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THE *A PRIORI* IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON* AND LONERGAN'S *INSIGHT**

1. Kant's reasons for his quest of the *a priori.*

KANT'S WORK is indissolubly bound up with two notions: that of the transcendental as a method of analysis and that of the *a priori* as the result of such an analysis. In the following pages we propose to study that second notion as it appears in the *Critique of Pure Reason,*[1] though this will often lead us to touch on the first notion as well. Our aim is to set forth as detailed an analysis as the limits of the present paper will allow. Without entering into the history of the composition of the *KRV,* let us simply say that because of what Norman Kemp Smith calls "the tentative character of Kant's conclusions "[2] it would be an extremely long and difficult task to establish the stages through which Kant's thought evolved and to document the philosophical positions to be found in this *Critique.* Our purpose is rather to clarify the basic epistemological lines of the *KRV* in their various aspects, in their tensions, and in what seems to us to be their common direction. The epistemology of Lonergan will not be the direct object of analysis in this paper; rather it will be presupposed and used to supply the key to our reading of the *KRV,* as will be evident enough to those of our readers who are familiar with *Insight.*[8]

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* I am very much indebted to the Reverend Frederick E. Crowe, S. J., of Regis College, Toronto, for having gone through my manuscript improving the style and clarifying a number of passages.

The present paper offers some key insights already treated more thoroughly in a detailed study of Kant's writings in my book: *Das Apriori in der menschlichen Erkenntnis. Eine Studie iiber [(ants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Lonergans Insight,* Meisenheim am Gian (A. Hain) 1971.

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* abbreviated in this article as *KRV,* and referred to according to the original pagination of the first (A) and second (B) editions. References will be frequent, and so will be given in the text rather than in footnotes. The English translation will be that of Norman Kemp Smith, except for minor changes and the addition of emphases.

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[2] Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's* 'Critique of Pure Reason'. New York, p. *561.*

•Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding,* London & New York, 1957. References to this volume will also be given in the text rather than in footnotes, with emphases added in some cases.

Perhaps the relation Kant and Lonergan in this study should be clarified. Directly the article is a study of Kant; it is, however, a critical study, a critique of a critique. Now a critique proceeds from horizons, presuppositions, premisses, positions, which are those of the critic himself. Thus, Kant's own critique of pure reason proceeded from his position on the relation of understanding to the empirical, and from the presuppositions that lay behind that position. Similarly, our critique of Kant proceeds from presuppositions held by the author, and those presuppositions are derived from the cognitional theory of Lonergan's *Insight.* However, we judged it legitimate to omit a detailed presentation of Lonergan here; surely we are not mistaken in thinking, after nearly twenty years and so many general presentations of Lonergan's thought, that we can take the basic ideas of *Insight* to be familiar.

There may indeed be a question about some of its particular ideas, whether they have been superseded by Lonergan's later work, but that would have to be proved in each case. In fact, Lonergan gives his own recent views on *Insight* in the paper, " *Insight* Revisited" (A *Second Collection,* London, 1974), and though he indicates some ideas that have undergone revision in his thinking of the last twenty years, there is not the slightest hint that his basic cognitional theory and epistemology, that which is presupposed in the present article, has been abandoned. On the contrary, he repeats and underlines his basic purpose and strategy in

Why did Kant set up his study of human knowledge in the form of a quest for an *a priori* component in that knowledge? He gives his own answer to our question: to ground the synthetic *a priori* judgments which constitute our scientific knowledge (B 19). We can express Kant's reason in the following syllogism: Scientific knowledge is knowledge of the universal and necessary. But universality and necessity cannot come from experience; that is, they cannot be based on anything *a posteriori.* Therefore they are *a priori.*

We will not examine the merit of the first premiss. However, we must note that it contains an ambiguity that flows over into the entire enterprise of Kant: Is the *KRV* the study of human knowledge without qualification, or is it the study of that particular type of knowledge which science is? The latter does not in fact exhaust the scope of human knowledge. However, leaving this ambiguity aside, we cannot doubt that for Kant scientific knowledge amounts to knowledge of the universal and necessary. It is the classical ideal of science, and Kant not only fully accepts it but also carries it to its final consequences. Today we cannot follow Kant along that road. A modem analysis of knowledge must begin by getting rid of the heavy burden of conceptualism we inherited from our predecessors. They were forever in search of a universality and necessity greater than the science of the last four centuries has aimed at achieving; if we follow them we will be laboring to find an *a priori* in order to explain a knowledge which we do not in fact possess.

The need to change our approach is still more evident when we consider the second premiss, viz., universality and necessity cannot come from experience. What is experience? There are at least two meanings of the term in the *KRV,* and we must keep them in clear distinction if we would understand adequate-

Insight. The same point might be inferred from his continual references to that work in his recent writings; it is clear that he regards it as expressing his fundamental philosophical position; see, for example, the Index of *Method in Theology* (London, s. v., Lonergan ... *Insight.*

ly this principle which is so fundamental to Kantian epistemology. Both meanings are already found in the first section of Kant's Introduction (B 1). Here, at the very beginning, *Erfahrun.g* is equivalent to pure sense knowledge; its nature is determined specifically by the fact that sense is a faculty which must be moved by a material object in order to know. Hence *Erfahrung* denotes that activity which, at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic, is called *Empfindung* (sensation [A 34]). At the end of the same passage, however, *Erfahrung* no longer designates sense knowledge alone, but human knowledge in the full meaning of the term, including therefore the sensible and the intellectual together. Now if experience is taken in the second sense it is easy to see that, far from excluding universality and necessity, it essentially includes them, in so far as it requires the constitutive intervention of the pure forms of intuition and of the pure concepts of understanding. If, on the contrary, experience is taken in the first sense, then it is true that necessity and universality do not originate in experience.

The foregoing may seem obvious enough at first glance. Nevertheless, more attentive scrutiny reveals a flaw in the construction of the syllogism with which we began. Between the second premiss (experience can yield neither necessity nor universality) and the conclusion (necessity and universality are *a* primi) there is another premiss which must be made explicit before the conclusion is valid. This premiss is that the cognitional phases which follow upon *Empfinding* are incapable of raising the representation of the concrete sense object to the status of the universal and the necessary. Here we touch on one of the fundamental problems of Kantian epistemology. The *KRV* clearly recognizes that knowledge is a composite, in particular a composite of sensibility and understanding. But his fundamental intuitionist conception of knowledge inclines Kant to say-more or less explicitly according to the degree that the intuitionist principle comes to the fore-that the object of knowledge is given to us through the senses and only through them; the later phases of the cognitional process do not contribute a partial object of their own to the constitution of the full and final object of knowledge. Let me put it more precisely still: to understand the sensed object and to reflect on what has been understood, is not, in the Kantian view, to add a further, different content to our knowing; the content of knowledge is simply repeated in shifting from the sense level to the level of understanding, *Verstand*.[4]

Now Kant says of *Erfahrung* that, taken as mere sense experience, it " tells us indeed, *what is*, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise" (A 1). Actually, experience itself is knowledge neither of the " what" nor of the " is " ; it is purely and simply presentation. To know " what" is presented and whether this " what " really " is " belongs to the intelligent and rational phrases which follow the sensible phase. Kant tends to say that knowledge on the first level already attains the " what is " of reality, though it may be only in its singularity; and the reason is that he is thinking according to the intuitionist principle. If, however, this principle is abandoned, then both the " what " and the "is", as well as necessity and universality, are found to have a different origin. As formal determination is added through understanding to an object which is otherwise a mere datum, and as existence is then ,added through judgment, so the universality of the formal determination as well as the factual necessity of existence are added to the same sense object. We have to consider the entire structure of knowledge in order to grasp how a process, which clearly has its empirical side too, can also have contents and qualifications which are not empirical-not empirical, at least, if one restricts " empirical " to the first level of the cognitional structure.

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[4] We shall see presently that Kant's *a priori* has its own objective content. It is not true, under this aspect, that the object is simply repeated in passing from one level to another. On the other hand, in so far as Kant recognizes an objective-content *a priori*, he feels constrained to qualify the known as reality-for-us. True reality is (or rather ought to be) only the content of the first phase of knowledge. In fact it is not, since our intuition is sensible. This simple hint is enough to show that statements often voiced concerning Kant's epistemology must be recast from complementary, if not contrary, points of view which are also to be found in the *KRV*. One ought to keep this principle of interpretation in mind throughout this paper, even where it has not been possible to document it.

2. Does the mind impose the *a priori* on reality or does it question reality through the *a prioii?*

The Kantian conception of the *a priori* is open to two opposing dangers. One danger is to empty it of any real meaning. Kant finds himself in this danger whenever he insists on the empirical character of our knowledge. If indeed reality is given to us through sense intuition, what are the various *a priori* representations supposed to do? It might be said: They make us think of the object and thus come to know it with a properly human knowledge. But then we would have to ask: What do we thus come to know that we did not know already through sensation alone? The opposite danger is to attribute too much to the *a priori.* This danger is expecially grave when Kant underlines the constitutive-formative function of the *a priori,* according to the fundamental statement of the Preface: " we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves *put into them"* (B xviii).

We believe it is possible to overcome this tension and to define more satisfactorily the nature and function of the *a priori,* by bringing to completion that turn to the subject *(Hinwendung zum Subjekt)* which is the purpose of transcendental analysis. A metaphor which Kant himself proposes will illustrate our meaning. While for Kant this metaphor helps clarify the function he assigns to the *a, priori,* for us it indicates the way to overcome the insufficiencies of the Kantian conception:

> Reason, holding in one hand its principle ... and in the other hand the experiment ... must approach nature in order to be taught by it. It must not, however, do so in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses *to answer questions*

> which he has himself formulated. Even physics, therefore, owes the beneficent revolution in its point of view entirely to the happy thought, that while reason must seek in nature, not fictitiously ascribe to it, whatever as not being knowable through reason's own resources has to be learnt, if learnt at all, only from nature, it must adopt as its guide, in so seeking, that which it has itself *put into* nature (B xiii f.).

Let us set aside the phrase, put into, as well as the question of experimental method, and concentrate on the judge.[5] By hypothesis the judge knows nothing of what has happened. Yet the judgment of the case is confined :to him. Why? Because he possesses juridical science. In virtue of this he puts precise questions to the witnesses. The latter are men of common sense and so know the facts under the headings of violence, tragedy, cruelty, and so forth. But knowledge under those headings does not interest the judge. For him what the witnesses say-aside from the question of their veracity-is not yet the reality he seeks to know; their statements are for his purpose only data which through his inquiry must undergo a twofold promotion. First, they must be promoted to the level of understanding, of data that are understood. Then the judge must exercise his: juridical science in a critical reflection that weighs all the factors pertinent to a legal judgment; by this means the data are promoted to the level of sufficient evidence, and the judge achieves knowledge of the juridically determined fact. It was just this juridical reality which he wished to ascertain.

In this case it is easy to see what the *a priori* of the judge is: juridical .science. It does not seem correct to say, according to any acceptable meaning of the expression that there is something which the judge himself has " put into " the juridically determined reality. Rather we must say that he has drawn an element from himself and put it into the data. What is that element? It is the questions he asked in virtue of his knowledge. By asking, seeking, reflecting, the judge has come to know the reality. Now let us go behind this specific *a piiori:* Juridical science in the judge, that complex of knowledge in the witnesses termed common sense, those various mentalities that form the pre-understanding *(Vorverstandnis)* by which one man is an engineer, another a sociologist, a third a poet, all are specifications of a unique, basic pre-understanding, the same for everyone, by which everyone, whether he knows under this aspect or that, always knows being or the real.

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[5] Here we expand Lonergan's analysis as it is found in the mimeographed notes of his course at the Gregorian University, *De methodo theologiae*, Rome, 1962, p. 49.

Thus, to say that there is an *a priori* at the root of knowledge is to say that learning does not start from nothing. But whereas in the case of the judge the starting point is knowledge properly so called, when we go back further, to the point from which all the different specific kinds of knowledge get their start, we no longer find a knowledge of objects, of nature, or of the human world, but rather a knowledge purely and simply on the side of the subject. The presence of the subject to himself (consciousness), in its immanent orientation toward the universe to be known, is identical with the notion of that objective toward knowledge of which the subject proceeds intelligently and rationally. This is the *a priori* in its first and proper sense, and particular objective *a priori's* are formed within it. The constitution of the particular *a priori's* is *a posteriori;* it occurs within the cultural components of the environment in which one is born and raised, and through the personal experiences which constitute the life of the individual in its unicity. The first *a prim,* on the contrary, is the *a priori* in an absolute sense.

Now if, in virtue of his particular pre-understanding, the judge is able to pose his specific questions, what questions are we able to ask and what knowledge can we reach in virtue of that pre-understanding which is *priori* as human beings? The question we can ask is the question about being, and the knowledge we can reach is the knowledge of being. Questioning creates within human spirit that space by which it is able to manifest reality. According to Kant "we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them " (B xviii); we believe that it is more according to common experience to say " we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves *ask* about them." The questions we ask " invest " the data, and only then do the data mediate reality to us, a reality which is first intended and only subsequently known. Moreover, it is in virtue of questioning, as forming the horizon of our inquiry, that the data actually enter the field of intelligent consciousness. The manifestation of reality is possible because the question, in that anticipatory movement which constitutes it as question, already has the meaning of reality; without this primordial knowledge, which is of the essence of spirit in so far as spirit is being in its luminousness, and hence meaningful to itself, the datum could not be revealed to us .as reality.

Summing up as clearly as possible what the *a prim* is according to *Insight*, we could say that primordially and fundamentally it is the question. Questions constitute the operator which promotes the successive expansions of consciousness in the transition from one level to another of the structure. Questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, and, beyond the strictly cognitional phase of human activity, questions for decision-these are the *a priori.* This conception is paralleled in *Insight* by the notion of reality as intrinsically intelligible. Is reality what you can look at (whether the " look " be conceived as an act of ocular or intellectual vision), or is reality what you intend by asking questions? *Insight* maintains and fully develops the second alternative, which we shall refer to as the rational conception of the real. The clarification of such a conception of reality will hopefully be one of the more important contributions of this study.

Human knowledge, then is inexplicable if we do not admit a strictly subjective *a priori* which, without being constitutive of the object as object, nevertheless makes it formally possible for the object to be known. It is an *a priori* which$_1$ while not being itself determined as a category, still grounds the possibility of every determination of whatever is known. To speak of a primordial question implies that human spirit is meaning in quest of meaning. The meaning with which man is naturally endowed is merely heuristic; it is anticipatory of reality. Hence a true search for something really unknown is quite possible, and so is the recognition of reality once we have found it. Human spirit betrays a total poverty at the very same time that it reveals a total capacity for discerning and judging by itself everything in the range of the true.

3. The Intuition Principle in the *KRV* and the Structure Principle in *Insight.*

It is well to preface an examination of the *a priori* on the various levels of knowledge with a study of what we consider to be the first principle of Kantian epistemology. Heidegger has formulated it with extreme exactitude: " To understand the *KRV* one must literally hammer into one's mind the principle: Knowledge is primarily intuition."[6] The Transcendental Aesthetic opens with the enunciation of this principle: " In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed" (A **19=B** 33). Intuition is thus the unique means by which in the last analysis we are able to establish an immediate cognitional relation with the object. Consequently, given that knowledge consists in this relation of the subject to the object, we must conclude that knowing is intuition. That this is the first principle of the *KRV* is to be presumed from the very frequency with which Kant refers to it. He often says that intuition alone gives us the object, or that intuition alone refers to the object; for example: A 16=B 30, A 68=B 93, A 224=B 272, A 239=B

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[6] Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem dM" Metaphysik,* Frankfurt am Main, 1965, p. 29.

'l98, A 271=B 327, A 320=B 377, A 719=B 747, etc. Elsewhere, mindful of the twofold structure of knowledge, he formulates the principle as follows: through *Anschauen* the object is given to us, through *Denken* it is thought; see, for example: A 15=B 29, A *50=B* 74, B 146, etc. On the basis of these texts we can establish the following conclusion: There are many activities which contribute to the constitution of our knowledge; but, if we ask what constitutes knowledge as knowledge *of an object,* and hence as knowledge simply and without qualification,[7] we have to answer: It is intuition. No matter how many mediated relations other activities are able to establish with the object, if we wish to avoid the nonsense of a series of mediations, no one of which reaches the reality to he mediated, we must say that there is a type of cognitional activity whose very nature consists in setting up a bridge between knower and known. This is intuition. Knowledge is essentially intuition; therefore intuition is to be found in all knowledge.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the intuition principle in Kant's epistemology. It is present everywhere, and commands the solutions of various problems as they arise in the *KRV.* This is not to say that it constitutes the whole epistemology of Kant. Transcendental analysis, which is the aim of the *KRV,* implies a ,shift from consideration of objects to consideration of cognitional acts and, more generically, to consideration of the subject. Now such analysis leads to a doctrine which is at loggerheads with the intuition principle: we mean the doctrine of knowledge as structure. This doctrine appears in the *KRV* in a rather complex manner. Various enumerations of acts and faculties are found in various sections, indeed frequently in the very same section, but we cannot find any means of reducing them to unity or of sketching clearly the whole course of the cognitional process. Kant contents himself with studying from time to time this or that aspect of knowledge, under the pressure of problems at hand, without becoming concerned as to how the various faculties and acts combine to constitute a single process.

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[7] Of course, this takes it for granted that knowing is essentially knowing an object, and hence that knowing essentially implies the duality of the knowing subject and the known object. It is precisely this assumption that is at the base of what we have termed the intuition principle. Kant is forced by this assumption to conceive the *a priori* as itself an object. Lonergan's analysis, on the contrary, uncovers an *a priori* strictly on the side of the subject, thereby replacing the Platonic duality of knowledge as confrontation with the Aristotelian theorem of knowledge by identity.

Between the intuition principle and the structure principle there is a tension in so far as the first tends *per se* to exclude the second. The object is given in intuition; therefore Kant inclines to reduce knowledge to this single act. Hence the obscurity in which the entire Transcendental Analytic is involved: Of what use are the phases of thinking and judging which follow upon intuition? No matter how many functions we ascribe to them, we cannot say that they are cognitional activities if knowing is intuiting an object and these activities are not intuitive but only transport from one level to another (and what does that mean?) the very same object which has already revealed itself to us immediately in the *Ansohauung?*

It is possible to eliminate this tension and give due recognition to the cognitional function of the various acts constituting our knowledge if we choose a different approach. We must set aside the intuition principle, viz., the model of knowing as looking, and consequently of the known as what is looked at, whether it be the sensible singular or the intellectual universal, and in its place we must examine knowledge in itself and study it by introspection as it actually occurs. For this reason Lonergan sets up his study of knowledge as a response, not to the question *whether* we know, or *whether* our knowledge has objective validity, but rather to the question *what* knowledge is. More precisely still: What happens when we know? Or what kinds of acts do we perform in the process of knowing? First must come understanding of the activity that in fact occurs and is called knowledge, and only afterwards judgment on its validity as knowledge of objective reality. Moreover, once the actual facts are understood, the problem of objectivity appears in a different light. One realizes that the investigation into the objective value of knowledge owes its dubious or negative solutions to an erroneous conception of the nature of cognitional activity, a conception which was taken for granted as being too obvious to need examination.

Lonergan's method is therefore an introspective one, based on the conscious character of the cognitional process. The decisive reason in favor of such a method is that it can highlight what is proper to the subject: not only the productions of the subject, but what the subject itself is, formally as subject. Introspective analysis becomes transcendental analysis when consciousness manifests itself as normative throughout the entire cognitional process. It is here that the contingent fact of knowledge, that is, our pragmatic engagement in the process of knowing (*Insight,* 332), manifests its intrinsic necessity by revealing the norm according to which it must unfold in order to lead to a true knowledge. We can recapitulate the results of this analysis under two titles: (1) the intelligent and rational intention which grounds and constitutes the entire cognitional process, (2) knowledge as a formally dynamic structure, that is, as a whole composed of parts, and those parts activities that are self-assembling in a series.

We already described the first result when we spoke of wonder, the primordial question, and considered it not only as principle of the cognitional process from which spring forth specific single questions, but also as penetrating the cognitional process, regulating everything, and rendering every single act meaningful. Our radical questioning, then, is a dynamism towards knowledge, an intelligently and rationally conscious dynamism, and one of unlimited scope. Because of these characteristics Lonergan names our pure desire to know *the notion of its objective,* that is to say, the notion of being. The characteristics found in the object of this intention, when it is realized in a manner faithful to its immanent norms, are anticipated by the subject itself, which is not content with data alone, but confronted by the data poses questions in order to understand and to reflect.

The second result is the doctrine of knowledge as structure. Human knowledge occurs according to a structure of experience, understanding, and judgment. The many acts which introspective analysis brings to light arrange themselves on three essentially different levels, each one adding a new and quite distinct dimension both to knowledge as immanent activity and to the objective content known, until we reach on the one hand rational judgment and on the other the corresponding object.

4. Relation of cognitional activity to reality.

According to the intuition principle cognitional activities are objective, that is, cognitive of the object, in the measure in which they resemble ocular vision. Thus it is established in advance, on the basis of this analogy, what these activities must be if they are to be cognitional at all. But if we abandon the intuition principle, and instead consider the acts we in fact continually exercise in the process of knowing, we come to different conclusions (1) on what establishes the immediate relation of our knowledge to reality, and (2) on the way this relation is realized, that is, the way we pass from a relation of intention towards reality to a relation of actual knowledge. We have stated above the conclusions of *Insight* on this subject.

Therefore to the question, What gives our cognitional activities their relation to the object? we answer: Our pure desire to know, which is our intention of being. Hence the importance of the *a prioii* as tendency to the absolute. The unrestricted scope of the objective of our primordial question and the unconditional character we seek in the judgments by which we move toward that objective, are interdependent. Being, that which has absolute status, is the correlative of an unrestricted intentionality capable of tending towards its object without any qualification or condition. But, to recognize that a tendency to the absolute is the basis of our knowledge of being, we must have have explicitly worked out a rational conception of the real. Transcendental analysis will avoid ending up in immanentism, if and only if, it operates on the basis of the intrinsic intelligibility of the real.

> If by being one means the objective of the pure desire to know, the goal of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, the object of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, then one must affirm the intrinsic intelligibility of being. For one defines being by its intelligibility ... one denies that being is anything apart from the intelligible or beyond it or different from it. *(Insight,* 499).

Kant did not get as far as the intrinsic intelligibility of reality, even though he was opposed to empiricism and highlighted with all desirable emphasis the operations superior to sensing. Precisely on account of that failure, when he comes to decide on the objectivity of these operations, he can only deny it. Man understands, conceives, and-according to a certain meaning of the word-judges; he performs all these activities in a manner coherent with their immanent norms. But for all that, what does he know of reality? Nothing. The intelligent and rational fulfillment of the cognitional dynamism is not the means of knowing reality. And rightly so, since by hypothesis reality is neither intelligible nor rational. Such is the reality which Kant calls Noumenon: something absolutely beyond our intelligent inquiry and our critical reflection. Then, in order not to leave our knowledge without an object, Kant assigns it another entity as object: the Phenomenon, which is always in danger of vanishing into nothing.

Let us try to clarify what we mean when we say that the *KRV* presents an irrational conception of the real. In a general way Kant admits that in order to know reality, other acts beyond sensing are necessary; he states therefore that the object is given through sensibility, but not thought without

Verstand. But such generic statements do not yet prove a rational conception of reality. Such a conception would require *Verstand* to have *its own proper and real content* not given through the senses. It is just here that *Insight* differs from the *KRV. Insight* not only states that intellect thinks or brings to the concept the contents of sensible intuition, but it qualifies this doctrine in a way which goes beyond that of Kant; intellect grasps a *new content* which was not given in intuition: the intelligibility of the sensible grasped in the sensible. Understanding thinks, or brings to the concept, or subsumes under the concept, the object of sense by adding to it an objective element which is not sensible. If we fail to recognize this, the term, to think, remains an empty term, so that verbally one seems to refer to knowledge as a structure, but in fact one still understands knowledge as only intuition. In order actually to overcome the intuition principle we must deny it from the beginning, i. e., deny that the object of our knowledge is given us in intuition. Instead we must say that sense intuition has its own content, that the understanding of *Verstand* has its own content, and, going beyond the binary structure, that the judgment of *Vernunft* has its own content. Hence it is clear that we can no more say that intuition gives us the object of reality, than we can say that understanding gives us the object-except for the functional priority of the sense act over that of understanding. Each cognitional act gives us a partial object. It is the task of the entire structure, which is brought to term in rational judgment, to give us the proper object of knowledge, that is, being.

If the intuition principle is assumed, we can see readily enough how Kant, in the measure in which he recognizes both the intuition principle and the structure principle, has to relate the various cognitional acts to reality. According to the passage cited from #1 of the Aesthetic, intellectual activities, termed generically *Denken,* refer to reality through sensible intuition. This interpretation of the objectivity of knowledge is confirmed at the beginning of the Analytic a propos of the activity of *Verstand:* " Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it .... Judgment is therefore the *mediate* knowledge of an object, that is the representation of a representation of it" (A 68=B 93). In the Dialectic Kant treats of our tendency to the unconditioned. In virtue of the same intuition principle the activities of *Vernunft,* far from realizing the immediate relation of knowledge to its object, are doubly mediated instead, by *Verstand* and by *Anschauung:* "Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding; and it is only through the understanding that it has its own empirical employment" (A 643=B 671; see also A 359, A 306 f.=B 363, A 335=B A 567=B 595). This is perfectly comprehensible: if knowledge can have an immediate relation to the object only through a sort of intuition, then *Vernunft,* as tendency towards the unconditioned, will resemble intuition even less than *Verstand,* as faculty of the intelligible, resembles it.

Analysis of knowledge in its own terms, that is, analysis of the sort adopted in this paper, will overturn the relationship that Kant conceived. Relationship to reality is immediate in the intention of being which is our dynamism towards the unconditioned. We obviously mean an immediate relationship to reality in so far as the reality is intended. The same relationship to a reality which is no longer only intended but rather attained, is immediate in judgment, in so far as judgment, as absolute positing, satisfies our intention of the absolute. If we wish to use the image of seeing, we must say that the act by which we see reality, and hence are in immediate contact with it, is the judgment.

However, this relationship to reality is mediate in understanding and conceiving-in *Denken,* to use Kant's term. In fact, the intelligibility grasped by understanding implies of itself only the possibility of being; it will be promoted to the level of knowledge in the full sense only when there is added to understanding the concrete judgment of fact in which the intelligibility is absolutely affirmed. The same relation to reality is doubly mediated in the data of sense and of consciousness. The datum in its pure givenness, far from constituting the moment of our encounter with the real *qua* real, must be enriched by some intelligibility through the process of inquiry, and this intelligibility must be shown in critical reflection to be correct, before we are brought to knowledge of that reality with whose datum we began.

5. The *a priori* of sensibility.

Kant distinguishes a passive and an active aspect in sense representation. In so far as the representation is related to the object through sensation (i.e., through the object affecting the faculty of representation), it is entitled empirical intuition. But in the same representation there is also a component which arises from the activity of the senses. This component is intuition in so far as it is from the senses, and *a priori* in so far as it is not caused by the *Empfindung.*

The object known through intuition is thus a composite object:

> That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance. That in which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form, cannot itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all appearance is given to us *a posteriori* only, its form must *lie ready* for the sensations *a priori in the mind,* and so must allow of *being considered apart from all sensation* (A fW=B 34).

This general principle is applied when Kant analyzes space and time. Actually Kant does not adduce new elements at that point to demonstrate that space and time are *a priori* forms and, indeed, the only forms of sensibility.

Why is it that the formal component of sensible knowledge cannot originate in the *Erfahrung?* The *KRV* does not give us the slightest response to this question; we find ourselves face to face here with what is a tacit premiss for Kant. Nevertheless, it is possible to give at least a psychological explanation of the fact that Kant could consider as obvious a premiss which for us obviously needs demonstration. Admittedly Kant attributes an *a priori* origin to the synthetic, intelligible element of our knowledge. The reason he was drawn to do so was that he overlooked the act by which we grasp an intelligibility in the sensible. So it was natural for him to attribute, by a sort of argument from analogy, an *a priori* origin even to the unifying forms of sensible knowledge.

The *a priori* of sensibility is thus a pure form of space and time, which provides a form for the known object. But what is the form? In the beginning, and more correctly, we believe, the form is introduced as the relation or the system of relations among the contents of the *Empfindung.* In this sense it is hard to see what Kant can mean when he declares that the form can be considered in itself, apart from all matter (A 20=B 34), or that we can know space and time prior to all actual perception (A 42=B 60). But the same statement becomes more meaningful when Kant attributes to the form a content of its own, independent of the *a posteriori* content. In this sense he speaks of space and time as a totality, or as an infinite magnitude given to pure intuition. This conception of the *a prwri* is still clearer where he says that the pure intuition contains a manifold which is likewise *a priori* (A 77=B 103, A 76=B 102, B 137, etc.). We touch here on the ever-present tendency in Kant towards a conception of the *a priori* in which it has an objective content of its own. This tendency is even stronger in the Aesthetic where he examines the intuition which is the very act of knowing an object.

But this conception does not represent the entire Kantian doctrine on the *a priori* of sensibility. Whereas the objective-content conception would lead us to think of the *a priori* as a manifold which is laid upon or added to the empirical manifold, there is another conception according to which the sensible *a priori* forms are seen as modes of sense receptivity. Thus, in his reply to Eberhard, Kant explicitly rejects the interpretation that the *a priori* is an objective representation; it is only the ground (the subjective constitution) of the space-time representation.[8] We may term this latter conception "' operative" in so far as it states that the *a priori* is the law of the sensitive receptive operational power in respect to the impressions caused by the alteration of the sense organ. On the basis of this conception Kant says that space and time are nothing if we prescind from the operational power the senses exert when confronted with data.

> It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever .... The constant form of this receptivity which we term sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations in which objects can be intuited as outside us (A 26 f.=B 42 f. For time, cf. A 34 f.=B 51).

It seems to us that what Kant says is exact, but it does not lead to the theory of appearance as the only knowable reality. To say that sense representation conforms to the constitution of the sensing subject is not the same thing as saying that the senses bring us to knowledge of mere appearance. To evaluate correctly the ontological import of the object of our knowledge we must take into account the entire structure of knowledge. Experience is only the presentation of data for the sake of knowledge of reality. Now it is undeniably true that this presentation depends also on the sensing subject. Presentation implies a relation between two parties; here, between the material reality and the receptive organ. Hence it will differ according to the different organs, and also according to the physiological state of the organ. To prescind from the relation to the organ is to prescind from the very presentation. When we say that a body is extended, that is, that it has *partes extra partes,* or that it has a certain smell, or that it is heavy, we are doing nothing more than asserting our intelligence of this relation and affirming the relationship. But the intelligence we are exercising is descriptive; its terms are experiential conjugates, that is, " correlatives whose meaning is expressed, at least in the last analysis, by appealing to the content of some human experience " *(lnSi,ght,* 79). If we remember that descriptive intelligence has this element of relation to our sensibility, it will be meaningless to ask what color is independently of the act of seeing, or what seeing is except the grasping of bodies as colored. Nor will we ask what extension is apart from that complex of sense acts of which it is the content.[9] Since descriptive intelligence consists in grasping the connection between content and act of sensation, it is evident that, if we prescind from one of the two terms of the relation, we no longer have the connection, and so there is no longer any understanding and much less any resulting concept. Herein lies the correctness of the statements of the *KRV* on the relational element in the object of our sense knowledge.

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[8] *Kants gesammelte Schriften,* Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1910-, VIII, flflfl.

Besides descriptive intelligence, in which the human subject is the privileged point of reference in respect to which reality is understood and expressed, there is the explanatory intelligence of scientific knowledge, which consists in grasping the relations of things to one another. The terms in which this intelligence is expressed are pure conjugates, that is, " correlatives defined implicitly by established correlations, functions, laws, theories, systems" (*Insight*, 80). Whence it is clear that the relational element is no less present in scientific knowledge than in descriptive. In every case understanding, which is indispensable for the constitution of our knowledge, grasps a connection. But no subjectivist interpretation must be given to the affirmation of a relational element as constitutive of human knowledge. For, if knowledge is a structure, then the ontological value of its object can only bedetermined by considering the whole structure. We have spoken of the relation component in every content of understanding. But with understanding we have not yet attained knowledge. What is still lacking is the judgment which pronounces on the correctness of the understanding and so goes further than a mere relation to the knowing subject. If then experience verifies the descriptive intelligence of reality as spatial, temporal, colored, etc., we must admit that bodies as extended, temporal, colored, etc., are real. Reality here obviously means the reality as understood; other understandings of the same reality in different contexts may also be verifiable.

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[9] Representation of extension is correlative to a number of fundamental complementary sensations. Thus we understand how this representation, unlike--for example-that of color, is always necessarily present when there is a minimum of sensitive life. Kant relies on this impossibility of eliminating the experiential conjugates of space and time from representation, when he assigns them a privileged ontological status, intermediate between the mere illusion *(blosser Schein)* of secondary qualities and the absolute reality of the thing in itself.

In #2 Kant asks: " What, then, are space and time? " His answer to the question of their reality is, in a certain sense, secondary. More significant is the fact that he does ask this question from the very beginning of the *KRV*, and from the very beginning he answers it. The study of the sensitive phase of knowledge implies, no doubt, that its object be determined, since act and object are correlative. But to determine the sense object is not yet to determine the ontological status of the object; it is not yet to answer the question of being. For that, we have to analyze what the datum becomes when understanding and judgment are added to sensation. Now examination of the structure enables us to integrate two aspects of knowledge that are otherwise incompatible. This incompatibility is at the root both of the Renaissance theory of the unreality of the secondary qualities and of Kant's theory of the ontological status of appearance which he attributes to space and time. Now because in knowledge there are different components and different functions we can recognize that intelligence is synthetic by its very nature, since it grasps connections and relations in what is presented, and at the same time we can see that this relational element is not opposed to the truth of knowledge. In judgment, which is the absolute positing of a correct insight (correct because it is verified), reality is known. Human knowledge does not involve a passage from phenomena to reality, or from a merely relative reality known by means of empirical intuition, to an absolute reality known through an intellectual intuition. The course of the cognitional process extends rather from the given to some understanding of it, according to the indefinitely different configurations which understanding can assume, and from understanding to the rational judgment in which reality is known. Consequently, in critical inquiry as to the reality of what we know, the crucial point lies in the passage from understanding to judgment, from the relational component of the former to the absolute character of the latter. Where this distinction is not clear, the relational component of intelligibility is claimed to be a sufficient reason for affirming the relativity of the known reality.

6. The *a priori* of *Verstand.*

Parallel to what we have seen concerning the *a priori* of sense there is in the *KRV* a twofold conception of the *a pri,ori* of *Verstanil.* According to the first conception the categories are functions of synthetic unity, that is, functions of a judgment *without content* (A 349). They express the spontaneity proper to *Verstand,* by means of which the manifold of pure intuition "is gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected if it is to be known" (A 77=B 102). It belongs to the categories to bring sense knowledge up to the level of human knowledge; and this they do by means of a synthetic activity which they exercise on the contents of sensibility. Not by chance does the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding begin with a detailed examination of the combination *(Verbindung)*, as of that which "can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation" (B 129 f.). Whether Kant speaks of the modes of combining the manifold peculiar to our understanding (B 306), or of the functions of understanding (B 104, A 245), or of the *Verstandeshandlung* (B 130), or of the pure *Handlung des Denkens,*[10] it is always to point out the operative character of the categories. Under this aspect, they are not objective contents, but rather the ability of *Verstand* to add an intelligible content to the sense object by operating a synthesis upon it, or the capacity of "making a concept out of any data that may be presented" (A 239=B 298).[11]

Characteristic of *Verstand,* according to the *KRV,* is its spontaneity, which manifests itself as an original synthetic capacity. Such a spontaneity must be taken in the fulness of the capacity to which our intelligent consciousness witnesses. In this respect Kant's analysis is not carried far enough. He speaks of twelve categories, indicating that our intellect can have neither more nor less (B 146). It is the common view of Kantian scholars that Kant erred in considering his table of categories to be complete. But the error is not corrected simply by increasing the number of categories. The real deficiency lies in the too formalistic or too logical conception which Kant has of the spontaneity of *Verstand.* For him this faculty is endowed with a certain number of pure concepts, a number determined *a priori.* Actually the spontaneity of understanding cannot be pigeon-holed into any set of concepts. Every concept, no matter how general, is *a posteriori;* but the operative intelligibility of understanding, that which makes it an intelligent intelligible, is *a priori.* The concept, every concept, is the product of this intelligence in operation, never the norm of its operation.

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[10] *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Kants gesammelte Schriften,* Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1910-, IV, p. .

[11] This is a line of thought that is certainly to be found in the *KRV,* though not so explicitly as we have expressed it, since in the *KRV* the operative conception of the categories never goes so far as to eliminate the objective-content conception,

To discover this operative intelligibility is to discover the true *a priori* of *Verstand,* which works within a very precise structure, but is always superior to its products. "The mind is not just a factory with a set of fixed processes; rather it is a universal machine tool that erects all kinds of factories, keeps adjusting and improving them, and eventually scraps them in favour of radically new designs. In other words, there is not some fixed set of *a priori* syntheses " *(Insight,* 406). There is no doubt that Kant tends to conceive of the categories as a system of fixed processes and for this reason Lonergan charges his *a priori* with being too rigid *(Ibid.,* 428).

This insufficiency stands out even more if we consider the second conception of the categories which is strictly connected with the rigidity we have mentioned. We mean the objective-content conception. Just before the table of categories we find this :

> The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental *content* into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applying *a priori* to objects (A 79=B 105).

We do not insist on the affirmation of a content which would be peculiar to the categories,[12] an affirmation which stands in opposition to other texts stating that the categories do not have a content (A 849, A 77=B 102). The difference between the two series of texts seems at least partly verbal and may be merely verbal. Much more probative of the second conception of the categories is the very way Kant sets up his quest for the *a priori.* In Introduction B, Kant refers to the traditional theory of the composition of knowledge as the basis of his inquiry into the *a priori:*

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[12] Kant speaks of a transcendental content. But this qualification is far from unambiguous.

> Though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition *(Zusatz),* it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it (B 1 f.).

Whatever the *a priori* may prove to be in the course of Kant's inquiry, it will in any case be an addition made by the cognitional faculty to the raw material of the sense impressions. The context does not allow us to interpret this addition in any other way than as an *objective* content added to that other objective content which is the raw material coming from the senses.

The *a priori* is then an objective content alongside the *a posteriori* objective content. Certainly the *a priori* is the formal element in what is known, but this does not make it less an object. In studying the Aesthetic we saw that the sensible *a priori* is a manifold of intuition which can by itself be the object of knowledge" apart from all sensation" (A 20=B 34). The same objective-content conception holds as well for the *a priori* of *Verstand,* indeed it occurs in the text much more often than the operative conception. On this basis Kant speaks of an *a priori* knowledge of objects. Such an affirmation is acceptable if it rests on the notion of an *a priori* which is itself an object, whereas it would be acceptable only with a number of qualifications if it rested on the assumption of a heuristic *a priori.* Moreover, the entire problematic of the application of the pure concepts of understanding to a corresponding intuition, makes sense only because the pure concept of understanding is precisely a content to be applied. Likewise, the description of the *a priori* as something which lies ready in the mind (*Gemut)* , or in the *Verstand,* obviously indicates it to be an object. Finally, the affirmation that the *a posteriori* of empirical intuition is only the occasion or the opportunity for the mind to draw forth from itself the formal *a priori* elements which it already possesses, points in the same direction, for as regards a heuristic *a priori*, the given is much more than a mere occasion.

It is true that from the beginning Kant says that " thoughts without content are empty" (A 51=B 75), whereby it is meant that the content is given through *Anschauung.* Similar statements occur throughout the *KRV.* But we must note in these texts the prevalence of the intuition principle, which stands in a relation of tension not only with the conception of the categories as contents which ,are to be added to the *a posteriori* contents of sensibility, but also, more generally, with the conception of knowledge as structure, of which the doctrine of the categories is a part. The intuition principle taken in all its rigor excludes not only the conception of the categories as *a priori* contents but even the conception of them as a synthetic activity of *Verstand* in search of an intelligible objective content. In fact, according to the intuition principle, a content of knowledge is possible only where there is an intuition-like activity. But the very exclusion of a real objective content, one known through the activity of understanding exercised on the data of sense, led Kant to maintain an *a priori* content: precisely, the pure concepts.

Extremely important for determining the notion of the categories is the ample section of the Analytic known as the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding. Why does the problem of justifying the objective reality of the *a priori* concepts arise at all? Kant begins the deduction by viewing the problem provisionally from the common sense point of view. To common sense it is evident that the object is given to us through sense intuition; from this it is not difficult to understand why the *a priori* conditions of sensibility are conditions of the object of sense knowledge, and hence have objective validity; but one cannot see why the same object must conform to synthetic *a priori* forms of understanding. But, whereas the objection against the objective validity of the pure concepts of understanding is proposed on the basis of the intuition principle, the response is given on the basis of the binary structure of knowledge. Therefore the answer denies the very basis of the objection; that is, it denies that "appearances [objects] can be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding" (A 90= B 122).

The appearances that enter our field of consciousness are already fruits of the synthetic activity of which works on the appearances through the imagination. This is the final word of the Kantian critique. We have thus set forth a course of thought which in this explicit form is not formulated by Kant, but is the one towards which the various inquiries of the *KRV* tend, no matter how they approach the problem. The unifying moments of the pure concepts of understanding, as well as of the pure intuitions, are the result of the synthetic unity of consciousness which operates from the very beginning of the cognitional process, and finds progressively in the *a posteriori* datum what it has put there itself, and thus goes ahead creating, on different levels of the structure, the conditions of possibility of objectively valid knowledge. What might seem to be the empirical condition antecedent to an intellectual knowledge is actually a consequence (A 114, 123) of the synthetic activity of imagination, and ultimately of transcendental apperception, which is *Verstand* itself in its role as the ground of unity of the pure concepts of understanding. "The order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there" (A 125).

It is possible to find in the *KRV* quite a number of passages in which this position is modified in the direction of a greater realism, that is, of a conception of a really determining *a posteriori.* But it is not too difficult to realize that in such passages the strictly intellectual features of knowledge retreat to the background, since in fact it is impossible to base them on an *a posteriori* factor if the premisses of the *KRV* are accepted. One such premise, contained in the principle that universality and necessity cannot be derived from experience, is the inability of understanding to penetrate the sensible; this means that there is no act in the structure of knowledge capable of effecting the passage from the concrete to the abstract, from the singular to the universal, from the approximation to the ideal-in a word from the datum to the concept. To place the concept, precisely in its character of universality and necessity, at the center of human knowledge, and at the same time to overlook the act of understanding which preceded it, is to take upon oneself a desperate task. The doctrine of the construction of mathematical concepts, as well as the doctrine of the imagination, and in part too of the schematism, are attempts to find a substitute for that act which for Aristotle is at the center of the cognitional process. The problematic of the *a priori* in Kant, at all levels and above all at those of sensibility and understanding, is indissolubly bound up with his having overlooked the act of understanding that grasps an intelligibility in the sensible.

If we interpret correctly the justification of the objective validity of the categories, then we must say that the final direction of Kant's epistemology is towards a totally thetic knowledge. The *a priori* either posits or is itself constitutive of the reality which it enables us to know. In respect to such an *a priori,* expressions which would otherwise sound surprising keep their literal meaning: put into *(hineinlegen:* B xii-xiv), think into *(liineindenken:* B xii), prescribing laws to nature (B 159), reality must conform to our knowledge (B xvi), etc. On this thetic activity, which extends to the *Anschauung,* depends the ontological status of known reality. The obscurity, the tortuousness, and even the incoherence of the *KRV*, are due to the aim of recovering empiricist realism within this idealist perspective. What we consider to be the final word of the *KRV*, whenever it is said and as soon as it is said, is subject to correction and reinterpretation within the empiricist perspective-in a to and fro movement which shows in itself no criterion for settling on any one definitive position.

7. The *a priori* of *Vernunft.*

Kant finds in the depth of the human mind a tendency to broaden the field of knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience as they have been ascertained in the Analytic. What is the goal of this tendency? It is the unconditioned. " What necessarily forces us to transcend the limits of experience and of all appearances is the unconditioned (*das Unbedingte)* " (B xx). Not by chance does the term "das Unbedingte" appear only on two pages of Preface B, and then disappear until, the Aesthetic and Analytic completed, Kant faces the problem of metaphysics as a science. In fact at the beginning of the Dialectic the theme of the unconditioned is taken up again. Parallel to what he did in the Analytic, Kant here institutes a metaphysical deduction of the pure concepts of reason, taking as a clue the formal and logical procedure of reason, namely, the syllogism, which is the typical mode of operation for *Vernunft.* It is difficult to maintain that this deduction has a truly philosophic value. What is significant, however, is that Kant, having brought to a conclusion his doctrine of knowledge in its objectively valid performance, feels compelled to take into consideration the tendency towards the unconditioned. It is with this other factor that his epistemology must reckon. We read in a Reflection: " The unconditioned is *the only* theoretical idea of the *Vernunft."* [13]

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[18] Reflexion 6414 *(Kants gesammelte Schriften,* Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1910-, XVIII, p. 709).

What is the unconditioned? Here again we bring into relief two aspects which, without being mutually exclusive, and even without being clearly distinguished by Kant, constitute two different modes according to which the *a priori*, representation of reason acts upon human knowledge. According to the first aspect, the unconditioned amounts to the totality of conditions; according to the second it amounts to what we can call the simply absolute. In the first two ideas of reason the first aspect prevails, in the third the second aspect prevails.

In the course of our study we noted that Kant tends to conceive the *a priori* as a content on the side of the object. But we added that in Kant there is also present an operative, heuristic conception. Now in the transcendental ideas there is clearly present the conception of a content on the side of the subject, that is, we find a dimension of consciousness as norm of the cognitional process. " These concepts of reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we *interrogate* nature in accordance with these ideas" (A 645=B 673). This statement recalls the formulation of Preface B: "Reason must constrain nature to give answer to questions of reason's own determining " (B xiii) , which we used as a basis for disclosing a merely heuristic *a priori.* According to Kant we have here something less than what the *a priori* ought to be if it is to be objectively valid; actually we have here the true *a* not a content which is added and hides another content, but rather that which first makes possible the content of knowledge in its rational character. It is rationality on the obverse side, which requires and hence seeks unconditionality on the reverse side, in the content presented by both the experiential and intelligent levels.

How does reason satisfy this exigency? By means of an indefinite regressive *discursus.* We saw that the systematic way for discovering the transcendental ideas is to consider the discursive-syllogistic activity of reason. This, according to Kant, requires not only the search for the general condition of a judgment, but even beyond that, the beginning of an indefinite regress which is imposed on our mind just as the first deduction of knowledge from a principle was imposed on it. Thus, just as *Vernunft,* in its role as a faculty of principles, passed from a particular to a universal, so it goes from a universal to a still more universal principle, etc. The syllogism is thus the beginning of an infinite regress of pro-syllogisms (A 499=527, A 323=B 379). This means that it never constitutes the attainment of any sort of unconditioned, but rather is always merely transitional, a moment of passage (A 33l=B 387 f.). The unconditioned is found only at the end of the series or is the infinite series itself in its totality. There is no sense in which it can be said to occur also at each link of the chain.

Let us see what is said in *Insight* about our tendency to the unconditioned. From the beginning of our study we have insisted on the intelligent ,and rational dynamism which lies at the base of our knowledge. Because of an intelligent *a priori* in the quest of the intelligible, there is an intelligible content, expressed in the concept, which is added to the sensible content of presentation. Now the same consciousness expands, setting up the new *a priori* which operates at a higher level than that achieved in the concept. Spontaneously we meet every concept with the question: Is it so? Such a question expresses the dissatisfaction of our mind in respect to any representation whatever which does not bear the mark of the absolute, that is, does not claim the same value as our dynamic orientation itself, which is unrestricted and therefore unconditioned.

At this point it becomes necessary to overcome totally Kant's conception of the *a priori.* The *KRV* is set up entirely as a search for the formal conditions of the possibility of having objective contents as objects of knowledge. From the beginning of Preface B the search for the *a priori* means the search for the formal addition which comes in to constitute that composite which is knowledge. This approach is confirmed in the Aesthetic and the Analytic-the *a priori,* is the formal content of the object of knowledge. In the last section of the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding, in a paragraph which plainly recalls the beginning of Preface B, the pure intuitions and the pure concepts of understanding are said to be " elements of knowledge, which are found in us *a priori"* (B 166) . Such concepts, Kant continues, "make experience possible" (Ibid.). With this the doctrine of the *a priori* according to the *KRV* is concluded.

But the transcendental analysis is concluded only when, going beyond the formal conditions according to which sensibility receives impressions and understanding thinks the contents of intuition, it arrives at the subject which performs all these actions. The question whether or not the subject has fixed *a priori* forms is really of secondary importance. This other question, however, is decisive: Why and how does the subject fulfil its cognitional activity? The answer is that the subject is a rational consciousness which traces out, in the orientation which constitutes it, the horizon of its search as the horizon of being. In principle it is possible to delimit any formal sphere of consideration whatever: the sphere of mere appearance within which our experience is confined according to the *KRV,* the sphere of the purely logical, within which mathematicians are contained in the elaboration of their hypothetical deductive systems, etc. But it is not possible to limit the sphere delineated by the intelligent and rational concrete subject who marks off these domains. The subject, when he performs all the operations brought to light by the *KRV* and even others of which the *KRV* is ignorant, acts according to that *a priori* which he is.

An imaginary computer furnished with the two forms of sensibility, the twelve categories of understanding, the transcendental schemes, etc., would be able to accomplish all the operations described in the *KRV:* the object of operations performed by means of such formal equipment would be the appearance. In what would such " knowledge " differ from that of man? In this, that in man the structure of knowledge is actualized as a response to the questions which express the dynamism of his consciousness. Sensible conditions and formal elements, all are put into the conscious orientation towards that absolute which we call being. Even conscious intelligence in quest of the intelligible is a moment in the realization of the subject which works necessarily within the horizon of being. We shall later consider the function of the *a priori* in respect to judgment. The importance of judgment lies in the fact that it gives the answer, at least by way of successive increments, to our tendency to the unconditioned. Much more important, however, than the fact that it founds the judgment as *one* phase of the cognitional structure, is the decisive fact that the tendency to the unconditioned constitutes the operational power of the subject which enables it to act on every level. Such a power of intelligent and rational operation is really our *a priori*. It alone brings to light, not just what the subject does or what it has, but the subject itself which acts, and what it is.

We said above that there are two modes according to which the Dialectic considers the unconditioned: (1) it is the totality of conditions, (2) it is the simply absolute. In neither of these cases, according to Kant, is the unconditioned able to acquire objective reference and thus become constitutive of our knowledge. In *Insight* there are two senses of the unconditioned which have a certain affinity with the two senses of the *KRV:* (1) the formally unconditioned, (2) the virtually unconditioned. The first has no conditions whatever; the second has conditions indeed but they are fulfilled *(Insight,* 280). Let us try to determine the difference between the virtually unconditioned and the *Unbedingtes* as the totality of conditions, so as to see why the first according to Lonergan can enter into the constitution of our knowledge, whereas the second according to Kant cannot.

According to Kant " the transcendental concept of reason is directed always solely towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never terminates save in what is absolutely, that is, *in all respects,* unconditioned" (A 326=B 382). The unity towards which reason tends is the unity of a system (A 680 f.=B 708 f.). This conception of the totality of conditions as constituting one system is particularly evident in Kant's conception of nature. There is demanded of the human mind a quest without end, in accordance with the deterministic connections of natural events. This ontological conception of the universe as one system corresponds to the conception of our discursive activity 'as the beginning of an indefinite regress of pro-syllogisms.

Now it is possible to acknowledge a constitutive function to the idea of the unconditioned, only if Kant's conceptions both of the material universe and of the discursive capacity of the mind are submitted to a revision. According to Lonergan the whole universe is not such a pattern of internal relations that no part and no ,aspect of it can be known in isolation from any other part or aspect. The universe is not simply an explanatory system, a system whose single parts are totally determined by the internal relations which hold among themselves; for " its existents, and its occurrences diverge non-systematically from pure intelligibility; it exhibits an empirical residue of the individual, the incidental, the continuous, the merely juxtaposed, and the merely successive; it is a universe of facts" *(Insight,* 345). In harmony with such a universe Lonergan describes the act of judgment as follows: " A judgment is a limited commitment; so far from resting on knowledge of the universe, it is to the effect that, no matter what the rest of the universe may prove to be, at least this is so" *(Ib'id.,* 344). The nature of judgment as limited commitment determines the way we come to pronounce a judgment: " So far from pronouncing on the universe, it is content to affirm some single conditioned that has a *finite* number of conditions which, in fact, are fulfilled " *(Ibid.,* 345).

The Kantian *Unbedingtes* is the comprehensive coherence which embraces the entire universe and towards which we tend by asking questions *for intelligence* (*Ibid.,* 345). There is no doubt that in this sense the unconditioned has a purely normative function in our knowledge. In fact what we grasp with the understanding is always a partial intelligibility, which therefore is not unconditioned; in itself, as intelligibility of such a nature, it implies merely the possibility of being, not being simply. But our cognitional structure brings forward questions of another kind, those *for reflection,* which turn precisely on those intelligibilities which embrace a limited sphere of the universe. Now the reflexive inquiry subsequent to these questions is capable of attaining an unconditioned which is the result of the combination of a conditioned (expressed by the concept) with the fulfilment of its conditions. It is virtually unconditioned or *de facto* absolute.

To parallel what we have said about the universe as proportioned to our knowledge, namely, that it is not a single interlocked field of internal relations, but a universe of facts, we must clarify the nature of the discursive 1activity of our mind.[14] Prior to the reasoning found in the syllogisms dealt with in formal logic, there is an activity, generically termed reasoning, which is a movement towards understanding. In it we must distinguish two levels: the movement towards direct understanding and the movement towards reflective understanding. The first is a movement towards that intelligible synthesis which is expressed in the concept, the second towards that content which we have called the virtually unconditioned. Just as the content both of sensible experience and of direct understanding enter into the constitution of human knowledge, so with no less truth does the content of reflective understanding form a constitutive part of the same knowledge. Upon it is founded the act of judgment.

"See Berna.rd J. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Edited by David B. Burrell), University of Notre Dame, 1967, pp. 54 ff.

8. Judgment as adequate response to the *a priori,* of mind.

If it is the absolute character enjoyed by mental synthesis that founds the judgment, then the judgment is not a synthesis of concepts, a *compositio et divisio,* but rather the absolute positing of the synthesis. The absolute positing is the peculiar contribution of judgment to the cognitional structure. What Kant calls analysis and synthesis are two different kinds of understanding, and hence two kinds of synthesis. Kant was all the more inclined to attach a fundamental importance to the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments since he was not at all clear on the *a posteriori* origin of all our concepts. But once this origin is brought to light, the problematic of judgment becomes totally different. We must not overlook the intimate connection between what we have said above on the *a pioii* of reason according to Kant, and his doctrine of judgment as that " in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought " (A 6=B 10). If we assign to the *a priori,* as quest for the unconditioned only the function of regulating the development of our objectively valid knowledge, then the judgment, in the measure in which it is nonetheless recognized as an act of the cognitional structure, can only be conceived as a synthesis of subject and predicate.

But the notion of absolute positing is not unknown to Kant. It crops up especially when he treats the theme of our knowledge of reality. The entire treatment of the categories of modality in The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General elaborates this double theme: (1) only the first three groups of categories have a function constitutive of the concept; (2) the fourth group, while it designates the supreme character of reality *qua* reality, nevertheless is not on the same plane as the formal determinations which belong to the first three groups. The same doctrine is found in the section on the impossibility of an ontological proof for the existence of God. Everything Kant says about *Wirklichkeitor Existenz* or *Dasein* or *Sein* in opposition to the category of *Realitiit* (*Qualitiit)* culminates in the notion of positing. In the tenth paragraph of the section on the ontological proof we have the essential elements of the Kantian doctrine of being as posited. " Being is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, *as existing in. themselves"* (A 598=B 626). Again, " the object as it actually exists, is added to my concept synthetically" (A 599=B 627). The concept as concept is a determination of my state and hence it is in me; on the other hand, the object as existent is outside my concept. Similarly, the Lectures on Metaphysics tell us: "Die wahre Erklarung des Daseins ist: *eiistentia est positio absoluta."* [15]

We can establish two conclusions on the basis of the quoted texts: (1) from an ontological viewpoint, *Wirklichkeit* (actuality) or *Dasein* means the positing of the thing in itself;[16] from a cognitional viewpoint actuality does not involve any conceptual determination beyond that involved in the knowledge of possibility. Lacking in this Kantian analysis is any indication of the cognitional act correlative to actuality. Being means the thing in itself. But by what process do I achieve this absolute positing of the thing in its being and thus attain a knowledge of the thing in itself? The difference between knowledge of possibility and knowledge of actuality is that the first goes only as far as a conceptual content, while the second reaches the thing itself, so that the existential statement *(Existenzialsatz)* adds the thing itself to the concept.[17] But how do we add the thing (!) to the thought of the thing?

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[15] Kant, *Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik,* Erfurt, Photomechanischer Nachdruck, Darmstadt, 1964, p. 104.

[16] In these texts " thing in itself " means the thing outside the concept. Whether it belongs to reality as appearance or to absolute reality is a further problem which Kant does not raise at this point.

[11] Kant, Reflexion *(Kants gesammelte Schriften,* Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1910- XVIII, p. 548): "Durch das Pradikat des Seins tue ich das Ding selbst zum Begriffe hinzu."

Faced with this question, after he has set forth the binary structure of knowledge, and arrived at the notion of absolute positing, Kant is always in danger of falling back into empiricism: " While possibility is merely a positing of the thing in relation to the understanding ... actuality is at the same time a connection of it with perception" (A 234=B 287 note). In the same chapter Kant writes: " perception is the sole mark of actuality" (A *225=B* 273). It is impossible not to notice a strange leap in Kant's investigation of the process by which we arrive at knowledge of reality. Having reached the decisive point he jumps over to the reality without showing clearly how we make this jump or what act it is in which we know the real. If he ever again happens to speak of cognitional operations, he seems to attribute to perception alone the activity of knowing the actual existent.

If we turn now to *Insight* we find that its whole doctrine on knowledge of actuality can be summed up in this way: The act of judgment is the means by which we know reality. A mental synthesis which has the character of the absolute is a true synthesis, and the true is the " medium in quo ens cognoscitur." The true meaning mediates reality for man. To speak of an absolute positing of a synthesis is not to speak of perception alone, nor of perception plus concept, but rather of an act which is at once empirical, intelligent, and rational. There is only one way to safeguard the role which the senses as well as the concept play in our knowledge of reality, and that is to recognize that both intuition and concept are assimilated by that absolute grounding by means of which the cognitional process passes from thinking to judging.

Let us take another step in our analysis of the process by which judgment brings *us* to knowledge of reality. To study this process is to study the problem of the transcendence of knowledge. Here again, as we saw in the general problem of knowledge, the real question is not *whether* our knowledge is transcendent, but *what* transcendence actually means. For our part we place the transcendence of human knowledge entirely in the fact that it is knowledge of being *qua* being, being *sub ration.eentis,* that is, being as something unconditioned. Neither givenness nor intelligibility enjoys this absolute character. The given is known as what has some relevance to biological activity; it is " real " from this " viewpoint." The intelligible is the object of spirit in its search for meaning; yet this alone does not imply an absolute character, precisely because intelligible means intelligible for someone. Being is that which is known in answer to the question, *An sit?* But in the latter case relativity to the subject is identical with transcendence in respect to the same subject and in respect to any restrictive qualification whatever, because in this case, and only in this case, the subject is defined by a tendency to the transcendent. In other words, in this case the viewpoint according to which the object is sought is the transcending of all viewpoints.

If the *a, priori* which rules our cognitional acts is a demand for the absolute, then only the unconditioned will constitute an adequate fulfillment, and hence only in virtue of the unconditioned will the intention of the intending subject pass from anticipation of being to knowledge of being. Obviously, the representation as representation is in me, it is mine. But, by reason of the unconditioned, the content is not relative to me. An absolute, the representative content is a representation under an aspect which does not mean relativity to the subject. In brief, the representation of the unconditioned does not imply relativity to any reality other than that which intrinsically constitutes the unconditioned itself. It is in this sense that we call it an absolute representation.

Now we know everything that is represented to us-independently of the question whether the represented content transcends the representation. This principle, which is valid for all phases of knowledge, must hold as well for the representation of the unconditioned. Therefore a faculty which represents to itself an absolute content, if it knows anything at all-and this is to be granted, once the irrational conception of the real is overcome-knows precisely this absolute. But the absolute is what everyone understands-operatively-by being. To ask whether we know being is the same as to ask whether we are capable of a representation whose character, formally as representation, is unconditionality. Our answer is yes, since we saw that the cognitional process is capable of representing the virtually unconditioned, by thinking of a conditioned and grasping the fulfillment of its conditions. The delicate point is, How is the content of our representation grasped as absolute? And our answer is: Not by the direct way of formal content, but by the indirect way of the virtually unconditioned.

The *a priori* as quest of the unconditioned determines for us the object of our knowledge, which we call reality or being. Being is the objective of our intelligent and rational dynamism. When the mental content, the representation *qua* representation, has acquired the character of the absolute, we have a representation which by its very nature brings about that transcendence that belongs to knowledge; arriving at it as a mental representation is the means of reaching the thing directly. The difficulty of recognizing this reflexively, even though it is spontaneous in our performance whenever we make a rational judgment, is the difficulty of intellectual conversion-the shift from the animal extroversion with which our psychic life first develops and which perseveres as a valid function throughout our entire life, to the intellectuality and rationality constitutive of our spirit, recognized and accepted as the immanent norm of our knowledge of the universe of being.

9. Expansion of the *a ']YJ'i,ori:* from knowledge of nature to constitution of the human world.

The Kantian epistemology is highly obscure, fragmentary, and even contradictory. One must disagree with Kant in statement after statement of his analysis of knowledge. The significance of the *KRV* lies much more in its setting the problem than in its solving the problem. Its special merit consists in its having opened to philosophical reflection the problem of the *a piori* in all its breadth and thus introduced the study of the role of the subject in human knowledge. One need only think of the importance that modern focus on the subject has for present-day culture to be aware of the epochal significance of Kant's quest of the *a piori*.

We have spoken of man as that being which is intrinsically endowed with meaning. We have seen that this meaning is his *a priori:* the dynamism, intelligently and rationally conscious, which lies at the source of the cognitional process and penetrates it throughout, setting up principles normative of the different phases of the structure in which it is realized. We have eliminated from our interpretation of the *a piori* the objective-content elements which are found in the Kantian doctrine, thereby opposing the " hineinlegen " (putting into) on which Kant relies so heavily. It does not seem to us that an attentive analysis of knowledge, particularly in its character of receptivity and development, confirms the *a piori* as a knowledge of an object, or of a partial object, which lies ready in the mind.

Kant's analysis considers mainly, if not exclusively, that kind of knowledge which is natural science. But, once the role of the subject in knowledge of nature is thematized, the way is open to recognize the subject as the principle of intentional activity in every other field as well. As a matter of fact, the intelligently operative intelligible which, as subjects, we all are, is not only the capacity for bringing ourselves to knowledge of a reality which already exists independently of the conscious activity of man; it is also a principle which creates a reality other than that of nature--man himself and the human world. We have here a reality not only mediated by meaning, but also constituted by meaning; hence this section of the world can be correctly called the world of meaning. That meaning, both receptively searching and creatively expanding, which we saw to be our *a* is that by which man makes himself and his own world. Here we can restore in all its truth the thetic conception of the *a priori* of the *KRV.* As regards the human world, the affirmation that objects must conform to our knowledge, i.e., to our intentionality or to our capacity for giving a meaning, or that we know of things only what we ourselves put into them, must be taken literally. Here truly the spirit gives the law to reality, raising nature to the ontological level of human reality. Here knowledge of reality is essentially interpretation, that is, knowledge of the meaning understood and realized by others from the horizon of their own meaning.

But there is still another development. The expansion of consciousness to the rational level is ultimate for cognitional activity, but not for the conscious activity of man as a whole. Our *a priori* is not only a dynamism which demands the truth of knowing in order to attain being, but also requires, beyond that, consistency between knowing and doing, in order to constitute authentic human living on the basis of true meaning. This makes still more evident both the importance of transcendental analysis in order to thematize that *a priori* which constitutes us as intentional beings, and the necessity of determining what path it must follow to lead us to truth in our knowledge. We are capable of a categorical imperative which constitutes our interior *anagke* together with our supreme dignity, because we are capable of the truth of being in the interior *anagke* of rationality.

The merit of *Insight* lies in its having advanced the transcendental analysis begun in the *KRV,* bringing to light the conditions for the possibility of objective knowledge. This has resulted in a three-fold clarification: (1) of the *a priori* as the conscious-subjective dimension of knowledge (2) of knowledge as an empirical, intelligent, and rational structure, and (3) of reality as intrinsically intelligible.

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NATURALISM AND THOMISTIC ETHICS [1]

IT IS NOT unusual to find the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas described as naturalist. The meaning of the adjective must be sought in the still ongoing squabble between Prescriptivism and Naturalism. Doubtless there is always the danger of anachronism in the use of current labels to speak of the thought of a predecessor and it is surely foolish to borrow a recommendation of Thomistic ethics from the capital of contemporary trends. Old wine, new bottles. But vintners know that age is itself a recommendation. Nonetheless I think there is something to be gained from seeing Thomas's moral thought through the dust of today's controversies. To call him a Naturalist in ethics is, as far as it goes, true. This paper is an effort to see how far indeed it goes.

The Prescriptivist conception of ethics which has been developed by R. M. Hare is elevated on Hume's guillotine (Ought cannot be derived from Is), the fact/ value dichotomy and, more specifically, G. E. Moore's so-called Naturalistic Fallacy. The acceptance of these as commonplaces can no doubt lead in a number of directions, but Hare's position seems to arise inexorably out of the sternest and most unrelenting adherence to them.

Moore was concerned to show that it is a mistake to try to explain the meaning of " good " by appeal to the characteristics or qualities of the thing called good. No doubt it is because the thing has certain qualities that we evaluate it as good, but these qualities cannot be what we *mean* by " good." Hare has a conveniently succinct way of showing why this is so.[2] Let

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[1] This paper was read at a symposium held to commemorate the 700th anniversary of the death of St. Thomas at Aquinas College. I am grateful to Professors Joseph Boyle, Alan Donagan and Giles Milhaven for their comments.

[2] A flurry of footnotes would be needed to document this summary of Prescriptivism. Those acquainted with R. M. Hare's *The Language of Morals* and *Freooom and Reason* will, I trust, find it accurate.

P .stand for the qualities of the good thing. Then, when we say that " an X which is P is good," if " is P " were the meaning of " good," the formula could be made to say, " an X that is P is P" and that is not a very informative remark. In order for evaluations to perform some useful function, then, it seems necessary to distinguish the qualities the good thing has from what we mean by calling it good. These qualities are sometimes called the criteria of application of the term so that the distinction is sometimes expressed as one between the meaning of " good" and the criteria of its application. This distinction is given added force when we reflect that there is no single set of qualities had by each and every thing called good. The qualities we have in mind when we call a book good are surely not those involved in calling a wife good. This might lead *us* on to say what Hare himself does not, namely, that " good " has many meanings. Hare does not .say this because, were we to take just one of our alleged meanings of " good," say that which is involved in the phrase, "a good book," we would of course cite the qualities the book has as the meaning of " good " in that instance. But Hare is every bit as intent to deny the identification of the criteria of application and the meaning of "good" in this case as in any other. His reason is that "good" has one and the same meaning whatever criteria for application may be invoked.

As an evaluative term, " good " bears the abiding meaning of commending the object called good. Commendation, prescription-these, or this, is what constitutes the single, pervasive meaning of " good." This enables us to .see why Hare is so insistent on denying that the meaning of " good " could ever be identified with the descriptive qualities of the thing called good. If such an identification were possible, it would seem to follow that, in calling a thing good, we are engaged in describing it. But it is perfectly clear to Hare that description is not the standard function of sentences in which the term " good " appears. Such sentences are standardly used to commend and prescribe.

Sometimes Hare allows that the qualities of the thing, the criteria of application of " good," constitute *a* meaning, the descriptive meaning, of " good," but, for reasons already suggested, he does not want us to confuse the descriptive meanings "good" may have with its single and abiding meaning as an evaluative term. Hare remains faithful to the **OED** which informs him that " good " is the most common term of commendation in the English language. Let us not, then, misled by the descriptive meanings " good " takes on in various uses, lose sight of its chief role, and meaning, which is to commend.

If " good " can be said to have, over and above its chief use and / or meaning which is to commend, other descriptive meanings, there is no logical tie between the descriptive meaning of " good," the criteria of its application, and the single evaluative meaning of " good." Like Moore before him, Hare maintains that anything whatsoever can be called good. If there is no analytic connection, no logical tie, between factual properties of a thing and its being commended, we have opened up a gap which permits some surprising things indeed. If, in commending an object, I must have in mind *some* qualities or properties of that thing, it is nonetheless true that, in principle, logically speaking, I can have in mind *any* qualities of the thing. Hare's notorious example of the" fanatic" is proof enough how seriously he takes the gap between evaluation and factual properties. From the point of view of the logical behavior of the term "good," in its commending function, it is possible to commend an object on the basis of any qualities whatsoever.[3] Indeed, this possibility is, for Hare, the very root of our freedom. That we are unlikely to select just any qualities of the thing commended, is, according to Hare, a contingent fact.

Perhaps this is sketch enough of Prescriptivism for us to understand the misgivings of those opponents of Hare whom he calls Descriptivists. It just .seems wrongheaded to them to sug-

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[8] Cf. my "The Poverty of Prescriptivism," *American Journal of Jurisp1'Udence* (17)' pp. 80-91.

gest that a thing or action or person or whatever can be commended on the basis of any qualities or properties you please. They want to say that, in the nature of things, there are constraints on the qualities which can be invoked in commending what we commend. If you say that Alcibiades is a good man, and I ask your reason for saying so, and you reply that he can wriggle his ears, you have no doubt suggested criteria of application of the term " good " to Alcibiades, but you will forgive me if I cease taking you seriously. The most charitable interpretation would be that you are speaking in riddles, in some Delphic way which must be decoded. Hare too, let it be said, would be surprised at that in Alcibiades which led you to call him good. He is as aware as you or I that, taken literally, the ability to wriggle one's ears is just not the sort of thing people are likely to ground their favorable evaluations on. Nonetheless, Hare will defend to the death your freedom to do so and he will be particularly concerned to defend you against the charge of having made some logical mistake, of being insufficiently instructed on the evaluative meaning of " good." However Pickwickian your standards of evaluation, you do have standards, and since no standards are analytically connected with evaluation, yours are, from the point of view of the logic of " good," as good as any others.

There are two quick ways in which his opponents have tried to undercut Hare. (1) Some sentences in which "good" occurs can be said to commend, but others, such as questions or the protasis of a hypothetical, are not so used and yet we understand their meaning fully. "Is *The Gulag Archipelago* good?" "If he is a good writer, I am Dostoievsky." Since " good " can be understood here without reference to commendation, commendation does not seem to be *the* meaning of the term. (2) It is further suggested that Hare has confused the elocutionary force of sentences in which " good " occurs with the meaning of the term and even perhaps the meaning of those sentences. Thus, " *The Winds of War* is a good book " may in given circumstances be used to commend the novel, but that is not what the sentence *means.*[4]

I think the second of these objections to Hare is more successful than the first. But neither is quite what we would get if we turned to Aquinas and compared his teaching on such matters with the positions of the controversialists of our time. Indeed, it can be said that there is something mystifying in the use that both Hare and his opponents make of such terms as *logfoal, logically* and *the logic of* . . . If Hare maintains, somewhat obscurely, that logically I can commend an object on the basis of any qualities whatsoever, some of his opponents have a tendency to say that logically I cannot commend a thing on any basis whatsoever. The sense of the adverb is hard to come by in both cases. Let us look for some way to avoid this shared obscurity.

What I propose to do is to turn to St. Thomas to see what he might have made of commendation as Hare has laid it out:

An X which is P is good.

This is, it might be said, the logical form or the general structure of (some) sentences used to commend. What the Descriptivists wish to say is that a commendation has an addressee and this is not an unimportant feature of the activity of commending. I commend something to someone for some reason or other, where by " reason " I do not mean my motive but rather the qualities or features the commended thing has. The addressee, further, is presumably in the market for recommendations of this sort. That is, the recommendations will work only if the addressee is in need of, desirous of, objects having the features the thing called good has. In calling it good, in telling him it is good, I am presuming that he will like or want it because of those characteristics. In short, we have a triad:

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[4] Cf. J. O. Urmson, *The Emotive Theory of Ethics,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 130 ff.; R. M. Hare, *Essays on the Moral Concepts,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, p. *55* ff.; *Practical Inferences,* same publisher, same year, p. 74 ff., and Alisdair Macintyre, *A Sh()Tt History of Ethics,* New York: [Macmillan, 1966,) p. 249 ff.

a) the thing commended
b) to someone who wants
c) a thing with such qualities.

This seems to entail constraints on commending and that is what the Descriptivists or Naturalists want. When you say "This is a good glass" and I ask why, your answer might be, " When struck it gives off the C above Middle C." If I couldn't care less, if nobody cared, it is silly to go about recommending glasses on that basis. The introduction of the addressee of recommendations thus opens up the possibility of finding in the structure of the agent, who might act on the basis of advice or recommendations, criteria for the correct use of " good." That possibility suggests, of course, a central feature of Thomas's ethics and one he shares with, because he borrowed it from, Aristotle.

Let us approach the notion that it is somehow the structure of the human agent which provides criteria of the human or moral good by taking what is not really a detour through some matters discussed by Peter Geach and Bernard Williams. Williams is of especial interest because he pursues the Aristotelian path only so far and then decides that we cannot go the full distance with Aristotle.

In his essay entitled " Good and Evil," Geach introduces the grammatical distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives to pry apart what Moore had joined together, namely, "yellow" and "good." "Yellow" is a predicative adjective.[5] The force of this claim can be seen by noticing that " The canary is a yellow bird " can be broken into " The canary is a bird" and "The canary is yellow." Despite the assumption of many, this is not how" good" modifies: it is an attributive adjective. "Player is a good golfer" cannot be analysed into

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•Peter Geach, " Good and Evil," reprinted in Phillipa Foot, ed. *Theories of Ethics,* Oxford University Press, 1965.

"Player is a golfer" and "Player is good." "Good" is attributed to Player qua golfer and its sense cannot be grasped independent of such roles or titles. Williams further illustrates this difference by showing its effect on inference.[6] We can reason thus:

> The canary is a yellow bird,
> A bird is an animal,
> The canary is a yellow animal

but we cannot similarly reason:

> Player is a good golfer
> A golfer is a man,
> Player is a good man.

The upshot of this is that since "good" occurs attributively, that is, in such phrases as "a good golfer," "a good typist," and so on, it can only be explicated with reference to the role or description under which the agent is envisaged. Thus, in a phrase of the form "a good X," the meaning of "good" is essentially tied to what goes into the place of X. What goes into the place of X is some term which signifies a role or function of the thing called good. To call something a good knife is to say that it possesses the qualities wanted in knives in order that they might do their work well. And, insofar as there are knives and knives and the function of even a paring knife is somewhat various, there is a certain play in the qualities we might have in mind in calling a knife a good one. The point is that knives being *what* they are, which has built into it what we want or expect from them, we are under constraints as to what qualities we can cite in calling a knife a good knife.

In the case of men, we call them good insofar as they play certain roles or perform given functions and we will have to make reference to the role or function in explaining the meaning of "good" in such phrases as "a good flautist," "a good novelist," "a good cobbler," and so on and on. In even the simplest case, there is a range of aspects of the function or role which may be brought into play in explaining the meaning of the phrase, but the range is not infinite. Williams, having brought his discussion to this point, now observes, "If there were some title or role with which standards were necessarily connected and which, by necessity, a man could not fail to have nor dissociate himself from, then there would be some standards which a man would have to recognize as determinants of his life, at least on pain of failing to have any consciousness at all of what he was." [7] Who in reading this can fail to be reminded of the following passage from Aristotle's *Nicomacliean Ethics?*

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[6] Bernard Williams, *Morality,* New York: Harper Torchbooks,

> For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and in general for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, feet, and in general each of the parts has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? [8]

When man is viewed as performing some role or function, we assess his performance by appeal to the role or function. Man as golfer, man as surgeon, man as hunter: so viewed we can come up with standards which enable us to assess a man as a good surgeon, a mediocre golfer and a bad hunter. Now, if it were possible to see *being human* as a role or function, if we could look at ourselves not merely qua hunter, qua surgeon, qua whatever particular role or function, but qua man, well then, we would be able to say what is meant by a good man *sans phrase.* When Aristotle speaks of man qua man, he is not of course looking for yet another particular role to put beside the others. He is not proposing a list which would go like this: hunting activities, healing activities, golfing activities and-human activities. What he is rather looking for is the note or characteristic which pervades all such particular human activities and leads us to call them human. Particular human activities of the kind we have mentioned can be assessed in terms of functions and roles; there is now the suggestion that these same activities can be assessed from a more basic or fundamental point of view, as human.

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[7] *Ibid.,* p. 57.

[8] *Nicomacliean Ethics,* 1097M5-80.

St. Thomas makes quite explicit what may be only implicit in Aristotle, and that is the identification of human acts and moral acts. ". . . nam idem sunt actus morales et actus humani." [9] This may seem a surprising identification since what it means is that all our deliberate acts, all our conscious acts, are as such moral. The only thing Aquinas contrasts with moral acts, *actus humani,* are what he calls *actiones hominis,* acts of man. Examples of the latter are scratching, thoughtless movements of the head or hands and, we may perhaps add, seeing, hearing, digesting food, etc. There are activities which can be truly predicated of a man but which do not arise from any deliberate intention on his part. The domain of morality is thus bewilderingly vast and we may wish to ask what becomes of contrasts like that between the moral and legal, the moral and prudential, the moral and the religious, etc. Furthermore, just as the move from man qua harpist, man qua surgeon, man qua aquatic performer, to man qua man is not a move down a list to a final entry on it, as if there were some few acts which are human while the rest are something else, so too the search for moral acts is not one which brushes away as irrelevant the surgical, hunting, golfing and other such activities men engage in. On the Thomistic view, these are all moral acts because they are human acts. Now that seems odd and odd on Thomas's own assumptions. Our look at attributive adjectives was to make the point that the good golfer is not, as such a good golfer, a good man. Do we want to say that there must be several ways of assessing such particular activities as golfing, healing, hunting, etc., first, in the light of standards embedded in the particular roles or functions, and, second, in the light of wider considerations? But does not this make the moral assessment look generic and vague? We must return to this.

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[9] *Summa theologiae,* lallae, q. 1, a. S. c.

The identification of human acts and moral acts is implicit in the following crucial passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics.*

> Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'a so-and-so' and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of the function (for the function of the lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.[10]

The human good is the excellent performance of activities which involve a rational principle. As we know, in arriving at this, Aristotle made a list of activities which can be truly ascribed to man and suggested that not all of them pertain to man as man. Thus, it can truly be said that a man sees, feels, hears, fears, etc. But, if these activities can also be predicated of beings other than man, as they can, they cannot be peculiar to man and thus do not belong to him as man. That is one of the significances of the qua-locution. Of the many activities which are truly predicated of man, only some are such that they are peculiar to or proper to man. These are the activities which follow or involve a rational principle; they are Thomas's conscious deliberate acts. This makes it yet more clear that playing the flute, performing brain surgery, using the sand wedge, are not to be contrasted with acts of man qua man: they are instances of such acts. But we have also seen that, once we have a class of activities which are peculiarly human-since they are conscious and deliberate, since they follow or involve a rational principle-the diversity within the class is explained by reference to a diversity of roles or functions, leading us to speak of man qua flautist, man qua surgeon, etc. If we try once more to contrast what belongs to man qua man and what belongs to him qua surgeon, say, we seem to have nowhere to go except to the generic, more universal and vague. Aristotle, in the passage last quoted, suggests another possibility.

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[10] *Nicomachean Ethics,* 109Sarn-Is.

If human actions are the set of all the acts performed according to particular roles and not the performance of some special function laid next to the others, the set may still be an ordered one, that is, it may involve a hierarchy such that some particular functions are on an appropriate basis more human than others. If this should be the case, the human good, of man qua man, could be read from them. Both Aristotle and Aquinas lean in the direction of this solution, but not perhaps in the way too commonly thought. If there is, on some appropriate basis, a hierarchy among the particular functions and roles such that some human activities are more human than others, it is nonetheless not the case that performing that or those functions well is identical with, exhaustive of, the human good, the good for man.

What have I tried to do thus far? Some contemporary ethicians feel that we can grasp the meaning of " good," its single abiding meaning, by seeing that its function in evaluative discourse is to commend. What is commended is commended on some basis, because of descriptive qualities or characteristics; nonetheless, there is no logical tie between the evaluative meaning of " good " and such descriptive meanings as might be fashioned from the descriptive qualities of the things called good. Since there is no logical tie, it is logically possible to select any qualities whatsoever as the basis for commending a thing. Descriptivists, on the other hand, wish to say that it is not logically possible to commend something on any basis whatsoever. Their misgivings seem to be based on the fact that there must be an addressee of commendations and the structure of the addressee introduces constraints on what can be proposed to him as good. The notion that the structure of the human agent is the locus of criteria for assessing the good of man, the human good, is a feature of the moral theory of Aristotle and Aquinas. What is it that belongs to man as man? I have tried to show the ambiguity of the qua-locution in the phrase" man qua man". Making use of Geach and Williams, we arrived at one understanding of it by considering the assessment of man in different roles and functions: qua flautist, qua surgeon, qua hunter. We figure out what is meant by calling a man a good flautist by examining the role or function of the flautist. But a good flautist does not seem to be as such a good man. So it is asked, is there some function or role, being human, which would underwrite the phrase " man qua man " in such a way that, by examining that function, we could tell whether a man is a good man without qualification? The difficulty which arose was that either this function would be merely a generic way of referring to the particular functions or it would be a particular function among the others and then the others would not be human activities. A second understanding of the qua-locution in the phrase " man qua man " is based on distinguishing from among the activities which are truly predicated of man, those which are peculiar or proper to him. It is these which pertain to him qua man. They are said to follow or involve a rational principle; they are deliberate conscious acts. But this only brings us back to the set of role- or function-activities with which we began: playing the flute, operating on patients, bagging a bird-all these are conscious deliberate activities and belong to man qua man. The only way out of the dilemma suggested is that some sort of scale or hierarchy might be discerned among human acts such that some are more human than others. Performing those well could thus be said to constitute the human good by a kind of synecdoche.

Bernard Williams, who has followed the role or function way of explaining " good " as attributive adjective, feels that the effort to elicit unquestionable moral ends from distinguishing marks of man's nature, is bound to fail. In support of this, he puts forward three surprisingly weak and inapposite arguments.

> *First,* a palpable degree of evaluation has already gone into the selection of the distinguishing mark which is given this role, such as rationality or creativity. If one approached without preconception the question of finding characteristics which differentiate men from other animals, one could as well, on these principles, end up with a morality which exhorted men to spend as much time as possible in making fire; or developing peculiarly human physical characteristics; or having sexual intercourse without regard to season; or despoiling the environment and upsetting the balance of nature; or killing for fun.[11]

Williams has made a list of things which man alone can do and of course the remarkable thing is not that he has found so many candidates but that he has contented himself with so few. It would be easy to add such deeds as going to the moon, writing novels, attending philosophical symposia, buying on the installment plan and thinking up objections to Aristotle's ethical theory. No matter how prolonged, such a list is not such that the distinguishing mark Aristotle himself pointed to could appear on it as another item. Indeed, it is clear that Williams's entries as well as those I have added are all instances of what Aristotle settled on. Such an objection, then, ends by paying a backhand tribute to its target. For, Aristotle might ask, "And now, Mr. Williams, what do all these items have in common which led you to ascribe them to man and only to man? " That there is some common note seems clear from the fact that, once we see such a list, we are able to add to it easily and without any need for extensive and lavishly funded research.

> *Second,* and very basically, this approach bears out the moral *ambiguity* of distinctive human characteristics (though Aristotle paid some attention, not totally successfully, to this point). For if

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[11] *Op. eit.,* pp. 68-4,

> it is a mark of man to employ intelligence and tools in modifying his environment, it is equally a mark of him to employ intelligence in getting his own way and tools in destroying others.[12]

Williams goes on to point out that, if it is the mark of man to have a conceptualized and fully conscious awareness of himself as one among others, this is a precondition of both benevolence and cruelty. "If we offer as the supreme moral imperative that old cry, " Be a man! ', it is terrible to think of the ways in which it could be taken literally."

In order for this second objection to work, it has to assume that Aristotle is saying that any use of intelligence in action is a good use. But of course what Aristotle was looking for was a distinctive activity the good use or performance of which would constitute man's good. "Be a man!", which is Kipling, not Aristotle, and none the worse for that, of course, can function as a moral imperative only if it is understood to mean not, act as you cannot help but act, viz. intelligently, consciously, to some purpose, but: do this *ccmime il faut,* well. That Williams has indeed gone so strangely astray is clear from what he immediately adds: " Here we seem to encounter a genuine dimension of freedom, to use or neglect the natural endowment, and to use it in one way or another: a freedom which must cut the central cord of the Aristotelian enterprise." Williams can only regard this remark as pertinent on the assumption that to say that it is the mark of the human agent qua human to act intelligently is equivalent to saying that it is a necessary mark of the human agent to use his intelligence well. Since it was Aristotle who opined that most men are bad, it is witless to interpret him in such a way. I suspect that Aristotle would say that, while we are of course free to put our minds to the perpetration of every conceivable sort of cruelty, debauch and injustice, we are not free to constitute such behavior as perfective of the kind of agent we are.

Williams has a third objection which contrasts being helplessly in love and being rational, but discussion of it would lead too far afield. Despite the objections he brings against the Aristotelian view, Williams assures his reader that he is far from thinking that considerations about human nature, about what men are, what it is for man to live in society, do not contribute to a correct view of morality: "one could not have any conception of morality at all without such considerations. In particular, they help to delimit the possible content of what could be regarded as a morality." [13] What he questions is that there is any direct route from such considerations to a unique morality and a unique moral ideal. In that, I think he is both right and not at odds with Aristotle (and Aquinas) .

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[12] *Ibid.,* p. 64.

To the objections raised by Williams against the notion of a distinctive human characteristic or function, let us add others raised by D. J. O'Connor in his brisk tendentious little book, *Aquinas and Natural Law.* These objections bear on Aristotelian tenets which O'Connor rightly sees to have been accepted by Aquinas.

> (1) The whole discussion seems to confuse two senses of ' good ' as (i) what *is* sought after, and (ii) what *ought to be* sought after. What reason is there to suppose that there is any coincidence between happiness and virtue?
>
> What reason is there to suppose that human beings have a characteristic function (ergon)? Aristotle's argument to show that there is a function peculiar to man is a very poor one. . . .
>
> (3) Granted that the good life for man must somehow be grounded in human nature, how do we argue from the *facts* of human nature to the *values* of morality? As Hume notoriously showed, the gap between fact and value cannot be bridged by logical argument.
>
> (4) Although the relation of means to ends does entail that some things are desired for their own sakes and not as a means to something else, we have no reason to suppose that there can be only *one* final end to which all our acts are means. Indeed, our experience clearly shows that the ultimate objects of human desires and activities are many and diverse. [14]

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[13] *Ibid.,* p. 66.

[14] D. J. O'Connor, *Aquinas and Natural Law,* New York, 1968, pp.

Of these four objections, (1) and (8) seem to involve pretty much the same point; (2) may be taken to stand for the sort of objections we have already found in Williams; and (4) is a statement of the most common objection to the Aristotelian and Thomistic ethical theories. We have then two objections to consider:

> (1) Does the ethical theory of Aquinas involve a fallacious elision from what men do in fact seek to what they ought to seek?
>
> Does the notion of an ultimate end involve the fallacy which has been illustrated in the following way: since all roads end somewhere, there is somewhere that all roads end?

I think that it is undeniable that Aquinas thinks that there is a way in which we can argue, or proceed inferentially, from what men do in fact seek and pursue to what they should or ought to seek or pursue. In noticing this, however, we are well advised not to invoke dogmatically an alleged Humean feat, namely, his having shown that from premisses of a descriptive sort (Is-statements) we cannot conclude to a normative or Ought-statement. H matters are to be settled by invoking our predecessors, then the fact, as Hume noticed, that most moralists make the disputed illation (including perhaps Hume himself) is difficult to overlook. To admit impediments to so common a practise might indeed involve notoriety, though perhaps not of the kind O'Connor has in mind. The point is that slogans are of little help here. Let us look at what Aquinas does and test his procedure in the usual way to see if it works.

The opening discussion of the moral part of the *Summa theologiae* (IaIIae.1.1.c) seeks to establish that human action is teleological, that it is a characteristic of human action that it has a point, that men act for the sake of some goal or end.

> (1) Of the actions which can be truly ascribed to men, only those which pertain to man as man can properly be called human.
>
> Man differs from irrational creatures in this that he is master of his own actions.

(8) Only those acts of which man is the master can properly be called human acts.
(4) Man is the master of his acts thanks to reason and will.
(5) Therefore those acts are properly called human acts which proceed from deliberate will.
(6) Actions which proceed from any faculty or capacity are caused by it under the formality of its objects.
(7) The object of will is the end or good.
(8) Therefore, all human actions are for the sake of an end.

We may have special difficulty understanding (6); perhaps some parallels will be helpful. Objects of sight are such under the formality of color, objects of hearing are such under the formality of sound. So here Aquinas holds that whatever we do, whatever we deliberately choose to do, we do under the formality of goodness, *sub ratione bani.* This way of speaking suggests that we can distinguish what is chosen materially, the particular course of action, say, and the formality under which it is chosen. Just as mind is not restricted to a category of objects materially depicted, *so* will, which is the rational appetite, has universal good as its (formal) object. ("... *obiectum voluntatis est finis et banum in universali.")* What we have, then, is a kind of sandwich: the formality of goodness and the (material) thing, action, whatever, which is judged to save or sustain or exemplify that formality.

What is the " formality of goodness," the *ratio bani?* Thomas takes from Aristotle the account of "good" as that-which-all-things-seek. And, in a passage which has occasioned some Humean inspired outrage, he *seems* to make an inference from *bonum est quod omnia appetunt* to *bonum est faciendum et prosequendum.*[15] Now that does seem odd, not least because it seems to make a virtue of necessity. If all men, say, do in fact seek the good, it seems otiose to recommend that they do or to say that they ought to. It sounds like a move from " Snow falls in winter" to "Snow ought to fall in winter." (Carlyle's retort to the woman who said she approved of the universe-" You had better, Madam "-does not provide a similar oddity.) While sense can no doubt be made of the remark that it ought to snow in winter, it does not seem to follow from the fact that it does in fact snow in winter. Let us charitably assume that Thomas is not simply urging men to do what they are already doing and what they perhaps cannot not do. What then is he doing? We must first ask what the force of the claim that the good is what all things seek is. Seeking, appetition, desire, may be said to be a "trying to get." Trying-to-get presumably involves something one has not got. Appetition thus suggests a want or lack, a negation, in the subject of appetite, of the one trying to get. Furthermore, the want, lack (or negation) will be fulfilled if the trying-to-get is successful. Thus, having got what one is trying to get is preferred to not having it and this preference suggests the judgment that having it is fulfilling of or perfective of the agent. Let us see if we can, on the basis of these humble observations, construct a Thomistic argument which derives Ought from Is.

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[15] *Summa. theologiae,* laIIae, q. 94, a.

(1) Men are *de facto* engaged in the pursuit of a vast variety of objectives, ends, goods.

The pursuit of the good involves the judgment that, say, a particular action, A, has the formality G, goodness; that is, A is regarded as perfective of the agent.

(S) That A has G is the reason for, the justification of, desiring A.

(4) It is possible that A, which is thought to have G, does not really have G.

(5) One desiring A under the assumption that it has G who comes to see that it does not have G, should not pursue A.

(6) If A is seen not to have G, there is no longer any justification of pursuing it.

(7) And if B is seen to have the G A was mistakenly thought to have, one who ought not to pursue A, ought to pursue B.

Looked at in this admittedly schematic and general way, the procedure from the fact that particular courses of action are pursued under a given formality, first to judgments that a course of action ought not to be pursued and then to affirmative judgments as to what ought to be pursued, does not seem to fly in the face of reason. Any man may be presumed to act in the light of what he thinks is truly perfective of the kind of agent he is, and, because of the possibility that what is seen in that light, what is brought under that formality, is not really perfective of him, his judgments can be regarded as corrigible. Further, as this type of analysis suggests, there is presumably no action which could exhaust the formality under which it is performed, as if the concrete and abstract could coalesce and a particular action be identical with the *ratio boni,* the what-is-perfective-of-the-human-agent. That would mean that some good is tantamount to goodness. (For Thomas, as we know, it is because God *is* goodness that He can *be* man's ultimate end in a way which would make no sense in moral philosophy.)

We can now profitably introduce the conception of an ultimate end. From a formal point of view, the ultimate end, that for the sake of which man does whatever he does qua man, is the formality of goodness or the *ratio boni:* whatever is perfective of the kind of agent man is. From the formal point of view, there is little difficulty in saying that all men have the same ultimate end, but, as Aristotle observed, so stated it is little more than a platitude. Matters get interesting, difficult and controversial, insofar as attention turns to the concrete actions which are brought under this formality. The .second objection that we have extracted from O'Connor's four brings against the notion of ultimate end the fact that no single determinate type of action can be said to exhaust or be identical with this formality. And this is of course true. It does not, however, as O'Connor and many others have thought, go contrary to what Aristotle and Aquinas say.

Aristotle described the distinctively human activity as following or involving a rational principle. Human activity is rational activity. To say this is not, as we observed against Williams, to introduce a particular role or function irotn among others like shoemaking and performing lobotomies. Rather," rational activity " functions as the genus of such particular roles. It is this genus that Aquinas expresses as deliberate voluntary activity. To perform such activity well is the formal ultimate end we have just been speaking of. The difficulty that the objectors see, and that Aristotle and Aquinas saw before them, is that rational activity or deliberate voluntary activity is not a particular kind of action. The next step, accordingly, is to look for sub-genera, less general than rational activity and more general than the sort of thing we and Williams have included on our lists. To make a long and complicated story deceptively short and easy, I shall simply say schematically that it is possible to distinguish between essential rational activity (which *involves* a rational principle) and participated rational activity (which *follows* a rational principle). That is, sometimes human actions are simply the use of reason itself, at other times rational activity is acts of other faculties or capacities which can come under the sway of, bear the imprint of, rational direction. Essential rational activity is further distinguished into theoretical and practical uses of the mind. Well then, and this is the point of so summary a recall, the excellences or virtues of rational activity, subdivided in this way, are the constituents of the human good. Do Aquinas and Aristotle identify the formal ultimate end with the virtue of one of these subtypes of rational activity? The answer would seem to be yes and no. The highest perfection of the theoretical use of our mind, contemplation, is sometimes spoken of as if in its case we could have that coalescence of matter and form, of particular action and the *ratio boni*, we spoke of earlier. Nonetheless, a careful reading of Aristotle and Aquinas makes it clear that they do not really hold this identification.[16] What emerges is rather that the human good has structure, that it is a set of virtues or excellences which may be thought of as ordered in a variety of ways. Some virtues are more *necessary* than others, some virtues are more

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[1] Cf. *ibid.,* q. I, a. 7.

noble than others, but however the set is hierarchically arranged, plurality is retained. Surely it is worse than a parody of the material consideration of the ultimate end to suggest that Aristotle and Aquinas are interested in homogenizing mankind so that the richness and variety of human occupations and-in that jargon phrase-life-styles would ideally be overcome.

Our aim has been to look at Thomistic ethics from the vantage point of the problematic of our own day and to show that Thomas shares certain hopes for ethical theory with Naturalists and that, in his hands, those hopes develop in ways which involve great difficulties. The distinctive function of man must not be viewed as yet another particular one, yet that is how it is often objected to. No more did Thomas identify the *ratio boni* with some particular activity. The fear that he violated the Humean stricture against deriving Ought from Is was allayed by presenting his procedure so that one can judge for himself, independently of slogans, whether a fallacy has been committed. Williams and O'Connor, and in this they are hardly unique, fear that talk of an ultimate end must end in laying it down that every man is ideally destined for the same identical vocation or career. The distinction between the formal and material aspects of ultimate end enables us to see that while the former is one, there is a necessary plurality, even limitless variety, in the latter. Williams and O'Connor concede that human nature provides the basis for a correct view of morality and helps delimit its content. If this paper has succeeded in removing misunderstandings about Thomas's views on this point of agreement, the way is open to press on to the real difficulties. In that further task, the thought of Thomas Aquinas provides a sure and lucid guide.

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BERNARD LONERGAN ON VALUE

THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION to philosophical and theological thought that Bernard Lonergan has made over the last few decades has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, considerable attention has been paid over the years to his work in such areas as cognitional analysis, epistemology, philosophical theology, and, most recently, method in theology. Less consideration has been given to his contributions in the field of ethics.

An important element in the development of Lonergan's ethical thought has been his reflections on value.[1] Inasmuch as these reflections are at once not only strikingly original but also deeply rooted in the best of traditional and modern philosophical thought, they have the potential for making a major contribution to the task of clarifying the foundation for a contemporary ethic.

However, because Lonergan's reflections on value have developed significantly over many years, and because they have not been presented as a whole in an explicit, systematic integration, their full potential has never been readily available. It is my intention in this brief article, then, to lay out in an explicit way the key elements and basic pattern of Lonergan's developing reflections on value. This article will not attempt to present a complete exposition of anything like "Lonergan's Theory of Value " ; rather, it will concentrate on two central issues in the development of Lonergan's reflections on this topic: first, the explicit introduction of a transcendental notion of value, and, .secondly, the relation of value and feelings.

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[1] This is most evident in the period beginning with *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957; designated below as *Insight)* and continuing up to the appearance of *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972; designated below as *MT)* . An important point in the course of this development is marked by *The Subject* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968; designated below as *Subject)* •

I. Transcendental Notion of Value

The fundamental difference in modes of intending, and thus also the principal division of sources of meaning, according to Lonergan, lies between the categorial and the transcendental.[2] Categories are involved in asking determinate questions and giving determinate answers through experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding.[3] Transcendentals, on the other hand, "are contained in questions prior to the answers,"[4] they "ground questioning."[5] Transcendentals are, in fact, "the radical intending that moves us from ignorance to knowledge. They are *a priori* because they go beyond what we know to seek what we do not know yet. They are unrestricted because answers are never complete and so only give rise to still further questions. They are comprehensive because they intend the unknown whole or totality of which our answers reveal only part."[6]

Most importantly for our interests, however, "the transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, constitute our capacity for self-transcendence."[7] In the following passage Lonergan further clarifies the meaning of this radical thrust for self-transcendence by distinguishing between transcendental concepts and transcendental notions:

> . . . intelligence takes us beyond experiencing to ask what and why and how and what for. Reasonableness takes us beyond the answers of intelligence to ask whether the answers are true and whether what they mean really is so. Responsibility goes beyond fact and desire and possibility to discern between what truly is good and what only apparently is good. So if we objectify the content of intelligent intending, we form the transcendental concept of the intelligible. If we objectify the content of reasonable intending, we form the transcendental concepts of the true and the real. If we objectify the content of responsible intending, we get

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[2] *MT,* pp. 11 and 78.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 11.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 74.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 11.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 105.

> the transcendental concept of value, of the truly good. But quite distinct from such transcendental concepts, which can be misconceived and often are, there are the prior transcendental notions that constitute the very dynamism of our conscious intending, promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action.[8]

.According to Lonergan, the subject operates on different levels of consciousness, qualitatively distinguished by questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation. It is important to emphasize here that these distinctive and functionally interdependent " levels of consciousness are united by the unfolding of a single transcendental intending of plural, interchangeable objectives." [9] Lonergan formulates the dynamic movement in this way:

> What promotes the subject from experiential to intellectual consciousness is the desire to understand, the intention of intelligibility. What next promotes him from intellectual to rational consciousness, is a fuller unfolding of the same intention: for the desire to understand once understanding is reached, becomes the desire to understand correctly; in other words, the intention of intelligibility, once an intelligible is reached, becomes the intention of the right intelligible, of the true and, through truth, of reality. Finally, the intention of the intelligible, the true, the real, becomes also the intention of the good, the question of value, of what is worth while, when the already acting subject confronts his world and adverts to his own acting in it.[10]

The many levels of conscious intentionality, then, are, as Lonergan says, just " successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit." [11] And this single, radical drive is the principle of the relation and interdependence between the levels of consciousness. For the image of " levels " of consciousness is no more than a metaphor denoting the successive and sublating enlargements of consciousness that occur with the unfolding of the subject's fundamental drive for transcendence. These successive enlargements and sublations of consciousness are brought out clearly in the following passage as Lonergan first runs through the " levels " from " top to bottom," then reverses the direction:

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[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 11-12.

• *Subject,* p. 22.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 22-23.

[11] *MT,* p. 13.

> To know the good [the human spirit] must know the real; to know the real, it must know the true; to know the true, it must know the intelligible; to know the intelligible, it must attend to the data. So from slumber, we awake to attend. Observing lets intelligence be puzzled, and we inquire. Inquiry leads to the delight of insight, but insights are a dime a dozen, so critical reasonableness doubts, checks, makes sure. Alternative courses of action present themselves and we wonder whether the more attractive is truly good. Indeed, so intimate is the relation between the successive transcendental notions, that it is only by a specialized differentiation of consciousness that we withdraw from more ordinary ways of living to devote ourselves to a moral pursuit of goodness, a philosophic pursuit of truth, a scientific pursuit of understanding, an artistic pursuit of beauty.[12]

Lonergan further suggests that the transcendental notions not only promote the subject to full consciousness and direct him to his goals, but they also

> provide the criteria that reveal whether the goals are being reached. The drive to understand is satisfied when understanding is reached but it is dissatisfied with every incomplete attainment and so it is the source of ever further questions. The drive to truth compels rationality to assent when evidence is sufficient but refuses assent and demands doubt whenever evidence is insufficient. The drive to value rewards success in self-transcendence with a happy conscience and saddens failures with an unhappy conscience.[13]

Value, then, in this analysis, is a transcendental notion, that is, it is " what is intended in questions for deliberation, just as the intelligible is what is intended in questions for intelligence, and just as truth and being are what are intended in questions for reflection." [14] But we must emphasize again, with Lonergan, that " such intending is not knowing." [15] " When I

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[19] *Ibid.*

[1·] *Ibid.*, p. *85.*

u *Ibid.*, p. 84.

'"*Ibid.*

ask what, or why, or how, or what for," he says, "I do not know the answers, but already I am intending what would be known if I knew the answers."[16] Likewise, "when I ask whether this or that is so, I do not as yet know whether or not either is so, but already I am intending what would be known if I did know the answers."[17] And so, "when I ask whether this is truly and not merely apparently good, whether this is or is not worth while, I do not yet know value but I am intending value."[18]

Again, to repeat a fundamental point, just "as the notion of being is the dynamic principle that keeps us moving toward ever fuller knowledge of being, so the notion of value is the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving toward ever fuller realization of the good, of what is worth while."[19]

Readers of *Insight* will recognize that the analysis of value I have outlined here does not correspond to the treatment given in *Insight* under the title, "The Notion of Value."[20] The fact is that Lonergan had not yet worked out a *transcendental* notion of value at the *Insight* period of his development. In *Insight*, value is the good of order with its concrete contents as a possible object of rational choice that comes to light in moral consciousness.[21] Ten years later, however, in *The Subject* (1968), Lonergan presents an explicit consideration of the notion of value as transcendental. Here, however, the transcendental notion *seems* simply to replace the former notion of value developed in *Insight* as part of a threefold division of the good: the particular good as object of desire, the good of order, and value. For in *The Subject* Lonergan says that the transcendental notion of value is "distinct from the particular good that satisfies individual appetite, such as the appetite for food and drink, the appetite for union and communion, the appetite for knowledge, or virtue, or pleasure."[22] Further, he says, the transcendental notion of value is "distinct from the good of order, the objective arrangement or institution that ensures for a group of people the regular recurrence of particular goods. As appetite wants breakfast," he says, "so an economic system is to ensure breakfast every morning. As appetite wants union, so marriage is to ensure life-long union. As appetite wants knowledge," Lonergan continues, "so an educational system ensures the imparting of knowledge to each successive generation."[23] So far, what Lonergan has said here about particular goods as objects of desire and those objects as ordered corresponds exactly to his position in *Insight.*[24] He continues in *The Subject,* however, by saying that "beyond the particular good and the good of order, there is the good of value."[25] But this value that is beyond the particular good and good of order is the transcendental notion of value, not the good of order itself with its concrete contents as a possible object of rational choice, as in *Insight.*[26] This transcendental notion of value in *The Subject* functions as a norm, for Lonergan says that "it is by appealing to value or values that we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, that we approve some systems for achieving the good of order and disapprove of others, that we praise or blame human persons as good or evil and their actions as right or wrong."[27] But while introducing this transcendental notion of value, *The Subject* does not explicitly discuss the notion of value worked out in *Insight,* and by discussing the transcendental notion of value in the context of and in relation to the particular good and the good of order, *The Subject* has the effect of allowing the reader to confuse the two notions of value, or to think that the concept of value of *Insight* has simply been replaced by the new transcendental notion of value.

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[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Subject,* p. 24.

[20] *Insight,* pp. 601-602.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 601.

Method in Theology finally introduces some measure of clarity to this question, but while both notions of value are treated here, the discussions are .separate and not explicitly linked. Further, *Method in Theology* adds the issue of judgments of value to the whole question. So while there is some degree of clarity to this latest work, it is in something of a potential form that needs to be actualized through some direct explicating and relating.

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[22] *Subject,* p. 23.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Insight,* p. 596.

[25] *Subject,* p. 23.

[26] *Insight,* p. 601.

[27] *Subject,* pp. 23-24.

Three key terms central to our question occur at various places in *Method in Theology:* judgments of value, terminal value (as in *Insight),* and the transcendental notion of value (as in *The Subject).* Judgments of value are related to terminal values through decisions or choices, inasmuch as terminal values are objects of possible choice or, indeed, actually chosen,[28] and choices, when they are responsible, conform to judgments of value. Terminal values, indeed, are the primary and basic instances of value discussed in *Insight* under the title "The Notion of Value," in relation to the particular good and the good of order, a threefold division that is maintained in *Method in Theology.*[29] In *Insight,* Lonergan explains that these values of reasonable choice.[80] In *Method,* however, he emphasizes true values, describing terminal values as "true instances of the particular good, a true good of order, a true scale of preferences regarding values and satisfactions."[81]

As we have seen above, *Method* also discusses the transcendental notion of value, but without explicitly and clearly relating it to the notion of terminal value. We may recall, however, that in discussing the transcendental notion of value, Lonergan likens it to the notion of being. "Just as the notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being," he says, "so too the [transcendental] notion of value intends but, of itself, does not know value."[82] There are further similarities be-

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••*Insight,* p. 601; and *MT,* p. 51.

•• *Insight,* p. 601; and *MT,* pp. 48-51.

[80] *Insight,* p. 601.

[81] *MT,* p. 51.

[82] *Subject,* p.

tween the transcendental notions of being and value that Lonergan points out which will, I think, be helpful to note here:

> Just as the notion of being functions in one's knowing and it is by reflecting on that functioning that one comes to know what the notion of being is, so also the notion or intention of the good functions within one's human acting and it is by reflection on that functioning that one comes to know what the notion of good is. Again, just as the functioning of the notion of being brings about our limited knowledge of being, so too the functioning of the notion of the good brings about our limited achievement of the good. Finally, as our knowledge of being is, not knowledge of essence, but only knowledge of this and that and other beings, so too the only good, to which we have first-hand access, is found in instances of the good realized in themselves or produced beyond themselves by good men.[88]

The first point in the above passage will be especially important in helping us to understand the relation between *Insight's* notion of terminal value and the later transcendental notion of value. Just as we can distinguish the being or reality *intended* in questions for reflection and the being or reality *known* through true judgments, so we can distinguish between the value *intended* in questionS' for deliberation and the value *known and realized* in true judgments of value and reasonable, responsible decisions or choices that conform to those true judgments. There are, in other words, the reality and value that are intended in questioning (the transcendental notions) and the concrete instances of reality and value that are known and realized in correct judgments and authentic choices. We may say, then, that the transcendental notion of value stands to the notion of being as terminal values stand to the reality known through true judgments, or, in more direct response to our original question, that terminal values stand to the transcendental notion of value as the reality known through true judgments stands to the notion of being. As the notion of being functions as a criterion for the judgments through which

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. ft5-26.

reality is known, so the transcendental notion of value functions as a criterion for the decisions and choices through which terminal values are realized.

II. Value and Feelings

We have considered several aspects of the question of value thus far, but we must now turn our attention to one aspect that seems central, the relation of value to feelings. For while we have discussed values and their judgments and choices in relation to the cognitive operations, Lonergan makes a point of the fact that " the apprehension of values and disvalues is the task not of understanding but of intentional response." [84] And "such response is all the fuller, all the more discriminating," Lonergan says, " the better a man one is, the more refined one's sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings." [85] Briefly, and quite simply, Lonergan puts the matter this way: " Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments in value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given of feelings." [86]

Lonergan's most interesting consideration of feelings, perhaps, is in connection with his analysis of symbolic meaning, through which "mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate." [37] Because of " internal tensions, incompatibilities, conflicts, struggles, destructions," [88] the need for this internal communication is basic, and symbols, obeying" the laws not of logic but of image and feeling," [89] have the power of recognizing and expressing the internal tensions and conflicts that logical discourse abhors. [40] "Organic and psychic vitality," says Lonergan, " have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche. Again," he says, " our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses,

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•• *MT,* pp. H-5.

[85] *Ibid.*

[86] *Ibid.,* p. 87.

BT *Ibid.,* p. 67,

•• *Ibid.,* p. 66.

•• *Ibid.*

' 0 *Ibid.*

in feelings: here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings."[41] Most basically, according to Lonergan, "a symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."[42] Though we do not have the space to pursue Lonergan's analysis of symbolic meaning here, we should remember that this is the primary context in which his discussion of value and feeling must be interpreted, the issue which we must now consider directly.

Relying on the phenomenological analyses of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, Lonergan distinguishes in the realm of feelings between "non-intentional states and trends" and "intentional responses."[43] Non-intentional states are fatigue, anxiety, bad humor. Trends or urges are, for example, hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort. Such .states and trends have causes or goals, and the feeling is related to the cause or goal simply as effect to cause, as trend to goal.[44] "The feeling itself," says Lonergan, " does not presuppose and arise out of perceiving, imagining, representing the cause or goal. Rather, one first feels tired and, perhaps belatedly, one discovers that what one needs is a rest. Or first one feels hungry and then one diagnoses the trouble as a lack of food."[45] Now values are apprehended not in these states and trends, says Lonergan, but rather in the intentional responses that he contrasts to them in the following description:

> Intentional responses, on the other hand, answer to what is intended, apprehended, represented. The feeling relates us, not just to a cause or an end, but to an object. Such feeling gives intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin. Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration,

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" *Ibid.,* pp. 66-67.

••*Ibid.,* p. 64.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 30.

"*Ibid.*

'"*Ibid.*

reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning. We have feelings about other persons, we feel for them, we feel with them. We have feelings about our respective situations, about the past, about the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished.[46]

But, further, intentional responses are not all of a kind, and values are not to be apprehended in every intentional response. For, as Lonergan explains, "feelings that are intentional responses regard two main classes of objects: on the one hand, the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying; on the other hand, values, whether the ontic value of persons or the qualitative value of beauty, understanding, truth, virtuous acts, noble deeds." [47]

Response to the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying is, unfortunately, ambiguous. "What is agreeable," says Lonergan, " may very well be what is a true good. But it also happens that what is a true good may be disagreeable. Most good men," he says, " have to accept unpleasant work, privations, pain, and their virtue is a matter of doing so without excessive self-centered lamentation." [48] In contrast, according to Lonergan, "response to value both carries us toward self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or of which we transcend ourselves." [49] For, he says, "we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of moral self-transcendence." [50]

Feelings, then, in Lonergan's analysis, respond to values, but they do not respond simply; rather, they respond in accord with a scale of preference. So Lonergan suggests that we may distinguish" vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order." [51] He sketches the character of these various types of values in the following passage:

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[46] *Ibid.,* pp. 80-81.

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 81.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.,* p. 88.

> Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social values, such as the good of order which conditions the vital values of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world.... [52]

It is also important for the ethical theorist to note, as Lonergan does, that feelings develop. While they are fundamentally spontaneous in their origin-not lying at the beck and call of decision, once arisen, feelings " may be reinforced by advertence and approval, and they may be curtailed by disapproval and distraction." [58] Lonergan continues by pointing out that

> such reinforcement and curtailment not only will encourage some feelings and discourage others but also will modify one's spontaneous scale of preferences. Again, feelings are enriched and refined by attentive study of the wealth and variety of the objects that arouse them, and so no small part of education lies in fostering and developing a climate of discernment and taste, of discriminating praise and carefully worded disapproval, that will conspire with the pupil's or student's own capacities and tendencies, enlarge and deepen his apprehension of values, and help him towards self-transcendence. [54]

Before returning more directly to the question of value, we

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[01] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

•• *Ibid.*, pp. SI

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

"'*Ibid.*

should note with Lonergan that feelings are not merely transient, that while some easily aroused feelings just as easily pass away and while some feelings are repressed into an unhappy subterranean life, still

> there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life. Here the supreme illustration is loving. A man or woman that falls in love is engaged in loving not only when attending to the beloved but at all times. Besides particular acts of loving, there is the prior state of being in love, and that prior state is, as it were, the fount of all one's actions. So mutual love is the intertwining of two lives. It transforms an " I " and "thou" into a' we" so intimate, so secure, so permanent, that each attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, acts in concern for both.[55]

Lonergan concludes his brief consideration of feelings by noting that besides development there are also aberrations of feelings, and that " it is much better to take full cognizance of one's feelings, however deplorable they may be, than to brush them aside, overrule them, ignore them." [56] This issue, which has received so little consideration from moral philosophers, seems to lie at the heart of the question about an adequate ethical theory, for such a theory must be able to come to grips in a satisfactory way with the nature of personal authenticity, itself intrinsically dependent on genuine self-knowledge. And, as Lonergan says,

> to take cognizance of [one's feelings] makes it possible for one to know oneself, to uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility that gave rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant attitude. On the other hand, not to take cognizance of them is to leave them in the twilight of what is conscious but not objectified [what Lonergan thinks at least some psychiatrists mean by the unconscious]. In the long run there results a conflict between the self as conscious and, on the other hand, the self as objectified.[51]

Just as transcendental method rests on a self-appropriation, on

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•• *Ibid.*, pp. Sf.l-88. [66] *Ibid.*, p. SS. [67] *Ibid.*, pp. 88-84.

> attending to, inquiring about, understanding, conceiving, affirming one's attending, inquiring, understanding, conceiving, affirming, so too therapy is an appropriation of one's own feelings. As the former task is blocked by misconceptions of human knowing, so too the latter is blocked by misconceptions of what one spontaneously is.[58]

To conclude, now, our discussion of value, we may point out with Lonergan that in judgments of value three components unite. First, says Lonergan, "there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself." [59] This is simply a more explicit and systematic way of saying what we have already noted with Lonergan, that "intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments in value lie apprehensions of value." [60] There are, in other words, first the issues on which practical reflection itself can reach virtually unconditioneds. Thus Lonergan says that "the judgment of value presupposes knowledge of human life, of human possibilities proximate and remote, of the probable consequences of projected courses of action." [61] In this regard Lonergan notes that "when knowledge is deficient, then fine feelings are apt to be expressed in what is called moral idealism, i. e., lovely proposals that don't work out and often do more harm than good." [62] But, as our consideration of value and feeling has indicated, "knowledge alone is not enough," and, Lonergan says, "while everyone has some measure of moral feeling for, as the saying is, there is honor among thieves, still moral feelings have to be cultivated, enlightened, strengthened, refined, criticized and pruned of oddities." [63]

Finally, says Lonergan, "the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling lead to the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one. With that discovery," he states, " there emerges in consciousness the significance of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility."[64]

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[58] *Ibid.,* p. 84.

[59] *Ibid.,* p. 88.

[60] *Ibid.,* p. 87.

[61] *Ibid.,* p. 88.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] *Ibid.*

We may bring this article to an appropriate close, I think, while anticipating further discussion, by pointing out with Lonergan that " it is by the transcendental notion of value [the fullest manifestation of man's radical exigence for self-transcendence] and its expression in a good and uneasy conscience that man can develop morally. But a rounded moral judgment is ever the work of a fully developed self-transcending subject or, as Aristotle would put it, of a virtuous man."[65] This point inevitably brings us to the question of the conversions from which such subjects emerge. But they must be the topic of another paper.

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[64] *Ibid.*

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

SOME ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON AND COSMOLOGICAL PROOFS

> "Laws like the principle of sufficient reason . . . are about the net and not about what the net describes." (Ludwig Wittgenstein)
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> "What a pity science cannot resolve to keep people under discipline and to keep itself in check!" (Kierkegaard's Vigilius Haufniensis)

RCENT literature concerning cosmological proofs for the existence of God has stressed their employment of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Though in the past many critics of theistic arguments have not only not recognized the operation of this principle but also have criticized theists for employing a version of the principle of causality explicitly rejected by many in the theistic tradition/ contemporary criticism has generally acknowledged the functioning of the PSR. This is not to .say, however, that the principle has not been found wanting. In fact, confining ourselves just to discussions of what we might call in a preliminary way its " truth," two types of criticism seem to have been advanced. The first type, developing a characterization used by James F. Ross, might be called "Humean" so as to stress its epistemological character as well as its similarity with standard empiricist procedures against the principle of causality. The other type, which might be called " theological," attempts to reveal the incompatibility of the PSR with the existence of

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[1] See W. Norris Clarke, S. J., "A Curious Blindspot in the Anglo-American Tradition of Anti-Theistic Argument," *The Monist*, 54 (1970), pp.

a free creator God; the PSR must thus be repudiated by traditional theists themselves.

Our first concern, in section I, will be a presentation of various "Humean" arguments as they have been developed by Professor Ross[2] and by Professor William L. Rowe.[3] In section II we shall develop and discuss their criticisms of the PSR in an effort to come to a correct understanding of the meaning, status, and function of the principle. Our contention will be that both critics and defenders have not always been clear on these issues, especially on the difference between "Rationalist" and "Aristotelian" understandings of the PSR and cosmological argumentation. We shall argue that there are at least *two* ways the PSR can be denied, that there is a different type of absurdity involved in each denial, and that the context and nature of the denials must be stressed by one who would successfully defend the principle. In view of the complex structure of the "theological" argumentation of both Ross and Rowe, and since much of what we would say in response would be a reiteration of what was developed earlier, we shall confine ourselves in section III to a presentation of what we consider the basic claims of this type of critique. Our analysis in section IV will stress the essential modesty of the "Aristotelian" PSR; instead of providing the basis for an overbearing rationalism, scientism, and determinism, this PSR seemingly functions to render philosophical theology a discipline which attains its goal in a simultaneous recognition of its *essential incompleteness* with regard to possible truths about the divine.

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[2] James F. Ross, *Philosophical Theology* (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969).

[3] In "The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason," *Man and World,* 1 (1968), pp. In "The Cosmological Argument," *No-Us,* 5 (1971), pp. 49-61, Rowe presents a "theological" argument, but in the process clarifies his formulations of the PSR. (Our essay was written previously to the publication of Rowe's more detailed analyses in his *The Cosmological Argument* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)).

I.

The following four objections to the PSR have been advanced (the first two by James F. Ross, the third and fourth by William L. Rowe):

1. Since the principle that everything has (must have) an explanation or sufficient reason is assumed without proof, how is it known to be true? Any attempt to establish it as true runs into the dilemma:

a) If the PSR is known by induction its absolute universality cannot be established. It can only be a synthetic principle of doubtful truth, since a finite body of evidence is available which could falsify it.

b) On the other hand, if the PSR is a necessary truth, then "there is something for whose being there is no explanation " is self-contradictory. But this means that one has to *establish* this negation of the PSR as self-contradictory. No one has done this. " Experimental attempts with propositions like ' There is no explanation for the existence of the moon ' will show that the contradiction is at least elusive, if not absent." [4]

2. One cannot say that the denial that everything has an explanation leads to absurdity. That would be similar to the mistake of saying that the denial of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) necessarily leads to absurdity. "For if a man says there is one exception to the principle of non-contradiction, he denies the principle, but as long as he does not pretend to offer us that exception-the proposition which is both true and false-he will not fall into the wilderness of confusion Aristotle anticipated, since his statement that there is such a two-valued proposition has only one truth-value." [5] So one could say that not everything has an explanation without having to designate which, if any, things are unexplained.

3. Assuming the PSR has not or cannot be demonstrated in

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[4] Ross, *op. cit.,* p. 97.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 98.

the way Locke, for instance, imagined, it does not follow that it cannot be known as true (for not everything can be *proved).* An examination must be made of the claim that the PSR is a necessary truth, known *a priori.*[6] Before doing this it is important to distinguish the strong form of the PSR (PSR1) from a *weak* form (PSR2). PSR1 is a restatement of the first premise of Samuel Clarke's version of the cosmological argument, "Whatever exists is either a dependent being or an independent being," where " dependent being " means " a being that has the reason of its existence in the causal efficacy of some other being" and" independent being" means" a being which has the reason of its existence within its own nature." [7] Thus PSR1 states: Whatever exists must have a reason for its existence either within the nature of the thing itself or in the causal efficacy of some other being.[8] "PSR1 implies only that every existing thing has a reason for its *existence."* [9] On the other hand, PSR2 claims only *that whatever comes into existence* must have an explanation of its existence.[10]

Now, if the PSR is necessarily true, either it is analytically true or it is a synthetic *a priori* truth.

a) Is PSR1 analytically true? Clearly it is not logically true. " Nor ... does the mere notion of the existence of a thing *definitionally* contain the notion of a thing being caused." [11]

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[6] Rowe's considerations here will be different from those presented in Ross's first argument.

[7] Rowe, " The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason," p. 280.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 282.

[9] Rowe, "The Cosmological Argument," p. 57. Rowe's or other quoted author's emphasis unless otherwise indicated

[10] This formulation of the weak form of the PSR (what we have called PSR.) must be distinguished from what Rowe himself calls PSR_2 in his *Notis* article, namely, " Every actual state of affairs has a reason either within itself or in some other state of affairs " [p. 57]. This is explicated as a stricter form of PSRi, and it is this stricter form which Rowe like Ross finds incompatible with a free divine creation. We shall discuss this PSR, which we shall call PSR., in sections III and IV below.

[11] Rowe, " The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason," p. 282.

With regard to PSR2, though " Every effect has a cause " is analytically true, " Every event has a cause " is not. An event like a leaf falling does not seem to contain the idea of something *causing* that event.

b) The difficulty with the view that either PSR1 or PSR2 is necessary, though not analytic, is " that we do seem able to conceive of things existing, or even of things coming into existence, without having to conceive of those things as having an explanation or cause."[12] It seems conceptually possible that something should exist and yet have no cause or explanation of its existence. The Humean claim (that since the separation of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence is possible in the imagination, the actual separation of those objects is also possible) reveals the lack of a necessary connection in reality between a cause and a coming into existence. In fact, many assert that there is no way of proving that uncaused and unoriginated events do not occur. These may be possible, and so the denial of the PSR is true.

4. In view of these difficulties some defenders of the cosmological argument adopt the more modest view that the PSR is a *metaphysical assumption,* a presupposition we as scientists are forced to make in order to make sense of our world. But does a scientist in his work really assume that everything that happens has a cause (PSR2)? *Perhaps,* since the failure to find causes does not lead anyone to abandon the causal principle, and it has been argued that it is *impossible* to obtain empirical evidence against the principle.

Though a case might be made for the *weak* form of the PSR, can the *strong* form of the PSR be argued to as a presupposition of reason itself, remembering that PSR2 is only concerned with what happens or comes into existence, while PSR1 pertains to whatever exists? If we imagine a star that has always existed, it is doubtful that we presuppose that there must be an explanation for the eternal existence of this star. It is true

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[18] *Ibid.,* p. fl85.

that the question, " Why does this thing exist?," may be sensibly ·asked about an eternally existing star, but this is quite different from arguing " that all men presuppose that there must be an adequate answer to that question .... "[18]

II.

1. The question, "How is the PSR known to be true?", resulted in considering whether the PSR was established either by induction or by its recognition as a necessary truth whose denial resulted in a self-contradiction. In our examination of these alternatives we shall attempt to show the inappropriateness of asking about the truth of the PSR and to reveal in what sense the PSR can be considered both as known by induction and as necessary without being subject to the objections posed.

a) According to Ross's analysis of it as a truth known by induction, the PSR seems to emerge as a universal affirmative synthetic *a posteriori* proposition. Like the perennial " Every swan is white," " Everything is explainable " seemingly is to be regarded not only as a truth confirmed by past and present experience, but also as one which future experience could falsify. But should the PSR be considered as a universal proposition? We think not, for the predication of "explainable " of " thing " distorts the meaning of the PSR. It is not things or substances which are regarded as explainable, but, as Richard Taylor has argued, states or changes of things or substances. If it is then countered that the PSR could easily be reformulated as the universal proposition, " Every fact is explainable," it emerges that the subject does not refer to substances or things as does an ordinary subject, but rather to complex states of affairs which are usually regarded as expressed by a total proposition.

If the description of our present working formulation of the PSR as a universal proposition is unnatural, perhaps we nevertheless can see it as standing in a close relationship to propositions. Let us take it as saying that every true proposition or every fact which it reflects has an explanation. The PSR is thus at least oriented to an expression of the relation of propositions to other propositions or to the relation of facts to other facts, if not to the relation of propositions to facts. It is not a proposition in that it does not reflect that which is the case, but rather attempts to say what propositions themselves do or can do, but do not say they do or can do. Considerations of this sort open up the possibility of treating the PSR as a rule directing us to search for the grounds of some of the truths which we regard ourselves as expressing in our language. Just as it would be inappropriate to ask about the truth or falsity of the rules of formation or transformation of a propositional calculus, so it would be inappropriate to ask about the truth or falsity of the PSR. The rules of a logical system are concerned with the interrelations among the parts of a system and the development of a system such that they decide what will be admitted into a system and what moves are permissible within the system. One can talk of the truth or falsity of the axioms and theorems in a system, but not about the truth value of the rules of a system.

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

Logical systems, of course, are quite consciously constructed, with the rules often being placed near or at the beginning of the presentation of the system. Rules determine whether a token is eligible to enter in the system as well as its behavior as an element in the system. The game of the system cannot be entered into, much less fully engaged, without an abiding by the rules. Let us, however, envision a situation in which one becomes conscious of being *in medias res*, in the midst of a game, and discovers himself abiding by rules, though not knowing exactly the nature of those rules, or even what game he is playing. M. Jourdain, who did not know he had been speaking prose all his life until so informed by the *maUre de philosophie*, was abiding by some grammatical rules, though he might not have been able to state what they were or even if there were any rules at all. Now in the playing of a logical system an instructor could point out to a neophyte that a certain move he had made was the source of all his subsequent confusions and difficulties. If the student is to avoid future mistakes in his work in the system, he *must* follow the rules. But the student can decide he is not capable of such a commitment, and terminate his logical studies, escape from the system and its rules. So, if our ordinary language does include the utterance and use of propositions and if in employing them one is following certain rules (the PNC, for example), one might exempt oneself from this rule only by refusing to make truth claims (perhaps by silence or by trying to engage only in nonpropositional discourse). But one cannot say he is disobeying the rule and, while still uttering propositions and claiming them as propositions, expect those who say they obey the rules and utter propositions (if they consider what he is saying as meant seriously) to engage him further in what they believe to be truth-value discourse. He will perhaps be regarded by them as Cassandra was by those who believed that a future contingent proposition could not be known either as true or as false.

A rule can be regarded by those who are engaged in an activity as something which provides a framework for the existence and viability of that activity. The question we are confronting is the acquisition of the knowledge of the rules of an activity of which one can become conscious by his past and present and likely future participation, namely, the activity of truth-value discourse. Having recognized the distinctiveness of this activity, one can come to an awareness that some statement concerning it is a rule, because in engaging in the activity of truth-value discourse he always abides by it, and would say that he was not engaging in that activity if he violated it. Here we see how knowledge of a rule is attained inductively from a reflection on past and present participation in an activity, and how it has ·an element of necessity in that future violation of it would be recognized as a cessation of participation in the activity. Under the presupposition that there is an awareness of having engaged and / or being engaged in a distinctive game or activity, one can explicate the rules of that game, and say that if these rules are not obeyed one would no longer be playing the game. One could, of course, discover that the proposed formulations of the rules hinder the performance of the game (consider the possibility of purist grammatical rules hindering the development of style and the expression of ideas). Although someone's statements as to what the rules are might not he correct, nevertheless, if a game is being played, it is played under basic rules which serve to make it the game that it is. The basic rules are implicit in the activity, and when we think that what we regard as the basic rules of a game we are playing have been violated, we would either consider the game to be over, or come to the realization that perhaps the present game is not the one we thought we were playing. The basic rules of a game or an activity cannot be disestablished by any new developments or evidence.

Some clarification with regard to the way the PSR and the PNC function as rules might be achieved by examining Aristotle's remarks in the *Posterior Analytics* regarding what might be called the game or activity of scientific knowing:

> We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident-witness those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it, since the former merely imagine themselves to be, while the latter are also actually, in the condition described. Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.[14]

Aristotle's way of speaking reveals that he is giving a state-

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u Aristotle, *Po11terior AnalytiC11,* I, 2; 7lb8-15, ment of what common opinion believes perfect science to be, what people mean by " unqualified scientific knowledge " whether it exists or not, what people think they possess when they say that they know in a scientifically perfect way. His definition is based partly on an inductive survey of the claims of those advertising themselves as scientists of the strictest sort. The advertisement is so clear that one claiming this knowledge could be justifiably convicted of sophistry or false advertising, if he cannot show that what he claims to be his possession meets the criteria of common opinion. People believe they would possess unqualified scientific knowledge if they could present the total set of necessary conditions of a fact whose denial would be self-contradictory or impossible. Insofar as one believes he is engaged in the activity of acquiring perfect knowledge, he believes he is being governed by, must satisfy and cannot violate the PNC (insofar as it relates to self-contradiction) and the PSR. The PNC and the PSR belong necessarily to" perfect scientific knowing" in that an inductive survey of its ordinary use sees them as part of the meaning of " what is generally meant by those who employ " [15] this phrase. In this way we see how the PSR and the PNC are *analytically necessary* to a certain use of "science" in ordinary language. The PSR and the PNC thus are not truths, but rather criteria and/or rules which are applied to propositions to determine if a particular notion of science has been or is being realized. "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a ' proto-phenomenon.' That is, where we ought to have said: *this language-game is played.* The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game." [16]

b) As we investigate the other alternative Ross suggests in his first argument, that as a necessary truth the denial of the

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[15] Thomas Aquinas, *In I Post. Anal., lect. 4.*

[16] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), I, nos. 654-655.

PSR should lead to a self-contradiction, we should stress that our discussion had led us to conclude that the PSR, insofar as it talks about the sufficient or the total set of necessary conditions, and the PNC, insofar as it includes the notion of the propositions to be explained having self-contradictory denials, are both necessary to the *definiens* of the common notion of unqualified scientific knowing. We have found it inappropriate both to speak of the PSR as a " truth " and also to consider it as a necessary truth in Ross's sense of "necessary." The only aspect of its necessity so far isolated is its status as pa.rt of the meaning of the common notion of unqualified scientific knowing. To attribute this kind of semantical necessity to the PSR does not entail that a denial of it leads to a self-contradiction. What it does entail is that a denial of the PSR as part of the meaning of unqualified scientific knowing will lead to semantical inconsistencies on the part of the denier; that is, he who says, " The PSR is not part of the meaning of unqualified scientific knowing " will be led into a position where it becomes clear that he is not giving a phrase the meaning everyone else does.

Let us, however, envision someone acknowledging the PSR as a necessary ingredient of perfect scientific knowing, yet also denying it by saying, " There is something for whose being there is no explanation whatever." Ross challenges the defender of the PSR to show this negation of the PSR to be self-contradictory: "No one has succeeded in doing this, and there is no reason to think you will." [17] Since our defender has refused to acknowledge the PSR as a universal necessary proposition, he, of course, need not be compelled to see this denial as leading to a self-contradiction. But what can he say or do about this straightforward denial of what both defender and opponent have recognized as a basic rule or criterion? A clue seems to be given us by the following reasoning of Jacques Maritain:

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[17] Ross, *op. cit.,* p. 97.

> The expression in *virtue of which,* when we say that in virtue of which an object is, must have a meaning or be meaningless. If it is meaningless philosophy is futile, for philosophers look for the sufficient ground of things. If, on the other hand, it has a meaning, it is evident that in virtue of the principle of non-contradiction it is identical with the meaning of the phrase *that without which* an object is not. If, therefore anything exists which has no sufficient reason for its existence, that is to say has neither in itself nor in something else that in virtue of which it is, this object exists and does not exist at the same time. It does not exist because it lacks that without which it does not exist. This *reductio ad absurdum* proves that to deny the principle of sufficient reason is to deny the principle of identity. [18]

Recognizing that Maritain's formulation of the PSR is different from Ross's, we nevertheless see an attempt to show, first of all, that since the PSR is part of the meaning of philosophical science, he who says that it is meaningless must also regard the " Aristotelian " common notion of what philosophic science is seeking as meaningless. This we take as a variation on the theme we were developing earlier with regard to the common notion of perfect scientific knowing. Maritain then moves on to the denial of the PSR itself. Granting the difficulties in both his formulation of the PSR and his rather quick (and we follow him in this) equation of the meaning of sufficient reason with the totality of necessary conditions, it is interesting to note that his conclusion amounts to saying that a denial of the PSR results in a denial of the PNC. We might thus say that instead of defending the PSR by showing that its opposite is self-contradictory (which procedure operates by considering the PSR as a proposition) , a proponent of it might show instead that a denial of it leads to the denial of the PNC. We admittedly have difficulty in discerning how Maritain's argument leads to this conclusion, since he seems to consider the PSR as a universal necessary proposition [19] whose denial leads to a self-contradiction, rather than what he says, namely a denial of the PNC itself. But we might offer a suggestion based on Maritain's intuition. We recall that sufficient reasons are sought for facts which cannot be other than they are, that is, for those facts expressed by propositions whose denial would be self-contradictory. If these facts do not have grounds without which they could not be the facts they are and not otherwise, then these facts could be other than they presently are. It is thus possible for that which cannot be other than it is to be other than it is, to say which is sufficient to deny the PNC.

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[18] Jacques Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics* (New York: Mentor Omega Books, pp. 99-100. For Maritain the PNC is "but the logical form of the principle of identity " [p. 91].

[19] See *ibid.,* p.

This last consideration stresses the nature of the denial of the PNC which results from the denial of the PSR. In terms of experimental attempts it thus becomes imperative that the particular proposition with which one is concerned express a necessary fact, for the PSR is not ruling on *sufficient* explanations of facts which can be other than they are. Thus, when "The moon exists " is the subject of conceptual experimentation, if " exists " is regarded as a synthetic but not as a necessary predicate, the results would be quite different from an analysis (such as Maritain's, we believe) based on regarding " exists " as functioning as both a synthetic and necessary predicate. We stress that even though the PSR itself is not a necessary truth, it so frames those which are synthetically necessary that a denial of its efforts to sufficiently ground them leads to a denial of the PNC.

2. We can now move with some continuity into the second of Ross's "Humean" criticisms, one which considers the analogy between a denial of the PSR and a denial of the PNC, and which disputes the claim of their defenders that their denials necessarily lead to absurdity.

As a first step, it must be ascertained exactly what a denier of the PNC is contending. If he says, "The PNC has one exception," he might not be directly denying the PNC, but rather denying that it is a universal principle or rule. The difference between these two types of denial must be recognized and maintained, in order for a defender of the PNC to reply to a charge such as Ortega y Gasset's against Aristotle's treatment of it. Ortega contends that Aristotle offers a direct proof of the PNC in *Metaphysics,* IV, 3, despite the Stagirite's own claims that this most basic principle cannot be proved:

> What those lines convey to us is something more interesting and important than if they enunciated a proof which Aristotle had deliberately thought out. They show us that, very much against his will . . . Aristotle had no choice bat to prove the principle. The greater part of the demonstration is the definition of principle: absolute principle is a proposition of truth, unprovable according to normal apodictical, non-hypothetical but necessary proof. The lesser part says: there is a proposition-that of noncontradiction- the truth of which is *necessary* to the existence of any other truths whatever. The conclusion announces, then, that this proposition is an absolute principle. It is a syllogism. That it may not be the typical apodictical syllogism in the Aristotelian sense, does not deprive it in the least of its syllogistic quality.[20]

It is obvious that Ortega conflates a proof of the PNC with a proof that the PNC is a most certain or absolute principle. Is it not plausible that part of the explanation for this conflation is due to Ortega's describing the PNC .as a *true JYfoposition?* An examination of Aristotle's own text reveals that he does not characterize the PNC as a true proposition in the argument considered, though admittedly in the previous paragraph he does talk about the truth and falsity of the common axioms as not being the subject of mathematical inquiry .[21] At any rate, we would stress the difference between those axioms which can serve as starting points in a particular discipline (and which 1are properly called propositions), and those principles (axioms of axioms) which are the common rules for all disciplines, and should not be called propositions. What, however, can be the response to one who clearly denies that the PNC is a universal or most basic principle? It can be pointed out that the PNC, unlike the PSR, governs *all* propositions, and their corresponding facts, not just necessary propositions and the facts which cannot be other than they are. It can be noted that any type of what is called scientific knowing demands consistency, though only unqualified scientific knowing necessitates sufficient explanations. Furthermore, in its function as a rule the PNC allows that *any* proposition can be directly negiated, and demands that the truth-value and sense of the negation be directly opposite to the negated. If any sentence refuses to submit to this rule, it cannot be a proposition, and that which it purports to express cannot be a fact.

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[20] Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Idea of Principle in Leibnitz and The Evolution of Deductive Theory,* trans. Mildred Adams (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 180.

[21] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* IV, 8; 1005al8-1005b84.

It seems, however, that Ross's objection is concerned with the direct denial of the PNC: someone could say without absurdity, "Some proposition is both true and false," for this proposition has but one truth value. The implication is that the denier can maintain a position similar to one of omega-inconsistency,[22] that is, he could claim that some proposition is both true and false, even though he might acknowledge that all the propositions he would be able to list are not both true and false. This position seems to be a more laconic statement of George Mavrodes's critique of Aristotle's negative demonstrations in defense of the PNC. Stating the PNC as the universal proposition," No proposition is both true and false," Mavrodes argues:

> The contradictory, then, of the Law of Non-contradiction is merely 'there is some proposition which is both true and false.' But this is perfectly compatible with 'there are many propositions, of which *p, q, r,* etc. are examples, which are not both true and false.' Thus a person could reject the Law of Non-contradiction and accept its contradictory, while consistently maintaining of each

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[22] See Ross, *op. cit.,* pp. 308-09, for his explanation of this notion, and for an argument that Ross's own principle of heteroexplicability does not result in this sort of inconsistency.

> and every statement which he himself made or used that it was not both true and false.[23]

Mavrodes diagnoses Aristotle's mistake in this matter as an overlooking of the basic Aristotelian distinction between a contradictory denial and a contrary one. So, according to Aristotle's procedure here, if one does not accept the PNC, " then he must be holding its ' opposite,' i. e., its contrary. That would be, of course, that all propositions are both true and false. So the possibility of a person's holding merely the contradictory of the general law, i.e., a statement to the effect that there is some exception to, that law, is. overlooked." [24]

However, both Ross .and Mavrodes seem to claim that the denier of the PNC would assert the PNC to be false and its contradictory opposite true. For them the denier would assert, " ' No proposition is both true ,and false ' is false " and " ' Some proposition is both true and false ' is true." The denier could thus avoid absurdity, because he is not necessitated to the absurdity, "'All propositions are both true and false' is true," but could maintain the contradiction of the contrary of the PNC, "'Some propositions are not both true and false ' is true," which would also result in the falsity of the contrary of the PNC. Prescinding from the semantical paradoxes involved with this self-referential use of "true" and "false" in the formulation of the PNC as 'a universal proposition, it must nevertheless be recognized that the denier is accepting the basic framework of the square of opposition, which has been our way of understanding the PNC, while he thinks he has been denying the PNC. The denial derives its plausibility from a conflation of a proposition within the framework of the square with that framework statement (the PNC itself!) which permits that proposition to have a contradictory denial directly opposite to it in truth value and sense. That no absurdity results is due to the fact that the denier has been assuming the PNC while thinking he has been denying it. We should now be quite conscious, moreover, of the dangers in formulating the PNC as a universal proposition. As an author has recently emphasized, it would be just as inappropriate to attribute truth-value to the PNC as it would be to say that the meter standard in Paris is a meter long.[25]

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[23] George I. Mavrodes, "Aristotle and Non-Contradiction," *Southern Journal of Philosophy,* 8 (1965), p. IU.

[24] *Loc. cit.*

3. The context of Rowe's consideration of the PSR is, of course, his analysis of Samuel Clarke's cosmological argument, and it is clear that for him the PSR as a restatement of the argument's premise. "Every being is either a dependent being or an independent being," involves the acceptance of a limitation of the referential range of " being " : " In speaking of beings ... we shall restrict ourselves to beings that *could be caused* to exist by some other being or *could be causes* of the existence of other beings. God (if He exists), a man, a star, a stone are beings of this sort. Presumably, numbers, sets and the like are not." [26] So, if the PSR is to be considered a viable principle, its range of applicability must be recognized as somewhat limited. But, we ask, what is the correct rationale for such a limitation? Consider numbers or fictive beings. Why should the PSR not be regarded as applicable to them? Is it because they are not recognized as beings which could either cause existence or be caused to exist? Or is it because they are not regarded as real independent existents, that is, beings capable of existence without the aid of human mental activity? The answers to these questions become particularly crucial when one focuses on the question of the existence of God. If God exists, he would certainly be the independently existing cause of the existence of other independent beings, but at the *beginning* of such an inquiry as the cosmological argument our knowledge of the independent existence of God is the very point at issue. If we wonder about God's existence at that stage of inquiry when we

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[25] See Patrick J. Bearsley, S. M., "Another Look at the First Principles of Knowledge," *The Thomist,* 86 p. 588.

[26] Rowe, " The Cosmological Argument," p. 50.

are concerned with the formulation and application of basic principles, we would say that it is possible that there be a God and that God *could be* the cause of the existence of other beings, but we would ·also say we are not sure that God is a real, presently existing, independent being. As we have previously argued, the PSR directs us to the sufficient explanation of facts which cannot be other than they are, and it is not certain that God's existence at the beginning of our inquiry is a fact, much less a fact whose denial is self-contradictory. The situation is similar to the one generated for the law of excluded middle when either empty terms are permitted to appear in the subject position of the disjuncts or when the disjuncts are singular future contingent propositions. With regard to the former case neither of the disjuncts can be called propositions because there is no assumption that they are describing actual states of affairs, while with regard to the latter alternative, neither one of the disjuncts can be called a proposition for though each one may be called " true or false," neither can knowingly be called "true " or be called " false." So though at the beginning of inquiry " God exists " is either " true or false," we cannot say if it is true or if it is false, for we do not know if the subject refers, to a present reality. This emphasizes the necessity for not including the merely possible being of God, and the proposition " God exists," within the range of application of the PSR. Only if the schematism of a principle is initially restricted to propositions whose truth-value is known does the principle retain its character as a rule for unqualified knowing.

A certain hesitancy must also arise with regard to Rowe's formulation of the strong form of the PSR (PSR1). Rowe's formulation could easily be interpreted as "whatever exists1 must have an explanation why it exists2 either within its nature or in the causal efficacy of some other being," where exists1 and exists2 have the same meaning. To accept PSR1 we would distinguish exists1 from exists2, seeing the purpose of " exists1 " as being restrictive in that it would be making instantiation necessary for the subject terms of the propositions which express the truth of the facts to be explained, while regarding " exists2 " as expressing that the explanation must be of the necessary relation of a real property to the unempty subject. Thus a question such as, " Why are knights of the round table bald? " would definitely not be within the framework of PSR1. The chief inadequacy in the statement of PSR1, however, is that it does not specifically characterize the nature of those propositions, which must serve as the explanations of the propositions expressive of the necessary facts, as *per se* or analytically necessary ones. Let us now call this revised "Aristotelian" formulation of PSR1, PSR1'.

The weak form of the PSR (PSR2) is quite complex in that it claims that the of *that which comes into existence* must have an explanation. As so stated, of course, it again seems concerned with the making of a quite specific claim in that it focuses on "exists " as it would be predicated of beings which at one time did not exist, and then later come into existence. Indeed, PSR2 does not seem universal enough to cover both eternal existents and existents which come to be. It has thus been regarded as not operative in cosmological arguments. But arguing for its truth as so expressed does create some problems for PSR1'. For what it does is stress the accidental character of existence so that all existential statements about non-divine objects seem to become synthetic and not-necessary. We would prefer to see a discussion of principles prescind from which predicates are necessary (if any) and which not. This is why we think that PSR2 must be revised to merely contending that there must be an explanation for every contingent fact, that is, for facts expressed by non-necessary propositions. This "Aristotelian" revision, we shall call PSR2'. As differentiated from PSR1', PSR2' does not talk of the *per se* necessity of the explanation. Whereas PSR1' expresses what belongs to the common notion of unqualified science, PSR2' expresses the common notion of reasonable opinion.

a) What is the meaning of the claim that PSR1 is not logically true? If it means that PSR1 or PSRi' does not have a tautological counterpart in the elementary propositional calculus as does the PNC [(p) ,__, (p. '-' p)] and the Law of Excluded Middle [(p) (p v ,__, p)], this is certainly true. Perhaps this is due to the propositional calculus largely being an explication of the negation operator, which can define both disjunction and conjunction,[27] while PSRi' (though perhaps not PSR1) develops the logic of an independent operator, which acknowledges by its operating on necessarily true synthetic propositions the existence of a place in logical space occupied by necessarily true propositions with new senses (which are not opposite senses).

Let us begin by working briefly with Rowe's PSR1 and PSR2 (and in the process see how PSR1' and PSR/ are transformations of them) in order to come to grips with his contention that while being caused is analytically contained in the notion of effect, neither existence nor event include being explainable or being caused in their respective definitions. First of all, it can be noted that neither the notion of the negation of a proposition nor the notion that such a negation must be opposite in sense and truth value to the negated is contained in the definition of any proposition. Secondly, with regard to the mere notion of existence, *if* it makes sense to ask, " Why does x exist?," it would certainly be strange to give as a reply to this question " x exists because x is caused," " x exists because x is explainable." A distinction must be made between what is offered as a cause or an explanation of a particular property of a subject and the contention that every particular property must have a cause or explanation. Although traditionally the definition of x was usually given and had to be given as the explanation of a necessary fact about x, this did not mean that " being definable " was the explanation of any necessary property belonging to x. Thus our contention in PSRi' arises: that the operator " why " over a necessary fact generates a definitional proposition, or at least some kind of *per se* proposition, as a necessary type of answer to the question posed. Thirdly, although a particular contingent event such as a leaf falling does not contain the notion of something causing that event, nevertheless, given the operation of " why " on the true contingent proposition expressing that event, PSR/ insists there must be another true proposition, which need not be a definitional proposition or any *per se* one, which accounts for that event. Although the event itself does not contain the notion of being caused, the operation of ' why ' on the proposition expressive of the event generates the necessity of a causal explanation of it.

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[27] See Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 86 ff.

These considerations lead to an awareness of the similarities and differences in the operation of negation in the PNC, and the operation of the interrogative ' why ' in PSRi' and PSR/. We have seen that neither the PNC nor PSR' is part of the meaning of a proposition, though each applies only to propositions: the PNC to all propositions whose truth value is known, PSRi' to known necessarily true propositions, PSR2' to known contingently true propositions. While the PNC determines quite definitively both the truth-value and sense of a contradictory opposite, PSR1' only specifies that the proposition (s) explanatory of a necessarily true one be true as well as analytically necessary, so that the operator 'why' cannot be appropriately applied to it (them). PSRi' also specifies that the necessary proposition (s) offered as explanation (s) be such that no more adequate explanation (s) can be offered. To generalize: unlike the application of the PNC, the application of PSR' only provides a matrix for another proposition to arise; the other proposition itself is not automatically generated.

b) As we move on to discuss another argument countering the necessity of the PSR, we must stress that we have now isolated at least four aspects of its necessity. First of all, we have seen that it is necessary insofar as a denial of what we later called PSRt' leads to a denial of PNC; secondly, that PSRi' is applied to synthetically necessary propositions; thirdly, it is necessary according to both PSRt' ;and PSR/ that there be other propositions serving as explanations to satisfy the ' why ' operating on the events expressed by a synthetic proposition; and fourthly, with regard to the application of PSRi' only a *per se* (analytic) necessary proposition can serve as an explanation of the fact which cannot be other than it is. It seems to be the third type of necessity which is disputed by the Humean claim of our capacity to imagine things existing or of coming into existence without having to conceive of the things as having a cause or explanation. But, though it is possible that for any beginning or modification of existence, E, and any particular cause, C, E can be conceived to happen without C, this does not imply the possibility of imagining a coming into existence without any cause.[28] As Anscombe suggests, what Hume often seemD'"to do during the course of his conceptual exercises is to mistakenly conflate two questions which he does in fact explicitly distinguish, namely, "Why a beginning of existence must necessarily always have a cause?" and "Why such particular causes must always have such effects? " From the supposed truth of his great principle, "That there is nothing in any object, considered in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it," and from its implication that causes need not even give rise to effects, not to say definite effects, he infers that there is no necessary connection between causes and effects. But does this affect the viability of the principle which states the necessity of the things which exist or have come into existence having causes or explanations? Neither PSR1 nor PSR2 (nor PSRt' nor PSR2^{1}) states that a cause *must* always produce a definite effect or have an effect at all or even that the relation-

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••See G. E. M. Anscombe, "'Whatever Has a Beginning of Existence Must Have a Cause': Hume's Argument Exposed," *Analysis*, 34 (1974), p. 149.

ship between a cause and an effect is a necessary one, but rather contends that *given* the fact there *must* be a cause. Of course, it is the particular inquiry itself which must specify the cause, as it also determines the fact being investigated.

When the criticism moves on to the assertion of an incompatibility between the PSR and the possibility of uncaused and unoriginated events, the necessity of once again clarifying the range of application of the principle arises. Much hinges on the meaning of "event." If "event" means "effect," then there would be an incompatibility; but it would be rather contrived, for it would depend on events being all that is the case. Certainly the PSR would not be insisting that facts to be explained are all that is. If it were, its general formulation would be tantamount to the unacceptable, "Every being has a cause."[29] With regard to Rowe's formulation of PSR2, we see an application only to beings which come into existence, and thus no assertion that these beings constitute all reality. A similar point can be made with PSR/ in its claim that all contingent events must have a cause or explanation. When the focus is shifted to the strong form of the PSR, care must be taken about its claims. If it is understood to claim that everything that is or can be must have a cause of its existence either in itself or in something else such that God as *causa sui* is considered part of the domain of applicability, then there is no possibility for the recognition of uncaused existence. If, however, PSR1 is understood to claim that every necessarily true synthetic proposition is explained by at least one other necessarily true proposition (that is, PSR1') these self-explanatory propositions need not be understood to explain themselves in the sense of expressing self-causation, but rather can be understood to *revieal* an identity of subject and predicate which explains the necessary inherence of the predicate of the necessary synthetic proposition in its subject. These self-explanatory propositions open up the possibility

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•• See Clarke, *art. cit.*, pp. 189 ff.

of the expression of what might be called uncaused or unoriginated events. Detailed investigation of this would involve, however, examination of those theological criticisms which see the PSR in conflict with the notion of a free Creator, a task pursued in section IV.

4. As we turn to the claim that the PSR is a metaphysical assumption necessary in order for one to make sense of the world, let us examine the seemingly innocent assertion that this is a more modesrt view than the claim that the PSR is a necessary truth. Another author pictures this position as a weaker one, one that is or might be retreated to by defenders of the PSR after their other arguments in behalf of its necessary truth have failed.[30] The modesty here apparently is that as an assumption the PSR is recognized as an *hypothesis* we make in order to come to the grips with a world which, after all, might be unintelligible. But, if it is an hypothesis, it seems that it would still be susceptible of being regarded as true or false! Our efforts in section I have shown that this conception of the PSR is a mistaken one. Far from being the assumption of the basic compatibility of thought and reality, the PSR articulates rules for the relationship of truths to one another. It assumes truth, and works on it and on the relationship of truths expressing facts to one another, rather than it itself being the presupposition for truth. As we have shown, the PSR cannot be true or false, and thus is not an hypothesis. Moreover, if the denial of the PSR does lead to a denial of the PNC, it emerges ·as a basic rule precisely because it is not capable of direct demonstration, so that calling it a presupposition of our thought about reality is the *least modest* of all phrases. It is interesting to note that those who claim the modesty of the position that the PSR is a presupposition of scientific investigation seem to do so either with a forlornness that a direct demonstration has not been given of it or in the context of the possibility of finding a

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[30] Bruce R. Reichenbach, *The Cosmological,Argument: A Reassessment* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1972), pp. 67-70.

fallacy in what is proferred as a direct demonstration of it. We thus find it plausible to suggest that what are called attempts to directly demonstrate the PSR be recognized either as conflations of demonstrations of the principle with direct proofs that ithe principle is basic or necessary (direct proofs which would, of course, preclude the possibility of a direct demonstration of the principle) or else as attempts at demonstrating something quite different. As an example of the former we might take the claim that " the principle of sufficient reason is a necessary principle " can be considered *both* as the conclusion of an argument which shows it as a basic presupposition of thought and reality, *and* as the conclusion of a direct deductive argument purporting to prove the PSR itself.[31] The latter might be illustrated by the suggestion[82] that Thomas Aquinas offered a direct proof of the principle of causality in the following passage of *On Being and Essence:*

> Now, whatever belongs to a being is either caused by the principles of its nature, as the capability of laughter in man, or it comes to it from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the sun's influence. But it is impossible that the act of existing be caused by a thing's form or its quiddity, (I say *caused* as by an efficient cause); for then something would be the cause of itself and would bring itself into existence-which is impossible. Everything, then, which is such that its act of existing is other than its nature must needs have its act of existing from something else.[33]

But what is Aquinas arguing here? We take it that he has already established by his man and phoenix argument that essence and existence are distinct, that is, that existence is other than essence, though essence is the formal cause (sometimes the material-formal cause) of the existence of any being for

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[81] *Ibid.,* p. 70.

••Originally offered by Joseph Owens, " The Causal Proposition-Principle or Conclusion," *The Modern Schoolman,* 32 (1954-1955), pp. 255-270, 323-339, and adapted by Reichenbach, *op. cit.,* pp. 60-64.

[81] Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essence,* trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949), ch. iv, p. 47.

which an explanation is being sought. In this sense, essence is a necessary condition for existence. But is it sufficient? This is the problem Aquinas is trying to solve in the present argument. PSRi' tells him that the answer to a why question concerning a necessary fact is likely stated in another proposition with the same subject as the proposition describing the fact to be explained. If this is not sufficient, it is necessary to discover another necessary proposition with a different subject. So PSR/: every necessary fact must have its total explanation in a necessary proposition with either the same subject or with a different subject. If it is possible that the necessary fact of the existence of any being is accounted for by the essence of the being as risibility is accounted for by rational animality, then the total explanation is found within the thing (by a proposition with the same subject), and it can be said that this particular scientific inquiry has come to a close (the game has been won), as the principle has been satisfied. But, Aquinas argues, form or essence cannot account for the existence of a thing in the manner of an efficient cause as does the formal cause of risibility.[34] Thus, the efficient cause of existence must be in something extrinsic. If our interpretation is correct, then Aquinas is not arguing for the principle of causality but rather is using PSR/ to determine what has been thus far established in his inquiry, and to point up the need to continue the inquiry by his concluding " causal proposition" that existence is caused by something other. Principles are used to test whether we know that we know (to determine if the game has been won), and the use of PSRi' *at this particular moment* is such that the limited nature of the results so far achieved is revealed (the game must go on!) . And Aquinas does go on, as he *argues, through* that aspect of PSRi' which states in effect that *per accidens* necessity must be explained by *per se* necessity, to that specific extrinsic cause which results in the complete satisfaction of PSRi'.

"Cf. John C. Cahalan, "On the Proving of Causal Propositions," *The Modem Schoolman,* 44 (1966-67), pp. 140-41.

We might now be in a position to discuss the issues surrounding the assumptions a scientist makes in his work. In this context our transformations of Rowe's formulation of PSR1 and PSR2 become significant. Rowe argues that perhaps we as scientists do operate under the device that *whatever happens* has a cause (PSR2), though it is doubtful that we as scientists assume that *whatever exists* has a sufficient explanation. What we have done, however, is stress the emphasized phrases as operating over facts (or their propositional expression) rather than over things (or their referring names). *Whatever happens* serves to indicate any contingent fact (one expressed by a true contingent proposition whose contradictory and contrary opposites are possible states of affairs). Indeed, most of our ordinary inquiry is an investigation of happenings and events of this sort, and in this sense PSR2 as PSR/ can be recognized as the framework of much of our questioning. We do operate under the belief that contingent facts so described must have an explanation, and that we can come up with reasonable opinions as explanations of them. Our approach to PSR1 has been to transform it so that *whatever exists* designates whatever facts must be what they are, that is, facts the propositional expressions of whose opposites would be regarded as impossible. If we assume (and admittedly there are difficulties in this assumption) that for an unempty x, "some x exists" expresses a necessary fact, an inquiry into such a fact would be conducted under PSRi', which is what we consider common opinion considers the operating principle for the *strictest* scientific inquiry. We thus begin to see the irrelevancy of the objection concerning the eternal existence of stars to PSRi'. PSRi' is not concerned with the duration of the objects referred to by the subjects of the propositions it operates upon, but rather with the sufficient grounds for the relation between the referring subjects. and that predicated necessarily of such subjects. Insofar as one believes that " why " is operating on a meaningfully true necessary synthetic proposition, he must recognize, under pain of violating. PNC, that there is a sufficient answer to that question.

III.

Having considered "Humean " objections to the PSR, let us examine aspects of what might be called a theological objection. Roughly expressed this type of objection contends either that there is an incompatibility between the PSR and the notion of God as a free creator or that the PSR reveals a certain incompleteness in its employment when it attempts to cope with the possibility of a free divine creation. The basic intuition here appears to be the traditional voluntarist one that the complete intelligibility demanded by the PSR implies a determinism. Since the arguments advanced by both Ross and Rowe are quite complex in structure, we shall not present them, but rather isolate three of what we consider their basic claims.

1. The PSR can be stated as, " For whatever is so, and for whatever is not so, there must be a sufficient reason or explanation,"[35] or as "Every actual state of affairs has a reason either within itself or in some other state of affairs," with the implication that for any positive contingent state of affairs there must be a reason why there are such states of affairs rather than not.[36] (Let us call these quite strong formulations, PSR3.)[31]

It is impossible that there be a sufficient reason for every contingent state of affairs, since however well the being of the universe is explained, " there must always remain in principle, and in need of explanation, at least one thing: God's having chosen to create the world."[88] To give a sufficient reason as to why God created this world rather than another " leads to the consequence that He *could* not have created any other-that this is the only possible world,"[89] a position tantamount to a Spinozistic determinism.

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[85] James F. Ross, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 89, *51.* Hereafter: Ross, *IPR.*

••Rowe, " The Cosmological Argument," pp. *57-58.*

n See above, n. 10. It should be noted, however, that Rowe might not recognize a distinction between PSR, and PSRs. See William L. Rowe, " Two Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument," *The Monist,* 54 (1970), pp.

••Ross, *IPR,* p. 70.

•• *Ibid.,* pp. *65-66.*

8. When Aquinas says that God communicates His Goodness (even freely) to other things *as far as possible,* it is possible to say that this does not imply that what is created is the only world that could have been created (the one which contains the best possible expression of the divine goodness), but merely means that x, something God created, " inasmuch as it has being, is a likeness of God, and that God could not have made it more like Him, given that x is the sort of thing it is."[40] But, replies Ross, this seems to make the statement " God communicates His likeness as far as possible " a trivial thing to assert and exposes the fact that Aquinas's theory can offer no reason for God's creating the world He did create. Even though Aquinas's contention that God creates because He is Good (where His Goodness is not asserted to be *His* reason, but our reason for what *He* did) absolves Aquinas from the charge of having assigned an *insufficient* reason for God's doing what he did, it results in the conclusion that Aquinas did not assign any reason whatever for the divine creation. (This might be called the incompleteness of Aquinas's theory.)

IV.

1. The difference between PSR1' and PSRa must be recognized and maintained. PSRa is much stronger in that it contains "... and is not so " or "... rather than not " as part of its formulation, and in that it seems to embrace all states of affairs, not just necessary ones as does PSRi' or contingent ones as does PSRz'. Whereas PSR1' would tend to recognize the structural legitimacy of such inquiries as " Why does any thing exist? " or " Why are things in motion moved by others?," PSRs would see these better framed as " Why is there anything at all rather than nothing?" or "Why are things in motion moved by others rather than otherwise? "

One approach to the rejection of PSRa, compatible with the accepting of PSRi' and PSR/ ias basic principles, is suggested by a remark of Richard Taylor: " If one were to look upon a barren plain and ask why there is not and never has been any large translucent ball there, the natural response would be to ask why there should be; but if one finds such a ball, and wonders why it is there, it is not quite so natural to ask why it should *not* be, as though existence should simply be taken for granted."[41] Basic wonder seems to be about states of affairs expressed by affirmative propositions regarded by the inquirer as true. But Ross's use of PSRa sees it as applicable when the mere possibility of the truth of a proposition is granted. Thus, arguments he considers employ the disjunction " Either God exists or God does not exist,"[42] and proceed on the hypothetical assignment of a truth value to one of the disjuncts. PSRa also seems to be oriented in its formulation to a sufficient explanation of why one set of compossible " truths " has become a set of propositions rather than another set of compossible " truths." It seems odd to us to suggest that common opinion would regard this type of sufficiency as that sought for in perfect knowing.

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[40] Ross, *Philosophical Theology,* p. n. 16.

Perhaps, however, we can suggest why one might think that the very strong PSRa, with its deterministic implications, must be operative in cosmological arguments. We have regarded PSRi' ,as expressing Aristotle's notion of what is regarded as unqualified scientific knowledge, and it might be thought that this entails that PSRi' is only fully realized when a deduction is made of the necessary fact from the sufficient explanation. Has the philosophical tradition not regarded this *propter quid* demonstration as the ultimate realization of Aristotle's definition of scientific knowing? In it the *necessary* connection between cause and effect is so perfectly expressed that given the cause the effect must arise, with the deterministic consequence that the rationale for this effect *rather than* its opposite is revealed. Thus an identity seems to arise between PSR1' and

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[u] Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics,* second edition (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 104.

[0] See Ross, *op. cit.,* pp. 303-304, and Ross, *IPR,* pp. 39-40.

PSRa insofar as both are expressions of *propter quid* certainty, with the resultant incompatibility between either PSRi' or PSRs and the notion of a free divine creation. But, if it is recalled how PSR1' operates, its difference from PSRa can be recognized once again. Aristotelian scientific inquiry begins with a search for the explanation of necessary facts. It is true that in a Euclidean geometric system one explains the recognized necessary truths by axiomatic definitions which reveal themselves as sufficient by the deduction of the considered necessary fact as a theorem. However, the course of inquiry is such that one can still claim unqualified knowledge without the deduction by showing that what must be regarded as the complete conjunction of the necessary conditions for the necessary fact *cannot* result in the deduction of the necessary fact. This is, for example, what we take Aquinas as attempting in the argument quoted above with regard to essence (it *cannot* generate existence though it is a necessary *per se* condition for existence), and subsequently in *On Being and Essence* with regard to the being called God who has emerged as the necessary *per se* extrinsic cause of existence (God is not in a genus and is thus *incapable* of definition).[43] In this case the employment and satisfaction of PSRt' precludes the applicability of PSRa, with the important consequence that the relationship of cause (s) to effect *cannot* be a necessary one. Moreover, since what is now achieved is as much exactitude as the logic of the inquiry about a specific necessary fact permits, what has been attained can appropriately be called unqualifiedly scientific. Even through PSRa is stronger than PSRt', the latter alone expresses the essentials of the traditional notion of perfect scientific knowing.

2. Agreeing that PSRa is incompatible with a free creation, and having argued that Aquinas's cosmological argument in *On Being and Essence,* which works through PSRt', precludes the functioning of PSRa in this context and thus necessitates

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[43] Aquinas, *On Being and Essence,* ch. v, p. 50; ch. vi, p. 59.

a non-necessitarian relationship between God and his effects (as well as between the essence and existence of non-divine existents), we see that for Aquinas the rule of PSRi' dictates an end to the particular game of inquiry in which he has been engaged, for the game has been won. One of the fruits of victory is that a new *logos* cannot be pursued under rule PSRa. One cannot ask for a sufficient reason as to why God created rather than did not create, or why he created this world rather than another. PSRi' forbids it! The divine freedom in creation necessarily emerges as something not to be explained. It *cannot* be approached under the rules and methods of science. To wonder now at the existence of the world in the form of a scientifically posed question is nonsense.[44] PSR1' would likely result in Aquinas's agreement that the same could be said about the effort to explain creation that " Vigilius Haufniensis " said about an attempt to explain the entrance of sin into the world: " a stupidity which could only occur to people who are comically anxious to get an explanation."[45] If PSRi' is successfully applied to the question of the existence of things, the ultimate realization is that the satiation of its gnostic proclivities in this domain results in the problems of life not only remaining completely untouched, but also in being untouchable by philosophical-scientific inquiry. "Science cannot explain such things."[46] With the game of scientific philosophy being over and done with, the question is not one as to why God created rather than not, but rather the problem of the nature of the existing relationship between free existents, between God and man, between man and his own existence. The possibility of an existential communication spoken freely by God to a being conscious of a free relationship to his own existence thus arises. " But what is the self? The self is a relation which consciously relates itself to its own self . . . and in freely relating itself to its own self relates itself freely to another which transparently grounds it." [47]

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[44] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, " Lecture on Ethics," *Philosophical Review,* 74 (1965), pp. 8-10, 12-13. Reprinted in *Philosophy Today No. 1,* ed. Jerry H. Gill (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 3-19.

[45] Soren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread,* second edition, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 45. Aquinas would not likely agree with the tone of the remark.

[46] *Loc. cit.* See also Karl Rahner, *Hearers of the Word,* trans. Michael Richards (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 24.

3. **It** so emerges that Aquinas offers no reason and cannot offer any reason for God's creating or not creating, for creating this world rather than any other. This is dictated by PSR1' itself! Far from being a revelation of the incompleteness of Aquinas's position *vis a vis* the PSR, his "theory" of creation seems to be framed with a recognition of the fullest possible realization of the principle which as its last act acknowledges its own limitations. For one who has progressed this far in the inquiry all that can be done now is to evoke reminders of what has been discovered and achieved (God is Goodness, perhaps), so that one who is pondering the nature of the relationship between God and His" creation" (and himself, perhaps) will not be tempted to treat it scientifically or philosophically, that is, turn a recognized freedom into an objectivity capable of demonstrative certitude. At this stage of inquiry, it seems, the task of an Aristotelian philosopher becomes Socratic in the sense of trying to offer reminders of what one already knows and of pointing out the pretension involved in claiming any sort of ultimate wisdom for what one so knows. Indeed, a propensity has been educed for listening to men and women who understand the subject of things divine, to those who tell the truth, but know nothing of what they say, for ultimate wisdom and virtue is surely not a matter of scientific knowledge.[48] An unscientific postscript is thus perhaps the concluding activity of philosophy.

The impossibility of a philosophical answer to the " question " of creation, which emerges with the awareness of the

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••Adapted from "Anti-Climacus " in Soren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death,* in *Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death,* trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1954), pp. 146-47,

••Plato, *ltleno,* Sla-b, 99b-d.

limits of scientific discourse, points up a recognition of what might be called " the mystery of existence." It might be helpful to differentiate what we consider to be implicit in the manner of Aquinas's recognition of this from the attitudes of Wittgenstein and Munitz. When Wittgenstein speaks of the nonsense involved in wondering at the existence of the world, he does so in terms of an *experience* which he likens to what people refer to when they talk about God having created the world, and says that this " astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question and there is no answer to it. Anything we can say must, a priori, be only nonsense."[49] The world cannot be imagined as not existing, a condition which would be necessary to render the question of creation a meaningful one for Wittgenstein. Milton K. Munitz's insistence that the mystery of existence lies in the unanswerability (because of the lack of an available appropriate methodology) of the question," Is there a reason-for-the-existence-of-the-world?"[50] seems to espouse an agnosticism equivalent to that of Aquinas. Aquinas's position, however, would seem to differ from that of the early Wittgenstein not only in its lack of an *experiential* basis for astonishment of *this sort* (this might come later), but also in its recognition that the logic of previous inquiry leaves open the possibility for other types of intelligible discourse. There need not be silence. Thomas's position would seem to differ from Munitz's in that in having accepted PSRi' (which Munitz would reject), and having applied it to the necessary fact of the existence of things (in *On Being and Essence,* we assume), Aquinas would claim that a question tantamount to " Is there a-reason-for-the-existence-of-the-world?" is already answered by a successfully completed philosophical inquiry. Insofar as the question at issue would be posed *anew* in the context of a full satisfaction of PSR/ (with its concomitant exclusion of PSRa), then, and only then is talk of a relative scientific agnosticism permissible. Aquinas, however, seems to have been much more sanguine than Munitz as to the possible and actual discovery of a new *logos* and methodology necessary to respond to the problem with the requisite exactitude.

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[49] Wittgenstein, "Lecture on Ethics," pp. 10, 12-13.

[50] Milton K. Munitz, *The Mystery of Existence* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), pp. 259 ff.

V.

Different versions of the PSR have been delineated, as well as has the radical difference between the cosmological arguments to which the versions are applied. If the "Aristotelian" PSRi' is not subject to the criticisms of Ross and Rowe, it nevertheless is evident that its application depends upon the existence of true synthetically necessary propositions. Indeed, our classification of Aquinas's cosmological argument in *On Being and Essence* as a demonstration working through PSR1' hinges on regarding it as implicitly using " exists " not only as a real synthetic predicate but also as a necessary one. Needless to say, much contemporary thought would find such a position untenable. Thus, since PSRi' depends on the notion of necessary facts, its applicability can be denied by denying the reality of such types of facts. Only if necessary facts are recognized can the propositions which express them be regarded as necessarily explained by *per se* necessary propositions. It may emerge that a reputed necessary synthetic proposition is actually analytic or contingent, but one which is as it is reputed cannot be what it is without being so grounded. (This does not imply that it can be deduced from its explanations.) With regard to PSR/, its claim amounts to a rejection of the notion of an independently existing contingent state of affairs which bears no relation to another. Though" [there] is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened,"[51] if something has happened, it must at least be due to one other state of affairs. Thus, PSR2' disputes the Wittgensteinian claim that the only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

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[51] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 6.37.

Insofar as PSRi' has emerged as a principle both of discovery and assessment, the demonstrations it encourages are not attempts to argue for a particular conclusion (e.g., "God exists "), but rather are attempts to satiate a quest for explanatory certitude with regard to a necessary state of affairs. If there is a cosmological argument which demonstrates the existence of God in the framework of PSRi', it was not necessarily devised for this purpose. It thus emerges how misleading it can be to say that all cosmological arguments are arguments for the existence of God.

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A NOTE: AQUINAS'S USE OF *PHANTASIA*

IN HIS WELL received *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy,* Professor Julius Weinberg wrote as follows concerning the faculties of sensation in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas:

> The sensitive (powers) include the functions of the five exterior senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) as well as the functions of the interior senses of the common sense, the phantasy, the imagination, the estimative (or cogitative) capacity, and memory.[1]

In defending this account about the number of sense faculties found in Aquinas's epistemology, Weinberg refers the reader to Book Four, Chapter *58,* of the *Summa Contra Gentiles.*[2]

Given this passage, Weinberg leads his readers to believe that, in Aquinas's epistemology, there are five faculties of the

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[1] Julius Weinberg, *A Short History of Medieval,Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 201.

[2] I suspect that Weinberg's reference here is either a misprint or a mistake. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Chapter 58 of Book IV is a discussion entitled " On the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law," which contains no reference at all to the faculties of the internal senses let alone affirming that the *phantasia* is a distinct faculty of internal sense. It is Book II of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* which contains much discussion of epistemological issues together with explicit reference to the faculties of the internal senses. Yet Chapter 58 of Book II cannot justify Weinberg's analysis either. It is a discussion entitled "That in Human Beings there are not Three Souls: Nutritive, Sensitive, and Intellective." Although there is some discussion of epistemological questions in this chapter, nevertheless there is no explicit reference to any faculties of internal sense. Furthermore, in my reading of the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* I have never found a reference to the *phantasia as* a distinct faculty of the internal senses distinct from the imagination. Furthermore, when referring to the imagination in the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Aquinas usually makes use of the Latin terms, " *vis imaginativa* " or *"imaginatio* " rather than " *phantasia."*

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internal senses. The above passage asserts that the" phantasy," what Aquinas and other medieval philosophers refer to as the " *phantasia,"* is an independent and separate faculty of the internal senses. According to this interpretation, in addition to the common sense,[3] or *sensus oommunis,* there are four additional faculties of internal sense: the phantasy, the imagination, the estimative (or cogitative) faculty and the memory. In Weinberg's account, the *phantasia* is not the same faculty of inner sense as the imagination.

In this article, I intend to show that Aquinas never held that the *phantasia* was a faculty of the internal senses distinct and separate from the other faculties mentioned in Weinberg's account. I suggest that Aquinas referred to the *phantasia,* either as another term for the imagination, or as a generic concept referring to those faculties of inner sense which were capable of utilizing phantasms. The former position is explicitly mentioned in the *Summa Theologiae* while the latter interpretation can be found in Aquinas's *Commentary on Aristotle's on the Soul (In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium)* . When used in the generic sense, the *phantasia* refers to the imagination, the estimative faculty (or the cogitative faculty in humans) and the sense memory. These three faculties of the internal senses are those to which Aquinas ascribes the use of phantasms. It follows from this that the common sense as a faculty of awareness does not utilize phantasms.

In the classical account from the *Summa Theologiae* in which he discusses his epistemological position on sense perception,

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[8] In discussing medieval epistemologies, it is important to realize that the " common sense " or *sensus communis* is indeed a faculty of sensation. It has no connection with what later philosophers like Thomas Reid in the Eighteenth Century and G. E. Moore in the early Twentieth Century have referred to as "Common Sense Philosophy." Furthermore, the common sense as a sense faculty has nothing to do with the " common sense intuitions " which some philosophers have predicated of all human beings. In Aquinas's epistemology, the common sense is that internal sense faculty which conjoins together the disparate sensations received from the faculties of the five external senses.

Aquinas identifies the *phantasia* with the imagination. Note the following passage:

> But for the retention and preservation of these forms (i.e., those acquired through the external senses and conjoined by means of the *sensus communis),* the phantasy or imagination, *which are the same,* is appointed . . . .
>
> I., Q. 78, a. 4 (Italics mine).

The Latin text of the above passage explicitly refers to the *phantasia* as the internal sense identical with the imagination:

> . . . ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, *quae idem sunt*. . . .
>
> *Ibid.* (Italics mine).

In this text from the *Summa Theologiae,* Aquinas clearly affirms that the *phantasia* is identical with the imagination. It is not a distinct and separate faculty of inner sense. In the remaining parts of this article in the *Summa Theologiae,* Aquinas discusses the other faculties of inner sense which require phantasms, namely the estimative faculty (or the cogitative faculty in humans), and the sense memory.

> Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the *estimative* power is appointed; and for their preservation, the *memorative* power, which is a storehouse of such intentions. A sign of this is the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very character of something as past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.
>
> Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between humans and other animals. For they are similarly immuted by external sensibles. But there is a difference as to the above intentions. For other animals perceive these intentions only by some sort of natural instinct, while humans perceive them also by means of a certain comparison. Therefore, the power which in other animals is called the natural *estimative,* in humans is called the *cogitative,* which by some sort of comparison discovers these intentions . . . .
>
> Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imagi-

> native a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms; for instance, when from the imaginary form of gold and the imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than humans, in whom the imaginative power suffices for this purpose. Averroes also attributes this action to the imagination, in his book, *De Sensu et Sensibilibus.* So *there is no need to assign more than four interior powers to the sensitive part,* namely, the common sense, the imagination, the estimative (or cogitative) power and the memory.
>
> *Ibid.* (Italics mine) .

In these passages, three points relevant to Weinberg's interpretation of Aquinas should be noted.

I) There is categorically no assertion that the *phantasia* is a faculty distinct from the imagination.

2) The *phantasia* is explicitly identified with the imagination.

3) There is a clear statement that there are only *four* internal sense faculties.

As Aquinas notes in the above passages from the *Summa Theologiae*, Avicenna did assert the existence of the *phantasia* as a distinct and separate faculty. Furthermore, Aquinas rejects the need for a fifth faculty of internal sense. In addition, Aquinas's mentor, Albertus Magnus, at times asserted the existence of five faculties of internal sense, one of which was the *phantasia.* According to the account ascribed to him in the *Libri Tres De Anima,*[4] Albertus lists five faculties of the internal senses: the common sense, the imagination, the estimative faculty, the memory, and the *phantasia.* In his *Summa De Homine,*[5] however, Albertus places the common sense with the

[4] *Libri Tres De Anima,* in *Omnia Opera,* ed. Borgnet, lib. 2, tract. 4, c. 7, Vol. V., pp. 802-804, as found in *The Discursive Power* by George Klubertanz, S. J. (St. Louis: *The Modern Schoolman,* 1952), pp. 185-188. Klubertanz's work is an exceptionally lucid analysis of the internal senses as discussed by Jewish, Arabian and Christian philosophers prior to Aquinas.

[5] *Summa De Homine,* (Part 2), title of question 18, Vol. XXXV, p. 164; p. 828, as found in Klubertanz, *op. cit.,* pp. 189-142.

external senses. He then lists four faculties of internal sense: imagination, estimative, memory and *phantasia*. Accordingly, there is textual evidence that Aquinas's teacher did indeed affirm the existence of the *phantasia* as an independent and distinct faculty of the internal senses separate from the imagination.[6] It is interesting to note that Albertus assigns to the *phantasia* the ability to " combine and divide " images and intentions.[7] The above passage from the *Summa Theologiae* indicated that Aquinas attributed to Avicenna the postulation of an additional internal sense faculty to " combine and divide " images. This is what Wolfson has referred to as the " compositive imagination."[8] As the passage from the *Summa Theologiae* indicated, however, Aquinas explicitly rejected this position. Aquinas ascribed to the imagination both the " retentive " and the " compositive " functions which Avicenna and Albertus had attributed to distinct faculties.[9] Aquinas explicitly argued that there is no need for a separate faculty distinct from the imagination to provide this function of " combination and division." To use Wolfson's categories, Aquinas combined the " compositive " and the " retentive " imaginations into one faculty of internal sense. Therefore, even though some of Aquinas's predecessors indeed had affirmed that the *phantasia* is a separate and distinct faculty of the internal senses, an interpretation which Weinberg attributed to Aquinas, nevertheless in the *Summa Theologiae* there is textual evidence that Aquinas explicitly denied this position.

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[6] For a discussion of at least four different ways Albertus classified the internal sense faculties, cf. Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *Harvard Theological Review,* XXVIII, #':t (April, 1935), pp. 116118. Wolfson's article is a classical historical analysis of the development of the various positions medieval philosophers affirmed in discussing the function of the internal senses.

[7] *Libri Tres De Anima, op. cit.,* p. 303, as found in Klubertanz, pp. 136-137; also cf. Wolfson, p. 117.

[8] Wolfson, pp. 116-117.

[9] Although both Avicenna and Albertus postulated the *phantasia* as a faculty of inner sense distinct from the imagination, both assigned different functions to it. In many texts, Albertus assigned to the *phantasia* the power to "combine and divide" images-what Wolfson refers to as the "compositive imagination"-while Avicenna assigned this compositive function to the imagination. What Wolfson refers to as the "retentive imagination," Avicenna calls the *phantasia* while Albertus refers this " retentive" function to the imagination. As we have seen, Aquinas combined both functions with one faculty, which in the *Summa Theologiae* he called both the *imaginatio* and the *phantasia:* ". . . *phantasia sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt."* Wolfson also notes that in one work, the *Isagoge In Libros De Anima,* Albertus identified the *phantasia* with the *sensus communis.* In his *De Anima,* Avicenna asserted the same identification. Thus, there are texts in which both Avicenna and Albertus identify the *phantasia* with the *sensus communis.* The relationship between the *sensus communis* and the *phantasia* in Aquinas's epistemology will be discussed later in this article.

In his *Commentary on Aristotle's on the Soul,* however, Aquinas sometimes appears to use the *phantasia* as a generic concept referring to those internal sense faculties which utilize phantasms. Insofar as a phantasm is not needed by the *sensus communis,* this faculty is not part of the *phantasia.* I suspect that this generic use of the term *phantasia* is due to the fact that, while in his *De Anima,* Aristotle mentioned the imagination, nevertheless he had no general term to refer to those faculties which came to be known by the medieval philosophers as the internal senses. The Jewish, Arabian, and Latin philosophers of the middle ages postulated additional faculties in order to account for the various functions of the internal senses as distinct from the five external senses. I suggest that in the *Commentary on Aristotle's on the Soul,* Aquinas used *phantasia* at times as a generic concept to refer to those functions of the internal senses about which Aristotle had no term of reference. In his *Commentary on Aristotle's on the Soul,* Aquinas remarked that ". . . it is by the *phantasia* that we become conscious of phantasms." [10] He argues elsewhere that ". . . the powers in which the phantasms reside ... (are) ... the imagination, the memory and the cogitative faculty." [11] It is true that in the *Commentary* at times Aquinas uses the *phantasia* as another term for the imagination. Yet I have found no use of the term *phantasia* referring to a faculty of inner sense distinct from the imagination. In other words, *phantasia* is used either as a concept coextensive with the imagination or as a generic term referring to those faculties of inner sense which utilize phantasms. The *phantasia* is not used by Aquinas as a term referring to a distinct faculty of inner .sense separate from the ·others.

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[10] *In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium,* # 638.

[11] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Book II, Chapter 73, # 14.

Insofar as the *phantasia* is a generic term referring to the faculties of inner sense which utilize phantasms, it is appropriate to make a distinction between a) the external senses and the internal senses, and b) the external sensorium and the internal sensorium. The basis for the external / internal sense distinction is the physiological locus of the sense faculty. The faculties of the external senses are found with bodily organs while the internal senses are located within the brain and function without bodily organs external to the brain. According to Wolfson, among the Arabian commentators on Aristotle, the is.sue of the localization of the internal senses within parts of the brain caused disputes between the physicians and the philosophers.12 On the other hand, the external/ internal sensorium distinction is based upon whether or not the sense faculty in question needs a phantasm. As we have seen, according to Aquinas only the internal senses of imagination, estimative or cogitative faculty, and sense memory require phantasms. The *sensus communis,* although an internal sense faculty, is part of the external sensorium. It functions without a phantasm. Accordingly, the two categories of" sense" and" sensorium" are neither equivalent nor coextensive. In the *Commentary on Aristotle's on the Soul,* the *phantasia* when used as a generic concept describes only the internal senses which need phantasms. Therefore, the *phantasia* as a generic concept is equivalent to the internal sensorium or inner sense.

Aquinas affirms that the *sensus communis* is not part of the *phantasia* insofar as the *phantasia* is used as a generic concept. However, the precise relationship and distinction between the *phantasia* and the *sensus communis* are not consistently eluci-

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[12] Wolfson, p. 97.

dated by either medieval or early modern philosophers. For example, in his *Liber Canonis,* Avicenna lists the *phantasia* as a faculty distinct from the *sensus communis.* It refers to that faculty of inner sense which retains the sensible forms after they have been conjoined by the *sensus communis.* This account is structurally the same as the one provided by Aquinas in the *Summa Theologiae* when he identified the *phantasia* with the imagination. On the other hand, in his *De Anima,* Avicenna identified the *phantasia* with the *sensus communis:*

> Of the hidden vital apprehensive powers, the first is the phantasy, which is the common sense. It is a power placed in the first concavity of the brain, receiving by itself all the forms which are imprinted on the five senses and given to it.[13]

In the Seventeenth Century, when writing his famous "wax example " in the Second Meditation, Descartes also identified the "imaginative faculty" with the *sensus communis:*

> ... I shall proceed with the matter in hand, and inquire whether I had a clearer and more perfect perception of the piece of wax when I first saw it, and when I thought I knew it by means of the external sense itself, or, at all events, by the common sense *(sensus communis),* as it is called, that is, by the imaginative faculty.[14]

At any length, there is no textual evidence that Aquinas ever identified the *phantasia* or imagination with the *sensus communis.* Moreover, since the *sensus communis* is not part of the internal sensorium, it cannot be included with those faculties of inner sense to which the *phantasia* applies as a generic concept. There is a category difference between the *sensus communis* and either use of *phantasia* by Aquinas.

Before concluding, it will be interesting to discuss briefly the account of the internal senses which Wolfson ascribed to Aquinas's epistemology:

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[18] Avicenna, *De Anima,* as found in Klubertanz, p. 95.

" Meditation Two, Veitch Translation. The Latin text of the above passage contains the following: "... *vel saltem sensu communi, ut vocant, id est, potentia imaginatrice* . . . ." In Footnote #9 above, it was noted that Albertus Magnus also identified the *phantasia* with the *sensus communis* in some texts.

> (1) *sensus communis,* imagination *(phantasia sive imaginatio),* both retentive and compositive, the latter only in man, (3) estimation in animals corresponding to cogitation in man *(aestimativa, cogitativa),* (4) memory *(memorativa)* .[15]

In addition, Wolfson lists the five faculties of the internal senses which he claims Aquinas attributed to Avicenna. Interestingly enough, these are the very same five faculties of internal sense which Weinberg attributed to Aquinas:

> Referring specifically to Avicenna's fivefold classification of the internal senses, Thomas enumerates these as follows: (1) *sensus communis,* retentive imagination *(phantasia),* (3) compositive human and animal imagination *(imaginativa),* (4) estimation or cogitation *(aestimativa seu cogitativa),* the former in animals and the latter in man, (5) memory *(memorativa)* .[16]

Given this discussion, it appears that Weinberg attributed to Aquinas what indeed Aquinas had attributed to Avicenna.

In conclusion, I suggest that textual evidence demonstrates that Weinberg's account of Aquinas's position on the number of internal sense faculties is incorrect. Aquinas never argued that the *phantasia* was a separate faculty of inner sense distinct from the imagination. It is true that some of his medieval predecessors did, even his gifted teacher, Albertus Magnus. In fact, as Wolfson has shown, nearly every medieval commentator on Aristotle devised his own position regarding the number and function of the internal senses. As far as I can discover, however, Aquinas never used the term *phantasia* to refer to a distinct faculty separate from the imagination. In Wolfson's categories, Aquinas combined the " retentive " and the " compositive" functions of inner sense into one faculty. As we have seen, in the *Summa Theologiae* this faculty is called the *imaginatio* or *phantasia.* The *phantasia* is not a distinct faculty of inner sense.

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[15] Wolfson, p. 112.

[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 120-121.

A NOTE: AQUINAS ON INTENTIONS

COMMENTATORS ON THE works of St. Thomas Aquinas have traditionally distinguished between 'first intentions' and 'second intentions.' In this paper I shall argue that, althought the distinction between first and second intentions is entirely consistent with the thought of Saint Thomas, it is not the case, given what Thomas actually says, that all concepts can be classified as either first intentions or second intentions.

The distinction between first and second intentions is perhaps presented most simply by Mortimer J. Adler: a first intention is " that which is conceived " and a second intention is "the concept."[1] Joseph Bobik gives a more complete account: " First intentions are meanings or concepts derived from, or at least verified in, extramental, or real things,"[2] " second intentions are *concepts* about certain sorts of relations among anything and everything (words, concepts, things) involved in the human way of knowing."[8]

I have not found that Thomas uses the expressions 'first intention' and 'second intention' in distinguishing between two kinds of objects of concepts. But it clearly is Thomas's position that concepts have for objects not only external things but also concepts themselves and what we could call cognitive processes of the mind:

> . . . because the intellect reflects upon itself, according to this same reflection it understands its own understanding and the species by which it understands.[4]

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[1] M. Adler, *Problems for Thomists: The Problem of Species* (New York: 1950), p. 13.

• J. Bobik, *Aquinas on Being and Essemce* (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1965), p. 17.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. *56.*

• *Sum. Theol.,* I, 85, fl ad *Resp.* All quotations from St. Thomas appearing in this paper are my own. I have been helped in making them by available standard translations.

In his theory of concepts Thomas uses the term ' intention ' *(intentio)* with two primary meanings.

1. A concept is intentional in its being. All concepts are intentional beings in that they are forms, images, or representations of things, existing in minds and not in things. 'Intentional being ' has the same meaning as ' being of reason.' [5]

2. A concept is intentional in the manner in which it gives us things and is related to these things, as distinguished from what is formally the same in concept and things. Thomas gives a number of examples of the intentional in this sense. Most important, things are individual, but known universally; hence, the universality of our concepts is intentional:

> The universals can be considered in two ways. First, insofar as the universal nature is considered simultaneously with the intention of universality. Since the intention of universality, that is, the relation of one and the same to many, comes from the intellect's abstraction, it is necessary that according to this mode the universal is posterior . . .
>
> In another way it can be considered according to the nature itself, . . . the intention of universality is consequent upon the mode of understanding, which is by abstraction. [6]

> . . . universals insofar as they are universals exist only in the soul. However, the natures themselves, to which befall the intention of universality (i.e., which are conceived universally), exist in things. [7]

There are two primary ways that we conceive a thing universally: as a species or as a genus. We conceive a thing as a species when we conceive it universally as a fully determinate substance; we conceive a thing as a genus when we conceive it universally and indeterminately as a substance. [8] In both cases

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[5] See *In IV Meta.,* 4, 574, *In 11 De Anima,* 22, *553, De Spirit. Creat.,* I, ad 11, and *Sum. Theol.,* I, *56,* 2, ad 3.

[6] *Ibid.,* I, 85, 3, ad 1. See also *In VII Meta.,* VII, 13, 1571, and *Sum. Cont. Gent.,* II, 92, 6. For a discussion of the universality of concepts, see my paper, " St. Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Universals," *The Monist,* LVIII (1974), pp. 163-172.

[7] *In II De Anima, 5,* 380.

[8] See *De Ente et essentia,* III.

.the mind adds *something* to the nature which it apprehends.[9]

Since concepts are universals, concepts are not of other concepts as individuals, but rather are of their common characteristics, e. g., are of them as being concepts of genera or species. Thus are formed the concepts *what it is to be a species* and *what it is to be a genus.* As understood in this way, Thomas calls the genus and the species " intelligible objects." [10]

The problem with the distinction between first and second intentions, made in terms of the objects of concepts, is that some concepts-which we must, apparently, call first intentions because their objects are external things-incorporate an explicit reference to certain ways in which the mind conceives things and these ways of conceiving are the objects of second intentions. According to Bobik, " that which is a genus " is a first intention (an example is *animal),* while "what it is to be a genus " is a second intention. " To be a genus is to have a relation of a certain sort (genericity) to other meanings. Animal has such a relation to man and dog." [11] This is true and adequate as far as it goes. When we conceive Fido to be an animal, the object of our concept is Fido; and when we conceive a genus to be a relation among meanings, as Bobik would have it, or a way of conceiving things indeterminately, the object of our concept is the relation of the intellect to things. However, we do not always conceive simply that Fido is an animal-as distinct from a vegetable or a mineral, etc.-; we may conceive that Fido, as an animal, is generically the same as Socrates-as opposed to his being specifically different. Now the object of our concept is not just the nature of Fido, understood in a certain way, but the nature of Fido *as understood in a certain way.*[12] To know that Fido and Socrates are generically the

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•See *Sum. Theol.,* I, 89, 4, ad 8 and *De Ente et essentia,* IV.

[10] *In Boeth. de Trin.,* VI, 8, ad *Resp.*

[11] Bobik, p. 18.

[12] Cf. Thomas, *In VII Meta.,* 18, 1570: " ... 'universal' can be understood in *two ways. In one way,* to mean the nature itself, to which the intellect attributes the intention of universality: and thus universals, such as genera and species, signify the substance of things, in being predicated quidditatively. 'Animal,' indeed,

same, we must have knowledge not just of Fido and Socrates but also of what it is to be a genus.

Let us see what is being talked about in the following propositions: (I) "Socrates is an animal." We are talking about Socrates as understood in a certain-indeterminate-way, although we are not focusing our attention on the way we are conceiving Socrates.[18] "The generic nature of Socrates is animal." We are still, in a sense, talking about Socrates, but now we are focusing our attention more on the way in which Socrates is known, that is, generically. (8) "Animal is a genus." We are no longer talking about Socrates as a given individual, but about the nature of Socrates and other animals as this nature is understood in a certain way. We are focusing our attention on the way the nature is understood-as a genus-rather than on the nature itself.[14] (4) "The nature of a genus is ..." Here we are talking about the way that our minds conceive things, and we are not focusing our attention on the things at all. Parallel observations can be made about the following set of propositions: (I) "Socrates is a man." "The specific nature of Socrates is rational animality." (8) "Rational animality is a species." (4) "A species is ..."

The operation which yields the concepts *animal as genus* or *man as species* can be called *the incorporating of cognitive process into cognitive content.* In the case of the concept man as species, the mind first abstracts the nature of man in that it understands the nature *man* apart from the individuating conditions of particular men, then the mind reflects upon its mode of understanding man-universally and determinately-and, finally, the mind includes in its concept *man* the universal and

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signifies the substance of that of which it is predicated, as does 'man.' *In the other way,* a universal can be understood insofar as it is universal, and insofar as a predicated nature falls under the intention of universality: i.e., insofar as animal or man is considered as a one in many."

[18] Cf. *Sum. Theol.,* I, 30, 4, ad *Resp.:* "Indeed, the names of genera or species, as ' man ' or ' animal,' are imposed to signify the common natures themselves, not, however, the intentions of the common natures which are signified by the terms ' genus ' or ' species.' "

"Cf. *De Ente et essentia,* IV.

determinate manner in which *man* is known. Cognitive process is to be distinguished from what could be called psychological process-in this case the informing of the mind by an immaterial species-since the immateriality of the species is never incorporated into the concept *man.* (We know *by means of* the intelligible species in our minds, and all of the other psychological processes and their effects necessary for knowledge; but we know things *as* species, genus, universal, etc., in accordance with all of the cognitive processes involved in knowing.)

The cases in which no cognitive process becomes part of cognitive content are cases such as that of the concept *man as man (homo inquantum est homo* or *homo in eo quad est* homo) , which Thomas also calls *human nature absolutely considered (natura humana secundum suam absolutam considerationem)* . According to Thomas, the notion of the species does not belong to human nature absolutely considered, but is " among the accidents which follow upon it according to the existence it has in the intellect." [15] None of the other accidents which follow upon the existence of the concept in the mind- or upon the relationship of the concept in the mind to things [16]- are part of human nature absolutely considered, or *man as man,* for the reason that, " whatever belongs to *man as man* is predicated of Socrates," [17] and other individual men.

However, it cannot be said that the concept of a universal belongs to the nature so received, because oneness and commonness belong to the concept of the universal. However, neither of these belong to human nature according to absolute consideration. If commonness were of the meaning of *man,* then in whatever humanity is found, commonness would be found. And this is false, because in Socrates no commonness is found, but whatever is in him is individuated.[18]

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[15] *Ibid.*

[18] Strictly speaking, the notion of the species follows upon the relationship of the concept in the mind to things, and not simply upon the existence of the concept in the mind. Thomas himself sometimes, although not always, makes this distinction: " the universality of the form (the intellectually comprehended form) is not according to the being which it has in the intellect, but insofar as it is referred to things as a likeness of things." *(De Ente et essentia.)* The *oneness* which a nature has when considered apart from things follows solely upon the existence which the concept has in the intellect. (See *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* VIII, and *In Perihermeneias,* I, 10, 9.)

[11] *De Ente et essentia,* IV.

This is not to say, of course, that *man as man* is not known universally-only that the mode of knowing is not part of the cognitive content. Our attention is focused entirely on what is known, not on how it is known.

Human nature absolutely considered includes none of the accidents which follow upon its existence in men[19]; in fact, human nature absolutely considered includes none of its existences.[20] However, since human nature exists only individually-in individual minds or in individual men-, and as such is necessarily accompanied by the accidents of its particular act of existence, it is apparent that the content of the concept *man as man* is determined not simply by what men are, but also by our way of knowing men-that is, apart from their accidents and their individual existences. At the same time, our way of knowing *man as man* is not part of the content of the concept. One could say that our simple and absolute consideration of human nature affects the content of the concept *man as man* only negatively: things are excluded from it, but nothing is added.[21]

The case is very different with the concept *humanity,* whose content is *positively* influenced by the cognitive processes which give us the concept. Unlike *man as man*-or simply *man,* from which *man as man* is derived-, *humanity* cannot be predicated of individual men because " it excludes all designation by matter," and does not contain it " implicitly and indistinctly " as *man* does. In Thomas's words, *humanity* signifies human nature as a *part (ut partem)* .[22]

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[18] *Ibid.,* IV.

[19] *Ibid.,* IV, p. 80-81; cf. *In Boeth. de Trin.,* V, 8, ad *Resp.*

[20] *De Ente et essentia,* IV.

[21] It should be noted that, while *man as man* is predicable of Socrates, we do not say, 'Socrates is *man as man,'* but rather, 'Socrates is a man.' *Man as man* excludes no individual existences in order that it be predicable of any man. But once it is predicated of a given man, human nature is then taken with the individual existence of the man; and *man as man* cannot include any given individual existence and still be predicable of other men. *Man as man* is derived from *man* by the focusing power of the mind. When we conceive Socrates as a man and when we conceive *man as man* we conceive the same nature, but in the latter case we conceive the nature just as a nature and not as predicated of anything that has it.

How is the concept *humanity* possible? Since man's nature, his essence, contains common matter, and common matter is individual matter referred to in an indeterminate way, how can *humanity* signify man's nature in *any* sense? If we remove the reference of man's form to matter, it would seem that we have lost man's form, which necessarily is a *material* form. The answer is that *humanity* does not lose its reference to matter. Humanity is derived from *man,* which contains a reference to matter in that the concept *man* is derived from, and understood in, phantasms which represent individual matter. Hence, *man* can be predicated of individuals. *Humanity* is the same concept-that is, derived the same way-, but with a restriction placed upon it: that it cannot be predicated of individual men.[28]

It can be said that the cognitive operation performed upon *man* to produce *humanity* is the contrary of the cognitive operation performed upon man to produce *man as species.* The latter is produced when the content of *man* has incorporated into it the reference of the concept to many things.[24] As we have seen, the notion of the species does not belong to *man as man;*

•• See *De Ente et essentia,* III.

•• That *man as man* and *humanity* share a common content is apparent from the following: "... humanity, indeed, signifies that whereby man is man." *(Ibid.)*

•• Francis Cunningham has drawn the distinction between the concepts *man* and *humanity* in Thomas as follows: *man is* "a first intention inasmuch as it ,has a proximate foundation in reality; " *humanity* is " a second intention because it has no more than a remote foundation in reality." ("A Theory on Abstraction in St. Thomas," *Modern Schoolman,* 1957 (85), pp. 252-8.) This way of distinguishing first and second intentions and *man* from *humanity,* is certainly not wrong, But neither is it very helpful. My purpose is to explain what it is about concepts which makes their foundation in reality more or less remote: the manner in which, and the extent to which, cognitive process is included in cognitive content.

but it can be added. However, the notion of the species cannot be added once the restriction has been placed on man which produces the concept *humanity:*

> Because, however, that to which belongs the concept of the genus or of the species or of the difference is predicated of this designated singular, it is impossible that the concept of the universal, namely of the genus or of the species, belong to an essence insofar as it is signified as a part, as by the word ' humanity ' or ' animality.' [25]

Why do we form the concept *humanity?* What purpose is served in understanding man's nature as a part? Thomas's answer is that the concept *humanity* reveals to us that a part of man's nature is fully intelligible. *Humanity* is not predicable of individual men because individual men contain individual matter, which is not intelligible, and which can be known only insofar as it is related to that which is intelligible in man, his species, or essence. At the same time, man's essence cannot be known entirely independently of man's matter, which is not intelligible. By means of the concept *humanity,* we achieve a special kind of knowledge-knowledge as intelligible of that whose intelligibility is necessarily rooted in what is not intelligible.

It should be noted that the inclusion of cognitive process in cognitive content functions somewhat differently in the case of *humanity* than it does in the case of concepts like *man as species.* Regarding the latter, the inclusion of cognitive process in the concept tells us primarily about how the nature is known, that is, universally and determinately; regarding the former, the inclusion of cognitive process in the concept tells us primarily something about the nature, that it has an intelligible part.

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[06] *De Ente et eaaentia,*IV.

HANS-GEORG GADAMER'S *TRUTH AND METHOD:* A REVIEW ARTICLE*

IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL tradition the term 'hermeneutics' has referred principally to the set of problems centering around the interpretation of texts, especially religious and legal texts. With the rise of methodical historical scholarship in the nineteenth century the problems of 'reconstructing' past ages, epochs, periods, of obtaining 'objective' historical knowledge, also became part of the general hermeneutical problematic. However, on the level of self-reflection, the so-called human sciences *(Geisteswissenschaften)* were unsure just what kinds of things they were, for, unlike the empirical natural sciences that had been subjected to rigorous analysis by Kant, they apparently did not, and could not, utilize the procedures and categorial apparatus of the empirical natural sciences themselves. Kant was aware of this, but his treatment of the problems was never really accepted as constituting a satisfactory framework for their self-understanding. Ranke and Droysen devoted themselves to methodological reflections as well as to empirical historical research as they tried to delineate the essential contours of historical knowledge. Dilthey followed in their wake and characterized his own project by an explicit parallel between his projected critique of historical reason and the Kantian critique of pure (scientific) reason. His was the first attempt to raise the human sciences to a universal methodological consciousness of themselves and to situate them, precisely and in depth, over against those modes of knowing proper to the investigation of inanimate nature.

It is Gadamer's intention in the present volume to take this problem complex back to its ultimate foundations and to transform it from a specifically 'epistemological' and 'methodological' issue into one dealing with the very conditions of the possibility of understanding itself. Indeed, under the rubric of a philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer wants to construct, by means of a phenomenological analysis, a *proper model* for grasping the act of human understanding and to delineate the ultimate matrices in which the act takes place. In such a procedure he joins a phenomenology of understanding to an ontology. It is his belief that "Heidegger's

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**Truth and Method.* By Hans-Georg Gadamer. New York: Seabury Press, 1975. Pp. xvi + 588. $22-60.

temporal analytics of human existence *(Dasein)* has, I think, shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviours of the subject, but the mode of being of There-being itself" (p. xviii). The present book is meant to be Gadamer's major contribution to the clarification of this mode of being, and consequently it must be understood in the root anthropological sense as an inquiry into ourselves and into the foundations of our intercourse with the world.

The book itself is so massive-a veritable Alexandrian library-that in a review of this sort I can basically only touch upon certain topics that run throughout it. I will return elsewhere to a more specific treatment of the present volume and problems arising from it. I will here try to schematize the *operative core* of the book and the fundamental model of understanding that Gadamer has constructed-or discerned-by his phenomenological analysis. I will divide what follows into four sections. Section one will deal with Gadamer's reformulation of the hermeneutical problem. Section two will concentrate on the model itself-principally that of *Spiel*--around which Gadamer builds his analysis of understanding. Section three will be devoted to the linguistic matrix of understanding and the world. Section four will offer some critical comments upon Gadamer's project as a whole.

I. *Gadamer's Conception of Hermeneutics*

Gadamer explicitly differentiates his conception of hermeneutics from a *Methodenlehre,* whose goal would be the formulation of rules of procedure to guide us to' objective' knowledge in the interpretation of texts or in historical research. In fact, the very title of the book has an ironical twist to it, for Gadamer's project is to investigate that region that lies beyond the methodical impulse itself and, in a sense, makes it possible. As he writes in the introduction, " From its historical origin, the problem of hermeneutics goes beyond the limits that the concept of method sets to modern science. The understanding and the interpretation of texts is not merely a concern of science, but is obviously part of the total human experience of the world. The hermeneutic phenomenon is basically not a problem of method at all " (p. xi) . As he puts it, a little further on, " The following investigation ... is concerned to seek that experience of truth that transcends the sphere of the control of scientific method wherever it is to be found, and to inquire into its legitimacy. Hence the human sciences are joined with modes of experience which lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science " (p. xii).

Gadamer's characterization of science and scientific method functions-not altogether fruitfully, since it is based on a misconception-as the contrastive element to his own conception of understanding. In essence, science, for Gadamer, seeks the ' domination ' of being, the 'subjection' of it to public, objective, verifiable procedures. Furthermore, following his mentor Heidegger in this regard (cf. *Vortrage und Aufsiitze,* " Die Frage nach der Technik "), he sees the whole pursuit of metaphysics as a science in western thought as leading, by definite traceable steps, to the primacy of a methodical and manipulative, and, hence, objectifying relationship of man to the world and, ultimately, to his historical life as a whole. The paradigm of such a relationship is that of contemplative theory which *stands over against* the world as a whole and directs its gaze at it as something *external* to itself, existing in the mode of *Vorhandenheit.* Moreover, the methodic impulse is also under the tutelage of the drive to totality and the ultimate identification of being and thought. In this respect, Hegel's project functions as the paradigm example of such a stance vis-a-vis the world and the totality of history, though Gadamer's attitude toward Hegel is far from negative.

Gadamer's intention is to undercut the move to totality by showing that *finitude* conditions and makes impossible any such thing and that, at least in those regions dealing with the experience of art, of history, and of language as a whole, we are in no wise presented with a ' subject ' confronting an 'object' with which it has nothing in common. Rather, " understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood" (p. xix). The whole book is an attempt to show how this is so in the three areas outlined in the three principal parts of the book: Part One, The question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art; Part Two, The extension of the question of truth to understanding in the human sciences; Part Three, The ontological shift of hermeneutics guided by language. In all these three cases, Gadamer argues, we find ourselves caught up in an event, or happening, that overspills the subjective consciousness of the understander. Rather than being able to control the event, to make it happen, it is, Gadamer thinks, more correct to say that we ourselves become part of the event, of the happening, which, in all cases, is an *event of meaning (Sinn).*

Hermeneutics, then, as Gadamer conceives it within the parameters of the book, has as its goal to determine in as universal a fashion as possible just what kind of thing this happening, the event of understanding itself, is. What is the procedure? The procedure is to combine as closely as possible " an inquiry into the history of concepts with a factual exposition of its theme" (p. xv). This makes for an incredibly complex investigation and it is such a procedure that makes the book so difficult, and rewarding, to read. The book resembles a tapestry, woven out of a multiplicity of strands that interlock, separate, and then come together again, so that the ultimate result cannot really be said in capsule form, but rather must itself be experienced. Nevertheless, I will try to state what I think is Gadamer's major achievement in his hermeneutical project and which, he claims, gives solid support to his thesis on the universal aspect of hermeneutics. That major achievement is the construction of a model of understanding that lights up the specificity of the human experiences of art, history, and language. In fact, it lights up the very structure of experience itself. What is this model and how does Gadamer go about constructing it?

2. *The Model of Understanding*

The first step in Gadamer's construction of the model of understanding is an analysis, both historical and systematic, of those fundamental structures governing the experience of a work of art. His major target is the subjectivisation of aesthetics in the Kantian critique and its extension into the notion of an art of experience and the consequent emphasis upon the role of genius in both artistic creation and interpretation. In the Kantian aesthetic doctrine the aesthetic object and the aesthetic experience are removed from the common stream of our experience and are constituted as a completely autonomous realm wherein our faculties, freed from all concerns with either the theoretical or the practical, achieve a harmonious condition of mutual adaptation and disinterested pleasure. In Gadamer's view such an approach to a work of art is' abstract,' effecting an aesthetic differentiation of the work from the general structures of the experience of meaning, and, consequently, from the general structures of experience as a whole.

Gadamer counters this idea of the aesthetic experience with one based on the concept of play *(Spiel)* . Play becomes the clue not only to the understanding of experience but also to the uncovering of the ontological structure of the work of art itself. The guiding idea of the analysis is the fact that in a play, or a game, the participants do not stand over against the game as an object distinct from themselves and which they confront in the mode of *Vorhandenheit.* Rather the participants become part of the *event* which overspills their private individual consciousnesses and which has laws and structures governing its own being which are not reducible to the operations of objectifying subjectivities. The players do not *dispose over* the game or play, but through them the play itself comes to presentation, appears in and to the world. The first task of a universally oriented hermeneutics, therefore, is to understand the ontological structure of the experience of a work of art, which become paradigmatic for the total phenomenon of a hermeneutical experience.

The whole second part of the book is devoted to the extension of the analysis to the human sciences. As in the rest of the book the procedure is to combine historical and factual-that is, phenomenological-analyses. There are three steps in the historical treatment as Gadamer (I) outlines the background and deficiencies of a psychologically oriented hermeneutics in the Schleiermacherian form and the connection between it and the historical school of Ranke and Droysen, (2) details the complexities and antinomies-rooted in a residual Cartesianism-of Dilthey's attempt to 'lay the foundations' of the human sciences, and (3) tries to show the breakthrough to the properly hermeneutical dimension in Heidegger's project of a hermeneutical phenomenology. Heidegger functions as the pivot to the more systematic analyses in section two of the second part of the book where the goal is to establish the foundations of a theory of hermeneutical *experience.*

The contours of such a theory begin to come to light in the discussion of Heidegger's disclosure of the fore-structure and circular character of understanding and the rehabilitation of the role of prejudices *(Vorurteile)* as conditions of understanding. The historicality of understanding comes clearly into view here and leads immediately, in the book, to a discussion of the determinative role of *application--drawing* upon the model of legal hermeneutics and the role of application in the Aristotelian form of ethics. The task facing the interpreter of any text is to find the relevance of the meaning that is handed down in the texts themselves, where 'finding the relevance' refers to the attempt to grasp *the thing that is being said* in the text and its relation to the circle of meanings in which one dwells. We can only grasp the thing, how.ever, by a *fusion of horizons-not* by a transposition of ourselves back into the original horizon-wherein our horizon and the horizon of the text become one in the event of meaning, an event which is the paradigm of an historical event. In the event of understanding a text we play our foreunderstanding off against the understanding present in the text and in the process something comes into existence which transcends both our horizon and that of the text itself. Understanding may be understood as a spiral process that corresponds to the dialectical movement of question and answer such as we find it, for example, in a Platonic dialogue or even in a conversation that we have concerning some topic of mutual interest. In an authentic dialogue or conversation the partners let themselves be led by the subject-matter, and the route they take, if they genuinely give themselves up to the movement of discourse, is not under their control. Neither their relation to one another nor their relation to the subject matter is 'objective,' but they are both taken up into an event in which meaning is grasped and truth is disclosed.

Therefore, in the hermeneutical experience priority is given to the *question* to which the text itself is an answer. Indeed, our reading of texts must be understood, so Gadamer argues, according to the model of a dialectic of question and answer. The notion of dialectic that runs throughout the book is not construed merely in Platonic fashion, but the monumental figure of Hegel casts a shadow continuously over the whole book. Although Gadamer eschews the Hegelian rationalization of history as the manifestation of an overarching principle of order and direction, nevertheless historical reality presents to man a complex of possible and authentic meanings in which he can truly find himself, and the chief task of hermeneutical experience is to uncover those meanings and truths that come to us through the paradigmatic texts and experiences of the tradition. In the activity of appropriation we are in every case caught up in a process that is no longer under our control and subject to our domination and manipulation, but rather our consciousnesses become part of the very things they encounter, which is nothing less than history itself.

Part Two of the book, then, centers around the problem of *describing* as precisely as possible the critical factors in the act of understanding as it applies to texts and to the documents and remnants that constitute the traces of the historical process. Taking off from the non-psychologistic analyses of *Spiel* in Part One, Gadamer proceeds to construct his model around the notions of effective-historical consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein),* application, fusion of horizons, prejudices, the dialectic of question and answer, and, finally, the all-encompassing notion of a hermeneutical *experience.* In the differentiated unities of our experience the world of meanings and objects forms around us in a process that is rather given to us, that comes to us, than controlled and guided by us. In fact, we are guided by experience and taken up into its play, according to Gadamer, and in the process, once again, an event occurs of which we are participants, not directors.

The richness of Gadamer's analyses at this point is magnificent and shows the *dialectical* character of our experience as well as its ineluctable finitude.

3. *The Linguistic Matrix*

The final step in the construction of the model takes place in Part Three of the book and resumes, within the context of an extraordinary discussion of the relation between language and understanding, practically all of the points developed in the previous parts of the book. The goal of the section, if one can say that it has only one, is to establish language as the ultimate horizon and matrix for all understanding and world-experience. Once again, factual exposition and historical presentation are intertwined to such an extent that the closeness of the book to the Hegelian enterprise is never more clearly perceived. Here the phenomenology of language joins hands with a precise reflection upon the stages of the Western experience of language.

Phenomenologically considered, language is the medium of the hermeneutical experience itself since it is presupposed in all processes of interpretation. As such, according to Gadamer, it determines both the hermeneutic object and the hermeneutic act. The hermeneutic object lies at the heart of Gadamer's operation: the object is a meaning, a sense, which, in the case of writing, having attained a state of ideality, allows us to meet it without attempting to transpose ourselves back into the subjectivities either of the original authors or of the original addressees. Meeting the object, or uncovering it, is the work of the interpreter whose job is to relate the unity of sense found in the text to " the whole complex of possible meanings in which we linguistically move." (p. 357) In fact, " to interpret means precisely to use one's own preconceptions so that the meaning of the text can really be made to speak for us." (p. 358) The text makes a present claim upon our self-understanding and in it a unique object or meaning comes to speech. While historical reconstruction has its place in determining the object, Gadamer argues, that place is not primary and is not the hermeneutical experience itself, which has its own task and procedures.

The hermeneutic act is the act of understanding itself, and, like speech, " understanding is always a genuine event." (p. 361) Gadamer strives mightily to establish the identity of understanding and interpreting, processes in which the meaning of the text is realized in the effective-historical consciousness. The discussion here is rather diffuse, and I find myself somewhat at a loss to characterize in a few words just how the analysis proceeds. The central point is that in the act of understanding word and object are joined in an indissoluble unity. This does not entail, however, that we are imprisoned in language, but rather there is a " superior universality with which reason rises above the limitations of any given language. The hermeneutical experience is the corrective by means of which the thinking reason escapes the prison of language and it is itself constituted linguistically." (p. 363) By means of the hermeneutical experience one is lifted out of one's own horizon and placed in a new horizon of meaning that is effected through a fusion of one's prior horizon and that of the text that one meets. In such a way tradition is assimilated and man's being in the world is determined.

In the historical section Gadamer traces in a most nuanced and exact analysis the emergence of the concept of language in the history of Western thought, starting with the correlation of language and *logos* in Greek thought, proceeding to the relation between language and *verbum* in the Neoplatonic and Medieval developments, and culminating in a discussion of the intimate relation between language and concept formation in more recent work. The superb reflection upon the *Cratylus* at the beginning of the analysis leads into a detailed investigation of the role of mental word in Aquinas, and then into a discussion of such thinkers as Nicholas of Cusa, von Humboldt, and Cassirer. Gadamer's goal, however, is not merely historical, for it soon becomes clear that the historical meditation is really an aspect of his phenomenology and an instance of the hermeneutical experience itself. In fact, all of the historical studies within the book manifest the effective-historical structures of the hermeneutical consciousness itself, and it would not be incorrect to say that Gadamer's own method in the book *shows* the actual thesis that he is concerned to argue discursively.

The book ends with a section devoted to language as horizon of a hermeneutic ontology. The thrust is that language opens and constitutes for man the world itself, functioning as a mirror or prism in whose reflections we are caught up and in which the world is revealed. Dwelling within language as our home the world comes to us and we come to it in the *play* of language itself. Rather than language belonging to man as something over which he can dispose, man belongs instead to language and, through language, to the world, in whose eternal play he participates as the locus where the event of meaning happens. The connection between the play of language and the play of light, which has been a constant theme throughout the book, comes to fruition here, but I can only mention it, leaving an actual study of it to another time. In short, we might sum up the import of all of Part Three by citing two of Gadamer's most startling sentences. The first runs as follows: " Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache: Being that can be understood is language." (p. xxii) And the second, even more fitting perhaps, runs: 'Wer Sprache hat, hat die Welt: He who has language has the world." (p. 411)

4. *Conclusion: Some Critical Comments*

A book of the present sort demands time to be appropriated. As a contribution to our understanding of understanding it ranks with the work of Peirce, Husserl, Cassirer, Wittgenstein, Polanyi, and Lonergan as a highpoint of twentieth century reflection upon the constitutive conditions of knowing. It is, however, not a complete work, and demands expansion, supplementation, and modification, some of it substantial. Part of the task has been done by Gadamer himself in his *Kleine Schriften* (3 vols.) but even there the result is not fully satisfying.

The strongest points of Gadamer's analyses far outweigh any weaknesses that are resident in his own operative presuppositions. His major thesis is that he has adequately *described* the act of understanding, at least as it occurs in those domains beyond the reach of the methodical impulse. In his debates with his critics he has insisted that what he has given are descriptions of what occurs universally and invariably whenever the event of understanding occurs. Purely phenomenologically I am inclined to agree, in spite of the fact that the descriptions are not complete. But Gadamer's purpose is not to be complete but to outline the precise matrices within which the act of understanding takes place and the conditions to which it is subject.

At the same time Gadamer is not always his own best advocate. The ana,lyses of Part Two of the book, devoted to the human sciences, become incredibly complex since he is trying to handle questions of history and questions of interpretation of texts at one and the same time. In so doing, and in developing his notions of effective-historical consciousness and the fusion of horizons, the precise roles of historical reconstruction and historical understanding are not clearly delineated. In order better to understand the relation between historical understanding and hermeneutical understanding one must turn, I think, to Lonergan's attempt to disentangle the issues in *Insight* and *Method in Theology,* which themselves must be seen in the light of the kinds of analyses Gadamer undertakes in *Truth and Method.*

Moreover, one might fruitfully study how Gadamer's thesis on the linguistic nature of understanding stands to the similar thesis propounded by Peirce but in the context of a reflection not upon the hermeneutical problem but upon the fact of science and scientific method. For the weakest and most unsatisfactory aspect of the book is the characterization of 'science' which runs throughout the book like a refrain. Coming out of a totally different tradition, Michael Polanyi has, I think, demolished the image of science that functions as Gadamer's contrastive term and shown that such a thing, while it may have corresponded to certain parts of the scientific tradition's self-interpretation, could never really have existed in fact and that, rather, a careful phenomenology of science would reveal a structure of understanding incredibly similar to that Gadamer has discerned in the hermeneutical realm.

Furthermore, although he probably would try to deny it, I think there is a bias in the first part of the book toward properly linguistic works of art, despite the attempt to generalize the notions of *Spiel* and *Bild* to cover all forms of aesthetic self-presentation. More differentiation and hence more precision is needed in such forms, perhaps something along the lines, appropriately modified, that Suzanne Langer has been pursuing. Indeed, Mikel Dufrenne's *Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* and the work of Roman Ingarden have to be more systematically confronted.

Finally, there is, as I see it, an ambiguity running throughout the book in the very notion of *experience* itself. Although it is a very fruitful ambiguity, for it allows Gadamer great flexibility in his analyses, the idea itself demands more methodological differentiation. For certainly we 'experience' physical objects just as much as we 'experience' meaning of texts or the texts themselves, and in the last case experiencing is really an understanding of a quite precise sort. The notion of a hermeneutical experience is the most powerful in the book, and in Gadamer's thought as a whole, illuminating the basic structures of human being in the world, and it stands in intimate union with the further notion of a hermeneutical understanding. *Erfahrung* and *Verstehen* constitute a dialectical unity, and I hope to show elsewhere just how hermeneutical *experience* is precisely *understanding,* and vice versa. Only in this way can Gadamer's project be buttressed against the charges of willfulness and subjectivism which have been levelled against it.

In conclusion, then, it is impossible to praise this work too highly. The sensitivity and seriousness of the author, the breadth and depth of his learning, manifested in the copious and rich notes, the allusive power of his presentation, and the centrality of his problem make the reading of the book an example of what it is about. Although the English translation does not live up to the precision and felicity of the German original, the subject matter itself shines forth. All those laboring in the humaniora-including the theologians-will neglect this volume at their own risk. For in its innermost dynamism it is the attempt to develop a " theory of the real experience that thinking is" (p. xxiv) by engaging us in the very thing itself.

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BOOK REVIEWS

San Tommaso. Fonti e riflessi del suo pensiero, Saggi. Edited by Antonio Piolanti. Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso d'Aquino (Studi Tomistici 1). Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 1974. Pp. 488. **L.** 6.000.

The Roman Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas has inaugurated a new series of Thomistic Studies under the directorship of the indefatigable Msgr. Antonio Piolanti, Vice President of the The first four volumes of *Studi Tomistici* commemorate the seven hundredth anniversary of the death of St. Thomas Aquinas through a wide variety of studies, historical and contemporary, by internationally known scholars. These volumes are entitled: (1) *St. Thomas, Sources and Reflections on his Thought;* (2) *St. Thomas and Contemporary Theological Problems;* (8) *St. Thomas and Modern Thought;* (4) *St. Thomas and the Philosophy of Law Today.* They are beautifully produced, though some, notably Piolanti's lengthy contribution in the first volume, abound with typographical errors.

The first volume, devoted to sources and reflections on the thought of St. Thomas, consists of eighteen articles, eleven of which are in Italian, six (and a preface by Etienne Gilson) in French, and one in German. Though not all contributors shed new light on the problems considered, the eminence of such authors makes this volume particularly noteworthy as a monument of contemporary Thomistic scholarship and deserves particular consideration.

The first volume is roughly divided into two parts: (pp. 13-222) studies on the sources of St. Thomas, and (pp. 226-486) historical reflections on his thought throughout the centuries prior to the *Aeterni patris* of Leo XIII (1879). Each of these two parts is divided unequally into three chronological groups of studies. The first part considers non-Christian philosophers, Fathers of the Church, and medieval authors; the second focuses on certain aspects of the Renaissance, the 16th century, and the 19th.

In a judicious summary study Carlo Giacon, S. J., of the University of Padua, discusses " The Thomistic Interpretation of the Unmoved Mover," locating Thomas's novelty in conceiving the Unmoved Mover as Creator of the universe who creates freely with full knowledge of Himself and things other than Himself. The interesting study of Prof. Ermenegildo Bertola, of the Catholic University of S. Cuore in Milan, " The Theory of Light in Avicenna," is basically a paraphrase of the relevant chapter in Avicenna's *De anima.*

Among studies devoted to the Fathers of the Church, the most stimulating and suggestive contribution is made by Clemente Vansteenkiste, O. P., of the Pontifical University of St. Thomas in Rome, in his brief Notes *(Appunti)* on" St. Thomas and Hilary of Poitiers"; without listing all the references or drawing out all the ramifications, he shows that, among the more than 700 explicit references identified, St. Thomas had a special affinity for the apostolic spirit of this *auctoritas,* who is an *antiquus Doctor* in the period prior to St. Augustine. In " St. Thomas and St. Augustine " the eminent Charles Boyer, S. J., Secretary General of the Pontifical Academy, repeats much of what he has previously said, notably his conviction that Augustinian " Illumination " is none other than " the creation, the conservation and the motion of intelligence." (p. 80) The lengthy study of Msgr. Brunero Gherardini, of the Lateran University, presents nothing new under the title of " The Augustinian Tradition in the Thomistic Synthesis." Msgr. Giorgio Giannini, of the Lateran, in "The Fourth Thomistic Way in Augustinian Perspective," argues that the fourth Way of St. Thomas is "purely *explicative* and not demonstrative" (p. Ill) and that there is no " substantial " difference between the approach of St. Thomas and St. Augustine to the existence of God. In his "Note on the Procession of the Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Theology of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas," Agostino Trape, O. S. A., of the " Augustinianum " in Rome, shows that " St. Thomas moves along the line traced by St. Augustine," but that he does " resolve some important questions which St. Augustine had left unsolved." (p. 119)

In an important study, "Patristic and Monastic Traditions in the Teaching of the *Summa theologiae* on the Contemplative Life," Dom Jean Leclercq, O. S. B., of the Abbey of Clervaux in Luxembourg, analyzes the technical vocabulary of St. Thomas and the monastic tradition, e. g., " quies," " otium," " vacare," and " libertas," the primacy of contemplation, grades of contemplative life, and the originality of St. Thomas in reconciling traditional views with the vastly different mentality of Aristotle. Dom Leclercq's observations deserve careful reconsideration by Thomists, particularly his account of the "mixed life" (pp. 144-46), the legitimacy of his calling contemplation a " means " or " instrument " of action, and the role of Aristotle in Thomas's theology of contemplation. (pp. 150-58) A fascinating discussion is presented by Cardinal Pietro Palazzini in "An Erroneous Citation of St. Thomas: The *Privilegium Romanae Ecclesiae* and the Milanese Mission of St. Peter Damiani," in which the text attributed to Nicholas II (from *Decret. Grat.,* D. 22, c. I) should be correctly attributed to Peter Damiani, *Op. 5* (PL 145, 91). A careful analysis of St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Sentences* is given by Abbe Francis Ruello, of the Catholic University of Angers, in his " St. Thomas and Peter Lombard: Trinitarian Relations and the Structure of the Commentary on the Sentences of St. Thomas Aquinas." L.-B. Gillon, 0. P., of the Pontifical University of St. Thomas in Rome, presents an illuminating note concerning the view that God created man *propter reparationem angelicae ruinae* (II *Sent.,* dist. 1, n. 6) in his article "The Spirit, 'Part' of the Universe: Concerning a Text of Richard Fishacre."

Although there are only seven studies making up the second half of the volume, they constitute a significant contribution to the history of Thomism, a vast field still needing considerable research. The first contribution is a comprehensive survey of " Thomism at the End of the Middle Ages " by Professor Stefan Swiefawski of the Catholic University of Lublin. Unfortunately the author, who elsewhere has contributed seriously to the study of Thomism in Poland in the 15th century, here depends exclusively upon secondary sources, notably on the recent work of P. 0. Kristeller. In "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and the Thomistic Thesis of *lpsum esse"* Msgr. Giovanni Di Napoli, now of the Lateran University, maintains that while Pico was not a Thomist and did not want to be classified as a Thomist "per appartenenza all'Ordine domenicano o ad una scuola" (p. 280), his formidable insistence that the essence of God is *lpsum esse* makes him substantially faithful to "l'ontoteologia di Tommaso d'Aquino." (Of course, Giovanni Pico was received into the Dominican Order by Savonarola when he was on his death bed at the age of 31.) In an unfortunately brief article Count Gian Ludovico Masetti Zannini relates certain little known facts "About the Roman Edition of the Works of St. Thomas (1569-1571)." Father Guglielmo Di Agresti, 0. P., editor of *Memorie Domenicane,* Pistoia, publishes three letters of St. Catherine de Ricci with copious Thomistic notes, shortly to be included in volume 8 of the *Fanti,* in his article "The Doctrinal Affinity Between St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Catherine de Ricci." In a short, but illuminating and convincing article Msgr. Heribert Schauf, Professor in the diocesan seminary of Aachen, shows " Thomas as Theological Crown-Witness in the Provincial Council of Cologne (1860)." A most valuable contribution is made by Msgr. Robert Jacquin, Honorary Professor at the Catholic Institute of Paris, in his article " The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in France During the 19th Century Before the Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879)" by showing the chronological rehabilitation of Thomistic philosophy from the initial lectures of Victor Cousin in 1828 through the numerous editions and translations of St. Thomas's *Summa* and finally elementary Thomistic summaries presented as the true "philosophie chretienne."

The longest contribution to the entire volume is the 98 page article by the editor, Msgr. Antonio Piolanti, entitled "Pius IX and the Revival of Thomism." While the work of Pius IX preparatory to the clarion call of Leo XIII may not be sufficiently recognized, documents relative to this work are available with little difficulty and there have been numerous studies published recently concerning the Thomism of lesser known leaders in Italy during the pontificate of Pius IX, especially in the Lateran periodical *Aquinas.* There is little need to publish all such documents *in extenso.* However, many students will be grateful for making them so readily available together with a rather complete bibliography of recent work. The trouble with the "Thomism" of so many of these pioneers is that the authenticity of their Thomism has not been sufficiently analyzed. Even the early appeals of Pius IX to the authority of " Scholastic Doctors " was not specifically, much less exclusively, to the authority of St. Thomas. The prodding of many less studied individuals led to the clarification of the precise role of St. Thomas in Catholic theology and, even more, in philosophy.

While few, if any, would wish to see a return to the legislated Thomism of the Modernist "period" (whenever that is supposed to have ended), many would wish to see a more accurate understanding of the authentic teaching of St. Thomas in its historical context together with a faithful analytic appreciation of its lasting significance.

What is needed today, even after seven hundred years, is further research, both historical and analytical, into the thought of the Common Doctor of the Church. Nothing less than the truth will make us free: *veritas in seipsa fortis est et nulla impugnatione convellitur (Contra Gentiles,* IV, c. 10). Nothing less than the highest scholarship, the profoundest meditation, and the noblest apostolic zeal can best serve the needs of the Church in the modern day. This volume and many other contributions to the septicentennial celebration in 1974 not only testify to the vitality of contemporary Thomistic studies, but also open new avenues for renewed research in all areas of concern to the Church.

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A New Pentecost? By LEON JOSEPH CARDINAL SUENENS. Translated by Francis Martin. A Crossroad Book. New York: The Seabury Press, 1974. Pp. *252.* $7.95.

Many of us grew up in an era when utterances of the ecclesiastical hierarchy could be expected to deal with issues merely in the perspective of their propositional orthodoxy. Such readers will find Cardinal Suenens's *A New Pentecost?* a leap, in one easy lesson (if, indeed, they have had no others) into a new day. Presenting an orderly reflection on the role of the Holy Spirit in Christian life, the book reviews the multiform phenomena of charismatic happenings in the Church. The years following Vatican II, Suenens confesses, have been, in large part, a dark night tempting to despair. Now, he declares, "I can see signs telling me that the winter of the post-Council era is evolving into spring." (p. 216)

The witness of the Cardinal is singularly affecting. The institutional mind (not, of course, a monopoly of some hierarchs) has ordinarily thought of the charisms which he describes as in some tension with the Institution. The gossip about local prayer groups, new forms of community, and startling occurrences has been cynical and often censorious. We know the " types." We know of the excesses of history. We have doctrinal problems in connection with what is reported. We hear of demands for investigation by the hierarchy. Besides, as phenomena that do not pertain to ecclesiastical structure, even the good things are perhaps less meaningful to the larger community. Suenens admits to having held similar suspicions regarding what others were calling a charismatic movement.

From the point of view of his earlier misgivings, the author sets out to forestall objections to the new style of Christian living about which he reports. His apologetic is a basic, loosely organized Pneumatology. The Holy Spirit is the bond of unity or the life-breath of the Church. This oneness is experienced not so much by merely " sociological" Christians as by those who are fully engaged in Christian living. The *Acts of the Apostles* is like a fifth Gospel, in which the Holy Spirit is seen as the life principle of the early Church. Not all charisms are extraordinary; St. Paul speaks of the charism of teaching (Rom. 12.7; 1 Cor. 12.28; 14.26), of exhortation and consolation (Rom. 12.8), and of the gift of administration (1 Cor. 12.28). Charisms have been given and recognized throughout the centuries. In Vatican II, when Cardinal Ruffini suggested prudently relegating them to the past, he was successfully opposed by Suenens. Though we conceive it poorly, the relation of the Holy Spirit to Jesus is at the heart of the Liturgy. To experience the Spirit is to be removed from neither suffering nor the world of men.

In his fifth chapter, Suenens retells the story of the charismatic movement in the United States. He is convinced this is not so much a " movement " as the manifestation of a renewal in the universal Church, linked to communal renewal movements such as the *Opera di Maria (Focolarini)* and the Family Encounter.

In a further interpretation, the author gives the constant characteristics of charismatic renewal. It is Christocentric; it shows a deepening of the life of prayer, which favorably affects social action; it possesses a sense of the Church. An extended and helpful discussion of praying in tongues informs the reader that such prayer is neither miraculous nor pathological nor useless to those who hear it. In fact, concerning charism generally, it is the" normal" and authentic Christian who is charismatic. Various new forms of community are described as drives toward the essentially communal nature of Christianity. These basic communities must find some way of integrating themselves into the life of the local parish and of exercising a prophetic role there-even though the parish structure, as the author acknowledges, suffers some obsolescence. A chapter entitled " The Holy Spirit and Mary " goes beyond the vague notion of exaggeration in explaining why Protestants have objected to Marian devotions: Catholic piety has ascribed to Mary what is proper only to the Holy Spirit-e. g., the assertion that Mary forms Christ in us. Yet Mary must be seen as the model of the charismatic Christian; her reception of the Spirit left no trace of illuminism.

This is a theological book on a subject which stands in need of theological reflection. The need is probably greatest among those who remain aggressively uninterested in charismatic renewal. Nevertheless, a polite applause for its theological effort would be improperly condescending. In several places a reader could wish for more. There seems to be a confusion between desiring to experience God and wishing to demonstrate His existence; otherwise religious experience would not be suggested as God's verifiability. (pp. 58-54) Some useful observations can be made in terms of " the biblical conception of truth" (p. 58), "Hebrew thought" and contrasts between "the Old Testament" and "the New Testament" (p. 59); but perhaps some major discriminations of biblical scholarship could be usefully incorporated without forfeiting the argument. There are two undistinguished capsulations of historical exaggerations-{)ne which finds that the Modernists situated the essence of Christianity in a subjective experience of life, and another which has Schleiermacher extolling a religion of romantic sentiment. (p. 57) Many enthusiasts of liberation theology may fail to find their objectives mirrored in the author's treatment of that movement. (pp. 167-76) But, above all, a central issue of Pneumatology is left unstudied-i. e., the relation of the Holy Spirit to Christ. The author returns to the subject repeatedly but seems not to advance the development. (e.g., pp. mo, 165-66)

Nevertheless, the Cardinal has done well to give us this book rather than to succumb to the intimidation of unanswered questions. A reader does not hesitate to accept his allusion to I Cor. 2.8-4, where St. Paul asks his readers to note that he has not relied upon " the persuasive arguments that belong to philosophy " but rather upon " a demonstration of the power of the Spirit." (pp. 28, 87)

The demonstration in our case is of one bishop's conception of his role in the Church. I have not been a faithful Suenens watcher; but, even if I could set this book into the context of news releases on the Cardinal, I would judge that inappropriate. What we have here is a powerfully encouraging representation of a bishop as literary *persona,* a dramatic image which is a theological *datum* of great value. The bishop-author of *A New*

Pentecost? allows us to see a bishop, within the frame of his composition, offering a personal testimony before the Church. He presents the experience and insight of a fellow-Christian, not suppressing awareness of that finitude by which each of us belongs to a given " generation." (p. 2) He is a courageous listener. He hears appreciatively what "rank and file Christians" (p. 107) say and what theologians think. (pp. 48-49, 63-64, 104, etc.) He is, in fact, uniquely encouraging to theologians, by continually and publicly longing for the understanding which they seek. His ecumenism begins in the specifics of what he has learned from the East, from the Ortho" dox, from Episcopalians, and from Protestants. For him even " prayer is becoming more and more a listening." (p. 218) He has a sense of the limitations of institutional elements in the Church, but a conviction of their necessity as well. He summons his fellow-bishops to catch up with the charismatic renewal (p. 91); they, and theologians too, must study the phenomenon by being part of it. (p. 104) He does not wait for directives, but he indicates how his leadership falls within the programmatic lines of papal utterances. He is not slow to admit to handicaps and to previous error. This bishop-author is a stimulating sign.

When such a writer says he sees signs that the winter of the post-Council era is changing to spring, he is easy to believe. As we become acquainted with him, the question-mark of his title vanishes.

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St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, Volume 57 (3a 66-72). Baptism and Confirmation.* Commentary and translation by JAMES JusTIN CUNNINGHAM, O. P., with two Appendices on the Liturgy by GERARD AusTIN, O. P. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. and London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1975. $12.50.

This recent addition to the Blackfriars edition of the *Summa Theologiae* is a welcome one. Father Cunningham has rendered a readable translation of the Leonine text which admits of no major textual variants. The accompanying apparatus is helpful, particularly in that it offers references to Mansi's monumental work on the Councils. The author is a Professor of New Testament, and the footnotes, together with the first three appendices, are especially sensitive in analyzing and often amplifying St. Thomas's use of Scripture, always with an eye to contemporary biblical exegesis and theology. Father Cunningham's presentation of the biblical roots of baptism, the problem of infant baptism, and the relationship of faith to baptism commend this volume to the reader concerned with an up-to-date and exact survey of these current issues with reference to Aquinas.

It is unfortunate that Father Cunningham was unable to have at his disposal the preceding volume of the series, yet unpublished, entitled "The Sacraments" ('De sacramentis in communi '). Undoubtedly, this accounts for the failure of this work to note St. Thomas's expansions upon his previous introductory questions on the sacraments in general. Several instances of what might have been done come to mind. St. Thomas's twofold manner of seeing the sacraments as " cultic " and " sanctifying " (III, Q. 60, art. 5) might have served as two poles of perspective ordering the appendices and enabling the author(s) to have brought to better light the internal connections between baptism and confirmation in the *Summa.* Also, mention might have been made of the fact that St. Thomas's treatment of sacramental efficacy has been considerably deepened in his elaboration of the effects of baptism and confirmation, now seen as intimately linked with incorporation into Christ and the mission of the Holy Spirit. Another case, though not entirely neglected, is Aquinas's view of the general relationship between faith and the sacraments. It is only when St. Thomas treats of baptism that the actual order of redemption is seen to require neither faith alone nor sacraments alone, but faith and the sacraments for justification. What has been hinted at in the previous treatise is made explicit here. This point obviously has significance if for no other reason than to round out Aquinas's general sacramentology. However, Father Cunningham cannot be completely faulted for this predicament. The entire series suffers somewhat from lack of integration. While it may have been too formidable a task to have neatly integrated the whole enterprise, it could surely have been done within various tracts, particularly in the appendices.

The approach of the appendices shows their concern with relevant problems in the theology and practice of both baptism and confirmation. Helpful might have been an appendix that seriously tried-without bringing the niceties of current scholarship into the foreground-to show the reader how St. Thomas understood these sacraments. For example, Aquinas sees the effects of baptism as incorporating the recipient into Christ, illuminating the intellect, and assisting in the production of good deeds (III, Q. 69, art. 5) ; in turn, he views these effects as complementary to the effect of confirmation (III, Q. art. 7). The interrelationship of these sacraments and the Eucharist in Aquinas's thought was not a primary concern of this work. One way of illustrating the differences between baptism and confirmation in St. Thomas, and, then again, their intimate connectedness, is through a study of the *res et sacramentum* of both sacraments-a topic which receives only peripheral attention throughout the book.

Father Austin's appendices are worthwhile sketches of the liturgical background of these sacraments, and, understandably, weigh in favor of the liturgical tradition's interest in seeing, through actual practice, a greater unity among the sacraments of initiation. The opportunity, however, of bringing out the " cultic " dimension of St. Thomas's sacramentology with respect to baptism and confirmation is oddly bypassed. Surely such a consideration would have tempered Father Austin's remark-stemming from Thomas's ascribing to the "power " of baptism the ability to work for one's personal salvation-that some might consider this a " non-social description of baptism." (p. 246) Taken in the larger context of Aquinas's emphasis on the incorporation into Christ of the baptized and his sharing in the priesthood of Christ with its socio-ecclesial implications, this becomes a misleading observation. Another such instance is Father Austin's correct paragraph on Aquinas's misfortune in not having available to him accurate liturgical sources when theologizing about confirmation. If, as it is, Aquinas erred in citing the authority of a 'Pope Melchiades,' it does not follow, as the author seems to imply, that what was attributed to the ' Pope ' was not in the authentic tradition of the Church's understanding of the sacrament.

Interestingly enough, in the enumeration of reasons for deferring confirmation to a later time after baptism, Father Austin does not mention "pastoral reasons" as a possible explanation for its delay. The only possibilities seem to be either the " rarity of episcopal visits " or " indifference " (p. 247) about the sacrament. On the other hand, Father Cunningham has had no timidity in theorizing that " pastoral concern " had significant influence in determining the practice of infant baptism so widespread in Aquinas's era.

None of these observations is meant to take away from the substantial value of this work, evident in the excellent translation and in the informative scholarly footnotes. As a guide to St. Thomas's mature thinking on these sacraments, it serves as a worthy introduction.

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Religionin America. By GEORGE C. BEDELL, LEO SANDON, JR., and CHARLES T. WELLBORN, eds. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975. Pp. *588.*

While your reviewer lately has found himself weary of the overworked concept of relevance, he must admit that relevant is what this book in fact is. It addresses itself directly to those areas of historical reality and personal experience currently evoking widespread interest on the part of

American university students relatively ignorant of religion but eager to consider their identities as religious or irreligious Americans.

This introduction to religion in America presents much more than a mere anthology, although its documentary selections constitute as healthy a balance of readings as I have seen. The authors present an interpretative point of view and let their anthological inclusions act as an accumulating illumination and criticism of their work. The readings serve as true sources of enlightenment regarding what the authors imply in their developing essay. The readings are not chosen, it seems to me, merely to serve as buttresses and bulwarks upholding and defending what the writers have to say. Indeed, the documents do shed light on the continuing thread of commentary. The result here is that we move away somewhat from the dreadfully sterile neutrality, the dogged objectivity, that renders most introductory works in religion at the college level so inescapably soporific.

The authors dare to begin where most Americans are. They consider, first of all, the roots and marks of civil religion in American life both today and yesterday. They demonstrate in their commentary and documents the way civil religion constitutes an amalgamation of elements, such as what I would call Old Testament Christianity, Enlightenment philosophy, and American nationalism, into a popular alloy politically and religiously comforting to the consciences of most pragmatic Americans. I refer to those Americans who want to retain their traditional loyalties to their pre-American or extra-American religious heritages while at the same time participating whole-heartedly and religiously in the experience of being Americans.

Looking more closely at the range of documents, we draw the following sample from the greater corpus to indicate the scope of it. Not all of these selections of course, are included in their entirety, but the range spans the years from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries and covers the religious landscape of American culture in all of its more widespread and noteworthy manifestations. For examples: "Civil Religion in America," Robert Bellah; "Thoughts on the Revival," Jonathan Edwards; "The Arrogance of Power," William Fulbright; "The Church and the Republic," James Cardinal Gibbons;" Pronouncement on the Churches and the Public Schools," NCCC; "Unitarian Christianity," William Ellery Channing; "A Plea for the West," Lyman Beecher; "Letter from Birmingham Jail," Martin Luther King, Jr.; "Anti-Semitism in the United States," Arthur Gilbert; ".The ' Soft ' Revolution," Sam Keen; " How to Save Mankind from Extinction," Shri Hans Ji Maharaj.

Religion in America treats descriptively such themes as civil religion, revivalism, indigenous American religious movements, and American religion in ferment, as well as the more usual themes such as religious liberty and the free church, liberalism and conservatism, Black and White in the

American religious pattern, ecumenism and interfaith cooperation, these themes constituting the majority of the book's major chapter headings.

While the authors claim the use of several scholarly methodologies in their approach, including history, sociology, theology and anthropology, the general spirit of the work bespeaks a presuppositional commitment to America as a developing society moving rather surely in the direction of a national unity blessed by a providence that inspires the populace to an increasingly benign understanding of America's broad pattern of religious communities and traditions. This attitude emanates quite clearly from the concluding sentence of the book, a sentence appearing very much to be a peroration, " Given the highly dialectical and pluralistic character of American religion, the student is encouraged to proceed in continuing investigation of this complex and fascinating phenomenon with an open and inquiring mind." One closes the book tempted to feel that really America is a very nice place in which to be religious, and that there is no pressing hurry involved in our making up our minds about the doctrinal particulars of our respective commitments. Could it be that, in the great tradition of John Dewey, our ultimate purpose as Americans in studying religion is a religious commitment to study more religion?

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Philosophy of Beauty. By FRANCIS J. KOVACH. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974. Pp. *350.*

In his Preface the author explains that in this book he has not aimed primarily at novelty and originality but at truth concerning beauty, at least as he understands it, "on the basis of epistemological (though not naive) realism." (p. vii) The book is the result of a double "prise de conscience " : on the one hand, of the fact that esthetic objectivism is being questioned from all sides and is thus on the defensive; on the other hand, of the fact that the precious heritage and the admirable wisdom of the esthetic objectivists of the past, especially those of the Middle Ages, are virtually forgotten. *(Ibid.)* The book is written in such a way that it can be used both by students at different levels and by professionals. The first part, on esthetics in general, examines the definitions (first etymological, then " essential ") and the divisions of esthetics. The second part, which is much longer, begins by establishing through direct argumentation " the objective, extramental reality of beauty" (p. *65);* the author thereupon criticizes successively the various forms of esthetic subjectivism;

he then examines the reasons why people disagree about esthetics. Next, after a historical inquiry into the essence of beauty, the author presents his own "essential definition" of beauty, then demonstrates it "speculatively, both at the physical (empirical) level and at the metaphysical level " (p. 184) , employing the esthetic method which he has previously explained. Proceeding by syllogisms, the author demonstrates that at the physical level " every beautiful material being is an organized whole," and " all material beauty consists in order, that is to say, in a unity that is integral and proportioned." (pp. 184 and 185) At the metaphysical level "every beautiful being is an integral whole, with or without proportioned parts," and "beauty in general is integral unity with or without proportion of parts." (p. 185) The author thereafter discusses the division of beauty, its " transcendentality " (always according to a syllogistic method), and its privation (ugliness). Finally, in his concluding chapter, he studies esthetic experience.

One readily sees that the entire endeavor of the author is to show the objectivity of beauty. The criticisms which he addresses to Maritain (apropos of transcendental beauty and esthetic beauty) indicate clearly that he wishes at all costs to avoid esthetic subjectivism (see pp. 262-263). From this standpoint his effort is very interesting. But it seems that he does not altogether succeed in establishing an adequate realism as a basis for safeguarding objectivity. In order perfectly to safeguard the reality and the objectivity of the beautiful (while at the same time recognizing the subjective component which it implies) , should he not have *begun with esthetic experience?* The beautiful does not have the objectivity of the true, nor that of the good; it has an objectivity of a very particular type which entails a certain subjectivity. In analyzing what the beautiful is, ought he not to distinguish the beautiful as founded in reality from the beautiful as perceived by man as artist (since the beautiful, in the famous phrase of Saint Thomas, is "that which pleases in being seen")? I may perhaps be allowed to refer, on this point, to my study, *L'activite artistique,* Volume 2, pages 246-295 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1970).

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Becoming Human: An Invitation to Ethics. By WILLIAM E. MAY. Dayton: Pflaum Publishing, 1975. Pp. *155.* Paper, $4.50.

This small book is an introduction to Christian moral theory, presented through a survey of what has been happening in Christian ethics over approximately the last ten years. The major points most discussed at the present time are all touched: the relation of Christian ethics to the human moral enterprise in general; questions of relativism and truth in ethics; the meanings of conscience and its rights before authority; what at root makes an action good or evil; the social dimensions of personal morality; the concrete natural and supernatural factors that make men able or unable to recognize what is good and to do it.

Only a few of the books listed in the annotated bibliography antedate 1965. But May does cite most of the leading Christian moralists who have participated in the debates of the last ten years. The author's own position is clearly a classical one; significantly he expresses his personal judgment that "[Germain] Grisez and [Paul] Ramsey are the very best analysts of moral action writing in English." (p. 146) But he shows also how hospitable a traditional Christian moralist can be to the many rich suggestions flowing from contemporary moral thought. Still he does sharply reject an ancient position that is being revived by a number of Catholic moralists: a consequentialism that finds no kind of action intrinsically wrong, that insists that *any* kind of action whatever is justifiable if one has a "good enough reason" for doing it.

In a brief treatment of the relationship between ecclesial authority and moral scholarship he reveals a genuine sympathy for the position of those whose views have tended to weaken the acceptance of the Church's moral authority. Yet he insists that it is clear that even in her "noninfallible teaching" (a phrase that needs and does not receive careful analysis) the Church's authentic teachers are not simply offering opinions to the faithful. (pp. 65-70) Unfortunately, the brevity of his treatment forbids anything like a satisfactory resolution of the difficulty.

This book is presented as an introduction to Christian ethics. But a good introduction to ethics should not be so tightly bound to contemporary debates. The important participants in the contemporary debates have their roots in men like Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, and Mill. Students need a good grounding in at least *some* consistent and rounded ethical theory if they are to study the contemporary debates with much personal insight. But this book could be useful in an introductory course. While the students are beginning to probe in some depth the classical problems of moral thinking, they need also a reliable guide to the contemporary discussions. And this is an excellent survey of recent debates among Christian moralists. For this reason it would be helpful also for those who have studied moral theology many years ago, and seek a clearer understanding of what has been happening in the last decade.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Intervarsity Press: *The Universe Next Door: A Basic World-View Catalog,* by James W. Sire. (Pp. 214, $4.25, paper).

The Macmillan Company: *Man is the Measure,* by Reube! Abel (Pp. *Knowing and Acting: An Invitation to Philosophy,* by Stephen Toulmin (Pp. 310).

McGraw-Hill Book Company: St. Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologiae,* Vol. *55* (3a, 53-59) *The Resurrection of the Lord,* translated by C. Thomas Moore, 0. P. (Pp. 135, $10.00). Vol. 59 (3a 79-83) *Holy Communion,* translated by Thomas Gilby, 0. P. (Pp. 187, $15.00).

Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto: *Philip the Cha:ncellor's Theology of the Hypostatic Union,* by Walter H. Principe (Pp. 218, $IMO).

Pontificia Accademia Teologica Romana: *Tomismo e Neotomismo a Ferrara,* by Giuseppe Cenacchi (Pp. 216).

Scholars' Studies Press: *Suicide and Morality: The Theories of Plato, Kant and Aquinas,* by David Novak (Pp. 136, $7.50).

The Seabury Press: *Against the World for the World: The Hartford Appeal and the! Future of American Religion,* edited by Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus (Pp. 164, $8.95, cloth; $8.95 paper). *Bonhoeffer: Exile and Martyr,* by Eberhard Bethge (Pp. 178, $7.95).

The University of California Press: *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle,* by Franz Brentano, translated and edited by Rolf George (Pp. 197, $12.50).

The University of Notre Dame Press: St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles,* translated with Introduction and Notes by Anton C. Pegis. Vols. 1-5, Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.00. Individual volumes available.

Yale University Press: *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies,* by Hans-Georg Gadamer, translated with an Introduction by P. Christopher Smith (Pp. 116, $10.00).

Westminster Press: *Lighten Our Darkness: Towards an Indigenous Theology of the Cross,* by Douglas J. Hall (Pp. *256*, $10.95). *God's Parable,* by Frederick H. Borsch (Pp. 128, $8.50. paper).