TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE AND REALIST METAPHYSICS

I.

D URING THE FIRST decades o£ this century Thomists, anxious lest they be charged as dogmatists before the bar o£ post-Cartesian philosophy, concentrated on the problem o£ philosophical method. [1] In the development o£ this school o£ methodologically-oriented Thomists, Pere Joseph Marechal, S. J., 1878-1944, remains a preeminent figure.[2]

His magnum opus, *Le point de depart de la metaphysique,* consists o£ five volumes," *c.ahiers,"* which are subtitled"

---

[1] See Georges van Riet, *Thomistic Epistemology: Studies Concerning the Problem of Cognition in the Contemporary Thomistic School,* trans. by Gabriel Franks (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1963) .

• Cf. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J., " Metaphysics as Horizon," in *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. *HZ;* Otto Muck, *The Transcendental Method,* trans. by William P. Seidensticker (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), pp.

sur le developpement historique et theorique du probleme de
la connaissance." [8] *Cahiers I* to *IV* project an historical nexus
for what Marechal identified as the modern philosophical prob-
lem of knowledge. *Cahier V* resolves this same problem by a
polemical epistemology derived from a confrontation of St.
Thomas and Kant. [4] Most notably, this fifth volume displays
Marechal's effort to refute the Critical Philosophy from its own
principles by utilizing the Kantian transcendental method to
reestablish a " Thomistic " or, as I shall emphasize, a realist
metaphysics. For the specific " problem of knowledge " set
forth in *Cahier V* is the possibility of a method that could
guarantee metaphysics to be a universal and apodeictic science
of Being.[5]

Among Thomists, *Cakier V* provoked a controversy in which
it was argued, often sharply, that Marechal had violated not
only the letter but also the spirit of orthodox Thomistic
philosophical doctrine. [6] If this· particular polemic is jejune, as
it is sometimes claimed/ the basic controversy, far from being
a passing scholastic quibble, has been kept alive in today's

---

[8] *Cahier 1: De l'antiquite a la fon du moyen age: la critique ancienne de la
ccmnaissance,* 1st ed. (Paris: Alcan, Museum Lessianum, section philosophique,
1922); *Cakier II: Le conjtit du raticmalisme et de l'empirisme dans la pkilosopkie
modeme avant Kant,* 1st ed. (*Ibid.,* 1923); *Cahier Ill: La Critique de Kant
(Ibid.,* 1923); *Cakier IV: Le systeme idealiste chez Kant et les postkantiens*
(Brussels: L'Edition Universelle, and Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, Museum
Lessianum, section philosophique, 1947 [published posthumously]); *Cahier V: Le
tkomisme devant la pkilosopkie critique* (Louvain: Editions du Museum Lessianum,
and Paris: Alcan, 1926).

For the complete bibliography, see A. Milet, " Bibliographie du Pere J. Marechal,"
in *Melanges   Mareckal, l* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1950), pp. 47-71.

A partial English translation of the five *cahiers* can be found in *A Mareckal
Reader,* trans. and ed. by Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970).

All of my citations of Marechal refer to the volume and page number of the
French original.

• See V, 14; 84.

• See V, 15; 34-43.

[6] The bibliography for this controversy can be found in Milet, pp. 65-71. Cf.
Muck, pp. 205-243.

[7] See Bernard A. M. Nachbar, "Is It Thomism?," *Continuum,* 6 (1968), pp.
282-235.

discussion of the role of hermeneutics and method in deter-
mining the rational foundations of metaphysics and theology .8
Under the guise of hermeneutics, there is reincarnated the
dominant issue of the earlier exchange: the proper interrela-
tionship of metaphysics and epistemology .9 Yet, the current
methodological vogue is unequivocal only in that it endows *Le
point de depart de la metaphysique* with a contemporary sig-
nificance. How this significance is to be discerned, stated, and
evaluated continues to be a major dilemma if the principles
of a Thomistic tradition are compared with the diverse, perhaps
contrary, presuppositions of prevailing hermeneutical theories. 10

In the original debate, one can conveniently isolate two kinds
of questions. Roughly speaking, there are: (1) *historical ques-
tions* about the Thomistic character of Marechal's metaphysics;
(2) *philosophical questions* about the criteria that would serve
to identify a genuine doctrinal development within a philo-
sophical tradition. 11 However, it is this distinct separation of
historical and philosophical questions which is now frequently
labelled an uncritical assumption ignorant of the cognitive hori-
zons that structure our inquiries. Operationally, in the actual
exegesis of a text, the two kinds of questions are, to be sure,
sometimes mixed together. The stronger and here principal
thesis is that hermeneutical presuppositions necessarily deter-
mine the structure of all historical or exegetical questions and
their corresponding answers. 12

8 See *Foundations of Theology,* ed. by Philip McShane, S. J. (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1971) and *Language, Truth and Meaning,* ed. by Philip McShane
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972).

• See Etienne Gilson, *Le realisme methodique* (Paris: Pierre Tequi, n. d. [1935]).

10 See Etienne Gilson, *Linguistique et Philosophie; Essai sur les constantes
phiques du langage* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1969).

11 Cf. Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge,* ed. by Gerald B. Phelan
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), pp. 71-81.

12 · In view of this intention of any ' retrieving ' interpretation, it in fact ap-
pears doubtful whether it is to be refuted in detail by arguments from traditional
research. . . .. It would be remiss to assume that there is for Heidegger a thing
' in itself ' which could ' from the outside ' yield a ' criterion ' which would de-
termine whether the 'unsaid ' in what is said in a definite text has been disclosed
'correctly' or 'falsely.'" Werner Marx, *Heidegger and the Tradition,* trans. by

As a prophylaxis against this thesis of a constitutive her-
meneutical a priori, whose radical historicism could only be
cured by some form of realist metaphysics, let us assume that
we all travel around the famous circle: that the meaning of
a text can only be exposed from an intellectual and cultural
stance, and that the stance requires a further critique to render
itself explicit. So much, one readily supposes, is obligatory for
every self-reflective investigation. But acknowledgement of the
hermeneutical circle does not entail the additional but common-
ly held premise that the intentionality of any but especially of
a historical text is, *in itself** inaccessible to the inquiries of the
reader. That is, one can abstain from or repudiate a hermeneu-
tics in which the interpretation of the text becomes essentially
an imposition or a construction of meaning, a construction
whose plausibility is determined not by the intrinsic intelligibil-
ity embodied in the text but by the systematic consistency of
the cognitive horizons or categories of the interpreter. [18]

In opposition to a " Copernican" hermeneutics [14] or, more
exactly, to its epistemological forebear, the Thomists of Mare-

Theodore Kisiel and MurraY: Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1971)' pp. 109-110.

Merely to catch the Hegelian-Heideggerian resonance that can be heard among
some contemporary " neo-scholastic " philosophers, the following quotation seems
example enough: " There is no pure immediacy of what appears and what is to
be received because every objective content which comes to us as givenness is
already mediated through the performance of the subject. The way in which
we see the object, against which background and in which context we understand
it, which questions we direct at it, and which answer-from our perspective-we
expect from it, all this helps determine the object as it discloses itself to us and
becomes ' phenomenon.' "-Emerich Coreth, S. J. "I=ediacy and the Mediation
of Being: An Attempt to Answer Bernard Lonergan," in *Language, Truth and
Meaning,* ed. McShane, p. 88.

[13] Cf. Joseph Owens, C.Ss. R., "Judgment and Truth in Aquinas," in *Mediaeval
Studies,* 82 (1970), pp. 188-158; Hans Jonas, "Change and Permanence: On the
Possibility of Understanding History," Ch. 12 in *Philosophical Essays: From
Ancient Creed to Technological Man* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp.
287-260.

" " On peut penser que Kant, de nos jours, aurait donne un supplement a sa
Dialectique, specialement consacre a l'histoire." Victor Goldschmidt, *Platonisme
et pensee contemporaine* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1970), p. 218.

chal's generation, by reason of their own noetic principles, were obliged to evaluate, historically, the Thomistic character of his metaphysics. That historical interpretation proceeded from the realist contention that meaning or intentionality is effected by but is not a construction of the human intellect. In Thomistic terms, the debate about a historically, that is, a textually veri- fiable interpretation of St. Thomas, is legitimated by the very possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Words and word usage are, indeed, immersed in the obfuscating changes of history, hence the need for hermeneutics, but intelligence and intel- ligibility transcend their historical instantiations, hence the need for a *realist* hermeneutics.

Now the human mind ... is in itself above time, but it is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with continuity and time, in keeping with the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species ... *(Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 113, a. 7, ad 5).

A text, albeit difficult to interpret, retains a potential but in- trinsic intelligibility which historical exegesis partially unveils but does not create. Understanding in its own right the meaning of a text, the goal of a realist hermeneutics, is an instance analogous to the intellect grasping the natural intelligibility of a thing.[15] For hermeneutics, with all of its peculiar and some- times intractable problems, is a derivative science governed, in its fundaments, by the principles permitting knowledge of Being.

The distinction posed between historical and philosophical questions does not deny that such investigations are reciprocal. They are, however, differently ordered. Historical exegesis aims to reveal the meaning of the text in itself; philosophical re- flection, methodologically subsequent, demonstrates that this intelligibility can, in principle, be revealed in itself. Therefore, in the order of discovery of meaning, historical exegesis can

[15] A realist hermeneutics reflects the crucial distinction between *instrumental signs* (words and texts) and *formal signs* (concepts). For the epistemological ele- ments of a realist hermeneutics, see Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge,* pp. 119-128, 387-417.

function independently of any explicit hermeneutical theory. [16]

The Thomists' response to Marechal centered on a point of order-the   order to be observed between metaphysics and epistemology. Does a realist metaphysics, to be considered apodeictic, need as its proper prolegomenon a critique of knowledge? The judgment that Marechal's philosophy is not " Thomistic " depended on historical and systematic arguments that asserted the impropriety of such a critical prolegomenon for a *Thomistic Realism.* These arguments merit rehearsal, but, since the stated purpose of *Cahier V* is also to instantiate the Critical Philosophy, it is no less compelling to ascertain whether Marechal reestablished a realist metaphysics of Being by means of a *Kantian* transcendental method. [17]

Roughly speaking, this is an investigation of the historical kind which, although it does not evoke the full Thomistic doctrine of metaphysical knowledge, at least grants that the hermeneutical circle is not " vicious " : that there is an essential distinction to be maintained between the intentions and meanings embodied in a text and the structuring features of our inquiry into the text. On this realist hermeneutical principle, which Marechal professed/ [8] is founded the central historical analogy drawn in *Cahier* V: between Aquinas and Aristotle, Marechal and Kant.

---

[16] " We need, in the first place, a nonhistoricist understanding of nonhistoricist philosophy. But w.e need no less urgently a nonhistoricist understanding of historicism, that is, an understanding of the genesis of historicism that does not take for granted the soundness of historicism." Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago.: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 33.

" What does a philosophical understanding of the history of philosophy involve? It involves nothing less than the discovery of philosophy itself. Only he who knows philosophy can see the history of philosophy in its light. If there is a philosophical truth, then it and it alone is the real location of the meaning of the history of philosophy." Anton C. Pegis, *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,* Vol. I, "Introduction" (New York: Random House, 1945), p. xliii.

[17] A project suggested but not carried out by Francis P. Fiorenza in the "Introduction " to Karl Raimer, *Spirit in the World,* trans. by William Dych, S. J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. xxxiv.

[18] Cf. V, 13-17; 29-31. The conclusion of this paper is to question whether Marechal could consistently maintain such realist principles.

II.

The vocabulary common to Aristotle and Aquinas has occasioned the idea that Thomism, in its internal principles and structure, is Aristotelian philosophy in the service of a Christian emendation and amplification of Aristotelian doctrine. Such was Man!chal's conviction. [19] But this interpretation, and others like it, are over-simplifications that leave unexplained how Aristotle and St. Thomas, supposedly using the same principles and method. could have reached patently different conclusions in their respective metaphysics. [20]

The historian most responsible for an alternative view, Gilson, has insisted that, despite the indisputable " presence . . . of an Aristotelian level," Thomism " did not come out of Aristotelianism by way of evolution but of revolution." [21] The transformation of Aristotle occurred, in the main, because St. Thomas believed in the theological doctrine of creation, understood God as the *Prima Causa,* and identified *actus essendi* and not form as the primary actuality in a finite substance. Put succinctly, Aristotle and St. Thomas reached different conclusions because their philosophical principles were different.

In the most general perspective, to correlate the methods of St. Thomas and Aristotle is to distinguish the theological *Summa* of a mediaeval Christian theologian from the metaphysics of his Greek predecessor, a non-Christian, pagan philosopher. This delineation of the realms of philosophical nature

[19] " --- Ia pensee philosophique, a travers ses tatonnements, ses oscillations, ses deviations, ses redressements, ses progres, recherche obscurement, a chaque epoque, et aujourd'hui autant que jamais, *une position d'equilibre,* qui correspond, en fait, pour l'essentiel, a celle qu'occupa *l'aristotetisme thomiste."* V, 34. [Italics mine.] Cf. I, 101, 104, 106, *256-257;* V, *35,* 39, 75.

[20] See Anton C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964); "Some Reflections on *Summa Contra Gentiles II, 56,"* *An Etienne Gilson Tribute,* ed. by Charles J. O'Neil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), pp. 169-188.

[21] Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Torcmto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. *158; History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, *1955),* p. *365.*

and theological grace touches upon theoretical and historical problems too many and too complex to be raised here.[22] Instead, it is sufficient only to note that   considered that Aristotle and St. Thomas had engendered a common, metaphysical patrimony. For this heritage, Marechal essayed a transcendental justification that should have reconciled Kant's new method to old metaphysical conclusions.[23]

Paradigmatic for the relationship drawn between Kantian method and realist metaphysics is the relationship that Marechal attributed to Aristotle and St. Thomas. As Aquinas had made explicit what was latent in Aristotelianism, so Marechal could make explicit and justify the realist metaphysics that he thought latent in the method of the Critical Philosophy. [24]

If Marechal's project seems a quixotic or an untenable legerdemain, this suspicion is generated by one's own conception of the aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* For there have issued, from different interpretations of the Critical Philosophy, the numerous commentaries whose proliferation is mirrored in a variety of ideas about Kant's purpose in the first *Critique.* [25]

Although Kant himself often mentioned what he hoped to accomplish, his intention is most neatly stated in the question that is asked in the " Introduction " : " How is metaphysics, as science, possible? " [B22]. This question, if we allow that it correctly poses the aim of the *Critique,* requires attention to Kant's deployment of the term "metaphysics." [26]

[22] See Anton C. Pegis, *The Middle Ages and Philosophy: Some Reflections on the Ambivalence of Modern Scholasticism* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963).

•• Cf. V, 33-34, 39, 599-601.

••" Comment constater, dans le kantisme meme, la presence ou l'absence de cette metaphysique implicite .... Telle fut . . . {1'] attitude prise par les Cahiers devant le probleme de la connaissance." V, 602.

•• See Nathan Rotenstreich, "Interpretations and Systems: On Approaches to the *Critique of Pure Reason,"* in *Experience and Its Systematization: Studies in Kant* (The Hague: Martin us Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 132-174.

•• See D. P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966). Cf. Nathan Rotenstreich, "Kant's Concept of Metaphysics," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie,* 8 (1954), pp. 392-408.

In defining " metaphysics," Kant indicated that it is a knowledge of things but, mostly, he stressed that the *Critique* is an investigation concerned" not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects" [AI2]. Kant's emphasis notwithstanding, the *Critique* is not, in the later sense of the Marburg school, an epistemology. Kant, it is important to remember, was concerned with the mode of our knowledge of *objects* and not with our knowledge of knowledge.[27]

Marechal can be assimilated to the group of interpreters who recognize that the purpose of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to establish the possibility of metaphysics as a science.[28] This assessment makes plausible, if only initially, Marechal's proposal to use the *Critique* to reestablish a metaphysics. That this is a realist metaphysics and that it can be derived from Kant's method is the heavy burden of proof assumed in the fifth *cahier.* For there, the demonstration of the *"affirmation ontologique* " is attempted.

As itself an explicit judgment, the " affirmation ontologique " declaims the "absolu de l'etre": in Kantian terms, the existence and theoretical intelligibility of God and the noumenal order.[29] As true, the "affirmation ontologique" is the logical ground for all judgments and is the implicit condition of the possibility of any object of thought,[80] and, in that sense, resembles Kant's concept of the Transcendental Ego.[81] That it is also the ontological ground for the objectivity of knowledge precisely supersedes the possibilities of Kantian philosophy to express.

Although the *Critique* does demonstrate the objectivity of human knowledge by explaining how the noetic object is con-

---

[27] Cf. Dryer, p. 26, footnote 2.

[28] See Heinz Heimsoeth, "Metaphysical Motives in the Development of Critical Idealism," in *Kant: Disputed Questions,* trans. and ed. by Moltke S. Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp. 158-199; Gerard Lebrun, *Kant et la fin de la metaphysique* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970), pp. 13-41.

[29] Cf. V, 318.

•• Cf. V, 459.

[81] Cf. *Critique of   Reason,* B131-Bl36 = *[K. r. V.,* B131-Bl36.].

stituted in and for consciousness, Marechal, curiously enough,
construed Kant's explanation as an answer to how the *phe-
nomenon,* defined as "l'etat d'impression subjective," becomes
an "object."   For Marechal, the essential characteristic of a
noetic object is a certain " unite independante " or self-con-
tained permanency, whereas the defining mark of a phenomenon
is its accidentality.   A *phenomerum.,*Marechal claimed, is mere-
ly a changing, qualitative modification of consciousness.[82] In
this phenomenological sense, the distinguishing feature of the
noetic object is that it is an" en-soi "known only" par opposi-
tion au sujet." [88] Whether there is an ontological ground for
this phenomenological " opposition " both the Thomist and
the Kaniian must determine.   In making this determination,
each philosophy confronts a comparable problem which can be
located in reference to the coterminous intra-mental and extra-
mental character of a noetic object.

For St. Thomas, a noetic object is the immanent form of the
intellect: " Intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu." [84] But
there is for this formula a counter-balance, the doctrine of the
transcendent or intentional character of a noetic object:
" Species.intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur, sed id quo in-
telligit intellectus." [85] From a profoundly altered slant, the
Critique explains the noetic object as the product of the under-
standing, the " relation [which] is nothing but the necessary
unity of consciousness." [86] But this revolutionary assertion
must also be squared with Kant's famous remark in the
"Aesthetic":   "Thoughts without content are empty ... [and]
it is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible,
that is to add the object to them in intuition." [87]

Kant's account of the objectivity of knowledge Marechal re-
garded as an error originating in a self-contradictory doctrine

[••] Cf. III, 141-145.
[••] III, 145.
[••] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 14, a. 2.
[86] *Ibid.,* q. 85, a. 2.
[••] *K. T.V.,* A109 .
[••] *K. T. V.,* A5l,

of phenomenality. The transcendental deduction of the" affirmation ontologique " is designed to expose this contradiction and to supply a true account of the ontological ground for the noetic object. The linchpin in Marechal's deduction is the concept of final causality, for it enabled him to appropriate the principal conclusion of traditional theory: that all agents must have some final end or terminus for their activity. And the human intellect, with its infinite potentiality, has for its final end Infinite Being. [38]

The relationship of final causality is to be observed in the process that is identified as. objective knowledge. Marechal emphasized that the possession of an intelligible form, the species abstracted from the material thing, is not a static perfection or actualization of the intellect; it is "le dessin actuel d'un mouvement," [39] a provisory term or end of the intellect's tendency toward Infinite Being. As provisory, a noetic object is distinct from the knowing subject because it is only a *partial* realization of the intellect's potency and not the final end of the *rationalis appetitus.*

Demonstrate that all these partial ends are necessarily in the " ordre absolu du noum{me," [40] and one thus proves that the condition which distinguishes a noetic object from the subject, the relationship of finality, is the same condition that grounds a noetic object in the ontological order. This demonstration establishes that the phenomenological affirmation of the extramental character of a noetic object also entails the ontological reality and intelligibility of the noetic object, the noumenal "en-soi " distinct from the subject.

Kant restricted the affirmation of the noumenal order to postulates of practical reason that enshrine the moral necessity to ground the categorical imperative. In addition to the difficulties inherent in Kant's singularly austere concept of duty,

---

[38] - *L'infinite virtuelle* de !'intelligence, comme puissance, et !'objet formel total de !'intelligence, *l'etre abstrait et transcendantal,* sont done des expressions correlatives, qui se peuvent indifferemment deduire l'une de l'autre."   V, 375.

[39] V, 443.

••V, 445.

Marechal discerned a more fundamental oversight in the argument from Practical Reason. Moral action is only secondary or derivative; practical postulates should be derived from the conditions of the fundamental human a priori, the necessity of voluntary action *in genere.*

In opposition to Kant, Marechal insisted that the affirmation of the noumenal order is a necessity of theoretical reason because such an affirmation is the necessary logical condition for voluntary action *in genere.* That is, to attempt to will an end which is, under all conditions, a logical impossibility is simply to attempt to will non-being. And this notion, in reference to the primary nature of the will, is self-contradictory. [41] Consequently, the logical condition for every voluntary act or pursuit of an end, is, *implicitly,* the judgment that it is logically possible to realize this end.

If we schematize Marechal's prolix argumentation/ [2] his

[41] Marechal claimed that the Final End, God, is logically possible for man to attain. It cannot be the case that "... la tendance radicalle de notre nature intellectuelle devient une absurdite logique: l'appetit du neant" V, 448. In this *reductio ad absurdum* argument, Marechal fell back on the axiom, " Desiderium naturae non potest esse inane." Otherwise, "... 'la volonte de nature' devrait etre con<;ue comme volonte de !'impossible: l'etre tendrait au neant; la position serait negation, le non-etre etre" V, 421. However, these assertions are not meant to compromise the gratuitous, super-natural character of the Final End. See V, 419-423.

•• Marechal propounded a metaphysical and a transcendental deduction of the " affirmation ontologique." The transcendental deduction deploys the phenomenological method and is considered to be, because of Kant, an unavoidable prolegomenon for a critical metaphysics. (Cf. V, 15-16.) The phenomenological method, however, is " un artifice " yet legitimate because it terminates in " l'affirmation metaphysique sous les phenomimes" (V, 69). Thus, the two deductions are complementary since they both arrive at the same ontological conclusions. The metaphysical deduction, although it assumes the ontological reality of the noetic object, includes the transcendental subject. The transcendental deduction, although it begins only with the a priori subject, concludes to the existence and intelligibility of the ontological object. (Cf. V, 69-70.)

The difference between the metaphysical and the transcendental deductions is the difference in their starting points. The starting point of the metaphysical deduction is the noetic object interpreted ontologically: the "proportion entitative" between existent things and the intellect. (Cf. V, 460, # 1.) In the Kantian sense, the metaphysical deduction is " uncritical." A critical (transcendental) de-

transcendental   deduction devolves into three major steps that bridge the gap between the logical (phenomenological) possibility of volitional and noetic ends and the ontological or noumenal reality of those ends. The deduction proves that: (1) *Phenomenologically,* the Final End for the human intellect is Infinite Being, the Absolute, or God.[43]   The logical possibility of God entails the existence of God.[44]   (3) The existence

duction assumes only the phenomenal object denuded of any ontological reality. Its *point de depart* is " ... une diversite ordonnee de 'phenomenes' contingents, presents *a* la pensee, et dont il s'agit precisement d'apprecier le rapport eventuel avec un absolu ontologique" (V,   .

[43] "Intellectus   autem respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri" (V, 374). For Marechal, the Thomistic argument is demonstrative but it should be put into a transcendental mode. (Cf. V,   In the transcendental mode, the concept of an end is " analytically " derivable from the concept of motion as a passage from potency to act. (Cf. V, 363.) That St. Thomas did not have an " analytic" concept of final causality has been established in a detailed textual survey by George P. Klubertanz, "St. Thomas' Treatment of the Axiom 'Omne Agens Agit Propter Finem,'" in *An Etienne Gilson Tribute,* ed. by Charles J. O'Neil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), pp. 101-117. In referring to the Final End, Marechal used expressions such as " Infinite Being," " the Absolute," and "God," interchangeably.   (See V, 375,   Cf. Edouard Dirven, S. J., *De la forme a l'acte: Essai sur le thomisme, de Joseph Marechal, S. J.* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1965), p. 149, footnote

[44] La fin subjective adequate de notre dynamisme intellectuel-la   beatitude parfaite, possession du Bien parfait-consiste dans nne ' assimilation ' saturante de la forme de l'etre, en d'autres termes dans la possession de Dieu. Et cette fin, quoique surnaturelle, doit etre, *en soi,* possible: sinon la tendance radicale de notre nature intellectuelle devint une absurdite logique: l'appetit du neant.

Or la *possibilite* de la fin subjective (' finis quo ') presuppose la *realite* de la ·fin objective, ('finis cujus ') pour que l'assimilation *a* r:Etre absolu soit possible, *il faut* avant tout que cet Etre absolu *existe.* . . .

Et, par consequent, dut-on repousser la valeur metaphysique immediate des tendances ' naturelles,' valeur admise par les Scholastiques, il resterait encore que poser un acte intellectuel quelconque, c'est affirmer *implicitement,* non pas seulement la possibilite mais la realite de la ' fin objective,' du ' finis qui, vel cujus,' condition logique de possibilite de la ' fin subjective.'

Lorsque la 'fin objective' est un *objet fini,* le mode de realite de ce dernier n'est point totalement fixe par le seul fait de 'terminer' objectivement une tendance ....

Mais lorsque cet objet est Dieu, lorsque la fin objective s'identifie avec l'Etre *necessaire par soi* (Acte pur), qui n'a pas d'autre mode de realite que l'existence absolue, l'exigence dialectique enveloppee dans le desir prend une portee nouvelle-- et cela, non pas *a* raison du seul desir naturel, mais *a* raison de l'*objet* du desir:

of God as the Final End grounds the noumenal existence of all finite (partial) ends. [45]

Since it embodies much traditional metaphysical vocabulary but does so under a novel doctrinal aegis, it is necessary to reiterate, with some commentary, the three steps of this de- duction.

First,   appealed to the idea of the adequate formal object of the intellect (*totius entis universalis)*   and finality *(rationalis appetitus).*   This reinstatement of traditional meta- physics, however, is made from the standpoint of a *phenom- enology* that portrays Infinite Being, the Absolute, or God as the Final End of the human intellect. To this phenomenology is joined a logical analysis of the conditions which make possible the activity of the finite will.

Secondly, Marechal stressed, it is true, the *de facto* dynamism of the finite intellect but the existence of the Absolute which grounds this dynamism is demonstrated by a simple and classic statement of the Ontological Argument: [46] the existence of God

affirmer de Dieu qu'il est possible, c'est affirmer purement et simplement qu'il existe, puisque son existence est la condition de toute possibilite.

Nous pouvions done poser, en toute rigueur, que la *possibilite* de notre fin derniere subjective presuppose logiquement *!'existence* de notre fin derniere objective, Dieu, et qu'ainsi, dans chaque acte intellectuel, est affirmee *implicitement* d'un Etre absolu: ' Omnia coguoscentia coguoscunt implicite Deum in quolibet coguito ' (V*erit., !it!it, !it,* ad I. Interpreter ceci par *S. Th.,* I, 84, *5;* 88, 3) ." V, 448-450.

•• "Achevons de degager ce que la finalite de notre acte intellectuel renferme d'implicite.

Nous tenons deja !'existence necessaire de la fin derniere objective.

Ajoutons-y !'existence necessaire de tout ce que !'analyse revelerait etre indis- solublement lie a la fin derniere; cela va de soi [viz., les fins partielles subordon- nees].' V, 451.

" Les formes particulieres, immanentes a notre intelligence, tiennent done leur valeur objective de leur subordination finale a une Necessite absolue .... " V, 459.

•• My assertion has been called "simply wrong" by J. Michael Vertin, "The Transcendental Vindication of the First Step in Realist Metaphysics According to Joseph Marechal" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1973), p. !it86. [Cf. Denis J. M. Bradley, "Transcendental Critique and the Possibility of a Realistic Metaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy of Joseph Marechal" (un- published Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1970), pp. 137-138.]

But consider Vertin's reconstruction of Marechal's argument: ". . . (1) the intelligence's striving for an objective term implies the intelligence's affirming that

is possible, but since the Divine Existence must be conceived as the necessary ground of all logical possibility, *therefore,* God exists.

that term is (a) at least possible, in general, and (b) actual at the time when it is achieved, (2) the intelligence inevitably strives for an ULTIMATE objective term, and (3) the notion of the ultimate objective term implies the notion of unlimited actuality and thus excludes the notion of mere possibility; and, consequently, (4) it follows that the intelligence inevitably affirms that ultimate term as actual." *[Ibid.]* No less than Marechal, Vertin (expressly in step 3) argues from the *notion* of possibility to the "notion of unlimited actuality."

Dirven candidly admits: "Ce texte [V, 448-450], qui ressemble tellement a la preuve ontologique de Leibniz, est simplement deroutant " *[op. cit.,* p. 248] but emphasizes Marechal' s reference to " *l'exigence dialectique* du desir " (p. 250) . Vertin also stresses "the implicit, dynamic, performative order" (p. 286) and cites Marechal's specific criticisms of the Ontological Argument (See V, 473, 339, 344-346, 472-474, etc.) to support the idea that the deduction argues from the *de facto* intellectual dynamism to the Final End which makes this dynamism possible.

Similarly Dirven: "Ceci est prouve [i.e., the existence of God], non par l'analyse logique du contenu conceptuel, ni par un examen du pur finalisme ... mais par un enracinement *dans l'etre du dynamisme . .•. " (Op. cit.,* p. 253, italics mine).

However, on the premise that Marechal criticized the Ontological Argument one can hardly conclude that his own deduction is free from every vestige of Anselmian logic. To the contrary, the regulations which initially govern the deduction create a profound antithesis: Either (1) the *de facto* intellectual dynamism is merely and strictly a phenomenological dynamism void of any ontological referent, or (2) it is, actually, an existential dynamism rooted in Being. In order to refute Kant, Marechal needed to prove (2) but was constrained to begin his argument with the assertion of (1). Yet if Dirven and Vertin have correctly characterized the deduction, then Marechal, in fact, began with (2), in which case his argument does not accomplish its stated objective. Assuming that his argument begins at (1), as Marechal claimed, it seems necessary that some form of the Ontological Proof be interpolated.

For if Marechal presupposed, uncritically, the ontological existence of the *de facto* intellectual dynamism, his deduction founders on a methodological in- consistency. The " factuality" of that dynamism must be maintained to be strictly in the phenomenological realm. But if it is consistently restricted to a phenomenological *terminus a quo,* the deduction can only move from a *notion* (a description with an existential *epoche)* of intellectual dynamism to that analytically implied *notion* of the intellect's Final End which, in this case, must necessarily be conceived to exist. Indeed, the Ontological Proof introduced at this point is highly " dialectical " and more subtle than the Anselmian and Ra- tionalist formulations that Marechal criticized.

However, merely to observe that Marechal's deduction "... est suspendue, non a notre marche vers un *terme,* mais a l'objet en taut que conditionnant l'etre de la marche" (Dirven, p. 250) is to ignore the methodological problem and to

... affirmer de Dieu qu'il est possible c'est affirmer purement et simplement qu'il existe, puisque son existence ,est la condition de toute possibilite (V, 450).

The third step promulgates the significant and novel conclusion. In the case of the partial specifications of finite intellectual dynamism, the End absolutely " justifies" the means. Because God exists, any noetic object that is, phenomenologically, a subordinated end on the way to the Absolute must also be conceived to have a noumenal existence and intelligibility.

Elsewhere, it should be readily acknowledged, Marechal denied the probity of Anselm's reasoning, confident, no doubt, that his own *dialeotical* treatment of intellectual tendency did not stray from the preserve of Thomistic orthodoxy .. But one asks how is there a way to pass from a truly Phenomenological Absolute to a truly Ontological Absolute other than by the Ontological Argument? Surely in the very necessity to make this passage, there is revealed the radical discrepancy between *Cahier V* and the classical, especially Thomist, procedure.

The Aristotelian and Thomistic arguments begin with the existent motion in the world, establish the impossibility of an actually existent infinite series of moved movers, and conclude to the actual existence of an Unmoved Mover or Final End which is the definitive termination of the series of relative or subordinated ends. Marechal, however, could not demonstrate that the ontological existence of the Final End follows from the *existence* of the subordinated series of relative ends because, in his deduction, these ends are initially assumed to be only phenomenal. Indeed, it is the specific purpose of the deduction to demonstrate that this initial assumption is *ultimately* false but it is essential to begin only there.

raise but not pursue the ontological question. How can Being be introduced into an argument which is, *ex hypothesi, strictly phenomenological?*

Reviewing Marechal's argument, Joseph De Vries, S. J., *La Pensee et L'Etre* (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, p. concludes: " ... une metaphysique de la connaissance qui pretend resoudre les problemes critiques fondamentaux en s'appuyant sur la connaissance de la ' nature de !'intelligence' ne peut manquer de presupposer deja ce qu'elle veut demontrer."

In a Thomistic metaphysics, no bridge can be built between a Phenomenological Absolute and its subordinated series of phenomenal ends and an Ontological Absolute which is the *causa essendi* of all subordinated beings. For Marechal removed from his deduction the initial affirmation of finite *esse* that is the cardinal principle and sole motive force of the Thomistic proof.. As a result, the transcendental deduction of the ontological affirmation reverses the order of the Thomistic proof from final causality; it argues from the existence of God to the existence of finite beings.[47] In Marechal's deduction, then, there is sufficient "ontologism " to satisfy the suspicions of Kantians and Thomists alike.

On the other hand, Marechal understood the Critical Philosophy to be contradictory since it posits a phenomenal object divorced from its ontological grounds. But the doctrine of a strictly phenomenal object was Kant's personal mistake. Kant's method can be freed from that mistake. An adequate transcendental analysis, even if-for the sake of philosophical dialogue-it begins, hypothetically, with the Kantian phenomenal object, proves that the so-called strictly phenomenal object must necessarily be "sublated" into the reality of the noumenal order, indeed, into the very order of the Absolute.

III.

Unfortunately, terminological and logical confusions mar Marechal's ingenious attempt to refute the Kantian doctrine of cognitive objectivity. In Marechal's reading of the *Critique,* the " premiere opposition " of the subject and the object is engendered by the " imposition " of the categories on the phenomenon. His definition of the phenomenon as " le donne reS!u par nous" corresponds, apparently, to Kant's term "appearance" *(Erscheinung)* in the first edition, the sensible datum as subject to the a priori forms of space and time.[48] If "opposi-

---

•• See Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., "The Conclusion of the *Prima Via,"* in *Modern Schoolman,* 80   pp. 88-58,   "Actuality in the 'Prima Via' of St. Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies,*   (1967), pp.

•• Cf. ilI, 145; *K. r. V.,* A90,

tion" first arises when the phenomenon *(Erscheinung)* is sub-
ject to the categories, the implication is that there can be an
unsynthesized manifold, that is, an *Erscheinung* not subject
to the categories. Although problematical/ ⁹ there are texts to
support this idea in the *Critique.*

   Kant gave one clear statement of the relationship between
"appearance" *(Erscheinung)* and" phenomenon."

Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the
unity of the categories, are called phenomena   .

This text, however, is not included in the second edition, which
does not hold to the distinction first drawn. On the contrary,
in the second edition, the term " *Erscheinung* " is used to cover
both the indeterminate object of sensible intuition and the de-
terminate object of the understanding. ⁵⁰ In the case of the
indeterminate object of sensible intuition, what is given, strictly
speaking, is the matter of appearance. The form of the appear-
ance pertains to the a priori forms of the sense faculty. ⁵¹ In
both editions, Kant rarely used the term " phenomenon " and
when it is used, it can only refer to *Erscheinung* in the full
sense-to the determinate object of the understanding.

   In A248 ⁵² Kant distinguished the different contributions to
knowledge of the sense faculty and the understanding. Sensi-
bility accounts for *Erscheinung,* the understanding for the phe-
nomenal objects, although the production of the phenomenal
object comes about only because the understanding is neces-
sarily related to the sense faculty. Marechal's definition of the
"phenomenon," "l'etat du donne sensible sous les formes
spatiale et temporelle " ⁵³ is confusing and confused.

⁴⁹ See *K. r. V.,*   Cf. Graham Bird, *Kant!s Theory of Knowledge: An Out-
line of One Central Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul,   p. 58.
   ⁵⁰ E. g., *K. r. V.,*   fl'. Cf. T. D. Weldon, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,   ed., 1958), p.
   ⁵¹ See *K. r. V.,*
   ⁵² Commenting on this text, H. J. Paton, *Kant!s Metaphysic of Experience,* Vol.
II (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1986), p. 440 complains: "... [Kant]
habitually uses the word 'appearance ' *[Erscheinung]* without making clear whether
by that he means the whole object or only a partial and temporary aspect of it."
   ⁵⁸ III, 144,

Kant did not use the term " phenomenon" to refer to the indeterminate object of sensible intuition and never considered the phenomenon to be merely "l'etat d'impression subjective." [54] Marechal's notion that the categories impose "conditions nouvelles " [55] on the "phenomenon" and that these new conditions are what enable one " connaitre le phenom{me objectivement" [56] is meaningless. By Kantian definition a "phenomenon" is a categorized object, so that the subject-object opposition cannot be based on an opposition of the phenomenon to the a priori categories of the understanding. In the *Critique* there is not and cannot be any such opposition.

Evidently, Marechal's muddled terminology indicates a more significant anomaly in the starting point of his deduction. Marechal identified the " phenomenon" in a way that could only be isomorphic with Kant's problematical idea of an unsynthesized manifold. But the idea of an unsynthesized manifold is never the initial premise in any of Kant's arguments. Rather, all the versions of the Transcendental Deduction presuppose an empirical unity of consciousness, a unity that is multifaceted and variously explicated by Kant. What Kant demonstrated is that the *de facto* empirical or psychological unity of consciousness has its necessary ground in an a pnon or transcendental unity of consciousness. [57]

---

[54] III, 141.

[55] III, 145.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] Marechal noted "' L'objet dans Ia pensee,' ou la 'pensee objective,'-postulat initial de toute Ia Critique- .... " (III,   but commenced with "le point de vue de !'objet, considere precisivement comme 'objet phenomenal '" (V, 589). This, supposedly, is "le minimum incontestable d'objet donne ' a titre de science ' . . . selon Kant. . . ." *(ibid.)* . By "precisivement," Marechal meant that one should adopt an "as if" stance: his deduction proves that "la notion d'objet *exclusivement* phenomenal" is intrinsically contradictory but, in the beginning, this is the assumed (false) pr.emise. (Cf. V, 517.)

Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 105, explains that " In each of the versions of the Deduction, ... the starting point ... is a revised form of the *cogito* which expresses what Kant believes to be the most general fact about any consciousness: its unity."

In the first edition, Kant distinguished between a Subjective and an Objective Deduction. [58] The text is tortuous but the key to the Subjective Deduction is the doctrine of the three-fold synthesis which is the a priori generative process, the activity which is the understanding itself, that underlies and grounds the unity of consciousness. The Objective Deduction assumes this generated unity of consciousness, the " original apperception," and proceeds to the essential elaboration of the validity of our a priori concepts. In the second edition, although the distinction between the Subjective and Objective Deductions is not maintained with any consistency or clarity, the doctrine of a priori synthesis must still be presumed to be the generative source of the transcendental unity of apperception. This latter doctrine, fully developed, is the characteristic Kantian expression of the necessary unity of consciousness. For, on the level of the understanding, the transcendental unity of apperception is not only the principle governing concepts but it is also the supreme principle of the possibility of all intuitions. [59] The function of judgments, the categories of the Metaphysical Deduction, is to bring the manifold of intuition under this one, original apperception. [60]

Kant did allow, perhaps inconsistently, that we can think of the concept of an unsynthesized manifold. But this is the concept of thought negating its own contribution and leaving as a remainder the uncategorized sensible data. Since Kantian knowledge is the determination of sensible intuitions according to the categories, it is impossible, in any positive sense, to know the sensible given in and by itself. The attempt to conceive this situation is only to set a limit, in reference to the mutual con-

---

Marechal thought that his own conception of the " phenomenal object " marked the most elementary level of consciousness since " ... on ne pent descendre endessous sans rendre impossible toute conscience objective" (V, 589). But Kant would have regarded Marechal's starting point as already making " conscience objective" impossible. Cf. *K. r. V.,* BlSl-132.

[58] See *K. r. V.,* Axvi.

[59] See *K. r. V.,* Al22.

•• See *K. r. V.,* Al27, Bl35.

tributions of sensibility and understanding, to " the notion of experience itself." [61] Marechal's concept of the phenomenon and Kant's idea of an unsynthesized manifold, if we have correctly coordinated them, are both *Grenzbegrif]e.*

Yet the purpose of Marechal's deduction is to demonstrate that Kant's concept of an" objet exclusivement phenomenal" is self-contradictory. This supposed self-contradiction is puzzling. How does it arise if the phenomenal object is entirely defined by negating any determinative predicates? There can be no contradiction, it would seem, unless Marechal's concept of a phenomenon incorporates some categorial content which could be signified by predicates that are incompatible in the same subject. The discovery that the concept of the phenomenal object is self-contradictory indicates, certainly, a deviation from any isomorphic element discernible in Kant's epistemology but, principally, it reveals the equivocation latent in Marechal's definition of his own starting point.

In comparison with the texts wherein Kant distinguished the phenomenal and noumenal orders, Marechal's version of the phenomenal object is truncated. Kant clearly attributed to the phenomenal object an ontological ground. [62] The definitions of appearance and thing-in-itself, or phenomenon and noumenon, are correlatives. The phenomenon is the noumenon known under the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding. Despite persistent criticism, Kant never doubted either the independent reality of the thing-in-itself or its unknowability. Paradoxically, because we *krww* only phenomena we can and must *think* of noumena. Without the doctrine of the ontological autonomy of the noumenon, the Transcendental Aesthetic, with its definitive affirmation of an independent, non-subjective source of the manifold of sensible intuition, would be completely overthrown, and with it, the entire Critical Philosophy. [68]

[81] Bird, p.

•• See *K. r. V.,* Bxxvi-Bxxvii.

•• See Bernard Rousset, *La doctrine kantienne de l'objectivite: L'autonomie*

The affirmation of the ontological reality of the thing-in-itself
is, admittedly, problematic.   "Existence" is a category which,
in the *Critique,* can properly apply only to the data of sensible
intuition.   The Kantian problem becomes insurmountable if one
regards the phenomenon and the noumenon as two separate en-
tities or affirms the being of the noumenon to be diverse from
the being of the phenomenon.   For Kant, apart from some oc-
casional, careless phrases, did not envisage the noumenon as an
entity distinct from the phenomenon.   The distinction between
the two is not in the ontological order.   The noumenon refers
to the same ontological object as the phenomenon but from a
different epistemological perspective. [64]

The duality that characterizes the noumenon and the phe-
nomenon is a duality that springs not from two diverse beings
but from the fact that the known object has two different kinds
of relationship to the knowing subject.   These two different
relationships are analytically implied by the concept of
Erscheinung by which it is both possible and necessary to think
of the object of experience apart from the conditions of sensi-
bility. If that possibility is eliminated, then the *Critique* could
no longer meaningfully pose the givenness of sensible intuition.
As evidenced by the great divide between Kant and his suc-
cessors, the objectivity of knowledge, ultimately, rests on the
ontological reality of the unknowable thing-in-itself, the founda-
tion that makes the Critical Philosophy an .empirical realism
and not an empirical idealism. [65]

In the *First Critique,* against the claims of dogmatic meta-
physics, Kant protested that theoretical reason could neither
prove nor disprove the existence of God.   However, once ren-
dered impotent, theoretical reason could permit a philosophical
faith.   For the God of the *Second Critique* is the rationally
justifiable postulate of a practical reason which, in the face of
nature's indifference to man, must show the "necessary con-

comme devoir et devenir (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1967), pp.
162-177.

    •• See *K. r. V.,* ASO.

    [65] See *K. r. V.,* A370, B519a.

nection between morality and proportionate happiness." [68] This divine harmony, or *Summum Bonum* for which men strive, is guaranteed in the *Third Critique* by a God whose existence is postulated as the necessary condition for the moral teleology intrinsic to free human action. [87]

The Moral Law, which always commands some end to be achieved, entails the concept of freedom, of agents causing effects in the phenomenal world, and this agency, in turn, necessarily implies purposiveness. Concomitantly, there appears, between the realms of a postulated freedom and a nature bound in ineluctable causal chains, an " immeasurable gulf " [68] that theoretical reason cannot traverse. However, the *First Critique,* in fact, had already constructed just that bridge in the schematism which depicts judgment as the link between reason and understanding. [69] By their schematism, the Faculty of Judgment can give to itself the law of the purposiveness of nature, not as a determinative category but as a heuristic principle or reflective judgment guiding the understanding. [70]

Purposiveness, not only as an exigency of the moral realm, must also be attributed to nature itself because the concept of " mechanical " causality is insufficient to explain all phenomena. Nature may be regarded as a mere mechanism but not even a Newton can explain the production of a blade of grass, or any other living thing, without relying on the concept of a design or purpose underlying the pertinent causal laws. Kant did not suggest, however, that teleological explanations, because they are necessary heuristic principles, are logically superior to causal laws. "As far as it is in our power," [71] everything in nature should be interpreted according to mechanical causality.

[68] *Critique of Practical Reason,* trans. by Lewis White Beck (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1956), p. 129.

•• See *Critique of Judgment,* trans. by J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1951), pp. 298-804 [= *C.* J., pp. 298-304].

[68] *C.* J., p. 12.

•• See *K. r. V.,* B176-B187 .

•• *C.* J., p. 17.

[71] *C.* J., p. 264.

In one sense, teleological and causal explanations are on a par.
The causal principle is itself constitutive of our knowledge of
nature, but the maxim that "All explanations should only be
causal ' as far as it is in our power' " is a regulative principle.
Without generating an antinomy for theoretical reason, the two
maxims, since they are reflective judgments, govern only our
way of investigating nature which must be viewed from both
the causal and the teleological standpoints.

The concepts of the understanding, although determinative
of nature in general, the horizon of possible experience, do not
exhaust the manifold of nature. There remains an indefinite
number of laws that cannot be deduced from the categories of
the understanding but can only be educed from empirical ex-
perience.72 From the standpoint of our understanding, these
empirical laws are known as contingent but because we regard
them as laws of nature, we must think them as necessary. Since
they cannot be derived from the categories, there must be dis-
cerned for these laws another principle of unity, " so as to make
possible a system of experience." 73 Such a unified system is
accomplished by reflective judgment positing the law of the
purposiveness of nature.

When applied to the realm of appearances, the concept of
an unconditioned is not a constitutive principle of any em-
pirical series but is a heuristic rule governing "the widest pos-
sible empirical employment of the understanding." 74 An ap-
pearance as such is always conditioned, and reason in investi-
gating a series of appearances proceeds, by indefinite regression
or infinite analysis, without a terminal point. Kant's scientific
progress is the modern, never-ending search for particular
causal laws.

Although God is the ground for the totality of all empirical
conditions, Kantian reason must think the Necessary Being" as
entirely outside the series of the sensible world." 75 The concept

•• *K. r. V.,* Bl65 .
•• *C. J.,* p. 16.
•• *K. r. V.,* B545.
•• *K. r. V.,* B589.

of God signifies; not the first member in a series of empirical conditions, for there is none, but the " unknown ground of the possibility of the sensible series in general." [76]

In the noumenal realm, Kant allowed that reason can think that causes do not proceed *in infinitum.* [77] But this concept of pure reason has no application to the realm of appearances, and no speculative proof for the existence of God can be constructed on the basis of the traditional metaphysical principle, *Impossibile est in finibus procedere in infinitum.* This latter is not a constitutive principle of the understanding that governs any empirical series. Similarly, the corollary principle, *Omne age'M agit propter finem,* is not a universal and necessary condition of all possible experience but should be applied only to one class of agents.

For Kant carefully argued, in the *Third Critique,* that some cause-effect relationships can be simply and completely explained by mechanical or efficient causality. The only cause-effect relationship that necessitates reference to the concept of end or purpose is found in a living, organized being, the relationship of the living whole to its parts. In this case too, the purposiveness attributed to the living whole is posited in a reflective judgment that embodies an analogical concept of purposiveness originally instantiated in the moral act. [78]

In *Cahier V,* the description of noetic finality is a knowledge claim about the universal and constitutive feature of phenomenal experience. In that way, Marechal identified the heuristic and the constitutive. For the Critical Philosophy, this attempted identification could only be judged illegitimate, a dogmatic over-extension that confuses determinative and reflective judgments.

In the opinion of contemporary scholars, an opinion which Marechal also held, the problem of noetic objectivity is "the

[76] *K. r. V.,* B59Q.

[77] Cf. *K. т. V.,* B443-B448.

[78] " For we bring in a teleological ground . . .when we represent to ourselves the possibility of the object after the analogy of that causality which we experience in ourselves . . . . " *C.* J., p. Q06.

specifically critical problem," identical with the " transcendental deduction" [79] itself. In the *Critique* the objectivity of knowledge emerges from the oppositions of internal to external sense, from sensible intuition to the a priori categories of the understanding, and from the subject as activity distinguished from the product of its activity. The dynamic activity of the Kantian subject is displayed in the irreducible distinction between intuition and spontaneity, and, most clearly, in the ceaseless workings of the imagination whose temporal schemata mediate between the pure categories and sensible intuition. [80]

From a Realist, and especially from a professed Thomist, one might anticipate the charge that the Kantian resolution of the critical problem is deranged because it establishes that the " subjective is the foundation of the objective." [81] But Marechal precisely complained that Kant ignored the proper dynamism of the knowing subject in favor of a static and formalistic epistemology.[82] Kant, we know, did not advert, in the three critiques, to any teleological theory to explain the objectivity of knowledge. This, however, is neither a lacuna in the Critical Philosophy nor a sign of its excessive formalism; it is, rather, merely an indication, in this context, that the *First Critique* provides a unique elucidation of the subjective activity that underlies all objective knowledge.

Kant explained, in a footnote in the *Prolegomena,* that be,...

[79] H.-J. De Vleeschauwer, *The Development of Kantian Thought: The History of a Doctrine,* trans. by A. R. C. Duncan (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd.,   pp. *56,* 75.

[80] " This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul. ... " *K. r. V.,* B180.

[81] De Vleeschauwer, p. 70.

[82] "En fait, Kant ne tire aucun parti de l'acte transcendantal d'affirmation, que pourtant il suppose. En formulant les conclusions agnostiques de la *Critique de la raison pure,* il se rabat sur les seules relations formelles et statiques de la connaissance. L'affirmation de la 'Chose en soi' reste un episode inexploite" (V,

Rousset, however, is more judicious: "A la racine de la correlation statique entre le sujet et !'objet, il y a donc un perpetuel dynamisme constructeur, que mettent specialement en evidence laplace accordee a !'imagination, la definition de l'entendement par !a spontaneite .... " *(Op. cit.,* p. 341).

cause of a difference in the argument's starting point, two different methods could be employed in the development of the Transcendental Deduction. [83] The *Prolegomena,* for reasons of pedagogic simplicity, uses the analytic method which *assumes* the cognitive validity of physics and geometry, and regressively explicates the a priori conditions of possibility for these sciences. The *Critique,* since a truly critical argument must be presuppositionless, uses the synthetic-progressive method. It demonstrates from independently reasoned premises about the unity of consciousness, that geometry and physics, but not metaphysics, are transcendentally possible and valid. [84]

The actual argument of the *Critique,* however, surpasses the tidy distinctions of the *Prolegomena.* Commentators dispute how the two methods are finally related, but usually they hold that the *Critique* reinstates both methods at a higher level of philosophical complexity .[85] The reason for this complexity can easily be grasped. By means of the synthetic-progressive method barely outlined in the *Prolegomena,* Kant attempted to prove not only the possibility of an object of experience but to prove the possibility of experience in general. The nature of this task, so unique and difficult, suggests that the relationship between the two methods, as they were mutually developed in the *Critique,* could not have been given a simple or an exact parallel elsewhere.

Between the *Critique* and *Cahier V,* however, there is no methodological parallel. Marechal's transcendental deduction is not a synthetic-progressive demonstration because it does not begin with a reasoned premise whose truth remains certain. The conclusion of his argument *cancels* the initial premise (the concept of a strictly phenomenal object) by exposing its inherent self-contradiction. But, alternatively, Marechal's deduction is not analytic-regressive. Its initial premise, although

[83] See *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,* ed. by Paul Carus (La Salle, Dlinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1955), p. 9!7, note.

•• Cf. *ibid.,* p. 9!4. But this text is contradicted by K. *r. V.,* B!itO.

[85] See Roger Verneaux, *Le v.ocabulaire de Kant: doctrines et methodes* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1967), pp. 175-181.

hypothetically taken to be true, does not correspond, obviously,
to the *Prolegomena's* assumption of the validity of geometry
and physics. The *Critique,* far from undermining their assumed
validity, provides for these sciences a transcendental and in-
dubitable justification.

Marechal's deduction begins with an apparently true premise
that is then proved to be false by the internal movement of the
argument itself. The self-contradiction hidden in the assumed
starting point necessitates a passage from falsity to truth, or,
one may say, from appearance to reality. This internal   move-
ment or passage provides the clue to the method actually used
in *Cakier V.*

The common purpose of all the various forms of the *dia-
lectical method* is " to transcend or remove contradiction," [86]
and, in the Hegelian dialectic, the removal of contradiction is
accomplished by an" inward mediation ... [that] proves itself
to be necessary." [87] This, exactly, is what Marechal's argument
effects on its own premise: the concept of a strictly phenomenal
object is shown to be self-contradictory, and, therefore, neces-
sarily generative of a new starting point. Marechal accused
Kant of propounding a theory of knowledge which was exces-
sively "formelle et statique." [88] This remark, so indicative of
a dialectical philosophy, echoes Hegel's fundamental   com-
plaint: "After all, it was only formally, that the Kantian sys-
tem established the principle that thought is spontaneous." [89]

Whereas Marechal accepted the basic viability of Kant's
method, Hegel had decided that the Critical Philosophy needed
a radical reorientation to overcome the one-sidedness of its
method through a Dialectic that would restore to Reason its

[86] Richard P. McKeon, "Philosophy   and Method," *Journal of Philosophy,* 48
(1951), p. 662.

[87] G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. I, trans. by E. B.
Speirs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1895), p. *65.*

[88] V, 592.

[89] *The Science of Logic: The First Part of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences in Outline,* trans. by William Wallace, 2nd ed., rev. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1892), p. 119.

full scope and power. [90] Thus, Marechal's transcendental jus-
tication of a realist metaphysics, if successful, not only turns
the *Critique of Pure Reason* on its head, but also refutes the
Hegelian riposte that the partiality of the Kantian method leads
necessarily to its dialectical sublation by Reason. Therein lies
the central issue. In their disavowals of the *Critique* and in
their constructive designs, a close parallel can be drawn between
the criticisms and objectives of Hegel and Marechal.   Are we,
then, to view *Cahier V* in terms of its stated intentions, as an
attempt, possibly valid, to reestablish "Aristotelian-Thomistic"
metaphysics, or are we to conclude, through a more precise
analysis of the deduction's inner structure, that Marechal's
argument is, all said and done, a simulacrum of Hegel's *Logic?*
If, in fact, Marechal did not use Kant's method, as I have
argued, then the latter, Hegelian alternative may supply the
correct vantage for an assessment of the metaphysics in
Cahier V.

IV.

The transcendental deduction of the " affirmation ontologi-
que," as a type of argument, resembles the Hegelian transfor-
mation of phenomenology into logic or ontology. [91] The *Phe-
nomenology,* by means of a philosophical description of frag-
mentary experience, is compelled to reach at its end " science "
or the " organized whole of determinate and complete knowl-
edge." [92] The *Logic,* since it has been handed this " ladder,"

[90] Kant's "mistake was to stop at the purely negative point of view, and to
limit the uncDnditionality of Reason to an abstract self-sameness without any
shade of distinction.   It degrades Reason to a finite and conditioned thing, to
identify it with a mere stepping beyond the finite and conditioned range of un-
derstanding.   The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite,
always involves the absorptiDn of the finite into its own fuller nature." *Ibid.,* p. 93.

[91] Consciousness is Spirit as knowing which is concrete and engrossed in ex-
ternality; but the *schema of movement* of this concrete knowing (like the de-
velopment of all physical and intellectual life) depends entirely on the nature
of the pure essentialities which make up the content of Logic ... philosophy is
just the exhibition of this movement." *Science of Logic,* trans. Johnson and
Struthers, I (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 19£9), p. 37.

[92] *The Phenomenology of Mind,* trans. by Sir James Baillie (London: George
Allen and Unwin, rev. £nd ed., 1949), p. 79, [Preface].

begins at the standpoint of the Absolute and gives, in purely conceptual terms, a circular demonstration of its own rational necessity. Within that circle, the Ontological Argument evinces that this necessity, the inseparableness of Thought and Being, is " found in an absolute form ... in the case of God " [93] and in a relativ.e form in the case of finite being. [94]

In comparison with a *PhenomeJWlogy* that reveals the goal of history and culture, or a *Logic.* that thinks the thoughts of the Absolute, *Cahier V* may seem exceedingly modest. Nonetheless, it contains a phenomenology of the form of knowledge that internally generates an ontology of God and man. For Hegel and Marechal this dialectical transformation has as its privileged center an assertion of the necessary unity of Infinite Being and finite thought. In both dialectics, the Ontological Argument so employed entirely transcends its Anselmian formulation because it posits not only the existence of God but also the existence of all beings subordinated to God.

Cahier V stipulates that finite thought is possible because it is governed by the Principle of Identity which, in traditional metaphysics, is also the first principle of Being. [95] But one should not, as Marechal chastised Kant for doing, treat the Principle of Identity solely as an analytic norm of logic and ignore, thereby, its synthetic character. [96] This synthetic character can be grasped in the necessity expressed. In any judgment of identity the predicate is affirmed as necessarily identical with the subject, and this modal necessity reveals the unity of intelligibility and Being or, as Marechal maintained, the unity of essence and existence. Marechal's conclusion though idiosyncratic follows upon " Kantian " premises: since every synthesis is a unified diversity, for which there must be a prin-

[93] *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. III, p. 358.

[94] " ... every 'proof' of God [for Hegel] is reducible to the ontological proof; each argues from the necessity of thinking the infinite, if we are to *think* the finite." Quentin Lauer, "Hegel on Proofs for God's Existence," *Kant-Studien,* 55 (1964), p. 452.

[95] See V, 87-89.

[96] see V, 88.

ciple of unification, the necessary unity of Being and intelligibility in every judgment of identity has a ground. [97]

In the Principle of Identity, the synthesis expressed is of the most universal order," etre comme Realite et etre comme Idee." [98] One principle of unity is alone superior to this universal synthesis: the Absolute Unity of reality and thought-God. Finite thought, synthetic in nature because governed by the Principle of Identity, is unable to encompass the absolute unity of God except analogically. But once the first principle is affirmed, there is implicitly posed as its ground the necessary unity of Thought and Being in God. [99]

In effect, by making explicit the necessary relationship between any finite statement of identity and the Absolute, Marechal provided the elements of a proof for the existence of God. Although rudimentary and undeveloped, this " proof " conjures up Hegel's project. The *Logic* begins with the statement of undifferentiated identity or Pure Being. This presuppositionless beginning, to which in its own fashion *Cahier V* cursorily alludes, is the " point de depart " of Hegelian science. In the full mediation of the *Logic,* the Principle of Identity provides the dialectical source of all the categories implicit in the absolute identity of Thought and Being. [100]

Unlike the *Logic* and *Cahier V,* the *Critique* raises no ques-

•• " Car aucune synthese n'est necessaire par soi: la diversite, comme diversite, ne pouvant etre principe de sa propre unification, la necessite d'une synthese doit avoir sa source dans la necessite meme d'une unite oil s'efface la diversite des termes synthetiques."   V, *563.* Cf. *K. r. V.,* BIOS.

•• V, *563-564.*

•• "Les etapes dialectiques qui nous conduisent a l'Etre absolu par la voie du premier principe, entendu en son sens metaphysique integral, sont done les suivants: a) possibilite objective du premier principe, reconnue dans son application necessaire a !'objet physique ... ; b) affirmation de l'Absolu, Acte pur, comme source necessaire de cette possibilite objective. La seconde etape est bien reellement a priori mais elle resterait hypothetique,   faute de la premiere." V, *565.*

· 00 · ••• it is clear that the Law of Identity, and still more the Law of Contradiction, is not merely analytic, but synthetic. For in its expression the latter contains not only empty, simple self-identity, but also the Other of identity in general, and, further, absolute non-identity or self-contradiction. And the Law of Identity itself contains ... the movement of Reflection ---- " *Science of Logic,* Vol. II, pp. 4f.!-43.

tion of Being because Kant considered the origin of finite existence to be theoretically insoluble.[101] In that sensible intuition is simply given, Being too is simply given. Being is truly the supreme *quaestio facti* and the Critical Philosophy carefully confines itself to a manageable *quaestio juris,* how sensible intuition is possible and thinkable. This latter question transcendental method can resolve by validating the a priori concepts of the understanding, a validation which shows that the concept of God is solely a regulative idea of pure reason.[102]

Cahier V, however, raises the Hegelian question but withdraws from the Hegelian answer. It demonstrates that the necessarily existent God is an a priori condition of possibility for finite thought. The *Phenomenology* takes the next decisive step: God is an a priori condition of possibility for finite thought because the concept of the Absolute is Thought's most universal category.[103] In his intentions ever the faithful Thomist, Marechal did not take that step. To do so is to replace the Thomistic doctrine of a formal union between the knower and the known, the *adequatio rei et intellectus,* with the Hegelian doctrine that Thought and Being are identical. Above all, it is to do away with a created intelligence possessed of analogical knowledge of God in favor of an Absolute unfolding itself in finite thought.[104]

[101] · The objects of exp.erience, then, are *never given in themselves,* but only in experience, and have no existence outside it .... For everything is real which stands in connection with a perception .... The non-sensible cause of these representations is completely unknown to us .... We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity." *K. r. V.,* B521-B522. Cf. Cornelio Fabro, "The Transcendentality of *Ens-Esse* and the Ground of Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* 6 (1966), pp. 389-427.

[102] See *K. r. V.,* A696/B724-A702/B730.

[103] · This last embodiment of spirit-Spirit which at once gives its complete and true content the form of self, and thereby realizes its notion, and in doing so remains within its own notion-this is *Absolute Knowledge.* It is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, it is knowledge which comprehends through notions." *Phenomenology of Mind,* pp. 797-798.

[104] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 84, a. 1 and *Science of Logic,* Vol. II, pp. 466-486; *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 12, aa. 1-13 and *Phenomenology of Mind,* pp. 789-808.

Thomistic metaphysics identifies Thought and Being in God/[05] but preserves against any dialectical sublation the irreducible otherness of finite *esse intentionale* and *esse 1UJr turale.*[106] Moreover, in the Beatific Vision, in which the divine essence is seen because it is the form by which the intellect, through grace, understands, the finite intelligence does not dissolve into the divine intelligibility but remains incapable of comprehending the infinite God infinitely.[107] Guided by *Sacra Doctrina,* the metaphysical theology of the *Summa Theologiae* explains the relationship between finite thought and Being as a relationship between the creature and the Creator. Because human knowledge consists of judgments that refer to the *ipsum esse rei,*[108] it is related to God Who is *lpsum Esse Subsistens* and the universal *causa essendi.*[109] But this ontology of knowledge, entirely derived from the creature's existential relationship to the Creator, does not negate the " epistemological" level that is maintained in Thomistic noetic theory.[110] At the epistemological level, the level at which the intrinsic principles of the cognitive act are elucidated, the Absolute does not func-

---

[105] "In Deo autem non est forma quae sit aliud quam suum esse. . . . Unde, cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis . . . ex necessitate sequitur quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius essentia et eius esse." *Summa Theol.,* I, q.14, a. 4.

[106] " --- *esse* dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto." *Ibid,* q. 4, a. 4, ad 2.

[107] " In tantum enim intellectus creatus divinam essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, inquantum maiori vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur. Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum comprehendat." *Ibid.,* q. *Hl,* a. 7.

[108] *In Boethium de Tn'nitate,* q. *5,* a. 3, ed. P. Wyser, pp. 38, 11, 8-11.

[109] " Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius .... " *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 8, a. 1.

[110] " --- in luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et iudicamus, inquantum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale sive gratuitum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis primae .... Unde cum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur; multo minus Deus est id quod primo a nostro intellectu intelligitur." *Ibid.,* q. 88, a. 3, ad 1.

tion as an immanent condition for finite thought.r [11] Both na-
ture and intelligence are created and are secondary or depen-
dent, but each, in the Thomistic scheme, sustains its own
authentic and integral causal efficacy.[112] Thus, the human intel-
lect, considered as an activity, is the proper agent of its own
cognition, and, considered as a receptivity, is infqrmed by its
proper object, the abstracted natures of sensible things.[118]

If we reflect on Aquinas's unremitting rejection of Avicenna's
Dator Formarum or Averroes's Agent Intellect, [114] or, more sig-
nificantly, his complete recasting of the Augustinian theory of
divine illumination, [115] *Cahier V,* from a Thomistic perspective,
seems to obfuscate metaphysical and epistemological explana-
tions. True enough, God's existence is only implicitly affirmed
in each noetic act but, in fact, a solely epistemological explana-
tion of the validity of cognition is eliminated.[118] To explain
adequately a noetic act as act, one must posit God Who,
seemingly so transcendent, becomes a necessary condition with-
in the epistemological justification of knowledge. Here, viewed

[111] " --- habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum.... "
Ibid., q. 44, a. 1, ad 1.

[110] " --- quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt, quod
nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus sed solus Deus immediate omnia
operaretur .... Hoc autem est impossibile. Primo quidem, quia sic subtraheretur
ordo causae et causati a rebus creatis. Quod pertinet ad impotentiam creantis: ex
virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi.--Secundo, quia
virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur, frustra essent rebus attributae, 'li
per eos nihil operarentur. Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo
esse frustra, si propria operatione destituerentur; cum omnis res sit propter suam
operationem." *Ibid.,* q.105, a. *5.*

[118] " Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis,
nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstrac-
tionis." *Ibid.,* q. 79, a. 8, ad 8.

[11·] See *ibid.,* q. 79, aa. 4-5.

[110] See Etienne Gilson, " Sur quelques difficultes de !'illumination augustinienne,"
Revue Neo-scholastique de philostYphie, 86 (1984), pp. 828-881.

[118] "Nous croyons superflu d'insister sur Ia rencontre inevitable, dans toute con-
naissance intellectuelle d'objet, d'une double condition relative a Ia Realire: une
condition *empirique* (intuitive sensible), et une condition *tranacendantale* (rapport
implicite de toute synthese objective a Ia Realite absolue) .... " V, *565.*

from the Hegelian context, Marechal's argument stops short of an identification of "logic" and "ontology." [117]

On Kantian principles, *Cahier V* must certainly be judged a mistaken effort to reestablish pre-critical metaphysics. [118] But, in this regard, Marechal's mistakes are not those of an incompetent historian but of a philosopher who, in bending a method to serve purposes which, historically and philosophically, are alien, irresistibly transformed his own principles. Since philosophical methods, principles, and conclusions are mutually constituted, it is to be expected that the observant among latter-day Kantians and Thomists should reject *Cahier V.* On both sides, this rejection, needless to say, leaves unresolved the truth of the Hegelian *Aufhebung.*

Respect for the integrity of individual philosophies disinclines one to read the history of post-Kantian philosophy with Hegelian spectacles. [119] It should be allowed that the method of the *Critique* need not lead by any Hegelian necessity to the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic.* [120] Yet the Hegelian *Aufhebung* one might still consider, with whatever reservation, as the pertinent historical denouement of post-Kantian philosophy. But, merely on those cautious terms, the *Logic* can be seen to incorporate *Cahier V* in the unfolding of its own Dialectic. The transcendent Reason, by means of which Hegel closed in the Absolute the hiatus between finite thought and Being, brings

[117] " --- Ia logique transcendentale est deja Ie germe de Ia logique speculative de Hegel qui ne connait plus Ia borne de Ia chose en soi. Cette logique de l'etre se substitne a l'ancienne metaphysique qui s'ouvrait sur un monde transcendant. Hegel ne revient pas au dogmatisme anterieur, il prolonge Ia logique transcendentale en logique speculative. Les categories deviennent les categories memes de l'Absolu." Jean Hyppolite, *Logique et existooce: essai sur la logique de Hegel* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1961), p. 70.

[118] One recalls Kant's fulminations in the "Open Letter on Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre,* August 7, 1799,*" in Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondtmce, 1759-99,* ed. and trans. by Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 253-254.

[119] Cf.   pp. 9-17.

[120] For a general characterization of the "school of transcendental philosophers," see Klaus Hartmann, " On Taking the Transcendental Turn," *The Review of Metaphysics,* 20 (1966), pp. 223-249.

to a complete realization and harmonization, so he claimed, the God of the metaphysical tradition and the insights of transcendental philosophy.[121] In making the same attempt Marechal's metaphysics seems mightily, albeit unintentionally, drawn towards the same Absolute.[122]

Of course, the distance between St. Thomas and Marechal is not in direct ratio to the distance between *lpsum Esse Subsistens* and the Hegelian Absolute.[123] The movement of *Cahier V,* with all of its explicit vacillations and latent tensions, cannot be reduced to that, or to any, :fixed proportionality.   Yet the Hegelian comparison can be left standing because it illumines those vacillations and tensions.[124]

Although they did not excel the historical finesse of Gilson and like-minded colleagues who refused to their philosophical programs the accolade of "Thomism," the Nco-Scholastics of that generation continued to proclaim, vehemently, their allegiance to St. Thomas.   Forty years later, that particular .vehemence has abated somewhat/[25] since, for one reason, a tolerant *aggiornamento* has tamed doctrinaire ecclesiastical censorship. But discussions of the nature of historical Thomism are

[121] See Emil Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension In Hegel's Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 15-18.

[122] Marechal, of course, eschewed Idealism because " ... les Idealistes post-kantiens enervent leur principe de finalite en le combinant de force avec le *prejuge de la totale immanence"* (IV, 454). But " ... la metaphysique thomiste trouverait sans doute dans ces systemes plus jeunes, qui renouerent la tradition metaphysique interrompue par le kantisme, des inspirations heureuses pour son propre developpement " (IV, *455).*

[123] "La differenza metafisica fondamentale sul problema del'.essere fra Hegel e S. Tommaso e nulla concezione della creazione, in quanto per Hegel l'elevarsi al punto di vista speculativo comporta il riportarsi in Dio al 'momento che precede la creazione.' Invece per S. Tommaso e soltanto con la creazione, come produzione libera e totale del'essere da parte di Dio .... " Cornelio Fabro, C. P. S., "L' Esse' Tomistico E Il 'Sein' Hegeliano," *Sapientia Aquinatis: Communicationes IV Congressus Thomistici Internationalis* (Romae: Officium Libri Catholici, 1955), p. 268.

[124] The opposite contention, that Marechal illumines the unresolved problems in Hegel, is made by Franz Gregoire, " Themes hegeliens et depassements thomistes," *ibid.•* pp. 282-291.

[125] For a different opinion, see J. Donce.el, S. J., " Transcendental   Thomism," *The Monist,* 58 (1974), pp. 67-85.

not, these days, altogether passe because theories abound that directly counter the principles of historic Thomistic metaphysics.126 Yet, as well as be tested, this metaphysics can also test. To wit, it might be profitable to examine the historicism planted by Hegel now flowering in the hermeneutics of second-generation Heideggerians.127 However, there is place to pause for an intermediate question. If my analysis of Marechal is germane, one may wonder whether contemporary " Transcendental Thomists," as Neo-Scholastics are now called, are not themselves caught in implicitly Hegelian dilemmas, dilemmas which can be more clearly posed-and perhaps abandoned-as the consequences of Hegelian principles.128 Explication of these dilemmas, especially as they bear on the problems of hermeneutical theory, I take to be an appropriate *point de depart* for further investigations.

<div align="right">DENIS J. M. BRADLEY</div>

Georgetown University
   Washington, D. C.

126 Cf. Terence G. Walsh, S. J., "Assimilation and the Problem of a Contemporary Thomism," *The New Scholasticism,* 44 (1970), pp. 591-599.

127 See Alphonse De Waelhens, "Sur une hermeneutique de l'hermeneutique," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain,* 60 (1962), pp. 578-591.

12~ Cf. Georges Van Riet, "Histoire de la philosophie et verite," in *Problemes d'epistemologie* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1960), pp. 218-282.

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF BEING

PHILOSOPHERS AND PSYCHOLOGISTS in the twentieth century who reflect on man's knowledge-its scope and processes-generally deny to man the kind of metaphysical knowledge St. Thomas ascribes to him. In such a situation those who share Thomas's view that man has a capacity for, and an orientation to, a metaphysical knowledge of reality as being, do well to reflect upon man's knowledge in a way that is in close touch with contemporary thought. In this article I wish to do just that, to present an account of the psychogenesis of being that makes central use of contemporary psychologies of knowledge and has in view contemporary objections against man's metaphysical knowledge-albeit only in an exploratory manner, more to suggest its significance than to develop my theme with the fullness it deserves.

To introduce this study, brief though it is, we must review something of the Thomistic analysis of man's understanding of being. There is no one universally accepted interpretation of Thomas's view on the way man knows reality as being. There is however widespread agreement that the existential judgment is proportioned to the knowledge of being as understood by Thomas, since for him being is *that which is.* Reality as being is reducible neither to substance nor to the act of being. If one accepts this, there still remains disagreement about the principles that account for such knowledge being present in

The main Thomistic view is that man's knowledge of the concretely existing sensible reality is primary in the genesis of such knowledge, and thus that both the concrete sensible reality and man's knowledge of it through sense, intellectual abstraction, and insight are the essential principles of this

knowledge. **But** for many interpreters this cannot fully account
for man's existential judgment, since sense knowledge and in-
tellectual abstraction as such do not properly deliver *esse* or the
act of being. In another place I have defended the view that
for a full explanation of the existential judgment one has to
recognize that the act of being is more properly the object of
man's affective inclination and volitional act than of his intel-
lectual insight mediated by sense knowledge and abstraction. [1]
As supportive of this view we may note that we place the infini-
tive form of the verb in a sentence as the direct object of a word
or .expression referring to our acts of love, desire, and hate; for
example, we say " I want to live." We normally express the
direct object of an act of knowledge by a noun or a noun clause.
If *esse* is more properly the object of affectivity and desire than
of intellectual knowledge, the existential judgment and the
knowledge of being proper to metaphysics is dependent in part
on the intellectual knowledge we have through participation in
our affective inclination, act, and its object-our own actualiza-
tion (or act of being) as the good we seek, and other realities
that are related to this or to which our actualization is related.
The existential judgment is not fully explained by direct intel-
lectual knowledge of concrete sensible reality through sense
and abstraction.

   We need not review the major modern difficulties against this
view of man's knowledge of being-such as those that come
from Heidegger on the one hand or from an empiricism, ra-
tionalism, or constructivism on the other-to recognize that we
need something like a contemporary   " phenomenology " of
knowledge if we are to evaluate Thomas's view in a way that
meets the problems of our time. [2] For such a contemporary
analysis of man's knowledge I suggest that major attention
should be paid to the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget,

[1] See "Existence, the Intellect and the Will," *The New Scholasticism,* 29 (1955),
145-174, and "Man's Transcendence and Thomistic Resources," *The Thomist,* 38
(1974)' 426-484.
   [2] I examine these difficulties and suggest an approach to them in " Religious
Reflection and Man's Transcendence," *The Thomist,* 37 (1973), 1-68.

and I suggest this in spite of his strictures against a philosophy of knowledge.[8] His is widely recognized to be the outstanding twentieth-century psychology of knowledge he has an epistemological interest in showing how one comes to have the structures of knowledge exhibited in modern science; and his developmental approach provides a unique insight into the dynamism of man's knowledge. Moreover, his study of human knowledge has gone far beyond the reductionism of the behaviorists. By turning to Piaget we have a vast reservoir of experiments on and observations of human knowledge in its stages from infancy to adolescence that philosophers of differing traditions have to come to grips with. Yet Piaget's work, valuable as it is, needs to be supplemented by the work of some American psychologists who have a different emphasis and interpretation from Piaget's. In fact, it appears that the traditional dichotomy between empiricism and rationalism (or some form of idealism) is seen in a different way today in this divergence between some American psychologists such as Eleanor Gibson and Jerome Bruner (different as these are from one another) and Piaget and his associates. Their agreements are all the more significant for their differences, and these agreements and differences help us to grasp the present state of the question. For a full study of the relevance of their work for the psychogenesis of being one would have to analyse their questions, methods, and evidence at much greater length than we are able

• These criticisms are expressed in J. Piaget, *Insights and Illusions of Philosophy* (New York: 1971). Lhave commented on several of them in ;<Religious Reflection," 48-53.

The philosophical relevance of Piaget's work is discussed in Theodore Mischel, ed., *Cognitive Development and Epistemology* (New York: 1971). One of the discussants (D. W. Hamlyn) discounts such relevance: "My own opinion is that the mixture of philosophical and empirical issues involve in each case a muddle, that the philosophical and psychological questions which are at stake are different from each other, and that there are no grounds for the belief that philosophical questions can be answered by appeal to empirical evidence or vice versa." p. 19. Other contributors differ from this position (Stephen Toulmin and Bernard Kaplan). We should also refer here to the study of Piaget's work in E. Cantore, "Science and Philosophy. Some Reflections on Man's Unending Quest for Understanding," *Dialectica,* (1968),

to here; our brief study can do no more than suggest the possi-
bilities a larger study might contain. To indicate how the
findings of these contemporary psychologies of knowledge are
related to the question of the psychogenesis of being, we will
note, first in reference to Piaget and more briefly in reference
to Gibson, their points of departure, their models of knowledge,
and the stages evident in the evolution they study. Then, as
we proceed, we shall suggest the relevance of their views to
the question of the psychogenesis of being.

In the *first* place, Piaget's point of departure is to take the
structures basic to scientific knowledge, e. g., the formation and
systematic testing of hypotheses, and then study the evolu-
tionary emergence of these structures in the epistemological
subject. As he writes: " The main aim of a theory of develop-
ment is to explain the constitution of the operational structures
of the integrated whole or totality *(structure operatoire
d'ensemble)* ." [4] Reacting against the simple stimulus-response
empiricist explanation of knowledge, Piaget has insisted that
our knowledge of the world depends upon the structures we
bring to bear on it. His early biological work on the evolution
of the mollusc gave him a genetic approach to the problem of
explaining psychologically the structures present in scientific
knowledge. Experiments have shown, for example, that it is
only in the child of 11 or 12 that hypothetico-deductive rea-
soning is found. Piaget then seeks to explain this emergence
genetically. He finds an analogy between the emergence of new
psychological structures and the emergence of new biological
structures. Among the evolutionary theories of the emergence

• Jean Piaget, "Piaget's Theory," *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology,*
Srd ed., ed. Paul H. Mussen (New York: 1970) ¥ol. 1, p.   Of Piaget's many
books we can cite here particularly his summary work, J. Piaget and Barbel
Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child* (New York: 1969). He discusses his own
intellectual development in *Insights.* Among works on Piaget, I have been par-
ticularly helped by J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget*
(Princeton: 1968), and Hans G. Furth, *Piaget and Knowledge* (Englewood Cliffs:
1969).

of new biological structures he finds that of C. H. Waddington
to be most consistent with his own previous psychological
findings. Waddington gives great weight to the initiative and
self-regulation of organisms in developing strategies to respond
to challenges posed by the environment, the feedback from the
environment and these strategies upon the organisms, and the
emergence through this of successively new structures by which
the organisms interact with the environment. [5] Similarly, in the
process of the development of the infant into an adolescent
Piaget finds that the epistemological subject in his cognitive
interaction with the environment constructs a series or succes-
sion of structures that emerge from earlier ones and lead to
those found in the pre-adolescent and adolescent. His analysis
of the emergence of these structures is in part an explanation of
man's progressively enlarged knowledge of his environment
since this knowledge is dependent upon these structures.

  Eleanor Gibson places her more recent studies on perception
within a developmental framework. [6] She is working with an
interpretation of perception that her husband, James Gibson,
defended, and that is gaining wider acceptance. [7] James Gibson

  • See C. H. Waddington, "The Theory of Evolution Today," in *Beyond Reduc-
tionism,* eds. Arthur Koestler and J. R. Smythies (Boston: 1969), 857-895.

  [6] Eleanor J. Gibson, *Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development* (New
York: 1969). This book represents not only Gibson's work but also that of many
psychologists, mainly Anglo-American, whose work she reports on and nses. Also
see D. Elkind and J. Flavell, eds., *Studies in Cognitive Development* (New York:
1969), and D. Hyde, *Piaget and Conceptual Development* (New York: 1970).

  [7] See James J. Gibson, *The Perception of the Visual World* (Boston: 1950),
and Herbert L. Pick, Jr. and Anne Pick, " Sensory and Perceptual Development,"
in Mnssen, ed., *op. cit.,* vol. 1, pp. 849-988.

  The philosophical relevance of J. Gibson's work is brought out by R. Harre
and E. H. Madden in "Natural Powers and Powerful Natures," *Philosophy,* 48
 (1978),   In this article the authors show that a non-Humean philosophy
is needed to account for what science is doing-in reference to our knowledge and
concepts of natural powers, natural kinds, and natural agency. The authors show
that Gibson's work undercuts a philosophical presupposition of those who accept
Hume's event-ontology: "Finally the powerful psychological work of J. J. Gibson
has shown that there is no empirical basis for the tacit assumption, shared by
many philosophers, that , as a matter of fact percepts are organized groups of
sensations." p.

reacted against the empiricist view that we initially sense only color (as points or blotches of color), and that perception of distance or depth is basically learned, that this perception is the effect of one's interpretation of cues or clues and is thus a construction by a process of association. Against this he shows that the stimulus considered globally has correlates for one's perception of depth (e. g. in gradients of texture in the ground or setting of one's normal perceptions in the visual world) and that three-dimensional physical reality is given basically in perception rather than learned. In continuity with this, Eleanor Gibson understands perception to be " action, but it is exploratory action, not executive action in the sense of manipulating the environment." [8] She writes:

Perception, functionally speaking, is the process by which we obtain firsthand information about the world around us. It has a phe-nomenal aspect, the awareness of events presently occurring in the organism's immediate surroundings. It has also a responsive aspect; it entails discriminative, selective response to the stimuli in the im-mediate environment. [9]

She is reacting against the behaviorist interpretation of percep-tion or the view that learning occurs through association of objects with the behavior or response they evoke. Gibson holds that differing behavior with differing objects (for example, the differing behavior of Pavlov's dog in the presence of a circle that signaled the presence of food, and an elliptical figure that had ceased to signal food's presence) is a *sign* that the subject *has* discriminated the different objects-it is not the discrimina-tion itself nor does it mediate this discrimination. She studies perceptual learning, understood as "an increase in the ability of an organism to get information from its environment, as a result of practice with the array of stimulation provided by the environment." [10] And she studies this in the context of the child's development within its natural environment.

[8] E. Gibson, *op. cit.,* p. Ul.

• *Ibid.,* p. S.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 77. "The criterion of perceptual learning is thus an increase in specificity. What is learned can be described as detection of properties, patterns, and distinctive features " not previously registered-Zoe. *cit.*

These basic approaches reflect the fact that the current psy-
chological investigation of knowledge is primarily develop-
mental; knowledge is studied as a process of interaction be-
tween an enlarging environment and a developing subject. We
suggest that this approach has value also for the question of
the psychogenesis of being. In asking the question of the emer-
gence of man's understanding of reality as being we should ask
how the interaction of subject and environment gives rise to
this understanding.   And in studying this we should give as
much attention to the activity of the subject and its structure
as to the object known in virtue of this activity and structure,
as much attention to the physical world as to the cognitive ac-
tivity and structure that it evokes. Man's self-knowledge ap-
pears to be as essential to this genesis as man's knowledge of
the physical world, if Piaget's analysis of knowledge as de-
velopment from egocentrism to objectivity-as   we shall recall
it below-is valid. Metaphysics, through this approach, will
appear as a further stage of this interaction (when compared
to the sciences) both in reference to the scope of the environ-
ment opened up to the subject and in reference to the cognitive
structure centrally involved. It will appear to be not only be-
yond science in a hierarchical order but postscienti:fic in the
order of man's cognitive development.

In the *second* place, Piaget and Gibson take different aspects
of knowledge and develop their analyses of the subject's inter-
action with his environment primarily in reference to these.
Piaget's analysis of the neonate's cognitive interaction with his
immediate environment starts with an examination of the in-
fant's sucking reflex and how its use mediates knowledge. By
assimilating objects to this action scheme or schema, and by
accommodating this structure to the variety of objects he sucks,
the infant can differentiate among them. For example, the
infant sucks the breast, and knows it through this act; but he
also sucks a coverlet, a toy, and a thumb, and all of these are
sucked differently! Knowledge by the infant is through as-
similation of its environment to a primitive structure and by

the accommodation of this structure to its environment. Piaget considers assimilation to be " the fundamental fact of psychic development." [11] Assimilation is a process common to man's behavior considered physiologically and psychologically; it explains the basic psychological fact of repetition for it shows how repetition can have functional meaning for the subject. Moreover,

the concept of assimilation from the very first embodies in the mechanism of repetition the essential element which distinguishes activity from passive habit: the coordination of the new with the old which foretells the process of judgment. In ;effect,the reproduction characteristic of the act of assimilation always implies the incorporation of an actual fact into a given schema, this schema being constituted by the repetition itself.[12]

Initially the child's knowledge is really limited to the most superficial aspects of its environment and is marked by egocentrism-that is, an awareness of the environment only as it is related to the self, without distinguishing the one from the other. "At the beginning of assimilatory activity, any object whatever presented by the external environment to the subject's activity is simply something to suck, to look at, or to grasp: such assimilation is at this stage centered solely on the assimilating subject." [18] Objectivity is· a term of the child's development, occurring when assimilation and accommodation are in balance, and mediated not only by the child's knowledge of the environment but by his growing self-awareness of what he contributes and how he distorts the world.[14] The emergence of new and more fully developed structures by which the child cognitively interacts with his environment occurs· through the initiative of the child, the feedback of the environment and his activity upon his structures, and the effect of this feedback upon an adjustment of these structures. What is basic here

[11] Jean Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York: 1968), p. 42.

[12] *loc. cit.*

[13] J. Piaget, *The Construction of Reality in the Child* (New York: 1954), p. xi.
" *Ibid.,* pp. 854-857.

is an equilibration process evoked by the discrepancy between the environment and the subject.

Gibson's analysis of the interaction that accounts for de- velopment is much simpler. Basically, she assumes

that there is a structure in the world and structure in the stimulus, and that it is the structure in the stimulus-considered as a global array, not punctate--that   constitutes information about the world. That there is structure in the world is self-evident to the physical scientist who uses .elaborate tools and methods to discover it.[15]

There are discriminable aspects of this environment that at any particular point in time have not yet been discriminated; development of perception is in the direction of specificity of discrimination-a   development from perception of gross fea- tures of objects to greater specificity, rather than a process of synthesis toward structured wholes. She examines this develop- ment in reference to aspects of the child's natural environment, such as objects, space, events, representations   of these and coded sources of stimulation   (e. g., speech and writing).   Prin- ciples or processes operative in perceptual learning or differenti- ation that she particularly   stresses are

abstraction of differential properties of stimuli, filtering out of ir- relevant variables of stimulation, and selective attention of the kind described as exploratory activity of sense organs.[16]

What is the significance of this difference of emphasis re- garding man's knowledge of his environment for the psycho- genesis of being that grounds metaphysics?   Much could be said, but we want particularly to note that the differing inter- pretations of knowledge in these two views correlate with the primacy given in the one to touch and in the other to visual perception. In the first motor activity as mediating knowledge of the world is more emphasized, while in the second emphasis is placed on the stimulus present in the environment.   The difference in emphasis can in part be due to the difference in the

[15] Gibson, *op. cit.,* pp. lS-14.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 117.

questions asked by these psychologists. Piaget is interested in the emergence of cognitive structures, and particularly the scientific structure with the place it accords to mathematics; and Gibson is interested in the emergence of man's perception of the physical world. It does seem to be a fact that these two initially unintegrated aspects or forms of knowledge are present in the infant; we shall see some examples below indicating that both are operative in later stages of knowledge and that one cannot be reduced to the other-both are essential principles of man's developing knowledge of the world. Moreover, in the knowledge of reality as being, both of these forms of knowledge are likewise involved. We saw that knowledge of being, according to Thomas's understanding of it, is essentially dependent not only upon the physical reality of the environment but also upon two modes of knowledge. In one of these-the one mediated by sense knowledge, intellectual abstraction, and insight-we are more in continuity with what Gibson emphasizes. In the other-the one we called participative knowledge, i. e., knowledge of our *esse* and what is related to it through participation in our affective inclination and its object-we are more in continuity with the dimensions Piaget emphasizes. The infant's motor activity emerges from its affective inclination, and the knowledge this activity mediates is not only that of the physical environment but also that of the self (though at this age not distinguished), since these actions are directed to the need or good of the self. If we take account of the contributions of both Piaget and Gibson, despite their tensions with each other, we find in the infant's knowledge an anticipation of, or a point of departure for, the emergence of man's metaphysical knowledge as understood by St. Thomas. There are quite a few stages that the infant must pass through, of course, before he becomes a metaphysician!

In the *third* place, the major successive periods of cognitive growth that Piaget discovers in the child's evolution from infancy to adolescence are the sensori-motor period (from **birth**

until about 18 months), the concrete operatory period
ginning about the age of 7 and preceded by a
stage) , and the period of formal operations (beginning about
the age of 12). We will note some central characteristics of
these successive periods, indicate some variants in the work
of Gibson, and suggest some implications these psychologies of
knowledge have in reference to our question.

   In the sensori-motor period, Piaget studies the succession of
action schemes or patterns   that emerge from such primitive
patterns as the sucking reflex. He analyses the emergence of
such patterns as sensory coordinations (e. g., between sight and
hearing, between prehension and sight), the infant's progressive
efforts to discover objects that have been hidden near him,
and his use of means for an end. Piaget's observations and
analyses bring out the gradual construction of action patterris
in the infant, patterns that later contribute to the construction
of internalized actions (e. g., deferred imitation, symbolic play,
formation of mental images, and verbal evocation of events)
and still later to the formation of concrete logical operations
of the school-age child and the interpropositional thought pat-
terns of the pre-adolescent. These early action patterns also
have great importance for the way in which the world comes
to be cognitively constructed by the child. For example, Piaget
finds that objects near the infant do not initially have the char-
acter of permanently existing objects that they have for us; the
construction of the permanent object is a process that occurs
in stages over the first year. Piaget notes "how phenomenalis-
tic this ·primitive universe " [17] of the neonate is. The infant
initially appears to be interested in objects about him only as
these are occasions for his_actions-e.   g., sucking and looking.
Until these objects are regarded as independent of the infant's
action they are not considered as permanently existing sub-
stances. Concerning an intermediate stage in the process of
constructing the permanently existing object, i.e., when the

   ._; Piaget,   p. II.
i.   _:.   .

infant coordinates sight and hearing by looking toward the origin of sound, Piaget writes:

the space involved here is still only a space dependent on the immediate action and not precisely an objective space in which things and actions are placed in relation to each other in groups that are independent of the body itself. In short, intersensory coordinations contribute to solidifying the universe by organizing actions but they do not at all suffice to render that universe external to those actions.18

There is a certain recognition of objects by the neonate, but this can be accounted for by the infant's recognition of the reaction these objects set up in him; it does not of itself indicate the infant's recognition of objects as independently existing. It takes the infant a similarly long process of construction to become aware of a space in which his own body is not the absolute center but rather is an object together with other objects.

Gibson's study of the same early period shows marked differences from Piaget's. She holds that the objects about the infant and the stimulus array can account for the child's perception of space and the permanent object, and that growth here is due to the infant's gradual discrimination of this global stimulus array, not to the child's motor activity or synthetic construction save in a very subordinate sense. For example, in an experiment called " The Visual Cliff " she helped to show that infants just able to crawl had depth perception; this occurs earlier than Piaget's analysis can account for.[19] In this experi-

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 8-9.

[19] See E. J. Gibson and R. D. Walk, "The Visual Cliff," *Scientific American,* 202 (1960), 64-71, and *op. cit.,* ch. 17, " The Development of Perception in the Individual: Perceiving Space and Events," p. 869 ff.

For supporting studies see T. G. R. Bower, "The Visual World of Infants," *Scientific American,* 215 (1966), 80-92, and "The Object in the World of the Infant," *Scientific American, 225* (1971), 80-88. Bower develops ingenious experiments to defend for the infant what J. J. Gibson defended for the adult, namely, that perception of size, distance, shape, and solidity is not due to an inference based on association of visual or tactile cues with the infant's perception of the *projected* object; it is rather due to the infant's perception of the *real* object with its size, distance, shape, and solidity. It is however questionable whether Bower undermines Piaget's view on the amount of time it takes the infant to construct the permanently existing object.

ment the infant is placed on a board that extends across plate
glass; under the glass to one side of the board there is a texture
pattern quite close to the bottom of the glass, and the same
texture pattern is placed more deeply under the glass to the
other side of the board. Infants move to the apparently shallow
side rather than to the perceptual cliff side, thus indicating that
they have depth perception due to gradients of texture or mo-
tion parallax. Perception of object permanence, similarly, can
be explained by the global array of stimulus:

Object permanence and perception of an event are reciprocal phe-
nomena. One quite literally implies the other. **If** the ball rolls be-
hind a chair, is temporarily occluded, and then rolls out again, we
do not see it as a different ball and a new event ....

A concept of permanence would indeed be an intellectual achieve-
ment, but invariants over time in a stimulus sequence may provide
a basis for the perception of an object's permanence (like the ball
rolling behind a chair and out again) .[20]

In these two explanations of infant knowledge of the environ-
ment there is definitely a theoretical div.ergence that has not
been resolved by psychologists. Yet I think that, without tres-
passing on their field, it is legitimate to conclude that neither
approach taken as such is a fully adequate account of the child's
cognitive growth, and that both taken together-without our
being able to resolve the diff.erences-contribute to an explana-
tion of knowledge that offers a starting point for the kind of
knowledge we indicated at the beginning of this paper as in-
volved in the knowledge man has of being. With Gibson we
must admit that there is in the stimulus, as a global array,
information that can account for one's perception of the perma-
nent object and space. But with Piaget we must admit that
after the first year there are elements in the infant's knowledge
of permanent objects and space that were previously not
present. There is a sense in which, partially dependent upon
the child's action on the object, the object becomes disengaged
from his action and acquires for him a permanent existence it

[20] Gibson, *orp. cit.,* pp. 381, 384.

did not have earlier. Similarly, due in part to a development of the infant's motor activity into more complex action patterns, there is a growth in organization not only of the infant's behavior but also of the space about him. There seem here to be two central principles of the infant's developing knowledge: one beginning from the object perceived visually but not exactly related to the self, the other from the child's executive action depending on his needs and interests and the significance this has for his knowledge of self and the environment, which are only gradually differentiated.

With reference to the child's growth after the sensori-motor period, we should note at least that both Piaget and Gibson view language as having a subordinate, though very important, role.[21] Language is not the source of the child's image, concept, or logic; but when the child does begin to develop speech, language has a feedback function promoting perceptual discrimination (Gibson), and it "enables thought to range over vast stretches of time and space, liberating it from the immediate" (Piaget).[22]

A central period in the child's cognitive development (and one in which the divergence between Piaget's and Gibson's interpretations is quite clear) occurs about the age of 7. Around this time the child develops a series of concepts in organizing the concrete environment about him, a development that enables him to escape the distorting influence of perceptual cues to which he was earlier subject. For example, there is the development of the concept of the conservation of quantity. **If** in front of a child an experimenter pours water from a wide, short beaker into one that is tall and narrow, and then asks the child whether there is more in the first beaker or the second, or whether there is the same amount in both, the child of *5* will most often say that there is more in the second, being

---

[11] For example, see Piaget, *The Psychology of the Child,* p. 90: "These data ... indicate that language does not constitute the source of logic but is, on the contrary, structured by it." See also Piaget, " Language and Intellectual Operations," in Furth, *op. cit.,* pp. 121-180; and Gibson, *op. cit.,* p. 154 ff.

as Piaget, *Psychology,* p. 86.

confused by the perceptual cue of height. At times he may
centrate on width and say that there is more in the first. He
may vary his answers, but these are subject to the perceptual
cues he is centrating on. About the age of 7 (or earlier for
some children, but still in a definite sequence of stages), the
child will say that there is the same amount in each beaker and
thus will show that he recognizes the conservation of quantity,
a concept he will not lose. Similarly the child gradually be-
comes aware of conservation with other subject matters, such
as number, area, space, and volume.

For Piaget, this achievement is due to what he calls a" reflec-
tive abstraction,"

which does not derive properties from *things* but from our ways of
acting on things, the operations we perform on them; perhaps,
rather, from the various fundamental ways of coordinating such
acts or operations. [23]

The knowledge of conservation that exists in the object is due
to the child's assimilation of the object to an action scheme
somewhat as the infant comes to know the nipple or thumb by
assimilating it to the action scheme of sucking. Between the
sensori-motor period and the period called that of " concrete
operations," the child interiorizes the actions he performs on
things; the action of pouring water from one beaker to the other
leads by a process of reflective abstraction to an operation, or
an interiorized structure, of inversion. By the operation of in-
version and by that of negation (e. g., negating the height of
the flask and adding proportionately to the width, or vice
versa) the child here gains an insight into the conservation of
quantity. Piaget finds support for this interpretation in the in-
termediate stages through which the child moves in this

[23] J. Piaget, *Structuralism* (New York: 1970) p. 19. Piaget acknowledges a
qualitative abstraction from things as a factor in our knowledge of the world:
" There is what we call *physical experience,* which consists of extracting informa-
tion from the objects themselves through a simple process of abstraction. This
abstraction reduces to dissociating one newly discovered property from the others
and disregarding the latter. Thus it is physical experience that allows the child
to discover weight while disregarding the object's color, etc., or to discover that
with objects with the same nature, their weight is greater as their volume increases,
etc." in Mussen, *op. cit.,* I,

achievement.   Another influence on Piaget's interpretation   here
is the success of the group concept in mathematics,   where a
property is arrived at not by abstraction   from the thing but
by an abstraction   from an operation   performed   on it. Piaget
holds   that   we cannot   adequately   explain the function   of
mathematics   in physics unless we acknowledge   that by reflec-
tive abstraction   a person reaches structures   in the world that
are independent   of him. The isomorphism   between intellectual
structures   and physical structures   existing in the world is owed
to the fact that our intellectual   structures   are constructed
through the push and pull of the environment   upon us: the for-
mation of our external action patterns   as a response to the en-
vironment,   and the interiorization   of these patterns   through
reflective   abstraction. [24] One characteristic   of such concrete
operations   and conservation   concepts that can only be ac-
counted for by reflective abstraction   is their necessity; the child
who has come to recognize the conservation   of quantity   will say
that there *has* to be the same amount of water in both beakers.
But

if the logico-mathematical   laws of "being" are discovered from
without, in the manner of physical laws, they are then no longer
"necessary"   in the deductive and axiomatic meaning of the term,
and nothing proves that the selection was sufficient for our adapta-
tion being complete in their regard rather than simply approxi-
mating, as in other domains (perception, etc.) .[25]

•• See *Structuralism,*   pp. 37-43, 62. That there is a construction   at the founda-
tion of mathematical   concepts is a view very widely held in the 20th century,
though this construction   is interpreted   in different   ways. See Charles Parsons,
"Mathematics,   Foundations of," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. P. Edwards,
(New York: Macmillan, 1967) vol. *5,* pp. 188-213, particularly   his discussion of
two types of constructivism,   namely, 'intuitionism'   (Brouwer) and 'formalism'
(Hilbert) . For a brief survey of how widespread the constructivist   view of
mathematics   has hecome, see M. Vignano, "La matematica e ancora vera?,"
Gregorianum, 54 (1973), 61-89. While studies of the foundations of mathematics
and of modern logic associated with mathematics   are generally axiomatic and not
anchored in the child's cognitive   interaction   with the world, Piaget   relates the
development of some primitive mathematical   concepts and an elementary   modern
logic to the matrix of the child's natural cognitive development.

[25] J. Piaget, *Biologie et Connaissance* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967) p. 361; also see
Piaget's analysis of the meaning of structure, e. g., in *Insights,* p. 109: "The notion

Eleanor Gibson interprets   the same case differently .. She
holds that" conservation is invariance over time and over event
sequence. . . . The perception of sameness over change is what
is critical. ... " [26] Some evidence supports this. For example,

of 'structure' is not at all reducible to a simple formalization due to the observer's
mind; it expresses, on the contrary, through its formalizations to which, moreover,
it lends itself, properties of the structured 'being.'" Piaget acknowledges that some
of his collaborators have differed from him on the source of necessity. *Ibid.,* p. 31 f.

It is very informative to compare Piaget's views with those in the excellent book
by Henry Veatch, *Two Logics. The Conflict between Classical and Nco-Analytic
Philosophy* (Evanston: 1969). The logic whose genesis Piaget investigates is what
Veatch calls a 'relating-logic,' and the logic associated with Piaget's 'simple ab-
straction' is called by Veatch a 'what-logic.'   The representatives of neo-analytic
philosophy and 'relating-logic'   whom Veatch studies deny that by this logic we
reach structures, causality, and necessity in the world. Piaget, however, considers
that by this logic and the physical experience it organizes we do indeed reach
quantitative structures in the physical world and their necessity and causal rela-
tions. On the other hand, Piaget denies that we reach a necessity in nature by
qualitative knowledge or 'simple abstraction,' whereas Veatch argues effectively
that we do. Veatch denies that the category 'analytic proposition' does justice
to our ' what statements,' and he shows that these statements are basic to our
ordinary discourse, the humanities, and parts of science. While these are necessary
truths if they are true at all, they can be in principle proved false by experience.
We may present one summary expression of this in Veatch's book:
  " For example, such statements as ' Hydrogen is an element,' or ' Human beings
are a species of animal,' or ' Motion is a transition of something from something
to something else ' are clearly what-statements, in that each merely attempts to
state in the predicate what its subject is. If this is so, then it would seem that
the evidence for the truth of such statements would have to be a self-evidence--
i. e., it is only through a consideration of hydrogen itself that we come to know
what it is. On the other hand, for all of their seeming self-evidence, we also
noted that such statements might well turn out to be false. Chemists might de-
cide that hydrogen was not an element after all, or motion might turn out to be
an entirely different sort of thing than the Aristotelians had thought it was, etc."
pp. 216-217.
  •• Gibson, *op. cit.,* pp. 388-389. She is here dependent upon experiments cited
by Jerome Bruner in " On the Conservation of Liquids," in J. Bruner *et al., Studies
in Cognitive Growth* (New York: 1966) pp. 183-207, although she, together with
Piaget, differs from Bruner on the question of the dependence of conservation on
language.
  Also see L. Wallach, "On the Bases of Conservation," in Elkind and Flavell, eds.,
op. cit., pp. 191-219. Wallach gives positive value to both experience or perception
on the one hand and to cognitive structure and operation on the other in the
genesis of conservation, though more to the former than to the latter. See, in the
same book, D. Elkind, "Conservation   and Concept Formation," pp. 171-189;

the majority of children tested give as their reason for the con-
servation judgment the identity of the water in both beakers.
Moreover, in an experiment where a screen is placed between
the beakers and the children, thereby shielding them from per-
ceptual differences, they judge more quickly that there is the
same amount of water in each; this judgment seems then to
come not from interiorized actions such as negation or compen-
sation but from perception of sameness over change. So for
Gibson it is a matter of physical abstraction from the objects.
In the conservation judgment she does not recognize a quali-
tatively higher stage of knowledge, as compared with percep-
tion, whereas Piaget does affirm such a qualitative difference
between these forms of knowledge.

The problem of what accounts for the child's awareness of
conservation has a bearing on how other concepts are de-
veloped, including some used in metaphysics. Without being
able here to treat this question as it deserves, we would point
out that whether conservation comes to be known by reflective
abstraction or by simple abstraction, there is a structure or
property in the physical thing that is known (contrary to
Hume), and the basis for one's judgment is the physical object
as well as his cognitive structure (contrary to Kant). Perhaps
we must agree with Piaget that reflective abstraction does at
times give access to a structure or property of physical reality,
since modern physics reaches such structures; as Piaget says,
mathematics is not simply a language in physics-it predicts
at times. J\1oreover, it would seem we must agree with Piaget
that the conservation judgment, when compared with pre-
operatory perception, is a qualitatively higher form of knowl-

---

Elkind compares Piaget's study of concept formation with studies of concept for-
mation by way of discrimination. He judges that the discriminative studies reflect
more an Aristotelian mode of concept formation while Piaget's reflects more a
Galilean mode of concept formation. He concludes: " Taken singly, either ap-
proach provides only a partial understanding of the concept as we know it in the
behaving and thinking subject and in the history of scientific enquiry. Taken to-
gether, however, these two versions of the concept can provide a comprehensive
view of the concept that will account for the modes of conception in both the
individual and science." p. 188.

edge of the environment. And yet Piaget's view that necessity cannot properly derive from simple abstraction may show a lingering influence of empiricism in his own work; it has not met with as much agreement as other aspects of his studies on conservation. Gibson's view that conservation is due to the perception of sameness over change has much to support it, but it seems excessively wary of admitting any distinction of stages in knowledge, and it does not give sufficient account of the subject's structures that may be involved. Perhaps at times the subject's structured activity is the *conditio sine qua nan* and the physical object and simple abstraction from it the more direct source of a valid concept; at other times the subject's operation may be the source and the physical object and experience of it the *cmulitio sine qua nan.* In any case, one can see the relevance of developmental psychology's conservation studies to the question of the psychogenesis of philosophical concepts, specifically that of being.

A further stage of the child's cognitive growth is found in pre-adolescence (from age 11 or U to 15), a period Piaget calls that of formal operations. To relate this to our question we shall note. an observation that exemplifies this period in part, discuss what accounts for the knowledge distinctive of this period, and then inquire whether the knowledge found here is implicitly metaphysical.

A central characteristic of the formal operatory period may be seen in the following experiment. Five flasks are set before subjects taken from middle childhood and pre-adolescence; each flask has a chemically different liquid, which may be designated as 1, S, 4, and *g.* The experimenter tells each subj-ect that a yellow liquid may be made by combining *g* with one or more of the other flasks' contents; the subject's task is to produce the yellow color. A younger child (7;1) takes *g* and pours it into several of the other flasks without achieving the desired result, and then into some combinations of the other flasks, but he reaches only a few of the possible combinations. The pre-adolescent begins otherwise. One subject (18;0) says:

You: have to try with all the bottles. I'll begin with the one at the end (from 1 to 4 with g). •.. **It** doesn't work any more. Maybe you have to mix them (he tries $1 + + g$, then $1 + 3 + g$) ... It turned yellow. But are there other solutions? I'll try ... [27]

This example illustrates the actual transcendence in the pre-adolescent's cognitive structure and operation when compared to the younger child's. The child at the concrete operatory level is not unsystematic, but what characterizes his approach to the problem is that he begins immediately by attempting an empirical correspondence with the experimenter's results. He is oriented to the actual concrete rather than to the possible. This is true generally of his level of operations, as the earlier example of the conservation of quantity showed. Connected with this limitation is the fact that the child of the concrete operatory period forms operational concepts one by one for very limited areas. His organization of the world about him proceeds by his development of " more or less separate islets of organiza-tion," [28] not interlocking to form the integrated systems found in adolescents. The pre-adolescent begins his consideration of the problem here by a systematic recognition of all the possibles, and only then proceeds to look for the real or actual by an exam-ination of the different variables. He thus clearly distinguishes the actual from the possible in the problem. Other characteristics are associated with this basic property of the formal operatory period. The pre-adolescent proceeds in the problem by a hypo-thetico-deductive method, systematically trying all the possible situations. This approach depends upon what the concrete operatory child has achieved, but the pre-adolescent puts these achievements into the form of propositions and reflects on the propositions rather than simply on the concrete data. Piaget notes that this interpropositional thinking is an approach sufficiently disengaged from centration on the concrete to allow a separation of form from content, and of possibilities from the

[27] B. Inhelder and J. Piaget, *The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood tv Adolescence* (New York: 1958), pp. 117.

[28] Flavell, *op. cit.,* p. !'l04.

actual. The greater scope and possibilities of the pre-adoles-
cent's knowledge are based upon this more advanced structure.
Piaget describes this structure and relates it to the adolescent's
growth in affective and social interest in the following passage:

The subject succeeds in freeing himself from the concrete and in
locating *reality* within a group of *possible* transformations.   This
final fundamental decentering, which occurs at the end of childhood,
prepares for adolescence, whose principal characteristic   is a similar
liberation from the concrete in favor of interest oriented toward the
non-present and the future. This is the age of great ideals and of
the beginning of theories, as well as the time of simple present
adaptation to reality. This affective and social impulse of adoles-
cence has often been described . But it has not always been under-
stood that this impulse is dependent upon a transformation   of
thought that permits the handling of hypotheses and reasoning with
regard to propositions removed from concrete and present observa-
tion.29

   Athough we have not followed Piaget's analysis of the de-
velopment of moral reasoning in the younger child (an area
not as central to Piaget' s interests as the knowledge that leads
to scientific reasoning) , we should at least note, as the above
passage indicates, that Piaget associates the adolescent's moral
idealism and interest in the non-present and future with the
cognitive development characteristic of the formal operatory
period. The value orientation of the adolescent shows a de-
velopment over that of the younger person similar to that found
in his cognitive development. In both the affective and the
cognitive areas the adolescent, while retaining the operation
characteristic of the younger child, is capable of going beyond
this by systematically considering what is possible and cen-
tering on the actual in its relation to the possible. There is a
correlation between stages in cognitive development and in
socialization or moral reasoning. To take an example from an
earlier stage, it is only when the child is entering the concrete

   •• Piaget and lnhelder, *Psychology,* pp. 130-131. Emphasis added. Flavell com-
ments as follows: "The most important general property of formal-operational
thought, the one from which Piaget derives all others ... concerns the *real* versus
the *possible."* Flavell, *op. cit.,* p. 204.

operatory period that he is capable of playing games with other children in a way that calls for all of them to observe equally a set of rules independent of them. During the concrete operatory period the child's moral awareness mainly centers on an organization of his concrete behavior in virtue of rules given him and his affective relation to parent figures that makes the assimilation of rules possible. This period is marked by a moral realism that does not make much room for differences between intentional and accidental wrongdoing. The scope of the adolescent's interest, however, is much greater; this is due not simply to sociological factors but to an inner growth toward an ability to center on possibilities for himself and society, to experience their value and seek their realization, frequently, indeed, in a utopian manner. [30]

In continuity with his approach to earlier stages of the child's cognitive interaction with the environment, Piaget stresses that in the period of formal operations knowledge is gained more through the mediation of the subject's operation than through discrimination of the structure given in the environment. While not denying the latter, he emphasizes the former because he is showing the genesis of the knowledge and structure that underlies physical science, and particularly physics. He is interested in the child's quantitative knowledge, because that is what is characteristic of physics and the interrelation of mathematics and physical experience found in that science. The logic whose genesis he examines is the modern logic that is closely related to mathematics. The development from the child's concrete operatory period to his formal opera tory period is for him a matter of reflective abstraction. **It** is owing to the objective situations the child faces in his environment (physical, but also social and academic, because these can facilitate or retard the child's growth), the inadequacy of the child's present structures to meet the problems presented to him by his situation, and the feedback from the situation and his own cognitive interaction with it that a new and more adequate

[30] See Piaget, *Psychology,* pp. 114-127, 149-151.

cognitive structure is generated within him. The pre-adolescent
who tries to find the combination that gives the yellow color
achieves his solution by way of an operation that orders his
action and the environment in accordance with a mathematical
logic more advanced than that of the concrete operatory child:

Without knowing any logical formula, or the formal criteria for a
mathematical   " group" ... , the preadolescent of twelve to fifteen
is capable of manipulating transformations   according to four pos-
sibilities; I (identical transformation), N (inverse transforma-
tion), R (reciprocal transformation),   and C (correlative trans-
formation) ... combining inversions and reciprocities into a single
system, and thus achieving a synthesis of the hitherto partial struc-
tures.31

At a deeper level the operation of the pre-adolescent is seen
as an application of the schemes of the possible and actual in
accord with the hypothetico-deductive   method.   Similarly,
Piaget sees the adolescent's new awareness of values as a knowl-
edge mediated by his activity, his development of the structure
of the formal operatory period, and his orientation to a wider
horizon than in middle childhood.

   In our analysis of earlier periods of the child's cognitive de-
velopment we have suggested that Piaget's account must be
supplemented by that of some Anglo-American psychologists
who stress the subject's discrimination of the features of the
environment to explain his cognitive growth. We have indi-
cated that in the infant's achievement of knowledge of the
permanently existing object the knowledge present is not only
that mediated by the child's activity but also (and just as
centrally) that mediated by his perceptual discrimination. In
the concrete operatory child achieving awareness of conser-
vation we have suggested that what is operative is not only
knowledge mediated by internalized activity or operations but
also a qualitative knowledge through what Piaget calls " simple
abstraction"   (e. g., discrimination of the attribute of quantity
from that of height or width in the case of the flasks of water,

   31 *Ibid.,* pp. 139-140.

by abstraction of the one from the other over a process of change) . Similarly we now suggest that in the formal operatory period there is also this qualitative knowledge that is basic to the increased scope evident in the young person's knowledge. At times Piaget acknowledges this, though he denies its centrality. For example, in explaining one of his experiments with pre-adolescents (a pendulum experiment), he notes that the child gains his knowledge of metrical or quantitative proportion only by beginning with qualitative proportion. [82] The psychologists who emphasize cognitive development through discrimination rather than through operation do not extend their studies into adolescence in the way that Piaget does. But in continuity with what we have said earlier, we suggest the following. The pre-adolescent's knowledge of the distinction between the actual and the possible, which he applies in the hypothetico-deductive reasoning that Piaget studies, is mediated by a process of discrimination as well as by a process of operation or adjustment. It is mediated by what Piaget calls simple abstraction as well as by r.eflective abstraction. We acknowledge the presence of the latter. That is, the knowledge is in part the result of the growing child's adjustment to his environment (including here both his physical .environment and his value horizon), his experience that this .environment is larger than that to which he previously adjusted himself and that the adjustment made in middle childhood is no longer adequate, the feedback of both environment and of his earlier adjustment to it upon him as cognitive subject, and his action (by reflective abstraction) of adjusting to this environment, now within the context of the actual and the possible. But it in part is due also to a kind of intellectual discrimination between the actual and the possible, a discrimination not central for the younger child and made through a negation: the real is distinct from the simply possible. This involves a simple abstraction of what actually is from all the possibilities relating to a specific experiment (e. g., that of making the yellow color by a combination

[82] *Ibid* .• p.

of flasks). And it is involved in areas of qualitative knowledge
that Piaget does not investigate, in a natural logic that ques-
tions why things are the way they are rather than otherwise.
Making this discrimination seems to require a higher order of
abstraction than the abstraction of this (e. g., quantity as an
attribute)   from that (e. g., height or width as attributes) , which
underlay the child's grasp of conservation in his earlier period
of cognitive growth. While depending genetically on the earlier
discrimination of the child, this later growth makes possible the
greater scope of the adolescent's knowledge.

   What is the relevance of these remarks on the formal opera-
tory period to our question about the psychogenesis of being?
I suggest that this type of knowledge found in the adolescent,
which is basic to scientific knowledge as well as to his self-
direction in preparing himself for the adult world, is made pos-
sible through knowledge that is implicitly metaphysical.   The
basis for this suggestion is that what enables the pre-adolescent
to interact cognitively with his environment in a way sur-
passing that of middle childhood is his knowledge of being. His
approach to many problems offered him by his environment is
based on his adjustment to this environment in the context of
what is actual and what is possible, and on his discrimination
of the actual from the possible. This is what liberates him from
the limited focus and method of the concrete operatory period
and enables him to test systematically the varied possible an-
swers to a problem such as that of the flasks. And this is what
liberates him from centering his value orientation upon an
adaptation that is simply to present circumstances. His knowl-
edge does reach a structure in his environment and is not simply
a knowledge of language or concept, for it is only a knowledge
of the actual in the environment (as distinct from the possible)
that enables him to operate as he does in realistically forming
and testing hypotheses. And similarly this knowledge does
reach a dimension of the value to which he is orientated, since
the life that is possible for him is not restricted to an adjust-
ment within his current situation or circumstances. The ac-

tualization of his own possibilities and those of the society of which he is a part engages his interests; a sense of responsibility for such an actualization is a growth over his orientation of middle childhood, and it is as central to the development characteristic of the young person as his more directly cognitive growth. But, as we indicated at the beginning of this article, this entire achievement is what is meant by the word " being." Or, what actually is, as distinct from what is merely possible, is nothing more than reality as being; in his orientation to the actualization of his own possibilities and those of his society the individual is orientated to *esse,* since the actualization of his being is *esse.* Moreover, a double ground for the adolescent's knowledge of being is evident in his action and knowledge, the double ground called for by a Thomistic understanding of the psychogenesis of being. The ground is, as we said, a discrimination of the actual from the possible; and this recalls the Thomistic position that being is known through sense knowledge, abstraction, and intellectual intuition or insight into the concrete existing reality of one's physical environment. The ground is also the initiative of the subject shown in his adjustment to an ever .enlarging environment, an adjustment that his own being *(esse)* elicits from him; this is explainable by the Thomistic association of the good with *esse,* and the dependence of the subject's organization of his own activity and of his environment upon his orientation to this actualization of himself and others. We suggest, then, that the adolescent's distinctive knowledge is explainable by his orientation to being and, on this account, that his knowledge is implicitly metaphysical in that it is possible only through his knowledge of being. But it is merely implicitly so, for this knowledge is not possessed reflectively, systematically, and objectively, as it is in metaphysics.

In conclusion, we have attempted to evaluate St. Thomas's assertion of man's orientation to, and capacity for, a knowledge of being that validly bases a metaphysics-a knowledge mediated both by intellectual insight into being as concretely ex-

isting in the sensible individual and by man's affective orienta-
tion to, and action for, the good. We have sought to do this
in view of modern objections against ascribing such a meta-
physical scope to man's knowledge that derive from one or
other aspect of modern science. To base our evaluation on
modern experience and on a modern interpretation of knowl-
edge, we turned to the developmental psychology of Jean
Piaget and some American psychologists to study their analyses
of the subject's cognitive interaction with his environment in
a progressive manner, and the observations on which they base
their interpretations. We have presented evidence to support
Piaget's assertion of a limited transcendence in this knowledge
through the sensory-motor period, the concrete operatory
period, and the formal operatory period. The dimension of the
environment that the child adjusts to and knows enlarges
throughout this development, as do the structures that he
brings to bear in his knowledge; the development is provoked
both by dimensions of the environment not assimilable to
earlier structures and by the activity of the cognitive subject.
The activity of the subject that Piaget stresses is behavior that
leads by reflective abstraction to a more adequate and interior
organization and construction of operations and environment.
The activity that the other psychologists stress is exploratory
and discriminating perceptual activity. For the latter the en-
vironment is discriminable structure, whereas for the former it
is more a principle to which man adjusts his behavior and which
has a feedback influence on his changing cognitive structures.
The action that Piaget emphaszies is central not only for the
subject's organization of the physical world but also for en-
larging his value awareness and moral knowledge.

   With the aid of developmental psychology we have uncovered
knowledge experiences that many adversaries of metaphysical
knowledge cannot account for. For example, Hume's phe-
nomenalism cannot account for the infant's grasp of the per-
manent object; only a realism can account for this. Linguistic
philosophers who give primacy to language use cannot account

for the emergence of language in the infant and young child, nor can they account for the relation of this emergence to the child's earlier cognitive interaction with his environment; only a recognition of the dependence of language on knowledge can do this. Those who, in accord with the analytic-synthetic distinction, deny any knowledge of necessity in nature that is objectively based, cannot account for the child's development into the concrete operatory period, nor, for that matter, for science itself. And those who deny man's knowledge of reality as being, in continuity with Thomas's understanding of this, cannot explain the pre-adolescent's enlargement of knowledge or the distinctive structure of his knowledge, shown both in his primitive scientific approach an.d in his value orientation and knowledge.

The development of these insights can help show man's orientation to, and capacity for, a knowledge of being that bases a metaphysics; more than that, it can help save modern science from itself. Those who would restrict man's knowledge and interest to the level of science and to the technology *it* makes available deny the context that alone makes possible science and technological advance. If one restricts man's cognitive growth and his adjustment to his environment to such a level, he denies the meaning of scientific knowledge as well as the fully human context in which technology's use can be properly evaluated.

<div align="right">

JOHN FARRELLY, O. S. B.

</div>

St. Anselm's Abbey
Washington, D. C.

TOTALITY AND TIME

I

T HE PURPOSE OF this article is to explore to what extent the philosopher is able to clarify in his own way a problem much under debate at present, that of time-reversal.[1] It should be made clear from the start that the goals under consideration are very limited. I am not concerned with time-travel, nor shall I make the claim and demonstrate philosophically that particles or events are running in reverse-as in a film taken with the camera upside down and inserted backwards in later editing. There is not, it seems, sufficient ground to assert this philosophically. I should add that philosopher and scientist approach the notion of *time* differently. While the scientist observes time as a flow of particles or anti-particles, the philosopher looks for their embodiment in certain events or things-that-change and as a result offer him the possibility of time-awareness. Naturally the philosopher's attempt to interpret certain events in the realm of time should not contradict the proven data of science, but it is important to keep in mind that some of the scientific conclusions concerning time, especially concerning time-reversal, are themselves speculative; although at times they carry a certain plausibility on the theoretical level, their fulfillment in the physical realm is not easily verifiable. Whenever particular results on time-reversal seem to have been obtained by the scientist, they appear to be infinitesimal in both size and duration.

We shall be able to define later what we understand by time-reversal, but now we must stress the point that the understanding of time-reversal in this article gives a definite role to

the *future*. As is well known, there is strong disagreement among philosophers on the function of the future. Many in recent times r.esent any consideration of the future dimension as an object of meaningful study. What matters is the past, which, on the basis of an incessant cause-and-effect concatenation, builds up the present. Evolution and survival of life are explained on the basis of a mechanistic cause-and-effect sequence. We shall come back to this topic later; it suffices to note that this approach does not implicate the future as a *cause*. This attitude is considered scientific, and a great number of philosophers who make the claim that as philosopher one should not proceed beyond what exists and as such is verifiable, share that view.

There are still philosophers, however, who would question such a radical stand. This writer for one would assert-and in these pages will attempt to confirm his statement-that the future dimension is a very relevant one, a " phenomenon" of great importance. I would like to introduce here a scholastic term that is very illuminating, the term *scientia visionis.* Aquinas defines it as the knowledge in God, of himself, of all creatures, whether past, present, or future (not the *futuribilia*) .[2] It would be sheer presumption to transfer this original meaning to any human application. Yet the present use of the term would like to stress that the philosopher *qua* philosopher is bent upon past, present, *and* future. In that sense the *scientia visionis* is his potential and the cosmos as a whole his territory, however modest the results of this endeavor. Things-to-come are also the object of his observation and phenomenological description. It may very well appear that life and the world as a whole are not intelligible on the basis of the past alone. The philosopher is entitled to this " complete " intelligibility, as we shall attempt to show.

---

[2] " Quaedam enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt; et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum intelligere Dei, quod est ejus esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, presens intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut in subjecta sibi presentialiter" *(Summa Theol.,* I, q.l4, a. 9).

II

A traditional philosophy that accepts God as the ultimate ordinator of the cosmos and of life would make the assertion that in God's vision, or what has been called above his *scientia vi8ionis,* there is foreknowledge *at work.* We use the term *at work* purposely, for we want to stress that the divine interven- tion in this view is active: God plans a world and by the same token e:x;ecuteshis plan. The term *teleology* has been often used to denote this movement in its immensity, and the fact that there are or seem to be traces of such divine supervising activity has been called the teleological proof. To a certain number of philosophers this approach does not appear compelling, either because such supervising or planning activity cannot be dis- covered or because, if there is a planning, this can be seen as built-in within things and is then called Nature. Whether the existence of a Mastermind as a distinct and personal entity can be deduced from the planning that seems to be there is not the topic of our research. The natur.e of the planning itself, how- ever, in a sense we shall clarify later, deserves serious considera- tion.

Modern biologists accept a certain end-directedness.   Several among them, confused and disappointed by the dogmatic ac- ceptance of, and the radical stress upon, the mere cause-and- effect adaptation   process, have now reworded their formula- tions. Instead of claiming that the turtle comes ashore *and* lays its eggs, they now concede that the turtle comes ashore *to* lay its eggs.[3] In other words, the claim is that in the living, end-directedness is a fact. This means, of course, organization- not sheer randomness but organization that results in adapta- tion. This new position does not acknowledge Aristotelian teleology, for it refuses to accept the compelling and causal function of the absent and futuristic element that affects my deed from afar according to a plan to be executed. One acts

[3] Colin S. Pittenbrigh,   "Adaptation,   Natural Selection and Behavior," in *Behavior and Evolution,* ed. by Anne Roe and George G. Simpson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958) pp. 393 and fl'.

for, one does not act because of. The new term is *teleonomy.*
Teleology is herewith excluded, and divine " planning " would
find no protagonists among the teleonomists.

ill

Our charge is not to defend Aristotelian teleology, just as we
did not consider it our task to safeguard the teleological proof.
The solution we shall presently submit is somewhat different.
Yet by way of preparation for our proposal we would like to
bring to the fore several points that at times have been for-
gotten when examining the problem under consideration.

The first is that as one observes life as a global phenomenon,
it appears to have a certain will-to-be-and-to-survive. We must
not understand this will-to-be in the Nietzschean sense of will-
to-power, which stresses self-expansion, but rather as a cona-
tion-to-live beyond the present moment *and* to do so in spite
of a problematic situation. We shall call this the will *to sur-
vive.* Notice how the second part of our proposition includes
the future, for it clearly stresses the fact that to survive signifies
in one way or another a move into the future, To survive is
not just to live in the present but to go beyond the present into
the future. A danger is offset and a menace overcome. This
is the deeper meaning of the verb "to survive." This philo-
sophical observation is confirm.ed in the continual effort of the
living to overcome entropy: it is only on the basis of an
incessant conatus-to-live beyond the present problematic
menace that total entropy is avoided. In looking at this
conatus, one sees that it is only natural that it, too, employs
in its execution what is commonly called the cause-and-effect
sequence, and by the same token makes its way into a certain
environment and" adapts "itself. The will-to-be and to survive
therefore does not exclude the mechanistic cause-and-effect se-
quence, but the latter alone does not explain the will-to-b{io.
Rather, the will-to-be and to survive command the causal se-
quence as an instrumentality that makes the move into the
future possible.

A second point that deserves consideration in observing this *conatus essendi* is the knowledge connected with it. Such knowledge need not be a clearcut and explicit awareness of what *will* happen or of what the present deed implies, nor need it be shared by the one who accomplishes the deed. So, for example, the turtle need not know why it moves ashore. An animal may very well be ignorant of the ultimate purpose of its own act, yet the *act* itself is anticipatory. In other words, the act itself embodies an information. It is a lived knowledge of the future that is not known as such by the turtle but is revealed by a more advanced consciousness. The act itself betrays the end, but that end is often present only to the consciousness of man.

In fact, not too much observation is required to notice that in my human consciousness, whether I am the agent or not, *anticipation,* is a very strong and prevalent phenomenon. My consciousness is present to the present, no doubt; through memory it is present to the past as well; but most of all I appear to go beyond the present and into the future, and so I am present to what-is-not-yet. I should add that, from what is not yet, I keep incessantly coming back to the present. This is what I call the anticipatory movement in the very essence of consciousness. In some way the future *is* already. We shall attempt to detail its *modus operandi* later, but already this "being in some way" affects me now.

All this of course presents itself on an individual plane and is obviously microscopic compared to what the human totality in its enormous reservoir of knowledge must be. This knowledge and its will·to-be we shall not consider as some Hegelian Spirit, but nothing prevents us from considering it as the knowledge of a totality resulting from the sum of individual visions. Such a tatum, made up of the sum of its components, "knows " its future on a wider expanse and, like the *individual* knower, directs its constitutive elements toward its own survival. There is no reason to deny " end-directedness " to the tatum in its attempt for survival if we grant it to the individual.

Realistically, it is not possible for us to say precisely how far this reach into the future extends. Perhaps it covers only a small part, or perhaps it extends very far in a mode that the human individual cannot even imagine. This, however, can perhaps be said: just as the human individual unfolds his *curriculum vitae* and in this very unfolding at times unwittingly reaches into the future in such a way that what will happen in his life directs his present life from afar-I did this or that at 25, and at 50 it becomes clear to me that what I did at 20 or 25 was indeed programmed by that unknown-yet-known future-likewise the totality or subtotality in the present does what it is asked to do by whatever will happen a thousand years from now. It seems plausible to accept the fact that the totum *qua* totum is ahead of the individual, that it reaches farther than the latter, hence is present to or is a witness of what one habitually calls the future, and from that future directs the present.

IV

It would be a mistake to consider both these awarenesses, individual and collective, as unr.elated. Apart from the fact that the individual himself is part of the collective-and this is something we have thus far presumed and have not felt the need to reassess-it may be well to stress that consciousness itself is not and never was a solitary enterprise in the full sense of solitary. As soon as a child is born he becomes entangled in a web of traditions, languages, customs, laws and rules, sciences and religion, which constitute a tightly closed environment that takes over as soon as he leaves the womb. The species offers the inheritance of millions. He is part and fragment of this, and if he is wise, he plays his *part.* Such indeed is the individual called man or woman.

This is, of course, a look from without. But if we gaze at individual consciousness in the act of reflection, where one is alone and the center of solitude, it will appear that even there consciousness is not as solitary as we have been led to believe.

Some day, after longer and more detailed research than this
study can afford, it might be shown that consciousness in the
act of reflection is in fact a participative operation. Individual
thought mov.es in some invisible way within the sphere of its
own time and space, as one cupola covers many thinking cen-
ters. This does not cloud the fundamental agreement of men
and women of *all* times, but it merely goes to say that this
common .essence is affected by its own time and that this " con-
tamination " reaches even into the self, as center of thought
and awareness. Every epoch has its modes of expression and
its main themes, and they shape our individual thought. The
texture of thought is a mystery to us, but perhaps part of the
mystery would be lifted if we were prepared to accept the fact
that thought is geographically structured, i.e., on a horizontal
mode it touches and is touched by the thought of one's fellow-
men, just as it is historically enchained by the individuals who
precede or follow it in the line of generation. All this is still
noumenal territory, no doubt, yet the least that can be said is
that Cartesian isolation is deceptive when one considers what
Descartes carried within the cell of absolute solitude before
locking the doors. Aristotle himself may very well have alluded
to this strange intertwining of minds in the cryptic passage
of Book III, ch. *5* of *De anima,* when discussing the need for an
agent intellect. The necessity of explaining abstraction is his
main purpose, no doubt, yet the whole passage is most complex
and in fact stresses a form of noetic oneness, bringing the multi-
plicity of individuals together from above.

   The *participative* activity of the individual consciousness
fulfills itself *within* the collective awar.eness and as a result is,
with the collective, also partially present to what-is-not-yet.
This does not give the participant a conscious prophetic role.
Such a function seems to belong to the prophet, who for some
unknown reason moves into the future more forcefully than
his fellow men. Prophecy, though at times the object of ridi-
cule, merits more attention than it gets: since, however, the
prophet is the exception, we prefer in this article not to con-

centrate on him but instead to center on the common man. For even the common man, in his function of participant in the vision of the totality, is carried beyond the present participatively into a not-yet that he as an individual does not live. This participation is a knowing and planning of that future on the part of the individual, yet it cannot always be said to he a conscious and explicit awareness of the not-yet. It may perhaps be spoken of as a subconscious presence to the future.

What is the nature of this "presence"? As we see it now, it can only be of a noetic nature. I am present to eidos x, not to an *existential* dimension. Idea, or eidos x, is not yet actualized but it is foreseen; hence in some way, i. e., as known, it affects the participativ.e knower in his or her present being. This molding from afar, or what I would now like to call a type of time-reversal, is not something that consciously triggers the here-and-now; rather in my opinion it must be seen as a corrective. By this I mean that eidos x in touching from afar the present dimension z does not lie somewhere in the future as a blueprint of what will be, but rather as a negative that completes and corrects the deficiency of the present. The blueprint that is my counterpart, therefore, is a blueprint in reverse. I act in such a way that my very incompleteness expects and will find an achievement or " completion " or perhaps a " correction" at a distance in time, which will result in a survival of the totality. Hence there is in this "awareness" of the future unmistakingly a will-to-be, even though this will includes a confession of incompleteness: that which is a part is somewhere, somehow achieved and fulfilled, to the extent that the totality in its immobility is and survives. Survival is precisely the outbalancing of the im-perfect against the im-perfect. Hence, in the view here presented, there is no finality in the sense that the future in blueprint *causes* the past or the present. There is finality to the extent that a totality made up from the multiple im-perfect survives through this very interplay.

In this view the individual is no longer isolated or self-sufficient. He or she is very much connected with a past and /

or with a future which he or she completes, or by which his
or her im-perfection is corrected-or   should I say " expiated" *?*
The knowledge of that future affecting the present is not con-
ceptual, it is mostly" lived." My own deeds in their very execu-
tion call for redemption, yet in some way they are also re-
deeming under the manipulation of a totality that survives,
but only accomplishes this feat through the internal disposition
of its parts toward that goal. This negative modeling of my
own life from afar is a *form of time-reversal.* It is not time's
running backwards in the narrow and scientific sense; still it
appears as a return from eidos *x* in its blueprint negative form
to me in the present, where it *de facto* affects me and molds my
activity.

<div align="center">V</div>

   The question may be raised at this point whether, instead
of considering the totality in its internal succession and un-
rolling (throughout time), one might not understand it in the
full-fledged sense as that which is *totum et simul,* hence present
to any event that happens within its orbit, regardless of time
and space. *We* are different from *me.* As soon as *we* enter into
the game, *our* overlapping of before-and-after and here-and-
now increases *our*   and eliminates the limits of the in-
dividual caught in the here-and-now. Only *we* can replace the
angularity of the individual in the realm of knowledge and en-
hance it to a   hence to a shrinking of time.
   In such an hypothesis the totality appears more forcefully
as the *immobile* entity disposing its internal constitutive ele-
ments toward the global achiev.ement of survival. What the
totality knows or does not know in its global view or *scientia
visionis* is something no one individual can claim to ascertain,
for if he or she did, he or she would no longer be an individual
but would be plainly and simply the totum. Such a vision of
the totality in its very concept dominates present, past, and
future. In fact, it has no time dimension. From the point of
view of its components it is of course time-bound, hence it

entails a succession type of survival as we know it. My presence
to the future in the time-bound typ.e of structure is a presence
to eidos *x* as explained above, but taking the point of view of
what we may call the *oculus Dei,* then I appear apart with my
" counterpart " on a horizontal line of simultaneity, and the
balance of things and their mutual completion *is* without suc-
cessiOn.

This audacious way of looking at things may be more ac-
ceptable if we do not press its accomplishment to the very limit
but see it .effected by some form of unitary vision which, though
in our times still fictional, is more easily representable. Let us
view the *oculus Dei* as multipresent, *not* as omnipresent, and
by the same token bring things to the size of man. Based upon
the shrinkage of time as manipulated by a totality, this would
eliminate the absoluteness of the *rww* but it would not make
the claim of absolute quasi-divine simultaneity. In fact, it
would show everything on a plane of *relative* simultaneity.
Take the following example. Let us suppose my brain cells are
themselves caught in a mode of existence that is much shorter
than mine, yet through me are drawn into an eternity (which
is not really such, only relatively speaking) and into an ubiquity
 (again not really such, only relatively speaking). Let us sup-
pose also that this " eternity " and " ubiquity" appear as such
to the individual brain cell. Could I not say that certain things
happen for me, the individual self, and yet not for the individual
brain cell? Or, to put it differently, what appears unknown
and totally in the future for the individual brain cell may very
well be actual and present for the accumulation of brain cells
that is the individual consciousness. Let us now transfer this
example from *within* to *without,* i. e., into a construct like the
following. Suppose that an accident occurs on the planet Pluto
and is perceived by a unitary consciousness (which is *there-and-
also-here):* it will be a simultaneous perception by the unit *x*
as *one,* but it will appear successively to the individual percep-
tive particles perceiving the accident from different planets.
Clearly a certain lapse of time (e. g., four hours) is required

for the transmission of light from the one planet to the other, which makes it imperative for the individual perception (viz., the perception that is caught in the *here* and *now)* to live in a world of change, hence to wait. It is apparent that the world of absolute time is non-existent and that it is no longer a meaningful notion philosophically. The elimination of universal simultaneity, if the individual particle is taken as norm, is effected and we merely confirm philosophically what Einstein has established scientifically.

Of course in all this it is paramount to remember that our coming to similar conclusions is not because we follow similar roads. The scientist has based his conclusions upon a mathematical calculation and upon observation of physical reality. The philosopher, so as to approximate the shrinkage of time, has introduced a multiplication of selves to escape the limits of the *here* and *now*. How to accelerate this shrinkage of time and realize the coming to be of what w.e have called a unitary consciousness is something we are at present not able to say, or at least we do not consider it as part of this study. [4] What matters for our thesis is the insight that what is *future* for me is *present* for the collective, and that through the collective, I myself, *as part of that collective,* am indeed reaching the future and am being shaped by it. This return of the future to me traverses this totality and reaches me in time (my time), since I live in time, but it can be visualized only as happening

---

• It seems probable that the improvement of hardware in the world of electronics is definitely an instrument conducive towards the coalescence of the multiple. Hence without denying the fact that we still stand at the beginning of an era in this field, it is fair to say that we can already distinguish between *dimension A* and *dimension B,* the former being time as milieu of perception of the individual self and the latter being time as organ of the collective-unified apprehension.

Dimension B-in-full is the radical dismissal of time as a separate dimension and its theoretical overlapping with space. This is not what we can normally observe. What we are approaching, though, is what I would like to call a contraction comparable to Lorentz's contraction in the realm of the scientific. This makes sense in our hypothesis as well, for now we can understand how a multipresence (I shall not say an omnipresence) must unavoidably result in the contraction of the object. A multipresence, of course, is the presence that encloses the object.

beyond time or in a dimension of shrunken time. Once again this return to me as individual is in most cases merely lived, not conceptualizable, ineffable, but still translated into my be- havior and my acts.

VI

We are hesitant to give the position taken in this article a precise name. Although we agree with both the end-directed- ness and the organization that the proponents of *teleonomy* consider as essential, our suggestion of a " completive " activity at work from afar does not accord with the definition of tele- onomy. Nor would the term *teleology* alone, in the classical sense, fit our description exactly, since the *negative* blueprint that we have considered essential for survival does not agree with the concept of final cause as presented by tradition and as what is commonly called the *causa causarum.* We shall propose the term *completive teleology.*

Let us attempt to clarify our position in relation to these other views and at the same time bring to the fore the method- ology that has guided its development. The first thing that must be kept in mind is that the instrumental position that seems to be the fate of the individual does not prevent him from being a noetic center as well. Although part and fragment (ontologically), he sees *completion* to some extent as the in- cessant activity of a totality, which as a result survives. In- dividual man *sees* order; he has the vision that the multiple itself, through the repeated encounter of things and persons as *complementa,* constitutes and protects the whole. Clearly the concept of order belongs to individual semantics. It makes sense only from the standpoint of the individual, who *sees* pro- gression and also the disposition of means toward an end. The totality-in-full does not progress from the present to the future, nor does it strictly speaking return from the future to the past, since by definition it is present to all dimensions. But for what lies at the crossroads of those dimensions, for what we have agreed to call the individual, the possibility of time-reversal, as defined, makes sense.

This being the position of the individual, let us take a look from above or see "what God sees," as we have suggested at the beginning of this article. For it is indeed very much in the light of that particular hypothesis that we have said what we have.

There is no need to reassess the problem of causality. This has been done many times indeed. But let us for a moment observe the terms *action* and *pas8ion* as they relate to the concept of causality, and do this from the point of view of the totality, not from the point of view of the one-who-acts (which has always given rise to the notion of *action)* nor from the point of view of the one-who-undergoes (which originated the notion of *passion).* In taking the point of view of the no-time totality, causality will appear as an *encounter* of two objects that merely are *themselves in this en.counter: x* is itself and so is *z.* The one is no more active than the other, nor is the one more passive than the other. They are merely themselves and in their encounter act accordingly. Causality as an encounter of *x* and *z* is an encounter of the different with a contribution coming from both *x* and *z.* From the same viewpoint, i. e., from the viewpoint of the totality, causality does not appear as a meeting of the active and the passive but rather as an encounter of two *complementa.* Thus we come to see completion or complementation as the true cause. Let us clarify this point.

A first character of completion is that it eliminates the dichotomy between the dimensions of space and time. This dichotomy has been stretched beyond necessity, as if the two dimensions were unrelated and disconnected. Such is not the case, for if we ask how things are connected in space or how they are connected in time, we discover a Striking similarity. Although there is no intent to deny that *juxtaposition* (in space) is different from *succession* (in time), the connections between *x* and *z* are nevertheless similar in both dimensions in the sense that both result in mutual achievement. This mutual completion does not *per se* imply succession; completion or mutual achievement is what it is regardless of time. We could

also add that the very act of completion, if and when it does not imply succession as its main characteristic, could be considered-we do not say must be considered-as a performance that acts independently of time and of what we may call contiguity or proximity in time (which is, of course, the case for normal succession). To be complementary x and z need not be contiguous. They can be centuries apart and still balance one another out in the way of mutual achievement or correction.

Further, the term *complement* reflects a contribution on a double level. Notice first of all that the deeper meaning of the word denotes a " supply-in-part" to a common achievement. This supply-in-part differs in both cases. What x posits in the act, z does not, and what z posits, x does not. The partial achievement coming from both results in the " effect," and this by definition reaches beyond the individual accomplishment of either x or z. Notice also how the contribution coming from both sides is unqualified. The newer term with its greater degree of vagueness brings to the fore the undetermined character of the achievement that takes place, an achievement to which both x and z have contributed in an unspecified way. For although the *effec,t* itself is known, we are unable in most cases to define with exactness what part each of the " causes " (efficient or material) has played in producing that effect. In light of this view, it is correct to say that life is a container of incessant encounter or of endless completion.

At this point we may well ask whether or not the term *effec,t* is still meaningful. In answer to this we might say that it still exists for individual purposes and is indeed perceptible from the individual point of view, which clearly is that of modem science. In fact it is the interference of individual man that " constitutes" the deed in its *effec,tual* position. The photographer does much the same: through the shutter-release he stops the movement of the object and calls it a portrait. The freezing of the action brings forth its kind of truth. Similarly the scientist freezes the incessant encounter of things at a cer.:

tain moment and calls it an *effect.* Both are entitled to do so,
and we shall not criticize them for their attitude, even though
it was not our approach in this study. We have attempted to
propose the totality as the Observer or great noesis that in
some way knows what is within itself. In accepting this great
noesis that is the " we," one observes and confronts things that
are incessantly-related and are incessantly-in-the-act-of-com-
pleting-one-another. The chain is indefinite, and it must be
understood that for a determinate encounter of *x* and *z* a
mobilization *8ine termino* is at work. It is thus from afar in
the past *and* into the future in the complex space-time dimen-
sion that we must look to find the intelligibility of the com-
pletive encounter of *x* and *z,* the encounter called *causality*
in traditional semantics. It is at the intersection of past and
future that we discover the individual from afar, as the one
who is *here* and *now,* hence as the one who measures or observes
the encounter *as* causality. This does not mean that this atti-
tude, which is also the attitude of the scientist, is erroneous.
It means simply that such an approach, while suitable from
a pragmatic and scientific point of view, is not *de facto* satisfac-
tory for the philosopher. *With that aim in mind the philosopher*
attempts to transpose causality into the semantics of comple-
mentarity, to lift complementarity into the domain of the
totality, and to observe what is observable in that totality re-
gardless of time and space.

What matters therefore is the insight that a past and a future
are somehow " present," for otherwise the deed would not be
what it is. We shall thus accept a timeless plasticity buried in
the plasticity of matter. This timeless plasticity leaves no room
for annihilation, but it does leave room for continual alteration,
for alteration presumes the presence of matter in its never-
ending potentiality. But such a presence could not exist with-
out a future. There is no breakdown at this point in time called
the present. What we saw in the past precludes that break-
down. The consciousness of the Observer as totality witnesses
this incessant mobility and interrelatedness as a whole; it is,

of course, a more complete witness than the " individual " approach that presents us with the immediate, i. e., with present and past only.

In the light of what we have attempted to propose, time-reversal means simply this: it is the individual's participation in survival, hence in the conscious or unconscious know-how that survival implies and in a personal activity under the influence of a future completive event *x,* working as eidos merely or, in the more advanced and speculative interpretation, as an already existing counterpart. The completive movement arching beyond space and time keeps life alive through endless correction. This is what we understand by *completive teleology.* An incessant completion is at work by which things happen in a never-ending collusion. Survival as the ultimate achievement presumes that activity. It must be seen as a long-range plan and its execution as multi-directional. **It** presumes also an elasticity of matter in depth, a built-in planning of things and of people, and last but not least, a will-to-be and a form of multipresence that goes with it.

I confess that we have arrived at these conclusions only through the totality. All in all I am inclined to think that philosophical problems should be approached through " collective " comprehension. Only when we are able to understand the totality and the alterations that the sum of its diverse and unequal components introduce into the texture of physical reality, shall we begin to understand the future, the eventual impact of that future, and perhaps the possibility of an anti-world. On the level of the totality, the coming and going of forces and fields and the gradual awareness of the same cannot be excluded a priori.

WILFRID DESAN

Georgetown University
Washington, D. C.

FREDERICK WOODBRIDGE: EXPERIENCE AND IDEA

WHEN HE SPOKE to the Columbia department of philosophy on the occasion of John Dewey's death, John Randall remarked that Dewey learned from Frederick Woodbridge what metaphysics is.[1] A good number of people, including Randall himself, learned that lesson from Woodbridge. His role-as teacher, chairman of department, and dean of the Columbia faculties of arts and sciences-in the development and flowering of Columbia Naturalism is pivotal. If his greater influence seems to have been as teacher and friend of other Naturalists, we cannot afford to overlook the few volumes of his writings which exhibit the power of mind that made him so extraordinary a teacher and so stimulating a friend, and that embody his own peculiar and attractive philosophy. It is to Woodbridge's" intellectualism" that I wish to call attention here, and attempt to do so by some comments on the most provoking of his works, *The Realm of Mind.* [2] Woodbridge taught that being is " logical." What did he mean? And what did he mean by " idea " *?* The answers to these questions help one situate Woodbridge in relation to other Naturalists of his generation such as Santayana and Dewey and to estimate his considerable influence on second generation Naturalists such as John H. Randall, Jr. and Sterling P. Lamprecht, and mark *The Realm of Mind* as a significant contribution to the metaphysical endeavors of Naturalists.

[1] John H. Randall, Jr. "John Dewey, 1859-1952," *Journal of Philosophy,* 50 (1953), p. 9. Randall suggests that Dewey's *Experience and Nature* most clearly reveals Woodbridge's influence. Cf. "The Department of Philosophy," *A History of the Faculty of Philosophy af Columbia University* (New York: 1957), pp. 127-218.

[2] F. J. E. Woodbridge, *The Realm of Minrl* (New York:

I. A naive realism

There is no attempt in *Realm* to offer a psychology of knowing. Questions of epistemology, insofar as they are treated at all, are subordinate to and placed in the context of metaphysics. Woodbridge takes as his starting point the fact that man thinks. He sidesteps, as an initial consideration bound to lead to absurd conclusions, a theory of knowing based on an acceptance of sensing as mediator in cognition between mind and existence.[8] He suggests that if one begins with sensation as the sole avenue of contact with the realm of being, one is compelled by the logic of the starting point to end with mind as an entity internal to body, an entity which depends on sensation for its activity in existence and which is inevitably restricted to consideration of sense data and not of existence itself. A different starting point, he suggests, yields an entirely different and more reasonable outcome.

Thinking as a fact leads one directly to what is thought about. To ask about thinking is necessarily to ask about what is thought. For Woodbridge, " objective mind," or what we might call the thinkability of being, is a necessary correlate to thinking as an activity in being.[4] The problem *how* man thinks and the epistemological problem of the meaning of ideas and their relation tol existence is to be settled within a context already set by the apparently common-sensical affirmation that what man thinks about is no more obscure a topic or distant a subject matter than the fact that he thinks. In fact, to begin a consideration of mind and being with the already established conclusion that the two are either at a distance from one another in existence or are to be considered as separate prob-

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 18 f. I think that Woodbridge may well have had Santayana in mind here. Santayana had already made known his basically Kantian position on the cognitional problem. He remained obtuse on this point, and is as consistent in his obscurantism on the mediatory function of sensing as Woodbridge is clear on the same question. See Santayana's *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (New York: 1900), pp. 1-2!1.

'*Ibid.,* pp. 2, 18, 81-82.

lems for examination is to belie the obvious fact that thinking
is thinking-about.

Once thinking-about is accepted as axiomatic, the philoso-
pher is free to pass on to an analysis of the subject matter of
thought.   How is it to be characterized?   **If** thinking is an event,
what are we to say of that in which it takes place? What is it
that is accessible to thinking?   And what, by the very fact that
it is thought, is revealed about the content of thought?   **If**
thinking is relevant to its content, as it obviously must he, what
is it in the constitution of the content of thought that makes
it relevant to thinking? 5 Only in answers to these questions
is any similarity between a Woodbridgean and Kantian starting
point obviated.   Woodbridge confesses a dislike of the *Critique
of Pure Reason.*6 We may surmise that Kant would have felt
himself lulled back into the sleep of the dogmatic by the ca-
dences of Woodbridge's unashamed realism.

That in which thinking is an event is the" realm of being." 7
That which is accessible to thinking is termed the "realm of
mind." 8 Since thinking goes on in the realm of being, that to
which the term " being " is applicable is that which is accessible
to thinking: the realm of being and the realm of mind are co-
extensive.9 The subject matter of thinking, then, is being, or
that which is, whatever thinking might find it out to be. Wood-
bridge is characterizing being, and not maintaining that to be
is to be thought, for logical structure is only one among a num-
ber of general characters of being. His position would be better
phrased" to be is to be thinkabl.e," for the activity of thinking
is, in the concrete, limited by experience. The realm of experi-
ence is the realm of mind in act; that realm of mind in act consti-
tutes *a* realm of being which is known and which is in *the* realm
of being.10 Being, then, in its widest extension, applies to what-

5 *Ibid.,* pp. 81-82.
6 *Ibid.,* p. 28.
7 *Ibid.,* p. 2.
• *Ibid.,* p. 29.
• *Ibid.,* p. 32.
10 *Ibid.,* p. 41.

ever is, and whatever is is coextensive with objective mind, with
the logical structure or thinkability of being. *The* realm of
being, although not in act thought about, and *the* realm of mind
are one and the same.

Woodbridge clearly maintains, then, that being or existence is
logical in character, for he means by "realm of mind " that
character of existence which renders it subject matter for hu-
man intelligence. His position on this matter is central to his
metaphysics of natural process; without it his metaphysics
is a shambles. The very fact that being, as actual or possible
subject matter of thought, is thought about reveals the fact
that being is possessed of a logical structure, of that which ren-
ders it accessible to thinking. [11] That logical structure is a char-
acter of being is discovered in the very fact that it is thought
about. To Woodbridge it is as clear as this: ". . . as our
digesting involves a chemical world, so our thinking involves
a logical world. And as by our digesting we do not introduce
chemistry into a world not already chemical, so by our thinking
we do not introduce logic into a world not already logical." [12]
So much for Kant. **If** the scope of our thinking defines the
realm of mind and if we say that what we think about is " in
the mind," then the realm of being is the realm of mind, and
is marked by a logical structure correlative to thinking. Rather
than contract the realm of being and its logical structure to a
thinking mind, he expands the realm of mind to being.[13]

Logical structure is, according to Woodbridge, " of the es-
sence of things." Being is logically constructed, the realm of
being is a realm intelligible, a *mundus intelligibilis.[14]* And this
logical structure is antecedent to thinking, for it is discovered
as characteristic of existence and not created. We have to work
to find it out; being is so structured " irrespective of our efforts
to comprehend it." [15] Things are constituted as relevant to our

[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 46-47.
[12] *Ibid.,* vii.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. S!t.
[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 49-50.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 49; cf. pp. 83-84.

thinking, then, because the constitution of things is logical. As
the mechanical character of the world is revealed by our
walking in it, so the logical constitution of existence is revealed
by our thinking it. [16] To discover that being has a logical struc-
ture is " to discover the essential nature of mind,"· i. e., that
being *is* objective mind, and to lift the mind (human intelli-
gence) out of its cage behind the senses and to place it where
it belongs, in being, in correlative relationship to its subject
matter.

II. A NOT SO NAIVE ARGUMENT

Woodbridge's presentation is simple and direct, and decep-
tively so with regard to his argumentation for the logical con-
stitution of being. How does he arrive at his position? At times
the matter is obvious, as obvious as it would be to common
sense. Is Woodbridge answering the question of the intelligi-
bilty of being simply on the grounds that his construction of
the facts is obvious? Or is he merely affirming what is a matter
of belief among men, as any good common sense realist should?
This is suggested when he speaks of men's confidence in in-
telligibility and when he tells us that " belief " in objective mind
is natural and sound. [17] Or is there a more properly philosophical
basis for his position?

That the latter is the case is indicated by his frequent use of
the words " implication " and " inference " when he writes of
the relationship between thinking and the structure of the sub-
ject matter of thought. [18] He is careful in his language at these
points. For example, when he argues that thinking is a par-
ticipation in existence and not something at a remove from
existence, he says:

... it is worth insisting again that our thinking in the world can
hardly be less relevant to its constitution than our walking in it.
By our efforts existence becomes better known and better under-

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 81-82.
[17] *Ibid.,* pp. 49, 52.
[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 49, 54, 81-82.

stood. It may be that, by forgetting distractions and by remembering how knowledge is naturally effected, belief in objective mind may appear as warranted an implication of the facts as any other implication of them. [19]

He has admitted that the confidence of men in the intelligibility of being is not conclusive proof that things are intelligible. What is the conclusive proof? That literature, the language of science and philosophy, and religious beliefs express the confidence of men is interesting and confirmatory, but not conclusive. Is the logical structure of being a matter of inference from the fact of thinking and discourse? It seems that Woodbridge's position rests on a deduction or an inference from the activity of knowing and its outcome in discourse to the intelligible and discourse-able structure of the known. Woodbridge quite sharply demonstrates the absurdities of any other philosophical path on the matter in the first chapter of his book. His own position is far more subtly worked out than may at first appear. If this is so, Woodbridge is other than the" naive realist" he so often called himself. He may be so critical a realist that his argument r-ests on a deduction of intelligibility as the condition of possibility of knowing. He makes individual minds the consequence not only of the organization and rebtivity of bodies but of the logical structure of existence. [20] He also puts it that objective mind is a necessary implication of the axiom that man thinks. [21] This sounds suspiciously like a deductive inference. I think that the possibility ought to be admitted in spite of Woodbridge's adherence to analytic and empirical philosophic method. In effect, then, he is arguing tu the sensible and intelligible character of being from two cognitional activities of man, sensing and understanding. Although the argument is placed in a metaphysical context, it begins with a brief but quite precise statement of cognitional fact. And although Woodbridge is given to the " method of analysis and

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 54.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 129.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 82.

tested generalization " here he departs from generalization. He
deductively infers the structur.e of being (metaphysics) from
the structure of knowing (cognitional analysis) .

III.   A LESS NAIVE DEVELOPMENT

What is logical structure?   The question is answered in three
ways by Woodbridge.   First, he tells us what it is not; second,
he sugg.ests that logical structure is a matter of discovered rela-
tionships between things; and third, he extends his analysis of
the correlativity of thinking and the content of thought by
maintaining that logical structure is precisely that character
of being by which being is thought.

Logical structure concerns space, time, objects, qualities, re-
lations, but it is none of these things. It concerns the explora-
tion of the material world, but it is not "physical."   The many
names for it (e. g., Spinoza's *ordo et connectio idearum et
rerum)* "name something besides a non-entity.   But what?
Whatever it is, it is clearly not something which can be located.
in a place or given a date. It is not *like* something else." [22]
Woodbridge's refusal to confuse logical structure with that of
which logical structure is a character is paralleled by his sharp
distinction between things and ideas. Ideas are not things, he
maintains; rather, they are things in their logical relations.
Whatever logical structure is, it is not the observable and
measurable, although it concerns the observable and measurable
aspects of things.

Logical structure is the realm of being as this realm " dis-
closes itself as so connected that we can discover what one fact
or event in it implies in terms of other facts and events." [23]
Experience, then, is a matter of implications and inferences as
well as a matter of space, time, and mass.

We discover that there is in the realm of being a structure by virtue
of which one fact or event in it may lead our thinking on to other
facts and events which are involved, and opens to us the reaches

•• *Ibid.,* pp. 83; see pp. 41, 46, *53.*
•• *Ibid.,* p. 41.

of time and space and what they contain. . . . There is a coherence
in things which is found out by thinking. This coherence is some-
thing quite different from spatial juxtaposition, temporal succession
or mass accumulation.[24]

If Woodbridge's language seems vague at this point it is be-
cause implications, inferences, coherence, and connection are
not things that can be pointed at or described. Logical struc-
ture is a discovery about things that can be pointed at or
described, a discovery which enables us to speak intelligently
about them without pointing and to speak of them explana-
torily as well as descriptively.

Woodbridge's attempt to make clear what he means by logi-
cal structure finds its most characteristic formulation in heuris-
tic or anticipatory statements.   Logical structure is what is
accessible to thinking. It is the character of being among others
which renders it relevant to thinking. It is that which we ex-
plore when we think and that which language tries to express.
It is that which we try to discover and .explain.[25] As the quest
of thought is for reasons, so logical structure is that character
of being which responds to the search for reasons: it is the
reason in things, that which " accounts for things and renders
their operations intelligible." [26] Men anticipate that events do
not occur in isolation; what they discover about things which re-
moves them from their isolation is the logical structure of
things. [27]

Woodbridge means that logical structure is what is antici-
pated and sought when a question is raised, and what is dis-
covered when an answer is reached. It is what is grasped by in-
telligence when a question is intelligently answered.   The an-
swer is not the thing.   The knower does not "become" the
known in the sense that the thing has " entered " consciousness
in any quasi-physical way. Knowledge is knowledge *of* the

2ₐ *Ibid.,* pp. 46-47.

26 *Ibid.,* p. 83; see pp. 29, 46-47, 81-83.

26 *Ibid.,* pp. 49-50.

27 *Ibid..* p. 51.

thing, it is the thing in its power-to-be-known, its intelligibility, its logical structure. It is not without significance that the title page of the *Realm* is inscribed with a quotation from *De Anima.*

Further light is thrown upon the meaning of logical structure by Woodbridge's treatment of ideas. His discussion of ideas in the *Realm* takes place in his chapter on objective mind. This fact is not without its significance: Woodbridge is a meta-physician, and hesitates at naming his treatment of ideas "epistemology." He is wary of a theory of knowledge which amounts to a "piling of one act of knowledge on another." [28] Nor is he a psychologist interested in the psychological aspects and components of knowledge. Nor does he engage in any analysis of sensation. His starting point, as we saw above, is not in an analysis of sense data, or an assumption of the media-torial role of sensing, or any theoretic construction of the rela-tionship between thing, thing sensed, and thing known. He takes knowing as a matter of fact and asks what this fact im-plies about man and the realm of being in which man exists and knows. His interest is that of a metaphysician and his analysis is metaphysical analysis. He asks: What *is* an idea? What *is* language? And what must be the characteristics of a world in which such activities as thinking and speaking take place?

There are some objections which might be raised to Wood-bridge's approach to the problem of ideas and their relationship to being. There is, in the *Realm,* a refusal to take up an analysis of sensing, of experience, and even of consciousness which seem essential to any adequate theory of knowing. But Woodbridge had treated these topics over the years to an ex-tent that his position on them had been made sufficiently clear. What he seems to have done in the *Rea.lm* is to make available in apodictic form the conclusions of those years of consideration of the many problems related to the overriding metaphysical interests of the *Realm.* [29]

"" *Ibid.,* p. *55.*

•• For his treatment of consciousness and cognition, see the essays gathered in *Nature and Mind* (New York: 1987).

In the few pages of the *Realm* devoted to the subject, Wood-
bridge offers us a series of statements on the nature of knowl-
edg.e which are incisive, tantalizing in their brevity, and
thought-provoking in their implications. Although some ques-
tions are left unanswered and some, perhaps, unasked, the pages
are a welcome r.elief from the obscurantism all too frequently
met in the literature of the theory of knowledge. Woodbridge
tells us what knowledge is and what it isn't, in a style and with
a clarity difficult to fault or match:

What, then, is knowledge? **...** To stare the world in the face, so to
speak, is not to know it **....** Knowing things is not being them, nor
is their existence knowledge of them. Possession of a counterfeit of
reality is no nearer to knowledge than the possession of reality it-
self **....** We may accordingly conclude that, given all the experience
we have or can have, an idea-unless we arbitrarily make it such
by a definition to start with-is never a copy, image, likeness, re-
semblance, counterfeit, presentation or representation of anything
whatever. Likenesses are things like photography, paintings,
drawings, models. They are expressed in lineaments comparable
with the things they are like. Ideas are not so expressed. They
are expressed, when we speak or write, in propositions. And a
proposition is never, in any sense, like the thing it propounds. [30]

What, then, are ideas? We may now say that an idea is an object
in its logical connections. **It** is in no sense image, copy, likeness; in
no sense one kind of existence set over against another kind, de-
manding comparison between the two in order that there may be
knowledge. Nor is it the object's presence, not even if we describe
that presence as a presentation to or in consciousness. For we may
see objects and yet have little or no idea of what they are. We
may handle them and still be ignorant of them. To have knowledge,
something more and something quite different is necessary. Objects
must effect a specific kind of leading on. They must evoke affirma-
tions and denials. They must generate propositions. And our con-
tention is that they do this, not by being first transformed into
something like them or into something which implies them, but by
being themselves already involved in a net of logical connections
which we follow out and discover. The idea of anything is what
that thing *is.* What a thing is, is conveyed by language, by a material
exchange, and is wholly indifferent to the particular material ex-

---

[30] *The Realm of Mind,* pp. 57-61.

change which may convey it; and no exchange conveys it more truly than another. In terms of the realm of mind, ideas are its logic particularized and focused in objects. [81]

The clarity and confidence of the presentation are impressive. Hume or Kant might have been helped considerably in their own thinking had these pages of the *Realm* been available, or had they read Aristotle and Spinoza as carefully as Woodbridge did.

The more significant aspect of Woodbridge's teaching on knowledge in the *Realm* may be summarized as follows:

1. Knowing as an activity cannot be equated with sensing or imagining; the knower does not possess or become the object known. Knowledge is not sense data or images, nor does it amount to a re-duplication of an external object in an internal object, nor any absorption of the object by the mind or the mind by the object.

2. Knowing as activity is a matter of getting ideas; knowledge as a fact is having ideas.

3. Ideas are gotten from experience through contact with ob-jects, but ideas or knowledge are not experience or contact.

4. Ideas are gotten from, or are effected by, an object's ability to" lead on" in a specific way, a leading-on which issues in affirma-tions and denials. [32] The specific kind of leading-on that objects effect is exemplified in the questions they provoke and in the search for answers. The object effects this leading-on precisely insofar as it is part of the system of objective mind.

5. An idea, then, is not the thing of which it is the idea. It is the obj.ect in its logical aspect. It is *what* the thing is, the answer to the question *quid sit.* Woodbridge might be styled an adherent of a correspondence theory of truth, with this caution: he means that there is a correlativity of intelligence and the intelligible as-pect of things. The object outside thought is not a correlate of an

---

[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 85-87. Harry Todd Costello relates, in "The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge," that "when someone raised the question one day whether there is ever such a thing as imageless thought, Woodbridge replied that the real question is whether there is any thought which is not imageless." *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* ed. Y. Krikorian (New York: 1944), p. 308.

[32] Woodbridge seems to include in his notion of idea the act of judgment. A distinction between having an idea, or an answer to the question *quid sit,* and judging that one's idea is correct, or answering the question *an sit,* would have lent clarity to his discussion. It is the difference between hypothesis or concept and judgment of fact. Both involve idea but they are not the same activity. An explicit consideration of judgment, such as Dewey's *Logic,* is called for.

object inside thought; a spatial metaphor is misleading. We might put it this way: an object understood is not *the·* object; it is the object *understood.*

Woodbridge has written what to my mind is a superb essay on the distinction between the activities of experience (sensing, imagining) and idea. His masterful grasp is nowhere more evi- dent than in his telling use of the classical example of the dif- ference between the idea of a circle and the images of circles, and in his description of the situation in which the experience of an object does not amount to an idea of it. [83]

The same telling distinction is made in a different way in his question to Dewey, "Of What Sort is Cognitive Experi- ence?" [34] The essay was written in 1905, twenty-one years prior to the *Realm.* It was written in response to Dewey's "The Pos- tulate of Immediate Empiricism." [35] The point which Wood- bridge takes up is the relationship between cognitive experience and other kinds of experience. It is helpful to note that Wood- bridge did not prefer the phrase " cognitive experience." It does not appear in *Realm* nor, I think, in *An Essay on Nature.* I suspect that the reason for this is that his own understanding of the distinction between experience and understanding   was so firm and clear that, although he considered thinking an ex- perience, he felt that the use of the phrase would lead to con- fusion.

In that essay, Woodbridge suggests to Dewey that cognitive experience is of quite a different sort from any other kind of experience. He writes:

… it appears to me clear that in cognitive experience all other sorts of experience may .exist without alteration; for, otherwise, how could we find out what sort they are? How could they be identified as the concrete, particular sorts of experience indicated? In other words, in the cognitive sort of experience, all other sorts appear to be transcended. The nub of the *question,* to use Professor Dewey's words once more, is, undoubtedly, what sort of experience is meant

[33] *The Realm of Mind,* pp. 60, 67.

•• *Nature and Mind,* pp. 816 ff.

[85] *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (New York: 1910), pp. 226-241.

or indicated. But it would appear that this question can be *answered* only in a cognitive .experience!

There are many sorts of experience of which the cognitive is only one and one which can be confused with the others only to the detriment of all. But I must now add that the cognitive experience is of such a" sort" that it enables us to tell what the others actually are when we ask the question about *their* sort.[36]

The *Realm,* and essays such as " The Field of Logic " and "Mind Discerned," exhibit Woodbridge's firm grasp of cognitional fact and his willingness to follow the implications of the facts. His devotion to Aristotle, Spinoza, and Locke may explain a good deal of the content of his metaphysics and his method, but it does not explain what Woodbridge himself had to achieve, an achievement displayed in his writings: he found out what he was doing when he was knowing, and he capitalized, with singular brilliance in metaphysics, on that discovery. His achievement influenced one generation of Columbia Naturalists-his association with Dewey lasted over thirty years-and contributed to the philosophic development of his students, among them John H. Randall, Jr. and Sterling P. Lamprecht. From him they learned the difference between obscurantism and intelligence in philosophy. They maintained, each in his own philosophic context, the fundamental positions announced by Woodbridge, namely, that thinking implies a thinkable world; that the problem of knowledge is not that of closing a gap between mind and the thing-out-there, but a matter of answering questions and that the content of knowledge is not the " thing " or a representation of it, but an imageless (i. e., immaterial) understanding of the meaning of things.

IV. CRITICAL CoMMENTS

Woodbridge's distinction between experience and idea is incisive and decisive-for anyone willing to pay attention to his

---

[36] *Nature and Mind,* p. 319. One again,   is what one arrives at when one has answered the question *quid sit.*

[37] *Ibid.,* pp. 56-78, 160-17!l.

own cognitional activity. But the distinction suffers the limits of a two-moment cognitional theory. Except for some references to judgment in the early essays, Woodbridge fails to advert systematically to the third moment in human knowing, the moment in which one says of his idea that it is correct or incorrect.88 He largely ignores that critical moment of reflection on idea which leads to affirmation or denial. There is, then, this further distinction to be made: not only is idea distinct from experience, but reflection and the subsequent judgment are activities distinct from idea and experience. In addition there is an ambiguity in his notion of idea. He seems to mean by it both understanding as activity and concept as formulation of the content of understanding. Idea is for Woodbridge an amalgam (acceptable in ordinary conversation but misleading in philosophical analysis of cognition) of the act of understanding and concept as its product.

I suggest that this weakness in cognitional theory is traceable to Woodbridge's (and *a pari* the other Naturalists') failure to deal adequately with the modern turn to subjectivity. Without an adequate explication of the cognitional activities of the human subject, the language of Woodbridge's metaphysics can be dismissed rather easily as a mere repetition and refurbishing of the classical tradition. Surely Kant is wrong-Woodbridge knew this-but metaphysics needs a theoretic ground in an explicit cognitional theory which he and the other Naturalists refused to develop. One can understand that refusal, for epistemology had become a tiring and unproductive business and introspection a suspect philosophic method by the beginning of our century. The expeditious solution is to step around the bog. Woodbridge did more than that, of course. If I am not entirely mistaken he did approach a critical realism based in recognition of cognitional fact-but he did not exploit that recognition and develop a carefully formulated and critical cognitional theory.

•• See *Nature and Mind,* pp. 33-34 and 68-69. He uses judgment to refute a relativist position on knowing. For a later statement, see *Realm,* pp. 61-62.

I find the most intriguing aspect of Woodbridge's development to lie in what I called above the "deductive inference" which comes to the fore in the *Realm.* Here Woodbridge does not seem fully to be aware of what he is engaged in. He is able to talk about the sensible / logical character of being only because he is able to distinguish sharply between the two activities of experience and understanding. In fact, his theory of the sensible / logical structure of being is a deduction from that distinction and the result is a transcendental categorization even if he would prefer to call it a generalization. One wishes that he had pushed the matter further. Had he adverted to and systematically employed a three-fold distinction of cognitional activities (experience, understanding, judgment) he might have erected a theory of being as triadically structured (sensible, intelligible, real) and perhaps have addressed himself to the question whether natural existence is thoroughly or transcendentally intelligible. He was blocked from doing so, in my opinion, by two factors: by his espousal of an " analytic and empirical method" and its result in congenial generalization, and by an absence of a critical theory of the human subject. And it is precisely the absence which allows an uncritical espousal of the empirical method.

WILLIAM M. SHEA

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

ARE CONCLUSIVE PROOFS IRRELEVANT TO RELIGION?

FOR CENTURIES the proofs for God's existence have been debated and their role in religious belief-systems assessed. There have been those who claim that the proofs are conclusive, those who claim that they are invalid, and those who claim that they are valid but inconclusive. There have been disputes, furthermore, as to whether the logical base for religious belief systems should be sought in proofs and evidence rather than in "self-authenticating" religious experiences and acceptance of religious authority. But no one, until recently, ever contended that *even if the proofs were conclusive* it would be irrelevant to religious believers. People have thought that religion *must* be undergirded by proof, *aan be* undergirded by proof, and *need not* be undergirded by proof, but not that proof would be irrelevant.

Now of course there are many senses in which a proof could be relevant to religious believers. The Vatican Council affirmed that if people denied that God could be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason they would be anathema. Thus it could have made quite serious practical differences to a believer whether he accepted the proofs or not. As philosophers we are not concerned with this sort of practical difference but with philosophical ones, and the question to be explored is: Is there something philosophically at stake for believers in this question of the proofs for the existence of God? I want to contend that Steven M. Cahn is utterly wrongheaded in his claim that religious believers have no real interest in philosophical proofs for the existence of God.[1] I am assuming that this

---

[1] Steven M. Cahn, " The Irrelevance to Religion of Philosophic Proofs for the Existence of God," *The American Philosophical Quarterly* (April, 1969), pp. 170-72. Further citations will be given by page number in the text. Cahn has

is not a statistical claim to be settled by polls but rather a philosophical claim. Cahn makes no effort to produce questionnaire results from a proper sample of believers nor shall I.

To examine this question, in the context of Cahn's contention, it is fortunately not necessary to resolve the question of the validity of the proofs. In an effort to dismiss them once for all, Cahn is willing to assume that the proofs are valid, for the sake of the argument. " Suppose we assume, contrary to what most philosophers, I among them, believe, that all of these proofs are valid. Let us grant the necessary existence (whatever that might mean) of the most perfect conceivable Being, a Being who is ali-good and is the designer and creator of the universe. What implications can be drawn from this fact which would be of relevance to human life? In other words, what difference would it make in men's lives if God existed?" (p. 170)

In support of his surprising thesis that religious believers are right in ignoring the proofs, he gives two chief arguments, that religious believers make their decisions as to what beliefs to hold and what practices to follow on the basis of "self-validating " personal experiences which render the proofs unnecessary, and that the success of the proofs would not enable a newly converted unbeliever to know what beliefs and practices to choose. He therefore contends that the proofs are relevant for neither the believer nor the unbeliever.

In examining his contention about the relevancy of proofs I propose to look at what religious belief systems say about this problem, an approach Cahn does not seem to care to use. In this connection it should be noted that his sources are curious, for he cites not one person who would be taken by anyone to be a normal religious believer. He cites Antony Flew, Wallace Matson, C. B. Martin, and Mordecai Kaplan, but not John

Hick, John Smith, H. D. Lewis, or Austin Farrer, and the only theologian whom he mentions in support of his claim is that most untypical Dane, Soren Kierkegaard.

Even the arguments which he claims support his thesis, drawn from Kierkegaard and Kaplan, do not do so. He says, correctly, that Kierkegaard regarded attempts to prove God's existence as ludicrous. He does not tell us that Kierkegaard thought that the proofs were invalid and thought that he had demonstrated sufficiently that this was so. It hardly supports Cahn's contention that the proofs *if* *valid* are irrelevant to note that a theologian who thought that the proofs *were invalid* found attempts to prove God's existence absurd. Moreover he does not tell us that Kierkegaard is in no way typical of religious philosopher-theologians or of religious believers.

In the case of Kaplan, Cahn cites a remark that people seldom convert to religion because of proofs. Again he does not tell us whether Kaplan thought this would be so of *valid* proofs. Kaplan, he mentions, is a naturalist, hence is even more untypical than Kierkegaard of religious believers.

It would seem sensible, first, to look at the place proofs and rational justifications play in religious belief-systems in order to see whether or not the proofs *if* *valid* are irrelevant.

The primary argument advanced by Cahn is that the basis for religious belief is not proofs or .evidence but self-authenticating experiences. First, then, we must look to see if this is the view of the logical basis for religious belief typically held by believers themselves. As the First Vatican Council made clear, Catholics believe that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the light of natural reason. Of course Catholics are not obliged to hold that reason is required to establish truths about God, for revelation is available to do that. Nevertheless the validation of the proofs for God would give rational support to basic Catholic beliefs and would be welcomed on that basis. Catholic apologists often criticize other religions just because of their reliance on slippery criteria such as personal religious experience or " sheer faith."

Outside Catholicism one typically finds greater suspicion of
human reason, hence a greater reliance on historical arguments
and arguments from miracles rather than the rational proofs,
but the point about undergirding is still valid. The typically
protestant appeal is to some *evidential* base rather than to self-
authenticating experience as a rule. John R. W. Stott, for ex-
ample, speaks for very conservative forms of Protestantism
in arguing for the acceptance of Jesus as authority on the
grounds that there is all but conclusive *historical* evidence that
Jesus was uniquely divine. [2] Particularly Stott places emphasis
upon the resurrection as validation of Jesus as authority. Re-
ligious believers of various sects would appeal to such " facts "
as the escape of the people of Israel from Egypt, the miracles
of Jesus, the golden tablets given to Joseph Smith, and so on.
In short, religious believers are not just told to " believe," they
are told to believe because . . .

It is often said that believers appeal to authority, and they
do. What needs to be noted is that believerstypicallythinkthat
they have rational and evidential *justification* for accepting
the doctrines proclaimed by their authorities as true. This is
so even though the same religious believers may speak of knowl-
edge of God " by faith." Faith is not thought to be unwarranted
trust or belief but is thought to have its justification in evidence
and rational argument. What sometimes confuses interpreters
of religion is that they fail to notice the distinction believers
make between the experience which leads them to *live religious-
ly* (have" faith" in the sense of placing ultimate trust in God),
and the intellectual grounds upon which they rest their set
of beliefs. When Reformers said that knowledge of God was
by faith they meant that the believer achieved commitment
to God in an experience, but *not* that he first came to have
knowledge that God existed by that experience. Calvin, for ex-
ample, admitted that all men have an implanted knowledge
of God and that God's existence is obvious in the fashioning of
the universe and the continuing government of it. For Calvin

• John W. Scott, *Basic Christianity* (Eerdmans, 1958), p. *59.*

it does not take faith to believe *that* God is but only to believe *in* him. Much the same point should perhaps be made in connection with classical mystical religions, whether eastern or western, but for reasons to become apparent such religions must be excluded from this discussion.

Biblical religion is often put forward as an example of a religion that rests upon appeal to authority, and it is sometimes not fully appreciated how wrong it is to present biblical religion in this way. Biblical man supported his beliefs by appeals to evidence. Very seldom is appeal made to self-validating visions or to the words of authoritative spokesmen *unless an attempt has been made to show that evidence exists to support the claims of that authority to speak truth.*

The test of a true prophet is whether God does what the prophet says he will, and false prophets are recognized as such by the falseness of their claims. Jesus is shown to be the Lord by the miracles which he performed, by his fulfilling the prophecies made of old, by his resurrection from the dead and supernatural reappearance to his disciples. The apostolic preaching of the first generation heavily stressed the resurrection and miracles as a validation of their claims that Jesus was the Redeeming Christ. The authority of the Church, in Catholic apologetic, rests upon its having been established by Christ, and by the miraculous demonstration of catholicity and infallibility which it has evidenced in history. Similar claims have been made about the Bible as providing clear evidence of its own supernatural origin.

Further indication of this stress on evidential justification is shown by the historical explanations provided for the religious rituals practiced by believers. When children ask why the rituals should be practiced they are to be told that it is because God rescued the children of Israel from Egypt. Christian sacraments are given their justification in terms of acts of Jesus as presented in the Scriptures or remembered in oral tradition. It is symptomatic of Biblical religion to give answers as to why such and such should be believed or practiced by reference to

historical events. Seldom if ever is the justification given" because Moses wrote this down and what he said is inspired." It is doubtful that Moses is ever quoted by anyone in the Hebrew Bible, although it is true that words were attributed to him at various periods as the laws were recodified. The justification for belief is not "Moses said" but "God did."

Those who stand outside a particular religion may find themselves there just because they doubt the " facts " by which the religion claims justification, and when that is true then of course it looks to these outsiders as though the religion is totally unjustified by an appeal to reason or to evidential support. But this is not the case for those who stand inside the tradition and believe *because* of what God allegedly did in the time of Moses and does for his people now.

There are some important dissenters from the thesis that religion as a rule claims philosophical and evidential backing. Some theologians, often influenced heavily by the second " melancholy Dane," maintain that all knowledge of God comes through special revelation and that no backing at all for religion exists. Because this group has been highly vocal in the past thirty years, and because this sort of non-justification for religion fits in nicely with some contemporary strands of philosophic thought, the view has become rather widespread that religion is typically revelational, but this is plainly not the case. The alliance of Wittgensteinian fideists and philosophical skeptics on the role of reason in religion is of recent origin and is plainly unacceptable to most religious believers who have written on the subject in the past ten years, as it has been unacceptable historically.

In support of this historical claim stands Walter Marshall Horton, theologian, who tried to state the ecumenical consensus concerning knowledge of God based on World Council of Churches documents. He maintained that" conservative Protestants have been as little convinced as liberal Protestants of the total illegitimacy of the rational approach to theology." [8]

• Walter Marshall Horton, *Christian Theology: An Ecumenical AP'[JToach* (Harper & Row, 1955), p. 74.

He observed further that theologians who deny this rational approach, such as Aulen and Karl Barth, have been unable to persuade the majority to their views and that the consensus, Protestant as well as Catholic, conservative as well as liberal, is overwhelmingly against them. Similar observations have been made about the tendency of some philosophers to regard the sort of discussion represented in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* [4] as the norm for contemporary philosophical examination of religion. Twenty years of discussion of the falsification criterion have indicated clearly that whatever else they may be theistic assertions are *intended* as cognitive by most theists and that religious believers typically offer *evidence* to support their claims. Far from being disinterested in proofs for God's existence, both the classical rational proofs and appeals to miracles, tradition ancient and modern strongly suggests the opposite. Of course it is true that as people come to believe that the proofs are of doubtful validity they may come to lay more stress on other ways of validation. A substantial and highly vocal minority of theologians did shift to appeals to "self-authenticating " revelations, under Karl Barth's influence, but they never constituted the *norm* for religion.

On this matter there are borderline cases that are difficult to classify. There are those who defend a different model of proof than that classically presented by, say, St. Thomas and William Paley. What does one say of a person who holds that theological statements are parts of metaphysical belief-systems which are validated in terms of their perceived adequacy as world-views (hence "proved" in that sense), but states that because adequacy is always" perceived" adequacy these world views cannot be *known* to be true in any fool-proof fashion? [5] Since those experiences which give rise to the belief-system would not be accepted if an integrated metaphysical helief-sys-

---

• *New Essays in Philosophical Theology,* ed. by Antony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre (SCM Press, Ltd., 1955) .

• Frank B. Dilley, *Metaphysics and Religious Language* (Columbia University Press, 1964), chapters VIr and VIII.

tem could not be developed from them, the experiences are not
treated as self-authenticating.   They must be authenticated in
terms of the adequacy of the metaphysical belief-system that
is developed, and without the successful system the experiences
would be discarded as non-cognitive. Certainly those of us who
take this view believe that it would make a great deal of dif-
ference if the proofs were valid. The possibility that we were
letting our inherited beliefs or unconscious motives bias our
world view in leading us to a religious world view would· be re-
moved.

So far we have looked at two lines of argument for the thesis
that religious believers are not interested in the proofs. The two
claims that religious believers are in fact disinterested and that
they rest their beliefs upon self-authenticating experiences have
been denied, both as regards classical tradition and as state-
ments of dominant contemporary religious opinion. Believers
typically appeal to justificatory arguments and evidence to sup-
port their beliefs and practices. A minority of contemporary
theologians, a number of contemporary philosophers who speak
on religious questions, and large numbers of unbelievers may
take the position that religion rests wholly on a revelation
which you either get or do not get, but the religious consensus
denies this.

It is time to address the question, what value would proofs
for God's existence have for religious believers and unbelievers?
To answer this question satisfactorily we must take a look at
some aspects of the proofs themselves. It should be remembered
that the question is, what relevance would the proofs have *if
valid,* if, that is, there is proved to be a most perfect conceivable
Being who is ali-good and the creator of the universe?

In the first place, most of the religions of the world have
gods whose nature is incompatible with that established by the
proofs. It is curious that Cahn never discusses this question
at all. Polytheistic religions typically affirm a multiplicity of
finite and imperfect deities, each responsible for some aspect
of nature or human existence,:hence would be overthrown by

the proofs. Acosmic mysticisms typically deny that the Divine in any real sense created the world or that it has the kind of objective value order in it that would justify, say, the fifth way of St. Thomas or any other version of the teleological argument. In short, given the Cahn concession that the God proved is the most perfect conceivable Being, creator of the universe, most of the religious views held by people in the world would become logically invalid. Moreover, all atheisms would be refuted. It does not take much argument to show that if the proofs of God were acknowledged to be conclusive it would make a great deal of difference for *these* large groups of believers and unbelievers.

Cahn claims, correctly, that the proofs would not enable someone to know .exactly what set of religious beliefs and practices should be followed; however, he unfortunately forgot (or failed to mention) that someone *would* know that he should adopt some practices consistent with monotheism and not with polytheism or atheism. If the proofs were valid it is clear that many people would come to know that their practices were wrong. I would also contend that people would also come to know a large range of practices that were right.

To support· his case Cahn claims· that the proofs would not enable a converted unbeliever to know what set of ethical valuations to adopt, hence he or she would not know how to please God. "We may affirm that God is ali-good and yet have no way of knowing what the highest moral standards are " (p. 171) . It is true that the converted believer could not *deduce* from the nature of God what is good, but if we remember what kind of world we would have to hav:e for the proofs to be valid we can see where Cahn goes wrong. He forgets (or neglects to mention) that for the teleological argument to be valid it must be the case 'that people can readily see that the world is designed, and consequently can recognize what is good just by observing the design of the world. Moreover the fourth way of St. Thomas presupposes our ability to recognize gradations of goodness. In short, if *we take the proofs seriously* we recog-

nize not only that the practices of most religions and atheisms are wrong but also that we could read right off the world itself what is good. The trouble we now have is that the order of the world is not clear .enough for the teleological argument to really work for most of us. If it did work, presumably the order would have to be clearer.

Although it is fair to cite Hume, as Cahn does, in support of the claim that normative judgments cannot be deduced from factual premises, it is not fair to claim support in Hume for the contention that were the proofs valid we would not know what moral standards to follow. Whatever else Hume may have said, all three of the personages in Hume's dialogues on natural religion agree that the validity of the teleological argument would establish a God whose goodness was very much like ours. Demea opposed the teleological argument precisely for this reason, opting instead for a more transcendent God, and Philo agreed with him. Hume could then be cited in favor of the view that God's standards would be like our standards *if the teleological argument were valid.* Granted that this does not help to meet the *other* problem, that of alleged relativity of value standards, it does show that a God whose existence was established by the teleological argument would have to have values much like ours, according to Hume. Secondly, the divorce of "is" from "ought" depends upon a non-telic interpretation of the universe, but a non-telic universe is not consonant with the teleological argument. That argument, it should be recalled, is an argument from the rational order and goodness of the universe to an all-good orderer. For the argument to be successful man must know what the good is and must be able to see that the ends toward which all things strive are good, and surely he would then be able to derive a sense of moral code from the actual patterns and processes he observes.

So far we have contended, against Cahn, that the validity of the teleological argument would establish both that God's values are like ours and that values can be read off the nature of things. What should be said about the contention that there

is actually a great variety of moral codes? I suspect that it is
false, particularily if the kinds of religious and non-religious
views that the proofs would invalidate are .eliminated. Objec-
tivists in ethics have available a whole range of responses to
alleged ethical relativism. Differenees in family and civic pat-
terns can be handled in terms of special circumstances or be
given developmental interpretation. Perhaps slavery was good
in ancient Greece, but not now. When it was believed that
Protestants' souls went to hell it was perhaps justifiable to slay
the body in order to save the soul. To slay one's parents when
it is believed that by so doing they will be young in the after-
world may be commendable filial piety. Some acts resembling
murder, such as assassination under certain conditions, the
shooting of criminals by police, and the killing of enemies in
wartime, might be right but they do not fall under the pro-
hibited class of actions called murder because of the circum-
stances in which they occur.

Cultural relativism as a general thesis about widespread dif-
ferences in basic ethical axioms has fallen on evil days. Ac-
cording to Richard Brandt, recent second looks at anthropolog-
ical data have disclosed a number of ethical universals. **It**
would be a mistake, he says, to take .ethical relativism " as a
truth with pervasive scope. Relativism as an emphasis is mis-
leading, because it draws our attention away from the central
identities, from widespread agreement on the items we care
most about." [6] Moreover, *could* a defender of the traditional
proofs be an ethical relativist? The Fourth Way requires that
we recognize a hierarchy of goods, and the teleological argument
requires that we be able to see the purposiveness of the uni-
verse, and it seems plausible to argue that a good teleologist is
obliged to maintain some objectivist theory of ethics. He is
not obliged to hold that in fact all people agree right off about
value matters, but he is obliged to hold that there *ought* to be
agreement on values once prejudices are set aside and all the

[6] Richard B. Brandt, *Ethical Theory* (Prentice Hall, 1959), p. 288.

facts known. A revelationist could claini that ethical disagree-
ments are unsolvable in principle until the wrong party is con-
verted, but it is not evident that a teleologist could so claim.

A third point which is relevant is that many believers would
not *c.are* what diversity of beliefs and practices people hold,
within limits. Supposing that a person holds ethical beliefs
which fall within a permissible range, that he believes in God,
and that he holds no beliefs which are harmful to the human
body or mind, many believers would not care what particular
rituals and myths someone might support. Doubtless the num-
ber of believers who hold that to miss being baptized is to
court hell is diminishing. Strong ecumenical tendencies are
moving religious groups toward unity on terms which in effect
deny the importance of minor matters of belief and practice.
It is true that no one could deduce from a consideration of the
nature of God what specific religious beliefs to hold, but many
believers would hold that it does not matter what specific ones
are held beyond belief in the fatherhood of God and the
brotherhood of man. The converted naturalist who, we are to
imagine, has been converted by the proofs and is in doubt as
to what religion to practice might be told that it just does
not matter much either to other believers or to God. The proofs
will be relevant to converting him to *a* religious view, consistent
in basic outline with a number of religions, but it might not
matter which one is followed.

Now it is true that there is a wide variety of basic beliefs
and religious practices which fall within the scope allowed by
valid proofs for God's existence. One could not infer from the
proofs whether to believe in transubstantiation   or not, or
whether God, although one, exists in three persons, but this is
not to say that one could not know what set of moral standards
to adopt. Cahn is right that the proofs do not decide many re-
ligious questions. His mistake is in claiming that they would
decide *none* of the important ones.

The main value to religious believers that would come from
valid religious proofs has not been mentioned, an escape from

doubts about subjectivism with regard to religious experience. While proofs would not establish everything about religious belief and perhaps would not establish which putative religious experiences were genuine and which were not, proofs would at least establish the possibility that *some* religious experiences are authentic. Cognitive support is sought by religious believers because of their awareness that human experiences can be highly subjective. What seem to be authoritative," self-validating" experiences turn out sometimes to be fallible and subject to revision. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that my experience of Isis could be duplicated by someone who takes LSD. A person convinced of one religion can be converted to another if a new "self-authenticating" experience succeeds the old one. Moreover my " knowledge " that she loves me can be shaken by her marrying the other person. That I have an experience which *seems* to be self-authenticating is no sure sign that it is cognitive, as everyone knows who believes that there is only one God and has met someone who has had an exp.erience of a different one. Even if I based my religion on "self-authenticating" experience, valid proof that there is a God would be relevant by establishing that there really is a God, hence that my visions or religious beliefs and practices need not be sheer projections onto nothing. [7] Many believers are seriously troubled by subjectivist explanations of religious experience, and the validity of the proofs would show them that *some* visions could well be grounded, although not necessarily that theirs is one of the ones that is authentic. Since this is so, valid proofs for God's existence would be relevant, not irrelevant, as Cahn claims, for those who base their beliefs upon religious experience. Not only would the possibility of authentic experiences be established but also some parameters would be set in terms of the kind of God proved.

---

[7] While it seems curious to talk of providing cognitive backing for " self-authenticating " experiences, I think it is a valid way of talking since " self-authenticating " refers to psychological reactions, not objective status. Sense perceptions are self-authenticating even though mirages may be involved.

CoNCLUSION

Those of us who are religious believers but who have to come to terms with the fact that the proofs are not fool-proof would welcome the support of valid proofs in the way religious believers have always looked for such support. While it is no disaster that the proofs are not convincing to everyone, it would be a welcome fact if it were not so. While religion is possible without proof, and so is objective morality, the case for both is seriously weakened compared to what it would be if there were valid fool-proof proofs.

In the first place, valid proofs would disestablish the alternative world views of polytheism, mysticism, and naturalism leaving only theism as a live option for the structuring of life. Secondly, the proofs could be valid only if this were a world of the sort depicted by St. Thomas or by Paley, where the signs of design are clear for all to see. Some kind of natural law theory would be established, along with grounding for the objectivity of ethics and the relatedness of divine being and values to human being and values. Thirdly, the case would be established that religious experience is not necessarily subjective and some parameters would be set which would enable us to disqualify some experiences as inauthentic.

Given these ways in which valid proofs would be relevant for religious belief, to claim that the fact that the proofs do not establish *exactly which* religious beliefs and practices are correct establishes their irrelevance to religious belief is to make a senous error.

Steven Cahn's claim that the philosophical proofs for God's existence are irrelevant for religious beliefs is wrongheaded. Such a claim can result only from serious misunderstanding of the logic of religion. Fool-proof proofs would solve many of the basic problems faced by religious believers. Alas, there are no fool-proof proofs, but it would be wrong either to make a virtue of that lamentable fact, as Barth does, or to make it a matter of irrelevancy, as Cahn does.

FRANK B. DILLEY

University of Delaware
Newark, Delaware

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE RECONCILIATION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND CONTINGENT ACTION

I F THE END of wisdom is to put things in their proper order, perhaps no finer illustration of such ordering wisdom is to be found than in the monumental work of Thomas Aquinas in balancing the elements of Christian revelation with the inherent possibilities of the Aristotelian philosophical system to achieve an increased intelligibility of what God has revealed to man. To appreciate the finesse of this achievement, however, we must analyze and particularize, break problems down into their component parts, retrace their history, and attempt to reassemble them as they were once understood in successive contexts in the mind of Thomas.

One of the most challenging problems that confronted Aquinas in his daring effort to adapt Aristotelianism to Christianity was the problem of contingency. Aristotle had affirmed the contingency of human activity as a refutation of determinism. By his appeal to the *per accidens* (viz., chance combinations and interferences of causes), he felt that he had destroyed the two premises of determinism: first, that every effect has a *per se,* or necessary, cause; and second, that granted the cause, the effect must necessarily follow.[1] Unfortunately for Aquinas, Aristotle's position on contingency led him to a negation of divine providence unacceptable to a Christian thinker. In his basic indifference to the world, the Aristotelian Prime Mover is a far cry from the God of Abraham and Isaac. The dilemma Thomas was confronted with is a good illustration of the difficult position in which medieval theologians who de-

---

[1] The basic texts in Aristotle are *Metaphysies* D, 6, 7, 30; E, 3.

pended   upon Aristotle frequently   found themselves-to   deny
the certitude of divine providence was impossible, but did one
have to relinquish Aristotle's victory over determinism as well
and seek its flefutation on other grounds?

Aquinas, of course, viewed these problems basically as a
theologian and within the context of a series of interconnected
theological problems. Father Bernard Lonergan, S.J., in his
investigation of the Thomistic theology of grace [2] has shown
that it is impossible to understand   how Thomas handled the
delicate problem of *gratia operans* and *gratia cooperans,* unless
some of the basic philosophical pr.esuppositions underlying his
treatment are clearly understood.   Among these presuppositions
are the analogy of operation, the theory of instrumentality,   a
fully evolv.ed notion of the freedom of the will, and a position
on the problem of contingency that enabled him to preserve
the solution of Aristotle without negating the Christian doctrine
of providence. [3] This position Lonergan terms the " theorem
of divine transcendence."   [4]

Although Aquinas' solution finds its fullest expression in the
Commentarium in Perihermeneias, lect. 14, it is a tribute to his
speculative genius that the basic position is already clear as
early as his *Commentarium in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (c.
1252-1256) . The task of this study is to examine the nature
of the theorem of divine transcendence as expressed in four key
texts, attempting to explain its significance and to show the ad-
vances made in its expression and comprehension.

---

[2] *Grace and Freedom.   Operative Grace in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas*
(London-New York: 1971). Based on the author's dissertation, this study first
appeared as a series of articles, "Thomas' Thought on *Gratia Operans," Theologi-
cal Studies*   (1941),   3   69-88, 375-402. Any reader of this
seminal work will recognize the indebtedness of the present study to the main
lines of interpretation suggested there; indeed, it grows out of seminar work begun
under Fr. Lonergan's direction.

[3] *Grace and Freedom,* "Concluding   Summary,"   139-145. (References will be
to the book throughout.)

[4] *Op. cit.,* 79. " Theorem " here is used in the sense of " exact technical expres-
sions of one's scientific understanding."   Cf. D. Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard
Lonergan* (New York: 1970), p. 43.

I. *Commentarium in Sententias Petri Lombardi.*

Because the theorem of divine transcendence is basically a solution that reconciles antitheses it is usually expressed in two parallel contexts, the first concerned with the possibility of contingency or with the question of the divine knowledge and will of the contingent reality, and the second concerned with the certainty of divine providence. [5]

In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. *5,* is of the former variety, i.e., it is the first in a long series of texts in which Thomas asks himself the question, " Utrum scientia Dei sit contingentium? " The response is immediate and unhesitating. Neither the fact that God is the necessary cause of all things nor the fact that knowledge presupposes a determination in the thing known precludes the existence of contingent things or God's knowledge of them. The first does not because the necessity or contingency of the effect follows the proximate cause and not the First Cause. This might seem, however, to imply that the secondary cause can impede the operation of the primary cause, an objection Thomas answers on the basis of the certitude of the divine knowledge. Such certitude demands a determination in the object known, a determination that in the case of the known

----

[5] *First Series:* the divine knowledge and will of contingent reality.

A) " Utrum scientia Dei sit contingentium " -*In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. *5; De Ver.,* q.   *Contra Gentiles,* I, c. 67; *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 14, a. 13; q. 86, a. 4; *De Malo,* q. 16, a. 7, ad 15; *In I Periherm.,* lect. 14; *Compend. Theol.,* cc. 133-134.

B) "Utrum voluntas divina rebus volitis necessitatem imponat *"-In I Sent.,* d. 47, q. 1, a. 1,   *De Ver.,* q.   a. *5; Contra Gentiles,* I, c. *85;* II, cc. *Summa Theol.* I, q. 19, a. 8; *In I Periherm.,* lect. 14.

Second Series: the certitude of divine providence or predestination.

A) *Positive expression:* "Utrum providentia (vel praedestinatio) sit certa *"-* *In I Sent.,* d. 39, q.   d. 40, q. *3; De Ver.,* q. 6, a. *3; Contra Gentiles,* III, c. 94; *Summa Theol.,* I, q.   a. 6; *De Subst. Sep.,* cc. 13-15, esp. no. 137; *Quodl.*   q. 3.

B) *Negative expression:* "Praescientia, providentia, praedestinatio et huiusmodi non imponunt necessitatem omnibus rebus *"-In II Sent.,* d.   q. 1, a.   ad   *De Ver.,* q.   a. 1, ad 13; *Contra Gentiles,* III, cc. 71-75; 163; *Quodl.* 11, q. *3; Summa Theol.,* I, q.   a. 4; q.   a. 1, ad 1; a.3, ad *3;* a. 6; II-II, q. 171, a. 6, ad 1; *In VI Meta.,* lect. *3; De Rationibus Fidei,* c. 10; *Compend. Theol.,* cc. 139-140.

contingent can only obtain when the thing really exists. This is exactly the way in which the divine mind does know, though, because " all knowledge is after the mode of the knower, as has been said. Since therefore God is eternal, it is proper that his knowledge have the mode of eternity ... and so in his knowledge he sees all temporal things, although successive in themselves, as present to him ... " *(In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 5) .

This presence at one and the same time to God of all the existents that man apprehends as successive, in the responses receives a name [6] and an axiomatic formulation. [7] It is nothing other than hypothetical, or conditional necessity. Expressed differently its meaning may be put as follows: because God is completely outside the temporal order, He sees all existents as here and now existing, and not merely as existing in their causes, although He sees the causes as well. He sees these existents as necessary, but by a hypothetical necessity, i.e., because they here and now *are,* and not by an absolute necessity, i.e., because they are the result of some necessary cause. If A, then A-but the protasis does not posit an anterior necessary cause, it merely affirms the reality of what appears in the apodasis.

We find that the same solution holds for the divine will, for when Thomas considers the question, " Utrum voluntas divina semper efficaciter impleatur? " the objection that every effect whose cause cannot be impeded is a necessary effect is answered by the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. [8] The divine operation, since it is the manifestation of God's knowledge and will, is subject to the same explanation. The theorem is also found, as might be expected, in texts that fall within our second series.[9]

---

[6] " --- et quia esse quod est, quando est, necesse est; quod tamen absolute non est necessarium . . . uncle bona est distinctio, quod est necessarium *necessitate consequentiae,* et non consequentis, vel *necessitate corulitionata,* nQn absoluta " (ad 3).

[7] · Ipsum enim necesse est esse, dum est ... necesse enim est Socratem currere, dum currit" (ad 4).

[8] *In I Sent.,* d. 47, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

• E. g., d. 40, q. 3, a. 1 (Utrum praedestinatio sit certa).

It is time to take note of several factors in the background to this solution. First of all, the terminology is from Aristotle, as is, of course, the basic problem. [10] Secondly, the solution appears in a negative form. We get no positive statement of the transcendence of a God who is able to know and to will at the same time and with equal certainty and efficacy the necessary and the contingent; instead, we find a negative response to the queries of objectors-" Contingent existents are not made necessary by the fact that they are the objects of certain knowledge. Your mistake is in a false conception of the knowledge of God." Thirdly, the key to the understanding of the solution lies in clearly grasping the atemporal character of God's existence. We must realize that all events are present to God; ". . . otherwise error will inevitably r.esult," as Thomas himself said. [11]

This is the theorem of divine transcendence, Aquinas' solution to the problem of contingency in its negative expression: the hypothetical necessity that routs objectors. But there is an addendum to the general picture that must be considered before we can pass on to the treatment of God's transcendence in later works. One of the two larger contexts in which the solution, by its very nature, always appears is that of the certitude of divine providence. But here we find an anomaly, because it would seem that in the *Sentences* Thomas holds a *certitudo scientiae* with regard to providence but not a *certitudo causalitatis.* [12] This weakness is seen in the article we

---

[10] The key text for the Aristotelian background of Thomas's use of the term "necessarium" is *In VI Meta.,* lect. 3. The importance of the term and the width of its application in Thomas can be seen from even a cursory glance at the number of citations it receives in the *Tabula Aurea,* the index to Thomas compiled by Peter of Bergamo. For our purpose it is sufficient to note the equivalent expressions for *necessitas conditionalis,* viz., *necessarium ex suppositione, necessitas consequentiae,* and perhaps *necessarium secundum quid.*

[11] *In I Sent.,* d. 40, q. 3, a. 1, ad *5.*

[12] Lonergan, *op. cit.,* 76-80, where three theoretical shortcomings in the *Sentences* are educed. The weakness is seen most clearly in *In I Sent.,* d. 47, q. 1, a. where it is even said that some things take place " praeter operationem divinam," and " ... multa fiunt quae Deus non operatur! "

have been examining, because whereas later, in similar con-
texts/3 Aquinas will be forthright in his affirmation that God
is the transcendent cause of the whole of being and all its dif-
ferentiations (in other words, he will place the solution to the
problem from causality on an equal footing with the solution
to the problem from knowledge), here he must buttress his
solution to the difficulty from necessary causality with his solu-
tion to the difficulty from certain knowledge, lest the former
collapse and we are left with a God whose will can be thwarted
by secondary causes.[14] The very order in which the two objec-
tions are treated in *In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. *5* and in *In I
Periherm.,* lect 14, hints at this. In the *Sentences* the objection
from causality must he handled first because its answer will be
insufficient unless it dovetails into the answer to the objection
from knowledge. In the *In Perihermeneias,* on the other hand,
the objection *ex parte voluntatis divinae* is handled after the
objection *ex parte scientiae* as merely another aspect of the
theorem of divine transcendence.

The explanation for the weakness of Thomas's position in
this article sems to lie in the fact that contingency is ascribed
to the proximate cause alone.[15] In the later works more em-
phasis will be placed on the fact that God causes all things and
their modes of existence (contingency and necessity) as well.
Such affirmations, for instance, are found in the *De Ver.,* q. 2,
a. 12, ad 7; *In I Periherm.,* lect. 14, no. 22, and most clearly
of all in *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 19, a. 8. It must be noted, how-

[18] E. g., *In I Periherm.,* lect. 14, no.

[14] - Sed adhuc manet dubitatio maior de secunda: quia causa prima necessaria
potest simul esse cum defectu causae secundae, sicut motus solis cum sterilitate
arboris; sed scientia Dei non potest simul stare cum _defectus causae secundae. Non
enim potest esse quod Deus sciat simul hunc cursurum, et iste deficiat a cursu:
et hoc est propter certitudinem scientiae et non propter causalitatem eius. Oportet
enim invenire ad hoc quod sit certa scientia aliquam certitudinem in scito." (d.
38, q. 1, a. 5-italics added). In other words, Thomas seems to be saying that
the causality of God's knowledge does not extend as far as its certitude.

[15] Cf. Lonergan, *op. cit.,* pp. 108-109, footnote 79, where references are given to other
texts in the *Sentences* that express the same view, e. g., *In I Sent,* d. 39, q.
a.   ad   d. 40, q. 3, a. 1; and d. 47, q. 1, a. 1, ad

ever, that this ascription of contingency to the proximate cause alone-without the tempering addition that it is God who causes all things, including the orders of contingency and necessity as a transcendent cause-is a recurrent feature in Thomas's treatment of the question, e. g., *Contra Gentiles,* I, c. 67; *De J.I!Ialo,* q. 16, a.7, ad 15; and *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 14, a. 13. How can one account for this recurrence? It would seem from the context that Thomas is merely repeating a stock response to a standard objection, because we are usually dealing with the same example of the defect in the tree that impedes the necessary causality of the sun that should result in the appearance of buds. Aquinas seems to have proceeded with magisterial ease, confident that the close student would make the necessary connections (e. g., comparing I, q. 14, a. 13 with q. 19, a. 8) and get the full picture. It must also be remembered, of course, that from man's point of view contingency or necessity in an effect comes from the proximate rather than the remote cause. The only problem is that if one insists on looking at things strictly from man's point of view one will never attain an understanding of the divine knowledge and causality.

II. *De Veritate.*

The problem of contingency vs. providence reoccurs in the *De Veritate* (written   during the first Paris period), as might be expected, and here two parallel formulations must be examined in order to follow the train of Thomas's thought. [16]

In q. 6, a. 3, St. Thomas responds to the question of the certitude of predestination by a distinction between *certitudo cognitionis* and *oertitudo ordinis.* The order of providence is certain in two ways: first, in particular cases in those things that come from necessary causes; and second, universally but not in particular cases for those things that proceed from contingent causes-" ... and so nothing can deviate from the general goal of providence, although sometimes there is deviation

---

[16] There is a third treatment of some importance also, q. 2, a. 12, "Utrum Deus sciat singularia futura contingentia." Cf. especially the response ad 7.

from some particular goal." [17] Thomas then attempts to save
the day by positing a certitude for predestination   that extends
beyond that of providence, in other words, to the particular
as well. This new certitude springs not from the mere addition
of a *certitudo praescientiae* (thus going beyond the position
of *In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 5), but from the statistical law that
God will grant so many graces that the end is always sure,
even though no single grace is sure. Thus Thomas has admitted
a merely statistical certitude for divine providence, a position
he will contradict in his later treatments of this question. [18] He
is still on the level where the first factor in the theorem of divine
transcendence,   that of divine knowledge, has been clearly
worked out/[9] but where the corresponding factor of the divine
will, as expressed through the question of the causal certitude
of providence, remains confused.

One does not have to look far for the clarification, for it oc-
curs within the very same work, viz., in q. 23, a. *5,* "Utrum
divina voluntas rebus volitis necessitatem imponant?"   Thomas
rejects the idea that we can fully explain the contingency of
effects by the mere fact that they follow contingent mediate
causes and not the necessary First Cause in their mode of *esse.*[20]
This opinion is seen to support a Platonic emanationism in
which God could not directly create a multitude or a contingent
being.   Ther.efore another reason must be given for the
contingency of things, this reason being the fact that every
effect is assimilated to its cause in proportion to the strength
of that cause. Since the divine will is the *agen.s fortissimum,*
it will necessarily give not only the being of its effect, but the
mode of that being too, i.e., either contingency or necessity.

[17] Cf. q. *5,* a. 8.

E. g., *Contra Gentiles,* III, c. 94; *Quodl.* 12, q. 3.

[19] Cf. responses ad 6 and ad 10. We should, however, note that in the response
ad 3, Thomas comes very close to making a breakthrough   when he says, " ... quia
et ipsum modum divina voluntas rebus dedit, ut sic eius voluntas impleretur; et
ideo quaedam explent divinam voluntatem necessario, quaedam contingenter,
quamvis illud quod Deus vult, semper fiat."

[20] As he does in' the other late texts cited above:' *De Ver.,* q. 2, a. 12, ad 7;
In I Periherm., lect. 14, no. 22; *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 19, a. 8.

God therefore adapts the order of causes to produce effects in the manner in which He wills them to be, i.e., as either contingent or necessary. Howev.er, and this is the main point, contingency or necessity must not be thought of as resulting mainly from the order of secondary causes: no, God as transcendent First Cause always bears the prime responsibility. [21]

The advance has been made; the divine will is now as' fully transcendent as the divine mind. No longer is it conceived to be that which initiates a line of causality that extends from absolute necessity through mediate causes to contingent effects and thus is only statistically certain; rather now it is seen as standing outside any such line in its unique transcendency. God's attention falls first and foremost on the individual thing because all things are equally present to him. He wills the thing to be either contingent or necessary and then disposes the order of causes (which are also *equi-present* to him) to produce the thing in its proper mode. The possibility of the contingency of individual things (despite objections from the divine will) has thus been affirmed, just as Aquinas and previous authors such as Boethius had been able to affirm the existence of real contingency despite the obj.ections from divine knowledge.

III. *Summa Con,tm Gentiles.*

It remains for us to consider the specific application of the advance made in the *De Veritate,* q. 23, a. *5,* to the problem of the certitude of divine providence in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the attendent full and positive affirmation of what we have called, following Lonergan, the theorem of divine transcendence. Indeed, the very concentration on the idea of providence that is found in the third book of the *Contra Gentiles* (thirteen chapters mention providence explicitly in their titles) against

---

[21] " Et sic non dicimus quod aliqui divinorum effectuum sint contingentes solummodo propter contingentium causarum secundarum, sed magis propter dispositionem divinae voluntatis, quae talem ordinem rebus providet" *(De Ver.,* q. 23, a. 5). The radical reason for this is given in the ad 1: the difference between natural and voluntary causes. Natural causes can give only the *esse* they have; voluntary causes give the *esse* they decide to give.

its comparative paucity in *In I Sent.* (only two articles) is an indication that the divine will is now coming in for an extended consideration in which its transcendent character will appear more evidently.

In *C011,tra Gentiles,* III, c. 94, Thomas once again turns to the question " De certitudine divinae providentiae," and opens the stage with the basic Aristotelian objection that a divine providence that is certain is impossible if we admit the contingency of human acts. The solution to this problem draws on much of the material worked out previously in the course of the opus, a massive re-thinking of the Christian position in the light of the Arabic philosophical challenge.[22] Since God is the author of all things, his providence must embrace all (c. 64). In any provider two things must always be considered, the *praemeditatio ordinis* and the *institutio ordinis praemeditati.* The divine provider is perfect in both these orders, because in the *praemeditatio* his gaze penetrates to the least particulars (c. 28) and in the *institutio* he operates instrumentally in all things (c. 67). Ther.efore, divine providence can never be prevented in any way and we can explain the seeming anomaly that some of its effects are contingent (and therefore of lower dignity than necessary effects) on the basis of the distinction between the intention of a particular agent, who looks only to the good of the individual, and the intention of a universal agent, who looks to the integrity of the whole. Thus we are given what is almost a paraphrase of the position worked out in the *De Ver.,* q. 23, a. 5: "But God, who is the governor of the universe, intends that some of his effects be produced here with the modality of necessity, there with that of contingency. And to do this he adapts causes differently, for some effects using necessary causes, for others contingent causes" *(Contra Gentiles,* III, c. 94). This leads Aquinas to clinch his argument against Aristotle's denial of providence and provide us with the full positive statement of the theorem of the divine transcen-

[22] On the character of the *Contra Gentiles,* see M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding Thomas* (Chicago: 1964), pp.   an& the literature noted there.

dence of the will: " ... for divine providence is the *per se* cause that this effect come about contingently. And this cannot be impeded."

Note the clear advance of this position over that of *In I Sent.* d. 38, q. 1, a. *5,* where the contingent effect was related back to the proximate contingent cause alone, and no mention was made of God as the *per se* cause of the whole order of contingency. Thomas has finally affirmed a divine providence that in its causal action rules each and every act of man, but he has achieved this by a remarkable inv.ersion of the Aristotelian position-he rejects Aristotle's position on *per se* causes, because God through his providence is the *per se* cause of all things, even contingents; but he retains the Aristotelian contingent effect, because God is also a transcendent cause who produces effects as necessary or contingent according to his pleasure.

The theorem was complete; the contingency of creatures had been affirmed. Divine transcendence was not to find its fullest expression until *In Perihermeneias,* lect. 14, which belongs to the second Paris period (written c. 1270), but all the advances had been made, since the divine operation *ad extra,* as an expression of God's intellect and will, fell into line with the positions already worked out. [28] The negative .enunciation of the theorem, i. e., hypothetical necessity, was designed to answer objections; the positive .enunciation, viz.," ... that God knows with equal infallibility, he wills with equal irresistibility, he effects with equal efficacy, both the necessary and the contingent," [24]   a profound insight into the divine nature, the *Ipsum Esse Subsistens.* The theorem was to prove useful in the

[23] A full tr.eatment of the parallel advance made in the conception of the divine operation *ad extm* would involve an extended consideration of the idea of application and the analogy of operation which would be out of place here. It was only after Thomas had seen that the causal certitude of divine providence must reach each particular that he could affirm that God operates in every agent. Cf. Lonergan, *op. cit.,* 76-80. *Quodl.* 11, q. 3, is interesting in this connection, because in it *praedestinatio* seems equivalent to *operatio* and is placed as the third member after *praescientia* and *voluntas* as examples of divine transcendence.

"'Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 107.

Summa when applied to particular theological questions/ [5] and it is frequently found in later works in the general framework we have already examined, although, as has been seen, there are occasional reversions to modes of expression that marked the earlier stages.

The development may be summarized thus: Aristotle had denied divine providence because of his position on the contingency of human actions. Thomas, as a Christian theologian, not only had to account for the contingency of man's acts but also to square this with certitude of God's providence. His solution was to conceive God as a transcendent inteUect, will, and source of operation. The transcendent knowledge is clear right from the earliest works, because God is always conceived as present to all events and thus seeing them as hypothetically necessary; the transcendent will is obscur.e in the *Sentences* and in the earlier part of *De Verita.te,* but it comes to the fore by *De Veritate,* q. a. *5,* and especially in the *Contra Gentiles,* III, c. 94, where God is shown as a universal transcendent cause, completely outside the terrestrial orders of contingency and necessity; the transcendent operation follows as a corollary from the divine knowledge and will.

BERNARD McGINN

University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

•• Cf. *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 46, a. *!'l,* and also q. 1, a. *!'l;* q. 14, a. *!'l;* q. *65,* a. 4; q. 84, a. *5.*

HANS KUNG ON PROPOSITIONS
AND THEIR PROBLEMATIC: A CRITIQUE

I N HIS BOOK on infallibility [1] Hans Kung has made of use an " auxiliary " philosophical argument to support his general conclusion that no set of propositions can a priori be said to be infallible. His argument takes the following form.

Articles of faith are propositions. Formulas of faith, professions of faith, and definitions of faith, are propositions-simple or complex -and are not a priori free from the laws that govern propositions. Nor are propositions of faith ever directly God's word, but at best God's word attested and mediated by man's word: perceptible and transmissible by human propositions. But, as such, propositions of faith participate in the problematic of human propositions in general. [2]

Kung claims that his aim is " a very modest one." He will make use of certain "basic and scarcely disputable observations" about propositions in order to make clear "that propositions -of which the Church's faith has to make use-are a problematic affair. The obvious conclusion will be that a Church which summarizes or defines its faith in propositions and perhaps has to do this, cannot get away from the problematic inherent in propositions as such." [3] Kung's point seems to be that a consideration of certain "general laws" about propositions will substantiate the conclusion that all propositions have what he terms an inherent "capacity for error," and that therefore dogmatic propositions must also share inherent " capacity for error" which capacity, according to Kung, is incompatible with the claim that they are infallible.

[1] Hans Kiing, *Infallible? An Inquiry,* trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, 1971).
[2] *Ibid., p.* 157.
• *Ibid.,* p. 158.

exactly what I want to say, i.e., that the snow is white. "But didn't your intention go beyond that?" No, I did not have an intention at all.

Kling gives an example: " What would be conveyed if the Church were to define the proposition (which is certainly fundamental),' God exists'? Everything-and yet so infinitely little and nothing at all by comparison to what might be said on this proposition." ⁵ One is tempted to ask: Do propositions convey things the way trucks proposi- tions for small loads, big propositions for big loads? Are some loads not conveyed by propositions (trucks) at all? The correct answer to the question "What is conveyed by the proposition 'God exists'?" is that God exists. ("Aren't you taking all the sublimity out of theology?" "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand." ⁶⁾ The first law of propositions really seems to be a case of *Unsinn.*

Kling's second law about propositions is: "Propositions are open to misunderstanding. Whatever I say can be misunder- stood, and not only as a result of lack of good will." ⁷ To this one wants to say, just try to misunderstand the proposition "The snow is white." What is the criterion for misunderstand- ing it? Are you sure that you have misunderstood it, or do you merely think that you have misunderstood it? Kling writes: " Words have different, often ambiguous and fluid meanings. And if I qualify their meaning, these qualifications too have again various meanings and often the variable factor itself in these meanings cannot be precisely grasped." ⁸ But it also seems to be the case that some words have quite definite meanings, and there is no reason to suppose that we cannot clear up ambiguities by plain talk. We do it every day. The observation that the use of some words can be ambiguous does not justify the conclusion that propositions as such are am-

• *Ibid.,* p. 158.

• Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Inve8tigations* (New York, 1958) I, 118.

⁷ Kling, *InfaUible?* p. 158.

⁸ *Ibid.,* p. 158.

biguous. **If** this were so, we would never succeed in communi-
cating. The second law of propositions seems to involve a hasty
generalization from a few limited examples.

The third law about propositions is that " Propositions can
be translated only up to a point. Every instrument plays the
high C in its own way, but it sounds different on the violin from
what it does on the cello; the sounding board is different." [9]
"The snow is white" can be translated into the German" Der
Schnee ist weiss." Now what is the" point" up to which prop-
ositions can be translated? Has something been missed in the
translation? What has been left out? **If** something has been left
out, well then pu't it in. The problem about translation is
knowing two languages well enough to be able to. say in one of
them precisely what is said in the other. This takes skill, but
the limitations involved are the limitations of human capacities
and the resources of particular languages. Not everything can
be said in every language. **It** is not at all clear what conclu-
sion Kling wants to draw from this fact. If one wants to
say that God exists, one must say it in a language in which it
can be said. There are numerous (mostly artificial) languages
in which " God exists " cannot be   This is not a limitation
of propositions but of particular languages. Insofar as the
third law is true, it is not at all clear what relevance it has to the
question of the a priori possibility of the infallibility of
propositions.

Kling's fourth law of propositions is "Propositions are in
motion **....** Words and sentences can completely change their
meaning in a new situation." [10] He gives an example:

The proposition " God exists " is also a historical proposition:
understood differently by a Greek of the time of Pericles and a
Jew of the time of the Maccabees, differently by an early hellenistic
Christian and by a Christian Frank; differently too by a medieval
scholastic and a neoscholastic of the nineteenth century, differently
by Luther, by a representative of Lutheran orthodoxy and by
a Lutheran of the twentieth century ... [11]

• *Ibid.,* p. 159.   [10] *Ibid.,* p. 160.   [11] *Ibid.,* p. 160.

There are several points to be made here. First, what reason is there to think that all the above people understood something different when they said "God exists"? They may well have understood exactly the same thing, i.e., that God exists, but simply have taken it to have different implications. Kling may here be misled by surface grammar into thinking of what is understood as a kind of " thing " which " stands behind " particular words.

Further, even if it is true that different people did differ in what they understood when they   " God exists," this merely points out that people can use the same sentence to say different things-just as people can use different sentences to say the same thing (or so it seems).

Part of the difficulty here is that Kling has not told us exactly what he means by " proposition." It is, of course, a philosopher's word, and there is nothing like universal agreement on how it should be used. I take " proposition " as the equivalent of " what we say " in a context in which it is appropriate to ask about the truth value of what we say. As far as I can see, this seems to be the usage most consistent with Kling's general purposesY However, in this fourth law Kling seems to have slipped into identifying propositions with " words and sentences." It may well be true, as Kling maintains, that " words and sentences can completely change their meaning " in new situations. But we are not concerned with words and sentences when we inquire into truth or falsity (or infallibility) , but rather we are concerned with what is said (i.e., the proposition) when we use the words or utter the sentence. "The snow is white " and " Der Schnee ist weiss " are different sentences made up of different words, but they both state the same proposition, i.e., they both say the same thing. Words and sentences can change their meanings as much as you please. This does not argue to the conclusion that " propositions are in motion "-unless this picturesque conclusion simply means

---

[19] Thus Kung's second law reads: "Propositions are open to misunderstanding. Whatever I say can be misunderstood .... " *Ibid.,* p. 158.

that we can say different things at different times, which
is true but trivial. The fourth law is based on a confusion be-
tween propositions and sentences.

The fifth law does not really say much more than the fourth
law. "Propositions are ideology-prone: words and sentences
are at our service. They can be used, abused, and expioited.
. . . " [13] Once again Kung assimilates propositions to words
and sentences. What he says seems to me to be true indeed
about words and sentences. But once again the point must be
made that propositions should not be simply identified with
words and sentences. The question of truth or falsity pertains
to what we say and not to the particular words, sentences, or
language that we use to say it.

After elaborating his five laws Kung considers the objection
of an imaginary scholastic theologian who suggests that " in
spite of all this, there are propositions-even propositions of
faith-clear enough in themselves to exclude all misunderstand-
ings, almost as clear in fact as 2X2=4." [14] Kung replies that
mathematical propositions are clear " only as long as no ques-
tions are raised about the foundations of mathematics .... " [15]
Now here surely is one case where the scholastic theologian is
right. 2X2=4 is a paradigm of clarity. Kung's appeal to the
"foundations of mathematics" is gratuitous. There is nothing
in the philosophy dealing with the foundations of mathematics
which would in the least expose mathematics to the difficulties
which Kung has suggested. The further issue as to whether
at least some religious propositions are as clear as mathematical
propositions is probably a bogus one, unless some definite cri-
terion of clarity is agreed upon. We have a criterion for saying
whether the sky is clear or not, i.e., the presence or absence of
clouds, etc. This may lead us into thinking that we have a
similar criterion for the " clarity " of propositions---which I
want to say we do not. In at least one of its uses, saying that
a proposition is clear is just another way of saying we under-
stand it.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 160.   *"Ibid.,* pp. 161-2.   [15] *Ibid.,* p. 162.

The initial conclusion which Küng draws from his analysis of the problematic of propositions is as follows:

These five observations should be sufficient for our purpose, to bring out in the concrete the problematic of propositions. But- in order to ·exclude misunderstandings as far as possible-we do not mean that propositions are incapable of stating the truth, that all propositions are equally true and false, that they cannot cor- respond to the reality which they claim to express, that under- standing is impossible. We mean simply that propositions are by no means as clear as they seem to be, that they are rather funda- mentally ambiguous and consequently can be understood dif- ferently by different people, that with the best intentions not all misunderstanding and misuse can be a priori excluded.[16]

I have argued that Küng has confused propositions with sen- tences. Consequently he is not entitled to the conclusion that " propositions are by no means as clear as they seem to be," but rather his arguments seem to support the view that at least some sentences are not as clear as they seem to be. It does not seem that he has shown that this is true of all senten- ces, nor that sentences (much less propositions) are "rather fundamentally ambiguous." Some sentences seem to be quite unambiguous, or at least are not ambiguous in any " funda- mental" way. The obvious counterexample is "The snow is white." It seems to me that even with the worst intentions a native speaker of the language will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to misunderstand or misuse the utterance " The snow is white."

After his section dealing with the problematic of proposi- tions in general Küng adds a section on what he calls the problematic of so-called clear propositions. He here engages in a brief excursus into the history of philosophy at the con- clusion of which he asserts his allegiance to a Hegelian view of the truth and falsity of propositions. As Küng expounds Hegel this seems to mean that propositions are not simply true or false but rather express both truth and falsity in vary- ing degrees.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 161.

Underlying it [Hegel's thought] was the basic insight never for-
gotten since his day, that I cannot really tell the truth by means
of a single sentence in isolation. I need basically three sentences,
to give definiteness and precision to what I have said, to deny it and
to integrate it into a further assertion. Our train of thought could
be: "That's what it's like"; "No, it's not just like that"; "Ah,
but *this* is what it's like." And so the process can go on. Truth
then lies in the totality, not in the particular steps, propositions,
or elements of which it is made up.U

Kung does not argue for this Hegelian position, nor would
it be fair to expect him to in a work of the present scope. We
must note, however, that insofar as a version of Hegelian logic
is integral to Kung's larger argument, it is less likely that his
argument will be acceptable to those of us, especially in the
Anglo-American philosophical world, who think there is nothing
more obvious than that propositions are simply either true or
false. I will argue below that a position similar to Kung's can
much more plausibly be argued without the Hegelian logic-
and that Kung himself is not really quite as committed to
Hegel as he seems to think he is.
   Kung finally comes to the main point of his philosophical
analysis concerning propositions by drawing conclusions con-
cerning what he calls the problematic of ecclesiastical defini-
tions. Kung writes:

   Error really seems to become a special problem only with regard
to those propositions from which it is sought to exclude error a
priori and in principle. . .. Doesn't such a claim call for the most
profound skepticism? All that has been said in the two previous
sections makes it seem scarcely probable that even the Church's
propositions of faith-which are admittedly human propositions--
could be freed a priori from the human weakness, inadequacy,
dubiousness, and therefore also the capacity for error, which are
inherent in propositions. [18]

Is Kung really entitled to this conclusion? Has his previous
analysis really given a reason for us to be skeptical about a

   [17] *Ibid.,* p. 166.
   [18] *Ibid.,* pp. 169-170.

claim to exclude a priori and in principle error from a particular set of propositions? His argument would indeed have some plausibility if we could simply identify propositions with sentences. Kung has successfully argued that at least some words and sentences change their meaning, and we perhaps are willing to grant the inference that *all* words and sentences can change their meaning. He is then entitled to conclude that we should be skeptical about a claim to exclude a priori and in principle error from a particular set of words or sentences (provided one were willing to grant that it is appropriate to predicate error of words and sentences). But propositions are what we use multifarious words and sentences to express, i.e., we can say the same thing in different words, and Kung by his philosophical analysis has not given any satisfactory reason to suppose that we should be skeptical about a claim to exclude error a priori and in principle from a particular set of things which are said. Indeed, the only way in which I can conceive that one could argue this position is by giving a good reason to think that at least one member of that set is false. But that kind of argument, which is indeed the essence of Kung's *theological* (not philosophical) argument, has nothing to do with an alleged problematic of propositions.

In order to substantiate his contention that ecclesiastical definitions have to "allow for the fact that every proposition can be true *and* false," Kung analyzes a concrete example drawn from Catholic-Evangelical controversy. It will be instructive to observe exactly what Kung does with this example, since it is here that the untidiness of his analysis can be made graphically clear. I will show that Kung's example is not at all an instance of a proposition which is both true *and* false. Kung writes:

But since there is no error without any co:re of truth, there is an inherent danger that a polemically oriented proposition may strike not only the error, but also the core of truth in the error: that is, the true ·concern behind the error, the truth within the error. For instance, as long as an Evangelical Christian unpolemically observes that " the just man lives by faith," the shadow of error,

which accompanies the proposition, does not come to the fore. **But**
if he asserts polemically that " the just man lives by faith," against
a legalistic Catholic who is exaggerating the importance of good
works, then there is a danger that the shadow of error may ob-
scure the truth of his statement   with the unexpressed secondary
meaning: "The just man lives by faith (and does no good works)."
Conversely the same holds. As long as a Catholic unpolemically
observes that " the just man does works of charity," the shadow of
error accompanying the proposition does not come to the fore.
But if he asserts polemically, against the error of a quietist Pro-
testant attaching too much importance to faith, that " the just man
does works of charity," then there is a danger that the shadow of
error may obscure the truth of his statement with the unexpressed
secondary meaning: "The just man does works of charity (and
does not live by faith." [19]

  Kling's analysis rests on the assumption that the utterance
" The just man lives by faith," made in a specified polemical
context, acquires an " unexpressed secondary meaning," i. e.,
" and does no good works." But this analysis seems to me
to be clearly false. What Kling calls the secondary meaning
is really not a meaning of the original utterance at all.
It is simply an additional proposition which in a particular
context can perhaps be taken as an implication of the speaker
saying what he did, but not (and this is the crucial point)
as an implication of what the speaker says (i. e., the original
proposition) . **If** Kiing wants to establish that " the just man
lives by faith " has as part of its meaning " and does no works,"
he must at the very least show that " and does no good works "
is an implication of what is said. But he has not done this.
His example is a clear case of *the speaker saying what he does,*
rather than what is said, being the vehicle of implication. [20]

  [19] *Ibid.,* pp. 170-1.

  [20] The distinction between *what is said* and *the speaker saying what he does*
is elaborated by H. P. Grice, "The Causal Theory of Perception," *Perceiving,
Sensing, and Knowing,* ed. R. Swartz (New York, 1965) pp. 444 ff. Keith Leh-
rer explains a similar distinction as follows: " The distinction between what a
speaker implies when he utters certain words, and what is implied by what the
speaker said, is in need of some elucidation. Sometimes a person implies something
because what he said implies it, and such cases present no difficulty. Confusion is
apt to arise when a person implies something not implied by what he said, be-

But if what is said (i.e., the proposition" The just man lives by faith ") does not imply " and does no good works," then the truth or falsity of the original proposition is independent of the truth or falsity of the alleged implication. Conversely, in a context in which the speaker saying " the just man lives by faith " can correctly be taken to imply " and does no good works," the addition of the implication now gives us two propositions, each of which can be true or false independently of the other (precisely because the implication is due to the *speaker* and and not to *what is said)* . The conclusion which I draw is that there is nothing in Kling's example to force upon us the highly paradoxical thesis that propositions can be both true *and* false.

There may indeed be other considerations in Idealist philosophy which lead Kling to defend the Hegelian logic, but if the only reasons he has are of a kind with the analysis he has given above, one might suggest that he consider not only whether a much more plausible alternative is available but also whether the reasons he has proposed are really Hegelian. As far as I can see there is nothing in Kling's examples, here or elsewhere, which implies the Hegelian conclusions which he feels compelled to draw out of them.

Up to this point my consideration of Kling has been mainly

cause in such cases one may mistake the activity of the speaker for the logic of what he says. In order not to confuse what a speaker implies with the implications of what he says, we may employ a simple test for determining whether an implication is an implication of what is said or merely of the man speaking. Suppose that certain words ar,e uttered and there is the implication that *P*. To decide whether the implication that *P* is an implication of what is said when those words are uttered, ask whether it is logically consistent to say, '**I** am not saying whether *P,* but ... ,' where the words originally uttered by the speaker are added at the end of this locution. If it is consistent to say this, then what is said when the words in question were first uttered does not imply that *P*. For if what is said when those words are uttered implied that *P,* then it would be inconsistent to utter those words and at the same time to say that one is not saying that *P.* For example, what is said when one utters the words ' That is a triangle ' implies ' That has three sides,' and thus it would be inconsistent to say, ' I am not saying whether that has three sides, but that is a triangle.' " Keith Lehrer, " Belief and Knowledge," *Philosophical Review,* LXXVII (196S), 498-4.

negative. I have tried to show that there are sound philo-
sophical reasons for thinking that his alleged problematic of
propositions is simply a red herring, and that the appeal to
Hegel is at best unnecessary. It would not be fair, however,
to conclude on a negative note. Kling, I suspect, has felt im-
pelled to adopt what seem to be highly questionable philos-
ophical theses in order to give some kind of philosophical under-
pinning to his much more important theological thesis that
the Church can remain " in the truth " while erring on par-
ticular issues. I have neither the intention nor the capacity to
evaluate the truth or falsity of this contention here. Kling is
right, I think, in seeing this as mainly an issue for historical
theology. I would like to show, however, that what Kling
proposes can be elucidated quite satisfactorily without the
unnecessary metaphysical baggage which Kiing employs.

In the first place, I propose that, when speaking philo-
sophically, we limit truth and falsity to talk about propositions
being true or false. At least this is a use of" true" and" false"
which most of us seem to most readily understand. Kiing, and
the rest of us, are legitimately concerned with whether things
said by Vatican I or *Humanae Vitae* are true or false. We all
understand this and have no need of a philosophical theory of
truth to set us straight on it.

It is also true that there is a certain religious use of " truth "
 (or perhaps a use of "truth" in religious circles) in which we
speak of " abiding in the truth " or " being led into the complete
truth," etc. It is this latter use which I want now to elucidate
briefly.

Whether we are religious believers or not, we all have numer-
ous things which we hold as true. A lot of these are everyday
things about sticks and stones, people and their shadows. We
have numerous beliefs about history, politics, finance, love, and
war. Now the thing about beliefs which we hold is that some
of them are true and some of them are false. Anyone who
possesses the least bit of self-knowledge knows that at least
some of the things which he believes are as a matter of fact
false. As we go through life we correct our beliefs, abandon

some and acquire others. The only trouble is that right now we do not know which of our false beliefs are false. If we did, we would stop believing them to be true. Still, by and large, we do not let this fact disturb us. We feel confident that our true beliefs far outnumber the false ones, or at least that over a period of time the true beliefs we have will help us to over-come the false ones. We feel that, as far as natural knowledge is concerned, we are situated " in the truth." In this respect we are much better off than madmen or orang-utans who, from our point of view, are simply "in darkness."

Now, the above use of" in the truth" as applicable to human knowledge, the knowledge which is more or less equally avail-able to the race, may l throw some light on the Christian use. Christians look to the Holy Spirit to keep them " in the truth," i.e., the Christian truth, just as all men, whether they believe it or not, depend on God to keep them " in the truth," i.e., the truth accessible to man whether he has Christian faith or not. What I want to suggest is that, just as the human race does not really feel that it has lost its grip on the " truth" when it turns out that one of its generally or even universally held beliefs was false, so too if it turns out that Christians have had a false belief this need not imply that the Holy Spirit has failed to preserve them " in the truth." The thing about " being in the truth" is that it helps you to distinguish what is true from what is false and keeps you on the right track. Does it mean that every one of your beliefs has to be true and not one of them can be false? This is the question which Hans Kiing has addressed to the Church for an answer. Anything like an adequate response to this question will require careful eval-uation of the many issues of historical theology raised by Kiing. I suggest, however, that the answer has absolutely nothing to do with a " problematic of propositions."

VINCENT M. CooKE, S.J.

Fordham University
Bronx, New York

BOOK REVIEWS

Beyond The New Theism: A Philosophy of Religion. By GERMAIN GRISEZ.
   Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Pp. 385.

This book is a most comprehensive treatment of questions and problems
in the area of philosophy of religion. Taking philosophical theology as falling
under the broader category of philosophy of religion, the author discusses
issues which are proper to philosophical theology as well as issues belonging
to other parts of philosophy or religion. In the former category Grisez
puts questions like the existence of God and the meaningfulness of God-talk.
In the latter, broader category he puts issues like the compatibility of free
will and foreknowledge, the compatibility of evil and God's existence, the
possibility of miracles, the logical coherence of Christian teachings and the
reasonableness of believing in doctrines such as the Incarnation and the
Eucharist. To all these as well as to a number of other questions Grisez
addresses himself in some detail. Included also in this all-comprehensive
text is a lengthy section in which the author carefully presents a:hd answers
criticisms of the cosmological argument from almost every quarter-from
the empiricists, the Kantians, the absolute idealists and the metaphysical
relativists.

But by far the most important part of the book by Grisez's own admis-
sion is the section in which the author painstakingly presents his own ver-
sion of the cosmological proof of God's existence. One reason for the special
importance which Grisez attaches to this section is his own belief, which
I find questionable, that all God-talk other than that concerned with the
question of God's existence makes sense *only* if a reasonable argument has
been given showing the existence of God. As against the author, it seems
to me quite sensible to discuss questions like the compatibility of divine
foreknowledge and free will, the compatibility of God's existence and the
existence of evil, and other such questions in the philosophy of religion
without first presenting an argument for God's existence. Be that as it
may, however, I now turn to Grisez's version of the cosmological proof
which, by the way, is similar to, but not the same as, Aquinas' argument
in Chapter Four of *On Being and Essence.*

Succinctly, Grisez argues as follows: suppose we have the contingent
state of affairs that someone is reading a sentence in his book, a fact which
he labels SRS. Since SRS can either be or not be, the question arises as
to why SRS obtains, i.e ., why it is an *existing* state of affairs. There are
certain extra-propositional prerequisites which (1) must obtain for SRS to
obtain,   are contingent states of affairs, and (3) themselves obtain only

if still further prerequisites are fulfilled. Let us call the set of these pre-requisites C. C is itself a state of affairs, namely, the state of affairs that conditions are so disposed as to provide what is necessary for SRS to obtain. Now since C is a contingent state of affairs as is SRS, the question next arises, " Why does C obtain? " That C must be a contingent state of affairs is evident from the fact that C is the cause of a contingent state of affairs, namely, SRS. If C were a necessary state of affairs then the proposition which corresponds to it, say' P ',would be necessary. Further, if SRS were a necessary consequence of C, then {letting **'Q'** stand for the proposition corresponding to the state of affairs SRS) ' Q ' would follow necessarily from **'P** '. But if a proposition **'P'** is necessary and **'P'** implies 'Q ', then **'Q'** is necessary. But **'Q'** is not necessary since it expresses a con-tingent state of affairs, namely, SRS. Hence, to be the cause of the *con-tingent* state of affairs SRS, C must itself be contingent.

But if C is contingent then the question arises, " Why does C itself ob-tain?" C's existence, being contingent, can only be explained by another contingent state of affairs, say, De. De stands for the state of affairs that an uncaused entity causes C to obtain. And so, De causes C, which in turn causes SRS. Through De is contingent, it needs nothing which is not in-cluded in itself to obtain. Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress of contingent states of affairs, in which case the fact that SRS obtains could never be explained. Still, De must be contingent since what it explains, SRS, is contingent. (Also, if De were noncontingent it would follow that God or the uncaused entity does not cause C freely, but of necessity). Thus, while contingent, De includes a state of affairs, D, which is noncontingent. D stands for the state of affairs that an uncaused entity exists. D obtains not because of some further state of affairs nor does it obtain because it obtains. Rather, D obtains simply because of *what* it is. Hence, in order for SRS to obtain, an uncaused entity must exist.

This argument feeds on two ambiguities. First, during the course of de-veloping the argument, the author uses C to stand for the following three distinct things: (a) C stands for the *class* of those states of affairs which are necessary conditions for SRS to obtain, (b) C stands for a *complex state of affairs* which includes other states of affairs, and (c) C stands for the kind of *meta state of affairs* that there are a certain number of states of affairs which are prerequisite for SRS obtaining. But these three senses are clearly neither equivalent nor even mutually compatible. For one thing, a class or set is not a state of affairs, much less either a real state of affairs or some meta state of affairs. Moreover, in case Grisez means (a) by C, it is difficult to imagine how a class or set can be the cause of a fact or state of affairs. Further , as regards (b) , it is not clear whether there *are* such things as complex states of affairs, or, if there are, it is unclear how or in what sense they can be said to " include " other states of affairs.

We speak of classes or sets "including" members, but clearly this is not, and cannot be, the sense of " include " when we say that one state of affairs includes others, even assuming that there are such things as complex states of affairs. And on this latter point, Russell, for one, once argued that, while there are complex atomic propositions, there are *no* complex (or molecular) states of affairs. To say that there are complex states of affairs which (somehow) include simple states of affairs is in any case a debatable point. Yet Grisez simply and repeatedly assumes that there are such entities, an assumption which is crucial to his argument.

But there is even a more serious ambiguity which mars Grisez's argument. Grisez holds that De causes C which in turn causes SRS. But by ' cause ' he seems to mean two different things. C is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for SRS, according to Grisez. Otherwise, one would not need to have recourse to De to explain SRS. But for Grisez De and what it includes is not only a necessary condition but also a sufficient condition for C; other-wise one would have to have recourse to something not included in De to explain C. So it seems that in the expression, "De is the cause of C's obtaining which is in turn the cause of SRS obtaining," the term ' cause ' is used in two distinct senses. But, even if Grisez were consistent in the use of ' cause ' here, there would still be a problem which remains, a prob-lem which takes the form of a dilemma. Either he means by cause ' neces-sary condition' (or a class of necessary conditions) or 'necessary and sufficient condition ' in the phrase " De causes C to obtain, which in turn causes SRS to obtain." If the former, then De and what it includes is not sufficient to explain C. But Grisez wants to hold that De and what it in-cludes *is* sufficient to explain C. But on the other hand if by 'cause ' Grisez means the latter, i.e., 'necessary and sufficient condition,' then De would be superfluous in explaining SRS, since C, being the cause of SRS, would be both necessary *and sufficient* to explain SRS. But Grisez obviously holds that C is not sufficient to explain SRS. Accordingly, depending on whether he uses ' cause ' in the former or in the latter sense, it seems that the author is forced to conclude either that De and what it includes is insufficient to explain C or else that the same De is superfluous in any explanation of the state of affairs that SRS obtains. But it is precisely and ironically the con-tradictories of these two statements that among other things Grisez is at-tempting to show.

<div align="right">JOHN PETERSON</div>

University of Rhode Island

Medieval Aspects of Renaissance Learning. Three Essays by PAUL OsKAR
    KRISTELLER. Edited and translated by Edward P. Mahoney. Duke
    Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies No. I. Durham:
    Duke University Press, 1974. Pp. 187.

*Alessandro Achillini (1463-1512) and His Doctrine of 'Universals' and
    'Transcendentals.'* A Study in Renaissance Ockhamism. By HERBERT
    STANLEY MATSEN. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, and Lon-
    don: Associated University Presses. 1975. Pp. 332. 27.50.

The first title above inaugurates a new and welcome series of scholarly
publications, Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, and
this is indeed an auspicious volume to mark the series' beginning. Kristel-
ler's three essays, each in its way a masterpiece, were first published be-
tween 1960 and 1970 and have as their common theme the continued
presence of medieval traits in the civilization of the Renaissance. Briefest
of the three (25 pp.) , the first essay is entitled " The Scholar and His Pub-
lic in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance " ; it appeared originally
in German as a contribution to a *Festschrift* honoring Walther Buist,
Kristeller's friend and fellow student at Heidelberg in the 1920's. The
second essay *(65* pp.), "Thomism and the Italian Thought of the Renais-
sance," was written in French for the annual (1965) Conference Albert-le-
Grand at the Institute of Medieval Studies of the University of Montreal.
The concluding essay *(65* pp.), the only one of the three to be published
previously in English, was given at St. John's University, Collegeville, under
the auspices of its Monastic Manuscript Microfilm library; entitled " The
Contribution of Religious Orders to Renaissance Thought and Learning,"
it contains a valuable bibliography and two appendices, one listing selected
monastic and conventual libraries (many in Italy and Austria) from which
most of the source materials mentioned in the essay were obtained, the
other listing members of religious orders who achieved reputations as hu-
manists or scholars between 1400 and 1530. The volume also contains two
prefaces: one by the editor, Edward P. Mahoney, who translated the first
two essays into English and obtained the author's collaboration in bringing
the footnotes up to date and expanding the appendices; the other by Kris-
teller himself, wherein he explains the provenance of the essays and some
of the points they were intended to make. Since much of the material
covered in all three essays, and particularly the second, pertains to Thomism
and its history, it was deemed appropriate to have the volume published
in 1974, the seven-hundredth anniversary of the death of St. Thomas.

As might be expected of this eminent expert on Renaissance thought,
Kristeller's essay on the scholar and his public is a masterful exposition
of the confusing variety of written and published works in the late Middle

Ages and the Renaissance-a multiplicity that becomes intelligible once one understands not only the different types of literature (e. g., scholastic, humanistic, vernacular) but also the different reading publics to which they were addressed (e. g., students, colleagues, adversaries, sponsors, interested laymen). Previous students of this mass of literature have tended to impose arbitrary divisions on authors, to locate them in one school or another on the basis of their being, say, either scholastics or humanists, and even to disregard some of their writings when they do not conform to Procrustean categories. Galileo, although not discussed by Kristeller in this context, is an excellent case in point: he used practically every form of scholarly and literary communication discussed in this article, as dictated by the varying audiences he had in mind, and yet his scholastic *quaestiones* on the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle have never once been edited, presumably because they did not conform to expectations of what Galileo, the anti-Aristotelian scientist, ought to have thought and said. Those who have to deal with Italian authors of the *quattrocento* and the *cinquecento,* in particular, will find in this first essay a corrective to biases of very long standing, and certainly it will become required reading for any student beginning serious studies in this area.

The second essay was reviewed by the present writer in these pages when it first appeared in French [see *The Thomist,* 31 (1967), pp. 367-369]. Nothing needs to be added to the observations then made, save to commend Professor Mahoney on his excellent translation and his up-dating of this superb account of Thomism and its complex relationships with the Italian Renaissance.

It is the third essay, however, that will especially commend this volume to many readers of *The Thomist,* for in it Kristeller explodes yet another persistent myth, namely, that the Renaissance was essentially a lay movement, a humanism that had to be combatted by monks and friars, and thus, having nothing in common with the Middle Ages, could have had no support or encouragement from religious orders. Carefully documenting his case, supplying an abundance of illustrations, and listing 33 pages of religious who contributed substantially to humanist or scholarly literature, Kristeller details the extent to which monks and friars actually helped Renaissance culture assume the form it finally took. As the author himself admits, the list is far from complete, and is particularly deficient in its treatment of Jesuits and other religious who wrote in the latter part of the sixteenth century. The present reviewer has been more concerned with the history of science than with the histories of literature and philosophy, and in the former field religious orders likewise made outstanding contributions. Kristeller's list might be augmented from this area with many names-Antonius Andreas, 0. F. M., Domingo Banez, 0. P., Filippo Fantoni, 0. Camald., Joannes Gratiadei, 0. P., Isidorus de Isolanis, 0. P.,

Joannes Versor, O. P., Benito Pereira, S. J., Domingo de Soto, O. P., and Francisco Toledo, S. J., come immediately to mind. But even without these Kristeller has made his point, and he has made it very well, while leaving room for others to complete the details of the grand panorama he has laid before us.

* * *

The second title, by one of Kristeller's students, is a study of quite different character. Growing out of the author's doctoral dissertation, and still bearing the marks of its origin, it provides a detailed examination of a few logical and metaphysical topics in the philosophy of Alessandro Achillini. Previous historians have labelled Achillini an Averroist, but Professor Matsen finds this characterization deceptive; his own researches, based on an anaysis of Achillini's teachings on universals and transcendentals, accent elements in his thought that derive more from William of Ockham than from any other medieval thinker. Working mainly from early printed editions of Achillini's work, Matsen first surveys Achillini's intellectual biography and then devotes successive chapters to his teaching on universals, on being (ens), on unity and truth *(unum* and *verum),* and on the good, the what, and the thing *(bonum, quid,* and *res).* There follow a conclusion and two appendices, the first reprinting Matsen's paper on Archillini's two-year sojourn at Padua from 1506 to 1508 (his main teaching career was at Bologna, 1484-1512) which appeared originally in the *Quaderni per la Storia dell' Universita di Padova,* 1 (1968) , pp. 91-109, and the second providing a chronological list of Achillini's published writings. The study is scrupulously documented, containing over a hundred pages of notes and bibliography, and is well indexed (indices of primary texts, of names, and of subjects) .

Matsen's thesis, which in sum holds that Achillini "was the main impetus behind a revival of interest at Bologna around 1500 in the philosophy of the English Franciscan philosopher and theologian William of Ockham," (p. 16) does not make light reading, but it contains much valuable information that is not otherwise available in English or in any other modern language. Achillini has generally been neglected by Renaissance historians; so we are fortunate that Matsen has rescued him from the domain of glittering generality and given us some authentic details of his philosophy. In this he joins the ranks of others of Kristeller's disciples-William F. Edwards, Neal W. Gilbert, Edward P. Mahoney, Charles B. Schmitt, et al.-who have followed in the footsteps of their master and substantially enriched the field of Renaissance scholarship.

WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

La Legge Nuova: L'Elemento Esterno Della Legge Nuova Secondo San Tommaso. By Enw ARD KAcZYNSKI, 0. P. Rome: Libreria lnternazionale Edizioni Francescane, 1974. Pp. 184.

Few questions in Christian moral theology are so fraught with complexity as the problem of the fundamental sources of moral obligation. What speaks to the conscientious Christian in the concrete situation of daily life? Are there objective norms which address themselves to his conscience from the outside? Or, is it not rather the inner, immediate voice of the Spirit which he is to heed in his decisions? The divergent answers have led to a conflict between what has been called an inhuman legalism, on the one hand, and a mindless illuminism, on the other. Not spawned by the Reformation, but certainly nurtured by it, the discussion seems to gather in intensity in our times. And the disagreement between Protestant and Catholic schools of thought sometimes seems less wide than the differences between various members of the same confessional background. On the Catholic side, so great has become the diversity of theological expression on the matter that the hierarchy of the Church in the United States sees the need for a statement from the bishops on moral norms.

Professor Kaczynski's study brings into this many-sided discussion a voice whose dispassionate accents introduce a needed note of serene sagacity. The book is an examination of St. Thomas' much-neglected short tract on the New Law *(Summa Theol.,* 1a2ae, qq. 106-108), in which he studies the external element of the New Law in its relation to the inner element, the reality of grace acting within the soul. The work does not pretend to give immediate and all-inclusive answers to what is a whole series of questions in contemporary moral teaching. But it does bring into the discussion, whose various parties appeal to St. Thomas for arguments, elements of the Angelic Doctor's writings which have been largely overlooked. In this sense, it has an offering to make to contemporary moral theology.

The study begins with a short history of the attention which Christian thought has devoted to the theology of the New Law, almost to the present day. Here the author highlights an unexplained anomaly, the commentators' neglect of St. Thomas' treatment of the subject. The author, then, outlines his own procedure and, wisely, sets careful limits for himsel£; what he undertakes is an exposition of the three questions on the New Law, enlightened by St. Thomas' teaching on Law, in the *Summa Theologiae* and in parallel places mostly in the *Commentary on the Sentences* and in the *Summa contra Gentes.* His aim is simple: to present the thought of Aquinas on the external element of the New Law. He does not intend 3. mere reconstruction of St. Thomas' thought, nor does he intend to address all the problems presently germane to that thought. To set forth St. Thomas' thought on the subject, placing it in its context, is a singular

service, granted that its applications must be made by those who treat of the practical aspects of moral theology in the modern world.

Following the short introduction on history and on his own methodology, the author enters quickly but carefully into the heart of his subject. The question is set within its own proper context, in the general framework of St. Thomas' thinking. Once having established the close relationship between Law and Revelation, on the one side, and between Law and Salvation History, on the other side, the book proceeds to its main argument, the teaching of St. Thomas on the exterior element of the New Law (chapters 3 to 6).

Grace, in its transcendence, in its divine origin, is obviously external to man; but when, concretely, grace is operating within man, it is *(pace* Luther) rightly called internal to man. And, related to this sanctifying reality of the New Law, its proposal is, really and just as obviously, external, i. e., " any writing that is external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the gospel" *(Summa Theol.,* la!ilae, q. 106, a. !il). These, the internal and external elements of the New Law-as the author emphasizes-are not two separate, independent realities. The Holy Spirit, speaking in the heart through grace, is truly distinct from the written word of Sacred Scripture, from the precepts proposed to us externally, either by oral or by written word. There is, however, a living bond between the two realities, for it is the same Spirit who speaks interiorly or exteriorly, and He can never speak contradictorily. As St. Thomas-ever the realist-emphasizes, there is a sense in which the grace of the Holy Spirit, as well as the religious and moral demands of the Gospel, remain ever external to man: precisely because the New Law is instilled into man by "being, as it were, added to his nature by a gift of grace" *(ibid.,* ad 2). And the external demands of the New Law are a means for the reduction of the tension in man between the divine and the human, between the inner grace and the egoistic tendencies to which every sinful man is heir. Thus divine grace shows its face in history not-most surely-by man's efforts but in the realisation, through grace, of the fundamental demands of the Law of the Gospel preached by Jesus and His Church.

Some seem to feel that St. Thomas has said all that he has to say to the contemporary world, that his works are an exhausted mine so far as the present is concerned. Professor Kaczynski's work is one sign of how far this is from the truth. As long as Christianity has existed, it has been necessary for moral theology to be on its guard against an exaggerated spiritualism which would divorce the Holy Spirit from word and command which is written or spoken. Equally, it has had to be on its guard against an extrinsic legalism which would muffie the Holy Spirit by finding His sole expression to consist in external law. As an understanding of this brief tract of St. Thomas shows, a soul which is obedient and docile to the Holy

Spirit will hear His voice in every word uttered by Christ and continually preached by His Church to this day.

PHILIP F. MuLHERN, 0. **P.**

University of St. Thomas Aquinas
Rome

The Cosmology of Freedom. By RoBERT C. NEVILLE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. Pp. 385.

Robert Neville has developed a mesocosmology of freedom. This is not metaphysics or ontology, which are independent of experience in the sense that anything determinate (even ideas) is their subject matter (p. rather, this is a type of cosmology, which is directly dependent on existence. Unlike microcosmology and macrocosmology which treat more of speculative physics, mesocosmology deals with human experiences. Neville claims that his topic (i. e., the particular aspect of human affairs called " freedom ") is quite limited, but he clearly believes that some additional careful work could convincingly extend the applicability of his theory past human freedom into all areas of cosmology; of course, " freedom" is a pervasive reality, tending to interrelate human activities among themselves as well as to relate human activity to the non-human, and so a consistent mesocosmology of freedom might easily be broadened to a consistent general cosmology.

Neville works in the thought-categories of A. N. Whitehead; indeed, it is tempting to think of this book as the presentation of a process philosophy of freedom. It is intriguing to note the influence of the outstanding New England theologian Jonathan Edwards, especially in the area of social values. After describing his more general principles, an understanding of which is anterior to the specific discussion of freedom, Neville details personal freedom (the basic dimensions of which are: external liberty, freedom of intentional action, freedom of choice, and creativity) and social freedom (four fundamental dimensions: freedom of opportunity, social pluralism, freedom of integral social life, and participatory democracy).

The argument is detailed and sophisticated; Neville honestly and effectively confronts the basic issues revealed in a worthwhile analysis of freedom. This review is limited to three particularly interesting themes: (A) time, (B) elegance as a component of value theory, and (C) privacy as an aspect of social freedom.

(A) One example of the detail in Neville's work is his consideration of " time." There are at least two obvious reasons for his concern about time. (I) Anyone using process categories must address the question of continuity; when change is taken seriously, one faces the question of relating

"before" to "after." Neville will not say that there is a constant under-
lying substratum or a fixed form which is regularly reiterated (pp. 114-15);
rather, he is consistently faithful to process categories and says that the
continuity consists in " appropriate changes." Whether or not one can
conceptually appreciate this sense of " continuity " (" appropriate " neces-
sarily bears a heavy burden here), one can see the importance of having
a philosophy of time, for it is precisely in the present that future real
possibilities becomes past facts; that is to say, the present is the moment
of change. (2) Serious considerations of " freedom " lead to the question
of time, especially future time. (If the future is already determined, free-
dom seems not to exist.) Past, present, and future are three modes of
existence. Even though something (someone) does not at the present time
occupy a present time this does not mean that it lacks present reality.
Napoleon has the present reality of occupying a past time; the events of
2500 do not have present existence now, but they do have future existence
now. (p. 95) Not only is Neville distinguishing present existence from
both past and future, but he is also drawing a deep distinction between
past and future modes of existence. What is past is fact; what is future
is possible. Neville recognizes that the future is not totally open; those
past factors (e. g., height, weight, temperament, etc.) which determine
aspects of the future are " primary universals." But there are also " secon-
dary universals," past factors open to several future actualizations; there
is true freedom, since future possibilities are only partially determinate
(but Neville is right in recognizing that future possibilities are not totally
indeterminate).

   Neville uses several words which invite confusion: "real," "existence,"
and " actual " are often only vaguely precised. ("Potentiality " and " possi-
bility" are more neatly distinct: "potentiality" refers to something in
the present open to future actualization, whereas "possibility" refers to
something in the future mode of existence.) "Actual" seems rather con-
sistently reserved for the present moment in which possibilities are "ac-
tualized." However, "real" is slippery. Existence is a *real* predicate. (p.
96) Possibilities are logical or *real;* only *real* possibilities exist (in the mode
of future existence), "since to exist is to have a mode of temporal exis-
tence relative to some present existent." (p. 141) Neville seems to grant
primacy to present existence (not unexpected in one who uses process
categories, since the present is the moment of change, of actualization of
possibilities, of prehending other actual occasions). To occupy a past time
is actually to have occupied some present time; to occupy a future time
is possibly to occupy some present time. In each case, there is reference
to a present time (which seems to be what makes something *real);* how-
ever, past "reality" and future "reality" are "real" in quite different
ways, at least as different as "fact" and "possibility." Neville says:

To say Napoleon existed once but does so no longer is only to say that he does not at this present time occupy a present time; it should not be taken, as Thomists are prone to do, to mean that Napoleon lacks present reality. Rather, so long as he is determinate, he has reality-in this case, the present reality of occupying a past time. (pp. 94-95)

I think that Thomists do not usually speak of " reality " in exactly the same ways Neville does; indeed, for him "reality" gets its meaning primarily from temporal considerations (making" present reality" a potentially confusing choice of words). The Thomist who carefully follows Neville's use of " reality " might not be so prone to deny " present reality " to Napoleon; and if Neville were to follow carefully the Thomist's use of "reality," he might be less prone to assign "present reality" to Napoleon.

  (B) Human experience finds fact and value together; the human mind can separate the two, but it always initially discovers them together. A "fact" gets our attention precisely because it reveals some degree of importance to us. We do intuit values, but "the mere fact of feeling, upon which Hume and others base intuitionist ethics, is not the ground of the aesthetic judgment." (p. 191) We feel that x is better than y because there is more" elegance" in $x;$ Neville grants that the perception of elegance is intuitive, but rejects any suggestion that it is irrational.

   I am most interested in the role of elegance in ethical decision-making, but its application embraces more than ethics. Elegance is a combination of " complexity " and " simplicity " ; a high degree of elegance des-o::ribes the coincidence of a high degree of complexity (i. e., a large number of different modes of harmony are present) and a high degree of simplicity (i. e., the large number of differing forms of harmony are arranged in a hierarchy wherein a few constituents on a higher level can contain under them a great variety of lower harmonies). In more familiar language, the Oakland Athletics' baseball team displays elegance; many highly-talented individuals (high complexity) are molded together into a winning team (high simplicity) without significant loss of the complexity. Contrast this to a winning football team (high simplicity) which has become so much a unit that the individual talents seem obliterated (low complexity). "Contrast" is the mark of elegance; a high degree of simplicity sometimes minimizes contrast. Indeed, elegance does seem to be a not-irrational dimension, even though it is perceived only by intuition; we get a feel for elegance.

   To apply aesthetic categories to ethical decision-making reminds us of Jonathan Edwards. Similarly, although Neville does not mention him, I find a similarity to H. Richard Niebuhr's emphasis on doing the "fitting" thing in an ethic of responsibility. However, I find Neville even more helpful than Niebuhr. Actuating the "appropriate" change (Neville's language) is not wholly unlike doing the "fitting" thing, but Neville gives

more indicators whereby one can intuit elegance (a high degree of elegance makes for appropriateness); in Neville's theory, complexity and simplicity lend themselves to some sort of quantitative measurement.

A sensitivity to elegance should help the ethical decision-maker in at least two areas. (I) Whenever one faces a conflict-situation, when two or more values cry out for one's attention and action (e. g., when both wife and mother claim my time and love), one needs a rational hierarchy of values. "Elegance" appears to be a workable category for both (a) a generalized listing of values according to their greater or lesser appropriateness as *types* of action, and (b) a measurement of the appropriateness of concrete alternatives in this or that particular case. (2) More exciting is the possibility of a more creative approach to human activity. Too much discussion in ethics is chatter about avoiding this particular bad (" inappropriate ") action. Not nearly enough is said about the far more common situation in which it is not a matter of the easy choice of good over evil, but rather the choice of one action when several quite worthy alternatives present themselves. (Most human decisions are of the latter sort, but since so much ethical discourse focuses on choices between good and evil, many persons forget the deep ethical significance of those decisions which involve a choice from among goods alone.) To adopt elegance as a measure is to challenge the agent to incorporate as many goods as possible (high complexity) into his action; the true virtuoso creatively embraces as many varied values as he possibly can.

:N"eville indirectly addresses the prudence/ art distinction of Thomas; his words are instructive. "An artist begins with a simple idea suggested by his materials and his past work; contrast comes through the delicate addition of complexity, and at the end of the creative process there is far more than was intended at the beginning." (p. 183) Human living (Neville does not speak of " prudence ") tends, on the other hand, to begin in the face of almost stunning complexity; the task of the ethical agent is to introduce simplicity into the complexity without destroying the contrast, without any undue loss of value revealed in the original complexity.

(C) When Neville discusses privacy he is clearly extending his cosmological theory past the arena of freedom. Helpful is his distinction of at least two major senses of "privacy." **(1)** In one case the "private" is divided over against the " public." Properly " public" matters are concerned with sustaining an environment wherein creativity can occur; creativity itself is a concern of the "private." There is an interplay between public and private, between environment and creativity; to limit one is ultimately to limit the other. Neville shows this interplay as it works out in education. Whereas the education of children is essentially a parental responsibility, the public sector quickly becomes involved because it wants to protect and enhance the realm of personal creativity. However, and here Neville speaks

eloquently to the contemporary scene, public education can effectively stifle
creativity;   hence, he speaks of a possible *right* to refuse public education!
 (If public education is not sustaining an environment for creativity but
is in fact making creativity less possible, then it loses its justification as a
"public" enterprise.)   Implicit in all this is that the public sphere remains
always open to scrutiny in the light of public standards, whereas the private
sphere is the home of creativity, imagination, and idiosyncracy (which defy
public standards).   When Neville speaks of a "right to privacy," the
emphasis shifts from the environment-creativity   (i.e., public-private)
polarity and interplay to the more vulgar "right to be left alone," to be free
of invasion by others, to be a subject rather than a controlled object. " The
point is, the subjective value of choosing is worth prizing even when the
objective values produced are not." (p.   True subjectivity, autonomy,
self-initiated revelation (rather than the prying eyes and ears of hidden
technology) are to be prized. As a matter of fact, this sounds very much
like the " right to be creative " ; indeed, creativity and privacy are closely
linked in each of Neville's uses of "privacy."

   Neville has certainly not detailed every nuance of "privacy," but what he
has done is good. The contemporary concern to protect privacy easily leads
to fuzzy, and even improper, ideas about privacy; it is a concept open to
thoughtful nuance and Neville is clearly aware of at least some of the possi-
ble distinctions which can enlighten any discussion of "privacy."

                                        WILLIAM J. FINAN, 0. P.

Dominican House of Studies
     Washington, D. C.

Pio IX e Antonio Rosmini. By GIANFRANCO RADICE. Vatican City: Libreria
     Editrice Vaticana, 1974. Pp. 369.

   This study, which relies upon a wide range of primary and secondary
sources, examines the relationship between Pope Pius IX and the priest
and philosopher, Antonio Rosmini. It is a revisionist work as Monsignor
Piolanti, Postulator for the Cause of Pius, indicates in the Preface. It
seeks, among other things, to disprove two commonly accepted notions:
first, that the relationship between the two churchmen was determined es-
sentially by the political events of 1848-49, and second, that Pius was not
consistent in his treatment of the philosopher. Radice attempts to negate
these assumptions by a comprehensive examination of the interaction of
the two protagonists.

   The volume is divided into four parts, corresponding to their four periods
of critical interaction. In the opening pages the author concentrates upon

the political collaboration of the two men in 1848; in part two he examines the implications of the censure of two of Rosmini's works by the Sacred Congregation of the Index; in part three he dwells upon the years from 1849 to 1854, culminating in the conclusion of the General Congregation of the Index that Rosmini's works were not heretical; while in the final section Radice discusses the defense of the orthodoxy of the works of the philosopher, following his death in 1855, and the part played by the Pope in this defense.

The author's meticulous research has led him to unearth some interesting material which allows one to question some of the accepted assumptions concerning the relationship between Pius and Rosmini but does not justify overturning the traditional interpretation. Indeed the reader is forced to conclude, in part one, that the political divergence between the philosopher and the Pope played an important part in the subsequent difficulties that Rosmini encountered, including the failure to obtain the Cardinal's hat Pius had promised him. The different positions the two assumed on the question of papal participation in the war of national liberation as well as constitutionalism served to keep them apart and assured that Rosmini would always remain a peripheral figure and never a trusted advisor. This is corroborated in part two, where the author admits that Pius allowed Rosmini's enemies to condemn two of his essays, not because they were theologically culpable but because they were thought to hinder a return to the peninsula's prewar normalcy. (p. 157)

Nonetheless the author demonstrates in the last two parts of the book-where he makes his most important contribution-that even if the political divergence between the two was influential in determining the nature of their relationship, it was not everything. While Pius disagreed with Rosmini upon a number of issues, and considered some of his ideas dangerous in light of the troubled situation of the Papal States and the perilous position of the Church, he never allowed this to alter his own personal assessment of the philosopher. Rather Pius is presented as considering Rosmini not only learned and saintly but an obedient and faithful son of the Church.

Radice reconstructs the position of the Pope towards Rosmini by examining the letters, articles, and words of those around him and by the author's conjecture, which is consistently sympathetic to Pius and Rosmini. Aside from his apologia for the actions of these two, Radice has attempted to let the facts speak for themselves. This often leads to a series of quotations tied by the briefest of commentary producing excessive repetition, confused chronology and, in more than one instance, the loss of clarity.

FRANK **J.** CoPPA

St. John's University
  Jamaica, New York

Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part I of the *Summa Logicae.* Translated and Introduced by MrcHAEL **J.** Loux. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. Pp. £34.

Dr. Michael Loux has made a definite and worthwhile contribution to the field of Logic and to the academic society at large by this readable translation of a famous textbook written by one of the best of the late Scholastic savants. The *Summa Logicae* is a work that provides a rather comprehensive introduction to the key themes of both his Ontology and his Philosophy of Language, even though some scholars consider it to be peculiar both in structure and style. Wisely this translator used the scholarly, but critical, text of Fr. Philotheus Boehner and opted to avoid the many difficulties of a stuffy literal translation by giving us a work that is both accurate and readable. It is all that, and for his attempts to bring to the translation the Ockhamistic traits of simplicity and sharpness Dr. Loux is to be highly commended.

Preceding the translation itself there are two essays (pp. 1-46) that focus on some of the general aspects of Ockham's theories on *being* and *supposition.* Though this reviewer did not find either essay very helpful, he appreciated the aims of Dr. Loux who honestly declared that some of Ockham's writings in the area of Logic tend to be " hopelessly mysterious to the contemporary reader." (p. 10)

The translation itself, comprising some 77 chapters, runs about 174 pages (pp. 48-!i!£1). In a very short time one becomes quite aware that Part I of the *Summa Logicae* is constructed more or less along the traditional scholastic format of a Logic textbook, as it is a real in-depth study of TERMS, the basic ingredients into which all propositions can be resolved. The manner in which these chapters are written is for the most part consistent with his overall purpose: " my intention is rather to examine cursorily some basic issues to aid those untutored in logic" (p. 69), and again on page 105 we read: "therefore, to instruct the novice I shall examine some of the relevant terms."

In the early chapters (1-11) Ockham defines and divides "terms," providing rather simple explanations and copious examples of categorematic and syncategorematic terms as well as abstract and concrete names. Then, just prior to a well-done treatment of the Predicables (Chaps. £0-25) , he offers a somewhat novel and enlightening view on " universals " which he considers to be grounded on the teaching of Aristotle. However, in this area his unique type of Nominalism begins to show and it is hardly the moderate realistic view of the Stagirite. (cf. p. 99) Next comes a rather detailed dialectical presentation of the Predicaments (Categories) that formally runs from chapters 40-6£, in which he not infrequently drifts into non-logical questions and apologies for being so brief, but insisting that

most of his views are "compatible with Aristotelian philosophy." This section is very well done pedagogically and demonstrates his chief concern for beginners. However, at the same time, it is crystal clear that Ockham, unlike some modern logicians, is very much aware that no logician is philosophically neutral. The final chapters (63-77) deal with the general and particular notions of *Supposition.*

It was revealing to this reviewer how much the great Ockham was dependent upon and conversant with both pagan and Christian logicians from the Stagirite to St. Anselm: e.g., St. John Damascene, Boethius, Porphyry, and the outstanding Arabs. But, nevertheless, it was very clear too that Ockham, as a savant, was very much his own man especially in his many interpretations of them and the philosopher's texts in the area of Logic and Philosophy. Besides, in the spirit of medieval times, he was very concerned with how some of his contemporaries were trying to use or to abuse the instrument of Logic in theologizing.

Though Notre Dame Press deserves much credit for its excellent printing job, a little more caution could have been exercised in either proof-reading or in the actual printing of this masterpiece as this reviewer came quite easily upon more than enough misspellings or typographical mistakes: e. g., page 49, line 'propositions'; page 67, line 'fallacious'; page 75, line 'substance'; page 111, line 'elucidated'; page 183, line 'preceding'; page 187, line 8 'let'; page line 'disjunctive' and an excess of commas on the last line of page 105 and line 18 on page 198. But despite these minor blemishes which should be corrected in any later edition, it is my hope as one who has been teaching Logic for almost two decades that Dr. Loux will quickly complete translating the other parts of this great medieval work as well as he has done this part.

DENNIS C. KANE, O. P.

Providence College
Providence, R. I.

Jezus, Verhaal van een Levende (Jesus, the Story of One Who is Alive). By EDwARD ScHILLEBEECKX. Bruges: Emmaus, 1974. Pp.

(The third enlarged printing (1975) has an additional five pages numbered to on " the inner salvation-meaning of Jesus' resurrection," in which the author insists that it is impossible to reduce the resurrection to the subjective Easter-experience of the disciples. That experience includes and is inseparable from the objective Easter event. As he wrote before: the experience of the reality and the reality of the experience are inseparable (p. . A nineteen-page biblical index has also been appended (pp.

641) listing all scriptural references as well as the references to apocryphal
writings.)

Schillebeeckx's" christological essay," in which he proposes a" Christian"
approach to Jesus-interpretation,   one in which both historical-critical
thinking and faith have their say, is intended to show his readers, whether
true believers or men of little faith, a way out of the confusion reigning
in the minds of many today. They are overwhelmed by the ever-growing
variety of opinions regarding Jesus. He frankly faces this variety as a
theologian, without ignoring any comer of it, and critically evaluates what
is acceptable and what is not. The outcome of his careful survey of the
vast exegetical output of today and the recent past proves to be: Jesus
is alive today.

Part One: *Questions of Method, Hermeneutics and Criteria* (pp. 33-84)
is basic, evidently, as a first step in clearing up the confusion. The author's
stand is firm and decisive: Jesus of Nazareth (the Jesus of history) is
the norm and criterion of every Jesus-interpretation.   A believer too has
to take an historical aproach to the problem of Jesus, who offers salvation
on behalf of God. His starting-point in the study of Jesus is what history
tells us about him. Jesus, who was proclaimed the Christ by Christians,
is to be studied in a modern historical-critical manner. No doubt, the his-
torical question concerning Jesus of necessity opens out on a theological
problem, but only a post-critical historical narrative, a critical presentation
of the "story of Jesus," can answer our present-day need for historical
truth and open the door to theological reflection.

The difficulty in this critical-historical approach is well-known: even in
the gospels and in the most ancient Christian records, Jesus of Nazareth
is identified with the Christ acclaimed by the Christian communities. The
facts about the earthly Jesus are "painted over" by faith in Christ the
Savior. Yet it is possible, the author says, from what he learned from the
exegetes to sift the various layers in the early Christian tradition: to shift
what comes from Jesus himself and what comes from the believing com-
munity. This has been done by exegetes of various beliefs. He reviews
critically the criteria they made use of: redaction history, form-criticism,
tradition history, consistency in content, in Jesus' message and praxis; and
he refuses some criteria, such as linguistics and cultural geography and
the nature of parables.

The conclusion of his review of question about method and hermeneutics
is clear: it is the imperative need, for a new Christology, of a critical study,
first, of what is actually told about Jesus (Part Two), but also of the ex-
periential setting in which both Jews and Greeks have reacted to the "his-
torical phenomenon" that was Jesus of Nazareth, whether they did so in
personal contact with him or from what they were told about him by
other people (Part Three). A further conclusion will follow from this;

the need, for a correct understanding of Jesus Christ, to take into account the ever-new, present-day experiential setting (Part Four).

It is in Part Two: *The Gospel of Jesus Christ* (pp.   that the author gives a believer's historical-critical study of the good news or gospel of Jesus Christ: his message to the world, his words, his deeds, his suffering and death, and his exaltation by God.

Jesus' message is definite: final (eschatological) salvation comes through him from God. The author sketches the complex background of its reception by his hearers: the prophetic-apocalyptic movements in the Israel of the time, the message and praxis of John the Baptist, Jesus' own baptism by John. Its basic aim is God's reign over men as illustrated in the parables and leading to the " revolution " of the beatitudes.

Jesus' praxis presents, in his very dwelling among men, a God-given salvation. He went about doing good: his signs and wonders were its offer. His liberating and gladdening dealing with men, his association with them at table, particularly with the disciples who follow him, usher in this salvation. Man's cause is God's cause. Jesus frees man from an oppressive image of God. It is his own Abba-experience that was the spring of his life's secret, of his message and of his praxis.

Was all this reality or illusion? The answer to this question, decisive if any is, is given in God's reign that comes through Jesus' rejection and death. The problem of his death: why did Jesus die? is answered, the author explains in reviewing the literature of both Catholic and Protestant, believing and "rationalist," exegesis, according to three main schemas: the contrast-schema of the eschatological prophet and martyr, the salvation-historical schema of God's salvific design, and the soteriological schema of his saving death. In actual fact, Jesus met his approaching death in an unconditional service of men. The historical-legal reason for his execution was his silence about the God of the Jews-he was a pseudo-teacher. His very death was a prophetic sign which other people were to interpret.

The Christian story of Jesus goes on after Jesus' death. At his arrest and death, the disciples were scandalized in their faith. But they were given a paschal experience, as apparent from the tradition about the holy sepulchre in Jerusalem, and from the apostolic tradition: we believe that God raised him, Jesus showed himself to Peter and the eleven, and to Paul. This came to mean for them: on Jesus' initiative, their conversion to him as to the Christ, finding their definitive salvation in Jesus the Christ.

Part Three: *Christian Interpretation of the Risen Crucified One* (pp.   studies the Christian understanding of the paschal experience. The gospels reflect the early Christians' reactions to the Easter-event in four different credos of the time: the "maranatha" or parousia Christology in which Jesus is seen as the bringer of salvation, Lord of the future and judge of the world; the *theios-aner* Christology: Jesus is the divine wonder-

worker, the Salomonic son of David; the sapiential Christologies: Jesus as messenger and teacher of divine wisdom, himself pre-existent, incarnate, humbled and exalted Wisdom; and the paschal Christologies: Jesus is the risen crucified One. All of these rest on a historical facet of Jesus' life. Their synthesis builds up the Christian credo in which the historical Jesus, the very person of Jesus, is decisive. The story of Jesus is a story of God. Ultimate meaning and salvation, experience teaches, come from him.

Thus the four above-mentioned models of final "saviors " agree in showing the link between the earthly Jesus and what the first Christians believed of his resurrection and exaltation. Three Jewish models were available: the eschatological prophet of God's reign, the eschatological messianic son of David of a national-dynastic or of a prophetic-sapiential messianism, and the Son of Man. It took time for the Christians, using these models, to identify the person of Jesus the Christ: Jesus surmised as eschatological prophet, as the eschatological divine messenger: the Christ, Lord, Son understood as the prophetic-sapiential Son of David (not as a dynastic Davidic messiah). This identification of the person of Jesus links the earthly Jesus with the early Christian faith in Christ the Savior of the world.

The resurrection is an implication of this Christian faith in Jesus Christ. The author studies the historical understanding of the fact: "raised from the dead," against the setting of the late-Jewish concepts of life-after-death, and the meaning of " the third day " for an eschatological definitive event. He examines the connection between resurrection and exaltation in the various old Jewish and early Christian traditions which color the paschal experience. And he asks: does this experience remain ambiguous? Did exaltation mean for Christ the imminent coming of the Spirit, the imminent parousia? And he answers: yes, it did, in a way: " while history continues its course, a definitive salvific action of God took place in Jesus of Nazareth, the risen Crucified One." (p. 144) Jesus was not mistaken in announcing that salvation was near at hand despite his death. The eschatological times have begun with the risen Christ.

All this, the author explains, is but a theology of Jesus of Nazareth, a study of his speaking and experience of God's reign. But who is this Jesus? *The question of Chrjstology is the question of the person of" Christ.* It is in a second-level reflection, inevitable no doubt, on the data of Scripture in the setting of Hellenistic thinking about God that the christological dogma of Chalcedon arose. How?

After a brief examination of the various models present in the N. T., the author lists different understandings of Jesus Son of God: Son of David, son of Abraham; risen Christ sending the Spirit; pre-existent. How did Scripture lead to the acceptance of the dogma of Chalcedon: Son of God Incarnate? The answer is explained by the author in the con-

text of the Greek " paideia " : a doctrine of salvation, education to diviniza-
tion. The patristic concept of God is the hellenistic idea of God, a God
for men, *Theos pros hernas.* In this setting Christ is the one who brings
salvation from God: in Jesus God is with us and for us. The understanding
of the scriptural "salvation in Jesus from God," through the hellenistic
concept of God, and after Nicaea's stress on " from God " and Chalcedon's
stress on "in Christ," naturally led to the Christology of Chalcedon: Jesus
Christ, distinct from and yet not less divine than the Father. Shall we
say today also, as Chalcedon did: Christ is a divine Person?

Part Four: *Who Do We Say He Is?* (pp. 470-549) is only a "pro-
legomenon" (cf. p. 461) to the new Christology for our time. The author
briefly sketches the manner in which this Christology could and should
be worked out-his promise to do so himself in the near future is not
definite. He analyzes the present-day christological crisis and its presup-
positions. Why is it that some rethinkers of the doctrine today hesitate to
call Christ God, as Chalcedon did, and that traditionalists incline to see
in this hesitation a denial of the divinity of Christ? After some passing
indications about the patristic and medieval scholastic christologies, the
author explains the breach between tradition and contemporary thought
ushered in by the Enlightenment. The present-day reluctance to ratify
the traditional formula springs from that breach. The Enlightenment, with
its stress on necessary truths, spelt the decline and gradual elimination of
history from theology and philosophy. Historical facts are not necessary
truths: things could have been different. Hence, apparently, the history
of Jesus cannot reveal who the Son of God is-a necessary truth! Nor can
universality, such as is implied in "Savior of the world," be mediated by
or in a particular historical fact.

It is here that the need for a present-day rethinking of Christology comes
in. For there is, in fact, " *a unique universality of a historically particular
man."* In our human history God acts to save men, and his action can
be the object of faith and can be expressed in the language of faith. This
definitive salvific action of God in history is exactly the message of the gos-
pel: definitive salvation in Jesus from God. To the further question: in
Jesus or in the risen Crucified One?, the answer of the gospel is definitely
in favor of the second alternative, or rather of the inseparable unity of the
two. But the gospel does not include a theoretical answer to the christologi-
cal identification of his person.

In his prolegomenon to a new Christology, a substantial one indeed
(pp. 470-549), the author only suggests the way. He points in particular
to the fact of Jesus' Abba-experience as Son of God, the soul of his mes-
sage, life and death, and the revelation of his life's secret, in which the way
to the new Christology is to be found. In the present volume he does not
go beyond asserting the link between theoretical Christo logy, the story of
Jesus, and his praxis of the reign of God.

This "Story of Jesus the Living One" is definitely a difficult book. It bespeaks more than ordinary erudition and much scholarly research and criticism, and it demands that the reader be ever-watchful to make value-judgments on countless details and, more importantly, on the story as a whole. Not many a" common reader," for whom the book is meant, may carry away from its painstaking study all the breadth and depth of learning and faith to which it is an eloquent witness. One cannot help being struck by the unfailing serenity with which the author faces both the global problem of Christology (who is this Jesus the Christ?) and the countless little problems of literary and historical criticism involved. What is the secret of the overall sound judgment and choice which a professional theologian is making from the expert scholarly work of a host of exegetes? (He quotes a saying of Congar: " I respect and consult unceasingly the science of the exegetes, but I challenge their magisterium.")

Throughout this volume one senses the felicitous marriage of brain and heart, scholarship and faith, both of these operative and " all there " throughout the book in an uncommon degree. The author, both believing and critical, has an insight all his own into the problem that is at the core of his study: the present-day crisis in Christology and the answer to this crisis, His very example is part of the answer.

Readers who can spare the effort and time to work through his witness to Christ and through the many details of his story may come to share his insight in varying degrees. And they may be taken up by the experience in spite of the tough going. They will hope that Schillebeeckx's second volume, his new Christology, may not be long in coming.

P. DE LETTER, **S. J.**

St. Albert's College
Ranchi, India

Philosophies de la Cite. Edited by YvoN LAFRANCE. Montreal: Les Editions Bellarmin, 1974. Pp. fl89. Paper. $5.00.

This third volume in the series, " L'Univers de la Philosophie," is a collection of brief expository articles by eleven professors at universities in Montreal and Ottawa. Rather than being summaries, critiques, or commentaries, the articles serve as prologues to the study of the political philosophers themselves and syntheses of their thought. In the editor's words, the intent was to bring together the great moments in the history of political philosophy which " have exercised a decisive influence both on our conceptions of the political society (" la chose publique ") and on our own social and political institutions .... In this way we believe that

these studies will be useful not only to professors and students but also to that whole lay group which is taking more and more interest in the future of our political institutions and in the destiny of our modem societies." The articles are unevenly documented, but all conclude with a suggested reading list.

The last two articles, both on contemporary political philosophers, are by far the longest and most detailed. They suggest the editorial emphasis upon present-day problems and the tendency to view the history of political philosophy in light of today, rather than vice versa. For some readers this trace of historicism may limit the value of the work.

The two contemporary articles present the reader with an alternative choice of philosophies based upon realism and idealism, and corresponding assessments of the state.

The first of these, "Jacques Maritain: elements d'une politique humaniste," by Y. Filippini, is oriented more toward personalism than Thomism. Drawing upon 13 of Maritain's works (principally *Man and the State),* Professor Filippini shows his thought to be "modest " and radical " at the same time. The author regards these as the most significant of Maritain's conclusions: Political philosophy is essentially ethical and realist; political society is both natural and reasonable; the state is society's instrument for securing the common good as well as personal rights; the new democracy must be both pluralist and theistic. Professor Filippini acknowledges the theological ground upon which Maritain's philosophy is based.

The second contemporary article, and the final one in the collection, is "La 'Philosophie politique' d'Eric Weil," by Jean Roy. As the title indicates, this is mainly an exposition of one work, but it also attempts to relate Weil's thought to Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. The reader is led to conclude that Weil's main concern was the modem struggle against violence and that he made use of Kantian moral concepts not for their own sake but for the individual's orientation in his search for the good life. There is here not only a critique of theology but also a fundamental suspicion of the state. Professor Roy calls upon Paul Ricoeur for assistance in explaining Weil's outlook.

If one thus begins with the final section of this book, the orientation of the earlier articles is more apparent. The first three, dealing with the ancients, form the basis of Maritain's thought, and the next six, covering the modern period, prepare one for the study of Weil.

Georges Leroux's well-outlined "Metaphysique et politique chez Platon " opens the collection with a study of the *Republic* and, to some extent, of the *Laws.* Brief attention is also given to the *Seventh Letter* and the *Statesman.* Leon Charette next provides a less documented explication of Aristotle's *Politics* with a preliminary consideration of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the connection between the two treatises. Then in " La cite de

Dieu: un nouveau centre du monde" G.-H. Allard presents an excellent introduction to St. Augustine with references to many of his writings which help explain the motivation behind the *City of God* as a work of political philosophy.

There is no article on St. Thomas. Indeed, the whole of the medieval period-the apogee of the classical-Christian tradition and of western political philosophy-is passed over in silence.

The six articles forming the central section of the collection are the briefest. Antonio D'Andrea in "Le probleme du succes politique dans la pensee de Machiavel " concentrates on the autobiographical evidence of Machiavelli's intention but steers a neutral course between his accusers and defenders. He passes very rapidly over the *Prince* and the *Discourses.* The next article, "Montesquieu et l'esprit des lois" by M. J. Silverthorne, focuses on two principal aspects of this work: the analysis of socil(ty and Montesquieu's thoughts on liberty and tolerance. Next Paul Gagne in" La republique de Hobbes " presents an outline of *Leviathan* after locating Hobbes and his work in the historical setting which explains both.

After skipping over Locke and Hume, the book next takes up "Jean-Jacques Rousseau et l'ideal republicain." Guy Lafrance, aware of the difficulties in coming to terms with Rousseau's thought, reduces it to the state of nature and natural society (in the *Discourse on Inequality)* and civil society (in the *Social Contract).* Yvon Lafrance links Hegel with the French Revolution in " La philosophic du droit de Hegel," and precedes his synthesis of the *Philosophy of Right* with a brief consideration of its antecedents in the *Encyclopedia.* Finally, "Marx: d'une philosophic de la cite a une theorie de Ia formation sociale " by Jean-Guy Meunier ranges through Marx's writings (especially the earlier, more philosophical ones) to concentrate not on Marx's thought as a whole but on the particular theme indicated in the article's title: the concept of society and the class struggle.

By way of overall evaluation, we may concede the difficulty of compressing the history of political philosophy into so few pages and yet wonder at certain shortcomings in what these authors have produced. Attention has already been called to some significant omissions. It is surprising, moreover, that several important schools of political philosophy (such as those of Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin) should be neglected in the interpretative references to these articles.

The authors, however, no doubt had a more modest goal than a rigorous study of the history of political philosophy. Their work might at least serve as orientation for those who wish to find some light for our own day in what has come before.

JoHN A. GUEGUEN

Illinois Statll University
Normal, Illinois

Readings in Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics.   By MILTONC.NAHM. Engle-
    wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975. Pp. 603. $13.50.

   Professor Nahm's just published anthology is a bulky book comprising,
in addition to a preface and a general introduction, seven parts and 12
chapters. The main function of the introductory chapter is to state the
specific aesthetic topics to be used as the principles for the selection of the
texts (artistic genius, inspiration, freedom and creation) and to explain the
title's distinction between " philosophy of art " (i. e., metaphysical aes-
thetics or philosophy of beauty and art) and " aesthetics " (i.e., general
psychological aesthetics)   through the historical role played by A. G.
Baumgarten.   The remaining chapters present selected aesthetic material
from Heraclitus to contemporary American aestheticians.

   Interestingly enough, Professor Nahm plays two separate roles in this
anthology: that of an editor and that of a selected author. As the editor,
he has written a general introductory essay (chap. 1, A); a special intro-
duction to each subsequent chapter, and a *vita* to each selected aesthetician.
As an author, Nahm appears three times in the book: with two papers re-
printed from journals (pp. 10-17 and 575-87), and a brief commentary
on Aristotle's theory of catharsis, written for this anthology. (pp. 186 f.)

   In evaluating this lengthy aesthetic anthology, first the weaknesses will
be considered, moving from the least important to the most serious defects;
to be followed by a positive evaluation of the strength and value of this
publication.

   Beginning with mere technicalities, I found misspelled or mispunctuated
Greek words on pp. 5a, 12, 163a, 166b, and 296a; and misspelled Latin
words on pp. 28a, 246b, 338a, 400b, and 518a. The Latin phrase in n. *5*
of p. 299 is both unintelligible and erroneous; the correct title is given in
n. 47 of p. 317. There are misspelled German words on pp. 434b; 471 n.
95; 475 n. 109; 477 n. ll3; and 493a. Lotze's and de Bruyne's names are
misspelled on p. 487 n. 135 and p. 200a, respectively. Also, misspelled
English words or other typographic errors are on pp. lOb, 130a, 19la, 254a,
334b, 432 n. *35,* and 554b. The word " below " stands for " above" (p. 327
n. 9); and *Poetry* in Puttenham's book title should read *Poesie* (p. 196 n.
33). Finally, some sentences or clauses seem to need grammatical improve-
ments (p. 195b 4-5 and p. 198b 16-17) .

    Somewhat more important are certain quantitative and qualitative weak-
nesses in the biographical notes preceding the selections from the aesthetic
literature. One may wish to maintain proportion in the lengths of the
biographical notes by keeping in mind either who is *more* important or
who is *less* well-known. **If** the editor followed the former consideration,
it is difficult to understand why Aristotle's *vita* consists of 91 lines, while
Kant's is only 82 lines long; Augustine's, *25;* Plotinus's, 28; Hegel's, 18--
one less than Katherine E. Gilbert's; and Aquinas's, 13-just as Philo's and

Philostratus's. If, on the other hand, the latter consideration was followed, it is not clear why the *vitae* of the well-known Spinoza and Descartes are about twice as long *(35* and 37 lines, respectively) as the equally well-known Hegel's; why the *vitae* of the famous Hume and Leonardo da Vinci receive 43 and 41 lines, respectively-more than the utterly unknown Leone Ebreo lines); and why the *vitae* of such differently known figures as Dante and S. H. Butcher are of the same length lines).

The qualitative weakness of the biographical notes lies mostly in the selection of works listed under the names of the authors. The *vita* of Aristotle mentions only the *Poetics;* and that of Aquinas, only his two *Summae.* Yet virtually all the works of Hume, and many by Leibniz and Kant, are listed. Aristotle's biographical note has also a unique imperfection. While, e. g., Plato's *vita* is a fair outline of the significant events in the thinker's life without any unnecessary detail, Aristotle's lengthy *vita* abounds in trivial details, such as the circumstances of Callisthenes' life and death, and that Aristotle was slender and elegantly dressed and spoke with a lisp-not only echoing Diogenes Laertius' *Lives* but undoubtedly using it as a source material for such trivia. [1] And the general characterization of Aristotle, that he was " not only a superb moral and· political philosopher, but he was also a shrewd man," (p. 103a) is simply inexcusable.

Turning next to the weaknesses in the introductory essays and selections, one notices first of all the quantitative weakness of disproportion. Some introductory essays are only a few pages long (in chapter U, two pages; in chapter 13, two pages and a half); while some others are many times longer: in chapter 11, eleven pages long; in chapter pages; in chapter 9, 13 pages. The disproportionate length of the selected texts is at least equally conspicuous. While the selections from Plato and Aristotle are, appropriately, of the same amount (63 pp. each), the continental rationalists are represented rather meagerly (17 pp.); and the postaugustinian medieval aesthetic thought has received an inexplicably brief representation through three authors: Dionysius and Dante with one page of selection each, and Thomas with one page and a half. The monumental three-volume work of Edgar de Bruyne, [2] whom Professor Nahm explicitly mentions (p. , and the second volume of Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz's brilliant *History of Aesthetics* [3] demonstrate with sufficient force that, in such a lengthy aesthetic anthology as Nahm's, the medieval philosophy of beauty and art is neither properly nor proportionately represented on as few as five pages.

[1] Cf. portions of Diogenes Laertius, *Lives,* I, *5,* Loeb-ed. I, 445-55.

[2] De Bruyne, *Etudes d'Esthetique Medievale.* (Bruges: De Tempel, 1946), pp. XIV + 370; X + X + 400.

• Vol. II: *Medieval Aesthetics.* (C. Barrett, ed. The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1970), pp. VI+ 315.

Let us turn our attention next to the qualitative evaluation of the selected texts. Granting that the principle of selection and the actual selection according to that principle are basically up to the editor of any anthology, and that no book of readings in the field of the philosophy of beauty and art (as Nahm properly points out on page XVI) "could ever claim to be exhaustive," one can still wonder even within the self-imposed limitations discussed on pp. XIII-XIV why some texts were and others were not included in *Readings.* Of the Hellenistic aesthetic literature, for instance, the omission of any text by M. T. Cicero is rather difficult to justify. For medieval philosophers almost invariably quote Cicero as an authority on the philosophy of beauty, and thus Nahm's second and third principles of selection (to be found on page XIV) would seem to demand the inclusion of this great eclectic author.

Also, given the decision to include Dionysius the Areopagite, *De divinis nominibus,* cap. *3* § 7-in itself a laudable decision, the inclusion of § 7 in chapter four would have been consistent with the editor's third principle, viz., the selection of "classical" texts which have endured on account of the great influence they exerted upon subsequent speculation. For chapter four § 7 of the work in question inspired and gave rise to such magnificent gems of medieval aesthetic thought as the commentaries of St. Albert and St. Thomas.

As to the texts selected by Nahm from Thomas the first text on p. !M6 could have been befittingly complemented by his *Commentary on the Sentences,* bk. I, dist. 31, q. fl, a. I; and even more so by *Summa Theologiae,* II-II, q. 145, a. fl. Similarly, the second selection on pp. fl46 f. would be ideally complemented by *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, q. fl7, a. **1,** ad. 3. Last but not least, as a paraphrase and enrichment of Pseudo-Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus,* c. 4, § 7 (which in turn, is ultimately rooted in Plato, *Symp.* flllA) , some portions of Thomas's *Commentary on the Divine Names,* chap. 4, lesson *5* would considerably enhance the informative and representative value of Nahm's selections of Thomas. Moreover, to do justice to medieval aesthetics, such authors as Erigena, Richard of St. Victor, William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Thomas of York, Ulrich of Strasbourg, Vitelo, Duns Scotus, and Dionysius the Carthusian, but most of all Albert the Great and Bonaventure (probably the greatest and richest aesthetic writers in the Middle Ages), should be included in any anthology of aesthetics. These authors are suggested here not only for their aesthetic doctrines or theories in general but also and even more importantly for their specific contributions to such central topics of Professor Nahm's *Readings* as the" great analogy" between divine and human artist, [4] as well as artistic talent, genius, inspiration, motivation, and art criticism. [5]

• St. Thomas speaks of three correlated analogies: one, between the human and divine creative idea *(In II Sent.* 18, 1, 9! sol.); another, between human and

In the modern selections the most glaring omission seems to be, among the continental rationalists, Alexander G. Baumgarten. The reason for the gravity of this omission is the role Baumgarten played in starting to re-place, to a great extent, the premodern preoccupation with the philosophy of beauty and art with the modern predilection for the artist and art-work [6]–a development expressed in the very title of this *Readings,* and thematically expressed in chapters 2 to 8 and 9 to 13, respectively. And yet, the editor goes only so far in the introductory essay on the continental rationalists as to discuss some doctrines (p. 296) of *Reflections on Poetry, Metaphysics,* and *Aethetics,* without granting Baumgarten a single selection from any of these three works. This omission is the more baffling since, in Nahm's expressed opinion, the contributions of the three selected ra-tionalists (Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz) are " sparse and avid " (p. 297a); and Leibniz' is "meager" even in comparison to Descartes'. (p. 299b)

At this point it may be noted that some text references connected with the selections are defective. In identifying, e. g., the first two selections from Thomas, [7] the important portion **"part I"** is omitted each time the editor refers to these texts (p. 200 n. 58; p. 246) ; and in the second selec-tion, "art. 5 " should read "art. 4. (p. 246b) Also, in discussing Aquinas, Nahm states that according to Thomas, "Art makes a work of art. The artist is a craftsman. His technique does not necessarily produce beauty; " and identifies the source of these views in footnote 56 merely as " *Commentary on Ethics"* -which is a work of 566 pages in the Marietti-edition.8 Moreover, the Dionysian- Albertian doctrine, which in Nahm's own words reads " the essence of the thing pertains to brilliance," is identi-fied on p. 199a merely as one to be found in *Opusculum de pulchro et de*

divine art *(De Verit.* 4, 4, sed contra 3; !!, 14 sed contra !!; *Summa contra Gent.* II, c. !!6, n. 1039; *Quodlib.* V, 1, !!; *Summa Theol.* I, q. 14, a. 8); and a third, between human and divine artist *(Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 93, a. 1; q. 45, a. 6).

[5] The table of contents of de Bruyne's *Etudes* (vol. III, pp. 380-400) lists one page each on artistic conception and mtention; four pages on artistic inspiration; six, on artistic creation; eight, on artistic imitation; nine, on artistic imagination; ten, on aesthetic crticism; and fourteen, on artistic talent or genius-all being central topics in Nahm's *Readings.* Cf. E. de Bruyne, *The Esthetics ʋf the Middle Ages.* Eileen B. Hennessy, tr. (New York: F. Ungar, 1969), pp. 135-38; 140 f.; 144 and 148. Similarly, the subject index of Tatarkiewicz' *Medieval Aesthetics* con-tains such highly relevant entries as art, artist, beauty, content and expression in art, idea, imagination, imitation, inspiration, intuition, visual arts, etc. (pp. 31H5.)

[6] See *Readings,* chap. 1, pp. 5-7.

[7] *Summa Theol.* I, q. 39, a. 8; I, q. 5, a. 4, ad I.

[8] *In X libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum.* Editio tertia. (R. M. Spiazzi, ed. Turini: Marietti, 1964). Nahm may refer to *In VI. Eth.* lect. 4, nn. 1165-1173.

bono. Actually, it is taken from the *solutio* of the second and fifth questions, with the significant difference that Nohm's phrase "essence of the thing" reads in those passage "essence of beauty" *(ratio pulcri)* .[9]

Some words, finally, about the editor's way of referring to some historical facts and stating certain doctrines. Professor Nahm remarks in chapter 6 that Edgar de Bruyne and Maurice de Wulf have argued that the *De pulchro et bono* was written by Albertus Magnus rather than by Thomas Aquinas. (Pp. QOOa and p. 199 n. 50) This remark suggests that these two scholars were the first to recognize Albert's authorship of the *opusculum* in question. This, however, is not the case. Mercier questioned as early as 1894 that the work was Thomas's/ [0] and Pierre Mandonnet attributed it to Albert in 1910; [11] whereas De Wulf and De Bruyne did so in 1924 and 1946, respectively. [12] Furthermore, two parallel statements may easily confuse the reader without additional explanation. On p. 199 the editor states that the *opusculum* in question is one which " *has been* listed among the writings of St. Thomas which are not genuine; " whereas on page QOOa he declares that the writing " *is not* listed among St. Thomas' writings." *(Italics mine.)* The truth is that *in the past* the *opusculum* was actually attributed to Aquinas. P. A. Ucelli, the discoverer and first editor, wrote about it as a Thomas-autograph in 1867, and published it under Thomas's name in 1869; [13] and Michael de Maria included it in Thomas's *Opuscula philosophica et theologica,* III, pp. 561-88, since misled by four seventeenth century witnesses. [14] As a consequence of these publications P. Vallet [15] J. J. Urniburu/ [6] G. Lepore, [17] *et al.,* took it for granted that the treatise was Aquinas's work. But, due to the efforts of Mercier, Mandonnet, de

---

[9] M. de Maria-ed. (Tiferni Tiberini, 1886), pp. *565* and 571.

[10] " En realite, cet opuscule ne semble pas appartenir a S. Thomas," wrote Mercier in "Du beau dans Ia nature et dans l'art," *Revue Neo-scolastique,* I, 3 (July, 1894), p. 285, n. 1.

[11] *Des Ecrits Autheutiques de Saint Thomas d'Aquin.* (Fribourg: Herder, 1910).

[12] M. de Wulf, *Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale,* I. (Louvain: Bibliotheque de l'Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1924). English tr. by E. C. M.essenger. (London: Longmanns, Green, 1925), vol. I, 396. De Bruyne, *Etudes,* III, pp. 161-173, especially p. 162.

[18] *Di un codice autografo di S. Tommaso d'Aquino conservato nella Biblioteca nazionale di Napoli memoria.* Reprint from *La Caritit,* II (1867) of Naples. *Del bello·, Questione inedita di S. Tommaso d'Aquino* ... Napoli, 1869.

"'See the de Maria-ed., *Praefacio,* pp. 561 f.

[15] *Metaphysica et Ethica (Praelectiones Philosophicae ad Mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis,* II). Editio prima. (Paris: A. Roger et F. Chernoviz, 1879). Ed. secunda. (Paris: Jouby et Roger, 1880).

[16] *Ontologia (lnstitutiones Philosophicae,* II). (Vallisoleti: A. Cuesta, 1891), pp. 527, 529-32, 538-40.

[17] *Lectiones Aesthetice11.* (Viterbii: Agnesotti, 1905), p. 19.

Wulf, and Grabmann, authors do now unanimously attribute the treatise to Albert; and so does, most importantly, the critical edition of Albert's *Opera omnia.* [18] It would, finally, be helpful to inform the reader that, although the" *Opusculum de pulckro et de borw"* is Albert's rather than Thomas's commentary on Dionysius' *On the Divine Names,* chap. 4, § 7, Thomas also wrote a commentary on this work, in which chap. 4, lessons *5* and 6 are the longest aesthetic passages in all the works by Aquinas.

And now to the doctrinal interpretations. K. E. Gilbert's understanding of the classical and the Renaissance concept of the artist (attributed to Aristotle, pp. 3-4 and 194a) – an interpretation fully adopted by Professor Nahm and used as the principle of "the pattern " of his *Readings* (p. Sa) – is highly inaccurate and misleading. For the alleged Aristotelian idea of the artist is said to mean that the artist merely " discovers the statue in the marble and carves out what he finds in it," whereas in the Renaissance interpretation " no such statue exists in the marble but is originated by the sculptor." (p. 4b.) Yet, if one carefully reads any number of texts by Aristotle, dealing with the topic, he will readily see that the Gilbert-Nahm reading of Aristotle's view is in fact misleading. Certainly, Aristotle does consider the marble as a material substance capable of receiving the artistic form and, as such, as matter in potency to the shape of the statue which will be imposed upon it by the artist. But Aristotle also teaches that any such artistic material is in potency to the artistic form not in the sense that it has it " hidden " in itself, ready to be discovered and actuated, but rather insofar as it, as any matter, is suitable to receiving any number of forms-while actually receiving precisely the one form which is conceived by the artist, and imposed on matter according to that conceived form. All this is in the very texts selected by the editor. We read, for instance, "All art is concerned with coming into being, i.e., with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made " ; and again, " it is the shape and the form which pass from the carpenter ... It is his soul, wherein is the 'form', and his knowledge, which cause his hands ... to move his tools and his tools to move the materials. . . ." [19] Furthermore, Gilbert's distinction fails to apply also to St. Augustine, who, as Nahm points out (p. 198a) is speaking of the "beautiful patterns which through the medium of men's souls are conveyed into their artistic hands." One may also question the wisdom of the editor's remark, "It is clear that Augustine is convinced that art is 'wind and smoke' "–a remark made by Nahm right before acknowl-

[18] *Alberti Magni Super Dionysium De Divinis Nominibus (Opera omnia,* tom. 87); nn. 71-9!'l. P. Simon, ed. (Monasterii Westfalorum: in aedibus Aschendorff, 197!'l), pp. 180b-195 b.

[19] Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.,* VI, 4, 1140a 11-13; *De gen. an.,* I, *!'l!'l,* 730b 14-19. *Readings,* pp. 187a, 139a.

edging the centrality of the "great analogy" to Augustine's thought (p. 198). In *Conf.* X, 84 Augustine merely emphasizes that the beauty of the human artwork is a potentially harmful allurement to the human soul. But that remark alone does not entitle anyone to conclude that, in Augustine's opinion, artistic beauty or human art itself is nothing but " wind and smoke," unless one interprets Augustine as holding either that the analogate of divine art is " wind and smoke " or that " wind and smoke " emanates from divine beauty.

Also questionable in terms of consistency are the editor's assertion that Dionysius held God to be both the Nameless *and* the Many-named and his remark, " To ascribe beauty to God or to predicate it of Him is to ascribe a term to the Nameless." (p. 199a) Besides, this latter observation ignores the Neoplatonic doctrine of Dionysius that God is "at once beautiful and super-beautiful," or "as beautiful and as Beauty." [20]

All these interpretational weaknesses are dwarfed, however, by those concerning St. Thomas's aesthetic thought. Professor Nahm's introduction to St. Thomas's aesthetic views begins with quoting the utterly irrelevant Thomistic teaching concerning the absolute incognoscibility by reason of the triuneness of God. Having stated that teaching, Nahm proceeds to declare that " the issue here is of importance for the Thomist Philosophy of Art and for the followers of St. Thomas' doctrine." (p. 199a) One need not be an authority on Thomistic aesthetics to recognize the erroneousness of this statement. For, obviously, the natural unknowability of the triuneness of God can by no means lead to the recognition of the three analytic principles constituting the essence of beauty, as the unknowable and the unknown are *per se* incapable of leading to any knowledge in the human intellect. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the editor should introduce his treatment of Thomas's philosophy of beauty with the doctrine of the absolute incognoscibility of the triune God as triune seems to be that, out of the three passages in which Thomas lists *all* three analytic principles of beauty, two passages occur in a trinitarian context. [21] For from this one might conclude that either the idea of the triune God in general or the " appropriations " of the three divine persons in particular enable the mind to recognize the essence of beauty. The fact is, however, that the opposite is true. To show this to be true, one must know that in the first selected text Thomas asks whether it is proper to attribute, with Augustine, beauty to the Son. [22] In answering this question Thomas argues as follows: For

[20] *De div. nom.,* c. 4, § 7. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca,* 8, col. 708D.

[21] The two trinitarian passages are *In I Sent.* d. 81, q. 2, a. 1, sol. and *Summa Theol.* I, q. 89, a. Sc. The only non-trinitarian text is *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 145, a. 2.

[22] Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 10, 11 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* 42, col. 981) interprets Hilary's appropriation of the Son, *"species," (De Trin.* II, 1; *Patrol. Lat.* 10, col. 51A) as meaning "beauty."

beauty, three things are required, viz., integrity, proportion, and clarity. But the Son *perfectly* conforms to the nature of the Father; is the expressed *image* of the Father; and, as the Verb, is perfectly *intelligible.* These truths render the Son having integrity, proportion, and clarity. Therefore, the Son is appropriately called beauty or beautiful. From this syllogism it is evident that Thomas resolves a trinitarian problem by means of his *pre-conceived* idea of beauty rather than *derives* the latter from the former. Consequently, the trinitarian context has, *per se,* no bearing on Thomas's notion of beauty. Nevertheless, Nahm compounds the misinterpretation in question by proceeding to discuss a Thomistic-scholastic doctrine concerning the relation of faith and reason, which is as completely unrelated to Aquinas's aesthetic theory as the trinitarian issues have been found to be. (p. 199)

In the next portion of his introductory essay to Thomistic aesthetics Professor Nahm misunderstands Jacques Maritain in remarking that two doctrines connected with the "great analogy," viz., Dionysius's conception of God as the superbeautiful Creator proportionately imparting beauty to all his creatures, [23] and Thomas's notion of art as a practical habit, lead to "one problem which the Schoolmen encountered in Philosophy of Art." The problem is identified with Maritain's alleged contention that " the production of beauty belongs to God alone as His true property "-so much *so* that, to quote again Nahm's assertion of Maritain, "should the artist attempt to produce beauty, the effort is a denial of the conditions of making and, in certain circumstances, an arrogation of the aseity of God." (p. QOOb) What all this is supposed to mean is a clash between Thomas and Maritain: the affirmation by the former and the denial by the latter of the possibility of man being able to act analogously to God the Artist. Now, it is true that the subsequently given lengthy quotation is actually contained in Maritain's "The Frontiers of Poetry." [24] But in that very difficult text Maritain is not generally asserting, contrary to Nahm's under-standing, man's inability to create beauty in a manner analogous to God. What Maritain does maintain in that text in an extremely metaphorical and cryptic language is that human art, as anything that touches the transcendental order, [25] has the tendency to go beyond the limitations of the human condition and to become "pure" or "abstract" art (whereby Maritain means art in the form of its primary analogate or, simply, divine art which creates *ex nihilo* rather than makes out of a pre-existent materi-al); and that this endeavor is necessarily unrealizable-just as it is impos-

[23] Nahm does not identify this text. It is *De div. nom.* c. 4, § 7 *(Patr. Graeca,* 3, col. 703C) .

[24] Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry.* J. W. Evans, tr. (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 196ft), pp. IQQ f.

[25] *Op. cit.,* n. 178, p. QQ4.

sible for the contingent man to become God, the being-by-itself *(ens a se).*
In brief, all Maritain maintains is that, in the strictest sense of the term
artist, i.e., as meaning creator, only God is an artist-just as in the fullest,
pure, and absolute sense only God is good.[26] In holding this view Maritain
does not for a moment question the possibility for man to be an artist in
the sense of a person making artworks in a fashion *analogous* to God, as
Thomas maintained.   There are numerous texts in *Art and Scholasticism*
to confirm this interpretation.   "To produce beauty," Martain writes in
one passage, " likewise belongs to God alone *in the strict sense."* [27] Again:
" Thus, the work bears the mark of the artist; it is the offspring of his
soul and his spirit. In this respect also human art imitates God " ; and,
"Artistic creation does not copy God's creation, it continues it." [28] In brief,
then, there is no problem stemming from Thomas's notion of the " great
analogy " for the modern schoolman; nor does Maritain disagree with
Thomas;-simply   Professor Nahm misinterprets Maritain.

Having gone through this list of critical remarks, one may perhaps wonder
about the value of Professor Nahm's *Readings.* For this reason this re-
viewer hastens to assure any potential reader of this anthology that the
above points, although rather numerous, are indubitably outweighed by
the overall value of this work. For one thing, misprints and defective
quotations, as well as historical inaccuracies or isolated doctrinal misinter-
pretations, are easily corrected in any later edition (which this anthology
would certainly deserve); and even as they stand in the present first edition,
they are vastly outnumbered by hundreds of exact quotations and thou-
sands of items of invaluably precious information.

To support this favorable (and, apparently, abrupt) evaluation, one
may consider Professor Nahm's *Readings* absolutely (in itself) and rela-
tively (in comparison to other aesthetic anthologies); and in the latter
case, one may compare this publication with other similar ones both quan-
titatively and qualitatively.

In terms of mere length Nahm's *Readings* is presently the third among
English aesthetic anthologies. [29] In regard to the number of selected authors
Nahm's *Readings* contains texts from no less than 46 aestheticians; and,
as such, together with Melvin Rader's *A Modern Book of Esthetics,* [30] it
is the most comprehensive Engilsh aesthetic anthology.

With respect to the character of the editorial texts there are today five

[26] *Op. cit.,* p. 122.
[27] *Op. cit.,* p. 84. Italics mine.
[28] *Op. cit.,* pp. 87, 60.
[29] Hofstadter-Kuhns' *Philosophies of Art and Beauty* (New York: The Modern
Library, 1964) contains 701 pages; M. Levich's *Aesthetics* (New York: Random
House, 1968), 649 pages.
[30] Fourth edition. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978). 568 pp.

kinds of aesthetic anthologies. The first kind contains, besides the selected texts, nothing but a few biographical data on the selected authors; [31] the second kind, a very brief general introduction only; [32] ·the third kind, a general introduction and a very short characterization or biography of each selected author; [33] the fourth kind, a general introduction and a doctrinal summary or a special doctrinal introduction to each selection; [34] and the fifth kind, a general introduction as well as a special doctrinal essay in each chapter and biographical information about each selected aesthetician. [35] So considered, Nahm's *Readings* belongs to the most ambitious and most sophisticated fifth kind of aesthetic anthology.

In respect to the number of the selected periods in the history of aesthetics a good practical measure of the comprehensiveness of an aesthetic anthology is how much it includes of ancient Greek aesthetic thoughts and of the period between Hellenistic and modern aesthetics. One extreme in this respect is Stolnitz' *Aesthetics,* [36] in which the first selection is from Aristotle; the second, from Tolstoy. The richest selection (disregarding Nahm's), in contrast, contains selections from Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, and Marsilio Ficino before moving on to the moderns. [37] Professor Nahm's *Readings,* however, includes seven Presocratics before Plato and Aristotle; the sixth chapter is dedicated to eight Hellenistic and medieval authors (Philo, Philostratus, Longinus, Plotinus, and Augustine; and Dionysius, Aquinas, and Dante); and the seventh chapter contains selections from two Renaissance writers (Leone Ebreo and Leonardo da Vinci), before turning to modern aestheticians-a truly refreshing and long-needed innovation. For this innovative superiority the editor deserves high praise and genuine appreciation from anyone who is aware of the wealth of medieval and Renaissance aesthetic thought or interested in observing the continuity of thought in the history of aesthetics.

While the relative consideration alone helps us already to recognize that Nahm's *Readings* is among the best in a number of respects within the field of contemporary English aesthetic anthologies, the true value of *Readings* remains hidden from us if only its relative superiority is considered. In the considered opinion of this reviewer the greatest value of

---

[31] E. g., Beardsley- Schueller, eds., *Aesthetic Inquiry.* (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson, 1967) . 805 pp.

[82] E. g., A. Sesonske, *What Is Art?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). 428 pp.

[88] E. g., J. Stolnitz, *Aesthetics.* (New York: Macmillan, 1965). 115 pp.

[84] E. g., M. Levich, *op. cit.*

[35] E. g., P. E. Richter, *Perspectives in Aesthetics.* (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1967) . 472 pp.

[86] See n. 83 above.

[87] The selection in question is the Hofstadter-Kuhn anthology. See n. 29 above.

Nahm's *Readings* can be recognized only through a careful and reflective reading of the general introduction and, even more so, of the twelve special introductory essays to chapters Q to 13. In the general introduction (chap. 1) Professor Nahm broadly sketches the difference between the philosophies of beauty and art before and after Baumgarten, as the central theme moved from divine creation to human making, giving increasing emphasis to artistic genius, inspiration, and creation. In the special introductions the reader is given a comprehensive and clearly drawn outline of how the main topic or topics of the chapter were treated within the respective period by the selected authors. Nahm usually compares and contrasts the treatment of the main issues in any one period with a treatment of those issues in the previous and/or subsequent periods. In every case, however, the birth, growth, and development of the leading aesthetic ideas, together with their impacts and relative values, are sketched with a few bold and masterly strokes, so much so that each introduction (with the partial exception of that in chapter 6) constitutes an impressive, even dazzling display of the author's familiarity and intuitive-comprehensive vision of the dominant features of the period in question [38] and, cumulatively, of the entire body of aesthetic thought, with all the complexities of the interrelations of its components and factors. These sketches cannot fail to appear to the careful reader as the magnificent fruits of a lifetime spent on studying and reflecting on the history of aesthetics, and as a brilliant manifestation of Professor Nahm's own aesthetic wisdom.

All in all, despite its isolated and relatively few shortcomings, this aesthetic anthology is an extremely rich and enriching *source-book* of ideas about beauty, art, and artist, and an almost uniquely profound and rewarding *philosophy of aesthetic history,* that concentrates on the enduring mysteries of artistic genius, originality, freedom, and creation, with its quantity and quality beautifully balanced.

FRANCIS **J.** KovAcH

University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma

Catholicism Confronts Modernity: A Protestant View. By LANGDON GILKEY. New York: The Seabury Press, 1975. Pp. Qll. $8.95.

Langdon Gilkey, Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Chicago Divinity School, offers us, in *Catholicism Confronts Modernity,* a work that is insightful and richly suggestive. The book's point of departure is the current crisis of Catholic theology and structures in the aftermath

---

[88] See, e. g., chapter 10, pp. 383-90 and chapter 11, pp. 423-24.

of Vatican II; and its writing is animated by the author's conviction that "the resolution of Catholicism's most significant dilemmas [is] the most important thing that can happen for the whole church in the present." (p. 175)

As contribution to this resolution Gilkey presents the reflections of a sympathetic and concerned observer who brings to his analysis the fruit of the Protestant experience of the last two centuries, which witnessed the rise and decline of liberal Protestantism and nco-Orthodoxy (a trajectory which contemporary Roman Catholic thought shows manifold signs of repeating) . Indeed, Gilkey himself is struggling to articulate a renewed liberal theology, chastened and purified by the Barthian critique, yet serious about the challenges of historical consciousness and process to Christian theologizing.

The methodological basis of Gilkey's undertaking is his clarification of Vatican II's emphasis upon " aggiornamento" in terms of the problematic relation which he perceives between the symbols of the tradition and contemporary human experience. In this regard he reiterates in shortened form the analysis of secularity as radical challenge to religion which he developed at length in his earlier book, *Naming the Whirlwind.* He adds, however, a nuanced and extremely helpful study of the levels of meaning of theological symbols; apropos of this, I would venture to say that Chapters Four and Five of the book, entitled, respectively, "Sources and Tradition" and " The Origins of Action in Theological Understanding," are the strongest of the present work and as good a short introduction to theological method as any I know.

Gilkey maintains that we do better to speak of a "development of symbols" rather than a " development of dogmas " ; for the former must be continually filled with new existential content if they are to remain creatively relevant to actual experience. In particular he holds that the key task facing Catholic theology today is " to translate traditional Catholic symbols into the nonsupernaturalistic forms of modern experience, thought, and valuations." (p. 58)

Though this "hermeneutic aggiornamento" must extend through the entire range of Christian symbols, a particularly crucial importance attaches to the ultimate symbol, that of God. Gilkey thus reaffirms his persuasion, already at the center of *Naming the Whirlwind,* that the renewal of God language is the paramount challenge confronting theology today. To my mind Gilkey in the present book speaks *about* the need for such reinterpretation much more than he actually engages in the task he advocates. However, he does indicate the direction he believes the advance should take, as when he states, "Any meaningful and valid concept of God must be set in dynamic, active, related terms " (p. 90) , a thesis which seems to put Gilkey in general agreement with process theologians like Ogden and Cobb.

Catholicism Confronts Modernity has grown out of lectures delivered by the author to Catholic audiences over the past several years. Yet, despite their " occasional " character and inevitable repetitions, the chapters manifest an astonishingly high quality of theological reflection. It is as tribute to their stimulus and as token of concern for the emergence of a renewed liberal theology (an enterprise to which Professor Gilkey has already contributed a great deal) that I offer some critical reflections of my own.

Firstly, the book at times betrays the perennial liberal temptation to embrace modernity in too uncritical a fashion, with the ensuing danger that its perceptions and standards become normative for Christian faith. This tendency, of course, aroused the ire of Barth against classical theological liberalism; and, I must confess, there were certain passages in Chapter Two on "The Priesthood in the Modern World" which brought an exclamatory *"Nein!"* to my lips. Happily, in other sections of the book, Gilkey does add needed nuances, as when he avers: "No philosophical system per se, modern or Greek, can be adopted without transformation to fit the symbols of our tradition." (p. 1£6) This, in my view, is the crucial point. Stated in terms of the typology of H. Richard Niebuhr's classic *Christ and Culture:* a revitalized liberal theology must labor according to the model of " Christ the Transformer of Culture " and must not espouse the " Christ of Culture " model, if it is to be both creative and faithful.

Secondly, the reader of Gilkey's book experiences a strange hesitancy at the heart of the hermeneutical concern which structures the work. On the one hand, there resounds the insistence that the symbols of the tradition must be reinterpreted if they are to live; on the other hand, there lurks the suspicion that secularity may be impervious to just that dimension of experience which such symbols elucidated. The result becomes an oscillation between the two poles of traditional symbols and contemporary experience that can be more productive of vertigo than of foundational principles upon which to construct, however provisionally, new theologies and new structures.

This sense of uncertainty crops up, for example, in the book's last chapter, "Addressing God in Faith," where Gilkey seems to waver over the question whether "the presence of the holy" can or cannot be ·"evoked" in worship (contrast pp. 180 and 187): an irresolution which threatens to render the whole reinterpretation project somewhat otiose. It is, perhaps, such uncertainty which accounts for Gilkey's speaking eloquently about the need for reinterpretation, while seeming to accomplish relatively little of the task himself. On occasion, when he ventures his hand, the resultant theology strikes one as strongly reminiscent of Tillich-a respectable enough achievement, but somewhat anticlimactic in view of the apocalyptic analysis of secularity's challenge.

Let me, then, suggest where the issue may lie. In order for the hermeneutical relation between symbol and experience to receive its full due,

it must be self-consciously extended to include the third pole, everywhere
presupposed, but nowhere explicitly treated: namely, the creative inter-
preter and his will to interpret. For it is this mediator between the tradi-
tion and the present, the individual prophet, poet, saint, or theologian,
who embodies his or her own experiential quest in a more ample symbol
and thus makes it available to the common experience of the community.
Moreover, the " embodiment," whether in scripture, work of art, style of
life, or summa, is essential, if the symbol is to become publicly accessible
and not a mere fugitive illumination. In brief, a reflective concern for
reinterpretation must broaden into a philosophical meditation upon the
interpreter who creatively weds the logos of the tradition with the energies
of the present, and upon the vehicles in which the new vision becomes
incarnate.

   What I am suggesting is perhaps akin to what Gilkey himself admits
when he asserts in self-critical vein: **"It** is not enough for theological re-
flection (as now I must confess I once thought) to relate the eidetic
meaning of the symbol to lived, existential experience in order for us to
conceive it. For a theological symbol to become a doctrine for our reflec-
tion, it must be expressed in modern ontological and philosophical form."
 (p. lfl6) Now modern philosophy is irreducibly a philosophy of the sub-
ject. Hence Gilkey's "move towards metaphysics," adumbrated in the
above citation, should lead him to join the congenial company of Rahner
and Lonergan who base their hermeneutical endeavors on a metaphysics
of the incarnate subject operating in a world open to transcendence. The
outcome of modernity's (and Professor Gilkey's) confrontation with Cath-
olicism and its philosophical sensitivity might then be a renewed apprecia-
tion of the need for metaphysics if we are ever to rise above an oppressively
one-dimensional existence and glimpse once more the Mystery which is
our home. Ultimately," aggiornamento"   will be more than a passing fancy
only if founded upon a reflectively critical philosophy of God and man.

RoBERT P. IMBELLI

St. Joseph's Seminary
  Dunwoodie, N. Y.

Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World. Edited by Isma'il Ragi al
     Faruqi & David E. Sopher. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
     Inc., 1974. Pp. 346. $1fl.50.

   This is the first atlas of world religions. **It** includes sixty five maps,
many of which are pioneer efforts at cartographic interpretation, and twenty
articles on the religions of the world written by thirteen scholars. Carto-
graphic materials have been advanced for some time in the religions of

Semitic origin, and thus the greater portion of maps in this atlas reflect emphasis on Christianity (13 maps) , Islam (17 maps), and Judaism (13 maps) . Although there are fewer maps for the other religions, for example, Hinduism (3 maps), Buddhism (6 maps), indigenous China (I map), traditional Africa (0), and Amerindian maps), the exploratory nature of the effort is clear. Perhaps it will encourage more cartographic work in these non-Semitic areas. More than anything else, it points to the need to advance geographical understanding in religion study and the manner in which spatiotemporal patterns occur in and affect a religion and relationships among religions.

The book is divided into the religions of antiquity, ethnic religions, and universal religions of the present. It is interesting that Judaism, Hinduism, and the traditional African religions are still considered ethnic religions and the universal religions ate limited to Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. A coherent understanding of the religions of antiquity is presented through the theogony, anthropogony, and cosmogony of early religious expression. However, a coherency is absent in the treatment of some of the ethnic and universal religions due to the varying perspectives of the individual authors. Many articles are clearly historical in approach while others proceed from a more literary or anthropological perspective. Each article is good in itself, and the sections on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam reflect superior quality, but no consistent methodology is evidenced in the whole. Moreover, several articles on Japanese religion and Judaism are too sketchy to offer substantial understanding. It appears that the authors had no one audience in mind. As a reference work these observations are not serious; when the work is read as a whole, the lack of coherency is more significant. Professor al Faruqi, the editor of the articles, has contributed several chapters, and those on Egyptian religion and Islam may be the most lasting. His extraordinary grasp of the Sufi tradition and the medieval crusades in Islam reflect scholarship from within Islam itself, so infrequent in Western reference works on religion.

The value of this atlas and the superior production of it are evident; it is one of the most attractive reference books available. The bibliographies are brief and authoritative, the chronologies of the religions are thorough, and the indices of subjects and proper names are most useful. The editors and publishers are commended for initiating an atlas of world religions and introducing scholarship into areas previously unexplored.

WILLIAM CENKNER, O. P.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Barnes and Noble: *Aristotle on Emotion,* by W. W. Fortenbaugh Pp. 99, $10.00); *Philosophical Remorks,* by Ludwig Wittgenstein. (Pp. 315, 18.50); *Freedom, Responsibility, and God,* by Robert Young. (Pp. fl49, $16.50)

Fides Publishers: *Belief in the Micl-Seventies,* by William J. Bausch. (Pp. 176, $7.95)

McGraw-Hill Book Co.: *St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae.* Vol. fl0, (1a flae, 31-39) *Pleasure,* by Eric D'Arcy (Pp. 169, $1fl.50); Vol. 32, *Consequences of Faith* by Thomas Gilby, 0. P. (Pp. 163, $11.00); Vol. 34 (fla 2ae, fl3-33) *Charity* by R. J. Batten, 0. P. (Pp. 321, $15.00); Vol. 38 (2a 2ae, 63-79) *Injustice,* by Marcus Lefebure, 0. P. (Pp. 290, $20.00)

Orbis Books: *Polygamy Reconsidered: African Plural Marriages and the Christian Churches, by Eugene Hillman.* (Pp. fl59, $15.00 cloth, $7.95 paper)

Priests of the Sacred Heart: *The Unity of Love of God and Love* of *Neighbor in Recent Theology,* by Jan de Jong, S.C. J. ($3.00)

The Seabury Press: *The Way of :the Word,* by John Meagher. (Pp. fl34, $9.50); *The New Demons,* by Jacques Ellul. ($9.95); *An American Catholic Catechism.* (Pp. 300, $10.00 cloth, $4.95 paper); *Liberation, Revolution and Freedom,* ed. by Thomas M. McFadden. (Pp. fl12, $7.95)

University of Notre Dame Press: *Caesar Baronius: Counter-Reformation Historian,* by Cyriac K. Pullapilly. (Pp. 236, $12.95)

KTAV Publishing House: *Studies in Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas,* ed. by Jacob I. Dientag. (Pp. 350, $25.00)

Verlag Aschendorfl': *Der Kommentar. des Radulphus Brito zu Buck III De Animo,* ed. by Wilfried Fause, S. J. (Pp. 312, no price listed)

The Free Press: *Escape from Evil,* by Ernest Becker. (Pp. 170, $9.95)

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: *Isagoge,* by Porphyry the Phoenician, translated with Introduction by Edward W. Warren. (Pp. *65,* $3.fl5)

Pontificia Accademia diS. Tommaso: *San Tommoso e la filosofia del diritto oggi,* ed. by Antonio Piolanti. (Pp. fl97, L. 5.000)