his revised version of the theory of subsistence which first appeared in the 1959 edition of *The Degrees of Knowledge,* Maritain stated his intention of keeping his speculations on subsistence free from theological considerations, basing them instead on philosophical evidence.

Although admitting to the above errors, Maritain nevertheless insisted upon the fundamental correctness of the original namely, that, in order to exist, the substantial essence must be " sur-completed " or perfected by a positive mode which, although adding nothing new to the essence in the line of essence, confers an additional reality which renders it capable of existing.[59] But, whereas in the original version, he had maintained that subsistence rendered the substantial essence incommmunicable and, hence, incapable of sharing the act of existing *(esse)* of another substantial essence, he here maintains that subsistence confers no new incommunicability. As noted above, he subsequently agreed with Diepen that the individuated, substantial essence is already incommunicable in that its act of existing is perfectly adapted to it, since essence is a thing's formal principle. What reality, then, does subsistence confer? Maritain's answer is that subsistence enables the substantial essence to transfer its incommunicability from

•• *Degrees of KndWledge,* p. 437.

the plane of essence to the plane of existence by rendering it capable of *exercising* its act of existing *(esse)*.[60]

To appreciate what Maritain is getting at here, it is necessary to examine the considerations upon which he bases the revised version. First, he appeals to our experience of extra-mental reality. We experience "things, subjects, *existents."* By abstraction, our intellect disengages from these existents essences, intelligible structures. Although these essences exist in our minds as universals, where they are known *as such*, they exist really in individual things in a state of singularity. Thus, essences, because they are derived from existents and apprehended under the aspect of their intelligible structure, as "that by which the things, subjects, or existents are such or such," do not confront the intellect as the existents themselves but as their intelligible structures. [61] Essence is a principle *quo*, i.e., not that which exists but *that in virtue of which* it exists as a suchness or whatness.

Second, essence is related to the act of existing as potency to act; the act of existing is " act and perfection *par excellence."* Essence is form or act in a certain order, i.e., the order of specification or formal causality; but in the order of exercise or in relation to the act of existing *(esse)*, it is potency or capacity. The relation which obtains between essence and existence is analogous to that which obtains between intelligence and the act of intellection, the will and the act of volition. [62]

Third, Maritain insists, as we have already noted, that there is an intuition of existence ". . . in virtue of which, within the very analogy to which we have just referred between *esse* in relation to the intellect or the will, the *esse* is perceived quite precisely- even as in their own order intellection and volition-as an *exercised* act, exercised by the thing or the existent subject, or as an activity in which the existent itself is engaged, an energy that it exerts." [63] From these considerations Maritain concludes:

[60] *Ibid.*
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 43.3.
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] *Ibid.*

Existence is therefore not only received as if by *esse* essences were pinned outside nothingness like a picture hung on a wall. Existence is not only received, it is also *exercised.*

And this distinction between existence as received and existence as exercised is central for the philosophical theory of subsistence . . . Truly-one can rightly maintain-since it is the potency to *esse,* essence as such suffices by that very fact to limit, appropriate or circumscribe to itself the existence that it *receives* (in order to bring the subject to existence). But to *exercise* existence something besides the bare essence is necessary, namely, the supposit or person. *Actiones sunt suppositorum,* actions are proper to supposits, and especially and above all the act of exercising existence. In other words, to exercise the existence the essence must be completed by subsistence and thus become a supposit.[64] (Maritain's emphasis)

All of which goes to show that the argument for the revised version begins with the attempt to demonstrate that the recognition that not essences but things or existents exist leads to the position that the mode of subsistence is needed, in addition to the essence and the act of existing. The second and third considerations, cited above, seek to establish that the act of existing is not only received but *exercised* and, hence, requires a *quod,* a subject or supposit capable of exercising the act of existing. Essence is a principle *quo,* a *that by* or *in virtue of which* a thing exists, not that which exists, not the existent, subject or thing. Similarly, the act of existing is that which actuates the potency of essence to exist, but, in Maritain's estimation, it cannot do so unless there is a subject capable of exercising that act of existing.

However, the second and third considerations require scrutiny, especially the second. Its claim is that the relation between essence and existence is analogous to the relation between intelligence and the act of intellection. The point of relevance which Maritain sees between the two relationships is that the actualization in each case consists in an act that is exercised. Just as the act of intellection presupposes an intellect to exer-

[64] *Ibid.*

cise that act so the act of existing *(esse)* presupposes a subject to exercise it. But the two relationships clearly differ in the fundamental sense that the potency of which the act of intellection is the actualization presupposes the prior existence of the intellect whose act it is; conversely the potency, namely, essence, of which the act of existing is the actualization, does not presuppose the prior existence of the essence whose act it is.

What is there, then, to exercise the act of existing as long as there is no essence to receive existence? Maritain thinks that the difference of order between essence and existence poses no problem that cannot be handled by the principle of reciprocal causality. There is, he .says, a "transcendence," so to speak, of existence in relation to essence.[65]

> Since existence by its very notion demands as we have just seen, that it be not only received but exercised, and since this exigency, pertaining as it does to the existential order, places us outside and beyond the order of essence, it must be said that (substantial) essence or nature can *receive* existence only by *exercising* it, which it cannot do as long as it remains in its own essential order. In other words, it can receive existence only on condition of being drawn at the same time from the state of simple essence and placed in an *existential state* which makes of it a *quod* capable of exercising existence. This *state* which completes, or rather surcompletes the essence-not at all in the line of essence itself, but in relation to a completely other order, the existential order-and permits the essence (henceforth supposit) to *exercise* existence, IS precisely subsistence. [68] (Maritain's emphasis)

This passage reveals that the analogy which Maritain asserts between essence and existence, on the one hand, and intellect and the act of intellection, on the other, does not .suppose that existence is received by essence in the sense that it is received into essences as into a pre-existing subject, for, then, essence would be in existential act before it existed! Rather, the distinction between existence as received and existence as

[65] *Ibid.,* p. 437.
[68] *Ibid.*

exercised must be seen in the light of the axiom *causae ad invicem sunt causae,* i.e., in terms of the involution of causes.

The supposit exists by formal causality, for the essence is actuated by *esse;* the existence is received by the essence in the sense that, as *esse* actuates essence, essence specifies the *whatness* of the existent, whether it shall be a man or a dog, etc.: the existent must be a *this* or *that;* it must have a *such*-ness. And from the standpoint of *material causality-i.e.,* the dispositions in the being, as marble is the material cause of the statue-the cause of the essence receiving *esse* and being actuated by it is subsistence which transports the essence from its essential order, making it a supposit capable of exercising existence. Hence, existence is exercised by the supposit because existence is received by the essence, and existence is received by the essence because it is exercised by the supposit. [67]

This account seeks to render our experiences intelligible without mutilating them, i.e., without leading to the denial or distortion of any datum. Like essence and *esse,* subsistence is not regarded by Maritain as a *thing* but, rather, as a principle or component of the existent. Subsistence is a reality-a real mode-because it produces a real difference in the existent. Nevertheless, only the composite is the thing or existent.

But, although the realities which essence and the act of existing contribute to the existent are assignable, it is still not clear what assignable difference subsistence makes to it. For in the second version, Maritain says no more on this score than that subsistence enables the substantial essence to exercise the act of existing.

> And so the proper effect of subsistence is not ... to confer on the individual essence or individual nature an additional incommunicability (this time in relation to existence) or to make it limit, appropriate, or circumscribe to itself the existence it received, and hence prevent its communicating in existence with another essence or receiving existence conjointly with another essence; it is simply to place it in a state of *exercising existence,* with the incommunicability proper to the individual nature. The individual

[17] *Ibid.,* pp. 489 and 487.

does not receive a new incommunicability from the fact of subsistence. Facing existence as a subject or supposit capable of exercising existence, it is enabled to transfer into the existential order, to exercise in existence itself the incommunicability which characterizes it in the order of essence and as an individual nature distinct from any other. This is not a new knid of incommunicability, but the promotion onto a new plane of the incommunicability which defines singularity. Subsistence renders the essence (become supposit) capable of exercising existence.[68] (Maritain's emphasis)

Before proceeding to the question of what this pasage means and, specifically to the question of what it means to say that subsistence confers the capacity to exercise the act of existing on the individual essence, it would be well to summarize Maritain's argument so far. Just as in the original version, the suppositum or subject of action is not the mere individual or substantial essence but the substantial essence made capable of existing-this time made capable of *exercising* the act of existing-by the mode of subsistence. To use a spatial metaphor, it is a real state in between the substantial or individual essence and the existent. For if existence is *exercised*, and if only a subject or supposit can exercise the act of existing, then the substantial essence must be rendered capable of exercising that act: it must be made into a subject.

At first sight, this version appears more exotic and difficult to understand than the first version. Consider: On the one hand, we are told that subsistence adds nothing new to the essence in the line of essence; i.e., no new assignable properties; and, on the other hand, we are told that subsistence renders the substantial essence capable of exercising the act of existence *(esse).* It confers no new incommunicability on the individuated essence but, rather, enables that essence " to transfer into the existential order, to exercise in existence itself the incommunicability which characterizes it in the order of essence and as an individual nature distinct from any other."

But what reality does subsistence confer? What is it that

•• *Ibid.,* p. 438.

adds no new individuality or incommunicability to the individual essence and yet enables it to do what it could not do before receiving subsistence? When we talk of a subject, do we not have in mind a determinate thing, i.e., a particular person, a table, etc.? Finally, what does it mean to say that, before the individual essence can go from the realm of essence to the realm of existence, it must be capable of exercising existence? Why is not *esse* sufficient to actualize the individual essence? After all, in this second version, subsistence is no longer necessary to individualize essence or to make it incommunicable: Maritain has repudiated the position that it is metaphysically possible for two substantial essences to share one and the same act of existing. To say that existence *(esse)* requires a subject which has that existence, or which exists, is one thing; to say that the positive reality which makes an individual essence into a subject adds nothing new to its essential characteristics is something else again. We immediately wonder, as with the original version, how the individual essence and the subsistent individual differ. What difference enables the one to exercise the act of existence and the other not?

Maritain's answer to these questions seems to be located precisely in the claim that subsistence enables the substantial essence to exercise the act of existing, i.e., makes it a subject or supposit. Consider the following passage from the revised version:

> . . . subsistence constitutes a, new metaphysical dimension, a positive actuation or perfection, but under the title of a *state* (according as a "state" is distinguished from a "nature") or a terminative mode . . . Let us say that the state in question is a state of *active exercise*, which by that very fact makes the essence pass beyond the order of essentiality (terminates it in this sense) and introduces it into the existential order-a state by reason of which the essence so completed faces existence not in order only to receive it, but to exercise *it*, and constitute henceforth a centre of existential and operative activity, a subject or supposit which exercises at once the substantial *esse* proper to it and the diverse accidental *esse* proper to the operation which it produces by its powers and faculties.[69] (Maritain's emphasis)

[69] *Ibid.*

At first glance, this passage seems no more informative than any of the others. Placed in the proper context, however, it can furnish us with a clearer view of what Maritain is getting at in his second version.

He says in this passage that the existent, e.g., this man, Peter, this blade of grass, etc., can exercise the act of existing because it is "a centre of existential and operative activity," which is to say, it is a subject of action, and that to be a subject of action is to be more than an individual essence. The latter belongs to the essential order because it lacks an existential center; it lacks the capacity to exercise the act of existing. But, we continue to ask, what, precisely is this existential center? Maritain's answer would appear to reside at this very point of discussion. Because the subject of action belongs to the existential order rather than to the essential, the reality conferred by subsistence cannot be described in terms of assignable properties; it is not a quidditative constituent of essence. To think so, is to fall into the error of essentialism, i.e., the tendency to view reality as a succession of reified essences. Maritain has long criticized essentialism/ [0] and this criticism seems to be at the bottom of his theory of subsistence.

Thus, to understand what Maritain seems to be getting at in the revised version, it is necesary to view it in the light of his criticism of essentialism. In *Existence and the Existent,* which appeared seven years before the revised version, he distinguishes " authentic Thomism " from Thomist philosophies in which "the spirit of Plato, Descartes or Wolff has insinuated itself." [71] (He does not, however, indicate which Thomist philosophies he has in mind) . What distinguishes authentic Thornism from these others is the primacy which it gives to existence and to the intuition of existential being. Maritain goes on to say:

Even before these systems appeared [" contemporary systems of existentialism "], I had already repeatedly pointed out the error of

[7°] C£. for example, Maritain's *The Dream of Descartes with Some Other Essays,* tr. by Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), pp. 127-132 and *Existence and the Existent,* pp. U & 43-44.

[71] *Existence and the Existent,* p. U.

conceiving the philosophy of *being* as a philosophy of *essences* or as a dialectic of essences (what I call thumbing through a picture-book) instead of seeing that philosophy for what it really is, what constitutes its peculiar advantage over all other philosophies and gives it its unique and eminent place among them, namely, the fact that it is the philosophy of existence and of existential realism, the confrontation of the act of existing by an intelligence determined never to disown itself.[72] (Maritain's emphasis)

And, as noted at the outset of this article, Maritain in the same work refers to subsistence as " the metaphysical notion which has given so many headaches and baffles everyone who has not grasped the true-the existential-foundations of Thomist metaphysics. . . ."

What are these existential foundations? Not simply the act of existing *(esse)* apparently, but more accurately, that the existential order differs *sui-generis* from the essential. It will be recalled that among the considerations upon which Maritain bases his revised version of the of the theory of subsistence is the observation that what we experience are things, subjects, *existents,* and that by abstraction, our intellect disengages from them *essences* or intelligible structures. These disengaged essences do not appear as the existents themselves but rather as that which is immanent in the existents and in virtue of which they are what they are. Essence is in its very notion a principle *quo,* i.e., a *that by which a thing is what it is,.* not the thing itself.

In Maritain's judgment, the error of essentialism consists in mistaking the manner in which things exist in our minds when we know them for the manner in which they exist outside our minds. But Maritain, to reiterate, argues that only subjects exist in the primary sense of the word "exist." This is why he grounds the revised version in an appeal to our perceptions of the world: What we perceive are " things, subjects, *existents."* Although a subject embodies an essence, it is more than the essence: it is a being which *exercises* its own act of existing *(esse)* according to the determinations of that essence.

[72] *Ibid.*

Now what makes a subject to be a subject is not an essence; hence, subsistence cannot be captured by a concept.

The crux of the matter-and a point which Maritain believes cannot be stressed too heavily-is that the subject is an *existent,* not an essence to which existence has been added but a subject that is a source of existential activity. The existent or subject is " the individual thing which maintains itself in existence, this supremely .concrete reality " with " its irreducible originality .... " [73] This emphasis on the *existential,* as opposed to the essential, basis of philosophy comes through quite clearly when Maritain writes:

> God does not create essences to which He can be imagined as giving a last rub of the sandpaper of subsistence before sending them forth into existence! God creates existent subjects or suppositа which subsist in the individual nature that constitutes them and which receive from the creative influx their nature as well as their subsistence, their existence, and their activity. Each of them possesses an essence and pours itself out in action. [74]

Maritain seems to fear that the formula " essence plus *esse* produces the composite being " leads to a construction of essence as it is apprehended by the mind, as an abstract universal-an object-which is then made actual by the addition of the act of existing *(esse).* This is what he means by "conceiving the philosophy of being as . . . thumbing through a picture book. . . ." The addition of *esse* in this case fails to account for the existential reality of the existent, for it is simply a picture of an object, a static recipient of activity that is bereft of the " supremely concrete reality " of the existent. On the contrary, what makes a substantial essence capable of exercising the act of existing is an existential mode, not the mere actuation of a property belonging to essence. The latter is the assumption of essentialism, starting as it does with essences rather than with existents.

This emphasis on the existent would appear to be the import

[78] *Ibid.* p. 71.
[74] *Ibid.,* p. 74.

of Maritain's distinction between existence *as received* and existence *as exercised:* Existence as merely received is the existence mistakenly ascribed to essence as disengaged by abstraction in the intellect; existence as exercised is the genuine existence of individual, dynamic things. This, presumably, is what he has in mind when he refers to the " supremely concrete reality" of the subject. In order to exist, the individual essence must possess a "supreme achievement" which contributes nothing to that individual essence in the line of essence and yet, this supreme achievement, namely, subsistence,

> . . . terminates it in the line of essence (closes or situates it, constitutes it as an in-itself or an inwardness face to face with existence) in order that it may take possession of this act of existing for which it is created ...[75]

That is to say, a nature or essence *as known,* as it exists in the intellect, exists not as an "in-itself" but as a "for-another," as an object to be known, for which purpose the intellect disengages it from the individual existent in which it is embodied. Conversely, the existent, insofar as it is a subject and, hence, *a source of activity,* exists as an" in-itself." To exist is to exercise the act of existing, which exercise requires a subject. The existent is a subject just because to be a source of activity requires a center of organization, an inwardness or "in-itself" whence this activity emanates. This "in-itself" is, for Maritain, then, a perfection which is simply and entirely outside the realm of essence, belonging, instead, to the existential realm.

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Thus, it looks as though the source of the difficulty in arriving at an understanding of the reality conferred by subsistence -the difference between the substantial essence and the subject of action-is the very existential character which Maritain ascribes to the subject of action. Not being one of the quidditative constituents of essence, it possesses no assignable properties by which it can be described; yet, the reality con-

[75] *Ibid.,* p.

£erred by subsistence is of fundamental importance in that it makes the substantial or individuated essence into a subject capable of exercising the act of existing *(esse).* To use Maritain's terms, it carries the substantial essence from the essential to the existential order so that it can become an existent; but the substantial essence can receive existence only by exercising it.

What about the second question raised above, namely, Why does not *esse* suffice to account for the substantial essence being subsistent and a subject of action? The answer proposed to the first question-What reality does subsistence confer? -seems to furnish the clue for answering the second. If existence is an act that is exercised and if a subject is necessary to exercise this act, then *esse* cannot suffice for subsistence; otherwise the act of existing would exercise itself. Hence, a real mode is required to transfer the substantial essence from the essential to the existential order, i.e., to make it a subject capable of exercising-and receiving-existence.

This interpretation of the revised version appears to find added confirmation in Maritain's discussion of subsistence on the level of intellectual creatures. It is at this level, moreover, that the difference between the substantial, individuated essence and the subject of action becomes somewhat clearer. In Maritain's view subsistence at the level of intellectual creatures expresses itself in the form of personality, while the exercise of existence *(esse)* expresses itself in terms of independence and autonomy.

> And when the subject or supposit is a person, subsistence, from the fad that the nature which it " terminates " or " sur-completes " is an intellectual nature brings with it a positive perfection of a higher order. Let us say it is then a state of active and autonomous exercise, proper to a whole which envelops itself (in this sense that the totality is in each of its parts), therefore interior to itself, and possessing itself. Such a whole, possessing itself, makes its *own* in an eminent sense, or reduplicatively, the existence and the operations that it exercises. They are not only *of it,* but *for* it-for it as being integral parts of the possession of the self by the self characteristic of the person. All the features we have just indicated belong

to the ontological order. They refer to the ontological depths of subjectivity. Precisely here lies the ontological basis of the properties of the person in the moral order, of the mastery that it has over its acts by free choice, of its aspirations to liberty of autonomy, of the rights its possesses ... [76] (Maritain's emphasis)

Does subjectivity terminate human essence in the same sense that subsistence terminates the substantial essence of a subrational being, i.e., does it confer a new reality upon human essence without adding anything to the quidditative consituents of that essence itself? The answer requires a brief explication of Maritain's claim, in the above passage, that subjectivity is *ontological* rather than psychological. The intellectual being, or person, knows itself because it has so perfect a degree of being that it is self-unifying, unified from within. Hence, subjectivity-the form of subsistence on the level of intellectual creatures-is, in Maritain's judgment, the source of the person's autonomy or freedom. Being self-unifying, he is " a whole which envelops itself (in the sense that the totality is in each of its parts), therefore interior to itself, and possessing itself."

Is there an experiential basis for the claim that subjectivity is ontological rather than psychological? To begin with, the .subjectivity about which Maritain is speaking is not the awareness of myself which I have during my waking moments, as when I say to myself: " Here I am, sitting at my desk, writing about *subjectivity."* For this is to make myself an object of thought. When I know anything, I enter into a subject-object relationship with that thing. In order to know an object I must simultaneously know myself as the subject who knows. If I did not have-in some profound sense not accessible to conceptual conscious knowledge- [77] an awareness of myself as the unique knower of this object, I could not be said to know that object in the sense in which we apply the word to human knowledge. If I were not aware of myself as unique, knowledge

.. *Degrees of Knowledge,* pp. 488-489.

[77] Maritain, "The Immortality of Man," *The Review of Politics,* Vol. 8, 1941, pp. 415-416.

would be no different from the operation of the tape recorder: a blind reception and response to impressions without any conscious subject.

The fact of subjectivity supports Maritain's dual claims that, on the one hand, subsistence is a positive mode or reality, and, on the other, that it confers nothing new to essence in the line of essence. Consider: I, the person that I am, this unique center of conscious being, I am real. I am a positive entity, and yet I am not an essence nor a property of essence. On the contrary, the essence is part of me, for it is part of the subject that I am. Hence, the mere combination of essence, existence *(esse),* and signate matter cannot account for me, for the *I* that I am. My essence accounts for the fact that I am a man, a member of the human species. Signate matter, by individuating my essence, accounts for my being *this* man, possessing these bones and this flesh, etc. My existence *(esse)* accounts for the fact that I am a real, existent man. But what about my *self,* my *I,* my existence as a unique subjectivity and center of moral action? My essence cannot explain it, for the essence *man* is in itself impersonal; it applies to all men without applying to any man in particular. Signate matter cannot explain it, for matter is not conscious; it does not mark off and hence individuate my *self,* as if there were a general self which matter constricts into individual selves. For matter individuates things into parts, as it accounts for the fact that there are several individuals having the same essence. Finally, the *I* cannot be explained by existence *(esse)* , for existence is what I have, an act, the primary act that I exercise.

Do we not, then, require something further to explain the subject, in this case, the person? Something which makes the individual essence to be a subject possessing his own existence; something which enables the individuated essence, this man, to be a subject and, hence, to exercise his existence, and to do so in an autonomous and unique way? Maritain's answer is that *person* implies perfection or completion by a real mode: subsistence. All my actions-my very existence-are the actions and the existence of a being who knows himself as a self, as a sub-

ject. Do not the locutions by which I refer to myself and my body illustrate that essence is a principle of being, and of itself cannot exercise existence for itself and for its own unique purposes? I do not say "my man" but rather, "the man that I am." It is *my* body and *my* intellect. [78] I am a *whole*, whereas my essence is a *part* of that whole. In this sense I am a totality who am in each of my parts. Hence, personality, characterized as it is by subjectivity, does not seem to be a property of essence but its perfection or completion. Personality, therefore, goes hand in hand with subjectivity and may be regarded as a perfection or completion in the sense that my subsistence-which is to say, my subjectivity-follows from my essence, not as risibility follows from my essence as a rational being, but, instead, as the demand of my essence for completion. And this completion is to be a unique center of self-aware being and activity.

In sum, Maritain's application of the theory of subsistence to intellectual beings clarifies the real mode which, according to him, is conferred by subsistence on substantial essence: My unique self, the self by which I act, is not a quidditative constituent of essence; it is not my act of existing, nor the signate matter which individuates me as an individual member of the human species. Yet it is not the less real for all that. To exist as a human being is to exist as a self, as the possessor of an interior organization called "subjectivity." This is what it means to exist-to be a subject of action-on the level of intellectual beings.

Equally, what enables a substantial essence on the sub-in tellectual level to be an existent-what makes it a subject, thereby capable of exercising its act of existing-is " a supremely concrete reality," an "irreducible originality" that is neither existence *(esse)* itself nor one of the quidditative constituents of essence. Yet the mode conferred by subsistence is an indispensable condition for the reception and exercise of existence *(esse)* by a substantial essence.

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[78] *Diepen,* p. 101.

It can be concluded that Maritain's claim that Thomism is an existentialism was not merely, if at all, an attempt to dress Thomist philosophy in the fashionable garments of the day but, on the contrary, expresses a profound appreciation for the difference between the essential and existential realms. Moreover, the above examination has revealed that this appreciation was not inspired by contemporary existentialism nor by a desire to answer Sartre. It was explicit and operative in his philosophical writings as early as as is clear from his emphasis on the importance of subsistence in *An Introduction to Philosophy.* The significance of his final metaphysical work, *Existence and the Existent,* is that it represents an attempt to respond to existentialists, such as Sartre, by showing how Thomism achieves a fusion between the necessity and universality of essence, on the one hand, and the contingency, uniqueness, and freedom of existence, on the other. Indeed, in the light of his claim that subjectivity, or personality, is the form of subsistence on the level of intellectual creatures, it is no accident that *Maritain's* socio-political philosophy is libertarian and progressive, despite its grounding in the Natural Law and the universality of human nature.

Lastly, although an interpreter of the writings of Thomas Aquinas in the tradition of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, Maritain has, with the development of his own distinctive theory of .subsistence, revealed himself as a creative metaphysician.

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ARISTOTLE ANNOUNCES at the beginning of his treatise commonly called the *Physics* that his study is "the science of nature" *cpvcrEwc;* [1] Again at the opening of Book II, which seems to be a second introduction to the treatise, he says that nature belongs to the class of things whose existence is obvious, and that to attempt to prove nature's existence would mark one as a man unable to distinguish the self-evident. [2] Elsewhere, he writes that not knowing what needs demonstration and what does not " argues want of education," [3] and only the uneducated "demand a reason for everything." [4] They are not rational beings. Indeed, they are no better than vegetables! [5] Nature *is.* Its reality cannot be denied. But *what* is nature? That, Aristotle tells us in *Physics* 193 a 1, has already been stated. This sends the reader back to see where Aristotle offers a definition of nature. The statement closest to a definition is in *Physics* 192 b 22: " nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily." Later we are informed, "Nature has been defined as ' a principle of motion and change.' " [6] And in the *Metaphysics* he says nature is " a principle of movement." [7] Since he devotes the entirety of *Physics* Book I to establishing that matter, privation of form, and possession of form are the three factors of all change, we can conclude that a natural object is one in which these factors inhere, i. e., to which they belong primarily. A natural object has the internal power to originate-and to resist--change. This internal power is the dis-

[1] *Physics* 184 a 15. All quotations from the works of Aristotle are from the English translations edited by W. D. Ross and published by Oxford University Press, except where otherwise noted.

[2] *Physics* 193 a 5.

[3] *Metaphysics* 1006 a 5-7.

[4] *Ibid.,* 1012 a 22.

[5] *Ibid.,* 1006 a 15.

[6] *Physics* 200 b 11.

[7] *Metaphysics* 1049 b 10.

tinguishing characteristic of its naturalness; it is what makes it a *n,atural* object. A natural object is one which without appealing to anything external to itself can move from here to there, can change from this to that.

Can one be more specific about this internal power of a thing which makes it a natural object? Some have, says Aristotle. Some think that matter is the locus of the internal power, e. g., the wood of a bed, or the bronze of a statue. Some locate the natural in the element earth, says Aristotle, although he also tells us in *Metaphysics* 989 a *5* that no one has selected earth for this role. Perhaps the difference is that Aristotle means that no philosopher has selected earth, although the common people [8] and Hesiod [9] have expressed this opinion. This may be why he separates the two statements "some assert earth" and "others fire or air or water." [10] But whether it be the common people or philosophers who affirm matter as the locus of the natural, this is an impossible view, adds Aristotle. His argument is an analogy: an art object is not art by reason of the material of which it is made but by reason of the form imposed on the material; so a natural object is not natural by reason of the material but by reason of the form. At least a thing is more what it is defined to be when it has attained its fulfillment, i.e., its form, than when it merely exists potentially, i.e., as matter. This, however, we must note is circular, since a definition for Aristotle is a verbalization of the form. Aristotle's fundamental realism prevents him from supporting either the material or the formal locus of the natural. He next, in one of those passages of the opera too often overlooked by Aristotelian scholars, tries a process philosophy alternative. Ross translates the relevant passage, "We also speak of a thing's nature as being exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is attained. [11] I translate this remarkable state-

[8] *Ibid.,* 989 a 9.
• *Ibid.,* 989 a 10.
[10] *Physics* 193 a 9ll.
[11] *Ibid.,* 193 b 13.

ment: "We say that nature is as it becomes itself in nature." The final cause operates in the changes which realize the final cause. In other words, the actualization factor is both *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem.* Oak tree as formal and final necessary conditions operates as the efficient necessary condition in the growth of the acorn to its fulfillment as an oak tree. Aristotle's process view of nature leads him to one of his favorite parallels: the form-matter relationship is integral like snubness and nose.[12] If anything has the characteristics of snubness, it has to be a nose, for only noses are snub. Likewise, form cannot be except in the form-matter syndrome. Of course, we must add that this holds only for all objects from the center of the earth to the surface of the moon. The complex of informed matter may be studied as only matter or as only form, but in either case what is studied is an abstraction from the existent object. The term "nature" denotes both, or better, " nature " denotes the form-matter unit.

In spite o£ this clarification in the first two books o£ the *Physics,* the £act remains that Aristotle is careless in his use o£ He does not seem to desire to use with one fixed designation. One obvious malpractice is his use o£ to denote a mythological reification, e. g., "Nature is a good housekeeper," [13] "an intelligent agent," [14] "an intelligent workman," [15] " a painter," [16] etc.

Since part o£ the problem in understanding Aristotle's view o£ nature is rooted in the tendency to regard nature substantially, perhaps we ought not to seek £or the meaning o£ (nature) but o£ *cpvcrH* (by nature, or naturally). After all, he does begin *Physics,* Book II with the words *rwv 5vrwv ra p,ev* €ern (0£ existing things some come into being naturally.)

Another facet of the problem is that we usually try to

[12] *Ibid.,* 194 a 13.
[13] *On the Generation of Animals* 744 b 16.
[14] *On the Breath* 485 b 8.
[15] *On the Generation of Aninnals* 731 a 24.
[16] *Ibid.,* 743 b 22.

comprehend Aristotle's concept of nature by a frontal attack. But if we appeal again to 192 b 8 we can see a suggestion of an indirect approach, a comprehension by appeal to contradictories, i. e., an initial examination of the non-natural ways of coming into being. The entire sentence is *Twv ov'T(JJV Ta fLEV €un cf>vuet, Ta S€ a)\)\ar; alTiar;* (Of existing things some come into being naturally. and some by other conditions.) (I prefer to avoid " cause " as a translation of *ahia.)* What would be the result if we attempted to understand the other possible conditions of existence first and then attempted to understand *cf>vutr;?* In other words, instead of examining cf>vcnr; and then *a)\)\a<; ai'Tta<;,* why not look at *acf>vut<;* (non-nature) and from this study arrive at a comprehension of cf>vcnr;?

Aristotle in the opening sentence of *Physics,* Book II has alerted us to the fact that things may come into being non-naturally as well as naturally, so that after a succinct presentation in Chapter S of the four-fold *ahia* in its six modes-particular, general, proper, incidental, potential, and actual-he may turn to the other conditions by which a thing can be brought into being. These non-natural conditions for coming into being, which I refer to jointly as *acf>vutr;* are *TEX.VYJ,* and *avT6fLaTo<;.* The adverbial translations I prefer for these terms are respectively "coming into being artificially," "coming into being luckily," and "coming into being haphazardly."

The key text for this study of *cf>vcnr;* and *acf>vutr;* in Aristotle is *Metaphysics* 1070 a 6-8: *yap TEX.VYJ cf>vuet yiyveTat TJ TVX.TJ TJ 'TW UV'TOfLU'TW 71 fLEV OVV TEX.VYJ dpx_YJ EV UJ\.1\W, 71* OE *'f'VO"t<; EV UV'TW . . . ai* S€ *)\ot1Tat alT£at 'TOWWV.*

For things come into being either by art or by nature or by luck or by spontaneity. Now art is a principle of movement in something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself . . . and the other causes are privations of these two. (Ross)

Things come into being by art or by nature, or else by fortune or by chance. When they are generated by art, their source is in something else; when by nature, their source is internal to them . . . and when they become by fortune, they do so by privation

of art; and when by chance, by privation of a natural factor. (Hope) [17]

Things come into being artificially or naturally, or else luckily or haphazardly. When things come into being artificially, their source of coming into being is in something other than themselves; when they come into being naturally, their source of coming into being is in themselves. When things come into being luckily, they do so by privation of the source of coming into being artificially; when they come into being haphazardly, they do so by privation of the source of coming into being naturally. (Organ)

My translation is an effort to preserve the dynamic form by the use of adverbs. Also I bring out the contrarieties and privations in full.

Much of the meaning of this quotation hinges on the term of opposition translated "privation." According to Aristotle there are four kinds of opposition (avnKEtJ.LEva): (1) contradiction "as affirmatives to negatives"; (2) contrariety "as contraries to one another"; (3) relation n), " as correlatives to one another"; (4) privation "as privatives to positives." [18]

The kinds of opposition among *TEXVTJ, rvx?},* and are contrariety and privation. Contraries, says Aristotle, are " other in form." [19] Coming into being artificially and coming into being luckily are forms of coming into being in which the formal conditions are external; coming into being naturally and coming into being haphazardly are forms of coming into being in which the formal conditions are internal. Externality and internality stand in the opposition of contrariety. They are other in form to each other, yet they are " in a sense, the same form " [20] since they are both forms of coming into being.

[17] Richard Hope, *Aristotle-Metaphysics* (Ann Arbor: The University of Mich*igan Press,* 1960).

[18] *Categories* 11 b 17; *Topics* 109 b 17; *Metaphysics 1055* a 88, 1057 a 84-87. In *Metaphysics* 1018 a while making an excursion into ordinary language, Aristotle mentions two other opposites: beginning-imd and incompatible attributes.

[1"] *Metaphysics* 1058 b

[••] "For even contraries have in a sense the same form." Metaphysics 1032 b 2.

'!-r€pTJr:nc; comes £rom *crrep€w* (to deprive, to take away, to rob a person o£ something) . *!dpTJcrLc;* is defined as " the denial o£ a predicate to a determinate genus." [21] Hope translates it "a privation o£ a thing's very being is a denial also o£ its genus." F. E. Peters has it "the negation o£ something within a defined class." [22] Aristotle also describes privation as " a determinate incapacity." [23] His introduction o£ the term into the *Physics* casts light upon its importance. In *Physics,* Book I he argues that coming into being involves three principles: a permanent substratum (imoKEtf:.tEVot:.t) and a pair o£ opposites or contraries *(f.vavria):* "We have now stated the number o£ the principles o£ natural objects which are subject to generation, and how the number is reached: and it is clear that there must be a substratum £or the contraries, and that the contraries must be two." [24] Aristotle immediately rephrases what he has said: " Yet in another way o£ putting it this is not necessary, as one o£ the contraries will serve to effect the change by its successive absence *(a1Tovcria)* and presence *(7rapovcria)*." [25] In *Physics* 191 b 15 Aristotle introduces the use o£ the term *crr€pTJcrLc;* to connote the contrary in a state o£ absence *(a1Tovcria).* This is in accord with his observation that "every contrariety depends upon privation." [26] But the shift o£ terms calls our attention to the important £act that the *f.vavria* are not to be taken as contradictories. In *Posterior .4.nalytics* 78 b 22 he says that *f.vavria* may denote either *crrEpTJL<;* or *avricpamc;:* " For within a single identical genus the contrary o£ a given attribute is either its privation or its contradictory." Another very good reason £or the introduction o£ the term *CTTEPTJCTL<;* is that *f.vavriov* understood as *avricpacrL<;* might be understood as negation, but "negation means just the absence

[21] *Ibid.,* 1011 b 19.

[22] F. E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 180.

[23] *Metaphysics* 1058 b

[••] *Physics* 191 a 4. The use of opposites was a common device in ancient Greek speculation. The most notable was the Pythagorean ten sets of opposites.

[25] *Physics* 191 a 6.

[26] *Metaphysics* 1063 b 17.

of the thing in question, while m privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted." [27]

Privation must always be understood in context, as Aristotle says in *Topics* 147 b *35:* "a proper rendering of its *[a-r€p'l'}<Tts]* essence must state both of what it is the privation and what it is that is deprived." Again in *Physics* 191 b 13-15 he writes, " We ourselves are in agreement with them [the Eleatics] in holding that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not. But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may 'come to be from what is not' -that is, in a qualified sense. For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is not-being-this not surviving as a constituent of the result." The important words are " in its own nature," which means that the privation is qualified, not unqualified. Thus the change from a non-red thing to a red thing, as in the ripening of an apple, is a change from the non-being of redness in the nature of the apple to the being of redness in the apple, not a change from non-being *per se* to being *per se.* Everything that becomes becomes not from being *per se* nor from non-being *per se,* but from non-being in a qualified sense There is another mode of explanation, says Aristotle, [28] and, while using this other mode, he comes to the conclusion that by making semantic distinctions even the Eleatic terminology may be used: "In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no 'being' without qualification: yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of 'what is.' For coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which *potentially* 'is,' but *actually* 'is not'; and this something is spoken of both as 'being' and as 'not-being.'" [29]

Privation shares properties with both contradiction and contrariety. Aristotle tells us that "privation is a kind of contradiction." [30] This is because the privation-possession opposition

[27] *Ibid.,* 1004 a *15.*
[28] *Physics* 191 b 28-29.
[29] *On Coming to Be and Passing Away* 317 b 16-18.
[30] *Metaphysics 1055* b 3.

can be stated as the affirmation and negation of some attribute. But, unlike contradiction, some kinds of privation " admit of an intermediate," [31] so "clearly all contrariety must be privation." [32] Privation is a kind of contradiction, and contrariety is a kind of privation. W. D. Ross comments, "Contradiction is the relation between two propositions of the type ' A is B,' 'A is not B.' Privation is the condition of a subject capable of being B (let us call it Ah) when it in any degree fails to be B. Contrariety is the relation between two conditions of Ah, that in which it is fully B and that in which it is not B at all. Thus contradiction includes privation as a particular case, and privation includes contrariety as a particular case." [33] Privation enables Aristotle to distinguish sentences like " This shirt is not blue" (because its color is from sentences like " Sneezes are not blue " (because color is not a property of sneezes), and it also provides intermediates between "seeing" in the full sense and " blind " in the full sense, to use one of Aristotle's examples of privation.

After this consideration of the essence of a-TEPTJfn<;, we are ready to note that *a-TEpTJa-t<;* is the opposition which holds between coming into being artificially and coming into being luckily, and between coming into being naturally and coming into being haphazardly. The latter types of coming into being, i.e., *7VXrJ* and *avT6/LaTo<;,* SUffer a privation Of a pOSSession which the former types of coming into being enjoy. In each case what is deprived is the telic operation of the formal conditions. T€xvTJ possesses and *TVXrJ* is deprived of the effective realization of results through the purposive thought of an external agent. *<I>va-t<;* possesses and *avT6/Lan<;* is deprived of the effective realization of results through the inner dynamics of nature. T€xVTJ is COntrary to *cpva-t<;* and *avT6/LaTo<;,* and it pOSSeSSeS that Of which *TVXrJ* is deprived. *<I>va-t<;* is contrary to *TEXVTJ* and *roxr},* and it possesses that of which *avT6/La-ro<;* is deprived. The indirect approach to *cpva-t<;* is to examine first the contraries of

[31] *Ibid.,* 1055 b 9.
[32] *Ibid.,* 1055 b 14.
[33] *Aristotle's Metaphysics,* Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924) pp. 291-292.

cpwts, i.e., and its privative, i. e., Tvx'J]; then to examine the privative of cpvcn<; i.e., avT6t-taTo<;; and finally, to examine cpvcn<; itself. Through such an approach the *what* of cpvcn<; is determined by the examination of acpvcn<;.

The effort to define cpvcn<; through an analysis of acpvcn<; is not foreign to Aristotle. In the *Topics,* after observing that " opposites are always simultaneous by nature." [34] he indicates that a thing can be defined through its opposite: " Some people think, also, that both are objects of the same science, so that one is not even more intelligible than the other. One must, however, observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way, e. g., the double without the half, and all the terms are essentially relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something, so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other, and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced." [35] In this connection it is interesting to note that Aristotle himself utilizes a discussion of as a means to prepare the way for a discussion of cpvcn<;; in fact, in *Physics,* Book II he uses all three of the acpvcn<; concepts to clarify cpvcn<;. Again in *Metaphysics,* Book *0,* Chapter 7 he first presents artificial production: "And (1) the delimiting mark of that which as a result of thought comes to exist in complete reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent has willed it it comes to pass if nothing external hinders," [36] and then natural production: " and in the cases in which the source of the becoming is in the very thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it." [37]

In examining the types of coming into being beginning with rather than with cpvcn<; we are forced to ignore the many

•• *Topics* 142 a 24.
[35] *Ibid.,* 142 a 25-32.
•• *Metaphysics* 1049 a *5-6.*
•• *Ibid.,* 1049 a 13-14.

passages in which Aristotle describes art as imitating or completing nature.[38] However, Aristotle says not only that art imitates nature but also that nature imitates art.[39] Students of the history of Greek philosophy who seek to fashion an Aristotelian *system* ought to heed the warning of Whitehead that philosophy in its primary states is an "assemblage" rather than a system.[40] But even Whitehead slips when he says, "Aristotle systematizes as he assembles."[41] Why didn't Whitehead note that Aristotle was the first to write treatises on the "adventures of ideas"?

The first item to be noted about *TEXVYJ* is that, contrary to what might be expected from the usual translation of *TEXVYJ* as "art," Aristotle does not have primarily in mind what we today call the "fine arts." "Craft" would be a better translation, if we insist on the nounal form. This, however, does not convey the dynamic connotation Aristotle has in mind. he tells us, denotes the sphere of becoming, and denotes the sphere of being.[42] However, since he has in mind not merely that *TEXVYJ* stands for a coming into being but especially for a certain way of coming into being, an adverb conveys his meaning better than a verb or a noun, e. g., "artificially" or "craftsmanly."

Coming into being artificially, according to Aristotle, is a "making."[43] It is a making which seeks to fill up the deficiencies of nature.[44] While all comings into being or makings require three things- (1) a something as agent by whose action the coming into being takes place, (2) a something upon which comes into being by reason of the agent's action upon the something upon which the coming into being takes place-

[38] *Physics* 194 a 22, 199 a 16; *Meteorology* 381 b 6; *On the Universe* 396 b 11.
[39] *Physics* 199 a 10-14.
[40] Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1938), p. 2.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[42] *Posterior Analytics* 100 a 8.
[43] *Metaphysics* 1032 a 25, 1140 a 16.
[44] *Politics* 1337 a 1.

coming into being artificially is differentiated by the separation and pre-existence of (1) above. In traditional Aristotelian language this is the form in its roles as efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause which is homogeneous with the product. There is no *TEXVYJ* unless there is a mind which images the product prior to its production: "Art indeed consists in the conception of the result to be produced before its realization in the material." [45] An art object requires a pre-existent material and a preexistent agent separate from the material. The agent is the locus of the three-fold *aiTia:* plan, movement, and goal.

The distinctive feature of *TEXVYJ* is the imposition of form from outside the something upon which coming into being takes place. Aristotle says this in many ways, e. g., "in the case of things made the principle is in the maker"; [46] "art is the starting-point and form of the product; only it exists in something else, whereas the movement of Nature exists in the product itself"; [47] "from art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul of the artist"; [48] "if it happens by art, the form is in the soul" [49] and " whose orif,rin is in the maker and not in the thing made." [50] There is no power in the material used in artificial production such that under proper conditions the art object will come into being in the absence of the agent. Aristotle's illustration, borrowed from Antiphon, is that if a wooden bed were to take root and grow, it would produce a tree, i. e., reproduce the wood from which the bed was made, but never a bed. [51] Art objects have no nature (i.e., no principle of movement and change. They do not contain in themselves the source of their own production. [52] They do not purpose; they are purposed. They are *artificial* in the sense that they are brought into being by another rather than by

[45] *On the Parts of Animals* 640 a 82.
[46] *Metaphysics 1025* b 21.
[47] *On the Generation of Animals* 785 a 2.
[48] *Metaphysics* 1082 a 88.
[49] *Ibid.,* 1082 b 28.
[50] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140 a 18.
[51] *Physics* 198 a 18.
[52] *Ibid.,* 198 b 27.

themselves. This is why the paintings of trees and the sculptures of horses are art objects but trees and horses are not. The process by which a canvas comes to resemble a tree and a stone comes to resemble a horse is accidental to the canvas and the stone.[53] But the process by which trees and horses come into being is not accidental to the material component of trees and horses.

The form external to the material in coming into being artificially operates as form always does for Aristotle in three modes: as plan, as movement, and as goal. The plan arises in the mind of the external agent from notions gained by experience,S4 just as experience in turn arose from the memory men share with some animals and the sensations men share with all animals. *TexV7J,* however, men share with no animals, for only man lives by " art and reasoning" as well as by " appearances and memories."[55] The form as goal in artificial production is noted by Aristotle as a coming into being for the sake of some function of the craftsman, not for the sake of a function inherent in the material,[56] e. g., a statue of Athena is made because of the sculptor's desire to glorify Athens and her patroness, not to display the beauties of Delphian marble. The form as the locus of movement has already been sufficiently noted. Artificial coming into being may be described in traditional Aristotelian language as the type in which the moving cause, the formal cause, and the final cause are externally related to the material out of which the art object comes into being.

The artisan has in mind the creation of a good specimen of its kind. By this we do not mean that the sculptor desires to make statues of only thoroughbred horses, but rather that he wishes to represent well the sort of horse he chooses to represent in the work, be it thoroughbred or mongrel. Art is always of universals; experience is always of particulars.[57] As

•• *Ibid.,* 198 a 15.
•• *Mmaphysics* 981 a 6; *Posterior Analytics* 100 a 7.
[55] *Metaphysics* 980 b 25.
[56] *Physics* 194 b 7.
[57] Metaphysics 981 a 16.

.for the hierarchy of values among the various kinds of art, Aristotle as a consistent humanist contends that the best art object is the state, and the best craft is statesmanship. [58]

Coming into being artificially is limited to human beings, since only in men do " logically indiscriminable particulars " make a stand as " rudimentary universals " and finally become " the indivisible concepts, the true universals," [59] and only a mind capable of forming universals can operate upon materials in coming into being artificially. There is no chimpanzee art! However, sometimes a human being capable of acting as agent in an art process acts in such a manner that an art object comes into being, not intentionally but accidentally: " the same result as is produced by art may occur spontaneously." [60] A subtle distinction however is made between art objects and what might be called " look like art objects." The products of art "require the pre-existence of an efficient cause homogeneous with themselves" and "this cannot possibly be produced spontaneously." [61] "Art indeed consists in the conception of the result to be produced before its realization in the material" but "as with spontaneity *(avr6fLaros),* so with chance *(rvx-rJ)* for this also produces the same result as art, and by the same process." [62] This statement is curious. "The same result as art " is not difficult to handle, since we can distinguish between a genuine art object and a "look like art object" which appears the same as one which is the consummation of the conception of the result in the mind of the agent and the activity of the agent. But what can Aristotle mean by " the *same* process "? Obviously the process of a sculptor making a sculpture out of a block of marble is not the same as the process by which a young child playing with modeling clay accidentally creates a statue, or the process by which wind, rain, and snow have fashioned the Old Man of

[58] *The Great Ethics* b 1.
[59] *Posterior Analytics* 100 a 16-b
[60] *On the Parts of Animals* 640 a
[61] *Ibid.,* 640 a 31.
[62] *Ibid.,* 640 a

the Mountain. The subtle and important difference between a legitimate work of art and a "look like art object" depends precisely on the processes, which are *not* the same. Aristotle himself distinguishes doing something grammatical and doing something grammatically: " Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible to do something that is in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by chance or by the suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when he had both done something grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself." [63] The meaning, of course, is that it is " true even of the arts," i.e., one may make something which when examined as an object looks as it would look were it brought into being by an end-seeking activity, or one may make something which is in fact brought into being by an end-seeking activity. Only the latter is an instance of coming into being artificially.

Aristotle's discussion of is confusing because he sometimes uses the term as practically synonymous with and sometimes treats and as terms with differing meanings. The confusion is identified when we realize that he uses both as the generic term " chance," by which he means any form of action in which the results are not predictable and as the specific term which we are here translating "haphazardly," the privative of "naturally" as opposed to "luckily" which is the privative of" artificially." For example, in *Physics,* Book II, Chapter 4 he treats and as distinct, but in *Physics,* Book II, Chapter 6 he informs us that is a wider term than Translators make matters more difficult by reason of the wide variety of translations offered for the relevant Greek terms, even when they are aware of the two uses of the terms, e. g., William Ogle says in a footnote to his translation of *On the Parts of*

•• *Nichomachean Ethics 1105* 11;

640 a 32 in the Oxford translations, "Accident is called Chance -or preferably Luck-when the accidental agent acts with intention, though not with the intention of producing the result that actually -occurs. It is called Spontaneity when the agent has no intention at all." then, is that form of chance *(avT6f-taToc;)* in which an agent acts with intention, but not with the intention of producing the result which actually occurs. involves a slip between the thought and the deed, as is indicated in Aristotle's quotation from Polus: "Experience made art, but inexperience luck." [64]

Both luck and art function in the area in which the conceiving and acting of an external agent may be expected, only whereas in the case of coming into bei.ng artificially the agent does in fact conceive and act to bring about the result, in the case of coming into being luckily the agent conceives and acts but not for the purpose of bringing about the result which follows. Aristotle's way of saying this is that "luck and thought are concerned with the same sphere; for purpose cannot exist without thought." [65] Again, " Of the products of man's intelligence some are never due to chance or necessity but always to an end, as for example a house or a statue; others, such as health or safety, may result from chance as well." [66] But he does not mean that a chance act is one not due to an end; rather he means that a chance act is the act of a rational being acting for an end which acting will realize another end he might have chosen, but did not. His example is that of a man collecting subscriptions who goes to a place for another purpose and there sees the man whom he most wished to ask for a subscription. [67] is manifest only in the actions of an end-selecting being. Aristotle says, "Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to agents that are capable of good fortune and of moral action generally. Therefore necessarily chance is in the sphere of moral actions." [68]

[64] *Metaphysics* 981 a 5.
[65] *Ibid.,* 1065 a 32.
[66] *Posterior Analytics* 95 a 3-5.
[67] *Physics* 196 b 33-197 a 7.
[68] *Ibid.,* 197 b 1-2.

Hardie and Gaye prefer "chance" as a translation of This is allowable, although I prefer " chance " for the generic term. However, their translation of *1rep'i* nl. *1rpaKra* as "the sphere of moral action generally " is misleading and borders on mistranslation. Hope's translation is far superior: "Hence luck must pertain to practical affairs." In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1105 a 22 Aristotle says one may luckily write or speak in accordance with the rules of grammar. The heart of the issue is not that luck is located only in the area of morality but that luck is appropriate to agents " *that are capable of* good fortune and of moral action generally." Hardie and Gaye indicate this in their translation of *Physics* 197 b *5:* "Hence what is not capable of moral action cannot do anything by chance." Aristotle says inanimate things, lower animals, and children are incapable of acting luckily. They may be affected by but only insofar as the rational agent who happens to act luckily is dealing with them. [69]

Conjunctions described as yield no knowledge, " for chance conjunctions exist neither by necessity nor as general connexions but comprise what comes to be as distinct from these." [70] All reasoning proceeds from necessary or general premises, and the premises established by do not meet these criteria. Yet when Aristotle attempts a definition of he usually says it is a species of *alr£a* which is the building block of knowledge: " Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes," [71] e. g., "an incidental cause in the sphere of those actions for the sake of something which involve purpose "; [72] "an accidental cause at work in such events adapted to an end as are usually effected in accordance with purpose "; [73] " a cause by accident, but in the unqualified sense a cause of nothing"; [74] " the cause of good things that happen

•• *Ibid.,* 197 b 18.
[70] *Posterior Analytics* 87 b
[71] *Metaphyiscs* a 1.
•• Physics 197 a *5.*
•• *Metaphysics* 1065 a 80.
.. *Ibid.,* 1065 a 85.

contrary to reasonable expectation." [75] In the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle (or perhaps a later Aristotelian) denies that is a cause; instead it is a word we use to cover our inability to identify the cause: "... we ought to say that nothing happens by chance, but do say that chance is a cause simply because, though there is some other cause, we do not see it." [76] A similar observation is made in the *Rhetoric:* "The things that happen by chance are all those whose cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way." [77] But in another passage in the *Rhetoric* chance is listed as cause in a curious list of " seven causes ": " Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite." [78]

Aristotle makes evaluative distinctions among events and objects that come into being luckily. "Now many events happen by chance," he says, " and events differing in importance." [79] Some are of good fortune; some of its opposite. Good luck and bad luck, he tells us elsewhere, are distinguished by the goodness or badness of the result. [80] By " good luck" Aristotle means a state of affairs which comes into being accidentally in an area where choice and deliberate action might have been exercised. In *Rhetoric* 1361 b 39-1362 a 12 he offers the consolation that many of the good things of life are due to " artificial contrivance," e. g., health, and many others are due to nature, e. g., beauty and stature; yet he concedes that many good things remain which can only be due to good luck: "as when, for instance, all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else had overlooked; or when a missile hits the next man and misses you; or when you are the only man not to go to

[75] *Rhetnric* 1362 a 6.
[76] *Eudemian Ethics* 1247 b *5.*
[77] *Rhetoric* 1369 a 31.
[78] *Ibid.,* 1369 a *5.*
[79] *Nichomachean Ethics* 1100 b 22.
[80] *Metaphysics* 1065 b 1. See also *Physics* 197 a 25 and *Eudemian Ethics* 1247 b 3.

a place you have gone to regularly, while the others go there for the first time and are killed." Finally, in a strange passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle says that art "is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning" and that " lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning." [81] "True" evidently refers to a form of reasoning in which the end produced is the same as the end envisioned, and " false " refers to a form of reasoning in which the end produced is other than the end envisioned. This is an interesting pragmatic use of" true" and "false." It gives us another dimension of the earthy qualities of the Stagirite.

An evaluational consideration of the results attained in coming into being luckily leads Aristotle to the third type, i.e., coming into being haphazardly. Just as a process may lead to good fortune or to bad fortune as a result of a line of action controlled by an external agent seeking to realize a different result, so " good fortune " or " bad fortune " may follow a line of action of beings incapable of intelligent choice, and one in which the direction of the process is not determined directly or indirectly by an external agent. Furthermore, the direction of the process cannot be predicted by an analysis of the being, although one can predict that under certain conditions there will be a coming into being.

The examples Aristotle gives of *a1rr6p,wror;* reveal the problems he has raised. Inanimate beings, lower animals, and children are mentioned by Aristotle as subject to coming into being haphazardly. [82] "Good fortune" and "bad fortune," he says, cannot be ascribed to them except by analogy. His example of *avr6p,aro<;* in an inanimate being is a reference to Protarchus who praised the " good fortune " of the stones of altars as compared with the stones of the street which are trodden by the feet of men. [83] This example raises no special

[81] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140 a 20-23.

[80] *Physics* 197 b 6.

[83] *Ibid.,* 197 b 8-10.

problems. But his other two examples do raise problems. A horse, he says, comes haphazardly to a place which turns out to be a place of safety.[84] A tripod falls "of itself" in such a manner as to form a seat.[85] A horse is an end-desiring but not an end-selecting creature. It is not rational because it is incapable of forming the "rudimentary universals." That is, it is not aware of the universal "safety," so it cannot select the place to go which will give it safety. It can experience safety, although it cannot conceive it. Hence, without deliberation the horse haphazardly moves to a place of safety. Note also that the locus of the value safety is in the horse. The tripod, on the other hand, is neither an end-desiring nor an end-selecting entity. It falls "of itself." This, of course, is not so strictly speaking, since the tripod in order to fall must be activated by something-by wind, water, an animal, a person, etc. Hope takes liberties with the Greek and adds that the tripod was " tossed into the air "! Whatever were the circumstances, the support of the tripod was removed and -in Aristotelian terminology-the earth of the tripod moved to its natural location. When the falli:ag tripod came to a stop, it was in such a position that it formed a seat. But a tripod forming a seat haphazardly is quite different from a horse finding a place of safety haphazardly. *If* the horse were capable of deliberative intention, it would have gone to this place, for a place of safety is a value for a horse; but it makes no sense to claim that *if* a tripod were capable of deliberate intention, it would fall in such a manner as to form a seat, for forming a seat or not forming a seat is irrelevant to a tripod. The "good " fortune " of the altar stones is by analogy in the stones; the " good fortune " of the horse in finding a place of safety is actually in the horse; but " good fortune " cannot be ascribed analogically or non-analogically to a tripod which haphazardly falls to form a seat. This " good fortune " must be located in the person who, desiring a place to sit, finds the tripod in a seat-forming position.

[84] *Ibid.,* 197 b 16. [85] *Ibid.,* 197 b 17.

The relationship between *rvx1}* and *avr6JLaTO<;* is brought out in Aristotle's observation: "Yet beings unable to act by luck (rvx1/) may indeed in some sense be acted upon by luck, namely, when an agent brings something about by luck in dealing with them." [86] What he seems to have in mind is that the same event can be said to come into being luckily or haphazardly depending upon the point of view. A weary traveler leans against a tripod for support, and in so doing pushes it over. He then notices that the tripod has fallen in such a manner as to form a seat upon which he can rest comfortably. According to Hope's translation, this would be a case in which a being unable to act by luck is acted upon by luck. The fall of the tripod from the traveler's point of view is an example of *rvx1},* but the fall of the tripod considered merely as a tripod falling and coming to rest as a seat is an example of *avr6JJ-aror;.* Aristotle's statement that *rvx1/* "is due to an external factor " whereas *avr6p,aror;* "is due to an internal factor " [87] needs amplification and clarification. *Tvx1/* is a type of coming into being in which the intention of an extemal agent is operative, only it is not operative in bringing about the result under consideration. *Avr6p,aror;* is a type of coming into being in which internal formal conditions are operative, only they do not operate to bring about the specific result under consideration. The falling downward of the tripod can be accounted for by the tendency of the element earth to seek its natural location at the center of the planet earth, but coming to rest as a seat cannot be explained in this manner. *Tvx1/* is the *rY'TEpT)rYL<;* 0 f *'TEXPT]; avrop,aror;* IS the *rY'TEPTJrYL<;* 0 f *yvrYt<;.*

If we may momentarily break our promise not to appeal from *cpvcYL<;* to *avr6p,anr;,* We are able to note that *avr6p,aror;* is a conception of the non-natural, not of the supernatural, or the supranatural, or the transnatural, or the preternatural. The fall of the tripod, the wandering of the horse, and the placement of the stones in the altar are all natural events. The non-natural elements are the formation of the seat, the coming to a place of safety, and the "good fortune" of not being

[86] *Ibid* 197 b 11. Hope translation. [87] *Ibid* 197 b 34. Hope translation.

worn away by the feet of men and animals. Another example of offered by Aristotle is that of a stone which fell and struck a man.[88] It did not fall for the purpose of striking a man, although it might have been so directed by an agent. The fall *per se* was an event which followed precisely what we know about objects composed of earth when unsupported and when not at the center of our planet. But the striking of the man was a haphazard event.

Does Aristotle believe in a contingent universe, or does he believe that the haphazard is merely the result of human ignorance of operative factors. Ross summarizes his discussion of *TVX'lj* and with this observation: " Chance is simply a name for the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation. So far we have no reason to attribute indeterminism to Aristotle." [89] Yet later in this volume-and Ross calls the reader's attention to the passage in a footnote on p. 78-Ross writes, "Aristotle is not an absolute determinist." [90] Aristotle describes both *Tvx'1]* and as " incidental causes." [91] This may be interpreted to imply that he does not believe in genuine contingency. Furthermore, he clearly held that the human mind is never able to grasp all the factors in a process: " That which is *per se* the cause of the effect is determinate, but the incidental cause is indeterminable, for the possible attributes of an individual are innumerable." [92] The universe is indeterminable but not indeterminate. The world is not chaotic, but man's knowledge of the world is limited. An illustration in *Metaphysics,* Book E, Chapter 8 is that every man shall die, but the manner of his death is not determined. However, once a man starts certain lines of behavior. e. g., an addiction to the drinking of hemlock!, the manner of his death can be predicted with high probability.

[88] *Ibid.,* 197 b 80.

[88] *Aristotle.* Third Edition, Revised (London: Methuen and Co., 1987), p. 78.

[••] *Ibid.,* p. 80. Ross also comments, " On the whole we must say that he shared the plain man's belief in free will but that he did not examine the problem very thoroughly, and did not express himself with perfect consistency." (Ibid., p. 201.)

[81] *Physics* 197 a 88.

[02] *Ibid.,* 196 b 28.

The unpredictiveness of the world lies in the accidental. There is no science of the accidental. [93] The locus of the accidental is matter. [94] But in making matter the source of the accidental, the unknowable, and the unpredictable, Aristotle created serious problems for himself, particularly in his biology. In the generation of animals the female contributes the catamenia, which is the material for the semen to work upon. [95] The male contribution is the form which shapes the matter. In the form-matter struggle in the embryo, either the male element prevails and " draws the female element into itself," i.e., makes the offspring a male, or the male element is prevailed over by the female and " changes into the opposite or is destroyed," [96] i.e., either makes the offspring a female or kills the embryo. Elsewhere he calls a female "a mutilated male." [97] Aristotle also explains the birth of monsters as the result of matter which is improperly controlled by semen. [98] Although Aristotle does in one place state that there are some animals which have no female sex, [99] he recognizes that reproduction in most animal" is sexual. A species in which all conceptions resulted in the proper births of males would soon pass out of existence. Matter, the locus of the indeterminable, is also the locus of the female. That which makes reality unknowable is also that which makes living beings possible!

No discussion of avT6f:LUTOr; would be complete without mentioning spontaneous generation. According to Aristotle some flora and fauna reproduce only spontaneously, e. g., eels, [100] limnostrea/ [101] testacea/ [102] and mistletoe/ [103] and some can repro-

[03] *Metaphysics* a
[0•] *Ibid.,* a 15.
[06] *On the Generation of Animids* a 31.
[96] *Ibid.,* 766 b 16.
[97] *Ibid.,* 737 a
[98] *Ibid.,* 769 b
[99] *On Plants* 816 a 17.
[100] *The History of Animals* 570 a 6.
[101] *On the Generation of Animals* 763 a
[102] *Ibid.,* 763 a
[108] *Ibid.,* 715 b

duce either from eggs or spontaneously, e. g., certain trees [104] and several species of mullet and whitebait/ [05] Aristotle claims that spontaneous generation is the work of matter: " some matter is such as to be set in motion by itself and some is not of this nature." [106]

Avr6p,aros is a type of coming into being in which a result is attained in the absence of direct or indirect guidance by an external agent and in such a manner that knowledge and prediction are impossible.

cf>va-ts

In our efforts to determine the *·what* of nature we are avoiding the " definition " of *cf>va-ts* in *Physics* 192 b 22, and we are utilizing the classification of comings into being mentioned in *Metaphysicsl070* a2-8. Coming into being artificially and coming into being luckily are related in the kind of opposition known as possession-privation, or, as Aristotle says, another way to state this is that coming into being artificially and coming into being luckily *vis-a-vis* a selected quality are contradictories. The same opposition holds between coming into being naturally and coming into being haphazardly. Coming into being artificially and its privative, i.e., coming into being luckily, are contraries of coming into being naturally. Coming into being naturally and its privatives, i.e., coming into being haphazardly, are contraries of coming into being artificially. Finally, the contraries of coming into being naturally and the privative of coming into being naturally constitute the contradictory of coming into being naturally. In other words, coming into being non-natmally is exhausted by coming into being artificially, coming into being luckily, and coming into being haphazardly. Coming into being naturally is coming into being in a manner which can be designated

[104] *On Plants* 820 b 30.

[105] *The History of Animals* 569 a 10-24. See also *Metaphysics* 1034 a 9 and 1032 b 23 where he says health may be produced either spontaneously or artificially.

[106] *Metaphysics* 1034 a 13.

coming into being non-artificially-non-luckily-non-haphazardly.

is the term to apply to changes which take place which are other than those modes of change in which the formal telic operative factors are external and which possess that which is privative in the haphazard mode of change.

The place to begin a definition of by the method of opposition is with coming into being haphazardly. Nature possesses what is missing in a horse coming haphazardly to a place of safety, a tripod falling to form a seat, and a falling stone hitting a person. In nature such things happen, but not haphazardly. Then do they happen by reason of a source of coming into being in something other than nature? No, for this is the whatness of the contrary types of coming into being. Coming into being naturally is a type of coming into being other than coming into being by reason of something other than itself. In the natural mode of coming into being there is no god directing the activity, and there is no completely haphazard coming into being. "Our first presupposition," says Aristotle " must be that in nature nothing acts on, or is acted on by, any other thing at random." [107] Further, "Now surely as in intelligent action, so in nature .... Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e. g., had been a thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art." [108] The Greek translated " for the sake of an end " is *rov,* and the translation is correct. This is part of *Physics,* Book II, Chapter 8 in which Aristotle is giving his arguments for a teleological interpretation of nature, his chief argument being the uniformity of natural events: " But when an event takes place always or for the most part, it is not incidental or by chance." [109] But at this point in the Oxford translations, for some puzzling reason, the translators, R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, translate *rov* as "purpose": "It is absurd to suppose that *purpose* is not present because we do not

[107] *Physics* 188 a 3!'l.
[108] *Ibid.,* 199 a 11-l!'l.
[109] *Ibid.,* 199 b !'l4.

observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, *purpose* is present in art, it is present also in nature. The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that. It is plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a *purpose."* [110] There is no good reason for this shift in translation, and there are many good reasons for preserving the earlier translation. Hope is consistent in his translation of these passages, making it either " for any end " or " to some end." W. Charlton, avoiding both "end" and "purpose," translates *EVaKa TOV* aS "the 'for something.'" [m] Ross wants it both ways! His analysis of the Greek text is as follows: " It is absurd to deny *purposiveness* because of the absence of deliberation. Art does not deliberate; and art differs from nature only in that the motive principle is not in the thing moved. When it happens to be so, as when a physician heals himself, we get something just like nature. So if there is *purposiveness* in art, there is *purposiveness* in nature. Nature then is a cause, and one that works *towards an end."* [112] Elsewhere Ross concludes that Aristotle has a doctrine of " unconscious teleology " which, he says, is "unsatisfactory." He adds, "Unconscious teleology implies a purpose which is not the purpose of any mind, and hence not a purpose at all. But Aristotle's language suggests that he (like many modem thinkers) did not feel this difficulty, and that, for the most part, he was content to work with the notion of an unconscious purpose in nature itself." [118] Note that Ross equates " unconscious teleology " and " unconscious purpose." Ross seems to have forgotten that he had translated *Metaphysics* 1065 a 32 as " for purpose cannot exist without thought." G. M. A. Grube in his volume, *Plato's Thought*

[110] *Ibid.*, 199 b !!6-82. The italics are mine.

[111] W. Charlton, *Aristotle's Physics, Books I and II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) p. 42.

[119] *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 857-858. The italics are mine.

[118] *Aristotle,* p. 186.

translates *rexvYJ* as " purpose." [114] This may be a bit extreme, although Liddell and Scott do offer " skill," " cunning," and " wiles." But Grube's translation helps, for if *rf.xvYJ* means "purpose," then *cfn1cn<;;* as that which is contrary to purpose cannot denote purposiveness nor non-purposiveness. The whole notion of purposiveness is irrelevant to an interpretation of *cf>vo-t<;;.*

Aristotle does not maintain that coming into being naturally is coming into being purposively. Rather he says that in coming into being naturally ends are realized in a manner contrary to the purposive manner by which ends are realized directly in coming into being artificially and indirectly in coming into being luckily. The source of the ends in coming into being naturally is within as it is in coming into being haphazardly, only in coming into being naturally the source is possessed rather than deprived. Nature is a kingdom of ends, not a kingdom of purposes, and a kingdom of ends is no more immune from errors than a kingdom of purposes. "Now mistakes come to pass even in the operation of art. . . . Hence, clearly mistakes are possible in the operations of nature also." [115] Nature works uniformly but not infallibly.

Neither Aristotle's conception of *cf>vo-t'>* nor his presentation of the conception is flawless; but here, as has often been the case, the problem is not with Aristotle but with Aristotelians, for it is they, not Aristotle, who create Aristotelian systems. How often we miss what Aristotle says either by trying to keep him as a Platonist seeking knowledge as contrasted to opinion, or by trying to turn him into a modern scientist confining himself to empirical data. But Aristotle is neither. He is usually a dialectician. I say this despite the fact that Aristotle condemns dialecticians as those who, assuming the guise of philosophers, [116] forever raise questions without coming to a conclusion. [117] The dialectics which Aristotle *condernns* is ques-

[114] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 17!'l.
[115] *Physics* 199 a 34-36.
[116] *Metaphysics* 1004 b 18.
[117] *Ibid.,* 1004 b £5.

tioning for questioning's sake-adisease for which it should be the cure; the dialectics which Aristotle *practices* is the distilling of knowledge from opinions-a dialectic whose telos is truth. Aristotle's problems are both conceptual puzzles and puzzlements about empirical facts. His data are both that given by sense observations and the *A.ey6fLeva* (things said) by the common folk and the wise. How astute was Dante in describing Aristotle not as "the master of *knowledge*" but as "the master of *those who know."*

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BOOK REVIEWS

Man: Believer and Unbeliever. By FRANCIS M. TYRRELL. New York: Alba House, 1974. Pp. *$5.95* (paperback).

Francis Tyrrell, formerly professor of philosophy and now professor of fundamental theology at Immaculate Conception Seminary, Huntington, New York, has given us in this book reflections that are obviously the fruit of many years of study and teaching. The spirit that breathes through this work is one of sympathetic understanding for the multiple faiths of our modern world and a sustained effort at dialogue with them. The author seeks to help men of our time appropriate themselves as orientated toward God and as finding themselves in Christ, and to do this in a period of conflicting humanisms. The book then is dedicated to help us to believe, and so is in the field of foundational theology. There are three main parts to Tyrrell's work.

In the *first* of these he analyzes the problem of belief in our time. Here, in chapter 1, he presents the central positions of the formers of modern consciousness (particularly Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Comte, Dilthey, and Freud), who have in common an interpretation of man through his desires and values. For them, the Christian God is an alienating factor for man, and they want to help man grow from the state of childhood characterized by religious consciousness to an adult state, though they do this, of course, in differing ways. Largely because of their cumulative influence, believers are now a cognitive minority, and we have witnessed the demise of cultural Christianity. These men generally interpret the Christian belief in God as man's projection. In the process of man's transcendence, he forms projects; the projection of God occurs because of the difficulties man meets in life; modern man is called to go beyond this stage so that he may fully possess his humanity. As Tyrrell points out later in his book, this theme of man's self-transcendence is common to Christian humanism and atheistic humanisms:

> at the core of every one of these diverse understandings of man is man's self-transcendence as the radical dynamic o' which all (their) themes are so many formulations and by virtue of which the human dimension of being is set off from every other existent form. (810)

It is then the signs of transcendence that we should study in a reflection on belief today. Tyrrell goes on, in chapter to analyze the main humanisms current today: an existentialist humanism, a Marxist humanism, and a secular humanism. In the first, he dwells particularly on Heidegger

and Merleau-Ponty. Here we have a vision of man as an intentional being, with his intentionality particularly apparent in his insertion in the practical world. Man is a finite transcendence characterized by time, a subject in history. He is creative of himself, but not totally so; he acts within a framework of goal or value that is partially given, but not within the context of an absolute value. In his study of Marxist humanism, Tyrrell summarizes for us not only Soviet orthodoxy with its view that society creates man but also the positions of some revisionists. He presents the central position of certain Eastern European revisionists who insist that society cannot give the individual his freedom and who complain about the alienating factors in socialism, of Mao Tse-Tung who "sinocizes" Marxism, and of Bloch and Garaudy who have a rather positive evaluation of religion in their Marxist interpretation of man. Finally Tyrrell studies the secular humanism of men like Dewey, Julian Huxley, and Szczesny. These three hold that none of man's goals or values:

> IS 1mmune from his critical review, all are provisional, subject to the constant test of experience and liable to even the most radical revision. Absolute only is man's right to subject all systems and viewpoints to the norm of serving his individual and collective well-being, and of enhancing his capacity to achieve a better life in the future. (IOfl)

It is, of course, this latter position that is particularly prevalent in the United States.

In the *second* part Tyrrell dedicates himself:

> to construct a Christian anthropology or understanding in the light of Christian faith which is truly contemporary, that is, at once true to the image of man proposed in Christian revelation and professed in the faith of the Church and yet coherent with what the man of today experiences and understands himself to be. (109)

In the first chapter dedicated to this purpose (chapter 8) Tyrrell examines the thought of Marcel, Blonde}, and Teilhard de Chardin. These Christian philosophers examine man's experience and find, respectively, that in opening himself to another subject man is implicitly opening himself to an Absolute Subject; in action for immediate values, man is really seeking the Absolute Value, a union with God that he cannot realize; in the evolutionary process, the world and man are implicitly seeking an Omega point. These men present generous evidence to support their interpretations, but they also agree that " the progressive steps of their thought involve options which are demanded by the evidence and yet are free human decisions." (162) In chapter four Tyrrell analyzes man's transcendence as it is articulated by the Marechalian Thomists, and particularly by Karl Rahner. He shows how Rahner defends man's knowledge of the Absolute and being by his transcendental method, and how by the same method he defends man's

openness to an historical revelation. Historical man's orientation to God and knowledge of God is mediated by that effect within man that comes from God's universal salvific will, including that gift called by Rahner "the supernatural existential." We can see by this analysis that anthropology is really theology, since man can be understood only through his orientation to God. In the following chapter (chapter 5) Tyrrell shows that anthropology is, further, Christology, since Christ is the norm of what man is and is to be. Here he follows Rahner in showing how Christian revelation is the thematization (as categorical revelation) of what is revealed to men in a non-objective manner universally (transcendental revelation). We may note that Tyrrell adopts Raimer's method that follows from such a relation between these two revelations. That is, his defense of Christian anthropology is basically through presenting this to man in the hope that man can recognize that it does indeed fit and fulfill his orientation and his self-awareness, as a thematization of this or a bringing of it to fuller consciousness.

In the *third* part of the book Tyrrell follows the dialogue between Christian humanism (in its Catholic expression) and atheistic humanisms into the present. He lays the basis for the dialogue through showing the malaise of unbelief that affiicts even the believer (chapter 6) and the bases of this doubt in the form of knowledge that faith is and in, the risk and insecurity involved in any commitment. A central presupposition of the dialogue:

> is that all of us are believers of, some kind, that we are all committed to some meaning of man or at the very least to some attitude regarding the possibility of such a meaning. By the same token, we are all also unbelievers in the sense that we are all open in some degree to being unfaithful to what we profess as our faith commitment. (308)

Another basis for dialogue is our common acceptance of man's capacity for self-transcendence. In chapter 7 Tyrrell surveys the Christian-Marxist dialogue and the Christian-secular humanist dialogue. In the first he recalls the encounters arranged in Germany in the mid-sixties, dwelling particularly on Garaudy as a representative of Marxism and Rahner, Metz, and Quentin Lauer as representatives of a Christian view of man. Garaudy credits Christianity with " uncovering the constitutive dynamic of man's subjectivity, his uniqueness in nature as the self-transcending being who is self-creative ... ," (311) but he judges that Christianity has "erred in the definitive positive answers it has presumed to provide " to questions of man's horizons and resources. In his survey of Christian-secular humanist dialogues Tyrrell centers on one held in Brussels in 1970 and one held in New York in In the former, the main themes proposed by the humanists were the common underlying values of humanism (e. g., "We must shape our own ends and be the source of our own development,"

the humanist creed of an open mind in an open society (i.e., the the rejection of any particular creed as absolute or definitive), and men's common responsibilities in world policy. In the New York dialogue the discussion quickly centered on more concrete moral problems; the general topic was conscience and morality: sources and sanctions of conscience, issues of conscience and the state, including civil disobedience and questions of sexual morality. What appeared here was the division among the humanists on these issues and the fact that in their dialogue they presupposed a pre-Vatican II stereotyped Catholic adversary. Divisions among the Catholic representatives also appeared on many of these issues. The dialogue between Marxists and Catholics seems to have gone to a greater depth and to have been more focused than that between secular humanists and Catholics. It is obvious from these dialogues that the modem believer is faced with the problem of multiple human faiths, with an increasingly secularized world, with humanisms that are social and political in emphasis, and with an enormous stress on man's orientation to the future. Tyrrell treats these themes in his final chapter (chapter 8) where he draws on Metz (his interpretation of the Christian roots of secularity, and his political theology) and on liberation theologies, without fully identifying himself with either of these approaches. Finally, he shows the liberating influence that is present in Christianity's understanding of man's horizon as not limited to history:

> The task of the Church in the world . . . is to witness to this faith and hope in man's Absolute Future, already actualized in Christ. But it is to be achieved by man, sinful and alienated, yet redeemed, by the gradual conquest of himself and his world through the power of Christ's Spirit but also by the exertion of his own labor and genius. (393)

Tyrrell has done a real service in writing this book; it helps to bring us up to date concerning the internal development of atheistic humanisms of our time and some Catholic dialogues with these views. With its rich bibliographical references it is a help to the theologian, and it could well be used in an undergraduate or seminary course on foundational theology.

Tyrrell's book also points to the need for futher developement in this area of foundational theology. We are at a stage where the reflections on man's transcendence given to us by the Marechalian Thomists, even with Metz's criticism and the development of Rahner, are no longer sufficient. In addition to their contribution we need a greater use of what modem psychology and the social sciences can tell us about man and his transcendence. This is not a substitute for a philosophical reflection on this transcendence. In the area of man's orientation to value even the psychologist and the social scientist begin with self-presence and an awareness of their own orientation to value; their sciences implicitly depend upon their acceptance of the validity of what is manifested to them through this self-

presence. They cannot interpret the behavior of individuals or societies save in the context of their awareness of the relation of their own behavior to themselves as agents acting for a goal or value. We need psychology and social sciences in our reflection on man's transcendence in value orientation for a number of reasons. Modern atheistic humanisms are both influenced by and influence the findings of these sciences; they find support for their interpretation of man in these sciences. To come to grips then with these humanisms, we must interact with them on this plane. Also, in a way parallel to the insight that modern evolutionary biology has given us in our reflection on God's creative and redemptive activity, psychology and the social sciences can illuminate our reflection on man's self-transcendence toward God. The philosopher or theologian cannot grasp this simply by self-reflection, because the self he is reflecting on is the product in part of a psychological development and social influences. The transcendence that he grasps is a part of a process that has been going on since infancy, and developmental psychology can help us to know something of the stages and factors of this process. There are factors in this process that are trans-cultural; for example, the organism and the stages of its maturation are common to all men, as are the facts that man exists within a society and that he is an active agent of his development and interaction with society. There are cultural relativities also. As Erik Erikson brings out, different cultures use the stages through which the infant develops to shape the infant toward what the particular society needs in its adult members. Man's transcendence toward God is the full context of more immediate stages of his transcendence that are, in part, studied by biology, psychology, and the social sciences. One of the major tasks then of foundational theology in the immediate future is to evaluate what these sciences have to say about the structure of man and his transcendence.

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Why Does Evil Exist? A Philosophical Study of the Contemporary Presentation of the Question. By CoLM CoNNELLAN, 0. M. I. Hickville, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1974. Pp. 218. $10.00.

The ancient question of evil still draws the active interest of our contemporaries. And Father Colm Connellan has set for himself a difficult task. He has sought to reply to modern queries on the " why " of evil, resting his case on the soultions that St. Thomas Aquinas worked out in the thirteenth century,

His undertaking causes the reviewer some disquiet, for if it be true that the philosophic stake in the problem of evil remains constant, the historical sensitivity towards the various forms that evil takes, has evolved considerably. And in justice, in the case of evil, philosophy must pay the greatest attention to the insights of experience.

The present book, which is the reproduction of a thesis sustained at the University of Fribourg, initially presents two brief expositions of the work of the French thinker, Albert Camus, and that of the English philosopher, Anthony Flew. Then the author summarizes with considerable exactitude and finesse St. Thomas's definitive views on the subject.

Yet we may question whether his procedure of treating only evil's existence and not its nature according to St. Thomas is not a somewhat artificial methodological plan. Especially in a meaningful dialogue with modern thought, can we restrict ourselves to the philosophical teaching of St. Thomas on evil? It is manifest that his philosophical and theological views are inextricably conjoined. In fact, dialogue between St. Thomas and authors like Camus and Flew often resembles a conversation between deaf persons. It could scarcely be otherwise. That is why the very purpose this book is meant to serve is and remains a mystery to me.

What can be found in common between the existential tragedy of Camus and the metaphysical serenity of St. Thomas before the unjustifiable character of evil? Camus is certainly one of the most eloquent witnesses of the scandal that the suffering of the innocent gives to modern thought. But why choose such a person if one wishes strictly to pursue a purely philosophic approach to the problem of evil? The outcome could only be deceptive, confusing.

Moreover, the author's conclusions consist simply in an underscoring of the fundamental differences towards evil between St. Thomas and the twentieth century authors. It is never made clear how, in strictly philosophical terrain, St. Thomas's conclusions, which are inseparably philosophico-theological, can satisfy the radical questioning of modern thought.

In any case, the fundamental question concerning the suffering of the innocent cannot be resolved in the purely philosophical order. The only response to the unjustifiable presence of evil is uttered by another presence, that of the Passion of the suffering Just One, Jesus Christ.

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La portee de l'Eglise des Apotres pour l'Eglise d'aujourd'hui. Colloque <Ecumenique de Bologne (10 - 13 avril 1973) (Academie Internationale des Sciences Religieuses; publie sous les auspices de la revue *Istina).* Bruxelles: Office International de Librairie, 1974. Pp. 130.

This volume contains eight papers read at the Ecumenical Colloquy held in Bologna, April 10- 13, 1973, at the invitation of Professor Giuseppe Alberigo. The theme of the Colloquy was: "The Bearing of the Church of the Apostles on Today's Church." These studies represent yet another effort to find common grounds on which to build unity among the Christian Churches. The Church of the Apostles was thought to afford just such grounds. However, as the papers manifest only too well, diversity in structure as well as in interpretation existed within a single purpose of conformity with the Gospel from the very beginning of Christianity. Furthermore, the Church of Christ is not merely turned towards a common past, a Deposit of Faith, which she is called upon to live and deepen in the Spirit today, but is also turned toward the future Coming of Christ. Fidelity to the Gospel would seem to include the following aspects as integral parts of its reality: historical continuity with the Primitive Church as described in the New Testament; recognition that the "eschata" are at work in the Church throughout time (Tradition); orientation toward the achievement of the Kingdom with the Second Coming of Christ.

Professor W. Pannenberg, in his short paper: "What is the meaning of a reference to a common past for the Separate Churches," (pp. 6-12) while affirming strongly the role of the Primitive Church in the domain of faith and church life, places the emphasis on the future Coming of Christ as the decisive element in the search for unity. We must not merely turn to a common past, a sort of Golden Age, but to Jesus Christ as the common future of the Church and of the World. There is already diversity in the Primitive Church both in teaching and life. There is already need to distinguish what is essential from the cultural. Each church can find its background in one section of the other of the New Testament. Furthermore, the historical conditions the Church must live today are other than those of the past. The past of every church should be considered as part of the common heritage of all churches. The future of Jesus Christ, taken as the focal point of all churches, can bring unity to them.

Professor **J.-L.** Leuba's article: "What does it mean when divided churches refer back to a common past," (pp. 13-19) recalls the specific and normative role the epiphany or manifestation of Christ plays in Christian faith. This is the " given " common heritage which comes to us through the apostolic witnesses. The answers of man, throughout time and guided by the Spirit, are new but always in relationship with that initial and perpetual call which is the manifestation of Christ. In this sense, the call of God remains the criterion of Church History and the ferment of unity among

the churches. The wealth of the call is seen in the diversity of answers it brings forth throughout time and space, whereas these answers are to be judged in the light of the unique call. The ecumenical dialogue obliges the churches to compare their various answers among themselves in the light of the unique call.

Professor P. Bonnard, in his article: "The New Testament as Norm and the Primitive Church as Exemplar," (pp. 20-30) addresses himself to the principal question of this Colloquy. He is of the opinion that the New Testament cannot be reduced to a unique and coherent doctrinal whole especially in the case of Ecclesiology. He finds it even more problematic to speak of the Primitive Church as exemplar of the Church and prefers to speak of the churches of the New Testament, certain aspects of which appear as exemplary and normative. The notions of historical " foundation " of the Church, Church ministry as well as Eschatological People of God, are open to a variety of interpretations. As for the texts themselves, the Lucan, Pauline, Pastoral, and Johannine presentations of the Community can hardly be lumped together. What, then, is common to all New Testament Ecclesiologies? The proclamation and acceptance of the Gospel (s), the celebration of baptism and of the eucharist, with the emphasis being placed on the role of the Gospel even in its state of oral Tradition. Ministry is given to the Church for its construction in collaboration with its Head. But, the Gospel is its own guarantee.

Professor P. C. Bori's article: "The reference to the Community of Jerusalem found in the Christian Literature of the Orient and the West up to the 5th Century," (pp. 31-48) relates the influence of the Summaries of *Acts* on the doctrine and ecclesiology of the Early Fathers. The context is that of reform and renewal based on a return to an idealized past, a compact primitive community under the leadership of the Apostles in Jerusalem (Cyprian and Origen). True, Eusebius of Caesaria speaks more of continuity between the present Church and its past, while the founders of monasticism keep alive a nostalgia for the primitive church of Jerusalem as described in Acts 4:32, which becomes the model for the material and spiritual needs of the local communities. All of the Fathers are aware of the continuity which exists between their church and that of the New Testament. Concurrently, they are conscious of the qualitative distance which separates them both. The Summaries of *Acts* remain the model of individual Christian life as well as that of the local community and of monasticism. The latter remains the most perfect realization of this ideal. The Fathers manifest by their works the creative power of the New Testament in their efforts to meet the needs of their times.

Mgr. Damaskinos, in his article: " Openness to the Holy Spirit and fidelity to the origins according to the Greek Fathers," (pp. 49-64) undertakes the thorny question of Scripture and Tradition within the more general context of the procession of the Divine Persons and their missions

with the past but also as fidelity to the Spirit in the present aspiring eschatological consummation in the future.

"ad extra." Christology, Pneumatology, and Ecclesiology are closely linked realities. Christ vivifies the faithful through the Spirit. The teaching of Christ, found in the New Testament, can only be correctly interpreted in the Spirit who is at work in the Church throughout time and space. It is the Spirit who guides the Church in her endeavor to meet the problems of today and to distinguish between the substance and the form of Truth. Thus, the high esteem in which the Orthodox Church holds the teaching of the Fathers, the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils, and Oral Tradition.

Professor J. D. Zizioulas, in his article: "Continuity with the apostoiic origins in the theological conscience of the Orthodox Churches," (pp. 65-94) begins by recalling that Tradition and the Liturgy play important roles in the Orthodox Churches. These two elements can be translated as " history " and " theophany ." Continuity with the Church of the Apostles can be considered in two ways according to the meaning given to the term " apostle," i. e., men sent on a mission, or those exercising an eschatological function. Mission implies the notion of being sent to the extremities of the world, whereas " eschata " implies convocation to become the People of God. In this latter sense, the Apostles can only be conceived as a College. These two aspects of the Apostolate were maintained in Post-Apostolic Times (cf. Ignatius of Antioch). Continuity, for the historical approach, is based on transmission, norms to imitate, psychological anamnesis of the past. Apostolicity, for the eschatological approach, is based on the future which is present "hie and nunc," i.e., the Resurrected Christ. For the historical approach, Christology is primordial; for the eschatological, Pneumatology where linear historicity becomes as present as in sacramental anamnesis. A synthesis of these two aspects can be found in the Eschatological Christ in whom the Church, his Body, lives through the gift of the Spirit and is, thus, epicletic. This synthesis is realized and symbolized in the Eucharist which is at the heart of Church life. Continuity with the Apostolic Kerygma is not only fidelity to an objective faith but especially communion with and in the Spirit who gives strength to the Word. Ministry, likewise, is to be considered as the work of the Spirit. within the context of the community of the Church assembled around Christ and the Apostles. In this way, both the historical and the eschatological aspects of ministry are maintained. Episcopal succession is seen as essentially: a succession of communities in which the bishop presides over the Eucharist. It is not so much the foundation of the local church which is important but rather the Icon of the eschatological presence of Christ and his Apostles in the persons of the bishop and the presbyterum, the bishop, by his ordination, being a member of the College of Bishops. Authenticity in the Church, be it in the domains of Tradition, Ministry or Ecumenism, ehould not be seen :merely from the point of view of historical continuity

J. J. von Allmen, "The Reformed Church of the XVI th Century and the Ancient Church," (pp. 95-110) concentrates his attention on the attitude taken by the Reformed Church toward the Ancient Church. From this study, it is only too evident that, in the domain of faith, the Ancient Church and in particular the Word of God, has a normative tole to play, The four early Councils, especially Ephesus and Chalcedon, are very ifil• portant though subordinated to the Canon of Scripture. The same principle holds true in the use made of the Fathers. However, much more liberty is taken as regards Ecclesiology, ministerial practice, theology of the sacraments, asceticism, and spiritual life. Consequently, solidarity is maintained with the Ancient Church in the domain of doctrine, but reticence and prudence are shown toward the ecclesial life in which this doctrine was elaborated. The Author ends by asking to what extent is it possible to separate the two?

G. Alberigo's article: "'Forma ecclesire' in Christian Humanism, and in particular in the case of Nicholas de Cusa," (pp. 111-129) describes how a humanist of the 15th century conceived of reform in the Church as a conformity with the Resurrected Christ who is to come in glory. Nicholas is, no doubt, interested in the Ancient Church, but, for him, the whole of Tradition is considered as ancient without any special emphasis being placed on the Primitive Church. What is important is for the Militant Church to become one with the Triumphant or Eschatological Church, i.e., the :Kingdom of God. In this way, conformity with Christ will be realized. Platonism, biblical augustinianism, humanistic philologism as well as a dynamic notion of history, all seem to have influenced Nicholas in his insistence on " forma Christi " as the goal of reformation. It is possible that Nicholas refrained from referring back to a Golden Age of the Church for historical and political reasons since the reform which he fostered included that of the Empire.

These papers presented at the Colloquy of Bologna are certainly marked by the church traditions of the participants. This is not necessarily an evil since it gives us occasion once again to note the positive aspects of these traditions. There are still questions to be solved, but the cause of Ecumenism can only be fostered by such frank and open discussion. There is much that we still have to learn from one another. In the present case, it is evident that the role of Scripture and Tradition in the formulation of Ecclesiology still has to be studied as well as that of Tradition and traditions. It is also noteworthy that the notion of the Parousia has reappeared in ecclesiological discussions. If we all remain open to the Spirit of Truth, he will guide us along the way of all truth.

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Augustin: Qui est Jesus Christ? Essai theologique et pastorai. By FERNAN!l ARSENAULT. Hier-Aujourd'hui, XVI. Paris-Tournai: Desclee; Montreal: Bellarmin, 1974. Pp. 184.

There are many of us, I suppose, who are inclined to give only reluctant attention to Augustine's various expositions of Scripture, and then chiefly out of respect either for the text or for the interpreter. And it is true, of course, that both the Bible and Augusine are often more accessible by other paths. Yet we may find ourselves surprised on both counts when we actually attend to one of the works of Augustine the interpreter.

This work by a French-Canadian professor and spiritual leader serves amply to renew our respect for Augustine's interpretative writings, for in manageable compass it surveys the major themes of the Fourth Gospel as Augustine read it-Word, illumination, revelation, incarnation, faith, Church-and in addition brings them into encounter with modern thought, doing it with a light touch, not forcing contemporary assumptions upon the past, not fearing to point up oppositions, yet suggesting even then that it is often the same fundamental problems that are being adressed. Thus it offers a useful and subtle invitation to the further study of Augustine's sermons on the Fourth Gospel.

I could say more about the way many themes are treated-the emphasis placed upon interpersonal relationship in discussing illumination and revelation, for example, or the way in which incarnation is related to these other themes which suggest a more immediate access to God; but what most struck me in reading this work is what it points up concerning Augustine's understanding of the Christian consciousness and the time of the Church.

The Fourth Gospel, with its promises concerning the future activity of the Paraclete, has always been a favorite source of prooftexts for those who want to stress the gifts of the Spirit-and who are accused, in return, of glorifying themselves, or their times, or the Church, at the expense of Christ himself. Augustine like other Fathers was often tempted to use the achievements of the Church within the space of a few centuries as proof of its divine authorization-yet he was also aware of the dangers of this kind of argumentation, and especially as the Pelagian controversy went on he became more careful to qualify his statements about what is possible in the era of the Church.

Arsenault highlights Augustine's treatment of these promises concerning the Spirit at a number of points. He notes, for example (pp. 99-103), that no new doctrines· are to be taught by the Spirit, and no older doctrines are to be dropped away: Christ crucified remains the foundation of all later growth *(Tractatus* 98, 2 and 6), and the Spirit's "teaching" is essentially an increase in understanding which comes through *car#as (Tr.* 96.4). Or again, in the case of the promise that Christ's followers will do even greater

works (pp. 134-35) Augustine's emphasis is that these " greater works " consist quite simply of the faith through which sinners are made righteous, so that the preaching of Christ by believers accomplishes more than what Christ accomplished through his direct words and actions, though all of this is to be understood not as lack but as generosity on Christ's part *(Tr.* 7U-3).

Augustine's hermeneutical procedure is worth analyzing. It may be, of course, that the Fourth Gospel itself contains all of these qualifications upon its promises. But one cannot help but notice Augustine's abundant use of passages from the Pauline epistles to reinforce the aspects of tentativeness and struggle in the Christian life and thus forestall a spirit of triumphalism. He is not functioning purely as a historical or literary commentator concerned with the text of the Fourth Gospel alone. His interpretation comes out of a situation of conflict-many conflicts!-in his own day, and it is executed by dealing with the New Testament as a whole, not supposing, however, that it is a perfectly homogeneous whole, but recognizing the diversity of voices with which it speaks and letting one part " correct " or at least clarify what might seem to be implied in another part. This is, of course, the usual procedure of the early centuries, when the New Testament canon still retained its pluralistic character. It may be worth closer examination in our own day, when we are confronted with a newly reinforced awareness of the diversity within the Scriptures and when questions concerning the meaning of the canon and the nature of the hermeneutical process have gained new urgency.

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Pattern for a Christian according to St. Thomas Aquinas. By A. I. MENNESSIER, O. P. Translated by Nicholas Halligan, O. P. New York: Alba House, 1975. Pp. $4.95.

Pattern For A Christian is a marvelous explanation of the meaning of religion as transformed by Christ through the New Convenant of Faith, Hope, and Love in him. At the same time the author is disclosing for the reader the Christian rather than the so-called Aristotelian St. Thomas Aquinas. In order to achieve his twofold objective, Father Mennessier simply turns to Aquinas's commentaries on the Bible and those sections of his theological writings which are more directly inspired by Sacred Scripture. In reality, the author is convinced that St. Thomas is Christian in his use of Aristotle, for he used the writings of the Stagirite with his eyes fixed on Christ rather than on Greek thought.

Another corrective that Father Mennessier supplies is for those who limit themselves to one tract from the *Summa* and presume they have the total doctrine of Aquinas on the subject. By so doing, the author feels, they miss and at times distort the authentic teaching of the Angelic Doctor. One example from the book is the doctrine on grace. (cf. chapter 4) However, the main interest of this book is an adequate explanation of religion in all its aspects as taught by St. Thomas in the *Summa* and as elaborated upon in his commentaries on the Bible as' well as expressed in his preaching.

The methodology of the book is ideal for attaining the purpose of the author. He sets up the doctrine, updated for our times, and explains it. Then he selects texts from St. Thomas as a continuation of his own thought. Father Mennessier introduces most of the texts with observations that focus the attention of the reader on the precise thrust of the text which comments, as it were, on the author's presentation. The result is a profound reenforcement of the central theme of the book, namely, how Christian religion is an embodiment of Faith, Hope, and Love. Without much explicit reference to the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy from Vatican II, the book, nonetheless, is extremely helpful in disclosing the theology involved in the new liturgy.

Pere Chenu has written the Introduction and must have done so with great satisfaction. Father Mennessier has captured the message of Chenu's classic *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* and put the doctrine into practice. In *Pattern for a Christian* we have the whole St. Thomas, the theologian, the preacher, and above all the Master of the Sacred Page expounding the rich and all embracive meaning of religion. The book becomes a journey into the essentials of the spiritual life, a most welcomed event for all Christians. Also welcomed are the first English translations of sections of St. Thomas's commentaries on the Gospel of John and Hebrews.

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Jacobus M. Ramirez, *De Donis Spiritus Sancti deque Vita Mystica. In II P. Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae Expositio, Opera Omnia, Tomus VII.* Ed. VICTORINO RODRIGUEZ, O. P. Pp. 606. 550 ptas.

St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, Volume 24(1a2ae 68-70). The Gifts of the Spirit.* Commentary and translation by EDWARD D. O'CONNOR, C.S. C. Blackfriars in conjunction with McGraw-Hill: New York, and Eyre and Spottiswoode; London, 1974) Pp. 185. $10.00.

Theology does seem to be feeling the lack of an adequate Pneumatology. The experience of the spiritual dimensions of the Church brought to light by Vatican II, and the consequent recognition of a certain deficiency in Ecclesiology in regard to the place of the Holy Spirit, and the present experience of charismatic vitality in piety and practice, invite a rereading of St. Thomas's presentation of the Christian's new life in the Spirit. The usual " Thomistic synthesis " on grace rarely gets to the point of mentioning that Aquinas has any special doctrine in this area. The venerable commentaries have not given this theme prolonged consideration, and even in the era of Neo-Thomism the bibliography is remarkably small. Both the above books appeared in time for the seventh centenary celebrations of St. Thomas's death. This is a happy providence indicating the desirability of retrieving for modem reflection what is at once one of the most relevant and beautiful sides of his thought.

There is something of a challenge for the reviewer in that enormous Latin text of the eminent Spanish Dominican, Santiago Ramirez. Its size, its language, its style, its frame of reference, even apart from its content, are sturdy indication that there are more things theological in the world than man, especially " modem secular man," might dream of.

The editor tells us that this volume is made up of three distinct treatises. The first and largest, over three hundred and sixty pages, treats specifically the gifts of the Holy Spirit, as St. Thomas writes of them in I-II, q. 68 and II-II, qq. 8, 9, 19, 45, *5!!.* This is the outcome of a course given in Fribourg some forty-five years ago. It is, indeed, a highly organized commentary on the pertinent sections of the *Summa* and moves in the context largely established by the medieval debate on the nature of the gifts. The editor has added some bibliography, some enumerations, and an index. We are told that Ramirez was rather unwilling to publish this disquisition on the gifts, feeling the lack of positive sources together with the inherent speculative difficulties of the question. It must be admitted that one has the impression that the author was not at his best in handling these issues. Of course, there is a well-divided and syllogistic treatment of the various questions, a certain dialectical play with ancient adversaries, all requisite attention to scholastic detail, leading to a careful restatement of general Thomistic positions.

The editor, at least, is not lacking in enthusiasm. He assures us that the "lector versatus" will readily recognize that his author's treatment of this theme is quite outstanding (" vere princeps inter omnia ") , even when compared to the classic work of John of St. Thomas in 1644. That might be, but I would be of the opinion that Gardeil, Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain, Labourdette, and Philippe, all within the Thomist tradition, have addressed themselves to these questions with more inspiration, insight, and, most of all, with a sense of what the theology of the gifts really stands for.

The second treatise is on the active and the contemplative life, essentially a commentary on II-II, qq. This runs to some two hundred pages and is the product of a course taught forty years ago. From then we jump to the time of the third treatise in this volume, dealing with the " recta aestimatio " of the contemplative life and of the religious institutes which profess it. This comparatively brief (about fifty pages) statement was writen during the time of the Second Vatican Council which Ramirez attended as a "peritus." It is mildly polemical, written against "iudicia minus sana minusque correcta" that were, apparently, in the air at the time.

The editor connects these three treatises by suggesting that they show a progressive development of the same theme, and hence follow one another not only chronologically but logically as we progress from the more easy to the more difficult *(ordo arduitatis doctrinalis).* The chronological point, at least, cannot be contested.

I must confess that I leafed through the " conciliar " treatise first of all in an effort to see in what way the " conciliar " Ramirez developed from the scholastic, Thomistic one. Well, at least it is an edifying florilegium of papal, patristic, and Thomistic texts, leading to the traditional conclusion, that, whilst the active and contemplative life are both necessary, contemplation is always superior to action. I see no special doctrinal difficulty in understanding such a conclusion, and, of course, St. Thomas, in his own historical situation, does agree. Our author is making his point against pastoral activism and more worldly forms of spirituality. I suspect, however, that there is more to be found for modern spirituality than is contained in such a conclusion, especially if one does return to Aquinas's doctrine on the gifts. They are, after all, not all contemplative; and fortitude is one of them.

These remarks hardly do justice to the great Spanish theologian. His works on analogy, beatitude, human action are of enduring quality. It just happens that this particular volume is a disappointment. Perhaps that is the way it is with *opera omnia:* not all our works are perfect. The historian of doctrines will find this volume interesting as an example of what can happen. What is so fundamentally pertinent to modern concerns can be so immured in a forbidding labyrinth of scholasticism as to defer the

hour when such riches are made available. The presentation of St. Thomas's doctrine on the gifts in this manner does everything possible to deter modem theology from showing any interest in such themes. There in lies the peril and the promise of the great tradtion of which Ramirez is an outstanding representative.

But now let us pass from a rather reserved acceptance of one volume to an unqualified welcome of another. The Dominican editors of the *New English Summa,* Volume 24, are to be congratulated. It is an outstanding and most timely presentation. Fr. Edward O'Connor, CSC, Professer of Theology at Notre Dame, has already produced a number of writings on the Holy Spirit and the charisms. He was a good choice to translate and comment on this section of the *Summa.* He does note, however, that the title of this volume, *The Gifts of the Spirit,* might lead some readers to expect a treatment of the charismatic gifts, but he indicates that St. Thomas's treatment of that element in the Christian life is to be found elsewhere, in volume 45 of the present series.

The English translation is accurate and readable, and supported by a generous array of useful footnotes. There is always the problem of finding the best translation of " instinctus." I am a little dissatisfied with " prompting," but since we have a special appendix on the meaning of this word, there is no need to quibble.

The theme of the gifts of the Spirit is ably introduced: "This section of the *Summa* represents the ultimate and most exquisite refinement of its theory of the divinization of man by grace through the action of the Holy Spirit." (xiii) O'Connor goes on to give a brief but thorough outline of the place of the gifts in St. Thomas's theory of grace and the activity of the Spirit in human existence. The seven appendices at the end of the volume are very helpful. In a brief space they bring together perspectives and information that make this Volume 24 of the *New English Summa* an excellent theological resource.

The first appendix grasps the nettle: " The Scriptural Basis for the Doctrine of the Gifts." This is very deft, stressing, on the one hand, the gift of the Spirit as "the one in whom all God's promises converge and are fulfilled" (80); on the other, the often mysterious role of the key text Is 11:2 for the development and articulation of this doctrine. In the second. appendix, " The Fathers of the Church," we have this point developed more historically. Augustine and Gregory are treated in a special manner. O'Connor wryly remarks that Augustine has a " penchant for basing his doctrine on mistranslations of the Latin bible." (97) He proceeds to makes some very sensible methodological remarks. The third appendix, " Scholastic Thought before St. Thomas," offers a good range of material, and a competent organization of the same, all in a few pages. Hence, a very accessible and valuable statement. Appendix 4 is a study in the development of St. Thomas's own thought on the gifts. Three main stages are indicated: I.

The characterization of the gifts as a superhuman mode of action, especially in the *Sentences; Il.* A fresh way of explaining this mode of operation through action of the Holy Spirit, as in I-II; and 8. An opening up of this orginal position to make it more open to a comprehensive notion of the activity of the Spirit. This is to be found in the II-II where the various particular gifts are freed from " the uncongenial biases that have been imposed on them by the pressures of Augustinian rhetoric and scholastic systematization." {180) O'Connor suggests enough evidence to invite are-reading of the relevant sections with such an hypothesis. I find this quite plausible.

The next three appendices are more particular and are of great help to anyone engaged in a textual and historical investigation of these matters. Appendix 5, *"lnstinetus* and *lnspiratio"* (A comment on the work of Max Seckler, E. Schillebeeckx and J. H. Walgrave on this point would have been in order. Cf. A. J. Kelly, "The Gifts of the Spirit: Aquinas and the Modern Context," *The Thomist* XXXVIII (April 1974), p. 198, notes 10, 11). Appendix 6, "St. Thomas' Use of the *De Bona Fortuna;* and Appendix 7, "Various Recensions on the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh."

After this, there follows a select bibliography, a glossary of terms, and Index of scriptural references, and then the General Index. The whole volume is a model of presentation.

With this kind of resource theological reflection today has a great opportunity. I imagine that theology will prefer to follow the line of Thomas's own development and so seek to present the gifts more as a component in the anthropology of " existence in the Spirit " than in the form of Aristotelian faculty analysis. Any relocation of the gifts might also tend to bring out one of the intuitions of the " Franciscan theology " that accompanied the Thomist developments, namely, that the gifts conform man not to some Greek ideal of heroism but to the reality of the " new man," Christ in his suffering, death, and resurrection. The theology of the gifts emerges more and more as a way of understanding the kind of humanity the Spirit of Christ is forming, and, more intriguingly, a way of understanding the God who is the Spirit of such a transformation.

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Master Eckhart, *Parisian Questions and Prologues.* Trans. with an duction and Notes by Armand A. Maurer, C. S. B. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974. Pp. 1Q8. $8.50.

For the reader who is fond of riddles and paradoxes, who savors the dialectical contrarieties of a Cusa or a Hegel, these stimulating and provocative treatises by Master Eckhart which Armand Maurer has here collected together and translated are without a match. The central paradox around which the discussions in these pages turns is Eckhart's insistence, on the one hand, that Being is God and that creatures have no being of their own while, in another treatise, he argues that God is intellect alone and that in no sense is Being to be found in him. The former position plies that creatures are nothing, " not even a little bit," while the latter view is defended by showing that intellect is essentially a kind of non-being or nothingness. Intrinsically paradoxical of themselves, the two theses are equally incompatible with one another.

At one point in these treatises Eckhart himself is led to comment upon his love of paradox. Adverting to his (Dominican) " brethren " who had heard his original interpretations of the Scriptures and of medieval metaphysical theory and who wished to have it set forth in writing, Master Eckhart says, ' They urged me to do this particularly because novel and unusual topics are a more pleasant stimulant to the mind than ordinary ones. . . . " Then, with an almost uncharacteristic caution, he adds: "... though the latter may be more valuable and important." (80)[1]

Eckhart possesses a subtle, imaginative, and very fertile metaphysical mind. He has long been recognized as a central figure in the history of Western mysticism. His vernacular sermons and treatises on spiritual matters are classics of the German language, studied with equal fervor by Germanists, philosophers, and students of the history of religion and mystical thought. The dialectical charm of his writings was to be his undoing, however. He was called before the Inquisition for some twenty-eight propositions which Pope John XXII would condemn in 18Q8, not long after Eckhardt's death. As a result of this condemnation, Eckhart's Latin works were all but ignored by Catholic theologians, except for an edition of them by Nicholas of Cusa. It would not be until 1885 that the German Dominican scholar H. S. Denifle would bring our attention back to them again. In 1986 work began on the great critical edition of Eckhart's Latin and German writings under the auspices of the *Deutsche* *schaft* at Stuttgart.[2] Thus it has only been in the last forty years or so that critical and reliable texts of either the German or Latin writings have

[1] All references in parentheses are to Maurer's volume.

[2] *Meister Eckhart; Die und lateinischen Werke,* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1986 ff.).

been available. And while there has always been some interest among English-speaking authors in Eckhart's vernacular sermons, there are, to my knowledge, only two works of English translation of Eckhart's Latin writings: one by Clarke and Skinner in 1958,[3] and the other the present selection by Armand Maurer. Though Eckhart's gifts as a mystic and spiritual writer have long been recognized, the subtlety and innovations of his work as a scholastic *magister-the* very name by which he is known to us today-have all but been ignored.

Maurer has brought together here three separate selections: (I) the *Parisian Questions,* five disputed questions held at Paris in 1302-03 and 1311-14 *(Latin Works,* v. V), discovered independently by Ephrem Longpre and Martin Grabmann in 1927; (2) the *Prologues* to the *Opus Tripartitum (Latin Works,* v. I); (3) a selection from the *Commentary on the Book of Exodus (Latin Works,* v. III). The first three *Parisian Questions,* especially Questions I and II, are important documents in the Latin corpus. In the first two questions Eckhart argues, along with "Brother Thomas" (Aquinas) that in God *esse* and *intelligere* are identical, while in angels they are distinct. His arguments, however, are quite un-Thomistic. He holds that intellect and being belong to totally different realms. Being is that which has been created or caused. As it is written in the *Liber de causis;* being is the first of all created things. Intellect, on the other hand, is not reducible to being: intellect can separate that which is not separate in reality (47); it can think the universal which is not found in reality (54); the essence of the intellect is not to be itself a being but that which *knows* being. (52-3) Like the pupil of the eye in Aristotle's *de Anima,* intellect must be totally devoid of that which it knows-being. [4] The divine intellect is altogether above being, beyond it, as its exemplary and efficient cause, while the created intellect is below it and caused by it. (48) Thus God is above being and "if you wish" to say that in God *esse* is this very *intelligere* "I do not mind. Nevertheless I say that if there is anything in God that you want to call existence, it belongs to him through his understanding" (48) (Question I). In angels, on the other hand, there can be no such reducibility of being to understanding, for angels are creatures, and so being is proper to them. There is thus a real distinction between the created intellect and its being. (Question II) . In Question III Eckhart goes on to show the superiority of the intellect over the will (which is hardly surprising, considering that intellect is superior to *esse* itself.) Questions IV (whether there can be a motion

[8] *Meister Eckhart: Selected Treatises and Sermons,* Trans. James M. Clark and John V. Skinner. (London: Faber and Faber, 1958).

• I have explored the significance of these views in my "The Nothingness of the Intellect in Meister Eckhart's *Parisian Questions," The Thomist* Vol. XXXIX, 1, pp. 85-115.

without end) and V (whether Christ's body remained identical before and after the crucifixion) are atypical of Eckhart's extant works and without any relation to the matters treated in this volume.

The *Prologues* are made up of the "General Prologue" to the entire *Opus Tripartitum* and the two special prologues to the *Book of Propositions* (Book I) and the *Book of Commentaries* (Book III); the prologue to Book II, the *Book of Questions,* is not extant. In these prologues Eckhart argues a position directly contrary to the *Parisian Questions:* Being is God *(esse est deus)* and creatures are nothing, not even something small. This is defended by showing that in the same way that white things are white by whiteness itself, the created being *(ens)* has being by *esse* itself. But *esse* must be God, for otherwise God would have being by something other than himself-which would in effect, then, be his God, which is absurd. Eckhart does not want to grant the creature a being of its own. A creature exists with the being of God. The creature has being the way the air has light, or the way the body has being from the soul. Eckhart does not subscribe to pantheism, however. He means instead only to deny an independent or autonomous being to creatures. It is usually said that whereas Thomas Aquinas taught an analogy of proper proportionality between the creature and God, Eckhart held an analogy of attribution.

Which is it then? Are we to think that *esse* is God, or that God is intellect and so devoid of *esse?* Is God Being or Nothing? The position which Maurer takes, and quite rightly I think, is developed by Lossky: Eckhart has not changed his views in these two treatises; he has merely adopted different perspectives.[5] In the *Parisian Questions,* Maurer says, " he looks upward to God from the perspective of creatures and sees Him as pure intelligence devoid of the being He creates." But in the *Prologues,* "Eckhart's stance . . . is now a descending one he looks at creatures from the divine perspective and sees them in their pure nothingness." (38) Eckhart's constant position, in both treatises, is that God is the " purity of being " *(puritas essendi)*; that is, God exists with a being *(esse)* which essentially transcends created being, which is pure of every created imperfection. Thus if one begins with creatures and calls them real, then God is being only in a higher way, which is, for Master Eckhart, pure intellect. But if one begins with God, creatures have no being at all-except what they borrow from him. From the point of view of God, creatures are so low as to be nothing; from the point of view of created being, God is so high as to be beyond being. God is-dialectically-both Being and Nothing, because he is the purity of being. God is the purity *of* Being where this " of " is both a subjective and objective genitive.

[5] Vladimir Lossky, *Theologie negative et connaistmnce de Dieu chez Maitre Eckhart,* (Paris: Vrin, 1960), pp. fllO-fW.

The final selection made by Maurer is Eckhart's exposition of *Exodus 3,* 13 *(eg.o 81Jm qui 81Jm).* For Eckhart this means: I am who I am. Moses is told that God .dwells in a self-contained mystery which cannot be disclosed; he .exceeds every name which is given to him, God's being is pure and untouched by any name which is given to it. Here is the common thread of both positions: God has being in such a supereminent and mysterious way that it is barely possible to compare creatures with him. God's being so transcends cre.atures that if creatures have being, . God does not, and if God has being, creatures do not.

Maurer has translated Eckhart's terse Latin prose into a readable English which is quite free .of Latinisms. The numbering of Eckhart's arguments which he introduces into the text makes for increased clarity. The one quarrel one can pick with this translation is Maurer's decision to translate *esse* as " existence." In Thomas Aquinas *esse* is the animating, active principle of being *(ens)* it is that which is actual about being. But in Eckhart *esse* is related to *ens* the way whiteness is related to that which is white, the way the abstract is related to the concrete. *Esse* is the abstract perfection in which the individual entity *(ens, ens hoc aut* hoc) participates. Now Maurer not only knows this, he gives a splendid explanation of it. (34-7) But still he gives *esse* a translation which suggests more of the Thomistic existential act than of Eckhart's abstract perfection. To my mind everything points to translating *esse* as Being and *ens* as "(the) being." To illustrate, Maurer renders "... *deo non convenit esse nee est ens"* as " ... existence does not belong to God, nor is He a being." I should have preferred "... Being does not belong to God, nor is He a being." As Maurer notes, Eckhart himself translated *esse* into the Middle High German *istikeit* ("is-ness"). (29) Josef Koch, in the German translation of the Stuttgart edition of the *Parisian Questions,* renders *esse* and *ens* as *"Sein"* and *"Seiende (s)"* which preserves the connection between these words which Eckhart had in mind. Thus, while one would not wish to render *esse* and *ens* in Thomas Aquinas by Being and being, the opposite is the case, I believe, with Master Eckhart.

On the whole, however, there is little to quarrel with in Father Maurer's admirable work. The translation is smooth and readable, the introduction is informative and helpful, and the choice of texts is excellent. There is a brief bibliography and a helpful index. Errata: p. *35, 3* lines from the bottom: "(w) hile "; p. *55,* n. 1: should say "above", not" below"; p. 115, line *3:* vol. "5 " not "56."

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Divorce and Remarriage: Resolving a Catholic Dilamma. By DENIS J. DoHERTY. St. Meinrad, Indiana: Abbey Press, 1974. Pp. 194. $8.50.

The author is quite forthright in stating the purpose of his book: " I propose to urge that the present official teaching of the indissolubility of marriage be changed because, as it stands, it is theologically untenable." (p. 4)

The Council of Trent defended its teaching on the indissolubility of marriage on the grounds that it was in accord with " evangelical and apostolic teaching" *(Sess. XXIV, Canon* 7). One might expect that the author would look for flaws in the Church's teaching on scriptural or early historical grounds. But this is not the method to be used.

The author is quite candid in admitting that " exegesis is not my area of competence," and in noting an observation of one who is competent, Joseph Fitzmeyer, S. J.: "So far as the texts are concerned we have Jesus's absolute command. [People looking for a change in the Church's attitude towards divorce] can't look to the New Testament scholars to provide them with loopholes." Doherty's own reply is somewhat startling: "No need. Moralists and canonists have already provided them in abundance." (p. 153)

If we may judge by the Index of Authors the writer seemingly has little competence in the area of early Church history or the history of dogma. Augustine alone is cited from the early Christian writers and Fathers of the Church who reflect and comment upon the data of Scripture.

Candor seems to be the author's strongpoint, and this is evidenced once again when he informs us that he intends to urge a change in the Church's teaching" from the standpoint of moral theology, both traditional and contemporary." (p. 4) But "traditional" moral theology begins with Gratian in the twelfth century, and contemporary moral theology is reflected almost wholly in the more advanced views expressed by Catholic and non-Catholic moralists and ethicians who agree with the author's conclusions.

Admittedly there is a growing consensus among moralists, canon lawyers, and theologians that it is time for the Church to change her teaching on divorce and remarriage and to accomodate her practice to that of the Eastern Christians and that of our separated brethren of the West. Doherty's method of "resolving a Catholic dilemma" may appeal to some moralists, and I am sure that they would report more favorably on the author's efforts. As a sacramental theologian who has taught the theology of marriage for some decades and who has been more recently engaged in presenting a theology of marriage in terms of covenant, I find that the twelfth century, with its new emphasis on marriage as a contract, is not the best point of departure.

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The Ethics of Fetal Research. By PAUL RAMSEY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975. Pp. 125. $2.95 paper, $7.95 cloth.

This is an excellent little book-" must " reading for anyone interested in bio-medical ethics.

Professor Ramsey begins by classifying and explaining the various kinds of fetal research. A statement of method follows; and here Ramsey resolves to set the discussion " within the context of the existing standards of medical ethics." (p. xvi) With this as his method, then, Ramsey's first task is to determine what the existing standards of medical ethics are. But this is no easy procedure. As a first step, Ramsey informs the reader that it is medicine's primary duty to" do no harm." (pp. xvi, xiv) Still, this knowledge does not carry one very far. Is the duty to do no harm absolute or merely *prima facie?* Does the fetus's prenatal status negate or somehow "weaken" the duty? And what is the meaning of "harm " ? In an apparent attempt to answer these and similar questions, Ramsey does two things. First, he introduces three efforts to formulate official guidelines permitting fetal research (I) the Peel Report, or the British attempt to formulate such guidelines, (2) the provisional set of guidelines issued by our National Institute of Health in 1973, and (3) the revised set of NIH guidelines, proposed in 1974 but never accepted as official policy. And second, because living, pre-viable human fetuses bear certain resemblances not only to human infants but also to the dying, the condemned, and the unconscious, Ramsey examines the restrictions placed upon experimentation with these kinds of subjects and argues that they should be applicable also in the case of fetal human beings.

The themes in ethical analysis having been introduced, Ramsey argues that the recent Supreme Court decision on abortion has skewed medical ethics in such a way that it gives rise to a twisted moral logic. In arguing for the moral propriety of fetal experimentation, Ramsey says, at least one author has held that" since *we have given ourselves the right* to medically unnecessary abortion (given ourselves the right to do the fetus. . .. ' unimaginable acts of violence' . , .) , then *we have given ourselves the right* to place the fetus at risk of lesser injury." (p. 42) But the fact that we have given ourselves the legal right to kill a fetus entails nothing so far as morality is concerned-" ought " cannot be derived from " is." If the canons of medical ethics specify that a doctor is to do no harm, medically unnecessary abortions are wrong. And to argue that because this wrong is permitted under the law one is morally right in performing a lesser wrong is to fall victim to a form of thinking which Ramsey calls the " one-wrong-justifies-a-lesser-wrong" fallacy. (p. 41)

After examining the relationship between abortion and fetal research Ramsey evaluates the provisional and revised NIH guidelines, denouncing the latter as allowing almost any experimentation, just so long as it is

part of an abortion procedure. Once again, then, Ramsey finds the one-wrong-justifies-a-lesser-wrong fallacy at work; only now its influence is being felt in molding public policy.

Ramsey ends his book with a discussion of the doctrine of informed consent. There is problem enough with the doctrine of consent in ordinary doctor-patient-relationships; and when the issue concerns consent for fetal experimentation, Ramsey quite properly concludes that it would be "... an extreme moral paradox to designate a woman who is planning a medically unnecessary abortion to be the one charged with consenting or not consenting ' for ' the abortus and with protecting it from further avoidable harm." (p. 98)

Ramsey's work is significant for many reasons: the reader is given the background necessary in order to fully understand the current controversy surrounding fetal experimentation; the layman is instructed concerning the various kinds or types of fetal research; and moral issues are sharply drawn. However, the real power of the book lies in its examples. One especially bears mention. Ramsey describes the following research project as one which was submitted for NIH funding:

> The objective was to study the speed of disposition of minerals into the fetal mandibles (jawbone). The protocol called for maintaining whole previable abortuses alive for up to three days, injecting the substance or substances being tested into the umbilical cord, and then at five-minute intervals cutting off the heads of a series of abortuses over the three day period in order to examine the jawbones of each at that point in time. I (Ramsey) do not know how or what major vital signs were to be maintained, but evidently the jawbones and the abortuses *as* a whole were alive and well and growing, or else the protocol would have been pointless. (p. 9l9l)

Funding for this study was first approved by NIH, and then later disapproved, ostensibly because the American public would not " understand " the project.

Despite its excellence, Ramsey's book is not without its problems. The main difficulties all seem to flow from Ramsey's desire to restrict the scope of the ethical discussion. What does Ramsey mean when he says that he will set the discussion of fetal experimentation " within the existing standards of medical ethics? " The implication is that there is a determinate set of moral standards which can be applied by medical researches in order to assess the rightness or wrongness of their acts. But this is not true. The standards of medical ethics can be interpreted in a variety of ways; and Ramsey admits as much, for he provides the reader with numerous examples of moral disagreement within the medical community. (pp. 31-50) Thus, the problem is not to determine what the standards of medical ethics are, but what they *should be.* And any discussion of this sort carries one beyond medical ethics to a discussion of the nature of ethical reasoning in general.

Perhaps Ramsey does not mean to imply that there is a determinate set of moral standards just awaiting application by members of the medical profession. It is possible that by setting the discussion within the context of the existing standards of medical ethics, Ramsey means only to justify certain methodological assumptions, among them: {1) an assumption concerning the deontologic!Llcharacter of ethics, and {2) an assumption concerning the humanity of this fetus. This view is not without support. Ramsey tells us that medical ethics is not a net-benefit ethics alone (p. xvi) ILUd he resolves the question of the fetus's humanity by appealing to the Peel Report and NIH guidelines. {pp. 27-28) But if this is what Ramsey means he weakens his argument considerably. This comes out most clearly in his discussion of the relationship between abortion and fetal experimentation. Those who deny the fetus's humanity will certainly argue that there is no fallacy of one-wrong-justifies-a-lesser-wrong And if one begins by rejecting deontology in favor of teleology he might find numerous grounds rejecting Ramsey's arguments.

Those of us who accept Ramsey's conclusions will look forward to his developing a full-scale ethical argument in support of his views. In the meantime, *The Ethics of Fetal Research* provides much food for thought. The book is bound to generate discussion within the classroom and should be required reading for anyone taking a course in bio-medical ethics.

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The Supreme Court and Religion. By RICHARD E. MoRGAN. New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. 224. $3.95.

" The inherited attitudes of the early settlers, the nature of colonial religious and legal practices, religious ' settlement ' at the federal constitutional convention, and the framing of the First Amendment are all matters which need concern us." Thus does Richard E. Morgan in the opening paragraph of his book *The Supreme Court and Religion* indicate the four principles which he sees at work in Supreme Court decisions on religion during the first two hundred years of this country's existence. Although some contemporary observers once characterized the early American community as "tolerant" and "cosmopolitan" in behavior, the "cultural baggage of the vast majority of those who managed the affairs of the town and colonies was, according to Morgan, " English," with two tendencies deriving from the English Reformation: one, " an abiding hostility to Roman Catholicism" and the other, "an implicit notion of the state as

an inferior and potentially dangerous institution." These, he states, gave to American culture and tradition, constitutionally embodied, the separationist thrust which has characterized court decisions ever since. Morgan sees the history of the Supreme Court decisions on religion as an uneven struggle between accommodationists, on the one hand, and separationists, on the other, the latter consistently, he would say, with the historically derived and constitutionally expressed tradition.

While he acknowledges that "an important group of constitutional critics has argued that the Madisonian reading given the establishment clause by Black in Everson is simply incorrect on historical grounds," he brushes aside their " superficially attractive advice " as somewhat irrelevant for the reason that "the historical materials themselves will not settle anything." The task of the constitutional court, says Morgan, " is precisely to choose between conflicting traditions," using " the available historical materials to legitimize the choice."

Summarizing his own position, the author declares that the Court " has done well to the extent that it has retreated from the quite sweeping theory of separation articulated by Black in the early pages of his Everson opinion." Moreover, he sees the possibility "in the coming decade" that " sufficient support may develop " for the view (Kurland's) that, " providing the primary purpose of the governmental program be secular and the legislative ends satisfy the public purpose requirement of the due process clause, governmental programs which provide substantial support to religious institutions are constitutional."

Contributing to this possibility, says the author, are five new conditioning factors: (1) "The argument for separation based on creeded divisiveness is weakening"; (Q) An increasingly urbanized or "mass" society is prone " to encourage the development of a variety of private and charitable and educational styles"; (8) Religious schools themselves are secularizing so rapidly that talk of the dangers of proselytism "is losing force"; {4) "Far from regarding religious schools as a menace, many minority parents are enthusiastic about them, and only wish that more were available"; *(5)* "American public schools simply do not need a monopoly position."

While the above factors may indeed be conducive to a change in constitutional thinking, this reviewer doubts that of themselves they will suffice to overcome the formidable opposition to such change which the vested interests of the public school establishment will most certainly continue to maintain.

This book, though debatable in its easy dismissal of arguments against the historicity of the alleged Madisonian view of separation, renders a valuable service to the changing but ineluctable dialog on religious and educational freedom.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Abbey Press: *Divorce & Remarriage. Resolving a Catholic Dilemma,* by Denis J. Doherty. (Pp. 194, $8.50)

Alba House: *Pattern for a Christian according to St. Thomas Aquinas,* by A. I. Mennessier, O.P. Tr. by Nicholas Halligan, O.P. (Pp. $4.95); *The Dominican. A Short History,* by William A. Hinnebusch, 0. P. Pp. 185, $3.95)

Barnes & Noble Books: *Experience, Inference and God,* by John **J.** Shepherd. (Pp. 190, $16.50); *Friederich Nietzsche: Philosopher. of Culture.* ed., by Frederick Copletson. (Pp. $11.50)

Les Editions Bellarmin: *La Vocation de la Liberte dans la Philosophie de Paul Ricoeur,* by Rosaire Bergeron, S.C. (Pp. $15.50) ; *Philosophes de la Cite.* Collection "L'Univers de la Philosophie," 3. (Pp. $5.00)

Citta Nuova Editrice: *Studi Tomistici.* 4 *San Tommaso e la Filosofia del Diritto Oggi.* Saggi (Pp. 308, **L** 5.000)

Columbia University Press: *Causality & Determinism,* by Georg Henrik Von Wright. (Pp. 164, $10.00)

Dickenson Publishing Co.: *Philosophical Problems of Causation,* ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp. (Pp.

Divus Thomas: *Il Movimento Neotomistica Piacentino Iniziato al Collegio Alberoni da Francesco Grassi nel 1751 e la Formazione di Vincenzo Buzzetti,* by Giovanni Felice Rossi. (Pp.

Fides Publishers, Inc.: *Evangelization Today,* by Bernard Haring. (Pp. 191, $4.95) *Positioning. Belief in the Mid-Seventies,* by William **J.** Bausch. (Pp. 184, $7.95)

Franklin Publishing Co.: *The Mystery of Man, An Anthropologic Study,* by Owen Sharkey. (Pp. 189, $10.95)

The Free Press: *Angel in Armor. A Post-Freudian Perspective on the Nature of Man,* by Ernest Becker. (Pp.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.: *Gate of Heaven,* by Ralph Mcinerny. (Pp. $8.95)

Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.: *Resurrection and the Message of Easter,* by Xavier Leon-Dufour. (Pp. $9.95)

Liber: *Dinamismo Intellettuale ed Esperienza Mistica nel Pensiero di Joseph Marechal,* by Filippo Liverziani. (Pp. L. 3000)

Libreria Editrice Vaticana: *Biblioteca per la Storia del Tomismo.* 6 *Vincenzo Buzzetti Teologo,* by Vittorio Rolandetti (pp. 7. *Un'Opera Inedita di Gaetano Sanseverino,* by Pasquale Orlando. (Pp.

McGraw-Hill Book Co.: *St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae.* Vol. 31 107) *Faith,* by T. C. O'Brien. (Pp. WS, $15.00); Vol. 57 (Sa, *Baptism and Confirmation,* by James **J.** Cunningham, 0. P. (Pp. $15.00)

Macmillan Publishing Co.: *Religion in America,* by George C. Bedell. (Pp. *553,* $11.95)

Ohio University Press: *Political and Social Essays by Paul Ricoeur,* ed. by David Stewart and Joseph Bien. (Pp. $9.00)

Oxford University Press: *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman.* Vol. XXVII *The Controversy with Gladstone. January 1874 to December 1875.* (Pp. 475). Vol. XXVIII *Fellow of Trinity. January 1876 to December.1878,* ed by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas Gornall, S. J. ($48.00 each); *Causation and Conditionals,* ed. by Ernest Sosa. (Pp. $4.95); *The Cement of the Universe. A Study of Causation,* by J. L. Mackie. (Pp. $17.00)

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: *Porphyry the Phoenician. Isagoge,* tr., introd. & notes by Edward W. Warren. (Pp. 65,

Princeton University Press: *John Duns Scotus "God and Creatures."* The *Quodlibetal Questions,* tr., introd., notes & glossary by Felix Alluntis, OFM and Allan B. Wolter, OFM. (Pp.

Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh: *Thomas von Aquin und die Philosophic,* by Harald Holz. (Pp. 88, 12.-)

The Seabury Press: *Catholicism Confronts Modernity: AProtestant View,* by Langdon Gilkey. (Pp. $8.95); *A New Pentecost?,* by Leon Joseph Cardinal Suenens. (Pp. $7.95) ; *The Common Catechism. A Book of Christian Faith.* (Pp. 715, $10.75); *A Rahner Reader,* ed. by Gerald McCool. (Pp. 409, $13.50 cloth, $6.95 paper); *An American Catechism,* ed. by George Dyer. (Pp. $10.00 cloth, $4.95 paper); *Rome and Canterbury through Four Centurjes,* by Bernard and Margaret Pawley. (Pp. 431, $13.50)

Sheed and Ward, Inc.: *Our Savage God,* by R. C. Zaehner. (Pp. 319, $8.95)

University of Alabama Press: *Mounier and Maritain: A French Catholic Understanding of the Modern World,* by Joseph A. Amato. (Pp. $9.50)

University of California Press: *Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic. Collected Papers, 1933-1969,* by Ernest A. Moody. (Pp.

University of Notre Dame Press: *Exercises in Religious Understanding,* by David B. Burrell, CSC. (Pp. $11.95); *Beyond the New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion,* by German Grisez. (Pp. 418, $16.95 cloth, $6.96 paper)