THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH
Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017

VOL. XL JANUARY, 1976 No. 1

– A BICENTENNIAL ARTICLE –

PHILOSOPHICAL PRE-SUPPOSITIONS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: MYTH AND REALITY

JULIAN BOYD has suggested that the era of the Founding Fathers was to government what the Age of Pericles was to art, the Age of Elizabeth to exploration and discovery.[1] On the threshold of the nation's bicentennial, it would be advisable to separate this myth from the reality that is the great experiment that is America. For so much myth surrounds the Founding Fathers that the reality often disturbs the placid conviction that our heroes were unmoved by the base passions and the turbulence characteristic of contemporary life.

The word, myth, of course need not be used pejoratively. Mircea Eliade has revealed how pre-scientific mythic visions of reality did at least give the ancient world a cohesive world

[1] *Fundamental, Testaments of the American Revolution,* intr. Julian Boyd. Washington: 1973, p. 3.

view, even if the deeds of the gods were somewhat capriciously invoked, and the vision itself destined to yield to more precise scientific explanation. The mytho-poetic vision of Homer and Hesiod bore little resemblance to consequent Platonic or Aristotelian visions of the universe, but the power of myth seems less determined by inner structure than by the extent to which it is given credence.

For instance, it has been comforting to us to see Puritan forefathers, harassed by the motherland, blazing new trails in an exciting new world, seeking freedom above all else. It has been said more accurately perhaps that they wanted to worship God in their own way and to force everybody else to do the same. The Puritan mind was as sternly conservative in the new world as it was in the old. In the 17th century it was theocentric and family oriented, paradoxically committed to the establishment of a theocracy and suspicious of the political realm. Faith, not reason, was to be man's guide, and the Convenant of Grace was more important than rational arrogance-especially since reason was and is an integral part of a nature vitiated by primal sin. The Puritans indeed rejected the formalism of establishment Anglicanism and Catholicism, were suspicious of an Anglican religious establishment allied to an inevitably unholy state, and they chose simplicity over what they considered a quasi-popish ritual. Although James Madison was later to see a vital link between liberty and learning, the 17th century Puritan of the "Holy Commonwealth " was not tolerant theologically, not democratic politically, nor inquisitive intellectually.[2] A native toughness of mind did pose questions that Puritan mysticism was to avoid.[3] The attempt to understand the world of the

[2] Cf. Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness*, New York: 1956, Ch. V, "The Puritan State and Puritan Society," pp. 141-153. Alan Hemert has best described the complexity of the eighteenth century religious mind in his book, *Religion and the American Mind*, Cambridge, Mass.: 1966.

[3] John Bentley disagrees. He sees "democratic ideals embedded deeply in Puritan hearts," and "with matchless wisdom they joined liberty and learning in a holy alliance." *Outline of American Philosophy*, Patterson: 1963.

Founding Fathers will not be satisfied as much by a study of their political institutions, social conditions, and economic situation as by a study of their manner of thinking. Gordon Wood, in his monumental work, *The Creation of the American Republic*, cites Joel Barlow's observation that the mind of man is the only foundation for any system of politics. If this be so, it becomes increasingly necessary to study the .evolution of a mentality, rather than limit oneself to empirical data. This is but another way of expressing the primacy of the *logos* over the deed, if we really want to understand the deed.[4]

It is also probable that we see here the power of myth and the limitation of fact. If men think that they are unequal in an Aristotelian political sense, they will not be disturbed by their consequent inequality of status; but if the colonists were convinced that all men were equal in their rights, then the Revolution was indeed made and sustained by the basic conviction.

It is another question to ask what the basic convictions of the colonists were. Were they egalitarian in the first place? Are they the transplanted ideas of the *philosophes* of the French Enlightenment, 17th century English jurists, Puritan theologians, or of Locke and the Commonwealthmen? Were the young Americans stimulated by the indigenous pamphleteering in the colonies, or were they reacting by way of " brute pragmatism" to the American scene?

In accepting Barlow's thesis, one can still see something valuably formative in the colonial experience itself that possibly led to a habit of thinking discernibly different from the original thinking that produced the experience.

There is indeed an emerging pattern of belief in 18th century America, complex in structure, and sometimes imprecise in terminology, dependent to a degree upon classical and medieval sources, but growing out of all of them to express a new

[4] One thinks here of Goethe's line in Faust: "In the beginning was the deed," as contrasted with the opening words of St. John's gospel, "In the beginning was the *logos.*"

political outlook that will find only partial expression in the Constitution.

The American Revolution was one of the least revolutionary of revolutions, if we would calibrate revolutions by the violence they exhibit. But however articulated, the conviction was there. Camus, in *The Rebel,* says "Rebellion is born of the spectre of irrationality, confronted with an unjust and incomprehensible condition .... Man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is." [5]

The colonists perhaps were not always capable of defining injustice, but they eventually saw themselves as unjustly treated victims, and they indeed refused to be what they were. The loyalists, who possibly numbered about one-fourth of the population, on the contrary, saw the Revolution as madness and fury beyond comprehension. [6] However sympathetic we may be to the much neglected Tory point of view, the scope of which has been examined by that knowledgeable scholar of the period, Bernard Bailyn, the American Revolution was primarily a revolution of the mind rather than a series of convulsive acts of passion committed by a desperate and tyrannized people. The colonists seem to have been more exercised by the idea of being dictated to than they were to de facto dictation. When Edmund Burke had thf' colonists sniffing tyranny in every tainted breeze, he was aware that the colonists were intellectually concerned with the problems of equality, right and justice, long before they had been to any great degree deprived of them. [7]

[5] Albert Camus, *The Rebel,,* New York: 1956, pp. 10-11.

[6] Cf. William N. Nelson, *The American Tory,* Oxford: 1961; Wallace Brown, *The King's Friends,* Providence: 1966; Bernard Bailyn, *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson,* Cambridge: 1974; Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution,* New York: and Mary Beth Norton, *The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England, 1774-1789.* The war, of course, was, in a real sense, a civil war whose combatants were not divided by geographical borders.

[7] Samuel Eliot Morrison calls them " the freest people in the world," not to obtain freedom, but to confirm it. *The Oxford History of the American People,* New York: 1965, p.

The historian often laments the poverty of his sources. But when one consults the writing of the period, especially the sermons and pamphlets, one wonders if the colonists ever had an unexpressed thought.

As Gordon Wood observes:

> It seemed to be a peculiar moment in history when all knowledge coincided, when classical antiquity, Christian theology, English empiricism, and European rationalism could all be linked .... To most of the Revolutionaries there was no sense of incompatibility in their blending of history, rationalism and scripture. [8]

But perhaps most theoreticians of the Revolution found the inconsistencies of eclectic politics easier to bear, both because of the casualness of their exposure to the contradictory traditions, and because of the adaptiveness that became so much a part of the American character after more than a century of struggle in an unrelenting primitive environment.

And perhaps the comparative absence of violence in the struggle could be found, not in the moral superiority of the colonists themselves, but in the colonists' sympathy for the Constitution of the British they were fighting. As late as January 1776, John Adams expressed himself against independence from Britain. The colonists seemed to feel in some vague way that divine ordinance, nature, and rational legal refinement were felicitously combined in the Constitution of Great Britain. From Montesquieu to the Adamses, no praise was too great for the " perfect " Constitution, although hostility could simultaneously be directed against an insensitive Parliament and a remote monarchy which were thought to be perverting that very Constitution.

THE EARLY YEARS

It is customary to begin our colonial philosophical history with a consideration of Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), but

[8] Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic,* 1776-1787, Chapel Hill: 1969, pp. 7-8.

despite the curious blendings of Calvinistic theology and Lockean empiricism, it would seem that dissenting theologians in general rather than Edwards in particular were of more importance. It has been suggested that the philosophical origins of Congregrational Puritanism go back to the Platonic humanism of Peter Ramus (1515-1586) whose anti-scholasticism and anti-Aristotelianism would be compatible with the Founding Fathers' humanistic deism-although Jefferson was no admirer of Plato either. Almost a century before the Declaration of Independence, Platonism had a base in Cambridge, and one of the Cambridge Puritans, William Ames, provided the philosophy texts of early New England. [9]

Thomas Hooker is another name that was to be famous in the convenant theology of New England, and his influence was to become both religious and philosophical. Schneider sees convenant theology as a secular variant of social contract theory, directed against religious formalism as the compact is directed against excesses of the Crown.

Although it is questionable that the Puritan Platonists were more philosophical than Biblical, the transition to deism and r.eligious naturalism does seem to have been a gradual and almost inevitable development. Not only were Locke's *Treatises* widely read in the colonies, but Locke was a hero to Edwards all of his life.

Quite simply, the greatest ideological influence on the Founding Fathers of our nation-before and after the revisionist theory of the past fifteen years-is the towering figure of John Locke .

There is considerable interest in philosophical influences to which Locke was subjected, and the odd way in which his libertarian theory weaves in and out of the thought of the Commonwealthmen and pro-American Parliamentarians.

Those influences would he the classical study of his Westminister years, the Scholastic philosophy which, like Descartes,

[9] Cf. Herbert W. Schneider, *History of American Philosophy,* New York: 1963, p. 6.

he knew and disliked; the libertarian ethics and theology of Ralph Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist; the Christian humanism of Richard Hooker; the rationalism of the great Descartes; and the cautious scepticism and empiricism of Gassendi, which he probably knew best through his discussions with Gassendi's disciple, Bernier.

Caroline Robbins sees Locke as a "determined Whig," but exposed to many friends of varying beliefs at home and abroad. [10] At least in his earlier years before the return to Oxford in 1666, he does seem to be more the involved politician than philosopher, although he began to write his philosophical ideas down as early as 1660. His long association with Lord Ashley, later Earl of Shaftesbury (for whom he was both secretary and physician) was to sharpen his taste for political theory. Especially pertinent was his association with Shaftesbury in the 1669 writing of a constitution for the colony of Carolina, and his developing distaste for political and religious intolerance. Although involved almost all 0£ his life in practical affairs, he nursed at times a Cartesian aloofness, and a caution possibly born of his successful fight against extradition before the Glorious Revolution.

Not only was the work of Locke known to the more literate colonists, but his 1690 *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* provided much 0£ the basis for the French *philosophes'* faith in Reason. His *Second Treatise of Government,* written between 1679 and 1681, was perhaps a more direct influence on social contract theory among the Founding Fathers. [11]

[10] Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman, Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies,* Cambridge: 1961, p. 58.

[11] The best available version of the *Essay* is edited by Peter H. Nidditch. It is the first volume of the Clarendon Edition published at Oxford. Peter Laslett's *Two Treatises* published by Cambridge in 1960 is the best edited version of that important source. In 1960, Mr. Paul Mellon purchased the Lovelace collection of Locke's works and presented them to the Bodleian Library at Oxford. Cf. R. I. Aaron, *John Locke,* Oxford: *1955;* Maurice Cranston, *John Locke, A Biography,* London: 1957; and J. W. Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy,* Oxford:

Scholarship has, within recent years, challenged the view that Locke was, in Merle Curti's words, America's philosopher, or in Morton White's, the father of American Philosophy- or indeed, one of the Founding Fathers by adoption. Although these claims cannot be lightly dismissed, the case for Locke as the greatest single philosophical influence can be sustained.

First of all, what does Locke actually say in the *Two Trea.tises of Government?* Because of the comparative recency of Peter Laslett's critical edition (1960), one can determine better what Locke actually believed.

The lesser *First Treatise,* as is well known, is simply a disdainful evaluation and critique of Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha,* the celebrated defense of the divine right of kings. The ridicule Locke heaps on the unfortunate Filmer would, of course, be most sympathetically received by the colonists, especially by the more literate, who were less than ardent admirers of George III.

The more important *Second Treatise* begins with a treatment of the common state of nature into which all men are born. The state of nature is not meant to be an actually existing primitive historical condition, but the pre-state situation of men, who, though not involved in Hobbesian warfare, live according to reason " without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them." In short, it is the absence of civil society. Pre-state man, guided by reason, is destined to endure in benevolence and good will; but because of the regrettable tendency of some to seek power and violate the rights of others, civil government by the consent of the governed comes into being. There is no compact here between ruler and ruled, but between individuals of equal status. And if any become tyrants, they are enemies who may be punished by the community at large.

1950. John Dunn emphasizes the influence of Locke's religious commitments in the formation of his political theory and minimizes the influence of Locke on American political theory in the eighteenth century. *The Political Thought of John Locke,* Cambridge: 1969.

It is interesting to note that Locke here .espouses an optimistic rationalism which recognizes tyranny to be a behavioral aberration from normative appropriate behavior. And yet his odd and indefensible def.ense of slavery is not seen in this context of aberrant behavior. H is doubtful, however, that Locke's espousal of slavery contributed greatly to that institution's prospering in the new world. The concern of the slave owners was more financial and practical than ideological.

It will be remembered that the status of the slave and prohibition of the slave trade were discussed but consciously omitted before the American Constitution was drawn up, and Congress was specifically prohibited from abolishing the slave trade for twenty years.[12]

The colonists certainly realized that slavery was a painfully obvious denial of liberty, but they realized too that its abolition would spell financial ruin.

> Few even of the most enlightened Virginians were willing to declare, as Jefferson did in the instructions he wrote for his colony's delegation to the First Continental Congress, that ' the rights of human nature (are) deeply wounded by this infamous practice.'[13]

In general, it may be said that the colonists had a qualified interest in equality (except for those cited occasions when equality would entail a significant financial loss). But they were aware, as was Locke almost a century before, that those free men of superior gifts and industry would inevitably acquire preferential status. And as Charles Lee was to observe, the honors would be obtained " without court favor or the rascally talents of servility."

[12] The colonists were certainly aware of the Lockean justification of slavery, and the literature of the period reveals that they thought themselves victims of a British effort to reduce them to the position of slaves. Cf. Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* Cambridge: 1967, pp. 282-246.

[13] Ibid., p. 286. Patrick Henry too agonized over this inconsistency, and hoped for a future opportunity to get rid of this " lamentable evil." This does not appear, however, to be a widely shared sentiment among 18th century Americ1m plantation owners,

The question of property was of considerable concern to Locke, Although no one had natural and exclusive rights to the goods of the earth, man was represented as having a right to seek and acquire the goods of the earth for his own well being. It is by the labor of man that the goods of nature are transformed into property, and the state is obliged to safeguard property in its acquisition, maintenance and transference. Locke rather interestingly articipates the labor theory of value, and suggests that man's acquisitive powers be limited to that which can be transformed by his personal labor. He takes for granted the" just precedency" of some over others.

Power is to be employed by the people for " the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates." Sovereignty remains with the people, although they may designate one, the few, or the many to represent their interests. It is significant to remember in this context that Jefferson objected to being ruled by Parliament, not because its rulings were unjust, but because Parliament had no right to make the rules in the first place.

The colonists' suspicion of the metastasis of power was not limited to the excesses of Great Britain. In later years it would be directed against their own representatives.

The pervasive Whig mistrust of power had in the years since Independence been increasingly directed not only against the traditional rulers, but also against the supposed representatives of the people, who now seemed to many to be often as distant and unrepresentative of the people's interests as Parliament once had been.[14]

Locke himself seemed to prefer an executive constitutional monarch, and an elected parliament, and there would seem to be considerable pro-monarchy sentiment even among those who would refuse George Ill's claim to this position. Professor Wood suggests that the hostility of the colonists was not

"Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787,* Chapel Hill: 1969, p. 598.

directed against aristocracy as much as against a crown-appointed aristocracy.

But of interest to the colonists particularly would be Locke's justification of rebellion under extraordinary circumstances. He was not interested in hobbling the executive power, but he did recognize the necessity of rebellion when lesser means of redress failed. It is human reason that judges the gravity of governmental injustice, and it is that same human reason that prompts man to refrain from hasty precipitate action when less drastic measures suffice.

Rebellion is aimed, not at anarchy nor at a return to the individualism characteristic of the state of nature, but toward the just government of the many. And when the prince rules arbitrarily and unjustly, ignoring constitutional or legal restraints; when he dissolves the legislature or impedes its work, sovereignty returns to the people.[15]

In general, Locke's philosophy is open, liberal, sympathetic and forward-looking. He is the believing rationalist, who accepts Revelation as a supplement to reason, repudiates the right of the state to intrude in matters of the spirit, and who speaks, for the most part, eloquently in the defense of religious freedom. It is perhaps this sympathy to religion, a quality not found ordinarily in the *philosophesoftheEnlighten*-ment, that made a felicitous combination of the political and spiritual for the religious colonists.

It is perhaps surprising that he was so wrong in the matter of slavery and in his unwillingness to extend toleration to Catholics and atheists, but for the time in which he wrote, he was quite liberal.

[15] It is here that Locke invokes his " appeal to heaven " argument, by which tyrannized people, " by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men", have the right to rebel. Ultimately, this is the Hobbesian argument of self-preservation. Cf. *Treatise,* Ch. xiv; Bailyn, *op. cit.,* pp. 198-229; Wood, *op. cit.,* Ch. x, " The Sovereignty of the people," pp. 344-390.

ENTER THE REVISIONISTS

It has been customary to consider Locke's influence as indirectly exercised on the colonists by means of the *philosophes* of the Enlightnment, but the revisionst work of scholars in the past decade has given us new insights into intermediary influences only partly Lockean in inspiration.

Of particular importance in any study of the philosophical pre-suppositions of the Founding Fathers has been the work of Caroline Robbins and Bernard Bailyn. [16]

Bailyn has summarized what he calls the myth of the American colonial experience, citing first the supposed fact that, previous to the American Revolution, the political experience of Colonial America was roughly analogous to Great Britain; secondly, that an alliance of planters and merchants, constituting an aristocracy embodying religious orthodoxy, economic privilege and social hierarchy, were attacked by native, frontier-bred democrats through the medium of many provincial assemblies, especially in the decade previous to 1776.

The traditional picture is completed with the American Revolution destroying the oppressive power of this aristocracy and giving power to freedom-loving Whig colonists. By the imposition of these radical ideas on a traditional society, a social revolution was effected that destroyed all but the remnants of an old aristocracy-but remnants which survived to regain power in a counter-revolution of the 1780s and impose conservative views on the new Federal constitution.

By its light, politics in America, from the very beginning could be seen to have been a dialectical process in which an aristocracy of wealth and power struggled with the people, who, ordinarily ill-organized and inarticulate, rose upon provocation, armed with powerful institutional and ideological weapons to reform a periodically corrupt polity.[17]

[16] Caroline Robbins, *op. cit.;* Bernard Bailyn, "Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth Century America," in *The American Historical Review,* Vol. 67, January, 1962, pp. 339-351. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* Cambridge: 1967.

[17] Bailyn, *American Historical Review,* Vol. 67, p. 841.

The assumption involved was that an Enlightenment-inspired group 0£ American radicals had turned a dispute in imperial relations into a sweeping reformation 0£ public institutions and land, and that what evolved, evolved from a necessity 0£ time and place.

The revisionists, writing against the theory 0£ such texts as Carl Becker's *History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776,* and Charles Beard's *Eoonomio Interpretation of the Corn.stitution,* tell a different story.

To some 0£ them, it was not the Enlightenment that provoked American radicals during the Revolution, nor any other ideological source, but the brute pragmatism 0£ American li£e.[18] Daniel Boorstin in *The Amerioans: The Colonial Experience* (1958) emphasizes experience, the "given", as the secret 0£ American li£e rather than old world wisdom 0£ any class 0£ knowers.

So two sets 0£ £acts are in evidence. The first, the conscious seriousness with which Revolutionary leaders took ideas 0£ social and political theory that they certainly knew; and colonial practicality, which spawned an *ad hoo* ideology that the uniqueness 0£ their situation suggested.

Moreover, Robbins sees a continuous fresh flow 0£ information into the colonies (already strong in the 17th century, but increasing in the 18th) coming principally by way 0£ English dissenters and their American co-religionists. This means that a neglected source 0£ colonial thought was the commonwealth radicalism 0£ the 17th and 18th centuries, involving not only the obvious figures 0£ Beccaria, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Locke, whose works were known to the colonists, but a whole group 0£ lesser known foes 0£ traditional authority like Trenchard, Gordon, Neville, Harrington, Watts, Neal, Sidney, Priestley, and Price. Moreover Diderot, Montesquieu, and Voltaire, liberal as they were, had doubts about the

[18] Cf. Frederick B. Tolles, "The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement: A Re-evaluation," in *The American Historical Review,* Vol. 60, October, 1954, pp. 1-12.

possibility of republican government succeeding m a great country.

Most interestingly, It IS to be noted that in the pamphlet literature-and Bailyn discovered more than 400 available in wide circulation in 1776-the work most often cited in the colonies was not that of Montesquieu or Locke, but *Ca.to's Letters,* radically libertarian essays written in London between 1720 and 1723 by two dissenters, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,[19] who later were to write commentaries on Sallust and Tacitus that evoked the praise of Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson.

The controversy over the validity of imperial government in the colonies is seen as providing a common vocabulary, common thought, and later, common principles. But the revisionists see the colonists not only aware of being innovators, but effecting reforms in the name of reason. They also see franchise not being exercised by colonists who could vote, and dissent well tolerated and not penalized.[20] In short, dissent is seen as a well-established phenomenon before the Revolution. And Enlightenment theory is seen as having little to do with these developments, which are occasioned by the exigencies of the situation. Bailyn says simply: "Nowhere in the 18th century was there democracy-middle class or otherwise-as we use the term."[21]

The Commonwealthmen of whom Caroline Robbins speaks were an extraordinary group. Their names are not well known and no great achievements are attributed to them, but they were a group of Whigs who preserved the evolutionary tradition for service in the American Revolution. They worked from the older libertarian tradition of Harrington, N edham, and Milton

[19] Books, newspapers, travel, correspondence are also cited as sources of transmission of Whig radicalism. Cf. Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution,* New York: 1979!.

[20] It has been said that mobs in 18th-century America functioned as a part of the political structure rather than as an attack upon it.

[21] Bailyn, *Ibid.,* p. 346.

in Cromwell's time; through Sidney, Neville, and Locke at the time of Charles II; and a later group including Burgh, Price, and Priestley were the latest of the series.

> The Commonwealthmen themselves produced, soon after 1689, accounts, arguments, essays, and histories which might be dubbed the apocryphal books of the Whig Bible as it was to be read by revolutionaries and reformers all around the Atlantic world.[22]

Robbins goes on to describe the Commonwealthmen of three generations, seeing Priestly and Price early radicals of the last period whose work was roughly contemporaneous with the Revolution. Their thought, of course, was not a matter of unanimity, but they argued for personal freedoms, a system of checks and balances, resistance to tyranny, and constitutional government.

Adams and Franklin both had direct contact with the Trenchard-Hutchinson Whigs and were probably influenced by the preoccupation of this group with religious and political liberty, extension of the franchise, freedom of thought, although oddly enough, not with egalitarianism. The London tavern rather than the academic hall was the favored meeting place, and many a tract or pamphlet seems to have been born of these "club " discussions.

It is, of course, impossible to cite all of the figures involved, but one man stands out among the early Commonwealthmen both for the violence of his convictions and for the fact that his *Discourses* were "more of a Bible to the revolutionaries than any of the works of his century, Milton alone excepted."[23]

Algernon Sidney the aristocratic self-proclaimed foe of tyranny, was executed by the government of Charles II. His *Discourses,* abusive to the Crown, though not egalitarian, placed power in Parliament and in the people; justified rebellion when necessary; condoned the slaying of tyrants and the freeing of slaves; and advocated a militarily strong state.

[22] Robbins, *op. cit.,* p. 5.
[23] Robbins, *op. cit.,* p. 46.

A ringing message from a violent man, it not only appealed to the revolutionary mind in England and in America, but expressed the hopeful conviction that popular government is self-corrective. And his was an appeal that lasted for over a century. It is somewhat odd that the more temperate Locke does not seem to have read the *Discourses*.[24]

The fame of the great Milton and the equally great Newton is in the fields of literature and science. Though Newton, like Descartes, sought a low profile, his socio-political theorizing and theological speculations seems to have influenced his own century as much as his science did a later one. Richard Cumberland (1631-1718), Anglican bishop and anti-Hobbes political philosopher, in *De Legibus Naturae* emphasized the role of reason operative in a teleological universe, and he appears to have been widely read.

Robert Molesworth (1656-1725), one of the most important Whigs of his time, was admired by Locke and wrote in his famous *Account* of the blessings of health and liberty. He was erroneously supposed to have contributed to the immensely popular *Cato's Letters* of the independent Whigs, Gordon and Trenchard.

Another work that had eleven printings and was well known in the colonies was *The Case of Ireland of William Molyneux* (1656-1698), basically because of its anti-colonial sentiment. Another Englishman of this period was Thomas Hollis, whose interest and benefactions to the colonists .elicited Dr. Johnson's exaggerated but flattering charge that he was partially responsible for the American Revolution.

FRANKLIN AND FRIENDS

The Enlightenment in the American experience is first associated with the name of Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790).

"Curiously, Locke recommends Sidney, but claims he never read him. Madison, in a letter to Jefferson on February 8, concerning textbooks, expresses reservations about both Sidney and Locke, though conceding that they both are basic sources for English republican theory.

Thirty-seven years older than Jefferson, he had spent sixteen years in England, where he made the acquaintance of David Hume. And in his seventy-first year, he began a nine-year sojourn in France, where he enjoyed the friendship of Condorcet, Voltaire, Madame Helvetius, and other figures prominent in the French Enlightenment. [25]

Exposure to the critical thought of Hume and Voltaire, and the rationalism of the *philosophe.'!,* while encouraging a political stance that showed a marked development from a Conservative loyalty to British institutions to a political liberalism based on self-determination, did little to disturb his rather serene deism, and the relatively conservative work ethic reflected in the aphorisms of *Poor Richard* and in the *Autobiography* .[26]

He certainly believed in the service character of government, had a rationalistic confidence in the ability of well-intentioned men to form viable political structures, and saw man as destined to an eternity with the God who created him.

Yet Franklin, though he has been called with Jefferson the fullest embodiment of the Enlightenment spirit in America, is more the experimentalist than the theoretician. For him, philosophy lets light into the nature of things, and while he is interested in theoretical understanding, the practical skills take precedence.

This same "pragmatic wisdom" is found in Franklin's

[26] Cf. Ralph Ketcham, *Benjamin Franldin,* New York: *1965;* Frank Mott and Chester Jorgenson, eds., " Introduction," in *Benjamin Franldin: Representative Selections,* New York: 1936; *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franldin,* New Haven: 1964; *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,* 8 vols., New Haven: 1959; C. L. Sanford, *Benjamin Franldin and the American Character,* Boston: *1955.* Condorcet and Turgot, who considered Americans " the hope of the world," were to figure importantly in the philosophy of progress, one of rationalism's most powerful dynamics.

[26] His acceptance of a Providential God, mentioned in a 1790 letter to Jefferson's friend, Yale president, Ezra Stiles, would suggest a rather unorthodox deism. The classic exposition of deism is probably J. Toland's *Christianity Not Mysterious* (1696), which rejects Revelation and Providence. Cf. also S. Clarke, *Demonstrations of Being and the Attributes of God* (1704-06).

approach to morality and politics.[27] It is the empirical intelligence of a Bacon and Locke that he brings to domestic and foreign politics and ethics. Like Jefferson, he esteems good works over good words. Socrates and Christ were not for Franklin the rather blasphemous association they would be for a Jonathan Edwards.

A particular influence on Franklin was the Welsh dissenter and moral philosopher, Richard Price (l His well known pamphleteering in behalf of the American cause possibly lessened Franklin's aversion to breaking "that fine and noble vase, the British Empire," although the latter did propose separation as early as 1767.[28] The Philadelphian, as has been noted, had been in England almost uninterruptedly from 1757 to 1775, and had become friendly with Price, to whom the Continental Congress with Washington's blessing wanted to extend citizenship. The Congress was interested in his skills as a government financial consultant. He is also remembered for his philosophical discussion with Hume and Priestley.[29] His association with Franklin took place chiefly at the fortnightly meetings at the London Tavern of the Honest Whigs, a group of dissenters that included Priestly and Boswell. His *Observations on the Nature of Civil Lib'erty, The Principles of Government and the Justice and Policy of the War with*

[27] The term is Adrienne Koch's, used in her description of the American Enlightenment. She sees hers as a mediating theory between the Carl Becker thesis (that the 18th century colonial mind accepted a divinely designed nature that could be discovered by reason and articulated in normative laws) and the Boorstin view that the given and the experienced took precedence over theory in the American experience. Boorstin sees the colonists uncongenial to any class of knowers and sensitive to the unique and "unpredicted whisperings " of environment. Cf. Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence,* New York: 1945, and *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers,* New York. Daniel Boorstin's work is *The Colonial Experience,* New York: 1958.

[28] Jefferson too, writing as late as August *25,* 1775, to his loyalist relative, John Randolph, hoped for an end to an " unnatural contest," and wished for a reunion with the parent country.

[29] Carl B. Cone, *Torchbearer of Freedom; The Influence of Richard Price on Eighteenth Century Thought,* Lexington, Kentucky: 1952.

America (1776) was his most significant work, and his *Discourse on the Love of Our Country* (1789), written in defense of the French Revolution, was to provoke Burke's famous *Reflections on the Revolution in. France.*

Price saw in his *Observations* an America being deprived of the natural and inalienable right of liberty. He described the various species of civil liberty involved in the principle of self-direction, and eventually proposed for the peace of the world a league of independent states. Government power should be forever suspect; structures should be representative; people should not be arbitrarily taxed; and the people should be the ultimate arbiters of the rule under which they live. He mocks the enemies of the colonists who sneer that America's defenders are Mr. Locke's disciples-and glories in the title. [30]

Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), "a dissenter by training and disposition," ten years younger than Price, was minister, scientist, and philosopher. In his work, *An Essay on the First Principles of Government* (1768) he displayed his Lockean sympathies in behalf of political and religious pluralism and civil liberty in general. His work is an odd combination of unitarianism, determinism, and that kind of materialism espoused by Jefferson that is compatible with spiritual values. He continued to write on theological and political questions after emigrating to Pennsylvania on 1794, angering some Americans by his criticism of their intolerance, but enjoying Jefferson's friendship and protection. [31] Passmore credits Priestley's *Socrates and Jesus Compared* (1803) with provoking Jefferson's *Syllabus* of religious beliefs; and another of the former's works, *The Doctrines of Heathen Religion Compared with Those of Revelation* (1804) evoking in John Adams an interest in comparative religion.

The greatest of the political pamphlets of the American Revolution is *Common Sense* of Thomas Paine (1737-1809). Published early in 1776 by the erratic corsetmaker, grocer,

[8°] Caroline Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

[81] Cf. John Passmore, *Joseph Priestley,* New York: 1965.

teacher, and preacher-perhaps best remembered by the colorful but inaccurate description of Theodore Roosevelt as "that filthy little atheist,"-it touched, as Bernard Bailyn has suggested, "some extraordinarily sensitive nerve in American political awareness," although the author had been in the country less than three years prior to its publication. [32]

What is most notable is that, at the time of its writing, independence from England was neither a political nor a popular cause of great significance. As late as January, 1776, John Adams was to assert that he did not wish America to break away from Britain. The picture of an American nation almost universally desirous of independence from Britain in 1776 is a popular myth. The American nation was a scattered group of individualistic colonies possessed of neither ideological nor political unity, and Great Britain, despite her rather short-sighted ruling clique, had a much better record on constitutional liberties than her contemporaries, who would have been quite willing to further their own interests at America's expense. [33]

It has been said that Paine considers government, like clothes, a badge of lost innocence. And despite its emotional intensity which would suggest that this first widely disseminated plea for independence was more reflective of heart than mind, the pamphlet has some philosophical pre-suppositions, chief among which are the pessimistic convictions that a just monarchy is even theoretically impossible, and the optimistic conviction that corporate good sense and a rational capacity for perceiving the orderly universe resides in the masses.

Quite simply, Paine was writing to a people who did not as a group want independence from Great Britain. He saw an umbilical cord that was not a conv.eyor of life but a rope of

[32] Bernard Bailyn, "Common Sense," in *Fundamental Tenets of the American Revolution,* Washington, 1973, p. 7. John Adams despised Paine in particular, and New Yorkers in general.

[33] Professor John Alden, however, argues for "the essential solidity of the English colonies," *A History of the American Revolution,* New York: 1969, p. 5.

strangulation-and he wanted it severed. He saw Europe-not England-as the mother country, and he lamented the narcotic effect of any phrase or thought that would deaden the political aspirations of the colonists. Paine is not speaking in a formal Enlightenment idiom, although he is eventually to arrive by sheer wrath at Enlightenment conclusions in favor of the individual versus the iniquitous tyranny of a " sullen-tempered Pharoah " like George III.

In short, his is the short-cut of rage through the lucubrations of reason. Logic and reason will later support his plea for independence and freedom-although he specifically denies having even read Locke. His heart quite clearly had its own reasons and he expressed those reasons with incredible intensity.[34] The message of *Common Sense* spread like wildfire through the colonies after its publication in January of 1776.[35]

JEFFERSON

In any discussion of the philosophy of the Founding Fathers, the name of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) inevitably assumes the pre-eminent place. Although it is not a matter of unanimity that Jefferson was a philosopher at all in the strict sense of the term, the many-sided genius was much more than the chief representative of Enlightenment thought in the colonies.[36]

[84] Cf. Alfred Owen Aldridge, *Man of Reason: The Life of Thomas Paine,* New York: 1959.

[85] John Adams, however, cited Jonathan Mayhew's *A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resistance to the Higher Powers* (1750) as the opening gun of the Revolution. It combined libertarian thought of Sidney, Milton and Locke.

[86] Adrienne Koch, for instance, cites the reluctance of the Jefferson scholar, Gilbert Chinard, to consider Jefferson as a philosopher in the formal sense of the word. She insists, however, that while Jefferson scorned school metaphysics, and was not a system-builder like Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, he was a man of considerable intellectual curiosity and talent, with a capacity for methodical rational analysis of the human situation and environment. Cf. *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,* Chicago: 1964, pp. xi-xiv. Cf. also *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* Julian Boyd, ed., 16 vols., Princeton: 1950; Paul Ford,

Our knowledge of the first four decades of Jefferson's life is not helpfully revealing, but we do know that from his study of the classics in James Maury's private school, he was exposed to the thought of Homer, Euripides, Herodotus, Virgil, Ovid, Seneca, and Cicero.[37] Stoicism and Epicureanism were also to figure in his early formation, but neither tradition could be said in any sense to have claimed his allegiance as a system.

He was a practical man whose thought was frequently speculative. He was the great American libertarian, swearing eternal hostility to every attempt to constrain the mind of man; yet at various times, as Michael Kammen has pointed out, "... he could embrace loyalty oaths, consider internment camps for political suspects, draft a bill of attainder, urge prosecution for seditious libel, ignore the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, condone military despotism, use the army to enforce laws in peacetime, choose professors for their political opinions, and endorse the doctrine that means, however odious, could be justified by the ends." [38]

Jefferson is not simply categorized in any philosophic or religious system, for the simple reason that he never submitted his opinions to any party or system in politics, religion, philosophy, or anything else, and considered such submission as servility and as a degrading addiction for a free moral agent. "If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all." [39]

The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 10 vols., New York: 1892-1899; Daniel Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, New York: 1948; Merrill Peterson, *The Jefferson Image in the Virginian*, Vol. I, *Jefferson and the Rights of Man*, Vol. II, *Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty*, Vol. III, *Jefferson, the President*, Vol. IV. Two additional volumes are to complete this definitive biography begun in 1948. Norman Cousins, *In God We Trust*, New York: 1958.

[37] *The Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson: His Commonplace Book of Philosophers and Poets*, Gilbert Chinard, ed., Baltimore: 1928.

[38] Michael Kammen in Book World, *The Washington Post*, July 7, 1974, pp. 1-2.

[39] Letter to Francis Hopkinson, March 13, 1789, Memorial Edition, *Writings*, Vol. 7, p. 500.

Like Franklin, whom he admiringly referred to as the Father of American Philosophy, Jefferson had, in his Paris period (1785-1790), acquired a personal knowledge of the figures and principles of the French Enlightenment, which is suggested as a major philosophical influence in his life. The common sense realism of his contemporary, Dugald Stewart, was to influence him and colonial college curricula considerably .[40]

The Enlightenment, of course, is frequently cited as one of the great sources of Revolutionary thought.

In general, the Enlightenment refers to the 18th century Age of Reason when popularizers such as Voltaire, Holbach, Diderot, La Mettrie, Condorcet, Helvetius, D'Alembert, and Beccaria developed a distinctively rationalistic point of view conditioned by the empiricism of Bacon and Descartes, and social theory derived from the thought of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke. Fundamentally, the *philosophes* were not professional philosophers, but they were concerned with rationally ascertained knowledge of man and nature that hopefully would lead man to the good life. Implicit in Enlightenment thought was an optimistic philosophy of progress which would see the good life as possible by the unaided natural powers of enlightened man. [41]

Jefferson not only knew the philosophy of Locke, but he was also influenced by Bolingbroke's scepticism which is structured along the lines of Book Four of *The Essay Concerning Hurrwn Understanding.* Henry St. John Bolingbroke (1678-1751), the colorful Tory statesman and man of letters, the object of Hume's contempt and and Dr. Johnson's wrath, was not an important philosopher, but his deism and rather inconsistent

[40] Cf. Jefferson to Madison, November 15, 1817, *The Writings of James Madison,* Vol. 4, p. 213. Jefferson was interested in Stewart, the friend of his Paris days, on the faculty of his " new " university.

[41] Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism,* New York: 1966; Ernst Cassirer, *The Phuosophy of the Enlightenment,* Koelln-Pettegrove trans., Boston: 1955; Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Phuosophers,* New Haven: 1932; and J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress,* London: 1920.

scepticism, coupled with a humanistic concern, appealed to Jefferson. [42]

In Bolingbroke authority and surmise is to yield to reason; principles, far from being absolute, are relative to a time and place; materialism is the philosophy reason dictates, but reason must find a way to justify spiritual values.

Jefferson was perhaps sensitive to the inconsistencies of his position. He seems to have been uncomfortable with any form of philosophic idealism, yet he had, as his voluminous correspondence reveals, a profound interest in and respect for ethical and spiritual values, even attempting to use the materialist idiom to define the human soul, fashioned, like the universe, by an orderly and intelligent "Superintending Power." [43]

The man who has such a natural sympathy for the empirical idiom tries with only partial success to articulate a belie£ in an intelligent and benevolent Creator, who is at one time identified as being akin to Mind, yet who cannot really be known or described. [44]

A life well lived is, for Jefferson, the ultimate test for religion's value. The good man, who reflects the sublime doctrines of Jesus of Nazareth in his life, is more important than sectarian affiliation. Yet it can be seen that even this qualified personal faith is far removed from the strident atheism of a Holbach or a Diderot, whose extraordinary versatility his own skills resemble. [45]

It will be remembered that the *Encyclopedie, ou Dictionnaire*

[42] Cf. Sir Douglas Harkness, *Bolingbroke: The Man and His Career,* London: 1957; Walter McMerrill, *From Statesman to Philosopher: A Study in Bolingbroke's Deism,* New York: 1949.

[43] Letter to John Adams, April 11, 1823, Memorial Edition, Vol. 15, p. 427.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] Jefferson's quasi-intuitionist ethic would, of course, differ sharply from Diderot's rejection of free will in the deterministic *D'Alembert's Dream.* Yet they share an ethical naturalism. In searching for a teacher of ethics for the University of Virginia, Jefferson, in a letter to Madison on November 30, 1824, suggests a layman to teach in a philosophical tradition of Locke, Stewart, Brown, or Tracy, rather than a clergyman, who, he felt, would slant philosophy in the favor of a specific religious traditio!l,

ra-isonnedes scwnces, des arts, et des metiers, edited by Diderot and finished just four years before the Declaration of Independence, was to become not only the bible of rationalists, but the greatest cultural ev.ent of its time. But it was not a formally philosophic work any more than its famous contributors were formal philosophers. Jefferson was particularly impressed with D'Alembert's famous introduction to the *Encyclopedic.* D'Alembert knew English empiricism, and the *D-iscours preliminaire* reveals not only a debt to Cartesian rationalism, but more specifically to the empiricism of Bacon, Newton, and Locke. He also shared Jefferson's acute distaste for school metaphysics, and saw the human mind as capable of ferreting out the One Great Truth that is the universe. Jefferson did not accept John Adams' vigorous denunciation of the Encyclopedists as men " totally destitute " of common sense, but he did not accept either their mechanism or belief that religions were merely illusory " visions judaiques." [46]

But even given Jefferson's general philosophic orientation-and it must be remembered that he used the word philosophy in a generalized sense that would include systematic investigation on the natural sciences-he is in no sense an American edition of the French Encyclopedists.

Even the term American Enlightenment which implies similarity to the French movement is perhaps an unfortunate one. Adrienne Koch identifies the Franklin-Jefferson synthesis as Pragmatic Wisdom, a blend of empiricism, rationalism, and a humanistic concern for the whole man. [47]

Its message is the confident Jeffersonian conviction that the fruits of pragmatic wisdom were more evident in America than in England. Jefferson, like many of the prominent theorists of the American Revolution, had his misgivings at times about the success of the great experiment; but he did feel

[46] Letter to Adams, April 8, 1816, Memorial Edition, Vol. 14, pp. 468-71.

[47] Adrienne Koch, " Pragmatic Wisdom and the American Enlightenment," in *The William and Mary Quarterly,* Vol. 18, July, 1961, pp. 813-829; and *The American Enlightenment,* ed., Adrienne Koch, New York: 1965.

that the three greatest men who ever lived, Bacon, Newton, and Locke, philosophers and Englishmen all, found their crowning achievement in the new world rather than in the old.[48]

To pursue the investigation of the source of the ethical convictions of Jefferson, one must cite the man credited by the Sage himself as the author of the greatest moral philosophy ever written, Pierre Charron (1541-1603). Charron's *De la sagesse* espoused an optimistic and naturalistic humanism which was not only to influence Jefferson's moral theory, but which was to have a direct influence on his political stance. The liberal Whig or conservative Tory, in Jefferson's mind, is not the product of an independent rational investigation. The parties are determined by the nature of men, and dichotomized by good and bad psychological traits respectively. [49]

Oddly enough, Adrienne Koch, in her classic study of Jefferson's philosophy, takes little note of Charron as a formative influence. Pierre Charron was an ordained priest and lawyer. His important *De la sagesse* (1601), highly controversial and widely read, was admired by Pierre Gassendi, among others. Sceptical and fideistic in tone, it proposed both the inadequacy of human knowing powers and the legitimacy of the faith affirmation. From a sceptical methodology, Cartesian in nature, man develops a natural ethic as best he can, even though the human predicament precludes certainty based on the resources of nature. [50]

THE SLAVERY QUESTION

Perhaps the most perceptive study of slavery and the Founding Fathers has been provided by William W. Freehling,

[48] Letter to John Trumbull, February 15, 1789. This is a recurrent theme in Jefferson.

[49] Letter to Joel Barlow, May 3, 1802, Memorial Edition, Vol. IO, p. 319; letter to Lafayette, November 24, 1823, Memorial Edition, Vol. 15, p. 490.

[50] Cf. Richard Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes*, Assen, The Netherlands: 1963.

who examines the impact of revisionist history on one of our less glorious institutions. [51]

The original roseate vision of our Founding Fathers sounding the death knell to an iniquitous institution has yielded to a more cynical view that sees both privilege and slavery fortified by an elitist Constitution.

At first glance, Jefferson's eventual freeing of nine of his slaves strikes one as a rather pallid liberalism, somewhat reminiscent of Dick Gregory's remark that a liberal lynches a victim from a low tree.

There is an agonizing ambivalence in Jefferson's approach to the problem dictated by the internal conflict of idealist and pragmatist. He sees the utopian goal rendered impractical by the world that was, and his own suspicion of black sexual prowess and intellectual inferiority must be admitted to be a part of the world that was. By conviction Jefferson, like Washington and Randolph, would have freed all of his slaves. But property value and ethnic theory were both involved.

The financial cost of abolition, heavy enough by itself, was made too staggering to bear by the Founding Fathers' racism, an ideological hindrance to anti-slavery, no less important than their sense of priorities and their commitment to property. [52]

At any rate, though slavery was not dying in Jefferson's Virginia, he must be credited with localizing the .evil and looking

[51] William W. Freehling, "The Founding Fathers and Slavery," *The American Historical Review,* 77 (1972), 81-91. Cf. also Robert McColley, *Slavery and Jeffersonian Virginia,* Urbana: 1964; Staughton Lynd, *Class Conflict, Slavery and the United States Constitution;* William Cohen, "Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Slavery," *Journal of American History, 56* (1969), *503-26;* Merrill D. Peterson, *Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography,* New York: 1970. David Brian Davis' works are classic: *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture,* Ithaca: 1966, and *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution,* Ithaca: 1975.

[52] William W. Freehling, *op. cit.,* p. 83. Thomas Hutchinson, the most famous loyalist in exile, wrote in his anti-Declaration pamphlet of November, 1776, his mystification as to the unalienable character of life and liberty if more than a hundred thousand Africans were denied those rights. Cf. Bailyn, *The Ordeal. .. ,* p. 358.

forward to its ultimate strangulation. We Northerners conveniently forget that fourteen percent of New York's population at the outbreak of the war were slaves. And though the battle was carried on by Edward Coles, the friend of both Madison and Jefferson, Jefferson's initiatives are recognized in his drafting of the anti-slavery ordinance of 1784, his message to Congress on December 2, 1806, on the eve of the deferred abolition of the slave trade, and in public and privately expressed opinions on the evil of slavery as an institution. Jefferson and his friends indeed, in Freehling' s words, left to posterity a crippled and restricted institution. If one believes that the American Revolution did not end in 1790, then one can see the virtue of a policy, which though too compromising by our standards, was realistically farsighted by his.

James Madison (1751-1836), the great Virginia constitutionalist, reflects both the political liberalism and the pragmatism of the Founding Fathers. [53] He was particularly impressed by Hume's anti-faction *Ideas of a Perfect Commonwealth* (175'2). As a follower of Jefferson, the Father of the Constitution was a longtime advocate of religious and political freedom, a foe of Hamilton and the conservatives of the Washington administration, yet pragmatist enough like Jefferson to accept a constitution that more recent scholarship has revealed to be a basically conservative document. Herbert W. Schneider sees the period as a time when philosophical thinking and social action were most intimately joined. America " gathered into action the reflections and passions of several generations of European thinkers, and it also led the way toward the bold political, religious, and moral experiments in which the whole world has ever since participated." [54]

Not only were Adams, Franklin, Jefferson and Madison not

[53] Cf. Adrienne Koch, *Jefferson and Madison, the Great Collaboratiou,* New York: 1950.

[54] Herbert W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy,* New York: 1963, p. *35.* The coordination factor is illustrated by John Adams' arresting figure of thirteen clocks striking together.

philosophic system builders, but even their great themes of religious liberty, natural rights, equality before law, freedom of thought and expression were shortly to be assailed, and often repudiated. Democratic thought in the colonies was neither unanimous nor continuous after 1776, as has been noted.

And a change was taking place in the religious formulations of the period that would influence its philosophical assumptions. It was the dissenters' progressive movement from a vertical supernaturalist theology to a deistic horizontalist humanitarian ethic. In short, much more was involved in the evolving mentality than the rejection of the mediatorial office of the priesthood, the sacramental system and Anglican formalism.

THE SUMMING UP

In the final analysis, what were the philosophical presuppositions of the Founding Fathers?

The author has perhaps reprehensibly minimized the classical influence that Richard M. Gummere has so ably described. But despite the erudite character of the late Jefferson-Adams correspondence, it is questionable that either Jefferson or Adams ever really understood Plato; nor is it probable that many American farmers could read Homer.[55] Certainly themes in Aristotle, Cicero, and Polybius are discernible in the political patterns for the new republic, and the classical tradition did figure in the education of Adams, Jefferson, and Madison; but it is difficult to see these influences as proximate or significantly specific.

The first and foremost philosophical influence (although this influence is perhaps more indirect than formerly thought) would still be John Locke-and the political and empirical synthesis of Locke, Bacon, and Newton.

Enlightenment rationalism with its progressivist social theory

[55] Richard M. Gummere, *The American Colonial Mind and the Classical, Tradition: Essays in Comparative Culture:* Cambridge: 1963. The correspondence, despite the modesty of the writers, is much more than "senectutal loquacity" or "senile Garrulity."

and libertarian religious and political ideas would seem to be a strong second influence.

Next would be the tradition of English common law, with its repudiation of tyranny, its advocacy of inteUectual and religious freedom and representative government.

Fourth, the tradition of dissent through correspondence, tract, pamphlet, newspaper, and pulpit of the English Commonwealthmen of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is a much neglected source of colonial theory. As Jack P. Greene has observed, these elements of dissent were long a part of colonial political tradition before the outbreak of overt hostilities. J. G. A. Pocock would go as far back as Florentine Renaissance humanism to see the origins of these eighteenth century eruptions.

Giambattista Vico once suggested that one of the greatest faults of the historian was what he called the conceit of the learned, that is, the habit of assuming that the people about whom one is writing were as reflective as the historian himself, whereas the world-historical individuals were among the least academically minded. Thus it is that when the above sources are cited, it is with the realization that much of the inspiration for the Revolution was not the result of *a priori* philosophical principles as much as an *ad hoc* ideology based primarily on pragmatic considerations.

Genuine equality would appear to be largely a myth both before, during, and after the Revolution, despite the Declaration of Independence. It is not strongly affirmed by the otherwise liberal Commonwealth (at least before the time of Price), nor is it satisfactorily contained in the American Constitution which was their memorial. Their anti-Catholicism can be partially explained, not by an endemic narrowness of mind, but by the involved character of Stuart politics and religion.

Colonial ideological unanimity is another myth. Tory sentiment was not only strong, as the studies of Maier, Bailyn, Nelson, and Norton remind us, but the supposed tyranny of

Britain was not as widely felt in the scattered colonies as traditionally represented; and the Revolution was felt to be the embodiment rather than the rejection of English constitutional government. Perhaps the colonies were far removed from the profound tranquillity that General Gage spoke of in 1772, but they were hardly seething with rebellion.

The principal works influencing the colonists, directly or indirectly, would seem to be Algernon Sidney's *Discourses* (c. 1683), *Cato's Letters* of Gordon and Trenchard (1720-1723), *Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) and *Second Treatise of Government* (c. 1680), and Paine's *Common Sense* (1791-1792). Yet one can readily admit that thousands of colonists never heard of the above works of their authors. Staughton Lynd once noted that observations about national character are usually extrapolated from the documents of the articulate wealthy. They tend to reflect a point of view and a valuable one, but one realizes that a Carolina farmer was probably more interested in crops than in constitutions.

Our gratitude to the Founding Fathers needs neither apotheosis nor cynical reappraisal. Our Founding Fathers could be as choleric as Adams, as inconsistent as Jefferson, as promiscuous as Franklin. We need not be shocked that they often exhibit the less admirable qualities of us, their descendants; they also exhibited that idealism and tough practicality that add up to greatness. The men and the hour met, and it is not their fault if we choose to interpret their heritage as events to be commemorated rather than work to be finished.

ROBERT PAUL MOHAN

Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

TALK OF GOD AND THE DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

> If then we take the divine attributes one by one and and ask whether each of them is to be found in God, we must reply that it is not there, at least as such and as a distinct reality, and since we can in no way conceive an essence which is nothing but an act of existing, we cannot in any way conceive what God is, even with the help of such attributes.
>
> E. Gilson

> The world requires as its cause a being totally transcending it in every respect; but how can we even affirm the existence of such a being, if our experience of the world gives us no words by which to define him?
>
> E. L. Mascall

I

THE CLASSICAL DOCTRINE of analogy has been used to try to show how terms involved in God-talk have an appropriate meaning even if the key statements involving God-talk are not verifiable even in principle. Someone who 1) accepted the verifiability principle as a criterion for what is to count as *factually* meaningful and Q) who took the intent of the normal use of most indicative God-talk sentences to be to make factual statements, would assert that for ' God loves His creatures ' to be properly meaningful, we must show what implications for our experience would or at least in principle could count for or against its truth. Some defenders of the doctrine of analogy present an alternative account of the *meaning* of such utterances, an account, which, if correct, would, for much of God-talk at least, supply an answer to the challenge that non-anthropomorphic God-talk is devoid of factual significance. I shall consider the merits of such views.

Father F. Copleston and Professor James F. Ross provide us with distinguished contemporary statements of such a position.[1] They both claim that where we are speaking of a transcendent and infinite being-the object of a religiously adequate God-talk-the terms predicated of this being must be used analogically if they are to have any meaning at all. We need such an analogical account to escape the following dilemma. If, on the one hand, the terms are used with the same meaning, say in respect to God and to man, then God becomes an anthropomorphic being. That is to say, if God's intelligence or love is like man's intelligence or love, then God becomes simply a kind of superman, a being that is a part of nature, and not an infinite, non-spatio-temporal being, transcendent to the world. Yet, on the other hand, if ' intelligence ' and ' love ' are said to have a completely different sense when applied to God, they lose all meaning for us. The meaning-content of terms such as ' intelligence ' and ' loving ' is determined by our experience of human beings, by our experience of human intelligence and love, "and if they are used in an entirely and completely different sense when predicated of God, they can have no meaning for us when they are used in this way."[2]

'Intelligence' as applied to dogs and men could have (I don't say it does have) a completely different sense and still 'intelligence' could be intelligibly predicated of a dog's behaviour as well as a man's because we could ostensively teach how we

[1] F. C. Copleston, *Contemporary Philosophy* (London: Burns and Oates, 1956) and James F. Ross, "Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. I (1961), pp. 468-502. In his later "A New Theory of Analogy," in *Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism,* ed. by John Donnelly (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972), Ross uses work in structural linguistics to give the outline of a new theory of analogy which he believes to be compatible with the classical theory. His account there (where it applies to analogy of proper proportionality) is vulnerable to most of the criticisms I level at his earlier and more detailed account. I shall concentrate my discussion most extensively on his earlier and more detailed account, but I shall in the final section say something which applies particularly to the later account.

[2] Copleston, *op. cit.,* p. 93.

used the term. But the case is different with God for we have not observed and cannot observe God-anything that could be observed, *ipso facto,* would not be God.[8] Since this is so we cannot discover by ostensive definition or ostensive teaching what it means to say God has intelligence or is loving. Thus 'intelligence' and 'love' have a completely different meaning when applied to God, we can have no understanding at all of these predicates. If such key utterances as 'God loves human beings' or 'God's intelligence is manifest in his creation' are to have meaning, then 'love' and 'intelligence' must be used analogically: "that is to say, a term which is predicated of God and finite things must, when it is predicated of God, be used in a sense which is neither precisely the same as nor completely different from the sense in which it is predicated of finite things."[4] Terms like 'love' and 'intelligence' must be used in a " sense which is similar and dissimilar at the same time to the sense in which it is used when predicated of finite things." "

To put the matter in a slightly different way. For Aquinas and for other late medieval writers, who, as thoroughly as most contemporary writers, rejected any claim that there could be a *logically* necessary being or a purely conceptual identification of God, the problem of *meaning* was an acute one.[6] Our ordinary language with its pervasive empirical anchorage was accepted by these thinkers as being applicable to God. We must start from the language of common experience if we are to have any understanding of anything at all. But, as Ross puts it, Aquinas' problem then was this:

> How could he show that this language (all of the terms, expressions and employments of which are learned from human experience) can be applied, without such equivocation as would render invalid all argument, to God, an entity which is so different from the

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 91.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 94.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] See here Terence Penelhum, *Religion and Rationality* (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 77-87, and 365-79.

objects of experience as to be ' inexperience-able ' in any of the ways common to ordinary human experience.[7]

It is claimed that it is just here-if our God-talk is to be shown to have an intelligible factual content-that we must develop a viable theory of analogical predication. Again, as Ross puts it, in a more technical rendering of Copleston's point:

If the predicate terms in G-statements (statements with 'God' or a synonym as the subject) are *totally* equivocal with respect to the occurrences of the same predicate terms in E-statements (with any object of ordinary, direct or indirect experience as subject), then all arguments with an E-statement in the premises and a G-statement as the conclusion will be invalid, committing the fallacy of equivocation; and all G-statements will be meaningless because none of the human experience will count either as evidence for or as explications of those statements. [8]

But if our common terms here have a univocal meaning, we (Ross agrees with Copleston) fall into a gross anthropomorphism in which our statements about such an anthropomorphic deity are certainly literal enough but false or, as Copleston puts it, at least they commit their user to a concept of God that no one (presumably no ' contemporary man ') " would be seriously concerned to argue" for.[9] As Ross puts it" if the G-statement predicates are univocal with a representative set of instances of those predicates in E-statements, then our statements about God will be, in most cases, obviously false and, in the remainder, misleading." [10] We are back with the old problem: God-talk seems to be either without a proper meaning or, where it has an evident factual content, our fir.st-order God-statements are simply false and embody religious concepts which are plainly religiously inadequate. [11] The analogy theory on such con-

[7] Ross, *op. cit.,* p. 470.

[8] Ibid., pp. 487-88.

[9] Copleston, *op. cit.,* p. 89.

[10] Ross, *op. cit.,* p. 498.

[11] See here my " On Fixing the Reference Range of 'God'," *Religious Studies,* Vol. II (October, 1966), *Contemporary Critiques of Religion* (London: Mac-

temporary readings as Copleston's and Ross's is designed to bail us out here.

II

I shall begin by examining Copleston's account, for it is relatively straightforward and yet it attempts, taking into account the analytical or linguistic turn in philosophy, to break new ground. I shall then in section III examine Ross's "Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language." Ross's essay is a complicated piece, full of stipulative definitions and a formidable jargon, but it does, though in an unnecessarily cumbersome way, attempt to come to grips with these crucial problems of meaning. I shall not examine E. L. Mascall's *Existence and Analogy* for two reasons: (1) it has already been extensively criticized and (2), as Ross points out, it does not really come to grips with the problems of *meaning*, for it treats analogy as a theory of inference rather than as a theory purporting to .show how God-talk can have factual intelligibility. [12]

To say (1) 'God is intelligent,' (2) 'God made men out of nothing,' and (8) ' God loves all human beings' is, according to Copleston, to use-when (1), (2) and or (8) are vehicles for religiously adequate assertions-'intelligent,' 'made,' and 'loves' analogically. As we have noted, where our God-talk is not grossly anthropomorphic, all predications of God must be analogical. Where we have analogical predication as in (4) 'James is intelligent,' and (5) 'Fido is intelligent,' we must say that the terms predicated of the different subjects, e.g. James and Fido, are used in a sense which is neither precisely the .same nor completely different. Yet this general remark,

millan Ltd., 1971) and *Scepticism* (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1972). For F. C. Copleston's account of this situation see his "Man, Transcendence and the Absence of God," *Thought*, Vol. XLIII (1968), pp. 24-38, "The Special Features of Contemporary Atheism," *Twentieth Century: An Australian Quarterly Review*, Vol. *25* (Spring, 1970), pp. 5-15 and his reviews of Axel Hagerstrom's *Philosophy and Religion* and Richard Robinson's *An Atheist's Values* in the *Heythrop Journal*, Vol. 7 (1966) and Vol. *5* (1964), respectively.

[12] Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

Copleston stresses, tells us very little. Moreover, to be told that ' intelligent ' is used analogically when applied to God is not yet to be told what *meaning* it does have or even how to determine what meaning it has.[13] To say that 'intelligent' in (5) is used analogously to the way it is used in (4) is most certainly not to tell us how it is used. We still do not know what it means to say that Fido is intelligent. What behaviour traits are we referring to? What would Fido have to do not to be regarded as intelligent? As we have indicated with Fido and his canine brethren, we can resort to ostensive definition but with God no such thing is possible.

How then do we know how 'intelligence ' is used when applied to God? The negative way, though it is a natural way to proceed, will not do with (6), 'God is intelligent,' for we cannot intelligibly go on saying that God's intelligence is not like this or like that, if we cannot .say *what* God's intelligence is. Every time I say that God's intelligence is unlike a characteristic of human intelligence, I whittle away more of its meaning. To intelligibly apply ' intelligence ' to God I must make, or be able to make, some *positive* affirmation such as ' God is intelligent in an infinitely higher sense than human beings are.' But this, Cople.ston is well aware, is still to say very little. Moreover, when asked to give " a positive account of this higher sense," I find myself, full circle, back to the way of negation. Furthermore, if I continue in the affirmative way I end in anthropomorphism.14 A successful theory of analogical predication must combine those methods without falling into the pitfalls of either. As Copleston puts it, "to avoid anthropomorphism of a gross sort the mind takes the way of negation, departing from its starting point, namely human intelligence, while to avoid agnosticism it returns to its starting-point." [15] We try here, in oscillating back and forth between anthropomorphism

[13] Copleston, *Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 94.

[14] Copleston, *Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 94-95. See also his "Man, Transcendence and the Absence of God," *Thought*, Vol. XLIII (1968), pp. 24-38.

[15] Copleston, *Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 96-97.

and agnosticism, in our predications concerning God, to hold together similarity and dissimilarity at the same time.[16]

This is indeed perplexing, but we must not forget that we are speaking, or trying to speak, of a mysterious being transcendent to the universe. We have, Copleston tells us, no direct apprehension of God.[17] God transcends our experience and thus He " cannot be positively and adequately described." This, he believes, should not lead to a rejection of God-talk as incoherent but simply to a recognition that our understanding of God-who after all is mysterious-is of necessity inadequate. Without the possibility of an adequate understanding of God, we must use analogy to have any understanding of God at all. This is simply one of the features " of our understanding of descriptive statements about God." [18] But, Copleston continues, that our concept of God is imperfect and can never be thoroughly purified of anthropomorphism does not mean that the very idea or concept of God is anthropomorphic; it only means that what Copleston calls the *"subjective meaning"* of ' God is intelligent ' or ' God loves his creation ' is inadequate and in part anthropomorphic. It does not mean that the *objective meaning* of these statements is inadequate.

Copleston's use of that tricky word 'meaning' is rather unusual. By ' subjective meaning' he means " the meaning-content which the term has or can have for the human mind." [19] By 'objective meaning' he means "that which is actually referred to by the term in question (that is, the objective reality referred to) . . ." [20] In the case of such key God-statements what is objectively referred to isn't at all anthropomorphic, but what our subjective meaning signifies is. It is this meaning that is inadequate, but not ' necessarily false.'

The distinction Copleston draws between 'subjective mean-

1. *Ibid.,* p. 97.
17 *Ibid.,* pp. 96-97.
1. *Ibid.,* p. 97.
1. *Ibid.,* p. 96.
20 *Ibid.*

ing ' and ' objective meaning ' most certainly seems to be crucial in his attempt to rehabilitate the appeal to analogy, but it unfortunately is not a coherent claim. We might intelligibly speak of the distinction between ' subjective meaning ' and ' objective meaning,' where the former referred to the meaning-content of a term as used on a given occasion or set of occasions by an individual or some group of people. This would make a non-vacuous contrast with 'objective meaning, ' since the latter could be taken to refer to the meaning-content the terms would have if people were fully informed and took to heart the implications of the terms in question. But for Copleston ' subjective meaning' includes any meaning-content the term or terms" can have for the human mind," the 'objective meaning' of terms predicated of God is said to transcend our experience.[21] "It cannot be positively and adequately described."[22] But if the ' can ' and ' cannot ' here have a logical force, *viz.* if it is logically impossible to adequately grasp the objective meaning of these terms or even if it is some sort of ' ontological impossibility,' then there is no genuine contrast between 'objective meaning' and 'subjective meaning.' We can have no understanding of this 'objective meaning;' we can have no understanding of whether the ' subjective meaning ' adequately or inadequately characterizes that 'objective reality' that the objective meaning adequately signifies. *Any* understanding at all of such matters that we humans can have-no matter how purified of anthropomorphic elements-is still subjective; the meaning we apply to predications of God is still necessarily and irredeemably ' subjective meaning.' Having no grasp of the ' objective meaning,' we can have no idea at all of whether our attempts to purify our ' subjective meaning ' succeed or fail. Indeed ' purifying ' actually has no use here, for we cannot know what would count as ' purifying' the meaning of a term unless we had some grasp of the standard of perfection aimed at. How, in short, does subjective meaning A fall shorter of

[21] *Jbid.*

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 97.

perfection than subjective meaning B? To know this we must have some understanding of the meaning-content of that which they fall short of, but if we have such a knowledge, then by definition it will not involve 'objective meaning' but ' subjective meaning.' But again we do not know and cannot know how this stands in relation to A and B.

There is a further quite unrelated difficulty in Copleston's account. In trying to avoid agnosticism about our predications of God we try to " hold together similarity and dissimilarity at the same time." [23] To be an analogical predication of God and man, the terms in question must be used in a sense which is neither precisely the same nor completely different. But this characterization is ambiguous. Taken in one way it makes analogy the same as univocity; taken in another it makes analogy the same as equivocity. If, on the one hand, 'James is intelligent' and' God is intelligent' have even one similarity, then it is the case (or so at least it would seem) that one property (characteristic) of intelligence when referred to man and God is the same. But this means (or so at least it would seem) that the term by which this property (characteristic) is signified is a univocal predication of man and God and that, after all, not all God-predicates are analogical. If this is true, then analogical predication is neither essential nor complete in our talk about God. Indeed even for analogical predications to be possible, there must be some univocal predications as well. Suppose, on the other hand, the 'not precisely the same ' rules out their having any common property or relation, then there can be no similarity since we cannot assert in what respect they are similar. If this is so, analogical predication really becomes the use of equivocal terms. Yet there seems at least to be no other way of intelligibly taking the terms being used so that in the different contexts they are used in a way which is neither precisely the same nor completely different. Thus Copleston has not been able to give us an intelligible account

2. *Ibid.*

of analogical predication that would distinguish it from a univocal or equivocal use of predicates when applied to God and the world.

There is a further problem that Copleston .should face which is directly related to the falsification issue. If his claim that' intelligent' (for example) is in a definite sense similar, when used of both God and man, then (given the correctness of the above argument) in both employments of' intelligent' the term must signify at lea.st one common property or, if you will, a relation. But then, aside from being committed to claiming-inconsistently with his general thesis about analogical predication-that at least one predication of God is univocal, he also in effect commits himself to treating ' God is intelligent ' as a statement which can, at lea.st in principle, be confirmed or disconfirmed, for if to be intelligent is to have property X and if property X is never manifested by God or if God does something inconsistent with ascribing X to Him, then we have grounds-though surely nothing like conclusive grounds-for denying that God is intelligent and if He does manifest X we have grounds for asserting that 'God is intelligent' is true. We have (if this is so) shown how such God-talk is verifiable by showing how evidence is relevant to the truth or falsity of 'God is intelligent.' The same, of course, applies to ' God loves all human beings.' But now these theological-metaphysical statements become what Copleston elsewhere has denied that they can be if they are to count as metaphysical .statements, namely empirical assertions. [24]

This unintended implication of his account of analogical predication is surely unwelcome, for Copleston is committed to the view that such God-talk does not at central points consist

••This is very evident in his debate with A. J. Ayer. See A. J. Ayer and F. C. Copleston, "Logical Positivism: A Debate," in *A Modern Introduction to* ed. by A. Pap and P. Edwards edition, New York: Macmillan, 1967). In a later essay "Man, Transcendence and the Absence of God," *Thought,* Vol. XLIII (1968), Copleston contends that while believers and non-believers have the same expectations in regard to events in the world, their interpretations of the world are different. (See p. 37 of his text.)

in statements of empirical fact open to the usual precedures of confirmation and disconfirmation. Indeed Copleston seems anxious to meet, in some way, Flew's challenge about falsifiability. God-statements are taken by him to be factual statements, but they are alleged to be ' factual metaphysical statements.' Of these Copleston remarks: " I can hardly be said to know what is meant by a factual statement unless I am able to recognize that something at least is not asserted " and " unless I am able to recognize that something is excluded I do not know what is asserted." [25] But in his actual arguments concerning this, Copleston does not give us straightforward factual statements which could be used to confirm or disconfirm our theological statements. Rather, reasoning like what has been called a theological non-naturalist, his statements, used in confirmation and disconfirmation, hav:e the same equivocal and controversial logical status as the statements to be confirmed or disconfirmed. He never breaks out of the religious network of statements; that is to say, in Ross's terminology, he gives us no E-statements to confirm his A-statements and so does not in reality meet Flew's challenge or give our A-statements their needed empirical anchorage.

That this is *so* can be seen from Copleston' s own analysis of 'God is intelligent' and' God loves all human beings.' He asks us, in asking for the meaning of these statements, to consider why a person would make such statements. Consider ' God is intelligent.' A man who has the idea of an ' existentially dependent world ' naturally ascribes the order or system in the world to a creator. My' subjective meaning '-the only meaning I can have for' God is intelligent,' on Copleston's account- is ' There is a creator of the world who orders the world.' But if one is puzzled over what (if anything) it could mean to assert or deny that God is intelligent, one is going to be equally puzzled about the statement, given as the' subjective meaning• or part of the' subjective meaning' of that statement. We

•• Copll)ston, *Contemporary Philosophy,* p. 99,

do not have a .statement that is plainly an empirical statement to give empirical anchorage to our G-Statement. The same applies to ' God loves all human beings.' [26] Copleston remarks 'that if this statement or rather putative statement " is compatible with all other statements that one can mention and does not exclude even one of them," then it is devoid of factual significance. But it appears at least that it is so compatible, for no matter how many millions are put in the gas chambers, it is still said by the faithful that God loves his children. No matter what wars, plagues, sufferings of little children are brought up *a la* Dostoevski, they are still taken, by the faithful, to be compatible with the truth of the .statement ' God loves all human beings.' Given such linguistic behaviour, one is tempted to think that nothing is excluded in the statement and thus it appears to be devoid of factual content. But, Copleson avers, this impression is mistaken. Something is incompatible with it, only we have been looking for that something in the wrong direction, namely in the experiences of men. But the Christian theologian knows a factual statement with which it is incompatible, namely' God wills the eternal damnation and misery of all human beings.' The truth of ' God loves all men ' is confirmed by ' God offers all men through Christ the grace to attain eternal salvation.' Knowing this latter statement to be true, we are justified in asserting ' God loves all men.' But here again Copleston is lifting himself up by his own bootstraps, for he is verifying religious statements by appealing to further religious statements without any of them getting the necessary empirical anchorage. The verifying statements are as problematic as the statements they are supposed to verify. In short, Flew's challenge concerning falsifiability is not met, for we have not been given any *empirically* identifiable state of affairs that is excluded by these statements. We do not have the anchorage in experience that Copleston so stresses as necessary for an understanding of God-talk.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 100.

In short, Copleston has not provided us with an answer to Flew's challenge: he has not shown us how experiential statements either verify or falsify' God loves all mankind' or' God is intelligent ' or any G-statement at all and he has not given an intelligible account of analogy that would enable us to overcome the anthropomorphism of univocal predication or the impossibility of understanding what is meant by the predicates in God-talk if they are used equivocally when applied to God and the world. He has not shown us how it is that ' we see through a glass darkly,' for given Copleston's approach to the incomprehensible Godhead, we can never know whether, by self-consciously and sensitively using our analogical concepts, we purify or fail to purify our understanding of God, because we can have no idea at all of the ' objective meaning' of such a concept.

III

Ross tries to state in contemporary terms what he takes to be the vital heart of Aquinas' theory of analogical predication. But while his .statement is far more complicated than Copleston's, it is no more successful.

As has frequently been pointed out, ' analogy ' is itself au analogical term, that is to say, it has several meanings which are not unrelated: that is, they are partly similar and partly different. Moreover, 'analogy' is a term of art for the scholastics. In speaking of analogy we speak of analogy of attribution, metaphor and analogy of proper proportionality. But, as Ross and others have argued, it is analogy of proper proportionality that is most crucial in considering the analogical relation between terms predicated of God and terms predicated of man and other' contingent natures.' It is then to analogy of proper proportionality that we shall tum.

Ross escapes some of Copleston's confusions by arguing that " analogy of proper proportionality is the general form of language about God " and that it is improper to call this language inadequate " for no other language is *possible* given the Christian assumption that God is transcendent and different in kind

from all other things." [27] 'God,' on this account, is " a shorthand for the definite description which would result from a combination of all the properties shown to be attributable to one unique being with some (psychologically prior) property such as' First Cause' or' Creator.'" [28] But the terms signifying these properties are all " analogous by proper proportionality with respect to psychologically prior instances of the same terms in ordinary experience describing statements." [29] In order to make sense of religious discourse, in order to explain how we have any understanding of the concept of God at all, we must give an intelligible account of analogy of proper proportionality and then show how it applies to God-talk.

What then are we talking about when we speak of analogy of proper proportionality? A proportion is the equality of two ratios, i.e. a is to b as c is to d. Ross gives several paradigms the least unfortunate of which is (a) Fido caused the barking and (b) Plato caused the murderous act.[30] Here 'caused' is supposed to be such an analogical term. And in (a) and (b) we have an analogy of proper proportionality. Fido's causing the barking is as Plato's causing the murderous act. Where we have analogy of proper proportionality, we have statements of the form:

1. (a) A is (or has) T
   (b) B is (or has) T

or:

Where ' T ' is a term, namely a word capable of naming or applying to a thing or things, A and B are things, and x and y are properties, actions or events. No. I above, Ross argues, is reducible to no. 2.

We are asked initially to assume that in our paradigm

[27] Ross, *op. cit.,* p. 501-02.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. *500.*
[29] *Ibid.,* p. *501.*
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 487.

'caused' is *not* being used univocally. Later Ross will attempt to show that this assumption is justified. Secondly, to have such an analogy there must be at least two instances of the property signified by' T.' As Ross puts it, "the second condition states, briefly, that the two things denoted by the term 'T' must have the property signified by' T' and that the first condition must still be preserved: that the term is equivocal." [31]

There is, as Ross recognizes, quite obviously a problem here. If ' T ' is equivocal, the properties would not be the same. But if the term' T' in its instances signified the same property, has the same meaning as or is equivalent in its instances, then, in its instances, it has the same intention (connotation). But if this is so, then either the term is, after all, univocal or the second condition is unsatisfiable. [32] The first and second characteristics of such analogical terms appear at least to clash and this casts doubt on the coherence of analogy by proper proportionality.

To make sense out of this conception of analogy, we must show how both characteristics of this type of analogy are jointly satisfiable. This is exactly what Aquinas, Ross tells us, sets out to do and in Ross's opinion he is successful. To do this Aquinas must show how a term can be " univocal in signification ... while being equivocal in not conforming to the rule for univocity of intention." [33] That is in (a) 'Fido caused the barking ' and (b) ' Plato caused the murderous act ' we must show how 'caused' in both cases signifies the same property, yet does not have exactly the same intention: does not in each case have the same conjunction of terms applicable to that to which each instance of 'caused' is applicable. There must be some term which is applicable to that to which 'caused' in (a) is applicable which is *not* applicable to that to which ' caused ' in (b) is applicable and yet ' caused ' in both occurrences must still signify the same property or set of properties.

[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

We must examine whether such a notion makes sense. It most certainly appears to be nonsensical. But, as Ross argues, appearances are not to be trusted here.

To understand how this might be done, we must attend to a distinction Aquinas makes and Ross stresses between the *res signifi0ata* and the *modus signific,andi* of a term. A necessary condition for having an analogy of proper proportionality is to have a ratio in which the *modus signific,andi* differs and the *res signifi0ata* is the same. In such a situation we have the requisite .similarity in difference. We have a situation in which we have a univocal signification together with an equivocal intention of the terms in question.

To make anything of this we must understand Aquinas' distinctions here. The intention of a term specifies not only the property or properties signified by the term but the *way* it is signified. The former is the *res signific,ata* of the term and the latter-the way it is signified-is the *modus signifi0andi* of the term.[84] In considering our paradigms (a) and (b), if we take our allegedly analogical term ' caused,' we can speak of two instances of the term ' caused ' differing in their *modus signifi0andi* in the sense that ' caused' refers to *different* kinds of causality. (Ross also works out the same point for' knowledge.') The intention of 'caused' is proportionally the same in (a) and (b) "but the mode in which the property is possessed makes entirely different the kinds of action which can be performed."[85] We have the foundation of analogy of proper proportionality in " the unequal and different in kind participation of different natures in the same property according to differing modes of being determined by their nature."[86]

The terms ' knowing ' and ' causality ' are indeed univocal or equivocal depending on their use *in sentences.* In (a) and (b) ' caused ' is not univocal even though we may form a metalanguage term ' caused ' or ' causality ' which is neutral with

•• *Ibid.,* p. 488.
[36] *Ibid.,* p. 489.
[36] *Ibid.,* p. 490.

respect to all the object-language senses of 'caused.' The object-language senses of 'caused' are themselves equivocal. Given that the meta-language term' caused' is about language and is neutral in the respect mentioned, then it need not be univocal with respect to any object-language sense of 'caused.' [37] In the different kinds of causality, distinguishable in the different object-language uses of 'caused,' we have the basis for the difference (the analogues are partly different) and in the meta-language use of the term 'caused' we have the basis for similarity (the analogues are partly similar). The neutral sense of ' caused ' is not on the same level as the different kinds of causality exhibited, in the different uses that ' caused ' has in different .sentences in the object-language. The former is a meta-linguistic notion which includes the other uses and signies them all equally and alternatively. [88] It, as a meta-linguistic term, is a predicate in sentences about predicates of sentences. This meta-linguistic use of the term is univocal. But this does not make the object-language terms univocal. They are, in contrast, equivocal. It is here that we have an intelligible rationale for analogy of proper proportionality.

There is, however, a fundamental confusion in Ross's argument. Where 'knowing' or' caused' (the analogous predicate in question) is a predicate about predicates, where it is a meta-linguistic term, it is no longer ' knowing' we are talking about but '"knowing".' Where we are actually talking about knowing or causing something-the object-language terms-we are not talking about linguistic expressions but about their meaning or use in object-language sentences. But where we are talking about the expression ' knowing ' or ' causing ' we are talking about language. ' She is bald ' makes sense; ' She has three letters does not.' ' " She " is bald ' is nonsense while ' " She " has three letters ' is not. 'Knowledge is difficult to obtain and Jane caused him to give up the quest' make sense but ' Knowledge has nine letters and caused has six letters ' is

[37] *Ibid.*
[88] *Ibid.,* p. 491.

nonsense. Again'" Knowledge" is difficult to obtain and Jane "caused" him to give up the quest ' is nonsense while ' "Knowledge " has nine letters and " caused " has six letters ' is an intelligible meta-linguistic sentence.

Ross thinks that he has found a univocal sense of 'knowledge' and' caused' and a equivocal sense of 'knowledge' and ' caused ' and that he has thus escaped a crucial difficulty about analogy of proper proportionality. But he has not at all, for he is not really talking about the same verbal symbol, for, even on his own definition, we can only say that two marks or sounds are the same verbal symbol when they have the" same recognizable pattern." But ' knowledge ' and ' " knowledge " ' are clearly distinct. It is apparent we do not have the same verbal symbol or the same expression, so we have no basis for univocity and thus none for analogy of proper proportionality.

Let us assume, however, that somehow this difficulty has been surmounted. Being analogous is a semantical property of a term and-someone might possibly argue-I have mistakenly treated it as if it were a syntactical property. This does not seem at all plausible to me, but let us assume that my criticism can thus be put aside or that it can somehow be gone around. (After all, Ross in his later "A New Theory of Analogy " has formulated a doctrine of analogy which is not vulnerable on *this* score.) Still, even with these assumptions granted, is everything in order with Ross's account?

When we apply this analysis to the concept of God, Ross's position gives rise to exactly the same difficulty as Copleston's. In the *res significata,* if analogous terms signify a common property or set of properties, as they do, then the terms specifying that property or set of properties will be univocal and thus some univocal predications of God are possible. As Ross shows, if there is to be an intelligible account of analogical predication, the analogical terms have, through their *res significata,* a property or set of properties in common. Thus there must be some univocal predication possible concerning God if there is to be any analogical predication at all. But the crucial point

of Aquinas and the Neo-Thomists is that *all* predications of God are analogous. The fact that they are used in different modes or in different contexts or with differing intentions will not alter the fact that, since they have a common term signifying (standing for) a common property, it is the case that some univocal predication is possible. The terms signifying those common properties must have been used univocally. In neither of his essays has Ross escaped this difficulty.

That Ross (and, on his interpretation, Aquinas) is committed to such a position can be seen from what he says about (c) 'Fido knows his dog house' and (d) 'Plato knows philosophy.' 'Knows' in (c) and (d) is supposed to be used analogously. But if we accept Aquinas' partial definition of 'knowing,' we have accepted a generic common feature of knowing, a property that is common to and distinctive of all knowing. This feature is, according to Aquinas, "the possession of the form of another as belonging to another." [39] This is indeed but a partial and very obscure definition; to fill out his definition Aquinas adds to the above quotation " according to one's natural mode of possession." This last qualification presumably gives us the difference which keeps the predication from actually being univocal. But it remains the case that, on the assumption (questionable in itself) that Aquinas' account of knowing is intelligible, it is true that on all uses of 'knowing' there is a property that remains common to and distinctive of all these uses. That is to say, we could construct a predicate signifying the *res mgnificata* of ' knowing ' that would be predicated of all cases of knowing. This would be a univocal predication.

Exactly the same thing would be true of the *res mgnificata* of 'God', if the predicates of 'God' are to meet Ross's conditions for analogical predication. But to meet these conditions they must violate another supposed characteristic of predications of ' God,' namely that all such predications be analogical.

•• *Jbid,*

In short, for there to be analogical predication of a subject ·term some univocal predications must be possible. Yet Aquinas and the Neo-Thomists will not allow that there can be any univocal predications of ' God ' ; but then it is impossible for there to be any analogical predications either.

As a kind of postscript to this argument, it should be noted that Ross's account here clashes radically with Yves Simon'<:i account of analogical predication. Ross is committed to the claim that in analogical predication the *res significata* picks out generic features common to all instances of a given analogical term. But Yves Simon's fundamental point is that such abstraction is impossible for analogical predication. Two important Thomistic accounts are in plain conflict with each other.

Even if my above arguments are mistaken and Ross has given an intelligible account of analogical predication, it will not work for what it is really crucial for, namely for' God.' We, if it were correct, would never be in a position to understand the *modus significandi* of ' God.' As Aquinas, Copleston, Ross, Simon, and Thomists generally all stress, we can have no direct apprehension of God. We are limited to our own human ways of apprehending things. But the *modus sign.ifioandi* of predicates applied to ' God ' is supposed to be distinguished by being according to God's distinctive mode of possession. But we finite creatures can have no understanding of that, so we can have no understanding of the *modus signifioandi* of the predicates applied to God. When Aquinas tells us that the nature of the thing denoted by the logical subject determines the modal elements of the intention of predicates which are applied to the subject, he cannot apply this to ' God,' for no direct apprehension of God is *possible* and if no direct apprehension is possible-if no use has even been given to ' a direct apprehension ' of God-then no indirect apprehension is possible either.

If it is replied that ' knows ' in ' Fido knows his dog house ' has the same logical features as ' love' in ' God loves all man-

kind,' yet it is plainly meaningful, it simply must be pointed out, against Ross, that 'Fido knows his dog house' does not have all these logical features. It is not the case that there is "within the intention of the terms applied to animals ... no term which specifies how the dog knows." [40] We can speak of conditioning, of memory, of seeing a familiar object, of smelling and a host of other things. If we are prepared to use 'know' with respect to animals, we can bring in these definite characteristics, for this 'mode of possession.'

Let us again assume that all my previous criticisms of Ross's reconstruction of Aquinas have been in some way mistaken. Yet there are still further difficulties in his account. Aquinas is claiming that a *necessary* condition for two terms being analogous by proper proportionality is that they differ in their *modus significandi* but have the same in *res significatia.* But this is but a *necessary* condition, for the terms could still be equivocal. [41] So far we have at best explained (1) "why certain terms cannot be used of God and creatures univocally" and (2) "how a term can in two instances signify the same property and yet be equivocal." [42] In short, we have at best shown how the first two conditions for analogy of proper proportionality are compatible. But there is a third condition, namely that there must be a *proportional similarity* between what is denoted by the two putatively analogous terms.

We must scrutinize this notion of 'proportional similarity.' There is a similarity in what the terms in question stand for "if they are in some respect identical but never numerically identical." [43] The respects, of course, must be specifiable. 'Proportion' for Aquinas, is a synonym for 'relation.' 'Relation,' e.g.' to the left of,' is a two or more place predicate in object-language sentences. By 'proportionality between A and B,' Aquinas means, according to Ross, that "there is a *similarity*

[40] *Ibid.,* p. 492.
[41] *Ibid.,* p. 494.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.,* p. 495.

in the proportions (or relations) of A and B." Thus there is a "proportional similarity ... between any two things, A and B, which have similar relations to some property, event, or thing." [44] Thus for' caused' in (a) 'Fido caused the barking' and (b) 'Plato caused the murderous act ' to be analogous by proper proportionality, they must have some common properties or relations. [45] Ross then significantly mentions that if we are to be able adequately to establish a doctrine of analogy by proper proportionality, we need some criterion to determine when in fact two things are proportionally similar. [46] We need in short "a criterion of similarity of relations" and this in turn means that we must be able to say in what respect they are similar and this, as Ross points out, means that they are in some respects identical, though never numerically identical.47 Recall that for Ross, as for most followers of Aquinas, 'God' is a short hand substitute "for the definite description which would result from a combination of all the properties shown to be attributable to one unique being with some 'psychologically prior ' property such as ' First Cause ' or ' Creator'." [48] This means (gives to understand) that there is at least a partial identity between God and the world. But this most certainly seems to be a denial of God's transcendence. It seems, at least, to make it impossible to say what Thomists and all orthodox Christians and Jews want very much to say, namely that God is transcendent to the world. (Note the initial quotations from Gilson and Mascall.)

However, following Bochenski here, Ross .sets out a criterion for similarity of relations that might, if workable, mitigate somewhat this anthropomorphism by making it innocuous. We can say that ' Relation R is similar to relation R" if (1) both are relations and (2) if they" have common formal properties with respect to either a formal or merely linguistic set of axioms,

"*Ibid.*
••*Ibid.*
•• *Ibid.,* p. 496.
"*Ibid.,* p. *495.*
••*Ibid.,* p. 470.

the latter not being explicitly formulated in ordinary language, or, they have a common property." [49] Yet, as Ross is quick to point out himself, there are plainly difficulties here. If we consider first whether there are common " formal properties, i. e. common syntactical and semantical properties," we face the difficulty that such an ideal language has not yet been worked out and that it ".supposes a more extensive formalized language than seems practicable." [50] But, it seems to me, that there is a far more crucial objection to this first alternative in setting out a criterion for similarity of relations, namely that in so talking about purely formal properties we are, in effect, talking about an ideal language or an uninterpreted calculus. To give it an interpretation so it would have .some application to reality, including the putative reality of God, we would need to be able to specify some non-formal properties. Thus, the first alternative in effect reduces to the second and to specify non-formal properties would, in the case of talk of God, require the unwanted partial identification of God and the world. Indeed, we would have a univocal predication bobbing back up at us again, for we can, as Ross puts it, have a proportional similarity only if the terms are in some respect identical. [51] Ross operates (quite properly I believe) on the assumption that if x is similar to y, then there must be some respect in which xis similar to y. But this, given his reconstructions of Aquinas' account, in effect lays the foundation for the inescapability of some univocal predications of God. But it is exactly this conclusion that he and Thomists generally wish to avoid.

There is a further related difficulty in Ros.s's account similar to a difficulty we found in Copleston. His account would make a statement such as 'God loves all men' open to Flew's challenge. That is, such statements would be empirically verifiable (confirmable or disconfirmable), for it is a question of

[49] *Ibid.,* pp. 496-97.
[50] *Ibid.,* p. 497.
[51] *Ibid.,* p. 495.

empirical fact whether ' loves ' in ' Nixon loves all Americans ' and' loves' in' God loves all men' have a property in common. (That this is so, is even more evident in Ross's "A New Theory of Analogy.") But, as Thomists argue in other contexts, such God-statements are not so verifiable.[52] But, if they accept this last criterion, of similarity of relations, they must treat such God-talk as open to empirical confirmation and disconfirmation. They want it both ways but they cannot consistently have it both ways.

Finally, even if we accept, as I argued we could not, common purely formal properties as an adequate criterion for similarity, we still in a way are caught by Flew's challenge, for it is a fact whether there· are or are not such formal properties. If we have no reason to say that there are, then we should say that it is probably false that ' God loves all men ' and the like are intelligible, i.e., do have their intended factual significance. At the very least, we should say that we had evidence that counted against the intelligibility of that claim. But the faithful are not at all willing to put their claims to such a test. In short, even if such a theory of analogy can be worked out for terms like 'caused' and 'knows,' it does not work for God-talk. If no other language is possible, as Ross claims, if we are to talk literally and intelligibly about God, then it must certainly appear that we cannot talk literally and intelligibly about a non-anthropomorphic God, for such an account of analogical predication is thoroughly broken-backed.

IV

I have not claimed that generally speaking all theories of analogy have been shown to be unsatisfactory. I do not even

[52] See here M. J. Charlesworth, "Linguistic Analysis and Language About God," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 1 (1961), pp. 139-67, Thomas Corbishley S. J., "Theology and Falsification," *The University* No. 1 (1950-51), C. B. Daly, "The Knowableness of God," *Philosophical Studies* (Maynooth, Ireland), Vol. IX (1959), pp. 90-137. I have critically examined their views in my "God, Necessity and Falsifiability," in *Traces of God in a Secular Culture*, ed. by George F. McLean. (Alba House: Staten Island, New York, 1973).

claim that for the conception of analogy of proper proportionality. What I have shown, if at least most of my arguments are sound, is that two distinguished and influential accounts of analogical predication have crippling defects. Perhaps some account could, or even does, escape these difficulties; perhaps there is or could be a perspicuous account of analogical predication. I do not know of one, but it is well to remain agnostic on this score.

Finally, I should say something about a later and parallel effort by Ross, namely his "A New Theory of Analogy." There he deploys some of the technique of structural linguistics and appeals to some of their findings. But, I shall argue, not with the result that he has .shown how there is a formulation of the doctrine of analogy of proper proportionality that obviates the key difficulties I have found in his earlier and more extended account.

In his "A New Theory of Analogy," Ross shows what I have not been concerned to deny, that analogy is a pervasive feature of natural languages, that any predicative term can be used analogously and that analogy is a crucial "part of the expansion structure of ... language." [58] Indeed it is the case that "many terms have varying meanings in different contexts and that the meanings of some pairs of the .same-terms may be regarded as being derivative either from one another (*unius ad alterum)* or from some ' prior ' use (or set of uses) of the same term *(multorum ad unum)* ..." [54] Furthermore, I agree that competent native speakers can and do recognize, in practice at least, that "there are sets of same-term-occurrences which are, taken pair by pair, equivocal but which can be ordered as meaning derivatives ..." [55] There are sets of same-term-occurrences which are in pairs equivocal which are regularity con-

[58] Ross, "A New Theory of Analogy," in *Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism,* ed. by John Donnellly (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972), p. 126.

[54] *Ibid.,* p. 125.

[55] *Ibid.*

trolled and there are pairs which are not. Ross's example of the last for ' fast ' .seems well taken. (Compare ' He ran fast,' ' He observed the fast,' ' He stood fast ' and ' He considered her fast.') The various uses of ' fast ' here *vis-a-vis* each other seem at least to be regularity controlled, though it is difficult to be confident about this. (Is not ' fast' in 'He considered her fast' derivative from' fast' in' He ran fast')? Now compare these uses of 'fast' with the uses of 'count' and 'calculated ' in the following: ' Children count when taught to ' and ' Computors count when programmed to ' and ' In oppressing the dissidents the use of physical force was calculated ' and in ' In building the bridge the physical force of the spring floods was calculated.' ' Count' and ' calculated ' here are equivocal when just the same term pairs are considered, but it is also the case that they differ from ' fast ' in being regularity controlled *vis-a-vis* each other. ' Count' in ' Computors count when programmed to ' is derivative from ' count ' in ' Children count when taught to ' in a way that the different instances of ' fast' cited above seem at least not to be derived. Similarly the first instance of ' calculated ' above is derivable from the second instance.

What Ross rightly stresses is that there are such analogy regularities built into the structure of our language. People with a grasp of the language readily understand derivative uses of terms; there are, legitimatizing them, meaning regularities within the corpus of our actual discourse and in mastering our language (English, Spanish, Swedish, etc.) , we come to have an understanding of them.

However, the acceptance of all this is quite compatible with making the criticisms I have made of Copleston's and Ross's accounts of analogy, for they were giving a certain reading or account of 'analogy' which would have a certain import for theology. They were not just establishing that there are analogical uses of language. My criticisms have been directed against their readings and against their attempted theological employment.

In his ' new theory ' Ross uses ' count ' and ' calculated ' to exhibit how analogy of proper proportionality works and is indeed something which can quite naturally be extrapolated from semantic regularities in our natural languages. Consider the following:

(1) Children count when taught to.
(2) Computors count when programmed to.
(3) The use of force by the police was calculated.
(4) The force of the wind was calculated.

Here, with **(1)** and (2) and again with (3) and (4), we have relationships which are meant to exhibit analogies of proper proportionality. In (2) 'count' is derivative from 'count' in **(1)** and it differs in meaning from ' count ' in **(1)** in exactly the ways in which 'computors' in (2) differs in semantic category from' children' in **(1).** That is to say, the meaning of ' count ' in (2) is derivative from its meaning in **(1)** and is altered " with respect to ' computors' in just the way the semantic categories of that term differ from those of ' children'." [56] It is "the difference-of-meaning by combinatorial contraction which corresponds to proportionality." [57] This enables us to understand the shift of meaning, while still carrying similarities, which sometimes obtain when there is a shift from one discourse environment to another. [58] The same considerations hold for' calculated' in (3) and (4).

In **(1)** and (2) and in (3) and (4) both pairs of terms differ in their respective pairings in their discourse environments and this is what in modern terms could be called their differences in *modus signific,andi.* But in both cases there is still a sameness in *res significata* for each. In simpler terms (or at least in a more familiar jargon) Ross's point could be put as follows: in both pairs respectively the property (set of properties) which the term signifies is present and indeed is the same property; i.e. both times 'count' signifies the same property (set of

[56] *Ibid.,* p. 189.
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] *Ibid.*

properties), and both time.s 'calculated' signifies the same property (set of properties), but in both cases respectively " the conditions of use of the term in two contexts ... prohibit us from making all the same inferences of each occasion." [59] ' Calculated ' on both occasions of its use signifies the same property and 'count ' on both occasions of its use signifies the same property, but the entailments of 'calculated' and 'counts' differ, showing that in each case the property is present in each subject in a different way.

However, as in his first account, there is in this very sameness in the *res significata* an implicit appeal to univocity. In (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) this can be seen. In spite of all the difference in discourse environment' count' in (1) and 'count' in (2) both signify a reckoning up to find a sum or total. When we assert-talking about either or both what the computors did or the children did-' There was a reckoning up to find a sum,' we can in that proposition say something which is significant and indeed sometimes even true. And there is also a predication here, but the predication ' reckoning up to find a sum here' is univocaL [60]

The use of 'calculated' in (3) and (4) might seem more helpful for Ross. In (3) 'calculated' could be replaced by 'deliberate' with little, if any, change in meaning. But no such substitution could be made in (4), yet 'calculated' in (3) is derivative from 'calculated' in (4). We move from ' computed by figures ' to ' ascertained beforehand by exact reckoning' to 'planned deliberately.' And here 'calculated' seems to have a family-resemblance rather than its being the case that there is any respect in which what they signify is similar. What, it is well to ask, is the characteristic in common

[59] Terence Penelhum, *op. cit.,* p. 81. Penelhum generally in his discussion of analogy acknowledges his indebtedness to Ross.

[60] I simply use 'predication' here in the standard way, characterized by Michael Durrant as follows: "An expression that gives us a proposition about something if we attach it to another expression that identifyingly refers to something which we are making the proposition about." See Michael Durrant, *The Logical Status of 'God'* (London: Macmillan Ltd.• 1973), pp. Xiii-Xiv.

signified by 'calculated' in (3) and (4)? In both cases we are talking about something reckoned up according to plan. But do ' reckoned up ' and ' according to plan ' signify common properties or are they themselves family-resemblance terms?

Even allowing that the elusive conception of family-resemblance is well-enough fixed so as to exclude common characteristics between paired terms, both (3) and (4) would be false, if no expected result was ascertained. And it is implausible to claim that ' result was ascertained ' is so different in the two environments that there is no respect in which what they signify is similar. Moreover, as Ross acknowledges himself, where there is a similarity between two terms we must, for ' similar ' to be intelligible, be able to say in what respect they are similar. But then again we can see how univocal predication underlies analogical predication such that the very possibility of two terms being in an analogical relation of proper proportionality requires that we can make some univocal predications of what is referred to by these terms. And this brings with it the host of problems I discussed in the previous section.

In sum, Ross in two essays, one detailed and utilizing some of the techniques of modern logic and one more sketchy and using some of the techniques of structura1 linguistics, has sought to articulate a sound theory of analogy which will serve as a crucial philosophical underpinning in making sense of our talk of God. I have argued that he has failed in both attempts, though in the latter he has made it quite evident that there are analogical uses of language and he has shown us something about these uses. But neither he nor Father Copleston have given us an account of analogy which will enable us to make sense of non-anthropomorphic God-talk.

KAI NIELSEN

University of Calgary and
University of Ottawa

ANALOGY AND THE MEANINGFULNESS OF LANGUAGE ABOUT GOD: A REPLY TO KAI NIELSEN

I MUST SAY that I feel considerable sympathy with Professor Nielsen in his difficulties in making sense out of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy as a device for rendering language about God meaningful. In fact, for many years now I have been struck by the constantly recurring phenomenon of philosophers outside the Thomistic tradition trying to understand the doctrine of analogy as applied to God and being quite sincerely baffled in their attempts to see how it can do the job assigned to it. When this occurs so often, there is a good chance that the fault is not all on the one side. And, to be honest, I do not think Professor Nielsen gets adequate help from either Father Copleston or Professor Ross. He may not get adequate help from me either, but I would still like to try, since I consider the issue such an important one.

The main reasons for the obscurity surrounding the Thomistic theory of analogy seem to be three. First, *historically*, St. Thomas himself, ordinarily such a systematic thinker, for some unexplained reason was never willing to pin himself down to any one consistent terminology or structural analysis of the logical form of analogy. He simply used it, very sensitively, but without any full dress explanation of what he was doing. When Thomistic commentators after him have tried to pin down the theory more precisely and technically, they too often have fallen into the straight jacket of Cajetan's oversimplified and restrictive systematization, in which the structure of proper proportionality is understood as a four-term proportion, a structure that St. Thomas himself quietly abandons as not adequate by itself after his early work, *De Veritate.*[1]

[1] For a summary of these developments, see David Burrell, *Analogy and Philosophical Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), Chap. 6

Secondly, *doctrinally* speaking, Thomists tend too often to omit in their formal analyses of analogy the indispensable metaphysical underpinning that alone justifies the application of analogy when one of the terms is not known directly in itself. No purely logical or semantic analysis of the structure of analogous concepts can supply this extra-logical component. In addition, Thomistic commentators for the most part do not bring out clearly enough-if indeed they accept the point at all-the fact that analogy does not lie so much in any formal structure of concepts themselves as in the actual lived usage of meaningful analogous language, found only when the so-called analogous concepts are used in *judgments.* [2] In the light of the above comments I would like to see if I can shed some light of my own on Professor Nielsen's difficulties, so that at least the authentic and essential points of disagreement may be brought more clearly into focus and allow more fruitful dialogue thereon than usually seems to be the case in this elusive question of analogy.

Objections of Professor Nielsen

The three most crucial objections of Professor Nielsen against the explanations of Copleston and Ross seems to me to be the following. (1) The first concerns the distinction made by Copleston between the "subjective meaning" of an analogous term, i. e., our understanding of the meaning as drawn from instances in our experience, which he admits is anthropomorphic, and the "objective meaning," i. e., the objective reality referred to by the concept as found in God and affirmed of him, even though we do not know just what this is like, but only point to it in the dark, so to speak, and for good reasons, since it is an infinitely higher mode beyond the direct grasp of our experience and concepts. But the

on Aquinas, and G. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Anafogy* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960).

[2] Although I had come to this conclusion some time ago myself, I am deeply indebted to Fr. Burrell for his fine elucidation of this point, one of the main ones in his fine book cited in n. 1.

trouble here, as Professor Nielsen points out, is that, since we have no access to this objective meaning as it is verified in God, which is quite different from the subjective meaning drawn from our experience, this so-called objective meaning is vacuous, empty of meaningful content for us who are using the term. And the gap between the two meaning-contents indicates that the concepts predicated in each case are not the same, though the same word is used; hence there is equivocation. (2) The second concerns the very meaning of an analogous concept in itself. At the heart of every analogous concept, Professor Nielsen insists, there must be " a common core of meaning," which in tum necessarily implies that this core of meaning must be univocal. " Common core of meaning " and " univocal " are co-existensive and convertible terms. No merely formal structure of isomorphic relations can supply such a common core. (3) Third, Professor Nielsen points out that there is no way of confirming or verifying the meaningfulness or truth of what is analogously predicated of God, since there is no way of verifying or falsifying it from experience or by any kind of testing for consequences.

Most of my reply will be directly concerned with the objections to Copleston, since the objections to Ross seem to me merely a more technical application of the same basic difficulties. And, besides, I agree with much of Professor Nielsen's dissatisfaction with any attempt to lay out analogy in some formal logical structure. No isomorphism of formal relations can supply for intrinsic similarity in content between the sets of relations compared. Since I do not think it feasible to separate out the answers to the three objections, for they all involve the same roots, I shall give my own account of how analogy works and pick up the objections along the way at appropriate points. I will not give any distinct answer to the third objection. Many have handled this already. And there is simply no testing from experience or from consequences of predications when one is discoursing about the attributes of God. The only testing is the metaphysical exigency of

intelligibility itself: predications about God *must* have both meaning and truth if our own world is not to fall into unintelligibility. They are all metaphysical *musts* flowing from the primary *must* of the causal bond itself. Hence I will divide my exposition into three main sections: I. Must Analogy Be Rooted in Univocity? IL The Extension of Analogy Beyond the Range of Our Experience. III. The Application of Analogy to God and Its Metaphysical Underpinning.

I. *Must Analogy Be Rooted in Univocity?*

As we read through Professor Nielsen's criticism of both Copleston and Ross, we notice one crucial assumption functioning over and over again, at first more or less implicitly, then finally surfacing with full explicitness. It is this: if there is to be any genuine similarity within difference in the various predications of an analogous term, then this similarity necessarily involves some " common property" or attribute, even if only a relation, which holds in all applications; now the presence of such a common property necessarily involves a "univocal core of meaning." Analyzing one of St. Thomas's descriptions of knowing (it should be noted, however, that this does not apply to all knowing but only to the knowing of another than oneself) , which runs, " the possession of the form of another as another, according to one's natural mode of possession," Professor Nielsen comments:

> This last qualification presumably gives us the difference which keeps the predication from actually being univocal. But it remains the case that on the assumption (questionable in itself) that Aquinas' account of knowing is intelligible, it is true that in all cases of ' knowing ' there is a property that remains common to and distinctive of all these uses. That is to say, we could construct a predicate signifying the *res significata* of 'knowing' that would be predicated of all cases of knowing. This would be a univocal predication. (p. 50)

In other words, whenever there is a common property predicated, there must be a univocal core of meaning. Hence even

the qualifying phrase added by St. Thomas, "according to one's natural mode of possession," must leave intact the univocal core of meaning, " possession of the form of another as another."

Here is the central and clear-cut point of contention between Professor Nielsen and the Thomistic tradition in the very meaning of analogy itself. Thomists would admit-though a,few, like David Burrell, seem unduly squeamish about doing so-that in some significant sense there must be some common core of meaning in all analogous predications of the same term, for otherwise it could not function as one term and concept. But they insist, on the other hand, that this common core of meaning is not therefore univocal, but remains analogous, similar-in-difference, or diversely similar. If it is any consolation to Professor Nielsen, his objection is exactly the same as that brought against Thomistic analogy by Duns Scotus and William of Ockham shortly after the time of Thomas himself. For them the sufficient requirement that a term be univocal is that it be able to function as a middle term retaining the same meaning in both premises of a syllogism, enough to avoid equivocation. An analogous term was for them really a verbal unity of two distinct, though related, concepts, and if used in both senses in the same argument would introduce a fourth term and invalidate the argument. [3]

Yet this is definitely not the Thomistic understanding of univocity and analogy. The difference in approach between the two positions might be summed up thus: The Scotus-Ockham analysis is geared primarily to the demands of deductive reasoning and the logical functioning of concepts. It also takes the word and concept as the fundamental unit of meaning,

[8] Cf., on Scotus, Burrell, *op. cit.,* Chap. *5* and 7; C. Shircel, *Univocity of the Concept of Being according to Duns Scotus* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1942); on Ockham, Burrell, *op. cit.,* Chap. 7; M. Menges, *The Concept of the Univacity of Being regarding the Predication of God and Creatures according to William Ockham* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1958).

which remams intact in its own self-contained meamng no matter how it is moved around as a counter in combination with other concepts, including its use in a judgment, which is interpreted simply as a composition of two concepts, subject and predicate, without change in either. The Thomistic analysis is geared much more to the actual lived usage of the concept in a judgment, interpreted as an intentional act of referring its synthesis of subject-predicate to the real order, as it is in reality. Hence it tends to look right through the abstract meaning of the concept to what it signifies, or intends to signify *(intendit significare),* in the concrete, and so adjusts the content of the concept to what it knows about its realization in the concrete. The difference in perspective-and in theories of the relation of concept to judgment-leads to quite different conclusions, which I think are considerably more than a merely verbal dispute over different terminologies for the same thing, though there is some of that hanging like a cloud over the scene too, causing the opponents to pass each other in the fog without meeting.

Let me explain now how I think Thomistic analogy actually works, building it up genetically from its actual origin and use in living language. I take it as understood that from now on when I speak of analogous terms and concepts I am referring only to what Thomists identify as properly and intrinsically analogous terms, i. e., those that are intended to express a *proportionate intrinsic similarity* found in all the analogates (hence not analogies of the so-called " extrinsic attribution," such as " healthy " applied to man and to food, which is not designed to express similarity but some relation of causality, belonging to, etc.). Such intrinsic analogies are found in terms like "knowledge," " love," " activity," " unity," "goodness," "being."

We construct and use analogous concepts in our language-life to fit occasions wherein we cannot help but use them. This occurs when we notice some basic *similarity-in-difference,* or proportional similarity, across *a range of different kinds*

of subjects (or on different levels of being, of qualitative perfection), such that the similarity we notice does not occur in the same qualitative way in each case but is noticed to be found in a *qualitatfoely different way* in each case. When we form a univocal concept, on the other hand, we pick out some similarity, usually some form or structure or quantitative relation, which we judge or notice to be found with significant qualitative variation in each case, usually falling within the same species or a genus with closely related properties. In such a case we notice that, even though a few examples are needed to get started, the meaning content, what the term objectively signifies, once grasped, remains neutral, indifferent, unchanged with respect to any further instances. Such a content is thus quite well defined, determinate, and fixed.

Not so with an analogous concept. The similarity we notice here is not some one thing or characteristic that remains exactly the same in all cases, except for some new additional note being added on each time from the outside. It is rather that the similar property itself is more or less profoundly and intrinsically modified in a qualitatively different way each time, so that through and through the *whole* property is recognized as at once similar yet different (not just found in some new instance that in other ways is different). An analogous concept is not a composition of one part exactly identical and another part different, as Scotus, Ockham, and Nielsen seem to imply; rather it is an indissoluble unity where the similarity itself is through and through diversified in each case. As a result there is quite a bit of " give," flexibility, indeterminacy, or vagueness right within the concept itself, with the result that the meaning remains essentially incomplete, so underdetermined that it cannot be clearly understood until further reference is made to some mode or modes of realization.

This leads us to discover one of the most remarkable and distinctive features of analogous concepts, especially the ones of broadest range: it is in fact impossible to define what we

mean by an analogous concept, to grasp the similarity involved, except by actually running up and down the known *range* of cases to which it applies, by actually calling up the spectrum of *different* exemplifications, and then *catching the point.* The similarity involved cannot be isolated from its qualitatively diversifying modes and expressed by itself clearly, as it can be in the case of a univocal concept. It can indeed be caught or recognized by an act of intellectual insight as we run up and down the scale of examples. It can be *seen.,* and *shown forth* by our meaningful linguistic behavior, as Wittgenstein would say, but it cannot be *said* or expressed clearly by itself. Or, if you wish, it can be said by framing one linguistic term for use in all cases, but the meaning of the term cannot be grasped at all clearly without actually calling up a diversified range of cases. The meaning of the term, therefore, must be completed and made determinate in each case by reference to some concrete qualitative mode. That is why the notion always contains within it, at least in an implicit way-which can easily be made explicit, as St. Thomas does in the example of knowledge-the parenthetical indication (like a kind of metalinguistic instruction or warning) *that* the property in question will be present in each case " according to the mode proportionate to the nature of each." Yet the concept itself, as an abstract predicate by itself, fit to be used in many different predications as somehow the same one concept, does not mention or contain within its expressed content *any* of these particular modes in any of its predications, but is understood as transcending them all. Otherwise, it is clear, it could not be used to refer to any other instance with a different mode. However, when this indeterminate abstract concept, unified as such, is actually *used in a concrete judgment,* its meaning, as *understood* in the *whole concrete act of knowing that is the judgment,* then molds itself or shifts to take on the particular determination of the case in hand, while at the same time continuing to recognize the intrinsic proportional similarity-in-difference of this instance with all the others in

the range outlined by the concept. This is the point of the very astute remark made by Gilson long ago, that "'analogy' for Aquinas refers to our ability to make the kind of judgments we do," that it is to be explicated " on the level of judgment " and "not of concept " alone.[4] Analogy is to found and understood on the level of the *lived use* of concepts and terms, not in any formalizable logical structure of the concept in itself. Thus when I understand in an analogous way a proposition like " *x* is intelligent," what I mean is, " *x* exhibits or realizes in this different but still sufficiently similar way the same similarity-in-difference which I have already noticed running through a certain range of cases, so much so that I feel justified in expressing this case by the same analogous term as the others."

I have laid special stress in the above on the importance of the lived use of concepts in judgment, because it is not always brought out sufficiently by Thomists, and is one of the distinguished marks of the approach of St. Thomas when compared to that of Scotus and Ockham. A Thomistic analogous term does indeed contain a certain genuine unity, though heavily laced with indeterminacy at its core, enough unity to function *logically* quite like a univocal term. And, of course, if one considers an analogous concept from a comparative or negative point of view with respect to other concepts, it is quite determinate in what it *excludes* from consideration, in how it delimits its *whole rang•e* from that of other concepts. But the point remains that when looked at in what it positively includes within its range it cannot express clearly by itself the similarity in isolation from the differences. When it tries to do so through so-called definitions it can only call up as paraphrases other equally analogous and indeterminate terms, which themselves require reference to a range of diverse examples in order to be meaningful. And whenever it

'E. Gilson, *The Christian Phil,osophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 105-107.

tries to become too precise, it contracts to become identical with just one of its modes and loses its analogical function.

Let me illustrate what I have been saying above by taking the same example used by Professor Nielsen, that of knowledge, defined by St. Thomas as " the possession of the form of another as another, according to one's natural mode of possession." Let us say that we have already recognized as included within its range of proper instances the dim knowledge through touch of the environment around it by an oyster or snail; the more complicated integration of visual, tactile, and audible sense images by a dog or other higher animal; the intellectual insight of man into justice or the inner law of operation of a typewriter or Einstein's Theory of Relativity; the Zen master's empty, imageless, supra-conceptual awareness of reality; the mystic's awareness of God in the "fine point of the soul " beyond all concepts and faculties. All are judged to be genuine though highly different instances of knowing. Now suppose we try to say or describe just what is the similarity amongst all of them, in itself. And suppose the person to whom we are trying to describe it says "I don't want you to do it by examples; just tell me what it is in itself." What could we possibly tell him that could capture the commonness by itself? We can only run through the spectrum of examples on different levels and then appeal to the person's own experience. "Do you know what I mean? Do you get the point? "

Professor Nielsen, it seems, would like to insist: " But there is a common univocal core: possession of the form of another as another ..." Yet suppose we try to apply this even to only two cases, such as a dog's "possession" of the "form" of a typewriter in the mode of a visual image of its external shape and color, compared with a man's" possession" of the" form" as intellectual insight into the inner law of operation of the machine. What in the world does "possession" mean here? How can we describe it in itself? Is it like the possession of a marble in one's pocket? No. Or having a ca;st in one's eye?

No. Is it possessing a visual image in consciousness? Aside from the problem of defining "consciousness," this is *one* example, but not one that adequately circumscribes the meaning, since having an intellectual insight into the intelligible form or law is vastly different, even though somehow similar-it is impossible to *specify* just how. The same difficulty would occur in trying to explain " form." The only thing one can finally do is call up the whole range of examples and ask, "Don't you catch the point? Do you see what I mean? " This is not an evasion; it is precisely the intelligent (in fact, the only effective) way to do it. The same with other analogous concepts, such as unity, activity, love, goodness, power, perfection (imagine trying to describe precisely what is similar in all instances of activity or perfection) . In a word, although one can indeed say that in some true sense (analogous) there is a common core of meaning in an analogous concept, it is nonetheless clear that the concept functions quite differently-if we look at it from within *as used,* not just from without *a,s a logical counter* in an argument-from a univocal concept with its common core.

This leads me to one more distinctive characteristic of the analogous concept which I think it most important to mention, since it too is frequently not made explicit by Thomist commentators. What kinds of things, or aspects of reality, or properties are thus amenable to, even necessarily require, expression through analogous terms? As I see it-and I am willing to defend this, even though it is not commonly mentioned-there is only one " dimension " of reality or " kind " of property that is capable of truly analogous expression: this is the realm of activities or dynamic functions, what we might call " activity properties " understood in the widest possible sense (plus, 0£ course, the opposite correlative properties of receiving, being acted on, etc.: loving and being loved, causing and being caused are equally analogous). All such properties are expressed originally and primarily by *verbs,* not nouns, or are in some way reducible to verbs. Analogous

terms can of course be nouns, but then the noun presupposes the verb-e. g., it signifies a subject, but as the doer of *such and such an action,* which aspect alone is made explicit (knower, lover ...) .

The reason why activity properties are such fit candidates for analogous expression is that the same general " kind " of activity can be performed quite differently by different kinds of agents or subjects without destroying the similarity-in-difference of the activity aspect itself. This is not true of forms, structures, quantitative relations, and the like, which are not thus elastic in their realizations. Different kinds of things in the universe, different levels of being, are not like each other in their essential specific forms or essences considered statically. But they are proportionally alike in their modes of *activity,* in their *dynamic functions.* Different forms themselves can only be compared as alike insofar as they are forms or structures for similar actions. If there is any formal structure to analogous concepts, it is not a strictly logical or formal structure, but the structure of an activity situation: an analogous term expresses *this general kind of activity X,* recognized as carried on in one distinctive proportionate way by subject *a,* in another distinctively different proportionate way by subject *b,* etc. The subjects and modes of acting are quite different in each case; the activities themselves are *recognized* as proportionately similar, similar-in-difference, although it remains impossible to state just *what* this similarity is apart from its range of varied modes. Let me add that if the term " activity" itself here is allowed to expand to its full analogous breadth of illuminative meaning, existence itself then not only can be described but is uniquely appropriate to be described as the most radical kind of activity or act, the act of "presencing." This is the Thomistic analogous notion of being itself: "that which has, or exercises, the act of existing."

II. *The Extension. of Analogous Terms beyond thJe Range of Our Experience*

So far we have been analyzing how analogy functions within a range where all the main levels of exemplification lie within our experience, hence where the different modes can be directly known to us. The next phase of our investigation, crucial for the application to God, concerns the extension of analogous concepts beyond our present range of known examples, i. e., the formation of "open-ended" concepts whose range extends indefinitely beyond our present experience, at least in an upward direction. The ranges of analogous concepts can be roughly classified as follows: (1) those having *a ceiling but no floor* (no lower limit) in their application: terms like physico-chemical activity, whose upper limit is biological activity, or perhaps consciousness, but that extend downward to unknown depths of matter still hidden from us and perhaps very strange indeed compared with what we know; (2) those having both *a floor and a ceiling,* say, biological activity, or sense knowledge, limited by the non-living or unconscious below and intellectual knowledge above; (3) those having *a, floor but no ceiling:* intellectual knowing, love, life, joy, etc.; (4) those having *neither ceiling nor floor:* the all-pervasive "transcendental properties" applicable across all levels of being, such as being, activity, unity, power, intelligibility, goodness (in the widest sense). Our special concern will be with numbers (3) and (4) , as alone applicable to God.

How in general do we go about opening up an analogous concept beyond its presently known range of examples? Let us take the example of knowing. Suppose we reflect on how remarkably diverse are the modes we already know, and how impossible it is to deduce from a lower level what a higher level will be like; it then appears to us, when reflecting on the ttnalogous meaning of knowing, that we have no good or decisive reasons for closing off its possible range at the level we knqw; in. i$ $Orne plausible suspicioµ that

may be higher kinds of intelligence on other planets or perhaps even beyond all corporeal entities (not yet God). We decide we should remain prudently open to the possibility of higher intelligence trying to communicate with us through some kind of signal. We have no idea what kind of communication or signals-they would not even have to be through material signs but might be by direct telepathy or thought-communication-or what the mode of intelligence involved might be like or how it might function in itself, even when not attached to a body. Yet it makes perfect sense, and in the concrete it is quite easy-we are actually doing it already-to open up the range of meaning of what we now experience and understand as intelligence to include in expectancy some possible level at present quite unknown and uncharacterizable by us. The new extension of the term, though empty of any precise content describable by us now, is not simply empty. It gets its new and very useful content of meaning from *its place on an ascending* (it might also be descending) *scale,* which serves as guide for *evaluation assessment* (respect, awe, fear, caution, etc.). Such a role as guide to evaluation procedures, and their practical consequences, is an indispensable one for our concrete life of the mind in the midst of a reality that is always partly known, partly concealed in relation to us.

Another example arises from the new scientific interest in para-psychology and psychic phenomena of various kinds. There is widespread talk of some new kind (s) of force that produces effects in the material world, yet seems to operate in ways thus far unknown to us and is quite different from the other physical forces we know-" psi-forces," some caU them. They may be a new kind of physical radiation, or more probably psychic energy fields, or what have you. The point is that we quite readily enlarge the notion of force to make room for the *possible* discovery of a new mode, concerning which we can say nothing clear as yet, not even that it really exists. It may be objected that there is a univocal core in all description of such forces, in that they produce observable

effects in the material world. There may, it is true, be one element of their definitions that has a univocal cast: the material effects produced. But the notion of force does not *mean* the effects produced. It means the *power producing* such effects, and as long as this central part of the meaning is variable in its mode the meaning must remain analogous.

In both of the above, and many other possible examples, in order to extend the range of an analogous concept we must "purify" its meaning-content, what it explicitly signifies, making it indeterminate enough so that its range of application will not be restricted within present limits. If we judge that this cannot be done without a violent and arbitrary wrench in the meaning that renders the term no longer comfortably serviceable enough, we judge the proposed extension inviable, too confusing, and devise an entirely new term to express the additional range of cases presumed to exist. This is a matter of good judgment, of a sense for successful living language, not a matter of the logical structure of concepts.

It is within the context of this extension of an analogous concept to a new application whose mode of realization is unknown to us that the traditional distinctions arise between "objective meaning" and "subjective meaning" (Copleston), the *res significata,* or the objective property signified by the term, and the *modus significandi,* or the modes by which we express to ourselves this property (St. Thomas), and other similar semantic devices. There is unfortunately much confusion in terminology here (and not infrequently in thought too, I fear), and I am not happy with either of the above ways of trying to spell out the same general point. St. Thomas' way is clear enough in itself-though often misunderstood, as it clearly is here by Professor Nielsen-but is so narrow in scope as he uses it that it does not do the entire job that has to be done. Copleston's way is, I fear, open to serious misunderstanding and seems to me to be inadequate to its task. So let me first state the job to be done, and how I think it best to express it, and then return to assessing the two sets of distinctions mentioned above.

In such a context of using analogous language, we must separate out the following: (1) the *res significata*, i. e., the " thing " or common property signified, which is what is actually predicated in each case, whether previously known or not. Its meaning-content as expressed in the analogous concept is deliberately or systematically vague and indeterminate, not restricted to any of its modes so as to be truly predicable of all cases. (It does not mean, by the way, the actual concrete referent of this predicate in a given judgment, although the terminology of " thing "-res-has misled some into thinking so.) (2) The *real modes*, or modes of being, in which this common objective property or attribute is understood to be realized in given applications, as we apply the term in concrete complete acts of knowing in the judgment. These modes may already be known to us, as the animal and human modes of knowing, or they may as yet be unknown to us, in which case we intend to signify what is there in the concrete but through a vague and incomplete act of knowing. Or, if you wish, we intend to refer to what is really there, but through a vague and incomplete mental sign, recognized as such, although we do recognize clearly *that* we are referring to a mode different from the others we know. These modes, however, are not part of what is actually predicated by the abstract analogous predicate itself, as is (1) above, although we *understand* the indeterminate content to take them on in the concrete, as we actually use the term.[5] (8) *The modes of*

[5] St. Thomas himself is quite clear about this. Cf. his sensitive basic treatment in *Summa Theol.*, I, quest. 13 entire, esp. art. 3: " Some words that signify what has come forth from God to creatures do so in such a way that part of the meaning of the word is the imperfect way in which the creature shares in the divine perfection. Thus it is part of the meaning of " rock " that it has its being in a purely material way. Such words can be used of God only metaphorically. There are other words, however, that simply mean certain perfections without any indication of how these perfections are possessed-words, for example, like 'being', 'good', 'living', and so on. These words can be used literally of God" (the translation is the new English one edited by Thomas Gilby, *Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae*, Vol. I, Garden City, Doubleday Image Book, 1969).

our understanding of the *res mgn.ificata,* which are the best known modes of concrete realization of the common property, considered as ways or media *through which we first come* to lay hold of the meaning of the property and *upon which we fall back* as the clearest examples when we wish to evoke its meaning for ourselves anew-since, as we noted above, it is always necessary to call up some examples across a range in order to grasp or recall the meaning of an analogous concept. Among these there is usually-not necessarily always, it seems-one or more that stand out as prime analogates for us, i. e., as focal meanings or privileged examplars closest to us by which we most easily and immediately grasp the meaning experientially, and out from which as from a center we extend it in lessening degrees of clarity. This usually means the properties as experienced and lived in our own selves, whether in body, psyche, or spirit. But it should be clearly understood that these ways of our coming to understand most vividly the common property do not themselves enter into the object meaning of the term when it is predicated analogously, in *any* of its predications. They are modes of *revealing* the analogous meaning of the term; they do not *constitute* its objective meaning itself-otherwise they would restrict it and destroy its analogical spread. Its objective analogical meaning as predicated is deliberately expanded, enlarged, made more vague and indeterminate than these modes of discovery, so that it will be able to transcend them in scope of applioation. Thus at the same time that we call up these privileged modes in order to evoke the meaning of the concept for ourselves, we *understand* (at least implicitly, but in a way that effectively controls our use of the term) *that* the meaning of the analogous term is being left open for further application, that it is not tied down to these modes of discovery. Thus if we were asked, in the example of speaking of hypothetical higher forms of " intelligence " that might communicate with us from outer space, what we mean by "intelligence," we would say something like this: " You know,

the kind of thing we do, being self-conscious, comprehending the natures and properties of things, making signs or communicating in some way, in a word, understanding, but probably in quite different ways from ours." We do not confuse the modes of understanding with the reality understood, or signified.

We could add another aspect (4) which would correspond exactly to St. Thomas' *modus significandi,* or modes of signifying the *res sign.ificata.* These are often misunderstood as signifying aspect (2), the actual modes of concrete realization of the common property in particular cases, as Professor Nielsen seems to understand them. This is quite incorrect. They are also sometimes extended to coincide with our (3), man's modes of *understanding* the *res significa,ta.* There is no great harm in deliberately using *modus significandi* with this meaning, and one does need some appropriate term to express these. But it is still not what the expression itself means as Aquinas uses it. **It** refers only to our human modes of expressing the *res significa,ta,* i. e., conceptual-linguistic modes. **It** was originally intended to take care of the obvious difference between the way God's perfections are found in him and our way of expressing the perfections of God through multiple verbal predicates, each distinct from the other, which are predicated of a subject as though they were accidents inhering in a distinct substance: " God is wise, *and* loving, *and* powerful." This is the way they are found in us, where wisdom can come and go and where a man can be wise but not powerful or vice versa. But what they signify as found in God himself is that God *is* identically all the positive perfections signified by these terms but united together in a single simple plenitude of perfection. Similarly we speak of God, who is beyond time, through verbal forms with tenses. Yet St. Thomas is quite clear that, although our *modes of expressing* these attributes bear the mark of their origin in our experience, these modes are not *what is express'ed and predicated* by the concept itself,

in any of its predications.[6] To say that John is wise and powerful does not *mean,* though it may indeed be understood to be also true, that wisdom in John is an accidental attribute really distinct from his power and his own essence. It is simply stating that it is true that he is wise and it is true that he is powerful, without stating how these are related. Hence our modes of expression do not corrupt with anthropomorphism our predications about God, or about anything, for that matter.

This is as far as St. Thomas's *modes of expressing* take us, though he also speaks of the " modes in which a perfection is found " or realized in its subject, which are not quite the same thing, but correspond rather to our *modes of rea.lizatU:m*in (2) above. Where do Copleston's "objective meaning" and" subjective meaning" fit in here?[7] It is not entirely clear to me from his text how they do, and it is no wonder to me that Professor Nielsen had serious-and to my mind quite justified-difficulties with his explanation. For Copleston, the "objective meaning" means" the objective reality itself referred to by the term in question," which in his example, " God is intelligent," he maintains is "the divine intelligence itself,'J as it is in itself. The "subjective meaning" is" the meaning-content in my own mind ... primarily determined for me by own experience ... of human

[6] See his text in note *5.*

[7] The main part of the text Professor Nielsen is quoting *(Contemporary Philosophy,* Westminister, Md.: Newman Press, 1956, p. 96) runs as follows: " By 'objective meaning' I understand that which is actually referred to by the term in question (that is, the objective reality referred to), and by 'subjective meaning' I understand the meaning-content which the term has or can have for the human mind ... i. e., my understanding or conception of what is referred to .... If this distinction is applied to the proposition 'God is intelligent', the 'objective meaning' of the term 'intelligence' is the divine intellect or intellect itself .... And of this I can certainly give no positive account .... The 'subjective meaning' is the meaning-content in my own mind. Of necessity this is primarily determined for me by my own experience, that is, by my experience of human intelligence. But seeing that human intelligence as such cannot be predicated of God, I attempt to purify the 'subjective meaning' .... And in doing so we are caught inextricably in that interplay of affirmation and negation of which I have spoken."

intelligence." But here it seems that "intelligence" means in this predication " divine intelligence " and yet the only meaning-content in my mind in all predications is " human intelligence." This opens up a yawning gap between the two which Prof. Nielsen has very astutely seen, and it is not at all clear from this text alone just how one crosses the gap. What Copleston fails to explain is that what he calls the " subjective meaning " is not really the *meaning-content* in my mind at all which I mean to signify by the analogous concept. It is my *way of discovering* the meaning, but not the purified more indeterminate analogous *meaning* itself. He needs another intermediate term in his discussion to indicate this. He comes close to it, in fact, when he adds at the end of his text, not quoted by Nielsen, " But seeing that human intelligence as such cannot be predicated of God, I attempt to purify the 'subjective meaning' .... And in so doing we are caught inextricably in that interplay of affirmation and negation of which I have spoken." It is this "purified meaning," purified by being made more indeterminate and open, that is the one actually predicated of God, which is not Copleston's objective meaning either, since that is already determined to fit God only. He does not make this clear enough in his text. (I fear there is some confusion too in Fr. Copleston's text between meaning and reference, when he speaks of the meaning as " the reality *referred* to.") Thus it should be clear that I dissociate myself from Fr. Copleston's explanation and consider it an inaccurate rendering of St. Thomas's teaching, or at least an easily misleading one. Professor Nielsen has good reasons for finding it unsatisfactory. There is in fact no gap between the meaning of "intelligence " as predicated of God and its meaning as predicated of man. But there is a gap between the modes of realization which I *understand* this attribute will take on in the concrete in each case, as well as between my mode of coming to understand this meaning and the mode I affirm in God.

III. *Application to God*

Let us now take brief stock of what we have accomplished. We have tried to explain what the structure of analogous predication is in general, how it works, and what it means to extend the range of an analogous concept beyond its ordinary range in our experience. But the actual extension of our analogous language to some new entity, such as God, that is beyond the range of our experience requires three further steps: (I) we must have good grounds for affirming that there *actually is* (or at least might be) such a new candidate for the application of our language; (2) we must have good grounds for affirming that this new candidate is actually *objectively si,milar* in some way or ways to the presently known beings in our experience-in other words, that there are good grounds for applying our concepts and language at all; (3) once we are in possession of these grounds we must then proceed to figure out just which of the attributes in our store of knowledge are apt to be extended meaningfully and legitimately to such an entity. But the first two suppositions cannot be provided by a theory of analogy itself. They must come from outside, to build a bridge across which our analogical language can walk. It is especially the lack of any awareness of the second point above, the establishment of a bond of similarity between God and creatures, that renders Professor Nielsen's exposition of Thomistic analogy so cripplingly incomplete. Let us now turn to each of these three points. The first two will be handled together under Section 1.

I. *Causality as the Bond of Similarity between God and World*

The first step is establishing the existence of God. This is done through a causal argument, which postulates that, under pain of our world of experience falling into unintelligibility, there *must* exist, as experience's ultimate condition of intelligibility, or adequate sufficient reason, one ultimate Source of all being, whose only intelligible mode of being must be

infinite perfection-for otherwise it could not be the ultimate condition of intelligibility. I would not carry on this argument through the Five Ways of St. Thomas, since they are too incomplete by themselves and defective in structure to do the job for us today. I would use rather the simpler and more basic metaphysical resources of St. Thomas, not drawn on clearly enough in the Five Ways, to show that no being that begins to exist, or is finite in perfection, or composed in its radical being, or member of a system of dynamically interrelated elements-to sum it up most simply, no finite being or group of finite beings-can supply the sufficient reason or ground of its own existence, and that such an ultimate condition of intelligibility is not reached until we posit an infinite being, a being infinite in perfection.

It is not my purpose to work out this argument here, since it would take another whole article, and our main aim here is explaining the function of analogy within such a framework. Let us therefore suppose that this step has been carried out successfully. If it cannot be, there is no point in discussing Thomistic analogy any further as applied to God. But as soon as we have established the argument, without paying any explicit attention to analogy in the process, we discover that a strange thing has happened. Analogy is already being used in the very formulation of the conclusion: there *is* an ultimate *Source* or *condition of intelligibility for the existenee of*. . . , or *cause.* (This by the way is all we *mean* by " cause " here in its widest metaphysical sense: that which fulfills a need for intelligibility, which answers the question, "What is effectively responsible for the existence of this datum *x,* which has turned out to be non-self-explanatory? "-not some meaning drawn from the sciences.)[8] For to be intelligible to us, these terms

[8] For this whole question of the meaning of "cause " in the context of the mind's quest for intelligibility and its necessarily analogous character as a correlate of the enquiring mind at work, see my own fuller development in "How the Philosopher Gives Meaning to Language about God," in *The Idea of God,* ed. by E. Madden, R. Handy, M. Farber (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1968),

themselves must all be analogous when applied to a being outside our experience.

Does this mean that a vicious circle is here involved, that analogy presupposes causality and causality itself presupposes analogy? This is an excellent and crucial question, which Professor Nielsen himself has certainly seen, when he speaks of a circle where one religious statement backs up another. There is indeed a circle of mutual involvement, but it is not a vicious circle; it is a vital one. For it is the very thrust of the mind's search for intelligibility, reaching out into the unknown to postulate a sufficient reason somewhere in being, that both sets up a new beachhead in being for our knowledge to explore further and at the same time carries with it its own enveloping field of analogy. Immanent in the entire innate drive of the mind toward intelligibility is an unrestricted commitment to intelligibility, wherever it may lead, and simultaneously to its objective correlate, being itself, as the source of all answers to this quest. To this range of intelligibility and its correlate being it is impossible to set any limits, since the mind, as soon as it becomes aware of these limits as limits, immediately transcends them by this very awareness. Our own inner *experience* of this quest for intelligibility that defines the very life of the mind reveals to us that both the quest itself and the answers to it are infinitely Protean, taking on endlessly different forms and modes. In a word, we experience the field of intelligibility, enveloping our own minds and reaching out beyond into its correlate, being, as *intrinsfoally analogical,* open-ended but somehow all bound together in some vague unspecifiable unity. The first and all-embracing analogous field which we discover-not by constructing it deliberately but by waking up within it, so to speak-is the correlation *intelligibility-being.*

Hence it is that when, as in the case of the affirmation of

pp. 1-28; and "Analytic Philosophy and Language about God," in *Christian Philosophy and Religious Renewal,* ed. by G. McLean (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1966), pp. 39-73, esp. pp. 46-51, 61-71.

God, the mind is convinced-for what it believes are good reasons-that it can save the intelligibility of the world of our experience only by positing or postulating as existent outside this world (i. e., transcending its limitations) an ultimate infinitely perfect source of all being, it necessarily envelops this term that it posits with its own pre-existent and potentially all-embracing field of analogy, at once positing it as a *real* condition of intelligibility and as *necessarily analogous* in the same movement of thought. This initial analogy is extremely vague, not yet extending beyond the immediate correlates of the intelligibility-being field itself, together with the index of location within this field at the supreme apex of perfection, whatever that may be. For all the terms used to describe God in this initial stage, "ultimate *condition of intelligibility* for the existence of the world = cause," are nothing but reaffirmations of the general principle of the intelligbility of all being in principle, tailored to the particular situation where the beings we start with do not contain their own sufficient ground of intelligibility within themselves, hence force us to look beyond them. [9]

[9] It is very important to make the point here that according to St. Thomas's metaphysical method-and *any* sound metaphysical method, it seems to me, which seeks to achieve knowledge of some being beyond our experience-it is a fatal error to accept the demand so habitually made by analytic philosophers and others that one must define what he means by " God " *before* undertaking to establish His existence. This stand is not an evasion; it is a question of proper method. It is *impossible* philosophically to give any definition of God that can be shown to make sense before actually discovering Him as an exigency of the quest for intelligibility. The meaning of " God " emerges only in function of the argument that concludes to the need of a being to which we then can appropriat-ely give the name " God" or not, according to our culture and religious tradition. The *philosophical* meaning of God should be exclusively a function of the *way by which He is discovered.* Hence a properly philosophical approach to the existence of God should not ask, " Can I prove that God exists? " but rather, " What does the world of my experience demand in order to be intelligible? " Following out this exigency rationally, we " bump into " God, so to speak, as a being all of whose properties are defined exclusively by its needs to fulfill its job of satisfying the exigencies of the quest for intelligibility. Hence any philosophical " proof for the existence of God " has already taken the statement of the question from some non-philosophical source, usually religion.

Thus the very initial positing of God as cause of the world situates him within the primary a priori (a dynamic and existential, not a logical, a priori) analogous field of both intelligibility and being-of being precisely *because* this is demanded by intelligibility. From the very beginning of our intellectual life there is a necessary mutual co-involvement of intelligibility, being, and analogy. This very vague initial analogous beachhead of knowledge about God is now ready to be expanded by further judicious search for more determinate valid analogies.

It is at this point that a second crucial corollary of the causal bond comes into play, one that is too often neglected in expositions of analogy, and of which there is likewise no hint in Professor Nielsen's discussion. This is the principle, handed down to St. Thomas by both the Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian traditions, that *every effect must in some way resemble its cause.* In a word, every causal bond sets up at the same time a bond of intrinsic similarity in being. In the Platonic-Neoplatonic tradition this took the form of the principle that every higher cause communicated something of its own perfection to its effect beneath it, which participated in the latter as much as its own limited nature allowed. In the Aristotelian tradition it took the form of the principle that no being can cause any perfection in another unless it already possesses in act (in some equivalent way) this same perfection. These two strands were joined together in a single synthesis of *causal participation* by St. Thomas and other medieval thinkers; and the same *general* principle of causal similitude has been accepted by most realistic metaphysicians ever since, in one form or another.

The philosophical reason why every effect must in some way resemble its cause, at least analogously, is this: since all the positive perfection of the effect, as effect, derives precisely from its cause (s), the latter cannot give what it does not have; the effect must in some way participate or share in the perfection of the cause that is its source. If the cause does not possesss

in an equal, or some higher equivalent manner, the perfection it communicates to its effects, then the perfection of the latter would have to come from nowhere, have no relation to its cause. Where there is no bond of similarity whatever between an effect and its cause, there can be no bond of causality either.

The similarity in question, however, could be of two main kinds. If both cause and effect were of the same species the similarity would be on the same level and kind, that is, univocal. If the cause were a higher level of being than the effect, then the similarity could not be strictly univocal but would have to be at least analogous. In this perspective, the very fact of establishing a causal link between a lower effect and a higher cause at once *ipso facto* generates an analogous similarity, a spectrum of objective similarity extending from the known effect at least as far as the cause, whether the latter is directly known or only postulated as a necessary condition of intelligibility for an already known effect. Whether both terms of the relation are known or only one, every effect has to be similar in some way to its cause, or it could not be a real effect, and the same holds for the cause. As St. Thomas sums it up:

> Effects which fall short of their causes do not agree with them [i. e., are not exactly like them] in name and nature. Yet some likeness must be found between them, since it belongs to the nature of action that an agent produce its like, since each thing acts according as it is in act. The form of an effect, therefore, is certainly found in some measure in a transcending cause, but according to another mode and another way [i. e., analogously]. For this reason the cause is called an *equivocal came* [a term that is " equivocal by design " in Aristotelian terminology is the same as what was later called "analogous "-opposed to "equivocal by chance"] ..... So God gave all things their perfections and thereby is both like and unlike all of them. [10]

An effect that does not receive a form specifically the same as that through which the agent acts cannot receive according to a

[10] *Summa Contra Gentes,* Bk. I, chap. 29, n. 2. Cf. also *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 13, a. *5.*

univocal predication the name arising from that form .... Now the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to a specific likeness of that divine power; for the things which God has made receive in a divided and particular limited way that which in Hirn is found in a simple and universal unlimited way. It is evident, then, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things .... For all attributes are predicated of God essentially ... But in other beings these predications are made by participation.11

It is because of this metaphysical context of causality and causal participation undergirding the Thomistic theory of analogy that the most recent and authoritative-in the sense of being almost universally accepted among Thomists-commentaries on St. Thomas's theory of analogy now all agree that despite his many changes in terminology he fairly early drops the structure of proper proportionality, taken by itself alone, for a richer structure involving both immanent proportionality among the analogates of a term *and* a reference to the causal source from which the analogous perfection in question is communicated to all the participating analogates. This fuller metaphysical-semantic structure of analogy as applied to the relation of God and creatures is most aptly called " the analogy of causal participation." The previously long accepted "orthodox" explanation of Cajetan in terms purely of proper proportionality without reference to a source is now recognized as inadequate to handle the application of analogy to a being not accessible to our experience, as is the case with God. A purely formal isomorphism of relations can supply no positive content of knowledge about the term of comparison otherwise unknown to us unless some positive intrinsic bond of similarity has already been established between both ends of the comparison. Cajetan presumed this had been done elsewhere, but his omission of this step from his

[11] *Ibid.*, chap. 82, nn. 2 and 7. He goes on to say in chap. 88, n. 2: " For in equivocals by chance there is no order or reference of one to another, but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things .... But this is not the situation with names said of God and creatures, since we note in the community of such names the order of cause and effect .... "

formal and explicit analyses of analogy leaves a very serious gap in his formal theory of analogy *when taken by· itself,* as most non-Thomistic thinkers, if not forewarned, would naturally tend to do. St. Thomas himself appears to have come to recognize this, since after his early work *De Veritate-the* main source for Cajetan's systematization of all Thomistic texts-he never again uses the formal structure of proper proportionality by itself to express his own thought.

Thus it is not surprising that when non-Thomistic thinkers like Professor Nielsen come to the theory of Thomistic analogy through older traditional expositions in the mode of Cajetan, which omit the context of causal participation as part of the doctrine itself as applied to God (or to any unknown cause), they find the structure of the analogy of proper proportionality by itself quite inadequate to perform the role claimed for it. Their critical insight is quite accurate. [12]

2. Which Attributes Can Be Applied to God?

Once we have set up this basic framework of causal similitude between all creatures and God, from which it follows that there *must* be some appropriate analogous predicates that can be extended properly and legitimately to God, the next step consists in determining just *which* attributes can, in addition to the initial most indeterminate attributes of being and perfection, allow for open-ended extension all the way up the scale of being, even to the mode of infinite plenitude, without

[12] It is because of this basic similitude between all creatures and God that the phrase applied so often to God by theologians, philosophers of religion, and spiritual writers, describing His transcendence over creatures, namely, that God is " totally Other," is really, if taken in unqualified literalness as a metaphysical statement, quite unacceptable as sound philosophy, theology, or spirituality. For if God were literally totally other, with no similitude at all with us, there could be no bond whatsoever between us, no affinity drawing toward union as our true Good, no image of God deep in the soul, etc. He might be totally other in His essence or *mode* of being, since He is beyond all form, but not totally other in His *being* itself or the *activity properties* that flow directly from its fullness of perfection.

losing their unity of meaning. This is the search for the " simple or pure perfections," as St. Thomas calls them, which are purely positive qualitative terms that do not contain as part of their *meaning* any implication of limit or imperfection. Once we have located one of these, even though we enter into its meaning in first discovering it or in re-evoking it through the limited and imperfect modes (i. e., our privileged modes of *exemplifying* it to ourselves) belonging to the things we find in our experience, *what we intend or mean* directly by the concept, once we have purified or enlarged it for good reasons into an analogous concept, is a flexible, broadly but not totally indeterminate core of purely positive meaning that transcends all its particular possible modes, both those we know and those we do not know.

We can recognize that we have effected this purification when we can meaningfully affirm, as we certainly do, that *all* the experienced modes of these open-ended perfections, such as unity, knowledge, love, and power, are *limited*, not yet perfect modes. For to affix the qualification "limited or imperfect " to any attribute is already to imply that our understanding of this attribute transcends all the limiting qualifiers we have just added to it. Any attribute that cannot survive this process of purification, or negation of all imperfection and limitation in its meaning (and of comse in its actual mode of realization when applied to an infinite being) without some part of its very meaning being cancelled out, does not possess enough analogical " stretch " to allow its predication of God. The judgment as to when this does or does not happen is of course a delicate one that requires careful critical reflection, along with sensitivity to the existential connotations of the use of the term in a given historical culture. [13]

Two types of attributes have been sifted out as meeting the above requirements by the reflective traditions of metaphysics, religion, and theology: (l) those attributes whose meaning

[13] Cf. for a fuller development my articles cited in note 8.

is so closely linked with the meaning and intelligibility of being itself that no real being is conceivable which could lack them and still remain intelligible, i.e., the so-called *absolutely transcendental properties* of being, such as unity, activity, goodness and power; and (;2) the *relatively transcendental properties* of being, which are so purely positive in meaning and so demanding of our unqualified value-approval that, even though they are not co-extensive with all being, any being higher than the level at which they first appear must be judged to possess them-hence a fortiori the highest being-under pain of being less perfect than the beings we already know, particularly ourselves; such are knowledge (particularly intellectual knnwledge), love, joy, freedom, and personality, at least as understood in western cultures.

a) *The Absolutely Transdendental Properties*

Once established that God exists as supreme infinitely perfect source of all being, it follows that every attribute that can be shown to be necessarily attached to, or flow from, the very intelligibility of the primary attribute of being itself must necessarily be possessed in principle, without any further argument, by this supreme Being, under pain of its not being at all, let alone not being the supreme instance. Thus it is inconceivable that there should exist any being that is not in its own proportionate way *one*, its parts, if any, cohering into one and not dispersed into unrelated multiplicity. Hence God must be supremely one. Such all-pervasive properties of being are few, but charged with value significance: e. g., unity, intelligibility, activity, power, goodness (in the broadest ontological sense as having some perfection in itself and being good *for* something, if only itself), and probably beauty too.

Since these properties are so general and vague or indeterminate in their content-deliberately so to allow for their completely open-ended spectrum of application-we derive from this inference no precise idea or representation at all as to what *this mode* of unity, etc., will be like in itself. But we do

definitely know this much: *that* this positive qualitative attribute or perfection (in St. Thomas's general metaphysical sense of the term as any positive quality) is really present in God and in the supreme degree possible. Such knowledge, though vague, is richly *value-laden* and is therefore a guide for value assessment and for value responses of reverence, esteem, etc. I am puzzled as to why Professor Nielsen would consider such value-laden and value-guiding concepts simply empty and hence apparently able to serve no cognitive purpose at all.

b) *The Relatively Transcendental Properties*

There is a second genre of transcendental attributes of being that are richer in content and of more immediate interest and relevance in speaking about God. These are terms that express positive qualitative attributes having a floor (or lower limit) but no ceiling (or upper limit), and hence are understood to be properties belonging necessarily to any and all beings above a certain level of perfection. Their range is transcendental indefinitely upward but not downward. Such are knowledge (consciousness, especially self-consciousness and intellectual knowledge), love, lovableness, joy (bliss, happiness, i. e., the conscious enjoyment of good possessed), and similar derivative properties of personality in the widest purely positive sense (not the restrictive sense it has in many oriental traditions). All such attributes appear to us as purely and totally positive values in themselves, not matter how imperfectly we happen to possess them here and now. As such, they demand our unqualified approval as unconditionally better to have than not to have. Hence we cannot affirm that any being that exists higher than ourselves, a fortiori the supremely perfect being that God must be, does not have these perfections in its own appropriate mode. To conceive of some higher being as, for example, lacking sel£-consciousness in some appropriate way, i. e., being simply blacked out in unconsciousness, would be for us necessarily to conceive this being as lower in perfection than ourselves.

Nor is there any escape in the well-known ploy that this might merely mean inconceivable *for us* but in reality might actually be the case for all we know. The reason is that to affirm that some state of affairs *might really* be the case is to declare it in some way conceivable, at least with nothing militating against its possibility. This we simply cannot do with such purely positive perfection-concepts.

What happens in our use of these concepts, as soon as we know or suspect for good reasons that there exists some being higher than ourselves, is that, even though *our discovery* of their meaning has been from our experience of them in limited degree, we immediately detach them from *restricting* links with our own level, make them more purified and indeterminate in content, and project them upward along an open-ended ascending scale of *value aPJYl'eoiation.* This is not a logical but an existential move, hooking up the inner understanding of the conceptual tools we use with the radical open-ended dynamism of the intellect itself. One way we can experience this power of projection of perfections or value attributes beyond our own level is by experiencing reflectively our own poignant awareness of the limitations and imperfection of these attributes as we possess them now, even though we have not yet experienced the existence of higher beings. We all experience keenly the constricting dissatisfaction and restlessness we feel over the slowness, the fuzzy, piecemeal character of our knowing and our intense longing, the further we advance in wisdom.. for an ideal mode of knowledge beyond our present reach. The very fact that we can judge our present achievement *as limited, imperfect,* implies that we have reached beyond it by the implicit dynamism of our minds and wills. To know a limit *as limit* is already in principle to have reached beyond it in dynamic intention, though not yet in conceptual representation. This point has for long been abundantly stressed by the whole Transcendental Thomist school, not to mention Hegel and others, who bring out that the radical dynamism of the spirit indefinitely transcends all finite determinate conceptual expressions or temporary stopping places.

The knowledge given by such projective or pointing concepts, expressing analogous attributes open-ended at the top, is again very vague and indeterminate, but yet charged with far richer determination and value content than the more universal transcendental attributes applying to all being, high or low. By grafting the affirmation of these attributes, as necessarily present in their appropriate proportionate mode in God, on to the lived inner dynamism of our spirits longing for ever fuller consciousness, knowledge, love (loving and being loved), joy, etc., these open-ended concepts, affirmed in the highest degree possible of God, can serve as very richly charged *value-assessment guides* for our value-responses of adoration, reverence, love, longing for union, etc. But note here again that the problem of the extension of analogous concepts beyond the range of our experience cannot be solved by logical or conceptual analysis alone, but only by inserting these concepts into the context of their actual living use within the unlimitedly open-ended, supra-conceptual dynamism of the human spirit (intellect and will), existentially longing for a fullness of realization beyond the reach of all determinate conceptual grasp or representation. Thomistic analogy makes full sense only within such a total notion of the life of the spirit as knowing-loving dynamism. The knowledge given by these analogous concepts applied to God, therefore, though extremely indeterminate, is by no means empty. It is filled in by a powerful cognitive-affective dynamism involving the whole human psyche and spirit, which starts from the highest point we can reach in our own knowing, loving, joy, etc., from the *best* in us, and then proceeds to project upwards along the line of progressive ascent from lower levels towards an apex hidden from our vision at the line's end. We give significant meaning to this invisible apex precisely by *situating* it as apex of a line of unmistakeable direction upward. This delivers to us, through the mediation (not representation) of the open-ended analogous concept, an obscure, vector-like, indirect, non-conceptual, but recognizably positive knowledge-

through-love, through the very upward movement of the dynamic longing of the spirit towards its own intuitively felt connatural good-a knowledge " through the heart," as Pascal puts it, or through " connatural inclination," as St. Thomas would have it.[14] Such an affective knowledge-through-connatural-inclination is a thoroughly human kind of knowing, quite within the range of our own deeper levels. of *experience,* as all lovers and artists (not to mention religious people) know. Yet it is a mode of knowing that has hitherto been much neglected in our contemporary logically and scientifically oriented epistemology.

Conclusion

It is time to conclude this already too lengthy response. To sum up, analogous knowledge of God, as understood in its whole supporting metaphysical context of (1) the dynamism of the human spirit, transcending by its intentional thrust all its own limited conceptual products along the way, and (2) the structure of causal participation or causal similitude between God and creatures, delivers a knowledge that is intrinsically and deliberately vague and indeterminate, but at the same time richly positive in content; for such concepts serve as positive signposts, pointing vector-like along an ascending spectrum of ever higher and more fully realized perfection, and can thus fulfill their main role as guides for significant value responses, both contemplative and practical. Such knowledge, with the analogous terms expressing it, is, and by the nature of the case is supposed to be, a *chiaroscuro* of light and shadow, of revelation and concealment (as Heidegger would say), that alone is appropriate to the luminous Mystery which is its ultimately object-a Mystery which we at the same time judge

[14] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 1, a. 6 ad 3; I-II, 9-45, a. 2. Also J. Maritain, "On Knowledge through Connaturality," *Review of Metaphysics,* IV (1950-51), 483-94; V. White, "Thomism and Affective Knowledge," *Blackfriars,* XXV (1944), 321-28; A. Moreno, "The Nature of St. Thomas' Knowledge *per connaturalitatem," Angelicum,* XLVII (1970), 44-62.

that we *must* reasonably affirm, yet whose precise mode of being remains always beyond the reach of our determinate representational images and concepts, but not beyond the *dynamic thrust* of our spirit which can express this intentional reach only through the open-ended flexible concepts and language we call analogous. Such concepts cannot be considered" empty" save in an inhumanly narrow epistemology.

W. NORRIS CLARKE, S. J.

Fordham University,
New York, N. Y.

ECCLES/A DOCENS:

STRUCTURES OF DOCTRINAL AUTHORITY INTER-TULLIAN AND VINCENT

IN THE CONTROVERSY following the publication of the encyclical *Humanae Vitae,* the discussion concerning ecclesiastical doctrinal authority occupied much more time than the arguments over the moral issues more directly involved. The prohibition and condemnation of contraception had to be upheld, it was maintained, because to do otherwise would mean introducing an element of serious discontinuity with previous Catholic teaching.[1] It has been claimed that this preoccupation with continuity is a trait of the modern Church, especially of the modern Papacy. It is intriguing to consider whether the remark of Tertullian in *Adversus Praxean* referred to similar concern for continuity c. 200 A. D. The bishop of Rome, according to Tertullian, was on the verge of granting some sort of recognition and approval to the Montanist movement in Asia Minor, when the Modalist heretic, Praxeas, dissuaded him with lies and" ... by (his) insistence on the decisions of the bishop's predecessors."[2]

Continuity, in one form or another, has been a constant concern of the Church. In earlier centuries, this concern could be summed up in the word" apostolicity." As the first generation of Christian gentile converts began to pass from the scene and increasingly discordant versions of the Christian message were preached, the need for verification of the link with the past became evident. Irenaeus could speak proudly of his direct connection with the Apostle John through Polycarp of Smyrna. Yet Florinus had had the same experience and Irenaeus con-

[1] H. Kling, *Infallible? An Inquiry.* (Trans. E. Quinn, Garden City, 1971) 54.
[2] *Adversus Praxean.* 1 (CC Kroymann & Evans).

sidered him a heretic.a Papias could proclaim his preference for the living voice of tradition. Yet his own beliefs, e.g. millenarianism, demonstrated the unreliability of this approach. Eusebius deemed Papias " a man of exceedingly small intelligence." [4']

The growing dilemma led to increasing pressure for a practical solution. This practical solution was found in combining the argument from succession, formulated succinctly in Clement of Rome, with the ever more important officeof the monarchical episcopate. [5] Gnostics also claimed that their teaching took its origin from the teaching of the Apostles. As Ptolemy wrote to Flora: "For with God's help you will learn ... if you are deemed worthy of knowing the apostolic tradition which we too have received from a succession ..." [6] The answer to the Gnostic challenge was formulated by Irenaeus and Tertullian. [7]

The basic argument has not changed greatly since that day. Immutability is the hallmark of Catholic doctrine; variation, the characteristic of heresy. Bossuet in the 17th century, like Tertullian in the third, could still pursue this reasoning. [8] As historical knowledge increased and, more important, the historical mentality took deeper root in the 18th and 19th centuries, this view became untenable. Evolutionary and developmental theories became the fashion of the time. Yet, when it was a question of Catholic doctrine, only a homogeneous development was acceptable. Catholic doctrine did change, it was recognized, but always in the sense of progress, always in the direction of greater clarity and explicitation. As Jossua has observed, homogeneity came to play in historically aware

• Eus. *H. E. V.* 20. 4-8. (GCS text (E. Schwartz) in K. Lake, Loeb edition. Vol. 1 496-8.)

• Eusebius *H. E.* III. 39.13 (LCL 1.296).

[5] Clement of Rome. 42. 1-2 (K. Lake, Loeb edition 78-80.). The Letters of Ignatius of Antioch (LCL 172 ff) .

[6] Letter of Ptolemy to Flora (SC 24.68 Quispe!) (Paris, 1949).

• Irenaeus *Adversus Haereses* III. 3 (SC 211. 30£ Rousseau & Doutreleau) (Paris, 1974). Tertullian *De Praescriptione Haereticorum* 36 (CC 1.216-7 Refoule).

[8] 0. Chadwick *From Bossuet to Newman* Ch. 1 "Semper Eadem" (Cambridge 1957).

circles the role that fixity and perenniality had for more conservative minds.[9] Today's problematic is considerably more complex than this. Even a recent Roman document like *Mysterium Ecclesiae* (sect. 5) admits the problem of the historicity of doctrines but then gives it short shrift.

One's view of the ancient solution of apostolic succession seems highly colored by one's basic ecclesial presuppositions. Van den Eynde, writing in 1933, found: "In sum, the supreme norm in doctrinal maters is none other than the Church herself. It is her teaching, a legacy received from the hands of the Apostles, which serves as a measure for every other doctrinal source. It is her chiefs, successors of the Apostles, who guard the tradition and who alone teach the faithful with authority."[10] In other words, van den Eynde found the modern Catholic idea of an episcopal magisterium in command in the and 3d centuries. Swedish Lutheran B. Hagglund, writing in 1958, came to a different conclusion. "For Irenaeus, the true tradition is nothing else than prophetic and apostolic tradition. It is false, therefore, to understand this as an explanation of the content of the Faith by bishops or Church teachers. Its content coincides rather with Holy Scripture ... The correct *traditw* of the Church therefore is a *traditw* of Holy Scripture."[11]

For some Protestant critics, the rise of the notion of Apostolic tradition, while meant to guarantee unbroken continuity with the teaching of Christ and the preaching of his disciples, only succeeded in betraying the lack of such continuity, "The early Catholic concept of tradition is based upon a dual error. First of all, there was an historical error, because the tradition which was claimed to be apostolic did not stem from primitive

•Jean Pierre Jossua "Immutabilite, Progres ou Structurations multiples des Doctrines chretiennes?" *RevScPhTh* (1968) 175.

[10] D. van den Eynde *Les Normes de l'Enseignement chretien dans la litterature patristique des trois premiers siecles* (Paris, 1933), 103.

[11] B. Hagglund "Die Bedeutung der 'Regula Fidei' als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen" *Studia Theologica* rn (1958) *15-16.*

Christianity alone. Furthermore, there was an error in principle, for the Church could not exist historically simply by clinging to a tradition which was understood as a completed law." [12] The modern evaluation of the ancient idea of apostolicity is itself thoroughly conditioned by the critic's view of what constitutes the Gospel.

The modern critic, whatever his persuasion, finds a number of questionable presuppositions behind the ideas of the Fathers: that the content of Christian faith constitutes a unity and a totality from the beginning; that this content is definite and determined from the beginning and, despite the best efforts of heretics, is destined to remain so forever. How were the ancient Christians so certain of these presuppositions? How did they recognize and accept one doctrine as apostolic and reject another as false and heretical? They accepted what they had been taught, of course. But what happened if two regions of the world Church claimed apostolic authority for divergent customs? This did happen in the Quartodeciman controversy and the predictable result was conf:lict.[13]

The solution to the wider question, however, is not so easily apparent. In their own minds, they just knew what was apostolic, suggests Greenslade. [14] In their view, there could not have been such divergencies in the age of the Apostles. Such evils could arise only later. One gets the impression that the belief and practice of the Church of any given time and place were simply presumed to be in fact apostolic. Certainly, in the realm of praxis it is not surprising (to us!) that divergences could arise in time, slowly and imperceptibly, and these would, locally at lea.st, be presumed, with the passage of a generation or two, to be of apostolic origin. [15]

[12] C. Andresen *Die Kirche:n der alten Christe:nheit* (Stuttgart, 1971) 688.; G. Ebeling, *The Problem of Historicity* (Trans. G. Foley, Phila. 1967) *53.*

[13] Eus *H. E.* V. 23-4. (LCL *l.502-512).*

[14] S. Greenslade "Scripture and other doctrinal Norms in early Theories of the Ministry" *Journal of Theological Studies* 44 (1943) 164.

[15] N. Brox, "Altkirchliche Formen des Anspruchs auf Apostolische Kirchenverfassung " *Kairos* rn (1970) 123, 129, 116.

What Norbert Brox calls the Church's perennial "Urspr141glichkeitsbediirfnis " led it to look backward to its origins, seeking especially to justify its present belief and practice by reference to those foundation stones of the Church, the Apostles. The argument from Apostolic succession furnished the basic instrument for this justification. [16] As the centuries passed and the time of the Apostles became more distant, problems became more complex. Correspondingly, the Church's instruments, its mechanisms, for dealing with these problems, especially doctrinal problems, within the framework of apostolicity, became more sophisticated. This process of growing complexity and the initial development of some mechanisms of defence and decision can be traced in two early Western documents dealing explicitly with questions of innovation and continuity. These are the *De Praescriptione llaereticorum* of Tertullian (c. 203 A. D.) and the *Commonitorium* of Vincent of Lerins (c. 434 A. D.).

II

Faced not only by the teachings of the Gnostics and their threat to the coherence of the Christian Church, but especially by the Gnostic claim to be passing on to its adepts the real teachings of Jesus, albeit esoteric ones fit only for the illuminati, Christian thinkers developed a line of argumentation which has become standard throughout the later history of the Church's resistance to heresy. The elements of authority and succession in ministers of the local Church are found variously in earlier strata. It was left to Irenaeus and then Tertullian to combine these elements and weld them into a theory of authority for the future as well as a weapon against the troubles of the present.

Although Tertullian authored several treatises against a

[16] Reference to the past, as later times would show, could be used as an instrument for innovation under the banner of reform. See J. Preus " Theological Legitimation for Innovation in the Middle Ages" *Viator*. Medieval and Renaissance Studies Vol. 3 (1972) 1-26. Also K. Morrison, *Tradition and Authority in the Western Church*, 300-1140. (Chicago, 1969) 7.

variety of enemies, both individual and collective, he hoped in his treatise on prescription to forge a weapon that would serve as a " short way with heretics," a general historical proof of the truth of Catholic doctrines rather than a detailed refutation of the tenets of any particular heretic. The object of interest here is not the question of the prescription or prescriptions in this work,[17] but the question of whether or not Tertullian sees in any Church office or structure a mechanism empowered to distinguish between doctrinal error and truth. Does Tertullian see in the Church of his own time .someone or something that has the authority to decide whether a given doctrine or practice is compatible with the teaching of Christ?

The offices or structures, the " mechanisms " of doctrinal authority of which the modern Catholic immediately thinks, namely, the Papacy and/or councils of bishops are clearly not within Tertullian'.s view when he discusses questions of doctrinal import. In two late works, from his Montanist period, he mentions councils. In one instance, he remarks that the *Pastor Hermae* has been rejected by numerous councils from the accepted Scriptures. Moreover, he distinguishes between Catholic and Montanist councils.[18] In the *De leiunio* he speaks of councils being held throughout Greece. The subjects of their discussions are not .specified. Although Tertullian says that they treated " certain deep issues," the whole fleeting reference comes in the context of a discussion of obligatory fasts, specifically the Montanist Xerophagies. [19]

There are also a few clear or problematical references to the Church of Rome in Tertulliam's later works. In the well-known attack on the bishop who proclaimed his authority to forgive sins of adultery and fornication, Tertullian sarcastically refers to his opponent as a " bishop of bishops " and a " *Pontifex*

[11] On the prescriptions, see D. Michaelides, *Foi, Ecritures et Tradition.* Les Praescriptiones chez Tertullien. (Paris, 1969), and J. Stirnimann, *Die Praescriptio Tertullians im Lichte des romischen Rechts und der Theologie.* (Fribourg, 1949).

[18] *De Pudicitia* 10.12 (CC 2: 1301. Dekkers.).

[19] *De leiunio* 13.6 (CC 2: 1272. Reifl'erscheid & Wissowa).

maximus." [20] Many scholars have seen in this adversary not only a bishop of Rome but specifically, Callistus (217-22). In 1914, Adhemar D'Ales even wrote a book on this "Edict of Callistus." In fact, of course, no one has proved definitively that the target of Tertullian's righteous indignation was really a Roman bishop. A sizable number of scholars opt rather for a bishop of Carthage, probably Agrippinus.

The other incident involving Rome is that referred to in passing at the beginning. Praxeas is accused of having turned the Roman bishop against the prophecies of Montanus, Prisca and Maximilla just as he was on the verge of " recognizing " them and offering peace to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia. [21] The exact meaning of what Tertullian is describing is not clear; less clear still, in view of his Montanist bias, is the relation between what he describes and what actually happened. What does emerge is the very general conclusion that, in Tertullian's mind, Roman approval of the New Prophecy would have been a prestigious gain for it.

The incidents mentioned in which the Roman bishop or Greek councils were involved are concerned basically with problems of discipline. To be sure, many disciplinary issues have doctrinal implications or repercussions. Moreover, Tertullian's own notion of *disciplina* has been shown to include elements we would now classify as doctrinal. [22] Yet, at least it can be said that the issues in question are not to be found in the *regula fidei.* Here it should be pointed out that the *regula fidei* is the faith itself *(fides quae).* The rule is not an external criterion or an outside measuring device whereby individual tenets of the faith are either tested and approved or found wanting and rejected. [23]

[20] *De Pudicitia* 1.6 (CC 2: 1281-2).

[21] *Adversus Praxean* 1 (CC 2.1159) "... agnosccntem iam prophetias ... et ex ea agnitione pacem ecclesiis Asiae et Phrygiae inferentem .. ,"

[22] V. Morel, "Le Developpement de la 'Disciplina' sous !'Action du Saint-Esprit chez Tcrtullien" *RevHisEccl 35* (1939) 263.

[23] F. Refoule, Introduction to: Tertullien: *Traite de "la Prescription contre les Heretiques,* (SC 46, 51-2) (Paris, 1957).

This *regula* is of the greatest significance for Tertullian. For him there can be no question that it has been handed down whole and entire from Jesus himself as a simple, unified, definite and determined corpus of doctrine.[24] Christ taught these things to his Apostles and they are the key figures for the transmission of this faith, not only to their own age but to all subsequent ages as well. All centuries of the time of the Church receive the teaching of Christ as handed on from Christ to the Apostles and from them to the Churches they founded. " This is my basic principle: that a single and definite doctrine has been taught by Christ which the world must believe absolutely ... "[20]

We come into contact with the teaching of Christ always mediately, through the Apostles. They are our *auctores.*[26] If, as Tertullian believed, the teaching of Christ is a single, unified, definite and determined corpus of doctrine, it was the prime task of the Apostles to pass it on unchanged to those whom they converted. In the course of developing this line of thought, Tertullian answers various objections. Christ did not have a secret doctrine he communicated to some while giving another teaching to the masses. If there were such a secret doctrine, who would have received it but these same disciples? On the contrary, they were fully instructed in the very *schola Chnsti.*[21] Similarly, it is incredible that the Apostles themselves would have taught an esoteric doctrine different from their public preaching. Again, if such a special teaching existed, who would have been its recipients but the leaders of the Churches founded by the Apostles? The deposit of faith committed to the Apostles is not a secret one.[28]

Thus all heresies are proved to be that worst of evils, innovations, attempts at twisting or distorting one or another teaching handed down by the Apostles. By its very nature, the

•• B. Hagglund, *Art. Cit. 85.*

[25] *De Praescriptione Haereticorum.* 9.8 (CC *1.195* Refou!e.).

•• *Prae.* 6.4 (CC 1.191).

[27] *Prae.* 22.8-5 (CC 1.208) *Scorpiace* 12.l (CC 2.1092 Reifferscheid & Wissowa), •• *Prae.* 26.Sf. (CC 1.208); *Prae.* 25.8 (CC 1.206).

divine truth has priority over falsehood. The original must come before the imitation. [29] It does no good to argue that the entire Church around the world has strayed from the truth. If such errors had crept in, variations inevitably would be the result. Yet, as all can see, the Churches in different parts of the world all teach the same doctrine. Heresies are developments of the times after Christ, although their coming was predicted. [30]

This truth handed on faithfully by the Apostles and their successors is found in the *regula fidei.* The *regula* is the *doctrina* and the Scriptures are the *instrumenta doctrinae.* [31] Unfortunately for the apologist, the heretics also make use of the same Scriptures. They, however, interpret them in an incorrect and perverse way, through either mutilating them (Marcion) or simply twisting the meaning to their own purposes. Hence the need to emphasize the *regula* as the traditional teaching of the Church found throughout the earth. "Where true Christian discipline and faith are found, there will be the true Scriptures, the true interpretations and all the true Christian traditions." [32] Even in the late work, *De Pudicitia,* when his own earlier arguments were being turned against him, he was still able to write: "From the beginning they have fashioned the very substance of their doctrine to agree with the details of the parables. Of course, since they are not bound by the rule of faith, they are free to hunt up and piece together things which seem to be typified by the parable. We, however, do not fashion doctrines using the parables as raw materials, but rather, we interpret the parables on the basis of our doctrines." [33]

Tertullian has already arrived at a well-known dilemma. What is to be taught as Christian doctrine is to be found in

[29] *Prae.* 35.3 (CC 1.216); *Adversus Marcionem* 4.5.1 (CC 1.550-1. Kroymatnn),
[30] *Prae.* 28 (CC 1.209); *Prae.* 30.4 (CC 1.210-11).
[31] *Prae.* 38.2-3 (CC 1.218).
[32] *Prae.* 19.3 (CC 1.201).
[33] *De Pud.* 8.12-9.1 (CC 2.1296).

Sacred Scripture, yet these Scriptures do not explain themselves. Thus the traditional teaching of the Church is to be taken as the correct and orthodox interpretation of what the teaching of Christ was as the Apostles handed it down. He mentions the Holy Spirit as the " *vicaria vis . . . qui credentes agat"* and the *"Christi vicarius"* who could not have allowed the Churches to believe otherwise than *he* preached through the Apostles. Yet he never develops this thought very much.[34]

Tertullian does not yet have any mechanism or structure in the earthly Church which is itself a God-given authority enabled to judge between truth and falsehood in doctrine. Offices and structures like the Roman primacy or the council are barely seen in Tertullian. The monarchical episcopate has moved much beyond the embryonic stage although it does not occupy a very large amount of space in Tertullian's thoughts as mirrored in his writings.

One possible exception to this statement is to be found in the *De Praesoriptione.* My contention is that Tertullian's use of the episcopate in this work does not involve an appeal to an authoritative office as such but an appeal to historical verification. It is the capstone of Tertullian's argument that the teaching of Christ as transmitted by the Apostles has been handed down faithfully and unaltered by the succession of bishops of the local communities which make up the world Church. He places special but not exclusive emphasis on the local Churches founded by the Apostles themselves. Yet all the Churches founded later by missionaries from these primordial Churches are apostolic by " *consanguinitas doctrinae."* [85]

To sustain his claim of complete doctrinal continuity and consistency, Tertullian appeals to the evidence of the universal Church, especially as seen in the local Churches founded by

•• *Prae.* 13.5 (CC 1.198); *Prae.* 28.1. (CC 1.209). To be sure, in his later works, the Paraclete takes on ever increasing importance. Even here, Tertullian is careful to insist that there is no change in doctrine, only a greater progress in *disciplina* (in the direction of ever greater rigorism) .

[85] *Prae.* 32.6 (CC 1.213) .

Apostles. The basis of argumentation is still to be found in the idea of succession, a notion which Tertullian describes in almost the exact words of Clement of Rome. The Apostles in their missionary preaching founded local Churches. They, who had received the integral teaching from Christ, passed this on to these same Churches with the exhortation and warning not to adulterate or distort this work of the Lord.[86]

The lesson is that one who is seriously seeking the true teaching of Christ and his Apostles must go to these same Churches. Such Churches are conveniently scattered about the Roman world so that they may be consulted with relative ease wherever the sincere seeker may be located. Rome is the apostolic church of record for Carthage as well as the whole West. It is outstanding for its association with not just one but three Apostles and these, the leaders of the Apostolic band.[87] The uniformity of this apostolic teaching found the world over in these ancient Churches as well as their offshoots is proof that they have preserved the Lord's teaching undefiled. These Churches are the *matrices et originales fidei*.[88]

Yet in all this, there is no hint of automatic acceptance of a doctrine because it is proposed by an authoritative person or structure. Doctrines taught by Christ and handed on by the Apostles are to be accepted, of course. But this is precisely the question: What are these doctrines? Tertullian does not appeal to an authoritative individual or body which is viewed as having the power to decide what the teaching of the apostles is in the contemporary world. Neither the bishop of an apostolically founded Church nor his community is to decide what that teaching is. They are simply to pass on what they have received intact to the next generation and to other newly

[86] Clement of Rome 4!U-2 (LCL 78-80); *Prae.* 37.1 (CC 1.217); *Prae.* 21.4 (CC 1.203); *Prae.* 20.5 (CC 1.202).

[87] *Prae.* 32, 36 (CC 1.212-3; 216-7). Peter, Paul and John. Tertullian is the earliest instance of the apocryphal tradition in which John was thrown into boiling oil in Rome in an unsuccessful attempt at execution.

[88] *Prae.* 21.4 (CC 1.202).

founded Churches. The apostolicity of persons or offices *is* totally subordinated to the apostolicity of what it is they are commissioned to transmit. [39] The structures of the local Churches are not the masters of this doctrine but its servants. They are not its makers, but its witnesses and purveyors. [40] In fine, Tertullian's arguments are not an appeal to structures of authority, but an historical appeal to the preservation of the apostolic preaching in the public teaching of the Churches founded directly or indirectly by the Apostles. The basic structure of doctrinal authority, the episcopate, was already in place. Papal and conciliar structures developed from it. Yet the episcopate is still viewed as subordinate to and controlled by the teaching it has received from the past.

III.

In the approximately 230 years separating the two related works of Tertullian and Vincent of Lerins, the whole world was transformed and turned upside down. The Western empire, for Tertullian the bulwark holding off the end, [41] now was in disarray, divided up among barbarian invaders. Christianity, the once suspect and hounded sect, had become the official religion of the empire. Wracked by dissension in the Arian and Donati.st controversies as well as by a host of lesser contentions, it nevertheless could boast of having enjoyed the devoted service of most of the leading minds of late antiquity. Throughout the trials of the fourth century, the Church had envisaged its task in exactly the same way as always: to preserve and hand on intact the deposit of faith. But at the same time, there had been considerable developmental growth in the structures and offices of doctrinal authority, notably the monarchical episcopate in its divergent forms as manifested in the Roman primacy and the ecumenical council. By the time of the Council of Ephesus (431), the conciliar structure had become the prin-

•• F. Refoule, *Traite* (SC 46,
[40] *Prae.* 6.3-4 (CC 1.191).
[41] *Apologeticum* (CC Dekkers).

cipal means of confronting serious and widespread doctrinal disagreements.

Augustine, who died in Hippo as preparations for the Council of Ephesus were being made in the East, apparently attributed supreme authority to this organ of the Church and the bishops. In his lengthy debates with the Donatists, Augustine was faced with the embarrassing task of admitting that Cyprian had been wrong in his views on the rebaptism of heretics. Yet he attempted to exculpate the great African hero-martyr, at least partially, by recalling that the question in his day was still basically an open one. Since Cyprian's time, a plenary council had spoken and the consensus of the Church had been made clear, thus depriving the Donatists of any excuse or of any further justification for carrying on the old practices. [42]

Individual authors may err, local councils may be wrong. All must give way to the authority of plenary councils. [43] Augustine wrote in the context of trying to show that, however exalted Cyprian's position in the African Church, his opinion could not be considered infallible against the decision of the Church as a whole expressed in later plenary councils. While Augustine's statement about later councils correcting (improving?) earlier ones is much disputed, his views of the plenary council as having a final authority are clear. What is not clear is what he means by a plenary council. He states that earlier plenary councils have "often" been corrected by later ones but when Augustine wrote (c. 400-1), only Nicaea was commonly accepted in the West as an ecumenical council in the modern sense. Obviously what we mean by an ecumenical council cannot simply be equated with Augustine's "plenary" council.

Some thirty-three years after Augustine's *De Baptismo* and

[42] Augustine *De Baptismo* 1.18.28 (BibAug 29.116-120. Paris, 1964).

[43] Augustine *De Baptismo* 2.3.4. (BibAug 29.132-4). On Augustine's views on councils, see: F. Hofmann, "Die Bedeutung der Konzilien fiir die kirchliche Lehrentwicklung nach dem heiligen Augustinus" 81-89. (in) J. Betz and H. Fries, hrsg. *Kirche und Uberlieferung,* Freiburg, 1960.; more recently, H. J. Sieben, "Zur Entwicklung der Konzilsidee" Part 4: Augustine and (for what follows) Part 5: Vincent. *Theologie und Philosophie* 46 (1971) 364-386; 496-528.

in the wake of the council of Ephesus, Vincent, a monk of Lerins, an island off the coast of S. Gaul, wrote the second work of interest to us as one of the few ancient treatments dealing explicitly with the questions of doctrine, orthodoxy and authority. Not without a certain irony, it has been suggested that the work was discreetly but pointedly aimed at Augustine and his supporters. Feeling that Augustine in his declining years had gone too far in his writings on grace and predestination, Vincent, the argument goes, brought up the cases of Origen and Tertullian to assert that however great any individual author, he is not guaranteed immunity from error. Yet so great was Augustine's reputation after his death that this polemic had to be carried on without so much as a mention of his name.[44] In any event, the solution to the question of Vincent's view of Augustine is no part of this essay.

Depite the more than two centuries separating them and the developments of these two centuries, there is a surprising continuity between Tertullian and Vincent. Like Tertullian, Vincent is aware of the difficulties of relying on Scripture alone for settling doctrinal disputes. The same text is interpreted in quite diverse fashions by different people. In fact, heretics are very zealous in their insistence on Scripture. The heretic will scour the Scriptures to present thousands of examples and testimonies to support his own ideas. They are well aware that this is the surest way to ensnare the innocent and the gullible.[45] Like Tertullian, Vincent knows that something more is needed beyond the authority of Scripture. This something extra is basically the Scriptures as interpreted by the tradition of the Church.[46]

[44] For a negative view on this question, see: W. O'Connor. "St. Vincent of Lerins and St. Augustine" *Doctor Communis* 16 (1963) rn3-257.

[45] Vincent of Lerins. *Commonitorium* (ed. by Adolf Jiilicher, Tiibingen, 1925) 2, 26, *25* (Jiilicher 3, 42, 39).

[46] *Comm.* 29 (Jiilicher 46); "Non quia canon solus non sibi ad universa sufficiat, sed quia verba divina pro suo plerique arbitratu interpretantes varias opiniones erroresque concipiant, atque ideo necesse sit, ut ad unam ecclesiastici sensus regulam scripturae caelestis intelligentia dirigatur."

Vincent had much more history to look back over than did Tertullian. It is not surprising then that there is less direct and obvious reference to the Apostles in Vincent. Yet, once again, the basic argument of both Vincent and Tertullian is the same, though expressed differently. Tertullian had taken, as a basic axiom, the temporal priority of truth over truth's counterfeit. The original must predate its imitation. Vincent's more sophisticated appeal to antiquity, universality and consent rests on the presumption that the authentic tradition is ancient and error is novel. In Vincent, too, the apostolic is there as the basic datum but because the time of the Apostles is so much more distant, the reaching back is that much more tortuous, the dangers that much more numerous and subtle.

With the usual presupposition that the Apostles have handed down the teaching of Christ whole and entire and that it is the task of each Christian generation to do exactly the same, Vincent outlines his solution of how this is to be accomplished. Scripture does not interpret itself. Such interpretation must be directed " according to the norm of the ecclesiastical and catholic sense." [47] In short, one must cling to that which has been taught *ubique, semper* and has been accepted *ab omnibus.* This alone can be considered truly and properly Catholic. New and questionable developments are ruled out by the requirement for antiquity. False teachings which may give the impression of antiquity will be eliminated from consideration in a restricted area. The Christian must eschew the craving for novelty and cling to the " *tradita et recepta semel antiquitus credendi regula."* [48]

Vincent begins his work by speaking of the doctrines handed down by the ancestors and deposited with us. These doctrines, however, are not simply entrusted to individuals. The Church is to be " the loyal and careful guardian of what has been entrusted to her." [49] Is this any different from Tertullian? Basi-

[47] *Comm.* 2 (Jiilicher 8).
[48] *Comm.* 21 (Jiilicher 81).
[49] *Comm.* 28 (Jiilicher 86).

cally, no. The Catholic of Tertullian's time, after all, was not left on his own. Specifically he was directed to consult the Churches founded by the Apostles. For Tertullian, what the Apostolic Churches taught was traced back to the Apostles. There was a *de facto* consensus among all these local Churches at any given time although they did not through their representatives come together to express it formally.

For Vincent, this appeal has been replaced by a more formal mechanism. Instead of the simple appeal to antiquity and universality, there was an historically more verifiable appeal to consent as expressed in the councils. If there arises some question about error in antiquity, the inquirer will .seek out the decrees of a previous ecumenical council to solve his doubt. These councils have not decreed anything new; rather they have made more clear or explicit what had been believed before confusion was introduced by the wiles of heretics. The authoritative decrees of such councils, basing themselves on the faith of the Fathers, fix and make more definite the *regula fidei.* It is not lawful to scorn such conciliar decisions. [50]

Vincent's vocabulary demonstrates the development and importance of these structures of doctrinal authority. In times of heretical attack, the teachings of the past are in danger: " superiorum *instituta* violantur . . . rescinduntur *scita* patrum ..." [51] In contrast to these rather vague terms, Vincent with growing frequency speaks of the <*lecreta* and *definita* of councils. The decrees of an ecumenical council are always to be preferred to the temerity of a small group of individuals. These councils have combatted heresy by explicitating the beliefs of the ancients in their *decreta.* The decisions of the council of Ephesus, guided by God *(divinitus)* are apostolic and catholic <*lecreta.* When heretics distort the deposit of truth, councils take what has been handed down in tradition and render it more secure and sure by confirming Catholic tradition in clear and concise documents. [52]

[50] *Comm.* 3, 23, 28, 33 (Jiilicher 4, 36, 46, 52).
[51] *Comm.* 4 (Jiilicher 5-6).
[52] *Comm.* 3, 27, 23, 33 (Jiilicher 4, 43, 36, 51-2).

With the focus on councils, there is less stress on apostolic sees. Alexandria and Antioch receive scarce attention. Rome receives special mention for its efforts for orthodoxy on two occasions. Rome, for Vincent, is *the* Apostolic See. The bishops of Rome are " the blessed successors of the blessed Apostles," the Apostles referred to being not the Twelve but Peter and Paul. Stephen is applauded for resisting the African custom of rebaptizing heretics. Stephen outdid others in his devotion to the faith as he surpassed others" *loci auctoritate."* But, the reference to Stephen comes in the context of praise for individuals of the past who combatted heretical novelties rather than praise for institutions. In Vincent's own time, Popes Celestine and Sixtus III are lauded for their efforts during and after the Council of Ephesus. But attention is centered on the Council itself.[58]

Yet there were many doctrines and controversies that countcils had never treated. How was the tradition of the Fathers to be safeguarded in these cases? In this instance, one is thrown back on the views of the Christian thinkers and writers of the past. Here Vincent sees the need for great care. After all, one of his purposes in writing is to warn against the exaggerated esteem accorded to some individuals which has led to difficulties in the Church. Whether it be Tertullian or Origen in older days (17-18) or Nestorius in his own day (11), individuals, however brilliant or great, can go astray. The shining example of a dedicated life can be tarnished and destroyed in the end by pride. Why does God permit it? Vincent never tires of repeating Deut. 13: 1-4 concerning false prophets: " The Lord is testing you ..." Clever heretics seek to justify their notions by bringing forward alleged support from the more obscure passages of some ancient author who cannot explain or defend himself. They not only seek to deceive the .living but bring insult and disgrace on the dead whose shortcomings should have been buried in silence.[54]

[58] *Comm.* 6, (Jiilicher 8, 50-1).
[54] *Comm.* 7 (Jiilicher 9).

Therefore, if a past conciliar decision is lacking, one must turn for guidance to the writers of the past. The essential thing is to seek a consensus of the past and not to be satisfied with the opinions of only one or two authors. This consensus entails the unanimous or nearly unanimous definitions and op1mons of the bishops and doctors. More specifically,

He will seek answers from the Fathers; he will compare their opm10ns. He will seek especially for what has been taught in different times and different places by men who remained in communion with the faith of the Church and who have come to be considered approved teachers (*magistri probabiles)* . Everything that they have affirmed, written, taught, not just as individuals, not just two or three of them, but all of them together, in complete agreement, openly and often, with persistence-all this a Catholic can believe without hesitation. [55]

As soon as a hersy is detected, those who are diligent in the defence of the faith must set about collecting the opinions of the ancients with a view to refuting the error. Vincent later repeats a string of adverbs qualifying these collected opinions of the Fathers-what has been held and received " *uno eodemque sensu manifeste frequenter perseveranter."* **It** should be, he adds, as if one were listening to a council of these *magistri.* Lacking a council, we must seek the " consensus of the great teachers." [56]

Here the two concepts join, the authoritative council and the collected views of the Fathers. Both are expressions of consensus, the first unified in time and place; the second, gathering opinions from men widely scattered in country and century. The defenders of the faith of old clung tenaciously and faithfully to the decrees and definitions of all the priests of the Holy Church. " Who ever started a heresy except the one who first cut himself off from the consensus of the universal and ancient Catholic Church? " [57]

[55] *Comm.* 2, 3 (Jiilicher 3, 4) "… omnes pariter nno eodemque consensu aperte frequenter perserveranter tenuisse scripsisse docuisse cognoverit …"

[56] *Comm.* 28, 27 (Jiilicher 44, 43) .

[57] *Comm. 5,* 24 (Jiilicher 7, 38) .

At the recently concluded council of Ephesus, Cyril of Alexandria had introduced a florilegium of patristic texts to support his position against Nestorius. By divine inspiration (*divinitus),* comments Vincent, the Fathers of the council decreed that all must adhere to the tradition represented by the ancients. This indeed was a sacred *aonsensio* inspired by the gift of heavenly grace. In the Council of Ephesus, there was found, in Vincent's view, the agreement of the Bishops accepting the consensus of the Fathers, to proclaim in unambiguous terms the truth of the faith handed down from the beginning. "Wherefore, neither the apostolic definitions nor the ecclesiastical decrees may be scorned, by which in accordance with the holy *consensio* of universality and antiquity, all heretics of all the ages ... have been condemned . . ." [58]

IV.

Madoz, author of one of the few monographs on Vincent, has complained of his excessively historical [59] bias and the fact that the hierarchy as *ecclesia docens* plays such a secondary role in the treatise. This observation is correct. Despite the centuries intervening, the arguments of both Tertullian and Vincent remain appeals to historical verification of the claim that the orthodox teaching of the Church of any century is that teaching which has been faithfully handed down and preserved from the Apostles themselves. Tertullian appeals to the local Churches as living witnesses of the undistorted teachings of Christ. Preeminent among these are the Churches founded by the Apostles themselves, of which again Rome is the outstanding example. But in theory at least, any local Church founded by the Apostles, directly or indirectly, can fulfill Tertullian's requirements. Historically, each one can trace the line of its bishops back to the founding Apostle or missionary. It is an historically verifiable genealogy, that is

[58] *Comm.* 33 (Jiilicher 51-2).

[69] J. Madoz, *El Concepto de la Tradicion en S. Vfoente de Lerins* 166. (Rome: 1933, Analecta Gregoriana 5).

also a pedigree of doctrine. The key figure emerging in Tertullian's discussion, as in the whole rationale of apostolic succession, is the monarchical bishop. Yet, at this early date, his position is still primarily one of witness to that which he has received from those who came before him.

Vincent, writing in 434, remains largely in the .same line. There is less explicit and direct mention of Apostles. Yet they are very much there. The appeal to universality, antiquity and consent is still almost entirely an appeal to historical verification. The important institutional development is the rise of the council of bishops, especially the ecumenical council. But even this is seen largely within the perspective of historical verification that the contemporary doctrine of the Church is that of the Church of the Apostles.

The council is seen as an authoritative body, a structure of doctrinal authority in the world Church. But it derives its authority from the proclamation of the truth and the deposit of faith handed down from the Apostles. Lacking a council, the faithful Christian seeks to adhere to the consensus of the Fathers who are, as it were, a council of *magistri.* The council of bishops must do essentially the same thing-it discerns the teaching of the past and denounces modern innovations and errors. The appeal is still to the past, the verification and renewed proclamation of the teaching of the Apostles rather than to the contemporary authority of the council as a structure composed of authoritative office holders. We are, in the fifth century, still at a point in which the teaching proclaimed is the authoritative agent rather than the body proclaiming the teaching. The monarchical bishop of Tertullian's argument and the ecumenical council of Vincent's are still the witnesses to the truth, not its masters.

ROBERT B. ENO, S. S.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

ACTION, PERSONHOOD, AND FACT-VALUE

THE FACT-VALUE issue-whether or not values can be derived from facts or "ought" from "is "-has emerged as the fundamental problem in contemporary ethical and value theory.[1] For what is at stake is the validity of ethical and value judgments as such. In its usual form, however, the problem seems virtually insoluble. As we shall see, it is fallacious to derive value solely from fact. On the other hand, it is also mistaken to hold that value has no relation to fact, that values are arbitrarily postulated by private emotive preferences, or that they are somehow mysteriously intuited.

The fact-value problem, then, is a dilemma; both alternatives or horns are equally unacceptable. This is enough indication that it is a pseudo-problem based upon a false dualism between fact and value. In our original experience-which we shall see is action-fact and value are not separate but interconnected. In reflection we .separate them and assume that they are also separate in experience, thus creating the fact-value dualism. Our task then becomes one of trying to join together what we have sundered by asking whether value can be derived from fact. However, as is the case with other dualisms-whether spirit and matter, subject and object, or thought and action-once a gulf is made between two fundamental categories of reality, bridging it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

The aim of this article is to overcome the fact-value dualism by showing how value originates in action, and that action, properly understood, constitutes the primary level of human

[1] See, for example, W. D. Hudson, ed., *The Is-Ought Question* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969). See also Kenneth Pahel and Marvin Schiller, eds., *Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 1-IS!'l.

activity and experience. To make this point, in Part I I shall briefly present three basic aspects of human nature or per.son-hood: mutuality, agency, and reason.[2] Then in Part II I shall examine the bearing of this anthropology on the origin and nature of value in general, focussing upon the fact-value issue. Space does not permit me to develop specific modes or types of value.

I. Anthropological Foundations

A. The Mutuality of the Personal

Much of traditional philosophy-especially Modern philosophy since Descartes-has adopted the individualistic conception of the person. According to this view, man is constituted as a person independently of his relations with other per.sons; sociality, culture, and community are peripheral or accidental rather than fundamental or essential to human personhood. On the other hand, there have been other currents of thought, especially in the twentieth century, which are strongly anti-individualistic. Thinkers such as Buber/ Marcel,4 and Macmurray,[5] not to mention the behavioral sciences, have emphasized the mutuality of the personal. According to this view, interpersonal relatedness pertains to the core or essence of personhood; the unit of personal existence is not " I " but " You and I " ; and the fundamental or primary human reality is the entire field of persons-in-relation. This field by definition in-

[2] For a fuller development of these three themes-especially reason-see my "A Personalist Theory of Human Reason," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* XIV, No. 2 (1974), pp. 161-80.

[8] *I and Thou,* trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith, Scribner Library (2nd ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) .

•*The Mystery of Being,* trans. by G. S. Fraser and Rene Hague, Vol. I: *Reflection and Mystery,* Vol. II: *Faith and Reality,* Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960).

[5] *The Form of the Personal,* Vol. I: *The Self as Agent;* Vol. II: *Persons in Relation* (London: Faber and Faber Limited; New York: Harper and Row, 1957 and 1961). I am indebted to Macmurray for a number of important ideas in this paper. See also my own study, *John Macmurray's Logical Form of the Personal: A Critical Exposition* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, 1970).

eludes all persons, and is the inclusive context and matrix for all aspects of experience, culture, and individuality. There is nothing that can be called truly personal that is not related to and not dependent upon the mutuality of persons. Even an individual's biological makeup is transmitted in and through the interpersonal context; it depends upon the procreation of persons.[6]

As including all persons, the mutuality of the personal refers to both the direct and indirect relations of persons. The first involves face-to-face contact, or personal acquaintance. The second lacks this quality, yet the persons involved are related to each other politically, economically, or metaphysically. I am politically related to those Americans on the West Coast whom I do not know, since we all belong to the same nation. I am economically related to those Italians who built and exported my automobile. And I am metaphysically related to the people of India and China, for we are all members of the human family; we are all brothers under the fatherhood of God. Since there are some four billion people on earth, it is clear that the vast majority of interpersonal relations are indirect rather than direct. Still, the direct relations are the basis for the indirect ones; without the direct relations of persons there would be no indirect relations.

Mutuality's emphasis on relatedness, however, does not deny the reality and importance of personal individuality. On the contrary, the mutuality of the personal is its necessary condition; it is only in and through the interpersonal context that the individual can exist and grow. Both relationality and individuality are essential dimensions of personhood; neither by itself constitutes a person's total reality. Still, relationality is primary, while individuality-both that which is given at birth and that acquired after birth-is secondary and derivative, yet necessary. On the other hand, for individualism, individuality is primary and relationality is secondary.[7]

[6] Unless otherwise indicated, " person " refers solely to human persons.

• Although thinkers such as Hegel and Marx emphasize man as fundamentally

For individualism, the realm of persons-in-relation is an " aggregate " ; for the mutuality of the personal, it is a " field." An aggregate is a group whose members are extrinsically related to each other, e.g., a heap of stones. Take away the heap, take away the extrinsic relations among the stones, and each stone retains its full individuality. Similarly, for individualism, take away the relations of persons and each person is left intact in his individuality. Each person is first fully-constituted as an individual person in his own right and then, as a secondary and peripheral moment of his existence, becomes related to other persons. This aggregate view of persons-in-relation can be seen in the early Modern social-contract theory of society, in Descartes' conception of personhood as *cogito,* and in the Aristotelian-Scholastic definition of man as a rational substance in which relation is merely an "accident." On the other hand, the field theory holds that the relations among persons are *intrinsic* to their personhood; take away the relations among persons, and one *ipso facto* takes away the persons who hitherto were related. For the aggregate theory, there can be an" I" in isolation; for the :field theory, there is no "I" apart from the" I-You" relationship.

The foregoing emphasis on man as *person* does not suggest some kind of dualism between him and Nature or cosmos. For just as an individual person needs an Other with which to interact, so also does the whole field of persons need its own Other. This Other is the rest of reality: God, social institutions, Nature, and matter. Hence, the mutuality of the personal implicitly involves the totality of reality; there is no aspect of reality that is not related to it in some way. Moreover, since the whole field of persons-in-relation is related to the other levels of reality, so also are individual persons related to them, although not in the same way as they are related to other per-

relational, they do so at the expense of his individuality. For Hegel, the individual person is swallowed up by the Absolute and by the State. For Marx, the individual person lacks any real transcendence to Nature and to social institutions in general.

sons. Still, the central matrix of human activity is the mutuality of persons.

B. Person as Agent

Granted that man is fundamentally relational rather than an individual, what does interpersonal relatedness consist of? My view is that it consists primarily of action rather than thought; action is *ipso faoto* interaction; it is inherently interrelational.[8] The self (or person) cannot act in isolation; he needs the Other with which to interact. Thought, on the other hand, is a private and inward activity. In reflection the self withdraws from active relation with others into himself and his world of ideas. In this sense it is individualistic. Action corresponds to the relational aspect of mutuality; thought as such corresponds to its individual aspect. This does not mean, however, that thought has *no* relation to the Other. Such an assertion would be manifestly false. In action the Other is given originally and directly; in thought the Other is given derivatively and indirectly, through the mediation and representation of concepts and symbols. Thought, then, is individualistic in its intention, although it is relational in its reference and, indeed, must be for it to be true. Action, on the other hand, is relational in its very intention. Moreover, in view of the relational character of action, it has a collective dimension: not only does it involve a singular agent interacting with a non-personal Other, but more significantly a plurality of agents in concert. As such it includes both the direct and indirect relations of persons.

The self, then, exists as primarily agent and secondarily as thinker; the self's being lies primarily in his agency and only secondarily in his thinking capacity. This can also be seen by analyzing the inner constitution of thought and action. Action

[8] Cf. *The Self as Agent.* For an anthology of different views on various aspects of action, see Myles Brand, ed., *The Nature of Human Action* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1970). See also my own article, "Thought, Action, and Personhood," *The Modern Schoolman,* Lii, No. 3 (1975), pp. 271-83.

in comparison with thought is a much more inclusive activity of the self. In thought the " mind " alone is active; in action both " mind " and " body " are active. Action is not blind. It contains a cognitive element as necessary to its constitution. For in action not only are we aware that we are acting, but also, to some extent at least, we know what we are doing. This awareness or cognition in action is called " intention," which, on the practical leivel, may be defined as what we are aiming at in action. Moreover, intention involves sense-perception and freedom. The latter is the self's capacity to choose between alternative courses of action, or between the possibilities that are constitutive of the situation which confronts the agent. To act is *ipso facto* to choose. Without choice, action would not be action at all but merely organic "behavior." A deterministic action is a contradiction in terms. Again, to choose between possibilities requires a motive--a " reason " why we choose one possibility over the others.[9] Finally, motives involve emotions or feeling, the springboards of action. There is no motive in action without feeling.

Consequently, besides its mo.st salient feature, bodily or physical movement, action also includes intention (or cognition) , sense-perception, choice, motive, and feeling, all of which are integrated with movement to constitute one continuous activity. When we think, however, we exclude at least bodily movement; what else is excluded depends upon how " pure " the thinking becomes. The purer it becomes, the more it excludes the other elements and moves in a kind of gossamer world of abstract and general ideas; the more intensive thought becomes, the less extensive it is of the selfs power:s and capacities. Action, then, is a fully concrete activity of the self in which all his basic capacities are employed, whereas thought is constituted by the exclusion of some of his powers and a withdrawal into an activity which is less concrete and less existential. The self-as-agent is the self in his existential whole-

[9] Motive, then, should not be confused with intention, as they often are. The intention is what we are doing; the motive is why we are doing it.

ness, while the self-as-thinker denotes only an aspect of the self. In this sense "agent" and "person" are co-extensive terms; persons-in-relation are agents-in-relation.

Agency or action, then, is inclusive of personal existence. Consequently, action does not denote only the more physically intensive types of action, e.g., athletics and manual skills, which are often called practical in a narrow sense. More importantly, it includes any act of *communication,* from simple conversations to complex and sophisticated activities such as political negotiations and professional conventions. Communication is properly called action because of its relational or interactive character, and because it involves those essential elements of action which have just been mentioned. It must be .stressed that action is not necessarily a *primarily* physical activity; physical movement is merely one of action's several elements. Many actions involve only" mild" physical activity, while at the same time they involve a high intensity or quality of cognition. On the other hand, in many physically strenuous kinds of action, the cognitive element is minimal or recessive. Indeed, if the bulk of the agent's energy is expended in physical activity, there is less remaining for the cognitive element. In its ultimate extension, action includes the total range of interactions between self and Other; it constitutes what Dewey has called "primary experience." [10]

C. Reason and Personhood

My argument so far may be summarized as follows: the mutuality of the personal is the fundamental and all-inclusive given of personal reality, and the nexus of relations contained therein is primarily actional. Reason is a function of these two basic ideas. In its experiential origin or primary expression, it is the capacity by which man determines *how* he should act or relate himself toward the Other-personal or otherwise. [11] It

[10] *Experience and Nature* (2nd ed.; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), pp. la-S9.

[11] As this statement suggests, and as we shall see, reason is inclusive of will.

may be defined as the self's capacity for self-transcendence: the capacity to act from or for oneself (i.e., autonomously or subjectively) and in terms of the nature or objectivity of the Other. Non-rational behavior, on the other hand, stems from the capacity of an organism to react deterministically to stimuli from the Other in terms of the organism's own biological constitution. Thus, there are two essential differences between rational and non-rational activity. First, rational activity is free or autonomous, while non-rational activity is determined. Secondly, rational activity comprehends the inner nature of the Other, while non-rational activity reacts to the Other in terms of how an organism's impulses, drives, and instincts are affected by the Other. Since an act of genuine human love is a free, subjective response to the objective needs or inner nature of another person, it is rational. On the other hand, a dog who " loves " his master is merely reacting to stimuli from the Other which are associated with the past satisfaction of the dog's basic biological needs of food, shelter, and comfort.[12] Such animal activity, then, is non-rational. It may be adequately represented by a stimulus-response model, but such a model is scarcely adequate for rational activity.

Instead, reason may be represented as a synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity; one is the condition for the other, and without one the other could not exist. "Subjectivity" denotes the self's capacity to act freely or autonomously, his capacity for self-reflection, self-initiative, and self-determination. " Objectivity" denotes the self's capacity to grasp or comprehend, and to act in terms of, the nature or otherness of the **Other.**

[12] For a similar contrast between human love and animal "love," see Werner Stark, "Teilhard and the Problem of Human Autonomy," *Preceedings of the Teilhard Conference 1964* (New York: Human Energetics Research Institute, Fordham University, 1964), pp. 81-84. For example, Stark makes the following observation on mother ants who fondle and kiss their young from morning to night. " Take a baby ant out of the hill, wash it and put it back, and you will find that the supposedly loving mother will completely ignore it, in fact, will let it perish. The sober truth of the matter is that mother ants lick the babies because the babies are covered with a sweet-tasting sweat which they enjoy licking." (P.

But why is one the condition for the other? Take science, for example, which everyone will agree is a rational activity of some sort. As rational, it is both subjective and objective. It is subjective because to think scientifically is to think independently, employing a rigorous methodology which itself is a subjective construction, instead of believing something on the basis of custom, tradition, or authority. However, for thought to be truly independent or subjective, it must also be objective: it must be based upon the otherness of the Other-which indeed science is-not upon one's own private fancies or prepossessions. The earth is round whether we like it or not. Indepen· dent thought does not occur in a vacuum but in a "mind " open to reality. In this sense, objectivity is the condition for subjectivity.

This can also be seen by comparing science with its opposite: superstition and dogmatism. If one believes that the earth is flat, such a belief, of course, lacks objectivity, since the earth is really round. But it also lacks subjectivity. A belief which flies in the face of conclusive evidence to the contrary is non-independent or heteronomous, the result of some *external* factor of the Other-e. g., custom, tradition, authority-imposing itself deterministically upon the self and thwarting his capacity to think freely and for himself. Since this thought is not objective, it cannot be genuinely subjective either.

Correlatively, subjectivity is the condition for objectivity. One can guess or arbitrarily believe that the earth is round. But until one demonstrates this proposition scientifically, until one has sufficient evidence to support it, the proposition lacks true objectivity. Although it *happens* to be in conformity with the nature of the Other, the self has not *comprehended* this conformity. In this case, then, unless one follows a procedure embodying independent thinking-i. e., scientific methodology-there is no way to guarantee that the Other is really as our belief asserts.

Man's capacity for self-transcendence, then, which is precisely his capacity for synthesizing subjectivity and objectivity,

is the essence of reason and the root of that which distinguishes man from animal. It is thus the common core of all those phenomena commonly associated with the distinctively human: self-consciousness, conceptualization and reflection, intentionality, culture, language and other forms of symbolization, the distinctively human feelings such as love, compassion, and kindness, and everything that all of these imply-religion, morality, politics, philosophy, science, mathematics, art, technology, etc. Even in the case of self-consciousness, which seems to involve "pure" subjectivity it is only by grasping the objectivity of the Other that one can grasp one's own selfhood. Self-consciousness, in other words, is mediated by consciousness of the Other's objectivity, and vice-versa. This is implied by the mutuality of the personal.

In brief we may say that mutuality, agency, and reason are three moments in the constitution and growth of selfhood. Mutuality provides the context and matrix in which and through which the self exists. In turn, he exists primarily as agent, interacting with other agents. Finally, as agent, he is continually required to decide, in virtue of his rational capacity, how he should act toward the Other.

II. Fact and Value

Our primary experience of value-what we experience as good and bad, right and wrong-is constitutive of action.[13] This proposition may be demonstrated as follows. Action, we have seen, contains choice as an essential element. To act is to do " this " rather than " that," to actualize one possibility or alternative in a .situation, and in so doing to negate the others. And since action is interrelational, choice is necessarily directed toward the Other. Now, to actualize one possibility

[13] The terms " value " and " disvalue " will be used interchangeably with the terms " good " and " bad " and " right " and "wrong," respectively. This is not the case, however, with the term "ought." My value theory is axiological rather than deontological: value is the ground of ought and obligation rather than the other way around.

in a situation thus negating the others is to characterize (or judge) the chosen one as "right" or "good" and the negated ones as " wrong " or " bad." Although this characterization or judgment applies explicitly only to the situation in which the choice occurs, it extends, by implication, to all situations of that type. Without this valuation-in-action, action itself would be impossible, since in action the end sought is *ipso facto* designated as "good." Conversely, without action, valuation itself would be impossible. For action is its primary source, since the interrelation of agents or persons is the fundamental and inclusive context of all experience.

To avoid misunderstanding, a number of qualifications must be made to the foregoing argument. First, choice-in-action must not be confused with mental choosing: the act of deciding which often precedes a particular action-and indeed should-and which is the result of deliberation or reflection. The latter is not choice in the strict, concrete sense of the term. For we can and do change our mind before the (mentally) " chosen " action is performed-if indeed it is performed at all. However, once choice-in-action is intended or performed, there is no going back, there is no changing our mind. Action is irreversible. After it is performed, I may regret my choice, but I cannot undo my action. What I have done is a new reality which must now be reckoned with. Real choice, then, is the doing of an action, and "action is choice" (or conversely, "choice is action") whether or not action is preceded by mental choosing. Choice-in-action-or more precisely, the *power* of choice-in-action-is what I mean by the traditional concept of " will."

Secondly, choice-in-action as valuational does not imply that the agent's choice is *ipso facto* correct, or that his choice is a sufficient condition for the objective rightness of that action. For, since there must be at least two possibilities in a situation for choice-in-action to occur, it is always possible for the agent to choose the wrong one. The agent's choice merely *characterizes* the chosen alternative as good; it does not *constitute* it as good. The essential fallibility of the agent, then, is a corollary of the very structure of action.

Finally, my position seems to imply the Socratic doctrine that we cannot knowingly choose what we believe is wrong. In this conection, three points must be made. First, the agent's judgment of a chosen alternative as good means that it is chosen under the aspect of goodness, not that the chosen alternative is judged to be perfectly good. Conversely, the other alternatives or possibilities are negated under the aspect of badness, but not under complete badness. As the Medieval Scholastics held, evil as such cannot be chosen, since it is tantamount to nothing.

Secondly, as we have seen, action is primary while thought is secondary, and action itself contains a cognitive element as necessary to its constitution. Consequently, if there is a conflict betwen the agent's practical choice and mental judgment- i. e., if the agent actually performs what he claims he thinks or feels is wrong-it is his action rather than his mental judgment which is the primary indication of what he really believes is right. This statement, however, excludes " acts of passion," i. e., involuntary acts, which are not really actions at all in my sense of the term. The foregoing is another way of saying that, as far as morality goes, what we *do* is more important than what we think (and feel). As Aristotle observed, pure thought by itself moves nothing. It is action that makes a difference in the real world. Indeed, action may be defined as a modification or determination of reality. This is not to say that our thoughts and feelings by themselves are morally irrelevant. Indeed, it is precisely our feelings which illuminate the whole realm of values. If we did not experience reality or being in terms of desires, inclinations, and aspirations, we would not be aware of value at all. Nevertheless, the original *locus* of feeling is as a constituent element of action. My main point is that action is the primary source of morality (or value) while thought and feeling as such are only a secondary source. What primarily counts in the moral order, then, is whether and how we act out our thoughts and feelings. Still, it must be recognized that they have a natural tendency to pass over into action.

Thirdly, the goods chosen in action are often inadequate or merely apparent; our choices are often the wrong ones. Again, if we make the right choice, its justification is necessary; the rational agent must be prepared to give good reasons for his choice. Consequently, value-in-action needs reflective value-i. e., value judgments which are the term of reflection rather than of action-for its rectification, improvement, and justification. Reflection explicitates our practical choices to see whether or not they can be justified when brought out into the open. In other words, in terms of the person-as-agent, practical value is primary, and reflective value is secondary yet necessary.

While values arise from action or the interrelation of agents, it is reason-i. e., the *rational* agent-which *intends* them. This intentionality involves three phases. Ffrst, the rational agent apprehends the situation, or the Other, in terms of its discrimination into a set of possibilities for action. Secondly, he valuates-in the light, ideally, of all the relevant factors and knowledge-each discriminated possibility. Thirdly, he wills-i. e., chooses or actualizes-the possibility he values most highly or positively. Will, then, as choice-in-action, is a necessary or constituent aspect of practical reason.

The foregoing sugests that reason or rationality is our standard of value. The valuable is that which is rational or reasonable; the disvaluable is that which is irrational or unreasonable. In view of our definition of reason, value is self-transcendent: it is that which is intended by, and is the term of, rationality. Whereas reason as such is the *capacity* for self-transcendence, value is the *actualizing* (i.e., intending) of self-transcendence. Hence, value is that which makes objective sense in terms of the constitution of the Other and at the same time brings into play the subjectivity of the self; it is the actualizing of the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity.

At this point, it may be objected that my concept of value implies axiological subjectivism or relativism. For, it will be asked: whose reason do we take as normative? This objection, however, is based upon a false conception of reason. For reason

is a capacity of man *qua* man; it is universal, common to all persons. Its subjective structure is the same for everybody. Moreover, reason's objective polei--the Other-likewise has the same basic structure for everybody. However, this is to deny neither the uniqueness of individual persons nor that each of us has a somewhat different vantage point on the Other. Rather, it is to affirm that the whole of Reality, which by definition is one, constitutes the objective pole of any self's reason, which itself is essentially the same for everyone. To be sure, this one Reality or Other is mediated by one's own experience. Nevertheless, it is the same objective reality which is experienced by all. In turn, this experience is interpreted through reason. Moreover, although the variable features of reality-especially on the personal level-are numerous and obvious enough, the invariable features are far more important and fundamental. For example, what human beings have in common, what distinguishes them from animals, is much more significant than what distinguishes one human being from another.

Let us now look into the relation of value to fact. In Modern ethical theory, the fact-value issue is bound up with the "naturalistic fallacy," which may be defined as the attempt to logically derive value from fact, or ought from is.[14] As so defined, it seems correct to call it a fallacy. For, from the standpoint of logic, the possibility of deriving value from fact, or ought from is, would imply that propositions containing value terms such as ' good," " right," and " ought" could be correctly or validly inferred from premisses containing no such terms. This simply cannot be done according to the accepted canons of deductive or inductive logic. To do so would be to argue that A is B, therefore A is C without introducing any proposition to connect B and C. Therefore, as one author points out: " In this: sense, those who insist that we cannot go from Is to Ought or from Fact to Value are perfectly correct. Such

[14] As is well-known, this term was coined by G. E. Moore. See *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1965), pp. but especially pp. 9-10.

an inference is logically invalid unless there is a special third logic which permits us to do so." [15] However, as the same author adds, such a logic does not yet exist.

On the other hand, to accept the validity of the naturalistic fallacy has its own difficulties. If values are not derived from facts, then from what are they derived? As one author puts it:

> If these (fact and value) are separate and incommensurable, as is customarily assumed, then there is no way in which, through a consideration of the natural order of things, we can ever determine the moral order of things. If fact and value are wholly separate and distinct, then no investigation of the facts of human nature can ever disclose what human good is or what is the good life for man. [16]

The validity of the naturalistic fallacy seems to suggest some kind of emotive theory of value, according to which value judgments are merely private expressions of emotional preference, while only factual judgments are public and objective. It seems, then, that the fact-value issue has reached an impasse: if we hold that value can be derived from fact, we violate logic; and if we hold that value cannot be derived from fact, then we deprive value of any real, rational, and objective foundation, thus suggesting that values are nothing more than arbitrary, emotive preferences.

However, the situation is not as dilemmatic as it appears. For there is another alternative. Within the context of action, we can hold that facts are " derived " from values. " Fact " denotes existence, or the actual and determinate aspect of the situation in which action is performed. However, there is more to action than existence or fact. As we have seen, action involves possibility as well as existence. Indeed, action, as the

[15] William Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 80.

[16] Henry B. Veatch, *Rational Man* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press), p. 199. For Veatch's entire critique of Moore and of the naturalistic fallacy, see pp. 188-208.

choosing of a possibility, is a synthesis of fact (or existence) and possibility; action unites the actual and the possible.

It is precisely this unity or synthesis of fact and possibility from which value (or disvalue) arises. If the agent acts rationally, i.e., synthesizes subjectivity and objectivity, he *ipso facto* achieves an *effective* synthesis of fact and possibility. In this case, (positive) value is affirmed. On the other hand, if the agent acts irrationally, i.e., if he fails to synthesize subjectivity and objectivity, he does, to be sure, actualize possibility and therefore in some sense unites the possible with the actual, but no effective synthesis of the two is achieved. In this case, disvalue is affirmed. Value, then, arises from and is constitutive of the wholeness of action, i. e., of the synthesis of fact or existence and possibility, which synthesis is achieved by the rational agent's synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity. In the concrete, however, there is not value as such but rather specific modes of value, e. g., ethical, religious, aesthetic, and instrumental value. In terms of the foregoing analysis, we may conclude that each mode of value arises from two simultaneous and interrelated conditions: (1) the level (or levels) of the Other-e. g., other persons, Nature, inanimate objects-toward which the agent's action is directed; and (2) the mode of action he performs with the Other, i. e., the specific way he is acting rationally, e.g., treating the Other as end or as means. In brief, each mode of value arises from a corresponding mode of rationality-or mode of synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity. However, this point cannot be developed here.

As arising from the wholeness of action, value is derived from neither fact nor possibility by itself. Indeed, in either case action and therefore value would be impossible. Regarding the fact-value problem, then, we do not have to violate logic by trying to derive value from fact. Nor do we have to determine some other " where " from which our values come. As constitutive of action, value is given in reality and in experience *ab initio.* Moreover, since value arises from the wholeness of action, whereas fact refers only to its existent aspect, it is fact

which is derived from value rather than the other way around, through an activity of reflective abstraction in which we eliminate value from original experience and obtain the concept of "pure" fact. In action, however, there are no pure facts. In action, fact is included within value as a constituent and subordinate part of value. Without fact there would be no existent basis for the possibilities to be evaluated and thus no values at all. On the other hand, value goes beyond fact to the possibilities themselves.

By including value within action, I am not denying its ontological irreducibility. Value is a unique feature or quality of action (albeit it pervades the whole of action); it is that which the rational agent produces and affirms in action through a synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity, and in so doing effectively synthesizes fact or existence with possibility.

In action, then, fact and value are inseparably connected in one integral experience. On the other hand, in reflection, the *concepts* of fact and value are first distinguished and then .separated out. When this happens, and when we forget that action is the original source of value, the fact-value problem is created. At the same time, it is also forgotten that fact and value are not ontologically on the same level. If they were, they would exclude each other, and the dualism between them would be impossible to overcome. Or as Macmurray puts it:

> When we contrast fact and value the conceptual opposition leads to the assumption that the contrasted elements are on the same level and existentially exclusive. In the same fashion we tend to think that the contrast between mind and matter implies that these are entities in the same sense and at the same level. Descartes thought of them as two ' substances ' : more vaguely we conceive them as different entities. This is one of the trickeries of language to which we are liable. It is clear that any assertion of value presupposes what is matter of fact; and the experience of value includes and supervenes upon the apprehension of fact. . . . The experience of value is not a different but rather a fuller experience than the experience of the fact which is valued, though it is true we may concentrate our attention on the valuational aspect of the

total experience; and this may on occasion lead us into mistakes about the character of the fact itself.[17]

In brief, value includes, subordinates, and is partially constituted by fact; value is "more than" rather than "other than" fact. Value cannot be derived from fact for the simple reason that the greater cannot be derived from the lesser; a whole cannot be derived from one of its parts. On the other hand, since in action fact is a constituent aspect or dimension of value, the concept of fact as such can be derived from value by a limitation of attention and intention to certain features of the fullness of action. For, in reflection, the lesser can be derived from the greater, a part can be derived from its whole.

At this juncture, however, a serious difficulty arises. What I have said so far applies only to *human* value. However, in my view, the universe is created by God-the infinite rational agent and person. As such the univel'.se is not the result of human rational action. This universe includes not only Nature but also human nature as a given prior to human choice-in-action. Does not God's creation have value in this sense? Or does it have value only insofar as man confers value upon it?

Let me say without qualification that God's creation does have value prior to human choice. The argument I have been developing with respect to human value also applies to divine value, albeit analogously. For, since God is a rational agent, creation is the result of His rational action; He creates the world by choosing the best possible out of a realm of possibilities. In this sense, Leibnitz is correct in saying that this is the best of all possible worlds. It is this divine rational action which endows creation as .such with its primordial value. Moreover, God's rational action creating the universe takes place out of the depths of His subjectivity. However, since God creates *ex nihilo*, His valuation cannot be a synthesis of subjectivity with objectivity, i.e., with an objective universe al-

[11] *Religion, Art and Science: A Study of the Reflective Activities in Man* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1961), pp.

ready given. Rather, His subjectivity creates the very objective universe (with the exception of social institutions, which are human creations), which is then to be synthesized with human subjectivity. Human valuation, then, is a kind of continuation and development of divine valuation, but on a somewhat different level, since man does not create *ex nihilo.* Nevertheless, since the objective world, including man, is created by God, man's valuation, as involving objectivity (and not only his subjectivity) , must be in harmony with divine valuation. This does not mean, to be sure, that man merely acquiesces to the universe's objective structures. If he did, human value could not occur at all. At the very least, man must subjectively ratify or affirm that which God presents to him as an objective given. But more significantly, mankind is called, through his subjectivity, to renew, promote, and develop the universe-especially the world of persons and their institutions. Finally, with respect to the fact-value is.sue, we arrive at the purely factual aspect of divine valuation by reflectively abstracting creation from divine agency thus obtaining the concept of the world as matter-of-fact.

Since the foregoing analysis of value has prescinded from its modal differentiations, it is necessarily sketchy and .somewhat abstract. To fill in the concrete content of value, we would have to distinguish its basic modes, which will be treated in a sequel to this paper. Enough has been said, hopefully, to indicate the general lines of overcoming the fact-value dualism.

VVALTERG.JEFFKO

Fitchburg State College
Fitchburg, Massachusetts

ARISTOTLE ON UNIVERSALS

THE CENTRALITY 0£ the 'one-many' problem or 'problem 0£ universals' to epistemology and metaphysics is hardly an issue £or argument. Questions regarding the metaphysical status 0£ universals and their relation to individuals, the process 0£ 'concept formation,' and the epistemological £unction 0£ universals in predication are classic ones in philosophy having originated with Socrates and Plato. In view 0£ the contemporary interest in these problems as well as the numerous studies 0£ other topics treated 0£ by Aristotle, it is a matter £or at least initial surprise that there exists no systematic account 9£ his views on universals. This is partially explicable by the £act that these questions are not dealt with by Aristotle in any single treatise or place in his works; indeed, texts relevant to these problems are scattered throughout them all, from the *Categories* to the *Poetics,* and even the fragments. In addition, many 0£ the texts are, as one might expect, obscure, and some apparently contradict others. Another £actor which might help explain the situation is that there is a traditional, 'orthodox' interpretation 0£ Aristotle's thinking on these matters, which gives rise to the impression that whatever he has to say on the topic is already known in sufficient detail, has been fully considered, evaluated, and refuted, so that it would be pointless to pursue the matter further. This impression has little basis in £act. The 'orthodox' interpretation has it that Aristotle is a 'moderate realist,' holding that universals exist somehow 'in' individuals.[1] Taken as it stands, this interpretation is worse than unhelpful. It does

[1] This view is propounded, for example, by Whitney J. Oates, *Aristotle and the Problem of Value* (Princeton, 1963), p. 182; Ralph W. Clark, "Saint Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Universals" *The Monist,* 58 (1974), p. 163; many other examples could be cited.

not tell us what a universal *is*, just that whatever it is, it exists 'in' things. The truth is that Aristotle's theory of universals has never been satisfactorily stated by his interpreters, and its adequacy as a general solution to the problems associated with universals has not been fairly assessed.

Our object in this paper is to present an interpretation of Aristotle's theory of universals which is detailed, precise, and based upon the relevant texts from the entire corpus. That is, we will not limit our discussion to the *Categories* only, or to the *Metaphysics* only, but will attempt to integrate the appropriate texts from many works into a unified and consistent doctrine. We shall consider, in order, the ontological status of universals and their relation to particulars, the psychological processes by which universals come to exist in the soul, and the role played by universals in knowledge. The theory which will emerge is, in brief, as follows: that universals for Aristotle exist only in the mind, *not'* in things' (although there *is* a *basi,s* for them in things), that universals arise in the mind through numerous inductions of particulars, and, contrary to the usual view, that it is universals which in fact make knowledge of individuals possible. Aristotle's theory is important, we shall conclude, because it does justice to the empirical facts, and to the requirements of scientific knowledge.

I

From the time of Porphyry onward, discussions of Aristotle's conception of a universal have centered about what occupies less than twenty lines in Bekker's text, a portion of chapter two of the *Categories.* We begin, then, with, an examination of these lines, for the core of Aristotle's theory is indeed to be found there. [2]

In this chapter Aristotle gives what appears to be an exhaustive classification 'of things' *(Twv ovTwv)* determined by

• Whether or not the *Categories* is an authentic work of Aristotle's, it has been commented upon by interpreters and taken as if were a genuine work, and we shall do so here.

two principles 0£ division: being 'said 0£' (A.eyerm) and being 'in' (ev) a subject *(v1ToKeiμh<p).* These principles are combined to give rise to a fourfold division 0£ reality. We begin with the most .straightforward and least controversial class which, since it comes last in Aristotle's exposition, we will designate as class (d) : " Some [things] are neither in a subject nor said 0£ a subject, for example, the individual man or the individual horse" (lb3-4, Ackrill tr.) . This class is not problematic: it is composed exclusively 0£ individual sensible substances. These are not ' predicated 0£ ' or ' said 0£ ' [8] anything else, nor do they exist ' in ' anything else. They are simply there, given.

Another class (b) 0£ individuals is marked out as being " in a subject but not said 0£ any subject" (la22-3) , for example "the individual-knowledge-of-grammar" (T/ 'l"t> translated as "a piece 0£ grammatical knowledge" (Cooke), " a certain point 0£ grammatical knowledge " (Edghill)) is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white (To 'l"t *A.evKov* "a particular whiteness" (Cooke), "a certain whiteness" (Edghill)) "is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body) but is not said 0£ any subject" (la26-9). Precisely what is intended to be marked out by this definition and the examples given is controversial, and several recent journal articles have been devoted to this question. We shall consider the point in a moment, but will be content now merely to agree with Ackrill (p. 74) that Aristotle refers here to "individuals in categories other than substance."

The remaining two classes are concerned with species and genera. (a): "Some [things] are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, man is said 0£ a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject" (la20-3). And (c):

• Whether these two expressions are equivalent in meaning is controversial. Hamlyn, "Aristotle on Predication" *Phronesis,* VI (1961), p. 113, and Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De lnterpretatione* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 76, see a difference; J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Aristotle on Predication" *The Philosophical Review,* LXXVI (1967), p. 85, n. 11, holds that Aristotle does not keep a distinction by use of two expressions,

"Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar (Tfjs *ypaμ,μ,anKfJs)"* (la29-b2). To simplify matters, we will hereafter substitute for " species and genera " the term " universal." [4] Summarizing, then, the results so far, we have the following fourfold division of reality:

Individuals	(d) primary substances (b) qualities, quantities, etc.,
Universals	(a) universals said of, but not present in, subjects (c) universals both said of and present in subjects

Two problems are evident at this point. One is the ascription to Aristotle of the doctrine of individuals in categories other than substance, that is, members of class· (b) , for this doctrine has recently been branded a " dogma," and dismissed. The other is that class (c) appears to be in flat contradiction to the conception of universals that we impute to Aristotle in this paper. For we hold it to be his view that universals exist only in the mind and not in things, whereas class (c) is said quite explicitly to be made up of universals which are " in a subject." We can attack these problems together, for they are very much intertwined.

The thesis that class (b) is not composed of individuals in non-substance categories has been propounded by G. E. L.

• The substitution is clearly legitimate. It is a matter for discussion only because *Ka06"11.ov,* the term translated by " universal," does not appear in the lines we have been discussing, nor, indeed, anywhere in the *Categories.* The term does not have a history prior to its being used by Aristotle, and is a crasis of *Karil. 5"11.ov* (lit., ' in respect of a whole,' or perhaps as a whole,' or 'taken generally'), which is used by Plato in this sense at *Meno* 77a, and *Republic* 392de. The term coined by Aristotle is defined by him and used characteristically to mean 'that which is predicable of many,' cf. *Metaph.* 1023b29-32, lOOOal; *De Int.* l7a38-b2. It is likely that it was used first by Aristotle in the logical works where it is employed regularly in the sense of universal *proposition.* In any case it is clear that inasmuch as a species and genus denote kinds or types of things, and hence are predicated of many, it will be appropriate to subsume them under the more general term " universal."

Owen,[5] in a paper which has elicited much criticism.[6] We will not attempt to catalogue here the arguments which have already been given for and against Owen's thesis; rather, we limit ourselves to seeing whether the texts which Owen himself advances against the traditional interpretation of class (b) can be made consistent with that interpretation. In the process we hope to show in what sense it is true that universals can be spoken of by Aristotle as being in a subject when in fact all that is in a subject is particular.

Against the traditional view of class (b) Owen offers the following texts:

I: "knowledge is in a subject, the soul" (lbl-2)
II: "colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body 'at all" (2b2-3)

These texts, Owen thinks, " settle the issue " ; that is, they show that members of class (b) are not individual. For ready reference we quote again Aristotle's formulation of this class:

III: "the individual-knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all color is in a body), but is not said of any subject" (la26-9)

If I and II can be made consistent with III when III is understood in the traditional way, then Owen's argument will collapse. Assume, then, that III is to be taken in the traditional way. What meaning can then be attached to the phrase in parentheses: *a'Tl'av yap xpwµa f.v cr<!Jµan?* Given the context, it would hardly do to understand it as asserting that the universal" color" is, as a whole, in a body. This would surely not

[5] "lnherence" *Phronesis,* X (1965), pp. 97-105.

[6] Moravcsik, *op. cit.,* pp. 80-96; Gareth B. Matthews and S, Marc Cohen, " The One and the Many," *The Review of Metaphysics,* XXI (1968), pp. 680-655; R. E, Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories," *Phronesis* XIV (1969), pp, 31-89; Barrington Jones, "Individuals in Artistotle's Categories," *Phronesis* XVII pp. 107-rn8.

explain, as the *yap* indicates the phrase is intended to do, how this *individual* white is in this individual body. It must mean, then, that all instances of color, i. e. individual instances in the sense understood by the traditional doctrine, are in individual bodies. Then III would be an enthymeme in Barbara with the suppressed premiss being " this individual white is a color." If we thus take the phrase in the distributive sense specified, then ' color' as a universal is predicated of an instance, while the instance itself is not predicated of anything else.

This analysis tells us how to understand the texts which Owen .sets in opposition to the traditional view. Proceeding in reverse order, passage II begins: "color is in body and therefore also in an individual body; ..." Inasmuch as an individual color (i. e. an individual instance, not a species like Owen',<; "vink ") is *a* color, it is true to say that there is color in this individual body. And this can be said without taking it to mean that a universal, specifically the universal ' color; ' is as a whole in the individual thing, or indeed that *any* universal so exists there. All that is meant is that the individual quality which is in the body *is* a color. To say that there is color in a body is to say that there is some shade of color in it, but more than that, it is to say that there is an individual instance of that .shade in it. None of this implies that a universal of any kind exists in an individual thing; only individual instances of colors exist there. The continuation of text II is quite consistent with this: "for were it [viz. color] not in some individual body it would not be in body at all." Text II, therefore, does not contradict III when the latter is taken in the traditional way.[7]

As for text I, " knowledge is in a subject, the .soul," the same analysis will hold good here as well. For since an individual instance of knowledge *is* knowledge, then if such an instance is in the soul, knowledge is in the soul. Owen's attempt to do away with individuals in non-substance categories is, then, a failure.

[7] Cf. Allen, pp. 34-5, and n. 6.

The principle established in our consideration 0£ Owen's argument may be used now to understand what Aristotle means by saying that some things are in a subject and predicated 0£ a subject, where the thing in question happens to be a universal. The statement "color ... is in an individual body" (2b2), contains a universal term: 'color.' We have seen that the statement does not mean that the universal *qua* universal is in some body, but merely that some individual instance 0£ color is in a body. Now this individual instance may be taken in two ways, as the individual instance which it is, or as a universal; £or any individual may be considered as if it were a universal.[8] But it is the same thing which actualy exists in the thing whether it is regarded' as an individual or as the universal 0£ which it is an instance. It is this which allows Aristotle to speak in the way illustrated, while nevertheless maintaining that it is only individuals which exist, whether as primary substances, or as qualifications present in them.[9]

This account receives confirmation from the other treatises in which universals are discussed. In them it is characteristically found that " by ' a universal ' we mean that whose nature is such that it may belong to many" *(Metaph.,* 1038bll,

[8] For elaboration of Aristotle's doctrine that individuals may be " taken universally," cf. J. Owens, "The Grounds of Universality in Aristotle," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 8 (1966), pp. 162-169; instances of this locution appear at 1085b29f, 1087a5-7, among other places.

[9] Ackrill, pp. 74-5, maintains that as a consequence of the "inseparability requirement" of la24-5, it is Aristotle's doctrine that "only *indiviiluals* in non-substance categories can be ' in ' individual substances. Aristotle could not say that generosity is in Callias as subject, since there could be generosity without any Callias. Only this individual generosity-Callias's generosity-is *in* Callias. Equally, white is not in chalk as subject, since there could be white even if there were no chalk. White is in body, because every individual white is the white of some individual body. For a property to be in a kind of substance it is not enough that some or every substance of that kind should have that property, nor necessary that every substance of that kind should have it; what is requisite is that every instance of that property should belong to some individual substance of that kind. Thus the inherence of a property in a kind of substance is to be analysed in terms of the inherence of individual instances of the property in individual substances of that kind."

Apostle tr.). Again, this does not mean that a universal as something numerically one exists in many individuals. But what, then, does exist in particulars which serves as the basis for the universal which is in the soul? The answer is: a common attribute. An attribute is common to many particulars in the sense that each individual instance of it which is found in things is the same in species with every other instance.

That Aristotle identifies the universal with what is common is clear from many texts:

The universal is common: for what belongs to many we call ' universal,' *ra lle Ka86i\011 Koiva· ra yap 7Ti\doaw 1mapxovra Ka86i\011 i\iyoµEv, De Part. An.* 644a26-8

a universal is common, *r6 ll€ Ka86i\011 Kow6v, Metaph.,* 1038bll

the universal is a common predicate, *Kow6v Kar'rJYopo/,ro, De An.,* 402b7

these are common and belong universally, *Koiva Kat Ka86A.011 Phys.,* 200b22-3.

Further, the common attributes are *in* things:

The [scientific]method of selection consists in laying down the common genus *(y€vo> Koiv6v)* of all our subjects of investigation-if e.g. they are animals, we lay down what the properties are which inhere in every animal *7To/,a 7Tavrl 'iii'P 1Yrrapxn An. Po.,* 98al-5, Mure tr.

some [characteristics] which are common to all things that have a share in life [are] waking and sleep, youth and age, inhalation and exhalation, life and death, *De Sensu,* 436al2-16, Hett tr.

The common characteristics are observed, not necessarily inferred, to be in things: "We must collect any other common character which we observe (a),J.o *'n 0<fiBii V7rapxov KOWOV eKA.aµ,f3avovra),*" *An. Po.* 98al5, Mure tr.

Criticizing the theory of Forms, Aristotle insists that positing a universal where there is no common characteristic is impossible: " this would be similar to calling both Callias and a piece of wood ' a man,' although we observe nothing common in them *(µ:·YJSEµ,iav Kowwviav E7rif3A.eif;a<;;avrwv)* ," *Metaph.* 1079bl-3. The universal itself does not exist in things because it is one

the common, however, does: "what is one cannot exist in many ways at the same time, but what is common can exist in many ways at the same time." [10]

None of this need be taken as implying that a universal in any way exists in the things of which it can be predicated. For a term to be ' predicated universally ' means simply that it applies to, i. e. may be truthfully said of, each of the instances of which it is predicable. The reason for this is that each common attribute is the same in .species as all the others of which the term is predicable.

The universal refers to a common characteristic whether or not the universal is in the category of substance:

> ' man ' and every common term denotes not an individual substance (*r68€* n) but a quality or relation or mode or something of the kind, *Soph. Elene.* l 78b37-9al; cf. l 79al-ll

> as regards secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name--when one speaks of man or animal-that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this' *(r68€* n), this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification (1rot6v n), for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things, *Cat.* 3bl3-18.

Thus it is that the universal existing solely in the mind refers to common characteristics which exist in all the many individuals of which the universal is predicable. But how is the universal established in the soul? How is it that the common attributes of things are mentally cognized by a universal?

II

Inasmuch as Aristotle treats of this question separately and at length only at *An. Po.* II, 19, we will follow this account in the main. The ostensible subject of this chapter, which parallels in many respects *Metaph.* A 1, is an explanation of how the

[10] *Metaph.* 1040b25-7; cf. Apostle's comment *ad lo1V.:* **"If** [a universal] exists as one numerically, it does so in the soul, but as such (a predicate) it does not exist in the things of which it is predicated."

first principles of scientific knowledge are acquired. Aristotle's discusssion, however, actually concentrates upon the psychological genesis, not of first principles, but of the universals themselves. The development of univer:sals is in fact the sole topic treated from 99b35 through 100b5, and there is no reason why we should not think that the explanation given here will not hold for all universals whether or not they are part of a first principle. The examples given as end-products of this process, 'man," :animal' at lOOhl-5, are surely not limited in their employment to first principles.[11] Moreover, the parallel account in *Metaph.* A 1 makes no mention of primary axioms at all.

The operations by which universals come to exist in the soul are inductive,[12] and induction presupposes the capacity of sense-perception.[13] The latter, which is perception of the individual,[14] gives rise, in those animals which are capable of it, to a persistence in the soul of what is perceived, even though the original object of perception is no longer present.

Although Aristotle does not say so in *An. Po.,.* it is clear from other treatises that what persists is an image *(cpavmCTµ,a),* and that the faculty responsible for this is the imagination *(cpavmCTia).* Thus: "imagination is the process by which we say that an image is presented to us" *(De An.* 428al-2), and, in itself, imagination is " a movement produced by sensation actively operating" (429al-2), and it gives rise to "imaginations [which] persist in us and resemble sensations" *(ibid.* 5-6). Images "are similar to objects presented except that they are without matter" (432a9-10) .

Ross (Aristotle's Parva Naturalia, pp. 32-3, *Aristotle's De Anima,* p. 39) attempts to disassociate imagination from any claim to having a role in knowledge, and in fact argues in the main that Aristotle " regards it not as a valuable faculty but

[11] For a different account of this, cf. James H. Lesher, "The Meaning of NOUS in the *Posterior Analytics," Phronesis* XVII (1973), pp. 44-68.

[12] *Top.* IOSbl0-11; 156bl5; *An. Po.* Slbl-3.

[13] An. Po. 8lb5-9, 71a21, 24; *Top.* 105a13-19, 156315-7.

[14] *An. Po.* 87b31-34, 100al6-l 7; *De An.* 417b22; *Metaph.* 98Ibll, and cf. texts in preceding note.

as a disability," *(Arist. De. An.,* p. 39) . His arguments for this position are not convincing. He appeals to Aristotle's claims that *"cf>avracria* is neither sense-perception (428a5-16), nor scientific knowledge nor intuitive reason (a16-18) ... and that it may be either true or false" (ibid.). But imagery may play the role we assign to it here quite in spite of these facts. For even though imagination *is* not scientific knowledge or intuition, it may nevertheless be operative in the formation of these. For sense-perception itself is not scientific knowledge or intuition but the account in *An.. Po.* is very definite that sense-perception is nonetheless a requirement of scientific and of intuitive knowledge as well. As for the possible falsity of images, it is surely difficult to see how a process which issues in infallible knowledge can make use of other processes which are themselves fallible, but the fact is that memory is explicitly said (at *An. Po.* 100a3-6, cf. *Metaph.* 980a27-8lal) to be involved in the genesis of the primary axioms, and it is fallible also. (This is implied by the distinction between good and bad memories *(De Mem.* 449b5-8, 453a32-b8), and by its dependence upon images *(ibid.,* 450a10-11); further, it is said to belong" to that part of the soul to which imagination belongs" *(ibid.* 445a24) .) According to Ross the imagination is a disability because it is " due ... to the eclipse of reason by passion, disease or sleep in man," (op. *cit.,* p. 39) . But in the sole pas.sage to which Ross appeals for support of this view, *De An.* 429a6-8, Aristotle does not say that the faculty is " due " to these phenomena, but only that men "frequently act in accordance" with images as a result of these causes. This does not mean that imagination may not be valuable in the genesis of knowledge. [15]

Returning to *An. Po.* we find that frequent repetition of such persistence, which we now take to mean: frequent repetition of images, gives rise to memory. [16] This interpretation is at least

[15] Contrast Ross himself in *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford, V. I, p. 116 on Lesher, pp. denies that Aristotle holds awareness of first principles to be " infallible."

[16] lOOal-4, cf. *Metaph.*

partially confirmed by *De Mem.:* "Memorizing preserves the memory of something by constant reminding. This is nothing but the repeated contemplation of an object as a likeness, and not as a thing in itself." [17] The dependence of memory upon imagination is stressed: "memory, even of the objects of thought, implies an image." [18] Aristotle makes an even stronger claim: " it is impossible even to think without an image." [19]

We may pause at this point to ask what is the relation, if any, between images and memory on the one hand, and common properties inhering in individuals on the other. The answer is that it is just those individual properties common to many individuals which are the objects of perception and remembered in the form of images. Sensation puts us in contact with qualities of individuals, [20] and these qualities will be individual in any given instance of perception. Inasmuch as images resemble sensations, it follows that they would have to be as individual as the qualities of which they are ' mental pictures.' Universality does not exist at the level of sensation, [21] nor, therefore, on the level of images. Where, then, does universality first exist? On the level of memory?

It seems that the universal does not exist yet on this level. [22] For at 100a4-7 the universal is described as being "in the soul," but that is already the level of experience (eμ,7TEtp£a). Further, since memory is simply " the retention of an image as a likeness of that of which it is an image" *(De Mem.* 451a14-16), it would follow that since images and what they resemble are individual qualities, that this is all that is remembered as well. The universal, then, is not yet present at the level of memory.

From memory arises experience: " repeated memories of the

[17] 45la13-14.

[18] 450aU-13.

[19] 449b31-50al, cf. *De An.* 432a7-10.

[20] *De An.* 418al3-14.

[21] *An. Po.* 88a2, 87b30-33.

[22] This is in contrast to Ross' account, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 677-8.

same thing give rise to experience; because memories, though numerically many, constitute a single experience " (*An. Po.* 100a4-6, Tredennick tr). This is the level at which it is definite that the universal exists in the soul, £or in experience there is " the whole universal come to rest in the soul, the one alongside the many, which is one and the same in them all." [23]

When Aristotle speaks of " repeated memories of the same thing" does he mean the numerically same thing? [24] In view of the fact that induction is regularly described as dealing with particulars rather than with a particular, and is usually illustrated by many particulars which have some feature in common, [25] it .seems unlikely that Aristotle means to restrict " the same thing " to one and the same individual. Indeed, it would be difficult to extract a universal, which is common to many, from a single individual.

How then does the universal arise in experience? Perhaps in this way: The several memories, each of which is composed of an image representing some individual attribute of a previous perception, are all memories of some common characteristic. When one object, image, or memory is perceived alone and by itself, all that is perceived is individual. But when the many memories, representing common attributes are perceived, as it were ' together,' and the fact of their commonality is apprehended, this is experience, and the specific form in which the commonality is realized *is* the universal. The universal, then, is an intellectual apprehension, realization, or experience *as a whole* of the common attributes which exist apart in many individuals. This is the meaning of lOOal7-bl: "though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal."

Is this interpretation consistent with the ' rout in battle '

[23] **100 A 6-8:** ***7ravT0s 1,peµ-l}uavTosToV Ka86Aov Ev Tfi If!vxfi, ToD €v0s TraµO. re\ 7roi\A&, a Clv Ev ChraUIV Ev'fi EKelvois rb aVr6.***

[24] As thought by Apostle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Bloomington and London, 1966), p. £55, comm. 6.

[25] *Top.* 105al3-17, 108bl0-11.

metaphor and the ' clearer ' account of the whole process given at 100a15-b4? The battle metaphor is intended to provide an analogy to the way in which *ai* €gcii;, the ' states of knowledge' just described, viz. memory, experience, and the universal, develop out of sense-perception, *yiyvovmi* d:iro *alafJ'ljaewi;,* lOOall. The analogy is this: there is a military formation which is broken by a retreat; but then one man stops retreating, then another, and another, until the original formation has been taken up once again.

This is picturesque, but not very informative. Aristotle explains it at 100a15-b4: *<TTUVTO<; yap TWV a8iacp6pwv €v6<;, 1tpWTOV ev rfi l/Jvxfi Ka86>..ov.* This can only refer to the level of experience: what stops is a universal, which exists first at this stage.[26] Perhaps the universal corresponds to the common attributes in individuals as the formation before the rout corresponds to the one after it. Or perhaps' the intended parallel is with the common attributes as represented by images in the memory. The analogy is not close and cannot be pressed closely with complete success. It is possible that the *ov aacpwi;* at 100a15 is intended to warn us of this.

The parenthetical remark at 100a16-bl is disturbing. The assertion there that " perception is of the universal " *(Ti 8' ataOT)at<; roil Ka86Aov eariv)* is contradicted earlier (88a2) : " there is no perception of the universal " (*ov yap roil Ka86Aov ataOTJaii;),* and the reason for the latter is clearly given:

> granting that perception is of the object as qualified, and not of a mere particular, still what we perceive must be a particular thing at a particular place and time. A universal which applies to all cannot be perceived by the senses, because it is not a particular thing or at a given time ... (87b30-33, cf. 34).

Indeed, Aristotle insists again and again that only repeated perceptions of individuals can give rise to a universal, for example *Top.* 108b10-ll: "it is by induction of particulars on the basis

[26] Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytic,* p. 677, holds that the ' standing still ' is " of an individual before the memory" ; Lesher, p. 61, holds that an *infimae species* is meant.

of similarities (ɐ1Tt *TWV* oμofow) that we infer *(atwvμev)* the universal" (cf. *An. Po.* lOOal-6).[27] Lesher, for these reasons, holds that " it is simply false to say that the universal is present in the soul from the first perception of the individual." [28] But perhaps this problematical assertion (as well as the similar claim at 100b4-5) is to be understood in the light of the earlier (lOOal0-11) explanation (which is in fact the clearer account, in spite of the *ov<racpwc;* at 1OOa.15), that *ai lteic;*, memory, experience, and the universal are *produced from* perception *(y[yvovrai a1To ai<rB„]<rewc;).* If so, then perception must be understood to be only a necessary and not a sufficient condition of the production of the universal, a *sine qua non* of the universal's existence. Taken in this way the remark ceases to provide a problem and does not contradict our account of the psychological genesis of the universal in the soul.[29]

III

We turn now to the role of the universal in knowledge. It is well known that for Aristotle there is an alleged dichotomy between the real and the known: only the individual is real whereas only the universal is knowable. For many commentators this means that Aristotle's metaphysics is at odds with his epistemology and therefore that there is an insoluble contradic-

[27] These facts pose a problem for Ross' account *(ibid.* p. 678) whereby in perception " the awareness of an individual is at the same time awareness of a universal present in the individual; we perceive an individual thing, but what we perceive in it is a set of qualities each of which can belong to other things." But if the qualities are *in* the thing as universals then they *do* belong to other things. If they are individual, then how does one know that they " can belong to other things " by perceiving, which is of just one individual? It seems that only the notion of many individuals having common qualities which can be realized in the process of induction can make sense of the genesis of universals in the intellect.

[28] P. 61, n. 42.

[28] On the other hand, perhaps Aristotle means by " universal " that which is common; thus the remark could be taken as: perception is of what is common, viz. an attribute which is possessed also by other individuals of the same species. This solution does not s•eem any more satisfying than the one proposed in the text.

tion at the heart of his system. Can the conception of the universal advanced so far be of assistance in solving this difficulty?

Leszl has broken down the evidence for the view that Aristotle held that knowledge is of the univer:sal into three distinguishable principles, which, this view alleges, Aristotle maintained:

(a.) The individual is singular, but definition is common, so no definition is of individuals.

(b.) The individual is too complex and many-charactered to be the object of universal knowledge.

(c.) The individual is contingent and transitory, while knowledge is of what abides, and this is the universal. [30]

To a large extent, these problems can be minimized in their apparent seriousness if it is realized that Aristotle held that it is only in a sense that knowledge is of universals, while there are other senses in which it is quite legitimate to say that knowledge is of individuals, even when by " knowledge " is meant " scientific knowledge." The distinction can be stated in general terms as follows: While knowledge is of universals in the sense that it has universals for a medium and hence occurs on the level of universals, nevertheless the universals themselves *are derived fr01n and apply to individuals.*

That this is true of definition can be easily shown. For if a species is defined, what is stated in the definition will be true also of each and every member of the species: in fact, it is because the definition is true of the members that it is true of the species. To the extent that the definition constitutes knowledge, therefore, the individual *will* be known *through* definition.

Why, however, should definition be of the class or species and not of the individual *per se?* This question is especially

[30] Walter Leszl, " Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge of the Particular in Aristotle," *The Review of Metaphysics* XXVI pp. esp. pp.

pertinent to those who maintain that for Aristotle the universal exists in things, for, if definition were of the universal and the universal existed in an individual, why should not the individual instead of the class be the proper object of definition? It is only on the conception of the universal as being derived from induction of many individuals of a species that we can explain why definition is of the species. The discussion of definition in *An. Po.* II 13 provides support for this analysis. A general description of the process of forming a definition is given at 97b7-14, in which it is made clear that induction across many individuals is a requirement for sound definition. There is no ready explanation why this should be a requirement were the universal inherent in each individual. On our account, however, the answer is plain: common characteristics must be passed before the mind, retained in the memory, and so forth, until the universal is elicited from these repeated inductions and identified by a formula which is the definition. At the same time, the definition, though of the species, will apply to each and every instance of it. The individuals, therefore, will be known in this way.

This analysis has by no means to be restricted only to definitions, however, for *all* ' universal knowledge ' may be shown to be knowledge of individuals in this manner, for all universals are no more than mental recognitions of what is common to many individuals. If this is correct, it would be impossible for universal knowledge not to be applicable to, and therefore ' of,' individuals.

Aristotle distinguishes three types of knowledge. **(1)** *Potential* knowledge in the sense of mere possession of a universal truth; (2) *Sense* knowledge, or knowledge proper to an individual thing here and now; and (3) *Actual* knowledge, recognition that the here and now individual is an instance of the universal under which it falls.[31] Thus, actual knowledge is in a sense universal, but also in a sense particular. To say with-

[31] *An. Pr.* II 21, esp. 67al2-21, 26-30, 37-67b5; *An. Po.* 71all-29; *Metaph.* 1087al2-25; cf. 98Ial3-29.

out qualification that knowledge is either universal or particular is to tell the truth but not the whole truth: it does not take into account all that knowledge is or may be.[82]

It would not, therefore, be literally correct to say that for Aristotle knowledge exists when the universal is recognized to be 'in' the individual. The facts are just the opposite: the individual is rather 'in' the universal, that is, it falls within its scope, and when the mind realizes this, this is actual knowledge. The Aristotelian theory of universals, then, does not necessitate a divorce of epistemology from metaphysics. If anything, the Aristotelian universal provides the connecting link or bridge between them. Universals are the correlates in the mind of that which is common to many individuals in reality, and because of this correlation scientific knowledge of individuals is possible.

That further elaboration of Aristotle's theory may constitute a complete and comprehensive solution to all the difficulties which today go under the heading of 'the problem of universals' is not claimed here. What I hope to have shown in this exposition is merely that there is more to the Aristotelian theory than there is usually thought to be, and that what is there is based firmly upon the facts of observation, developed with logical consistency and rigor, and provides an adequate account of the nature of scientific knowledge.

EDWARD REGIS, JR.

Howard University
Washington, D. C.

[32] Leszl, p. 303, states the relationship in this way: "potential and actual knowledge have the same contents, namely the rule or connection expressed by the mentioned hypothetical proposition. The difference between them lies in the fact that potential knowledge is the unactualized capacity to apply the general rule to any particular case which falls under it, and actual knowledge is the actualization of this capacity by application of that rule to a given particular case." Cf. his replies to objections pp. 303-5, and his *Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle* (Padua, 1970), pp. 467-75, 496-522.

BOOK REVIEWS

San Tommaso e il pensiero moderno, ed. Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso d'Aquino Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 1974. Pp. 334. Paper, lire 5,000.

I

This volume is the third in a four-volume series of essays published by the Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso to honor the thirteenth century thinker on the seventh centenary of his death. It consists of fifteen articles. Ten are in Italian, two in Spanish, and one in German. It is divided into three sections. Of these the first is concerned with the foundations of the metaphysics of Aquinas. The second and by far the longest has for its heading "St. Thomas and the Great Modern Problems." The third treats of Aquinas in confrontation with Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Josef Pieper. No general introduction or further explanation of its purposes is offered.

II

In the opening article Etienne Gilson, "Observations on Being and its Notion," replies to a charge made by the late Jacques Maritain. Gilson, Maritain wrote, is so fascinated by the *intuition* of being that he has rejected the *concept* of existence. Gilson (p. 8) affirms that this is still his way of thinking, and undertakes to explain his own understanding of the terms. His model for an intuition of existence is the grasp of it as a nature in the beatific vision of God. This grasp is denied to the human intellect in its present state, with which alone the article is concerned. Because existence as men know it is not a something, it cannot be said to exist. Hence the concluding sentence: " The intuition of an object of which one cannot properly say that it exists is ill conceived." (p. 17) Yet existence is explicitly termed " immanent cause of that which it makes be " (p. 10) and (p. 13) "immanent formal cause". The sensible existent is the "effect" (p. **11)** in which existence is made manifest. The article emphasizes throughout that the proper object of the human intellect is quiddity, and that no quiddita:tive apprehension of existence can be had. It places beyond conceptual knowledge the understanding of the intelligible principles. These give rise to judgments, not concepts. (p. 15; cf. p. 11) From this viewpoint the first principles· of reason may be called intuitions, if for no other reason than to distinguish them from conclusions. (p. 11) What Gilson is obviously opposing is an intuitive concept (" con-

cept intuitif, source des autres "-p. *15)* from which other abstract concepts could arise.

What is to be thought of this approach to the problem? No explicit mention is made of Aquinas's tenet that human intellection is basically twofold, namely the apprehension of a thing from the viewpoint of its nature and the apprehension of it from the viewpoint of its being. Both of these are required concomitantly for the knowing of an existent. If the requisite for an intuition is the immediate apprehension of an existent, then of course the term " intuition " cannot be applied to human knowledge of existence, since, as the article makes clear, the existence of sensible things is not itself an existent. Aquinas, it is true, does not prefer " intuition " for the immediate apprehension of existence in judgment (but see texts cited in Bogiolo's article, present volume, p. 47, n. 18). Yet does not the ordinary use of the term " intuition " today bear rather on the immediate grasp of what is the case? Only with difficulty, one might suggest, may it be refused to the immediate apprehension that takes place in judgment. But that is where the intuition of existence is found for Maritain, with whom the discussion is here being held. Gil11on's article refers to judgment in terms of saying (p. *15)*, posing and affirming (p. 16), rather than of apprehending. This one remark, however, need not impede appreciation of the article as a whole. Couched in quiet humor, it abounds in penetrating observations arising from a long lifetime of reflection on the topics. It repays very careful reading, and a number of its remarks are worth committing to memory. Especialy the Thomistic tenet that God remains utterly unknown is handled with exceptional skill.

The other article in the section, M. F. Sciacca's "Reflections on the Principles of Thomistic Metaphysics," is spread over far too wide a ground to permit penetration in depth. It gives a capsule presentation of Neo-Thomist metaphysical doctrine, confronting its anthropology with the various ' absolute humanisms." (p. 29; cf. p. 27)

III

In the second section Luigi Bogliolo, " Modern Realism and Thomistic Realism," proposes " a more modern way of understanding experience and cognition, on the basis of the Thomistic text." (p. 66; cf. p. *55)* He suggests that the realism towards which modern philosophy tends cannot be understood without returning to the Thomism of Aquinas, which is often very different from the Thomism of his commentators. (p. 33; cf. p. 54) In complementary fashion he sees also that perhaps only today, urged on by the thrust of modern thought towards realism, can we evaluate the realism of Aquinas in all its depth and actuality. (p. 40) The link between the two is to be found in "human subjectivity " firmly grounded on being. (p. 34) "Intellectual experience," in which intuition

and concept and experience immediately coincide (" si immedesimano "-p. 46; cf. p. 54), has for its object all reality. (cf. pp. 41-4Q) Accordingly "the intellective experience of *being* is that on which the whole of philosophy rests " (p. *53)* , and an analogy may be set up " between the *creative* intuition of God and the *re-creative* (spiritualizing) intuition of man." (p. *65)* In this way the article envisages human subjectivity emerging into an all-embracing realism (" onnirealismo "-p. *53;* cf. p. 41) that is already found sketched in Aquinas and towards which modern philosophy tends. Hence the " integral realism of St. Thomas, based upon the act of being, understood in the way explained, allows one to interpret and evaluate critically the realism of the other philosophies." (p. 4Q) In its light not all the philosophies that call themselves realisms are so in fact. (p. 40)

This thesis merits attention. How is it to be gauged? In concentrating on the activity of the human intellect as a unified " intellectual experience," it neglects the crucial distinction of Aquinas between apprehension of a thing under the aspect of its nature and apprehension of it under that of being. Worse still, it pays little attention to the Aristotelian specification of faculties and acts by objects, at least from the viewpoint in which the nature and content of intellection are known through its object. How could this tenet, correctly understood, allow "human subjectivity" or "intellectual experience" to be the basis ("la base "-p. *55)* of the Thomistic approach? Should not the basis be seen frankly as external sensible things, with awareness of the intellection as only concomitant? Moreover, should not the notion of " realism " be taken in the way it is used by philosophers who expressly call themselves realists, instead of setting up apriori the doctrine of Aquinas as the model according to which all true realisms are to be assessed? To bring Thomistic thinking under the label " realism " has grave dangers. Nevertheless Bogliolo's articles deserves attentive study. It is replete with acute philosophical observations on the various themes it touches, and is excellently documented from the writings of Aquinas himself.

Next in the section, Alberto Caturelli offers a solidly Thomistic discussion of creation in terms of participation of being. The creationist doctrine is shown to provide a rationally demonstrable demythologizing (" demitificati6n "-p. 70) of the ancient world and to be capable of remaining efficacious in confrontation with the contemporary thrusts of logical positivism and Hegelian immanentism.

Georg Siegmund, "The Question about the 'Nature' of Man," offers an able and convincing defense of the truly basic (p. 89) role of human *nature* for the guidance of moral life. Medicio-biological as well as philosophical anthropology can show that man's nature in its dominantly spiritual teleology contains an "obligatory (p. 86), vindicating the general

direction of the encyclical " Humanae Vitae " against the recent philosophical notions of "love" as the sole deciding factor. No effort, however, is made to integrate these important tenets into the Aristotelian and Thomistic understanding of choice as the first principle of the moral order.

Francesco Cacucci, " The Doctrine of Image according to St. Thomas Aquinas," gives an interesting and well-written presentation of Aquinas's teaching on the Trinitarian likeness of God in man, against a background in which the divine word, perfect image of the Father, is regarded as the model" type of every image." (p. 91) The treatment is theological throughout.

Alberto Galli, "Morality of Law and Morality of Spontaneity according to St. Thomas," discusses how the moral doctrine of Aquinas avoids on the one hand extrinsic legalism (" estrinsecismo "-p. 109) and on the the other the ethics of non-preceptive spontaneity or love (p. 117) as the sole principle of morality. It treats in detail (pp. 118-125) the positions of well-known Catholic moralists who today follow the latter tendency. It notes that freedom itself is not freely assumed but pertains to the *nature* of the rational will. (p. 110) While correctly upholding free-will as the primary root of moral action (p. 127), and maintaining "the irreducible difference between moral law and ontological law " (p. 135), it insists on the essentially rational character of law (pp. 140-141), showing that goal-directed and preceptive law is required by the very essence of morality. (p. 151)

Mario Valentino Ferrari, "A Study of Justification of Means in View of End, in the Light of St. Thomas Aquinas," examines the teaching of Aquinas on the way the end imparts goodness to the means, the only way (p. 176) in which it "justifies " them. The article shows how the end cannot so justify means that are immoral in themselves. The end may require one good to be sacrificed in favor of another and more important one (cf. p. 175), or that an equally or less important good be safeguarded by using a different method. The article applies its conclusions to a number of practical cases.

Giuseppe Perini, " Comparison of Man with Animals in the Sexual Anthropology of St. Thomas and of the Moderns," finds that today's two dominant anthropologies, the one phenomenalistic in the framework of Kant and Husserl, the other biological in the wake of Darwin, destroy " the central idea of Thomistic anthropology," which is "nature." (p. 193) With remarkable acumen the article defends the Thomistic sexual ethics against misunderstandings by its two main opponents, and shows the contribution it has to offer today to a true knowledge of man.

Luigi Salerno, " Relation, Opposition and Dialectic in Modern Thought and in Thomas Aquinas," aims to integrate " the valid element contained in Hegelian thought" (p. 234; cf. pp. 230; 233) into Christian philosophy

and theology by inserting it into the framework of relation and of being. (p. 231) The essential oppositions throughout the entire range of human interests should be regarded not as contradictory but as relative. (p. 239) In this way becoming can be explained through relations (p. 225), and dialectic can be inserted into the further frame of being, which remains "the fundamental concept in Christian philosophy" (p. 230). Contradiction is never a necessity, and "an ontological continuity" (p. 239) should be present between the parts of reality.

Pier Carlo Landucci, "Physico-chemical Structure of Matter and Thomistic Hylomorphism," confronts the two different approaches to the structure of matter, the one philosophical and ancient, the other modern and of experimental and mathematical character. Close scrutiny shows that the findings of the latter, such as discontinuity of matter and the convertibility of matter and energy, in no way work against the conclusions of Thomistic hylomorphism. The Thomistic tenet that primary matter in itself lacks all existence and actuality is defended against the Scotistic tradition. (p. 253) Nevertheless Thomistic hylomorphism is regarded as "metaphysical" in character, apparently in the Wolffian use of the term.

IV

The third section commences with an attractively written article by Georges Kalinowski, "The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Face of the Critique of Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger." The article notes (p. 257) that some spiritual sons of Aquinas have reservations about the efficacy of his metaphysics today. It finds that on the contrary the critiques by Kant, Nietzsche and (dealt with at by far the greatest length) Heidegger have arbitrary and dubious starting points. They do not touch the metaphysics of Aquinas, which is based upon a broad and solid empirical foundation. (p. 283) But in arguing Kalinowski makes use of the principles-philosophy of Neo-Thomism (pp. 259-261), plus the modern distinction between the existential and the predicative" is." (pp. 273-274) The article, though, envisages a Thomistic metaphysics that is open in all desired directions of refinement, deepening, and extension (p. 283).

Andrea Milano, "The 'Becoming of God' in Hegel, Kierkegaard and Saint Thomas Aquinas," capably explains and defends the doctrine of Aquinas on divine immutability against current Hegelian and Process Theology trends in Catholic writers. Drawing on Krempel's magisterial study of relations in Aquinas, he shows that the new relations of creator and the like are truly *in* God but add no real entities, and that for Aquinas the mode of human knowing does not always correspond to the mode of reality. (p. 293) From this viewpoint God enters history remaining always himself, the Eternal. (p. 294)

Octavio N. Derisi, "Two Antagonistic Conceptions of Being: Sartre and

Saint Thomas; Nihilistic Immateriality and Realistic Immateriality," outlines the commonly received interpretations of Sartre and Aquinas on being and immateriality. He concludes (p. 314) that they embody antagonistic conceptions of being. For Sartre, immateriality annihilates being; in the Thomistic conception it enriches it. (p. 306) The annihilating immateriality makes love a conflict of subject and object for Sartre, in contrast to true love which is the fruit of immateriality understood as richness, fruit of the spirit. (pp. 299-300) Accordingly in Aquinas spiritual striving is for enrichment in being, and not for its destruction. (p. 314)

In the final article Ubaldo Pellegrino, " The Crisis of Man and Metaphysics in Josef Pieper," surveys Pieper's "Christian Optimism" (p. 330), which is theocentric (p. 318) in its regard for man as a "pilgrim being." (p. 324; cf. p. 327) Moral life has to be grounded in " faithfulness to being" (p. 323), which is" law, hence authority, for whoever wishes to live in an orderly manner." (p. 326; cf. p. 329) This permits the establishing of moral law and of an obligatory ethics, based on the nature of things and of man. (p. 329) The role of prudence gives rise to the morality of a man come of age, in contrast to a casuistic morality based on an extrinsic model (" l'estrinsecismo moralistico "-p. 321). The article regards Pieper's conclusions as drawn from the principles of Thomism and the encounter with today's philosophical problematic (p. 317), in an open and Christian philosophy. (p. 318) It quotes (p. 316) with approval a view of Pieper's work as destined to influence the general educated public rather than as shriveled into a kind of knowledge for initiates.

V

These essays give rise to a number of reflections. First, they are a living witness to the innate capacity of Thomistic principles to function effectively in the broad panorama of modern thought, and to face the problems of the present-day world without too much danger of contamination or absorption. They are an apt testimony to the " intemporal thomisme de Thomas Aquin lui-meme" (Gilson, p. 11). In this regard, the relatively lighter penetration into the particular issues raised by English philosophical literature is sufficiently explained through the absence of Anglophone contributors.

Secondly, the essays radiate a refreshing sense of existence as the basis upon which all things must ultimately be judged, and a quiet but healthy understanding of the role of nature, natural law, precept and obligation in moral matters. They show intelligent reaction to the chaos of situation ethics and unregulated spontaneity by insisting on the integrity of the human person to the full. The confrontation is not overdone, and is a welcome contribution to the steadying influence of a growing literature in this direction.

What does give one pause, however, is the problem of marketing these

principles of Aquinas in the current world. It would certainly be too much to expect that writing of this type should evoke the active enthusiasm generated among contemporary readers by Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Ayer. The septicentennial meetings and publications of 1974 have shown that by and large the modern intellectual world is quite ready to pay tribute to Aquinas as one of great thinkers of the West. But the interest seems to end there. To bring the Thomistic principles effectively into the living ferment of present day thought is, one must acknowledge with regret, a problem still to be faced. It has to be faced with an utterly open mind. Aquinas wrote in medieval Latin. He couched his profound philosophy in a frankly theological framework. He did not enjoy the wealth of scientific and anthropological information that means so much in today's world. These obstacles are far from easy to counter. Against that background is it too much to wonder whether the overall breadth of vision required by the Thomistic principles has yet been attained by contemporary writers? The warning (p. Q57) that Thomists may still be writing for a closed community deserves careful consideration. Even more devastatingly one may ask if the spirit of a closed system has been effectively overcome. To Gilson (p. 8; cf. p. 16) it still seems a bit of a scandal that two seasoned followers of Aquinas should be in disagreement on a fundamental point of interpretation. He draws from it a lesson of intellectual modesty. But might not the real lesson be something very different?

It might not be too hard to prove that no two leading Thomists of the present century have interpreted Aquinas in exactly the same way. This could be documented sufficiently to show that in the philosophical inspiration of Aquinas there are many truly inhabitable mansions. Should not the lesson, then, be a much broader acceptation of individually different approaches on the part of each Thomistic writer? Aquinas himself was quite used to philosophical pluralism among his Greek and Arabian predecessors as well as among his Christian forebears and contemporaries. Should not the same spirit hold within the orbit of Thomistic thought? The text of Aquinas has to be scrupulously upheld. But to be vital and effective, does not the understanding and development of it have to vary with each individual? Cannot each continue to benefit from interpretations that are found personally unacceptable? But can this open spirit be said to have been attained as yet among Thomistic writers?

There is no doctrinal relativism implied here. Still less can there be acquiescence in the contamination of Thomistic principles by the tenets of other philosophies, a defect so widespread in Neoscholasticism and so justly though gently criticized in Bogliolo's article. (p. 33) Thomistic principles will continue to reject these alien transplants. Antibiotic treatment to suppress the opposition will soon render the organism incapable

of surviving in the actual environment. Rather, what is called for is a development of the Thomistic principles from within, in the way in which each individual writer experiences them in his own intellectual life and puts them into practice in his own personal involvement in each sphere of human activity. For this, obviously, the notion of adherence to a " system of thought " will have to be completely overcome. In the meantime, publications like the present one play an essential role in keeping alive the spirit of interest in the writings of Aquinas.

JosEPH OWENS, C. Ss. R.

Ponaifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Toronto, Canada

Evangelization Today. By BERNARD HARING. Translated by Fr. Albert Kuuire. Notre Dame: Fides Press, 1974. Pp. 191. (paperback).

This book is an effort to apply the two great themes of Evangelization and Reconciliation currently being celebrated in the Catholic Church to a serious reconsideration of the basic understanding of moral theology and its urgent problems that have surfaced as a result of its encounter with the contemporary world. *Evangelization Today* continues Father Haring's long scholarly development of an understanding of moral theology which is faithful to the absoluteness of God and is, at the same time, responsive to the experiences of man. Underlying his entire approach through so many books is Father Haring's thesis that the revelation of the person of Jesus always takes place in and to community which leads to communion. Thus, the gospel message must always be embodied in the Church's life if it is to be proclaimed.

As Father Haring sees it, the split between dogmatic theology and moral theology and the deep cleavage between the structure of contemporary societies and the Catholic Church make such a re-examination at this time essential for the future of the Church. Although there has been a healthy switch away from casuistry distant from the gospel and life in the solution of moral problems, many of the solutions being offered today in the name of social justice, human development and freedom are no closer to the perspectives and demands of faith. Consequently, in this book, Father Haring shows how the moral teaching of the Church and the moral life of the faithful are integral parts of witnessing to the faith which is evangelization. (Evangelization is understood not only as the initial propagation of the faith but also as its perennial deepening and continuing vitalization). While the characteristic note of Christian moral theology is the perfect synthesis between love of God and love of neighbor, today sees the rise

of a new and dangerous ' moralism ' that limits itself either to an appeal to people to become involved in a good cause or to a threat of sanctions for a failure to respond. It is in the light of this new danger that "moral theology must think over its structures and norms in the light of evangelization." (p. 3) .

As far back as 1956 in his book, *Macht und Ohnmacht der Religionssoziologie al,s Anruf,* that is, even before his intense involvement in Vatican II, Father Haring saw clearly the necessity of interaction between theology, sociology and the pastoral ministry of the Church. His work as *peritus* at Vatican II and secretary to the commission which prepared the *P(J)3toral, Constitution of the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes)* reflects very much his unifying insight into the sacramental nature of the Christian life, expressed so eloquently in *Gabe und Auftrag der Sacramente* in where he says: "We do not separate the ethical commandment from the good news. Instead we see in Christ himself, in his works of grace and in the good news of the gospel, our salvation and the law of our life."

His next work, published the year Vatican II convened, *Konzil im Zeichen der Einheit,* developed this understanding further when Father Haring insisted that the Church must re-examine all aspects of its life to see if its structure, preaching, liturgy, juridical forms and moral teachings are truly reflective of Christ's love and serve, therefore, as effective witnesses to it.

This latest book brings to a further stage a lifetime of scholarship and prayerful reflection. While it cannot be considered a major work, it is an important contribution to the current multi-level discussion in the Church today: Where are we going? Father Haring's answer, the direction given by the Holy Year and the Synod of Bishops, is that we are to be instruments of reconciliation and evangelization; to be effective, we must know and read " the signs of the times."

Evangelization Today is divided into three parts. In the first part, the author describes the problem to which he is addressing himself: the relationship of moral theology to the Church's mission to evangelize the world. The second part explores a rather extensive series of problems that arise out of the efforts to evangelize a world which is no longer sympathetic to or in harmony with the great cultural roots of Western Catholicism. The third part is a consideration of how God is acting in the world today, as the setting for evangelization. Since evangelization presupposes God's presence as Creator and Redeemer, evangelizers must meditate not only on the revealed word, but on the world itself, discerning God's action, so that they can cooperate most effectively with the Lord of History.

"Part I: The Vision of Morals in the Light of Evangelization: The Fundamental Problem." Fr. Haring sees clearly and proposes forcefully

that evangelization cannot be accomplished by systems or institutions, only by faithfilled people who have themselves been evangelized and can read the signs of the times. Consequently, he calls for some rather radical changes in the thinking and understanding of the Church and its role. In particular, he thinks that the modern situation demands a " demythologization of authority," calling for humble service, subsidiarity, collegiality and co-responsibility in the carrying out of the mission of the Church as opposed to the traditional clericalism. He says: "A Church which assumes as a fundamental criterion only the external rite and cold statistics instead of the sincere faith of the person cannot evangelize the world of tomorrow." (p. 19).

Applying this understanding to the Church's teaching authority, he observes, "This is not to serve primarily for the control of orthodoxy, but for the convincing communication of the joyful news: such a demand should condition the whole style of the exercise of the magisterial authority." (p. 37). Furthermore, the structuring of moral systems requires that the Church recognize that the centers of influence are passing from Europe and the old Western World to the so-called Third World.

" Part II: The Morals of Evangelization and the Evangelization of Morals." "Moralism" fails to recognize the priority of the gospel as a way of life and fails to place evangelization before moral teaching; consequently, moralism blocks the action of saving grace and becomes an obstacle to experiencing the joy of the gospel and effective evangelization.

The first chapter of this part, " The Morality of Evangelization," is especially appropriate today in the light of the prevalence of Pelagian and semi-Pelagian teaching. Father Haring says:

> The fact of having been gratuitously reconciled became for Paul the most urgent motive for preaching the gospel. . . . To recognize the gratuity of the gift of salvation and of reconciliation transforms all our life into a Eucharist, into a thanksgiving; and thus, we become, by an internal necessity, messengers and propagators of the Joyful news.' ' (p. !'l7).

In other words, only the joy-filled believer can spread the faith, and he is driven to this act of sharing what he has been freely given because of the urgency of the experience of salvation. Given the joyful nature of this proclamation of salvation, it follows that, once man accepts the gospel, his life becomes a joy-filled living out of the message-he lives the gospel morals.

In the second chapter of this part, Father Haring argues to certain characteristics moral life should have when it has been evangelized, insisting that the gospel must always evangelize the morals already existing in various cultures. Christians cannot simply impose European moral models on non-European cultures, especially with regard to Church government

and understanding the natural law; however, whatever expression morals take, it should always be an expression of the fundamental gospel law of love. Here he touches again on the point he raised in the first part: " Evangelization imposes on the Church the liberating duty of abandoning a clerical, juridical and centralistic concept of her government, modelled on and deeply marked by the out-dated political systems of the western world." (p. .

"Part III: Evangelization as Response to the 'Kairos '." This part offers a phenomenology of today's world to provide a perspective for evangelization at this moment in history. Men and woman today, by and large, do not identify with the Church and exhibit an attitude which is markedly critical. At the same time, while being extraordinarily dynamic, the world is *also* manipulative even though it thinks of itself as self-sufficient and adult. It is further divided by extremes of wealth and poverty. As a result of this new situation, Father Haring explores in some detail how the Church must respond with drastic changes in its attitudes towards theology, eclesiastical structure and authority. He courageously touches upon some very difficult and controversial issues, especially regarding the morals of marriage in non-European, specifically African, cultures. He returns again to stress the importance of the Third World by insisting that the Church take greater cognizance of the role of culture in the expression of moral life, realizing that the gospel transforms all human expressions of culture.

This book is worthy of praise. The insights are as brilliant as one expects from Father Haring because he continues to develop his theology along the lines of his understanding of the primacy of love in the gospel message so that all moral life of the Christian and his Church is an ever-growing extension of that experience in the Spirit. The observations he offers with regard to the situation in the present day are most accurate. We do live in a post-Christian world, and the institutional Church can no longer depend upon a residue of understanding among the vast minority of mankind for a sympathetic hearing of its message. Therefore, change is essential, and Father Haring is well qualified to suggest the lines along which change should take place in the interest of reaching all, although they may seem radical and even destructive to those whose thelogical growth has not kept pace with the changing thoughts of the Church-a development to which Father Haring has been a respected contributor for many years.

Whether it is due to the translator or to Father Haring's own trenchant style of writing, the book is difficult to read. One is forewarned that it is not a one-sitting effort. It requires reading and rereading, mainly because principles are stated in a rather complicated way, and the reader is left on his own to draw out the inferences and practical ramifications. At the same time, it is not a substantial theological treatise. In spite of its

deficiencies-obvious perhaps because one expects so much-it does lead to a gospel understanding of reconciliation and evangelization in our secular age.

JOHN BURKE, O. P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

Thomas and Bonaventure: A Septicentenary Commemoration. Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Volume XLVIII. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1974. 344 pp.

Scholars teaching in Germany, Spain, Italy, Japan, Canada, and the United States have contributed to this septicentenary volume. Their thirty-one papers are grouped under six headings: "The Nature of Philosophy,"" Man and Knowledge,"" God and Religious Knowledge," "Ethics," "Law," and " Texts," followed by a commemorative oration by Robert J. Henle, S. J. The concluding section of the volume contains the presentation of the Aquinas Medal by W. Norris Clarke, S.J., to Cornelio Fabro, C. P. S., and such Association business as committee reports and minutes of meetings.

Not all of the papers are directly on Bonaventure or Thomas. Some are on relevant problems or historical background. For example, the first paper, by Thomas Langan, presents a conception of a Christian philosophy that provides a place for both metaphysics and historicity. Louis Dupre, in " The Mystical Experience of the Self and Its Philosophical Significance," explores what mystical experience contributes to the knowledge of the self as such. Adolfo Munoz-Alonso and A. Robert Caponigri discuss St. Augustine, who was a master to both Bonaventure and Thomas. Munoz-Alonso, in " The Idea and the Promise of Philosophy in St. Augustine," by showing that Augustine does not detract from nature or human intelligence to exalt the role of faith, helps the reader to see him more clearly as the forerunner of Thomas Aquinas. Caponigri, in " Contemporary Neo-Augustinianism," thinks Augustine speaks directly to contemporary man and notes that Catholic scholars like Munoz-Alonso, Blonde!, Sciacca, have renewed for our time the thought of Augustine. John McNeill, S. J., in " Blonde! on the Subjectivity of Moral Decision Making," sees Blondel's philosophy of action as the most powerful presentation of the Augustinian tradition in contemporary philosophy and theology. Julian Gervasi, in "The Integralism of Michele Frederico Sciacca," relates Sciacca's concept of objective inwardness to Augustine's experience both of inwardness and openness to transcendence.

Of the papers directly on the theme of the volume, those on St. Bona-

venture are outnumbered by those on St. Thomas Aquinas, but they should not be neglected by students of Franciscan philosophy. John O. Riedl, in" Bonaventure's Commentary on Dionysius' 'Mystical Theology,'" gives a careful textual analysis of those portions of the second of the *Collationes in Hexaemeron* in which Bonaventure speaks of Dionysius the Areopagite, whom he names as a guide, along with Gregory and Augustine. Bernardino Bonansea, O. F. M., in "The Impossibility of Creation from Eternity According to St. Bonaventure," compares and contrasts the position of St. Bonaventure with that of St. Thomas on this admittedly difficult question and tries to show the reasonableness of Bonaventure's position. Ewert Cousins, in "God as Dynamic in Bonaventure and Contemporary Thought," and Leonard Bowman, in "A View of St. Bonaventure's Symbolic Theology," would bring Bonaventure into dialogue with twentieth century man. Cousins, seeing the God of Bonaventure's Trinitarian doctrine as a dynamic, self-diffusive source, suggests the fruitfulness of comparing his metaphysics of fecundity with the thought of Whitehead and Teilhard. Bowman, noting that Bonaventure described material creatures from above as footprints of the Trinity, asks what these *vestigia* would look like to twentieth century man who describes phenomena from below. Seeing them as gifts to our consciousness which disclose a giver of infinite fecundity, Bowman finds Bonaventure's symbolic theology not too different from some things said by Heidegger, Karl Rahner, and Gerard Manley Hopkins. Ignatius Brady, O. F. M., in " The *Opera Omnia* of St. Bonaventure Revisited," discusses four points on the Quaracchi edition and later developments: 1) the background of the edition and its preparation; problems of the edition or items open to criticism; 3) the question of whether or not pieces found since the edition can be attributed to Bonaventure; 4) things that still remain to be discovered. The Bonaventure scholar will appreciate Father Brady's frank and helpful report.

Some of the papers on St. Thomas Aquinas explore his thought by studying it in his own context, or by comparing it with recent views, or by doing both. Fritz-Joachim von Rinteln, in "The Good and the Highest Good in the Thought of Aquinas," presents the context of metaphysical realism within which Thomas situates his theory of value. Cornelio Fabro, C. P. S., in "Philosophy and Thomism Today," contrasts the present reduction of being to being-of-consciousness with the Thomistic position on being as the inexhaustible foundation for the activity of consciousness. Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., in "Aquinas on Cognition as Existence," also shows clearly that the starting point of philosophical inquiry for Thomas is being; being exists with a new mode of existence in knowledge. Kenneth Schmitz, in "Another Look at Objectivity," inquires into the factors that enter into " the apprehension of a thing as it is." While sensitive to the role of the knowing subject, he finds the center of objectivity in the dis-

closure of a thing as it is. Henry Veatch, in " Essentialism and the Problem of Individuation," tries to clarify Thomas' notion of matter as the principle of individuation against the background of issues discussed today by Chisholm and Wiggins. **D. H.** Salman, 0. P., in "Body and Soul," suggests that the Thomistic concept of man as a unity of body and soul can be shown by appealing not just to the adult human being's accomplishments but to psychological data on behavior, motivation, and development at all stages of human life, including early childhood. Richard Reilly, in "Weakness of Will: The Thomistic Advance," and Klaus Riesenhuber, in "The Bases and Meaning of Freedom in Thomas Aquinas," point to contrasts between Thomas's views and those of the Greeks. Reilly thinks Thomas' understanding of weakness of will goes beyond that of Aristotle. It does not mean being overcome by passion, as for Aristotle's incontinent man; it is rather a deliberate pursuit of a lesser good at the risk of forsaking a higher spiritual good. Riesenhuber believes there was a shift in Thomas' position on freedom from the earlier to the later works. He thinks that Thomas first seemed to make will a subordinate and executive faculty of the intellect and later shifted the emphasis towards the autonomy of the will, in response to the Greco-Arabian necessitarianism condemned in Hl70.

Some of the writers search in Thomas for answers to problems raised in our time. James Reichmann, in "From Immanently Transcendent to Subsistent *Esse:* Aquinas and the God-Problem," shows how Aquinas' theory of being, if properly understood, answers the contemporary need to solve the problem of transcendence and history. For Aquinas God is in history but not dependent upon it, immanently present to it, but transcending this immanent presence. David Tracy, in "St. Thomas on the Religious Dimension of Experience: The Doctrine of Sin," shows that Thomas has something to say to our contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion. He finds that Thomas's philosophical theory can justify both the explicitly religious Christian insight into the gratuity of God's grace and the dimension of man's freedom which acknowledges the fact but not the necessity of sin. Vernon Bourke, in "Aquinas and Recent Theories of Right," examines the distinction of good and right in British-American ethics, shows that Aquinas regards good as the primary value and right as secondary, and points to the contemporary significance of Thomas' view. Kevin McDonnell, in "Aquinas and Hare on Fanaticism," explores the function of reason in ethics by using as a test case the problem of fanaticism raised by Hare. He finds that Thomas's view of reason, particularly moral reason, provides the more adequate basis for a rejection of fanaticism. Martin Golding, in "Aquinas and Some Contemporary Natural Law Theories," and John U. Lewis, in "Aquinas and Professor Kelsen: Their Differing Conceptions of Legal Science," compare Aquinas' view on law with modern theories and suggest its relevance for our time.

The volume, though dominantly appreciative of Aquinas' contributions, is not an anthology of eulogies, but of careful scholarly expositions and appraisals. John Noonan, Jr., in "Masked Men: Person and *Persona* in the Giving of Justice," asks some hard critical questions about Thomas's distinction of the public person and the private person. This might well be read together with Nicholas Rescher's discussion, in "Morality in Government and Politics," of the question: Should public agents be exempt from standards that apply to others? These papers and others in the Law and Ethics sections would be useful supplementary reading for an Ethics course.

Another critical note can be found in Leslie Dewart's discussion of "The Relevance of Thomism Today." He finds no Thomism today which enjoys at the same time both "historical legitimacy" (i. e. fidelity to the principal doctrines of Thomas) and philosophical adequacy. This is not surprising since, as Ralph Mclnerny points out, he takes phenomenology as a norm of philosophical adequacy. He raises an interesting question which is, however, as relevant to the disciple of Husserl and Heidegger as to the disciple of Thomas Aquinas: Is the spirit of philosophy antithetical to the spirit of discipleship? The question, "What does it mean to be a Thomist today?," could be further explored on a theoretical level, but it is implicitly answered in several of the earlier papers in this volume.

Edward Mahoney, in "St. Thomas and the School of Padua at the End of the Fifteenth Century," points out that there is still no detailed and exhaustive history of Thomism, but his paper provides some solid information on three philosophers who were influenced by Thomas: Nicoletta Vernia, Agostino Nifo, and Pietro Pomponazzi. James P. Reilly, Jr., in "The Leonine Commmission and the Seventh Centenary of St. Thomas Aquinas," presents I) a brief history of the Leonine Commission; 2) an examination of the method used to provide a critical edition of the works of Aquinas; 3) a statement on the present and future prospects of the Commission.

Father Henle, in his commemorative oration, predicts "a great revival of Thomistic scholarship and interpretation." If he is right, this book may well be a precursor of such a revival. Many may turn to this volume for additional historical knowledge about two major thinkers of the thirteenth century, but they will find more than this. They will glimpse a coherent view of man and reality in a theocentric universe. They will also be alerted to the help that Bonaventure and Thomas can give us with some of the problems of our own time.

BEA H. ZEDLER

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Perception: A Philosophiccil Symposium. By F. N. SIBLEY. London: Methuen and Company, 1971. (Distributed in the United States by Barnes and Noble, Inc.). Pp. vii and 193.

This book is the proceedings of a colloquium held at the University of Lancaster some five years ago. There are four major papers published substantially as presented at the colloquium and four responses, some more detailed than others. Some of the participants, like G. J. Warnock, William Kneale, Godfrey Vesey and Bernard Williams, are philosophers important in mid-century British analytic philosophy. This is a very technical work and in its present published form probably of interest only to those philosophers actually involved with the current discussions regarding perception theory. The papers and responses contained in the book are a logical development of the concerns about perception expressed by philosophers like Russell, Moore, and others central to the foundation of analytic philosophy in the beginning of the present century.

Hovering behind three of the major papers is the ghost of the sense datum theories so common to epistemological accounts of perception by analytic philosophers a quarter century ago. That the concern with sense datum theories is now moribund is apparent from only a cursory reading of this book, which represents current work by analytic philosophers. Given the disdain with which the sense datum theory is viewed today, it is difficult for the contemporary student of epistemology to realize why it was so thoroughly and tenaciously held by so many not so long ago. Although there are no explicit refutations of the sense datum theories in these papers, nevertheless the theory's demise has prompted new problems, especially the claim that the " acquisition of beliefs " is a necessary condition for an adequate analysis of perception. This " epistemic " or " propositional " view of perception plays an explicit role in the papers by G. J. Warnock, J. W. Roxbee Cox, and F. N. Sibley. On an unrelated topic, Brian O'Shaughnessy's paper provides a new yet fairly difficult analysis entitled " The Temporal Ordering of Perception and Reaction." O'Shaughnessy's analysis appears a bit out of place, given the " epistemic " theme considered in some form or other in the other three papers. Since these three papers have a common theme, the major part of this review will be devoted to them.

In his paper entitled " On What is Seen," Warnock discusses the nature of some of the insights regarding perception theory attributed to the late John Austin. That Austin was no friend of the sense datum theory is well known by anyone even vaguely familiar with his work. Using Austin's remarks from *Sense and Sensibilia* as a spring board, Warnock continues the demolition of the appearance/reality distinction made by representative realists, and *a fortiori* by advocates of the sense datum position. Warnock

spends much time in discussion of the validity of the following argument form:

A sees X.
XisP.

AseesP.

Insofar as the conclusion attributes the property "P" to what is perceived as "X", this implies that an epistemic dimension is part of the perception process.

Throughout his discussion, I suspect that Warnock has blurred the important and useful distinction found in Aquinas between the object of perception known via the *sensus communis* (which I take to be a composite of proper and common sensibles), and the object known via the *vis cogitativa* (which I take to be an awareness of an individual object as a *concretum-what* both Aristotle and Aquinas refer to as the "incidental object of sense"). I find this Thomistic distinction quite useful although it is commonly blurred in contemporary discussions of perception theory. Interestingly enough, in responding to Warnock, D. M. Taylor attributes the same structural blur to Warnock's analysis which I have suggested (cf. p. 18 ff.).

The second and third papers and their corresponding responses explicitly deal with questions concerning the epistemic nature of perception. Insofar as Sibley's "Analysing Seeing" is in some sense a more general treatment of this problem, editorially it could well have been placed before Roxbee Cox's "An Analysis of Perceiving in Terms of the Causation of Beliefs." Given the logical priority of Sibley's analysis, I shall treat it before discussing Roxbee Cox's article.

Sibley's long article begins with a clear expository account of two opposing positions discussed in contemporary perception theory:

a) *Epistemic:* This position affirms that perception must be analyzed in terms of states of belief. Thus an adequate analysis of seeing things and events necessarily involves reference to a state of "believing that ...."
b) *Non-Epistennic:* This position affirms that there are some basic acts of perception which do not necessarily involve the acquisition of beliefs. Thus an adequate analysis of perception can be given without reference to the concept of belief.

In his article, Sibley endorses considerations which favor an epistemic view and presents difficulties for any version of a non-epistemic position.

I suggest that scholastic philosophers familiar with Aquinas's distinction mentioned above between the object of the *sensus communis* and the object of the *vis cogitativa* can obtain a *prima facie* awareness of the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic accounts of perception. I suggest,

furthermore, that an analysis of the act of awareness of the *vis cogitativa* and its object (the incidental object of sense) in terms of what Sibley has referred to as an epistemic account of perception might prove both fruitful and intriguing.

Simply put, Sibley's thesis is as follows:

> It is proposed that there are two visual uses of " see " with direct object, one epistemic and one not, and that the epistemic is in various respects the more fundamental. (p. 83)
> ... an account of seeing must be ultimately epistemic in the sense that every being able to see (non-epistemically) logically requires, as a necessary condition, the capacity for seeing (epistemically), a capacity that is epistemic. (p. 108)

In proposing and developing his position, Sibley discusses in some detail the accounts of perception given in Warnock's 1963 article, "Seeing," Fred Dretske's *Seeing and Knowing* and D. M. Armstrong's *A Materialist Theory of Mind.* Dretske's position is the only one Sibley affirms as totally non-epistemic. Sibley reduces the positions of Warnock and Armstrong to modified forms of epistemic accounts. Warnock's remarks in his paper published in this symposium would tend to substantiate Sibley's claim.

In a manner similar to Sibley's discussion, Roxbee Cox develops a position elucidating an account of perception of the "causal variety." The account is elucidated in terms of the " causation of beliefs." Accordingly, it is epistemic in nature. Roxbee Cox explicitly claims that his position is causal in the sense of Grice's famous 1961 article, " The Causal Theory of Perception," yet structurally more akin to the theory proposed by Armstrong. Roxbee Cox explicitly argues that the concept of " perceiving that " is fundamental-i. e., the concept of perceiving that so and so is the case. On his analysis, it follows that the concept of " perceiving a thing " can be explained in terms of " perceiving that," whereas the converse does not hold. For Roxbee Cox, the concept of perceiving is the concept of the exercising of an epistemic capacity; and this capacity, he suggests, is not just a capacity for being at the receiving end of a perceptual process.

William Kneale's response to Roxbee Cox contains more historical touchstones than any of the other major papers or responses. Furthermore, it is the one most structurally interesting to scholastic philosophers. Kneale concentrates on a proposition affirmed by Roxbee Cox that animals and human babies cannot rightly be said to perceive anything in the full sense of the concept of perception. This assertion follows from the propositional nature of the epistemic position affirmed by Roxbee Cox. In response to Roxbee Cox, Kneale elucidates the following important distinction:

> a) the having of a perception.
> b) the making of a perceptual claim.

But it is certainly not true that all respectable talk of perce1vmg ca:n be

To indicate the historical dimension of this distinction between sensation and perception, Kneale quotes extensively from the *Summa Theologiae*, I., Q. 78, a. 3 and a. 4. Kneale believes this distinction is im.-portant as opposed to many empiricists like Hume who have used "perception" as "an omnibus word for whatever goes on in a mind." Kneale focuses attention on the concept of *"intentiones non sensatae"* affirmed by Aquinas and other medievals when discussing the *vis cogitativa* and the *vis aestimativa*. Yet Kneale appears to accept an account of the *vis cogitativa* developed by the late Professor Klubertanz in his *The Discursive Power*. Klubertanz argued that, according to Aquinas, the principal function of the *vis cogitativa* is to perceive that a thing is either useful or harmful. This interpretation of the *vis cogitativa*, especially given Aquinas's account of this faculty of inner sense and its connection with the incidental object of sense elucidated in his *Commentary On Aristotle's On The Soul*, seems quite incomplete to me. However, this review is neither the time nor place to argue that point in detail.

Kneale offers an analysis of Thomas Reid's account of perception and likens Reid to Aquinas in that both strongly affirmed the important distinction between "sensation" and" perception." Kneale suggests that Reid is " right in trying to rescue the word ' perceive ' from misuse." In the end, Kneale argues against any epistemic account of perception.

But it is certainly not true that all respectable talk of perceiving can be reduced to talk of perceiving that (pp. 72-73).

Kneale provides an interesting insight with his claim that the worry about "sense experience" and its traditional connection with the postulation of intermediary entities like sense data have forced epistemologists like Roxbee Cox into epistemic positions. This postulation of intermediary entities is further connected, I suggest, with the acceptance of a perceptual model based upon the "diaphanous mental act" inherited from Moore, Russell, and Price. For a discussion of the nature of the diaphanous mental act and its relation to contemporary analytic philosophy, see this reviewer's article, "Deely and Geach on Abstractionism in Thomistic Epistemology," *The Thomist*, July, 1973. What might be necessary to further the development of perception theory capitalizing on Kneale's remark is to provide an account of a non-diaphanous mental act which is at the same time non-propositional-i. e., not a state of belief. And possibly some reworking of the structure of Aquinas's faculty psychology could provide some insights for this task.

On the whole, this book is highly recommended for those philosophers actively engaged in work with contemporary perception theory. It should be on the shelves of all libraries at colleges and universities with serious philos-

ophy programs. Yet it is not a text-book nor is it a monograph which could be picked up by a casual observer or an unsophisticated student of philosophy interested in discovering what contemporary philosophers have to say about perception theories. And it is precisely this point which has caused this reviewer some anguish. I make the following comment from the perspective of a *teacher* of philosophy. A book like this, serious and important as it is, would be better if it contained a competent and lucid introductory chapter, especially one expository in nature, which would indicate where in the flow of contemporary philosophy these papers and responses fit. This type of introduction would be an invaluable asset for students of philosophy confronting these difficult issues for the first time, either in seminars or through independent study. I realize that at times authors are under pressures from publishing-house editors to limit severely the size of introductions. Nevertheless, editorial policy should be in keeping with educational needs. And one such educational need for books of this caliber is the inclusion of introductory material helping students to become aware of how the important papers contained within the book are connected with each other and how the issues discussed are related to the other concerns central to twentieth-century epistemology.

ANTHONY J. LISSKA

Denison University
Granville, Ohio

The Political Philosophy of Luis de Molina, S.J. (1535-1600). By FRANK BARTHOLOMEW COSTELLO, S. J. Roma: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1974. Pp. XXVIII + 242. Paper.

Father Costello, now of Gonzaga University, Spokane, is a former student of Heinrich Rommen at Georgetown. The present work, his dissertation researched in Rome, is Vol. XXXVIII in the Bibliotheca Instituti Historici Societatis Iesu. It is monographic in its documentation: there is a bibliography containing every work cited, an index, and long footnotes which include quotations from Molina's Latin. But the simple and clean prose makes the book swift and readable. Moreover the report of Molina's thought is spiced at the beginning and end of each chapter with ancient and recent parallels and contrasts. These wide-ranging citations make the reading easy and enjoyable, provided one is willing to pass over the exhaustive footnotes.

The book is divided into nine chapters which open with Molina's biographical and historical setting, and then take up in turn his theories of civil society, political authority, the right of resistance, church and state, war, slavery, and law. A brief concluding note is appended to the last chapter.

The reader is impressed with Father Costello's mastery of the materials and his admiration for his subject. Molina receives from him an apologetic treatment in the face of the " almost universal neglect " of the great Spanish jurist-theologian by modern scholars, notably political scientists and international lawyers. Father Costello places Molina at the head of the " social-metaphysical tradition of the Jesuits". In the summer of sixteenth-century scholasticism, he writes, " Molinism became the distinctive flower of Jesuit thought." (p. 231)

Molina's political thought is encompassed in the massive *De Justicw et Jure,* which began as lectures commenting on the *Secunda Secundae* of St. Thomas at the University of Evora in Portugal. Its five volumes, published betwen 1593 and 1609, are subdivided into tractates and disputations. Although the plan of the work is original, its inspiration came from Aristotle's classification of justice. Besides St. Thomas, Molina's work was strongly influenced by two other Dominicans, more contemporary with him: Vittoria and Soto. No doubt the neglect of Molina by historians of political philosophy is largely due to his adherence to a tradition already established by illustrious predecessors.

Molina's treatment of the origin and nature of civil society unfolds along Aristotelian-Thomistic lines. He postulates three broad groups of reasons for the origin of political society. The first two provide a natural basis for the state's *directive* function: *indigentia* (the instinctive rational sense of need) and *socialitas* (which insures the possibility of human development). The third is responsible for the *coercive* power of the state: *eventus peccati* (the effects of original sin).

As for political authority, Molina is among the Translation theorists, who argued that it stems from the commonwealth as a whole. For Molina the immediate *use* of power is conferred on governors through a *communicatio* or *concessio* which renders inactive the natural residual authority of the people but also leaves it intact. Hence the right to resist a tyrant.

Father Costello finds Molina's thought least satisfactory in the matter of church-state relations. In principle, he held that rulers are independent of the pope in the secular domain; he has no *direct* power to intervene in temporal maters except in his own state. But Molina concedes practical circumstances when the greater spiritual common good requires such intervention and entitles the pope to claim temporal jurisdiction.

Father Costello next devotes two chapters (comprising one-third of the whole book) to Molina's principal contribution to political theory: the law of war. As a forerunner of Grotius (whose *De Jure Belli et Pacis* refers 21 times to Molina) , his principles are " in perfect harmony with the practice of modern international law" (p. 131) and could well be helpful in studying today's conflicts, Father Costello affirms. But as he outlines Molina's principles governing the right to wage war, the essential elements

of a licit war of aggression (proper authorization, right intention, just cause), and the conduct of war, one cannot help thinking that our contemporary international situation is more than a little removed from the civilization Molina knew.

It is in connection with slavery that Molina's thought has been most controversial. In responding to his critics, Father Costello treats the matter delicately: "Molina's approach to the question of the morality of the slave trade was first of all to review facts carefully as far as he could know them," and then outline the norms by which slaves might be legally acquired, denouncing at the same time the illegal slave traffic. (p. 198)

The concluding chapter, on Molina's philosophy of law, is little more than a survey of what could make another entire book if handled in detail. For throughout the five volumes, Molina is concerned to state clearly and develop in great detail the Thomistic definition and division of law. Father Costello contents himself with a consideration of three elements of Molina's jurisprudence: the definition and divisions of law, the relation between natural law and *Jus gentium,* and positive civil law in relation to economic problems such as taxation.

In his conclusion the author finds Molina's political philosophy *realistic* (considering man in the concrete within contingent historical conditions), *personal* (placing the free individual in the center of his concerns), and *democratic* (consistently opposing all usurpations of authority). These are the fruits of Father Costello's exploration of the stream of Jesuit political thought as it flowed into the larger river of scholastic political thought in the last quarter of the sixteenth century.

JOHN A. GuEGUEN

Illinois State University
Normal, Illinois

The Commentary of Conrad of Prussia on the De Ente et Essentia *of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Introduction and Comments by JoSEPH BOBIK. Transcription of the Manuscript by James A. Corbett and Joseph Bobik. The Hague: Martinus Nijhofl', 1974.

The *De Ente et Essentia* was one of St. Thomas's first and shortest works, and yet it has been very popular in Thomistic circles ever since his death. At least nine commentaries on it were written up to the end of the 16th century, and in modern times it has been edited many times and translated into several languages. If St. Thomas were alive today he would no doubt be astonished at the attention given to this brief and occasional treatise. Its popularity is understandable, however, for apart from his commentary

on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* it is his only purely philosophical treatment of the notions of being and essence and other related metaphysical terms. The *De Ente et Essentia* reveals the young St. Thomas calmly and surely laying the foundations of his metaphysics, which he developed and deepened later on in his theological writings.

In the book under review Professors Bobik and Corbett have published and analyzed the first known commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia.* The manuscript of the commentary was transcribed by Corbett and Bobik, and the Introduction and Comments were made by Bobik. The commentary is extant in only one manuscript, dating from the mid-14th century. It was written before St. Thomas' canonization in 1323, since it refers to him as Brother Thomas. Martin Grabmann, who discovered the manuscript in the monastery library of Admont, Austria, attributed it to Conrad of Prussia. He noted, however, that the name of the author was erased in the manuscript; only ' de Prusya " remains. A partial erasure of the name " Conradi" preceding ' de Prusya " in another treatise in the same codex suggests that the erased name of the author of the commentary was also "Conradi." But on the evidence presented, nothing certain can be said about the name of the author. Even if his name was Conrad of Prussia nothing further is known about him.

The commentary consists of a Prooemium and sixteen *lectiones* or lectures, each of which is divided in the medieval manner into two parts: a division and summary of Aquinas' text, and a commentary on it. After presenting the Latin text of the author, Professor Bobik comments on it at length (pp. 92-162). His "one purpose" is " to employ Conrad's *lectiones* as a means to make clearer, if possible, some (certainly not all) of the claims which Aquinas makes, and the arguments which he devises, in this densely packed philosophical treatise" (p. 99). He is not unconcerned, however, with the author's interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine, and he suggests both weaknesses and strengths in it.

I should like to comment briefly on the edition of the text and then on its interpretation of the thought of St. Thomas.

Anyone who has tried to edit a medieval work from only one manuscript-and a poor one at that-will sympathize with the editors' difficulties in presenting an intelligible text. This reviewer has not had access to a copy of the manuscript, and so was unable to check the edition. On the whole, however, the text is readable and intelligible. Only a few sentences raise difficulties. Occasionally the manuscript clearly needed the emendations made by the editors, but sometimes they have altered the text unnecessarily. For example, *aliquod* is changed to *aliud,* p. 26, lines 471, 473, and p. 27, line 496. *Profertur* is changed to *prosequitur,* p. 36, line 700. The words *si animal alitur* are omitted on p. 37, line 744, but they do make sense in the context: according to Aristotle plants are both born and

nourished "if the living thing is fed" (See *De Anima,* II, 413a80). *Quiddam* is changed to *quoddam,* p. 51, line 140 (but seep. line 157 for *quidam)*. For convenience sake the Baur edition of the *De Ente et Essentia* has been printed before Conrad's commentary, and the *lemmata* of his text have been changed, where necessary, to conform to the reading of the Baur edition. There are a few easily detected misprints; e.g. *fundamentaum* for *fundamentum,* p. *56,* line *eamden formam* for *eamdem formam,* p. 78, Lectio XIII; *aliquor:m* for *aliquorum,* p. 18, line 216; *nonm* for *non,* p. 12, line 77. *Hoc et illuc,* p. 18, line 219, should likely be *hue et illuc; qui est res,* p. 20, line 304, should surely read *quid est res.*

Many of the citations of authorities have not been identified and checked, on the ground that the primary purpose of the edition is philosophical, not paleographical (p. 4). But this reduces the usefulness of the edition and also its excellence. The verification of the references would sometimes help to establish the text. It was hazardous to change the reading of the *dictum* of Averroes on p. 24, as given in the manuscript, without consulting Averroes' own words. Regretfully, this edition, from a paleographical point of view, leaves something to be desired.

To the historian of philosophy, Conrad's commentary is important as one of the earliest interpretations of Aquinas' metaphysics. St. Thomas' immediate followers seem uniformly to have failed to understand in depth his notions of *esse* and *essentia.* The author of the present commentary must be placed among their number. The commentary is a literal exposition of Aquinas' work, and one can find in it almost all the arguments, phrases, and expressions of the Angelic Doctor. From that point of view Grabmann was correct in calling it a lucid explanation of Aquinas. Only occasionally, as Professor Bobik points out, does it misrepresent Aquinas' doctrine, as when it claims that the essence of a material substance, conceived as a part (e.g. humanity) does not include both matter and form (p. 61, lines 402-404). The commentary also confuses the divine being with *esse commune* (p. 73, lines 714-715). It is thoroughly Thomistic, however, in describing God as *esse tantum* (p. 72, line 698); in asserting that his *esse* does not differ from his essence, while in creatures *esse* is other than their essence (p. 66, line 512); that the intelligences are composed of *esse* and essence (p. 64, lines 461-462), receiving their *esse* from an extrinsic cause, namely God, who is his *esse* (p. 68, lines 559-562).

Like the *De Ente et Essentia* itself, the commentary says little about the meaning of *esse.* It does not clarify Aquinas' work by referring to Aquinas' later profound descriptions of *esse* as "the actuality of all acts and consequently the perfection of all perfections " *(De Potentia,* VII, 2, ad 9), or "the actuality of every form" *(Sum. Theol.* I, 3, 4). One suspects that the author was not aware of Aquinas' later developments in his doctrine of *esse.* He does give some hints, however, as to how he conceived

being and *esse*. He says that *esse* is that by which a thing is or subsists (p. 69, lines 595-596). *Essentia* and *esse* are not the same, though they communicate between themselves. *Esse* is the " union of form with matter " *(unio formae cum materia)* (p. 45, line 973). This reflects Aquinas' doctrine in his commentary on the *Sentences*, that the *esse* of a substance composed of matter and form "consists in a certain composition of form with matter" *(In I Sent.* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3). *Esw* is not described, however, as a synthesizing *act* of the essence. Essence, curiously, is said to be the "duration" of the composite or simple substance (p. 45, line 975). In a clear distortion of St. Thomas' notion of being, the author asks his reader to imagine the relation of *ens* to *essentia* on the pattern of the relation of animal to rational. *Essentia* is added to *ens* as a kind of specific difference: essence is an *ens extr.a animam* (p. 18, line 245 ff.) !

While Conrad, like St. Thomas, is concerned throughout to elucidate the meaning of terms such as " being " and " essence," it does not seem to me that either philosopher understands this to be merely a linguistic or logical task, as Professor Bobik claims (p. 5). Aquinas, to my knowledge, never observes ' that the word 'being ' is *composite" (ibid.),* though he, with his commentator, speaks of a composition of essence and *esse* in creatures. Professor Bobik's identification of the meanings of the word "being" with its uses *(ibid.)* suggests a Wittgensteinian interpretation of the *De Ente* and its commentary that the works themselves do not bear. To Aquinas, the terms analyzed in his treatise are terms of first intention, signifying reality itself; hence their analysis is not logical but metaphysical.

The book concludes with three useful Indices: 1) to Aquinas' *De Ente et Essentia*, 2) to Conrad's commentary, 3) to the footnotes, introduction, and the comments on Conrad's commentary.

One must be grateful to the authors of this book both for an edition of a manuscript of such importance for the early history of Thomism and for their many helpful comments on it.

ARMAND MAURER, C. S. B.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Toronto, Canada

BOOKS RECEIVED

Alba House: *Where Peter Is: A Survey of Ecclesiology, by* Edward J. Gratsch (Pp. 276, $4.95 paper) .

Barnes and Noble: *The Ethics of Buddhism,* by S. Tachibana. (Pp. 278, no price given) .

University of California Press: *Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary, A Critical Edition and Translation,* by Michael J. B. Allen (Pp. 574, $20.00).

Desclee-Bellarmin: *La Pedagogie de la Crainte dans l'Histoire du Salut selon Thomas d'Aquin,* by Andre Guindon, 0. M. I. (Pp. 417, $16.00).

Dimension Books: *Building God's World* by Robert Faricy, S. J. (Pp. 190, $4.95, paper). *Inward Stillness* by George A. Maloney, S. J. (Pp. 236, $6.95, cloth).

Franklin and Co.: *Joachim of Fiore in Christian Thought,* Vols. I and II, edited by Delno C. West, (Pp. 631, $28.50).

Liviana Editrice: *Summa Dialetice Artzs deUa Biblioteca Feliniana di Lucca,* edited with Introduction by Lorenzo Pozzi (Pp. 260, no price given).

McGraw-Hill Book Co.: St. Thomas Aquinas: *Summa Theologiae.* Vol. 7 (Ia, 33-43) *Father, Son and Holy Ghost,* translated with appendices by T. C. O'Brien (Pp. 274, $20.00). Vol. *56* (3a 60-65) *The Sacraments,* translated by David Bourke (Pp. 160, $12.50) .

The Seabury Press: *Ethics of Manipulation: Issues in Medicine, Behavior Control and Genetics,* by Bernard Haring (Pp. 211, $8.95).

Scholars' Press: *The Religious Language of Nicholas of Cusa,* by James E. Biechler (Pp. 240, $4.20).

The University of North Carolina Press: *Philosophy and the Modern Mind: A Philosophical Critique of Modern Western Civilization,* by E. M. Adams (Pp. 225, 12.95).

Western North Carolina Press, Inc.: *The Horizontal Line Synopsis of the Gospels,* by Reuben J. Swanson (Pp. 597, $23.95).

Martinus Nijhoff: *Religious Consciousness and Experience,* by Thomas N. Munson (Pp. 192, Guilders 42.50).

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